

TRADE AND POLITICS IN BANJARMASIN

1700 - 1747

by

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Being a thesis submitted to the University of
London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May, 1969





ABSTRACT

Banjarmasin was one of the chief sources of pepper in South East Asia during the period 1700-1747. The need for this commodity attracted the English, Dutch, Chinese and Indonesian merchants to the area. This study, therefore, is not only concerned with the development of Banjarmasin as a commercial mart but also with the activities of the traders, particularly the Europeans in the region, and the response of the local rulers to their coming. Since the commercial policy of the rulers was shaped to a large extent by political forces, special attention is paid to the role of the Bugis in local politics and an attempt is made to examine the effect of their intervention in the Civil War of the 1710's on the pepper economy. In tracing the course of English and Dutch activities, stress is laid on the strategic and political considerations which besides the commercial ones, led the Europeans to enter the area.

This study also presents a detailed narration of the mechanics of trade in the port. In this connection, particular reference is made to the important part played by the Chinese merchants, and finally, the commercial and political activities of the aboriginal tribes, the Bataks, and the repercussions of Banjarese rule over these people.

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ABBREVIATIONS

LB	Letter Book
OC	Original Correspondence
CM	Court Minutes
JFR	Java Factory Records
SFR	Sumatra Factory Records
CFR	China Factory Records
FRM	Factory Records Miscellaneous
HMS	Home Miscellaneous Series
EIC	East India Company
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
KA	Koloniaal Archief
BTLV	Bijdragen tot de Taal, Landen Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut
TEG	Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal, Landen Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Batavia'sch Genootschap

GLOSSARY

Beeswax	wax obtained from the honey-comb of a special genus of bees called <u>Apidae</u> . It is used for manufacturing candles.
Bezoar stones	a concretionary substance found in certain apes or monkeys of Borneo and certain other Indonesian islands. It is used to counteract poisons.
Bichara	consultation or discussion.
Bird's nest	a type of nest made by swiftlets which Chinese eat as a delicacy.
Cassia Lignum	an extract from a type of shrub, or herb found in Java, Borneo or Sumatra for the treatment of cutaneous diseases and also used as a purgative.
Daching	a steel-yard for weighing pepper or other products, (commonly used by the Chinese and Indonesians).
Dragons Blood	sap extracted from a herbaceous plant grown in Borneo and other parts of the East Indies for medicinal purposes.
Kuala	estuary or mouth of a river.
Nakhoda	master of a junk or other trading-ship.
Padi	rice which is not winnowed or cooked.
Pagar	palisade or stockade.
Perahu	light Indonesian sailing craft.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

- 1 kati: 16 tahils or $1\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. (overdupois)
- 1 pikul: 133-134 (English) lbs. or 122-125 (Dutch) lbs.
- 1 bahar: varied between 360 and 600 lbs.
- 1 gantang: $3\frac{1}{3}$ - $3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. (overdupois)
- 1 koyan: 3,400 lbs. and considered the equivalent of a last (or ton of shipping space) or two tons (measurement)

LIST OF PANAMBAHANS OF BANJARIASIH1642 - 1759

Pengeran Ratu or Sultan Ra'jat Allah	1642-1661
Sultan Amir Allah	1661-1663
Pengeran Dipati Anom	1663-1680
Sultan Bagus Kasuma	1680(?) - 1703
Sultan Suria Alam	1703-1718
Sultan Kasuma Dilaga	1718-1730
Sultan Hamid Dulla	1730-1734
Sultan Tanjung Dulla or Kasuma Alam	1734-1759

LIST OF GOVERNOR-GENERALS OF BATAVIA1650 - 1750

Carol Reyniersz	1650-1653
Joan Maetsuycker	1653-1678
Rijckloff van Goens	1678-1681
Cornelis Janszoon Speelman	1681-1684
Joannes Camphuys	1684-1691
Willen van Outhoorn	1691-1704
Johan van Hoorn	1704-1709
Abraham van Riebeeck	1709-1713
Christoffel van Zwoll	1713-1718
Hendrick Zwaardcroon	1718-1725
Mattheus de Haan	1725-1729
Diderick Durven	1729-1732
Dirck van Cloon	1732-1735
Abraham Patras	1735-1737
Adrian Valekenier	1737-1741
Johannes Thodens	1741-1743
Gustaaf Willem, Baron van Imhoff	1743-1750

LIST OF DUTCH FACTORS AT BANJARMASIN1711 - 1737

N.V.D. Bosch and I. Indus	Sept.- Oct. 1711
N.V.D. Bosch and A. Pouille	Aug.- Oct. 1712
J. Landsheer and J.M. Broun	Nov. 1726 - June 1727 May - Dec. 1728
A. Broyell and J.M. Broun	April - Oct. 1729
P. Snippe and P. Kamerbeek	Feb. - Aug. 1730 July - Nov. 1731
P. Snippe and C. Braine	March - July 1732
C. Marre and D. Brouwer	March - Oct. 1733 April - Nov. 1734 Jan. - Aug. 1735
J. Brouwer and G. Keyser	April - July 1736

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTIONA - ORIGINS

Situated in the south-eastern part of Borneo, Banjarmasin is drained by the Barito or Banjar river, which has its source in the central range of mountains commonly known as the Gunong Tobing range.¹ The principal tributary of the Barito is the Negera or Bahan, while two other important rivers flowing parallel to it into the Java sea are the Kahajan and the Kapuas Murung.² Between the mountains of the interior and the swampy coastal lowlands lies an irregular hilly zone covered predominantly with tropical rain forests.³ The climate is equatorial with heavy rains during the period of the south-west monsoon from May to September, while a drier spell prevails between October and April, the season of the north-east monsoon.⁴

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1. J.J. de Hollander, Handleiding bij de beoefening der Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie, Vol. II, (Breda, 1884), p. 9.
 2. Ibid., p. 23. The Kahajan and the Kapuas Murung are also known as the Great Dayak and Small Dayak rivers respectively.
 3. E.H.G. Dobby, Southeast Asia, (London, 1953), p. 244; C.A. Fisher, Southeast Asia, (London, 1964), pp. 221-23.
 4. Fisher, op. cit., p. 215; Dobby, op. cit., pp. 36-39.

In the seventeenth century, settlement was peripheral, bordering the coastal regions and estuaries, with river navigation as the most practicable means of transport. The early immigrants from Java and the people of Malay stock from other parts of the archipelago, for instance, settled on the lower banks of the Barito river, but when the royal capital was shifted to Martapura after the destruction of Banjarmasin in 1612 by the Dutch, the colonists also moved to this area. Consequently, Kayu Tinggi and Tartas (the river-island lying between the Barito and Antassan-Kween rivers)⁵ were established as new towns, while smaller pockets of settlement were found in the neighbouring districts of Riam Kiwa, Riam Kanan, Margasari and Pulau Laut.⁶ Due to their good harbour facilities, Banjarmasin and Tartas attracted foreign traders, including Arabs, Bengalis, Medurese, Balinese and Chinese, a large number of whom became permanent residents.⁷ By the mid-seventeenth century, the Banjarese settlements had extended to Amuntai in Upper Negara, Kota Waringin and Sampit.

5. C.A.L.M. Schwaner, Borneo, Pt. I, (Amsterdam, 1853), p. 15.

6. Ibid., p. 43; Hollander, Handloiding, pp. 136-37.

7. Schwaner, op. cit., pp. 55 & 70-71; Hollander, Handloiding, pp. 139-41. For details of port facilities and the volume of trade handled by Banjarmasin, especially with reference to the early twentieth century, see R. Broersma, Handel en Bedrijf in Zuid en Oost-Borneo, (The Hague, 1927), pp. 18-25.

The Banjarese, who claimed to be the result of intermarriage between the original Javanese inhabitants and the foreign immigrants,⁸ and described as "well-shaped, clean limbed, middle statured" with "black hair and a complexion somewhat darker than Mulattoes"⁹ lived in attap huts built on stilts or wooden logs along the river banks. Their chief occupations were fishing, pepper-trading, boat-making, handicraft-work, especially with wood or rattan, gold and diamond mining.¹⁰ Although the majority of Banjarese were not inclined towards agriculture, small plots of padi, tapioca, and sugar cane were planted for home consumption as in Amuntai, Pleihari and Lampej. Pepper was cultivated on a larger scale in Pulau Laut and Molukko for commercial purposes. The imported articles were cotton, gambir, tobacco, salt, rice, copper, porcelain ware and Chinese silks.¹¹

8. Hollander, Handleiding, pp. 129-30; Broersma, op. cit., p. 17.

9. D. Beekman, A voyage to and from the island of Borneo in the East Indies, (London, 1718), p. 40.

10. Hollander, Handleiding, p. 130; Anon., "The island of Borneo; its situation, extent, history and divisions, with notices of its principal inhabitants, the Malays, Chinese, Bugis and Dayaks", The Chinese Repository, Pt. IV, 1835/36, (Canton, 1836), p. 504. The Chinese records mentioned that rhinoceros horns, peacocks, parrots and deer-hides were among the exported articles. - W.P. Groeneveldt, "History of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643), Book 323", - Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca, (London, 1877), p. 107.

11. Schwaner, op. cit., p. 90.

While the Banjarese were confined to the valleys, the more hilly intermediate zones and the middle valleys of Ulu Pulau Petak, Mengkatip, Kapuas, Ulu Sampit and Kahajan were inhabited by Biajus or Njadjus,¹² the aboriginal Dayak tribes of south-east Borneo. Recognised as a "vigilant, agile, robust race of men having a yellowish coloured skin," the Biajus were generally taller, fairer and more bellicose than the Banjarese.¹³ Living in long-houses,

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12. Schwaner, op. cit., pp. 131-44; Hollander, Handleiding, pp. 48-55; S. Muller, Reizen in den Indischen Archipel, (Amsterdam, 1857), p. 1; M.T.H. Perelaar, Ethnographische beschrijving der dayaks, (Zalt Bommel, 1870); C. Hose and W. McDougall, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, 2 Vols., (London, 1912).
13. J.J. De Roy, Hachelijke Reys-Togt na Borneo en Atchin, (Leiden, 1706), - (English translation in Mackenzie Collection, 1822), f. 128; Schwaner, op. cit., p. 135. Hose and McDougall made the following general observation about the Dayak tribes of Borneo: "These peoples present no very great differences of physical character. All are of medium height; their skin-colour ranges from a rich medium brown to a very pale cafe-au-lait, hardly deeper than the colour of cream. Their hair is nearly black or very dark brown, and generally quite lank, but in some cases wavy or even almost curly. Their faces show in nearly all cases, though in very diverse degrees, some of the well-known mongoloid characters, the wide cheek bones, the small oblique eyes, the peculiar fold of the upper eyelid at its nasal end, and the scanty beard. In some individuals these traces are very slight and in fact not certainly perceptible. The nose varies greatly in shape, but is usually rather wide at the nostrils, and in very many cases the plane of the nostrils is tilted a little upwards and forwards." - Pagan Tribes, Vol. I, p..37. .

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they were a migratory people who did not stay longer than a few years at one site, essentially because their movements were largely influenced by agricultural and religious factors. As ladang planters of pepper and hill-padi, the Biajus had to move frequently in search of virgin soil for cultivation.¹⁴ Also being animists, they would leave their homes as soon as epidemics or other calamities occurred, believing that the spiritual forces rendered their dwellings unfit for further residence. Hence, with their strong beliefs in the abundance of good and bad spirits, manifested, for example, in the incidence of diseases or thunder and lightning, the Biajus would stay away from evil forces or propitiate them through worship or sacrifice.¹⁵ Besides cultivation, the Biajus were also engaged in diamond and gold mining, collection of bezoar-stones, beeswax, dragons-blood, fishing and crude wood-carving. They would often barter their products for beads, sarongs, copper utensils, salt and

14. Schwaner, op. cit., p. 138; Hose and McDougall, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 41.

15. Perelaer, op. cit., p. 4; Hose and McDougall, op. cit., p. 41. Scharer observed that "the idea of God runs through the whole culture and religion like a scarlet thread, and that it is in fact the focus of life and thought." H. Scharer, Ngaju Religion - The Conception of God among South Borneo people (translated by R. Needham), (The Hague, 1963), p. 6.

tobacco from the Indonesian or foreign merchants.¹⁶

The socio-political structure of the Biajus was very simple consisting primarily of a tribal chief who was either the head of his family or a longhouse elder called Anai.¹⁷ Succession to chieftainship was hereditary, although in certain cases, a Biaju who had distinguished himself in war or had accomplished other feats would also be elected. Each village was ruled independently by its Anai, unless there was a defensive or offensive alliance with another village.¹⁸ Although the extension of Banjarese political control over the Negara and Kapuas territories in the mid-seventeenth century did not really upset the basic structure of Biaju society, nevertheless, it introduced certain new features into the socio-political system of the latter. In acknowledgement of the suzerainty of Banjarmasin, the Biajus were obliged to pay tribute to the central government at Martapura via the Banjarese administrators who were sent to these districts.¹⁹ Tribute was of two

16. De Roy, op. cit., f. 128; Hollander, op. cit., pp. 121-22; Beekman, op. cit., p. 44; Journal Borneo, (1701-02), 20 September 1701.

17. Hollander, op. cit., p. 57.

18. Ibid.; Hose and McDougall, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 41.

19. Hollander, Handleiding, p. 58.

types; hasil, an annual payment in gold to the value of five per cent for the products of the land (which thenceforth, was treated as government land), and serah, the compulsory levy on the natural produce, primarily pepper, which occasionally was also exchanged for necessities such as provisions and cotton.²⁰ The collection of tribute was more effectively enforced in the riverine villages adjacent to Banjarese settlements, but in the more remote interior where the Biajus were 'sheltered' by dense jungle and swift rapids, the Banjarese authorities found difficulty in levying dues and the aborigines there were relatively more independent than their fellowmen in the valleys.²¹

In contrast to the Biajus, the Banjarese had a much more advanced and intricate socio-political structure, which understandably, because of the influence exerted by the original immigrants, was based on the Javanese feudal pattern. At the head of the political structure reigned the Panambahan or Sultan, who was in theory, the supreme ruler of the land. Below him were the Kjahis or Pengerans,²²

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 59.

22. B. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), ff. 824-27.

The foreign names are underlined only in this introductory section to give emphasis to the terms but not in the other chapters.

princes or chieftains ruling over territorial units normally uncoffed to them by the Sultan, and whose main functions were those of tax-collection and general administration. Although the Kjahis were usually nominated by the Panambahan, it was nevertheless widely accepted that a son would succeed to the office on his father's death; in such a case, the Sultan merely had to give his verbal consent to the new appointment. In return for his office, each Kjahi was expected to apportion a certain percentage of the tolls he collected to the Panambahan.²³

A great social barrier existed between the nobility or Orang Bangsawan and the commoners (Orang Mardika).²⁴ Although at the village or kampong level, the Kjahi assigned administrative duties to the kampong head (Pembekel), and appointed boatmen, bodyguards and personal attendants from among his own relatives or 'hangers-on' (Orang Patan), the rest of the paid labour was supplied by the ordinary citizens, who were essentially from the peasant class. Compulsory services and the most menial tasks, however, were carried out by the slaves (Orang Abdi), who were either debtors (Orang Budak) or Orang Tangkapan, offenders of the law (Adat), and prisoners of war, including pirates and

23. Hollander, Handleiding, p. 69.

24. Schwaner, Borneo, pp. 167-68.

captured Biaju rebels as well as women and children.²⁵

Although endogamy was practised to prevent the upper social groups from marrying the lower ones, nevertheless, there were instances where Banjarese chieftains took Biaju women, noted for their beauty, as their wives.²⁶

Social subdivision was not only prevalent in the inland states of Bekompay, Sampit, Amuntai and Mendawai but also extended to the harbour principalities of Kayu Tinggi and Tartas, where a small group of foreign patricians (Orang Tamoi), comprising Chinese, Gujeratis and foreign Indonesians, were clearly distinct from the majority of retail traders, artisans and slaves. Because of their wealth and knowledge of languages, the patricians were selected by the Panambahan to act as Shahbandars, with authority not only to transact business between foreign merchants but also to collect port duties.²⁷ In recognition of their services, these foreign dignitaries were often given titles of honour such as Kjahi and Pengeran by the ruler. Early in the 1700's Lim Kin Ko, the Chinese Capitan, was also known as Kjahi Roxa.²⁸

25. Ibid.; W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, (The Hague/Bandung, 1959), p. 134.

26. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 26 January 1707, SFR (7), no page.

27. B. Schricke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Pt. I, (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), p. 28.

28. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 26 January 1707, SFR (7).

whilst a Gujerati was given the title of Pengeran Marta Raya.²⁹

Although the nobility constituted only a small class compared to the mass of commoners, there were however, various divisions according to origin and office within its ranks. These ranks, with titles to denote the status of the holder, were apparently introduced into Banjarmasin by the first Javanese immigrants during the Majapahit period.³⁰ Sons of the Panambahan were known as Pengerans or Gusti if they were minors; princesses were called Putri but were elevated to the level of Ratu on their marriage. The children of a princess and a commoner were addressed as Nanang or Andin, but the Panambahan could increase their status to Raden or Mas, common titles for the nobility.³¹ Kjahi, Demang, Mantri, Patih or Djaksa were high-ranking titles accorded to chief administrators or Government officers.³² Generally, it was customary for the nobility

29. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 824.

30. Hollander, Handleiding, p. 69.

31. A. van der Ven, "Aanteekening omtrent het rijk Bandjarnasin schets van het Martapoeroesche hof en van het landbestuur", Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-Land en Volkenkunde, Batavian General IX, (1860), pp. 114-16; L.W.C. van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangen en Titels op Java en Madoera, (Batavia, 1887), p. 1-11; Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsche-Indie, (The Hague, 1917 and 1921), pp. 7 and 361-65.

32. Ibid.

and top officials to affix sub-titles, such as Adipati (Deapati), Temenggong, Mangku, Aria, Ngabchi, Ingaboy, Demang and Rangga to their main titles to enhance their prestige.³³

In the first half of the eighteenth century it was estimated that there were over twenty Pengerans and thirty Kjahis in Banjarmasin.³⁴ Some of the Kjahis were Narang Baya, the shahbandar of Banjarmasin, Wangsa Duta, shahbandar of Kayu Tinggi, Bupa Burt, a pepper merchant, and Juree Tulis Mardi, the treasurer of the customs-house at Tartas.³⁵

With a large entourage of relatives and officials, it was difficult for the Panambahan to hold paramount sway in his territory. Although the appointment of chieftains, distribution of fiefs, guardianship of the Treasury and the decreeing of war and peace were royal prerogatives, the Kjahis and Pengerans were virtually despots in areas under their jurisdiction.³⁶ Apart from the district chiefs, several persons also exercised considerable authority in Banjarmasin, namely, the religious head (Mufti), and the judges.

33. Van den Berg, De Inlandsch Rangen, p. 8.

34. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 827.
Van den Berg and Ruimbeck to the Batavian Council, 12 April 1747, KA 2591, p. 57.

35. English factors to E.I.C., 8 March 1740, SFR (9), ff. 17-25.

36. Congreve to E.I.C., 22 June 1746, CFR (52), f. 13;
Hollander, Handiciding, p. 69.

The Mufti was an important member of the Banjar Council. All Muslim matters such as court ritual and practices, declaration of festival periods and interpretation of the lunar calendar were dealt with by him with the assistance of the religious teachers of lower rank. Being a religious people, the Banjarese would seldom make any political or economic decision without first obtaining the advice of the Mufti.³⁷

With regard to law and order, De Roy stated that there was "neither order nor command" in Banjarmasin.³⁸ This statement is partially incorrect, for although there were no regular courts or written law, a certain code of behaviour was prescribed by the Adat, or customary law.³⁹ For example, offenders against the Adat were tried before Pengeran Mangku, the judge for life and death, and Kjchi Dosang, the Justice of the Peace in Tartas.⁴⁰ Minor offences were generally neglected but in more serious crimes such as those involving personal injury to the plaintiff, the accused could be punished by rattan-strokes or sent to the agricultural regions for hard labour, while murderers

37. Van der Ven, "Aantekening", TBG, Vol. IX, 1860, p. 114.

38. De Roy, op. cit., f. 167.

39. Schwoner, op. cit., pp. 165-66.

40. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 823.

could be executed.⁴¹ However, the English factors claimed that the two judges were "a cursed crew, who had neither honesty nor currage [courage]," but were biased or corrupted.⁴² They added that Pengeran Mangku and Kjahi Demang, who were also engaged in the pepper trade, would often accept bribes and use their influential position to extract loans from the Chinese, who asked for personal favours,⁴³ such as the release of Chinese prisoners or the right to establish retail stores in the town.

Despite the division of control in the government, a certain degree of cohesion, manifested in the Banjarese Council, nevertheless existed between the Panambahan and the nobility in matters of state importance. The Council, the legislative and executive organ of the country, consisted of the Panambahan, six chief Pengerans, four Kjahis, four Orang Kayas and the Mufti.⁴⁴ It met frequently to hold bicharas or conferences and to receive foreign dignitaries.⁴⁵ On many occasions, it presented a united front to the foreign merchants, such as the Dutch and the English. The English

41. Van der Ven, op. cit., pp. 115-16.

42. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 27 January 1701.

43. Ibid.

44. Hollander, op. cit., p. 69.

45. English factors at Banjarmasin to E.I.C., 3 March 1740, SFR (9), f. 17.

commented that it was impossible to negotiate secretly with any Council member as the news would inevitably leak out to the rest of the court.⁴⁶ Because of this apparent sense of unity among the Banjarese court officials, the English and Dutch found that they constantly had to exercise the utmost discretion in dealing with the Banjarese authorities; otherwise their commercial ventures would be jeopardised and they would have to leave Banjarmasin with little or no pepper.

At this juncture, it would be appropriate to discuss the cultivation of pepper, the primary product of Banjarmasin. Pepper was grown along the clayish foothills of the Negara highlands in Bekompay, Lusong, Barambai, Koenenting and Bonava Assam,⁴⁷ and the more sandy river-banks⁴⁸ of Amuntai, Molukto, Kayu Tinggi and Pulau Laut.⁴⁹ Ladang or shifting dry cultivation in which old woods were burned to clear sites was commonly practised by the Bajas, the principal cultivators, and some Banjarese. As soon as the virgin land lost its

46. Ibid.

47. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien, Pt. III, (Mackenzie Private Collection (64A)), f. 352.

48. According to Ridley, well-drained areas along river banks were the most suited to pepper cultivation. L.H. Ridley, Spices, (London, 1912), p.255.

49. T. Rodgett to Captain Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 22.

fertility, the planter would desert his old plot and move on in search of fresh ground to replant.⁵⁰

Reference to the methods of pepper cultivation in Banjarmasin are lacking in the Dutch and English records. Nevertheless, the accounts of Buchanan, Hunter and Marsden⁵¹ describing the systems of pepper planting in Malabar, Penang and West Sumatra can be assumed to apply generally to Banjarmasin as well.

When the site for the pepper plants had been prepared, poles which were kept about six to seven feet apart from each other were stuck into the ground, after which two vines were attached to each pole. In Borneo, the use of poles to prop up the pepper vines differed from the practice in West Sumatra where chengkrings were planted.⁵² Although the pepper plot had to be kept weeded, care had to be taken to ensure that the roots of the pepper vines were not injured or the soil nutrients exhausted, particularly during the dry months

50. Ibid.

51. F. Buchanan, A Journey from Madras through the countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar, Vol. II, (London, 1807), pp. 463-67; W. Hunter, "Remarks on the species of pepper which are found on Prince of Wales island", Asiatic Researches, Vol. IX, (London, 1809), pp. 383-93; W. Marsden, The History of Sumatra, (London, 1811), pp. 108-18.

52. Marsden, op. cit., p. 108.

of July and August when the ground moisture had to be retained. In the second or third year, to ensure high productivity, the vines were layered or 'turned-down', soon after the plant had borne its first fruits.⁵³ The layering process which had to be carried out before the berries ripened involved releasing the vines from the pole and bending them horizontally into the earth. Subsequently, only two vines were allowed to twine around the pole to avoid weakening the whole parent plant through excessive foliation.⁵⁴ For purposes of re-cultivation, often young suckers (lada sulor), were obtained from nodes of old vines. Alternatively, roots which were direct sproutings from stems that were layered could be cut off and transplanted to the pole for propagation.⁵⁵ This method of cultivation by cuttings called lada anggor had more fruitful results, for the plant bore fruit shortly after fresh stems grew whilst vines grown from lada sulor took five to six years to reach fruition.⁵⁶

The cultivator could not expect any return from pepper planting for two or three years unless he had a second garden. It is doubtful that many Biajus owned two or more

53. Ibid., p. 110; Buchanan, op. cit., p. 464.

54. Marsden, op. cit., p. 110.

55. Ibid., pp. 110-11; Hunter, op. cit., p. 387.

56. Marsden, op. cit., p. 112.

plots of land. Apparently, between the planting and harvesting seasons, the majority of cultivators in the Negara regions maintained themselves by bartering products such as gold, bezoar-stones, dragon blood and diamonds for salt, tobacco, cotton and trinkets from the lowland Banjarese, Indonesian or Chinese merchants.⁵⁷

Once the harvesting season commenced, the Biaju cultivator was assured of a more steady and abundant supply of pepper than his competitors in the lowlying pepper areas of Kayu Tinggi and Molukko. Although the harvesting period in Banjarmasin officially lasted from September to March, it was possible to obtain small quantities of the product from Negara during the other months of the year.⁵⁸ On occasion, if climatic conditions were favourable, a second crop could be expected in March.⁵⁹

The type of pepper produced in Negara differed from that grown in the other regions of Banjarmasin. In fact, three varieties, all of which were sub-species of Piper Figrum,⁶⁰

57. De Roy, Hachelijke Reys, (Mackenzie Collection, 1822), f. 287.

58. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 November 1704, SFR (7), f. 37.

59. Ibid.

60. I.H. Burkill, A Dictionary of the Economic Produce of the Malay Peninsula, Pt. II, (London, 1935), p. 1749.

the black pepper originally planted on the Malabar coast, could be distinguished by the shape of the leaf, the rate of growth, life-span and the size of the grain.⁶¹ These sub-types were named after areas where they were cultivated. The commonest and smallest grains were derived from Negara pepper which was usually dusty and light. When weighed, Negara pepper measured about 32 lbs. in 10 gantangs. The plant bore fruit practically the whole year round but was short-lived.⁶² Molukko or Laut pepper contained much larger, cleaner and heavier berries. Ten gantangs of Molukko pepper weighed between 35 and 37 pounds. Its productive rate though slower, lasted longer.⁶³ The intermediate variety was Kayu Tinggi pepper which had medium-sized but less dusty grains than Negara pepper. The weight of 10 gantangs of Kayu Tinggi pepper was between 32 to 35 pounds.⁶⁴ Another species of pepper which was occasionally sold but not produced in Banjarmasin was long pepper, which was the unripe spadix or fruit spike of the Piper Longum. The red spikes were obtained by constant pruning of the pepper vine which was

61. Ibid.

62. E. Arnold to E.I.C.,¹⁵January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 23.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

trained to a stake soon after planting.⁶⁵ A native of the Circar mountains in India, long pepper was cultivated in Semarang, Macassar and several south-east Asian areas and was brought to Tartas by Indonesian coastal traders.⁶⁶ While black pepper was sold by gantang or pikul weight, commercial transactions in long pepper occurred only in pikul weight, usually at 3 or $3\frac{1}{2}$ Spanish dollars per pikul.⁶⁷

Besides black pepper, white pepper which was rarer in Banjarmasin than in Palembang, was occasionally processed for sale to the European buyers. Because of the time and labour required in the method of processing the product, and the little encouragement given by the chiefs to increase production, white pepper was expensive. Although the English East India Company expressed its intention of purchasing a small amount of white pepper in 1699,⁶⁸ none was bought, probably because the Company found it financially more worthwhile to buy the black variety. Except for occasional purchases, as in 1728 when 60 pikuls were procured,⁶⁹ the Dutch also refrained from shipping white pepper, because the

65. T.C. Archer, Popular Economic Botany, (London, 1853), p. 103; Burkill, op. cit., p. 1751.

66. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 22.

67. Ibid.

68. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, LB (11), f. 57.

69. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 618.

Banjarese would not lower the price from seven to eight reals to six or six and a half reals per pikul which was the rate fixed by the Company.⁷⁰

The bigger grains selected for processing white pepper were generally plucked from the vines as soon as they ripened, (unlike black pepper where the seeds were not allowed to ripen), although it was not easy to find all the berries maturing simultaneously.⁷¹ Thereafter, they were put into pits dug out along river banks or swampy areas for about two weeks.⁷² Leaves were laid on top of the pits to prevent the berries from drying up. After the specified length of time, the swollen berries were taken out of the pits and decorticated by hand-rubbing or trampling. They were then washed and dried in the sun.⁷³ Another method practised by the planters was to allow the berries to rot in the pits until the husks fell.⁷⁴ Although this process involved less work for the cultivator, the results were less effective for many berries became discoloured and the inner grains were damaged. From twelve or thirteen gantangs of black pepper, only five gantangs of white pepper could be produced.⁷⁵

70. Ibid.

71. Marsden, op. cit., pp 118; Buchanan, op. cit., p. 465.

72. P. van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oost Indische Compagnie, Vol. II, Pt. I, (Stapel, Hague, 1931), p. 305.

73. Ibid.

74. Marsden, op. cit., p. 118.

75. E. Arnold to E.I.C., 15 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 23.

B - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The origins of Banjarmasin as a political entity are obscure due to the scarcity and unsatisfactory nature of early Banjarese sources which were largely compiled from local mythology.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, available evidence seems to suggest that Javanese influence was preponderant in Banjarmasin during the early period. For instance, in the mid-fourteenth century, Banjarmasin was listed as a dependency of Majapahit in the Negarakertagama.⁷⁷ This subjection to Majapahit was apparently the result of the marriage between Raden Putra, a Javanese prince, and Putri Tanjaong Buihi, the daughter of Lembong Mangkurat, the ruler of the first colony of south-east Borneo.⁷⁸ With his ascension to the throne, Raden Putra, now Sultan Suria Nata, became the

-
76. For a non-historical, i.e. mythological account of the origins of Banjarmasin, see J. Hageman, "Bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis van Borneo", TBG VI, (1857), pp. 225-46; Van der Ven, "Aanteekeningen", TBG IX, (1860), p. 93; F.S.A. de Clercq, "De Vroegste Geschiedenis van Bandjarmasin", TBG XXIV, (1877), pp. 238-66; J.J. Meyer, "Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Geschiedenis van het Voormalig Bandjermasinsche Rijk", De Indische Gids, Vol. I, (1899), pp. 257-80; A.A. Cense, De Kroniek van Bandjarmasin, (Santpoort, 1928), pp. 2-91; J.J. Ras, Hikayat Bandjar - A Study in Malay Historiography, (The Hague, 1968), pp. 1-4.
77. A.H. Hill, "Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai", (a revised romanised version of Raffles M.S. 67 with an English translation) - JMBRAS, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. 2, (June, 1960), pp. 107 and 166; Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Pt. I, pp. 30-31.
78. For more details, see Schwaner, Borneo, pp. 43-46.

founder of the sultanate of Banjarmasin.⁷⁹

When the power of Majapahit declined between 1513 and 1528, the suzerainty which it had hitherto exercised over Sukadana, Pasir, Kutei, Sambas, Landak, Kota Waringin and Banjarmasin shifted to the principality of Demak.⁸⁰ The supremacy of Demak in the 1520's was significant because under its auspices Islam was introduced into Banjarmasin, thereby transforming it from a Hindu into a Muslim state.⁸¹ This transitional period from Hinduism to Islam roughly coincided with the expansionist phase of Banjarmasin, for under the rule of Sultan Suria Angsa, the borders of the kingdom were extended to include Batang Tabalong, Batang Balangan, Alai and Amandit.⁸² During the early decades of the seventeenth century, practically the whole of the south-

79. Ibid., p. 46.

80. Schrieke, op. cit., p. 31. In recent times, the account of the court poet, Prapanca, on the territorial extent of Majapahit has been challenged by authors like Hall, Wertheim and Cense. They state that though Majapahit could have exercised a measure of hegemony over the lesser islands of the east, it is doubtful that other parts of the Malayan Archipelago listed in the Negarakertagama remained within its effective control; rather, relationships between these states and Majapahit were limited to mere payment of tribute. - See D.G.E. Hall, A History of South East Asia, (London, 1955), pp. 78-81; Wertheim, op. cit., pp. 51-52; Cense, op. cit., pp. 108-09.

81. Cense, op. cit., p. 109.

82. Ibid., pp. 111-12.

west, south-east and eastern regions of Borneo were paying homage to Banjarmasin. In 1636, for example, the Panambahan claimed Sambas, Lawei, Sukadana, Kota Waringin, Pembuang, Sampit, Mendawei, Upper and Lower Kahajan, Kutei, Pasir, Pulau Laut, Satui, Asem-Asem, Kintap and Sawarangan as his vassal states.⁸³

The political "control" of the Javanese coastal principalities over their Borneo tributaries inevitably declined with the rising power of Banjarmasin. Early in the seventeenth century, Pajang, which succeeded Demak as the chief Javanese state after 1574, did not receive any tribute from Banjarmasin. Similarly, in 1615, the attempts of Tuban to subjugate Banjarmasin with the co-operation of Madura and Surabaya were fiercely resisted.⁸⁴ The task of restoring Javanese hegemony over Borneo, therefore, was left to Sultan Agung of Mataram (1613-1646) who emerged as the supreme ruler of Java after defeating his rivals from Japara and Grisek early in the 1610's, and Tuban, Madura and Surabaya in 1619, 1624 and 1625 respectively.⁸⁵

In launching his colonisation programme, which included

83. Ibid., p. 54.

84. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

85. Ibid., p. 36.

not only the Javanese coastal ports but also the south, south-western and south-eastern states of Borneo, Sultan Agung managed to assert his authority over Sukadana in 1622.⁸⁶ Nine years later, the Banjarese anticipated a large-scale attack by Mataram, which fortunately for them did not materialise.⁸⁷ Despite the continued threat from Mataram and the fear of the withdrawal of Javanese rice-supplies on which it was largely dependent,⁸⁸ Banjarmasin did not recognise Mataram's suzerainty until 1637 when peace was concluded between both states.⁸⁹ At this stage, with the influx of a greater number of immigrants who were the victims of Sultan Agung's aggressive policy, Javanese influence over Borneo became more marked than before, and thus it can be assumed that the seaports and towns of Borneo became diffusion centres of Javanese culture.

Relations between Mataram and its subject states deteriorated early in the 1650's when Banjarmasin and Sukadana

86. H.J. de Graff, De Regering van Sultan Agung, Vorst van Mataram 1613-1643, en die zijn voorganger Panambahan Seda-Ing-Krapjak 1601-1613, (The Hague, 1958), p. 279.

87. Ibid.

88. Schrieke, op. cit., p. 75. Also see Chapter II, pp. 96-98 for more examples of economic sanctions against the Banjarese.

89. De Graaf, op. cit., p. 279.

ceased to pay tribute to their suzerain in 1659.⁹⁰ Moreover, to protect themselves against future threats by Mataram, the latter two states concluded a defensive and offensive pact with each other in 1661.⁹¹ A second attempt by Mataram to re-establish its hegemony over the Borneo states seven years later failed miserably, largely because of the decline of its military power, which meanwhile had been expended in curbing the rebellious Javanese principalities. Subsequently, in the 1670's, a series of internal wars in Java which led to the downfall of Mataram,⁹² accorded Banjarmasin the opportunity of regaining its full autonomy.

While the lucrative trade in diamonds attracted the Europeans, Portuguese, Dutch and English to Sukadana,⁹³ it was the growth of the pepper production which raised Banjarmasin from a fishing village into a flourishing pepper mart of south-east Asia in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Initially, pepper production was accelerated to meet the demands of the Chinese junk merchants, who had hitherto procured their supplies from Bantam, Patani and

90. Cense, op. cit., p. 116.

91. Ibid.

92. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

93. J. Willi, The early relations of England with Borneo to 1805, (Langenzalza, 1922), p. 2.

Jambi.⁹⁴ In the 1610's the Chinese were ousted from the pepper trade of Bantam and Jambi by the English and Dutch. They could also not obtain any pepper from Patani, after the pepper estates of Johore and Kedah which exported their supplies to Patani had been destroyed by the Achinese. As a result, the Chinese turned their attention to Banjarmasin.⁹⁵ They were rapidly followed by the Javanese and the Macassarese, and finally, by the Portuguese, Dutch, English and the Danes.

In attempting to establish trade with the Banjarese, the Dutch Company sent G. Michielszoon to Banjarmasin in 1606, but the undertaking proved a failure when the factor was murdered in Banjarmasin the following year.⁹⁶ No punitive expedition was sent until 1612 when a squadron was despatched to destroy the capital of old Banjar, thereby compelling the Banjarese court to establish a new base at Martapura.⁹⁷ For the next decade, the Dutch refrained from making any commercial contact with the Banjarese.

94. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, Asian Trade and European Influence, (The Hague, 1962), pp. 169, 245-47 and 258.

95. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 54-55; Meilink-Poelofs, op. cit., p. 262.

96. L.C.D. Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, Den Solo-Archipel, Cambodia, Siam en Cochin-Chine, (Amsterdam, 1362), p. 1; Cense, op. cit., p. 94.

97. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 2; Cense, op. cit., p. 94.

In 1626 however, at the request of the Panambahan, the Batavian Council permitted pepper from Banjarmasin to be sold at Batavia.⁹⁸ Apparently, the fear of an attack by Mataram motivated the Panambahan to make this approach in exchange for protection against his enemies. The establishment of Dutch-Banjarese relations culminated in the ratification of a treaty between both parties in September 1635, whereby the Sultan promised to concede the pepper monopoly to the Company on condition that the Dutch should restore his former vassal states of Pasir and Kutei.⁹⁹ The Batavian authorities, anxious to expel their rivals, the Macassarese and the English from the Banjarese ports, immediately ordered a fleet under the command of Pool to sail to Pasir and Kutei.¹⁰⁰ Pasir was ravaged when its inhabitants refused to submit, but Kutei pledged itself to recognise Banjarese sovereignty and the Dutch monopoly of the pepper trade.¹⁰¹

98. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1626, 22 May 1626, p. 256; Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 10.

99. The treaty was signed by the Banjarese ambassador, Retna di Ratya and the Batavian Council. In the treaty, the Banjarese Council promised the exclusive sale of pepper at 5 reals per pikul to the Dutch provided the latter sent a ship or frigate to Banjarmasin and advanced 3,000 reals. See J.E. Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum, Vol. I, (The Hague, 1907), pp. 270-71.

100. P.A. Leupe, "Stukken betrekkelijk Bornco, 1635-1636", BTLV, Vol.III, 1855, pp. 272-74.

101. J.C. Noorlander, Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de tweede helft de 18 de Eeuw, (Leiden, 1935), p. 7.

Although the Panambahan was thinking more in terms of security than profit when he signed the pepper contract with the Dutch, the Banjarese traders felt and acted otherwise. The Banjarese, reluctant to sacrifice the lucrative open trade with the Chinese, English and the Macassarese, were not very keen to deliver their stocks to the Dutch factors.¹⁰² Insistence on maintaining their treaty rights inevitably brought the Dutch into conflict with the Banjarese. The differences between both sides were enhanced by the intrigues of the pro-Javanese faction at Court, comprising Raden Dipati Anom, Raja Itam and Raja Mampawa.¹⁰³

In 1637 when peace was concluded between Mataram and Banjarmasin, Dutch-Banjarese relations deteriorated rapidly when the old Sultan left the bulk of the administration to his court subordinates.¹⁰⁴ Matters came to a head in the following April when the factor, Kramer, and twenty-nine

102. Ibid.

103. Raden Dipati Anom was also known as Kjahi Adipati Martasari, a pro-Javanese noble of Banjarmasin. - W.Ph. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Vol.II, 1639-1655, (The Hague, 1964), p. 12. Raden Dipati and the other Banjarese nobles, Raja Itam and Raja Mampawa had interests in the pepper trade. When they found that their incomes were affected by the Dutch policy of fixed prices, they decided to evict the Dutch from Banjarmasin. - Dagh Register, Batavia, 1637, 11 April 1637, p. 130.

104. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1637, 11 April 1637, p. 130.

other Dutchmen were murdered and the Dutch factories at Martapura and Kotawaringin were plundered and burned; altogether the Company's losses were estimated at 160,000 guilders.¹⁰⁵ The Batavian authorities retaliated by blockading the Banjarese ports, hoping thereby to bring trade to a standstill. Nevertheless, the blockades were ineffective as the pepper merchants managed to smuggle their product to the foreign traders, and the Dutch fleet eventually had to withdraw from the area.¹⁰⁶

After the bitter episode of 1638, the Dutch Company relinquished all plans to trade with Banjarmasin. In 1660, however, a reduction in the amounts of pepper available from Palembang and West Sumatra and an increased demand from the European market compelled the Batavian Council to renew commercial relations with Banjarmasin.¹⁰⁷ Dirck van Lier was sent to Martapura to obtain a pepper cargo and to claim reparation ~~amount~~ing to 50,000 reals for losses sustained by the Dutch Company in 1638.¹⁰⁸

105 Noorlander, op. cit., p. 7; Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 60.

106. Noorlander, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Van Dijk, op. cit., pp. 81 and 82.

107. Original General Missive, 16 December 1660, KA 1122, f. 31.

108. Ibid.

Though recognising the existence of the old debt, the regent, Pengeran Ratu, preferred to discharge his financial obligations by allowing the Dutch Company to pay a reduced rate of five per cent instead of seven per cent for port duties. This clause, laid down in the new agreement of December 1660,¹⁰⁹ was reasserted in another treaty of May 1661.¹¹⁰ Also, the Company was guaranteed the pepper monopoly with the price of pepper fixed at 16 reals per 180 gantangs,¹¹¹ apparently because Pengeran Ratu, in the face of court intrigues by other Banjarese nobles, hoped to secure Dutch support to maintain his position. Unfortunately for the ruler, the Dutch refused to take sides in a factional struggle, and consequently in 1663 Pengeran Ratu was deposed by Pengeran Dipati Anom who established his administrative centre at Banjarmasin.¹¹² Dipati Anom refused to recognise the validity of the contracts of 1660 and 1661, but finding that the Dutch were just as determined to adhere to their treaty privileges and fearing another war with Mataram, he agreed to ratify the treaty of 1661 on 7 September 1664. The new contract guaranteed the Dutch Company the sole right to conduct trade

109. Hoeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. II, (The Hague, 1931), : pp. 181-82.

110. Ibid., pp. 186-88.

111. Ibid., p. 187.

112. Original General Missive, 21 December 1663, KA 1131, f. 56.

in south-east Borneo; simultaneously, the Banjarese insisted that the Dutch should build a factory at Martapura at a convenient date.¹¹³

Despite the renewal of the contract, the Company did not achieve very effective results in the pepper trade. The Hoogcaspel, for instance, returned to Batavia with only 36 lasts of pepper in 1664.¹¹⁴ Two reasons contributed to the failure of the Dutch to maintain the monopoly. The first was the reluctance of the Biajus, the chief cultivators, to supply pepper to the Banjarese merchants. In attempts to enlist Dutch support for his precarious regime and to consolidate his power, Pengeran Dipati Anom was anxious to fulfil his part of the bargain by offering all the pepper stocks to the Company. He therefore sent his officials to the hinterland of Negara to compel the cultivators to deliver their produce. Consequently, many Biajus refused to harvest the crop and left their fields.¹¹⁵ Secondly, the refusal of the Dutch to make monetary advances, especially to the chieftains, led the local merchants, who feared financial losses,

113. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1664, 7 September 1664, pp. 394-95.

114. Original General Missive, 23 December 1664, KA 1136, f. 50. One last is equal to 230 gantangs or 3,066 $\frac{2}{3}$ to 3,400 English pounds. This unit is generally used when measuring rice.

115. Original General Missive, 21 December 1663, KA 1131, f. 57.

to smuggle their pepper cargoes to the Macassarose and Portuguese traders instead of loading them into the Company vessels. Some of the pepper merchants even sailed to Batavia to sell their goods direct to the private traders.¹¹⁶

These commercial hazards and the Dutch reluctance to involve the Company in the political issues of Banjarmasin led the Batavian authorities to abandon their pepper trade in 1667. In November 1665, the Company received a plea for military support from Pengeran Dipati Anom,¹¹⁷ against possible incursions by Mataram and also against Pengeran Ratu who was rumoured to be preparing a war against the Banjarese ruler.¹¹⁸ The Batavian Council shunned all political responsibilities by calling off its voyages to south-east Borneo.¹¹⁹

In 1678 the Dutch in Batavia decided to re-establish trade in Banjarmasin. They treated Banjarmasin as an alternative source of pepper for the Canton market because production had fallen in Jambi when the pepper planters turned to padi

116. Original General Missive, 30 January 1666, KA 1142, f. 65.

117. Ibid.; Dagh Register, Batavia, 1665, 6 November 1665, p. 340.

118. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1665, 7 December 1665, p. 400.

119. Original General Missive, 25 January 1667, KA 1146, f. 69.

cultivation for a more secure means of livelihood.¹²⁰ The Dutch also hoped to forestall future English voyages to the area when they heard that two English Company vessels were despatched to Banjarmasin in 1671 and 1678.¹²¹ The new venture of the Dutch Company in 1679 did not meet with much success. The factors, P. der Vesten and J. van Mechelen received only a small pepper cargo on the Helena,¹²² partly because of the unstable political situation in Banjarmasin which had dragged on into the 1670's from the previous decade, and partly because of the establishment of the Portuguese in the area. According to the Dutch records, the power of Dipati Anom was seriously challenged by Pengeran Ratu's two sons, Suria Angsa and Suria Negara¹²³ early in the 1670's.¹²⁴ They enlisted Portuguese aid from Macao to overthrow Dipati Anom.¹²⁵ Although the two young Pengerans suffered a

120. The Dutch Company needed about 5,000 pikuls of pepper for the Canton market annually. - Original General Missive, 15 February 1678, KA 1212, f. 585.

121. Original General Missive, 21 December 1678, KA 1220, f. 21.

122. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, KA 1220, f. 213.

123. Suria Angsa and Suria Negara were also known as Raden Bagus and Raden Basu.

124. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1679, 14 May 1679, p. 185.

125. Letter from Pengeran Dipati Anom (or Agong) to the Batavian Council, 13 May 1679, KA 1256, f. 540.

temporary setback in 1678 when they were driven back from Banjarmasin to the hinterland of Alli and Montrado, which were gold-mining regions in south-west Borneo, they nevertheless managed to defeat Dipati Anom in the following year.¹²⁶

Subsequently, Suria Angsa became the Panambahan. The Portuguese were given favoured treatment and their ships were loaded with pepper before those of the other foreigners, except the Chinese who offered the highest prices on the open market. Although other foreign traders were banned from selling opium to the Banjarese, this condition was waived in the case of the Portuguese.¹²⁷

Suria Angsa did not recognise the Dutch treaty of 1664 which in his eyes, was signed by a pretender to the Banjarese throne. The Batavian authorities, however, took a more serious view and considered the concession of commercial privileges to the Portuguese as a breach of the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1664. They felt that in order to make the contract effective, a patrol boat should be stationed at the river mouth to prevent the Portuguese and other "contraband" traders from loading pepper. They dispelled this idea when they heard that the Macassarese, who had burnt one of the Pengeran's

126. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1679, 14 May 1679, p. 185.

127. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, KA 1220, f. 231.

houses, intended to launch an attack on Banjarmasin.¹²⁸ This would mean that the Dutch Company would be obliged to give political aid to the Sultan if the Portuguese were evicted so as to ensure peaceful conditions of trade. The Batavian Council, therefore, decided to sever ties with Banjarmasin and tried to obtain more pepper from Palembang and Bantam.¹²⁹ With the withdrawal of the Dutch, the position of the Portuguese in Banjarmasin was further strengthened in 1690 when they managed to secure contractual rights from the ruler for the exclusive purchase of pepper.¹³⁰

English connections with Banjarmasin originated in 1615 when a factory was established for the export of pepper and bezoar stones. However, the venture which was regarded as a failure, was abandoned three years later, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between the Dutch and the English in the East Indies.¹³¹ A demand for a larger supply of pepper in England and Europe in the 1630's encouraged the English

128. Ibid.

129. Original General Missive, 24 April 1681, KA 1242, f. 92.

130. De Roy, Hachelijke Reys, (Mackenzie Collection, 1822), f. 156.

131. The Directors referred to the Banjarmasin factory as "a needless factory" in 1618. - W.N. Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1617-1621, (London, 1870), p. 107.

East India Company to search for alternative sources of pepper in the East. In Bantam, little pepper could be obtained as the population had shifted to fishing and the cultivation of food crops after the Dutch blockades of 1620 to 1629.¹³² Thereafter, the English attempted to trade on the west coast of Sumatra in 1634. One year later they managed to re-establish commercial relations with Banjarmasin, whereby stocks amounting to 10,693 reals were invested in the new factory.¹³³ Dutch competition and the policy of exclusive trade, secured by the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1635, adversely affected English commerce in Banjarmasin. In December 1636, for example, despite an advance of 10,000 reals, the Sultan, probably out of fear of the Dutch, prohibited J. Tuesley from taking further supplies of pepper after 150,000 lbs. had been loaded into the Fearl.¹³⁴ Shortly after, the English supercargoes left Banjarmasin for Bantam.¹³⁵

When Kramer and the other Dutch factors were murdered by the Banjarese in 1638, the English were not in Banjarmasin.

132. Meilink-Roelofs, Asian Trade and European Influence, p. 258.

133. Bantam Council to E.I.C., 31 January 1635/36, OC (15), f. 1552.

134. Bantam Council to E.I.C., 20 December 1636, OC (15), f. 1582.

135. W. Ph. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, Vol. I, 1610-1638, (The Hague, 1960), p. 630.

They did not return to the area until the Dutch had lifted the coastal blockade in mid-1639. When they arrived in Banjarmasin, the English took advantage of Banjarese goodwill to secure commercial benefits which had previously accrued to the Dutch.

Except for a brief period initially when its employees managed to trade satisfactorily, the English Company did not really achieve its objectives. Severe competition from the Chinese and Macassarese merchants hindered the successful loading of the English ships. In October 1640, the Coaster returned to Bantam with only 60 pikuls and the Michael with 35 tons of pepper.¹³⁶ Moreover, amicable relations with the ruler proved difficult to maintain when he and other Banjarese nobles borrowed vast sums of money from the English with promises of repaying in pepper.¹³⁷ The debts were not fully repaid, partly because the factors, instead of recovering the money, quarrelled among themselves "without consideration to the responsibility entrusted to them," and ^{partly} because the debtors

136. The Coaster's unsuccessful loading was attributed essentially to the excessive rains in Banjarmasin which destroyed part of the pepper crop and delayed the harvest. - President Baker at Bantam to E.I.C., 17 November 1640, OC (17), f. 1762, and 27 November 1641, OC (18), f. 1781.

137. "The original of the Companies [damag(e)] in Banjar came through Samuel Husbande's lending of the old kinge 20,000 r. of 8t. of wch $\frac{1}{4}$ is not recovered," - Baker to E.I.C., 29 December 1645, OC (19), f. 1884.

were reluctant to repay the loans.¹³⁸ Also, ignorance of the Indonesian language and customs created a barrier between the two peoples.¹³⁹ In 1649, T. Peniston, the Bantam president, ordered 20,000 reals to be deducted from the Banjarmasin accounts, as the factory was "in desperate debts and dead-storke (stock)."¹⁴⁰ When the report on Banjarmasin was sent to the Directors, they decided "to desert that factory and to only send a ship there once a year to trade as best they can."¹⁴¹ T. Fenn, the chief factor, was therefore recalled in October 1651 after the factory had been dismantled.

With the severance of Anglo-Banjarese relations by the closure of the factory, the Company did not show any further interest in south-east Borneo until 1661 when it expressed the intention of procuring as much pepper as possible by investing anew in Palembang and Banjarmasin.¹⁴² The project

138. Baker to E.I.C., 27/28 November 1641, OC (18), f. 1781.

139. In a letter to the Bantam President after T. Fenn had left Banjar, the Panambahan advised the former to send a factor who understood local custom and language if the Company intended to resettle in Banjarmasin. - Rajah Cotterington [sic] to the President at Bantam, 15 November 1651, OC (22), f. 2231.

140. President Peniston at Bantam to E.I.C., 11 January 1649/50, JFR (3), f. 12.

141. Minutes of the Court of Committees, 22 February 1649/50, CM (20), f. 491.

142. E.I.C. to Bantam Council, 20 February 1661, LB (2), f. 360.

would take the form of annual expeditions to the Banjarese ports without the establishment of factories. It is conceivable that when new and more vigorous charters were given to the English Company by Cromwell and Charles II in 1657 and 1661, the Directors should express their desire to renew trade with the Banjarese after the neglect of the 1650's.¹⁴³ J. Edwards, the Bantam agent, was agitated that the Directors had not recommended the resumption of trade earlier, as he felt that the English could have prevented the signing of the Dutch-Banjarese contract of 1661. Nevertheless, he was enthusiastic over the news of the Company to despatch ships to Banjarmasin. He immediately instructed his factors at Macassar to buy pepper at Martapura,¹⁴⁴ hoping thereby to remedy the pepper losses incurred by the English at Bantam because of the more successful Dutch competition through the payment of heavier and better 'Mexico' reals by the Dutch.¹⁴⁵

143. This revival of interest in the East Indies was also probably the effect caused by the restoration of the monarchy in May 1660, whereby there was "a definite sense of the importance of national prestige expressed in the determination (more evident in the 1670's) that the Dutch should not be permitted to control the entire trade of the East Indies." - D.K. Bassett, The Factory of the English East India Company at Bantam 1602-1682, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955), p. 256.

144. Bantam Council to E.I.C., (date unknown), JFR (3), 3, f. 666.

145. Ibid., f. 664.

The instructions of Edwards were not acted upon until mid-1664 when H. Weston was sent to Banjarmasin from Macassar in the Royal Oak. The visit of Weston was short-lived. In negotiations with Sultan Suria Nata, Weston was informed that he would not be allowed to trade unless the English Company was prepared to establish a factory in Banjarmasin.¹⁴⁶ Apparently, the Sultan wanted the English to be present there to counteract the Dutch influence in the region during the early 1660's. Weston, aware of his employers' injunction that no factory should be set up, decided to leave Banjarmasin. When A. Hurdt, the Dutch commander, arrived in Banjarmasin at the end of July 1664, he found that the English had already left for Japara. On the explicit orders of Maetsuycker, the Batevian Governor-General, he despatched a squadron to the kuala of the Barito river in order to prevent exports of pepper by interlopers.¹⁴⁷ In November 1664 when Dutch treaty rights were reasserted in the new contract of 1664, the Bantam Council decided to stop further voyages to Banjarmasin.¹⁴⁸

146. Original General Missive, 23 December 1664, KA 1136, f. 51.

147. Maetsuycker ordered A. Hurdt, the Dutch commander, to confiscate the pepper stocks of native or Portuguese vessels, but only "amicable reasoning" was to be exercised towards the English. - Dagh Register, Batavia, 1664, p. 297.

148. Bassett, op. cit., p. 260.

In 1671 the Bantam Council attempted to renew trade with the Banjarese by despatching the Pink to Martapura. The supercargoes were instructed to obtain a pepper cargo, but if the Sultan rejected their overture, the Pink should sail to Grisek to purchase pepper there.¹⁴⁹ When they arrived in Banjarmasin in March of the same year, the supercargoes were able to negotiate for a supply of pepper from the Sultan in return for payment of custom dues.¹⁵⁰ Another expedition to Banjarmasin was sent by the Bantam Council seven years later but apparently, the English were unsuccessful in their commercial venture then, because of internal instability and interference of the pepper trade by the Portuguese and the Dutch. Thereafter, the Bantam Council refrained from sending any more vessels to Banjarmasin.¹⁵¹

149. Bantam Council to the supercargoes of the Pink , 25 February 1671, JFR (6A), f. 1.

150. Consultations of the Bantam Council, 21 March 1671, JFR (6A), f. 15.

151. Original General Missive, 21 December 1678, KA 1220, f. 21.

CHAPTER II

THE ENGLISH SETTLEMENT: 1700-1707

In September 1698 the new East India Company, under the name of the English Company trading to the East Indies, was incorporated by royal charter.¹ Its aim was to replace the 'Old' or London Company which had to recall all its factors, and dismantle all its forts and factories in the East Indies by September 1701.² In their search for lucrative avenues of trade in the East, the Directors of the 'New' Company selected Banjermasin as one of the prospective trading centres. After an absence of half a century since the closure of the British factory in Martapura in 1651,

1. Private traders, especially the merchants of London, had petitioned Parliament from 1690 onwards to sanction the formation of a new Company and to dissolve the 'Old' Company. With a desire to participate in the Eastern trade, the traders alleged that the London Company not only had a monopoly of goods which were in great demand, but kept these articles for their own use. The King intended to give the 'Old' Company a period of three years before it was dismantled. In 1694, however, the King renewed the 'Old' Company's charter. The increasing pressure from the private traders on the House of Commons induced the latter to pass an Act sanctioning the incorporation of the New Company in 1698, after the private merchants had promised to raise £2 million for the government. Accordingly, the royal charter for the New Company was received from the throne. See S.A. Khan, The East India Trade in the Seventeenth Century, (London, 1923), pp. 226-27.

2. Ibid., p. 245. The 'Old' Company was never dismantled. As a result of talks which were held between the two Companies, they were amalgamated in 1702 as the United Company trading to the East Indies.

the 'New' Company attempted to regain a foothold in the south-east region of Borneo.

Banjarmasin was to serve as a commercial centre for the 'New' Company. By focussing attention on the China market which held extensive possibilities for the investment of European and Indian manufactured goods, and purchases of the much sought after Chinese wares such as tea, silk, copper, zinc and porcelain, the Directors considered Banjarmasin to be a significant intermediate port of call between India and China.³ They were equally hopeful that the products of Banjarmasin, particularly pepper, and other goods of lesser importance such as dragons-blood, bezoar stones, rattans, gold and diamonds, would serve as profitable commodities in the China trade.⁴ They were optimistic that Banjarmasin would supply pepper not only for China, but also for England. In other words, the Company anticipated a three-fold system of trade between Banjarmasin, China and England.⁵

In April 1699 the New Company appointed H. Watson and

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3. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11), f. 97.
 4. In 1699, the English East India Company appointed a China Council with A. Catchpole as the President. The Council hoped to make Chusan its main trading base from where commercial transactions with the Chinese could be conducted.
 5. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11), f. 96.

a delegation of four other Council members, T. Tooly, W. Rodgett, T. Joyner and T. Moseley,⁶ to sail to Banjarmasin with Captain C. Coatsworth on the Julia.⁷ Although the objective was to establish a factory, the Council members were instructed not to acquaint the Panembahan of their true intention on their arrival, but merely to inform him that they would "bring trade thither, which would tend much to promoting the interest of his [Panembahan's] country."⁸ They were also to request the cession of land in Banjar, Tartas or Kayu Tinggi for establishing a factory, a royal chop granting freedom of trade with the Banjarese and other merchants at Banjarmasin, the purchase of pepper at the lowest prices possible, and the award of extra-territorial rights to the English on judicial matters. In return for these rights, the Council would give presents to the value of a dollar for every koyan of pepper bought, but would be exempted from paying custom duties. If any English vessel did not obtain a cargo exceeding twenty-five koyans of pepper, then the factors were not obliged to give presents or money to the Panembahan. The English would also not allow any Banjarese chief or Pengeron to borrow money from them unless

6. The names of the Council members were listed in order of seniority beginning with Watson as Chief. They were paid £100, £68, £40 and £40 per annum respectively.

7. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, LB (11), f. 51.

8. Ibid., f. 52.

he had some pledge of repayment.⁹

Although the English Company laid down the conditions for its factors to make a settlement in Banjarmasin, it did not overlook the possibility of failure in the negotiations between the Panambahan and the Council. It pointed out that if the factors were unsuccessful in establishing a settlement, they should purchase a full cargo of pepper and smaller quantities of gold, bezbar stones, beeswax, dragons-blood and rattans and return to England. However, if they were not permitted to trade at all in Banjar, they should sail to Malacca or Achch to procure a cargo of goods for Mokha.¹⁰

With a cargo of 41,100 items of piece-goods and two tons of opium,¹¹ the Julia arrived in the Bay of Banjar in April 1700.¹² The factors had to wait for nearly a month before they were granted an audience by the Panambahan at

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9. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, CFR (6), f. 757. With regard to the last clause, if any Banjarese who did not belong to royalty owed money to the Council and absconded, the Panambahan had to issue a search warrant for the absconder who would be delivered to the English after he had been arrested.
10. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, LB (11), f. 56. Mokha was a busy port on the Red Sea and the English made periodic visits there in the seventeenth century.
11. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, FRM (6), f. 45.
12. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 24 April 1700.

Kayu Tinggi. In the letter which S. Landon, who replaced Watson as Council chief,¹³ delivered to Sultan Bagus Kasuna, the Directors had written that the English were keen to renew the "ancient friendship" between the two peoples and to establish a settlement, "... in order to carry on a trade in your kingdom for the benefit of your Majesty's dominion and this honourable Company, so as it may be done with safety and security provided your Majesty will afford them the necessary articles for their so doing, which we recommend to you, otherwise they are ordered by us to apply themselves elsewhere..."¹⁴

Bagus Kasuna would not permit the English Company to settle in Banjarmasin on its own terms but stipulated that it had to pay port duties. Eventually, both sides agreed that the English should give \$350 per ship as port charges in return for the right to build a bamboo house for conducting trade.¹⁵ Nothing was mentioned about the pepper transactions, although the English factors were optimistic that they

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13. The Directors had appointed S. Landon, Council Chief, as they considered him "the best person to advance the interests of the Company in Banjarmasin, being a man of ingenuity and address and knows the humour very well of those people [Banjarese]." - E.I.C. to Watson, 26 September 1699, LB (11), ff. 96-97.
14. Letter from the E.I.C. to the Sultan of Banjarmasin, 13 April 1699, CFR (6), ff. 761-62.
15. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, FRM (6), f. 45.

would soon win the Banjarese to their side, and persuade them to offer all their stocks to their Company.¹⁶ The outcome of the negotiations showed clearly that the Panambahan did not want the English to dictate conditions to him, and the factors, instead of merely giving presents, had to pay port dues as well.¹⁷

The initial attempts at creating a settlement were encouraging. A site was selected for the factory opposite the Barito river where the English ships were anchored. It was "within muskett shott of [the English] ships, where they would build a small house, and in a year or two, by degrees doubt not but the island would be raised and made firm."¹⁸ Here at Banjar, about twelve miles from the Java Sea, the English settlers built along the river banks on stilts several bamboo houses with thatched roofs of kajang leaves. By the end of 1700, the factors were reported to be "well-settled" in Banjar.¹⁹

The loading of pepper into the Julia commenced in

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16. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 August 1701, JFR (6B), No. 34.
17. The total cost of the presents and the port duties came up to \$950.- Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, FRM (6), f. 45.
18. Landon to E.I.C., 11 July 1700, FRM (6), f. 46.
19. Minutes of the Hughli Council, 16 November 1700, FRM (6), f. 31.

November of the same year. The first consignment of one hundred and fifty tons was the remnant of the pepper harvest of 1699 which Landon managed to procure from the Banjarese at thirteen gantangs per Spanish dollar. This initial success encouraged the English to think in terms of engrossing the whole pepper crop of Banjarnasin which was estimated at 2,000 tons per year.²⁰ Although the Directors had given instructions that no money should be advanced to the Banjarese until the actual delivery of pepper supplies, the factors found that it was impossible to conduct business in this way as the Banjarese were reluctant to send any pepper to them until they had received advances. Nevertheless, the English hoped that the Banjarese merchants would follow their system once Anglo-Banjarese commercial relations were placed on a sounder basis.²¹

Many of the English ships which visited Banjar, such as the Rising Sun, Seaford, Neptune, Sarah, and China Merchant, were enjoined by the Company to obtain pepper for sale in the various ports of China and to purchase

20. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6), f. 60.

21. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 21 August 1701, JFR (6B), No. 31.

Chinese goods.²² Together with the chests of bullion, namely Spanish and pillar dollars,²³ the ships were stocked with many bales of Indian wares especially Coromandel cotton and Bengal opium. Few English articles were included in the invoice of the ships as the factors discovered that English goods were hardly saleable in Banjarmasin. Even English bayonets and small arms, which were considered to be novelties, were not popular among the Banjarese.²⁴ The Banjarese insisted on Spanish dollars when making pepper transactions with the English because pillar dollars were unacceptable as a medium of exchange. A shortage of Spanish dollars created difficulties for the English factors. On many occasions, for instance, vessels which were on their way to Banjarmasin had to stop over at Batavia to change their pillar dollars ^{into Spanish dollars} in order to buy pepper at Banjarmasin.²⁵ The English Company therefore resorted to the sale of Indian

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22. Most of the ships mentioned above came to Banjarmasin in 1701. The Rising Sun and Seaford were bound for Canton, Neptune for Amoy, Sarah and China Merchant for Ningpo. A general record of their arrival and departure is given in JFR (6B), No. 29.
23. See Appendix I, p. 329.
24. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6), f. 67.
25. Krises, bayonets, sword-blades, hats and silver were taken to Batavia from India or Chusan to exchange for Spanish dollars. - Chusan Council to E.I.C., 4 January 1701, OC (56), 3, no page.

products and also made use of Spanish dollars when it bought pepper. The Directors also displayed a great zeal in boosting the sale of their Coast and Bay goods, particularly opium, which was in great demand among the Banjarese.²⁶

Despite the difficulty of procuring bulk supplies of pepper as they had originally intended, the English factors earned the credit of developing Banjar from a sleepy village into a bustling centre. Tartas, which was about six miles further up the Barito river than Banjar town, was the busy commercial centre where traders of different countries, such as the Portuguese,²⁷ Arabs, and Indonesians from the neighbouring areas of Java, Madura, Celebes, Lombok, Bali and Sumbawa assembled to conduct their business transactions. When the English Council established a settlement on Banjar, Pengeran Dipati, who was in charge of port duties, shifted his customs office from Tartas to Banjar.²⁸ Consequently,

26. Opium was sold at three Spanish dollars per kati in Banjarmasin. - Rodgett to E.I.C., 23 November 1701, FRM (C), f. 67. Beeckman stated that the Banjarese were the greatest lovers of opium imaginable. See Beeckman, op. cit., p. 87.

27. Jacob de Roy, who was formerly in the service of the Dutch East India Company, and who had fled to Banjarmasin in 1691 when the Dutch authorities raised certain charges against him, claimed that the Portuguese of Macao showed the Chinese the way to Banjarmasin. Each year, four or five Portuguese ships came to Banjarmasin to buy pepper. See De Roy, Hachelijke-Reys, f. 145.

28. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 10 May 1701.

the Chinese junks and the Indonesian perahus, which normally resorted to Tartas, also had to come to Banjar to pay their port dues to the Fengeran.²⁹ Thus, the commercial importance of Tartas was overshadowed by the new settlement at Banjar.

However, there was no harmony in the English Council for differences arose among the factors. Watson was dismissed by the Company in August 1701³⁰ on the grounds that he had "fomented differences aboard ship" and had "made himself a laughing stock to ye Dutch,"³¹ as soon as rumours of his mismanagement of affairs at Banjar reached Batavia. According to Landon, all his colleagues in the Council were guilty of "debts and interceptions." Apparently, Watson had planned with Oldham, an interpreter of the Company, to enter false accounts in the Council ledger, so that they could make use of part of the money to purchase pepper for their own profit.³²

29. Ibid.

30. It has been incorrectly stated by Suntharalingam that Landon was appointed chief of the factory only in August 1701 when Watson was dismissed. Landon had headed the Council even before the Julia arrived in Banjarmasin. - R. Suntharalingam - "An Abortive Attempt at Settlement, 1700-1707", Journal of South East Asian History, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1963), p. 40.

31. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 21 August 1701, LB (11), ff. 317-18.

32. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 13 March 1701.

In another case, Rodgett bought \$400 worth of cassia lignum for his own use, but charged the sum to the Company accounts. A further instance of "interception" occurred when a debt of \$1,250 which the Council owed to Pengeran Dipati was inserted in the ledger as "payment already made," when in fact only \$250 had been paid to the Pengeran.³³ As a result of these illegal activities by the above-mentioned factors, Landon confined them to their quarters.³⁴

The high-handed conduct of Landon provoked the other factors to oppose him. They alleged that early in 1701, Landon had supplied two separate stock ships with pepper. This delivery delayed the dispatch of the Julia and the Panther which were both Company ships.³⁵ Rodgett explained that Landon had been dishonest when he loaded ten tons of pepper into the Panther in his own name. For every ten gantangs of pepper which was consigned to the Company, Rodgett claimed, Landon had extracted one gantang.³⁶ By this means, Landon had managed to accumulate pepper to the amount of ten tons. "When Landon dies," Rodgett continued, "he would leave an account of irregular proceedings and trade at

33. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 13 March 1701.

34. Ibid.

35. E.I.C. to Landon, 29 August 1701, JFR (6B), No. 34.

36. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia, 23 September 1701, FRM (6), f. 66.

Banjar."³⁷ To lend support to Rodgett's allegation, Tooly, another Council member, stated that "the President understands ye country and his owne interest very well, but is very high and exercises his authority beyond its bounds."³⁸

How far the various accusations and counter-accusations were true, cannot easily be gauged. It can, perhaps, be argued that Watson, who was disgruntled because he had been relegated to second position on the Banjar Council, had conspired with the other factors to trump up charges against Landon. It can be more definitely asserted that the whole Council, including Landon, to a greater or lesser extent, were engaged in, or attempted to participate in the separate stock trade.

The salaries paid by the Company to its factors in Borneo and China were highly inadequate. As it has already been noted, the chief of the Banjar factory received £100 per annum, while a writer obtained as little as £40 per annum. Generally, it was recognised that his salary made up only a small part of the emoluments of a Company servant. Unlike the government official whose meagre income was supplemented by presents, exactions and bribes, the factor or supercargo

37. Ibid.

38. Tooly to E.I.C., 3 January 1701, FRM (6), f. 72.

had few opportunities to obtain these extra sources of income. It would seem that the only means for him to supplement his income was to indulge in a limited amount of private trade which was sanctioned by the East India Company as an incentive to maintain its employees' interest and loyalty.³⁹ However, the practice of limited private trade by Company servants was easily abused, and inevitably, it led to the gain of the factors at the expense of the Company. For instance, when Landon ordered Joyner and Wooly to check the Company accounts to see how much the Council owed the Banjarese for the pepper purchases, they showed him a debit account totalling \$16,000. Later on, Landon discovered that these two men had added \$500 to the account.⁴⁰ The factors were guilty not because they had engaged in private trade, but because they had made use of the money or the investments of the Company to pursue their own interests. A more serious charge against the Council members was that they had joined the separate stock traders to carry on private trade against the explicit orders of the Directors who had instructed them not to "...directly or indirectly load or help in loading goods in India on any separate stock ship for Europe, nor load any goods from port to port, nor trade with ships, nor advance them any

39. H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834, Vol. I, (Oxford, 1926), pp. 70-71.

40. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 13 March 1701.

money."⁴¹

Although the Royal Charter of 1698 granted the right of trading to the East Indies to the 'New' East India Company, it did not fully exclude separate stock merchants. Out of the £2,000,000 which the Company had promised to raise for Parliament, £23,000 worth of the stock had been subscribed by the private traders.⁴² By making this subscription, the private traders could stake a claim to the Eastern trade. The Directors admitted that "although private traders were not in the Joint-stock, yet they had the liberty to trade to India by virtue of the subscription to the amount of what little subscription they had."⁴³

In Banjarmasin, the separate stock ships competed with the Company vessels for pepper purchases. As the Directors were powerless in preventing the movements of the private traders, they could only instruct their employees in Banjar to get an exclusive pepper contract from the Panambahan for

41. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LE (12), f. 575.

42. Out of the £2,000,000, the London or 'Old' Company made a subscription of £315,000 while the 'New' Company held the largest number of shares totalling £1,662,000. See W. Milburn, Oriental Commerce, Vol. I, (London, 1813), p. xi.

43. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LE (11), f. 98.

the East India Company,⁴⁴ and so deter the separate stock merchants from making further voyages to Banjarmasin. Their hopes for the whole pepper supply, however, quickly faded away. In addition to the large amounts of pepper which were taken away by the Chinese junk owners, considerable quantities were also despatched by the private ships. It has already been indicated that the Banjar factors were partly responsible for contributing towards the successful despatch of the separate stock ships. Furthermore, by competing with the Company for pepper, the private traders not only reduced substantially the quantities of pepper sold to the English Council, but created additional difficulties for the Company. On a few occasions, the Council members had complained that in spite of their numerous attempts to persuade the Banjarese to accept pillar dollars and other currency, they could not succeed.⁴⁵ This was because the various separate stock ships, such as the Panther, and later on the Marlborough, Trumball, and the Black Boy⁴⁶ which came to Banjarmasin, always had a ready supply of Spanish dollars with which to trade.

Anglo-Banjarese relations were not very cordial by

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44. E.I.C. to Landon, 29 August 1701, LB (11), f. 322.
 45. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LB (12), f. 575.
 46. The Marlborough, Trumball and Black Boy visited Banjarmasin in 1703. - W. Lambert to E.I.C., 12 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8187.

mid-1701. Although the Pengerans and Gustis paid frequent visits to the English in their huts or ships, and were warmly received, and on occasions obtained presents such as small firearms,⁴⁷ they still harboured animosity against the English. One of the chief enemies of the English was Pengeran Aria, the eldest son of the Panambahan and "a person of great position and much feared by the country people."⁴⁸ Pengeran Aria's hatred of the English probably stemmed from the time when he was threatened by Captain Coatsworth who compelled him to deliver seventeen koyans of pepper for which payment had already been made. Coatsworth had made it clear that if Pengeran Aria failed to make the delivery, he would have to repay \$100 for every koyan of pepper below the quantity he had contracted to deliver.⁴⁹ Besides Aria, Sultan Bagus Kasuma also resented the English because he objected to the recruitment of Bugis soldiers by the English Council.⁵⁰

There were few Bugis when the English factory was opened in 1700. When Landon appeared to take a strong liking to the Bugis, Wadjoe Loeboe, who was one of the first recruits from Chinrana in the Celebes, persuaded many of his discontented

47. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 22 November 1700.

48. Ibid.

49. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 27 December 1700.

50. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 22 June 1701.

kinsmen to leave their homes and come to Banjar to serve the English Company. These Bugis mercenaries, who were paid five to seven dollars per month by the Banjar Council, were commanded by a famous warrior from Bony, called Bambang.⁵¹ At a meeting with the Panambahan on 17 June 1701, Landon tried to account for the large number of Bugis present in the factory. He explained that due to the short supply of European troops at Banjar, he was obliged to employ Bugis to guard the factory. However, he had already requested the Directors to send more English soldiers to Banjar; once they arrived, the number of Bugis would be considerably reduced. This was just an empty remark which Landon made in order to calm the nerves of the Banjarese ruler. One strongly feels that if the Company had sent a reinforcement of European soldiers, Landon would not have dismissed his Bugis mercenaries but would have retained them in the service of the Banjar Council. Landon also assured the Panambahan that the Bugis were under strict orders and if they committed the slightest crime, they would be severely punished.⁵²

The Sultan, like Pengeran Aria, was also bitter that the English had behaved in a domineering manner towards the

51. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia, 19 August 1701, KA 1539, f. 57.

52. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 22 June 1701.

Banjarese. The Directors, while instructing their employees to exercise caution, nevertheless insisted that courtesy should be shown towards the Banjarese when they advised that the English factors should strive to win over the Banjarese "by all manner of affable carryage, and courteous behaviour and above all by doing no wrong or injury to them."⁵³

Despite this advice, some of the Council members did not abide by it. In compelling Pengeran Aria to deliver pepper to the Company, Coatsworth boasted that if the Pengeran did not act as he was told, he could have him shot merely on a verbal order from Landon.⁵⁴ On another occasion when an attempt was made to kill Landon, the unsuccessful Banjarese assassin was captured by the English and imprisoned. When Bagus Kesuma sent men to release his subject, Barre, who was in charge of the prisoner, not only refused to surrender him, but shot at several other Banjarese in their perahu.⁵⁵

The English had also infuriated the Biajus when they seized some of their perahu which were wrecked in the Bay of Banjar.⁵⁶ Hence, when Pengeran Mangku, another Banjarese noble, informed the English Council that Pengeran Aria and the Sultan intended

53. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11), f. 96.

54. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia to E.I.C., 23 September 1701, FRM (6), f. 68.

55. Ibid. Barre was the supercargo of the Borneo.

56. Ibid.

to oust the English from Banjar, the factors were not the least surprised if hostilities were to break out. As early as 4 January 1701, the Banjar Council anticipated an early war and so had requested the Directors to send "men, grenades, shells, drummers and provisions for half a year."⁵⁷

The need to keep constant guard on the factory had been impressed on the English factors even before they had set foot on Banjar.⁵⁸ To ensure that the factory had some measure of protection, the Company decided that one ship should be constantly stationed at Banjar so that "the native or Chinese will not use you ill, or be guilty of any unfair practice towards you whilst there is a ship in the road capable to protect you against any injuries that shall be offered you."⁵⁹

To the English, one of the first signs of impending warfare occurred in June 1701 when Sultan Bagus Kasuma, accompanied by an entourage of a thousand followers in thirty

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57. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 27 June 1701, FRM (6), f. 70.
58. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 27 June 1700, LB (11), f. 2000. The Directors warned that the Banjarese were "a false and treacherous people, and you must accordingly deal with greater caution and wariness and not trust your money without pepper being actually delivered to you, nor trust your person or people beyond command of your ships which you must keep always in a posture of defence and not let too many natives come aboard at any one time and those without creuses (krises) or other arms."
59. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1700, LB (11), f. 96.

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perahus, shifted his residence from Kayu Tinggi to Tartas. According to the Capitan China, Lim Kim Ko, the Panambahan intended to make only a brief stay in Tartas. Sensing that Tartas was a step nearer to Banjar than Kayu Tinggi, the English made preparations for defence.⁶⁰ For about one and a half months, the situation in Banjar was tense, but there was no outbreak of violence. However, on 28 August 1701, an old Macassarese officer informed Landon that there were current rumours that the Banjarese inhabitants in the vicinity of Banjar were making preparations to evacuate their families and possessions in order to clear the way for a surprise attack on the English factory.⁶¹ When Landon and H. Barre, the supercargo of the Borneo, went to investigate, they saw that all the perahus and junks along the Barito river were covered with awnings and that the inhabitants had loaded their goods into their boats. The Banjarese informed Landon that they had been warned by their chieftains to evacuate the town before they were killed by the English. When the English insisted on learning the truth about the mass evacuation from the Sultan, the Capitan China reported that Bagus Kasuma had expressed great astonishment at the withdrawal of his subjects

60. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 5 June 1701. Although the Council had requested ammunition from the Company, it did not receive any. However, the English had to go ahead with their plans to defend the factory.

61. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 28 August 1701.

from Banjar and wanted them to return to their homes.⁶² Lim Kim Ko assured the English that the Panambahan meant no harm as he was still a close friend of the English.

On 30 August the factors found that the Chinese residents of Banjar were also planning to leave their homes with their families. The few remaining Chinese felt that they were risking their lives.⁶³ Meanwhile, the English traders, together with their families and some Macassarese civilians, left their huts and went aboard the Mary to safeguard themselves. Landon, however, stayed on the platform and with the aid of his Bugis soldiers, mounted a few big guns. A palisade of wooden boards was placed around the Mary to serve as a line of defence.⁶⁴

Hostilities commenced on 31 August 1701 at the upper end of Banjar town when fighting broke out between the Bugis soldiers of the Company and some Banjarese who had shot at them from their perahus. The scuffle turned into open conflict when Banjar town on both sides of the river was set on fire by the Banjarese.⁶⁵ When the English suspected that the

62. Ibid., 29 August 1701.

63. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 30 August 1701.

64. Ibid. The factory was deserted. The English intended to resist the Banjarese assault from the Mary.

65. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 30 August 1701.

Sultan and Pengeran Aria had initiated hostilities, they took the offensive by storming Tartas with a party of thirty-six Europeans and seventy Bugis on 10 September 1701.⁶⁶ By this time, the Panambahan and his followers had already gone to Kayu Tinggi. Undaunted, the Company troops pursued the Banjarese to Kayu Tinggi, after they had set Tartas in flames for a stretch of over one mile.⁶⁷ This was probably done by the English as a retaliatory measure against the Banjarese who had burned Banjar. The Panambahan, who was not really prepared for a full-scale war with the English, bravely defended his stronghold at Kayu Tinggi. However, the ill - manned Banjarese soldiers were unable to put up very effective resistance against the better-prepared Bugis and European troops. In the event, the English managed to surround Kayu Tinggi so that neither provisions nor reinforcement of soldiers could be sent to the beleaguered Banjarese. The war dragged on for about a month. When the Sultan found that he was at the losing end of the struggle, he decided to call off the war and sign a truce with the English in mid-October 1701.⁶⁸ According to the contract,

66. Landon to E.I.C. (undated), OC (57), f. 7726.

67. In his description of the war, Logan said that the English overran several towns such as Banjarmasin, Tartas, Kayu Tinggi and Martapura. See J.R. Logan, "Early English Intercourse in Borneo", Journal of the Indian Archipelago, Vol. II, (1848), p. 509.

68. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 14 October 1701.

(as recorded by the English since no copy of the actual Anglo-Banjarese treaty is available), the Sultan promised to repay the English \$3,000 for debts which Pengeran Mangku and Pengeran Dipati owed the Company, and another \$300 as war expenses incurred by the Council. There was no clause stipulating that Banjar would be ceded to the English Company, although it was stated that the English could settle and trade in Banjar as long as they continued to pay port duties to the Panambahan.⁶⁹

It is difficult to trace the causes of the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701. Apparently, the Banjarese started the war when they burned Banjar town. The English factors contended that open warfare was the culmination of the Sultan and Pengeran Aria's hatred of the English because of their impolitic actions such as the recruitment of Bugis and the display of arbitrary conduct. Rodgett, the Council member, pointed out that Landon had hurt native sentiments when he showed total disregard for Banjarese authority by declaring himself as "King" and his Bugis mistress as "Queen" of Banjar.⁷⁰ Thereupon, the Banjarese revolted in an attempt to evict the English from Banjar.

69. Ibid., 22 June 1701.

70. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia to E.I.C., 23 September 1701, FRM (6), f. 68.

The English also alleged that the Banjarese could have launched the attack because they wanted to liquidate their debts. They indicated that Pengeran Aria, Pengeran Mangku and a few other nobles became indebted to the Company when they did not supply the full amount of pepper on which cash advances had been made by the factors.⁷¹ Thus the Banjarese nobles tried to cancel their outstanding debts to the Company by creating hostilities. If this allegation had any grounds, the Banjarese obviously did not realise that if they lost the war, reparation costs to the Company would be financially heavier than their outstanding debts.

The argument would be too one-sided if one were to assume that Banjarese provocation definitely caused the war of 1701. The English could have misconstrued the Sultan's journey from Kayu Tinggi to Tartas in June 1701 as a design by the ruler to gather his forces in preparation for war. It was usual for the Sultan to travel regularly between Kayu Tinggi and Tartas, as the former was his hill resort and the latter his administrative centre. The Sultan might have resented the actions of the English council members, but so long as they did not attempt to override his authority, he tolerated their presence in Banjar.

Very likely, there was really no deep-seated cause for

71. Rodgett to E.I.C., 23 September 1701, FRM (6), f. 68.

the war. It probably started as a scuffle between the Bugis and the Banjarese. Moreover, the English were perhaps misinformed by their Bugis employees that the Banjarese intended to rout them. Consequently, Tartas came under heavy English attack and was overrun. The Sultan was either unaware of the situation because he had already left for Kayu Tinggi, or he did not want to be embroiled in the conflict and therefore had hurriedly left Tartas. He was inadvertently brought into the war when the English pursued the Banjarese to Kayu Tinggi. The sudden nature of the attack caught the Sultan by surprise and probably explains why the Banjarese were unable to defend themselves effectively against a small Anglo-Bugis force.

After the war, the English Council took precautionary measures to defend the settlement on Banjar by mounting two bastions and twenty guns. In March 1702 Landon, who was probably apprehensive of a fresh outbreak of Anglo-Banjarese hostilities, indicated his intention of abandoning the factory.⁷² It is conceivable that he realised that the Banjarese were aggrieved over the English onslaught on Tartas and Kayu Tinggi and felt that they might retaliate by attacking the English settlement. Landon's advice to withdraw from Banjar was not heeded by the other Council members, partly because they

72. Landon to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FRM (6), f. 119.
Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 July 1702, JFR (6B), No. 56.

objected to his leadership, and partly because no instructions for withdrawal had been issued by the Directors.

In April 1702 the Banjarese, who had recruited five hundred Blaju warriors to boost their numbers, launched an attack on the Mary which was anchored in the Bay of Banjar.⁷³ On this occasion, when the English saw that they were heavily outnumbered, they decided to abandon Banjar and sail to Batavia. The break-up of the factory occurred on 6 April 1702.⁷⁴

The assault on the Mary, and the subsequent withdrawal of the English from their factory,⁷⁵ came at a time when the affairs of the Council were at a very low ebb. After the war of 1701, the Banjarese factory was in a "bare condition."⁷⁶ Owing to the high mortality rate among the Council employees at Banjar and to the lack of replacements, there was insufficient personnel to run the factory.⁷⁷ A more serious mishap was the shortage of funds in the Council. Landon claimed that

73. Landon to E.I.C., 29 April 1702, CFR (6), f. 932.

74. Joyner at Batavia to E.I.C., 29 June 1702, FRM (6), f. 121.

75. Landon stated that since he did not wish to offend the junk traders, he had told them that the Council would return to Banjar to reopen trade as soon as possible.
- Landon to E.I.C., 29 April 1702, CFR (6), f. 391.

76. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 31 March 1702.

77. Landon to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FRM(6), f. 933.

since the date when he assumed office as chief of the factory, he had not received more than \$14,000 from the Company for Council expenses. In fact, after the Anglo-Banjarese war, he had to borrow \$6,000 to \$7,000 from Barre in order to maintain the factory, but nonetheless, felt that it was pointless to stay on in Banjar after the bitter episode of the Mary.⁷⁸

In April 1702 the Macclesfield, which was on its way to Banjar, arrived at Batavia from London. The Chusan Council, then temporarily stationed in Batavia,⁷⁹ could not verify the events at Banjar. Nonetheless, it was resolved that the Macclesfield should continue its voyage as instructed by the Directors,⁸⁰ in order to obtain a cargo of pepper. H. Rouse and R. Master of the Chusan Council were selected to accompany Captain Stacy of the Macclesfield to Banjar so as to re-establish trade, and to reopen the factory if the settlement under Landon's presidency had already been "broak~~en~~ up".⁸¹

78. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 15 June 1702, CFR (6), f. 933.

79. Originally known as the China Council when it was founded by the Company in 1699, the name was changed to Chusan Council when a settlement was made on Chusan. The Council withdrew to Batavia late in 1701 after encountering certain setbacks on Chusan. - LB (11), f. 117; OC (56), f. 7408. Also see pp. 86-87.

80. The Directors had instructed that the Chusan Council and the Banjar Council should work closely together in order to advance the Company's interest. - E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 21 August 1701, CFR (6), f. 924.

81. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 25 April 1702, JFR (6B), No. 6.

On the voyage to Banjarmasin in May 1702, the Macclesfield met the Borneo, which was transporting Landon and his party to Batavia, off Rembang. Landon, who had Watson and Tooly aboard as his prisoners, could not be persuaded to return to Banjar.⁸² Instead, he tried to dissuade Rouse and Master from continuing their journey probably because he was anxious for their safety and felt that it would be better if they could stay away from Banjar for a while until the situation there had become normal again. Rouse and Master did not heed Landon's advice but proceeded towards their destination.⁸³

Early in June 1702, the Macclesfield reached Banjarmasin. Initially, the factors were given a cool reception by the Banjarese. After a preliminary meeting with the Shahbandar where they pointed out that they had come to trade,⁸⁴ Rouse and Master managed to gain access to Bagus Kasuma. In the ensuing negotiations, the Panembahan would **only** permit the renewal of trade if the English gave him \$1,000 as port charges and a large supply of arms, in lieu of what Landon had seized from his people in the first Anglo-Banjarese war

82. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 21 July 1702, JFR (6B), No. 56.

83. Ibid.

84. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 10 June 1702, JFR (6B), No. 42.

of 1701.⁸⁵ When Rouse and Master protested and insisted on the former agreement of October 1701, the ruler was adamant as he considered that the contract had been invalidated when the English left Banjar in April 1702. Eventually, the supercargoes of the Macclesfield had to agree on the sum of \$500 as port duty on every vessel which traded in Banjar. In return, the Sultan allowed Rouse and Master to build temporary sheds in Banjar for storing water and provisions.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the Directors had received reports of the abandonment of the Banjar factory and also various complaints against Landon from the other Council members. When informed that Landon had no intention to return to Banjar, but had proceeded to Bengal, the Directors dismissed him from the service of the Company in August 1702.⁸⁷ Tooly, who had been brought back in chains to Batavia, was absolved from all blame as the Directors were given the impression that "his character and behaviour had been unblameable in Europe."⁸⁸ Thereafter, they appointed him as the new chief of the Banjar Council. Rodgett, Joyner and Beauchamp became his assistants.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. E.I.C. to the commanders of the Borneo, Macclesfield and other ships. - August 1702, MRM (19), no page.

88. Ibid.

When Tooly arrived in Banjarmasin in August 1702, Rouse and Master refused to acknowledge him as chief because they felt that the initiative to reopen the factory had been given to them by the Chusan Council. They told Tooly that it was they who had revived the commerce of Banjar, as the Banjarese could not even tolerate the names of the previous Council members being mentioned in their presence. Since "the trade we are now driving is of our owne planting," Rouse and Master continued, "tis but reason we should reap the credit or discredit of it."⁸⁹ Because of their refusal to co-operate with him, Tooly was compelled to administer the factory jointly with Rouse and Master and he promised not "to insist on any superiority."⁹⁰

In the course of their joint administration of the Banjar factory, conflict occurred between the two English groups when they competed with each other for the supply of pepper. Rouse and Master, who had signed the commercial contract with the Panambahan, expected to load the Macclosfield before other English ships.⁹¹ Instead of complying with this

89. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 1 September 1702, JFR (6B), No. 86.

90. Tooly to Rouse and Master, 2 September 1702, JFR (6B), No. 87.

91. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 21 October 1702, JFR (6B), No. 138.

request, Tooly advanced \$500 to the Banjarese to deliver pepper to the Panther, a private vessel.⁹² When Rouse and Master admonished him for intercepting the pepper trade because they felt that the principal way to lose the friendship of the Banjarese was to make cash advances,⁹³ Tooly blamed Rouse and Master for the slow despatch of the Macclosfield. He stated that if they had not deferred payment to the Banjarese but had handed out cash promptly, the Macclesfield would have completed its loading by then. In fact, the pepper merchants and the Chinese Shahbandar had voiced their dissatisfaction with the deferred payments. Since Rouse and Master had already wasted so much time, Tooly continued, it was not in the interest of the Company to wait for the loading of a single vessel and thus he had decided to obtain pepper for several ships at once.⁹⁴

The presence of another private ship, the Frederick,

92. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 22 October 1702, JFR (6B), No. 140.

93. Ibid.

94. Tooly also denied that he had disclosed confidential matters to Captain Robinson of the Panther. He charged that Rouse and Master tried "to lessen him on all occasions and make mountains of molehills by telling halfe storeys as suits best with them." - Tooly to Rouse and Master, 22 October 1702, JFR (6B), No. 140.

in Banjar in 1702 complicated matters, and led to further friction among the English. In their determination to procure a complete cargo for the Macclesfield, Rouse and Master refused to permit Captain Peacock of the Frederick buy any pepper. When Captain Peacock ignored their instructions and started to load pepper, Rouse and Master sent their men to seize his supplies.⁹⁵ Peacock thereupon complained to Tooly that his co-administrators had no right whatever to obstruct the free commerce of Banjar. As he had already paid port duties and made ample cash advances to the Banjarese merchants, he had equal right to participate in the pepper trade. As a matter of fact, one of the Pengerans at Tartas had announced that all English merchants could trade in Banjar so long as they made cash advances.⁹⁶ Rouse and Master disagreed and stated that since the Frederick was not a Company vessel, Peacock should have asked permission from the Banjar Council to purchase pepper.⁹⁷ Despite their threats designed to prohibit other English merchants from obtaining pepper, Rouse and Master failed to persuade the Banjarese to give them a full cargo of pepper for the Macclesfield. When they asked Tooly to part with ten tons of pepper and he

95. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 18 November 1702, JFR (6B), No. 179.

96. Peacock to Tooly, 18 November 1702, JFR (6B), No. 177.

97. Rouse and Master to Peacock, 18 November 1702, JFR (6B), No. 179.

refused, Rouse and Master decided to leave Banjar for Palembang where one of the Pengerans had promised them three hundred pikuls of pepper.⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the Directors were thinking of ways to make the Banjar venture a success. As the factory at Chusan was already closed, Banjar was considered as an alternative station from where the English Company could attempt to reopen trade with eastern Indonesia and also China. In order to consolidate its position and advance its interests in Banjar, the Company resolved to erect a fort around the factory. From time to time, the Banjar Council, in writing to the Directors, had advocated the fortification of the settlement. Rodgett, who succeeded Tooly as chief of the factory when the latter died early in 1703,⁹⁹ indicated that a fort would not only defend the English against further attacks of the Banjarese, but would also fulfil a major economic objective of the Company, namely, the encouragement of the Chinese junks to return to Banjar. After the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701, many nakhodas transferred their commercial transactions from Banjar to Tartas. When the English factory was re-established in 1702, the Chinese could not be persuaded

98. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 17 December 1702, JFR (6B), No. 209.

99. Tooly died on board the Edward and Dudley on 11 May 1703. - Ship log, Edward and Dudley, (1702-1705).

to trade with the English at Banjar.¹⁰⁰ Rodgett informed the Directors that the nakhodas had declared that they would bring their junks to Banjar again only if they were assured of protection by the English Company, since they did not wish the events which they had experienced under Landon to recur. The nakhodas had complained that during Landon's presidency, they were compelled to pay double port duties to Landon and the Banjarese Shahbandar at Banjar. Hence the English had to ensure that sufficient protection was given to the junk merchants against future toll-exactions by the unauthorised Banjarese and/English Council members.¹⁰¹ Rodgett thereby indicated that the only means to deter the aggressive Shahbandar from receiving duties at Banjar was for the Company to construct a fort.¹⁰²

Rodgett's conviction that the Company should fortify Banjar stemmed from his confidence that the English had the right to carry out such a project because Banjar, so he claimed, had been ceded to the Company by the Sultan in 1701. It is difficult to determine whether there was any cession of territory at all because of the absence of such a treaty. It can be recalled that the English sources merely mentioned

100. Rodgett and Griffith to E.I.C., 23 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

that the Sultan had promised to allow the English to settle in Banjar so long as they paid port dues. This clause implies that the ruler did not consider Banjar to be ceded territory, but rather, as land which was still under his suzerainty. There is a possibility that Rodgett and some of the other Council members interpreted the contract differently, namely, that Banjar was ceded territory; as such, only the Company had the prerogative to collect duties and to construct a fort.

Undeniably, the English were very keen to trade with the junks at Banjar. The hopes of the Directors to establish profitable trading settlements in China where the Company servants could purchase silk, tea, and porcelain, at cheap prices had not been fulfilled. The withdrawal of the Council from Chusan in January 1702 was a manifestation of the East India Company's inability to conduct successful trade with the Chinese. Catchpoole, the President of the Chusan Council, and his subordinates, had faced numerous administrative and commercial difficulties in Chusan. They found that payment of a duty of two per cent to the Chumpein or governor of Chusan was not sufficient to enable them to participate in the commerce of Ningpo.¹⁰³ They also had to satisfy the demands of the Hoppo or Commissioner of Customs at Ningpo,

103. H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company,
Vol. I, p. 111.

who resented the idea that the Chumpein should grant commercial privileges to the English without first consulting him.

With regard to the commercial difficulties, the Chusan factors could not persuade the Chinese merchants to accept their form of payment, viz. two-thirds in silver and one-third in European or Indian goods for the purchases they made, because the Chinese insisted on being paid in the proportion of three-quarters and one-quarter in money and goods respectively.¹⁰⁴ The Chusan Council stated that it met with "dilatatory proceedings, specious and false pretences and base usage in treating for goods by having one price given us today and another tomorrow."¹⁰⁵ Subsequently, the English Council was expelled from Chusan by the Mandarin of Justice.¹⁰⁶

In December 1703, the Directors sanctioned the fortification plans at Banjar and appointed H. Barre to direct the building operations, shortly after the English

104. Ibid., p. 114.

105. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 31 January 1701, OC (56), 4, f. 7408.

106. The Chusan members alleged that two private merchants, H. Gough and J. Roberts, instigated the Mandarin of Justice to expel them by claiming that the Council, especially Catchpoole, the President, behaved in a domineering way towards the separate stock traders. In their great hurry to sail off, the Chusan Council left behind 51,300 taels of unliquidated advances and some unsold stock in the factory. - Morse, op. cit., pp. 114-16.

Council had managed to obtain the approval of the Panabahan.¹⁰⁷ It is clear that though Rodgett considered Banjar to be the territory of the Company, the Directors recognised that even if it were only a formality, the Sultan had to be consulted in order not to incur any Banjarese hostility. Extensive preliminary ground-work had to be undertaken before actual construction work commenced, for after the factory was burnt in 1702, the area was "mostly in ruins".¹⁰⁸ When the place was resettled, only temporary sheds for storing water and provisions were put up, while the Company servants and merchants were housed in the ships anchored in the Bay of Banjar.¹⁰⁹

In its search for a site to build a fortified factory, the Banjar Council suggested Tomborneo, a small island off Banjar Bay, abounding in fish, cattle and timber. Since Tomborneo was sparsely populated because of its reputation as a favourite haunt for Indonesian pirates, it was considered to be an ideal choice. However, the island, consisting of very low land, and liable to periodical flooding

107. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

108. W. Lambert to E.I.C., 12 September 1703, OC (5), f. 814.

109. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8218.

during the rainy season, had to be drained.¹¹⁰ After some deliberation, the English Council resolved to construct the fort on Banjar and not Tomborneo. The Council found that it was not feasible to drain Tomborneo because of the limited number of workers available on Banjar, for the task of drainage required many "hands, tools, naval stores and stationary wares."¹¹¹ Although Rodgett had proposed to recruit Javanese carpenters and blacksmiths to work on the settlement because he felt they were cheaper to obtain than Europeans, the Directors decided against it. Moreover, since Banjar was already an established settlement, the Directors felt that it would be easier to fortify the place where labourers, building materials, and provisions were within easy reach of the Council members.¹¹²

Working plans on Banjar commenced early in 1704. By September of the same year, the settlement was reported to be "thriving".¹¹³ After the ditch had been cleared, a large timber warehouse was built. In order to construct a wharf,

110. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 28 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

111. Rodgett to E.I.C., 24 February 1704, SFR (7), f. 5.

112. Ibid.

113. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), f. 13. In fact, Rodgett claimed that the factory was resettled through his efforts. He stated that prior to his arrival, "not much as a board dared to be sent ashore or a tree cut downe. Therefore, the credit of resettling Banjar cannot be taken from me." - Rodgett to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8218.

wooden piles were drilled into the ground to serve as the foundation.¹¹⁴ Despite the initial progress, work on the building project was stopped in mid-1705. The reason for this cessation of activity was attributed to the sparse number of builders available in Banjar. At the time of Barre's arrival in September 1705, there were about forty Europeans in the settlement, but most of them had fallen sick because they could not bear the strain of working in a hot climate. Moreover, some of the Indonesian slaves who provided the English Council with manual labour, had run away.¹¹⁵

Barre, who had assumed charge of the factory from Joyner, soon after his arrival in 1705, felt strongly that the building of the fort should be resumed as quickly as possible. With the reinforcements which he brought along, he estimated that there were sufficient men to undertake the project which had lain dormant for several months. From his previous experience of the Banjarese, and from Joyner's earlier impression that these people were seriously contemplating another assault on the factory, Barre was convinced that "force prevailed more than arguments" in Banjarmasin.¹¹⁶ He argued that the Banjarese "dreaded the Dutch and feared the

114. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), f. 13.

115. Joyner and Griffith to E.I.C., 28 May 1705, OC (61), f. 8361.

116. Barre to E.I.C., 25 March 1706, SFR (7), f. 28.

Macassarese" because both races had demonstrated the use of force before.¹¹⁷ This aggressive policy of Barre differed from the concept of Griffith, one of the Council members. The latter held the opinion that the "natives could only be managed by prudence and not force," otherwise war would be the inevitable result.¹¹⁸ Subsequent course of events were to prove that Griffith was the better judge of the Banjarese than Barre.

Under the direction of Barre, the building plans were put into operation in January 1706. After the ground had been provided with a stable foundation of wooden piles, Barre wanted to fortify the factory with stone, and not brick and timber, as he felt that a stone wall would be stronger.¹¹⁹ The whole project, which included a wharf as well as a defence wall, was designed to be completed in twenty months at a cost of \$9,000 and \$12,000 respectively. Altogether, \$48,000 were needed for the whole scheme which included the cost of the factory buildings.¹²⁰ By the end of November 1706, the builders had put the finishing touches to a spacious two-

117. Ibid. The Dutch and Macassarese were both renowned for their military and naval skill.

118. Griffith to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f. 23.

119. Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, JFR (9), f. 42.

120. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 23 November 1706, SFR (7), f. 34.

storeyed barracks and a brick warehouse.¹²¹ The latter, which was designed to stock six hundred tons of pepper at a time, replaced the old timber building which had been built under the supervision of Rodgett. A lime-kiln was established in Tomborneo to manufacture bricks which were needed for the various factory buildings.¹²² Since Barre did not trust the Bugis and Macassarese soldiers as he considered them treacherous, he asked the Directors to recruit only European personnel to serve as resident guards at the factory once the fortifications were completed.¹²³

Despite Barre's enthusiasm over the swift completion of the project, unforeseen obstacles tended to hinder the remaining part of the building programme. The high mortality rate in Banjarmasin frequently robbed the English Company of valuable workmen.¹²⁴ It has already been observed that it was difficult for the Banjar Council to replace carpenters, bricklayers or blacksmiths. This problem of replacement became greater when the English were expelled from their settlement on Pulau Condore as the occasional supply of

121. The length and width of the barracks and warehouse were 106 ft. by 25 ft. and 90 ft. by 40 ft. respectively.
- Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f. 42.

122. Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f. 42.

123. Ibid.

124. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 23 March 1706, SFR (7), f. 23.

workers from there to Banjarmasin was terminated.¹²⁵ The unskilled labourers, made up of imported African or local Indonesian slaves, had the habit of escaping from their English masters. The torrential rains in Banjarmasin were another difficulty encountered by the workmen; there were long periods in which operations were at a standstill.¹²⁶

A greater problem which beset the English more than the above-mentioned ones was the lack of timber and rice supplies. Although the Banjar Council managed to obtain a small quantity of timber for its buildings from Tomborneo, the bulk of it had to come from Java. However, it was difficult for the English to ship raw materials and rice from Java as the bustling activity in the Banjar factory apparently unsettled the Dutch authorities at Batavia. Various English captains of ships observed that the Dutch were distressed to witness the large number of English vessels arriving at Banjarmasin "and seemed resolved to persecute ye trade thither with gter. vigour than ever."¹²⁷ As early as December 1700 Willem van Outhoorn, the Governor-General of Batavia, expressed concern over the fact that in addition to the English ships

125. Ibid.

126. Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f. 42.

127. Observation of H. Gough on the Mary at the Cape of Good Hope. - 21 February 1701, FRM (6), f. 46.

which were going to China and hampering Dutch commerce with the Chinese junks, an increasing number of them were also stopping at Banjarmasin to trade. He remarked that the Dutch Company had ignored the problem of British intrusion into areas where it had exclusive contracts with the indigeneous rulers, such as Banjarmasin for some time, but henceforth, it could not do so any more.¹²⁸ Here, the Dutch-Banjarese contract which Van Outhoorn referred to was that signed in 1664 whereby the Banjarese ^{had} promised to send all their pepper to the Dutch Company to the exclusion of all other peoples.¹²⁹

When the attempt of Joannes van Mechelen and Pieter der Vesten to purchase a full pepper cargo at Banjarmasin in 1678 failed, the Batavian Council decided to stop sending any more Company ships to Banjarmasin, but sanctioned private vessels of the Burghers and the Chinese inhabitants of Java to sail to Banjarmasin to procure pepper for the Company. Steady but moderate quantities of pepper were received from the Banjarese by the private merchants of Java who sold them to the Dutch authorities on their return to Batavia.¹³⁰ When

128. Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520, f. 414.

129. Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, Pt. II, in BTLV, (1931), Vol. 87, pp. 285-87.

130. Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1715, f. 367-68. In this missive, the Governor-General and Council of Batavia referred to incidents concerning Banjarmasin in the 1660's and 1670's.

he talked of English intrusion into Banjarmasin, Van Outhoorn implied that the Banjarese-Dutch contract of 1664 was still valid although Dutch Company ships had not visited Banjar for a long time. He added that measures would be taken against the English to prevent them from establishing a strong settlement at Banjar. He had thought of forbidding English ships proceeding to Banjar to land at Batavia to get provisions and water, but had decided against it as such a move would appear to be a breach of promise to the English to allow them to use Batavia as a landing site.¹³¹

Although Van Outhoorn had considered the question of taking measures to check the English at Banjar in 1700, the subject was not brought up again in the Council until 1703. In that year, the Governor-General stated that he had received information that Captain Barre was expected to come to Banjar in August 1703 to take charge of the English settlement there.¹³² In view of his impending retirement as Governor-General, Van Outhoorn urged his Council colleagues not to abandon their attempts to find effective means to impede the English activities on Banjar. He was especially concerned about the smuggling trade in opium by the English

131. Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520, f. 415.

132. Original General Missive, 25 February 1703, KA 1545, f. 113.

interlopers from Batavia to Banjar which was threatening the commerce of the Dutch Company.¹³³ Because of the great popularity of opium among the Banjarese, and the high profits which could be derived from the sale of the product, the Dutch alleged that the English who came to Batavia and Semarang to obtain provisions, usually managed to smuggle substantial quantities of opium into their vessels along with the other necessities.¹³⁴ Although an order was given to the Resident of Semarang in April 1702 to restrict the supply of opium to the private traders of the town so as to prevent smuggling by the English, the Dutch authorities found that the contraband trade in opium still existed to a considerable extent.¹³⁵

In March 1703, the Banjar Council reported that the Dutch Company tried to starve the inhabitants of Banjar by restricting rice supplies from Java to that quarter. The limited quantities which were available on the Banjar market cost 16 gantangs per Spanish dollar whereas formerly, 60 gantangs could be obtained for a dollar.¹³⁶ It did not mention anything about the earlier Dutch attempt to hinder

133. Ibid.

134. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 25 April 1702, KA 617, f. 140.

135. Ibid.

136. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

the English from bringing opium from Java to Banjarmasin. Although the restriction on rice imports into Banjarmasin was a deliberate measure of the Batavian Council to check Anglo-Banjarese trade, it was nevertheless carried out because of the urgency to conserve the rice supplies in Java. As early as 25 April 1702, the Batavian Council had instructed the Resident of Japara to send all the rice supplies of his area to Batavia so that the needs of the Dutch Company personnel could be satisfied first. If extra quantities of rice remained thereafter, Javanese private merchants could obtain passes to export the rice.¹³⁷

In July 1703 the situation with regard to the rice shortage in Java had worsened. A certain Burgher called Roelof Willems, was only permitted to take salt and some other provisions, but not rice to Malacca and Aceh. The Dutch authorities announced that in view of the small stocks of rice available in Java, these would be strictly kept for the consumption of the Company servants in Batavia and Ceylon.¹³⁸ Because of the restriction, it is possible that only very small quantities of rice were smuggled by the private traders of Batavia to Banjarmasin and other areas;

137. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 25 April 1702, KA 617, f. 140.

138. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 17 July 1703, KA 618, f. 332.

hence, this accounted for the exorbitant price of the product in Banjar. Nevertheless, the Banjarese inhabitants under the English control were alarmed when they were deprived of extensive rice imports from one of their chief granaries. Rodgett attempted to solve this problem by despatching English vessels from Banjar to Batavia to purchase direct supplies.¹³⁹ However, the mission was unsuccessful, and the outcome was that the Banjarese labouring force was compelled by the English to remedy the shortage by planting its own rice and also some sugar cane.¹⁴⁰

The regulation imposed by Van Outhoorn in 1703 prohibiting the export of rice from Java was still enforced in 1706. In fact, early in 1706 the new Governor-General of Batavia, Johan van Hoorn, intensified measures against the English in Banjarmasin. When he found that the Resident of Tagal was not vigilant enough in checking the smuggling trade in rice, he transferred him to Semarang and sent Cornelis Jongbloet to replace him.¹⁴¹ A more serious case concerned eleven Chinese merchants of Demak who were banished to Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope by Johan van Hoorn for furnishing

139. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

140. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), f. 13.

141. Resolutions of the Batavian Council, 4 March 1706, KA 622, f. 177.

stocks of timber and rice to the English at Banjarmasin.¹⁴²
 The Governor-General declared that he had taken such a stern measure in order to show an example to other private traders who still continued to help the English.¹⁴³ Because of all these obstacles, a disappointed Barre had to announce at the end of 1706 that the whole building project would require two years instead of twenty months to complete.¹⁴⁴

As the Dutch obstructive measures occurred simultaneously with the attempts of some Macassarese coastal traders to obtain pepper in Banjar, the Banjar Council suspected that they had been deliberately sent to the area by the Governor of Macassar to displace the English from the pepper market.¹⁴⁵ Instead of purchasing pepper at the port as the English and the Chinese merchants did, the Council claimed that the Macassarese went directly into the hinterland of Negara to procure pepper from the Biajus.¹⁴⁶ Due to a growing fear that this intrusion by the neighbouring Indonesians in the pepper trade would leave them with hardly any pepper in the

142. Ibid., f. 178.

143. Ibid.

144. Barre to E.I.C., 3 November 1706, SFR (7), f. 34.

145. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LE (12), f. 570.

146. Rodgett to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, CC (59), f. 8218.

end, the English held hasty consultation sessions or bicharas with the Panambahan.¹⁴⁷ They tried to persuade him to prohibit the Macassarese from going inland to make pepper purchases, and to grant an exclusive pepper contract to the English. Sultan Bagus Kasuma gave his verbal consent.¹⁴⁸ In effect, the Banjar Council received only an empty promise, for the ruler certainly had no intention of stopping the lucrative Indonesian trade, and thereby diminish the toll-duties derived from this source.

Because of intensive competition from the Indonesian coastal traders and the junk nakhodas, English vessels which arrived in Banjar in 1705 and thereafter were not very successful in procuring full pepper cargoes. Ships such as the Seaford which had to depart from Banjar in May 1704 without a single grain of pepper did so merely because the factors had no Spanish reals to buy the product.¹⁴⁹ But in the case of the Mary, Featherstone, Caesar, Catherine, Blenheim and Jane which visited Banjarmasin in 1705,¹⁵⁰ full

147. Ibid.

148. Rodgett to E.I.C., 20 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8217.

149. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 16 May 1704, SFR (7), f. 2.

150. The Featherstone actually came to Banjar on 10 November 1704. The Caesar and Catherine arrived in May and August 1705 respectively, while the Blenheim and Jane reached Banjar on 6 September 1705. - SFR (7), ff. 14, 15 and 24.

cargoes were not procurable chiefly because, so the Banjarese claimed, the bulk of the crop had been damaged by excessive rains.¹⁵¹ Although he had promised the Banjar Council that he would help the English to fill their ships with pepper, Sultan Bagus Kasuma was alleged to have acted in a 'dilatory' manner towards the English in 1705.¹⁵² Moreover, Pengeran Aria, who was accused by the English as one of the principal instigators of the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701, tried to hinder pepper supplies to the English when he fined a Chinese nakhoda for selling pepper to them.¹⁵³

Several of the English Council members, who disliked Joyner as chief of the Council, attributed the hostile attitude of Pengeran Aria and some of his subordinates to Joyner's arbitrary behaviour and the way he ^{had} bungled relations with the Banjarese authorities. It was true that Joyner's past record as chief of the Banjar Council had not been very favourable. He had first assumed office as chief after Rodgett had died aboard the Seaford late in 1704 while on his way to Pulau Condore to acquire tools and workers

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151. W. Salladine at Batavia to E.I.C., 11 July 1705, SFR (7), f. 13.
152. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 8 October 1705, SFR (7), f. 12.
153. Joyner to Griffith, 10 August 1705, SFR (6), no page.

for the construction project on Banjar.¹⁵⁴ At the beginning of his term of office, Joyner was reported to have a "good understanding with the natives."¹⁵⁵ However, when he was officially appointed chief by the Directors in February 1705, the other factors alleged that Joyner became arrogant, and Anglo-Banjarese relations rapidly deteriorated. Because of his ill-conduct, Joyner earned the disrespect of his colleagues in the Council, and when reports of his behaviour reached the Directors, so the other members claimed, they "caused a scandal in India."¹⁵⁶

According to the English factors, Joyner's association with his Macassarese soldiers incurred the displeasure of the Banjarese nobles. Like Landon, Joyner was on very friendly terms with his men and he made no attempts to impose discipline, or to check the Macassarese when they broke "barrack" regulations. On many occasions, the Macassarese were alleged to have shown negligence in guarding the factory by staying away from duty, had fallen asleep while on patrol, or had robbed the Banjarese inhabitants or abused some of the factors.¹⁵⁷ Instead of taking action against the Macassarese,

154. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f.29.

155. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 2 February 1705, SFR (7), f.15.

156. Barre to E.I.C., 4 February 1706, SFR (7), f. 26.

157. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, SFR (6), no page.

Joyner had rebuked his subordinates for causing "dissension and separateness" in the Council.¹⁵⁸

Griffith, a Council member, warned Joyner not to put implicit trust in his soldiers because he suspected the loyalty of the Macassarese to the English.¹⁵⁹ The recent appearance of Pengeran Purabaya in Banjar enhanced his suspicion. Purabaya, of Macassarese and Banjarese blood, was regarded as a prospective claimant to the Sultanate of Banjarmasin. When his father who held the regency during Bagus Kasuma's minority had died, Purabaya tried to wrest the throne from the heir-apparent. He was unsuccessful in his attempt and was subsequently deported to Pulau Laut.¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Purabaya was hopeful of claiming the throne from Bagus Kasuma and therefore had started to recruit Macassarese troops from Pulau Laut and Banjar.¹⁶¹ His attempts at persuading the Macassarese to join his army made a few English factors, including Griffith, suspect that Purabaya intended to stir up a rebellion against the English at Banjar; an event similar to that which had occurred at Pulau

158. Joyner to the rest of the Banjar Council, 6 August 1705, SFR (6).

159. Griffith to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f. 23.

160. De Roy, Hachelike Reys, f. 136.

161. See pp. 123-24 for a more detailed account on Purabaya.

Condore.¹⁶²

Griffith was afraid that if the uprising at Banjar occurred, there was every possibility that the Macassarese soldiers of the English Company and Purabaya would inflict harm on the English, "by having so many of them among us, and you [Joyner] say yourselfe there are greater rewards offered them by the other party, so weighing the whole matter, our English people here are not without some grounds uneasy at your confiding so much in ye Macassars."¹⁶³ Thus, Griffith felt that certain precautions were necessary in order to ensure the safety of the English in case violence should break out. One of these measures should be the redistribution of the Macassarese soldiers in Banjar so that some of them could be sent to Tomborneo to guard the Company's effects there while the rest could remain in the factory at Banjar. By restricting these men in such a way that the Indonesian soldiers would not exceed the number of Europeans in either place at any one time, there was less likelihood for the Macassarese to inflict harm on the English. For defensive

162. The Macassarese soldiers on Pulau Condore had revolted against the English factors on 3 March 1705. The Council on Pulau Condore suspected that the Cochin Chinese had instigated the Macassarese to take action against the English in order to drive them away from the island. See Milburn, Oriental Commerce, Vol. II, p. 445.

163. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, OC (61), f. 8370.

purposes, the English factors should construct a drawbridge so that their ship would be a place of safe retreat in case of any Macassarese attack.¹⁶⁴

Griffith also considered the danger from the Macassarese who were not in the service of the English Company. He suggested that these people should be asked to remove their plantings to the other side of the Barito river away from the Company's ship, so that if the factors fired their guns during an attack, the Macassarese would not be in the way to mask their guns. Finally, the English soldiers should be on the alert all the time by refraining from excessive drinking and they should also abandon their native mistresses.¹⁶⁵

Joyner denied all these charges and considered the threat of a "Macassarese-inspired" rebellion in Banjar as "ridiculous" because Purabaya was leaving Banjar shortly.¹⁶⁶ Contrary to what Griffith had said, Joyner admitted that Purabaya had in fact approached him for help to subject the upland Biajus, but he had refused.¹⁶⁷ He argued that

164. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, OC (61), f. 8370.

165. Ibid. The Banjar Council alleged that Joyner cponly encouraged debauchery by keeping a harem of female slaves. - Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f. 23.

166. Joyner to Griffith, 6 August 1705, SFR (6), no page.

167. Ibid.

Griffith's fears of a revolt by Purabaya against the English were unfounded. Purabaya had no reason to stage an uprising as he did not have any grudge against the English.

He wanted some of the Macassarrese soldiers of the English Company to join his army /it is likely that he *intended* to use ^{because} them to suppress the Biajus in order to gain a foothold in the upper province of Negara.. Once the Biajus were subjected, Purabaya could launch the attack on Banjar from Upper Negara with less difficulty than from Pulau Laut. By approaching the chief of the English factory for military aid, it was obvious that Purabaya was determined to oust the Sultan and become the ruler himself.

Joyner was also resentful that Griffith had cast doubt on the loyalty of his Macassarrese soldiers who were a well-disciplined force. He was positive that as long as the English Company needed their services and they were not ill-treated, the Macassarrese would remain faithful to the Banjar Council.¹⁶⁸ With regard to the construction of a drawbridge, he informed his subordinates that he had already made plans to build it. However, he thought that it was an insufficient means of defence, for if the Macassarrese really intended to launch an attack on the factory, they had other ways to carry out their plans. On the subject of Macassarrese

168. Joyner to Griffith, 6 August 1705, SFR (6).

mistresses, Joyner admitted that he had permitted a few of his subordinates to keep female slaves for the "odd several necessary occasions."¹⁶⁹

Despite Joyner's protestations, the factors continued to send incriminating reports on him to the Company. Friction between Joyner and his subordinates increased after Barre's death in March 1707¹⁷⁰ and ^{when} Joyner succeeded as chief for the second time. This was clearly seen in one instance when the English prohibited a few junks from loading supplies until the Jane had been stocked with 45,000 gantangs of pepper.¹⁷¹ The factors managed to do this by stationing a guard vessel at the kuala of the Barito river. Shortly afterwards, Joyner told the junk traders that he would remove the guard vessel and allow them to receive pepper if they gave him \$2,500. To show that he would keep his word, Joyner ordered the guard ship to sail out of the river. The nakhodas then bribed him and started to load pepper into their junks. When the rest of the Council members heard about this incident, they rebuked Joyner who was thereafter obliged to reimpose control over the junks by commanding the guard vessel to go

169. Ibid.

170. Barre had complained of pain in his head and neck before he died. - Banjar Council to E.I.C., 22 March 1707, SFR (7), f. 43. In 1713, when Captain Beeckman visited Banjarmasin, the Banjarese boasted that they had poisoned Barre. - See Beeckman, op. cit., p. 37.

171. J. Casby and Griffith to E.I.C., 2 June 1707, SFR (7), f. 46.

to the kuala again.¹⁷² Under the threat of force, the Chinese were compelled to return all their pepper supplies to the Jane.¹⁷³ After this incident, the Council members accused Joyner of encouraging his Macassarese soldiers to loot Banjarese perahus which were wrecked in the Bay of Banjar. They claimed that when Joyner wanted to share the loot with them, they refused because they did not want to participate in his illicit activities.¹⁷⁴

When the Directors received the reports on Joyner from the other factors, they discharged him from his post early in June 1707 on the grounds that he was no longer fit to exercise his duties because of his irresponsible and impolitic actions.¹⁷⁵ J. Cunningham,¹⁷⁶ the President of the factory at Pulau Condore before the English were expelled by the native inhabitants, was sent to Banjar in the same month to

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, SFR (7), f. 51.

175. Minutes of the Court of Managers, 20 June 1707, CM.(42), f. 604.

176. Hamilton described Cunningham as follows: "He was bred a surgeon, and had turned virtuoso; would spend whole days in contemplating on nature, shape and qualities of a butterfly or a shell fish and left the management of the Company's business to others as little capable as himself, so everyone but he was master." - See A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, Vol. II, (London, 1930), p. 77.

act as the new chief of the English Council. Alas, it was too late for Cunningham to attempt to restore the goodwill of the Banjarese. The wounds which the English chiefs, namely, Joyner and Barre, had inflicted on the Banjarese authorities were too deep to heal.

On 21 June 1707 Bagus Kasuma, various Banjarese princes and nobles held a secret meeting at Tartas.¹⁷⁷ Soon after the conference, the Panambahan addressed a very friendly letter to the English Council. He offered to grant the whole pepper contract to the English which they, without hesitation, accepted.¹⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Cunningham had received a report that a large number of Banjarese were busy constructing warrior perahus in the upper region of Negara. When he went to verify the truth from the Pengerans, they assured him that he had nothing to fear as the few Banjarese nobles were merely building hunting vessels.¹⁷⁹

The hunting expedition of the Pengerans turned out to be an onslaught on the English settlement of Banjar. On the morning of 27 June 1707, about one hundred and fifty perahus swooped down on the Blenheim, Charlton, and some

177. John Wolff to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of Batavia, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 371.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid.

small English boats which were anchored in Banjar harbour.¹⁸⁰ The Blenheim could not offer much resistance because the gunpowder on board was wet. The Charlton emerged from the assault with little damage, and managed to go to the aid of the Blenheim, in time to rescue the crew and other Englishmen who were aboard.¹⁸¹ However, the rescuers did not find the captain of the Blenheim and a certain Jacob Hoogkamer,¹⁸² who had fled into the interior of Banjarmasin while the fighting was on. In the scuffle, the Chinese residents of the town and some foreigners who stayed in the vicinity of Banjar, either escaped or were massacred by the fierce Banjarese.¹⁸³ Although the smaller English ships were badly damaged and their crews were injured or killed, the Blenheim and the Charlton did not suffer such heavy losses. On their side, the casualty rate of the Banjarese was estimated to be a high one with about one thousand and five hundred men

180. John Wolff to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of Batavia, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 371.

181. Ibid.

182. Jacob Hoogkamer was an official in the Dutch Company at Batavia who was compelled to flee in 1706 when he became involved in some political difficulties with the Batavian Council. He came to Banjarmasin to join the English but in the skirmish with the Banjarese in 1707, he fled into the hinterland where he died of fever. See F. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien, Vol. III, (Mackenzie Collection (Private)), (64V), ff. 399-401.

183. John Wolff to Johan van Hoorn, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 372.

dead.¹⁸⁴ Before the Banjarese could launch a fresh attack, the English decided to leave the factory and sail to Batavia. The factors managed to retrieve sixteen chests of treasure, but the losses in cash and goods were valued at \$22,000 and \$28,000 respectively.¹⁸⁵

Several reasons can be suggested for the Banjarese assault on the English factory. According to Griffith, the ill-conduct of Joyner and his treatment of the Banjarese, alienated the Banjarese from the English.¹⁸⁶ It would seem that the charges which the Council members brought against Joyner earlier on made him fully responsible for incurring the hostility of the Banjarese. It is improbable, however, that Joyner alone could infuriate the Banjarese to such an extent where they wanted to kill or expel the English. A more likely explanation would be that the attitude of the Sultan and his subordinates had not changed since 1702; they continued to detest the English after the attack on the Mary. But when the English insisted on resettling and trading at Banjar in that same year, the Banjarese authorities consented on condition that the English Company would only conduct

184. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 78.

185. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.I.C., 24 July 1707, SFR (7), f. 32.

186. Griffith at Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, SFR (7), f. 51.

commercial transactions in the area.

Peaceful relations between the two peoples were partially restored by Barre when he arrived in September 1705 and tried to reassure the Banjarese that the English wanted merely to trade. These amicable ties between the English and Banjarese disappeared when the Banjarese authorities saw the mounting fortifications. When the construction works were in progress, Barre asserted that it was useless for the Banjarese to object to their fortifications, because the Council members had a military force at hand to resist any attempt that was made against them.¹⁸⁷ Barre could have also incurred the displeasure of the Panambahan when he shot at Gusti Ganton, a Banjarese chieftain, who had murdered a Chinese captain, and narrowly missed the Banjarese queen who was in the perahu with the Gusti.¹⁸⁸ It was a sign of great disrespect when Barre fired on the Gusti, but it was a personal insult to the Panambahan that Barre should have acted in such a violent manner when his wife was aboard the perahu.

The Banjarese onslaught was also attributed to the intrigues of the junk traders. According to Cunningham,

187. Barre to E.I.C., 4 February 1706, SFR (7), f. 26.

188. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.I.C., 24 July 1707, SFR (7), f. 32.

the junk masters became embittered and jealous of the factors after they had been deprived of pepper cargoes when threatened by an English military force and the appearance of the guard vessel. They also felt that once the fort was completed, the English would claim a monopoly of the whole pepper trade.¹⁸⁹ Hence, Cunningham felt that the Chinese instigated the Banjarese to take action against the English factory. As soon as the English were evicted, he stated, the Chinese could resume their profitable commerce and move freely in the area, as their movements had been considerably restricted by the guard vessel which was stationed at the kuala of the Barito river.¹⁹⁰

Cunningham's contention that the Chinese were involved in the Banjarese plot to expel the English had no grounds. One would have thought that if the Chinese had made instigations against the English, they would not have been massacred by the Banjarese. Unfortunately, many Chinese inhabitants of Banjar were killed in the attack. Evidently, the junk traders and Chinese residents were unaware of the plot to evict the English. They might have disliked the English for imposing arbitrary measures to prevent their trade in pepper, but it is highly improbable that they

189. Cunningham to E.I.C., 26 July 1707, SFR (7), f. 47.

190. Ibid.

played a part in the preparations for war. It can be more definitely concluded that the Banjarese authorities planned the attack on their own. As already indicated, the Panambahan and his subordinates had harboured resentment towards the English for a long time since the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701. The second war was, in a sense, the culmination of Banjarese ill-feelings towards the Council members for constructing a fort against the Sultan's orders.

Finally, it can be said that the outbreak of Banjarese hostilities in 1707 was a result of the fear of the Banjarese that the English would dominate the whole of Banjarmasin if their actions went unchecked. In allowing the English to trade in Banjar, Bagus Kasuma made it clear that he did not want the factors to set up any armaments in his territory. The latter, however, openly flouted his ruling by importing soldiers and building a fort. To the Banjarese, the fortifications signalled the end of their freedom and the beginning of British control in their land. Joyner and Barre, who displayed the might of the "Pax Brittanica" whenever they had the opportunity, enhanced the gnawing fears and antagonism of the Banjarese. Thus, before the fortifications were completed, the Banjarese, who knew that the English force was depleted by the flight of sixteen

men to Java,¹⁹¹ seized the chance to attack the English settlement, and were rewarded by the withdrawal of the Banjar Council to Batavia. Griffith had been proven right when he declared that force would beget war!¹⁹²

When they reached Batavia, the Banjar factors stayed there for some time to repair their damaged ships.¹⁹³ In March 1708 the remaining members of the Council, consisting of Cunningham, Edwards and Griffith, resolved to return to Banjar to recoup some of the losses which were incurred in the onslaught of 1707.¹⁹⁴ The factors were hopeful that if the Company sent them a force of two hundred soldiers and builders from Madras, they could suppress the treacherous Banjarese for "you [the Directors] will not pass by such indignity and loss sustained by such perfidious people."¹⁹⁵

In April 1708 the factors, without waiting for the reply of their Company, sailed with J. Legg, another Council member, on the Anna to Banjarmasin. When they arrived on

191. R. Edwards alleged that Joyner had been impudent enough to allow the Banjarese to know the number of men who were in the force of the Company. - Edward's account of the war of 1707, 7 March 1708, SFR (7), f. 53.

192. Refer to p. 91.

193. Wolff to Van Hoorn, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 371.

194. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.I.C., 5 March 1708, JFR (9), f. 3.

195. Ibid.

1 May of the same year, the Banjarese authorities avoided them. A month elapsed before the English were invited for talks with the messengers of Sultan Bagus Kasuma in Kayu Tinggi.¹⁹⁶ After weeks of negotiation over the resumption of the pepper trade by the English, the ruler sent a letter to the factors. The important contents of the letter were "... that the English might trade honestly but must stop no vessels going or coming from Kayutonge [Kayu Tinggi] and when landed, must depart."¹⁹⁷ Here, the Sultan implied that the English could neither build a factory nor a fort, but were to conduct ship-based trading, i.e. they could go ashore for the trading season only. This condition was probably inserted in order to prevent a recurrence of troubles in case the English should decide to stay on in Banjar. The port duty was fixed at \$1,000 per ship while the cost of pepper was ten gantangs per Spanish dollar. However, before the English could undertake any commercial venture, they had to pay the Panambahan \$3,000 as a peace gesture.¹⁹⁸ This sum was insisted upon because Landon took the same amount from the Banjarese when he defeated them in the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701.

196. J. Legg to E.I.C., 8 February 1709 - Abstract letters from Coast and Bay, f. 193.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid.

When the factors refused to pay the \$3,000, Bagus Kssuma was adamant. He warned that the English should comply with this condition or leave Banjarmasin immediately.¹⁹⁹ The English chose the latter course, and departed for Bengal on 1 October 1708.²⁰⁰ After a four-months' stay in Banjarmasin, the factors found that their design to renew commerce with the Banjarese and to resettle the factory had ended in failure. Since the two experiments by their employees to settle in Banjar in 1701 and 1707 had proven futile, it took the Directors six years before another attempt was made to establish a factory in Banjarmasin.

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199. J. Legg to E.I.C., 8 February 1709, - Abstract Letters from Coast and Bay, f. 194. Edwards felt that the Panambahan would not give in to the English on their terms because Cunningham was included in the party to Banjarmasin. He said that "Cunningham had been fairly beat out of their [Banjarese] country for the English crimes in general." - Letter to the Council at Bengal, 6 January 1709, Bengal Letters received, no page.
200. Letter from Fort St. George General, 1 October 1708, - Abstract Letters from Coast and Bay, f. 158.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL DISTURBANCES

After he had regained his independence from Mataram in the 1670's, it has already been noticed that the Panambahan of Banjarmasin managed to exercise suzerainty over the neighbouring areas of Sukadana, Sambas, Landak, Kota Waringin, Pasir and Kutei.¹ His authority over these south-western and south-eastern states of Borneo was greatly weakened by the end of the seventeenth century when his control over his own subjects of Banjarmasin declined because of internal conflict.² Henceforth, with the Panambahan's attention focussed on his own territory, practically every vassal state was able to throw off the yoke of its former master and to re-establish its independence.

Within the sultanate of Banjarmasin, the Panambahan, Bagus Kasuma, who reigned at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was, as his title denoted, the supreme ruler. His political control existed only in theory, for in practice, it was confined to the lower regions of the Barito and Bahan rivers including the towns of Tartas, Banjarmasin, Kayu Tinggi

1. Refer to Chapter 1, p. 32.

2. C. Nagtegaal, De Voormalige Besturende en Gouvernements Landschappen in Zuid-Oost Borneo, (Utrecht, 1939), p. 4.

and the capital of Martapura. The government in the remaining parts of the kingdom rested with three persons, Pengeran Anom, Gusti Temenggong and Pengeran Purba or Marta Ningrat. The first chief, who was the brother of Bagus Kasuma, and known officially as the Sultan of Negara, controlled the pepper-producing provinces of Gekompay, Borangbaha, Marampiade and Negara, and levied duties on the popper exports which were sent down the Sungei Negara, from which a certain percentage was delivered to the Panambahan.³ Gusti Temenggong, with his seat of power at Bonawa Assan, governed the gold-mining districts of the hinterland, such as Alli, Nahara, Pantsja, Komanting and Bonawa Tengah.⁴ A shrewd and cunning politician, he derived a very lucrative income from the revenue received from the mines and from the compulsory annual tributes made by the Banjarese to the Panambahan. Instead of sending the full tributary sum to the ruler, it was said that Gusti Temenggong only made an account of his transactions to his master as he thought "proper and agreeable with his own interest."⁵ Although Bagus Kasuma was fully aware of the dishonesty of the Gusti, he could not make any move to check him because he felt that "a person of such

3. De Roy, Hachelijke Reys, (Mackenzie Collection, 1822), f. 165.

4. Ibid., f. 135.

5. Ibid.

high rank and authority cannot so easily be controlled, since no person whatever may come within his district and mines without having previously obtained his leave to it, still less dare they enter into any commercial speculation with the natives of his jurisdiction."⁶ The third chieftain was Pengeran Purba who resided in the outskirts of Martapura. Being a military figure who controlled the Banjarese forces, he was heavily relied upon by the Panambahan and Pengeran Anom for the defence of their territory as they thought that he was "invincible."⁷

Sultan Bagus Kasuma had little cause to fear that any of these three chieftains would challenge his authority so long as he did not try to encroach on their right to collect dues or interfere with regional politics in their respective territories. The chiefs, on the other hand, though envious of the Sultan's powers, were even more intolerant and jealous of each other "on account of suspecting one another of intrigues in favour of the king, so that what the one proposes, the other disapproves, endeavouring thereby to master the other, wherefore the king as well as the other three chiefs are loath to attempt anything for fear of the other so that all is now in a complete confusion here."⁸

6. Ibid., f. 136.

7. Beeckman, A voyage to Borneo, p. 94.

8. De Roy, op. cit., f. 165.

It has been indicated that the people who had to bear the brunt of taxation levied by the local rulers were not so much the Banjarese as the Biajus, the Dayak tribes of inland Negara and Kapuas, who were forced to pay gold or pepper to the Panambahan. Since Bagus Kasuma had discreetly steered clear of local politics in order to ensure his own safety on the throne, the regional chiefs would generally exact more than the fixed dues from their Biaju subjects to fill their own treasury. The Panambahan, because of his own political weakness in a land torn by local loyalties and support, had to turn a blind eye to such unfair practices, which invariably, gave rise to discontent among the Biajus. On the whole, Bagus Kasuma was able to keep his Biaju fiefs under control by stationing large numbers of Banjarese soldiers in regions where there were predominant Biaju populations.⁹ However, the relationship between the two parties became gradually more strained until it culminated in the Biaju uprising of 1711.

When Suria Alam succeeded Bagus Kasuma as Panambahan in 1708, the Banjarese nobles decided to raise

9. There were roughly 1,800 soldiers in Kayu Tinggi and its villages, 700 in Tartas and Banjarmasin, and 500 in Negara. In the first three places, the soldiers were used to defend the ports and the administrative centre, while a comparatively large number of them were deployed in Negara to keep guard on the Biajus. See De Roy, op. cit., f. 291.

the tribute levied on the Biajus from forty to sixty tahils of gold.¹⁰ This act raised a huge outcry from the Biaju leaders who complained that they were grossly maltreated and demanded a reduction in the duties, but the Banjarese rulers simply turned a deaf ear to their pleas. In addition to this malpractice, the Biajus claimed that further injustice was meted out to them. With the influx of large numbers of Chinese junk traders into Banjarmasin after the expulsion of the English factors from Banjar, the Biajus, despite the fact that they were the principal pepper cultivators of Negara, Marampiade and Bekompay, were forbidden by the Banjarese rulers to sell pepper direct to the Chinese or other foreign merchants. Instead, they were compelled to deliver all their stocks at a very low price to the Banjarese, who would in turn, sell the pepper to the junks at an extremely high profit at Tartas and Kayu Tinggi.¹¹ These two causes, higher taxation and lower income, presumably incited the upland people to cast aside all fears of suppression by the better-armed Banjarese and to rebel in 1711.

The Biaju revolt was easily quelled by the Banjarese

10. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1174.

11. Ibid.

troops who not only had a capable leader in Pengeran Purba, but they were also supplied with an extra twenty muskets by the Dutch factors, Bosch and Indus, when they came to trade in Banjarmasin in September of the same year.¹² Suria Alam acted rashly by pardoning his Biaju prisoners because he felt that they would not create trouble again if he showed mercy to them.¹³ The Panambahan had misjudged his subjects because soon after they were set free, the Biaju leaders solicited the support of Pengeran Purabaya of Pulau Laut. **Purabaya** still harboured a strong grudge against the Banjarese royal family for expelling him from Banjarmasin in the days of Bagus Kasuma.

It has already been indicated that for some time, Purabaya had considered himself the legitimate heir to the throne, basing his claim on the fact that although his mother was a Macassarese princess, his father, who was the uncle of Bagus Kasuma, had been the regent when the latter was a minor.¹⁴ When Bagus Kasuma came of age, a succession dispute ensued between him and his uncle after the latter had contrived to make Purabaya his heir.¹⁵ After an

12. Bosch and Indus to the Governor-General of Batavia, 31 September 1711, KA 1633, f. 1415.

13. Ibid., f. 1417.

14. Refer to p. 103.

15. De Roy, op. cit., f. 136.

unsuccessful application for help from the Dutch, Sultan Bagus Kasuma turned to some Portuguese from Macao for support. The Portuguese managed to regain the throne for him in 1680. In return for their military favours, the Portuguese were granted an exclusive contract to purchase pepper at twelve gantangs per dollar,¹⁶ while Pulau Laut was ceded to Purabaya as a conciliatory measure. Purabaya was not satisfied. Hence when he arrived in Pulau Laut, Purabaya started to enlist men, consisting chiefly of Macassarese for his army,¹⁷ in preparation for the day when he could launch an attack on Banjarmasin. As already observed, he went as far as Banjar to recruit Macassarese soldiers who were employed by the English East India Company and was partially successful in his attempt.¹⁸

When he was approached by the Biaju leaders to act as commander late in 1711, Purabaya decided that it was the appropriate time to attack Banjarmasin and depose Suria Alam.¹⁹

16. The pepper contract granted to the Portuguese was maintained until 1691. In 1691 when the Portuguese tried to get the whole pepper supply and prevented a Spanish galleon from loading pepper, the Banjarese revolted and drove them out. De R6y, op. cit., ff. 158-59.

17. Captain Reid on the Arabella, 4 May 1715, JFR (9).

18. Refer to pp. 105-06.

19. Bosch and Indus to the Governor-General of Batavia, 31 September 1711, KA 1683, f. 1416.

In addition to the coalition of the Biajus, who looked upon the continued struggle against the Banjarese as one of liberation against their greedy masters, Purabaya could recruit the help of Daing Mamantuli, the notorious Bugis prince who had been expelled from Macassar for his misdeeds, and who had gone to Kutei in the meantime as the guest of Krain Bonteramboe in order to support her claims to the region of Pasir.²⁰ The appearance of the Bugis in south-east Borneo at this time was not a strange phenomenon. A maritime and warfaring race from the Celebes, the Bugis, through their piratical activities, had penetrated into many parts of the Malay Archipelago. By the end of the seventeenth century, there were sizeable colonies of Bugis immigrants along the Klang and Selangor rivers.²¹ In 1701 a small number of Bugis mercenaries were introduced into Banjarmasin by Landon, the English Council chief, to guard the East India Company's

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20. Krain Bonteramboe was the daughter of Krain Kronrong of Goa and a princess of Pasir. Soon after her marriage to the ruler of Kutei, relations between Pasir and Kutei were strained because of Bonteramboe's ambitions to exercise sovereignty over Pasir. To lend support to her territorial claims, Bonteramboe sought the help of Daing Mamantuli. For more details, see C. Bock, Reis in Oost en Zuid Borneo van Koetai naar Banjarmassin ondernomen op last der Indische Reggering in 1879 en 1880, (The Hague, 1887), pp. XIV-XLX.
21. R.O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya," JMBRAS, Vol. XIII, Pt. I, (1935), p. 151.

factory at Banjar.²²

With the entry of Purabaya and Daing Mamantuli, the revolt, which had originally been a minor conflict between the Banjarese and the Biajus, escalated into a full-scale war involving external forces. Hostilities which had ceased temporarily late in 1711, commenced again in August the following year when the first batch of Purabaya's soldiers arrived off Tomborneo to join the Biajus. In the face of overwhelming odds, Suria Alam despatched two ambassadors, Raden Aria and Tanu Kati, to Batavia for military assistance. The Dutch authorities, not wishing to entangle themselves in an internal war in Banjarmasin, gave a negative reply to the Panambahan.²³

Meanwhile, Daing Mamantuli and his two hundred followers had reached Pulau Laut from Kutei, where they were met by Purabaya and his son, Gusti Busu. With a fleet of seventeen perahus, the combined Macassarese and Bugis troops sailed to Banjarmasin.²⁴ To send reinforcements to the Biajus, they

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22. Secret report on the English factory at Banjarmasin by the Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia, 19 August 1701, KA 1539, f. 57. Also refer to pp. 67-68.
23. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, f. 86.
24. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, f. 1266.

went up the Barito river into the upper region of Negara, which was the chief trouble spot. Heavy fighting occurred but confronted with a more formidable foe, especially the Bugis, and heavily outnumbered, the Banjarese army of Pengeran Purba and Pengeran Nata Dilaga was badly defeated. Consequently, the Bugis were able to occupy extensive stretches of pepper land while the more remote areas in the interior were burnt.²⁵ The scene in Upper Negara and Bekompay was one of pillage, devastation and desolation. Many pepper plantations were neglected or ruined, and large numbers of Banjarese fled to the towns or ports of the lowlands for refuge.

The victorious Macassarese and Bugis managed to advance down the Barito river until they reached the outskirts of the city. Here, Purabaya and Gusti Busu compelled the Banjarese merchants to hand over their pepper stocks to them, so that only the most intrepid traders managed to smuggle meagre quantities of pepper to Kayu Tinggi or Tartas which were then sold to the Chinese junks at exorbitant prices.²⁶ On one of his reconnoitring trips along the Barito river, Purabaya confronted Van Lanschot, skipper of the Dutch boat, Bogaard, who was attempting to go inland to obtain pepper. He informed Lanschot that the Dutch Company had been deceived

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

by Suria Alam who had promised to load all the Dutch ships with full cargoes of pepper. In fact, most of the pepper lands were now in the hands of the Bugis, while the little pepper that remained in the warehouses could not be exported because of blockades imposed by the enemy.²⁷ Purabaya added that if the Dutch factors were keen to purchase pepper, they would have to ask his permission and declare their support for him. Lanschot, who had strict orders from the Batavian Council not to take sides, told Purabaya that he and his colleagues would remain neutral.²⁸

It was evident that the unstable situation in Banjarmasin was beyond the control of Suria Alam and his court. Lacking reinforcements of arms or men from the Dutch Company, the Banjarese suffered heavy casualties at the hands of Daing Mamantuli and Purabaya. Furthermore, a serious blow was dealt the economy of the country by the dislocation of the pepper trade. Since Banjarmasin could not meet their demands for pepper supplies,²⁹ the number of foreign ships which called at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi decreased

27. Ibid., f. 1267.

28. Ibid., f. 1268.

29. The Dutch Council reported that even the Chinese Licutenant of Batavia, Que Hoenko, could not obtain any pepper although he offered the Banjarese a high price in advance.- Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751, f. 369.

considerably, and this led to the reduction of part. duss. Moreover, the government had to increase imports, especially of provisions, to feed both the soldiers and the civilian population, after the ricefields had been abandoned by the agricultural population who had fled to the lowland ports and towns for refuge.³⁰ Suria Alam realised that unless he could obtain reinforcements of soldiers or arms from the Europeans, his kingdom would be ruined.³¹ Since he had been rebuffed by the Dutch, he therefore turned to the English in a desperate attempt to gain military support.³²

The appearance of the Borneo and the Eagle Galley (vessels sent by the English East India Company to revive trade with the Banjarese) in Barito waters at the height of the upland revolts in 1713 probably served to boost the morale of the lowland Banjarese who had despaired of victory over their foes. Although the English were there only to buy pepper, it is possible that Suria Alam hoped that he could manoeuvre in such a way that he could at least recruit some military aid from the English for his internal war by promising to load the two boats swiftly. If his plan backfired, he still had another trump-card up his sleeve. Evidently,

30. Ibid.

31. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 822.

32. Ibid.

by sending embassies to Batavia,³³ Suria Alam was bent on Dutch assistance against his enemies especially after Purabaya had joined forces with Daing Mamantuli. Yet he was conscious that the Dutch authorities at Batavia were reluctant to commit themselves even to send more ammunition to Banjarmasin. The arrival of the English at this juncture could possibly reverse the odds in his favour. The Panambahan felt that since the Dutch at Batavia were keen to obtain pepper from the region of Negara, they would definitely resent any competition from the English.³⁴ Therefore, by playing on the Dutch fears of intense English competition in the pepper trade, he hoped that he could make the Batavian government send more arms and some troops to Banjarmasin to augment his greatly depleted numbers. In short, Suria Alam wanted to play off both European sides, and in the event, attempt to get the best bargain out of both, or at least, from one party.

In the negotiations with the English, Pengeran Purba, as the spokesman of Suria Alam, informed the factors that if they wanted to trade in Banjarmasin, it was necessary for the Eagle Galley and the Borneo to sail into Tartas harbour,

33. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, f. 86, and 11 January 1714, KA 1724, f. 1191.

34. Original General Missive, 30 January 1714, KA 1739, f. 1395.

instead of anchoring off the Bay of Banjar, so that the Banjarese could keep an eye on them to prevent any outbreak of violence.³⁵ This was just a pretext on the Panambahan's part for his real intention was to get the ships to act as a bulwark against further incursions by Purabaya and the Biajus. The opposing forces had invaded Negara town once but had been repulsed. There was no guarantee that they would not attack again. If Purabaya launched another assault at this stage, Suria Alam felt that it would be easier to recruit British help if the Eagle Galley and the Borneo were stationed at Tartas. However, the English, sensing that the ruler wished to embroil them in his war, and that they would be risking their own lives if they did, courteously refused the Sultan's invitation.³⁶ Undeterred by the English reply, Suria Alam, at a subsequent meeting, offered cheap pepper to the English in exchange for some men and ammunition to enable him to intensify his war efforts against his enemies. Thus, in July 1714 B. Swartz, captain of the Eagle Galley, spared two of his crew members to assist the Banjarese forces in routing some Biaju rebels whose hideout was about three hundred miles from Dayu Tinggi.³⁷

35. Boeckman, op. cit., p. 63.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., f. 80.

It has been noted that the Panambahan's plan to gain British support for the war did not meet with much success. About two years had elapsed since the start of the internal conflict, and Suria Alam had witnessed his territories one by one falling into the grasp of Purabaya and Daing Mamantuli. If these two leaders were able to continue their victorious attacks, it would not be long before they would overrun the lowland ports and towns and oust him from his throne in the process. Such fears eventually led the ruler to appeal to the Indonesian and Malay merchants to defend his kingdom.³⁸

At all times of the year, large numbers of Indonesian and Malays called at Banjarmasin and its ports to trade with the Chinese, English, and Dutch, as well as the Banjarese. These small-scale inland traders from Java, Madura, Sumbawa, Bali and Johore bartered rice, salt, rattans, birds'-nests and sappan wood for pepper and bezoar-stones, but particularly for Chinese luxury articles including silk, tea and porcelain. For many of them, the coastal trade, with Banjarmasin as the commercial centre, gave them their sole livelihood. When internal war broke out in Negara and the neighbouring regions, the Indonesians and Malays found that their mercantile activities were adversely affected. As fewer foreign vessels

38. Banjarese embassy to the Governor of Macassar, 17 September 1716, KA 1732, f. 1452.

visited Banjarmasin with the disruption of the pepper economy, many of the coastal traders were left with unsold goods, and moreover, they could not obtain the required products to bring back to their homeland.³⁹

These short-term effects listed above were, however, not as harmful as the long-term ones, which were piracy and looting, evils dreaded by the merchants. The Indonesians and Malays wanted a quick stop to the war because of a gnawing fear of the Bugis who had become infamous as robbers, pirates and mercenaries. If Suria Alam lost the war, then Daing Mamantuli and his henchmen would become the masters of Banjarmasin. Instead of a thriving port, Tartas or Kayu Tinggi would become a pirates' den. Since they had a stake in the region and wanted to see that peaceful conditions existed so that normal trade could be resumed once more, the Indonesian and Malay traders therefore pledged their loyal support to the Sultan, and supplied him with arms, warriors and one hundred perahus.⁴⁰

With the large reinforcements of artillery and men, Suria Alam regained his confidence. During the last few months of 1714, the Banjarese, with the assistance of their Indonesian allies, launched a counter-offensive against

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

Purabaya and the Bugis. In the struggle, the Bugis suffered the most severe losses since the war began, including Gusti Busu, who was killed in action by the Banjarese soldiers.⁴¹ When the Biajus saw that many of their leaders were slaughtered, they retreated to the mountains, leaving the Bugis behind to continue the fight. Within a few months, the Banjarese were able to reverse the scales while Purabaya found difficulty in halting his advancing foes.⁴²

Although the revolts had subsided considerably, Suria Alam was ill at ease. He was unsure whether the calmer situation which had returned to Banjarmasin could prevail for long, as he was apprehensive that Purabaya would enlist more aid from the Bugis in the Malay Archipelago to avenge the death of his son. The Sultan did not wish to see a temporary halt to the war but a complete end to it. To achieve his objective, Suria Alam felt that he had to make another appeal to the Dutch for arms such as muskets, which could be provided by his Indonesian neighbours. Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China, who was sent as ambassador to Batavia, told the Governor-General that the Panambahan was willing to grant the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin to the Dutch Company if troops and muskets were despatched to his kingdom

41. Lim Kim Ko to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 November 1716, KA 1779, f. 57.

42. Ibid.

to help him defeat Purabaya.⁴³ When Lim saw that the Governor-General, Christoffel van Zwoll, was unimpressed with this offer, he tried to play on the Dutch fears of English intrusion in south-east Borneo by declaring that if the Company was reluctant to extend a helping hand to the Banjarese, the generous offer would be thrown open to the English Company, which would henceforth become the master of that region. Once again, the Dutch authorities did not relent but adhered to their original resolution of abstaining from the internal disorders of Banjarmasin.⁴⁴

Although the odds were in favour of the Banjarese in 1714, the Panambahan, even then, was unduly alarmed by the disturbances in his land. After the Banjarese counter-attack of that year, the Bugis and Macassarese never regained their former military strength. No doubt, there were occasional affrays between the two factions, but these were generally minor clashes which the Banjarese were able to deal with without incurring great losses. Purabaya knew he was fighting a losing battle, but still he did not surrender but struggled on until he was also killed by his enemies late in 1717.⁴⁵

43. Ibid., f. 58.

44. Ibid.

45. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24 November 1717, KA 1782, f. 1452.

His handful of followers (compared to the large army which he commanded during the initial stages of the war), fled back to Pulau Laut. Daing Mamantuli felt that it was worthless to continue the conflict, and thus, with his depleted forces, sailed off to Kutei.⁴⁶ With the Biajus in subjection in the uplands of Negara, peace had been restored to Banjarmasin.

Kasuma Dilaga, who succeeded to the throne in 1718 after the death of Suria Alam, was faced with the difficult task of putting the country, ravaged by the civil war, on its feet again. There was the need to attract foreign ships into the harbour of Banjar, to resettle the refugees and encourage them to replant the land, and above all, to import rice and other provisions so as to remedy the shortage of food created by the war. The first two needs did not pose much of a problem. With the removal of the enemy blockades along the rivers, and easy accessibility to the pepper plantations which had not been ruined, the English, Chinese and Indonesian traders returned to Tartas or Kayu Tinggi to resume their commercial activities, while the pepper planters, assured of a large market, resumed work on their fields.⁴⁷

46. Ibid.

47. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24 October 1717, KA 1782, f. 1453.

However, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient amounts of rice gave the Banjarese court a headache. As Java provided one of the chief granaries for Borneo, the Panambahan was especially interested in renewing mercantile connections with the Dutch Company so that he could obtain large supplies of rice in exchange for the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin. However, when they were approached in 1720,⁴⁸ the Batavian authorities did not accede to Kasuma Dilaga's request because they felt that it was senseless to go to Banjarmasin which was still a potential trouble spot despite the cessation of the Bugis-Banjarese war, when the Company already had adequate stocks of pepper from Bantam and Palembang which had signed new contracts with the Dutch Company.

While the Banjarese were busy with their redevelopment schemes, the peace which the country had enjoyed for a few years was suddenly shattered by the return of the Bugis. The first signs of renewed Bugis activity, according to the Dutch records, occurred late in 1725 when Arun Sinkang, a famous pirate, with his small retinue of men overran Sampit, a village of Pasir, and kidnapped about one hundred and

48. Original General Missive, 31 December 1720, KA 1826, ff. 1564-65. In fact, two Banjarese missions were despatched, one to Macassar and the other to Batavia on 30 April and 14 December 1720 respectively.

fifty men.⁴⁹ This action provoked the Raja of Pasir to go to Macassar to ask for Dutch aid to drive out the intruder.⁵⁰ Kasuma Dilaga heard that Arun Sinkang was sailing towards his land, and fearing that the latter would plunder passing vessels and impede traffic in Banjarmasin waters, he despatched two representatives to Batavia in October 1726 in a further attempt to lure the Dutch to Banjarmasin, in the hope that they would provide him with the necessary support in the event of a Banjarese-Bugis conflict.⁵¹

On this occasion, the Batavian Council responded to the ruler's invitation by sending Landsheer and Broun on a trade mission to Banjarmasin in 1727.⁵² This was a deviation in the policy of the Dutch Company which was to abstain from trading with the Banjarese. The change was brought about not because the Batavian Council felt that it had a moral obligation to help the Banjarese to defend themselves against external foes, but because of an urgent need to buy pepper from Banjarmasin so as to replenish the depleted

49. Original General Missive, 5 December 1726, KA 1929, f. 847.

50. Ibid.

51. Letter from Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 1 November 1726, KA 1931, f. 1839.

52. Original General Missive, 5 December 1726, KA 1929, f. 848.

supplies from Bantam and Palembang.⁵³

As soon as the Dutch ships, the Arend and the Volk reached the Bay of Banjar in January 1727, the Banjarese nobles made numerous complaints to the Dutch about the piratical acts committed by the Bugis. For instance, the Temenggong's son mentioned that he encountered seven Bugis vessels from Tidor while he was sailing home from Mandhera. The Bugis raided his boat and he was only saved by a small passing vessel which was smuggling goods to Selangor.⁵⁴ Pengeran Dipati cited an incident when he met two Bugis vessels off Sukadana which tried to obstruct his path. When he opened fire, the boats sank and the Bugis swam away.⁵⁵ Other nobles also stated that Bugis perahus were sighted daily in Banjarmasin waters. Since the factors were already in the area, they should help the Banjarese to remove the Bugis threat in return for a steady supply of pepper. Landsheer and Broun assured their hosts that these were minor piracies and that they were confident that the Bugis would not dare to infiltrate Banjarmasin in large numbers as long as the Dutch were there to trade.⁵⁶

53. Ibid.

54. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 374.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., f. 375.

The appearance of the Bugis did not cause much consternation among the common people until May 1729 when Toassa, the Captain or second-in-command of Arun Sinkang, sailed up the Barito river and plundered Banjarese boats which were carrying pepper cargoes.⁵⁷ Like his predecessor, Daing Mamantuli, Toassa used force to compel the pepper planters to deliver their stocks (which were consigned to the lowland merchants) to him when he reached Upper Negara.⁵⁸ The Dutch factors, Broyell and Broun, refused to give a positive answer when Kasuma Dilaga told them that their Company must erect a factory and stockade in Banjarmasin to protect Banjarese interests if Dutch-Banjarese commercial relations were to be maintained.⁵⁹

The expedition of Toassa into Negara was only a preliminary step to enable him to survey the inland regions of Banjar. In the following months, Arun Sinkang, who had gained supremacy in Pasir by then, ordered Toassa to launch an attack against the Banjarese.⁶⁰ Toassa, encouraged

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57. Landsheer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 14 November 1728, KA 1992, f. 176.
58. Ibid.
59. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 27 June 1729, KA 2025, f. 316.
60. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia, 28 February 1730, KA 2055, f. 46.

possibly by the thought of large spoils in the event of victory, swiftly gathered his six hundred followers, and in thirty six war perahus, the Bugis sailed down the east coast of Borneo to Tomborneo.⁶¹ When the Panambahan realised that war was impending, he insisted that the Dutch Company should start building the factory and that in the meantime, more Dutch assistance should be forthcoming.⁶² Instead of lending a helping hand to the Banjarese, Broyell and Broun had to sail home in the Volk because of the large number of sick men aboard ship.⁶³ In spite of strong resistance from the Banjarese, the Bugis were able to capture many of the villages in the interior, and they took away men, women, and children in addition to spoils. During the fierce skirmishes, about twenty merchant vessels which were heading for the Banjarese ports, abruptly turned back for Kayelin, Mandhara, Sumanap and Surabaya.⁶⁴

In March 1730 Kasuma Dilaga passed away after a short illness and his nephew, Hamid Dulla, became the Panambahan.

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61. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia, 2 March 1730, KA 2055, f. 47.
62. Letter from Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 15 November 1728, KA 1992, f. 182.
63. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 2 September 1729, KA 2025, f. 279.
64. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Governor-General of Batavia, 8 April 1730, KA 2055, f. 2.

The latter, who was anxious for the safety of his kingdom, promised the new Dutch factors, Snippe and Kamerbeek, that he would personally see to the safe delivery of pepper for their ships even when supplies were interrupted upriver, if they would pledge to oust the Bugis invaders from Banjarmasin.⁶⁵ Although not initially impressed by this offer, Snippe and Kamerbeek realised, after a short stay in Tartas, that unless they came to a compromise with the Sultan, they would be unable to stop the Banjarese from selling their pepper to the Chinese at exorbitant rates, and thus the Dutch would be deprived of available stock.⁶⁶ In the next three years, the Dutch found that their supplies of pepper were diminishing rapidly. This was because the pepper merchants became more reluctant to consign their stocks to them, especially when the amounts of pepper were restricted by the intrusion of the Bugis, and the presence of the Chinese junks.⁶⁷

When Marre and Brouwer led the Dutch expedition to Banjarmasin in 1733, they decided to put an end to the contraband practices of the Banjarese, and boost pepper deliveries to the Company by signing a treaty with Sultan

65. Ibid.

66. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Governor-General of Batavia, 8 May 1730, KA 2055, f. 87.

67. Original General Missive, 25 October 1732, KA 2097, f. 58.

Hamid Dulla and Pengeran Suria Dilaga. While commercial interests motivated the Dutch, political considerations, namely, the necessity for European aid to defend the borders of Banjarmasin, spurred the Banjarese authorities to seal the contract on 26 September 1733.⁶⁸

The treaty contained nineteen articles. Article II to VI laid down the regulations under which the junks could trade in Banjarmasin. Henceforth, although Chinese junks could still enter the Banjarese ports, only one junk per year would be permitted to ship pepper outside the Bay of Banjar under the supervision of the Dutch officer, so as to ensure that the vessel would not take more than the fixed quantity of 4,000 pikuls annually.⁶⁹ If any extra pepper was found aboard the junk, it should be treated as contraband, and therefore, subject to confiscation under Article VII, and the proceeds were to be divided equally between the Dutch factors and the Banjarese Shahbandar. In return for the right to purchase clean and pure pepper at the price of 4½ reals per pikul (125 lbs.) which was laid down in Article IX to XII, the Dutch Company promised to protect the

68. Dutch-Banjarese contract, 26 September 1733, Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. V, (The Hague, 1938), pp. 165-70.

69. The amount of 4,000 pikuls appeared only in the ratified treaty. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, f. 506.

Panambahan against external invasion in Article XIII either by means of a factory or pagar as soon as it was constructed, or when vessels were stationed at the kuala of the Barito river, without having to bear the costs of such ventures. The right of extra-territoriality for the Company servants was guaranteed in Articles XIV and XV whilst Article XVI stated that any trespassers on the Dutch factory were to be prosecuted or shot. The monopoly of the pepper trade was ensured to the Company in Article XVII. It specified that all Europeans, whether English, French or Portuguese would be prohibited from trading in Banjarmasin. In exchange for these trading privileges, Articles XVIII and XIX stipulated that the Company could, if it wished, build a factory or pagar either at the site which the Dutch factors had occupied since 1727, or near old Banjar which was in the lower part of the Barito river.⁷⁰ Here, the Company could continue to send its ships for trade without the obligation to build a fort or pagar, unless the Governor-General and Council wished to do so.⁷¹ The decision of the Batavian Council to render assistance to the Sultan, even though it was occasional and not continuous, namely, only when ships were stationed at the river-mouth, marked a major change in the Dutch Company's

70. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, p. 168.

71. Article XIX, Stapel, op. cit., p. 168.

policy towards Banjarmasin.

When the draft treaty was presented to the Batavian Council for ratification, the Governor-General, while recognizing that military aid to Banjarmasin was essential for obtaining a pepper monopoly, did not like the idea of involving the Dutch Company too fully in Banjarese politics.⁷² As far as possible, the Company did not wish to take sides in any conflict of Banjarmasin but the treaty committed it to support the Banjarese. As no date was fixed for the erection of the factory, the Governor-General decided that it could be indefinitely postponed since Banjarmasin did not deserve such great attention as to warrant the existence of a factory. However, an armed vessel could be stationed off Banjar to repel future Bugis attacks.⁷³

The treaty between the Dutch and the Banjarese for the joint defence of Banjarmasin did not have much effect in halting further Bugis incursions into south-east Borneo. One of the most renowned figures was Topass **Amy** who had made Linggi his den after his expulsion from Bony twelve years previously.⁷⁴ On one of his occasional raids in the Straits

72. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, ff. 509-10.

73. Ibid., f. 510.

74. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 46.

of Malacca, Topass Aray met Arun Palla, another pirate, and both of them set off for Linggi to pursue their illicit activities in the Straits of Bangka. The former went as far as east Java where he managed to force the Javanese to deliver their rice supplies to him.⁷⁵ When the Banjarese authorities heard that Topass Aray intended to make Banjarmasin his next target, they requested the Dutch factors, Marre and Brouwer, to send one or two ships to keep patrol along the coast in accordance with the treaty terms.⁷⁶ Although Sultan Kasuma Alam, who had ascended the throne as regent for his nephew Mohamed after the sudden death of Hamid Dulla, the latter's father, early in 1734, was not very eager to maintain friendly relations with the Dutch, he was nevertheless anxious to see that the Chinese junks, which were loaded with valuable products, should be escorted safely into Tartas or Kayu Tinggi.⁷⁷ The factors claimed that the pro-Chinese attitude of the Sultan had been largely moulded by Pengeran Kasuma Ningrat, the chief minister of state, and a close friend of the Capitan China.⁷⁸

75. Ibid., f. 47.

76. Ibid., f. 48.

77. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 17 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 16.

78. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 9 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 13.

The sight of the Dutch vessels, the Snip and the Rotte off the Bay of Banjar prevented Topass Aray from inflicting harm on the Banjarese and other foreign merchants when he arrived in Tomborneo. Instead, as soon as he heard that Arun Sinkang and Toassa were making preparations for another war on the Banjarese, Topass Aray offered his services to Kasuma Alam.⁷⁹ It was evident that the first two Bugis chiefs, with an army comprising 500 men and 40 perahus,⁸⁰ intended to crush Banjarmasin once and for all. While they were on their way to the Banjarese coast in April 1735, Arun Sinkang and Toassa encountered Topass Aray, and both factions fought. After his thirty perahus were sunk or burnt, and most of his ^{were} men/killed, Topass Aray fled into the interior of Negara late in April 1735.⁸¹

With Topass Aray beaten, the Panambahan had to depend on the Dutch to win the war for him. Under the command of J. Graffe, the gunboats, Snip and Rotte as well as the other Dutch vessels, Tanjong Pura, Onbeschaamheit and Quartel, were all stationed at the mouth of the Barito river to stop Sinkang's party from sailing inland.⁸² When the Bugis

79. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 29.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., f. 30.

appeared, the Dutch opened fire. By their active participation in the war in May 1735, Marre and Brouwer realised that they had gone against the instructions of the Company regarding non-involvement in Banjarese politics.⁸³ However, they felt that it was impossible to stay aloof when at least one gunboat had to be posted at the river's mouth in order to comply with the regulations stipulated in the treaty of 1733. Although plans for the erection of the factory and stockade could be left aside, other forms of military aid had to be given; otherwise, the Dutch Company could not expect any pepper deliveries from the Banjarese.

When Arun Sinkang and Toassa could not gain access into the Barito river in May 1735, they started to encircle the Dutch vessels with their perahus, hoping thereby to force their enemies to give up this way.⁸⁴ But before all the perahus could encircle them, the Dutch fired on the Bugis boats. Heavy fighting resulted but the Bugis could not contend with the modern artillery of the Dutch. After ten days of periodic skirmishes in which Arun Sinkang found that every move on his part was repelled by the joint Dutch-Banjarese forces, he and Toassa decided to return to Pasir.⁸⁵

83. Ibid., f. 31.

84. Ibid., f. 32.

85. Ibid., f. 33.

When the Bugis withdrew, Topass Aray left his hideout in Negara and went to Tomborneo. To ensure that he had no opportunity to create mischief, Kasuma Alam despatched a battalion of Banjarese troops under the leadership of Pengeran Marta and Gusti Johore to the island to keep guard.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, in May 1735 Topass Aray sailed to Martapura to request a loan of some weapons and a few war-boats from the ruler, apparently with the intention of launching a counter-attack on Arun Sinkang and Toassa in order to retrieve his losses.⁸⁷ Kasuma Alam hesitated but consented when assured that Topass Aray meant no harm. After he had obtained the military goods, Topass Aray also bought three chests of opium from the Dutch factors. Marre and Brouwer became suspicious and doubtful of the true intentions of the Bugis chief, when they saw that he could still afford luxury articles after declaring that he had incurred great losses in the war.⁸⁸

As soon as he returned to Tomborneo, Topass Aray sent his second-in-command, Karee Patas, to Pasir to invite Arun Sinkang and Toassa to join him in a combined onslaught on

86. Ibid., f. 36.

87. Ibid., f. 39.

88. Ibid., f. 37.

Banjarmasin.⁸⁹ The reply was favourable and in mid-June 1735, Arun Sinkang's forces and thirty perahus reached Tomborneo.⁹⁰ However, as on the previous occasion, they were unable to storm the Banjarese towns for the Dutch vessels were once more stationed along the coast. The affray ended up with the Bugis retreat.⁹¹ This time, the Dutch and the Banjarese did not allow their foes to gather strength for a renewal of fighting, and therefore, they made a surprise move by storming Tomborneo at night. The Bugis, who were caught totally unawares, were badly defeated. In addition to the capture of many soldiers, about eighty members of Topass Aray's family became prisoners of the Banjarese.⁹² Of the three Bugis chiefs, only Toassa managed to escape, whilst the other two were exiled to Ceylon.⁹³

In spite of the help rendered the Banjarese, the Dutch factors were very dissatisfied with the post-war situation after 1735. Instead of obtaining large supplies of pepper which had been promised in return for military assistance,

89. Letter from Kasuma Alam and Kasuma Ningrat to the Batavian Council, 11 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 22.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., f. 23.

92. Original General Missive, 16 December 1735, KA 2220, f. 1489.

93. Ibid.

the Company witnessed only the reverse, and in 1737, it withdrew its ships from Banjarmasin once more.⁹⁴ Moreover, the removal of Topass Aray and Arun Sinkang from the scene did not mean that the Bugis menace was over, for small numbers of pirates still roamed the Banjarese shores in search of prey while others were engaged in smuggling activities.⁹⁵ As far as the Panambahan was concerned, he was for the moment, not unduly worried by the minor contraband practices and the withdrawal of the Dutch, so long as peace had been restored to his kingdom internally, and he was assured of profitable trade from the Chinese and other foreign merchants.

94. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2245, f. 1289.

95. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

DUTCH ACTIVITIES: 1711-1737

When J. van Mechelcn and P. der Vosten failed to obtain a pepper cargo for Batavia in 1678, the Dutch Company stopped despatching ships to Banjarmasin for commercial purposes.¹ In 1708, Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China of Banjarmasin, came to Batavia as the ambassador of Sultan Suria Alam. He informed the Batavian Council that the Sultan intended to renew commercial relations with the Dutch Company and would be sending an embassy to Batavia shortly for negotiations.² It can be recalled that in the same year, the ruler was faced with a political crisis when the Biajus threatened to revolt because of unfair taxes and extortion by the Banjarese nobles. By extending an invitation to the Dutch Company to return to Banjarmasin, Sultan Suria Alam hoped that the Batavian Council would respond and give him military aid in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with the Biajus. When the Batavian authorities received the news from Lim Kim Ko, they decided to encourage free trade between the Banjarese and the inhabitants of Batavia. Thus, they

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1. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, KA 1220, f. 231.
 2. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 30 October 1708, KA 624, f. 758.

permitted the Banjarese to sell their pepper at Batavia, and also issued free passes to the Batavian Chinese, thereby allowing them to buy pepper at Banjarmasin for the Dutch Company at five Spanish reals per pikul. If the price of pepper exceeded this fixed amount, a premium of half a real would be given for every pikul.³ Instead of relying on its own employees, the Batavian Council preferred to send the private Chinese traders to bring pepper supplies to it.⁴

In February 1711 however, the Governor-General, Abraham van Riebeeck, reversed the established policy of the Council not to send ships to Banjarmasin by declaring that a Company vessel, the Peter and Paul, would be despatched to Banjarmasin to buy pepper, gold and ambergris.⁵ Several reasons can be advanced for the major change of policy. First, the method of obtaining pepper from the Batavian Chinese had not worked satisfactorily for the Company. In 1709, 850,000 lbs. of pepper had been supplied by the Chinese traders but the quantity had dwindled considerably in the subsequent years. Moreover, the price of pepper was not five reals but seven to eight

3. Ibid., f. 759.

4. Figures on the exact amount of pepper imported into Batavia by the private Chinese traders are unavailable for this period. According to the Governor-General, the amount seldom exceeded a few hundred thousand pounds annually. - Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 1711, KA 627, f. 103.

5. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 1711, KA 627, f. 103.

reals per pikul.⁶ Secondly, in contrast to the small stock of pepper which the Company could purchase, a fleet of thirteen junks from China had gone to Banjarmasin in August 1710 for a large consignment of pepper.⁷

Van Riebeeck, who realised that the Panambahan was eager to renew Dutch-Banjarese relationships, felt that this was the moment for the Company to break into the pepper market of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi and prevent the Chinese junk owners from taking away the whole crop. During this period, 1700-1725, the Directors in Holland increased their demand for pepper from the East. Each year, between 5.16 - 6.45 million pounds of pepper were required by the European market, but generally the Batavian Government sent amounts of pepper which were below the quantities stipulated because of insufficient tonnage.⁸ In order to satisfy the demand of the home market, the Batavian authorities were prepared to revive the trade with the Banjarese.

The Batavian Council was also alarmed by rumours that the English intended to re-enter south-east Borneo to trade.

6. Ibid.

7. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 9 August 1710, KA 626, f. 527.

8. Original General Missive, (no date), KA 2195, f. 490.

The recollection of the former English settlement and the fortification on Banjar made Van Riebeeck decide that he could not ignore the region. If the English were to re-establish themselves on Banjar, their commercial and political actions could prove detrimental to the Dutch interests in Java and the surrounding regions, as they had previously done between the years 1700-1707. Even in June 1708, when the Dutch officials heard that Cunningham and his party planned to resettle in Banjarmasin, they issued orders to all the governors of the east coast of Java to prohibit private ships from transporting timber, limestone, or rice to Banjarmasin, in order to prevent the English from receiving these supplies.⁹

Despite the initial enthusiasm shown by the Governor-General over the renewal of trade with Banjarmasin in 1711, the project was hastily withdrawn two years later after the Batavian Council had decided that it was no longer financially worthwhile to continue to ship pepper from the region.¹⁰ It pointed out that while the first voyage of the Peter and Paul had brought back 826 $\frac{2}{3}$ pikuls of pepper, the amount had decreased to 586 $\frac{1}{2}$ pikuls in 1712.¹¹ Although N.V.D. Bosch

9. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 22 June 1708, KA 624, f. 490.

10. Original General Missive, 11 January 1714, KA 1724, f. 1191.

11. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1176 and 17 January 1713, KA 1708, f. 1265.

and I. Indus, the first and second factors of the Peter and Paul, found that most of the crop of the season had been consigned to the junks when they arrived in Tartas in September 1711, they managed to persuade the new Panambahan, Suria Alam, to grant them a full cargo of pepper at four Spanish reals per pikul.¹² This was because the factors, who responded to the call of the Banjarese authorities to help them curb the Biaju revolt which had broken out in Negara in 1711,¹³ gave twenty muskets to the Sultan who was in desperate need for arms.¹⁴ In less than one month, the Peter and Paul was able to return home with a full cargo.¹⁵

Unfortunately, the second Dutch expedition to Banjarmasin in August 1712 did not come up to the expectations of the Batavian Council. With the prospect of a larger supply of pepper according to the promises of the two Banjarese ambassadors, Raden Aria and Tanu Kati, who came to Batavia at the beginning of 1712,¹⁶ the Batavian Council furnished

12. Bosch and Indus to the Batavian Council, 12 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1415.

13. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711, KA 1691, f. 96.

14. Bosch and Indus to the Batavian Council, 12 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1415.

15. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1176.

16. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, f. 86.

10,000 reals¹⁷ to the factors, Bosch and A. Poulle, who replaced Indus, and sent the Luitpool and the Jambi to accompany the Peter and Paul in collecting the stocks.¹⁸

However, on arrival, the factors were unable to make immediate purchases as the Banjarese merchants had given most of their supplies to the junks at the rate of six to seven Spanish reals per pikul.¹⁹ Moreover, the nakhodas, in order to ensure that Suria Alam would not repeat his action in consigning their stocks to the Dutch, had paid the Chinese middlemen to obtain the pepper direct from the uplands, even though there was a civil war in the land. Consequently, when the Dutch ships left the Bay of Banjar in October 1712, only the Peter and Paul was loaded, with 7331 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. or 586 $\frac{1}{2}$ pikuls of pepper.²⁰

The Dutch authorities were frustrated with the poor results of the pepper trade. They had despatched ships to Banjarmasin with the expectation that pepper supplies from

17. Ibid. The amount was 6,000 reals more than the previous sum.

18. The Batavian authorities were informed by Bosch that ships such as the Peter and Paul which were over 100 ft. long, could not sail up the Banjar river because of the great sandbank at its mouth, particularly during the Westerly monsoon. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 29 December 1711, KA 627, f. 962.

19. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, f. 1264.

20. Ibid., f. 1265.

that quarter would help to meet the demand of the Directors in Holland for bigger amounts of pepper annually from south-east Asia.²¹ It was, therefore, suprising that these voyages to Banjarmasin should be abruptly stopped in 1713. Evidently, the Batavian Council was disgruntled that the Banjarese merchants had given most of their pepper supplies to the nakhodas. It should be realised that during this period when the Banjarese and Biajus were embroiled in the civil war, pepper production was at a very low level.²² The reduced annual yield could not meet the demands of both the Chinese and Dutch simultaneously. Since the Chinese paid higher prices for pepper, the Banjarese gave them their pepper before the Dutch.

When faced with this difficulty, the Governor-General and Council had to decide whether to continue the expeditions to Banjarmasin or not. They resolved not to send any more vessels there, partly because they were disappointed that the Company's goods, viz. Indian cloth and opium, could not be sold in Banjarmasin, and also because they did not wish to become politically involved in the internal disturbances of that region. With regard to the sale of cloth and opium,

21. Original General Missive, 1733 (no specific date), KA 2195, f. 5153.

22. Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751, f. 363.

the Council had hoped that the losses incurred by the reduced sale of these goods to the Chinese at Batavia would be partially remedied at Banjar if the Banjarese purchased Indian cloth and opium in large quantities.²³ To the Governor-General's consternation, these articles were not popular with the Banjarese. The Council was also not interested in the export of arms or military stores to the Banjarese despite the Sultan's pleas for such aid. Hence, it decided that it would try to obtain more pepper from the other areas of Bantam, Palembang and Malabar where the annual production was less likely to fluctuate, and where their political conditions were relatively more stable.²⁴

The arrival of a Banjarese embassy consisting of Pengeran Kasuma Negara, Kjahi Mata Juda, Kjahi Angsa Dipa, and Lim Kim Ko in Batavia in February 1713,²⁵ failed to make any impact on the Batavian Council to reverse its decision not to despatch any vessels to Banjarmasin. Sultan Suria Alam had ordered his messengers to inform the Governor-General,

23. The Dutch stated that they lost the trade in Indian cloth and opium to the English who went to Canton to sell these articles to the Chinese. - Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, f. 86.

24. Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751, f. 370.

25. Original General Missive, 11 January 1714, KA 1924, f. 1196.

C. van Zwoll, that he would give the monopoly of the pepper trade to the Dutch Company if it would assist him in restoring order in Banjarmasin.²⁶ The ruler was very concerned over the war at this stage, for by 1713, Purabaya and the Bugis had captured the major pepper-producing regions of Negara and Bekompay from the Banjarese and were then advancing towards Tartas. Unless the enemy could be stopped soon, the Sultan was afraid that he would lose the war once Banjarmasin or Tartas was overrun by the Bugis. Van Zwoll, who was convinced that the Sultan was making an empty promise, refused to amend the resolution of the Council to abandon Banjarmasin.²⁷

A decline in the pepper production of Bantam and Palembang, and the failure of the Batavian Council to meet the demands of the Directors in sending bigger stocks to Holland in the late 1720's, compelled the Governor-General to re-establish trade with the Banjarese. In Bantan, for example, the berries were smaller and had more imperfections. Moreover, the annual yield which was between 3.8 million to 5.4 million lbs. from 1718 to 1723,²⁸ dropped to 2,162,083 lbs.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 88.

in 1726.²⁹ In Jambi, the new pepper plantations had not produced really worth-while results. Meanwhile, the Directors in the Netherlands who had requested Batavia to transport between $5\frac{1}{4}$ million and $6\frac{3}{4}$ million lbs. of black pepper from 1700 to 1725, increased the demand thereafter to 6.45 - 8.60 million lbs. per year.³⁰ Early in October 1726, Sultan Kasuma Dilaga invited the Dutch Company to reopen commercial relations with Banjarmasin in order to enlist Dutch support to curb the Bugis pirates who had renewed their activities off the Banjarese coast. The Batavian authorities seized the opportunity by dispatching the Arend and the Volk to Tartas in November of the same year.³¹

The first Dutch fleet returned to Batavia in mid-1727 from Banjarmasin with 3,962 pikuls or 495,250 lbs. of pepper.³² Compared to the amounts of pepper secured in 1712-1713, it can be seen that the factors, Landsheer and Broun, had made a good start in making purchases especially when 8,000 pikuls

29. Original General Missive, 21 October 1726, KA 1928, f. 27.

30. Original General Missive, 1733, (no specific date), KA 2195, f. 5153.

31. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 5 November 1726, KA 642, f. 723.

32. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 371.

of pepper had been contracted to the junks and a small quantity had been given to the English merchants in the preceding year.³³ In 1728 all the six Dutch ships, namely, the Zuijderbeek, Wolpharsdijk, Volk, Raadhuis, Olijftak and Doornik were fully loaded with a total of 19,785 pikuls of pepper.³⁴ In addition, another 363,943 lbs. were shipped to Batavia by the private merchants of Banjarmasin.³⁵ Altogether, 22,692½ pikuls of pepper were bought by the Dutch Company. It was able to make such a record purchase not only because production was at its peak during that season, but also because Kasuma Dilaga had decreed that the Banjarese traders were to supply the whole crop to it.³⁶ However, the Dutch vessels which were sent to Banjarmasin thereafter never managed to obtain a similar quantity of pepper; in fact, as

33. Ibid.

34. KA 1992, f. 170. The breakdown of the shipment of pepper per vessel in 1728 is as follows:

<u>Name of ship</u>	<u>Quantity in pikuls</u>	<u>Payment in Spanish reals</u>
Olijftak	750	3,195½
Zuijderbeek	5,000	21,290
Raadhuis	4,000	17,220
Wolpharsdijk	4,000	17,048
Doornik	5,000	21,292
De Volk	1,035	9,907½
Total	<u>19,789</u>	<u>84,452½</u>

35. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 618.

36. Ibid.

the table below indicates, the amounts decreased annually until the Batavian authorities tried to rectify the situation by signing the contract of 1733 with the Banjarese court.

Quantity of black pepper obtained by
the Dutch Company from Banjarmasin

<u>Year</u>	<u>Quantity</u> (Dutch lbs.)
1727 ¹	495,250
1728 ²	2,453,340
1729	1,071,250
1730	784,125
1731/32	276,834
1733	264,347

Sources: 1. KA 1949, f. 371;
2. KA 1992, f. 170;
KA 2195, f. 5164 for all other years.

One of the causes for the marked fall in the pepper purchases of the Company was the widespread resentment and disappointment among the cultivators and merchants because of the imposition of a fixed price on the sale of pepper. Hoping that the Dutch Company would build a factory and stockade in his territory in exchange for commercial concessions, Sultan Kasuma Dilaga had granted the whole pepper supply to the Dutch in 1727 at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ Spanish reals per pikul by announcing that pepper should be loaded

only into the Dutch boats.³⁷ By taking away the large crop in 1728 at this low price, Landsheer and Broun deprived the Banjarese merchants of large profits which they could have obtained if the pepper stocks had been sold to the junks instead. Broyell and Broun claimed that in an attempt to drive away the Dutch and to dissuade the cultivators from making deliveries to the factors, certain Chinese merchants, led by Lau Kim Kong, spread rumours that two Banjarese coolies had been killed by the Dutch because they had refused to load pepper into the vessel, Zuiderbeek.³⁸ Consequently, fewer Banjarese traders offered their pepper to the Dutch factors for fear that they would receive similar treatment. Even after the Panambahan had publicly declared that these rumours were unfounded,³⁹ the situation did not improve and much smaller cargoes of pepper were shipped back to Batavia. Besides, when many cultivators found that they had received few returns for their efforts and that it was not worthwhile to continue planting, they abandoned their pepper plots and migrated to the towns or simply switched to some other sort

37. Original General Missive, 31 January 1728, KA 1953, f. 2236.

38. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 1 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 325.

39. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 10 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 326.

of work, such as woodcraft or fishing.⁴⁰ Moreover, they resented the compulsive methods which were used by the Banjarese court officials to secure the pepper from them,⁴¹ for the officials would not have been able to enforce the orders of the Sultan if they had left the pepper sales to the free will of the cultivators and the traders.

Despite the assurances of the Panambahan that all the pepper of his land would go only to the Dutch, the latter observed that the ruler did not have full control over the pepper trade. In fact, greater influence was exerted by Pengeran Mangku, the state administrator, and Gusti Temonggong, the governor of the upland provinces.⁴² Except for a brief period between 1727 and 1728 when they carried out the orders of the Panambahan by despatching pepper cargoes to the Dutch factors, these Banjarese officials generally conducted commercial transactions independent of the ruler or without his knowledge.⁴³ They realised that the Dutch monopoly of the pepper trade had led to decreased

40. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, f. 2678.

41. Ibid., f. 2679.

42. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 265; P. Snippe and C. Braine to the Batavian Council, 15 May 1732, KA 2130, f. 7.

43. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 265.

revenue for them, since much of their income, particularly that of Pengeran Mangku, came from the bribes and loans they obtained from the rich Chinese of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. The Chinese had complained that large-scale purchases by the Dutch had adversely affected their trade with the junks. Thus, both the disgruntled Banjarese officials and the Chinese merchants of Tartas conspired to prevent further supplies of pepper from reaching the Dutch ships. The Chinese merchants indicated that unless Pengeran Mangku acted swiftly so that the Dutch could not obtain further quantities of pepper, the Banjarese could not expect any more loans.⁴⁴ Accordingly, on several occasions when Kasuma Dilaga was away in Kayu Tinggi, Pengeran Mangku, who was left in sole charge of commercial matters in Tartas, sent men to intercept the perahus which were transporting pepper stocks downriver for the Dutch factors.⁴⁵ Thereafter, these pepper cargoes were delivered to the nakhodas of the junks who returned to Tartas in 1729, notwithstanding the Sultan's injunction and the protests of the Dutch factors.⁴⁶

In addition to their interest in purchases of pepper, the Batavian authorities were also keen to boost the sale

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

of their cotton piece-goods and opium to the Banjarese late in the 1720's. They surmised that if they could persuade the Banjarese to accept these commodities, it was possible that a time would come when their products would be exchanged for pepper in the same way as the Chinese bartered their goods, and thus the lucrative sale of the piece-goods would prevent the drain of Spanish currency from Batavia.⁴⁷ It has been noted that as early as 1711, the Batavian Council decided to put the scheme into practice by despatching ten bales of cloth in the Peter and Paul.⁴⁸ No price was fixed for the sale of the article as this was left to the discretion of the factors, Bosch and Indus, who were also instructed to study the possibilities of an extensive trade in retail wares on the Banjarese market.⁴⁹ However, when the Peter and Paul returned to Batavia in 1712 with the whole cargo of goods which had originally been consigned to it, the Council gave up the idea of trying to sell piece-goods in Banjarmasin.⁵⁰

47. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 1711, KA 627, f. 103.

48. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 July 1711, KA 627, f. 487.

49. Ibid.

50. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, f. 86.

With the renewal of trade between the Dutch Company and the Banjarese in 1726, the Batavian Council revived its interest in the sale of cloth and opium.⁵¹ Although Landsheer and Broun managed to sell four pieces of Bengal baftas and two chests of opium (which was a very small turnover of goods) in 1728, they received only 738.4.12 florins from the Banjarese instead of 1,909.10 florins.⁵² The factors complained that they had to advance the goods to the Banjarese before payment as the latter would not otherwise buy the products. However, it was difficult to make the Banjarese pay up; consequently, when the Dutch departed, the Banjarese still owed them 73% of the debt.⁵³ Landsheer and Broun pointed out that neither the Banjarese officials nor the merchants would repay their debts in pepper. The trade in piece-goods and opium proved to be of less importance in subsequent years when even smaller amounts were sold but the Dutch Company still incurred a loss in some cases. In 1729, for instance, three bales of cotton which cost the Dutch 260.19.4 florins, were sold at 191.15.12 florins since the

51. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727, KA 643, f. 509.

52. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 370.

53. Ibid.

Banjarese would not pay more than 45 reals per bale.⁵⁴ The two chests of opium and the remaining three bales of cotton which were unsold, were shipped back to Batavia. Moreover, Broyell and Broun could not persuade the Banjarese to repay what they owed the Dutch in the former years.⁵⁵

The Dutch factors ascribed their failure in the retail trade to the competition of the junk owners of Canton and Amoy.⁵⁶ After their voyage to Batavia or Semarang, the Chinese nakhodas, who stopped at Tartas on their way home to load pepper and to dispose of their Chinese wares, would also resell some of the piece-goods and opium which they had purchased in Java. The Dutch estimated that every year, roughly twelve to fifteen bales of cotton, and five to six chests of opium were distributed among the Banjarese by the nakhodas.⁵⁷

When the Batavian Council realised that its Indian piece-goods were not in demand in Banjarmasin, it instructed its factors to promote the sale of neurenberger⁵⁸ articles,

54. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 5 October 1729, KA 2025, f. 291.

55. Ibid., f. 292.

56. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, ff. 2683-84.

57. Ibid.

58. Neurenberger: the term is probably derived from Neuremburg in Germany, thereby indicating the origin of these articles.

that is, small wares such as cutlery, glasses and mirrors, among the inhabitants of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. It expressed optimism over the prospects of such a trade provided the factors studied the market carefully in order to gauge the needs of the Banjarese.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the venture proved a failure when P. Snippe and P. Kamerbeek tried to sell these small wares in Tartas in 1730.⁶⁰ The situation remained the same two years later when C. Marre and D. Brouwer took a small quantity of neurenberger goods with them to Banjarmasin.⁶¹ The factors informed the Council that there was no use trying to further the sale of small articles in the area for the Banjarese were already amply supplied with these products by the coastal traders of Macassar, Semarang and other Indonesian areas.⁶²

Nonetheless, unsaleable goods at Tartas did not pose such a grave problem to the Batavian authorities as that of the smuggling in fine spices between the Spice Islands and Banjarmasin. Early in the 1720's, the governor of Macassar

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59. Original General Missive, 17 October 1730, KA 2032, f. 26.
60. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 31 July 1730, KA 2055, f. 90.
61. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November 1734, KA 2206, f. 55.
62. Original General Missive, 17 October 1730, KA 2032, f. 26; Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November 1734, KA 2206, f. 55.

wrote that large amounts of cloves and nutmegs were smuggled out of Macassar, Banda and Ceram to Banjarmasin and other neighbouring areas by Bugis pirates such as Gonepatja, Tokinjang, Tosumi and Amanapati.⁶³ These spices, which were distributed among the Banjarese and Chinese merchants, were in turn resold to the junk nakhodas and the English at various rates ranging between 100 and 130 Spanish reals per koyan, depending on the state of demand.⁶⁴ In return, the Bugis smugglers received contraband pepper, various Banjarese products such as bezoar stones, gold and Chinese articles. At times, they also carried on a certain amount of coastal trading with the merchants of Pulau Laut, Kutei and Cambodia.⁶⁵ Through their connections with the smugglers, some of the coastal traders also participated in illicit trading on occasions, as for example in 1728, when they shipped pepper to East Java and Trengganu.⁶⁶

Although smuggling was a problem which had plagued the Dutch government since the establishment of the spice

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63. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727, KA 643, f. 511.
64. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 373.
65. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 20 September 1728, KA 1992, f. 175.
66. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 16 May 1728, KA 1992, f. 125.

monopoly by J.P. Coen in the 1620's,⁶⁷ it still caused considerable concern to the Dutch authorities because of the difficulty of suppressing the pirates. As Governor Gobius of Macassar admitted, despite more stringent checks along the coasts by the Dutch vessels, the problem could not be solved, because the inhabitants of the Spice Islands, who resented the monopolistic practices of the Dutch Company, conspired with the pirates and smugglers to evade the authorities.⁶⁸

The Batavian Council tried to stamp out smuggling with the co-operation of the Panambahan. In July 1727 the Governor-General appealed to Kasuma Dilaga to give full support to the Dutch factors in checking all ships for contraband spices and to send the offenders to Batavia to be punished.⁶⁹ Although the Sultan was not in favour of disturbing the maritime traffic of his kingdom by imposing checks and measures in case he should drive away the traders, nevertheless, he consented to send perahus to accompany the

67. J.C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), pp. 122 and 141. For more details of the Dutch spice monopoly, see Meilink-Roelofs, Asian Trade and European Influence, pp. 207-38.

68. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 621.

69. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727, KA 643, f. 511.

Volk in hunting down the pirates.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, in his pursuit of Gonepatja up the Barito river, J. Sanderts, commander of the Volk, found that the water was too shallow for the vessel. By the time the Sultan's perahus arrived, Gonepatja had fled to Lombok.⁷¹ In the event, all the other smugglers also escaped before action could be taken against them.⁷²

In order to guard his territory against the return of the Bugis, who had fled to Kutei after the civil war of Banjarmasin, and at the same time enable the Dutch to keep watch over the activities of the spice smugglers along the Banjarese coast, Kasuma Dilaga suggested that the Dutch Company should construct a fortified post or factory in Banjarmasin. He informed the Batavian Council that he had deliberately lowered the price of pepper from 6 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul to the annoyance of his subjects, so that the Company would continue to trade with the Banjarese and establish a factory in order to deter Arun Sinkang, the new Bugis chief, from making any attacks on his land.⁷³

70. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 20 September 1728, KA 1992, f. 129.

71. J. Sanderts to Landsheer, 21 July 1728, KA 1992, f. 135.

72. Ibid.

73. Letter from Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 4 October 1728, KA 1992, ff. 123-24.

Discussions on the construction of a factory between the Sultan and Landsheer and Broun, who visited Banjarmasin in 1727, had yielded no positive results as the Dutch factors had no authority to make decisions without prior consultation with the Batavian Council. Therefore, with the object of pursuing this matter further with the Batavian authorities, Kasuma Dilaga sent an embassy consisting of Kjahi Akama Udin and Pengeran Mangku Negara in mid-1728 to Batavia.⁷⁴ The Council, though sympathetic to the views of the Banjarese, stated that it could not make any move until it had received an answer from the Directors in Holland.⁷⁵

The Sultan became more anxious that the factory should be built at an early date after the Zuijderbeek which had been despatched to Banjarmasin in 1728 for patrol duties, departed for Batavia in August 1729 because of the sick aboard, instead of maintaining surveillance along the coasts against Bugis attacks.⁷⁶ Kasuma Dilaga wrote to the Batavian authorities that he would prefer to see a fixed establishment rather than the frequent arrival and departure of ships of

74. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 9 July 1728, KA 1992, f. 177.

75. Ibid.

76. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 2 September 1729, KA 2025, f. 277.

the Dutch Company.⁷⁷ He assured the Dutch that if they carried out his request, they could be assured of the monopoly of the pepper trade which, for the present, was still not guaranteed. He added that the Panjarese merchants were not convinced that the Company would establish a permanent trade with them unless the Dutch made a permanent settlement on the island.⁷⁸ It is obvious that the Panambahan had political reasons for stating that the Banjarese merchants wanted a Dutch factory. It is inconceivable that the Banjarese should feel the same way as their ruler since a factory would deprive them of a free trade especially with the Chinese junk traders.

The general opinion of the Dutch factors, Landsheer, Broyell and Broun, and later, Snippe and Kamerbeck, on the erection of a factory was that while it was advisable for the Company to heed the request of the Panambahan if it intended to continue to take pepper from the region, they, nevertheless, doubted the utility of such an establishment.⁷⁹ Landsheer

77. Letter from Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 25 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 274.

78. Ibid.

79. Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 2021, f. 6390. Original General Missive, 8 December 1732, KA 2101, f. 2196. Snippe and Kamerbeck to the Batavian Council, 8 May 1730, KA 2055, f. 87.

and his colleagues maintained that the Dutch trade with Banjarmasin was profitable only as far as output, that is, exports of pepper, was higher than input of capital in terms of personnel, ships and arms.⁸⁰ If the Dutch Company embarked on the project of building a factory, very much expenditure would be entailed in the actual construction work. The overhead costs of maintaining such an establishment would greatly exceed the profits which could be derived from the pepper trade especially during a poor harvest. Additional costs would be incurred in the despatch of troops or military stores to the Sultan **if** there should be a renewal of war between the **Banjarese** and Bugis.

The factors also indicated that several classes of people had to be taken into account if the Batavian Council intended to build the factory. First, the Company would have to deal with the ordinary Banjarese inhabitants. The factors did not expect the inhabitants to help in the construction project, such as in transporting the timber supplies because the Banjarese generally disliked the Dutch trading in their ports.⁸¹ Secondly, there were the Banjarese nobles and Chinese private merchants to consider. These people were also not keen on having a Dutch factory, since their incomes

80. Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 2012, f. 6390.

81. Ibid., f. 6391.

would be considerably reduced if the Dutch Company should establish a monopoly of the pepper trade once the factory was completed. The factors conjectured that the Chinese merchants might retaliate by preventing the Dutch from taking away the pepper supplies, either of their own accord or through the interference of the middlemen.⁸² The net effect would be a loss of profits for the Company.

Finally, Landsheer and his colleagues felt that the political power of the Sultan was also questionable; apart from his sovereignty over the lowlands, the Sultan had little control in the pepper regions of Upper Negara. If the Biaju chiefs or the regional governors should decide not to abide by the regulations set down by the Dutch, the Panambahan would be powerless in compelling them to obey his ruling. Moreover, the Dutch Company could not be assured of a permanent trade with Banjarmasin, because if the present ruler were to die, the Dutch could not predict whether his successor would still maintain trade on an old footing with the Company.⁸³ Nevertheless, the factors concluded that as long as the Company traded in Banjarmasin without a fixed residence, it could not hope to engross the whole pepper supply.⁸⁴ In

82. Ibid., f. 6392.

83. Ibid.

84. Original General Missive, 8 December 1932, KA 2101, f. 2197.

other words, they hinted that a factory would not be worthwhile under any circumstances.

The Governor-General and Council, after receiving the reports of **their** employees, decided to act cautiously by **deferring** the matter despite the persistent pleas of the Panambahan.⁸⁵ They resolved that unless the commercial situation improved, in the sense that much larger stocks of pepper were transported by their ships, preferably to the extent **which** had prevailed in 1728, it was really not worth the expense and effort to stake so much on Banjarmasin which was not producing as much pepper for the Company as **originally** anticipated.⁸⁶ The Batavian authorities decided that they could not afford to abandon the pepper trade of Banjarmasin as production from Bantam and the other pepper stations was inadequate for the European market. They, therefore, resolved to continue **the** trade with the Banjarese; consequently, Dutch vessels were sent to that region from 1729 onwards to obtain pepper supplies.

Unfortunately, the Dutch did not have much success in

85. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 645, f. 209. On 14 November 1729 and 1 May 1730, the Panambahan wrote again to the Council for an answer but the latter declined to give any positive reply. KA 2025, f. 33 and KA 2055, f. 87.

86. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 645, f. 209.

their commercial ventures. Since the Batavian authorities were disinclined to yield to the military expectations of the Panambahan, Sultan Hamid Dulla, the new ruler, proved even more recalcitrant in making commercial concessions to the Dutch. In 1733 for instance, Marre and Brouwer, the Dutch factors, were told by Pengeran Suria Dilaga that they could not obtain a shipload of pepper although more than 1,200 pikuls of the article had been bought up by the junks.⁸⁷ Because of the frequent complaints of their employees about the difficulties of loading pepper, the Dutch authorities felt that positive action was essential in order to rectify the imbalance in the pepper trade.

Even at this juncture, the Batavian Council was still not convinced of the feasibility of constructing a factory at Banjar. However, the imminent threat of a Bugis attack on Banjarmasin, which was evident in the periodical raids by Topass Aray and Arun Sinkang along the Banjarese coast, impressed upon the Governor-General and Council the urgency of signing a contract with the Sultan if they intended to continue trade in that region. Such a treaty would help to define the Company's political role in Banjarmasin. The Sultan had claimed that the Dutch, by trading in his land, were morally bound to assist him against

87. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 August 1733, KA 2177, f. 22.

his enemies⁸⁸ although the Batavian Council had dismissed such a claim by insisting that all its ventures in the area were commercial ones according to the contract of 1664.⁸⁹ Thus, guided by the instructions of the Batavian Council, Marre and Brouwer, who acted on behalf of the Company, signed the treaty with Sultan Hamid Dulla and Pengeran Suria Dilaga on 26 September 1733.

It is unnecessary to reiterate the details of the treaty here since they have been mentioned in a previous chapter.⁹⁰ However, it should be pointed out that in ratifying the treaty, the Batavian authorities, while recognising the importance of Article VI which provided for a Dutch patrol ship to guard the Barito river against contraband practices by the nakhodas, nevertheless, doubted whether the Dutch Company could maintain a pepper monopoly for long if the price was fixed at $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul.⁹¹ They decided to amend Article X

88. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 15 November 1728, KA 1992, f. 182; Lau Kim Kong to the Governor-General of Batavia, 14 December 1729, KA 2025, f. 235.

89. Original General Missive, 31 March 1731, KA 2045, f. 8130. The treaty of 1664 was a ratification of the agreement of 1661 which granted the pepper monopoly to the Dutch Company.

90. Refer to pp. 143-44.

91. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, f. 507.

by raising the pepper rate to 5 Spanish reals per pikul.⁹² In making the amendment, the Dutch authorities hoped that the increase in price would encourage the Banjarese merchants to bring all their stocks to the Dutch Company and deter them from smuggling or selling pepper to other traders by illicit means. However, they emphasised that the higher rate had to be accompanied by better quality pepper which was clean and dry, and not the dusty and adulterated type which had previously been given to the factors.⁹³

Although Hamid Dulla made the mistake of not compelling, but rather gave the Dutch Company the option of erecting a factory or pagar in Banjarmasin, and thus left the interpretation of Article XIII to the Dutch (who decided merely on keeping a guard vessel at the river mouth),⁹⁴ it was apparent from the inclusion of the eighteenth and nineteenth clauses that the Panambahan had great hopes that the Dutch would definitely construct a factory sooner or later. In fact, two sites were allocated to the Dutch Company for trading purposes by the Sultan as far back as 1729.⁹⁵ The first site, consisting

92. Ibid., f. 508.

93. Ibid.

94. See Chapter VI, p. 231.

95. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 25 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 275.

essentially of morassic soils, was located between Pulau Kaget and old Banjar about five miles up the Barito river. The Dutch factors, whose vessels were anchored off the river-banks, advised the Batavian Council not to build the factory there⁹⁶ because of the incidence of floods in the area.⁹⁷ They preferred the second site on Tomborneo where the land was higher and drier. In addition to the abundance of fish, fruit and drinking water on Tomborneo, the factors claimed that it could serve as a strategic centre designed to obstruct pirates and smugglers who had hitherto made the place their den.⁹⁸ It will be recalled that the suggestions of the Dutch were similar to those of some English East India Company servants, who had wanted to construct a factory on Tomborneo in 1704.⁹⁹

96. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 15 November 1730, KA 2055, f. 116; Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November 1733, KA 2177, f. 31.

97. The factors noted that the river-banks were normally under $4\frac{1}{2}$ ft. of water in the dry season and $7\frac{1}{2}$ -10 ft. in the monsoon or wet season. According to Hollander, as much as 160 miles of the river-banks stretching from the kuala upwards could be flooded daily by the Barito river, while the flooded area extended to 420 miles in the rainy season. See Hollander, Handleiding, Vol. II, p. 25.

98. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 15 November 1730, KA 2055, f. 116.

99. Refer to Chapter II, pp. 88-89

As an additional incentive to the Company to establish a residence, Hamid Dulla offered to cede some districts of Dusun Ulu in Negara, such as Lanan, Siang or Santanen, Lemno, and Tawan, to the Dutch in 1734.¹⁰⁰ Although the Panambahan did not furnish any reason for his offer, the Batavian Council, from the reports of its factors, learned that the Sultan had decided to transfer these dependencies after the inhabitants, the majority of whom were Biajus, had flouted his authority and revolted.¹⁰¹ While the Governor-General, Dirck van Cloon, was keen to accept the Sultan's offer, apparently because he was interested in the products, viz. gold, diamonds and bezoar stones produced by the districts,¹⁰² he nevertheless made certain that he would not put the Dutch Company in a position where it would be obliged to build the factory and pagar if he consented to the transfer of the districts. He declined to accept the native districts and preferred to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, for he wanted to be sure that the pepper contract was observed by the Banjarese before the Company could abide by Articles XVIII and XIX of the treaty.¹⁰³

100. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, f. 511. These four districts, situated east of Sukadana, were sparsely populated.

101. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, f. 511.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., f. 510.

Apart from some initial success in loading cleaner pepper, the factors, Marre and Brouwer, found that the treaty neither led to any improvement in their trading position nor did it ensure the Company the pepper monopoly. In 1734-35, the Dutch ships received 338,816 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.¹⁰⁴ of pepper but the quantity fell to 212,363 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. one year later.¹⁰⁵ The increased pepper price offered by the Dutch Company certainly had the effect of encouraging the Banjarese merchants to bring their supplies more readily to the Dutch. Unfortunately, this effect was nullified in 1735 shortly after Hamid Dulla had declared a rise of five per cent in the customs levy on all ships engaged in the internal traffic of Banjarmasin and an additional quarter real on all pepper tolls levied in the interior of Banjarmasin.¹⁰⁶ This toll of five per cent threatened to cut into the profit margin of the Banjarese merchants since the pepper rate to the Dutch Company was fixed. It also deprived them of the right to trade freely with the junks. Because of the prohibitive clauses of the Dutch-Banjarese contract and external taxes, many cultivators abandoned their pepper gardens or simply allowed their plants to rot during the harvest season without

104. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 49.

105. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, f. 1287.

106. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 1 June 1734, KA 2206, f. 9.

plucking the fruit.¹⁰⁷ As a result, the Dutch factors had difficulty in loading their ships.

Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was not particularly enthusiastic about maintaining the pepper contract signed by his predecessor, Hamid Dulla. Nevertheless, fearing that the Company would withdraw its military support to Banjarmasin at the height of the Bugis invasion by not sending any vessels to the Barito river, which it had the option to do, he tried to force the cultivators to deliver their pepper to the Dutch.¹⁰⁸ However, many planters disobeyed the ruler's orders, for after the ban on the junks which prohibited the nakhodas from loading pepper had been lifted late in 1734,¹⁰⁹ the Banjarese reverted to their previous practice of delivering their pepper to the Chinese rather than the Dutch factors.¹¹⁰ A few cultivators were in fact encouraged by their provincial rulers to defy the instructions of the Panambahan since the chiefs did not want their incomes to be reduced unduly by the Dutch who offered much lower prices for pepper than the

107. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, ff. 49-50.

108. Ibid., f. 50.

109. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 17.

110. Ibid.

nakhodas.¹¹¹ Pengeran Singa Sari of Taping,¹¹² for instance, refused to part with his pepper stocks even when Pengeran Anom, on the Sultan's orders, had personally gone up to the region to obtain the product. Consequently, Tamjeed Dulla had to despatch a small army to subjugate Pengeran Singa Sari, who was thereafter sent to Kayu Tinggi to beg for mercy from the Panambahan.¹¹³

After obtaining such small supplies of pepper, and witnessing the ineffectiveness of the compulsive methods (implicit in the treaty of 1733) used on his subjects by the Sultan to grant pepper to the Dutch Company, Brouwer and G. Keyser advised the Batavian Council to terminate its commercial relations with Banjarmasin.¹¹⁴ They stated that although the bad harvests in Banjarmasin were partly responsible for the insufficient cargoes shipped home by the Company vessels, the fierce competition of the junks as well as the defiant attitude of the upland cultivators towards

111. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 July 1735, KA 2237, f. 51.

112. Taping or Tampang was one of the pepper-producing regions of Negara and was situated in the upper part of Kahajan Ulu. - Hollander, Handleiding, Vol. II, pp. 119-21.

113. Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 22 April 1736, KA 2275, f. 3.

114. Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 5 July 1736, KA 2275, f. 24.

the Panambahan in not transporting their supplies to the Dutch, were major causes for the failure of the Dutch to get full supplies.¹¹⁵ The Dutch Company trade became worse after the Bugis-Banjarese war was over in 1736. Without further need of the Dutch, Tamjeed Dulla ignored his pledges to the Company and permitted the junks to ship large pepper stocks out of Tartas.¹¹⁶ The Batavian Council was disillusioned with the broken promises of the Sultan to supply it with the whole pepper crop. Although it realised that the only means to obtain the main pepper trade was to construct a factory or stockade as the Sultan had perpetually requested, it did not wish to become involved in Banjarese politics or to incur any expense on a building project. The Council thus refused to listen to the Sultan's point of view, but was only concerned with the half-empty ships that returned to Batavia. It became convinced that the Banjarese were a "treacherous lot" and withdrew its ships from Banjarmasin in 1737.¹¹⁷

115. Ibid., f. 25.

116. Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 25 May 1736, KA 2275, f. 20.

117. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, ff. 1290-91.

CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS OF THE PEPPER TRADE

The English and Dutch regarded Banjarmasin as one of the supply centres of pepper in south-east Asia in the eighteenth century. As long as they had current Spanish dollars or reals, they generally expected to procure the quantities of pepper they desired. If the Banjarese were unable to meet their demands fully, the Europeans would often accuse them of keeping their stocks of pepper for the Chinese junks. Though the accusations were true at times, it can be stated that, generally, the English and Dutch merchants tended to ignore or failed to realise that the Banjarese were often faced with numerous problems in the cultivation and sale of pepper. Some of these problems were adverse weather conditions and labour shortage which resulted in fluctuations in annual output.

Natural hazards such as monsoonal rainstorms and drought often destroyed a large percentage of the pepper crop. In September 1704 heavy rains from the Westerly monsoon spoilt most of the vines in Kayu Tinggi although the plantations in the Negara highlands were not affected.¹ In mid-1733 Pengeran

1. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), f. 13.

Purba informed the Dutch factors, Marre and Brouwer, that his pepper gardens in the lowlands of Pamingir, Kaluwa, Pringin and Amandit² were flooded, while his crop bordering the foothills was also unfit for export as the vines were too dry and withered owing to insufficient moisture in the ground.³ Instead of saving part of their pepper stock for that season by plucking the riper fruit, the cultivators, many of whom were afflicted with small-pox, neglected their plants altogether. Fearing that they would be also infected by the disease, the healthier planters deserted to the hills.⁴

In addition to natural calamities, a shortage of labour caused production to decline. The scattered nature of ladang cultivation and the concentration of population in the river towns and ports made it difficult for planters to employ pepper-pickers during the harvesting period, especially in the peak month of September.⁵ Rather than risk making long journeys into the interior of Molukko or Negara to pluck berries, many young Banjarese preferred to

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2. These four districts were included in the region of Amuntai.
 3. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 7 June 1733, KA 2177, f. 19.
 4. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 50.
 5. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 22.

serve as 'hired hands' to the European or Chinese traders in Tartas or Banjarmasin.⁶ In the pepper-producing villages of Kayu Tinggi where more pickers were available because of the region's proximity to Tartas, the amount of work was limited as production of the crop was about one hundred tons annually.⁷ In Molukko, where the harvesting period was longer, production was restricted to a mere fifty tons per year.⁸

In Negara where the bulk of the pepper was obtained, production was seriously hampered during the Biaju-Banjarese civil war years of 1711-1717. Many planters, lured by the message of the Biaju leaders that they should fight to regain their independence from the Banjarese rulers, deserted their pepper gardens to join the Biaju army led by Purabaya.⁹ Consequently, the berries were left to rot on the vines because of the shortage of pickers in the harvesting season.¹⁰ The population in Kahajan or Upper Negara in 1879 was estimated at 16,000¹¹ compared to about 60,000 in Amuntai¹²

6. Ibid.

7. Arnold to Stacy, 15 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 23.

8. Ibid.

9. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, f. 1266.

10. Ibid.

11. Hollander, Handleiding, Vol. II, p. 122.

12. Ibid., p. 129.

and 50,000 in Martapura.¹³ The population figures were obviously much lower in the first half of the eighteenth century. Biajus who stayed behind to work on their plots were soon disheartened because of the slump in the pepper trade after the Indonesian and foreign merchants stopped visiting Banjarmasin in the mid-1710's.¹⁴ Moreover, small stocks of pepper which were harvested had no access to the towns as many rivers were cut off by enemy patrols or piratical Bugis.¹⁵

One of the chief reasons for the continued discontent and the reluctance of the cultivators to work their pepper gardens was the low prices offered by the Banjarese chieftains and traders. Although rates tended to fluctuate according to the quantity of pepper each season, they were usually disadvantageous to the planters. The Banjarese merchants put the blame for these low payments on the Dutch and English who came to trade. Prior to 1710, the English could purchase 13 or 14 gantangs of Negara pepper for one Spanish dollar or 12 and 11 gantangs of the more expensive Kayu Tinggi and

13. Ibid., p. 134.

14. Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751, f. 369.

15. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1709, f. 1267.

Molukko pepper respectively.¹⁶ In comparison, the Chinese nakhodas who were willing to pay higher prices on the competitive market, obtained only 11 gantangs of Negara pepper and 9 gantangs of Kayu Tinggi pepper per Spanish dollar.¹⁷ These were, however, the official market rates generally transacted between the Banjarese and foreign merchants. The prices were even lower when the district chiefs or principal Banjarese traders bought pepper directly from the cultivators; in Negara, as much as 20 gantangs could be procured for one Spanish dollar.¹⁸

In contrast to the English, the Dutch Company factors disregarded the different grades of pepper by offering an equal rate of four reals per pikul to the Banjarese when they came to Banjarmasin in 1711 and the 1720's.¹⁹ Except for an extra quarter real as toll duty to the ruler, they refused to pay higher prices even when production had dropped to a low level as in the mid-1710's for they insisted on maintaining the previous contract terms of 1664.²⁰ It can be observed

16. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 22.

17. Ibid.

18. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 November 1706, JFR (6), no page.

19. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711, KA 1691, f. 96, and 31 January 1728, KA 1953, f. 2236.

20. Ibid.

especially in the 1720's, that commercial transactions between the Banjarese authorities and the Europeans were usually made without consideration for the cultivator. By exerting their influence on the Panambahan through the presentation of ammunition or by displaying their military might, the Dutch and the English were able to negotiate their own prices and indirectly compel the Banjarese merchants to deliver pepper to them.²¹ This, in turn, adversely affected the cultivators who were even paid less for their pepper by the Banjarese middlemen. As a result of the meagre profits, Biaju owners of pepper plots allowed their plants to be ruined by absconding or changing occupations.²² During the civil war period of the 1710's, cultivators in Molukko and Kayu Tinggi, who were relatively unaffected by the labour shortage, could have intensified their efforts by increasing the acreage of their pepper lands. However, they did not find it lucrative enough to extend their activities for despite the better grains that were grown in these regions, the prices remained the same as that of Negara pepper.²³

21. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 618.

22. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, f. 2678.

23. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, f. 1267.

The planters were also discouraged by the infrequent and irregular payments made by the chiefs and principal merchants who were normally the intermediaries at the warehouses or weighing houses of the ports. Waterways being the main form of transport for goods and men, the journey downriver from Tartas to the Banjar Bay, approximately eighteen miles, took about two days,²⁴ while the period was longer if the starting point was in Negara. Thus, the intermediary required at least several weeks to complete his schedule before he could pay the cultivators. Further delays in payment were possible for another reason. The English and Dutch traders, in accordance with their companies' orders, were often reluctant to make cash advances before deliveries.²⁵ Generally, this problem was solved only after the Banjarese traders had warned that no pepper would be delivered until cash advances were made.²⁶ Instead of paying the planters for their pepper supplies as soon as they had received the advances, the Banjarese chiefs would often use part of the cash they obtained to settle personal debts to rich Chinese whom they owed money or spend it on

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24. Ship log, Edward and Dudley, (1702-1705), 21 March 1703, no page.
25. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 21 August 1701, JFR (6B), No. 31. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711, KA 1691, f. 96.
26. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6), f. 60. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1176.

luxury goods such as silk and tea.²⁷ Consequently, large arrears were due to the cultivators when payments were delayed. Instances occurred where some of the Pengerans conveniently forgot to honour their debts altogether. As a reprisal, the cultivators would retain part of their pepper when the Banjarese intermediaries came for supplies the next time.²⁸ Unfortunately, the Europeans, and not the Banjarese traders, suffered the ill-consequences when they were not given the specified quantity of pepper after making the full payment.²⁹

Pepper production figures in the 1720's and 1730's were generally lower than pre-civil war figures in Banjarmasin. The English factors tended to exaggerate when they stated that about 2,000 tons of the article were produced annually.³⁰ A more correct estimate, except for 1702 and 1705 when only 720 and 355 tons³¹ respectively were exported because of bad weather conditions, would be between 1,100-1,500 tons or

27. W. Griffith to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, JFR (9), f. 2. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 265.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6), f. 60.

31. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 November 1706, SFR (7), f. 37.

roughly 19,000 to 25,000 pikuls per year.³² In comparison, production figures late in the 1710's and 1720's were usually below 20,000 pikuls annually with the exception of 1728 when a bumper crop was procured.³³ This was because the pepper gardens, which had been abandoned during the war years and whose plants had deteriorated, were not renewed, and moreover, few attempts were made by cultivators to open up virgin land for fresh vines.³⁴

Early in the 1730's, the situation became worse when more plots were deserted by the planters because of their discontent over the Dutch attempts at setting up a monopoly in the pepper trade. Natural calamities also had an effect. Hardly more than 2,000 pikuls were procured in 1733-34 when the vines were badly hit by floods and the natives were reluctant to pick berries purely for the purpose of export by the Dutch Company.³⁵ Their resentment against the Banjarese authorities for raising toll duties by five per cent on all internal traffic in 1734 enhanced the planters'

32. Ibid. Original General Missive, 31 March 1731, KA 2045, f. 8132.

33. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 618 and KA 2195, (1733), f. 5153.

34. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, f. 2678.

35. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November 1734, KA 2206, f. 44.

apathy towards pepper cultivation.³⁶ It can be recalled that the Panambahan, in a desperate bid to increase production, and angry that his subjects should disobey his orders, issued a decree compelling all pepper owners, especially the Biajus, to continue to tend their old gardens and to extend their acreages of pepper.³⁷ However, the Biajus, who had already flaunted royal orders before, as in 1711 when they rebelled against the Banjarese, ignored the decree and either deserted their villages or converted their pepper lands into padi fields.³⁸

Although the cultivator was essentially involved with the problems of cultivation and production, the Banjarese trader also had to face difficulties in the pepper trade, chief of which were complaints from the English and the Dutch merchants. A common source of dissatisfaction among the Europeans was that of irregular and slow delivery of pepper stocks at the warehouse or into their ships. They claimed that they often had to postpone their departure from Tartas or Kayu Tinggi because the loading of their boats

36. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 50.

37. Ibid., f. 52.

38. Ibid.

took a much longer period than expected.³⁹ Delays in the prompt shipment of pepper supplies which were inevitable in many cases, were caused by flooded rivers during the monsoon season which made it too dangerous for perahus to sail downstream until the floods had subsided.⁴⁰ Also, it was impossible for the intermediaries to transport their stocks to the ports during non-rainy periods, when the river-level was too low for rafts or perahus, as for example in August and September 1706.⁴¹ In that same year, the rains arrived only in December by which time most of the grains had rotted due to poor handling and storage. Hence, the pepper which was of poor quality, fetched very low prices although initially the crop was a good one.⁴²

Another common complaint among the English and the Dutch was the use by the Banjarese of fraudulent weights and measures in commercial transactions. Landon and Rodgett, members of the Banjar Council between 1700 and 1702, alleged that the measurement of pepper in gantangs early in the 1700's

39. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LE (12), f. 567. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November 1733, KA 2177, f. 31.

40. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 November 1706, SFR (6), no page.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

was disadvantageous to the English for it was a light measure compared to the pound weight.⁴³ The disadvantage was especially marked in the sale of different grades of pepper. The Banjarese, in order to obtain more profits from the expensive Molukko or Kayu Tinggi grains, would add the light Negara pepper to them since it was volume rather than weight which counted on the pepper market.⁴⁴

The change from measurement in gantangs to that by weight in pikuls or koyans was made around 1710,⁴⁵ apparently after the Banjarese court had realised that frequent disputes occurred between the foreigners and its subjects over the gantang measure. Although a Banjarese official was appointed to the weighing house to supervise operations, there was no standardization of the scales,⁴⁶ particularly the crude home-made daching, as one scale could differ as much as a few katis from another. Kjahi Aria, a Banjarese noble, for instance, kept two daching. One, which was used for obtaining pepper from the cultivators, and in which only half a pikul of the product could be measured at a time,

43. Stacy to E.I.C., 21 April 1703, FRM (6), f. 163.

44. Ibid.

45. Swertz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 825.

46. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 446.

was designed to hold surplus weight. The other daching, meant only for transactions with the foreign merchants, could measure quantities up to one pikul, but was highly inaccurate.⁴⁷

Neither the Europeans nor the Chinese merchants could use their own weights to measure pepper. The former, in their protests over inaccuracies in the daching, attempted to persuade the Sultan to permit them to use their own weighing methods.⁴⁸ The English pointed out that because of its thick edges, the daching was not designed to weigh very small quantities of pepper.⁴⁹ Moreover, to increase its weight, the Banjarese would normally add one or two mata burong to the daching.⁵⁰ Hence, a pikul of pepper weighed on the daching would register about 132 lbs. on the English scales when the correct weight should have been 133 1/3 - 133½ lbs.⁵¹ The Banjarese authorities refused to standardise their weights and measures for the benefit of their English customers by warning them that no pepper would be sold if

47. Ibid.

48. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Thistleworth and the Borneo, 10 December 1718, LB (16), f. 574. Supercargoes of the Onslow to E.I.C., 31 October 1746, CFR (52), f. 35.

49. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Hester, 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 817.

50. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 827.

51. Ibid., Supercargoes of the Onslow to E.I.C., 31 October 1746, CFR (52), f. 35.

they raised further objections.⁵² On the other hand, the Dutch factors were more successful in their requests to use their own scales in weighing pepper. In 1728 shortly after Broyell and Broun, the Dutch factors, had protested that they had been cheated because a tin instead of a copper weight had been used, resulting in a shortage of about 3 lbs. in every pikul (or 125 lbs.) of pepper,⁵³ the Panambahan pacified them by granting them permission to weigh their own pepper stocks.⁵⁴

Besides their demand for accurate weights and prompt supplies, the European merchants expected pepper to be well-garbled. They alleged that the pepper which was delivered to them, was more often than not, dusty and impure containing clay particles and black corns.⁵⁵ The Sultan and the Pengerans considered that it was inevitable for some impurities to be present, since the cultivators could not afford to discard too many grains with the meagre profits which they

52. Ibid.

53. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 7 July 1729, KA 2025, f. 309.

54. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Batavian Council, 31 August 1730, KA 2055, f. 144.

55. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 12 April 1701. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 20 September 1728, KA 1992, f. 126.

obtained in the process of garbling.⁵⁶ During the initial stages of the English East India Company's trade with Banjarmasin between 1701 and 1703, the Directors tolerated dusty pepper stocks which were shipped home by their factors. However, in 1704 when an Act was passed laying down a freight duty of 10d. per lb. on all imports into England, the Directors instructed their covenanted servants to accept only clean pepper as they did not want to incur extra freight costs because of the additional bulk if pebbles and pepper corns were present.⁵⁷ Thereafter, despite persistent requests to the Banjarose merchants, the English factors found that there was little improvement in the standard of deliveries, for just as many pebbles and empty pepper corns were present in the gunny sacks as before.⁵⁸ The factors were informed by the Panambahan that unless the English Company paid higher prices for pepper, his subjects would not be prepared to sift their stocks thoroughly.⁵⁹ Consequently, the English decided to garble the pepper themselves.

56. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Batavian Council, 31 August 1730, KA 2055, f. 144.

57. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 16 December 1704, LB (12), f. 351.

58. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 November 1706, SFR (7), f. 37.

59. Ibid.

In the garbling process carried out by the English, all wet grains were laid out to dry under a shed with a detachable roof so that when the rains came, the roof would be covered to protect the pepper.⁶⁰ Dusty particles and leftovers were thrown into the river or sea. Shortly afterwards, the English merchants discovered that at night when they were out of sight, the Banjarese would stealthily retrieve particles floating on the water surface, dry them in the sun and then mix them with new supplies of pepper.⁶¹ Moreover, in loading pepper from the perahus onto the English vessels, the Banjarese, who acted as hired hands, would steal small bales of pepper, and similarly, these would be sold together with the fresh stocks to the English.⁶²

Realising that the Banjarese authorities would not punish the offenders if they protested, the English subsequently devised a method to outwit the Banjarese. Instead of disposing the waste particles all at once during the day, the factors would work at night and throw small quantities into the water to ensure that they sank to the bottom of the sea

60. T. Butler and J. Collier to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, SFR (9), f. 167.

61. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Hcster, 14 March 1715, LB (15), ff. 817-18.

62. Ibid.

before the next lot of dusty grains were dropped in.⁶³ The method was only partially successful, for on occasions, the Banjarese could still retrieve dusty pepper corns. The problem of impure pepper supplies continued into the 1730's and the early 1740's.⁶⁴ Although the Batavian Council tried to obtain cleaner pepper by inserting a clause to this effect in the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of September 1733, it soon found that the Banjarese complied with the regulation only for a short while but reverted thereafter to their former ways of delivering dusty stocks.⁶⁵ The Council thus came to realise that if it wanted to obtain large quantities of pepper from Banjarmasin, it had to sacrifice quality for quantity on some occasions, for the same high standard of garbling could not always be maintained by the Banjarese.

63. Ibid.

64. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 14 August 1730, KA 2055, f. 1140. T. Butler and J. Collier to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, SFR (9), f. 167.

65. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 49.

CHAPTER VI

CHINESE JUNK TRADE: 1700-1737

The Chinese resorted to Banjarmasin for pepper from the first half of the seventeenth century after they had been ousted from Bantam and Jambi by their Dutch and English competitors.¹ When they were informed about the vast commercial possibilities of the pepper trade of Banjarmasin by the Portuguese of Macao, they arrived in junks² at the rate of four to thirteen annually from the ports of Amoy, Canton, Ningpo and Macao. The nakhodas were welcomed at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi by the Banjarese because they brought along articles which were in high demand among the inhabitants.

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1. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Pt. I, pp. 29-30.
 2. Chinese junks, often unwieldy and massive, had square hulls and double planking riveted together with iron bolts. It was not unusual for one junk to have five or six layers of planks on top of old ones. As the junks were mainly propelled by bamboo-matted sails, great reliance was placed on the trade-winds. The junks which visited Banjarmasin and Java weighed between 60 and 100 lasts each and there were 90 to 200 men in each boat. Because of their sturdy build, the junks could resist typhoon winds of the China Sea much better than the lighter Arab or Indian vessels although they were less manoeuvrable.- List of Chinese junks to Batavia in 1746, KA 2550, f. 968; H. Yule, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian, concerning the kingdoms and marvels of the East, Vol. II, (London, 1903), pp. 250-51; Heilink-Roelofs, Asian Trade and European Influence, pp. 74-75.

Different types of raw and finished silk, tea, camphor, salt, copper utensils, lacquered boxes and porcelain ware were bartered for pepper, gold, dragons-blood and birds-nest.

The frequent appearance of the junks developed Banjarmasin into a bustling port where traders of various countries, the Arabs and Gujeratis, and those of the neighbouring Indonesian areas of Java, Madura, Celebes, Lombok, Bali and Sumbawa flocked to transact business with the Chinese.³

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the junk trade had become so important that the Barito river was also known as the China River because of the frequent movement of junks up and down stream.⁴

Although the season of the pepper sales in Banjarmasin was from early October to March of each year, the junks did not normally arrive in Banjarmasin until the end of February, just before the sales season came to an end.⁵ One would think that because of their late arrival, the junk merchants would obtain only the remnants or the left-overs of the pepper crop from the sellers. However, the "first come, first served" policy did not generally apply to the Banjarese

3. Report of J. de Wolff to the Governor-General of Batavia, 18 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 360.

4. D. Beeckman, A voyage to Borneo, p. 58.

5. E. Arnold, "Instructions on the Trade of Banjarmasin", January 1702, JFR (6B), Nos. 22 and 23.

traders. It was common for the Banjarese to reserve the major portion of their pepper supplies for the junk traders instead of giving them to the English or Dutch as they were attracted not only by the Chinese commodities, but also by the higher prices offered by the junk merchants. For instance, the common type of pepper which was produced in the region of Negara, with brittle, light and dusty grains, was sold to the English at Banjar for thirteen gantangs per Spanish dollar by the Banjarese in 1701, while the nakhodas of the junks acquired it at nine gantangs per Spanish dollar.⁶ The English factors argued that the Chinese could offer higher prices simply because they could evaluate pepper prices in terms of the prices of the Chinese goods, while the English merchants had to make payment in hard cash with Spanish dollars.⁷ Very often, the junk owners did not have to make any cash payment at all; their commodities were so lucrative that they were able to acquire large pepper cargoes with them. They only used leaden string cash⁸

6. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), No. 1.

7. Griffith in Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, JFR (9), f. 2.

8. Leaden string cash usually consisted of small coins which were threaded together. Each coin, cast out of lead or coarse brass with Chinese characters on both sides, had a square hole in the middle. See A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, Vol. II, (London, 1930), p. 172.

(the Chinese currency) which was considered to be very much inferior in value to the pillar dollar in the East Indies, to pay the balance if the pepper costs were higher than the costs of the Chinese wares.⁹

With the establishment of the English settlement on Banjar in 1700, the junks and the Indonesian perahus, which normally resorted to Tartas, made Banjar their new port of call. The Asian traders changed their destination not by choice but from necessity as Pengeran Dipati, who was in charge of port duties, moved his customs house from Tartas to Banjar and the Chinese and Indonesians had to pay tolls at the new centre.¹⁰ After the defeat of the Banjarese in the first Anglo-Banjarese war of October 1701, the Chinese found that they had lost their place of honour on the pepper market. It has been observed that the Panambahan, whose actions were largely dictated by the English as the victors of the war, ordered his subjects to deliver pepper to the English factors at fixed prices, while the junk merchants could buy pepper only under the supervision of the English who placed a guard vessel at the mouth of the Barito river. As a result of the English East India Company's control of

9. Griffith in Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, JFR (9), f. 2.

10. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 10 May 1701.

Banjar, the junks shifted back to Tartas in 1702 to conduct their commercial transactions,¹¹ and in the following years, fewer junks came to Banjarmasin to trade.

The decreased junk trade and the diversion of the junks from Banjar to Tartas alarmed the Banjar Council which had hoped that the Chinese would stay on in the settlement. One of the principal reasons for the construction of a fort on Banjar by the English Company in 1704 was to attract the junk trade, since the Chinese had declared that they would not return unless they were assured of proper British protection against unscrupulous men like Landon who had exploited them.¹² It is an undeniable fact that the English dreaded the fierce competition of the junk merchants in the pepper trade of Banjarmasin. Nevertheless, for the sake of acquiring valuable Chinese products, the English welcomed the idea of the junks coming to their factory, for they discovered that they could buy goods from the Chinese as easily as the Banjarese. Early in 1702, Landon mentioned that it was in fact easier to obtain Chinese wares in Banjar than in China.¹³ The prospective

11. Report of J. de Wolff to the Governor-General of Batavia, 18 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 363.

12. Rodgett and Griffith to E.I.C., 23 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.

13. Landon to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FRM (6), f. 119.

customer of silk, for instance, could unpack all the materials for examination before he made a purchase. The junk trader "made allowance for every small band [of silk] which practice was not possible in China."¹⁴

The Anglo-Chinese trade at Banjar was not a one-sided affair. Besides the purchases which they made from the junk traders, the English could sell vast quantities of their goods, especially copper, fine Indian cotton, tutenague and sappan wood to the Chinese.¹⁵ Prior to the establishment of the English settlement at Banjar in 1700, the junk merchants had obtained these products mainly from the Dutch at Batavia. Junks from Amoy, Canton and Ningpo came to Batavia in the months of March to May each year to purchase Indian cotton, benzoin, saltpetre, indigo, sugar, pepper, cloves and nutmegs. In return the Chinese merchants furnished the Dutch Company with silk, tea, camphor, sandalwood, gold and Chinese medicines. The junk trade at Batavia was highly esteemed by the Dutch as their sales to the Chinese

14. Ibid.

15. The total cost of the purchases of the English Company's goods was estimated at £4,000 annually.-- Minutes of the Council of the Bay of Bengal, 25 January 1702, FRM (6), f. 152.

brought in profitable returns to their Company.¹⁶ In return the Dutch also acquired valuable Chinese goods without having to go to China to buy them.

In 1701 however, the Batavian Council noticed that its sales to the junk nakhodas had declined considerably for that year; not only did it yield no profit on some goods, but it had also incurred losses on others, such as certain types of Indian cloth.¹⁷ The Batavian Council gave two reasons for the decrease in Dutch-Chinese trade. First, there was a change in some of the tastes of their Chinese customers.¹⁸ The Dutch declared that it was extremely difficult to ascertain the likes and dislikes of the Chinese. For example, the junk traders would want only red cloth in a certain year and black cloth in another. The Council conjectured that it was possible that in 1701, the junk merchants had been dissatisfied with some types of materials, and consequently, had made few purchases. The other reason for the reduced trade with the junks was the competition from the English who sold their products to the Chinese at

16. In 1700, the Chinese bought goods valued at 355157½ reals from the Dutch Company, but in 1701 the purchases of iron and Bengal goods had decreased to f. 15605.15.8 - Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520, f. 405, and 31 December 1701, KA 1543, f. 1128.

17. Original General Missive, 31 December 1701, KA 1534, f. 1128.

18. Ibid.

lower prices than the Dutch Company. The Batavian Council claimed that since the establishment of English trade with China, the Chinese had resorted more to the purchase of cheaper English articles in their own Chinese ports and as a result, fewer junks came to Batavia and thus less Dutch goods were bought. The Governor-General, Van Outhoorn, considered that if the Dutch Company wished to increase its sales to the Chinese at Batavia so that the junk trade could be brought back to the profitable level of previous years, it would either have to reduce its prices or send its employees to Canton to compete with the English on the Chinese market.¹⁹

Apparently, the Batavian authorities during the early 1700's did not have any correct notions as to the manner in which the English were undercutting their trade with the Chinese.²⁰ It was not in China but in Banjarmasin that the

19. Ibid., ff. 1128-29.

20. The Dutch Company gathered information on the English traders in China from the nakhodas or captains of junks at Batavia. The nakhodas were thoroughly interrogated by the Dutch and they were asked questions such as: "How many English ships came to Amoy or Ningpo this year?" "What goods did the English sell to the Chinese and what did they buy?" "How many English vessels are expected in China in the coming year?" It can be explained that the nakhodas could not always be relied on to furnish accurate information; hence, the inaccuracy of the Reports of the Batavian Council. - Questions and answers between the Dutch authorities and the nakhodas, 28 January 1701, KA 1522, ff. 1718-20.

English had established profitable commercial ventures with the junk merchants. Instead of sailing all the way to Batavia to obtain cotton, saltpetre, cloves and nutmegs, the Chinese were going to Banjarmasin which was not only nearer to China, but it had a more abundant and cheaper supply of these goods and pepper. Besides, the Chinese could also dispose of their own merchandise in Banjarmasin. However, the junk trade at Batavia was not terminated altogether. Chinese junks still frequented Batavia to carry on their business transactions with the Dutch Company, but in fewer numbers before 1710. The sale of goods to the Chinese dropped from 355157 $\frac{1}{2}$ reals in 1700 to 229396 $\frac{3}{8}$ reals in 1706.²¹

Commercial relations between the English and the junk merchants in Banjarmasin ended after the expulsion of the former by the Banjarese in the second Anglo-Banjarese war of 1707.²² Shortly after the flight of the English factors, the Chinese re-established themselves as the principal traders of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. From then on, there was neither a guard vessel nor a military force to obstruct the movement of the nakhodas in their transactions

21. Original General Missive, 30 November 1706, KA 1608, f. 472.

22. See Chapter II, pp. 109-111.

with the Banjarese or Biaju pepper cultivators. Greater numbers of Chinese flocked to Banjarmasin than before. These consisted of two classes, namely the junk merchants, and the private traders or individuals who came to set up their homes in the area, bringing their families and belongings with them. The junk traders only stayed temporarily in Tartas or some other Banjarese port. After completing their commercial activities which included stocking their vessels with pepper and disposing of their goods, they sailed off to Canton, returning to Banjarmasin only in the next season. As for the Chinese immigrants and settlers, they considered Banjarmasin their second home. For a living, many of them established shops in the towns or ports while others became warehouse keepers, middlemen or agents for the nakhodas in the pepper negotiations with the Banjarese traders. Beeckman, the supercargo of the Borneo, observed that the Chinese there were "ye only persons that have shops tolerably well furnished: they set them off with coarse chintz, callicocs, bastees, tea, drugs, china ware and many other things."²³ Although there were about eighty Chinese families in Tartas and Kayu Tinggi prior to 1708, the number steadily increased to over two hundred units after that period.²⁴ Gradually,

23. Beeckman, op. cit. p. 91.

24. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9), no page.

many of them were able to communicate with the Banjarese in the Indonesian tongue, thus making themselves an integral part of the community, and they could move freely about the place as they liked.

The chief of the Chinese community in Banjarmasin was Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China or Kjahi Roxa Sirana, as he was known among the Banjarese. A wealthy and renowned personality, he managed to advance the interests of his countrymen through his influence over the Banjarese authorities, particularly with Pengeran Dipati and Kjahi Aria. According to Captain Reid, the commander of the Arabella who was sent by the English Company to buy pepper in Banjarmasin, Lim had frequent audiences with the Panambahan and his court "where he is in great esteem and makes a good interest on behalfe of his countrymen."²⁵ Sultan Suria Alam and some of his subordinates trusted Lim to the extent that on many occasions, they delegated him as spokesman and representative at meetings with the European traders. For instance, it can be recalled that late in 1708 after Cunningham and his colleagues had failed to persuade the Banjarese to reopen trade with the English, Lim was sent to Batavia to inform the Governor-General that Suria Alam was keen to renew

25. Ibid.

commercial ties with the Dutch Company.²⁶ A headman, named Wang Ling, was included in the committee established in September 1711 to negotiate pepper prices with the Dutch factors, Bosch and Indus, when they came to make purchases on the orders of the Batavian Council.²⁷

Although the success of the junk merchants in the pepper trade can be attributed to their willingness to pay high prices and to their rich cargoes, it cannot be doubted that a great deal of credit for their success went to the influential Chinese of Banjarmasin. When the English successfully reopened trade with the Banjarese in 1713 and obtained pepper cargoes for the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, the Chinese residents of Tartas, who were apprehensive of a British re-settlement on Banjar, were alleged to have "left no stone unturned to blacken the name of the English before the Banjarese nobles" so that they would be evicted once more and thereby leave the Chinese in peace to trade with the Banjarese.²⁸ Reid observed that the Chinese fully recalled "ye former transactions [of 1700-1707] at Banjarmasin culminating and misrepresenting ye English on all occasions.

26. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 30 October 1708, KA 624, f. 758.

27. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1176.

28. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9).

They are also very diligent in prepossessing the natives, telling them ye English designe revenge and destruction to their country, totally to subdew it and make them and their children servants and slaves as they formerly attempted and ye Dutch everywhere does. This wonderfully affects them and much obstructs converse and commerce ..."²⁹

As long as their commercial interests were protected and their stocks of pepper were bought by the nakhodas, the Chinese residents of Banjarmasin were all in favour of the withdrawal of the English. They depended largely on the purchases made by the nakhodas, but once the junk trade was stopped, even temporarily, the Chinese residents were in a dilemma. In 1717, an Imperial Edict by Emperor Kang-Hsi was issued forbidding all junks to leave China for the south-east Asian ports of call.³⁰ This prohibitive measure adversely affected the pepper trade of Banjarmasin, since no junk came to Tartas in 1717 or 1718.³¹ Wealthy Chinese such as Ong

29. Ibid.

30. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24 October 1717, KA 1782, f. 1453. The emperor Kang Hsi had issued the edict as a retaliatory measure against the Dutch authorities at Batavia for regulating and lowering prices of Chinese tea, after tea purchases to the Dutch had exceeded pepper sales to the junks as a result of the higher demand for tea in Europe. - Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 216.

31. Glamann, op. cit., p. 216.

Gie Ko and Lim Kim Ko, had to find alternative means to dispose of their supplies which they had stocked up for the junk owners. Ong, on behalf of the Banjarese and the Chinese merchants, tried to draw the Dutch Company into Banjarmasin by offering very good terms for the pepper purchases, viz. at $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul. It has already been observed that the Dutch were somewhat reluctant to re-establish trade at this stage when political conditions created by the Biaju-Banjarese war were still unsteady and they could obtain adequate stocks from Batavia and Palembang which were relatively more peaceful.³² As a result, the pepper traders were compelled to sell their supplies to the English who, since 1713, had periodically paid visits to Banjarmasin while they were on their way to Canton.³³

A common method whereby the nakhodas managed to outwit their European rivals in the pepper trade was to send Chinese middlemen directly into the pepper areas of the uplands or the interior, such as the region of Negara, and get hold of the pepper before it was transported down-river to the ports where the English or the Dutch were waiting to make purchases. Hence, by the time the perahus reached the towns, only

32. Ibid.

33. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 453.

limited quantities of pepper were available for sale to the other traders. Even at the height of the Biaju rebellion in 1712, when many pepper gardens were at a standstill, the junk merchants, through their agents, managed to obtain a large consignment of pepper from the remaining pepper areas. This distressed the Dutch factors, Bosch and Indus, who had to return to Batavia with the Peter and Paul half-laden with pepper.³⁴ In 1713 after they had been foiled in an attempt to acquire pepper cargoes by the English of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, who had been given the bulk of the pepper crop for that season by Suria Alam, the junk owners intensified their efforts by despatching more agents to obtain the product from the interior. As a result, seven junks sailed away with full cargoes of pepper in 1714.³⁵

Owing to the numerous economic and political difficulties of trading in Banjarmasin, the Dutch authorities withdrew their vessels in 1713. Two years later, the Governor-General of Batavia, C. van Zwoll, received a surprise visit from Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China, requesting him to renew trade

34. The Peter and Paul obtained 586½ pikuls or 73312½ lbs. of pepper while the Luitpool and the Jambi, the two smaller boats which accompanied the former to Banjarmasin, sailed away empty-handed.- Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1706, f. 1265.

35. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9).

with the Banjarese.³⁶ Lim stated that the Chinese of Banjarmasin resented the presence of the English in 1714, and wanted the Dutch to oust them from the region. In return, the Chinese pledged assistance to the Dutch in their pepper purchases. Evidently, the Capitan China wanted the Governor-General to believe that the Chinese inhabitants sincerely wished the Dutch to return to Banjarmasin. It is more likely that the Sultan, more than the Chinese, was keen that the Dutch should revive trade with the Banjarese so that he could obtain armed support against the Biajus and Bugis in the internal disturbances of the 1710's. Though they disliked the English, the Chinese were used as an excuse to persuade the Governor-General to despatch ships to Banjarmasin. However, the Batavian Council was unmoved by such pleas and refused to revoke its policy of non-renewal of commerce in south-east Borneo.

Further evidence to testify that the Sultan and not the Chinese inhabitants wanted the Dutch in Banjarmasin was recorded in 1728, two years after the Batavian Council had sanctioned fresh voyages to Banjarmasin. Although more than a decade had elapsed since assurances had been given by the Capitan China, the Council felt that the Dutch would still

36. Lim Kim Ko to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 November 1716, KA 1779, f. 57.

be welcomed by the Chinese merchants. Unfortunately, the Dutch factors; Landsheer and Broun, received little co-operation from the Chinese in their purchases of pepper when they arrived in Kayu Tinggi in January 1727.³⁷ It was only after Sultan Hamid Dulla had issued a public proclamation that all pepper stocks should be given to the Dutch factors that the Chinese were compelled to part with their pepper. Because of the Sultan's injunction, the Dutch managed to procure 19785 pikuls of pepper in 1728 at the rate of $4\frac{1}{4}$ reals per pikul.³⁸ In that same year, no junk was present in Banjarmasin possibly because the nakhodas had received the news that only the Dutch would be allowed to trade.³⁹ The actions of the Dutch in engrossing the bulk of the pepper crop and the absence of the junks created great discontent among the Chinese merchants. Therefore, the fact that the Chinese were eager to trade with the Dutch during this period can be definitely ruled out in favour of more apparent political motives on the part of the Panambahan, namely, Dutch protection and military aid against future Bugis invasions of Banjarmasin.

37. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 367.

38. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 618.

39. Ibid.

There were various reasons why the Chinese merchants disliked trading with the Dutch factors. Compared to the high prices, viz. $6\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul which the Chinese nakhodas paid for pepper prior to 1728,⁴⁰ the sums received from the Dutch factors were relatively much lower, namely, $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul.⁴¹ Invariably, the level of profit for the merchants was much reduced when they were compelled to deliver their pepper to the Dutch. Through their long commercial dealings with the Banjarese and Chinese residents of Banjarmasin, the high rates offered for pepper by the junk merchants, even though they were often evaluated in terms of their products, had come to be regarded as the prevailing market price by the sellers. If other traders offered lower rates or were given the pepper at prices below the market price, then inevitably, there would be dissatisfaction among the sellers. The rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals paid by the Dutch suited only the Panambahan since he was very keen to obtain Dutch military aid against the Bugis, but not his subjects who were connected with the pepper trade, and whose immediate concern was for their own economic welfare. Moreover, with the abstention of the junks from Tartas in 1728, no Chinese

40. The price paid by the nakhodas for pepper ranged from $5\frac{1}{4}$ to $6\frac{1}{4}$ reals per pikul. The price of $6\frac{1}{4}$ reals was about the highest given at this time because of the competition the junk owners faced from the Dutch.

41. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, KA 1849, f. 369.

commodities were brought along. This move affected the pepper traders and the retail merchants whose livelihood depended essentially on the products of China which were given to them by the junks for sale to the Banjarese and Biaju inhabitants of the interior

The success of the Dutch in loading pepper in 1728 encouraged them to intensify their efforts to gain the monopoly of the pepper trade for their **Company**. Landsheer and Broun, the Dutch factors, realised that although no junk came to Banjarmasin in 1728, it would not be long before the nakhodas would appear on the commercial scene again, as the Chinese required large quantities of pepper and were eager to sell their products. In order to prevent the Chinese merchants of the ports from storing pepper in their warehouses for the nakhodas, the Dutch acted in a similar manner as some of the Chinese agents by going direct into the uplands to obtain the crop.⁴² The Dutch action incurred the anger of the Chinese middlemen who felt that this type of business transaction was their prerogative and that the Dutch had intruded into their sphere of activity.⁴³ They were happy to act as agents for the junk merchants because they were

42. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 18 April 1728, KA 1992, f. 7.

43. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 October 1729, KA 2025, f. 294.

paid for their efforts as middlemen. As for the Dutch, they had dispensed with the middlemen by going into the pepper regions on their own. Consequently, the agents brought the issue before Lim, the Capitan China, who in turn appealed to Hamid Dulla not to offer the pepper at such low rates to the Dutch unless the Batavian Council definitely gave the Banjarese its word on creating a factory in Banjarmasin, for so far, the Dutch factors had been silent on the subject.⁴⁴

The attempts of the Dutch to obtain a monopoly of the pepper trade created two major difficulties for their Company. The first was the problem of pacifying the Chinese inhabitants who had become antagonistic towards the Dutch because of reduced revenue, and the obstruction of their free trade through the injunction of the Sultan. One of the influential Chinese merchants who was greatly affected by the Sultan's compulsive measures was Lau Kim Kong, whom the Dutch Company alleged, attempted to discredit Landsheer, the chief factor, in front of Hamid Dulla. The Company pointed out that Lau had accused Landsheer of extortion and intimidation. Landsheer had vehemently denied the charge by stating that

44. The Dutch factors had stated that their Company could not meet its obligations to build a factory in Banjarmasin until all the pepper commitments due from the Banjarese to the Dutch had been fulfilled.- Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 October 1729, KA 2025, f. 294.

as Lau had only fulfilled part of the pepper supply on which he had paid cash advances, he had merely taken extra stocks without making additional payments.⁴⁵ It is probable that Lau and some of the other merchants could have made false charges in order to have the Dutch evicted, and in the event, encourage the nakhodas to return, as they had done to the English when the Arabella arrived in Banjarmasin in 1715. On the other hand, Landsheer could have acted in a high-handed manner towards the Chinese by compelling them to surrender their pepper supplies; such compulsion was possibly regarded by the Chinese as extortion. However, the fact remains that wide discontent was caused by the sale of pepper at a cheap rate to the Dutch.

The other serious problem which faced the Dutch Company was the increased smuggling trade around the creeks and coasts of Banjarmasin. The steady arrival of the junks, especially after the termination of the Biaju rebellion in 1717, had drawn more and more Indonesian and Malay vessels to the Banjarese ports. Merchants from Macassar, Cambodia, Kutei, Semarang, Pulau Laut, Sumbawa, Bali and Trengganu brought their cloth, rice, rattans, birds'-nests, mats, wax and betel nuts to trade with the nakhodas for the usual and

45. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, ff. 2684-85.

popular Chinese goods.⁴⁶ Together with the ordinary commercial transactions, a certain amount of illicit trading was carried on between the Indonesians and the Chinese in opium, cloth and pepper. When these Asian traders discovered that none of the junks came to Banjarmasin in 1728 and their goods could not be sold, they resorted more to smuggling with the Banjarese and the Chinese inhabitants of Tartas.⁴⁷ Instead of giving all their stocks of pepper to the Dutch, many Banjarese merchants furtively delivered large portions of their produce to the Indonesian vessels which thereafter transported the pepper to East Java, Trengganu or Macassar. A few intrepid Chinese merchants sent their pepper supplies in small boats to Batavia and sold them at 6½ reals per pikul to the Javanese merchants.⁴⁸ In return, they carried large quantities of Indian cloth, opium and other Dutch goods back to Banjarmasin for sale to the inhabitants. Thus, the Dutch factors found that their consignments of these goods were never saleable in any of the

46. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 3 June 1727, KA 1949, f. 372.

47. Ibid., f. 373.

48. Among these coastal vessels, one which sent 800 pikuls of pepper to Batavia in 1728 belonged to Lau Kim Kong while another was owned by Oey Hwan Ko, another Chinese merchant. - Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, f. 2679.

Banjarese towns.⁴⁹ Furthermore, with the intrusion of the Bugis, piracy increased off Tomborneo. Gonepatja, a Bugis pirate, outwitted the pepper dealers by stating that he had come to load pepper on the orders of Joan Gobius, the Governor of Macassar.⁵⁰ As a result of all these illicit activities, the Dutch never managed to obtain very much pepper after 1728 and the amounts continued to decrease year after year until 1733, when the Dutch Company tried to impose severe regulations to impede the smuggling trade.

As the Dutch had expected, the order of the Panambahan to restrict most of the pepper sales to them could not deter the junks from returning to Banjarmasin. During the bumper crop season of 1732 when the Dutch Company anticipated large supplies of pepper from the Banjarese, the arrival of three junks frustrated its hopes.⁵¹ Once more, the pepper dealers reverted to their former practices by despatching most of their stocks to the junks at $5\frac{1}{4}$ to $5\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pikul. As a result, the Dutch boat Langerak under the command of P. Snippe and C. Braine obtained only 276,834 lbs. of pepper

49. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, f. 662.

50. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 14 November 1728, KA 1992, f. 173.

51. Original General Missive, 25 October 1732, KA 2097, f. 58.

in 1732.⁵² Instead of rebuking his subjects for flouting his orders whereby anybody who was found loading pepper to the junks would have his supplies confiscated, Sultan Hamid Dulla did not only remain silent, but refused to punish the offenders, much to the annoyance of the Dutch. In July 1733 the Panambahan permitted two of the three junks which returned to Tartas to ship away 12,800 pikuls of pepper.⁵³ As the production of the crop from the other pepper regions of Bantam and Palembang was still limited and demand exceeded supply, the Batavian authorities felt that the time had come for them to make more definite terms with Hamid Dulla over Dutch rights in the **pepper** trade. The ruler had made repeated assurances to the Dutch Company that the junk owners would be unable to interfere with the pepper deliveries to its factors, but everytime the Dutch had been disappointed.

It has been noticed that as a last resort to gain the monopoly of the pepper trade, the Dutch Company persuaded Hamid Dulla and Pengeran Suria Dilaga to sign a contract on 26 September 1733.⁵⁴ The Dutch had hoped that if the ruler granted them the sole trading rights to the pepper trade,

52. Ibid.

53. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 August 1733, KA 2177, f. 22.

54. Dutch-Banjarese contract, 26 September 1733, Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. V, pp. 165-70.

then inevitably, the junk merchants would be ousted from Banjarmasin. Alas, they were proven wrong, for the Panambahan agreed to exclude all other peoples from the commerce of his kingdom, but not the Chinese. He argued that it was still possible for the Batavian Council to get the bulk of the pepper supplies if a restricted number of junks were allowed to enter Banjarmasin.⁵⁵ All along, his subjects had depended on the junks to bring in valuable Chinese articles. A great hue and cry would be raised against him if he were to deprive the nakhodas of the opportunity of trading in his land.⁵⁶ It can be recalled that Marre and Brouwer, the Dutch factors, reluctantly agreed to the insertion of a clause which made it possible for the junks to visit Banjarmasin but it was explicitly stated that only one junk could load pepper not exceeding 4,000 pikuls annually.⁵⁷ The factors, however, impressed on Hamid Dulla that Dutch ships should be stocked with pepper first at all times before the nakhodas could load their junks.⁵⁸

55. Original General Missive, 31 October 1733, KA 2150, f. 116.

56. Ibid.

57. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 18 May 1734, KA 2206, f. 3. The amount of 4,000 pikuls was not specified in the original contract which stated vaguely that the junk could have a full cargo of pepper, but was an amendment made by the Dutch early in 1734.

58. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 18 May 1734, KA 2206, f. 3.

Despite the fact that the Dutch had virtually become the sole buyers of pepper except for the inclusion of one junk under the contract of 1733, the Batavian authorities were disgruntled over the outcome of the agreement.⁵⁹ They considered it useless to exclude the other foreign merchants from the pepper trade if the Chinese, their most aggressive rivals, were permitted to participate in the commercial transactions. Although the Panambahan had stipulated that only one junk per year would be allowed to load pepper, yet it was possible for just this one junk to inflict great harm on Dutch commerce in Banjarmasin unless it was brought under control. When the factors were out of sight, the Banjarese could ship the pepper from their perahus into one junk after another but still pretend that certain quantities of the produce were due to the nakhodas before the maximum amount of 4,000 pikuls was reached.⁶⁰ The only safeguard against such malpractices was that in emergency cases, the Dutch Company could confiscate contraband pepper in the absence of the Banjarese Shahbandar. Therefore, it was vital for the factors to maintain a strict check on all the junks, otherwise abuses would occur to the great disadvantage

59. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, KA 653, f. 507.

60. Ibid.

of the Company.⁶¹ Consequently, a Dutch patrol boat, the Verlangen, was stationed at the mouth of the Barito river to supervise the shipment of pepper into the junks and to prevent smuggling by interlopers.⁶² Before the junk could load any pepper, the nakhodas had to obtain a permit from the chief Dutch factor first. Otherwise, the commander of the Verlangen could detain the junk and confiscate the pepper aboard. This intended measure was similar to that practised by the Dutch in Bantam late in the 1610's when they seized junks which were loaded with pepper for China.⁶³

For a short period, Marre and Brouwer were content to see that although three junks were present at Tartas, they did not make any surreptitious move to obtain pepper while the Dutch vessels were stocked with cargoes.⁶⁴ On his part, Hamid Dulla adhered to the regulations by instructing the pepper merchants not to ship pepper freely aboard the junks. The Dutch factors were confident that as long as the ruler maintained the contract terms of 1733, and the Verlangen

61. Ibid.

62. Instructions by Marre and Brouwer to the Verlangen, 10 May 1734, KA 2206, ff. 6-7.

63. Meilink-Roelofs, Asian Trade and European Influence, p. 253.

64. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 18 May 1734, KA 2206, f. 4.

was not prohibited from patrolling the river, the Chinese would soon be disheartened and stay away from Banjarmasin, except for the despatch of a single vessel to buy the pepper.⁶⁵

The hopes of the Dutch were suddenly shattered by Hamid Dulla in May 1734 when he unexpectedly announced that a five per cent custom dues would be imposed on all in-coming and out-going ships of Banjarmasin regardless of whether they were Asian or European vessels. Furthermore, another quarter real would be added to the existent toll for every pikul of pepper purchased.⁶⁶ The factors considered the new ruling a very unjust measure on the part of the ruler to increase the price of pepper, and thereby eliminate the few advantages which the Company could derive from the contract. Also, with the imposition of a five per cent toll on all internal traffic, less perahus would transport pepper to them, as the cultivators and the Banjarese merchants would have a reduced incentive to dispose of their crop even during a good harvest season.⁶⁷

Before Marre and Brouwer had recovered from the shock of the royal announcement, Pengeran Marta Negara informed the factors that the Sultan had requested them not to hinder

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., f. 9.

67. Ibid.

the movement of the nakhodas in collecting pepper and to withdraw the Verlangen.⁶⁸ When they refused by declaring that Hamid Dulla was acting contrary to the regulations of the contract of 1733 by issuing such an order, two court favourites of the Sultan, Kjahi Warga and Juregan Besji, proceeded to deliver pepper into three junks and the guards of the Verlangen were unable to take any action against them.⁶⁹

In a situation where they were under the constant surveillance of the patrol boat and where they could not collect pepper, the nakhodas had turned to the Panambahan for help. With the aid of Kjahi Aria and Kjahi Ingaboy, who were influential Banjarese nobles, the Chinese managed to persuade Hamid Dulla to relax his orders and let their junks obtain pepper. The junk owners had realised that if they tried to acquire pepper on their own, the Dutch would confiscate their supplies by treating them as contraband. Therefore, the only way to attain their end was to send the two Banjarese favourites along in order to avoid a clash with the Dutch factors. Consequently, in the bad pepper season of 1734 when the price of pepper rose to 8 reals per pikul, the Dutch received only 500 pikuls while the junks

68. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 17.

69. Original General Missive, 30 November 1734, KA 2190, f. 1275.

shipped away 1,200 pikuls.⁷⁰

It is difficult to imagine how the wealthy Chinese merchants could tolerate the regulations of 1733 for long even if the ruler had not taken sides with the nakhodas. As in former times, the Chinese were highly dissatisfied when they were compelled to deliver their pepper which was far below the market rates, especially during a year of poor production. Once more, they had used their position and wealth to influence the decision of the Panambahan. Part of the blame for the failure to make the contract of 1733 workable lies with the Dutch factors. If they had not been so rigid in fixing the pepper rates, instead of attempting to establish the same price of 4 reals per pikul as was stipulated in the old treaty of 1664, the Dutch Company would have succeeded in compelling the Banjarese to deliver pepper to them. Once competitive prices were set up, the Banjarese and Chinese merchants would not have been so keen to give their pepper to the junks. Moreover, the reluctance of the Company to erect a factory or pagar in Banjarmasin according to the contract terms, added to the odds against the Dutch in making the ruler steer away from his promises. Practically all the Dutch factors, Broyell, Landsheer, Broun and Snippe, had made it clear to the Batavian Council that if it wanted

70. Ibid.

to carry on a successful trade in Banjarmasin, it had to construct a factory or pagar, as the Panambahan had made persistent pleas to this effect in order to obtain protection against the Bugis.⁷¹ The Dutch Company, despite its desire to continue trade, was not prepared to undertake such a building project as it considered that a factory was useless and involved the Company too much in the internal politics of Banjarmasin when the explicit purpose was merely trade.⁷² On their side, the junk owners had maintained the friendship at court by a frequent offer of gifts to the Banjarese ruler and by a readiness to pay high prices when they faced stiff competition on the pepper market.⁷³

Even before a year had elapsed, the contract of 1733 had become a dead letter to the Banjarese. The failure of the Dutch to obtain the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin became more apparent in September 1734 with the death of Hamid Dulla. The new Panambahan, Sultan Tamjood Dulla, was unsympathetic towards the Dutch as he firmly believed in a strong Sino-Banjarese trade since his subjects could derive

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71. Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 2012, f. 6390. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 8 May 1730, KA 2055, f. 87.
72. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729, KA 645, f. 209; Original General Missive, 8 December 1732, KA 2101, f. 2197.
73. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, f. 1176. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 17.

more profits from that commercial sphere. The main objective of the Dutch Company to oust the Chinese junks from Banjarmasin had not been fulfilled. The suppression of the junk trade had merely led the nakhodas to make more determined attempts to load their vessels with pepper. After a prolonged stay of two more years in which the Dutch had limited pepper cargoes, the Batavian authorities once again withdrew all their ships and gave up the idea of making Banjarmasin one of their chief supply points for pepper in the East.⁷⁴ The junk trade was left to thrive in Banjarmasin without any Dutch interference until 1747 when the Dutch Company compelled the Sultan to sign a new treaty giving it the monopoly of the pepper trade. The Company also decided to construct a factory in Banjarmasin then, as it realised that the dictum that "force prevailed more than persuasion" was true, if it intended to maintain its control over the pepper trade and deprive the Chinese nakhodas of lucrative pepper cargoes.

74. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, f. 1286.

CHAPTER VII

ENGLISH ACTIVITIES: 1713-1747

In 1713 the English East India Company sent its first two ships to Banjarmasin after a lapse of six years in a fresh attempt to trade with the Banjarese. The Directors hoped that their deficit in the pepper stocks from Malabar would be remedied by large exports from Banjarmasin. They felt that it was possible to convince the Panambahan, Suria Alam, of their fervent desire to reopen commercial relations with his state, and in the process, recoup at least part of their losses incurred in the Banjarese coup of 1707.¹

B. Swartz and J. Becher were appointed as first, and D. Beeckman and T. Lerves as second, supercargoes of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo.

Unlike the former expeditions where the Company permitted its employees to risk their own capital in some private stock trade, this policy had been altered by 1713. The Directors realised that private trade by their factors had adversely affected the Company by reducing its profits when the supercargoes advanced their own interests before those of their employers. In order to reduce the amount of private

1. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, 14 August 1713, CM (45), f. 451.

trade carried on by their servants to a minimum, the Directors introduced the practice of granting to the supercargoes a commission of five per cent on the total value of the merchandise.² Each ship was no longer to form a separate venture, with the accounts kept independently, but henceforth, the supercargoes of both ships were to constitute a Council on their arrival at Banjarmasin. To give added incentive, to the factors to return the Eagle Galley and the Borneo to England during the westerly monsoon via the Straits of Bali or Lombok, and not Batavia, the factors were promised an extra fifty guineas if they returned by the scheduled route. Otherwise, if they sailed via Batavia, the supercargoes would only be paid a commission on the net, and not the gross value of the merchandise.³ Moreover, if they met any Dutch ship on the high seas, the supercargoes were not to divulge their destination but to state that they were proceeding to Bencoolen.

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2. Ibid. The 5% commission was shared by the two or three factors on each ship in the following proportions: equally, or 3% and 2% in the case of two factors, and 2½%, 1½%, 1% in the case of three factors. The commission was later increased to 6%.
 3. The Directors intended the expedition through the Straits of Bali to serve as an experiment so that if the supercargoes discovered that the route was a safe one, then all Company ships could make use of it in future and, therefore, by-pass Batavia. - 23 September 1713, LB (15), ff. 85-91.

As in the previous voyages, the factors were instructed not to advance money to the Banjarese when buying pepper but to pay for the product only when it was brought to the scale at the weighing house. If this practice was not acceptable to the Banjarese, then the English could advance a small sum to the pepper merchants provided sufficient pledges in the form of gold or jewels were made.⁴ Although the Directors were eager to renew trade with the Banjarese, nevertheless, they felt that they were treading on unsteady ground. They still remembered the unsuccessful attempt of Cunningham and his Council to re-establish a foothold on Banjarmasin in 1708. They reminded the factors of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo that it was possible that the Banjarese would still demand \$3,000 (regarded as an old debt) from them, as they had in 1707, before they were allowed to resume commercial connections. If this was so, the factors should remind the Banjarese that an outstanding debt of \$20,000 was still owed to the English. If the Banjarese refused to listen to them, then the English should pay this initial sum. In addition, the willingness of the Directors to pay further duties to the Banjarese indicated clearly their desire to resume trade at Banjarmasin, which in itself reflected their contemporary difficulty in procuring sufficient stocks of pepper from

4. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, 23 September 1713, LB (15), f. 90.

India.⁵

With their cargoes of silver worth £4,315 and £4,313 respectively, the Eagle Galley and Borneo sailed to Banjarmasin in 1713. On arrival in Tartas, the factors discovered that the Banjarese still harboured resentment against the English. The Banjarese informed the factors that they did not regret expelling the English from their factory in 1707 "because there was always such enmity, and inveterate hatred between them, that the natives declared they never carry'd to them the tenth part of what they did us; being willing to have as little to do with them as possible."⁶ Even the Banjarese nobles, Kjahi Raden Tuka and Kjahi Chitra Uda, hesitated to welcome the supercargoes until they had been assured that the factors were private merchants and not servants of the English East India Company.⁷

Initially, the supercargoes were unable to persuade the Banjarese officials to give them any pepper as both sides could not agree on the price of five Spanish dollars per pikul insisted upon by Pengeran Purba. Nevertheless, after further negotiations whereby the English promised to deliver

5. Minutes of the Court of Directors, 22 July 1713, CM (45), f. 438.

6. Beeckman, A Voyage to Borneo, p. 101.

7. Ibid.

twenty muskets and two barrels of gunpowder to the Panambahan to assist him in the current Bugis-Banjarese war, the Banjarese authorities agreed to sell 4,000 pikuls of pepper to the English at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ Spanish dollars per pikul, while an additional suku or quarter dollar per pikul was also charged as customs dues.⁸

Evidently, Sultan Suria Alam was keen to receive armed support from the English in order to help him to subdue the Biajus in the civil war. His overtures to the Dutch Company for arms and troops between 1711 and 1713 were unsuccessful as the former did not want to be politically involved in Banjarmasin. Therefore the Sultan had to resort to the English. Under such circumstances, the topic of military assistance was raised by the Banjarese authorities whenever they had an audience with the supercargoes. For example, at a subsequent meeting with the English at Kayu Tinggi in July 1714, the ruler insisted on more arms to fight his enemies. Except for one occasion when the crew members gave military support to the Banjarese, the factors generally declined on the grounds that they needed all the men and ammunition they had for their own defence against any piratical attack on their return voyage.⁹

8. Ibid., pp. 65-67.

9. Ibid., p. 77.

In their commercial transactions, the supercargoes rented a small wooden house as a godown for the storage of pepper which was delivered to them by perahus in bales of four to five pikuls at a time. As soon as the pepper had been weighed with a daching, payment was made to the Banjarese. At other times, the English went direct to the merchants' warehouses to procure pepper which they shipped to their boats in hired perahus.¹⁰ Although a great amount of pepper had been promised to them by the ruler, the English found that delivery was slow and that only small quantities could be obtained. Two reasons accounted for the sluggish despatch of pepper, namely the upland war between the Biajus and the Banjarese, and the monsoonal rains, which hampered production as well as delivery of the crop.¹¹

In addition, the supercargoes encountered several other problems. Instead of obtaining a steady supply of pepper, the English found that most of the stocks were hoarded by the Chinese merchants of Tartas who intended to sell them at a higher price to the junk-traders who came in February or March of each year. Moreover, some Banjarese had hesitated to give the English further supplies when the factors paid two-thirds in Spanish dollars and one-third in

10. Swartz to the E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 822.

11. Ibid.

pillar dollars, for as usual, the Banjarese wanted all financial transactions to be conducted in Spanish currency.¹² As a result, by the end of September 1714, a short while before the Eagle Galley and the Borneo left Tartas, less than one quarter of the stipulated amount of 4000 pikuls had been sold to the English. Consequently, the Borneo had to retrun to England without a full cargo.¹³ Despite the Sultan's protestations that he would compel his subjects to sell their pepper to the supercargoes under threat of seizing all their stocks, Beeckman and his men realised that it was impossible to dispatch both ships with full cargoes by mid-October. Only the Eagle Galley was fully stocked when it left Banjarmasin on 10 December 1714.¹⁴

Although the pepper supplies brought back by the Eagle Galley and the Borneo were not fully up to the Director's expectations, they continued to send ships to Banjarmasin to purchase pepper. This was because they became convinced that subsequent trade missions would be more successful after they had heard that the Banjarese were willing to grant the main pepper trade to the English Company.¹⁵ To ensure that

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Minutes of the Court of Directors, 22 February 1715, CM (46), f. 581.

the Banjarese would not expel the English again, Swartz, the first supercargo of the Eagle Galley, had advised future factors to play on the fear of an English invasion of Banjarmasin. He considered that if the civil war between the Biajus and Banjarese was continuing, a more effective guarantee for the English would be to pretend that they had many offers of military assistance from the Bugis commanders, who were currently supporting the Biajus against the Banjarese.¹⁶ This was a very odd way for Swartz to reassure the English as this sort of threat would only make the Banjarese more suspicious of the English. Nevertheless, Swartz felt that it would be a workable plan because he was confident that the Banjarese authorities could not afford to wage a war with the English at this stage when most of their troops were deployed in curbing the internal disturbances.

Despite the optimism of Swartz, the voyage of the Arabella to Banjarmasin in 1715 was unsuccessful. As soon as the Banjarese nobles met Captain Reid and his men, they insisted that the Arabella should sail up to Tartas before any commercial transactions could be begun.¹⁷ Apparently, the Panambahan wanted the English vessel to act as a bulwark against any Bugis invasion of Tartas. Reid, however, asked

16. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 823.

17. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9), no page.

to be allowed to conduct trade at the kuala of the Barito river if he paid all the port charges. The Banjarese authorities refused on the ground that Suria Alam had issued instructions that all foreign merchants could only procure pepper if their ships were anchored in Tartas harbour.¹⁸

Reid indicated that he would agree to bring the ship to Tartas if he could purchase pepper at a similar price of 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ Spanish dollars per pikul as the Eagle Galley and the Borneo.¹⁹ The Banjarese authorities objected and claimed that they had no power to fix pepper prices in a free port like Tartas. Moreover, the Panambahan could not restrict the sale of pepper to particular individuals or bodies. In a situation where free trade existed, it was impossible for the ruler to attempt to impose his authority on his people. The Biajus had rebelled because the nobility had tried to interfere with the pepper supplies and custom dues. The Banjarese officials added that the English could dictate prices to the pepper merchants during the time of Captain Barre because they were powerful then and had a well-garrisoned establishment at Banjar. Since the English were merely ship-based traders now, they had to listen to the Banjarese for a change, namely, to conduct trade and pay according

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

to what was stipulated by the Banjarese traders.²⁰ Reid was not convinced by these arguments and insisted on meeting the pepper traders to enter into direct negotiations. He felt that it was unfair for the Banjarese authorities to grant commercial privileges only to the Chinese junk merchants and not to the English. The Chinese could reside in Tartas and move freely to ply their trade in exchange for pepper, but the English could purchase the product in a piecemeal fashion from year to year as they no longer had any resident to protect their trading rights at Banjar.²¹ In other words, Reid refused to abide by the Banjarese regulations unless the English were given a permanent residence and a guaranteed annual supply of pepper.

Shortly after, the Banjarese nobles re-attempted to persuade Reid to bring his ship up to Tartas to obtain pepper supplies. On this occasion, however, Reid had grave doubts about whether he would be able to secure any pepper, since the Pengeran had already informed him that the junk-merchants had obtained the contract for the whole pepper crop that season, thus making what little pepper there was in the lowlands, scarce and expensive.²² Reid felt that even if he

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

were willing to pay the same pepper rates as the Chinese, namely, at nine or ten Spanish dollars per pikul, he was doubtful of getting more than twenty pikuls because the Banjarese always tried to exchange pepper for Chinese wares. "To what purpose then," Reid argued, "to bring ye ship over a long dangerous barr, in a tempestuous time of the year and height of a violent monsoon, hazard ship and treasure, lose a great deal of time in getting out again, be obliged to pay all port charges which is considerable, and ye only thing I found they drove at, as they had before declared that they intermeddle with nought but customs and port charges, and all these without the least prospect of any pepper or other advantage thereby."²³

After his two futile attempts at conducting negotiations with the Banjarese nobles, Reid departed from Banjarmasin without obtaining a single grain of pepper. This was because he did not comply with the demands of the Banjarese authorities; doubtless, he was keeping rigidly to the advice of the Directors that he should only trade with the Banjarese merchants off-shore. In the case of the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, the Panambahan had allowed the supercargoes to anchor their ships in the Banjar Bay, but this example was not repeated when the Arabella arrived in the area. Moreover,

23. Ibid.

the Shahbandar was non-committal when Reid requested that two or three English merchants should make a permanent residence at Tartas in order to facilitate Anglo-Banjarese commercial relations.²⁴

Because he had failed in accomplishing his mission, Reid declared that the English Company's trade in Banjarmasin was "irretrievably lost."²⁵ He saw no other way for the Company to re-establish a settlement there except by using arms to subjugate the inhabitants. Since Barre and Landon, who had a small force but superior weapons, could dominate the Banjarese, there could be no doubt of the Company's success if it were willing to risk the venture. He pointed out that it was unnecessary to have a large army in Banjarmasin, "but a small and well prepared [one], which would infallibly reduce the place, settle and secure the whole trade of that island."²⁶

It is open to speculation why the Banjarese authorities did not supply pepper to the Arabella and allow it to be stationed in the Bay of Banjar. It has been observed that although Suria Alam did not see eye to eye with the English Company, nevertheless, he expected the factors to supply him

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

with arms. Beeckman and Swartz had disappointed him by not furnishing him with sufficient military aid. Therefore, when the Arabella arrived, he was not very eager to make any further move to befriend the English.

Another possible reason for the unresponsive attitude of the Banjarese towards Reid was the Chinese merchants who exercised considerable influence over the Banjarese court. According to the Governor of Macassar, the imposition of one suku on every pikul of pepper as port charges on all European vessels was the Chinese Capitan's idea.²⁷ Evidently, the Chinese inhabitants of Tartas did not want the English to settle in Banjarmasin because of their bitter experience with them prior to 1708. The English had not only compelled the Sultan to grant them the monopoly of the pepper trade then, but had also severely checked the junk-trade and exacted heavy tolls from the nakhodas. Very likely, if the suku tax had been suggested by the Chinese Capitan, it was a retaliatory move against the English.

The factors of the Hester and Thistleworth also encountered several problems when they tried to purchase

27. The Governor of Macassar obtained the information from a Bugis inhabitant of Banjarmasin. - Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 30 November 1716, KA 1782, f. 1450.

pepper in Tartas in 1716.²⁸ Although it was customary to give presents to the Banjarese chiefs, the English refused to give more than was thought necessary even when they were cajoled by the chiefs. This provoked Kjahi Aria, who administered and fixed the pepper rates, not to give any rebate to the factors.²⁹ Even when they approached the pepper merchants directly, the English could not obtain any reduction in the pepper price of $6\frac{1}{2}$ Spanish dollars per pikul, as the merchants had been forewarned by Kjahi Aria that all offenders would be severely punished.³⁰ Furthermore, the English had to pay an extra suku for every pikul of pepper purchased. These custom dues differed considerably from the rate of 300 dollars for every ship prior to 1707. The factors calculated that a ship weighing over 200 tons now had to pay treble the original amount. In addition to these high duties, the Shahbandar forced the English to pay an extra sum of 100 dollars for anchorage dues.³¹

The Directors could never predict what action the Banjarese would take when the next Company ship arrived. The

28. Minutes of the Court of Directors, 20 February 1716, CM (46), f. 281.

29. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 446.

30. Ibid.

31. E.I.C. to the Committee of Correspondence, 27 August 1718, Reference to the Committee of Correspondence, (2), f. 85.

Banjarese could behave in a perfectly calm and friendly manner one moment and change to complete antagonism the next, as happened in the case of the King George which sailed to Banjarmasin in 1719. Although C. Small of the Thistleworth informed the Directors that the Banjarese had indicated that they wanted the English to trade at Tartas, yet six weeks elapsed before any pepper was given to the King George.³² After one hundred tons of pepper had been supplied and the factors were still awaiting for more to come, the Banjarese, numbering about one thousand and five hundred, under the command of Pengeran Purba, suddenly launched an attack on the English ship in the harbour. The English managed to escape in the nick of time at night and came to Tomborneo roads after crossing the Banjar Bay.³³

The factors could not explain this sudden outbreak of hostility on the part of the Banjarese, for all along, the supercargoes of the King George had pretended that they were private traders and not employees of the Company.³⁴ It is possible that the Banjarese suspected the English to be Company merchants. They must have realised that if the supercargoes were private merchants as they claimed, they

32. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Godfrey, 29 November 1721, LB (18), f. 57.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

would only conduct ship-based trading instead of requesting a permanent residence. The Sultan would probably have allowed the English to remain in Banjarmasin if they had not refused his overtures to obtain military aid. When the English refused to do so, the ruler decided to launch an attack on the King George in order to oust the English from his land. This bitter experience of the supercargoes served as a warning to the Directors when they remarked that the Banjarese were "very tricking and deceitful tho' fawning, and in appearance both in language and behaviour very submissive and complaisant. Experience has taught the English [that] they are very vindictive and will conceal their resentments till they have a fair opportunity to do mischief."³⁵

The Directors were, however, undaunted by the attack on the King George and subsequently risked more ships to Banjarmasin. This persistence of the English Company in advocating a policy of continued trade with Banjarmasin was evidently the result of its dissatisfaction over the station at Bencoolen or Fort Marlborough which was established in 1685 as the headquarters of the English pepper trade. Bencoolen was badly situated to have much commercial or strategic importance. It was not in the direct route of the China-bound vessels to serve as an intermediate station, and

35. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 448.

was also too far from India to act as a revictualling and refitting centre for ships engaged in the Indian trade. Although heavy financial losses were incurred in upkeeping the settlement, nevertheless, the Directors were determined to maintain it in the face of intensive Dutch rivalry in the Archipelago. They were of the opinion that Bencoolen should be used as a bulwark against Dutch attempts to secure the monopoly of the pepper trade in the Malayan region. The following comment testifies to the Directors' anti-Dutch sentiments: "This financial loss we cannot, we must no longer bear. It would be much better to quit the whole coast, and so we should have done before this were it not that we consider it a national benefit to secure a footing in the pepper settlements to prevent the Dutch engrossing the whole."³⁶ Therefore, it is understandable why the Company refused to surrender its ventures in Banjarmasin; it fervently hoped that the port would offer the commercial advantages which Bencoolen lacked.

The Middlesex, which sailed to Banjarmasin in 1720, was followed by the James and Mary, the Godfrey and the Princess Amelia in 1721, 1722 and 1724 respectively. The supercargoes were bound to the English Company by the same system as that of the mid-1710's whereby they could obtain

36. E.I.C. to Council at Fort Marlborough, 14 September 1720, LB (17), f. 450.

six per cent commission on the gross cargoes brought to England.³⁷ The Directors did not raise any objections to the increase in the pepper price from $\$4\frac{1}{2}$ to $\$6\frac{1}{2}$ per pikul between 1713 and 1716 at Banjarmasin. In fact, they ordered their employees to pay the rate stipulated by the Banjarese merchants because they felt that if they could offer a higher price to the Banjarese merchants than the other foreign or separate stock merchants, they could outbid and discourage their competitors.³⁸ This interesting new approach raises the question of why the Company should have been more liberal than formerly in the payments for pepper. It is conceivable that the Directors realised that new opportunities were present for an expanding trade in pepper for the English Company at Banjarmasin.

When the Chinese junks were prohibited from the south-east Asian ports under an Imperial edict of 1717,³⁹ the English Company wanted to take advantage of the situation by breaking into the pepper market of Banjarmasin. The Directors conjectured that in the absence of the Chinese, the Banjarese would face an economic crisis if their pepper stocks were not sold to any prospective buyer. There was even a possibility

37. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 453.

38. Ibid.

39. Refer to p. 217.

that prices would be reduced in the event of unsold pepper supplies. It was true that the pepper merchants could offer garbled pepper to the Dutch, but at this juncture, even the latter were not very interested in trading at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi. Thus, if the English factors wanted to obtain pepper at this stage, they were likely to succeed. In their instructions to their employees, the Directors reminded them that they should not reveal their plans to the Dutch authorities at Batavia in case they were obstructed on the high seas.⁴⁰

During this period, the Directors were interested in shipping pepper from Banjarmasin to China and not England. They made it clear to the supercargoes that it did not matter whether pepper was purchased at Banjarmasin or Batavia if the price was about the same.⁴¹ Another surprising addition was that regardless of whether the ship obtained a full cargo or not, it had to leave Banjarmasin by 31 July for Canton where the factors could dispose of their pepper cargo to the Chinese traders. On their departure from Canton, the factors should purchase Chinese goods for sale at Mokha in exchange for well-garbled coffee for Europe.⁴² Instead of directing

40. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 1720, LB (17), f. 453

41. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Princess Amelia, 30 September 1724, LB (19), ff. 293-95.

42. Ibid., f. 295.

their pepper imports to England, the English had to channel their cargo to China simply because many Chinese merchants who were forbidden to make any outward voyage, were willing to pay high rates for pepper which was brought to their shores. Thus, this explains the intention of the Directors to focus their attention on China, and not on the European market.

In 1723/4 the return of the Chinese, and about two years later, the arrival of the Dutch in Banjarmasin put an abrupt stop to the ambitious plans of the English Company to open extensive trade with the Banjarese. The few private English ships which called at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi hardly received any attention from the pepper merchants.⁴³ The latter either delivered their cargoes to the Dutch factors so as to gain support to defend their land against the Bugis invasions, or to the Chinese nakhodas who had re-established trade with Banjarmasin after the royal edict had been revoked at the death of Emperor Kang-Hsi.⁴⁴ It was not until a decade later that the English managed to trade in the area again after the Batavian government had abandoned all its expeditions

43. Original General Missive, 30 November 1725, KA 1911, f. 606.

44. Although the Imperial Edict was revoked at the end of 1722, it took some time for the junks to reorganise their expeditions to south-east Asia.

to Banjarmasin. This was because the Dutch were frustrated by the decreasing annual supply of pepper although the commercial agreement of 1733 had stipulated that the main pepper trade would be given only to the Dutch Company.⁴⁵

Another reason why the Dutch abandoned Banjarmasin in 1737 was probably due to a shortage of current silver cash at Batavia which had led to the discontinuation of the direct trade in tea between the Netherlands and Canton.⁴⁶

Although the Banjarese authorities would have preferred to transact business with the Chinese rather than the Europeans, their wishes were overruled by the Panambahan. Motivated more by political interests, the Sultan was anxious to reopen commercial relations with the English. Evidently, if Tamjeed Dulla wanted to maintain his balance of power in the absence of the Dutch, since the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1733 had proven ineffective, he had to depend on English military assistance. Thus, he was obliged to invite the English East India Company to trade in his land. It was true that the notorious Bugis leaders, such as Daing Mamantuli, had been expelled, but the insecurity and dangers of external raids were still present as large numbers of Bugis continued

45. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, f. 1289.

46. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740, (Copenhagen, 1958), p. 240.

to commit piracies off the shores of Banjar.⁴⁷ Internally, the ruler could never be sure when one of his jealous and discontented relatives or court aides would stage a coup d'etat. Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was only acting as regent for his nephew, Mohammed.⁴⁸ Until such time as the latter ascended the throne, Tamjeed Dulla still had to contend with the numerous chieftains, who were envious of his position and of the control which he exercised on the young Mohammed. He apparently felt that there was less likelihood of threats to his personal safety if the English were in his land.

It should be noted that this was the first time since the abortive English settlement of Banjar in 1707 that the English Company was officially invited to trade in Banjarmasin by the Panambahan. The Company voyages between 1713 and 1726 had been made to appear as private ventures.⁴⁹ Late in 1737, however, the picture changed when Tamjeed Dulla made the first approach to the English Company since 1707.⁵⁰ The Directors, though surprised that the Dutch factors had left

47. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, f. 1289.

48. Mohamed was the son of the deceased Panambahan, Sultan Hamid Dulla. - Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 9 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 13.

49. Refer to p. 240.

50. The Panambahan's letter reached the Directors in October 1737. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales, 12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 268.

Banjarmasin so hurriedly in that year, accepted the ruler's invitation to trade by despatching the Prince of Wales in 1738.⁵¹

Undoubtedly, the Company was pleased to re-establish relations with the Panambahan for two reasons. First, it was given fresh opportunities to obtain pepper which was still very much in demand in the Asian and European markets. Secondly, the Directors were of the opinion that the pepper trade of Banjarmasin was "of great consequence especially in enlarging and improving the China trade."⁵² The sale of large supplies of pepper to the inland merchants of Canton who normally found difficulty in procuring sufficient stocks from the junk nakhodas, would reduce the drain of bullion from England and provide a satisfactory medium of exchange for the purchase of Chinese luxury goods.⁵³

With regard to the first objective, the Directors were eager to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the absence of the Dutch to make Banjarmasin one of their chief pepper markets in south-east Asia. The steady demand for

51. Ibid., f. 269.

52. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, SFR (9), f. 8.

53. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales, 12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 270.

pepper encouraged the Directors to proceed with their plans in developing the pepper trade of Banjarmasin. To give an indication of the pepper price on the London market, white pepper, considered to be the most expensive of all types of pepper, was sold at a constant price of about 3.5s. per lb. in the 1720's and 1730's, compared to the rate of 2.5s. per lb. in the 1700's.⁵⁴ At Banjarmasin, the English suggested to the Sultan that if the Dutch Company had not complied with the Dutch-Banjarese contract of 1733 by leaving Banjarmasin, then Tamjeed Dulla should not be obliged to the Dutch anymore and could sell pepper to whoever he wished.⁵⁵ If a "well established trade" based upon "a well grounded mutual confidence" between the Banjarese and the English could be developed, then, claimed the Directors, "we might besides ye immediate benefit thereof, have a continual account of all transactions in those eastern parts, and thereby further enlarge our commerce with Malays of all sorts as occasion may offer."⁵⁶ With these two objectives in mind, the Company was prepared to send two ships each year to Banjarmasin, and even

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54. White pepper is used as the example since brown pepper is not listed on the price list. - Lord Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, Vol. I, (London, 1965), Appendix II (on Price Relatives).
55. Council at Fort Marlborough to J. Hurlock, 31 December 1738, SFR (9), f. 5.
56. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, SFR (9), f. 9.

advised its factors to bribe the Banjarese authorities if necessary in order to purchase large stocks of pepper.⁵⁷

When they reached Tartas late in 1738, the factors of the Prince of Wales were warmly received by the Banjarese authorities and were given a full cargo of pepper. The Jane, which was sent to Banjarmasin in the same year, was treated likewise.⁵⁸ The Marlborough and the Walpole, however, were not so fortunate. Captain J. Hurlock, the chief factor of the Marlborough, had negotiated for a cargo of 2,000 pikuls of pepper for every Company ship at six Spanish dollars a pikul inclusive of custom taxes from Tamjeed Dulla in mid-1739.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the Banjarese, after supplying only 820 pikuls, stopped delivery to the English, and started to load pepper into the two junks which had arrived from Canton and Ningpo.⁶⁰ Possibly, the Sultan had realised that his overtures to the English in 1737 had produced no political results and thus he was inclined to favour the Chinese again. When the supercargoes asked him for an explanation, the Panambahan claimed that a bad drought had dried up the rivers and

57. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales, 12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 269.

58. Council at Fort Marlborough to J. Hurlock, 31 December 1738, SFR (9), f. 3.

59. Supercargoes of the Walpole to supercargoes of the Duke, 17 July 1739, SFR (9), f. 20.

60. Ibid., f. 22.

prevented the pepper from coming down to the ports. It was essential to fill the junks first since 5,000 pikuls of pepper had been contracted to the nakhodas before the arrival of the Marlborough and the Walpole.⁶¹ The Shahbandar, however, furnished the English merchants with a different account. He said that for every pikul of pepper, the nakhodas were paying eight Spanish dollars and half a dollar or two sukus extra as custom charges. Since they paid higher rates, the junks invariably obtained pepper first.⁶²

From the Shahbandar's explanation and the complaints of the factors, it would seem that the junk owners, through their competitive bidding on the pepper market, had managed to succeed where the English had failed. By giving preference to the junks, the factors asserted that the ruler had not kept his promise to the English Company to grant it an equitable and profitable trade at Banjarmasin.⁶³ The English did not realise that their failure to provide military aid to the Sultan had encouraged him to help the Chinese in loading their vessels with pepper. The supercargoes were also to blame for giving unacceptable currency to the Banjarese. Instead of making the customary payments for their pepper

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

purchases in Spanish dollars, the supercargoes of the Marlborough and the Walpole advanced new milled dollars to the Banjarese.⁶⁴ This type of currency had been introduced into Banjarmasin by the English Company to replace the old Spanish coins which were becoming obsolete and scarce. The factors discovered that it was increasingly difficult even to obtain Spanish reals from Batavia which was also experiencing a shortage of the currency.⁶⁵ They hoped that the new milled coins, which were widely circulated in other parts of the East Indies, would be acceptable to the Banjarese merchants.

For a while, the Sultan was willing to take the new currency, and the factors, including those of the Prince of Wales and the Jane, were permitted to load their vessels with pepper. However, when the ruler realised that he had accumulated new milled coins to the value of 60,000 dollars, he insisted on exchanging them into Spanish currency with Captain Hurlock and Captain Boddam, the chief factor of the Walpole.⁶⁶ When the English pointed out that they did not have more than a few Spanish coins, Tamjeed Dulla gave instructions to his subjects to stop the pepper supply to the

64. Ibid.

65. E.I.C. to Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, SFR (9), f. 12.

66. Supercargoes of the Walpole to supercargoes of the Duke, 17 July 1739, SFR (9), f. 22.

supercargoes.⁶⁷ This partly explains the ruler's excuse that further supplies were meant only for the junks. The Banjarese resumed delivery of pepper into the English vessels in mid-1739 only after the factors had given 3,000 Spanish dollars to the Panambahan.⁶⁸

However, after 1,200 pikuls of pepper had been weighed, Tamjeed Dulla became discontented again and demanded one suku or a quarter dollar extra in duties for every pikul bought by the English.⁶⁹ Captain Hurlock felt that the ruler was extorting money from the English. Since he did not wish to sever commercial ties with Tamjeed Dulla without prior orders from his employers, Hurlock accepted the Sultan's proposition on condition that he would grant a chop for 6,000 pikuls of pepper annually to the East India Company at the fixed price of $6\frac{1}{4}$ dollars. Tamjeed Dulla then made it clear that he would agree only if the Directors sent him a guard ship to defend his land against his enemies.⁷⁰ Hurlock, not willing to commit himself in a matter which involved politics, decided to leave Tartas. Hence, the Walpole sailed off in July 1739 with only one-third of the pepper cargo

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

which had been consigned to it. The Marlborough, meanwhile, remained in Tartas to await the next harvest harvest.⁷¹

Instead of sending vessels out to south-east and east Asia only from London, the English Company in 1738 authorised its employees in Bencoolen to conduct expeditions to Banjarmasin so as to save time and money.⁷² In this respect, the Marlborough was the first outward-bound ship from Bencoolen to Banjarmasin since the renewal of trade with the Banjarese, and it was shortly followed by the Duke in February 1740.⁷³ The authorities at Fort Marlborough did not foresee much difficulty in the Duke obtaining a full cargo as Tamjeed Dulla had written that the forthcoming harvest would be a much better one. The English could expect 4,000 to 5,000 pikuls of pepper if they arrived early in the Bay of Banjar.⁷⁴ However, when the Duke returned to Bencoolen about five months later, the invoice of the ship showed that not more than

71. Ibid. The supercargoes of the Marlborough remained in Banjarmasin on the understanding that Tamjeed Dulla would compensate their loss from their longer stay in Tartas by giving them a full cargo when the next harvesting season occurred.

72. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, SFR (9), f. 8.

73. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 24 February 1740, SFR (9), f. 16.

74. Letter from the Council at Fort Marlborough to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 6 January 1740, SFR (9), f. 2.

2,000 pikuls of pepper had been purchased;⁷⁵ an amount which fell far below that promised by the Panambahan.

Although the Banjarese faction at court, consisting of Juree Tulis, Pengeran Suria and their subordinates, can be held responsible for the small quantity of pepper which was furnished to the English, the factors of the Duke and the Marlborough were also to blame, especially for the undiplomatic way they treated the Banjarese. The Sultan was probably sincere in his pledges, but when Tamjeed Dulla was away in Kayu Tinggi, he left Juree Tulis, his representative, to handle commercial matters with the English at Tartas.

T. Hindeman, the chief factor of the Duke, tried to insist on going up to Kayu Tinggi to see the Sultan as he felt that Juree Tulis, being a good friend of the Chinese junk traders, would not advance the interests of the English East India Company, but was refused.⁷⁶ By acting in this manner, Hindeman had antagonised the Banjarese official, who thereafter was instrumental in halting supplies of pepper to the Duke since it was within his power to do so.

Hindeman and Hurlock also traced the cause for their poor pepper supplies to the few junk owners who received

75. Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 1741, LB (25), f. 562.

76. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 1 April 1740, SFR (9), f. 28.

large bales of pepper daily from the merchants.⁷⁷ They alleged that the Chinese intensified their efforts by sending their own men into the interior of Banjarmasin to procure pepper.⁷⁸ Fearing that the junk traders would deprive them of a large cargo, the factors went to persuade Pengeran Suria and Tamjeed Dulla to stop the practice of ventures up-country by the Chinese, but if that was not possible, to permit the English merchants to do the same.⁷⁹ The Panambahan, however, would not allow the supercargoes to go inland to transact business because he felt that they would be able to obtain pepper at a cheaper rate from the Biajus. The English would not only dispense with the profits of the middlemen, but also could avoid the payment of duties, since they could cheat by not weighing their pepper at the customs-house. In the case of the nakhodas, the Sultan had made an exception because they had advanced more than 10,000 dollars to the merchants; hence, the Chinese had gone upland to receive payment in kind.⁸⁰ If the English wanted to load their ships quickly, Tamjeed Dulla stated, they should give

77. Ibid., 17 March 1740, f. 24.

78. Ibid. The practice of the Chinese to go into the interior of Banjarmasin to procure pepper was not new but went back as far as 1712. Refer to p. 218

79. Diary of Duke in Banjarmasin, 17 March 1740, SFR (9), f. 24. Also letter from supercargoes of Duke to Pengeran Suria and Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 22 June 1740, SFR (9), f. 41.

80. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 7 May 1740, SFR (9), f. 38.

large advances to the Banjarese in Spanish currency.⁸¹

Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was granting favourable treatment to the Chinese and he was perhaps partially justified in his actions. Apparently, he was very disappointed with the English for not providing arms or the guard vessel as he had previously requested. Thereafter, the Sultan refused to co-operate with the supercargoes in their loading of pepper. His disappointment was reflected in his displeasure at the way the supercargoes conducted trade. The Sultan objected to the frequent payment of new milled coins by the English.⁸² Moreover, instead of making cash advances, the supercargoes of the Duke made payment only when pepper was brought to them, although they realised that the Banjarese always operated on advances. Nevertheless, Hindeman asked Tamjeed Dulla not to misconstrue their non-compliance "as a diffidence of your Majesty's paying us again, but flatter ourselves that you'd relinquish your proposal [to do us harm] and put it upon no other footing than that we are obliged to be tenacious of our employer's orders."⁸³

81. Ibid.

82. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 10 May 1740, SFR (9), f. 35. In one instance, the supercargoes of the Duke had to borrow \$200 in current cash from Kjali Dipa to buy a few bales of pepper.

83. Letter from T. Hindeman to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 1 July 1740, SFR (9), f. 43.

When the supercargoes found that they could not make much progress in their negotiations with the Sultan, they decided to deal with the nakhodas. Hindeman and Hurlock thereupon approached Kjahi Raksa, a Chinese official who was in charge of pepper deliveries to the junks.⁸⁴ They told him that the nakhodas, by giving more than the fixed price of six dollars per pikul, had broken the commercial regulations whereby the Panambahan had decreed that it was an offence for anyone to bid for pepper at more than the above rate. The factors were of the opinion that it was fair for Kjahi Raksa to give them the extra pepper rather than to the junks as the latter had already loaded over 3,000 pikuls of pepper.⁸⁵ When Kjahi Raksa explained that the contract did not concern him since it was a matter between the junk owners and the Panambahan, the English then tried to threaten a certain nakhoda.⁸⁶ They warned him that unless he delivered part of his pepper stock to the Duke, they would insist on making a thorough check of his junk at the Bay of Banjar so that if his supply exceeded 1,000 pikuls, they would take the extra amount by force.⁸⁷ The nakhoda refused and reported the matter to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, who subsequently

84. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 26 April 1740, SFR (9), f. 31

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., 29 April 1740, f. 32.

87. Ibid.

reproached the factors.⁸⁸

When Hindeman reminded the ruler of his promise to supply full pepper cargoes for the English Company ships, the Sultan stated that it was difficult for him to keep his bargain when the Directors had not despatched the guard ship which he had requested in 1739.⁸⁹ The incident alienated the Sultan's feelings towards the supercargoes for the English found that after the meeting, hardly any pepper was brought ~~the~~ ^{to} them.⁹⁰ The supercargoes of the Duke and Marlborough decided thereafter to leave Banjarmasin. Before their departure, they warned Tamjeed Dulla that the English Company would have no further dealings with him as "we are thoroughly convinced that you only mean to amuse us to what end we are ignorant; we deem the pretended friendship as not to be rely'd on, having already forfeited ye promise of giving us all ye last crop you gave under your hand in a letter to ye Governor and Council of Bencoolen so much to our prejudice and your dishonour, that we justly conclude no confidence is to be put in future assurances which we shall punctually acquaint ye Honourable Company not doubting but that they

88. Ibid., 3 May 1740, f. 33. Sultan Tamjeed Dulla referred to the factors as "Dutchmen" (in a derogatory sense) who intended to create disturbances in Banjarmasin.

89. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 3 May 1740, SFR (9), f. 33.

90. Ibid., 7 May 1740, f. 38.

will have due regard thereto."⁹¹

Hindeman and Hurlock were responsible for weakening commercial relations between the Banjarese authorities and the Company. The Banjarese were aggravated when the supercargoes became insolent towards the junk owner and threatened to confiscate his supplies of pepper. Sultan Tamjeed Dulla who was already disappointed with the Company for not despatching the guard vessel, therefore decided to expel the English from Banjarmasin. On 16 July 1740 the Banjarese attacked the two English ships which were anchored in the Bay of Banjar. The English, who had been forewarned by Dato Mas that the Sultan intended to launch an onslaught, retaliated by firing upon the Banjarese perahus. After three days of sporadic fighting, when the English heard that the Banjarese intended to send for reinforcements, the supercargoes resolved to leave the Bay. The Duke and Marlborough sailed off in the direction of Bencoolen on 20 July 1740.⁹²

The complaints of the supercargoes of the Duke and the Marlborough about the treachery of the Banjarese went unheeded by the Directors in London although the Bencoolen Council

91. Letter from the supercargoes of the Duke and the Marlborough to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 12 July 1740, SFR (9), f. 45.

92. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 20 July 1740, SFR (9), f. 45.

wanted to abandon the project of despatching further vessels to Banjarmasin.⁹³ The Directors did not intend to give up so easily, particularly when possibilities of an extensive trade in pepper could be explored in the absence of the Dutch. They did not doubt that the Chinese nakhodas were highly successful competitors and it was out of the question for the English Company to topple or outbid them. However, the Directors were sure that in a normal year when the yield was between 15,000 and 20,000 pikuls,⁹⁴ the market at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi could offer pepper to buyers other than the Chinese.

The Directors could have thought that their employees had blundered and hoped the mistake could be rectified by inviting the Panambahan or his representatives to Bencoolen for negotiations. In fact, they were keen to hold discussions with the Banjarese authorities as early as 1738 when the Prince of Wales was sent to Banjarmasin in order to foster goodwill and to improve commercial relations between the two peoples.⁹⁵ The Directors realised that the only way to bring

93. Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 1741, LB (25), f. 562.

94. This estimate of the annual pepper yield in a normal harvest season is cited by J.A. Baron van Hohendorff, "Radical Beschrijving van Banjormassing", BTLV, Vol. 4, (Amsterdam, 1861), p. 201.

95. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales, 12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 270.

about harmonious relations was to send a guard ship to the Sultan. They accordingly despatched a letter to Tamjeed Dulla outlining their intention.⁹⁶

The Panambahan, obviously pleased with the English Company's pledge to assist him, accepted the invitation and sent two officials to Bencoolen. When the Banjarese arrived in July 1742, they were warmly received by the Deputy Governor and Council of Fort Marlborough.⁹⁷ In the ensuing negotiations, the Banjarese delegates were personally assured by the Bencoolen authorities that the guard ship would be sent as soon as commercial relations were re-established between the Company and the Banjarese. In his letter to the Bencoolen government, Tamjeed Dulla had stated that he could supply only 3,000 pikuls of pepper to the English Company each year, for part of the crop had to be given to the junks which brought valuable goods to his people. Shortly before the Banjarese delegates left with a declaration "that they would on all occasions, contribute their best endeavours to render our English correspondence to their country agreeable and friendly," a subsequent letter from the Sultan encouraged the Bencoolen government to anticipate a much larger supply of pepper for

96. Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 1741, LB (25), f. 563.

97. Council at Fort Marlborough to E.I.C., 28 February 1743, SFR (9), ff. 178-79.

its ships at Banjarmasin. Hereby, Tamjeed Dulla promised that he would deliver 8,000 pikuls of pepper to the Company if its ships reached Tartas within two months' time.⁹⁸ Possibly, the Sultan felt that a pledge to grant a larger quantity of pepper to the English would produce swifter results as far as the despatch of the guard vessel was concerned.

The Bencoolen Council conjectured that the Sultan had made the new offer after he had found out that the nakhodas did not come to collect the pepper stocks which were consigned to them in that year, probably because the Chinese were short of cash.⁹⁹ In this ^{sense,} /the Council was mistaken. The nakhodas had refrained from ^{visiting} Banjarmasin in 1742 not because they lacked money, (as it has already been noted that the lucrative Chinese cargoes were easily exchangeable with pepper), but because of disturbances in Java which prevented them from sailing to the south seas.

These revolts in Java were the outcome of mass immigration of Chinese into Batavia in the 1730's. The Dutch, unable to check the inflow of more Chinese and faced with the problem of mass unemployment, decided to deport some of them to Ceylon and South Africa. This action of the Batavian Council provoked the Chinese to rebel in 1740. In the event, the

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., f. 180.

disturbances spread to northern Java when certain Pengerans also took up arms against the Dutch.¹⁰⁰ Fearing that the riots would become more widespread and that the Javanese chieftains would be incited to rise against their masters and declare their independence, the Batavian authorities invited neighbouring Sultans to support them against the rebels.¹⁰¹ It is conceivable that in the midst of these disturbances, the nakhodas from Canton, Amoy and Ningpo who frequented Batavia annually, preferred (or were instructed) to refrain from visiting the area until the situation had returned to normal. Since many junk owners also stopped at Banjarmasin while they were on their way to Java, the number of junks in the former place inevitably decreased during this period. Meanwhile in Banjarmasin, when Tamjeed Dulla noticed the large leftovers from the pepper crop of the last harvest of 1740-1741, he decided to make the offer to the English instead, and hoped that they would send the guard vessel very soon.

The Directors, eager to accept the Panambahan's offer,

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100. J.K.J. de Jonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indie, Vol. 9, (The Hague, 1881), p. 923; B. Hoetink, "Ni Hoekong, Kapitein der Chincezen te Batavia in 1740", BTLV, Vol. 74, (The Hague, 1918), pp. 447-518; E.S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies, Vol. I, (Rotterdam, 1938), pp. 363-69.
101. The Batavian authorities specially asked the Sultan of Madura to assist them by sending his armies "with expeditiousness to demolish the Chinese our enemies at Kartasoorah." - Account of the Chinese War in Java, Mackenzie Collection 1822, (24), ff. 1-12.

despatched the Severn and Neptune to Banjarmasin in 1742. Within one and a half months of their arrival, the supercargoes were able to procure a total of 6,700 pikuls of pepper:¹⁰² a record collection compared to the low figures obtained by the previous English vessels which stayed as long as six to seven months in Banjarmasin. Although he was willing to concede a large pepper supply to the English, Tamjeed Dulla, however, was reluctant to sign any contract with them. When T. Butler, first supercargo of the Severn asked him for a chop granting 8,000 pikuls of pepper yearly to the English Company, he evaded the issue.¹⁰³ He considered it unwise to give commercial privileges to the Company when it had not sent the guardvessel that had been promised. Perhaps Tamjeed Dulla was also hoping that the Chinese would return to Banjarmasin very soon to resume their trade.

The successful loading of the Severn and the Neptune encouraged the English Company to send more vessels to Banjarmasin.¹⁰⁴ The Colchester, Porto Bello and the Onslow were despatched in 1743, 1744 and 1745 respectively. It is

102. T. Butler and J. Collier to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, SFR (9), f. 167.

103. Ibid., f. 168.

104. The Directors stated that the supercargoes of the Neptune and the Severn received kind treatment from the Banjarese. - E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Porto Bello, 25 April 1744, LB (26), f. 382.

noteworthy that during this period when the Company was expanding its commercial activities in China, the Directors advised their employees to pay special attention to the purchase of tea besides pepper at Banjarmasin.¹⁰⁵ The supercargoes were told that in case they came in contact with the junk owners at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi, they should persuade the latter to sell their tea, particularly the cheap type of brown Bohea tea or green tea, to them at the rate of 20 dollars to 25 dollars per pikul.¹⁰⁶ The factors of the Dragon and the Norfolk who sailed to Borneo in 1746 were even instructed not to load any pepper if they could fill their ships with tea at Tartas.¹⁰⁷

Tea had become a very important beverage in Europe in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In England, the tea sales of the East India Company had risen from 316,182 lbs. in 1720-1721 to 1,049,593 lbs. a decade later.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the prices had increased steadily after Walpole had introduced the tariff reform act of 1724; roughly speaking, Bohea tea rose from 8s. 9d. to 12s. per lb., while the price of green

105. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Dragon, 13 February 1745, LB (26), f. 382.

106. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince Edward, 6 August 1746, LB (26), f. 512.

107. Ibid., f. 513.

108. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 225.

tea (which had a more phenomenal increase) had escalated to 14s. 6d. from 6s. 6d. per lb. by 1727.¹⁰⁹ By 1734, the price of green tea was 16s. per lb. It increased to 19s. per lb. one year later. This rate probably remained constant in the 1740's. In contrast, the price of pepper practically showed no increase at all from the 1720's to the 1730's when it remained at 3.5s. per lb.¹¹⁰ Unfortunately, the supercargoes who went to Canton discovered that it was not easy to purchase tea. They encountered stiff competition from the other European companies, such as the Dutch, Ostend, Danish and Swedish companies, and also met with difficulties from the Chinese authorities.¹¹¹ Hence, the Directors thought that it would be a good idea if their factors at Banjarmasin could procure tea from the nakhodas there. This was not to be the case. When the English factors reached Banjarmasin, they found that the nakhodas either gave all their stocks of tea under contract to the Banjarese retail salesmen or exchanged tea for pepper with the pepper merchants, hence leaving none for the English. As a result, the English could only hope to purchase tea at Canton.

109. Ibid., p. 226.

110. Lord Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England, Appendix II, no page.

111. Glamann, op. cit., pp. 212-43; Morse, The East India Company trading to China, Vol. I, pp. 181-96.

With regard to the pepper trade, the English also received poor response from the Banjarese who did not seem very eager to supply pepper to the English ships which arrived in the Bay of Banjar after 1742. Tamjeed Dulla was unimpressed by the repeated assurances of the English Company to despatch a guard ship to him for in 1745, three years after the English had made their promise to send the vessel, there were still no signs of the ship. As a result, the factors of the Porto Bello had great difficulty in persuading the Banjarese to deliver pepper into their boat.¹¹² In the case of the Orford and the Colchester, the supercargoes were compelled to pay another suku in addition to the quarter dollar for the custom duties by the Temenggong before they were permitted to buy pepper.¹¹³

Apart from the Sultan's dissatisfaction over the non-appearance of the guard ship, another obstacle contributed to the ill-success of the English expeditions, namely, the return of the junks to Banjarmasin in 1743. After the Chinese revolts in Java had subsided at the end of 1742, the nakhodas resumed their commercial activities in the East Indies, including Banjarmasin.

112. Supercargoes of the Orford to the supercargoes of the Onslow, (exact date not specified, probably mid-1746), CFR (52), f. 12.

113. Ibid.

Instead of maintaining the pepper contract which the Banjarese emissaries had negotiated with the Bencoolen government, the supercargoes complained that the merchants in Tartas and other ports reverted to the old practice of loading their stocks into the junks.¹¹⁴ Moreover, they claimed that the Sultan would have detained the Orford to defend his land if the factors, T. Sandys, E. Smith and W. Churchey had not convinced Tamjeed Dulla that the guard ship would definitely reach Banjarmasin before the end of 1745.¹¹⁵ This action of the Sultan to detain the vessel shows the extent of his disappointment with the English for not keeping their promise to provide political aid.

In fact the guard ship, the Dragon, did not reach Banjarmasin until 6 October 1746,¹¹⁶ although instructions for its departure had been issued in February 1745. The date for despatching the ship had constantly worried the Directors. Each time they wrote to Tamjeed Dulla that the Dragon would be sent soon,¹¹⁷ some problem had cropped up to hinder its departure, chief of which was the war in

114. Ibid., f. 13.

115. Diary of the Orford, 3 April 1746, Dutch Records (A), Vol. 7, f. 59.

116. Diary of the Dragon in Banjarmasin, 6 October 1746, CFR (52), f. 31.

117. Letter from the E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 5 February 1745, LB (26), f. 385.

Europe which prevented military supplies and warships from leaving England.¹¹⁸

In their instructions to the factors, J. Butler, F. Steward and H. Kent, of the Dragon, the Directors stipulated that the ship would be maintained strictly as a guard vessel for six months after which it would be relieved by another boat. The factors should not take advantage of their position to create hostilities in Banjarmasin.¹¹⁹ The functions of the Dragon would be left to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla who would be requested to pay half the cost for its maintenance.¹²⁰ Moreover, the factors were forbidden to establish any factory in the place or to leave the ship unnecessarily. After six months, if they found that conditions in Banjarmasin were peaceful and that it was not necessary for the Dragon to guard the area anymore, then they should return to England with a full cargo of pepper.¹²¹

The despatch of the Dragon to Banjarmasin marked a forward step in cementing relations of the English Company with the Banjarese. This was the first time since 1707 that

118. Letter from the E.I.C. to Kjahi Temenggong, 3 July 1745, LB (26), f. 347.

119. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Dragon, 13 February 1745, LB (26), f. 382.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

the Directors had sent a military vessel to the region and by doing so, the Company had indicated that it was supporting Sultan Tamjeed Dulla against his enemies. The Directors realised that in the 1710's and the 1720's, their refusal to render aid to the Sultan had resulted in the displacement of the English by the Dutch. They also thought that the Dutch were able to gain a relatively strong foothold in Banjarmasin because of their willingness to give armed aid against the Bugis. However, when the Dutch withdrew from Banjarmasin on their own accord, Tamjeed Dulla had invited the English to re-establish trade relations with him primarily in the hope of getting military support. Thus, there was no reason why the English Company should not take the opportunity to consolidate its position in the area by stationing a guard vessel in Banjarese waters. As long as the Dragon was in Banjarmasin, the Directors felt that there was little likelihood for the ruler to bring in other foreign powers.¹²² In attempting to secure commercial objectives, the Company allowed itself to become politically committed to the Panambahan.

However, the Dragon arrived too late in Banjarmasin to be of any use to Tamjeed Dulla for by then, external events had affected the course of Anglo-Banjarese relations.

122. Ibid.

In June 1746, shortly after the arrival of the Onslow in Tartas, the Sultan of Madura who had also reached Banjarmasin, asked the English supercargoes to protect him and his family against the Dutch who had besieged his land.¹²³

He alleged that the Batavian authorities had taken drastic measures against him after he had refused to return certain territories in Java which they had ceded to him for helping to suppress the Chinese rebels during the Javanese civil war in 1742.¹²⁴ Since then, he had attempted to enlist military support from the Bencoolen Council to regain his kingdom but this had proved futile.¹²⁵ Therefore, he had come to Banjarmasin for refuge. When they realised the Sultan's plight, the supercargoes allowed the Madurese to station their perahus beside the Onslow, but did not make any pledges of help to the Sultan.¹²⁶

Unfortunately for the Sultan of Madura, the Dutch had pursued him to Banjarmasin. When the Dutch commodore, Van den Burg, discovered that he was under the protection of the English, the commodore accosted Tamjeed Dulla and threatened

123. C.F. Noble, Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748, (London, 1762), p. 96.

124. Ibid., p. 97.

125. Consultations of the Council at Fort Marlborough, 14 October 1745, Dutch Records (A), Vol. 7, f. 60.

126. C.F. Noble, op. cit., p. 98.

"that if he did not immediately secure ye English captain he knew was ashore and put him in close confinement, till ye King of Madura was delivered up to him, he would represent him to his master ye Governor-General of Batavia, who would soon take satisfaction on his refusal, by using him in the same manner with ye King of Madura."¹²⁷ Fearing Dutch reprisals if he did not act accordingly, the Panambahan ordered his men to capture Congreve, the chief supercargo of the Onslow. Congreve, tricked into going to Kjahi Temenggong's house to discuss pepper rates, was put in chains as soon as he reached his destination.¹²⁸ The other English factors were told that Congreve would be released only if the Madurese Sultan and his family were surrendered to the Dutch commodore.¹²⁹ The English had to agree. Even after the Madurese had been delivered up to their pursuers, Sultan Tanjeed Dulle insisted on making Congreve his hostage until the guard ship arrived, but later on he relented and released his prisoner at the end of July 1746.¹³⁰ By resorting to Banjarmasin for refuge, the Madurese Sultan had indirectly brought back the Dutch into the region. Thus, when the

127. Ibid., p. 99.

128. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 27 June 1746, CFR (52), f. 16.

129. Ibid.

130. Captain Congreve was not freed until 29 July 1746. - Diary of the Onslow, 29 July 1746, CFR (52), f. 22.

Dragon arrived, the factors found that the Panambahan was not interested in the guard ship anymore; in fact, heavy pressure was put on him by the Dutch to expel the English from Banjarmasin.

Undoubtedly, the presence of a Dutch squadron in the Bay of Banjar in March 1747 indicated the determination of the Dutch Company to establish itself in the area again. This revision in the policy of non-interference to one of direct control in Banjarmasin was due mainly to Baron van Imhoff, the new Governor-General of Batavia. He considered it imperative to oust the English and to re-establish the Dutch Company's monopoly of the pepper trade. With the increased smuggling trade in opium and spices between the Moluccas and Banjarmasin, Van Imhoff felt that now, more than before, the Dutch Company should secure Banjarmasin for itself in order to impose more rigorous measures on the contraband traffic.¹³¹ He argued that formerly, his predecessors had given lame excuses for abandoning Banjarmasin after the previous expeditions had proved financially unsound. By leaving the region, the Dutch had given the chance to other foreign powers, especially the English, to take away the pepper which rightfully should belong to the Dutch Company by virtue of the fact that it had signed a series of treaties

131. Secret Resolution of the Batavian Council, 17 February 1747, KA 2552, f. 1784.

with the Banjarese in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.¹³² The time had come for the Company to make a permanent settlement in Banjarmasin and to evict all English and Chinese merchants so that the Dutch would have exclusive rights to the pepper trade.¹³³

The pursuit of the Madurese Sultan provided a good excuse for the Dutch to re-enter Banjarmasin. Van den Heyden and Van Akervelt, two Dutch commanders, were instructed by the Batavian Council to join Van den Burg in Tartas, and they were to blockade the coast (as a demonstration of Dutch military power) if the Sultan was reluctant to act in accordance with the Governor-General's orders.¹³⁴ When the Hartenlust reached the Bay of Banjar in March 1747, the Dutch noticed that the factors of the Onslow and the Dragon were busy negotiating with the Banjarese authorities for pepper to be supplied to their ships.¹³⁵ Although Ratu Anom tried to prevent the English from obtaining any stocks as he wanted the pepper to be reserved solely for the junks,¹³⁶

132. Ibid., f. 1785.

133. Ibid.

134. Instructions from the Batavian Council to Van den Heyden, 3 March 1747, KA 2552, ff. 1794-95.

135. Van den Heyden to the Governor-General of Batavia, 7 April 1747, KA 2591, f. 10.

136. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 19 May 1747, CFR (52), f. 88.

Pengeran Suria and Kjahi Nabi were more accommodating and persuaded the merchants to bring small bales of pepper to the English factors.¹³⁷ With the Dragon in Tartas, Congreve felt that the English were entitled, under previous agreement, to certain commercial privileges from the Banjarese, namely, that of free access to the Sultan, the right to participate freely in the pepper trade and also to weigh pepper on the English scales.¹³⁸

It has already been observed that at this stage, Sultan Tamjeed Dulla hardly paid any attention to the demands of the English factors as he was involved with more important political matters when Van Akervelt and Van den Heyden arrived in Tartas. Under the threat of having his ports blockaded if he did not comply with the orders of the Dutch Company, Tamjeed Dulla was compelled to sign a preliminary treaty with the Dutch factors on 27 March 1747. The draft treaty was subsequently ratified on 18 May 1747.¹³⁹ In the treaty, the Dutch Company promised to protect Banjarmasin against all its external enemies but stipulated that it would

137. Ibid., 28 December 1746 and 1 March 1747, f. 50 and f. 63.

138. Ibid., 28 August 1746, f. 26. With reference to the last clause, the factors claimed that the Banjarese scales were much lighter than the English weights as the former were 1 lb. 4 oz. short in the pikul which was estimated at $134\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. according to English weight.

139. Dutch-Banjarese Treaty, 18 May 1747, Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. 5, pp. 448-54.

not meddle in internal politics.¹⁴⁰ In return, the Sultan had to grant the main pepper trade to the Dutch Company at the rate of 6 Spanish dollars per pikul of 125 lbs. The pepper, which should be dry and unadulterated, would be weighed on the Company's scales in the presence of two parties, namely, the Dutch and the Banjarese. They would settle any dispute arising from inaccuracies in the pepper weight.¹⁴¹ All Europeans would be excluded from trading in the area.¹⁴² In accordance with the Sultan's request, the Chinese would be permitted to load one junk with pepper annually at the rate of 8 Spanish dollars per pikul.¹⁴³ All incoming and outgoing ships would be checked for contraband pepper, spices or opium. If any contraband goods were found, the crew of that vessel would be sent to Batavia for punishment.¹⁴⁴ So long as the contract remained valid, the Banjarese would be allowed to go to Batavia and the rest of Java as far as Grisek and Surabaya, but were prohibited from sailing further east to Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa and Timor, or the west and north, namely, Billiton, Palembang, Johore and Malacca.¹⁴⁵

140. Ibid., Article II - IV, pp. 449-50.

141. Ibid., Article VIII, pp. 450-51.

142. Ibid., Article VI, p. 450.

143. Ibid., Article VII, p. 450.

144. Ibid., Article IX and XI, p. 451.

145. Ibid., Article X, p. 451.

Finally, the treaty stipulated that the Dutch Company would build a factory in Banjarmasin to conduct its commercial affairs.¹⁴⁶

When they ratified the treaty, the Governor-General and Council made it clear that since the Company was pledged to defend the Banjarese, the latter on their part, could not grant any asylum to an enemy or rebel of the Company.¹⁴⁷ Because of previous experience in which the Madurese Sultan had sought asylum at Banjarmasin, the Council felt that it was necessary to prevent similar practices in future and therefore, had inserted this clause.

Until early April 1747, the English had no idea that a contract had been concluded between the Dutch and the Banjarese government. They were hopeful of obtaining a full cargo and had split hairs among themselves as to whether the Onslow or the Dragon should be loaded with pepper first. Butler, the factor of the Dragon, accused Congreve of not lending him current money which he lacked, to buy pepper.¹⁴⁸ When Congreve obstinately refused to part with any cash,

146. Ibid., Article XII, p. 452.

147. Separate Articles of the Governor-General and Council of Batavia, I and II, Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, pp. 453-54.

148. T. Butler to R. Congreve, 8 December 1746, CFR (52), f. 47.

the Dragon had to sail off in mid-March 1747 without any pepper supply.¹⁴⁹ When they were assured by the Banjarese nobles that their ship would be fully stocked with pepper, the supercargoes of the Onslow decided to remain in Tartas. Congreve only realised the futility of his stay when Ratu Anom informed him that "as so many Dutch ships are arrived, it is not in our power to grant you more pepper, therefore we do advise you to set sail -."¹⁵⁰ Since his political power had been transferred to the Dutch Company by the signing of the treaty of 1747, Sultan Tamjeed Dulla had to make it clear that if they wanted to make further trading negotiations, they had to go through the Dutch authorities "for I must acquaint them [the English] if they have a desire to continue a trade here, they must be obliged to ask liberty of the Dutch Company."¹⁵¹ Thereafter, the supercargoes found that it was pointless to stay on in Banjarmasin.

Before their departure in June 1747, the English wanted to make a last attempt at procuring a full cargo but the Dutch objected.¹⁵² It was the intention of the Batavian

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149. Diary of the Dragon in Banjarmasin, 15 March 1747, CFR (52), f. 82.
150. Letter from Ratu Anom to R. Congreve, 7 April 1747, CFR (52), f. 76.
151. Letter from Sultan Tamjeed Dulla to R. Congreve, 9 May 1747, CFR (52), f. 84.
152. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 17 May 1747, CFR (52), f. 87.

authorities to oust the English from Banjarmasin,¹⁵³ and the Dutch factors felt that they were not obliged to accede to their request even though the English had advanced money to the pepper merchants.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, as in 1733, the Dutch factors made an exception in the case of the Chinese by allowing one junk to ship out 4,000 pikuls of pepper at 8 dollars (rix) per pikul in accordance with the treaty terms. By refusing the request of the English, the Dutch showed that although they feared the aggressive Chinese competition and wanted to stamp it out by limiting the supply of pepper to the nakhodas, they were even more resolved to oust the English who were in the main, their most dreaded rivals in the East Indies.

The establishment of the Dutch in Banjarmasin did not utterly deter the English away from the area. Although a junk nakhoda warned the Delaware not to proceed to Tartas in 1749, the captain refused to listen to him.¹⁵⁵ On arrival, the Delaware found that the Banjar coast had been blockaded on the orders of Van Imhoff, and subsequently, it did not

153. Secret resolution of the Batavian Council, 24 February, 1747, KA 2552, f. 1738.

154. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 29 March 1747, CFR (52), f. 72.

155. Journal Delaware, (1749-1750), 25 March 1749.

procure any pepper.¹⁵⁶

A revival of English interest in Banjarmasin occurred in the 1760's when the Bencoolen Council, in accordance with the Directors recommendations of 1763, resolved to despatch vessels to that quarter in order to obtain pepper for the Canton market.¹⁵⁷ The Council held the opinion that the existence of a factory at Banjarmasin did not mean that the Dutch had the sole right to the pepper trade. When Tangee, a certain nakhoda, left for Banjarmasin in December 1764, Governor Carter sent a letter to ^{the old} Sultan and the regent through him. Carter also signed a contract to buy Banjar pepper at Bencoolen at ten dollars per pikul, and in return, the English would sell arms to the Banjarese if the Directors permitted them to do so.¹⁵⁸

The plan of the Council to send vessels to Banjarmasin did not materialise until January 1766 when the Royal George and Diligent were despatched. At this juncture, the Bencoolen authorities had little information about Banjarmasin then as Tangee did not return to Bencoolen the previous year. In its instructions to the supercargoes of the Royal George,

156. Ibid.

157. D.K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia, 1760-1772, BTLV, Vol. 120, (The Hague, 1964), p. 212.

158. Ibid., pp. 212-13.

the Bencoolen Council stated that if the supercargoes were unsuccessful in procuring pepper at Banjar, then they should proceed to Pasir, Sumbawa and other eastern islands to trade or to gather information on these places.¹⁵⁹ Meanwhile, a current rumour that the Dutch Company intended to abandon Banjarmasin raised the hopes of the English. The Bencoolen authorities thereupon expected their supercargoes to be warmly received by the Banjarese. They even indicated that if 6,000 pikuls of pepper could be obtained from the Banjarese every year at six dollars per pikul, then the English Company could establish a settlement at Banjarmasin. Pulau Laut was proposed as the site of the new settlement.

When the Royal George reached Banjarmasin in July 1766, the supercargoes did not receive an enthusiastic welcome from the Banjarese as the Council had anticipated. In fact, on the advice of A. Palm, the Dutch Resident, the Sultan refused to sign any commercial contract with the English. Since it did not obtain any pepper cargo, the Royal George had to leave Banjarmasin. The supercargoes felt that they would be more successful in their commercial ventures at Pasir and Sumbawa.¹⁶⁰ After this futile attempt to trade at Banjarmasin, the English Company refrained from despatching further trade missions to south-east Borneo. By their withdrawal, the English left the Dutch as undisputed masters of that region for the rest of the eighteenth century.

159. Ibid., p. 213.

160. Ibid., p. 214.

CONCLUSION

From the mid-fourteenth to the seventeenth century, Banjarmasin was subjected to extensive Javanese influence when it repeatedly came under the hegemony of different Javanese states, beginning with the kingdom of Majapahit and followed soon afterwards by the Moslem harbour principalities, and eventually by Mataram. By 1600 political disunity and internal dissension among the Javanese states had caused considerable migration into Banjarmasin. To retain their cultural and social links with the motherland, the early Javanese immigrants introduced their traditional institutions and customs into south-east Borneo.

Simultaneously, the infiltration of Arabs, Indians and Chinese transformed Banjarmasin into a significant commercial centre. Pepper, which had hitherto been sold in small quantities together with the other products, such as bezoar stones and dragons blood, became the major crop of the region when large amounts were exported by the Asian and European traders. The difficulties of procuring sufficient stocks in Patani, Palembang and Bantam had encouraged the Asians, especially the Chinese nakhodas, to treat Banjarmasin as an alternative source of pepper.

Meanwhile, through the accumulation of wealth and the dynamic rule of the Javanese immigrant chieftains, Banjarmasin managed to extend its political boundaries so that by the mid-seventeenth century, the east, south-east and south-west coasts of Borneo were included in its domain. With the acquisition of greater power, it was natural for the Banjarese to regain their autonomy from Mataram. To achieve this, Banjarmasin made a military alliance with Sukadana, and attempted to enlist European support, especially from the Dutch. The latter, undeterred by their initial failure to establish successful relations with the Banjarese, readily accepted the invitation to trade.

As a profit-making concern, the Dutch East India Company was only interested in obtaining pepper and not in the acquisition of territory or involvement in local politics. In concluding the early treaty of 1635 the Banjarese authorities made it certain that the Dutch Company was under no military obligation to the Sultan, but demanded the right to the monopoly of the pepper trade as it held the strong belief that the economic objective could best be attained through such means. However, the Dutch overlooked Banjarese interests, and by trying to suppress free trade and oust their competitors, the Portuguese, English and Chinese from the market, they incurred the hatred of the local merchants and their Banjarese sympathisers. The Banjarese faction, who had pro-Javanese interests, openly revolted, and murdered the Dutch factors at Martapura in 1638.

Instead of adjusting its commercial policy to suit the Banjarese merchants after its factors had re-entered Banjarmasin in 1660, the Dutch Company attempted to continue its monopolistic practices by signing a series of treaties with the Banjarese in the same decade. Apparently, with the fresh outbreak of hostilities between Mataram and Banjarmasin in the 1660's, the Panambahan was willing to concede commercial privileges to the Company in return for Dutch protection which should extend, if necessary, to the construction of fortifications. It is significant to note that the Batavian Council realised that henceforth, it could no longer be free from political responsibilities if it intended to make the pepper monopoly work. It continued to trade with the Banjarese only as long as the internal situation was calm in Banjarmasin, but in the late 1670's once chaotic conditions prevailed, abandoned the place with the ostensible excuse that its pepper supplies were drastically reduced by foreign competitors.

English ventures in Banjarmasin in the seventeenth century were not very successful either. The English East India Company had hoped to obtain lucrative cargoes after Dutch competition was removed. But the contraction of large debts by its agents, poor pepper cargoes of the vessels, and the severe competition of the Asian merchants, indicated the inability of the English to secure a strong trading

position in the area, with the consequence that Company operations were terminated in 1651. Attempts to resume trade with the Banjarese a decade later proved futile, for the factors discovered that the firm establishment of the Dutch in the area rendered commercial transactions by other Europeans unprofitable.

After witnessing the Dutch withdrawal and the ambitious, though futile, designs of the Portuguese to establish a commercial monopoly, the Banjarese were increasingly suspicious of European activities. Nonetheless, because of the need to maintain Banjarmasin as an international pepper mart in order to boost its economy, the Banjarese had to pursue a policy of tolerance towards the Western merchants in the eighteenth century.

Interest in the Far East trade attracted the English to Banjarmasin in 1700. Evaluating the importance of the port in terms of the China trade, the Directors of the new English East India Company intended Banjarmasin to act as an intermediate station, and as a source of raw materials for exchange with Chinese articles. Moreover, the Directors foresaw large returns if their employees could engross the whole pepper trade. However, though the early efforts of the factors to set up a factory were extremely fruitful, to the extent that they even managed to build up a thriving port at Banjar, the Company, nevertheless, at the end of

six years, could not regard the venture as a success. Within this period, only 6011 tons of pepper were shipped out though the factors estimated that the total production was about 10,000 tons. The above export figure, compared to that made between 1713 and 1726 when a smaller amount of the product was loaded, was a relatively good one. But the Directors were dissatisfied as they felt that the figure could have been much higher if the Company had sufficient current money to buy pepper.

As a matter of fact, until the end of the first half of the eighteenth century, a shortage of current Spanish reals proved to be a perennial problem to the factors in their commercial transactions with the Banjarese. Since the latter did not accept pillar dollars, the usual type of currency kept by the English, the factors often had to retail Indian wares to obtain pepper, or in certain cases, Company vessels would exchange their pillar dollars into Spanish currency at Batavia before proceeding to Banjarmasin. The Banjarese proved especially intransigent towards the English with reference to the medium of exchange. Even in the 1730's and 1740's when Spanish dollars were becoming scarce and falling into disuse, the Banjarese, convinced of the intrinsic value of the Spanish dollar, were reluctant to accept new-milled dollars, which had replaced pillar cash, from the English. However, they relaxed their rules when trading with the

Chinese. Despite the fact that Chinese string cash was less valuable than the pillar dollar in other parts of the Archipelago, the Banjarese would not hesitate to accept Chinese money because of the popularity of Chinese goods which could easily be bartered for pepper; the string cash thus served only to pay the extra costs when the price of pepper exceeded that of the luxury articles.

Besides the shortage of money, considerable damage was inflicted on the English Company trade by the private or separate stock merchants. By allowing their employees to participate in a certain amount of private trade apparently with the intention of supplementing the low salaries of their servants, the Directors were partially responsible for their own economic loss. The factors, striving for personal gains, often co-operated with separate stock merchants, who were the Company's competitors in the pepper trade to obtain cargoes, instead of devoting their energies to loading the vessels.

Corruption was rampant among all the English Council members at Banjar. Like the officials of the Dutch Company, a senior official like the English Council chief was just as interested in enriching himself as his subordinates. Strict supervision was therefore out of the question, and the outcome was theft of the Company's goods, falsification of the account books, the abuse of power, the increase of personal grievances among the officials, and the further

growth of private trade. Judging from the few accounts of separate stock trade in the 1710's, it is apparent that private trade decreased after the Directors had banned individual trading by their factors and introduced the commission system as a substitute.

These economic problems however would not have led to the Company's abandonment of Banjar in 1707 if the factors had not encountered political difficulties. Within six years, the English experienced two wars with the Banjarese, in 1701 and 1707. Why did the Banjarese, who had displayed a great degree of tolerance towards the English initially, suddenly turn hostile or were the English to blame? Also, after they had lost the war in 1701, why did the Banjarese, abandoning caution, decide to go to war again? The English factors, for lack of other reasons, put the blame on the Banjarese, alleging that they were war-like and treacherous. Since the latter had attacked the Dutch factories twice in the seventeenth century, there was no doubt some truth in the English accusation. But in assessing the motives for these clashes, it is necessary to consider the Banjarese as well as the European point of view.

On their first arrival, the Panambahan had permitted the English factors to establish a factory strictly for commercial purposes, without the mounting of any cannon or

other arms. For a while, the English kept within the limits of the ruler's terms. However, when they found it difficult to procure pepper stocks in the face of fierce competition from the Chinese and Indonesian merchants, the Banjar Council led by Landon, assumed more powers on their own accord. A guard ship was placed at the Barito river mouth to stop foreign vessels from taking away pepper, and on occasions, foreign ships were plundered. These acts were apparently repeated under Joyner's presidency. By using force, the English hoped to obtain exclusive rights to the pepper trade. It should be recalled that in the 1630's the Dutch had applied the same tactics to achieve similar ends. In fact, they had more justification as the right of exclusive trade was guaranteed to them in the contract with the ruler, but no such agreement was mutually signed between the English and the Banjarese. Even though allowance was made for the extension of English trade after 1702, this was done only because the Banjarese, as losers in a trial of armed strength, had to accept the terms dictated by the English East India Company. As a result of the oppressive measures imposed by the English, the commerce of Banjarmasin apparently suffered when the Asian merchants stayed away from the area.

To guard their factory, the English chiefs recruited Bugis mercenaries. Whilst it can be said that an insufficient number of European soldiers led to such a move,

it cannot be doubted that the infiltration of the Bugis caused great uneasiness among the Banjarese, especially at a time when the Bugis were extending their political influence over other parts of the East Indies, such as the Malay states. For the past few centuries, the Banjarese had been subjected to Javanese control; with their newly acquired freedom, it was obvious that they did not want further subjugation by another Indonesian power. Such a threat was indeed imminent considering the fact that Pengeran Purabaya, a prospective claimant to the throne of Banjarmasin, was at that period enlisting military support from the Bugis in Pulau Laut. Thus, the import of Bugis soldiers by the English only enhanced indigeneous fears of a Bugis-Banjarese war.

These fears were confirmed when the Bugis soldiers became involved in a brawl with some Banjarese in October 1701. It is conceivable that a misunderstanding arose on the part of the English that the Banjarese authorities intended to evict them from Banjar. As a result, they launched an attack on the Banjarese, thereby turning a minor clash into an Anglo-Banjarese war. In the event, the Panambahan was compelled to take a defensive position in Kayu Tinggi although he was not at the scene of the clash when hostilities started. The unruly behaviour and impetuosity of the English in launching the attack on the

Banjarese can be regarded as a major reason for the war of 1701.

Nevertheless, one cannot completely rule out the English viewpoint that some Banjarese nobles, who were insolvent, deliberately created disturbances in an attempt to drive the English out of Banjar. Insolvency was common among the Banjarese nobles as a result of the system of commercial operations, viz. advance payment before delivery of the product. Often, the Banjarese chieftains were unable to honour their debts in cash or kind mainly because they had spent the money before obtaining the pepper stocks from the Biaju producers. In 1651 the English had had to desert the factory because the nobles were unable to pay their debts. The Dutch, faced with a similar problem, had also pressed for payment from the Panambahan in the draft treaty of 1600. Apparently, the English also encountered such difficulties in the eighteenth century. An instance occurred when Captain Coatsworth threatened to shoot Pengeran Aria because he had not paid his debts. It can be argued therefore, that the Banjarese could have contributed to the disturbances of 1701 with a view to liquidating their debts.

Political motivation and indigenous resentment of the English is more likely to have accounted for the second Anglo-Banjarese conflict of 1707. Probably, the

Sultan never forgave the English or ceased to suspect them after the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701. He only tolerated their presence because the English had insisted on resettling in Banjar. However, Banjarese suspicions of the extension of English power, aroused by the behaviour of Landon and Joyner and the employment of Bugis, were heightened with the arrival of Barre. The English Council chiefs did not pay any attention to Griffith's warnings that the Banjarese should be pacified; instead, to add fuel to fire, their plan to fortify the factory only served to confirm Banjarese fears of English domination in the region. To preserve their freedom, the Banjarese revolted. This attack of 1707 was thus explicable in terms of an indigenous reaction to English impolitic conduct since 1701. The Banjarese succeeded in evicting the English from Banjar largely because the latter were unable to defend themselves effectively with only a half-completed fort.

It would not be too far-fetched to say that the Dutch contributed towards the English defeat at the hands of the Banjarese in 1707. Ever since the establishment of the English factory in Banjar at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Batavian Council had shown grave concern over English activities in the Archipelago. Although the Council was not interested in returning to Banjarmasin itself, nonetheless, it was jealous of English commercial contacts with the Banjarese. To hamper trade, the Batavian

Council imposed economic sanctions by prohibiting the export of rice to Banjarmasin. These checks on rice exports were, however, also made because of the necessity of preserving the Dutch Company's stocks during a period of bad harvests. Nevertheless, the sanction on exports was ineffective as rice supplies still managed to reach Tartas and Kayu Tinggi via smugglers from Java. It should be pointed out that Rodgett's advice that the Banjarese should cultivate their own padi for self-dependency did not create much impact on the native inhabitants of Banjar who found it more lucrative to produce pepper. Moreover, the small acreages of padi grown in the hinterland of Negara were essentially of the hill variety and the cultivators were not Banjarese but Biajus, who hardly came into direct contact with the English.

When the ban on rice exports failed, the Batavian authorities were determined to enforce other measures to check the English, especially after they had learnt about the fortification plans of Barre. It was apparent that the Dutch were apprehensive of British domination in Banjarmasin once the fortifications were completed. If these plans materialised, then there was no question of a Dutch re-entry into south-east Borneo. Even more to the point, the Batavian authorities felt that from their base at Banjarmasin, the English could extend their authority to

the rest of the Borneo territories, and eventually, to other parts of south-east Asia. The warnings of the out-going Governor-General of Batavia, William van Outhoorn, to his subordinates were indicative of Dutch fears over the increasing powers of the English Company. By prohibiting the supply of important raw materials such as wood and bricks from the coastal ports of Java to Banjarmasin and deporting smugglers, the Dutch were able to hinder progress on the fort and thereby foil the English plans. Subsequently, the Banjarese managed to destroy the factory.

Shortly after the expulsion of the English, the Dutch renewed commercial relations with the Banjarese by despatching a trade mission to Tartas in 1711. Though the ostensible purpose was to load pepper, the real motive for the Dutch move was to prevent the English East India Company from re-establishing contacts with Banjarmasin. Despite its initial enthusiasm, the Batavian Council swiftly abandoned the project at the end of 1712. Dutch expeditions to Banjarmasin were not undertaken again until fourteen years later but these ventures lasted only for a decade. Why were they so short-lived? If the Batavian Council was apprehensive of the English, why then did it not attempt to establish a fort similar to that planned by the latter in order to consolidate its powers in Banjarmasin? Before these questions can be answered, it is essential to survey the

political background of south-east Borneo.

At the time of the Dutch arrival in 1711, Banjarmasin was on the verge of a major revolt by the Biajus against their Banjarese masters. Since the mid-seventeenth century after the more northern and eastern districts of Banjarmasin were colonised by the Banjarese, the original inhabitants of these districts had become the subjects of the Panambahan. Regents or Pengerans were sent to govern the outer territories and to collect taxes in the form of gold and pepper from the Biajus as homage. The Biajus soon fell prey to the avaricious chieftains who exploited them for their own personal gains. With a structure of government where court intrigues were prevalent and aspiring claimants sought to oust the ruler, the Panambahan, aware of his own weak position, could not redress these wrongs.

The perpetration of malpractices by the Banjarese masters sowed the seeds of discord and bitterness among their subjects. In the seventeenth century, the Biajus had expressed their resentment in various ways: as the major cultivators of pepper, they had refused to deliver their product to the merchants. When this method failed, they would leave their pepper gardens untended, or merely abandon them. These forms of protest, though affecting the economy of the country, were not fully effective, as the abuses did not cease. Minor rebellions had also occurred but they

were easily quelled.

In the eighteenth century, after decades of Banjarese misrule, the Biajus decided to stage a major revolt in an attempt to achieve independence. They were fully supported and encouraged by Pengeran Purabaya, who intended to use the Biajus to further his ambitions of becoming the sovereign. With the intervention of Purabaya and Daing Mamantuli, the Bugis pirate chief, the Biaju revolt, initially fought on a small-scale, developed into a major war. Understandably, when the Dutch factors arrived at Tartas towards the end of 1711, the Panambahan pleaded for military assistance, but was rejected because the former had been instructed not to involve themselves in political matters. By the end of 1712, when the Batavian Council realised the gravity of the situation and the fact that the odds were very much in favour of the Bugis participants, it decided to terminate further voyages to Banjarmasin.

Disillusioned, the Panambahan allowed the English to re-establish trade with his kingdom, hoping thereby to obtain support from the English East India Company. However, the ^{English} Company was also not prepared to shoulder military responsibilities. Eventually, assistance came from the neighbouring Indonesian traders whose livelihood had been adversely affected by the disruption of the Banjarese economy. Consequently, in 1717 with the reinforcement of

fresh troops, the Banjarese managed to defeat their enemies.

Despite the death of Purabaya and his son Gusti Busu, the Panambahan realised that the external threats to his kingdom were still present, particularly when the Bugis were taking refuge in Pasir. His plan to provoke the Dutch to return by granting commercial favours to the English between 1714 and 1726 had not worked because the Batavian Council was more conscious of the danger of involvement in internal politics than of the loading of pepper. In 1726, the Banjarese court again offered the pepper monopoly to the Dutch if they were willing to return to Banjarmasin. On this occasion, the Batavian Council readily complied as it was very keen to replenish the depleted pepper stocks from Palembang and Jambi in order to meet the increased demands of the European market.

Because of the inadequacy in the supply of arms which he received from the Europeans, the Panambahan felt that a fortified factory would offer security against all future attacks. Thus, when the Dutch factors returned to Banjarmasin in 1727, he stressed the necessity for a factory and fortifications which the Batavian Council had promised in the treaty of 1664. Here, one notices the glaring contrast between the ruler's eagerness for a fortified factory in 1727 and the bitterness of the Banjarese court in the early years of the eighteenth century against the English attempts

at fortification. This was because the Banjarese realised that the English, by building a fort around their settlement at Banjar, meant to utilise it for their own protection. On the other hand, a Dutch stockade at Tartas, which ~~was~~ densely populated by the Banjarese, would protect the inhabitants against the Bugis assaults in critical times.

The Panambahan's plea put the Batavian authorities in a dilemma. As trade and politics were inter-linked, they realised that on the one hand, they could not remain neutral if they wanted to load pepper, but on the other hand, construction of a factory or pagar would mean full involvement in Banjarese politics, and possibly, the extension of their territorial responsibilities. However, when the majority of their employees who had been in Tartas before testified to the impracticability and worthlessness of such a stockade, the authorities decided not to implement the project for some time, but preferred to adopt the 'wait and see' attitude.

Despite some initial success in the pepper trade, the Dutch factors experienced delays in their loading of their cargo, and finally non-delivery of the product. The difficulty of obtaining sufficient pepper cargo constantly worried the Dutch authorities; although it was not the principal reason for the Company's withdrawal in 1712, nevertheless it precipitated or hastened the process of

withdrawal. In 1711, the Company had clearly indicated its intention to re-establish the pepper monopoly in Banjarmasin when it sanctioned the expeditions, for it treated the contracts signed with the Banjarese in the seventeenth century as valid. The Banjarese, however, did not regard the treaties in the same light. They felt that by leaving Banjarmasin for about half a century since the date of the last treaty, viz in 1664, the Dutch Company, through its own default, had effected the breakdown of the contracts.

It should be pointed out that the Banjarese detested the system of monopoly just as much in the eighteenth as in the seventeenth century. They did not want any European power to dominate them commercially, and therefore deprive them of lucrative revenues. Maintenance of the 'laissez-faire' system was the policy of the Banjarese — high prices for pepper could be expected on the competitive market whereas in a system of monopoly fixed prices to the benefit of the monopolist prevailed. For instance, the Dutch were only willing to pay four Spanish reals per pikul of pepper whilst the Chinese offered six to seven and a half reals for the same amount. Hence, despite the Panambahan's keenness to give the exclusive pepper trade to the Dutch, the Banjarese merchants were reluctant to deliver their crop by applying 'dilly-dallying' tactics or stocking the supplies for other Asian buyers such as the Chinese.

Another factor which accounted for the reluctance of the Banjarese to trade with the Dutch and also the English was the meticulous trading system of the Europeans. The English and Dutch insisted not only on cheap but good quality pepper. Time and again, the Europeans lodged complaints to the Banjarese authorities about the delivery of adulterated, dusty and sandy pepper. The Banjarese merchants alleged that the Europeans failed to take account of the fact that a certain amount of impurity was inevitable since production of pepper was carried out according to primitive methods by the Biajus.

Moreover, the Dutch and English often accused the Banjarese of cheating because of inaccuracies in **their** weights and measures. Apparently, they expected commercial operations to be conducted according to European standards, but here again, they tended to ignore the 'cheating' habit of the Banjarese. In many parts of south-east Asia, petty cheating in business transactions was not regarded as dishonesty but as shrewdness. As Beeckman observed, the Banjarese "esteem him [the cheat] the best qualify'd, and most ingenious man, that can most over-reach and cheat his neighbour by false weights, measures, etc. Neither do they reckon it a fault but glory in it as a masterpiece of wit."¹

1. Beeckman, A Voyage to Borneo, p. 105.

Undoubtedly, the main reason for the Dutch and English failure to operate successfully in Banjarmasin was due to the aggressive competition of the Chinese nakhodas. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century when they contributed to the growth of Banjarmasin as an international mart through bulk pepper purchases, the Chinese had become a significant commercial element in the area. Despite the many attempts of the Europeans to oust them, the Chinese managed to hold their position of pre-eminence in the commercial sphere. This was because apart from the payment of high prices and the sale of luxury goods, the junk nakhodas had agents to work for them and powerful Chinese friends who could wield influence on the Banjarese nobility.

With the influx of more Chinese immigrants into Banjarmasin after the expulsion of the English in the 1700's, the number of intermediaries increased. By resorting to these agents, the nakhodas saved much time, and avoided the trouble of making preliminary transactions with the Banjarese merchants; perhaps this partly explains why the junk traders could afford to arrive late, viz. in February of each year while other merchants, especially the Europeans, had to come much earlier to Banjarmasin. Normally the junks were able to load supplies immediately on their arrival without incurring high demurrage charges. Also, the Chinese agents constantly harassed the European buyers by going directly into the

pepper regions to procure pepper, and thus the English and Dutch were left with insufficient cargo by the time the perahus reached the lowlands bringing the pepper stocks.

The nakhodas would not have been such fierce and successful competitors if they were not assisted by the Chinese leaders of Banjarmasin such as Lim Kim Ko. These Chinese heads, who did not have such extensive political and economic authority as the Chinese Captains of the Straits Settlements of the nineteenth century to create an "Imperium in Imperio", nevertheless, wielded sufficient influence on the Banjarese nobility to gain commercial privileges for their junk counterparts. For instance, if the nakhodas were frustrated by the European merchants in the delivery of pepper, then the Chinese leaders would contrive to procure the next season's crop for the nakhodas. It was inevitable that a close relationship should exist between the 'resident' Chinese and the junk merchants since a large proportion of the wealth of the former was derived from the retail trade of products imported by the junks of Canton or Amoy. Thus, any attempt to lay obstacles in the path of the junk trade was fiercely resisted by the Banjar Chinese as in the 1700's when the English extorted money from the nakhodas.

In 1733, the urgency of coping with the pressing demands of the European market for bigger pepper supplies, and the problem of suppressing smuggling in fine spices

between Banjarmasin and Macassar which was rife, led the Batavian Council to conclude a new treaty with the Panambahan. It is clear that the Council, recognising the tremendous handicaps confronted by its factors in pursuing an exclusive trade policy in the absence of a valid contract, was obliged to take positive measures towards securing economic advantages. Hamid Dulla apparently agreed because he felt that the Dutch would abide by the political conditions to defend Banjarmasin which were an essential part of the agreement. Although the ruler was willing to concede the main pepper trade to the Dutch, he was however unprepared to exclude the Chinese totally from it, but insisted on allowing the nakhodas to ship a specified amount of pepper from Banjarmasin annually.

To the Batavian authorities, the inclusion of the Chinese defeated the prime purpose of negotiations with the Panambahan, which was to oust the Chinese competitors. Henceforth, the Dutch felt that **the contract for the monopoly** of the pepper trade would be ineffective despite the exclusion of all other rival merchants. It is possible that Hamid Dulla's insistence on the continuance of the junk trade provoked the Dutch to refrain from fulfilling their military obligations. On the other hand, serious doubts can be raised as to whether the Batavian authorities who had shunned political involvement in Banjarmasin all along, were really genuinely interested in constructing a factory,

as has previously been observed. Rather, it would be truer to say that they wanted the maximum commercial advantages with the least political commitments. Hence, the careful wording of the articles to ensure that no specific date was set for the construction or completion of the factory and stockade. Instead, to maintain the defence clauses, the Dutch posted a guard ship at the mouth of the Barito river for surveillance and also to check the junks for contraband pepper, thereby hoping at least to achieve a 'near perfect' system of monopoly.

The presence of a Dutch squadron was invaluable to the Banjarese. Early in the 1730's the Bugis, after a temporary respite, decided to launch new attacks on Banjarmasin. Smuggling and plundering off the Banjar coasts were rampant. Despite their vast numbers and military prowess, the ventures of the Bugis leaders, Arun Sinkang, Toassa and Topass Aray, were ill-timed as a strong defence was mounted by the Dutch and the Banjarese troops. After the initial exchanges in which neither side gained a positive advantage, the Dutch, through sheer naval strategy and the use of better arms, managed to defeat the Bugis in Pulau Laut.

Instead of showing his appreciation by assisting the Dutch to enforce the monopoly contract, Hamid Dulla, apparently influenced by the court nobles, imposed a five per cent tax on all incoming and out-going vessels and

prohibited the guard vessel from continuing its surveillance duties. This worsening of the commercial situation led the Dutch, noting their decreased importance and also the poor results of the pepper trade, to abandon Banjarmasin in 1737.

In a survey of European voyages to Banjarmasin in the eighteenth century, it should be pointed out that normally, the English and the Dutch were not in the area simultaneously. As soon as the Dutch factors left, the English would invariably move into Banjarmasin again. As co-signatories of Dutch-Banjarese treaties, the Dutch would not tolerate the presence of the English and hence the latter, in order to avoid direct conflict, discreetly sailed off. The necessity of having a European power late in the 1730's in Banjarmasin to preserve his status quo and to defend his territory against future enemy incursions persuaded Tamjeed Dulla to invite the English Company to trade after the Dutch withdrawal. This was the first time since 1707 that the Company received an official invitation from the Banjarese court, for hitherto the ventures conducted between 1713 and 1726 were made to appear as private voyages, because of the Banjarese distrust and 'inveterate' hatred of the English.

Initially, the Directors had no intentions of providing armed support, since their objectives in renewing commerce with the Banjarese were to procure pepper and to perpetuate the China trade, which still held vast possibilities

especially in tea, where the market value had increased rapidly because of its popularity as a beverage in Europe. Unfortunately, as in previous instances, the ruler was not prepared to grant pepper supplies unless the English complied with his request for military support. Realising that military commitment was the only practicable way of establishing a permanent foothold in Tartas, and to forestall future Dutch designs of renewing commerce with the Banjarese, the Directors promised to despatch a guard vessel to the Panambahan in 1741.

However, events did not turn out favourably for the English. Baron van Imhoff, the new Governor-General of Batavia and an Anglophobe, contrived not only to oust the English from Banjarmasin but to resettle the Dutch permanently in the area. He considered his predecessor's action in withdrawing from Banjarmasin as sheer acts of cowardice. Though it was all right for the Dutch Company not to be involved in Banjarese politics, it should not have abandoned the place at the first signs of commercial failure. By leaving Banjarmasin, the Dutch, through their own default, had allowed other competitors, especially the English, to re-establish trade. Van Imhoff also felt that only force could subjugate the Banjarese and compel them to maintain the treaty effectively.

The resurgence of smuggling in opium and spices on a wide scale off Banjarmasin and the incident involving the Madurese Sultan provided the Dutch with the opportunity of entering Tartas with a squadron of armed vessels in 1746. The English factors, who had unwittingly given refuge to the Madurese Sultan, a 'wanted' prisoner because of his rebellious activities against the Dutch Company, was forced under threat of arms and a blockade of the coast to leave Tartas. It is significant to note that if the Dragon had arrived earlier, a shameful retreat by the English could possibly have been averted as the armed ship would have served as a useful means of defence against the Dutch.

By expelling the English and blockading the coast, the Dutch had broken the first article of the Anglo-Dutch Marine Treaty of 1674 which was signed in Europe at the end of the third Anglo-Dutch war. This stipulated that neither side should exclude the other from commerce and free navigation in a territory which was at peace with the Dutch or the English. A strong protest from the Directors of the English Company about the domineering behaviour of Van Imhoff² in 1749 was waived aside by the Dutch Company. Subsequently, the Directors did not broach the question again until 1762 when discussions were held between the English representatives and the Dutch commissioners, Van Schoonhoven and Van der Hoop,

2. Dutch records (A) Vol. 17, 15 December 1762.

over the exclusive right of the English to salpetre in India.³

The English based their claims on the fact that the Dutch Company held a pepper monopoly in Banjarmasin which was prejudicial to English interests. Notwithstanding the existence of Anglo-Banjarese trade and relations as stipulated in an unofficial agreement between 1741 and 1747, the Dutch had evicted the English factors, and thereby had perpetrated a breach of the treaty of 1674. The Dutch commissioners in reply justified Van Imhoff's actions on the ground of former contracts concluded between the Dutch Company and the Banjarese, the existence of which the English had strongly denied. It was apparent that the English had invalidated the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1733. They argued that if a treaty did exist, the Dutch should have adhered to it by despatching vessels to trade and to protect the Panambahan. Instead, there was neither evidence of Dutch commercial operations nor a guard ship in Banjarmasin, hence proving that the Dutch Company had already renounced all previous contracts.⁴ Except for an unsuccessful attempt by the Bencoolen factors to procure a cargo of pepper at Banjar for the Canton market in 1766, no positive action was taken by the English against the Dutch claims to Banjarmasin until the early nineteenth century with the advent of Stamford

3. Dutch records (A) Vol. 17, 11 December 1762.

4. Ibid.

Raffles and Alexander Hare.

In the event, in the second half of the eighteenth century the Dutch Company ensured its sovereignty over Banjarmasin by the ratification of a new treaty in 1747. In this, the Panambahan, in effect, signed away his freedom. Henceforth, though Banjarmasin was freed from fears of external threats, the establishment of Dutch control signified the beginning of the end of the Banjarese political and commercial independence. Surprisingly, the Banjarese submitted themselves to Dutch suzerainty although they had fiercely resisted all previous attempts at domination, probably because they welcomed Dutch protection during these insecure periods, as had previously been manifested in the ruler's request for a Dutch fortified factory.

The main object of this study was to trace the development of Banjarmasin as a commercial mart and to analyze the activities of the English and Dutch in the region during a period which historians have neglected. It is conceivable that Dutch and English authors have deliberately ignored the first half of the eighteenth century of Banjarese history not because the records were unavailable but more because they chose to write on the pre-1700 and post-1747 periods when the ventures of the Dutch and English East India Companies in south-east Borneo had more permanency and were not so temporary and sporadic.

It has already been observed that the cause and outcome of the European ventures were due to certain factors, such as Banjarese intransigence and resistance to European domination or control, Asian especially Chinese competition, and the reluctance of the Dutch and English East India Companies to extend their political responsibilities in Banjarmasin. In order to assess the relative importance of each factor, one has to examine the underlying motive for European penetration into Banjarmasin; then only can one reach a definite conclusion about the strength or weakness of the Banjarese vis-a-vis the Dutch and the English. In this context, an important question which arises is whether the English and the Dutch could really have been ousted by the less technically and militarily advanced Banjarese if they had been determined to establish a strong foothold in the area.

With regard to the English East India Company, it has been stressed that the Directors' initial objective in despatching ships to Banjarmasin was to promote the China trade. Interest in Borneo was therefore only incidental — to fulfill the need for an intermediate station. The Directors definitely had no desire to colonize the area, but only to purchase pepper for the China market. In this, their express instructions to the employees were clear-cut and well defined. In the event, however, when their factors

in Banjarmasin exceeded their commercial functions and became involved in Banjarese internal matters, the Directors, who considered that their employees knew best how to advance the Company's interest, merely accepted this state of affairs.

Evidently, the men on the spot in Banjarmasin who were given powers to establish a factory, felt the urgency and expedience of embracing political duties in addition to commercial tasks if they intended to trade successfully in the area. They were given a free hand to carry out the commercial policy of the English Company so long as they did not commit themselves and pledge military aid to the Banjarese. Men like Landon, Barre and Joyner nevertheless felt that it was imperative for the "Pax Britannica" to follow the establishment of trade. The political situation in the East served to enhance the personal ambitions of the English chiefs in Banjarmasin. Although Holland and England were at peace in Europe, relations between the two peoples in the East Indies were not so amicable. The Amboyna massacre had demonstrated Dutch hostility towards the English and this animosity was also witnessed in Sumatra and the Celebes. The chiefs in Banjar were therefore determined that their Company should entrench itself in the area. If Banjarmasin were established as a British base, they felt, it would be strategically sited to enable English ships to sail safely through the Java sea. Even more important, a base would

deter the Dutch from setting foot in the area. The actions of the English factors in recruiting Bugis soldiers, in stationing a guard vessel at the river mouth, and ultimately, in fortifying the settlement all indicated their tendency to establish a military and strategic station in Banjarmasin.

Nevertheless, the objective of the English factors differed from that of their superiors in London. It is important to note that the Directors approved the fortification plan only because they thought that it would increase the Company's prospects of a better trade in Banjarmasin. The Banjar factors, fully realising this, had only put forth the economic argument when they were asking for the fortification plan to be approved. There is no evidence to show that they suggested the colonial motive as well for fear that their decision to fortify Banjar would be overruled.

This lack of political interest in Banjarmasin on the part of the Directors was further seen when the fortification plan failed and the English were expelled from Banjar. Despite the factors' pleas for a punitive expedition to be sent to Banjarmasin, the English Company did not take any positive action until seven years later when it merely ordered the new supercargoes to obtain reparation costs from the Banjarese — even then, it did not send any squadron to ensure that the Banjarese repaid their debts.

A slight change occurred in the English Company's policy only in the early 1740's when the Directors were prepared to grant military assistance to the Banjarese in order to ensure that some security was offered to their China-bound vessels against Bugis attacks in the Java Sea. Here again, it must be noted that the Company was not interested in Banjarmasin for its own sake but only wanted to make use of the place to safeguard the route to China. However, in pursuing such an objective, it was nevertheless keen to avoid direct conflict with the Dutch, in recognition of the Anglo-Dutch Marine Treaty of 1674. Thus when the Dutch squadron sailed into Tartas harbour in 1746 to assume control, the English failed to put up any effective resistance. It is likely that because of the presence of other alternatives whereby English vessels could by-pass Banjarmasin and sail to China via the Sunda Straits from Bencoolen, the Directors did not lodge any vehement protests against the Dutch until 1762 when they brought up the Banjarmasin incident merely to strengthen their claims for saltpetre in India. It was this apathy and disinterest in Banjarmasin of the Directors, more than the Banjarese strength to resist the English traders that led to the Banjarese success in dislodging the English on several occasions.

Like the English Company, the Dutch Company was unable to establish a strong trading position in Banjarmasin in the

first half of the eighteenth century simply because it did not make any determined efforts towards achieving such an end. Though the Batavian Council, the representative of the Dutch Company in the East Indies, had attained a very independent position with regard to policy-making since the issuance of the last "Instructions" by the latter in 1650, it preferred to maintain the Company's mercantile policy in which the extension of political responsibilities were to be avoided at all costs. This was particularly true of Banjarmasin which was regarded as a subordinate pepper port, far less important than the more established places such as Jambi or Palembang. Undoubtedly, it was this low opinion of Banjarmasin, and the reluctance of the Batavian Council to waste its resources of men and money which prevented the Dutch from taking positive steps to compel the Banjarese to adhere to the pepper treaties in the seventeenth century. As it was immaterial whether it retained Banjarmasin or not, the Council was therefore unanimously opposed to the idea of interfering in Banjarese politics. The numerous missives of the Governor-General to his factors, and the Council's dismissal of Banjarese requests for armed aid against Bugis infiltration into the region testify to the indifferent attitude of the Dutch towards Banjarmasin. Hence, when the Banjarese halted their pepper supplies to the Dutch, the Council chose to withdraw its ships rather than use force to pursue trade.

The departure of Dutch policy from that of non-involvement in indigeneous politics to one of active intervention in Banjarmasin in 1746 was the result of a change of personalities in the Batavian Council. Unlike his predecessors, Baron van Imhoff belonged to the new 'breed' of Dutchmen who believed that commercial power could only be attained by the extension of the national frontier, and not by the conclusion of ineffective treaties. With the threat of foreign competition especially from the English, it was essential for the Dutch Company to set up colonies to safeguard the interests of the merchants. Although Van Imhoff realised that he was overstepping the bounds of his authority by advocating such a radical policy, he was nevertheless prepared to face the consequences. Imbued with a sense of national consciousness which was simultaneously mixed with personal ambition, the Governor-General of Batavia took the initiative to establish political control in Banjarmasin. It can also be argued that with the decline in importance of the other pepper ports in the East Indies, the Governor-General grasped the significance of retaining Banjarmasin for the Dutch Company's vital pepper supplies before the English secured a firm position in the area.

In tracing the development of Banjarmasin as a primary pepper port, this study tries to show that without the influence of external factors, such as the influx of the Chinese, the increase in the demand for pepper on the European market, and the patronage of the neighbouring

Indonesians, the Banjarese on their own would not have been able to elevate their port to such a position of importance. The insistence of the Banjarese on subjugating the Biajus in order to reap all the profits of the pepper trade, and the dishonest practices of the Banjarese nobles in not honouring their pepper contracts, certainly did not create conditions conducive to economic development. Fortunately for the Banjarese, the settlement of the Chinese and their subsequent establishment of a sound trading system whereby many commercial functions which had been previously handled by the Banjarese were transferred to the Chinese, helped to attract foreign merchants to Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. As far as day-to-day commercial transactions in Banjarmasin were concerned, this study tends to provide supplementary and confirmatory information on the subject of Asian trading methods which have also been discussed in great detail by Van Leur and Meilink-Roelofs. Although figures on the volume of trade and the tonnage of ships are not readily available, it can be said that commercial practices in Banjarmasin were, in the main, similar to those which prevailed in other pepper ports such as Banten in the same period. Because of the great importance of the south-east Asian pepper trade, the Banjarese were not only interested in self-rule but also the maintenance of the economic autonomy in the early part of the eighteenth century.

APPENDIX ISPANISH DOLLAR OR REAL OF EIGHT

Between 1600 and 1750, the Spanish dollar or real of eight was the current coin and unit of currency in many parts of South East Asia, including Banjarmasin. Also known as a piece of eight among the English, it was minted in Mexico, Peru or Seville. Linguistically, it was called real of eight because there were eight schellinger to a coin, and it appeared with subdivisions of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{16}$ and $\frac{1}{32}$. In the 1620's, the real was equivalent to 48 stuivers or a rix-dollar. The Peruvian real, also known as the pillar dollar because of the presence of two pillars on the obverse of the coin, was debased by the middle of the seventeenth century. Consequently, the Dutch Company prohibited its circulation for some time. It is conceivable that the Banjarese refused to accept pillar dollars after the period because of its debased value.

Sources:-

1. I.C. Scholten, Coins of the Dutch Overseas Territories, p. 32.
2. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, pp. 50-51.

APPENDIX IIDUTCH-BANJARESE TREATY. 26 SEPTEMBER 1733

Contract, gemaakt en gesloten door den coning Dachmet Doula en den pangerang Souria de Laga, regeerders en in heerlijkheid verheven in het coningrijk Banjermassing, met haare vrunden, de opperhoofden van de Generaale Geoctroyeerde Nederlandse Oostindische Comp, den coopman Christoffel de Marre en den ondercoopman David Brouwer, sijnde tot het sluyten dezer geauthoriseert door den gouverneur-Generaal en de Edele heeren Raden van India tot Batavia.

ART. 1

De coning en pangerang, regeerders van deeze landen, beloven altoos met de Comp in vrundschap te leven en hare onderdanen de volgende bevelen te doen verstaan en tot de gehoorsaanhijid derzelve te constringeeren; ook dat dit contract by alle hare nasaten sal werden geobserveerd en tot eeuwig geheugen hetselve in coper laten synden, tot een eeuwige memorie van onvergankelijkheid.

2

De Comp sal jaarlijks soo veel jonken hier ter handel tot het verkopen van Chineese wharen moeten tollereeren, als na dit coningrijk off rivier willen stevenen.

3

Een jonk off wankang sal door de Comp moeten werden getollereert, dat dezelve tot sijn volle lading van de Banjareesen peper inkoopt, maar geen meer.

4

Wanneer de jonk off wankang, die gepermitterd is peper in te copen, binnen deeze rivier niet volladen soude kunnen werden, uyt vreesse van niet sonder gevaar buyten deeze rivier te geraken, sal dezelve het resterende syner lading mogen met gontings off andere inlandse vaartuygen na buyten brengen, om voor de bank hetselve te kunnen inneemen.

5

Tot voorkoming van alle sluykeryen sal aan het opperhoofd van de Comp, wanneer men peper na buyten sal bregen aan de jonk off wankang, eerst kennis moeten worden gegeven (aan het opperhoofd van de Comp) dat die peper voor de gepermetteerde wankang is, die dan volgens sijn goedvinden een off twee van sijn manschappen daar sal opsetten, om te

sien, dat die corl aan geen andere vaartuygen werd overgegeeven als aan dengeene, die tot den peperhandel is getollereert geworden.

6

Ook sal het de Comp vrystaan een vaartuyg tot brandwagt te leggen by de jonk, die tot den peperhandel gepermitteert werd, om te sien, dat dezelve in off buyten deeze rivier geen peper aan zijn medemackers off andere overgeeft, 'tzy onder wat pretext het soude mogen sijn, sulks niet te mogen geschieden.

7

Wanneer ymand in gontings, wankangs off andere vaartuygen, die gesloten sijn en waarmede men peper soude kennen vervoeren, buyten en behalven de wankang, die jaarlijks moet gepermitteert werden, eenige peper laad, soo sal het opperhoofd van de Comp de sabandhaar van Tatas by hem doen roepen en ten overstaan van dezelve de peper uyt die vaartuygen halen, confisqueeren, wegen, en gedeelt werden, een helft aan den coning voor de gecontracteerde prijs te betalen en de andere helft voor de Comp.

8

Wanneer den sabandhaar van Tatas, off dengeene, die uyt 'sconings naam op Tatas is gestelt, by het opperhoofd van de Comp geroepen over sake, die geen uytstel off wagen kenne veele, en hy aanstons niet verschijnd, soo sal volgens goedvinden van het opperhoofd, Comp dienaren het alleen mogen verrigten en het van dieselven effect sijn sal off conings volkeren daar waren present geweest, om door uytstelle en te moeten wagen voor te comen, dat geen slaykerie passeeren, dat anders ligtelijk soude gebeuren.

9

Voorts sal de Comp alle de peper werden gebracht, die in dit coningrijk werde bevonden, het picol off 125 ponden tegen $4\frac{1}{4}$ Spaanse reaal, soo voor den peper als conings tol, en geene meerder nog minder prijs te sullen mogen bedingen dan boven gesteld.

10

De Comp sal verpligt sijn ook alle de peper, die deese landen voortbregen, tot de gestelde prijs van $4\frac{1}{4}$ reaal het picol off 125 ponden te moeten aannemen, sonder eenigre om haar stoffighid af te wysen.

11

Men sal aan de Compagnie drooge en goede peper moet brengen, en de natte sal mogen werden uytgeligt en eerst gedroogt werden, eer men die behoeft in te slaan.

12

Sand, steenen off diergelyke dingen, die buyten de stoff van peper sijn, sal de Comp niet behoeven in te slaan, voor en aleer den peper is van alle het geene gesuyvert, dat hem vervalst heeft, maar schil, bast off hetgeene den peper selfs van hem geeft, sal men moeten inwegen soo het gebragt werd, sonder van eenige suyveringe te spreken.

13

De Comp sal gehouden sijn, wanneer hier een logie off pagger heeft gemaakt, off met scheepen off sloepen is leggende, dit land en volkeren op versock van den coning en pangerang te assisteeren, wanneer van buyten off in deeze rivier eenige vyandelijkheden werd gepleegt, sonder de ongelden, door de Comp gedaan, sal behoeven door den coning te werden gerestitueerd, maar sulks voor 's Comp reekening te moeten blyven.

14

De Banjareezen, 't sy wie het soude mogen weesen, sullen de dienaren van de Comp onverhindert laten en geen de minste molesten aandoen, off sodanige, die eenige 's Comp dienaren off onderhorige aandoen, bestelen of eenige andere onordentelijkheden tegen dezelve pleegen, sullen mogen werden opgepakt en by de Comp soo lang bewaart, tot den sabandhaar off dengeene, die in deese negerye daartoe is gestelt, is geroepen, wanneer dien kwaaddoender daaraan sal werden overgegeven om volgens de wetten dezels lands door den coning gestrafft te werden over syne begane fouten.

15

De dienaren en onderhorige van de Comp sullen de Banjareezen en al de onderhorige van den Sulthan geen de minste molesten, nog haar met drygingen goederen affdwingen off moeyelijkheden aandoen; den overtreder, die sulks aanvangt, sal door 's conings volkeren mogen werden opgepakt en aan het opperhoofd ten eersten overgegeven, die desulke over sijn begane quaad na merite sal straffen.

16

Wanneer eenig Banjarees off andere onderhorige van den coning op de plaatsen kwam, daar 's Comp dienaren logeeren, en wilde amok speelen, sal men de sodanige daarvan affhouden en sien sulks te beletten, des mogelijk sijnde; maar anders sal het de dienaren, en wel voornamentlijk de schildwagten,

die op haar posten staan, (gepermitterd zijn) de sodanige met geweld tegen te gaan met het gebruik van zijn geweer; en den geweldpleger daardoor dood off gequest werdende, sal men daar den sabandhaar kennis van geven, sonder verdere verantwoordinge te doen, sodanig ook behandelt sal werden de Hollanders, wanneer die by de Banjareese ook sodanig kwaad plegen; en gequest rakende, sal daar ook geen navragen over sijn.

17

Wanneer cenige Engelsen, Franse, Portugeese off andere Europeese natie hier ten handel comen, soo dal den coning en pangerang haar moeten afwysen en seggen, sy geen goederen hier kenne bemagtigen, met die expressie, dezelve aanstons moeten vertrekken, sonder hier iets te mogen verkopen off kopen.

18

Den coning en pangerang geven aan de Comp tot voortsetting van den handel de keur, wat grond sy het bequaamste oordeelen, om op te wonen, sijnde twee plaatsen hier in dese negery daartoe aangeweesen, het eene waarop men sedert het jaar 1727 al heeft gewoont, en het andere, gelegen een wynig lager op de benchedenhoek van de eerste dwarsspruyt, daar men neede door de negery Oud-Banjer na de groote spruyt vaart, welke een van byde door de Comp can genomen en gebruykt werden.

19

De Comp sal op de grond, die het beste geoordeelt werd tot gebruyk, een logie off pagger mogen maken, na sulks goed gevonden werd, dan wel met scheepen 's jaarlijks een besending doen, soals men sedert het jaar 1727 gedaan heeft, sonder dat men genoodsaakt sal sijn een pagger off vastigheid te bouwen, 't geen in het geheel aan het goedvinden van den Gouverneur-Generaal en de Raden van India blijft gerefereert.

Onder stond: Aldus gecontracteert in de negery Cayutange, gelegen in 't coningrik Banjermassen, dan 26 September 1733.

Lager stond 's conings en pangerangs segul, gedrukt in roode lacque, met die van den pangerant in 't swart.

Onder stond: Accordeert - was geteekend - D. Brouwer.

Source:

F.W. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol V, pp. 165-70.

APPENDIX IIIDUTCH-BANJARESE TREATY, 18 MAY 1747

Vernieuwt contract van handel, vrient- en bondgenootschap tusschen den sulthan Tamdji Dulla, den pangrang Ratoe Anum benevens de verdere grooten van Banjermassing, en de magtige Hollandsche Oost-indische Maatschappyc, op speciale gegevene macht en order van den HoogEdelen Heere Gustaaf Willen, Baron van Imhoff, Gouverneur-Generaal, en de Weledele Heeren Raaden van Nederlands-India, gemaakt en gesloten door derzelve daartoe expresselijk afgesondene, den opperkoopman Steven Marcus van der Heyden, benevens de cooplieden Jan van Suchtelen en Daniel van den Burch.

Nademaal de voorige contracten tusschen de Nederlandsche Compagnie en de sulthans van Banjermassing niet zodanig als men wel gewenscht had, gestrekt hebben tot welzijn der wederzijdse onderdanen, en de volkeren van Banjer in het onderhouden derselver, inzonderheit in opzichte van het laatste, met den sulthan Chamidulla gesloten, geheel nalaatig zijn geweest, waardoor het contract genoegsaam aangemerkt is geworden alsof het niet meer in wesen was, overzulk heeft den Gouveneur-Generaal en de Raden van India goedgevonden gehad den oppercoopman en president Steven Marcus van der Heyden, benevens de cooplieden Jan van Suchtelen en Daniel van den Burch expresselijk in commissie na Banjer te senden, met speciale magt en last omme nader met den sulthan Tamdji Dulla en grooten derselver landen te confereeren en zodanig nieuw contract van handel en bondgenootschap te sluyten, als beter zoude kunnen voldoen aan de intentie van wederzcydsc contracteerende partyen, 't welk in deser voege thans ten effecten gebracht en vastgesteld is.

Articul 1

Eerstelijk zal tusschen den sulthan, Ratoe Anum, benevens de verdere grooten en volkeren van Banjer en tusschen de Hollandsche Compagnie zijn en blyven een vaste vriendt- en bondgenootschap, zoodanig dat men elkanders welvaren van wederzyden zal trachten te bevorderen zonder daarvan af te wyken ofte veranderen.

Articul 2

Byaldien eenige vyand dit land van Banjer mogt komen aan te tasten, hetzy te waater of te land, belooft de Comp dat haar schip, scheepen of volkeren, zich alhier bevindend, die van Bandjer na vermogen zullen bystaan, ten eynde zoodanig een vyand te helpen afweiren en te verdryven, zonder eenige onkosten voor kruyt of loot te rekenen.

Articul 3

Maar wanneer onder de koninglyke Banjareesche familie, 't zy tusschen twee broeders of twee zoonen, tweedragt off oorlog mogt ontstaan, zal de Comp niet behoeven of vermogen een der parthyen te helpen, maar by 't sneuvelen van een dier beyde zal den overwinnaar of die het rijk behout, aan de articulen van dit contract moeten voldoen.

Articul 4

Daarentegen belooft den sulthan het opperhoofd, dienaren en onderdanen van de Comp, die zich alhier zullen bevinden, te neemen in zijn bescherming en te bezorgen dat sezelve geen leet of overlast komen te lyden, 't zy van de volkeren van Banjer, 't zy van andere; en by aldien zulx mogte geschieden, dat de Comp daarin behoorlyke satisfactie gegeven en de schuldige op het strengste gestraft worden, zullende de Comp van hare kant besorgen, dat haar volk den Banjaresen meede geen geweld of overlast aandoen, of die daaraan schuldig mogt bevonden werden, maar billikheyt straffe doen erlangen.

Articul 5

Voorts belooft den sulthan en Ratoe Anum alle de peper, die haar landt voorbrengt, geene uytgesondert, aan de Comp te leveren en te verkoopen, zonder aan eenige anderen, wie het ook zy, daarvan iets te moogen verkoopen of permitteeren uyt te voeren, ook te zullen beletten dat door hunne onderdanen off inwoonders aan inant anders dan aan de Comp alleen eenige peper verkogt of geleverd word, ook niet uyt het landt vervoert.

Articul 6

Ingevolge van dien beloven den sulthan en Ratoe Anum ook alle Europesche natien, die alhier ten handel mogten willen koomen ofte die door haar mogten worden uytgesonden, alle, geene uytgesondert, te sullen afwysen en niet te permitteeren dat deselve alhier eenige goederen aanbrengen, inkoop, verkoopen of verhandelen, mitsgaders ook beletten dat eenige van hare onderdanen met deselve eenige de minste handel dryven. En zullen de schuldige, die daerop geatrappeert werden, als overtreders van dit contract gestraft werden.

Articul 7

Doch zal de Comp op des sulthans speciaal versoeck permitteeren dat jaarlijx alhier eene Chinese wankang aankomt, en geen meer, met zoodanige goederen als China uytleverd en alhier vertiert werden, eger onder dese voorwaarde - die den sulthan en Ratoe opregtelijk belooven

naar te komen - dat door hun nog door hunne onderdanen gene peper aan deselve zal mogen verkogt, verruyt of in eenige maniere geleverd werden; maar aan de Comp alleen zal het wrystaan van hare alhier opgeslagene voorraat aan die wankang peper te verkopen tegens 8 rijxdaalders Spaans het picoll.

Articul 8

Daarentegen belooft de Comp alle de peper, die 't land van Bandjer voortbrengt, te zullen aanneemen en betalen tegens 6 rijxdaalders Spaans de picol van 125 pond, mits deselve geleverd werd goed en droog, zonder vermenging van sant of steentjes, en gesuyvert van alle vuyligheyd. Ook zal die peper met Comp gewigt en schalen gewoogen werden van wederzeyde, des begerende, ten overstaan van twee gecommitteerdens, ten eynde dese de ontstane disputen zouden kunnen beslissen; en byaldien zulx ondoenlijk is, zal die beslissing moeten geschieden door den sulthan en het opperhoofd, dat hier Comp wegen zal wesen.

Articul 9

En gelijk den sulthan genogen is alle sluykdryen en vervoer van peper, zooveel in zijn vermoogen is, te weeren en tegen te gaan, geeft Zijn Hoogheyd tot betere bereyking van dat oogmerk aan de Comp opperhoofden, die alhier zullen zijn, vrye magt, om alle uytgaende vaartuygen te laten visiteren, zonder egter de daarop varende personen eenig leed te doen; maar by ontdekking van peper zal men denzelven mogen aanslaan en verdeelen, de eene helft voor de Comp en die andere ten voordeele van des sulthans schryvers.

Articul 10

Wyders belooft de Comp voor nu en altoos, zoo lange dit contract ten vollen naargekomen werdt, te zullen toelaten de vrye vaart der Banjaresen op Batavia en geheel Java, tot Crisse en Sourabaja toe, dog niet verder om de Oost, 't zy naar Baly, Lombok, Sumbawa en de verdere eylanden tot Timor toe, of na de Baviaan; ook niet naar de West of Noord, als na Biliton, Palembang, Johore, Malacca en andere custen en landen, daar omher gelegen, tot al hetwelke den sulthan de nodige orders zal geven, opdat zyne onderdanen door het niet naarkomen van dien geene schade of ongluk komen te ontmoeten.

Articul 11

Ook zal de Comp magt hebben alle inkomende vaartuygen, waarop suspicie valt, exactelijk te visiteren, ter ontdekking en agterhaling van desulken, die vreemde amphioen of Comp speceryen tragten in te voeren. En zullen Comp opperhoofden alle vaertuygen, waarin speceryen of amphioen - niet by de

Comp gekogt - bevonden worden, met derzelver ophebbende manschappen naar Batavia mogen versenden, om aldaar naar maate van haar delict straffe te erlangen.

Articul 12

Eyndelijk belooft den sult an aan de Comp ten genoeg en bekwame plaats en huys tot logement der dienaren en berging van goederen en handelwaren te bezorgen, mits daarvoor betalend een billyke prijs; insgelijks geven de sulthan en Ratoe Anum volkoomene vryheyd om een logie te vinden, in gelyker voegen als zulx door den voorigen sulthan Chamidulla is toegestaan geworden.

Aldus gedaan en gecontracteerd in 't hoff des sulthans tot Cajoetangi, den 18 Mey 1747. En zijn hiervan gemaakt twee consluydende afschriften, op gelyke wyse getekent en gesegeld, waarvan een onder Zijn Hoogheyd en een onder de commissianten verbleven is.

Onder het Maleyts stonden twee zegels, een van den sulthan Tamdjidulla en een van Ratoe Anum, mitsgaders onder 't Hollands drie zegels van de commissianten, en daarbezyden getekent: S.M. van der Heyden, Jan van Suchtelen en D. van der Burgh.

Daaronder: Accordeert - getekent - F. van Ruybeek, secretaris.

Ratificatie door Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden van Indie.

... Zo wierd goedgevonden en verstaan hetselve te ratificeren, behoudens de separate articulen, ter secreete resolutie van den 2 beser vermeld, en gemelten opperkoopman Van der Heyden bereeds toegesonden by missive van den 4 Juny deses faars, mitsgaders de acte van ratificatie diendwegen te laten expedieeren na vorige exempelen, ook speciaal ten opsigte van Banjer te vinden bij resolutie van den 15 Maart 1734.

Batavia in 't casteel, dato voorschreven - was getekend - G.W. van Imhoff, J. Mossel, D. Nolthenius, J.M. Cluysenaer, J. van den Bosch, H. Verysel, A. van Broyel, J.H. Thelingen, P.A. van de Parra, secretaris.

Separate artikelen, door Gouverneur-Generaal en Rade aan het voorgaande contract toegevoegd.

I

Aangesien in het jongst gerenoveerde contract van vriendschap tussen den sulthan Tamdji Dulla, den pangerang Ratoe Anum en de verdere groten van Banjermassing aan de eene, en de Nederlandsche Oostindische Comp aan de andere

zyde, onder den 17 May deses jaars 1747 eenige notabèle veranderingen zijn gemaakt, soowel ten opsigte van de prijs van de peper als andersints, dewelke hetselve souden kunnen doen aanmerken als een nieuw contract, tegens de intentie der contracteerende parthyen, soo is nodig g'oordeelt by dit separate articul daaraf de nodige verklaring te doen en dienvolgende wel uytdrukkelijk te inhaerecren de vorige contracten, tussen de Nederlandsche Comp en het rijk van Banjer, al van hondert jaren herwaards, gemaakt, als de grond en het fundament van de tegenwoordige, speciaal die van den jare 1664 en 1733, waaraff het presente alleen een nadere vernieuwinge en verklaringe is, en de pointen, daarby vermeldt, allesins te doen standgrypen voor en soo verre in het laatste contract niet zijn verandert ofte gcheel en al vernietigt.

II

Ook is tot nader verstand van het eerste articul der voormelde renovatie, spredende van de vernieuwing der vriendschap en bondgenootschap, zodanig dat men elkanders welvaren te wederzyden sal trachten te bevorderen, item van het tweede articul, houdende belofte aan de zyde van de Comp, om het land van Banjer, invoegen als daarby vermeldt is, te beschermen, nodig g'oordeelt in desen te verklaren, dat aan de zyde van den sulthan en pangrang, item de gróten op Banjer, speciaal ook onder de voorschreven vernieuwinge der bondgenootschap sal gehoren, dat aan niemand, die met de Comp in oorlog is, eenige schuyfplaatsse aldaar of in het geheele gebied van Banjer sal mogen gegeven werden, veel min eenige besceerming, maar dat degeene, die 's Comp vyanden off rebellen sijn, aanstonds sullen moeten werden afgeweesen en, hetzy goedwillig off quaadwillig, van daar verdreven, sonder onderscheyt wie het ook zy.

Dese separate articulen sullen werden gehouden van volle kragt en waarde, even off deselve by het contract van den 18 Mey laastleden van worde tot worde waren g'inscreert.

Source:

F.W. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. V, pp. 448-54.

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
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SOUTH-EAST BORNEO
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