

The Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns

Henri L. F. de Groot, Gert-Jan Linders,
Piet Rietveld and Uma Subramanian*

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent research in international economics points at the likely relevance of barriers to trade other than tariffs and quotas. Rauch (2001) focuses on the importance of information costs that are related to physical (and cultural) distances. Deardorff (2001) argues that international trade patterns to a large extent depend on largely unobservable trading costs, instead of factor endowments and technology. On the same note, Anderson (2001) states that informal trade barriers appear to be very large even between similar countries, such as the US and Canada. Thus, informal trade barriers may help explain the home bias or border effect in trade (McCallum 1995). Also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) highlight the possible role of unobserved trade costs in sorting out some of the apparent puzzles in international economics.

The unobserved barriers to trade are often related to incomplete or asymmetric information and uncertainty in exchange. North (1990, 1995) argues that, because of imperfect insight and incomplete information, people form institutions. He defines institutions as ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (1990, p. 3). These rules of the game are intended to reduce the uncertainty in exchange, and lower transaction costs. The impact of institutions on transaction costs has received a lot of attention in the literature on economic growth and development (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999, Olson 1996, Knack and Keefer 1995). This literature builds on the notion that poor governance entails negative externalities for private transactions, and consequently raises transac-

* Corresponding author: Henri L. F. de Groot, Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 20 444 6168 (6090), Fax: +31 20 444 6004, Email: hgroot@feweb.vu.nl. Gert-Jan Linders and Piet Rietveld: Dept of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit and Tinbergen Institute. Uma Subramanian: World Bank, Washington. We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for useful and stimulating comments on an earlier version of this paper. Furthermore, we thank Silvia Stiller and participants of the ERSA 2003 conference for comments on an earlier draft.

tion costs with negative effects on growth and development. We can neatly extend these arguments to international trade (see Wei 2000). Because international transactions involve multiple governance systems, the effectiveness of domestic institutions in securing and enforcing property rights in economic exchange is an important determinant of trade costs. Furthermore, formal rules affect informal norms of behaviour and inter-personal trust, which influence the mores and conventions of doing business. These, in turn, may also impact on risk perceptions and preferences in international transactions. We therefore investigate the hypothesis that institutions matter for international trade¹.

In order to identify the effects of institutions on bilateral trade, we estimate gravity equations. The ‘gravity model’ of bilateral trade is inspired by Newton’s equation of gravity in physics, which relates the gravity force with which two bodies attract each other proportionately to the product of their masses, and inversely to the square of their distance. Interpreting trade between two countries as the economic analogue of the mutual gravitational force between two bodies, with their respective GDPs reflecting mass, we see the intuitive rationale for a gravity model of bilateral trade². In general, the gravity model considers trade between a pair of countries as an increasing function of their national incomes and a decreasing function of their geographical distance (Frankel and Rose 2002). Other variables that relate to both countries, or either of the two countries separately, may also enter into the equation (population size, land area, contiguity, etc.). The model has performed well empirically. Amongst others, studies by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998) show that both new trade theories of product differentiation as well as the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage can provide a theoretical rationale for the gravity model of bilateral trade.

Compared to the literature on institutions and growth, the impact of institutions on international trade flows has received relatively little attention³. Two

1. Evidently, the growth and trade lines of research are closely related. Many studies have identified openness to international trade as an important determinant of economic growth (e.g., Frankel and Romer 1999). Thus, even if institutions are shown to be of less direct importance for economic performance than trade (cf. Dollar and Kraay 2002), a strong link between the quality of governance and trade reconfirms the importance of good governance for long-run economic performance. See, for example, Frankel and Rose (2002) who use a gravity model approach to argue that the main benefits of a currency union for economic performance are related to its positive effect on trade and openness, which affect performance beneficially.
2. The analogy doesn’t entirely follow suit. While the resulting force with which either of the two particles attracts the other is equal (irrespective of their individual mass), trade from one country to the other may in general be different from its counterpart.
3. Anderson (2001) and Den Butter and Mosch (2002) are examples in the literature that focus on the effects of informal institutions on trade.

recent empirical studies have considered the impact of institutions on trade in a gravity model context (Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, Koukhartchouk and Maurel 2003). Anderson and Marcouiller have been amongst the main contributors to extend institutional analysis of the economy explicitly to the field of international trade. Their most recent contribution combines the analysis of the effects of institutions in a theoretical model with empirical estimates of the impact of institutional effectiveness on trade. Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003) analyse the effects of joining international institutions such as the WTO and the EU on trade patterns. They introduce variables reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of potential trade effects for Central and Eastern European countries.

Our paper intends to contribute to this virgin literature in two ways. First, we have used the most recent and comprehensive data-set on the quality of governance available. This database was constructed for the World Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2002). Indicators from 17 different sources, constructed by 15 organisations have been combined, including the sources used by Anderson and Marcouiller (World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report) and Koukhartchouk and Maurel (Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom Index). Second, we intend to analyse not only the effect of institutional quality on trade, but also the effect of similarity in governance quality. In this way, we capture both the country-specific effect of good governance on trade, and the bilateral influence of institutional distance on patterns of trade. We expect that institutional homogeneity results in similar, hence familiar, informal business procedures, which may reduce transaction costs.

We proceed as follows. Section II discusses the measures of institutional quality that we have used in the analysis. In sections III and IV, we present and discuss the regression results for alternative specifications of a basic and extended gravity model, respectively. Section V concludes.

II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MODEL SETUP

In the empirical analysis that follows, we make use of both country-specific and bilateral data from various sources. Gross domestic product for exporting and importing countries are examples of country-specific variables that we include in the analysis. Geographical distance, adjacency, main language and religion, amongst others, are examples of other characteristics that we take into account for each pair of countries. We focus on trade patterns in 1998, for a set of more than 100 countries. We use bilateral exports as dependent variable, such that each country pair yields two observations, with each country either as exporter

or importer. Since these variables are more or less standard in the literature, we do not extensively discuss them here. Appendix A further describes these data and their sources.

Since the main emphasis in this paper is on the effects of institutions, we take a closer look at the institutional variables. We have used the database constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2002). They have constructed six indicators of perceived institutional quality. Each indicator captures some related aspects of the quality of governance. They either reflect the political process, the quality of the state apparatus and its policies, or the success of governance. We discuss these indicators in turn.

1. 'Voice and Accountability' reflects the extent to which citizens can participate in selecting government and hold it accountable for the actions taken. This score includes various characteristics of the political process as well as assessments of the independence of the media. It reflects whether citizens and business can prevent arbitrariness in the behaviour of government and enforce good governance when needed.
2. 'Political Stability' refers to the perceived likelihood of the government being destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional interference or excesses of violence against persons and possessions. These factors are highly detrimental for the continuity of policy and the stability of the economic environment.
3. 'Government Effectiveness' is a measure for the quality of government inputs. It represents, amongst others, the perceived quality and independence of the bureaucracy. This indicates the ability of government to formulate and implement good policies.
4. 'Regulatory Quality' is directly focused on the quality of implemented policies. It includes the perceived incidence of policies that inhibit the market mechanism, and excessive regulation of foreign trade and business development, and as such closely reflects the transaction costs that result from policy intrusion by the state in private trade.
5. 'Rule of Law' indicates the quality of the legal system. It indicates society's perceived success in upholding fair and predictable rules for social and economic interaction. Essentially, it focuses on the quality of the legal system and the enforceability of contracts.
6. 'Control of Corruption' represents the extent of 'lawless' or unfair behaviour in public-private interactions. It complements regulatory quality and rule of law indicators, pointing at the impact of bad governance on economic interaction. Corruption, like regulatory intrusion, affects transaction costs by adding a 'third-party' involvement to private transactions. An added component of corruption to trading costs is its arbitrary, uncertain nature.

Table 1 below illustrates the data on institutional quality. It presents the sample means and standard deviations for each of these indicators, together with some tentative illustration of the corresponding cross-country differences in institutional quality.

Table 1

Some data on governance as illustration: countries at various levels of quality

Governance Quality	Voice and accountability	Political Stability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption
One s.d. above mean	Spain	France	Hong Kong	Uruguay	Spain	Slovenia
Mean Governance	Slovenia	Morocco	China	Brunei	Tanzania	Jordan
One s.d. below mean	Azerbaijan	Benin	Yemen	Burundi	Azerbaijan	Tanzania
Mean (s.d.)	0.22 (0.92)	0.15 (0.88)	0.14 (0.92)	0.18 (0.79)	0.16 (0.95)	0.09 (1.00)

Note: All indicator scores have been scaled from -2.5 to +2.5 (see Kaufmann et al. 2002). The selected countries have a minimum distance to the mean and the score of one s.d. above and below average, respectively.

To capture similarity in institutional quality, we have constructed dummy variables for the various dimensions of governance that we introduced before. If the difference in institutional effectiveness (positively defined) between two countries in a country-pair exceeds (is below) a specified fraction of the sample standard deviation of the specific indicator of effectiveness, the countries are viewed as heterogeneous (homogeneous) in terms of the quality of governance. In such a case, the country-pair scores a value of zero (one) on the governance similarity dummy. The estimated effect of institutional homogeneity on trade, measured in this way as a discrete impact, is clear and concise in its interpretation⁴.

All aspects of governance are interrelated. As a result, the indicators are highly positively correlated. For that reason, we treat them separately in the em-

4. Alternatively, we could have specified a non-linear function of the absolute value of the difference in institutional quality. In this way, we would have an index of heterogeneity on a continuous scale. The interpretation of the size of the effect would be more difficult though. To account for the sensitivity of our dummy variable specification, we address the results for several similarity criteria.

pirical analysis, including one dimension of governance in the equation at a time. Adding too many at once results in serious problems of multi-collinearity. We will also use a composite indicator of institutional quality, to capture the overall quality of governance in a country. The simple arithmetic average of the scores on each separate indicator serves as a composite indicator that reflects overall quality of governance.

A typical gravity equation that we estimate below looks as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(T_{ij}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(Y_i) + \beta_2 \ln(Y_j) + \beta_3 \ln(y_i) + \beta_4 \ln(y_j) \\ & + \beta_5 \ln(D_{ij}) + \beta_6 Adj_{ij} + \beta_7 Lang_{ij} + \beta_8 PTA_{ij} + \beta_9 Religion_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{10} Col_{ij} + \beta_{11} Inst_i + \beta_{12} Inst_j + \beta_{13} SimInst_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where i and j denote the exporting and importing country. The dependent variable T_{ij} is aggregate merchandise exports from i to j for 1998. The independent variables are, respectively: national income (Y), income per capita (y), the distance between i and j (D_{ij}), dummies reflecting whether i and j share: a land border (Adj), their primary language ($Lang$), membership in a regional Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), their main religion ($Religion$), and whether they were part of a common colonial empire (Col). The variables of particular interest in this paper are, respectively, the level of subjective institutional quality ($Inst$), and a dummy reflecting whether both countries have a similar quality of institutions ($SimInst$). The last term is the stochastic error term, which captures all other (omitted) effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved. The gravity model estimates are acquired using OLS.

III. BASIC RESULTS

Before investigating the effects of institutions, we first discuss a set of specifications of the gravity equation that take into account standard variables often applied in the literature. The results are contained in *Table 2*. In the first specification, we regress bilateral trade on the levels of gross domestic product in the exporting and importing country. This specification of the gravity model corresponds to basic new trade theory models, in which trade is positively related to market size. In accordance with other gravity model studies of bilateral trade, we find that GDP positively and significantly affects trade. This confirms theoretical expectations. Since we focus on exports rather than total bilateral trade, we can also examine whether the effect of GDP on trade differs between the country of origin and the country of destination of trade flows. The results indicate that export supply is income elastic: a 1% increase in exporter GDP

THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BILATERAL TRADE PATTERNS

raises bilateral trade on average by about 1.2%, while trade is inelastic with respect to importer GDP, with an estimated elasticity of 0.86. The importance of GDP variation in accounting for the variation in trade is illustrated by the fact that about half of the variation in bilateral trade flows is explained by variation in GDP.

Table 2

Standard gravity equations; dependent variable: log total bilateral export

	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 3	Specification 4	Specification 5 ^{a)}
Log GDP exporter	1.19 (89.25)	1.26 (106.41)	1.20 (81.24)	1.18 (81.05)	
Log GDP importer	0.86 (69.07)	0.90 (81.48)	0.86 (59.80)	0.85 (59.32)	
Log GDP per capita exporter			0.15 (5.31)	0.20 (7.23)	
Log GDP per capita importer			0.11 (4.03)	0.15 (5.72)	
Log Distance		-1.34 (-51.95)	-1.30 (-50.24)	-1.15 (-42.30)	-0.89 (-31.74)
Border Dummy				0.67 (4.80)	1.09 (8.57)
Language Dummy				0.19 (1.75)	0.58 (5.48)
Trade area Dummy				0.87 (10.19)	1.00 (11.28)
Religion Dummy				0.45 (8.39)	0.75 (14.53)
Colonial Dummy				0.68 (7.46)	0.65 (7.00)
adj. R^2	0.53	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.72
number of obs.	9 554	9 554	9 006	9 006	9 652
F-statistic	5 444.81	5 554.86	3 296.67	1 782.42	-

Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms, where applicable, are not shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.

The second specification adds geographical distance as an explanatory variable of bilateral trade. Distance serves as a proxy for the size of transportation costs and also reflects other distance related trade costs. This specification includes the relevant variables that feature in basic new economic geography models

(see Fujita et al. 1999). Distance negatively affects the intensity of trade. According to our estimates, a 1% increase in bilateral distance reduces trade more than proportionately. The effect of distance is highly significant. The result supports the importance of trade costs for explaining the patterns of trade. After including the basic gravity variables (income and distance), more than 60% of the variation in trade is accounted for.

Standard gravity models also control for other country-specific and bilateral characteristics that may affect trade. The third model included in *Table 2* allows for an effect of the level of development on trade. Trade is estimated to increase with the level of income per capita in both countries. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding has also been reported frequently in other gravity studies (e.g., Frankel 1997, 1998), but is not undisputed. Trade theories do not provide a clear explanation for the positive effect of per capita income. As it is, the estimates confirm the observation by Dear-dorff (1998, p. 16) that 'high-income countries trade disproportionately more (. . .) with all trading partners and not just among themselves, while low-income countries trade less'. Adding income per capita to the gravity equation decreases the coefficients for the GDP variables somewhat to separate the effects of economic size and economic development.

The fourth specification extends the model with several variables that have proven to be effective controls for shared historical, political and cultural background (see Frankel 1997)⁵. The dummy variables indicate the presence of a common language, common dominant religion and common colonial history. Furthermore, we control for the effect of economic integration using a dummy variable for common membership in regional trading blocs. Measurement errors in the distance variable, as well as the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries are captured by the dummy for common land border. The results show that all variables have the expected positive sign as is often reported in the literature, and are significant at the 10% level at least.

The coefficients on GDP and income per capita are quite robust to these extensions. As expected, the estimated impact of distance on trade (positively defined) declines somewhat. Most relations represented in the bilateral dummy variables more or less cluster in space. Thus, adding these variables arguably

5. The rationale for the extended model is not so much that it increases the share of explained variation in trade flows (the adjusted R^2 rises only slightly). It is by no means an uncommon finding that the proportion of the variance in trade flows explained by the gravity model does not rise substantially after the basic gravity variables have been accounted for. The bilateral dummies in Specification 4 correct for the effects of various unobserved trade costs on bilateral trade, that would otherwise bias the estimates on the basic gravity variables.

corrects for an upward omitted variables bias in the estimated impact of distance on trade.

We may still wonder whether the coefficients on the bilateral dummies themselves suffer from the effects of omitted country-specific variables. The results for a regression equation that includes country-specific dummies for each country, both as exporter and importer, are presented in the last column of *Table 2*. The model is estimated with a full set of dummies, omitting one dummy and the constant term. The dummy variables represent all country-specific factors that might be relevant for their propensity to trade, either in the role as exporter or as importing country. The resulting parameter estimates for bilateral variables generally become more precise and do not suffer from omitted variable biases.

Following the introduction of country-specific dummies, the coefficients on the bilateral dummy variables rise, and they become statistically more significant. However, country-specific fixed effects lower the impact of distance and its statistical significance. Despite the quantitative changes in the estimates, the qualitative effects do not change in comparison to the standard gravity model as represented in Specification 4.

IV. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

In this section we extend the analysis in the previous section and focus on the explanatory role of institutional quality and institutional homogeneity for the intensity of bilateral trade. The economic rationale for including these variables is simple. A better *quality* of the institutional framework reduces uncertainty about contract enforcement and general economic governance. This reduces transaction costs directly, by increasing the security of property, as well as indirectly, by increasing the level of trust in the process of economic transactions. *Homogeneity* in the perceived quality of institutions (cf. Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik 2001) may give rise to similar norms of behaviour (conventions, business practices) and similar levels of trust in doing business. Institutional homogeneity leads to familiarity with each other's formal procedures and with the informal conventions and habits developed to deal with the governance situation. If traders in both countries experience similar levels of institutional effectiveness, they are better equipped to use each other's institutions, to operate in each other's institutional environment. This reduces adjustment costs that have to be made because of natural unfamiliarity with international trading partners, and lowers the insecurity related to transaction contingencies in trade. Similarity of informal business procedures may increase bilateral trust. Economic

agents in similar institutional environments have more confidence in being compatible trading partners, compared to the traders from two institutionally heterogeneous countries⁶.

Our reasoning logically relates to the argument in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002, pp. 343–344), who state that insecurity of international transactions influences trade by imposing a price mark-up on traded goods. This price mark-up depends on two factors. The quality of institutions determines their effectiveness in protecting and enabling private transactions. However, the bilateral familiarity of trading partners is important as well. This determines how ‘skillfully’ traders can use each other’s institutional capacity. Anderson and Marcouiller refer to the instrumental roles that can be played in this matter by language commonality and contiguity. They also justify the relative insecurity mark-up on traded goods as compared to domestic goods by arguing that transaction costs in domestic trade are lower because of the greater availability of informal procedures to protect property rights. We argue that institutional homogeneity is an additional factor determining relative transaction costs and price mark-ups in bilateral trade.

4.1 *The effects of institutional quality*

Table 3 presents the results for a gravity model supplemented with institutional quality. Each specification includes an indicator for the perceived quality of a country’s institutional framework. The variable relevant for each specification is given in the column headings. Across the board, the impact of a higher perceived quality of governance on bilateral trade is positive and highly statistically significant, independent of which indicator of quality is used in the estimations. Because the indicators of institutional quality vary between -2.5 to $+2.5$, we cannot log-linearize the relation between institutions and trade. The relation necessarily is of a semi-log form. The effect sizes reported are semi-elasticities. To interpret the substantive impact suggested by these effect sizes, we start from the standard deviation of these variables within the sample. The effect on trade of a difference of one standard deviation from the average institutional quality gives a good indication of the average impact of variation in in-

6. Similarity of informal norms resulting from a similar experience with formal governance is an important potential factor of cultural familiarity. Language, religion and other historical ties are other factors that have received earlier attention in the literature. The general argument of ‘cultural familiarity’, or ‘psychic distance’, goes back to Linnemann (1966) and others (cited in Frankel 1997).

THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BILATERAL TRADE PATTERNS

stitutional quality on trade flows. *Table 1* illustrated the sample means and standard deviations of the indicators for institutional quality.

Table 3
 Extended gravity equations: institutional quality;
 dependent variable: log total bilateral export

	Voice and Account- ability	Political Stability	Govern- ment Effective- ness	Regula- tory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Cor- ruption	Compos- ite Indi- cator
Log GDP exporter	1.20 (82.31)	1.19 (80.21)	1.18 (80.19)	1.19 (80.41)	1.19 (80.47)	1.19 (80.57)	1.19 (80.92)
Log GDP importer	0.85 (60.03)	0.85 (57.74)	0.84 (57.65)	0.85 (57.97)	0.85 (57.67)	0.85 (57.85)	0.86 (58.19)
Log GDP per capita exporter	-0.05 (-1.48)	0.05 (1.32)	-0.05 (-1.18)	0.10 (2.93)	-0.06 (-1.38)	-0.04 (-0.97)	-0.09 (-2.04)
Log GDP per capita importer	0.07 (1.95)	0.00 (-0.06)	-0.02 (-0.55)	0.01 (0.30)	0.04 (1.07)	0.02 (0.48)	-0.05 (-1.25)
Log Distance	-1.15 (-42.47)	-1.16 (-42.89)	-1.16 (-43.03)	-1.19 (-43.42)	-1.15 (-42.56)	-1.17 (-43.15)	-1.18 (-43.53)
Border Dummy	0.70 (5.04)	0.66 (4.73)	0.71 (5.11)	0.65 (4.72)	0.70 (5.03)	0.66 (4.72)	0.66 (4.72)
Language Dummy	0.12 (1.12)	0.20 (1.80)	0.26 (2.42)	0.21 (1.96)	0.28 (2.58)	0.24 (2.18)	0.21 (1.95)
Trade area Dummy	0.89 (10.50)	0.88 (10.27)	0.84 (9.79)	0.84 (9.82)	0.85 (9.89)	0.86 (10.04)	0.85 (9.95)
Religion Dummy	0.47 (8.77)	0.47 (8.70)	0.49 (9.04)	0.45 (8.40)	0.49 (9.15)	0.48 (8.89)	0.49 (9.06)
Colonial Dummy	0.69 (7.67)	0.65 (7.14)	0.53 (5.81)	0.55 (6.07)	0.56 (6.20)	0.56 (6.15)	0.55 (6.10)
Governance exporter	0.37 (10.45)	0.21 (4.69)	0.34 (7.70)	0.19 (4.34)	0.33 (7.60)	0.29 (7.43)	0.43 (8.30)
Governance importer	0.13 (3.86)	0.23 (5.43)	0.26 (5.87)	0.29 (7.19)	0.15 (3.53)	0.17 (4.28)	0.31 (6.11)
adj. R^2	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
number of obs.	9 006	8 834	8 834	8 834	8 834	8 715	8 715
F-statistic	1 515.69	1 469.26	1 479.88	1 473.76	1 473.92	1 473.45	1 481.48

Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not shown in the table.

Although differing between indicators and according to the country's role as exporter or importer, the impact of variation in the quality of institutions on trade is substantial. An increase in regulatory quality of one standard deviation from the mean leads to an estimated increase of 16–26% in trade⁷. Lower corruption, on average, accounts for 19–34% extra trade⁸. Using the composite indicator of governance quality (last column), we gain insight in the overall trade impact of variation in governance effectiveness⁹. Increasing the overall quality of institutions one standard deviation above its mean level would raise bilateral exports by 44%, and bilateral imports by 30%. These effects of governance on trade intensity are substantial.

Apparently, trade costs associated with the effectiveness of institutions seriously affect the distribution and size of bilateral trade flows. Yet, the introduction of institutional quality in the gravity equation does not substantially increase the explained share of variation in trade flows, or noticeably affect the coefficients on the bilateral variables and GDP. Omitted variable bias turns out to be an essential element in interpreting the gravity model with institutions. After institutions have been included in the gravity model, the clearly positive effect of income per capita levels on trade disappears. The result is most pronounced for the specification that uses the average index of institutional quality. The effect of the level of development on trade becomes insignificant and negative for the import side, and even significantly negative for the export side. This result confirms the findings in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), and makes clear that the standard gravity model including income per capita as explanatory variable suffers from severe omitted variable bias, if institutions are not taken into account. Stated alternatively, institutional quality helps opening up the black box that is created by the inclusion of GDP per capita.

On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that institutions are dominant in explaining why rich countries trade more in general, and more so amongst each other, while poor countries trade less amongst themselves. Kaufmann et al. (2002, p. 4) already note the 'strong positive association across countries between governance and per capita incomes'. High-income countries support high quality institutional systems that reduce transaction costs. Hence,

7. The mean score for regulatory quality is 0.18, with a standard deviation of 0.79. For an exporting country (a semi-elasticity of 0.19), the average trade increase figure is computed as follows:

$$d \ln(T_{ij}) = 0.19 \times 0.79 \text{ so } \frac{dT_{ij}}{T_{ij}} = (e^{0.19 \times 0.79} - 1) = 0.16 = 16\%.$$

8. This confirms the finding by Tamirisa and Wei (2002) that corruption is an important informal barrier to trade.

9. The average overall quality of governance in the sample is 0.16, with a standard deviation of 0.84.

a possible solution for the missing theoretical explanation why rich countries trade more has been found.

4.2 *The effects of institutional homogeneity*

Table 4 concentrates on gravity models extended with variables to reflect the effect of institutional similarity. We focus on the composite indicator of governance quality, and discuss different models depending on the selection criteria of classifying countries as similar in terms of institutional effectiveness. The general qualitative pattern in the effect of similarity across various assumptions is almost entirely replicated for the separate indicators individually (results are available upon request).

In section II, we have explained how we constructed the dummy variable for institutional similarity. If the absolute difference in institutional effectiveness between the exporting and importing country does not exceed a specified fraction of the sample standard deviation in the relevant index of governance, the quality of governance is regarded as similar in both countries. The first three columns present models in which we vary only the specified fraction. In the first column, each difference below one standard deviation is associated with institutional homogeneity. The other columns use 2 and 3 standard deviations respectively. Columns 4 and 5 check for the importance of omitted country-specific variables for the parameter estimates of similarity. They present models with a fully specified set of country-specific fixed effects, using similarity dummies based on the one or two standard deviation criterions.

The effect of similarity in institutional effectiveness on trade appears to depend on how inclusive the set of 'similar' countries is. With one standard deviation as the criterion, 50% of the countries classify as homogeneous in terms of governance effectiveness. The effect of similarity in this case is not significant and appears to be negative. The effect is rather small: having a similar institutional framework appears to lower trade by 5%. If we relax the cut-off criterion to two or three standard deviations, the fraction of 'similar' countries increases first to 83% and then to 98%. In effect, this means that only countries that differ very widely in terms of institutional quality are seen as dissimilar. The trade effect of similarity becomes substantially positive and significant. For a cut-off criterion of two standard deviations, similarity raises trade by an estimated 13%.

Table 4

Extended gravity equations: institutional homogeneity;
dependent variable: log total bilateral export

	Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference in institutional quality is:				
	< 1 standard deviation	< 2 standard deviations	< 3 standard deviations	< 1 standard deviations ^{a)}	< 2 standard deviations ^{a)}
Log GDP exporter	1.18 (79.93)	1.18 (79.97)	1.18 (79.98)		
Log GDP importer	0.85 (57.48)	0.85 (57.58)	0.85 (57.58)		
Log GDP per capita exporter	0.20 (7.39)	0.21 (7.55)	0.21 (7.60)		
Log GDP per capita importer	0.15 (5.71)	0.15 (5.66)	0.15 (5.58)		
Log Distance	-1.17 (-42.94)	-1.17 (-42.80)	-1.17 (-42.94)	-0.88 (-31.31)	-0.88 (-31.36)
Border Dummy	0.62 (4.43)	0.60 (4.28)	0.60 (4.33)	1.08 (8.44)	1.05 (8.24)
Language Dummy	0.19 (1.71)	0.19 (1.70)	0.18 (1.64)	0.59 (5.50)	0.58 (5.49)
Trade area Dummy	0.89 (10.27)	0.87 (10.04)	0.87 (10.12)	0.95 (10.52)	0.90 (9.94)
Religion Dummy	0.47 (8.61)	0.46 (8.54)	0.47 (8.64)	0.79 (15.27)	0.78 (14.96)
Colonial Dummy	0.64 (7.10)	0.64 (7.09)	0.65 (7.16)	0.62 (6.66)	0.61 (6.58)
Governance similarity	-0.05 (-1.13)	0.12 (2.03)	0.49 (2.75)	-0.03 (-0.59)	0.27 (4.25)
adj. R^2	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.72	0.72
number of obs.	8 715	8 715	8 715	9 234	9 234
F-statistic	1 587.92	1 588.70	1 589.64	-	-

Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms, where applicable, are not shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BILATERAL TRADE PATTERNS

Table 5

Extended gravity equations: institutional quality and homogeneity;
dependent variable: log total bilateral export

	Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference in institutional quality is:		
	< 1 standard deviation	< 2 standard deviations	< 3 standard deviations
Log GDP exporter	1.19 (80.91)	1.20 (80.99)	1.19 (80.96)
Log GDP importer	0.86 (58.14)	0.86 (58.27)	0.86 (58.20)
Log GDP per capita exporter	-0.09 (-2.04)	-0.10 (-2.15)	-0.09 (-2.04)
Log GDP per capita importer	-0.05 (-1.26)	-0.06 (-1.31)	-0.05 (-1.16)
Log Distance	-1.18 (-43.53)	-1.18 (-43.39)	-1.18 (-43.53)
Border Dummy	0.66 (4.76)	0.64 (4.61)	0.65 (4.69)
Language Dummy	0.21 (1.95)	0.21 (1.94)	0.21 (1.88)
Trade area Dummy	0.86 (9.97)	0.84 (9.74)	0.85 (9.87)
Religion Dummy	0.49 (9.08)	0.49 (9.02)	0.49 (9.11)
Colonial Dummy	0.55 (6.10)	0.55 (6.06)	0.56 (6.16)
Governance exporter	0.43 (8.25)	0.44 (8.48)	0.43 (8.36)
Governance importer	0.31 (6.11)	0.31 (6.11)	0.29 (5.87)
Governance similarity	-0.03 (-0.66)	0.15 (2.69)	0.43 (2.46)
adj. R^2	0.67	0.67	0.67
number of obs.	8715	8715	8715
F-statistic	1367.46	1369.06	1368.78

Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not shown in the table.

In *Table 5*, the specifications for different similarity definitions are estimated when controlling for the level of institutional quality in both countries. Indeed, institutional similarity and institutional quality have separate effects. Differences in institutional effectiveness affect trade, independently of the impact of governance effectiveness itself. It appears that controlling for the level of quality corrects for an omitted variable bias on the effect of similarity as defined in the first specification of *Table 4*. The effect of similarity in the specification using country dummies (column 4, *Table 4*) is very similar to the effect in the first specification of *Table 5*. The negative effect of income per capita shows up again after we have controlled for institutional quality as well (compare with *Table 4*). Moreover, when accounting for the effect of institutional similarity, the impact of institutional quality remains highly significant and positive.

To conclude, the impact of similarity on trade becomes substantially and significantly positive if we classify sufficient countries as similar in terms of institutional effectiveness. Alternatively, differences in institutional quality only start to have independent negative effects on trade, when the difference becomes really large. Then, unfamiliarity adds an extra dimension to the transaction costs of bilateral trade. Adjustment costs, and additional lack of trust and confidence in the security of transactions begin to accumulate when differences in the institutional environment between exporters and importers increase. When the impact of governance quality is taken into consideration, similarity raises trade by an estimated 16% in the middle scenario of *Table 5*.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Recent research draws attention to the importance of informal barriers to international trade, caused by intangible factors. The institutional framework is an important element in explaining the size of transaction costs. This paper has therefore explicitly investigated the effect of institutions on the patterns of bilateral trade. It starts from the argument that the quality of formal rules that govern economic interaction is an important determinant of the uncertainty and opportunism in market exchange. A low quality of governance increases the transaction costs that are incurred in exchange. The impact of institutions on private trade and investment is argued to be at least as important in international exchange as in domestic transactions. Moreover, the quality of formal rules affects the informal norms and procedures of doing business that are devised to cope with transactional uncertainty. This creates the possibility that countries with similar levels of institutional quality may be familiar with each others' business practices. This reduces transaction costs.

We find that institutional quality has a significant, positive and substantial impact on bilateral trade flows. The same goes for similar quality of governance. These results support the hypothesis that institutional variation is an important determinant of informal barriers to trade. The positive correlation between income per capita and the quality of institutions gives rise to an explanation of why high-income countries trade disproportionately amongst each other, while the same does not hold for low-income countries. Generally good governance lowers transaction costs for trade between high-income countries, while trade between low-income countries suffers from high insecurity and transaction costs.

An important implication emerges from our separate focus on country-specific quality of institutions and bilateral homogeneity of governance. We show that large divergence in the effectiveness of institutions independently reduces trade. This reflects the adjustment costs and extra uncertainty involved when traders do not share a sufficiently effective institutional framework. Institutional dissimilarity affects trade between countries with the best institutional quality and those that have the lowest effectiveness. Potential trade between these countries is diverted to partners closer in terms of institutional effectiveness. The impact of trade diversion is likely to be most severe for low security countries. Countries with poor formal institutions, apart from the negative effect of bad governance on their mutual trade, somewhat bounce back into trade with similar countries. Thus, they cannot benefit as much from trade with highly developed countries, despite the potential comparative advantages, knowledge spillovers, and large sales markets. These countries may become locked into a situation of low economic performance. This provides an additional argument for serious policy concern with the international promotion of good governance.

APPENDIX

A. Description of data

This appendix contains information on the data and variables used in the analysis. A description of the variables used in the analysis is presented, as well as a description of their sources. Our data-set comprised the countries that have been included in Kaufmann et al. (2002). In each estimated regression equation, we included those countries for which data on trade and the relevant regressors were available or could be constructed.

For our analysis, we used data on bilateral trade for 1998 from the WITS database, accessed on courtesy of the World Bank. The WITS includes various

data-sets on trade. We have used UN data on aggregate exports between pairs of countries. The figures focus on merchandise trade only. For information on the level of GDP and GDP per capita, data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2000, on CD Rom) were used for 1998. The data for institutional quality were taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which we also used to construct figures for the bilateral variables reflecting institutional homogeneity. A further description of the institutional variables has been included in the main text. We refer the reader to section 2 for this purpose.

The data on geographical distance, common border, common primary language, common trade agreement, common dominant religion and common colonial history have been collected from diverse sources, such as the data-set used by Sala-i-Martin (1997), for religions and colonial backgrounds, and John Haveman's International Trade Data for distance, language and contiguity¹⁰. This part of our database is available upon request from the corresponding author.

Many costs of trade are related to geographical distance, from physical transport costs of goods and persons to the costs of cultural unfamiliarity. As conventional in the literature, geographical distance has been measured as the distance from home to foreign 'as the bird flies', using the principal city of each country as its centre of gravity. This implies that the distance between the two centres of gravity of neighbouring countries is likely to overestimate the average distance of trade between them. The argument that the distance measure used leads to an overestimate of the distance of trade holds true for all pairs of countries. However, its relative impact is much larger in neighbouring countries than in countries that are far away from each other. Not all countries in our data-set were represented in the database for bilateral distances. For these countries, proxies were constructed using distances from neighbouring countries that were included in the database. For more discussion of the use and usefulness of other, more sophisticated measures of geographical distance, see Frankel (1997, chapter 4). In general, more sophisticated measures do not change the estimation results much, and cannot eliminate the measurement error for contiguous countries either.

A common border dummy indicates whether two countries are adjacent. Measurement error in the distance variable, as well as the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries are captured by this dummy-variable. For

10. See <http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm> and <http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Gravity>, respectively. We gratefully acknowledge that these data have been made available electronically in such an accessible way.

countries in our data set that had no adjacency data available from the main source, the CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook) was used to determine whether they shared borders with any other country in the data-set.

To assess commonality in primary language, we used a database that distinguished fourteen languages: Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. In case none of these applied or no data were available, the categories 'other language' and 'non available' were assigned. Using the CIA factbook, these countries have been checked. A dummy variable reflects whether or not two countries have the same primary language, an important aspect of cultural similarity.

Whether pairs of countries take part in common trade agreements has been assessed using WTO data on major regional integration agreements. A dummy variable (common trade bloc) indicates whether a pair of countries enters into at least one common regional Preferential Trade Agreement.

Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a common dominant religion or a shared colonial past. Data for religion and colonial background have been taken from Sala-i-Martin (1997). Percentages of the population that adhere to one of seven major religions are presented. These religions are: Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jewish religion, Islam, and Protestantism. For some countries, two religions were equally dominant over the others. These countries entered into the analysis with both religions as dominant religion. Commonality of dominant religion implies a value of 1 for the dummy variable 'common religion'.

The dummy variable 'common colony' reflects for each pair of countries whether both of them share a similar colonial history. The data considered the British, French and Spanish empires only. We also included the colonizers themselves into the respective empires, contrary to the original source. In this way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs of countries.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, J. E. and D. Marcouiller (2002). Insecurity and the pattern of trade: an empirical investigation, *Review of Economics and Statistics*. 84: pp. 342–352.
- Anderson, J. E. (2001): *Trade and Informal Institutions*, unpublished manuscript.
- Beugelsdijk, S. and A. B. T. M. van Schaik (2001). Cultuur en economie, *Tijdschrift voor Politieke Economie*. 23: 69–84.
- Deardorff, A. V. (1998). Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical World?, in: J. Frankel (ed.), *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Deardorff, A. V. (2001). *Local Comparative Advantage: Trade Costs and the Pattern of Trade*, unpublished manuscript.
- Den Butter, F. A. G. and R. H. J. Mosch (2002). Het belang van vertrouwen in de internationale handel: een empirische verkenning, *Maandschrift Economie*. 66: 314–336.
- Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002). *Institutions, Trade, and Growth*, unpublished manuscript.
- Frankel, J. and A. Rose (2002). An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May 2002: 437–466.
- Frankel, J. A. (1998). *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. NBER project report, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Frankel, J. A. (1997). *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System*. Washington D. C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Frankel, J. A. and D. Romer (1999). Does Trade Cause Growth?, *American Economic Review*. 379–399.
- Fujita, M., P. Krugman and A. J. Venables (1999). *The Spatial Economy: cities, regions, and international trade*. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
- Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones (1999). Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 114: 83–116.
- Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985). *Market Structure and Foreign Trade*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton (2002). Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000–01, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2772.
- Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Measures, *Economics and Politics*. 7: 207–227.
- Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 112: 1251–1288.
- Koukhartchouk, O. and M. Maurel (2003). Accession to the WTO and EU enlargement: what potential for trade increase?, CEPR Discussion Paper, 3944.
- Linders, G. M., H. L. F. de Groot and P. Nijkamp (2002). *Economic Development, Institutions and Trust*, unpublished manuscript.
- McCallum, J. (1995). National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns, *American Economic Review*. 85: 615–623.
- North, D. C. (1995). The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in: J. Harriss, J. Hunter, and C. M. Lewis (eds.), *The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development*. London: Routledge.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (2000). The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?, in: *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000*.
- Olson, M. (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Olson, M. (1996). Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 10: 3–24.
- Rauch, J. E. (2001). Business and Social Networks in International Trade, *Journal of Economic Literature*. 39: 1177–1203.
- Sala-i-Martin, X. X. (1997). I Just Ran Two Million Regressions, *The American Economic Review*. 87: 178–183.
- Tamirisa, N. and S. J. Wei (2002). Bribery in Trade: Liberalizing Grease or Non-tariff Barrier?, *IMF and Harvard University*.
- Wei, S. J. (2000). Natural openness and good government, NBER Working Paper, 7765.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BILATERAL TRADE PATTERNS

SUMMARY

This paper studies the effect of institutions on trade flows, using a gravity model approach. Standard gravity equations incorporate factors such as geographical proximity, language, trade policy and common history as explanatory factors for variation in bilateral trade that reflect the costs of trade across geographical and cultural distance. We extend this type of analysis by focusing on the relevance of the quality of governance and the extent of familiarity with the resulting framework of rules and norms in explaining variation in bilateral trade patterns. More specifically, we test whether institutional homogeneity and institutional quality have an independent impact on the trade volume between pairs of countries. We find that having a similar institutional framework promotes bilateral trade by 13%, on average. Furthermore, a better quality of formal institutions tends to coincide with more trade. Depending on being either importer or exporter, an increase in overall institutional quality of one standard deviation from the mean leads to an estimated increase of 30–44% in bilateral trade.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Artikel untersucht anhand eines Gravitationsmodells die Auswirkungen von Institutionen auf Handelsströme. Gravitationsgleichungen beinhalten standardmässig Faktoren wie geographische Entfernung, Sprache, Handelspolitik und gemeinsame Geschichte als Erklärung für Veränderungen im bilateralen Handel, die die Kosten des Handels über geographische und kulturelle Grenzen hinweg anzeigen. Wir weiten diese Analyse aus und konzentrieren uns auf die Relevanz der Qualität der Regierung und das Ausmass der Vertrautheit mit dem bestehenden Regelwerk, um Variationen in bilateralen Handelsmustern zu erklären. Insbesondere testen wir, ob institutionelle Homogenität und Qualität unabhängig voneinander das Handelsvolumen zwischen zwei Ländern beeinflussen. Wir finden, dass der bilaterale Handel unter ähnlichen institutionellen Bedingungen durchschnittlich um 13% steigt. Ausserdem fallen qualitativ bessere Institutionen tendenziell mit mehr Handel zusammen. Für Importeure bzw. Exporteure führt eine Steigerung der gesamten institutionellen Qualität um eine Standardabweichung zu einer geschätzten Zunahme des Handelsvolumens um 30 bis 44%.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article étudie les effets des institutions sur les flux de commerce en se servant d'un modèle de gravité. Les équations de gravité standard comprennent des facteurs comme la distance géographique, la langue, la politique du commerce et une histoire commune pour expliquer les variations dans le commerce bilatéral qui sont une image des coûts du commerce sur une distance géographique et culturelle. Nous étendons ce genre d'analyse en nous concentrant sur la signification de la qualité du gouvernement et la connaissance approfondie des conditions de base des règles et des normes pour expliquer les variations dans le commerce bilatéral. En particulier, nous testons si l'homogénéité et la qualité institutionnelles ont un impact indépendamment l'une de l'autre sur le volume de commerce entre deux pays. Nous trouvons que le fait d'avoir un cadre institutionnel semblable augmente le commerce bilatéral d'environ 13% en moyenne. En outre, une meilleure qualité des institutions formelles a tendance à coïncider avec un commerce accru. Pour les importateurs et les exportateurs, respectivement, une hausse d'une déviation standard de la qualité générale des institutions engendre une hausse estimée du commerce bilatéral d'environ 30 à 44%.