



NORWEGIAN  
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# Scandinavian Attitudes towards Immigrants

A Comparative Study of Denmark, Norway and Sweden

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## **Abstract**

In the last few decades immigration from many parts of the world has transformed Scandinavian countries from once homogenous societies to multicultural countries. Immigrants and their offsprings constitute 10 to 15% of the populations in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The arrival of immigrants has been varying from time to time depending on the prevailing economic and political situations. Similarly the reaction of host societies towards immigrants and their impact on the economy, culture and politics has been dependent on the particular socioeconomic and social psychological circumstances of individuals residing in these societies. Using data from the European Values Survey in 2008, this thesis explores the factors that determine attitudes towards immigrants. The results indicate that Scandinavian attitudes towards immigrants are driven more by concerns about identity and politics than economy. National identity, particularly, its ethnic expression is the most important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. Following ethnic identity, it is politics, especially self-placement on the left-right spectrum of political views that explains attitudes towards immigrants.



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## Abbreviations

<b>ATTD_GEN</b>	General Resentment Scale
<b>ATTD_SOC</b>	Social Hostility Scale
<b>DK</b>	Denmark
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EVS</b>	European Value Studies
<b>NO</b>	Norway
<b>SSB</b>	Statistics Norway
<b>SE</b>	Sweden





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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. The Backdrop of this Study

It is the event of July 22, 2011, a bomb attack on a government building in Oslo and a massacre of innocent youth at a summer camp at Utøya that has prompted me to write on the subject of religion, immigration, globalization, diversity, multiculturalism and xenophobia. The background for the theoretical and empirical discussion presented in this study includes the social, cultural, political and economic developments that constituted this particular event and have been unfolding in the last three to four decades in Norway, Scandinavia and across Europe.

Apparently, the immediate reaction that marked many of the media outlets, particularly the international media, was to assume that Norway become the latest victim of Al-Qaeda's terror attack (Recall *The Daily Mail's* headline and *The Sun's* front page: Norway's 9/11) (Harris, 2011). Norway's involvement in Afghanistan and Libya has been cited as one of the reasons for it to qualify as a potential target (Harpviken, 2011). But when the dust settles and facts about the actual perpetrator become apparent, it went against the grain to presume and insist that "Islamic" terrorism is the only threat to the security of Western countries.

The incident has also thrown many issues on aspects about the image and self-perception of Norwegian society. It has resurfaced a flurry of questions and reflections regarding the general trend of political and cultural developments within the Norwegian society. Reactions across the wide spectrum of the public discourse reveal the shock the incident has generated and is characterized by refrained response and apparent uncertainty about articulating the exact nature of the violence. There is also an ambivalence to map the social and political ramifications of the event, particularly how it will reflect on and change the Norwegian society.

The aftermath of the incident has seen a proliferation of analyses of the incident from diverse, though partisan perspectives. In the course of writing this thesis, there have been a remarkable production of information about Breivik's biography, state of mind, his guns, his networks, the response of the police and so on, however somehow debating Breivik's connection to contemporary political life has become a taboo (Myhre, 2012). The apparent reason for this to be is that the issue is sensitive and establishing or claiming causal relations without risking being impartial requires time and accounting and for all the 'unknown' factors.

Despite such constraints, reactions to the event have been coming forward and few representative examples are cited here. Siv Jensen, the leader of the Norwegian Progress Party, a party 'implicated' to influence Breivik, denounced the incident as an exceptional act of a 'lone, lunatic and insane' person, downplaying the possible connection between the perpetrator's motives

and any cultural or political milieu that may have inspired his acts of terror (Jensen, 2011). An alternative to this view has also emerged, which frames immigrants, particularly Muslims and multiculturalism as the root causes of the incident (Aftonbladet, 2011).

Contrary to these arguments, Terje Emberland, a religious historian and senior researcher at the Center for the Holocaust Study, in an interview he gave in the aftermath of the event, asserts that:

“Breivik is the product of a political climate that has been plaguing the political debate in Norway for the last twenty-five years. Parts of the Norwegian ultra-conservative right have developed a worldview in which a sinister “politically correct elite” has established domination of all intellectual life and the major media; and handed Norway over to Muslims who are simultaneously conquering the country through their high birth rate. According to these beliefs, Norway is under “alien occupation” and the government is “traitors who never asked the people their opinion on such paramount questions”” (Bach, 2011).

In a similar vein of thought, albeit calling for a robust understanding, a Swedish scholar Mattias Gardell insists that the terrorist attacks were not an outburst of irrational madness, but a calculated act of political violence, maintaining that the carnage was a manifestation of a certain logic that can and should be explained, if any future repetition of such an act is to be avoided (Gardell, 2014).

In this thesis, the attempt is to put the event in a wider context that enfolds the interaction between immigrants/Muslims and the Scandinavian societies, which is constituted of political, cultural and economic currents. The main thrust of the thesis is to analyse the interplay between these currents and understand the mechanisms in which they influence attitudes of Scandinavians towards immigrants and immigration. This thrust will revolve on scrutinizing the mechanisms in which political, cultural and economic concerns about immigration has become problematized. The inquiry will be grounded in the analysis and interpretation of the European Value Study (EVS) survey dataset from 2008.

One of the most noticeable characteristics of this particular event is that the logic and narratives behind the violence strikingly mirror the logic behind many of the religiously framed acts of terrorism seen in Europe in the last decade. It is the salient features of religion that hover over the heart of the conflict. The protagonist, Anders Behring Breivik perceives a danger looming over Europe: the danger of the Islamization of the ‘Christian Europe’, and the threat is coming from Muslims and those elite leaders who conspired and allowed them to settle in Europe.

Perhaps the more significant development that parallels this tragic incident is the emergence of populist and right-wing parties across Europe. The electoral success of such parties draws much of its strength from anti-immigrant sentiments of the public, which shies from supporting open prejudice and discrimination but privately blames immigration and votes for parties that frame

immigrant for society's diverse ills. At least tentatively, it can be presupposed that Breivik's act of violence, rather than being an isolated act, is a radical and extreme conclusion of the logic that governs the discourses of these parties. His views overlap with the political, religious and ideological premises behind many of the right-wing parties, which some of them are prominent in the mainstream party politics of many European countries. This is not to imply that there is a direct and causal one-to-one link between Breivik's views and these parties, but to highlight the common root they share and establish the fact that many of his views are not new, but have been around for a while. The following paragraphs briefly clarify and illustrate the tentative presupposition mentioned above.

At home, Anders Breivik was a member of the youth wing of the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), from 1999 until he quitted in 2007 (Bangstad, 2011). He has been also involved in several far-right online networks and chat-forums like document.no, Stormfront and nordisk.nu (Strømmen, 2011). Abroad, he has been actively networking with other same parties in Europe particularly the English Defence League in the UK. In the European context, Jacques Coutela, member of the National Front party in France calls Anders Breivik as '*the most important Defender of the West*', while Mario Borghezio, a politician in the Northern League party in Italy, and a member of the European Parliament, unapologetically affirms Breivik's ideas as 'good' and 'brilliant'. Francesco Speroni, a member of the same party also said 'Breivik's ideas are in defence of western civilization' (Hooper, 2011).

This particular incident when set against other incidents in Europe, it holds significance, since it exposes the propensity of certain ideologues to how far they go in their extremism. But it also exposes the rhetorical overlap between such ideologies and the public discontent that has been shaped by media representation about the economic, cultural and security threat perceived to be posed by Muslims/immigrants.

For the last few decades, the 'immigrant question' has been at the heart of much of the political and cultural discourse that has polarized public opinion and shaped the policies and institutional arrangements governments adopted to solve the question. Populist parties in Scandinavia, though unique in each country, have harnessed anti-immigration sentiments to the point that it defines their identity and purpose. Anti-immigrant fervour, especially in Denmark and Norway, which have a smaller proportion of immigrants than Sweden, rose sharply in the 1990s, and extremist parties continue to appeal to such sentiments (Einhorn & Logue, 2003).

The Progressive Party in Norway has started as anti-establishment and anti-tax movement but later morphed into anti-immigration movement. Similarly, the Danish People's Party, since its beginning and growth into becoming a major political party, has politicized immigration and set it

as a main election issue. In the case of Sweden, unlike Denmark and Norway and as late as 2010, there was no political party (in parliament) that has made immigration an issue. However, in the 2010 election, the entrance of Swedish Democrats to the national parliament has transformed the perception of Sweden as a tolerant and more pro-immigrant country where anti-immigrant parties failed to establish and put it on par with its neighbour countries. Similarly the Sweden Democrats, though hold small number of seats in the parliament, are entirely defined as anti-immigrant party (Dahlstrom & Esaiasson, 2013). It is in the course of the last few decades that immigration has become increasingly politicised and anti-immigrant rhetoric has gone mainstream, shaping the implementation of strict regimes of immigration control and management of diversity.

The success of anti-immigrant parties and the implementation of strict immigration policies by mainstream parties at local, regional and supranational levels indicate the rising discontent of Scandinavian societies about immigration and immigrants. However these general developments reveal very little about the kinds of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration among the general population. Questions about the prevalent attitudes towards immigrants, their strength and distribution among the general populations, and their interaction with basic socioeconomic, cultural and political factors are barely discernible from these developments. This necessitates a close examination of the interaction between and among sociodemographic, economic, political and cultural factors and their respective influence over attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. This examination will eventually proceed to answer some of the most fundamental questions Scandinavian societies face with respect to immigration and immigrants. The following section will present the main research question of the present thesis.

## **1.2. Research Questions**

The main research question in this thesis is to investigate the primary factors that determine attitudes towards immigrant and how these attitudes vary across populations and across Scandinavian countries. In other words the research will determine whether it is politics, economy, culture or identity that plays a significant role in shaping Scandinavians attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. The investigation of these factors requires descriptive, explanatory and comparative analyses, which in the course of the thesis will be dealt in various depths. Through a preliminary overview of the contemporary social, cultural and political trends in Scandinavia, several explanations that shed light on the research question will be provided. However the main empirical discussion of these questions is grounded on a secondary analysis of the European Values Study survey data from 2008. The main approach to understand the nuanced nature of attitudes towards immigrants is to analyse the values and attitudes of individuals; where it will be possible to investigate whether the general development are reflected in the values and attitudinal shifts at

the individual level. It is also possible, with a reasonable approximation, to decipher the intermediate processes that constrain individuals' behaviour toward immigrants. It is the subject of this study to analyse data from the 2008 European Values Study and explore factors that significantly affect attitudes towards immigrants.

The focus in this study will be to identify the nature and changes of attitudes toward immigrants. As a starting point, a tentative premise that states that attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are constituted of cultural, economic, political and social-psychological dimensions will be forwarded. This premise narrows down to the number of variables required to explain attitudes towards immigrants. These variables will be further discussed in the method and data section later, but in the next sections, it is the terms, concepts and contexts used in this thesis that are presented.

### **1.3. Scope and Aim of the Study**

The political, cultural and economic developments and mechanisms that accompany the July 22 event in Norway are intricately interrelated and present a monumental challenge that require thorough interdisciplinary analysis. The study of the themes of immigration and its subsequent dynamics in Norway as well as Scandinavian countries draws the attention of diverse scholars. The scope of this research, however, is limited to the discussion of the main factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants and their spatial comparison. But this limitation is further constrained by the available data, which is the 2008 European Value Study survey, and which bounds the kinds of questions to be asked and be able to answer.

Among the alternatives for analysing this issue, I have opted for quantitative approach based on a secondary analysis of the European Values Survey data from 2008. This quantitative approach is buttressed by contemporary and relevant theories, which link the whole study with previous corpse of knowledge. The issue of immigration and the challenge it poses has been the subject of many projects and scholarly undertakings. This study will be a continuation of previous debates; it builds on theories and premises that have been widely used in previous scholarly works in the field of immigration studies.

This thesis has three main objectives. First it aims at providing a contextual analysis of the undercurrent concern towards immigrants and immigration and situating the phenomenon in the current global as well as local cultural, political and economic contexts of the contemporary society in Scandinavia. Second, it aims at critically exploring the factors that play significant roles in forming and shaping attitudes towards immigrants, by assessing empirical observations in dialogue with theoretical orientations. Third, it contributes, though small, to the ongoing debate that surrounds immigration, thereby shedding light on complex issues associated with it.



Under the umbrella of the main research question an attempt is done to explore some questions like where is the current dynamics between immigrants and host societies heading. What is the status of the debate on immigration? Is it desirable? Could it be envisaged differently? Is there any alternative to the contemporary social configuration that can accommodate difference without repeating the past ‘failures’? Such questions underlie both the empirical and theoretical discussions that unfold in this thesis.

#### **1.4. Outline of the Study**

After a general introduction, a review of previous studies concerning attitudes towards immigrants will be presented in chapter 2. A theoretical and conceptual framework where the empirical data is interpreted is also outlined in chapter 3. Chapter 4 consists of the description of the data and method used to analyse the EVS 2008 dataset. Brief description of the data source, sampling procedures, sample size, data collection, error sources and other aspects are given. Analysis and subsequent discussion of the results is given in chapter 5. Finally conclusions and further research interests will be presented in chapter 6.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1. Overview**

The three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden share several historical, social and political features that distinguish them from the rest of Europe. However, the three countries also have several unique aspects that defy the perception of uniformity and homogeneity that seems apparent for outsiders. The history of immigration is one of these aspects that have evolved differently in the three countries. Sweden has started receiving labour migrants in 1950s and 1960s whereas Denmark and Norway followed in the 1960s and 1970s (Ervasti, et al., 2008:188). In the aftermath of the oil crisis of the 1970s and following the footsteps of major European countries, Scandinavian countries started to devise policies and practices to control and limit the flow of labour migrants. But this development did not stop the flow of migrants, rather a new pattern of immigration started to appear when families of earlier labour migrants started to arrive. In the 1980s and 1990s refugees and asylum-seekers from conflict regions of the world came to add a new pattern of immigration to Scandinavian countries. According to recent estimates, the foreign-born population constitutes 17% (Sweden), 10% (Norway) and 9.6% (Denmark) of the total populations in these countries (OECD, 2013).

The impact of immigration on the social, economic and cultural landscape of Scandinavian countries is inevitably tied to the characteristics of the immigrant population and the contingent historical processes that constrained their entry. Immigration has increasingly turned the once 'homogeneous' Scandinavian states into a society of religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity (Einhorn & Logue, 2003:ix). For instance, Norway has now immigrants from 219 different countries and independent regions around the world (Statistics Norway, 2012). Immigration has also become a new cleavage in politics. For instance, in the case of Norway, studies of the 1993 and the 1997 elections indicate that, together with the role of the state in the economy, environmental issues, and traditional moral issues, immigration has appeared as one of the cleavage lines among the electorate (Heidar, 2001:83). Similar developments are also observed in Danish elections beginning in 1983 when the Progress Party opposed the passing of several liberal immigration laws (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008). Moreover Sweden, often described as a country with no anti-immigrant party, has witnessed the historical rise of the New Democrats in 1991 and of the Sweden Democrats to the national parliament carrying anti-immigrant agenda (Demker, 2005; Dahlstrom & Esaiasson, 2013).

There have been several surveys, both national and international, that have gauged the patterns of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Scandinavia. These surveys used diverse frameworks for understanding these attitudes through questions designed to capture the opinions of the majority towards immigrants and immigration and their impact on the economy,

welfare state, culture and security. The following section is a brief overview of these surveys and the outcomes of studies based on these surveys. The focus in this section is to review previous studies about perceptions and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants among the majority population in the three Scandinavian countries. The review will focus on the major theoretical explanations used and levels of analyses of the historical, political and economic contexts that shaped those attitudes.

## **2.2. Scandinavian Attitudes towards Immigrants**

In the Scandinavian context, historically speaking, it is the indigenous Sami nation and ethnic minorities (Swedes in Finland, Finns in Sweden, ethnic Germans in Denmark, and Kvener and Romany people in Norway) that have been objects of discrimination and were subject to diverse regimes of inclusion into the dominant culture (Maagerø & Simonsen, 2005:146-159). The contemporary scenario however is different in many aspects. In contrast to former cases, the objects of attitudes and public opinions now are immigrants composed of guest workers, refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants who settled in those countries in the decades after the World War II (WWII). What makes the pattern of immigration to Scandinavian countries unique is that immigrants came from many parts of the world, in contrast to countries like Britain or France whose immigrants largely come from their former colonies (Gullestad, 2002:26).

The study of attitudes and public opinions towards immigrants has been a recurring theme in Scandinavian scholarly works. It is widely investigated in terms of attitudes toward others that are considered different (Knudsen, 1997; Hernes & Knudsen, 1992), xenophobic sentiments (Hjerm, 2005, 2009; Botvar, 2009) prejudice and racism (Vala, et al., 2004) or intolerance (Gundelach, 1992). Some of these studies are quantitative and focus on the national level (Bloom, 2009; Hernes & Knudsen, 1992; Jenssen, 1994), whereas others are comparative studies of Scandinavian and European contexts (Knudsen, 1997; Botvar, 2009; Ivarsflaten, 2005, Ervasti, et.al, 2008).

Most quantitative studies were based on surveys collected at a national level like those of Statistics Norway or cross-national surveys like the World Value Studies (WVS), European Value Studies (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and Eurobarometer and so on. Moreover, these surveys vary not only in their scope and underlying methodology but also in the way the questions are formulated and presented.

Besides surveys that aim to capture opinions and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration; media coverage, election studies, government's immigration and integration politics and public and political discourses and party positions on immigration were also used to study perceptions about immigrants and immigration. In this regard, there are qualitative studies that

analyzed the discourses of immigration in the media (Hagelund, 2002; Lindstad & Fleldstad, 1997, 1999); immigration and institutional practices (Bø, 2002) and immigration and political parties (Jensen, 1994).

### **2.2.1. National Studies**

Based on a national survey from 1988, Hernes and Knudsen (1992) have examined attitudes of Norwegians toward new immigrants. They have explained these attitudes in terms of the theory of *relative deprivation*, which they stated as ‘a feeling of injustice when others receive more than they should in relation to their efforts, their need, their rank, and so on - whether such a feeling is based on a real difference or an assumed one (1992:124). And such a feeling of injustice may lead to negative reactions, either toward those who manage to improve their situation, or toward those who make it possible for them to do so. Relative deprivation can take the form of social, political or economic deprivations, though it is the economic aspect that is widely used to explain xenophobia and prejudice towards immigrants.

The main premise in the work of Hernes and Knudsen was that there is a relationship between attitudes and social position as related to sociodemographic characteristics such as education, age, gender, work and income (1992:125). According to this theory, the segment of society likely to develop anti-immigrant attitudes will constitute those who hold the lower ladder of social strata, which includes the unemployed, those with low education level, and working class members. Hernes and Knudsen found out that sociodemographic variables like age, gender, level of education, income, occupation and other individual variables like religious involvement, degree of feeling of control over one’s life can explain attitudes towards immigrants (Hernes & Knudsen, 1992:125-132). Hernes and Knudsen concluded that the more people feel their economic situation is worsened relative to others, the more sceptical they become; conversely, when the individual perceives him/herself to be in control of his/her own life chances, he/she tends to be positive toward newcomers.

In a similar manner, Peter Gundelach, a sociologist at the University of Copenhagen, conducted a research on the attitude of Danish people towards immigrants based on the 1981 and 1990 data from the EVS. Besides relative deprivation, low educational level, political populism and authoritarian personalities that vary across segments of the population, he concludes that socioeconomic positions are the most important factors that explain intolerance towards immigrants (Gundelach, 1992). Another theory that is employed to explain attitudes towards immigrants is the *rational choice theory*, mainly mentioned in Danish studies (Nannestad, 1999).

A closely related and ‘*irrational*’ variant of the rational choice theory is the *marginalization theory*, where a marginalized segment of society collectively scapegoats immigrants for its frustrations and concerns (Andersen, 2002:4). The marginalization is perceived both in its physical sense and in the

sense of general feeling of disempowerment and powerlessness against society. The unprecedented scale of change in society, driven by globalization processes of migration, financial deregulation, transnational relocation of jobs, accompanied by weakening of nation-states, security vulnerabilities and perception of threat about loss of local identities all contribute to the feeling of powerlessness.

Mikael Hjerm's study of Swedish attitudes towards immigrants explores whether the size and visibility of immigrant population is related to anti-immigrant attitudes (2009). This study differs from studies mentioned above in such a way that by including variables about the size of the immigrant population, it shifts the locus of anti-immigrant attitudes away from the individual and situates it in the local context where the natives and immigrants share and interact. This did not diminish the importance of sociodemographic variables for the explanation of attitudes toward immigrants, but recognizes factors and contexts that are beyond the individual but that can affect attitudes towards immigrants and their subsequent inclusion in further analyses.

### **2.2.2. Comparative Studies**

In the previous section I have presented the major researches conducted on each Scandinavian country. This section is devoted to the review of comparative researches that explored the cross-national characteristics of attitudes towards immigrants. These studies lift the contexts of exploring attitudes from national to cross-national levels, thereby enabling one to identify new patterns of variations in a new relief. The comparative analyses also expand the units of analysis from the individual to the country, and the time periods to account variations of attitudes over time. One particular advantage comparative studies offer is that, beyond the classic socioeconomic factors like age, gender, education, income and occupation, other political, cultural and economic factors found within a nation-state are given primacy to explain cross-national differences of attitudes towards immigrants.

One of the new variables that appeared in several of these studies is the variable "national identity" as the major variable for explaining attitudes towards immigrants. For instance, Knudsen's (1997) comparative study of Norway and Sweden attempts to explore the possible links between national identity and fear of foreigners – or xenophobia. Similar comparative study conducted by Hjerm (1998) investigates the connection between the civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants in four Western countries including Sweden.

In another comparative study, but with more similar approach, Pål Ketil Botvar (2009) has analyzed the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data from 2003 to study the link between religion, national identity and xenophobia. His emphasis was to explore the interrelation between church membership and people's views on the nation (chauvinism) and on immigrants (xenophobia) in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The main question was that whether church

membership in combination of perception about the church-state, is linked to xenophobia and chauvinism (Botvar, 2009:183).

While the above comparative studies largely focused on data gathered on a certain specific year, there are other researches that focused on longitudinal variations of attitudes towards immigrants. Among these studies are those of Svein Bloom (2011) that compared Norway with the rest of European countries based on a European Social Survey between 2002 and 2006 and a study conducted by Marie Demker (2007) that compared Swedish attitudes from 1986 to 2006.

In another study based on the 2002/2003 European Social Survey, Bail explored the prevalence of symbolic boundaries against immigrants in Europe (2008). He found out that, in Europe in general, the most favoured groups of immigrants are those who speak the country’s language, committed to its way of life and have good educational and occupation that the country needs. A similar pattern is also observed in Norway, where language and commitment to the country’s way of life are important basis of immigrant preference. There are no large systematic differences between Scandinavian countries and other European countries. What this finding confirms is that preferences based on race and religions are less important than those of language, culture and education (see table below).

**Table 2. 1 Mean scores of preference for immigrants in Scandinavia**

Country	Race	Religion	Language	Culture	Education	Occupation
Denmark	1.84	3.57	6.41	6.88	6.28	6.39
Norway	2.27	3.39	6.25	6.57	5.10	5.89
Sweden	1.31	2.32	4.35	7.73	4.48	4.84
EU-21	2.44	3.52	6.78	7.57	6.19	6.74

Source: Bail, 2008

Respondents were asked: ‘Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside (country) should be able to come and live here.’ They were then shown a card with the following statements: 1) be white, 2) come from a Christian background, 3) speak (one of) the official languages of (country), 4) be committed to the way of life in (country), 5) have good educational qualifications, and 6) have good work skills that (country) needs. Responses were coded on a 10-point Likert scale where 0 is ‘extremely unimportant’ and 10 is ‘extremely important’.

Using a different set of variables from the same survey, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005) did a comparative analysis of the role of culture and identity in determining preference for restrictive asylum and immigration policies in 18 European countries. She hypothesized that Europeans’ preference for restrictive asylum and immigration policies are the result of worries about declining national authority, diminished cultural unity and uniqueness and a presence of a highly visible anti-immigrant elites.

A cultural unity index constructed from three items that refer to preference of one’s country sharing the same customs, language and religion was used to rank the 18 countries involved in the study (Ivarsflaten, 2005:31). Norway, together with Greece and Portugal, is among the three countries, where support for cultural unity is the highest. Multivariate analysis of the impact of belief in cultural unity and other factors indicates that beliefs in cultural unity mattered more for

preference of restrictive immigration and asylum policy in western Europe than all other explanations taken together (Ivarsflaten, 2005:38). Even though her study primarily focuses on policy preference, the explanatory factors she found significant in her analysis are also relevant for understanding Scandinavians' attitudes towards immigrants.

### **2.3. Summary**

In the previous sections I have presented a brief summary of both cross-sectional and comparative studies that explored Scandinavians' attitudes towards immigrants. The basic question that guided these studies is 'what are the fundamental causes that underlie attitudes like prejudice or hostility towards immigrants?' It is this single overarching question that frames the theoretical and empirical discussions and has become the focus of multiple explanations through a wide range (and level) of sociological, psychological, political and anthropological perspectives. In purely statistical terms, the dependent variable is prejudice, hostility, 'xenophobia', 'racism', or simply 'attitude toward immigrants', whereas the explanatory (both independent and intermediate) variables include socioeconomic, political, cultural, social-psychological and spatial or territorial factors.

From a preliminary overview of empirical and explanatory studies about Scandinavian attitudes towards immigrants, it is possible to identify a common thread running through these studies, which is the recognition that attitudes towards immigrants as well as the explanatory factors behind them are complex. To begin with, attitudes towards immigrants are not either/or one-dimensional that swing between two extremes of a spectrum, positive attitudes of acceptance/solidarity on one-end and xenophobic/hostile/racist attitudes on the other. Rather they are diverse and reflect ample diversity and contradictions towards different aspects of immigrants and are driven not only by economic concerns but also by political, cultural and identity concerns.

In the attitudes investigated in many of the researches reviewed and presented in the previous sections, there are strong egalitarian concerns when it comes to granting equal opportunities to immigrants, ambivalence towards whether immigrants should assimilate into Scandinavian culture and scepticism about immigrants' access to welfare benefits and insecurity about the potential threat they pose. Besides attitudes are friendly when it comes to having immigrants as neighbours (with the exception of Muslim immigrants) but for immigrants as in-laws, the time has not come. There is also a clear differentiation of attitudes along immigrants of western and non-western origins, a point that has been entrenched in institutions.

Similarly there are diverse classes of explanatory factors used to account for the types and distributions of attitudes towards immigrants. The first category of explanatory factors is socioeconomic factors, where one's attitudes are conceived as a function of one's social standing.

Hernes and Knudsen's (1992) conclusion, rooted in the theory of relative deprivation, states that those – the elderly, unemployed, less educated, working class people – have the least control over their own lives and are vulnerable to hold negative attitudes. However, this conclusion does not explain why, immigrants become objects of negative attitudes, or in another sense, if it is only socioeconomic factors are considered, negative attitudes should be directed against all groups of people regardless of ethnic or cultural difference.

Besides socioeconomic factors, party preference and self-placement on the left-right political spectrum are also related to attitudes towards immigrants. For instance, in the case of Norway, Progress Party voters exhibit not only the most anti-immigrant attitudes, but also their view on immigration policy is the most consistent with (even stricter than) the party's official position (Jenssen, 1994:46). Whereas those voting for the Socialist Left Party have the most liberal view of immigrants, while the rest fall in between.

The second category of explanatory factors includes those based on culture and identity, which are particularly employed in cross-national comparative studies. Few of the studies mentioned in this literature review reveal that in relative terms, chauvinism, and support for cultural unity and xenophobia are higher among Norwegians (Botvar, 2009; Knudsen, 1997; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Specific patterns of national identities and (beliefs) in a given country are the by-products of an interaction between the historic macro-events of the economic, political and religious transformations and the material basis including geographical location (Rokkan, 1987). Moreover, a whole range of macro-events may be assumed to influence the values of the populations: experiences of war, hyperinflation, and social and religious revolutions (Listhaug, 1990). In the context of post-1970 immigration history in Norway, these macro-events include the trend of economic growth, unemployment rate, size of the immigrant population, and referendum against joining the European Union, terrorism or the rise of the Progress Party. But besides these, one can also argue that the history of relationship between the majority and ethnic, cultural or religious minorities like Jews, Jesuits, the Sami nation, Kvener and Romani serve an antecedent to the contemporary relationship between immigrants and Scandinavians.

While many of the studies are comparative in nature, there has not been comparative enough to include the three countries together. Quite often the comparison is between Norway and Denmark or Norway and Sweden or Sweden and Denmark. The fact that Norway is not a member of the EU is also reflected in the number of scholarly articles that omit Norway from their analysis.

One of the most important outcomes of this diversity is that these surveys, even though they have overlapping topics and themes for which they gauge public opinions and attitudes, they are incomparable with one another. Moreover such diversity also constrains the scope and the



theoretical and empirical considerations of researchers that are interested in investigating the surveys. This also explains the diverse theoretical perspectives employed to explain attitudes and opinions. Another limitation of researches based on surveys is that supra-individual factors like the state of the economy, the rate of unemployment, significant political and social events and other factors that shape and affect attitudes towards immigrants become less visible and are not accounted for.

### **3. Theory, Concepts and Hypotheses**

Throughout this thesis, the main thrust of the study is to situate the contemporary debate on immigration in wider social, cultural, political and economic contexts of Scandinavia. These contexts, however, are not isolated, and rather are linked to supranational and global contexts. Immigration, by its very nature, intersects the local, national and global contexts where political, economic and cultural processes interact with each other and shape the attitudes of individual actors towards immigration and other diverse issues. In other words, attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are shaped not only by socioeconomic factors but also macro-events like important global events that affect the migration patterns of people and particular events that bring acute focus to the issues of immigration. Consequently, reactions towards immigration and immigrants are not reactions only to the local effect of immigration but at the same time to the factors and forces beyond the local. Though there are multiple actors and multiple perspectives in the field of immigration, the focus in this thesis is the survey of the attitudes of the majority of Danes, Norwegians and Swedes towards immigrants and immigration.

This section briefly presents the terms and concepts of attitudes that will be used in this thesis. It concisely explores the nature of attitudes including their formation, construction, structure and change. The section also will present an overview of the major theoretical perspectives that will be deployed to interpret and explain the quantitative data analysis in later sections. Moreover the review of each theoretical perspective will be used to forward tentative hypotheses about attitudes towards immigrants that will be tested against the survey data. The choice of literature will be limited to the fields of sociology and social psychology where vast amount of studies concerning attitudes exist. Particular attention will be paid to the relevance of this body of literature to the study of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

#### **3.1. Attitudes – Definition**

There are several definitions of attitudes found in the literature of social sciences, particularly in the field of social psychology. Since most of them have overlapping terminology and conceptual framework, here it suffices to mention only few that capture different aspects of attitudes.

An attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Emphasizing its nature, other researchers define the term ‘attitude’ as ‘a learned predisposition to respond to a particular object – a person, product, institution, idea or event – in a generally favourable or unfavourable way’ (Borgatta & Montgomery, 2000:184). In a similar vein of thought Ajzen refers to attitudes as evaluative reactions to objects of psychological significance (Ajzen, 2001).

Though the above definitions seem to imply that attitudes are to be evaluated as positive or negative or neutral, recent studies provide alternative views that postulate attitudes as non-unidimensional but can also be both – positive and negative at the same time (Jonas & Ziegler, 2007, Conner & Armitage, 2008). For instance, in the context of Scandinavian countries, an individual's attitudes towards immigrants rather being either positive or negative can be made up of several simultaneously contradicting beliefs drawn from egalitarianism and/or individualism. Such contradictions can arise from beliefs about solidarity with immigrants, actual or perceived competition for resources, direct contact experience or frequent media exposure. This psychological state, which is referred as attitudinal ambivalence, is the simultaneous existence of positive and negative beliefs or emotions with regard to the same object in an individual's attitude base (Jonas & Ziegler, 2007:31).

There are different explanation how ambivalent attitudes form. With regard to attitudes towards social groups, Mucchi-Faina et al. (2002) argue that intergroup encounters can induce ambivalence because ambivalence arises as a means to manage reactions toward social groups. A general tendency for people to prefer in-group to out-group can conflict with other motivations, such as the norm of “fairness,” creating ambivalence toward both in-group and out-group members (Mucchi-Faina, Costarelli, & Romoli, 2002). Besides ambivalent attitudes are connected with a more contradictory attitude structure, an aspect that makes them more susceptible to influences of the situational context (Jonas & Ziegler, 2007:39). These points are particularly relevant to the study of attitudes towards immigrants, where situational factors like size of the immigrant population; economic concerns or other factors affect these attitudes. Further discussion of this issue will be provided in later sections.

One aspect common to all definitions of attitudes is that all attitudes are object-oriented, which means they are always directed to a person, an object, idea, event or thing. In our case, immigrants and immigration constitute the primary attitude objects.

### **3.2. Attitudes and the Social Context**

One of the most significant limitations on the social psychological perspectives on attitudes is that both the theoretical and empirical analyses put large emphasis on the individual whereas ignoring the wider social contexts the individual exists. Smith and Hogg contend that much of the study of attitudes almost universally adopts a conceptualization of attitudes as intra-individual cognitive structures (2008:337). Consequently, they argue that, instead of being intra-individual characteristics, our attitudes are more often grounded in the groups we belong to and they serve to define and proclaim who we are in terms of our relationships to others who are members of the same or different groups (2008:337). Hogg and Abrams further note that attitudes are social

because they orient people with respect to other people, events, and/or physical objects (1998:10). In addition, attitudes map the contours of social groups and shared identities and they are socially structured and grounded in social consensus, group memberships, and social identities (Smith & Hogg, 2008).

### 3.2.1 The Social Identity Theory

In an attempt to explain the social dimension of attitudes, several theories have emerged that account for factors beyond the individual. The *social identity* theory is one such theory that emerged to contest the individualistic tendency of attitude studies and bring emphasis to the immediate social and cultural contexts of attitude-holders (Hogg & Abrams, 1998; Smith & Hogg, 2008). Though, Henry Tajfel (1991) originally formulated the theory, the present thesis will be based on the reformulation of the theory found in the works of Abrams and Hogg (1998).

The central principle of the social identity approach is that belonging to a group (of whatever size and distribution) is largely a psychological state which is quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual, and that it confers *social identity*, or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:3). Social identity is defined as that “part of an individual’s self-concept, which derives from her/his knowledge of her/his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978:63). Social identity is not merely the knowledge that one is a member of a group and of the defining attributes of group membership; it also involves an emotional and motivational attachment to the group (Smith & Hogg, 2008:340).

The following quote from Hogg and Abrams outlines the core assumptions of the social identity approach concerning the dynamics between individuals and social groups in a society and their interrelationships:

Society comprises social categories, which stand in power and status relations to one another. ‘Social categories’ refers to the division of people on the basis of nationality, race, class, occupation, sex, religion, and so forth, while ‘power and status relations’ refers to the fact that some categories in society have greater power, prestige, status, and so on, than others. (1998:13).

According to the quote above, the two important aspects of the social identity approach are social categories/groups and their respective power and status relations. With respect to categories, Hogg and Abrams noted that though society is made up of individuals, it is patterned into relatively distinct social groups and categories; and people’s views, opinions, and practices are acquired from those groups to which they belong (1998:2). The pattern and nature of the social categories and their relations to one another lend a society its distinctive social structure, a structure that precedes individual human beings. Individuals are born into a particular society and thus social categories are largely pre-existent with regard to individuals. However, the social structure is not a static monolithic entity. On the contrary, it is a constant flux, constantly changing (gradually or very

rapidly) as a consequence of forces of economy and history, categories come and go, their defining features alter, their relations with other categories change, and so on (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:2-13). Consequently, people's concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others (whether members of the same group—*in-group*— or of different groups—*out-group*), is largely determined by the groups to which they feel they belong (Hogg & Abrams 1998:2). It is within these premises that attitudes and opinions toward out-groups can be considered as indicators of the nature of interrelationship between in-groups and out-groups.

Furthermore Hogg and Abrams stated that categories do not exist in isolation; a category is only such in contrast with another (1998). For instance, with regard to immigrants, the social category 'immigrant' is meaningless unless it serves to differentiate between those who are 'immigrants' and those who are not—that is, natives, a contrasting category. Any individual is at once a member of many different social categories (e.g. a male Buddhist Australian surfer), but is unlikely to be a member of mutually exclusive categories, such as Protestant *and* Catholic in Northern Ireland (Hogg and Abrams, 1998:13).

With regard to the second aspect - power and status relations – Hogg and Abrams argued that *social categories are not neutral entities concerning the issue of power and status*, but they stand in power, status and prestige relations to one another where the dominant group (or groups) has the material power to propagate its own version of the nature of society, the groups within it and their relationships (emphasis mine 1998:24). That is, the dominant group imposes the dominant value system and ideology which is carefully constructed to benefit itself and to legitimate and perpetuate the status quo. Individual human beings are born into this structure and by virtue of their place of birth, skin colour, parentage and physiology and so forth, fall into some categories and not others (Hogg & Abrams, 1998).

The two aspects of the social identity approach – social categories and their respective power and status relations – provide important insights regarding immigration and immigrants and their interaction with their host societies. First immigration introduces new categories of people into existing social categories complicating the already murky existence of diverse categories. Second, the introduction of new categories of immigrants entail the reconfiguration of power and status relations among these diverse social categories, eliciting reactions that cut through the social, economic and cultural makeup of host societies. Further elaboration on the implication of immigration on existing social categories and their respective power relations will be provided in later sections. However, in the next two sections, the focus will be on the processes behind the formation of social identity, which is constituted of two important and interrelated processes: categorizations and social comparison.

### **3.2.2. Categorization**

There are two important processes involved in social identity formation, namely categorization and social comparison. The first, *categorization*, involves the classification of persons who are similar to the self as the in-group, and those who are different as the out-group. It premises that people tend to classify others on the basis of their similarities and differences to self; they constantly perceive others as members of the same category as self (in-group members) or as members of a different category to self (out-group members) (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:19). Consequently, categorization renders a multifaceted and infinitely varying world (both the social and non-social worlds) contextually meaningful by segmenting it into smaller number of categories. This has adaptive function since instead of having to treat each of an infinite variety of stimuli (people, events or objects) as unique and thus unpredictable, we are able to quickly assign stimuli to pre-existing categories and thus are able to predict what is likely to happen (Hogg, 2001:58). In effect, categorization is a fundamental and universal phenomenon that serves important function for adaptation to and structuring of the social as well as the natural world.

It is further noted that the process of categorizing someone as a group member perceptually assimilates them to the relevant in-group or out-group prototype, and thus depersonalizes them (i.e., they are not viewed as idiosyncratic persons, but as embodiments of the prototype); in other words, categorization perceptually homogenizes in-groups and out-groups (Hogg, 2001:59). This categorization process is not only directed toward others, but it also includes the simultaneous categorization of self: self-categorization, which underlies the identification process. The consequence of self-categorization is an accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and other in-group members, and an accentuation of the perceived differences between the self and out-group members. This accentuation occurs for all attitudes, beliefs and values, affective reactions, behavioural norms, styles of speech, and other properties that are correlated with the relevant intergroup categorization (Hogg & Abrams, 1998). Self-categorization is also assumed to provide the cognitive substrate for attachment to in-groups and differentiation from out-groups – the first step toward in-group bias and discrimination (Brewer, 2001:20).

### **3.2.3. Social Comparison**

The second process in the social identity formation is, *social comparison*, which refers to the comparisons between self as in-group member and others as out-group members (or between in and out-group as a whole) (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:20). It is through social comparison that persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and are labelled the in-group; persons who differ from the self are categorized as the out-group (Stets & Burke, 2000:225). Social comparisons are based on the assumption that people have a need for a positive social identity and that therefore they strive to distinguish their in-group positively from relevant out-groups (Zagefka & Brown,

2006:100). It follows that people compare their in-group with out-groups in order to identify their group as both different from and superior to other groups. But it is not only the need for positive social identity that forms the basis of comparison. As Hogg and Abrams point out, people are also motivated to make social comparisons in order to be confident about their perception of themselves, other people and the world in general (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:21). Such a comparison involves an evaluation that posits the in-group versus the out-group on different dimensions. In other words, people like to feel that their perceptions, rooted in their own groups' consensus, are better and more correct than the out-groups' perceptions (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:21).

According to Abrams and Hogg, categorization and social comparison operate together to generate a specific form of behaviour: group behaviour. This involves intergroup differentiation and discrimination, in-group favouritism, perceptions of the evaluative superiority of the in-group over the out-group, stereotypic perception of in-group, out-group, and self, conformity to group norms, affective preference for in-group over out-group, and so on. *Categorization* leads to stereotypic perceptions of self, in-group and out-group, and also a degree of accentuation of intergroup differences. *Social comparison* accounts for the selectivity of the accentuation effect (accentuation mainly occurs on self-enhancing dimensions) and the magnitude of the exaggeration of intergroup differences and intra-group similarities (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:21).

### **3.3. Social Identity Theory and Attitudes towards Immigrants**

The theoretical premises of the social identity approach discussed above can be extended to explain attitudes towards immigrants. The social identity theory is concerned with intergroup relations and it rests on the assumption that society is comprised of categories that are based on nationality, class, religion, race/ethnicity, occupation, sex and so on, which have different power and status relations. These categories play significant roles in the formation of the social identities of individuals and their attitudes towards outgroups (Hogg & Abrams, 1998).

The central tenet of the social identity approach is that individuals have a need to belong as well as a need to be different (Brewer, 2001:21-22). These needs are contradictory, since the need to belong entails identification with a group while the need to be different involves separation or distance from the available out-groups. These needs make the bases for the formation of the individuals' social identity from social groups or categories they feel they belong to. Moreover, individuals and groups have social identities that enhance their self-esteem and cohesiveness through the comparison of their group with others, the out-group (Tajfel, 1981). These social identities are descriptive (what the attributes of the group's members are), prescriptive (how the members should behave and think), and evaluative (how the group compares to other groups) (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).

Immigration is a phenomenon that involves the crossing of members of one nation or nation-state immigrating to a host country of which they are not nationals (Triandafyllidou, 2001:56). But it is not only nationality, but immigration also introduces new identities that are based on ethnicity, language, religion and so on that are different than host societies. The categories immigrants form while crossing the geographical as well as the social, political and cultural boundaries of the host society, exhibit different characteristics in term of size, religion, language and core cultural values. The arrival of immigrants adds new aspects and alters the dynamics of the social identity processes of categorizations and social comparison.

Two important observations, one about host societies and the second on immigrants, can be made about these processes. First, the social identity formation processes are contingent upon the particular characteristics of host societies, which include socioeconomic and sociocultural features that determine the degree, extent and distribution of categorization and social comparison. For instance, the degree of identification with the notion of “Norwegianess” is not the same for every individual Norwegian, rather it depends on the age, level of education, occupation, and other psychological, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics.

Second, the categorizations and social comparison processes of social identity –i.e. categorization and social comparison, processes are not directed uniformly on all immigrant groups. In other words, immigrants come from different parts of the world, and their perceived similarity/difference from the host society determines their potential for constituting the in-group or out-group categories necessary for the social identity of host societies. Echoing the voice of George Orwell’s famous dictum, one can say that “all immigrants are out-groups, but some immigrants are more out-groups than other immigrants”. The categorization of immigrants into Nordic and non-Nordic immigrants, western and non-western immigrants, problematic and non-problematic immigrants, culturally-close-neighbors and culturally-distant-strangers, welfare-consumers and welfare-contributors are not a mere exercise of classifications but form the bases of processes of social identity formations of Scandinavian societies. It is the perception of how similar/different are the characteristics of immigrants from those of the host society that constitutes the categorization and social comparison processes of social identity formation of both host societies and immigrants. These similarities/differences render some immigrant groups (immigrants from EU countries for instance) as more close to the host society and therefore favorably evaluated while rendering other immigrant groups as distant and problematic (the process could be reciprocal if one examines immigrants’ attitudes towards host societies).

This aspect of immigration intersects the bases of identification of host societies, be it nationality or other. Hence it follows that immigrants by virtue of being newcomers and crossing



national boundaries become outsiders and constitute the out-group category, which may or may not change overtime. Not only do immigrants carry new identities that may become a target that constitutes the categories for social identity processes, immigrants by virtue of being late entrants possess little cultural, economic and political resources, and usually occupy the lower ladders of society. The time it takes for them to economically and culturally integrate to the host society's way of life creates a relative lag which may render immigrants into the lower or subordinate group status.

It should be noted that the category 'immigrant' is not a monolithic entity, but comprises multiple sub-categories based on salient features like nationality, linguistic, religious, geographical and other differences or temporal features like citizenship or naturalization. In the case of Europe for instance, apart from nationality-based distinction of immigrants, there are broader distinctions between immigrants from Northwestern, Southern, and Eastern Europe and those from developing nations (Lahav, 2004:115). And more significantly, in the post 9/11 era, the category 'Muslim' has increasingly become a distinct category that has important implications both for host societies as well as Muslims in Western countries.

Moreover, the term immigrant has also negative connotations attached to it. In the streets and the mass media, the meaning of the word oscillates between the dictionary meaning and an implicit code based on 'Third World' origin, different values (religion) from the majority, 'dark skin', or working class (unskilled or semi-skilled work) status (Gullestad, 2002:50). Lahav (2004) also points out that reference to "immigration problems" is tantamount to referring to the influx of migrants and asylum-seekers from developing nations. Consequently, instead of the simple distinction between in-groups and out-groups, theoretical as well as empirical consideration of attitudes towards immigrants should account for the diversity of the immigrant category.

The social identity theory also posits that there are power and status differences between social categories, which make evaluations of some categories as either positive or negative inevitable, and which has an important implication for the individuals' self-concept and self-esteem. In other words, some social groups have more power than others, and their views and attitudes towards out-groups will reflect the inherent power asymmetry that exists among social categories. Immigrants as bearers of new identities, are not only different but possess different degrees of powers and their entry into new societies entails a change. However this process is not a smooth transition. Because identities are valued or devalued because of the place of their bearers in the prevailing structure of power and their revaluation entails corresponding changes in the later (Parekh, 2000).

In summary, through the processes of categorization, individuals constantly structure their social world into in-groups and out-groups while through social comparison; they strive to maintain a positive social identity. It is within this framework that attitudes, as important constituents of individuals' identities, become the function of the processes of social identity formation. Such conception assumes that attitudes are emergent, context-dependent and temporal; and ties them with the immediate matrix where local, national and global economic, cultural, and political forces interpenetrate each other and determine the form of attitudes toward immigrants.

Hence attitudes toward immigrants reveal the link between; on one side, the reactions of the host societies to the size and any particularities of the immigrant population; and on the other side, the socio-economic, - cultural and –political characteristics of host societies. Furthermore, these attitudes can reveal the role of the processes and actors that mediate between these two elements. Consequently, based on the theoretical underpinnings of the social identity approach, some tentative hypotheses can be made with respect to attitudes towards immigrants.

First if the assumption attitudes are grounded in the groups we belong is accepted provisionally it can reveal that attitudes towards immigrants can be assumed to reflect the cultural, economic and political make up of both the attitude holders (the host society) and the immigrant groups. What salient characteristics of immigrants become important references of self-categorisation and social comparison for natives of host societies? What are the prevalent aspects of evaluations of immigrants and immigration? Such evaluations could be favourable like solidarity; 'neutral' like 'tolerance', or unfavourable like stereotypes, intolerance, prejudice, or xenophobia. Which aspects of the immigrants or immigration are eliciting strong reactions: their relative size, potential for resource competition, crime and security, or differences based on religion and values? In what way does the socio-economic/demographic and cultural/political background of the attitude-holder influence his/her attitude towards immigrants? How do these attitudes lead to behaviours like voting for pro or anti-immigrant parties? Or living with immigrants in the same neighbourhood or fleeing away from immigrant neighbourhoods? Or supporting or opposing multicultural education or other initiatives and so on? How do individuals in the host society categorize themselves in terms of group memberships, which groups do people compare themselves with and which dimensions provide the basis for comparison?

Second, if we accept the premises mentioned above, what are the temporal characteristics of these attitudes or in other words how stable are these attitudes over time? If attitudes towards immigrants have changed over time, what contextual factors have changed that may have influenced these factors. This is particularly pertinent if longitudinal data about attitudes towards immigrants is included in the data analysis.

Analysing the groups and categories and their relations that constitute both the host society and the immigrant groups will reveal which aspects or characteristics of these entities play significant role in shaping their respective attitudes. Since the data available for this thesis concerns with the attitude of Scandinavians towards immigrants, the immigrant's attitudes towards Norwegians will not be considered here.

### **3.3.1 Personal Identity – the neglected twin of social identity**

Earlier in this chapter, I have described that the social identity theory has evolved partly as a reaction to the universal conceptualization of attitudes as intra-individual characteristics rather than their social aspect. Consequently, in attempt to refocus the study of attitudes from personal to social perspectives, the theory has neglected the role of unique personal traits and characteristics in shaping intergroup behaviours and attitudes – in simple words - personal identity has become the neglected twin of social identity (Worchel, et al., 2000). However, Worchel and others, after reviewing previous studies conclude that personal traits and characteristics like authoritarian personality, self-esteem, need for affiliation and cognitive complexity influence intergroup behaviour (2000). Moreover, demographic characteristics that are unique to individuals like gender, age, level of education, and region of residence are also found to correlate with prejudice (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005).

The importance of personal characteristics in shaping intergroup attitudes opens a new path for synthesizing both social and personal identities in order to explain intergroup behaviours. But this also leads to the synthesizing of both social-psychological and sociological perspectives in order to explore intergroup attitudes. In this regard, attitudes towards immigrants will be examined not only from the social identity perspective but will combine aspects of personal identity as the available data permits.

## **3.4. Supplementary Theoretical Perspectives**

While in the above section a brief discussion of the social identity approach is presented, it is important to point out that the social identity approach is not the only approach available for explaining intergroup relations such as between host societies and immigrants. Other theories such as the *relative deprivation* theory and the *realistic group conflict* theories have featured in previous studies of attitudes towards immigrants.

### **3.4.1. Relative Deprivation**

The theory of relative deprivation is among one of the theories widely used in Norwegian immigration studies (Knudsen, 1997; Hernes & Knudsen, 1992), and has overlapping feature with the social identity approach. Relative deprivation is defined as the belief that you (or your group)

are worse off compared to another person or group coupled with feelings of anger and resentment (Smith & Ortiz, 2002:94). Since it was formulated, there have been distinctions made between different kinds of deprivations. Runciman (1966) points out that people may compare themselves to other people and feel personally deprived (egoistic/personal deprivation), or they may compare themselves as members of an important reference group to another group and feel group deprived (fraternal/group deprivation).

Though comparison, which is central to both the relative deprivation and social identity theories is a process that connects both theories, relative deprivation emphasizes the behavioural outcomes of such comparison while the social identity approach focuses on the processes of how people make intergroup comparisons (Ellemers, 2002:242). Some researchers have also pointed out that the theory of relative deprivation provides no specific predictions about comparison preferences and the nature and choice of referents is one of the key remaining issues to be resolved by the theory (Ellemers, 2002; Hogg & Abrams, 1998).

With regard to the discussion on attitudes towards immigrants, the theory of relative deprivation can be critiqued for its shortcomings particularly when it comes to the question why prejudice becomes directed towards immigrants rather than affluent members of society. The theory can also be critiqued from a perspective that by focusing on the individual's subjective feelings of deprivation, it ignores the social as well as power dynamics that exists between different groups of society.

### **3.4.2. Realistic Group Conflict Theory**

*Realistic group conflict* theory emphasizes the role of material bases for determining intergroup behaviour and attitudes. It posits that prejudice, intergroup hostility or bias arise from conflict over objectively scarce resources such as territorial possessions, jobs, or political power and competition among social groups over valued commodities or opportunities (Sherif, 1967; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Accordingly the primary motivation underlying intergroup behavior is instrumental; groups like each other (or not) because it serves their interests or goals to do so.

The realistic group conflict theory is also similar with the group threat theory, originally stated by (Blumer, 1958), which states that individuals identify with one or more groups and that the diverse interests of different groups generate conflicts that in turn generate negative attitudes. This theory since its origin has been undergoing further refining in order to accommodate additional insights. For instance, Quillian (1995) contends that it is the *perception of threat rather than* the real threat to the group's resources that produces hostile reactions to out-group. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the important point is that it is the perceived threat to the group that tends to produce the most hostile reactions, not threat to the individual (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

Thus, it is primarily the threat to in-group interests that produces hostility toward alternative out-groups. Consequently, prejudice develops because of the struggle over jobs, adequate housing, good schools, and other desirable materials. Because of these struggles, competition continues, and the members of the groups involved come to see each other in increasingly negative terms. In light of this theory, attitudes towards immigrants are assumed to be a function of competitions between host societies and immigrants over material resources. Immigrants pose a threat to the material wellbeing of host society, eliciting anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviors particularly among the segment of the population who are likely to face competitions from newly-arriving immigrants.

However, the realistic group conflict theory is found incomplete following the discovery of intergroup discrimination in minimal groups; groups without any history or future, and are based on some minimal, even trivial, categorization criterion, where group members do not even know who else is a member of their own or the other group (Capozza & Brown, 2000:viii; Stroebe, Spears, & Lodewijckx, 2007:174). The mere categorization of individuals into two groups, an in-group and an out-group, is sufficient to determine both perception and behavior (Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007). Moreover, according to the social identity approach, competition rather than being a cause is considered as a consequence of group identification (Hogg & Abrams, 1998:52).

The precedence of categorization over competition has significant implication with regard to attitudes towards immigrants. First societies are comprised of diverse groups and categories<sup>1</sup> based on age, occupation, income, gender, level of education, religion, place of residence, nationality, ethnicity, political view etc, which form the loci of group identification. These loci confer social identities that vary both in kind and intensity from individuals to individuals subsequently affecting the attitudes and behavior towards immigrants. More specifically, it can be stated that not all these characteristics are of equal importance as bases for categorization vis-a-vis any particularities of immigrants. Some categories like education, income level, religion, nationality, political views can prove to be more salient and can serve as categories where differences with immigrants are accentuated.

Second, the groups that constitute society stand in power and status relations to one another, which becomes disrupted by the arrival of immigrants. Immigrants' interaction with host societies is asymmetrical because of the social, cultural and economic power differences. The arrival of immigrants inevitably leads to the reevaluation of these power and status relations, subsequently individuals within host societies, depending on their social and economical standings will exhibit

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<sup>1</sup> **The usage of groups and categories in the fields of social sciences, particularly sociology needs some clarification. Sociology maintains a distinction between groups and categories. Social groups are composed of one or more networks of people who identify with one another and adhere to defined norms, roles, and statuses; whereas social categories are those in which people share similar status but do not identify with one another (Brym & Lie, 2007:161). In this thesis, these terms will be used interchangeably.**

diverse attitudes towards immigrants. The kind and intensity of these attitudes towards immigrants also varies on the real or perceived threat immigrants pose to the social identity and material well-being of host societies.

The discovery that categorization is more significant over competition does not completely invalidate the strength of the realistic group conflict theory, but highlights the precedence of categorization over competition in determining intergroup attitudes and behaviours. In the same breath, it should be noted that contexts of experimental groups like minimal groups are significantly different than real life contexts where large numbers of people and social groups are involved. Explanations of intergroup attitudes need to account both for the minimum sufficient conditions and situational factors that influence attitudes and perceptions. Rather than considering the social identity theory and the realistic group conflict theory as mutually contradicting explanations, both can be integrated and assumed to complement each other in explaining intergroup behaviours.

### **3.5. Hypotheses**

The brief review of the theoretical perspectives in the sections above provides important insights with regard to intergroup attitudes. First, the theory of social identity expects that identity – particularly group identity – matters. Scandinavian countries with their distinctive history and contemporary social and cultural contexts confer different kinds of social identities upon their citizens. And immigrants, as bearers of distinctive social identities, disrupt the dynamics and power relations present in the host society. Second, the realistic group conflict theory expects that intergroup attitudes can have material bases. In this regard the arrival of immigrants can be perceived as threatening, particularly for those who occupy the lowest social and economic ladders of host societies.

The theoretical discussions presented above represent only a small fraction of the vast number of theories and approaches. As Turner (2001) notes in his review of sociological theories, the field is hyper-differentiated and somehow the idea of a general law governing or inclusive of all social phenomena is becoming unachievable. However, in this thesis the attempt is to synthesize and integrate the different theoretical perspectives and use them in the investigation of attitudes towards immigrants in Scandinavian societies. In light of the findings of the previous literature and the theoretical discussion presented above the following predictions and tentative hypotheses are drawn from these theories that can be tested against the available quantitative data.



## **4. Data and Method**

### **4.1. Overview**

The main data source for the present research is the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS) survey conducted in 2008. The EVS survey is a large-scale cross-national and longitudinal research program on how Europeans think about religion, work, politics and society (EVS, 2010). The 2008 survey was carried out in 47 European countries, using randomly drawn samples with a net sample size 1500 and using a personal face-to-face interview (except in Sweden where the survey was conducted through the post) with standardized questionnaire (EVS, 2010; 2011). The survey consists of several variables that broadly fall into major categories like perceptions of life, politics and society, work, religion, family, national identity, environment, life experiences and demographic characteristics. The EVS data also consists of specific variables that tap into people's attitudes towards different social groups, including Jews, Gypsies, Immigrants and Muslims.

Variables that concern attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are found scattered throughout the EVS data set. These variables are not directly concerned with immigrants per se. The variables, on one hand, gauge the social dimension of respondents' attitudes towards immigrants, which could be of racial, ethnic, or religious nature. The main emphasis of these variables is to measure respondents' attitude to the physical proximity (neighbours) of diverse categories of people. On the other hand, there are variables that measure the economic, cultural and security challenges associated with immigrants and immigration. It is the perception that immigrants increase crime rates, burden the welfare state and undermine cultural life of the country (Norway, Denmark or Sweden) that made up the bulk of these measurements. Besides these variables, there are also few variables that tap about people's perception about the size of immigrant populations and concern about and solidarity with immigrants. The next sections will present first, the methodology used for the statistical analysis of the data, which will be followed by a detail description of the relevant variables from the EVS dataset.

### **4.2. Method**

The appropriate method to analyse the available data and suggest valid explanations is dependent on the main thrust of the research question and the level of measurement of the available variables. The research questions presented above in section 1.2 have one overarching purpose; to assess Scandinavian's attitudes towards immigrants based on the 2008 EVS data. This requires a cross-sectional approach since it is the attitude towards immigrants at a specific time, which is under consideration.

This thesis is primarily based on a quantitative analysis of the EVS 2008 dataset for Norway, Denmark and Sweden using statistical software – SPSS – version 21. It is a secondary analysis that



incorporates the use of univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses. This is due to the number of factors involved in the analysis of attitudes towards immigrants. Since variables that concern religion, politics and economy and their influence on attitudes towards immigrants are considered and are part of the complex interrelationships, these types of analysis help to explore the kind and degree of correlation that exists among them. To establish causal arguments, however, multivariate statistics is employed to identify and model causal relations, as well as verify and measure the size of the causal effect.

All the above methodological aspects are particularly useful and relevant when the units of analysis are individuals and their respective groups and categories. However these individual level analyses are further supplemented by a cross-national perspective, which includes comparative approach. Comparison brings the nuanced differences and similarities of attitudes towards immigrants between different countries into a more pronounced relief. It also provides a predictive basis of the trends of the differences and similarities, where new aspects of the variables are highlighted and more relevant information extracted.

### **4.3. Variables**

The main direction of this research is to explore factors that determine Scandinavian attitudes towards immigrants; in statistical terms, the factors will be the independent variables that will be used to explain the dependent variable – an attitude towards immigrants. The choice of independent and dependent variables and models is dependent on the available variables in the 2008 EVS survey and the theoretical and empirical discussions presented earlier. In this thesis an attitude towards immigrants is conceptualized as a composite index made up of several dimensions such as perceptions regarding social proximity, and economic, cultural and security concerns. These dimensions are neither directly observed nor measured, but are gauged by proxy variables that are assumed to tap into them. Based on statistical analysis of the EVS dataset, this thesis will attempt to investigate the primary factors that determine attitudes towards immigrants. The thesis will also explore the dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants.




Figure 4.1: Conceptual model of dependent and independent variables.

In addition, ‘an attitude towards immigrants’ is assumed to be a function of diverse background factors (Figure 4.1); hence this study is geared to identify which variables bear major influence and what kind of relationship exists between these variables. It will also explore the degree and direction of relationship that exists between different variables, and describe the kind of picture that emerges when these relationships are compared across the Scandinavian countries.

#### 4.2.1. Dependent Variables

As already mentioned, the present study will focus on ‘attitudes towards immigrants and immigration’: precisely how Scandinavians perceive immigrants and immigration as they react to the presence of immigrants and impact of immigration in these countries. In the EVS dataset these attitudes are tapped by variables that measure the reaction of respondents either to the presence of immigrants in their immediate neighbourhoods or to the impact of immigrants on society, culture, the welfare system and the economy. The list of these variables is given below in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1** List of Variables concerning immigrants in the EVS 2008 Dataset

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Variable Label</b>
<b>V47</b>	Don't like as neighbours: people of different race
<b>V53</b>	Don't like as neighbours: Muslims
<b>V54</b>	Don't like as neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
<b>V102</b>	Jobs are scarce: giving...(nation) priority than immigrants
<b>V268</b>	Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality]
<b>V269</b>	Immigrants undermine country's cultural life
<b>V270</b>	Immigrants increase crime problems
<b>V271</b>	Immigrants are a strain on welfare system
<b>V272</b>	Immigrants will become a threat to society
<b>V273</b>	Immigrants maintain own/take over customs
<b>V274</b>	Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger
<b>V275</b>	Immigrants living in your country: there are too many
<b>V292</b>	Are you concerned with: immigrants?

From a quick glance through the list of variables in the above table, one can identify two broad categories. The first category includes a set of variables (V47, 53, and 54), which refer to group of people respondents do not like to have as neighbours. It includes out-groups such as immigrants, foreign workers and Muslims. These variables measure the degree and extent of xenophobia against such out-groups. The survey question was presented as 'on this list are various groups of people: could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?' Respondents are able to mention or not-mention and choose more than one group. The corresponding values of the items represent the percentage of respondents who replied that they do not want these groups as neighbours.

The second set of variables consists of ten items (V102, V268-V275 and V292), each inquiring the attitudes of respondents to a series of statements about cultural, economic or security challenges posed by immigrants and immigration. Six of these items are made up of a series of contrasting statements (A&B) and have a ten-point scale in between, where respondents are asked to look on the statements and indicate where they would place their views on the scale. These items are:

- A. Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country
- B. Immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country
- A. Immigrants undermine a country's cultural life.
- B. Immigrants do not undermine a country's cultural life.
- A. Immigrants make crime problems worse
- B. Immigrants do not make crime problems worse
- A. Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system
- B. Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system
- A. In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society
- B. In the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society
- A. For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions

B. For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but adopt the customs of the country

In addition to the above six items, there are four more variables that concern immigrants and made of a five-point scale where respondents were asked to state whether they agree or disagree on a given statements. The statements are:

- Jobs are scarce: giving...(nation) priority than immigrants
- Because of the number of immigrants in Norway, I sometimes feel like a stranger.
- Today in Norway, there are too many immigrants.
- Are you concerned with immigrants?

Overall, in the EVS dataset, there are 13 variables that cover issues related both directly and indirectly to immigrants and/or immigration. Three of these variables measure respondents' attitude towards out-groups such as immigrants and can be considered as measuring xenophobia/social hostility towards immigrants as neighbours. The rest of the variables measure respondents' perception toward the threat of immigrants and immigration on job security, culture, security, the welfare state, and the structure of the population. They also measure respondents' perception to the size of immigrant population as the questions about 'feeling strange in one country' and 'there are too many of immigrants' present. Additionally, the variables also tap into people's attitudes towards policies and measures that should be taken against or for immigrants and immigration: such as curbing immigration, or allow immigrant groups either to maintain their culture or force them to adapt to the host culture. These variables can be summarized as relating to the general impact of immigration and correspondent policies to be adopted.

At a conceptual level, it can be assumed that these sets of variables form two distinctive clusters and therefore measure two dimensions of attitudes. The first set of variables measure respondents attitudes towards the physical proximity immigrants as neighbours. The logic behind distinguishing between the social and general aspects of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration is based on the observation of the available variables. But a question remains whether such distinction has any statistical equivalence in the EVS dataset for the three countries. In order to test the validity and determine the empirical significance of these tentative distinctions, all the variables are subjected to relevant statistical tests and the outcomes of these tests is presented in the section below.

In the following section, the 13 variables listed above (Table 4.1) are analysed in order to identify and describe whether there exists common factors underlying the variables and therefore verify empirically the conceptual distinction mentioned above. The analyses will also simplify their incorporation in further analysis in later sections.

#### 4.2.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis

A factor analysis examines the associations between variables based on the correlation between them, to see if there are underlying factors (Hinton, et al., 2004). Such analysis also helps to identify the pattern of correlation among variables and thereby to reduce and summarize the observed variables into a manageable number of factors, assisting further statistical analysis. Consequently, the 13 items of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration were subjected to factor analysis using SPSS Version 21. Factor analysis involves two steps: extraction and rotation. While the former is used to determine the factors underlying the relationship between variables, the latter is designed to explore how the factors extracted differ from each other and to provide a clear picture of which variables load on which factor (Miller, et al., 2002). Prior to performing factor analysis, the suitability of the data for factor analysis was assessed. The number of variables to sample ratio (Norway=1090, Denmark=1507 and Sweden=1187) is large enough to ensure the reliability of the results of factor analysis. Table 4.2 is a summary of statistics from a run of factor analysis.

**Table 4.2. Summary Statistics from Exploratory Factor Analysis**

	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
<b>Sample Size</b>	1187	1055	890
<b>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Values</b>	0.856	0.862	0.918
<b>Factors Extracted</b>	2	2	2
<b>Total Variance Explained (%)</b>	46	50	66.7
<b>Correlation between components</b>	0.45	0.418	0.506

**Extraction:** Maximum Likelihood. **Rotation:** Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

As can be seen in Table 4.2, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin<sup>2</sup> value for all samples exceeds the recommended value of 0.6 and the Barlett's Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Three variables (V102, V273 and V292) are dropped from the factor analysis, due to very low communalities that indicate the absence of relationship between these and the rest of the variables.

Factor analysis using Maximum Likelihood<sup>3</sup> extraction method and Direct Oblimin<sup>4</sup> rotation method indicates the presence of two factors with Eigen values exceeding 1, explaining 47, 50 and

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<sup>2</sup> Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is a statistical test used to determine whether the data is suitable for a factor analysis. As a rule of thumb if the KMO value is 0.5 or above, the data is considered suitable for factor analysis (Hinton, et al., 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Maximum Likelihood extraction method is one of the six extraction methods available in SPSS. Information on the relative strength and weakness of these extraction methods is scarce, however, in this thesis, the choice of the maximum likelihood extraction over other extraction methods is based on the interpretability of the resulting factors.

<sup>4</sup> Direct Oblimin is a rotation method used in order to simplify structure when the factors identified through extraction are found to be related with one another. For unrelated factors, SPSS has another alternative method of rotation – namely orthogonal rotation.

67% of the total variances of the samples from the three countries. As shown in the table (Table 4.2), in all samples, the two factors are moderately correlated ( $r = 0.45, 0.42$  and  $0.5$ ), which necessitates the use of oblique rotation method, which allows correlation between factors.

The pattern matrix, a matrix of correlations between variables and factors, which is given in Table 4.3, identifies two factors where the variables load differently on the extracted factors. The correlation numbers, simply termed loadings, reflect the extent of relationship between the variables and the factors. From the simple distributions of the loadings, it is obvious to see that those variables that measure the degree of hostility towards immigrants, Muslims and people of different race belong to the same factor. This factor is termed as *social hostility*, since it specifically concerns about attitudes towards immigrants, Muslims and people of different race, if they happen to be neighbours with respondents.

Table 4.3. Pattern Matrix

Variables	Denmark		Norway		Sweden	
	Factors		Factors		Factors	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
Don't like as neighbors: people of different race	.583		.663		.787	
Don't like as neighbors: Muslims	.587		.584		.540	
Don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers	.749		.879		.841	
Immigrants take away jobs from natives	.451		.571		.751	
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life	.715		.773		.831	
Immigrants increase crime problems	.752		.671		.859	
Immigrants are a strain on welfare system	.758		.673		.906	
Immigrants will become a threat to society	.854		.827		.933	
Immigrants living in Norway: feels like a stranger	.455		.561		.729	
Immigrants living in Norway: there are too many	.608		.753		.830	

The rest of the variables load on the second factor, which is termed as *general resentment* since it concerns with a number of issues related to the impact of immigrants and immigration on the economy, culture, security, welfare state and employment conditions of the host country. The two factors can be viewed as individual and societal perspectives on immigrants and immigration. In the next section, these two factors will be further developed to construct reliable scales. However, before the construction of scales few statistical tests are required to detect possible variable redundancy and presence of principal components.

#### 4.2.3. Suitability for Scale Building

Besides factor analysis, the suitability of the variables for scale building is also inspected in SPSS. The two factors identified by factor analysis (described in the above section) and their corresponding variables are further analysed for suitability of scale building and are used to construct composite scales that represent the measure attitudes toward immigrants: *social hostility*

(factor 1) and *general resentment* (factor 2). The social hostility scale will have three items while the general resentment will have seven items (See the pattern matrix table 4.3).

The three variables that load on the first factor, *social hostility*, are “do not like as neighbours – people of different races, Muslims and immigrants. These three variables are formed into a composite index labelled as the *social hostility* scale or in short – ATTD\_SOC. The rest of the variables that load on the second factor, *general resentment*, will be constructed as ATTD\_GEN scale. Those variables considered under ATTD\_SOC are dichotomous variables and concern specifically about the social distance between Scandinavians and immigrants. On the other hand, those variables considered under ATTD\_GEN have more categories and are more diffuse and concern with diverse aspects of immigrants and immigration. These two scales will be used later in the sections for bivariate and multivariate analyses. Summary statistics for the reliability analysis of the two subscales are given below in Table 4.4 and 4.5.

**Table 4.4. Scale Reliability Statistics for the *Social Hostility* Scale**

Country	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items		
Denmark	.667	.688	3		
Norway	.749	.749	3		
Sweden	.746	.779	3		
Item – Total Statistics					
Variables		Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted			
		Denmark	Norway	Sweden	
Don't like as neighbours: people of different race		.616	.693	.656	
Don't like as neighbours: Muslims		.611	.719	.759	
Don't like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers		.489	.576	.603	

The tables (4.4 & 4.5) present the reliability statistics of the *social hostility* and *general resentment* scales for the three Scandinavian countries. The alpha values for *social hostility* scale of each country, except Denmark, are higher than the recommended Cronbach's Alpha (0.7). This indicates that the items can form a scale that has reasonable internal consistency reliability. None of the items included in the scale will increase the alpha value of the scale if deleted.

**Table 4.5. Scale Reliability Statistics for the *General Resentment Scale***

Country	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
Denmark	0.838	0.851	7
Norway	0.865	0.865	7
Sweden	0.926	0.942	7
Item-Total Statistics			
Variables	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted		
	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
Immigrants take away jobs from (Nationality)	0.839	0.863	0.918
Immigrants undermine Norway's cultural life	0.8	0.836	0.908
Immigrants increase crime problems	0.811	0.849	0.913
Immigrants are a strain on welfare system	0.806	0.846	0.906
Immigrants will become a threat to society	0.784	0.828	0.902
Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger	0.835	0.859	0.928
Immigrants living in your country: there are too many	0.821	0.836	0.923

Similarly the alpha values for the *general resentment* scale (Table 4.5) for each country are all above the recommended value of 0.7, which guarantees that the scale can be considered reliable with respect to the samples of each country. For the *general resentment* scale, none of the variables, if deleted, will increase the overall alpha value.

Besides inspecting the reliability of the scales, a summated scale is constructed using the items that belong together. Since each item does not have the same response categories, each item is transformed into a standard score (z-score). Such transformation into standardized values enables the expression of all items on the scale to have the same potential length, thus ensuring that each item has an equal potential weight in the final score (de Vaus, 2002:253). A summary statistics of these summated scales is given below (Table 4.6.).

**Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics of Scales**

A. Descriptive Statistics for <i>Social Hostility Scale</i>				
	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
<b>ATTD_SOC_Denmark</b>	1264	11,68	-10,80	,88
<b>ATTD_SOC_Norway</b>	1081	11,69	-10,82	,88
<b>ATTD_SOC_Sweden</b>	1187	11,18	-10,25	,94
B. Descriptive Statistics for <i>General Resentment Scale</i>				
	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum
<b>ATTD_GEN_Denmark</b>	1408	24,40	-13,57	10,82
<b>ATTD_GEN_Norway</b>	1064	24,85	-12,22	12,63
<b>ATTD_GEN_Sweden</b>	890	21,38	-11,95	9,44



As seen in the tables (Table 4.6.A&B), the two scales have values that range between -13.57 to 12.63 (for ATTD\_GEN) and -10.82 to 0.94 (for ATTD\_SOC). This is inevitable since the scales are constructed not from the raw values of the items included but from standardized values. Such scale values are less meaningful and before any further analysis, it is suggested they should be transformed so that the scales have meaningful upper and lower limits (de Vaus, 2002:254). Consequently, the scales are transformed to have values that range between 0 to 6 where for both the ATTD\_SOC and ATTD\_GEN scales lower values represent anti-immigrant attitudes and higher values represent pro-immigrant attitudes. A summary statistics for the new transformed scales is given below in Table 4.6.

**Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics for the transformed scales**

A. Descriptive Statistics for Social Hostility Scale					
	N	Range	Min	Max	Mean
<b>ATTD_SOC_Denmark</b>	1264	6,00	,00	6,00	5,5479
<b>ATTD_SOC_Norway</b>	1081	6,00	,00	6,00	5,5385
<b>ATTD_SOC_Sweden</b>	1187	6,00	,00	6,00	5,5009
B. Descriptive Statistics for General Resentment Scale					
	N	Range	Min	Max	Mean
<b>ATTD_GEN_Denmark</b>	1408	6,00	,00	6,00	3,3253
<b>ATTD_GEN_Norway</b>	1064	6,00	,00	6,00	2,9421
<b>ATTD_GEN_Sweden</b>	890	6,00	,00	6,00	3,3664

**4.2.4. Summary of Dependent Variables**

Common to all types of attitudes, including attitudes towards immigrants, is the complexity inherent in their nature and expression. This complexity also manifests in the difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring attitudes, which necessitates the use of multiple indicators rather than one. Moreover, attitudes are not directly observable but inferred from multiple variables, which inevitably leads to the use different statistical techniques in order to decipher them. The use of multiple variables helps to get the complexity of attitudes, assist in developing more valid, reliable and precise scales (de Vaus, 2002:233).

In section 4.2.1 I have provisionally discussed the conceptual distinction between the 13 variables selected from the EVS dataset. This conceptual distinction was followed by relevant statistical analysis which helped to establish and validate the distinction. The factor analysis (including the different methods used) and scale building presented in the previous section provides two important outcomes – first it reduces the number of variables from 13 to 10 and eventually to two factors, which will be further used to construct the dependent variables. Second it helps to determine the relationship between each variable and the extracted factor, which

simplifies the statistical investigation particularly when it becomes more complex. In other words, instead of considering the 13 variables individually and exploring their variation across the population of the three countries, now it is possible to focus only on two factors and investigate the variation of these two factors.

The two factors identified through factor analysis are termed the social hostility (ATTID\_SOC) and general resentment (ATTID\_GEN). These two factors are further developed into scales that will be used as dependent variables throughout the next phases of statistical analyses.

#### 4.2.5. Independent and Intermediate Variables

The list of independent variables used in the empirical analysis includes basic socio-demographic background variables like education, sex and age, employment, occupation, and income. Besides these variables, intermediate variables that comprise measures of religious and political views together with national identity variables are included in the analysis.

##### Age

During the survey age is registered as respondents' year of birth, but for this thesis, the variable is transformed into years of age. The average age for Denmark, Norway and Sweden is 49, 46 and 48 respectively. Since it is not the age of each respondent per se that is particularly relevant to subsequent analyses, all respondents are grouped into age categories that range from the youngest (18 – 29) to the oldest (70 – 79) producing six age cohorts.

##### Gender

This variable is considered in the analyses and it is included as dummy variable with two values: male (0) and female (1). The gender ratio of respondents in the samples for the three countries is given in the table below.

**Table 4.8 Gender proportion among the respondents**

		Denmark	Norway	Sweden
<b>Sex (%)</b>	Male	49.6	51.3	47
	Female	50.4	48.6	53

##### Education

This variable education in the EVS dataset is measured following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and is derived from the highest level of education the respondent has achieved. It has seven response categories that vary between pre-primary (no education) to second stage of tertiary education.

**Table 4.9 Education Statistics**

		<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Norway</b>	<b>Sweden</b>
<b>Education (%)</b>	Primary and Lower Secondary	23,8	28,2	21,2
	Upper Secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary	39,0	31,3	45,5
	Tertiary	36,0	40,6	33,2

In order to identify patterns of relationships between education and attitudes towards immigrants, these seven categories are further collapsed into three categories of primary and lower secondary, upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, and tertiary levels of education (See Table 4.9).

### **Employment and Occupation**

This variable is a composite measure of two variable sets. The first is the paid and unpaid employment subgroups. The unemployed together with students, the disabled, housewives, those on military service and the retired are grouped into the unpaid employment subcategory. At the time of the interview (2008), 74% (Norway), 65% (Denmark) and 60% (Sweden) of the respondents were employed. The paid employment category consists of those self-employed and regularly employed respondents.

The second set consists of computed variable based on European Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC) scheme. This scheme of occupational status has nine categories that range from large employers to routine workers. Therefore it is further regrouped into three categories: higher occupations, intermediate occupations and lower occupations. It is hypothesized that attitudes towards immigrants vary not only with respect to employment/unemployment status but also with the different kinds of occupations within the employed category.

### **Income**

This variable refers to a gross annual income and consists of 15 categories that range from under 120,000NOK to over 850,000NOK. Since this variable has too many categories that render further analysis to be difficult, the categories are further collapsed into three subcategories as low- (below 330,000NOK), middle- (330,000-504,000NOK) and high-income (above 504,000NOK) household groups. Since there are currency differences between the three countries, it was the annual income given in Euros that was used in the preparation of the categories.

## National Identity

National identity is considered as an awareness of affiliation with the nation-state that gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others (Keane, 1994). However, though the nation-state acts as an umbrella entity that confers national identity, the degree of identification with a nation-state is an individual characteristic and can thus vary between individuals of the same nation (Gellner, 1983). Not only are there variations on the degree of identification, the bases of identification are also different among individuals in one nation. As noted by Anthony Smith (1991), national identity can take the form of either civic and/or ethnic models. The permutations of these models can range between individuals having strong ethnic or civic national identities or an identity that draws from both or weak identification with both aspects.

In the EVS 2008 dataset for Denmark, Norway and Sweden, there are five variables that are used to gauge individual's perception of what constitutes of being Danish, Norwegian or Swedish. These variables probe into individuals' self-definition with regard to the nation and perception of the importance of language or ancestry for being truly Danish, Norwegian or Swedish. Table 4.10 below presents these variables with corresponding levels of importance.

**Table 4.10 National Identity Variables**

<b>Table 4.8 National Identity Variables</b>			
Variables	Important		
	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
<b>Important: To have been born in (Country)</b>	45,5	52.0	49,5
<b>Important: To have a (Nationality) ancestry</b>	40,4	31.6	36,8
<b>Important: To have lived in (Country) for a long time</b>	50	57.0	76,5
<b>Important: To be able to speak the language of (Country)</b>	98,1	98.4	97,3
<b>Important: To respect the (Country's) political institutions and laws</b>	97,5	98.1	96,1

As the above table indicates, the three countries are similar about the importance of speaking the language and respecting the country's political institutions and laws, than to have an ancestry, or to have been born or to live for a long time. However, the Danes consider having a Danish ancestry more important than the Swedes and the Norwegians. The Swedes also consider living in Sweden for a long time more important than the Danes and the Norwegians.

Factor analysis of these five variables yielded a two-dimensional structure with the presence of two empirically and conceptually correlated factors. The first factor consists of the first three variables, while the second has the remaining variables (Table 4.10). The first factor is identified as the *ethnic aspect* of national identity, since it consists of having a Norwegian/Danish/Swedish ancestry, which is a clear marker, and the other two variables that concern being born in

Norway/Denmark/Sweden and living in Norway/Denmark/Sweden for a long time. These three variables not only load strongly on the same factor, but they also are correlated moderately to each other (with all correlation coefficients above 0.4). Consequently, they are summated and constructed into an *Ethnic Identity* scale (ETHNC\_ID) that has a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.635 and with scale values 1 for strong and 2 for weak ethnic identification simultaneously.

**Table 4.11 Rotated Component Matrix of National Identity**

Variables	Components					
	Denmark		Norway		Sweden	
	Ethnic	Civic	Ethnic	Civic	Ethnic	Civic
Important: to have been born in (Country)	.808		.814		.870	
Important: to have a (Country) ancestry	.837		.853		.884	
Important: to have lived in (Country) for a long time	.814		.739		.621	
Important: to be able to speak the language	.327	.662	.331	.668	.343	.711
Important: to respect (Country's) political institutions and laws		.870		.870		.826

The second factor consists of the remaining two variables – to respect country's political institutions and laws and being able to speak the language, and can be considered as belonging to the *civic aspect* of national identity. The two variables are summated to construct a measure of *Civic Identity*– CVC\_ID that has value 1 and 2 with 2 indicating strong civic identity. Unlike, the ethnic identity scale, this scale has a lower Cronbach's alpha (0.164), which can be explained in terms of the few number of variables used.

Among all the variables, language seems peculiar in a way it is related to both factors though less strongly to ethnic identity than the civic one. It is interesting to see language being associated more with the civic rather than the ethnic dimension, indicating that in the three Scandinavian countries, language rather than being a partition front for belonging is more considered as an important aspect of being an integral member of a civic society.

The point of departure for including national identity as an intermediate variable is that the hypothesis that respondent's identification with either the civic or ethnic dimension will have implication on their attitude towards immigrants. Like any other form of social identity, national identity has a dual character; it defines who is a member and who is not (the foreigner, the immigrant) thereby demarcating the boundaries of the national community (Castles & Miller, 1993). Previous research established that people with strong ethnic identity are more xenophobic towards immigrants than people with civic national identity (Hjerm, 1998). Moreover, the ethnic element of national identity is based on ascriptive characteristics and organic perception, the legitimacy of which is threatened by immigrants (Lewin-Epstein & Levanon, 2005). Consequently,

national identity is considered as an important indicator of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

**Political View**

Political attitudes as measured by respondent’s self-placement on the Left-Right<sup>5</sup> spectrum of political ideology or party identification can affect attitudes towards immigrants. Findings from previous research indicate that people who consider themselves as being to the Left on the political spectrum are positively disposed towards immigrants than those on the Right (Demker, 2007). Identification with parties either on the Left or Right also follows a similar pattern; followers of right wing parties are found to be more xenophobic than those of left parties (Botvar, 2009:193).

In light of these previous results, the present thesis considers respondents political views as one of the determinant factors of attitudes towards immigrants. The EVS dataset for the three Scandinavian countries consists of variables that measure political views; hence two of them will be included in further analysis. The first variable measures self-placement of respondents on a 10-point scale, which is dichotomised simply into left and right categories. The statistics for the

**Table 4.12. Left-Right Scale for Denmark, Norway and Sweden**

		Denmark	Norway	Sweden
<b>Political View</b>	Left	57.5	55	50.8
	Right	42.5	45	49.2

For questions regarding party identification, the presence of several small parties with diverging views on many issues complicates any relationship that can be recognized between party preference and attitudes towards immigrants. For instance in the case of Norway, the survey shows that the three largest parties; the Labour Party (DNA), the Progress Party (FrP) and the Conservative Party (H) have the following of 70% of the total population each having 28.9%, 21.6% and 19.4% respectively. The remaining 30% is shared between five minor parties, which are the Centre Party (Sp) – 8.1%, Socialist Left Party (SV) – 7.0%, Liberal Party (V) – 6.4%, Christian Democratic Party (KrF) – 5.5%, the Red party – 2.3% and other small parties. A complete list of the political parties and their respective shares of voters is given in the table below.

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<sup>5</sup> The classification of political attitudes into Left and Right has its roots in French Revolution, when supporters of the status quo sat on the right side of the French Assembly hall and its opponents sat on the left. In contemporary usage, the two core aspects of the left-right dimensions are attitudes concerning change versus stability and equality versus inequality. In many Western countries, left-wing and right-wing respondents alike associate the right with such terms as “conservative”, “order”, “individualism”, “capitalism”, “nationalism” and they associate the left with “progressive”, “system change”, “equality”, “solidarity”, “protest”, “opposition” “radical” “socialism”... (Jost, et al., 2009)

**Table 4.13. Political parties vote distribution**

Denmark	%	Norway	%	Sweden	%
DK Venstre, Denmarks Liberal Party	30,3	NO Labour Party DNA	28,9	SE Social Democratic Party (S)	30,1
DK Social Democrats	22,6	NO Progress Party FrP	21,6	SE Moderate Party (M)	28,0
DK Socialist Peoples Party	20,2	NO Conservative Party H	19,4	SE Liberal Party (FP)	9,1
DK Danish Peoples Party	8,7	NO Centre Party Sp	8,1	SE Green Party (MP)	9,0
DK Conservative Peoples Party	8,3	NO Socialist Left Party SV	7,0	SE Left wing Party (V)	7,6
DK Radical Left Party	6,9	NO Liberal Party V	6,4	SE Center Party (C )	4,5
DK Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)	1,8	NO Christian Democratic Party KrF	5,5	SE Christian Democratic Party (KD)	3,9
DK New Alliance (Liberal Alliance)	,4	NO Red	2,3		
DK Christian Democrats	,3	NO Other	,8		

Since the number of categories (parties) for this variable is high and categories with very small frequencies can produce misleading statistics, it is important to regroup the categories into small number of groups. However, these parties have diverse views on several issues and it is difficult to find a suitable basis for regrouping. One way to work around this challenge is developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project, which, based on a content analysis of parties' policy preference, place them on the left – right continuum of the political spectrum. One such analysis conducted in 2009 for parties in Norway, places all but the Progress Party in Norway on the left. Consequently, these parties that have small frequencies are combined into a “Small Parties” category that is used as a unit of comparison together with the three largest parties. Similar procedure is also applied to the small political parties of Denmark and Sweden.

### **Religiosity**

Another factor to be included in the examination of attitudes towards immigrants is the role of religion in shaping views regarding immigrants. In previous studies, indicators of religiosity such as church attendance and participation in practices like prayer are found to correlate with attitudes towards immigrants. In one Swedish study conducted in 2004, for instance, it is found that respondents who stated they are praying at least once a month are much more positively disposed towards immigrants than those who pray less often (Demker 2005). Similar difference is also observed between regular churchgoers and those who went to church more seldom. In Norway as well as Denmark and Sweden, xenophobic attitudes are found to be more widespread among

people who do not go to church on a regular basis than those who are among the core members (Botvar, 2009:195).

In the EVS dataset for the three Scandinavian countries, there are several questions that measure religious view including degree of religiosity, belief in God, church attendance, practicing of prayer/meditation, belonging to religious denomination and opinions about the roles of churches and religious leaders. Though there are more than 15 variables that are designed to gauge respondent’s religiosity in terms of belonging, belief and practice, preliminary analysis of these variables reveals no systematic patterns or underlying latent factors. The variables appear to be incongruent; therefore the discussion of religiosity among respondents is limited to the discussion of individual variables and their distribution in the population.

For the Norwegian sample, for instance, among respondents who answered the question “do you belong to a religious denomination?” the majority (89%) belong to the Church of Norway, whereas the rest of the respondents are divided among the Roman Catholic (2.8%), Free Churches that are not part of the Lutheran State church (2.6%), Islam (1.5%) and other religious denominations like Buddhism and Hinduism.

Similarly, the degree of religiosity among respondents was also gauged with a question “are you a religious person?” The figure of those who claim to be non-religious is around 49% (for Norway), which shows large difference with the high figure for belonging to religious denomination indicating that belonging to a religious denomination is based more on non-religious or cultural grounds. Other aspects of religiosity that highlight this gap are questions that concern belief in God and whether the church should respond to social problems. For the former, only 53% of the respondents stated to believe in God while 83% are found to disagree on a question whether the church is able to answer social problems. The following table shows a summary of degree of religiosity among Scandinavians.

**Table 4.14 Degree of religiosity among Scandinavians**

Variable	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
Belong to a denomination*	86%	70%	60%
Believe in God	59%	53%	36%
How often attend religious services? **	10%	11%	8%
Are you a religious person?	69%	44%	30%
*those who belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark, the Church of Norway or the Swedish Church **at least once a month			

In the case of Norway the table shows that, it is only 11% of the respondents that attend religious services at least once a month, while those who never attended religious services constitute 41% the respondents. Since nearly 90% of the respondents belong to the State Church, comparison



of attitudes towards immigrants based on belonging to religious denominations becomes disproportional because of the overrepresentation of members of the Lutheran State Church. Instead attitudes are explored along the lines of church attendance and beliefs in God. In summary, religious orientation gauged by questions that concern beliefs, practices and belonging are seen in light of their possible correlation with attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

### **EU Fear – Loss of National Identity**

Besides the socioeconomic, political and religious variables discussed above, the sample for Denmark and Sweden consists of respondent's attitude towards the European Union, particularly whether the EU is perceived as a threat to the national identity of these two countries. The logic for including this variable is the assumption that those who are afraid of the EU as a threat to their national identities are the same people who hold negative attitudes towards immigrants and vice versa. Other variables like degree of control over life and satisfaction in life are also included in order to explore their potential relationship to attitudes towards immigrants.

In the following chapter bivariate and multivariate analyses of the dependent and independent variables will be presented.

## **5. Data Analysis and Discussion**


This section primarily presents the outcome of bivariate and multivariate analysis of the EVS 2008 data for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The presentation includes tables and graphs accompanied by respective analysis and interpretation. The graphs and tables are generated by SPSS and will be used to portray a preliminary exploration of relationships between the independent and intermediate variables and the dependent variables. There are two dependent variables, *social hostility* (**ATTD\_SOC**) and *general resentment* (**ATTD\_GEN**) that are analysed with respect to variations in diverse independent variables such as age, gender, income and so on. In the following sections a brief overview of these analyses beginning with bivariate and then multivariate analyses will be presented.

Before proceeding with the analysis and discussion, it is important to note that the bivariate analysis is carried out to explore the relationship between a single independent variable and attitudes towards immigrants by holding all other variables constant. Consequently the resulting outcome of the bivariate analysis will be limited to deciphering the existence of relationship, but will reveal very little about the degree and direction of relationship. The later will be achieved through multivariate analysis, which will be presented later. While the bivariate analyses will focus on the relationship between the dependent variables and each independent variable individually, the multivariate analyses will focus on the combined effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables.

### **5.1. Attitudinal variations across Age Groups**

Bivariate analysis of the relationship between respondents in different age categories and their corresponding attitudes towards immigrants in the three countries are presented in this section. A brief description of the case of each country will be given first and then followed by a comparison of the three countries. The graphs for Denmark, Norway and Sweden reveal the pattern of relationships between the different age groups and their corresponding response to whether or not they would like to have immigrants as neighbours. The social hostility scale, **ATTD\_SOC**, has values that range between 0 and 6, where the lower numbers represent those who indicated that they do not like to have immigrants as neighbours, while the higher values represent pro-immigrant attitudes. Since there is no visible difference among those who said they do not like to have immigrants as neighbours, the comparison is made across the other end of the scale.


As seen on the graph for Denmark (Figure 5.1A), people in the age category 70-99 are the



**Figure 5.1A Age vs social hostility -DK**

there is no clear difference in their preference.


When it comes to Sweden (Figure 5.1C), it is only the age category 70-79 that show less preference for immigrants as neighbours. Looking at each country individually, one can see that the relationship between people in certain age categories and



**Figure 5.1C Age vs social hostility - SE**

- consistently show less preference for having immigrants as neighbours than those in other age categories.


least enthusiastic to have immigrants as neighbours. For the rest of the age categories, there is no clear distinction on their attitudes towards the social proximity of immigrants, except for the respondents between 40 and 49. Whereas for Norway (Figure 5.1B) it is the age groups 60-69 and 70-79 that are less enthusiastic about having immigrants as neighbours. For the rest of the age groups




**Figure 5.1B Age vs social hostility - NO**

their attitude towards immigrants is not systematically patterned. In other words, there is no one-to-one correspondence between age and attitudes towards immigrants. However, comparing the three countries as a whole, one can see that people in the age category - 70-79

When it comes to the variation of the scale of the general resentment (ATTID\_GEN) among the different age groups and for the three countries, the graphs (Fig 5.1D, 5.1E and 5.1F) show no systematic pattern of variation. For both Denmark and Norway, the lower side of the scale where anti-immigrant attitudes are represented show no clearly differentiated response from all age groups. The variation among the age groups becomes more apparent and distinguishable on




**Figure 5.1D Age vs general resentment - DK**



**Figure 5.1E Age vs general resentment - NO**

the higher side of the scale where strong pro-immigrant beliefs are represented. In the cases of both Denmark and Norway, people in age groups 60-69 and 70-79, similar to the social hostility scale seen above, are less pro-immigrant than the rest of the age groups. For Sweden (Fig 5.1F), the relationship between age and the general resentment scale is markedly different than that of Denmark and Norway. But the difference is marked more for lack of

any systematic pattern of correlation between age and the resentment scale. However, similar to respondents in Norway and Denmark, Swedish respondents between the age of 70 to 79 are distinctively less enthusiastic about immigrants (either as neighbours or their benefit for society) than the rest of the age categories. Overall the bivariate analysis of the age category as an independent variable and the two dependent variables, social hostility and general resentment, indicates the existence of a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. However this relationship is not systematic both among the different age groups and across the three countries.



**Figure 5.1F Age vs general resentment - SE**

## 5.2. Gender and Attitudes towards Immigrants

Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are also examined with respect to gender differences among the respondents of the three Scandinavian countries. In Denmark as seen in the graph (Fig 5.2A), attitudes towards immigrants if they happen to be neighbours does not vary with the gender of respondents. In other words the difference between male and female respondents is not discernible. In the case of Norway (Figure 5.2B), men are more positive than women, whereas for Sweden (Figure 5.2C) it is vice versa, it is women who have positive attitudes towards immigrants as neighbours.

In the case of Sweden, women are more positive than men about having immigrants as neighbours. The difference between men and women respondents is relatively larger in Norway than in Sweden. These attitudinal differences (or their absence) observed in the three countries are not systematically patterned, which means the relationship between gender and attitudes towards immigrants is not consistent. This can be explained by the fact that gender, though it can affect attitudes towards immigrants, it may also be mediated by or interacts with other variables like level of education, age, income or other relevant characteristics of the respondents. The effect of the mediating variables is presented in the multivariate analysis in later sections.




Figure 5.2A Gender versus Social Hostility for Denmark




Figure 5.2B Gender and Social Hostility - Norway




Figure 5.2C Gender and Social Hostility – Sweden

The bivariate analysis of gender and the general resentment scale for the three Scandinavian countries can be seen on graphs Figure 5.2 D, E and F. As can be seen on the graphs a marked difference between women and men emerges when one considers the relationship between gender and the general resentment scale. For all of the three countries, women are consistently



Figure 5.2D Gender and General Resentment - Denmark

found to be less anti-immigrant and more pro-immigrant than their male counterparts. Again, there




Figure 5.2E Gender and General Resentment - Norway

is a difference between Swedish female respondents and those of Norway and Denmark; in the latter countries, most of the female respondents display moderate attitudes with few respondents falling in the extreme anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant attitude spectrum. In the case of Sweden, most female respondent are pro-immigrant than male respondents than those of Denmark and Norway. The bivariate analysis of the three

countries reveals not only the differences between men and women but also the differences between each individual country. In general, in all three countries, women are found to be more pro-immigrant than men, confirming the fact that gender difference affects attitudes towards immigrants. However, the effect of gender is clearer on attitudes when respondents were asked about the social, cultural and economic impacts of immigrant, rather than their spatial proximity. In summary, for the general resentment scale, gender plays a causative role, because of the fact that women respondents are consistently found to be positive about immigrants in all three countries. However, the lack of such systematic variation among women and men when it comes to their




Figure 5.2F Gender and General Resentment - Sweden

attitudes towards immigrant as neighbours may indicate that other variables could be at play interfering with the effect of gender.

### 5.3. Attitudes and Educational Level

Education is another variable that is hypothesised to have an influence on people’s attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Education can lead to positive attitudes towards immigrants in two ways, direct and indirect ways. The direct way involves the positive relationship between education level and income status, which protects highly educated (high income) people from experiencing direct competition from immigrants. Indirectly, education may also have a value-based effect on prejudice, in such a way that educational institutions may be regarded as vital propagators of democratic and tolerant values and higher education may offer broader perspectives with more knowledge about foreign cultures, which in turn may reduce prejudice (Ervasti, et al., 2008).

The bivariate analysis attempts to find out the relationship between education and attitudes towards immigrants, while keeping every other variable constant. For both dependent variables, the social hostility (ATTD\_SOC) and general resentment (ATTD\_GEN) scales, the response




Figure 5.3A Education\*Social Hostility - Denmark




Figure 5.3B Education versus Social Hostility - Norway analysis of the social hostility scale with respect to education, respondents with primary education are found to be the least positive about having immigrants as neighbours. This is observed in all three countries as seen in Figures 5.3 A, B and C. However, the difference between

patterns among respondents with different levels of education and vocational training are presented in the graphs of A to F of Figure 5.3. To begin with the bivariate





Figure 5.3C Education versus Social Hostility - Sweden

respondents who have educational levels above primary educations is not systematically patterned. Another aspect that can be seen from these graphs is that, the relationship between education and attitudes towards the social proximity of immigrants is more differentiated in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark there is no difference between those who have upper secondary and tertiary education, while in Norway the difference is minimal. In general, on the social hostility scale, those with primary and vocational level of education are less likely to prefer immigrants as neighbours.

For the general resentment scale (Figure 5.3 D, E and F), the relationship between education and attitudes towards the social, cultural and economic impacts of immigrants is clearer than the previous case of the social hostility scale. For instance in the case of Denmark (Figure 5.3D), respondents with education levels of lower secondary are less enthusiastic about immigrants than those with higher levels of education. This is also true for both Norway and Sweden. Another aspect that is revealed from these graphs is that for all three countries the difference is more pronounced between



**Figure 5.3 D Education vs general resentment for Denmark, Norway and Sweden**

those who have secondary level education and those who have tertiary level education; the later consistently exhibiting less anti-immigrant and more pro-immigrant attitudes than the former. In summary, the relationship between education and attitudes towards the social proximity of immigrants is less systematic, i.e. bears no discernible trends, than that of education and the general resentment scale. The comparison of the three countries on both attitude variables reveals that, respondents with tertiary education are found to be less enthusiastic about having immigrants as neighbours but generally display positive attitudes about the impacts of immigrants on the economy, culture and security aspects of society. Previous studies suggest that the less educated are vulnerable to hold negative attitudes towards immigrant, however the comparative bivariate



analysis provides a more nuanced picture that respondents with tertiary education while being positive about the impacts of immigrants are at the same time less enthusiastic about having immigrants as neighbours. This is an ambivalent attitude.

#### 5.4. Attitudes and Employment Status

Employment status of respondents is also explored with respect to attitudes towards immigrants.

Concerning for preference of immigrants as neighbours, the social hostility scale for all of the three




Figure 5.4A Employ. Vs Social Hostility - Denmark

countries (Figures 5.4 A, B and C) does indicate a visible difference between the employed and the non-employed; in all three countries, employed people are more positive towards immigrants than the unemployed. Unlike the cases of age and gender variables and their variation with attitudes towards the social proximity of immigrants (presented in section 5.2 and 5.3), the




Figure 5.4B Employment Vs Social Hostility - Norway




Figure 5.4C Employment Vs Social Hostility -

relationship between employment and attitudes towards immigrants is found to be consistently and systematically patterned among the three countries, i.e. the unemployed are less enthusiastic about having immigrants as neighbours than the employed. In other words, all variables held constant,




Figure 5.4D Employ. Vs General Resen. - Denmark

employment status has a direct effect on attitudes towards the social proximity of immigrants.

For the general resentment scale, the bivariate analysis for the three countries is presented in the graphs 5.4 D, E and F. For both Denmark and Norway, most respondent hold moderate views on immigrants unlike the few who have either

anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant views. However, Sweden presents a different scenario on two aspects. First, as seen in the graphs the largest difference between the employed and the unemployed is observed in Sweden (Figure 5.4F). Another significant difference between Sweden and Denmark and Norway is that, while in the later most respondents hold moderate attitudes towards immigrants, Sweden has a




Figure 5.4E Employment vs Gen. Resent. - Norway

clear majority of respondents who hold pro-immigrant attitudes. Overall, in all three countries, the employed consistently exhibit positive propensity both towards immigrants as neighbours and the




Figure 5.4F Employment vs Gen. Resentment - Sweden

impact of immigrants on the economy, culture and security. This is consistent with the finding of previous research that suggested that employed people have more control over the course of their life and are less vulnerable to potential competitions from immigrants.

### 5.5. Annual Income and Attitudes towards Immigrants

The interaction between, income (measured as the annual household income) and attitudes towards immigrants is also explored for both the social hostility and general resentment scales of the three countries. The social hostility scale, except for Norway, does show perceptible difference on




Figure 5.5A Income vs Social Hostility - Denmark




Figure 5.5B Income vs Social Hostility - Norway

whether a variation in the annual income of the household has any relation to respondent's preference for immigrant neighbours. In Norway, there is no visible difference between high, middle and low income respondents about their attitudes towards immigrants as neighbours. This is not




Figure 5.5C Income vs Social Hostility - Sweden

the case for Denmark, where middle income respondents are less hostile than those of high and low income respondents, with the difference between the latter two categories barely discernible (Figure 5.5A). Similar pattern is also observed in the Swedish sample, however with a clear difference between the three income categories, where high income respondents are found to be the least enthusiastic about having immigrant as neighbours. To state the obvious, this is counterintuitive in such a way that respondents with high income face the least competition from immigrants, but they are the category that are unhappy about having immigrants as their neighbours. The variation of attitudes with income is not systematic, that is, the gradual difference between low, middle and high income categories is not reflected in their corresponding attitudes.




Figure 5.5 D Income vs General Resentment - Denmark

For the general resentment scale,




Figure 5.5E Income vs General Resentment - Norway

suggests that high-income households exhibit less anti-immigrant and more pro-immigrant attitudes than those of low and middle-income households combined. But this is only for the Norwegian sample. For the Danish and Swedish samples, those of middle income respondents consistently show pro-immigrant attitudes than those of low and high income respondents. Otherwise it can be concluded that the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and annual income is not a clear-cut but is non-systematic, suggesting that income instead of playing direct role on shaping attitudes towards immigrants, is interacting with other variables that would produce different effects.

the role of income and its relationship with attitudes towards immigrants is presented in graphs Figure 5.5 D, E and F. For Denmark, respondents with middle income are more positive than those of low and high income respondents. Whereas for Norway, the difference is more between those of high income and low and middle income respondents. There is a clear difference that





Figure 5.5F Income vs General Resentment - Sweden

**5.6. National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigrants**

As previously discussed in Chapter 4, national identity is conceived along two dimensions; ethnic and civic identities. The variables for these dimensions are developed from a list of five questions that tap into respondent’s answers about the importance of ancestry, birth place, language proficiency, length of residence and respect for laws and institutions. Findings from previous studies provide that people with strong ethnic identity have the tendency to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants. Bearing this in mind, one could explore the relationship between ethnic identity and attitudes towards immigrants, while holding every other variable constant. The bivariate analysis in this section presents the resulting outcome.




The first graph (Figure 5.6A) shows the variation of ethnic identity with respect to the social hostility scale, i.e. how the ethnic identity factor shapes attitudes towards immigrants as neighbours. As seen in the graph (Fig 5.6.A), respondents with weak ethnic identities are less likely to state that they do not want to have immigrants as neighbours. This holds true consistently for the three countries, but with the fact that the difference is more observed in Norway than Denmark and Sweden. This is also consistent with the findings of the previous research.

Figure 5.6A Ethnic Identity versus Social Hostility – Denmark, Norway and Sweden

Similarly, for the relationship between ethnic identity and the general resentment scale, weak ethnic identity is also found to be related to less anti-immigrant and more pro-immigrant

attitudes (Figure 5.6B). As can be seen on the graphs, ethnic identity is one of the clearest predictor



of attitudes towards immigrants. There is a systematic and inversely proportional relationship between ethnic identity and attitudes towards immigrants; those with strong ethnic identity hold anti-immigrant attitudes than those of weak ethnic identity.

When it comes to the relationship







Figure 5.6B Ethnic Identity versus General Resentment – Denmark, Norway and Sweden

between civic identity and attitudes towards immigrants, the graphs do not show any systematic patterns either with the social hostility or the general resentment scales. This observation holds true for all three countries. The weak or non-existing relationship between civic identity and attitudes towards immigrants can be explained by the low Cronbach's alpha of the civic identity scale.

### 5.7. Political Views and Attitudes towards Immigrants

The relationship between respondent's self-placement on the left-right political spectrums and their attitudes towards immigrants is also explored both for the social hostility and general resentment scales. As noted in the literature review section (chapter 2), people with left-leaning political attitudes tend to hold positive attitudes towards immigrants. As observed in the graphs (Figure



5.7A), respondents that identify themselves as left-leaning are less hostile towards immigrants as neighbours than those in the right. This difference is more pronounced in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden.




Figure 5.7A Political view versus social hostility - Denmark, Norway and Sweden

Similarly, for the general resentment scale, those on the left of the political spectrum clearly display pro-immigrant attitudes. This






Figure 5.7B Left-Right Political view vs General Resentment - Denmark, Norway and Sweden



is particularly clear in the case of Sweden where the left-right division is unusually strong (Demker, 2007).

In addition, respondent's identification with the major parties in these three countries is also analysed with respect to the two scales (Fig 5.7.2). However the number and diversity of the parties in each country renders the degree of comparability between them less useful. For the social hostility scale, those who identify with the Labour Party are less prone to dislike immigrants as neighbours than those who identify with the Conservative and Progress parties combined. The scenario for the general resentment scale is more complicated, with a sharp contrast between the Labour Party followers and those of the Progress Party. Followers of the latter are the most anti-immigrant and the least pro-immigrant than any followers of other parties.

### 5.8. Religiosity and Attitudes towards Immigrants

Religiosity measured in terms of church attendance and frequency of prayer practice is considered as one of the factors to influence attitudes towards immigrants. Previous studies suggest that the role of religion in shaping attitudes towards immigrants could be ambivalent. On one side, religion can be a source of advocacy and tolerance towards out-groups, while on the other side, it can also lead to exclusive and bigoted views. In the graphs (Figure 5.8 A and B) present the findings of the bivariate analysis.




Figure 5.8A Frequency of prayer and attitudes towards immigrants - Norway

For all the three Scandinavian countries, none of the indicators of religiosity show any systematic relationship or variation with respect to the social hostility and the general resentment scales. Here it suffices to present the case of Norway. As seen in the graphs for the Norwegian sample (Fig 5.8 A&B), both frequency of prayer practice and church attendance have little systematic variation either with the general resentment scale or the social hostility scale. In other words, increase of frequency of prayer practice from never to at least once a month does not have a positive or



negative effect on either the social hostility or the general resentment scales.




Figure 5.8B Religious Attendance versus attitudes towards immigrants (Norway)

**5.9. Bivariate Analysis Summary**

Preliminary analyses of the associations between the *social hostility* and *general resentment* scales and different independent variables have been presented in the above sections. The social hostility scale is a measure of the attitudes of Scandinavians towards the social proximity of immigrants, i.e. how respondents in these three countries see immigrants as neighbours. Similarly, the general resentment scale is a measure of attitudes towards the economic, cultural and political impact of immigrants. As the bivariate analysis presented above confirms, these two scales are found to vary across the populations in the three countries.

There are three observations that emerge from this preliminary analysis. First most of the independent and intermediate variables interact more strongly with the general resentment scale than with the social hostility scale. This is partly due to the small number of variables used to construct the social hostility composite index (3 for the social hostility against 7 for the resentment scale) and due to the small percentage of respondents that fall into one of the response categories for variables used to construct the scale. Second, in relation to the general resentment scale, not all variables have equal and strong interaction with the scale; some of the variables have strong interaction while others are less related to the scales. Third the variables that have a relationship with either of the attitude scales vary from one country to another country.

Among the independent and intermediate variables used in the analysis, variables like gender, level of education, annual income, ethnic identity and political view exhibit strong and systematic interaction with measures of attitudes towards immigrants. With regard to gender, though the degree of variation is different from one country to another, women are found to be consistently pro-immigrant more than men. The same observation applies to ethnic identity, where

respondents with strong ethnic identity are found to be less enthusiastic about immigrants. Whereas the interactions between variables like age categories, employment, civic identity and religiosity (approximated through church attendance and prayer) are less systematic and less prominent. Therefore this observation serves to screen the number of variables used in the multivariate analysis that will examine the combined effect of all variables.

### **5.10. Multivariate Analyses and Discussion**

The bivariate analysis presented in the above section only highlights the relationship of the independent and dependent variables as seen as separate and isolated items. In other words, it explores the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and each socioeconomic variable, while holding any other variables constant. However, quite often and in the real world, attitudes and behaviors do not behave in such a way rather they are part of a complex whole that is made of multiple relations and interactions. This section, therefore, will present multivariate analysis that will shed more light on the degree of strength and impact of a whole set of independent variables on dependent variables. This will be achieved through the use of partial correlation, partial regression and multiple regression methods that are widely used in the social sciences.

The multivariate analyses for all three countries are conducted in step-by-step manner by starting from the basic socioeconomic variables and gradually including other relevant variables. From the analyses, the regression result for the social hostility scale (ATTD\_SOC) is found to be insignificant. None of the variables whether the basic socioeconomic variables or other variables included in the analyses were found to explain more than 10% of the variance in the social hostility scale. Consequently, the social hostility scale is excluded from further multivariate analysis, and the focus will be on the general resentment scale.

In contrast to the social hostility scale, the independent variables were relatively better and able to explain the variance in the general resentment scale. In this section first the results of the analyses for each country will be presented and then a comparative discussion of the three countries will follow.

#### **Norway**

The regression of the general resentment scale, a measure of attitudes towards immigrants, against the independent and intermediate variables for Norway is presented in table 5.1. Note that, dummy values are used for the variables – gender (0 – male, 1 – female), employment (0 – employed, 1 – unemployed), political view (0 – Left, 1 – Right), and identity (0 – weak, 1 – strong). As shown in table 5.2, for the Norwegian sample, the variables gender, age, educational level, occupation and annual income explain only 11% of the variance in the general resentment scale. Among the six socioeconomic variables only gender and level of education are found to be significant, which

means that the results did not occur by chance but have a valid explanatory value in the population. Both gender and level of education are positively related to attitudes towards immigrants, however, it is education that is a strong predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. The more education one has the more pro-immigrant one becomes. The rest of socioeconomic variables like age, employment, occupation and annual income are statistically insignificant, and do not help to explain the variance in attitudes towards immigrants.

**Table 5. 1** Regression of the General Resentment Scale\*\* against Independent Variables – Norway

Variable Categories	Variables	Unstandardized	Standard Coefficient.	
		b	Beta	Sig.
Socio-economic Variables (R <sup>2</sup> - 11%)	Gender	,090	,066	,042
	Age	-,016	-,035	,325
	Educational Level	,156	,183	,000
	Employment	-,050	-,031	,385
	Occupation	-,050	-,065	,094
	Annual Income	-,014	-,017	,628
Politics (R <sup>2</sup> -17.5%)	Political Party	,024	,043	,189
	Left-Right View	-,305	-,223	,000
Identity (R <sup>2</sup> - 25.5%)	Ethnic Identity	-,397	-,288	,000
	Civic Identity	-,176	-,039	,222
Religion (R <sup>2</sup> - 26%)	Attendance	-,040	-,065	,076
	Belief in God	-,042	-,030	,401
Life Satisfaction and Control over life (R <sup>2</sup> -26%)	Control over life	,067	,056	,094
	Life satisfaction	,057	,043	,190
<b>*- All values of R<sup>2</sup> are adjusted values. ** F-test values for all regression runs are significant.</b>				

When variables that concern politics like party preference and political view (position on the left-right political spectrum) are included in the model, the percentage of variance that can be explained jumps from 11 to 17%. However it is only the left-right political standing that has significant impact than party affiliation. Similarly when identity variables are included in the model, the explained variance increases by 8%. However, only ethnic identity is found to be significant. Finally variables about religious views and one's perception of control over life or life satisfaction are insignificant and add a little to the prediction of attitudes towards immigrants.

To summarize, the four most important variables that are significant and are able to predict attitudes towards immigrants in Norway are gender, level of education, political view, and ethnic identity. In plain non-statistical terms, this can be described as follows; women than men, highly educated than less educated, those with left-leaning political views than those with right-leaning views, and those with weak ethnic identity than those with strong ethnic identity are all pro-immigrant. Among these four variables ethnic identity has the strongest predictive power followed

by political view, level of education and gender. While more education is related with pro-immigrant attitudes, strong ethnic identity and right-leaning political attitudes are related with anti-immigrant attitudes.

## Denmark

The multivariate analysis for Denmark reveals a slightly different picture than that of Norway. While in the case of Norway it is the variables gender and level of education that are significant predictors, in Denmark, among the basic socioeconomic variables, it is the variables age, level of education and occupation that are capable of predicting attitudes towards immigrant, which is represented by the general resentment scale (Table 5.2.). Similarly, the analysis also shows that the left-right political standing and ethnic identity are also strong predictors of attitudes towards immigrants. Moreover, variables about religion and one's degree of control over life and satisfaction in life are found insignificant and contribute very little to the prediction of the general resentment scale. This finding is similar to that of Norway. One additional variable that is found to have a strong predictive value is the fear of the European Union as perceived as undermining the national identity is relevant to both Denmark and Sweden. This factor alone explains 5% of the total variance of the general resentment scale.

**Table 5. 2** Regression of the General Resentment Scale\*\* against Independent Variables – Denmark

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	
		b	Beta	Sig.
Socioeconomic Variables (R <sup>2</sup> - 12%)	Gender	,076	,031	,178
	Age	-,096	-,124	,000
	Education Level	,149	,092	,000
	Employment	-,083	-,032	,246
	Occupation	-,175	-,124	,000
	Annual Income	,003	,001	,959
Politics (R <sup>2</sup> - 14%)	Political Party	,000	,000	,983
	Left-Right	-,360	-,141	,000
Identity (R <sup>2</sup> - 21%)	Ethnic Identity	,564	,225	,000
	Civic Identity	,226	,019	,384
EU Fear (R <sup>2</sup> - 26%)	Loss of National Identity	,618	,251	,000
Religion (R <sup>2</sup> - 26.3%)	Attendance	,010	,005	,825
	Belief in God			
Life Control (R <sup>2</sup> - 26.4%)	Control over life	,122	,035	,131
	Life satisfaction	-,206	-,045	,049
*- All values of R <sup>2</sup> are adjusted values. ** F-test values for all regression runs are significant.				

One of the fears associated with the EU is that whether the EU implies loss of national identity. This single variable is found to be the strongest predictor of all variables; those who have no fear of the EU are found to hold pro-immigrant attitudes. As the figures of the standardized

coefficients show, the most important variables in order of magnitude of prediction are EU fear, ethnic identity, political view, occupation, age and level of education. Again, this list of variables is similar to that found in the case of Norway except for the variable occupation.

## Sweden

Multiple regressions analysis is also conducted for Sweden. As the table below shows (Table 5.3), the regression analysis using only socioeconomic variables indicates that gender, occupation and level of education are the most important variables that predict the dependent variable of attitudes towards immigrants. When variables about politics are included in the regression, both indicators are found to affect attitudes towards immigrants but in opposite directions; people on the right of the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes whereas when it comes to party preference those who would vote for the Social Democratic Party other parties on the left of the political spectrum are pro-immigrants. Similar to the case of Denmark, the EU fear factor is also an important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. However, the magnitude of prediction is higher in the case of Denmark than that of Sweden. Moreover, variables about religion and satisfaction in life are insignificant predictors. But the variable about one's degree of control over life is a predictor of attitudes towards immigrant. This is not seen either in Denmark or in Norway.

**Table 5. 3 Regression of the General Resentment Scale against Independent Variables - Sweden**

Table 5.4.				
Model		Unstandardized	Standardized	
		Coefficients	Beta	Sig.
		B	Beta	Sig.
Socioeconomic Variables R <sup>2</sup> -.12%	Age	,028	,026	,613
	Education Level	,146	,066	,246
	Annual Income	-,132	-,051	,313
	Occupation	-,262	-,143	,009
	Employment	-,122	-,035	,483
	Gender	,227	,073	,123
Politics R <sup>2</sup> -13.5%	Political Party	,246	,175	,000
	Left-Right	-,528	-,170	,001
Identity - R <sup>2</sup> -15.4	Ethnic Identity	,654	,211	,000
	Civic Identity	-,306	-,018	,694
EU Fear R <sup>2</sup> -20%	Loss of Identity	,657	,210	,000
Life Control - R <sup>2</sup> - 23.5%	Control over life	,777	,152	,002
	Satisfaction in Life	,501	,105	,032
Religion - R <sup>2</sup> -27%	Attendance	-,174	-,109	,040
	Believe in God	-,100	-,032	,541

\*- All values of R2 are adjusted values. \*\* F-test values for all regression runs are significant.

## Comparing Norway, Denmark and Sweden

When the multivariate analysis for the three countries is observed in comparison with one another, some interesting differences and patterns emerge that were not obvious in the single country analysis. For instance, of all variables included in the analyses, only the variables about left-right political orientation and ethnic identity are found to predict attitudes towards immigrants consistently in all three countries.

Table 5. 4 Comparison of the three Denmark, Norway and Sweden

Variable Categories	Variables	Norway		Denmark		Sweden	
		Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
<b>Socio-economic Variables</b>	Gender	,066	,042	,031	,178	,073	,123
	Age	-,035	,325	-,124	,000	,026	,613
	Educational Level	,183	,000	,092	,000	,066	,246
	Employment	-,031	,385	-,032	,246	-,035	,483
	Occupation	-,065	,094	-,124	,000	-,143	,009
	Annual Income	-,017	,628	,001	,959	-,051	,313
<b>Politics</b>	Political Party	,043	,189	,000	,983	,175	,000
	Left-Right	-,223	,000	-,141	,000	-,170	,001
<b>Identity</b>	Ethnic Identity	-,288	,000	,225	,000	,211	,000
	Civic Identity	-,039	,222	,019	,384	-,018	,694
<b>Religion</b>	Attendance	-,065	,076	,005	,825	-,109	,040
	Belief in God	-,030	,401			-,032	,541
<b>Life Control</b>	Control over life	,056	,094	,035	,131	,152	,002
	Life satisfaction	,043	,190	-,045	,049	,105	,032
<b>EU Fear</b>	Loss of National Identity	na	na	,251	,000	,210	,000
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>		26%		26.4%		27%	

Not only is ethnic identity a stronger predictor of the two variables; it also predicts attitudes towards immigrants more strongly in Norway than Denmark and Sweden. In other words, the relationship between ethnic identity and attitudes towards immigrants is more pronounced among Norwegians than the Danes and the Swedes. The emergence of identity as the primary predictor of attitudes is a paradox. In chapter 4 (Section 4.2.5), the overview of respondents' answer to questions regarding national identity was presented. The questions include variables about the importance of having a Norwegian/Danish/Swedish ancestry, to be born in Norway/Denmark/Sweden, to live in Norway/Denmark/Sweden for long, to respect Norway's/Denmark's/Sweden's laws or learn Norwegian/Danish/Swedish language languages. Respondents in all three countries emphasized that it is learning the language and respecting the laws that matter. However, the result of the multivariate analysis paints a different picture – it is having a Norwegian/Danish/Swedish ancestry, being born in Norway/Denmark/Sweden and living in Norway/Denmark/Sweden for a long time that matters.

Similar observation can be made about the left-right scale of political view. The left-right scale of political view predicts attitudes towards immigrants more strongly in Norway than Denmark and Sweden.

Among the independent variables, some variables like the level of education, occupation, political party preference and degree of control over one's life are relevant to one or two of the countries. For instance, level of education predicts attitudes towards immigrants in Norway and Denmark but not in Sweden. Similarly occupation predicts attitudes towards immigrants in Denmark and Sweden but not in Norway. For both Denmark and Sweden, occupation is inversely related to attitudes towards immigrants; those of non-skilled workers and have routine works have anti-immigrant attitudes than those of higher managers. Only in Denmark is the variable age significant predictor of attitudes towards immigrants in Denmark, while the same is true of the variables about political party preference and degree of control over one's life, which are significant in Sweden. Denmark and Sweden as being members of the EU have one variable among them that is strong predictor of attitudes towards immigrants; fear of loss of national identity which is associated with the EU. This variable, which is only applicable to Denmark and Sweden, predicts attitudes towards immigrants more strongly in Denmark than in Sweden. The statistics is interpreted in such a way that the less afraid are people toward the EU, the more pro-immigrant attitudes people hold. For all of the three countries, the variables gender, employment, annual income, civic identity, church attendance and one's degree of satisfaction in life add a little to the prediction of attitudes towards immigrants.

## 6. Conclusion

Globalization is considered to be one of the most important phenomena in the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Though the trans-regional and cross-continental movement of people, commodities and cultures is not unique to our time, technological advancements in transportation and communication and rapid political transformation in the last few decades have ushered a new era of movement of people, capital and ideas across the globe. The scale, intensity and complexity of this global phenomenon are unprecedented and has several important features that distinguish it from similar phenomenon in the past. Among these important characteristics, it is migration in general and immigration in particular that has been happening with far-reaching implications in the contemporary world.

In the last few decades, immigration from non-western parts of the world has been changing the ethnic and cultural makeup of Europe in general and Scandinavian countries in particular. One of the consequences of this cultural and demographic transformation is that the introduction of new ethnic and cultural groups that challenge the prevailing power structures and relationships of dominant ethnic, religious or cultural groups that constitute Scandinavian societies. Such challenges are inevitable considering the complexity of immigration and the prevailing social, political and cultural circumstances that dictate the terms of entry for newly arriving immigrants.

Immigration is inherently disruptive process for host societies; it disrupts the cultural, linguistic and political landscapes of host societies. For instance, in less than five decades, immigrants from 221 countries around the world and children born to immigrants constitute more than 14% of the current population of Norway (SSB, 2014). Immigration is also disruptive for a state that, in its brief history since the emergence of nationalism, considers itself as the sole guardian of the nation whose identity will remain unchanged. It is also disruptive for the state that has built its institutions around the notion of the “imagined community” of the dominant ethnic group that has unbalanced access and control. This disruption is acutely reflected particularly in the realms of political, social and cultural discourses and practices in Scandinavian countries. Elections are fought and won by political parties that either directly or indirectly organize themselves around the issue of immigration. Media representations of issues of immigration and immigrants also reflect the polarizing effect of immigration and the raging debate about what to do about it. Government policies, particularly those that concern integration, education and culture are not also outside the looming influence of immigration. When one considers terrorism and arrival of new waves of refugees into this barrage of phenomenon, it makes immigration as the single most important phenomenon in the contemporary world.

It is in this complex and constantly changing context that individuals find themselves dealing with the relevant issue of immigrants and immigration. From the outset, this thesis is



concerned to find the most important determinants of attitudes towards immigrant – whether as neighbours or their impact on the economy, culture and social life of Scandinavian countries. Subsequent review of literature and theoretical perspectives in conjunction with the quantitative analysis of the European Value Studies survey data from 2008 have helped to elucidate the most important variables that predict attitudes towards immigrants in the three Scandinavian countries. Based on the theoretical discussion and data analysis conducted in the previous sections, the following conclusions are drawn.

First, the investigation of the survey data and its comparison across the three Scandinavian countries highlights that it is identity and political view that has the most relevant and strong predictive power. Identity, especially its ethnic version, is the single most important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. In other words, Norwegians, Danes and Swedes view of immigrants is more closely related to their social identity than any of their individual characteristics. The more strong one's ethnic identity is the more anti-immigrant one becomes. Among the three countries, it is in Norway that ethnic identity is stronger predictor of attitudes than in Denmark or Sweden.

Second, the self-identification of people with the Left or Right spectrum of politics, is also found as an important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. Scandinavians who identify themselves as left-leaning are more positive about immigrants than those with right-leaning political views. At the heart of the difference between the left and right political views are two interrelated aspects namely advocating versus resisting social change, and rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost, et al., 2009). With regard to societal change, in the last few decades, Scandinavian countries have seen new developments related to immigration; the electoral success of populist parties with explicit anti-immigrant agenda and the increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by mainstream parties. Is such development a symptom of voters' dissatisfaction with the degree and rate of societal change and an eventual sign of the gradual shift of politics from leftism to the right among Scandinavian countries? In all three Scandinavian countries, individuals who identify themselves as holding left-leaning political views are found to be pro-immigrant. Is this positive tendency towards immigrants driven by their desire to openness for social change or egalitarian concern for immigrants who are often affected by economic and social inequality? The findings of this thesis do not give any definitive answer on this question. However, recent political developments in Scandinavian countries like the rise of populist right-wing parties with explicit anti-immigrant agenda paints bleak prospect for any positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Third, in a global perspective, the salience of identity reveals the paradox of globalization – on one side migration is bringing new people and cultures into close proximity and the world is experiencing integration and homogenization while becoming one global village in the process. On

the other side, simultaneously with this homogenization is the process of fragmentation and differentiation based on different kinds of social identities as seen in the resurgence of issues of identity – either in the national, regional or local manifestations. Identity has become the frontline where categorization and social comparison help individuals to deal with the perplexity of immigration. The resurgence of identity is a local reaction to the global phenomenon of immigration. Current debates on immigration are often shrouded by concerns about the issues of economy or security risks associated with immigrants; while this can be true for the political elites, ordinary citizens are more driven by issues of identity. With the number of immigrants coming to Europe increasing year by year and Scandinavian countries being choice of destination, the future holds more entrenchment of identity as a defining aspect of attitudes and behaviours of native Scandinavians towards immigrants.

Fourth, the emergence of identity, particularly ethnic identity, as a salient predictor of attitudes towards immigrants has a significant implication for social harmony particularly for large cities like Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, where large concentration of immigrants are found. While the official policy is that immigrants need to learn the language and respect the laws in order to be accepted as members of Scandinavian societies, the salience of ethnic identity poses an intractable obstacle on the paths of immigrants. This is due to the fact that ethnic identity is not a matter of voluntary decision and free choice; one cannot stop being a Norwegian or a Pakistani, or a Danish or an Ethiopian out of choice. The same social identity processes, categorization and social comparison, that underlie Scandinavian attitudes towards immigrants also underlie the paths of immigrant's integration into Scandinavian societies. Are immigrants reflecting back the very ethnic tendency they see on their Scandinavian neighbours? The segregation and urban divisions seen in Oslo, Malmo or Copenhagen could be manifestations of these social identity processes.

### **Future Research**

This thesis began with the aim of investigating the primary determining factors of attitudes towards immigrants among Scandinavian countries. However, in the course of writing the thesis, some issues have arisen that were both limitations and at the same time could further the research question set at the beginning. The first issue regards the research design; this thesis is based on analysing a survey data collected at a specific time. Including a longitudinal perspective could help in a better understanding of how attitudes change over time.

The second issue is about the relationship between attitudes and behaviours; does holding negative attitudes towards immigrants lead to voting for anti-immigrant parties or avoiding social contacts or demonstrating against reception of refugees? What is the underlying mechanism

involved between attitudes and behaviours? What kind of situational conditions lead to violence outbursts or solidarity with immigrants?

Third, the thesis was based on the statistical analysis of the EVS data. However, the resulting multivariate analysis could only explain around 25 – 27 % of the variance in the dependent variable. This could be improved with a better research design and robust statistical analysis.

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