Procedural Justice and Status:
Status Salience as Antecedent of Procedural Fairness Effects

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The current article explores status as an antecedent of procedural fairness effects (the findings that perceived procedural fairness affects people's reactions, e.g., their relational judgments). On the basis of the literature, the authors proposed that salience of the general concept of status leads people to be more attentive to procedural fairness information and that, as a consequence, stronger procedural fairness effects should be found. In correspondence with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed stronger procedural fairness effects on people's relational treatment evaluations in a status salient condition compared with a control condition. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and, in further correspondence with the hypothesis, showed that status salience led to increased cognitive accessibility of fairness concerns. Implications for the psychology of procedural justice are discussed.

Social justice is an unquestionable aspect of human life (see, e.g., Folger, 1984). Human behavior and the choices people make in life are strongly affected by what is fair to people and what is morally desirable (cf. Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). One fairness concern that people have is related to the distribution of outcomes: People want to receive fair outcomes. Social psychologists have therefore studied what outcomes people perceive to be fair. This has been labeled the psychology of distributive justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974). Another fairness concern that people have is related to decision-making processes: People want the procedures that lead to decisions or outcome distributions to be fair. The study of people's reactions to procedures has been labeled the psychology of procedural justice (for overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). The distinction between distributive justice and procedural justice is important, because the classic work of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has shown that social

justice concerns indeed involve questions about both the fairness of outcomes and the fairness of procedures.

An important factor to explain the psychology of both distributive justice and procedural justice is social status (e.g., Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, in press). The relation between status and distributive justice has been argued to depend on perceptions of entitlement (Feather, 1994). People perceive outcomes to be fair if they think that they are entitled to those outcomes, and social status (operationalized by Feather as relative standing compared with other people) can determine whether people perceive themselves as entitled to certain outcomes. As a consequence, people may sometimes perceive differences in outcomes (e.g., salaries) as fair depending in part on differences in status positions (e.g., full professors vs. assistant professors). Status thus can exert a strong influence on people's distributive justice perceptions.

Several authors have suggested that social status not only is important in the distributive justice domain but is a crucial factor in the procedural justice domain as well (Cropanzano et al., in press; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000, in press; Tyler & Lind, 1992). However, we argue here that the current literature has not been very explicit about the precise role of status in the psychology of procedural justice. That is, we propose that (a) procedural justice researchers have defined status in various ways, (b) the data addressing the relation between status and procedural justice are not conclusive, and (c) the underlying psychological processes of how status is related to procedural justice are not understood as well as may be possible. These shortcomings in the literature are unfortunate, we argue here, because status is a fundamental concept in important procedural justice theories (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the current article, therefore, we study the relation between status and procedural justice. Below, we first provide a review of the literature on procedural

justice and status. After this, we lay out the specific aims of the current research.

Procedural Justice and Status

One of the most important findings in procedural justice research is that perceived procedural fairness positively affects a wide range of people's perceptions and behaviors, such as relational treatment evaluations and affective reactions (Lind & Tyler, 1988). In the current article, we refer to these findings as examples of *procedural fairness effects*. An illustration of procedural fairness effects can be found in people's reactions following voice as opposed to no-voice procedures: People tend to rate procedures that allow them an opportunity to voice their opinions to be more fair than procedures that do not allow them such an opportunity (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; see also Brockner et al., 1998; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Numerous studies have indicated that voice affects many other reactions as well (for overviews, see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988). For example, voice procedures have a positive influence on people's perceptions of their relations with authorities and on their affective reactions. Such procedural fairness effects are very robust and easily generalize across methodologies and samples (e.g., Folger et al., 1979; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998).

One of the most prominent theoretical perspectives that has recognized status to be important to an understanding of procedural fairness effects is the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also Lind & Tyler, 1988). Inspired by social identity theory, this model assumes that people attach importance to being valued members of the social groups they belong to (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The relational model argues that, as a consequence, people search for information about the extent to which they are respected and valued by their group members. To this end, people pay particular attention to the way in which they are treated by relevant group authorities, because group authorities tend to be regarded as representatives for their group (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Hence, fair procedures by group authorities may indicate that one is valued and respected as a group member (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996).

On the basis of the relational model, Tyler (1989, 1994) argued that people search for information about whether the authority regards them as having a high or a low status position in the group. People infer such information from the way authorities treat them: If an authority treats people respectfully, people infer that the authority regards them as having high status in the group. If an authority treats people rudely, people infer that the authority regards them as having low status in the group. This information about status subsequently affects people's perceptions of procedural justice and should therefore lead to stronger procedural fairness effects. In this way, the relational model suggests a fundamental and causal relation between status and procedural fairness effects. The relational model assumes that procedures affect the emergence of status differentials, and it assumes that status differentials affect the perception of procedural treatments. The present study focuses on the latter assumed causal relation.

Information about one's intragroup status position has often been referred to as status recognition or standing (e.g., Tyler, 1989, 1994). But are status recognition and standing really the same thing? Lind (2001) emphasized that the concept of standing, as described in the original work on the relational model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992), should be defined as the extent to which people perceive themselves as included in valued social groups, independent of relative intragroup status differences. Related to this, Cropanzano et al. (in press) argued that, broadly speaking, procedural justice scholars have used at least two definitions of status, one referring to relative intragroup differences (cf. Tyler, 1989, 1994) and one referring to matters of inclusion (cf. Lind, 2001).

This distinction corresponds to what Tyler and Blader (in press) recently have labeled comparative status and autonomous status. According to these authors, comparative status refers to status based on social comparison processes and is based on external standards such as differences in performance. For example, high achievers may gain higher regard from fellow group members than low achievers. Autonomous status involves considerations of where people stand in terms of the standards that define the group and is based on internal standards such as values and norms (e.g., the extent to which people's personal norms correspond to group norms). For example, people who generally have the same attitudes as fellow group members may gain higher regard from the group members than people who hold attitudes different than those of fellow group members. Given that Tyler and Blader (in press) were the first to investigate this distinction in empirical procedural justice research, it can be concluded that procedural justice researchers have not consistently used the same concept when referring to status. Instead of further separating these different forms of status, we argue here that it is important to get an idea of what the common contribution of these different forms of status to the procedural justice field may be. In the present article, we argue that, at a more general level, different definitions of status have a lot in common, as both autonomous and comparative status boil down to people's perceptions of the regard and approval they receive from others.

Aside from definitions, we argue here that empirical research has not collected conclusive data on the relation between status and procedural justice. Although an elaborate overview of the empirical work on status and procedural justice is beyond the scope of the current article (for more complete descriptions, see Cropanzano et al., in press; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000), we discuss three empirical studies that have directly assessed the relation between status and procedural justice: Tyler (1989), Tyler (1994), and Tyler and Blader (in press). The Tyler (1989, 1994) surveys both reported positive correlations between status recognition and perceptions of procedural justice. Furthermore, the Tyler and Blader (in press) survey found that perceptions of both autonomous and comparative status were associated with procedural justice judgments, although this relationship was stronger for autonomous than for comparative status judgments. These three studies are important because they provide empirical support for the position that status is related to people's reactions to procedural fairness. Furthermore, the Tyler and Blader (in press) findings are interesting because the positive correlations of both autonomous and comparative status with procedural justice judgments suggest that, even though several types of social status can be distinguished, these types are, at least to some extent, related to procedural fairness effects. This further underscores the prominent role that status may play in the

psychology of procedural fairness effects and strongly suggests that people may associate status with procedural justice.

In both the Tyler (1989) and the Tyler (1994) surveys, however, the author measured status by asking participants whether authorities had been polite to respondents and had shown respect for their rights. Furthermore, in the Tyler and Blader (in press) survey, status was operationalized as perceptions of pride and respect. Although we would certainly expect relations between perceptions of status and these operationalizations, it can be argued that these operationalizations do not measure status as directly as may be possible. Furthermore, these studies report correlational data to demonstrate the relation between status and perceptions of procedural justice. As a consequence, we cannot be sure about the causality of the relation between status and procedural fairness effects, and, additionally, we have little knowledge about the psychological processes that explain the relation between status and procedural justice.

The Present Research

In the present research project, we directly study the causal effects of status on people's reactions toward fair and unfair procedures. We do so by adopting a broad definition of status: lay people's own constructions of the general concept of status. Although several definitions and operationalizations of status have been used in the literature (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, in press), we argue here that these definitions have a lot in common at a broad level: All definitions of status have to do with the regard and approval that people receive from others. As a result, focusing people on their own constructions of the general concept of status should provide a good starting point to study the psychology of procedural fairness effects. We return to this in the General Discussion.

Following the argument that the general concept of status has to do with the regard and approval that people receive from other people (cf. Tyler et al., 1996), we argue here that cognitive accessibility of the general concept of status (e.g., because of feedback about one's status position, or because one has just answered questions about status in a survey) may lead to an increased concern for such regard and approval. In situations in which information about status is made cognitively accessible, people therefore seek cues that may inform them about how they are held in regard by others. Building on the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992), we argue here that this status-related information may be found in procedural fairness information. After all, the relational model has argued that people use procedural fairness information to make inferences about status-related issues such as the extent to which they are held in high regard by others in interpersonal encounters (Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also Lind & Tyler, 1988). As a result, in situations in which status concerns are made cognitively accessible, people may become relatively more attentive to procedural fairness information, compared with situations in which status concerns are not made accessible.

The reasoning that increased accessibility of status concerns makes people more attentive to fairness information suggests that there may be a cognitive connection between the general constructs of status and fairness. More specifically, we argue that people have mental representations of the concepts of status and fairness and that there is a cognitive link, or mental association, between these representations, such that representations of status affect representations of fairness. Therefore, in situations in which the concept of status is activated, people's fairness concerns should become more accessible. Activation of the general concept of status may therefore lead people to be more attentive to fairness information and, as a consequence, to react more strongly to fair as opposed to unfair procedures.

On the basis of this, we propose that cognitively activating the general concept of status leads to stronger reactions toward fair and unfair procedures. We investigated this idea in two experiments by manipulating the salience of the general concept of status. We did this with a minimal salience manipulation: In both experiments, we asked participants to answer two simple, open-ended questions about the general concept of status. This manipulation of status salience was followed by a manipulation of procedural justice. We hypothesized that participants would show stronger procedural fairness effects in status salient conditions than in control conditions.

Experiment 1

In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis by manipulating status salience with two open-ended questions that asked participants about the general concept of status in the experimental condition and that asked participants about a nonstatus issue in the control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedure by varying whether the experimenter allowed participants an opportunity to voice their opinions in a decision-making process (e.g., Folger et al., 1979). Relational treatment evaluations are important dependent variables in the procedural justice domain (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; cf. Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 2001). We therefore investigated our hypothesis on three typical relational treatment evaluations: We asked participants whether they thought the experimenter had respect for them, trusted them, and treated them politely (cf. Tyler, 1994).

Method

Participants and design. We tested our hypotheses in a 2 (status salience: salient vs. control) × 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design. A total of 116 students at the Free University Amsterdam (27 men, 89 women), varying in age from 18 to 41 years, voluntarily participated in the experiment. The experiment was preceded by one experiment and followed by another, unrelated experiment. The experiments lasted approximately 90 min, and participants were paid 20 Dutch guilders for participation.

Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to 1 of 15 separate cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found a computer mouse, a keyboard, and a computer screen, equipment that was used to present the stimulus information and to collect the data. Furthermore, participants found a piece of paper and a pen in the cubicles. They were then informed that the computers in the laboratory were connected to each other and that the experimenter could send messages to the participants by means of the computer network (in reality, all stimulus information was preprogrammed, an experimental procedure none of the participants objected to on debriefing). Furthermore, participants were told that a lottery with a prize of 100 Dutch guilders would be held among every 50 participants. Participants were informed that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among every 50 participants and that the experimenter would allocate some of these lottery tickets to the participants.

After this, we induced the manipulation of status salience. In the status salient condition, participants were asked to respond to two open-ended questions concerning their thoughts and emotions about the concept status (cf. Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). Specifically, participants were asked to write down on the piece of paper next to the computer their answers to the questions "Please describe briefly the thoughts and emotions that come to mind when you think of the concept status" and "Please describe a situation out of your own life in which status played a role." Participants in the control condition were posed two similar questions referring to something that is not related to status: watching TV (cf. Van den Bos, 2001). Thus, participants in the control condition were asked to respond to the questions "Please describe briefly the thoughts and emotions that come to mind when you think of the concept watching TV" and "Please describe a situation out of your own life in which watching TV played a role." After this manipulation, all participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This measure served as a filler task and to assess whether the status salience manipulation engendered positive affect (PA) or negative affect (NA; cf. Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). The PANAS consists of 20 items referring to how participants feel at the moment and can be divided into two subscales: one 10-item subscale measuring PA ($\alpha = .82$) and one 10-item subscale measuring NA ($\alpha = .92$).

Following the PANAS scale, we induced the manipulation of procedure. Participants in the voice condition received a message from the experimenter that they were allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about what percentage of the lottery tickets they felt they should receive. These participants were subsequently asked to type in this percentage. Participants in the no-voice condition received a message from the experimenter that they were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about what percentage of the lottery tickets they felt they should receive, and they were not asked to type in this percentage.

We then asked the questions pertaining to the dependent measures and the manipulation checks. To assess participants' relational treatment evaluations, we asked the following three questions: "Do you think that the experimenter respects you?" (1 = *certainly not*, 7 = *certainly*), "Do you think that the experimenter trusts you?" (1 = *certainly not*, 7 = *certainly*), and "How politely did the experimenter treat you?" (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*). These three items were averaged into a reliable relational treatment scale ($\alpha = .84$).

To check for the manipulation of status salience, we asked the following two questions (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): "Did you think about the concept status during this experiment?" and "To what extent did you think about the concept status during this experiment?" These two items were highly correlated ($r = .88$, $p < .001$), and we averaged them into a single status check scale ($\alpha = .93$). To check for the procedure manipulation, we assessed the following two items (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): "Did you receive an opportunity to voice your opinion about the allocation of the lottery tickets?" and "To what extent did the experimenter allow you an opportunity to voice your opinion about the allocation of the lottery tickets?" These two items were highly correlated ($r = .82$, $p < .001$), and we averaged them into a reliable procedure check scale ($\alpha = .90$). Furthermore, we checked the manipulation of procedural justice by posing the following two questions: "How fair was the procedure used to divide the lottery tickets?" (1 = *very unfair*, 7 = *very fair*) and "How just was the procedure used to divide the lottery tickets?" (1 = *very unjust*, 7 = *very just*). These two items were highly correlated ($r = .79$, $p < .001$), and we averaged them into a reliable procedural justice scale ($\alpha = .88$). After this, participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. We checked the experimental manipulations with 2 × 2 univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The

ANOVA on the status check scale showed only a significant main effect of status, $F(1, 112) = 60.59$, $p < .001$. Participants in the status salient condition indicated that they had thought more about the concept status ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 1.77$) than did participants in the control condition ($M = 2.50$, $SD = 1.59$). These findings indicate that the manipulation of status salience was successful in affecting the relative strength of participants' thoughts about status, as was intended with this manipulation.

The analysis on the procedure check scale yielded only a significant main effect of procedure, $F(1, 112) = 495.70$, $p < .001$. Participants in the voice condition indicated that they had perceived more opportunities to voice their opinions ($M = 6.39$, $SD = 0.92$) than did participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.81$, $SD = 1.27$). From these analyses, we can conclude that the participants had perceived the experimental manipulations as intended.

We then analyzed participants' procedural justice judgments. As expected, this analysis showed only a significant procedure main effect, $F(1, 112) = 39.54$, $p < .001$. Participants in the voice condition rated the procedure to be more fair ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.69$) than did participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.54$). In correspondence with previous research, manipulating voice as opposed to no-voice procedures was a successful operationalization of procedural justice.

PANAS findings. The PANAS was included in the experiment to rule out the possibility that our status salience manipulation may have caused unintentional affective reactions. A multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) on the PA and NA scales showed no significant main or interaction effects at either the multivariate level or the univariate levels (overall means and standard deviations: PA scale, $M = 4.50$, $SD = 0.83$; NA scale, $M = 2.09$, $SD = 1.09$). This shows that, as expected, the status salience manipulation had no effects on participants' positive or negative affective reactions. Thus, the effects reported here cannot be attributed to affective reactions following status salience.

Relational treatment evaluations. An ANOVA on the relational treatment scale yielded significant main effects of procedure, $F(1, 112) = 77.60$, $p < .001$, and status salience, $F(1, 112) = 6.20$, $p < .02$; these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction effect, $F(1, 112) = 4.59$, $p < .04$. The cell means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. As predicted, the effect of procedure was stronger when status was salient, $F(1, 112) = 58.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .34$, than when status was not

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants' Relational Treatment Evaluations as a Function of Status Salience and Procedure (Experiment 1)

| | Status salience | | | |
| | TV salient | | Status salient | |
Procedure	M	SD	M	SD
Voice	5.28	0.92	5.20	0.70
No voice	3.87	1.32	2.89	1.45

Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more positive relational treatment evaluations.

salient, $F(1, 112) = 23.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Thus, participants' relational treatment evaluations were more strongly affected by the procedure manipulation in the status salient condition than in the control condition.

Additionally, it can be noted here that the effect of status salience was nonsignificant in the voice condition ($F < 1.00$), and significant in the no-voice condition, $F(1, 112) = 9.94$, $p < .01$. We come back to this in the General Discussion.

These results support the prediction that salience of the general concept status enhances procedural fairness effects. Before we draw strong conclusions, however, it is important to replicate the current findings in a second experiment. An additional aim of the second experiment was to test a basic assumption of our hypothesis: the assumption that cognitively activating the general concept status makes fairness concerns more accessible. As an extension of our research, we wanted to know whether this assumption is correct. We therefore included cognitive activation measures as manipulation checks to find out whether status salience really made fairness concerns more accessible.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2 we induced the same status salience manipulation as in Experiment 1. Following this, participants completed a word-fragment completion task. In this task, participants were presented with uncompleted Dutch words that could be completed either as fairness-related or as nonfairness-related words. Word-fragment completion tasks are widely interpreted as unobtrusive measures of construct accessibility (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). The word-fragment completion task, therefore, served as a manipulation check of whether status salience made fairness concerns more accessible: We expected that participants in the status salient condition would come up with more fairness-related words than would participants in the control condition.

In Experiment 2 we tried to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. To do so, we wanted to test whether our predictions would be supported if we presented the status salience manipulation as fully unrelated to the procedure manipulation. We therefore presented Experiment 2 to the participants as two separate studies. The status salience manipulation, the PANAS, and the word-fragment completion task were included in the first study. After this, we manipulated procedure in a scenario experiment, which was presented as a second, unrelated study.

To ascertain whether our results may generalize to other operationalizations of procedural justice, we decided to induce a different procedural justice manipulation than in Experiment 1. That is, in Experiment 2 we manipulated procedural accuracy (Leventhal, 1980): The authority either did or did not take all relevant information into account to come to a decision. This manipulation has been shown to be an alternative way to study procedural fairness effects (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997): People tend to rate accurate procedures to be more fair than inaccurate procedures. Furthermore, manipulations of procedural accuracy affect the same range of people's reactions as do manipulations of voice, and, thus, they may produce procedural fairness effects (cf. Van den Bos et al., 1997).

In Experiment 2 we again assessed relational treatment evaluations as dependent measures. To have an indication of the robust-

ness of our findings, we also measured participants' ratings of satisfaction with the procedure (Lind & Tyler, 1988). We expected that participants' relational treatment evaluations and procedural satisfaction ratings would both be affected more strongly by accurate as opposed to inaccurate procedures if status had been made salient than if status had not been made salient.

Method

Participants and design. We tested our predictions in a 2 (status salience: salient vs. control) × 2 (procedure: accurate vs. inaccurate) factorial design. Participants were 88 students from the Free University Amsterdam (38 men, 50 women), varying in age from 18 to 41 years. We asked whether participants had participated in Experiment 1. An affirmative answer to this question would have disqualified them for participation. The experiment was followed by another, unrelated experiment. The experiments lasted a total of 50 min. Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and were paid 12.50 Dutch guilders for participation.

Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in the same individual cubicles as in Experiment 1. In the cubicles, participants again found a computer screen, which was used to present the stimulus information; a keyboard; and a computer mouse. The experiment was presented to the participants as two unrelated studies. "Study 1" then started, in which participants responded to the questions pertaining to the status salience manipulation, the PANAS, and the word-fragment completion task. The status salience manipulation was the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants typed in their answers on the computer rather than wrote down their answers by means of paper and pencil. After this, participants again responded to the 20 items of the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988). The 10 items measuring PA were averaged into a reliable PA scale ($\alpha = .78$), and the 10 items measuring NA were averaged into a reliable NA scale ($\alpha = .88$).

So that we could check for the status salience manipulation, participants then performed the word-fragment completion task. Participants were presented with a total of 20 uncompleted Dutch words. In all cases, several correct answers were possible. For each uncompleted word, participants were asked to make one Dutch word. This word had to consist of two, and sometimes of three, syllables. Participants had to type this word into the computer, after which a new word was presented. Of the 20 uncompleted Dutch words, 14 were filler words. The remaining 6 words were constructed in such a way that participants could logically come up with fairness-related and nonfairness-related words. For example, participants were asked to construct a word of two syllables that ended with *lijk*. Pilot testing revealed that participants could come up with the Dutch fairness-related word *eerlijk* (*fair*) but also with Dutch nonfairness-related words, such as *vrolijk* (*cheerful*) or *lelijk* (*ugly*). Another example is the following: Participants were asked to make a word of two syllables that ends with *nrecht*. Pilot testing revealed that participants could come up with the fairness-related Dutch word *onrecht* (*unjust*) but also with the nonfairness-related word *aanrecht* (*kitchen sink*). The 6 fairness-related words (translated in English) that participants could come up with were *fair*, *unjust*, *respect*, *unequal*, *honest*, and *impolite*. For each participant, we counted the total number of fairness-related words that the participant had typed in.

Following the word-fragment completion task, participants were informed that Study 1 had ended and that they would start Study 2, which was presented as unrelated to Study 1. We then asked participants to imagine the following situation:

> You are an employee at an ironware factory. Because of a financial windfall, the management has decided to give every employee a one-time only financial bonus. In order to assess the magnitude of your bonus, the management has made a total evaluation of your work. Within your work you have 10 different activities.

After this, we induced the procedure manipulation:

You find out that the management has taken your performance of 10 out of your 10 [1 out of your 10] activities into account to make a total evaluation of your work.

After this, participants were asked to answer the questions that constituted the dependent variables and the manipulation checks. As in Experiment 1, we collected participants' relational treatment evaluations. Because two out of the three relational treatment evaluation items that were assessed in Experiment 1 contained key words that participants could have come up with in the word-completion task that they just had completed (i.e., *respect* and [*im*]*polite*), it was important to use different items than in Experiment 1 for this measure. To keep our relational treatment evaluations measure unrelated to other operationalizations used in the current experiment, we asked the following three questions (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): "To what extent do you think that the management is partial?" (recoded), "To what extent do you think that the management is objective?", and "To what extent do you have trust in the management?" (cf. Tyler, 1989). These three items were averaged into one reliable relational treatment evaluations scale (α = .70). To get an indication of the robustness of our findings, we also asked the following question to measure participants' procedural satisfaction (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): "How satisfied are you with the procedure used to make a total evaluation of your work?"

To check the status salience manipulation, we asked the same two questions as in Experiment 1. Again, these items were highly correlated (r = .87, p < .001), and we averaged them into a reliable status salience scale (α = .93). Furthermore, to check whether procedural accuracy was a successful manipulation of procedural justice, we assessed the following two procedural justice judgments: "How fair was the procedure used to make a total evaluation of your work?" (1 = *very unfair*, 7 = *very fair*) and "How just was the procedure used to make a total evaluation of your work?" (1 = *very unjust*, 7 = *very just*). These two items were highly correlated (r = .98, p < .001), and we averaged them into a reliable procedural justice scale (α = .99). After this, the experiment ended. Participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. The manipulations were checked with 2 × 2 ANOVAs. The ANOVA on the status salience scale showed only a main effect of status salience, $F(1, 84)$ = 26.10, p < .001. Participants in the status salient condition indicated that they had thought more about the concept status (M = 4.57, SD = 1.72) than did participants in the control condition (M = 2.71, SD = 1.72). In correspondence with Experiment 1, these findings indicate that the manipulation of status salience was successful in affecting the relative strength of participants' thoughts about status, as was intended with this manipulation.

To further check the status salience manipulation, we then analyzed the word-fragment completions. This analysis showed only a significant main effect of status salience, $F(1, 84)$ = 5.91, p < .02. As predicted, participants in the status salient condition came up with more fairness-related words (M = 2.44, SD = 0.96) than did participants in the control condition (M = 1.98, SD = 0.84). These findings are supportive of the proposition that the status salience manipulation makes fairness concerns more accessible.[1] It therefore can be concluded that the status salience manipulation was perceived as intended.

The analysis on the procedural justice scale showed only a significant main effect of procedure, $F(1, 84)$ = 315.99, p < .001. As expected, participants in the accurate conditions rated the procedure to be more fair (M = 6.15, SD = 1.04) than did

participants in the inaccurate condition (M = 1.88, SD = 1.22). In correspondence with previous research (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1997), manipulating procedural accuracy was a successful operationalization of procedural justice. On the basis of these findings, it can be concluded that the experimental manipulations were successful.

PANAS findings. A 2 × 2 MANOVA on the PA and NA scales showed no significant main effects or interactions at either the multivariate level or the univariate levels (overall means and standard deviations: PA scale, M = 4.57, SD = 0.75; NA scale, M = 2.13, SD = 0.93). In correspondence with Experiment 1, this shows that the status salience manipulation had no effects on participants' ratings of PA or NA. Thus, effects of the status salience manipulations cannot be attributed to participants' affective reactions following their thoughts about status.

Relational treatment evaluations. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants' relational treatment evaluations showed a significant main effect of procedure, $F(1, 84)$ = 27.81, p < .001, an effect that was qualified by the predicted interaction effect, $F(1, 84)$ = 4.07, p < .05. The cell means and standard deviations are shown in the upper half of Table 2. As predicted, the effect of procedure was stronger in the status salient condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 25.78, p < .001, η^2 = .24, than in the control condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 5.51, p < .03, η^2 = .06. This shows that, as predicted and in correspondence with the results of Experiment 1, participants' relational treatment evaluations were more strongly affected by the procedure manipulation in the status salient condition that in the control condition.

As an aside, it can be noted here that the effect of status salience was significant in the accurate condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 4.94, p < .03, but not in the inaccurate condition (F < 1.00). We come back to this in the General Discussion.

Procedural satisfaction judgments. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants' procedural satisfaction judgments yielded a significant main effect of procedure, $F(1, 84)$ = 125.90, p < .001, an effect that was qualified by the predicted interaction effect, $F(1, 84)$ = 5.08, p < .03. The cell means and standard deviations are depicted in the lower half of Table 2. As expected, the effect of procedure was stronger in the status salient condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 88.70, p < .001, η^2 = .51, than in the control condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 41.15, p < .001, η^2 = .33. On the basis of these results, we conclude that our prediction can also be found on participants' procedural satisfaction judgments.

It can further be noted here that the effects of status salience were nonsignificant both in the accurate condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 2.28, and in the inaccurate condition, $F(1, 84)$ = 1.73. We come back to this in the General Discussion.

General Discussion

Both experiments show that procedural fairness effects are enhanced when status has been made salient compared with when status has not been made salient. Further evidence for our hypoth-

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[1] We also analyzed the completions of the four words that were most explicitly fairness words (*fair*, *unjust*, *unequal*, *honest*). This analysis showed a significant main effect of status salience only, $F(1, 84)$ = 7.72, p < .01. Participants in the status salient condition came up with more fairness-related words (M = 2.23, SD = 0.90) than did participants in the control condition (M = 1.76, SD = 0.77).

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Participants' Relational Treatment Evaluations and Procedural Satisfaction Ratings as a Function of Status Salience and Procedure (Experiment 2)

| | Status salience | | | |
| | TV salient | | Status salient | |
Dependent variable	M	SD	M	SD
Relational treatment evaluations				
Accurate procedure	4.55	1.07	5.35	0.73
Inaccurate procedure	3.75	1.14	3.58	1.48
Procedural satisfaction ratings				
Accurate procedure	5.09	1.69	5.81	1.25
Inaccurate procedure	2.44	1.38	1.82	1.18

Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more positive ratings on the dependent variable in question.

esis was found in Experiment 2, in which we presented cognitive activation data showing that status salience led to increased accessibility of fairness concerns. This suggests that people are more attentive to fairness information and are more strongly affected by perceived procedural fairness following questions about status than following questions about nonstatus issues. In other words, status salience makes people's fairness concerns more accessible.

We have pointed out that a minimal salience operationalization of the broad term status (i.e., as lay people perceive it) may be important at this point in the research literature to investigate procedural fairness effects. That is, although researchers have specified several definitions of status (e.g., Cropanzano et al., in press; Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, in press), we argue that, at a broad level, these definitions have a lot in common. We were therefore interested in the answers that participants in the status salient conditions gave to the status questions (the answers of participants in the control condition were not related to the concept status). Inspection of participants' answers to these questions in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 shows that lay people, when thinking about status, generally think about the regard and approval that they receive from others. Furthermore, the distinction among different types of status (e.g., autonomous vs. comparative status; Tyler & Blader, in press) seems to refer to different bases for such regard and approval: People can receive regard and approval from others because of internal characteristics, such as their norms and values, or because of external characteristics, such as performances. (An illustrative answer one of the participants gave was the following: "the regard and approval that people receive because of their character, or because of the amount of money they have.") This suggests that, although there may be different definitions of status, because status can be based on various qualities of a person, at a more general level these definitions have to do with the regard and approval that individuals receive from other people.

We think that the current finding that status salience enhances procedural fairness effects provides new insights into the relation between status and procedural justice. That is, although the relational model assumes a causal relation between status and procedural fairness effects, empirical work on this topic has only reported correlational data (see, e.g., Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler &

Blader, in press). In the current study we have reported evidence for the causal order that is most central in the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Although this does not rule out the possibility that procedural justice affects perceptions of status as well, the present experiments do support the prediction that status salience affects people's reactions to perceived procedural justice. Additionally, it should be noted here that the relational model is somewhat ambiguous about whether the relation between status and procedural fairness effects is moderating or mediating in nature. Building on Tyler and Lind's (1992) discussion of the relational model, we were very well able to infer that status may moderate procedural fairness effects. However, in several empirical articles on the relational model (Tyler, 1989, 1994), it has been argued that status information may shape procedural justice judgments and subsequent procedural fairness effects, thus assuming a mediational relation between status and procedural fairness effects. In the current research we have demonstrated that status salience may moderate procedural fairness effects. Future research would do well to explore whether evidence for the mediational relation may be found as well.

It is important to note here that previous work on status and fairness was focused on the importance of status to understand social justice phenomena without explicitly concentrating on salience (e.g., Cropanzano et al., in press; Feather, 1994; Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, in press), whereas the current article explicitly explores the effects of status salience. By investigating whether salience of the general concept status is sufficient to affect procedural fairness effects, we tried to investigate the psychology of the effects of procedural fairness information on variables such as people's relational treatment evaluations and their satisfaction with procedures. The fact that status salience was enough to affect procedural fairness effects suggests, in our opinion, that the relation between status and procedural justice may be more deeply rooted in people's minds than has been recognized before. We hope that the current findings may add to a better understanding of how status is related to fairness.

Several social justice researchers have argued that it is important to investigate the underlying cognitive processes with which people decide how to react to procedural justice issues (Ambrose & Kulik, 2001; Cropanzano et al., 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, only recently have a few social justice researchers attempted to collect cognitive process data (Hafer, 2000; Miedema, Van den Bos, & Vermunt, 2000; Steiner, Guirard, & Baccino, 1999; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001). In Experiment 2, we developed a measure of fairness accessibility based on the social cognition literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2001). These data show that cognitive accessibility effects may operate in people's processing of fairness information. We therefore think that an important avenue for future research is applying social cognition methodologies to investigate social justice processes. More specifically, future research should be oriented toward integrating group dynamics with the cognitive processes that underlie people's reactions to perceived procedural fairness (Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2001). This may deepen scientists' understanding of the psychology of procedural fairness effects.

In Experiment 1, we found that the effects of status salience especially affected participants' relational treatment evaluations

following unfair (no-voice) procedures and not following fair (voice) procedures. In Experiment 2, however, we found that status salience affected participants' relational treatment evaluations following fair (accurate) procedures and not following unfair (inaccurate) procedures and did not lead to significant differences within procedure conditions on participants' ratings of procedural satisfaction. On the basis of the present data, it cannot be stated with certainty whether status salience mainly affects people's reactions following fair or following unfair procedures: After all, we were able to find effects of status salience following both fair (Experiment 2) and unfair (Experiment 1) procedures. This may have to do with different psychological impacts of the different operationalizations of procedural justice and the different dependent variables in the two experiments. Future researchers may want to find out when reactions to fair versus to unfair procedures are affected as a function of status salience manipulations. More important for the present purposes, however, was the fact that the hypothesis that people are more strongly affected by procedural justice manipulations in a status salient condition than in a control condition was supported in both experiments presented here.

We tested our hypothesis both in an experiential experiment in which participants really experienced procedural justice (Experiment 1) and, so that we could present status salience as fully unrelated to the procedure manipulation, in a scenario experiment (Experiment 2). Furthermore, we used different operationalizations of procedure. Converging evidence across the experiments suggests that the findings reported here are robust and may generalize to different methodologies. This conclusion is further underscored by the notion that in Experiment 2 we not only replicated the effects on relational treatment evaluations but also found the hypothesized effects on procedural satisfaction ratings. Thus, the effects of status salience on procedural fairness effects can be found for different types of people's reactions following various types of procedures.

Recent procedural justice experiments have shown that procedural fairness effects were enhanced in situations in which people had thought about things that made them feel uncertain (Van den Bos, 2001; see also Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). We argue here that the findings reported in the current article are unrelated to these uncertainty salience issues. First, there was no indication in participants' answers to the status questions that thinking of status made them feel uncertain. Second, and more important, we recently conducted a series of experiments on intragroup status differences and procedural fairness effects (Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002). In these studies we manipulated participants' intragroup status (high, average, low, and unknown). In correspondence with the findings reported in the current article, the results showed that information about intragroup status (which thereby made status a salient issue to participants: the high, average, and low intragroup status conditions) led to stronger procedural fairness effects than in the status unknown condition. In other words, we found stronger procedural fairness effects when participants were certain about their intragroup status than when participants were uncertain about their intragroup status. These findings clearly contradict the position that the enhancing effects of status on reactions to procedures may have to do with human uncertainty.

An additional point to discuss when interpreting the current findings is the potential role of culture. The Netherlands can be conceived of as an egalitarian society, and it could be the case that

status differences are generally seen as unfair. It might therefore be argued that the current status salience findings are specific for egalitarian societies in which status salience leads people to remember unfair events. However, we found no evidence in participants' answers to the status questions that they perceived status differences as unfair or that they remembered unfair events. Additionally, in a 2 (word valence) × 2 (status salience) × 2 (procedure) ANOVA on the word-fragment completion data (with word valence included as a within-subject factor), we only found the predicted main effect of status salience and could not find significant differences in participants' completions of positive (fairness-related) versus negative (nonfairness-related) words. Furthermore, all interactions in this analysis were nonsignificant. This shows that status salience did not remind participants of unfairness only. Finally, in the intragroup status experiments described above (Van Prooijen et al., 2002), we manipulated intragroup status by varying participants' own contributions to a group task relative to other group members' contributions. Although this operationalization of status clearly is not an unfair event, we found results that are in correspondence with the current findings. From all this, we infer that the current findings cannot be explained by the assumption that Dutch people perceive status to be an unfair construct and that it is more appropriate to focus on the process status salience may activate fairness concerns.

In closing, we think that it is safe to conclude that the present study has shown new insights into the psychology of status and procedural justice. We have studied how status affects the cognitive processing of fairness information by arguing that salience of the general concept status leads people to be more attentive to subsequent procedure information, which is reflected in an enhancement of procedural fairness effects. This suggests that status salience leads to an enhanced accessibility of fairness concerns, a view supported by cognitive process data. It can be concluded, therefore, that status salience is an important antecedent of procedural fairness effects.

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