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RESEARCH REPORT

Tell Me What You Believe and I'll Tell You What You Want: Empirical Evidence for Discriminating Value Patterns of Five Types of Religiosity

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On the basis of Wulff's (1997) theoretical model of religious attitudes and of Schwartz's (1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) value theory, a refined theoretical framework has been constructed and empirically tested concerning the relation between 5 types of religiosity and personal value orientation. Two theoretical value patterns associated with religiosity were identified: A theological one focused on transcendence and mutual care, and a sociopsychological one focused on acceptance of social order and avoidance of uncertainty. Religious commitment and Hutsebaut's (1996) types of religious attitudes, which are based on Wulff's theoretical model, were, in a theoretically predicted and meaningful way, empirically related to a different value pattern. Moreover, each observed pattern could be explained as a specific combination of the 2 theoretically derived value patterns.

In the past, the relation between values and religion has played a central part in theories of theologians, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists (e.g., Marx,

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Weber, Freud, Tillich). The interest in this relation persists to date. A good example of this continuing interest is the great attention paid by many people to the so-called loss of values in our Western society, which is attributed by many scholars from different fields to a decline in religiosity. Although religion cannot be reduced to a set of abstract moral norms or values, they do form an important part of each religion (Vergote, 1997). Therefore, at a psychological level, it is theoretically interesting to study the relations between personal religious commitment and religious attitudes, which we refer to as religiosity on one hand and individuals' personal value orientation on the other.

The first empirical approach to human values as transsituational (abstract) guiding principles in one's life and the investigation of their relation to religiosity has to be credited to Rokeach (1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1973). He asked participants to rank 18 instrumental and 18 terminal values as guiding principles in their lives and compared religious and nonreligious participants with respect to the average rank order of each value item. He found that religious participants estimated the value terms *salvation*, *forgiveness*, and *obedience* higher and the value terms *pleasure*, *independence*, *intellect*, and *logic* lower than nonreligious participants did. Most of the subsequent empirical research on the relation between religiosity and value orientation was inspired by Rokeach's approach (e.g., Lau, 1989; Paloutzian, 1981; Sohlberg, 1986; Wolfe & Mourribi, 1985). However, this approach shows two shortcomings. First, individual religiousness is often merely defined in terms of belief and nonbelief or research has been limited to comparisons between different religious denominations. Thus, religiosity is often treated as a unidimensional, homogeneous characteristic within or between religious denominations. Moreover, even the rare studies using classical multidimensional approaches toward religiosity (e.g., Tate & Miller, 1971, using the intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity measures of Allport & Ross, 1967) can be questioned because these approaches have been recently criticized on both psychometric and conceptual grounds (see Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990). The second shortcoming has to do with Rokeach's (1973) value approach. Aside from the methodological problems associated with rankings, each value item is treated separately, and with 36 values this leads to poorly organized results. New developments during the last decade in the conceptualization and measurement of both religious attitudes (Hutsebaut, 1996, 1997) and human values (Schwartz, 1992) offer the possibility to shed a new light on their relation.

Recent theoretical and empirical research by Schwartz and Huisman (1995) about the relation between religiosity and value orientation builds on Schwartz's (1992) new conceptualization of values. They showed that there is a theoretically meaningful pattern of associations between religious commitment and a representative set of values in four Western religions (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). In all four religious groups, religiosity was associated with the importance of "respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that tra-

ditional culture and religion provide” and a de-emphasis on “pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself” (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995, p. 90). However, Schwartz and Huisman only used a unidimensional conceptualization of religiosity in terms of subjective religiosity and church attendance. In this article we not only try to replicate their findings, but we also confront their theory and findings with the new multidimensional conceptualization and measurement of religious attitudes by Hutsebaut (1996, 1997). Furthermore, we investigate whether and how the various dimensions of religious attitudes are related to different value priorities. Thus, the aims of this study are to (a) empirically replicate Schwartz and Huisman’s findings, (b) refine and extend their theoretical framework from a unidimensional to a multidimensional view on religiosity and to the according differences in relations between various types of religiosity and personal value orientation, and (c) empirically test the extended theoretical framework.

SCHWARTZ’S VALUE APPROACH

Schwartz (1992) developed a comprehensive theory about the content and the structure of the value domain, which has been empirically supported in more than 40 countries (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). He defined a value as a transsituational, desirable goal that varies in importance as a guiding principle in one’s life. On the basis of theoretical analyses and extensive empirical research, 10 different value types, each characterized by their own motivational goal, have been identified: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction (see Table 1). These 10 value types can be organized into a two-dimensional circular circumplex structure on the basis of the mutual compatibilities and conflicts between their respective motivational goals (see Figure 1). Value types that share compatible motivational goals are most positively correlated and emerge adjacent to one another in the two-dimensional representation. Value types that are characterized by conflicting motivational goals are less, or even negatively, correlated and are situated opposite one another in the two-dimensional representation.

Schwartz’s theory and research means a considerable improvement with respect to Rokeach’s (1973) earlier work. Instead of using 36 distinct values, Schwartz identified 10 theoretically distinct and stable value types, and he specified mutual compatibilities and conflicts between these 10 value types. Moreover, because these value types can be situated in a circular circumplex pattern, associations between these value types and external variables are expected to follow a specific, sinusoid pattern. Thus, if the value type that should be most positively related with an external variable and the value type that should be most negatively related with an external variable can be identified, then the or-

TABLE 1
 Definition of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of Their Goals and the Single Values
 That Represent Them

Power	Social status and prestige, control, or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image) [social recognition]. ^a
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential) [intelligent].
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence) [sexuality].
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life).
Self-direction	Independent thought and action choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals) [self-respect].
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broad-minded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment).
Benevolence	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) [true friendship, mature love].
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate) [detachment].
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, politeness, self-discipline, honoring parents and elders).
Security	Safety; harmony and stability of society, relationships, and self (family security, national security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favors) [sense of belonging, health].

Note. From "Values Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions," by S. H. Schwartz and S. Huisman, 1995, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, June, p. 90. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological Association. Reprinted with permission.

^aValues in square brackets were not used in computing indexes for value types.

der of all other relations with that external variable can be predicted on the basis of the circumplex structure.¹ The relations should systematically decrease as one goes from the most positively related to the most negatively related value type, or they should systematically increase as one goes from the most negatively related to the most positively related value type.

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND PERSONAL VALUE ORIENTATION

Using a unidimensional conceptualization of religiosity, Schwartz and Huisman (1995) theoretically derived and empirically confirmed a single religious value pat-

¹The size of the empirical associations between the value types is not so large as to completely determine the order of correlations with external variables. Only a tendency for a sinusoid correlational pattern can be expected.

tern in terms of the 10 value types on the basis of a theological, sociological, and psychological analysis of the relation between religiosity and value orientation. As they expected, tradition was found to be most positively correlated with religiosity and hedonism most negatively, whereas the correlations for all other value types were situated in between, according to their position in the circumplex structure. The correlations decreased from tradition over benevolence, universalism, self-direction, and stimulation to hedonism, and the correlations increased from hedonism over achievement, power, security, and conformity to tradition. Because we use a multidimensional approach toward religiosity, we treated each classical approach in its own right. Later we investigate to which extent each approach has differential validity for different types of religiosity. We first present these approaches, limiting ourselves to Christianity.

According to a Christian theological analysis, religion is in essence characterized by an orientation toward and a dependency on a personal God and a transcendence of material concerns and temporary affective desires (e.g., Niebuhr, 1935; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Tillich, 1956; Vergote, 1997). This implies awe and respect for a God which is expressed through regular worship and personal control over material and affective desires. Being centered on one's self, the material world, and one's temporary affective desires is rejected from a theological perspective. However, the focus toward a transcendent God represents only one fundamental dimension of Christianity. The other fundamental dimension of Christianity, which has not been discussed by Schwartz and Huismans because their analysis was not limited to




FIGURE 1 Theoretical model of relations among value types. From "Values Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions," by S. H. Schwartz and S. Huismans, 1995, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, June, p. 91. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological Association. Reprinted with permission

Christian religion, deals with the love for human beings whether or not they belong to one's own social group as a divine command (Vergote, 1997). This implies an orientation toward and a care for other humans and the rejection of self-centeredness. Thus, from a pure theological perspective, Christian religiosity should imply a value pattern that is characterized by Transcendence and Mutual Care, a pattern which we named the *TC value pattern*.

We translated this theological TC value pattern in terms of Schwartz's 10 value types. The TC value pattern is expected if only the theological analysis accounted for the relation between religiosity and value orientation. Under this condition it is hypothesized that religiosity will correlate highest with tradition and benevolence and lowest (or even negatively) with hedonism and achievement, with a gradual decrease of the correlations from tradition over conformity, security, and power to achievement and from benevolence over universalism, self-direction, and stimulation to hedonism (see also Table 2 in the Results section). The value type tradition that is characterized by commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas provided by religion most clearly expresses the importance of striving for transcendence, whereas benevolence, defined as preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact, most clearly expresses the importance of mutual care. Also, conformity is compatible with an attitude of awe and respect for a transcendent reality, whereas universalism, with its focus on the well-being of all human beings, shares the mutual care perspective. Stimulation, with its focus on pleasurable arousal, expresses self-indulgence, whereas power, with its focus on social status, expresses materialism. Thus, both stimulation and power should be in conflict with religiosity. For self-direction and security, no clear predictions can be made. Although self-direction can be conflicting with a focus on transcendence and mutual care, it can also be conflicting with materialism. Also, from a theological perspective, the value type security can be both compatible and conflicting with religiosity. To the extent that security implies in-group solidarity, it is compatible with religiosity. However, because security values are often in conflict with well-being of members from an out-group, there can be a conflict with religiosity.

The relation between religiosity and values can also be analyzed in terms of societal and personal needs which are being fulfilled by religion. Typical sociological theorizing has stressed the role of religion in supporting the acceptance and the stability of the existing social order (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Glock, 1973; Marx, 1848/1964; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Although in some periods of revolt and chaos religion can be opposed to the existing social order, the dominant religion will tend to support and even treat as sacred the existing social order over longer periods of time (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Wilson, 1982). From this sociological point of view it can be expected that in normal conditions religious institutions will support respect for and reliance on the existing social order among its members, instead of creating a critical and independent opinion that can lead to social change.

Starting from a psychological analysis of personal needs, it has been pointed out that religion can fulfill the human need for uncertainty avoidance (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). By offering a global worldview and a moral program, the complexity of human life is reduced and clearly structured. Religion creates a psychologically safe environment. Thus, according to this psychological point of view, people who have a more intense need for uncertainty avoidance will be more attracted by religion and the safe environment it creates.

Although these psychological and sociological theories about the relation between values and religion differ in a number of ways, their predicted associations of religiosity with individual values are highly compatible. Values that support the existing social order and stability also lead to a well-defined and certain environment. Thus, on the basis of the sociological and psychological analyses, religiosity should be associated with the importance of values that stress the acceptance of Social Order and lead to Uncertainty Avoidance. Such a value pattern is called an *SU value pattern*.

Under the condition that only the sociopsychological analyses holds, the following relations between religiosity and Schwartz's (1992) value types can be expected. Religiosity should be correlated most with security and conformity and should be correlated least with self-direction and stimulation, with decreasing correlations going from security over power, achievement, and hedonism to stimulation and with increasing correlations going from self-direction over universalism, benevolence, and tradition to conformity (see also Table 2 in the Results section). Security and conformity values express most clearly the need for a certain and stable social environment. Self-direction values express most clearly an independent attitude toward the existing social system, whereas stimulation values, with their focus on striving for novel experiences, indicate low uncertainty avoidance. Tradition also implies an acceptance and reliance on the existing social structure. Even power and, to a lesser extent, achievement fit within the sociological and psychological perspective. Their main goals, namely social status and personal success, are reached according to and within the existing social structure. Universalism values, however, with their focus on well-being for all people, can be critical toward the existing ingroup social system. Hedonism, although to a lesser extent than stimulation, can lead to novel experiences and to uncertain environments. Benevolence can be both in accordance with or in opposition to the existing social order, resulting respectively in certain or uncertain environments.

HUTSEBAUT'S MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES

Hutsebaut's (1987, 1990) multidimensional approach to the measurement of religious attitudes is inspired by Wulff's (1991, 1997) unifying framework for the vari-

ous and divergent theoretical and empirical perspectives on the relation between psychology and religion. According to Wulff, these perspectives can be situated in a two-dimensional space, spanned by the dimension inclusion versus exclusion of transcendence and the dimension literal versus symbolical interpretation of religion (see Figure 2). The two extreme poles of the first dimension indicate whether the approach allows for the possibility of a transcendent reality. The two extreme poles of the second dimension refer to whether religion has to be seen as an objective—right or wrong—representation of reality or as a symbolic system that can only be understood through a process of interpretation. On the basis of these two dimensions, Wulff distinguished four fundamental perspectives toward religion. The first, Literal Affirmation (inclusion of transcendence and literal thinking), refers to the position of the orthodox believer or, in its extreme form, the fundamentalist. The second, Literal Disaffirmation (exclusion of transcendence and literal thinking), is the position of the real unbeliever, rejecting religion because it does not of-




FIGURE 2 Integration of Hutsebaut's (1996) scheme in Wulff's (1997) theoretical model of religious attitudes.

fer a “right” representation of reality. The third, Reductive Interpretation (exclusion of transcendence and symbolic thinking; Wulff mentioned Freud as an excellent example of holding this position), maintains that religion is an illusion. Religion is treated as a symbolic system, but the ultimate reality the symbols refer to is rejected. The meaning of the symbolic system is reduced to nonreligious variables. Finally, with the Restorative Interpretation (inclusion of transcendence and symbolic thinking), there is no literal interpretation: Religion is considered a symbolic system, and the reality to which the symbols refer is accepted. It is a position in which a rational approach toward reality and a trust and a faith in a transcendent reality is integrated.

Hutsebaut (1996, 1997) used this framework to conceptualize and measure different types of religious attitudes at an individual level. Attitude statements for each of the four quadrants of Wulff’s (1997) model were generated by experts and students in psychology of religion. In a first stage of empirical research, three factors clearly emerged by means of factor analyses, which were named Orthodoxy (e.g., “Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question”), Historical Relativism (e.g., “I consider the Bible to be a guide, full of signposts in my search for God, and not as an historical account”), and External Critique (e.g., “The scientific clarifications of human life and world have made religious clarifications superfluous”; see Figure 2; Hutsebaut, 1996, 1997). The Orthodoxy scale measures Wulff’s Literal Affirmation quadrant. For the rejection of transcendence no empirical distinction was found between Wulff’s Literal Affirmation and Reductive Interpretation. All items clustered together in a single rejection cluster that was termed External Critique. The last factor, Historical Relativism, contained items referring to a rational but symbolic belief and thus corresponds to Wulff’s Restorative Interpretation.

A reanalysis of these data by means of multidimensional scaling (Duriez, Hutsebaut, & Fontaine, 1999) further revealed that Historical Relativism could be separated into a cluster of items referring only to the symbolic acceptance of transcendence (e.g., “I consider the Bible to be a guide, full of signposts in my search for God, and not as an historical account”), which will be further referred to as Symbolic Belief, and a cluster of items referring to the historical contextualization of religion (e.g., “I am well aware of the fact that each assertion on God is determined by the time in which it is formulated”), which will be further referred to as Relativism.² Symbolic Belief and Relativism are both characterized by a symbolic interpretation of religiosity, but Symbolic Belief items clearly implies the inclusion of transcendence, whereas Relativism is characterized by an intermediate position on the inclusion–exclusion of transcendence dimension (see Figure 2).

The validity of the psychological interpretation of these scales in terms of Wulff’s (1997) model has been empirically supported by relating them to other re-

²Probably, this fourth factor did not turn out in factor analysis because it consists of only three items.

ligiosity scales, measurements of various attitudes toward God, scales for literal and symbolic thinking, and measurements of certainty and uncertainty (Hutsebaut, 1996).³

RELATIONS BETWEEN FOUR TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VALUE ORIENTATION

The theological and sociological or psychological analyses of the relation between personal value orientation and religious commitment can be straightforwardly applied to the two dimensions of Wulff's (1997) theoretical model. The theological perspective directly relates to the dimension inclusion–exclusion of transcendence. Individuals who accept transcendence can be expected to be more guided by the theologically implied values (focused on transcendence and mutual care) than individuals who reject transcendence. The analysis in terms of societal and psychological needs closely corresponds to the literal or symbolic dimension. In a literal mode of thinking, only one right answer is possible. In this way, clarity is created and uncertainty is removed. To the extent that religion is supportive of the existing social order, literal belief in religion will not only reduce uncertainty but will also support the existing social order. In the symbolic mode of thinking, multiple interpretations are possible. This implies a tolerance for uncertainty and for interpretations that are critical for the existing social order. Thus, a literal mode of thinking about religion is hypothesized to be more compatible with social stability values and values that reduce uncertainty than a symbolic mode of thinking.

Because Hutsebaut's (1996) religiosity scales are derived from Wulff's (1997) model, straightforward predictions can be made with regard to the relation between Hutsebaut's four religious attitudes scales and their respective value pattern by combining the theoretically derived TC and SU value patterns. Participants who score high on Hutsebaut's Orthodoxy (inclusion of transcendence and literal approach in Wulff's schema) should be characterized by a combination of a TC and a SU value pattern. Participants who score high on Hutsebaut's External Critique (exclusion of transcendence and literal approach

³Orthodoxy correlated positively with positive God images, anxiety, and guilt feelings in the relation to God, belief in the Bible, and quest belief, which supports the inclusion of transcendence. Orthodoxy also correlated positively with literal thinking, religious certainty, and anxiety for new and complex problems, which supports the literal interpretation. Historical Relativism (combining Symbolic Belief and Relativism) correlated positively with symbolic thinking and openness for complex questions supporting the symbolic interpretation and correlated positively with positive God images, quest belief, and belief in the Bible supporting inclusion of transcendence. The last scale, External Critique, correlated positively with fear for uncertainty which supports the literal interpretation. The exclusion of transcendence is supported by negative correlations with religious certainty, quest belief, belief in the Bible, positive God images, and by positive correlations with both feelings of frustration toward God and with the rejection of dependency feelings toward the normative influence of God (Hutsebaut, 1996).

in Wulff's schema) should be characterized by a combination of a reversed TC value pattern and a SU value pattern. Hutsebaut's Symbolic Believers (inclusion of transcendence and symbolic approach in Wulff's schema) should be characterized by a TC value pattern and a reversed SU value pattern. Because Hutsebaut's Relativism items had an intermediate position on Wulff's dimension inclusion versus exclusion of transcendence and were clearly situated at the symbolic side on Wulff's second dimension, we expect Relativism to be only characterized by a reversed SU value pattern.

METHOD

Participants

Participants were 211 students ranging from 18 to 29 years old ($M = 22$); 49% were men. Half of the respondents were 3rd- and 4th-year psychology students at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) who were each asked to recruit one other fellow student from the same university to cooperate in this research. All participants were Dutch-speaking Belgians. Despite the fact that participants received no credits, refusal rate was very low (less than 4%).

Measures and Procedure

The data reported here were part of a larger project investigating the intrapersonal and interpersonal correlates of shame and guilt. Participants were informed that the study was about "positive and negative emotions in the experience of adults."

Participants received a booklet containing all questionnaires in a brown envelope, together with the instruction to complete the booklet and to return it in the envelope within 2 weeks. Full confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed.

The following measures were completed by participants: The Dutch translation of the Schwartz (1992) value survey consisted of 58 values, representing the 10 value types postulated to cover the full range of different human values across cultures (see Table 1). Each value was rated in terms of its importance as a guiding principle in one's life on a 9-point scale ranging from -1 (*opposed to my principles*) to 0 (*not important*) to 7 (*of supreme importance*).⁴

The unidimensional measure of religious commitment consisted of an aggregate of six items. First, participants were asked whether they considered themselves to be a believer without specifying the content of that belief. Then they had

⁴As in Schwartz and Huisman (1995), the 10 value scales were computed after correction for the mean score for each participant. This was done to control for systematic response sets.

to rate five questions, each on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very strongly*), concerning religious commitment (“How religious do you consider yourself?” “To what extent does religion influence your daily behavior?” “To what extent do you believe in the existence of a [personal or nonpersonal] God or a supernatural reality?” “How much do you feel you are connected with the Church?” “How often do you attend church services?”). A principal component analysis supported the unidimensional structure. Only the first component had an eigenvalue larger than 1, and the scree test (Stevens, 1996) also supported the solution with one component. Each item had a loading of at least .69 on the single religiosity component. The estimate of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the Religious Commitment scale⁵ was .89.

Participants also completed Hutsebaut’s (1996) Post-Critical Belief Scale. This scale consists of 24 items measuring Hutsebaut’s four religious attitudes. A multidimensional scaling (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) on the Pearson correlations between these 24 items for these participants replicated the existence of four religiosity types situated in a two-dimensional space as found earlier by Hutsebaut et al. (1998). Estimates of internal consistencies (Cronbach’s alpha) of the religious attitude scales were .64 for Orthodoxy, .84 for Symbolic Belief, .45 for Relativism, and .71 for External Critique.

RESULTS

Bivariate Correlations

The relations between the various measures of religiosity and the 10 value types were investigated for each religiosity scale separately by means of bivariate correlations (see Table 2). For each religiosity scale, we only report the significant correlations at .05 significance level and whether the pattern of correlations followed a sinusoid pattern.

First, the bivariate correlations of Religious Commitment with the 10 value types followed a (near perfect) sinusoid pattern: The most positive correlation was with tradition, and the most negative correlation was with hedonism (see Table 2). All other correlations except one (achievement) were situated between these two in the order predicted by Schwartz’s (1992) value theory. The positive correlations with tradition, conformity, and benevolence and the negative correlations with hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction were significant.

Second, each of Hutsebaut’s (1996) four religious attitudes scales were characterized (at least partially) by a different value pattern. Orthodoxy correlated significantly and positively with tradition, conformity, and security. Orthodoxy correlated significantly and negatively with self-direction and hedonism (see Ta-

⁵This scale was computed as the sum score of the standardized items because not all items were scored on the same response scale.

TABLE 2
Theoretical TC and SU Value Patterns and Bivariate Correlations Between the Five Religiosity Scales and 10 Value Types

Value Type	Value Pattern		Religiosity Scales				
	TC	SU	RC	O	S	R	E
HE	-.95	-.59	-.25****	-.13*	-.35*****	-.16**	.18**
ST	-.59	-.95	-.18***	.01	-.15**	-.06	-.04
SD	.00	-.95	-.17**	-.15**	-.09	.14**	.06
UN	.59	-.59	-.07	-.10	.08	.11	-.08
BE	.95	.00	.14**	.01	.19***	.09	-.06
TR	.95	.59	.36*****	.27*****	.37*****	-.03	-.32*****
CO	.59	.95	.24****	.22***	.17**	-.09	-.01
SE	.00	.95	.12*	.15**	-.06	-.12*	.04
PO	-.59	.59	-.07	.04	-.18**	-.05	.10
AC	-.95	.00	-.01	-.00	-.11	-.02	.08

Note. TC = Transcendent–Mutual Care; SU = Social Order–Uncertainty Avoidance; HE = Hedonism; ST = Stimulation; SD = Self–Direction; UN = Universalism; BE = Benevolence; TR = Tradition; CO = Conformity; SE = Security; PO = Power; AC = Achievement; RC = Religious Commitment; O = Orthodoxy; S = Symbolic Belief; R = Relativism; E = External Critique.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$. ***** $p < .0001$.

ble 2). Tradition was correlated most positively and self-direction was correlated most negatively with Orthodoxy. All correlations except one (stimulation) followed a sinusoid pattern. The correlations decreased from tradition over benevolence and universalism to self-direction, and they increased from self-direction over hedonism, achievement, power, security, and conformity to tradition. Stimulation formed an exception: It correlated higher with Orthodoxy than hedonism correlated with Orthodoxy.

Correlations for Symbolic Belief also followed a near-perfect sinusoid pattern (see Table 2). Symbolic Belief showed the most positive correlation with tradition. Correlations decreased over conformity, security, achievement, power, and over benevolence, universalism, self-direction, and stimulation, to the most negative with hedonism. Contrary to the sinusoid pattern, achievement correlated higher (less negative) with Symbolic Belief than power did. The positive correlations with tradition, benevolence, and conformity and the negative correlations with hedonism, stimulation, and power were significant.

For Relativism, the pattern was less clear (see Table 2). Relativism correlated most positively with self-direction and most negatively with hedonism. The correlations of universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security followed the sinusoid pattern. But the correlations of power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation were not in accordance with the sinusoid pattern. Only the positive

correlation with self-direction and the negative correlations with hedonism and security reached statistical significance.

The most eye-catching findings for External Critique were the significant positive correlation with hedonism and the significant negative correlation with tradition (see Table 2). The other correlations were not significant and did not show an apparent consistent pattern.

Finally, differences in bivariate correlations with each value scale for each pair of religiosity scales were tested at .05 significance level by means of a *t* test for differences in correlations for dependent samples (Blalock, 1972; Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1988; Klugh, 1986). Each pair of religiosity scales correlated significantly differently with at least one value type (see Table 3).

Regression Analyses for the Explanation of the Value Patterns

To investigate the extent to which the observed value patterns could be attributed to the two theoretically derived value patterns, regression analyses have been performed with the observed value patterns as dependent variables and the two hypothetical TC and SU value patterns as independent variables (see Table 2). Given the assumption that all value types are situated on a perfect circle and that all adjacent value types are equidistant from one another, the expected value pattern could be obtained by computing the sine of the angle of the value type on the circle (see Table 2).⁶

The value pattern associated with Religious Commitment was somewhat more related to the SU value pattern than to the TC value pattern. Together, both theoretical value patterns account for 87% of the observed value pattern of Religious Commitment (see Table 4).

Up to 73% of the value pattern associated with the Orthodoxy scale could be accounted for by the two theoretical value patterns. But only the SU value pattern showed a significant positive weight (see Table 4).

For Symbolic Belief, only the weight of the TC value pattern was significant (see Table 4). Up to 86% of the Symbolic Belief scale could be accounted for by the TC and SU patterns.

⁶However, the latter assumption cannot be fully justified by Schwartz's (1992) value theory. Empirical research with the Schwartz value scale supports only the rank order of the value types and not equidistant positions from a common origin and adjacent value types (e.g., see Schwartz, 1992). Therefore, besides a classical regression analyses with the perfect sinusoid value pattern, an optimal scaling regression analysis was also performed. In optimal scaling regression analysis, only the ordinal information in the independent variables is taken into account. The results of optimal scaling regression analyses were highly comparable with the results reported in this article.

TABLE 3
Pairwise Differences of the Correlations Between the Five Religiosity Scales and 10 Value Types

Value Type	Pairwise Religiosity Scales									
	RC-O	RC-R	RC-S	RC-E	O-R	O-S	O-E	R-S	R-E	S-E
HE	-.12	-.09	.10	-.43***	.03	.22**	-.31**	.18	-.34***	-.52***
ST	-.19**	-.13	-.03	-.15	.07	.16*	.05	.10	-.02	-.12
SD	-.02	-.30**	-.09	-.23	-.29**	-.07	-.21	.22*	.08	-.14
UN	.03	-.18	-.15**	.01	-.20	-.18*	-.01	.03	.19*	.16
BE	.13	.05	-.05	.20	-.08	-.18*	.07	-.10	.15	.25
TR	.09	.39***	-.01	.68***	-.08	-.10	.59***	-.40***	.29***	.69***
CO	.02	.33**	.07	.25	.30**	.05	.23	-.25**	-.08	.18
SE	-.03	.24*	.18***	.08	.27*	.21**	.11	-.06	-.16	-.10
PO	-.11	-.02	.11	-.17	.09	.21**	-.06	.13	-.15	-.27
AC	-.00	.01	.10	-.09	.02	.10	-.08	.08	-.10	-.18

Note. HE = Hedonism; ST = Stimulation; SD = Self-Direction; UN = Universalism; BE = Benevolence; TR = Tradition; CO = Conformity; SE = Security; PO = Power; AC = Achievement; RC = Religious Commitment; O = Orthodoxy; S = Symbolic Belief; R = Relativism; E = External Critique.
* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

TABLE 4
Multiple Regression Analyses of the Sinusoid TC and SU Value Patterns on the Five Religiosity Value Patterns

<i>Religiosity Scales</i>	<i>Theoretical Value Patterns</i>		
	b_{TC}	b_{SU}	R^2
Religious Commitment	.54**	.61**	.87***
Orthodoxy	.21	.77**	.73**
Symbolic Belief	.87***	.15	.86***
Relativism	.65*	-.63*	.57
External Critique	-.77*	.04	.58*

Note. TC = Transcendent–Mutual Care; SU = Social Order–Uncertainty Avoidance; b_{TC} = standardized weights for TC value pattern; b_{SU} = standardized weights for SU value pattern.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

The value patterns of the Relativism and External Critique scales could not be predicted as well by the two theoretical value patterns as Orthodoxy, Symbolic Belief, and Religious Commitment (see Table 4). Only 57% of the Relativism value pattern and 58% of the External Critique value pattern could be accounted for. The TC value pattern had a significant positive weight, and the SU value pattern had a significant negative weight for the prediction of the Relativism value pattern. For External Critique there was only a significant negative weight of the TC value pattern.

DISCUSSION

First, the five religiosity scales in this study (Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy, Symbolic Belief, Relativism, and External Critique) were each clearly associated with a different value pattern. At least one and up to three value types had a significant different association for any pair of the religiosity scales. Regression analyses also showed that each religiosity scale was characterized by a different and in general predicted and theoretically meaningful pattern of weights of the two theoretical value patterns. Thus, these results further support the validity of Hutsebaut's (1996, 1997; Duriez et al., 1999) conceptualization of religious attitudes.

Second, the value pattern associated with Religious Commitment can be best understood in terms of a combination of the theological and the sociopsychological value patterns. The theological TC value pattern and the sociopsychological SU value pattern contributed about equally, with a slight overweight of the SU value pattern. Moreover, the observed value pattern associated with Religious Commitment replicated the findings of Schwartz and Huisman (1995).

Third, results concerning Hutsebaut's (1996) scales clearly show that the relation between religiosity and value orientation differs for the various types of religious attitudes. In line with our hypotheses, the SU value pattern has the highest positive weight for Orthodoxy. This supports the hypothesis that an orthodox approach to religion is characterized by a striving for safe social environments and uncertainty avoidance. However, no support for the presence of the TC value pattern was found. This pattern was expected to be significantly associated with the Orthodoxy value pattern because Orthodoxy implies a positive attitude toward transcendence. However, when we take a closer look at the bivariate correlations (see Table 2), Orthodoxy is most positively correlated with tradition and is nearly as negatively correlated with hedonism as with self-direction, as could be expected on the basis of the theological TC value pattern. However, contrary to the TC value pattern, Orthodoxy is not positively related to benevolence and universalism and is not negatively related to achievement and power. Thus, although the orthodox value pattern shows little resemblance with the TC value pattern as a whole, it does share its focus on tradition and on hedonism.

Symbolic Belief is, as expected, characterized by the theological TC value pattern. This could mean that symbolic believers really want to live according to their beliefs. However, the observed value pattern associated with Symbolic Belief did not show a resemblance with the inverted sociopsychological SU value pattern. A resemblance was expected on the basis of the low uncertainty avoidance associated with a symbolic mode of thinking. Instead, a slightly positive but nonsignificant weight for the SU value pattern was observed. Nevertheless, the sociopsychological SU value pattern was far more important for Orthodoxy than for Symbolic Belief, as predicted. Furthermore, if we turn to the bivariate correlations between Symbolic Belief and the 10 value types, we observe some deviations from the predicted theological TC value pattern. Based on the theological analysis about the importance of transcendence and mutual care, the highest correlations were predicted for tradition and benevolence on one hand and the lowest for hedonism and achievement on the other. However, Symbolic Belief correlated less positively with benevolence than with tradition and less negatively with achievement than with hedonism. This suggests that the mutual care perspective is probably less important than the focus on transcendence for symbolic believers.

As expected, the value pattern associated with Relativism is characterized by low uncertainty avoidance and a critical attitude toward the existing social order as is shown by the positive correlation with self-direction and the negative correlation with security. However, it was not expected that the Relativism value pattern was also characterized to some extent by the theological TC value pattern (most evident in the significant negative correlation with hedonism). A possible explanation of this finding could be that most participants in our study, including relativistic participants, have received a religious upbringing that still influences their value pattern (see also, Hutsebaut, 1997). However, because Relativism consists

of only three items and its internal consistency is rather low, further empirical research is needed on this scale. The low internal consistency also probably accounts for the overall low correlations found with this scale and for the fact that the two theoretical value patterns accounted less well for the observed value pattern than was the case for Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy, and Symbolic Belief.

External Critique was only negatively correlated with tradition and positively correlated with hedonism, which only partially matches the predicted inverted theological TC value pattern. Other correlations were not significant and did not show a consistent pattern. A possible explanation for these results can be found in Hutsebaut's (1996) earlier findings. He found that External Critique correlated positively with both feelings of frustration toward God—indicating an initial dependent attitude—and feelings of autonomy—contradicting acceptance and dependence on a higher being. This points to two motivational pathways to External Critique. Religion could be rejected because of a frustration of an initial dependent attitude or because it is considered to be irreconcilable with one's striving for autonomy. This probably means that people who score high on External Critique form a heterogeneous group that only share the rejection of transcendence and thus the typical value orientation implied by the rejection of the transcendent perspective.

Thus, our theoretically derived SU and TC value patterns shed a new light on the relation between various forms of religiosity measures and value orientation. Nevertheless, when we consider the results of Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy, Symbolic Belief, and External Critique, one general trend comes to the fore: Religiosity is always associated with stressing the importance of tradition values and the de-emphasizing of hedonism values, irrespective of whether religion is interpreted in a literal or symbolic way.

CONCLUSIONS

This study replicates the systematic pattern of associations reported by Schwartz and Huisman (1995) between Religious Commitment and 10 value types. The refinement of Schwartz and Huisman's theoretical rationale for deriving hypotheses about the relation between religiosity and value patterns, which led to the isolation of two different theoretically expected value patterns instead of only one, was also empirically supported. The value patterns associated with Religious Commitment and four types of religious attitudes could be explained as a weighted combination of two theoretically derived value patterns, namely a theological TC value pattern and a sociopsychological SU value pattern.

Furthermore, differences between the observed value patterns could be interpreted in terms of different weights of the two theoretical value patterns. Religiosity scales that imply an acceptance of transcendence (e.g., Symbolic Belief) are very well explained by the two theoretically derived value patterns, supporting the comprehensiveness of the present theoretical framework. However, religiosity scales that are neutral

toward or even reject transcendence (e.g., External Critique) are less well explained by these two value patterns. This could point to the fact that rejection of transcendence is not just the reverse of acceptance of it from a psychological point of view (see also, Vergote, 1996). Thus, these results suggest that not only the acceptance but also the rejection of transcendence should be scrutinized in future research for a better understanding of the relation between religiosity and personal value orientation.

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