The book cover features a highly detailed and ornate decorative border. At the top, two winged figures, likely personifications of Liberty and Justice, are seated amidst a dense arrangement of flags and banners. The central text is enclosed in a rectangular frame with a repeating circular pattern. Below the title, a small laurel wreath is centered. The bottom of the cover is dominated by a large, flowing scrollwork design that frames the publisher's name. Various symbols of power and authority, such as a crown, scepter, and other regalia, are integrated into the decorative elements.

LOUIS XIV
AND THE CRAFT
OF KINGSHIP

EDITED BY

JOHN C. RULE

OHIO STATE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

LOUIS XIV
AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP




Edited by John C. Rule

Among French sovereigns, few have exerted more fascination through the years than the Sun King, Louis XIV, whose long reign (1661-1715) marked the apogee of absolutism in monarchical government.

Hailed at his birth by a joyous populace as *Le Dieudonné* — “the God-given” — his death was greeted with unconcealed rejoicing. His critics have claimed that Louis was preoccupied with his *gloire*, and that he pursued it relentlessly at home and abroad in a series of diplomatic and military adventures that impoverished France and earned Louis the hatred and distrust of Europe. Yet to many throughout the realm, to some members of the clergy, to the wealthier bourgeois, to merchants, intellectuals, and the well-to-do peasants, he was a *roi d'aujourd'hui*—an agent of stability whose personal struggle was their struggle, and whose goal it was to contain the crises of the age.

It is to the paradox of Louis that the original essays in this collection are addressed. They are: “Louis XIV: *Roi-Bureaucrate*,” by John C. Rule; “The Formation of a King,” by John B. Wolf; “The Medical History of Louis XIV: Intimations of Mortality,” by C. D. O'Malley; “Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs,” by R. M. Hatton; “Louis XIV, Soldier-King,” by John B. Wolf; “Law and Justice under Louis XIV,” by A. Lloyd Moote; “Louis XIV and the Church,” by H. G. Judge;

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
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PREFACE

THIS book was born of a conference on the reign of Louis XIV held at the Ohio State University in December, 1964. At that time papers were read by Professors Ragnhild Hatton of the London School of Economics, University of London; Paul W. Bamford of the University of Minnesota; A. Lloyd Moote of the University of Southern California; Herbert H. Rowen of Rutgers University; Orest Ranum of Columbia University; and John B. Wolf, now of the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. The editor is indebted to the participants of that conference for their stimulating discussions, and he is grateful to Dean Richard Armitage of the Graduate School of the Ohio State University for the generous support that made the colloquium possible.

For purposes of publication a few more papers were solicited that were felt to complement those presented at the conference, and an introductory first chapter and a bibliographical essay were prepared by the editor.

These papers offer an introduction to some of the historiographical problems of Louis XIV's reign and also a re-evaluation of many of the current historical interpretations of that period. Each contributor was urged to present his own assessment; and although a surprising consensus emerges from these essays, the editor has not attempted to reconcile points of view when there is a clash of interpretation.

J. C. R.

January, 1969

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THE tasks of an editor are made more pleasant by the advice and encouragement given him by his friends and colleagues, among whom he particularly wishes to thank Professor Ragnhild Hatton of the London School of Economics; Professors John C. Burnham of the Ohio State University and Donald R. Howard of the Johns Hopkins University; Mr. Graham Gibbs of Birkbeck College, the University of London; Professor R. Clayton Roberts of the Ohio State University; Dr. Philip Knachel of the Folger Shakespeare Library; Dr. Victor Morales Lezcano of La Laguna University, Spain; and Professor Charles Williams, Ohio State University.

The bibliographical essay was read by Dr. Ronda Larmour, whose suggestions for its reorganization proved most valuable. Professors June Z. Fullmer and Franklin Pegues of the Ohio State University commented on individual sections of the bibliography; Mr. David Palmatier and Mrs. Phyllis Leffler helped in preparing it for publication.

Acknowledgment is gratefully made for permission to reprint "Louis XIV and the Church," by H. G. Judge, which originally appeared in *History*, Vol. XLV (October, 1960), under the title "Church and State under Louis XIV."

Special thanks go to Miss Ann Liston for the care she took in typing the entire manuscript, and to Mr. Robert Demorest of the Ohio State University Press for his care and patience in editing these essays.

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LOUIS XIV
AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP

Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate

JOHN C. RULE

THIS first essay, which serves as an introduction to the reign of Louis XIV, is divided into three sections. The first reviews the political and diplomatic legacies left to the young king by the cardinal-ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin. The second treats the domestic policies of Louis XIV's personal reign (after 1661), presenting an overview of French governmental structure and the accomplishments of those great architects of stability Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Le Telliers father and son, and their associates. The last section deals with the administration of the foreign office, the evolution of French foreign policy, and the crises in Louis XIV's government in the middle and later years of the reign.

THE BEGINNINGS, 1635-59: THE TWENTY-FOUR YEARS' WAR AND THE FRONDES

On September 5, 1638, in the palace of St. Germain-en-Laye, Anne of Austria, wife of Louis XIII of France, gave birth to a male child, Louis. He was quickly acclaimed by a grateful French nation as *Le Dieudonné*—the God-given—and would in four years and eight months become the fourteenth king of his name. In the weeks that followed the young prince's birth, the court, Paris, and the provinces gave themselves over to ecstatic celebrations. From the European capitals plenipotentiaries came to congratulate the king of France; and in Rome, Pope Urban VIII celebrated a pontifical high mass in

honor of "Le Dauphin" Louis. But in all Europe no one expressed greater satisfaction at the birth of the crown prince than did France's principal minister, Cardinal Richelieu, who, in the official *Gazette*, noted that "between the father and the mother, lay that admirable child, the object of their desires and the last expression of their happiness."¹ Two years later, with the birth of a second son, Philippe, the Bourbon succession seemed at last secure.

The celebrations that attended the birth of future king Louis XIV were held against the grim backdrop of war and threatened invasion. France had for nearly twenty years prior to 1635 eschewed open military intervention in the Thirty Years' War. By the early 1630's, however, the drift toward war had become irreversible. It was then that Richelieu ordered French troops to reinforce the border garrisons at Metz, Toul, and Verdun and to occupy the strategic posts within the duchy of Lorraine of Bar-le-Duc, Stenay, and Suze. During the same years Richelieu's agents in The Hague, Turin, and Hamburg launched a series of diplomatic *démarches* that led in 1635 to the signing of defensive alliances with the Dutch, the duke of Savoy, and the Swedes. The denouement of the combined French military and diplomatic maneuvers came in May, 1635, with a formal declaration of war on Spain, followed in early 1636 by a declaration of war against the Emperor Ferdinand II.

If 1635 was a year of diplomatic triumph, 1636 was one of near military disaster. Cardinal Richelieu and his advisers had not reckoned on the military prowess of the seasoned Hapsburg armies, who in the spring of 1636 drove scattered French forces before them as they advanced in three columns along a front extending from Grave-lines on the Channel to the valley of the Somme, and from the rich, rolling farmland of Burgundy to the Belfort gap. In August, 1636, the town of Corbie, some seventy miles north of Paris, fell to Spanish forces headed by Philip IV's brother, the Cardinal-Infant. As in similar crises in 1709-10, 1792, 1870, 1914, and 1940, cautious ministers of state in Paris advised the government to flee southward to the Loire valley. Louis XIII, however, in a *beau geste* worthy of his father, Henri IV, announced that he would in person lead a counterattack against the Spanish forces. In the ensuing weeks Frenchmen rallied to the royal banner, and in the autumn of 1636 a French army led by the king and his minister recaptured Corbie. Once the tide of invasion was stemmed, it ebbed slowly in favor of France.²

In the winter of 1636-37, as French armies advanced into Picardy and Artois to the north of Paris, Richelieu, with the aid of his able secretary of war, François de Sublet de Noyers, and their agents, the *intendants de l'armée*, recruited mercenary troops from among the Walloons, the Germans, and the Swiss. By the winter of 1637 the French military establishment numbered over 100,000. To head the important Army of the Rhine, Richelieu hired the services of one of the last of the great *condottieri*, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. At the cardinal's behest, Saxe-Weimar initiated a campaign in 1637 against the Imperial fortresses that guarded Spanish supply routes along the upper reaches of the Rhine river. By 1638 Saxe-Weimar's troops had swept the upper valley nearly clean of Imperials and had invested the important fortress of Breisach in Alsace, securing that bridgehead over the Rhine. A jubilant Richelieu announced in December, 1638, to one of the architects of his German policy, Father Joseph, that Breisach "est à nous!" In a few days his prophecy became fact.³

Richelieu's and Sublet de Noyers's adroitness in staffing and supplying the armies insured France of continued success in the military campaigns of 1639 and 1640. Even with Saxe-Weimar's death in July, 1639, Richelieu was able, by means of generous gifts to the garrison commanders in Breisach, to secure that strategic fortress for France and with it the key to Alsace. In 1640 Arras in the north and Turin in Savoy fell to French forces; and in the same year France's most formidable foe, Spain, became embroiled in civil wars in Catalonia and in Portugal. Emboldened by Spanish misfortunes, France seized Perpignan and then the province of Roussillon, which lay under the shadow of the Pyrenees. Thus by the time of his death in 1642 Richelieu's dream of French ascendancy seemed close to realization: Artois, Alsace, and Roussillon were within France's grasp, and with them gateways were opened to Flanders, to the Germanies, and to Catalonia.

In late November, 1642, Richelieu, exhausted by the political carnival over which he had so long and so masterfully presided, fell ill at his Paris residence, where he died on December 4. Louis XIII, who survived his principal minister scarcely six months, succumbed to a fever on the fourteenth of May, 1643. With his death, Dauphin Louis, a boy of four years and eight months, became king of France under the title of Louis XIV, and his mother, Anne of Austria, became queen regent.

RICHELIEU'S LEGACY: FOREIGN POLICY

In foreign affairs Richelieu had committed France to a policy of expansion along the northern and northeastern borders. With the seizure of Breisach (1638) and Arras (1640), the French became further entangled in the fate of the Burgundian and Lortharingian (Lorraine) inheritances. Since 1477 France had been vitally concerned with the partitions of the Middle Kingdom, that is, the disposition of the great Burgundian lands that extended from the ports of Antwerp and Ostend to the county of Luxembourg, thence to the rich valleys of the Franche-Comté at the base of the Jura mountains. These areas, though interrupted by lands of the bishop of Liège and by Imperial and German fiefs, seemed relatively secure in the late sixteenth century, guarded by Spanish troops ensconced in strongly fortified cities that lay strewn along the borders. As the French knew, these fortresses gave the Imperial and Spanish Hapsburgs advance bases from which to launch attacks on the northern heartland—*le cœur*—of France. The specter of invasion haunted France throughout the era of the *ancien régime*, but at no time in this period did the threat loom more ominously than it did in the later years of the 'Thirty Years' War.

By Richelieu's day France had—by right of a century of military occupation—a claim over the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which nestled on the periphery of Burgundy and Lorraine. In the early 1630's French troops moved from these fortresses into the duchy of Lorraine, driving the reigning duke into exile. To protect the new conquests from counterattack either through the Franche-Comté, the Belfort gap (appropriately named the *Porte-de-Bourgogne*), or over the Alsatian bridgeheads, Richelieu had encouraged Saxe-Weimar's campaign along the Rhine valley into Alsace. In later years Louis XIV and his advisers continued and extended Richelieu's policy by annexing further lands in Alsace, the city of Strasbourg, and the Franche-Comté.⁴

The struggle for the Burgundian and Lortharingian lands points up another problem entailed by Richelieu to Louis XIV, that of natural frontiers. It seems certain—as Gaston Zeller demonstrated a generation ago⁵—that neither Richelieu nor Louis XIV was seeking so-called natural frontiers of France nor, for that matter, the ancient

boundaries of Gaul. Their aim in Lorraine and Alsace was to establish advanced bases, variously termed *passages*, *entrées*, *têtes de pont*, *portes*, from which to repulse an enemy attack or launch one of their own.⁶ Richelieu asserted in *L'Avis au Roi après le siège de La Rochelle* (1629), "I believe that we must fortify Metz and advance as far as Strasbourg, if possible, in order to acquire 'une entrée' into Germany."⁷ These bases often protected great water routes that led into northern and northeastern Europe, e.g., as with Menin and Armentières on the Lys; Valenciennes and Tournai on the Scheldt; Charleville, Sedan, Stenay, Dunn, Verdun on the Meuse; Thionville and Mont Royal on the Moselle; and Fort Louis, Strasbourg, and Breisach on the Rhine. An extension of this concept of *portes* or *entrées* can be found in the fortresses at Belfort on the *Porte-de-Bourgogne*, and in Pignerol and Casale that guard the Maritime Alps of Italy. Where no natural protection existed—no forest, promontory, or river bend—the engineers of Richelieu and Louis XIV (chief among them Clerville, Vauban, and Chamlay), designed a *barrière* or *frontière de fer*: a frontier or wall of iron made up of fortified towns, often linked together by canals or dikes that could be opened to permit the flooding of the surrounding territory. Such a frontier was perfected in the later years of Louis XIV's reign by the genius of the Marquis de Vauban, whose great fortresses were scattered along the northern and northeastern border like a necklace of iron and stone. The strategy of the *portes* or the *barrière* emerged as one of the *idées maîtresses* of military and diplomatic planning in the age of Louis XIV.

In the field of foreign policy Richelieu left several dreams unfulfilled. One of the most important of these was the so-called Italian adventure, or the *grande entreprise italienne*. Richelieu in his early career admitted that he believed Italy to be *le cœur du monde*, the heart of the world. He spoke with the fervor of a late Renaissance man, whose eyes turned naturally to the glory of Florence, Rome, and Venice, where, surrounded by the splendor of the baroque, lived men of science and letters, architects, painters, and poets of renown. Like the Renaissance princes Charles VIII and Francis I, Richelieu and Louis XIII ordered French armies over the Alps into the fertile plains of Lombardy; but like these Frenchmen of an earlier day, they had to retreat before the superior strength of the Hapsburgs, holding only the mountain passes at Pignerol. Richelieu's successor, Cardinal

Mazarin, was likewise enamored of the Italian dream: he, too, interfered in Italian affairs when he launched an ill-fated expedition to aid the Neapolitan rebels in 1647–48. Louis XIV himself felt occasionally the lure of the Italian will-o'-the-wisp, as witness the French invasions of Italy in the late 1680's, again in the 1690's, and in 1701–6; but Louis's troops were not more successful than were those of his predecessors. Only in 1797–98 did French Republican armies under Napoleon succeed in a military sense where the Bourbons had failed. Yet, in reality, the Italian dream had died in the seventeenth century, and neither Napoleon I nor Napoleon III could revive it. It died because the French became increasingly involved in the fate of the Burgundian inheritance; and with the shift in emphasis—only barely begun in Richelieu's day—the great balance of European power tilted northward and found its axis in the lines that cross from north to south and east to west somewhere near the mouth of the Rhine river, a focal point for the power struggle among the Dutch Netherlands, England, France, and the Germanies. For the next century and a half the fate of Europe was in part decided on the battlefields of those Burgundian lands.

RICHELIEU'S LEGACY: THE BUREAUCRATIC IMPULSE

In implementing his domestic policy of centralization of power in the crown, Richelieu faced determined foes among members of the royal family; among the great nobles, *les grands* or *les importants*; in the Roman Catholic church, where Jesuits and Jansenists quarreled incessantly; among the Protestants, whom Richelieu robbed of their political benefits under the Edict of Nantes; in the municipal governments, which resisted reformation; in the great law courts, the parlements, which guarded their prerogatives with tenacity worthy of the great Parliament in London across the channel; and among the peasantry, who, racked by taxes and condemned to a life of poverty, protested in the only way they knew how, through the *émeutes*, or uprisings. These same forces, often selfish and shortsighted, or simply misguided, remained the chief enemies of Louis XIV's government.

Richelieu, in countering these divisive forces within the realm, assembled allies closest at hand, his family and their clients, or crea-

tures. He placed his nephews, grandnephews, and his cousins in positions of trust both in the military and civil services. By 1640 his relatives, the Du Plessis and the De la Portes, held the posts of marshal of France, the intendant-general of the marine, general of the galleys and master of navigation, and grand master of artillery; in addition the cardinal's nieces contracted marriage alliances with several of the great families of France.⁸ Although the use of nepotism was as old as politics itself, the refinement of this practice reached its consummation under Louis XIV. Ministers and secretaries of state established dynasties of administrators. The Phélypeaux (who were important civil servants as early as the sixteenth century), the Colberts, the Le Telliers, the D'Aguesseaus, D'Argensons, and Lamoignons, some of whom had been Richelieu's creatures or those of his family, became entrenched in the civil service during the seventeenth century. Many of these families had risen from the nobility of the robe or from the lesser country nobility, what would in England of the time have been termed gentry. Others had been royal bailiffs, or seneschals, who had built their property holdings on the patronage of the royal government. Richelieu, as did Louis XIV, employed an increasing number of this class as administrators in the central or provincial governments. From this class, who were sometimes known as the *gens de la plume*, Richelieu drew such excellent administrators as Claude and Léon le Bouthillier, who were related to the Lamoignon and Phélypeaux clans. Richelieu also employed Abel Servien and his nephew Hugues de Lionne, both future ministers in Louis XIV's government; and Pierre Séguier, keeper of the seals and then chancellor of France from 1635 to his death in 1672. Through these men and their clients in the courts, commissions, and committees, Richelieu fashioned a bureaucratic machine that Louis XIV inherited and exploited.

An important aspect of this seventeenth-century bureaucracy was the emergence of ministerial departments. By 1642, as Orest Ranum has pointed out in his book *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII*,⁹ there had appeared at least two departments of government, those of war and foreign affairs. The secretaries of state for these departments, along with other secretaries of state and their *premiers commis*, or heads of bureaus, became the chief conduit through which information was channeled from the provincial officials to the

central administration. Moreover, the secretaries and their bureaus represented continuity in government. As Claude le Bouthellier observed:

. . . It is necessary in the king's affairs to keep a continuity which is formed by dispatches of ambassadors, who should never fail to make them very ample, to Monsieur the Secretary of State. . . .¹⁰

This continuity in government was also preserved by the purchase of the office of secretary of state, which allowed the secretary to hold the post *en survivance* for a son or nephew or cousin.

By the 1660's the *gens de la plume* had emerged as a powerful subgroup within the nobility, bitterly hated by the older nobility of the sword, whose spokesman, the Duc de Saint-Simon, described them as *vile bourgeois*, a misnomer that has stuck. The words of a polemicist should not becloud the fact that these "new bureaucrats"—these king's men whose place in the French government had been increasing in importance since Philip the Fair's day—were fashioning the pen into a more powerful weapon than the sword. Thus one of Richelieu's most important legacies was the impetus he gave to bureaucratic centralization, the very stuff of which so-called seventeenth-century absolutism was made.

Of all the legacies left by Richelieu to Louis XIV, none was more immediate in its impact than his choice of a successor as principal minister, Jules, Cardinal Mazarin. Born in Rome in 1602, Giulio Mazarini, later gallicized as Jules Mazarin, began his political life as a diplomat in the service of the papal *curia*. In 1631 he led a successful deputation to settle peace terms over the disputed succession to the duchy of Mantua. It was then that he attracted the favorable notice of Cardinal Richelieu, who later in the 1630's induced Mazarin to enter the French diplomatic service. After Father Joseph's death in 1638, Mazarin came increasingly to serve as Richelieu's diplomatic troubleshooter, and by the time of Richelieu's death in late 1642 it had become apparent to the court that he had selected Mazarin to succeed to his mantle as principal minister.¹¹

Mazarin, as his portraits reveal, was a small, pudgily handsome man, with large eyes, delicate hands, and a graceful carriage. His manner, as one contemporary observed, was "charmant, . . . agréable, gracieux, agile, vif, aimable, poli. . . ." ¹² Beneath this patina of politesse lay a mixture of cynicism, detachment, and self-knowledge that made Mazarin every bit as formidable a minister as

ever was Richelieu. For example, during the worst days of the French civil war—the Fronde—at a time when he was publicly reviled, his personal life satirized, and he himself driven into exile, Mazarin began collecting the savage lampoons of his person and policies known as the *Mazarinades*; he had them bound, read aloud for his own amusement, and later he sold some of the sets for considerable profit. Thus in one gesture he displayed a cynicism, detachment, and, further, a desire for financial gain that typifies his whole life.

Mazarin served the crown with as great a loyalty and devotion as had Richelieu. Indeed, so marked were Mazarin's gallantries to the regent Anne of Austria that rumor, then and now, has linked Mazarin and Anne in secret marriage. There is no proof to support this allegation; we can only note that their relationship was cordial beyond pleasantry and tender beyond friendship. The root of such friendship and devotion is not hard to find. They were both foreigners caught in an alien land, surrounded by a hostile nobility. Together they formed an alliance of necessity anchored in mutual esteem and affection.

Anne of Austria, who became queen regent at the time of Louis XIII's death in 1643, was a phlegmatic, plump, slightly dowdy dowager, who devoted much of her time to prayer and good works. Her political prowess should, however, not be underestimated. She was tenacious in the struggle to preserve her infant son's royal prerogatives and the image of his *gloire*. In her quest for political stability she leaned heavily on the advice of her astute cardinal-minister. Mazarin, in his turn, was able to reinforce the queen mother's devotion to her son and to relieve her of the tedium of routine decision-making. But it would be an error to say that the government of the regency was run solely by the cardinal; it was a government conducted in tandem, with Mazarin supplying the creative energy and Anne the prestige of office and certainty of purpose. It was an alliance surprisingly like that which had existed between Richelieu and Louis XIII.¹³

MAZARIN AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As principal minister, Mazarin's greatest and most lasting accomplishment lay in the field of foreign affairs. One of the most important diplomatists of his age, he combined the statesmanlike qualities of

his predecessor with an inimitable shrewdness of his own. Fortune favored Mazarin's diplomatic odyssey in the early 1640's. Europe was wearied of war. Spain, plagued by domestic upheavals in Andalusia, Catalonia, and Portugal, had suffered defeat at the hands of the French at the battle of Rocroi in 1643 and seemed exhausted by her military intervention in the Thirty Years' War. England too was convulsed by civil war, one of the worst in her history. The Emperor Ferdinand III, uncertain of the Northern War, feared yet another Swedish invasion of the Germanies, as did many of the princes of the Empire. At the same time, in Stockholm, young Queen Christina begged her councilors to heed the populace's cries for peace. It was at this moment that Mazarin seized the opportunity to appoint a distinguished peace embassy, headed by the king's cousin, the Duc de Longueville, assisted by the astute diplomats Abel Servien and the Comte d'Avaux. It took some years and many sessions meeting at the German cities of Münster and Osnabrück for the French embassy and their allies, the Swedes, to negotiate a definitive peace settlement. The French cause was forwarded, however, by the spectacular French victories on the battlefields of Gravelines (1644), Mardyck (1645), Nordlingen (1645), and Lens (1648).¹⁴

Mazarin's policies differed from Richelieu's, particularly as they concerned the questions of the Spanish Low Countries and Alsace. In writing to the French plenipotentiaries at the congress of Münster, Mazarin spoke of "le cœur de la France," saying that this heartland could be protected only when the borders of France had been extended to Holland and the Rhine (*côte de l'Allemagne*) and included the provinces of Lorraine and Alsace. Thus, like Richelieu, Mazarin posited the existence of a northern heartland—the *cœur*—and understood the importance of guarding that heartland. But whereas Richelieu had advocated the cantoning of the Spanish Netherlands and the establishment of steppingstones to the Rhine, Mazarin sought outright annexation of the "Pays-Bas" and the *côte de l'Allemagne*, that is, Alsace. The French threat was not lost on the Dutch statesmen, who in January, 1648, made their separate peace with the Spanish in the first Treaty of Münster.¹⁵ Shortly thereafter, Spain withdrew from the congress, refusing to sign a peace settlement with France. Cheated of annexations in the Spanish Netherlands, Mazarin turned his full attention to completing an agreement

with the emperor, which was signed on October 24, 1648, in the second Treaty of Münster. By Franco-Imperial accord France gained legal title to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, leaving it to the lawyers to determine the exact boundaries of those three dioceses. As to Alsace, Article LXXIV stated:

The Emperor, as well as in his own behalf as the behalf of the whole Most Serene House of Austria, as also of the Empire, resigns all Rights, Properties, Domains, Possessions, and Jurisdictions which have hitherto belonged either to him, or the Empire, and the family of Austria, on the City of Brisac, the Landgraveship of Upper and Lower Alsatia, Sungtau, and the Provincial Lordship of Ten Imperial Cities. . . .¹⁶

Thus in one article the emperor ceded outright the Sundgau, a compact area in upper Alsace held by the house of Hapsburg as a hereditary possession; he countenanced the right of garrison to the city of Breisach; he relinquished to France his claims (rights) to the ten imperial cities (the Decapole) and recognized French title to the landgraviate of Upper and Lower Alsace.

Mazarin's legacy to the age of Louis XIV, as seen in the Treaty of Münster, was marred by ambiguities and unfulfilled pledges. First of all, French claims to the Burgundian and Lotharingian lands were unfulfilled. Article IV of the second Treaty of Münster stated "that the Circle of Burgundy shall be and continue a member of the Empire. . . ." ¹⁷ But the authors of this clause presumed that the war between France and Spain would be terminated in 1648 rather than in 1659. The question of the border between France and the Spanish Low Countries was thus left undetermined, pending the final peace settlement with Spain at the Pyrenees eleven years later. Second, the actual disposition of the Spanish Low Countries themselves was left open to arbitration. Mazarin had suggested that France to assure the safety of her capital might have to extend her boundaries to the Dutch border. But his assertion of French sovereignty over the Southern Netherlands was not acceptable to the Dutch. All told, four possible solutions to the problem of the Southern or Spanish Low Countries were debated during Louis XIV's reign. First, there was the idea of cantoning or partitioning the Southern Netherlands as proposed by Richelieu and the Dutch as early as 1635; second, Mazarin's plan for French annexation; third, the suggestion that the

government of the Spanish Netherlands be placed in the hands of a so-called neutral party; fourth, that the Burgundian lands located in the area of the Low Countries be ceded to the emperor. In 1648 the final solution had yet to be worked out, and it was a full sixty-five years before a viable compromise emerged.

A third problem posed at Münster concerned the disposition of Alsatian lands; on this question Mazarin's diplomacy achieved a dubious victory. The emperor, it is true, resigned his rights in that province to France, but he bequeathed to the French a heritage of ambiguity. Did the emperor have the legal authority to give away what he did? What were the rights of "immediacy," and what was meant by the term "full sovereignty"? Some historians have criticized Mazarin and his agents for not clearing up these ambiguities; others, the historian Paul Vaucher among them, have countered by saying that "the idea which seems to have guided Mazarin, and the concept that later guided France, was that the French government became the guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia [i.e., Münster and Osna-brück] . . ."; from the position of arbiter France could then safeguard her own interests in the Rhine valley.¹⁸

THE FRONDES

Mazarin faced even graver difficulties in his domestic policies than he did in his foreign. Louis XIV's reign opened with great expectations on the part of nobleman and commoner alike. It was hoped that an era of good times had begun, and when the queen regent appeared with her infant son before the Parlement of Paris on May 18, 1643, four days after the death of Louis XIII, the great magistrates and princes hastily set aside Louis XIII's will, hoping by the revision of the act of regency to solicit royal grace and favor. But both the magistrates and the nobles were to be sorely disappointed. Anne was not a woman to be frightened or cajoled. Far from jettisoning the policies of the late Cardinal Richelieu, she continued and reinforced them by retaining Jules Mazarin, Richelieu's "shade," as her principal minister and personal confidant. *Les grands*, finding themselves thus snubbed, plotted Mazarin's overthrow in the so-called *cabale des importants* (1643); but like so many misadventures of the former reign, this one, too, was wrecked on the shoals of jealousies

and mistrust. Informed by his spies of their activities, Mazarin exiled the leaders of the cabal to their estates, leaving his position supreme in the council.¹⁹ The defeat of the *cabale* was made an even greater victory because Mazarin had not resorted to bloodshed, as Richelieu had often been forced to do on similar occasions.

The critical problems in the years 1644 to 1648 were, however, not political but economic. The receipts of the state were encumbered for two or three years in advance of the actual collection of taxes. In order to ease financial strain on the treasury, Mazarin called in an expert, Particelli d'Emery, as superintendent of finances. To increase state revenue, Particelli proposed two new taxes, the *toise* and the *aisés*, the first being a tax on real estate and the second an income tax that fell heavily on the rich.²⁰ The Parlement of Paris, as it would do again in the period of the Fronde and in the eighteenth century, adopted the tactics of delay. After a *lit de justice*, held on Louis XIV's seventh birthday, September 5, 1645, the parlement finally agreed to a compromise measure in which a tax on corporations was substituted for heavier real estate and income taxes. Yet even with this concession, discontent grew. Murmurs of protest were heard in the law courts and in the streets of Paris. Voices called for Mazarin's dismissal.

The hostility shown the government by the populace and the parlements was aggravated by a general European crisis in which the English revolution, in particular, served as the model for the French jurists, who hoped, like their brethren in Parliament at Westminster, to become arbiters of state policy, the balance wheel between the great lords and the monarchy. In the spring of 1648 the Parlement of Paris met in the Chambre de Saint-Louis, where they drew up the Twenty-Seven Articles calling for, among other things, the suppression of the office of intendant, the establishment of the right of habeas corpus, and recognition of the right of consent in matters of taxation (*consentement à l'impôt*). So outspoken became the opposition to the government that earlier in the year Omer Talon, one of the chief judges of the parlement, had cried out, "It is important to Your Majesty that we become free men, not slaves."²¹ The ermine glove had been cast at Mazarin's feet, but he hesitated before accepting the challenge.

Finally, in August of 1648, the ministry, wearied by the continual harassment from the law courts and heartened by French military

victories over the Spanish, openly attacked parliamentary pretensions to power by ordering the arrest of several of their leaders. From that month until the summer of 1653 there was no peace in France. A civil war ensued, which historians have called the Fronde—or more properly, the Frondes—the name coming from a slingshot used by street urchins, symbolizing the resistance of the Parisian populace to the so-called tyranny of the foreigners, Mazarin and Anne of Austria. The Frondes may conveniently be divided into three uprisings: that period beginning in August, 1648, and lasting until March, 1649, known as the Parliamentary or Old Fronde; the period following it and extending to February, 1651, in which the interests of the nobility of the robe and sword were joined, and known as the Princely or New Fronde; and the last period, from February, 1651, to 1653, marking the years of desultory fighting and known as the Condéan Fronde, named after its principal leader, the Prince de Condé.²²

The chief events of the period are quickly told. After the arrest of the men of the parlement, Paris, as it has so many times before and since, threw up barricades and challenged the power of the central government. Sporadic fighting continued until Anne of Austria gave way to pressure from the streets and granted a number of the demands enumerated in the Twenty-Seven Articles. Anne, however, was playing for time; indeed, she never forgave the parliamentarians for the peremptory tone of their petitions; and in January, 1649, she, Mazarin, and the young king rode out of Paris secretly and sought shelter in the palace of St. Germain-en-Laye. There followed a siege of Paris by royal troops, led by the Prince de Condé, who had pledged his support to the queen mother. In late March, 1649, the parliamentary forces in their turn bowed to a *force majeure* and signed a treaty at Rueil, which assured an amnesty to them and to their followers. An uneasy truce followed the treaty of Rueil, made more uneasy by continued parliamentary opposition to the crown, which was encouraged by the coadjutor of the archdiocese of Paris, Paul Gondi, and by groups of dissident bourgeois. As the number of *Mazarinades*, those violent pamphlet attacks on the cardinal, increased, so did the restiveness of the Parisians. At court, Louis II de Bourbon, prince de Condé, the victor of Rocroi and Lens, strutted about the Louvre, a veritable “peacock of pride.” Although his advice was solicited by the queen regent and his vanity fed by Mazarin, Condé’s ambitions seemed unbounded. When these ambitions were frustrated, he plotted

with other princes of the blood and great nobles and with the Paris Parlement to overthrow Mazarin. Richelieu's worst fears had come to pass: an alliance had been formed between the princes of the blood, the great nobles, and the robe.

Anne of Austria, waving aside Mazarin's pleas for caution, had, in what was tantamount to a coup d'état, the princes of Condé, Conti, and Longueville arrested and imprisoned, first at Vincennes and then at Le Havre. She justified her move by saying that "the royal authority will be entirely overthrown by the attacks of these Princes. . . ." ²³ Their arrests touched off frenzied reactions at court and in Paris. Many nobles left Paris for their estates, among them the great general Turenne. An added threat came from external force as the Spanish troops launched an attack on the northern frontiers. Fearing they would once again be trapped in the cul-de-sac of the Louvre, the court began its wanderings across France. "We have," as Mme de Motteville testified, "been in a wretched condition." ²⁴ The household budget was exhausted, the crown jewels were pawned, and many of the great officials had been left unpaid. As the Duke of York, then in France, reported: "Nothing was so rare as money. The French Court was in very great straits, . . . the Crown was reduced to a most deplorable condition." ²⁵

In early 1651 the insistent demands of the parlements and *les grands* forced Anne to release the princes. The Parisians, delirious with the thought of their heroes' return, heaped their scorn on Mazarin, singing, among other ditties, the one beginning:

Voicy une Harpie, habile en Cardinal!

Qu'on dépend le copie pour prendre l'original.²⁶

"Here is a Harpy, dressed as a cardinal!

We'll have to do with the copy until we can get the original."

Mazarin, aware of the danger to himself and to the royal family if he remained, fled France for the safety of a castle near Cologne, from where he collected funds and troops, corresponded with the foreign princes, and advised the queen as to what course of action she should pursue. Condé, self-styled savior of the monarchy, once again strutted about the court as if he were already named regent. His insatiable appetite for offices and for the advancement of his creatures led him to renewed conflict with Anne, who, as the duke of York noted at

the time, "was difficult to frighten and whose courage was dauntless. . . ." ²⁷ The pattern of the previous year was re-enacted: Condé again broke with the queen regent, leading his followers into open revolt and invasion of the southern provinces. Repeatedly in the fall of 1651, Anne begged Mazarin to return to court, which, after some hesitation, he did in January, 1652, bringing with him some 7,000 troops. At the same time Turenne cast his lot with the royal family. A campaign of march and countermarch developed—a great chess game between the two great commanders of the day, Turenne and Condé, culminating in a brief encounter in early July, 1652, at the gates of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. Condé was saved from defeat by the artillery barrage from the Bastille, whose guns were fired by order of La Grande Mademoiselle, the king's cousin. But as Condé's right hand grasped at victory, the left hand threw it away. The prince's arrogance alienated the Parisians, who in October, 1652, were only too happy to welcome Their Majesties to the capital. Wisely, Mazarin refrained from returning to Paris until February of 1653. With the cardinal's triumphal entry into the city, the Parliamentary and Princely Frondes may be said to have come to an end. ²⁸

Yet, for the next six years intermittent fighting continued along the northern and northeastern borders. Condé, fleeing to the Spanish Netherlands, carried on his private Fronde under Spanish colors, and once again the dual of titans ensued, with Turenne leading a French army against Condé's Spanish forces. While battles on the borders continued, Mazarin strove to establish order within France. Working with his councilors, the "faithful"—Michel Le Tellier, Nicolas Fouquet, Abel Servien, and Hugues de Lionne—Mazarin brought a semblance of order in the realm of finance and of direction in the reorganization of the army. In the field of diplomacy Hugues de Lionne, an ambassador-on-mission first in Spain and then in Italy and the Germanies, helped frame the League of the Rhine, signed in August, 1658, with the archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, by which a "bonne amitié" was established between those princes and the French crown. France was a guarantor of the *libertés germaniques* against aggressors, be they Spanish or Imperial. ²⁹ The seed planted at the congress of Münster had begun to take root.

Another of Mazarin's diplomatic coups was the alliance concluded in March, 1657, with England, which brought 6,000 English troops

to the Continent in support of Turenne's campaign against the Spanish in the Low Countries. Oliver Cromwell, England's protector, demanded as a *quid pro quo* the strategically important town of Dunkirk, which was handed over to the English commander following the great Anglo-French victory at the Battle of the Dunes in June, 1658.³⁰

As these events unfolded, and as Spain made faint noises concerning a peace parley, Mazarin turned his attention increasingly to a problem that was to become one of the leitmotifs of Louis XIV's reign: that of the Spanish succession. Castilian law, unlike French, did not prohibit a woman from inheriting the throne in her right. Thus the marriage of Philip IV's daughters became a matter of anxious discussion in the courts of Europe. Louis XIV's mother, Anne, after the disturbances of the Fronde had passed, desired nothing more in this life than to see her son wedded to a Spanish infanta, and she thought it fitting that Louis should marry the eldest daughter, Maria Theresa. Louis, in 1657 a young man of nineteen, had already formed a romantic attachment with Mazarin's niece, Marie Mancini; but *raison d'état* and motherly admonitions overruled the youthful *affaire de cœur*. In 1658 Philip IV consented to the marriage of his daughter, and peace negotiations began in Paris early the next year.³¹

Mazarin's last and perhaps greatest contribution to the stability of the *grand siècle* was the negotiation of the Peace of the Pyrenees. *Pourparlers* initiated in January, 1659, lasted into the fall of that year, when Mazarin and the Spanish prime minister Luis de Haro met in person at the foot of the Pyrenees. The treaty was signed on November 7, 1659, and included five main provisions: (1) A settlement of the Prince de Condé's affairs, which included his reinstatement at court and the return of his estates. Such acts of reconciliation and oblivion, medieval remnants, were still an important aspect of the "character" of seventeenth-century kingship. In a more modern vein, the negotiators agreed that (2) Artois, with Arras, was deemed forfeit to France, as were the fortresses along the Belgian border and Luxembourg border of Gravelines, Quesnoy, Landrecies and Thionville. (3) Roussillon and Cerdagne, in "the Pyrenean mountains which anciently had divided the *Gauls* from *Spain*, should also make henceforth the Division of the said Kingdom." (4) The duke of the "Marches of Lorraine" agreed in return for his duchy not to

bear arms against France and to cede a half-dozen fortified towns on the French border, including Stenay, Dunn, and Clermont-en-Argonne. The French obtained the right of passage for their troops. Lastly, (5) Philip agreed to the marriage of Maria Theresa to Louis XIV. The famous marriage clause, the *moyennant*, was drawn up by Lionne, whose talents as a diplomatist were never better displayed. The *moyennant* required that a dowry of 500,000 *écus* must be paid to France within eighteen months in order for Maria Theresa's renunciation of the Spanish throne to be valid. Since neither Lionne nor Mazarin anticipated a miracle by which the Spanish treasury would become filled, it appeared that Lionne had goaded Philip IV's ministers into granting France a lien on the Spanish inheritance.³²

The Peace of the Pyrenees was Mazarin's final will and testament to the young king. It was at once a coda of the Treaty of Münster and an overture to the diplomacy of the next generation. By this peace settlement France extended its borders to the Pyrenees, gained its buffer marshland of the *côte d'Espagne*, and assured itself a new line of fortresses along the Flanders border—the future *barrière de fer* of Vauban, in which Gravelines, Arras, Quesnoy, Landrecies, and Thionville played an important strategic role. Lastly, Lorraine was dismembered and dissected. The diplomatic specters that Richelieu and Mazarin had evoked were those with which Louis XIV wrestled for the rest of his life.

LOUIS

As the 1650's drew to a close, the court and country looked increasingly to the young king, Louis XIV, for signs of leadership. What manner of man was this fourteenth Louis? Would he resemble his timid, socially inept father, Louis XIII? Would he take after his gregarious, hearty grandfather, Henri IV? Or would he indeed manifest the obstinacy of his great-grandfather, Philip II of Spain? These are questions posed not only by the generation of the 1650's but by that of the 1970's.

It is a commonplace to assert that the Frondes provided the young Louis with his best lessons in practical education. We should ask, rather, what character traits in the young king were nurtured by the Frondes, and how circumstances molded them? The young prince

had, contrary to legends current in his day, received exceptional training for his kingly role. His mother had inculcated in him a sense of majesty of office, had deepened his feeling of divine mission.³³ Mazarin had reinforced her words by insisting that he take lessons in the political responsibilities of being king. Louis, under the cardinal's guidance, attended council meetings, heard the reading of important dispatches, and actually oversaw the writing of some diplomatic instructions. Both the regent and minister also encouraged the young king in cultural pursuits. Anne fostered an appreciation of music, religious and secular; and Mazarin introduced Louis to Italian comedy, to the opera, and to the ballet. The regent imparted to him a speaking knowledge of the Spanish language; Mazarin, of the Italian. From Louis's tutor, Hardouin de Péréfixe, Louis acquired a taste for history, particularly for accounts of his grandfather, Henri IV, who epitomized in Louis's mind the man of war, the builder of monuments—a true king, the opposite of a *roi fainéant*. But above all, his mother, his principal minister, and his tutor allowed him freedom to play with his friends and his brother, Philippe, and time to indulge his childish fantasies. Play-acting may have allowed the young king to escape some of the tendencies toward morbid introspection that were so pronounced in the character of Louis XIII.³⁴


Louis, fortunately for France of the 1650's, survived his childhood diseases, including smallpox, and grew into a serious, self-possessed youth who, even at an early age, "was prudent enough to say nothing for fear of not speaking well."³⁵ As he grew older, observers noted that Louis was by nature a rather passive individual, an excellent listener, a person who weighed experience and kept his own counsel. This passivity and secretiveness seem to have been born in part of fear of his father and mother. "His Royal Highness, the little Dauphin was barely three years old," Mme de Motteville noted, "when he appeared to be a source of vexation and resentment to the King [Louis XIII] who complained bitterly to the Queen . . . accusing her of encouraging his son to hate him. . . ." ³⁶ In later life Louis seldom spoke of his father; instead, he showed a marked preference for the memory of his grandfather Henri IV. But his conduct was governed not only by fear of his father but by resistance to the dictates of a possessive mother. Anne lavished on her sons the love that had for years found no outlet. Although Louis seems to have fought

her dominance with greater tenacity and temerity than did his brother Philippe, yet his opposition to his mother never led to an open break. In fact, they seldom openly disagreed; and when they did, it was a painful experience for them both. As a result, Louis from an early age avoided—indeed, abhorred—family quarrels and kept rigid control over his emotions. The advent of the Frondes heightened in the young king the sense of isolation and dramatized the need for secrecy. An aura of cloak and dagger pervaded the palace. Surrounded as he was by hostile and overbearing nobles, Louis witnessed frequent confrontations between his close advisers and haughty courtiers. These quarrels implicated members of his own family, his overbearing cousin Condé, his supercilious and malevolent uncle Gaston d'Orléans. Even in council Louis and his chief minister Mazarin were spied upon by agents of the Fronde. These confrontations and betrayals of confidence served as practical lessons in statecraft. From Mazarin Louis learned the stratagems of defense: silence and secretiveness, the art of watchful waiting. It was Mazarin who in 1650 cajoled the insufferable Condé; it was Mazarin who, disregarding the snide remarks of the *Mazarinades*, had bargained with the "men of law" in 1652; it was Mazarin who had delayed his return to Paris until the right moment in 1653; it was Mazarin who gave way to Anne's insistence on a Spanish alliance in 1658. "Time and I shall conquer," wrote the cardinal. Louis's variation of this theme was "Je verrai"—"I shall see."³⁷


From this constellation of basic character traits, spawned in the nursery of his father's hate and of his mother's love, nurtured by the troubled times and reinforced by the wisdom of his principal minister,³⁸ there developed a cluster of related behavior patterns and responses that dominated Louis XIV's life. They are so closely tied, so inextricably bound together, that it is hard to separate them. They include Louis's sense of politesse, of fastidiousness, and of order; his intense dislike of disorder and of dissent; his passion for deliberation in council; his fear of betrayal; his devotion to his office; his search for *la gloire*, that is, the aggrandizement of the state and of his reputation; his absorption in the mechanics of military campaigns, in the movement and deployment of armies.

This innate sense of tidiness and order was not only characteristic of the man but of the age. The "Formal French,"³⁹ W. L. Wiley


Conseil D'Etat.



Conseil des Finances.



Conseil des Depesches



Conseil Prive ou des Parties




Fig. 2.—The councils of Louis XIV's government. Reproduced from H. A. Chatain, *Atlas historique* (Amsterdam, 1739), courtesy of The Folger Shakespeare Library.

calls them. The mechanisms of order were omnipresent: the ritual *levée*, or arising of the king in the morning; his *couché*, or retirement in the evening; the ceremonies attendant on the *lit de justice*, when the king in full regalia addressed the great judges of his Parlement of Paris, his dukes and peers, the great officers of the state; the formal *entrée* of an ambassador into a city or a procession of officials to the sovereign court or to the estates. Adumbration of such events filled hundreds of pages in the chronicles of the day. Even in death the "formal French" could not escape the *pompes funèbres* of the state funeral. This emphasis on order and ceremony heightened in Louis a craving for decorum and hastened the ritualization of kingship. In this guise Louis was a supreme classicist; and when Bossuet later spoke of the king's greatness, it was to praise the "discipline in his armies" and the "order in his household." Repeatedly, Racine's plays celebrate the triumph of moral and political order over the forces and the agents of violence and rebellion. Versailles itself was a monument to order and ritual in life; and as Professor Whitman has pointed out, the very symbolism of the Latona Fountain cried out against the disorders of the Fronde.

This man of order, as one can easily imagine, disliked dissent and dissenters, whether they were ultramontanes or Jesuits, Huguenots or Quietists, aristocrats or republicans. To Louis they were all tarred with the brush of treason, and *Frondeurs* were not to be abided. It was the memory of the men of the Fronde that haunted his youthful dreams, they who had caused him and his family to flee from one town to another, who had frightened his mother, exiled his principal minister, emptied his treasury and questioned his authority. Louis never forgave them, but with characteristic caution he dissembled: with honeyed words he greeted his cousin Condé on his return from Spain, and with careful attention he listened to Turenne's advice; but both men were kept under surveillance by spies from the war office or by the army intendants. Louis's use of the so-called surveillance system curtailed the seditious activity of his over-mighty subjects, causing noble dissent to go far underground.

A corollary to Louis's passion for secrecy and caution was his reliance on the judgment of a few close advisers whose trustworthiness was well recognized. Mazarin had termed these men "the faithful" because of their devotion to the king's cause during the terrible

years of 1650–53. Louis, like Mazarin, entrusted his government to these creatures of the crown. He protected them, suffered their incompetence, as in the case of Louvois's son Barbezieux, or their mediocrity, as in the cases of Michel Chamillart and Claude Le Peletier. What he could not forgive was a hint of disloyalty, and Louis kept up his guard even with his trusted servants. In council he matched them one against another, listened to their opinions, their arguments, reserving final judgment for himself. As one minister later complained, nineteen times out of twenty the king agreed with his ministers, but on the twentieth time he might override their opinion.

Caution and secretiveness, however, often led Louis into the serious fault of procrastination. It is true that some problems can lessen or disappear entirely with the passage of time. But at critical moments decisions, good or bad, have to be made. It was at these critical junctures that Louis sometimes faltered: we find him hesitant in 1672 to accept Dutch offers of peace; hesitant in 1688 to move against William III; hesitant in 1700 to accept Carlos II's will, or in 1709–10 to negotiate a peace settlement.

Yet despite all his doubts and hesitations Louis found the kingly craft to his taste: "Le métier de Roi est grand, noble, délicieux."⁴⁰ For Louis the chief ingredient of the art of kingship seems to have been a dogged devotion to the task of "being king," an absorption in the *métier du roi*. After fifty-five years of active personal rule, Louis worked until the day of his death, hedged to the last by formalism and detachment.

By 1661, then, we may say that Louis XIV had become a "man of parts"; and it was at that moment that Mazarin chose, most appropriately, to exit from the political stage. "En France," La Rochefoucauld reflected, "tout arrive."⁴¹

THE QUEST FOR STABILITY: IN POLITICS, IN THE FINE AND
LITERARY ARTS AND SCIENCES, IN THE ART OF WAR

Leisurely in all matters, Mazarin took a month to die. On February 9, 1661, he became too ill to carry on state business and retired to the château of Vincennes, where he died of cancer on March 9. The king, upon hearing the news, was reported to have said to his friend Grammont, "We have lost, you and I, a good friend." Yet for Louis

the cardinal's death was at once a sorrow and a release. As Louis himself described the scene, he was so overwhelmed by emotion that he retired to a small chamber next to the cardinal's bedroom, where he remained in seclusion for several hours. Following his first depression, he felt an exhilaration, or, as he later expressed it, a delicious sense of freedom. When he emerged from his seclusion, he at once embarked on a course of action that he appears to have been contemplating for some time. He announced to his startled courtiers that henceforth they could address their petitions to him, that he would serve as his own first minister.⁴² Brave words. But there were many obstacles yet to overcome, the major one being Nicolas Fouquet, the superintendent of finances, who expected to be named principal minister after Mazarin died.

Fouquet was a scion of an important robe family, a brilliant, ambitious politician, and at the same time a man of incomparable taste in the arts, a modern Maecenas, in whose service were employed some of the greatest artists of the age: Le Nôtre, Le Vau, Le Brun, and Molière. As superintendent of the king's finances, he had proved himself to be a supple financier and a shrewd state banker. His position seemed unassailable.⁴³ Louis, however, feared him both as a dishonest man of affairs and as a potential focus for political discontent, a symbol for future *Frondeurs*. Why, then, did he retain him in office for six months before arresting him? An explanation was later offered by Louis to his son: "Some may find it strange that I should have him serve me, when it is known that at that time his peculations were known to me . . . but I was convinced that he possessed some talents, and had a great knowledge of domestic affairs [and that] . . . he might render me essential service."⁴⁴ Yet ultimately, Louis's fear of the *esprit frondeur* outweighed his respect for Fouquet's talents. In the months between March and September, 1661, Louis plotted Fouquet's disgrace. As the king listened to reports of the financial state of the kingdom read to him by Colbert from the *registre des recettes*, it became apparent to both the king and his informant that Fouquet was not only withholding information about finances but might be plotting against the king himself. Colbert no doubt exaggerated the dangers, but the king was more than willing to listen. Colbert thus became Louis's instrument of liberation from what the king considered to be the threat of an over-mighty minister.

As Mazarin himself had on his deathbed reportedly said to Louis: "I am acquitting myself of some of that debt [I owe] to your majesty in giving you Colbert."

On September 5, 1661, Fouquet was arrested and at once arraigned before a *chambre de justice*. This kind of *coup de théâtre*, beloved of Louis, was a splendid birthday gift to the king, who could now indeed call himself first minister.

In the following months and years Louis carefully reorganized the central government, emulating the pattern already suggested by Richelieu's and Mazarin's *conseil étroit*. As early as March, 1661, Louis limited active participation in his council to three men: Michel Le Tellier, Hugues de Lionne, Fouquet, and, after September, 1661, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. These men were technically the king's ministers, and through the long reign only those men who regularly participated *en conseil* were considered of that rank. This first ministry was given the name of the "Triade," the "Image de la céleste Trinité." From time to time other members of the government were called for consultation: the chancellor, the secretary of state for the king's households, the members of the council of conscience, and in times of grave emergency, the marshals of France; but for *affaires ordinaires*, as Condé called them, only the ministers spoke. In the 1670's the membership of the *conseil des trois* was expanded to four, and observers, as they had in the 1640's, referred to the king's council as the *conseil d'en haut*, or the high council. After 1690 the number of ministers increased to five, and that number remained constant until 1714, when it returned to three.⁴⁵

Louis selected his ministers not because of their hereditary office at court, nor their rank in the aristocracy, nor their position in the army or navy, nor their eminence in the legal system; his two criteria for selection were that his advisers be dedicated to his service and that they be useful. He found these qualities most often in men of the civil service, who were not the "vile bourgeois" that Saint-Simon speaks of but members of the *noblesse de la plume*, the administrative nobility, experts in their field who had usually long served the king in one of his larger councils or in the royal provincial administration. If these men proved not to have the probity, suppleness, and self-effacing qualities that Louis demanded, they were either relieved of most of their duties or excluded from the council altogether. Such

was the case in the 1660's of the older and younger Brienne, whose charge of secretary of state for foreign affairs was purchased by Lionne; of Séguier, who was considered to be too infirm; of Pomponne, too lethargic and too closely allied to the Jansenists; of Barbezieux, who led a dissolute life; of Le Peletier and Chamillart, for whom the task of being controller-general of finances became too onerous.

Louis called only seventeen ministers to his *conseil d'en haut* in his fifty-five years of personal reign: they included a great noble, the Duc de Beauvillier (who served from 1691 to 1712), and two marshals of France, the Villerois, who were nominally ministers because of their close personal relation to the king but who took little part in the actual government of the state. The remainder were *noblesse de la plume*, drawn in large part from three families: the Colberts, the Le Telliers, and the Phélypeaux. All told there were five Colbert ministers: Jean-Baptiste, known as the Great Colbert (who served from September, 1661, to September, 1683); his brother Croissy (November, 1679, to July, 1696); the former's son Seignelay (October, 1689, to November, 1690); Croissy's son Torcy (January, 1699, to September, 1715); and the Great Colbert's nephew Nicolas Desmaretz (1709 to 1715). There were three Le Telliers: Michel (who served from March, 1661, to October 30, 1685); Louvois (January, 1672, to July, 1691); and a cousin, Le Peletier (September, 1683, to September, 1697). One minister was a member of the Phélypeaux family: Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain (November, 1690, to July, 1714); his son Jérôme served as secretary of state from 1699 to 1715, but not as a minister. Born outside the circle of the three families were two foreign ministers, Hugues de Lionne (March, 1661, to September, 1671), and Simon Arnauld de Pomponne (1671-79 and 1691-99), and two war ministers, Michel Chamillart (November, 1700, to June, 1709) and Daniel-François Voysin (June, 1709, to 1715), and a superintendent of finances, Nicolas Fouquet (March-June, 1661). There were also five important secretaries of state: Barbezieux, Louvois's son (1691-1701); and four Phélypeaux: Jérôme de Pontchartrain at the marine (1699 to 1715), and the two La Vrillières and Châteauneuf as secretaries in charge of the royal household and of religious affairs. Two men closely associated with the council as advisers were the Duc de Chevreuse and the Duc d'Harcourt,

neither of whom seems to have been appointed as minister *en titre*. Louis allowed the office of secretary of state to be purchased and held *en survivance* for a relative, but he never permitted venality of office to infect the council. Selection was on merit alone. Regarding conciliar matters, Louis was an iconoclast. In 1661, he excluded not only the chancellor and marshals of France but his mother, brother, princes of the blood, and, interestingly, all churchmen. In the case of the "Children of France" (the heirs apparent and presumptive), he suffered their presence, but seldom allowed them an active part in debates. Bitter complaints about the selection of ministers came from the nobility. As one courtier wrote: "The Great men of the Court, among others, M. de Turenne, were strongly dissatisfied and asked the king if he were going to give to three bourgeois the principal place in the government of the State."⁴⁶ But Turenne's complaint made little impression on Louis. His trust was placed in "the faithful" who had served Mazarin so well and who he hoped would serve him with equal devotion. It is not that Louis altogether excluded "others"—*les autres*—from his council. When he needed the advice of experts in war or diplomacy—particularly of men like Turenne, or later, Chamlay, Tourville, or Harcourt—he would summon them to sit with his ministers. Yet, for *affaires ordinaires* Saint-Simon was essentially correct when he later called the ministers the "Five Kings of France."

Of all the subjects that the ministers discussed, foreign affairs held the most prominent place on the agenda. Usually, the secretary of state for foreign affairs sat immediately to the left of the king and read excerpts from letters sent to him from French ambassadors and foreign ministers across Europe. Policy decisions were then debated, and the foreign secretary made notes of the replies that were to be made to the ambassadors; later, he submitted a draft of the important letters to the king (routine correspondence the secretary answered). Other major topics most often discussed in council were religious policies, reforms of the law, appointments to high office, and, during wartime, military strategy. Conciliar decisions were codified in a profusion of new ordinances, edicts, regulations of existing ordinances; of edicts in the form of declarations, commands to the secretaries of state, orders to the governors of provinces; of *lettres de cachet*, usually to the intendants or to a minister; *arrêts du conseil*, that is,

a type of executive order; and letters of commission to armed forces and memoirs to aid the king's executive officers. The actual letters, instructions, *arrêts*, and edicts were not drafted in council but in the bureaus of the individual ministries or by the staff secretaries attached to the large *conseil d'état privé ou des parties*. To expedite the flow of orders to the *conseil d'état* and to the ministries, the high council met frequently, often as many as five or six times a week.⁴⁷ Of the scanty records we have of these council meetings those of *Mémoriaux de Conseil de 1661*,⁴⁸ edited in three volumes by Jean de Boislisle, are perhaps the most important. From notes of the meetings later transcribed by Boislisle we know the council met 119 days out of 179 from March to September, 1661, or on the average of twenty times a month or five times a week. The largest number of consecutive meetings was from May 2 to May 13. The council did not meet at all between August 21 and September 2 (immediately before Fouquet's arrest). At these council sessions the king was usually assisted by one of his secretaries *de la plume*, a trusted official of his cabinet who could forge his signature and who kept notes for the king's use. The most famous of these secretaries who held the prerogative *de la main* was Toussaint Rose, seigneur de Coye (1615-1701).

After the mid-1660's Louis tended to relegate routine financial and administrative matters to meetings of the council of finances and to the council of dispatches. In the latter council letters from the intendants in the provinces were discussed by the four secretaries of state, two or three ministers, and the chancellor. The council of dispatches declined in importance, however, during the latter half of the reign. By 1690 it met but twice a month and by 1714 but twice a year. As the importance of the council of dispatches waned—and with it the influence of the council of finances—the power of the individual secretaries of state and of their bureaus increased. By 1712, for instance, the marine boasted ten bureaus, the war department, eight, and foreign affairs, eleven. These ministries contained their own archives, training schools, and hosts of agents, avowed and secret. Moreover, the marine and war departments controlled dozens of intendants who served with the armies, in the chief ports, and in the colonies. The foreign office was responsible for the direction of over forty chiefs of missions abroad. In 1715 France boasted the

largest diplomatic corps in Europe, with fifteen ambassadors, fifteen envoys, and consuls in Cairo, Smyrna, Seide, and other places in the Levant. Thus in his own lifetime Louis XIV was witness to, and a moving force in, the bureaucratization of the French government. Indeed, one of his chief claims to prominence as a practitioner of the kingly craft was his willing espousal of the role of *roi-bureaucrate*.

The king's ministers divided among themselves the responsibility of corresponding with royal officials in the provinces and the municipalities. Their task was greatly facilitated by the presence in many of the provincial capitals of royal intendants, who were often chosen from among the *maîtres des requêtes* (consulting lawyers) of the *conseil d'état* (*privé ou des parties*). Cardinal Richelieu had employed royal intendants as tax inspectors and as organizers of the war effort (after 1635) on the provincial and local level. At the time of the Fronde in 1648-49 the intendant's office was suppressed; but Mazarin, on his return to Paris in 1653, reinstated the royal provincial intendant and augmented his powers. It was not, however, until the late 1660's and the 1670's that these officials took up permanent residence in the provinces. The presence of this powerful royal official aroused a storm of protest from the provincial authorities. Jealous of their prerogatives, the municipal councilors, the syndics of the towns, the local judges and the judges of the parlements, the military governors, and many of the local nobility, singly or assembled in their estates, often challenged the authority of the "king's man," or, what was in many instances more effective, ignored his decrees. But, by the dawn of the eighteenth century, the intendants, and their assistants, the subdelegates, had become so integral a part of local administration that in many parts of France they were often regarded as allies rather than enemies. Thus one of the great accomplishments of the *roi-bureaucrate* was the establishment of the royal provincial intendant on a permanent footing.

As one critic, Georges Pagès, has pointed out, Louis was well suited for his task as *roi-bureaucrate*.⁴⁹ Blessed by nature with the gift of good health, his attendance at the council was for fifty-five years unbroken. He told his son: "I made it a rule to work regularly two or three hours each sitting . . . and at any other time to whatever might rise unexpectedly."⁵⁰ Louis built his life on a devotion to a schedule from which he seldom strayed. As Saint-Simon observed: "Naturally fond of trifles, he unceasingly occupied himself

with the most petty details of his troops, his household, his palaces, his table expenses."⁵¹

All three ministers of the "Triade" shared Louis's own passion for work, but the man perhaps best known to us today as the prototype *homme-bureaucrate* was Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who was born in 1619 at Rheims, son of Nicolas Colbert.⁵² Nicolas, an improvident businessman, turned to the civil service as a *conseiller d'état* at the Hôtel de Ville. Like his father, Colbert exchanged the life of a businessman for the royal service and through a family connection solicited a job in the office of Michel Le Tellier, the secretary of state for war. In 1651, having managed several of Cardinal Mazarin's private business ventures with astuteness, Mazarin entrusted Colbert with the governance of his household affairs, giving him the imposing title of Intendant of the House of Monseigneur le Cardinal. In this post Colbert gained invaluable knowledge of the world of business and commerce. With the cardinal to support him, Colbert soon amassed a fortune of his own and founded a bureaucratic dynasty whose members included, as we have noted, five ministers of state during Louis's reign; also among his family were an archbishop, two bishops, intendants of the police and of the marine, and three generals of the army. His daughters all married dukes, two of whom became ministers to Louis. It was a remarkable family, whose members were among the ruling elite throughout the *ancien régime*.

Colbert spent most of his waking moments at his desk directing multifarious matters of state. In 1661 he was called to the *conseil des trois* as minister; in 1664 he became superintendent of the king's buildings (*Surintendant des Bâtiments*); in 1665, controller-general of finances; and in 1669, the secretary of state for the marine. In time he became the very image of the harassed executive, so impatient of his time that Madame de Sévigné likened him to the bitter wind, "Le Nord." One observer saw him as an image of marble; another, in a moment of exasperation, called out to him, "Monseigneur, at least make me a sign that you are listening."⁵³ The great artist Bernini, who disliked Colbert, sketched the minister with "sly, busy eyes; his mouth . . . energetic but with rather fat and unmolded features. . . ." ⁵⁴ But in one thing all his critics agreed: "He executes his duties despotically and crushes all opposition." In the king's presence, however, Colbert became the suppliant and Louis the "monseigneur." Louis enjoyed chiding his minister in a friendly

fashion by saying, "Colbert, here, is going to say to us again, 'Sire, the great Cardinal de Richelieu, *etc.* . . .'"⁵⁵ Indeed, as Charles Wilson has aptly observed, Colbert played "Pooh-Bah to Louis."⁵⁶ On occasion the king became exasperated by his minister's single-mindedness, as he did in 1671 when he reminded Colbert:

I was master enough of myself, day before yesterday, to conceal from you the sorrow I felt at hearing a man whom I have overwhelmed with benefits, as I have you, talk to me in the fashion you did. . . . It is the memory of services that you have rendered me, and my friendship, which caused me to do so. Profit thereby, and do not risk vexing me again because after I have heard your arguments and those of your colleagues, and have given my opinion on all your claims, I do not ever wish to hear further talk about it.⁵⁷

Except for such occasional clashes of will, however, Louis and Colbert worked together in harmony, and theirs was a fruitful relationship.⁵⁸

Colbert inaugurated his service to the king in 1661-62 by establishing in Paris the *chambre de justice* to investigate the activities, financial and otherwise, of Fouquet and his associates. Once the former finance minister and his henchmen had been arraigned, Colbert and the members of the *chambre* extended their activities to include an investigation of the entire financial community. As Colbert remarked: "It was necessary to disentangle a machine that the cleverest men in the kingdom . . . had snarled up so as to make of it a science that they alone knew, so that they might be essential."⁵⁹ But with persistence Colbert unraveled the financial skein and in the process recovered for the state some 100,000,000 *livres* in back taxes and misappropriated funds. By 1664 he extended his reforms to encompass the entire field of state taxation and by the 1680's, despite two wars and opposition of provincial officials, doubled the tax revenues, increasing the *aides* (indirect taxes) from 5,000,000 *livres* to 22,000,000 *livres*; the *gabelle* (salt tax) from 14,750,000 to over 18,000,000 *livres*; the tobacco monopoly from 300,000 to 600,000 *livres*; the receipts of the royal forests from 168,000 to 1,000,000 *livres* and the royal domain from 80,000 to 5,500,000 *livres*. It was a spectacular achievement.⁶⁰

Investigations of the *chambre* in the 1660's also led Colbert to request that the king appoint a council of justice to effect a reform of the law codes. The king's servants, masters of request and coun-

cilors of state, and the king's own representatives sat for over fifteen years in the Herculean task of cleansing the Augean stables of the French law. In 1667 a civil code was issued; in 1669 a criminal code; the commercial code, or the Code Savary, in 1673; the Ordinance for the Marine in 1681; and the Code Noir, concerning slave ownership, in 1685, two years after Colbert's death. Under the aegis of king and minister the impetus toward legal uniformity appeared a century and a quarter before the codifications and revisions of the Napoleonic period.

Other of the Colbertian reforms embraced the department of the marine. So obsessed did Colbert become in the 1660's with fostering the growth of the navy that Louis had to warn Colbert, in an ironic aside, that "if the marine does not suit you; if it is not to your taste, if you would prefer something else, speak freely. . . ." ⁶¹ Louis was thus reminding his minister that if he continued to press the case for the marine too strongly, he would be relieved of his job. Colbert no doubt toned down his requests; but his accomplishments, despite Louis's reticence, were impressive. Colbert's goal, as it had been in the realm of finance and law, was to establish order. In Mazarin's day the navy had been in complete disarray. The cardinal reported in 1651 that he could command only six warships in His Majesty's service; in 1656, 3,000,000 *livres* were expended on the navy, less than had been allocated ten years before. In the early 1660's Colbert reported to the king that "for ten years not more than two or three French war vessels have been seen on the sea; all the arsenals of the navy are completely empty . . . the total number of vessels has been reduced to twenty or twenty-two. . . ." ⁶² Colbert set about to rectify this national disgrace. Working nominally through Hugues de Lionne, who had charge of the navy department until Colbert reorganized it in 1669, Colbert ordered the recruiting for the royal navy on a rotary basis, with the *gens de mer*, i.e., the able bodied seaman, serving once every three years in the royal navy. ⁶³ He refurbished the *hôtels des invalides*—the hospitals—in the major ports. He rebuilt the arsenals at Toulon and Rochefort, and increased the size of the navy from between nineteen to twenty-five ships in 1661 to 140 ships in 1677, among them twelve of the first rank and twenty-six of the second, with a galley fleet of thirty-four vessels. Further, the minister established schools of marine engineering and of hydrography and

cartography that became world-famous by the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

To support his grand designs for the navy, Colbert, like his colleagues in the departments of war and foreign affairs, established the panoply of administrators, ranging from the first secretaries of the *bureaux des marines* in Paris to the intendants and their delegates, the *commis aux classes*, in the port cities. From the ranks of the naval officers Colbert recruited some of the French navy's most renowned commanders, including Abraham Duquesne and Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin de Tourville. Duquesne, of whom Colbert complained that he had "an unaccommodating disposition," was a brilliant line officer, the victor of the battles of Messina and Augusta off the coasts of Sicily in 1676.⁶⁴ His reputation "in the service" was matched only by De Tourville, called "the greatest seaman of the century," at once an inspired commander and elegant courtier, under whose guidance the navy won the battle of Beachy Head in 1690 and seized part of the Smyrna fleet in 1693.⁶⁵ He also presided over the major defeat of French seapower at La Hougue in 1692, a defeat from which France had difficulty recovering in the following years. However, even with Anglo-Dutch naval ascendancy at the turn of the eighteenth century, the marine under the ministerial leadership of Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain and Jérôme de Pontchartrain never fell to the levels of the pre-Colbertian days. The two Pontchartrains managed to keep a navy "in being" of between sixty-six and seventy-two major ships.⁶⁶

Louis himself, guided by the principles of *Realpolitik* that called for a land frontier against the armies of the emperor and his allies, appeared to be less interested in the fortunes of the navy than in those of his armies. In 1680, however, Colbert's efforts were praised in a letter sent by Louis to his minister:

I was very pleased with the works of the port [Dunkirk], and from now on I will understand the letters on the navy much better than I used to, because I saw a vessel from every point of view and saw it make all maneuvers both for fighting and sailing. . . . The maritime works are surprising and I have not visualized things as they were. In fact, I am very satisfied. My trip will have cost me something, but my money will have been well spent.⁶⁷

The late seventeenth century marks no less the heroic age of the French navy than it marks a similar age for the French colonies. Like

Colbert's policies of the marine, those that governed the empire rested on the concept of extreme bureaucratic paternalism and economic protectionism (the term *Exclusif* was used in the colonies). Colbert and his successors, Seignelay and the Pontchartrains, fought hard to wrest control over foreign trade and over the colonies from the secretaries of war and foreign affairs. With Louis's consent Colbert in 1669 incorporated under the ministry of the marine the bureau of the Ponant, which oversaw the administration of Canada and Senegal, and the bureau of the Levant, which controlled the administration of the West Indies. In the following years Colbert created the departmental archives for the marine and the colonies, one of the first of its kind in the world, and Colbert's son, the Marquis de Seignelay, established a bureau to examine the financial accounts of the colonies. Between 1690 and 1694 Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain created four new departments within the ministry. When Jérôme Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain officially assumed the secretaryship of the marine (1699), he and his father forced the controller-general to relinquish much of his power over the colonial office, making it for the first time truly autonomous. French colonial administration thus developed along Weberian lines, with an ever-increasing bureaucracy and bureaucratic controls.⁶⁸

How did this minister-centered, bureaucrat-centered imperial government enforce its will in the colonies? Confronted with administrative confusion, Louis XIV, Colbert, and his successors imposed upon the colonies five overlapping layers of authority: at the base of the pyramid they re-established—particularly in New France—a somewhat antiquated seigneurial regime that fitted perfectly into the Colbertian pattern of paternalism (*étatisme* or *Colbertisme*). Above the seigneurs the ministers established in each colony a sovereign court, whose chief duty was to hear petitions and to serve as a judicial review board. Associated with the court was a governor, who represented the majesty of the king and the power of the military establishment. Sharing pride of place with the governor was the intendant, whose duty it was, as in France, to curb the power of the corporations, supervise the economic and legal affairs of the colony, and serve as the minister's eyes and ears. Finally, above these officials was a corps of inspectors, who, unlike their counterparts in the Spanish Empire, visited the colonies infrequently and were a symbol of the king's and minister's power of coercion, remote but powerful.

It is interesting that Louis XIV and Colbert's institution of hierarchy of offices fostered colonial regimes built upon suspicion rather than mutual confidence and represented Louis's theory of check and balance in an extreme form. The ministry in Paris constantly set one faction in the colonies against the other, constantly encouraged rival groups to appeal to Paris. So highly paternal did the system become that a river frozen over, a ship wrecked by a storm or seized by raiders, or a courier detained in port might cause the entire chain of command temporarily to collapse.

What did Louis and Colbert hope to gain from an overseas empire? The king wanted to create a *France d'Outre mer*, that is, to establish French provinces on the shores of the St. Lawrence and on the isles of the Antilles, with a panoply of parishes, seigneuries, syndics, courts of the *prévôté*, captains of the militia, and intendants—all the symbols of authority they would find at home. Colbert expressed this point well when he wrote to the intendant Jean Talon in the early 1670's that "the king, in considering all his Canadian subjects from the first to the last almost as if they were his own children, wishes to fulfill his obligations to make them feel the sweet tranquility and happiness of his reign as much as those who are in the middle of France. . . ." ⁶⁹ The governor and the intendant stood *in loco tenens* for the king and his minister, and like their confrères in France the *colons* not only looked to the metropole for guidance but were actually urged to set up a bit of France in the New World. ⁷⁰

Louis XIV and Colbert were concerned not only with the development of the marine, industry, commerce, and the colonies but with the renewal of the fine arts, literature, and sciences. In 1662-63 Colbert solicited the help of men of letters and scientists, preparatory to establishing royal academies of sciences, *beaux-arts*, and architecture. The year 1662 was an auspicious one for the minister to undertake such ventures. An intellectual renaissance of the first magnitude had for over a decade stirred Paris and the provinces; it included among its leaders men of science such as Gassendi, Roberval, and Mersenne, and men of letters such as Pierre Corneille, and in the 1660's Boileau, Racine, and Molière. To give voice to this renaissance, a spate of private academies had arisen in the late 1640's and 1650's. Among the more celebrated were those that met at the homes of the Duc de Luynes, at Roberval's, and at the Académie de Mortmor.

These gatherings attracted many distinguished foreign guests, such as the Dutch mathematician Christiaan Huygens, and Nicolas Steno, the Danish anatomist. By the early 1660's several new academies were added to the list, including Thévenot's established in 1661 and the Petite Académie in 1663.⁷¹

From this potpourri of academies, salons, societies, and debating groups, Colbert assembled a few members to meet with him in his house on the Rue Vivienne and to advise him on policy decisions in the arts and sciences. Included in Colbert's circle were Charles Perrault, the astronomer Chapelain, and the mathematician and physicist Huygens. Chapelain, acting as secretary to the group, drew up a list of scientists he believed worthy of state support; he supplied the minister brief sketches of these men that Colbert could read to Louis in council. As the proceedings *chez* Colbert became known to the intellectual community generally, letters and memoirs arrived on the minister's desk, appealing for aid. An important suggestion came from Melchisédec Thévenot, former French ambassador to Rome, who outlined his plan:

On my return to Paris [ca. 1660], I gathered around me a company of men known to be very able, of whom Mm. Frenicle and Steno were lodged in my house. In a house joined to mine I maintained another person for experiments of chemistry, but the cost of these experiments, observations, and anatomies greatly exceeded my revenue. . . . I [then] suggested to M. Colbert that it be given a more lasting form under the approval of the king.⁷²

"Truly," observed another man of science, Samuel Sorbière, "only Kings and wealthy Sovereigns, or a few wise and prosperous Republics [thinking of Venice] can undertake to set up a physical academy where everything would pass in continual experiment. . . ." ⁷³

Both men sought "princes who have a taste for science." In Louis XIV they found a sovereign dedicated to the extension of state power, and, as Colbert reminded them, a prince who would not only be a "titular but an effectual influence upon his royal academy." In 1666, after consultation with Louis, Colbert appointed, under the benevolence of royal patronage, fifteen scientists to serve as fellows of an Académie Royale des Sciences, with a pension of 1500 *livres* per annum. Among the first fellows "pitched upon" were Roberval, the

great Cartesian; Picard; Huygens; and Claude Perrault, Charles's brother and the editor of Vitruvius's architectural works. The academy later attracted such luminaries as the Italian astronomer Cassini and the Dane, Roemer. At the same time Louis XIV and Colbert created a center of science in the famed Observatory in Paris, which would "serve many purposes. There will be winter gardens, a laboratory, and several other things suitable for making all sorts of experiments."⁷⁴ In the 1670's Paris became a modern Rome, attracting to its salons and laboratories not only Steno, Huygens, and Cassini, but the jurisconsultant Samuel Pufendorf and the philosopher Leibniz.

Did the king's intervention in the sciences destroy initiative? Harcourt Brown observes that the Academy of Science became "more like a branch of the French civil service. . . ." Yet, it should be noted that even under the repressive measures adopted in the 1680's by Colbert's successor, Louvois, the academy suffered relatively little direct interference from the government.⁷⁵ Louis may thus be given credit for having been one of the first monarchs in modern time to have subsidized the sciences without demanding an immediate *quid pro quo*.

The king himself displayed a greater interest in fine art and architecture than in the sciences; that interest, moreover, was not wholly altruistic, because he had an overriding passion for building and needed the advice of specialists in the field. As with the sciences, Louis ordered Colbert to establish committees to advise them in the fields of both art and architecture. In the arts Colbert again selected Charles Perrault and, in addition, Charles Le Brun, an artist already noted for his works of interior design in Fouquet's palace, Vaux-le-Vicomte. Le Brun, with Louis's encouragement, became in the decades of the 1660's, 70's, and 80's the official purveyor of *bon goût*. He was then and has since been criticized as being a hack, a mediocrity, an opponent of such a man of genius as Bernini; but he was useful to Colbert and Louis. He accommodated the production of interior decorations to the demands of modern technology, making the manufacture of tapestries (particularly of the Gobelins) and mirrors into a *discipline commune*. His designs were turned out en masse by teams of artisans, blocking out patterns for use in the great palaces of the king. As products of an assembly line, they were far above the average for the day. Le Brun was also helpful to the king in the reorganization

of the Academy of Painting in 1664 and in the establishment of the French Academy of Rome in 1666.⁷⁶

In architecture, too, Le Brun's star was in the ascendant; he served on the council of architecture composed of Louis Le Vau, the king's chief architect until his death in 1670, and the ubiquitous Claude Perrault. This "Triade" dominated the arts as surely as the "Triade" of ministers dominated the government. When Le Vau died, his place was filled by Jules Hardouin-Mansart, the grand-nephew of the great architect François Mansart⁷⁷ and in his own right a superior technician and able adapter of his predecessors' ideas.

Supported by members of the Academy of Architecture, founded in 1671, the "Triade" espoused a doctrine of art that pleased Louis's and Colbert's taste. As Hardouin-Mansart succinctly expressed it: architecture should follow a "logical and simple plan with strong and sober lines, discrete decorations, and bold execution."⁷⁸ Vitruvius was their oracle and Palladio their interpreter. The colonnade of the Louvre, designed in committee, represented a curious blend of Italian baroque and French classicism, but, withal, it initiated a departure from the high Roman baroque style. On the other hand, the plans for the palace of Versailles were at first guided by Louis Le Vau, who had a penchant for Italian baroque design. Only later in the 1670's, when Hardouin-Mansart's influence became dominant, was there an emergence of a more vital classical style, with an emphasis on the principles of order. This French classicism reached its perfection in the serried columns of the arches and windows of Versailles's façade, which was completed in the 1680's.

The role of builder was in the early modern era an attribute of the kingly craft. Louis's great-grandfather Philip II of Spain, his grandfather Henri IV, and his father Louis XIII had all been great builders. The Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin had added to their own *gloire* by sponsoring the construction of churches, colleges, and schools. Louis was not to be outdone either by his ancestors or his ministers. From the early 1660's Louis scrutinized with childlike eagerness plans submitted to him by his architects. He was also keen to consult the pope's architect Gianlorenzo Bernini about plans for a colonnade to be added to the Louvre, and in 1665 he sent a personal message to Bernini inviting him to Paris. Bernini replied that it would be an honor and delight "to design for a king of France,

un roi d'aujourd'hui, buildings grander and more magnificent than the palaces of the emperors and the popes." 79 The great Roman architect arrived in Paris on June 2, 1665, and departed in October, 1665, after having submitted plans for the colonnade. Although his plans were not accepted by Louis and the "Triade," the Bernini interlude is, nevertheless, noteworthy, because the Roman was a shrewd, discerning student of human nature and because he has left us one of the masterpieces of his day, a tangible sign of his visit, a bust of Louis XIV, which consciously adds to the iconography of Louis's kingship. Somehow, Bernini, who worked steadily at his portrait of Louis for three months, has made the king's features peep out from the stone in a marvelously lifelike fashion. Here are the full sensual mouth, the well-shaped upper lip, the pencil-line moustache, à la mode; and above the mouth the long, misshapen nose, the sight of which caused Louis to whisper to his brother: "Do I really look like that!" Here, too, is the arrogant tilt of the head by which Bernini tried to capture the youthful majesty of a man who for the artist and his French audience was indeed *un roi d'aujourd'hui*, the symbol of modern kingship.⁸⁰

For Louis the building of a colonnade at the Louvre was as much an interlude as Bernini's visit. Much to Colbert's chagrin, Louis insisted upon lavishing great sums of money on his country residences at St. Germain-en-Laye, Chambord, Vincennes, and Versailles; the minister complained that Louis "neglected the Louvre, which is assuredly the most superb palace in the world." But the king persisted. He gave his architect Le Vau explicit commands to design at Versailles a block of buildings that would surround—literally encase—his father's old hunting lodge, which Saint-Simon called the *petit château de cartes*—the house of cards. Yet even as Le Vau's construction neared completion in the late 1660's, Louis was still not content. The proportion between the old and the new sections of the palace were off balance; and since Louis refused to raze the older, inner shell, new wings had to be added to round off its symmetry. When Le Vau died in 1670, he left blueprints for yet more additions to Versailles; and within six years Hardouin-Mansart, adapting Le Vau's drawings to his own specifications, began the central façade and the extension to either side of the main building of two vast wings. Behind the palace proper arose a great block of

buildings that housed a *maison* of over 10,000 people. Beyond the palace grounds themselves a town sprang up, studded with *hôtels* of the great nobles and princes of the blood who made their winter home at court.

As Versailles rose, André Le Nôtre, the king's gardener, laid out around it his famed *jardin de l'intelligence*, or formal garden. Aiding nature, Le Nôtre imported over 75,000 trees and had them planted in the filled-in land that stretched in front and to the sides of the palace; he also created a first and second parterre, and a Grand Canal upon which Colbert for the king's amusement and instruction floated a navy in miniature. Some 1,400 jets of water played from the fountains, and thousands of statues and urns dotted the gardens.⁸¹

From every turn in the patterned floral aisles, from every glade and grotto, the attentive Le Nôtre displayed the iconography of kingship. Visitors found on all sides the legends of the kingly craft written in stone: the Apollonian image of Phoebus-Roi in the chariot of the sun gliding atop a vast pond; or Hercules-Roi, semi-concealed by an elegantly trimmed hedge, subduing the Hydra-headed image of religious non-conformity; or of Louis himself, lightly disguised as a Roman emperor, leading his victorious legions against the Teutonic hordes.

Yet beneath its façade of royal grandeur, with its iconographic and artistic splendors, Versailles appeared often as a cold, dark, damp, and malodorous pile to the courtiers who had to inhabit it. In a wickedly telling passage in his *Mémoires* Saint-Simon speaks of Versailles's seamy side:

His apartment [Louis XIV] and that of the Queen suffer from the most dreadful inconveniences, with back-views over the privies and other dark and malodorous offices. The astonishing magnificence of the gardens is equalled only by the bad taste with which they are designed. . . . To reach the coolness of the garden's shade one is forced to cross a vast, scorching plain at the end of which there is not alternative, at any point, but to climb upwards or downwards. . . . The violence done to Nature everywhere is repellent and disgusting. The innumerable water-courses pumped or otherwise guided in from all directions makes the water itself green, thick and muddy . . . and gives off a vile odour. . . . From the vantage point of the gardens, one may enjoy the beauty of the whole design, but the palace itself looks as though it had suffered a conflagration

in which the top stories and the roofs had been destroyed. . . . One could go on listing indefinitely the defects of this enormous and enormously costly palace and its seven more costly outhouses.⁸²

An English visitor, Lord Montague, was no more favorably impressed:

The monarch as to his health is lusty enough, his upper teeth are out, so he speaks a little like old Maynard [a famous London lawyer], and picks and shows his under teeth with a good deal of affection, being the vainest creature alive even as to the least things. His house at Versailles is something the foolishest in the world; he is strutting in every panel and galloping over one's head in every ceiling, and if he turns to spit he must see himself in person or his Vicegerent the Sun with *sufficit orbi*, or *nec pluribus impar*. I verily believe that there are of him statues, busts, bas-reliefs and pictures above two hundred in the house and gardens.⁸³

Louis, like his English visitor, seems in time to have wearied of his great palace and increasingly as he grew older sought refuge in the smaller palaces—the hermitages—that he built close to Versailles. At first he retreated to the Porcelin Trianon, completed in 1670 by Hardouin-Mansart and rebuilt in the late 1670's, with its exquisite gardens in miniature and its view of the Grand Canal. As the pleasures of the Trianon palled, Louis had the palace of Marly constructed, at the cost of 11,000,000 *livres*. The grounds contained some of the "finest gardens in the world." Even Saint-Simon admired them. "Shady avenues," he said, "changed suddenly into huge lakes, with boats and gondolas, and reconverted as suddenly into forests of impenetrable gloom, with their succession of fresh statues. . . . Such was the fate of a place which had been a den of serpents, toads, frogs, and carrion. . . ." ⁸⁴ The costs of all these magnificent piles, with their attendant gardens and water courses, was conservatively estimated at between \$100,000,000 and \$120,000,000.

But for Louis, Versailles was far more than another château in a long line of royal residences: it represented, above all, his administrative capital, a fact that did not escape the notice of the omniscient Saint-Simon:

[Louis XIV's] constant residence at Versailles caused a continual coming together of officials and persons employed, which kept

everything going, got through more business and gave more access to ministers and their various business in one day than would have been possible in a fortnight had the court been in Paris. The benefit to his service of the king's precision was incredible. It imposed orderliness on everybody and secured despatch and facility to his affairs.⁸⁵

The prime concern of the *roi-bureaucrate* had been served. He had within his sight—within the confines of one palace—his minister-servants and his courtier-clients, all of whom were petitioners for royal favors. He could say of those whom he wished to punish: "I do not know them," or, "They are people I never see," because the king was literally blind to those of whom he disapproved. Louis thus reduced the art of kingship to a timetable, which well suited his temperament, his "middling" disposition. The cadence of the kingly craft became deliberate, precise, ordered, and predictable, drained of surprises. It evolved into a ritual that could be re-enacted daily for each succeeding wave of courtiers. The king had become his own best architect of stability.

At Versailles, Louis XIV established not only the finest administrative capital in Europe but peopled it with creative, talented men and women, musicians, writers, poets, preachers, arbiters of taste and morals. The reader of contemporary journals and memoirs is at once struck by Louis's remarkably well-developed taste in music. He inherited from his mother a love of the violin, and his chamber orchestra, the "Twenty-four violins of the King," became famous throughout Europe. The sound of music pervaded the court. It was heard at ceremonies, in the king's chapel, in the daily routine of suppers and dinners, and in the evening entertainments, the *appartements*, as they were called. There was thus a great demand for *musique de circonstances*, occasional music, and the titles of the pieces reflect this demand and the pervasiveness of the king's patronage: J. J. Mouret's "Fanfares for the King's Suppers"; M. R. de Lalande's "Symphonies for the King"; J. B. Lully's "*Plaude, laetare Gallia*" (composed in 1668 for the baptism of the Grand Dauphin); Lully's "March of the Turenne Regiment" (from which Bizet probably took one of his themes for *L'Arlésienne* suite); Marc-Antoine Charpentier's "Epithalamium" for Elector Max Emmanuel's marriage; and François Couperin's "La Steinquerque," composed for the French victory of 1692.⁸⁶

The major-domo of the king's musicians was J. B. Lully, who marshaled under his command not only the Twenty-Four Violins of the King but a full orchestra, several chamber groups, and a corps de ballet. Lully made his debut at court in the 1660's as Molière's collaborator in the production of *comédie-ballets*: *Les Fâcheux*, *George Dandin*, and *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*. He also collaborated with Pierre Corneille on *Psyché*. In later years Lully produced hundreds of *divertissements*, masques, comedies, and dozens of operas. He was noted for the use of mechanical stage devices perfected by Rameau in the eighteenth century. In Lully's music we find a characteristic of the age: animated expression of the Italian baroque style moderated, often to the point of austerity, by the restraining influence of the French classicism, much the same as we find in other artistic expressions at Versailles.⁸⁷

Like Lully, Louis XIV had a penchant for the *opéra-ballet*, a taste that was not universally admired. The French critic Saint-Evremond asked: "Would you know what an opera is? I'll tell you, it is an odd medley of Poetry and Musick, wherein the Poet and Musician, equally confined one by the other, take a World of Pains to compose a wretched Performance." But like Louis himself, Saint-Evremond favored Lully: "Only in my opinion, Lully is to be exempted, who knows the Passions, and enters further into the Heart of man than the Authors themselves."⁸⁸ High praise from one of the most discerning critics of the day.

Another musician favored by Louis was François Couperin, "the Great." His music was marked by the intensity and grandeur that Louis loved. During the 1690's Couperin composed organ music for the king's chapel at Versailles and also jotted down occasional pieces for the amusement of his noble friends. The latter are playful satires, poetry in music, written so as to reflect the personality of a great court official as he caught them in music. In these pieces there is a marvelous admixture of themes from the *commedia dell'arte*, from popular French tunes, and from the more dignified Italian inventions of such a virtuoso as Arcangelo Corelli, a great favorite of the French court. Couperin's art, like Lully's combined "le goût italien et le goût français" and therein achieved the Bachian compromise before Bach.⁸⁹

Louis recognized the greatness of another musician, Marc-Antoine Charpentier, much of whose music was known to his age only in

manuscript. Louis himself awarded Charpentier a pension in 1686 when illness prevented the musician from actively entering the competition for a royal prize in music. Like Lully, Charpentier collaborated with Molière in writing musical comedies; but unlike Louis's *chef d'orchestre*, he tended toward religious mysticism and left a large body of music written for the church.

These men of the court, these king's servants, bequeathed a remarkable musical legacy of ingenuity and virtuosity that often reached heights of grandeur and intensity. It attests the mixture of Italian baroque and French classical elements so common at the end of the seventeenth century.⁹⁰

Louis demanded music as a backdrop for court ceremonial, as companion at his meals, as a solace, and as a tranquilizing influence in his life; but like Mazarin he also thirsted after the excitement and the spice of the drama. The lively art of the theater had undergone a transformation between the late 1630's and the 1650's. The appearance of Pierre Corneille's *Le Cid* (1637) and *Horace* (1640) marked a watershed in dramaturgy. They juxtaposed the baroque elements of illusion, tensions, and conceits with the classical elements of restraint and internal conflict that foreshadowed the plays of Racine, and at the same time introduced a tenderness and gravity that one finds in *commedia dell'arte*. Corneille also employed the use of stage mechanism, with its *trompe l'oeil* effect, which was so dear to Louis and his court.⁹¹

By the late 1650's Louis XIV had become an avid theatergoer. He attended the opening of Thomas Corneille's *Timocrate* at the Théâtre du Marais and of Pierre Corneille's *Œdipe*. His first serious patronage of the theater, however, came in the 1660's when, after Fouquet's fall, he inherited that minister's favorite playwright, J. B. Poquelin, called Molière.

Molière, who had toured France with troops of comedians in the 1640's and 50's and who had written farces, masques, and comedies during this period, brought a wealth of experience to the royal theater at the Louvre and at Versailles. During the 1660's and early 70's he produced in rapid succession some of the greatest comedies of all time. The untutored taste of Louis's court at first favored performances of the lighter, less significant works: *Les Fâcheux*, *Cocu imaginaire*, and *Mariage forcé*. But by the late 1670's the taste in comedy of the king and his courtiers had apparently improved, and we

see that *Le Médecin malgré lui*, *Femmes savantes*, *Tartuffe*, and *Le Misanthrope* top the list.⁹²

Louis also delighted in the tragedies of Jean Racine. It offered the king an opportunity to weep—a practice of which he was very fond—at hearing noble sentiments expressed in some of the most gloriously cadenced French of the age. Between the mid-1660's and the late 1670's Racine produced ten plays, including *Andromaque* (1667), *Britannicus* (1669), *Bérénice* (1670), *Bajazet* (1672), *Mithridate* (1673), *Iphigénie* (1674), and *Phèdre* (1677). Louis's two favorites were *Mithridate* and *Britannicus*, with their portrayals of great kings and princes struggling valiantly against an overwhelming fate.⁹³

Racine's last two plays *Esther* and *Athalie* were written expressly for Madame de Maintenon and were produced *in camera* for her girls at St. Cyr.⁹⁴ Louis XIV attended all the performances. He and the courtiers who accompanied him to St. Cyr were struck by the "grandeur" of the themes, which in their intensity rivaled Milton's description of revolt against the Gods. Here is the eternal struggle of Good and Evil, of Baal against Jehovah, Satan against God. These last dramas epitomized not only Racine's own struggle to find meaning in an age engulfed in the abyss of war but also epitomized the plight of the intellectual generally. Racine was a man torn by sense and sensibility, reason and emotions, yearning for *la belle simplicité*, yet forever frustrated in his search by the demands of society.

Louis, who may have felt these dilemmas but dimly, was himself torn by the tensions of his age. These tensions were signalized early in the reign by the production of Molière's *Tartuffe*, a bitter satire on hypocrisy in high places. Molière himself pointed up the moral dilemma to Louis in this way:

[When] Molière wrote his *Tartuffe* . . . he read the first three acts to the King. This play pleased His Majesty who spoke much too well of it not to arouse the jealousy of Molière's enemies and above all the *cabale des dévots*. M. de Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris, placed himself at their head and spoke to the king against the comedy. The king, who was continually under pressure on all sides, told Molière that one must not annoy the *dévots* who were implacable and that he ought not to perform his *Tartuffe* in public. His majesty thought it sufficient to speak to Molière in this way without ordering him to suppress the play.⁹⁵

But Molière fought back, attacking the religious zealots on their own grounds: he baited "the hypocrites," saying that they could not take a joke: "they started by panicking and were amazed that I could be so daring as to ape their looks. . . . In their usual praiseworthy fashion, they have disguised their own interests as the cause of God; in their mouth, Tartuffe is a play dangerous to religion."⁹⁶

Molière's *cri de cœur* dramatized the dilemma of the great classical age of French arts and literature. Underneath the façade of gentility seethed the hatred of one faction for another, the loathing of the nobles for the *règne de vile bourgeois*. "What," asks W. G. Moore, "is the outstanding feature of life in the seventeenth century, as we can see it from contemporary memoirs, pictures, letters, documents? Not order or rule or reason, nor pageantry or splendour, but vigour and even violence, restless activity."⁹⁷

Louis XIV, who himself admitted that as regards the arts he "was continually under pressure on all sides," also found himself buffeted by economic and social crises: by wars, directly and indirectly of his own making; by controversies in the realm of religion, where Jansenist fought Jesuit and Protestant fought Catholic; in the sciences, where Cartesians struggled with traditionalists; in the arts, where supporters of the Roman school of the baroque hurled insults at the indigenous school of classicists. Little wonder that Louis tried, in reaction to the divisive factionalism of his intelligentsia, to impose a regime of order. The Colbertian reforms thus represent an attempt to bring the dissident elements within society under control. These reforms, Sagnac believes, reveal Louis as a "tentative revolutionary."⁹⁸ But a revolutionary—even a tentative one—is too strong a word to apply to Louis in the realm of the arts; his actions show him to be, rather, a trimmer. His favorite playwright, Molière, was permitted to present plays at court, but not in Paris. Racine could espouse Jansenism, but not so openly as to offend the royal conscience. Boileau, the great critic and Louis's friend, could create the daring first *Satires*, but must not forget that he was the defender of the classical order in society, the author of the great classical epitome, *L'Art poétique*. Throughout his life Louis mistook the spirit of dissent for the *esprit frondeur*, the energy of intellectual discussion for conspiracy. But it must be said in his favor that he usually reacted to a *furor academicus* with caution and cunning. Above all,

Louis pictured himself as an arbiter, as a stabilizing influence within society, *raisonnable, solide, juste*, the guardian of the rules of conduct, the dispenser of *bon sens* and *juste cadence*.

Colbert, as we have seen, was one of the major agents of the Ludovican compromise. It was not the greatness of his mind but his devotion, his perspicacity, his breadth of knowledge, his relentless activity, and his vigor that gave him such a formidable reputation in his own day. He became the symbol of the royal bureaucrat, the defender of the regime against *émeutes*, disorders, incipient *frondes*. His legend was perpetuated by his friends and enemies alike. In 1699 businessmen of Bordeaux wrote to the new controller-general expressing the pious hope that he would be as vigorous a partisan of their welfare as Monsieur Colbert had been. And in England a few years later Vanbrugh wrote to a mutual friend in praise of Colbert: "Ah, what would Mons. Colbert in France have given . . . for such talent!"

But Colbert was not the only great architect of stability in France. There were two others who deserve special mention: the Le Telliers, father and son. The father, Michel Le Tellier, was born in 1603, the son of a councilor in the *cour des aides*. He served Richelieu as a civil servant in the war department in Paris and in the early 1640's as an intendant of the French armies in Italy. At the accession of Louis XIV to the throne, Mazarin named Le Tellier the secretary of state at war, a post that he held until 1677, when he resigned his charge in favor of his son, François-Michel, marquis de Louvois. Dubbed "le fidèle" by Mazarin in the terrible years of the Fronde, Le Tellier did indeed serve the cardinal and the queen mother faithfully. It was during those years and in the later 1650's that Le Tellier initiated a number of reforms of the army; these reforms did not constitute a coherent program but were, rather, a piecemeal offering, for the minister was *au fond* a conservative reformer, extremely cautious, or as Louis André describes him, "l'homme du passé," a man of tradition. He was Richelieu's *continuateur*, a link between the moderate reforms begun in the 1630's and the period of more rapid change in the 1660's.⁹⁹

Michel Le Tellier's basic conservatism did not prevent him from setting in motion a series of changes that led in the path of administrative centralization. His chief problem concerned civil administra-

tion, i.e., on the housing, payment, and transportation of troops, on the establishment of special services, such as engineering and artillery corps. Like his colleagues in finance and foreign affairs, Le Tellier began in the 1640's and 50's to strengthen his administrative controls over both the local and the provincial centers. With the armies, either on march or in quarters, he placed *commissaires des guerres*, whose duty it was to check the muster rolls, see to local housing and feeding of troops, to aid in buying supplies and in routing the armies. The *commissaires* reported and were responsible to the *intendants d'armée* who were usually drawn from the ranks of the *gens de robe*, the trained royal judges and court officials, and were sent on the king's special charge to serve with the armies in Flanders, the Rhine, Italy, and Spain. The army *intendants* like those in the provinces wielded extensive police powers: they could arrest insubordinate officers, including marshals of the army; they could institute court martial proceedings, inspect the financial records of the army, and attend all councils of war. Like their counterparts in the navy, in the provinces, and in the colonies, they represented civilian authority and served as countervailing force to the military establishment.¹⁰⁰

Both the *commissaires* and the *intendants* were directly responsible to the secretary of state in Paris (or later, at Versailles), to whom they reported as often as once a week. Inspectors, called *maîtres des requêtes inspecteurs délégués*, were periodically sent out to consult with the *intendants* and to report irregularities in the *intendant's* office directly to the secretary of state. Thus, as in Colbert's ministries, a rough check-and-balance system developed under the aegis of a minister-centered administration.

As the number of commissioners, *intendants*, and inspectors increased during 1650-80, so, commensurately, did the personnel of the central administration. By 1680 there numbered in the war ministry eight bureau chiefs, hundreds of clerks and agents, and an enormous archive of documents, which by 1691 contained 900 volumes of correspondence covering a thirty-year span. The king's treasury dispensed millions of *livres*, even in peacetime, to stoke this great war machine. The armies they administered jumped in size from 25,000 at the time of Turenne's invasion of the Germanies in the 1640's to 220,000 men in the mid-reign, to 350,000 during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14).¹⁰¹

If the 1650's mark the first reformation of the army, then the 1660's mark the second. In the second wave of reforms, instigated by Louis XIV himself, the Le Telliers worked side by side. Their characters reveal striking similarities and differences that still trouble historians of the reign. Both men, like Colbert, were dedicated bureaucrats who, in Isaiah Berlin's words, were hedgehogs who pursued one great idea, in this instance the improvement of Louis XIV's armies. Both were "bland, quick, insinuating, supple, and cunning, and could be as dangerous and as vindictive as an Italian."¹⁰²

But the differences between father and son were striking too: the father was far more the law-giver, the codifier of reforms, the civil servant who worked *in camera* through his bureaucratic network. Although conservative by nature, the senior Le Tellier proved to be quite inventive within the circumscribed sphere of the war office. On the other hand François-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, was far less the diplomat than his father—more direct and at times blustering. "He was a brutal, violent man, imperious and tough." Louis XIV termed him "le confident." Madame Sévigné described him, more accurately, as *La Mer*, unpredictable, often violent, subject to sudden surface changes, yet, ultimately, unfathomable. Born in 1641, four years after Louis, Louvois was carefully trained for his position at the Collège de Clermont and at the ministry of war, where in the early 1660's he was entrusted by his father with a number of special missions. It was Louvois who planned the campaign in Germany and Austria (1664) that sent supplies and troops to aid the emperor in his campaign against the Turks. In 1666 Louvois gained Louis XIV's favorable attention for his meticulous logistical preparations for the War of Devolution. Louvois accompanied the king on his reviews of troops in 1666-67 and on his tour of duty in the Low Countries during the actual war with Spain in 1667-68. The young secretary took infinite pains in planning Louis's itinerary, and the king was impressed by Louvois's enthusiasm and efficiency. Indeed, enthusiasm and efficiency became the hallmarks of Louvois's success. He matured into a highly trained liaison officer, co-ordinating efforts of the ministry and the high command. For this task he drew from an armory of bluff, blunt words by which he intimidated the officers of the general staff, prima donnas like Turenne and Luxembourg; yet,

Louvois was not enamored of words; plainly, he knew that it was planning that won a battle, not oratory.¹⁰³

All the same, the Le Telliers, father and son, worked well together. Louvois was as "ardent, devoted collaborator, animated by the same sentiments" as his father. Together they busied themselves in establishing winter quarters for a standing army that numbered about 40,000 in 1661 and over 150,000 in 1678. In the 1660's they regrouped the army corps along the north and northeastern borders, in the Italian Alps, and in the provinces adjacent to the Pyrenees; munitions magazines were built along the *grandes routes* leading to the garrison towns; casernes were established or refurbished in the towns themselves, particularly at Pignerol, and Perpignon in the south and southeast, and along the north and northeast at Grave-lines, Arras, Amiens, Soissons, and Breisach. Arsenals, where gun powder and cannon balls could be stored, were built in Paris, Grenoble, and Metz; foundries were established at Sedan, Pignerol, and Douai; military hospitals were founded or rebuilt at Dunkirk, Arras, and Calais, and the cornerstone laid in April, 1674, for the famous old soldier's home in Paris, the Hôtel des Invalides. The engineering corps, which was completely revamped under the leadership of Chevalier de Clerville, helped in the 1660's to design model citadels at Marseilles and Pignerol in the south, and at Dunkirk, Arras, and Breisach in the north and northeast.¹⁰⁴

In the years 1672-73 to 1691 (the year of his death), Louvois contributed a number of reforms, *en seul*. In his heavy-handed, often peremptory fashion, he tried like his father before him to wrench order out of feudal chaos. Inspectors-general, the most famous being Martinet, drilled the army infantry into some semblance of discipline; *congés*—leaves—were denied to officers needed for soldiers in winter quarters; depots were established at local quartermasters' posts to receive and store supplies; uniforms were issued by a central quartermaster's office; and schools were established to train officers. Louvois strained every bureaucratic muscle to circumvent, if not subvert, the old feudal machinery of war—to abolish the old *ban* and *arrière-ban* as means of raising troops and to break the aristocratic monopoly of the officer corps. In so doing, Louvois, with the king's consent, elevated many of his own creatures to the dignity of mar-

shals of France: Duras, Lorges, Rochefort (in the mid-1670's), and, later, Tallard, D'Huxelles, D'Harcourt, Boufflers, and Villars. All of his men were loyal to the ministry and to the king rather than to a feudal lord or territorial prince. The days of Saxe-Weimar, Turenne, and Condé—the age of *condottieri*—was disappearing by 1680 and with it the spirit of the Fronde. Like Richelieu and Colbert, Le Tellier *père* and Louvois employed their family as active agents of reform. Among them were Saint-Pouanges, D'Alègre, Claude Le Peletier, and Louvois's brother, Charles-Maurice, jokingly called "Le Cochon Mitré," who for all his grossness of person and of character was a powerful family pawn in the game of church politics.¹⁰⁵

Despite his reputation for hauteur, Louvois rewarded talent and listened to advice. His confidants included Martinet, the inspector-general; the Marquis de Chamlay, the grand strategist; Berthelot, the munitioner; and, above all, Sébastien Le Prestre, marquis de Vauban, a great engineer and one of the geniuses of his age.¹⁰⁶ A self-made man, the Horatio Alger of his times, Vauban was born in 1633 of a poor gentry family. He attended school for a few years but left in 1651 to follow Condé's standard. In 1653 he joined the royal service, becoming in 1655 an *ingénieur ordinaire du roi*. Serving his apprenticeship under Louis's engineering consultant, Clerville, he made his debut as a chief engineer during the War of Devolution in the late 1660's. Louvois at once recognized his genius, and in the years following 1667 sent him on numerous missions along the north and northeastern borders. Vauban's letters of that time burst with energy, ebullience, and impatience; he represented the angry and eager generation of the 1660's, liberated from the oppressive apprenticeship of Cardinal Mazarin's age. These young men looked to Louis—much as did the younger generation in the United States look to John F. Kennedy—as the embodiment of youthful energy. *Gloire*, "nec pluribus impar," were a part and parcel of kingship, the paraphernalia of rejuvenated monarchy. Vauban's enthusiasms reflected this era of hopes and grand designs. The engineer showered the ministry in Paris with plans for acquiring towns of strategic importance. In 1668 it was Lille; in 1675, Condé, Bouchain, Valenciennes, and Cambrai. Concerning these fortresses and the adjoining areas, Vauban observed to Louvois: "Seriously now, the king out to give some thought to establishing his meadow square (the

pré quarré [pré carré]),”¹⁰⁷ i.e., a fortified zone along the northern border, where there could be defense in depth, a shield against the *razzias*, or heavily armed raiding parties.

In 1678 Vauban was again importuning the minister, this time suggesting the annexation of the towns of Dixmude, Courtrai, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg as excellent *portes* into the Germanies. His demands became more persistent and peremptory in the next few years and began to reveal ever more clearly his thoughts for a line of strategic bases, or *frontière de fer*. Certain *portes* in these strategic lines must serve as bastions of strength to guard the Flemish, Brabant, Liégeois, Lotharingian, and German borders. Vauban did not have in mind a static line but rather a web of fortifications, resilient and interconnected, protected by canals and waterways that could be flooded at times of invasion. Outside the walls of the great forts were to be built *camps retranchés*, large entrenched camps not unlike the Roman fortified encampments described by Julius Caesar in the *Gallic Wars* (favorite reading of Louis XIV as well as of Vauban). These forts, armed camps, and waterways were meant to complement nature, to guard a gap in the forest lands, to assure control of a river valley or close a mountain pass.

In all, Vauban surveyed and helped design the fortifications for 128 fortresses along the French northern and northeastern borders; and in 1692, as a tacit recognition of his work, Louis XIV set up a monument on the Rhine to the *Securitati Perpetuae* of France. These words in time became alive in French foreign policy as well as set solidly in stone.

THE QUEST FOR STABILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CRISES IN GOVERNMENT, 1661-1715

If Louis loved war, or, rather, the mechanics of warfare, he loved diplomacy more. Vauban and Louvois were men of energy—*honnêtes hommes*—whom Louis respected; yet consistently, the councilor with whom he most frequently consulted was the minister for foreign affairs. From the first year of the personal reign in 1661 Louis established the custom of meeting with his foreign secretary both in the morning and again in the evening to hear the dispatches

read. When the great peace congresses met at Aix-la-Chapelle (1668), Nijmegen (1677-79), Ryswick (1696-97), and Utrecht (1712-14), the foreign ministers worked even more closely with the king, "patiently summarizing Louis's endless instructions." Louis also liked to have the *Gazette de Holland* read to him, usually in the hour before supper. As he grew older, the king became increasingly absorbed in matters of foreign policy, particularly as they touched upon the Spanish Succession. When his own grandson ascended the throne of Spain as Philip V, Louis took infinite pains in spelling out the responsibilities of kingship and the duties imposed by the *métier du roi*. From this correspondence with Philip V developed a type of *secret du roi*, a secret diplomacy that was not channeled to the foreign secretary's office. But Louis's *secret du roi*—unlike that of the eighteenth century—was of a very limited nature, usually reserved only for family matters. More often than not, the king respected the prerogatives of the secretary of state and did not, as had been the custom in Mazarin's day, go over his head.¹⁰⁸

Louis XIV's first foreign minister was Hugues de Lionne, the third member of the Triade of 1661. Lionne was an exceptionally talented man, sensitive to the nuance of diplomacy—a skilled negotiator and a master of foreign languages. The nephew of Abel Servien, one of Mazarin's ministers, Lionne early in his career served on special missions to the Congress at Münster in 1648 and to Spain, Italy, and the Germanies in the 1650's. Appointed one of the chief delegates to the congress that drafted the Peace of the Pyrenees, he authored the *moyennant*—marriage—clause that provided the basis for later French claims to the Spanish inheritance. From 1659 until his death in 1671 Louis XIV relied on his judgment and named him a minister in his first meeting of the *conseil d'en haut*. Regretably, personal misfortunes plagued his last years in office. The notoriety of his wife's infidelities drove Lionne increasingly to drink, and he was often acutely ill; as Lionne's health declined, his colleagues, especially Louvois, interfered increasingly in the affairs of his department.¹⁰⁹

Lionne's successor, Arnauld de Pomponne, was one of the most admirable men of Louis's reign, gifted with great wit and politesse, a model for the *honnête homme*. Pomponne, whom Herbert Rowen calls one of Louis's "moderate" ministers, served his apprenticeship as ambassador to The Hague and to Sweden. In the late 1660's he

tried to negotiate a settlement of the Franco-Dutch disputes, but failed. After he became foreign minister, he continued to pursue a policy of accommodation that quickly aroused the distrust of Louvois. Unfortunately, Pomponne also incurred the enmity of Colbert, and together the war and finance ministers helped unseat their colleague in 1679. Louis, however, had misgivings about his harsh judgment of Pomponne and in 1691 recalled this "moderate minister" to the high council, where he served without portfolio (actually a second foreign minister) until his death in 1699.¹¹⁰

Pomponne's immediate successor was Colbert's brother, the Marquis de Croissy. In contrast to Pomponne, Croissy was "a bluff, obstinate, opinionated and often quite irascible man."¹¹¹ Yet, like most of the Colberts, he was an energetic and faithful servant of the king, and like Lionne and Pomponne, was carefully trained for his office, serving in the 1650's as the intendant in the strategically important frontier province of Alsace and in the late 1660's as ambassador to London. Croissy, again like Lionne and Pomponne, suffered the brunt of Louvois's dislike and constantly struggled with the war minister over what constituted the prerogatives of the foreign minister's office. Yet Croissy, who was of the same mettle as Louvois himself, held his own against Louvois and actually outlived him by five years. Croissy was known to the diplomatic corps for his punctiliousness and for the care with which he composed his dispatches.

Croissy's son, Colbert de Torcy (foreign minister from 1699 to 1715) was a model diplomat and administrator. During the difficult years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14) Torcy conducted with consummate skill the negotiations that led to the meeting of the Congress at Utrecht. Torcy was withal an excellent administrator. During his term in office the budget for the foreign office personnel rose from 1,000,000 *livres* to 3,450,000 *livres*, and the size of the bureaucracy nearly doubled. Torcy also assembled around him a brilliant staff, including François Callières, the author of *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*; Abbé de Polignac, a future cardinal and negotiator at Utrecht; Antoine Pecquet, the author of one of the leading manuals for diplomats; and Nicolas Mesnager, a Rouen merchant and expert on the *asiento* agreements. An Academy of Politics was established in the Louvre in rooms alongside the archives, where bright young men were to be trained for the diplo-

matic service. Although the scheme did not have time to mature before Torcy's forced retirement in 1715, it served as a model for future schools. Under Torcy's guidance, the bureaucratization of diplomacy was begun and the conduct of foreign affairs increasingly institutionalized.¹¹²

Overtures to Aggression, 1661-1672

From the vast number of dispatches, *aide-mémoires*, instructions to ambassadors, and letter-books preserved in the archives of the foreign ministry, the historian can piece together with a fair degree of accuracy the history of international relations during the reign of Louis XIV. Louis's policies were concerned principally with anticipating on the diplomatic chessboard the moves planned by the Hapsburgs in Vienna and Madrid and, laterally, the stratagems advanced by the Atlantic powers of England and the United Provinces of the Dutch Netherlands.

The memory of Spanish aggressions in the Low Countries, the Franche-Comté, and the Pyrenees was fresh in the minds of French statesmen during the 1660's. A dozen or more times during the Thirty Years' War French soil had been violated by Hapsburg troops, with Spanish commanders usually at their head. And although peace had been signed officially at the Pyrenees in 1659 and sealed by a marriage between the two dynasties, there lingered in the French monarch's mind a desire for revenge and, at the same time, for the safety of his realm. In point of fact, a cold war existed between France and Spain during most of the reign, erupting four times into open conflict before 1700: namely, the War of Devolution, 1667-68; the so-called Dutch War, or War of the First Coalition, 1672-79; the War of the Reunions, 1683-84; and the War of the League of Augsburg, or the Second Coalition, 1689-97.

Louis XIV, as punctilious in matters of precedence as his Spanish cousins had been earlier in the century, set out deliberately to humiliate his father-in-law, Philip IV, in the so-called *petites affaires* of the 1660's. In June, 1661, the French ambassador to Madrid, Embrun, demanded and gained the right to make a public entrée into the Spanish capital, which had been previously denied to France.¹¹³ In October of the same year an open street fight broke

out in London between the French ambassador and the Spanish ambassador, Watteville. After a free-for-all between the ambassadors' retinues, the French retired ignominiously from the field.¹¹⁴ Louis and his court were spending the last of the autumn season in Fontainebleau when on October 16 Louis received word of the Spanish "outrage." The Spanish ambassador was summarily shipped off to Spain. Again, as in the Embrun affair, Philip IV bent before the French storm and henceforth, as Louis demanded, the French ambassador took precedence over the Spanish in the courts of Europe, except in Vienna, where the emperor would not acknowledge French pretensions.

Louis also undertook aggressive diplomatic moves against his father-in-law at the level of strategic military planning. From his cousin Charles II of England Louis purchased the port of Dunkirk on the border of the Spanish Low Countries as an entrepôt for possible military action against Spanish forces in the area.¹¹⁵ Through his ambassadors in London and Lisbon, Louis surreptitiously aided the Portuguese War of Independence. Expressly forbidden by the peace settlement of the Pyrenees to take an active role in the affairs of Portugal, the French king used England as his cats-paw. An Anglo-Portuguese alliance, sealed by the marriage of Charles II to the Portuguese princess Isabella, brought to England as a dowry the cities of Tangier and Bombay. In return, Charles II promised troops and a fleet to help in Portugal's bid for independence. Louis sent money and a military commander, Schomberg, to bolster English resources. Spain formally acknowledged Portuguese independence in 1668.¹¹⁶ Louis also pressed the Spanish for payment of Maria Theresa's dowry, and when the gold was not forthcoming, he dropped the hint that France would accept in lieu of money payment the Franche-Comté, the city of Luxembourg and environs, Cambrai and the Cambrésis, all of which portended future demands.

The second strand of French anti-Hapsburg policy was interlaced in Louis's personal relations with his cousin, Emperor Leopold I. Leopold had been elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1658 despite French attempts to gain the crown for Louis. In his own day Leopold was a figure of some amusement to foreign ambassadors and even to members of his own court.¹¹⁷ The young Torcy described him as a man with pinched features, a long beak-like nose, a partially open

mouth, the overhanging Hapsburg lip, and half-closed eyes, all of which caused him to appear to be not quite bright.¹¹⁸ Other observers commented that he was, variously, dominated by his wife, by the Jesuits, by the great Austrian court officials. Yet, these same critics often failed to note that Leopold was withal a shrewd observer, an obstinate and tenacious guardian of his family's rights, and ultimately Louis's most determined enemy in Europe. His importance to this narrative is based on three elementary but important facts: his longevity, his passivity, and his modernity. First, his longevity: he was emperor from 1658 to 1705, and during those forty-seven years there emerge discernible patterns in his foreign policy, continuities that one does not find in the policies of Spain or England or even in the Dutch Netherlands. Second, his passivity: Leopold inclined before the winds of adversity, before storms that might have frightened and fatigued and even broken more active monarchs—a William III or a Louis XIV. In giving way, it often appeared that he was being bullied by the Spanish faction at court, or the Bohemian cabal, or the Jesuits, or the Italians. Yet, for all of his procrastinations and real or feigned indecisions, Austria and the Austrian empire of the Danube emerged as the victor in the early eighteenth century—"the miracle of the House of Austria." But then, his modernity: in this he resembled Louis XIV. Leopold was not a warrior. Like Louis, he had sloughed off the quasi-feudal guise of the active military leader in exchange for the less hectic and more modern role of commander-in-chief, remote among his files and secretaries. Leopold's contemporaries William III, Charles XII of Sweden, and Peter the Great retained the strenuous office of field commander, and in so doing represented a less-advanced stage of the kingly craft.

Louis's reaction to the Austrian Hapsburgs was much the same as to the Spanish cousins: he plotted aggressions, *petites affaires*. In the 1660's the king moved his troops into Lorraine, forcing Austria's ally, the duke, to flee to Vienna. At the same time Louis strengthened his hold on the Alsatian territories and increased his subsidies to the Rhineland princes, to the elector of Brandenburg, to the Polish magnates, and, secretly, to the Hungarian nobles who opposed Austrian domination. Yet, for all the heated rivalry that existed between Louis and Leopold, they were quite capable, in the name of *raison d'état*, of dividing up the Spanish inheritance between

themselves. In early 1668 when it appeared that Philip IV's successor, the child-king Carlos II, might die before reaching majority, the French emissary to Vienna negotiated the Secret Partition Treaty with the Austrians. Leopold I and his children were to have Spain, Milan, and a lion's share of the Spanish colonies. France claimed the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, and the Philippines. Thus in two instances Louis detailed his demands on the Spanish empire: first, through his letter to Philip IV concerning Maria Theresa's dowry; and second, in the Secret Partition Treaty of 1668.¹¹⁹ These demands would at the very least include claims to part of the Spanish Netherlands, to possession of the Franche-Comté and Luxembourg, and to compensation in Italy. The French attitude toward Vienna and Madrid, which was governed largely by considerations of territorial aggrandizement within the circle of Burgundian and Lortharingian lands, represented a traditional and fairly consistent policy that can be traced down through the reign to 1714.

French policy toward the Atlantic powers of England and the Dutch Netherlands is, on the other hand, more difficult to chart. It is filled with trials and errors, with egregious mistakes, with threats of reprisal and promises of gold. From the first, Louis and his ministers underestimated the power of England and misjudged the ability of that country to recover from the terrible years of civil war. Louis, moreover, misjudged Charles II, who was a man passively hostile to the French but no fool; in need of French money and therefore willing to accommodate Louis, he would, yet, in moments of danger to the crown, bend to the anti-French sentiments of his parliament and people. Withal, Charles was a dangerous ally for Louis XIV.¹²⁰ The Dutch were equally puzzling to French statesmen. Louis and Colbert called them "horse traders of . . . Europe, lock-pickers and messengers of the ocean" and "a nation of herring mongers, of cheese vendors." Yet, these very cheese vendors and herring mongers employed upward of 20,000 ships in the 1660's while France maintained only 600.¹²¹ Louis was also bemused by the fact that the United Provinces were an aristocratic republic that sported the house of Orange-Nassau, whose prince became during wartime the virtual military commander-in-chief. Louis, who failed to comprehend the workings of the complex Dutch political and military estab-

ishment, dismissed them as unreliable allies and unworthy enemies. Like Voltaire, Louis seems to have pictured the Dutch in terms of *canaux*, *canards*, *canailles*. In coalition, however, they proved to be formidable foes.

By 1665-66, just as the "Dutch problem" was becoming acute, Louis suffered crises in his public and personal life. In September, 1665, Philip IV died after a long illness, bringing into dramatic focus the question of the Spanish inheritance. In January, 1666, Anne of Austria died of cancer, leaving Louis bereft of a strong female influence in his life. Louis truly grieved for his mother because, as he admitted to his son, "I . . . knew better than any one person with what energy that princess preserved my dignity, at a time when I could not defend it myself . . ."; she displayed as well "intrepid firmness . . . and [when the time came] had voluntarily made [resignation] of sovereign authority in my favour."¹²² Altogether, in Louis's eyes, she was an admirable woman. And yet, her death was for the king a release from the last vestiges of parental control.

Although he mourned his mother's passing, it was the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV, that set in motion a portentous series of events. As early as 1664, Michel Le Tellier oversaw the building of granaries and munitions centers on the routes that led to the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands. Great stores of arms, cannon, and powder were accumulated in the newly acquired fortresses of Dunkirk, Arras, and Amiens. Troops were assembled close to the northern border, and Louis held a series of reviews, in that year of reviews, 1666. The king enjoyed the military pageantry; his taste for *gloire militaire* was whetted.

In May, 1667, Louis dispatched a letter to Madrid, addressed to "Her Most High, Illustrious and Mighty Princess, our dear and loving Sister Mariana, the Queen Dowager of Spain," in which the *Jus Devolutionis*—rights of Devolution—were set forth by the king's lawyers. The latter claimed that (1) Louis's wife, Maria Theresa, had not renounced her rights in the Spanish inheritance since no portion of her dowry had been paid; that (2) she was heir to her mother's marriage settlement and to her jewels amounting to 1,100,000 crowns in gold; thus (3) since neither had been paid, Maria Theresa was claiming certain places in the Spanish Low

Countries as her right by the local Brabant Law of devolution, which allowed the mother's fortune to devolve on the daughter. Her claims for territorial compensation were not inconsiderable: Antwerp, Upper Guelderland, Namur, Limburg, Hainault, Artois, Cambrai, the county of Burgundy, and the duchy of Luxembourg.¹²³

The Spanish Court, for once prompt in its answer, pointed out that (1) the *Jus Devolutionis* was not recognized as valid by Madrid; it was only a municipal (private) law of Brabant, having nothing to do with the sovereignty of that area; (2) there was no precedent, even in Brabant law, that favored the female over the male heir, and therefore Maria Theresa had no right to supersede her half-brother Carlos; (3) the fact that payment of Maria Theresa's dowry had not been made did not invalidate the renunciations she had acceded to; (4) lastly, the edict of Charles V in the sixteenth century, confirmed by the Estates of Brabant, forever joined the county of Brabant to the crown of Spain. Not content with these arguments, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands added his own answer in a letter to Louis XIV in which he appealed to the Law of Nations and Nature. He reminded Louis that the Empire could never allow "as noble a Member, as the Circle of Burgundy, . . . [to] be taken away," and recalled that Louis's proposed "appeal to arms" violated the Treaty of Münster, which provided a ten-month "cooling-off" period. These arguments point up the strong sense of legalism inherent in most of Louis's dealings with the house of Hapsburg. Yet, this lawyers' quarrel quickly turned into armed conflict. As a contemporary dolefully admitted: "Once the flame of a new War . . . began to be kindled"¹²⁴ there was no damping it. French troop movements commenced on May 20, 1667, just as Louis arrived at St. Quentin to oversee personally the movement of munitions to the front. Louvois had preceded his master by two days, preparing in minutest detail the military parade into the Low Countries. The ministers Lionne and Colbert followed closely behind. Turenne headed an army of 25,000 infantry and 10,000 horse against the border positions. The war was entirely one-sided. The Spanish governor, true to his own predictions, retreated, destroying his border fortifications as he went. Tournai fell, then Bergues, Furnes, Oudenarde, place-names of war that would become familiar in the next century and a half.

After lengthy negotiations, peace was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle one year later in May, 1668. The terms left France in possession of twelve fortresses including Lille, Courtrai, Douai, Tournai, and Charleroi, forming an irregular border that was "so dangerous and absurd" that it invited revision at the earliest opportunity.¹²⁵

Five months before the signing at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Dutch and English representatives, on January 23 (N.S.), 1668, signed a significant document known as the First Triple Alliance (so called because Sweden came into the agreement in April); it was a harbinger of the emerging Anglo-Dutch entente that slowly evolved in the 1670's and that was directed against French pretensions to the Spanish Low Countries and against the French overseas empire.¹²⁶

Even before the news of the signing of the Triple Alliance, Louis and his advisers, Lionne, Louvois, and Colbert, contemplated a "neutralization" of the Dutch power. The government of the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic had since 1635 allied themselves with France against the Spanish threat. But as that threat receded, the Dutch negotiated a *détente* with Madrid, first by making a separate peace with the Spanish in 1648 and second by granting the Spanish crown a subsidy of 480,000 crowns in 1668. Paris did not hide its resentment, and it became clear to the Dutch that an old proverb of theirs was becoming an alarming reality: *Gaullus amicus sed non vicinus*—France a friend but not a neighbor.

The Triple Alliance appeared to France as an aggressive move on the part of the Dutch, and Louis XIV countered by weaving a diplomatic web of alliances around the United Provinces, gaining uneasy allies in the Rhineland, including the elector of Cologne (whose dependent territory of Liège provided the necessary invasion route against the Dutch), the elector of Trier, and the bishop of Münster. Brandenburg, through bribery and promises, was neutralized. The emperor still adhered to the provisions of the First Partition Treaty, and Charles II of England—the key to the Atlantic entente—was suborned through promises of gold. As the Danish envoy in London reported: "The French are leaving no stone unturned in their machinations against the Triple Alliance."¹²⁷ The Secret Treaty of Dover was a further checkmate: a promise of three million *livres* to be paid to Charles II, one-half to be delivered before an English declaration of war on the Dutch.

Several developments unfolded in 1669 just before the signing of the Secret Treaty. First, Carlos II fell ill, throwing into stark relief the problem of the Spanish Succession. At the time a Dutch statesman wryly remarked that "the whole state of Europe is to be pitied when its peace depends upon the pleurisy or other illness of a child."¹²⁸ Close upon the illness of Carlos followed Louis XIV's claim that the seaport town of Nieuport in the Spanish Netherlands was "feudally subordinate" to the territory ceded him in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The tactics employed in the Reunions of the late 1670's had already begun.

As the Dutch conflict moved inexorably toward its violent phase, what, in sum, were its causes? Certainly the formation of the Triple Alliance was one; and commercial rivalry another. Third was the clash of interest between the French and Dutch over the Burgundian lands, which was one of the major catalysts in changing Dutch friendship for France into fear; fourth was the urgent need for a settlement of the Spanish inheritance, dramatized by Carlos II's illness in 1669. Louis XIV and his advisers felt ever more strongly that their outposts on the borders of the Spanish Netherlands must be strengthened and their enclaves enlarged; fifth was the "very existence" of the Dutch Republic, which Ernst Kossmann called "a paradox and a challenge" to the French—they disliked its parochial, independent ways, its fidelity to an antiquated "aristocratic ideal of liberty," which in itself was an insult to Louis's concept of the state. Yet, of all these contributory causes, those that concerned the Burgundian and Spanish inheritances were probably the most important. Professor Haley puts it succinctly when he says, "The ultimate object of Louis XIV's invasion of Holland has been to make easier his encroachments in Flanders without Dutch interference."¹²⁹

In order to move against the Spanish Low Countries and at the same time to "neutralize" the Dutch armies, Louis struck at the Dutch Netherlands by way of the "corridor" through the bishopric of Liège. Like the campaigns of 1667-68, the Dutch War began as a triumphal parade. Louis, accompanied by his brother the duke of Orléans, his two great generals Condé and Turenne, four other marshals, and an army of 25,000 horse and 86,000 foot, followed the course of the Sambre and Meuse valleys to the Rhine and crossed into Dutch Netherlands, near the border post of Tolhuis. "At the first sight of

the French Army," the historian Stephen Baxter has quipped, the United Provinces collapsed, "like a bad soufflé."¹³⁰ The year 1672 quickly became the *Rampjaar*, the year of disaster, in the annals of Dutch history.¹³¹ Their army, pitifully small and miserably armed, retreated before the French, falling back on Fortress Holland, that quadrilateral containing Rotterdam, The Hague, Haarlem, and Amsterdam. As an English agent noted: "The near approach of the French doth so much amaze us and put us into confusion here [in Rotterdam] that we are all in an uproar, the common people tumult, . . . pretending the great ones send away their money & best things, . . . and intend to follow after, & leave the people to the mercy of the French. . . ." ¹³²

As the wealthier population fled before the *furia Franca*, the regent or ruling classes of the Netherlands fell to quarreling among themselves. But out of this internal chaos was born the spirit of resistance to French hegemony, the antithesis to Louis's ideal of *gloire*. The active leader of this antithetical movement was William of Orange-Nassau, the stadtholder and military leader of the Dutch Netherlands. At the time of the French invasion William was twenty-one years old and like Leopold of Austria something of a physical curiosity. Barely five feet tall, hunch-backed from birth, wearing a brace to prop himself up during battles, asthmatic, subject to migraine headaches, fainting spells, and temper tantrums, William had neither the physical appearance nor the political maturity to inspire confidence among even the most loyal Orangemen. Seldom has a nation in a time of crisis called upon such a misfit and misanthrope to be its leader. Yet, as the jingle went:

Though he be very small
He'll be Stadtholder after all.¹³³

And stadtholder he became and remained, because like Louis XIV he was tenacious of his rights and possessed of an exaggerated sense of duty both to his house and to his country. In other ways he resembled not only Louis but Leopold I: all three were egocentric; all three boasted an exaggerated sense of *gloire*; all three were intolerant of dissent. Yet, they tempered these faults with political prudence; they weighed evidence, they listened to rumors, they took their time—often an inordinate length of time—to come to a decision.

Louis' own hesitations were never more clearly manifested than in his hour of triumph over the Dutch in the spring of 1672. Louis preferred the slow measured pavan of siege warfare; he enjoyed the spectacle of a stately maneuvering army. The rapidity with which the campaign broke into the Dutch Netherlands in the spring of 1672 startled the king and left him without a coherent or viable policy for peace or war. At the end of June, faced with the imminent collapse of the Republic, the Dutch States-General sent a delegation to Louis with very generous offers of territorial and commercial concessions. The king, nonplussed, appealed to the two ministers traveling with him, Louvois and Pomponne, for advice. Each outlined a course of action. Pomponne advised moderation and prudence; Louvois urged the king to demand even harsher terms, hinting that the French might soon dictate peace terms from the town hall in Amsterdam. Like polar opposites within Louis's own character, the ministers fought for dominance, and Louvois won temporarily. The peace delegation was sent packing, and the French demands were increased to include all the lands along the Rhine, extensive tariff concessions, free exercise of Catholic faith in the Netherlands, and an indemnity of 24 million *livres*. The politics of *gloire* triumphed.¹³⁴

Yet, to Louvois's surprise and Louis's chagrin, Dutch defenses held. The lands around Amsterdam and other areas of Fortress Holland were flooded; and William appealed to some European princes to support his cause *pro religione et libertate*. To others he played on the old theme of universal monarchy, substituting a French variation for the older Spanish one. On August 30, 1673, the Grand Alliance of The Hague, pledging military support for the Netherlands, was signed by Spain, the Rhenish states, Lorraine, Brandenburg, and the emperor. Louis's armies, having already retreated from their advanced positions in the Netherlands, took up a defensive line along the Rhine, the Moselle, and the valleys of the Spanish Low Countries in what was to become the classic strategic disposition of troops for the next three wars of coalition.

The campaigns that followed trumpeted patterns of warfare often repeated in the late seventeenth century: the siege of great fortresses, such as Vauban's brilliant investment of Maestricht in 1673; the march and countermarch of armies, such as Turenne's invasion of Alsace or Marshal Luxembourg's sallies along the Flemish front; and

the rapid military maneuver, such as the seizure in 1676 of the Franche-Comté. The Imperial forces retaliated in what was already a characteristic response by mounting a counterinvasion, led on this occasion by the great Austrian commander Montecucculi, which swept into Lorraine in 1676-77, arriving at the very gates of Metz. During that campaign Strasbourg was used as a *porte d'entrée*, a fact that did not escape the notice of the planners at Versailles.

Although Louis had for the second time won a claim to the Franche-Comté by the right of conquest, his war efforts on other fronts were dogged by diplomatic and military defeats, beginning in 1674 with the defection of England from the French alliance, followed in July of 1675 by Marshal Turenne's death on the battlefield, by the military rout of France's ally Sweden in June, 1675, and by the popular uprisings in Bordeaux and Brittany. Louis, heartily sick of the Dutch adventure, initiated peace negotiations in earnest in 1676 at the Dutch town of Nijmegen. England, serving as mediator, was represented by the shrewd and articulate statesman William Temple. The French delegation was headed by the seasoned diplomats D'Estrades, D'Avaux, and Colbert de Croissy, the last of whom had Louis's "particular confidence." The Imperials sent Count Kinsky and the Dutch, J. Beverning, both able negotiators. A stalemate developed at once because, as Temple observed: "Those who had gained by war pretended to retain all they had got and those that had lost pretended to recover all they had lost."¹³⁵ Later, Temple complained even more bitterly that the negotiations languished, "accroché des cérémonies." The stalemate was broken in 1677 when "the treaty [was] . . . truly won [by the French] in the field. . . ." ¹³⁶ So secure was Louis in his gains that even the "coquins" of Amsterdam accepted French terms, which again, as at the Pyrenees and Aix-la-Chapelle, marked out Spain as the victim. The Spanish ceded France the Franche-Comté and eleven towns in Flanders, including Ypres and Cambrai, thus rounding off the northern borders between the Spanish Low Countries and France and giving Vauban his prized *pré carré*. Maestricht, the great fortress town on the Meuse, was returned to the Dutch along with certain economic concessions; territory lost to Sweden was restored; and finally, the emperor, signing in February, 1679, granted Louis garrison rights to Freiburg-im-Breisgau, with access to Breisach on the Rhine.

The lessons learned from the Dutch War, or War of the First Coalition, are among the most significant of the reign because of their impact on Louis's attitude toward strategic planning and planners. First of all, Louis became thereafter more cautious in the deployment of his troops. The impetuosity of youth was gone, and he and his advisers made few grand gestures again like the invasion of the Dutch Netherlands. Under strict orders from Versailles, French planners were content with punitive raids into the Rhineland (1688), or campaigns in northern Italy in the 1690's; but not until the War of the Spanish Succession, when the grand strategy of the duke of Marlborough and of Prince Eugene forced them to it, did the French commanders risk the exposure of their inner lines. Second, for the next twenty years the strengthening of strategic frontiers was uppermost in Louis's mind. In the years following Nijmegen, Vauban was ordered to design fortifications for the length of the northern and northeastern frontiers. Elaborate defenses sprang up at Mount Royal, Saarlouis, Breisach, Luxembourg, and Philippsburg, all in an area where the memory of Montecucculi's invasion of 1676-77 was still fresh. At the same time Croissy, Louvois, Vauban, and Chamlay urged on Louis the policy of reunions and annexations.¹³⁷

A third legacy of Nijmegen was the concept of an anti-French coalition of powers. The idea was spawned in the Triple Alliance of 1668 and reinforced in the Grand Alliance of The Hague of 1673. Louis and his advisers noted that the great variable in these coalitions was England, who in the 1670's was rapidly recovering from the malaise of civil war and the three Dutch wars of the 1650-70's. But as Pomponne sagely observed in a memorandum to Louis XIV: "So long as she [England] is divided within herself she will be little equal to making herself considerable abroad and to holding that balance which seems to lie naturally in her hands among the contentions of Europe."¹³⁸ "That balance which seems to lie naturally in her hands"—a prophecy of which Louis and his foreign minister seemed well aware but were powerless to prevent. William Temple, too, realized England's strategic position. Writing to Charles II in early 1677, he noted "that all men knew, France was not in condition . . . to venture a war with England in conjunction with the rest of the Allies."¹³⁹ By 1679, with or without England's support, Louis's two implacable enemies—the Austrians and the Dutch—had formed a

working alliance. Out of the machinations of these two nations and the allied princes in the Low Countries, in the Germanies, and in Spain arose the great coalitions of the end of the century (*coalitions raisonnées*).

The fourth lesson of Nijmegen was reflected in the *conseil d'en haut*: conflicts within the council were exacerbated by the pressures of war. Louvois quarreled with the high command, with the Colberts, and with the king himself. As a group, they vented their spleen on the unfortunate Pomponne, whose plight became known in 1679 as the *affaire Pomponne*. It reached its crisis point in April, 1679, when Louis dismissed his foreign minister. Louis explained his action by saying that Pomponne had been derelict in the performance of his ministerial responsibilities, which was in part true, as is reported by the Venetian ambassador and other observers. Pomponne was also suspected of leaking information concerning the Jansenist problem to his family, many of whom were leaders in the Jansenist movement. This charge may, in part, be true also; if so, it was a serious breach of confidence. More likely, however, Pomponne was simply the victim of an intramural quarrel between the Colberts and the Le Telliers.¹⁴⁰

Louis, always cautious in these internecine fights within his council, did not heed Louvois's pleas that a member of the Le Tellier clan be appointed as foreign minister. Instead, Louis maintained a balance within the council by appointing Colbert's brother, the able lawyer and diplomat, Colbert de Croissy. It was Croissy who immediately initiated the policy of the "Reunions," by which the French minister reverted to cautious tactics of piecemeal annexations in the area of Alsace and Lorraine.¹⁴¹ The Courts of Reunion—*chambres des réunions*—were established at Metz, Besançon, and Breisach, and were charged by Colbert de Croissy with making "an exact investigation of the king's rights" in the provinces as granted him at Münster, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nijmegen. The cities of the Decapole had already been occupied in 1672-73. In the early 1680's French troops, bearing writs from the *chambres des réunions*, seized territories contiguous to the city of Strasbourg. Strasbourg, indeed, was the prize. It had served as a bridgehead over the Rhine by which the Imperial-Brandenburg army had entered Alsace in 1676-77, and Louis's advisers believed the Strasbourg *porte* must be closed. Louvois and Vauban were particularly adamant on this point. It was Louvois,

the technician of war, who planned down to the minutest detail the march into Strasbourg, which took place on September 30, 1681.¹⁴² At that time a medal was struck grandly announcing that *Clausula Germaniae Gallia*: France had closed the gate to Germany. On the reverse side was inscribed *Securitas Alsatiæ*, the security of Alsace assured. But the verdict of history was not as certain as Louis XIV might have hoped. In 1871, as the Prussians hailed their king as emperor of Germany at Versailles, the historian Ranke could write that Germans were still fighting the wars of Louis XIV—still hoping to regain Strasbourg irredenta.

Beginning in the years of the Reunions and of Strasbourg's fall, Louis XIV seems to have suffered a series of personal crises, which, for want of a better term, we may call *crise de midi*. In 1682 Louis was forty-four years old and was suffering from ill health: he complained of his "vagaries"—headaches, toothaches, chills (in part from attacks of malaria), dyspepsia, and acute swelling and bleeding associated with an anal fistula (which was to be operated upon in 1686). In the same years Louis's personal relations underwent a crisis. His wife Maria Theresa died in 1683. Of her he said, the only sad moment she had given him was in her dying. But Maria Theresa's death was a minor inconvenience. More serious was the revelation three years before that his vivacious and imperious mistress, Madame de Montespan, companion of his early maturity and mother of seven of his children, had been strongly implicated in a scandal that involved a series of infamous poisonings and the practice of black masses. The news of the *affaire des poisons* was quickly quashed by the lieutenant general of the police;¹⁴³ but enough of the details were known at court to alarm the council and to disillusion Louis.

During the same period Louis seems to have undergone a *crise de conscience* as well. He became concerned for his immortal soul. In his quest for surety he turned increasingly for guidance and comfort to the governess of his legitimated children, Madame de Maintenon, one of the most remarkable women at his court. Madame de Maintenon, a descendant of a noble but impoverished Huguenot family and a convert to Catholicism, was widowed at an early age. She had, as an act of charity, been given the post of governess to the bastard children of Louis XIV by her kinswoman, Madame de Montespan. Maintenon's greatest virtues as a governess were patience and an

even temper. She was also an excellent listener, and Louis found her a perfect confidante, an ideal repository of secrets. She kept her own counsel, and she did not belabor Louis with complaints or gossip. When she did speak, her words were balanced, cautious, non-committal, lest she perpetrate a political or personal *faux pas*. Like his hermitage at Marly, Madame de Maintenon's rooms at Versailles provided Louis with a refuge, a secluded corner in which to muse for a few hours. Madame de Maintenon herself describes it best: "When the king returns from hunting, he comes to me; then the door is closed, and no one enters. Here I am then alone with him. I must bear his troubles, if he has any, his sadness, his nervous dejection; sometimes he bursts into tears which he cannot control, or else he complains of illness."¹⁴⁴ Maintenon in her later years was at once a companion, a confidante, and, in short, a mother substitute to the aging monarch.

Maintenon's rewards were not inconsiderable. Louis built her a school at St. Cyr, close to Versailles, where she could indulge her schoolmarmish bent by directing the education of young ladies of good but impoverished families. The king may also have married Maintenon, but the exact date is difficult to determine, sometime between 1683 and 1700, probably closer to the former. Her political influence, though considerable, is likewise difficult to ascertain: Louis did not tolerate direct advice from his family or from his women companions. So much did he detest the image of the *roi fainéant*, the king ruled by a strong minister or wilful woman, that he was on constant guard lest he be accused of having fallen prey to the sin of his ancestors. Yet, critics of Maintenon, then and now, have credited her with a major role in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685); in Fénelon's exile to Cambrai (the late 1690's); in the attacks on Louvois (1689-90); in the acceptance of the will of Carlos II (1700); in initiating overtures for peace in the period 1709-12.¹⁴⁵ These political coups are either fabrication from whole cloth or exaggerated. Maintenon did wield political influence in Louis's later years, but she did so through her creatures, her friends in office—men like Michel Chamillart, minister from 1699 to 1709, and a former controller in her household; or Daniel-François Voysin, a minister from 1709 to 1715, also a former official in her household; or through close friends, like Marshal d'Harcourt or Princess des

Ursins. But as to direct political influence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to document. From scattered evidence we may, however, conjecture that in decisions affecting foreign policy Maintenon probably had very little influence; but in decisions affecting political appointments (particularly after 1698) her opinion, when sought by the king, was not lightly disregarded.

Madame de Maintenon, as one might expect, was hated by members of the king's immediate family, by Louis's supercilious and effeminate brother, Philippe, and by Philippe's rather masculine-appearing wife, Elizabeth-Charlotte of Bavaria, nicknamed Liselotte, and by Louis's son, Monseigneur, the Grand Dauphin. They thought of her as the perpetrator of *mésalliance* and referred to her with scorn as that monstrous woman, that sorceress; or in more colorful language, particularly from the pen of Liselotte, as that "old bag," "old slut," and worse.¹⁴⁶ But the courtiers sensed about her an aura of quiet competence and referred to her as *Toute-Puissante*—the all-powerful. Her pre-eminent position in Louis's entourage was assured after 1684, and she survived the political vicissitudes of the closing years of the reign because of a fortunate mixture of religious ardor, political astuteness, and personal asceticism.

Maintenon's ascendancy coincided with the further routinization of Louis's life. In May, 1682, the court officially moved to Versailles, and the secretaries of state, with their bureaus and files of state documents settled into a wing of the huge palace. The *conseil d'en haut* met in chambers leading directly off Louis's great state bedroom; there, at a long table covered in green velvet and trimmed in gold fringe, the ministers and their king debated affairs of state, usually from 9:30 in the morning until nearly noon, and often, in wartime, again in the late afternoon. Louis in later years consulted more frequently in private audience with his ministers or with a favorite general or admiral or ambassador returned home; these *tête-à-têtes* were held before mass in the morning, in the early afternoon, or in the evening beside Madame de Maintenon's fireplace.

As the affairs of the council began to loom more importantly in Louis's life than the affairs of the heart, the quarrels among his ministers increasingly absorbed his attention. Following Pomponne's disgrace in 1679, the Le Telliers and the Colberts jockeyed for the premier position in Louis's council. However, until the great Colbert's

death in 1683, the two families were evenly matched, with Michel Le Tellier and Louvois on one side and Colbert and Croissy on the other. Then with the death of Colbert and the appointment of Louvois's creature Claude Le Peletier as controller-general, the Le Telliers held a slight edge. Le Peletier soon proved to be an ineffectual administrator, and with the elder Le Tellier's death in 1685 and Colbert's son Seignelay's appointment to the council in 1689, a balance between the two families was once again restored. In 1690 a third family, the Phélypeaux, was introduced to the *conseil d'en haut*. Louis Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, who represented a long line of civil servants, was named controller-general and secretary of state for the marine; his son, Jérôme, became a secretary *en survivance* and officially succeeded to the marine in 1699. With Louvois's death in 1691 Louis appointed moderate ministers in his stead: the Duc de Beauvillier and Arnauld de Pomponne, the latter recalled out of semi-retirement. The power of the Le Telliers declined precipitously in the decade of the 1690's. Indeed, Louvois's heir, Barbezieux, was so inept that though he was allowed to retain his inherited office as secretary of state for war, he was never given a seat on the council. The Colberts, on the other hand, maintained their prominent position in the government. The Marquis de Torcy, Colbert's nephew and Croissy's son, succeeded to the office of foreign minister in 1699; and Nicolas Desmaretz, another of Colbert's nephews, was nominated as controller-general in 1708, after having served for thirty years as one of the most important civil servants in that ministry. At the end of the century there emerged two other factions: one led by the creatures of Mme de Maintenon, Michel Chamillart and Daniel-François Voysin; the other—dubbed the *dévots*, or devout party—headed by the Ducs de Beauvillier and Chevreuse. The latter group allied itself with the young duke of Burgundy and his mentor, Archbishop Fénelon. Louis, however, never permitted a person or a faction to hold the preponderant position in his council; by skilful apportioning of favors and offices, he maintained until the very last years of his reign a precarious equilibrium among striving parties, be they the Colberts, the Le Telliers, the Phélypeaux, the creatures of Maintenon, the *dévots*, or, later, the supporters of the dukes of Maine and of Orléans.

Even as the king was withdrawing into the remoteness of his palace at Versailles and submerging himself in the debates of his councils,

his personal *crise de conscience* was projected ever more forcibly into the religious affairs of France. Ironically, just at the moment in the late 1670's and early 1680's when the king's concern for his salvation became strikingly evident, the pope, Innocent XI, appeared as one of Louis's bitterest critics. Macaulay said of Innocent that "in all private relations [he was] the meekest and gentlest of men; when he spoke officially from the Chair of St. Peter, he spoke in tones of Gregory the Seventh and Sixtus the Fifth."¹⁴⁷ Two strong men of Louis XIV's and Innocent XI's ilk seem fated to quarrel, as indeed they did over the *régale*, which was "the right of disposing of the revenues of a bishopric when vacant, and of nominating to the benefices. . . ." It had by custom in France been a local privilege; but in his quest for uniformity, Louis and his religious advisers had in the years 1673-76 nationalized it. Several stalwart opponents of Louis challenged the king's right to interfere in local church affairs, among them the bishops of Pamiers and Alet, who appealed to the pope in Rome. Innocent supported their petitions and in so doing infuriated Louis. At the end of the 1670's the king came close to breaking diplomatic relations with Rome. Louis was reinforced in his opposition to the papacy by his confessor, Père La Chaize; by Bishop Bossuet; and by the archbishop of Paris, Harlay de Champvallon. Although a member of the Jesuit order, La Chaize was a convinced Gallican;¹⁴⁸ Bossuet, a famed orator at court,¹⁴⁹ the tutor of the king's son and heir, and the author of a number of books on church government and history, was, like La Chaize, a defender of the rights and privileges of the French church; and Harlay a "balanced, just and sound man,"¹⁵⁰ was a model courtier. None of them opposed Louis's private war on Innocent XI.

The clash between king and pope gained in intensity in the 1680's, exacerbated by the promulgation of the Gallican Articles of 1682, with their emphasis on the local and national rights of the French Roman Catholic church over those of the ultramontanes, and by Louis XIV's apparent neutrality in the Turkish invasion of the Holy Roman Empire. As the French foreign minister supposedly remarked at the time: "You know that [Holy Wars] have ceased to be in fashion since St. Louis."¹⁵¹ An attack on Innocent XI personally was heralded in the early 1680's by the publication of a *Memoire by the Reverend Father de la Chaize to Prove that Innocent XI is a Jansenist*. These personal and doctrinal quarrels reached an apogee

in 1687 when Louis replied to one of Innocent's frequent complaints, saying "I have never regulated my actions by those of others; God has placed me here to give example, not to receive it."¹⁵² The Roman *curia* retorted that Louis's attitude toward Rome was "villianous, calumnious, blasphemous!" The king's advisers saw in such words a "sign of mental aberration" in the pope. The confrontation of a seemingly impious and certainly imperious king and a pious and certainly intractable pope precipitated a European scandal.

The Franco-Papal imbroglio, which was not resolved until after Innocent's death in 1689, was further complicated by the Huguenot problem in France. Some authors have suggested that Louis's intensification of the attack on the so-called Reformed Religion in the late 1670's and early 1680's was sparked by his desire to appease the pope. This seems highly unlikely; Innocent XI, although a staunch crusader against heretics, was not one to be placated by French offerings of this sort. In fact, Louis complained that the pope was not sufficiently appreciative of his government's efforts to purify the religious body of France. What, then, sparked Louis's concern with the problem of the Protestants in 1680? Like so many of his decisions, it seems in part to have been a pragmatic one. Following the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678-79, Louis found that he had at hand an army of veteran troops that he did not wish to disband.¹⁵³ In consultation with the war office, the king sent some of the soldiers to frontier garrisons; others were deployed in Alsace and Lorraine to aid in the occupation of territories claimed by the chambers of reunion; still others served as the labor force in Vauban's vast construction programs or under Hardouin-Mansart's supervision at Versailles. It was probably Louvois's suggestion that the remainder of the contingents be sent as "booted missionaries" into the province of Poitou to help "persuade" Protestant families to return to the Roman Catholic religion. Since the first days of his personal reign Louis had dreamed of a unified state. His dislike of the spirit of the Fronde, as we have seen, embraced all forms of dissent, and he particularly abhorred what the French called "L'Etat dans l'état"—or *imperio in imperium*, which, in theory, the Huguenot sect represented. The Edict of Nantes promulgated in 1598 by Henri IV had granted political and religious rights to the Huguenots as means of pacifying the nation. Yet, the Edict should be remembered in the

context of its time. It granted limited toleration, with civil and military rights to buttress its religious clauses. From the first it had been so unsatisfactory an arrangement that Richelieu had been impelled to repeal the political clauses in 1629. In the 1650's bishops had begun a campaign urging the repeal of the religious clauses; and by the 1670's a full-fledged crusade was undertaken against the Protestants.¹⁵⁴

Louis felt that in undertaking this crusade he was exercising his right to follow the doctrine of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, set down in the sixteenth century; and he looked upon himself as the New Constantine, the New Charlemagne, whose *gloire* was to be further enhanced by religious triumphs. To many Frenchmen, Louis was like a colossus of stability standing in the midst of the troubled seas of dissent. Thus, when the Edict of Nantes was revoked by the Edict of Fontainebleau in October, 1685, Louis, like his chancellor Michel Le Tellier, viewed this act as one of the great achievements of his reign.

In reviewing Louis's policy today, several aspects still confound and repel the observer. The use of the *dragonnades* seems reprehensible: they caused untold suffering, the flight of over 200,000 men and women, and a series of subsequent revolts, including those in the Cévennes in 1702-5. Second, the policies of Louis and his religious advisers, most notably Bossuet, seemed to be running counter to the movement for toleration that was being born even in the 1680's. As the modern critic Paul Hazard has remarked, "While Louis XIV was still at the zenith of his power and glory, . . . virtually all those ideas which were called revolutionary round about 1760, or for that matter, 1789, were already current as early as 1680. . . ." ¹⁵⁵ Indeed, in the Low Countries the Huguenot exile Pierre Bayle, an early *philosophe*, railed against Louis's policies in his great work *Philosophical Commentary on the Words of Jesus-Christ: Compel Them to Come in*, saying that "to use force in matters of conscience—the thing [is] monstrous and horrible." ¹⁵⁶ Louis's thoughts, on the other hand, were one with Père Maimbourg, who said, "The disastrous conflagration which has wrought such ruin in France [Protestantism and the religious wars] . . . and of which little more than the smoke remains, that will soon be utterly extinguished." ¹⁵⁷

Of the denunciations of Louis XIV's aggressive policies none were more eloquent or biting, or inspired more by politics, than those of

the Austrians. In 1683 the Ottoman Turks had invaded Austrian crown lands, but no French troops were sent to Vienna's succor. In fact, it was strongly rumored that Louis was encouraging Turkish aggression. A doggerel then current underscored the Austrians' suspicions of France:

The Crescent Moon [of Islam] climbs up the night sky
And the Gallic cock sleeps not!¹⁵⁸

When, in 1683-84, the crescent flag of Islam began its retreat from the gates of Vienna before the combined forces of the king of Poland, the German princes, and the emperor, the jubilant Viennese posted a great placard in letters of gold on their gates:

Vienna Stands Freed
The Turkish Power Totters
.
Happy Austria (for which God always
doth Wonders against the *Turks* and *French*)
Arises from her Ashes. ¹⁵⁹

Austria did indeed, like the phoenix, arise from her ashes, and pursued the defeated Turks to the gates of Belgrade, capturing the city of Buda in the beginning of what was to become a great *Drang nach Osten*. As the historian Stoye points out: "The advance down the Danube [is] one of the major developments of seventeenth-century history."¹⁶⁰

But as the doggerels on the street placards attest, the Austrians had not forgotten what they considered to be the perfidy of France. In the west during the summer of 1686, like another phoenix from the ashes, arose the League of Augsburg, bringing with it an association of the emperor, Carlos II (in his capacity as the duke of Burgundy), Charles XI of Sweden, and the elector of Bavaria.¹⁶¹

It was the League of Augsburg and the policy of the Reunions that focused French attention on the "German problem" in the 1680's. The war of 1688 was prefaced by the French siege of Luxembourg in 1683, which led to limited war with Spain and the Twenty Years' Truce, signed at Ratisbon in 1684, by which France retained her conquests made under the Reunions. Following the formation of the

League, Louis's government prepared for war with the emperor. Louis abandoned the legalism of the Reunion policy by seizing Luxembourg in 1682. At the same time Vauban's vast building program in Alsace appeared to give plausibility to the claim: *Clausula Germaniae Gallia*. Louis's aggressive religious policy and his intervention in the affairs of the Burgundian Circle drove many of the German princes into open opposition, and with them a motley assemblage of allies: the emperor, Spain, Innocent XI, the Dutch, and, belatedly, the English.

The problem of England at this time was a curious one. Louis and his advisers cast a jaundiced eye at James II's indiscretions. Having come to the throne in 1685, James possessed neither the charm nor the caution of his brother Charles. The French ambassador Bonrepaus warned Louis's government that James was a bumbler, a bigot, and, worst of all, a fool, who would not listen to the cautionary note sounded by his cousin in France. When Louis suggested that French subsidies be spent on a fleet that would work in concert with France, James turned a deaf ear. Thus when William of Orange set off in 1688 to invade James's England, Louis was caught in a dilemma. Even though James had told "his dear brother, France," that *au fond*, he had a "French heart," Louis's plea for co-operation had been brusquely declined. Moreover, information supplied to Louis by the secretary of the marine, Seignelay, had predicted that William would not sail for England so late in the season. With a recalcitrant James on the throne, and with the French navy at a technical disadvantage, Louis and his advisers thought it might be to their advantage to foster a full-fledged civil war in England, which might keep the English out of a continental war. Another factor also played an important role: the recurrent problem of the Spanish inheritance.¹⁶²

Lastly—and probably the *clef* to the whole problem—was the German question. Louis in 1687 became deeply involved in the nomination of a French candidate, Cardinal Fürstenberg, to the electoral seat of Cologne. Innocent XI refused to confirm Fürstenberg on the ground "that he was a notorious pluralist and simoniac."¹⁶³ As the French ambassador in Madrid told the council at Versailles: the pope with "gaiété de cœur et d'un dessein prémédité" plotted with the emperor a war on Louis. Louvois saw the issue clearly: "The Germans, henceforth, must be considered as our true enemies; they

alone can do us great harm; *if they had an emperor who could mount a horse*"¹⁶⁴ (italics added). Louis's great minister of war enunciated anew the old conception of France *inter teutonicos et latinos*.

While the Germanies and Vienna thus engrossed Versailles's attention, England fell to William's invading forces without a single French soldier or naval vessel being sent to help James. At the same time, war in the Germanies broke out, not in the electoral territory of Cologne but in the Palatinate, where Louis, claiming certain rights of inheritance for his sister-in-law (shades of the War of Devolution) sent his armies to lay waste the country in the hopes of slowing down the advance of Imperial forces. The destruction in the Rhineland areas of the Palatinate was dreadful, and though the Palatine War of 1688-89 proved to be a tactical victory, it was a diplomatic debacle. The German princes, enraged over the scorched earth policy, flocked to Imperial colors.

By a pact signed in May, 1689, known as the Grand Alliance of Vienna, the German princes, the emperor, the Dutch, and the English joined together the might of Mittel-europa with the power of the emergent Maritime states in an alliance to put a halt to Louis's pretensions to the Palatinate. The war of 1688-97 is variously called the War of the Second Coalition, the Orleans War, the War of the Grand Alliance, the Palatine War, the War of the English Succession, King William's War, the Nine Years' War, or the War of the League of Augsburg.¹⁶⁵ The latter designation, which is usually given it by the French historians, will be adopted here.

The War of the League of Augsburg was a rather dreary spectacle: Fortress France, which was ranged against the rest of Europe, preserved her borders against incessant allied hammering. Quite early in the war, a stalemate of march and countermarch developed within the *pré carré* of the Spanish Low Countries. In June, 1691, Marshal Luxembourg captured Mons, which Louis had so many years before viewed through his telescope; in June, 1692, Namur surrendered, with Louis and his court in attendance; and a victory at Steinkirke in the same year caught the French fancy: it became fashionable to wear a "Steinquerque" cravat at court and to play Couperin's new "Steinquerque" march at concerts. The year 1693-94 brought further French victories; but in 1695 Marshal Luxembourg, France's ablest commander, died, and Villeroi, his successor, was one

of Louis's poorest appointments. During these annual Flanders campaigns William III displayed a dogged determination to rally his troops against the might of France: he rode with his officers, encouraged his troops personally, and oversaw the minutest details of logistical planning. In September, 1695, came William's one great land victory, the recapture of Namur. The French war effort was also weakened on the home front. The year 1693-94 brought a devastating crop failure, one of the worst winters in the seventeenth century, matched only by the famine of 1708-9. At the same time new taxes were levied in order to finance the war, the *capitation* or head tax, being the most famous.

France needed peace. Louis sent off his special emissaries to Spain and the veteran diplomat D'Avaux to Sweden. Louis followed the negotiations with his usual concern for details, carrying with him, as he did in the Dutch war, a staff of junior ministers and secretaries to whom he dictated letters and discussed peace proposals. In Paris, Pomponne urged that "considerable concessions" be given to the allies of the Grand Alliance. His "suggestion," seconded by Louis XIV, was at once relayed to Bonrepas in Copenhagen and to agents in Switzerland and The Hague. Their combined efforts were rewarded in 1696 when Savoy shattered the Grand Alliance by making a separate peace with France. In 1696-97 the French held serious negotiations with the Dutch and Imperials, who met in the palace of Nieuwberg in Ryswick.¹⁶⁶ One of the hinges upon which the door of peace swung was the question of the fate of the city of Strasbourg. Alarmed by reports that Louis XIV meant to surrender that great city to the Imperials, Vauban wrote that "a Rhine crossing and location of Strasbourg's size and strength [is] worth more than all the rest of Alsace. . . . [Moreover, it is] the finest and most secure arsenal in Europe."¹⁶⁷ The clinching argument, however, was that only with Strasbourg in his possession could Louis style himself king in Alsace—otherwise, he was "but a great nobleman."¹⁶⁸ Louis, who probably read Vauban's letter, worked out a compromise with the allies: he gave up claims to all fortresses on the right-hand bank of the Rhine and to Philippsburg, to the city and fortress of Luxembourg, and to certain places in the Southern Netherlands in exchange for the recognition of France's legal title to Strasbourg and possession of Saarlouis. Vauban's bridgehead and arsenal was thus secured. As for

William III, he wrested the title of king of England from Louis. Otherwise, the European settlement signaled a return to *status quo ante bellum*.

In the matter of empire overseas, France was more fortunate. Governor Frontenac of Canada had defeated the Phipps expedition against Quebec in 1690, and in the years following had initiated a successful Indian campaign against the New England colonies. In 1697 a French-Canadian commander, Iberville, and his troops had raided the Hudson Bay country, capturing Fort Nelson,¹⁶⁹ and a French fleet had sacked Cartagena on the Spanish Main. The Ryswick settlement recognized the modest French colonial gains. In India, on the African coast, and in North America the *status quo ante* was maintained. In the Caribbean, Spain acknowledged French *de jure* rights to the western half of the island of Santo Domingo and to the island of Tortuga.

Three observations can be made of the Ryswick settlement: first, it represented a quest for legitimacy, as was shown in the pursuit of *de jure* rights to Strasbourg, to Santo Domingo, and above all to William's claim to the English throne. Second, Ryswick ushered in a settlement of world as well as European problems, with heavy emphasis on colonial claims. Third, it reiterated Europe's search for security, whether in the form of barrier fortresses in the Southern Netherlands or a bridgehead to the Rhine.

With the legal French occupation of Santo Domingo went an increase of the king's interest in the French empire. Louis in consultation with Vauban and Jérôme de Pontchartrain (who served his father, Louis de Pontchartrain, as unofficial secretary of the marine) envisioned several colonial ventures, including an expedition to the Louisiana country. With Jérôme's vigorous support a French expedition led by the Canadian hero Lemoyne d'Iberville set sail for the New World late in 1698, landing at Pensacola Bay in January, 1699. On March 2 of the same year the Iberville expedition discovered the mouth of the Mississippi River, which they claimed for France. From this modest beginning grew the Louisiana colony.

Along with the revival of interest in the colonies went Jérôme de Pontchartrain's attempts to strengthen the ministry of the marine. In 1695-96 he created a *dépôt* of maps and plans, which in time evolved into a central planning agency for the marine and the col-

onies. To this bureau were attracted geographers, marine and military engineers, former colonial governors and intendants, lawyers, diplomats, and swarms of agents. From its members were recruited men who planned the fortifications of the New World and the French coast; geographers to map the vast wildernesses of the Mississippi and Laurentian valleys; oceanographers and cartographers who produced such works as the revisions of *Le Neptune français*, and the publication of *Carte des environs du Mississipi* (1701); and strategists like Iberville, who outlined in his *Projet sur Caroline* a comprehensive blueprint for French expansion into the New World, at once a containment policy and a gospel for the spread of *Pax Gallica*.¹⁷⁰

After Ryswick

In the years immediately following the Ryswick settlement, Louis XIV seemed to seek greater seclusion, frequently retiring from the formality of Versailles to his hermitage at Marly, where during the "season" (October to spring) he would remain from late Wednesday until Sunday. He did not, however, abandon the practice of meeting daily with his ministers, whether it be in *conseil d'en haut* or singly or in pairs, or whether it be Marly or Versailles. He also took to consulting frequently with his two chief military strategists, Chamlay and Vauban, who planned for further revisions of the north and northeastern border. One of the results of these military conversations was the construction of Vauban's masterpiece, the great fortress of Neuf-Breisach, built to guard against a sudden invasion of the Alsace territories.

During the same years of 1697-1700 Louis relied heavily on the advice of the aged Pomponne and on young Torcy, both of whom served as foreign secretaries after Croissy's death in 1696. The king and his foreign ministers recognized the need to reach a compromise settlement with the emperor and the Atlantic powers over the question of the Spanish inheritance. A group of able ambassadors were sent off to capitals of Europe: Villars to Vienna, Tallard to London, and D'Harcourt to Madrid. William III, "my dear brother, England," proved to be more amenable to a negotiated settlement on Spain than did the emperor, who, flushed with recent victories over the Turk, became ever more intransigent.¹⁷¹

Torcy and Pomponne set forth the problem in a series of memoirs: the chief contender for the throne of Spain was Emperor Leopold's grandson Joseph Ferdinand, son of Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria, and of Leopold's daughter Maria Antonia. The elector's family was then living in Brussels, where Max was serving as Spain's viceroy. The other two candidates were Archduke Charles, Leopold's second son by his third marriage, and Louis XIV's son and heir, the Grand Dauphin. Both Louis XIV and William III favored a partition of the empire among the three candidates, leaving the lion's share of Spain and Spanish overseas possessions to Joseph Ferdinand, who as a Wittelsbach-Hapsburg would serve as a make-weight in the power struggle between Bourbon and Austrian Hapsburg. The French dauphin was to be compensated by lands in Italy—Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan ports; and the Austrian archduke was compensated by cession of Milan and the Milanese. This agreement to partition the Spanish inheritance was signed in October, 1698; but it was at best an uneasy and tenuous accord because Leopold I was certain to reject it and England was equally certain to claim compensation for herself, probably, as William suggested in a conversation with Tallard, a naval base at either Ceuta, Port Mahon, or Oran. Yet, as shaky as the settlement was, it was an experiment in the politics of moderation that both Louis and William felt was necessary. Moreover, the First Partition Treaty left the "crucial area" of the Spanish Low Countries—that prize piece of the Burgundian inheritance—in the hands of a Wittelsbach rather than a Bourbon or a Hapsburg.¹⁷²

The diplomatic house of cards collapsed in February, 1699, when the young Joseph Ferdinand died. His passing snatched away the best hope that the French and the Maritime powers had for reaching a compromise. Undaunted, Torcy alone—for Pomponne was too ill to be of much help—negotiated a Second Partition Treaty, signed on March 13, 1700, that left the Archduke Charles with Spain, the Indies, and the Spanish Low Countries (where England preferred the Hapsburgs over the Bourbons). The dauphin received as compensation the same Italian possessions suggested in the First Partition Treaty and, in addition, the Duchy of Milan, which he hoped to exchange for Lorraine (and settle the Lotharingian problem). The second agreement, unfortunately for the peace of Europe, had less chance of success than the first. Louis most reluctantly gave up to the

house of Hapsburg what amounted to the hegemony of Europe; and once again, the Atlantic powers found themselves inadequately compensated.¹⁷³

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, THE PEACE OF UTRECHT,
AND AFTER, 1700-1715

In October, 1700, a few months after the English and French emissaries had pieced together the Second Partition Treaty, Carlos II, in Madrid, ordered his last will and testament drawn up. Carlos, who was in a dudgeon over rumors of the partition of the Spanish empire, had, in one of his few energetic moments, decided to leave the empire "entire" to the strongest candidate in Europe, Louis XIV's grandson Philip of Anjou. Failing the Bourbons, the Spanish inheritance was to go to Charles, the son of Leopold I, and failing the Hapsburgs, to the house of Savoy. Carlos died on November 1, and his will was presented to the French *conseil d'en haut*, which met at Fontainebleau on November 9. The peace faction, led by the Duc de Beauvillier, favored the Second Partition Treaty; but Colbert de Torcy, who had been one of the major architects of that treaty, in an apparent *volte face*, supported the will. Torcy argued that (1) Leopold was, in any event, committed to a war policy if any part of the Spanish inheritance was left to the Bourbons, so that war with the Austrian Hapsburgs was inevitable; (2) that Louis must accept the inheritance "entire," or by the terms of the will it would legally pass to the next in line of succession, Archduke Charles; (3) that if the French did not accept the will at once, the Spanish grandees and the ruling junta in Madrid might shift their allegiance to Vienna.¹⁷⁴ After long hours of discussion Torcy's views prevailed, and six days later Louis XIV announced to his assembled court that his grandson, Philip of Anjou, had taken his rightful and legal title as Philip V of Spain. Many of the European princes received the news from Fontainebleau with astonishing equanimity; and even the cautious Maintenon confided that the "wisest people are sure that we will have no war."¹⁷⁵

Yet, like a restless contagion, war fever spread across Europe, and the great powers drifted ever closer to the maelstrom. The observer

may ask why. The answer would seem to be that, first of all, the ruler of England, the governors of the United Provinces, and the emperor either wanted war or felt that it was inevitable. William III wrote to the Dutch Grand Pensionary Heinsius that he would "drag this people in by prudent and gradual means." Meanwhile, Heinsius and his associates in The Hague began at once casting about among the German princes for allies, and in Vienna, Leopold ordered an army under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy to invade the heartland of northern Italy, the Lombard plain.

The second major cause of war was the lack of direction given by Louis XIV to his foreign policy. During the events of late 1700 to May, 1702, Louis seems to have suffered a failure of nerve not unlike those he experienced in 1672 and 1688. He was torn between personal loyalty to his grandson Philip V and to James II on the one hand and to a policy of *Realpolitik* on the other. Characteristically, Louis trimmed his sails, leaving both his allies and his opponents uncertain as to his goals. For example, at the behest of his grandson, Philip V, Louis dispatched French troops to occupy the barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, sending their Dutch garrisons packing. Such an action was legal, but it caused rumors of war to sweep over the Dutch Netherlands. At the same time Louis sent some of his best diplomats to The Hague to assure the Dutch that his intentions were pacific. In Madrid, meanwhile, Louis's agents framed a new *asiento* (monopoly of slave trade) agreement that favored French interests, confirming the fears of William III and Heinsius that France meant to exercise economic as well as political hegemony within the Spanish empire.¹⁷⁶

In answer to what they saw as the French challenge, William III and Heinsius along with the representatives of the Empire signed the Grand Alliance of The Hague, actually, a Third Partition Treaty, on September 9, 1701. Louis's indirect response to the Allied gauntlet came on September 18 with the recognition of James III in succession to his father James II, who had died that very day. It was an ill-timed *beau geste*.

With news of the first full-fledged campaigns of the war in June and July, 1702, Louis seemed to slough off his ennui, becoming, instead, as the Dutch would say, "obsessive," absorbed with the task at hand. Louis met with his *conseil d'en haut* nearly every day to map out the strategies for war and peace; and in the evenings he often

worked late into the night to frame a viable war policy and to seek a quick settlement of the conflict.

Although Louis pursued a policy of war and peace simultaneously, the historian can for heuristic purposes separate them. In matters pertaining to war the major administrative burden was carried by Michel Chamillart, controller-general of finances from 1699 to 1708 and minister of war from 1701 to 1709. A pleasant, well-meaning mediocrity, Chamillart is an excellent example of a "palace appointment," whose nomination to these great offices was probably due to the favor shown him by Madame de Maintenon. Chamillart, unfortunately for Louis and for the French war effort, was a bumbler, who too often interfered in the conduct of other ministers' affairs, angering, among others, the foreign minister Colbert de Torcy and the secretary of the marine Jérôme de Pontchartrain.¹⁷⁷ As tensions again mounted within the king's high council, the ministers and the secretaries of state began to complain quite openly of insubordination and disobedience of orders. This malaise became so widespread within the administrative hierarchy that ministerial reports were filled with words like *malversations*, *mauvais conduite*, *désobéissance ferme et déclarée*, *grand abus*, *insolence*. It was what Marcel Giraud has described as a severe "crise de conscience et d'autorité."¹⁷⁸

To add to Louis's griefs, the war went badly for France. The Allied commanders, John Churchill, the duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene of Savoy outmaneuvered and outfought Louis's marshals on battlefields ranging from Flanders to Bavaria and from Italy to central Spain. As a consequence, the king's high command suffered its own crisis of leadership. Marshals Villeroi, Marsin, Tallard, and D'Harcourt, all creatures of Louvois, had distinguished themselves as courtiers and ambassadors but not as field commanders; they were indeed poor substitutes for the veterans Catinat and Vauban, who retired early in the war. Only Vendôme, Berwick (James II's illegitimate son), Boufflers, and Villars acquitted themselves with distinction on the battlefield; and, as time and the crucible of war would prove, it was only Villars who would mature into a first-rate tactician. In the meantime a series of startling defeats stalked the French armies and stunned the council at Versailles. In 1704 Marlborough and Eugene cornered and routed a French army at Blenheim in Bavaria, capturing Marshal Tallard; in 1706 at Ramillies in the Southern Low Countries the troops of the incompetent and inept Villeroi were driven

out of most of the Southern Netherlands; and in 1708 at Oudenarde in the same area yet another French army was outmaneuvered and defeated by the Allies. Little wonder that by the winter of 1708–9 both the ministers at Versailles and the populace in country cried out for the reform of the army and for the dismissal of the architect of the war policy, Michel Chamillart. Even his patroness, Madame de Maintenon, was heard to exclaim of the war minister, “Ah, that poor unfortunate man”; and in the streets of Paris a parody on the Lord’s Prayer was sung with these words:

Our father who art in Versailles
 Your name is no longer glorified.
 Your kingdom is no longer great!

 Give us our bread which we totally lack
 Forgive our enemies who have beaten us
 But not our generals who have let them do so
 Do not succumb to the temptations of the Maintenon
 And deliver us from the Chamillart!¹⁷⁹

In early June, Chamillart was dismissed from his offices, and in the same month France rejected the first important Allied overture for peace.

These two acts may at first seem incompatible, but in reviewing Louis’s peace policy, we may see some logic to it. As with the war program, Louis depended on a minister to help direct his policies. But unlike the war minister, the foreign minister was an able administrator and a perceptive statesman. “Torcy chose the *via media* between the extremes of the peace faction . . . and the war faction. . . . His . . . balance . . . and moderation were traits in which . . . [he] most nearly resembled his father-in-law Pomponne, [yet] above all he was a Colbert and in many ways clearly resembled his father [Croissy] and his uncle [Colbert], particularly in his austere compulsion to work. We might say that, like Sir Edward Grey, . . . he displayed a certain ‘strenuous simplicity.’”¹⁸⁰

Torcy and his associates at the foreign office, especially François Callières, Pierre Rouillé, and Nicolas Mesnager, undertook clandestine peace talks with the Allies from the first year of the war. Recog-

nizing The Hague as an important *lieu de réunion*, Torcy sent more than a dozen deputations there in the first five or six years of the conflict. Each mission ended in deadlock, until in 1708 Louis and Torcy became desperate in their search for an agent at once acceptable to the Allies and to France. In March, 1709, Torcy sent his trusted aide Rouillé to the Dutch Netherlands, but he, too, failed because, as Torcy noted, the Dutch were "carried away by the torrent [of war] and prefer agreeing with [the British] to contradicting them."¹⁸¹

Following Torcy's note to Louis in April, 1709, stating that "there was no longer room to hope for success" in the peace negotiations, the king hastily assembled the *conseil d'en haut* attended by Torcy, Beauvillier, Pontchartrain, Chamillart, and Desmaretz. Beauvillier, prompted by a desire to see a speedy end to the war, painted France's plight in the most somber hues, and at the end of one of the most dramatic council meetings in Louis's long reign, the king wept. "Then indeed," Torcy observed, "the king was aware . . . that the situation of a monarch, absolute master of a great kingdom, is not always the happiest. God was pleased to humble him, before he checked and chastised the pride of his enemies."¹⁸²

On the spot, Torcy was commissioned to proceed secretly to The Hague, where he was to treat in person with the allied representatives. The summary articles of this conference, known as The Hague Preliminaries, reflect the desperateness of the French position: the allied statesmen demanded Strasbourg and other fortresses in Alsace, an extensive string of barrier fortresses in the Southern Netherlands, a barrier for Savoy, and Philip V's abdication of the Spanish throne. Torcy was appalled by the allied intransigence and wrote to Louis that he should "feel entirely free to reject absolutely these conditions."¹⁸³

On Torcy's return to Versailles on June 2 one of the stormiest sessions of the entire history of the *conseil d'en haut* took place. Beauvillier again spoke for peace; the dauphin supported a continuation of the war. Torcy and Louis found themselves in the "middling" position, favoring a rejection of the Preliminaries with the option of reopening peace negotiations. In the end their view prevailed, but war continued while the statesmen talked.

If 1708-9 was the *Rampjaar* for the French, the year 1709-10 was one of renewal. With Louis's refusal to accept "the inadmissible terms" of The Hague Preliminaries, French determination to resist

the Allies increased. The dreadful winter of 1708-9—the worst in the memory of that time—caused tens of thousands of peasants to join the army, where they would at least receive a daily ration of bread. Daniel Voysin, Chamillart's successor, was a competent administrator, and at once began the strategic redeployment of his new recruits. Louis and Voysin together agreed to the appointment of the bumptious but brilliant Villars as commander of the Flanders army. Villars, along with Boufflers, was able to infuse the army with the will to victory; and in the autumn of 1709 the French army made a stand at the village of Malplaquet, where they sustained 15,000 losses to 24,000 lost by the Allies. Although the French were forced to retreat, the battle at Malplaquet, as Torcy noted, "raised the courage of the French nation rather than weakened it."

In early 1710 the French again sought peace, hoping for more acceptable terms. Meeting at the small Dutch town of Gertruydenberg, the French plenipotentiaries, the Marshal d'Huxelles and Abbé de Polignac, found that after four months of negotiations the Allies still pressed for Philip V's abdication; and if he were to refuse, they demanded that Louis send a French army to help dethrone him.¹⁸⁴ Yet, even the duke of Marlborough realized the absurdity of such a demand, because as he had earlier admitted to Godolphin: "It is plain the French Ministers have it not in their power to recall the Duke of Anjou."¹⁸⁵

Following the abortive Gertruydenberg conference, the direction of French foreign policy fell more and more into Torcy's hands. Hearing of a shift in the balance of power within the English government that favored the more pacific Harleyite Tories over the bellicose Marlborough-Whig coalition, Torcy attempted a rapprochement with the Tory leaders in the late spring and summer of 1710.¹⁸⁶ After nearly a year of clandestine negotiations, Matthew Prior, traveling incognito to Fontainebleau, presented the foreign minister with an outline of British demands. Torcy, although taken aback by the English pretensions to Gibraltar, Port Mahon, the Asiento agreement, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay country, sent his veteran economic adviser Nicolas Mesnager back to London with Prior. In early October, 1711, the French and English were able to patch together preliminaries that encompassed most of the English demands, leaving the details to be worked out at a general congress. By astute diplomatic

moves Torcy and his associates had thus been able to split the Grand Alliance by separating England from her allies.

Heralded by a *furor diplomaticus*, in which the Dutch and the Imperials denounced the English as a perfidious ally, the penultimate peace congress of Louis XIV's reign met in January, 1712. From all over Europe plenipotentiaries, representing neutral as well as belligerent nations, journeyed to the Dutch cathedral town of Utrecht. Amidst the bustle of continual meetings, diplomatic procedure was relaxed, partly in order to avoid the interminable quarrels over procedure and protocol that had marred the congresses of Ryswick and Nijmegen, and partly because the precarious state of Queen Anne's health impelled the English and French delegations to hasten their deliberations. Thus at Utrecht no neutral arbiter—papal or secular—was appointed; delegates entered the meeting hall pell-mell, seating themselves at a great round table placed in the meeting room of the town hall. A vast number of technical advisers appeared at this congress: experts on economic affairs, engineers, colonial governors, mapmakers, Latinists, historians, military advisers, and, inevitably, a large number of journalists. After fifteen months of heated debate and consultation, after secret missions sent from London to Paris and Paris to London, and after a suspension of arms and then an armistice between Great Britain and France, the statesmen of Europe—excepting those of Spain and the Empire—signed a general peace agreement on April 11, 1713.¹⁸⁷

Out of this great peace congress at Utrecht and the related meetings at Ratstatt and Baden emerged a more clearly defined balance of power in Europe and the world, a balance that was shared among three great geopolitical areas. The first area comprised the island kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and her allies on the Continent, the United Provinces of the Netherlands and Portugal. The second consisted of the Mittel-european Austrian empire, with its scattered lands extending from the Southern Netherlands in the west to the Carpathian Mountains in the east, from Poland in the north to Serbia and the Ottoman empire on the south. The reascent of Austrian power allied itself until 1756 with Great Britain in what is known as the "old system." The third geopolitical area of power embraced the Franco-Spanish states and included on its periphery the Wittelsbach electors of Bavaria and Cologne. France, as the

leader of the Bourbon-Wittelsbach entente, survived the War of the Spanish Succession with her boundaries, as of 1697, largely intact: Strasbourg and Alsace had been preserved; the Franche-Comté incorporated into France; and Lille and the Cambrésis added to the *frontière de fer*. Moreover, Louis's grandson sat on the Spanish throne as Philip V. Philip, who saw French friendly overtures as disguised hostility, rebuffed an alliance with France until the late 1730's when, in the face of Anglo-Austrian hostility, both courts espoused a series of "Family Compacts," in a policy known as *Bourbonisme*.

In 1714, however, Louis could look back on his diplomatic efforts as having achieved a degree of success. The great Alsatian *portes* had been closed, the northern borders had been fortified and "rounded off," and the Porte-de-Bourgogne, or Belfort gap, along with the Franche-Comté, had been secured. Louis and France had good reason for public rejoicing. Yet, the last years of the king's life were filled with sadness. In 1711 his son, the Grand Dauphin, died, followed to the grave in 1712 by his eldest grandson, the duke of Burgundy, and by his eldest great-grandson, leaving only two heirs to the throne, the Duc de Berry and a two-year-old great-grandson, the future Louis XV.

Outwardly, however, Louis's life was little changed by public triumphs or personal sorrows; the ritual of kingship was too clearly established and the mask of the kingly profession too firmly set. The hunts, the *appartements*, the chapels, the meetings of the council, the fireside chats, all unfolded from day to day as they always had. In the ministries Colbert de Torcy and his cousin, Nicolas Desmaretz, a supple financier trained by the great Colbert himself, carried the burden of government. They were ably seconded by the war and navy secretaries of state, Voysin and Jérôme de Pontchartrain. The king, with his usual grave self-possession, listened to his ministers' reports, but it was obvious to many observers that policy decisions were increasingly being formulated in the ministers' chambers rather than in Louis's council room. In fact, the king-minister-centered government, which had been Louis's great achievement as *roi-bureaucrate*, was itself giving way to a minister-bureau-centered government that was to characterize the eighteenth century.

In mid-August, 1715, the king himself interrupted the routine of kingship by complaining of an acute pain in his leg. Louis had long suffered from the "vagaries" of so many ailments that his physicians

at first showed little concern over his latest complaint. It was only in late August, when it appeared that the king was seriously ill, that the spot on his leg was diagnosed as a gangrenous infection. Asked if he would consent to having his leg amputated below the knee, Louis replied that he was too old and too weary to undergo such an operation. It was then that he resigned himself to death: he breathed his last on September 1, 1715, five days short of his seventy-seventh birthday.

EPILOGUE

As Louis XIV himself said of the tasks of kingship, they were at once great, noble, and delightful. Yet Louis's enjoyment of his *métier*—his craft—was tempered by political prudence. As a child he learned the lessons of circumspection. The disturbances of the Frondes caused the already introspective boy-king to build psychological and institutional barriers between himself and the outside world. At an early age he learned to listen attentively to his advisers, to speak when spoken to, to ponder evidence presented in the high council, to avoid confrontations, to dissemble, to wait. Like Mazarin he believed that time and tact would conquer. Invariably, in later years he greeted importunate petitioners with the words *Je verrai*. In order better to assess the actions of his courtiers, the king drew not only on his own prodigious memory but on material aids: the collective recollections of his councilors, his household servants who carried tales to him overheard in the corridors, police reports, excerpts cut or copied from the gazettes, or letters intercepted by his postmasters. Yet despite all the evidence provided him by his ministers and his servants, Louis often hesitated before making a decision; he brooded, and in some instances put off decisions altogether.

As he grew older, the king tended to hide his person and his office behind a screen of Byzantine ritual. Like an icon, Louis was displayed to his troops and to his people, and like an icon he was returned for safe-keeping to his niche in Versailles, or Marly, or Fontainebleau. Even his officials seldom saw the king for more than a brief interview; many were content to be acknowledged by a regal nod of the head. And as decision-making became centralized in the hands of the

ministers and their intendants, the great corporations of the realm—the municipalities, the judges, the local estates, the guilds, and at times the peasantry—contested royal encroachments on their rights and privileges. Yet to many in the kingdom, to some members of the clergy, to wealthier bourgeois, merchants, *gens de la plume* (civil servants), better-to-do peasants, Louis represented a *roi d'aujourd'hui*, a modern king, an agent of stability whose struggle was their struggle and whose goal was to contain the crises of the age. To some critics of Louis XIV his reign appears as a hideous solidarity, “une sorte de monotonie passionnée.” Louis XIV would no doubt have taken such a description as a compliment.

1. V.-L. Tapié, *La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu* (Paris, 1952), p. 469.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 403 ff. Two recent summaries of the Thirty Years' War are found in Georges Livet, *La Guerre de Trente Ans* (Paris, 1963), and S. H. Steinberg, *The Thirty Years' War and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600-1660* (New York, 1966). An older but admirably balanced account is Georges Pagès, *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618-1648* (Paris, 1939).
3. Paul Vaucher, *Études sur la France de Henri IV et Louis XIII* (“Les Cours de Sorbonne,” Paris, 1954), p. 183; Tapié, *La France de Louis XIII*, p. 471; and Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden* (Münster, 1959) (see particularly the section, “Jahre des Gleichgewichts 1635-1640,” pp. 77-98).
4. For a review of works concerned with France's Rhine policy, consult the careful appraisal by Paul E. Hubinger, “Die Anfänge der französischen Rheinpolitik als historische Problem,” *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXXI (1951), 21-43. A striking reappraisal of France's role as a political force in the Rhine Valley appeared in W. Mommsen's *Richelieu: Seine Politik im Elsass und in Lothringen* (Berlin, 1922). Mommsen stressed the “defensive” character of the French moves into Alsace, the attempt to guard the *portes* into France's heartland. This thesis was supported by the works of Gaston Zeller, cited below. Supporting evidence for their conclusions can be found in the *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, edited by Max Braubach and Konrad Repgen (2 vols.; Münster, 1962). From reading the documents published by Braubach and Repgen one can better understand Richelieu's desire for acquiring those stepping stones to the Rhine: “Saverne, Schlestadt, Colmar, Brisak.” At the same time Richelieu urged “ainsy que Pignerol [in Italy] est necessaire au Roy.”
5. “La Monarchie d'ancien régime et les frontières naturelles,” *Revue d'histoire moderne*, IV (1933), 305-31; and his “Histoire d'une idée fausse,” in *Aspects de la politique française sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1964), pp. 90-108.
6. Louis André summarizes views given by Mommsen and Zeller, above, in *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950), pp. 6 ff.
7. Paul Vaucher, *Études sur la France de 1598 à 1660* (“Les Cours de Sorbonne,” Paris, 1954), pp. 93-94; also André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 24-25.
8. Vaucher, *Études sur la France de 1598 à 1660*, pp. 49 ff.; also, Orest Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII* (Oxford, 1963), p. 30.
9. Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII*, Chapters II, III, and IV.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

11. A particularly engaging and informative review of Mazarin's career is contained in Georges Mongrédien *et. al.*, *Mazarin* (Paris, 1959); an interesting review of Mazarin's legacy is Georges Pagès's chapter "Le legs de Mazarin à Louis XIV," in *Naissance du grand siècle. La France de Henri IV à Louis XIV, 1598-1661* (Paris, 1948), pp. 194-221.

12. Mongrédien *et. al.*, *Mazarin*, p. 10.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-81.

14. Vaucher, *Etudes sur la France de 1598 à 1660*, pp. 110, 124.

15. See Max Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede* (Münster, 1948), and Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*; the latter work contains an excellent bibliography, pp. 57-88.

16. Quoted from a *General Collection of Treatys, Declarations of War, Manifestoes and Other Publick Papers Relating to Peace and War* (4 vols.; London, 1710), I, 22, Article LXXIV.

17. *Ibid.*, I, 5, Article IV; see also Georges Pagès, *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, Chapter VIII: "Mazarin et les Congrès."

18. Vaucher, *Etudes sur la France de 1598 à 1660*, p. 127.

19. For the *cabale des importants*, see Paul Gondi, Cardinal de Retz, *Mémoires* ("Pléiade" edition, Paris, 1956), pp. 42-48. Retz says of one of the leaders, Beaufort, that he was less capable than a *valet de chambre*; and of another, the bishop of Beauvais, that he was *une bête mitrée* (pp. 42, 48); also Madame Langlois de Motteville, *Memoirs for the History of Anne of Austria . . .* (5 vols.; London, 1727) (hereafter cited as *Memoirs*).

20. Ernst H. Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden, 1954), pp. 36-37.

21. Omer Talon, *Mémoires continués par Denis Talon*, in *Nouvelle Collections des Mémoires . . .*, ed. J. F. Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat (Paris, 1854), XXX, 209-12.

22. For the literature on the Fronde, see the bibliographical essay at the end of the volume, pp. 412-14; note particularly works by E. Kossmann cited above; Roland Mousnier's valuable summary in *Fureurs paysannes: Les Paysans dans les révoltes du XVII^e siècle (France, Russie, Chine)* (Paris, 1967), particularly pp. 13-156; and the review essay by J. H. M. Salmon, "Venal Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-Century France," *Past and Present*, No. 37 (1967), pp. 21-43.

23. Madame de Motteville, *Memoirs*, III, 219.

24. *Ibid.*, 233.

25. *The Memoirs of James II: His Campaigns as Duke of York, 1652-1660*, trans. A. Lytton Sells (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), p. 57.

26. Quoted in J. W. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad 1604-1667* (London, 1952), p. 406.

27. Sells, *Memoirs of James II*, p. 111.

28. Kossmann, *La Fronde*, Chapter VI.

29. See Jules Valfrey's two volumes on Lionne: *La Diplomatie française au XVII^e siècle; Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en Allemagne . . .* (Paris, 1881), and the companion volume, *Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Italie 1642-56* (Paris, 1877).

30. Philip A. Knachel, *England and the Fronde: The Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution on France* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1967), Chapter IX.

31. F. J. Routledge, *England and the Treaty of the Pyrenees* (Liverpool, 1953), pp. 15-17.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 69: the exact statement in the peace treaty read: "moyennant le paiement des dits 500,000 écus d'or aux termes ci-dessus dits, la sérénissime Maria-Theresa rénonce. . . ." Philip IV's concern for his children, legitimate and illegitimate, is shown in documents contained in the British Museum, London, MS

Egerton 347 and Additional MSS 17, 578. My thanks to Dr. V. Morales Lezcano, of La Laguna University, Spain, for calling my attention to these volumes.

33. P. H. Chérot, *La première jeunesse de Louis XIV (1649-1653), d'après la correspondance inédite du P. Charles Paulin . . .* (Lille, n.d.[1892]), p. 158. Note Chérot's refutation of Saint-Simon's description of Louis's education as perpetuated in historiographical legend by P. A. Chéruel in *Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV* (4 vols.; Paris, 1879-90), IV, 76, 80.

34. G. Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1923), pp. 85-102. See also Willy Heinecker's brief essay, *Die Persönlichkeit Ludwigs XIV* ("Historische Studien," Berlin, 1915); there is a good bibliography.

35. Madame de Motteville, *Memoirs*, I, 390.

36. *Ibid.*, 265-66.

37. Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV*, pp. 109-38.

38. Chérot, *La première jeunesse de Louis XIV*, pp. 77 ff.

39. W. L. Wiley, *The Formal French*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); see particularly Chapters VI and VII.

40. Jean Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1927), p. 281.

41. Chérot, *La première jeunesse de Louis XIV*, p. 147, quoting La Rochefoucauld.

42. F. M. A. de Voltaire, *The Age of Louis XIV*, trans. M. Pollack (London, 1961), p. 69.

43. See Georges Mongrédien, *L'Affaire Fouquet* (Paris, 1956), especially Chapter III; see also Jules Lair, *Nicolas Fouquet* (2 vols.; Paris, 1880).

44. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, p. 28; also quoted in Longnon's shorter edition of the *Mémoires*, *A King's Lessons in Statecraft: Louis XIV: Letters to His Heirs*, trans. Herbert Wilson (London, 1924), p. 56.

45. One of the best accounts of Louis XIV's councils is contained in Jean de Boislisle (ed.) *Mémoriaux du Conseil de 1661* (3 vols.; Paris, 1905-7), particularly the Introduction to the first volume.

46. *Ibid.*, I, 1-5.

47. See Georges Pagès, *La Monarchie d'ancien régime en France* (Paris, 1928), pp. 138 ff., and his *Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV* ("Les Cours de Sorbonne," Paris, 1961).

48. See note 45 *supra*.

49. Pierre-Edouard Lemontey in his classic work on Louis XIV's administration, *Essai sur l'établissement monarchique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1818), calls the king "Louis l'Administrateur," p. 333. This concept is quoted by Pagès in *La Monarchie d'ancien régime*, p. 138. On p. 331 Lemontey speaks of "le despotisme des ministres, et leur indépendance des rares délibérations des conseils conservaient le nerf de la volonté royale."

50. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, p. 22.

51. A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930), XXVIII, 38-39, 392.

52. The literature concerning Colbert and his policies is vast; one of the best guides to the man and his program is contained in Pierre Clément's edition of *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-73) (hereafter cited as *Lettres . . . de Colbert*). See also P. Boissonnade, *Colbert: Le triomphe de l'étatisme . . . 1661-1683* (Paris, 1932).

53. Charles W. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism* (2 vols.; New York, 1939), I, 293. Cole's work is rightly judged a classic of its kind by Pierre Goubert, *Louis XIV et vingt millions de Français* (Paris, 1966), p. 86.

54. Rudolf Wittkower, *Bernini's Bust of Louis XIV* (Oxford, 1951), p. 5.

55. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 294.

56. *Mercantilism* ("Historical Association Pamphlet," London, 1958), p. 23.

57. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 289-90.
58. In 1679, for example, Colbert received as largess from a grateful master 700,000 livres. (In the same year it is interesting to note that Louvois, who was supposed to be more solidly entrenched in the royal favor, received a remembrance of only 300,000 livres.) See Archives Nationales, Paris, MS K. 119 B.
59. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 301.
60. See Germain Martin and V. Bezançon, *Histoire de crédit en France sous le règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1913), pp. 73 ff.
61. Clément (ed.), *Lettres . . . de Colbert*, VII, 53-54; quoted by Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 451.
62. See Clément (ed.), *Lettres . . . de Colbert*, II¹, 50; quoted by Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 451.
63. For a discussion of the Colbertian schemes for recruiting seamen, see Eugene Asher, *The Resistance to the Maritime Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960).
64. See A. Jal, *Abraham du Quesne et la marine de son temps* (2 vols.; Paris, 1873), a thorough and insightful biography.
65. Charles de La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française* (6 vols.; Paris, 1899-1932); see VI, 84 ff. for Tourville's career.
66. Clément (ed.), *Lettres . . . de Colbert*, III¹, 196.
67. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, I, 466.
68. See Hubert J. Deschamps, *Les Méthodes et les doctrines coloniales de la France* (Paris, 1953); see also for a review of the literature in the field John C. Rule, "The Old Regime in America: A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., XIX (October, 1962), 575-600.
69. W. J. Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV 1663-1701* (Toronto, 1964), pp. 30-31, cites one version of Colbert's letter to Talon.
70. The thesis in this paragraph and the one preceding it were expounded in a paper read by the author at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1965, under the general topic, "Constitutional Tensions in the American Empires in the Eighteenth Century."
71. A. Rupert Hall, *From Galileo to Newton 1630-1720* (New York, 1963), Chapter V: "Florence, London, Paris."
72. Harcourt Brown, *Scientific Organizations in Seventeenth-Century France (1620-1680)* (Baltimore, 1934), p. 136.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
75. Hall, *From Galileo to Newton*, pp. 149 *passim*.
76. V.-L. Tapié, *The Age of Grandeur: Baroque and Classicism*, trans. A. Ross Williamson (London, 1960), Chapter VII.
77. See Anthony Blunt, *François Mansart and the Origins of French Classical Architecture* (London, 1941), particularly pp. 74-78; also, by the same author, *Architecture in France, 1500 to 1700* (London, 1953), pp. 138-66, 225-54.
78. Translated from Roger A. Weigert, *L'Epoque Louis XIV* (Paris, 1962), p. 71.
79. Wittkower, *Bernini's Bust of Louis XIV*, p. 3; see also Tapié, *The Age of Grandeur*, Chapter VI, on Bernini's visit. Blunt notes in *Art and Architecture in France*, p. 231, that Bernini displayed an "arrogant attitude towards French traditions." A more sympathetic appraisal of Bernini is given by Rudolf Wittkower in *Art and Architecture in Italy, 1600-1750* (Baltimore, 1958), pp. 123-25.
80. Wittkower, *Bernini's Bust of Louis XIV*, p. 15; and Fréart de Chantelou, *Journal du voyage du Cavalier Bernin en France* (Paris, 1885).
81. See J. Guiffrey, *André le Nostre* (Paris, n.d.); P. de Nolhac, *La Création de Versailles* (Versailles, 1901).

82. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXXIII, 187, as quoted in Gillette Ziegler, *The Court of Versailles* (London, 1966), p. 25.
83. Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath, Wiltshire* (3 vols.; London, 1904-8), III, 192.
84. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXVIII, 173-74.
85. *Ibid.*, 129 ff.; 409 ff.
86. The best book on Couperin is Wilfrid Mellers, *François Couperin and the French Classical Tradition* (London, 1950).
87. For Lully, see Lionel de La Laurencie, *Lulli* (Paris, 1919), and Henri Prunières, *Lully* (Paris, 1910).
88. Mellers, *François Couperin*, p. 77.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-21.
90. For a discussion of classicism and baroque in French music, see Cuthbert Girdlestone, *Jean-Philippe Rameau* (London, 1957).
91. Corneille discusses his art in his renowned *Discours* (1660), published in Corneille, *Œuvres*, (7 vols; Paris 1862), I, 51 ff.
92. See W. G. Moore, *Molière: A New Criticism* (Garden City N.Y., 1962), for a succinct and engaging interpretation of Molière's career.
93. Jean Racine's significance for the age is assessed with care by Raymond Picard in *La Carrière de Jean Racine* (Paris, 1956); also Jean Pommier's excellent work, *Aspects de Racine* (Paris, 1954).
94. E. Byrne Costigan, *Étude sur l'Athalie de Racine* (Cork, 1958).
95. A version of this passage is cited by Emanuel Chill, "Tartuffe, Religion and Courtly Love," *French Historical Studies*, III (1963), 155.
96. Preface to Molière's *Tartuffe*: see the 1930 edition of his *Œuvres*, III, 293-94.
97. W. G. Moore, *French Classical Literature: An Essay* (Oxford, 1961), p. 16.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 139.
99. Louis André, *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois* (Paris, 1942).
100. Louis André, *Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique* (Paris, 1906), particularly chapter XIII.
101. André Corvisier, *L'Armée française de la fin du XVII^e siècle au ministère de Choiseul. Le Soldat* (2 vols.; Paris, 1964) I, 53-73.
102. André, *Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée*, p. 40.
103. Louvois's activities are well portrayed in Jacques Hardré's edition of *Letters of Louvois* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949); see especially pp. 6-8 of the Introduction and the highly informative "Identification List," pp. 502 ff.
104. André, *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois*, pp. 111 ff.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 602-4.
106. The literature on Vauban is immense. An excellent general guide, detailed and balanced, is P. Lazard's *Vauban, 1633-1707* (Paris, 1934). A review of the literature and a corrective to earlier studies is Henry Guerlac's essay "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward Meade Earle, with Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N. J., 1944), pp. 26-48.
107. The phrase *pré carré* is quoted in one of the first and still most detailed biographies of Louvois: Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire* (4 vols.; Paris, 1862-63), II, 203. For Vauban's ideas as to frontier fortifications, and for the ideas of his predecessors, see Gaston Zeller, *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du Nord et de l'Est au XVII^e siècle* (Nancy, Paris, Strasbourg, 1928). For Vauban's plan for fortification of Dunkirk, see the plans preserved in the British Museum, Additional MSS 17, 782, fols. 16-18; there is a discussion of the Risbank (the famous fortress just off the quay) and the King's Basin, which could float forty ships.

108. For the function of the secretary of state and his bureaucrats, see the issue of *Le XVII^e siècle: Bulletin de la Société d'Etude du XVII^e siècle* devoted to "Serveurs du roi: Quelques aspects de la fonction publique dans la société française du XVII^e siècle" (Nos. 42-43 [1959]).

109. See footnote 29 *supra*; also see Herbert Rowen, *The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1671* (The Hague, 1957), pp. 2, 6-7, and *passim*, for a discussion of Lionne's last years in office. There is also a discussion of Lionne's diplomacy that is less favorable than most other commentaries in Georges Pagès, *Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1905), p. 2 and *passim*.

110. A perceptive account of Pomponne's ministry can be found in Herbert Rowen, "Arnauld de Pomponne: Louis XIV's Moderate Minister," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1956), 531-49.

111. Quoted from my essay on Croissy's son, "King and Minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy," in *William III and Louis XIV: Essays by and for Mark Thomson*, ed. Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool, 1968), p. 216 (hereafter cited as *William III and Louis XIV*).

112. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-36.

113. L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, p. 54.

114. George N. Clark, *The Later Stuarts* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1961), p. 24.

115. See Lucien Lemaire, *Le Rachat de Dunkerque par Louis XIV* (Dunkirk, 1924); for the consequences of this sale to the English government, see Clyde L. Grose, "Dunkirk Money, 1662," *Journal of Modern History*, V (1933), 1-18. An interesting sidelight on Dunkirk, its sale, and subsequent refortification is shown by the fourteen plans of the city contained in the British Museum, Add. MS 17,782; it also tells of the Count d'Estrades negotiations in 1661-62 that led to the purchase of Dunkirk, Mardyck, and Fort Louis on the Bergues Canal, "with all artillery and war-like stores," for five million livres, or £273,437 sterling.

116. L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 61 ff., "La Question portugaise."

117. For a vivid portrait of Leopold I, see Adam Wandruszka, *The House of Hapsburg* (London, 1964), pp. 131-34.

118. Colbert de Torcy's account of Leopold I is contained in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Nouvelles Acquisitions françaises, MS 10,668, fols. 47-49.

119. The question of the Spanish Succession is discussed exhaustively in the classic work, *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV, ou correspondances, mémoires . . . concernant les prétentions et l'avènement de la maison de Bourbon au trône d'Espagne*, ed. François A. M. A. Mignet (4 vols.; Paris, 1835-42), II, 323-481 (hereafter cited as *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*). Mignet was the first historian to comment extensively on the Secret Partition Treaty of 1668, called by some, Louis's "beau coup."

120. For the latest assessments of Charles's statecraft, see Maurice Lee, Jr., *The Cabal* (Urbana, Ill., 1965), especially pp. 2-5, 102 ff.; and K. H. D. Haley, *Charles II* ("Historical Association Pamphlet," London, 1966), especially pp. 14-15.

121. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 120-21.

122. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 154-55.

123. Summarized from Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*, I, *passim*; also Ernesto Pontieri, *Luigi XIV e la Preponderanza francese in Europa (1661-1715)* (Naples, [1963]), pp. 82-88.

124. Quoted from a contemporary English work on the War of Devolution: *A Relation of the French King's Late Expedition into the Spanish Netherlands in the years 1667 and 1668* (London, 1669).

125. L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 116-17.

126. For the Triple Alliance see Waldemar Westergaard, *The First Triple Alliance: The Letters of Christopher Lindenov, Danish Envoy to London, 1668-1672*

(New Haven, Conn., 1947); a thorough discussion of the Alliance is presented in a seventy-eight page Introduction.

127. *Ibid.*, p. lxx.

128. H. Rowen, *The Ambassador Prepares for War*, p. 64.

129. K. H. D. Haley, *William of Orange and the English Opposition, 1672-4* (Oxford, 1953), p. 158.

130. Stephen Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), p. 70.

131. Pieter Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, part 2: 1648-1715 (London, 1964), pp. 121 ff.

132. Baxter, *William III*, p. 72.

133. Nesca A. Robb, *William III: A Personal Portrait* (2 vols.; London, 1962-66) I, 66.

134. G. Zeller, *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du Nord*, Chapter IV; also p. 50.

135. *The Works of Sir William Temple, Bart.* (4 vols.; London, 1814), II, 404.

136. *Ibid.*, IV, 134-35.

137. G. Zeller, *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du Nord*, chapter IV.

138. G. Mavidal (ed.), *Mémoires du Marquis de Pomponne* (2 vols., Paris, 1860), I, 548.

139. *The Works of Sir William Temple*, IV, 140.

140. See Charles Gérin, "La Disgrâce de M. de Pomponne," *Revue des questions historiques*, XXIII (1878), 5-70; H. Rowen's recent interpretation in his article, "Arnauld de Pomponne," pp. 537 ff.; and L. André, *Le Tellier et Louvois*, p. 305.

141. Gaston Zeller, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (Les chambres de réunion)," *Revue historique*, CXXXI (1919), 267-75; the older interpretation of the same question can be found in Emile Bourgeois, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy, les chambres de réunion," *Revue historique*, XXXIV (1887), 413-18.

142. For a vivid and well-documented account of the French seizure of Strasbourg, read Franklin Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), Chapter II.

143. See Georges Mongrédien, *Madame de Montespan et l'affaire des poisons* (Paris, 1953).

144. A. Geffroy (ed.), *Madame de Maintenon, correspondance authentique* (2 vols.; Paris, 1884), II, 48-49.

145. For Madame de Maintenon's political activities, see A. Baudrillart, "Madame de Maintenon, son rôle politique pendant les dernières années du règne de Louis XIV," *Revue des questions historiques*, XXV (1890), especially 111-14; the best edition of her letters is Marcel Langlois (ed.), *Lettres de Madame de Maintenon* (5 vols.; Paris, 1935-39); unfortunately Langlois's edition covers only the years to ca. 1700. Still valuable is A. Geffroy's edition of the *Correspondance authentique* (footnote 144 *supra*).

146. Gertrude Scott Stevenson (ed.), *The Letters of Madame: The Correspondence of Elizabeth-Charlotte of Bavaria* (2 vols.; London, 1924), II, 239.

147. Louis O'Brien, *Innocent XI and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes* (Berkeley, 1930), pp. 18-19; and Jean Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI. Les appels au futur concil de 1688 et l'opinion française* (Paris, 1949); Orcibal reviews the continuing conflict of the 1680's (excellent bibliographical references). For an estimate of Innocent XI's character by the great Jansenist, Arnauld, see the British Museum Add. MS. 20,401, fols. 85-90.

148. See Georges Guitton, *Le Père de la Chaize: Confesseur de Louis XIV* (2 vols.; Paris, 1957).

149. See Aimé-Georges Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet* (Paris, 1953), with its excellent bibliography; also, A. Gazier, *Bossuet et Louis XIV, 1662-1704. Etude historique sur le caractère de Bossuet . . .* (Paris, 1914).

150. J. Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI*, p. 54, quoting from Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, II, 349; also, *ibid.*, p. 16, where Orcibal speaks of Harlay's "docilité."

151. O'Brien, *Innocent XI and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes*, p. 35.

152. *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 40 ff. See also Emile Michaud's important work, *Louis XIV et Innocent XI, d'après les correspondances diplomatiques* . . . (4 vols.; Paris, 1882-83); and J. Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI*, p. 11 and *passim*. Orcibal shows clearly how Louis XIV tended to absorb the ideas of his advisers. In church affairs Louis maintained Mazarin's policy of defiance to Rome, which was reinforced by Bossuet and Harlay (p. 54).

153. André, *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois*, pp. 472 ff.

154. Warren Scoville, *The Persecution of Huguenots and the French Economic Development 1680-1720* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 28-63; this work contains an excellent bibliography.

155. Paul Hazard, *The European Mind (1680-1715)*, trans. J. Lewis May (London, 1953), p. xviii.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

158. John Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (London, 1964), p. 17.

159. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

160. *Ibid.*, p. 295; see also M. Vachon, "La France et l'Autriche au siège de Vienne en 1683," *Nouvelle Revue*, XXIII (1883), 775-80.

161. David Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 195-96.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 207: "Early in June Louis received secret information that Charles of Spain was (at last) about to die." For a clear statement of the emperor's position, see *A Letter Sent from the Imperial Diet . . . to the Thirteen Cantons in Switzerland* (London, 1689).

163. Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III*, p. 206.

164. Gaston Zeller, *Les Temps modernes. II. De Louis XIV à 1789* ("Histoire des relations internationales," Vol. III; Paris, 1955), part 2, p. 66.

165. One of the best essays on the problem of periodization is George N. Clark, "The Character of the Nine Years War, 1688-97," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, XI (1954), 168-82. For the violent pamphlet campaigns that accompanied the War of the League of Augsburg, see Friedrich Kleysler, *Der Flugsschriftenkampf gegen Ludwig XIV. zur Zeit des pfälzischen Krieges* (Berlin, 1935) and P. J. W. Van Malsen, *Louis XIV d'après les pamphlets répandus en Hollande* (Amsterdam, 1936), pp. 64 ff.

166. For a role of Savoy in the War of the League of Augsburg, see E. Pontieri, *Luigi XIV e la preponderanza francese*, pp. 131-38, "Relazioni europee alla politica aggressiva di Luigi XIV"; see also Chapter VIII. For the peace negotiations see Mark Thomson, "Louis XIV and William III, 1689-97," in Hatton and Bromley (eds.), *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 24-48.

167. Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition*, p. 63; also, H. J. van der Heim (ed.), *Het Archief van den Raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius* (3 vols.; The Hague, 1880), p. 228, Callières to Mollo, February 3, 1697: ". . . Si l'Empereur devenait maître de Strasbourg au milieu de l'Alsace, qui est au Roy et dont l'Empereur cherche par là à luy revolter ses sujets de ce pays là et de porter la guerre en France par le moyen de la Lorraine."

168. Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition*, p. 63.

169. See Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV*, pp. 196-206.

170. This paragraph is based on a paper by the author on "Jérôme de Pontchartrain and the Founding of the Louisiana Colony, 1696-1715," to appear in John Francis McDermott (ed.), *Frenchmen and French Ways in the Mississippi Valley*

(Urbana, Ill., 1969). For the revival of trade under the leadership of the Phélypeaux, cf. Joseph Chailley-Bert, *Les Compagnies de Colonisation* (Paris, 1898), pp. 24-27. The figures given by Chailley-Bert show that twelve companies were founded for overseas trade between 1696 and 1712, in comparison with ten founded between 1662 and 1673 and seven between 1679 and 1686; none were chartered between 1686 and 1695. See also Ralph Davis, *A Commercial Revolution* ("Historical Association Pamphlet," London, 1967), p. 16: "The French acquisition of the large island of Hispaniola [sic; the author apparently means the acquisition of the western half of St. Domingue] from Spain in 1697 was followed by the rapid building up of sugar plantations there. . . ." Obviously, the question of the second imperial impulse manifested by the French during Louis XIV's reign needs further investigation. Too long have historians labored under the shadow of the great naval historian La Roncière and of the French and Anglo-American schools of historians; a re-evaluation of the Phélypeaux is long overdue. Cf. Rule, "The Old Regime in America."

171. See Paul Vaucher (ed.), *Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France . . .*, XXV, 2. Angleterre, Vol. III (1698-1791) (Paris, 1965), 1-68; also Max Braubach, *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz. Die Vorstadien der diplomatischen Revolution im 18 Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 1952), especially pp. 17 ff. Braubach, however, gives too much importance to the role played by the *dévots* faction at the French court; he also mistakenly identifies Madame de Maintenon as a member of that faction after the Quietist scandal of the mid-1690's.

172. P. Vaucher (ed.), *Recueil des instructions . . . Angleterre (1698-1791)*, pp. 65-68.

173. *Ibid.* For the Austrian side, see V.-L. Tapié, *Les Relations entre la France et l'Europe Centrale de 1661 à 1715* ("Les Cours de Sorbonne," Paris, 1958), pp. 169-76; see also Braubach, *Versailles und Wien*, pp. 17 ff.

174. Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelle Acquisitions françaises MS 10,668, fols. 68-69; Archives Nationales, MS K. 1,332, nos. 23 and 25. For Louis XIV's account of the will see Paul Grimbolt (ed.), *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and Their Ministers . . . 1697-1700* (2 vols.; London, 1848), II, 472-76, Louis XIV to Count Briord, Fontainebleau, November 7, 1700.

175. G. R. R. Treasure, *Seventeenth Century France* (London, 1966), p. 395; see also Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 189.

176. For a judicious assessment of the causes of the war, see Mark Thomson, "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," in Hatton and Bromley (eds.), *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 140-61; see also M. Braubach, *Versailles und Wien*, pp. 26-27.

177. There is no full-length study of Michel Chamillart's career; perhaps the best way, then, of reviewing his policies is to read from his correspondence and papers, which have been edited by Abbé G. Esnault: *Michel Chamillart, contrôleur-général de finances . . . papiers inédits* (2 vols.; Paris, 1885), I, v-viii; and Marcel Langlois devotes a section of his book on Louis's court to Chamillart (*Louis XIV et la cour* [Paris, 1926], pp. 215-59).

178. Quoted in Rule, "The Old Regime in America," p. 580; also, there are bibliographical references given to Marcel Giraud's work, p. 577, note 7.

179. Quoted in A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France* (5 vols.; 1890-1901), I, 333; see also Mme Ursin's letter welcoming Chamillart's successor, Voysin, in M. A. Geoffroy (ed.), *Lettres inédites de la Princesse Ursins* (Paris, 1887), pp. 368-69, Ursins to Voysin, July 5, 1709, Madrid.

180. Rule, "King and Minister," p. 219.

181. *Mémoires du Marquis de Torcy, pour servir à l'histoire des négociations depuis le traité de Ryswick jusqu'à la paix d'Utrecht* (2 vols.; Paris, 1828), I, 180-81.

182. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

183. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

184. For the Gertruydenberg conference one of the best sources is the "Mémoire sur les negociations de Gertruydenberg," in the Archives Nationales, MS K. 1,338, No. 30; also, the Archives des Affaires Etrangères, C. P. Hollande, Vols. 222, 223, and 224; and Mémoires et Documents, Hollande 58.

185. Historical Manuscripts Commission, The House of Lords, IX.

186. Archives des Affaires Etrangères, C. P. Angleterre 230 and subsequent volumes.

187. Still one of the best accounts of the Congress of Utrecht is Ottokar Weber's *Der Friede von Utrecht* (Gotha, 1891).

The Formation of a King

JOHN B. WOLF

THE biographer of a king and his portrait painter share a number of problems. Neither can be sure of the final shape or tone of any of the royal features until the whole picture—the background, the costume, and the paraphernalia of office—have been completed. It is probably true that a man's personality and characteristics have achieved firm contours by the time he is twenty-five, but the historian trying to portray them finds that it is a formidable problem to sift the evidence that comes down to us from a seventeenth-century life and to separate the significant from the transitory. All personality studies seem to show that some experiences are enormously meaningful, others, of little importance; and yet, unless the man we study becomes articulate in his testimony and his contemporaries record voluminously the things that happen to him, it is nearly impossible to assign weight to the important and to dismiss the myriad of his ephemeral contacts with the world. This is particularly true in the case of Louis XIV, since he has left us very little that can be called introspective evidence; even the remarkable *Mémoires*, intended for the instruction of his son, allow us only to infer his experience. Just as he cautioned his son never to say today what can be put off until tomorrow,¹ Louis was reticent about his feelings and motivations. This limits the historian; without the significant testimony from both the king and those who watched him grow up, it becomes difficult to study Louis, the man, or Louis, the king, *en* Dr. Freud; and therefore, we must largely proceed with our inquiry *en* Dr. Watson.²

Obviously, one must begin with a man's family. Louis XIV inherited the blood and the traditions of the houses of Austria, Spain, Burgundy, Florence, and France; both his father and his mother were descendents of the Hapsburg-Valois; Louis seems to have inherited the physical frame and features of his Burgundian ancestors. Unlike his own son, who was more completely a Hapsburg, Louis's genetic background was not the product of inbreeding. His social environment was as rich and varied as his genetic inheritance. In his ancestral traditions there were models for a king: Charles V, Philip II, Henri IV—these were great kings who had left their marks on Europe. His preceptors told him about the great rulers of France, but the early death of Louis XIII and the frictions between Louis's mother and the Orléans and Condé families made the Spanish Hapsburg influence of Anne of Austria more important in his immediate environment than the Valois-Bourbon traditions of his French forebears.

There can be little doubt that Anne and Mazarin were the two most important individuals in Louis's early life. We know very little about the contacts he had with his father, and the stories that do come down to us are not of the type that could be used with any degree of assurance. Louis never talked about his father, never honored his father's memory.³ Beyond this observation very little can be said with assurance about the part that Louis XIII played in his son's life. Anne's role is much less equivocal: Louis was born after more than two decades of a childless, loveless marriage, and his birth not only justified Anne as a woman and released great stores of emotional energy but also gave her a new status as queen. The haunting fear that she might be ignominiously sent back to Spain as well as the humiliation resulting from her failure to fulfill the role to which she had been born were both dissipated at the birth of the dauphin. Anne, who had so recently been a foreign princess suspected of treasonous correspondence with the enemy, became in a few short years not only the mother of the next king of France but also the regent charged with the task of maintaining the position and prestige of the realm. In her late thirties and long anxious for a child, Anne was able to give her son something quite rare for a royal prince: his mother's love and long hours of concentrated attention and care.

Louis's personal stability in the face of adversity as well as the healthy structure of his ego may well be traced in important part to the influence of this vigorous, proud, attentive, and determined woman. Mazarin's influence upon the young Louis will emerge as a major part of this paper. As his stepfather and first servant, as preceptor and friend, as a respected and almost certainly beloved father-figure, Mazarin must have been the most important masculine influence in Louis's life.

Two years after Louis's birth, his brother Philippe came into the world. Brothers, as he wrote to his son, create a problem for the first-born. "My care," he writes, "will be to raise them [the dauphin's non-existent brothers] as well as you, but yours ought to be to raise yourself above them, and to make the whole world see that you merit . . . this rank that seems to have been given by the order of your birth alone."⁴ Elsewhere he warns that brothers of the king of France can become political problems. But Louis's own experiences with Philippe were conditioned by the fact that Anne was determined that her second son would not behave toward Louis XIV as Louis XIII's brother did toward him. Philippe was brought up to defer to his brother in all things; he was dressed as a girl much of the time until he was well past adolescence, and he continued occasionally to dress in women's clothes as an adult. His latest biographer insists that Anne's rearing of this boy was probably responsible for his homosexual tendencies.⁵ There may have been some sibling rivalry between the boys, as the anecdote of their wetting each other in bed might indicate; but neither contest for their mother's affection nor feelings of inferiority vis-à-vis his brother could possibly have bothered Louis. Poor Philippe was not so lucky; the mere fact that he, and not Louis, became the ancestor of so many of Europe's nineteenth-century kings probably would have been no recompense for the feelings of frustration and inferiority that he must have had.

Louis had other relatives who taught him wisdom by their own lives rather than by their precepts. His uncle Orléans had conspired and revolted against Louis's father; the elder Condé had played the same role against Louis's grandmother. Orléans's daughter, La Grande Mademoiselle, was to fire cannons at Louis's own company; and Condé's son, the Grand Condé, was to join the Spaniards in war against France. Beaufort, a grandson of Henri IV from the left hand,

plotted to murder Mazarin and, along with the Grand Condé's sister, joined the Fronde. Louis's aunt Henriette of England brought the tragic tale of rebellion climaxed by the execution of her husband, Charles I. These relatives may not have had much personal influence, but their lives were evidence that the throne was no rocking chair, and that a king must look long to find men whom he can trust.

The entourage of a minor king is a fluid, changing force. At one time Anne's court seemed to Condé to resemble a ladies' circle rather than the court of a great king; at another time Louis was surrounded by boys and girls of his own age: the nieces and nephew of Mazarin, the noble youths who were chosen to be his companions. In the troubles of the Fronde and the years that followed, with the war against Spain, Louis found himself in a court of intriguers, soldiers, bureaucrats, and, occasionally, statesmen who turned his attention to the massive problems of the day. Each of these in turn, as we shall see, contributed to the formation of the king.

GENERAL EDUCATION

What sort of an education did Louis receive? If we are to believe his testimony given in his old age, it was so scanty that he could almost pose as a self-made man, a posture enjoyed by many men of action. Saint-Simon heartily agrees with Louis's estimate; Louis, in his eyes, was an *ignoramus* who did not even know how little he knew. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Druon reached the same conclusion. What did Louis know at twenty, he asks; the answer, "Nothing, or almost nothing!"⁶ Such harsh judgments must have some foundation; once found, it is simple. Louis apparently knew little Latin beyond a schoolboy's translation of Caesar's *Commentaries* and a few exercises; thus he was largely ignorant of the Latin and Greek classics common to the humanistically educated men of both the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries.⁷ If a Renaissance education is the criterion by which one judges a man's culture, Louis undoubtedly was an *ignoramus*. By other standards, his education does not seem so hopelessly inadequate.

Although his knowledge of Latin was weak,⁸ Louis did learn to use the French language with a degree of elegance. His achievement may

be contrasted with that of the Grande Mademoiselle's faulty use of her mother tongue; and it is altogether surprising when one reads the ungrammatical half-Spanish, half-French written by his mother, or the Italian-French of Mazarin, and if one remembers that both Anne and Mazarin spoke French with atrocious accents. Druon believes that Louis learned his French from Anne's women, and it may well be the case; however, it seems unwise to discount completely the training of his teachers. In addition to his mother tongue, Louis learned enough Italian to speak it fluently and to appreciate Italian lyric poetry. He also learned, but imperfectly, to speak Spanish; of course he had no trouble understanding it. English and German seem to have been *terra incognita* to him, but a man with three languages is hardly illiterate.

Louis's knowledge of geography was more advanced than that of most of the men of his day; both foreign ambassadors and his own correspondence testify to his considerable understanding of the geography of Europe. It is unlikely that the schoolbook geographies he used as a boy were more than the basis upon which this knowledge was founded. In the mid-seventeenth century "geographies" included a mélange of material about customs, politics, climate, and the like. Louis had books available that discussed the cities and provinces of France, the kingdoms of Europe and the Orient, including the Ottoman Empire. His own travels as a youth never took him outside the kingdom, and it is difficult to assess the educational value of his journeys with the court, for it would be possible to travel all over France with the court and yet see very little of the country. Discussions with Mazarin, interviews with ambassadors, and the reports of French agents were undoubtedly of great importance in forming Louis's understanding of Europe.

In the instructions for the dauphin, Louis urges the importance of the study of history; but aside from an occasional recondite digression into the past that probably originated with the pen of Perigny or Pellisson, the *Mémoires* are largely written without benefit of historical learning. Nonetheless, we know that Louis was exposed to considerable historical lore. Péréfixe wrote for him *L'Histoire de Henri le grand* as a principal text for studying the "role of king" in France. Péréfixe's idea of history was admirably conceived for the education of a king; he studied Henri's decisions, the reasons for them, and the possible alternatives; this could be useful training

for a man whose birth placed him in a position that demanded decisions. La Porte, Louis's *valet de chambre*, contributed his bit by reading to Louis from Mézeray's *L'Histoire de France*, which began to be published in 1643. We can believe with La Porte that Louis was incensed over the behavior of the early *fainéant* kings,⁹ and determined not to be Louis, the *Fainéant*. Louis probably read Commines, or at least discussed his work with La Mothe le Vayer, who joined Péréfixe as instructor; and during the Fronde he probably listened to readings from several chronicles describing the uprisings of the past. But how much could he get from this effort? As far as we can tell, most of his formal historical instruction was finished before he was fifteen; the professor of history who reads the test papers of even twenty-year-olds should not be surprised that Louis's *Mémoires* were not buttressed by historical evidence.

There was another more or less informal source of Louis's education in history. When the court was traveling, it was customary to visit the church in any town where the queen stopped. This often meant a harangue by a clergyman or other important notable, and very often the theme of the address was taken from history.¹⁰ There were three kings whose lives and works were again and again paraded before the young king and his mother as models for action: Clovis, St. Louis, and Henri IV. The reasons for the choice were simple enough. Clovis held firm to the Roman church and destroyed the Arians; the clergy hoped that Louis would end the toleration of the "pretended reformed religion." St. Louis gave France a mild and just reign during which the church prospered; furthermore, Blanche of Castile, the regent during his minority, could be used to remind Anne of her obligations. Henri IV, whose alleged policy of peace and prosperity contrasted with the war and taxes of the era of Mazarin, made the third "model" for the young king. It is difficult to guess how much Louis understood of these discussions, but even if he did retain some, there remained gaps in his historical knowledge that, as Saint-Simon testily asserts, were never bridged.

How much mathematics did he know? He had some instruction in the subject, but probably little more than simple arithmetic. His literary education was equally limited. He may have read *Don Quixote*, and he did read Scarron's *Le Roman comique* (an early contact with that family). He also attended performances of the plays of Corneille and Molière and the Italian theater that Mazarin

brought to Paris to please Anne. His conception of *la gloire* was almost identical with that propounded in *Le Cid*. Marie Mancini introduced him to Italian lyric poetry, but this was hardly enough to make up for the lack of imaginative literature. No stories have come down to us to indicate that Louis as a child exercised his imagination in play-acting; as a young man, he occasionally took part in amateur dramatics at the court, but aside from that there is little evidence of his having a very lively fancy. It might be true that humanistic literature would have filled this gap, but it might also be argued that his natural disposition and temperament and his lack of a sense of humor, as much as his education, dictated his turn of interests and his feelings about the world.

We have no direct evidence about any education in the fine arts, and yet, as king, he was a patron of painters, sculptors, and architects. It is probable that he was familiar with Mazarin's fine collection of Italian art, and he undoubtedly was influenced by the Italian decorators, some of whose work for Mazarin can still be seen in the Musée Carnavalet in Paris. Indeed, an art historian might be able to develop an interesting study by comparing the artistic tastes of Louis XIV and the cardinal. How familiar Louis was with Mazarin's magnificent library is also a matter for conjecture.

The instruction of the king also included fencing, dancing, riding, hunting, and some music. The Fronde interrupted the process of instruction, but Louis learned to dance, ride, and hunt with elegance. His marvelous physique and natural grace may have been more important than the formal education. Every picture that we have of Louis as a young man bespeaks his handsome figure, his athletic prowess, his natural charm; his teachers cannot be credited for these graces.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

February 10, 1638, Louis XIII issued *lettres patentes* announcing his intention to take the Virgin Mary as the protector of his kingdom. On March 26 he ordered the archbishop of Paris to proclaim his intention from all the churches "so that each could prepare himself to

offer himself with me . . . and to join his prayers with mine so that it will please her to extend her powerful protection to her kingdom.”¹¹ Louis, *le Dieudonné*, was born seven months later. In the celebrations that followed the fortunate event, religious services played an important part: indeed, it can be said that Louis *le Dieudonné* came into the world with a chorus of *Te Deums*, hundreds of forty-hour devotions, and thousands of votive masses rising from the churches of France. As Louis XIV, *le Grand*, he continued to order religious services to thank God and the Mother of Jesus for benefits bestowed upon the kingdom. The medal that Louis XIII had struck portraying the king of France on his knees before a statue of the Virgin Mary offering her his kingdom in gratitude for her favor was illustrative of the religious values of the French royal family in the mid-seventeenth century; Louis absorbed these values with the air he breathed and made them part of himself.

Anne, even more than Louis XIII, regarded the birth of *Le Dieudonné* as a miracle. Her religious background was strict and tinged with mysticism. Her father, Philip III, read his office daily with the spirit of a monk; he heard voices (in Castilian Spanish) from heaven; he pressed the pope to proclaim the dogma of the Immaculate Conception; reared in the court of the aged Philip II, he was more suited for the church than for the throne. Anne's mother was at least as attentive to the services of the church as Philip III; she heard two masses daily, took Communion every Sunday, and spent many hours on her *prie-Dieu*. Under such influence Anne grew up reading books of devotion and religious mysticism; accepting the symbolism found everywhere in the Escorial as substantial idea; finding solace and meaning for her life in church services; and seeing religious mystery in the strange religious allegories of Lope de Vega. Before her marriage to Louis XIII her life had been wrapped in a texture of religious observances, cults, and mysteries that conditioned her thought and action until her death. This was not as apparent in her first years at the court of France, when youthful vigor and animal spirits encouraged playful, often frivolous, behavior; but one has only to read the De Motteville memoirs to see how much she changed after she was forty. Anne's Catholicism was Spanish: candles, hours at the *prie-Dieu*, books of devotion, and mystery.¹²

Her most important declaration of faith was crystalized in the baroque church at Val-de-Grâce. In the days of her near disgrace that cloister had been a place of refuge where she could talk about God in Spanish with sympathetic nuns;¹³ when the birth of a son gave her status, Val-de-Grâce became the object of her special attention. Her body was buried at St. Denis, but her heart was sent to Val-de-Grâce, along with many of her most treasured possessions. The symbolism¹⁴ in the church identifies the mother of the king of France with that other mother whose son was the King of Heaven; in the chapel of Saint Anne at Val-de-Grâce, the sculptor Michel Anguier glorified with mystic symbolism the married state and divine love in marriage. St. Anne and St. Joachim, the parents of the Virgin, suitably became the central figures of the drama of marriage. Roman Catholics in the twentieth century will recognize the emotional force behind this sort of cult of saints.

Although not as pious as Anne, Marzarin, too, was a deeply religious man. For a long time the present writer tended to discount as mere formalities the appeals for prayers, the expressions of respect for God and His saints, and the religious tone in so many of Mazarin's letters. Could it be that this man who seemed to fear so little in the world was so respectful of God? However, it is clear that Professor G. N. (now Sir George) Clark was unquestionably correct when he once remarked that we must take a seventeenth-century man seriously when he talks about God. Mazarin, like Anne, must have encouraged Louis in the fulfillment of his religious duties.

There were many priests and monks in and out of the court during the childhood of Louis, but the man whose name occurs most often as an intimate of the family was St. Vincent de Paul. He prepared Louis XIII for death; he remained as friend and counselor of the queen during the regency. His influence on the Council of Conscience was often enough nullified by Mazarin, but until his naïve attempt to end the conflict during the Fronde, St. Vincent was well known at court. He was no theologian, not even a "thinker," but his religion of good works, pious intentions, and spiritual exercises suited the royal family; and it did not seriously interfere with other activities that may have been less pleasing to God.¹⁵

The young king's formal spiritual education was entrusted to Father Charles Paulin, S.J., who, as confessor and friend, directed the

conscience of the young man. Father Paulin's interest was the saving of Louis's soul by giving him a Christian upbringing. How much he recognized Anne's part in the work can be seen from a letter written to the general of the Jesuit order at the time of Louis's first Communion: "There is no lamb more sweet, more tractable than our king. . . . He has in him the piety which the most Christian Queen has inculcated in him from early childhood by her tender counsels and advice."¹⁶ Anne more than "counseled" her son; when Louis attempted to use some language that he had learned in the stables, Anne imprisoned him in his room in solitary confinement for two days.¹⁷ This punishment may or may not have been responsible for the fact that Louis's speech was never profane, but there can be little doubt about the influence of Anne's "counsels" on his later life. It was she who reduced him to tears over his weakness for La Vallière; and it was probably her introjected superego that forced him so often to try to give up De Montespan and finally, when his queen had died, to take Mme de Maintenon as his wife. It is well to remember that Louis may have enjoyed the pleasures of the flesh in his early manhood, but not without attacks of conscience.

It is difficult to assess the impact of a single event on a man's life, and yet it is hard to believe that the ceremony of consecration performed when Louis was a boy of fifteen could fail to leave a strong impression on his mind. The *sacre* was Mazarin's answer to the rebellious noblemen who could not be controlled by a regent and a boy king; the event itself, however, must have been an emotional experience for the young man. Louis prepared himself spiritually for the consecration the night before much as a bishop prepares for his elevation. At 4:30 A.M. the high clergy robed themselves and began the ceremonies; by six o'clock the court and a great press of people filled the great cathedral of Rheims, and then the bishops of Beauvais and Châlons, followed by the crowd, marched to the door of the archepiscopal palace where the Duc de Joyeuse, acting as Grand Chamberlain, demanded: "What do you wish?" Beauvais: "The king. We ask for Louis XIV, son of that great king Louis XIII, whom God has given us for king." Upon the third repetition of this formula, the doors were thrown open and the crowd marched to the bed where Louis, clad in rich clothing, awaited them. With holy water, incense, and prayers, they led him to the cathedral for the

age-old ceremony of anointing with oil that "came from Heaven" for the consecration of Clovis. The consecration emphasized the sacerdotal character of the kings of France: "Your Majesty," he was told, "must recognize by the maxims of piety as much as by the light of pure truth, that if the kings of France are of a divine order . . . this striking privilege flows from the sacred unction, the holy ampoule of oil that gives sacred character. . . ." Louis may have noted that Condé and others were absent, in rebellion against his rule; but he also knew that God had established kings as His rulers on earth, and that the church consecrated their rule.¹⁸

Dubois tells us of the young Louis's strict attention to religious duties; Fénelon assures us that the old Louis's religion was superstitious and devout, in the Spanish style.¹⁹ These two witnesses, over a half-century apart, can be corroborated by many others. Louis probably understood no more than his mother did about the theological differences that separated the Catholic and the Reformed churches; his conception of God as an object of worship seems to have led him to perform acts of piety, to cause prayers to be said, to thank God for His blessings. When things went well with the royal projects, Louis knew that God had blessed his labors and ordered *Te Deums* and Masses and other religious services in thanksgiving.²⁰ When his armies were defeated, when drought brought crop failure, when his kingdom looked like a land occupied by a hostile power, Louis feared that God had withdrawn his protection from his kingdom; then his prayers were to supplicate God's forgiveness for his pride and to ask for a return of favor.²¹

It should finally be noted that Louis's respect for the church and its ministers did not blind him to the fact that the church and the churchmen played many roles in society. One can almost hear Mazarin's voice in one passage of the *Mémoires*: "I have never failed to call your attention whenever the occasion presented itself to the respect we owe to religion and the deference we owe to its ministers in the things that make up their principal mission, that is, the celebration of the mysteries of cult and the spread of evangelical doctrine. But because the men of the church are likely to take advantage of their profession . . . I am obliged to point out to you certain points that may be important."²² The "certain points" concerned the property of the church and the service of churchmen to the state. In

other words, as Louis's career indicates, he was brought up to respect cult, to give his heart to God, but he also had a practical attitude toward the clergy and its wealth.

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

Louis's general education may have been neglected, but his professional training was not. The times in which he lived, as well as the devoted efforts of his mother and Mazarin, combined to give Louis XIV an education in the art of government seldom allotted to princes. It was professional education that would have appealed to John Dewey: he learned by doing, by direct experience with the problems of state. Louis could never be a doctrinaire politician; his education gave him a practical, pragmatic approach to the problems of government.

Anne once remarked that kings did not need to *study* history since they *lived in* it. Louis certainly lived in history from the time he could take note of things, even though it is improbable that he understood what was happening at first. Minority governments had long since been the "opportunity" for the "great ones" who wished to reverse the centralizing tendencies of the royal authority; and in the 1640's the "great ones" were joined by the regular officials of the kingdom (members of the sovereign courts and the municipal and provincial officials) who resented and feared the rising power of the king's council and its agents.²³ The Fronde really started almost as soon as Louis XIII closed his eyes. Beaufort and the "important ones" plotted to murder Cardinal Mazarin; parlement refused to register the edicts of the council; Condé demanded special favors for his son as soon as that young man won victory for the king's arms; the boy king *had* to hold a *lit de justice* and listen to the tense speeches; provincial as well as parliamentary officers complained about the activities of the king's *maîtres des requêtes* on mission (intendants). His aunt Henriette of England, a refugee in France, did not need to tell of the troubles in her husband's kingdom for the young Louis to realize that the paths of kings are not easy. He had only to see his mother's anger and humiliation at the speeches of Omer Talon in parlement and hear her mutter, "My son will punish them when he grows up."

The boy of ten who remarked on the occasion of a French victory in the Netherlands, "The gentlemen in Parlement will not be pleased," had absorbed much from his environment about the political process in the kingdom, and there was more to come.

The Fronde was well under way before the riots and barricades in Paris called attention to the problems in France. However, the drama of the rioting crowds demanding the release of the arrested parliamentarians; the tense speeches and hasty conferences; the fears that the royal palace might be invaded and sacked; the intrusion of men demanding to see if the young king was really asleep in his bed and not spirited away; the nocturnal flight from the city with his mother and the cardinal, obviously afraid of the possible consequences of their act; the siege of Paris and perhaps some knowledge of the awful things that men were writing and saying about his mother and Mazarin;²⁴ the semi-hypocritical appeals for the king to return to "his city of Paris," which was at war with him: these and many more dramatic events of the first year of the Fronde were unforgettable experiences for the boy king, and there were more to come. Writing for his son some twenty years later, Louis says of this period: "It is necessary to point out the conditions of things: terrible agitations throughout the kingdom both before and after my majority; a foreign war in which these domestic troubles cost France a thousand advantages; a prince of the blood and a very great name at the head of the armies of our foe; cabals in the state; the parlements still in possession, and in taste for, usurped authority; in my court, very little fidelity without personal interest. . . ." ²⁵ This is a graphic description of the misery of the Fronde.

Charles Péguy once wrote a moving essay about *Misère* in which he asserted that anyone who has ever experienced such total privation can never forget it and can never act without its influence. Such a person will pile up money and any other security beyond all need simply because of the memory of the pain. The Fronde was *misère* for the young king of France, an experience that he never forgot. Its memory colored many of his acts in later years: the maintenance of a strict etiquette to control members of the court, the treatment of a harmless brother asking for favors or for a military command, the regulation of parlement and the royal bureaucracy, and a host of others. This is not surprising: it was humiliating to be shut out of his own cities (it mattered little that the rebel soldiers also cried,

"*Vive le roi!*,"²⁶ since they still held towns against the king's loyal forces); it must have been near to terrifying to see his mother being forced to send Mazarin, the only man she really trusted, into exile; it must have been disturbing not to know whether a soldier like Turenne would be on the side of the king or of the king's enemies. Nor did the humiliation end with the victory over rebellious noblemen, parliamentarians, and the Spanish armies; years later, when Louis was proudly showing his recently forgiven cousin La Grande Mademoiselle a new regiment equipped with kettledrums, he asked her if she had ever heard the like before (he, Louis, had not). The answer: "Oh yes, years ago during the war (Fronde) with the foreign troops."²⁷ Even the joy of a new military toy was blighted by memory of the Fronde.

Though the Fronde was a period of political misery, it was also an object lesson in the art of government, a time when a young man with his eyes open could learn much about the game of politics. It was as instructive to watch a master politician like Mazarin manipulate affairs, even from exile, as it was to observe the twisting and turning of his uncle Orléans, of the wily Retz, of the calculating Châteauneuf, and others. Soldiers no less than politicians had much to teach about politics as well as about war. Louis learned well. His later dramatic arrests of the Cardinal de Retz and Fouquet plagiarized the pattern set by Anne and Mazarin in the arrest of Condé; his famous response to all requests—"je verrai."—probably originated in a youthful slip of the tongue during this period.

Mazarin's role in the political education of Louis XIV was, as mentioned above, most important. He was Louis's godfather (at the request of Louis XIII); he was superintendent of Louis's education (suggested by the then dead king, the queen, Orléans, and Condé);²⁸ he was probably Louis's stepfather; finally, he had a deep affection for the young man. Memoir writers and many historians have told stories about Mazarin's neglect of the young boy, of hostility between the two, of Louis's impatience to be rid of his minister. The facts seem to have been exactly the opposite. There was a deep friendship, a feeling probably near to love, between the two men. One has only to read Mazarin's letters to Anne to see the warmth, the fatherly feelings of the elder man.²⁹ Like Anne, who always treated Louis as *her king* and gave him the homage due a king, Mazarin always showed great respect for the person of his "master"; even when he

sent Louis letters filled with scolding words, recalling him to his duty as a father might write to an erring son, the formal tone of the letter was that of a courtier, just as Anne's behavior toward Louis was that of courtesan. But neither Anne nor Mazarin were really formal toward Louis; their courtly ways were intended to teach him the respect due a king. Both of them thought of Louis as king and man, and were anxious that the boy should succeed in both roles. Mazarin wrote, "He [Louis] has in him the stuff of several kings and of an *honnête* man."³⁰ On another occasion he wrote to Villeroi, "As you know how many times I have said to you that we can expect that he [Louis] will be a prince as accomplished as any that one has seen in several centuries."³¹

"Le Confidant" (Louis) was obviously Mazarin's pride and hope. Writing to Anne: "The king is well—he has taken great pleasure in the letters that you have sent me. . . . He knows the firm and tender love that you have for him. . . . He never fails to embrace me in the evenings, and we talk in terms from the heart."³² Louis was privy to the secrets of the household; he knew that Anne did not wish to displease Mazarin "by deed or even by thought."³³ When Louis and Mazarin were with Turenne at the front, the cardinal's letters to Anne sound like those of a doting father, proud of the achievements of his son. And when Louis was deathly ill, in 1658, Mazarin wrote to Lockhart, "I want above all to hope that God does not wish to punish this kingdom by taking from us the one who brings it joy, being the father of the people. . . ." And to Turenne, when the fever finally broke: "I rejoice again with you over the grace that God has given us in conserving for us the king." These letters during Louis's illness are filled with paternal love and anxiety; because of his confidence in the queen's love, it was not until later that Mazarin realized how much personal danger he might have been in had Louis's brother become king.³⁴

Louis's own feelings are more difficult to assess. Even as a small boy, he was reserved and sober; yet the oft-quoted words to the cardinal at the time of the illness give some indication of his feelings: "You are a man of resolution and the best friend I have; therefore, I beg you to alert me if I shall be near to death; for the queen would not dare to do it for fear that it would augment the illness." Up until Mazarin's death Louis deferred to him and left all to his judgment; and Louis wept hot tears both after his last interview with

the cardinal and when the news of his death was announced. Anne's grief was not the only reason for ordering full court mourning, heretofore reserved for members of the royal family. Furthermore, Louis's *Mémoires* and his government after Mazarin's death are a standing monument to his respect and his love for the cardinal. Lacour-Gayet was not wrong when he concluded that Louis loved and respected Mazarin so much that it almost seemed that the Cardinal ruled decades after his death."³⁵

Mazarin's method of instructing gave the young king direct contact with affairs. In the first place, he urged him to read the state papers as they came in, accustoming him to the most elementary work of a ruler, namely, the learning of the facts upon which decisions must be made. In addition, Mazarin gradually introduced Louis into council meetings, but only after the young king had read the papers to be discussed, and in slow stages, so that the problems would be simple enough for him to understand. At first it seems that Louis attended only meetings at which decisions could easily be made; later, he was to learn that it is not always possible to make a decision. In his *Mémoires* Louis explains that he would secretly make up his mind how the matter should be decided, and prided himself that very often the decision of older heads was the same as his own. When foreign ambassadors visited the court or when a French envoy was sent abroad, Mazarin had Louis assist him with the interview, thus instructing him in the art of high politics and the counters of diplomacy. The unquestioned skill and knowledge that Louis was to show as king are tributes to the success of this method of instruction.³⁶

Louis spent many hours closeted with Mazarin during the last half-dozen years of the cardinal's life. When the court was domiciled at one of the palaces, the young king would spend time in the morning and again in the afternoon in the cardinal's chambers; when the court was traveling, the two were together almost as much. What went on during these interviews? There is no direct documentary evidence, but much can be inferred from a study of Louis's *Mémoires*. These pages were dictated, written, and suggested by Louis for the education of his heir; some of the passages recount events and decisions that Louis had made as king and therefore are the result of his own experience; other passages are general reflections about politics, society, the handling of men, and the like; still others, insight into the art of government, rules for managing affairs. Many of these

are much more sophisticated than one has the right to expect from a young man in his twenties, even a young man as bright as Louis. It cannot be proved, and yet there is undoubtedly a strong presumption, that these passages are Louis's recollections of the advice and counsel of the cardinal, and, perhaps of his mother.

In a short paper it is impossible to analyze the content of the *Mémoires*;³⁷ it is enough to note that parts of them are surely some of the best pointed and practical counsels that were ever written for the education of a prince. Here and there, Louis falls into a high moral tone, exhorting his son to "give his heart to God" or expatiating on "virtue"; but for the most part he confines himself to practical advice. They deal with questions in the everyday life of a king as well as more difficult problems of state policy. "How shall a king live with his neighbors?" "How shall he choose his ministers?" "How does a king reward those who serve him?" "The importance of keeping one's given word." "Do not presume too much; it is better to wait until success is sure before announcing victory in politics." "Do not hope too much from fortune; indeed, be suspicious of hopes." "Wisdom and councils." "Faithful and faithless servants." "A king must be father of his people." "Factions: it is better to prevent their forming in the state." "Means and methods of dealing with the clergy." "All classes have utility to the state; protect the bourgeoisie and peasants from the soldiers." These and many more were topics for the dauphin; they must also have been Mazarin's lessons for the young king.

Mazarin's advice covered big as well as little things. He did not need to urge Louis to be his own first minister, but we know that he did so. Louis scrupulously followed Mazarin's policy of thanking those who served the king's government; this sort of letter bulks large in the correspondence of both men. Both men managed people by indirection whenever possible rather than by force; both were polite to those about them. Perhaps even more important, Mazarin's discussions of foreign policy, the only policy that really interested him, must have left a strong impression on his protégé, for Louis's foreign policy for the next quarter-century and more can best be understood by studying Mazarin's ideas about Europe and the role of the French Bourbon dynasty in Europe. Lastly, Louis's methods of work were unquestionably in part influenced by Mazarin. The cardinal insisted

that no one can govern without studying the documents; he urged Louis to be attentive to work and praised him when his style of writing and his grasp of political problems improved. It may even be that Louis's *feuilles*, from which he wrote or dictated the *Mémoires*, were in imitation of Mazarin's *Carnets*.³⁸

Where Mazarin left off, Anne took over the task of preparing her son for the *métier du roi*. Louis's love for his mother led him to see her often and intimately. Like those of so many attentive mothers, Anne's counsels were not always heeded by her son; and yet, much of Louis's vision of himself and his part in the world cannot be explained or understood unless we infer that Anne, the Spanish princess educated in the Escorial in the days when the memory of Philip II was still a vital force in that court, was a significant factor in his education. Anne's vision of royalty and the role of the king in society, as well as her conception of the honor and respect due to kings,³⁹ was not in the Bourbon tradition. Henri IV's court had been managed with the easy-going manners of a guerrilla captain; he got his way by backslapping, by cajolery, by feigned intimacy, or, at last, by force. Louis XIII had run the state and secured obedience by cold, surly, and, at times, brutal insistence upon his policy; though Richelieu understood the meaning of diplomacy and indirection, both he and Louis XIII were willing to rule by force. Anne and Mazarin, perhaps because they had less moral authority, were less cruel, less willing to depend upon the headsman's ax. She knew that men can be controlled by etiquette, by imposed manners, by a system of values saturated with ideas of rank and social position. She also retained a vision of a great king, Philip II, whose life might have been a failure but whose notions about the *métier* of a king surely *ought to be* the secret of success. Louis did not follow all of his great-grandfather's patterns, but the long hours over paperwork, the attention to detail, the vision of the grandeur of royalty, and, of course, the obvious connection between Versailles and the Escorial, all indicate possible relationship between the two men. The student should never underestimate Anne because of her love of cocoa, her self-indulgence, her passion for entertainment, nor even her indolence; the mother of Louis XIV was the woman who stood up (with the aid of Mazarin) against the storms of the Fronde, coldly scorning and hating her enemies who did not share her vision of her son, and finally

triumphing (again with the aid of Mazarin) over princes and noble cabals and sovereign courts that wished to limit the royal authority. In Louis her scorn and hatred was translated into action that controlled the minds and bodies of men and forced them to play parts that were set by the king.

There were two important roles that Louis XIV assumed: that of soldier and that of administrator. Louis's own heirs failed to see that when Louis the soldier was combined with Louis the administrator and Louis the Great, Louis the enlightened despot emerged. Frederick II of Prussia did not miss this lesson. In the education of Louis the soldier-administrator, many men, unmentioned here, contributed a share: bureaucrats and soldiers who trained the king in the arts of war and administration.

The French king was expected to be a soldier; indeed, that was his historic role in an age when war was the natural agency for curing anarchy and shaping political life. Louis's father, his grandfather, and the great kings of the Capet-Valois line had been soldiers; it was a role that French kings had to play. Le Tellier and Turenne were Louis's most important preceptors in military affairs; the one taught the art of command, the other, the science of military administration. Turenne was a hardheaded teacher of the art of war; his cadets included the dukes of Luxembourg, Lorraine, Villars, and Marlborough ("handsome Jack Churchill"), and many other soldiers who fought for and against France in the era of Louis XIV. Louis's period of apprenticeship under the great soldier was not long enough to make him into a great captain, but Mazarin and Louis spent much time with the army between 1654 and 1659, and most of it was in the company of Turenne. Mazarin's letters tell us of the enthusiasm and ardor with which Louis followed the sieges and other operations.⁴⁰ Turenne's counsels were reinforced by those of Le Tellier, the first bureaucratic war minister who, with his son Louvois, was the architect of the French standing army. Le Tellier, whose code-name was "le Fidèle" in the Anne-Mazarin correspondence, was one of the few people whom the family could really trust. It is not unlikely that Louis not only learned enough from these two men to write the shrewd passages about military affairs that one finds in the *Mémoires* but also got from them his liking for wars of position, of sieges and maneuvers, as well as his fear of infantry battles in the field, in which a war could be won (or lost) in an afternoon.⁴¹

Colbert's influence upon Louis was undoubtedly important, but by the time Colbert became the king's trusted man, Louis's character and ideals were already fixed, so that Colbert's role was more that of a counselor and advisor than of a teacher; many historians who see Louis's wars as acts of the royal will, regret that the minister of economics did not get to the king earlier.⁴² When Mazarin died, obliging him, as he wrote to his son, "no longer to defer that which I had hoped for and feared so long," Louis recognized himself as ready to assume the task of government. It only remained for him to use his education effectively.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Seventeenth-century men were more conscious of the problems involved in justifying political power than any European generation before their time; a galaxy of political philosophers—Hobbes, Harrington, Bossuet, Pufendorf, Spinoza, Grotius, James I, Locke, and Leibniz, to mention only a few—proved how fruitful were their efforts. With his contemporaries so self-conscious about the problems of political philosophy, it was inevitable that Louis XIV should somehow be instructed in its secrets. But, as in his study of history, his philosophical education was neither formal nor structured. That he was king was unquestionably an important factor in the formation of his ideas; both sycophants and sincere men combined to exalt the office in his mind. The structure of political society itself was also significant; centuries of political evolution under a monarchy in which the king was a consecrated officer had created a series of political assumptions that the young Louis absorbed in much the same way in which he breathed. A politically self-conscious generation made it necessary to form these ideas into words.

Louis warned his son that "those people badly abuse themselves who imagine that the pretensions to this quality [the pre-eminent position of royalty] are only a matter of ceremonies. . . ." ⁴³ Yet the numerous ceremonies in which he either took part or that were held in his honor must also have been of considerable importance in the formation of his ideas about the role of king. Meetings in parlement when the government held a *lit de justice*, receptions of delegations, and, of course, the impressive consecration at Rheims—all

entailed implications about the role of king. The elaborate ceremonies after 1661, when the king's real or imaginary triumphs were celebrated with tableaux of papier-mâché, fireworks, trumpets, pantomines, and extensive oratory were not as common during his minority and early years as king, but the number of receptions and speeches honoring the king is nonetheless impressive.⁴⁴

In the period of the regency not all the speeches were friendly to the government; if there is one thing that all of these ceremonies had in common, however, it was a full recognition of the idea that the king had been established by God as father of the people. Even Omer Talon, when his forthright words in parlement offended Anne, admitted freely that God had given France her king, and that the king should be obeyed.⁴⁵ The large number of books and pamphlets published without royal permission during the Fronde manifest this same tendency; even though the authors hated the regent and her minister, they were almost universally royalist and ready to admit that the throne was established by God.⁴⁶ In other words, both sides of the conflict in the mid-seventeenth century accepted the basic assumption that the king's power came from God, and both regarded the king as a sacerdotal officer.

There has been, however, considerable misunderstanding about the nature of that grant from God. Did "king by divine right" mean that the king could do what he wished? By no means. The Roman church had long expounded the doctrine of divine right based upon the sentence in St. Paul's Letter to the Romans XIII: 1: *Non est potestas nisi a Dei*. Men with as varied backgrounds as Mazarin, Bishop Bossuet, Claude Joly,⁴⁷ and Antoine Arnauld, all would agree on the church's teaching on this point. All power and authority—indeed, everything in the world—came from God; and since hierarchical society was necessary for man's well-being, God therefore had created kings to rule over men. But in Catholic thought, man had the free will to do right or wrong, and kings were no exception to this rule: it would make God the author of the evils committed by bad men if God were responsible for kings' actions. The problem was solved by making God the source of power, power that he bestowed upon kings with the right to act as His lieutenants on earth. But just as Locke divided power (ability to govern) and authority (right to govern), giving one to kings and retaining the other for the people, so the doctrine of divine right left the authority (the right

to govern) in the hands of God, giving only the *potestas* (the power to rule) into the hands of magistrates. Jacques Maritain insists that the same relationship exists today between God and governments, even parliamentary ones. God, however, expected kings to do their duty, to carry out His work on earth; and if they failed to do so, He not only would punish them in the next world but also would withdraw His protection from them in this one. Péréfixe had the young Louis translate into Latin the phrase, "I know that the principal duty of a Christian prince is to serve God and that piety is the basis for all royal virtues." Louis wrote for his son a long passage insisting upon the necessity for a king to submit to God's law and urging him to believe that kings have greater obligations toward God than other men. "Important obligations demand of us, heavy duties" he wrote; "and since, in giving us the scepter, He has given us that which appears as the most striking thing on earth, we ought, in giving Him of our heart, to give him that which is most agreeable in His eyes."⁴⁸ Mazarin put it even more bluntly at the time of the Mancini crisis: "God," he wrote, "has established kings to care for the well-being, the security, the repose of their subjects, and not to sacrifice those goods and that repose to their own passions, and if that unfortunate situation does occur . . . the Divine Providence abandons them. The histories are full of revolutions and prostrations [*accablements*] that they [wilful kings] have brought down upon themselves and their subjects."⁴⁹ It would be hard to find a statement that better expressed the assumptions of the doctrine of divine right as it was understood in the mid-seventeenth century.

Louis's deductions from the idea that God established kings and endowed them with power to govern were in part his own and in part common to his society. Kings, he was sure, were a race apart, signally different from other men because of God's action. They are the "fathers of their peoples." God not only placed them on the throne but also gave them the wisdom necessary to do His work. Kings, created in the image of God, Louis believed, had a natural understanding of politics. He was certain that he could deal with affairs of state more surely and more deftly than his ministers, who were always anxious to be sure that their action would be acceptable.

Since power was the gift of God to the king, any division of sharing of that power, in Louis's opinion, tended to corrupt or degrade it. How many of the *Mazarinade* pamphlets expressed this same point

of view in urging the king to govern without a "companion" (Mazarin), to be the sole "father of his people". It was also the lesson of the valet, La Porte, who read histories of *fainéant* kings, of Mazarin who urged Louis to become his own first minister. Louis writes about the plight of English kings: ". . . This subjugation, which forces the sovereign to take the law from his people, is the last calamity that can fall upon a man of our rank." He went on to say that a prince who has to give power to a first minister is in a miserable condition even though he has the right to choose that minister; but infinitely worse is the lot of a monarch who has to depend upon a popular assembly, because it is not "merely power that a people assembled attributes to itself; the more you give it, the more it pretends to; the more you favor it, the more it despises you; and when this power is once in its possession, it is held so strongly that one cannot take it away without extreme violence."⁵⁰

So brief a statement does not do justice to Louis's discussions about power and the use of power, and yet a fuller statement would only modify and expand his basic assumptions, namely, that God has established kings and endowed them with the ability to carry out His work on earth, and secondly, that his gift of power is personal and therefore the king should exercise it himself. However, in reading Louis's *Mémoires* it becomes clear that the expression of absolutism is tempered by the fact that Louis also understood that he ruled a kingdom in which history and tradition had created a matrix of rights, customs, and privileges, limiting the action of power; royal absolutism did not imply the right to arbitrary political action even in the mind of so absolute a king as Louis XIV.

THE PERSON OF THE KING

Anyone who has watched children grow up to become men knows that there are important individual differences in physical and emotional inheritances. American environmentalist assumptions sometimes tend to ignore these genetic differences, and historians usually pay no attention to them. Nonetheless, inheritance is important. In Louis's case he was richly endowed by nature. As a youth and as a man he was handsome, athletic, and vigorous; his emotional temper-

ament was calm, at times almost lethargic, and even as a small boy he carried himself with a natural dignity, related perhaps to good muscular coordination. In spite of his tendency to hypochondria, which caused him to take quantities of pills and potions,⁵¹ he was usually in excellent health. Just what the relationship of inheritance and environment was to the various characteristics of his personality we cannot, of course, say. Even more baffling are other aspects of his personality. The present status of personality psychology still leaves us at a loss to know which questions are the most important ones to ask: and even if we did know the proper questions, it is often impossible to find trustworthy witnesses to supply the answers.

Personality theorists are, however, largely in accord with an observation that wise men had long suspected, namely, that an individual develops the contours of his personality in part as the result of meaningful repetition of behavior that proves to be successful in effecting inner satisfaction. In other words, characteristic behavior patterns tend to become firmly fixed to the measure that the individual receives satisfactions in the form of social rewards, inner feelings of well-being, success in dealing with anxieties, and the like.⁵² It would be very difficult to produce evidence that would prove the connection between Louis's behavior patterns and his inner feelings, and yet the *Mémoires* are replete with passages from which we can infer that Louis learned to fill the role of king by successfully becoming king under the tutelage of Mazarin and his mother; that he "resolved" the threatening anxieties of the Fronde by being associated with the master politician whose skill pulled the teeth of the rebellion; that he absorbed the ceremonial pattern of the king by successfully acting out the role on a score of platforms. Such achievements alone probably would not have given him the conscience that drove him to try to fulfil his part as king, and yet they may well have been the added fillip that brought satisfaction to Louis, the man, when he acted out the part of Louis, the king, and demanded of himself the effort necessary to live up to his *gloire*.

William James believed that a man's "self" is the sum of the different roles that he plays in the world; more recent psychologists, affected by Freudian concepts, have produced considerable evidence that strongly suggests that the interpersonal relations of a child with his parents or qua parents are of great importance in the fulfillment of

roles, as well as of "ego" development. Of particular significance seems to be the love-respect attitudes of the parents toward the child, and the consequent desire of the child, in order to be assured of his parents' continued love, to act within the patterns, values, and behavioral limits represented by the parents. In "important" (to the parents) and stressed behaviors, the child who is loved, respected, and guided with some consistency is said to "introject" the values of the parents.⁵³ Louis was born to the role of king, but so were many others, and yet only a few of them have acted out their role on the stage of the world and fulfilled it as seriously and pervasively as Louis XIV did. Today when we think of a king, the stereotype is either Louis XIV or Charlemagne. Why did Louis assume so well his role?

One thing that we can be sure of is the mutual affection between Louis and his mother, and it seems almost equally sure that a similar relation existed between him and Mazarin. Who knows the hundreds of daily and persistent contacts among these three people that may have been decisive factors in Louis's opinion of himself, his role, and his obligations toward God, man, and himself—in short, his *gloire*. We do know that Anne never ceased to impress upon him her desire that he should grow up to be a great king, as well as a good man: she had a sense for majesty, a feeling for the rights and obligations of rulers, and an ideal of *la gloire* that meant in effect the fulfilment of both the role and the inner potentials entrusted to a man. How she transmitted these to Louis cannot be told, but her attitudes and values and his later actions correlated so well that we do have the right to infer a strong relationship. We have also shown similar instances with regard to Mazarin.

Furthermore, Mazarin's intervention at the time that Louis wished to marry Marie Mancini has left us a series of letters that leave no doubt about his attitudes and influences. The deeply infatuated Louis was ready to throw over all the advantages of a royal Spanish marriage to marry Mazarin's niece. Louis's argument that the house of Bourbon was deeply indebted to Mazarin and that the marriage he wished to make would, in a way, repay that debt, speaks for Louis's ingenuity as well as for his feelings toward Mazarin (and Marie). Mazarin's letters are those of a father using all the arguments he can muster to prevent a wilful son from committing an act of folly. He speaks of Anne's feelings, of his own labors for the well-being of the

kingdom, of Louis's duties as king, of his obligations to society. At one point he recalls that Louis had often asked what he must do to become a great king: attention to duty, hard work, recognition of obligations. The fact that Mazarin was willing to go further in his argument, balancing his own career and life against the will of the young king, may indicate his feelings more poignantly than the impersonal arguments; it may also indicate the extent of his moral authority over the boy, for Louis *was the king*, and Mazarin never questioned that fact. Indeed, it was to Louis the king that Mazarin appealed to check the passion of Louis the man.

These letters at the time of the Mancini crisis seem to be the most dramatic documentary evidence of the sort of influence that made Louis XIV seek so untiringly to fulfil his historic destiny, his conception of his *gloire*. All the formal education in the world cannot persuade a man to play his part, to fulfil his potestate. But if a man has taken into the core of his self-concept, of his ego, if he has identified with himself the deepest values of his beloved and respected parents—in this case, his destiny as a great king and an *honnête homme*—this may well drive him forward to accordant action. The fact that Louis gave up Marie Mancini may well be the great tragedy in his life,⁵⁴ but that fact that he did give her up upon the insistence of his mother and Mazarin that in this way lay duty to kingdom and *la gloire* seems to argue that, among other influences that we do not know about, the relationship that existed among these three persons⁵⁵—Louis, Anne, and Mazarin—provides a most important key for the understanding of this man whose career was so fateful for the history of Europe.

1. Charles Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860), I, 195 f., (hereafter cited as *Mémoires de Louis XIV*). I have used this edition rather than the version published in *Œuvres de Louis XIV* (6 vols.; Paris, 1806), in which the *Mémoires* are less critically handled. For other editions of the *Mémoires* and for a bibliography of books published since this essay was first written, see my essay "The Reign of Louis XIV: A Selected Bibliography of Writings Since the War of 1914-1918," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI, 127-44.

2. How true this is becomes apparent with even a cursory investigation of the literature on the early life of Louis. G. Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1898 and 2d ed., 1923) is the best study dealing with his youth, but it attempts no evaluation of the possible significance of the events or ideas discussed. The two more recent and more popular studies, Mme Saint-René Taillander, *La Jeunesse du Grand Roi, Louis XIV et Anne d'Autriche* (Paris, 1945), and

Henri Carré, *L'Enfance et la première jeunesse de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1944) follow the same pattern. Mlle E. Carpentier's *L'Enfance de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1869) is even less revealing. Shorter discussions, such as are to be found in Lavisser or Chéruel, are largely conditioned by the author's interpretation of Mazarin's influence or of the author's feelings about Louis himself, matters that will inevitably color any study of personality. Naturally, the present paper relies heavily upon the copious memoir materials long available for the period. Those of Louis XIV, De Motteville, De Monpensier, Montglat, La Porte, and Dubois were the most important. These memoirs, however, will not be cited in the footnotes unless the incident or idea has not been used by other writers.

3. Saint-Simon tells us that he was the only one to attend the annual Mass for the soul of the late king. Saint-Simon, of course, considered Louis XIII to be a great king, perhaps because from him came the ducal title of the house of Saint-Simon.

4. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 18.

5. Philippe Erlanger, *Monsieur, frère de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1953).

6. N. Druon, *Histoire de l'éducation des princes dans la maison des Bourbons de France* (2 vols.; Paris, 1897), I, 177.

7. Many nineteenth-century writers assumed with Saint-Simon that Mazarin had deliberately sacrificed Louis's education. French hatred of the Italian favorite is one of the most interesting residues of the Fronde. Lavisser remarks, "Louis was a bad scholar because of the fault of the Cardinal . . ." and then adds, "but also because of the circumstances of the civil war . . ." (E. Lavisser, *Histoire de France* [Paris, 1905], Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 124).

8. The 1806 edition of the *Œuvres de Louis XIV* contains the translation of Caesar's Gallic Wars that he made, according to La Porte, to surprise his teacher. The present writer also once translated this work and was impressed with Louis's version, but there is no reason to believe that Louis's translation may not have been "corrected" here and there before it was published.

9. See also Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 373.

10. There are a large number of accounts of these speeches given at "receptions of the king," some of which were delivered in the royal presence and others simply "presented" in printed form. The following are illustrative of this kind of literature that can be found for the entire reign: Buhot, *Discours sur le joyeux avènement du roy Louis XIV, prononcé le 15 juin 1643* (Paris, 1643); *Les assurées nouvelles des magnificences faites à l'entrée de sa Majesté dans sa ville de Bordeaux et l'harangue à luy prononcée par MM du Parlement* (Paris, 1650); *La vray et veritable harangue fait au roy par un des principaux deputiez en presence de toute sa cour* (Paris, 1652); *Harangue fait au roy et à la reine dans la ville de Mellium . . .* (Paris, 1652); *Entrée de Louis XIV dans la ville* (D'Auxerre, 1658).

11. *Lettre du roy, écrit à Monseigneur l'Archevesque de Paris, 26 mars, 1638*. The vow of Louis XIII attracted much contemporary attention both because of the piety of the act and because of the birth of a son, which many saw as an answer to Louis's prayers. One of the most interesting discussions of the vow was in a sermon given by P. Gilles Buhot in which he compared Louis's dedication to the Virgin with Hadrian's taking Hercules for his companion. He also traced the history of the cult of the Virgin in France from Druid days to his own. See Gilles Buhot, *Discours sur le Voeu du Roy à la Sainte Vierge* (Paris, n.d.).

12. De la Varenne, *Anne d'Autriche, femme de Louis XIII, 1601-1666* (Paris, 1938), has amassed the evidence on Anne's piety. See also P. H. Chérot, S. J., *La première jeunesse de Louis XIV (1649-1653) d'après la correspondance inédite du P. Charles Paulin . . .* (Lille [1892]), pp. 9-20.

13. The full story of the relationship between the great ladies of the seventeenth-century court and the nuns in the cloisters about the city of Paris has not

yet been written. It will make an interesting study of courtly society and religious practices.

14. Cf. G. Vauthier, *Anne d'Autriche et l'église du Val-de-Grace* (Paris, 1916).

15. There are many books on St. Vincent de Paul. In addition to G. Maynard, *St. Vincent de Paul* (1827), III, 393-403, C. Capefigue, *Vie de St. Vincent de Paul* (1839) and Siiri Juva, *Monsieur Vincent, évolution d'un Saint* (Paris, 1939) should be consulted.

16. Quoted by P. -H. Chérot, *La première jeunesse de Louis XIV*, p. 49.

17. Louis seems not to have been punished very often, since none of the memoir writers make much of it. This contrasts strikingly with the treatment his father had been given in his boyhood. Henri IV believed that no one should rule who had not "felt the whip himself." Anne was less cruel in her treatment of her son, but we cannot assume that the difference in punishment in part accounts for the fact that Louis XIII used the ax where Louis XIV relied upon the prison; on the other hand, it must be given consideration.

18. *Le Sacre et couronnement de Louis XIV* (1717); *Le véritable journal de ce qui s'est passé au sacre du roy Louis XIV* (1654); *Cérémonies faites et observées au sacre et couronnement du roy Louis XIV, 7 juin, 1654* (n.d.).

19. Dubois, *Journal du valet de chambre Dubois*, ed. Léon Aubineau, *Bib. de l'Ecole de Chartres*, IV, 2d ser., 1847-48, pp. 22-25; Fénelon, *Œuvres complètes*, VI, 509.

20. The magic of mid-twentieth-century recording is making this music available today. A magnificent example is the Lully *Te Deum*, Westminster Hi-Fi W.L. 5326.

21. Louis was not the only seventeenth-century ruler with so naïve a view; his cousin Leopold of Austria was sure that God had withdrawn protection from the house of Hapsburg during a particularly unhappy period of his life. Louis writes in one place, "Les heureux succes que j'avais en toutes ces choses me faisant voir la protection que Dieu donnait aux prémices de mon administration, je m'efforçais aussi de lui faire paraître mon zèle en tout ce que regardait son service" (Dreyss [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 417-18). And in yet another passage he indicates that he does not think that observance of cult is enough: a king must also give his "heart" to God (*ibid.*, II, 422-23).

22. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 208 ff.

23. A. Lloyd Moote, in "The Parlement of Paris: The French Crown and Royal Absolutism during the Fronde, 1643-1652" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1958), analyzes the problem of the conflict between the two levels of royal officials and presents a fresh interpretation of this important aspect of the Fronde.

24. The pamphlet literature and songs of the period were scurrilous in the extreme. One version of a song popular at the time went as follows:

Veut on scavior la difference
qu'il y a de son Eminence
et le feu Monsieur la Cardinal
La response en est toute preste
l'on conduisoit son animal
et l'autre monte sur sa Beste.

(Bibliothèque Mazarine, MS 2158 [27])

See also Pierre Barbier and France Vernillat, *Histoire de France par les chansons*, Vol. II, *Mazarin et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1956).

25. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 373-74.

26. Siege of Bellegarde, April, 1650.

27. *Mémoires de Mlle de Montpensier*, ed. J. F. Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat (Paris, 1838), p. 263. All discussion of the Fronde was banned at court, as though

Louis the man wanted to forget what had happened to Louis the boy; but the reflection "on the miserable condition of princes subjected to the will of their people" and "on the conduct of princes of the royal house" are only part of the evidence that it was not forgotten (Dreyss [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 5-13).

28. "Lettre de la Reyne à Mms. de la Chambre touchant le gouvernement de la personne du roy," March 15, 1646, Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris, MS 2117.

29. Cf. P.-A. Chéruef (ed.), *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin* (Paris, 1872-1906), Vols. V, VI, and VII *passim*.

30. The quotation is from *Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy*, ed. J. Michaud, pp. 6-7, but the idea runs through Mazarin's letters. For example, he wrote to Louis during the Mancini crisis that he knew that "la Confidante [Anne] s'intéresse plus que personne à vous voir non seulement le plus grand roy au monde, mais le plus honnest homme" (Chéruef [ed.], *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin*, IX, 28). He hoped to use Louis's love for his mother and knowledge of her wishes to see him a good man to control the king's emotions. About the same time he wrote to Anne, "Je suis au désespoir de voir la payne où vous estes de toutes les choses que vous avez la bonté de me mander . . . priant Dieu de tout mon cœur qu'il bénisse mes intentions; car, en ce cas, le Confident sera le plus grand roy du monde et plus heureux . . ." (Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS 863, I; 188, V).

31. Chéruef (ed.), *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin*, IV, 435.

32. *Ibid.*, V, 649.

33. *Ibid.*, V, xiv.

34. *Ibid.*, VIII, 498 ff.

35. *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (2d ed.; Paris, 1923), pp. 136-37.

36. In this paper we shall not consider the question of the wisdom of the policies defined by Mazarin and carried out by Louis XIV. This is obviously another problem.

37. The Dreyss edition, Vol. I, contains an exhaustive analysis of the problems of authorship of these *Mémoires*. See also P.-A. Chéruef, *Étude sur la valeur historique des "Mémoires de Louis XIV"* (Paris, 1886) and Paul Sonnino's essay in this collection.

38. Both are to be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale. *The Carnets*, written in Italian, French, and Spanish, all in a crabbed hand, are now in the process of being re-edited.

39. When Louis XIII died, she knelt down and made an obeisance before her child son as *her king*; and, as mentioned above, until she died, she was a courtesan.

40. Chéruef (ed.), *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin*, VI, VII, VIII *passim*.

41. John B. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715* (New York, 1951), p. 44.

42. This point of view, however, is postulated upon ideas unknown in the seventeenth century (cf. Sir George Clark, *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century* [Cambridge, England, 1958]) or upon uncritical acceptance of Louis's remark as an old man: "J'ai trop aimé la guerre." Warfare provided the sole means of giving firm contours to large aspects of seventeenth-century political society. Louis's fault was not so much love of war as it was his failure to understand what was happening in Europe after the treaty of Nijmegen; it did not prove easy to disengage France from a war that was undertaken as a limited adventure. But this is another story.

43. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 15.

44. Both the number and the elaborate structure of these celebrations, festivals, welcomes, and so on, is astonishing. It is only after studying the numerous records of these festivities honoring the king that one can get an understanding of Louis's later vision of himself. It would have taken a remarkable person to have been unaffected by the adulation inherent in the worship of the "cult of the king." See John B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York, 1968), pp. 357-78.

45. Omer Talon, *Mémoires* (The Hague, 1732), IV, 182-94.
46. Between the library of the University of Minnesota and the Newberry Library at Chicago, the Midwest has about as many titles of this Mazarinade literature as one can find in the libraries of Paris.
47. *Recueil des maximes véritables et importants pour l'instruction du roy*, 1652, by Claude Joly, was apparently widely read by clergymen, for many quoted freely from it.
48. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 422-23.
49. *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin*, La Paix des Pyrénées, IX, p. 75.
50. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 6-8.
51. Cf. Vallot, D'Aquin, and Fagon, *Journal de la santé du roi Louis XIV de l'année 1647 à l'année 1711*, ed. J. -A. LeRoi (Paris, 1862), *passim*. Cf. the essay in this volume by Charles D. O'Malley.
52. J. Dollard and N. E. Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture* (New York, 1950); C. S. Hall and G. Lindsay, *Theories of Personality* (New York, 1957); O. H. Mowrer, *Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics* (New York, 1950). The present writer is indebted to his wife for insights and bibliography in this section. Naturally, she is not responsible for the form of the statement.
53. These processes lose none of their significance because they seem frequently to be unconscious or unintentional on the part of the child and/or the parents. A succinct statement re this viewpoint can be found in J. McV. Hunt (ed.), *Personality and the Behavior Disorders: A Handbook Based on Experimental and Clinical Research* (New York, 1944), pp. 85-113; but, as most of the readers will know, it occurs widely in the literature of personality development.
54. It is the present writer's opinion that Louis's subsequent marriage to Maria Theresa, a woman of very limited abilities, was responsible for much of the disorder in his personal life.
55. Obviously, there were other factors and personalities involved in the formation of the king; the role of his parents, however, deserves the special treatment given in this paper.

The Medical History of Louis XIV: Intimations of Mortality

C. D. O'MALLEY

LOUIS of Bourbon, elder son and heir to the throne of France, "after having kept the queen in labor for more than five hours," was born at 11:22 in the morning of September 5, 1638, ushered into the world by a single midwife, Dame Peronne. His royal parents, Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, had lived through twenty-two years of sterile matrimony and strong mutual hatred prior to the birth of the child, so that it was no wonder that the French nation looked upon the event as little short of miraculous and called the infant prince Louis *Dieudonné*. Moreover, according to an old superstition, a child born with teeth already apparent was a child favored by destiny, and the infant Louis could display two such prophetic teeth that, incidentally, boded ill for the wet nurses of the royal child who, as Hugo Grotius was to write to Christina of Sweden, "not only drains the breast of his nurse, but lacerates it with his biting. Let France's neighbors take care against such an early voracity." Indeed, the infant prince had a succession of wet nurses, each in turn compelled to retire as a result of this rather bizarre occupational hazard. Among these lactifluous heroines we may salute Elisabeth Ancel, Pierrette Dufour, and Marie de Segneville Thierry.

To be born alive in the seventeenth century represented triumph over merely the first of many lethal obstacles between the infant and the adult, even though, as in the instance of the recently born

dauphin, everything possible would be done to insure survival. Actually, from our point of view, not a great deal was then possible; and that Louis survived into the eighteenth century was despite himself, his physicians, and the then uncontrolled diseases that were ubiquitously active, their transmission made all the easier by reasons of the throngs that crowded the court.

Hygienically speaking, it was a dirty world, less concerned with personal cleanliness—at least in regard to bathing—than had been so in the previous period of the Renaissance or even of the Middle Ages. Although it was recognized that from time to time bathing was necessary, usually such baths were recommended as part of medical treatment; they were occasionally prescribed for Louis XIV, but infrequently, since it was believed that they were a cause of his headaches and fits of vertigo. In contrast, it was recognized that the hands ought to be, not necessarily washed, but at least wiped with a cloth daily upon arising; and in Louis's case the cloth was normally first dipped in brandy, providing perhaps, not apparent cleanliness but at least a fortuitous antiseptic measure. Further hand-wiping followed meals since as yet, even at court, the fork was an uncommon piece of tableware.

The extended period during which clothing was worn without change was a complementary feature of that unhygienic age, but did not represent any retrogression from earlier practices. The heavy, elaborate costumes may have provided some comforting warmth during the cold season, but at other times of the year they naturally promoted perspiration and compounded the olfactory offense of which even the sinners occasionally complained and sought its concealment under the pungent cloak of strong perfumes. To conclude, it may be added that the handkerchief was considered to be part of one's adornment and an object primarily for use in various polite gestures and flourishes; nasal cleanliness was achieved by other and less pleasant means.

Living conditions were a source of similar sensory unpleasantness, and, in addition, contributed more effectively to ill health. Large, high-ceilinged rooms were naturally difficult to heat, especially in an era of inefficient heating devices; in consequence, they were often sealed so tightly that any proper ventilation was out of the question. The heavy furniture of the period, the beds enclosed by draperies

on all sides, contributed to this condition as well as to an interior gloom and somberness. As one should not be astonished at the absence of bathrooms, so, too, of the privy, a rare adornment of homes, or even palaces, although toward the close of the century a number of them were installed at Versailles but as curious luxuries rather than necessities. The quantities of dogs that had, so to speak, the freedom of Versailles, especially in the king's quarters, somewhat nullified this last hygienic measure. In the midst of all this unpleasant lack of cleanliness, which from the viewpoint of later times would almost suggest a determination to make the onset of disease as easy as possible, it should be noted that, quite unlike the situation in Paris—where the waters of the Seine, used for both sewage disposal and consumption, represented an ever-present danger of disease—some effort was made at Versailles to provide water from a pure source. When there, Louis, on the advice of his physicians, drank only from an uncontaminated spring.

Were disease to assert its presence, there was not very much that the physician could do to stem the attack, even if he succeeded in making a correct diagnosis. Indeed, he was more likely to attempt far too much and so obstructively weaken his patient's natural recuperative powers. Despite some advancement in basic medical research and some improvement in surgical techniques, clinical medicine of seventeenth-century France for the most part displayed little advancement over that of the previous century. In fact, there were few French clinicians of the time who displayed the merits of such sixteenth-century figures as Jean Fernel and Guillaume Baillou, or, in the seventeenth century, could approach the accomplishments of Thomas Sydenham in England and Giorgio Baglivi in Italy; there is considerably more fact than fantasy in Molière's unflattering representations of the French physicians of his day.

This cheerless situation was certainly not improved by the conflict between the methods and philosophies of the two rival medical schools of Paris and Montpellier, which led each to attempt to prevent graduates of the other from practicing in its area, and, generally speaking, made it impossible for whatever the merits of one school to be accepted and introduced into the other. Paris recognized a strict allegiance to orthodox, Galenic herbal medicine, but Montpellier, despite some basic Galenism, had for long covered

itself with a veneer of Moslem influence in so far as its pharmacopœia was concerned, to which, under the influence of Lazare Rivière (1589-1655), it added the spagyric doctrine of Paracelsus; most notably, Montpellier took its stand on the use of antimony, a purgative mineral drug that was long anathema to Paris.

The hostility between the two schools was brought to a head in consequence of the activities and temporarily successful defiance of Paris by Théophraste Renaudot (1584-1653), a graduate of Montpellier (1606). Arriving in Paris in 1612, Renaudot gained nominal appointment as a physician to Louis XIII, which gave him the right to carry on a private practice that was unusually successful owing to Renaudot's marked sense of publicity. As a "foreigner" and as an advocate of chemical drugs, especially antimony, the newcomer was bitterly attacked by the local physicians but found strong support among the apothecaries of Paris, who resented their subjugation to the medical faculty, and with Richelieu. The latter, looking with disfavor on the privileges and powers of the University of Paris, notably those of the medical faculty, saw in the dispute with Montpellier an opportunity to gain control of the former institution. With Renaudot as his cat's-paw, he developed plans for the construction of a charitable medical clinic in the suburb of Saint-Antoine as the first step toward the establishment of an institution to rival, and hence to reduce, the power of the medical faculty as a move toward the subjugation of the university as a whole. However, with Richelieu's death, the scheme collapsed; and the Paris faculty, suddenly emboldened by this turn of events, in 1644 undertook a lawsuit aimed at strengthening restrictions against the practice of medicine by "foreigners" in Paris, as well as emphasizing the prohibitions already existing against the use of antimony. Although the suit was successful, nevertheless the faculty had had a bad scare that tended to intensify feelings against Montpellier and its products.

During the long reign of Louis XIV the direction of the royal medical service had been drawn at one time from Paris and at another from Montpellier; and since the king lived most of his life in or near Paris, those premier physicians who were products of the southern school were subjected to constant harassment from a source distressingly near at hand, and especially from the caustic pen of Guy Patin (1601-1672), member of the Paris faculty of medicine and

its self-appointed spokesman and defender. Patin was a violent opponent of the slightest deviation from Galenic orthodoxy, and his conservative position may be judged from his assertion that Harvey's doctrine of the circulation of the blood was "paradoxical, useless, false, impossible, absurd, and harmful." However, no matter which philosophy controlled the direction of the royal medical service, the existence of two such strongly opposed and belligerently divergent philosophies within the kingdom could only be harmful to that service.

Nor was this situation of disquiet within the royal medical service the result solely of conflicting professional philosophies. The ever-increasing idleness of the nobility at the royal court and a consequent serious concern with frivolity and gossip led to its taking the utmost interest in every aspect of the king's life, including those matters relating to his health. Of course, at a time when everything depended upon the favor of this one man, it was undoubtedly of importance to know the state of the royal health, which might determine decisions affecting the personal lives of the courtiers; perhaps, too, it might be possible to make one's own contribution to the maintenance or recovery of that health and thereby gain some token of favor. Memoirs of the period contain much gossip about the inconsequent details of Louis's frequent bouts of self-induced gastric upset, his headaches, colds, and, of course, his more serious ailments; it seems, too, that there was no detail of the royal physiological processes that was not discussed with amazing frankness as to function or malfunction. Such lack of delicacy should be no cause for astonishment when one considers that the king himself set this earthly tone by such practices as giving audiences from his *chaise percée* or by reading, without embarrassment or displeasure—perhaps with satisfaction—his physician's account of the various purges given him with monotonous regularity and the resultant, carefully counted, multiple bowel movements. Great ladies of the court occasionally made all preliminary arrangements in the royal presence for the taking of a clyster, and the device itself was frequently the subject of the artist's pencil.

The seventeenth century was the great age of the clyster, or enema, actually an ancient device but given great prominence and certain refinements in Regnier de Graaf's book on the subject, and generally used as a purgative or an emollient measure. In time it came to have a certain literary prominence as the "instrument of Molière" because

of the place it held in many of the great dramatist's plays in which he so frequently satirized the medical profession of his day, especially its blind faith in certain therapeutic measures and its determination to employ those measures, whether needed or not. Hence when one of the characters in *The Doctor despite Himself* remarks, "I never felt better in my life," the reply is, "This superabundance of health forbodes some evil; and it would not be amiss to bleed you gently, and administer a little dulcifying injection." Such, in fact, was often the fate of the unfortunate king. To the seventeenth century such facts—which no one pretended to conceal, even to the actual employment of the instrument—added further to its distinction. No well-run household would ever be without it, and fashionable society required its daily use.

It was no great distance from concern with every royal symptom to confident, curial diagnosis, and, finally, equally confident proposals for treatment, so that the premier physician often found himself compelled to compete with courtiers in the maintenance or recovery of his royal patient's health. This particular plague of non-professional advice arose chiefly among the women of the court.

Despite the apparent brilliance of the royal court, many of its members were, in fact, not far or long removed from the earlier, rustic, and unsophisticated life of the French nobility in which the nobleman's wife had dispensed medicine and medical advice throughout the countryside, and within her own household had ministered to a large brood of children subject to many diseases and, indeed, mostly carried off in their early years. Such medicines had been of the homely variety that had no sanction in any pharmacopoeia but were, nevertheless, time-honored within the family or had been accepted for use on the recommendation of some other noblewoman. Occasionally, they may have had some value, knowledge of which had been gained empirically; but often these medicines reflected nothing but gullibility and superstition. At court such medicines might be altered on the side of pseudosophistication, but the tradition of the woman's role in treatment remained, as well as the belief that medicine was actually a very simple affair; as the Marquise de Sévigné wrote, "The study of medicine is neither long nor difficult," and, she continued, one might quickly learn more about it than any physician. The marquise, an especially gullible woman, was always

a ready prey to the latest charlatan so that in the course of her industrious letter-writing, she was never at a loss for some new remedy to recommend strongly to her trusting family or friends; it was her sort, "the woman who interferes with our profession," that Guy Patin described as "a stupid animal."

The new, superficial splendor of the court, the desire to replace any appearance of rusticity by one of sophistication, and to indicate one's membership in the circle of learned women—who were, of course, completely unlearned so far as medicine was concerned—led to the production of new medicines and panaceas of which the more esoteric the ingredients, the greater the belief in their efficacy. In illustration we may turn once again to the Marquise de Sévigné, whom we find recommending a broth made from viper's flesh for the improvement of vision while others recommended the therapeutic value of oil of scorpions, or an essence of urine. Such activities were strongly supported by boredom, gullibility married to enterprising charlatantry, as well as by the rage for alchemy and the search for the philosopher's stone. The results were as completely nasty as they were ineffectual. Even chocolate, tea, and coffee, because of their novelty, were for a time looked upon as having therapeutic value—even by physicians—although in the completely irrational fashion of the day there were those who declared such beverages to be harmful and, on occasion, even lethal if used in large amounts or over a long period of time.

The royal medical service as it was to be found in the reign of Louis XIV had its beginnings with the first Bourbon king, Henri IV, under whom for the first time the premier physician, or *archiater*, became one of the high-ranking officials of the court. Indeed, the *archiater* was in some ways set apart from all others since by the nature of his duties he had access to the monarch at all hours—under Louis XIV, even before the first *levée*—was aware of certain intimate aspects of the royal life and person denied to all others, and might develop a uniquely personal influence over the monarch that could be maintained or improved through such unlimited approach and opportunities to make the most of his patient's physical and mental condition. Although the members of the court might have scant regard, if any, for the *archiater* as a man, nevertheless, even the highest nobility paid close heed to his remarks and activities in his official capacity.

In the fully developed service of Louis XIV, the archiater—or, officially, “Premier physician of the king”—once appointed was pretty much at liberty to appoint the rest of the staff, including a physician-in-ordinary—not an associate but, rather, an assistant lacking either the status or the income of the archiater but occasionally able to succeed or to supplant him. Eight further physicians served for trimestrial periods at court, and throughout the kingdom there were sixty-six consultant physicians to be called upon whenever the king ventured forth on a tour of his realm. Later, four “spagyrist,” or physicians specializing in the use of chemical drugs, represented a triumph of the medical school of Montpellier; and their further concern with alchemy demonstrated the continued irrational, gullible character of the age, as did also the two “physician-mathematicians” who were, in fact, astrologers. The final appointment on what may be considered the professional level was that of the “physician-botanist,” although the control of the royal botanical garden, the Jardin des Plantes, and the related, valuable perquisites belonged to the archiater.

Lower-ranking members of the royal service, since they were as yet declared officially to be members of crafts rather than professions, were the premier and second surgeons, eight more surgeons serving trimestrial periods, and twelve consultant surgeons located throughout the kingdom; still lower on the scale were the apothecaries and their assistants, and such so-called empirics as dentists, lithotomists, oculists, barbers, herbalists, and masseurs. In due course, as it came to be considered desirable to imitate the king in every way possible, not only did other members of the royal family develop their own medical hierarchies but also such members of the nobility as possessed the means for that purpose.

From his birth until the year 1646, thus as dauphin and thereafter for his first several years as king, Louis was under the medical care of Jacques Cousinot (c. 1585–1646), a graduate of Paris (1618) and once dean of that school’s faculty of medicine (1624); as a consequence of his antecedents and his unquestioned and complete allegiance to Galen, he enjoyed the favorable comment of his sharp-witted colleague Patin. Because of admirable forethought, or, at least, good fortune, Cousinot had married a daughter of Charles Bouvard, premier physician of Louis XIII, and due to this circumstance was introduced to the court, became physician to the young dauphin,

and, virtually designated as successor to Bouvard, shared in the care of the tuberculous Louis XIII during the final period of his life. Faithful to the doctrines of Paris, Cousinot's treatment was no different from that of his father-in-law, who could declare proudly that in one year he had dosed the unfortunate, dying king with 215 medicines, given him 212 clysters, and bled him on 47 occasions. Much as we may sympathize with Louis, who shortly before his death described his physicians as "executioners," such treatment was fully orthodox according to the Parisian school of medicine.

Since Cousinot had no immediate and possible professional heirs upon his succession to the post of king's archiater in 1643, the question of who would next gain that position naturally became a source of the greatest interest in medical circles. It was further intensified by uncertainty as to whether the successor would be drawn from the school of Paris or from antimonial Montpellier, which, supported by Richelieu, had, upon the death of the cardinal, been successfully suppressed, as far as its influence was concerned, through the efforts of the briefly powerful Cousinot.

The appointment of Cousinot, devoid of any consideration of his professional ability, had been the result of family influence as well as political turmoil and some reaction against the regime of Richelieu, in so far as he had shown favor to the products of Montpellier. The appointment of François Vaultier (1590-1652) as the next premier physician was in turn the result of reaction against the previous monarch, as distinguished from Richelieu, and represented the favor of Mazarin and Anne of Austria, gained at least in part by Vaultier's clear record of disfavor in the eyes of the now defunct Louis XIII.

After receiving his medical degree at Montpellier (1612), Vaultier came to Paris, where he succeeded in establishing a fashionable and lucrative practice. Introduced at court, it was not long before this handsome and presentable physician became the medical attendant of Marie de' Medici, but was dismissed by Louis XIII because of the great influence he was considered to have acquired over the queen mother. Thereupon, Vaultier joined the cabal against Richelieu and, with its failure, was imprisoned in the Bastille for the next twelve years. Such a past was enough to insure his welcome at the new court, to which he returned to become the physician to Mazarin and the confidant of Anne of Austria. He was even made one of the

physicians to the dying and helpless Louis XIII, but behaved with the utmost circumspection since succession to Cousinot was not beyond the bounds of possibility.

Naturally, the conflicting medical philosophies of Paris and Montpellier brought Vaultier, as the new premier physician, under fire of the Parisian faculty (notably, of course, that of Guy Patin, who declared him to lack knowledge of Hippocrates and Galen and to be mostly concerned with astrology, alchemy, and the search for the philosopher's stone). Nevertheless, Vaultier was a clever man, whatever his capacity as a physician, and, for better or worse, an innovator who had much to do with the further popularization of chemical drugs, especially the emetic antimony. His besetting sin was avarice, which could be regarded sympathetically by Mazarin; and in 1649 it was nominally the king who rewarded Vaultier's services with the revenues of the abbey of Saint-Taurin d'Evreux "in special recognition of his cure of Monsieur, sole brother of the King." At this time Louis was eleven years old.

There is little factual information regarding Vaultier's services as archiater. His successors were to keep a complete record of the king's health, illnesses, and medical treatment, the *Journal de la Santé du Roi* that, begun by the succeeding archiater, Antoine Vallot, was, however, retrospective for the year 1647 when Louis suffered an attack of smallpox, his first serious illness. Vallot, friend of Vaultier, fellow alumnus of Montpellier, and, so to speak, second in command, had been called into consultation on this occasion; hence the *Journal*, otherwise beginning with the year 1652, contains reference to this earlier medical problem, a success for the Montpellier physician over the objections of those of Paris. Vallot may well have included the case as a mark of gratitude for Vaultier's good will, ultimately of no little assistance in gaining him succession to the premier post in the royal medical service.

On the eleventh of November, 1647, Louis complained of pains in the region of the kidneys and lower back, accompanied by a general malaise; a restless night, increasing fever, and certain other indications led Vaultier to consider the possibility of smallpox, and on the following day the king was bled. A second disturbed night was taken as indication for further bleeding, and by the thirteenth, any doubts of the nature of the disease were dispelled by the appear-

ance of the pustules. Alarmed by a royal delirium, on the following morning Vaultier called into consultation François Guénault, a leading Parisian physician, Vallot, and Pierre and Claude Séguin, uncle and nephew, physicians to the queen mother. All agreed that the medicinal cordials thus far employed were satisfactory, although, curiously enough, the Séguins opposed a third bleeding, even carrying that opposition to the queen mother. Nevertheless, Vaultier, strongly supported by Vallot, ordered it carried out, and coincidentally and fortuitously the patient's condition appeared to improve; a later setback on the twenty-first led to a fourth bleeding on the following day that once again corresponded to improvement, and by the twenty-fifth a safe recovery was foreseen, to the relief not only of the physicians but of Mazarin and Anne of Austria, who, had the patient failed to respond, might have had their control of the state jeopardized.

Although the young king from time to time suffered bouts of minor ill health arising from his gluttony, there was no further official medical information until 1652 when, upon the death of Vaultier, the post of premier physician was given to Antoine Vallot (1594-1671), as has been mentioned, like his predecessor a graduate of Montpellier and consequently a partisan of that chemical pharmacy so strongly opposed by the orthodox, Galenic medical school of Paris. Arriving in Paris, Vallot had quickly gained a fashionable clientele, and through the influence of Vaultier became physician to Anne of Austria, a steppingstone to the king's service; however, it has been said, without clear proof, that the decisive factor was a payment of 30,000 *écus* to Mazarin. Vallot's strong support of Vaultier's treatment of Louis's smallpox in 1647 was by no means to his disadvantage, although, of course, the new premier physician was strongly criticized by Guy Patin, that foremost defender of the Parisian school of medicine.

It was Vallot who initiated the *Journal*, or medical record of the king, that was fully and meticulously maintained by him and by his successors and remains the major source of knowledge of the state of Louis's health from 1652 to 1711. However, since Louis himself from time to time read the *Journal*, not only does it reflect the general aura of adulation that pervaded the court but also occasionally contains curious circumlocutions necessary for avoidance of any injury to the royal sensitivity. As well, one may find in it here and there expressions

of irritation aroused by meddling courtiers and some indication of the growing conflict of interests between physician and surgeon.

Although the *Journal* introduces the young monarch as possessing every imaginable virtue, it nevertheless contains a note of reservation respecting his health, recognizing inheritance from a sickly father which it was hoped would be cancelled by that from a robust mother. In addition to this hint that the king would be well served by control over his already intemperate nature, there was the further suggestion of the importance of the medical service, requiring the premier physician to pay ever close heed to his patient lest medical aid need be thrown into the balance; nevertheless, the king's sympathy and all-important support seems never to have been extended to the medical profession as a whole, in contrast to his protection and even applause of Molière, medicine's most savage critic.

That Louis had at least inherited his mother's appetite—indeed, surpassed it to the point of gluttony—was already apparent in 1652 when the new premier physician was required on several occasions to administer to a so-called flux of the stomach, or, as we may say, diarrhea. The malady and its treatment by purge, clyster, and diet (the last never maintained for long) appeared with monotonous regularity through the many years of the *Journal*. Constipation was also the major cause of Louis's bouts of vertigo, although sometimes these were partly fostered by other matters equally unsettling to digestion, such as various amorous pursuits during the king's earlier years and unfavorable military or political events during the later. In 1653 Louis suffered on several occasions from the common cold, and this, too, was a complaint to which he was frequently subject throughout his life.

It was not until 1655 that Louis, at the age of sixteen, was bothered by a second serious illness, the result of his initiation into the art of Venus by Madame de Beauvais, first lady of the bedchamber to Anne of Austria. Whether influenced solely by youthful inquisitiveness or because of a total lack of discrimination—Madame de Beauvais, blind in one eye, was a woman of mature years—the young king gained not only initiation into the art of which he was soon to be recognized as a master but, as well, an unwelcome souvenir of this event in the form of gonorrhœa. The symptoms as described to Vallot by the king's personal servitors and as observed by the

physician himself left no doubt as to diagnosis, but the problem was one requiring the utmost in medical diplomacy. Mindful of Louis's habit of reading the *Journal*, Vallot at first described the ailment as inexplicable, especially in view of the high moral and virtuous qualities of the patient; he finally hit upon the expedient of explaining the symptoms as the result of excessive exercise, especially horse-back-riding, which ought to be avoided for a time. Furthermore, Louis was advised—delicately, of course—that his complaint, “the first time that medical science has recorded such a case,” might have dire consequences in respect to future progeny and succession to the throne.

However, the young king was impatient of any delay that might hinder his joining in the successful campaign being waged against the Spanish along the eastern border, and probably at first sufficiently ignorant, so that treatment was only intermittent, interrupted by the lure of military glory. But if these interruptions saved him from a certain number of bloodlettings, clysters, and medicines such as Vallot's Martial salt (prepared crayfish stones, pearls, and coral), at some state he seems to have discovered the true nature of his disease and some idea of the ridicule and embarrassment often associated with it, since Vallot was ordered “not to speak to anyone of a matter of such consequence” and “to conceal the reason that required these remedies.” The remedies were in fact altered from time to time, the last being large quantities of the water of Forges, brought in containers by relays of mounted troops. At the end of seven months Louis was declared recovered and, as history records, without any lasting injury to his procreative powers.

As the attention of Venus had been a royal embarrassment, that of Mars was by long odds more threatening to the king's life. The account of this second illness bears some suggestion of typhus, then a common accompaniment of warfare and armies in the field, although the sickness has also been variously described as scarlatina, typhoid fever, and even malaria. According to the *Journal*:

After the conquest of Dunkirk and Bergues, when the King was at Mardyke . . . on Saturday, 29 June 1658, he was overwhelmed by an unusual warmth, weakness in all his limbs, and a severe headache; he was without force, vigor, and appetite. Then, soon after his return from a trip to Bergues, fever set in accompanied by extraordinary weakness.

At this time Vallot was in Calais attending to the mortally wounded Maréchal de Castelnault; and to make matters even worse, Louis, anxious to return once more to Bergues, sought to conceal his condition. Nevertheless, it deteriorated so rapidly that it became apparent to Mazarin, then with the king, who ordered him taken to Calais, where Vallot awaited with the inevitable clyster; and despite the physician's recognition of Louis's "great weakness," nevertheless "that did not prevent the drawing of three basins of blood from the king's right arm." There can be no question as to the seriousness of the case, the high fever, delirium, eruption of "red, violet, and blackish spots . . . inflamed throat, and thick and black tongue"; indeed, for several days Louis was so little master of himself or of his surroundings as to be wholly incontinent.

In all, from the onset of the disease until July twenty-second, when the king left Calais for a period of convalescence at Compiègne in the heartening company of Marie Mancini, he was bled eight times, purged on four occasions, and compelled now and then to submit to the indignity of the clyster. No doubt the recuperative powers of youth together with diet and rest, maintained "religiously and with great exactitude," and despite the violence of treatment, promoted recovery. Nevertheless, Vallot, as a son of Montpellier, would have us believe that the administration of the hitherto-banned antimony—"three ounces of emetic wine"—given on July eighth with the approval of Mazarin, had no little effect on the outcome of the case. According to this physician, the effect was "prodigious," a description strongly supported by further precise details, and "we recognized a notable change and a decrease in the fever and all that accompanied it." It was a marked victory for the school of Montpellier since henceforth antimony, become a remedy for the king, had to be recognized as a respectable medicine despite protests from Paris. But even Paris was compelled to capitulate in accordance with a decision of the Parlement of Paris in 1666.

The final disease of Louis's youth was a case of measles contracted from his recent queen, Maria Theresa. A paragon among husbands, except when he was being unfaithful, Louis had manifested intense but indiscreet devotion during the queen's illness, remaining with her day and night and even sharing the connubial couch; in consequence there could be little doubt of his fate. There is no particular

reason, however, for dwelling upon this incident in the calendar of royal ailments; suffice it to say that the first symptoms became apparent on May 28, 1663, but by June 5, thanks to the strength of his constitution, Louis began his convalescence and was able to enjoy Racine's ode celebrating his recovery from "the insolent disease that had dared to threaten him."

Thereafter for some years, Louis's health suffered only from self-afflicted abuses, that is, occasional gastric upset following upon excessive bouts of gluttony. His appetite was gigantic. A meal might consist, as on one occasion, of four bowls of different soups, a whole pheasant, a partridge, a large bowl of salad, two slices of ham, a slice of mutton, and a dish of pastries, topped off with fruit and boiled eggs. It was an abnormality that remained until the end of his life. As the gourmand king was no gourmet, so, according to report, he was not an elegant feeder, and, to quote from a contemporary text, "a person gifted with good hearing and standing in the next room with the door open, could hear an unmistakable sound of chewing." Later, as the king's dental problems developed, the chewing all but ceased, and food was sometimes wolfed—peas in their pods, for example—without mastication and, of course, with ultimately distressing results. Curiously enough, the king was abstemious in his drinking habits, and it was not until the age of twenty that he was prevailed upon to take a little wine with his meals, and that always much diluted. About 1675 the royal physician suggested that he drink coffee for his spells of dizziness, but the resultant restless nights compelled him to give it up.

In 1662, for the first time, Louis experienced a spell of faintness and vertigo, a condition often to recur and ascribable to those dietary excesses just mentioned, sometimes assisted by immoderate work or pleasures and perhaps occasionally assignable to particular events. In 1661, as a result of Mazarin's death, Louis for the first time assumed the actual reins of government; it seems not unlikely that intensive concentration upon affairs of government may have been a factor helping to bring on the first bout of the new and troublesome condition. Nor should we overlook the fact that throughout much of his life Louis, like his father, suffered from intestinal worms, first discovered in 1659. In this regard, however, strong doubt must be expressed over the proposal of two of the king's biographers, Louis

Bertrand and G. Lenôte, to the effect that Louis, unknown to his physicians, harbored throughout his life a gigantic worm, of a size truly worthy of the great monarch, and that this was the actual cause of his enormous appetite—that Louis was in fact eating for two—and his bouts of vertigo.

Although it is difficult to place any credence in the theory of a king-sized ascarid lurking through the years in the royal intestines, on the other hand it seems probable that, at least in the latter half of his life, the king's "naturally very bad teeth" were contributory to his gastrointestinal difficulties. For a long period he had been subject to toothache, which could often be calmed by the use of essence of clove or essence of thyme. During a period of hunting in September, 1678, and in consequence of exposure to bad weather, Louis caught cold and with it developed a dental abscess that produced a suppurating periostitis. In 1685, as a result of caries, it became necessary to extract all the teeth on the left side of the upper jaw. However, the extraction was carried out in such clumsy fashion that the jawbone was split and a portion of it carried away with the teeth, and in time the hole that resulted became carious. Although Dubois, the royal dentist, cauterized its sides with satisfactory results, henceforth whenever Louis drank, the water was liable to go from his mouth into his nose "and flow from there as from a fountain"; Moreover, as a consequence of his loss of teeth on this occasion, as well as others, the king could not masticate his food properly, a fact readily apparent in the closely watched royal stools. This disastrous condition, compounded with the king's dietary intemperance, reached a climax in periodic and embarrassing incidents, even in the presence of visiting dignitaries.

Meanwhile, the death of Vallot in 1671 had been followed the next year by the appointment of Antoine d'Aquin (c. 1620-1696) as premier physician. As a graduate of Montpellier (1648), he represented a continuation of that school's ascendancy in the royal medical service, a continuity made even tighter by the fact that D'Aquin had married a niece of Vallot. It was this relationship, coupled with discreet deference to his uncle-by-marriage, that led to D'Aquin's appointment in 1667 as physician to the queen; and the strong support of Madame de Montespan, then at the height of her power, gained him appointment as premier physician to the king in 1672,

despite a vigorous contrary campaign of intrigue by the Parisian medical faculty.

Relative to the seventeenth century, it may be said that the king was now entering upon his elder years, although, as it turned out, that final period of his life was to be an unusually extended one. Nevertheless, he seemed to become more prone to brief illnesses and accidents and began to develop some more or less chronic complaints. In 1679, as the result of exposure to inclement weather while hunting, he caught a severe cold that left him for several months with an unpleasant cough. In 1682 he had his first attack of gout, an inheritance from his father and grandfather and made inevitable by his dietary habits. In 1683 exposure during the course of a hunt led to otitis, and in the same year a fall from his horse produced a dislocated elbow; within the same month an inflammation of the left axilla produced lymphangitis. This doleful accumulation of ailments, as well as the sudden death of the queen in 1683 from staphylococcal septicemia, the result of an axillary abscess, was a kind of preparatory stage for the most dramatic and publicized incident in Louis's medical history, his anal fistula.

On 15 January 1686, his Majesty complained of a small tumor . . . two finger-widths from the anus, rather deep, insensible to touch, without pain, redness, or pulsation; otherwise he was well and in no way impeded in his normal activities, even horseback riding. Nevertheless, this tumor, little by little, appeared to grow and harden, and on 31 January it seemed to us significant enough so that we pressed the King to accept some remedies to resolve it if possible. His Majesty agreed, and on 5 February a poultice was applied.

When it was realized that the tumor was not responding to such treatment, the premier surgeon, Charles François Félix de Tassy (d. 1703), urged upon Louis the advisability of surgery, but the latter, rather than submit, preferred first to pay heed to the urgings of courtiers. As a result, he was prevailed upon to try a plaster prepared by one of the ladies of the court, Madame de la Daubière; and this was administered in the presence of, and under the direction of, the lady herself. However, a trial of several days convinced Louis that the highly praised remedy was useless, and, in considerable pain and hardly able to walk, he took to his bed. The care of the problem

was restored to the physicians, now understandably somewhat irritated, who decided that the tumor must be drained. To this end they applied a caustic to it, but the result was merely a small opening, not sufficient for complete drainage, and in consequence a fistula developed penetrating into the rectum.

Despite this unfortunate turn of events, Louis recovered his mobility and appears to have suffered no great inconvenience in his activities; in fact, he was sufficiently active to take up horseback-riding again. Nevertheless, his medical staff was greatly disturbed, although it was not until the latter part of the year that the king could be induced to submit to more radical treatment by surgery. By mid-summer his condition was widely known, and in the manner of the times a variety of remedies had been proposed from all sides, especially since it was felt by those at court and elsewhere that resort to surgery would be unnecessarily dangerous; and those who could not otherwise meddle turned to the churches in order to seek divine assistance for this regal sub-divinity.

Louis was only too willing to try the various treatments proposed before yielding to the terrors of surgery, but even his civil councilors recognized the necessity for prior trials. Thus when the healing power of the waters of Barèges was recommended, four volunteers with the king's complaint were sent to Barèges at royal expense; but Gervais, surgeon to the Hôpital de la Charité, who accompanied them, was compelled to report with regret that daily injections of the water into the fistulas of these volunteers showed no curative effect. A similar group of subjects was dispatched to test the waters of Bourbon, recommended by one of the ladies of the court, once more to no avail. Still other remedies were offered, and since none of them could be ignored, Louvois, one of the chief ministers of state, was compelled to set up a kind of temporary research station in Paris to which fistulous volunteers came or were summoned to give their services as human experimental animals. None of the remedies was found to live up to advance testimonials.

The king had been kept advised of these trials by Louvois and Félix de Tassy, the latter losing no opportunity to declare that only surgery could produce a cure. Finally, after further consultation with a famous Parisian surgeon, Bessières, who supported the advice of the royal surgeon, Louis was reluctantly convinced that there was no

alternative to that drastic procedure, although first demanding that it be explained to him step by step. Actually, the royal surgeon had never performed such an operation, and in order to gain experience, as well as to perfect the instruments necessary for it, he rounded up further volunteers in Paris upon whom he practiced. Inevitably some of them died or, we may say, sacrificed their lives in a national cause.

On November 18, 1686, "the great operation" took place at Versailles. At five o'clock a preparatory clyster was administered, and at seven, with Louis placed on the edge of his bed, a pillow under his belly, and his thighs held wide apart by two apothecaries, the operation was performed by Félix de Tassy, attended by the members of the medical staff as well as by Louvois and Madame de Maintenon. It was completely successful, and an hour later Louis was able to receive from his bed the major personages of the court and thereafter hold a meeting of the *conseil d'en haut*.

Despite some tendency to be amused by the nature of the ailment and by a mental picture of the ridiculous position of the august monarch during the course of the operation, we should note it as much to Louis's credit that he bore the considerable pain quite unflinchingly and without complaint. Moreover, he was well aware who deserved the credit; and although he presented D'Aquin with a gift of 100,000 *livres*, he gave three times that amount, as well as an estate, to the surgeon. Indeed, the success of this highly publicized operation had some share in promoting the status of surgery in France, so long subservient to medicine. A ludicrous instance of this is to be found in the case of the thirty gentlemen of the court who, in complete health, applied to the royal surgeon to duplicate the king's operation upon them, and their intense disappointment when informed that they lacked the requirement for such surgery.

Throughout the remainder of Louis's life his medical history, although revealing frequent instances of morbidity, for the most part lacked those dramatic qualities that had hitherto aroused national interest; then and henceforth, that history was more indicative of advancing years and, in some degree, a full harvest reaped from earlier intemperance. It should be no cause for astonishment that the king began to suffer from gout, a complaint which, as mentioned earlier, attacked him first in 1682 and recurred periodically for the rest of his life—from 1686 onward becoming chronic—producing

not only the usual pain but sometimes utter incapacity. Sometimes the gout was blamed on diet, resulting in short but, of course, never-sustained periods of restricted regimen. In 1689 the wine of Champagne, always drunk temperately by the king, was declared the villain and, on the order of the premier physician, replaced by that of Burgundy, so producing a heated polemical exchange between the vintners of Champagne and Burgundy over the merits of their respective wines.

On August, 6, 1686, "the king awoke at three o'clock in the morning with headache, his teeth chattering, a feeling of lassitude and weakness, and some fever." Although there are a few possible indications of malaria earlier in Louis's medical history, henceforth there was to be no doubt of the nature of this further complaint, a side effect of such pleasure as he gained from his new residence at Marly. The very rustic design of woods and waters that Louis enjoyed provided an excellent breeding area for the *Anopheles* mosquito, vector for the malaria then endemic in parts of northern Europe. Louis's recurring attacks, coinciding with his summer visits to Marly, were, however, relatively effectively controlled by the administration of a preparation of cinchona bark, introduced at the French court by an English pharmacist, Sir Robert Talbor. Unlike Cromwell, who died of malaria because, reputedly, he would not be dosed with "Jesuit bark," the French king purchased the method of preparation from Talbor. Thereafter, the new medicine enjoyed great popularity as a panacea, so that, as Racine wrote to Boileau, "one no longer sees at court anyone whose belly is not full of quinine."

In 1693 D'Aquin was removed from office partly as a result of his avaricious demands upon the king, of which the latter had grown weary, partly as a result of his unwise criticism of other members of the medical service (especially Félix de Tassy, who had profited so greatly in wealth and esteem from his successful treatment of the king's fistula), and partly as the result of a court intrigue in which Fagon, then physician to the royal children, succeeded, with the help of Madame de Maintenon, in undermining D'Aquin's professional reputation. For the first time since 1646 a graduate of the Parisian medical school was placed in charge of the royal medical service: Guy-Crescent Fagon (1638-1718), M.D. (1663); physician to the dauphine (1680); premier physician to the queen (1680-

1683); thereafter, to the royal children; and, finally, premier physician to the king (1693-1715).

It is to Fagon's credit that he recognized the damage that had resulted from the rivalry between Paris and Montpellier and so sought to introduce a spirit of conciliation that was of some success in helping to bring about advancement in French medicine. As premier physician, he naturally took over the care of those problems of the king's health already existing as well as several new ones.

"On 12 August [1696] as the King was putting on his perruque in the morning, he felt a pain at the nape of the neck where I [Fagon] saw a red point which I recognized as a furuncle." Attempts to relieve this condition by the application of plasters were unsuccessful, since the furuncle continued to grow in size, became suppurative, and developed into a carbuncle that required the royal surgeon's services; two incisions provided for drainage. Some days later a second carbuncle appeared nearby to the great distress of everyone—causing Madame de Maintenon to faint at the news—since the condition was one considered to have lethal potentialities. However, the second carbuncle was also opened, and by the end of seven weeks the king was declared to be safely recovered from this acute problem representing merely an incident within the pattern of his more chronic complaints.

Long and frequently subject to colds, Louis now began to develop complications in the form of heavy, chronic nasal discharge and prolonged fits of coughing. Gravel and renal colic first appeared in 1709, made all the more vexing by the accompaniment of increasingly frequent bouts of constipation and the discomfort of flatulence arising from unreformed dietary habits and an ever-decreasingly active life as age advanced and the king was compelled to shoulder more and more of the cares of state. Yet, whatever else might change, the huge royal appetite remained constant, so much so that, for example, we find a weary and aging Louis genuinely considering his dinner as a slight one when it included no more than a few crusts of bread, a bowl of soup and three roasted chickens.

For various reasons Fagon did not carry the *Journal* beyond the year 1711, hence there is no official medical description of Louis's final days and death. In consequence we must rely chiefly on the accounts of Saint-Simon and Dangeau, from whom we learn that

the king was reasonably active until the final weeks of his life. From August 15, 1715, he was bedridden, for the first week bothered by a general discomfort that gradually became centered in his left leg. In the final week senile gangrene made its appearance as the leg became gangrenous from foot to thigh, indicating that it would be only a very short period, until death would occur, as it did on September 1. The autopsy conducted by George Mareschal (1658-1736), then premier surgeon, merely confirmed the clinically recognizable cause of death as atherosclerosis.

On occasion, attempts have been made to relate Louis's death somehow to his gout and to his stone, quite different medical entities and, according to the findings at autopsy, wholly unrelated to the cause of death. It has also been remarked from time to time that the king died as a result of his chronic gluttony, but this is to forget that amazing vigor which permitted him to spend the day hunting at the age of seventy-four and to return with a full bag of game; to control a runaway team of horses that threatened to throw his carriage over a cliff at the age of seventy-five; and, finally, that he lived to the age of seventy-seven, approximately three times the average life span of his contemporaries. Louis, it appears, died of old age and nothing more.

What then was the value of his elaborate medical service? It is much to be feared that it served little purpose except, as one industrious writer tabulated, to give the king somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 purges, some hundreds of clysters, a vast quantity of cordials, juleps, and medicinal broths, a great variety of so-called specifics, and several pounds of quinine; it may be added that the king was relieved of a considerable quantity of blood until, through repugnance and perhaps some common sense, he refused to sacrifice any more.

No doubt such medical persuasion as produced a temporary restriction of diet helped ease the king's gastrointestinal difficulties from time to time, and undoubtedly the administration of quinine was of value in controlling his attacks of malaria. There were, furthermore, several occasions when surgery was effective, most notably, of course, in the instance of the celebrated anal fistula. Nevertheless, having given this somewhat scanty credit to the royal medical service and so dismissing it from consideration, we may then declare that

Louis survived into what for his day may be called extreme old age despite his excesses, despite an utter disregard for the ravages of an active and laborious life, and despite the well-meant ministrations of his physicians, simply because of the strength of his constitution. When Antoine Vallot, as premier physician, had inaugurated the *Journal de la santé du Roi* in 1652, he called attention to Louis's double inheritance from a sickly father and a robust mother and expressed the hope that the maternal legacy might prevail. That Vallot's hope was fulfilled seems beyond dispute.

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Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs

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THANKS to his exceptionally long personal reign,¹ Louis XIV had what might be termed—from the point of view of the space at our disposal in this chapter—a superfluity of fellow monarchs.² Moreover, their number increased between 1661 and 1715, since some of Louis's fellow sovereigns who were not monarchical heads of state (electors, dukes, landgraves, and lesser princes come into this category) attempted, and at times succeeded in achieving, the status of crowned head. In the European table of ranks it was relatively easy to cope with the few "mixed cases": the elected kings of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the *Rzeczpospolita Polska*, generally known in western Europe as the Republic of Poland; the elected popes, who as temporal sovereigns of the small Papal States counted little but carried great weight as the crowned spiritual heads of the Catholic church; the elected emperors of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the office that carried the undisputed highest temporal honors, and on which the Austrian Hapsburg family had so strong a hold that, in Louis's words, "the imperial crown has become virtually hereditary in the house of Austria."³ It is more difficult to make a hard and fast distinction between fellow monarchical sovereigns and other categories of fellow sovereigns when surveying Louis's reign because of the several regencies during minorities or illnesses of rulers: in Spain after the death of Philip IV and in Sweden after the death of Charles X; in Portugal when Alfonso VI was incapacitated by mental illness. At such times Louis's relationship with his fellow monarchs (whatever it might be in

theory) was in practice transferred to influential individuals, as was the case with the oligarchic republics of Europe, those of the Dutch,⁴ of Venice, and of Genoa. Even where the king was alive and of sound mind, there is evidence suggesting that unless he was a strong king, his state tended to be looked upon, at least by Frenchmen, as a temporary republic.⁵ Conversely, a strong republic could successfully battle to achieve equality with monarchies in diplomatic etiquette.

The division of Europe in Louis XIV's time into monarchies, or states that received monarchical honors, and "the rest" can therefore be seen to be based in a rough and ready way on the estimation of the realities or—where a monarchy had become temporarily weak—potentialities of power. The very geopolitical situation of Louis XIV's France at the time when he took over personal responsibility was such that his attention had to be focused on his fellow sovereigns, whether these were fellow monarchs or not. In the first place, Louis was concerned with his immediate neighbors: with the kings of Spain, the rulers of Austria, the Stuarts of England, and that scion of the houses of Stuart and Orange, William, whom Louis hoped (for reasons of state as well as for the sake of monarchical solidarity) to make sovereign ruler of the Northern Netherlands long before 1672. After 1688, whatever the state of official recognition at any particular time, Louis regarded him as the reigning king of England and the *de facto* head of the Dutch state, although his title was that of a mere stadtholder. The way in which Leopold (head of the Austrian Hapsburg dominions since 1657 and emperor from 1658) tried to govern the Empire in foreign affairs, despite the terms of the capitulation imposed on him at the time of his election, rendered the German princes vitally important for Louis XIV's diplomacy. Further afield, the kings of Sweden, fellow guarantors of the Treaties of Westphalia, were of the greatest significance, the Swedish state comprising not only Sweden, Finland, and the East Baltic provinces, but also the Swedish king's possessions in the Holy Roman Empire. The kings of Denmark-Norway had to be taken into account as well, since they shared control of the Sound with Sweden; but the tsars of Muscovy were just impinging on the European map of power politics toward the end of Louis's reign. It was also in the later years of his life that Louis was faced with a female fellow monarch: Anne,

who succeeded William III in England in 1702. Louis seems to have assumed (though not ranking Anne either with minors or lunatics) that with her accession England had more or less reverted to the republican form of government in which it had existed in Cromwell's time,⁶ and his diplomatic contacts were with her ministers. In the War of the Spanish Succession Louis visualized recognition of Anne as queen and a guarantee of the Protestant succession as part of the price to be paid—and not a stiff one, in the circumstances—for the peace, along with the promotions of the elector of Brandenburg to king in Prussia and the duke of Savoy to king of Sicily. Shortly after the 1713-14 settlements, Louis granted "Their High Mightinesses," the States General of the United Provinces, royal treatment in matters of precedence, ostensibly to compensate the Dutch for the implied loss of status suffered by William's death, but in reality in order to gain good will at a time of diplomatic rivalry.⁷

The hierarchical organization of states was one that all Europe took for granted as the outward expression of power and prestige, and changes were not easily made: bitter enemies joined to resist innovations that might disturb the balance of the pyramid that had, haphazardly enough, though on a realistic basis, been constructed. Before peace was concluded after the Nine Years' War, Emperor Leopold, the electors of the Empire, and Louis XIV joined successfully to refute the claim of a mere prince, supported by Leibniz's pen, to send an ambassador to the peace congress on the plea that the Treaty of Münster had given all German princes sovereign rights and thus equality.⁸ Louis himself jealously guarded his own rank and privileges lest concessions might become precedents working to the detriment of French prestige in the future. On the basis of incidents studied in isolation, it has become commonplace to assert that Louis regarded himself as the very apex of the hierarchical pyramid and demanded to be treated as above his fellow monarchs. One could cite Louis's insistence that Leopold of Austria must notify him of his election as emperor before his diplomats could be received at the French court;⁹ the apology demanded from his father-in-law after the servants of Philip IV's ambassador to St. James's had attacked those of Louis's in a struggle for precedence;¹⁰ the humiliation of the pope following a similar fracas in which members of the French suite were killed;¹¹ the forcing—by threats of reprisals—of the

doge of Genoa, contrary to the laws of that city, to come to Versailles to transmit in person his promise to remain neutral during Franco-Spanish hostilities.¹² This view becomes less tenable once the cases used as illustrations are put into perspective¹³ and compared with actions of other monarchs of the time in such disputes. The kings of England refused to grant reciprocity of salute in the Channel to Louis XIV and demanded in the most arrogant terms that the Dutch should salute their flag;¹⁴ when the king of Denmark refused such salute, English diplomats worried whether the nation would stand for "this affront" without recourse to war.¹⁵ The Dutch denied the title of "Your Holiness" to the pope at the Congress of Nijmegen;¹⁶ rulers not infrequently had to ask satisfaction for the murder or wounding of servants of their envoys; there were constant squabbles about precedence at all courts with consequent demands for apologies and punishment of those guilty of transgressions. In reality Louis showed a remarkable flexibility and ease in matters of etiquette once his equality with all hereditary monarchs—under the Holy Roman Emperor, who by virtue of his elected office held the first rank—was accepted.¹⁷ He was freer with the cherished "Frère" for aspiring fellow monarchs (prized above the "Cousin" for dukes and the "Sieur" or "Monsieur" for princes) where it did not conflict with French interests;¹⁸ he permitted his diplomats great freedom to find expedients in matters of precedence "as long as the royal dignity is not impaired."¹⁹ He proved keen to agree to expedients suggested by other powers when he wanted negotiations to proceed: he accepted Temple's suggestion to get the traffic moving in the narrow streets of Nijmegen when rigid attention to rank threatened to paralyze the congress by the pile-up of carriages unwilling to yield on account of rank;²⁰ he co-operated meticulously in the mathematically contrived Dutch solution to ensure full equality between France and Spain at the signing of the peace treaty of 1678, when a table was so placed between doors that the two missions, entering simultaneously, reached the table at exactly the same time, to sign, with synchronized speed, respective copies on the coveted side of the document;²¹ he worked with the English at the Congress of Utrecht "to lay aside titles" in order to avoid trouble over rank.²² Indeed, it is safe to assume that where Louis made any difficulty over a question of diplomatic etiquette, he had an underlying political motive of some importance.

This is true also of his fellow monarchs of the first and second rank; it is possibly less easy to discern the *Realpolitik* behind the refusal of the envoy of the elector of Mainz to the Diet of Regensburg to deliver his credentials since the particular staircase by which his predecessors had been admitted had been destroyed.²³

The concern with political realities is also evident when we go beyond etiquette to Louis's conception of royal behavior in international relations. He had, like most of his fellow monarchs, a code of honor. He argued, as most of them did (exceptions can be found, one of them Augustus of Saxony-Poland),²⁴ that a ruler pledged his word. Treaty obligations must not be surrendered lest trust be dissipated and allies not forthcoming; the promise and the threat must stand lest the next ones be treated lightly. But Louis, like other rulers of his time, would permit mediators to release him from his pledge. In 1678-79 a scheme was devised whereby Louis was persuaded to go back on his promise not to make peace with Leopold before the prince of Fürstenberg had been released from captivity by that prince's brother petitioning Louis not to let his given word become the obstacle to a peace so eagerly desired by all Europe; similar ways were found to permit a minor concession to Brandenburg in respect of land in Swedish Pomerania, once Louis's insistence that the king of Sweden should have all his German possessions restored, as promised, had been largely effective.²⁵ This loyalty to the given word was part of the *gloire*, or reputation, of the ruler, and of his *gloire* every ruler was extremely jealous. Such and such action would be against his *gloire*, Charles XII of Sweden argued;²⁶ Leopold used very similar terms;²⁷ and so did William III.²⁸ In twentieth-century historical writing there is too often a tendency to equate *gloire* with military glory only, or at most with military glory coupled with "magnificence." The military glory and the pomp and circumstance were obviously part of *gloire*, but it was not all of it. It is significant that when an Italian agent of Leopold's reported a conversation with Chamlay, he translated *gloire* with *Reputation* or with *Ansehen*.²⁹ It is also significant that crowned heads did not reserve the term only for themselves as persons or representing the nation: Louis XIV urged Turenne to act "for the good of the state and the glory of your arms."³⁰ This concept, the *bienfait* of the nation, was in Louis's case nearly always coupled with mention of his own *gloire*,³¹ and indeed, the concern

for *gloire* seen in its proper perspective sprang from a preoccupation, which is discernible in most of the monarchs of the period, with the verdict of history on the individual ruler.

The very task of an absolutist ruler in respect of foreign policy (and in foreign affairs, as we have been reminded, William III acted in England as independently as any absolutist king,³² while in the Republic he had full control once he had learnt to manage the anti-Orangist regents)³³ tended to produce certain common characteristics. The work was hard, the responsibility weighed heavily, and the reward was often gross flattery to one's face³⁴ with criticism and unfavorable comment behind one's back: the latest story of favoritism, obstinacy and pride, or of stupidity, going the rounds of court and gossip. Neither William III, nor Louis XIV, nor young Charles XII drank much, fearing it might cloud brain and judgment ("I hope he does not expect good wine at my table," Louis drily commented on the arrival of an ambassador known to enjoy his glass). They read endless memoranda and dispatches, they listened to experts, and had, finally, to make up their own minds. They worried when things went wrong: Charles XII shut himself up and refused to see anyone while he got over private grief (the death of a beloved sister) and the public humiliation of the surrender of his army at Perevolochna;³⁵ William burst out in a moment of despair, "There is nothing left for me here, I shall have to go to the Indies";³⁶ Louis wept over the miseries of the nation in the War of the Spanish Succession.³⁷ But all three (and other monarchs of their time in other, if less drastic, dilemmas) had to grit their teeth and fight back. The very weight of their responsibility and their concern for the *gloire*, for the verdict of history upon them, helped them to mobilize reserves of personal courage. They were all determined not to leave the state entrusted to them diminished and more defenseless than when they had received it: this would be the ultimate blot on their own *gloire*. "Rather a forty years' war in the Empire," Charles XII commented on the eve of his 1718 offensive, "than a bad peace."³⁸ "Shall I be the one," cried William in bitterness to Heinsius in 1701 when French troops poured into the Southern Netherlands, "to lose without a battle what I have struggled for during more than twenty-eight years?"³⁹ "Never," reported Chamlay, during the Nine Years' War, "have I, in the twenty years I have known the king, seen Louis

XIV so angry as when it was suggested from Vienna he should give up the gains of the Treaty of Westphalia." "What!" Louis had exclaimed, "am I to sacrifice the work of thirty years—I who have struggled so hard lest my enemies shall come into my house. . . . Rather war for ten years more." ⁴⁰

If one is to make a distinction, and one ought to be made, between the three rulers whose attitudes have just been compared, it is between the two, William and Charles, who commanded armies in person, and Louis who, though passionately interested in the army,⁴¹ was no commander in his own right. A difference in degree, therefore, between William, who said, "I can always lie in the last dike,"⁴² and Charles, who argued that it was up to him to risk his life encouraging the soldiers to be unafraid ("Better to die in battle than surrounded by doctors and weeping relatives," he once joked),⁴³ and Louis, who, when he could not sleep because of bad news from the front, comforted himself that there was yet the grand army between the frontier and the capital.⁴⁴ And on the personal level, in any comparison between the three, the inclination to take risks characteristic of commanders in the field, once preparations are complete, is strongly marked in William and Charles ("We must take risks while we are in luck," was one of the Swedish king's standing phrases;⁴⁵ "his almost reckless boldness" is a recent verdict on William by a Dutch historian),⁴⁶ and notably absent in the cautious Louis, who loved the craft of diplomacy and being at the center of things, who planned ahead for all eventualities, but who sometimes missed opportunities by being too unwilling to take risks in the military sense. Typical of Louis was also a certain doctrinaire, legalistic outlook that is particularly noticeable in his attitude to the house of Stuart after the debacle of 1688. Outward forms were insisted upon; the niceties of scrupulous use of the title "Prince of Orange" for William III was maintained for years after Louis had decided that the restoration of James II was no longer feasible, partly as a lever in peace negotiations but also, as Louis's correspondence with D'Avaux between 1694 and 1697 makes clear, out of concern for the legal position of the Stuarts. It would be offensive to a fellow monarch who had been unlucky enough to lose his crown, and against Louis's *gloire*, to expose James publicly to shame and humiliation by a premature recognition of William: if peace were not gained, such hurt had needlessly weakened James's

position.⁴⁷ And it would seem, from evidence only recently brought to light, that it was the complaint of Mary of Modena that her son would, on James's death, be just an ordinary person (*un simple*) that helped to decide Louis in favor of granting royal title to James Edward in 1701: William, it was argued, was king of England *de facto*; James II's son had the title by hereditary right, and to deny him the rank of king would be tantamount to a denial of his legitimate birth.⁴⁸ The dangers of recognition were clearly seen, but accepted in the hope that no ill would come of it since Louis was tied by the Peace of Ryswick not to foment trouble for William in the British Isles. To break this would go against honor and *gloire*; but—it was held—if the country rose against William or, later, Anne, then armed assistance from France would be permissible. Similarly, support for a Stuart invasion in 1708 was held to be a "legitimate" retort to the allied attempts to stir up trouble for Louis in the Cévennes⁴⁹ and to land troops in Toulon. Another field where Louis was forced into a more equivocal position than he might have preferred was the Hapsburg struggle against the Turks. Louis was never the ally of the Ottomans,⁵⁰ and in the 1660's (when his relationship with Emperor Leopold was on the whole good)⁵¹ he sent his contingent of 6,000 men as a member of the League of the Rhine to fight bravely in the battle of St. Gotthard, while a detachment of the French fleet joined that of Venice to do battle with the infidel at sea;⁵² but Louis took no part in Europe's defense of Vienna in 1683. The years of détente with the Austrian Hapsburgs had come to an end with the fall of Lobkowitz and Leopold's renunciation of the partition treaty of 1668, and Louis felt that the most he could do to live up to the title of "His Most Christian Majesty" was to withdraw troops from his eastern frontier to make clear that he would not embarrass or hinder the fight against the Turks.⁵³ The Hapsburg battle against the Ottomans in the 1680's enabled the house of Austria to rally the Empire to its side,⁵⁴ and the *gloire* that came to Leopold as the victor of 1683 was considerable. In Italy, French diplomats reported, it was Leopold's fame—not that of Louis—that rang through the land.⁵⁵ Yet, the tradition of French policy in the Near East⁵⁶ and Louis's own growing rivalry with Leopold over the Spanish succession prevented his playing an active role against the Turks, and his conception of his own *gloire* made it impossible for him to use the opportunity to attack Leopold.

Louis personally met very few of his fellow monarchs, and none while they were actually reigning, with the exception of his brief meeting with Philip IV on the Island of Pheasants in 1660. The Stuarts Louis knew as exiles, Charles II before the Restoration, James II after 1688; John Sobieski he met before his election as king of Poland.⁵⁷ His own grandson, Philip V of Spain, was in a special position. Louis's personal knowledge of the young man illuminates the post-1700 correspondence between them and makes it a particularly valuable (and underestimated for this purpose) source for Louis's concept of the duties of kingship.⁵⁸ Other monarchs he could only learn something about from diplomatic reports. The standard of the best French diplomats was very high indeed. Callières—himself an erstwhile diplomat and then *secrétaire du cabinet*—wrote on the duty of giving pen-portraits of the king and the chief ministers of the country where one resided:

Thus the able diplomatist can place his master in command of all the material for a true judgement of the foreign country, and the more successfully he carries out this part of his duties, the more surely will he make his master feel as though he himself had lived abroad and watched the scenes which are described.⁵⁹

But Louis was not only a passive receiver; he asked specific questions and ordered Callières, Harlay, and Crécy (and was criticized for it by Vauban) to pay an extended call on William III after the French recognition of him in 1697. It is from a detailed report of this conference that we learn that William spoke excellent French, "without any accent"; the word-for-word reportage and the description of behavior and habits (the "shy half-smile" reminding us of the more publicized half-smile of Charles XII—the protective device of rulers schooled to guard secrets) is extremely vivid.⁶⁰ From the time of the negotiations for the first partition treaty, Tallard's dispatches from London are full of fascinating details of conversations with William, the king's every word and facial expression being reproduced.⁶¹ One particularly important conversation we can check against William's equally detailed report of the French ambassador's every word and facial expression to Heinsius at The Hague. The differences in interpretations are, however, noticeable: Tallard pleased that he had skilfully maneuvered William into a position whereby he must move closer to France; William delighted at the effect of his

calculated statement that, were he to come to an agreement with Louis, he would separate himself from the house of Austria. ("I never saw a man in such joy, scarcely able to contain himself, and repeating it four or five times.")⁶² But such temporary misinterpretations are inseparable from all diplomatic intercourse, and in the long run Louis's methods paid dividends. By carefully collecting and sifting information, by memorizing the idiosyncracies of fellow monarchs and their ministers, useful guidance could be given to later diplomats. One striking example comes to mind. When Croissy (the brother of Colbert de Torcy) was sent to Charles XII at Stralsund early in 1715, he was told, "Do not bother to penetrate this king's designs—he does not give anything away."⁶³ There speaks the voice of experience. But the amount that could be found out, and the amount of pressure that could be put on ministers and officials abroad, was such that Louis himself was anxious to deny his fellow monarchs the advantages of negotiating important matters at the French court. Such negotiations offered too many opportunities for close observance and of influence with ministers; and Louis, therefore, preferred, if at all possible, to send his trusted men to other capitals to transact important business. For this reason few pen-portraits of Louis at work informally were sent home to his fellow monarchs: the one by Portland, who became as charmed as one of Louis's own diplomats (Pomponne) when he had the chance to see the king throw off the cloak of majesty and the proud haughty air he wore in public,⁶⁴ is worth noting: "He did me the honor to speak to me as a private individual, with an obliging freedom and familiarity, often laughing, and quite throwing aside the gravity which is usual on such occasions."⁶⁵

The long reign and the constant diplomatic and military activity have made it difficult for historians to deal adequately with the theme of Louis and his fellow monarchs on a European-wide scale. The sheer bulk of the material to be handled, its relative inaccessibility when compared, for instance, to the published memoirs of the king himself, of courtiers, and of some of his ministers, are not conducive to a balanced picture. It is very easy to forget that his *Mémoires* were penned⁶⁶ when Louis was a fairly young man and to let the views he expressed then remain valid for the whole reign, thus denying him development. Even so, clues in the *Mémoires* to

regrets for past actions (as Louis, when reviewing the Dutch war, suggests that ambition and a desire to shine in combat might be forgiven "in so young a ruler as I was and one so favored by fortune") have been ignored.⁶⁷ Anti-Louis propaganda has also been easily available in the many German and Dutch pamphlets of the reign, so that we have become familiar with the warnings of Lisola and others that Louis aspired to "universal monarchy."⁶⁸ The inevitably one-sided arguments of propaganda warfare have tended to become accepted as objective facts. Obviously, the circumstances surrounding each discussion of Louis's candidature for the imperial crown must be taken into account: in 1683 it was the elector of Brandenburg who offered to work in the interests of Louis or the dauphin, or any prince favored by Louis, in the hope of securing French co-operation against Sweden; in 1670, when Louis had suggested that the elector of Bavaria should vote for him, it was with the proviso that the latter should be made king of Rome—again, a diplomatic bargaining to gain support, this time for France.⁶⁹ The very nature of the Grand Alliances forged against France encouraged the two Maritime Powers (Protestant in their religion) to give public utterance to their genuine horror and fear at Louis's Catholic aggression against the Huguenots in France after 1685, whereas the equally sincere protests of the Dutch and the English against Leopold's treatment of the Protestants in Hungary, and the use of the Neapolitan galleys for those who would not retract,⁷⁰ were delivered discreetly and privately. Small wonder, therefore, that the treatment of Louis XIV in his relationship to Europe is at times in the history books of those nations who fought against him a rather over-simplified one. The twentieth century's experience of, and attitude to, war also help to brand Louis as the aggressor, so that even the most objectively intended non-French survey of the reign tends to superficiality: "This period of undoubted great preponderance unfortunately witnessed a series of aggressive wars, which Louis XIV undertook for purposes of international prestige, military glory, and the extension of his frontiers."⁷¹

Modern French survey works have been even harsher on Louis XIV, though the views of their authors are more varied.⁷² He is often presented as a bully compelled by visions of personal glory, easy to mislead, and hardly ever taking the right advice. There is usually some sympathy for his moral courage during the War of the Spanish

Succession;⁷³ and curiously little condemnation of the War of Devolution, which is reckoned, with the Dutch war, as the "defensive wars" of the reign⁷⁴—the rest being "aggressive wars" or "unlimited wars." It used to be fashionable to seek for one basic motivation in Louis XIV's foreign policy: for some the Spanish succession issue determined the king's attitude toward the rest of Europe throughout the reign; for others the dogma of the drive toward the "natural frontiers" was paramount.⁷⁵ Today, historians either deny any pattern,⁷⁶ interpreting Louis's policy as responses to incidents provoked by circumstances, or attempt a neat division into periods. One such division runs: the age of gold, the age of magnificence, the age of occasional coalitions against Louis, the age of determined opposition against him. Another: the age of defensive warfare followed by the age of aggressive warfare. Yet another: Louis's foreign policy before and after the fistula (1686).⁷⁷ But all tend to assume that one underlying motive of the policy, however divided into periods, was the desire to control Europe, the search for hegemony and preponderance.

Material for a revision, or at least a modification, of this view does exist on the level of Louis XIV's diplomacy as such, on the place of Louis in France, and on the role of France in Europe and overseas. Historians who have worked on the foreign policy of their own countries have come to what was for them rather startling conclusions. Geyl found that "Louis showed himself surprisingly moderate" in negotiations with the Dutch in the 1660's, and has shown that it was the domestic struggles in the Northern Netherlands that made impossible (in spite of De Witt's agreement) a Franco-Dutch solution of the problem of the Southern Netherlands.⁷⁸ Mark Thomson, while concluding that France's enemies had reason to distrust Louis during the peace negotiations that did not come to fruition in 1708-10, has in all his work stressed Louis's shrewdness and sense of responsibility.⁷⁹ Even monographic studies that are one-sided in their approach, such as that of Heinrich Ritter von Srbik on relations between Leopold and Louis in the Nine Years' War (the intrigues of France are always "Machiavellian" here),⁸⁰ have brought to light documents that are of the greatest importance for understanding the motives of the rulers and countries discussed. Srbik, just because he is so biased in interpretation, makes lively reading; the more objective studies of various aspects—or periods—of France's relations with Europe in

Louis's reign are possibly duller but always valuable for the variety of material that is collected and studied, or for the microscopic examination of a particular topic. Mention must be made of Höyneck's monograph on the Congress of Nijmegen; of the many studies connected with the Rhineland by Max Braubach and his pupils;⁸¹ of the work by French and American historians on problems connected with the Alsace and Lorraine regions;⁸² and of the fine analysis of Strasbourg's fate between 1648 and 1789 by Franklin Ford,⁸³ to which we shall have occasion to return. Specialist work not directly connected with France nor using French material yet manages to throw indirect light on Louis's relations with Europe; Veenendaal's book on the Anglo-Dutch condominium of the Southern Netherlands;⁸⁴ Coombs's study of Anglo-Dutch relations during the War of the Spanish Succession;⁸⁵ Stork-Penning's examination of the Dutch attitude to peace with France between 1708 and 1711.⁸⁶ Any study of Jacobitism naturally enough touches on Louis XIV.⁸⁷ Swedish research into Franco-Swedish relations is also illuminating but less easily accessible, though happily a growing number of historians on both sides of the Atlantic read one (and thus all) of the Scandinavian languages: Andrew Lossky, whose main interest lies in the intellectual history of Louis's reign, has made some significant contributions also to the topic of French relations with the north of Europe.⁸⁸ Research even on the purely domestic history of France's neighbors helps the historians put Louis and his country into perspective: we must take into account that Spain's decline was (in the opinion of several scholars) arrested in the third quarter of the seventeenth century; and that a series of demographic and other studies has recently demonstrated that the Hapsburg dominions were increasing in resources and power during Louis's reign.⁸⁹ In France diplomatic history as such has for some time been out of fashion (the only new work of importance for Louis, at the end of his reign, is by Claude Nordmann);⁹⁰ but the interest in officials and administrators—noticeable also among American historians working on French history⁹¹—is producing important bases from which to illuminate Louis's relations with those who worked with him. The biographies published on Turenne⁹² and on Vauban (though written in the 1930's, the latter has only just appeared)⁹³ are of great value for an assessment of the role of military considerations, although Zeller's

work on the frontier remains the foundation on which all must build who want to study French foreign policy. "The natural frontier" as the guiding motive for the reign was demolished by Zeller's book and articles, but his lucid analysis of the part played by considerations of defense and of the "out-works" across the Rhine for defense as well as for bargaining from strength stands unsurpassed.⁹⁴

There are gaps. The chief one is that we do not know enough about one of Louis's great adversaries, Leopold of Austria. We possess a fine historiographical study of the older works on Leopold, Joseph, and Charles;⁹⁵ we have brief but perceptive character sketches of these three emperors by Kann in his recent work on Austrian intellectual history and by Wandruzska in his history of the Hapsburg dynasty.⁹⁶ There are monographs that help to illuminate aspects of Hapsburg policy in Louis XIV's reign.⁹⁷ Braubach's massive biography of Prince Eugene⁹⁸ is of special interest for us, but we still lack modern well-documented studies of the Hapsburg rulers between 1648 and 1740. From the point of view we are here considering, new light on Franco-Hapsburg relations may be thrown by work in progress in the United States, for example, by Spielman's study of the relations between the Maritime Powers and Austria during Joseph's reign and by Snyder's work on Godolphin and Marlborough.⁹⁹ The interest of Canadian and American scholars in French policy overseas during Louis's reign¹⁰⁰ is already yielding results and may lead to reassessments of the impact of such policy on Louis's European diplomacy.

My own interest in Louis XIV and Europe started, so to speak, with the wrong end of the reign: I have moved backward from the post-Utrecht period all the time. My main preoccupation is with diplomatic relationships during those two long wars, the Great Northern War (1700-1721) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713).¹⁰¹ The study of Sweden, France, and the Maritime Powers—that convenient single name for the Dutch and the English nations at a time when they were both allies and rivals—has restricted me to the archives of London, The Hague, Paris, and those of the Scandinavian countries. I have found, however, that some of my hobbyhorses, and in particular my curiosity about "presents and pensions" and their role in foreign policy, have pushed me back to 1688,¹⁰² and to considerations of even earlier years, on a more

European-wide scale. For the pre-1688 period there is, fortunately, a great deal of documentary material in print; not only the fine series of the French *Recueil des Instructions*,¹⁰³ but the magnificent edition now in progress in Germany of the Treaties of Westphalia.¹⁰⁴

The year 1648 may seem to take us back a long way (since Louis XIV at that time was only ten years of age), but it is my contention that neither of the two big war periods that interest me can be understood without reference to the 1648 settlements: in the ambiguous terms imposed on each other by war-weary powers still reluctant to surrender cherished aims, in the elucidations and counter-elucidations that followed, we find the vital clue to the struggle between Louis XIV and the Hapsburgs for the interpretation of the Treaty of Münster. The Treaty of Osnabrück—that between Sweden, the Empire, and the Hapsburgs—was less ambiguous, but the struggle for interpretation still went on: for example, over the Swedish attempt, eventually unsuccessful, to include the town of Bremen¹⁰⁵ with the duchy of Bremen. The Great Northern War can be seen (as Hugo Hantsch noted as far back as 1929) as a late harvest sprung from the seed of the Thirty Years' War.¹⁰⁶

The connection between the settlement of 1648 and Louis XIV's foreign policy is obvious to Ford, who has had to cope with the knotty problem of the ten towns of Alsace (the Decapole) that were, in one paragraph, ceded by the house of Hapsburg to France with all rights; then, in a later clause, their sovereignty somehow kept for the Empire; yet with a final paragraph added that nothing previously stated should in any way diminish the sovereign rights accorded to Louis.¹⁰⁷ What becomes clear, however, when all material at our disposal is studied is that the struggle was not only about differing interpretations of French sovereignty in Alsace but of the virtual undoing of one of the main gains of 1648 for France: the transfer of sovereignty in that year to Louis XIV over the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, occupied by the French since 1552.

Both sides were aggressive. Leopold, Joseph, and Charles insisted on the return of the three bishoprics both before and after the French interpretation in respect of the Alsace towns had been confirmed at the Peace of Nijmegen. One of the aims of the Hapsburgs in the Nine Years' War, as well as in the War of the Spanish Succession, was the return of Metz, Toul, and Verdun; after 1679 the reversal

of the Nijmegen decision on Alsace, and of Spain's cession to Louis of Franche-Comté at that peace, loomed large among Austrian objectives.¹⁰⁸ There was a parallel move in the north of the Empire by Brandenburg to force Sweden out of her German possessions with the emperor's help—a German-wide movement, therefore, against the “foreign” powers that influenced, and also was influenced by, Leibniz's scheme for a closer federation of Germany and by the so-called German mission of Leopold. For his part, Louis was determined to keep the gains of 1648 and tried to interpret all treaties and incidents in France's favor; first, in relation to what had been gained in Alsace; then, in the reunion clause; and, finally, in the occupation of Strasbourg as a punishment for that city's help to Leopold. The French case was that the Hapsburg side had been the initial aggressor, the Emperor Ferdinand III (Leopold's father) having, contrary to the stipulations of 1648, let 6,000 soldiers march across the Empire to reinforce Spain in the Southern Netherlands. In his turn Louis earned the distrust of those preoccupied with German liberties when he, against assurances that had been given, or at least assumed, began pushing his claims in Alsace.¹⁰⁹

Even greater international concern came over the French attempt to incorporate Lorraine with France. It was true that Lorraine had been occupied for long periods at a time before 1660; it was true that Louis had made a deal with the family that included (and for that reason met opposition from the French princes of the blood) giving the house of Lorraine a share in the heritage of the French crown; but the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Montmartre from France's side, coupled with its repudiation by the young Duke Charles, who did not feel tied by his uncle's promises, rendered Louis's case indefensible from the point of view of international morality of the time, and Duke Charles's marriage to the Emperor Leopold's sister gave little hope for success in Louis's cherished objective of “rejoining this province of France to the body and heart of the country”.¹¹⁰ Louis never gave up hope, however. Lorraine had to be evacuated in 1679—though with French control of the four military routes through the country; but reoccupation soon followed, and Louis continued with schemes, common enough throughout Europe at this period, for exchanges and equivalents: the dukes of Lorraine (first, Charles V, and after his death, his son, Leopold Joseph) became

candidates, if not for vacant thrones as in the case of Augustus of Saxony-Poland between 1706-9 and of James Edward Stuart after 1701 (for whom Poland, Egypt, and the Barbary states were at times canvassed), at least for territory thought tempting enough to make them sacrifice Lorraine. The Southern Netherlands, Naples and/or Sicily, the Milanese, and a host of other possibilities, were discussed.¹¹¹ The French share of the partition treaties in Italy (which worried English and Dutch competitors for trade in the Mediterranean) were intended as an exchange for the duchy of Lorraine. A successful exchange would enable Louis to make sure of land through which his enemies had entered France in previous times: one of the "doors" (*portes*) into the heart of the country. The *porte* into France represented by Dunkirk had been secured by purchase from Charles II in 1662, that leading from the Franche-Comté had been closed by Spain's cession of the province in 1678, and that from the Southern Netherlands was bolted in the 1680's by an iron bar, the famous *carré* of Vauban, which withstood attack in the wars of 1689-1713.¹¹² Concern for the remaining eastern "doors" deepened with growing Hapsburg power. The hope of closing at least one of them is fundamental to the partition treaties. Naples and Sicily (the French share of the First Partition Treaty of 1698) would, it was planned, be exchanged for the duchy of Lorraine; and when the Second Partition Treaty (of 1700) added to France's gains the Duchy of Milan, as well as Naples and Sicily, an exchange of the former with either the Duke of Lorraine or (if he refused) with the Duke of Savoy was stipulated in a secret article. It is difficult to over-emphasize Louis's and his advisers' concern for the safety of the eastern frontier or their desire to incorporate enclaves inside the territory they considered as "France." The most striking illustration came during the Nine Years' War when (as Srbik has shown) Louis was willing to renounce for himself, the dauphin, and all his heirs, any share in the Spanish succession—and to let this renunciation be registered by the Paris Parlement—provided France was permitted to retain the gains of Nijmegen in the east and to absorb Lorraine against equivalents. One condition was postulated (not an unreasonable one): in his turn Leopold had to promise that the Austrian Hapsburg dominions and the Spanish inheritance, which would then come with Louis's blessing to the Vienna branch, should

never be united under one ruler. The empire of Charles V must not be restored.¹¹³ I shall have more to say of the Spanish succession issue as such in a moment; here I am just stressing what sacrifices Louis—who never relinquished belief in the hereditary legitimate right of his children and grandchildren to the crown of Spain—was willing to make for the security of the eastern frontier. Similarly, Hapsburg concern to undo 1648 is illustrated by the immediate refusal of Louis's offer; probably not, as contemporary diplomats believed, because Leopold loved his son Charles better than his son Joseph and hoped to see him restore the empire of Charles V,¹¹⁴ but because there was in Vienna as genuine a fear of Louis and of French plans for invasion along the Danube valley (did he not hold Strasbourg, the key to the Hapsburg house?) as there was of Hapsburg designs in Versailles (where Strasbourg was looked upon as the key that turned the lock against invasion). Neither side could give up its attempt, even at the cost of appeal to the dice of war, to get a solution favorable to itself.

It has been argued that if Louis had only rested content with the truce of Ratisbon (Regensburg) of 1684 and refrained from efforts to have it turned into a permanent peace by his aggressive actions in 1688–89, all would have been well.¹¹⁵ It is an interesting point of view; but it does tend to ignore that Louis at the time, and some of his advisers, were convinced that once Leopold had achieved peace with the Turks on his terms, he would turn against France. And the Austrian archives have yielded confirmation of such fears: those in favor of the Turkish war prevailed on the emperor to postpone the reckoning with Louis only because they convinced him that, victorious in the east, he would be better equipped to defeat France.¹¹⁶

The vital importance of the eastern frontier can also be illustrated from the War of the Spanish Succession. In his several efforts to obtain peace Louis offered to give up every gain that had come to the Bourbons from his having accepted the will of Carlos II; but he remained firm, even in the darkest hours, that he could not, and would not, give up Metz, Toul, Verdun, nor the Nijmegen confirmation of the sovereignty over the Decapole and the transfer of Franche-Comté, though Strasbourg—gained by treaty in 1697 when the occupation of 1681 was internationally recognized—he at times despaired of keeping. And when, after the breakdown of the Hague

conference of 1709, he issued his famous manifesto to the French people, appealing for their support, the point that loomed so large with the Allies (and with English historians)—his refusal to give military help to throw his grandson out of Spain—was mentioned only in one sentence, in the form nearly of an afterthought: "I pass in silence over the suggestion made to me. . . ." ¹¹⁷ What loomed large in the manifesto was his explanation that if he surrendered the cautionary towns ¹¹⁸ that had been asked for in return for an armistice, the Allies—unless the suspension of arms were turned into a safe peace, for which there was no guarantee—would be able to penetrate to the heart of France and wrest from it to the gains of so many years and so many wars: the nation would be dismembered.

It is my contention, therefore, that despite the aggressive actions of Louis XIV on the eastern borders of France (where deeds were perpetrated that, however justifiable from the strategic point of view and regardless of whether Louis was personally responsible or not, have been condemned by contemporaries and posterity), the underlying purpose of defense is part and parcel of the struggle that took place between Bourbon and Hapsburg over rival interpretations of 1648, and that Louis's actions were not the prelude to the establishment of control over the Empire or of universal monarchy.

Where Louis can be labeled "aggressive" is in an area where modern French historians have been unexpectedly soft with him, classing the War of Devolution as "defensive" or even explaining it as a "rectification" of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. ¹¹⁹ The preposterousness of applying private Brabantine law to the realm of international politics has been stressed, naturally enough, by historians of the Netherlands; but that issue has been largely ignored in books written in French, even in a modern *Etude historique sous les droits successoraux de la Reine Marie-Thérèse de France*. ¹²⁰ Nor was there at the time any grounds for fearing that the United Provinces would take offensive action in the Southern Netherlands; the Dutch, having refused French plans for partition that would bestow some territorial benefit on both parties, leaving an independent Catholic buffer state between them, were content with the status quo. Their attempts during the Thirty Years' War to conquer the Southern Netherlands for themselves had failed; the outright partition they had offered France during that war had been declined at a time when Mazarin was

negotiating privately with Spain. Now any discussion of change brought fears to the rich towns of the province of Holland, and in particular to Amsterdam, that the river Scheldt might be reopened and Antwerp become a competitor in trade.

Louis XIV's purchase of Dunkirk from Charles II in 1662 had not worried the States General;¹²¹ Louis was their ally, whereas the English were bitter trade rivals. But Louis's precipitate invasion of the Southern Netherlands in 1667 was deeply disturbing to the Dutch. He saw it as a justifiable attempt to improve France's frontiers since Philip IV had refused to annul Maria Theresa's renunciation, even though the term within which her dowry should have been paid had expired. They saw it as an abuse of French power. Louis, when he became aware of their unease, gave Spain the choice of ceding to France either Franche-Comté or certain towns in the Southern Netherlands. Franche-Comté (which the Spaniards thought of as indefensible in the long run and had earmarked as a bargaining counter to achieve the return of the "gap in the Pyrenees," Roussillon and part of Cerdagne, given up in 1659) was what Versailles expected Carlos II to cede; but the Spanish king's advisers consciously sacrificed part of the Southern Netherlands to frighten the Dutch Republic enough to make sure of its support in case of renewed French aggression. In Louis's attack on the Dutch in 1672 there is undeniably an element of irritation and annoyance at the manner in which the States General took upon themselves all honor for having arranged the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668). The war had, however, two basic purposes: to warn the Dutch that France was a serious commercial competitor in Europe and overseas, and to force them to give Louis a free hand in the Southern Netherlands when the Spanish succession issue should be decided. By the partition treaty between Leopold and Louis in 1668 it had been agreed that the Southern Netherlands would fall to Louis's share;¹²³ and though a secret article in the Franco-Swedish treaty, which (with many others) belongs to the diplomatic preparations for the war on the Dutch, guaranteed that France would respect the integrity of the Southern Netherlands and permit the States General an independent existence,¹²⁴ Louis at this time certainly envisaged a chastened Republic and the road open to a future incorporation of the Southern Netherlands with France. The greed of the War of Devolution and of the Dutch War of

1672 was, at least according to my reading of the *Mémoires* and the instructions of the *Recueil*, regretted by Louis in more mature years. It might have been poor comfort for him to reflect that retribution had not been slow in coming: Leopold, anxious not to lose the leadership of the German mission and beginning to aspire to the whole of the Spanish succession for his own house,¹²⁵ renounced the partition treaty; the Dutch war developed into a struggle for the whole eastern frontier of France; and William III's determination that Louis's aggression must be resisted at all costs¹²⁶ was forged to last his whole life through.

At the end of the Dutch war Louis accepted that the Republic—which was not the tiny, powerless state¹²⁷ of those who read history backwards—was entitled, since he had begun the war, to have the status quo restored and also to receive some compensation (given in the form of trade advantages), in contrast to those rulers, such as Carlos and Leopold, who had declared war on France.¹²⁸ Furthermore, Louis, who did learn from experience, accepted the basic lesson of the war: the impracticability of aspiring to the Southern Netherlands against the wishes of the Dutch. From 1679 onward Louis had no serious hope of ever incorporating all or most of the Low Countries with France. But he was—and to this Dutch historians have paid too little attention—worried whether the States General might come to an arrangement with someone other than himself for a partition or for a government essentially in the Dutch economic interest. His attempts to persuade Spain to let Charles of Lorraine or Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria, receive the Southern Netherlands as an independent state (a scheme that would benefit Louis in that Lorraine could then be incorporated with France, by a direct exchange in the first case, and by the duke of Lorraine taking over Max Emmanuel's German lands in the second) met opposition from all sides: from the Dutch, who feared either duke would be tied to French apron strings; from Carlos of Spain, who did not want to dismember his patrimony; from Leopold of Austria, who aspired to the entire Spanish succession to dispose of as he wanted.¹²⁹ The Dutch, always frightened of a repetition of 1672, were, for their part, also on the alert for opportunities to checkmate Louis in the Southern Netherlands. At the Peace of Ryswick they wrung from him permission to negotiate with Spain about keeping Dutch garri-

sons in certain fortresses inside the Southern Netherlands to serve as a barrier against future French aggression: this Dutch "Barrier" was arranged in 1698,¹³⁰ and its security and extension became one of the major aims in Dutch foreign policy from that date.¹³¹ When Max Emmanuel was made governor general of the Southern Netherlands, the Dutch held conversations with him for the purpose of securing the country against France once Carlos II should die. The secret treaty that France and Europe believed the two parties entered into has recently been shown as much more likely to be genuine than not, in spite of the denials of the elector and the States General when the news leaked out.¹³² It was the fear of such arrangements that a French minister used, in confidential conversation with a Swedish diplomat at Versailles, as an explanation for the entry of Louis's troops into the Barrier towns in 1701.¹³³ The official reason given (which also must be allotted some weight because of the French need to show Spain that Philip V would bring power in his train) was that the new king of Spain, Louis's grandson, had no need of help from the Dutch to defend his own.¹³⁴ It was this very entry that reduced William to despair, that he had to witness "in one day and without a single battle being fought" the loss of the security he had worked for for twenty-eight years; and it was this entry that decided both William and Heinsius for war.¹³⁵

Great efforts had been made by these two statesmen and by Louis to avoid hostilities over the Spanish succession. Once Leopold's intransigence became known, the Maritime Powers adroitly avoided renewing their promise in the Grand Alliance of 1689 that they would work for the succession going in its entirety to the Austrian Hapsburgs; but this did not particularly worry Vienna, where it was argued that in any war over the Spanish inheritance the English and the Dutch would eventually be drawn to the side that fought against Louis XIV. William's distrust of the emperor (whose efforts on behalf of the Stuarts in the Nine Years' War were not unknown in Whitehall)¹³⁶ and the general concern at the growth of Hapsburg power led to negotiations between William and Louis for a settlement of the succession, in which it was hoped the emperor would eventually join. The death of Max Emmanuel's son, Joseph Ferdinand—grandson of Philip IV's daughter, Margareta Theresa—shortly after the signature of the First Partition Treaty was a cruel disappointment

to both monarchs. The candidature of the electoral prince might, they hoped, have been enforced without recourse to arms, by moral and diplomatic pressure alone, on Austria as well as on Spain.¹³⁷ The partitioning aspect of the first treaty was relatively slight: enough concessions for France in Italy to permit Louis to offer exchanges to either Lorraine or Savoy (which would realize one or other of the rectifications of the French frontier discussed above), with hopes also of colonial concessions that would benefit France's plans for maritime and commercial expansion.¹³⁸ The duchy of Milan was to go to Archduke Charles as compensation for the Austrian Hapsburgs. The Second Partition Treaty, by necessity choosing the younger of the emperor's sons as king of Spain and heir to most of Carlos II's realm, inevitably widened Louis's claims for compensation. Spain would now lose all her Italian possessions to the dauphin, and Louis would be put in a position to achieve both the desired exchanges: Lorraine as well as Savoy might be incorporated with France.¹³⁹

A partition between the two main claimants, even with the lion's share going to the Austrian Hapsburgs, must be hurtful to Spain's pride and might still not prove acceptable to Leopold. The emperor had worked against the candidature of his grandson, the electoral prince, in Madrid even when the whole succession was involved; and he proved adamant in refusing accession to the Second Partition Treaty: the perils of war were far preferable. In his view he would lose nothing by insisting that the whole succession should go to the younger of his two sons since William and Heinsius would support him, rather than the Bourbons, in any clash of arms. He bargained also on the influence of Carlos II's German wife, related to the Austrian house,¹⁴⁰ to have the Archduke Charles declared heir to all Spain. So, it is clear, did William and Heinsius; for when the struggle for succession inside Spain had produced a will in favor—in the first place—of Louis's grandson, the duke of Anjou (Archduke Charles to be offered the entire monarchy only if the French candidate refused), both these statesmen were utterly taken by surprise. "I had thought Spain was on our side; I never expected them to call in the French," was the comment of Heinsius.¹⁴¹ Louis XIV's suspicions that the king of England and the Dutch grand pensionary had not pressed Vienna strongly to bring about acceptance of the Second Partition Treaty seem reasonably well founded. William thought of

the partition treaty as a reinsurance that could be used to wring some sacrifices from Leopold once the succession was safe with the Austrian Hapsburgs: Louis should be given enough to permit him to keep the peace, and the Maritime Powers would receive rich rewards as mediators.¹⁴² That William did not regard the Second Partition Treaty as one to be enforced on Leopold with arms is evident from his outburst after Carlos's will became known: "Having made the partition treaty in order to avoid a war, I am not fighting a war to enforce the treaty for France's benefit."¹⁴³ Furthermore, once the unexpected offer of all Spain for the duke of Anjou had been accepted—though Louis took care not to let his grandson set foot on Spanish soil till the term given Leopold for entry into the Second Partition Treaty had expired¹⁴⁴—William and Heinsius looked upon the treaty as one that might serve to wrest concessions both for the emperor and the Maritime Powers from Louis XIV.

Whether such concessions were possible, given the temper of the Spaniards (who had chosen Louis's grandson for their king not out of a love for France but out of a conviction that French power would be able to protect them against partition), is a debatable point. What is clear is that Louis felt he could not let the succession go by default to Austria; that would mean—in view of Leopold's refusal to give an undertaking that the empire of Charles V should not be restored—the certainty of encirclement, the probable loss of the gains of his own reign (the improved northern frontier; the incorporation of Alsace, Franche-Comté, Strasbourg; the four military routes through Lorraine and the occupation of that duchy, which he hoped would become permanent), and the possibility of losing even the gains of 1648 and 1659. Louis, in accepting the will, gambled on peace and a Bourbon family alliance that would give him a friendly neighbor in the south, favorable opportunities for French commerce in the Spanish empire overseas, and, in the future, exchanges of territory that would improve France's own borders.¹⁴⁵ Above all, he felt that the balance of Europe would become redressed: the access in power and *gloire* that the Turkish wars had brought to Leopold would now be compensated for by a Bourbon family alliance in the west. That Louis did not enjoy the peaceful possession of the Spanish succession was in part due to the accidents of history, such as the death of James II at a particularly delicate time of Anglo-

Dutch negotiations with France. But it was also due to Louis's own mistakes: he could have made it much clearer to the Maritime Powers than he did that the reservation of Philip's rights to the French crown was intended to keep the Orléans branch of the royal family distant from succession and dictated by hopes of keeping Philip, as king of Spain, in some dependence on a France he might—if death removed the nearer heirs—rule once he had made alternative provision for Spain. As it was, he raised the specter of Charles V's empire under Bourbon sway. Nor must the insistence of William and Heinsius that he should not enjoy the peaceful possession of the will, except at the price of concessions to them in respect of Barrier towns and overseas trading posts, be forgotten. Louis's inability (quite apart from his unwillingness) to make immediate sacrifices of Spanish territory, either to the Maritime Powers or to the Austrian Hapsburgs, proved Leopold right in his analysis of the situation: the Dutch and the English would be driven to support him rather than Louis in a struggle over the Spanish succession, provided he took the initiative in resisting a French candidature. As soon as Philip reached Madrid, Leopold prepared to send his troops into Italy to take over the Spanish possessions there for his own family. The Grand Alliance followed in 1701, and general war broke out when the preparations of the Maritime Powers were complete in 1702.

That Louis, after this hardest of all the wars that France had to fight during his reign, achieved a reasonable compromise peace in 1713-14, he owed in part to the accidents of history—such as the change of government in England in 1710—but also to his own and his advisers' clever use of the opportunities that this and other happenings presented, and to the country's grasp of what was at stake: not Spain, but the security of France. After the settlements of 1713-14, Philip remained king of Spain and of Spain overseas; but the areas that had been the particular concern of the partition-treaty negotiations, the Southern Netherlands and the Spanish possessions in Italy, were detached from that crown to move—more or less permanently—into the orbit of the Austrian Hapsburgs. Spain also had to give concessions to the English, if not to the Dutch (outdistanced and even cheated by the Tories in the peace negotiations), in respect of trade; and some, at least, of England's claims to Mediterranean possessions—long since postulated¹⁴⁶—were satisfied by the acquisition

of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. France herself had to sacrifice land overseas that she had, in Louis's own reign, taken from England.¹⁴⁷ But the European gains of Louis's reigns were safeguarded, and the French maintained their interpretation of 1648. In contrast, the Dutch lost their hoped-for gains from the Thirty Years' War: Cleves, and Spanish Guelders—to which the Treaty of Münster had given them a claim—went to Prussia.¹⁴⁸ Charles XII, on his return from Turkey at the end of 1714, fought hard in defense of Sweden's German possessions, Prussia and Hanover having joined the anti-Swedish coalition to obtain, respectively, Swedish Pomerania and Bremen and Verden. To keep Sweden, the fellow guarantor of 1648, in the empire, Louis entered in April, 1715, into a subsidy-treaty with Charles XII. The death of Louis in September of that year certainly weakened Sweden's cause in Germany. By the peace treaties of the Great Northern War, 1719–21 (after the death of Charles in 1718), Sweden was left with Wismar and a small part of Pomerania as footholds in the Empire; but she was no longer a power to be reckoned with in German affairs.

Louis XIV's attitude to his fellow monarchs was, naturally enough, deeply anchored in the past. His policies in respect of the frontiers, the Empire, and Italy—even toward the pope¹⁴⁹—were in general conditioned by those pursued by Richelieu and Mazarin; the technique of the reunions was in the Capetian tradition of his predecessors, as were his efforts (successful in the case of Orange, unsuccessful in the case of Avignon) to absorb foreign enclaves on French soil. He did not, however, slavishly follow established patterns or lines; he tried to avoid what he regarded, in the light of experience, to have been mistakes in the past. To give one example: Louis looked upon Mazarin's alliance with Cromwell as being, in part, responsible for Charles II's vacillating policy after 1660—this, it has been suggested, helps to explain the recognition of James Stuart as king in 1701 as a form of reinsurance for the future.¹⁵⁰ That Louis learned from his own mistakes has already been proposed in our discussion of the Southern Netherlands (though he did not realize the sensitivity of the Dutch fully enough to avoid further mistakes in 1701); and he did try to avoid falling into traps that had proved dangerous in the past. In 1700, when Louis sent Villars to Vienna to attempt securing Leopold's accession to the Second Partition Treaty, he

warned his ambassador not to mention the strength and power, the *puissance*, of France, nor boast of its armed forces or its good finances, lest Vienna should become frightened and set about forging coalitions against France—though he was warned not to make France out so weak and poor that the dignity of king and country would be impaired.¹⁵¹ In 1714, to give another example, when Louis sent a French diplomat to Italy to inspect, discreetly, the future second wife of Philip V, the envoy was reminded that the preference of Philip and his first wife for French advisers had alienated Spaniards, and he was enjoined to lead the new bride into better ways: in a perceptive instruction Louis summed up what he had learned from the sometimes strained relationship of Spain and France during the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁵²

We are left with the problem of why Louis XIV—were he as relatively sensible and moderate as this paper has argued—has had such a bad press. He certainly was insensitive at times to the reactions of fellow monarchs and other nations, but in this he was not alone: Professor Kossmann has reminded us that “the Dutch had no idea of the intense feelings of jealousy and fear that their success had aroused in others.”¹⁵³ Louis, like all rulers, at times misjudged situations. His most serious misjudgment is probably that of the situation in the Empire after 1689. His dispatches to French diplomats, and in particular to D’Avaux in the important years 1694–97, are full of arguments that he genuinely felt must carry weight with the Swedes and the German princes: he tried to rouse the king of Sweden against a Leopold who was becoming so powerful that he might not only throw France and Sweden out of the Empire but also subdue the German princes and rob Germany of her liberties.¹⁵⁴ Similar arguments are found in letters to French diplomats inside the Empire.¹⁵⁵ It does not look as if Louis realized that, in an age of individual ambitious drive among the German princes, the emperor had the upper hand because he was the fountain of honor and titles inside the Empire. One by one the German princes gave Leopold their support: Hanover in 1692 for the electoral title; Saxony in 1697 for support for its prince to be elected king of Poland; Brandenburg in 1701 for the title of “king in Prussia”; while George I of Hanover-England and Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia were kept on tenterhooks, dancing to at least some of the tunes of Charles VI, by

their need to obtain imperial investitures for their Swedish conquests.

The accepted view of the consequences for French economic life of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes has recently, by the studies of Scoville and Lüthy, undergone some necessary revision.¹⁵⁶ But on Louis's relations with the Protestant powers of Europe, the evidence that comes to light points to an ever-deepening distrust and horror of Louis after 1685. Geyl has shown how the Dutch, from the cynical "Tut, tut, what does religion matter in state affairs"¹⁵⁷ of the pre-1685 years, entrenched themselves in a belief that Louis plotted not only universal monarchy but also universal religion to be imposed on Europe by his arms. This belief was reinforced by the clause (No. 4) in the Ryswick Treaty that decreed that in the reunions returned by France to their rightful owners the Catholic religion should prevail. Srbik has shown how great a share Leopold and his Jesuit advisers had in clause 4;¹⁵⁸ but though some contemporaries blamed Lillie-root, the Swedish mediator, for not preventing the clause,¹⁵⁹ Louis has carried most of the blame. Belief in the plot of resurgent Catholicism has found some support in modern research. Louis and Leopold had a common interest in the Stuart cause and in its concomitant, a Catholic England, which facilitated those negotiations between them that so worried William III during the Nine Years' War.¹⁶⁰ A similar Catholic-front element can be discerned in the 1714-15 negotiations between Versailles and Vienna, when Louis was anxious to reinsure against George I restarting the war against France, and Charles VI was alarmed at the growing power of the Protestant princes in the north of the Empire.¹⁶¹ That fear of Louis as the instrument of a counter-reformation was spread by Huguenot refugees is well known. More important, possibly, is the fact that many Dutchmen and Englishmen, settled as traders in French ports, felt the full force of the Revocation—either because they had become naturalized or because they (though remaining subjects of their own country) had French wives who, with their children, were not exempt from the Edict. Their bitter complaints aggravated anti-Louis feeling in London and at The Hague.¹⁶² William III was also concerned at the difficulties his restored principality of Orange encountered as an enclave of tolerance in an intolerant France.¹⁶³ The spread of persecution and brutality to the Savoyard Protestants (instigated by Louis, who objected to French Huguenots settling across the border in such

numbers that they constituted a threat to the security of France) further alienated European opinion. Louis's argument is given some support by the fact that the Allies in the War of the Spanish Succession helped to rouse the Protestants of the Cévennes (at a time when persecution had already ceased) against Louis. The tolerant attitude of William in religious matters and his genuine concern and attempts to help Protestants in trouble for the sake of their religion (clearly evidenced in his correspondence with Heinsius)¹⁶⁴ tends to make him rather than Louis the more acceptable character to a tolerant age, even when it has been shown that Louis personally was not the instigator of persecution inside France and was ignorant of much that happened.¹⁶⁵

In other and more personal spheres Louis irritated contemporaries—at least in the earlier part of his reign—as well as posterity. There is a telling comment by one English diplomat who disliked and feared “this Great Comet that is risen of late, the French King, who expects not only to be gazed at but adored by the whole world.”¹⁶⁶ Most nations struck medals, put up monuments, or otherwise remembered their victories: France was annoyed by the Dutch inscription on a medal struck after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle;¹⁶⁷ the English took offense at Dutch commemoration of their Chatham victories; but a great many nations felt hurt by the monument in the Place des Victoires by which Louis in 1686 celebrated the Peace of 1679. Rumor even had it that allies no less than former enemies had been humiliated in verse and paint on that occasion to enhance the glory of France.¹⁶⁸ Charles XII, with his aversion to statues of living rulers, felt a slight contempt for a monarch who praised himself by having statues put up in his own lifetime: such *gloire* should be left for posterity to decide.

Deeper than such resentments went the distrust of Louis, bred by the progressive interpretation of 1648; by the several occupations of Lorraine, which pointed to permanent designs (the Dutch, when Louis's inclination to incorporate Lorraine became apparent, harked back to a statement of his from 1670 specifically denying such designs and told him they would “rather die” than let him realize his plans); by the memory of the War of Devolution, which rendered Louis suspect in the Palatinate: what might he not do with the claim of his sister-in-law's *immeubles* at a time when the legal heir, as settled by

the 1648 treaty, was the father-in-law and supporter of the emperor? From this distrust grew the desire of all who felt threatened to contain Louis by united diplomatic and, if need be, military action: William III's "indivisibility of the peace" became their slogan, at least as long as fear was strong. Yet, toward the end of Louis's reign relations mellowed between him and Europe. Old enemies died: William III, who had inherited Lisola's mantle as leader of the anti-French coalitions; then Leopold of Austria; then his son Joseph. The new emperor, Charles VI, was both less "German" and less "Austrian Hapsburg" in the early years of his reign than his father and brother had been. Heinsius and the Dutch were shocked enough at English behavior in the last years of the Spanish Succession War, and bothered enough by Charles VI's intransigence in the Southern Netherlands over their Barrier, to take a better view of Louis. Saint-Simon noted, with some surprise, that not one adverse comment on Louis was heard from the capitals of Europe when his death was announced.¹⁶⁹

Louis's relationship with France is being reassessed. As Asher has shown,¹⁷⁰ specialist studies are undermining the image of the all-powerful autocrat at home. The tyrant abroad, the aspirer after universal monarchy, may also diminish somewhat in stature when seen in the proper perspective permitted by new lines of research. The textbook picture of the just downfall of the tyrant, the Louis who after a long reign of aggression in Europe met with utter failure at the end of his life, also needs some realignment. This paper ventures to suggest that Louis XIV was, on the one hand, more frightened than has been realized, and, on the other, moderately successful in achieving, after hard struggles, the relatively modest goals he set for himself—or fate set for him. The objectives of 1648 were secured in 1678–79, and not lost in 1713–14;¹⁷¹ a Bourbon dynasty in Spain helped to safeguard the eastern frontier as completed by 1697 and made possible the later Family Compacts; the principality of Orange was absorbed;¹⁷² the four military routes through Lorraine were kept, and the incorporation of that duchy was—by 1738—achieved in principle along the lines of exchange-equivalents in Italy laid down by Louis.¹⁷³ The deepest concern of Louis not to lose *gloire* by bringing his country loss of territory and of rights was, at least in Europe, gratified.

1. The formal reign (1643-1715) is longer than any recorded in Europe till the early twentieth century, when Queen Victoria and Emperor Francis Joseph outdistanced Louis.

2. Louis's blood relationship to his fellow monarchs is traced by A. Lossky's chapter on "International Relations" in the forthcoming Volume VI of the *New Cambridge Modern History*, hereafter cited as N.C.M.H.

3. *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France* (hereafter cited as *Recueil*), Vol. I: *Autriche* (Paris, 1884), p. 158, Mémoire for De Luc, 1715.

4. The formal title of the Dutch Republic was the States General of the United Provinces, often abbreviated to the United Provinces.

5. See Tessé to the Princesse des Ursins, March 1, 1701, in *Lettres inédites*, ed. M. C. Hippeau (Caen, 1862), p. 54, for the expression "se faire république ou être roi."

6. For England being regarded as a republic in Cromwell's time, see G. Zeller, *Les Temps modernes. II. De Louis XIV à 1789* ("Histoire des relations internationales," Vol. III; Paris, 1955), part 2, p. 32.

7. The title of "Leurs Hautes Puissances" ("Their High Mightinesses") was, however, not conceded (or recognized, from the Dutch point of view) till after Louis's death—again at a time of rivalry for Dutch support: see R. M. Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714-1721* (London, 1950), p. 235.

8. P. Höynck, *Frankreich und seine Gegner auf dem Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress* (Bonn, 1960), pp. 49 ff. (hereafter cited as Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*). The prince was Duke Johann Friedrich of Hanover, and Leibniz wrote under the pseudonym Caesarinus Furstenius.

9. For Louis's discussion of his motives see M. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres de Louis XIV*, (6 vols.; Paris, 1806), I, 69 ff. (hereafter cited as *Œuvres*); for expedients to avoid a stop to negotiations on this account see *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, 7-8, 43 ff.

10. For the 1661 incident and the subsequent Spanish apology (since Louis was technically in the right), see Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, p. 17; cf. *Œuvres*, I, 129 ff.

11. For the connection of this incident with the prestige quarrel with the house of Hapsburg, see G. C. Picavet, *Les dernières années de Turenne* (Paris, 1919), pp. 142 ff. (hereafter cited as Picavet, *Turenne*).

12. See G. Spini, N.C.M.H., V, 471, for this journey in 1685; cf. Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, p. 65, for the brilliant reception.

13. For the diplomatic etiquette of the period, see G. C. Picavet, *La Diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV, 1661-1715* (Paris, 1930), pp. 73-146.

14. C. Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London, 1957), pp. 88-89, 120-21. See H. Woodridge, *Sir William Temple: The Man and His Work* (Oxford, 1940), pp. 110-11 (hereafter cited as Woodridge, *William Temple*), for a shooting incident on this account. The fundamental work on the subject is T. W. Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea* (Edinburgh, 1911).

15. See D. H. Somerville, *The King of Hearts. Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury* (London, 1962), p. 91 (hereafter cited as Somerville, *Shrewsbury*).

16. Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, p. 27.

17. For Louis's attitude to the imperial title, see *Œuvres*, I, 75 ff.

18. See, for example, *Recueil*, VIII: *Russie*, (Paris, 1896), I, 47 ff. and 54 ff., for liberal use, in writing and conversation, of "le grand seigneur Czar," "notre affectionné Frère," and "Sa Majesté le Tsar" in 1657 and 1680. Cf. the difficulties made by Leopold toward Russian rulers, investigated by K. Meyer, "Kaiserliche

Grossmächtigkeit," in *Rossia Externa. Festgabe P. Johansen* (Marburg, 1963), pp. 115-74.

19. *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, p. 51; cf. P. S. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II and James II* (New Brunswick, 1966), pp. 110-11, for the solution of a problem of protocol in Paris.

20. Woodbridge, *William Temple*, pp. 172-73.

21. Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, pp. 150-51.

22. Public Record Office (hereafter cited as P.R.O.), London, Treaty Papers, Vol. 98, has much correspondence on expedients to avoid problems of etiquette, as well as premature recognitions. See, for example, Huxelles to Louis XIV, Utrecht, February 6, 1712.

23. See F. Carsten, *N.C.M.H.*, V, 447, for this incident in 1701.

24. A distinction can be made between Catholic rulers whose advisers, often Jesuits, encouraged them to put their concern for religion above their word to their fellow sovereigns; but it must not be pressed too far since the personal attitude of each ruler was the decisive factor. H. von Srbik, *Wien und Versailles, 1692-1700* (Munich, 1944), pp. 119 ff. (hereafter cited as Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*), shows the soul-searching of Austrian statesmen when Leopold's signature on a specific document had to be denied to his allies.

25. M. Braubach, *Kurkölnische Miniaturen* (Münster, 1954), pp. 25-27; Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, pp. 21-23, 197 ff.

26. See letter of Charles (in Swedish, but giving *gloire* in French) of March, 1701, quoted in *Sveriges Historia*, IV, ed. M. Weibull, M. Højer, et al. (Stockholm, 1881), p. 530; cf. the reference to *heder* in his draft of December, 1712, in *Konung Karl XII:s Egenhändiga Brev*, ed. E. Carlson (Stockholm, 1893), p. 393; cf. *Ehre* in the German edition, *Die eigenhändigen Briefe König Karls XII*, ed. E. Carlson (Berlin, 1894), p. 383.

27. See e. g., Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, p. 22, n. 28, for a certain course being "au préjudice de notre honneur réputation."

28. *Ibid.*, p. 78, for William's *Ehre*; see also A. J. Bourde, "Louis XIV et Angleterre," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 46-47 (1960), devoted to "Problèmes de politique étrangère sous Louis XIV," p. 58; cf. the character sketches of William in P. Geyl, *Oranje en Stuart* (Utrecht, 1959), pp. 381-537, and in the same author's *Kernproblemen van onze Geschiedenis* (Utrecht, 1937), pp. 116-34.

29. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, p. 105.

30. Picavet, *Turenne*, p. 429, Louis's letter to Turenne of May 20, 1675 ("le bien de mon service et la gloire des vos armes"). For William III's use of *gloire* when discussing the negotiator's craft, see *Œuvres*, VI, 519.

31. The clearest expression can be found in Louis's "Reflections on the Role of a King" of 1679; see the English translation edited by J. Longnon, *A King's Lesson in Statecraft: Louis XIV's Letters to His Heirs* (London, 1924), p. 170 (hereafter cited as Longnon, *Statecraft*). Cf. Louis XIV in *Œuvres*, II, 455, for "le bien et la puissance de l'Etat," and, 470, for "la gloire et la sûreté de l'Etat."

32. M. A. Thomson, *Some Developments in English Historiography during the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1957), p. 5, and G. Davies, "The Control of British Foreign Policy by William III," *Essays on the Later Stuarts* (San Marino, 1958).

33. See P. Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, Part 2: *1648-1715* (London, 1964), pp. 127-38, 147-52 (hereafter cited as Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*), for William's methods in this respect; cf. M. A. M. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's Politieke en Diplomatieke Activiteiten in de Jaren 1667-1684* (Groningen, 1966), pp. 261-62, summing up in English his detailed examination of William's relationship to Amsterdam.

34. See Longnon, *Statecraft*, p. 59, for Louis's "perpetual uneasiness" at praise that he did not feel he had earned. Cf. R. Clark, *Sir William Trumbull in Paris*,

1685-86 (Cambridge, England, 1938), p. 15 (hereafter cited as Clark, *Trumbull*), quoting Savile's opinion that Louis did not like "too gross" flattery. William and Charles were also suspicious of flattery.

35. See R. M. Hatton, "Charles XII and the Great Northern War," in *N.C.M.H.*, forthcoming Vol. VI; cf. Charles's own letters (note 26 above), nos. 71-74.

36. Somerville, *Shrewsbury*, p. 115, William to Shrewsbury in July, 1696, at a moment of acute financial difficulties: "If you cannot devise expedients to send contributions or procure credit, all is lost and I must go to the Indies."

37. For tears at the meeting of ministers in 1709, see A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, (43 vols.; Paris, 1929), XXVII, 44 and notes; for tears in the king's private room in the presence of Villars in 1712, see *Mémoires du maréchal de Villars*, quoted in W. H. Lewis, *The Splendid Century* (London, 1953), p. 481.

38. Said to General Schwerin: see document (in Swedish) edited by T. Westrin, *Historisk Tidskrift*, XV (1895), 341-42.

39. William to Heinsius, Hampton Court, February 8, 1701, *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, Vol. III, ed. F. J. L. Krämer (Leyden, 1909), p. 407 (hereafter cited as Krämer, *Archives*).

40. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 105, 204. Cf. L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950), p. 292, that Leopold, on being pressed by Villars to accede to the Second Partition Treaty, reported that there was no war the perils of which would not be preferable to those implied in accession.

41. For an assessment of Louis as a military man, see pp. 196-223.

42. Woodbridge, *William Temple*, p. 118 ("He had one way still left not to see its [his country's] ruin completed, which is to lie in the last dike"), and p. 171 (he would "rather die" than make a particular agreement).

43. "Mémoires d'un Suédois qui a servi le roi Charles XII," printed (in the original French) under the title "Die Erinnerungen Axel von Löwens," ed. A. Adler and S. Bonnesen, in *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* (1929), pp. 17-100 (quotation from pp. 25-26).

44. G. Zeller, *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du Nord et de l'Est au XVII^e siècle* (Nancy, 1928), p. 50 (hereafter cited as Zeller, *Frontières*); but see W. H. Lewis, *The Splendid Century*, p. 481, for Louis's comment to Villars in the spring of 1712 that—if things went badly—they might scrape up enough troops for a last effort "in which we will either die together or save the State."

45. Some of these phrases have been translated in English in F. Bengtsson, *The Life of Charles XII* (London, 1960), e.g., pp. 11-12. Note title of the American edition, echoing one of them: *The Sword Does Not Lie*.

46. E. Kossmann, *N.C.M.H.*, V. 297; cf. Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, p. 134.

47. There is much correspondence on this problem in the Archives des Affaires Etrangères (Paris), Correspondance Politique, Suède, Vols. 70-82; and Public Record Office (London), Foreign Office Miscellanies 31 (several volumes of mainly unused D'Avaux entry-books, letters received, etc.): see in particular F.O. 95, Vol. 576, Louis to D'Avaux, September 20 and November 15, 1693.

48. Nils Reuterholms *Journal*, ed. S. Landahl, for *Historiska Handlingar*, 36:2 (Stockholm, 1957), 80-81 (hereafter cited as *Reuterholms Journal*), where Reuterholms enters a "relation" from Paris of October 10, 1701, which he had been permitted to see in Hanover. This amplifies G. H. Jones, *The Main Stream of Jacobitism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 59 ff. (hereafter cited as Jones, *Jacobitism*), and C. Petrie, *The Marshal Duke of Berwick* (London, 1951), p. 70 (hereafter cited as Petrie, *Berwick*).

49. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, p. 320.

50. This is often stated, erroneously, possibly because of the Dutch and English contemporary nickname for Louis, "The Christian Turk": see, for example, the

[anon.] pamphlet, a copy of which is in the British Museum, *The Most Christian Turk: Or a View of the Life and Bloody Reign of Louis XIV* (London, 1690).

51. See R. R. Betts, N.C.M.H., V, 491.

52. Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, p. 20.

53. V. L. Tapié, "Quelques aspects généraux de la politique étrangère de Louis XIV," XVII^e siècle, Nos. 46-47 (1960), pp. 19-20 (hereafter cited as Tapié, "Quelques aspects").

54. See R. Kann, *A Study in the Intellectual History of Austria in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1960), pp. 38 ff. (hereafter cited as Kann, *Intellectual History of Austria*), that Italian and German contemporary writers praised Austria as the standard-bearer of the Imperial anti-Moslem mission in order to stem anti-Hapsburg currents in the empire. Cf. Spini, N.C.M.H., V, 471: "To strengthen the Empire against the Turks meant also, implicitly, to strengthen the Habsburgs against the Bourbons."

55. Hippeau, *Lettres inédites*, pp. 46-48, Tessé to Harcourt, letters from Milan of February 15 and 27, 1702, that people there were infatuated with "la grandeur de l'Empereur" and everything German was regarded as wonderful. Cf. A. Wandruszka, *Österreich und Italien im 18. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1963), p. 16, on the Italians in 1701 shouting, "Viva l'Imperatore!"

56. For Franco-Turkish relations, see K. Koehler, *Die orientalische Politik Ludwigs XIV* (Leipzig, 1907), and J. Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (London, 1964), pp. 228 ff. (hereafter cited as Stoye, *The Siege*).

57. The visitors of high rank who came to Paris are noted in the memoirs of Beauvillier, who arranged the receptions for them: see M. Langlois, *Louis XIV et la cour* (Paris, [1926]), pp. 9 ff.

58. See *Œuvres*, VI, 65 ff., for letters between 1701 and 1711. Cf. letters quoted in the French treatments of the War of the Spanish Succession by A. Baudrillard, *Philippe V et la cour de France* (5 vols.; Paris, 1889-1901) and A. Legrelle, *La Diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne* (4 vols.; Ghent, 1888-92).

59. François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes* (South Bend, Ind., 1963; reprint, with introduction by S. D. Kertesz, of the Whyte translation [1919] of the 1716 edition), p. 137.

60. *Œuvres*, VI, 518-20, Callières to the Marquise d'Huxelles, November 12, 1697, on the meeting that had taken place on November 9. For Vauban's disapproval, see A. Rébelliau, *Vauban* (Paris, 1962), p. 134.

61. These can be found in *Letters of William III and of Louis XIV and Their Ministers, 1697-1700*, ed. P. Grimblot (2 vols.; London, 1848) (hereafter cited as Grimblot, *Letters*).

62. Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 456-64, Tallard to Louis, London, May 8, 1698; 464-66, William to Heinsius, Windsor, April 29/May 9, 1698; 471-75 (474 for the quotation used in text), William to Portland, Windsor, May 2/12, 1698.

63. *Recueil*, II: Suède (Paris, 1885), 274.

64. H. Rowen, *The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1672* (The Hague, 1957), p. 8 (hereafter cited as Rowen, *Pomponne*).

65. Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 396, Portland to William, April 20, 1698.

66. For the chronology of the *Mémoires*, see P. Sonnino, "The Dating and Authorship of Louis XIV's *Mémoires*," *French Historical Studies*, III (1964), 303-37.

67. Later implied criticism of himself can also be found, e.g., *Recueil*, XIII: *Hollande*, II (Paris, 1923), 273: "Chacun peut se tromper dans le choix de la route qu'il croit la plus sûre pour la paix."

68. See, for example, H. Gillot, *Le Règne de Louis XIV et l'opinion publique en Allemagne* (Paris, 1914); F. Kleyser, *Die Flugschriftenkamp gegen Ludwig XIV. zur Zeit des pfälzischen Krieges* (Berlin, 1935); P. J. W. van Malssen, *Louis XIV d'après les pamphlets répandus en Hollande* (Amsterdam, 1936).

69. The belief, both contemporary and later, in Louis's serious attempts to obtain the imperial title owes much to Mazarin's policy in 1657-58, for which see S.F.N. Gie, *Die Kandidatur Ludwigs XIV bei der Kaiserwahl vom Jahre 1658* (Berlin, 1916); for research into the 1669-70 and the 1679-82 periods, concluding that Louis did not strive for the title, see W. Platzhoff, "Ludwig XIV, das Kaisertum und die europäische Krisis von 1683", *Historische Zeitschrift*, 3d series, XXV (1909), 377-412.

70. R. R. Betts, *N.C.M.H.*, V, 493; cf. Kann, *Intellectual History of Austria*, pp. 12 ff.

71. W. F. Church (ed.), *The Greatness of Louis XIV: Myth or Reality?* (Boston, 1959), p. ix. For a similar judgment see D. Maland, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1966), p. 266: "The reputed glory of Louis XIV's reign, the perpetual warfare to aggrandise his fame and enlarge his territories. . . ." Cf. H. G. Judge (ed.), *Louis XIV* ("Problems and Perspectives in History," London, 1965), p. 134.

72. The more recent surveys of the reign are (apart from Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, and the same author's chapter, "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting," in *N.C.M.H.*, V, 198-221): G. Pagès, *Les Origines du XVIII^e siècle au temps du Louis XIV, 1680-1715* (Les Cours de Sorbonne, Paris, 1938); L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950); R. Mousnier, *Les XVI et XVII^e siècles, 1492-1715* ("Histoire générale des civilisations," Vol. IV; Paris, 1954); L. Tapié, "Quelques aspects," is very brief but has a balanced analysis; cf. the same author's chapter in *Propyläen Weltgeschichte*, Vol. VII (Berlin-Frankfurt-Vienna, 1965), ed. G. Mann and A. Nitschke, entitled "Das Zeitalter des Absolutismus Ludwig XIV," pp. 277-348. The brief summary by W. Hubatsch, *Des Zeitalter des Absolutismus* (Braunschweig, 1962), p. 143, is worth noting because it stresses—in contrast to the usual conclusion that Louis's reign ended in total failure—that he died in the knowledge that *Ansehen* of his country could be maintained.

73. The clearest expression of this is in Tapié, "Quelques aspects," pp. 24-25.

74. Most strongly stressed by Mousnier, *Le XVI et XVII^e siècles*, p. 280, who argues that up to 1678 the wars were defensive. Contrast this view with William III's comment on being warned by Carlos II that the House of Austria ought to be more feared than the France of Louis XIV: he would share such a fear when the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs began to violate the frontiers fixed by the Peace of the Pyrenees—"whenever that should happen, he should be as much a Frenchman as he was now a Spaniard, but not before" (quoted by Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, p. 15, no. 1).

75. Mignet was the chief protagonist of the former explanation, *Lavisse* of the latter. For a Dutch historiographical study of French views on Louis XIV (with a French summary), see P. de Vries, *Het Beeld van Lodewijk XIV in de Franse Geschiedschrijving* (Amsterdam, 1948); for works on the reign in the twentieth century, see J. B. Wolf, "The Reign of Louis XIV: A Selected Bibliography of Writings since the War of 1914-18," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI (June, 1964), 127-47.

76. For the denial of any pattern see Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, pp. 18 ff.; cf. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 2 ff.

77. For Louis's medical history see pp. 00-00.

78. Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, pp. 42-43, 99, 164: "Louis XIV, who even in those years of intoxicating pride of power did not disdain the weapon of moderation." Cf. J. B. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers* (New York, 1951), p. 60, that Louis, at the time of the Second Partition Treaty, "proved reasonable beyond all expectation."

79. Mark Thomson's articles touching on Louis are reprinted (together with a paper hitherto unpublished) in *William III and Louis XIV. Essays by and for Mark Thomson*, ed. R. M. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool, 1968) (hereafter cited as *William III and Louis XIV*).

80. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles, passim*.

81. See in particular M. Braubach, "Die Reichsbarriere," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte Oberrheins*, Neue Folge, Vol. 50 (Karlsruhe, 1936), 481-530 (hereafter cited as Braubach, "Die Reichsbarriere"); text and bibliographical notes in the first three volumes of the same author's *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, (Munich, 1963-64); also contributions by W. Engles, W. Scheuer, and H. Weber in *Spiegel der Geschichte. Festgabe für Max Braubach*, ed. K. Repson and S. Skalweit (Münster, 1964).

82. Several unpublished theses that may soon appear in print deal with these areas, e.g., those by J. Herley and J. Fayard in France and by J. F. O'Connor in the United States; among published works, note C. Badalo-Dulong, *Trente ans de diplomatie française en Allemagne: Louis XIV et l'Électeur de Mayence 1648-1678* (Paris, 1956), and R. Pillorget, "La France et l'électorat de Trèves au temps de Charles-Gaspard de la Layen, II: 1658-79," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, Vol. 78 (1964), 118-48.

83. F. Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition, 1648-1789* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) (hereafter cited as Ford, *Strasbourg*).

84. A. Veenendall, *Het Engels-Nederlands Condominium in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1706-16*, Part I (Utrecht, 1945), has so far carried the study to 1710. Cf. the forthcoming work by J. Rule on Lord Orrery and the Low Countries.

85. D. Coombs, *The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958). Cf. the study of British opinion of Austria during the same war by H. Kospach, "Englische Stimmen über Österreich und Prinz Eugen während des spanischen Erbfolgekrieges," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, XXIII (1965), 39-62.

86. J. G. Stork-Penning, *Het Grote Werk* (Groningen, 1958), and the same author's "Het gedrag van de Staten 1711," in *Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XVIII (1963-64), 193-229.

87. See in particular Jones, *Jacobitism*, note 48, and bibliography there given.

88. See his *Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), and "La Picquetière's Projected Mission to Moscow in 1682 and the Swedish Policy of Louis XIV," in *Essays in Russian History: A Collection Dedicated to George Vernadsky*, ed. A. P. Ferguson and A. Levin (Hamden, Conn., 1964). His contribution to *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 7-23, contains a more general analysis of Louis's policy in the 1680's ("Maxims of State in Louis XIV's Foreign Policy in the 1680's"); cf. above, pp. 000-00.

89. For Spain, see the chapter by J. Regla, "Spain and Her Empire" in *N.C.M.H.*, V; J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716* (London, 1963), pp. 365 ff.; H. Kamen, "Melchior de Macanaz and the foundation of Bourbon power in Spain," *English Historical Review*, LXXXI (1966), 699-716. For the Austrian Hapsburgs see R. R. Betts, "The Habsburg Lands," in *N.C.M.H.*, V, and Tapié, "Quelques aspects," p. 24. Proof of Hapsburg financial power during the War of the Spanish Succession has been given by G. Otruba, "Die Bedeutung englischer Subsidien und Antizipationen für die Finanzen Österreichs 1701 bis 1748," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Vol. 51 (July, 1964), 192 ff., where the author is, however, too sweeping in this contention that there were no subsidies, only loans, in the War of the Spanish Succession; for payment of arrears of subsidies by Great Britain, see R. M. Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714-1721*, p. 163.

90. C. Nordmann, *La Crise du Nord au début du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1962), starts after the peace settlements of 1713-14. Since the above was written, an issue of the *Revue d'histoire Diplomatique*, Vol. 79 (Oct.-Dec. 1965) has, in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of Louis XIV's death, been devoted to three articles on his diplomacy. The one by J. Bérenger, pp. 291-314, "Une tentative de rapprochement entre la France et l'Empereur: le traité de partage secret de la Succession d'Espagne du 19 Janvier 1668," is an important contribution in that it analyzes, from French archive material, the reasons that made Louis XIV sign the partition treaty of 1668. The author is strongly critical of Louis, placing on him

the full blame for Leopold's later renunciation of the treaty and rating Leopold's right to the Spanish inheritance by virtue of the Hapsburg family arrangement of 1671 (which decreed that the Austrian Hapsburgs should inherit the lands of the Spanish Hapsburgs if that line died out) far above that of Louis. J. Fayard's article, pp. 338-71, "Les tentatives de constitution d'un tiers party en Allemagne du Nord 1690-1694," should also be noted, as it utilizes new material to explain the failure of Louis XIV's policy in the Empire during the Nine Years' War.

91. See, for example, Rowen, *Pomponne*, and J. Rule's chapter on Torcy in *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 213-36. Of the French studies, L. André, *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois* (Paris, 1942) and G. Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1648-1715* (Paris, 1954, 2 vols. or 1956, 1 vol.) are particularly relevant for foreign policy.

92. Picavet, *Turenne*.

93. Rebelliau, *Vauban*.

94. Zeller, *Frontières*; see also his "Politique extérieure et diplomatie sous Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, VI (1931), 124-43.

95. See P. Moraw, "Kaiser und Geschichtsschreiber um 1700," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, Vol. 22 (1962), pp. 162-203, and Vol. 23 (1963), pp. 93-136.

96. Kann, *Intellectual History of Austria*, pp. 4 ff.; A. Wandruszka, *Das Haus Habsburg* (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 142-57, for Hapsburg rulers from 1648 to 1740, with bibliographical references p. 211. An English translation of this book, *The House of Habsburg*, appeared in London in 1964.

97. The best guide to these are, for the pre-1914 period, the footnotes to O. Redlich, *Weltmacht des Barock. Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopold I 1658-1705* (Vienna, 1961, fourth ed. of the 1921 work, which was written before the first world war), and H. Hantsch, *Geschichte Österreichs*, II (Vienna, n.d. [1950]) with bibliographical notes; for twentieth-century research, see the bibliography and footnotes of M. Braubach's *Prinz Eugen*, Vols. I-III.

98. See in particular Braubach, I, 99 ff. for Leopold; II, 130 ff. for Joseph; and III, 56 ff. for Charles V; for Leopold see also Stoye, *The Siege*, pp. 53 ff.

99. So will the studies in progress by S. Shapiro (California) on Franco-Austrian relations, 1679-84; W. Slotman (Berkeley) on Paget, A.D. Machlachlan (Cambridge) on the Peace of Utrecht; D. McKay (London) on Anglo-Austrian relations during the early years of Charles VI's reign.

100. For such work, see J. Rule, "The Old Regime in America: A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d series, XIX (October, 1962), 575-600; cf. for European interest in this topic W. Gembruch, "Zwei Denkschriften zur Kolonial und Aussenpolitik Frankreichs aus den Jahren 1699 und 1700," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 195 (1962), 297-330.

101. The book mentioned in note 7 above is one outcome of this; so are *Charles XII King of Sweden* (London, 1968; New York, 1969); *War and Peace, 1680-1720* (London, 1969); and *Europe in the Age of Louis XIV* (London, 1969).

102. See my "Gratifications and Foreign Policy," *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 68-94.

103. This series is still in progress; Vol. XXVIII, in two parts, dealing with the Empire (ed. G. Livet), appeared in 1962 and 1963, and Vol. XXV, 2, *Angleterre*, 3: 1689-1791 (ed. P. Vaucher) in 1965.

104. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, ed. M. Braubach and K. Reppen, of which two volumes have so far appeared (Munich, 1962 and 1964). The first is most useful for our present purpose: see in particular pp. 221-32, 259-300, 477 ff. A fine study by F. Dickmann, *Der Westphalischen Frieden*, was published in 1959, at Münster, with a revised edition in 1965.

105. N. Larsson, *Om stadens Bremens ställning till Sveriges krona efter Westfaliska freden*, I (Stockholm, 1847), *passim*; G. Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, I:3 (Stockholm, 1952), 62-67.

106. H. Hantsch, *Reichsvizekanzler Friedrich Karl Graf von Schönborn 1674-1748* (Augsburg, 1929), p. 208.

107. Ford, *Strasbourg*, pp. 28 ff. Ford has stressed how late (due to the war with Spain until 1659) France could begin to implement the 1648 treaty, and has analyzed (pp. 58-59) the nervously defensive atmosphere in France and the genuine concern at the growing power of the Hapsburgs. Cf. *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, p. 91, Louis XIV's letter of September 26, 1681, and *Œuvres*, I, 217.

108. Braubach, "Die Reichsbarriere," pp. 482-83, considers that the time of real opportunity to achieve Hapsburg success occurred during the War of the Spanish Succession.

109. See *Reuterholms Journal*, pp. 22-23, for the comments by the Swedish diplomats Von Friesendorff and Snoilsky on Louis's behavior. Cf. the opening of the English verse (anon.) of 1706 called "The French Kings Rhodomontade," a copy of which is in the British Museum:

Lorain a day,
A week Burgundy won,
Flanders a month;
What would a year have done?
Rochester's prophetic answer:
Lorain you stole,
By fraud you got Burgundy,
.....

110. Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, p. 65 and n. 66; cf. *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, pp. 119-20, Louis's comment of July 22, 1687.

111. Apart from land in Italy and the Netherlands, the following were at various times discussed as equivalents for Lorraine: the duchy of Mecklenburg, six secularized bishoprics in the Empire, some of the Swiss cantons, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

112. When Marlborough and Eugene had some success against the *carré* in 1710, the political situation in England prevented them from acting boldly.

113. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 124-36.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

115. Tapié, "Quelques aspects," p. 21.

116. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 95 ff.; G. Livet, "Louis XIV et l'Allemagne," *XVII^e siècle* (1960), pp. 41-42.

117. Manifesto, "To the Governors of the Provinces," translated into English in Petrie, *Berwick*, pp. 235-37. Cf. the Eugene plan to conquer Spain "in the heart of France": G. Otruba, "Prinz Eugen and Marlborough," *Österreich und die Angelsächsische Welt*, ed. O. Hietsch (Vienna, 1961), pp. 9-27.

118. For the cautionary towns demanded see Stork-Penning, *Het Grote Werk*, pp. 260 ff., and Braubach, *Prinz Eugen*, II, 277 ff. Cf. for the 1710 discussion of the same topic Stork-Penning, pp. 312 ff. and Braubach, II, 332 ff.

119. Zeller, *De Louis XIV à 1789*, p. 115.

120. By J. de Stuers, published in Geneva, 1949.

121. In the Franco-Dutch treaty of April, 1662, the States General guaranteed the possession of Dunkirk to France. See Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, p. 58, for the Dutch failing to get as firm a guarantee for their occupation of Cleves. For the Dutch eastern frontier after 1648, see A. C. J. de Vrankrijker, *Die Grenzen van Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1946), pp. 101 ff.

122. That such annulment was possible is shown by the Spanish action in 1700.

123. The French share was further to comprise Naples, Sicily, Spain's African possessions, and the Philippines.

124. G. Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, I:3 (Stockholm, 1952), p. 168. Cf. for similar assurances in Germany, G. Pagès, *Contributions de la politique française en Allemagne* (Paris, 1905), pp. 38-40.

125. His two sons, of his third marriage, were born in 1678 and 1685. Wandruszka, *Das Haus Habsburg*, p. 152, has stressed the importance of the German marriage of Leopold (to Eleonora of Pfalz-Neuburg) producing sons, and also of the German marriages arranged for Joseph and Charles.

126. See P. Geyl, *History of the Low Countries: Episodes and Problems* (London, 1964), Chapter VI, "William III and the Liberties of Europe."

127. See E. Kossmann, *N.C.M.H.*, V, 286, for the power and riches of the United Provinces at this time.

128. Höynck, *Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress*, p. 28.

129. Leopold had successfully pressed his daughter (Maria Antonia) by his Spanish wife to transfer her claim to the two sons of the third marriage, so that the hereditary right that Joseph and Charles derived from his own Spanish blood should be reinforced.

130. R. de Schrijver, "De eerste staate barrière in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1697-1701," *Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XVIII (1963-64), 65-90 (hereafter cited as Schrijver, "Barrière") is the first historian to discuss in any detail the Dutch-Spanish convention: in textbooks it is usually assumed that the Barrier as such formed part of the 1697 peace treaty. Cf. W. Hahlweg, "Untersuchungen zur Barrierepolitik Wilhelms III von Oranien und der Generalstaaten im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," *Westfälische Forschungen*, XIV (1961), 42-81.

131. See R. Geikie and I. Montgomery, *The Dutch Barrier* (Cambridge, 1930), *passim*; Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, has excellent maps of the Barrier at various times between pp. 294-95.

132. See Schrijver, "Barrière," pp. 77 ff.

133. Portland Papers (deposited Nottingham University Library), PWA 1011: Palmquist to Portland, Paris, December 8, 1700, reporting talks with an unnamed French minister and with Torcy. Cf. Krämer, *Archives*, III, 343 ff., Heinsius to William, January 4, 1701, and p. 515, April 26, 1701.

134. Cf. Hippeau, *Letres inédites*, p. 55, Harcourt to Janson-Forbin, February 1, 1701, for Philip V—on being asked by the Dutch envoy to guarantee the security of the garrison troops of the United Provinces—expressing his preference that all such troops should leave the Spanish Netherlands.

135. The correspondence of William and Heinsius in Krämer, *Archives*, shows this conclusively: their constant fear was that Louis, becoming aware of their own preparations for war, should take the initiative (*praeveniren*) before they were ready for hostilities.

136. For these negotiations see Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 33 ff., 66 ff., 120 ff. Cf. M. A. Thomson, "Louis XIV and William III, 1689-97," reprinted in *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 26-30.

137. But note that Leopold had been able to have a will made in Madrid in favor of the electoral prince in 1696 revoked.

138. Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 482 ff., prints the First Partition Treaty. The French gains would, it was hoped, include also some rectification of the southern frontier with Spain.

139. *Ibid.*, pp. 495 ff., for the Second Partition Treaty, and the various possibilities in respect of exchanges left open for Louis.

140. She was Maria Anna of Pfalz-Neuburg.

141. Krämer, *Archives*, III, 387, Heinsius to William, January 25, 1701.

142. See Grimblot, *Letters*, and Krämer, *Archives*, for such rewards: e.g., Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 432, William to Portland, May 2/12, 1698, for the open

mention to Tallard of Port Mahon, Ceuta, and Oran, and the wish (as yet unspoken) for Gibraltar and some places in Spanish America. In the United Provinces the hope was for an extended Barrier and the incorporation of Spanish Guelders (Upper Guelderland): see Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, pp. 312-13.

143. Quoted in André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, p. 292.

144. Leopold might have been willing to listen to French offers after the publication of Carlos' will, but his pride forbade him to make the first steps: see André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 290-97.

145. Louis visualized possible exchanges with Spain: e.g., to give Roussillon and Cerdagne (for Spain's desire to reabsorb these territories see J. Regla, *N.C.M.H.*, V, 382) as equivalents for land either in the Southern Netherlands or in Italy that could in its turn be exchanged for Lorraine. For the importance of French commercial plans in the 1700-1713 period see E. Dahlgren, *Les Relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'Océan Pacifique* (Paris, 1909), pp. 237-729; cf. *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 70-71 (1966), devoted to "Aspects de l'économie française au XVII^e siècle," pp. 100 ff. Note Louis XIV's own comment of 1709, quoted in Dahlgren, p. 561: "Le principal objet de la guerre presente est celui du commerce des Indes et des richesses qu'elle produisent."

146. The desire of England for a share in the Spanish succession goes back further than William III; in the Treaty of Dover it was arranged that if England gave military help to France to secure the Spanish succession, Louis should be bound to help Charles conquer Minorca, Ostend, and places on the American continent: see André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe*, pp. 129 ff. and M. D. Lee, "The Earl of Arlington and the Treaty of Dover," *Journal of British Studies*, I (1961), 66. Cf. G. H. Guttridge, *The Colonial Policy of William III in America and the West Indies* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 44-98, chapter entitled "The War with France in North America" with some relevant material. The present writer hopes to deal more fully with the War of the Spanish Succession at a future date.

147. Parts of Hudson Bay and Newfoundland (Terre-Neuve) that had been conquered during the War of 1689-97.

148. See Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, p. 313.

149. For Louis's relations with the papacy, see pp. 240-64.

150. Petrie, *Berwick*, p. 318.

151. *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, pp. 146-47.

152. *Recueil*, X: *Naples et Parme* (Paris, 1893), pp. 170 ff. for Albergotti's mission. To the well-known authorities on Franco-Spanish relations during the war (A. Baudrillart, De Courcy, Hippeau and De la Trémoille) might be added M. Martin, "Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and Spain 1711-1714" (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1962), who throws new light on them from documents in the Spanish archives.

153. E. Kossmann, *N.C.M.H.*, V, 291; cf., for Sweden's insensitivity in respect of European reaction to her balancing policy, Hatton, *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 93-94.

154. Many examples of this in archive material quoted above, note 47.

155. Cf. *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, pp. 131 ff., 140 ff.

156. W. Scoville, *The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), (hereafter cited as Scoville, *Huguenots*); H. Lüthy, *La Banque Protestante de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, Vol. I, (Paris, 1959.)

157. Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, p. 166: Hop, on being warned of the danger to religion unless the Dutch armed against French ambition, answered: "What religion? Tut, tut, religion."

158. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 220, 268 ff.

159. *Reuterholms Journal*, p. 317.

160. Srbik, *Wien und Versailles*, pp. 56 ff., 119 ff.; cf. Mark Thomson, "Louis XIV and William III, 1689-97," *English Historical Review*, LXXVI (1961), 38, reprinted in *William III and Louis XIV*, pp. 24-48.

161. M. Braubach, *Versailles und Wien, von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz*, (Bonn, 1952), pp. 45 ff.

162. Clark, *Trumbull, passim*, for English subjects; S. B. Baxter, *William III*, (London, 1966), pp. 200-211, for Dutch subjects.

163. See Scoville, *Huguenots*, p. 70, for the principality between 1697 and 1702 being a haven of tolerance to which many French Protestants fled.

164. Archief Heinsius, The Hague, 273, Blathwayt to Heinsius, April 28, 1693; and, 546, November 6, 1698, on William III's compassion and practical measures. Cf.—from the Nassau Domeinen Archief—N. E. Robb, *William of Orange*, II: 1674-1702, pp. 236-7, 410.

165. Scoville, *Huguenots*, pp. 5 ff.

166. Temple to Ormonde, January, 1664, quoted from a Bodleian MS by Woodbridge, *William Temple*, p. 64.

167. See Geyl, *The Netherlands, 1648-1715*, p. 100, for the inscription (often wrongly given): "After having reconciled Kings, preserved the freedom of the seas, brought about a glorious peace by force of arms, and established order in Europe, the States of the United Netherlands had this medal struck: 1668." Cf. his comment that the Dutch could hardly expect England, Spain, or France to read this "with any great pleasure".

168. P.R.O., F.O. 95, Vol. 556, D'Avaux to Louis XIV, Stockholm, February 15, 1696. For modification of the 1686 design for the bas-reliefs after Swedish protests, see the documentary evidence cited in *Les grandes heures de l'amitié franco-suédoise* (Paris, 1964, publication of Archives de France), p. 85, catalogue entries 241-42.

169. Boislisle, *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXVII, 379-80; for an English translation see *The Age of Magnificence: Memoirs of the Court of Louis XIV by the Duc de Saint-Simon*, selected by S. de Gramont, II (New York, 1964), p. 184.

170. E. Asher, *The Resistance to the Maritime Classes* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), p. 94, for the need to penetrate that "facade of centralized authoritarianism which has long concealed the true nature of the reign." Cf. the discussion on Louis and "absolutism" by E. Kossmann, "Enkele problemen van de Europese Geschiedenis na de Middeleeuwen," *Scientia*, II (1957), 71-107.

171. The aim of Louis, as expressed in *Recueil*, I: *Autriche*, p. 741, to restore the Treaties of Westphalia in all their force, was therefore achieved (Instructions of September 8, 1679.)

172. Even in the worst days of the War of the Spanish Succession, Louis refused to consider giving up Orange (incorporated into France on the death of William III). Cf. p. 22 above.

173. In 1738 Louis XV's father-in-law, Stanislas Leszczyński, was made duke of Bar and Lorraine, the duke of Lorraine accepting Tuscany in exchange. It was agreed that Bar and Lorraine, on Stanislas' death, should go to his daughter and her children, and in 1766 they were incorporated with France.

Louis XIV, Soldier-King

JOHN B. WOLF

THE king of France was a soldier, and a king of France born during the Thirty Years' War, when all the talk in the court concerned battles and heroes, would inevitably want to play out the role of soldier-king. Although the young Louis may not have learned much about the art of war during the Fronde and the Franco-Spanish war that followed, these years did reinforce his determination to achieve his military *gloire*. La Grande Mademoiselle tells us that his all-consuming interests revolved around the doings of soldiers, their equipment, their drill. Small wonder that he was a little disappointed in the profound peace that he discovered in Europe after the death of Mazarin: ". . . My age and the pleasure of being at the head of my army," he wrote, "would have made me hope for a few more affairs abroad."¹ He could send a detachment to aid the emperor against the Turks, another to support a German bishop, another to fight the North African "pirates"; but none of these expeditions could test the military ability of the king nor give him a chance to fulfil his *gloire*.²

In the letters that he sent to the men who commanded these early expeditions, one theme stands out as a dominant interest. He demanded that his soldiers maintain strict discipline both to make the units more efficient fighting organizations and to support the reputation of the French king in foreign lands. This interest in discipline continues to be a most important theme in the military correspondence of Louis XIV from these early years until his death. The actual

development of discipline in the army was left to others, but it was superintended by the king. In Louis's mind, discipline was closely related to efficient administration; perhaps this is why he was so interested in it. In his *Mémoires*, intended for the dauphin, he explained: "I maintained so exact a discipline among my troops that having sent them . . . to my allies, to Hungary, and to Holland, they never gave the least reason for complaint. . . . Thus I had care to pay them exactly . . . and in Holland I raised their ordinary pay because I knew that costs there were greater than elsewhere." This statement, of course, is optimistic about the actual behavior of the French army, but it indicates the attitude of the king.

It is not surprising to find that a man who was concerned about his soldiers and his own career should welcome the Anglo-Dutch War and the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV, as chances to fulfil his role as king. Michel Le Tellier and Turenne had created a splendid army; here was the opportunity to use it.

As a war, however, the Devolution was a disappointment. In 1667 Louis joined his armies as a "cadet of Turenne"; the next year he invaded Franche-Comté with an army commanded by Condé "under the orders of the King." These campaigns gave Louis a chance to "enjoy" some of the "hardships" of war related to rain, mud, and short supplies; but outside of the siege of Lille, where a young engineer named Vauban proved his skill, they were more of the nature of promenades than of war. Indeed, during the summer the queen and the "ladies" arrived in Flanders so that Maria Theresa's new subjects could see their "rightful ruler"; the whole affair was a delightful adventure, but hardly a school for war. Louis, however, did learn one very important thing: the progress of the invasion was tied to the movement of supplies and men over bad roads. Even a fine army is of little use unless the logistic services support its drive, and Turenne's whole campaign in 1667 was limited by the problems of logistics. Louis understood this, for he later wrote in his *Mémoires* that a commander might lose a battle as a result of chance, the cowardice of the soldiers, the failure of morale, or simply bad luck without being to blame; but if he lost because the army lacked supplies, then the commander alone was at fault. Throughout his life Louis tried to control the chance of battle by careful administration of details, by careful organization of supplies. As everyone knows,

this effectiveness in military detail was the secret of Louvois's popularity with the king.

The next war was of a different order. Even though the Dutch were not prepared to fight the army of Louis XIV, the problems involved in an expedition so far from the frontiers of the kingdom, as well as the resistance of the enemy, made the year 1672 an important experience for the young king. He learned much more about the problem of supplies: the amount of forage needed for an army of 100,000 men, the problems of munitions and bread,³ put enormous demands upon the transport services. He also learned that discipline was a problem that concerned the entire army from the lowest soldier to the marshals who commanded it. Even though Turenne's commission made him almost the constable of France, and Louis's orders made his commands supreme, three marshals refused to obey him. Louis had to send them home, for their action "would be . . . too much a limitation on the authority of the prince; he can divide his power as it pleases him, and . . . according to the needs of the state, and not according to the pretensions of his officers. . . ." ⁴ He could disgrace a marshal, but even this would not assure the soldiers' obedience to orders of a war minister.⁵ In the following years Louis was to learn that even a "table of organization" that spelled out the right to command could not erase the practices of soldiers who had long considered themselves independent agents. The presence of the king or some member of his immediate family alone could impose order on the line of command when it was challenged by "men of quality" with high social prestige, or officers whose backgrounds encouraged independent action. This is one of the reasons we so often find the royal armies commanded by a marshal "under the orders" of the king, his brother, his son, or his grandson.

Perhaps even more important, Louis learned something about the "famous soldiers" whose glamorous reputations dazzled their own times as well as ours. All the propaganda, all the *Te Deums*, all the *feux d'artifices* could not blind the king to the fact that the campaign of 1672 was a failure, a military failure that his diplomats were not able to retrieve. If the "great soldiers" who commanded his armies were not to blame, who was? They had failed to sever the jugular vein of the Dutch Republic, even though it had been completely

exposed. Nor was that all; for Louis also learned that Condé's impetuous style of command not only failed to win the war but also was responsible for unnecessary casualties. At the crossing of the Rhine, Condé and a handful of volunteers ("people of quality"!) crossed the stream without waiting for Louis to post a battery that easily would have driven off the few defenders on the other side. Condé joined the charge of the hare-brained young men who cried, "Kill! Kill!" and thus left the Dutch soldiers no alternative to defending themselves. A half-dozen "people of quality" were killed, and Condé was wounded. It was obviously a foolish action for one who was responsible for the success of the campaign. Louis complained bitterly about the incident in a letter to his wife, and ever after was suspicious of soldiers who depended upon enthusiasm for an attack.⁶

The campaign of 1673 gave Louis new insights into the art of war. This time neither Turenne nor Condé had enough troops to do much more than defend themselves while the king marched with a large force to besiege Maestricht, with Vauban really in command "under his orders." In a letter to his grandson many years later, Louis gives us insight into the relationship that developed between himself and the military engineer.⁷ Eventually, Vauban was to become a lieutenant general and even a marshal of France, the first engineer officer ever to reach such honors in any army of Europe; but in 1673 he had no such prestige. Louis sensed that this engineer knew how to take a fortification as long as his orders were not interfered with by the other officers higher in the military hierarchy who also prided themselves on their understanding of sieges. Under the king's orders Vauban could direct a siege, and no one would dare to countermand his commands; thus the king's presence was probably necessary for a successful siege. When the king could not be present, he sent his orders as precisely as possible. In 1688, when the dauphin and Marshal Duras were sent to besiege "Philisbourg," Louvois wrote to Duras: "M. de Vauban will be in Alsace the 26th or 27th of this month. His Majesty expects that you will take his advice for the opening of the trenches and the details of the attack. Since you know his experience and capacity, the intention of His Majesty is that you will see to it that he is not contradicted."⁸ Years later Louis explained that when Vauban "commanded under his orders," the engineer would explain to the king the problems involved in the

siege and then give him a list of the men and materials that would be needed for success. Louis assured his grandson that Vauban never lacked the things that he ordered. One has only to read between the lines of the king's correspondence to see that he understood that Vauban was the expert on siege operations; and it was Louis's pattern to support the "expert" with the authority of the king, no matter what might be the area of action.⁹ Maestricht was Louis's first "great siege"; the year before, his soldiers had taken fifty-odd forts, but none of them were like Maestricht. Undoubtedly, Louis was thinking of Maestricht when he wrote: "Great sieges please me more than other action. . . ." ¹⁰

But the fascination with the operation of a siege was not all that Vauban taught his king. The engineer who could conquer a place also knew how to defend the kingdom. This was important to Louis; all his life, he had a neurotic fear of invasion, of violation of his frontiers. Thus when Vauban explained to him that the treaty of 1668 left the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands a hodgepodge of fortifications, in which the French and Spanish holdings were mixed together in enclaves that made no sense and could hardly be defended, Louis understood the engineer's demand for a *pré carré*¹¹ that could be defended. Obviously, neither Turenne nor Lionne had ever understood this demand for a lineal frontier; Turenne's military strategy depended upon the movement of the army from one fortified position to another without reference to the frontier, and Lionne's diplomacy never dealt in anything but frontier provinces or towns "and their dependencies." Under Vauban's direction there emerged the conception of "lines" with fortified cities and strong points that defined the military frontier of the kingdom. The Archives of the Ministry of War have many maps showing the evolution of this concept, as well as the actual structure of the "field fortifications" that gave security to the kingdom, since a small army behind these fieldworks could hope to stand off a large invasion force. Years later, when the balance of military power had shifted against France, Louis explained to Marshal Villeroi that he could not risk a bold attack against superior forces, because "it is important to think of defending my country and conserving my army in the best ways possible. . . . *If in holding the lines one loses a great number of men, one can hope that the enemy will lose considerably more on their side and that one can defend my country foot by*

foot."¹² Vauban's skill and Louis's fears established the lines that guarded the kingdom. Hans Delbrück once remarked that the Roman legions reappeared on the soil of Europe during these years that the princes learned to create standing armies; he might well have added that with the "Roman legions" came the "Roman lines" to set many of the frontiers.

This new system of defense was adopted after 1675, when the death of Turenne and the retirement of Condé left the field free to Louis and his own creatures of his own age; it was to become one of the cornerstones in Louis's military and foreign policies for the rest of the reign. After 1675 the campaigns on the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands, the evacuation of Sicily, and the defensive position in Alsace and along the frontiers of Lorraine were all conditioned by this new conception of defense. When the war ended, the Courts of Reunion took over where the soldiers left off to secure a defensible lineal frontier. One has only to visit the Saar Basin to see why the French king tried to firm up the lines between the Rhine and Luxembourg into a stable frontier that could be properly fortified; and of course, the annexation of Strasbourg was essential to the establishment of the "line of the Rhine." As far as I know, only once did Louis question the validity of this trend of thought: in 1705, when Marlborough, after failing to puncture Villars' position in Alsace, broke through the lines in the Spanish Netherlands that the elector of Bavaria and Villeroy were supposed to defend, Louis momentarily wondered whether the French should not return to the old style of war of maneuver, with its well-fortified camps, as being more suited "to the ability and genius of the nation."¹³ However, he soon realized that the problem in Spanish Flanders arose out of the fact that the lines there, unlike those along his own frontier, were weak and ill-suited for defense.

In face of the tradition, followed by so many historians, that Condé and Turenne were responsible for the military successes of the reign, and that after their removal, only mediocre generals commanded the armies, we should note that it was not until after Turenne was killed and Condé retired that the French armies were able to win the limited victory that Louis secured in the Treaty of Nijmegen. There is a belief that the Army of Alsace was on the verge of a great victory when Turenne was killed, but the precipitous retreat following the unlucky cannon shot hardly argues that this

army was much better than its German adversary. Turenne did show an aggressive vigor in 1674, but even then he was able only to push the enemy out of Alsace; it was not a victory that could impose a peace. In the campaigns of 1676, 1677, and 1678, however, the plans were more carefully drawn: the French punctured the defenses of the Spanish Netherlands and threatened the United Provinces enough to bring the Dutch bourgeois politicians to a separate peace. This was the work of Vauban, Louvois, and the king. Louvois, as quartermaster general, organized the supplies and manpower, Vauban projected and oversaw the sieges so that victory was assured; and there is one part of the campaign that bears the clear-cut mark of Louis's personality: each spring the enemy was thrown off-guard by a deceptive maneuver in which Louis used both the false movement of troops and the balls and fetes of the court to draw attention from the real objective of the campaign.¹⁴ It is difficult not to see most of Louis's later successful conduct of war as being founded on lessons learned in these last years of the Dutch War, when neither Condé nor Turenne were at his side.

There are a number of problems connected with Louis's conduct as a soldier. The fact that he would appear at the "head of his armies" early in the spring for a grand siege or two and then, in July, leave the army under the command of his generals in a defensive stance while he enjoyed himself at court has opened him to the charge of dilettantism. It is not always possible to understand why he left the army so soon, but the correspondence of 1676 gives us a small clue. The sieges of that year had been highly successful, even though Louis did not fight a field battle even when he had an advantage that probably would have assured victory.¹⁵ William of Orange got his armies into the field somewhat later than the French, but he succeeded in establishing trenches around Maestricht; the French immediately besieged Aire as compensation for the possible loss of Maestricht, and after taking it, Louis suggested trying another siege. It was discovered that the French magazines had been emptied of powder and shot by the sieges already undertaken, and, in Louvois's opinion, it would have been dangerous to draw powder and shot from the frontier fortifications that might be an object of attack from the enemies. The correspondence is highly revealing, and may explain that the king went home each July because there

was not enough powder to undertake a project worthy of his presence. This correspondence also tells us something about Louis: he urged another attack anyway, on the ground that the "enemies" were not as strong as they claimed to be. Finally Louvois gave in, and the army besieged and took Linck.¹⁶ After the fall of Linck, Schönberg, in a series of forced marches, took the army to the hills south of Maestricht and broke William's hold on that fortification. It was a severe jolt to the coalition against France, proving that the death of Turenne had not crippled French command.

It is probably true that the supply of powder and shot often put a limitation upon the "objectives" of the campaign; and thus, once these were achieved, the king's presence was not really any longer necessary. But this does not entirely excuse Louis of the charge of having a dilettante attitude toward war. He liked to go with the army, and he put up with the discomforts like a good soldier; but he also enjoyed having the court and the ladies with him on a campaign (very often, his tent looked more like a salon than a soldier's camp). When the court returned to the palace, he wanted to go with it; and he would take his personal troops, the famous *Maison du roi*, with him. Since his presence may not have been necessary for the army to stand on the defensive, he could easily find "good reasons" for his departure. It would seem that he tired of war when it was simply an affair of maneuvers and camps. The fact that he left the army sometimes had unfortunate effects. For example, after the king left the army during the campaign (1676) mentioned above, Schönberg had considerable trouble securing obedience to his commands; some of the great noblemen regarded him as a "German upstart," whereas they were "people of quality." Had the king been willing to stay with the army, the man who "commanded under his orders" would have been obeyed—even if he was a mere engineer. It might be noted that in later years, when the dauphin or the duke of Burgundy "commanded" the king's armies, Louis often kept them with the troops until late September or even October. But these were years when there was danger of invasion, and Louis always believed that the troops had better morale when a member of the royal family was at their head.

A second charge, perhaps more serious, has been leveled against the king by Saint-Simon and others: namely, that he was afraid to fight. His personal courage has been questioned in connection with

the unfought battle of Heurtebise and again in the spring campaign of 1693; beyond this, his fear of an infantry battle has been generalized to mean that he was even afraid to allow his soldiers to fight anything but siege operations. Indeed, a recent popular biographer, W. H. Lewis, calls him a "reluctant soldier."

It is surely true that the unfought battle of Heurtebise contrasts strikingly with Philippe's battle of Cassel the next year, but if we examine the conditions that contributed to the decision to stand on the defensive, Louis does not come out too badly. He always relied upon "experts" when considering decisions; thus he called a council of war as soon as the two armies opposed each other in battle formation. Neither Louvois nor a clear majority of the high officers who gathered around him wanted to risk the death of the king in a field battle. Luxembourg and Vauban both tell us later that the battlefield is no place for a king unless he is actually in command, for the commander is always hampered by the necessity of defending the king's person. Louis reluctantly accepted this decision at the time; years later, he was angry at Louvois because of it. In 1676, however, no one could forget the cannon shot that had killed Turenne a few months before, and no one in the entourage of the king wanted a regency with Maria Theresa as regent!¹⁷

The other charge, that in 1693 Louis was afraid to fight even though he had a great superiority in Flanders, also fails to take into account a council of war held at the Abbey of Saint Denis in Flanders. Louis's letters to his brother and Marshal Catinat give us insight into that decision. He wrote to Philippe:

I must tell you of a resolution that I took yesterday . . . on [hearing] the news of the taking of Heidelberg, to send my son with a large army into Germany with that of Maréchal de Lorge to make a powerful effort to force the princes of the Empire and perhaps the Emperor himself to accommodate themselves to me. I will admit [my] hopes of doing something extraordinary in this country [Flanders] corresponding to the power that I had assembled and the preparation that I had made, and a little *amour propre*. I resisted the pressing insistence that one presented and the solid and judicious reasons. . . . I persisted in my first design as you can see by coming here [to the army in Flanders], but finally I gave in to the remonstrances that one presented to me and the movement of my own reason . . . I sacrificed the pleasure of my

own desires and individual tastes and all that would flatter me for the good of the state, being convinced that this gambit would more effectively secure peace than any other that I might undertake. . . .¹⁸

Saint-Simon simply did not know what he was talking about. If there was any real question about the king's personal courage, it should be pointed out that he often visited the trenches in siege operations. This was a dangerous thing to do, as he himself well understood; for we find him repeatedly ordering Vauban *not* to inspect trenches personally, since his life was so important to the state. Louis surely was not always wise, but he was no more a coward than other men.

The question concerning Louis's attitude toward a battle in the open field deserves greater consideration. In this era a general could lose a war in an afternoon by a careless action; one would expect a man whose whole career was marked by attempts to foresee and avoid disasters in politics or war to urge caution upon his soldiers. There can be no doubt about his anxiety over an infantry battle; his correspondence after the death of Louvois is replete with admonitions against a battle "where my cavalry cannot act," against an infantry battle that "settles nothing" with much bloodshed. But this must not be generalized to mean that he opposed any action except maneuvers and sieges. The facts of his brother's victory at Cassel could be taken as a case study of the young king. Here we see Louis strengthening the army under Philippe's command, stripping all the cavalry from frontier fortifications for a hundred miles in each direction, and, finally, giving Philippe a free hand to act as he deemed necessary. Louis's only important restriction was to be found in his dispatching Marshal Luxembourg to join Philippe so that there would be another competent commander on the field in case something should happen to Marshal Humières. In one of the last notes before the battle actually occurred, however, Louvois wrote to Humières, saying that "His Majesty wants me to tell you . . . that he does not want Monsieur to make any terrible mistake,"¹⁹ but he did not revoke his grant of freedom of action.

Louis's attitude toward his brother's victory also raises a number of questions. He replied graciously to Condé's letter of congratulations on Philippe's success, expressing his satisfaction with the victory and

his pleasure over Condé's letter.²⁰ And yet, the men who gave the "news releases" to the *Gazette*, and the anonymous author of the beautifully illustrated manuscript history of the campaign, seemed to feel that they must play down Philippe's part in the victory and play up Louis's actions and foresight in providing the troops and the supplies that made victory possible. Which is the true Louis XIV? Was he the man who answered Condé's letter, or the man whose *amour propre* is so tender that courtiers believed it necessary to credit him with successes that he did not really achieve? Some have argued that it must be the latter since Philippe was never again in position to fight another battle. It is true that Philippe's commands in the next war were confined to the Channel coast, where he "directed" the defense against the Anglo-Dutch naval forces; but this may be because Louis did not want him to wave his sword and order a charge, as he did at Cassel. It is impossible to say why Louis did not give him another field command; but it is as reasonable to assume that the king was afraid that the next time Philippe's brash enthusiasm might spell disaster as it is to assume that he was simply jealous of his brother. Louis distrusted soldiers who depended upon the enthusiasm of the moment for a Condé-like attack; he preferred soldiers who depended upon longer-range plans and preparations for their victories. Philippe's character was not one to arouse great confidence.

Although it is a question who really gave the orders during these years when Louvois was at Louis's elbow, after the war minister's death we can be relatively sure that decisions taken were really those of the king. After 1691 Louis's correspondence leaves little doubt that his attitude toward a battle was conditioned by his faith in his commander, his assessment of the enemy armies, and, finally, the state of his treasury and magazines. In 1691-94, for example, he urged Luxembourg and Catinat to fight, whereas his orders to De Lorges, whose judgment was more questionable, were much more cautious. When William threatened to attempt the recapture of Namur in 1692, Louis wrote to Luxembourg: "My intention is that you march . . . with speed and approach him . . . fight him before he can establish his trenches. I will not prescribe your route; you know better than anyone the best way to fall upon him. . . ." A few days later, the king felt a little more cautious: "I believe that

there is nothing better for you to do than to approach him as closely as possible, taking positions that will not force you to fight without advantage. . . .” Then a few days later, “. . . You should approach the enemy and try to make him attempt some gambit from which you can profit. . . .” And, not yet knowing that Luxembourg had already fought the battle of Steinkirke, Louis ordered more reinforcements for his army so that he could fight “with advantage.” Luxembourg’s account of the battle includes this statement: “I have not wished . . . to engage in an infantry battle, your majesty having told me that you did not want to fight such a combat because so often they decide nothing . . . ,” and then went on to give his version of how he actually did fight the battle. He was obviously sure that he had not exceeded instructions.²¹

The next year, after the council of war at Saint Denis in Flanders had detached part of the army of Flanders to Germany, Louis wrote to Luxembourg, who still commanded a large army: “I hasten to repeat to you that you should approach the enemies as soon as possible; I leave the timing to you, recommending only . . . precautions so that nothing disagreeable happens to my armies. . . .” Four days later: “. . . Fall on their rear guard; if you cannot find a way to do this, I will know that it is impossible.” Again: “. . . If the occasion presents itself to fight them in a position where my cavalry can act favorably, you may take it. . . .” Later: “I leave you master of whatever you choose to do. . . .” Little happened for several weeks, and Louis wrote: “If you can find an opportunity to fight the Prince of Orange, you can not do me a greater service. . . .” Five days later came the battle of Neerwinden; Louis wrote to Luxembourg: “It is a pleasure to give orders when one obeys them as you did. . . .” Luxembourg graciously replied that it was easy to obey a monarch whose orders were so clear and precise.²²

There is not space to show that Louis’s letters to Catinat in Italy were much the same as these, except for the usual assurance that Louis understood that Catinat knew the situation in Italy better than he did, “never having been there.”²³ Noailles in Spain also had freedom of action, but not many troops.

It has many times been pointed out that Luxembourg’s victories did not yield results. There are at least two reasons for this fact. The first is that the “victories” after 1692 were never quite complete;

the "Prince of Orange" could find money to rebuild his army before the French could act decisively to take advantage of their battles. A second reason may have been Luxembourg's fault. In 1693, for example, after the battle of Neerwinden, Louis ordered Vauban to join Luxembourg and besiege Charleroi. It is hard to tell from the correspondence whether caution or dislike of Vauban's interference was responsible, but Louis had great difficulty convincing the marshal that the siege should be undertaken. Luxembourg had all sorts of excuses and other suggestions. Louis urged his point: "I still think that . . . you can besiege Charleroi. . . . I have not given positive orders being content to let you know my thoughts." Then: "I am not interested in promenades to Anghem, Hermes, Hiues [for contributions and bombardments]. . . . It is only a question of Charleroi. . . ." After several weeks of pressure, Luxembourg gave in, and Louis fairly crowed: "I have always believed that you could take Charleroi and at the same time hold the forts and lines in Flanders, because of the knowledge that I have of the wretched condition of the enemy army. . . . I have always said that the rumors that they publish . . . should not prevent me from taking Charleroi, and there is no evidence that I have been wrong. . . ." ²⁴

As we shall see, when famine stalked the land, Louis was forced to become more cautious; but the bad years of 1694-97 did not take all the fight out of the aging king. When the Spanish Succession brought on a new war, Louis was still ready to try a battle if he believed that he could force his enemies "to accommodate" themselves to him or guarantee his frontiers this way. In 1701 Prince Eugene, despite expectations, led an army over the Alps. It was inferior to Catinat's forces, and at Versailles, no one could understand why Catinat did not punish "the little abbé" for his temerity. Catinat pointed out that Eugene was always entrenched, but Louis could not believe that this should prevent a successful battle. He called Villeroi to Versailles. Villeroi had shown imagination and daring as a division commander under Luxembourg, and as commander of one of the armies in Flanders after 1695. Louis sent him to Italy with the order to fight. Villeroi left Versailles filled with courage and ambition; the king's letters purr with satisfaction. But Eugene was waiting at Chiari! Villeroi's first letter telling of the battle has to be read at least twice to see what had happened, and,

indeed, only when the casualty lists arrived at Versailles, did Louis appreciate the size of the disaster. "I ordered you to seek out the enemies . . . to keep as close as possible to them, to give battle, but that order ought to have been carried out with prudence. . . ." His next instructions: "You must be cautious and not risk anything with people who know how to profit by everything and to entrench themselves before you. . . ." He could have arrived at this point of view from Catinat's dispatches earlier in the year, but Louis had never thought highly of the German troops ("caterpillars"). It took Eugene to teach him to write, "It seems to me that the enemy troops have shown much courage. . . . You must lead my troops with prudence."²⁵

The experience in Italy, however, did not dampen the king's belief in his arms. When the English and Dutch entered the war the next year, Louis sent Marshal Boufflers "under the orders of the Duke of Burgundy . . . to attack the enemies or undertake some enterprise." This probably meant a siege. Louis went on to assure Boufflers that the French army would be stronger and more experienced than the enemies. Sometime later, he added: "We must accustom the troops to having the advantage, and at the same time disconcert the enemies, causing divisions that might contribute to peace. . . ." It turned out otherwise, for the Anglo-Dutch army was stronger and its commander more predatory and resourceful than Louis had expected. By mid-October, 1702, he wrote ruefully: "It is a long time since anyone has seen conquests so rapid as those of the enemy . . . nothing seems to stop them . . . I have lost more troops than the enemies lost at the battle of Fleurus, even though that victory was complete."²⁶

Even so, the next year he sent Marshal Villars into Germany to co-operate with the elector of Bavaria, and readily agreed to the pincer plan against the Hapsburg hereditary lands. Once he understood what Villars and Max Emmanuel wanted to do, Louis ordered Vendôme to co-operate with them by sending a strong detachment over the Alps from Italy to complete the pincer. The plan not only failed but also led to a conflict between Max Emmanuel and Villars that limited the usefulness of Louis's best commander. As the argument got hotter and hotter, Louis tried to calm Villars; at one point he exclaimed to Villars: "You ought not to talk that way to a

hereditary prince." But the king's attitude can be understood best by a letter that he wrote to Vendôme when he realized that Vendôme had had no intention of obeying his orders:

One cannot be more surprised than I to see that you have taken it upon yourself to defer the execution of an order of such importance that you will have reason to regret the rest of your days that you contributed to a derangement that you cannot repair. . . . Do you think that, when I give you an order as precise as that one that you received, I have no reason stronger than yours?²⁷

The fact that the duke of Savoy turned traitor saved Vendôme from further scolding or worse, but this letter does not sound like a "reluctant soldier"!

Even the battle of Blenheim did not take all the fight out of the king. Poor Louis learned of the defeat from letters sent to members of his court by relatives who had survived the affair. As the full extent of the disaster unfolded, Louis quickly moved to return the remnants of the Franco-Bavarian forces to Alsace, and quietly expressed the hope that Marlborough would give him a chance for revenge.²⁸ But after 1704, Louis's letters bristle with caution; Marlborough and Eugene had shown him what could be done with the new armies that he and his war ministers had done so much to bring into being. The one exception to this cautious maneuvering came when Eugene invaded France to besiege Toulon. Louis brought troops from all parts of his kingdom, even from Spain, to drive out the invaders who had had the effrontery to break into his kingdom. His efforts were successful: Eugene had to withdraw.²⁹

After the battle of Oudenarde, in 1708, when Vendôme and the duke of Burgundy, each blaming the other for the disaster, found it difficult to co-operate in the effort to relieve the siege of Lille, Louis again showed characteristic vigor, but to no avail. Some of the skirmishes for the control of the supply lines would have been called a "battle" seventy years earlier, and these ventures had the full support of the king; but they could not break Eugene's hold on Lille.³⁰

In 1709 the French were faced with impossible peace demands from the enemies and almost equally impossible conditions at home, where famine marched in the land. With Max Emmanuel out of the way and Boufflers ill, Louis could appoint his best general to defend the Flanders frontier. Villars's letters to the king before the

battle of Malplaquet are among the most exciting and interesting readings that any historian is ever allowed to study. Louis had confidence in his commander, but dreaded the cold logic that said: "One must fight or make peace; there is no middle way." Louis gave his consent for a battle, and Malplaquet probably can be credited with a large part of France's successful evasion of the desperate political situation of 1709. In this battle Louis's caution paid dividends. He sent Boufflers to second Villars, with the understanding that there would be two men capable of command in case anything should happen to either of them. Boufflers skillfully disengaged the army when Villars was badly wounded, leaving the enemies to count their dead.⁸¹

Louis's reputation for caution, verging on cowardice and fear of a battle, obviously rests upon misunderstood evidence. As long as he believed that his armies could win an advantage, he was willing to try a battle to force the enemies to accommodate themselves to him. When his armies were weaker than the enemies, he ordered caution and stood on the defensive. For example, the dramatic effects of the famine of 1693 became evident early in 1694. In January there was much talk of an offensive in Italy to break the duke of Savoy; Louis had confidence in Catinat and contempt for the enemy. But by February it was all called off because there was not enough money to hire carts, to buy forage, and to supply needed war materials for a campaign. The possibility of a favorable peace in Italy resulting from a victory had to be abandoned because of the condition of the country. Luxembourg had also to stand on the defensive in Flanders for the same reason. The dauphin, who was technically in command in Flanders, wrote to his father of his hopes for some kind of a victory. Louis's reply was prompt: "I too hope that you will be able to acquire much *gloire*, but since you ought always to think of the good of the state, I do not doubt that you will conduct yourself with wisdom and prudence as you tell me that you always do."⁸² The enemies also suffered from the bad harvests, but their naval power and the "English secret weapon"⁸³ shifted the balance of military power against France after 1694, a fact that finally forced Louis to make peace under conditions quite unfavorable to his interests.

One exchange between Louis and Villeroi in 1695 dramatically indicates the change in the balance of military power. Villeroi and Boufflers were in command in Flanders after Luxembourg's death,

and Villeroi conceived a bold plan to unite the two French armies and fall upon William before the Imperials could come to his aid. Louis's reply was definite: "This plan would be to my taste and I would hope that you could defeat them, but the more I think of their strength . . . and how the Duke of Würtemberg could force the lines at Ypres, the more I am convinced that it is important to think of defending my country foot by foot." When Villeroi protested, Louis wrote: "You have my last letter on this subject . . . I pointed out my intentions . . . not believing that it is to the good of my service to change orders that I have given you. . . ." ³⁴ He maintained this attitude throughout the years following 1694 because he understood the weakness of his armies vis-à-vis the foe.

This same cautious attitude dominated Louis's thinking after Blenheim, but the problem was aggravated by the fact that he realized that the fortifications in the Spanish Netherlands were not of the same quality as those that had defended the French frontiers during the last war. The fortifications were not up to the standards set by Vauban, and the lines in the Netherlands were hastily erected and weak. Small surprise that the king became cautious when faced with the aggressive tactics of Eugene and Marlborough. These years when the balance of power tipped badly against him must be treated in that context, not as a characteristic pattern of behavior found throughout Louis's career.

As long as Louvois was alive, it is difficult to discover the process by which the military decisions were made. Louvois, Le Tellier, Vauban, Chamlay, and several others "assisted" the king in making the decisions, but Louvois's part seems very large indeed. When Louvois died in 1691, Louis's part in the process undoubtedly became more important. He called Chamlay to him on the morrow of Louvois's death and offered him the dead man's post, but Chamlay would not deprive his friend's son of his "inheritance." A compromise was worked out by which Chamlay agreed to act as Louis's military advisor while Louvois's son, Barbezieux, retained the office of secretary of state for war. But Barbezieux was only twenty-three years old and a libertine in his personal life; he and the "war office" could handle the details, but he could hardly take his dead father's place. If we are to believe Madame de Maintenon, Louis assumed most of the work himself; but in the background of the king's decisions we

find Chamlay playing a very large part while Vauban and three or four others add their bit now and then. It also seems quite clear that Louis gave much more freedom to the commanders in the field than Louvois had allowed them.

The most important decision to be made was almost as much political as military. It was the question of allotment of troops and supplies to the several theaters of the conflict. The decision seems always to have been made with an eye to forcing the enemy to accommodate himself to the French demands, and the question of political softness was as important as any. In the winter at Versailles, Louis, Chamlay, Torcy, and others would decide upon the number of troops and the amount of war materials that could be sent to each commander. Thus even though the man in the field had much freedom of action, the size of his army was definitely a factor limiting his activity.

Both before and after Louvois's death, the men in the field did have considerable leeway in the determination of their program of action. The formula that Louis used with Condé, "I have great confidence in your affection and capacity . . . ,"³⁵ was a normal and usual procedure. Louis's letters are strewn with the expressions: "Not being acquainted with the land . . . I leave in your hands . . . "; "My confidence in you is complete, and I do not decide matters at a distance. . . ." But he did expect the commander to let him know what the plans were, thereby assuring for himself a veto if necessary. One such occasion came in 1703 when Tallard, commanding the army of Alsace under the "orders of the duke of Burgundy," proposed a siege of Breisach in the spring to assure communications with Villars in Germany. Louis suggested Landau as an alternative, but finally gave consent for an attack on Breisach. Then Vauban came to Versailles, and Louis discussed the plans with him. Vauban had fortified the place and knew that it could only be taken in the fall when the Rhine was low. Louis's letter is a masterpiece. Tallard was a favorite and much honored for his work as a diplomat in London. Louis wrote to him: "You know the confidence with which I give myself to everything that you think proper to my service . . . it is still the same and nothing should better persuade you of it than the fact that I gave the duke of Burgundy freedom to besiege Breisach rather than Landau because you believed it more practicable; how-

ever, I cannot set aside the experience of a man who has served me so long and so well as Marshal Vauban. . . . " The siege was postponed and Vauban sent to Alsace to assure success in the fall.³⁶

Another phase of the decision process was the practice that developed of shifting detachments from one army to another as pressure built up at new points on the frontier. This was an integral part of the new tactics, exploiting the "lines" and fortified anchor points; it gave flexibility to defense and established the idea that the frontier of the kingdom must be defensible. However, it was not always easy for the king to persuade his generals to send a detachment from their command for the aid of a rival. If the commander were a Turenne, he might find reasons for not obeying. This was the situation in 1674 when it seemed wise to shift troops from Turenne's army to Condé's. Turenne simply failed to obey. The letters are interesting: "In apprehension that you did not receive my letter [which of course he had] . . . you have not yet sent the cavalry to Flanders. . . ." Later: "The present state of my cousin the Prince of Condé makes me desire to send at once to Flanders. . . ." A little later, after indicating Condé's need: "The light cavalry should be sent without delay."³⁷ Although a Turenne or a Vendôme might find reasons for disobedience, most of the officers in later years did not. This process of moving detachments from one command to another allowed Louis to fight a successful defensive war, even when the military balance was against him. It failed in 1704, when he shifted the whole army toward the Danube; but the failure was not the fault of the king and his advisers at Versailles, for, though they could keep a degree of military balance by these shifts, they could not control the aggressive command of a Marlborough and a Eugene.

Other decisions for action came from direct intervention of the king. After 1691 Louis's correspondence is filled with "proposals" rather than "orders" for military gambits. A close reading of these letters suggests that many times he was simply paraphrasing either *mémoires* of, or conversations with, Chamlay. However, in these letters Louis nearly always discussed several possible gambits and left the commander the right to choose. At the end of one such letter to Luxembourg, Louis added: ". . . Since I take the affairs of my army to heart, it is not surprising that I should worry about things that could happen and speak out my thoughts . . . I know that I

do not teach you anything . . . but since we have been to war together we understand each other.³⁸

On several occasions Louis sent one of Chamlay's *mémoires* to one or the other of his commanders for their reaction. Luxembourg once remarked that the proposal was a good one from "a man living at Versailles," but in "Flanders things looked differently." Both the king and Chamlay were defensive, but Luxembourg had his way. On another occasion an engineer in charge of frontier fortifications suggested a winter attack on Ostend. Louis sent the plan to Boufflers and Vauban; it, too, was finally rejected after careful consideration by the men on the scene. Only rarely did Louis take responsibility for overruling his officers' refusal to follow a suggestion from Versailles.

One problem that has become more important since the development of the concept of "war crimes" is the question of responsibility for decisions to commit acts of frightfulness or terror. The devastations in the Netherlands in 1672-73, the savage bombardments of Genoa and the "pirate" harbors, the bombardments in the Netherlands in 1684, the devastation of Rhineland Germany in 1689, the bombardments in the 1690's, all must be seen as acts of violence that, in Vauban's words, "did not add an inch of land to his majesty's kingdom." A recent biographer of Madame de Maintenon recounted these events and exclaimed: "Louis XIV . . . committed a crime, and more exactly a 'war crime' . . . seeking to achieve strategic aims by extra-military affairs. For this systematic utilization of terror . . . the sovereign was responsible. . . ." ³⁹ Any study of the archives points to Louvois and Chamlay as the men who urged these acts, but Louis cannot escape his share of the blame, for we find him agreeing at every point. Louvois always insisted that it was "his majesty's wishes" when he browbeat recalcitrant officers into acts of terror and devastation that they wished to avoid committing;⁴⁰ and the king backed Chamlay rather than De Lorges when the latter tried to escape from the commands that he, unknowingly, had asked for on Chamlay's prodding. Furthermore, the mere fact that the letters were signed by Louvois cannot conceal Louis's part in the decisions, since systematic bombardment remained a French policy after Louvois's death.⁴¹

As long as Louvois was alive, he was largely responsible for the administration of supplies and munitions. The minutes indicate that he did discuss these problems with the king, but it is almost certain

that Louis did very little about this important part of the Ministry of War. After 1691, however, when the secretary of state for war was a young man, or later, when Chamillart held the posts of both the War Ministry and the Treasury, Louis seems to have had a much larger part in the administration of the army and its supplies. Madame de Maintenon tells us that the king carried the "whole burden of government" during these years, and there is little doubt that she was partly right, for almost as soon as Barbezieux became experienced enough to be of service, he died; and Chamillart could not handle both positions. We do know that this aspect of war interested Louis very much. He was first of all an administrator and a planner, who hoped to be able to control the future by foresight and preparations. He liked the role that current American military practice assigns to the chief of staff and the German, to the quartermaster general. As long as he had money and food available, he fulfilled this role with distinction.

Louis seems sometimes to have been more flexible in this office of supply and procurement than Louvois had been. When the fusil was developed in the Turkish war during the 1680's, Louvois sternly refused to allow its use in the French army because it might not be reliable when the weather was wet. In the battle of Steinkirke, however, the superiority of the fusil's more rapid fire became painfully evident, and Luxembourg sent his son to the king to place the problem before him. Louis's reaction is characteristic of his behavior under such circumstances. He wrote to Luxembourg, "Look into it to see if you believe that it would be most useful to the good of my service to have my infantry entirely armed with fusils or to leave the situation as it is. Talk to old officers and tell me what they think best. The Comte de Luc tells me that most of the pikemen threw aside their weapons and grabbed fusils from the enemy. If you believe it would be good to arm my infantry with them, tell me and I will order that they be distributed in the quantity that you desire." This was the king's pattern: attempt to find "expert" advice and then follow its recommendations.⁴²

The most important decisions made by any chief of state are the appointments that he makes to high office. The king's choices were often limited by the venal practices that made many of his offices hereditary holdings, and yet he could force an officer to sell

his office; and in the nomination to the high rank of marshal, he enjoyed a near free hand. In his *Mémoires* Louis bragged about the wisdom with which he picked his "team" to help him run the state, and throughout his life he considered the *Bienfaits du roi* a most important part of his role as king. Those who argue that Condé and Turenne were the last great generals to command his armies insist that he failed to appoint good officers to high commands. Mediocrities and favorites, so the story goes, had the ear of the king and the command of his army. Like so many stories about this era, a little close attention to detail reveals that half-truth has been mistaken for fact.

With the first promotions to the rank of marshal after the death of Turenne, the so-called *monnaie de Turenne* gave most of the batons to creatures of the dead *maréchal*. His two nephews, De Duras and De Lorges, the brother team that commanded in Germany, were second-rate men, but they had the blood and the recommendation of Turenne in their favor. Had Louis not appointed them, the criticism would have mounted to the high heavens. Of the others, Schönberg and Rochefort were surely well above the average of the officers of their generation, and Luxembourg was probably as fine a commander as any produced by the wars—perhaps even including Eugene, Villars, and Marlborough. The others of this first promotion were not worse than the average commanders in late seventeenth-century armies; even Vivonne, who may have become marshal because of his sister, actually distinguished himself in combat.

Louis's later choices were partially conditioned by the mishap of death. There were three or four lieutenant generals that managed to get themselves killed in action who might have been great captains had they lived. In an age when a Eugene would lead a cavalry charge, lieutenant generals had a hazardous occupation. But the actual choices were not as bad as Saint-Simon and his followers would have us believe. Boufflers, Catinat, Tessé, Vendôme, Berwick, and several others were surely superior to the average of the commanders in the enemy ranks, and Villars was a general of the same mold that made Eugene and Marlborough. Men like Tallard and Marcin are pointed to as poor officers, and rightly so; but they earned the king's favor first as diplomats rather than soldiers, for after the treaty of Ryswick, Louis liked to send men with military experience as his ambassadors.

Villeroi, a childhood friend of the king, may be the best case of favoritism gone astray; and yet Villeroi was a good detachment commander under Luxembourg, and a man with aggressive ideas about war. Louis might be pardoned his indulgence if he had only realized after 1702 that Villeroi was not a strong general. It must also not be forgotten that Louis promoted Vauban to the rank of marshal even though he was only an engineer.

All this does not excuse the king for poor promotions and even less for retaining men like Villeroi and Tallard when he should have known that their judgment was bad. And yet anyone who looks carefully into the problems of choice in the latter seventeenth century must be surprised that the king's promotions turned out to be as good as they were. Vendôme was promoted because he was a Bourbon, Berwick because he was a Stuart, Noailles because of connections with both the king and Madame de Maintenon, and others because of family or court connections. In spite of these reasons, many of these people turned out to be good soldiers in the context of their times. Perhaps this is because the armies of the enemies were also commanded by men whose family connections weighed heavily in the decisions that gave them command.

How shall we sum up Louis's role as soldier-king? His career as a soldier, like his career as a politician, was marked strongly by his belief that plan, foresight, and careful administration would iron out difficulties before they arose. He and Louvois were first of all administrators and after that, soldiers; they both paid close attention to the details of supply and equipment, organization and training of troops, and administration of the army. When Louvois died, much of the responsibility fell directly on the king. Unfortunately for him, the years after 1693 produced both famine and fiscal disorder in France, and enemies in Europe whose armies grew stronger than those of the French kingdom. That he succeeded as well as he did was probably the result of Vauban's teaching about the need for a *pré carré* on the frontier. Only when the lines between the king and his enemies were regularized as they were on a dueling field, was it possible to stand off a foe whose armies were stronger than those of the king. This concept of defense and the tactics that went with the development of the "lines" might be seen as another side of Louis's desire to control the future with plans and foresight.

The charge of dilettantism at war cannot be entirely dismissed. The presence of the court and the ladies in the theater of combat hardly suggests a serious attitude toward war. But, on the other hand, if the king's presence was necessary to assure the uninterrupted execution of Vauban's orders in a siege, it was hardly dilettantism that kept the king with the army as long as an important siege was under way. The charge of cowardice seems clearly without foundation; indeed, during the Dutch War, Louis often was open to the charge of rashness in the exposure of his person.

It is also evident that Louis understood that a successful battle might force his enemies to accommodate themselves to his demands, and that he was quite willing to urge a trusted commander to undertake to fight a battle in the open field when he believed that there was a good chance for success. On the other hand, Louis was also always conscious of the balance of military power and the fact that a general could lose a war in an afternoon. When his enemies were manifestly stronger than he was, Louis always urged caution as the better part of valor. This seems only evidence of wisdom, and should not be used to mark the king as a "reluctant soldier."

Louis's military decisions were usually administrative ones. He and his creatures in the court decided where the effort could best be made and allotted troops to the several theaters of the war on the basis of that decision. Once the armies were committed, the general in the field had a large measure of autonomy unless an enemy threat to one theater or another persuaded the men at Versailles that detachments should be made to counter the threat. In that case a commander might be ordered to send a considerable part of his troops to the aid of the threatened theater. But in general, Louis would explain his "intentions" to his commander and leave it to the men in the field to decide how these intentions should be implemented. He did require that the plans must be approved. The correspondence between the king and his commanders shows that Louis influenced their decisions, but also that he largely relied upon the judgment of the men in the field. After 1691, when Louis carried much of the burden himself, we find in his letters the ideas of Vauban, Chamlay, and others whose advice he regularly sought.

His choice of commanders has long been held as evidence of his failure to rise above favoritism and family. Louis recognized his

own inability to command; he never attempted to act out the role of soldier-king as Francis I had played it. This may be caution or merely good self-analysis. His choice of men to command his armies and to advise his military policies was limited to the circles around him. That he gave confidence to men like Chamlay, Vauban, Luxembourg, Boufflers, Vendôme, Villars, and others whose careers were distinguished, may be balanced off against his confidence in Villeroy, Tallard, Marcin, and those whose careers were hardly evidence of great talent on the battlefield. A fair-minded assessment must admit that his promotions were probably no better and no worse than those of other rulers during the period. Too often, the fact that the military balance of power shifted against France is confused with the abilities of the men in command.

Louis must carry his share of the responsibility for the terroristic bombardments and devastations that now appear as "war crimes." He was not as sensitive as many of his officers, who did everything they could to avoid carrying out his orders to destroy towns, cities, and provinces. When Louvois wrote, "The King sees with pain that you have not started the bombardment of Coblenz . . . , " or, "his Majesty is angry that the demolitions ordered were not carried out . . . , " or, "the King is disposed to destroy entirely the city and citadel of Manheim . . . , " ⁴⁸ obviously he had the king's consent. There is reason to believe that Louis was as responsible for the bombardment of Genoa as he was for that of Brussels, long after Louvois's death.

When failure dogged his armies and it seemed that God had withdrawn his protection from the house of Bourbon, Louis must have believed that he had failed to fulfil his military *gloire*. His letters to his commanders and to his grandson, the king of Spain, during these years reflect his doubts and difficulties. At that stage of his career Louis might have agreed with Saint-Simon and others who made him responsible for the disasters of the reign. The historian, however, must modify the picture: Louis's career as a soldier was not a distinguished one. He was no Charles V, no Frederick II. On the other hand, he was the last French monarch to play the role of soldier, and his career, for good or for bad, had a marked effect on the conduct of war for at least a century after his death.

There is a very large literature on Louis XIV as king, as politician, as soldier, and so on. My article in the *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI, 127-44, as well as the usual bibliographical guides, points to the important secondary studies. In the present essay I have given documentation to direct quotations and manuscript materials that may not be familiar: AMG refers to the Archives of the Ministry of War; AAE to the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; AN to the National Archives; and BN to the Bibliothèque Nationale (all in Paris).

1. Charles Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860), II, 382.

2. All seventeenth-century rulers wished to fulfil their *gloire*, that is, to fill the role to which they had been called by Divine Providence.

3. He later regretted that portable bake-ovens were not available until the following year, 1673.

4. AN, MS K119A, fol. 20.

5. Although Louvois carefully explained that his orders were those of the king, there were numerous times when the marshals refused to obey, or avoided obeying, them. Marshal Bellefroid actually did exactly the opposite to Louvois's commands. The result was that Louis often had to intervene personally to secure obedience. Cf. AMG, MS A1-379, fols. 284-89, 380. Louis to Turenne, July 1, 1674.

6. P. A. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres de Louis XIV* (6 vols.; Paris, 1806), III, 197-98 (hereafter cited as *Œuvres*). It is interesting to note that Condé's characteristic pattern cost him a victory two years later when LeTellier's bribe gave him command of the army in Flanders. At Seneffe he could have had a modest victory over the rear guard of the enemy, but instead he fought on in a bloody but quite inconclusive battle that only propaganda could inflate into victory. This may have contributed to his loss of nerve the next year.

7. AMG, MS A1-1667, Louis to Duke of Burgundy, July 29, 1703. See also *Mémoires militaires*, AAE, Mém. et Doc., Fr. 279, fols. 107 ff.

8. AMG, MS A1-824, fol. 65, Louvois to Duras, c. September 19, 1688.

9. One of the best accounts of the siege of Maestricht is to be found in the *Gazette* for June-July, 1673; the author obviously had access to the papers in the Ministry of War. AMG, MSS A1-315, 335, 338.

10. Grouvelle, *Œuvres*, IV, 15.

11. When it became clear that the war, started in 1672, would not finish quickly, Louvois sent Vauban on an inspection tour of the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands. The engineer was astonished to see how carelessly the frontier had been drawn. He wrote to Louvois, ". . . Seriously, monseigneur, the king ought to think a bit about making a *pré carré* [dueling field, rectangular in shape, with marked places for each antagonist]. The confusion of fortifications, friend and foe, helter-skelter the one beside the other, does not please me. You are obliged to care for three of them instead of one: your people are tormented, your expense augmented, and your power much diminished. I would add that it is almost impossible to put them all in good repair. . . . That is why, be it by treaty or by a good war, if you believe me, Monseigneur, preach always *la cadature, non pas du cercle, mais du pré.*" Louvois replied, "Patience." Vauban to Louvois, January 19, 1673; Louvois to Vauban, January 24, 1673. AMG, MS A1-337. This is the earliest reference to the necessity for a lineal frontier I have found in the AMG. There may be others, however; these papers are very extensive.

12. AMG, MS A1-1309, fol. 81 (italics added).

13. AMG, MS A1-1829, Louis to Villeroi, July 21.

14. The most easily available secondary account of these campaigns can be found in C. Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois* (Paris, 1862-64), Vol. II. This book is

still an indispensable account. The campaigns can also be followed in the beautifully illustrated volumes presented to the king: *Campaigns de Louis XIV*, BN, MSS Fr. 8,792, 8,793, and, of course, in the documents of the AMG, MSS A1-500's and 600's.

15. See below, pp. 00-00.

16. These documents are in AMG, MSS A1-500 and 501 *passim*. See also BN, MS Fr. 7,892, fols. 16 ff.

17. Louvois's letter to his father telling about the Heurtebise episode was the basis for the article published in the *Gazette*, AMG, MS A1-499, fols. 153 ff. The episode has been described and discussed in almost every account of Louis's reign. Saint-Simon and De Lorge have obviously distorted the story to make De Lorge's reputation somewhat greater than it should be. He was Saint-Simon's father-in-law. Cf. A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930), Vol. X.

18. AMG, MS A1-1201, Louis to Monsieur, June 8, 1693. Almost the same letter went to Catinat in Italy, AMG, MS A1-1220, June 8, 1693.

19. AMG, MS A1-544, fol. 172; this volume contains the whole story of the battle.

20. Grouvelle, *Œuvres*, IV, 117.

21. These letters can be found in AMG, MS A1-1142.

22. These letters are in AMG, MSS A1-1201 and 1205.

23. For the battle of Marsailles (Marsaglia) see AMG, MS A1-1220 *passim*.

24. These letters can be found in AMG, MSS A1-1202 and 1209.

25. These letters can be found in AMG, MSS A1-1507, 1510, 1511, 1515, and 1517.

26. These letters are in AMG, MSS A1-1554, 1555, 1556, and 1557.

27. The correspondence on the pincer movement is to be found in AMG, MSS A1-1675, 1677, 1685, and 1686. The letter to Vendôme in A1-1686, fol. 26.

28. The Blenheim campaign shows Louis to be a skilful manipulator of the several armies involved in the defense of the kingdom. As soon as Marlborough's intention to attack Bavaria became clear, Louis shifted his armies eastward to match the threat. His orders to his commanders were sound from a military point of view, for if Marlborough could not take several important fortresses or destroy the Franco-Bavarian armies, he could not winter in Germany, and his dangerous trip would have been a failure. The visitor to the field of Blenheim today cannot help wondering how the Anglo-Dutch-Imperial army ever dared to attack; Louis's marshals had every reason to think that they had obeyed the orders of their king by assuming the defensive position between Blenheim and Höchstadt. AMG, MSS A1-1731, 1749, 1750.

29. AMG, MSS A1-2041, 2042, 2049.

30. AMG, MSS A1-2075, 2078.

31. AMG, MSS A1-2151, 2152 *passim*.

32. AMG, MS A1-1257, Louis to the dauphin, July 23, 1694.

33. John B. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715* (New York, 1951), pp. 188 ff. The Revolution of 1688 created a fiscal situation in England that gave great advantage to that kingdom. Debts were no longer the "king's debts," for they were created by Parliament after consultation with the ministers of the treasury. Thus when other kingdoms were bankrupt because the king had so narrow a basis for taxation, the rulers of England could continue to find the money they needed because Parliament could and did find new taxes, and therefore could create new loans based upon these taxes. This was England's most important weapon.

34. AMG, MS A1-1309, fol. 81.
35. AMG, MS A1-380, June 21, 1674.
36. AMG, MSS A1-1666, 1667 *passim*. The letter is in 1667, fol. 6.
37. AMG, MS A1-379, May 21, 1674.
38. Grouvelle, *Œuvres*, IV, 306; AMG, MS A1-1060, fol. 39.
39. Jean Cordelier, *Madame de Maintenon, une femme au grand siècle* (Paris, 1955), pp. 312-13.
40. AMG, MS A1-871, *passim*.
41. One incident connected with these bombardments deserves passing notice. Before the bombardment of Brussels in 1696, Louis proposed that both sides refrain from such attacks on "open cities" except when besieging them. This was a proposal to stop the naval bombardments of the French channel ports. It came to nothing.
42. AMG, MS A1, 1143, fol. 88; Grouvelle, *Œuvres*, IV, 396.
43. AMG, MSS A1, 824, fol. 227; 872, fol. 137; 871, fol. 45.

Law and Justice under Louis XIV

A. LLOYD MOOTE

THE title of this essay will appear paradoxical to many persons. How can one write about the law, or justice, in the case of an absolute monarch whose personal will had the force of law? Louis XIV may well have proclaimed with pride and sincerity: "The chief objective which we have set for ourselves has been to have justice reign, and to reign in our State through justice."¹ However, the overwhelming opinion of historians has been that his justice was often injustice, his law enforcement a twisting of the law, and his dispensers of justice individuals who acted above and outside the regular judiciary of the realm. At best, the reader may agree with Voltaire that Louis XIV did many good things, and that his treatment of law was preferable to that of the selfish and corrupt judges in the parlements.² More likely, one will side with the opinion of Lavissee at the end of the last century that Louis XIV fell far short of his avowed goal, often giving it the lie.³

The following re-evaluation of the traditional image of Louis XIV must contend with three centuries of historical scholarship that has until recently done little to revise the opinion that the Sun King's contemporaries held of their monarch. When Bishop Bossuet wrote that there was a distinction between absolute and arbitrary government, he undoubtedly meant to imply that the *Grand Monarque* did not always make such a fine distinction. The Huguenots certainly knew before the Edict of Nantes was formally revoked, in 1685, that their ruler could interpret that law in a way that virtually destroyed its spirit. Their position was a peculiar one, to be sure. Many a Catholic Frenchman could assume that laws were not meant to pro-

fect members of the "Reputedly Reformed Religion," who seemed more like aliens and traitors than loyal Frenchmen deserving of legal protection. Yet, the actions of Louis XIV and his administration must have seemed illegal and unjust to his Catholic subjects on the many occasions when they were punished for their activities. Political enemies of the crown, wayward sons of noblemen, and the lesser clergy could cite instances where *lettres de cachet* deprived them of their freedom with little apparent justification. Lawless petty nobles of the sword, and law-enforcing nobles of the robe could attack the *Grands Jours* for condemning the former without the procedures or institutions of the latter. The sovereign law courts of the kingdom could well be angry that their advice on law codification was at first not solicited, and then given grudgingly a cursory reception by Colbert and his uncle, Henri Pussort. Frenchmen who had forced the monarchy to abolish the intendancies during the Fronde in 1648 must have watched in anguish as those dispensers of summary justice returned to the provinces in the 1650's and 60's.

What contemporaries of all walks of life felt personally became even more indelibly marked in the minds of Frenchmen of the succeeding century. It is true that the *philosophes* in extolling the virtues of the rule of law were more interested in the "injustices" of Louis XV than in those of his illustrious great-grandfather. But it was clear that Louis XIV had established the system that made arbitrary, capricious government the apparent norm. In attacking his successor, the *philosophes* could not help but strengthen the impression that Louis XIV shared the blame and guilt. The French Revolution and the liberal-democratic-republican traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries served to further the conventional view of Louis XIV. Generation after generation grew up in an atmosphere hostile to the monarchical principle and lived under a state very different from the one that scarcely deserved that name and was intimately connected with the person and will of the ruler. With less and less understanding of the problems, practices, and nature of Louis XIV's government, each successive age had found it easier to condemn the Sun King in the realm of law and justice.⁴

This image of Louis XIV, begun by his own subjects and continued by the historians of yesteryear, is difficult to eradicate but by no means impossible to reassess. Although no comprehensive re-evaluation of

Louis XIV's law and justice has yet appeared, specialists in many historical fields are beginning the slow, sometimes laborious, but often rewarding task of rehabilitating the Sun King. Little known to many general historians and specialists outside the Age of Louis XIV, monographs and scholarly articles are beginning to give us a much fuller picture of the *Grand Monarque's* government and society. Often without realizing it themselves, economic and social historians, scholars of local and central institutions, and biographers, as well as historians of French law, have provided the ammunition for demolishing the traditional image of Louis XIV. Already, the twentieth-century mania for historical revision has led a few scholars to pour new facts into new molds, rather than continue to fit them awkwardly into the old.⁵

Perhaps the greatest impetus to a fresh analysis lies in the twentieth-century political experience. While those unfamiliar with the seventeenth century glibly confuse absolute monarchy with totalitarianism and naïvely contrast it with democracy, the specialist of the *Grand Siècle* can use the present to shed light on the past. The historian of seventeenth-century France can easily see that Louis XIV's absolute monarchy lacked the techniques and the freedom from entrenched privilege groups that make totalitarian governments such a frightening reality. He can also detect that twentieth-century democratic governments have a far greater power over individuals than absolute monarchy did, if for no other reason than the willingness of today's citizens to be taxed and to fight in the interests of the nation. Once one realizes the essential fact of the limitations rather than the absoluteness of the seventeenth-century monarchy, a reinterpretation becomes not only possible, but highly probable.

No group of scholars has done more to provide a basis for reinterpreting Louis XIV than historians of French law, institutions, and political thought. A generation ago, Georges Pagès wrote with authority that Louis XIV's most significant innovation was in employing the military and police to control his subjects.⁶ Ironically, Pagès's own student and now a leading authority on seventeenth-century France, Roland Mousnier, can present with equal persuasion a very different thesis.⁷ The same holds true for legal historians. The generation of Olivier-Martin tends to minimize the arbitrary and brutal elements in the Sun King's government and to stress the justice of that monarch. Such a view would have been inconceivable to legal

historians who wrote at the turn of the last century. Glasson, for example, condemned the Code Noir for its severity, whereas Esmein was convinced of the harshness of the Criminal Code. Both were equally convinced that there was virtually nothing to check the excessive power wielded by Louis XIV, and made pointed reference to the king's control over the law courts and his arbitrary attitude toward private property rights. As late as a quarter of a century ago, Declareuil and Chénon were writing in the same tradition, although absence of specific accusations and emotionally charged words suggests that they were not so certain of the arbitrariness of Louis XIV.⁸

Living under the shadow of powerful twentieth-century governments, current legal and institutional historians have been struck by studies of absolutist political thought, which contrast so-called absolute monarchy with arbitrary or despotic monarchy. Such studies stress the early modern belief that the monarchy of the *ancien régime* was limited in theory by divine, natural, customary, and fundamental law. By definition, the absolute monarch is upholder rather than perverter or destroyer of law and justice. Since legal historians tend to see the *ancien régime* (at times this includes the period from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century) as a unit, Louis XIV fits neatly into place as merely the most important example of absolute, but not arbitrary, government. It is but a step for legal and institutional historians to assert that Louis XIV believed in the theory of absolutism and consciously acted within the framework of its limitations.

Such a view has to come to grips with the fact that Louis XIV did on occasion defy fundamental law (in legitimating his bastard children and alienating royal domains), and frequently used *lettres de cachet* and other devices to punish subjects without recourse to regular judicial channels. One is not convinced by the way in which legal and institutional historians deal with such stubborn facts. They contend that the use of *lettres de cachet*, extraordinary commissions, and royal councils to judge "arbitrarily" was nothing more than a resumption of the crown's judicial authority, which was usually "delegated" to the law courts. This is to argue that the king was just in being unjust. It is also suggested that the demands of war frequently lead today's democracies to suspend legal protection of individual rights; thus Louis XIV was no different from his more modern counterparts. Such an argument is beside the point. It remains

true that the Sun King repeatedly suspended liberties. One of the most persuasive arguments of students of political theory is that seventeenth-century Frenchmen continuously urged the king to rule personally. By becoming his own first minister, Louis XIV was therefore acting in a popular and constitutional manner. In reply, it should be obvious that this "constitutional" monarch still overrode existing legal and judicial limitations.⁹

The only argument of legal and institutional historians that is convincing involves the medieval principle of equity. This concept held that the king was bound to override the letter of the law if this would enforce its spirit. Even so, it remains to be seen that such was the result of Louis XIV's equity. One can summarize this and the foregoing contentions of the legal and institutional historians in the following manner. Louis XIV was in the tradition of medieval kingship, which held the king's most important function to be the dispensing of his personal justice. This is to say that Louis XIV was the medieval king par excellence, realizing the goal of his predecessors to a fuller degree than they found possible. One could just as easily say that Louis XIV used the rights of a feudal medieval king, but in so doing tended to destroy medieval kingship. In reality, medieval means "led to a modern end."¹⁰

Although the deceptive and erroneous reasoning and conclusions of legal and institutional historians must be laid bare, modern scholarship is deeply indebted to them for forcing a rethinking of the "justice" of Louis XIV. To test fully their interpretation of the Sun King, we must go beyond the level of theory and constitutionality and examine carefully the practices of the *Grand Monarque's* government. We must ask ourselves when and how Louis XIV overrode law and the regular judicial channels, to what extent and why he refrained from so doing, and what other forces were at work in the area of law and justice during his personal reign.

Some scholars make a test case of Louis XIV's attitude toward the fundamental laws of the realm. They point all too easily to the fact that Louis was actually bound by the fundamental law that forbade female inheritance to the French throne (the so-called Salic law). Actually, the Salic law was one restriction that scarcely limited the activities of a reigning monarch even if he respected it. On fundamental laws Louis's contemporaries were so vague and contradictory

on what was fundamental law and what was not that it is futile to discuss whether the *Grand Monarque* respected them.¹¹

It is more fruitful to examine Louis XIV's relationship to existing, written laws. Such an investigation must begin with the regular judiciary of his reign, especially the sovereign law courts, or parlements. So much has been made of Louis XIV's humiliation of the Parlement of Paris in his famous "bed of justice" of 1655 and his limitation of the courts' traditional practice of judicial review in the succeeding decade that we forget their remaining power. Even the best of historians uncover facts that show the tenacity of the judges, only to submerge them in the old thesis of Louis's control over the judiciary. This is equally true of Mousnier's monumental work on venality of offices under Henri IV and Louis XIII, and Franklin Ford's fine study of the robe and sword nobilities after 1715. Both authors see the upward social thrust of the high robe officials into the old nobility during the course of the seventeenth century. Both also stress the entrenchment of the high robe in their offices under Louis XIV. But both authorities insist that Louis XIV controlled the judiciary!¹²

Now, it is highly unlikely that the judiciary became a collective Rip Van Winkle for the sixty-three years following their defeat at the end of the Fronde. Although the courts were frustrated in their most obvious means of action—remonstrating, modifying, and tabling legislation—they had ample reason, opportunity, and power to continue independent and anti-absolutist activities in less spectacular but equally effective ways. This holds true especially in the field of private law (a field that is, incidentally, difficult to separate from that of public law). Venard's little study of the land hunger of the bourgeoisie south of Paris during the seventeenth century is a case in point. Among these bourgeois landowners were judges who were in close touch with the affairs of their rural communities and deftly used litigations to strengthen their rural position. Frequently, they loaned money to peasants, and then were awarded peasant lands when the peasantry became bankrupt during the economically difficult years of Louis XIV's wars.¹³ There are other indications that the judiciary along with civic governments and wealthy rural landowners frustrated Louis XIV's efforts to restrict wholesale grain trade in the interests of rural and urban lower-class elements.¹⁴

If robe officials used their influence to better themselves economically, the judges also played an enormous part in molding and changing social attitudes and relationships. Whereas the church's lax regulation of relations within the family unit tended to loosen family bonds and the monarchy half-heartedly interfered to strengthen the family, the judiciary staunchly upheld the authority of husband and father. Property interests of wives and freedom of children to marry were equally circumscribed by the frightened judiciary, which determined to make the law a conservative force in society.¹⁵ The parlements were not so interested in unifying the kingdom, as their successful obstruction of Louis XIV's codification of legal procedure testifies. On the other hand, First President Lamoignon's famous *arrêts* of 1702 and the jurist Domat's theoretical treatise of 1694 stand out as individual efforts to unite the state legally. Clearly, the judiciary of Louis XIV was a powerful force for making the private law in its own image, in a variety of ways.¹⁶

Nor did the courts completely abdicate their traditional role in public law. For two decades after the Fronde, the parlements and other sovereign tribunals of France plagued Mazarin, Colbert, and Louis XIV with obstructionism, especially in the matter of judicial review of financial legislation. The monarchy's bold proclamation in 1652 that the Parlement of Paris had no business interfering with state affairs was no different from that of Richelieu and Louis XIII in 1641, and it equally ignored the nature of seventeenth-century government. Justice still of necessity involved administrative and police functions, and the line between public and private affairs was difficult to determine. Until the government of the *ancien régime* became radically transformed, the judiciary would continue to play a role in public law and state affairs.¹⁷ As the personal reign of Louis XIV continued, the role of the robe became more modest, to be sure. But beneath the relatively calm surface the judiciary was as active as ever, changing its direction and preparing for the chance to reassert itself. Eugene Asher's suggestive monograph on provincial resistance to Colbert's naval recruitment reforms has uncovered much of this change. He argues with great effectiveness that the welter of judicial and other local authorities simply changed tactics under Colbert. By retreating from veto by the parlements and the provincial estates' recalcitrance to the more subtle delaying tactics of the courts

and last-ditch stands in lesser corporate bodies, the maritime provinces emasculated much of Colbert's program. Although one can find examples of the same tactics in the first half of the seventeenth century, it may be that they increased after 1661 as more direct opposition declined.¹⁸ Paul Bamford's study of French forest legislation leaves one with the impression there was not even a tempering or shifting of opposition in the case of the Forest Code of 1669.¹⁹

Two fresh studies on Louis XIV's intendants show how dangerous it is to generalize about the judiciary's activities in public law. Livet's exhaustive work on the intendancy of Alsace indicates that in that newly acquired province the judiciary was highly independent of the crown. The retention of Germanic law and the strengthening of the judges by the late introduction of venality, in 1698, probably placed the tribunals of Alsace in a more independent position than anywhere else in France.²⁰ In contrast is Fréville's thesis on Brittany. He believes that the local judges were docile even before the introduction of the intendancy to that province in 1689, due to royal repression of the parlement after the abortive stamp tax revolt of 1675. Fréville's thesis will convince many, but it must be balanced with Asher's treatment and Fréville's own emphasis on the fierce provincial pride and independent spirit of the Bretons.²¹

The role of the judiciary in public law under Louis XIV will be much better understood when historians begin to unravel the threads of class relationships during the late seventeenth century. Ford's thesis that the robe fused with the nobility of the sword and assumed leadership of the nobles' political opposition to the monarchy after 1715 should be expanded and amplified in two important respects.²² First, it should be noted that the shift in noble leadership meant that the robe's type of opposition, non-violent and "legal," replaced the open and crude military obstructionism so typical of the old nobility. Second, the robe was already asserting its leadership under Louis XIV. Unfortunately, there is no study of the personnel of the courts under Louis XIV to compare with the work of Bluche on the Parlement of Paris after 1715. One of his most interesting points is that the provincial parliamentarians became bolder politically than their Paris colleagues because their wealth was securely invested in land, whereas the judges of Paris relied heavily on the municipal *rentes* or bonds, which could be jeopardized by the monarchy. Whether

his thesis applies to Louis XIV's France is not known, but it strengthens the impression of the robe becoming increasingly involved in protecting the noble landowners' interests.²³

What is least clear about the social position of the robe under Louis XIV is its relationship to the classes beneath it, in town and countryside. One would expect that the upward social thrust of the judges would turn them increasingly against lower-class elements, but this is not necessarily true. The Marxist historian Porchnev contends that in the early seventeenth century there was a front of nobles, officials, and bourgeoisie against peasants and urban proletariat.²⁴ Mousnier is equally convinced that the seventeenth-century patron-client relationship continually threatened the monarchy with a coalition of all classes against the crown.²⁵ Their positions are diametrically opposed, and yet we must know class connections if we are to understand the abortive uprisings that frequently upset the law and order of Louis XIV's reign. Mousnier has convincingly demonstrated that Porchnev's thesis is shallow and simplistic, but he has not advanced sufficient evidence in support of his own position. An interesting study of specific revolts in the early decades of Louis's personal reign is the article by Leon Bernard on uprisings in the 1660's and 70's.²⁶ He supports Porchnev, and his most interesting observation is that Colbert deliberately and falsely accused the judiciary of fomenting "popular" uprisings so that he could blunt their remaining power. Bernard's picture of Colbert's "paranoiac distrust" of the parlements is somewhat overdrawn, and his inference that nobles and judges were opportunistic on the few occasions when they may have inclined toward lower-class uprisings is questionable. Colbert had experienced parliamentary ambivalence toward peasant and urban lower-class mob scenes during the Fronde.²⁷ Undoubtedly, Bernard is right that Colbert associated the parlements with rebellion more than the facts justified. Yet the judges were so clever in disguising their attitudes and actions that one cannot dismiss the possibility that they still permitted and encouraged popular insurrection as late as the 1670's. Despite the increasing polarization of French society under Louis XIV, that society was sufficiently fluid that it is difficult to tell when a class was "opportunistic" and when it was showing its supposed true class position. It should also be remembered that a tax revolt by peasants would mean potentially higher

dues to robe landowners, whereas an anti-landlord uprising would be a more frightening reality to judges. It would thus be in the true interests of judges to encourage secretly the one and firmly repress the other.

The activities of the crown in the realm of law and justice are easier to determine, and this becomes increasingly so with each year. The old picture of a Louis XIV determined to impose his will on the Parlement of Paris after the Fronde and of a Colbert implacably opposed to the parlementarians' independence has undergone considerable alteration. Historians remain convinced that Louis XIV's monarchy increasingly interfered with the judiciary, but they are quick to point out that within this framework several tendencies were developing. Above all, Louis XIV was more interested in ensuring general obedience and implementation of existing laws by the regular judges than in supplanting the latter. He went so far as to overrule Colbert and bring officials of the parlement into the discussion surrounding reform of civil and criminal procedure.²⁸ The famous *lit de justice* incident of 1655, although prior to the personal reign of Louis XIV, shows even more clearly the attitude of the Sun King and his government toward the regular judiciary. The apocryphal story of Louis XIV striding into the Parlement of Paris in riding costume to halt debate after the *lit* and declaring, "I am the State," is little more than a caricature of the actual sequence of events, and requires serious editing. What happened was that the king invoked his personal will on the specific issue but refrained from equating himself with the state. Moreover, his visit was followed by an attempt by the then first minister, Cardinal Mazarin, to flatter the judges into temporary submission. Mazarin went so far as to tell the judges "that [the king] did not claim to forbid them to assemble to make remonstrances," but merely wished a delay of several months to save face for royal authority. The other ministers saw that this would only encourage parliamentary boldness, and persuaded Mazarin to take a stronger stand. Through conferences the first minister then let it be known that the Parlement *must not* debate the issue for some time, and in the succeeding weeks the judges gradually accepted total defeat on the matter.²⁹

As for Colbert, he soon wavered in his initial determination to sweep aside abuses in appointments and procedures within the halls

of justice. He also genuinely sought to restrict the intendants to the time-honored function of supervising rather than replacing the judiciary.³⁰ It should be added that the crown became so accustomed to the judges' privilege of bequeathing their offices that Louis XIV no longer demanded the customary fee of the *droit annuel* or *Paulette* at the end of his reign.³¹

Our understanding of the actual activities of the intendants has also increased. Fréville and Livet describe these watchdogs of the state not as "thirty tyrants" but as persons highly sensitive to local privileges, traditions, and interests. Fréville goes so far as to see in Brittany a new, modern approach to local government toward the end of the reign. He quotes a letter from the intendant, Villemilan, to the controller-general in 1706. The intendant declared that he must proceed in that sensitive province with perfect legality, and asked for a conciliar decree to spell out his powers. For Fréville this is proof that Louis XIV's government was now acting not so much by pure "authority" as by "perfectly legal and prudent" measures. Probably, Fréville presses his thesis too far. The same intendant was known for his precipitous action and neglect of the legal niceties. One wonders also whether the supposedly modern approach was just a passing phase, until the monarchy had sufficiently assimilated the province that it could return to the "outmoded" way of authority.³²

In areas where the crown did compete with or bypass the regular judiciary, its achievements were far less striking than those of the regular judges, and often simply followed the desires of society and the lead of the judicial branch of government. This was certainly true of the use of *lettres de cachet* to enforce the authority of the heads of important families over wayward sons, daughters, and wives.³³ Law and custom were also effective brakes on the crown's desire to change the tax structure. Like his predecessors, the Sun King often had to rely on halting tax innovations through a broader interpretation of royal domanial rights. Nor was he always completely successful in such modest undertakings. Legal historians used to label as tyrannical Louis XIV's transformation of noble alodial lands into royal dependencies, subject to medieval dues.³⁴ They now admit that the struggle was a long and bitter one, and that the king contented himself with confirming the old noble rights in return for a fine. Just how difficult it was for the late seventeenth-century French monarchy to convince

the subject that taxation was a regular and legitimate element of the state has been shown by Meuvret's many studies.³⁵

Historians continue to give new descriptive titles to the work of Louis XIV. One of the most ingenious is that of the late James E. King, who saw the spirit of science and rationalism—in a word, the Cartesian influence—as the major motivating force. In political language this amounted to the introduction of a regime of “order” in place of one following the “maxims of confusion.” In terms of legal reform it meant the “extra-legal, coldly rationalistic,” and efficient approach of Colbert and Pussort prevailing over the traditional, lenient approach of Lamoignon and the judiciary.³⁶ As adapted by Asher, King's thesis has become a weapon to praise Colbert for seeking to impose a little order and reason on the parochial, selfish, and “feudal” interest groups in the provinces.³⁷ Both King and Asher can be criticized for making the work of Colbert and the monarchy more rigid and inflexible than it actually was. It is also highly questionable that Louis XIV's government was significantly influenced by contemporary science. Strong governments in all ages have sought to simplify, unify, and streamline the mechanics and work of the state.³⁸ Frederick L. Nussbaum was able to avoid some of the pitfalls of this interpretation by using the phrase “absolutism as façade” to describe the scientific spirit of the French government between 1661 and 1685.³⁹

A more convincing recent treatment of Louis XIV's government attaches the label “humanitarian” to its actions. Giraud sees this trend toward the end of the reign and in the work of Jérôme de Pontchartrain. He gives several examples of that minister's handling of naval and colonial affairs, particularly his relaxation of laws over slaves and mutineers.⁴⁰ His view is supported by the current generation of legal historians who are beginning to feel that the so called Code Noir dealt humanely with colonial slaves.⁴¹ Saint-Germain's remarkable study of La Reynie provides even better proof of humanitarianism. He depicts that first lieutenant of police in Paris as a man interested in tempering punishment of vagabonds, fallen women, and other unfortunates with mercy and rehabilitation. Of course, La Reynie was realistic enough to realize that exemplary punishment of a few archcriminals was more effective than attempting the still impossible task of bringing everyone to justice.⁴²

The most difficult individual to fit into the pattern of humanitarianism is Louis XIV himself. Saint-Germain is quite sure that Colbert was implacable in his insistence that laws be applied strictly and severely. The Sun King, on the other hand, emerges from his study as a highly complex man, reviewing all death sentences, periodically freeing long-term prisoners, and yet brutally insisting on wholesale rather than exemplary punishment when Protestantism, pornography, or anti-royalist pamphleteering was in question.⁴³ Other scholars are inclined to stress Louis XIV's devotion to hearing his subjects' complaints against injustice and his tendency to favor the underdog against the more powerful members of society in personal litigations.⁴⁴ In the case of debtors the crown also sought to ease legal restrictions and give them some chance to recover economically; however, notable exceptions were written into the codifications of the *Grand Monarque's* reign.⁴⁵ One need scarcely repeat that we now know the infamous *lettres de cachet* were most often used to bring wavering members of families back to an upright life. But it will surprise many to learn that Louis XIV carefully supervised gambling laws and practices in order to save the nobility from ruin and shame.⁴⁶

If Louis XIV still appears to be the subverter of laws and the practitioner of arbitrary justice, it is clear that the tone of his justice was more exalted than previous generations admitted and his interference with the normal course of justice less severe. Some of his humanitarianism was obviously a continuation of the medieval tradition whereby the king was meant to be the just and paternal protector of his subjects. Much of it simply conformed to, and buttressed the inclination of, his society. Perhaps in part it anticipated the emerging attitudes and ideas of the *philosophes*. There are still many secrets to be yielded about the Sun King's reign. The parlements, the social and economic conditions, and the application and interpretation of private and public law need exhaustive studies in depth. The many ministers of the late years of the reign still await their biographers. The intendants have so far escaped any broad work of synthesis.⁴⁷ When all this is accomplished, we may well be able to say that we know the France of Louis XIV better than the *Grand Monarque* himself did.

1. Quoted by E. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VII, Part 1 (Paris, 1905), p. 289.
2. There is a very thorough study of Voltaire that shows his attitude toward Louis XIV, his justice, and his parlements: Peter Gay, *Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist* (Princeton, N. J., 1959). The interested reader can also peruse Voltaire's histories of the age of Louis XIV and the Parlement of Paris.
3. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, Vol. VII, pt. 1, pp. 289-319.
4. There is no adequate historiographical study of Louis XIV. W. F. Church (ed.), *The Greatness of Louis XIV: Myth or Reality?* (Boston, 1959), provides useful excerpts from a variety of contemporaries and historians of Louis XIV on a tangential subject. His introduction follows the traditional picture.
5. J. B. Wolf, "The Reign of Louis XIV: A Selected Bibliography of Writings Since the War of 1914-1918," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI (1964), 127-44, is the best bibliographical aid to recent studies on all aspects of the reign. The entire issue of *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), is devoted to law in seventeenth-century France, and provides excellent bibliographies on private law (pp. 81-82) and public law (pp. 83-104). On the negative side, an idea of the hesitation on the part of many historians to re-evaluate the subject of this essay can be gained by glancing at E. Préclin and V.-L. Tapié, *Le XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1949), and P. Sagnac and A. de Saint-Léger, *Louis XIV (1661-1715)* (Paris, 1949).
6. G. Pagès, *La Monarchie d'ancien régime (de Henri IV à Louis XIV)* (Paris, 1928), pp. 178-79.
7. See especially R. Mousnier, *Les XVI^e et XVII^e siècles* (Paris, 1954).
8. F. Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français des origines à la Révolution* (Paris, 1948), pp. 344, 354-55, 518-22; E. Glasson, *Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France*, VIII (Paris, 1903), 177-78, 186, 189, 195, 206-7; A. Esmein, *Cours élémentaire d'histoire du droit français* (Paris, 1895), pp. 386, 787; J. Declareuil, *Histoire générale du droit français des origines à 1789* (Paris, 1925), p. 442; E. Chénon, *Histoire générale du droit français public et privé des origines à 1815*, II (2 vols.; Paris, 1929), 385.
9. For the above two paragraphs see especially Mousnier, *Les XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*; "Comment les Français du XVII^e siècle voyaient la constitution," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 25-26 (1955), pp. 9-36; F. Hartung and R. Mousnier, "Quelques problèmes concernant la monarchie absolue," *X Congresso Internazionale di scienze storiche: Relazioni* (Florence, 1956), IV, 3-55; J. Ellul, *Histoire des institutions*, II (Paris, 1956), 416-27; and Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français*. There is a judicious analysis and summary in F. Dumont, "Royauté française et monarchie absolue au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 3-29.
10. This is, indeed, recognized by Mousnier's concluding remarks in *Les XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*, p. 236, where he calls Louis XVI's power "revolutionary" and "autocratic." However, the conclusion comes as a surprise, and does not offset the previous rationalizations of the Sun King's actions. Ellul, *Histoire des institutions*, II, 422, makes the curious passing comment that Frenchmen had the impression that they were free until around 1690. The passage fits awkwardly into what precedes and follows it.
11. There is an old study by A. Lemaire, *Les Lois fondamentales de la monarchie française d'après les théoriciens de l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1907) that sheds some light on the subject.
12. R. Mousnier, *La Vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Rouen, 1945), particularly the conclusion; F. Ford, *Robe and Sword. The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), especially pp. 11, 82, 110-14.

13. M. Venard, *Bourgeois et paysans au XVII^e siècle. Recherches sur le rôle des bourgeois parisiens dans la vie agricole au Sud de Paris au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1957).

14. J. Saint-Germain, *La Reynie et la police au grand siècle* (Paris, 1962), pp. 256-75.

15. P. J. Timbal, "L'Esprit du droit privé au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 30-39, summarizes recent research.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32; Ellul, *Histoire des institutions*, II, 427-28.

17. A. L. Moote, "The French Crown versus Its Judicial and Financial Officials, 1615-83," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIV (1962), 146-60.

18. E. A. Asher, *The Resistance to the Maritime Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 54, 63, and *passim*.

19. P. W. Bamford, "French Forest Legislation and Administration, 1660-1789," *Agricultural History*, XXIX (1955).

20. G. Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1648-1715* (Paris, 1956), pp. 903, 912, and *passim*. F. Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition (1648-1789)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), is a delightful study underlining the same thesis.

21. H. Fréville, *L'Intendance de Bretagne (1689-1790)* (3 vols.; Rennes, 1953), especially Vol. I and Vol. III, pp. 329-31.

22. See above, n. 12.

23. F. Bluche, *Les Magistrats du Parlement de Paris au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1960). Jean Egret's review, *Revue historique*, CCXXVIII (1962), 484-86, insists that the eighteenth-century nobles of the sword still refused to accept the robe as equals. However, this does not refute the point that the robe led the entire nobility on political issues.

24. B. Porchnev, *Les Soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648* (Paris, 1963).

25. R. Mousnier, "Recherches sur les soulèvements populaires en France avant la Fronde," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, V (1958), 81-113.

26. L. Bernard, "French Society and Popular Uprisings under Louis XIV," *French Historical Studies*, III (1964), 454-74.

27. A. L. Moote, "The Parliamentary Fronde and Seventeenth Century Robe Solidarity," *French Historical Studies*, II (1962), 330-55.

28. This has long been known, but it is now being underlined, rather than submerged, in the old thesis. Cf. Timbal, "L'Esprit du droit privé," pp. 22; and Esmein, *Cours élémentaire d'histoire du droit français*, p. 786; and Glasson, *Histoire du droit*, VIII, 187, 189.

29. There is an excellent contemporary and eyewitness account, ignored by virtually every historian, in the Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Fr. 10,276 (the unpublished part of Jean Vallier's *Journal*), pp. 311 ff.

30. See especially Pagès, *La Monarchie d'ancien régime*; and Moote, "The French Crown."

31. Ford, *Robe and Sword*, p. 112.

32. See Fréville, *L'Intendance de Bretagne*, I, 124-25, 128.

33. Timbal, "L'Esprit du droit privé," pp. 38-39.

34. Cf. Esmein, *Cours élémentaire d'histoire du droit français*, p. 386.

35. Timbal, "L'Esprit du droit privé," p. 33; R. Mousnier, "L'Evolution des institutions monarchiques en France et ses relations avec l'état social," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 67-68; Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français*, p. 643; J. Meuvret, "Comment les Français du XVII^e siècle voyaient l'impôt," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 25-26 (1955), pp. 59-82.

36. J. E. King, *Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis XIV, 1661-1685* (Baltimore, 1949), especially pp. 28, 264-74.

37. See above, n. 18.

38. P. W. Bamford's review of Asher, *Resistance to the Maritime Classes*, in *American Historical Review*, LXVI (1961), 1104-5, justly criticizes his use of terms such as "Cartesian," "rational," and "feudal." The study remains very useful, as already discussed in this essay.

39. F. L. Nussbaum, *The Triumph of Science and Reason, 1660-1685* (New York, 1953), pp. 71-91, and particularly pp. 84-85, 90-91.

40. M. Giraud, "Tendances humanitaires à la fin du règne de Louis XIV," *Revue historique*, CCIX (1953), 217-37.

41. Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français*, pp. 354-55. Contrast Glasson, *Histoire du droit et des institutions français*, VIII, 195, 206, who criticized the severity of the Code and claimed that there was no humanitarian spirit under Louis XIV with the exception of a few judges!

42. Saint-Germain, *La Reynie et la police*, pp. 91-125, 186, and *passim*.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 94, 115, 125, 186, 189, 204-6, 235-36, 308-17.

44. Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français*, pp. 519-20. He suggests that officials gradually tended to keep subjects' complaints from the king, but feels that this was truer of the reign of Louis XV than of Louis XIV.

45. Venard, *Bourgeois et paysans au XVII^e siècle*, pp. 90-91.

46. Saint-Germain, *La Reynie et la police*, pp. 131-36.

47. The lack of basic guides to the institutions of Louis XIV and of the seventeenth century in general is shocking. There is nothing to compare to R. Doucet, *Les Institutions de la France au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1948); G. Zeller, *Les Institutions de la France au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1948); and J. L. Godechot, *Les Institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris, 1951). Of the two basic dictionaries of the *ancien régime's* institutions, Chéruel's is outdated and Marion's is untrustworthy for the seventeenth century.

Louis XIV and the Church

H. G. JUDGE

VERSAILLES was in some sense the church of Louis XIV, and the king was himself a religion:

This nation has its God and its king: the high and mighty among them go at a fixed time every day to a temple they call a church; at the upper end of that temple stands an altar consecrated to their God, where a certain priest celebrates some mysteries, called by them holy, sacred and formidable. The high and mighty men stand in a large circle at the foot of the altar, with their back to the priest and the holy mysteries, and their faces towards their king, who is seen kneeling in a raised and open pew, and towards whom all minds and all hearts seem directed. However, a certain kind of subordination is to be observed whilst this is going on; for these people seem to adore their prince, and their prince appears to worship God.¹

Versailles was the epitome of the system of Louis XIV: at once a center of power and efficient administration and a shrine to magnify and institutionalize the cult of the God-King. The ordered routine of its life was liturgical in character and every detail of architecture and decoration designed to express the honors due to the Apollo about whom moved the cultural, social, and political universe. Louis was developing on an impressive scale the principles that had informed his education:

Que cette idée te gouverne, tandis que tu gouvernes les autres: c'est ainsi qu'agirait Dieu. Que cette pensée te réveille le matin: aujourd'hui, j'ai à jouer le rôle de Dieu. Que cet examen termine ta journée: aujourd'hui ai-je été Dieu, ai-je été homme? ²

It was not only syntactical confusion in an ancient tongue that caused the citizens of Arles to smudge the distinction between God Almighty and Louis XIV in the inscription on an obelisk they erected:

What was formerly Consecrated to the SUN,
 The GOD of the Gentiles,
 Is Now with much more reason
 To LOUIS THE GREAT,
 Who by the Splendour and Sublimity of his Fortune,
 The Light and Penetration of his Genius,
 His Strength and Rapidity,
 His Liberality and Greatness of Soul,
 Is the true Sun of France
 Not Insufficient for many,
 Who neither errs nor ceases,
 Like him who is always in repose,
 And for his health and safety,
 On which the Publick Good depends,
 This Obelisque is Dedicated, Vowed and Consecrated
 To God Almighty,
 By the Senate and People of Arles.³

A king dedicated to the principles of uniformity, system, and order would not—least of all in the seventeenth century, when religious unity was widely believed to be the guarantee of political unity—tolerate religious dissent in any form. However inadequate was Louis's own understanding of the issues under debate, the influence of his mother and his own inflexible temperament marked him as a relentless champion of orthodoxy.⁴ In the religious and political universe that Louis created in his imagination, the Huguenots were therefore an anomaly. Although for most Catholics the settlement of 1598—by which Louis's grandfather, Henri IV, had guaranteed to the Huguenots their liberties—was temporary and provisional, the size of the Huguenot problem discouraged wise governments from attempting too abrupt and comprehensive a return to normality. By the time the Huguenots finally lost their legal status, there were from one and one-half to two million of them, and they had for many years penetrated all ranks of society.⁵ They were not in 1661 a small and depressed minority but a substantial and successful group

that included the general Turenne. Mazarin, whose theological conscience was not noticeably tender, preferred therefore to leave them undisturbed and approved their loyalty to the royal cause during the civil wars.

Louis at first protested his own disapproval of any abrupt or violent measures to reintegrate the Protestants in the ordered society over which he presided. "It seemed to me . . . that those who wished to apply extreme and violent measures misunderstood the nature of this evil, which was produced in part by hot tempers that should be allowed gently to subside without being inflamed anew by forceful contradiction—especially as the corruption is not limited to a certain known number but is dispersed throughout all parts of the State."⁸ The corruption that Louis detected was even less tolerable to the clergy, who expressed their demands for dramatic action through their general assemblies and through that pressure group of the devout, the *Compagnie du St. Sacrement*.⁷

Louis understood quite clearly what needed to be done. The best means of eliminating this foreign body was "to order the observation of what they had obtained in the previous reigns, but to accord them nothing else whatever and to restrict the execution of the law within the narrowest limits conformable with justice and propriety."⁸ They were at the same time to be excluded from enjoying any fruits of royal favor and patronage. From this discouraging prelude there emerged a systematic policy of interpreting the law by strict reference to its letter: the government made over three hundred orders restricting the benefits of the enlightenment of Henri IV.⁹ The declaration of 1669 is a good example of this crop: the exercise of the Protestant religion was then limited to those places in which it had been practiced in 1598; temples built since that date were to be demolished; Protestant funerals were forbidden during the hours of daylight; the number attending a Protestant wedding was limited to twelve; mixed marriages were prohibited.¹⁰ Paul Pellisson, the former Huguenot, founded and operated the *caisse des conversions*, from which each new convert could claim an average of six *livres*. The growing influence of Madame de Maintenon and of the Jesuits and the growing impatience of the king prompted a progressively more hostile series of measures.¹¹

These measures culminated in the *dragonnades*—the billeting of unwelcome and often boisterous troops upon Huguenots with the

intention of persuading them of their error in resisting for so long the clearly expressed wishes of their king. The intendant Marillac in Poitou could claim thirty thousand conversions as the fruit of his zeal in the application of this policy in 1680, and his dismissal, though checking the violence, did not reverse the direction of the king's program.¹² By 1685 Louis, fresh from diplomatic triumphs, was confident enough to strike at the roots of the Huguenot problem. The Edict of Nantes was revoked; all temples were to be demolished and ministers banished; lay Huguenots were forbidden to leave France. Bossuet spoke for all the clergy and for much of France when he applauded the piety of Louis: "Let us raise our acclamations even to the skies, attributing to this new Theodosius, this new Marcion, this new Charlemagne, the words of the six hundred and thirty Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon; 'You have confirmed the Faith; you have exterminated the heretics. This is the crowning achievement of your reign which hereby gains a character all of its own.'" ¹³ The revocation has indeed become for many the symbol of the reign of Louis, although not in the sense anticipated by Bossuet and intended by the king.

It has recently been demonstrated that the economic effects of the revocation have been consistently exaggerated.¹⁴ Although only ten per cent of the Huguenots fled from France, they were among the most skilled and enterprising men of their persuasion; their departure was not a major factor in the prolonged stagnation of the French economy after 1685, but it did have a marked effect upon an international opinion growing increasingly hostile to French pretensions and Bourbon methods.¹⁵ Bossuet came to doubt the wisdom of forcing former Huguenots into occasional conformity and into the sacramental life of the Catholic church; many wondered whether sacrilege was so much to be preferred to heresy. The Huguenot movement, distinguished for so many years by its loyalty to the royal power, was driven underground, to break out in the fanatical violence of the revolt of Camisards (1702-5).¹⁶ By 1715 it was clear that Protestantism was to survive, and that Louis had failed to build even a façade of religious uniformity. Had he been any more successful in dealing with problems and critics within the French church?

The major internal problem of the French church in the second half of the century was that of Jansenism. There was for many years little disagreement between king and pope over the proper treatment

of the Jansenists: papal and royal policies were in this matter complementary. Louis was probably no clearer than most people about what precisely Jansenism was—"It was a great pity," as Silvester Jenks observed in 1710, "so important a matter as Jansenism should be so universally talk'd of and so little understood"¹⁷—but he knew he disliked it. So great was Louis's prejudice that he was alleged to have refused an appointment to a noble suspected of Jansenism, but to have granted it when assured that the candidate was, in fact, an atheist.¹⁸ Louis found good reason for disliking a doctrine that owed so much of its success in France to the Abbé de St. Cyran, who never commended himself to the government.¹⁹ The early condemnations of Rome had failed to stifle the movement, the growth of which was viewed with increasing alarm by Mazarin, who entirely approved the mistaken belief that if the errors of Jansen were more carefully defined they would cease to be held. It was largely as a result of pressure from France that the Five Propositions attributed to Jansen were condemned by the bulls of 1653 and 1656, the second bull attempting to eliminate one Jansenist line of defense by insisting that they were condemned "in the sense meant by Jansen."²⁰ Meanwhile, a connection had been established between Jansenism and some of the leaders of the Fronde.²¹ This alone would have moved Louis to hate all Jansenists; and soon after 1661, the schools of Port-Royal were closed and the campaign against the Jansenists intensified.²² Cardinal de Retz having at last, now that Mazarin was dead and after an exile of eight years, resigned the archbishopric of Paris, was succeeded by Marca and, in the same year, Péréfixe.²³ The Formulary, which condemned the Five Propositions "in the sense which Jansen intended" and which had been first devised by Mazarin, was now enforced, and the pope incorporated it in the bull of 1664. Péréfixe, who was no friend of the Jansenists, and the king, his former pupil, insisted on signature of the Formulary without qualifications, and the non-juring nuns of Port-Royal who refused this were exiled on Louis's orders.²⁴

It was precisely this signature that was also refused by four of the bishops: Pavillon of Aleth, Buzenval of Beauvais, Henri Arnauld of Angers, and Caulet of Pamiers. They took refuge in the famous distinction of *droit* and *fait*, arguing with Pascal that though the pope's condemnation of the Five Propositions must be accepted, his ruling

that the propositions represented the teaching of Jansen need not since on such a matter of fact no papal judgment could be infallible.²⁵ This refusal by bishops widely respected in France embarrassed the government and prompted Louis's ministers to seek a compromise. The election of Clement IX in 1668, which was a triumph for French diplomacy, made possible the so-called Peace of the Church, the acceptability of which depended upon verbal juggling by Lionne. The reluctant bishops agreed to sign *sincere*, preserving in their consciences the distinction of *droit* and *fait*; in the copies sent to Rome, however, the word *simpliciter* mysteriously but significantly replaced *sincere*.²⁶ For some years this insecure settlement worked, but Louis had not forgiven the bishops who had openly rejected his commands, though his attention was diverted to a conflict with the pope, with whom relations had, indeed, already been strained in the 1660's by several episodes that seem to reflect widely held Gallican opinions.

Gallicanism in seventeenth-century France was in no sense a movement: the term itself was first used in the nineteenth century, although, of course, "l'Eglise gallicane" was already a time-honored expression.²⁷ Its use implied no particular view of the relationship of the French church to Rome, and it would be tempting to translate to this context the argument of Z. N. Brooke and to misappropriate the definition of Hubert Walter: "hanc occidentalis ecclesiae portionem quam in Gallia plantavit Altissimus."²⁸ "The French church" is much less misleading than "the Gallican church" as a translation of "l'Eglise gallicane." Gallicanism is no more than a useful term to describe the opinions of those Frenchmen who did not welcome the advance of the ultramontane claims. It has become usual to distinguish three elements in the family of Gallican opinions—episcopal, parliamentary, and royal²⁹—but it might prove more helpful to use different categories and to identify only two. Of these the first would be the Gallicanism of the parlement, which emphasized the dependence of the church upon the protection of the king's courts and the king's officers, and had developed the procedure of the *appel comme d'abus* as a restraint upon all ecclesiastical jurisdiction, episcopal as well as pontifical.³⁰ The second would be the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne. Admittedly, on most questions of substance there was little difference between the opinion of the parlement and that of the Sorbonne. In both corporations there was general assent to the

doctrines of the divine right of bishops, of the inferiority of the pope to a general council, and of the inviolability of the liberties of the French church. The Gallicanism of the Sorbonne was embraced by many of the French bishops, most of whom had read their theology there, and it was by the faculty rather than by the episcopal bench that the theory of ecclesiastical (as distinct from secular) Gallicanism was developed. The Sorbonne was never unanimous, and in the seventeenth century differences of opinion became sharper; yet, Gallicanism continued to be the characteristic feature of *les maximes de Paris*. The Sorbonne could readily agree with the parlement in resistance to papal claims, though it placed the emphasis upon the right of bishops to regulate the affairs of the French church.

Behind the Gallicanism of the parlement and that of the Sorbonne towered the policy of the king. It would be misleading to speak of a "royal Gallicanism" as a separate doctrine in its own right, since the king's policy was opportunist and had no distinct theoretical basis. For the crown the authority of the bishops or of the parlement was a useful weapon to use against the pope or in a general defense of its rights, when and if such pressure seemed desirable.

There was, therefore, in Louis XIV's France no one answer to the questions raised by the relations of church and state. Rome, pursuing a policy of centralization, invariably resented any interference with its will in the government of the church. The king, jealous of his prerogatives and his honor but immovable in his orthodoxy, could accept neither subordination to the pope nor separation from the Western church. The secular clergy and the Sorbonne exalted the authority of diocesan bishops and were indifferently suspicious of the pretensions of Rome and of the king's courts. The parlement, though sharing the hostility of many of the clergy to an intrusive Roman authority, was prepared to challenge the bishops in the king's name if they presumed to take too much upon themselves. The events of 1663-65 illustrate the degree of agreement and dissent within Gallicanism.

Relations between Louis and Rome had already deteriorated seriously. In 1662 there had been an open fight in Rome between the Corsican Guard and the servants of the French ambassador. The diplomatic quarrel that followed encouraged parlement to intervene in the following year against theses maintained in the Sorbonne

defending Bellarmine's interpretation of papal authority.³¹ Even Bossuet resented this interference, not because he had any sympathy with the theses, but because he recognized it as an infringement of clerical and academic independence. The dispute was sharp, although it was not the doctrinal opinion of parlement that was opposed but its claim that a secular court of law could be a proper judge of doctrine.³² In the same year the Sorbonne itself produced Six Articles of a strongly Gallican flavor. On this ground parlement and the Sorbonne were at peace, and the theologians could continue their debates. The faculty prolonged its campaign against papal authority, formally censuring Vernant in 1664 and erecting against his opinions an elaborate statement of the classical Gallican position.³³ The occasion was improved in the following year by a condemnation of the attempts of Guimenius to justify the moral theology of the Jesuits.³⁴ Such presumption exhausted the patience of Pope Alexander VII, who roundly condemned the censures in the bull *Cum ad Aures* in 1665.³⁵ This was the signal for a parade of the united forces of Gallicanism against Italian interference in the affairs of the church. Parlement, the Sorbonne, and the Assembly of the Clergy all protested under the patronage of the king and his ministers: the mutual resentments of 1663 had been forgotten.³⁶ When the campaign faded away, it was not because of any change of heart among the clergy or the lawyers but because Louis wished to avoid a quarrel with the pope while he was at war with England.³⁷ Relations with Rome were uneasy during the 1660's, and although the alliance of king and pope survived until after the Peace of the Church in 1668, it was already clear that Louis would not be without support in a struggle with the pope. Parlement and the Sorbonne, which had quarreled in 1663 over the frontiers of their jurisdictions, had united with the General Assembly of 1665 in a protest against the pope. That protest proved abortive only because the king, for political reasons, chose not to force an issue. This appeasement of convenience did not long survive the Clementine Peace of 1668.

Three years later, the relationship of church and state was profoundly affected by the election, as archbishop of Paris, of Harlay de Champvallon. Harlay both deserves and needs a biographer, but has not found one since the late seventeenth century.³⁸ He was in many ways a remarkable man, and astonishing as an archbishop under a

pious king in a church purified by the Catholic renaissance of the seventeenth century. He was worldly, scholarly, and astute. During the Fénelon controversy the wits observed that the archbishop had condemned the love of God without having heard of it. This does fair justice to his piety but none to his considerable learning; and more memorable is Saint-Simon's picture of the prelate walking in the grounds of his house with a favorite duchess, followed at a respectful distance by a gardener raking over the gravel disturbed by their feet. Harlay, who was born in 1625, early acquired a reputation for brilliance. At the assembly of the clergy in 1650 he proved his ability in the handling of business. At the age of twenty-six he succeeded his uncle as archbishop of Rouen, administering the archdiocese in an exemplary manner and winning the good opinion of the court.³⁹ He showed throughout his life the greatest zeal in keeping that good opinion by defending the rights of the king in the government of the French church. His own power in that government was apparently unlimited. Contemporaries were convinced, with good reason, that he and the king's confessor enjoyed a monopoly of power.

Only the Confessor could speak to the King of this matter or inform him of criticisms of the Archbishop's conduct: that is why Mgr. the Archbishop handles him carefully and works in agreement with him. This Jesuit, as long as he achieves his ends, consents to the rule of the Archbishop while the Archbishop as long as his rule survives and he is allowed to dominate his fellows, willingly sacrifices to the Jesuits the doctrine of the Church.⁴⁰

This was a partisan statement by a friend of those Oratorians who had suffered most from Harlay's policies, yet it seems to contain few exaggerations on matters of fact.⁴¹ From 1675 Harlay and La Chaize were the only members of the *conseil de conscience*, and very little effective opposition to their agreed program was possible.⁴²

That program included an extension of the power of the king: few historians have failed to observe the irony in the spectacle of a Jesuit abandoning the ultramontane tradition to strengthen his influence over the French king and church. Neither Harlay nor La Chaize could therefore be expected to show any resistance to the extension of the *régale*. This was the right enjoyed by the crown in most provinces to appropriate the revenues of a vacant see and with

them all episcopal rights of nominating to benefices not having a cure of souls. The extension of this right to all the provinces of France naturally appealed to the king's advisers and was therefore claimed in the edicts of 1673 and 1675. Pavillon of Aleth and Caulet of Pamiers, both of whom had already achieved notoriety at court by their refusal to sign the Formulary, once again showed their independence by a denial of the legality of the king's actions and an appeal to Innocent XI. Louis was already dissatisfied with the policy of this high-minded pope and bitterly resented his defense of the appellant bishops. Both Pavillon and Caulet were dead by 1680, but the struggle survived them to become the *casus belli* in the assembly of 1681-82.⁴³ Innocent reasonably insisted that he was defending not his own rights but those of the native bishops against the demands of a predatory state, hoping by this argument to drive a wedge between the Gallicanism of the clergy and that of the parlement.

This defense was, of course, rejected by Harlay, who inspired the letter of February, 1682, from the assembly to the pope. The argument of the letter was that the pope was wrong to resist the king on a relatively small matter of discipline; after all, the effect of the edicts was only to make universal what was already general. It was foolish to resist the lawful demands of so Christian a king: "What need is there to describe the horror with which the King regards all novelties, or to assert that they will find no shelter in any part of his realm?"⁴⁴

Harlay admitted that the magistrates might have been wrong in their opinions, but not that those opinions were heretical or that the edicts based upon them should have been disobeyed. This admission was a slight concession to those moderates, like Bossuet, who had been made uneasy by a unilateral abrogation of episcopal rights.⁴⁵

The disgrace of Pomponne in 1679 led to the acceptance of Colbert's demands that policy toward Rome should be hardened.⁴⁶ Diplomatic pressure on the Vatican was increased by César d'Estrées, the special representative of the king, and the clergy were marshaled for the Extraordinary Assembly of 1681. The dominant figure in this assembly was not Bossuet but the now less-celebrated Harlay. Behind him were Colbert and, keeping as quiet as possible, La Chaize.⁴⁷ There was no hint of extremism in the sermon on the unity of the church that Bossuet preached at the opening of the assembly on

November 9, 1681. The king's rights were described as inviolable, and the personal infallibility of the pope was denied; but no sympathy was shown for the encroachments of the *officiers*, and the absolute necessity of unity with Rome was emphasized.⁴⁸ Bossuet's intention was to reinforce the moderation of Chancellor Le Tellier and of his son, Charles Maurice, the archbishop of Rheims. It is not surprising that Harlay was displeased by the sermon.⁴⁹

Any hope of successful conciliation was seriously weakened during the winter months. From November, 1681, to February, 1682, the assembly was preoccupied with the intractable problems of the *régale*. A third edict confirming the universality of the king's rights *sede vacante* was prepared with the advice of the assembly (manipulated by Harlay), and the publication of this edict was the occasion of the letter of February, 1682.⁵⁰ The edict confirmed the orders of 1673 and 1675 and included "a precise declaration of our will and the manner in which we propose to exercise our effective right to succeed to archbishops and bishops, their sees being vacant, in the collation of benefices other than those having a cure of souls."⁵¹ Bossuet was anxious that the quarrel should be no further embittered, but the opposing policy of Harlay and Colbert prevailed in the assembly. A commission was appointed to examine the controversial Six Articles that the Sorbonne had approved in 1663, and to produce a declaration *de ecclesiastica potestate*.⁵² This declaration, drafted as the Four Articles, was accepted by the assembly on March 19, 1682. The first three articles of 1663 were compressed into the first of 1682; important changes were introduced of which the general effect was to make the statements of doctrine more positive and to widen their application.

The core of the first article was a declaration that kings and princes were subject to no ecclesiastical power in temporal matters.⁵³ *Reges et principes* had significantly replaced the *Rex Christianissimus* of 1663, and an attempt was made to limit the force of papal countermeasures by denying Rome the rights of deposition or of dispensation from obedience. The second article was remarkably imprecise: an admission of the pope's *plena potestas* was inconsistently linked with approval of the Council of Constance. Moreover, the French church "does not approve" the opinion of those who wished to limit the force of the decrees of that council. It follows that the assembly neither

approved nor condemned this opinion, and the second article survived these contrived ambiguities as no more than the general expression of a Gallican sentiment. The same doubt surrounds the third article, the uncertainties of which would forbid a rigorous interpretation of the rules, usages, and customs of the French kingdom and church, which were to remain inviolate.⁵⁴ A general principle was drawn from this particular statement, but the rules, customs, and institutions remained undefined.

These first three articles dignified with official approval a widely held but loosely articulated and carelessly defined body of Gallican opinions. They paled into insignificance beside the terse clarity of the fourth, which declared that although the pope had the principal part in questions of faith, his judgment was irreformable only if the church accepted it.⁵⁵ In 1663 the Sorbonne had simply ruled that it did not regard the doctrine of papal infallibility as being *de fide*. The Article of 1682 ruled positively that the pope's judgment was not irreformable.⁵⁶ In 1663 the Sorbonne was expressing a weighty opinion on a disputed point; in 1682 the assembly of the clergy claimed to determine the dispute. The *Declaratio* of 1682 was a statement by the bishops, and therefore enjoyed an importance and an authority that could be assumed by no private statement, even one made by so venerable a corporation as the Sorbonne. Equally significant was the undoubted enthusiasm of the king for the enforcement of acceptance of the Articles throughout his dominions. The differences between the statements of 1663 and 1682 reveal the deterioration in these years of relations between the king and the French church on the one hand and the pope on the other.

The year 1682 was the most critical of the century in the history of the relations of church and state in France. All the bishops who had taken any part in the assembly were now publicly committed to the policy of Harlay de Champvallon, who was left in complete control of the proceedings. The king signed an edict demanding that the Articles must everywhere be registered and taught and that every candidate for a degree in theology must subscribe to them. The pope acted with equal speed and thoroughness, sending to the assembly on April 2 a brief annulling all its decisions and lamenting the threat to the integrity of the faith.⁵⁷ The clergy replied in May with a brusque affirmation of independence ("L'Eglise Gallicane se

gouverne par ses propres loix") and a protest at the pope's attack on church and state: ". . . The most ancient rights of the Church, and the most firmly established customs of the State are being openly violated."⁵⁸ The policy of Rome, they declared, would overthrow at once monarchy and episcopacy: no bishop, no king.⁵⁹

The battle could no longer be limited to words, and in September, 1682, the pope decided to refuse bulls of institution to all who had taken part in the assembly; the king therefore determined to recommend to the pope for preferment none who had been absent from the assembly. The deadlock was complete and the moderates dismayed: Bossuet sought, in his *Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani* (written in the years 1683-85 but not then published) to rescue Gallican and Catholic principles from the confusion of battle and to reconcile them in a positive ecclesiology that would embrace both pontifical and episcopal power. But neither Louis nor Innocent could afford to see this deadlock indefinitely prolonged: it weakened the moral position of the crown, robbed it of the invaluable source of patronage guaranteed by the Concordat of 1516, and left dioceses without bishops in the years when the campaign against the Huguenots was being intensified. Louis certainly hoped that this campaign, and more especially the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, would give as much pleasure to Innocent as to Bossuet.⁶⁰ The pope remained unimpressed by Louis's efforts to prove his orthodoxy at the expense of the Protestants, and supported Camus at Grenoble in his denunciations of conversion by violence.⁶¹ The parlement felt justified in complaining bitterly in 1688 of the pope's ingratitude.⁶² It professed yet greater indignation at the insult to the sovereignty of the king of France implied by Innocent's abolition, in May, 1687, of the ambassadorial franchises in Rome.⁶³ Innocent had already warned Louis of his probable excommunication. The *procureur-général* made a shrill appeal: "Alleging that he refers his said appeal on this matter as also on others which he reserves the right to explain to the first Council that shall be held, being the truly sovereign and infallible tribunal of the Church, to which its visible Head is subject together with its other members."⁶⁴ Denis Talon, the *avocat-général*, warned the pope that if he continued to act on new and erroneous opinions and to use his spiritual authority against Lavardin, the king's am-

bassador acting under royal orders, it might become necessary to revise the Concordat.⁶⁵ Louis was busily soliciting in support of an appeal to a general council the opinions of parlement, the universities, and the clergy. Colbert de Croissy mounted a great press campaign against Rome, denouncing Innocent as a Jansenist, a Quietist, and an ally of the heretic William of Orange.⁶⁶ When the pope died in 1689, the worst of the polemical storm was over. The danger of schism had perhaps never been very real, and the violent sentiments of 1688 were soon forgotten.⁶⁷ The exaggerations of propaganda nevertheless left their mark and suggested immoderate precedents to eighteenth-century imitators.

Louis and his advisers calculated in 1688 that the certain hazards of pressing any further their policy against Rome were greater than the probable advantages. International complications were becoming more serious each month, and the king was anxious to reduce tension wherever he could. His advisers were disturbed by a growing undercurrent of criticism in France and knew that the perpetuation of an open quarrel with Rome must nourish this disaffection. Both Louis and Innocent XII, who succeeded Alexander VIII in 1691, hoped to secure the neutrality of Italy in the enlarging international conflict. It was no change of heart but a calculation of political advantages that brought Louis, in the autumn of 1693, to a decision to suspend the disputes with Rome. His position had by then been shaken by the disastrous harvest of 1693, and the concessions he made were considerable.⁶⁸

Louis XIV was saved from the indignity of a direct renunciation of his opinions by confining his public statements to a bare assurance that the royal edict of March 22, 1682, would no longer be enforced in France.⁶⁹ "I have given the necessary orders terminating the enforcements of those matters which past circumstances had obliged me to include within my edict of 22nd March 1682 touching the declaration made by the Clergy of France."⁷⁰ Could any retraction be more impenitent? The edict of 1682 is clearly described as inevitable, and all Louis now conceded was that it should no longer be observed. It is not surprising that the bishops had to go a little further than this. Each bishop signing the letter to the pope lamented anything done in the Assembly of 1682 that displeased the pope and

added that nothing that might be construed as a decree relating to ecclesiastical power and pontifical authority should, in fact, be treated as a decree.⁷¹

Even this declaration was neither wholehearted nor precise: *quidquid* could mean much or little, and all that the bishops effectively said was that they had not produced *decrees* on ecclesiastical or papal authority. It follows that neither by the king nor by the bishops was there an explicit renunciation of the positions of 1682. Even the question of the *régale* was left unresolved.

Bossuet was, perhaps too readily, convinced that nothing had been conceded to Rome and that the principles of 1682 stood quite unshaken by ten years of controversy and its conclusion.⁷² His own view of the relations of church and state remained both firm and moderate. In all his thought and writing the predominant notes were sanity, tradition, order, and clarity. He hated the extremes of ultramontanist and Protestantism; he rejected the conclusions of casuists as well as of Jansenists; he suspected the rationalism of the new philosophy as much as the dangerously formless and novel mysticism that he detected in the church. After the provisional settlement of the Gallican conflict, Bossuet became increasingly concerned with the dangerous excesses of mystical theology; his determination to remove these excesses brought a new factor into the relations of church and state. The seventeenth century was an age of renaissance in the spiritual life of French Catholics. The line between orthodoxy and heresy in the expression of a mystical experience is notoriously hard to draw, and the danger that spiritual abandon may insensibly decline into antinomianism was very real to a mind like Bossuet's. It was a tragedy that he should have detected this very danger in one of the greatest of his contemporaries, Fénelon.⁷³ Madame de Maintenon recognized Fénelon as a serious political rival and found in Bossuet a ready ally: it has even been argued that the quarrel that Bossuet forced upon Fénelon did not grow from a difference of religious opinion at all.⁷⁴ Bossuet, the indefatigable and erudite champion of order, was convinced that the perverse theses of Molinos were corrupting, through the sinister influence of Madame Guyon, the brilliant and refreshing mind of Fénelon.⁷⁵ Molinos had taught that a soul completely abandoned in prayer to God should grow into a state of complete indifference to its own salvation or damnation,

and a complete detachment from the ministrations of the church, from the sacraments, from dogmatic systems, and from moral precepts. In the pure love of God there could be room for no consideration save that of God himself. These, at least, were the terms in which the problem presented itself to Bossuet, and he, with the king and Madame de Maintenon, resolved to extinguish these errors.

This resolution modified the relations of church and state in France: the king was now prepared to accept the pope as an ally against the Quietists—as he had been an ally against the Jansenists in the 1660's—in spite of the fact that the whole purpose of royal policy in the meantime had been to abbreviate papal power. No one, unless immediate purposes were served, was less devoted to *le gallicanisme du roi* than the king himself.

It had been generally hoped that the conclusions of the irenic commission at Issy would detach Fénelon from the doctrines of Malaval, Molinos, and Madame Guyon. Unfortunately, the desire to accommodate Fénelon had produced loose wording in the drafting of the articles, of which he took advantage two years later by publishing *Les Maximes des Saints* (1697). This ill-advised attempt to define what the archbishop of Cambrai took to be the authentic tradition of Christian mysticism was interpreted by Bossuet as an act of bad faith and a revival of doctrines already condemned by Rome.⁷⁶ A bitter quarrel raged for two years, throwing into relief the irreconcilable minds and tempers of Fénelon and Bossuet; it was arrested only by the decision of the pope.⁷⁷ Fénelon had so few doubts of the defensibility of his own position that he appealed to Rome; like St. Paul, he found little reason to be content with the result. In his letter to Innocent XII, dated April, 1697, he submitted the *Maximes* to papal judgment, renouncing as abominable the Quietist teachings of Molinos. Fénelon thought that although the conclusions of Issy were in themselves sound and acceptable, they had since been misconstrued as an attack upon "l'amour pur de la vie contemplative." Bossuet rejected this defense, and Fénelon was commanded to leave the court; Louis was anxious that the pope should reach a decision as soon as possible and urged the necessity of "a clear and precise judgment on a book which inflames and a doctrine which divides his kingdom."

The bull of 1699 condemned not only the general tone of the *Maximes* but also twenty-three propositions drawn from the work.⁷⁸

Louis expressed his pleasure at so correct a decision but demonstrated his loyalty to one of the great principles of 1682 by accepting Bossuet's argument that the force of the bull in France should depend upon its formal reception.⁷⁹ A copy of the bull was sent to all the archbishops "so that joining their voices to the authority of the judgment of our Holy Father the Pope, the co-operation of these powers may totally stifle the innovations which wound the purity of the faith." The king made it equally clear that he enjoyed in his own right the power to preserve this purity.⁸⁰ Bossuet and Louis had been glad to accept the decision of Rome against Fénelon, but they had no intention of paying for this help with the liberties of bishops or of the crown.

This working alliance of king and pope was the most conspicuous result of the pacification of 1693. From that settlement the Jansenists were excluded, and now found themselves, as in the 1650's and 1660's, exposed to the united enmity of pope and king. The king had already in 1679 broken the spirit if not the letter of the Clementine Peace by reviving the persecution of Port-Royal: the Jansenist confessors were withdrawn and the doors closed to novices or postulants. The toleration of Jansenist opinions outside the convent depended upon the continued acceptance of the distinction of *droit* and *fait* and upon official acquiescence in "respectful silence" as an adequate response to the question of papal infallibility in matters of fact. This acquiescence the enemies of Jansenism were determined to dissolve. They found a powerful ally, anxious to redeem his disgrace, in Fénelon.⁸¹ He could not be blamed if he saw in the ruin of Jansenism, of which he was genuinely suspicious, an opportunity to damage those wrong-headed enemies who had effected his own condemnation. Quietist and Jesuit now worked together to enlist the king, by an appeal to his unconcealed hatred of Jansenism, against Noailles (Harlay's successor as archbishop), the Gallicans, and the Jansenists themselves. It is a maneuver of this kind that makes it impossible to represent in simple or constant terms the relations of church and state under Louis XIV.

The tactics for the first phase of this renewed attack on the Jansenists were simplified by the fact that Noailles, while he was still bishop of Châlons, had approved the second edition of the *Réflexions morales sur le Nouveau Testament* by the Jansenist Quesnel; yet in the following year, as archbishop-elect, he had condemned

a book written by another Jansenist, Barcos. This evident inconsistency was skilfully exploited by the anonymous author of the *Problème ecclésiastique* in 1698: since the doctrine of the two works is substantially the same, he asked, which Noailles is to be believed?⁸² Jansenism was brought back into the center of theological discussion. Old but unsolved questions were resurrected, and the Sorbonne found, in the *cas de conscience* of 1701, that a priest could give absolution to a penitent admitting some scruple over the *droit* and *fait* as well as some sympathy with other Jansenist principles.⁸³ This decision was promptly attacked, and the publication of the bull *Vineam Domini* in 1705 overthrew it: the Peace of 1668 was finally destroyed. Louis XIV, who had never had any patience with Jansenists, had been pressing for a bull, always provided "that it should be made in agreement with me and that it contain no term which might prevent its publication in my kingdom."⁸⁴

The bull was, in fact, prepared in consultation between Versailles and Rome, and every precaution was taken in France to avoid a dangerous precedent destructive of the liberties of the French church. Clement XI was understandably irritated by the endless repetition of this theme. Louis reminded the clergy, in his letter to the assembly, that they should take care to observe "the forms established by the said decrees and by the usage of the Gallican Church."⁸⁵ He was equally explicit in instructing the parlement that they were to register *Vineam Domini* only "if it appears to them that there is in the said constitution in the form of a Bull nothing contrary to the sacred decrees, canonical constitutions, rights and pre-eminences of our Crown or the Gallican Church."⁸⁶

Neither parlement nor the clergy neglected these instructions; the assembly observed, in the letter to the bishops, that the clergy of the French church did not execute the pope's orders but judged and pronounced in partnership with him. The bull against the Jansenists was received with the same caution as that against the Quietists; but the force of Gallicanism was weakened by the reception within a few years of two important bulls carrying papal definitions of doctrine. Louis was not to find it easy to balance his zeal for the purity of the faith with care for his own rights and those of his courts and bishops.

The difficulty of reconciling these diverse interests increased in the last years of the reign and appears especially in the negotiations leading to the bull *Unigenitus*. The Jesuits were determined that the

doctrines that Noailles had unwisely approved in Quesnel's *Réflexions morales*, and that restated at great length the objectionable substance of the Five Propositions, should be condemned with all possible solemnity. Louis, sharing this determination, asked the pope for a bull and expected to be consulted about its contents. Clement, on the other hand, wished his brief of 1708 to be taken as final, although it had condemned the doctrine of Quesnel only in general terms and had never been received in France. The king maintained diplomatic pressure, and, after many delays, the pope yielded and published the bull *Unigenitus* in the autumn of 1713. Although the French minister in Rome had been consulted, an advance copy had not been sent to Versailles. Louis's enthusiasm for a definitive condemnation of Quesnel had led him to ignore the Gallican principles he had often professed. His insistence on getting the bull was to occasion a long struggle in which many of the crown's natural allies in the parlement and among the clergy learned to resist the king's will. The fifty years of the personal reign of Louis XIV had seen most possible, and many improbable, groupings in ecclesiastical politics: king, pope, and Jesuits against the Jansenists; king, Jesuits, and Gallicans against pope and Jansenists; king, Gallicans, and Jansenists against Quietists; king, Quietists, Jesuits, and pope against Jansenists. To this restlessly shifting pattern was now added one last refinement: king and pope against Jansenists and Gallicans.⁸⁷ The collision over *Unigenitus* was to make a profound impression on the history of the eighteenth century.

Some attempt was made by Louis to soften the offense of *Unigenitus* to minds disposed to view with alarm the reception of a third important definition of doctrine by the pope. The king, in the letters patent, emphasized that he had himself asked the pope for a judgment against Quesnel's book. Parlement was again asked, before registering the bull, to be satisfied that it infringed the rights neither of the crown nor of the French church.⁸⁸ Parlement found no fault with the form of the bull but did insist that acceptance of it by the French bishops must precede registration. The king called together all the bishops who happened to be in or near Paris or Versailles, but this somewhat makeshift assembly, instead of accepting the bull promptly and gratefully from the hands of Clement and Louis,

appointed a commission that proceeded to a leisurely examination of each of the one hundred and one condemned propositions. Rome was quite unwilling to admit any right in the assembled bishops to meddle in this way with a final decision. Cardinal Noailles, angry at what he took to be a Jesuit plot to humiliate him, formally proposed that to the bull should be prefaced the interpretation placed upon it by the bishops' commission. He failed to persuade the assembly to accept this provocative tactic, and therefore drew up, in collaboration with seven of his episcopal supporters, a declaration: "We demand that there be given to the Court of Rome no just reason for supposing that we act only as simple executors of its decrees."⁸⁹ The dissidents were exiled to their dioceses by a *lettre de cachet*, and the report of the commission included no more than a mild defense of the rights of bishops to judge with the pope in matters of faith. The conduct of the parlement was, in the king's eyes, no more satisfactory: the bull was registered on February 17, 1714, but in profound silence. The Sorbonne in March accepted the bull only after stormy sessions and forceful expressions of dissent.⁹⁰ The reign ended with Gallicans in parlement and in the Sorbonne challenging the policy of a king who had failed, in this last episode of the reign, to reconcile independence of Rome with devotion to the Roman faith.

Louis's understanding of religion and philosophy was painfully limited and his policy in these matters dictated by a passionate hatred of dissidence or novelty.⁹¹ He intended, as God's vicegerent, to extirpate heresy and error from his kingdom; the task proved far beyond his powers. His chances of success would have been greater if the partnership of church and state, or rather of pope and king, had been more stable. That partnership was strained both by the opportunism of Louis's policy and by his ambition to claim for himself universal power. The resistance to the claims made under royal inspiration in the assembly of 1682 has been interpreted as the first symptom of opposition to the so-called absolutism of *Louis le Grand*.⁹² The king's own reaction, in 1688, to papal hostility constituted a dangerous precedent to which may be referred not only the controversies of 1718 but also the affair of the *billets de confession* and even the Civil Constitution of the clergy: in the irony of history, Louis had himself forged "les armes qui devaient frapper plus tard

l'organisation ecclésiastique de la monarchie."⁹³ Even in the persecution of self-confessed heretics, Versailles and Rome were not united: the revocation of 1685 marks the furthest advance of the militant Counter Reformation and of royal absolutism, but the pope soon lost his enthusiasm for the king's policy.

Louis had attempted to impose upon France a policy by which orthodox Catholicism was maintained with the support of a pope who must nevertheless be kept firmly in his place. Papalists, Gallicans, Jansenists, Quietists, Cartesians, and Protestants all learned to fear a priest-king who fought to arrest the birth of the eighteenth century. Some, like Harlay, supported the monarch for reasons of private interest; others, like Bossuet, because they shared his convictions but not his ignorance. It was Louis's misfortune to rule through years of rapid intellectual change: "Most Frenchmen thought like Bossuet. Suddenly they think like Voltaire; a revolution has taken place."⁹⁴ Louis had so identified church and state in France that the *philosophes* were to associate them under a like condemnation.

1. La Bruyère, *Characters*, trans. Henri Van Laun (London, 1963), p. 134.

2. P. Labbé, S.J., *Educatio regia* (n.p., 1644). Quoted in the valuable study of Louis's early life by G. Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (2d ed.; Paris, 1923), p. 205.

3. H. G. Judge (ed.), *Louis XIV* (London, 1965), pp. 56-57. This work contains translations of several documents to which reference is later made. For an interesting commentary on the imagery surrounding the king, see L. Hautecoeur, *Louis XIV: Roi Soleil* (Paris, 1953).

4. See the useful study by J. B. Wolf, "The Formation of a King," *French Historical Studies*, I (1958).

5. An interesting analysis of the intellectual and spiritual decline that marked the phase of acceptance and security is given by E.-G. Léonard, "Le Protestantisme français au XVII^e siècle," *Revue historique*, CC (1948), 157-64.

6. Jean Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1927).

7. R. Allier, *La Cabale des dévots, 1627-1666* (Paris, 1902).

8. J. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1927). There were several precedents for this policy; see J. Viénot, *Histoire de la Réforme française*, II (2 vols.; Paris, 1934), 398.

9. P. Bernard, *Explication de l'édit de Nantes* (Paris, 1666).

10. E. Préclin and V.-L. Tapié, *Le XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1949), pp. 262-63. For a good summary of the restrictive measures, see Warren C. Scoville, *The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 35-38.

11. G. Guitton, *Le Père de la Chaize, confesseur de Louis XIV* (2 vols.; Paris, 1959), I, 236.

12. H. Méthivier, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1962), p. 90. J. Orcibal, *Louis XIV et les Protestants* (Paris, 1951), Chapter II.

13. J.-B. Bossuet, *Oraisons funèbres* (Paris, 1931), p. 453.

14. Scoville, *Persecution of the Huguenots*, pp. 435-47.

15. W. J. Stankiewicz, *Politics and Religion in Seventeenth Century France* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), Chapter VI. The theme of this book is important, but see my review in *History*, XLVI (1961), 146-47. See also C. H. Dodge, *The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion* (New York, 1947).

16. R. Stephan, *Histoire du Protestantisme français* (Paris, 1961), pp. 172-82. It can be argued that the violent policy finally adopted by Louis rescued French Protestantism from the consequences of its own slow decay. See P. Chaunu, "Les Crises au XVII^e siècle de l'Europe réformée," *Revue historique*, CCXXXIII (1965), 59.

17. Silvester Jenks, *A Short Review of the Book of Jansenius* (n.p., 1710), Preface.

18. *Correspondance complète de Madame Duchesse d'Orléans*, ed. M. G. Bruner (Paris, 1863), II, 367-68.

19. For St. Cyran, see J. Laporte, *La Doctrine de Port-Royal*, Vol. I (Paris, 1923). L. Cognet, *Le Jansénisme* (Paris, 1961) is a very useful and recent summary.

20. The bulls *Cum Occasione* and *Ad Sanctam*.

21. Both Madame de Longueville and Cardinal Retz were known to sympathize with the Jansenists. The *Lettres provinciales* were published in 1656 and 1657.

22. H. C. Barnard, *The Little Schools of Port-Royal* (Cambridge, 1903), Chapter II.

23. Marca, who died in June, 1662, had been obliged before his consecration as a bishop to explain some of the Gallican opinions expressed in his *De concordia sacerdotii et imperii seu de libertatibus ecclesiae Gallicanae* (Paris, 1641). See F. Gaquère, *Pierre de Marca* (Paris, 1932), pp. 233, 237.

24. J. Orcibal, *Port-Royal: Entre le Miracle et l'obéissance* (Paris, 1957), p. 59.

25. I believe that the distinction as here applied was first developed by Pascal in the seventeenth and eighteenth of the *Lettres provinciales*. The common attribution of it to Arnauld seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the way in which he uses the terms (*droit* and *fait*) in his *Seconde lettre à un duc et pair*. For an interesting recent discussion of the obstinacy of the Jansenists in resisting authority, see J.-J. Thomas, *Le Problème moral à Port-Royal* (Paris, 1963).

26. A. Cauchie, "La Paix de Clément IX," *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse*, III (1898), 481-501.

27. A.-G. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet* (Paris, 1953), p. 13, n. 2.

28. Z. N. Brooke, *The English Church and the Papacy* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 9, 13.

29. See, for example, David Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (4th ed.; London, 1943), p. 296.

30. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 94 and n. 5. See also R. Génestal, *Les Origines de l'appel comme d'abus* (Paris, 1951). For this distinction between two families of Gallican opinion, cf. J.-B. Bossuet, *Correspondance*, ed. Ch. Urbain and E. Levesque (15 vols.; Paris, 1909-25), II, 277.

31. L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950), pp. 59-61. C. Gérin, *Recherches historiques sur l'Assemblée de 1682* (2d ed.; 1870), pp. 1-35, 518-24. L. André, *Michel le Tellier et Louvois* (Paris, 1942), pp. 115-32.

32. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, pp. 216-36. For the importance of the Articles of 1663, see below.

33. Jacques de Vernant ("Bonaventure Hérédie") had published in 1658 *La Défense de l'autorité de Notre Saint Père le Pape* (Paris, 1658).

34. *Amadei Guimenii Lomarenensis . . . opusculum singularia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens* (Lyons, 1664). This was the work of a Jesuit, Mateo Moya, and had already appeared in Spain; see Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 246; J. Boileau, *Recueil de diverses pièces concernant les censures de la faculté de théologie de Paris* (Paris, 1666), pp. 21-59.

35. Boileau, *Recueil de diverses pièces . . .*, pp. 92-96; C. Gérin, *Louis XIV et le Saint Siège*, II (Paris, 1894), 13-17.

36. A. Duranthon (ed.), *Collection des procès-verbaux des Assemblées Générales du Clergé de France depuis 1560 jusqu'à présent* (Paris, 1767-78), IV, 931-32. P. Blet, *Le Clergé de France et la monarchie. Etudes sur les Assemblées de Clergé de 1615 à 1666* (2 vols.; Paris, 1959), II, 319-25.

37. Charles Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860), I, 202, cited in Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 269.

38. Louis le Gendre, *Eloge de Messire François de Harlay, archevêque de Paris* (Paris, 1695).

39. *Biographie universelle* (Michaud) (edition of 1817), XIX, 430-31.

40. Bibliothèque Mazarine, MS 2456, fols. 39-49. See also P. Bayle, *Recueil de quelques pièces curieuses concernant la philosophie de M. Descartes* (Paris, 1684), pp. 17-23. It is clear from the manuscript that this note was written in 1679. See also *Mémoires du Curé de Versailles François Hébert* (Paris, 1927), pp. 20, 136; cf. G. Guitton, "Le Père de la Chaize et la 'feuille des bénéfiques,'" *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XLI (1950), 28-47.

41. The history of the Oratory in these years (see H. G. Judge, "The Congregation of the Oratory in France in the Late Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, XII [1961]), provides many examples of both the policies and the powers of Harlay.

42. J. Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI* (Paris, 1949), p. 54.

43. N. Abercrombie, *The Origins of Jansenism* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 205-7.

44. L. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté de 1682 à 1789* (Paris, 1893), I, 12.

45. Innocent XI had failed to capture, by the promise of a cardinal's hat, the support of Bossuet himself. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, pp. 341-57.

46. C. Gérin, "La Disgrâce de M. de Pomponne," *Revue des questions historiques*, XXIII (1878), 1-70. See also the illuminating article by H. H. Rowen, "Arnauld de Pomponne," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1956), pp. 531-49.

47. Gérin, *Recherches historiques*, pp. 139-40, 172-74; Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, pp. 380-82; Pierre Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-73), VI, 148-57.

48. *Œuvres oratoires*, ed. Lebarq, Urbain, and Levesque (15 vols.; Paris, 1911-26), VI, 98-151.

49. J. T. Loyson, *L'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682* (Paris, 1870), pp. 125-26; Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 428; F. Ledieu, *Mémoires et journal sur la vie et les ouvrages de Bossuet* (Paris, 1856), I, 174-75; A. Gazier, *Bossuet et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1914), p. 103.

50. See page 000.

51. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 3.

52. *Lettres du Cardinal le Camus évêque et prince de Grenoble*, ed. A. M. P. Ingold (1892), p. 415; Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, pp. 460-61. The Commission was presided over by Gilbert de Choiseul, the bishop of Tournai.

53. "Reges ergo et principes in temporalibus nulli ecclesiasticae potestati Dei ordinatione subijci." Text in Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 26-32. The assembly did not supply an official translation. A

French translation may be found in L. E. Dupin, *Histoire ecclésiastique du XVII^e siècle*, (Paris, 1714), pp. 533-36. See Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 462, n. 1.

54. ". . . Valere etiam regulas, mores et instituta a regno et ecclesia Gallicana recepta, Patrumque terminos manere inconcussos."

55. "In fidei quoque quaestionibus praecipuas summi pontificis esse partes, eiusque decreta ad omnes et singulas ecclesias pertinere, nec tamen irreformabile esse iudicium nisi Ecclesiae consensus accesserit."

56. For a discussion of the preference by Bossuet of *irreformabile* to *infallibile*, see Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 472.

57. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 33-43.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

60. See above.

61. J. Orcibal, *Louis XIV et les Protestants* (Paris, 1951), pp. 84, 138-39.

62. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 84-85.

63. E. Préclin and E. Jarry, *Les Luttes politiques et doctrinales aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, (Paris, 1955), I, 161.

64. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 82. This was a more positive statement of Article III (1682).

65. *Ibid.*, I, 100; Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI*, pp. 16-17.

66. Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI*, p. 45.

67. Lavardin had been recalled in April, 1689, and his successor had orders not to press any franchise claims. Cf. A. G. Martimort, "Comment les français du XVI^e siècle voyaient le pape," *XVII^e Siècle*, nos. 25-26 (1955), pp. 93-96.

68. J. Meuvret, "Les Aspects politiques de la liquidation du conflit gallican," *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XXXIII (1947), 257-70.

69. The text of his letter to Innocent XII (September 14, 1693) is in Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 64-65.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

71. ". . . Quidquid in iisdem comitiis circa ecclesiasticam potestatem et pontificum auctoritatem decretum censeri potuit, pro no decreto habeo et habendum esse declaro" (*ibid.*, p. 66).

72. Bossuet was convinced that the bishops' letter contained nothing of importance. F. Ledieu, *Mémoires et journal . . . de Bossuet*, I, 11-12.

73. For English sources the best introduction to Quietism and Fénelon is R. A. Knox, *Enthusiasm* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 231-356. M. de la Bedoyère's *The Archbishop and the Lady* (London, 1956) is more illuminating than its title. The Bossuet-Fénelon controversy has long been a *cause célèbre* of French history and literature. One of the most valuable contributions to the debate remains H. Bremond, *Apologie pour Fénelon* (Paris, 1910). See also L. Cognet, *Crépuscule de Mystiques. Le conflit Fénelon-Bossuet* (Tournai, 1959).

74. This is the thesis of R. Schmittlein, *L'Aspect politique du différend Bossuet-Fénelon* (Paris, 1954). Much of the force of the argument is destroyed by polemical exaggeration: Bossuet was a time-server (pp. 9, 26); an agent of Madame de Maintenon (p. 32); a violent sadist (p. 67); a dancing dervish (p. 73); a liar (p. 255); a man without scruples (p. 272); "menteur, calomniateur, diffamateur, falsificateur" (p. 488); an actor (p. 489). The passions aroused by the great quarrel are by no means extinguished. More serious is the argument that Madame de Maintenon first determined to break all her links with Madame Guyon and Fénelon because she feared that her enemy, Harlay de Champvallon, would use her friendship with "quietists" as a weapon to destroy her influence over the king (pp. 26, 27, 85, 389, 486).

75. For Molinos, see P. Dudon, *Le Quiétiste espagnol Michel Molinos* (Paris, 1921).

76. *Correspondance de Bossuet*, VIII, 126.

77. The comparison of Bossuet and Fénelon is a fruitful exercise. Bossuet ("un grand simplificateur," in Bremond's telling phrase [*Apologie pour Fénelon*, p. 263]) is often compared with Manning and the more sensitive Fénelon with Newman. It is a little fanciful to claim Fénelon as a "Romantic," but see the interesting comparison of the two ecclesiastics in the eulogy of Fénelon by the famous eighteenth-century critic La Harpe. *Œuvres de Fénelon* (Paris, 1810), X, 401-2.

78. For the text of these documents, see Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 133-50.

79. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 683.

80. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 153-55.

81. N. Abercrombie, *Origins of Jansenism* (Oxford, 1936), p. 304. It is impossible to resolve the debate on Fénelon's motives or to decide how powerful was his desire for revenge. He certainly became the most determined enemy of Noailles and of the Jansenists. H. Hillenaar, *Fénelon et les Jésuites* (The Hague, 1967).

82. P. Quesnel [?], *Solution de divers problèmes* (Cologne, 1699).

83. N. Abercrombie, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, pp. 326-36.

84. J. Carreyre, "Quesnel," *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique*, Vol. XIII, part ii (1937), col. 1501.

85. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, I, 175.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

87. This summary is, of course, an oversimplification for the sake of clarity. It is not claimed, for example, that "quietist" is a satisfactory description of Fénelon and his sympathizers.

88. Mention, *Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté*, II, 49.

89. J. Carreyre, "Unigenitus," *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique*, vol. XV, part ii (1950), col. 2067.

90. A. Gazier, *Histoire générale du mouvement Janséniste* (2 vols.; Paris, 1922), I, 241.

91. Compare, for example, his policy toward Cartesianism. F. Bouillier, *Histoire de la philosophie Cartésienne* (Paris, 1854), pp. 452-72.

92. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, p. 498.

93. Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI*, p. 88.

94. P. Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience Européenne* (Paris, 1935), p. i.

The Court and Capital of Louis XIV: Some Definitions and Reflections

OREST RANUM

NOT since the days of Etienne Marcel and the Hundred Years' War was the presence of the royal family in Paris so necessary to maintain urban tranquillity and to conduct a war. Even Louis XIII's minority, hectic as it was, had posed less of a threat to the crown than the robe and sword rebellion of the Fronde. After all, Marie de' Medici and Concini at least had the parlement's support, whereas Anne and Mazarin did not.

Louis XIV grew up a Parisian of sorts because the Fronde forced his mother to reside there. Long stays at Fontainebleau or St. Germain, hunting and playing with gentle girls and boys, were out of the question for him because his "family," consisting of Anne, Mazarin, and his brother Philippe, dared not leave Paris very often. Anne and Mazarin were not prisoners, technically speaking—no more than Henri III had been in his last days; but every move they made with the boy king started plots and rumors, and caused the prices paid for *rentes* to drop. So Louis knew the Louvre and the Palais Royal as home; and since he was the prince of landed aristocrats, living in the city came to be something he disliked, though this would be difficult to prove from what he said or wrote concerning his distaste for the city. The aristocratic tradition and Louis's own actions speak louder than his words. Gentlemen and kings were at

home on their rural domains in good company, and those who lived in the capital in the seventeenth century did so out of the necessity of attending court, rather than by choice. But only when the Fronde became too dangerous, or when epidemics came too close, was Louis hustled into the country.

In the later Middle Ages, French kings still considered the Louvre a tolerable place to live in the winter; but political conditions permitting, they usually preferred to reside near, but not in, Paris. Charles V built and lived in the Hôtel St. Pol, a pleasant country place outside the walls surrounded by gardens and monastic lands and situated in the *marais*, or fourth *arrondissement*. Charles VI also lived here before the Parisians enveloped the area. Then, after 1407, when the crown acquired the Hôtel des Tournelles in the same neighborhood, several kings made this comfortable (for those times at least) and fanciful flamboyant gothic palace their *séjour ordinaire*. In the sixteenth century Henri II stayed there quite often; and it was close by that he was struck dead in a playful jousting match held on the Rue St. Antoine, which was something like a country road then. Obviously, jousting and hunting could not be done in the narrow streets of Paris; and no French monarch, least of all the Bourbons, ever lost the aristocratic appetite for daily outdoor sports.

Queens, especially foreign queens—and this includes nearly all French queens—also played a part in shifting the monarch's habitual residence out of the center of town. Catherine de' Medici built the Tuileries out into the fields and far beyond the walls; and in the midst of the monasteries far south of the capital's walls, Marie de' Medici built the Luxembourg. So to make country living more accessible, Anne, too, ordered the Tuileries remodeled and an open, spacious double residence built within the walls of the old castle at Vincennes for escaping the unpleasantness of Paris. But none of these places was much lived in, perhaps because the family had become accustomed to living in the city.

When the Frondes were over and war subsided, habit and interests still kept the court in Paris. Unlike Richelieu, Cardinal Mazarin could not build a whole town and a great chateau on his ancestral estates, because he did not have any; so for this reason he stayed in Paris, to spend hours arranging his collections of classical manuscripts, medals, books, paintings, furniture, sculpture, and tapestries

in the two buildings that we now recognize as the Institut and the Bibliothèque Nationale. And after Mazarin's death, Louis continued to live with Anne in Paris, but with more frequent jaunts to Fontainebleau and St. Germain, until her death in 1666.

Anne's death upset Louis very much. He underwent something resembling an emotional crisis that manifested itself in an aversion for Paris. He recorded his urge to flee among his most intimate and important thoughts, which were to be edited and prepared for the instruction of the dauphin, saying, ". . . Being unable, after this misfortune, to bear the sight of the place where it had happened, I left Paris that very hour and withdrew first to Versailles. . . ." ¹ This phrase, so full of emotion, expresses something deeper than a mere decision by Louis to follow the tradition of kings by leaving the scene of death. Louis's tenderness and love for Anne, and his gratitude to her for having relinquished power when he became a man, were very deep feelings. And though it may be argued that this urge to flee was only the consequence of shock and, therefore, momentary and of no consequence, I think Louis's activities in the years immediately following Anne's death indicate otherwise.

In November, 1667, Louis, the queen, and the court took up residence in the Tuileries, intending to spend the winter there; but by late January, they were already installed at St. Germain.² One year later, Louis tried living in Paris, again with the intention of staying all winter, with the same results. His final try came in 1671, and this time the departure for St. Germain took place in mid-February. These were busy years for the king, but why the change in plans? Why did he leave Paris before the winter was over? Never again did he make the capital his home, nor even try living in the new wing of the Louvre built in his own reign. Perhaps the palaces, gardens, paintings, and statues, and their association with the past and with people whom he had loved, caused him to lose pleasure in being there.

Other things contributed to make Louis dislike Paris. The Sun King was always annoyed by petty quarrels between the guilds and corporations of Paris; and the longer he lived, the less willing he was to hear out their grievances or intervene personally in disputes over their privileges.³ And yet it would have been very difficult for him to have avoided these long and apparently numberless audiences

had he remained in Paris, because feudal custom prescribed that the hearing of petitions from the guilds in Paris was his duty. At Versailles he came to accept in person only statements of thanks from the guilds; and even these ceremonies became infrequent, probably because grievances might be insinuated into the eloquent prose read to celebrate his victories, grandeur, and glory.

But more important than these reasons for leaving Paris was Louis's own love for the outdoors. He wanted forests, lakes, gardens, stables, and long *allées* around him, and space for all these things could be found no nearer to Paris than Versailles. The belt of monasteries that surrounded the capital was in the hands of monks eager to sell the lands, but only at extortionate prices. Louis tried to buy Rueil, which was Richelieu's old country place, now known as Malmaison; but the cardinal's niece, the Duchesse d'Aiguillon, made it perfectly clear that she did not want to give it up, though she would bow to the royal will. She wrote Colbert: "The King is the master, and he who gave me Rueil so successfully taught France the obedience which it owes him, that His Majesty should not doubt mine."⁴ So the matter was dropped. That left St. Germain, which was remodeled a bit by adding a long terrace overlooking the Seine, but living quarters were too small; there was only Versailles. Louis XIII had been content to live with a few hunting friends, occupying Fontainebleau and St. Germain, and building his *château de cartes* at Versailles. Though scoffed at for putting up such a modest structure, he liked the little brick and stone building because it was near the deer and too small to house many courtiers. Louis XIII's somber personality, the wars, and especially the government conducted by devout ministers and social inferiors such as Mazarin, Le Tellier, Fouquet, and Colbert, had made French court life dreary and without luster. Anyway, only a monarch, and a young, handsome, and energetic one at that, could have a court worthy of the name.

In the early years I think that Louis held a great and lavish court because he wanted to make his subjects happy. His *Mémoires* imply that this was his aim, and it was a good one. Frenchmen had not seen a king enjoy himself or entertain publicly in the manner worthy of his dignity since Henri IV, and this is what I think Louis set out to do. Then he realized in the 1660's that he could use the court for political purposes.

None of the old residences sufficed for the Sun King and his court. Room had to be found for hundreds of courtiers, musicians, actors, scientists, poets, historians, fencers, horsemen, cooks, and servants, whom he invited to attend him in the aristocratic way—but only so long as they wished, or kept, favor—and to follow him wherever he went. Also, none of the old buildings was in the latest style of architecture, which was a factor of much importance then when the aristocratic way was to have only the *dernier cri*. Louis was probably determined to keep up with his subjects, and if this was the case, it would explain why even Versailles was remodeled extensively several times before his death. As to remodeling buildings other than those built at his command, Louis refused to demolish anything built by his ancestors. His order to preserve the *château de cartes* of Louis XIII gave Le Vau and later Hardouin-Mansart no end of difficulty, but it is still there today.

Building Versailles became a passion. Neither “his” wars, as they were called, nor Colbert’s opposition caused his interest to flag. Even distance from the work and other preoccupations did not keep Louis from thinking of Versailles. The letters to Colbert written by the king while campaigning in the Franche-Comté in 1667–68 are filled with questions, orders, and details about the masons, gardeners, and artists, who were always being urged to work faster. Obviously, Louis enjoyed building when Versailles began to take form, and this satisfied something in him that building in Paris had never done.

With a new setting, Louis and his entourage developed a court ceremonial so different from that of his ancestors, either French or Spanish, that they were certainly not imitating some monarch in the recent past. In the sixteenth century his Valois forbears tried to “restore” feudal pageantry and courtly love by making it into a kind of fetish; but the Sun King, though respecting his own ancestry and aristocratic valor, showed no nostalgia for the Middle Ages.

We do not know whether Louis understood the classical and mythological imagery that gives heavy intellectual baggage to all the artistic works at Versailles, but he was certainly in favor of it. His disapproval would have been enough to change the minds of all the tastemakers and artists. He called his gardens by their classical names and obviously liked being depicted as a Roman. Did he know much about the court life of the Caesars? Were the humanist descriptions

of and about the Romans and translations of ancient historians filtering down into the minds of men who surrounded the king? Favorite courtiers were neither avid readers nor prolific memorialists, so it is difficult to discover what they knew of Rome. But one thing is clear: Colbert's conception of grandeur and his definition of a capital were Roman. Perhaps there was also someone near the king who supplied the notion of creating an imperial court. The enigmatic figure here, of course, is Louvois, whose influence on administration and the army has been studied, but whose role in the making of Versailles has been ignored. Certainly, Louis's decision to make him superintendent of buildings, which he did in 1683 right after Colbert's death, would indicate that his taste was trusted as much as his bureaucratic talents were needed.

But did Louis's subjects take their cue from somebody in the court when they began to erect monuments to his glory in the Roman style? Marshal de La Feuillade's own monument to Louis's glory, the Place des Victoires, was a brazenly unchristian, if not pagan, depiction of Louis as a king conquering all of Europe and subduing other monarchs. Then the great equestrian statue of Louis, the immortal Roman done by Girardon for the Place Vendôme, showed him as a haughty prince, with thin lips turned down and eyes coldly staring. These were the first lighted public squares, for dozens of lamps were to be kept burning every night so that the king's glory might always shine. But instead of seeing Louis as the Parisians saw him, let us look at the plans made by the city fathers of Poitiers for a similar monument. Their idea was:

The ancients, who desired that the centuries to come should lose nothing of the great men whom Heaven made master from time to time, in order to serve as a model for others, were not satisfied with celebrating their heroes in the immortal writings that they have left us, they also wished to give us their concrete image, and by means of statues and medals that were devoted to them, to present them to our eyes as well as to our minds. . . . France, which had been a bit negligent in this matter until the present, is finally beginning to awaken and to acquire the good taste of the ancients under a happy reign that is causing the fine arts to flourish once more; and since France has never had a hero more worthy of immortality than Louis the Great. . . .⁵

Plainly the desire to emulate the Romans had sunk deeply into public minds, and for a purpose too. The Poitevins continued:

That the statue which was the occasion for this ceremony should not only be an ornament for the city but that the inhabitants in addition should look upon it as their protecting god, and since it places them in a more personal way under the prince's protection. . . .⁶

Other elements were also adopted from the Romans, and there seems to have been no concern for how the divine character of their emperors⁷ and the divine right of kings might conflict. Seventeenth-century Frenchmen saw them as complementary.

The monarchy had changed, and though Louis never seems to have said how, his more perceptive subjects did. D'Argenson illustrates this when, after trying to figure out who had the right to put posts in front of his *hôtel* in Paris, he wrote that in order to discover the different ranks and privileges of officials and gentlemen, one had to go back to the reigns of Charles V and Louis XI, "where ranks had not yet been confused as they have been since, though from no real inclination of the French, who naturally like to believe themselves equals and who only cede willingly before their sovereign, before the splendor of the royal majesty which darkens and humbles every other *gloire*."⁸ D'Argenson was a devoted royal official for whom all distinctions and rights emanated from the monarch, which was the old *thèse royale* argument; but he also was observing something more. For him the monarchy had established ranks, but now it was confusing them and making them meaningless by raising itself so far above even the greatest subjects. Here we find the fundamental principle of Louis's court. He always paid more respect, formally at least, to a duke or a prince than he did to a *seigneur* or Colbert; but in making everything turn round him and his pleasures at Versailles, Louis elevated a smile, a glance, or a courtesy from himself above all familial or personal honors. Saint-Simon noted:

Never has there been anyone more gracious nor anyone who as a result has raised to such a degree the value of his favors; never has anyone sold his words for a higher price, even his smile and his very glances. He rendered everything precious by choice and majesty, to which the scarcity and brevity of his words added a great deal.

If he spoke to someone, whether about a question or about inconsequential matters, everyone present looked at him, it was a distinction that was talked about, and which always conferred a sort of importance.⁹

Winning a battle might prove less rewarding than a compliment.

So splendor had a purpose, and its results were insured by the king's police—like surveillance of every detail of ceremonies at a court where even the most private act had been made a ritual. Colbert proposed that Louis give clothes to every person in his court,¹⁰ with the purpose in mind, I think, of imposing *uniforms*, common styles of clothing, upon subjects of various ranks and distinction. Louis decided what everyone was to wear. Even in his old age, he battled against the fashion of wearing fabric buttons, mainly because he had not launched it.¹¹ In the undeviating ceremonies at Versailles, he knew that everyone's *gloire*, wealth, or even piety, would be outdazzled by his own. But to say that he aimed to reduce the power of the nobility is to miss the point. I think he worked to confound the differences between them, and to make *les grands* just like the other gentlemen.

Versailles was not the *salon* of France but of Europe. Louis combined the forms of a feudal court with those of the *salon*. He did for monarchy what Lorenzo de' Medici and Federigo of Urbino had done for the patrician republic. Artists, poets, and playwrights could mingle with princes under the glare of a king whose own dignity made everyone else's seem insignificant. The Sun King did everything he could to impress; it was his *devoir*. Surrounded by cardinals, ambassadors, *les grands*, philosophers, and artists, Louis attained the greatest prestige that any monarch could have. He realized that he could overpower his subjects with hospitality and intimidate foreign princes with splendor. "Hospitality" was what Louis considered it to be, though courtiers found life at Versailles very costly. But had not Louis's own carefree attitude about the cost of splendor set the style for those who sought favor? And furthermore, was not the denigration of money the aristocratic way, and the superiority derived from having ruined a few creditors still sought after?

St. Evremond gave a public definition of the court as "un extrait de tout le royaume: tout ce qu'il y a de plus fin et de plus pur s'y rencontre."¹² Louis would have liked that definition had he known

it. There is nothing feudal about it; the *curia regis* seems distant indeed, nor is there any reference to regional or social distinctions. The *tout* is remarkably ambiguous, in a way dehumanized, and yet obviously referring to people of rank or cultural distinction.

I have found no private definitions that are as abstract or idealistic as St. Evremond's. For, numerous as they are, those I have seen emphasize the artificiality and masking of personalities that was the court. La Fontaine wrote:

Je définis la cour un pais où les gens
Tristes, gais, prêts à tout, à tous indiférens;
Sont ce qu'il plaît au Prince, ou s'ils ne peuvent l'être,
Tâchent au moins de le paroistre.¹³

Individual expression, and even amusement, were restrained by what the king wanted everyone to do. He was freer in the early years, quite prudish and pious later on. La Bruyère called the court a "marble edifice" where the pursuit of favor brought out the sordid aspects of everyone save those having grandeur or self-assurance. Like D'Argenson, he believed that Louis's greatness diminished that of others: "There is nothing like the prince's presence to make certain courtiers ugly: I can scarcely recognize their faces; their features are altered, and their countenance is degraded. Proud and superb people are the most undone. . . ." ¹⁴ This artificiality went beyond deviousness, ambition, and dishonesty to include crude pretentiousness in culture: "With five or six artistic terms, and nothing more, one poses as a connoisseur in music, painting, buildings, and in good eating." ¹⁵ And La Bruyère sensed the loss of liberty for some courtiers: "A man, if he lives at home in his province, lives free, but without support; if he lives at court, he is protected, but he is a slave: one compensates the other." ¹⁶ Here was a commentator suffering not a bit from nostalgia for the Middle Ages; but even more, La Bruyère's study of the classics gave him a knowledge of psychology that permitted him to record men's motives and selfishness at court. His view of men is not unlike Machiavelli's, though the *Caractères* lacks a political program. But he was off in a corner so far as Louis and the court were concerned, an amusing and harmless writer.

During the years of spending and youthful debauching, it was not difficult for Louis to attract and hold his guests; but when he

grew older, more concerned about good morals, and impoverished by wars, he lost control. The court lost luster and interest for those who would not stoop to the cheapest devices of seeking favor. Versailles was like a play sponsored by a millionaire who never allowed it to close. The extended visit became too long, the entertainment became somewhat out-of-date, or so it was thought; but rather than change with the times Louis went on from ceremony to ceremony, and later, from mourning to mourning, until his own body gave out.

Paris had always been a threat, but in the last two decades of the reign its parties, plays, banquets, and *salons* became the enemy for the king of Versailles. He began to insist that courtiers not go to Paris by merely frowning at them and grimacing at those who talked about what was going on in the capital; when he discovered that they were still going, he decided to set an example, which was the usual device for enforcing laws in the *ancien régime*, by forbidding the *filz de France* to go to Paris.¹⁷ His ministers went the few miles only infrequently, and then they would write about the city's problems as if they had no firsthand knowledge of conditions there.

Louis had long since decided not to go himself. From 1671 to 1693 he attended only twenty ceremonies there; and he did not come to the capital again until 1701, after which he visited there only four more times until his death in 1715. This was an extraordinary change from the habits of his ancestors. He had made the court and the capital two distinct institutions, with the former the center of power, favor, and style. He had given the court everything he could to make all seem to emanate from the king, and he gave it a physical home that it occupied nearly without interruption until the dissolution of the monarchy. Diderot, or a collaborator, observes this change in the article on *cour* in the *Encyclopédie*, where it is defined as "always the place which a sovereign inhabits; it is composed of princes, princesses, ministers, grands, and principal officers. It is therefore not surprising that it is the center of a nation's politeness." The court was no longer an occasion but a place, and it is worthwhile to notice the change in the order of those who attended. *Ministres* were placed before *les grands*, not carelessly, but deliberately—though unconsciously, I think, indicating the loss in prestige of the great aristocracy.

Louis XIV's court had made a difference. His predecessors had influenced manners in parts of the realm, but Louis, through Versailles, made that influence felt throughout Europe. The *Encyclopédie* article continues: "Politeness continues there through the equality in which the extreme grandeur of a single person holds all those who surround him, and taste there is refined by a continual use of the superfluities of fortune." This public definition differs little from D'Argenson's comment on what Louis's *gloire* was doing to distinctions of rank, or La Bruyère's, on manners; but the article went on to add the private definition of artificiality—after quoting Montesquieu's definition of *air de la cour* as the "exchange of its natural for borrowed grandeur"—as "the seductive varnish under which are hidden ambition in laziness, baseness in pride, the desire to become rich without working, the aversion for truth, flattery, treason, the abandoning of all obligations, the scorn for the duties of a citizen, the fear of the virtues of the prince, the hope in his weaknesses, etc. . . ." This is not far from charging that the courtier is a traitor. He is described as a worthless hanger-on without distinction of his own, title, battles won, prayers said, or artistic accomplishments. Louis's *gloire* had outshone them all, to leave the aristocracy naked, a caste of privileged whose own merits were lost. They were useless as citizens, so it would be easy to condemn them as anachronistic commentators on services they never performed. Elements of the notion that Frenchmen had in 1789 of the court and the useless nobility were already present, and it took Marx in 1848 to generalize the courtier into the whole feudal nobility that lived on the earnings of others.

The historians of Paris who wrote in the first half of the seventeenth century usually begin with a description of the city as it was under the Romans, and then bog down in the controversy over the meaning and origin of the name of Paris. What did Paris mean, they asked, and from what language or word did it come, and why did the Roman name of Lutetia go out of use and come to be replaced by Paris?¹⁸

These questions interest us now only because they enable us to discover that the sense of time was changing in Europe, and that the new perception of the past made possible through the study of the

origins and different meanings of words and their usage was trickling down to local history. Chronicle did not begin to change into history for the study of his city until Abbé Du Breul (1528–1614)¹⁹ strove to discover the meaning of its name. He understood only very poorly the techniques of etymology, but for his subject he was a pioneer who applied new methods of textual criticism to the history of his town. It was simple to argue that what Romulus was to the Romans, Paris was to the Parisians, but could not something more be learned? Who was Paris, or what was he—a god, a tribe, a man, an angel, or a king?

Having successfully dealt with this type of question, Du Breul described Paris as the *séjour ordinaire* of French kings, the city of Saints Geneviève and Denis, and the location of many ancient religious, educational, and judicial establishments. He had no notion of it as a capital, nor did he make any comparisons between it and ancient Rome. But by about 1675 Paris-the-capital and Paris-the-new-Rome had both become somewhat worn clichés for bureaucrats as well as poets. What had caused this change?

I cannot add to the known explanations of why during the Renaissance men became fascinated by the literature, lives, and history of the ancients; but I can illustrate very sketchily its influence on Paris. Again we are confronted by the French obsession for everything Roman.²⁰

The confusion of ancient, medieval, and contemporary symbols did not seem to shock the makers of the *siècle classique*. The title page of Saulmaise's edition of the *Historiae Augustae Scriptores VI* bears a remarkable engraving of the coat of arms of Paris, which is a sailing ship at sea, depicted as a kind of Roman warship with a great bird as its bow, armed by dozens of cannon, and piloted by a buxom lady dressed in Roman armor. The sails are sprinkled with fleurs de lis, and the word "LUTETIA" is engraved just above the waves. This kind of blending of ancient and contemporary sources and styles is also found in the first descriptions of Paris as a capital.

In 1667 the Abbé de Villeloin brought out a French translation of the same work, thought then to be a collection of ancient historians writing on the lives of Roman emperors, and dedicated it to the king. Opposite the dedicatory page is a sunburst with the visage of a man engraved inside it, and beneath it the lines:

Soit que l'on me compare au bel Astre du Jour,
 Ou que de cent Césars, la grandeur je surpasse:
 Soit que de mes rayons tous les autres j'éfasse [j'efface]:
 Je puis suffire à tous par crainte ou par amour.²¹

In his preface Villeloin does not suggest that Louis could learn from the Roman emperors, because he had to imply that the king's wisdom was already great; but he hoped that the king would find his work useful for identifying certain antique coins in the royal collection.²² But more important, anyone who reads about the emperors would scarcely have failed to be impressed by the political, religious, and cultural importance of Rome, the center of all things for the empire in the second and third centuries. His translations seem to me to be very free; for example, he writes of *maîtres des requêtes* under the Roman Empire, includes Crespin's music for Marcus Aurelius' military song, and cites the Fronde in the index to describe a Roman revolution under Emperor Florianus in 276 A.D. This casualness, I think, was typical of not only translators but also artists, poets, and statesmen, who sought conceptions that they could impose upon Paris to glorify Louis XIV. Certainly, the medieval notion of Paris as the *bonne ville*, or most-favored city, was not adequate for men searching and trying to do the latest thing or to be modern.

Colbert was a very sensitive administrator who took interest in the architecture, art, and sculpture of his contemporaries. I think he was doing more than merely repeating what someone else had said when he wrote to Bernini that the King wanted to preserve the recent additions to the Louvre because they had been "built after the first plans made in the time of the first men of the world who lifted architecture from the tomb in which the barbarism of the Goths and the centuries which followed had buried it. . . ." ²³ As founder of an academy in Rome and patron of many artists, we can be sure that he must have had a fine sense of taste combined with a feeling of his countrymen's inferiority in artistic matters. But both of these characteristics were less important than his desire to serve Louis, and in doing so, identify himself totally with the interests of the state.²⁴ His imagination enabled him to conceive of a capital that would have political preponderance in the state and be a model of design and beauty for every other city.

We can grasp this imagination, I think, from his enthusiasm for everything about the new Louvre. After having received Bernini's first design in 1664, Colbert replied:

It is certain that there is nothing more beautiful, more grand, more magnificent than this design, and which better reflects the grandeur of the kings for whom it is destined. One could even truly say that the ancient Greeks and Romans never invented anything which showed more taste for fine architecture and which at the same time had more grandeur and majesty.²⁵

This was certainly an extraordinary compliment to Bernini, but it also signifies something more. Colbert did not lose sight of the purpose for which the building was intended. Art was not for its own sake but for Louis's sake, and for that reason it had to be of the best.²⁶ Obviously, Paris was for him still to be the *séjour ordinaire* of French kings.

In what must have been a hastily prepared outline of plans, jotted down in 1669, we can see the almost poetic vision that he had of the capital:

Water at Versailles—consequences for St. Germain
 Grand terrace to finish
 Gardens likewise
 The Louvre to continue everywhere
 Arch of Triumph for the conquests on land
 Observatory for the heavens
 Pyramids, difficulty in executing them
 Grandeur and Magnificence.²⁷

Was it an accident that in a somewhat incoherent outline Colbert would write "Grandeur et Magnificence" after his plans for Paris, rather than after what the king had ordered to be done at Versailles? Colbert either could not see, or he refused to believe, that the king's passion for building Versailles made the execution of his own grandiose plans impossible. He hurried masons and architects to finish the so-called Perrault colonnade of the Louvre, and he planned to demolish the houses he would have the crown purchase that stood

between the new colonnade and St. Germain-l'Auxerrois in order to construct a public square; but by this time his own passion for Paris, rather than the king's, was urging him on. Had not Louis already made it clear to Colbert that Versailles would be his principal interest? Did Colbert still hope to convince Louis that he should live in Paris?

Colbert had already done everything a servant-minister could do to induce Louis to give up making a great chateau out of Versailles. He began as early as 1665 by pointing out all the disadvantages of the site; but its unevenness and wet, lowland quality, so unfavorable for building solid foundations, proved to be nothing more than a challenge for Louis, rather than a liability.²⁸ Then Colbert appealed to the king's sense of purpose. He wrote Louis in the same year that Versailles might well be a concern of his for entertainment and pleasure, but that it certainly would contribute little to his *gloire*.²⁹ Colbert hoped that his appeal to the king's dignity and sense of duty might influence him to renounce his projects for building Versailles. But what was Colbert thinking when he implied that living in the Louvre was more glorious than living at Versailles? Then he continued:

To conciliate all things, that is to say to give to the glory of Your Majesty what it ought to possess and to his diversions as well, he could have all the accounts for Versailles promptly closed . . . and then apply himself completely to finishing the Louvre, and, if the peace continues for a long time, raise the public monuments which bear the glory and grandeur of Your Majesty farther than that which the Romans built in the past.³⁰

Colbert had a vision of Paris that Louis did not share.

He had proposed a new kind of *gloire* to the King, but Louis rejected it and built Versailles. For Colbert, a capital was to be the residence of kings, where every monument, church, and institution was to be dedicated to the king's glory and would serve as a memorial to remind succeeding generations of his immortality. As minister, he had founded in Louis's name the new academies of Inscriptions, Science, Arts, and Architecture in Paris to be vehicles for the king's patronage. Even the *manufactures royales*, such as the Gobelins,

and the new hospitals, such as the Salpêtrière, were all considered by Colbert as monuments to the king's glory. And all this was in Paris, because a city as capital served a purpose.

In the *ancien régime* education,³¹ law enforcement, and even techniques of manufacture were believed to be best inculcated through setting perfect examples that everyone could imitate. For Colbert and many of his contemporaries,³² Frenchmen had to be educated and foreigners intimidated by the splendor and wealth of a capital. This was his fundamental purpose for building monuments, founding academies, and subsidizing manufacturers; without good examples, the haphazard confusions and poor taste of the past could not be swept away. A capital had a function.

From whom else could or should the initiative for building a new city come but from Louis *le Grand*? With the king in the capital, and the best officers, artists, scholars, scientists, and engineers serving him, all Frenchmen and even Europeans could learn of Louis's immortality, taste, obedience to his own laws, and could become prosperous in the way that he and the Parisians were. Colbert wrote his son, Seignelay: "Paris being the capital of the kingdom and the *séjour* of the king, it is certain that it sets in motion the rest of the kingdom; that all internal affairs begin with it."³³ This was his own conviction and political advice to his son, who was to succeed him in his office and serve a great king as he had. So he set about to make Paris a capital and worked to realize this aim until his death in 1683.

Louis's decision to build and hold court at Versailles hindered but did not deter Colbert from attempting to transform Paris into a monument. After all, Louis would not live forever, but Paris as the new Rome was to last an eternity. In 1676 Colbert undertook to establish a new program of public works for the city, and he wrote the following edict in Louis's name:

After having given peace to our people by the strength of our arms, we have considered the public works and everything which could serve the conveniences of our realm as an object worthy of our attention, and we have done the same for our fair city of Paris, so that the capital of our State can better make its grandeur known to foreigners, by the number and bounty of its works, and mark the happiness of our reign to posterity.³⁴

There follows a long list of *quais* to be built, streets to be paved, buildings and fountains to be repaired, and other projects to be carried out by the *prévôt des marchands*. Colbert established the first all-city plan for public works in Paris. The idea and purpose of a capital were now established in France. Succeeding generations had only to work for their realization, and Paris did become an example for other states and even other continents.

In 1692 an official inquired about cutting off the façade of a building on the rue St. Germain and commented: "We have considered this new plan for the city drawn up by the inspector of buildings of the city as one of the great designs which it takes centuries to carry out, which often never are completely executed."³⁵ But from then on, there were laws, plans, and inspectors to oblige architects, kings, emperors, and prime ministers to respect a classical style in Paris and follow standards of symmetry and order.

Under Colbert and Louvois Paris became a new Rome, or at least it must have looked that way to anyone coming from a medieval or even Renaissance city. This was because of the monumental character of the public buildings. The city gates of St. Bernard, St. Martin, and St. Denis became great arches of triumph decorated with bas-reliefs in the Roman style. These sculptures must have annoyed foreigners because of the humiliating fashion in which their homelands were depicted as being subjugated by lions or trampled on by Louis, naked and in the guise of the god Hercules.

The new Rome included the Invalides, Salpêtrière, the Observatoire, three massive stone aqueducts and numerous fountains, the Pont Royal—the first stone arched bridge to span the Seine unsupported by an island, the squares of Victoires and Vendôme, and, of course, the Perrault colonnade of the Louvre. All were not done in exactly the same style, but their ornamentation, massiveness, and classical inspiration made a harmonious ensemble to celebrate the majesty and glory of the King.

Not everyone was impressed. Every traditional criticism made against monuments and their makers was leveled at the new Rome. Some said the buildings were stylistically mediocre and poorly constructed, others complained that their high cost made taxes too high and that the poor and sick had been given short shrift because

ministers had vied with each other in eulogizing the king in stone. Such criticisms were to be expected, but not the kind made by La Bruyère. For him Paris was still not a real capital. He thought that men in the future would scoff at the feeble efforts to build a Rome in his own generation:

We who are so modern, will be ancient in a few centuries . . . [and] one will hear talk of a capital of a great kingdom where there were neither public squares, nor baths, nor fountains, nor amphitheaters, nor galleries, nor porticos, nor promenades, which was nevertheless a marvelous city.³⁶

Was La Bruyère serious? I think this “modern” who had no nostalgia for ancient Rome nor sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the greatest ancient authors, was objectively recognizing the progress that had been made, and that there was still much to be done. Paris might not be perfect, but it was nevertheless a *ville merveilleuse*.

How much Paris changed during the reign is difficult to say.³⁷ Even the notion of it as a *bonne ville* continued to influence the administrators of the city. In 1672, after having grandiosely described how the monarchy had caused the city to prosper, Colbert tried to stop Paris from growing because he feared it might experience “le sort des plus puissantes villes qui ont trouvé en elles-mêmes le principe de leur ruine.”³⁸ Had something been learned from the ancients? I doubt it.

Efforts to stop the growth of Paris had been made before through fear of popular riots and insurrection. Colbert, La Reynie, D’Argenson, and Seignelay, all strove to improve law enforcement and to reduce the causes of crime in the city; but despite their hard work, humanity, and genuine concern that justice be done and people cared for, the problems grew more serious. The years of poor harvests, high bread prices, plagues, extreme cold (1709), and misery from unemployment put Louis’s ministers to a real test. Even a cursory reading of their letters makes one admire their diligence and intelligence in coping with problems that were not only extremely dangerous to the welfare of the state, but also to their own lives, property, and families.

These *commis* sought precise information on the number, location, and needs of the poor, so that resources could be used for the benefit of as many as possible.³⁹ They tried to regulate bread prices by

selling royal bread below cost in an effort to bring prices down;⁴⁰ and they inspected prisons, hospitals, and courts to see that no one was locked up untried, or mistreated. Hospitals were akin to prisons in those days because beggars, vagabonds, and thieves who had committed petty crimes in order to obtain money for food were locked in with the sick. Conditions were lamentable indeed, but no one can say that Louis's *officiers* did not strive to improve them.

What the king himself knew about these problems is difficult to determine. I sense that he was not given the police reports and poor-lists to read for himself, at least late in the reign, and that his ministers sheltered him from the most terrible facts. Instead, Louis was read D'Argenson's police reports,⁴¹ which dealt with cases where individuals had committed a crime or broken the moral codes of the time. Saint-Simon implies that the king's interest in the details of crimes, sexual offenses, and violations of religious laws was pornographic⁴² because of the suggestive style in which they were written; but he either did not know about, or chose to ignore, the care that Louis took to see that justice was done. But why did D'Argenson bother to inform the king of these minor individual offenses, which must have been a very small number of those committed in a city with a population of half a million? I do not know, but perhaps Louis thought the Parisians were now almost free from corruption, more chaste and prosperous than in the period a quarter-century before when he saw them last. Had he nourished a vision of an obedient and affluent Paris, or was such a vision cultivated in his mind by his ministers? They may also have been protecting a very old man from the truth. Several times, guards were sent out on the highways where Louis was to pass, to arrest or otherwise dispose of any beggars, and sickly or maimed subjects, so that they would be out of sight when the king went by.⁴³ Louis did not know about the sufferings of his subjects in the last years of his reign. And he knew little about Paris. Even his ministers went to Paris so infrequently that they were upset by the dirty and poorly lighted streets.⁴⁴

Louis's last years were sad ones. Courtiers tried to console a man who grieved for the loss of his loved ones but who remained outwardly serene. The rhythm of ceremonies set in motion a half-century before went on. Paris was ignored to the end. The capital was like a vast mausoleum waiting to proclaim his immortality.

1. Charles Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860), I, 122 (hereafter cited as Dreyss [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*).

2. A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930), XXVII, Appendix VI.

3. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 172.

4. P. Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-73), V, 511 (hereafter cited as Clément [ed.], *Lettres de Colbert*).

5. "Relation de ce qui s'est passé à l'Erection de la Statue de Roy dans la Ville de Poitiers, le 25 août, 1687," in F. Baudry (ed.), *Mémoires de Foucault* (Paris, 1862), p. 181. Cf. also Saint-Simon, *Parallele des trois rois*, ed. M. Faugère (2 vols.; Paris, 1880), I, 230.

6. Baudry (ed.), *Mémoires de Foucault*, p. 189.

7. This is evident in the Latin verses inscribed on the pedestal of the statue in Poitiers; see Baudry (ed.), *Mémoires de Foucault*, I, 230.

8. P. Depping (ed.), *Correspondance administrative de Louis XIV* (5 vols.; Paris, 1847-61), II, 836; letter sent to Ponchartrain.

9. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXVIII, 143.

10. In a *brouillon* of the *Mémoires*; Clément (ed.), *Lettres de Colbert*, II, ccxvii.

11. Or was it to preserve the privileges of some guild?

12. "Cour," in *Dictionnaire de Richelet* (Paris, 1719).

13. *Ibid.* "I define the court as a country where the people / sad, gay, ready for everything, indifferent to everything, / are whatever pleases the Prince, or if they cannot be so, / try at least to appear to be."

14. Jean de La Bruyère, *Les Caractères accompagnés des Caractères de Théophraste . . .* (Nouvelle ed.; Paris, 1933), "De la Cour," Section 13.

15. *Ibid.*, Section 80.

16. *Ibid.*, Section 67.

17. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XVI, 272.

18. As late as 1699, and before adding his own speculations, Moreri began to summarize the topic: "The authors are not in agreement over the origin of its name, or who were its founders. Several have said that Samotheses, who lived at the time of Noah, laid the first foundations of this Queen of Cities. Others assert that it was a certain Paris, seventeenth king of the Gauls, and successor to Romus. Eusebius attests that Paris was older than Rome. Julius Caesar speaks of that city as does Julian the Apostate, who stopped [there] for a long time during his stay among the Gauls . . ." (*Dictionnaire historique* [Paris, 1699]).

19. *Le Théâtre des Antiquitez de Paris* (Paris, 1639).

20. Cf. Max von Waldberg's *Der Empfindsame Roman in Frankreich* (Strasbourg, 1906).

21. *Histoire Auguste* (Paris, 1667). "Whether they compare me with the beautiful Star of the Day, / Or Whether of a hundred Caesars the grandeur I surpass: / Whether by my rays all the others I efface, / I can be equal to everyone by fear or by love." On the ancient text, cf., Sir Ronald Syme, *Ammianus and the Historia Augusta* (Oxford, 1968).

22. *Ibid.*, "Epistre au Roy."

23. Clément (ed.), *Lettres de Colbert*, V, 261. For a general history of Colbert's achievements as superintendent of buildings, see A. Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France, 1500-1700* (London, 1957). See also P. Clément, *Histoire de Colbert* (3d ed.; Paris, 1892), II, *passim*.

24. Colbert described himself (1671) when he advised his son to "consider that he is serving the greatest king in the world and that he is destined to serve in the

finest position in all those men of my [sic] condition can hold . . . " (Clément [ed.], *Lettres de Colbert*, III, pt. 2, 47).

25. *Ibid.*, V, 251 ff.

26. He asked architects to examine the quality of stone in old churches and monuments in Paris to find out which stone lasted the longest, because, as he said, "I am resolved to give all the solidity possible to all the king's buildings" (*ibid.*, V, 384). This factor was not so important to the later builders of Versailles.

27. *Ibid.*, VII, 288; cf. essentially the same version in Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, ccxvi.

28. *Ibid.*, V, 266.

29. *Ibid.*, 268.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Colbert wrote: "In the sciences and the arts, there are two manners of teaching, that is: by precepts and by examples; one informs by the understanding, the other by the imagination" (*ibid.*, 498 [written in 1664]).

32. Chamillart wrote Harlay about a *Déclaration contre les Mendians* in 1699: "You know that the example set by the city of Paris should do a great deal to assure success in the rest of the kingdom" (Depping, *Correspondance administrative de Louis XIV*, II, 771).

33. Clément, *Lettres de Colbert*, III, pt. 2, 48.

34. *Ibid.*, II, 555.

35. A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux . . .* (Paris, 1874-97), I, 1094.

36. In *Discours sur Théophraste*, ed. G. Servois (Paris, 1865), p. 22.

37. La Bruyère could still describe it as "divided into diverse societies, which are like so many small republics, which have their laws, their customs, their jargon, and their jokes." *Caractères*, "De la Ville," Section 4.

38. Clément, *Lettres de Colbert*, V, 537.

39. Depping, *Correspondance administrative de Louis XIV*, II, 675.

40. In 1693; *ibid.*, 683.

41. See *Rapports inédits du Lieutenant de Police René d'Argenson*, ed. P. Cottin (Paris, 1891).

42. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 735, 841.

44. Pontchartrain is a good example, 1702; *ibid.*, p. 745.

Myth and Politics: Versailles and the Fountain of Latona

NATHAN T. WHITMAN

“Versailles, ce serait le palais d'Apollon.”—La Fontaine

ALTHOUGH the palace and gardens of Versailles constituted the primary stage on which was enacted the grandiose drama of the age of Louis XIV, vivid descriptions of it, as apart from mere itineraries, are surprisingly rare. Perhaps the two most engaging are those by La Fontaine and Mlle de Scudéry, both of whom penned their accounts in 1668.¹ La Fontaine utilizes the pleasant artifice of an excursion into the country by four friends who seek to combine the enjoyment of nature and a not too oppressive solitude with a reading of the romance of Cupid and Psyche. The place they choose to visit is Versailles, and La Fontaine's classical baroque recapitulation of Apuleius is gracefully interspersed with poetic delineations of the contemporary royal domain. Scudéry's account, although embroidered with some highly artificial touches of amorous interplay, is basically what it purports to be—a little tour of Versailles for the edification of a casual and presumably feminine public.

Consonant with her inclusive purpose, the lady does describe the interiors and their furnishings in some detail, but she concedes that the château itself is rather small and that the ultimate beauty of Versailles resides in the gardens. She likes the diversity of vistas and levels and fountains, of rustling foliage and splashing water, and at

one point atop the *fer à cheval* her enthusiasm breaks through her usual preciousness and she exclaims, "Tout y rit, tout y plaît, tout y porte à la joie. . . ." ² La Fontaine expresses a similar delight but rather more quickly; jocularly pleading ignorance of Oriental fabrics, he dispenses with the château and its furnishings in one brief sentence and wisely expends his poetic talents on extolling the summer beauty of its setting. For both authors Versailles is essentially a pleasure garden wherein one could find refreshment and enhancement within a deliberately ordered realm that sought to evoke harmonious images of an earthly paradise. Not yet had Versailles become the overwhelming embodiment of the centralized power of the emerging nation-state, a symbol whose formal impact was to be felt from St. Petersburg to Washington.

However, the concept of Versailles as a representational stage does permeate the description of the domain drawn up by the royal historiographer, André Félibien, in 1674. ³ His account is dry, factual—an inventory of objects and materials, an official guidebook rather than a subjective appreciation. Now it is a matter of an objective program that unifies and gives cerebral meaning to the entire complex. "First of all it is well to note that just as the sun is the device of the king and as the poets equate the sun and Apollo, so there is nothing in this superb residence that does not refer to this divinity: hence, since all the images and ornaments that one sees are not placed haphazardly, they have reference either to the sun or to the particular locations in which they have been set up." ⁴ The Apollonian nature of the program and its relation to the king could not be stated in more unequivocal terms, although as the book unfolds it is apparent that Félibien mercifully leaves the precise interpretation of most details to the individual visitor.

A program as such was unknown to Mlle de Scudéry, whose embarrassing laudations of the king, the queen, and even the dauphin are all too obvious set-pieces inserted somewhat randomly into her pastoral descriptions. Although she mentions that the king has already given orders for the château to be enlarged, she apparently knows nothing of any intention to alter the still basically verdant character of the domain. La Fontaine is much better informed. If both authors are delighted by the grotto of Thetis beside the château and describe it in considerable detail—indeed, La Fontaine has part of his reading

take place within its cool depths—only the poet discusses the sculptural group of Apollo and the attendant nymphs. Likewise, in the basin within the *fer à cheval*, he accurately places the group of Latona and the peasants, and, farther to the west, at the head of the canal, the animated ensemble of Apollo driving the sun-chariot. In point of fact none of these statutes had been executed in 1668 and so La Fontaine depicts a future intention rather than an existing reality.⁵ But if he thereby reveals his awareness of the great sculptural triptych that will form the nucleus of the program of Versailles, he still comprehends it as a graceful mythological explication of an enchanted realm, and the additional allusion to the king only adds another level of meaning to the varied modulations of a complex artistic entity. In short, as a sensitive and discriminating poet, heir to a long tradition of pastoral literature, La Fontaine interprets the projected sculpture humanistically and aesthetically rather than politically and didactically.

However, such a cultivated attitude was almost certainly not shared by the sponsors of the project, Louis and Colbert. The latter had always viewed art as one of the many instruments of state policy,⁶ and by 1668 the minister had been increasingly successful in persuading the king, basking in his recent victories over the Hapsburgs and anticipating ever greater glories, to adopt a like position. Unquestionably, the doctrine of art as propaganda, soon to be so clearly enunciated by Félibien, must have been much involved in the new embellishments of Versailles. Not only the position and character of the patrons, the climate of ideas that surrounded them, and the scarcely coincidental signing in May of that year of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle point to such a conclusion, but at least one of the sculptural groups provides similar evidence. For if the two extremes of the triptych are sufficiently general in theme to permit both a humanistic and a political interpretation, it is very difficult to account for the choice and the particular rendition of Latona and the peasants without recourse to a specifically didactic purpose. I believe that a stylistic and iconographic analysis will demonstrate that this group is only comprehensible in terms of the sociopolitical premises of the age of absolutism and is in fact intended as an almost threatening affirmation of the principle of divine-right monarchy.

Like so much baroque art, even in its classical inflection in France, the Latona group is part of a larger entity and cannot be properly

understood apart from the setting that engendered it. Fortunately, a well-preserved topographical painting by the elder Pierre Patel presents a vivid image of the royal domain of Versailles as it appeared in 1668 (Fig. 3). For at least five years, intensive work had been carried out in the gardens: to the south (left of the château in the painting) an orangery was built into the hill in 1663 and a parterre created over it; immediately to the north, the grotto of Thetis was erected in 1665 and a sloping axial garden laid out that culminated in the circular fountain of the dragon. Simultaneously with this elaboration of the cross-axis, the major east-west axis was greatly strengthened: trees were planted to tautly frame the parterre immediately in front of the château; at enormous expense and effort the slope separating the upper and lower gardens was pushed back to the east and given architectural form through steps and ramps. At the base and within the confines of this horseshoe a round basin was excavated, more parterres were laid out beyond the basin, and finally in 1667 the central *allée* leading to the old basin of swans—shortly to become the basin of Apollo—was considerably widened. The basin of swans defined the western extremity of the original garden created in the 1630's under Louis XIII, but clearly the impetus of the enlarged axis would brook no such sudden termination. Hence in 1668 the colossal enterprise of the canal was undertaken, a great trench was dug, the adjacent marshes drained and planted, and soon a long planar sheet of water literally swept the eye to the limits of the horizon. The baroque garden had encompassed infinity, the Copernican universe had at last found artistic embodiment.⁷

Such an amplified setting dwarfed the old château. In the autumn of 1668 Le Vau laid the foundations for a new building,⁸ and in a sense work never ceased until that château evolved into Hardouin-Mansart's great palace of 1678 (Fig. 4). The architectural enlargement in turn led to renewed elaboration of the garden: the orangery was doubled in length, and the Lac des Suisses and the basin of Neptune gave unmistakable definition to a broadened north-south axis that echoed Mansart's new wings; a parallel axis in the great park was created by the cross-arms of the canal, which balanced the old menagerie against the new Trianon (see background of Fig. 9) and firmly integrated both into the geometric pattern of the whole domain.⁹ Thus the development of Versailles resulted from a con-

tinuous interplay of architecture and landscaping—Le Nôtre's garden led to Le Vau's and Mansart's palace and that in turn back to the garden. The rearrangement of 1701, which permitted the placement of the king's bedroom on the central axis of palace, garden, and city,¹⁰ was only the final, seemingly inevitable step in a dialectical process as beautiful in its way as a Euclidean proof or a Thomistic argument.

Turning more specifically to the early development of the garden, one can discern a similar interplay. Not only do the accounts of 1665 testify to intensified digging and planting but also to the construction by Italian engineers of the pump and the water tower. These installations provided the necessary water and pressure for the new pools, and in 1666 the great jets were operating in the basin of the dragon, in the basin within the horseshoe, and in the old basin of swans.¹¹ Significantly, in that same year Girardon and Regnaudin received payment for the plaster models of the marble sculpture planned for the grotto of Thetis,¹² and the Marsy brothers appear to have obtained the commission for the dragon and its attendant figures.¹³ In short, the provision of water was a precondition for focal features of Le Nôtre's garden, and both water and landscaping led to a demand for sculpture. Not surprisingly, the sculptural groups for the two pools on the main east-west axis were ordered in 1668;¹⁴ that is, after the widening of the central *allée* and the digging of the canal had provided, along with the jets, the proper revelatory setting for them. I emphasize this sequence of factors in order to correct the impression, current from Félibien down to modern guides and handbooks, that the intellectual program embodied in the subject matter of the sculpture either determined the organization of the domain or at least held primacy within it. This attitude, spread understandably by litterateurs, is simply not true. On the contrary, manifold technical and formal problems had to be met and solved before sculpture as a final decorative adjunct could be inserted into the comprehensive and total work of art that is Versailles. But once that moment had arrived, the question of a program becomes important and adds a final level of significance to a complex entity.

The Apollonian program of Versailles is both too well known and too obvious to demand much comment. The solar reference was

established initially in the grotto of Thetis, where Apollo refreshes himself in the chamber of the sea goddess after the labors of the day (Fig. 5), a graceful allusion to the château as a place of relaxation and pleasure for the king, precisely corresponding to the earliest function of the domain. In his memoirs Charles Perrault, secretary of Colbert, claims credit for the iconography, an assertion that in view of his literary inclinations appears initially plausible.¹⁵ However, he then proceeds to impugn his own veracity by stating that he thereby wished to balance the image of the rising sun at the farther end of the Petit Parc, for the accounts clearly prove that Tuby's famous group of Apollo rising from the waters (Fig. 6) was undertaken in 1668 and completely set up by 1671.¹⁶ Thus in direct contradiction to Perrault's statement it was the subject of the grotto that engendered that of the westernmost fountain, quite possibly at the suggestion of the so-called Petite Académie, whose four or five erudite members met frequently with Colbert to advise him on artistic matters.¹⁷ In any case Apollo and his train, originally in gilded lead and glittering in the morning sunlight that illuminated them from behind the château, provided a dazzling point of focus against the backdrop of the canal and announced immediately and unmistakably to every visitor that this was the palace of the sun. So soon was pleasure laced by the assertions of power.

If the basin of Apollo and its sculpture was meant to be seen from afar, the same cannot be said for the pool at the base of the *fer à cheval* (Figs. 4 and 7). From the terrace before the château it is invisible, and nothing impedes the view along the great axis to Apollo and the canal. Only as one approaches the top of the stairs does one discover the basin and its sculpture. One pauses, one descends, one diverges of necessity from the central axis, one considers the statuary, one turns and proceeds again down the great spine of the domain. Almost imperceptibly a transition has been made from the upper half of the garden proper to the lower half. In terms of the organization of the Petit Parc, this is the nodal area that binds together the whole and provides simultaneously a maximum of diversity and a maximum of comprehension.

Since the sculpture for this important area was commissioned in the same year, 1668, as the Apollo rising, its subject matter must have been as carefully considered. It concerns Latona, the mother of Apollo

and Diana, and thus loosely conforms to the developing Apollonian program. However, it is more specifically narrative than the subject of the other two groups and illustrates the story, as recounted in the sixth book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, of how the weary Latona, pursued still by the jealous wrath of Juno, came with her children to a lake in Lycia and knelt to appease her thirst. But some peasants gathering reeds nearby prevented her, casting insults at her and muddying the water. Imploring their pity in vain, she invoked vengeance from the stars; and immediately the abusive peasants were transformed into croaking frogs, condemned to the watery element forever.

The sculptors, Balthasar and Gaspard Marsy, have followed the Ovidian account very closely: the goddess kneels on a rock in the middle of the shallow pool (the elevating tiers are later; compare Fig. 9); she lifts her head to heaven and stretches out her right arm in supplication; with her other arm she grasps the infant Apollo, whose standing form balances in reverse that of his seated sister on the lower left.¹⁸ It is a correct classical composition, and despite the slight *contrapposto* of the goddess' body it is basically planar and intended to be viewed primarily from the front, although the outward glances and gestures of the children are also quite comprehensible from the sides. Only the upraised arm of the goddess breaks the compactness of the group and, seen from most positions, wavers awkwardly in open space. The torso of the goddess may well be a thickened adaptation of the famous antique Venus discovered at Arles in 1651 and eventually transported to Versailles in 1684.¹⁹ An engraving of it by Claude Mellan was issued in 1669,²⁰ at the very time that the Latona was under execution, and both its French provenance and its original identification by some antiquarians as a representation of Diana would have made it an appropriate model. Even the uncertain position of Latona's right arm may not be unrelated to the absence of precisely that member on the ancient statue.

If the marble statue is a standard example of baroque classicism, the peasants belong to another tradition. Executed in that lead which was frequently employed in the early sculpture of Versailles, they deteriorated over the centuries and have been extensively restored. Even so, it is evident that they exhibit a sinewy naturalism, a spontaneity of gesture and movement, that is far removed from the idealism and rhetoric of the central group. Along with the expressive

croaking frogs, they are a product of the northern heritage of the Marsy brothers, who were born at Cambrai and never made the trip to Rome. Here they are working in two styles, and if those styles clash, that contrast may be appropriate to the confrontation described by Ovid. The gap in social rank of goddess and peasant is embodied in a stylistic discrepancy whose abruptness the highly structured society of the seventeenth century—and of Versailles in particular—must have intuitively comprehended and entirely approved.²¹

But these leaden figures have another quality that differentiates them even more strongly from the prevailing mood of the major sculpture throughout the garden. With their huge gaping mouths, hands already turning into webbed claws, and, in two instances, life-size human bodies topped by reptilian heads, they give an impression that can only be called grotesque. Nor is it that form of the grotesque where the unpleasant is sublimated into the decorative, for these figures, which are of the same scale and on the same level as the observer, are softened by no graceful arabesques of curves, and are all the more disturbing—even frightening—for being so unexpected in this harmonious setting. So many more heroic or gracious themes from the Apollo myth could have been selected that one is constrained to uncover the motivation behind the choice of a subject whose connection with the Apollonian program, above all with the Apollonian spirit, seems more formal than efficient.²²

Latona as an independent subject for the visual arts had not been very common. Apart from a mediocre ceiling painting dubiously attributed to early Tintoretto,²³ it hardly appears in sixteenth-century Italian art at all. Malvasia mentions a painting of Latona and the Lycian peasants by Annibale Carracci, as well as a very large one of the same subject by Guido Reni, executed for the king of Spain.²⁴ Unfortunately, both of these are lost, but at least the sources testify that the subject did figure in that interest in Ovid that characterized the circle of the Carracci and their followers.²⁵ A mediocre canvas by one of these artists, Francesco Albani, now in the museum at Dôle, is listed in the inventory of the French royal collection of 1683 and may already have been owned by the king in 1668. Although it could have served as a stimulus to the choice of subject, sculpture and painting show no compositional relationship.²⁶

In France the story of Latona had not been singled out for separate emphasis, and early representations of it appear to be confined

to popular illustrated editions of Ovid.²⁷ At the very beginning of the seventeenth century it does occur in a more monumental format as a tapestry designed by Toussaint Dubreuil for the Plancken-Comans workshop, newly established in Paris under royal patronage. But in this case also the Latona episode remains part of a narrative sequence, since it is only one of a series of ten tapestries that portray aspects of the myth of Diana. The cycle proved popular and is known in several sets originally scattered in various palaces. Although the Latona panel exhibits little resemblance to the later sculptural group, the several editions prove that the story had become well known in royal and aristocratic circles.²⁸ However, it had nowhere been subjected to the isolating medium of sculpture, either in Italy or France, and so the importance given to the theme in the gardens of Versailles remains unprecedented. In lieu of significant visual sources the explanation for its sudden prominence must be sought within the French social and political environment itself.

Although on one level the solar program of Versailles may indeed represent in humanistic language a somewhat strained assertion of an underlying world order, it of course refers within the political sphere to the Sun King himself and to the unification and harmony that his anointed rule has bestowed upon the kingdom of France. From at least 1663 the conventional metaphoric image of Apollo as emblematic of beneficent power and reason, previously utilized in panegyrics honoring various outstanding men, had been reserved exclusively to Louis XIV, a mythic inflation that was immediately given wide currency through medals, prints, and paintings.²⁹ Hence it follows that Latona, who here wears a diadem, must be a mask for Louis's mother, Anne of Austria, regent of France during his minority, an inflexibly authoritarian daughter of the Spanish Hapsburgs to whom the orphaned young king had been genuinely devoted and whose death at the Louvre in 1666 had plunged him into a paroxysm of grief.³⁰ But this statue is more than a general memorial or conventional apotheosis, for unlike the images of Apollo in the grotto and at the head of the canal, Latona is presented within a precise narrative context. She clasps her children in a protective embrace and implores heavenly aid against the shrieking peasants. Fear engenders ferocity, and vengeance ensues in a direct and brutal manner. If on one level the fountain of Latona announces the punishment that will befall those who rise up against the divinely




FIG. 3.—Versailles in 1668. Reproduced from a painting by Pierre Patel in the museum at Versailles, courtesy of the Archives Photographiques, Paris.




FIG. 4.—Contemporary air view of Versailles. Photograph courtesy of Editions Tel.




FIG. 5.—Interior of the Grotto of Thetis, Versailles (destroyed in 1684). Reproduced from an engraving by Jean Le Pautre, in Pierre de Nolhac, *La Création de Versailles* (Paris, 1901).




FIG. 6.—The Basin of Apollo, Versailles. Photograph courtesy of the Archives Photographiques, Paris.




FIG. 7.—The Fountain of Latona, Versailles. Photograph courtesy of Gerald Carr.




FIG. 8.—The Fountain of the Dragon, Versailles. Reproduced from an engraving by Perelle, courtesy of Widener Library, Harvard University.




FIG. 9.—The Fountain of Latona, Versailles, before 1680. Reproduced from an engraving by Perelle, Courtesy of Widener Library, Harvard University.




FIG. 10.—Panoramic view of the Fountain of Latona, Versailles. Photograph courtesy of the Archives Photographiques, Paris.

appointed ruler and thereby seek to disrupt the cosmic order, on the level of the particular event in which the general principle is revealed, the allusion is to the war of the Fronde. The various stages of this long internal conflict as well as the complex social and economic motivations underlying it are discussed at length in other sections of this volume. It is sufficient to recall here that after the death of Richelieu and Louis XIII an all-too-familiar pattern was re-enacted in France. The high nobility on the one hand and the urban middle class on the other sought to reassert their prerogatives against the encroachments of the increasingly centralized monarchy, now under the guidance of Mazarin and Anne of Austria. Exacerbated by the prolonged economic crisis of the seventeenth century, the situation continued to deteriorate until on August 26, 1648, the Paris mob rose in defense of the "liberties" of the parlement, and the queen regent was forced to concede certain rights to that body. Not that the situation was so easily alleviated, for a long period of bitter civil war ensued, and the young king and his mother were frequently endangered and at times even virtual prisoners of one or another faction. Only in 1652 was a semblance of royal authority re-established; in actuality the social dissensions continued in less violent form throughout the decade, and may be said to have ceased only after the advent of the young king to full power following the Peace of the Pyrenees. To France then, as so often since, the only alternative to anarchy appeared to be absolutism. The whole internal policy of Louis XIV rested on that conviction.

Although it was seldom mentioned during his reign and never in his presence, the king never forgot the tumultuous events of the Fronde nor the insults visited upon him at that time. On the occasion of his marriage in 1660, Louis, deliberately but with no word spoken, delayed for some days his solemn entry into Paris; on August 26 the members of the Parlement of Paris followed dutifully in the train of the king.³¹ In 1668, the very year in which the fountain of Latona was commissioned, his rule had been so completely secured that he ordered expunged from the records of the parlement certain decrees promulgated against royal authority during the period of the Fronde.³² Where other rulers might have been content discreetly to forget, Louis still rankled at the memory of previous dissent. Dangeau recorded in his journal that when, on August 26, 1715, by fantastic coincidence (or was it by royal will?), the king lay dying, he sum-

moned the officers of his household and placed his great-grandson and heir under their protection. "C'est un enfant de cinq ans qui peut essayer bien des traverses, car je me souviens d'en avoir beaucoup essuyé pendant mon jeune âge."³³ Sixty-eight years had passed and Louis still remembered the crises of his childhood.

Thus when one recalls the public agitations that had convulsed the kingdom during Louis's minority and that, in his and many other eyes, justified the authoritarianism of which Versailles became the greatest symbol, it is not unreasonable to see in the fountain of Latona, illustrating the story of a beleaguered queen, a husbandless refugee with two defenseless children, a reference to those early disorders. In the fashion of the baroque period a mythological story is employed in order to raise reality to the plane of the universal—punishment from heaven will befall those who disrupt the consecrated order—but in this case both the particularity of the narrative and the harsh realism of the peasants point directly to a specific historical event, the Fronde, and even to those days of terrifying proletarian violence that inaugurated it.³⁴

A society, like an individual, has its repressions. Every early description of Versailles mentions the fountain of Latona, but in concise, objective terms that betray no hint of its significance. One must proceed by indirection. It will be recalled that the same sculptors had also executed in 1666 the fountain of the dragon at the end of the north parterre (Fig. 8). The immemorial association of the north with water and darkness, with evil and irrationality, still prevailed at Versailles, albeit, I suspect, somewhat with tongue in cheek. Hence the presence here of the dragon, along with the grotto of Thetis, the famous relief of the bathing nymphs—companions of Diana, goddess of the moon—and various statues of naiads and tritons.³⁵ Needless to say, this dragon is not the cloud-dwelling Oriental species but the Python, that monster born of the mud and slime whom Apollo, god of light, slew at Delphi.

The image of the Python appears frequently in official French art of the period, nowhere more prominently than in the great staircase, the Escalier des Ambassadeurs, which functioned as the state entrance to Versailles until its demolition in the eighteenth century. Its elaborate figural decorations were minutely explained in the *Mercure galant* of September, 1680: "He [Louis] put an end to the civil wars. . . . These revolts are represented in the opposite picture

by the serpent Python, because it derived its origin solely from the coarse impurities of the earth and because it was pierced almost at birth by the arrows of Apollo, who in this subject represents the person of the king."³⁶ There is no concealment here: the king restores order by destroying the monster of civil rebellion.

By analogy the dragon in the northern garden must have much the same significance. Indeed, in the official account of the splendid fete held at Versailles on July 18, 1668, in order to celebrate the triumphant conclusion of the War of Devolution, one reads that the ceremonies began with a promenade by the king and his court through the garden.

After their majesties had made a tour of the large parterre, they descended onto the grassy one which is beside the grotto, where after having considered the fountains which embellish it, they paused particularly to look at the one which is at the bottom of the *Petit Parc* on the side with the pump. In the middle of the basin can be seen a bronze dragon, who pierced by an arrow seems to vomit blood through his jaws, hurling into the air a gush of water which falls back as rain and covers the whole basin. Around this dragon there are four little cupids on swans each of which produces a large jet of water and swims toward the edge as if to escape. . . .³⁷

It is like a ritual. The victorious king, the living Apollo, stands silently with his court contemplating the dying dragon. No elucidation is given beyond the dry description; none was needed.

I believe the same—for contemporaries—self-evident significance informs the fountain of Latona, only there the explicit visual reference to proletarian revolution, the deep-seated fear of any aristocratic society, was too terrifying to permit any verbal comment whatsoever, direct or indirect.³⁸ In the dragon, by contrast, the antagonistic forces are not spelled out but are suavely abstracted into a graceful and conventional image. The social psyche has convinced itself that all is well by transforming evil into an ornamental arabesque. In the fountain of Latona such a playful stylization does not occur, the social sublimation is curiously tenuous, the specific threatens uncomfortably to break through the worn veil of the universal. It is why that fountain strikes a dissonant note amid the surrounding harmonies of Versailles.

The changes made in the fountain by J. Hardouin-Mansart, significantly an architect and not a sculptor, helped to lessen this dissonance

(Figs. 7 and 9). In 1680 the marble group was elevated to become the apex of a polychromed series of diminishing, circular tiers.³⁹ As a result, the goddess is aggrandized at the expense of the Ovidian account, which explicitly places her just above the level of the water. Since both the spectator and the peasants must now look up at Latona, the impression of hierarchy is increased and the positive sense of danger of the original grouping is transformed into impotent menace. Finally, the goddess is turned a full one hundred and eighty degrees so that her gaze follows rather than counters the relentless outward movement of the central axis (Fig. 10); she becomes an integral part of the architectural domination of the garden by Mansart's immense palace rather than a suppliant turned toward it. Through these three devices of enrichment, elevation, and reversal the architect has diminished the original narrational emphasis and sought to fuse the goddess and her tormentors into the unified generality of Versailles. He has not quite succeeded. In point of fact only the removal or drastic alteration of the peasants and frogs could have eliminated the dissonance entirely, and that step seems never to have been contemplated.

It is unlikely that the king would have permitted such a transformation. In his own brief guide to the gardens of Versailles he wrote as the second of twenty-five terse orders: "Il faut ensuite aller droit sur le haut de Latone et faire une pause pour considérer Latone, les lézards, les rampes, les statues, l'allée royale, l'Apollon, le canal, et puis se tourner pour voir le parterre et le château."⁴⁰ One does not need such a directive, one is literally impelled to this spot from which one can most vividly comprehend the total domain, where one senses most strongly the subjugation of the individual to the arrogant sweep of the palace. And it would have been congruent with Louis's unswerving belief in his monarchical mission that he would have wished the visitor also to contemplate at this pivotal point a monument that celebrated in the mythic imagery of the seventeenth century the triumph of divine order and justice over the forces of anarchy. In 1648 the Parisian mob had risen, and Charles I of England had been arrested; in 1647 the Neapolitan masses had revolted against Spain; in 1641 the estates of Catalonia had renounced their union with Castile. Indeed, the decades from 1640 to 1660 had witnessed violent upheavals against constituted authority throughout Europe. But the sun had risen, the miasma of rebellion had been dispersed,

the natural ordering of society had been restored. Such was the assurance—and the warning—of the fountain of Latona. By 1668 the age of absolutism had dawned; by 1680 it had triumphed.⁴¹

1. Jean de La Fontaine *Œuvres diverses*, ed. Pierre Clarac (Paris, 1958). The principal descriptions of Versailles are to be found on pp. 128–33, 185–88. Madeleine de Scudéry, *La Promenade de Versailles* (Paris, 1920; reprint of first edition of 1669).

2. Scudéry, *La Promenade de Versailles*, p. 52.

3. André Félibien, *Description sommaire du chasteau de Versailles* (Paris, 1674). I have consulted the edition to be found in Félibien, *Recueil de descriptions de peintures et d'autres ouvrages faits pour le Roy* (Paris, 1698), pp. 273–387.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

5. Although his descriptions of two of the groups are quite accurate, that of Apollo driving the sun-chariot, with its reference to the accompanying Hours, appears to be inspired by Guido Reni's famous fresco of Aurora in the Casino Rospigliosi. La Fontaine must have seen models of the first two groups but not of the last. Probably, as yet no such model existed. Only in 1669 did the sculptor Baptiste Tuby receive money specifically for work on the "soleil levant."

6. See the often-cited letter from Colbert to Louis in which he upbraids the young king for lavishing funds on a luxurious bauble like Versailles instead of completing the great palace of the Louvre. The date is disputed: September 28, 1663, or 1665, probably the former. P. Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, (10 vols.; Paris, 1861–83), V, 268–70.

7. All of this information is excerpted from the well-documented and still basic work by Pierre de Nolhac, *La Création de Versailles* (Paris, 1901). For the history of Versailles under Louis XIII, largely unknown to Nolhac, see Louis Batiffol, "Le Château de Versailles de Louis XIII et son architecte Philibert Le Roy," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, Ser. 4, X (1913), 341–71; and Charles Du Bus, "Le plus ancien plan de Versailles," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, Ser. 5, XIV (1926), 183–97.

8. Fiske Kimball, "Genesis of the Château Neuf at Versailles, 1668–1671," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, Ser. 6, XXXV (1949), 353–72. In this excellent article the author explodes the old assertion stemming from Charles Perrault that Louis, out of filial piety, refused to allow the old château to be demolished. Actually, it was the prudent Colbert, with an eye on the accounts, who urged its retention. But French scholars have been reluctant to accept Kimball's argument.

9. The arms of the canal were excavated first, in 1672; the Lac des Suisses and the basin of Neptune were completed by 1682. Nolhac, *Création de Versailles*, pp. 178, 243.

10. Fiske Kimball, "Unknown Versailles: The 'Appartement du Roi,' 1678–1701," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, Ser. 6, XXIX (1946), 105–12.

11. Nolhac, *Création de Versailles*, pp. 55–56.

12. Pierre Francastel, *Girardon* (Paris, 1928), p. 69, cat. no. 19.

13. Nolhac, *Création de Versailles*, p. 58.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73, and corresponding notes.

15. Charles Perrault, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1878), pp. 101–2.

16. *Comptes des bâtiments du roi sous le règne de Louis XIV*, ed. Jules Guiffrey (Paris, 1881), I, 253, 333, 419, 421, 431, 509, 513, 527. Rarely does one find such precise documentation, a triumph of Colbertian bureaucracy!

17. Antonin Fabre, *Chapelain et nos deux premières académies* (Paris, 1890), pp. 411 ff. Art historians seem to have overlooked this little group, which, consti-

tuted in February, 1663, functioned as a fine-arts commission in charge of appropriate imagery for medals, inscriptions, paintings, statuary, and ceremonies sponsored by the royal government. In 1701 it was officially chartered as the Académie des Inscriptions. Perrault certainly attended its meetings, whether as member or secretary; and when he wrote his memoirs some years later, he may have confused the discussions and decisions of the group with his own ideas. That, at least, is the charitable explanation of those many assertions of Perrault that have subsequently been proved either wrong or inflated.

18. The central statue can best be studied in the engraving by Jean Edelinck, dated 1679. It is reproduced in Nolhac, *Création de Versailles*, p. 71. The accompanying verse states that Latona is demanding vengeance from Jupiter, a monarchical specification of Ovid's poetic terminology, "ad sidera." Edelinck attributes the statue to Balthasar Marsy, but the accounts of 1688 note payment to Gaspard Marsy for "une figure de Latone de marbre blanc" (*Comptes*, I, 252). Otherwise, throughout the accounts payments are simply made to the Marsy brothers without distinction.

19. Francastel, *Girardon*, p. 79, cat. no. 51.

20. Piganiol de La Force, *Nouvelle description de Versailles* (Paris, 1724), I, 152.

21. Of course, the sculpture is the product of two artists, but their work is apparently indistinguishable (see note 18 above). They had a common shop, presumably with the older, Gaspard, in charge, and their many other statues at Versailles are similar either to the baroque classicism of the Latona or to the ornate decorativeness of the dragon. The peasants remain a curious anomaly.

22. It is true that in a triptych it would not be unusual to have the active scene in the center flanked by more general supporting images. But the term *triptych* should be taken as my figure of speech (the grotto was not on the same axis, and its sculpture was in an interior) and would not in any case explain the stylistic discrepancy.

23. Rodolfo Pallucchini, *La giovinezza del Tintoretto* (Milan, 1950), fig. 74.

24. Carlo Malvasia, *Felsina pittrice* (Bologna, 1678), I, 500, and II, 56.

25. Domenichino executed a ceiling fresco of Latona with her two children, but since there are no peasants, the scene is presentational rather than narrative. Such a depiction of Latona at Versailles would have been much more in accord with the Apollo groups, but then there would have been no need to write this paper! Maria Brugnoli, "Gli affreschi dell' Albani e del Domenichino nel palazzo di Bassano di Sutri," *Bollettino d'arte*, XLII (1957), 273, fig. 10.

26. Pierre Francastel, *La Sculpture de Versailles* (Paris, 1930), pp. 40-43. The painting is reproduced in figure 13. For other examples in Italian art see A. Pigler, *Barockthemen* (Budapest, 1956), II, 145-46.

27. For example, the epigrammatic version by Gabriele Simeoni, first published in Lyons in 1559. The illustrations are by Bernard Salomon.

28. Heinrich Goebel, *Die Wandteppiche in Frankreich* (Leipzig, 1928), I, 72 ff.

29. Louis Hautecoeur, *Louis XIV, Roi-Soleil* (Paris, 1953), pp. 14 ff.

30. This event may also have been one of the many factors that caused him to abandon the Louvre and eventually Paris as a place of residence. Immediately upon his mother's death, he withdrew to Saint-Germain, and on his subsequent and increasingly rare sojourns in the capital, he housed in the newly refurbished Tuileries. After January 20, 1666, no ruler of France ever inhabited the Louvre.

31. Georges Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1923), p. 168.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

33. Marquis de Dangeau, *Journal* (Paris, 1859), XVI, 128.

34. It is possible that the fountain could have an additional, more immediate reference. In 1667-68 Louis fought the War of Devolution on the specious argu-

ment that he was defending the rightful heritage of his wife, Maria Theresa, in the Spanish Netherlands. The original position of the statue, facing the palace and imploring, as it were, aid from it, lends some weight to this assertion. However, the peasants would be largely irrelevant in such a context, and it would not be characteristic of the period to immortalize so passing an event in large-scale, permanent materials or in a major area like the *fer à cheval*. The primary reference must be the Fronde, although a generalized work of art can, of course, have multiple associations. It can also accrue more. After 1672 contemporaries might have seen in the fountain an allusion to the Dutch, those croaking officious democrats who lived in a swamp and had no respect for authority either abroad or at home. La Fontaine uses that image, most notably in the fable "Le Soleil et les grenouilles," and it likewise appears in contemporary cartoons.

35. Edouard Guillou, *Versailles, le palais du soleil* (Paris, 1963), pp. 51-57. This author's humanistic, traditional interpretation of the iconography of Versailles is very suggestive. The present fountain of the dragon is completely a restoration of the late nineteenth century.

36. *Mercur galant*, September, 1680, second part, p. 310.

37. I have consulted the luxurious edition of 1679, *Relation de la Feste de Versailles du 18 juillet 1668*, text by André Félibien, plates by Jean Le Pautre. The passage quoted is to be found on pages 4-5.

38. It was hardly an imaginary fear. Revolts of peasants and workers had been endemic in France since the 1630's, and only recently, in 1662 and 1664-65, serious disturbances had broken out in Boulonnais and Gascony. Others would occur in 1670 and 1675. Such associations certainly clustered around the fountain of Latona and may account for its utterly unsympathetic presentation of the peasants, not unlike Mme de Sevigné's callous description of the punishment of the Breton *canaille*. In this sense the fountain assured the upper classes, aristocracy and bourgeoisie alike, of the king's all-powerful protection; but inasmuch as Louis and his ministers always suspected some upper-class conspiracy behind these popular revolts, it may also have been intended as a subtle—and unnecessary—warning. See Leon Bernard, "French Society and Popular Uprisings under Louis XIV," *French Historical Studies*, III (1964), 454-74.

39. Francastel, *Sculpture de Versailles*, p. 40.

40. Louis XIV, *Manière de montrer les jardins de Versailles* (Paris, 1951), p. 7. This short text, written in the last decade of the seventeenth century, reads like nothing so much as a manual of arms. There is no suggestion of strolling, of following one's fancy, even of enjoyment. It is an order of march for mannikins, chilling in its implications.

41. There is an epilogue. Among the paintings with which Mignard adorned in 1677 the gallery of Apollo at Saint-Cloud, the residence of the king's brother, appeared the scene of Latona and the peasants. In 1685, on orders from Louvois, this and the other paintings were reproduced in tapestry by the Gobelins workshop. Thus the episode had become part of the iconography of the royal house, so much so that when Louis's grandson, Philip V of Spain, built the palace of La Granja, he had included among the sculptural decorations of the garden a fountain of Latona. Not surprisingly, this sculptural group, executed in the 1730's by René Frémin, a pupil of Girardon, is based directly on the example at Versailles: the marble goddess is raised high on a platform and ringed by leaden frogs and peasants. But stylistically, the differences are immense. The peasants, all creatures of fancy with reptilian heads, have been marvelously transformed into lavishly decorative rococo fantasies; and the goddess, twisting freely upon her ornate pedestal, seems to gesture in regal greeting. The harsh relevancy of the prototype has been metamorphosed into a sumptuous operatic vision. Jeanne Digard, *Les Jardins de la Granja et leurs sculptures décoratives* (Paris, 1934), figs. VII, 2, and XXI, 1 and 2.

Louis XIV and Absolutism

HERBERT H. ROWEN

I N the "discussion without end"¹ that is history at its best, or at least at its liveliest, there are many forms of debate. Perhaps the most practiced of these in recent years has been that method of historical controversy which consists in finding the mote in the adversary's eye; that is, in demonstrating that his questions and his judgments about the past are conditioned by his interests and his commitments in the present. We are, I am sure, familiar with the transformation of mote into beam that occurs as one crosses the dividing aisle of politics and ideology. Yet, although historical debate in this mold has proved immensely fruitful, I should like to come at my problem in this paper as a controversialist, to be sure, but under the aegis not so much of the sociology of knowledge as of linguistic analysis. If I shall split hairs *en quatre*, *en huit*, and perhaps *en seize*, it will be because I am persuaded that the principal barrier to a profitable study of the absolutism of the Old Regime and, more specifically, of Louis XIV consists at the present time not in inadequate identification of the linkage between the different interpretations of absolutism and the various "present days"² of their propounders but in the tangled meanings of the key words we use in discussing absolutism.

It is commonly taken for granted that absolutism and Louis XIV form a perfect equivalency. I deny that this equation is satisfactory not because I hold that it should read "Louis XIV and absolutism are *not* equivalent" but for two other reasons. First, absolutism historically was defined to fit the case of Louis XIV, so that defining

the policies and activities of the Sun King in terms of absolutism is pure circular reasoning, which brings us back to where we started knowing no more, although perhaps thinking we do. If the term "absolutism" is to be useful, we must define it as a broad historic phenomenon rather than according to the traits of a single monarch; and it does no good to say that he was typical or representative, for that is just what we have to prove. Second, whether or not absolutism was so single or specific a phenomenon as is usually assumed, it is beyond doubt that the word itself has been used in a variety of ways. It has come to mean such varied things as "unlimited power," "power uncontrolled by subordinates or those acted upon," "monarchical power in the absence of a representative or legislative assembly," "power founded upon divine right," "totally effective power," and "tyrannical power," not to speak of whatever meaning may be ascribed to the word in such a historical illiteracy as "feudal absolutism," that phrase dear to the hearts of editorial writers. Our problem, however, is not to determine what the "true" meaning of absolutism is but to examine its many meanings in the light of the historical experience, and with clearer and sharper meanings to grasp the events and processes more precisely and more profoundly.

The historical picture of absolutism as it has come down to us rests upon one or more of eight main interpretations or approaches.

The first of these is the "national monarchy" concept. It equates the absolute monarchy of the Old Regime with the nation-state so familiar to nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In it the monarch is seen as the symbol and embodiment of the nation as well as its agent. A great deal of French historical writing, particularly of traditionalist and royalist persuasion, has been written in the spirit of this conception. In these works Louis XIV, in his character, his purposes, and his achievements, is portrayed as the very quintessence of France.

The second of these themes may be called the concept of the "personal state," because it sees the king of France, and none more so than Louis XIV, as the symbol and agent of the state. The king is the state incarnate: *L'Etat, c'est moi*, in the phrase attributed to the youthful Louis XIV. When the king acts, he acts not on his own behalf but on that of the French state; when he amasses glory and becomes the Grand Monarch, it is really not the king but the

French state that achieves glory and grandeur. This notion at first glance may seem to be only the first theme restated in equivalent words, but it is so only for the proponents of the national-monarchy concept. It may actually be held quite independently of the national-monarchy theory.

Indeed, the personal-state concept of the monarchy will often be found linked to a third concept, that of "reason of state" or the state as pure power. For this school, political questions concern power—who rules whom, and how—and everything else is ideology and mystification. For it the problem of the nature and character of absolute monarchy requires essentially nothing more than the identification of the *who*, the *whom*, and the *how*. Absolutism then means that it is the king who rules everyone else, and special emphasis is given to the role of the professional administrators and the professional soldiery as the instruments of royal power.

The fourth theme is that of the king of France as, in Richelieu's phrase, the "first gentleman" of France. The kings of France, including Louis XIV, are portrayed as really members of the class of the nobility, whom economically and politically they both lead and serve. The role of the royal court as the locus of the interconnection between king and nobility receives emphasis as a consequence of this interpretation.

Against this theme may be set its polar opposite, which holds that the king was indeed the leader of a class of French society but that that class was the bourgeoisie, not the nobility. This concept stresses the alliance between crown and town. The upholders of this interpretation of the absolute monarchy give particular attention to the higher personnel of the royal government, whom they portray as bourgeois *par excellence*. They also view Colbertian mercantilism, especially the high protective tariffs and the measures in support of industry, as expressing the same policy of favoring the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Both of these last conceptions of absolutism—that the crown was the representative of the nobility or of the bourgeoisie—may be seen as special cases of the general thesis that the monarchy embodied the French nation, depending upon which of these social classes is taken as being especially and quintessentially national.

The sixth important interpretation of royal absolutism is the "divine right" theory. It sees the essence of absolute monarchy in the belief

and the practice of the doctrine that the king is the living image of God and his lieutenant upon earth. The king receives his power directly from God in order to serve the general welfare, the good of his subjects, the interests of the state. But in serving that purpose, the king is responsible to God and to God alone, but not to subjects or fellow monarchs or pope. Any resistance to the royal authority is a crime against God himself. We observe, of course, how this doctrine can flow into one of the interpretations of royal power sketched earlier.

The seventh interpretation we shall have to consider is the polar opposite of divine-right theory. It is the view that royal absolutism was nothing more than despotism, a rule triply tyrannical in that it was not derived from the consent of the people; it was exercised arbitrarily, that is, independently of the control of the people and according to the whim of the king, and it was employed against the people's interest and welfare. This doctrine has been held by both royalists and republicans—by republicans because of the very nature of their first principles, and by those royalists who uphold the tradition of constitutional and limited monarchy, whether in its old "estates-state"⁸ form or its modern parliamentary one.

The eighth and last interpretation to come under our critical eye is what we may call the "personal and anecdotal" school. It is represented in particular by that special variety of history the French call *histoire d'alcôve*, but it also includes the kind of biography written to delectate readers in search of melodrama or comedy—history in the style of light fiction. In these works the king may be the all too human protagonist or he may be the *deus ex machina*; but it is only personal relations that are considered, not social or political institutions and processes.

The present problem in the study of the absolutism of Louis XIV is that none of these approaches is adequate in itself and that no combination of them is adequate either, particularly since some are contradictory to others. Indeed, I suspect that the doldrums into which the study of this subject has fallen in recent decades—at least in comparison with the study of many other problems—is in part accounted for by the state of uncertainty that this confusion creates. Criticism of established interpretations may serve to guide new research and lead to new interpretations, hopefully more coherent and better founded on the evidence.

Before venturing to suggest new approaches, I must indicate where I feel the present interpretations of the absolutism of the Old Regime and of Louis XIV in particular are at fault.

The national-monarchy theory fails in a number of respects. There is a difficulty with the very word "nation." The proponents of this interpretation do not distinguish between two different kinds of nation. I do not mean the "two nations"—the haves and the have-nots—of nineteenth-century politics, for the point of that distinction was that the nation, the accepted be-all and end-all of politics, was in fact split asunder; I mean rather the nation as a basic ethnic-linguistic entity—the "folk" in the extended sense—and the nation as a political entity—the subjects of a given state. The modern nation-state concept, of which the national-monarchy interpretation is a special case, equates the ethnic-linguistic nation and the political nation as either existing fact or something to be brought about. But the merger of these two quite distinct groups, and of the concepts corresponding to them, was the result of a process that in France culminated only with the Revolution of 1789 and was still very far from complete in the seventeenth century. This process of the formation of the elements of the modern nation-state in the early modern period has not been much studied. The relationship of the dynastic monarchs, with their supranational character and connections, to the nation—however defined—is still less studied or understood. The so-called empire of Charles V is the classical case of the tension between dynasty and nation; but ought not the whole question of the Spanish Succession during the reign of Louis XIV be restudied without the inhibitions of nation-state assumptions? In any event, it is clear that it is not only anachronistic to assume that the equation of ethnic-linguistic and political nations had been brought about by the seventeenth century but that countervailing attitudes and practices remained very strong, particularly as part of the dynastic system of power-holding.

The personal-state interpretation of absolutism, which sees the king as the personal symbol and the agent of the state, does not suffer from the anachronism of the national-monarchy school. The personalism of the monarchy of the Old Regime, and of Louis XIV above all others, is overwhelmingly evident. But we must ask whether in fact it was not the state that was the agent and the instrumentality

of the king, not the other way round. This is the patent meaning of the immense bulk of narrative evidence that has come down to us. The difficulty lies rather with the doctrinal evidence, which does usually put state before king. It is undeniable that doctrine affected practice, but it must not be forgotten that practice also very largely defined the specific range and content of meaning given to theoretical statements. The problem for historical research is not to prove the primacy of practice over theory or of theory over practice but to demonstrate the interaction between them in concrete circumstances and in specific institutions. To say that the king was the state is not to say that the king was nothing more than the state incarnate, nor is it to say that the state was nothing more than the king's will transformed into political institutions and actions.

The reason-of-state approach to the absolute monarchy also identifies the king with the state, but it is concerned not with the personalism of his rule but with its efficacy. This interpretation is often paraded as the epitome of hard-headed realism above all considerations of morality. Proponents of the reason-of-state approach to the study of absolute monarchy take particular pleasure in what we may call the "Machiavellian" rights of the state and the monarch, that is, the doctrine that in pursuit of the interests and the safety of the crown and the state, the king has the right to trample all other rights. In its starkest form this is an assertion, explicit or (more usually) implicit, that the ethical value of the state is higher than the traditional norms of Western civilization. However, as Meinecke and Mosse have shown, the doctrine of reason of state has more often been upheld by those who defend the traditional ethic but assert that the state, in serving the higher good, is entitled to employ the devices of "holy pretence."⁴ This problem of "holy pretence" cannot be wholly solved by historical investigation and analysis, for it is ultimately a case for casuists, a study in ethics. But where the "holy pretenders" at least admit that their problem is ethical, the "pure Machiavellians" believe that they have risen above ethics. But not only is their doctrine arrant political moralizing draping itself as objective science; even worse is their tendency to treat the state as a mystic entity and to assume that the eternal existence, the nature, and the worth of the state are all self-evident. But is this not self-mystification with new idols?

But, shorn of this Machiavellian moralism, the reason-of-state approach does have an important contribution to make to our understanding of the workings of absolutism: like the personal-monarchy interpretation, it draws our attention to the role of the state as the instrument of royal policy. But it is not enough simply to see the state in this light. It is also necessary to examine the relationship between the interests of policy and the interests of the instrumentality by which they are to be achieved—a relationship that may be one of mutual reinforcement, or independence, or even antagonism. The studies of Roland Mousnier and Martin Göhring on venality of office⁵ are particularly significant as contributions to the understanding of this question. Yet, when all this is said, it must be added that this is a problem of the history of political power in general, not of absolutism as such, except in so far as the relationship is shaped and shaded by other characteristics of absolute monarchy.

The historians who emphasize the state-as-power in the study of absolutism and disregard the problem of political morality bring out clearly the role of the instrumentality, but at the expense of neglecting the problem of the purposes for which the state is used. They avoid the pitfalls of facile political moralizing, but at the expense of committing the fallacy of reduction—that is, they treat all the diverse aspects of the reality of a great historical institutions as “essentially” or “ultimately” or “really” forms of a single “fundamental” and “underlying” factor. But we cannot gainsay the fact that the ethical element was in fact present for the absolute monarchs and their ministers, and notably for Louis XIV and his officials, in a way that cannot be reduced to mere aspects of power. In this regard our problem is not to find spurious explanations but, as Meinecke taught us in his work on reason of state, to show the actual relation of the ethical element to the other elements in the historical picture.

The concept of the king as the leader of the nobility was originally the republican-liberal vision of the nineteenth century but has become now the baggage chiefly of those unrepentant believers in nineteenth-century categories and theories, the Marxists. This doctrine is overlaid with naïve moralizing in addition to being beside the point. Need it be said that the historian’s work does not consist centrally in placing the right people in the slots of “good guys” and “bad guys”? Granted that moral judgment is sometimes quite to the point in history, it should follow, not precede, description and analysis.

Furthermore, it is a most dubious bit of aprioristic judgment to assume that "the" nobility are the good guys or the bad guys per se. In any event, the theory of the king as the leader of the nobility, however apt it may or may not be to the situation in some other European countries or in France itself after 1789, too blatantly disregards the central characteristics of political history in France *before* the Revolution—that it was in the first instance a struggle between the crown and elements of the nobility, that the opponents of the crown were primarily nobles, though not the nobility as such, the nobility as a class. Narrative history has usually not fallen into this error; it is hard to conceive how anyone telling the story of particular political events in this period could build an account of them on any other basis. But historians engaged in analysis and evaluation of the absolute monarchy have managed to an astounding extent to act as if the evidence of narrative history did not exist. The result has been a failure of analytic history that ought to serve as a warning to those adepts of the behavioral-science method in history who sniff at the history of events. If they do, they do so at their own peril. If events are not behavior, what is?

As for the contrary school, which holds that the absolute monarchy was the servant of the bourgeoisie, it is guilty of reading back nineteenth- and twentieth-century attitudes and assumptions into the seventeenth century. But what is the evidence for a revival of the old alliance of crown and town that occurred now and then during the medieval period? There is the assertion that the higher personnel of the royal administration, including the ministers and secretaries of state, were bourgeois. That a substantial number of higher officials in fact had non-noble antecedents is indisputable, but this in no wise proves that they remained bourgeois. It is also indisputable that through the purchase of offices that carried with them the grant of noble rank, as well as by direct ennoblement for such as the Colberts and the Le Telliers, the Lionnes and the Pomponnes, great servants of the crown were elevated to the ranks of the nobility. Envy of their rapid rise was hardly absent, especially among those whose own families had made the same upward journey in recent generations, like Saint-Simon; but there was also eagerness, even among families of ancient lineage, to join forces by means of marriage with these powerful new nobles. Beyond this is the fact that these men were first and foremost royal servants; their class status flowed from that

fact and did not cause it. The king sought for his ministers not burghers but servants (it may be recalled that this is the primary meaning of the term "minister") who were totally dependent upon him for their power and their prestige, unlike great noblemen of long lineages and vast properties. Furthermore, the very term "bourgeoisie" in its nineteenth-century meaning is suspect in the seventeenth century. The nineteenth-century bourgeoisie included businessmen, *rentiers* and urban landlords, and members of the liberal professions; it was the class of wealthy and well-to-do commoners. The constituent elements of that class were present in seventeenth-century France, to be sure, but there was very little of that easy flow of persons from one subgroup to another that gave essential unity to the larger, inclusive group. Money, important as it was, did not open almost all doors, as it did two centuries later. If businessmen were the key element of the bourgeoisie (and this is an indisputable commonplace of our historical vocabulary), then we may note that they provided very few recruits for the royal service, except through the means of purchased office, and then at the cost of the loss—the desired loss!—of commoner status. Businessmen, on the other hand, were certainly concerned with the economic policy of the state, notably tariffs and subsidies. But Cole's work on Colbert⁶ has made it amply clear that French mercantilism was on the whole feared and even opposed by businessmen as an interference with their trade, and that Colbert had in mind the prosperity of the nation not as a good in itself but as a means of improving the tax base of the royal revenues. In a word, the relations between wealthy commoners and the state in seventeenth-century France do not add up to a picture of Louis XIV as the servant of the bourgeoisie.

As for either the nobility or the bourgeoisie being quintessentially national, these are merely cases of the perennial tendency in political debate to portray one's own group as being the paragons of all virtues, the chosen folk. But this is merely vainglory mixed even more with self-deception than the deception of others. From the point of view of history, such assertions are unproved and unprovable.

The interpretation of absolute monarchy that equates it with rule by divine right, although it has been the special darling of makers of textbooks, has actually relatively little to contribute to our picture of absolutism. At most, divine-right doctrine is concerned with stating the arguments in justification of the regime; when, as in Bossuet's

Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture Sainte,⁷ it does descend to specific description and analysis of absolute monarchy, the argument curiously turns out to be more utilitarian than theological in character. But the central fact about the theory of divine right is that it is not essentially a theory concerned with monarchy at all but is a bulwark of any and all legitimate government. Not only is this admitted by Bossuet himself, but it is striking and thought-evoking to observe that Bossuet's contemporary congeners in the field of political theory in the Dutch Republic used arguments almost identical to his to defend the absolute sovereignty of the provincial estates.⁸ Bossuet, like James I before him, in defending absolute monarchy against rival forms of rule, was arguing not for the legitimacy of political power—the "powers that be" of Scripture—as such, for this needed no proof in his age, but for the legitimacy of a particular royal individual's possessing that power by historical right derived from inheritance or indeed even from conquest. The equation of absolute monarchy and government by divine right appears to be largely due to the dominance won in political thought in the eighteenth century by Locke's critique of divine-right doctrine, the form of justification of absolutism favored by the Stuarts.

As for the view that absolute monarchy was simply tyranny, it can be neither wholly accepted nor wholly rejected. First of all, the sense of law in the absolute monarchy was very strong: the king ruled by law, and he could change law only piecemeal and within pre-established patterns. Yet, government by a man who can change the laws himself is in a real sense government of a man and not of law. But to assert that all rightful government must rest upon the specific consent of the people is to make a metaphysical, not a historical, statement. Many governments acknowledged as legitimate in the seventeenth century by their subjects as well as by other rulers did not derive their powers from the consent of their subjects, either in their origins or in their own time. Indeed, the seventeenth-century definitions of tyranny were either "rule by usurpation" or "rule against the interests and welfare of subjects." Usurpation required no definition, although disputed successions and elections showed that misunderstandings and resulting wars could still arise. The problem of royal arbitrariness was similar: the king's right to make policy was unquestioned, although whether he was obligated to consult others and accept their counsel was disputed vigorously. Louis XIV was

certain that he ruled for the interests and welfare of subjects, as did all other monarchs of the Old Regime. The simple, difficult question that remained open was, Who defined those interests and that welfare?

As for the school of personality and anecdote, its limitations and flaws are only too apparent to present-day historians, with their proper concern for the structural elements and the processes of history, and I shall not expatiate upon them. Much, perhaps most, of what falls under this rubric is nothing more than the production of variously erudite "Walter Winchells." Nonetheless, the work of such writers as W. H. Lewis shows that the personal and the anecdotal approach is not necessarily valueless and reminds us, as we often need to be reminded, of the humanity of kings and their ministers, who were usually just ordinary men in extraordinary places.

Thus far, I have been a critic. Changing my role, I should like now to suggest positive guidelines for a better picture of absolutism.

First, we must re-examine the term "absolute monarchy" itself. The word "absolutism" is a modern invention, dating back in English apparently only to 1830 and meaning simply the system of absolute monarchy as unlimited royal power, with overtones of tyranny and despotism. But the term "absolute" was still employed in the seventeenth century primarily in its scholastic sense of "unconditioned, full, complete." Absolute monarchy therefore meant *pure* monarchy, unmixed with any other forms of government. The equation of such "pure" monarchy with tyranny, as the arbitrary use of power for self-advantage, developed out of the arguments of opponents. However, whether or not tyranny is a necessary and inevitable consequence of pure monarchy, it is not the same thing. We must keep in mind, too, that there is no such beast as *unlimited* political power, royal or not; it is always fenced in, even if the bounds are only approximate and customary. Absolute monarchy acknowledged many more fundamental laws than those made explicit in the work of political theorists. The structure of society and property as well as the moral universe of traditional Christianity were all outside the proper field of action of royal power. The absolute rulers claimed *not* the power to do anything but only *all* legitimate political power; they claimed exclusive sovereignty. It is undoubtedly true that sovereignty brings with it the power to define just where its proper field of action ends, as well as the temptation to extend that field; but

the absolute monarchs, unlike a later species of potentate, did not deny the existence of things beyond their rightful power.

Second, we must remember that absolute monarchy was the product of a particular historical situation, not of abstract theory; and its character was defined by that historical situation. The absolute monarchs in Europe in the early modern epoch were the result of the victories of the princes over competitors for power in the state. The absolute monarchy was the existing government shorn of the participation of these rivals in power; something had been taken away rather than added. This is recognized by Emile Lousse, who recently defined absolutism as the "estates-state" minus the estates.⁹ This is a very significant contribution to our understanding of absolute monarchy as a general European phenomenon, but it remains too narrow, particularly in the archetypal case of France.

The institutions of the estates, or representative assemblies, had largely withered away in France by the beginning of the seventeenth century, but the state was not yet distinctly or clearly an absolute monarchy. The rivals of royal power who still struggled for a share in the sovereignty, in practice if not always in theory, were the nobility, especially the magnates, *les grands*. Their assertion of a birthright to participate in political power has been treated by most historians as a senseless anachronism out of tune with the times, a foolish claim by a foolish class concerned only with its own interests and not with the general welfare. This all may be true, although it requires proof; but the nobility nonetheless acted on the principles of this asserted birthright and sometimes died for it. It was not until this claim of the nobility was defeated—decisively and, so it seemed, once and for all—in the Fronde that the absolute monarchy emerged in all its purity and all its power under Louis XIV.

Nor were the almost extinct estates and the quite active nobility the only rivals of the crown. The governmental administration itself, whose striving toward bastard feudalism in the form of venal office was given royal sanction with the *Paulette* under Henri IV and confirmed by his next two successors, was a claimant for a right of autonomous participation in the sovereign power no less than an agency of the crown.

It is important to observe that these three overlapping groups—estates, nobility, and administration—together formed what we may call the "political class" of early modern France, the total group of

those other than the king who were involved in the making and the carrying out of the actions of state, those who in the terms of a recent historical conference were both "*gouvernés et gouvernants*", the governed and the governors.¹⁰ It need hardly be added that the people—the common people—were not yet part of the political class and that their intermittent violent action was a problem *for* politics but not a part *of* politics.

To summarize this guideline for the study of absolutism, we may say that absolutism arose from the victory of the prince in the Renaissance monarchy over the rival "governed governors" of the political class.

But in itself this guideline, although necessary, is not sufficient. It does not bring out another element in absolute monarchy, that the absolute monarch was also the "complete dynast." Absolutism historically was the consequence of the triumph of *dynastic* monarchy. It came about when the hereditary king was able to enforce the claim to sole legitimate ownership of the sovereign power (as an entail from his family and a fief or office given by God), to the exclusion of all other claimants to participate in the sovereignty by right, especially by right of inheritance. In one sense, dynastic monarchy was still medieval, in that it represented the triumph of one element of the medieval hierarchy—the prince—over other elements—notably, the baronage and the towns. But in another sense, it shed the essentially medieval characteristic of conditionality; it became psychologically an alodium, a freehold that the owner might use and abuse according to his sole pleasure. This change, I suggest, was the result of the permeation of the entire fabric of society by alodial attitudes and practices within the forms of a decayed and almost totally discarded feudalism. The king saw no reason why he should be more limited in the enjoyment of what was his—the state—than subjects were limited in the enjoyment of what was theirs—private property.¹¹

Absolute monarchy also obviously included the element of personalism. *L'Etat, c'est moi* meant that the political process peaked in the single person of the king, that the king was no mere symbol or figurehead like Bagehot's Victoria. On the contrary, he was centrally necessary to the functioning of the state, either as the creator and upholder of the principal minister, like Louis XIII, or as his own

principal minister, in the fashion of Louis XIV. It may be remarked that for Louis XIV, monarchy was not truly complete unless there was no Richelieu, no Mazarin, however great had been the services of these ministers to the cause of absolute monarchy.

What were the consequences of absolute monarchy as we have delimited and defined it?

First was the distortion of the relationship between the king and the political class. Some of the political class slid into a parasitical dependence upon the crown. At worst, politics degenerated into mere intrigue; at best, it became political debate without the opportunity for the debaters to test theory by personal political experience. Nonetheless, the political class remained inevitably the foundation of the power of the crown; its weakness ultimately became the weakness of the crown.

Second, the monarchs of the eighteenth century were so transfixed by the image of the Grand Monarch that they were unwilling and unable to undertake an effective transformation of both state and society to meet new needs.

Lastly, exaggerated personalism became a central part of the image of absolute monarchy. In this as in much else, Louis XIV ought to have been a warning no less than a model. The doctrine that the state existed for the service of the ruled, although never called into doubt in political theory in this time, was too obviously contradicted by the use of the state for the personal advantage of the monarch. Thus, by providing an object of reprehension, the Grand Monarchy also tended to shape the character of the opposition to it.

Notes in this paper shall mention only works specifically referred to. Otherwise, each paragraph would require reference by the score at the very least, and the apparatus would balloon into a major bibliography of sources and studies. In any case, the writer's analysis and judgment, although fed by a hundred streams, are his own; responsibility for what he takes and what he discards, no less than for what he adds, must therefore be his own too.

1. P. Geyl, *Napoleon: Voor en tegen in de Franse geschiedschrijving* (Utrecht, 1946), p. 5; Olive Renier, in her English translation, *Napoleon For and Against* (New Haven, Conn., 1949), translates "discussie zonder einde" as "argument without end."

2. J. H. Hexter, "The Historian and His Day," in *Reappraisals in History* (Evanston, Ill., 1961), pp. 1-13.

3. "Estates-state" is abominable English, but how else is one to translate the German *Ständestaat*, which is just what I mean? I shall be thankful to the master of English phrase who can do better.

4. Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte* (Munich and Berlin, 1925); George L. Mosse, *The Holy Pretence* (Oxford, 1957).

5. Roland Mousnier, *La Vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Rouen, 1946); Martin Göhring, *Die Ämterkäuflichkeit im Frankreich* (Berlin, 1938).

6. Charles Woolsey Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism* (2 vols.; New York, 1939).

7. Bossuet's posthumous work has never been translated into English in its entirety, although fragments appear in books of readings.

8. See especially E. H. Kossmann, *Politieke theorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse Nederland* (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkonden, nieuwe reeks, Vol. LXVII, no. 2 [Amsterdam, 1960]).

9. Emile Lousse, "Absolutisme, droit divin, despotisme éclairé," *Schweizer Beiträge zur Allgemeine Geschichte*, XVI (1958), 91. This passage was translated by Heinz Lubasz in his *The Development of the Modern State* (New York, 1964), p. 43.

10. The title of a joint session of the Société Jean Bodin and the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions, held in Brussels in June, 1961.

11. See my "L'Etat c'est à moi: Louis XIV and the State," *French Historical Studies*, II, (1961), 83-98.

Some Problems in Tracing the Intellectual Development of Louis XIV from 1661 to 1715¹

ANDREW LOSSKY

TO AVOID a misunderstanding that the title of this essay may suggest, let us point out at once that Louis XIV was not an intellectual in the true sense of the word. Though endowed with an intelligence above the average (and here we venture to disagree with Saint-Simon's appraisal), the king laid no claim to be either an original or a profound thinker, let alone a professional philosopher. In his *Mémoires*, written when he was barely thirty years old, Louis spoke with the weariness of a schoolboy of "some dark and thorny regions of science . . . where the mind attempts with effort to raise itself above its reach, most often to accomplish nothing; their uselessness, at least their apparent uselessness, repels us as much as their difficulty."² But, illustrating Descartes's famous dictum, Louis thought himself abundantly provided with good sense. This was rather important, since "the principal function of kings is to let common sense work, and it always works naturally and without strain."³ Louis XIV found many occasions to congratulate himself on faithfully discharging the principal duty of his office; this is, in fact, the main theme of his *Mémoires*. True enough, the same *Mémoires* contain some passages from which it appears that the "bon sens" did not always operate with such ease; less than ten years after completing the main body of the *Mémoires*, the king drafted some pages on the

difficulties and torments of decision-making.⁴ Yet, to the end he remained an apostle of common sense; only to give it effect, he put more and more emphasis on continuous and unremitting application to his work.

A man of action, believing in rational common sense, seldom has an elaborate and consistent philosophical system worked out to the last detail. But he cannot fail to have a set of assumptions, or "mood-thoughts," that may or may not be consistent with one another, and that form the basis of most of his conscious actions. To the process of decision-making of such a person we cannot deny the name of thought, though it is not of the same quality as the ratiocination of a philosopher. It is legitimate for a historian to inquire into this domain, for there is no other way to understand the idiosyncrasies of his actors. In the case of Louis XIV such an inquiry is made possible by the fact that the king liked to reason things out, either in oral discussions or on paper; as he himself said, it helped him to clarify his own mind when he had to express his thoughts in words.

Louis XIV looked upon himself as an incarnation of classicist reason. All might change around him, but the king remained always the same, upholding, under God's dispensation, the immutable principles of reason and justice, a vigilant guardian of the interests of his state. Since Louis sincerely believed that he was cast for this role, he convinced most of his contemporaries that this was indeed a faithful representation of him. The same impression, moreover, was passed on to many of the historians who have written about him. This is not the place to discuss the historiography of Louis XIV. Let us merely note that to most historians, regardless of whether they have praised or damned Louis, the king remained a static figure throughout his personal reign. G. Lacour-Gayet, in his *L'Education politique de Louis XIV*, has shown how the king had got to the point where we find him in the 1660's; regrettably, however, he never followed up his work to show Louis's further growth. Lavissee, in Volumes VII and VIII of his *Histoire de France*, gives an excellent panorama of the whole period, in which the king receives the attention that he deserves. The reader cannot fail to be taken in by Lavissee's picture of the monarch growing old and more devout; but, apart from this, there seems to be very little change in Louis's outlook and ideas.

Yet, no one denies that changes were occurring in the France of Louis XIV. Since the first half of the reign was spectacularly successful and the second half just as obviously unsuccessful, it is generally taken for granted that these changes were for the worse. Many explanations have been advanced to account for the deterioration of Louis's fortune: the king's health, absolutism becoming "overripe" and drying up initiative in the country, irresistible trends and forces changing the face of Europe. The royal advisers also figure prominently: thus Colbert's influence is usually supposed to have been good; Louvois's, evil; Madame de Maintenon's, either good or evil, depending on the historian's predilections and degree of acquaintance with her.⁶ In most of these interpretations, however, it is tacitly assumed that the king's own basic ideas—if he had any—remained the same from 1661 to 1715.

To suffer no alteration in one's beliefs in the course of fifty-four years of adult life is a sign either of extreme stupidity or of grave mental derangement. Since neither of these descriptions fits Louis XIV, we can take it for granted that changes did in fact occur in his thinking. The problem, therefore, is to detect and to define them. At this point we must admit that if we adhere rigorously to the formalist method of research, the sources available to us may appear to be inadequate both in their quantity and in their quality. Unfortunately for us, members of the *conseil d'en haut* guarded well the secret of the deliberations in that body, which seem to have been remarkably free and candid. No minutes were kept of their meetings. For the early 1660's the papers of Colbert and of others contain summaries of several conversations held in the council. We also have the *Journal* of Torcy from November, 1709, to May, 1711, where he reports what was said there. For the rest we have only a few scattered glimpses of the proceedings in the king's council. The king, however, liked to let his trusted subordinates know the reasons for his decisions, and in his correspondence we find a number of arguments and digressions on various subjects, with the aid of which it is possible to reconstruct some of his assumptions and mental processes. Leaving aside for the moment the question of authenticity of royal correspondence, let us note that it contains one group of letters that forms a class apart. Between 1701 and 1715 Louis XIV

sent over five hundred letters to his grandson, Philip V of Spain, whom he tried hard, though with little success, to teach the art of kingcraft.^{5a} Here, if anywhere, we can come close to the real thought of Louis XIV.

Unlike Philip II or William III, Louis XIV rarely held the pen in his hand. Instead, he preferred to dictate his memoranda or to give orally the substance of the amendments and insertions to be made in the dispatches. The main autographic writings that remain from Louis XIV comprise his guide to the gardens of Versailles; some military memoirs of the war of 1672-78 (of little interest); the "Métier de roi" (1679); short letters to persons in his immediate entourage; the advice to Philip V in December, 1700, and some of the subsequent confidential letters to him; and a draft of a harangue (1710); to these we must add the purely formal messages of congratulation or condolence to the other reigning monarchs. Most of the letters in this last category were not even written by Louis himself but by special secretaries, like Rose or Torcy, who were skilled in counterfeiting the king's hand. Even the bulk of the *Mémoires* was penned, not by the king, but by Périgny or by Pellisson, a fact that has led some critics to attack their authenticity.

The autographic material we have enumerated is clearly inadequate for an analysis of Louis's ideas, especially if we wish to follow their evolution throughout his reign. Before embarking on such an enterprise, we must cast off the fetters of indiscriminate and hypercritical formalism, which can be as noxious to history as is naïve credulity or carelessness. That Louis XIV was not the clerk who wrote out every word of his *Mémoires* and of every letter that he signed does not mean that his role in their composition was perfunctory. The various drafts of the *Mémoires* and of the more important outgoing dispatches contain many marks of the king's pencil. Sometimes, Louis merely changed some expressions, for he was an accomplished stylist; elsewhere he deleted whole passages, or altered or expanded a paragraph. It is fairly obvious that wherever we find the king's pencil or pen at work, we have a document whose final version Louis fully approved.

This is not all, for there are many documents not marked by Louis's pencil that, nevertheless, can be attributed to him. When any matter of importance was decided in the council, the minister concerned drafted the king's letter. Sometimes he did it in the king's

presence; in the later part of the reign one or several ministers would repair to Madame de Maintenon's room in the evening, where they would do their homework under the king's eye and in consultation with him; sometimes these sessions were indistinguishable from the regular meetings of the council. At other times the minister would bring his finished draft to the king, who would read or listen to it and then either approve it as it stood or order some changes to be made; these changes would then be inserted in the minister's hand. It is not always possible to ascertain whether a substantial alteration in the draft originated from Louis or from his minister, or from a consultation between them. But in most cases there can be little doubt that the final product was fully approved by Louis; this is especially true of the passages that were added on as amendments. Occasionally, one comes across a dispatch that has been completely rewritten, sometimes in the sense opposite to the original draft; this was usually the result of lengthy deliberations in the *conseil d'en haut*.⁶

The true authorship of the king's letters hinges on the nature of relations between Louis and his ministers: did the ministers shape the royal mind and express their own ideas in the letters they drafted, or were they merely the mouthpieces of the king? Louis himself entertained no doubts on that score: it was he who moulded his counselors, and he himself was the ultimate author of the good advice that came to him. The function of the ministers was to give candid advice and then to find the suitable expedients to carry out the royal decision, seeing to it that no detail or difficulty was overlooked. The actual situation was not quite so simple, for most of Louis's ministers, with the exception of the colorless Phélypeaux family, were strong men who held well-defined views of their own. Lionne, Le Tellier, Colbert, Seignelay, Croissy, Louvois, Pomponne, Torcy, Beauvillier, and Desmaretz were not mere file clerks. Since these advisers were more or less evenly distributed throughout the reign, the belief that Louis was served by capable ministers in the first half of his reign and by feckless time-servers in the second half lacks foundation, unless we choose to single out Colbert for a solitary pedestal.⁷

In the first half of his reign Louis seems to have kept or chosen his ministers because their main ideas were consonant with his own; in the second half, because they reflected some aspect of his person-

ality, which, in maturing, had become more complex and liable to combine contradictory elements. The king, however, did not expect his servants to agree with him in all matters; what he demanded of them was loyal and prompt compliance with his decision once it was made. Torcy's *Journal* records many instances in which he disagreed with his master,⁸ and, in the earlier part of the reign, there are indications that Lionne did not always agree with the king. But when it came to writing the royal letters, the same Torcy or Lionne faithfully followed Louis's decisions and views. This could hardly have been otherwise, for Louis would not have been slow to discover his minister's deviation and to correct it. Yet, the degree of Louis's supervision varied from department to department and from one period of the reign to another. Only in foreign affairs did his attention remain constant throughout.

The supervision of the king explains why the changes in ideas underlying his letters did not always coincide with changes in the ministry; this is a further indication that these ideas belonged mainly to Louis, at least by adoption. Against this it may be argued that one of the most striking changes came about when Colbert de Croissy replaced Pomponne as foreign secretary in November, 1679. But the change in the king's ideas that resulted in Pomponne's dismissal had occurred before that date.⁹ Moreover, in the first few months after Croissy had taken over Pomponne's job, the number of corrections in the drafts drawn up by the minister increased drastically. More often than not, these corrections altered the mode of expression rather than the basic meaning of the document: Croissy's original words were often appallingly brutal and insulting, whereas the final versions stated the same thing in courteous, though forceful and unambiguous, terms. Since these corrections, just as the original drafts, are in Croissy's hand, we cannot affirm with certainty that Louis was the author of them all. Yet, the corrections often bear the imprint of the royal style, and we are probably witnessing the lessons of polite international intercourse that the king administered to his servant.

Of course, Louis did not read all of the letters that all of his secretaries wrote. But we can assume that he read those of them in which an important new departure was made; at other times he proceeded by the method of spot-checking, which he recommended in

his *Mémoires*. There were some departments that he always kept under close surveillance: he never let foreign policy out of his hands, and the same is true, to a lesser extent, of army administration. In the other departments, as has been said before, the degree of his attention varied in different periods of the reign. For instance, in the several versions of the memoirs for 1661, it is stated that "no matters of real consequence" passed through the hands of the secretaries of state for the royal household and for Huguenot affairs.¹⁰ Between them these two secretaries were responsible for much of the internal administration of the realm. It is unlikely that Louis would have rated their departments so low in the later 1670's. When Louis liked and trusted the archbishop of Paris, as he did François de Harlay (1671-95), this prelate was in fact the king's minister for ecclesiastical affairs and received many confidential communications from Louis. Needless to say, no such good relations existed between Louis and Harlay's successor, Cardinal de Noailles, who was strongly suspected of Jansenism. In the later years the functions of a minister for ecclesiastical affairs were in practice exercised by the king's confessor, Père La Chaize, although Bossuet continued to set the ideological tone in these matters. In the last ten or fifteen years of Louis's reign, some of the late-comers to the ministry, like Desmaretz or Voysin, developed a new manner of writing, which was in striking contrast with the style of Colbert, Le Tellier, or even Louvois. Whereas these early ministers had ascribed all decisions and directives to the king, many of the later ones developed the habit of writing and issuing orders in their own name; their occasional references to the king sound like afterthoughts.¹¹ However, this was not true of Torcy, the foreign minister; in his department Louis's presence remained undiminished and constant to the end. In the documents dealing with foreign affairs, we thus have a source of more or less uniform value for tracing Louis's intellectual development throughout his reign. It is mainly on impressions gathered from this source that the following sketch is based; it is necessarily incomplete.

We can classify Louis's beliefs into three categories, considering not their contents, nor the intensity with which they were held, but only their persistence. The king held some of his beliefs and attitudes

fairly consistently throughout the personal reign; others underwent one or two major changes; still others changed at relatively frequent intervals, leaving, nevertheless, a distinct imprint on his policy.

Among the permanent elements of Louis XIV's idiosyncrasy was the belief in the "natural order of things," which God had established; it comprised a set of norms reflecting the ideal state of the world. These norms, however, were not self-enforcing; they required either a human agency or a special intervention of the Divine Providence to make them operative. But the Divine Providence usually worked through intermediary agencies, by endowing some persons with certain gifts: "God does not do our work without us."¹² The "natural order of things" could best be discovered by reason, and, in this sense, Louis remained a rationalist all his life. The application of reason demanded incessant labor on his part, which consisted largely in gathering information, for "he who is poorly informed cannot help but reason poorly."¹³ Louis's rationalism also showed itself in his faith in calculation in mathematical or mechanical terms. The "geometric spirit" pervaded his personal tastes and his view of human nature, and it inspired his predilection for siege warfare. The same spirit also resulted in perfectionism, which at times bordered on indecision: the king did not like to act rashly, before all the pieces were set in their appointed positions on his chessboard. When, on a few occasions, he took precipitate action, the results were usually harmful to him; these deviations from the path of reason occurred mainly in the later 1680's when he was passing through a period of confusion.

Louis did not have a high opinion of human nature. Man was above all an egoistic creature, whose chief drive was to procure private advantage for himself and to gratify his passions that sprang from his unreasonable nature. Most of man's actions, however, were controlled by the two mainsprings of fear and hope; the latter, depending on man's inclinations and social status, assumed the form of ambition, vanity, or greed, or a combination of these vices. The art of governing or of influencing people consisted in a large measure of applying these stimuli in the right dose and at the proper time. Though some of Louis's worst miscalculations can be traced to this naïve, mechanistic view of human nature, he persisted in it; in fact, it deepened toward the end of his life, to the dismay of some of his most devoted servants, like Torcy, who complained bitterly about the king's cynicism

and distrust.¹⁴ In what measure these attitudes were real or affected is hard to tell; the evidence is contradictory.

Louis's belief in royal absolutism was closely connected with his view of human nature. A private individual, if allowed any share in the sovereign power, was bound to misuse it, that is, to divert it to serve his personal ends and to the detriment of the public good. Even if he turned out to be that rare bird, a man of integrity, his virtue could not long withstand such a temptation unless his master watched closely over him, ever ready to apply the standard stimuli. The prince, therefore, had no right to alienate any part of his sovereign power, for fear that society would disintegrate into "a thousand tyrannies," so oppressive to the common man. As for the prince, his own self-interest, regardless of any other considerations, induced him to work for the public good, since the good of the state made for the glory of the prince. An absolute monarch, brought up in sentiments of honor, jealous of his glory, endowed with intelligence, and addicted to hard work, was bound to rule for the public benefit. Even if he was stupid, indolent, or vicious, his rule was preferable to that of a thousand tyrants: the harm inflicted by the latter was so much more difficult to repair, as Louis knew from his own experience during the aftermath of the Fronde. These were the theoretical grounds for Louis's dogged pursuit of absolute sovereign power.

There was one permanent element in the policy of Louis XIV that is apt to confound all attempts to find any neat formula explaining his behavior (it may also raise some doubts about the sincerity of his attachment to some of his principles): Louis XIV was an opportunist. At least, an element of pragmatism was always present in his policy to a greater or lesser degree. In his *Mémoires* Louis repeatedly proclaimed that reason of state was the first of all laws; in following its dictates, the prince had to adapt his conduct to changing circumstances and to the spirit of the times, and, if necessary, do violence to his natural inclinations in order to derive the greatest possible benefit for his state from every turn of events.¹⁵

Opportunism, however, can never be an absolute rule of behavior, for it must always serve some fixed end. Thus Louis held an unshakable belief in God; in the "natural order of things"; in the rightful pre-eminence of France and of the Bourbons in Christendom; in reason of state serving the public good; and in royal absolutism. These dis-

parate elements formed an integral whole in his mind, and a clash between any two of them was unthinkable to him. Louis preached opportunism only in the sphere of those principles that were designed to serve this set of values. But even here, he was not a wholly consistent votary of opportunism, for in nearly every major decision his motives were mixed. For example, the Cretan expedition of 1669, though it was undertaken partly for unadulterated religious motives, was also necessary to discharge the king's obligations to God and to enhance his reputation in Christendom. In 1683, had Louis been an out-and-out opportunist, he would have crushed the emperor, who was hard pressed by the Turk; yet, the Most Christian King did not do it. When Louis had concluded that the regime set up by the Edict of Nantes was an evil, there was no major external obstacle to prevent him from revoking it outright well before 1685; for instance, right after the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678. Likewise, the recognition of the Old Pretender as King James III of England in September, 1701, was not a purely opportunist move, even though it could be argued that it improved Louis's standing with Pope Clement XI, whose support was necessary to strengthen the Bourbon hold on the Spanish monarchy and to buttress their position in the Mediterranean generally. But, at that time, the French king stood well with the pope anyhow, for Clement XI feared the Hapsburgs more than the French. It can further be argued that Louis's quixotic measure was not only unnecessary but harmful, since it was apt to cause complications away from the main theater of action, which was in the Mediterranean area. These examples, and many others, indicate that Louis was fairly moderate in his opportunism; the record merely shows that in espousing different principles he never lost sight of the interests of his state as he understood them, and that these interests influenced some of his changes. This, however, does not warrant the conclusion that Louis's principles served him only as a hypocritical cover.

We have discussed some of the main, permanent features of Louis XIV's thinking. Most of them helped to shape the form of his beliefs; but this form could accommodate many different contents, which could exist harmoniously together, succeed one another, or clash and produce confusion. Three of Louis's beliefs underwent major changes or received a new emphasis in the course of his reign: the doctrine

of the "true maxims of state," the concept of the fundamental laws, and the appraisal of the role of Providence in human affairs.

From the "natural order of things" one could deduce certain "true maxims" for every community or geographical area. If faithfully followed, these maxims would procure the community the greatest benefits that it was capable of receiving. Prior to the Peace of Nijmegen, Louis held that the "true maxims of state" could change with the times. In the 1680's, however, he acted for the most part on the assumption that the "true maxims of state" were immutable. But the ossification of at least one compartment of the royal mind did not last very long. In the 1690's, and especially toward the end of his reign, Louis had managed to free himself from this rigid doctrine; and the "true maxims" once again came to express the living, and changing, interests of the state.¹⁶

The notion of the fundamental laws of the state was perhaps not wholly absent from Louis's mind at the beginning of his personal reign; but it was overshadowed by other interests and considerations, the first of which was to destroy all obstacles to the free exercise of sovereign power, which was then to be used to reform the realm and to bring it into line with the "natural order": ". . . Since the main hope of [accomplishing] these reforms rested on my will, their first prerequisite was to make my will quite absolute . . . [at the same time letting it be known] that though I rendered account to no one, I nonetheless governed myself by [the precepts of] reason."¹⁷ In consonance with this line of thinking was Louis's conviction, repeatedly proclaimed in the *Mémoires*, that he was the only depository of all property in the realm, a part of which he left in the usufruct of his subjects; hence he had an inherent right to tax all his subjects, lay and ecclesiastical, at will. He was also the sole source of equity, of "my justice," as distinct from that enforced by the courts. All of this is a far cry from the situation in 1710, when the Sorbonne was asked whether the king had the right to levy the *dixième* on his subjects; much to Louis's relief, the answer was in the affirmative.

The king's concern for fundamental law began to grow in the 1680's and reached its peak in the early 1700's. It is possible that it had an influence on his vacillating procedure in revoking the Edict of Nantes. At least, it can help to explain his psychological need to

show to himself that this edict no longer served any purpose, since virtually all the Huguenots had been converted; strange as it may be, Louis seems to have believed that this was indeed so in 1685. There is not much doubt that Louis's concern for fundamental law was spurred on by his interest in claiming the whole of the Spanish succession for the dauphin; this question began to preoccupy him seriously about 1685. It cannot be stressed too often that the dauphin's claim, as far as Louis XIV was concerned, was not based on the Spanish failure to pay the dowry of Queen Maria Theresa. Nor was it based on the testament of Carlos II. It rested on the fundamental laws of the Spanish monarchy, which could not be set aside by any testament, renunciation, or treaty. According to the doctrine of fundamental law, which is here closely bound with the divine right of kings, a reigning monarch could abdicate, but could not change the law of succession. By 1688 Louis envisaged that if Carlos II left no children after him, the dauphin would take over the Spanish monarchy, and then arrange, in concert with his eldest son and with the various *cortes*, the transference of the succession to his second son. Thereafter, if either of the two branches of the Bourbons died out, the other would be able to succeed it. The inconvenience of heedless adherence to the strict dictates of fundamental law was all too obvious to Louis; hence, the elaborate scheme to transfer the Spanish monarchy to the Duc d'Anjou. At no time did Louis entertain the chimerical notion that a Spanish monarch could reside in France, or vice versa. The idea of fusion of the two monarchies found currency only among some French merchants and some later historians.

With regard to the role of Providence, there is very little that we can say at this time, not because the subject is unimportant, but because we know so little about Louis XIV's religious beliefs beyond the obvious fact that he believed in God, subscribed to the standard dogmas of the Catholic church, and disliked extremist movements, whether of the Jansenist or of the Quietist variety. As sovereign, and as God's vicegerent in France—the first realm in Christendom—he often quarreled with the pope and held the papacy, as a human institution, in low esteem.¹⁸ There was, however, at least one perceptible change in Louis's religious views. In his *Mémoires* the king, from time to time, paid obeisance to Divine Providence, usually in a rather perfunctory manner; but in the drafts of this work he repeatedly

struck out or toned down many of the passages dealing with Providence.¹⁹ On the contrary, in Louis's correspondence during 1702-12, Providence became the decisive factor in human affairs; all events were in the hands of God, who disposed them for our benefit; it remained for us to worship God's judgments without murmuring.²⁰ When exactly this change in Louis's thinking came about is hard to determine. In the letters that his secretary, Toussaint Rose, wrote, imitating the king's hand, the theme of Providence is scarcely detectable prior to the spring of 1676; in May of that year it makes itself felt apropos of the capture of Bouchain by the French, and then it becomes ever more prominent in 1677 and 1678.²¹ This piece of evidence would become significant if it could be proved that Louis set the tone of his formal letters of acknowledgment sent in response to messages of congratulation he received on his victories; in the absence of such a proof, its value must remain in doubt.

Side by side with these big shifts in Louis XIV's thinking, it is possible to distinguish a number of relatively smaller changes that allow us to discern at least nine periods in his personal reign. The first of these is the early formative period, extending from the death of Mazarin to about 1665-66, that is, to the time when the king began a more or less systematic ordering of his ideas. In the early 1660's many of Louis's traits that later became marked were present in inchoate form. This was the time of the first joys of power and of the first assertions of sovereignty. The theme of fundamental law most unexpectedly cropped up in Louis's immediate entourage, to disappear just as quickly.²² There were elements of opportunism and of royal Gallicanism, encouraged both by Lionne and Colbert. Toward the very end of this period the king developed a certain curiosity for history and arranged to receive some instruction in this subject. But his interest in it was hardly profound; history provided some knowledge useful in peace and in war, and a number of examples for the pursuit of virtue.²³ "Virtue" was of paramount importance to Louis in this period: it showed the path to glory and to the pinnacle of success. The achievement of Charles V and of Philip II haunted him in 1661-62: through their extraordinary virtue these two monarchs had managed to raise Spain to a station above that warranted by the natural order of things.²⁴ Louis's "vertu" was thus synonymous with Machiavelli's "virtù."

In the second period (1666-73) we meet the "classical" Louis XIV, who is the model for the standard portrait of his admirers. This is the Louis of the *Mémoires*, who had more or less put his ideas in order. The themes of natural order, of common sense, and of mathematical perfectionism reached their full development. It was also the time when the assertion of absolutism proceeded according to plan and culminated in 1673 in the virtual suppression of the right of parliamentary remonstrance.

The third period extends roughly to the end of the war in 1678. One of the key figures in it was Pomponne, who, with the backing of the king, developed the principle of opportunism that he erected into a consciously held doctrine. More than ever before, considerations of legitimacy were explicitly put aside and replaced by those of naked expediency.²⁵ Probably, both Louis and his minister were put on this path by the French failure to overwhelm the Dutch Republic in 1672, in spite of all the well-laid plans and thorough preparation. Nevertheless, Pomponne did not lose sight of the system of Europe. France to him was merely the chief member of the community of European states, not an entity apart from it nor its oppressor. It was within this system that Pomponne played his game of procuring for his country the greatest possible advantages, but always in such a way so as not to damage, let alone destroy, the fabric of Europe. This is what gained for Pomponne the reputation of being a moderate as well as an honest man. But Louis XIV seems to have traveled much farther than Pomponne along the road to reckless opportunism, and this is what was probably at the bottom of the divergence between the king and his servant. Most of Louis's charges against Pomponne have a hollow ring,²⁶ except the accusation that the minister failed to press every claim that Louis could have derived from his military and diplomatic superiority in 1678-79.

The fourth period covers most of the decade of the 1680's and is rather complex, with overtones of incipient confusion. The decade as a whole was characterized by the activities of Colbert de Croissy and of Louvois.²⁷ We have already noted the temporary ossification of the doctrine of "true maxims of state" in this period. The other salient feature, especially of the early years of the decade, was the preoccupation with limited strategic objectives on the French frontiers. The rounding off of French territory through "reunions" was based

mainly on positive customary law and on purely legalistic interpretation of treaties and of other documents. In all of this we can detect the work of Colbert de Croissy—a forceful and rather unscrupulous lawyer, whose sole interest was to win lawsuits for his client and to score points against the other side, and who was utterly oblivious of all other considerations. The same narrow legalism appeared in the French dealings with Pope Innocent XI; it was only two decades later that Louis XIV and his entourage realized that “the maxims of France” in matters ecclesiastical were best left undefined if they were to be an effective shield against papal pretensions. Moreover, the violent measures and arrogant language of Colbert de Croissy and of Louvois were in strange contrast with the very limited and modest, not to say petty, aims pursued by the French government in the 1680’s.

These policies were carried on in utter disregard of the system of Europe, and even of the broad international interests of France. As a result, France was but a passive observer of the momentous changes in central, southeastern, and northern Europe: the first successful counteroffensive of the Christian states against the Turk; the gradual transformation of the Hapsburg state into a great military monarchy; the reform of the Swedish realm along new lines; and the re-entry of Russia into the system of Europe. For France her virtual absence from the scene of these great events entailed the crumbling of her system of alliances on the Hapsburg borders. At the same time, France’s nearsighted isolationism helped to bring about a split of the European system into three more or less independent zones: the west, the north, and the southeast; this division was to subsist until the end of Louis XIV’s reign.

In spite of what has just been said, let us note that in 1682 Louis raised the siege of Luxembourg, apparently so as not to impair the concerted effort of Europe in repelling the Turkish onslaught. But in the next year, he destroyed whatever advantage he might have reaped from this gesture: he invaded the Spanish Netherlands before the Turks had been driven away from the walls of Vienna. Shortly thereafter, his interest in fundamental law began to make itself felt. This development cannot be connected either with Colbert de Croissy or with Louvois; it is hard to ascribe it to the chancellor, Michel Le Tellier, or to any of the other intimate advisers. The first impetus may conceivably have come from Bossuet; but in the absence of any

evidence to support such a hypothesis, the most likely explanation is that this was a spontaneous growth in the king's mind, prompted by his interest in the Spanish succession. It is worth noting that in pursuing this great aim, Louis showed himself moderate in his methods as well as in his words. Whatever the origins of the fundamental law theme or of Louis's outburst of magnanimity in 1682-83, these developments did not fit in well with Louis's other assumptions at the time and contributed to the mounting confusion in his mind and in his policy.

This leads us straight into the fifth stage in the evolution of Louis XIV—the period of total confusion from early 1688 to 1691, which landed him in the Nine Years' War (1688-97), commonly called the "War of the League of Augsburg." While the king sought to disengage himself in the east in order to concentrate on wooing Spain, he allowed the small military operation that he undertook against Philippsburg at the end of September, 1688, to be escalated into a major war, and finally he managed to get himself embroiled with Spain in 1689. According to Louvois, the little war in the east was to have lasted four months; it lasted nine years. France was militarily unprepared for a big war;²⁸ her diplomatic preparation for it had been even less adequate: she had virtually no allies. While Louis posed as an international champion of the Catholic cause, his relations with the Holy See were of the worst, and he had incurred a secret sentence of excommunication by Innocent XI. In one respect only can Louis be absolved of the charge of improvidence: few rational men could have foreseen in 1688 that William III's expedition to England would be anything but political suicide. The French king was therefore quite right in not interfering with his enemy's enterprise.

Heedless violence is not an uncommon reaction in a proud man caught up in the coils of his own contradictions. Of Louis's advisers only Louvois believed in premeditated, systematic violence as an effective instrument of policy: sufferings inflicted on enemy subjects would induce them to press their sovereigns to comply with French desires. As for Colbert de Croissy, his brand of violence was that of the tongue rather than of action, except on a small scale, for instance, in taking up the cudgels in Hendaye's quarrel with the Spanish city of Fontarabia, which had been going on for several decades. Louis

XIV himself did not subscribe wholeheartedly to the favorite methods of either minister; occasionally he seems to have held them in check. Yet, in the 1680's, acts of violence committed, or at least authorized, by Louis XIV were on the increase. Although the systematic burning of dwellings in the Spanish Netherlands in 1683-84 bears the distinct imprint of Louvois, most of the other violent proceedings—the destruction of three-quarters of the city of Genoa by bombs fired from the French fleet in May, 1684, the massacres of the Vaudois in Savoy in 1686, the fantastic schemes in 1687-89 to browbeat Pope Innocent XI (only a few of which were put into effect)—appear to be irrational outbursts, with little or no premeditation. The devastation of the Palatinate, which has made more noise than Louis's other acts of violence, was also one of such outbursts. But at least it can be explained by fear: the French government suddenly found itself on the verge of a major war, for which it was unprepared, and its first reaction was to cut its enemies' lines of communication, regardless of political consequences or of moral considerations.

We could lengthen the list of inconsistencies and of acts of violence of Louis's administration in the later 1680's; but it would add nothing to the impression that the confusion in Louis's mind and his tantrums, especially toward the end of the decade, bordered on mental derangement; they were quite out of keeping with Louis's character during the rest of his reign both before and after the 1680's. Fortunately for the king and for his state, this condition did not last long. Even while he himself was hitting out indiscriminately in all directions, Louis XIV was capable of giving advice full of good sense and moderation to his weak-minded English cousin, James II. And, of course, he could not help being disappointed in his own servants, Louvois and Colbert de Croissy, in the first place. But something had happened to Louis: he could not bring himself to dismiss them as he had dismissed Pomponne in 1679. It was death that relieved him of Louvois on July 16, 1691.

The sixth period in Louis's development extends from 1691 until about 1696. Its primary theme was the liquidation of the legacy of the 1680's. Within a week after the death of Louvois, the king called Pomponne back into the *conseil d'en haut*. Though Croissy retained the secretaryship of state for foreign affairs and his place in the

council, Pomponne's hand was soon felt. Beginning with 1691, we can discern in the French foreign relations a policy rather than a set of erratic expedients.

There was another change in 1691: the Duc de Beauvillier joined the king's council a few days after Pomponne. Pomponne and Beauvillier resembled each other in their judicious, mild temperament and in their polished manners. Both were gentlemen, even great lords, rather than assiduous clerks. Both believed in the system of Europe, though Beauvillier was apparently inclined to lay more stress on fundamental law as its basis. However, in matters ecclesiastical, which at that time were of paramount importance for the internal structure of France, the two men stood for opposite tendencies. Arnauld de Pomponne certainly was not an out-and-out Jansenist; nevertheless, by his education, family ties, and personal tastes he was drawn to that movement. His children were brought up as moderate, but devout, Jansenists (among them was the future wife of Torcy). Beauvillier, on the other hand, had strong Quietist leanings, as his religious writings indicate. He was a close friend of his brother-in-law, the Duc de Chevreuse, also a Quietist. Both Beauvillier and Chevreuse were continuously in touch with Fénelon, and openly proclaimed their attachment to him, even when Fénelon was a *persona non grata* at court.

The ministerial shake-up of 1691 was significant of Louis's state of mind, because the king was well acquainted with Pomponne and Beauvillier and with their views. Thus there was nothing fortuitous about the opposite tendencies for which they stood being brought in simultaneously into Louis's inner council. Moreover, this enfranchisement of opposite views was not a passing phenomenon, for it subsisted almost to the end of the reign. Did the king try to institutionalize, and thereby to put into more orderly channels, the confusion of his own mind, or did he seek to dominate his council that much more effectively by maintaining discordant views in it? For the years 1691-96 we cannot answer this question with any certainty. But taking the period from the 1690's to 1715 as a whole, it is fairly clear that Louis sought to assert his control, as well as to gain information, by encouraging disputes between the ministers in his presence. In his *Mémoires* Louis had said that rivalry between the ministers helped to unite the full authority of the master in the king's person.²⁹

The *Mémoires*, however, are apt to be a misleading source for the later part of Louis's reign, unless they are corroborated by other evidence. In this instance we can draw on Torcy's *Journal* for an account of the sessions of the council in 1709-11. Torcy's descriptions, as well as some fragmentary indications in the dispatches, show that the clash between opposite views in the royal council was open and strong, that the king's decisions, after he had heard the debates, were indeed his own, and that he did not side consistently with any one adviser or group of advisers. No doubt, the king's view of human nature was partly responsible for his technique of arriving at decisions: one self-interest would cancel out another. This system could not guarantee Louis from vacillation and even from taking contradictory measures; but it did safeguard his personal exercise of the sovereign power.³⁰

To return to the years 1691-96: the task of liquidating the legacy of the 1680's was facilitated by French military victories in the Low Countries³¹ and by a series of diplomatic successes in Italy. These successes began in 1692 and culminated in the Peace of Turin in June, 1696, which exploded the anti-French coalition. At the same time the center of French political attention shifted definitely from north to south, from the Holy Roman Empire to Italy and Spain. Louis could thus afford to be moderate in his peace aims in the north while being victorious in the field in that quarter; with regard to Spain, his policy had been moderate throughout the Nine Years' War anyway. The king achieved this position of strength by following the restrained opportunism of Pomponne. Yet, at the same time, the theme of fundamental law and legitimacy was on the rise, which made it difficult for Louis to bring himself to recognize the kingship of William III. A further element of confusion continued to plague Louis's ecclesiastical policy. Admittedly, the theological quarrels that agitated the church of France in the 1690's were involved enough to have taxed the ingenuity of a professional theologian: it is enough to mention the ever-changing nature of the Jansenist movement and the Quietist scare. Since most of these issues carried political overtones, the king could not afford to ignore them, even if he had wished to do so. But the persistent confusion in the royal head, now heightened by confusion built into the council, resulted in such ill-considered measures as the appointment of De Noailles to the see of

Paris in 1695. Only in one respect did Louis succeed in solving the ecclesiastical imbroglio: he cut the Gordian knot of his relations with the Vatican by a virtually total surrender to the pope in 1693. True enough, the pope was no longer Innocent XI but Innocent XII.

The seventh period covers the time from the last stages of the negotiations at Ryswick to the acceptance of the will of Carlos II of Spain. The theme of legitimacy, though not altogether discarded, was overshadowed by a concern for the system of Europe, within which France would occupy a place of honor but not of hegemony. This was the background of the Spanish partition treaties and of the close co-operation between Louis XIV and William III. Such a policy was clearly inspired by Pomponne. This minister, freed from interference by Croissy, who had died in 1696, and ably seconded by his son-in-law, Torcy, was now in a position to make his ideas prevail.³² The king, for his part, wished above all to avoid getting involved in a war like the one from which he had just extricated himself; and he was glad to take shelter in Pomponne's ideas, for they seemed to guarantee him from precisely such a predicament. Moreover, the Spanish partition treaties held out the prospect of a considerable accretion of French territory and power without overturning the European system. The Spanish partition policy was Pomponne's greatest achievement in diplomacy, as well as his swan song. He died in September, 1699, when the Second Partition Treaty had already taken shape in its main outlines.

It was not Pomponne's fault that the will of Carlos II put such a severe strain on his policy. In fact, Carlos's will made the policy of partition virtually unenforceable, not by the bequest of the Spanish monarchy to the Duc d'Anjou (which was, indeed, highly desirable for a smooth working of the partition policy), but by the clause that transferred the entire succession to Archduke Charles if the grandsons of Louis XIV refused to accept the inheritance in its entirety. The adamant refusal of the Austrian Hapsburgs to consider any division of the inheritance at this time was well known. The French rightly judged that to enforce the partition treaty, it would have been necessary to conquer all of the far-flung lands of Spain, and then to proceed to dismember them. The best military opinion of the time held that France stood little chance of winning such a war, in which the Spanish nation (that is, the political classes of Spain) would be

on the opposite side; and, anyway, Louis's object was to avoid a war. It is to the honor of Louis XIV and of his council that it took them several days of deliberation to reach this embarrassing conclusion: their first decision had been to adhere to the Second Partition Treaty. Apparently, it was Torcy who first saw the absurdity of such a course and began to argue for an acceptance of Carlos II's will. The irony of it all was that neither Louis XIV nor his counselors believed in the validity of this will: no legitimate king could alter the law of succession by such a document. But the will could be used as a powerful propaganda weapon to misguide the Spanish public, and, as such, it was feared by the French.

Under the circumstances there was only one thing that Louis XIV could do, which was to take a strong stand on the issue of fundamental law and legitimacy. The various tactical mistakes that he committed in pursuing this course, leading to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (which could have been avoided, or at least localized), need not concern us here. We have already dealt with some of the aspects of Louis's preoccupation with fundamental law in the second half of his reign; what we should note here is the intensity of this reaction, which forms the main theme of the eighth period of his reign, until about 1712. Louis's belief in Providence reached its greatest intensity at the same time (1702-12). Of the many examples of Louis's preoccupation with fundamental law, let us cite his injunctions to Philip V to govern himself in accordance with the laws and maxims of Spain, the safeguarding of Philip's right of succession in France, and the recognition of the Pretender's royal title.³³ Later on, it was felt necessary to maintain that Francis Rákóczi was not really a rebel, but a defender of the ancient constitution of his land; to the best of my knowledge, no such arguments had been invoked before, in order to justify French aid to the Sicilian rebels in the 1670's or to the remnants of "Cromwell's faction" in England. To have been so thoroughgoing, the resurgence of the fundamental law theme must have answered a deeply felt need of Louis's mind. There was, however, at least one deviation from the general course: after the battle of Almanza in 1707, Louis encouraged the revolutionary schemes of the court of Madrid to introduce Castilian laws and form of government in Aragon and Valencia. But, in 1711, after Philip's second reconquest of Spain, Louis took up the defense of

Aragonese laws against the threat of Castilianization; he recommended to modify only those of the privileges of Aragon, and later of Barcelona, as were directly harmful to royal authority and to the whole state, and were therefore contrary to nature.

The transition from the eighth to the ninth period in Louis's development was not as abrupt as that of 1700. In this last period the preoccupation with fundamental law was tempered by other considerations and inclinations: by historical reasoning, rational analysis of existing conditions, a grain of opportunism, and humanity. For the first time all these elements were combined in the spirit of compromise, not of confusion.

French military defeats and deaths in the royal family made it impossible for Louis to adhere strictly to the fundamental laws not only of Spain but even of France, without endangering the very existence of his state. First, he had to press Philip to abandon most of his kingdoms, satisfying himself with a small state in Italy; failing this, he had to insist that Philip give up his right of succession in France. Of course, if one chose to stand firmly on the ground of divine-right constitutionalism, one could maintain that Philip's renunciation of his right to succeed to the French crown was null and void, though it was drawn up in strong terms and duly registered in the Parlement of Paris. Whether Louis, at the back of his mind, regarded it as such, we shall never know for certain; here, more than ever, he would have needed to exercise all his powers of dissimulation if this were so. Judging by the appearances, however, Louis sincerely believed that the renunciation was valid, for it had been inspired by Divine Providence.³⁴ Moreover, Louis knew that Philip's accession to the French throne might well spark a general war in Europe, and even civil wars in Spain and in France; all of this he was determined to prevent at almost any price.

Philip V's renunciation of his rights to the French crown and the series of deaths in Louis's family in 1711-14 brought the question of French succession to the forefront. The situation became critical in May, 1714, when the Duc de Berry, Louis's third grandson, died leaving no son. There was little hope that the sickly four-year-old child, the future Louis XV, would be spared. The next lawful heirs after him were Philip V of Spain and his two sons, followed by Louis's nephew, Philip of Orléans, and his son, and then several

young princes of the Condé branch. The inconvenience of Philip V's succession was clear, and the extinction of the other lines was a distinct possibility. The Capetian dynasty would then come to an end in France. The election of a new dynasty would have necessitated a convention of a body like the Estates General. Barring a miracle, such a body was certain to undo the work of the three Bourbon kings. It was apt to inaugurate aristocratic rule in France, and to set up institutions limiting the powers of the monarch. To Louis, this meant government by pressure groups, which would ultimately have reduced the realm of France to anarchy and degraded it to the status of England, or even of Poland. Louis had already firmly rejected the English proposals that the Estates General be convened to confirm Philip V's renunciation—proposals as naïve as they were insulting to Louis.

It is against this background that we must interpret the edict of July, 1714, declaring the Duc du Maine and the Comte de Toulouse, Louis's illegitimate sons, capable of succession to the crown after the princes of the blood. At about the same time, Louis drew up his will, which was dated August 2, 1714. In it the king enjoined his great-grandson to repair as soon as possible any degradation that might occur during his minority in the status of the Duc du Maine. In the same document the king also appointed the future Council of Regency, seeking thereby to ward off the more imminent danger of aristocratic government during the coming minority. Not that the king had much faith in the efficacy of all these measures; but to avert the calamities threatening his realm, he had to erect every barrier he could devise, however, unconstitutional or feeble.

Military defeat was not the only reason that made Louis press his grandson to give up some of the Spanish lands. As early as 1703, he began to urge Philip to cede the Spanish Netherlands to the elector of Bavaria. In this he was moved not only by the strategic need to keep this prince fighting on the Bourbon side, but also by the lessons of history: the Burgundian lands of Spain had been the main reason for Franco-Spanish enmity in the past. A complete liquidation of this heritage would help to prevent the same kind of enmity from arising between the two branches of the Bourbons in the future. Though historical thinking had not been entirely alien to Louis XIV before, it had appeared only sporadically and seldom left a significant

mark on him. Traces of such thinking can be seen in some passages of his *Mémoires* and, more clearly, in his analysis of the Franco-Spanish relations undertaken in the mid-1680's, when he wished to compose the differences between the two countries. It is not clear whether it was Torcy, an addicted student of history, that now guided the king on the path of historical speculation. The fact remains that toward the end of Louis's life, a historical view of the changing scene became an ingredient of his thought. It showed itself in his approach to Vienna in 1715, when he sought an alliance with the Austrian Hapsburgs. The only trouble with this policy was that neither the contemporary statesmen nor Louis's immediate successors possessed his penetration; the great diplomatic revolution had to wait until 1756. Yet, it is remarkable that at no time was the mind of Louis XIV so clear as in the last year of his life.

Though Louis had not been a total stranger to enlightened humanity, this feeling finally broke surface toward the end of his life. Nowhere did it appear more clearly, and to his greater credit, than in the intercession he made for the citizens of Barcelona in 1714. Philip V intended to stage a general massacre in that city as soon as it would fall into his hands. The old king was outraged by his grandson's callousness, and told him so in two forceful letters.³⁵ To appreciate the full import of Louis's plea for clemency, we must consider that there was no doubt in his mind that Barcelona was guilty of rebellion against its lawful sovereign; to Louis, the perpetrators of such an action were always "infinitely criminal."

One further remark needs to be made. It concerns Louis's personal character rather than the contents of his ideas. A reader of the king's *Mémoires* cannot fail to be impressed by some penetrating passages; but he will also find it difficult not to be suffocated in the fumes of the incense that the brash young man keeps burning before his own image. The panegyrics addressed to him by great and small men in every walk of life, and the palace of Versailles, where every courtier, every picture, every ornament, every statue, and almost every tree was dedicated to the single theme of the worship of Louis—all this should have redoubled Louis's propensity for self-adulation. It did nothing of the sort. Instead, as the king grew old, wisdom and even humility gradually replaced the themes of pride and self-worship in his words and actions. It is one of the ironies of human affairs that

so many historians have sung the praises of Louis XIV for the first part of his reign and have deprecated him for the second.

The picture of Louis XIV that emerges from this sketch is not a tidy one. It was not meant to be, for our main purpose has been to show that behind the impassive classical façade he presented to the world, Louis was a human being, as full of contradictions, passions, and confused thoughts and feelings as other mortals.

1. This essay summarizes some of the conclusions of the book I am preparing on the political beliefs of Louis XIV.

2. ". . . Quelques endroits obscurs et épineux des sciences . . . où l'esprit tâche à s'élever au-dessus de sa portée, le plus souvent pour ne rien faire, et dont l'inutilité, du moins apparente, nous rebute autant que la difficulté" (Jean Longnon [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV* [Paris, 1927], p. 22; Charles Dreyss [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* [2 vols.; Paris, 1860], II, 428 [hereafter cited as Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*]).

3. "La fonction des rois consiste principalement à laisser agir le bon sens, qui agit toujours naturellement et sans peine" (*ibid.*).

4. Commonly known as the "Réflexion sur le métier du roi"; see Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 280-82; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 518-21. See also note 9 below.

5. The problem of Madame de Maintenon's influence on Louis, and vice versa, is rather complex. She changed, as did Louis himself, in the course of their married life. Though there are instances where their opinions differed, Philip V of Spain, who knew Maintenon well, wrote to Cellamare in 1715 that she was "unicamente vinculada a la voluntad y gusto del Rey Christianísimo" (A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France* [Paris, 1890-1901], I, 648 [hereafter cited as Baudrillart, *Philippe V*]). Maintenon's full correspondence, especially for the later years, would have made an excellent source for a study of Louis XIV. But in 1713 she burned many of the king's letters to her; and in the following year Louis did the same with her letters to him. It is also regrettable that the critical edition of her letters undertaken by Marcel Langlois (*Madame de Maintenon, Lettres*, Vols. II-V [Paris, 1935-39]) stops in 1701. Some of Maintenon's letters for the 1700's are scattered in several *fonds* of the Manuscripts Department of the Bibliothèque Nationale; even these few letters are of great interest, and show her familiarity with what went on.

5a. A. Baudrillart tracked down a total of 538 letters of Louis XIV to Philip V; 401 of them, addressed to Philip or to Queen Marie Louise of Spain, are at present in the Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid, Estado, Legajo 2,460 *bis* (transferred from the General Archives of Alcalá de Henares); only five of the letters in this bundle date from before June 26, 1703. Some of Louis's letters to Philip are in the collection of the Duc de la Trémoille. The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris have 514 drafts and copies of Louis's letters to his grandson. They duplicate the vast majority, though by no means all, of the originals in Madrid. For further discussion of these materials see Baudrillart, *Philippe V*, I, 11-15, and A. Baudrillart, *Rapport sur une mission en Espagne aux Archives d'Alcalá de Hénarès et de Simancas* (Paris, 1889), pp. 25, 49-70.

6. See, for instance, Louis XIV to the Comte d'Avaux, ambassador at The Hague, September 2, 1688, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris,

(hereafter cited as A.A.E.), *Correspondance Politique, Hollande, Vol. 155, fols. 351-54*; this letter, bearing many alterations and pencil marks, is the one that instructed D'Avaux to declare to the Estates General that Louis had an alliance with James II of England. Another example is the letter to the Comte de Briord, also ambassador at The Hague, dated November 10, 1700, but obviously sent a little later (*ibid.*, Vol. 190, fols. 14-17); it informed Briord of the death of Carlos II of Spain and of Louis's decision to reject Carlos II's testament and to adhere to the Second Partition Treaty. However, the draft of this letter was rewritten at least twice, and in the final text the theme of adherence to the Partition Treaty is much less prominent than in the original version.

7. A history of the Colbertian myth would provide a most instructive insight into the "middle-class interpretation of history" fashionable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

8. See F. Masson (ed.), *Journal inédit de Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy* (Paris, 1884), *passim*.

9. In this connection it is interesting to note that Louis's original draft of the "Réflexion sur le métier de roi" had been written in the present tense; see Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Fr. 10,331, fols. 125-30. An exact copy taken from this draft exists in A.A.E., *Mémoires et Documents, France, Vol. 297, fols. 206-10*. At a later date the section dealing with Pomponne's inadequacy was changed over into the past tense, the accusations against Pomponne were toned down considerably, and the whole document was given the form in which it is usually published. This correction of the original text was made by a trembling hand, probably when the king was already old. The "Métier de roi" was thus originally a memorandum of the king to himself on what to do about Pomponne, who had ceased to satisfy him—an instance of the king trying to clear his ideas by expressing them. It was against Louis's principles to consult his advisers on matters of appointment or dismissal of the ministers and other very high officials, and hence he had to have recourse to pen and paper; see Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 228-29, 271; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 238-39, 341-42 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 22-23).

10. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, p. 30; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 391.

11. This is an aspect of the much wider and little-investigated process of administrative decentralization that set in during the last two decades of Louis's reign. The king conferred more and more initiative on his trusted advisers and ambassadors. At the same time the intendants were beginning to behave like full-fledged governors of provinces, and even the governors, whose office until then had been mainly honorific, were beginning to acquire a certain stature in the administration of the provinces. Anyone reading the day-to-day correspondence of the intendants and governors in the early 1700's cannot fail to be struck by the difference in tone between these letters and similar documents for the 1670's.

12. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, p. 118; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 565.

13. A draft for the *Mémoires* of 1666; see Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 95 (cf. *ibid.*, p. 429); Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, p. 23.

14. See, for example, Torcy, *Journal*, p. 172 and *passim*.

15. See, for example, Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 43, 113-14, 117-18, 208; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 229; II, 444, 561-62, 564-65; (cf. *ibid.*, II, 104-9). Most of these passages appear in the later Pellisson version of the *Mémoires*. The inspiration of Machiavelli is fairly obvious. On Machiavelli's influence on Louis XIV's *Mémoires* see Paul Sonnino, "The Dating and Authorship of Louis XIV's *Mémoires*," *French Historical Studies*, III, No. 3 (Spring, 1964), 303-37.

16. On Louis's doctrine of "true maxims" see my article, "Maxims of State" in Louis XIV's Foreign Policy in the 1680's," in *William III and Louis XIV: Essays by and for Mark Thomson*, ed. J. S. Bromley and R. Hatton (Liverpool, Eng., 1968).

17. ". . . Que pour ne rendre raison à personne je ne me gouvernais pas moins par la raison" (Longnon, *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 20-21; Dreyss, *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 382-83). This text is Pellisson's, and dates from about 1670.

18. A promising beginning of an inquiry into some of Louis's religious views has been made in Jean Orcibal's *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI* (Paris, 1949) and *Louis XIV et les Protestants* (Paris, 1951), and in Paul Sonnino's *Louis XIV's view of the Papacy (1661-1667)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966).

19. For example, in the draft of the *Mémoires* for 1661, prepared by Pellisson about 1670-71 (Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Fr. 10,332), there were eleven references to Providence. Five of them received the king's special attention: three passages were suppressed entirely (fols. 16, 23, 290-91; in this last case an entire long section on belief in God was suppressed [fols. 268-92]); one passage was drastically curtailed, so that only its weaker part remained (fols. 231-33); and one passage bears the mark of the king's black pencil (fol. 35).

20. For examples of Louis's stress on Providence in 1702-12, see Baudrillart, *Philippe V*, I, 116-17, 121, 259, 276, 499.

21. See copies of the royal letters "de la main" written by Rose in 1674-78, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Fr., Nouv. Acq., 20, 215.

22. Colbert recounts how on November 11, 1661, the day the dauphin was born, news was brought from Spain of the death of the only son of Philip IV (the future Carlos II was to be born a little later): the dauphin "étoit né par ce moyen héritier naturel et légitime des deux couronnes de France et d'Espagne" (A.A.E., *Mémoires et Documents*, France, Vol. 296, fol. 90). Since Colbert himself was the last person on earth to have bothered about fundamental law and legitimacy, it is improbable that this reflection originated with him; however, we cannot impute it with any certainty to the king either.

23. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 96.

24. See Louis's reflections in his council in October-November, 1661, as reported by Colbert: Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Clairambault, Vol. 485, fols. 54-56, printed in P. Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert* (8 vols. in 10; Paris, 1861-82), VI, 490. The reader should, however, be warned that in editing Colbert's notes for the history of the king, Clément changed the order of several paragraphs and altered some expressions. As a result, his text is more orderly than the original Colbertian document. See also A.A.E., *Mémoires et Documents*, France, Vol. 296, fols. 89-94. Cf. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 54-55, 87-88; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 452, 542 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16-17).

25. This development can be traced, for instance, in A.A.E., *Correspondance Politique*, Liège, Vols. 8, 9, 13, and Supplément, Vol. 1. In the years 1676-79, which this correspondence covers, Liège was undergoing a series of revolutionary upheavals. The Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid holds several bundles of letters of Louis XIV and of his ministers to the rebel Senate of Messina in 1674-77 (Estado, Legajo 2264): they reflect the same assumptions.

26. For example, in the "Métier de roi" Louis said that he disliked Pomponne's style of writing; but, as we have seen above, he apparently had no more reason to be satisfied with Croissy's style in the first months of his ministry. The other charges, like lack of diligence or of "capacité" (this last expression was later struck out by the king), were just nebulous expressions of general disagreement.

27. Without going into the controversy over the role of Louvois, let us point out that we know much about his military activity, thanks to Rousset's works; we also know that his manners were brusque. But of Louvois's actual political role we as yet know next to nothing; no doubt the difficulty of deciphering his handwriting is partly responsible for this state of affairs.

28. Recently my own impression of French unpreparedness for a big war in 1688 has been borne out by the findings of Geoffrey W. Symcox, who engaged in research in the Parisian archives on relations between Louis XIV and James II in 1688-92; it appears that the French navy, like the army, was caught unprepared in 1688, and was reduced to hasty improvisations.

29. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, pp. 25, 246; Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 267-72, 385-86.

30. Whatever may be said for this manner of decision-making in the central government, where Louis could dominate the scene by his physical presence, its defects were all too evident in Spain when, in 1703, it became clear that Louis would have to take over the administration of that realm. At the time, the French establishment at the court of Spain consisted of three great personages, all of them directly in touch with Versailles: Cardinal d'Estrées (the official ambassador, and member of Philip's council), Princesse des Ursins (the queen's *camarera mayor*), and Louville (Philip's former tutor). To these must be added two understudies: the Abbé d'Estrées (the cardinal's nephew and successor as ambassador) and the financial expert Orry (more or less a protégé of Ursins). The three *prima donnas* could never get along with one another; the cardinal and the princess hated each other blindly, and Louville detested Ursins and was most critical of the cardinal. As a result, the entire French establishment in Spain collapsed in the summer of 1703 at a critical juncture in the affairs of the Bourbons.

31. The battles of Fleurus (1690), Steinkirke (1692), and Neerwinden (1693), and the capture of the key cities and fortresses of Mons (1691) and of Namur (1692).

32. Perhaps it was not altogether fortuitous that the second rout of the Quietists, with the condemnation of Fénelon's *Maximes des saints* by the pope, also occurred at this time. We must hasten to add that, in spite of this discomfiture, Beauvillier retained his post in the council.

33. Louis maintained that this step involved neither a withdrawal of his recognition of William III nor any design to help the Pretender to establish himself in England. See, for instance, Louis to Chamilly, postscript to the letter dated September 15, 1701, A.A.E., *Correspondance Politique*, Danemark, Vol. 66, fols. 393-94.

34. See Baudrillart, *Philippe V*, I, 499.

35. Louis XIV to Philip V, July 2 and August 1, 1714, quoted in part in Baudrillart, *Philippe V*, I, 652-53.

The Sun King's Anti-Machiavel

PAUL SONNINO

LOUIS XIV was an earnest person who did not find it necessary to examine himself very closely. Reared by a loving mother, furnished with a practical education by Mazarin and by the royal tutor, Bishop Péréfixe, the young king readily accepted the world as an eminently sensible place. That futile revolt of the parlements and of the great nobles, the Fronde, may have caused him to reflect on the merits of absolute monarchy; but, by the same token, it failed to stir in him either a hatred for the nobility or an obsessive fear of revolution. If he learned how to deceive, as in the arrest of the Princes de Condé and de Conti, the experience did not necessarily turn him into a compulsive dissimulator. When he was studying the history of France, the very name of do-nothing kings and of mayors of the palace would distress him, and he selected his vigorous grandfather, Henri IV, for emulation. Yet, Louis dutifully married the Spanish Infanta, Maria Theresa, and managed to balance patience against an increasing confidence in his own capacities until March 9, 1661, when Cardinal Mazarin's death inaugurated the personal reign.

The king's approach to life was to be conceded if not applauded by all his intimates during the early years when he was his own master. Still, there was a challenge in testing himself, and his relationships, under the new conditions. He desired to be a model son, dutifully submitting to Anne of Austria's occasional reproaches in private, while exacting in return her total abstention from political intrigue. To all who demonstrated their friendship and loyalty, he was eager to reciprocate abundantly. He was hard put to contain

his youthful and warm-blooded passions, but he intended to keep them from interfering with the craft of kingship. Louis had succumbed to Mlle de la Vallière prior to November, 1661, when the dauphin was born. In 1662 the affair became public knowledge, but he persisted in confining it within his self-imposed limits. Time was to bring increased assurance. The year 1665, marked by the serious illness of his mother, presaged a new emancipation. He had also to consider his son's education, and he himself was approaching a milestone on the road to maturity: he would reach his thirtieth year in 1667.

The king's notions on government were also to be applied rather successfully during the formative stages of his own administration. Louis aspired to restore the French monarchy to its natural perfection. This meant affording his people the respite of peace, re-establishing the crown's financial stability, relegating the parlements and great nobles to their proper functions, and ridding the church of its Jansenist trouble-makers. These tasks proceeded apace, save for the last, which ran into numerous stumbling blocks. The restoration of order, however, was merely the basis for more glorious excursions into the realms of foreign policy and war. Even during the period of domestic reform, occasions for international prestige, such as avenging insults to French ambassadors in London and at the Holy See, or for territorial acquisition, such as the treaties for Lorraine and for Dunkirk, seemed to arouse the greatest enthusiasm in him. In 1662 the king proudly adopted the sun disk as his emblem, but, once again, the year 1665 stands out. That year, Philip IV of Spain died, leaving his disintegrating monarchy virtually defenseless. For the time being, an Anglo-Dutch war restricted Louis's freedom of action, but the Sun King could still view the advent of his thirtieth year as coinciding with a new and higher stage in the evolution of his designs.

Such a man is not a questioner but a justifier. He can be expected not to produce confessions in the grand manner but, rather, descriptions of his calling and how he had mastered it. Louis began early to prepare his vindications. On the very first day of the personal reign, he summoned his secretary, President Rose, and dictated to him the deathbed counsels of Cardinal Mazarin.¹ The matters brought up by the cardinal, relating mainly to domestic order and to the

need for personal rule, were to find their way into the king's own *Mémoires*. Late in 1662, moreover, Louis's financial expert, J. B. Colbert, attempted to secure a historian for the king's personal service. It may not be pure coincidence that in March, 1663, a certain President de Périgny emerged from obscurity to become a *lecteur du roi*. Nevertheless, it was Colbert who, shortly thereafter, assumed the task of chronicling the reign. In April he began to keep a journal that he subsequently extended into historical notes covering the years 1661 to 1664.² The work centered on Louis, stressing his intelligence, dedication, and admirable qualities. It described the domestic and international situations when he assumed personal control, outlined, in the spirit of Mazarin's counsels, the major policy decisions, and diligently recorded the principal events of the reign. But the year 1665, so central in other respects, also saw Colbert's efforts assume a different character. At that time he constructed a two-part document intended specifically for the king's own *Mémoires*.³ In the first section, which analyzes the international scene when Louis began the personal reign, the king speaks in the first person and addresses himself to his son. The moment was at hand for a preliminary accounting in anticipation of much greater triumphs.

Early in 1666, the personal and the political united to introduce the new setting. On the one hand, Anne of Austria died; on the other, Louis intervened in the Anglo-Dutch war. Almost immediately thereafter, we encounter the king giving direct attention to his *Mémoires*. He began to keep brief notes, or *feuilles*, on current events. Periodically, he transmitted these to Périgny, who emerges at this point as his principal collaborator, for insertion into a work book, or *registre*. The *feuilles* and the more extensive *registre* contain both events and reflections. Périgny used the *registre* as his principal source in drafting short segments of text, which he would later present for Louis's scrutiny. In this manner the *Mémoires* for 1666 gradually took shape, and assumed the form of contemporary history teaching by example.

That same year found the king, fully emancipated, squabbling with his brother, the Duc d'Orléans. But he may also have sought to find a new authority in the judgment of history by consulting such works as Machiavelli's *The Prince* and the *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*. The *registre* contains specific refer-

ences to these two works, and the entire *Mémoires* not merely demonstrate a knowledge of history but emerge as an implicit commentary on that frequently misunderstood Italian thinker.

Meanwhile, Colbert's previous work was applied by Périgny to the compilation of texts for the years 1661 and 1662. He also labored on portions of a text for 1665. Although these are now partially or totally lost, it is clear that they described the condition of France and of Europe at the beginning of the personal reign—Louis's assumption of power, his policies, and his experiences. The emphasis was on administrative, financial, and judicial matters, along with some consideration of religious, foreign, and military affairs. The king's confidence in Périgny may be weighed by the fact that in September, 1666, he designated this little-known man as tutor to the dauphin.

In 1667 Louis appeared to break off his affair with Mlle de la Vallière and to center his attentions on the long-anticipated war against Spain. But the *feuilles* and the *registre* thrived on the War of Devolution. The king's thoughts were echoed by Périgny, who began the first full text for 1666 with the words, "In the first part of these *mémoires*, which contains nearly five years, I have described to you in what manner I had conducted myself during the peace, and in this second one, I intend to show you how I have acted in war."⁴ He was to prepare two such texts and a revision for 1662. Although the year 1668 saw the *feuilles* and the *registre* abandoned, Périgny worked on three texts for 1667 and one for 1668. Then, around 1669 or 1670, came a revision for 1661 as well as a third text for 1666.

These efforts were interrupted by Périgny's death in September, 1670; but even then, Louis showed no intention of putting aside his *Mémoires*. The king quickly found a new collaborator in Paul Pellisson, a former Protestant, who enjoyed some reputation as a panegyrist and historian. Louis and his neophyte assistant undertook a new revision of the *Mémoires* for 1661, in which many additions, reminiscences of youth, evaluations of people, and reflections on religion bear the king's direct imprint. Still another minor revision followed, but the new collaboration proved short-lived. Louis had resumed his *feuilles* in 1670 and 1671, but in subsequent years, he turned almost exclusively to the chronicling of his military campaigns.

The king saved these documents with his most personal papers for over forty years, a token of their importance for him. Only in 1714, in the twilight of his reign, did he seem about to destroy them. Instead, he gave the manuscripts to Marshal de Noailles, who subsequently deposited them in the Royal Library. Gradually, the documents have come to light. In 1767 the Abbé d'Olivet issued a corrupted segment of Pellisson's revision for 1661, naming Pellisson as the author.⁵ Two editions that appeared in 1806, however, are of considerably greater value. The first, that of Gain-Montagnac, relied on the manuscripts and trumpeted Louis XIV as the writer.⁶ The second, the Grouvelle edition, is unsurpassed in its choice of texts.⁷ The editor possessed copies that are now lost, such as a last section of the *Mémoires* for 1661 and the revision of the *Mémoires* for 1662. Grouvelle believed that the king had labored alone between 1666 and 1670 and was only later assisted by Pellisson.

This progress could not withstand the onslaught of nineteenth-century criticism. To Charles Dreyss belongs the credit for discovering the collaboration of Périgny. To him, also, attaches the stigma, in his edition of the *Mémoires*,⁸ of having misled posterity for over one hundred years. Dreyss used all the scholarly apparatus of his age to advance the implausible and demonstrably wrong thesis that the second part of the *Mémoires*, the texts for 1666 to 1668, was written prior to the earliest texts for 1661 and 1662. The first part, he claimed, had been a mere afterthought, corrupted, moreover, by the futile efforts of the incompetent Pellisson. We find him condemning the work and the style of his own hero, Périgny, on the mistaken belief that it was Pellisson's. The edition seems to concern itself with everything except Louis.

Nevertheless, Dreyss's conclusions have matched brilliantly both the monarchist suspicion that great kings are beyond literature and the republican conviction that wilful tyrants live only on borrowed thoughts. Longnon's recent and readable editions, therefore, have been greeted with hostility, or at best sullenly ignored.⁹

In view of the scarcity of Louis's handwriting on the manuscripts, however, it is understandable that questions should arise regarding the authorship of the *Mémoires*. The *feuilles*, in the king's own hand, are undoubtedly authentic, and it is evident that Louis transmitted

information to Périgny for insertion into the *registre*. But what of the reflections and the references to Machiavelli's works, and what of the actual texts in which statements are amplified, changed, and even eliminated?

Some of the reflections are ascribable to the king, others are avowedly Périgny's; and there are still more, such as the Machiavelli notations, whose precise authorship is still uncertain. Yet we may recall the circumstances that made Louis turn to history. He studied, say the *Mémoires* for 1666, "even the most remote times."¹⁰ *The Prince* and the *Discourses* offer just the approach to statecraft and warfare, along with verdicts on historical figures, that might have aroused the king's enthusiasm. The author, moreover, draws heavily from classical antiquity. Louis missed Machiavelli's point repeatedly, as might be expected of an inexperienced reader with strong preconceptions. The king inadvertently or deliberately distorted this inveterate republican and religious utilitarian in order to exalt absolute monarchy and the true faith. Louis, notwithstanding his own moral fervor, also failed to recognize the same quality in Machiavelli. But all the reflections and notations whose authorship is ambiguous appear more trustworthy if one examines the actual texts, which betray the king's presence in a variety of ways.

They point up events that Louis considered worthy of note and of reflection. Late in 1661, in London, a dispute over precedence between the French ambassador and his Spanish counterpart, Baron de Watteville, had erupted into a street battle between their retainers. Colbert's historical notes, as might be expected, go into some detail on this matter. At the first news, Colbert relates, the king assembled a special council, which unanimously advised a policy of moderation. Louis, however, overrode them on the grounds that the occasion was ideal for a significant diplomatic triumph. Indeed, he brought such pressure to bear that Philip IV was obliged to recall Watteville and to concede a public declaration that Spanish ambassadors would no longer contest precedence with the French. Colbert's account of the council meeting was used in preparing the *Mémoires* for 1661. Had it been repeated verbatim, this would still provide an insight into the king's character. However, in the text the description is embellished by Louis's highly personal and self-congratulatory reflections on the affair, which include extremely interesting considerations

on the relationship between justice, honor, and utility.¹¹ If Périgny was the author of these reflections, he had managed to grasp the king's policies better than any of his contemporaries.

The documents also show how carefully Louis supervised the preparation of successive texts. In the years 1664 and 1665 the Sorbonne condemned two books that supported the doctrine of papal infallibility. Pope Alexander VII asked the king to have the censures withdrawn, and when Louis refused to comply, the pope took matters in his own hands. In June, 1665, he issued a bull condemning the Sorbonne. The Parlement of Paris thereupon retaliated with a condemnation of the bull. The king appeared to be on the verge of another crisis with the papacy.

At that point Cardinal de Retz, the *enfant terrible* of the Fronde, who had been relegated to an aimless existence in Rome, sought to make himself useful. He attempted, in greatest secrecy, to arrange a compromise between the Holy See and the Sorbonne. Louis acceded to the proposal, which had the effect of relaxing tensions, although nothing ever came of it.¹² Thus, on February 14, 1666, the king handed some notes to Périgny from which the collaborator made the following inaccurate entry in the *registre*:

Order to Cardinal de Retz to settle amicably with the Pope whatever problems there might be with that court; believing that with the great affairs that might arise for me, it was desirable to have its favor.¹³

Louis would never have displayed such confidence in the old rebel. Périgny continued to give the impression that the cardinal was a plenipotentiary in the first full text of the *Mémoires* for 1666. The king must have carefully scrutinized this text, because the section on Retz was subsequently corrected so as to read:

Meanwhile, I charged Cardinal de Retz with seeking ways in Rome, where he was, to settle the problems of the Sorbonne, seeing that since he was himself one of its doctors, he would be more likely to find some reasonable solutions.¹⁴

It is also true that Louis's offhand statements managed to find their way into the texts. Late in 1667, he was back from a successful campaign in the Spanish Netherlands, marred only by the necessity

of abandoning the siege of Dendermonde. The exuberant king found an occasion to wax philosophical, and Périgny did not fail to preserve it:

It is hard to see to everything at once! He who is charged with a private affair often blames the sovereign for not furnishing him with everything that he desired for his purposes. But he does not consider how many things there are to do at once, that it is necessary to take care of all of them, and that whoever would give too abundantly to one, would inevitably be lacking toward the others.

This is a reflection that the King has made to me, conversing casually today, September 12. It should be placed somewhere in the present or in the following years.

In the same conversation, on the retreat from Dendermonde, the King indicated to me that he believed it to be his most virtuous action of the entire campaign.¹⁵

Périgny had already completed most of the first full text of the *Mémoires* for 1666, but he found a place there to insert Louis's reflection, with much embellishment.¹⁶ On the other hand, the assertion about Dendermonde appears in the *Mémoires* for 1667, where the king says of the reversal, "I have regarded it as the only action of this campaign in which I had truly put my virtue to the test."¹⁷ This last example reinforces Louis's claim to the many personal statements that are found in the *Mémoires*, and notably, in the closely supervised Pellisson revision for 1661.

The king, therefore, gave Périgny the substance of the *Mémoires*. He may well have reflected on Machiavelli with him, and probably chose from Colbert's historical notes what matters were to be inserted. He carefully checked successive texts. We can be confident that it is he who speaks whenever we find expressions of his own feelings. In the *Mémoires* for 1661 he tells his son that he is leaving him "the means to correct history if it should go astray and misunderstand, from not having fully penetrated into my plans and into my motives."¹⁸ What reasons have we to doubt him?

Louis's principal concern in his *Mémoires* is with man and the state. He sees human nature as constant, insisting that men are corrupt and naturally bent toward their own particular advantages. All the same, they fall into different categories. Age and temperament

affect their behavior. The king speaks with understandable forbearance about youth, "an age when it is usual to love only pleasure."¹⁹ On the other hand, he displays an equally comprehensible impatience with crusty old age. The elderly Chancellor Séguier was "reputed to be lacking in firmness,"²⁰ and the Comte de Brienne, secretary of state, was "old and conceited."²¹ Men, of course, also vary in intelligence, but Louis sees social class as creating the most profound character distinctions. The mass of men seek only what is useful and pleasant. They enjoy criticizing what lies beyond their competence and at such times deserve to be ignored. An assembly of bourgeois, the king notes, is "easy to mislead and to intimidate."²² All this implies that the bourgeoisie, with rare exceptions, should be kept within its established functions. The *Mémoires*, however, present man's condition as an axiom rather than as a cause for censure. Louis prizes humanity for what can be done with it and yearns for its ultimate approbation. He also manifests especially warm sentiments for the nobility. He takes pleasure in their society. He wishes to reserve even the junior army posts for them. The king delights in relating how the Comte de La Feuillade came to the defense of his honor against a detractor in Spain.²³ Both Machiavelli and Louis are humanists, but the Italian moralist's admiration for the natural aristocrat gives way in the king to a predilection for the hereditary one.

It should surprise no one that Louis's conception of society is organic and corporate. "All these different conditions," according to him, "are united to each other only by an exchange of reciprocal obligations."²⁴ The king also points out that, "the more exhausted the provinces are by the soldiers or by anything else, the less capable they are of contributing to the other public burdens."²⁵ Thus "it is a great error for princes to appropriate certain things and certain persons as if they were theirs in a different fashion from the rest of their empire."²⁶ This attitude, however, serves mainly to justify the paternalistic obtrusiveness in taxation, commercial regulation, and sumptuary laws that manor and town had bequeathed to the monarchy. Indeed, Louis hastens to add that a king should be "the incorruptible judge and common father of all."²⁷ Louis also displays an immense respect for tradition. True, he believed the laws and institutions of his own time to be corrupt and in need of restoration. Nevertheless, any departure from tradition was the exception, and had to be justi-

fied by kings, at least in their own minds. "What they seem to do sometimes against the common law," he explains, "is based on reason of state, which is the first of all laws by common consent."²⁸ Louis reveres another form of tradition in religion, although he saw the church, too, as suffering from decay. Corruption had been responsible for the spread of Protestantism. It was probably at the root of the current Jansenist difficulties. All this suggests that if gross clerical abuses were eliminated, heresy would gradually vanish and religious unity could be restored. A particular merit of Christianity was that it taught submission to authority. "Those who would inquire into past times," the king reflects learnedly, "will easily see how rare, since the coming of Jesus Christ, have been those ghastly revolutions that occurred so often under paganism."²⁹ Once more, Machiavelli and Louis agree in their respect for tradition, their consciousness of decay and their awareness of religion as a political force. Yet the Italian, in the final analysis, is a radical seeking to escape his time. The king is basically a conservative.

Man's inclination toward self-interest would make democracy synonymous with anarchy, and Louis does not even deign to mention this type of popular rule. But the *Mémoires* make his contempt for any form of limited government abundantly clear. The king displays some irritation at the fact that the house of France no longer retains the Imperial title, but he finds consolation in describing the Holy Roman Emperors as, "captains-general of a German republic."³⁰ On the other hand, Louis feels sympathy for Charles II of England, since, "this subjection that makes it necessary for a sovereign to take orders from his people is the worst calamity that can befall a man of our rank."³¹ As to popular assemblies, "it is interest alone, whether private or of the state, that guides their conduct."³² Nor was the papacy spared this kind of analysis. It was dominated by persons "not born to greatness," and "able to sustain neither the brilliance that adorns it nor the storms that can threaten it."³³ Such reasoning also explains the drawbacks of prime ministers, whose private origins make their positions insecure and introduce personal considerations into their decisions. It follows, therefore, that the most effective government is one in which the supreme authority resides in the person of a hereditary monarch. He alone "has no fortune to establish but that of the state, no acquisition to make except for the monarchy, no authority

to strengthen other than that of the laws, no debts to pay besides the public ones, no friends to enrich save his people."³⁴ Here Machiavelli's subtle republicanism is opposed by the king's unequivocal advocacy of absolute monarchy.

Louis's traditionalism takes nothing away from his hierarchical and authoritarian conception of society. Nor does it prevent him from asserting that "kings are absolute lords and naturally have free and full disposition of all the goods possessed by clergymen as well as by laymen, in order to use them at any time as wise administrators, that is, according to the general need of their state."³⁵ Tradition, moreover, requires animation if its effects are to persist. "Private individuals," he says, "seem to find a well beaten path to wisdom by observing the public ordinances . . . the fear of punishment and the hope of reward are constant aids to them in their weakness."³⁶ It is the function of a king to "play on these great springs"³⁷ for the common welfare. Machiavelli makes much the same point, but one suspects that Louis also relishes the quasi-providential flavor of adapting vice to the service of virtue. It was all part of "exercising a divine function here below."³⁸

Finally, the breadth of a king's perspective permits him to compensate for the special interests of those who advise or appeal to him. This type of motivational arithmetic was almost second nature to Louis. It pervades the *Mémoires* and elucidates his famous statement that "the function of kings consists primarily of using good sense, which always comes naturally and easily."³⁹ To act rationally, moreover, is to do "as time and circumstances require."⁴⁰ Machiavelli, in his even more famous reflections on free will versus fortune, concluded that men are incapable of changing their temperament to fit the times. The king seems to fly in the face of this conclusion by insisting that this is precisely what a capable ruler must do.⁴¹

Louis's conservatism may well have been abetted by his immense pride in the French monarchy. He lauds the amiable informality that exists between the king and its nobility. The parlements, astonishingly, also come in for his praise. "If age is venerable in men," Louis remarks, "it appears all the more so to me in these ancient bodies."⁴² He also values the traditional privileges of the Gallican church, in so far as they protected the monarchy and its church from the incursions of the Holy See. Machiavelli, of course, emphasized the independence

of the nobility and the autonomy of the parlements in eulogizing the French monarchy. The king could scarcely have done more to distort him.

It is to be expected that when society lacks the proper leadership, state and church should falter. Quite consistently, Louis claims to bear no animosity for the Fronde. Moreover, "in reviewing history, there is hardly an order in the kingdom, nobility, clergy, or third estate that has not fallen at some time or other into terrible lapses from which it has recoiled."⁴³ Finally, of course, a king who harms his subjects weakens himself. Thus Louis's goal is merely, "to reduce all things to their natural and legitimate order,"⁴⁴ and, "restoring the purity of the laws and the general discipline in my state."⁴⁵ Even this, however, was to be undertaken with great caution. When, during a lull in the preparation of the *Mémoires*, Périgny submitted a high-minded proposal for the reform of the clergy, the king's response was to the effect that one had to improve gradually on his times.⁴⁶ In occasional moments Louis does give way to a vision. He looks forward to a day when extreme poverty will be banished from his realm. He notes, in passing, the desirability of integrating areas that are culturally French, such as Artois and Franche-Comté, into the monarchy. Throughout, he expresses confidence that his efforts will be durable and that the dauphin will never experience disobedience or rebellion. But then, the king recalls that "the most unscrupulous political thinkers, the least affected by principles of equity, of goodness and of honor seem to have predicted immortality for this state."⁴⁷ Louis is still much closer in mentality to Machiavelli than he is to the idea of progress or to modern nationalism.

The king attached great weight to foreign relations, one of his major concerns. The starting point of his diplomacy was the character and interests of the various powers. With this in mind, he did everything possible, through negotiation and bribery, to keep together those whose interests coincided with his own and to spread confusion elsewhere. In this regard, the *Mémoires* contain the very key to Louis's foreign policy. There he discloses that "the state of the two crowns of France and of Spain is such today and has been such for a long time in the world that it is impossible to raise one without humbling the other, which has almost nothing else to fear."⁴⁸ This "essential jealousy" and "permanent enmity"⁴⁹ is a matter of self-

defense and excuses even the violation of solemn treaties. The Spanish monarchy being a Hapsburg state, moreover, the king seems to encompass the Austrian and Imperial branch of the family in his enmity. This attitude accounts for his constant probing against the Hapsburgs and suggests that he was still aiming at the Spanish Netherlands in 1672, when he launched his invasion of the Dutch Republic.

The Franco-Spanish pendulum dominated and affected all other relations. The English were "the old and irreconcilable enemies of France,"⁵⁰ but their sale of Dunkirk and the defects in the structure of their government seemed to preclude the renewal of their menace. The Dutch merchant oligarchs, though old allies of France, desired only "to maintain their commerce and to humble the house of Orange."⁵¹ Their frequent failure to demonstrate the proper gratitude and confidence was only to be expected, but it nevertheless irritated Louis. For Sweden, another old ally, he displays considerably greater forbearance. His interest in Polish affairs rises when he has nothing better to do. The *Mémoires* are virtually silent on the proper relation between France and the papacy, probably because the king had such poor success in imposing his will upon it.⁵² On the other hand, they indicate a most surprising approach toward that "uncivilized nation,"⁵³ the Ottoman Empire. In noting the "distance and the intractable character of this nation,"⁵⁴ Louis seems to exclude it from the European state system.

The king also talks much about war. He describes the reviews that he held in preparation for the War of Devolution, taking the occasion to emphasize the importance of military discipline. He lays great stress on providing his soldiers with adequate pay. Louis's aim is to keep peacetime conditions in France from being disrupted by war, since subjects should be left to carry on their labors and pay taxes while a king pursues his military objectives. But the *Mémoires* are hardly a manual of strategy. Louis does point up the uncertainty of sea engagements and shows a predilection for sieges. He provides an enthusiastic account of his successful campaign in the Spanish Netherlands and gives himself the credit for the project of attacking Franche-Comté. But the king never goes beyond such maxims as, "the success of a siege almost always depends on the proper choice of attacks."⁵⁵

Louis hardly dispenses kings from human emotions, notwithstanding their special capacities for exercising good sense. He comes back repeatedly in the *Mémoires* to the problem of controlling one's inclinations. He delights in demonstrating how he has restrained his thirst for military glory, what measures he has taken to resist flattery, and the ability to contain his resentment in the interest of policy. The feelings, however, are not criticized in themselves. He regrets the necessity for kings to repress their openness for the sake of secrecy. He confesses his affection for Mlle de la Vallière, though insisting that such relationships must be kept separate from affairs of state.⁵⁶ Nor can he entirely disavow "that secret inclination of most magnanimous souls for arms and for those in this profession."⁵⁷ There is, finally, a passion to which he eagerly surrenders, the desire for renown and for glory.

Was Louis engaging in Baroque rhetoric? Or had he sensed, perhaps, that the mass of men and the church had interests of their own and that the monarchy actually resided in the finances, the court, and the army? Is it possible that despite his grandiose conceptions an implicit awareness of the limitations to his power stalks his conservatism, here combining, there separating, public good and the desire for personal glory? The *Mémoires* leave one asking whether it is frustration rather than wisdom that makes him combat the same emotions he cultivates. He seems to require, in order to reconcile state and king, a notion of higher utility based on intangibles. Perhaps this explains Louis's discovery that "the rules of justice and of honor almost always lead to utility itself,"⁵⁸ or his assertion about kings that "their constant desire for glory makes them disregard their own interest in many cases."⁵⁹

Just as utility blended into honor, the natural was permeated by the supernatural. Divinity had established the natural order of things. It did not usually tamper with it, "and when It wants to make a king fortunate, powerful, supported, and respected, Its most normal course is to make him wise, clear-sighted, fair, vigilant, and industrious."⁶⁰ The order, however, which at every moment brings together an infinite number of circumstances, is itself beyond the manipulation of men. Indeed, "the entire art of politics consists of playing on circumstances";⁶¹ and moreover, "the caprice of fate, or rather that wise Providence that rules supreme over our interests for purposes

beyond our comprehension, chooses sometimes to deflate the pomp of the loftiest men, in order to oblige them, in the midst of their greatest advantages, to recognize the source of all their blessings and to merit, through a continual avowal of their dependence, the assistance necessary for the success of their plans."⁶² Machiavelli's Goddess of Fortune seems barely recognizable in the garb of the Virgin Mary!

If Providence facilitates the trend of events, does not God expect the recipient of His assistance to seize the occasion and to carry out the divine purpose? Louis indicates that his very first successes in kingship made him "as deeply struck as I have ever been by the desire to serve Him and to please Him."⁶³ The *Mémoires* lead one to wonder if there were moments, in the king's later reign, when he might have assumed the obligation of being an instrument of the divine will. After the profitable Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded in 1668, he sent an expedition to the relief of Crete against the Turks. After the Treaty of Nijmegen, complemented by the reunion of Strasbourg in 1681—indeed, at the height of his power—he revoked the Edict of Nantes. Louis XIV may have known less about his own future than he transmitted to the reader of his *Mémoires*.

1. Published in P. Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-73), I, 535-36 (hereafter cited as *Lettres . . . de Colbert*). See also the slightly different version in *Archives des Affaires Etrangères* (A.A.E.), Mem. and Doc., Espagne 64, fols. 103-6.

2. See Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N.) MS Clair. 485, pp. 1-56 (published in Clément (ed.), *Lettres . . . de Colbert*, VI, 462-90). See the more complete copy in A.A.E., Mem. and Doc., MS Français 296, pp. 1-94.

3. Published in Clément (ed.), *Lettres . . . de Colbert*, II, ccxii-ccxvii.

4. B.N. MS Français 6732, fol. 180.

5. *Recueil d'opuscules littéraires tirés d'un cabinet d'Orléans et publiés par un anonyme* [Abbé J. d'Olivet] (Amsterdam, 1767).

6. J. L. M. de Gain-Montagnac (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV écrits par lui-même* (2 vols. in 1; Paris, 1806).

7. A. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres de Louis XIV* (6 vols.; Paris, 1806) (hereafter cited as *Œuvres*). Where possible, citations will be made to this edition.

8. C. Dreys (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860) (hereafter cited as Dreys [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*).

9. J. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires pour les années 1661 et 1666* (Paris, 1923), and J. Longnon (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1927). The correct order of composition is demonstrated in Paul Sonnino, "The Dating and Authorship of Louis XIV's *Mémoires*," *French Historical Studies*, III (Spring, 1964), 303-37.

10. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, II, 254.

11. *Ibid.*, I, 131-40.
12. For a full description of this dispute, see Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV's View of the Papacy (1661-1667)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966).
13. B.N. MS Français 6732, fol. 5 (published in Dreys [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 19).
14. B.N. MS Français 6733, fols. 300-301. See the second text in Grouvelle, *Œuvres*, II, 118.
15. B.N. MS Français 6732, fol. 100 (published in Dreys [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 260-61).
16. B.N. MS Français 6733, fol. 288. See the second text in Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, II, 106-7.
17. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, II, 310-11.
18. *Ibid.*, I, 5.
19. *Ibid.*, 105.
20. *Ibid.*, 34.
21. *Ibid.*, 35.
22. *Ibid.*, II, 346.
23. *Ibid.*, 192-94.
24. *Ibid.*, I, 105.
25. *Ibid.*, II, 93.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, 95.
28. *Ibid.*, I, 56.
29. *Ibid.*, II, 336.
30. *Ibid.*, I, 74.
31. *Ibid.*, II, 26.
32. *Ibid.*, 201.
33. *Ibid.*, 244.
34. *Ibid.*, I, 106-7.
35. *Ibid.*, II, 121.
36. *Ibid.*, 80-81.
37. *Ibid.*, 114-15.
38. *Ibid.*, 34.
39. *Ibid.*, I, 21.
40. *Ibid.*, 179.
41. *Ibid.*, II, 130-33.
42. *Ibid.*, I, 54.
43. *Ibid.*, 52.
44. *Ibid.*, 54.
45. *Ibid.*, II, 63.
46. For Périgny's proposal, see B.N. MS Français 6732, fols. 122-23 (published in Dreys [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II 490-95). See Louis's reaction in Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, I, 200-204.
47. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, I, 191.
48. *Ibid.*, 63.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*, 172.
51. *Ibid.*, 16.
52. See Sonnino, *Louis XIV's View of the Papacy (1661-1667)*.

53. Grouvelle (ed.), *Ceuvres*, II, 168.
54. *Ibid.*, 174.
55. *Ibid.*, 352.
56. *Ibid.*, 290-95.
57. *Ibid.*, 95.
58. *Ibid.*, I, 136.
59. *Ibid.*, II, 200.
60. *Ibid.*, I, 187.
61. *Ibid.*, 185.
62. *Ibid.*, II, 278.
63. *Ibid.*, I, 81.

Louis XIV and Reason of State

WILLIAM F. CHURCH

HERE is nothing more fascinating in the political thought and practices of the Age of Absolutism than the ways in which rulers and men of principle wrestled with the problem of reason of state. First appearing in Italy during the sixteenth century, the phrase *ragion di stato* and its linguistic equivalents rapidly became current in the languages of Western Europe and were utilized to signify a means-end rationality according to which the good of the state took precedence over other values in the conduct of political affairs. The essential issue, therefore, was that of defining legitimate policy for the benefit of the state and the extent to which rulers might violate accepted canons of justice and right in advancing the interests of their realms. In a sense, the fundamental problem of reason of state is as old as government within a civilization that recognizes the existence of higher law; but the exact combination of factors that prevailed in the seventeenth century—the definitive emergence of strong states in a society that continued to hold legal, moral, and religious values in high esteem—rendered the problem peculiarly acute.

From the vantage point of the twentieth century, it seems clear that the intellectual dilemma that is presented by reason of state is insoluble in absolute terms unless one frankly adopts a specific, a priori set of values and judges all acts of government accordingly. Since the emergence of the European system of sovereign states, not only have rulers and thinkers oscillated violently between extremes of Christian idealism and Machiavellian expediency when expressing their ideas concerning justifiable policy; experience has also shown

that their views have been strongly influenced by such practical, transitory factors as conditions within society, the effectiveness of governmental institutions, policies of neighboring rulers, and national experience in the immediate past. The element of principle is always present and sometimes determinative, but even the most high-minded observers have usually been willing to compromise with the ineluctable demands of necessity. This being so, the role of the historian of reason of state is necessarily limited to analyzing the views and practices that prevailed in any given time and place. He should assume a relativist position in which he attempts in so far as possible to recapture the mentality and experience of the period regarding this perennial problem and to view it according to the canons of the age itself without, however, ignoring the implications of his findings. In this essay it is proposed to examine those elements of Louis XIV's thought and governmental policies that indicate the manner in which he understood and applied the doctrine of reason of state. However, since Louis's absolutism represented the fruition of many long-term developments, both theoretical and practical, it is necessary to approach the subject by sketching the contributions of several earlier generations in this area.

The social and legal structure of seventeenth-century France and the acknowledged rightful relations within it were essentially those that stemmed from the immediate past. French society was both hierarchical and corporate in structure, a vast composite of individuals and groups that occupied varying positions in the social pyramid and enjoyed correspondingly divergent rights and privileges. Key individuals and families in various segments of the nobility and a host of religious, professional, and territorial bodies or "corporations," often of very intricate structure, possessed special rights that in theory reflected their contributions to the life of the whole. Although the favored position of many had originated in privileges granted by the crown, the vast majority on all levels of society regarded their rights as grounded in customary law and defensible in the courts, a fact that was confirmed by centuries of legal practice and tradition. This was especially true of property rights, a category that was then considerably more extensive than in recent times.

Superposed upon this society stood the French monarchy, which was absolute in the sense that it possessed a monopoly of governmental authority and suffered no coercive limitation by any human

agency. The king alone held complete, undifferentiated public power; all acts of government were done either by him in person or by his agents in his name. The rights, powers, and transmission of the crown were likewise grounded in law, the fundamental laws of the French monarchy. The French nation was therefore organized according to two spheres of legal right, public and private. Each was grounded in accepted law that in theory prevented the encroachment of one party upon the rights of the other. France may be said to have possessed a genuine constitution that, although unwritten and frequently uncertain, was sanctioned by tradition and innumerable practices.¹ The whole was infused with concepts of justice and equity, since all assumed that human law was at least consonant with natural and divine law, which limited the actions of all men. The king, as the divinely chosen ruler, had an especial obligation to conform to higher principles because of the nature and sanctions of his office.

Relations between states and princes, on the other hand, were considerably more indeterminate both as regards concepts of right and the proper conduct of policy. It was customary for the French to insist upon the complete independence of their king from both pope and emperor, a fact that signaled at once the absence of royal responsibility to any earthly power and the breakdown of universal Christendom. Principles of international law were extensively developed in the writings of theorists during the seventeenth century, but had only minimal influence upon the conduct of foreign affairs. The sovereigns and diplomats of the period acquired much experience in handling the many intricacies of international relations, and a number of diplomatic practices developed in consequence; but accepted canons of right and justice in the field developed slowly. The most specific controversies concerning the respective rights of sovereigns dealt with competing claims to border territories, where a hodgepodge of conflicting local customs, often feudal in origin, served as the only guides to legality and where the distinction between public and private law was frequently uncertain. Outright aggression and the violation of sworn agreements were invariably condemned, but beyond such general principles there was little to give sovereigns pause. It would seem, therefore, that concepts of legal right and justice, so essential to any definition of legitimate governmental

policy, rested upon a firm foundation within the French state but were much less certain in interstate relations.

The concept of divine-right absolutism that prevailed when Louis XIV assumed the reins of government preserved these ideas of right but also embodied principles that greatly extended the scope of the king's discretionary power. This momentous development in political concepts had resulted from an earlier series of challenges to the French monarchy, and embodied thinking men's desires for order and stability through increased royal competence. It is well known that Jean Bodin initiated the process by developing his theory of royal sovereignty for the purpose of strengthening the monarchy during the chaotic Wars of Religion. Discarding the older idea that the ruler merely held a series of "marks of sovereignty," Bodin redefined the royal authority as a natural and necessary body of power that was held by the king alone in all true monarchies. The definition of the royal authority as a series of specific powers or "marks of sovereignty" was traditional and was preserved by Bodin in his *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566), but in his *Six Livres de la république* (1576), he altered his position. Sovereignty for him now included not only the older prerogatives of administration and adjudication but also legislation, the needed instrument through which the ruler might make new laws to meet new situations. The king's power to legislate necessarily placed him above customary law, Bodin held, but he preserved the rights of the subjects, specifically those in property, by giving them a basis in natural law. Hence his insistence upon consent to extraordinary taxation. Bodin's followers seized upon his concept of royal sovereignty as the required mechanism for strengthening the monarchy but extended it further by giving it a basis in divine right. In this context the sovereign who wielded newly expanded power became God's chosen and anointed, whose rule was both divinely authorized and inspired. The inevitable tendency was to expand the king's rightful prerogative even further. The precariousness of Bodin's grounding of popular rights in natural law was amply demonstrated by the fact that insistence upon consent to taxation all but disappeared in French political writings early in the seventeenth century. Natural, divine, and fundamental law remained as limits upon royal policy, but customary law, which guaranteed the rights of the subjects, was now subordinated to the royal dis-

cretion. This concept of divine-right sovereignty, first developed by spokesmen for the *politique* party, became the predominant, quasi-official view of monarchy under Henri IV and provided the basic framework for speculation concerning the royal authority and justifiable policy throughout the seventeenth century.²

The ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin witnessed further expansion of the doctrine of absolutism and the appearance of the first extensive debates in France concerning reason of state. For Cardinal Richelieu the interests of the state took precedence over all legally based rights and privileges, which might therefore be sacrificed, if necessary, for the good of the whole. Richelieu justified this position by frankly supporting the concept of two levels of right and justice. Subjects were bound by established law and the rules of judicial procedure, but the state, because of its unique role in human society, was endowed with a superior morality that exempted the ruler's policies from the canons of ordinary justice.³ Matters of high policy, Richelieu held, were understood only by kings and their ministers; subjects should not concern themselves with the mysteries of state but should remain passively in their stations and willingly sacrifice their lives and goods as dictated by their divinely appointed ruler. Richelieu's application of these principles assumed many forms: not only extensive strengthening of administrative controls over the populace but eliminating members of the royal family from positions of political influence; financially exploiting the clergy; placing new restrictions on the nobles and executing several after trial by special commission; crushing the Calvinists' strongholds; merciless suppression of popular revolts; extensive increases in the burden of taxation; and, most important, the involvement of France in the Thirty Years' War in alliance with Protestant powers. For the first time in the history of France, she experienced the fruits of reason of state.

Richelieu and his supporters seem to have believed that all such measures were justified because the purposes of the state embodied the highest values that might be realized in mundane society. Far from rationalizing his efforts simply in terms of state power and Machiavellian expediency, Richelieu regarded himself as leading and disciplining the French nation in such manner that it might achieve its true potential and live in accordance with the highest principles. The French state was truly Christian because of the religious nature

and traditions of its monarchy, its long and heroic support of the cause of Christianity since the days of the crusades, its continued close ties with the Church of Rome, and the type of leadership that it afforded its subjects. In this sense the cause of France was the cause of religion, and policies that were undertaken in the interest of the French state redounded to the benefit of Christianity and embodied the highest good. That Richelieu, Father Joseph, and a host of their supporters understood and justified the cardinal's policies in these terms is clear from their actions and published statements.⁴ Indeed, such should in no way be surprising, since the concept of the lay state, deliberately divorced from religious considerations, lay far in the future.

During Cardinal Mazarin's ministry widespread reaction to the failure of the jurists and nobles to check the expansion of royal power during the Fronde extended the recognized sphere of royal discretion even further, not by the introduction of new concepts, but by reiteration of now-familiar ideas and a general, massive sentiment in favor of strengthening the monarchy. In the extensive literature that was written for the benefit and instruction of the young Louis XIV, the divine right of kings was developed to the furthest limit by repeated emphasis upon the divine choice of the individual ruler, his consequently vast prerogatives, and his responsibility only to God.⁵ The mysteries of state were comprehended only by the sovereign. In his extraordinary wisdom, he might dispose of the lives and goods of his subjects, dispense with established law, and otherwise exercise great discretionary power as required by necessities of state. Remarkably, the argument from the religious purposes of the state sharply declined during this period; major emphasis upon higher values was evident only in the constant reminders that the sovereign was subject to divine and natural law and was responsible only to God. In any case, it is evident that when Louis XIV assumed personal control of the French government in 1661 and chose to follow the precepts of reason of state as guides to policy, he was merely applying in practice many of the precepts that had been developed during several generations of French thought and experience, and, indeed, was attempting to govern in the manner that was expected of him.

This extension of royal competence before Louis XIV's reign took place in a society that continued to adhere to concepts of legality,

right, and justice, and whose very structure was founded upon the same. Royal discretionary acts and the rights of the subjects frequently clashed, but they were antithetical only in the sense that they represented different elements within the same flexible system of state organization. The constitution of the French state provided ample basis for both public and private spheres of legal right, although the manifold developments of the age caused much greater emphasis to be placed upon the powers of the crown. Chronic unrest among the lower classes, intermittent armed rebellion by the nobility, and constant threats of invasion from abroad caused thinking men to seek greater stability and security through the only available instrument, strong monarchy. It was an age, furthermore, that knew only pure monarchy, that is, a governing organ that held all public authority and simultaneously wielded legislative, administrative, and judicial power, often through the same body of officials. No division of powers limited the action of the crown; the subjects enjoyed the benefits of no representative institutions of consequence nor any recognized right of resistance. In such a context it was inevitable that the traditional legal and institutional guarantees of popular rights should prove inadequate barriers to royal encroachment.

If pursued indefinitely, the constant expansion of the royal discretion could lead to despotism and the complete negation of popular rights, even concepts of justice and equity. This was realized by many who nonetheless recognized the necessity of strong monarchy. Charles Loyseau, the ablest French jurist during the first generation of the century, held that kings enjoyed power over the lives and goods of their subjects, and might levy taxes and send men to war as needed for purposes of state; but since the subjects were free men and enjoyed legal ownership of their property, the king should use his power with reason and justice. If he merely followed the dictates of his discretion, he would reduce his subjects to slaves and confiscate property unjustly.⁶ Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, in his famous work on the parlements, said that the king of France was not absolute in the sense that his will was law; only Asiatic tyrannies were of that nature.⁷ In 1615 the remonstrance that the Parlement of Paris submitted to the regent Marie de' Medici protested against counseling the young king to initiate his reign with so many acts of *puissance absolue*, since good kings used it but rarely. Although royal power

was absolute, it should be used with moderation in order that it might long endure.⁸ Omer Talon, the very able *avocat général* in the Parlement of Paris during mid-century, thoroughly accepted the concept of divine-right sovereignty but insisted that despotism was of a different nature and that established law not only was the foundation of states but obliged the ruler to protect his subjects.⁹ Bishop Bossuet, the quasi-official spokesman for the crown on many matters during Louis XIV's reign, sharply differentiated between absolute and arbitrary monarchy. Under the latter the subjects were slaves, and all property belonged to the prince; he might dispose of their lives and goods as he saw fit, since there was no law but his will. In absolute monarchy, on the contrary, the prince remained within the limits of law and permitted legal redress to subjects who had been despoiled of their property.¹⁰ In spite of constant emphasis upon the broad discretionary powers of the crown, there was a strong, continuing tradition that absolute monarchy should remain within the limits of law and morality. The temper of France during the better part of Louis XIV's reign, however, emphasized the powers and prerogatives of the sovereign rather than his limitations. The great question was how Louis XIV would exercise his vast power and whether, in applying the doctrine of reason of state, he would fundamentally alter the nature of the French monarchy.

There is no doubt that Louis XIV was familiar with the rationale of reason of state. Both the phrase and the concept had become widely current before his time and were increasingly prevalent during his reign.¹¹ Although Louis XIV, like Richelieu, was primarily a man of action rather than abstract ideas, he always held to certain general principles in affairs of state. His religious convictions, although limited and in many ways deficient, were sufficiently strong for him to perceive the effects of divine favor or disfavor in the varying fortunes of his undertakings and, more important, to ensure that he was always conscious of his responsibility to God. He seems genuinely to have believed that "if we fail to fulfill his designs, He may allow us to fall into the dust from which He raised us."¹² Also, there is no doubt whatsoever that he was determined to fulfil his obligations as king as he understood them. From his dramatic *entrée en scène* in 1661 to the sentiments that he expressed on his deathbed, he sought first and foremost to discharge the responsibilities of his "profession of

king." Of course, he regarded himself as divinely appointed to rule, an image of God on earth. "He who gave kings to men desired that they be respected as his lieutenants, reserving to Himself alone the right to judge their conduct."¹³ Kings were "living images of Him who is most holy as well as most powerful."¹⁴ Divine inspiration automatically followed. The justice "that God placed in the hands of kings [is] like a participation in his wisdom and power."¹⁵ The mysteries of state were known and understood only by the king. "The people over whom we reign, not being able to grasp the nature of affairs, usually reach decisions on the basis of what they see about them."¹⁶ The government of kings might appear tyrannical when it was merely in accordance with reason of state, which the people do not comprehend. "The people suffer more by resisting than submitting even to the bad rule of kings over whom God alone is judge, for that which kings occasionally seem to do contrary to common law is founded on reason of state which all agree is the first of the laws but the most misunderstood and obscure to those who do not govern."¹⁷

All these ideas concerning monarchy had repeatedly been expressed earlier in the century, and Louis XIV merely followed an established pattern when he adopted them. In one important respect, however, his understanding of kingship embodied significant deviation from earlier concepts. This was his strong tendency to equate his personal interests and glory with those of the state. The view was not unknown in earlier periods of French history, since it was a natural concomitant of monarchical rule; but it reached its furthest development under Louis XIV, and may be regarded as the logical end product of personal absolutism. Indeed, it seems to have been in the nature of things during the reign of the Sun King—he who had been taught from infancy that he was divinely chosen to rule and who knew himself only as king. Since his public capacity was the essence of his being, and he was the focal point of all patriotic sentiment, he instinctively associated his glory with that of the state. Louis XIV regarded himself as doing much more than merely governing his realm. In a very real sense he set the ideal toward which his subjects should strive and led them to higher things.¹⁸ He absorbed their wills in all public affairs and epitomized the life of the state. He symbolized and personified the state and its purposes, and was identified with it in

this sense. Such is the meaning of the various texts that are frequently quoted in support of the apocryphal "L'Etat c'est moi." "When the state is one's concern," Louis said, "one works for oneself. The good of the one gives rise to the glory of the other."¹⁹ Also, Bossuet: "All the state is in him; the will of the people is contained in his."²⁰ Within the context of Louis's own thought and that of his age, these could only mean that Louis absorbed unto himself all leadership and public significance of the state and that he symbolized its existence, purposes, and higher meanings. They were never intended to mean that Louis *was* the entire state or that it was his personal possession.²¹

Although Louis XIV regarded his personal interests and glory as intimately allied with those of the state and guided his policies accordingly, he was capable of differentiating between himself and the state. "The interest of the state should take precedence,"²² he held, and from the context he clearly meant that in case of divergence the royal desires should give way to state interests. On his deathbed he uttered the famous words, "I depart but the state will always remain."²³ Louis's supreme position as sovereign of France and symbol of her greatness caused him instinctively to co-ordinate his personal prestige and interests with those of his realm, but he never claimed that they were identical in all respects. In spite of great expansion of the royal prerogative, Louis's insistence upon his unique understanding of the mysteries of state, his associating his personal glory with the interests of the state, and his symbolic expression of its higher meanings, his position merely represented the logical conclusion of divine-right sovereignty. The fundamental concept of two spheres of legal right survived,²⁴ although the major developments of the age and Louis's own ideas extensively subordinated the private to the public. The basic principle of reason of state may therefore be said to have won widespread acceptance in the sense that predominant opinion held the interests of the state to be superior to those of any of its parts and willingly accorded Louis all necessary authority to implement this doctrine. In the hands of a Louis XIV the position contained the potentialities of despotism, and, if applied to the hilt, would have fundamentally altered the nature of the French monarchy and the customary constitution. As Louis himself recognized, however, there is a great difference between abstract theories and the active management of government.²⁵ We shall now briefly examine

how he applied these ideas in practice. In analyzing Louis XIV's concept of reason of state as it is evidenced by his policies, we are concerned primarily with his motivation rather than the extent to which he was successful in achieving his objectives. His actual accomplishments in many areas varied greatly according to a myriad of circumstances, as many special studies have made clear.

Louis XIV's direction of internal affairs according to the precepts of reason of state was made possible by the vast growth of the royal bureaucracy that took place during his reign. In his intense desire to fulfil his role as king, Louis realized the absolute necessity of efficient organs of government that would render his will effective throughout his realm. He consequently embarked upon a policy of administrative reform and state-building that was so extensive that it established the form of the French government until the Revolution. Essentially, Louis's work took the form of building a body of expert, professional commissioners who were directly responsible to him and increasingly displaced the older, established officials, who enjoyed varying degrees of independence in their functions. His reasons for choosing professional experts as his ministers and secretaries of state, developing an elaborate bureaucracy, regularizing the system of intendants, creating an efficient police, and, in certain respects, building a large standing army were substantially the same: to bring all elements of the nation increasingly under royal tutelage. The result was two distinct and potentially antithetical developments during the period: a vast increase of personal power in the hands of the king, but also a massive growth of the impersonal, administrative state. The essentially divergent nature of these trends, however, was apparent only to a minor extent while Louis XIV was at the helm, since he successfully retained control over much of the vast system; and the concentration of effective power in his hands actually increased as the reign advanced. At no time was there any question of Louis's legal right to take these many steps to increase his power over his subjects, since the development of instruments of government was strictly a royal prerogative. The issue, therefore, was not Louis's authority to develop mechanisms of power, but the use that he made of them; that is, the nature of the policies that his administrative system was designed to render effective.

The intendants were by far the most significant arms of Louis XIV in controlling his realm, and the gradual consolidation of their position and powers typified the evolution of the royal administration. As directly authorized royal commissioners, they exercised undifferentiated power in their provinces, and may literally be said to have served as agents of reason of state. Their commissions, which were revocable at will, varied according to the necessities of government and the fluctuations of royal policy; but they were always very extensive, and were frequently expanded as the occasion required. The vast extent of the intendants' activities at once reflected and implemented Louis XIV's concept of state-building, namely, that the surest means of strengthening the state lay in maximum discipline and control by his administrators and autocratic leadership by himself. This authoritarian philosophy was founded upon the assumption that all phases of human existence might be improved and rendered more meaningful under a regime of sharp regimentation, which it was the monarchy's chief purpose to provide. A mere listing of the intendants' activities is sufficient to indicate the type of administrative tutelage that they sought to establish. As supreme local administrators, they exercised police power, raised military forces, managed a variety of public projects, regulated the intricacies of agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity, enforced censorship, and otherwise controlled manners and morals. They administered the financial affairs of cities and communities; they assigned and collected taxes, particularly the extraordinary levies that were created in this period; they exercised broad judicial powers in both civil and criminal cases; and occasionally, they undertook such unusual but significant functions as placing an entire province on a war footing or enforcing the many measures against the Huguenots, not only the revocation of the Edict of Nantes but also the extensive series of edicts before and after 1685.

When to the powers of the intendants are added those of the Paris police, masterfully directed by La Reynie and D'Argenson, as well as the peacetime activities of Louvois's army, the vast administrative controls that were available to Louis XIV readily become apparent. Extensive and varied friction between the intendants and local administrative personnel was inevitable, since the system super-

posed a new category of officials upon established organs and undermined the functions and privileges of older royal officials, municipal authorities, guilds and other professional bodies, religious and educational groups, local parlements and estates. Opposition ranged from passive resistance to open revolt, but all were faced with the fact that the intendants wielded regal power and might, in the king's name, override local rights and privileges. Like the authoritarian concept of rightful government upon which it was based, the system contained the potentialities of despotism. In practice, these were frequently unrealized as in Marseilles, which preserved the great majority of its privileges,²⁶ and in Alsace, where the more draconian provisions of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes were never applied.²⁷ The system nevertheless produced a Lamoignon de Basville, whose reputation for tyranny in Languedoc was proverbial in his own time.²⁸ The intendants' activities and their consequences—administrative tutelage over extensive segments of national life and the controls and exploitations that were thereby made possible—were among Louis XIV's most significant applications of the doctrine of reason of state.

Specific illustrations of these policies may be chosen from three representative areas; taxation, justice, and the subordination of all social classes to the crown. Of these, taxation was doubtless the most sensitive, since it touched property rights and many entrenched privileges throughout the social hierarchy. Louis XIV may have believed that he was "born to possess all and command all,"²⁹ but in practice this meant utilizing the vast human and material resources of the nation to support the many projects that he conceived for the good of the state. The long, miserable financial history of the reign need not be recounted here, but it should be noted that in two instances Louis attempted to go beyond the traditional patchwork of levies and expedients and to make good his claim that "kings are absolute lords (*seigneurs*) and by nature have full and free disposition of all property, both lay and ecclesiastical, to use as wise stewards, that is, according to the needs of their state."³⁰ First, he attempted to establish his position as direct lord (*seigneur*) over all landed property in the realm. This was an extension of the feudal principle, *nulle terre sans seigneur*, and would have eliminated at a stroke all allodial holdings, which were especially numerous in the *pays de droit écrit*.³¹

The idea was not new, and had been unsuccessfully attempted in 1629 and 1641. In his edict of 1692 Louis claimed that immediate, universal lordship over all lands in the realm (*directe universelle*) was an inalienable right of the crown, and that no alodial holdings would be recognized without proof of royal grant.³² Although this was merely an extension of an ancient principle, widespread changes in land tenure and alteration of property rights would have resulted in the southern provinces. These, however, offered considerable successful resistance, and alodial holdings survived, although diminished, until the Revolution.³³

Much more revolutionary were the implications of Louis XIV's two wartime taxes, the Capitation (1695) and the Tenth (1710), which were based upon the subjects' ability to pay and were in theory applied to all without regard to social status. No issue of popular consent was involved in these instances, since the provincial estates presented little trouble and the parlements were legally required to register all edicts without remonstrances. These levies, therefore, literally embodied Louis's claim to dispose of *all* subjects' property at will for the good of the state. Reason of state has no clearer practical application in the period. Had these two taxes become permanent in their original form, much would have been altered both in government finance and social relationships. The Capitation, however, survived in very attenuated fashion, and the Tenth lasted only a few years. The record of these levies demonstrates that even the monarchy of Louis XIV, with its great administrative power, was unable to appropriate subjects' property at will and to render the doctrine of reason of state effective in this most important area. The result was that the eighteenth-century monarchy chronically lacked adequate financial strength, and continued along the well-worn path of fiscal palliatives and expedients until these led to its downfall.

The evolution of judicial institutions during the reign of Louis XIV clearly illustrates his determination to subordinate all older, established bodies that might limit his authority and to increase his personal control over his subjects. For a variety of reasons, Louis intensely disliked the parlements and the jurists generally. He never forgot their actions during the Fronde, and he regarded many of the parlements' claims as encroachments upon his sovereignty.³⁴ Also, he could not but remember the extreme difficulty that he had experi-

enced in securing a verdict of guilty in the trial of Fouquet before a hand-picked commission of judges.³⁵ He consequently determined to destroy the parlements' political powers and to reduce them to mere tribunals for trying cases between subjects. This he did in a series of edicts that culminated in 1673 and required the registration of all new laws before remonstrances were made.³⁶ The latter, of course, disappeared, and thereafter until the end of the reign, there was no check whatsoever upon royal legislation, including tax edicts. The great codes of law—civil (1667), criminal (1669), commercial (1673), and others—that were promulgated during the reign were framed only partially with the co-operation of the jurists and were imposed upon the courts by royal fiat. Not surprisingly, Louis attempted as far as possible to exercise justice in person according to the doctrine of *justice retenue*. He carefully reorganized the system of receiving and handling petitions (*placets*), occasionally rendering decisions himself.³⁷ More important, he made extensive use of *lettres de cachet* for a variety of reasons, frequently condemning the victims to arbitrary imprisonment for indeterminate periods.³⁸ He also did not hesitate to evoke cases of note from the parlements for trial before the *conseil d'en haut* or the *conseil des parties*.³⁹ And he repeatedly broadened the judicial powers of the intendants, who thus became special agents of *justice retenue*, giving them decisive advantage over the parlements and other local courts. In these ways, Louis subordinated the established judicial organs to the supremacy of the crown and placed himself as far as humanly possible in immediate control over the dispensing of justice. The judicial defenses that traditionally protected the rights of the subjects were correspondingly weakened, opening the way for any policy that might be in the interests of the state.

In the eyes of Louis XIV and his ministers, the subordination of all social classes and groups to official controls was the *sine qua non* of strengthening the state and guiding it toward higher ends. All elements of the social hierarchy, he believed, were obligated to contribute not only to the life of the whole but to the maintenance and grandeur of the monarchy.⁴⁰ It was therefore quite logical that he should feel free to utilize the human and material resources of his realm for the good of the state as he interpreted it. His efforts along

these lines, however, differed considerably among the various social classes. Regarding the clergy, only limited changes were made in their position during the reign because earlier, extensive application of the principles of Gallicanism had given the king essentially what he wanted of the first estate relative to appointments, jurisdiction, and taxes. The king chose the great ecclesiastics of the French church, distributed its benefices, controlled the creation and dissolution of monastic orders, and enforced discipline in their houses. Through constant use of the *appel comme d'abus*, the parlements drew so many cases from the ecclesiastical courts that Louis felt it necessary to protect the latter's jurisdiction over purely spiritual matters.⁴¹

From the standpoint of the hard-pressed royal administration, levies on ecclesiastical wealth were doubtless the most important matter at issue. As we have seen, Louis claimed to be absolute lord over all property, lay and ecclesiastical, that he might use for the good of the state. He thus denied the immunity of clerical wealth from royal taxation, and, indeed, insisted that the first obligation of its holders was to contribute to the prince in support of the general good of the realm.⁴² In practice, however, Louis's policy was limited to little more than extending the traditional levies. The ancient *droit d'amortissement* was regularized and more efficiently collected.⁴³ The Assembly of the Clergy periodically granted the *don gratuit*, a contract that called for an annual payment of 1,300,000 *livres*. To this were added other temporary payments from clerical wealth in times of crisis, such as the Capitation and the Tenth. These payments were a major resource of the monarchy, and were utilized for any and all purposes of state. Though the parties to the contract were hardly equal, the clergy successfully preserved the legal fiction that the *don gratuit* was a gift rather than a tax. The monarchy, however, had effectively established the principle that the wealth of the clergy might be tapped by the state in case of need. The most specific extension of a traditional levy took place in 1673 when Louis decreed the application of the *régale* to the entire realm, thereby closing a gap in the rights that had been accorded the French king by the Concordat of 1516.⁴⁴ There is no need to recount the extensive struggle to which this gave rise. It is sufficient to note that Louis eventually forced the acceptance of the *régale* by both pope and clergy. Although these

developments indicate extensive subordination of the first estate to the monarchy, there is no doubt that the clergy were the least exploited among Louis's subjects.⁴⁵

Louis XIV's major objective regarding the nobility was not, as in the case of the clergy, control of a vast institution and its material resources but the subordination of an influential social caste and the exploitation of its personnel for purposes of state. After the failure of the Fronde and the building of Versailles, the great nobles and their families willingly accepted royal invitations (i.e., commands) to take up residence at court, where they lived on pensions, gifts, and such favors as benefices for their younger sons and doweries for their daughters. Louis's phenomenal memory enabled him to know and keep watch over thousands personally. Many of the most prestigious nobles of France were brought under surveillance, frequently becoming mere adjuncts to the brilliant life of Versailles. Furthermore, the noble caste was increasingly a royal creation, a product of ennoblement by the crown. In this instance as in so many others, Colbert transformed a royal prerogative into an important source of revenue. After extensive inquiry into the legitimacy of existing titles of nobility throughout France, Colbert ordered in 1661 the quashing of thousands of false titles unless proper payment was made.⁴⁶ Later ministers did not hesitate to sell hundreds of titles during times of crisis: 500 in 1696, 200 in 1702, and to all Inspectors General of the Navy and Galleys in 1704.⁴⁷ Louis XIV, like Richelieu, urged the wealthier nobles to enter commerce by making it possible for them to do so without losing caste,⁴⁸ but the effort was a failure. The great majority of nobles found their only reason for existence to be service in the military establishment, that is, under the command of the Sun King, who squandered their lives in his wars for personal glory and state interests. In his relations with the nobles, Louis undoubtedly benefited from the traditional ties of fealty that bound king and vassal, but he transformed these into a king-subjects relationship of which he was the only beneficiary. The result was that the nobles were quite dependent upon the royal will and found no opportunities for self-fulfilment except those that the king might provide for purposes of state.

As for the third estate, we have noted how the intendants increasingly sought to subordinate the cities and towns by managing their

financial affairs, dictating the choice of local officials, applying rigorous codes to industry, regulating commerce, exercising combined police and judicial functions, and otherwise bringing urban life under administrative controls. A massive decline of municipal independence and initiative occurred at the precise moment when France increasingly needed these to strengthen her position as a great power. Louis and Colbert, however, understood only one approach to strengthening the state, that through further regulation by royal commissioners. In one area, urban finance, such measures were doubtless justified. In his intense desire to place the nation's financial affairs on a firm footing so that Louis might enjoy massive support for his vast undertakings, Colbert undertook to systematize the chaotic financial administration that prevailed in most local communities. Through a series of edicts that was not completed until the last year of his life, he created an elaborate system through which the intendants might control all aspects of municipal finance.⁴⁹ More efficient handling of local affairs was assured, though at the cost of omnipresent administrative tutelage. Once initiated, moreover, the attempts to extend further controls over the cities seemed to develop endlessly. In 1687 an edict prohibited municipal officials' bringing cases to court without the intendant's permission.⁵⁰ In 1690 and 1691 royal procurers were established in all cities and towns to oversee the immediate handling of all municipal affairs and "to propose and require all that will be for the good of His Majesty's service and the public utility."⁵¹ In 1692 the offices of mayors and assessors were made venal, removing them from control by the community;⁵² ten years later, mayors and perpetual syndics were even created in rural communities that had lacked them heretofore.⁵³ And in 1699, a generation after La Reynie had organized his highly efficient Paris police, the system was extended throughout the realm by wholesale creation of lieutenants-general of police and their aides in all important centers.⁵⁴ A host of officials who were responsible only to the crown and who usually held venal offices spread over the face of the land for the sole purpose of increasing the centralization of power and rendering effective the sovereign's will.⁵⁵

It was the peasantry that Louis XIV exploited most extensively when he sacrificed his subjects' lives and goods for the interests of the state. The massive increases in taxation that his administrative

system made possible fell chiefly upon the defenseless tillers of the soil. Not surprisingly, the reign was punctuated by a series of peasant uprisings, since they bore the major burden of Louis's many ventures. Louis believed, furthermore, that the lower classes generally were obliged to sacrifice their lives for the defense of the realm as he might dictate. As his wars became more costly and the traditional, voluntary system of recruiting for his vast armies proved insufficient, Louis took the momentous step of initiating compulsory military service. First organized by Louvois in 1688, the system required each parish to send one recruit, who was elected by the inhabitants and assigned to a special unit of provincial militia.⁵⁶ The men were later chosen by lot in the presence of the intendant. The system lasted in one form or another until 1697, but was revived in 1701 and was utilized through the entire War of the Spanish Succession. This time the intendants were directed to assign levies according to the number of inhabitants and to supervise the formation of a specified number of companies.⁵⁷ These were merged with the regular forces and were assigned to combat duty outside the borders of the realm. All distinction between the regulars and the militia was quickly lost, and the system became the primary means of securing replacements for the royal armies.⁵⁸ The numbers thus recruited were, of course, dictated by the crown. This was the first massive application of the principle of compulsory military service as the king might decree. Truly, the lives and goods of the peasantry were increasingly subject to Louis's disposal to use as he would.

Through these diverse mechanisms Louis XIV sought in varying degrees to subordinate all social classes to the purposes of the state and to exploit them accordingly. In Louis's hands, his nationwide administrative system became a vast instrument for making available the human and material resources of the realm, directing it toward feats of greatness and implementing the doctrine of reason of state.

Louis XIV's foreign policy was, in certain respects, even more representative of his understanding of reason of state than were his achievements in state-building within the borders of the realm. On the basis of the record it seems that the major function of his strong administrative apparatus was mobilization of the nation's resources in support of his ventures abroad. Not only were these his major concern during the better part of his reign, they were also closest to his heart

because they permitted innumerable feats of glory, enhanced his personal renown, and enabled him to appear upon the vast European stage as leader and defender of the most powerful nation in Christendom. Glory, he readily admitted, was the ruling passion of his life; it required not only constant solicitude but perpetual augmentation if it were to endure.⁵⁹ Military conquests and the acquisition of territory were among its more important elements, he held, since he was highly conscious of the relative power and prestige of all European monarchs and constantly sought to exalt the Bourbons and their realm in Europe's affairs. Dynastic rivalry of this type was never absent from his calculations. It should be emphasized, however, that to a large extent Louis regarded his acquisition of glory as the logical concomitant to his fulfilling his vast responsibilities as sovereign of France. Since he acceded to the throne according to the combined dictates of fundamental law and divine decision, he was personally obligated to provide France with the finest governmental leadership both by masterful exercise of the royal prerogative and by defending his realm against all enemies. Far from being his to dispose of at will, his powers were a trust that he held during his reign and was duty-bound to exercise in the interests of the state to the best of his abilities. At his death he was similarly required to transmit the crown and his realm intact to his successor. Fulfilment of his obligations as sovereign was therefore as vital an element of his glory as his acquisition of personal renown. Indeed, the two were frequently synonymous in his eyes. His resulting foreign policy assumed many forms, ranging from aggressive war and feats of prestige to more defensive measures, especially late in the reign; but all were alike in that they embodied Louis's understanding of legitimate policy for the benefit of the realm and its sovereign. Throughout his many wars he closely equated his personal glory with the interests of the state and sought simultaneously to increase the power and prestige of both, since he regarded the distinction between them as minimal in most matters of policy. As sovereign of France and symbol of her greatness, he instinctively held that in foreign affairs, "when the state is one's concern, one works for oneself. The good of the one gives rise to the glory of the other."⁶⁰

Not even Louis XIV, however, claimed that war was a good in itself, a normal condition in human relations. Like all responsible

sovereigns, he instinctively adopted the position, later associated with the name of Clausewitz, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, an instrument for achieving a given end. It was Louis, of course, who determined the ends to be achieved, but he was highly conscious of the question whether he might justifiably use force for his purposes. On many occasions he attempted to place his actions in the most favorable light by issuing official explanations of his aggressions. Regarding the thorniest problem of interstate morality, the sanctity of treaties and sworn agreements, Louis adopted a position that was at once realistic and high-minded.

Although integrity requires that a prince always keep his word, it is not prudent to rely absolutely on that of another. . . . There is no clause so clear that it does not undergo interpretation, and as soon as anyone decides to retract it, he easily finds a pretext for doing so. Everyone arranges treaties according to his present interests . . . but when the reason that occasioned the promise is no longer, there are few who will keep their promises.⁶¹

On the other hand:

All the virtues find in themselves their own reward and felicity that never depend upon the success of the measures they counsel. . . . Above all others, integrity or good faith . . . has a special quality which causes it to be recognized by the least enlightened, and has powerful charms that cause it to be loved by all the earth. The world, however corrupt, holds it in such veneration that those who are least inclined to practice it are constantly obliged to imitate it so as to avoid being completely banished from all society. . . . Not without reason may one say that this virtue is esteemed, since only through its ministrations does the world receive all that is agreeable and advantageous. It is she who establishes commerce among nations, places society in cities, maintains family ties, and nourishes love and confidence between princes and subjects.⁶²

It is quite understandable that whenever Louis thought he had right on his side, he stressed the fact and attempted to make the most of it. Early in his reign, however, the all-important circumstance was that there was little but his self-restraint to limit his aggressions. The manner in which Louis XIV's foreign policy and wars evidenced his understanding of reason of state will now be briefly examined. Again, we are more concerned with Louis's motivation than the success of his

policies. Since space permits consideration of only a very limited selection of relevant materials, it seems more pertinent to examine Louis's reasons for resorting to war than the many concessions and alterations of policy that were forced upon him by his increasingly powerful enemies during the latter part of his reign.

From the first year of his personal rule (1661), Louis XIV made it clear that he would preserve his freedom of action regardless of any prior commitments. Proceeding on the assumption that "the condition of the crowns of France and Spain is such today and has been so for long that one may not rise without lowering the other,"⁶³ he held that neither party was entirely bound by its agreements, yet he attempted to appear in the right whenever possible. After unsuccessfully complaining to Madrid concerning twenty-six infractions of the Peace of the Pyrenees, Louis wrote to D'Estrades in London that Spanish violation of the Peace authorized him to do the same by aiding the Portuguese in their struggle against Spain. But Louis's action was

with this difference much to my advantage, that the Spanish having been the first to break their word which they could not do without blame, I would on the contrary be fully justified both before God and my own conscience which would reproach me with nothing in this regard because I merely imitated the example that the Spanish gave me, and because that in their procedure which was pure lack of faith was for me a rendering of justice to myself which no one might reasonably condemn.⁶⁴

Several years later, when D'Estrades was stationed in Amsterdam and was negotiating with John de Witt, Louis wrote to his ambassador that "these words, *clear rights*, which he [De Witt] used are a deliberate subterfuge, since there are hardly any in the world so clear, in any dispute whatsoever, that do not have some exceptions and contrary reasons which each accepts as good according to his passion or interest and uses against the other party."⁶⁵ During the Anglo-Dutch War of this period, Louis surveyed the diplomatic situation and, despite its embarrassments, sided half-heartedly with his Dutch allies, "to whom my word was pledged."⁶⁶

That the legal justifications of Louis XIV's first war, the so-called War of Devolution (1667-68), were discussed so extensively indicates that both he and his natural enemies had considerable respect

for the legal principles involved. Early in 1667, Louis ordered the publication of the important *Traité des droits de la reine très-chrétienne sur divers états de la monarchie d'Espagne*⁶⁷ as an official pronouncement justifying his invasion of the Spanish Low Countries. Louis's objective, the author disarmingly claimed, was not to acquire new domains or additional glory but to uphold the rights of the queen according to law. Throughout the work the emphasis is upon the element of legal right. The first part argues that the queen's renunciation of her heritage at the Peace of the Pyrenees was invalid both because of the unpaid dowry and because her action ran counter to the fundamental law of all monarchies. Members of royal families are born to rule as subjects are born to obey; neither may surrender or discard this obligation since fundamental law binds rulers and subjects alike. The second portion maintains that the hereditary transmission of the rights and powers of sovereignty was regulated by custom, in this case the custom of the duchy of Brabant that specified that the children of the first marriage should receive the entire heritage by right of devolution. "When there is no particular law [such as the Salic Law] for a sovereignty and it is nevertheless necessary to regulate its rights and succession, what other rule can one follow but that of the law and custom of the province?"⁶⁸ Such was his argument for elevating a local custom into a law of succession for the sovereign authority, a position that had a certain justification in many Hapsburg territories where the distinction between public and private law was very loosely defined. The emphasis, therefore, was upon the inalienable rights of the queen and Louis's obligation to enforce them in spite of the provisions of the Peace of the Pyrenees. "May he [Louis] do better as the father of the nation than to maintain its laws inviolate so that none may derogate from them for any reason and the sovereign and the people are equally subject to them?"⁶⁹

Quite by accident, it would seem, there appeared almost simultaneously Antoine Aubery's very different treatise, *Des justes prétentions du Roi sur l'Empire*,⁷⁰ which blatantly proclaimed Louis XIV's rights to most of the German Empire and could hardly have been officially inspired. Writing on a subject "which concerns no less the expansion than the reputation of the state,"⁷¹ Aubery claimed that the monarchy of Louis XIV was the same as that of Clovis, that the

larger part of Germany was the patrimony and heritage of the French princes, and that Charlemagne possessed Germany as king of France rather than as emperor. Aubery was patently justifying massive French conquests in Germany, particularly when he concluded that heaven had blessed Louis and his queen with a dauphin "to whom everything seemed infallibly to promise in the years to come both supremacy over the earth and universal monarchy."⁷² Reaction in Germany was understandably intense, and the embarrassed royal council felt it necessary to condemn Aubery's book and to confine him for two months in the Bastille, where, however, he was visited by the most distinguished persons in the realm. His punishment was indeed minimal, and his book was read throughout Europe.

The most important answer to these and similar French pamphlets was the influential *Bouclier d'état et de justice*, by Baron Lisola, the most indefatigable of Louis XIV's critics.⁷³ The French publications were mere excuses for war, he insisted, and taking his cue from Aubery, he turned against Louis the charge that the French had long used against the Hapsburgs, that of seeking universal monarchy.⁷⁴ He then argued the legal case at length. French entry into the Low Countries would be a violation of the Peace of the Pyrenees no matter what claims were made; throughout the work he insisted that the sanctity of treaties was fundamental to international peace. The queen's renunciation was valid, both because it was incorporated into sworn agreements between sovereigns and because she had received adequate compensation without the unpaid dowry.⁷⁵ Spanish holdings, moreover, must remain intact according to the inalienability of the royal domain. It was specious to argue that a local custom applied in this instance because "how can one make a public and fundamental law of a custom which is not universal nor established by the sovereign, and which is attached to particular circumstances of properties and places?"⁷⁶ Both the Peace of the Pyrenees and relevant law undercut the French position, Lisola maintained in a powerful presentation of his case. Turning to more practical matters, he insisted that the greatest danger lay in French willingness to introduce uncontrolled force into Europe's affairs. Because of the scattered nature of her holdings, Spain was strong in defense but weak in attack, with the result that the Spanish rulers always observed treaties, preferred religion to reason of state, ruled according to law, and never

made alliances with the Turk.⁷⁷ The French, on the other hand, manipulated all peace settlements to their advantage, had "the interest of the state as their unique rule without being limited by the sanctity of treaties, the good of religion or ties of blood or friendship," and made alliances with the Protestants and the Turk.⁷⁸ These were the principles of conquerors, he concluded, calling for unity among those threatened by French aims for universal monarchy. The debate was continued in a lengthy series of pamphlets and treatises, most of which were devoted to refinements of the legal issue.⁷⁹ In Louis's motivation legality was undoubtedly secondary to his desire for conquests and glory, yet it is noteworthy that he embarked upon his foreign ventures in an area where he believed legal claims to justify his ambitions.

After his initial military successes, Louis XIV's attitude toward the other European powers hardened, although he continued to make full use of legality whenever possible. His seizure of Lorraine in 1670 was justified, he claimed, by the Peace of the Pyrenees, which authorized French occupation of the province in case Duke Charles IV moved against French interests.⁸⁰ The duke had, in fact, offended Louis by recruiting troops and attempting to enter into anti-French diplomatic arrangements. When the emperor indicated that he might intervene in favor of the duke, Louis declared, "Lorraine belongs to me today because of many entirely legitimate titles, as much because of our treaties as by right of conquest."⁸¹ The emperor was offered the choice between Louis's enmity or friendship, accompanied by this threat: "The more affairs I enter into, the more glory I shall have if I am able to handle them properly, and whoever has good troops and funds for this purpose . . . should not be angered when others furnish him [the occasion for] this, especially when he may thereby acquire glory."⁸² As so often, Louis combined legal arguments with the use of force in his expansionist policies and his search for personal renown.

The Dutch War, on the other hand, was one instance in which Louis XIV embarked upon an aggressive war quite without benefit of any legal or moral justification. The interests of the realm were involved to the extent that the prevailing mercantilist philosophy justified economic war against the commercially powerful Dutch, and the religious achievements of Catholic France might be enhanced by

attacking a nation of heretics. Nevertheless, the primary reasons for the war lay in Louis's personal motivation. In a well-known memoir that he probably dictated late in 1673, he stated that the basic cause of his aggression was the ingratitude and unbearable vanity of the Dutch.⁸³ The Dutch owed their freedom to French aid first against the Hapsburgs and then against the English, but had never given the French any aid in return. During the War of Devolution the Dutch had been the prime movers in organizing opposition to the French. "I confess that their insolence stung me to the quick and I was ready, at the risk of whatever might happen to my conquests in the Spanish Low Countries, to turn all my forces against this arrogant and ungrateful nation."⁸⁴ He nevertheless adopted a more prudent course, made an honorable peace, and postponed the punishment of this perfidious people until he had adequately prepared the diplomatic situation. "Ambition and glory," he added, "are always excusable to a prince, particularly one who is young and as well treated by fortune as was I. Moreover, I adequately demonstrated by my subsequent conduct that I practiced vengeance only for reprisals and in order to maintain the glory and reputation of my realm."⁸⁵ Even in this war, which he undertook for highly personal reasons, he associated these with the interests of the state. As the war became European in scope and inevitably began to exhaust his resources, Louis became more moderate in his objectives, yet he never lost his sense of mission and self-righteousness. Writing to Colbert from the camp at Falais, he expressed the hope that "all will go well and that God will aid me as He has done until this hour. He knows that my intentions are just and that I hope for peace as I should."⁸⁶ Surely this was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. The cost of the war and its frustrations subsequently forced Louis to realize that the advantages of peace with honor would outweigh the repute to be acquired through further glorious deeds. In his instructions to his plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen, he wrote that "although the people's interest is to free themselves from taxes by means of peace while that of the prince is to preserve his reputation and authority through war,"⁸⁷ his emissaries should urge William of Orange to make peace because of its utility to him. The interests of his own realm, however, Louis interpreted in a highly personal manner. Early in the peace negotiations, he made it clear that French economic advantage vis-

à-vis the Dutch was one of his least concerns,⁸⁸ and in fact he bargained away Colbert's protective tariff against Dutch imports. Much more significant in his eyes were his territorial gains, of which he preserved the greater part in the Peace of Nijmegen. After the event, he wrote that in making peace, "the public good . . . took precedence on this occasion over the gain and personal glory that I found in the continuation of the war."⁸⁹ The distinction seems to have been meaningful to Louis, at least in times of stress. At all events, he knew that his successful conquests in the face of a European coalition had raised him to new heights of power and prestige. For Louis XIV this was sufficient justification for the use of force, as he interpreted the doctrine of reason of state.

During the interval of relative calm that followed the Peace of Nijmegen, Louis XIV pursued his expansionist policy by annexing border areas to which he held various claims under existing law and treaty agreements. His purpose was to acquire strategically important points on his most vulnerable frontiers, but he took great pains to publicize the legal bases of his moves. The major treaties in force—Münster, Pyrenees, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nijmegen—gave Louis extensive rights over Alsace and a number of other border territories with their dependencies.⁹⁰ His decision was merely to apply these provisions to the letter. If he could establish the dependence of additional territories upon those that he already held, he could justifiably extend his sovereignty over these adjacent areas, in effect expanding the realm. After investigation of the matter by some of the ablest jurists in France, Louis authorized the courts in several border areas to examine local tenurial rights that might subordinate additional areas to his control and to pronounce accordingly. In most instances the established courts sufficed for the purpose, although a special chamber was attached to the Parlement of Metz. Beginning in 1679, these courts initiated a series of decrees that effected the "reunion" of large numbers of dependencies with the French realm. The royal chamber in Metz was especially active; during its brief existence it issued dozens of decrees that brought small but significant border areas under French control.⁹¹

The work of the Chambers of Reunion has frequently been condemned as mere subterfuge, a cloak for further French aggression; but this view ignores the fact that the proceedings were quite sound

according to contemporary law, judicial practices, and relevant treaties. That Louis was not only an interested party but also assigned jurisdiction to the courts and enforced their decrees is an inadequate basis for criticism, since the crown combined within itself both executive and judicial powers, and the age possessed no arbitration by supranational bodies. No alternative procedures were possible. Furthermore, Louis was interested only in establishing his sovereign authority over these areas, not immediate ownership. He sought merely to incorporate them into the realm and to subject them to his rule, as was demonstrated by his requiring oaths of homage and fealty and establishing administrative and military controls, but he did not attempt to displace local property rights. Upon annexation, provincial rights and privileges were invariably confirmed.⁹² Rather than legal chicanery to cover further aggressions, the reunions should be viewed as Louis's taking advantage of the explicit provisions of relevant treaties and the tangled legal situation on his frontiers to extend his sovereignty. The resulting expansion of the realm was quite justified, he felt, both by law and the requisites of military strategy. Reason of state in this instance, as in so many others during the reign, found both a legal and practical justification. The climax of the movement occurred with the occupation of Strasbourg, which followed the same pattern. After a favorable decree by the Superior Council of Breisach, Louis circulated about Europe a statement that the treaties of Münster and Nijmegen had given him "absolute sovereignty" over all Alsace, including its capital, and that he was about to enforce his rights.⁹³ After brief negotiations with the city authorities, Louis accepted their proffered terms of capitulation in which he was recognized as Strasbourg's "sovereign lord and protector" and confirmed most of the city's traditional rights and privileges,⁹⁴ whereupon he entered his new domains with greatly panoply. All but a small portion of his gains through the reunions were confirmed to him by the Truce of Ratisbon.

Louis XIV's stated reasons for undertaking the War of the League of Augsburg and that of the Spanish Succession, the longest and bloodiest of his reign, fall into the familiar pattern that combined royal prestige, the interests of the Bourbon family, and those of the state, although in very different ways. In 1688, when Louis was at the height of his power, in command of a magnificent military force,

and faced with no well-organized coalition of hostile powers, it is not surprising that he adopted a hard line in dealing with the other sovereigns of Europe. In that year he issued a memorandum in which he attempted, with small success, to place the onus of renewed hostilities upon the emperor by arguing the necessity of preventive war.⁹⁶ Louis frankly admitted that it was to French interests to resume hostilities against the Imperialists before they overcame the Turk and were free to turn against France, but he insisted that the aggressive intent was the emperor's rather than his. He also stressed his determination to defend the rights of his sister-in-law in the Palatinate and his own in the archbishopric of Cologne. He offered to send plenipotentiaries to Ratisbon to negotiate outstanding difficulties; but if his offer was refused, the responsibility for forcing him to take up arms would fall upon the emperor, who had failed to take advantage of Louis's proposals for a durable peace. The argument was hardly convincing and merely served to place Europe on notice that Louis was again about to embark upon major hostilities. In this instance there seems little justification for aggression other than Louis's determination to take calculated advantage of certain momentary developments and to use them as excuses for strengthening his position at the expense of neighboring states. His calculations, of course, were completely upset by developments in England and the broadening of hostilities. Exhaustion of his resources finally forced him to make major concessions at the Peace of Ryswick, although he had the satisfaction of retaining Strasbourg. Louis's reliance upon force as an instrument of policy regardless of its justifications had clearly caused him to overreach himself at the cost of great losses and suffering throughout the nation.

Very different were the antecedents of the War of the Spanish Succession. After Louis XIV had agreed to two partition treaties whose purpose was peaceful solution of the problem of the Spanish inheritance, Carlos II's will confronted Louis with an impossible situation in which war seemed inevitable no matter what course he might pursue. He consequently chose to follow the dictates of honor, conscience, and family responsibility by accepting the Spanish heritage for his grandson, the duke of Anjou, who thereby became Philip V of Spain. Having made the decision, Louis understandably gloried

in the event, which he regarded as a heaven-sent opportunity to fulfil his role as sovereign of France and head of the Bourbon dynasty. There is every reason to take at face value his famous words: "Gentlemen, here is the King of Spain. Birth called him to this throne as well as the former king by his testament; the entire nation desired it and urgently requested it of me. It was the dictate of heaven; I granted it with pleasure."⁹⁶ The entire procedure seems to have been predicated upon the assumption that the crowns of France and Spain would never be united in the same person, since this was specifically debarred by Carlos II's will.⁹⁷ Within a matter of weeks, however, Louis issued a declaration restoring the rights of Philip V and his heirs to inherit the French throne.⁹⁸ Although Louis doubtless believed this to be justified both by reasons of state and family interest, it was one of the major blunders of the reign, since it raised the specter of Franco-Spanish union and was an important factor in bringing about the massive coalition that faced France in the War of the Spanish Succession. Louis's motivation is nevertheless quite understandable when one recalls his intense pride as head of the house of Bourbon and his determination to bring it all possible honor, not to mention his reluctance to violate the fundamental law of succession to the French throne. The declaration pleaded the necessity of following divine choice of rulers on earth (surely a vital principle with Louis) and his obligations as king and father. The strength of Louis's dynasticism and paternalism was such that he was willing to risk a disastrous war rather than diminish the rights of the Bourbons.⁹⁹ But the position could not be maintained in the face of his many enemies. In 1713, after years of bloodshed, famine, and national exhaustion had taken enormous toll and it had become clear that permanent separation of the two crowns was essential to peace, a great ceremony was held in the Parlement of Paris annulling the decree of 1700 and providing for perpetual exclusion of Philip V and his heirs from the French throne. The speech by the *avocat du roi* emphasized that this was a violation of fundamental law but the sacrifice was necessary for the good of the state.¹⁰⁰ Once more, disaster had demonstrated to Louis that the rights and prestige of the Bourbons were of less moment than the national interest and that political necessity might require personal sacrifices of the reigning

family. This was consistent with Louis's concept of justifiable policy, although he had always been reluctant to recognize any divergence between his personal prestige and the interests of the state. That their essential disparity should have been most conclusively demonstrated in the war that Louis tried most extensively to avoid and during which he offered major concessions in order to preserve the territorial integrity of his realm is one of the ironies of the period. Long before the close of hostilities, however, criticism of Louis's policies was rapidly gaining momentum. A new era was dawning in French opinion, and not the least of its sources was long experience with the ways in which Louis XIV, the greatest of absolute monarchs, had chosen to implement the doctrine of reason of state.

Even this brief survey of Louis XIV's wars reveals much concerning his fundamental motivation. Many factors may have impinged upon his frequent decisions to resort to force as an instrument of policy: the influence of key ministers, strategic considerations, diplomatic developments, and the fortunes of dynastic rivalry, not to mention such latent pressures as international economic friction and the avid desire of the French nobles to distinguish themselves. The one major constant, however, was Louis's concept of kingship and his determination to fulfil it to the hilt. All other factors, even the chronic Bourbon-Hapsburg rivalry, varied with the situation of the moment; Louis's ideology alone gives consistency to the pattern of events. Since he firmly believed that he was divinely appointed to rule without human limitation, was endowed with special knowledge of the mysteries of state, symbolized the state and led it to greater achievements, he necessarily assumed responsibility for all policy decisions and regarded himself as answerable only to God and his conscience. His accountability to God he seems never to have forgotten, although its immediate import was often neutralized by his enormous pride and self-righteousness. Of more practical significance was his respect for law and justice, as evidenced by his efforts to demonstrate the legality of his actions and his attempts to abide by the terms of sworn treaties. One authority on the period goes so far as to maintain that Louis never deliberately broke a treaty commitment.¹⁰¹ This, of course, is strictly untrue, since he repudiated a number of sworn agreements, notably the partition treaties of 1698 and 1700.¹⁰² His desire to find

a legally sound basis for his policies was apparent in his handling of the War of Devolution, the reunions, and the War of the Spanish Succession, although the Dutch War and, to a lesser extent, the War of the League of Augsburg illustrate his willingness to resort to force for more personalized reasons.

That Louis XIV closely associated the interests of his state with the honor and glory of the Bourbons and conducted his foreign policy accordingly was in the nature of things, since his divinely bestowed "profession of king" combined supreme authority over the state with headship of the reigning family. The two were but different elements of the enormously significant role that it was his destiny to perform. The equation between state interests and the glory and prestige of the Bourbons was never total, however, and repeated disasters increasingly forced Louis to recognize that the general good was greater than anything centered in himself. In the final moments of his life, he seems to have realized the massive extent of his errors of policy. In his last words to the dauphin, he all but rejected war as a justifiable instrument because of the burden that it imposed upon the people. "Do not imitate me in war; try always to maintain peace with your neighbors, to spare your people as much as you can, which I have had the misfortune not to be able to do because of necessities of state."¹⁰³ The latter he still recognized, although he now took the position that war was a last resort, something to be avoided at all costs. Even more indicative of his disillusionment was his rejection of kingly glory as sufficient reason for war in his written instructions to the dauphin. "Always prefer peace to the uncertain events of war, and remember, my son, that the most brilliant victory is always too costly when it must be bought with the blood of your subjects. Never shed it, if possible, except for the glory of God."¹⁰⁴ Long and increasingly disastrous experience with the fruits of his personalized orientation of reason of state had clearly altered his concept of justifiable policy. He seemed almost to anticipate the inspired words with which Massillon prefaced Louis's funeral oration in the Sainte-Chapelle: "Only God is great."¹⁰⁵

A few words should be added concerning the reactions of contemporaries to Louis XIV's policies and understanding of reason of state in order to place these in the perspective of the period. It is

well known that Louis's many wars and their increasing cost in lives and suffering were subjected to extensive condemnation, first in Germany and the Netherlands and later in France. These criticisms ranged from satire, invective, and outright hatred to more philosophical analyses of Louis's violations of the principles of justice and morality. Dozens of writers vented their spleen upon Louis's policies, but for our purposes it is sufficient to analyze the relevant ideas of two men: Leibniz and Fénelon. Although very difficult in background, intellectual position, and objectives, both men were close observers of contemporary affairs, had first-rate minds, and may be regarded as spokesmen for large bodies of opinion.¹⁰⁶

Leibniz' criticisms of Louis XIV's policies were but a small part of his political thought, which, in turn, was but a minor element in his vast range of intellectual activities. The richness of his mind ensured that his critique of Louis's policies would be among the most penetrating of the period. His most important work along these lines was his *Mars Christianissimus*,¹⁰⁷ a semi-satirical but deadly serious treatise in which he went to the heart of the problem of reason of state. The theme of the book is the universality of justice and Louis's violation of it by conducting French foreign policy as though he were exempt from its limitations. "Although these principles undoubtedly bind ordinary men," Leibniz wrote with telling irony, "there is a certain law, superior to all others and yet consonant with sovereign justice, which exempts the king from observing them. It must be recognized that the just know no law, and he who has the authority of extraordinary power is exempt from universal and humane obligations by virtue of his commission."¹⁰⁸ In making this charge, Leibniz was quite correct. For several generations the proponents of reason of state had held it to be axiomatic that there were two levels of justice, one for the populace and a higher one for the state, and that rulers, who alone understood the mysteries of state, might legitimately conduct their affairs according to this higher morality. Measures that were criminal among the people were quite justified when undertaken in the interests of the state. Leibniz had clearly put his finger on the most questionable aspect of the entire position. From this standpoint, he continued, justice is whatever benefits the stronger. "It must be admitted that he [Louis XIV] uses his

power with great moderation, since he has the right to carry out anything that enters his head, provided that it augments his grandeur."¹⁰⁹ It was impossible, Leibniz insisted, to justify French aggressions by appeal to ordinary law, and he cited violations of the treaties of Münster and the Pyrenees, the seizure of Lorraine, the Dutch War, and the occupation of Strasbourg and other Imperial territories.¹¹⁰ But God, he concluded, treats all equally and "never distinguishes between a king and a peasant except to augment his punishments in proportion to the greatness of sinners and the nature and consequences of their crimes."¹¹¹ Through his philosophical approach Leibniz succeeded in throwing into stark relief the major doctrinal weakness of reason of state. For those who thought like him—and there were many—Europe's sufferings stemmed essentially from Louis XIV's deviations from the fundamental canons of justice and Christian morality.

Fénelon likewise believed in the universality of justice according to immutable Christian principles; it was the foundation of his entire political system. Kings and peasants are alike before God, he held, and he did not hesitate to exhort the Duke of Burgundy, "Do you sufficiently understand all the truths of Christianity? You will be judged according to the Gospel like the least of your subjects."¹¹² Unlike Leibniz, however, Fénelon was not content merely to assert that right should prevail, and he wrote a series of works in which he articulated his political ideals in great detail. The king he regarded as little more than a servant of the people. "The condition of the king is very unhappy. He is the slave of all over whom he seems to rule; he is made for them; he owes himself entirely to them; he is burdened with all their needs; he is the man of the people and of each in particular."¹¹³ Specifically, he was compelled to rule according to established law and to render law effective in society. "The authority that he seems to have is not his; he may do nothing for his glory or his pleasure; his authority is that of the laws; he must obey them. Strictly speaking, he is merely the defender of the laws in order to cause them to rule; he must constantly watch and work to maintain them; he is a slave who sacrifices his repose and liberty for the liberty and happiness of the public."¹¹⁴ Fénelon was absolutely uncompromising in this. For him, the ruler was but a divinely

appointed instrument whose reason for existence was preservation of the law and advancement of the general welfare, but who had little significance in and of himself.

The common Father of the great [human] family confided his children to the sovereign only to make them happy; He desires that a single man, through his wisdom, serve the happiness of many men, not that the many, through their misery, serve to flatter the pride of one. God did not make him king for himself. He is king only to belong to the people, and he is worthy of royalty only to the extent that he effaces himself before the public good.¹¹⁵

Gone was most of the traditional grandeur of monarchy, and in its place Fénelon would substitute a humble, devoted ruler whose policies were always guided by religion and justice and who recognized that he was a mere servant of the general welfare.

With such high ideals as his frame of reference, it is not surprising that Fénelon found ample reason to formulate many penetrating criticisms of Louis XIV and his policies. In fact, Louis seemed to deviate from Fénelon's concept of true kingship in almost every essential. Fundamentally, Louis was at fault because he was not a true Christian:

You do not love God; you do not even fear Him with the fear of a slave; it is hell and not God that you fear. Your religion consists only of superstitions and petty, superficial practices. . . . You are scrupulous about bagatelles and hardened to terrible wrongs. You love only your glory and your comforts. You view everything in terms of yourself, as though you were God on earth and all others had been created merely to be sacrificed to you. On the contrary, it is you whom God placed on earth for your people. But alas! You understand nothing of these truths.¹¹⁶

A more devastating criticism from Fénelon's standpoint would be difficult to imagine. He was convinced that Louis's lack of religious morality had caused him to abandon the way of true kingship and to follow instead the dictates of personal pride, the antithesis of Christian humility. Louis's thirst for personal glory Fénelon repeatedly denounced,¹¹⁷ and he consequently condemned most of the policies that Louis held to be justified by his egocentric version of reason of state. In domestic affairs Fénelon intensely disliked Louis's

exploitation of the resources of the realm for personal purposes and insisted that a true king would abide by the laws that protected the subjects' property, taking the latter only when it was clearly required for the public good. "Have you never taken anything from one of your subjects by mere act of authority, contrary to the laws? . . . Have you thoroughly examined the true needs of the state in comparison with the distress that taxes cause before imposing them upon your people?"¹¹⁸ "The people's goods should be used only for the true benefit of the people themselves."¹¹⁹ The rule of law above arbitrary royal discretion he instinctively associated with the public good and the supremacy of Christian morality.

It was Louis XIV's wars that drew most of Fénelon's fire. He repeatedly insisted that wars for territorial expansion and the monarch's prestige were the negation of true kingship since they subordinated justice to royal pride. "Have you never called a necessity of state something that served merely to flatter your ambition, such as a war for conquest and glory? Have you never called your pretensions public necessities?"¹²⁰ The argument that the personal glory of the sovereign was an asset to the state and a sufficient reason for war clearly carried no weight with Fénelon. Furthermore, the concept of two levels of morality, so fundamental to reason of state, he found abhorrent. "A poor wretch who steals a coin on the highway in his great need is hanged, but a man who makes conquests, that is, who unjustly subjugates a province of a neighboring state, is treated as a hero! . . . To take another's field is a great sin; to seize a province is an innocent and glorious act! Where are ideas of justice? Will God judge in this manner? . . . Is justice no longer justice when the greatest interests are involved?"¹²¹ Fénelon's rejection of this basis of reason of state was total. He believed that the Dutch War embodied all these evils and was the source of all the later wars that had reduced France to ruin.¹²² Similarly, the dynastic interests of the Bourbons were no excuse for war. "It may be merely a question of some claim to a succession which concerns you personally; your people have no real interest in it. What is it to them if you acquire another province?"¹²³ Fénelon, in fact, all but rejected war as a justifiable instrument of royal policy. "All things considered, there is almost no war, not even a successful one, that does not bring more evil than good to the state. One has only to consider how it

ruins families, the number of men it causes to perish, how it ravages and depopulates the countryside, disrupts the state, degrades the laws, permits license, and how many years are required to repair the damage wrought by two years of war to good state policies.”¹²⁴ The only just war for Fénelon was one that was waged in order to prevent a lawless, tyrannical neighboring ruler from gaining overwhelming strength. When confronted with such a threat, resort to arms was justified.¹²⁵ In taking this position, Fénelon clearly had in mind the plight of Louis’s enemies and went far toward justifying their cause.

Fénelon similarly condemned all acquisitions of territory, such as the reunions and the seizure of Strasbourg.¹²⁶ The argument that frontier areas might be taken for strategic reasons he found valueless, both because annexations were unjust and because the principle might be extended to justify seizures as far as the borders of China.¹²⁷ As for treaties between states, their object should be to restore peace rather than to permit the victors to exploit the vanquished.¹²⁸ Treaties should be couched in the clearest possible terms and should take precedence over all local customs—an obvious reference to the War of Devolution.¹²⁹ In view of these statements it is not surprising that Fénelon insisted on the restitution of all territories that had been unjustly acquired—in effect, all of Louis XIV’s conquests.¹³⁰ There is a strong element of utopian idealism in many of Fénelon’s recommendations, combined with a complete unwillingness to recognize that political necessity might require a less principled and more practical type of policy, given the conditions of seventeenth-century interstate relations. The essence of his position was nevertheless quite unchallengeable, since it represented fearless application of Christian principles to Louis XIV’s policies, especially his wars. The result was a devastating critique of Louis XIV’s understanding of reason of state.

Few among Louis XIV’s critics during the latter part of his reign were as thorough-going as Fénelon, either because they examined only limited aspects of Louis’s government or because they were more willing to compromise with the principles of Christian morality. Fénelon nevertheless spoke for a large body of opinion, particularly the massive reaction against the great human sacrifices that Louis’s wars had entailed. In this there was general agreement among all of Louis’s major critics—Fénelon, Saint-Simon, Boulainvillers, Bayle, Vauban, Boisguillebert—regardless of their areas of special concern.

All deplored the incredible suffering that the wars had inflicted upon the nation, and not one, significantly, was willing to accept the argument that they were justified either by political necessity or the requirements of royal prestige. To this extent there was a general rejection of Louis XIV's concept of reason of state. It is noteworthy, however, that among Louis's critics there were no French jurists of stature. The concept of divine-right absolutism was largely their creation, since it stemmed essentially from Bodin's theory of royal sovereignty as altered in later juridical writings to include significant expansion of the royal discretion. Subsequent writers such as Bossuet may have added further refinements, but the foundations were laid by the jurists in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. From the standpoint of accepted legal concepts, Louis XIV was entirely within his rightful sphere of competence when he embarked upon those measures that were most criticized, specifically his wars. The legal definition of the royal prerogative provided no substantial basis for questioning Louis's foreign policy. The result was that the most penetrating criticisms came from other quarters, from theologians, philosophers, noblemen, economists, even military men. It was they who first voiced the widespread reaction against the consequences of Louis XIV's implementation of reason of state.

In conclusion, it should be noted that none of Louis XIV's critics questioned or sought to undermine the monarchy itself. Indeed, they may all be said to have favored absolute monarchy in the sense that none sought to diminish the sovereign authority or to divide it between the king and other governing bodies. They remained loyal to the only type of regime that they knew: monarchy in which the legally designated ruler held all public authority and assumed final responsibility for all acts of government. If they occasionally suggested structural modifications in the governmental system, this was for the purpose of tempering the exercise of royal power rather than changing or reassigning power itself. Their quarrel was not with absolute monarchy but with the policies of their absolute monarch, that is, the manner in which Louis XIV implemented the monarchical principle according to his personalized version of reason of state.

For several generations prior to 1661, a majority of thinking men had advocated increased royal power as the only means of ensuring order in French society, and had developed political concepts that attributed great discretionary power to the sovereign. Louis XIV

arrived, took them at their word, and provided France with the most thorough-going absolutism in her many centuries of monarchical rule. Its practical results, however, were massive exploitation of the human and material resources of the realm and a series of wars that inflicted upon it great suffering, bankrupted the royal government, and caused Louis to die generally hated. For all his efforts to justify his policies, the inescapable fact was that they had proved disastrous to the nation. The consequence was that before the end of his long reign, thinking men once more embarked upon the never-ending search for a principle of authority that would both ensure stability and advance the public good. This time they oriented their thought not toward increased royal power but toward maximum benefit of the people. Because of long experience with Louis XIV and his policies, they were convinced that there were better means of achieving the general welfare and that the royal government should be but an instrument toward that end. Rather than an object of adulation that was cloaked in mystery and stood far above human society, the monarchy came increasingly to be viewed as an organ whose purpose was public service and whose policies were to be judged accordingly. To this extent the experience of France during the reign of Louis XIV tended to undermine the ancient traditions of the French monarchy and to open the way for new concepts of rightful government. Such was the final historical import of Louis XIV's concept of reason of state.

1. William F. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), Chapter III. Joseph Declareuil, *Histoire générale du droit français des origines à 1789* (Paris, 1925), Book IV, Chapter I. François Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français des origines à la Révolution* (Paris, 1948), Book II, Chapter I. Roland Mousnier, "Comment les Français du XVII^e siècle voyaient la constitution," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 25-26 (1955), pp. 9-36. Roland Mousnier and Fritz Hartung, "Quelques problèmes concernant la monarchie absolue," *X Congresso Internazionale di scienze storiche: Relazioni* (Florence, 1955), IV, 4-12 (hereafter cited as *Relazioni X Congresso*). François Dumont, "Royauté française et monarchie absolue au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 3-29.

2. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France*, Chapter IV, parts B, C; Chapter VI.

3. Louis André (ed.), *Cardinal de Richelieu: Testament politique* (Paris, 1947), pp. 342-45.

4. Among the many studies of this matter, I shall cite only one of the most recent: Jean-Pierre Massaut, "Autour de Richelieu et de Mazarin: Le Carme Léon de Saint-Jean et la grande politique," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, VII, (1960), 11-45.

5. The best treatment of this is still Georges Lacour-Gayet, *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1898 and 1923). The first edition is the better, since it includes extensive footnotes and bibliographical apparatus. The second merely reprints the text, slightly revised.

6. *Traité des seigneuries* (Paris, 1608), Chapter I, nos. 32, 33.

7. *Treize livres des parlements de France* (Bordeaux, 1617), p. 704.

8. Mathieu Molé, *Mémoires*, ed. Aimé Champollion-Figeac (4 vols.; Paris, 1855-57), I, 31.

9. Omer Talon, *Mémoires*, ed. Joseph F. Michaud and Jean J. F. Poujoulat (Paris, 1839), pp. 210, 259.

10. *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte*, in *Œuvres* (Paris, 1828), XVI, 393-95 (hereafter cited as *Politique tirée*).

11. The phrase "raison d'état" is used frequently in Louis's *Mémoires* and appears in the dictionaries of Richelet (1680), Furetière (1690), and that of the Academy (1694).

12. Charles Dreyss (ed.) *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du Dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860), II, 423 (hereafter cited as Dreyss [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV*).

13. *Ibid.*, II, 285.

14. *Ibid.*, 287.

15. *Ibid.*, 399.

16. *Ibid.*, 15.

17. *Ibid.*, 444.

18. "Since the prince should always be a perfect model of virtue, it would be well for him to protect himself from the weaknesses common to the rest of mankind" (*ibid.*, 314).

19. *Ibid.*, 520.

20. *Politique tirée*, p. 236.

21. Cf. Fritz Hartung, "L'Etat c'est moi," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXIX (1949), 1-30; Mousnier and Hartung, in *Relazioni X Congresso*, pp. 9-10.

22. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 518.

23. Eudoxe Soulié and Louis E. Dussieux (eds.), *Journal du marquis de Dangeau* (19 vols.; Paris, 1854-60), XVI, 128.

24. The distinction between public and private law actually increased in the writings of the jurists during Louis XIV's reign. The best example of this is to be found in the works of Jean Domat. On this matter, see G. Chevrier, "Remarques sur l'introduction et les vicissitudes de la distinction du 'jus privatum' et du 'jus publicum' dans les œuvres des anciens juristes français," *Archives de philosophie du droit*, Nouvelle Série, I (1952), 5-77.

25. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 553.

26. Mireille Zarb, *Les Privilèges de la ville de Marseille du X^e siècle à la Révolution* (Paris, 1961), pp. 117-18, 128-31.

27. Georges Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV (1648-1715)* (Strasbourg and Paris, 1956), Book III, Chapter II.

28. Arthur de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930), XI, 80-81.

29. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 230, 303.

30. *Ibid.*, I, 209.

31. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that Louis was merely attempting to extend his direct lordship (*seigneurie directe*) over all the realm but was not concerned with immediate ownership (*seigneurie utile*) of lands. Thus he was not asserting his ownership of all landed properties but merely his overlordship.

32. Isambert *et al.* (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises* (Paris, n. d.), XX, 164-66.

33. Robert Boutruche, *Une Société provinciale en lutte contre le régime féodal: l'alleu en Bordelais et en Bazadais du XI^e au XVIII^e siècle* (Rodez, 1947), Chapter V. Emile Chénon, *Etude sur l'histoire des alleux en France* (Paris, 1888), pp. 219-26. On the other hand, alodial holdings slowly disappeared in certain areas because of the pressure exerted by the intendants. F. Loirette, "Un Episode des résistances locales aux empiètements du pouvoir royal: la défense du franc-alleu agenais au XVII^e siècle," *Annales du Midi*, LXXI (1959), 249-67. For the legal issues relative to the *directe universelle*, see E. Andt, "Sur la théorie de la *directe universelle* présentée par l'édit de 1692," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, Fourth Series, I (1922), 604-36. Andt shows that legal precedent was basically contrary to Louis's claims and that the edict was an innovation.

34. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 438-39. Louis insisted that the parlements be called "superior" rather than "sovereign" courts.

35. Jean Imbert (ed.), *Quelques procès criminels des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1964), Chapter VI.

36. Isambert *et al.* (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, XIX, 70-73.

37. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, II, 225-26.

38. Saint-Simon describes how the regent, in 1715, examined the offenses of all who had been imprisoned by *lettre de cachet* and found that most were accused of Jansenism or opposition to the bull *Unigenitus*. Others had been imprisoned for various reasons known only to the king or earlier ministers and now long forgotten. The regent freed all except those who were guilty of known crimes or offenses against the state. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXIX, 43-44.

39. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, IV, 382-84; V, 461-63.

40. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 250-51; II, 135-36.

41. Edict of 1695. Isambert *et al.* (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, XX, 243-57.

42. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 209-10.

43. Isambert *et al.* (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, XIX, 10-11; XX, 80-81.

44. *Ibid.*, XIX, 67-69.

45. Louis's policies toward the Huguenots lie outside this frame of reference. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a dramatic example of Louis's desire to establish order and uniformity within the realm, but it was not an invasion of traditional rights because the Huguenots' privileges were based upon a unilateral royal concession or grant, which was within the power of the king to annul at any time. When he revoked this edict by the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685, Louis merely restored the situation that had existed before 1598. Thus the revocation may not be regarded as an extension of royal power.

46. Isambert *et al.* (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, XVII, 392-97.

47. *Ibid.*, XX, 261-62, 410, 446.

48. *Ibid.*, XVIII, 217-18; XX, 400-402.

49. Edict of 1683, which summarized earlier regulations. *Ibid.*, XIX, 420-25.

50. *Ibid.*, XX, 50-51.

51. *Ibid.*, 106-10, 133-36. The quotation is on page 134.
52. *Ibid.*, 158-64. Certain communities repurchased these offices, thus retaining control over them. In others they fell into the hands of wealthy local families.
53. *Ibid.*, 408.
54. *Ibid.*, 346, 347. Following Lemontey's suggestion, Georges Pagès noted that creation of the police system "injected despotism" into the entire body politic. "L'Evolution des institutions administratives en France," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, VII (1932), 127.
55. The collection of Isambert contains dozens of edicts creating lesser offices.
56. *Ibid.*, XX, 66-70.
57. *Ibid.*, 378-81.
58. Georges A. M. Girard, *Le Service militaire en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV: racolage et milice (1701-1715)* (Paris, 1921), Part II, Chapter I.
59. "Reputation cannot be preserved without constantly acquiring more, and glory is not a mistress that one may ever neglect nor be worthy of her first favors unless one continually seeks new ones" (Jean Longnon [ed.], *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* [Paris, 1927]), p. 32. In 1688 Louis wrote to Villars, then French envoy to the elector of Bavaria, to urge the elector "to profit by the occasions that fortune may give him to aggrandize himself, which is the worthiest and most agreeable occupation of sovereigns" (Philippe A. Grouvelle [ed.], *Œuvres de Louis XIV* [6 vols.; Paris, 1806], VI, 6-7 [hereafter cited as Grouvelle (ed.)], *Œuvres*).
60. See above, n. 19. In his correspondence concerning military matters, Louis repeatedly associated his personal renown with the good of the state. In 1694 he wrote to Marshal de Noailles: "I believe that I am returning the Marquis de Noailles to you satisfied. He will tell you of the joy that I felt regarding the battle you won and the pleasure I have had from the service you rendered me. The good of the state coincides therein with my personal satisfaction, which is increased by the friendship that I have for you. Nothing could be more appropriate. I hope that the results will be propitious and that you will soon send me more good news which will cause everyone to understand your capacities when it is a question of serving me and the good of the state. Judge my feelings by what you do, and know that no one can have more friendship than I for you." Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, VI, 25-26.
61. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 228.
62. *Ibid.*, II, 33-34.
63. *Ibid.*, 445-46.
64. Letter of September 16, 1661, in *Mémoriaux du conseil de 1661*, edited by Jean de Boislisle (3 vols.; Paris, 1905-7), II, 324-25.
65. Letter of December 26, 1664. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, V, 284.
66. Dreyss (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, I, 104.
67. Paris, l'Imprimerie Royale, 1667. This work is usually attributed to the jurist Antoine Bilain.
68. *Ibid.*, 143.
69. *Ibid.*, 276.
70. Paris, 1667.
71. Aubery, *Des justes prétentions du Roi sur l'Empire*, p. 14.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
73. The full title is: *Bouquier d'état et de justice contre le dessein manifestement découvert de la monarchie universelle, sous le vain prétexte des prétentions de la reine de France* (Brussels, 1667).
74. *Ibid.*, Article I.
75. *Ibid.*, Article IV.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-18.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-24.

79. *Dialogue sur les droits de la reine très-chrétienne* (n.p., 1667); [Lisola], *Suite du dialogue sur les droits de la reine très-chrétienne* (n.p., 1667); Guy Joly, *Remarques pour servir de réponse à deux écrits imprimés à Bruxelles* (Paris, 1667); Georges de La Feuillade, *La Défense du droit de Marie-Thérèse d'Autriche, reine de France* (Paris, 1674); and many others. The sheer extent of the legal argumentation in this debate is ample evidence of the importance that contemporaries attached to this issue.

80. François A. A. Mignet (ed.), *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV* (4 vols.; Paris, 1835-42), III, 491-99.

81. *Ibid.*, 491.

82. *Ibid.*, 493.

83. This memoir is printed in Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire* (4 vols.; Paris, 1862-64), I, 517-40. The statement occurs in the opening sentence.

84. *Ibid.*, 519.

85. *Ibid.*, 532-33. In the manuscript a variant for "reputation of my realm" was "interest of my subjects." Apparently, these were interchangeable in Louis's thinking.

86. Letter of June 8, 1675. Pierre Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-73), VI, 327.

87. *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France: Hollande*, ed. Louis André and Emile Bourgeois (Paris, 1922), p. 368.

88. *Ibid.*, 352-54.

89. Grouvelle (ed.), *Œuvres*, IV, 147.

90. The question of Alsace in the Treaty of Münster is examined in Arsène Legrelle, *Louis XIV et Strasbourg* (Paris, 1884), pp. 155-79. At the Peace of the Pyrenees and those of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nijmegen, the Spanish ceded many border areas to France with "leurs appartenances, dépendances et annexes"; cited in *Les grands traités du règne de Louis XIV*, ed. Henri Vast (Paris, 1893-99), I, 110-15; II, 17, 87-91. The Peace of Nijmegen confirmed French rights over Alsace.

91. *Recueil des arrêts de la chambre royale établie à Metz, pour la réunion des dépendances des trois évêchés de Metz, Toul et Verdun, et autres endroits, à l'obéissance du Roi, en conséquence des traités de paix de Münster, des Pyrénées, et de Nimègue* (Paris, 1681). Most of these decrees established the subordination of various lands to one of the three bishoprics, which the French controlled.

92. On April 21, 1681, the chamber at Metz decreed the subordination of the county of Chiny to the French crown and required the count to do homage and fealty for the same in the chamber. A month later, the rights and privileges of all inhabitants of the county were confirmed by a special royal declaration. (*Ibid.*, pp. 226-36). Instances of this practice as applied to larger areas are cited in Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit français des origines à la Révolution*, p. 390. For the literature on this and related questions, see Georges Livet, "Louis XIV et les provinces conquises," *XVII^e siècle*, No. 16 (1952), pp. 581-507.

93. Legrelle, *Louis XIV et Strasbourg*, pp. 456, 520-22.

94. These included the rights, privileges, and customs of the city; freedom of religious worship; preservation of the city government and the rights of corporate bodies; control over local tolls and communication; exemption from extraordinary levies; and a general amnesty. Louvois, who negotiated the terms, insisted only on returning the cathedral to Catholic worship, allowing appeals to the Council of Alsace in cases involving major property holdings, and royal possession of all war materiel. *Ibid.*, pp. 561-63.

95. This is printed in *Mémoires du marquis de Sourches*, ed. Gabriel-Jules, comte de Cosnac, and Edouard Pontal (13 vols.; Paris, 1882-93), II, 397-404.

96. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, VII, 320-21.

97. Jean Dumont (ed.), *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* (8 vols.; Amsterdam, 1726-31), VII, 487.

98. *Ibid.*, VII, 494-95.

99. Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Louis indicated his willingness to negotiate concerning several outstanding problems but not the rights of Philip V and his heirs to the French throne. As events developed, even these negotiations concerning other matters came to naught. It is noteworthy that Vauban believed that the territorial ambitions of France should be limited by the Alps, the Pyrenees, Switzerland, and the two seas. Memoir written about 1700, printed in *Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits*, ed. Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun (Paris, 1910), I, 490-96.

100. Alfred Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France* (5 vols.; Paris, 1890-1901), I, 525-32.

101. Gaston Zeller, *Les Temps modernes. II. De Louis XIV à 1789* (*Histoire des relations internationales*, Vol. III [Paris, 1955]), p. 10.

102. It may be argued that Louis had no choice in the matter since acceptance of the Spanish heritage for the duke of Anjou automatically canceled the partition treaties. Legrelle discusses at length Louis's reasons for breaking his promises in the partition treaties and concludes that since war was inevitable, Louis made the most statesman-like choice, *La Diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne* (4 vols.; Ghent, 1888-92), Vol. IV, Chapter I.

103. Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, XXVII, 274 n. 4.

104. Letter written by Louis XIV shortly before his death, to be given to Louis XV when he reached the age of seventeen. In *Souvenirs sur Madame de Maintenon*, ed. Gabriel P. O. de Cléron, comte d'Haussonville, and Gabriel Hanotaux (3 vols.; Paris, n.d.), II, 374.

105. Jean-Baptiste Massillon, *Œuvres complètes* (12 vols.; Paris, 1810), IX, 213. Considering the circumstances under which it was given, this oration is remarkably critical of Louis's foreign policy and wars. "Already [during the Dutch War], the flame of war spreads over Europe. . . . All Europe joins together, and its combined strength serves only to show the superiority of ours; lack of success irritates our enemies without sparing them; their defeats, which should end war, perpetuate it; so much spilled blood nourishes hatreds instead of extinguishing them; treaties of peace are merely preparations for war. . . . The monarchy had never before seen such brilliant days; earlier it had recovered from its disasters, but now it seemed to perish and collapse under the weight of its own glory. . . . We raised ourselves with such successes, and did not know that the pride of empires is always the first sign of their decadence. Such was the grandeur of Louis in war" (*ibid.*, 220-22). There follows a lengthy description of the horrors of war and the sacrifices of the nation.

106. Leibniz' position in German intellectual currents is well analyzed in Hubert Gillof's systematic work, *Le Règne de Louis XIV et l'opinion publique en Allemagne* (Nancy, 1914). Fénelon's place in French thought is somewhat more special because of his religious views, his relations with the Duke of Burgundy and his lack of favor with Louis XIV. Fénelon may nevertheless be said to have voiced many criticisms that were rapidly gaining acceptance late in the reign.

107. *Mars Christianissimus, Autore Germano Gallo-Graeco, ou Apologie des armes du roy Très-Chrétien contre les chrétiens* (Cologne, 1684).

108. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-69.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

112. *Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté*, in Charles Urbain (ed.), *Fénelon: écrits et lettres politiques* (Paris, 1920), p. 30 (hereafter cited as Fénelon, *Examen*).

113. Albert Cahen (ed.), *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (Paris, 1920), II, 533-34.

114. *Ibid.*, 534.

115. *Supplément à l'examen de conscience*, in Urbain (ed.), *Fénelon: écrits et lettres politiques*, p. 93. Cf. *Les Aventures de Télémaque*, I, 191-92.

116. *Lettre à Louis XIV*, in *Fénelon: écrits et lettres politiques*, p. 153 (hereafter cited as Fénelon, *Lettre*).

117. "This glory, which hardens your heart, is dearer to you than justice, your own tranquility, the preservation of your people who daily perish from maladies caused by famine, and even your own eternal salvation which is incompatible with such worship of glory" (*ibid.*, pp. 152-53).

118. Fénelon, *Examen*, pp. 43-44.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 47. Fénelon listed many measures that would have reduced royal expenses and incidentally changed much in the life of the court (*ibid.*, pp. 44-52).

120. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

122. Fénelon, *Lettre*, pp. 145-47, 149-52.

123. Fénelon, *Examen*, p. 58.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 60. Cf. *Les Aventures de Télémaque*, II, 50-54.

126. Fénelon, *Lettre*, p. 148.

127. Fénelon, *Examen*, p. 58.

128. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56; Fénelon, *Lettre*, p. 146.

129. Fénelon, *Examen*, pp. 64-65.

130. *Ibid.*, pp. 55; Fénelon, *Lettre*, p. 157.

Louis XIV: A Bibliographical Introduction

JOHN C. RULE

Because of the vast amount of material that is available on the reign of Louis XIV this select bibliography has for the readers' convenience been divided into the following major topics: I. Introduction to the Reign of Louis XIV: Surveys of Europe, General Histories of France, Biographies, and Memoirs; II. The History of International Relations and Politics; III. The Institutions of Government in Practice and Theory; IV. Social History; V. Economic History; VI. The Army; VII. The Marine; VIII. The French Colonies; IX. Religion; X. Literature and Ideas; XI. Science; XII. Education; XIII. Art and Architecture; XIV. Music.

*I. Introductions to the Reign of Louis XIV;
Surveys of Europe, General Histories of France,
Biographies, and Memoirs*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—An indispensable guide to printed works written on the seventeenth century, both by contemporaries and later writers, has been compiled by Emile Bourgeois and Louis André in a series entitled *Les Sources de l'histoire de France: XVII^e siècle (1610-1715)* (Paris, 1913-35).

An extremely useful critical guide to historiographical trends and to major recent works published on French history can be found in *La Recherche historique en France de 1940 à 1965*, published by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris, 1965). An important source of information on recent works that have appeared in the field of seventeenth-century French history are the notices appended to

the journal *XVII^e siècle: Bulletin de la Société d'Etude du XVII^e Siècle* (hereafter cited as *XVII^e siècle*). Also helpful is the *Bibliography of French Seventeenth Century Studies*, published for the Modern Language Association, French Group III, since 1953; its emphasis is on literary history, but it is useful for works on cultural and social history as well.

Standard guides to works in the field have been compiled by E. Saulnier and A. Martin, *Bibliographie des travaux publiés de 1866 à 1897 sur l'histoire de France de 1500 à 1789* (2 vols.; Paris, 1932-38); G. Brière et al. (eds.), *Répertoire méthodique de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France* (9 vols.; Paris, 1899-1932); P. Caron and H. Stein (eds.), *Répertoire bibliographique de l'histoire de France* (6 vols.; Paris, 1923-38); and G. Pagès, L. Cahen, and M. Jayre (eds.), *Bibliographie critique des principaux travaux parus sur l'histoire de 1600 à 1914 en 1932 et 1933* (3 vols.; Paris, 1935-37). More recently, volumes continuing the earlier series have appeared under the title *Bibliographie annuelle de l'histoire de France du cinquième siècle à 1939* (Paris, 1953/54——).

A sporadically annotated but up-to-date compilation on modern history, containing sections on France, has been published by the Cambridge University Press as a companion to the *New Cambridge Modern History*, under the title *A Bibliography of Modern History*, ed. John Roach (Cambridge, 1968).

HISTORIES OF EUROPE.—A comprehensive, if uneven, survey of Europe in its world setting is Volume V of the *New Cambridge Modern History*, entitled *The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*, ed. F. L. Carsten (Cambridge, 1961). The French equivalent, in the "Peuples et Civilisations" series, Vol. X, *Louis XIV (1661-1715)* (3d ed.; Paris, 1949), is authored by Philippe Sagnac and A. de Saint-Léger, who find the *nœud* to Louis XIV's reign in the religious and political drama of the troubled years, 1682-88; the work is curiously ambivalent in its evaluation of Louis XIV. Two other French series should be mentioned. The "Clio" series contains a volume of Edmond Préclin and V.-L. Tapié, *Le XVII^e siècle* (2d ed.; Paris, 1949); it is an encyclopedic account with long if somewhat inaccurate bibliographies. In the series entitled *Histoire générale des civilisations*, edited by M. Crouzet, Roland Mousnier has a volume entitled *Les XVI^e et XVII^e siècles: le progrès de la civilisation européenne et le déclin de l'Orient (1492-1715)* (Paris, 1954; 3d ed., 1961). As a counterpoise to the French surveys, the student can turn to the new edition of the "Propyläen Weltgeschichte," Vol. VII, *Von der Reformation zur Revolution*, whose authors include Heinrich Lutz, Golo Mann, V.-L. Tapié, Adam Wandruszka, et al. (Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna, 1964); there

is a pertinent essay by Tapié on "Das Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV." A useful synthesis is also offered in the American series edited by William L. Langer under the title *Rise of Modern Europe*, including, for this period, F. L. Nussbaum, *The Triumph of Science and Reason, 1660-1685* (New York, 1953) and John B. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715* (New York, 1951).

HISTORIES OF FRANCE.—As an introduction to French history of the seventeenth century, there are two recent interpretative accounts that serve as welcome correctives to the older drum-and-trumpet histories: first, Robert Mandrou's contribution to the "Nouvelle Clio" series, *La France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1967) (with a detailed, if largely unannotated, bibliography); and Pierre Goubert's *Louis XIV et vingt millions de Français* (Paris, 1966), consciously revisionist but brilliantly conceived.

No student, however, can yet afford to overlook one of the classic twentieth-century accounts of the reign written by Ernest Lavisse in a contribution to a series he edited, *Histoire de la France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, Vols. VII¹, VII², VIII¹. The first two of these volumes, detailing the reign from 1643 to 1685, were written by Lavisse, and smack of a strongly anti-Bourbon bias. The last volume, covering the concluding years, 1685-1715, was written by Lavisse in collaboration with A. de Saint-Léger, A. Rébelliau, and Philippe Sagnac (Paris, 1905-8). Among these authors, Saint-Léger and Rébelliau were a shade less hostile to Louis XIV's regime than Lavisse.

A recent cogently written and intelligently organized guide to the reign is G. R. R. Treasure, *Seventeenth Century France* (London, 1966); unfortunately, the bibliography is carelessly compiled. A more elementary account, written primarily for language students, is John Lough, *An Introduction to Seventeenth Century France* (London, 1954). Elegantly written and handsomely illustrated is Georges Mongrédien *et al.*, *La France au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1965). A rewarding synthesis of recent works on seventeenth-century France is crammed into a volume by Hubert Méthivier, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1968); and for the background to 1660 there is Méthivier's *Le Siècle de Louis XIII* (Paris, 1964).

BIOGRAPHIES OF LOUIS XIV.—A brief summary of the great biographers of Louis XIV is presented by Philip de Vries in *Het Beeld van Lodewijk XIV in de Franse Geschiedschrijving* (Amsterdam, 1948); it contains an adequate bibliography and a précis in French. Biographies of Louis XIV abound. Happily, we have a guide to recent biographies in John B. Wolf's article, "The Reign of Louis XIV: A Selected Bibliography of

Writings Since the War of 1914-1918," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI (1964), 129-32. A sympathetic reading of the reign is given by Pierre Gaxotte in *La France de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1946). Louis Bertrand's amateurish attempt at psychological portraiture (*Louis XIV* [Paris, 1924]) only points up the need for a competent study in that field. Readable, if unexciting historiographically, is W. H. Lewis, *Louis XIV: An Informal Portrait* (London, 1959). An engaging narrative, largely undocumented, is Philippe Erlanger's *Louis XIV* (Paris, 1965). David Ogg's Whiggish summary, *Louis XIV*, has been reprinted by Oxford University Press (1966) with a revised and serviceable bibliography by R. M. Hatton. For Louis's quite public private life a good guide is Georges Mongrédien, *La Vie privée de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1938). John B. Wolf's *Louis XIV* (New York, 1968) provides a detailed account of Louis's personal and public life, garnished with vivid anecdotes and pungent insights.

Two handbooks dealing with historiographical and interpretive problems are William F. Church (ed.), *The Greatness of Louis XIV: Myth or Reality?* (Boston, 1959), and H. G. Judge (ed.), *Louis XIV* (London, 1965).

LOUIS XIV'S MEMOIRS AND LETTERS.—Paul Sonnino has discussed the problems concerned with Louis XIV's *Mémoires* in his article "The Dating and Authorship of Louis XIV's *Mémoires*," *French Historical Studies*, III (1964), 303-37. Sonnino has promised for early publication a new translation and critical edition of the *Mémoires*. Until it appears, we must content ourselves with the editions compiled by Charles Dreys and Jean Longnon. In the 1920's three versions of the *Mémoires* appeared, edited by Jean Longnon: first, *Mémoires pour les années 1661 et 1666* (Paris, 1923); second, an English translation of this edition by Herbert Wilson, entitled *A King's Lessons in Statecraft: Louis XIV; Letters to His Heirs* (London, 1924); and third, a more complete edition, *Mémoires de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1927). Still valuable is the nineteenth-century compilation of C. Dreys (ed.), *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du dauphin* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860).

The archival collection of Louis XIV's letters written in his hand, dictated, or inspired by him is so vast that only a few of them have as yet been published. The most convenient edition is Pierre Gaxotte's *Lettres de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1930), containing 139 letters covering the period 1659-1715. Also important as a source of our knowledge of Louis's statecraft are his letters to his ambassador in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession: *Correspondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot 1705-1709*, ed. Girardot (Paris, 1864).

LOUIS XIV AND HIS COURT.—The best introduction to the court life are the memoirs left by several of Louis's more perceptive and literate court-

iers, the more famous being those of the Duc de Saint-Simon and the marquises Dangeau and Sourches. The best edition of the memoirs of Louis de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, is A. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930). The *Journal* of Philippe de Courcillon, the marquis de Dangeau, has been edited by E. Soulié *et al.* (19 vols.; Paris, 1854-1860). The *Mémoires* of Louis F. du Bouchet, marquis de Sourches, have been edited by De Cosnac *et al.* (13 vols.; Paris, 1882-1893; with "Table" by L. Lecestre, Paris, 1912). Indispensable as a guide to court life are the shrewd comments made by the elector of Brandenburg's representative in France, Ezechiel Spanheim, in his *Relation de la cour de France en 1690*, ed. Emile Bourgeois (Lyon, 1900). For a background study of Spanheim see Victor Loewe, *Ein Diplomat und Gelehrter: Ezechiel Spanheim (1629-1710)* (Berlin, 1924). Other memoirs of importance are Emile Magne (ed.), *Lettres inédites à Marie-Louise de Gonzague, reine de Pologne, sur la cour de Louis XIV (1660-1667)* (Paris, 1920); Primi Visconti, *Mémoires sur la cour de Louis XIV*, ed. J. Lemoine (Paris, 1909); and Thomas Chabod, marquis de Saint-Maurice, *Lettres sur la cour de Louis XIV, 1667-1670*, ed. J. Lemoine (Paris, 1930).

Good secondary accounts of the court can be found in Jacques Levron, *La Vie quotidienne à la cour de Versailles aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1965), and Duc de la Force, *Louis XIV et sa cour* (Paris, 1956); Marcel Langlois, *Louis XIV et la cour* (Paris, [1926]). The latter work identifies—not altogether successfully—Chamillart as the author of Sourches's *Mémoires*. An informative essay concerning court etiquette and manners has been written by Henri Brocher, *A la cour de Louis XIV: le rang et l'étiquette sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1934).

THE LADIES IN LOUIS XIV'S LIFE.—Jules Lair, *Louise de la Vallière et la jeunesse de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1881); Pierre Clément, *Madame de Montespan et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1868); and A. Houssaye, *Mlle de la Vallière et Madame de Montespan* (Paris, 1896), provide a detailed account of Louis's unofficial wives. Perhaps the most important female witness to the events at court during the last years of Louis XIV's life was hismorganatic wife, Madame de Maintenon, whose *Lettres* have been edited by Marcel Langlois (4 vols.; Paris, 1935-39). Langlois has also written the best life of the marquise: *Madame de Maintenon* (Paris, 1932). Another noteworthy life is J. Cordelier, *Madame de Maintenon* (Paris, 1955); also Louis Hastier, *Louis XIV et Madame de Maintenon* (Paris, 1957), in which the author questions the traditional date of Maintenon's marriage to Louis XIV. The problem of Maintenon's political activities is treated by A. Baudrillart in "Madame de Maintenon, son rôle politique pendant les dernières années du règne de Louis XIV," *Revue des questions historiques*, XXV (1890), 101-61.

LOUIS XIV'S EARLY LIFE, THE FRONDES, AND THE 1650'S.—Although excessively favorable in its assessment of Cardinal Mazarin's achievements, still one of the best introductions to the "reign" of Mazarin and to the early years of Louis XIV's rule is the monumental work of P.-A. Chéruel, *Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV* (4 vols.; Paris, 1879-80), and its sequel, *Histoire de France sous le ministère de Mazarin (1651-1661)* (3 vols.; Paris, 1882). An invaluable source for the period, one on which P.-A. Chéruel based much of his work, is P.-A. Chéruel and G. d'Avenel's edition of *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin . . .* (9 vols.; Paris, 1872-1906).

The Frondes.—A stormy chapter in recent historiography of French history centers around the background to, and the uprisings accompanying, the Frondes, the civil wars that buffeted France from 1648 to 1653. An excellent guide to the political thought of the period, and at the same time a useful introduction to the historiographical trends (before 1952) is Ernst Kossmann's *La Fronde* (Leiden, 1954). Kossmann's first chapter introduces the reader to the general problems of the period and to the works of such historians as Chéruel, Henri Sée, and Paul Doolin. In addition to Kossmann's study, noteworthy are Louis Madelin's *Une Révolution manquée. La Fronde* (Paris, 1931), which pictures the Fronde as a fancy dress rehearsal for the French Revolution, and Paul R. Doolin's *The Fronde* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), which places the uprising in the context of its constitutional setting.

More recent works on the Frondes have stressed (1) the pan-European aspects of the mid-seventeenth-century revolutions and/or (2) the antecedents to the French upheaval, with emphasis on the social and economic history of the times. In the first category is the excellent summary edited by Trevor Aston under the title *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660* (London, 1965), which includes essays by E. J. Hobsbawm and H. R. Trevor-Roper on the "General Crisis" of the seventeenth century, with comments by Roland Mousnier and J. H. Elliott. These essays originally appeared in the journal *Past and Present*, Nos. 16 (1959) and 18 (1960), with comments (in addition to those of Mousnier and Elliott) by E. H. Kossmann, E. J. Hobsbawm, J. H. Hexter, and Lawrence Stone. Trevor-Roper has since elaborated his essay in his work *Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change* (London, 1967), particularly pp. 1-89.

The question of internal developments in France before and during the Fronde has recently been summarized by J. H. M. Salmon in his important article, "Venal Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-Century France," *Past and Present*, No. 37 (1967), pp. 21-43. Salmon gives us guidelines to follow in viewing the vast historical literature that

has appeared on the topic of the Fronde. He begins with the important article of Georges Pagès, "La Vénalité des offices dans l'ancienne France," *Revue historique*, CLXIX (1932), 477-95, followed by a review of the work of Roland Mousnier in *La Vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Rouen, 1945). Pagès and Mousnier placed great emphasis on the dictatorial aspects of the government of the old regime, on the use of the *commissaires* under the administrations of Richelieu and Mazarin, and on the clash of interest between the *officiers* and the newer bureaucrats. Some of their conclusions were challenged by the Russian historian Boris Porshnev in his work *Les Soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648* (Paris, 1963; Russian ed., Moscow, 1948; German ed., Berlin, 1954). Porshnev emphasized the class conflict preceding the Fronde of 1648, with particular reference to peasant leadership; he also stressed the feudal-absolutist character of the French monarchy, that is, the "alliance-in-oppression" of the nobility of the sword and the officeholder. Mousnier took ten years to reply to Porshnev; when he did, he denied that the popular uprisings had been spontaneous, but rather, that they were often led by the local seigneurs and that there was less class conflict than Porshnev indicated. His conclusions are contained in "Recherches sur les soulèvements populaires en France avant la Fronde," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, V (1958), 81-113; and more recently in his Introduction to an edition of the *Lettres et mémoires adressés au chancelier Séguier (1633-1649)* (2 vols.; Paris, 1964).

Other important works by, or inspired by, Mousnier are: *Problèmes de stratification sociale—deux cahiers de la noblesse, 1649-1651*, by Mousnier, J.-P. Labatut, and Y. Durand (Paris, 1965); and the richly documented work of Jean-Paul Charmeil, *Les Trésoriers de France à l'époque de la Fronde* (Paris, 1964), which further demonstrates the clash between the venal officials and the *commissaires*.

Two works that shed further light on the controversy over the Frondes are V.-L. Tapié's *La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu* (Paris, 1952; rev. ed., 1967), one of the first works to summarize for a French audience Porshnev's conclusions and to comment upon them critically, and Robert Mandrou's *Classes et luttes des classes en France au début du XVII^e siècle* (Florence, 1965), which asks significant questions of Porshnev's methodology.

A further refinement of the Russian position has been offered by Mme A. D. Lublinskaya in *Vnutrennjaja Politika Frantcuzkogo Absolutizma, 1633-1649* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1966). A recent work by the same author is *French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase 1620-1629*, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, England, 1968).

For England's impact on the Frondes the reader can consult the well-documented work of Philip A. Knachel, *England and the Fronde: The Impact of the English Civil War and the Revolution on France* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1967). Insights into the political temper of the times can still be gained by a close reading in the great collection of political tracts edited by C. Moreau, *Choix de Mazarinades* (2 vols.; Paris, 1853).

II. The History of International Relations and Politics

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—One of the best specialized guides to articles in the field of diplomatic history is Georges Dethan (ed.), *Table générale et méthodique de la revue d'histoire diplomatique depuis son origine (1887-1963)* (Paris, 1965). Also important is the work by Emile Bourgeois and Louis André (eds.), *Les Sources de l'histoire de France: XVII^e siècle (1610-1715)* (*Histoire politique et militaire*, Bourgeois and André, (eds.) Vol. V, [Paris, 1926]). Indispensable for biographical information is L. Buttner and L. Gross (eds.), *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder . . .* (3 vols.; Berlin and Zurich, 1936-1965).

PRINTED SOURCES.—The instructions sent to the French ambassadors and ministers abroad during the period 1648-1791, with supporting documentation drawn from the Archives des Affaires Etrangères, is published in a continuing series under the general title *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française*. The first volume appeared in 1879, and the latest, in 1965, the latter being the important instructions to England: Paul Vaucher (ed.), *Recueil des instructions données . . . XXV-2 Angleterre III (1698-1791)* (Paris, 1965). A convenient collection of treaties is contained in Henri Vast, *Les grands traités du règne de Louis XIV* (3 vols.; Paris, 1893-99).

GENERAL WORKS ON THE EARLY MODERN ERA.—Still of value for a general view of European diplomacy is Emile Bourgeois, *Les Origines (1610-1789)* (*Manuel historique de politique étrangère*, Vol. I [6th ed.; Paris, 1916]); and Max Immich, *Geschichte des europäischen Staaten-systems von 1660 bis 1789* (Munich and Berlin, 1905). An informative summary is Jacques Droz's *Histoire diplomatique de 1648 à 1919* (Paris, 1952).

SURVEYS OF LOUIS XIV DIPLOMACY.—A noteworthy survey, more clearly related to the reign of Louis XIV, is Louis André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950), which contains an extensive, if cryptically cited, bibliography. André gives a sympathetic reading to Louis's foreign policy,

whereas Gaston Zeller presents a harsher judgment in his two volumes that appeared in the series "Histoire des relations internationales," (ed. Pierre Renouvin) under the title *Les Temps modernes* (2 vols.; Paris, 1953-55), subtitled (Vol. I) *De Christophe Colomb à Cromwell* and (Vol. II) *De Louis XIV à 1789*. Zeller distills his views in the chapter "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting," in F. L. Carsten (ed.), *The Ascendancy of France: 1648-88* (*New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. V [Cambridge, Eng., 1961]), pp. 198-221. Generally hostile to Louis XIV as a ruler, Zeller first clearly outlined his ideas in an important article, "Politique extérieure et diplomatie sous Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, VI (1931), 124-43. Less hostile to Louis XIV's policies are the views of Georges Pagès, who, a generation before Zeller, summarized his point of view in a well-reasoned essay, "L'Histoire diplomatique du règne de Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, VII (1905-6), 653-80. V.-L. Tapié provides us with a brief but useful analysis of foreign policy in the chapter "Nec pluribus impar," in Georges Mongrédien et al., *La France au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1965), Ch. 7. Tapié asks such pertinent questions as: "Le sang et la gloire: les responsabilités du roi" "Frontières naturelles ou Succession d'Espagne?" Tapié and others also give us a general view of diplomatic history in "Problèmes de politique étrangères sous Louis XIV," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 46-47 (1960).

THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.—The best works dealing with the diplomatic practices of the age are C.-G. Picavet, *La Diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV (1661-1715): institutions, mœurs, et coutumes* (Paris, 1930); and an adjunct work, Camille Piccioni, *Les premiers commis des affaires étrangères aux 17^e et 18^e siècles* (Paris, 1928). The insights vouchsafed by Picavet and Piccioni come in part from a close reading of the great classics of diplomacy written during the Grand Siècle: Rousseau de Chamoy, *L'Idée du parfait ambassadeur*, ed. Louis Delavaud (Paris, 1912); François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz; trans. A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Ind., 1963); and Antoine Pecquet, *L'Art négociier* (Paris, 1737).

STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF LOUIS XIV'S DIPLOMACY.—There are many noteworthy studies directed toward specific periods of the age of Louis XIV that serve to provide a framework for tracing the development of diplomacy during that age.

The Peace of Westphalia and Peace of the Pyrenees: 1643-1659.—The years in which Cardinal Mazarin directed French foreign affairs have not yet been treated in a comprehensive survey. The Treaty of Münster, 1648, which codified, on paper at least, French holdings in

Alsace, is admirably dealt with in three major works: Max Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede* (Münster, 1948); Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden* (Münster, 1959); and Ernst Hövel (ed.), *Pax Optima Rerum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Westfälischen Friedens, 1648* (Münster, 1948). A summary account, cogently and concisely analyzing the international situation, is Paul Vaucher, *Etude sur la France de 1598 à 1660* ("Les Cours de Sorbonne"; Paris, 1954).

The myth that France at this time and in subsequent years lusted after so-called natural frontiers has been laid by Gaston Zeller in two articles: "La Monarchie d'Ancien Régime et les frontières naturelles," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, VIII (1933), 305-31; and "Histoire d'une idée fausse," in his *Aspects de la politique française sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1964), pp. 90-108.

The diplomacy of the 1650's is surveyed through the eyes of the able diplomat Hugues de Lionne in Jules Valfrey's *La Diplomatie française au XVII^e siècle: Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en Allemagne . . . d'après sa correspondance* (Paris, 1881); and J. Valfrey, *La Diplomatie française au XVII^e siècle: Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Italie 1642-56* (Paris, 1877). For Mazarin's interference in German internal politics, see P.-A. Chéruel, "La Ligue du Rhin," *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*, XIV (1888), 995-1065. Also of interest for the study of French aims in Germany is Claude Badalo-Dulong's *Trente ans de la diplomatie française en Allemagne. Louis XIV et l'Electeur de Mayence (1648-1678)* (Paris, 1956). Also Jules Bourelly, *Cromwell et Mazarin . . .* (Paris, 1886).

Overtures to Aggression, 1661-1672.—The opening phase of Louis's diplomacy in the 1660's is studied by P.-A. Chéruel, "Politique extérieure de Louis XIV au début de son gouvernement personnel," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, IV (1890), 161-73.

The Sale of Dunkirk, 1662.—Clyde L. Grose has written two articles of note: "England and Dunkirk," *American Historical Review*, XXXIX (1933), 1-27; and "Dunkirk Money, 1662," *Journal of Modern History*, V (1933), 1-18. In France the problem has aroused the interest of Alexandre de St. Léger in "L'Acquisition de Dunkerque et de Mardyck sous Louis XIV en 1662," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, II (1900-1901), 233-45. Detailed and reliable is Lucien Lemaire, *Le Rachat de Dunkerque par Louis XIV* (Dunkirk, 1924).

The Créqui Affair: Louis XIV versus the Pope, 1662.—Paul Sonnino, in *Louis XIV's View of the Papacy (1661-1667)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), provides us with the latest interpretation (with bibliography). His work does not entirely replace Charles de Moüy, *Louis XIV*

et le Saint-Siège. L'Ambassade du duc de Créqui (1662-1665) (2 vols.; Paris, 1893). Interesting, too, is Charles Gérin, "L'Affaire des corses en 1662-1664," *Revue des questions historiques*, X (1871), 66-147.

The Question of Lorraine in the 1660's.—See Gaston Zeller's exhaustive study, published with manuscripts, "Le Traité de Montmartre (6 février 1662) d'après des documents inédits," *Société d'archéologie Lorraine*, LXII (1924), 1-74.

The War of Devolution: Louis XIV versus Spain (1667-68).—Still the best introduction to the problem of Spain, the Spanish Low Countries, and the Spanish Succession is François A. M. A. Mignet (ed.), *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV. . . .* (4 vols.; Paris, 1835-42), which contains correspondence and memoir material. A basic work is Arsène Legrelle's *La Diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne* (4 vols.; Ghent, 1888-92); and the second edition (6 vols.; Braine-le-Comte, 1895-99). Legrelle excerpts many documents from the Archives des Affaires Etrangères, valuable for the entire reign. Basic, too, is the *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII^e siècle*, ed. H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier, and J. Lefebvre (6 vols.; Brussels, 1923-37). There is no good modern work on the War of Devolution; one of the best guides is the anonymously published *A Relation of the French King's Late Expedition into the Spanish Netherlands in the years 1667 and 1668* (London, 1669).

The Triple Alliance of 1668.—An important source is *The Works of Sir William Temple, Bart.* (4 vols.; London, 1757), Temple being one of the chief architects of the Triple Alliance. Modern works of value are: Waldemer Westergaard, *The First Triple Alliance 1668-1672* (New Haven, Conn., 1947); and Herbert H. Rowen, "John de Witt and the Triple Alliance," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVI (1954), 1-14.

The Secret Treaty of Dover, 1670.—Basic is Sir Keith G. Feiling's *British Foreign Policy 1660-1672* (London, 1930); and his article, "Henriette Stuart, Duchess of Orleans, and the Origins of the Treaty of Dover," *English Historical Review*, XLVII (1932), 642-45; also C. H. Hartman, *Charles II and Madame* (London, 1934); and the more recent, well-argued book by Maurice Lee, Jr., *The Cabal* (Urbana, Ill., 1965), particularly Chapter 3.

The Dutch War, 1672-1679: Its Origins.—The origins of this war are vigorously disputed by historians, who divide roughly between the economic and the political determinists. The leader of the economic historians is Simon Elzinga, whose chief work is *Het Voorspel van den Oorlog van 1672* (Haarlem, 1926). His conclusions are anticipated by Elphège Frémy

in "Les Causes économiques de la guerre de Hollande (1664-1672)," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XXVIII-XXIX (1914-15), 523-51, who stresses the effects of the tariffs of 1664 and 1667. Elzinga summarizes his work and that of Frémy in "Le Prélude de la guerre de 1672," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, V (1927), 349-66. Henri Sée asks many of the same questions in "Que faut-il penser de l'œuvre économique de Colbert?", *Revue historique*, CLII (1926), 181-94. Herbert H. Rowen challenges the economic interpretation by placing his emphasis on the Franco-Dutch struggle for the Southern Netherlands: *The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1672* (The Hague, 1957). See also Rowen's valuable edition of Pomponne's account of his mission to The Hague, *La Relation de mon ambassade en Hollande 1669-1671* (Utrecht, 1955).

Louis XIV versus the Dutch and Europe, 1672-1679.—The key figure in the alliances against Louis XIV from 1672 to 1701 was William III. The most recent and one of the best-balanced biographies of William III, recording in detail the events of the Dutch wars, the troubled years of the 1680's, and the War of the League of Augsburg, is Stephen B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966). Baxter draws extensively on the British and Dutch archives but, unfortunately, neglects the French, particularly the Archives des Affaires Etrangères; his account of Louis XIV thus has a strange, rather lopsided effect reminiscent of the Whig histories of "Protestant" William. The older, "standard" life of William is Nicholaas Japiske, *Prins Willem III: De Stadhouder-Koning* (2 vols.; Amsterdam, 1930-33); see also Nicholaas Japiske, *Johan de Witt* (Amsterdam, 1915). Herbert Rowen promises us soon a reappraisal of De Witt.

For the pamphlet campaign against Louis XIV a good summary work is P. J. W. van Malssen, *Louis XIV d'après les pamphlets répandus en Hollande* (Amsterdam, 1936). One of Louis's most bitter foes among the foreign diplomats was Freiherr von Lisola, whose career is detailed by A. F. Pribram in *Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola . . . und die Politik seiner Zeit* (Leipzig, 1894).

The Dutch defense of Holland against the French is described by Mary C. Trevelyan, *William III and the Defence of Holland, 1672-1674* (London, 1930); some of Miss Trevelyan's factual errors have been pointed out by Pieter Geyl in *Kernproblemen von onze Geschiedenis* (Utrecht, 1937).

The Peace of Nijmegen, 1676-1679.—The standard work on the peace is P. Höynck, *Frankreich und seine Gegner auf dem Nymwegener Friedens-Kongress* (Bonn, 1960). A contemporary work of interest is found in Saint-Didier, *Histoire de la négociation de la paix de Nimègue*

1676-1679 (2 vols.; Paris, 1680), and in William Temple, *Memoirs of What Past in Christendom from the War Begun 1672, to the Peace Concluded 1679* (3d ed.; London, 1693). A preliminary move to the peace is dealt with by Clyde L. Grose, "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678," *English Historical Review*, XXXIX (1924), 349-72.

The Reunions and the Fall of Strasbourg, 1679-1681.—A study of the reunions should be prefaced by an account of Pomponne's dismissal as foreign minister: C. Gérin, "La Disgrâce de M. de Pomponne (1679)," *Revue des questions historiques*, XXIII (1878), 5-70, and Herbert Rowen, "Arnauld de Pomponne, Louis XIV's Moderate Minister," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1956), 531-49. As to the role played by the ministers Louvois and Croissy in the reunions, see the conflicting interpretations given by Emile Bourgeois, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les chambres de réunion)," *Revue historique*, XXXIV (1887), 413-18; and Gaston Zeller, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les chambres de réunion)," *Revue historique*, CXXXI (1919), 267-75. Still valuable is H. Kaufmann, *Die Reunionskammer zu Metz* (Metz, 1899). The best modern discussion of Strasbourg in this period is Franklin Ford, *Strasbourg in Transition, 1648-1789* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), with an extensive bibliography. Also of interest for the German viewpoint is Erich Marks, "Ludwig XIV und Strassburg," in his essays *Männer und Zeiten* (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 91-108; and for the French view, A. Legrelle, *Louis XIV et Strasbourg* (Paris, 1884).

France and Europe, 1681-1688.—The Germanies are discussed in an older but still useful survey: B. Auerbach, *La France et le Saint Empire Romain Germanique depuis la paix de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française* (Paris, 1912). On French relations with Brandenburg see the useful monograph by F. Fehling, *Frankreich und Brandenburg in den Jahren 1679 bis 1684* (Leipzig, 1906), and the more general works of Georges Pagès, *Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1905) and *Contributions à l'histoire de la politique française en Allemagne sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1905). The crisis year of 1683 has given rise to a vast literature: W. Platzhoff, "Ludwig XIV, das Kaisertum und die europäische Krisis von 1683," *Historische Zeitschrift* CXXI (1920), 377-412; R. Lorenz, *Türkenjahr 1683* (rev. ed.; Vienna, 1944); John Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (London, 1964), with bibliographical references; and M. Vachon, "La France et L'Autriche au siège de Vienne en 1683," *La nouvelle revue*, XXIII (1883), 775-80.

The Dutch position is treated by G. H. Kurtz in an important monograph, *Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-1685* (Utrecht, 1928); and in the contemporary account *Négociations de monsieur le comte d'Avaux*

en Hollande . . . 1679-1688 (6 vols.; Paris, 1752-53). The Southern Netherlands are considered in A. Levae, *Essai historique sur les négociations de la trêve de vingt ans conclue à Ratisbonne en 1684* (Brussels, 1844).

Turkey, Poland, and Sweden and their relations with France have been studied by K. Koehler, *Die orientalische Politik Ludwigs XIV* (Leipzig, 1907); S. Rubinstein, *Les Relations entre la France et la Pologne de 1680 à 1683* (Paris, 1913); and Andrew Lossky, *Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954). The latter provides extensive notes.

A good introduction to the problems between England and Louis XIV can be found in Ruth Clark, *Sir William Trumbull in Paris, 1685-1686* (Cambridge, Eng., 1938), and in three important studies: Clyde L. Grose, "Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles II and the English Parliament," *Journal of Modern History*, I (1929), 177-204; Robert H. George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II," *Journal of Modern History*, III (1931), 392-413; and René Durand, "Louis XIV et Jacques II à la veille de la Révolution de 1689," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, X (1908), 23-48.

The War of the League of Augsburg, or the Nine Years' War, 1688-1697.—One of the best introductions and reappraisals of the period is presented by Sir George Clark, "The Character of the Nine Years War, 1688-97," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, XI (1954), 168-82. Clark's article supplements his earlier work *The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade 1688-1697* (Manchester, Eng., 1923), which should be compared with John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697* (Cambridge, Eng., 1953). Two works in German are important here: H. Ritter von Srbik, *Wien und Versailles, 1692-1697 . . .* (Munich, 1944); and the more balanced, wide-ranging study of Max Braubach, *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz* (Bonn, 1952). The latter provides an introduction to the problems of Franco-Austrian relations down to the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756. The best general treatment in French remains A. Legrelle's *La Diplomatie française de la Succession d'Espagne* (Ghent, 1888-92), Vol. III.

Peace Negotiations, 1690-1700: The Congress of Ryswick and the Partition Treaties.—A fundamental work here is Mark Thomson, "Louis XIV and William III, 1689-1697," *English Historical Review*, LXXVI (1961), 37-58, reprinted in R. M. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds.), *William III and Louis XIV. Essays by and for Mark Thomson* (Liverpool, 1968) (hereafter cited as Hatton and Bromley [eds.], *William III*

and Louis XIV). Also of note is A. Legrelle, *Les Conférences secrètes de Diessenhoffen et Steckborn 1694* (Braine-le-Comte, 1894), showing the importance of the Marquis de Chamlay as a diplomat; and Legrelle's *Notes et documents sur la paix de Ryswick* (Lille, 1894). The most thorough study yet made of the events leading to Ryswick is G. Koch, *Die Friedensbestrebungen Wilhelms III in den Jahren 1694-1697* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1903). The military events are reviewed by J. de Beaurain, *Histoire militaire de Flandre depuis l'année 1690 jusqu'en 1694* (2 vols.; Paris, 1755). Two source collections round out the picture of the peace negotiations and the partition treaties: *Actes et mémoires des négociations de la paix de Ryswick* (4 vols.; The Hague, 1699) and P. Grimbolt (ed.), *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of Their Ministers . . . 1697-1700* (2 vols.; London, 1848).

The War of the Spanish Succession, 1700-1714.—The vastness of the literature on the War of the Spanish Succession is a bit overwhelming; therefore, I shall list only a few representative works.

Several of the nineteenth-century multivolume general works on the period still serve as the best guides to Louis's diplomacy: Marquis de Courcy, *La Coalition de 1701 contre la France* (2 vols.; Paris, 1886); C. Hippeau, *L'Avènement des Bourbons au trône d'Espagne* (2 vols.; Paris, 1875); A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France* (5 vols.; Paris, 1890-1901), which was one of the first great works to make use of the Spanish archives; and Volume V of Arsène Legrelle (previously cited), *La Diplomatie . . . de la Succession d'Espagne*, (2d ed.).

A recent, detailed study of the preliminaries to the peace, 1705-10, is J. G. Stork-Penning, *Het Grote Werk; vreesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse successieoorlog, 1705-10* (Groningen, 1958). Two other works of importance analyzing the negotiations that prefaced the war and the peace are Mark Thomson's "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Ser. 5, IV (1954), 111-34; and his "Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance 1705-1710," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXXIV (1961), 16-35; they have been reprinted in Hatton and J. Bromley (eds.), *William III and Louis XIV*. Both the Stork-Penning book and Thomson articles give new dimensions to the peace negotiations.

The attitude of the French ministers toward the war can best be seen in G. Esnault's edition of Michel Chamillart, *contrôleur-général des finances . . . papiers inédits* (2 vols.; Paris, 1885), and Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, *Journal Inédit*, ed. Frédéric Masson (Paris, 1884). Valuable insights into French diplomacy, 1711-13, may also be

gained from reading in the *Letters and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke*, ed. G. Parke (4 vols.; London, 1798).

Two specialized works concerning French foreign policy decisions on the eve of peace are Pierre Paul, *Le Cardinal Melchoir de Polignac (1661-1741)* (Paris, 1922), and John C. Rule, "King and Minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy," in Hatton and Bromley (eds.), *William III and Louis XIV*.

The best work on the peacemaking, 1711-13, is still Ottokar Weber's *Der Friede von Utrecht* (Gotha, 1891). Weber completes his work on the peace congresses in his "Der Friede von Rastatt, 1714," *Deutsche Zeitung für Geschichtswissenschaft VIII* (1890).

One of the tangled problems left by the Utrecht settlement, a legacy of Byzantine diplomacy, was the question of the destruction of the port of Dunkirk, which is treated by A. P. Herlaut, "La Destruction du port de Dunkerque. Les Conflits diplomatiques franco-anglaises 1713-15," *Revue du Nord*, 2 (1925); and Alexandre de Saint-Léger, *La question de Dunkerque et du canal de Mardyck 1709-15* (Paris, 1904).

III. *The Institutions of Government in Practice and Theory*

Histories of the great institutions and of the administration of France in the Grand Siècle, both in practice and in theory, make up one of the most important and sprawling fields of research that we shall review, at once enormous in its output and weighty in subject matter.

THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT.—An indispensable reference work is Marcel Marion's *Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1923). One of the latest guides to the institutions of France, with strong emphasis on administrative and economic history, is Jacques Ellul's *Historie des institutions de l'Epoque Franque à la Révolution* (Paris, 1962), with its extensive, if somewhat unreliable, bibliographies. Another important general study has been assembled by Georges Pagès (ed.), *Etudes sur l'histoire administrative et sociale de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1938).

THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE MONARCHY.—The institutions of the monarchy are brilliantly reviewed in a group of essays written by Edmond Esmonin, *Etudes sur la France des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1964). Reprinted in this massive collection are significant studies of the Dauphiné. An important review article that complements Esmonin's work is Philippe Sagnac's "Louis XIV et son administration d'après des ouvrages et travaux récents," *Revue d'histoire politique et constitutionnelle*, III (1939), 23-47.

One of the best introductions to the monarchy is Georges Pagès's brief *La Monarchie d'Ancien Régime en France (De Henri IV à Louis XIV)* (Paris, 1928); Pagès restated his conclusion in his Sorbonne lectures of 1939, *Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV* (Paris, reprinted 1961.) As Professor Moote notes in his essay in this book, Roland Mousnier, one of Pagès's students and now holder of the chair of modern history at the Sorbonne, has modified the views of Pagès, particularly in his general history *Les XVI^e and XVII^e siècles* (cited previously) and in his article "L'Evolution des institutions monarchiques en France et ses relations avec l'état social," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 57-72. Another work of immense help to students, both by reason of its long bibliographical notes and challenging (but not unchallenged) thesis, is James E. King's *Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis XIV, 1661-1685* (Baltimore, 1949).

One arm of the central government, the post office, has been studied in great detail by Eugène Vaillé in his monumental *Histoire générale des postes françaises* (6 vols.; Paris, 1947-55); of particular interest are Volumes IV and V, which recount the activities of Louvois and Torcy as head of the post. The secret-service activity of the post office is studied in E. Vaillé's *Le Cabinet noir* (Paris, 1950).

The King's Councils.—An important source work here is Jean de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoriaux du conseil de 1661* (3 vols.; Paris, 1905-7); it should be supplemented by A. de Boislisle, "Les Conseils sous Louis XIV," in the appendixes of his edition of the *Mémoires* of Saint-Simon (Vols. IV, V, VI, VII [Paris, 1884-90]), IV, 377-439; V, 437-82; VI, 477-514; VII, 405-43. Another intimate glance into the council, written at the end of Louis XIV's reign, is Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, *Journal inédits pendant les années 1709, 1710 et 1711*, ed. F. Masson (Paris, 1884). A further glimpse into the king's working habits, as seen by the Abbé Saint-Pierre at the beginning of the eighteenth century, is afforded us by Merle Perkins, "The Councils of Louis XIV," *French Review*, XXX (1957), 395-97. An important study of the king's council is Roland Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi, de la mort de Henri IV au gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV," *Etudes d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, I (1947), 25-49.

The king's ministers are treated in the aggregate by Paul Viollet in his diffuse work *Le Roi et ses ministres pendant les trois derniers siècles de la monarchie* (Paris, 1912). A more recent survey of the social origins of the king's servants, including his ministers, is to be found in "Serviteurs du Roi," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 42-43 (1959).

The vast correspondence carried on by the council of dispatches and the privy council in the monumental editions of A. M. de Boislisle (ed.),

Correspondance des contrôleurs-généraux des finances avec les intendants des provinces 1683-1715 (3 vols.; Paris, 1874-97); and A. M. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoires des intendants sur l'état des généralités dressés pour l'instruction du duc de Bourgogne* (Paris, 1881); and G. B. Depping (ed.), *Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV* (4 vols.; Paris, 1850-55).

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE INTENDANTS.—In turning from the central government to the provinces, we must consider one of the most important historiographical and historical problems of the reign, i.e., the question of the origin and continuity of the intendant's office. The question of the origins is well put by Edmond Esmonin in his essay "Observations critiques sur le livre de M. Hanotaux *Origines de l'institution des intendants des provinces*," in Esmonin's *Etudes sur la France des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1964), pp. 13-17. The question of continuity is studied in the important articles of Gaston Zeller, "L'Administration monarchique avant les intendants," *Revue historique*, CXCVII (1947), 180-215; and Roland Mousnier, "Note sur les rapports entre les gouverneurs de provinces et les intendants dans la première moitié du XVII^e siècle," *Revue historique*, CCXXVIII (1962), 339-50, and his "Etat et commissaire. Recherches sur la création des intendants des provinces (1634-1648)" in *Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung: Festgabe für Fritz Hartung* (Berlin, 1958). The pioneering work of C. Godard, *Les Pouvoirs des Intendants sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1901), is still valuable. The newer model of its kind, richly detailed and insightful, is Georges Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV (1648-1715)* (Strasbourg, 1956). Two other important recent works are: Henri Fréville, *L'Intendance de Bretagne (1689-1790)* (3 vols.; Rennes, 1953); Emile Mireaux, *Une Province française au temps du Grand Roi: la Brie* (Paris, 1958). The question of military occupation and administration of conquered provinces is considered by Marquis de Roux, *Louis XIV et les provinces conquises: Artois, Alsace, Flandres, Roussillon, Franche-Comté* (Paris, 1938); and Georges Livet's important supplement to Roux, "Louis XIV et les provinces conquises," *XVII^e siècle*, No. 16 (1952), pp. 481-507. A more recent general survey of the problem is Vivian R. Gruder's *The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1968), which contains materials on the seventeenth century.

The Growth of Police Power.—Police power (other than that exercised by the intendants) is studied by Pierre Clément, *La Police sous Louis XIV* (2d ed.; Paris, 1866); and by J. Saint-Germain, *La Reynie et la*

police au grand siècle (Paris, 1962). Details of police activities in Paris during the era of the Spanish Succession can be gleaned from the *Rapports inédits du Lieutenant de Police, René d'Argenson* (1697-1715), ed. Paul Cottin (Paris, 1891).

CORPORATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATE.—The idea of corporation pervaded the thinking of many members of the ruling classes in the Ancien Régime and has been a topic of sustained interest since that day. Among the more important works on the subject, the best introduction, although it deals largely with the guild system, is Emile Coornaert, *Les Corporations en France avant 1789* (Paris, 1941). Longer works are Fr. Olivier-Martin's *L'Organisation corporative de la France d'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1938) and Emile Lousse's *La Société d'Ancien Régime: organisation et représentation corporatives* (Louvain, 1943). For a recent adaptation of the corporative interpretation of society and government under the Old Regime see R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution* (2 vols.; Princeton, N. J., 1959-64), I, 27 ff. Of importance for the guilds is E. Martin-Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers depuis leurs origines jusqu'à leur suppression en 1791, avec une appendice de bibliographie critique par Emile Coornaert . . .* (4th ed.; Paris, 1941).

The Estates.—Prominent among the great corporative bodies were the estates (along with the parlements). Among the standard accounts are: Armand Rébillion, *Les Etats de Bretagne de 1661 à 1789* (Paris, 1932); Prentout, *Les Etats provinciaux de Normandie* (3 vols.; Paris, 1927); and Emile Appolis's well-known study, "Les Etats de Languedoc au XVIII^e siècle: comparaison avec Etats de Bretagne," in Emile Lousse (ed.), *L'Organisation corporative du moyen âge à la fin de l'Ancien Régime* (Louvain, 1937).

The Parlements.—Franklin L. Ford offers a brief introduction to the "Sovereign Courts" and the "Right of Remonstrance" in Chapters III and V of his *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). Ford's work is also listed in this bibliography under Social History, where it more properly belongs.

The standard work on the Parlement of Paris is E. Glasson, *Le Parlement de Paris, son rôle politique* (2 vols.; Paris, 1901). The parlements of Brittany have been best served by historians: A. Floquet, *Histoire du Parlement de Normandie* (7 vols.; Rouen, 1840-42); and A. Le Moy, *Le Parlement de Bretagne et le pouvoir royal au XVIII^e siècle* (Angers, 1909).

Lower Justice.—Still the best works on justice administered by the lower courts are Gustave Dupont-Ferrier's *Les Officiers royaux des*

baillages et sénéchausées et les institutions monarchiques locales (Paris, 1902), and A. E. Giffard's *Les Justices seigneuriales en Bretagne aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1903).

Sale of Office.—Associated with the general problem of the corporative interpretation of the state is the question of the sale of office. A general introduction to the problem can be found in K. W. Swart, *Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague, 1949); Martin Göhring, *Die Ämterkäuflichkeit im Ancien Régime* (Berlin, 1938); and finally, the massive thesis published by Roland Mousnier immediately after World War II (which deals largely with the period before 1650, but illumines the whole era of the Grand Siècle), *La Vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Rouen, 1945).

THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT.—Good—even adequate—accounts of divine right absolutism as practiced and as theorized in France are difficult to find. A beginning may be made by reading John Neville Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings* (New York, 1965), with a perceptive introduction by G. R. Elton. Two other works helpful as background reading are the brilliant essay by Marc Bloch, essential to the analysis of the “properties” of kingship, *Les Rois thaumaturges, étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale, particulièrement en France et en Angleterre* (2d ed.; Paris, 1961; first published, 1924); and Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, N. J., 1957), which explores the concept of the king's mystical eternal person and his earthly being.

Basic to the understanding of the theory of absolutism are works by Frederick Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (London, 1957); and Martin Göhring's *Weg und Sieg der modernen Staatsidee in Frankreich, vom Mittelalter zu 1789* (Tübingen, 1947); also Henri Sée's rather disappointing—because one expects more of it—*Les Idées politiques en France au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1923).

The religious elements of political theory in the seventeenth century are outlined in W. J. Stankiewicz's *Politics and Religion in Seventeenth Century France: A Study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle, As Reflected in the Toleration Controversy* (Berkeley, 1960), a book marred by its excessive dependence on political terminology made popular by Harold J. Laski. The political philosophy of the Huguenots is well detailed by Guy H. Dodge's *The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion, with Special Reference to . . . Pierre Jurieu* (New York, 1947).

One of the best "critiques" of absolutism yet to appear is Fritz Hartung and Roland Mousnier's "Quelques problèmes concernant la monarchie absolue," in Vol. IV of *X Congresso Internazionale . . . Relazioni* (Florence, 1956) (valuable as a historiographical essay). Also important are Fritz Hartung's statement in *Enlightened Absolutism* (Historical Association pamphlet, London, 1951), and the perceptive articles by F. Dumont, "Royauté française et monarchie absolue au XVII^e Siècle," *XVII^e Siècle*, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 3-29; and William F. Church, "The Decline of the French Jurists as Political Theorists," *French Historical Studies*, V (1967), 1-40.

The influence of Hobbes on France is treated by André Morize in "Thomas Hobbes et Samuel Sorbière: Notes sur l'introduction de Hobbes en France," *Revue germanique* IV (1908), 195-204.

Of studies on Louis XIV's concept of divine right absolutism, particularly interesting are Georges Lacour-Gayet's enormously erudite analysis of the formation of Louis's thought in the second half of *L'Éducation politique de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1898; 2d ed., 1923) and Paul W. Fox, "Louis XIV and the theories of Absolutism and Divine Right," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXVI (1960), 128-42, which is drawn, in part, from his unpublished doctoral thesis at the University of London, "The Political Theory of Louis XIV." Also Emile Lousse's thoughtful "Absolutisme, droit divin, despotisme éclairé," *Schweizer Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte*, XVI (1958).

The principle of the king as "owner of the kingdom," in the sense that he owned it as a piece of property, is expounded by Herbert H. Rowen in "L'État c'est à moi: Louis XIV and the State," *French Historical Studies*, II (1961), 83-98.

Bishop Bossuet (see also section on religion) is often referred to as the supreme exponent of divine right absolutism at Louis's court. Two excellent introductions to his political thought are: Jacques Truchet, *La Prédication de Bossuet* (2 vols.; Paris, 1960), Vol. II, Chap. X; and Truchet's edition of the *Politique de Bossuet* (Paris, 1966).

IV. Social History

INTRODUCTIONS TO FRENCH LIFE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Perhaps the best introduction to the general topic of social history is given by Philippe Sagnac in *La Formation de la société française moderne* (2 vols.; Paris, 1945-46). The first volume, *La Société et la monarchie absolue (1661-1715)*, concerns the reign of Louis XIV. Another over-

view is contained in the varied essays contributed to the symposium "Comment les Français voyaient la France au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, No. 25-26 (1955).

Sagnac's introduction and the symposium in this same issue of *XVII^e siècle* seem, however, somewhat old-fashioned when compared to the more recent work being produced in the field of social history, particularly the historiographical advances made by younger scholars, some of whom have been classed in the "new wave" of historians and many of whom are members of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes at the Sorbonne and to the *Annales: Economies—Sociétés—Civilisations* (hereafter cited as *Annales: E.—S.—C.*) These "new" social historians are concerned—to list but a few categories—with problems of demography, class structure, popular (mass) culture, and social discontent. A convenient introduction to the problems that the "new" social historian faces and the fresh interpretations he suggests can be found in an exchange of views contained in the articles by Adeline Daumard and François Furet, "Méthodes de l'histoire sociale: les Archives notariales et la mécanographie," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, XIV (1959), 676-93, which explores the mysteries of the notarial archives, including a discussion of statistical evidence that can be adduced through a survey of marriage contracts, inventories of wealth, wills, etc.

The Daumard-Furet position is further elaborated in "Structures et relations sociales à Paris au milieu du XVIII^e siècle," *Cahiers des Annales*, No. 18 (Paris, 1961); and articles in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, X (1963), 185-210, and *Revue historique*, CCXXVII (1962), 139-54.

The Daumard-Furet analysis is scrutinized in the perceptive article by Jean Yves Tirat, "Problèmes de méthode en histoire sociale," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, X (1963), 211-18. Tirat poses the question as to whether any definitive methodological approach to social history has been or can be found. He cautions the reader to recall that statistics is still—and he hopes always will be—a handmaiden to history. His position is reviewed by A. Daumard and F. Furet in "Problèmes de méthodes en histoire sociale: réflexions sur une note critique," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, XI (1964), 291-98.

Significant contributions to social history, conceived in the "new" social history, are Robert Mandrou's brilliant—if uncategorizable—works, *Introduction à la France moderne; essai de psychologie historique (1500-1640)* (Paris, 1961), and the concise, clearly written review of "mass culture," *De la culture populaire aux 17^e et 18^e siècles* (Paris, 1964). The last, and one of the most important sociohistorical works to appear in

France since World War II is the vastly erudite, remarkably well documented thesis by Pierre Goubert on *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 à 1730. Contribution à l'histoire sociale de la France du XVII^e siècle* (2 vols.; Paris, 1960). Goubert's study offers the reader "un raccourci" of French society as it existed between the rivers Somme and Loire. It is an indispensable study.

Paris.—An intelligent-man's guide to the history of Paris is provided by Roland Mousnier in his Sorbonne lectures entitled *Paris au XVII^e siècle* (3 fasc.; Paris, 1961). Another indispensable history of the great city is Marcel Poëte's *Une Vie de cité: Paris, de sa naissance à nos jours* (3 vols.; Paris, 1927-31), particularly Vol. III, *La Spiritualité de la cité classique—les origines de la cité moderne—XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*. Delightful, too, is E. Magne's *Images de Paris sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1939).

POPULATION: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOGRAPHY.—Of all the fields within the area of social history, one of the most actively controversial is that of demography. Still useful for background reading is E. Levasseur's *La Population française* (3 vols.; Paris, 1889-92). Other important contributions are made by Philippe Ariès, *Histoire des populations françaises et de leurs attitudes devant la vie depuis le XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1948), M. E. Reinhard and A. Armengaud, *Histoire générale de la population mondiale* (Paris, 1961), and by Roland Mousnier, "Études par la population de la France au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, 16 (1952), 527-42. A more erudite and detailed work is Roger Mols, *Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d'Europe du XIV^e au XVIII^e siècles* (3 vols.; Gembloux, 1954-56). A challenging and brilliant excursion into the problems of the demographer is presented by Pierre Goubert in "En Beauvaisis: problèmes démographiques du XVII^e siècle," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, VII (1952), 453-68. Goubert's work should be read in conjunction with René Baehrel, "Statistique et démographie historique: la mortalité sous l'Ancien Régime, remarques inquiètes," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, XII (1957), 85-98. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's work on the effect of climate on seventeenth-century history is a summary statement of an important theme: "Climat et récoltes aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, XV (1960), 434-65.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF FRANCE.—An understanding of French social structure of the time can be gained through a reading of the following works dealing with the hierarchical groups.

The Nobility.—A concise, general work that minutely describes the gradation of nobility in France is Philippe du Puy de Clinchamps, *La*

Noblesse ("Que Sais-je?" series, No. 830 [Paris, 1962]). An excellent guide, also, is François Bluche and Pierre Durye, *L'Anoblissement par charge avant 1789* (Paris, 1962).

Fundamental questions on interpretations are asked by Marc Bloch in "Sur le passé de la noblesse française: quelques jalons de recherche," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, VIII (1936), 366-78, and by Robert Forster in "The Provincial Noble: A Reappraisal," *American Historical Review*, LXVIII (1963), 681-91. Forster makes somewhat the same point in his general work, *The Nobility of Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore, 1960), particularly pp. 47-65.

Two other fresh interpretative articles on the nobility are presented by Pierre Deyon, "A propos des rapports entre la noblesse française et la monarchie absolue pendant la première moitié du XVII^e siècle," *Revue historique*, CCXXXI (1964), 341-56, and his "Quelques remarques sur l'évolution du régime seigneurial en Picardie (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles)," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, VIII (1961), 271-80.

The Country Nobility.—This topic has been treated in rambling but still useful works by Pierre de Vassière, *Gentilshommes campagnards de l'ancienne France* (Paris, 1903; 2d ed., 1925), and Henri Froitier de La Messelière, *La Noblesse en Bretagne avant 1789* (Rennes, 1902).

The Nobility of the Robe.—The best general introduction to the social problems of the robe is Franklin Ford's important summary, *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), with a finely wrought "Essay on Bibliography." For a detailed study of the social class that made up the robe immediately after Louis XIV's death, see François Bluche, *Les Magistrats du Parlement de Paris au XVIII^e siècle (1715-1771)* (Paris, 1960) and his *L'origine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris . . . Dictionnaire généalogique* (Paris, 1956).

The Bourgeoisie.—Valuable for its methodological speculation (even though it deals largely with the eighteenth century) is Elinor Barber's *The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France* (Princeton, 1956). Pierre Goubert provides a close study of *Familles marchandes sous l'Ancien Régime: Les Danses et Les Motte de Beauvais*, (Paris, 1959). Another significant work is Jean Schlumberger et al., *La Bourgeoisie alsacienne: études d'histoire sociale* (Strasbourg, 1954). Still useful is Charles Normand, *La Bourgeoisie française au XVII^e siècle, la vie publique, les idées et les actions politiques, 1604-1661. Etude sociale* (Paris, 1908).

The Peasantry.—Two detailed *mises au point* concerning the relations between bourgeois and landholding classes are Marc Venard, *Bourgeois*

et paysans au XVII^e siècle. Recherche sur le rôle des bourgeois parisiens dans la vie agricole au sud de Paris au XVII^e siècle (Paris, 1957), and Pierre Goubert's "The French Peasantry of the Seventeenth Century: A Regional Example," *Past and Present*, No. 10 (1956), pp. 55-77, a careful analysis of peasant class structure and landholding in the Beauvais area. Regional studies of importance are: René Baehrel, *Une Croissance: la basse Provence rurale (fin du XVI^e siècle—1789). Essai d'économie historique et statistique* (Vol. I, Paris, 1961); Pierre de Saint-Jacob's *Les Paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord au dernier siècle de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1960); Michel Caillard et al., *A travers la Normandie des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, with an introduction by Pierre Chauu (Caen, 1963). This last work provides a vivid description of the uprisings of the *nu-pieds* in the Basse Normandie. Chauu provides an excellent introductory discussion of the use of "microhistory" in a social setting. Lastly a great work of synthesis as well as of profound research is E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans du Languedoc* (2 vols.; Paris, 1966).

Pauperism.—The very poorest segment of society, the paupers, is studied in P. Deyon, "A propos du paupérisme au milieu du XVII^e siècle," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, XXII (1967), 137-53.

How disastrous famines affected the population is reviewed in the works of Paul M. Bondonio, "La Misère sous Louis XIV. La disette de 1662," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XII (1924) 53-118; Arthur M. de Boislisle, *Le Grand Hiver et la disette de 1709* (Paris, 1903); and Shelby T. McCloy, *Government Assistance in Eighteenth-Century France* (Durham, N.C., 1946), Chapter 1.

V. Economic History

GENERAL WORKS ON EUROPE.—Two of the best introductions to the sprawling field of the economic history of the Ancien Régime are the brilliant summary by Fernand Braudel in *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme, XV^e—XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1967), and the indispensable, encyclopedic survey edited by E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, *The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (*The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, Vol. VI [Cambridge, 1967]). A particularly valuable chapter in the latter work is one entitled "Prices in Europe from 1450-1750," by Fernand Braudel and Frank Spooner; it points up the latest advances made by economic historians in their study of business cycles, currencies, money markets, and the like, and is indispensable for the uninitiated.

GENERAL WORKS ON FRANCE.—The best general introduction to the economic history of France in the Early Modern Era remains Henri Sée, with Robert Schnerb, *Histoire économique de la France* (2 vols.; Paris, 1939-43). Select articles of importance, showing the change in attitude of generations from Hauser to the scholars of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (which has been discussed under Social History) are: Henri Hauser, "Les Caractères généraux de l'histoire économique de la France du milieu de XVI^e siècle à la fin du XVIII^e," *Revue historique*, CLXXIII (1934), 312-28; Fernand Braudel, "L'Economie française au XVII^e siècle," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, VI (1951), 65-71; Pierre Vilar, "Pour une meilleure compréhension entre économistes et historiens: 'histoire quantitative'; ou, économétrie rétrospective," *Revue historique*, CCXXXIII (1965), 293-312.

MERCANTILISM.—Historiographically the problem of mercantilism, both as a pattern of thought and of action, dominates later works on the seventeenth century. The great study in the twentieth century on the so-called mercantile system is Elie F. Heckscher's *Mercantilism* (2 vols.; Stockholm, 1931; translated into English by M. Shapiro, London, 1935; extensively revised by E. F. Söderlund, London, 1955). Heckscher saw mercantilism not only as a quest for opulence but also for power in itself; moreover, he believed that mercantilism served as a unifying force within the emerging nation-states. Heckscher's work contains several significant chapters on France, notably Vol. I, Chap. II, pp. 78-109; Chap. V, pp. 137-212; Vol. II, *passim*. Heckscher's conclusions have been questioned and refined by, among others, Heckscher himself, in "Revisions in Economic History, V: Mercantilism," *Economic History Review*, VII (1936-37), 44-50; Herbert Heaton, "Heckscher on Mercantilism," *Journal of Political Economy*, XLV (1937), 371-93; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty As Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *World Politics*, I (1948), 4-11; and by D. C. Coleman, "Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism," *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, V (1957), 3-25.

COLBERT AND COLBERTISME.—The great mercantilist statesman of France was Colbert, whose brand of mercantilism has been dignified by the term Colbertisme. How greatly Colbert was influenced by mercantilist thought (or Cartesian thought, for that matter) and how much by pragmatic considerations of state policy?

As several historians have suggested, the best way of studying the genesis of Colbert's ideas is to probe the thought of his great predecessor, Cardinal Richelieu. Particularly germane is G. von Carlow's *Richelieu als*

merkantilischer Wirtschaftspolitiker und der Begriff des Staatsmerkantilismus (Jena, 1929), and Henri Hauser, *La Pensée et l'action économique du Cardinal de Richelieu* (Paris, 1944). Also important, especially for continuity of thought in the seventeenth century, is Charles W. Cole, *Mercantilist Doctrines before Colbert* (New York, 1931). Of significance, too, in Colbert's thinking was the overriding considerations of war; for the general problem see the brilliant work by Edmund Silberner, *La Guerre dans la pensée économique du XVI^e siècle au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1939). Valuable for the general pattern of Colbert's thought is Henri Sée's article "Que faut-il penser de l'œuvre économique de Colbert?", *Revue historique*, CLII (1926), 181-94.

Colbert's ideas can best be studied in their context. The only edition of Colbert's works pretending to completeness is Pierre Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-83); and for an insight into the thinking of one of Colbert's most trusted advisers, the reader can turn to Jacques Savary's *Le parfait négociant ou instruction pour ce qui le commerce . . .* (in two books; Paris, 1675). The latter should be read with Henri Hauser's comment on Savary in *Les débuts de capitalisme* (Paris, 1931).

Application of Colbertisme.—An excellent introduction to the practical side of Colbertian economics are Charles Wolsey Cole's three volumes, *Colbert and A Century of French Mercantilism* (2 vols.; New York, 1939) and *French Mercantilism, 1683-1700* (New York, 1943). Other valuable studies of Colbert's economic policies are found in Prosper Boissonnade, *Colbert, le triomphe de l'étatisme, la fondation de la suprématie industrielle de la France, la dictature du travail (1661-1683)* (Paris, 1932), and Boissonnade's early work, which serves as a preface to the above: *Le Socialisme d'état, l'industrie et les classes industrielles en France—1453-1661* (Paris, 1927).

Government Taxes, Direct and Indirect.—An overriding consideration for Colbert and his successors was the problem of taxation and banking and credit. Still the best work on the *taille* is Edmond Esmonin, *La Taille en Normandie au temps de Colbert, 1661-1683* (Paris, 1913). The *gabelle* and the *aides* have been exhaustively studied by Eugène-Pierre Beaulieu, *Les Gabelles sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1903), and Pierre Milne, *L'Impôt des aides sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1908). A more general account of taxation is included in Marcel Marion, *Les Impôts directs sous l'Ancien Régime principalement au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1910).

A useful and detailed study of Louis XIV's extraordinary tax, the *capitation*, is made by Stanislas Mitard, *La Crise financière en France à la*

fin du XVII^e siècle: la première capitation 1695-1698 (Rennes, 1934). The collection of taxes by the general farms is briefly reviewed (for Louis's reign) by George T. Matthews, *The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth-Century France* (New York, 1958), pp. 3-69.

For the contribution of the clergy to the general welfare, consult the excellent older study of A. Cans, *La Contribution du clergé de France à l'impôt pendant la seconde moitié du règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1910).

Credit and Banking.—The study of credit during Louis XIV's reign is considered in a classic work by Germain Martin and M. Besançon, *Histoire du crédit en France sous le règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1913). The Belgian historian, Paul Harsin, provides us with an indispensable study of *Crédit public et banque d'état en France du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1933). One of the greatest works to appear in the field of economic history is Herbert Lüthy's *Le Banque protestant en France de la Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution* (2 vols.; Paris, 1959-61), Vol. I, *Dispersion et Regroupement (1685-1730)*, which supplies in great detail a description of the Protestant banking cousinhood throughout western Europe. A rather impressionistic study of one of those Protestant bankers is made by Jacques Saint-Germain in his work: *Samuel Bernard: le banquier des rois* (Paris, 1960).

Commerce.—Colbert and his successors labored valiantly to rebuild France's commerce. Some of the pertinent problems of commercial history are discussed by Henri Sée in "Quelques aperçus sur le capitalisme commercial en France au XVII^e siècle," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XII (1924), 161-76. Colbert was always vitally interested in the expansion of French commerce. Histories of commerce include three classic works; E. Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de la France* (2 vols.; Paris, 1911-12); P. de Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales et maritimes de la France au XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (3 vols.; Paris, 1872-73); and Paul Masson, *Histoire de commerce français dans le Levant au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1896). This latter study has been in many ways superseded by the important work edited by Gaston Rambert, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille* (Vols. I-VII; Paris, 1949-66); see particularly Roger Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Le Levant*, Vol. V (1660-1789) (1957), and Gaston Rambert, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, Vol. VI (1660-1789; *Les Colonies*) (1959).

The commerce of two other great ports, Rouen and Le Havre, have recently been studied in a richly detailed work by Pierre Dardel, *Navires et marchands dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1963). Bordeaux trade is the subject of an article by H. Enjalbert, "Le

Commerce de Bordeaux et la vie économique dans le Bassin d'Aquitaine au XVII^e siècle," *Annales du midi*, LXII (1950), 21-35. Important, too, is Robert Boutruche, *Bordeaux de 1453 à 1715: Histoire de Bordeaux*, ed. Charles Higounet, Vol. IV (Bordeaux, 1966).

A classic study of internal commerce of France is found in A. P. Usher, *The History of the Grain Trade in France, 1400-1710* (Cambridge, Mass., 1913). Specialized articles of interest include: Margaret Priestley, "Anglo-French Trade and the 'Unfavorable Balance' controversy, 1660-1685," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., IV, 37-52, and R. B. Grassby, "Social Status and Commercial Enterprise under Louis XIV," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., XIII (1960), 19-38, which underlines the growth under Louis XIV's aegis of the *noblesse commerçante*. The importance of the local chambers of commerce and their representation on the Council of Trade (created in June 29, 1700) is treated by Warren Scoville in "The French Economy in 1700-1701: An Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade," *Journal of Economic History*, XXII (1962), 231-52. And finally, the impact of war on commerce: Gaston Zeller, "Le Commerce international en temps de guerre sous l'Ancien Régime," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, IV (1957), 112-120.

For external tariff barriers, of importance is the article by Simon Elzinga, "Le Tarif de Colbert de 1664 et celui de 1667 et leur signification," *Economisch-historisch Jaarboek*, XV (1929), 221-73.

Trading companies are ably treated by P. Boissonnade and P. Charliat, *Colbert et la compagnie de commerce du nord, 1661-1689* (Paris, 1930), and the very solidly documented and detailed study, Henry Weber, *La Compagnie française des Indes, 1604-1875* (Paris, 1904). Far slighter and less reliable is J. Chailley-Bert, *Les Compagnies de colonisation sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1898). For Africa, there is P. Chemin-Dupontès, *Les Compagnies de colonisation de l'Afrique occidentale sous Colbert* (Paris, 1903). Of Gaston Martin's numerous works on Nantes, one is particularly useful here: *Nantes et la compagnie des Indes orientales, 1664-1679* (Paris, n.d.).

Agriculture.—One survey of note has appeared in recent years on agriculture per se: Soreau, *L'Agriculture du XVII^e à la fin du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1952) (other studies on the peasant are listed under Social History).

Industry.—An adequate bibliographical guide is provided by Germain Martin, *Bibliographie critique de l'histoire de l'industrie en France avant 1789* (Paris, n.d.). Germain Martin's work on *La grande industrie sous le règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1898) remains standard. An excellent com-

parative work, rich in suggestions for further study, is John U. Nef, *Industry and Government in France and England 1540-1640* (Philadelphia, 1940). Another comparative study of the highest order is J. Koulischer, "La grande industrie aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles: France, Allemagne, Russie," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, III (1931), 11-46. For a review of pre-Colbertian industry, see Gaston Zeller, "L'Industrie en France avant Colbert," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XXVIII (1950), 3-20.

More recently, several important studies have appeared on industry: P. Léon, *La Naissance de la grande industrie en Dauphiné (fin du XVII^e siècle-1869)* (2 vols.; Paris, 1953); Bertrand Gille, *Les Origines de la grande industrie métallurgique en France* (Paris, 1947); and the valuable work by the American economic historian, Warren Scoville, *Capitalism and French Glassmaking (1640-1789)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), and P. Sagnac, "L'Industrie et le commerce de la draperie en France à la fin du XVII^e siècle et au commencement du XVIII^e," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, IX (1907-8).

The enforcement of the Colbertian reforms is another interesting aspect of industrial history: F. Bacquière, *Les Inspecteurs des manufactures sous l'Ancien Régime, 1669-1792* (Paris, 1927).

CRISES.—The growth of industry and commerce led inevitably to the intensification of economic crises. The "general crisis" in the economy of France and Europe (directly related to Trevor-Roper thesis, cited under the "Fronde" in General Histories) is outlined rather more forcefully than convincingly by E. J. Hobsbawm in "The General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century," *Past and Present*, No. 5-6 (1954), pp. 33-74. Jean Meuvret has studied the periodic crises of food and grain in his "Les Crises de subsistance et la démographie de la France d'Ancien Régime," *Population* (Oct.-Dec., 1946), pp. 643-50. For an older interpretation of crises, dealing with the end of the reign, see Adolphe Vuitry, *Le Désordre des finances et excès de spéculation à la fin du règne de Louis XIV et au commencement du règne de Louis XV* (Paris, 1883); and the revisions made on this theme by Roland Mousnier, "L'Evolution des finances publiques en France et en Angleterre pendant les guerres de la Ligue d'Augsbourg et de la Succession d'Espagne," *Revue historique*, CCV (1951) 1-23. An important methodological article is David S. Landes, "The Statistical Study of French Crises," *Journal of Economic History*, X (1950), 195-211.

We cannot leave the topic of "crises" without mentioning the important work of F. C. Spooner in *L'Economie mondiale et les frappes monétaires en France (1493-1680)* (Paris, 1956), which treats not only the question

of coinage but the effect that increased flow of gold and silver had on French economy. Massive documentation and numerous illustrative charts distinguish this work.

Prices and the Circulation of Money.—Closely related to economic crises is the circulation of money and the rise and fall of prices. The study of prices must begin with the great pioneering book of F. Simiand, *Recherches . . . sur le mouvement général des prix du XVI^e siècle au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1932); a disciple of Simiand, Ernest Labrousse followed within the year with a yet more statistically refined work, *Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIII^e siècle* (2 vols., Paris, 1933). Although Labrousse draws many of his statistics from late eighteenth-century sources, his conclusions are well suited to describe seventeenth-century conditions. An important survey, contemporary with that of Simiand and Labrousse is Henri Hauser, *Recherches et documents sur l'histoire de prix en France de 1500 à 1800* (Paris, 1936). Of subsequent works, some of the more important have been those of Jean Meuvret, and we list but a few: "Les Mouvements des prix de 1661-1715 et leurs répercussions," *Bulletin de la Société de Statistique de Paris* (1944), 1-9; "Circulation monétaire et utilisation économique de la monnaie dans la France du XVI^e et du XVII^e siècles," *Etudes d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* I (1947), 15-28; (with Michaline Baulant), *Prix des céréales, extraits de la Mercuriale de Paris (1520-1698)* (2 vols.; Paris, 1960); also the significant work by Georges Frêche, *Histoire des prix des céréales à Toulouse (1650-1715)* (Paris, 1964).

Critics of the Regime. Economic Reformers.—A provocative study of this problem is Lionel Rothkrug's *Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton, N. J., 1965), which includes interesting observations on Christian agrarianism, anti-mercantilist theory, militant secularism, with its "elaboration of anti-Christian themes." There is an excellent bibliography.

For the traditional economic reformers, the literature indicates at least two persons as important touchstones: The Marquis de Vauban (who is listed under "Military") and Pierre de Pesant de Boisguilbert.

The best introduction to Vauban is his *Projet d'une dixme royale*, ed. E. Coornaert (Paris, 1933); also see George Michel, *Vauban économiste* (Paris, 1899), and the more recent and detailed article by Walter Brauer, "Quelques remarques sur l'œuvre économique de Vauban," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XXIX (1951), 8-25.

Boisguilbert's great work *Le Detail de la France* is reprinted in E. Daire (ed.), *Economistes-financiers au XVIII^e* (2 vols.; Paris, 1943), Vol. I. Other works on Boisguilbert are Hazel Van Dyke Roberts, *Boisguilbert:*

Economist of the Reign of Louis XIV (New York, 1935); and A. Talbot, *Les Théories de Boisguilbert et leur place dans l'histoire des doctrines économiques* (Paris, 1903).

VI. The Army

GUIDES.—Three guides to the archives of the Département de la Guerre readily available are: Lt.-Col. de Buttet, "Les Méthodes de travail du Dépôt de la Guerre," *Revue historique*, CCXXVI (1961), 421-26; Claude Sturgill, "Bibliothèque du ministère des Armées," *French Historical Studies*, IV (1965), 108-10; and E. Rousset's more extensive article, "Les Archives de département de la Guerre," *Revue de l'intendance militaire*, No. 18 (1950), pp. 69-91.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES.—The best bibliography to the period is included in André Corvisier, *L'Armée française de la fin du XVII^e siècle au ministère de Choiseul* (2 vols.; Paris, 1964), particularly, I, 3-48. Also of value is Emile Bourgeois and Louis André (eds.), *Les Sources de l'histoire de France au XVII^e siècle* (8 vols.; Paris, 1913-35), VII, 309 ff.

GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE ARMY AND OF MILITARY LIFE.—Older but still useful as an impressionistic guide to the period is Albert Babeau, *La Vie militaire sous l'Ancien Régime* (3 vols.; Paris, 1889-90). The Hanotaux series offers an interesting overview: F. Reboul and J. Colin, *Histoire militaire et navale . . . des croisades à la Révolution* (*Histoire de la nation française*, ed. Gabriel Hanotaux, Vol. VII [Paris, 1925-7]). A more detailed general account is contained in L. Jablonski, *Des origines à Fontenoy* (*L'Armée française à travers les âges*, Vol. I [5 vols.; Paris, 1890-94]). Conditions in the army during the Ancien Régime are described by Emile Simond, *Histoire militaire de la France, 1643 à 1871* (2 vols.; Paris, 1888-95) and by Léon Mention, *L'Armée de l'Ancien Régime de Louis XIV à la Révolution* (Paris, 1900).

MILITARY REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—The changes in military strategy and tactics, which reached a climax in the revolutions of mid-seventeenth century, are treated by Michael Roberts in his thoughtful essay (given as an inaugural lecture) *The Military Revolution, 1540-1640* (Belfast, 1956). This essay and his Introduction to his important volumes on *Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden, 1611-1632* (2 vols.; London and New York, 1953-58) will serve the reader as a general introduction to the problem of the army in mid-century. Also useful for a general discussion of the seventeenth century are G. N. Clark, *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Eng.,

1958); and G. N. Clark, "The Social Foundations of States," in F. L. Carsten (ed.), *The Ascendancy of France 1648-88* (*The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. V [Cambridge, Eng., 1961]), pp. 176-97.

THE ARMIES OF LOUIS XIV.—The historian concerned with the early years of the military history of Louis XIV's reign must still rely on the massive works of Louis André and Camille Rousset. Rousset was the first historian to explore systematically the records of the *Dépôt de la Guerre*. His work, though now modified by the more recent interpretations of Louis André, is a mine of information; see Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire* (4 vols.; Paris, 1862-63). Rousset placed too great an emphasis on the role of François-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, in the creation of the French army. Louis André, in two long works, redresses the balance by showing us the importance of Louvois's father, Michel Le Tellier, as minister of war. André's works serve as the best guide to the early years of the reign: *Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique* (Paris, 1906) and *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois* (2d ed.; Paris, 1943).

Problems of recruitment during the last years of Louis XIV's reign are treated by Georges Girard, *Le Service militaire en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV: racolage et milice (1701-1715)* (Paris, 1921); M. Sautai, *Les Milices provinciales sous Louvois et Barbezieux 1688-97* (Lille, 1909) (though both are now partly superseded by Corvisier's work listed below); and by E. G. Léonard, in the opening chapters of his *L'Armée et ses problèmes au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1958), particularly pp. 1-98. By far the most significant study of the last years of Louis XIV's reign and the transition to the eighteenth century is the meticulously researched and abundantly documented thesis of André Corvisier, *L'Armée française de la fin du XVII^e siècle au ministère de Choiseul* (2 vols.; Paris, 1964). Written in the shadow of the "new wave" of historiography in France, Corvisier stresses, like his mentors, the bureaucratic and social background to war. The defense of the frontiers marks an important chapter in the history of the reign; the most insightful introduction to the topic is Gaston Zeller's *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du nord et de l'est au XVII^e siècle* (Nancy, 1928). Also of interest for letters that it publishes is H. Chotard, *Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban et les fortifications du Nord de la France* (Paris, 1889).

Perhaps one of the best ways to study the military history of the reign is to look at the memoir material, which is so rich that we can mention but a few here. One of the most important collections is that made by F. H. Vault and J. J. G. Pelet in *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV, extraits de la cour et des généraux* (11 vols.; Paris, 1835-62). Individual memoirs and correspondence of importance

are: *Mémoires et correspondance du Maréchal de Catinat, mis en ordre et publiés d'après les manuscrits autographes . . .*, ed. B. Le Rouyer de Saint-Gervais (3 vols.; Paris, 1819); Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, *Mémoires inédits de Maréchal Vauban*, ed. M. Augoyat (Paris, 1841); Claude L. H. Villars, *Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars*, ed. Charles J. M. Vogüé (6 vols.; Paris, 1884-1904); and Charles J. M. Vogüé (ed.), *Villars, d'après sa correspondance et des documents inédits* (2 vols.; Paris, 1888).

Special Services.—The services (infantry, engineers, guard corps, and health) have all been studied monographically in the last few years: J. Margerand, *Armement et équipement de l'infanterie française du XVI^e au XX^e siècles* (Paris, 1945); A. Corvisier, "Les Gardes du corps de Louis XIV," *XVII^e siècle*, No. 45 (1959), pp. 265-91; Colonel Charles-Albert Lecomte, *Les Ingénieurs militaires en France pendant le règne de Louis XIV* (Lyon, 1954).

Marshals and Generals.—Collective and individual studies of the great generals and marshals of the reign make up a vast literature. A barely adequate guide to the problem is L. Dussieux's *Les grands généraux de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1888). A more recent guide to the social origins of the great military figures is André Corvisier, *Les Généraux de Louis XIV et leur origine sociale* (Amiens, 1959). Individual studies are far more rewarding. Standard in the field are Camille-Georges Picavet's *Les dernières années de Turenne (1660-1675)* (Paris, 1914); P. de Ségur, *La jeunesse du Maréchal de Luxembourg, 1628-1668* (3d ed., Paris, 1904); P. de Ségur, *Le Maréchal de Luxembourg et le prince d'Orange, 1668-1678* (2d ed.; Paris, 1902); P. de Ségur, *Le Tapissier de Notre Dame, les dernières années du Maréchal de Luxembourg, 1678-1695* (Paris, 1903); Emmanuel de Broglie's *Catinat, l'homme et la vie, 1637-1712* (Paris, 1902) (barely adequate).

Also of interest are Maxime Weygand's *Turenne: Marshal of France*, trans. George B. Ives (Boston and New York, 1930); Henri Malo, *Le Grand Condé* (Paris, 1937); and Claude Sturgill's *Marshal Villars and the War of the Spanish Succession* (Lexington, Ky., 1965), though the latter work should not be read without reference to a review by Andrew Lossky in the *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIX (1967), 175-78. Excessively chatty but one of the only studies of the subject is Charles Petrie's *The Marshal Duke of Berwick* (London, 1953).

I have saved Marshal Vauban until last because the vast literature published about him could easily make up a special section. A first-rate introduction to his work and to his place in Louis XIV's reign may be found in Henry Guerlac's "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward Mead Earle, with Gordon

Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N. J., 1944), pp. 26-48, with Bibliography. Guerlac discusses at some length Vauban's famous "three systems" and the Lazard challenge to his thesis (see below). For an understanding of his tactics read the marshal himself: Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, *Traité de l'attaque et de la défense des places* (2 vols.; The Hague, 1737-42); and George A. Rothrock's edition and translation of Vauban's *A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968), with a perceptive "Bibliographical Essay," pp. 176-84.

More general works of note are P. Lazard's *Vauban, 1633-1707* (Paris, 1934), a thorough and well-documented study (Lazard questions the use of the term "three systems" of fortifications as seen in Vauban's works); and Sir Reginald Blomfield's *Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban 1633-1707* (London, 1938) (well illustrated by the author's own sketches of Vauban's fortifications). Published posthumously is Alfred Rébelliau's discursive but insightful work, *Vauban* (Paris, 1962). Still the most extensive work is Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun, *Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits, ses oisivetés* . . . (2 vols.; Paris and Grenoble, 1910).

VII. The Marine

A concise, informative introduction to the subject is provided by Joannès Tramond in his *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France* (Paris, 1927). Still the classic work in the field, however, is Charles de La Roncière's *Histoire de la marine française* (6 vols.; Paris, 1899-1932). La Roncière is partial to Colbert and, conversely, hostile to the Phélypeaux clan, two of whose members become ministers of the marine after 1690. To La Roncière and other interpreters of his school the years 1690-92 mark a watershed in the history of the marine, with the days of French naval glory departing after the defeat of La Hougue and the espousal at the same time of the *guerre de course*.

Other general works of note are G. Lacour-Gayet's survey of *La Marine militaire de la France sous les règnes de Louis XIII et Louis XIV* (Paris, 1911); and E. Sue, *Histoire de la marine française au dix-septième siècle, 1653-1712* (5 vols.; Paris, 1835-37). M. Mollat, *Les Sources de l'histoire maritime du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1962).

Monographic and specialized studies include Eugene L. Asher, *The Resistance to the Maritime Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), an important work that stresses "the tenacity and the success with which royal reforms [in this instance, naval] were resisted" in France; it contributes excellent bibliographical references. A comprehensive guide to the problems of

recruitment, armament, naval depots, and so on, is found in René Mémain's *La Marine de guerre sous Louis XIV. Le matériel: Rochefort, arsenal modèle de Colbert* (Paris, 1937), and his complementary work, *Matelots et soldats des vaisseaux du roi: levées d'hommes du département de Rochefort (1661-1690)* (Paris, 1937). Paul W. Bamford, in *Forests and French Sea Power, 1660-1789* (Toronto, 1956) offers a detailed analysis of problems of naval supply and administration.

The *guerre de course* and privateering are treated in detail by Henri Malo in *Les Corsaires dunkerquois et Jean-Bart 1662-1702* (2 vols.; 1913-14); *Les Corsaires, mémoires et documents inédits* (Paris, 1908); and his *La Grande Guerre des corsaires: Dunkerque (1702-1715)* (Paris, 1925). A recent work of importance on the subject is A. de Wismes, *Jean Bart et la guerre de course* (Paris, 1965). John Bromley has given us an admirable survey of the *guerre de course* in his chapter on "The French Privateering War, 1702-1713," in *Historical Essays 1600-1750 presented to David Ogg*, ed. H. E. Bell and R. L. Ollard (London, 1963), pp. 203-31. Also of importance is Léon Vignols, *Un Produit social de la guerre: flibuste et boucan (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles)* (1928).

Of special interest in the problem linked to the department of the marine is the "crisis of conscience and authority" that occurred in the French naval bureaucracy during the War of the Spanish Succession. This *crise* is carefully studied by Marcel Giraud in two brilliant articles: "Crise de conscience et d'autorité à la fin du règne de Louis XIV," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, VII (1952), 172-90, 293-302; and his "Tendance humanitaires à la fin du règne de Louis XIV," *Revue historique*, CCIX (1953), 217-37.

On the individual naval commanders a few studies are particularly recommended: A. Jal, *Abraham Duquesne et la marine de son temps* (2 vols.; Paris, 1873), whose biography Eugene Asher calls "the finest work . . . of [a] great naval historian." A detailed study of Duquesne's Italian expedition can be found in E. Laloy, *La Révolte de Messine, l'expédition de Sicile et la politique française en Italie, 1674-78* (3 vols.; Paris, 1929). Noteworthy are Emmanuel de Broglie's *Un grand marin Tourville, 1642-1701* (Paris, 1908), and Le Nepvou de Carfort, *Histoire de du Guay Trouin, le Corsaire* (Paris, 1922). On Jean Bart refer to the works of Henri Malo mentioned above.

VIII. The French Colonies

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—Alfred Martineau, Paul Roussier, and Joannès Tramond (eds.), *Bibliographie d'histoire coloniale (1900-1930)* (Paris,

1932), is an indispensable guide of 700 pages, which can be supplemented by bibliographical articles scattered throughout the *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (published 1913-31); *Revue d'histoire des colonies* (published 1932-58); and *Revue française d'histoire d'Outre-Mer* (1958—). Also containing excellent bibliographical information is Frédéric Mauro, *L'Expansion européenne (1600-1870)* (Paris, 1964), pp. 5-85.

SURVEYS.—Perhaps the best general survey is Frédéric Mauro's volume in the "Nouvelle Clio" series mentioned above. It has a valuable chapter on "Débats et combats: directions de recherche," pp. 265 ff. Mauro is very much a part of the "new wave" of French historians, and his interpretations smack strongly of the heady wine of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. A serviceable, if less exciting, overview is provided by J. Saintoyant, *La Colonisation française sous l'Ancien Régime* (2 vols.; Paris, 1929), and by Herbert I. Priestley, *France Overseas through the Old Regime* (New York, 1939). Still useful is the series edited under the direction of Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau, *Histoire des colonies françaises et de l'expansion de la France dans le monde* (6 vols.; Paris, 1929-34).

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE COLONIAL PROBLEM.—An excellent introduction to the general problems of colonialism is Robert Boutruche, "Existe-t-il une continuité dans la politique coloniale de la France?", *Revue historique*, CLXXII (1933). Among the first explorations into the political background of colonialism was Louis Pauliat, *La Politique coloniale sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1887), followed in this century by a valuable sketch that focused on ministerial responsibility: Albert Duchêne, *La Politique coloniale de la France, le ministère des colonies depuis Richelieu* (Paris, 1928). An important subject rather poorly treated is Yvonne Bezard's *Fonctionnaires maritimes et coloniaux sous Louis XIV, les Bégon* (Paris, 1932). A subject of considerable importance is given an introduction by L.-B. May, "Nicholas Fouquet et la politique coloniale de Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire coloniale*, XXXIII (1940-46), 70-83.

COLBERT AND THE COLONIES.—An early work still worth consulting is E. Benoit du Rey, *Recherches sur la politique de Colbert* (Paris, 1902). Of interest, too, are Stewart L. Mims's *Colbert's West India Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1912) and Paul M. Boindois, "Colbert et la question du sucre, la rivalité franco-hollandaise," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XI (1923), 12-59.

THE QUESTION OF SLAVERY.—A good introduction to the problem is Maurice Lengelle, *L'Esclavage* (Paris, 1962), and his article with the same title in *Cahiers économiques*, March, 1954, pp. 12-16. Basic is Gaston-

Martin's *Esclavage et colonisation. Histoire de l'esclavage dans les colonies françaises* (Paris, 1948). An important source collection can be found in *L'Esclavage aux Antilles françaises d'après les documents inédits des Archives coloniales* (Paris, 1897); also, Léon Vignols, "Une Question mal posée: le travail manuel des blancs et des esclaves aux Antilles (XVII^e-XVIII^e siècles)," *Revue historique*, CLXXV (1935), 308-15.

The Asiento.—The basic works are G. Scelle, *La Traite négrière aux Indes de Castille. Contrats et traites d'Asiento* (2 vols.; Paris, 1906); L. Vignols, "L'Asiento français (1701-1713) et anglais (1713-1751) et le commerce franco-espagnol vers 1700 à 1730," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XVII (1929), 403-36.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE UNDER LOUIS XIV.—French colonial interest in the seventeenth century extended to three major areas: Africa, Asia (India), and North America.

Africa.—Seventeenth-century French efforts to establish a permanent colony on Madagascar are discussed in R. Decary, "Les Etudes historiques sur Madagascar," *Revue d'histoire coloniale*, XXXIV (1947), 9-21; L. Pauliat, *Madagascar sous Louis XIV: Louis XIV et la compagnie des Indes orientales de 1664* (Paris, 1886); and J. Sottas, *Histoire de la compagnie royale des Indes orientales, 1664-1719* (Paris, 1905). The best summary account of Madagascar's history is H. Deschamps, *Histoire de Madagascar* (Paris, 1960). For Senegal see the excellent study of A. Delcourt, *La France et les établissements français au Sénégal entre 1713 et 1763 . . .* (Dakar, 1952). North African trade is treated by Paul Masson in *Histoire des Etablissements et du commerce français dans l'Afrique barbaresque 1560-1793* (Paris, 1903).

Asia.—A detailed account, meticulously documented, is E. W. Dahlgren's *Les Relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'Océan pacifique (commencement du XVIII^e siècle)* (Paris, 1909); S. P. Sen, *The French in India. First Establishment . . .* (Calcutta, 1947).

The Americas.—There is no adequate general account of the Americas under Louis XIV, or, for that matter, under the Ancien Régime. Passable is the survey of Gabriel-Louis Jaray, *L'Empire français d'Amérique, 1534-1803* (Paris, 1938). Charles-André Julien's *Les Français en Amérique 1713-1784* ("Les Cours de Sorbonne" [2 fasc.; Paris, 1955]) contains excellent bibliographies for the whole period of the Ancien Régime; also, Ch. de La Roncière, Joannès Tramond, and Emile Lauvrièr, *L'Amérique (Histoire des colonies françaises et l'expansion de la France dans le monde, Vol. I; published under the direction of G. Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau [Paris, 1929])*.

West Indies.—An adequate survey is Louis-Philippe May, *La France, puissance des Antilles* (Paris, 1931). Still basic narratives are S. L. Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1912), and Nellis Crouse, *The French Struggle for the West Indies, 1665-1713* (New York, 1943). Standard works in their fields are Cabuzel-A. Banbuck, *Histoire politique, économique et sociale de la Martinique sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1935); Louis-Philippe May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique (1635-1763)* (Paris, 1930); Maurice Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1928); and Pierre de Vassière, *Saint-Domingue, la société et la vie créole sous l'Ancien Régime, 1629-1789* (Paris, 1909). Among the many works of Gabriel Debien, one of the best is his *Le Peuplement des Antilles françaises au XVII^e siècle. Les engagés partis de La Rochelle (1683-1715)* (Cairo, 1942). An interesting article is L. Vignols, "Early French Colonial Policy, Land Appropriation in Haiti in the 17 and 18 Centuries," *Journal of Economic History*, II (1929), 101-45. Liliane Chauleau provides a brilliant sketch of Creole social life and class structure in *La Société à la Martinique au XVII^e siècle* (Caen, 1966).

Canada.—For a historical assessment see John C. Rule, "The Old Regime in America: A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., XIX (1962), 575-600. A brief documentary survey, ably edited by Cameron Nish: *The French Regime* ("Canadian Historical Documents Series," Vol. I [Scarborough, Ontario, 1965]).

Two good surveys of Canadian history are: Gustave Lanctot, *From the Royal Regime to the Treaty of Utrecht (A History of Canada, Vol. II* [Cambridge, Mass., 1964]); and W. J. Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV, 1663-1701* (Toronto, 1964). The latter is especially strong in institutional history and is written with perception and elegance. Highly recommended, too, is W. J. Eccles' very fine biography, *Frontenac: The Courtier Governor* (Toronto, 1959). Standard is F. H. Hammang, *The Marquis de Vaudreuil* (Bruges, 1938). Of the biographies of Iberville two can be recommended: Guy Frégault, *Iberville le conquérant* (Montreal, 1944), and Nellis Crouse, *Lemoyne Iberville, Soldier of New France* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1954). Also of interest are Thomas Chapais, *Jean Talon, intendant de la Nouvelle France (1665-1672)* (Quebec, 1904), and Lilianne and Guy Frégault (eds.), *Frontenac: Textes choisis et annotés* (Montreal and Paris, 1956).

For administrative history see Gustave Lanctot, *L'Administration de la Nouvelle France* (Paris, 1929), a succinct account; and Raymond Cahall's older but balanced *The Sovereign Council of New France* (New York, 1915).

An admirable introduction to church history is J. H. Kennedy, *Jesuit and Savage in New France* (New Haven, Conn., 1950).

For economic and social history see particularly two recent works: Jacques Henripin, *La Population canadienne au début du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1954); and Jean Hamelin's admirable short study, *Economie et société en Nouvelle-France* (Montreal, 1955). Still useful is H. A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy* (Toronto, 1940), and his *The Fur Trade in Canada* (rev. ed.; New Haven, Conn., 1956).

Louisiana.—The monumental work in this field is Marcel Giraud, *Le Règne de Louis XIV (Histoire de la Louisiane, Vol. I [3 vols.; Paris, 1953-65])*. This work is meticulously documented from French sources, but does not probe Spanish archival materials. Charles E. O'Neill's work on *Church and State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732* (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1966), is highly recommended, and contains an excellent bibliography.

IX. Religion

GENERAL WORKS AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND.—A comprehensive review of religion and religious institutions in the Early Modern Era, with extensive bibliographies, is contained in Edmond Préclin and Eugène Jarry, *Les Luites politiques et doctrinales aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1955), Vol. XIX of *Histoire de l'Eglise*, begun under the direction of A. Fliche and V. Martin in 1935. Jean Calvet's *La Littérature religieuse de Saint François de Sales à Fénelon* (Paris, 1938), is a well-balanced introduction to the period by one of France's most distinguished scholars of religious history.

A monumental work and an indispensable guide to the study of the Catholic renaissance in France in the seventeenth century is Henri Bremond, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu'à nos jours* (12 vols.; Paris, 1924-33). Two important works for understanding the religious climate of opinion before 1685 are Henri Busson's *La Pensée religieuse française de Charron à Pascal* (Paris, 1933) and *La Religion des classiques (1660-1685)* (Paris, 1948). A notable achievement of scholarship is Fortunat Joseph Strowski's *Saint François de Sales; introduction à l'histoire du sentiment religieux en France au dix-septième siècle* (new ed.; Paris, 1928). Several recent articles of importance both as bibliographical guides and historiographical assessments are Pierre Chaunu's "Le XVII^e siècle religieux. Réflexions préables," *Annales E.—S.—C.*, XXII (1967), 179-302. Chaunu com-

ments on the work of E.-G. Léonard in an article entitled "Les Crises au XVII^e siècle de l'Europe réformée," *Revue historique*, CCXXXIII (1965), 23-60.

FRANCE AND THE PAPACY.—An old but thorough account of Franco-papal relations may be found in Charles Gérin's *Louis XIV et le Saint-Siège* (2 vols.; Paris, 1894). Gérin should be read along with the fundamental work by Eugène Michaud on *Louis XIV et Innocent XI, d'après les correspondances diplomatiques inédits du ministère des affaires étrangères de France* (4 vols.; Paris, 1882-83). Two modern works on Louis XIV's relations with the indomitable Pope Innocent XI are basic to understanding: Jean Orcibal's *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI* (Paris, 1949) and Louis O'Brien's often overlooked *Innocent XI and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes* (Berkeley, 1930), which contains an extensive bibliography. Four important specialized works that treat of Louis XIV's relations with the papacy in the 1650's and 60's are: François Regis de Chantelauze, *Le Cardinal de Retz et ses missions diplomatiques à Rome* (Paris, 1879); Charles de Moüy, *Louis XIV et le Saint-Siège, l'ambassade du duc de Créqui (1662-1665)* (2 vols.; Paris, 1893); A. Bozon, *Le Cardinal de Retz à Rome* (Paris, 1878); and Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV's View of the Papacy (1661-1667)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966).

GALLICANISM.—Victor Martin's two works, *Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique, essai historique sur l'introduction en France des décrets du concile de Trente* (Paris, 1919) and *Le Gallicanisme politique et le clergé de France* (Paris, 1929), serve as the best introductions to the question. An unusually able account is also provided in Aimé-Georges Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet* (Paris, 1953), which contains an excellent bibliography. Martimort's work should be read in conjunction with a more conventional interpretation by A. Gazier, *Bossuet et Louis XIV, 1662-1704. Etude historique sur le caractère de Bossuet . . .* (Paris, 1914). An invaluable documentary collection concerning the Gallican problem is contained in A. Duranthon, *Collection des procès verbaux des Assemblées du Clergé de France depuis 1560 jusqu'à présent* (5 vols.; Paris, 1953-60). The background to the Gallican articles of 1682 is studied by Charles Gérin, *Recherches historiques sur l'Assemblée du clergé de France de 1682* (2d ed.; Paris, 1870); and more recently, in the notable work of Pierre Blet, *Le clergé de France et la monarchie, étude sur les Assemblées générales du clergé de 1615 à 1666* (2 vols.; Rome, 1959). Jean Meuvret treats the repercussions of the papal-Gallican quarrel in his important article "Les Aspects politiques de la liquidation du conflit gallican, (juillet 1691-sep. 1693)," *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XXXIII (1947), 257-70. An interesting study of the extensions of Galli-

canism to the colonies may be found in Canon Lionel Groulx's article, "Le Gallicanisme au Canada sous Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, No. 1 (June, 1947) pp. 54-91.

JANSENISM.—One of the most divisive and colorful chapters in the religious history of Louis XIV's reign concerns the question of Jansenism. A brilliant, sympathetic interpretation of Jansenism is rendered by the great French nineteenth-century critic C.-A. Sainte-Beuve in *Port-Royal* (7 vols.; Paris, 1867-1913), containing an alphabetical and analytical table of names and subject matter compiled by Anatole de Montaigon. A far more concise but no less insightful and sympathetic account is Ronald A. Knox's *Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion with Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 176-230. Nigel Abercrombie in *The Origins of Jansenism* (Oxford, 1936) provides us with a profoundly penetrating analysis of the early years of the Jansenists. Augustin Gazier's *Histoire générale du mouvement janséniste depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours . . .* (2 vols.; Paris, 1922), is the standard survey of the Jansenist movement (a movement that he denies existed in an organized sense). Gazier's conclusions should be read along with the corrections and additions offered by Cognet and Orcibal; a brief but brilliant summary of Cognet's views are contained in his *Le Jansénisme* (Paris, 1961). Jean Orcibal is the master of those who have interpreted the so-called Jansenist movement; a few of his works on this topic are: *Saint-Cyran et le Jansénisme* (Paris, 1961); *Port-Royal entre le miracle et l'obéissance: Flavie Passart et Angélique de Saint Jean Arnauld d'Andilly* (Paris, 1957); *La Spiritualité de Saint-Cyran, avec ses écrits de piété inédits* (Paris, 1962). Another excellent introduction to the understanding of the Jansenist position are two studies by Jean Laporte: "Le Jansénisme" in *Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie française au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1951), pp. 88-105, and his *La Doctrine de Port-Royal* (4 vols.; Paris, 1923-52). A study in depth of provincial Jansenism is the large work by René Taveneaux, *Le Jansénisme en Lorraine* (Paris, 1960). Pierre Chaunu has a cogent comment on Taveneaux's work in an article titled "Jansénisme et frontière de catholicité . . .," *Revue historique*, CCXXVIII (1962). Jacques-François Thomas, in a carefully documented monograph, has studied the last chapter of Jansenism in Louis XIV's reign: *La Querelle de l'Unigenitus* (Paris, 1950).

The Defender of Jansenism.—Blaise Pascal, at once the defender and interpreter of the Jansenist movement, has excited the interest of many biographers. Among the best of these biographies published since World War II are: Léon Brunschvieg, *Blaise Pascal* (Paris, 1953); Ernest Mortimer, *Blaise Pascal: The Life and Work of a Realist* (London, 1959);

Jeanne Russier, *La Foi selon Pascal* (2 vols.; Paris, 1965); Jean Mesnard, *Pascal et les Roannez* (Paris, 1965). Older but discriminating and instructive is Fortunat Strowski, *Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au XVII^e siècle. Pascal et son temps* (3 vols.; Paris, 1907-8). An insightful sociological study of Jansenism is Lucien Goldman, *Le Dieu caché* (Paris, 1955).

THE PROTESTANTS.—Four important surveys of French Protestantism are: Emile-G. Léonard, *Le Protestant français* (Paris, 1955); John Viénot, *Histoire de la Réforme française, de l'Edit de Nantes à sa révocation (1598-1685)* (Paris, 1934); Burdette Poland, *French Protestantism and the French Revolution. A Study in Church and State, Thought and Religion, 1685-1815* (Princeton, N. J., 1957); Samuel Mours, *Le Protestantisme en France au XVII^e siècle, 1598-1685* (Paris, 1967). A more specialized work is Victor-Louis Bourrilly *Les Protestants français de Provence aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Gap, 1956). A useful bibliographical review is found in Emile-G. Léonard, "Le Protestantisme français au XVII^e siècle," *Revue historique*, CC (1948), 153-79. With his usual careful and sensitive appraisals Jean Orcibal introduces the reader to the topic of *Louis XIV et les protestants* (Paris, 1951). A far more detailed but no less important modern work on Protestantism (with special reference to economics) is Warren Scoville, *The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720* (Berkeley, 1960). Scoville corrects our view of the extent of the emigration of the Huguenots; the older view of the consequences of the revocation (more obviously sympathetic to the Huguenots) are held by: Charles Weiss, *Histoire des réfugiés protestants de France depuis la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes jusqu'à nos jours* (2 vols.; Paris, 1853); Henry Baird, *The Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes* (2 vols.; New York, 1895); Frank Puaux and A. Sabatier, *Etudes sur la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes* (Paris, 1886). A more balanced view is held by Joseph Dedieu, *Le Rôle politique des protestants français (1685-1715)* (Paris, 1920) (particularly important for his remarks on Jurieu, the Camisards, and the Treaty of Ryswick). Interesting background material to the revocation is contained in Charles Benoist's *Condition juridique des protestants sous le régime de l'Edit de Nantes et après sa révocation* (Paris, 1900). An older, more Protestant view of the revocation is represented by F. Puaux, "La Responsabilité de la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes," *Revue historique*, XXIX (1885), 241-79. Three of the persons often accused of having influenced Louis XIV in his decision to revoke the Edict, Mme de Maintenon, the marquis de Louvois, and the intendant, Foucault, are studied by Marcel Pin in *Madame de Maintenon et les protestants*:

contribution à l'Etude de la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes (Uzès, 1944), and by L. L. Bernard in "Foucault, Louvois, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes," *Church History*, XXV (1956), 27-40. The last eruption of Protestant religious strife during Louis XIV's reign was the so-called War of the Camisards (1702-8), which broke out in the rocky wastes of the Cévennes Mountains. The Huguenot side of this conflict is brilliantly argued by Antoine Court in *Histoire des troubles des Cévennes ou de la guerre des Camisards sous le règne de Louis-Le-Grand* (3 vols.; Villefranche, 1760). Three important works have appeared on the same subject: Agnès de La Gorce, *Camisards et dragons du roi* (Paris, 1950); Charles Alméras, *La Révolte des Camisards* (Paris, 1960); and André Ducasse, *La Guerre des Camisards, la résistance huguenote sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1946).

QUIETISM.—One of the best introductions to quietism may be found in R. A. Knox's *Enthusiasm . . .* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 231-87. Louis Cognet presents a brilliant reappraisal of the struggle in *Crépuscule des mystiques: le conflit Fénelon-Bossuet* (Tournai, 1958). Another important addition to our knowledge of the Bossuet-Fénelon quarrel of the 1690's is R. Schmittlein, *L'Aspect politique du différend Bossuet-Fénelon* (Baden, 1954). The reader will wish, too, to consult the important article by Jean Orcibal, "Fénelon et le Quietisme," in *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 12-14 (1951-52), pp. 215-53.

SPECIALIZED STUDIES.—Two specialized studies related tangentially to the great religious problems of the reign are, first, a detailed account of Curé Meslier, whom the author terms a militant atheist and crypto-revolutionary: Maurice Dommangst, *Le Curé Meslier, athée, communiste et révolutionnaire sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1965) (well documented). At the opposite end of the spectrum is the figure portrayed by Georges Guitton, S.J., in *Le Père de la Chaize: confesseur de Louis XIV* (2 vols.; Paris, 1959).

X. Literature and Ideas

GENERAL WORKS, INCLUDING BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES, MANUALS, AND GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Cardinal Georges Grente and his associates provide the reader with an indispensable bibliographical guide: *Dictionnaire des lettres françaises* (Paris, 1951), published under the direction of Georges Grente *et al.* A concise, accurate, and well-annotated bibliographical guide to the literature of the period can be found in Pierre Langlois and André Mareuil, *Guide bibliographique des études littéraires* (3d ed.; Paris, 1965). P. Castex and

P. Surer's *XVII^e siècle* (*Manuel des études littéraires françaises*, Vol. III [Paris, 1947]) has assembled a brief but reliable compendium of facts. An important introduction to the bibliography of French literature in the period is Nathan Edelman (ed.), *The Seventeenth Century* (*A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*, ed. David Cabeen and Jules Brody, Vol. III [Syracuse, N. Y., 1961]). Detailed, recent compilations are R. W. Baldner, *Bibliography of Seventeenth-Century French Prose Fiction* (New York, 1967), and Alexandre Cioranescu, *Bibliographie de la littérature française du 17^e siècle* (3 vols.; Paris, 1965-[67]).

One of the great masters of French literary history in the late nineteenth century, Gustave Lanson, wrote a guide to French literature that is still valuable for its trenchant insights and comments: *Histoire de la littérature française* (Paris, 1898). Henri Peyre has collected many of Lanson's most valuable essays, including "L'Influence de la philosophie cartésienne sur la littérature française" and "Le Rôle d'expérience dans la formation de la philosophie du XVIII^e siècle en France," in Gustave Lanson, *Essais de méthode, de critique et d'histoire littéraire*, ed. Henri Peyre (Paris, 1965). A student of Lanson, Daniel Mornet, presents a lucidly written synthesis of the literature of the Grand Siècle in *Histoire de la littérature française classique, 1660-1700, ses caractères véritables, ses aspects inconnus* (3d ed., Paris, 1940).

A recent, well-documented survey of French letters, by an authority on the seventeenth century, is René Jasinski's *Histoire de la littérature française* (2 vols.; Paris, 1947). Antoine Adam presents a masterful, detailed, and indispensable study of French thought in his *Histoire de la littérature française au XVII^e siècle* (5 vols.; Paris, 1948-56). Broader in scope than that of Adam, but no less penetrating in its comments, is Pierre Barrière's survey of the intellectual history of France (in the tradition of the history of ideas): *La Vie intellectuelle en France: du XVI^e siècle à l'époque contemporaine* (Paris, 1961). Lucidly and learnedly reasoned (and broader in scope than its title indicates) is J. S. Spink's *French Free-Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire* (London, 1960). Another Englishman's guide to France, built around a close reading of twenty-one of France's great seventeenth-century writers from Malherbe to Fénelon, is W. D. Howarth's *Life and Letters in France: The Seventeenth Century* (London and Edinburgh, 1965). A brief, highly schematic approach can be found in V.-L. Saulnier's *La Littérature du siècle classique* (4th ed.; Paris, 1955) (excellent for periodization). Paul Bénichou presents a brilliant essay on the *Morales du Grand Siècle* (Paris, 1948).

An important background study of the age of Louis XIV is Jean Rousset's *La Littérature de l'âge baroque en France: Circé et le paon*

(new ed.; Paris, 1954. Rousset can be supplemented by the collaborative work edited by Jean-Jacques Demorest, *Studies in Seventeenth-Century French Literature* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1962), which includes essays by Nathan Edelman, Philip Wadsworth, Alain Seznec, Henri Peyre, and Hugh Davidson. As an introduction to the poetry of the age, R. Winegarten's *French Lyric Poetry in the Age of Malherbe* (Manchester, England, 1954) illuminates the development of poetical style in the seventeenth century.

In a general account of the *fin de siècle*, Arthur A. Tilley describes the last years of Louis XIV's reign as a period of literary deterioration: *The Decline of the Age of Louis XIV: Or, French Literature 1687-1715* (Cambridge, England, 1929). His work should be compared with Paul Hazard's *La Crise de la conscience européenne (1680-1715)* (3 vols.; Paris, 1934-35). Hazard posits the thesis that in the years 1685-1715 France was transformed from the age of Bossuet to the age of Voltaire. (The third volume contains an excellent bibliography "raisonnée".)

THE BAROQUE AND CLASSICISM.—Useful as an introduction to the baroque is Imbrie Buffum, *Studies in the Baroque from Montaigne to Rotrou* (New Haven, 1957). A more detailed guide to the concepts of both the baroque and of classicism may be found in the recent work of V.-L. Tapié, *Baroque et Classicisme* (Paris, 1957), with an excellent bibliography. Tapié's work has been rendered into English in a handsome edition: *The Age of Grandeur: Baroque Art and Architecture*, trans. A. Ross Williamson (New York, 1960). Also useful in Tapié's brief discussion, *Le Baroque* ("Que sais-je?", No. 923 [Paris, 1961]); see particularly his first chapter on "Définition et histoire du Mot Baroque." Of value too is Gonzague de Reynold, *Le XVII^e siècle. Le classique et le baroque* (Montreal, 1944), which studies the conflict between the classical and baroque ideals. René Wellek's chapter, "The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship," in *Concepts of Criticism* (New Haven and London, 1963), pp. 69-127, sees two main streams in evolution of baroque thought: one flowing from Renaissance mysticism and the other from rhetorical humanism and Petrarchism. A number of learned controversies have arisen over the definition of the baroque; some useful articles in making distinctions clearer are Helmut Hatzfeld, "Use and Misuse of 'Baroque' as a Critical Term in Literary History," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, No. 31 (1962), pp. 180-200; and Henri Peyre's lightly veiled attack on the baroque, "Common-Sense Remarks on the French Baroque," in Jean-Jacques Demorest (ed.), *Studies in Seventeenth Century French Literature*, pp. 1-19. More detailed studies are by Marcel Raymond, "Du baroque et de la littérature en France aux XVI^e et XVIII^e siècles," in *La Profondeur et le rythme* (Grenoble, 1948); Vaclav Černý, "Le

Baroque et la littérature française," *Critique*, XII (June, 1956), 517-33, continued in XII (July, 1956), 617-35; Franco Simone, "Per la definizione di un baroco francese," *Rivista di letteratura moderna*, XVII (July-September, 1954), 165-92; and a collection of articles entitled "Du baroque au classicisme," *XVII^e Siècle*, No. 20 (1955), pp. 249-318. Odette de Mourgues analyzes the many facets of baroque poetry in *Metaphysical, Baroque, and Précieux Poetry* (Oxford, 1953). The student of *préciosité* may also wish to compare her approaches to that of Daniel Mornet in "La Signification et l'évolution de l'idée de préciosité en France au XVII^e siècle," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, I (1940), 225-31.

Two elegantly written and sensibly argued guides to French classicism are: Henri Peyre, *Le Classicisme français*, retitled *Qu'est-ce que le classicisme?* in the revised edition (Paris, 1965); and Will G. Moore, *French Classical Literature—An Essay* (London, 1961). E. B. O. Borgerhoff's thesis is that French classicism, far from being inhibiting, was actually a liberating factor in French seventeenth-century literature (*The Freedom of French Classicism* [Princeton, N. J., 1950]). Excellent for background material is René Bray's *La Formation de la doctrine classique en France* (Paris, 1951). The impact of classicism on the theater is well treated by Jean Scherer in *La Dramaturgie classique en France* (Paris, 1950).

THE GROWTH OF IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—In the last decades of the seventeenth century the seeds of the Enlightenment were being sown by the first of the *philosophes*.

The Evolution of a New "Climate of Opinion" and Development of the Philosophical Spirit in France.—One of the most important problems facing the historian of ideas is the isolation of strands of thought that constitute the so-called climate of opinion, the elusive *Zeitgeist* of an era.

For an understanding—both historical and historiographical—of the climate of opinion during the last decades of Louis XIV's reign, an appropriate point of departure is the work of the distinguished scholar Gustave Lanson and one of his intellectual successor, Paul Hazard. Lanson's most seminal work concerning the growth of the philosophic spirit is contained in a series of articles written in the early twentieth century. Two of the most important are "L'Influence de la philosophie cartésienne sur la littérature française," in *Essais de méthode de critique et d'histoire littéraire*, ed. Henri Peyre (Paris, 1965), and "Origines et premières manifestations de l'esprit philosophique dans la littérature française de 1675 à 1744," *Revue des cours et conférences*, (1907-9). Paul Hazard then carried on Lanson's theme of the growth of the new climate of opinion in his *La Crise de la conscience européenne* (1680-

1715) (3 vols.; Paris, 1935) (discussed previously). Hazard credited the transformation of the spirit of the age to the role played by exotic literature, to the new trends in scholarship, and to philosophical innovations. A general work treating of the same topic is Georges Pagès's lectures of 1939 at the Sorbonne, reproduced under the title *Les Origines du XVIII^e siècle au temps de Louis XIV (1680 à 1715)* (Paris, reprinted 1961). Special studies of exotic literature (travelogues, descriptions of voyages, etc.) have been written by Geoffroy Atkinson in his *Les Relations de voyages du XVII^e siècle et l'évolution des idées; contribution à l'étude de la formation de l'esprit du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924); and *Extraordinary Voyage in French Literature before 1700* (1920). An interesting sequel—although marred by numerous factual errors—is Atkinson's *The Sentimental Revolution: French Writers of 1690–1740*, ed. Abraham C. Keller (Seattle, 1965). Other important studies of exotica are V. Pinot's *La Chine et la formation de l'esprit philosophique en France, 1640–1740* (Paris, 1932); and Gilbert Chinard's pioneering effort *L'Exotisme américain dans la littérature française au dix-seizième siècle* (Paris, 1911).

A. J. Krailsheimer's *Studies in Self-Interest from Descartes to La Bruyère* (Oxford, 1962) traces the varying reactions of selected seventeenth century authors to the concepts of *moi*, *gloire*, and *honnêteté*.

Diffusion of Ideas.—How philosophic ideas are diffused among the intelligentsia of Europe is discussed in a model work of its kind—certainly the best introduction to the subject, if in itself a bit diffuse. Ira O. Wade's *The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750* (Princeton, N. J., 1938). Ancillary studies, derivative both of the Lanson-Hazard school and the Arthur Lovejoy–Ira Wade history-of-ideas approach, are W. H. Barber's *Leibniz in France: From Arnauld to Voltaire* (Oxford, 1955); Paul Vernière's *Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution* (2 vols.; Paris, 1954); Gabriel Bonno's meticulous *Les Relations intellectuelles de Locke avec la France, d'après des documents inédits* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955); and Alfred R. Desautels's more monographic *Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au XVIII^e siècle, 1701–1734* (Rome, 1956). Among several specialized studies is the excellent commentary offered by Aram Vartanian in his *Diderot and Descartes: A Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment* (Princeton, N. J., 1953), depicting the clash of Cartesian and Newtonian ideas on science. In the same vein is Heikki Kirkinen's *Les Origines de la conception moderne de l'homme-machine. Le problème de l'âme en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV (1670–1715): Etude sur l'histoire des idées* (Helsinki, 1960). Kirkinen appends an extensive bibliography.

Of interest, too, is Lionel Rothkrug's *Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton, N. J., 1965) (cited also under Social History). Rothkrug, whose work has also been cited under studies in mercantilism, propounds a thesis that intellectual life was being transformed by "conditions external to the [formal] history of ideas," i.e., by the growth of bureaucracy, of depersonalization of government, of Christian agrarianism. Rothkrug's work contains an excellent bibliography. For the growth of the so-called bourgeois spirit, a significant, oft-neglected work is Bernhard Groethuysen's *Die Entstehung der burgerlichen Welt-und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich* (2 vols.; Halle, 1927-30). A study of the diffusion of seventeenth-century ideas during the Enlightenment is Albert Chérel's *Fénelon au XVIII^e siècle en France* (Paris, 1917). An uneven but a pioneering effort is D. T. Pottinger, *The French Book Trade in the Ancien Régime, 1500-1789* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

Free Thought.—Closely connected with the growth of the philosophic spirit is the development of libertinage, or free thought. A pioneering effort is Frédéric Lachèvre's *Le Libertinage au XVII^e siècle* (2 vols.; Paris, 1909). More thorough than Lachèvre is René Pintard's *Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVII^e siècle* (2 vols.; Paris, 1943), with an extensive bibliography. More discriminating than Pintard and covering a later period in the history of free thought is J. S. Spink, *French Free Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire* (London, 1960).

Salons.—The best general work on the influence of the salons is Roger Picard's *Les Salons littéraires et la société française, 1610-1789* (New York, 1943).

Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns.—The best work on this subject remains H. Gillot's *La Querelle des anciens et des modernes en France. De la défense et illustration de la langue française aux parallèles des anciens et des modernes* (Paris, 1914). Still useful is the older study by H. Rigault, *Histoire de la querelle des anciens et des modernes* (Paris, 1859), in which he sees the quarrel as a struggle between the supporters of conservatism and those of liberalism.

The Theater and its Public.—A monumental work on French dramatic literature is H. C. Lancaster's *A History of French Dramatic Literature in the Seventeenth Century* (9 vols.; Baltimore, 1929-42). John Lough's *Paris Theatre Audiences in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1957) is a needed corrective to Lancaster's work. Lough asserts that playwrights of the classical period wrote for audiences that were at once smaller and more aristocratic than Lancaster estimated. Pierre Mélése's *Le Théâtre et le public à Paris sous Louis XIV, 1659-1715*

(Paris, 1934) is immensely learned, and buttressed by extensive bibliographies. The problem of censorship is dealt with in a useful survey by Victor Hallays-Dabot, *Histoire de la censure théâtrale en France* (Paris, 1862). Harriet Dorothea MacPherson deals with the same topic in *Censorship under Louis XIV, 1661-1715. Some Aspects of Its Influence* (New York, 1929); although largely based on secondary works and marred by numerous errors, MacPherson's study is still the only brief survey of the subject in English.

"EUROPE LOOKS AT FRANCE."—Relatively neglected is the study of European public opinion and its reaction to the image of Louis XIV's France. A recent survey of the emergence of the idea of Europe provides some guide lines for a more comprehensive study: J. B. Duroselle, *L'Idée d'Europe dans l'histoire* (Paris, 1965). The author devotes Chapter IV to "De la Chrétienté à l'Europe (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)"; he believes the idea of "Europe" emerged in the 1660's and was fully recognized by "Europeans" at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. There are three other major works in this area that should be mentioned: Georges Ascoli, *La Grande-Bretagne devant l'opinion française au XVII^e siècle* (2 vols.; Paris, 1930); Hubert Gillot, *Le Règne de Louis XIV et l'opinion publique en Allemagne* (Paris, 1914); and P. J. W. Van Malssen, *Louis XIV d'après les pamphlets répandus en Hollande* (Amsterdam, 1936).

XI. Science

GENERAL WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.—Herbert Butterfield's challenging work on *The Origins of Modern Science* (London, 1949) is of especial interest to students of Louis XIV's France because of the importance he gives to the "transition to the *philosophe* movement" in Chapter IX. More balanced, and essentially more reliable in its judgments, is A. Rupert Hall's survey *From Galileo to Newton 1630-1720* ("Rise of Modern Science," Vol. III [New York, 1963]), with extensive bibliographies, and his *The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800* (Boston, 1956; London, 1954). For an excellent introduction to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, particularly the Galilean prelude, read A. Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore, 1957). An encyclopedic introduction to the subject, with special emphasis on technology, is A. Wolf, *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1935). Roland Mousnier begins his work *Progrès scientifique et technique au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1958) with an important chapter entitled "Aristotélisme,

Cartésianisme, Newtonianisme," which is a useful review for students of Louis XIV's reign. Mousnier mentions the work of B. Hessen, whose neo-Marxist interpretation of science in the seventeenth century is refuted by G. N. Clark in his essay *Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1948).

AN INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH SCIENCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Excellent guides to French contributions to science can be found in Maurice Caullery, *La Science française depuis le XVII^e siècle . . .* (2d ed., revised and corrected; Paris, 1948). More specialized are H. Metzger, *Les Doctrines chimiques en France du début 17^e à la fin du 18^e siècles* (Paris, 1923); the monumental work of Jacques Roger, *Les Sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1963), with a detailed bibliography; and Maurice Caullery, "La Biologie au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e Siècle*, No. 30 (1956), pp. 25-45. Brief but suggestive of avenues for further study in the realm of science's influence on letters is John Stephenson Spink's *Literature and the Sciences in the Age of Molière. An Inaugural Lecture at Bedford College, London* (London, 1953).

THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE.—One of the great achievements of France in the age of Louis XIV was the emergence of the great academies, of which the scientific academies were among the most important. A useful general introduction to the subject may be found in Martha Ornstein, *The Role of Scientific Societies in the Seventeenth Century* (Chicago, 1938). The pre-Colbertian scientific societies are studied by Bigourdan in *Les premières sociétés savantes de Paris au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1918). Still the most detailed and one of the most reliable guides to the academies and societies is Harcourt Brown's *Scientific Organizations in Seventeenth Century France (1620-1680)* (Baltimore, 1934). The work of the royal academy of science itself is detailed by J. Bertrand in *L'Académie des sciences et les académiciens de 1666 à 1793* (Paris, 1869); and by P. Gauja, *L'Académie des sciences* (Paris, 1934), augmented by his later article "L'Académie royale des sciences (1666-1793)," *Revue d'histoire des sciences*, 2 (1949). Coeval with the rise of the scientific academies is the emergence of learned journals. Betty Trebell Morgan investigates the earliest of these periodic publications in her thesis *Histoire du Journal des Sçavans, 1665-1700* (Paris, 1929). One of the first foreign appointees of J. B. Colbert to the Académie Royale des Sciences was Christiaan Huygens, whose *Œuvres complètes* (22 vols.; The Hague, 1888-1950) provides us with an invaluable picture of French science in the 1660's and 1670's. (Huygens' correspondence is published in the first nine volumes.) Two other works of note on Huygens are H. L. Brugmans, *Le Séjour de Christian Huygens à Paris* (Paris, 1935), and

A. E. Bell, *Christian Huygens and the Development of Science in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1947), which serves as well as a general guide to science in the period.

CARTESIANISM AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE.—One of the greatest of all scientific speculators of the day was René Descartes. The literature concerned with his achievements is so vast that we can only mention a few of the most important works: A. G. A. Balz, *Cartesian Studies* (New York, 1951); A. Koyré, *Entretiens sur Descartes* (New York and Paris, 1944); J. F. Scott, *The Scientific Works of René Descartes* (London, 1962). L. J. Beck presents a detailed examination of Descartes's famous deductive method in his book, *The Method of Descartes, a Study of the Regulae* (Oxford, 1952). A more general treatment of Cartesianism and of Cartesian physics and its influence to the end of Louis XIV's reign can be found in P. Moüy, *Le Développement de la physique cartésienne, 1646-1712* (Paris, 1934). One of the greatest popularizers of Cartesianism was Bernard de Fontenelle. A careful analysis of Fontenelle's two greatest works is contributed by Robert Shackelton in his edition of Fontenelle: *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes: Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* (Oxford, 1955). J.-R. Carré, who sees Fontenelle in the main stream of the Enlightenment, has contributed a standard work in the field: *La Philosophie de Fontenelle; ou, le sourire de la raison* (Paris, 1932). F. Grégoire presents: *Fontenelle: une philosophie désabusée* (Nancy, 1947), a searching study of Fontenelle's interest in science.

GASSENDI AND THE ATOMISTS AND MERSENNE AND MECHANICS.—Descartes's colleagues and successors have likewise had their chroniclers. Two of the most important seventeenth-century scientists were Gassendi and Mersenne, who have been ably studied by Bernard Rochot *et al.*, *Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), sa vie et son œuvre* (Paris, 1955); Henri Berr, *Du Scepticisme de Gassendi*, ed. B. Rochot, originally a thesis defended at the Sorbonne in 1898. Also of importance: Comité du tricentenaire de Gassendi, *Actes du congrès du tricentenaire de Pierre Gassendi (4-7 août 1955)* (Paris, 1957); R. Lenoble, *Mersenne, ou, la naissance du mécanisme* (Paris, 1943). Pascal's contributions to French science have been honored by a symposium on the tricentenary of his death: R. Taton (ed.), *L'Œuvre scientifique de Pascal* (Paris, 1964).

NEWTON AND NEWTONIANISM: A COUNTERVAILING FORCE.—Justly praised as the best available introductions to this field, at once detailed and discriminating, are: P. Brunet's *L'Introduction des théories de Newton en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1931); and his *Les Physiciens hollandais et la méthode expérimentale en France au 18^e Siècle* (Paris, 1926). Also of interest are the perceptive and challenging essays by Alexandre Koyré in *Newtonian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

XII. Education

GENERAL WORKS.—Two fundamental general works on French education are Geraldine Hodgson's *Studies in French Education* (Cambridge, Eng., 1908) and Stephen D'Irsay's outstanding *Du XVI^e siècle à 1860 (Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères, Vol. II [2 vols.; Paris, 1935])*.

THE ANCIEN RÉGIME.—The most recent and perhaps most important work on education during this period is Georges Snyders, *La Pédagogie en France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1965). Older but still useful works are C. Jourdain, *Histoire de l'université de Paris au XVII^e et au XVIII^e siècles* (2 vols.; Paris, 1862–66), and H. Lantoine, *Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1874).

SPECIAL WORKS.—Two significant studies of technical education are Frederick B. Artz, *The Development of Technical Education in France 1500–1800* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), and René Taton, *Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1964). For perceptive accounts of the Jesuits, see Fr. de Dainville, *Les Jésuites et l'éducation de la société française; la naissance de l'humanisme moderne* (Paris, 1940) and *Les Jésuites et l'éducation de la société française; la géographie des humanistes* (Paris, 1940).

Two of the members of Louis XIV's court, Mme de Maintenon and Archbishop Fénelon, were especially interested in education. An adequate introduction to Maintenon's ideas on education is presented by H. C. Barnard in *Madame de Maintenon and Saint-Cyr* (London, 1934). Studies of Fénelon as an educator include Gaston Bizos, *Fénelon éducateur* (Paris, 1886) and Gabriel Compayré, *Fénelon et l'éducation attrayante* (Paris, 1910).

XIII. Art and Architecture

GENERAL WORKS.—Three sources may help the student to better understand Louis XIV's interest in the arts. The first is Jules Guiffrey's selection from among the plethora of records kept by the king's superintendent of buildings, titled *Comptes des bâtiments du roi, sous le règne de Louis XIV* (5 vols.; Paris, 1881–1901). The second is Sieur de Chantelou's detailed account of Bernini's visit to Paris in 1665–66 and the report of the conversations between king and artist, published as Fréart de Chantelou, *Journal du voyage en France du cavalier Bernin. . .* With a Preface by G. Charensol (Paris, 1930). Sieur de Chantelou's *Journal* should be read along with Rudolf Wittkower's delightful lecture *Bernini's Bust of Louis XIV* (The Charlton Lectures on Art; London, 1951). The third source is entitled *Manière de montrer les jardins de Versailles*, with

a modern preface by Raoul Girardet and text by Louis XIV himself (Paris, 1951); it is an elegant guidebook to the gardens of Versailles.

There are numerous introductions to the art and architecture of the Ludovican period. Three works can be particularly recommended: Sir Anthony Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France, 1500-1700* (Baltimore, 1954), with a good select bibliography; V.-L. Tapié, *The Age of Grandeur*, translated from the French original, *Baroque et classicisme* (Paris, 1957) by A. Ross Williamson (London and New York, 1960); Roger A. Weigert, *L'Époque Louis XIV* (Paris, 1962). Other surveys of value are: René Schneider, *L'Art français: XVII^e siècle, 1610-1690* (Paris, 1925), and its sequel, *L'Art français: XVIII^e siècle, 1690-1789* (Paris, 1926); *L'Art français au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1911). Far more inclusive than the title indicates is Fiske Kimball's *The Creation of the Rococo* (Paris, 1964), which not only deals with the rise of the ornamentalists but reviews the progress of art and architecture throughout the reign and treats in detail the transition in styles from the age of Louis XIV to that of Louis XV. The diffusion of French artistic ideals is reviewed by Louis Réau in *L'Europe française au siècle des lumières* (Paris, 1938).

More detailed and specialized works on the period are L. Hautecoeur's encyclopedic work of reference, *Histoire de l'architecture classique en France . . .* (7 vols. in 9; Paris, 1943-57); and three important works that treat French painting in particular: Louis Dimier, *Histoire de la peinture française du retour de Vouet à la mort de Lebrun, 1627 à 1690* (2 vols.; Paris and Brussels, 1926-27); P. Marcel, *La Peinture française au début du dix-huitième siècle, 1690-1721* (Paris, 1906); and Sir Anthony Blunt, *Nicolas Poussin* (2 vols.; New York, 1967) (also Blunt's earlier work on the development of architectural modes of the period, *François Mansart and the Origins of French Classical Architecture* [London, 1941]). The work by René Crozet is a brilliant and indispensable guide to social background: *La Vie artistique en France au XVII^e siècle, 1598-1661. Les artistes et la société* (Paris, 1954). The royal academies are adequately treated in L. Vitet, *L'Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture* (2d ed.; Paris, 1880) and in H. Lapauze, *Histoire de l'académie de France à Rome* (2 vols.; Paris, 1924).

THE IDYLL OF VERSAILLES.—One of Louis XIV's great passions was the creation of the palace of Versailles. Many works have been written about this great palace; a few of the best are Pierre de Nolhac's, *La Création de Versailles d'après les sources inédites; étude sur les origines et les premières transformations du château et des jardins* (Versailles, 1901); *Versailles et la cour de France: Versailles, résidence de Louis XIV* (Paris,

1925); *Versailles et la cour de France: l'art de Versailles* (Paris, 1930), and *Les Jardins de Versailles* (Paris, 1906). The life of Louis XIV's famous gardener, Le Nôtre, is treated by Ernest de Ganay in *André Le Nôtre* (Paris, 1962). L. Hauteceur, *Louis XIV, roi-soleil* (Paris, 1954), is an excellent guide to the symbolism manifested in the sculpture and architectural devices of Versailles. Pierre Francastel, "Versailles et l'architecture urbaine au XVII^e siècle," *Annales: E.—S.—C.*, X (1955), 465-79, is an interesting article, in which Francastel offers the reader a sweeping reinterpretation of the palace in social history and in the history of architecture. He traces its development through three phases: 1661-68, a period he designates as *les fêtes*; 1668-74, the palace created for family living; and after 1674, the city of Versailles, the capital. Other books of importance are the detailed study of Louis Dussieux, *Le Château de Versailles* (2 vols.; Versailles, 1885); Pierre Bourget and Georges Catloui, *Jules Hardouin-Mansart* (Paris, n.d.); and Edouard Guillou, *Versailles: Le Palais du Soleil* (Paris, 1963).

XIV. Music

GENERAL WORKS.—A comprehensive introduction to the music of the Baroque is provided by Suzanne Clercx in her elegantly written *Le Baroque et la musique, essai d'esthétique musicale* (Brussels, 1948). Indispensable, too, is M. F. Bukofzer, *Music in the Baroque Era* (New York, 1947); especially interesting is the discussion in the last chapter of the "Sociology of Baroque Music," i.e., the patronage of music, both private and collective.

IN FRANCE.—Two treatments serve as a preface to the understanding of musical taste in France: Georges Snyders, "L'Évolution du goût musical en France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles," *Revue des sciences humaines* (1955), 325-50; and the collection of articles entitled, "Aspects de la musique française au XVII^e siècle," *XVII^e siècle*, Nos. 21-22 (1954), pp. 377-505. Important relevant studies by Henry Prunières on music and the ballet are: *Le Ballet de cour en France avant Benserade et Lully, suivi du ballet de la délivrance de Renaud* (Paris, 1914); *L'Opéra italien en France avant Lully* (Paris, 1913). Special studies of note are: Th. Gerold, *L'Art du chant en France au XVII^e siècle* (Strasbourg, 1921); J. Ecorcheville, *De Lully à Rameau, l'esthétique musicale* (Paris, 1906).

Since World War II the study of music during the Ancien Régime has greatly benefited by the publication of *La Vie Musicale en France sous les rois Bourbons*, under the direction of Norbert Dufourcq. Ten volumes

have thus far appeared; the most valuable to historians are: Vol. III: Norbert Dufourcq (ed.), *Michel-Richard Delalande: notes et références pour servir à son histoire* (Paris, 1957); Vol. IV: Maurice Barthélemy, *André Campra, sa vie et son œuvre* (Paris, 1957); Vol. VII: Shlomo Hofman, *L'Œuvre de clavecin de François Couperin le Grand* (Paris, 1961) (highly technical); Vol. VIII: Norbert Dufourcq (ed.), *J.-B. de Boësset. . . maître de la musique des reines Anne d'Autriche et Marie-Thérèse* (Paris, 1962); and Vol. X: Michel Antoine, *Henry Desmarests (1661-1741)* (Paris, 1965).

Add to these studies two biographies in English. Diligently researched, if a bit weighty in style, is Wilfrid Mellers' *François Couperin and the French Classical Tradition* (London, 1950). Cuthbert Girdlestone, in *Jean-Philippe Rameau* (London, 1957), provides an admirable introduction to the ages of Louis XIV and Louis XV that shows how the "rococo" style of the eighteenth century impeded the complete realization of Rameau's talents. Two works of importance on Lully should be noted: Lionel de La Laurencie, *Lulli* (2d ed.; Paris, 1919), and Henri Prunières, *Lully* (Paris, 1910). A brief but significant work is Claude Crussard's *Un Musicien français oublié: Marc-Antoine Charpentier (1634-1704)* (Paris, 1945). Also "Versailles et la musique française," *XVII^e siècle*, No. 34 (1957); and Bernard Champigneulle's brilliant *L'Age classique de la musique française* (Paris, 1946).

For the popular music of the period there is the well-annotated collection of Pierre Barbier and François Vernillat, *Histoire de France par les chansons* (3 vols.; Paris, 1956-57).

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
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