

**Rethinking Public Diplomacy:  
A Study of China Exerting its Influence on Taiwan**

by

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to

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## **Abstract**

The thesis aims to discover nature of China's public diplomacy by using the case study of China's influence on Taiwan; the thesis also intends to facilitate modifications to notions of public diplomacy by seeking the patterns from the case study. China's public diplomacy may contain inconsistency—the perceptions of China's public diplomacy and what China promote in practice. The inconsistency reveals deficiency to the notion of public diplomacy. The thesis first conceptualizes public diplomacy, and argues that modern public diplomacy does not deviate from its primitive purpose—to influence foreign publics to gain national interest. It also argues that the over-emphasizing of modern public diplomacy on soft power has created bias. By examining the concepts and history of China's public diplomacy, the thesis depicts missing elements in China's public diplomacy that can be verified through case studies. Then, the thesis introduces comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets that derived from case studies to provide a clear framework of how China exerts influence on Taiwan. Through the case study, the thesis unveils the inconsistencies in China's public diplomacy. China's public diplomacy contains elements of mutual communication while combining propaganda and opaque interest-related exchanges. The thesis thus argues that it needs to modify China's public diplomacy, and to rethink public diplomacy as well. Comprehensive public diplomacy can compensate the realm where soft power cannot; PD assets helps to narrow down the scope of public diplomacy. It also helps to explain why the private sectors are able to affect the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The thesis provides a modification to public diplomacy and reveals how China could exert influence by using multiple channels, particularly China's proxy agent framework.

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to my wife Hsin-Jong Chiang, my Sons Yu-Chien Hung and Yu-Chen Hung, who have been with me in joy and sorrow. This thesis is also dedicated to my father Chao-Nan Hung and my mother Yun-Ju Chang, who are my lifelong supporters.

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## **List of Abbreviation**

ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
ATIEM	The Association of Taiwan investment Enterprises on the Mainland
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCN	China Commodity Net
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China Central Television
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNS	China Network Systems
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CUP	Chinese Unionist Party
CWMAAA	China Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association
CYI	Chinese Youth International
DOD	Department of Defense
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NCCPC	National Congress of the Communist Party of China
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD assets	Public diplomacy assets
PR	Public relations
SCIO	State Council Information Office

SEF	Strait Exchange Foundation
TAO	Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council
TEEF	True Enlightenment Education Foundation
TRFDL	Tibet Religious Foundation of H.H. the Dalai Lama
TVB	Hong Kong Television Broadcasts Limited
TVBS	Television Broadcasts Satellite
TWMAAA	Taipei Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association
UFWC	United Front Work Department
USIA	United State Information Service Agency
VICA	Victims of Investment in China Association

## **Chapter I Introduction**

The thesis aims to discover nature of China's public diplomacy by using the case of China's influence on Taiwan; the thesis also intends to facilitate modifications to notions of public diplomacy by seeking the patterns from the case study. China's public diplomacy may contain inconsistency—the perceptions of China's public diplomacy and what China promote in practice. The inconsistency reveals deficiency to the notion of public diplomacy. Thus, the thesis proposes comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets to compensate the study.

Public diplomacy is a study that offers enormous barriers to researchers. The study of public diplomacy is inter-disciplinary. According to Gilboa (2008:74), public diplomacy involves many disciplines—such as international relations, political science, public-relations branding, history, media effect, marketing, public opinion, rhetoric, cultural studies, computer science, technology, psychology and sociology—all of which contribute to public diplomacy. The inter-disciplinary dimension thus inevitably increases the difficulty of grasping all viewpoints. For example, the “experts and practitioners in public diplomacy have often ignored relevant knowledge in communication and Public relations (PR), while communication and PR scholars and practitioners have often ignored the relevant literature in international relations, diplomatic studies, and strategic studies” (Gilboa, 2008: 73). The focus of different disciplines may also have an impact on public diplomacy in the study of international relations, as Armstrong (2009) indicates that the idea of improving national image with public diplomacy is deeply ingrained in brand management. Among these disciplines, more than 150 definitional descriptions of public diplomacy have been proposed (Fitzpatrick, 2009a). It is easy to ignore the contribution of other disciplines because different disciplines derive different foci from public diplomacy.

The intersection of many disciplines can easily lead to bias and contradiction. Public diplomacy has its controversy in its concepts and scopes. There is a gap between what public diplomacy should be and how governments promote public diplomacy in reality. With the innovation of technology and the rapid flow of information, the way in which governments conduct public diplomacy has fundamentally changed the concept of public diplomacy. Although transparency and credibility are major elements in modern public diplomacy, governments still ignore them from time to time. China, for example, generates a gap between its public diplomacy and Beijing's implantation of communication with foreign publics. In addition, China has already increased the degree to which it promotes public diplomacy, but a wide interpretation of its public diplomacy dilutes its focus and its meaning. Instead, it is more about public relations and defending policy. However, is this the true nature of China's public diplomacy? Apart from China's description of its public diplomacy, a more target-oriented purpose exists, and it should be examined and discussed. The extent to which governments go in dealing with foreign citizens to meet their national interests has become a topic of research.

### **1.1 Motive and Research purpose**

The thesis raises a question for this thesis: Why does China's public diplomacy have little impact on cross-strait relations while China continues to increase its influence on Taiwanese via communication and message disseminating, which also belong to the core of modern public diplomacy? The thesis thus intends to find the discrepancy between the notion of China's public diplomacy and how it did to communicate with Taiwanese. This study also tries to acquire an in-depth understanding of China's public diplomacy with respect to Taiwan: What are the strategies it uses in different times with respect to different groups? Another goal is to explore

how China's public diplomacy may affect modern public diplomacy. To do so, the thesis discovers the veil of China's public diplomacy which is not noticed in neither the study of China's public diplomacy nor current notion of public diplomacy.

The research question derives from the interactions across Taiwan Strait. From 2008 to 2016, conciliation across the Taiwan Strait boosted exchanges and communications, especially at the official level. The two sides signed 23 agreements to smooth interactions. Chinese officials also undertook many visiting missions to Taiwan. It was very common for Chinese officials to meet and communicate with Taiwanese businessmen and the general public during their visits. Regardless of the fact that Taiwan is due to political factors not in the scope of China's public diplomacy, the tasks of China's Taiwan policy and China's public diplomacy include projecting a positive image and increasing communication, trade and exchanges. However, these efforts seem to be ineffective, as they have had little impact on cross-strait relations. These visiting missions were successful neither in projecting China's image nor in increasing mutual understanding. The negative image of the Chinese government is unchanged in the eyes of Taiwanese. According to a public poll conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council (2016), more than 59.3% of Taiwanese participants consider the Chinese government to be unfriendly to the Taiwanese government while 50.6% consider the Beijing government to be unfriendly toward Taiwanese publics.

Ostensibly, these increased exchanges and communications still have facilitated and symbolized the vision of mutual prosperity and peace during the conciliation period despite the Taiwanese attitude toward Beijing. However, accompanied by increased interactions and political settlements, Chinese influence and Chinese factors have also increased unprecedentedly in the island. The ways that China magnifies its influence on Taiwanese

society through these exchanges and communications sometimes produces negative rumors and accusations. It has aroused notice that many of the interactions between Chinese officials and Taiwanese general publics are in fact acts of public diplomacy, but some of the processes and the results seem neither transparent nor productive.

To clarify the discrepancy, this thesis aims to facilitate modifications of China's public diplomacy and urges us to rethink some of the accounts of public diplomacy. Nowadays, *public diplomacy* refers to the governmental activities of communicating with foreign civilians for gaining mutual understanding and pursuing mutual benefit (Fitzpatrick, 2009a). Public diplomacy is deeply connected to soft power nowadays. The development of public diplomacy is as Jan Melissen (2005) describes: The current debates and the origins of contemporary public diplomacy are dominated by U.S. experience. Also, Gilboa (2008:56) argues that most studies of public diplomacy are historical, and most of them deal with the experiences of the United States during the Cold War. Although China has also developed its public diplomacy with its own characteristics, it is still from the U.S. experience. One of the legacies is its connection to soft power. The practices of China's public diplomacy adhere to soft power (Kurlantzick, 2007), and its practices of public diplomacy bear Chinese characteristics.

Nowadays, when China and other governments talk about public diplomacy, the term *public diplomacy* covers multiple methods of increasing national reputation and mutual understanding (e.g., cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, international broadcasting, etc.). Nevertheless, though China has used its public diplomacy to support its policies—such as to clearing misunderstanding of belt and road initiatives (BRI) and Chinese dreams—much of China's public diplomacy is actually an afterthought justification of policy, as in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. China's promotions have also aroused

reconsideration of what China's public diplomacy really is and what this means for Taiwan.

Examining China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan reveals a discrepancy between the concepts and the practice of public diplomacy. For example, the word *communication* becomes unclear when communication is not about value sharing and opinion exchanging but is instead about economic attraction and secret operations. To answer and explain the research question, this thesis proposes the bold hypothesis that soft power is not the only concept embodied in China's public diplomacy. Payment and threat are also essential to the framework of China's public diplomacy. We have ignored the fact that the practice of China's public diplomacy in Taiwan also involves aggressive and secret measures that are different from and more effective than its image-oriented campaign. Thus, I suggest adding this account to China's public diplomacy.

Moreover, the concept of transparency is vital to the new public diplomacy. However, China uses opaque and secret methods to influence Taiwan and Taiwanese politics. These methods contradict the concepts of China's public diplomacy, but reveal its actual application in Taiwan. This finding urges us to rethink China's public diplomacy and the new public diplomacy by redefining the concept of public diplomacy and the idea of soft power. The important theoretical issues of public diplomacy remain to be determined (Melissen, 2013). Thus, the aim of this thesis is also to shape and elaborate public diplomacy.

## **1.2 Literature review**

If *traditional diplomacy* refers to a government-to-government relationship, then *public diplomacy* is about the government-to-public relationship. How government promotes and implements public diplomacy and with what kinds of attitudes and purposes are matters of



scholarly interpretation.

Public diplomacy can be classified into traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy. Yun and Toth (2009) categorize them as realist public diplomacy and liberalist public diplomacy. Traditional public diplomacy is about influencing foreign publics that are not open to persuasion (Dutta-Bergman, 2006) via one-way communication (Gilboa, 2008) with the aim of affecting their governments (Malone, 1985; Henrikson, 2005) and supporting national objectives (Snow, 2009:6). New public diplomacy, on the other hand, is more about building relationships (Fitzpatrick, 2011; Gilboa, 2008; Nye, 2008; Melissen, 2005) and increasing national image (Zhao, 2007; Snow, 2007; d'hooghe, 2005) with a stress on mutual communication, transparency and credibility. It is as Gilboa (2006: 718) argues: New public diplomacy “is a communication system designed to create a dialogue with both foes and allies. It requires a capability to use effectively credible information in an attempt to persuade actors to understand, accept or support policies and actions.” New public diplomacy blurs the boundaries between foreign and domestic information distribution, between public and traditional diplomacies, and between “cultural diplomacy, marketing and new management” (Gilboa, 2008: 58). Without considering the differences between traditional and new public diplomacy, Kelley (2009: 73) notes that some observers are “bold enough” to classify these activities into three categories: short-term information management and dissemination (as categories of information), mid-term persuasion campaigns (as a category of influence) and long-term relationship building (as a category of engagement). To concentrate scholars’ definitions, public diplomacy is about the process of government communicating with publics (one-way or two-way communications) through direct or indirect information distribution to acquire interest or build relationships.

In the field of international relations, public diplomacy has long been considered a tool of international politics (Barghoorn and Friedrich, 1956; Tuch, 1990), synonymous with propaganda (Cunningham, 2002: 12; Macdonald: 2007)—especially during the Cold War. In this perspective, public diplomacy serves the ends of national security (Ninkovich, 1996) and psychological warfare (Lord, 2006; Tran, 1987).

On the other hand, after 9/11, many scholars believe that public diplomacy is different from traditional public diplomacy and propaganda. Joseph Nye has redefined *public diplomacy* with the notion of soft power (Yun, 2005). The central idea of public diplomacy rests on the exercise of soft power (Nye, 2008). The meaning of public diplomacy has thus expanded as a positive term and a tool of increasing mutual understanding before influencing public opinion. For many countries and researchers, the aims of current public diplomacy are to project and create positive images (Servaes, 2012; Lee, 2011; Zöllner, 2009; Nye, 2008; Snow, 2007; d’hooghe, 2005), thereby building relationship (Servaes, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2011; Gilboa, 2008; Nye, 2008; Melissen, 2005; Leonard, 2002) and creating effects (Pamment, 2013). Currently, the “notion” of new public diplomacy has dominated the study.

In addition, the role of private sectors in public diplomacy is increasingly discussed in modern public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 2009b; Snow, 2008). This is because private actors are able to “provide government the ability to accomplish what it might not have the resources or ability to do on its own (Fitzpatrick, 2009b)” and because “the best and most effective public diplomacy initiatives come from the private, non-governmental sectors” (Snow, 2008). Private sector diminishes the problem of low credibility because receivers are not aware of the source. However, the definition with *privatization* is, as Fitzpatrick (2009b) points out, that it lacks precise definition. For example, are contracting, cooperation and funding by government

necessary requirements for privatization? Further analysis of the cooperation of government and private sectors (e.g., corporations, NGOs, and elites that help China to conduct public diplomacy) is needed. In this thesis, for example, do these private sectors help China avoid the problem of low credibility, as current accounts have suggested? This thesis tackles these questions by examining how China exerts influence over Taiwan.

Public diplomacy is an elusive concept and has many problems. One of the major problems is its lack of theoretical foundation (Melissen and Sharp, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2009a; Gilboa, 2010). Consideration of public diplomacy is still popular in many subjects such as public relations and communications, but it somehow lost its momentum in the study of international relations. In addition, arguments and debates about the elements in traditional and new public diplomacy further complicate the study due to overlapping concepts and imprecise definition of such terms as *propaganda*, *psychological warfare*, *public diplomacy*, etc. For instance, *propaganda* and *public diplomacy* are actually interchangeable according to various scholars (Cull, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2006; Farwell, 2012). The term *psychological warfare* suffers from a similar situation. For example, Lerner (1949:195) argues that “avoiding detectable lies was one of the cardinal rules guiding psychological warfare in the World War II.” Lerner’s description also compatible when applied to the idea of traditional public diplomacy. Moreover, Ninkovich (1996) illustrates how propaganda depends on credibility, and is also interchangeable with the terms, *public diplomacy* and *new public diplomacy*. To clarify these similarities, scholars work to distinguish public diplomacy from similar concepts such as propaganda and psychological warfare. It depends on whether the source of information is transparent or not (d’Hooghe, 2014; Rugh, 2006), the information is manipulated or not (Zaharna, 2004). However, these classifications have also led modern public

diplomacy to focus more on pursuing sincere communications and mutual understanding while pushing traditional public diplomacy away. *Public diplomacy, propaganda* and *psychological warfare* have different foci; their concepts and ideas overlap based on different scholars, because they are terms used to describe the influencing of foreign publics. The differences are in the methods to used influence, and the terms sound negative or positive to the audience. Over-classification may create chaos in the definitions. In fact, even in modern public diplomacy, influence is still a main subject hidden in the themes of two-way communications or transparent sources of information. Influence through sincere communication and soft power is still influence.

Study of the issues of projecting positive images, building relationship and communicating with foreign publics are mainstream in current research (Broinowski, 2016; Mogensen, 2015; Gilboa, 2006, 2008; Riordan, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Leonard, 2002). From soft power and *noopolitik* to strategic communication, there are many concepts related to public diplomacy. In addition, the innovation of technology, communication tools, broadcasting mechanisms and the Internet have made a much progress in last decades; the manner of information flow has been changed the study of public diplomacy completely. These new changes enlarge the scope of the study while creating more contradictions. Some of researches focus on branches from public diplomacy, such as the media management and national branding (Szondi, 2008; Pigman, 2012; Xuereb, 2017). Others focus on theoretic constructions (Gilboa, 2008; Yun, 2005), area study (Avgerinos, 2009; Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011), etc. Many analyze how states pursue positive images, examine the defects of public diplomacy policy, and consider how public diplomacy should be conceptualized. However, only a few, like Pratkanis (2009) are involved in how states promote public diplomacy when countries have sovereignty

issue or international conflicts.

In the study of China's public diplomacy, China has recognized the power of positive image and how it might shape the world. The major objectives of China's public diplomacy are to offset the China-threat argument (Wang, 2008, 2012; Zhao, 2009; Cheng, 2012), increase economy (d'Hooghe, 2008, 2011) and build a desirable image (Aoyama, 2004). Many studies of China's public diplomacy have focused on the Beijing Olympics, the Shang Expo, Confucius Institutes, Chinese cultural festivals, the expansion of Chinese central television (CCTV), the reform of the spokesman structure, and the role of overseas Chinese, etc. (Finely and Xin, 2010; Berkowitz, Pere, et al, 2007; Cull, 2012; Flew and Hartig, 2014; Wang, 2008). In recent years, China has gradually expanded its focus of public diplomacy to project Chinese values and publicize its policy. For example, in 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the Chinese dream which is "pursuit [of] national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and the happiness of the people" at a domestic level while "realizing a world shaped by China and Chinese values" at an international level (d'Hooghe, 2014:1). To implement its policy, another new objective for China is to promote its merits and clarify misunderstandings in its policy, such as the strategy of BRI.

China's public diplomacy also faces several difficulties and problems. Being an authoritarian state, China controls its media and restricts its information flow with respect to international society. Wang (2012) argues that institutional constraints—such as its political ideology, communist party, the strong role of the central government, and the misuse of the term *public diplomacy* in its interest groups—are the difficulties that China faces in its public diplomacy, followed by its negative propaganda history and misuse of public diplomacy, China also faces the problem of low credibility (Wang, 2012; Rawnsley, 2012). It is as d'Hooghe

(2011: 183) indicates: The reason for China's low credibility rest on its state-centered model, its opaque political decision making, and its well-known use of propaganda. China's public diplomacy is thus considered less effective. Another criticism is that the target of China's public diplomacy is domestic rather than foreign publics. For instance, Cull (2008) argues that a major problem for some governments is "the tendency to conceive of their work not as a means to engage international publics but rather as a mechanism to impress domestic audiences.... They conduct public diplomacy overseas for the purposes of propaganda at home" (Cull, 2008:13). Cull (2011) further uses references to Brezhnev syndrome to describe the fact that China's public diplomacy is promoted according to domestic priorities, thereby revealing China's vulnerability. Cull explains that the Beijing Olympics was an opportunity to tell the domestic audience that China is on the world stage. China's public diplomacy "may be aimed at pleasing the audience at home" (Cull, 2011: 122). In addition, Lord (2006: 35) indicates that "public diplomacy is most effective when it is closely integrated with policy, rather than being simply an afterthought or post hoc justification of policy." Many researches of China's public diplomacy have focused on the afterthought justification. This thesis, however, tries to discuss China's public diplomacy first to clarify the goal of policy and seek how measurements were implemented to meet the goal. It is not only more effective for China but also more elucidatory for a research.

The studies and criticisms discussed above contribute to the study of China's public diplomacy. However, most of them either use notions of public diplomacy derived primarily from U.S. experience to examine China's public diplomacy, or they use Chinese perspectives (whether those of the Chinese government or those of Chinese scholars), to look at China's public diplomacy. This thesis, however, tries to ignore the boundary between traditional and

new public diplomacy and then seeks to determine how China exerts its influence on Taiwan to redraw the boundary. This thesis also tries to ignore definitions of its public diplomacy offered by the Chinese government and Chinese scholars so as to seek a more comprehensive notion of China's public diplomacy based on the very primitive definition of public diplomacy offered by Pratkanis (2009:112): *Public diplomacy* is "the promotion of the national interest by informing and influencing the citizens of other nations." I believe this method might best unveil the nature of China's public diplomacy. Further literature review is offered in chapters II, which also tackle the core issues this thesis aims to deliver in more detail.

### **1.3 Methodology**

This thesis conducts case-study research, to which a qualitative method is applied. The reason is that this thesis argues that there is contradiction in China's public diplomacy and China's increased communication and interactions, as mentioned in previous sections. People often mistakenly believe that "the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building (Flyvbjerg, 2006)", which is not true. Case study is, in fact, useful for "both generating and testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these research activities alone" (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229). Thus, this thesis aims to test existing China's public diplomacy and validate the contradictory in the research question is authentic or not. Then, it aims to look forward patterns for the plausible hypotheses, that comprehensive public diplomacy and the public diplomacy assets (PD assets) are thus derived from those patterns in this thesis.

In the data collection stage, multiple instances of data collection were used to strengthen the arguments (Eisenhardt, 1989: 533). Data was collected from existing documents such as

official documents, books, journals, newspapers, magazines, records, governmental publications and important speeches of Chinese leaders. The important incidents reported in newspapers were further analyzed and discussed. The other data-collection approach used here includes in-depth interviews, as more detailed and concealed information can be obtained through elite interviewing. Interviews are applied in some cases to determine the role of the medium and to see how it helps China to use public diplomacy. The interviews help to supplement the materials of the case study. The interviews focus on the connections between China and Taiwanese proxy agents, such as NGOs and Taiwanese elites. “The process of conducting qualitative research presents a challenge because procedures for organizing images are ill-defined” (Morse, 1994:1). Considering the weakness of qualitative research, a quantitatively based statistical analysis is used to supplement the argument to diminish the weakness, such as existing polls and surveys.

A document-analysis approach is employed to analyze documents acquired during the process which are deemed vital to this research. Although in the analysis, many of which are pure description, they are also the core to generate insights (Gersick and Pettigrew quoted by Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, the policies and strategies in the case studies are qualitatively evaluated and analyzed. Next, this thesis examines its effectiveness and limitations in different ways—mainly via documentary analysis and by combining existing surveys and polls concerning how the policies of both current and comprehensive public diplomacy work to fulfill the national interests of China.

#### **1.4 Significance and Delimitations**

If the answer to the research question is what the hypothesis proposes, then this thesis is



significant for showing that current study overlooks China's public diplomacy. This study would then redefine China's public diplomacy and provide a scenario to review public diplomacy as well. Throughout this thesis, I point out that bias exists not only in China's public diplomacy but also in modern public diplomacy—specifically, bias created by over-emphasizing the function of soft power in public diplomacy. Without facing the problem, the inconsistency that exists in China's public diplomacy would make the study of public diplomacy lose its values to be studied as well. As mentioned, the hypothesis suggests soft power is overrated and thus, if the research question has been verified, then it is highly likely that China is not the only country that has the problem of inconsistency in its public diplomacy as soft power is the core of the modern public diplomacy. More importantly, after decades of discussion and study of public diplomacy, research into the topic is moving gradually away from the realm of international relations. Public relations and communication study contribute more. There is a problem in the fact that public diplomacy is easily neglected when examining the governments' foreign influence. As a result, this thesis intends to bring public diplomacy back to the study of influence, which is becoming more and more important for states to tackle with foreign publics with the rise of interactions and the innovation of technology.

The case studies were conducted primary from 2008 to 2016, but this does not diminish the importance of current China's public diplomacy because of the policy continuity. In addition, the case studies focus more on Taiwanese proxy agents, because the significance and the impact of the proxy agent framework is recognized. To discuss the policies and strategies that government implements to influence on foreign publics, this study is limited to the realm of international relations. In addition, the concept of the term *public diplomacy* is very large, as it contains many different nuances that have been proposed by different scholars. Use of the term

*public diplomacy* may have different implications for different readers. To minimize this difference, use of the terms *public diplomacy*, *current public diplomacy* and *modern public diplomacy* here refer to the modern use of *public diplomacy*, which is new public diplomacy.

The study uses public diplomacy to examine China's influence on Taiwan. In cross-strait relations, scholars, especially researchers across the Taiwan Strait, often use the "united front" to discuss China's actions and activities with respect to the intention of unifying Taiwan. In China's united-front activities toward Taiwan, there are only several targets for China to influence: governments (Taiwanese government and other foreign governments) and foreign publics (Taiwanese, overseas Chinese and other foreign citizens). The former is the similar as the study of diplomacy while the latter is the similar as public diplomacy. The thesis does not suggest that public diplomacy can replace "united front," but it does suggest that the united front may not be as unique and influential as people thought in the cross-strait relations. It is still a strategy of influence. In the latter part of targeting at foreign publics, the strategy of "united front" is still in the scope of public diplomacy, which China uses to influence foreign publics (mostly Taiwanese). In this thesis, the meaning of *public diplomacy* differs from that of *united front*. The reason to use public diplomacy instead of united-front strategy is that the aim of this thesis is to propose a modification to China's current public diplomacy. Moreover, I believe that public diplomacy could be generalized better to other cases when another country exerts influence than united front.

## **1.5 Organization**

In the organization of the thesis, the thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I illustrates the deficiencies of current researches of public diplomacy and points that China's public

diplomacy may contain inconsistency—the perceptions of China’s public diplomacy and what China promote in practice. In the sections, the Chapter sketches the basic framework and concepts of this study, describes its motive and research purpose and includes research question and hypothesis. It also includes a literature review, a discussion of methodology, and considerations of significance, delimitations, and organization.

In chapter II, in order to examine whether the inconsistency exists and to explain why the inconsistency exists, the thesis examines public diplomacy and what it means for China in the relation to the perception of governments and academics. These chapters also provide a detailed literature review to determine why the inconsistency appears. Chapter II argues that inconsistency may not only exist in China as the reason for the inconsistency is rooted in an over-emphasis on soft power in public diplomacy. To be more specific, Chapter II focuses on conceptualizing public diplomacy. By identifying public diplomacy in academia and practice, I try to dissolve the connection between soft power and public diplomacy. I am against using soft power, smart power, sticky power or the “notions of powers” as the theoretical foundation of public diplomacy, because to do so generates bias. I focus more on what governments do to exert influence rather than on the work of public diplomacy that governments claim to do. Chapter II also assesses China’s thinking on public diplomacy, which includes the context within Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the history and development of China’s public diplomacy. I conclude that China may launch reform of its public diplomacy policy and transform it with Chinese characters, but the traditional thinking of external propaganda remains and evolves when practiced in modern times.

Chapter III introduces the preliminary notion of comprehensive public diplomacy by illustrating its importance, framework and definition. The chapter also discusses the notion of

PD assets. Although comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets derive from the result of case study in the chapter IV, it proves easier to understand it before the case study. I argue that comprehensive public diplomacy captures a wider appreciation of operations than current notions. Comprehensive public diplomacy helps to compensate for the problem of inconsistency and the PD assets supplements comprehensive public diplomacy with more explanatory detail.

In chapter IV, the thesis examines the case studies and tries to verify the research question. The chapter illustrates China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan. Through case study, I identify neglected public diplomacy practices in Taiwan. How China promotes public diplomacy and how its public diplomacy differs from the current study will be discussed. I also identify relations between China and Taiwanese proxies and discuss how the proxies help China do public diplomacy in exerting influence on Taiwan.

Finally, Chapter V summarizes and concludes the study, further indicates the contributions of this thesis, discusses its limitations and proposes future research. I conclude that the case study's results verify the research question, and the chapter also discusses the need for further study regarding the detachment between soft power and public diplomacy. I propose that PD assets and comprehensive public diplomacy have better implications for and applications to China's public diplomacy and may also be applicable to other countries' public diplomacy, which may urge us to re-think public diplomacy.

## Chapter II Conceptualizing public diplomacy

The study of public diplomacy has been prolific in recent decades. Yet the definitions, scopes and concepts of public diplomacy have varied from time to time and have different perspectives. Today, when we talk about public diplomacy, it is hard to identify the meaning of *public diplomacy* immediately without first knowing the topic, content, and even the discipline. For example, on the one hand, public diplomacy is considered to be a tool whereby countries pursue national interests by informing and influencing foreign publics (Pratkanis, 2009). On the other hand, public diplomacy could also represent a mutual-understanding mechanism. As Schuker (2004) says, public diplomacy is “effectively communicating with publics around the globe – to understand, value and even emulate America’s vision and ideas; historically one of America’s most effective weapons of outreach, persuasion and policy.”

The meaning of *public diplomacy* has changed through time and space. Nancy Snow (2005) points out that public diplomacy has expanded from the actions of governments in influencing foreign publics within their foreign policies to that of multi-faceted participants, including multinational corporations, the media, NGOs and faith-based organizations. Among these definitions and descriptions, Gregory’s definition covers a wider scope in the concepts of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2011: 353).

The discussion of public diplomacy offered in this chapter is nuanced and complicated due to the wide range of definitions available for the term. It is necessary to define and map the scope of the study by clarifying some debates and controversies concerning public diplomacy

and how it connects to other relevant concepts such as propaganda and soft power. Then it is comparatively easier to identify the question and the problem in current public diplomacy as well as China's public diplomacy. In addition, this chapter is important because the content of public diplomacy that the thesis tries to point out through the case study is not in the scope of current public diplomacy. Consequently, the meaning of public diplomacy and China's public diplomacy has to be clarified first.

## **2.1 The origin and development of public diplomacy**

The term *public diplomacy* was first used by *The Times* magazine in 1856 as an expression to criticize the posturing of President Franklin Pierce (Cull, 2008: 19), but the most widely used and acknowledged definitions are those proposed in 1965 by Professor of Tufts University Edmund Gullion (Wolper, 1991). His definitions have been widely used ever since (Malone, 1988: 2). Gullion argues that, "by public diplomacy we understand the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions" (Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy quoted by Henrikson, 2006: 9).

Early definitions place more emphasis on the purpose of influence. For example, Malone (1985: 199) argues that public diplomacy is a form of direct communication with a foreign public with the aim of influencing their thinking and ultimately their governments. The main actors are governments and private sectors which are usually hired or sponsored by the former (Malone, 1985). The U.S. has similar definition. The U.S. Department of State (*Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, 1987) says that *public diplomacy* refers to "government-sponsored programs that are intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries;

its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.” The United States Information Service Agency (USIA) defines *public diplomacy* as “promoting the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad” (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, n.d.). The purpose of public diplomacy on that time was to influence foreign publics and their governments to conform to U.S. national interest. These ideas about public diplomacy focused more on exerting influence on their thinking and thereby gaining national interest. After all, “Public diplomacy is an open civic education of foreign citizens and usually is promoted by non-political methods with political purpose” (Blitz, 1986: 96). The difference is how to look at how governments “educate” foreign publics.

However, as time goes by, the meaning of *public diplomacy* changes as well. Scholars have different thoughts about public diplomacy. Communication and mutual understanding are more and more important during the changing. Hans Tuch (1990:3-4) describes public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, and its national goals and current policies.” With the end of the Cold War, the discussion of public diplomacy decreased dramatically until 9/11.

After September 11, 2001, the importance of public diplomacy woke up America’ the question “Why do they hate us” was aroused in the United States. The United States government first focused on communication theories concerning public diplomacy because the U.S. government thought “they hate us because they don’t understand us” (Snow, 2009: 7). In fact, many 9/11 terrorists were the target of traditional public diplomacy: educated elites who know

about western values (Taylor, 2009: 12). The U.S. government launched some useful early initiatives, such as the Public Diplomacy Task Force, political campaigns, and the Coalition Information Center network, but they resulted in the discontinued of the projects, the departure of key persons and the inability of branch organizations (Gregory, 2007: 339). Besides, other problems of U.S. public diplomacy were, as Yun (2006) pointed out, that “US public diplomacy is conceived as marketing problems which can be solved by advertising.” Those problems provoked a revised consideration of public diplomacy in the academy. To change people’s minds, the old, secret, one-way communication methods were no longer effective in debates of public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008; Fitzpatrick, 2009a; Melissen, 2005; Zaharna, 2009)

Practitioners and scholars focus more and more on dialogue, mutual communication, and mutual cooperation, and the “new” public diplomacy emerged as Zaharna (2010: 83) argued that original ideas about public diplomacy are no longer applied. Since 2000, new public diplomacy was employed by scholars and practitioners (Gilboa, 2008). Many new concepts were introduced into public diplomacy—mostly based on the experience of the U.S. The construction of new public diplomacy was built up and varied according to feedback from the field and scholars’ assertions about the nature of effective new public diplomacy. Thus, many contents of new public diplomacy emerged. The definitions of new public diplomacy offered by different scholars vary, but most agree that new public diplomacy includes the idea of greater exchanges, dialogue and mutuality (Melissen and Sharp, 2006). New public diplomacy differs from traditional public diplomacy because it blurs traditional distinctions between domestic and international activities, between public and traditional diplomacy, between cultural diplomacy, news management and marketing in new public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008).



In the post-9/11 era, new public diplomacy became the mainstream in the domain. Joseph Nye (2010) points out that the new public diplomacy is no longer restrained to messaging, promoting campaigns, or even direct governmental communications with foreign publics in its attempt to fulfill foreign policy. New public diplomacy is also about building relationships with citizens, social actors and NGOs in other countries and facilitating relations between domestic and foreign non-governmental parties (Nye, 2010). Another salient point affecting the development of public diplomacy is the Internet and the new technology.

By 2008, the use of social media and the Internet have integrated with new public diplomacy to form the term *public diplomacy 2.0* (Cull, 2013). According to Cull, public diplomacy 2.0 has three major characteristics: using technology such as social networks to facilitate the creation of relationships, relating user-generated content through those social networks with public diplomacy 2.0, and distributing the information of the networks horizontally instead of vertically as it is before. Social networks and public diplomacy are closely bound. Now everyone can comment and send information through new social media such as Facebook or Titter. As ways of disseminating messages increase, methods of public diplomacy increase as well. Not only governments but also individuals could become actors in public diplomacy. Attias (2012) called it as peer-to-peer diplomacy. It is as He (2012) argues: Though the messages are sent among people and their peers, government can still involve themselves in peer-to-peer diplomacy and harness the communication.

## **2.2 The practice of public diplomacy in other countries**

In practice, countries promote public diplomacy differently. The focus of their policy diversifies the methods of public diplomacy. This section delivers public diplomacy

applications in some countries to reveal the veil of public diplomacy and to depict differences among those countries. It helps to identify the application of public diplomacy and to provide the foundation of what public diplomacy is and the fact that public diplomacy has its multi-layer of purpose. The section is important because it verifies and validates the definition of public diplomacy adopted in this thesis, and thus provides foundation for the next chapter.

### **2.2.1 The United States**

Public diplomacy is an important way for the United States to counter terrorism, exert influence on other nations and to promote its values. The beginning of U.S. public diplomacy can be traced back to 1917. President Woodrow Wilson named George Creel to establish the Committee on Public Information (CPI) to seek support from foreign publics and domestic people through newsprints, pamphlets, posters, radio and films, etc. (Wang, 2007; Masafumi and Kitano, 2010). Domestically, CPI launched programs such as *Four Minute Man*, which aimed to recruit volunteers to speak for four minutes in favor of the U.S. participating in the war. In addition, CPI also commissioned propaganda films such as *The Claws of the Hun*, *The Kaiser*, *The Prussian Cur*, and songs such as “Jonny Get Your Gun”, “Good-by Broadway, Hello France” (Marrin, 2000: 44). Internationally, CPI tried to improve the U.S. image overseas, to promote democracy against autocracy, to enhance morale in the Allied nations, and to create discord among the central powers (Wolper, 1993: 19). For instance, CPI dispatched representatives to overseas countries, issued German language newspapers, and bribed or subsidized foreign news institutions (Murphy and White, 2007: 18).

During World War II, President Roosevelt established the United States Information Service to cope with war propaganda. After the War, the U.S. Information and Educational

Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was passed and signed. It allowed for institutionalization of the Voice of America, additional exchange programs in the Fulbright Program, and other media. The act provided the foundation of the U.S. public diplomacy in the following decades (Wang, 2007: 24). However, one of the major restrictions was that it prohibited domestic distribution because Congress was concerned that materials targeting a foreign audience might later be used to propagandize the American people (Stanton et al., 1967).<sup>1</sup>

During the Cold War, ideological warfare between the U.S. and the Soviet Union boosted the U.S. to disseminate U.S. values worldwide against the Soviet Union and communism. The USIA was the organization that led U.S. propaganda/ public diplomacy to overtly counter communism. According to a memorandum from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency to President Kennedy (Claussen et al., 2001), the goals and ways of the USIA were as follows:

The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements. The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures,

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<sup>1</sup> it is *de facto* instead of *de jure* restriction

television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others (Claussen et al, 2001).

The activities USIA engaged in can be divided into five categories: cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, international broadcasting, listening, and advocacy (Cull, 2008). The work of USIA was diversified. In international broadcasting, it supervised U.S. government-funded media such as Voice of America, Radio and Television Marti, and the Worldnet Television and Film Service. In the cultural and educational dimension, the Fulbright scholarship program was one of the successful works. It has operated in 155 countries with more than one million alumni up to now. Other programs of USIA include the English-teaching fellow program and the international visitor program. Moreover, USIA launched speakers and specialists programs in 1994 to send American experts abroad to directly engage with foreign audiences to support U.S. foreign policy; USIA also ran over 100 information resource centers to distribute information related to the U.S. or its interests to foreign leaders, academia and media.

The lines between public diplomacy and espionage were sometimes intertwined in practice. During the Cold War, the USIA was basically to promote public diplomacy overtly while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) promoted covert psychological warfare missions and otherwise engaged in covert public diplomacy. For example, the CIA financed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to target people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union until 1972. The CIA also helped to issue magazines and organize international conferences in Western Europe, and it subsidized political parties, student groups and journalists (Nelson and Izadi, 2009). The CIA also made attempts at regime change and manipulation in countries such as Cuba, Iran and Guatemala. In addition, the USIA was involved in some covert operations during the Vietnam

War. The USIA was assigned a new mission to win support from the Vietnamese by “influencing journalists favorably, learning the tactics of psychological war used by the enemy and weakening its moral strength” (Mattelart, 1994: 112). USIA created The Joint United States Public Affairs Office to engage public diplomacy and psychological warfare in Vietnam. However, the work was questioned by Congress in 1972 because USIA agents worked covertly against the Kennedy’s instruction and because it was hard to determine whether work of USIA was to disseminate propaganda or information (ibid.).

After the Cold War, the importance of USIA declined, which resulted in a decrease of its budget in the late 1990s. The USIA was abolished in 1999, and most of its functions were incorporated into the Department of State. The turning point of the U.S. public diplomacy is the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Questions that President Bush and other Americans pursued— “Why do they hate us?” and “What do we do?”—led them to revalue public diplomacy by the U.S. government, media, and scholars. Public diplomacy thus regained its importance. Governmental institutions were established to promote and advise public-diplomacy related policies and strategies, such as the White House Coalition Information Center in 2001, Office of Global Communication in 2002. The aims of U.S. public diplomacy were to support the war on terror. Thus, the Department of Defense (DOD) was also one of the main actors in projecting the U.S. image (Cull, 2013a: 2). For example, the DOD established the Office of Strategic Influence to launch psychological warfare and propaganda even though the office was closed soon after the public learned of its existence. It was argued that many DOD projects and programs targeting foreign audiences were like “a militarization of the face of US public diplomacy within the frame of projecting American power and prevailing over adversaries” (Cull, 2013b: 130). In the post-9/11 era, many activities are promoted by the under-

secretary of state for public diplomacy. The position was established and is responsible for projecting the U.S. image—especially in the Islamic world—through radio, publications, Internet, television, lectures, and other programs.

It has been argued that traditional public diplomacy is no longer effective and that the focus of U.S. public diplomacy has also changed from informing, one-way communication to two-way communication. However, American public diplomacy has been criticized for promoting marketing, propaganda, and the one-way flow of information over confidence building and mutual communications (Dutta-Bergman, 2006; Izadi, 2016; Kruckeberg and Vujnovic, 2005). For example, a *Hi* magazine published in 2003 which featured celebrity and entertainment content of American was aimed to attract young Arabians to American culture. This resulted in failure, however, and the magazine suspended in 2005.

In his 2009 inaugural speech, President Obama declared that the U.S. “will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” The Obama administration has embraced the idea of “engagement” and has facilitated mutual communication in its public diplomacy (Comor and Bean, 2012). Moreover, Obama ended isolationist strategies in many countries such as Myanmar, Iran and Cuba. The U.S. has modified its public diplomacy strategies. Currently, the goal of the U.S. on public diplomacy is to counter violent extremism; to counter negative Russian influence; to promote trade agreements; to ensure efforts to support the advancement of democracy, human rights and civil society and to protect the global environment (United States Advisory Commission on public diplomacy, 2015: 13).

However, the United States still puts a lot of effort into counterterrorism. For instance, the Global Engagement Center, which replaced the Strategic Counterterrorism Communications in 2016, leads “the coordination, integration, and synchronization of

Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations” (U.S. Department of States, n.d.). In addition, to counter anti-American sentiments evoked by terrorists through the Internet, the U.S. Congress amended the *de facto* restriction on domestic. The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 (H.R. 5736), included at Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), was passed and signed in 2013. It amended the Smith-Mundt Act and authorized “the domestic dissemination of information and material about the United States intended primarily for foreign audiences, and for other purposes” (House of Representative, 2012). It is officially legal for the government to engage in public diplomacy domestically. The criticism that American public diplomacy involves more propaganda than relationship-building remains. Overall, the development of the public diplomacy in the United States reflects the changing of national and international situation it copes with.

### **2.2.2 The United Kingdom**

For the British government, *public diplomacy* means “work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organizations overseas, to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long-term goals” (Carter, 2005). Thus, the United Kingdom puts a lot of effort into projecting its culture and image through English-language teaching, educational exchanges, scholarships and international broadcasting. In 2002, the British government established the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board to formulate “a national public diplomacy strategy to support the UK's key overseas interests and objectives” (Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, n.d.). Although Public

Diplomacy Strategy Board was replaced by the Public Diplomacy Board in 2006, the strategy of British public diplomacy has a better layout. The core members of British public diplomacy bodies include governmental and government-funded institutions such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the British Council, BBC World Service and the Department for Culture Media and Sport, etc. Of these, the BBC World Service and the British Council are the primary institutions that deal directly with public diplomacy.

The role of BBC World Service is to project the UK's values rather than to project British image and reputation. It is, as the director of BBC world service, Nigel Chapman, said, that "it evinces in the way it covers journalism". He referred to the BBC World Service as a "great asset to Britain" (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2006: 24). As the world's largest international broadcaster, BBC World Service has reached a global audience in 29 languages of 308 million per week through the platform of Radio, TV and online (Unsworth, 2015). In 2015, BBC announced a plan to expand its services to reach 500 million by 2022 by adding 11 languages and other new investments ("BBC World Service," 2016). Overall, the BBC World Service is vital to the UK, as the report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2006: 25) concludes that BBC World Service is "a world class international broadcaster and to understand the significance of its editorial independence to its reputation and ability to deliver an unbiased trustworthy news service."

Another institution, the British Council, is responsible for promoting cultural relations with other countries (FCO, 2016: 95). It deals with many works in education, civil society, art and cultural opportunities by promoting knowledge of the UK and the English language. The purpose of the British Council is to achieve "friendly knowledge and understanding" between the people of the UK and other countries" (British Council, 2016: 2). The British Council has



made direct communication with more than 20 million people, and it makes indirect communication through online, broadcast and publication with 500 million people annually (British Council, n.d.). The British Council is regarded as a successful and crucial instrument in the UK.

The British government promotes public diplomacy with another crucial objective: to stimulate business and trade, especially in cultural industry and creative industry. Campaigns have been proposed and promoted by the government such as “Cool Britannia” and “Innovative Britain.” It is vital to incorporate soft power in investment, business and related cultural or educational products. The British government launched the “GREAT Britain” campaign from 2012 to “encourage people to visit, do business, invest and study in UK.

When William Hague served as Secretary of State for FCO in 2010, he directed a reform of the FCO and it changed the UK’s public diplomacy. He first launched “diplomatic excellence” to improve the framework of the FCO with the aim of providing the best diplomatic service in the world and to spread ideas, norms and influence—particularly focusing on combining political lobbying and aid to enhance trade (Pamment, 2014). In addition, although many public diplomacy activities and strategies remain, a major change is to alter the terminology from “public diplomacy” to “soft power” (Pamment, 2014). Ever since, the term *public diplomacy* seems to have vanished from government papers. Nevertheless, the UK maintains its strategy of public diplomacy in cultural and banding-related polices.

### **2.2.3 Japan**

Japan’s public diplomacy has a long history since the end of World War I. After World War II, Japan was anxious to get rid of its negative image as a military invader. To restore its

reputation, it sponsored a series of events like the Tokyo 1964 Olympics and the Osaka Expo in 1970. The 1964 Tokyo Olympic especially helped Japan to return smoothly to international society, as an improved image of Japan was contributed both by Japanese attitudes toward the Olympics and its infrastructure (Abel, 2012). Followed by the economic and oil crisis in 1970s, Japan's public diplomacy continued to focus on the United States. The main purpose of Japan's public diplomacy strategy was to increase its national reputation, economic and political influence in the United States (Zhao, 2007). Through campaigns and educational and cultural interactions organized by institutions such as the Japan Foundation and the United States-Japan Foundation, Japan aimed at increasing its national reputation and friendly image. At an economic and political level, the Japanese government and corporations put a lot of effort into political lobby to ease difficulties and serve Japanese interests such as selling Japanese products. For example, Japan spent 26.8 million dollars for political services and activities in the United States in 1987, including hiring public-relations firms and advertising companies (Manheim, 1994: 21). Overall, Japanese public diplomacy has made very good use of unofficial interactions, lobbying and founding research institutions in the U.S. to eliminate prejudice, to clear misunderstanding, to exert influence on the U.S.'s Asian policy, and to gain economic interest (Han, Zhao and Ke, 2011; Zhao, 2007).

Influenced by the model of the UK, Japan's public diplomacy is directed and organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is implemented by institutions such as the Japan Foundation, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), the Japan External Trade Organization and other NGOs and NPOs (Han, Zhao and Ke, 2011: 204). The Japanese government uses its corporations to promote public diplomacy by establishing official and semi-official foundations (Han, Zhao and Ke, 2011: 205).

In addition, the Japanese government has also noticed the functions of global social media. After the earthquake in 2011, the Japanese government suffered strong criticism from the global society. The late response of the Japanese government is to deal with the emergency caused the result of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Because of rumors and unverified information, concerns over nuclear pollution and other issues devastated the Japanese image. The credibility of the Japanese government with respect to the nuclear disaster was low. Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter became another way to acquire information. Therefore, in response to the crisis, the Japanese government put a lot of effort into providing accurate information through multiple channels. The deployment of global social media was emphasized to deal with the national crisis and to recover the nation's international image (Park and Lim, 2014). For example, the Cool Japan advisory Council argued for the need to increase ties with foreign societies through social networks (Cool Japan advisory Council quoted by Park and Lim, 2014).

Nowadays, Japan's public diplomacy has two major dimensions: One is to build a good reputation; the other involves economic benefits. To promote public diplomacy, Japan has focused on international aid, educational exchanges, Japanese language learning, manga exporting and tourism. For example, in 2002, Japan launched its "Cool-Japan" strategy, which focused on promoting Japanese popular culture. The "Cool-Japan" strategy is a national project that incorporated the Japanese intellectual-property strategy, which was designed to "increase global demand for Japanese products overseas and to use as a resource of symbolic power for inducing pro-Japan sentiments especially in Asia" (Daliot-Bul, 2009). With the bottleneck that Japan faced in promoting the "Cool-Japan" strategy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry modified the strategy because it noticed that Japan cannot rely on conventional models of industry and economy in 2012. The purpose of the Cool-Japan strategy is to make profit by

targeting people in Asian countries due to their rapid growth in economy. The products that the “Cool-Japan” strategies promote particularly focus on Japanese lifestyle and culture-related products such as food, drama, fashion, tourism, film and music, animation, and games; through the strategy, the ministry expects to gain foreign demand of around 8 to 11 trillion yen (2.3 trillion yen in 2012) from the market and to understand domestic demand, which creates more jobs in Japan and attracts more tourists (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2012).

#### **2.2.4 Norway and Canada**

Norway and Canada are often discussed together due their narrow focus on specific area in public diplomacy. As middle powers, Norway and Canada do not have many resources to deploy a full-scale public diplomacy strategy like that of the United States or China. Thus, it is much efficient for them to concentrate their resources on one or two specific subjects and goals. Due to its efficiency at generating returns, Gareth Evans calls it “niche diplomacy” (Herikson, 2005: 67), which employed in small and middle power actors that their information may be limited and easily be based upon prejudices. Both countries put their efforts into the arena of human security and are considered to have a good niche diplomacy, which also means a successful public diplomacy. Public diplomacy in Norway and Canada shows the example of a leading position in relationship-building (Zaharna, 2009). They also show the examples of the new public diplomacy because the actor of public diplomacy is not only included in the process of government-to-foreign people but also included in the processes of government-to-domestic people and of government-to-NGOs (Han, Zhao and Ke, 2011: 208), as new public diplomacy suggests.

Norway has concentrated its resources on promoting peaceful resolutions in conflicts.

Besides generating a positive image of the Nobel Peace Prize, Norway has primarily focused on conflict resolution activities in the middle East and elsewhere, such as by facilitating the 1993 Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Leonard, 2002) and mediating conflicts between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. One of the characteristics of Norway's public diplomacy is its reliance upon NGOs and sometimes even individuals. Herikson (2005: 70) argues that the success of Norway's public diplomacy involves intensive collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and direct communication with civil society. Many peaceful resolutions and activities of Norway are implemented by NGOs (Han, Zhao and Ke, 2011: 208). The relationship between the government and NGOs is like the "proxy agent" and the partners of the Norwegian government. On the one hand, Norway established the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation to finance NGOs and other foreign aids. On the other hand, NGOs have a strong influence in consultation with the Norwegian government to generate policies on peace diplomacy and to influence the choice of a policy of priority (Pisarska, 2015: 204-205).

Canada's public diplomacy grows from the Canadian-U.S. relationship because U.S. domestic legislation and regulation impact and affect the interests of Canada (Henrikson, 2005: 75-76). In 1995, the strategy of Canadian's foreign policy and public diplomacy lies in the three pillars, which are which are protecting national security within a stable global framework, promoting the prosperity and employment of Canada, and projecting the values and culture of Canada (Foreign Affairs Canada Office, 2005). However, among the three pillars, Canada's public diplomacy, like Norway, is famous for promoting human-security issues. The most significant case is the Ottawa Convention. Representatives of 122 countries gathered in Ottawa to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of

Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction in December of 1997. The convention aims to eliminate anti-personnel landmines. It was a successful act of public diplomacy because the signing of the convention required coordination from NGOs and other governments, such as Canada, Norway and Sweden. As a leading and hosting country, Canada facilitated the convention through communication with NGOs and by funding some of the NGOs, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The Canadian government also put effort in educational exchanges, art and cultural programs, international broadcasting, Internet forums (etc.) supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. With many reforms and restructurings of its governmental institution in the past decade, Canada's public diplomacy is currently directed by Global Affairs Canada, which is led by three ministers, including a minister of foreign affairs, minister of international trade, and minister of international development and La Francophonie. The focus of its public diplomacy seems to change. Trade and investment plays an important role in public diplomacy, and it is involved in many public-diplomacy programs and activities. Mckercher and Sarson (2016) argue that the Canadian government prioritizes trade and investments, which influence its public diplomacy and global-cooperation initiatives. For example, economic diplomacy and business dominate Canada's current public diplomacy as Mckercher and Sarson (2016) illustrates that the cut of foreign aid was from 0.34% of Canada's GDP in 2010 to 0.24% in 2014.

In addition, one of the crucial elements of Canada's public diplomacy is that the audience and actors of public diplomacy are not only targeting at foreign publics but also domestic publics due to separatism in Quebec (Huijgh and Byrne, 2012). The purpose is to forge a national identity domestically through international roles such as peace-keeper and aid-giver

(Potter, 2002: 48). For example, the Canadian government sent diplomats to Quebec to communicate with young people through conferences and lectures in school to introduce the international work of the Canadian federal government (Zhao, 2007).

Public diplomacy in many countries corresponds to what McQuail (2010:568) says: Public diplomacy is “a general term to describe the efforts by nation states to win support and a favorable image among the general public of other countries, usually by way of news management and carefully planned initiatives designed to foster positive impressions.” However, in general, different countries have different goals and strategies at different times and thus different outputs of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is an instrument that has adapted and changed in accord with national policies. When needed, the United States also promotes public diplomacy along with the CIA’s covert operations. The lines between public diplomacy and espionage activities cannot be clearly distinguished. When needed, the United States has changed its position on domestic distribution. When needed, countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada continue to promote public diplomacy to achieve economic interest and acquire a positive image through soft power. When needed, Norway and Canada still concentrate their resources on particular arenas to increase collaboration and human security. The point is that public diplomacy is adapted to a nations’ policy. When nations secretly exert influence on foreign publics, public diplomacy can also be considered traditional public diplomacy, propaganda or even espionage; when nations promote their values and cultures overtly, which is of course easily done through mutual communications or campaigns, then it is considered new public diplomacy. Based on the development of public diplomacy in different countries, it is realized that a nation will communicate and disseminate information to foreign publics if doing so will help to facilitate its goals. Thus, the greatest common description

of public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses to achieve its interests by influencing foreign publics without consideration for whether the channel is domestic or outbound. Public diplomacy thus has a multi-dimensional function of engaging foreign publics. China's doing is not that different from these countries. When needed, it would not be surprised that China used all kinds of methods to influence Taiwanese to acquire the goal. This thesis would further verify the argument made in this paragraph through the case of China's public diplomacy on Taiwan.

### **2.3 Debates on public diplomacy**

The concept of public diplomacy overlaps with other concepts in different subjects. Among these subjects are questions about the extent to which public diplomacy should be employed (such as national branding, propaganda, and strategic communication). More broadly, the study of public diplomacy is concerned with whether those terms should be related to public diplomacy at all. This is where debates on public diplomacy become heated. "What is public diplomacy?" remains a serious problem in the study of public diplomacy. The following sections illustrate the debates and the wide range of public diplomacy to show the need to further define *public diplomacy* in this study and to evolve over time, especially in the realm of international relations. The meaning of *public diplomacy* varies from country to country and from time to time.

#### **2.3.1 Two different kinds of thinking in public diplomacy**

To organize the development of public diplomacy, it is easy to discover that the focus of public diplomacy changed gradually from the Cold-War to the post-Cold-War era. However, the difference between traditional and new public diplomacy has diversified people's



perception of the meaning of public diplomacy, which has led to the contentious argument concerning the definition of public diplomacy. In fact, scholars have classified two contrasting schools. For instance, Terry L. Deibel and Water R. Rovers (1976) suggest that the objects of public diplomacy are “explain and defend government policies to foreign audiences” and “portray national society to foreign audiences.” The two objects imply a diverse purpose of public diplomacy, which is accord with the two thoughts concerning traditional and new public diplomacy. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) further classify the two philosophical thoughts of public diplomacy as tender-minded and tough-minded. Signitzer and Coombs (1992:141) suggest that the aim of the tough-minded school is to influence foreign attitudes while the tender-minded school is to create a climate of mutual understanding. Nancy Snow (2009: 6) describes two different philosophies in the utility of public diplomacy. The first one concerns those who treat public diplomacy as a necessary evil: merely a supplementary tactic that supports traditional public diplomacy and its diplomacy efforts (2009: 6). The second concerns those who treat public diplomacy as a context for how states interact with each other—from public-affairs officers to the citizen diplomat and student exchanges, for instance (2009: 6). Two different kinds of philosophical thought lead to two different kinds of public diplomacy. While one viewpoint regards *public diplomacy* as a soft term of *propaganda* (Holbrooke, 2001; Elliott, 2002) or “psychological-political warfare” (Lord, 2006: 8), others regard it as a “communication system designed to create a dialogue with foreign citizens” (Gilboa, 2006: 718). Followed by the two philosophical thoughts illustrated by Deibel and Rovers et al., the characteristics of the two distinct thoughts resemble traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy, respectively. Traditional and new public diplomacy were developed and classified in different times and spaces. The idea of public diplomacy of the Cold War is close

to that of the tough-minded school while the new public diplomacy is more like that of the tender-minded school. Although new public diplomacy is the mainstream in the current study, the question is whether the two different thoughts are mutually exclusive or not. Could the two thoughts be integrated when promoting public diplomacy? Solutions to these questions are proposed in this thesis.

### **2.3.2 Public diplomacy and propaganda**

Two philosophical thoughts reflect the diversity and complexity of public diplomacy. One of the debates in the field of public diplomacy is over the extent to which public diplomacy should use the techniques of propaganda to influence foreign publics or whether public diplomacy should be related to propaganda (Kelley, 2009: 75). It is known that public diplomacy is often considered a soft form of propaganda. This was especially true during the Cold War. In fact, Gullion himself admits that *public diplomacy* is used because the term *propaganda* is too negative (Brown, 2003):

To connote this activity, we at the Fletcher School tried to find a name. I would have liked to call it 'propaganda.' It seemed like the nearest thing in the pure interpretation of the word to what we were doing. But 'propaganda' has always a pejorative connotation in this country. To describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda, we hit upon 'public diplomacy'. (Gullion quote by Brown, 2003)

The USIA decided to use the term *public diplomacy* not only because *propaganda* is a negative term but also because *public diplomacy* can be given a new meaning (Cull, 2008: 21). The term

*propaganda* then was gradually replaced by *public diplomacy* in the USIA. By developing the study of public diplomacy, propaganda has become more like an “original sin” that is hard to get rid of.

In fact, the definitions and descriptions of propaganda are numerous and are widely invoked (Cunningham, 2002). There is no common definition of *propaganda* or *public diplomacy*. The term *propaganda* is frequently used in the media, governments and academia with different interpretations. Terms like *news management*, *information control*, *public diplomacy*, *brainwashing*, *strategic communication*, *manipulation*, *deception*, and *opinion management* are often treated as synonyms of *propaganda* (Cunningham, 2002: 12; d’Hooghe, 2014: 27; Macdonald, 2007). Propaganda is broadly used from war to elections, from domestic citizens to international society. Among these definitions, “manipulation” is the core characteristic in propaganda. Jowett and O’Donnell (2006: 7) define *propaganda* as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” A simpler explanation is offered by Lasswell (1995: 13): “propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by manipulation of representation.” Most of the time, propaganda is a negative word in western society. Hass (1953: 463) shows that “propaganda assumes the dishonest use of facts and the distortion of concepts devised on intellectually sincere grounds.” However, a more neutral definition treats propaganda as a neutral instrument used to achieve a goal. Taylor (2003: 7) says that propaganda is to serve the people who convey messages, ideas, and ideologies through communication with the aims of satisfying self-interest.

Although many definitions of propaganda involve deceptions and distorted information, sometimes the message of propaganda is not as opaque as we think. To classify forms of

propaganda, Jowett and O'Donnell (2006: 16-26) use the categories white, grey and black propaganda to distinguish the sources of information and the accuracy of the messages. White propaganda means that the source is identifiable and the message is authentic; black propaganda means that the message is distorted and concealed. Grey propaganda means that the source may or may not be identifiable and that the accuracy of the message is uncertain. Transparent or opaque, it all depends on how the actor propagates the information.

The merging of new public diplomacy represents a need to distinguish public diplomacy from notorious propaganda again. It may help to map the scope of public diplomacy. With respect to the source and accuracy of the information, the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy is that public diplomacy only overlaps with white propaganda (d'Hooghe, 2014: 28). Jan Melissen (2005: 18) argues that public diplomacy is two-way communication while propaganda focuses only on persuading people what to think without listening to what they say. Zaharna (2004: 223) argues that propaganda manipulates the communication on purpose such that the audience feels compelled to accept the information, while [new] public diplomacy is open public communication such that the audience is free to accept or not accept the information. Rugh (2006:4) argues that, unlike propaganda, public diplomacy uses "open means and not covert ones, and it is always truthful". Farwell (2012) points out that the use of soft power can be identified in public diplomacy but not in propaganda. To distinguish propaganda from public diplomacy, Cold-War public diplomacy is thus often classified as traditional public diplomacy, which is a synonym of black and grey propaganda while new public diplomacy is not.

However, it is too idealistic to exclude propaganda from public diplomacy. Propaganda is actually perceived by different foreign publics which have their own thoughts about the

information they receive whether the communication involves a monologue or a dialogue, distorted or authentic information. For example, even the Fulbright program was regarded as a tool of U.S. propaganda (Lindsay, 1989). In addition, Confucius Institutes were considered important and successful instances of public diplomacy (Wu, 2011; Wu, 2012; Gao and Guo, 2013). Confucius Institutes promote and teach Chinese culture and language around the world. By the end of 2015, there were over 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius classrooms all over the world (Hanban, n.d.). The Confucius Institution is a huge public-diplomacy project in the eyes of China. And yet the result so far has produced huge differences. The Confucius Institution is considered successful in some Southeast-Asia countries such as Cambodia and Thailand (Van Chinh, 2014), though it is suspected of being a Chinese institution devoted to propaganda in Europe and the United States. Peterson (2017b) argues that the Confucius Institutes have jeopardized academic freedom in the university. For instance, the textbook itself contains the ideology of Chinese value. They have reduced the content related to “the ideas of universal values, freedom of speech, civil society, civil rights, historical errors of the Chinese Communist party, crony capitalism, and judicial independence (Peterson, 2017a). Confucius Institutes are considered tools of China’s propaganda by many skeptics.

Moreover, public diplomacy and propaganda have the same ultimate goal, which is to change the attitude of the recipients so as to benefit the government who delivers the information. The differences are in the intentions and the methods. The intentions are, as discussed above: they are not determined by the government but by the audiences. From this perspective, new public diplomacy is the same as the public diplomacy used in 1965 except that it has been given another gentler, softer name to replace the old negative one.

### 2.3.3 Public diplomacy and strategic communication

Strategic communication has been re-valued since 9/11 and public diplomacy in the United States. The merging of strategic communication is due to the need to further integrate the resource on the war on terror. It is as Mills (2006) says: The four elements of national power – namely diplomatic, economic, informational and military power – need further development. It is not enough that only military power is resourced and activated (Mills, 2006). Thus, to win the war on terror, strategic communication is integrated with other elements. The purpose of strategic communication is to understand the attitude and culture in the world; to promote dialogue between institutions and people; to advise leaders, diplomats and policy makers; and to exert influence on the audience. According to the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2010: 226), *strategic communication* refers to,

Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

However, this is only one of the definitions of *strategic communication*. *Strategic communication* is also a term with abundant meanings. Some scholars take it as a synonym of *public diplomacy* while others use it in narrower or broader senses (Gregory, 2005). For example, Joseph Nye (2004) treats it as one of the pillars of public diplomacy. On the other hand, Jones (2005) argues that strategic communication includes the disciplines of public affairs,

public diplomacy, and military-information operation. In addition, Gregory (2005: 39) concludes that:

Public diplomacy and strategic communication can be used analogously to describe a blend of activities by which governments, groups, and individuals comprehend attitudes, cultures, and mediated environments; engage in dialogue between people and institutions, advise political leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through strategies and means intended to persuade.

The relations between public diplomacy and strategic communication are easily confused. According to the U.S. White House, *strategic communication* refers to “programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations” (The White House, 2010). As a result, to promote strategic communication requires the coordination and cooperation of governmental institutions such as Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and even foreign governments. Implementation of the DOD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan, issued in 2007, is a case to point. Its main purpose is to make “the Afghan people and people in Allied and partner countries recognize and support the efforts of the Afghan government, the U.S., its Allies and partners in stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan... and reject insurgency, terrorism, and the narcotics trade” (United States Department of Defense, 2007: 1). Therefore, to achieve it requires the work not only of the U.S. but also that of the Afghan government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other institutions. Though public diplomacy and strategic communication share many

similarities, the U.S. DOD has more roles for it than any other institution in the history of strategic communication. Strategic communication is easily considered to be a part of warfare or psychological warfare.

Public diplomacy does indeed overlap with strategic communication. Whether by public diplomacy or strategic communication, governments will engage audiences to gain their national interests through messages, communications and plans. They are all considered tools for winning hearts and minds. According to what is discussed above, the difference is that public diplomacy focuses more on soft power and nation branding while strategic communication has more of a focus on the role of military operations and wars. Though they are overlapping in many ways, the extent to which they overlap remains debatable.

#### **2.3.4 Soft power and public diplomacy**

Although soft power “is a vague concept, arguably, which has been difficult to implicate as pivotal to foreign policy outcomes (Hayden, 2015),” soft power is deeply connected to public diplomacy. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2006: 6). More recently, soft power is defined as follows: “the ability to get what you want by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction” (Nye, 2011: 13). To relate public diplomacy to soft power, Rugh (2009: 13-14) explains that public diplomacy helps to amplify existing soft power and serves the national interests and foreign policy of the United States. Nye (2008: 95) points out that public diplomacy is an instrument that is used to mobilize resources which produce soft power to attract and communicate with foreign publics. When public diplomacy focuses on launching dialogue and collaboration projects with receiver countries, soft power is an easily accessed



concept for public diplomacy in attracting foreign publics. However, soft power has its weakness in employing public diplomacy. Soft power involves weak relations between the aims and the methods used to achieve them. It is as Fan (2008) points out: Nye's concept of soft power is ethnocentric and has flaws. For instance, it is assumed that there are casual relationships between attraction and the ability to influence policy; also, policy making is complicated at a personal level such that rational consideration may be more important than soft power (Fan, 2008).

Indeed, soft power is an important pillar for public diplomacy, but it is not the only pillar that supports public diplomacy. It begins with the purpose of public diplomacy. In public diplomacy, the purpose of influencing foreign publics is vital, no matter whether this is done through propaganda or sincere communication. In traditional public diplomacy, the concept of influence is much more important because it intends to meet national interests. It is as Snow (2009: 6) points out: "Traditional public diplomacy has been about governments talking to global publics (G2P), and includes those efforts to inform, influence, and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign policies." Henrikson (2005) argues that public diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by governments through a wide range of ways for the reason of "influencing the politics and actions of other governments." In new public diplomacy, the term *influence* is much less used. However, it may be a softer mode of influence through dialogue and trust-building.

In addition, although there are many types of public diplomacy, the common feature is to achieve "influence" (Fisher and Bröckerhoff quoted by Chen, 2008). If the concept of influence is crucial to determining the essence of public diplomacy, then soft power cannot speak for public diplomacy alone. Influence is not only revealed in soft power but also in hard power and

payment (Nye, 2008: 95; Lord, 2008: 63). There are many ways to exert influence, yet current public diplomacy seems restrict itself to the realm of soft power. In fact, public diplomacy has gone beyond the realm of soft power. Jan Melissen (2005: 14) has used the phrase *negative branding* to describe the “unusual displays of public diplomacy” that the Dutch Ministry of Justice in 2004 successfully decreased the number of refugees flowing into the Netherlands. It is an example of public diplomacy without including soft power but threat. There are many other cases of “negative branding” which cannot be taken as exceptions.

Moreover, it may be too simple to connect public diplomacy to soft power without considering the problems soft power has. The concept of soft power is sometimes problematic when applied to public diplomacy. It creates more diversified meanings of public diplomacy rather than integrating it. It is as Ernest Wilson (2008) indicates: The backers of diplomacy (e.g., traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy) who criticize the unintelligent use of power made a serious flaw in conceptualizing hard and soft power. It is also true that, when connecting soft power with public diplomacy, it is hard to provide better definitions and conceptualizations of public diplomacy because soft power is not without problems when practiced in the field. For example, “Soft power is not a type of power at all; rather, any resource, including military capabilities, can be soft in as much as it is perceived as legitimate for a soft purpose, for example humanitarian aid” (Noya, 2006: 66). Though Nye (2006b) explains that the military can also use soft power, the line between hard and soft power is not clear but is blurred and needs to be clarified case by case. It reveals the fact that the ideas and definitions of public diplomacy also vary with the supplementary classification of soft power. Furthermore, the multiple definitions of public diplomacy further complicate and blur the application of soft power and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is closely related to soft power; thus, if it is hard to clearly

distinguish soft power in definitions, it is also hard to distinguish public diplomacy.

### **2.3.5 Smart power and public diplomacy**

Soft power is a prominent feature of current public diplomacy, but it is not the only concept employed in public diplomacy. The emerging notion of *smart power* has provided new momentum in the study of public diplomacy. Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage proposed smart power in 2007 to further compensate soft power. “A smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources” (Nye, 2008: 94). Public diplomacy is a part of smart power. As Nye (2008: 94) says, “public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power.” With the conceptualization of smart power, the importance of using smart power in public diplomacy has been endorsed by scholars (Brown, 2009; Nye, 2008; Wilson, 2008). Also, some relevant case studies have been proposed (e.g., Chen, 2012; Copeland and Potter, 2008; Polin, 2011; Kemp and Paulauskas, 2012). However, though the idea of smart power has been proposed, many cases have focused on the military’s role as applied in public diplomacy. For example, Oktay (2012) has discussed the strategy of NATO in civil-military cooperation as an example of the use of smart power. Karadag (2017) has focused on the military’s operations with respect to humanitarian relief, construction works, and international military-education and training programs. It is true that the military could have its role in smart power. Polin (2011) notes that the U.S. military is more effective in countering Al-Qaeda’s ideology in the non-military zone than in the private sector; the U.S. soldiers who are responsible for stabilizing and reconstructing the area are the true public diplomats, nation-builders and anthropologists (ibid.). Copeland and Potter (2008) propose the term *guerrilla*

*diplomat* to denote a combination of both military information and politics used to deal with conflicts by promoting two-way communication and local knowledge in an asymmetrical war at the warzone. Many cases of smart power involve military-related operations; however, there are still some diversified examples of implementing public diplomacy with smart power.

In the case of China, Chen Po-Chi (2012) has proposed a different way of thinking in combining governmental negotiation and guiding public opinion as examples of smart power. Chen (2012) argues that the Chinese government used the smart-power strategy to deal with the anti-Carrefour incident in 2008. He illustrates how China indulged speech on the Internet, guided public opinion and then put pressure on the French government by using secret governmental diplomacy to soften its position. In addition, Kemp and Paulauskas (2012) explored the development of smart power in public diplomacy while discussing the role of Lithuania in chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2011. Kemp and Paulauskas show that how Lithuania is able to promote public diplomacy by holding the chairmanship of the OSCE. Lithuania is able to acquire smart power by being part of NATO and EU. Such power can be increased when Lithuania holds important positions in these organizations, such as the presidency of the EU (*ibid.*).

The use of smart power in public diplomacy suffers from difficulties similar to those encountered by the soft power mentioned above. This is because the conception of “smart” public diplomacy requires a clear definition of both hard and soft power; yet many studies mention only the idea of smart power. The meanings of soft power, hard power and smart power varies when applied to different cases. Moreover, to apply smart power in public diplomacy sometimes further complicates the meaning of public diplomacy rather than clearing it up. For example, in “Cyber Public Diplomacy as China’s Smart Power Strategy: Case Study of Anti-

Carrefour Incident in 2008,” Chen argues that the Chinese government used secret diplomacy to coerce the French government to yield and take it as part of wielding its hard power. However, government-to-government processes are not in the realm of public diplomacy. Can they be treated as a smart power application of public diplomacy? Of course, the use of smart power combined with both public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy would be more reasonable, as Chen argues with respect to “a smart power strategy” for China. However, it also reveals the poor application of public diplomacy among soft power, hard power, and smart power, which complicates the conceptualization of public diplomacy. If it is as Nye (2004:5) indicates, that “hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) and threats (sticks)”, then the use of smart power in public diplomacy in addition to soft power could also include hard-power-based elements such inducements and threats toward foreign publics. In addition, despite the fact that smart power has been proposed in many studies of public diplomacy, people and scholars remain focused on cases of soft-power-based public diplomacy rather than on “smart” public diplomacy. It may also point out the unclear definition of “smart” public diplomacy when applied to public diplomacy.

It may be necessary to discard the notions of soft and hard power in public diplomacy. I believe that this is necessary, because it is difficult to provide a sound argument for public diplomacy and its definitions and conceptualizations. To better define public diplomacy requires defining soft power (or smart power) first. This not only complicates the research but is also unnecessary because not all cases of public diplomacy apply to soft power (or smart power). Korb and Boorstin (2005), for example, propose “integrated power” to replace the concepts of soft power and hard power because the two concepts are used “not alternatives but as essential partners.” Public diplomacy may have a different vision even when it is not

connected with soft power or smart power. This study thus tries to put the notions of soft and hard power aside to focus on ways of influencing foreign publics with government objectives.

## **2.4 China's public diplomacy**

This section examines and analyzes the concepts and history of China's public diplomacy to answer one important question: What is public diplomacy in the eyes of China? To what extent does China embrace public diplomacy? By examining the concepts and history of China's public diplomacy, this chapter depicts missing elements in China's public diplomacy that can be verified through case studies in the following chapters. To conceptualize China's public diplomacy, it is thus necessary to examine certain facts and concepts first, including those involved in the context of CCP and Beijing government, perceptions of China's public diplomacy among academics and history of China's public diplomacy. In the section of reviewing China's public diplomacy will also provide the foundation and discussion about the inconsistency—the perceptions of China's public diplomacy and what China promote in practice.

### **2.4.1 Public diplomacy the context of CCP and Beijing government**

Chinese leaders seldom use the term *public diplomacy* in speeches, reports, and documents. It was not until 2009 that President Hu Jintao announced, in his speech at the eleventh opening conference for PRC diplomacy, that China “is going to strengthen public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, deploy all kinds of external cultural interaction activities and spread out Chinese cultural solidly.” According to Han (2010), it was the first time a Chinese leader used the term *public diplomacy*. It thus represents a symbol that China then

started its focus on public diplomacy. In the years following, Beijing seemed to talk about public diplomacy much more often than it did before.

Moreover, the goal of “strengthening public diplomacy, developing people exchanges, promoting cultural exchanges and enhancing understanding and friendship between Chinese people and the peoples from foreign countries” was written into the suggestion of the CPC Central Committee for the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in 2010 (China Internet Information Center, 2010.10.28). In the report for the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) in 2012, Hu further claimed that, “we will promote public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges solidly, and protect our rights and interests overseas.” This represents the first time that the term *public diplomacy* appeared in the report of the NCCPC, which means that the importance of public diplomacy increased. In 2014, in his speech on the 60th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Xi Jinping emphasized the promotion of public diplomacy. Xi used the story of the treasure voyages (Zheng He Xia Xiyang) of the Ming dynasty to prove that China is a peace-loving country: “Zheng He led the world's most powerful fleets engaged seven naval expeditions to the Pacific and the western Indian Ocean, visited more than 30 countries and regions, did not occupy an inch of land, but only sowing the seeds of peace and friendship,” said Xi. The speech of Xi aimed to propagate the idea that China is not a threat and to promote the idea that public diplomacy could help people around the world get to know China.

It is thus confirmed that public diplomacy has a place in the Chinese government. Although Chinese leaders have promoted public diplomacy from time to time in recent years, the definition of the term remains elusive because most of the speeches and reports of leaders

only emphasizing on the need for more public diplomacy. So, what is public diplomacy in the eyes of Beijing? Many definitions and reflections on the scope of China's public diplomacy were offered by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council Information Office (SCIO). For example, Zhao Qizheng (2007), a former head of SCIO and a former spokesman of CPPCC, wrote as follows:

China's public-diplomacy aims at increasing national reputation, image and identity. Central government, local government, or other social actors promote public diplomacy in terms of communication, public relations, etc. By interacting and communicating with foreign publics, and deploying diplomatic activities, it clarifies misunderstanding, distributes knowledge, reshapes the value, and is thus able to meet national interest.

Zhao (2007) indicates that, except for government-to-government communications, the scope of public diplomacy contains other forms of communication, including government-to-people and people-to-people communications. However, China's public diplomacy is slightly different among different governmental institutions. For example, the minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Yang Jiechi (2011) writes as follows:

Public diplomacy is usually dominated by a government with various means of communications and dissemination, targeting its own national conditions and foreign policy at the foreign public, introducing the domestic public to its foreign policies and other related initiatives, aiming at making itself understood and thus winning the support



of both domestic and foreign public, establishing a good image of the nation and the government, creating for itself an environment favorable to the public opinion, and maintaining and promoting national interests.

In comparison, the main actor of public diplomacy is the government in Yang's definition, while people-to-people diplomacy is also part of public diplomacy according to Zhao. The differences in the definitions do not indicate contradiction. However, they show that the Chinese government has a rather vague definition of public diplomacy such that different official institutions have different interpretations of public diplomacy.

CPPCC is also an important organization in planning the development of China's public diplomacy. CPPCC is an advisory institution in the Chinese government. Although CPPCC is used to being regarded as a symbolic political institution, it has modified its function and increased its influence (Yu, 2015; Li, 2002). CPPCC plays an especially important role in planning the development of China's public diplomacy. Many official documents regarding public diplomacy have been discussed and written by the CPPCC, such as the work report of the CPPCC. Although the CPPCC has a long history of dealing with foreign exchanges in the work report, it was not until the third session of the eleventh CPPCC National Committee in 2010 that the term *public diplomacy* was written. The work report depicts the achievement in the past year and the plan for the next. From 2010 to 2017, the CPPCC lists many achievements, methods and goals related to public diplomacy (See Appendix A). On the part of achievement, the focus of CPPCC was first on the research and study of public diplomacy. The Shanghai World Expo and Beijing Olympic Games play significant roles as results of public diplomacy. The journal, *Public Diplomacy Quarterly*, was published thanks to the effort of the CPPCC.

Many forums were held and mutual exchanges were made with foreign countries. The CPPCC also conducted high-level dialogues and increased communications with organizations, think tanks, mass media and influential figures of foreign countries. On the methods, CPPCC emphasized many times its intention to “increase the contact with parliaments and congresses, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, and influential figures in foreign countries.” With respect to the goal of its public diplomacy, CPPCC retains the fundamental idea of public diplomacy, which is “to improve the international community’s understanding of China’s context.”

In the past few years, China’s public diplomacy has expanded its use in other policies. In the report of the 12th CPPCC National Committee in 2015 and 2016, public diplomacy is given one more purpose in serving China’s policy. It became a tool in recent years for serving the BRI and the Chinese dream. It is a transition in that the use of public diplomacy has been modified from that of national-reputation projection to the promotion of specific policies. The BRI was proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013 to strengthen cooperation between China and the rest of Eurasia. More importantly, it shows that China is aware of the multiple use of public diplomacy with respect to other policies.

#### **2.4.2 China’s public diplomacy in the academics**

The concepts of soft power and public diplomacy have attracted much attention in China in recent years. Especially after China’s Hu Jintao proposed the promotion of public diplomacy in his speech on the eleventh opening ceremony of the conference for PRC diplomats in 2009, more and more Chinese scholars became involved in that field. Publication of articles and research papers about China’s public diplomacy has been prolific during the last decade. Over

653 academic articles, theses and papers were published by Chinese academics from 2001 to 2011 (Wu, 2012). Universities have also established research centers for public diplomacy, such as the Beijing Foreign Studies University, the Renmin University of China and Jilin University.

Despite the fact that many definitions of public diplomacy have been proposed, many Chinese scholars and practitioner indicate that China's public diplomacy aims to increase the national reputation and safeguard its national interest—aims which also stick to the principles of the Beijing government. For example, Zheng Hua (2011) indicates that public diplomacy is directed by governments and participated in by NGOs and private sectors for the purpose of promoting national reputation in foreign publics. It is a diplomacy that targets foreign publics, especially foreign elites, primarily by using cultural activities. China's public diplomacy is led and directed by the Beijing government. The pioneer of public diplomacy, Zhao Qizheng, who directed the Chinese academy in public diplomacy, has taken the most credit. In 2010, the Foreign Affair Committee of the national PPC established an academic journal entitled *Public Diplomacy Quarterly* which is considered a guide and key journal in China's public diplomacy.

The journal issues many articles related to public diplomacy, and it has indeed reverberated through the Chinese academy. However, there is a major problem in confronting Chinese researchers and their investigations. Since the study of public diplomacy is initiated and promoted by governments, the study itself is another form of "public diplomacy." Besides, Chinese scholars put too much emphasis on what China's public diplomacy should be and not enough on what China's public diplomacy is. For example, in the category of "the development of China's public diplomacy" classified by Wu (2012), 70 of 144 articles emphasize what China's public diplomacy should be and why it is important. Other examples include Xianpong Wang's (2010) "Four Strategies for China's Foreign Policy," Baogang He's (2011)

“International Corporations Merger Require Public Diplomacy”, Qingquo Jia’s (2010) “Six Basic Element for Deploying Public Diplomacy”, and Yongnian Zheng’s (2010) “Establishing International Power of Words of China’s Foreign Policy.”

After the Chinese dream and BRI were proposed, the focus of Chinese public diplomacy gradually expanded to these two subjects. How to tell the Chinese stories and eliminate the worries about BRI became vital issues in the Chinese academy. Chinese scholars take external publicity as the core of public diplomacy (Hu, 2012). The role of Chinese public diplomacy is still to remove negative conceptions. For example, the Chinese dream is not a threat to the world (Shen, 2015). China needs to publicize the idea of peace and cooperation, mutual benefit and the win-win spirit of BRI for the international society (Wang, 2017).

To elaborate the concept of “China’s public diplomacy with its own characteristics,” first, China emphasizes people-to-people diplomacy. Beijing takes the Chinese people to be potential actors in public diplomacy. Domestic citizens become not only the actors of public diplomacy but also the target audience when the government teaches people “correct” ideas about China. As a result, China’s public diplomacy has been criticized for blurring the boundary between public diplomacy and domestic propaganda. For example, Nicholas Cull (2011) uses the concept of Brezhnev syndrome to describe a situation in which a government promotes public diplomacy according to domestic priorities. The consequences have been cognized by its practitioners. Cull (2011) explains that the Beijing Olympics was a piece of domestic propaganda about China marching on the world stage. The Confucius Institution is successful at gathering Chinese students to study abroad as a rallying point rather than spreading out Chinese culture (ibid.).

Second, China’s public diplomacy particularly emphasizes the function of soft power. In

2007, the report of the 17<sup>th</sup> NCCPC shows China's resolution to promote soft power and its culture. The core of China's soft power is about socialism, thought work, media propaganda and Chinese culture (Huang, 2009). The superiority of socialism with Chinese characteristics has to be fulfilled during the promotion of its soft power. As a result, the cultural industry and related propaganda are vital to China's soft power (Huang, 2009).

The policies of China with respect to promoting cultural diplomacy and soft power overlap with China's public diplomacy. The Confucius Institutions, the Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo, Chinese cultural festivals, and the Chinese dream are thus important objectives of China's public diplomacy and soft power. According to d'Hooghe (2014), many actors are involved in promoting China's public diplomacy, including Chinese leaders and missions abroad, the State Council Information Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its foreign embassies, the Ministry of National Defense, the CPPCC and CCP, etc. These actors follow their own objectives even while offsetting "China-threat argument and serving more general but vague concepts such as "harmonious society," and "peaceful rise."

### **2.4.3 The history of China's public diplomacy**

This section deals with the history of China's public diplomacy in the perceptions of academics, including western and Chinese scholars. As mentioned, one of the characteristics of China's public diplomacy is that it is hard to distinguish propaganda from public diplomacy (Rawnsley, 2013: 148). The development of Chinese propaganda is one essential part of the development of China's public diplomacy.

CCP has its history in promoting external propaganda. Before 1949, the CCP published several Chinese newspapers and magazines targeting Chinese overseas to provide information

about China, propaganda about the CCP etc. For example, these efforts included *Xian Feng Bao* in 1928 in San Francisco, and *Giu Guo Sh Bao* in 1935 in Paris. Other publications, such as the *Voice of China* in 1930, and the *China Digest* the in 1940s diversified the variety of CCP's publications (Aoyama, 2007: 3). In 1938, under the instruction of Chou Enlai, the CCP established the International News Agency (Guoji Xinwenshe). Under the International News Agency, the *Far East Bulletin* was the major English newspaper targeting foreigners. The Chinese newspapers *Zuguo Tongxun* and the *Guoxin Tongxun* targeted overseas Chinese. More than 150 news agencies used news from the International News Agency (Wang and Dai, 2003).

Foreign journals are one of the most important external sources of propaganda used by the CCP before 1949. The CCP has constantly promoted the policy of “using foreign strength to propagandize” for CCP by encouraging foreign media (Ding, 2011). One of the more successful cases in China is that of Edgar Snow. This case has been depicted by scholars in the development of China's public diplomacy (d'Hooghe, 2005: 91; Liu and Zhang, 2011). In 1936, Edgar Snow, an American journalist, was permitted by CCP to go to northern Shanxi to interview CCP leaders for months. Snow later published the famous book, “*Red Star Over China*,” thereby introducing CCP to the world. It was a paradigm case of China's external propaganda (Liu and Zhang, 2011). In fact, many journalists tried to get into CCP occupied territory at that time, but only Edgar Snow was chosen by Mao Zedong and other leaders (Liu and Zhang, 2011).

As Edgar wrote in his book, Chou Enlai told him that “I have report that you are a reliable journalist, friendly to the Chinese people, and you can be trusted to tell the truth” (Snow, 1937). After Snow, many other journalists (such as Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Helen Foster Snow, etc.) went to China and reported positively on the CCP. With the help of these foreign

journalists, the positive image of CCP was spread to the world and sometimes received substantial help. For example, Agnes Smedley, who wrote *China Fights Back: An American Woman With the Eighth Route Army*, reported that the military exploits of Eighth Route Army helped the CCP acquire medical supplies (Wang and Dai, 2003). Many of these journalists were treated as friends in China when left-wing or pro-communist perspectives were prevalent in the West. Because of the contributions of these journalists, the Smedley-Strong-Snow Society of China (now the China Society for People's Friendship Studies) was founded in the memory of these friends of China.

China devoted itself in projecting ideological warfare by clearly presenting the values and virtues of socialism and communism while attacking capitalism in its international broadcasting during the Cold War. The cultural revolution seriously affected its external propaganda. China asked its diplomats to issue the *Little Red Book* of writings from Mao Zedong and other publications of the cultural revolution to the world. This eventually led to diplomatic disputes in over 30 countries (Huang, 2007). For instance, Chinese diplomats ignored the warning from the Burmese government and issued this propaganda to citizens in Burma and overseas Chinese in 1967 (Huang, 2007).

However, China gradually changed its policy intentions when it was relatively isolated from the international community. In the 1970s, ping-pong diplomacy and panda diplomacy were used to project fresh images of China and to thereby break its international isolation (d'Hooghe, 2005: 91; Kaneko and Kitano, 2007: 42). These methods also helped to facilitate China's traditional diplomacy with other countries. For example, in 1971, the U.S. table tennis team participated in the thirty-first world table-tennis championships held in Nagoya. The U.S. team expressed its intention to visit China and finally received an invitation to visit China. This

so-called “ping pong diplomacy” signaled a breakthrough in Sino-U.S. relations and constitutes a successful example of public diplomacy. It resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In 1979, Hu Yaobang, head of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, proposed the idea of distinguishing foreign propaganda from domestic propaganda by introducing foreigners to new China rather than by using political ideology inside China (He, 2008). However, it was not successful as Tan and Lei (2005) argues that although most foreign propaganda emphasizes the advantages of socialism, the fact was to prevent people from sneaking into Hong Kong. In the 1980s, China modified its propaganda policy and the beginning of modern China’s public diplomacy had merged. For example, the establishment of China’s public diplomacy already occurred in 1983 during the period of “open and reform” when the spokesman system was established (Wang, 2012).

For China, the most significant transformation of its public diplomacy is the event of Tiananmen Square. As 9/11 was the turning point that encouraged the United States to focus on public diplomacy, the Tiananmen Square event of 1989 was the turning point that encouraged China to develop its public diplomacy. The Tiananmen Square incident damaged China’s image seriously. After the stabilizing domestic situation, China modified several directions concerning propaganda and thought work. For example, China hired Hill and Knowlton—public-relations firms—to rebuild its national reputation (d’Hooghe, 2005: 92), modified the importance of propaganda in the Politburo of CCP (Rawnsley, 2013: 147), remolded its foreign-publicity system (Zhang, 2009: 104), and expanded China Radio International. China hired two public-relation firms, Bell Pottinger and Weber Shandwick, to persuade the International Olympic Committee to grant the games to Beijing, thereby to improve human-rights in China (Page



quoted by Brady, 2009: 8).

The following reforms changed the formation of China's external propaganda system. The ministry of foreign affairs built up the foreign propaganda group in each embassy (Zeng quoted in Zhang, 2009: 104). China established SCIO in 1991, which was also called the Central Foreign Propaganda Office (Zhang, 2009: 104). It was directly under the central government. SCIO played an important role in the development of China's public diplomacy because it monitored foreign media, guided domestic media and developed the guidelines and instruction of public diplomacy (d'Hooghe, 2014:134). SCIO is also the major institution of propagating the positive image of China. In 1995, SCIO was also responsible for the external publicity of the Hong-Kong reunification (He, 2008).

When the peaceful rise and harmonious world were proposed and implemented under Hu Jintao's administration in 2003 and 2005, China's external publicity was also focused on promoting China's good intention to the world as a peace maker rather than a threat. In 2009, the MFA upgraded its office of public diplomacy from a department to an office. In 2010, MFA initiated the Lanting Forum to increase the platform between the Chinese government and foreign publics. Minister Yang Jiechi said at the first forum that "the Lanting Forum will serve as a bridge connecting diplomats with the general public, and China with the world. The general public and the whole world will therefore gain a better understanding of China's diplomacy" (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 2010). The MFA further upgraded its office and supported the establishment of the China Public Diplomacy Association in 2012 (Zhao, 2017).

According to d'Hooghe (2014: 143-146), in modern China's public diplomacy, many events and policies have been promoted other than the MFA. The Ministry of National Defense,

the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Commerce also play roles in public diplomacy. For example, the Ministry of National Defense has tried to increase its transparency by establishing an information office, sharing military news with foreign militaries, and arranging media to visit military bases. The Ministry of commerce has promoted its public diplomacy by expanding its information office, developing a spokesperson and press-release system, and providing reports and English-language platforms such as the China Commodity Net (CCN) for the international trade and cooperation. The Ministry of Education is responsible for student exchanges, institutional cooperation and the Confucius Institute via the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban). The Ministry of Culture conducts public diplomacy by organizing international cultural cooperation and exchanges. The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television encourages development by supervising China Central Television (ibid.). The promotion of the “Chinese dream” and the BRI are the latest objectives of China’s public diplomacy.

#### **2.4.4 Reviewing China’s public diplomacy**

After defeating nationalist Chiang Kai-shek, Beijing modelled its communication after the Soviet propaganda system, which characterized rigid and highly controlled mass dissemination of information to guide and convince audiences. Everything is done for the purpose of propaganda. After Chinese economic reforms, the deployment of hard power eased and propaganda became less rigid. In 1997, China changed the term *propaganda* into *publicity* to improve its international image. “Globalization has forced the Chinese government to pay more attention than ever before to public diplomacy and soft power” (Rawnsley, 2009: 282).

Yet, there are still problems and deficiencies to be revealed in China's public diplomacy, including those respecting issues of mutual communication, credibility and transparency. Moreover, how to incorporate public diplomacy into China's Taiwan policy is another topic to be discussed.

#### **2.4.4.1 The complex of mutual communication**

Mutual communications include exchanges of students, the mutual visit of NGOs, various seminars and forums in all kinds of industries and for academics and other groups. Yet the China-threat argument cannot be offset simply by public diplomacy. Even if China did a tremendous job with public diplomacy, it is still difficult for foreign audiences to understand or agree on China's idea of peaceful rise. Mutual communication does not mean mutual understanding. Mutual understanding may also lead to revulsion when the two sides have too many differences. In addition, if mutual communication fails not because audiences do not believe or misunderstand the information from the country that gives it but because the audiences do not accept or agree with the information, then what is the next step for public diplomacy? Can more mutual communication or other methods to change the minds of the audiences? And how to change the minds of the audiences?

In cross-strait relations, the Taiwanese know that the goal of China is to unify Taiwan by implementing "one country, two systems." Most Taiwanese refuse this concept not because they do not understand it but because they do understand it. Moreover, what does *mutual communication* means? What is the results that China wants? Does it aim to create more friendly interactions or something else? The reports of the CPPCC in the past few years (See Appendix A) indicate two types of communication by China. One is the work that China did to

communicate with foreign citizens, political organizations and social groups. The other is the channels of communication that China has expanded. Communication does not necessarily mean success, but successful communication is the bridge to relationship building. However, the methods used to communicate and build relationships are numerous. Transparent and open channels of communication or opaque and secret channels are both feasible.

#### **2.4.4.2 Is credibility really that matters in China's PD?**

*Credibility* means a perception or judgment of the believability of communicators and their messages (Mor, 2012:396). Credibility has everything to do with the success of public diplomacy, just as Zaharna (2004: 223) points out: “[T]he persuasive value of public diplomacy is tied to its credibility: the more credibility a government’s public diplomacy is, the more persuasive it is.” Especially in the information age, it is hard to separate technological innovation and credibility. Technology, the Internet and social networks make enormous changes to public diplomacy. Anyone who has a smart phone can easily take pictures and upload videos to the Internet in real time. This makes it very hard for government to deceive and manipulate people. Once the target audiences perceive that the government is not telling the truth or acting with political intentions, public diplomacy is failed and is accompanied by the collapse of credibility. Once credibility has collapsed, it takes more effort to restore the audience’s believability. As a result, new public diplomacy believes that mutual communication and telling the truth are good ways to establish credibility.

“Since credibility is in the eye of the beholder, those seeking to project credibility through public diplomacy must adopt an audience-centered approach” (Gass and Seiter, 2009: 162). Gass and Seither argue that credibility comes and goes. Therefore, fighting over credibility is

an ongoing effort for China. However, China's public diplomacy is bureaucratized and highly controlled. No matter how hard China develops its public diplomacy, things sometimes go wrong because of the lack of transparency. China is notorious for its information control. For example, China kept unfavorable information from the public, thereby impeding the growth of China's soft power and its international image (d'Hooghe, 2007).

The failure to control the information was a lesson for China. d'Hooghe took the severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 as an example. When SARS burst in China, China hid the truth and declared that everything was under control. Because China covered up the seriousness of the bird flu, its credibility was severely damaged. Furthermore, the information provided by China is incompatible with that the audience obtained from the Internet, social media etc. "China has strict control over the Web and blocks access to Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and other outlets" (Guschin, 2013). All of this is detrimental to China's credibility. This blocking of information is unfortunately one of the major causes of China's low credibility. China will continue to do this, however, because it is part of China's *modus operandi*. Therefore, it is impossible for Beijing to change this practice to increase its credibility by implementing successful public diplomacy.

However, even in the age of Web 2.0, it is possible to manipulate public opinion to avoid the problem of credibility. The volume of information on the Internet is simply gigantic. Joseph Nye (2011: 10) argues that "plentiful information leads to scarcity of attention." Plentiful information also keeps people from reviewing the authenticity of the information. Browsing quickly and seeing information without thinking about the authenticity of the information is considered normal in everyday life. Even if people notice particular matters and events, truth does not always win. When there is too much information to receive, people usually believe

what they think is more convincing, or they listen to other netizens, friends and family to determine their own position. When different people stand for different points of view, it may create confusion for other readers. And the winner is usually the one with the most support by other netizens. This phenomenon creates methods for companies or governments who hire people to speak for them anonymously and further generate profit and interest. China's 50 Cent Party is an example. Social networking service is another port for state to manipulate. Through smart phones and their messaging and voice-calling applications, social networks such as LINE, Facebook and Whatsapp Messenger have instant and direct access to individuals. Social networks are also new platforms for manipulating information, because people do not often question or to confirm the information they receive from their friends and family. As a result, though China may have its low credibility, there are ways to overcome the problem of low credibility. China's low credibility may not generate so many negative impacts to its own public diplomacy.

#### **2.4.4.3 Redefining and constructing the real China's public diplomacy**

From previous discussions it can be seen that many cases of China's public diplomacy have focused on image-projection campaigns, people-to-people communication, educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, attempts to eliminate negative images. Now, China uses public diplomacy as a tool not only to communicate with foreign publics but also to justify, smooth, and promote its policies. China has expanded the idea of soft power because business, development aid and investment are also considered to be modes of attraction (Kurlantzick, 2006:1). This also applies to China's public diplomacy. It is as Wu (2012) argued: China has articulated a broader concept of public diplomacy; Rawnsley (2013: 152) argued: China lacks

any clear distinction between propaganda, public relations and public diplomacy in the post-SARS era. This leads to the overuse of public diplomacy. If the policies or measurements involved in the concept of opening to the public or foreign publics, regardless of the objects of the policy, it would be considered as an example of its public diplomacy in China's perception. It simply dilutes the focus and effect of China's public diplomacy. It leads to the fact that China's public diplomacy does not have solid norms.

So, what is China's public diplomacy? If China's public diplomacy can be characterized in accord with the wide interpretations of Chinese officials, then China's public diplomacy is merely a positive term for propaganda in disguise. In fact, China's public diplomacy is also a tool used to serve China's political objectives when needed. For instance, when president Hu Jintao visited New York in 2005, he promised to give 10 billion U.S. dollars in aid to the poor countries China has diplomatic ties, signifying those countries who have diplomatic relations with Taiwan to change their recognition (Rawnsley, 2009: 284).

To understand the actual public diplomacy that China promotes, however, it is necessary to unhook the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power. People nowadays receive all kinds of information about foreign countries. Some may hear from friends and families while others hear from media, the Internet or even conversation from people on the street. All information is only a potential message of public diplomacy. When a government tries to manage information, or creates new information to guide foreigners, public diplomacy is formed. The information itself is not limited to attraction but also by intimidation. This idea may contrast with current public diplomacy, but in fact attraction and intimidation are merely the two sides of one coin. For example, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 is an example of negative public diplomacy launched by China. China tried to use a series of missile tests to threaten the

Taiwanese and to thereby influence the presidential elections. However, it had an adverse effect instead. It was not a successful measurement, but it was still an act of public diplomacy. As Djerejian (2003) argues, it was a “promotion of national interest by informing, engaging and influencing people around the world.” Afterward, China changed its strategy and tried to maintain a low profile in the next election while continuing to exert its influence in Taiwanese presidential elections by offering discount flight tickets to Taiwanese businessmen who work in China and then encouraging them to vote back to Taiwan for the candidate China preferred.

However, a very successful “negative” public-diplomacy campaign exists across the Taiwan Strait. In recent decades, China has threatened an immediate war with Taiwan if Taiwan seeks independence. The threat is well known to all Taiwanese. In 2005, China passed the anti-secession law, according to which the Beijing government could authorize military operations to unify Taiwan on three conditions.<sup>2</sup> According to the poll conducted by National Chengchi University and Duke University in 2015 (Chen and Niu, 2016), 32% of Taiwanese support Taiwanese independence even if China launches a war against Taiwan; 38% of Taiwanese support Taiwanese independence on the condition that China does not launch a war against Taiwan. These statistics mean that the intimidation China has used is effective. The intimidation has changed the people who support Taiwanese independence from a majority to a minority.

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<sup>2</sup> If "Taiwan-independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause Taiwan's secession from China, or if major incidents which entail Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or if the possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted, then the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity (“Full text of Anti-Secession Law,” 2015).



Could intimidation and threats have new implementations in current public diplomacy? Nowadays, it is not in the radar of modern public diplomacy. However, it is indeed a way of influencing foreign publics and is also fit for some definitions of public diplomacy. After all, “influence” is the core concept in public diplomacy, as discussed in previous sections.

How to convert the conception of foreign publics is crucial to both traditional and new public diplomacy. For instance, China is doing everything it can to prevent Taiwan from achieving independence. The threat of military force may prevent Taiwan from achieving independence, but it cannot prevent the rising of Taiwanese identity. Therefore, China has adopted many traditional and new measures of public diplomacy to gain national interest. China continues its interactions with Taiwanese elites, scholars and political parties while trying at the same time to filter the information in specific Taiwanese media channels. In the details of those measures, China has gone out of the frame. Some of the measures are even rare in “modern public diplomacy.” Probably it is as Melissen (2012) says: Traditional and new public diplomacy are combining into something new. This essay, however, prefers to regard China’s measures as a normal strategy for a country to influence foreign publics. After all, public diplomacy means “all the ways a country can engage the citizens of other societies and influence their opinions for the better” (Reinhard, 2009:197).

#### **2.4.4.4 Taiwan is in the scope of China’s public diplomacy in disguise**

Taiwan is the target of China’s public diplomacy. Taiwan is not in the scope of Chinese official because of the political concern. Though China takes Taiwan to be part of its territory, Taiwan has its government, people, territory and sovereignty. Therefore, when China communicates with Taiwanese citizens, it is just like communicating with a foreign public.

China has its ultimate goal for Taiwan, which is to unify with it someday. There are also other goals that China believes would help it to meet its ultimate goal. Therefore, when China tries to exert its influence on the Taiwanese people through communication, bribery, economic power and other methods, it employs public diplomacy and other methods that have not yet been classified in modern public diplomacy.

In addition, the part of Taiwan in the report of CPPCC is complied with the description of China's public diplomacy. For example, the fourth session of the eleventh CPPCC National Committee in 2011 contains the following passage:

We made full use of the Shanghai World Expo, the Guangzhou Asian Games and other platforms for cross-straits exchanges and cooperation to actively develop exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan, and strengthen emotional ties and increase common understanding between people across the Straits.

Compare this with the description of public diplomacy in the first session of 12<sup>th</sup> CPPCC National Committee in 2013:

We made full use of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing, the World Expo in Shanghai and international conferences on public diplomacy to deepen our friendly exchanges with relevant organizations, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, influential figures and ordinary people in foreign countries.

The descriptions of cross-strait relations and public diplomacy are compatible. So are the

following reports of CPPCC (See Appendix A). It is obvious that, though Taiwan is not the official target of China's public diplomacy, Taiwan actually fits the description of China's public diplomacy. For China, increased exchanges and cooperation are keys to its public diplomacy, so is its Taiwan policy. So, how does China conduct public diplomacy toward Taiwan? Given consideration of the methods of China's public diplomacy recognized by the CPPCC as a fundamental structure, China's influence toward Taiwanese should be considered as its public diplomacy as well. Chapter IV examines how China deals with Taiwanese in terms of public diplomacy, and how China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan differs from current notion of public diplomacy.

## **2.5 Summary and conclusion**

This thesis first tries to conceptualize public diplomacy by illustrating the origin and development of public diplomacy in other countries. The term *public diplomacy* was merely to replace the negative term *propaganda*. The development of public diplomacy was also transformed from focusing on influence to emphasizing mutual communication. This change was made because the old methods were no longer effective. Therefore, when examining the practice of public diplomacy nowadays, countries also pay more attention to boosting mutual communication to serve their public-diplomacy objectives—to boost their economies and trade, to project their images and cultures, to acquire reputations and discursive power, and other specific goals. In general, the meanings of public diplomacy changes in different countries and at different times, but they all serve one purpose: to achieve national interest through influence. To meet their needs, countries will change their methods.

This thesis also discusses some controversies regarding public diplomacy. This thesis

points out two philosophical schools of thoughts regarding public diplomacy in academia. One is about communicating with foreign publics to gain mutual understanding; the other is about influencing foreign publics to gain national interest. The two thoughts have profound influences on the development of public diplomacy. The issue of whether public diplomacy is propaganda or not, for instance, has aroused debates in the study. Scholars differentiate public diplomacy from propaganda depending on whether it involves two-way communication or one-way persuasion (Melissen, 2005), open communication or deliberately manipulated information (Zaharna, 2004), and with regard to the transparency of the source of the information (d'Hooghe, 2014). This thesis argues that propaganda or public diplomacy cannot simply be classified by these criteria. Instead, they are differentiated by the audiences who receive the information. Therefore, public diplomacy or propaganda, truth or manipulated information are all determined by the audiences, and it is impossible to distinguish them. In addition, soft power is deeply connected to public diplomacy in modern public diplomacy, but it may be problematic to use soft power alone or even other the notions of power in public diplomacy. This thesis suggests that soft power and smart power may not be able to provide a full-scale and clear foundation for public diplomacy. The criticisms of the meaning of soft power and smart power may only create variable definitions of public diplomacy. It may be necessary to de-connect public diplomacy and the notion of powers.

The development of public diplomacy is a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” It leads to the dominate new public diplomacy which over-focuses on dialogue and transparent message dissemination. It also neglects the modern use of traditional public diplomacy, including the role of new technology and the use of it. Although Melissen’s argues that there is “no one size-fits-all” model in public diplomacy, this claim may only represent the fact that the full picture

of public diplomacy has not yet been disclosed. To acquire a more complete idea of public diplomacy, this thesis defines public diplomacy as a tool whereby governments influence foreign publics to gain national interest by using multiple channels, direct or indirect methods, and domestic or foreign proxies.

So, the question is where does traditional public diplomacy go? When governments publicly promote a bright new public diplomacy, this does not mean that there is no ingredient of tradition public diplomacy in the other policies of that government. How to define and to relate public diplomacy is a major issue in this thesis. For example, Russia created misleading articles online to influence the 2016 presidential elections of the United States, with the intention to help Donald Trump (Timberg, 2016). The U.S. public-diplomacy campaign in Cuba was aimed to facilitate regime change in rare cases during the Cold War (Gilboa, 2006: 717). It is a government-to-foreign-people process, and it is in line with Russian or U.S. interests. Methods used to influence the results of elections by sending messages to influence Americans is in accord with many definitions of public diplomacy. But this returns us to the debate about whether propaganda is a part of public diplomacy. If we embrace the idea that propaganda is a characteristic of public diplomacy, it is foreseeable that governments have used many diverse methods to influence foreign publics to gain their national interests.

In China's public diplomacy, the thesis examines what *public diplomacy* means in the context of the Beijing government and CCP. Although China has expanded its use of public diplomacy, some factors have been neglected due to the political judgement of the Chinese government. Taiwan is a case in point. In the report of the CPPCC which compares the context of China's public diplomacy toward other nations and Taiwan, the descriptions and the contents are very similar. However, Taiwan is never in the scope of its public diplomacy. This is

understandable and reasonable given China's intention and attitude toward Taiwan. The question is how to define China's public diplomacy. When China claims how many works of public diplomacy it has done, more measurements of influencing and communicating with foreign publics are not included in the scope of its public diplomacy.

### **Chapter III Introducing comprehensive public diplomacy**

This chapter introduces the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets hypothetically because these two notions derive from the case study in the chapter that follows next. The thesis will first discuss its reasons for proposing comprehensive public diplomacy, as well as framework of comprehensive public diplomacy and definition of it. Then, an introduction of PD assets helps to compensate the notion of comprehensive public diplomacy and to understand the framework of the case study in the following chapter.

#### **3.1 The importance of the comprehensive public diplomacy**

In chapter II, the thesis discussed both the problems of public diplomacy in general and China's public diplomacy specifically. Part of this discussion covers the weakness of soft power and smart power in the realm of public diplomacy. The point is to argue that maybe we should not emphasize on the work of these power notions. China's case in Taiwan proves their weaknesses in practical applications.

Through the case study, the thesis finds that the crucial element in China's public diplomacy is to influence Taiwanese to acquire China's own interest. The methods to influence, however, are not restricted by the existing notions such as hard power, soft power and smart power. Some cases were soft power-oriented, some were hard power-oriented and others were smart power-oriented. That is to say, when China's public diplomacy—to achieve a goal of its own—contains all the elements of new public diplomacy, traditional public diplomacy or a combination of new and traditional public diplomacy, notions of these powers do not entirely clarify the differences in China's public diplomacy. Because every method in the practices of China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan may be visible, traditional or new public diplomacy

cannot alone explain its complications. Therefore, having a wider notion to cover all these methods is needed. Looking for other criteria to examine and to explain the case is required.

In addition, using existing concepts such as new public diplomacy and traditional public diplomacy are not enough to explain the China's case toward Taiwan fully. New public diplomacy, for example, is not able to analyze some cases that involve threats and opaque measurements. Traditional public diplomacy, for instance, lacks the idea of using mutual communication as channel in its framework. Thus, the thesis conceives comprehensive public diplomacy to compensate those deficiencies.


### **3.2 The framework of comprehensive public diplomacy**

To explain the differences among traditional, current and comprehensive public diplomacy further, this thesis focuses on the framework of how each promote public diplomacy. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 below illustrate how traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy operates. One may easily perceive that the structures between traditional and new public diplomacy—among government, private sectors and foreign publics—are the same. For example, one differences that distinguishes traditional public diplomacy from new public diplomacy is the content of its message. When a message is more about selling ideology, one would consider it as traditional public diplomacy. Likewise, when the channel of communication concerns monologue, one would interpret it as traditional public diplomacy. On the contrary, when a message regards value- and idea-sharing, scholars tends to classify it as new public diplomacy; similarly, when the channel relates to dialogue- and relation-building, one would take it as new public diplomacy. The point is that scholars employ different criteria to determine traditional and new public diplomacies, sometimes, it is hard to distinguish it




clearly. Regardless, each version of public diplomacy represents a method that attempts to influence foreign publics to advance a government’s interests. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate that the most important aspect to understand is the framework itself. Whether the channel is one-way or two-way, the content is attraction or threat or that message is authentic or manipulated, all express methods for a government to exert influence. As a result, they are all part of public diplomacy/comprehensive public diplomacy.

Figure 3.1 The framework of traditional public diplomacy



Source: Author’s compilation


Figure 3.2 The framework of new public diplomacy



Source: Author's compilation

Figure 3.3 below shows the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy. The upper section of this framework combines operations from Figure 3.1 and 3.2. Its structure contains all of the methods and messages of traditional and new public diplomacy. The structure's lower part is a significant element of comprehensive public diplomacy: it represents an acknowledgement that messages some private sectors disseminated meet a government's interest accidentally. The framework's lower portion significantly influences its upper structure, especially for the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The lower part is also the framework of PD assets which will be discussed in the following section.

Figure 3.3 The framework of comprehensive public diplomacy



Source: Author's compilation

The frameworks shown in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 also visualize that comprehensive public diplomacy as a concept that integrates both traditional and new public diplomacy. It is important to emphasize that how a government would use the framework to disseminate information in order to influence foreign targets no matter the contents or the nature of the information is. As mentioned, the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy derives from China's case toward Taiwan. To acknowledge this is also to submit that the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy is simultaneously China's proxy-agent framework.

At this point, one may question the framework because of the complicated and unique situation of cross-strait relations. If that situation is exceptional, the criticism might suggest,

then how could one generalize the framework? This thesis submits that cross-strait relations may not as unique as we thought. In the human history, it is not new to know a country tried to devour another country. In the past, sovereign lands would engage in many activities to influence foreign publics before launching war, including spreading rumors and threatening foreign populace. The thesis believes that similar situations will recur in the future again and again. It is true that there is one “unique” aspect of cross-strait relations when constructing the framework. That is, fruitful and diversified methods that we can find in a single case study. These fruitful examples and cases that we may not find in other countries to other foreign publics. For example, a democratic country like the UK may not disseminate explicitly threatening messages to general US-American publics in the modern age. It is more likely, in that particular relationship, that the UK would use a more friendly and transparent method during the process of public diplomacy. Even so, the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy still includes the friendly and soft-oriented methods the UK would use.

From this perspective, it also reveals the differences between comprehensive public diplomacy and the united front strategy. The focus is simply different. It is true that a number of studies might interpret cross-strait relations by discussing China’s united-front strategy, instead of considering public diplomacy. After all, public diplomacy cannot deal with the realm of traditional diplomacy. Therefore, the united-front strategy has an advantage when examining cross-strait relations. However, comprehensive public diplomacy emphasizes the process of exerting influence toward foreign publics, which implies that main actor within comprehensive public diplomacy is not limited to communist countries exclusively. Most cases in the united-front strategy are still methods of influencing foreign publics; thus, the united-front works that China adopted in cross-strait relations may not be as unique as presumed. Finally, this thesis

analyzes public diplomacy by using cases of cross-strait relations: it does not discuss cross-strait relations by using public diplomacy. Therefore, it does not try to discover a better framework for cross-strait relations but a better framework for governments to exert influence on foreign publics: a better framework for public diplomacy.

This thesis argues and emphasizes that the structure of comprehensive public diplomacy framework may be the whole picture of public diplomacy. The kinds of messages and information that a government tries to transmit within a given framework determine the kind of public diplomacy—traditional or new—it will use. Comprehensive public diplomacy does not focus on the classification of methods but on how a government achieves its goal through the influence of foreign publics, including the general public, individuals, companies, NGOs and political elites. Nonetheless, the discussion in the next chapter will proceed to classify different methods in order to prove they are also in the framework.

### **3.3 Findings from case study: The concept of the “PD assets” and its implication**

When collecting the materials of the case study, we encounter a problem in verifying the relationships between China and its proxy agents. Many cases could not be analyzed due to lack of evidence. Some organizations act in a way that accords with China’s interests, though there is no evidence to show that they have connections with China. It would be hard to neglect these cases, because they may generate similar effects if China promotes them. How to identify them and relate them to public diplomacy is an important issue in this thesis, because if they can be defined and analyzed, it would help to modify the study of public diplomacy. The section also explains the lower part of figure 3.3.

### **3.3.1 What is “PD assets” and what can it do**

The discussion in the Chapter IV reveals that some connections between China and its proxy agents are not 100% verified. If China and its proxy agents have no relations, is it public diplomacy? Rumors and accusations are difficult to verify, and yet, these possible proxy agents have tried to influence Taiwanese citizens in a manner that accords with China’s interest. They generate the same effect if China is behind the curtain. It is indeed a dilemma. On the one hand, if rumors and accusation are not in the scope of public diplomacy, then it cannot explain the phenomenon of the increasing number of rumors and accusations in Taiwan in the past decade, which still shows some linkages and connections with China. In fact, these cases could meet the requirement of avoiding the problem of low credibility in public diplomacy. The roles of private-sector actors have been considered to be effective actors in public diplomacy, as has been mentioned and emphasized in many academic papers (e.g., Olins, 2005; Wang, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2009b; Mueller, 2009; Reinhard, 2009). “The best and most effective public diplomacy initiatives have come from private, non-governmental sectors” (Snow, 2008). The target audience will not discover the message if it is actually disseminated by the government; thus, there is a higher possibility of trusting these messages. On the other hand, if the rumors and accusation are considered public diplomacy, then we face the problem of academic rigor. Since there is no solid evidence revealing that China has directly implemented connections within the private sector, it would be hard to call them proxy agents. However, during the period of data collection, the number of Taiwanese in the private sector who speak for or act in accord with China’s interest has increased enormously.

This fact simply violates common sense in Taiwanese society, considering the fact of rising Taiwanese identity. Reasoning from these facts and accusations, this thesis proposes a

preliminary concept: PD assets solve the dilemma and explain this unusual phenomenon. It also comprises those possible proxy agents and the private sector who do not have relations with the government but act in accord with the government's interest, such that they can be analyzed together not only to avoid wrong accusation but also to explain the factors that determine the success of public diplomacy. Through PD assets, the influence of unverified proxy agents and irrelevant private-sector individuals can be analyzed for its role in public diplomacy in a more neutral way.

This thesis suggests that use of PD assets constitute a people-to-people mechanism which generates the public-diplomacy effect. *Public-diplomacy effect* here refers to the actions and activities of private-sector persons who have had an impact or have influenced foreign publics in accord with the interests or policies of a particular country which would be considered as its public diplomacy if the government of that country has promoted it. The core concept of PD assets is that the government does not participate in the process—or at least, not yet. Thus, PD assets are those private-sector actors who engage in the process of one-way or two-way communications without involvement from the government. And yet it is possible that those private-sector actors generate the results that the government wants. Because those PD assets could sometimes generate the same effect as if the government promotes it, it is crucial to further explain PD assets.


As is shown in the figures below, the only differences concern whether government is involved or not. Figure 3.4 shows the framework of public diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> Government has two

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<sup>3</sup> Figure 3.4 combines figure 3.1 and 3.2.

ways of promoting public diplomacy: direct communication or communication through private-sector actors such as NGOs, NPOs or corporations. Figure 3.5 shows that the government has no connection with the private-sector actors or that there is a lack of evidence to prove the relationships. This also means that, if there is no connection between the government and the private-sector actors, the private-sector actors act according to their own interests and that the common interest of the organization and the government is a coincidence. However, even if it is just a coincidence, it also generates influence on the government. This is because the private-sector actors are either influential or are considered proxy agents of the government.


Figure 3.4 The framework of public diplomacy



Source: Author’s compilation.



Figure 3.5 The framework of PD assets



Source: Author's compilation.

From this perspective, the content of PD assets is not a new to public diplomacy. In fact, PD assets have been noticed in academic papers for a long time, but they have not been thought of as relevant. Most researchers treat PD assets as potential private-sector actors who can be used to promote public diplomacy; they thus argue that the government should employ it. For example, Chinese scholars had already noticed the functions of international corporations for a while and how they could serve China's public diplomacy (e.g., Yu, 2011; Huang, 2011; He, 2011). It is because these international corporations could easily influence the Chinese image by selling their products to foreign customers. If the image of the Chinese international corporation increases, it somehow also increases the image of China. So, some of the major Chinese companies were pointed out to promote Chinese public diplomacy while some are already the proxies of China. Likewise, the role of overseas Chinese in public diplomacy has

also been emphasized (e.g., Liu, 2010; Lin, 2013). Since China aims to acquire its interest such as reducing overseas supporters of Taiwan, so particular overseas Chinese groups or overseas Chinese communities are primary targets for China to attract or to communicate with. These international Chinese corporations and overseas Chinese groups were thus PD assets if they support for China before Beijing engaged them; they became China's public diplomacy once Beijing has utilized them.

In addition, China's public diplomacy takes domestic citizens to be the actors of public diplomacy. In fact, when people criticize internalized public diplomacy, domestic citizens indeed have their roles in public diplomacy. For instance, domestic actors can be the proxy agents that influence foreign publics; however, if those domestic citizens are the target audience and they cannot generate further influence on foreign publics, then they are not the actor of public diplomacy. Furthermore, if those domestic citizens are proxy agents who exert influence based on their own wills without cooperating with or receiving instructions from government, then they are PD assets.

In addition, the effect of PD assets is not exclusive. It is not unusual for social groups across the Taiwan Strait to hold exchange programs for young students of China and Taiwan. For Taiwanese students, these programs may make them realize that China is not as revolting as they thought; thus, the result accords with China's interest. The exchange programs are PD assets for both governments if both governments do not involve in the programs. They become public diplomacy when the government decides to involve itself in the programs. Chinese Youth International (CYI), for example, is a Taiwanese social group that promotes young student interchange. CYI also sometimes works with the Taiwan government to organize interchange activities. Thus, CYI can be considered an actor in Taiwan's public diplomacy and a PD asset

for China because the interaction is also conducive to China.

The function of a PD asset is to provide the ambiguity necessary to include private-sector actors as the research target. As mentioned, many of the connections are confidential in public diplomacy, especially for a country like China. The case of the True Enlightenment Education Foundation (TEEF) that will be discussed in the next chapter is a case in point. Although some evidences of the relationship between China and the TEEF has been revealed, they are indirect evidences. There is still no solid evidence to show that TEEF received funds or instructions from the Chinese government. On the one hand, it is China's PD asset if China has no relations with TEEF; on the other hand, it is China's public diplomacy if there is a *quid pro quo*. Either way, China acquires its national interest via the work of TEEF. We must therefore evaluate PD assets before we can determine whether the Chinese government is acting behind the curtain. The work of TEEF may generate equal results if China indeed tries to disparage the Dalai Lama and his followers in Taiwan. Private-sector actors, like TEEF, are able to solve the problem of credibility.

PD assets are not always conducive to governments. As mentioned, private-sector actors became PD assets because they generate the same effect as if the government was to promote it. However, PD assets does not guarantee to generate an expected influence for governments. PD assets are able to help nations promote public diplomacy even if those nations do not work on it. Likewise, PD assets may also jeopardize a nation's image or goals when people believe that it is the nation that promotes it behind the curtain even if the nation did not. PD assets are not indicators of successful public diplomacy, but they show that they have goals similar to those of the government. Therefore, it is likely that PD assets may also generate a negative effect on the government. The cases of Jiang Ping and Huang An are examples of negative

influences, which also will be discussed in the following chapter. Overall, PD assets represent both potential weapons of public diplomacy and existing sources of public diplomacy which have not yet been discovered. Either way, PD assets generate interest which accords with the nations' goal. Therefore, the concept of PD assets also represents the ambiguity of the possibility that the nation may have promoted it behind the curtain. The ambiguity provides a solution for evaluating nations' efforts in their public diplomacy, as is discussed in the following section.

### **3.3.2 How do PD assets help the study of public diplomacy?**

The concept of PD assets helps to narrow down the scope of public diplomacy because nowadays, when foreign publics are concerned, everything could be public diplomacy. In implementing the idea of PD asset, public diplomacy refers only to those cases in which governments have been proven to be involved; others are considered PD assets. For instance, pure people-to-people interaction is not in the scope of comprehensive public diplomacy. However, if the interaction generates a public-diplomacy effect, then it is the PD assets and is thus able to influence a government's public diplomacy. If the interaction itself is promoted by a government with an identifying purpose, then it is an example of comprehensive public diplomacy. Although PD assets are not "official" parts of public diplomacy, PD assets play an important role in the success of public diplomacy, because PD assets generate a public-diplomacy effect just as public diplomacy does. As a result, PD assets aid the evaluation of public diplomacy in two ways. First, PD assets are like catalysts of public diplomacy. PD assets are potential assets whereby countries promote public diplomacy. Second, PD assets are forms of public diplomacy that have not been discovered. Although it does not guarantee the success

of public diplomacy, it is in advantage, because people cannot verify or are not aware of the connection.

Field study revealed that PD assets may be used to identify possible public diplomacy. That is, the change in the number of PD assets means something. As mentioned, it is hard to discover China's actions with respect to Taiwan because there is no evidence to verify the connection between the possible proxies and China. However, during the past decade, such suspicious cases have increased dramatically. For instance, from 2008 to 2014, 116 new political parties were established in Taiwan, nearly 80% of which were pro-China unification and suspected of being funded by China (Chung, 2014). 80% of supporting rates simply contrasts to the common sense. When we tried to confirm with the party founders whether they have connections with China, the answer they provide is always negative. After all, they would not tell the truth even if they did have connections with China. If we considered each party as one PD asset and those parties that support unification as PD assets, then it may reveal that China is likely supporting these parties secretly because the amount of PD assets increased in a short period, and these increasing pro-China parties also against existing data and knowledge. Of course, the change in number of PD assets is only a preliminary observation that requires further study.

Individually, they may reveal the fact that those who support unification are on the rise. However, those numbers are against the public polls conducted by officials and academics. Putting these unverified facts together, the number of these cases has increased. Therefore, they may also indicate that China is very likely behind the curtain, because this explanation makes the revealing of these cases more reasonable. These PD assets of China could constitute an index to determine how energetic China's public diplomacy is in Taiwan. Therefore, the

increased number of PD assets could be an index of the work of country who is secretly engaged in public diplomacy. However, to what extent the increased number of PD assets is considered a country's public diplomacy rather than natural of course requires further study.

### **3.3.3 PD assets and soft power**

One could argue that *PD asset* is another term for *soft power*, because the private sectors that “accidentally” help a government are interpretable as a form of soft power that private sectors are willing to do without any connection to government. However, they are different. In a way, PD assets and soft power do have something in common. They are the invisible assets of states. Nye (2004) defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” PD assets, on the other hand, represent not the ability but groups of private-sector actors that coincidentally or secretly act in accord with your interest without being discovered yet. Also, the works of PD assets are not limited to attraction but rather involve many other modes of influence. The notion of PD assets considers soft power as one of the reasons that the private sector acts in accord with the country's interest but also acknowledge other possible reasons, such as private sector's own interest and unverified connection. In addition, the power of attraction helps nations gain benefits, though those benefits may not at first be the goals and policies of the states. However, PD assets are not always generating benefits. It is not the ability to influence the behavior of others but only the attempt to. The activities do not guarantee success.

### **3.4 Defining comprehensive public diplomacy**

From the case studies to be discussed in the next chapter, it is possible to first conclude

that comprehensive public diplomacy contains not only attraction but also threats and intimidation. It may be too aggressive and audacious to take threat into account in current public diplomacy. However, from the case studies, if they are excluded from public diplomacy, then public diplomacy is not complete. When attraction and threats are included as methods of influencing foreign publics, the picture of public diplomacy is completed. Though they are the two extremes on the spectrum of ways to exert influence, both are also treated as instances of public diplomacy.

Before defining comprehensive public diplomacy, the thesis first deals with the question of why the thesis uses the term *comprehensive public diplomacy*. Public diplomacy can serve many policies so long as the government believes it could gain national interest by influencing foreign publics. However, the use of comprehensive public diplomacy is nothing but an expression that specifies a genre of *public diplomacy*; therefore, readers would not become confused (because this thesis believes that comprehensive public diplomacy is the original form of public diplomacy). In addition, the term *comprehensive public diplomacy* implies that government will do anything to achieve the goal of exerting influence on the target audience. More importantly, it reveals that modern public diplomacy is not enough to meet the needs alone because traditional, new public diplomacy and other methods may be required at the same time to achieve the goal of its policy, as mentioned in the previous section.

What is comprehensive public diplomacy? This thesis defines comprehensive public diplomacy as a tool whereby countries influence foreign publics to gain national interest. The ways of implementing comprehensive public diplomacy include not only soft power but also any other methods of influencing foreign publics with identifying goals. As a result, comprehensive public diplomacy is a much larger concept than current public diplomacy. It

might be a problem to add threat to public diplomacy, simply because the scope of public diplomacy is already enormous. Current study of public diplomacy has already encountered many problems, one of which is that the large scope of public diplomacy diffuses the focus and the importance of the study. It is as if everything could be a part of public diplomacy. Kim Andrew Elliott notes that public diplomacy, “is now attributed to so many activities that it has lost useful meaning” (quoted by Brown, 2011). Elliott also depicts one of the reasons that the study of current public diplomacy is decreasing: because of the large scope. It is inevitable that comprehensive public diplomacy further expands the scope of public diplomacy. However, it does not further dilute the function of public diplomacy but classifies it in a more organized way. Besides, comprehensive public diplomacy is not a new concept in public diplomacy. Threat, for example, was one of the elements in traditional public diplomacy, but it faded away. Armstrong (2009:64) argues that, “As the threat became known and the fear of cancerous subversion occurring everywhere subsided, public diplomacy transformed from a ‘struggle for the minds and wills of men’ to a ‘winning hearts and minds.’” Threat has once again return to the stage to perform after people forgot it, specifically targeting small groups and individuals. Public diplomacy is constantly changing and adapting to the environment and technology. It is natural for states to meet their national interests; thus, it is also natural for states to seek any way to achieve their interests. Among them, new and improved methods would be implemented; thus, this process changes the contents of public diplomacy. Comprehensive public diplomacy simply refers the fact of the change, and it is thus able to catch up with the times.

To further position comprehensive public diplomacy, comprehensive public diplomacy shares some similarities with traditional public diplomacy. As mentioned in Chapter II, there are two philosophical thoughts about public diplomacy. One is more tender-minded. It considers



*public diplomacy* a tool of increasing soft power and mutual understanding. The other is more tough-minded: It treats *public diplomacy* as a synonym for *propaganda*. However, though comprehensive public diplomacy brought tough-minded ideas back into studies, comprehensive public diplomacy is not identical with the tough-minded school. The concept of tough-mindedness is as Signitzer and Coombs (1992: 140) illustrated it to be:

The tough-minded hold that the purpose of public diplomacy is to exert an influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and propaganda. Hard political information is considered more important than cultural programs. Fast media such as radio, television, newspapers, and news magazines are given preference over other forms of communication. Objectivity and truth are considered important tools of persuasion, but they are not extolled as virtues in themselves. The supreme criterion for public diplomacy is the *raison d'état* defined in terms of fairly short-term policy ends.

Comprehensive public diplomacy indeed intends to influence foreign targets, not only through persuasion and propaganda but through all the methods the government can implement, which includes the current public diplomacy. The forms of communication are no longer limited by fast media or even slow media (such as film). They also come from personal contacts (G-P-P) and contact with government officials (G-P).<sup>4</sup> Moreover, comprehensive public diplomacy is not confined by short-term policy but is also used for long-term policy, though the result is

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<sup>4</sup> It means the process of government to people to foreign publics, and the process of government to foreign publics.

relatively hard to measure in the long term.

Furthermore, comprehensive public diplomacy does not simply resuscitate traditional public diplomacy but merges it with modern public diplomacy as well. For example, case study shows that China uses many private channels to implant its proxy-agent framework. It is a black box, and it is hard to know what exactly happened to China. Some may question whether those private channels were considered part of public diplomacy rather than semipublic diplomacy. For instance, Henderson (1974) describes the fact that the Soviets used an armed threat and military exercises near the border of Czechoslovakia as a form of semipublic diplomacy, because the exercises were not going on in public, but Czechoslovaks and Western society would eventually know of their threatening nature through Czechoslovakian soldiers and citizens who saw the exercises occurring the other side of border. Those private channels are considered public diplomacy now, so long as it influences the public, elites and particular interest groups.

Therefore, comprehensive public diplomacy overlaps with both modern public diplomacy and traditional public diplomacy. It is extremely hard to identify every method states use to influence foreign publics, but the idea of comprehensive public diplomacy is a combination of traditional public diplomacy, modern public diplomacy and other modes of influence. The table 3.1 below compares traditional public diplomacy, modern public diplomacy and comprehensive public diplomacy.

Table3.1 Traditional, Modern and Comprehensive public diplomacy Compared

	Traditional public diplomacy	Modern public diplomacy	Comprehensive public diplomacy
Conditions	Conflict, tensions between states	Peace	Conflict or Peace, tensions between states or not
Objectives	To achieve political change in target countries by changing	Political-and-economic interest promotion to create receptive	To influence the target audience to meet the goal of the policy that can be

	target audiences' behavior	environment and positive reputation of the country abroad	identified
Strategies	Persuasion Managing publics	Building and maintaining relationships, engaging with publics	Persuasion, threats, building and maintaining relationships with groups and elites of target country to exert influence to meet the goal of the policy
Direction of communication	One-way communication (monologue)	Two-way communication (dialogue)	One-way communication, two-way communication. However, the communication may contain interest exchange and other forms of <i>quid pro quo</i> .
Research	Very little, if any	PD based on scientific research where feedback is also important	N/A
Message context	Ideologies, interests	Ideas, values	Ideologies, interests, ideas, values, threats, bribery and interest
Target audiences (publics)	"General" public of the target nation; sender and receivers of messages	Segmented, well-defined publics + domestic publics; Participants	General public, groups, elites, individuals; domestic publics may be actors in the process or be affected by the result.
Channels	Traditional mass media	Old and new media; often personalized via networks	Old and new media; often personalized via networks; often through private sectors
Budget	Sponsored by government	Public and private partnership	Sponsored by government openly or secretly; public and private partnership; threats or quid pro quo; no budget (the influence from PD assets)

Sources: The parts of traditional public diplomacy and modern public diplomacy (21<sup>st</sup> – [c]entury public diplomacy) is a direct quote from Szondi, (2009: 305). The part about comprehensive public diplomacy is the author's compilation.

The significance of comprehensive public diplomacy is its wide usage in the column of "condition", "strategies" and the "budget" of Table 3.1. The idea of PD assets is one of the major features that differentiate comprehensive public diplomacy from the other two. Comprehensive public diplomacy also underscores the function of private sectors (the proxy agent in the case of China) because private sectors have greater flexibility and are able to

decrease problem of low credibility. Although comprehensive public diplomacy is characteristic of both traditional and modern public diplomacy, what makes comprehensive public diplomacy different is its relationships to acquiring the goal. How to meet the goal by influencing foreign targets is the first priority. To achieve the policy sometimes requires multiple methods, and it is not limited by a single enforcement of public diplomacy. In addition, comprehensive public diplomacy acknowledges the fact that the roles of PD assets are sometimes influential in the determining the effectiveness.

### **3.5 Summary and conclusion**

This thesis proposes the idea of comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets to compensate for the gap. The framework of comprehensive public diplomacy helps to explain its differences from traditional and new public diplomacy. Comprehensive public diplomacy stands influence using modes such as manipulation, bribery, subsidies, threats, attraction and any other methods intended to influence foreign publics or proxy agents to gain interest. Meanwhile, PD assets try to explain the fact that private-sector actors can seriously affect the country's promotion of public diplomacy though they have no relations with the country. PD assets also provide ambiguity for undiscovered relations between government and private-sector actors. The ambiguity provides a possible route of analysis for the study. By proposing PD assets, it is possible to concentrate on the relationship between the goal of government and how to achieve it. This also helps us identify those who are involved in public diplomacy and those who are not involved in public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is important but the promotion of current public diplomacy has rarely played a decisive role in high politics. Current public diplomacy confronts its own limits. By

implementing comprehensive public diplomacy, this thesis argues that public diplomacy is able to deal with the major objects of government so long as they involve processes of influencing foreign publics. In addition, PD assets—the variable that strongly affect the effectiveness of public diplomacy—is also considered in the comprehensive public diplomacy (which is not considered in both traditional and new public diplomacies). The PD assets considered provide alternative explanations within the realm of influencing foreign publics to gain national interest.

## **Chapter IV China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan**

This chapter mainly discusses cases of China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan. This thesis takes Taiwan as case study rather than any other target country because China's intention of devouring Taiwan is loud and clear, which helps to simplify the study by allowing it to focus on China's methods. To illustrate the case studies clearly, related information and knowledge is provided. Thus, a brief introduction to current cross-strait relations is given. As mentioned in Chapter II, every country has different strategies and goals with respect to other countries. Therefore, it is necessary first to outline the strategies, goals and challenges of China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan before we can discuss cases. After the case study, this thesis will provide related analysis and evaluation. The results of the case study verify that China's public diplomacy fits within the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy, and it also arouses the need to rethink public diplomacy.

### **4.1 Structure and the criteria of case selection**

As for the criteria of case selection, they are based on certain principles. First, the main actors who conduct public diplomacy are China and private sectors such as individuals and organizations that are authorized, directed, and subsidized by Chinese authorities. The activities that these actors engaged meet with Pratkanis's concept of public diplomacy or privatized public diplomacy. Although China has been suspected of promoting these activities behind the curtain without solid evidence in some cases, it would also be discussed due to the special situation and possible exchange relationship. Second, the target of public diplomacy is Taiwanese including its general publics, individuals or NGOs, which also meets the criteria of the concept of public diplomacy. Third, China has certain goals which can be identified and

which may be fulfilled through the process of public diplomacy. It does not mean a successful public diplomacy but an attempt at it. It represents the intention to exert influence on the targets and to meet its national interest. Moreover, many cases selected depend on the visibility of media. The media includes newspaper, online news, television, etc. Although this does not mean that the public diplomacy is effective, it shows that the case has at least drawn certain attention. The visibility of the media does not mean that these cases are already known and studied, but it reveals some trace of public diplomacy. Another reason for the visibility of the media is that it is easier to identify more evidence through existing facts. A few cases, however, are not based on media and news but have been discovered by conducting interviews with related personnel in the process of China's public diplomacy framework. Some interviewees are the targets while some are Chinese sympathizers who help China promote public diplomacy.

The case selection in this essay aims to discover different dimensions of China's public diplomacy. Although most cases focus on the unusual/unorthodox public diplomacy of China, some new acts of Chinese public diplomacy are also provided to illustrate the similarities and differences between the two. To further divide China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan, the case study is divided into three categories. First, this thesis discusses some cases of public diplomacy which are within the current concepts and definitions of public diplomacy. The interaction between Kuomintang, aka Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and CCP, and the visiting missions of Chinese officials are examined. The cases are relatively transparent and exhibit the goodwill of China in presenting friendly gestures and hope of peaceful resolution and delicate messages to Taiwanese.

Next, this thesis focuses on the role of proxy agents in the following cases. This part contains the core concept of this thesis: that is, to discover the fact that a country like China

could use similar ideas about public diplomacy to deal with high politics and thereby meet its national interest without limiting itself in the frame of current public diplomacy. The cases focus on how China uses Taiwanese agents as actors to exert influence on Taiwan or to target particular groups. These cases reveal how China uses economic attraction, payment or potential profits to lure proxy agents into doing what China wants them to do with or without perceiving China's intentions. Although the ways in which these proxy agents exert influence may contain many tricky techniques, the aim for China is to gain national interest by achieving its political agendas, creating a positive image, trusting in China or addressing specific issues.

The last category of the case study focuses on few cases in which China intends to influence specific Taiwanese without using attraction but by using threats. It shows how China gains national interest through "negative branding," threatening, and by harassing specific targets and groups. The point of this category is to help us to rethink how far the concept of public diplomacy can go. The concept of threat instead of attraction is already beyond the tract of soft power, However, through the cases it is not hard to find that the channels and ideas China uses are far from public diplomacy. They have much in common. Probably the only difference is in whether attaching or the idea of soft power is used.

#### **4.2 A brief introduction of current cross-strait relations**

When examining China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan, history is the foundation which provides the background knowledge of the interactions between China and Taiwan. When KMT lost its civil war in China in 1949, many people who had followed KMT evacuated to Taiwan. It has been estimated that more than 1 million Chinese evacuated to Taiwan from 1946 to 1957: approximately 10% of Taiwan's population at that time (Wang, 1999: 14).



However, legal interactions were banned until 1987 when Taiwan lifted its martial law and allowed Taiwanese to visit their relatives in China. After approximately 40 years of separation, those people and their offspring were eager to visit their home towns. Increased interaction in the social and economic arenas also created a need for further trade and interactions. Problems such as smuggling, fishing disputes, and illegal border crossings also needed to be solved. Therefore, in 1991, Taiwan and China established semi-official organizations—namely, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)—to deal with these matters. In 1992, both SEF and ARATS negotiated in Hong Kong about document validation and registered mail across the Taiwan Strait. In the negotiation, both SEF and ARATS recognized that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Yet, both Taiwan and China argue they are the sole legitimate representatives of China. In 2000, the former minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, Su Chi, called it the “1992 consensus” and explained that it means there is only one China but that the meaning of that one China is according to their own interpretation (*yi Zhong ge biao*).

On the issue of trade across the Taiwan Strait, the total amount of trade was only around US \$3.9 billion in 1989. Of that amount, 3.3 billion was exported to China and 0.6 billion was imported to Taiwan. The trade increased every year after Taiwan lifted the trade restriction. *Taishang* (Taiwanese businessmen) facilitated China economy in the early 1990s. During the missile crisis of 1995, China reassured *Taishang* that political hostilities would not endanger economic and business matters (Bolt quoted by Cal, 2003: 205). With more and more Taiwanese invested in China, more and more disputes were aroused—especially after the Chinese economy started booming. Stories were heard from time to time about Chinese businessmen who worked with local governments to cast out *Taishang* and rob their factories, products and

companies. They all made the remaining *Taishang* aware of their relationships with the Chinese government, lest they become the next victims.

#### **4.3 China's Goal, its Challenges and its strategy toward Taiwan**

China's public diplomacy has different goals with respect to Taiwan, and it serves China's Taiwan policy. The long-term goal is to unify with Taiwan; the mid-term goal is to nullify the rising Taiwanese identity and to have more influence on Taiwanese economy. China's short-term goal is to maintain the one-China principle, also known as the "1992 consensus." Currently, it is not realistic for China to sell the idea of unification and "one country, two systems" to Taiwan. Instead, it is much easier for China to sell the concept of the 1992 consensus, because it symbolizes cross-strait cooperation, sounds peaceful, suggests mutual prosperity and, most of all, the KMT government and many Taiwanese support the notion of the 1992 consensus—although they define it differently than China does. The idea of mutual cooperation gives China room to maneuver its public diplomacy and to wield greater influence in Taiwan.

Both China and the KMT government have agreed to comply with the 1992 consensus. China argues that the 1992 consensus is the foundation of reconciliation interactions across the Taiwanese Strait. The spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO), Ma Xiaoguang, claims that the core concept of the 1992 consensus is that both Taiwan and China stick to the one-China principle and that the trust-building mechanism would collapse without the 1992 consensus (Chen and Hsueh, 2015; TAO, 2014). However, Taiwanese opposition parties, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, are skeptical of the 1992 consensus and argue that the interpretation of "one China" is

entirely in the hands of China and that no respective interpretations exist. In particular, Taiwanese opposition parties are skeptical about further cooperation between Beijing and Taiwan, which has even led to protests when cross-strait negotiations have been held in Taiwan. For example, when Chen Yunlin, chairman of ARATS, visited Taiwan for negotiations with the SEF in November of 2008, the main obstacle was the Taiwanese opposition's anti-China movement and other Taiwanese citizens who worry about China's growing influence in Taiwan.

China thus believes that Taiwanese citizens must be kept within the orbit of the one-China principle in the name of the 1992 consensus and that it is necessary to antagonize those in Taiwan who oppose it. Maintaining and securing the 1992 consensus is the first short-term priority for China, which is why China has constantly invited retired Taiwanese generals and ranking military officials to visit China—many of whom believe both sides should unite as one in the future. Moreover, provincial Chinese officials have frequently visited Taiwan in recent years while attempting to create a positive image for deeper economic cooperation and the 1992 consensus by announcing the purchase of Taiwanese agricultural products—particularly from southern Taiwan, which is considered the main domain of the DPP (Wang, 2010).

With the reconciliation of the KMT and the CCP in 2005, China's ties with Taiwanese businessmen and political elites expanded and became stronger. The party-to-party platform led to further interaction and cooperation. Following Ma Ying-Jeou's victory in the 2008 presidential election, relations between China and Taiwan improved even further. China's influence on the island spread enormously afterwards. However, it also led to negative reactions from some Taiwanese. The Sunflower Movement in 2014 was considered a setback for China's hopes of helping younger generations of Taiwanese to feel closer bonds with the Chinese. However, the Sunflower Movement was only one reaction among many to China's recent

public diplomatic efforts in Taiwan.

China has natural weaknesses in its reputation and image in Taiwan. After the KMT was defeated and fled to Taiwan in 1949, the Taiwanese were taught that the CCP was the enemy. This notion was etched in the minds of the Taiwanese for a long time. Because Taiwan remains under the threat of forced unification with China, many Taiwanese continue to have a negative perception of China. According to psychological theories of perception, it is much harder for people to accept information that contradicts their existing perceptions than it is for them to accept information that is consistent with those perceptions (Wang, 2011: 49). It is also extremely difficult to promote a positive role against existing negative perceptions (ibid). Under such circumstances, China's efforts to project a positive image are easily considered efforts at propaganda. Moreover, although Chinese culture is a major asset in its public diplomacy (d'Hooghe 2007, 15), the advantage of culture does not work in Taiwan because the Taiwanese and Chinese share the same culture. These factors make it difficult for China to project an image of itself in Taiwan. Therefore, China has tried to surmount those difficulties by targeting Taiwanese elites who share common ideologies and business interests with China.

In China's strategy toward Taiwan, China does not consider Taiwan a target in the field of public diplomacy because Taiwan is perceived to a domestic issue. However, what China does in Taiwan is in fact another form of an evolved traditional public diplomacy. The strategies of "using the economy to promote unification" and "using business to steer politics" are the primary weapons China uses to promote its public-diplomacy goals. At the individual level, China uses *Taishang* and politicians as proxies to achieve its public-diplomacy aims. In 2004, President Hu Jintao further elaborated the strategy of "going to the island, going to the households, going to the mind" (Rudao, Ruhu, Runao) on the fiftieth-anniversary of China

National Radio's cross-strait broadcasting, which amplified its strategy of aiming at the Taiwanese. For instance, laws in Taiwan restrict the development of CCTV and its broadcasts.

To overcome this restriction, China attempts to work with Taiwanese corporations that engage in substantial business in China to transmit a similar ideology and values to the island. China's huge market is also an asset to its public diplomacy, as it has helped "recruit" the Want Want Group as China's proxy in Taiwan, such that China can exert its influence and accelerate integration through mass media. In addition to *Taishang*, China has also focused on finding Taiwanese who support cooperation with China and who support the general concept of "one China" whether it stands for the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China. China's public diplomacy directed at Taiwan does not aim to offset the China-threat argument, to develop a positive image or to stimulate the economy; it instead aims to exert influence through its "proxy-agent" framework. The following case studies verify China's proxy-agent framework.

#### **4.4 Case of China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan (public diplomacy as conventionally assumed)**

For a long time, China has promoted public diplomacy toward Taiwan, which aims at facilitating exchanges, offsetting negative images and increasing mutual understanding in the areas of education, culture and social interactions. These activities are sometimes considered to be part of China's united-front work because they have a political purpose. However, the discussion shows that it closely resembles new public diplomacy because two-way communications and the transparency of those activities and exchanges somehow also increase mutual understanding. For example, educational exchanges are one of the categories that have

intensive interactions long before the warming cross-strait relations. Since March of 2004, the Taiwan government allowed schools to sign agreement across the Taiwan Strait. By the end of January 2007, schools at all levels on both sides of the Strait had signed 13,823 exchange and cooperation agreements (Executive Yuan, 2017). As of 2011, Chinese students are allowed to study in Taiwanese colleges and universities. 12,108 Chinese students studied in Taiwan from 2011 to 2016 (ibid.). These educational interactions and exchanges help students and teachers communicate and understand differences and similarities. Moreover, cultural, social and educational exchanges are areas toward which the two governments hold a relatively open-minded attitude. Numerous exchanges have been held or funded by governments across the Taiwan strait in recent decades. The following sections discuss two significance cases of China's public diplomacy as conventionally assumed.

#### **4.4.1 The interaction between CCP and KMT**

China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan mostly resides at the level of party-to-party platform. In the year 2005, when cross-strait relations dropped to an all-time low during the DPP government, the honorary chairman of KMT, Lien Chan, led KMT delegations to visit China. They had formal meetings with the CCP, including with Hu Jintao. It was the highest exchange between CCP and KMT after the previous meeting of 1945. After the meeting, KMT announced five points of compromise:

Both the CCP and the KMT agree to support the "1992 consensus", to end hostilities across the Taiwan Strait and promote a peace agreement, to establish mechanisms to promote economic cooperation, to promote negotiations on Taiwan's international participation, and to establish a party-to-party platform for future dialogue (Hong, 2005).

The visit was a huge progress and a successful strategy for China. Though the five points listed above constituted neither an official agreement (nor are they legally valid, as KMT was only the opposition party on that time), they became the foundations of the following negotiation between Beijing and Taipei after president Ma Ying-Jueo took office in 2008. Moreover, another salient point is that China took the 1992 consensus as the principle and foundation of negotiation across the Taiwan Strait. For instance, during the visit of Lien Chan, Hu Jintao reiterated that China is willing to have further negotiations with the Taiwan government concerning social, economic and political perspectives under the 1992 consensus and the one-China principle. China began to use the “1992 consensus” in its official documents after the meeting.

After KMT, China also invited other opposition parties of Taiwan to visit China, including the People First Party and the New Party. These may be considered instances of new public diplomacy, because the interaction involves not one-way but two-way communication. Through mutual communication, the result and peaceful atmosphere were supported by many Taiwanese. The interactions and communications of CCP and those parties increased dramatically in the following years. For example, both CCP and KMT, co-sponsored the cross-strait Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum. The forum, also known as the KMT-CCP forum, has been held since 2006. It provided intensive communications across the Taiwan Strait.

The table 4.1 below shows the details of these forums. These forums were held in China and the participants include Taiwanese politicians, Chinese officials, scholars and businessmen. Although Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping did not participate in the forum, they met several times with

the chairman of KMT before and after the forum.<sup>5</sup> Overall, the KMT-CCP forum was a very good opportunity for both China and Taiwan to communicate and understand the need for both sides—especially, given that KMT is an opposition party. After Ma took office in 2008, the position of the forum was criticized as a talk shop, because Ma’s administration was afraid that the KMT government would be criticized for using the party and the media to replace some government institutions, such as Mainland Affairs Council. In 2016, the title of the forum was changed to the “Cross-strait Peace-Development Forum.” The forum focused more on political issues such as the “1992 consensus” and on interactions of young people across the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, China increased its channels to facilitate more exchanges with young Taiwanese, because China realized that it needed to attract young Taiwanese from their inveterate fondness toward Taiwanese identity. For example, China announced its intention to expand the quota of internships in China’s government enterprise for Taiwanese students, to hire 260 young Taiwanese scholars, and to spend RMB 50 million yuan to encourage research by cross-strait scholars in the 2016 forum (Lan and Chen, 2016).

Table 4.1 The Cross-strait Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum

Sequence and Time	Leaders	Venue and Theme	Results
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<sup>5</sup> For instance, the Lien-Hu meeting in 2006, the Chu-Xi meeting in 2015, and the Hung-Xi meeting in 2016.



1st 2006.4	KMT: Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of KMT  CCP: Jia Qinglin, Chairperson of the National Committee of CPPCC	Beijing: The Cross-strait economic communication, and direct air and shipping service	China opened measures unilaterally, including Taiwan's 11 major vegetable varieties of zero-tariff input, recognition of Taiwan's universities, allowing Taiwan licensed doctors to practice in China, to develop regulations for Chinese to visit Taiwan.
2nd 2006.10	KMT: Lien Chan  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Bo'ao: Enhancing cross-strait cooperation and fulfilling the win-win situation across the strait agriculture industry.	KMT and CCP made seven proposals, including proposals to promote agricultural exchanges, to encourage Taiwanese farmers to invest in China, to ensure channels for Taiwanese agricultural products to import in China, to maintain fair trade, to promote agricultural technology exchanges, and to establishing mechanisms for agricultural safety.
3rd 2007.4	KMT: Lien Chan  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Beijing: Direct flights, tourism and educational exchanges	Made several proposals, including proposals to promote aviation industry exchanges, rescue cooperation, educational exchanges and Chinese travel in Taiwan.
4th* 2008.12	KMT: Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Shanghai: Developing and deepening cross-strait economic exchanges and cooperation	Made nine proposals, including proposals to promote cooperation in finance, service and fishery industries; to expand infrastructure and domestic demand; to improve regulations in direct flight and protection of investment; and to promote economic cooperation.
5th* 2009.7	KMT: Wu Po-hsiung, Chairman of KMT  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Changsha: Promoting and deepening cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation	Made 29 proposals, including proposals to improve the protection of monuments and intangible cultural heritage; to cooperate in cultural, educational and news exchanges; to sign the cross-strait cultural and educational agreement; to promote cooperation in energy saving and environmental protection and new energy industries.
6th* 2010.7	KMT: Wu Po-hsiung  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Guangzhou: Increasing cooperation in emerging industries and enhancing the competitiveness across Taiwan	Made 22 proposals, including proposals to promote the cross-strait economic-cooperation framework (ECFA), energy conservation and environmental protection; to promote the mutual recognition of academic qualifications; to support young people to participate in exchange activities; to improve cross-strait broadcasting,

		Strait	film and television, and the publishing industry; and to promote cross-strait intellectual-property protection.
7th* 2011.5	KMT: Wu Po-hsiung  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Chengdu: Deepening cross-strait cooperation, creating a win-win prospects	Made 19 proposals, including proposals to implement the ECFA; to improve economic cooperation in finance for small and medium-sized enterprises cooperation and bilateral investment; to improve nuclear-power safety exchanges and cooperation; to sign the cross-strait insurance agreement.
8th* 2012.7	KMT: Wu Po-hsiung  CCP: Jia Qinglin	Harbin: Deepening the peaceful development and benefitting the people across Taiwan Strait	Made 17 proposals, including proposals to promote the establishment of the Cross-strait Representative Offices; to improve cooperation in tourism, education, publishing, film and television industries; to encourage holding the cross-strait youth forum; to speed up the negotiation of ECFA.
9th* 2013.10	KMT: Wu Po-hsiung  CCP: Yu Zhengsheng, Chairperson of the National Committee of CPPCC	Nanning: Increasing exchanges and cooperation, and revitalizing China jointly	Made 19 proposals, including proposals to promote cooperation in trade, industry, enterprises, finance, agriculture, science and technology, film and television, publishing and education; to improve new energy and renewable-energy development and utilization, environmental science and technology and biotechnology cooperation; to improve tourism exchanges and cooperation mechanisms.
10th* 2015.5	KMT: Eric Chu, Chairman of KMT  CCP: Yu Zhengsheng	Shanghai: None	Made several proposals, including proposals to promote cross-strait economic integration; to establish a communication platform to study the ways in which Taiwan participates in the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and regional economic cooperation; to promote cooperation and exchanges in education, trade, the agricultural cultural industry, etc.; to study the problem of mainland passenger transit in Taiwan.
11th 2016.11	KMT: Hung Hsiu-chu, Chairman of KMT  CCP: Yu Zhengsheng	Beijing: None	Made several proposals, including proposals that both should adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence; seek further cooperation in areas such as industry docking, interconnection of infrastructure, ports and industrial parks, and transportation of young people across the Taiwan Strait; search for new models in film and television industry; and release information about more than 40 exchange projects in 2017.

\* KMT is the ruling party

Sources: news (Li, 2015; “Cong bian ma,” 2016; Lan and Wang, 2016; “Liangan heping,” 2016 )

From a public-diplomacy perspective, the KMT-CCP forum fits the requirement of new public diplomacy. First, though the forum is for the political parties of Taiwan and China, it is also a government-to-foreign-people mechanism rather than a governmental action. CCP has the power to execute the results of the forum and thus can exert influence directly by implementing policy unilaterally. KMT, on the other hand, was an opposition party before 2008 and after 2016. It therefore obviously cannot represent the Taiwan government and thus has remained in its position as a non-governmental actor. From 2008 to 2016, KMT was very cautious as the ruling party. President Ma deliberately weakened the role of the forum. The agreements made between KMT-CCP were only suggestions and so cannot represent agreements between the governments. Many of the suggestions announced after the forum were already under negotiation across the Taiwan Strait at that time.

In addition, during the eight years of KMT governance, the official channels were open and went smoothly; the function of the forum was for opinion exchanges. Second, the KMT-CCP forum created a platform for two-way communication, which is conducive to mutual understanding. Third, the forum is relatively transparent. The media is allowed to observe the forum, and scholars were allowed to publish papers after participating in the discussion panels in the forum. In addition, the forum created a cooperative image for both parties, thereby revealing the intention of CCP to find a peaceful resolution to cross-strait relations and to thereby offset the worries of Taiwanese concerning the unstable situation. Finally, the purpose of the forum is not to use persuasion as traditional public diplomacy did, but to build and maintain a trusting mutual relationship. Although it was sometimes criticized as merely a talk shop, it is also a platform for China to “yield interest” to attract Taiwanese. As the table 4.1

mentioned above, from 2008 and 2016, China unilaterally announced its intentions to lift or sponsor several policies and projects in the forum. It is no doubt that the forum itself is a practice of new public diplomacy.

#### **4.4.2 Visiting of Chinese officials to Taiwan**

During the period of warming cross-strait relations, the interaction between Chinese and Taiwanese officials increased enormously. Chinese officials often visited Taiwan. Head visiting is always part of public diplomacy because it is a good chance for leaders to communicate with foreign publics through the media. Considering the situation between Taiwan and China, it was rare for Chinese officials to visit Taiwan. Thus, even local Chinese governors or high-rank officials visiting Taiwan were able to gain a lot of attention from media. The media exposure was as if the head visiting of other countries. Many Chinese officials, especially governors at the province level, often visit Taiwan. Most missions are led by governors or deputy governors, while only nine secretaries of a provincial party committee visited Taiwan. Nevertheless, to the ears of Taiwanese, the title of governor sounds better than “secretary of a provincial party committee.”

The purpose of most visiting missions was to facilitate cultural, economic and trade exchanges. At first, the visiting missions attracted attention from Taiwanese because they often released information about the intention to purchase Taiwanese products such as agricultural products, home textiles, daily necessities and panels, petrochemical raw materials, machine tools and investment projects, etc. For example, Zhejiang governor Lu Zushan claimed to invest about 10 million U.S. dollars in Taiwan (about NT 320 million) (Hunag, 2010a). The contract of the purchase of the mission of Fujian Provincial Governor Huang Xiaojing was about 766

million U.S. dollars and was estimated to create NT 24 billion dollars' worth of business opportunities (Huang, 2010b; Lu, 2010).

However, the effect of those visits decreased dramatically for three reasons. First, the number and the value of products that the visiting missions claimed to purchase was overstated. Second, the government of Fujian province was discovered to be paying the Taiwanese media, *China Times*, to do placement marketing (which will be discussed in the case of the Want Want *China Times* Group). Soon, people considered the visiting missions to be propaganda without actual benefit to Taiwan and its economy. Third, after too many visits, the effect was diluted. For example, from 2008 to 2016, more than 163 of the visiting missions at the province level visited Taiwan.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the visiting missions seldom communicated with ordinary Taiwanese. The communication was more often focused on Taiwanese elites. Usually, the mutual communication focused on particular KMT politicians and businessmen with connections with China. As a result, the effect of the visiting missions at the province level was not very successful in generating a positive image of China in Taiwan.

Besides the visiting missions at the province level, Chinese central governments also engaged in the visiting mission to Taiwan. For example, the vice chairman of the ARATS, Zheng Lizhong, may be one of the Chinese officials who communicated with Taiwanese mostly and directly. During his tenure as deputy director of TAO, Zheng visited almost every cities, villages and towns in Taiwan. His focus was to communicate with Taiwanese who were in the agriculture or aquaculture industries—especially those in the southern part of Taiwan.

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<sup>6</sup> Author's calculation. For detail, please see the website of National Immigration Agency, ROC. Retrieved from <http://www.immigration.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=36452&CtUnit=17493&BaseDSD=7&mp=1>

Through mutual communication, Zheng was able to determine the need in those industries and formulate policies conducive to the Taiwanese as an instrument of public diplomacy. For instance, China purchased milkfish from the Xuejia District in Tainan after studying and communicating with the aquaculture fishermen (Huang, 2012). In the end, the value of the purchase was about NT 135 million dollars (US\$4.75 million) (Wei et al., 2016). However, the effectiveness also was limited. The fact that China purchased milkfish in the Xuejia District did not inspire those aquaculture fishermen to stop supporting DPP in the election. The purchasing project was suspended in April of 2016 for what many believed is political reasons (Tu, 2016). Moreover, media exposure of Chinese officials visiting Taiwan generated opposed positions. One thought it represented huge progress and a successful result of the warming cross-strait relation; another believed it was merely a propaganda of China. The effect of the visiting missions of Chinese officials to Taiwan was not as expected. When the DPP government refused to recognize the 1992 consensus, the visiting mission was suspended.

#### **4.5 Cases of China's aggressive implementing on Taiwan**

Governmental authorization of private-sector entities to engage in public diplomacy is common in U.S. public diplomacy. Manheim (1994: 14-35) cites the fact that countries have hired public firms to do political campaigns and lobbying in the United States as one example of strategic public diplomacy. It is not unusual for other countries to try to influence foreign governments by hiring public-relations firms to lobby for their interests. Hiring public firms is not an example of soft power but of payment, and the practice continues to the present day.

China's interactions with the Taiwanese private sector—i.e., with corporations, NGOs, and individuals—resemble privatized public diplomacy. China also emphasizes the role of

private entities particularly with regard to how effective Chinese international corporations might be in promoting public diplomacy. However, when China tries to exert its influence on Taiwan, the private entities it uses are not Chinese but Taiwanese. Moreover, the connection between China and its Taiwanese private-sector counterparts is relatively opaque. Indeed, it is much easier for private Taiwanese entities to exert influence on Taiwan than for private Chinese entities to do so because it is harder for Taiwan to determine both sources and intentions. With the Chinese market as bait, Taiwanese companies that do business in China are potential assets for China's public diplomacy.

#### **4.5.1 Want Want *China Times* Group**

China's public diplomacy relies heavily on Taiwanese private entities. In the global sphere, China uses mass media to project its national image (Wang, 2011: 44). China has spent substantial sums in the international media to enhance its global influence and to showcase its non-hostile and peaceful attributes as a global power (Zhang, 2011: 57). In Taiwan, China uses Taiwanese business corporations as a platform to limit negative images of China. Want Want Holdings Limited is the prime example of this type of activity.

Want Want Holdings Limited (Want Want Holdings) began as a Taiwanese food company that manufactured snack foods and beverages. The company invested in China in 1992. In recent decades, it has reaped huge profits in the food industry. Following the reconciliation of China and Taiwan after Ma's 2008 ascension, the owner of Want Want Holdings, Tsai Eng-Meng, purchased the influential Taiwanese media company, the *China Times* Group, and its affiliated television station, which included the *China Times*, the *Commercial Times*, the *China Times Weekly*, CTI Television and the China Television Company. Tsai merged Want Want

Holdings and the China Times Group into the Want Want China Times Media Group (Want Want China Times), and in 2009 began to issue *Want Daily*, a newspaper that primarily covered the news on the mainland and the cross-strait relationship while seeking to encourage the Taiwanese to learn about China “correctly” (“*wangbao*,” 2014).

After Tsai bought the *China Times* Group, the newspaper became decidedly pro-China (Brady, 2015:790). Many news stories and articles are considered to be biased in China’s favor. Tsai’s personal political ideology also affected the position taken by Want Want China Times. For example, in 2012, Tsai gave an interview to the *Washington Post* in which he argued that few people died in Tiananmen Square, and he admitted that he fired an editor for writing a defamatory article about China (Higgins, 2012). In addition, China has promoted its visiting projects in Taiwan while attempting to influence the Taiwanese media. Since 2008, more than 29 heads of ministries or the equivalents have visited Taiwan.<sup>7</sup> Want Want China Times has provided extensive reporting on these visits. The focus of the news was not limited to the number of business deals made by Chinese officials, but it seemed to include almost everything else. When the governor of Fujian Province, Huang Xiaojing, visited Taiwan in May of 2010, major Taiwan newspapers published more than 101 news articles related to his visit, including reports of his speeches, his interviews, his advocacy of trade and business cooperation, etc.<sup>8</sup> It was common for these visiting missions to have a large amount of media exposure in Taiwan.

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<sup>7</sup> Author’s calculation. For instance, Politburo member Han Zheng also visited Taiwan in 2010 when he was the mayor of Shanghai. Those visits typically attracted media attention. The peak visiting year was in 2010, when more than 15 visits were made by high-ranking leaders of Chinese local provinces.

<sup>8</sup> Author calculated. The news was calculated using the Central News Agency, *China Times*, *United Daily News*, *United Evening News*, *Economy Daily News*, *Commercial Times*, *Liberty Times*.



However, articles published by Want Want China Times were found to have used placement marketing after Su Shulin, the successor of the Fujian governor, visited Taiwan in March of 2012. This discovery resulted in fines of approximately U.S. \$12,100 (Chen, 2012). The Fujian government was found to have paid Want Want both to report the news positively and to include disguised advertisements.

Want Want also established the Apollo Survey, which primarily conducts public polling on political issues. The results of the Apollo Survey typically support pro-China stances. For example, the Apollo Survey conducts surveys about national identity in close contact with the Taiwan Competitiveness Forum: “a think tank led by academics known for their pro-unification stance” (Shih, 2013). Since 2013, the two groups have conducted a series of pro-China research studies and controversial polls. The results show that more than 90% of Taiwanese believe they are ethnic Chinese and that more than 61% think of themselves as Chinese—a result that sharply contrasts with the results of polls conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council, academic institutions, and other polling firms. According to the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, which has conducted polls addressing national identity for the past 20 years, results for that same year show that 57.1% believe they are Taiwanese, 35.8% consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 3.8% consider themselves Chinese. Despite the controversy engendered by Apollo’s statistics, this result was widely reported in newspapers and on television. Since 2013, such surveys have been conducted and published four times per year.

It has also been argued that the Taiwan Affairs Office, an official Chinese institution, attempted to purchase Taiwanese media outlets using 300 million U.S. dollars transferred from China to Taiwan and Hong Kong in 2007 (Tung qtd. in Hsu, 2014:520). However, it has been

most difficult to prove the connection between China and Want Want China Times. Tsai himself has admitted that he knew the Taiwan Affairs Office was attempting to buy the China Times Group with the help of other agents, but he denied that he was the agent (Tien, 2009).

According to Lee (2008), it is known that when China interacts with *Taishang*, China is always seeking to advance its political interest. Although it is debatable whether Tsai works for China or is merely willing to act spontaneously on China's behalf, an exchange relationship between Tsai and China has been revealed. For example, Tsai's magazine, *Want Want Monthly*, published an article about a meeting between Tsai and the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi. On December 5, 2008, Tsai visited to the Taiwan Affairs Office and told Wang Yi that Want Want Holdings' interest in buying the China Times Group was to improve cross-strait relations. Wang Yi replied that the Want Want Group would have the full support of the Taiwan Affairs Office, if necessary, both in its food industry and in television programming (Lin, 2011). After Want Want bought the *China Times* and shifted its political perspective, its profits in China rapidly grew. Want Want Holding's revenue increased from U.S. \$1.09 billion in 2007 to U.S. \$2.95 billion in 2011 and then to U.S. \$3.78 billion in 2014 (Want Want China, n.d.). In addition, Want Want Holdings received U.S. \$ 47 million in subsidies from China in 2013 (Haley and Haley, 2013). These figures may be mere coincidence, but such success may incentivize imitation by other Taiwanese businessmen. These profit figures are very attractive and may set an example for others to follow.

Notably, following Tsai's purchase of the China Times Group, a growing number of Taiwanese tycoons with business interests in China have shown their intention to purchase Taiwanese media companies and related industries. In 2014, the Ting Hsin International Group, a Taiwanese company that is the largest instant-noodle maker in China, attempted to merge with

China Network Systems (CNS), a major multi-system operator that provides cable-TV services to 30% of the Taiwanese market.<sup>9</sup> However, the merger of Ting Hsin and CNS failed because of a 2014 scandal in which Ting Hsin was shown to have deliberately allowed tainted cooking oil onto the market (“*dingxin*,” 2015). In a similar case, Television Broadcasts Satellite (TVBS), a national Taiwanese cable-TV company, was purchased by Cher Wang, the chairwoman of HTC Corporation, which had business incentives to expand in the Chinese market. After acquiring the lion’s share of Hong Kong Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) in 2011, Wang became a member of the board of directors of Hong Kong TVB and TVBS.<sup>10</sup> In January of 2015, Wang purchased TVBS, the Taiwanese subsidiary of TVB. Since purchasing TVBS, Wang has been able to expand HTC’s business more smoothly in China because of her new identity as a Taiwanese media owner (Huang, 2015). Economic considerations have become the biggest incentives for Taiwanese business tycoons to acquire media-related companies, because such purchases create win-win situations for both China and the Taiwanese company.

The China factor and Want Want China Times’ influence has gradually changed the culture of Taiwanese media. According to Freedom House reports in 2014 and 2015, as economic ties deepen across the Taiwan Strait, many Taiwanese media owners who have

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<sup>9</sup> Want Want China Group first attempted to merge with CNS in 2010. However, concerns were raised because acquiring CNS would mean that Want Want would have the right to decide whether TV stations were able to broadcast on their cable platform, which may have further affected freedom of the press—particularly with respect to negative information about China. After many protests, and based on worries that the Want Want China Group could become a media monopoly, the merger was eventually rejected by Taiwan’s National Communication Commission (NCC) in 2013.

<sup>10</sup> HTC is a Taiwanese manufacturer of smartphones and tablets. TVB is a commercial television station in Hong Kong that also runs TVBS, its subsidiary in Taiwan.

businesses in China or who sell advertising to Chinese companies are cautious about upsetting China. Thus, Taiwanese media owners have occasionally censored negative information about China, and journalists self-censor topics related to Chinese officials (Freedom House, n.d.). The case of Want Want China Times demonstrates China's huge influence in encouraging Taiwanese businessman to become proxies. Regardless of the proxies' willingness, they all become potential Chinese assets.

#### **4.5.2 Media operating in the case of Kenya fraud (reactive public diplomacy)**

With the help of Want Want Holdings, China is able to respond to the incident more smoothly. It may have caused serious damage to Taiwanese feelings and cross-strait relations without Want Want Holdings. In April of 2016, the Kenya police department sent 87 fraud suspects (32 Chinese and 45 Taiwanese) caught in Kenya back to China due to pressure from China. Among them, 23 Taiwanese citizens were caught in 2014. They were acquitted in the lawsuit of "unlicensed operation of the telecommunications industry" and of "unauthorized use of wireless telecommunication devices" on 5 April 2016. Three days later, eight Taiwanese were deported by Kenya police department to Beijing instead of to Taipei. With the help of the Taiwan government, the remaining 15 Taiwanese received further instruction that they should be handed back to local authorities pending further hearings due to the order from the Kenyan court. However, the Kenyan police disregarded the court's injunction, and sent those Taiwanese with the rest of 22 Taiwanese, who were arrested in a separate fraud case, back to China with China's personnel under escort. Suspects of other nationalities such as Thai were sent to Thailand.

This incident aroused huge uproar and anger about both Kenya's and China's brutal

behavior toward Taiwanese in Taiwan. The help from the Taiwan government was in vain under the pressure of China. China suffered severe criticism in Taiwan. Especially, after the case of Kenya, other cases of Taiwanese suspects sent to China were disclosed, including cases in Malaysia, the Philippines and even in Taiwan's diplomatic ally, Panama. The attitude of China was to treat the suspects as convicted criminals. These cases aroused the anger of many Taiwanese toward the impotent Taiwan government and toward China, because the Taiwanese argued that the Taiwan government, instead of China, has jurisdiction over those cases.

However, in response to the incident, China quickly launched a series of measurements to show their jurisdiction over the Taiwanese suspects. In a departure from its previous intransigent attitude, China adopted a different strategy. To respond to the worries and anger from Taiwan, China reiterated several positions on the fraud case. First, China claimed that all the victims in the fraud are Chinese who suffered dramatically after they lost their property; some even committed suicide. Second, China emphasized that, though these fraud suspects were sent back to Taiwan for trial according to the "Cross-strait Joint Fight against Crime and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (mutual legal assistance agreement)" signed in 2009, they had not been punished due to the separate investigation of the case between Taiwan and China. Many suspects were released after they arrived in Taiwan due to lack of relevant evidence. Finally, China pointed out that fraud crime is a felony in China but only a misdemeanor in Taiwan, such that the suspects were able to get away with it easily.

These positions were reiterated through the press conference of TAO via reports from the Ministry of Public Security. Its media, such as the *Xinhua news agency* and the *Global Times* further focused on the fact that the suspects were actual criminals. For example, on 14 April, the *Xinhua news agency* interviewed two Taiwanese suspects who dictated the process of

committing the crime. The agency emphasized that only 10% of fraud suspects were sentenced. Moreover, on 17 April, *Want Daily*, one of the news agencies of Want Want China Times, was arranged to listen to the interrogation and consequent confession of one of the suspects (Chen and Chu, 2016). *Want Daily* also reported that all of the 45 Taiwanese suspects pleaded guilty to fraud (Chang, 2016). The interviews and interrogation were reported and were broadcast intensively by the Taiwanese media (“*Zhapien taiiren*”, 2016).

As for its notorious record of human-rights violations, China also allowed *Want Daily* to visit the Beijing Haidian Detention Center to observe the daily life of the Taiwanese suspects. It was the first time that the Beijing Haidian Detention Center allowed media to visit (Chen, 2016). *Want Daily* reported on the life and daily schedule of those Taiwanese suspects, including the time spent learning, exercising, watching drama and news on television, etc. The detention center even provided different color uniforms to differentiate Chinese suspects. This news was forwarded and broadcasted by other Taiwanese media such as *Liberty Times*, *China Times* and the *SET News Channel*, etc. (“zhongguo shandai,” 2016; Tien et al., 2016).

The strategy was working with the help of Want Want Holdings. News of Want Want Holdings not only supported the idea of sending the suspects to China; it also criticized politicians who support the idea that Taiwan should have jurisdiction. Want Want Holdings labeled them as “the helper of organized fraud gangs” through using the multiple forwarding and reporting of relevant news in different news agencies under Want Want Holdings to increase its visibility. For example, *Want Weekly* published article which attacked legislator Huang Kuo-chang; the article was then reported by *China Times* (Chang, 2016). Moreover, after constantly reporting the perspectives of China, the New Party, a conservative party supporting the unification in Taiwan, published a public poll which had been conducted by Apollo Survey.

According to the poll, 49.1 percent of respondents agreed to send the suspects to areas other than Taiwan provided that the relevant evidence was not in Taiwan; 33 percent of respondents wanted to send the suspects back to Taiwan; 61.6 percent of respondents agreed that there are problems with Taiwan's legal system because fraud is merely a misdemeanor in Taiwan; 93.1 percent of respondents agreed that fraud damaged Taiwan's international reputation (Shih, 2016). The chairman of New Party, Yok Mu-ming, said in a press conference that the party supports sending the fraud suspects to China lest it encourage fraud in the future, because the law in Taiwan is not complete (Tu, 2016).

The poll was reported by the major media in Taiwan. It helped to justify China's behavior, despite the fact that the questions of the public poll are problematic. Respondents were misled by the questions, and many Taiwanese were misled by the result of public poll. Several problems were revealed. First, questions provided the premise that the Taiwanese government did not have relevant evidence but neglected the fact that China, which had the evidence, was reluctant to give it to Taiwan under the mutual legal-assistance agreement. Second, the public poll avoided referring to China in the questions; it instead referred to "areas other than Taiwan" to falsely increase the number of people who would support sending suspects to China. Third, the poll was designed to show that the Taiwan legal system is not trusted by Taiwanese but lacked questions comparing the Chinese and Taiwan legal system. After all, it is known that China's legal system is controlled by the CCP. The Chief Justice of China, Zhou Qiang, even rejected the idea of an independent judiciary (Forsythe, 2017).

After China implemented these strategies, it made many Taiwanese changed their attitude from feel angry to ashamed. In fact, it was a dispute of jurisdiction. China responded to the dispute by using its media and Taiwanese proxy agent, the Want Want China Times Group, to

win the support of Taiwanese for the incident of deportation. In the end, these efforts successfully offset the negative image of China in its reactions to the fraud case. After the case of Kenya in April, China won the jurisdiction almost in every other country without provoking the Taiwanese. China has constantly sent Taiwanese charged with fraud back to China for trial, including five Taiwanese in Kenya in August, 25 Taiwanese in Cambodia in June, 78 Taiwanese in Armenia in August, 13 Taiwanese in Cambodia in September, and 218 Taiwanese in Spain in February of 2017.<sup>11</sup> It is a successful strategy adopted by China with the help of proxy agents in Taiwan.

#### **4.5.3 China's lobbying of Taiwanese Veterans**

China has a simple and more straightforward method of communicating with Taiwanese veterans. Many of these veterans, particularly retired generals, support the 1992 consensus because they or their parents retreated to Taiwan after losing the Civil War in 1949, leaving their other family members behind in mainland China. They have a comparatively strong attachment to China and a lack of Taiwanese identity. After the conciliation, China repeatedly invited Taiwanese veterans to visit China and received them with hospitality: Examples include the 2009 cross-strait retired-generals' golf tournament, the 2011 Zhongshan Whampoa discussion meeting, and the 2013 Whampoa Forum. China constantly engages in communications and interactions with these generals.

In March of 2013, Li Kuei-Fa, a former deputy commander of Air Force Command

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<sup>11</sup> the five Taiwanese in Kenya had been acquitted in the lawsuit of fraud in Kenya; the judge even made it clear that these five Taiwanese had to be deported to Taiwan).



Headquarters, established the Taipei Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association (TWMAAA). At the founding ceremony of the TWMAAA, dozens of retired generals made a public appeal for unification because they believed it was Taiwan's safest option (Chen, 2013; "tuiyi jiangling"). According to the secretary-general of the association, Cheng Hung-I, Li founded the association with the intention of identifying people who share the same beliefs as the veteran association concerning cross-strait interactions and a unified China (Zheng, personal communication, September 10, 2015).

China invites members of associations such as the TWMAAA to join missions to China several times a year. Such events include the 2015 "communication among Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Taiwan" mission (Zheng, personal communication, September 10, 2015). According to Zheng, the United Front Work Department of the CCP's central committee (UFWD) leads these activities and receives assistance from the China Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association (CWMAAA). Sometimes these communications involve conferences about the history of second Sino-Japanese war. Moreover, it is not unusual for TWMAAA members to visit Chinese military bases. The TWMAAA organizes four missions to China per year. Since 2015, the membership of the visiting mission is no longer restricted to retired personnel but also includes the chief of the village. According to Cheng, the organization modified the composition of the visiting mission because it knows that this is what China wants. China wants more direct communications and interactions with local opinion leaders to bring pro-unification Taiwanese together.

More importantly, China is willing to finance this type of social group to maintain interactions with China and Taiwan. Cheng has indicated an awareness that other social groups have also received Chinese subsidies to sustain their maintenance costs. Although few admit it,

it is no secret that China will subsidize pro-China groups in Taiwan. According to Cheng, China has also demonstrated an intention to provide financial support to the TWMAAA. Although the TWMAAA refuses funding from China, core members engage in tourism business with China, which requires a good relationship with China for practical reasons.

Such relationships may be a stepping stone for China to exert its influence because, over the past few years, China has developed a positive relationship with Taiwanese veterans. The TWMAAA is indeed another proxy for China, although the members of the TWMAAA may think of these interactions as harmless and normal. Exchange relationships are also revealing. The TWMAAA helps China find Taiwanese sympathizers to endorse the “one China” stance, and the core members of the TWMAAA are thus able to develop their businesses by establishing social networks in China.

Regardless of concerns about confidential military-intelligence leaks, these retired generals are important to China for two reasons. First, retired generals are opinion leaders in the Taiwanese military. Retired and active Taiwanese generals are tightly bound by the military’s small ecosystem. It is relatively easy for retired generals to influence active generals through personal relationships and related military associations. Second, through constant interaction and communication between China and retired Taiwanese military personnel, China creates an image of a cross-strait brotherhood. The image of retired Taiwanese military personnel supporting unification is good domestic propaganda for China.

#### **4.5.4 China’s “subsidies” to Taiwanese political elites**

Having a good relationship with Taiwanese politicians is of major importance to the promotions of China’s proxy-agent framework. Through this framework, China is able to create

a win-win situation for both China and Taiwanese politicians, such as with Kao Chin Su-Mei, a Taiwanese legislator elected in the Highland Aborigines electoral district in 2001. As an aboriginal political elite, Kao Chin has obtained many resources from China because Taiwanese aboriginals play an important role in China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.<sup>12</sup> Kao Chin was accused of being a pro-China politician because of her extensive interactions with China (Tseng et al, 2009; Lin, 2015). During her term of office, Kao Chin enrolled in Minzu University of China in 2005 and graduated in 2011. It was unusual and controversial for a Taiwanese politician to have studied in China.

Over years of interactions, China has developed a good relationship with Kao Chin and has therefore accorded Kao Chin greater privileges than other Taiwanese politicians have received. For example, after Typhoon Morakot caused catastrophic damage to Taiwan in 2009, killing many aboriginals and damaging many villages, TAO donated nearly 100 million NT dollars to help the aboriginals. However, the donation was given directly to Kao Chin for handling ("baba shuizai," 2009). China was thus able to improve its image among Taiwanese aboriginals, while Kao Chin also benefited in the following election. Kao Chin has also organized several high-profile visits for Taiwanese aboriginals to China in recent years (Chen, 2015). Kao Chin once led Taiwanese aboriginals to protest against Japan for its atrocity during World War II and was praised by president Hu when leading a visiting mission to Beijing in

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<sup>12</sup> Taiwanese aboriginals are from the Austronesian people, who have little ethnic relation to the Chinese. However, China aims to show that Taiwanese aboriginals are actually historically Chinese, thus bolstering its claim that Taiwan is part of China. Please see Chiu 2008.

2009 (“gaojin sumei,” 2009).

It is widely recognized that the political elites invited by Beijing to visit China were better positioned to establish a personal relationship with high-ranking officials. Consequently, they or their family members had a better opportunity to benefit from the large Chinese market, thereby generating dissatisfaction among the Taiwanese. Some of these elites were suspected and accused of using their positions in the Taiwan to make a fortune in China. For example, Chiang Pin-kung, the former chairman of the SEF, was accused of using his position to help his son acquire a vanadium-iron business in China (“laohenda,” 2009).

This action led skeptics to question whether there should have been an exchange relationship between the parties. In recent years, rumors and accusations about Taiwanese elites receiving subsidies from China have increased. The increasing of political parties in Taiwan, mentioned in the previous chapter, have huge proportion of supporting unification. With no substantial evidence to support such accusations, political parties, the work of Taiwanese NGOs and corporations may be either suspected as propaganda or coincidentally in accord with China’s interest.

Communication is an essential element in modern public diplomacy. The roles of one-way communication, dialogue and even collaboration in public diplomacy have been widely discussed in the past decade (Riordan 2004; Cowan and Arsenault, 2008). It is exhilarating when a win-win situation is created through public diplomacy. However, it is sometimes difficult to understand who is actually benefitting from the process of dialogue and communication, even when it seems like a win-win situation. Asymmetric economic environments in cross-strait relations offer China a substantial advantage in promoting its own public diplomacy in Taiwan. Wu Jieh-min, a research fellow of Academia Sinica, uses the

concept of “cross-strait political and commercial alliances” to illuminate the structure under which capital and businesses exert influence on Taiwanese domestic politics (Pan, 2014). When political elites and business tycoons cooperate with the Chinese government as a result of complicated interests, it remains a question for skeptics to determine whether China has power over Taiwan’s economy and politics. At the very least, it simply gives China more leverage to aggressively conduct its public diplomacy.

#### **4.5.5 Elections and the discount flight tickets**

China has a long history of attempting to influence Taiwanese presidential elections. This history goes back to when the first direct presidential election was held in 1996. However, the attempt to influence the result of the election through intimidation failed. China often remains silent when Taiwan is undergoing presidential elections, because China is afraid to generate an opposite effect. In 2004, a Taiwanese-related business association in China, the “Yangtze Delta Love Township Association,” organized *Taishang* to go back to Taiwan to vote for KMT. The association negotiated with airline companies to book discount flight tickets (“guomintang,” 2016). Although China encouraged the associations to support KMT, the attitude of China was to keep a low profile to prevent any negative influence on the election.

However, China learned quickly and changed its attitude. China tried to influence the election without being noticed by the Taiwanese. The TAO has attempted to influence Taiwanese presidential elections by giving *Taishang* the motivation to go back to Taiwan to vote: i.e., discount flight tickets. The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM) is the major proxy agent responsible for negotiating the discount with the airlines and booking flight tickets on the surface. ATIEM is an association that was established

by *Taishang* in 2007. The purpose of ATIEM is “to enhance the relationships between members of ATIEM and the [Chinese] government, to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of members, to facilitate trade and economic across Taiwan strait, and to promote cross-strait relations and peaceful development” (The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland, n.d.). As a social group registered in China, ATIEM is also supervised and directed by TAO and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (ibid.). The advisors and honorary president of ATIEM are also Chinese officials, including the TAO director, Zhang Zhijun; Chairman of ARATS, Chen Deming; and vice chairmen of CPPCC, Lin Wenyi. The Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan has also indicated that the composition and personnel arrangement of ATIEM clearly involve the mainland authorities (Mainland Affairs Council, 2007). Many high-ranking members of ATIEM not only have a good relationship with Chinese officials but also received regulation and sometimes orders from China to influence the election.

Usually, ATIEM is responsible for providing discount tickets while TAO is responsible for persuading Taiwanese entrepreneurs and other *Taishang* to go home to vote by giving their Taiwanese employers special leave to vote (Kao, 2012; “lanlu zheng,” 2012). In the 2008 presidential election, it was estimated that over 250,000 *Taishang* who stayed in China had voting rights. If they went home to vote, it would be a great help for KMT to win the campaign, as China assumed that most *Taishang* will vote for KMT. After all, the policies and position of KMT are conducive to *Taishang* in facilitating trade and economy across the Taiwan strait and in stabilizing cross-strait relations. However, to ensure that most Taiwanese vote for KMT candidates, TAO also tried to influence the decision of the *Taishang*. For instance, China would suspend the business disputes for certain *Taishang*; TAO also suggested that *Taishang* pay for the tickets of their Taiwanese employees if the KMT candidate won (“lanlu zheng,” 2012). It

would be crucial for those *Taishang* to vote, because KMT lost the election in 2004 by only 20,000 votes. Therefore, the most straightforward way is to make the flight tickets cheaper. The discount was from 50% to 80% off, which is a huge motivation for *Taishang* to go home to vote and experience a reunion with family. ATIEM estimated that eventually more than 100,000 *Taishang* went home to vote in the 2008 election (Liu, 2011).

In 2012, the date of presidential election and the lunar new year were close; thus, the price of flight tickets was relatively high. With the help of discount tickets, *Taishang* could go home to vote and reunite with their families. It is thus estimated that more than 250,000 to 350,000 *Taishang* went home to vote (“guomintang,” 2016). After the 2012 election, the discount tickets have been extended beyond presidential elections to local elections. In the 2014 local elections, 50% discount tickets were released with the help of ATIEM (Hsu, 2014). For *Taishang*, the discount tickets are sometimes not given for free but *quid pro quo*. For instance, in the 2014 local election, the *Taishang* Association of Zhuhai, one of the associations of ATIEM, was accused of asking *Taishang* who received discount tickets to vote for KMT (Su and Wang, 2014). In the 2016 presidential elections, the unpopular KMT candidate had an impact on the discount tickets; TAO seemed reluctant to be involved in the matter of discount tickets due to the huge gap between the KMT and DPP candidates. Because ATIEM negotiated the discount with airlines, some *Taishang* even had to attend KMT political campaigns to acquire limited discount tickets (“guomintang,” 2016).

#### **4.6 Public diplomacy through threat, manipulations and amateur spies**

To discuss the “unusual displays of public diplomacy” or the “negative branding” that Jan Melissen has portrayed (discussed in Chapter II), this thesis attempts to open another door

of public diplomacy and see how far these “unusual displays of public diplomacy” could extend. In the following cases, China’s actions are mostly conducted through proxy agents. China’s techniques of exerting influence include the use of threat, manipulation and even espionage-like activities which target specific individuals and groups. These groups and individuals are mostly against the CPP regime or irritate China with their words or positions.

This section is divided into three parts. The first discusses the case of the VICA and the human-rights lawyer, which is described as the angle of China’s targets. The second, considers the case of The True Enlightenment Education Foundation: the foundation which attacked the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan to receive a possible *quid pro quo*. Finally, the case of pro-CCP is discussed through the lens of the proxy agents who work in accord with China’s policy in specific areas such as its attitude toward Falun Gong and China’s Taiwan policy. These cases show that the intention of China in exerting its influence on Taiwan via threat, manipulation and amateur spies.

#### **4.6.1 Victims of Investment in China Association**

The case of VICA shows that China has used Taiwanese proxies, or privatized public diplomacy as a way to influence its target. VICA was founded in 2003 by William Kao, a former Taiwanese businessman whose property and investments were defrauded and embezzled by Chinese people and corrupt government officials in 1999. According to Kao, “it is common for Chinese businessmen to work with officials in local governments or judges in courthouses to steal property from Taiwanese businessman” (Kao, personal communication, March 10, 2016). Some Taiwanese businesspeople were taken into custody illegally instead of robbers by the local Chinese government (Shih, 2005). As a result, the goals of VICA are to help Taiwanese



businesspeople who have been victimized to get a fair trial and fair compensation from China, and to propagate news of the risks of investing in China by telling the stories of other victims. However, VICA has primary failed to achieve this goal because it has been blacklisted for denouncing the illegal movements of the Chinese government with respect to other Taiwanese businesspeople. China has warned Taiwanese businesspeople that their cases will never be reviewed and compensated if they go to VICA for help (Kao, personal communication, March 10, 2016).

VICA is an example of “unusual display of public diplomacy” because China tried to change VICA’s decision via threat. Before the Beijing Olympics in 2008, some Taiwanese victims planned to go to Beijing to petition (*shangfang*). Not long after that, a Taiwanese, Chih-Hu Chu, who claimed himself representing the United Front Work Department (UFWC) and asked Kao not to go *shangfang* and every case handling by VICA will be reviewed by Chinese authorities again. However, after Kao declined, Chu threatened Kao by saying that that they are influential and that the petition will never succeed. Chu further claimed to be responsible for stopping the story about the victims that was written by VICA and published in the *Strait Business Monthly*, a publication of Strait Exchanges Foundation. Finally, he said that the petitioners were denied entry by China customs and that everything VICA has tried to do is indeed in vain.

#### **4.6.2 Amateur spies targeting a human-rights lawyer**

A Taiwanese human-rights lawyer, Theresa Chu, who is also the Taiwan Falun Gong’s warranted lawyer, suffered many instances of harassment in Taiwan from people sent by China (Chu, personal communication, September 18, 2015). According to Chu, her telephone and e-

mail are very likely to have been monitored, because every time she has meeting or discussion with other members of Falun Gong in public, a group of people will show up and try to listen to what they say. Considering the fact that China continuously spends many resources to supervise members of Falun Gong, as Noakes and Ford (2015) indicate, it is very likely that Chu, the spokesperson for the lawyers of the Taiwan Falun Gong, is indeed under electronic surveillance by China.

These people tried to collect information about the operation of Falun Gong, so they stalked and monitored Chu and the group—especially when the meeting was held in public restaurants and coffee shops. Usually they approached and eavesdropped on Chu’s meeting and tried to take photos, which they would need to prove their work to Chinese authorities. Theresa Chu knows they work for China because a man admitted it once during his amateur surveillance. The man, who tried to listen to the meeting and took photos of members of Falun Gong in another meeting, cannot achieve his goal due to geographical difficulties. The place is simply empty. Every movement the man made would simply be found out. So, after a few attempts to take photos of members of Falun Gong, the man approached and asked if he could take pictures of them. The man said that he is a Taiwanese businessman who has a business and factory in China and that he has to do it to save his business in China. The purpose of these Taiwanese businessmen, or “amateur spies,” is to record the activities of the target; thus, taking photos is important for those spies to prove they were working. They also tried to harass other members of the Taiwan Falun Gong. Some would receive anonymous calls after midnight; others were warned to stop participating in Falun Gong. That China uses Taiwanese businessmen as spies to monitor other Taiwanese groups is confirmed by the chairman of VICA, William Kao (Kao, personal communication, March 10, 2016). “They are the victims [of investment in China], and

yet they work for China because they believe they would get some compensation from China government,” according to Kao.

In addition, after years of participating in the affairs of the Falun Gong, Chu found that some members of Falun Gong seem to work with China to sabotage and differentiate people in Falun Gong. She called these people the “Red Democracy Movement” (*hongse minyun*). They participated in the activities of Falun Gong as other people did, but they took pictures of the activities and the major leaders within, no matter how inappropriate their timing was. They tried to participate every activity, but offer a lot of negative opinions during the preparation period of activities. More importantly, most of the information about the activities was leaked. She has caught some people in recent years due to their amateur behavior. Chu said that some of the people she caught did such things to make money. If they have pictures to prove that their information is authentic, they will receive money. Chu said that China first attempts to bribe some people in Falun Gong. If they refuse, they will be harassed by others sent from China. Chu herself has also suffered numerous instances of harassment: She has received nuisance calls and was slandering through the Internet after refusing a bribe when she first started her work as the lawyer of the Falun Gong.

The policy and attitude of China toward the Falun Gong is obvious. Combating the Falun Gong movement and Taiwanese independence is one of primary aims when China attempts to construct the ideology of “Chineseness” for international perception (Brady, 2015: 801). That China would try to surpass and defame the Falun Gong outside China by organizing netizens and infiltrating the Falun Gong was not news. What Chu describes above was merely the tip of the iceberg. It is not limited to Taiwan but also occurs in other cities and countries in the world. The purpose is to acquire information that can be used to strike the Falun Gong and intimidate

people. This thesis describes the method whereby China tries to meet its policy by influencing foreign publics or overseas Chinese. Therefore, China's attitude toward members of Falun Gong outside China is in fact a good display of how government attempts to exert influence on groups outside of its territory, whether the nature of the influence is positive or negative.

#### **4.6.3 A Buddhist group as China's proxy**

Considering the features of public diplomacy, rumors and accusations may actually mean something. Increased rumors and accusations may be a criterion for perceiving the effects of the public-diplomacy policies of other countries. After all, it is important to obscure the origins of the information to dilute the function of credibility in public diplomacy. The low credibility of China is the weak point in its public diplomacy. It is relatively hard for people to trust information from China because it is likely authorized by the Beijing government. Low credibility is serious for China because its intention is to unify Taiwan. However, if people do not know the source of the messages, they are more likely to believe them. After all, "In many cases, only private actors have the credibility to make a difference" (Holtzman qtd. in Victoria V. Orlova, 2009:88). The information that Taiwanese have received in recent years is actually easily confused because it is hard to tell whether China is selling its ideas behind the curtain or not. One of the difficulties is in finding the connections between China and its Taiwanese proxies because the connections are typically private and clandestine. Notably, there are growing numbers of rumors and accusations about Taiwanese individuals and groups receiving funds from China. In the following case, this thesis reports a significant case which coincidentally accords with the interests of China

The True Enlightenment Education Foundation (TEEF) is a Buddhist religious NGO that

has previously been accused of receiving funding from China and of having close relationships with the State Administration for Religious Affairs of China. Many works of the TEEF have attacked the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism—most of this literature addresses the copulation Tantra of lamas and their followers having group sex—by issuing brochures, publishing books, and funding negative advertisements in Taiwan. The Tibet Religious Foundation of H.H. the Dalai Lama (TRFDL) then accused TEEF of being a hatchet man for China in exchange for obtaining permission for publishing books in China. However, the TEEF has denied receiving either funding or instruction from China and has denied having any relationship at all with China. The TEEF and the TRFDL accused one another of defamation. Ultimately, a judge ruled against the TEEF in the lawsuit, suggesting in 2012 that the TEEF apologize to the TRFDL. According to the court’s judgment, the accusation regarding the TEEF having relations with China was not based on groundless rumor but could be inferred from evidence acquired by the TRFDL; thus, the TRFDL had not acted improperly.

The accusation is not without justification. The reputation of TEEF in China increased after they lost their lawsuit in Taiwan. Many books of TEEF were allowed to be published in China. In 2014, TEEF was rewarded “The Excellence Award of Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility” by the *China Philanthropy Times*, the official newspaper of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs. During the two sessions 2015 (Lianghui), the director of TEEF, Cheng-Wen Yu, was interviewed by the talk show, *China Talk*, a program under the China Internet Information Center. The interview was also transmitted by China National Radio (“zhengjiao,” 2015). Other Chinese news stories about TEEF were also positive (Wang, 2015; Li, 2014). It is possible to see that TEEF has experienced a rising trend in China in terms of their reputation and the books they are allowed to publish in China. Although there is no substantial evidence

regarding whether the TEEF had actually received funding from China to denigrate the TRFDL, the rumor that the TEEF obtained money from China persists.

#### **4.6.4 Activities of Pro-CCP groups**

There are some active pro-CCP groups in Taiwan such as “Aiguo Tongxinhui” (Patriotic Association) and the Chinese Unionist Party (CUP). These pro-CCP groups focus on specific issues related to national identity and cross-strait relations. For example, they advocate for unification under “one country, two systems,” attack Falun Gong and threaten people who hold different political stands and viewpoints. One of the pro-CCP groups is the Patriotic Association. The association was founded in 1992 and advocated the unification. In fact, in the first few years of the association, the association claimed to support the Republic of China instead of the People’s Republic of China. However, the position of the association changed; it now supports CCP and the People’s Republic of China. The Patriotic Association is notorious for its violent activities. For example, from 2013 to 2015, members of the Patriotic Association often advocated the merits of the CCP and slandered Falun Gong and attacked its members in mainland tourist attractions such as Taipei 101, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and The National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. The association has also participated in some protests against other protests such as the Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement, and they cooperate with the CUP, which is discussed below.

The president of Patriotic Association, Chou Ching-Chun, who also runs an agriculture and fishery business in China and has a company—Hubei Tongxin Lianfa Agricultural Comprehensive Development Co., Ltd.—seems to have good relationships with TAO and the United Front Work Department. For instance, at Chou’s son’s wedding ceremony, held in Hubei

province in 2013, branches of TAO and the United Front Work Department sent their congratulations—flower baskets—to this couple. They included letters from the director of the department of exchange of TAO, Cheng Jinzhong, and from the director of UFWD in Hubei, Liu Kaichun. This wedding ceremony also became news of the UFWD’s attempt to advocate the image of a united China and Taiwan (“dangyang,” 2013).

Consider another example. Chang An-lo, the president of the CUP, has been accused of receiving around NT 25 million annually from China’s Ministry of Public Security to promote unification activities in Taiwan (“bailing,” 2014). Chang An-lo, a gangster-turned-politician, is known for having a close relationship with China. Chang, also known as the “White Wolf,” fled to China to do business in 1996 because he was wanted by the Taiwan government for organized crime. He founded the social group, Defending the Chinese Alliance, in Guangzhou, China in 2004 and registered the CUP in Taiwan in 2005. During his stay in China, he also founded Strategic Sports Ltd., which has more than 5000 workers and produces 1 billion U.S. dollars of gross product annually. The annual sales from his helmet factory amounted to over 40% of the global market in 2013 (“30yi shenjia,” 2014; “bailang dalu,” 2014). He decided to return to Taiwan in 2013. Chang believes in the idea of “one country, two systems” and unification. He said his purpose in returning to Taiwan is to foster support for the CCP in Taiwan (Tsao, 2014).

After Chang returned to Taiwan in 2013, he organized and participated in political activities actively as the chairman of CUP. Most of activities—such as those of the Sunflower Movement and the Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement—were intended to “protest” against the protest. During the Sunflower Movement of 2014, after students occupied Legislative Yuan and urged it to reject the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in services, Cheng led and mobilized members of CUP and other supporters of the trade pact to the Legislative Yuan to show their

support of Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in services and to condemn the behavior of the student. In addition, in 2015, the Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement, a group of students, refused to accept the change guidelines of high school textbooks due to the opaqueness of the process of the proposed change. Students questioned the content is to “de-Taiwanisation” and to revive “Sinicisation.”<sup>13</sup> Chang led supports to “visit” the students in front of the Ministry of Education and asked them to leave (“fankegang,” 2015).

In addition, some young members of CUP used social networking to propose their positions of unification with China.<sup>14</sup> In early April of 2016, an unusual incident happened through the social network. Some Taiwanese netizens created accounts in Facebook to urge independence from Taiwan by counties such as Hualien, Taoyuan and Yilan, etc. They demand independence from Taiwan so they can reunite with China. It attracted little attention because most Taiwanese cannot even conceive of this viewpoint. Later, people who promoted these counties’ independence were discovered by other Taiwanese netizens to be members of the CUP, and “the independence” was supported by the Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China (“zhonggong zidao,” 2016).

The promotion of independence is merely a show conducted by Taiwanese proxies and China. Although the event did not arouse any reverberation, the spokesman of the TAO said that Taiwanese netizens use these actions as a counterexample to show the illusory and

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<sup>13</sup> For example, in the textbook of history, the way of depicting history and the words it uses in the textbook is on the viewpoint of China instead of Taiwan.

<sup>14</sup> Probably because of Chang’s gangster background and relationships with the United Bamboo Gang, many supporters of CUP are young Taiwanese, which was also questioned by those supporters who are also members of the United Bamboo Gang. For more information, please see [http://pfge-pfge.blogspot.tw/2016/04/blog-post\\_11.html?m=1#axzz4Y9cD48Jx](http://pfge-pfge.blogspot.tw/2016/04/blog-post_11.html?m=1#axzz4Y9cD48Jx).



impractical nature of Taiwan independence in response to a question from Want Daily, another pro-China media source. The event shows that China has tried to exert influence through its proxy agents to let Taiwanese know anger and frustration as the Chinese do when it comes to issues of independence. However, because of the link-trace system of Facebook, the role of CUP makes the event more like a rough farce.

The role of CUP and Chang have created and represented the voices of Taiwanese who support unification and agree to be ruled under “one country, two systems.”<sup>15</sup> Although the people who really support CUP are in the minority, the voice of Chang was magnified through media.<sup>16</sup> There are more and more activities of these pro-CCP groups, and they seem to have connections and to cooperate with each other. Sometimes, the activities involve violence. For example, in early 2017, three members of the legislative council of Hong Kong, and Joshua Wong Chi-fung, a Hong Kong student activist and the secretary of the Demosisto, were invited to Taiwan to participate in a forum held by the Power Party. When they arrived at the Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, they were attacked by pro-CCP groups such as the Patriotic Association. The three members and Wong were all key members of the 2014 Hong-Kong protests, also known as the “umbrella revolution.” Later, police arrested the attackers, including

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<sup>15</sup> TWMAAA and CUP have different ideas about how to unify with China. TWMAAA believes that, through communication and interactions, Taiwan and China will eventually understand each other; thus, TWMAAA is more open minded about the idea of unification. The name of the country, regime and how to unify (etc.) could be solved through negotiation across Taiwan Strait. However, the position of CUP is to unify with China ruled by CCP.

<sup>16</sup> CUP participated the 2016 legislative election for the first time, but it only acquired 56,341 votes with 0.46% of total votes in the party block. More information please see the website of The Central Election Commission, <http://db.cec.gov.tw/>.

the son of Chang An-lo, Chang Wei, who also runs a business called Strategic Sports Ltd. (“sheou huang zhifeng,” 2017). According to Wong, he was surprised that the pro-CCP groups acquired their flight information. They were surrounded by 50 protesters in Hong Kong International Airport and around 200 in Taiwan’s airport. Pro-CCP groups also protest in front of the hotels they stay in (Huang, 2017; Chen and Wu, 2017).

The above discussion shows that pro-CCP groups have many activities. The way of communication is one-way message dissemination. The content of the message includes attacks on Falun Gong and Taiwan independence and promotion of unification. It is hard to know whether these pro-CCP groups were involved in harassing human-rights lawyer Theresa Chu and other members of Falun Gong in private, which was discussed in the previous section. They did so in public. However, these groups represent Taiwanese who support CCP on every issue and position and desire to unify China. Besides advocating unification, they have specific purposes in targeting Falun Gong and people who oppose the ideology of China. More importantly, they have the resources they need to acquire information related to their targets, which is hard to acquire by a single political group such as the Patriotic Association. In addition, they all have businesses in China and relationships with China. It is easy to find that the work of these groups is very similar with that of the pro-CCP groups in Hong Kong: e.g., the Hong Kong Youth Care Association Limited and Caring Hong Kong Power. Therefore, although there is no solid evidence, it is very likely that China subsidizes these groups and feeds them information.

#### **4.7 Evaluating the case study and discussing public diplomacy**

The case studies discussed in the previous sections reveal three different approaches to

implementing public diplomacy. This section discusses a framework for clustering these together to see their impact on Taiwanese society. Basically, one of the major instruments China uses to exert its influence and to achieve its national interests is the proxy-agent framework. How to evaluate the proxy agent and its framework is discussed in what follows. Moreover, through the case analysis, this section suggests that most studies of public diplomacy have focused on the first part of the cases and labeled them public diplomacy while neglecting the second and the third part of the cases as simply problematic.

#### **4.7.1 Booming interactions across Taiwan Strait: a split society in Taiwan**

China organized many activities and conferences in the past decade to increase understanding and to clarify misunderstanding across the Taiwan Strait. However, from the perspective of current public diplomacy, it is hard for China to offset its negative image in Taiwan, though many Taiwanese recognize the rapid modernization and tremendous economic growth of China. China's intention to unify Taiwan is the major obstacle to facilitating a positive image in Taiwan. The assertion that China would not exclude the possibility of using military force to "liberate" Taiwan has even further hurt the feelings of the Taiwanese people. The intention of unifying Taiwan derives many arguments of threat spreading through mass media from Chinese officials, military generals and scholars. Those arguments are harmful to the image of China.

Currently, China appears neither to have converted the Taiwanese ideology nor won support from the general public. It would also be impossible to use modern public diplomacy to attract Taiwanese to create a spill-over effect to influence the Taiwanese government on the issue of unification. However, the activities that China promotes are not in vain because these

activities have collateral benefit.

The booming interactions during the warming cross-strait relations have also generated problems for Taiwanese society. The fact that China intends to unify Taiwan has become the main reason for a split society in Taiwan. Through mutual communication, it has further deepened the confrontation among general Taiwanese. In the case of the KMT-CCP forum, although it created a platform for mutual communication, it also deteriorated the political turmoil between the pan-blue and the pan-green.<sup>17</sup> The DPP had attacked KMT for trying to use the forum to replace governmental negotiation. In the case of the visiting missions of Chinese officials, it was discovered that the Fujian government paid *China Times* to do placement marketing. All of sudden, other Taiwanese media focused more on the issues of overstating reports and exaggerating the numbers that the visiting missions claimed to purchase. Those cases have further split Taiwanese society. The confrontation between pan-blue and pan-green have intensified, especially through those cases.

It is, however, conducive to China. The supporters of pan-blue contain both supporter of PRC and ROC. It is a huge difference, especially considering the civil war before 1949. Those who support PRC, those who still have dream of one China under ROC, and those who believe that cooperation with China is economically beneficial to both sides of the Taiwan Strait—all are prone to the pan-blue. It is a successful united-front work of China. That is, the alliance is

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<sup>17</sup> Pan-blue and pan-green represents a loose ideology coalition. Pan-blue is consisting of the political party such as KMT, the People First Party (PFP), New Party (CNP), and others who support with unification with China (with different interpretation about the China) or closely cooperation with China. Pan-green on the other hand, is consisting of the parties such as DPP, Taiwan Solidarity Union, New Power Party and others who support with independent perspectives or are more cautious about China's intentions and close economic ties.

of pan-blue against a common enemy: Taiwanese independence and those who are against the 1992 consensus. Although people who really support unification with China—such as pro-CCP groups and their supporters—are in the minority, pan-blues have become potential assets of China. This fact increases conflicts and disturbances inside Taiwanese society. The gap between pan-blue and pan-green continues to deteriorate. It represents the fact that there are people who still have common interest with China. China may not change the rising Taiwanese identity, but the pan-blue are the insurance keeping Taiwan from traveling the path of independence. The fact that CCP and KMT have similar political ideologies compared with the DPP may explain why there so many Taiwanese have become China's proxy agents. It also shows that, although China's public diplomacy (as conventionally assumed) has little impact on cross-strait relations, its "side-effect" is larger than the main purpose of projecting a positive image.

#### **4.7.2 The proxy-agent framework and its impact on Taiwan politics**

The case studies show that proxy agents are not entirely determined by subsidies from China or by their relationships with China but are instead determined by the actions and ideologies they promote in Taiwan; those ideas and ideologies are consistent with China's interests. While it is not improper to promote different values or Chinese values in democratic Taiwan, in light of the growing phenomenon of Taiwanese identity, it is strange to see the dissemination of so many messages promoting Chinese ideology in Taiwan's everyday life, as if such positions represent the majority view. In addition, the ideology espoused by some "proxy agents" is not the traditional Chinese identity associated with the Republic of China; it is instead an identity associated with the People's Republic of China. Proxy agents support unification and wave the flag of the People's Republic of China, not the Republic of China. Even if those

proxy agents do not receive subsidies or instructions from China but act according to their own free will, their behaviors demonstrate the success of China's Taiwan policy in changing Taiwanese attitudes toward China in recent years. Either way, China has increased its influence over Taiwan.

The Figure 4.1 below shows that, in these cases, China and its Taiwanese proxies seem to benefit, whereas the Taiwanese are the target to be influenced. The figure 4.1 is also the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy shown in the figure 3.3. The differences are figure 4.2 focuses more on the indirect way of influence instead of the direct way; it also reveals more detail of China's case.<sup>18</sup> In the figure, supply and demand between China and Want Want Holdings are in evidence. Want Want Holdings has made huge profits in China through the receipt of subsidies and supports from China's government. In exchange, the Want Want China Times Group influences the Taiwanese and attempts to promote an image of peaceful cross-strait relations and the brotherhood of China, propagandizing the positive effect of official visits and further economic cooperation, securing the "1992 consensus", and manipulating public opinion related to specific issues such as Chinese identity. In the case of TWMAAA, veterans aim to facilitate cross-strait interactions and eventually unify China by identifying friends in Taiwan and increasing mutual communications. People who participate in communication with China are selected by TWMAAA to satisfy Chinese requirements. In return, though TWMAAA


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<sup>18</sup> For example, the term *proxy agents* shown in the figure 4.1 and the term *private sectors* shown in 3.3 are compatible. In fact, the cases in section 4.4 and 4.6 are able to fit into the framework of integrated public diplomacy as well. Only the thesis uses section 4.6 to illustrate the framework.

has refused Chinese subsidies, its core members operate tourism businesses with China, where the need to maintain a personal network to operate a tourism business is notorious.

We see that Kao Chin has a very good personal relationship with China. For example, she has attended Chinese military parades as a representative of Taiwanese aboriginals, protested Japan for its atrocities during the war and led several visiting missions or performance groups for Taiwanese aboriginals to visit China. In addition, she has indicated that her ideology is similar to that of China with respect to issues such as attitudes toward Japan and the recognition that Taiwanese aboriginals are Chinese. In return, she received a donation from TAO to distribute after Typhoon Morakot, which providing her with an advantage in the subsequent election. This framework may show that the common point for proxy agents is not what they think about cross-strait relations or how they relate to China but what they do to help China maintain its interests in Taiwan.

Figure 4.1 The framework of China’s privatized public diplomacy towards Taiwan



Source: Author's compilation.

Proxy agents are the major instrument China uses to maintain or to change people's minds about certain existing viewpoints and ideology. These proxy agents have already had an impact on the social-political environment. First, the work of proxy agents not only projects a pro-China image but also further encourages cooperation with China and the securing of the "1992 consensus." Through media platforms such as the Want Want *China Times* Group, the image of peaceful and cooperative cross-strait relations has been created. This has triggered anxiety and worry among young Taiwanese and others who support Taiwan's subjectivity, thereby resulting in protests against China and its influence. The 2014 Sunflower Movement was an obstruction for China's hopes of attracting younger generations of Taiwanese to feel a closer bond with the Chinese. It also deepened the gap between those who support more cooperation across the Taiwan Strait and those who oppose China's influence. More serious opposition could arise in the future, which would be conducive to China's interests.

Second, the KMT became China's firewall. The role of *Taishang* is deeply connected to the KMT government's approach to integration and communication between China and Taiwan (Keng and Schubert, 2010). The Taiwanese with whom China has worked have typically been pro-KMT. This is quite understandable, because Taiwanese proxies typically support expanding economic relations with China, and the KMT has adopted the same stance. The historical progress of cross-strait relations established from 2008 to 2016 by Ma's government becomes burdensome when Taiwanese proxies propagate China's image. People are quick to link China's perspective with the KMT's perspective. Similarly, the perspectives of both Taiwanese proxies and the KMT create the problem of ideology recognition. In many cases, the KMT and



CCP have been labeled brothers in opposition. Similar principles and ideas confuse the Taiwanese public, thereby creating a buffer for China. Taiwanese who are skeptical about issues involving China have learned that the KMT has a similar perspective; thus, the KMT government became a scapegoat. Because the KMT lost the election, this development was not positive for China. However, China's proxy-agent framework is still running and exerts its influence, giving China more leverage to promote issues that advance China's interest in Taiwan. Proxy agents have generated influence and have an impact on Taiwan's social-political environment.

China's proxy-agent framework in Taiwan is opaque and contains an element of mutual communication while combining propaganda and interest-related exchange matters in serving its political objectives. China has heavily invested in personal relationships, particularly among the Taiwanese socio-economic elites. China's proxy-agent framework is an ecology system of interest that involves *quid pro quo*. Although some cases that raise questions concerning whether China has connections with Taiwan groups and individuals remain unverified, a coincident win-win situation between China and certain Taiwan groups is revealed from time to time. China's huge market and its promise of economic rewards have indeed influenced Taiwanese elites in their actions aimed at the other side of the Taiwan Strait. China is buying "the hearts and minds"—not of the general Taiwanese, but of Taiwanese elites as potential proxy agents.

Until now, China appears neither to have converted the Taiwanese into Chinese nor to have won the support of the general public. However, it continues to influence Taiwan's economic and political environment, because Taiwanese proxies need China's huge market and potential profits. Through the work of proxy agents, the divergence between the general public

and Taiwanese proxies may only increase, consistent with China's interest. In 2016, DPP chairwoman Tsai yin-wen won the presidential election and took office as the President of Taiwan. She rejected President Ma's cross-strait policies and refused to accept the "1992 consensus" and its "one China" principle. The cross-strait relation had reached stalemate, and the importance of the roles of China's proxy agents seemed to increase. In addition, at the December 30, 2016, New Year's tea party of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, President Xi Jinping stated that "we should adhere to the common political foundation of the '1992 consensus', push forward the integration and development of the economy and society, and promote the spiritual compatibility of compatriots across the Taiwan Strait" (Jiang and Yang, 2016). Given Tsai's policy and Xi's resolution, it is beyond doubt that China will continue to increase its proxy agents to exert its influence in Taiwan. Mattis (2016) reports that "more than 40 Taiwanese citizens were prosecuted for espionage and espionage-related crimes involving China, including serving and retired officials, military officers, and businesspeople" from 2006 to 2016. It would not be surprising to learn that those citizens were from China's proxy-agent framework and also perform other work to influence Taiwan. It is thus very likely that we will see an increasing number of Taiwanese devote themselves to the proxy agents' "industry."

#### **4.7.3 Threat, manipulation and its backfire**

In the section on "public diplomacy through threat, manipulations and amateur spies," this thesis discusses other measurements that are excluded by modern public diplomacy. In the case of VICA, amateur spies, and the activities of Pro-CCP groups, China's intentions fall heavily on its Taiwanese proxy agents. In the case of TEEF, however, no causal relationship

between the TEEF and China has been revealed; that group stands accused of receiving benefits from China.

The relations between China and its Taiwanese proxy agents are bound together with both hard and soft measures, such as money, threats and the identity of Chinese nationalism. From Taiwanese proxies to Taiwanese individuals and groups, however, the ways of communications are mainly through threat and harassment to exerting influence. Unlike the cases considered in the previous two parts, these proxy agents target more specific issues and individuals. In addition, the relationship between China and the proxy agent are not connected purely through attraction and payment. China has many other ways to connect with its proxy agents, willingly or unwillingly. *Taishang* who help spy on members and lawyers of Falun Gong, for instance, are trying to save their assets in China. This no doubt involves a *quid pro quo*, but they are not somehow forced to do this.

It is crucial to determine how to evaluate these cases and incorporate them in public diplomacy. This thesis argues that they are all part of public diplomacy, though their content did not involve soft power or attraction. Those cases fulfill most of the criteria of public diplomacy. The modes of transmission involved in the above cases still involve the government-to-people mechanism, just as in public diplomacy. Although they are Taiwanese proxy agents, the concept is the same as for privatized public diplomacy. The main actors are government and private-sector workers who are usually hired or sponsored by the former (Malone, 1985). It is common for the government to hire or work with private-sector elements such as companies and NGOs to promote public diplomacy. The target is the foreign audience and the goals of the proxy agents benefit the government which engaged the proxy agents. The only difference is that the information or communication the proxy agents engaged is neither soft power nor

attraction, but intimidation.

The question that remains to be solved is how to justify the idea that threat and attack should be included in modern public diplomacy? The answer is positive. First, the purpose of public diplomacy is to influence and inform foreign citizens to gain national interest, as Pratkanis (2009) says. Whether through threat or attraction, the ultimate goal is to gain national interest. These cases could easily fit in to this definition. It is true that there are many definitions of public diplomacy, and this is only one of them. However, current public diplomacy emphasizes more on what public diplomacy should be instead of what public diplomacy is. And the cases show how a country, China, uses its power to exert influence over foreign citizens. The question we should ask is why the concept of threat and intimidation is not included in current public diplomacy. Second, it would be problematic to exclude threat as part of public diplomacy. As discussed in previous cases, some of the works of China attract Taiwanese while others intimidate them. Both attraction and threat are actually quite similar. They all serve the same purpose and strategy. If attraction is intended to magnify the merits of the warming cross-strait relations to secure the “1992 consensus,” the threat serves to punish those who jeopardize it. They are two sides of the same coin: a public-diplomacy version of carrot and stick approach. The difference is merely in the way of exerting influence. They were considered better methods for gaining the national interest of China and were thus implemented.

Finally, both attraction and threat are ways of exerting influence, only the path of exerting influence is different. It is as Lord (2008) admits: influence not only shows up in soft power but also in hard power and payment. This means that soft power may be an important concept in public diplomacy, but it is not the only one. The cases show another way of wielding public diplomacy. This thesis also points out that China has adopted the same strategy: Exert

influence on Taiwan via its proxy-agent framework. It would be unrealistic to exclude those measurements of influence from the realm of public diplomacy. It is as Jan Melissen (2005) argues: there is “no one-size-fits-all” concept in public diplomacy. After incorporating public diplomacy in the idea of both attraction and threat, the following sections discuss how to develop it and from the comprehensive public diplomacy.

#### **4.7.4 The effectiveness of China’s work in Taiwan**

It is not as easy as people think to define successful public diplomacy. Of course, the simplest way is to see whether the goal has been achieved through the public diplomacy. However, it is hard for current public diplomacy to determine what makes people change their minds. Winning hearts and minds are major objectives for public diplomacy. It is like an ultimate goal of persuasion, as O’ Keefe (2006: 323) indicates: “identifying the current obstacles to agreement or compliance, that is, the bases of the audience’s resistance to the advocated action or view point; constructing effective messages aimed at removing or minimizing such obstacles.” However, the problem emerges when minimizing obstacles and measuring the casual relations between the methods. It is sometimes difficult to evaluate because we do not know what actually makes people change or maintain their thoughts on particular matters, because people’s minds do not necessarily change simply because they participate in events like a cultural festival or the Shanghai Expo.

The change of nation’s reputation and image takes time, and the methods are pluralized. Sometimes the change of mind is not due to public diplomacy but to the PD assets. It also increases the difficulty of evaluating it. Currently, the most common way is through public polls that evaluate the success of public diplomacy. This method has its pros and cons. Of course,

the statistics can show people's conception of a particular country. However, it is hard to determine what exactly makes people change their conception in the course of implementing public diplomacy, as mentioned above. Therefore, to analyze the effectiveness of China's public diplomacy in Taiwan, this thesis adopts a qualitative method of analysis mostly because it is hard to measure public diplomacy through numbers. Moreover, this thesis divides the analysis into two parts. The first part uses modern perspectives on public diplomacy to examine China's work; the second part takes the comprehensive public-diplomacy perspectives to evaluate the effectiveness.

From modern public-diplomacy perspectives, China's image and reputation could impact cross-strait relations. Successful Chinese public diplomacy could mean that China has gained a positive image in Taiwan, that China has successfully converted Taiwanese identity to Chinese identity, or Taiwanese now support for the unification. However, none of this happened, not even close. According to the Mainland Affairs Council (2017), 68.9% of respondents believe the Chinese government is unfriendly toward the Taiwanese government while 49.5% consider the Chinese government to be unfriendly to Taiwanese. They all have higher percentages than they did the previous year (the Mainland Affairs Council, 2017). In addition, though the public poll conducted by the National Chengchi University shows that Taiwanese who support unification and who consider themselves as Chinese increased from 1.5% in 2015 to 1.7% in 2016 and from 3.3% in 2015 to 3.4% in 2016, the number are still far away from a majority.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> For detail, please see "the Taiwanese / Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan"; Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan Retrieved from <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?class=203>; the increase of supporting unification may be a preliminary and positive result for China's public diplomacy, However, it is still a long way to achieve the goal.

The number supporting unification and a move toward unification actually decreased from 10.3 to 10.2%. By these lights, China's public diplomacy is far from a success.

The reason for this failure, I believe, is that China's carrot-and-stick strategies have impeded China from winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese. Even if the Taiwanese have a positive impression of China's economic success, the positive image is nevertheless vulnerable to China's unfriendly actions or even to the activities of China's PD assets (such as the attempt to restrict Taiwan's international space and compress Taiwan's visibility in world politics). Furthermore, Beijing is still not willing to give up military subjugation when considering the methods of unification. All of these positions seriously damage China's reputation and image in Taiwan. The failure of China's current public diplomacy is due to its policy priority, which also indicates that acquiring a positive image and reputation is not the priority of China in its Taiwan policy, and thus, that the goals of its public diplomacy with respect to Taiwan has changed accordingly.

However, taking the account of comprehensive public diplomacy into consideration, the picture is different. First, China's positive image is not as important as current public diplomacy perspectives suggest. The ability to control agenda-setting is far more important. Thus, how to secure and continue the "1992 consensus" is vital in the eyes of China. From this perspective, China did a very good job during the KMT government. Proxy agents such as Want Want Holdings often helped to direct public opinion through the media. Through China's proxy-agent framework, China's ability to control the media, agenda setting, and Taiwanese political elites has increased. In recent decades, China has continuously invited Taiwanese village chiefs to visit China and do business with China. It is a fast and silent transformation, which may impact the Taiwanese local election someday because of the important roles of the village chief as vote

broker.

China has largely increased its influence on Taiwan. These influences have become assets for China to further exert its influence elsewhere. China's reaction to the successful Kenya phone fraud case illustrates that, with the help of Taiwanese proxies, China is able to deploy and use public-diplomacy strategies to diminish negative view points. More and more Taiwanese fraud suspects caught in other countries are extradited to China without arousing attention and anti-China sentiments in Taiwan. China's comprehensive public diplomacy in Taiwan shows that the proxy-agent framework is a major asset for China when China needs to implement its policy or stop people from doing something. The targets that China threatens arouse little attention in Taiwanese society, which is conducive to China. After Tsai Yin-wen took office and rejected the "1992 consensus," China has suffered new obstacles, because the Tsai administration currently does not recognize the "1992 consensus." It may be treated as a failure of China's comprehensive public diplomacy. However, though China failed to secure the "1992 consensus" in Taiwan, relevant pressure from those Taiwanese proxies continues. It may be too early to determine that China has failed on the "1992 consensus." Even if China has failed to achieve its goal, the proxy-agent frameworks has been deployed successfully. It is a powerful tool for China to employ new strategies and goals in its public diplomacy. Either way, China's effort is definitely not in vain.

Overall, it is easy to determine that China has many goals for Taiwan. The common feature is that China wishes to convert Taiwanese to China's viewpoints on issues concerning the "1992 consensus," unification, the Dalai Lama, Chinese identity, etc. Issues such as "1992 consensus," the Dalai Lama and Kenya phone fraud are relatively easy for China to maneuver; others like supporting unification and China's image are harder to synchronize. The rise of



Taiwanese identity is also a difficulty for China. From this perspective, it is highly unlikely that China will succeed. Nevertheless, China's attempt to influence the Taiwanese will continue. China's influence is indeed acquiring some achievements. Without these influences, the Taiwanese will deviate much faster from the orbit of Chinese identity, one-China identity, and other issues. Taiwanese proxy agents are actually pillars of China's comprehensive public diplomacy toward Taiwan.

#### **4.7.5 Rethinking public diplomacy**

The result makes us rethink public diplomacy. In fact, the development of public diplomacy is much longer than people thought. When current study focuses on soft power and mutual communication, the history told us another story. Stories of using one-way communication, rumors and espionage to threaten and cheat foreign publics into acquiring interest happen constantly. The difference is that acquiring interest was the popular method of winning the war, acquiring territory, justifying the righteousness of sending military forces and increasing trade. When current study develops soft power and new public diplomacy, governments still maintain their traditional way to communicate with foreign publics. Though war is not the first priority for many countries to achieve their interests, the methods between the wartime and peacetime are similar. Therefore, when considering the process of government communicating with foreign publics, measurements which through threat, attraction, bribery and other ways of methods are still in the realm of public diplomacy. The cases of governments threatening foreign publics is still heard from time to time and will always be heard. Public diplomacy is a study of communication with foreign publics; thus, it should retrieve its origins, including the ignoble actions.

China's works are nothing different from the history of influence foreign publics. The only differences are in the recognition of the terminology of public diplomacy. Although China emphasizes that the function of public diplomacy is to clear up misunderstandings and communicate with the world, China's current public diplomacy is merely a tool for China to carry out its policy. The communication itself is not really mutual communications; it is rather an idea of selling. Mutual communications represent the possibility of compromise, which is very rare for China. Thus, when China promotes its BRI, its public diplomacy is considered an instrument to sell the positive image and the benefits of the BRI. It is not a mutual communication.

How to achieve the goal is not that different from China's public diplomacy with respect to Taiwan. They differ only in degree. China's public diplomacy with respect to Taiwan is a distinct way to show a wide range of public diplomacy, because China's strong intention with respect to Taiwan reveals its multiple methods of influence. It is realized that China's indirect activities, direct threats, and media-operations serve China's Taiwan policy. The existing cases discussed in the previous chapter provide a concept different from current public diplomacy. China has used various ways to influence the Taiwanese with different purposes, such as by increasing interactions and mutual understanding to show its good intentions; disseminating the idea that both sides share the same culture, history, language and ancestors; implanting its proxy agents in Taiwanese media; recruiting allies; trying to manipulate Taiwanese elections to acquire influence on Taiwan; threatening dissidents through negative propaganda and violence to minimize their influence; and supporting pro-CCP groups to propagate unification. These cases show that China has borrowed the methods and the mechanisms of public diplomacy but with more straightforward methods and stronger links between goals and deeds, and without

considering the types of power they are using. They will promote it as long as they believe it will work.

If taking new public diplomacy as standard to examine China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan, the result would reveal China's a failure. It would be unable to explain much in the relationships between the government's efforts and the target audience in terms of public diplomacy. China's public diplomacy would be limited to those activities across the Taiwan Strait. It would be pointless in both cross-strait relations and international relations. Taking other cases of China—including manipulation and threat in public diplomacy—the result of China's work on Taiwan is then able to explain a wider and much complete picture of how China exerts influence to gain its national interest. The results of China's efforts would also differ from current public diplomacy. This thesis finds that China is not the only nation promoting public diplomacy in the ways described above. Some other nations also promote it with similar methods.

Public diplomacy has its implications and practices in different times and different countries. As discussed in the section on the “practice of public diplomacy in other countries” in Chapter II, countries promote public diplomacy for numerous purposes and using various methods. Many of these are considered obsolete in modern public diplomacy, such as one-way propaganda and covert operations. From the development of countries' public diplomacy, the purposes of public diplomacy remain the same whenever national interest has changed. Because having a positive national reputation is beneficial to every country, it should not be the major purpose and goal of public diplomacy. The purpose of public diplomacy is to influence foreign publics, including individuals, groups and the general public to gain national interest. Of course, this thesis recognizes that many countries consider national image and reputation among the

primary subjects of public diplomacy; still, national interest and the methods used to achieve it vary depending on different countries among different target audiences at different times. For post-War Japan, the U.S. was the primary target of its attempt to influence and gain positive image and economic interest. Hiring public relations firms to do political lobbying was and still is one of the primary methods Japan uses to affect U.S. policy and bilateral relations (Ackley, 2015). Political lobbying is relatively successful for Japan; thus, it continues. For the U.S., the reason traditional public diplomacy has faded out in modern public diplomacy is not only that it fails to accomplish its goals but also that the purposes of the U.S. have changed. New public diplomacy emerged because social networks and technology may easily neutralize the effects of these old techniques. Transparency is highly valued because modern technology and the high speed of information flow will disclose manipulated information from government easily, and forces nations to communicate with foreign publics to gain trust and then national interest.

However, this does not mean that old-style covert operations are no longer part of public diplomacy. During the Cold War, it was not unusual for the U.S. to launch covert operations that involved funding private-sector actors to exert influence. Governments secretly promoted or financed NGOs and other organizations during the Cold War and in the modern age. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the CIA financed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to influence people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Covert operations still have roles to play in public diplomacy, as Kilbane (2009) claims with respect to the work and function of U.S. Psychological Operations personnel. Public diplomacy has its purposes and methods in different countries. National reputation is one of the subjects with respect to which countries promote public diplomacy, but it is not the most prioritized subject among their foreign policy. Current public diplomacy often focuses on acquiring benefits through facilitating national

reputation and mutual communications. In addition, public diplomacy nowadays is also considered a catalyst that can boost trade and the economy. Therefore, attraction and soft power are vital to current public diplomacy. However, current public diplomacy still faces several obstacles that lead to ignorance in the academy: Public diplomacy is hard to theorize, it can be defined in numerous ways, and it has a loose causal relationship between goals and deeds. All of these problems diminish the use of public diplomacy, both in academia and practice. The United Kingdom, for instance, has stopped using the term *public diplomacy* in its official documents. It may be true that the study of public diplomacy has decreased dramatically in the realm of international relations; the cases of influence on foreign publics, however, are increasing. When war is not the primary option, methods of influencing foreign publics to obtain interest become far more important. It is apparent that current public diplomacy is not able to deal with the fast-changing environment. The problem of current public diplomacy lies in over-emphasizing the idea of attraction and soft power. Though Joseph Nye recommended the use of smart power, the smart power he described still relies heavily on attraction. The term *public diplomacy* is still a tool of soft power for those who support the idea of *new public diplomacy*, and it is still a synonym of *propaganda* for those who are skeptical about it. Comprehensive public diplomacy is thus a solution that can incorporate both into one concept. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) indicate that “public diplomacy is a multi-faceted concept.” In fact, through the thesis, public diplomacy is about exerting influence using multi-faceted methods.

#### **4.8 Discussion: Utility of the concept of comprehensive public diplomacy**

Comprehensive public diplomacy requires further study, because the case studies in this

thesis are still relatively small. Nevertheless, through the cases, comprehensive public diplomacy is able to draw out some gaps that current public diplomacy missed. The missing part, for instance, indicates that the process of China's public diplomacy is the same with respect to the channels and with respect to the proxy agents; yet some are considered public diplomacy while others are not. The differences are based on the information the proxies try to disseminate. When the information is bright and positive, then it is public diplomacy; when the information contains the element of threat, it has been cast out from the study. It simply creates bias and a defected argument. The gap is filled through discussions in this thesis, which is primarily focused on the proxy-agent framework: what the proxy agent did to attract, threaten, motivate, manipulate and even spy on Taiwanese and generate interest. Finally, this thesis assumes that China also uses relative concepts to achieve its national interest in other bilateral, and multi-lateral relations of China. To validate this assumption, this thesis tries to use China's reaction to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) as a case to discuss the ingredient of comprehensive public diplomacy. The thesis then discusses the wide usage of comprehensive public diplomacy by considering the case of Jiang Ping and Huang An. This section furnishes more application of comprehensive public diplomacy.

#### **4.8.1 Can retaliation be part of comprehensive public diplomacy?**

China's comprehensive public diplomacy is not the patent in cross-strait relations but also applies to other countries, if necessary. One of the recent cases involved retaliation against Korea. After Korea decided to deploy the Thaad in 2016, China was against it fiercely. After diplomatic failure, China refocused on retaliation against Korea. The first target of retaliation was to remove Korean entertainers from TV and ban the shows and performances of Korean

entertainers in China. For instance, several fan events and concerts of Korean stars in China were cancelled or postponed (Qin and Choe, 2016). Jiangsu Broadcasting Corporation cut and blurred the images of Korean stars in its reality show, which was broadcast on television (Ling, 2016). Product endorsement by the Korean star, Song Joong-ki, was replaced (Tee, 2016). “The Mask,” a Chinese-Korean co-produced movie was cancelled (Hernandez, 2017). In recent years, Korean popular culture has obtained huge shares in China, and China is the largest market for the Korean entertainment industry (Qin and Choe, 2016). Although the Chinese government did not issue official documents to ban Korean entertainers, it used oral instructions to deliver its message of banning (Xu, 2016). These oral instructions became rumors at the beginning. Rumors about lifting restrictions on the Korean entertainment industry occurred periodically until further confirmation of the deployment of Thaad.

The retaliation damaged the Korean entertainment companies and caused the shares of these companies to fall sharply. The question about the extent to which these can be treated as instances of comprehensive public diplomacy needs to be evaluated. Restriction of Korean entertainers in Chinese public media also represented the involvement of nationalism (Qiu, 2016:315).

After Korea deployed Thaad in March of 2017, China’s retaliation increased. It further devastated the Korean tourism industry, the sales of Korean products and China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Korea. The Beijing government prohibited tour packages to Korea. Many Chinese also spontaneously refused to visit Korea. The Lotte Group—a Korean company which engages in multilayer business such as manufacturing, entertainment, beverages, retail, financial services etc.—became the primary target, because the Lotte Group provided the land for the deployment of Thaad. For instance, the Lotte section on China’s second largest online

sales company was closed; the Chinese boycotted the buying of products from Lotte; the official website of Lotte was unreachable; and one-fourth of the Lotte Market was shut down (Choi, 2017). Chinese companies and citizens also spontaneously resisted Korean products and tourism. Those retaliations caused economic loss and affected the Korean economy. Update to May of 2017, Korea suffered around \$7.5 billion dollars of loss while China also suffered about \$880 million dollars of loss (zhongguo dizhi," 2017).

The key to the retaliation is to clarify China's goal and methods. The goal of the retaliation is not simply revenge but to show the consequences of violating China's interests. More importantly, it is to affect the Korean publics and create pressure from below by arousing the Korean public's awareness of the Korean government and its reckless diplomacy of Sino-Korea relations. Although the retaliation could not remove the deployment of Thaad, the results show that the retaliations were not all in vain. The public poll published 14 March 2017, showed that 51.8% of Korean supported deploying Thaad: a 16% drop compared with the same period one year before. Another poll revealed that 82.4% of respondents believed that the Korean government had failed to respond to China's retaliations (Yang, 2017). It gave Korea another factor to consider when their government was involved in the similar situation in the future.

In the manner of China's retaliations, some were instructions of China while others were the work of Chinese nationalism. Although Chinese officials denied launching the retaliations and claimed that they were spontaneous acts of Chinese citizens, those retaliations were believed to be directed by the Beijing government (Yi, 2017; Su, 2017). Chinese companies and semi-official organizations, the proxy agents, helped to implement those retaliations, whether willingly or not. The mechanism is the same as that involved in China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan. The difference is that the proxy agents are Chinese private-sector



actors and the influence the proxy agents generate is in messages of threat with the form of economic retaliation. Therefore, China's retaliation toward Korea is also a form of comprehensive public diplomacy. Those spontaneous acts could be seen as PD assets and the work of retaliation is in fact a combination of both comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets. The implication and use of comprehensive public diplomacy are both wide and important.

#### **4.8.2 Individual actors and comprehensive public diplomacy**

Much of China's comprehensive public diplomacy lies in indirect information dissemination. Sometimes, a mix of direct and indirect methods were promoted. China also uses its own people as actors of public diplomacy to disseminate information. The following two cases show the variety of China's comprehensive public diplomacy as it was deployed. The catalyst—nationalism—is a two-edged sword. When used well, nationalism and comprehensive public diplomacy can influence foreign publics in accordance with national interest, as in the case of Thaad discussed above. However, sometimes a government could also inadvertently influence foreign publics with unexpected results. When policies or instructions are carried out to solve problems, they may also generate another problem. For example, when China has to maintain its legitimacy, nationalism is an easier tool; but it may also have a negative impact on China's Taiwan policy. Sometimes, it is hard to grab one without losing hold of another. The following cases explore and discuss the negative results that occur when privatized public diplomacy is on "autopilot."

##### **4.8.2.1 The case of Jiang Ping**

China considers domestic residents the actors and the target audience of public diplomacy,

because when the government educates people with “correct” information about China, they will help China to promote public diplomacy. However, this characteristic generates problems when cross-strait relations are considered. Chinese nationalism and educating domestic residents with the “correct” information sometimes jeopardizes cross-strait relations and arouses Taiwanese anger.

One of the famous examples is the case of Jiang Ping. At the twenty-third Tokyo International Film Festival in 2010, Jiang Ping, the head of the Chinese delegation and a movie director, threatened to change the name of the Taiwanese delegation from “Taiwan” to “Chinese Taipei” or “Taiwan, China” or to boycott the film festival a few hours before the opening ceremony. Thus, the appeal of Jian Ping was broadcasted through media because they were going to report the opening ceremony. In response, the Taiwanese delegation refused to change the name, and in the end the Chinese delegation dropped out the film festival and the Taiwanese delegations did not participate in the opening ceremony due to China’s appeal. This incident caught huge attention in Taiwan. The Taiwanese were angry about it no matter what their political stances were. Cross-strait relations were considered smooth and friendly at that time. Thus, it was regarded as a serious setback for president Ma’s cross-relation policy and diplomatic truce policy.

In fact, it is not unusual for Chinese NGOs to restrict Taiwanese NGOs in international organizations—for example, by threatening to change the name of a Taiwanese delegation, or refusing the membership to Taiwanese NGOs and asking to degrade the membership of Taiwan. Hundreds of cases have been reported and documented by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.<sup>20</sup> However, this case is the one that catches people's eyes because of the high visibility of Taiwanese actors and actress. What Jian Ping did actually meets China's requirement to boycott the Taiwanese international participation. After the incident, the spokesman of China's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, Yang Yi, said that China is reluctant to see that people across the Taiwanese strait have "internal friction on the issues involving foreign affairs." It was a softer and relatively nicer remark to Taiwan, concerning Chinese other responses before the warming cross-strait relations in the issue of Taiwanese international participation.

Considering the cross-strait relation at that time, the case of Jian Ping created trouble for both China and Taiwan given that the ECFA had been signed one month earlier and the Sixth Chen–Chiang summit was going to be held one month later.<sup>21</sup> Although the DPP politicians urged the delay of the summit, the meeting was eventually held on schedule. Thus, it is very likely that China did not want to see Jian Ping to do such a thing on a high-profile occasion despite the fact that what Jian Ping did was in accord with China's principle about Taiwan's international participation. The response of China and the further interactions across the Taiwan Strait may already confirm this possibility.

The case of Jian Ping was considered a "noise in the process of signal transmission"

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<sup>20</sup> Those reports were accessible on the website of Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but KMT administration decided to make them confidential documents due to the warming cross-strait relations; China is very conservative and cautious about Taiwanese international participation no matter in IO or NGO. Even in the period of the warming cross-strait relations, the attitude of China was that Taiwan can discuss their international participations with China case by case.

<sup>21</sup> Chen–Chiang summits were the most important meetings for both Taiwan and China in cross-strait relations on that time. Taiwanese reaction was the one of the major factors to affect whether the meeting would be hold on schedule due to the political sensitivity. Although the summits were semi-official meetings, the agreements they made were negotiated by both government officials.

(Tung and Chu, 2016). It is indeed a noise, but it is also the result of China's public diplomacy with its own characteristic. China promotes its public diplomacy by educating domestic populations, and people did send "correct" information to the Taiwanese delegation. Only the result was not in accord with China's interests. If considering these people as proxy agents when they exert influence on foreign publics, it is an example of comprehensive public diplomacy. It is similar with the case of VICA. Proxy agents threatened the Taiwanese to stop doing something. However, it also shows the vulnerability and the problem with this kind of public diplomacy. People's actions may sometimes jeopardize the goals of government, even when the message people deliver accords with the government.

#### **4.8.2.2 Taiwanese entertainers, Huang An and its backfire**

Popular culture from Taiwan has an important place in China. Music is an instrument whereby the Beijing government serves its political purposes. Thus, when the products of popular culture from Taiwan and Hong Kong were smuggled to China, the influence of the elements of popular culture (such as music and film) were profound. The names of those entertainers from Taiwan and Hong Kong were deeply rooted in China. After China opened up its market to foreign business in 1978, it provided unprecedented opportunity for the popular cultural industry of Taiwan and Hong Kong to penetrate the market (Thomas, 1993: 909). After decades of cultivation, Taiwan and Hong Kong depended largely on the Chinese market (Thomas, 1993). Particularly in popular music, Taiwanese singers had a huge share in the

Chinese market.<sup>22</sup> Since 2000, China allowed Taiwanese singers to receive national rewards on CCTV, the MTV Music Awards, and the CCTV-Channel V Music Chart, and Taiwanese singers were the major winners (Fung, 2007: 434).

As celebrities, Taiwanese entertainers may have had a negative impact on China if they went against the principle of the Beijing government by supporting Taiwan independence. Therefore, the management of “political censorship” became important to China, because these entertainers could jeopardize China’s interest. In 2000, the famous Taiwanese singer, Zhang Hui-mei (also known as A-mei) was invited to sing the national anthem of the Republic of China at the inauguration ceremony of President Chen Sui-bian of the DPP. After the performance, A-mei came under a Chinese media blackout in television and newspapers; the Chinese media also pulled out other programs and a Sprite advertisement featuring her. CCTV explained that it was because A-mei supports Taiwan independence (Ho, 2006: 450). The Taiwanese singer Chi Hsiao-Chun (also known as Samingad) suffered a similar media blackout after singing the national anthem at the inauguration ceremony of President Chen Sui-bian in 2004. With these and many other media blackouts and cancellations of commercial activities, Taiwanese entertainers were taught to be apolitical in public if they desired to enter China’s market.<sup>23</sup> However, with the development of social networks and Chinese nationalism, Taiwanese entertainers face a new challenge. Beijing has educated and punished entertainers whose behavior is against China’s principles and interests. The punishment occurs by both

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<sup>22</sup> The influence of Taiwan pop music has gradually decreased due to merging of Chinese pop singers and the Korean pop music. For more information, please see Liao, 2016

<sup>23</sup> For instance, when mention China, Taiwanese entertainers will not use the word of China because it implies they are different from Chinese. The words of “inland” and “the mainland” are often used.

direct and indirect methods.

These punishments have taught the domestic population a “standard code of conduct” for Taiwanese entertainers. The Chinese government is no longer the only actor to censor the behavior of these entertainers; Chinese citizens and even Taiwanese who support unification do so. Though China has its plan for using the domestic population as an actor of its public diplomacy, in the case of Taiwan, it further strengthened its intentions through law. The National Security Law of the People's Republic of China, passed on July 1, 2015, become the legal basis for individuals and groups to be proxies for China. In Article 11, the law notes the following:

All citizens of the People's Republic of China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people's groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to maintain national security. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China shall not be infringed upon or partitioned. Maintaining the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the state shall be the common obligation of all Chinese people including Hong Kong and Macao compatriots and Taiwan compatriots (“Full text of Anti-Secession Law”, 2005).

The law also provides incentive for individuals and groups to be proxies for China, because the Beijing government will reward those who make prominent contributions to the law. As noted in Article 12, “The state shall commend and reward individuals and organizations that have made prominent contributions to maintaining national security” (“Full text of Anti-Secession Law”, 2005). The passage of the law attracted Taiwanese celebrities, especially those who had resided in China, to join the “obligation of maintaining the unity.” For instance, the

case of Huang An is a good example to elucidate how the Taiwanese could maintain China's "national security."

Huang An is a Taiwanese "has-been" singer who has lived in China for decades. Huang is well known for his strong anti-Taiwanese independence stance and is a supporter of unification. He has constantly accused Taiwanese entertainers as a supporter of Taiwan independence since 2015. Huang often uses Weibo (the Chinese micro-blogging platform) to accuse those he believes are supporters of Taiwanese independence based on information he sees on the Internet. Huang's first accusation concerned Chung Yu-chen, a Taiwanese female who claimed that her group has business with a Chinese national corporation said on the Internet that she is going to "earn the money from China to support Taiwan independence." Huang disclosed it in China's Internet and reported it to TAO. It attracted much attention on the Chinese Internet. Later, TAO replied to Huang that his report had been confirmed. The Seashine Group will no longer do any business with Chung's company; TAO also appreciated Huang for reporting (Guotaiban huifu, 2015).

After this, Huang began his proxy-agent-like activities to make accusations against Taiwanese entertainers he believed support Taiwanese independence. He accused Taiwanese entertainers such as Crowd Lu and Yoga Lin of supporting Taiwanese independence, thereby causing them to be blacklisted from mainland entertainment shows. In addition, Huang also made accusation against Hong Kong entertainers, such as Anthony Wong Chau Sang and Wong He, for supporting Occupy Central and defaming Zhou Enlai respectively. These accusations are often base on ideology and speculation rather than on facts. For instance, Huang accused Taiwanese singer Crowd Lu of supporting Taiwan independence because Lu participated in the Sunflower Movement to the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement. Huang labeled those who

participate in the Sunflower Movement as those who support unification. When Huang accused Yoga Lin, he only implied that he was a supporter of Taiwanese independence, and the commercial performance of Lin was cancelled. After cancellation, Huang made an announcement to clarify that there is no evidence to show that Lin is a supporter of independence.

The most influential case occurred when Huang accused Chou Tzu-yu, a 16-year-old Taiwanese singer in a South-Korean girl band named TWICE, of being a “pro-Taiwanese independence” activist for waving the national flag of ROC in a Korean variety show few days before the 2016 Taiwan election. Soon the performance and activities of the Korean band were cancelled along with other Korean entertainers in the same company, JYP Entertainment Corporation. With the pressure of angry Chinese and the arrangement of her company, Chou apologized in a video on the Internet to China and her Chinese fans for waving the Taiwanese Flag on a Korean TV show. She also announced that there is only one China and that she is proud to be Chinese one day before the election. Many Taiwanese believed that Chou was forced to apologize. It was too heavy for a 16-year-old girl to be burdened with such political disputes in the eyes of many Taiwanese. Thus, this incident immediately angered many Taiwanese, especially young people. The apology made Taiwanese question the one China principle without different interpretations in the “1992 consensus.” Soon, people voted against KMT for the ideology of cooperation with China. It was estimated that Tsai Ing-wen would have won the presidential election even if Chou did not apologize, but some scholars believe the apology may have contributed 1 or 2% of the votes (“Taiwan election,” 2016). The incident may be more influential in the legislator elections, because KMT legislator candidates lost seven seats with only 5% of votes, including two seats with less than 2%. The results were not



in China's interest.

What makes the cases of Huang An prominent is that the accusations could always have a negative impact on Taiwanese business in China. The Taiwanese suffered the consequences of supporting independence, lacking political sensitivities, and having bad luck by losing their businesses in China—at least for a period of time. This also means that cancellation of those businesses was directed by related authorities such as TAO, state-owned media, and national companies. Without the cooperation of Chinese authorities, Huang's accusation would not provoke such response. Huang An is like a proxy agent, because the authorities supported Huang's allegation to punish these Taiwanese without verifying the evidence. It is also possible that the cancellations were due to pressure from Chinese citizens rather than from Huang. If so, the case of Huang An is more like a PD assets of China than an instance of public diplomacy. If not, Huang An became the proxy agent of China. Either way, it further devastated the trust of Taiwanese about the "1992 consensus" and the image of both the Chinese government and people.

The cases of Jian Ping and Huang An show China's rigid attempt to contain Taiwanese entertainers within the orbit of the one-China principle. The policy priority of China is prone to maintain its regime due to its nationalism instead of achieving the goals of Taiwan's policy. The two cases show that China's public diplomacy has its unintegrated parts because those individuals who followed the instruction of the "correct" ideology increased the difficulty China faced in implementing its Taiwan policy and reducing Taiwanese worries about unification. Individuals did not help China deal with cross-strait relations; they only worsened it. Although the ideology remains the same, the manner in which it is delivered can seriously affect the results. This also verifies the inconsistent results between China's domestic satisfaction and

China's Taiwan policy. Method A will have a negative impact on the goal of B even if the principle is the same. The goals and the methods are simply not integrated. Of course, nationalism is the key to maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP regime, which is in a way more important than the Taiwan issue. However, China requires a smart ploy to avoid conflict between its nationalism and its Taiwan policy.

#### **4.9 Summary and conclusion**

This chapter discusses how China has implemented its Taiwan policy by using public diplomacy, including unorthodox ones. This thesis first introduced the brief history of cross-strait relations to provide some background knowledge. Then, in the section on China's goals and challenges, this thesis indicates that the short-term goal of China was to maintain the "1992 consensus." Many policies and measurements were promoted to secure the 1992 consensus. The difficulties China faces in attempting to improve its image (due to the history and ideological differences) was also illustrated. Then, by illustrating the strategies that China used to deal with Taiwan's current situation, the foundation of China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan was provided.

This thesis divides the case studies into three different parts when examining China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan. The first part is modern public diplomacy. Cases are considered public diplomacy under the current concept of public diplomacy. China has put a lot of effort into attracting Taiwanese to offset the negative image of China's military threat. These interactions and exchanges show that China has particularly tried to communicate with Taiwanese elites such as KMT politicians and scholars.

In the second part of the case studies, this thesis proposed cases to show how China used

techniques of public diplomacy to exert influence. By using economic attractions and subsidies, China has attracted Taiwanese companies and groups to work for China. These proxy agents constitute successful examples of privatized public diplomacy, which means a mechanism of “government to proxy agents to foreign publics.” Moreover, one major similarity with the concept of current public diplomacy is the use of soft power. China uses these proxy agents to influence issues and ideology with the intention to win support or offset worries from Taiwanese. The difference between current public diplomacy and these cases is in the process of implementation. The process of those cases is relatively opaque.

In the third part of the case studies, this thesis focused on China’s intention to influence Taiwanese through threats and violent propaganda. Many of these were promoted through its proxy agents while some were warned by China. A public diplomacy without soft power and attraction but threat is a serious topic to discuss. Through these measurements, China has obviously obtained its benefits by stopping their targets from doing things against China.

China’s public diplomacy toward Taiwan is opaque and contains an element of mutual communication while combining propaganda and interest-related exchanges to serve its political objectives. China’s public diplomacy in Taiwan heavily involves personal relationships, particularly among the Taiwanese socio-economic elites. It is clear that China’s public diplomacy is not merely about projecting a self-image, as is conventionally assumed. China’s public diplomacy toward Taiwan is more like an updated version of traditional public diplomacy, which combines propaganda with opaque mutual communication. Although many cases in which China has connections with Taiwanese groups and individuals remain unverified, China’s huge market and its promise of economic rewards has already influenced Taiwanese elites in their actions aimed across the Taiwan Strait.

China's influence on the Taiwanese shows that public diplomacy requires further study in the realm of influence of foreign publics. Public diplomacy cannot be well-developed if its study remains in the soft and image-oriented mechanism. This is simply because using public diplomacy to promote national image or to boost trade and economy is only one of the foreign policies of a nation. Other objectives are easily neglected. When public diplomacy sticks to soft power and attractions, the policies and actions of threats and manipulation are easily neglected. Integrate public diplomacy is thus derived to explain the situation. The thesis also discusses the usage and variety of comprehensive public diplomacy by using more cases, so that it can further position and understand the notion of comprehensive public diplomacy.

## Chapter V Conclusion

This thesis aims to discover the nature of China's public diplomacy and how it might urge us to rethink some accounts of modern public diplomacy, such as accounts of the meaning of communications and credibility and the role of threats, payments, soft power and other "notions of power." By examining China's multi-variant strategies and analyzing different cases regarding Taiwan, this thesis finds that threats and payments are neglected in current discussions of public diplomacy.

In cross-strait relations, public diplomacy is never a topic to be discussed. From 2008 to 2016, the historical progress of cross-strait relations increased, including massive interactions and mutual communications across the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, China put a lot of effort into attracting Taiwanese through these exchanges. These interactions are also in line with the concept of public diplomacy. On the other hand, in the past decade, China's influence has increased through these interactions and communications. Rumors are frequently disseminated about the Beijing government trying to control Taiwanese media, to convert Taiwanese subjectivity to Chinese subjectivity, to cooperate with Taiwan politicians, to subsidize Taiwanese scholars, to exploit Taiwanese businessmen and even to control Taiwan economy. It would be less significant if we were only talking about China's current public diplomacy—the one focusing on image projection and policy explanation—toward Taiwan. Because many of China's united-front works toward Taiwanese are actually conducted through mutual communications, interactions, and exchanges, public diplomacy involves information dissemination as well. All of these methods resemble to public diplomacy.

Thus, this thesis asks why China's public diplomacy has had so little impact on cross-strait relations despite the fact that China continues to increase its influence on Taiwan through

communications and message dissemination, which are also the core of modern public diplomacy. Therefore, to answer this question, I hypothesize that soft power is not the only notion embodied in China's public diplomacy. Payment and threat are also essential to the framework of China's public diplomacy, but they have not have been discussed. The proxy-agent framework is also the main weapon for China's influence on Taiwan. The way the proxy agents are implemented in Taiwan makes China's public diplomacy significantly different from that described in the conventional conception. In addition, if the hypothesis has been verified, then it may urge us to rethink the claim that is China a unique case. This is related to another question: Is China's public diplomacy an exception, or it can be generalized?

To prove the hypothesis, this thesis has first illustrated the variety of public diplomacy in its definition and development. By illustrating the practice of public diplomacy in other countries, different countries have their own focus on public diplomacy, and some are already in contrast with the current notion of public diplomacy. The common feature of these countries is to gain national interest through influence, whether attraction or coercion. There are also similar notions that are connected or partially overlapping with public diplomacy: e.g., propaganda and strategic communication. This makes public diplomacy more flexible and inconsistent in both definition and practice. The development of current public diplomacy has been influenced profoundly by the U.S. experience, which leads us to focus on soft power and the ways of attraction. This change of focus creates problems such as biases and gaps when U.S.-developed public diplomacy is applied to other countries.

This thesis examines public diplomacy in the context of China. CCP has its long history of promoting its external-propaganda strategies and influencing foreign publics. After the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, Beijing launched several reforms to open better channels

through which to communicate with foreign publics—mainly through its diplomatic and spokesmen system. Public diplomacy became a popular topic in China, both in academia and practice. The goal of China is primarily to offset the “China-threat argument” and defend policies. These goals are heavily involved in the proactive activities of propaganda campaigns. However, this thesis notices that—although soft power or soft power with Chinese characteristic have their place in China and in China’s public diplomacy—the old traditional propaganda has also been transformed into more people-oriented communication. The trend of new public diplomacy is once again mixed with the traditional one, and the boundaries between propaganda and public diplomacy are actually blurred.

By seeking the patterns from the case study, this thesis proposes PD assets and comprehensive public diplomacy. Through illustrating the framework of comprehensive public diplomacy, it provides a clear outline before case studies. Comprehensive public diplomacy compensates for the missing part of current public diplomacy. Comprehensive public diplomacy is an instrument whereby a nation influences foreign publics to gain national interest. The ways of implementing comprehensive public diplomacy include not only soft power but also any other method that influences foreign publics and identifies goals. Therefore, comprehensive public diplomacy is a larger concept than current public diplomacy, though it is still possible to focus on particular issues due to the help of PD assets and the identification of goals and methods. Comprehensive public diplomacy merges with both traditional and new public diplomacy and other methods that can influence foreign publics. In other words, it is not enough to consider only modern public diplomacy or the traditional one.

PD assets are a people-to-people mechanism which generates the public-diplomacy effect. Public-diplomacy effect here refers to the actions and activities of private-sector persons who

have had an impact or have influenced foreign publics in accord with the interests or policies of a particular country which would be considered as its public diplomacy as if the government of that country has promoted it. The core concept of PD assets is that the government does not participate in the process—or at least, not yet. It thus helps to identify a country’s possible cases of public diplomacy and to narrow down the real cases of public diplomacy; it also helps to explain how private-sector actors may affect the effectiveness of a country’s public diplomacy. PD assets are “two-edged swords” to governments: they can generate both positive and negative effects. Whether the PD assets have connections with the government or not, PD assets may also generate negative effects depending on the audiences’ perception of the relationships. This is because the government and the PD assets could generate the same effect. As a result, PD assets are not instances of public diplomacy, but they are influential with respect to public diplomacy.

To verify this fact and to clarify the ingredients of the new and traditional public diplomacy, this thesis has examined how China put its hands-on Taiwan to discover how these schemes of public diplomacy work. China’s attempt to influence the Taiwanese is divided into three different categories. First, communications between China and Taiwanese—such as the interactions of political parties and the visiting of Chinese officials to Taiwan—are within the scope of current public diplomacy. Communication aims to facilitate the cooperation of cross-strait relations, and those communications and interactions have promoted certain degrees of understanding and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait. Second, this thesis focuses on cases that China tried to attract Taiwanese or its proxies with non-modern public-diplomacy measurements. China’s influence on Taiwan has increased through its connections with Taiwanese proxy agents. Channels between China and the Taiwanese proxy agents are often



opaque and hard to verify, but the connections are revealed from time to time through quid-pro-quo arrangements. China expects to benefit from the works of agents while these proxy agents also acquire benefits from the relationship they have with China. With the enormous interest of China, Taiwanese proxies are not only targets of China but are also the actors who influence other Taiwanese publics.

For China, the goal of influence is far more straightforward: to increase its agenda-setting ability in the Taiwanese media through Want Want Holdings, to exert influence on Taiwanese elections by giving discount flight tickets through ATIEM, to recruit possible local elites through TWMAAA, and to intensify the history of bounding with Taiwanese aboriginals through particular politicians. Third, this thesis discusses cases that communications between proxy agent and its audiences were through the use of threat. When dealing with the enemy or potential threats to China, Taiwanese proxies also help to threaten, attack and even spy on them. For instance, a Taiwanese proxy agent warned the chairmen of VICA not to go to Beijing to petition. Another harassed and spied on members of Taiwan Falun Gong through Taiwanese businessman. The True Enlightenment Education Foundation attacked the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism by issuing publications. The Patriotic Association and the Chinese Unionist Party attack dissents and support unification via aggressive and violent activities. The targets of these cases are specific groups and individuals who are minorities that are relatively hard to see in the mainstream media. Though the influences containing threats of violence, what proxy agents did are still exerting influence on particular Taiwanese to gain its interest. The actors, the channels and the target audience are the same as in public diplomacy. The only differences are in the contents of the information itself, which are delivered not through attraction but through threats. It is unreasonable that information which contains attraction is considered

public diplomacy. Particularly, whether a piece of information is an instance of attraction or a threat is a subjective judgment to be made by the audiences.

The case study shows that China's proxy-agent framework has been increased and fortified. These Taiwanese proxies have an impact on the Taiwanese socio-politic environment. First, through the management of Taiwanese proxies such as the Want Want China Times Group, the image of cooperation and further communication across the Taiwan Strait was projected during Ma Ying-Jeou's administration, which also arouses anxiety among Taiwanese who support Taiwan's subjectivity. The 2014, the Sunflower Movement was considered an obstruction of China's Taiwan policy. It also deepened the gap in Taiwan society between those who support cooperation with China and those who reject China's influence. It is also helpful to China. After all, a split Taiwanese society helps to keep Taiwan away from the path to independence. Second, the KMT became China's firewall. When Taiwanese proxies promoted the pro-China's image and the idea of supporting further cooperation with China from 2008-2016, it became burdensome for KMT because people were quick to discover that China's perspective and KMT's perspective are nearly identical. Thus, the perspectives that Taiwanese proxies held and the stance that the KMT held have generated a confusing ideology recognition due to their similarities. The similar stances and ideas created a buffer for China. When Taiwanese are skeptical about China's perspectives and the cross-strait cooperation, KMT is the target to be blamed.

In addition, to depict the outlines and trends of comprehensive public diplomacy, cases such as China's reaction to the Thaad deployed in Korea and the roles of individual actors have been discussed. This thesis further conceptualizes comprehensive public diplomacy. For instance, it is realized that the roles of individuals such as celebrities and social elites can

generate huge public-diplomacy effects—not only positive but also negative—with respect to the government. The case of Jiang Ping and Huang An verify it. Still, both PD assets and comprehensive public diplomacy are only preliminary concepts and thus require further studies, but they nevertheless provide fresh elements with which to modify public diplomacy. This thesis argues that influencing foreign publics to gain national interest is crucial and normal for countries, whether in the past or present. Propaganda, strategic communication, and public diplomacy (etc.) are all synonyms for these measurements. This thesis tries to cover more ways of influence without losing the focus. Comprehensive public diplomacy covers more in the realm of influence while PD assets help to focus the policies of government from private sectors who generate the similar effect.

The answer to the research question has been verified. China's public diplomacy has had little impact on cross-strait relations because current notions of China's public diplomacy are incomplete while those that can generate an impact are not considered in China's public diplomacy—though they all contain the core idea of modern public diplomacy, two-way communication and message dissemination. Soft power is the core of China's public diplomacy, but it is also determined by political judgement instead of by what Beijing government actually did. Attraction, threats and *quid pro quo* are all embodied in China's public diplomacy.

China's public diplomacy also leads to the next question: Is China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan an exception in public diplomacy? I argue the answer is no. The modern public diplomacy that countries promote has already cast out the traditional one. Public diplomacy has become a symbol that the government is trying to become transparent and to communicate with the world. Public diplomacy is always transparent and positive for governments. This is to say, today's public diplomacy is yesterday's propaganda. From China's case, this thesis urges us to

rethink public diplomacy: i.e., to enhance the causal relationships between goals and methods, to reconsider the role of soft power in public diplomacy, to consider the function of PD assets, to examine public diplomacy while considering the whole strategy and policy of a country (instead of afterthought justification), to consider other methods of influencing the current one, to seek after the nature of public diplomacy instead of seeking after what government claimed it to be. “Public diplomacy’s meaning is evolving and contested” (Gregory, 2008:274). Now may be the time for public diplomacy to move to the next stage to complete the study.

## 5.1 Contributions

The contribution of this study is threefold. It includes discovering the nature of China’s public diplomacy, suggesting a modification of public diplomacy, and reporting cases that may generate further impacts on cross-strait relations. First, this thesis has discovered that the true nature of China’s public diplomacy is not what people and scholars think it is. Current studies examine China’s public diplomacy in terms of western democratic values and perspectives, which neglect the fact that China has promoted *de facto* public-diplomacy policies. This thesis proposes a more realistic perspective on public diplomacy which is other than the “image-improving” approach. In fact, China’s current public diplomacy is merely another form of propaganda, but its true nature is far more policy-oriented and influential. This thesis thus provides a revised version of China’s public diplomacy as comprehensive public diplomacy.

Second, by deconstructing public diplomacy, this thesis suggests revising our consideration of public diplomacy because current public diplomacy is a “self-fulfilling prophecy”—as explained in Chapters—and thus leads to bias. This thesis also reveals that current study concentrates too much on attraction, mutual understanding and national branding

while overlooking the basic point that the ultimate goal is to influence foreign publics to gain national interest. In modern societies, the interactions and exchanges have expanded enormously through all kinds of technologies. It is easy to travel, see and communicate with foreign publics. In the immense information flow facilitated by technology—whether directly or indirectly—government is always managing to exert its influence to gain interest. It is the same when the target of government is a foreign public. Public diplomacy is a discipline that particularly studies the acts of governments to influence foreign publics to acquire benefits. And yet, current study of public diplomacy cannot conceive a sound theory to explain it because of the over-emphasis on soft power. This thesis cannot propose a theory of public diplomacy, but it tries to bring public diplomacy back to reality—that is to refocus the discussion of it on how governments engage with foreign publics to gain interest, which could provide a foundation that will allow future research to come up with a theory. As for the problem of its large scope, it is as Kim Andrew Elliott notes, that public diplomacy has lost its meaning. It seems that everything could be an instance of public diplomacy. To overcome this problem, this thesis proposes the concept of PD assets to focus on and to classify public diplomacy. This concept makes it possible to distinguish irrelevant events from public diplomacy and PD assets. In addition, by proposing comprehensive public diplomacy, this thesis also points out that the two philosophical thoughts about public diplomacy are in fact interchangeable and co-exist even when government promotes a single public-diplomacy policy to achieve its objectives.

Finally, in the cross-strait relations, China uses various methods to influence the Taiwanese. The proxy-agent framework is one of the most important instruments whereby China exerts its influence. Through the case study, this thesis reports some cases that have not been widely recognized by the general public and academics: TEEF, VICA and the case of

amateur spies. Some have been noticed apart from their connections with China, such as the case of TWMAAA and Kao Chin. Some have been highly noticed but without understanding their consequences and influence on Taiwanese society and corporations such as the Want Want *China Times* Group, the Apollo Survey, the case of Kenya phone fraud and the activities of pro-CCP groups. Putting them together, these are the elements in China's proxy-agent framework. These cases provide relatively novel ideas concerning China's influence on the cross-strait relations. Interactions and communications across the Taiwan Strait are unstoppable and irreversible. Identifying China's proxy-agent framework may arouse the attention of the Taiwanese government to face China's implantation and to react.

## **5.2 Limitations**

This thesis provides another account of public diplomacy. However, the accounts this thesis has proposed are induced and organized only by the results of the case study. On the one hand, I believe that the preliminary ideas regarding PD assets and comprehensive public diplomacy may be generalized and deployed in other countries, because the idea of influence is for governments to gain national interest. On the other hand, the findings reported here may not be applicable in other countries because the scope of case study is limited to cross-strait relations and thus has not yet been verified. In addition, the focus of this thesis is on China's public diplomacy toward Taiwan, which falls in the realm of international relations. Therefore, this study did not consider much of the study of communication, public relations, etc. The modifications this thesis suggests are not necessarily applicable in these studies, and the results of this thesis could also be considered biases in these studies.

### **5.3 Recommendations for future research**

The result of this thesis is merely the first step of the blueprint of reconstructing public diplomacy. The first step is to identify the nature of China's public diplomacy and how it changes the notion of current public diplomacy, because I believe that PD assets and comprehensive public diplomacy are not the patent of China. The next step is to verify these elements and see if they are also applicable in other countries. If so, then it is possible to verify the idea of comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets on more solid ground. Finally, this study proposes an argument and theory of comprehensive public diplomacy and PD assets by generalizing from those cases. To do this, I believe that public diplomacy may revive again rather than become a slogan used by practitioners. Public diplomacy is complete when all kinds of methods to influence foreign publics to gain interest are considered. However, readers and skeptics may argue that the complete idea of public diplomacy that this thesis argues is a black hole because of its enormous applications and content. Indeed, PD assets are only a preliminary idea and require further study. However, public diplomacy will bump into a cul-de-sac without a proper theoretical foundation. I believe that this study provides the crucial elements for building a theoretical foundation in the future. Even if this thesis is too bold to modify the notion of public diplomacy, still, the study of influencing foreign public to gain interest requires further study because of its importance and its frequent employment by governments. Channels and measurements that can influence foreign publics have increased enormously in the information age.

In cross-strait relations, two targets are used to study China's proxy-agent framework. The first is the involvement of Taiwanese village chiefs in China. China has constantly invited village chiefs to visit and to invest in China—especially in recently years. The influence could

be profound, but the information is relatively limited because China's invitation to the village chiefs is also relatively private. The issues of how village chiefs impact the Taiwanese political environment and the general public are yet to be discovered. Second, China's direct influence through social networking is a relatively new way to provide misleading information in Taiwan. After Tsai took office, China employed its information-manipulation technique to mislead DPP's policy to the Taiwanese, particularly through social networking services. One of the cases is to mislead DPP's gentle persuasion of reducing burning the incense and praying cash in the temples into believing that DPP government intends to forbid burning the incense and praying cash. It aroused worries that the DPP government disrespects the Taiwanese tradition and religion. It has also been reported that a member of CUP, one of the pro-CCP parties, has participated in the preparatory meeting of a protest. It has been confirmed by the Taiwanese national security agencies that the misleading information is from China's cyber warriors (Li, 2017; "Zhengfu yaoyan," 2017). Further study of the influence of China's cyberwarfare on the Taiwanese government and public is required.



## APPENDIX A

### THE WORK REPORT OF CPPCC FROM 2009 TO 2017

The Work report of CPPCC	Contents
<p>The third session of 11th CPPCC National Committee/ Jia Qinglin</p>	<p><b>Review of Work in 2009</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> Cleaving to the theme of peaceful development of the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, <u>we made full use of the unique strengths of the CPPCC to promote exchanges between our compatriots and cooperation between all sectors of society on both sides of the Straits.</u> With National Committee members as the main participants and with Heluo culture, painting and calligraphy, Beijing and Kunqu opera, Mazu culture, and the Whampoa spirit serving as a bridge, we carried out cultural exchanges by holding exhibitions and symposiums and staging performances in Taiwan; and exchanged visits with a number of groups there. All this greatly enhanced the acceptance of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture by our Taiwan compatriots... <u>We got them [overseas Chinese] to play their unique role in opposing Taiwan independence and supporting national reunification, increasing people-to-people contacts, and helping Chinese enterprises go global.</u></p> <p><b>Public diplomacy related:</b> <u>We held a forum on the foreign affairs work of CPPCC committees of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government, with focus on discussing our country's public diplomacy and international influence.</u> In addition, we conducted investigations and studies on China's public diplomacy at Shanghai World Expo. These activities produced significant result.</p> <p><b>Work Arrangements for 2010</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We are firmly committed to the goal of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, and <u>will constantly increase contacts with political parties, organizations, social groups, influential figures from all walks of life, and the general public in Taiwan.</u> We will carry out investigations and studies on cross-Straits economic, trade and cultural</p>

	<p>cooperation; deepen cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation; and strengthen emotional ties between people across the Straits.</p> <p><b>Public diplomacy related:</b> The CPPCC is an important channel through which we make friendly foreign contacts, and an important bridge through which the Chinese people develop friendship with peoples of other countries. We will actively exchange visits with other countries and carry out exchanges with them on many levels in multiple areas in a well-planned and focused manner. <u>We will actively undertake the CPPCC’s public diplomacy, and increase its contacts with the parliaments and congresses, governments, political parties, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, and influential figures from all walks of life in foreign countries.</u></p>
<p>The fourth session of 11th CPPCC National Committee/ Jia Qinglin</p>	<p><b>Review of Work in 2010</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We invited a delegation of representatives of public opinion in Taiwan, which was comprised of members of political parties and persons without party affiliation in Taiwan, to visit Beijing. We sent a delegation to Taiwan by invitation for the first time under the name of the CPPCC Members Association. We used these occasions to explore a new approach to exchanges between CPPCC committee members and representatives of public opinion in Taiwan. <u>We made full use of the role of Heluo culture, cultural and historical data, Beijing and Kunqu opera, calligraphy and paintings, religious exchanges and the Whampoa spirit as a bridge and link to increase the solidarity of Chinese sons and daughters and use cultural exchanges to cultivate in our Taiwan compatriots the sense of being a part of the Chinese nation.</u> We made full use of the Shanghai World Expo, the Guangzhou Asian Games and other platforms for cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation to actively develop exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan, and strengthen emotional ties and increase common understanding between people across the Straits.</p> <p><b>Public diplomacy related:</b> We took advantage of the important opportunity created by successfully hosting the Shanghai World Expo to vigorously advance research into and practice of the CPPCC’s theory on public diplomacy. We launched the <i>Public Diplomacy Quarterly</i>; carried out joint investigations and studies on public diplomacy; held a forum on foreign affairs; and gave reports on public diplomacy.</p> <p><b>Work Arrangements for 2011</b></p>

	<p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We will adhere to the principles of “peaceful reunification, and one country, two systems”; firmly grasp the theme of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations; actively promote the deepening of exchanges between CPPCC committee members and representatives of public opinion in Taiwan; broaden contacts with relevant political parties, organizations, social groups, influential figures from all walks of life and the general public in the island of Taiwan; and effectively do our work related to the people of Taiwan. We will actively promote the implementation of the cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), encourage the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Zone to fully play its role in leading the way and exploring new paths, and further expand cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in the areas of economics, trade and culture.</p> <p><b>Public diplomacy related:</b> The CPPCC’s friendly foreign relations are an important window on the country’s image and an important platform for China’s public diplomacy. We will exchange high-level visits with other countries, deepen traditional friendships, increase mutual political trust with relevant countries, and stimulate pragmatic cooperation in economic relations and trade and other key areas in accordance with the overall arrangements for the country’s diplomatic work...Increase our contact with parliaments and congresses, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, and influential figures in foreign countries; and constantly intensify the CPPCC’s public diplomacy.</p>
<p>The fifth session of 11th CPPCC National Committee/ Jia Qinglin</p>	<p><b>Review of Work in 2011</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> <u>We conducted multilevel exchanges of various kinds with Taiwan; steadfastly combined intensifying exchanges with representatives of various sectors of society in Taiwan with expanding contacts with its ordinary people; ensured the deepening of cultural exchanges and the strengthening of economic and trade cooperation with Taiwan stimulated each other; and further strengthened exchanges with political parties, organizations, representatives of public opinion, and social organizations in Taiwan, particularly groups of young people...</u> travelled to Taiwan for exchanges and discussions related to strengthening community culture and ecological awareness; constantly expanded areas of cultural exchanges and cooperation between the CPPCC and Taiwan; and enhanced the sense of identification of people on both sides of the Straits with Chinese culture and the Chinese nation.</p>

**Public diplomacy related:** As our country's relations with the world have become more intimate, the CPPCC's strength in carrying out exchanges with other countries has become more apparent, and the scope of its exchanges has broadened... we enlivened mutual exchanges of visits, made outstanding achievements in multilateral diplomacy, achieved great results in our investigations and studies, and made innovations in public diplomacy. We actively conducted exchanges of high-level visits; strengthened exchanges and contacts with foreign organizations and institutions; sent 39 delegations to 56 countries for state visits or to attend international conferences... We deepened studies on the practice and theory of public diplomacy. We held a series of forums on public diplomacy and cross-culture exchanges, and promoted the establishment of local public diplomacy associations.

### **Work Arrangements for 2012**

**Taiwan related:** We will firmly grasp the theme of peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Straits; deepen development of pragmatic exchanges with Taiwan; further expand contacts with political parties and organizations, social groups, eminent figures from all walks of life, and the general public on the island of Taiwan; and constantly strengthen the political, economic, and cultural foundation and public support for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. We will carry out investigations and studies on cross-Straits cultural exchanges, with the goal of deepening cross-Straits cultural exchanges and cooperation and getting the people of Taiwan, especially young people, to identify more closely with the Chinese nation and culture.

**Public diplomacy related:** The CPPCC is an important force for putting into practice our country's conception of public diplomacy, a vital platform for carrying out foreign contacts, and an important bridge for enhancing understanding and cooperation between Chinese people and peoples of other countries. We will actively exchange high-level visits with foreign countries, strengthen and develop traditional friendships, increase mutual political trust with relevant countries, and strive to win the international community's understanding of and support for China's concept of scientific, harmonious, peaceful, and cooperative development. We will cultivate exchanges and cooperation on multiple levels and in diverse areas with agencies of foreign countries and international organizations, get the subcommittees of the

	<p>CPPCC National Committee to play their instrumental role in external exchanges, and broaden the CPPCC’s research on and practice of public diplomacy.</p>
<p>The first session of 12th CPPCC National Committee/ Jia Qinglin</p>	<p><b>Review of the work in the past five years</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> Firmly grasping the theme of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, we further expanded our positive interaction with political parties, organizations, social groups, ordinary people and groups of young people in Taiwan; sent 20 delegations of National Committee members to visit Taiwan; and invited a Delegation of Representatives of Taiwan Public Opinion to visit the mainland. We made the CPPCC's cultural exchanges with Taiwan broader, deeper and more institutionalized on the basis of Heluo culture, the Whampoa spirit, religion, traditional Chinese customs, and Chinese martial arts, calligraphy, painting, and opera. We carried out investigations and studies on how to stimulate development of Taiwan-funded small and medium-sized enterprises, promote cross-Straits agricultural cooperation and scientific and technological innovation, and safeguard the lawful rights and interests of our Taiwan compatriots, and offered suggestions and proposals for deepening cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> We took spurring diplomacy as an important goal in increasing the CPPCC's foreign exchanges. We conducted high-level dialogue with other countries in exchanges of visits, and engaged in in-depth communication with foreign participants at international conferences we held or attended. We made full use of the Game of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing, the World Expo in Shanghai and international conference on public diplomacy to deepen our friendly exchanges with relevant organizations, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, influential figures and ordinary people in foreign countries. We launched the Public Diplomacy Quarterly; supported local CPPCC committees in establishing public diplomacy associations; intensified the CPPCC's theoretical research on public diplomacy, put it into practice innovatively, and increased public awareness of it.</p> <p><b>Suggestions on the next five years’ work</b></p>

	<p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We should comprehensively enhance our exchanges, dialogue and cooperation with all sectors of society in Taiwan; cultivate more common interest; increase a common sense of nation identity; cultivate consanguineous feelings toward each other; and constantly consolidate and deepen the political, economic, scientific and technological, cultural, and social foundation for peaceful growth of cross-Strait relations.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> We should create new channels for foreign exchanges, expand their scope, and improve their mechanisms on the basis of China's overall arrangements for diplomatic work so as to actively create external environment favourable to national development. We should exchange high-level visits with foreign countries and strengthen bilateral and multilateral exchanges with their peer institutions and international organizations. We should enrich CPPCC's public diplomacy and intensify our work related to congresses and parliaments, media, think tanks and the general public of other countries. We should continue to make full use of the role of important platforms including the 21th Century Forum, and support the China Economic and Social Council and the Chinese Committee on Religion and Peace in playing a positive role in our foreign exchanges.</p>
<p>The second session of 12th CPPCC National Committee/ Yu Zhengsheng</p>	<p><b>Review of the work in 2013</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We organized exchanges of visits between National Committee members and representatives of public opinion in Taiwan, increased our friendly exchanges with social organizations and groups in Taiwan, and publicized the vision that "we people on both sides of the Straits are one family."</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> We developed pragmatic high-level contacts and increased dialogue and exchanges with organizations, major think tanks, mainstream mass media and influential figures in foreign countries, extensively publicized China's achievements in reform and development, its system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of CPC, and its independent foreign policy of peace.</p> <p><b>Work arrangement for 2014</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We will fully implement the important thinking on the peaceful development of the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits; expand and deepened exchanges and cooperation with relevant parties</p>

	<p>in Taiwan; strengthen contacts with its representatives of public opinion and the general public there; and make suggestions and proposals on the economic, trade and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the mainland and Taiwan.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> We will...conduct investigations and studies on the role of overseas Chinese nationals in public diplomacy... We will carry out the CPC Central Committees' overall arrangements for the country's diplomatic work, get the CPPCC to play a more active role in foreign contacts and public diplomacy, improve the work of exchanging high-level visits, promote exchanges and cooperation with neighboring countries, and serve the country's overall diplomacy.</p>
<p>The third session of 12th CPPCC National Committee/ Yu Zhengsheng</p>	<p><b>A review of the work in 2014</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> Upholding the principle of <i>one china</i>, cleaving to the theme of peaceful development of the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, we made the exchanges with Taiwan on the basis of Heluo culture, the Whampoa spirit, agricultural cooperation, religion, traditional Chinese customs, and further strengthened exchanges with organizations, representatives of public opinion, and general public in Taiwan.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> We carried out cultural exchanges and public diplomacy, opened communication channels for the sake of reaching a consensus. We held international situation analysis meetings for the Belt and Road Initiative and relative issues.</p> <p><b>Work arrangement for 2015</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We will fully implement the CPC Central Committee Taiwan Affairs policies and the important thought of peaceful development of cross-strait relations. We will publicize the vision that "we people on both sides of the Straits are one family", constantly increase contacts with political parties, representatives of public opinion, and effectively do our work for the unity of general publics and young people in Taiwan.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> In accordance with the central government's overall plan for China's diplomatic work, we will carry out foreign exchanges and play the advantages and role of CPPCC special committee, China Economic and Social Council, China Committee on Religion and Peace in</p>

	<p>foreign exchanges; actively carry out people exchanges and public diplomacy; strengthen the analysis of the international situation; tell the Chinese side of the stories, spread the voice of China, and strive to create a favorable external environment for national development.</p>
<p>The fourth session of 12th CPPCC National Committee/ Yu Zhengsheng</p>	<p><b>A review of the work in 2015</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> We adhered to the mutual political foundation of both sides of the Taiwan Straits upholding the 1992 Consensus, improved communication and cooperation with relevant social organizations and groups in Taiwan through scientific, technological, legal, and cultural exchanges, advanced institutionalized exchanges between National Committee members and delegates from local legislatures in Taiwan, and conducted studies and consultations on topics such as the new issues confronting Taiwan-funded enterprises during the transformation and upgrading of the mainland’s economy. These efforts brought together strength for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related:</b> In accordance with the central government’s overall plan for China’s diplomatic work and the focus of the CPPCC, <u>we continued to develop high-level foreign contacts, worked actively to share China’s vision and plan of action for the Chinese Dream and the Belt and Road Initiative, spread awareness of the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, worked to improve the international community’s understanding of China’s context, its political systems, and the CPPCC, expanded bilateral contacts with relevant foreign countries, and advanced pragmatic international cooperation in major areas. We carried out public diplomacy as well as cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and other countries, strengthening friendly ties with foreign political organizations, economic and social groups, mainstream mass media, think tanks, as well as ordinary people.</u></p> <p><b>Major Task for 2016</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> On the political foundation of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing “Taiwan independence,” <u>we will continue to promote the peaceful growth of cross-Straits relations, develop contacts and exchanges with relevant social organizations and groups in Taiwan, and facilitate trade and economic and cultural exchange and cooperation between the two sides</u></p>



	<p><u>of the Taiwan Straits</u>. We will launch exchange programs for young people from Taiwan to experience the mainland first-hand, and conduct studies on the employment situation of students from Taiwan who have attended mainland schools. We will hold activities to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen, promote the study and passing on of his patriotic thoughts, revolutionary commitment, and enterprising spirit, and rally Chinese both at home and overseas to realize the Chinese Dream.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related :</b> In accordance with the overall plan for China’s diplomatic work, we will work hard to bring about a favourable international environment by actively carrying out high-level exchange visits, public diplomacy, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges and by giving full expression to the roles of such platforms as the China Economic and Social Council and the China Committee on Religion and Peace.</p>
<p>The fifth session of 12th CPPCC National Committee/ Yu Zhengsheng</p>	<p><b>A review of the work in 2016</b></p> <p><b>Taiwan related:</b> Upholding the 1992 Consensus as the common political foundation across the Taiwan Straits, we took a firm stand against separatists that advocate for the independence of Taiwan and their activities. We deepened institutional exchanges between National Committee members and delegates from local legislatures in Taiwan, held the 14th symposium on Heluo culture, invited the Chinese Association for Industrial, Economic, Cultural, Education, Scientific, and Technological Exchanges in Taiwan and one hundred young people to come to the mainland and observe and experience it first-hand, and conducted studies on the employment situation of students from Taiwan who have attended mainland schools.</p> <p><b>Public Diplomacy related :</b> In accordance with the central government’s overall plan for China’s diplomatic work, we worked to cultivate friendships with contacts overseas at multiple levels and in many fields. We worked pragmatically to forge high-level friendships, actively carried out public diplomacy and cultural exchanges, and increased communication with foreign political organizations, economic and social groups, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, and influential figures. <u>We explained to them the Belt and Road Initiative and the 13th Five-Year Plan, and familiarized them with the Chinese Dream, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation that exists under the leadership of the CPC, China’s socialist consultative democracy, and the fine traditional culture of China.</u> We held</p>

meetings to analyze the international situation, where we offered advice on building a community of common future with neighbouring countries and participating in global economic governance. We carried out in-depth studies on major issues concerning the Belt and Road Initiative, on the basis of which we offered advice on trade, economic, and cultural exchanges with countries along the routes, international cooperation on industrial capacity; development of China's capacity for international communication; and development of cross-border e-commerce. We supported the efforts of the China Economic and Social Council and the China Committee on Religion and Peace to strengthen contact with relevant international organizations, and in doing so, they explained China's policies and positions regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang and safeguarded our country's core interests.

### **Major Task for 2017**

**Taiwan related:** We will implement the major policies of the CPC Central Committee on Taiwan, uphold the 1992 Consensus as the shared political foundation across the Straits, and resolutely oppose any separatist activities for the independence of Taiwan in any form. We will deepen institutional exchanges between CPPCC committee members and delegates from local legislatures in Taiwan, and foster closer ties with local communities and young people from Taiwan, in an effort to build up public support for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

**Public Diplomacy related :** In accordance with the overall plan for China's diplomatic work, we will continue to promote high-level exchange of visits with our foreign counterparts. By giving full play to the strengths of the CPPCC National Committee's special committees, the China Economic and Social Council, and the China Committee on Religion and Peace, we will carry out exchange and cooperation with relevant foreign institutions and international organizations at various levels and on a wide range of issues. We will offer suggestions on improving and strengthening China's medical assistance efforts in Africa, on strengthening the cultural foundation for joint efforts to build the Belt and Road Initiative, and on promoting deeper mutual opening up at a higher level. We will carry out public diplomacy and cultural exchanges, and increase the CPPCC's international communication, with a focus on informing others about the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation that exists under the leadership of the CPC as well as the

	nature, position, and role of the CPPCC; on increasing awareness of the values, institutional strengths, and achievements of contemporary China; and on explaining China's proposition for improving global economic governance and its idea of building an international community of shared future so as to create a sound external environment.
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Source: The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, retrieved from

[http://en.theorychina.org/rdwx\\_2210/dsqcdh/](http://en.theorychina.org/rdwx_2210/dsqcdh/)

## **APPENDIX B**

### **INTERVIEW DATA**

This appendix contains selections from three interviews. The content was selected based on topics that related to the thesis. It contains a summary of the questions and responses. Three interviewees agreed to reveal their names in the thesis and signed the document of consent that the interviews would be used in the thesis. The interviews are all conducted in Chinese and thus the conversations below have been translated into English.

#### **PARTICIPANT 1 DATA**

The participant, Cheng Hung-I, is the secretary-general of the Taipei Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association (TWMAAA). The interview was held in Taoyuan on September 10, 2015.

**Question:** What is the purpose of establishing TWMAAA? Is the TWMAAA a subsidiary of Chinese Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association?

**Response:** The founder of TWMAA Li, Kuei-Fa, once said that the reason to establish the association was because we needed to find our comrades who shared the same beliefs in the veteran association. The aims of the association are to boost cross-strait relations through intensive interactions and exchanges and to merge with mainland China “naturally.” After all, we are all a family; we are all Chinese. Through the interactions and exchanges, the Taiwanese may one day all understand they are no different from people in mainland China.

**Question:** What is the viewpoint of TWMAA on future cross-strait relations? Does the

association support unification, independence or the current status quo?

**Response:** We support unification for sure. You see, in China's 5,000 years of history, the Chinese territory has always divided and then united, like a cycle. However, even though we support unification, it is not an unconditional one to unify with China. There are conditions to unify with mainland China; only the conditions remain to be discussed. The main principle, however, is to avoid war, and people in Taiwan have to agree to the terms of unification.

**Question:** Have you or your acquaintances participated in the exchange activities of retired military personnel with China? Can you name some of the activities?

**Response:** We have participated in many activities with China. Currently, we have interactions with them every three months, but the members who participate in the exchanges are not only retired veterans but also some chiefs of villages because we know that is what China wants. Having intensive exchanges is conducive to both sides. In these activities, active Chinese generals, colonels and lieutenant officers will also usually attend. Sometimes, they take us to visit their military bases, and their active military personnel would also join us. For instance, when we participated in the "exchange week among Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Taiwan" in 2015, we were accompanied by their active general and colonels. By the way, the title of the exchange week was agreed upon by both sides. There are many activities that we have participated in regarding China. Others such as "the seminar on the history of Chinese air force on both side of Taiwan Strait in the anti-Japanese war" was another visiting mission. There have been many exchanges during the past few years.

**Question:** During the process of exchanges, do you think that any official or civilian in

mainland China has conducted united front work to you or other members during the visits?

**Response:** Of course, we know the exchanges are a way of united front work. Deng Xiaoping once said that work on Taiwan cannot be stopped. It is important for people in the world to think that the two sides are the same country and that we are a family. The visiting missions are hosted by China, and they are effective. Many social groups will participate in these visiting missions because China will pay for the cost of the visiting mission. It is a way for China to connect them with the Taiwanese.

During the exchanges, their point of contact is their veteran association such as the China Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association. However, the head of their association also works for The United Front Work Department of the CCP's central committee (UFWD). Most of the time, when we visit China, the UFWD will also send their officials to go with us. They even asked us to visit more. I think it is not only because of the united front work, but also because they can make some money through the process of write-off expenses. Of course, it's only my speculations.

**Question:** There is a rumor that some social groups, especially those having communications with China, are receiving subsidies from China. And I wonder if TWMAAA has received subsidies as well?

**Response:** Yes, I know which groups have received subsidies from China to maintain their associations, but I am sorry that I cannot tell you. But I can tell you that it is true because their officials in UFWD have showed their willingness to offer a subsidy to us several times. But we refused to accept.

**Question:** Before and after you participate in the exchange activities with China, do these activities change your perceptions of the Chinese government?

**Response:** Yes, I think their exchange activities are successful, and it has indeed changed image of the Chinese government in a good way.

## **PARTICIPANT 2 DATA**

The participant, William Kao, is the Chairman of the Victims of Investment in China Association (VICA). The interview was held in Taipei City on March 10, 2016.

**Question:** Why did you establish the Victims of Investment in China Association?

**Response:** I was a businessman who had investments in China. It is common for Chinese businessmen to work with officials in local governments or judges in courthouses to “steal” property from Taiwanese businessman. I am also a victim. I remember that in the year of 1999 one day after vacation, I returned to my factory for work. When I arrived at my factory, everything was empty. The equipment, the office and valuable products. At first, I thought a thief stole my factory, but later I learned that I was robbed by the Chinese government. The Chinese government, especially local governments, broke the law and took everything. I was not the only incident. There are many other Taiwanese who have suffered the same thing. In particular, many Chinese businesses will bribe the Chinese local governments, and then they will rob the property of Taiwan businessmen together. There are many cases and information that you can find through the internet regarding how Chinese governments and their businessmen break laws or play with laws to rob Taiwanese.

**Question:** Have you heard that Taiwanese businessmen work for China to do political lobbying, espionage and other relevant activities?

**Response:** Yes, I know several cases where Taiwanese have helped China do such things. They are the victims, and yet they work for China because they believe they would get some compensation from China's government.

**Question:** Do you have personal contacts with these Taiwanese?

**Response:** Yes, I can tell you about some people that I met. A Taiwanese, Chu, Chih-Hu, who worked in Beijing and was a member of the New Party. He gave me his business card, so I knew he had established a research institution related to Taiwanese social research. In 2008, I received a mysterious call one day and asked me if I would organize a petition to Beijing. I asked who you are and then he just hung up. A few days later, he called again and asked me about the petition. He wanted to participate in the petition with us. I said you are not the victim of investment in China, why would you care? He said his brother is one of the victims. I asked who his brother was. Did your brother ask me for help? Then, eventually he hung up the phone. The next day, he went to my office and finally revealed his identity. He threatened me directly. He said he represented the United Front Work Department and asked us not to petition or we would be arrested in China. He said if we do not go petition, every case will be reviewed again. Chu threatened me that they are influential and the petition will never succeed. He further claimed himself responsible for stopping stories about the victims that was written by VICA and published in Strait Business Monthly periodically, a publication of Strait Exchanges Foundation. Before, I would write an article in the Strait Business Monthly to tell stories of Taiwanese victims who lost their investments in China. And one day, they stopped publishing



my articles in the magazine. At first, I didn't care too much, but after Chu said that, I called the Strait Exchanges Foundation to confirm the information. Unfortunately, they refused to tell me the real reason. They only said some people complained about it as the stories in the articles were too negative.

Moreover, I know some of the victims were helping China. Now, I don't even sure they are actually victims or not. For example, there was a victim who said his money, about 7 million, was stolen by the Bank of China. However, when the Bank of China visiting groups came to Taiwan, he refused to go to protest, but said he wanted to go to Hong Kong to protest. These kinds of victims may not be real victims, because they will definitely take pictures as if recording something.

**Question:** As the chairman of VICA, how does the association help Taiwanese victims? How many cases has the association solved?

**Response:** There have been approximately 300 cases in the past 10 years that we have dealt with. According to the Taiwanese government, the Taiwanese government received 28,315 cases from Taiwanese businessmen that involved investment disputes in China from 2000 to 2010. The Chinese government did not deal with these disputes, and no one has been punished after they stole property from Taiwanese businessmen. There are too many Taiwanese victims of investment. However, only in a few cases have we actually helped victims get some compensation because China had threatened those victims that if they asked us for help, their cases would definitely not be reviewed and there would be no chance to get their money back. So, many victims won't ask us for help. VICA now is trying to tell Taiwanese that it would be dangerous if they go to China to invest.

### **PARTICIPANT 3 DATA**

The participant, Theresa Chu, is a Taiwanese human rights lawyer and the spokeswoman for Taiwan Falun Gong lawyers. The interview was held in Taipei City on September 18, 2015.

**Question:** Has China used any method to attract, infiltrate or suppress Falun Gong or its members?

**Response:** Have you ever heard “hongse minyun” (Red Democracy Movement)? China will send people to the Weiquan groups to sabotage the groups by making factions in the groups. Ostensibly, “hongse minyun” supports Weiquan movements, especially Weiquan lawyers and NGOs. They will criticize the CCP harshly and loudly and thus gain the trust of other people in the group. They receive money from the CCP to record the details of the NGOs or lawyer teams they participate in. At first, they will try to bribe you; if you refuse, they will criticize through all kinds of channels. Sometimes, their agents will call you directly to threaten you. I know that because I have been there. One of our members, Lin, Hsiao-Kai is one of the victims that faced such threats. He was detained by China when he visited only because he was a member of Falun Gong. You can google him on the internet for details.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> For detail, please see Hou, Pei-Yin and Cheng, Sheng-Weiyou (2003, October 29) falun gong lin xiaokai huijia! fuqi ganji gejie shengyuan [Falun Gong Lin Hsiao-Kai went home! The couple thanks the help] TVBS News. Retrieved from <http://news.tvbs.com.tw/other/396184>; Wu, Sofia (2003, October 28) China releases Taiwanese Falun Gong follower. Central News Agency. Retrieved from <http://www.religionnewsblog.com/4859/china->

**Question:** How do you know who works for China?

**Response:** We have met too many of them. It is not difficult to find out who works for them. We have held many activities which aim to protest the CCP, but our confidential information would be leaked, such as the date and location of protest, if particular persons had joined the preparation meetings. We tried to find out who was leaking the information, and after many cross-comparisons, we found who leaked the information, then everything was clear. They would try to actively participate in every activity but have a lot of negative opinions during the preparation period of activities. And they like to take pictures, no matter how inappropriate the timing. It is their code of conduct. They have to take pictures to get money from China. In fact, my e-mail and my phone are intercepted, and I know that because every time I used e-mail or phone to arrange private meetings, and when those meetings were in public places such as coffee shops or restaurants, people would show up and try to listen to our conversation. I was aware of that because they were acting very unnatural and suspicious. They would try to take pictures of us in unprofessional ways; for example, one time when trying to take pictures of us, the man forgot to turn on mute mode of his phone, so his click sound was loud. When I looked at him, the lens was aimed at me. I also tried to have conversations with them several times, but they just ran away. If they are innocent, they would talk with me like normal people would do, a polite greeting at least. Anyway, those details of meetings were very private, and only I and the persons I met could possibly have known, so I know my e-mail and my phone are very

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likely being monitored.

**Question:** Do you know who those people are? I mean those who were trying to take pictures of you in public?

**Response:** Some are Chinese, but more are Taiwanese. I remembered there is a Chinese student who asked me if she can be my intern during the summer vacation. I thought it was weird, but still I agreed. I know she works for China, because she would take pictures of me every time we met. Later on, I realized why they need to take pictures because they can use the pictures they took to request payment. People who tried to listen to and take pictures of me in the coffee shop or restaurant looked like general Taiwanese, nothing particular. At first, I didn't know who they were. However, once when we had a meeting in Hualien, the place we met was very spacious and empty. And there was a man whose actions were suspicious and sneaky; we could see the movements he did because of the space. We tried to ignore him because he was not really close even though he seemed to try to monitor the situation. Probably he knew that we already knew he was watching, so after few attempts of taking photos, the man approached and asked if he can take pictures. He said he is a Taiwanese businessman and he had to take pictures because he had a business and factory in China to save. After years of being the target under the surveillances by amateur spies, we know that many of them are Taiwanese businessmen, including those who trying to listen to us.

**Question:** Do you know whether the Chinese government has put pressure on foreign countries to ban overseas dissenting groups?

**Response:** There are too many cases. Usually the Chinese embassy is the main institution to do

it. The embassy will collect the information and enlist its blacklist. They will also pay their overseas students to help them collect information. Then they use overseas Chinese communities or even hooligans to assault members of Falun Gong or to interfere with the activities of Falun Gong. The embassy will also pressure foreign governments. For example, the Singapore government often imposes a charge and sues members of Falun Gong for violating the rallying law; we have lost every lawsuit in Singapore.

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