






MOROCCO AND THE NETHERLANDS






# Morocco and the Netherlands

*Society, Economy, Culture*

Petra Bos and Wantje Fritschy (eds.)



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
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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

This book on aspects of society, economy and culture in Morocco and the Netherlands focuses on the tension between tradition and modernity. Nowadays the old opposition between 'tradition' and 'modernity' seems to have been replaced by an uneasy co-existence between 'fundamentalism' and 'post-modernism'. In contrast to 'tradition' and 'modernity', however, both 'fundamentalism' and 'post-modernism' seem to reside mainly in a virtual world.

Radical fundamentalism is primarily located in the world of international Internet contacts. It seeks to conquer the minds of an uprooted generation of young Muslims without affinity to the states from which their parents migrated.<sup>2</sup> Yet another target are young people who cannot feel loyalty towards states that are unable to offer jobs and political influence to a young generation. Radical fundamentalism is characterized by a lack of ties to historical developments and specific cultures. It believes in a worldwide *umma* or 'community of believers', to be governed by ancient Islamic laws. It denies historical developments and the need to adapt laws to new situations.<sup>3</sup> Extreme fundamentalism only seems prepared to enter the real world of politics to engage in acts of violence, with no regard for the reality of human suffering.

The main characteristic of post-modernism is a complete loss of belief in historical reality and the relevance and possibility of historical knowledge. Radical post-modernism postulates a virtual world consisting only of stories about reality. It has no other 'message' for young people than its analysis of 'differends',<sup>4</sup> situations of irresolvable conflict arising from the lack of universal frames of reference. It no longer seems to believe in the possibility of making the real world a better place for humanity. The core of both radical fundamentalism and radical post-modernism seems to be a conscious denial of the interconnectedness of human historical reality.

Morocco and the Netherlands have been confronted with the reality of human interconnectedness since the 1960s, when a conscious policy of 'globalizing' labour mobility was set in motion. The two countries, which had been loosely connected during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by trade flows and treaties and conflicts concerning trade, corsairs and captives, and during the nineteenth century by reports from Dutch tra-

1 We would like to thank *Taalcentrum-VU* in Amsterdam for their insightful and often quite intensive revision of all English and French contributions by non-native speakers.

2 Kepel (2004) 'Introduction' and Ch. 3.

3 Roy (2002) Ch. 6 and 7, esp. p. 142. See also the contributions to this book by Azzine and Van der Velden on the subject of 'ijtihad'.

4 Lyotard (1988); see also Zakri's contribution to this book.

vellers, writers and painters,<sup>5</sup> now became interconnected in a much deeper way. In the wake of this labour-immigration policy, which lasted less than a decade, the Netherlands had to adapt its cities to the reality of tens of thousands of Moroccan immigrants, mainly originating from the countryside of Morocco's northern Rif region, whose religion and cultural habits were very different from the (non-)religious attitudes and values of its own urban society. The migration of Moroccans to the Netherlands helped relieve the acute demographic pressure in a country characterized by political tension and a lack of sufficient employment opportunities. At the same time it eased the Netherlands' transition from an industrial to a service economy during the 1960s and 1970s.

It took some time before both Dutch society and the migrants themselves became aware that they would not be returning with a suitcase full of money to build a new life in Morocco once the economic transition of Dutch society had been completed and the jobs they had been asked to fulfil in the Netherlands began to disappear. Conditions in Morocco had not changed enough in the meantime to make return and investment very attractive, although many migrants continued to buy or build houses in Morocco, clinging to the idea of being able to return one day. Despite increasing unemployment, illnesses due to homesickness and growing tensions within Dutch society, life and prospects for their children still seemed so much better in the Netherlands than in Morocco that migrants sought to help as many friends and relatives as possible to escape from the conditions of life in Morocco. This is hardly surprising, as even now the average national income per head in Morocco is only 14% of that in the Netherlands.<sup>6</sup> In the meantime local Dutch society began to realize the historical reality of the emergence of what has now come to be known as 'European Islam'.<sup>7</sup> Since the second half of the 1970s, Dutch policy has drifted between attempts to uphold human values by allowing 'family reunion' and the building of mosques, and attempts to put a stop to immigration for economic reasons.

Recently this drifting policy has come to be replaced by panic-stricken measures to restrict immigration much more fiercely, and to artificially intensify the 'integration' of migrants into Dutch society. The visibility of mosques and the wearing of the Muslim headscarf came to be openly criticized by some people. This was due to the change in the political climate after '9/11' - the terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington - but even more to two subsequent events within the Netherlands which had a major impact on Dutch society. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn, a new figure on the political scene, threatened to destabilize Dutch politics by gaining massive support for a right-wing programme that rejec-

5 Benali & Obdeijn (2005).

6 For 2005, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> gives \$4,300 as the gross domestic product per head for Morocco, compared to \$30,500 for the Netherlands.

7 The concept is elaborated in the works of Tariq Ramadan, one of whose books, *Les musulmans d'Occident et l'avenir de l'islam* published in Paris in 2003 has recently been translated into Dutch. He has been invited to the Netherlands several times in the last two years. In January 2006, a talk by Ramadan at Erasmus University Rotterdam was attended by about 800 young people, mainly of immigrant origin, and was opened by the Mayor of Rotterdam



ted immigration and the visibility of Islam in Dutch society. He had been able to convincingly articulate a growing unease about the effects of 'globalization' in many districts of big cities like Rotterdam and Amsterdam, where relatively poor, lower educated 'white' sections of Dutch society felt that their job prospects and living conditions had deteriorated as a result. This new political programme also found favour with certain circles of 'enlightened' anti-religious right-wing intellectuals. Fortuyn was murdered before he could be elected to office – shot down, not by a radical Muslim, but by a radical animal liberation activist who justified his deed by calling Fortuyn a danger to vulnerable groups in society. In November 2004, however, one of those intellectuals who had supported Fortuyn, the filmmaker Theo van Gogh, was murdered by a young fundamentalist Muslim, whose parents had been born and raised in a small village in the Berber countryside of northern Morocco before their migration to the Netherlands.

Between those two events in the Netherlands, the bloody attack carried out by Muslim fundamentalists in Casablanca on '16/5' 2003 sent shock waves through Moroccan society. At the time, the Dutch media had emphasized that the violence of 'radical fundamentalism' was just as abhorrent to the vast majority of Moroccans in Morocco as it was to the vast majority of Moroccans and non-Moroccans living in the Netherlands. Such feelings of solidarity and 'interconnectedness' were endangered by the subsequent killing of Theo van Gogh, as the fundamentalist murderer was referred to as 'Moroccan', even though he had never shown much personal interest in his parents' Moroccan roots.

This is the background against which this book was conceived. It seemed important to try to restore a sense of normality to Moroccan-Dutch-relations. We decided to revive the contacts between Moroccan and Dutch universities which had existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and to invite scholars from universities in Morocco, and scholars from Dutch universities with an interest in Morocco or Dutch-Moroccan relations, to reflect on different aspects of Moroccan and Dutch society.<sup>8</sup> As we did not want to limit the discussion to issues related to the virtual worlds of radical 'fundamentalism' and academic 'post-modernism', we invited them to focus on the old concepts of 'tradition and modernity' as a unifying theme for their contributions, in order to obtain a more down-to-earth and 'real' view of what is going on in various sections of both societies.

<sup>8</sup> We owe much gratitude to *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam* for hosting and subsidizing a conference under the title 'Tradition and Modernity. Morocco and the Netherlands, 1605-2005' on 30 and 31 May 2005, to mark its 125th anniversary and 400 years of Dutch-Moroccan relations, which formed the basis for this book. The results of previous conferences, held in 1986 in Rabat, in 1988 in Leiden and Amsterdam, in 1990 in Rabat and Marrakech, and in 1992 in Nijmegen and Amsterdam, were published in Rabat under the title *Le Maroc et la Hollande* with the following subtitles: *Études sur l'histoire, la migration, la linguistique et la sémiologie de la culture* (1988), *Étude sur l'histoire, la migration, la langue et la culture* (1990), *La recherche scientifique au service du développement* (1992), *Une approche comparative des grands intérêts communs* (1995). To mark the occasion of 400 years of Moroccan-Dutch relations, a second Dutch-Moroccan conference was held in Marrakech in November 2005, under the title 'L'eau entre moulin et noria', the results of which will also be published.

We also asked them to share and discuss their views with a broad audience, not only of scholars but also of students and people outside universities with an interest in Morocco and the relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. To enable some young people from Morocco to participate in the discussions, we organized an essay competition for MA and PhD students from three Moroccan universities, in Rabat, Oujda and Fes. The seven winners of this contest were invited to come to Amsterdam. Four of their essays are published in this book. The other participants in the conference were invited to write a contribution on the basis of their presentations.<sup>9</sup> The book consists of five parts, in each of which at least one Moroccan and one Dutch author highlight several aspects of society, economy and culture.

In the introductory section of this book, the unifying theme ‘tradition and modernity’ is stated and discussed in general terms. Zakya Daoud, who was the editor of the critical journal *Lamalif*<sup>10</sup> in Morocco and who has written several books on Moroccan society and history, discusses how the concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ have been used *and* abused in the context of Moroccan society now and in the past. She points to the ambiguity of the meaning of these concepts in different contexts, especially since nowadays many young Muslims consider ‘fundamentalism’ to be ‘modern’. The historian Herman Obdeijn compares historical developments in both countries as regards the relation of tradition and modernity. As a former cultural attaché of the Netherlands in Morocco, and after that as the head of the Institute of Migration and Minorities Studies at Leiden University, Obdeijn was the initiator of the commemoration of ‘400 years of Dutch–Moroccan relations’. In his contribution, he suggests that modernity in the Netherlands nowadays seems to imply a break with a tradition of tolerance and he contrasts this with the respect for valued aspects of tradition shown by prominent men and women in Morocco’s current modernization process.

The second part of this volume highlights more specific developments in both societies. It starts with a chapter on the management of religious affairs in Morocco by Abdelhamid Lotfi of Mohammed V University in Rabat and Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. He is particularly interested in the efforts undertaken by King Mohammed VI to formulate new religious policies that take into consideration recent socio-economic changes in Morocco as well as the globalization of Islam. Lotfi offers interesting information on the modernization of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs under minister Ahmed Taoufiq. The chapter by Hendrik Vroom, Professor of Theology at *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam*, can be considered as a counterpart to Lotfi’s contribution. Vroom reports on one modern aspect of ‘managing religious affairs’ in the Netherlands: the launch of a new study programme in Islamic theology in order to pro-

<sup>9</sup> The contributions of De Haas and Bartels and De Koning were anonymously refereed at their specific request and were revised on the basis of the referee reports.

<sup>10</sup> *Lamalif* was a monthly review that existed from 1966 until 1988 and that is still often cited to this day. It tried to combine engagement and sound reasoning and many of its journalists came from academic circles. It sold 12,000 copies of each issue. It was founded by Jacqueline Loughlam and her husband. (Zakya Daoud is the pseudonym of Jacqueline Loughlam.): see <http://www.telquel-online.com/130/sujet2.shtml>.

vide Islamic spiritual care in hospitals and penitentiary institutions in the Netherlands. He provides the reader with inside information on the curriculum of the new programme and its first students.

In the next two chapters in this part, a Dutch and a Moroccan jurist discuss the most important recent modernization in Moroccan society: the new Moroccan Family Code. Frans van der Velden, a specialist at the Dutch Ministry of Justice in the application of Moroccan law to issues of marriage and divorce among Moroccans in the Netherlands, reviews modern and traditional aspects of the new law. He concludes that what is still badly needed is an authoritative interpretation of the new Code. Mohamed Azzine, a legal advisor to the Moroccan Embassy in the Netherlands, does not hesitate to conclude that the new Code is neither in contradiction to the traditional *shari'a* nor to the exigencies of modernity.

Lastly, this part contains chapters on two quite different political aspects of Moroccan society. Arne Musch, who is involved in the organization of partnerships between Dutch and Moroccan cities, considers the effects of the simultaneous process of increasing modernization and the growing influence of the moderately fundamentalist PJD, *Parti de la Justice et du Développement*, at local rather than national level and expresses the hope that recent and future changes in Moroccan politics may result in an increase in the delivery of real services to the population at this level. Mustapha El Qadéry, a historian who spent a number of years working for IRCAM, the *Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe* in Rabat, discusses the political impact of the lack of attention devoted to the *Amazigh* or 'Berber' past of Moroccan society in the 'Arabo-Islamic' state that resulted from the nationalist movement. He considers the important part played in modern and traditional aspects of Moroccan society by the memory of Abdelkrim, the hero of the Rif. Abdelkrim is held in very high esteem by many Dutch Moroccans, the majority of whom originate from the Rif.<sup>11</sup>

The third part of the book focuses on economy and migration. Hans Visser, Professor of International Economics at *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam*, and Omar Aloui and Saad Belghazi, economists who work for the research agency Agro Concept and for INSEA, the *Institut National de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquée*, in Rabat, discuss the impact on Morocco of the European-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the 'Barcelona Process'. In his contribution, Visser uses the most recent information available to emphasize the positive effects that Morocco's increased openness to trade is having on its economic growth. Aloui and Belghazi stress the desirability of a real 'Neighbourhood Policy' on the part of the European Union in addition to the Barcelona Process, especially with regard to agriculture. They also point out the importance of keeping an open mind regarding win-win scenarios in terms of labour mobility. Van der Veen analyzes attempts of the Moroccan government to control illegal sectors of the economy focusing on drug-trafficking, a poignant aspect of Dutch-Moroccan relations.

11 See for instance the documentary film 'Abdelkrim, rebelle of legitieme opstand' on <http://www.omroep.nl/nps/maroc/welcome.html?abdelkrim.html> ~content by Dr Mustapha Aarab, who was Qadéry's Moroccan-Dutch counterpart during the conference in Amsterdam.

Aspects of emigration from Morocco are considered by the Dutch geographer Hein de Haas and the Moroccan geographer Mohammed Boudoudou. In a thoroughly researched article, De Haas emphasizes the extent to which migration has become an all pervasive phenomenon in Moroccan society. As he sees it, migration is not only of economic importance due to the remittances of money to the regions of origin, but it is also 'the inevitable corollary of development and globalization processes that broaden horizons and increase capabilities and aspirations'. Boudoudou draws attention to the colonial background of the migration phenomenon and summarizes the three 'ages' of Maghreb migration to European countries and the consequences of the continuing lack of a genuine experience of equal citizenship among immigrants.

The fourth part of the book concentrates on young people. The anthropologists Edien Bartels, Martijn de Koning and Lenie Brouwer present the results of Dutch research on young Dutch Moroccans. Bartels and De Koning focus on 'identity construction' and cast doubt on Olivier Roy's argument that globalization and the ensuing deculturation lead to Muslim radicalism. They observe a quest among young people for a 'real' Islam suitable for western society. Brouwer elaborates this argument on behalf of her research into the meaning of 'Moroccan' websites as 'a new social space' for young Dutch Moroccans. The young Belgian anthropologist Els Vanderwaeren reports on some of the results of her research into the perceptions of Islam among highly educated Muslims in Flanders. The criminologist Anas Talbi of the university of Marrakech reflects on the possible causes of criminality among young Dutch-Moroccans. On the one hand he pleads for respect, dialogue and the rejection of violence, and on the other hand for '*intégration réciproque*', mutual integration.

The next two chapters in this part consist of two of the four essays selected for publication from the entries to the essay competition for MA and PhD students at Moroccan universities. The first one is by first prize winner Rachid Touhtouh, who is currently working on his PhD thesis at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fes. His essay was based on fieldwork conducted at a high school in northern Morocco. It argues that a system of education based on *hshouma*, the traditional culture of fear and taboo in the contact between boys and girls, creates 'gendered identities'. His work shows a preference among young people for co-education and illustrates how gender education can help in the development of social relationships between men and women and in the emancipation of women. Zakaria Zakri, who studied English linguistics in Rabat, is fascinated by the analytical possibilities offered by post-modernism to understand the situation of his own generation in Morocco. In his essay, he asks whether the idea of Dutch-Moroccan relations has any meaning as long as European borders are closed to young people from Morocco with intellectual ambitions. Does this idea have any meaning as long as Morocco itself, as he perceives it, still lacks a real openness to the rest of the Arab world and to the West?

The last part of the book offers some insights in the effects of globalization, of which Moroccan-Dutch relations are an aspect. The first chapter contains a winning essay by young historian Ouafaâ El-Mesmoudi of the University of Rabat. She analyses the story told by the Dutch woman Maria ter Meetelen about her experiences when she was held

captive in Morocco as a young woman between 1731 and 1743. She considers the story to be an example of 'modern' attitudes and a 'dialogue between civilizations' during the eighteenth century. Marianne Hermans, a young researcher in literature at *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam*, focuses on the narratives of young Dutch-Moroccan writers 'at the crossroads of two cultures'. Moha Ennaji, Professor of English Linguistics in Fes, considers the impact of globalization on language and identity in Morocco. He ends with a strong plea for a continuing dialogue between civilizations and the recognition and preservation of cultural diversity both within and among nations.

The last three chapters focus on architecture. The first is another of the prize winning essays, this one written by a young student at the *Ecole Nationale d'Architecture* in Rabat, Hanane Bouchtalla. She reflects on the tension between tradition and modernity in architecture. On the one hand she applauds the importance of the great modern architects of the twentieth century. On the other hand she pleads for an architecture conditioned by and sensitive to the context in which it is present. Fatima Sadiqi, Professor of Linguistics and Gender Studies at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fes offers a 'feminist view' of the architecture of Fes. She sees this architecture as conditioned by the predominance of a tribal mentality, as well as by the need to enforce Islamic law, and supposes that it offers a symbolic expression of the ways in which masculinity and femininity are perceived. Monique Eleb of the *École d'Architecture* in Paris offers some of the results of her research into the influence of changing social values on the development of living arrangements and lifestyle in Casablanca. Despite a certain attachment to traditional forms, there is no doubt that growing wealth is, for example, signalling the demise of the traditional 'multifunctionality' of the main room in Moroccan houses, and leading to the introduction of separate bedrooms for the various members of the family. Her article ends this book by giving us glimpses into the reality of private daily life in Morocco's biggest and most 'modern' city.

What is needed for the future is research that does not focus exclusively on phenomena at the margins of society, such as radical fundamentalism, and research on societies that is not exclusively inspired by post-modernistic academic approaches. This book calls for attention to be paid to the ongoing tensions between striving for modernity and clinging to tradition, to the tensions between striving for the preservation of respectable traditions and clinging to a narrow concept of modernity, and to the role these tensions play in the development of societies. Taking into account traditions of different origins is unavoidable within the real-life context of historical development in a globalizing world.

As for Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands, there is no doubt at all that they are here to stay. The Dutch Moroccan minority of 315,821 persons in 2005 now constitutes 1.9% of the Dutch population. In major cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, this figure is about 6%.<sup>12</sup> Although Dutch immigration policy is much more restrictive than it used to be, this percentage is certain to increase in the future as a result of 'import marriages' and birth-rate differentials. Many Dutch Moroccans will continue to cherish

<sup>12</sup> <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb>




ties with their country of origin, as migrants to foreign countries everywhere in the world have always done. Moreover, they will continue to cherish their religion, probably even more than Moroccans in Morocco do, as this has also been a typical phenomenon for migrants in all times and in all places. For the future of both countries, it seems more rewarding to develop an interest in each other's reality and the consequences of an unavoidable continuation of globalization than to try to shut doors and retreat into one's own supposedly 'superior' culture, the contours of which are either increasingly unclear in the case of non-Muslim Dutch, or characterized by a lack of knowledge about the reality of historical developments in their country of origin in the case of many Muslims.<sup>13</sup> We hope that this book will further the continuation of contacts between Dutch and Moroccan universities, to the benefit of both countries.

<sup>13</sup> See also Obdeijn's contribution to this book.



*Part I*

Tradition and  
modernity  
in Morocco and  
the Netherlands





Zakya Daoud

## Tradition et modernité au Maroc, passé et présent

### *Tradition et modernité: des comportements fluctuants, relatifs*

Dans les années 70, notre ami Paul Pascon, sociologue, malheureusement disparu et auquel je tiens à rendre hommage, inventait le concept de ‘société composite’. Il expliquait que la société marocaine était composite dans la mesure où chaque Marocain, confronté journallement à des types variés de modes de production, d’idéologie, de convention, de valeurs, de morale, de systèmes juridiques, de technologie, voire à différentes langues, monnaies et même calendriers, pouvait, dans la même journée et selon les domaines, avoir des idées et des comportements que l’on pouvait qualifier de modernes et d’autres que l’on pouvait qualifier de traditionnels.<sup>1</sup> Il attestait de cette réflexion en décrivant la journée d’un paysan du Haouz.<sup>2</sup>

Ce dernier quittait sa ferme sur son vélo moteur – qu’il devait réparer, car il ne démarrait pas – pour discuter avec le fonctionnaire d’un organisme de crédit d’un prêt pour construire une étable. Habillé de sa traditionnelle *djellaba*, il glissait dans sa *choukhara*<sup>3</sup>, non seulement ses papiers mais aussi un poulet à destination du fonctionnaire – pour non seulement s’attribuer ses faveurs, mais encore comme rémunération, selon le système patriarcal du temps – et de l’argent qu’il allait lui consacrer. Bien sûr, enfourchant sa bécane, il invoquait le nom de Dieu!...Arrivé à l’administration en question, il lui fallait chercher un introducteur, ne pouvant se présenter sans celui ci devant le fonctionnaire: car comment le reconnaîtrait-on? C’est le problème de l’identité qui est là posée.

Ce n’est qu’après qu’il pouvait discuter crédit, intérêt, encore que ceux ci se mélangent pour lui avec don et aide, d’autant qu’il devait prendre une assurance, ce qui heurtait son traditionnel fatalisme. Quand il lui fallait signer, le problème de l’identité – donc de l’existence dans cette société multiple – se posait à nouveau: comment une signature pourrait garantir l’identité à un homme analphabète?

L’exemple de Paul Pascon, également analysé par Jacques Berque dans *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (1962) a beaucoup frappé. Mais le concept de société composite n’a pas été assez creusé et il l’a été d’autant moins que l’évolution du Maroc a été ce qu’elle a été. De plus, la conclusion de Paul Pascon était passée dans les années 60 totalement inaperçue. Elle était pourtant déterminante pour l’avenir. Selon lui, pour s’y retrouver au milieu de ces dilemmes contradictoires, de ses causalités enchevêtrées, fondées constamment sur des compromis et des équilibres instables, le Marocain ne pouvait suivre qu’un seul fil

1 Dans l’ouvrage dont cet exemple est extrait Paul Pascon citait les modes de production d’énergie qui s’entrechoquaient dans le Haouz: animale, humaine, solaire, mécanique, électrique (Pascon (1977)).

2 Pascon (1986) 211-212.

3 Sorte de besace en cuir.

conducteur, celui de son intérêt. D'où un individualisme dont l'essor dans cette société patriarcale et traditionnelle, fondée sur le groupe, a interpellé sans que l'on s'y attarde vraiment.

### ***La sémantique est importante***

Un tel exemple, propre aux sociétés dites aussi dualistes, qui éclaire le vécu, montre bien que tradition et modernité sont des concepts relatifs. Le débat se réduit donc à la sémantique. Pour avancer dans la discussion, il importe de bien préciser ce que l'on entend par modernité et tradition, sous peine de tourner en rond et de ne plus savoir de quoi on parle.

Qu'entend-on par tradition? Selon le professeur Johanssen de l'Université de Berlin, écrivant dans *Lamalif* en 1975 un texte sur la question, 'la tradition est l'appropriation d'une pratique passée que l'on veut restituer dans le présent'.<sup>4</sup> C'est aussi une histoire qui s'est arrêtée et qui se répète, que l'on veut répéter plutôt. Tandis que le présent lui – à tort ou à raison – est assimilé à la modernité, conçue elle avec une idée de progrès dans le processus historique. Entre les deux – car c'est l'opposition des deux concepts qui est majeure, pas seulement chacun d'entre eux – il peut y avoir coexistence, mais plus souvent compétition, résistance, concurrence, multiples contradictions qui, en général, ne sont pas fructueuses mais bloquantes. C'est cette tension qui, à mon sens, fonde la paire tradition/modernité.

Le dualisme a été étudié sous le colonialisme, parce qu'il a été introduit par exemple au Maghreb ou au Maroc par le colonialisme. Le maréchal Lyautey, résident général de la France au Maroc de 1912 à 1924, a ainsi poussé très loin l'utilisation de la tradition comme instrument de pénétration, puis de consolidation, puis de domination. Cela a fondé, au Maroc, un dualisme perdurant, ce que Lyautey appelait 'gouverner avec le mandarin, pas contre le mandarin', constituer une réserve de bons sauvages, 'passionnément provinciaux'. De ce fait découle que la tradition est une forme imposée de pouvoir.

### ***Tradition et modernité: des concepts de pouvoir, des systèmes de pouvoir***

Tradition et modernité sont des concepts de pouvoir, des systèmes de pouvoir. Ce qui signifie que tradition et modernité sont des catégories idéologiques, elles fondent certes une identité sociologique, mais surtout elles légitiment une action, elles sont donc avant tout un concept politique, pour fonder une politique de manière inégalitaire, la tradition étant soit méprisée, soit marginalisée, mais nécessaire au maintien de l'ensemble d'un système double. Le respect de la tradition n'est vu qu'autant qu'il aide à maintenir un pouvoir et donc à réaliser des profits économiques.

L'instrumentalisation est inhérente même aux concepts et à leur opposition. C'est à la fois un discours et une pratique, mais le discours est important puisqu'il peut même aller jusqu'à qualifier la modernité improductive de traditionnelle. Avec cette observation majeure que l'instrumentalisation de la tradition détruit son contenu. Ainsi une société traditionnelle est supposée avoir une économie traditionnelle, ce qui n'est jamais le cas,

<sup>4</sup> *Lamalif* 71 (1975); sur *Lamalif* voire aussi 'Introduction' note 10.

puisque tout évolue, puisque les structures se transforment – qu'on le veuille ou non – par l'effet de proximité, par l'information, par des mesures qui ne peuvent pas toujours rester dans un champ clos, par des politiques suivies.

On assiste alors à ce que l'historien Abdallah Laroui appelait la 'retraditionalisation'.

C'est ce qui s'est passé sous Hassan II: nous avons assisté, et spécialement après les coups d'états militaires de 1971 et de 1972, à une politique de retraditionalisation systématique. On pouvait le constater au niveau des timbres, du costume national, des fêtes, de la résurgence des moussems, de l'appel à pratiquer une architecture s'inspirant de la tradition, mais aussi dans la définition de la forme du gouvernement, le Maghzen, non seulement glorifié dans sa continuité historique mais encore fondé sur une des applications possibles de la beia. La *bei'a* est l'allégeance, que les tribus ou les corps constitués pratiquent en s'inclinant devant le roi.

Mais au début de l'indépendance, lorsque les jeux de la tradition au service d'un système de gouvernance n'étaient pas encore joués, les nationalistes, avec en tête Mehdi Ben Barka – et nous y reviendrons – lui donnaient le sens – en prétendant qu'il était historique – de contrat: le roi s'engageait à soutenir, à appuyer, à servir ses sujets, lesquels s'engageaient à lui obéir et à le servir. Dans ce que nous avons vu à l'œuvre, c'est le sens d'allégeance sans contrat qui a prévalu. On ne peut que relever que fonder le système monarchique sur le contrat aurait été plus moderne et que le contraire était traditionnel, même si le discours alors devait importer et employer des termes tels que démocratie, parlement, et faire pratiquer des élections, des référendas et autres consultations. La distorsion alors entre le discours et la pratique, le dualisme poursuivi, avait de quoi rendre schizophrénique.

Pour bien attester de cette relativité de deux concepts, ambigus et contradictoires, d'une part et d'autre part, de leur instrumentalisation, tant par des pouvoirs que par des individus, d'ailleurs, qui fonde leur opposition, je vais prendre trois exemples.

### ***Zaynab, reine de Marrakech***

J'ai publié une histoire romancée de la femme de Youssef Ben Tachfine, le plus grand roi almoravide, mouvement religieux parti du Sahara profond au onzième siècle et qui est à l'origine de la création d'un empire qui durera moins d'un siècle, couvrant tout le Maghreb jusqu'à la Kabylie, et au delà de l'Andalousie en Espagne.<sup>5</sup>

Certaines des attitudes des Almoravides et spécialement de Youssef Ben Tachfine, peuvent sembler modernes. Le sens de l'administration et de l'organisation du territoire de Youssef Ben Tachfine, la qualité de ses conquêtes donc son organisation militaire, sa capacité de mobilisation, la construction de son armée et de son état, sont non seulement des qualités modernes, mais elles influencent encore le Maroc d'aujourd'hui, donc le Maroc dit moderne. Mais hormis cette personnalité dominante, les Almoravides sont présentés comme ayant des défauts d'intolérance, de machisme, de patriarcalisme, d'organisation tribale et patrimoniale que l'on pourrait qualifier de traditionnels. Ils les perdront d'ailleurs au contact de l'Andalousie ce qui contribuera d'une certaine façon à leur chute:

5 Daoud (2004).

leur traditionalité ayant été plutôt un facteur de permanence, leur modernité, un facteur de déclin. Paradoxal mais pas unique.

Cependant la question principale sous les Almoravides me semble être autre: c'est celle du centre et de la périphérie. Les Almoravides ont fondé un empire qui partait du Sahara jusqu'à la Kabylie, plus de la moitié du Maghreb donc et plus de la moitié de l'Espagne. Sur la zone qu'ils contrôlaient ce sont eux qui dictaient la norme, donc qui décidaient de ce qui était moderne et de ce qui était traditionnel. Comme aujourd'hui. Aujourd'hui, ce sont les puissances dominantes qui donnent son sens à la modernité. C'est ainsi que les Etats Unis dictent la norme mondiale en cette matière comme en d'autres. Du même coup, les fondamentalistes évangéliques qui sont au pouvoir dans ce pays, et qui détiennent les rouages politiques et administratifs, sont devenus modernes, l'essence même de la modernité, alors qu'ils paraissaient, il y a encore peu, totalement ringards. Non seulement ils sont modernes, mais encore ils sont post modernes, à la pointe donc de la modernité, ce dont on peut avoir conscience dans la diffusion mondiale et l'imitation tout aussi mondiales de leurs pratiques, prières, idéologies, musique. Tout comme je pense profondément que la modernité et la tradition sont des concepts relatifs qui ne valent que par leur opposition et leur tension réciproque, je pense également que ce sont les idéologues dominants et en l'occurrence, autrefois comme aujourd'hui, les politiques dominants qui décident de ce qui est moderne et traditionnel en fixant les normes. Ce qui ajoute encore à la relativité des deux concepts.

Autre enseignement de cette période: la figure de Zaynab, femme de sultan, mais surtout elle même femme de pouvoir, femme cultivée et donc femme de savoir, femme intelligente, donc intemporelle, femme tolérante vis à vis de la religion, femme de création, utilisant la technique. Peut on rêver plus moderne que cette figure? Ce qui montre bien que la modernité est de tous les temps et de tous les âges et que présenter systématiquement le passé comme traditionnel est une grossière erreur. Ce qui renforce encore le caractère fluctuant et relatif de l'opposition tradition/modernité et, j'oserais dire, la réduit à néant.

### ***Abdelkrim el Khatabi***

Abdelkrim el Khatabi était le héros du Rif qui parvient dans les années 20 à bâtir un état réformateur sur une partie du Maroc et à tenir en échec une énorme armée franco espagnole.<sup>6</sup> Dans les années 20, la démarche d'Abdelkrim, en totale similitude avec celle, dans l'ensemble du monde musulman, des réformateurs, tels Atatürk, Chakib Arslan, Ferhat Abbas et autres, est fondée sur la nécessité d'acquérir sciences, techniques, éducation, enseignement, savoir, pour combler le retard qui a engendré la colonisation, se hisser au niveau de l'Occident dominant et en être un partenaire et un interlocuteur, dans le cadre de la paix et du progrès que l'on croyait à l'époque irréversibles.

C'est sur ces fondements, qui traversent toute la *nahda* (renaissance) arabe, que Abdelkrim fonde sa démarche et bâtit son état: place centrale du droit dans cette con-

<sup>6</sup> Daoud (1999); sur l'importance d'Abdelkrim voire aussi la contribution de Qadéry dans ce livre.

struction étatique, lutte contre le clanisme, le tribalisme, le pouvoir des *zaouïas*, construction rationnelle et rigoureuse de l'armée, rédaction d'une Constitution, intérêt pour l'enseignement, attention constante aux sciences et techniques, téléphone, radios, armement, propagande, intérêt pour les médias, pour la politique internationale, volonté affichée et poursuivie de développement économique, etc. Les exemples sont nombreux.

Cependant, on ne peut pas dire que Abdelkrim ait été moderne, du moins ce que nous entendons aujourd'hui par moderne, pour son rapport au mariage - il avait deux femmes - et à la condition de la femme qu'il n'a évidemment pas eu le temps de transformer, ce dont toutefois, il n'a pas manifesté l'intention. Mademoiselle Ponzo, une infirmière ayant visité le Rif sous Abdelkrim, raconte, par exemple, que l'on doit examiner les femmes malades derrière des rideaux car personne, et en tous cas surtout pas un homme, fut-il médecin, ne peut les apercevoir. Ce que j'en retiens c'est que la modernité est une revendication politique, une méthode, un but à atteindre mais qu'elle n'est jamais totale et en l'occurrence, il a processus par étapes, pour ne pas aller trop vite, pour ne pas choquer. Que l'on se souvienne à cet égard, de la démarche plus globalisante de Atatürk qui fut plus tard contestée et sur le coup assez mal vue par certaines couches de la population turque. C'est là d'ailleurs une des applications de ce retour en arrière que l'on constate aujourd'hui.

Cependant on peut tirer aussi un autre enseignement de l'histoire d'Abdelkrim dont la mémoire reste très présente non seulement dans tout le Maroc mais aussi et surtout dans sa région d'origine. Ceux qui se réfèrent à lui, à son exemple, à sa mémoire, ont, semble-t-il surtout gardé de lui l'idée de revendication politique, mais pas cette idée pourtant présente de modernisation. On peut supposer que l'état d'arriération dans lequel le Rif a été laissé presque sciemment tant par les Espagnols - quand ils en ont repris le contrôle après l'échec de l'épopée d'Abdelkrim - que par le Maroc indépendant, délaissant une région rebelle et contestataire, a joué pour tirer vers une tradition recrée là encore, les esprits de la région au lieu de les porter à suivre les enseignements politiques et économiques de celui dont ils se réclament. Là on peut aussi vérifier encore le caractère relatif de l'opposition des deux concepts, leur caractère également fluctuant, et souligner que l'absence de modernité économique ne peut jouer qu'en faveur d'une tradition refuge donc recrée.

### ***Mehdi Ben Barka***

Mehdi Ben Barka était un chef politique marocain, tué à Paris en 1965 à l'âge de quarante cinq ans, qui fut à la fois un homme de gauche marocain et un des acteurs de la tricontinentale tiers mondiste<sup>7</sup>. Dans le cas de Ben Barka qui naît pratiquement au moment où le rêve d'Abdelkrim prend forme et disparaît au bout de 5 ans, la modernité est totale, l'attitude politique se conjugue avec une attitude à l'égard de l'enseignement, et des femmes entrant dans les catégories idéologiques de la modernité: apprentissage de la lecture à sa propre mère, dévoilement de sa propre femme, par exemple. Il n'y a pas de faille dans une revendication moderniste appuyée sur des idées nationalistes et progressistes qui ambitionnent une création étatique nouvelle, bien dans les termes du

<sup>7</sup> Daoud (2000).

tiers-mondisme des années 50/60, jusque et y compris le fait de puiser dans la tradition, par exemple pour la *beia*, des acceptions modernisantes.

On est alors dans le jeu et l'alternance des deux concepts: la modernité de la tradition, la tradition de la modernité. Dans le cas de Ben Barka, la modernité n'est pas seulement une méthode et un objectif à terme comme dans le cas d'Abdelkrim, elle est une revendication profonde qui s'inscrit dans un projet politique et dans une conquête du pouvoir, par opposition justement à ce qui fondait les caractéristiques du régime alors combattu, le Makhzen, qualifié de traditionnel et contré politiquement à ce titre également. La modernité est donc un concept qui fonde et détermine l'avenir. On peut ajouter que cet homme moderne a disparu selon des méthodes traditionnelles, mais en France, ce qui brouille aussi les pistes.

### ***Qu'en est-il d'aujourd'hui?***

Je voudrais examiner l'aujourd'hui de deux façons, à l'égard du Maroc, puisque c'est l'objet de cet article, mais en dépassant le cas du Maroc pour l'inclure dans la globalisation et la mondialisation d'aujourd'hui.

Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui continue-t-il d'être travaillé par l'opposition, la contradiction, entre la tradition et la modernité? Je dirais oui, c'est ce qui fait d'ailleurs sa complexité. On ne peut pas faire table rase du passé si facilement et le Maroc est fier de son passé, donc il ne l'évacue pas, bien au contraire. Dans certains domaines, y compris dans celui du pouvoir, certaines survivances peuvent être qualifiées de traditionnelles. Mais dans d'autres aspects, on est clairement dans le champ du présent mondial, donc de ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la modernité. Dans certains domaines, on s'efforce très clairement de dépasser le traditionnel pour accéder à la modernité, notamment dans le domaine économique. Dans d'autres domaines encore on empile les deux concepts de tradition et de modernité et on les fait cohabiter, comme chez le paysan du Haouz de Paul Pascon. Je n'en prendrais qu'un, pour la discussion. Celui de la nouvelle Moudawana<sup>8</sup>: on peut constater que la polygamie par exemple n'est pas éradiquée, elle est sérieusement freinée, mais les gens sont laissés libres de l'observer, sous certaines conditions. Même chose pour la répudiation dans les différentes formes de dissolution du mariage: elle en est une forme parmi d'autres, on peut s'y référer, ce n'est pas conseillé certes, mais c'est laissé à la libre appréciation de chacun pour peu, là encore, que certaines conditions soient observées.

La seule question alors, et je ne me risque pas pour ma part à y répondre, est celle-ci: cette cohabitation que l'on souhaiterait paisible, cette alliance pourrait on même dire, est-elle voulue. Est-elle un système de pouvoir? Conscient ou inconscient? Une conception du progrès par étapes, une transition?

### ***Modernité et de tradition: réalités fluctuantes et relatives***

Ces exemples donnent leur sens réel aux deux concepts ou au deux termes de modernité et de tradition: ce sont des réalités fluctuantes et relatives, qui sont au service de poli-

<sup>8</sup> Sur le Moudawwana voire aussi les contributions de Van der Velden et Azzine dans ce livre.

tiques différentes, mais peuvent coexister dans des comportements quotidiens, pas plus schizophréniques que dans d'autres aires culturelles. On est toujours moderne par rapport à quelqu'un comme on est toujours traditionnel par rapport à quelque chose. Il n'y en l'occurrence aucune connotation morale dans ces deux termes, qui n'ont en eux mêmes que la valeur que l'on veut bien leur donner. On ne peut fonder aucun jugement réel sur ces deux termes. C'est leur relativisme qui est essentiel.

Mais le Maroc ne pourrait être vu comme unique dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Qu'en est il alors de la tradition et de la modernité dans le monde d'aujourd'hui? Il me semble qu'aujourd'hui, modernité et tradition sont étroitement imbriquées dans chaque individu de part le monde et pas seulement dans chaque Marocain. Et ceci est encore plus prégnant qu'il y a trente ou quarante ans. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il y a un 'retour en arrière' et que des comportements et des idées extrémistes, religieux ou politiques d'ailleurs, tout comme le communautarisme, le clanisme, etc., etc., qui semblaient il y a quelques décennies des survivances du passé destinées à disparaître, sont revenues au devant de la scène au point d'être post modernes, donc modernes.

L'histoire tourne, elle pivote, et, contrairement à ce que l'on avait cru, parce qu'on l'avait appris, elle n'avance pas forcément, ni ne progresse forcément. Elle peut tout aussi bien stagner, voire reculer. Il n'est encore que dans les sciences, et pas toujours, que l'on puisse parler de processus ascensionnel constant.

Aujourd'hui donc la tradition est devenue moderne. Le débat ne se pose plus dans les mêmes termes, la tension est dans l'autre sens, celui où des gens d'autres générations qui ont connu autre chose que les temps présents combattent cette tradition *new look* au nom de leur idée de la modernité d'hier. Mais pour les très jeunes, cette situation là est moderne et c'est la modernité d'hier qui leur semble ringarde, dépassée, donc traditionnelle. Nulle part ces deux concepts ne sont figés, ils ne cessent d'évoluer l'un et l'autre, l'un par rapport à l'autre, tant dans le temps que dans l'espace, et leur éventuelle tension – j'aurais plutôt tendance d'accord avec Paul Pascon, à parler de cohabitation – forme la trame d'aujourd'hui.

C'est pourquoi, selon moi, ces deux concepts ont cessé d'être opérants. On pourrait les remplacer au niveau de la tension, de l'opposition, de la cohabitation par une autre paire, celle de fondamentaliste et de post moderniste, les deux prétendant sciemment ignorer les besoins et les sentiments d'hommes et de femmes, qui, de part le monde, revendiquent le progrès tout en conservant – pourquoi pas ? – certains aspects de leur passé ou de leur tradition et en voulant donner un nouveau sens à la modernité, en la revalorisant vers plus d'humanisme, au delà de ce que la modernité – ou la post modernité d'aujourd'hui – veut faire en transformant l'homme en objet de marchandise et de consommation.

Tel est le véritable dilemme d'aujourd'hui, au Maroc mais pas seulement. La prégnance du fondamentalisme et du post modernisme ne peut ignorer la tension de cette nouvelle modernité à l'œuvre et l'intérêt pour une tradition qui a, parfois, montré ses qualités. Non seulement les deux termes doivent donc être revalorisés mais leur interaction également.

*Herman Obdeijn*

## Modernity and tradition in Morocco and the Netherlands. A comparison

### **Introduction**<sup>1</sup>

‘Tradition and Modernity: Morocco and the Netherlands’ was the title of the conference for which this contribution was originally written. The word order suggested, albeit unintentionally, that Morocco represented tradition, and the Netherlands modernity. Most people usually think of modernity as ‘progressive’ and desirable, while tradition is associated with backwardness and is therefore undesirable. But the issue is not that simple.

As a historian I do not necessarily view modernity as a good thing in all situations. The dynamism and vitality of tradition as a force for continuity in history should not be underrated. A modernity that has no roots in tradition tends to chaos. Tradition can be seen as an appropriation of the past that has been reconstituted today. Humanity disposes of memory, and history is the collective memory of humanity. For every society interaction between tradition and modernity is desirable for a healthy future. Against this background I plan to focus on some developments in Morocco and the Netherlands over the last hundred years in order to stimulate a discussion on the relevance of the concepts of tradition and modernity for relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. I will touch on some political, religious, and cultural developments in the traditional and modern social aspects of both countries. In the final paragraph I will focus on the ambiguous position of young Moroccans in the Netherlands with respect to tradition and modernity.

### **Politics and democratization**

In the Netherlands modern political developments during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries mainly consisted of extending suffrage, along with a gradual ‘de-pillarization’ of society. In the nineteenth century the right to vote and participate in government had been based on property or wealth and gender. Men who paid a certain amount of taxes had the vote. In 1880 only thirteen percent of the male population older than fifteen could vote. In 1917 general male suffrage was introduced, and in 1922 general female suffrage was added. Dutch society had also arrived at a de facto sharing of power and responsibility among the different religious and ideological groups. Twentieth-century Dutch society was ‘pillarized’: Catholics, Protestants, socialists and liberals lived in their own spheres, in ‘pillars’ that consisted of institutions that encompassed all aspects of life. The leaders of each of these pillars made coalitions at the top. From almost the moment

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to the editors who suggested important improvements for my contribution.



of his or her birth nearly every individual was aware of the religious affiliation and party he or she belonged to. In the traditions of this pillarized society differences among people could easily be tolerated and accepted.

Much of this changed after World War II, especially in the sixties. The process of secularization meant that individuals were no longer automatically members of a particular party or group. Children of liberals could become socialists. Sons and daughters of Catholic parents might be more at home in the liberal party. Votes shifted and certainties disappeared. New political leaders and parties tried to rally adherents to programmes no longer based on the old religious and ideological convictions. New political groups appeared on the scene. There was now room for demagogues as well. One of the most spectacular recent political developments was the mass support for the right-wing leader Pim Fortuyn. It collapsed soon after he was murdered in 2002, but new right-wing politicians are following his example.

Even the famous Dutch *polder model* of mutual consultation to reach agreement – especially in labour relations – disappeared. The ideology of balance and shared power also disappeared. Along with their disappearance, the idea of a shared community whose members respected one another's convictions and lived according to a model of tolerance disappeared as well. Secularization led to an ideological levelling of society. Many people felt lost without the anchors they had known. Religious people began to be seen as deviant. The 'other' was no longer viewed as a partner but as a stranger, or even a potential danger.

These changes had major implications for a multicultural society. For centuries Dutch society had shown how different groups with different beliefs could live together. It had profited from the wealth of the differences and varieties in skills and convictions among the various parts of its population. But this attitude changed during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The other, the 'newcomer' was no longer welcomed as a partner or new member of the family, but was seen as a stranger and potential threat to Dutch society.

At the same time the Dutch seemed to lose their faith in politics, in a shared community where every member would shoulder his or her responsibilities. Politicians and political parties were regarded with mistrust. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende's programme to restore a climate of norms and values met with much scepticism. Although the Dutch were among the founding fathers of the European Union, in the summer of 2005 they refused to approve the European Constitution. Europe was no longer a beautiful dream but was viewed as a nightmare, a source of evil. There was mistrust and dissatisfaction, not only for the Euro and the bureaucracy in Brussels, but also because of the intention to make Turkey, a Muslim country, part of the European Union.

Historical developments in Morocco during the twentieth century were very different. There was a French Protectorate in the first half of the century (1912–1956) that gave the Moroccan population no voting rights at all. Opposition against the protectorate united Moroccans. French policy during the protectorate forged the unity of a nationalist movement. The sultan and the Istiqlal (Independence) party became the symbols of

a new reality. It was the ambition of left-wing Istiqlal leader Ben Barka to make Morocco a true democracy. Yet, after independence had been attained in 1956, the monarchy strengthened its position, succeeded in relegating the Istiqlal party to the sidelines, and became nearly all powerful. Although there were still political parties, a parliament, and universal suffrage, there was no real opposition and no freedom of expression in Moroccan politics. The hated Minister of Interior Affairs, Driss Basri (1973-1999), crushed all opposition, from the left as well as the right. Prisons were full of political prisoners and many of them disappeared.

It was only with the accession to the throne of Mohammed VI in 1999 that a shift occurred. Driss Basri was no longer powerful, and the press started to explore new possibilities of free expression. In 2002 the first fair elections without government manipulation took place. Citizens took advantage of their right of association and assembly as part of a civil society. In a speech to parliament in October 2003, King Mohammed VI said: 'There can be no democracy without democrats.' He was aware that education, freedom of expression, and a free civil society are the best ways to bring about democracy. Moroccans were very eager to proceed, although not everybody was convinced of the sincerity of those in power. People still feared oppression if they criticized public authorities, and not without reason.

The meetings of the Commission for Justice and Reconciliation installed by the king in 2004 created an opportunity to recognize and make good many of the injustices perpetrated during the reign of Hassan II. It remained a source of deep frustration, however, that the Commission was not able to prosecute those responsible for the injustices, casting doubt on the extent to which modernization may have been a clever tactical approach by those in power to maintain their positions.

### **Religion**

It is well-known that Islam is one of the foundations of Moroccan society, but which Islam? Calling today's differences between Muslims and Christians a 'clash of civilizations' shows a tendency to consider the Islam - and Christianity - as monolithic, unchangeable, a fixed ideology or religion. Islam in Morocco, however, is quite different from Islam in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Indonesia. There is also a difference between Islam as a religion, with its dogmatic and moralistic components, and Islam as the organizing principle of a society. This does not mean that these are completely separate aspects, but the ways in which they are linked differ within societies in the Muslim world.

Morocco is a special case because in Morocco the monarchy, with the king as *Amir al-Muminin* (the Commander of the Believers), is the symbol of this unity. There is no other country where the head of state claims this religious authority based on his descent from the prophet Mohammed. In present-day Morocco two very interesting developments are linked. On the one hand there is a tendency to free up religion from an overly legalistic, unchangeable system to one that has a more spiritual flexible attitude and belief. The *ulama*, religious scholars specialized in the Koran, the *hadith* (traditions about the sayings and deeds of Mohammed) and the *shari'a* have given way to the Sufis, spiritual leaders who are also interested in other ways to know God. Faith as such is not discussed, but

the long traditions of mysticism and Sufi practiced in the traditional brotherhoods or *zawias* are being re-evaluated. Mysticism has always been important in Morocco. As such, this development could be described as a return to tradition, although the Minister of Religious Affairs Ahmed Taoufik, a real representative of this line, is a very open-minded modern intellectual.<sup>2</sup>

Linked to this is also a tendency to a more vivid, practical interpretation of the Koran. Enemies of Islam are eager to stress that Islamic doctrine is immutable and not open to interpretation and adaptation. As part of the history of Islam, *ijtihad* (offering new interpretations of the Koran and the *hadith*) that is necessary to adapt them to new historical circumstances, has often played an important role. Political leaders unsympathetic to such flexibility discouraged the practice of *ijtihad*, almost causing it to disappear in Morocco in the last decades of the twentieth century. The new king of Morocco, Mohammed VI, took a firm and daring position on this. In reforming the *Mudawwana*, the Moroccan family and marriage laws, he did not abolish the Koranic laws, as did Kemal Atatürk in Turkey or Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. Examining the interpretations of the Malekite school of law as well as the interpretations of experts of other law schools, he chose the most open and liberal interpretations.<sup>3</sup>

He was not the first to argue that not everything in Islamic tradition is unchangeable. The world-famous Moroccan social scientist Fatema Mernissi, in her book *Le harem politique. Le Prophète et les femmes*, had already questioned the reliability of some *hadith*, especially on the position of women.<sup>4</sup> Abu Hurayra, one of the companions of the prophet and source, or possibly even the originator of many *hadith* on the position of women, was known as someone who did not like women. In January 2005 the Moroccan weekly *TelQuel* published a piece called 'Et si on relisait le Coran?' The authors recommended an interpretation of Koranic texts in the context of history.<sup>5</sup>

Morocco was traditionally an open, tolerant society where Muslims, Jews, and Christians could live and practice their religion. Islam had moreover always accepted different practices. The attacks of May 2003 in Casablanca shocked Morocco. Fundamentalism seemed to have possessed the population. The reaction of the government was prompt and severe. More than one hundred people were arrested. Morocco thus retains her image as an open society where modernity is firmly rooted in the tradition.

Religious developments in the Netherlands were quite different. The churches played an important role in public life during the first sixty years of the twentieth century. Religious leaders exercised their influence through the system of the 'pillarized' society and its institutions. But the sexual revolution of the sixties loosened their hold on society. Church members no longer accepted the strict rule of the churches. They did not

2 See also Dr Lotfi's contribution elsewhere in this book.

3 See also Professor Van der Velden's and Dr Azzine's contributions on *ijtihad* elsewhere in this book.

4 Mernissi (1987).

5 Ksikes and Benchemsi (2005).

accept the authority of priests and bishops with respect to sexuality. And an amazingly rapid secularization process took place. The leaders of many Christian denominations tried to maintain a strict interpretation of traditional mores. Nevertheless, if church members did not completely cut their ties with the old traditions, they were more interested in the spirit of religion than in the rules of the church. The traditional churches lost followers, and all kinds of 'new age' groups seemed more attractive to the religious minded.

Most Dutch people, however, no longer considered themselves members of a specific denomination. In a certain sense they lost their roots, and it is not very clear what will replace them, as even socialism and liberalism were no longer firm convictions or ideologies. The Dutch seem to have lost their links with tradition, while Moroccans have remained more in harmony with their history.

### *The cultural dimension*

Morocco has a strong tradition of multiculturalism: during the long history of Morocco Imazighen (Berbers), Arabs, Jews, sub-Saharan Africans, and Europeans helped to establish a genuinely multicultural society. It has to be admitted, however, that during the period of the protectorate and the first forty years following independence Moroccan nationalist leaders tended to stress the Arab Islamic identity of the country.<sup>6</sup> This was to unite the Moroccan population, first against colonialism and then to consolidate the new state. Even during the last years of the reign of King Hassan II and especially since the accession of Mohammed VI the richness of the multicultural society has again come to be recognized. The Amazigh culture is now presented as an integral part of Moroccan civilization, and the contributions of Jews and Europeans are cherished. Minister of Culture Mohammed Achaari, in a lecture in Amsterdam in April 2005, stressed that the process of democratization is strongly stimulated by cultural developments. In this field new initiatives stimulate the creativity of the population.

The Dutch historian Geert Mak argued in a recent essay that in the merchant society of the Republic of the United Provinces tolerance and mutual understanding were fundamental.<sup>7</sup> Open borders and open minds were essential characteristics of Dutch society. In a Europe where ethnic and religious uniformity were frequently advocated by the authorities, the Republic was a harbour for persecuted individuals. The 'pillarized' society of the first part of the twentieth century also existed through an agreement that there was room for different opinions and ways of life in the country.

A new situation arose with the arrival of many immigrants from the former colonies; this was later intensified by the arrival of invited labourers – called 'guest workers' – in the 1960s and 70s as well as asylum seekers. The experience of a massive immigration from non-Western countries was new. For a while Dutch society seemed to adapt to the new situation very well. Maintaining the tradition of the 'pillarized' society, the official

<sup>6</sup> See Dr Qadéry's contribution elsewhere in this book.

<sup>7</sup> Mak (2005), which analyzes the atmosphere in Dutch society in the two months following the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan fundamentalist.

policy was integration while retaining one's identity. The Dutch example of the multicultural society was considered a model for the rest of Europe.

A fundamental change in attitude occurred in the 1990s. Islam came to be perceived by an increasing number of people as a threat to Dutch society. Some opinion leaders argued that the fundamental values of Islam were incompatible with Dutch values. This affected the way Moroccan immigrants were regarded: Moroccans were no longer considered an ethnic minority but a religious one, and as Arab Muslims (especially those who were visibly religious) they were seen as potential terrorists.

The multicultural society was proclaimed a failure. It was felt that Dutch identity should be the standard, even though it had become an identity that was eroded by developments prior to immigration. While it was indeed important to have a thorough knowledge of Dutch, suddenly immigrants were supposed to learn more about Dutch history than most autochthonous inhabitants. They were also supposed to identify with this history. Immigrants had become strangers, and immigration came to be seen as a danger that had to be halted by any means. Fear became the dominant feeling, and safety was more important than privacy. From what had traditionally been one of the most open societies in Europe, the modern Netherlands changed to a very closed society.

***Young Moroccans in the Netherlands: are they a bridge between cultures and transnational citizens, or are they strangers and potential terrorists?***

The first generation of Moroccans was invited to the Netherlands during the 1960s. They arrived in a society undergoing rapid change. There was plenty of work for the newcomers: the Dutch no longer wanted to work in the factories, and were looking for white-collar jobs.

The Moroccan immigrants did not intend to stay. They believed they had come to the Netherlands temporarily, but changing conditions and poor prospects in their homeland led them to bring their families to the Netherlands. Most of the immigrants did not have much education, and tended to retain their traditions. Dutch society 'tolerated' them but did not encourage integration or assimilation. Moreover, many of the first generation immigrants lost their jobs in the 1980s.

The second generation had a difficult time: poor results in school, conflicts in the family, and few opportunities to find jobs. Nevertheless, there was some change in the 1990s: young Moroccans began to adapt quickly to Dutch society, Dutch became their means of expression, and writers of Moroccan origin became successful. They did better at school, and there was more appreciation for such elements of Moroccan culture as food, music, and clothing. Young Dutch-Moroccans began to feel they were transnational citizens, not living between two worlds but in two worlds. They seemed to represent the best outcome of the multicultural society, and the Internet became their way of communicating and discovering the world.

But their position changed dramatically in the beginning of the new millennium. The attacks on the World Trade Center in the USA on 9/11 reinforced existing feelings of suspicion against Islam and Muslims. Young Moroccans suddenly were no longer considered an ethnic minority or as having an interesting and valuable contribution to the

multicultural society. They were regarded as Muslims of Arab origin, as potential terrorists, and were forced to reconsider their position in Dutch society. Intensive discussions on different Web sites revealed their anger, their fear, and their despair.

Reactions were diverse. Many continued to consider themselves Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin; they continued to be confident of their place in a Dutch society that valued their particular qualities. They can be seen as representatives of a modernization process that had roots in tradition – but which tradition? Some discovered and stressed their Amazigh identity and harboured suspicions against a Morocco where Amazigh culture and the development of Amazigh regions remained marginal. Others cultivated or rediscovered their Islamic roots. The scarf became a symbol of self-esteem. Discussions on the Internet showed their interest in Islam, but they were also proud of the modernization process in Morocco and proud of their Moroccan identity.<sup>8</sup> A minority, but a minority that received much publicity, rejected Dutch society and turned to a ‘pure’ Islam, one without compromise, and some individuals even adopted violence as a means to realize their ideas.

### **Conclusion**

In 1997 an American political scientist described the confrontation between Islam and the Western world as a ‘clash of civilizations’.<sup>9</sup> His book received a great deal of notice, both approval and criticism world-wide, and was reprinted and translated many times. But his argument distorts what happened in the decades preceding 9/11 in Morocco and the Netherlands. It is not a useful way to describe the history and relations among these peoples.

Immigrants are by definition innovators. They take a risk in leaving their homes to build a new life in an unknown society. Over the centuries immigrants constituted an immense force for innovation in the societies that received them. Immigrants are not only needed for their labour, but also for their spirit of enterprise. While it cannot be denied that some young Moroccans have not yet found their places in Dutch society, but the great majority feels at home. They consider themselves to be Dutch with Moroccan roots. If they are approached with sincere interest and respect, it will help them provide a fruitful contribution to Dutch society. Their Moroccan and Islamic roots are not a handicap but can enrich a multicultural society. In much of Western Europe modernity seems to consist of closing the borders and regarding immigrants as people to be kept out of the country. In choosing this path Dutch people go counter to their own valuable traditions.




<sup>8</sup> See Dr Brouwer's contribution elsewhere in this book.

<sup>9</sup> Huntington (1997).



*Part II*

Society





Abdelhamid Lotfi

## Managing religious affairs in Morocco

Article Six of the 1996 Moroccan Constitution states that 'Islam shall be the state religion [and that] the state shall guarantee freedom of worship for all.' Article Nineteen, on the other hand stipulates that 'the King, *Amir al-Muminin*, Commander of the Faithful, [is the] Defender of the Faith.' The Constitution confirms a situation that has existed for centuries in Morocco. It grants the Moroccan monarch a constitutional monopoly of managing religious affairs both as a constitutional monarch who exercises power, and as a Commander of the Faithful whose spiritual leadership rests on his *sharifian* lineage, as a descendant of Prophet Mohammed.

The management of religious affairs is achieved through a variety of means, where rituals and ceremonies are opportunities to affirm and display symbolic power and to reformulate policies and guidelines designed to establish continuity, and to legitimize the monarch's right to regulate religious matters. The management of religious affairs is also carried out through a variety of government departments, the most important of which is the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MREIA). The MREIA supervises a network of over thirty thousand mosques, the *ulama* councils, and manages extensive religious endowments which make this department the single largest landowner in the country. Through its various departments, the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs implements the nation's religious policy as defined by *Amir al-Muminin*.

This paper will describe the religious situation in Morocco, and discuss the institutions through which religious affairs are managed. It will also highlight King Mohammed VI's efforts to formulate new religious policies for the country, which take into consideration recent socio-economic changes in Morocco, and the globalization of Islam and of world economies.

### *The religious scene in Morocco*

Morocco is an ancient country that is three times the size of Great Britain, and has a population of about thirty million. Its religious scene displays the hallmarks of a proud nation that once held sway over vast portions of North Africa and Andalusia. It also reflects the fight to preserve the country's religious and national integrity through centuries of struggle against Iberian powers bent on spreading Christianity in Africa, as well as Ottoman domination. The country finally yielded to intense economic and military pressures, leading to the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates in 1912. Centuries of fierce struggle to preserve its independence have shaped Morocco's culture and produced a specific religious identity. This identity was shaped by the nation's attachment to the *Maliki Madhab*, and the office of Commander of the Faithful, *Imarat*

*al-Muminin*, which for centuries has been held by all Moroccan monarchs<sup>1</sup>. It has also been shaped by the nation's strong commitment to Islam, as expressed through the flowering of popular Islam, whose mainstays were the religious brotherhoods whose *zawiyas*, shrines, and schools dot the Moroccan landscape.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, Moroccans considered matters of faith to be local matters. They resorted to the national religious leadership only when issues required national attention. This home-grown 'Moroccan Islam' that was represented by the various Moroccan *zawiyas* was challenged in the nineteen-forties by the emerging *Salafi*<sup>2</sup> elites. Under the influence of a number of religious reformers such as Jamal Eddin al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh, these elites began to call for the eradication of practices they deemed un-Islamic, including saint worship. The message of the *Salafi ulama*<sup>3</sup> was soon relayed by the independence movement in the mid-nineteen-thirties, which launched a widespread attack on popular Islam. This attack was prompted by the latter's strong ties to the local *zawiyas*, or religious brotherhoods, whose leaders had occasionally collaborated with the Spanish and French colonial authorities.

Moroccans have traditionally enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in managing their religious affairs. Nonetheless, kings of various dynasties who were also *Amir al-Muminin*, have always played an important role in the management of Islamic affairs. They did so through the appointment of higher level cadis and officials responsible for the management of religious endowments and Islamic affairs<sup>4</sup>. Moroccan kings have also often gone out of their way to co-opt leading religious scholars. They set up well endowed *madrasas* (higher schools), in the country's principal cities, to train the religious and administrative personnel needed to guide and supervise religious life in the country. In the early decades of the twentieth century, they initiated successive attempts to reorganize and reform leading Islamic universities such as al-Qarawiyyin University (Fès) and Ben Youssef University (Marrakech), in an attempt to modernize and improve their curricula and teaching practices.

1 Initiated by Malik ibn Anas (713-795) the *Maliki Madhab*, the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence, represents with the *Hanafi*, *Shafi'i* and *Hanbali* the four main juristic schools that have prevailed among Sunni Muslims for the last twelve centuries. The *Maliki Madhab* is said to express the Moroccan national character because it favours consensus, good judgment and public interest, and is said to help people steer a middle of the road course and shun all forms of extremism. Moroccan official religious discourse equates Malikism with faithfulness to tradition, even-handedness and tolerance. See the 'Maliki School' in *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 2* (1995) 459-460.

2 *Salafi* refers to the followers of the *salaf as-salih*, or the righteous ancestors, companions of Prophet Muhammad. The Salafi movement was launched in the 19th century by Muslim religious reformers who wanted to reconnect with pristine Islamic teachings.

3 *Ulama*, plural of *alim*, refers to the body of religious scholars in the Muslim World. For more on the role of the Ulama see Keddie ed. (1978).

4 It is worth pointing out that the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs is the only government department to be located within the Royal Palace in Rabat. This proximity indicates the importance of this ministry.

A quarter of a century ago, the religious scene was characterized by the co-existence of very dynamic, socially oriented, loosely organized religious associations and more conservative, state controlled mosques. The latter rarely challenged the religious or social status quo, except for occasional pronouncements by a handful of imams, who were quickly brought under control.

### ***Religious freedom in Morocco***

A Muslim country, Morocco has traditionally guaranteed freedom of worship to all of its citizens, as Islam grants such rights to Jews and Christians. The management of religious affairs in Morocco has always been based on upholding the right of Jewish and Christian minorities to practice their faith. It also allows them to establish religious courts to oversee their community affairs and to set up synagogues and churches, as well as schools, to teach religious subjects and train religious scholars.

Managing the religious affairs of non-Muslim communities meant granting them official recognition. This extended to the rights of these communities to practice their faith and to set up all the structures necessary for community life, in addition to providing them with a secure environment. These communities have enjoyed total autonomy in the management of their religious affairs, an autonomy that was guaranteed by every dynasty that has ruled Morocco, often with the help of local religious brotherhood leaders.

### ***The primacy of the Maliki Madhab***

In Morocco, the *Maliki Madhab* had, for centuries, served as a single framework for all religious activities, one to which all adhered. The privileged position of this *Madhab* was regularly reaffirmed. In a speech delivered on April 30, 2004, Mohammed VI defined the strategy of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs for the years to come. He reaffirmed Morocco's attachment to Islamic orthodoxy as expressed by the *Maliki Madhab*. He renewed his commitment to ensure that Islamic principles keep pace with the community's changing needs, urging the members of the '*ulama* councils to 'listen to all Moroccans, particularly the youth, and to help protect their faith and their minds against mystifiers.'

The main thrust of these measures is to affirm the principle of the adaptability of religious institutions. They also reinforce the role of religion as the foundation of national unity, through adhesion to the *Maliki Madhab*. This denies legitimacy to other *madahib*, or doctrines such as *Wahhabism*<sup>5</sup>, that have begun to attract followers in Morocco.

### ***Providing religious education and training religious specialists***

The authorities in the independent state of Morocco were well aware of the crucial role schools play in the religious education of the young. They made repeated attempts to

<sup>5</sup> *Wahhabism* is the movement of the followers of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century reformer from the Arabian Peninsula, and now the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.

reform and upgrade Islamic schools, to facilitate the integration of their graduates into the modern socio-economic sector, and to bring the schools closer to modern state-run schools. Their efforts to modernize these schools met with mixed success. Since Islamic schools attracted only a fraction of all school children, the modern school system had to provide classes in religious education. Thus Islamic subjects were taught in the modern state-run schools that catered to almost 98% of school children. The main role of the traditional Islamic schools was to train low-level religious specialists. Islamic subjects were taught throughout the curriculum in elementary and secondary schools, using textbooks produced or approved by the Ministry of Education. In 1972, the traditional *msids* or *kuttab* (Qur'anic schools)<sup>6</sup> were required to adopt government approved curricula, and to prepare children for the modern school system. Furthermore, departments of Islamic Studies offering undergraduate and graduate programmes were set up in the fourteen Moroccan state universities. *Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania* was founded to provide graduate programmes in various Islamic sciences, and to serve as a parallel structure to al-Qarawiyyin University, a traditional institution dating back eleven centuries, which was proving difficult to reform. The result of this was that the bulk of upper-level religious specialists were trained in modern state-controlled schools.

While allowing the government to bring Islamic education into the fold, these four measures also contributed to the emergence of a new corps of religious specialists with advanced degrees from national universities who claimed both mastery of Islamic subjects and access to modernity. This double claim, added to the fact that many had integrated the school system of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, enhanced their claims to religious leadership. This corps claims to be more representative of the nation's ethos than the Western educated elites who had, until very recently, controlled the Moroccan educational system.

### ***The reforms launched by Mohammed VI***

The reforms undertaken by King Mohammed VI concern the institutions involved in the management of religious affairs. These include the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MREIA), the supervisory bodies represented by the national and the local councils of *ulama*, and the institutions responsible for the education and the training of religious professionals.

MREIA reforms included the creation of a 'Directorate of Mosque Affairs'. This body establishes architectural standards for mosques, and devises management structures in areas such as funding. This is intended to prevent the foundation of 'unofficial' mosques, funded by undesirable sources. The reorganization of traditional Islamic schools is designed to adapt the content of traditional Islamic education to society's current needs. Another of its aims is to train religious professionals who will stress the values of tolerance and plurality within Islam. These values are referred to as 'a middle-way Islam' that shuns extremism and values popular Islam in Morocco, whose tolerance and moderation rest on a solid base of Sufi and Sharifian traditions. Under the guidance of the King, the

<sup>6</sup> See Wagner and Lotfi (1980) 238-251.

Higher Council of *Ulama* is responsible for 'spiritual security' as defined by *Amir al-Muminin*. This concept is embodied by men and women from a wide range of educational and professional backgrounds that are usually thought to have little or no connection with religious affairs.

### ***Reforming the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs***

In November 2002, Professor Ahmed Taoufik was appointed Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. He succeeded Abdelkebir Alaoui Mdaghri, who had been head of this department for eighteen years. Prof. Taoufik's appointment is significant in many ways. A renowned novelist and seasoned historian, his contributions to Moroccan historiography exhibit a deep understanding of Moroccan society and culture. Prof. Taoufik is a popular lecturer, who is fluent in four languages including English. He is also a devout Muslim and a prominent member of the *Boutchichiyya* Sufi order.

Prof. Taoufik brought to this department the rigour of his training as a historian, the openness of his outlook, the legitimacy of a religious scholar, and the tolerance of a Sufi. His task consists of translating into political programmes the views of the Commander of the Faithful concerning religious life in Morocco. The hallmarks of this policy are tolerance and openness, which are reflected in the restructuring programme that he has implemented since his appointment as head of this Ministry. This policy addresses both form and content. It stresses the message that Islam promotes tolerance and calls for a pluralism that rests on shared humanity. In addition, it displays a resolutely modern approach in its communication programmes.

To reform the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs two royal *dahirs*<sup>7</sup> were enacted. One defined the responsibilities of the Ministry (December 4, 2003), while the second reorganized the local and national *ulama* councils (April 22, 2004). This resulted in the creation of three new directorates within the MREIA, to oversee Islamic Affairs, Mosques and Islamic schools. The latter's mission is to ensure that these schools' curricula conform to modern scientific knowledge. It is interesting to note that the men who were appointed to head these departments come from the modern sector. For instance, the director in charge of traditional Islamic schools, Abdelwahed Bendaoud, holds a PhD in French literature, and is a former Dean of the Faculty of Letters and Social Science of Mohammed V University in Agdal Rabat. The director in charge of Mosque Affairs, Abdelaziz Derouiche, is a civil engineer.

The second *dahir* established the 'High Council of *Ulama*' and its thirty local branches<sup>8</sup> to provide close supervision of religious matters. They are designed to play a more active and qualitatively different role. This has been made possible by a generous allocation of human and financial resources, and through the educational background of a membership that includes thirty-seven *alimat*.<sup>9</sup> These bodies are required to implement a pro-

<sup>7</sup> A *dahir* is a decree issued by the king.

<sup>8</sup> These national and local bodies do not replace the existing (independent) 'League of the Moroccan *Ulama*', renamed the 'Mohammadia League of the Moroccan *Ulama*' (MLMU).

<sup>9</sup> An *alima* (plural *alimat*) is a female religious scholar.

found modernization programme for this sector. They will also issue *fatwas* (legal opinions on religious matters), in the name of the Commander of the Faithful, on important societal matters. This will counter those who issue *fatwas* outside the proper legal and institutional channels.

The reorganization of the *ulama* councils and the redefinition of their missions were matched by a reorganization of the local and regional representatives of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. The latter are called upon to implement this department's policies at regional and local levels, through the 'modern management of Islamic affairs'.

### ***Communicating Islam in Morocco***

The department responsible for the communication of Islam in Morocco has also been deeply affected by this process of reorganizing and modernizing the management of religious affairs. Traditional religious programmes on Moroccan radio and television have been redesigned and re-packaged to present a modern image of Islam. This image involves technologically oriented young men dressed in Western clothes, and women who highlight the humane values of Islam. In addition to a monthly publication targeting religious professionals, on October 16, 2004 the MREIA launched a radio station called Mohammed VI *Qur'an* Radio. This station broadcasts its programmes in Arabic and Berber dialects, as well as a couple of European languages. It stresses the venerable tradition of Islamic tolerance in Morocco and denounces all forms of intolerance and fundamentalism. The new communications policy of the MREIA uses modern technologies and techniques to display an image of Islam that connects Moroccans to the modern and globalized world in which they live.

The MREIA has also launched a TV station and a Website<sup>10</sup>. Both the *Assadissa* satellite TV channel and the Website aim to stress the unique features of Moroccan Islam, which derive from the nation's attachment to the *Maliki Madhab*. The *Assadissa* TV channel will broadcast in Arabic, Amazigh and French, to reach a wider audience. The Website [www.islam-maroc.ma](http://www.islam-maroc.ma) stresses the determination of Morocco to remain faithful to its tradition of tolerance. It also emphasizes the specific nature of Moroccan Islam, which is grounded in the *Maliki Madhab* and is given form by the Commander of the Faithful, who brings together both the Sufi and non-Sufi traditions.

The TV channel, the Internet site and the radio station support communication. They show that the government is sparing no effort to involve a wide range of institutions in the management of religious affairs. This has the appearance of an integrated project, one that seeks to involve all of the nation's institutions in a wide-ranging societal project. It encompasses a new approach to the management of religious affairs, as well as a commitment to democratic reforms and human development, including women's rights.

<sup>10</sup> Mohammed VI *Qur'an* TV-Assadissa and [www.islam-maroc.ma](http://www.islam-maroc.ma)

<sup>11</sup> See Prof. Taoufiq's lecture delivered at Dar al Hadith al Hassania in Rabat, 'La mission des oulémas dans le contexte du choix démocratique' <http://www.almajlis-alilmi.org.ma/fr/index.aspx> [Accessed 14/11/2005]

As part of the management of religious affairs, the nation's *ulama* are being urged to adhere to new values based on tolerance and democracy<sup>11</sup>. In Morocco, symbolic capital is shared between the *'ulama* and other social groups. The *ulama*, like other intellectuals, are urged to make use of all the tools available to them and to adhere to the rules imposed by Morocco's commitment to the democratization of all aspects of public life. Democracy is necessary, because it is the best available tool for managing diversity without endangering overall national unity. The essence of democracy is inherent to Islam. Muslims should use democratic principles to promote justice and humanity, because Muslim *'ulama* have not developed a view of man that is equivalent to the one developed by modern democracy. Muslims have to live in history and the *ulama* must acquire a stake in democracy. This involves a genuine acknowledgment of the universality of human experience, the acceptance of pluralism in theory and practice, and a willingness to embrace the specialization that comes with democracy, i.e. distribution of power. Moroccan *ulama* are urged to integrate democratic practices into Islam and to moralize and spiritualize democracy, in addition to abiding by all of the nation's laws. The *ulama* are now institutionally connected to the Commander of the Faithful, through their national council.<sup>12</sup>

The rehabilitation of popular Islam (a more relaxed and tolerant manifestation of Islam), both at the ceremonial and doctrinal level, has reconnected a large number of Moroccans with a native form of spirituality. It has also drawn into the fold a large segment of the middle class, many of whom are devout Muslims who have been put off by the 'roughness' and the 'rigors' of a number of imported Islamic practices.

The ongoing reorganization of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs has been seen by some as a clear attempt on the part of *Amir al-Muminin* to monopolize this important sector of public life. They view it as a means of excluding important religious actors, such as *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane* (Justice and Charity)<sup>13</sup>, and of preventing them from shaping the religious scene in Morocco. Prof. Taoufik argues that these reforms are meant to 'establish a dialogue between moderate Muslims and those who hold extremist political views, in order to seek the integration of all, acknowledge the uniqueness of our cultural heritage, and work to help our nation achieve a harmonious development that balances religious traditions and modernity.'

12 This paragraph is based on 'La mission des oulémas dans le contexte du choix démocratique' referred to above.

13 Launched by Abdessalam Yassine in 1974 this association has not been granted recognition by the Moroccan government. It has, however, managed to build a well organized structure with branches throughout the country, and a strong presence at the University where its members, who have taken over the National Union of Moroccan Students, work very hard to islamize both students and university alike, and to press the group's political demands. This organization is very active on the religious, social and communication fronts. See <http://www.aljamaa.com/ar/index.asp>, <http://www.yassine.net/Main.aspx> and <http://www.nadiayassine.net/>

### ***Managing Islamic affairs***

Managing religious affairs for the Muslim community has obviously meant more than simply granting Muslim populations the right to practice their faith. Indeed, throughout the country's long history, Moroccan monarchs have acted as the supreme religious leaders of the land. Their temporal authority was either legitimated by the *sharifian* descent that connected them to the Prophet Mohammed, or by patent piety and uprightness. In both cases, the rulers' legitimacy was reinforced by the support of prominent religious scholars from around the country. The legitimacy of Moroccan kings has sometimes been challenged by religious scholars and reformers of various kinds. This occurred in times of crisis, when these individuals felt that the monarch was meeting his obligations as defender of the faith. The Moroccan Constitution has now granted the King the title of *Amir al-Muminin*, and his power as Commander of the Faithful has been steadily increasing, thanks to his growing political role. There is an unchallenged and widespread consensus today that the Moroccan King is indeed a Commander of the Faithful.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Mosque management***

The management of religious affairs also includes control of the mosques and other places of worship. In the early nineteen-seventies, control of the mosques was tightened. They were required to open only for the regular prayers, rather than always being open for worshippers and visitors as had previously been the case. In addition, the imams' weekly sermons were monitored to ensure doctrinal and political 'correctness'. The reaction to this policy took many forms, ranging from the boycott of some mosques to the creation of an impressive number of 'store front' mosques<sup>15</sup>. The latter were set up in popular neighbourhoods and urban shanty towns by a variety of self styled cultural and educational associations, as part of a loose umbrella network of nationwide Islamic associations such as *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane* and others.

### ***Ulama organizations***

The League of Moroccan *Ulama*, whose members were supposed to provide guidance nationally and locally, was little more than a rubber stamp body with minimal impact on the Moroccan religious scene.

Symbolically, the King of Morocco continued to be involved with the religious scene. He did so by taking an active role in religious ceremonies and through his highly visible participation in the *Ramadan Hassani Lectures*, when he presided over scores of lectures delivered by Muslim scholars from around the world. Royal religious prestige was staged and reaffirmed during these lectures, which were broadcast live on Moroccan TV and later translated into many languages and distributed around the world.

<sup>14</sup> Abdessalam Yassin, spiritual leader of the *al-'Adl wal-Ihsane* movement is the only official challenger to the King's right to this title. For more on Yassin and his movement see below.

<sup>15</sup> A survey conducted by the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs in 2003 showed that about 37% of the thirty thousand mosques in the country were 'store-front mosques' that were under the influence of 'unauthorized' imams.



Religious affairs have also been managed through a comprehensive communications programme that includes radio and television programmes, print and non-print publications such as VHS, CD Rom and audiotape. This management extended to attempts to control the type of publications being imported into the country. Such attempts are mainly restricted to materials available through established outlets, since little can be done to restrict materials that are available through the informal sector or through satellite TV programmes and the Internet.

### ***Managing religious affairs in the political arena***

The Moroccan Constitution forbids the creation of political parties on an ethnic or religious basis, and all attempts to do so have been opposed by the government. Religious expression has therefore been channelled through cultural and social associations. Over the past twenty years, however, there has been considerable pressure to allow religious sentiment to be expressed and represented by political parties. These forces are currently represented by three main groups, *Al-Islah wat-Tawhid*, *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane* and *Al-Badil al-Hadari* (the Civilizational Alternative), whose members promote an Islamic agenda through a number of political and social outlets. Only one of these groups, the *Al-Islah wat-Tawhid*, has so far managed to achieve political legitimacy. While still struggling to gain official recognition, the others nevertheless play a very dynamic role in the social and political spheres, particularly *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane*.

Founded in 1982 as *Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya* (the Islamic Community), this group changed its name to *Al-Islah wat-Tajdid* (Reform and renewal) in 1992, to distance itself from what was happening in Algeria at the time. In 1996, it decided to join ranks with Dr Al-Khatib's party, the Democratic, Constitutional and Popular Movement (MPCD) and to change its name to *Al-Islah wat-Tawhid* (Reform and Unity). After the 1997 general election, members of *Al-Islah wat-Tawhid* transformed the MPCD from within. The party acquired a clear Islamic identity, under its new name of the Justice and Development Party (JDP)<sup>16</sup>, and worked very hard to enhance its image and legitimacy.

Thus, although the Moroccan Constitution prohibits the organization of political parties along ethnic and religious lines, the JDP is currently represented by 40 members in Parliament and promotes an Islamic political agenda. The JDP has weathered the crisis represented by the bloody terrorist attacks that were carried out by disgruntled Islamists in Casablanca on May 16, 2003.

On the political front, the management of religious affairs has involved keeping the most radical forces at bay while co-opting moderate Islamists who accept the pre-eminence of the Commander of the Faithful, and agree to play the democratic game and shun all forms of intolerance. This has also compelled the King to play a very dynamic and visible role on the social front, to crowd out the myriad religious and cultural associations that have invested this field. This year, under the direct supervision of the King, the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity<sup>17</sup> launched its eighth national collection

<sup>16</sup> In French: PJD: [www.pjd.ma](http://www.pjd.ma).

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.fin5.ma/>

campaign to finance a host of social programmes for the needy and the handicapped across the country. Mohammed VI plays a prominent role in the promotion of a culture of institutional solidarity. The aim is to ensure the perennality of the ambitious social programmes initiated by the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity.

### ***Managing religious dissent***

The management of religious dissent in Morocco is carried out through long-term projects involving education and communication, and through short-term measures which include security and judicial action. Religious dissent is represented in Morocco by what some have called a 'fundamentalist galaxy'<sup>18</sup> of over forty groups and movements. Some of these seek to establish an Islamic state in the country, based on *shari'a*. These include groups that resort to violence, some that condone it, and others that reject it outright. The groups include *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane*, *At-Takfir wal-Hijra* (Excommunication and Exile), *Salafia Jihadiya* (Arduous Reformism), *As-Sirat al-Mustakim* (the Straight Path), *Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a* (the Followers of as-Sunna).

Given the historical and constitutional primacy of the Commander of the Faithful in the Moroccan religious scene, any serious attempts to challenge this primacy are swiftly countered. Thus, when Abdessalam Yassin<sup>19</sup> addressed an open letter entitled 'Islam or the Flood' to the late Hassan II in 1974 in which he called upon the King to move towards the creation of an Islamic state, he was jailed for three and a half years. Upon his release from prison, almost all his attempts to communicate or to organize were countered. His various publications were subjected to heavy-handed censorship and eventually forced to shut down. Over the following twenty years, he was seldom a free man, spending most of the time in prison or under house arrest. This police harassment only ended in May 2000. However, his organization, *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsane*, has never been granted official recognition, despite its strong presence in society and in the media. Its more militant members are routinely jailed.

The leadership of these movements and some of their prominent members are subjected to close police scrutiny. They have often been condemned to long prison sentences for criminal activities or for speeches calling for violence. Indeed, after the May 16 terrorist attacks, prominent leaders of the *Salafia Jihadiya* and others (such as Miloudi Zakaria, Mohammed Fizazi, Omar Haddouchi, Abdelouahab Rafiki also known as Chaykh Abou-Hafs, Abdelkrim Chadli and Hassan Kettani) were condemned to long prison terms.<sup>20</sup> The management of religious dissent involves the use of a carrot and stick approach. Its aim here is to achieve some form of consensus about the need for tolerance and diversity, and about the primacy of the *Maliki Madhab* and the Commander of the Faithful.

18 Täieb Chadi, "La galaxie intégriste". [Accessed 21-Nov-05]

19 Yassine has published over thirty books and dozens of articles, including *Islamiser la modernité* (in French) in 1998.

20 Some of these individuals were pardoned by King Mohammed VI in October 2005.

### *A new management of religious affairs policy*

The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and the ensuing American 'War on Terrorism' had a profound impact on Muslims worldwide, as Islamic schools (particularly the more traditional ones) and religious professionals came under attack for having 'produced' the men who attacked America.<sup>21</sup>

Morocco, like most Muslim countries, was challenged to address the issue from this perspective, as America launched a variety of programmes designed to prod Muslim countries along the road to democracy and modernization of their religious and educational institutions.<sup>22</sup> Morocco subsequently took a number of steps to overhaul its management of religious affairs. However, it was only after the well coordinated terrorist attacks in Casablanca on May 16 2003, which left forty-four people dead, that Morocco adopted drastic measures to control the religious scene in the country. These measures, as we have seen, are based on the primacy of the *Maliki Madhab*, *Imarat al-Muminin*. This home-grown form of tolerance has for centuries been the hallmark of Islam in Morocco, and of democracy and social justice. The management of religious affairs in Morocco is an integral part of a new social project that rests squarely on Islamic and universal values of tolerance and coexistence. It uses democracy as a process for establishing the rule of law and for managing diversity.

This promising approach aims to help Muslims claim a comfortable position in history as they come to terms with a modernity that uses the noblest aspects of Islam - justice, equality, brotherhood, solidarity and a commitment to women's rights. The recent enactment of a bold Family Law in Morocco that grants new rights to women is a first step in that direction.<sup>23</sup> As indicated above, Morocco now communicates a new message of Islam to its citizens and to the rest of the world.

21 In fact most of the men behind the 9/11 attacks on America had a modern Western education, or were educated in the West, and came from the middle-classes.

22 These plans include among others, The Greater Middle East Initiative, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Foundation for the Future, the Fund for the Future and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

23 See the articles by F. van der Velden and M. Azzine elsewhere in this book.

Hendrik M. Vroom

## Islamic theology at the *Vrije Universiteit*

### **Introduction**

The *Vrije Universiteit* (VU) Amsterdam has started a new study programme in Islamic theology in september 2005. VU Amsterdam has about fifteen hundred Muslim students, many of them in the faculties of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences. Furthermore, since 2002, many Muslim students have taken part in the Faculty of Theology's religious studies programme. This initiative was not entirely unrelated to the political debate surrounding the question of integration. However, this debate has focused on the education of imams, because mosques are seen as centres of conservative thought. Rather than helping people to integrate Arabic or Turkish speaking imams often actually distance them from Dutch society. VU Amsterdam, however, has taken the initiative of providing a programme for Islamic Spiritual Care in hospitals and penitentiary institutions, not for imams in mosques. The university has applied for the right to launch a programme of Islamic theology for this group. It has also requested government support to this end, and has been promised a modest subsidy.<sup>1</sup>

Islamic organizations in the Netherlands organized a meeting at Elspeet, from February 19-20, to discuss the education of imams. Almost all traditional organizations sent experts to the meeting, which was also attended by specialists from Rabat and Ankara. The foreign experts, along with some *mufitis* and a few Dutch islamologists, expressed the opinion that, for the next ten to twenty years, imams should be educated in Turkey or Morocco. They felt that it would take at least that long to set up appropriate programmes in the Netherlands. Their argument was that the education of future imams starts with the teaching of schoolboys and takes more than twelve years.

In Turkey boys attend a *lycée hatip* for five years. Here they are taught Arabic and learn to recite the *Qur'an*. In Morocco they learn the *Qur'an* by heart. Many of them pursue their studies for a further four years at college or university level. Some also follow courses for another two years. This enables them to reach a level at which they can obtain the authority to decide on ethical issues, with regard to cases in which the application of *shari'a* is not immediately clear. Those experts at the Elspeet meeting who opposed the creation of a Dutch programme for the education of imams felt that a system of this kind cannot be realized in the Netherlands.

1 Note from the editors: In the meantime it has been decided that from september 2006 also Leyden University will be subsidised for a curriculum in Islamic studies, while the college for higher professional education 'Inholland' has been allowed, in cooperation with five Muslim-organizations, to start in september 2006 a professional Dutch-language training to become imam.

Those who disagreed with this viewpoint included women, some leaders of Muslim organizations, and some Dutch-born converts to Islam. Their main argument concerned the transmission of Islam to young people. This will be hampered if their imams remain foreigners in this country, are educated elsewhere and just stay here for four years, as many have tended to do. They are not familiar with the kinds of problems faced by young people in the Netherlands, nor are they conversant with the situation of young women here. Indeed, many of the Moroccan imams teach the customs of traditional rural Islam. These imams are ill-equipped to deal with young Muslims who tend to radicalize or who read messages from radical imams at certain websites. These were the arguments put forward by Muslims at Elspeet.

In the public debate that took place on 19 February, they contended that the Dutch Muslim community needs a contextual training programme for imams. On the 20th, the 'Committee for the Relations between Muslim Organizations and the Government' (CMO), decided to launch an Islamic programme for the training of imams. This ran counter to the recommendations made by a Turkish government official from Ankara, two professors of Islamic theology, one from Turkey, the other from Morocco, and some Dutch islamologists. The Center for Islamic Theology at VU Amsterdam only trains imams to provide spiritual care, it does not train them to work in mosques. It plans to offer a programme of study on the topic of religious education and the media.

### **Imams**

What are the duties of an imam, and what level of education is needed?<sup>2</sup> In a comparative approach, we must be careful to avoid making easy comparisons. Imams are neither Protestant ministers nor Catholic priests. Some imams merely recite the ritual prayers, and invite others to preach each Friday. Other imams recite, preach and teach, conduct *Qur'anic* study groups, as well as visiting the homes of those who are in difficulty and advising them on their best course of action. The latter are roughly equivalent to Protestant ministers and Catholic pastoral assistants. Still other imams have the authority to determine what good Muslims should do in new and difficult situations.

In Amsterdam, Muslims are bound to encounter new situations all the time, as they are surrounded by pagans. Traditional imams might preach against engaging pagans in conversation, something that is not feasible for those working in factories or attending non-Islamic schools. What of women who prefer to live their own lives? Are they nonetheless obliged to remain at home all day? A way has to be found of modernizing Moroccan life in the Dutch context. Events in Casablanca mirror those in Holland, but here the older generation has had to surmount two hurdles. The first was a migration from the countryside to the cities, the second a leap from Morocco to the Netherlands. For centuries, they and their ancestors have lived in a culture shaped by Islamic traditions. Now they have to find a new way of life, in an open and permissive society. Here,

<sup>2</sup> For those who wish to read more on this subject in Dutch, I would refer them to a volume on religious leaders such as imams, ministers, pandits and rabbi's, edited by one of our staff members: Kranenborg (2005).

people tolerate all kinds of opinions, and many do not believe in God. Furthermore, almost everyone accepts that the world is billions rather than mere thousands of years old. To these migrants, this appears to be a place where people experiment with almost everything that God has forbidden, and where everybody is free to find their own way. If you don't want to be an individualist, stick to your family. If you believe in God, have it your way. If you prefer to wear a head scarf, feel free to do so. Many Muslims very much appreciate this freedom!

It is an imam's job to provide an example of how to live as a Muslim. Whether they are from Morocco, Turkey or Surinam, they all have an excellent knowledge of Arabic. They know Arabic, but they are not Arabists. Instead, they are believers who see the *Qur'an* as the Revelation of God, rather than as an Arabic text. They are not students of Islam, but practitioners. What this means is that their lives reflect trust in God and obedience to His will. They are neither Arabists nor islamologists, but theologians who are interested in God and in human life. Students following theological study programmes do not study religious phenomena, they themselves are part of the phenomenon of Islam. The Islamic community in the Netherlands was in great need of just such a theological programme. If students follow Arabic studies, they learn Arabic, and read Egyptian papers, novels or classic philosophers, in addition to the *Qur'an*. However, they will not learn how to believe the *Qur'an*, nor how to renew their understanding as believers. To put it bluntly, they learn to watch but not to take part. There is an urgent need for Islamic theology study centres offering courses taught by Muslims who are in dialogue with scholars from other traditions. That is exactly what the Center of Islamic Theology at the Vrije Universiteit tries to offer.

Imams are poorly paid. Some of them just get free housing, and have to support themselves by taking a second job. Many mosques pay low salaries and are less interested in an imam's academic background than they are in his integrity as a Muslim. The Turkish governmental organization *Diyanet* pays better salaries but requires academic qualifications. Over the next ten years there will be a need for imams with Bachelor's degrees, but at this stage not all mosques will require their imam to have a MA-degree. The situation in Belgium is different, as the state pays the salaries and pensions of priests and imams.<sup>3</sup> In Norway, the government has adopted yet another arrangement. Previously, the state only paid the salaries of those employed by the Lutheran state church. However, it has now decided to make similar payments to every religious community that has been officially acknowledged. In each case, the amount involved will correspond to the membership of the community in question.

Better salaries would clearly make the post of imam more attractive. This in turn would prompt young Muslims to study Islam at university. Most politicians in the Netherlands and France, however, would not contemplate following the examples of Belgium and Norway. It would not occur to them that such systems guarantee better educated members of the ministry, who can help to establish better relations between the various sections of the population. Rather than pleading for state payments for the

3 Cf. Mayer (2005) 41.

ministry, I simply wish to highlight the dogmatic notions associated with secularization and the atheist climate. Such notions set the tone in the Dutch debate and hinder the development of creative solutions. This has serious consequences for the establishment of educational programmes for imams in the Netherlands and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

### *Theology at the Vrije Universiteit*

According to the Muslim community, what is needed is an institution for Islamic theology in which those who are familiar with Islamic tradition reflect on their role as Muslims in a European culture. The community wants to train theologians who are both believers and Dutch citizens. While they respect Arabists and islamologists, they doubt their ability to develop an inculturated form of Islam. These scholars can, of course, help by sharing their knowledge of the various inculturated forms of Islam that have developed throughout the world in the long history of the faith. However, the spadework must be done by the Muslim community itself. After all, to describe what believers think and do differs from taking responsibility to formulate beliefs and propose courses of action as a believer. Muslims and Christians have to think for themselves about how they should view atheism, liberalism, Hinduism, the theory of evolution, and so on and so forth.

*Vrije Universiteit* Amsterdam was founded in 1880, by Christians who wanted the freedom to pursue Christian modes of thought when dealing with the challenges they faced. This meant that they did not want the university to be owned by the church. Those dealing with new issues cannot allow themselves to be dictated to by synods, bishops or muftis. They have to be free to think for themselves, until they arrive at answers to novel issues. Contextual theology is practised by believers who, while being of the tradition in question, are nevertheless capable of thinking freely about it. Approaches that worked within the Faculty of Theology for 125 years now – involving many nuances, complications and interesting cases that cannot be explored here – are, in my opinion, equally valid for the Muslim community. The latter has a genuine need for Islamic theology taught by Muslims who genuinely represent their Islamic communities, and who are able to re-think their tradition within the horizon of their faith and of the wider Islamic tradition. The university should guarantee them the freedom to speak, write and teach as they see fit, because the only standard is truth, not the immediate consent of a majority. The founders of this university took as their example the private, freely constituted universities in the United States: no government should force you to be ‘neutral’ and ‘modern’ in a sceptical and secularized way, no church should dictate what you have to say about emancipation, creation or historical developments in holy scriptures, instead all are free to re-think and reconsider their beliefs and ethical practices and find their way in a changing culture.<sup>5</sup>

4 A private Muslim institute has been founded near Dyon, in France. Here, a number of Dutch students with no knowledge of the French language have studied Islamic theology .

5 See Vroom (1997) 395-414 and on theological institutions in the USA Dyrness (2003).

### ***Islamic theology***

Since 2002, the Faculty of Theology has taught a Master's programme in Spiritual Care for students of theology and religious studies. The students of this programme include a small group of Muslims, some of whom are already working as imams in prisons or institutions for juvenile delinquents. These individuals have advised the Faculty to expand the present course of study into a fully fledged programme in Islamic theology. Theo van Gogh, a public figure who regularly expressed fierce criticisms of Islam, was murdered in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004, by a young Muslim. This prompted a visit to The Hague, in December 2004, by the boards of the University and the Faculty, where they suggested that the Minister of Education should back their efforts to launch a programme in Islamic theology. In January 2005, the government invited educational institutions to submit proposals for programmes in Islam. In February, the government officially gave its backing to the *Vrije Universiteit* Amsterdam. The VU proposal was broader than Islamic Spiritual Care alone. The proposed programme would also offer young Muslims the option of studying their own tradition while training for a career in education and the media.

The programme in Islamic Theology has been incorporated into the Religious Studies programme, with the same *dialogical* and *hermeneutical* scope. This aspect is discussed in further detail below. Four lecturers have now been appointed. One will teach Islamic Spiritual Care, another *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and Islamic ethics, the third Islam in a European context, and the fourth Arabic. These individuals are all Muslims, with close ties with Islamic communities in the Netherlands. So, in addition to imams working in hospitals and prisons, VU Amsterdam now offers younger Muslim students the option of studying their own tradition in a wider university setting, one with a long tradition in inter-religious dialogue and in societal and political involvement.<sup>6</sup> Students at other faculties will have the option of taking Islamic Theology as a minor subject. VU Amsterdam takes religion seriously, and tries to bring it 'into rapport with contemporary thought', as the university's founder put it.<sup>7</sup> It now offers the same opportunity to its Muslim neighbours as well. We are convinced that this is the right course of action, given our identity as a university which follows an open and ecumenical path within the Christian tradition.

6 Since 1987 the research group on inter-religious relations and intercultural theology has organized five workshops and two conferences with volumes on Syncretism & Dialogue; On Sharing Religious Experience; Human Rights and Religious Values; Holy Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity and Islam; Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation; Religions View Religions; and two on Religions and Evil (forthcoming). In the series Currents of Encounter (since 1989; [www.rod-opi.nl](http://www.rod-opi.nl)) three volumes on contextual theology have been published. A few additional volumes are in press. Since 1990, together with staff of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, staff members have edited the journal *Studies in Interreligious Dialogue*. The *Vrije Universiteit* has a tradition in the dialogical study of Islam (Johan H. Bavinck, Dick C. Mulder, Anton Wessels and, since 2004, Nelly van Doorn). The establishment of the Center for Islamic Theology has to be seen against this background as well.

7 Cf. for Abraham Kuyper's idea of theology see Vroom (1978) 62-87.



### ***Programmes and the selection of applicants***

The Center for Islamic Theology launched its Bachelor's and Master's programmes on 1 September, 2005. The Bachelor's programme amounts to 180 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) credits. One ECTS credit represents twenty-eight study load hours, one academic year is worth sixty ECTS credits. The Bachelor's has been built into a Religious Studies programme that focuses on the plural society, contemporary religious life, and dialogue. Together with students from the other Religious Studies programme, Muslim students follow courses worth sixty ECTS credits. There are courses in Hinduism, the history of Western philosophy, theology & philosophy of science, an introduction into the sociology and psychology of religion, Judaism and Christianity, secular world views, ethics and comparative philosophy. Depending on their choice of subject for their bachelor thesis, these students can acquire up to ninety ECTS credits for classes in Islamic theology. There are classes on introductions to the history of Islam, the *Qur'an* and *hadith* (traditions about the sayings and deeds of Mohammed), in *kalam* (theology), Islamic philosophy and ethics, *tafsir* (exegesis), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), contemporary Islam and Islam in the public domain. The Arabic course is worth thirty ECTS credits. About eighteen students are taking this BA programme. Most of them are young and female and, incidentally, have opted to wear Islamic headscarves, but there are also a few older students and men. Students are admitted if they have either a pre-university-level secondary school diploma or if they have completed one year of a BA programme at a college of tertiary education.

The second course of study is the Master's programme in Islamic Spiritual Care. Worth sixty ECTS credits, this one-year programme can be studied on a part-time basis. Together with the other students, Muslims take classes in psychology and spiritual care. After this, they follow further classes in Islamic spiritual care, Islamic ethics and European Islam, undertake a supervised apprenticeship, and write their Master's thesis. To date, most of the students who have taken this programme are imams working either in prisons or in institutions for juvenile delinquents.

Universities restrict admission to Master's programmes to holders of a Bachelor's degree from accredited academic institutions. Non-native speakers must be able to present the diploma awarded for passing the state examination for proficiency in Dutch. Students with a college-level diploma – this level is more practically oriented, and less abstract – must follow a preparatory programme prior to joining the Master's programme. Following the government's decision to subsidize the Master's in Islamic Spiritual Care, some two hundred individuals have requested information about the programme. It was, of course, quite apparent that not all of them would have suitable qualifications. It was therefore decided to set up a pre-Master's course. This consists of two parts, each worth thirty ECTS credits, i.e. each involving one year's study on a part-time basis. Pre-Master's course A includes Religious Studies and Theology, while pre-Master's course B deals with Islamic Theology. The courses are taken from the Islamic programme that makes up part of the Bachelor's in Religious Studies. This implies that the Master's programme as a whole has three groups of students: pre-Master's course A students, pre-Master's course B students and those taking the Master's programme itself, which, for

students who have to follow both pre-master programmes, to four years of study on a part-time basis.

A committee consisting of two or three Muslims and the co-ordinator has been formed to deal with admissions to the Master's in Islamic Spiritual Care. The task of this Admissions Committee is to advise the Faculty's examination board on the admission of candidates and about preparatory studies. Between fifty and sixty candidates have applied for admission. They come from a variety of backgrounds, one is an imam, another is an advisor to the diplomatic mission of an Arabic country, there is also a schoolteacher, and an employee of a transport firm. Quite a few were unemployed, but had previously worked in research or for cleaning services. Many of them had been trained in theology at Islamic institutions in Morocco, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, or France.

Most of the candidates had received their early education in *madrassas* or *lycées hatip*. Given the difficulty of assessing the academic standard of these institutions, the committee decided to invite most of the candidates to interview them. The requirements are that the candidates must be able to recite major sections of the *Qur'an* by heart, and that they must be able to read and speak Dutch and Arabic. Furthermore, they must have a knowledge of Islam to BA level, in addition to some knowledge of Dutch culture in particular and Western-European culture in general. Before exploring the background and content of these requirements in greater detail, let us review the facts.

The committee interviewed about forty candidates between mid-June and early September. Six were admitted directly to the Master's programme, four were required to take pre-Master's course B or some of its component courses, while twenty were required to take pre-Master's course A, with many of these taking pre-Master's course B as well. Three were required to take a short-track Bachelor's equivalent to 120 ECTS credits. The remaining applicants were either referred to the Bachelor's programme or rejected. Most of the students who were required to follow pre-Master's course A have started their studies, while a few have opted to postpone their studies until next year. Others will not be enrolling, for a variety of reasons. The committee accepted some students for pre-Master's course A who, although capable of expressing themselves quite well in Dutch, did not have the diploma awarded for passing the state examination for proficiency in Dutch as a second language. Their admission was subject to the condition that they start a course for this state examination immediately and that they have sufficient time to pursue both studies in parallel.

Almost all of the candidates were strongly motivated to work in the field of spiritual care and to help Muslims to find their way in our secularized, plural and individualistic society. Many of them had taught primary school courses in Islam and, in some cases, Arabic, in addition to preaching in mosques on Fridays.

### ***A hermeneutical and dialogical profile***

Islamic lecturers in the Netherlands are faced with a very difficult task. Like their counterparts in Britain, Germany, Denmark, Norway and elsewhere, they have to translate traditional Arabic and Turkish Islam into a local context. There are no Dutch textbooks on Islamic Spiritual Care, which means that the lecturer in this field has no textbooks for

the students. In Turkey the practice of 'spiritual care' is, as yet, unknown. The lecturer for *fiqh* and ethics has started the work of translating Arabic jurisprudential terms into Dutch. That, in itself, is a very demanding job. At the same time, however, *fiqh* also has to be expanded to embrace modern ethical issues.

There is complete agreement concerning the need for students graduating from the Master's programme in Islamic Spiritual Care to be capable of talking to Muslims in crisis situations - i.e. resulting from admission to hospital, imprisonment, or army service - about the meaning of their faith. They also have to be able to deal with fellow professionals at work, such as Christian chaplains, humanists, and medical specialists in hospitals, as well as those working in prisons and institutions for juvenile delinquents. These considerations require students to be knowledgeable about such things as secular ethics, Christian ideas about abortion, and the discontinuation of fruitless treatment. They may find medical questions such as these more difficult to handle than discussions with prison inmates, and with young people who have not yet managed to give a direction to their lives.

The task of Muslim theologians is not only to translate Arabic texts into European languages, but also to translate Islam into an entirely different context. For that reason, the Center's profile is *hermeneutical*, i.e. understanding the tradition from its sources in a new context. Work on the further development of Islam will also be carried out in medical and theological faculties in Islamic countries. Unlike those in Islamic countries, Muslim theologians in the Netherlands must learn to communicate with practitioners from a variety of backgrounds.

Perhaps the most challenging task is to help young Muslims to give account of their faith and beliefs in our culture. If the gap between Muslim communities and the rest of the population is to be bridged, Muslims must learn to give account of their ideas. This touches upon one of the most serious problems for the Islamic community. Most of the older members are neither radicals nor fundamentalists, but deeply traditional individuals. A great many of those within the inner circles of Muslim communities have very little contact with non-Muslims. They neither read Dutch papers nor watch Dutch television. They restrict themselves to Moroccan, Turkish or Arabic TV channels. The main challenge for the Muslim community is to contextualize Islam. This will help young people to find the Dutch words needed to discuss their beliefs and their Islamic way of life, in essence to find a contextualized way of life as a Muslim.

Contextual theology requires dialogue with those holding different world-views. It also means learning how to give account of your views, which in turn involves *dialogue*. For that reason, from the moment that the first application was made to the government, the Center has maintained a *hermeneutical and dialogical* profile. The developments with which the Muslim community now has to contend are actually quite similar to events in recent Christian history. We speak easily about female emancipation now, but it is less than fifty years since women here were first given the right to sign documents on behalf of their family. Women have only been able to officiate in the mainstream Dutch churches since the sixties, a development that many churches still oppose. Other issues were not resolved until the eighties. Muslims have to find their own way in these matters, but

the problem is that they cannot take fifty years to do so...

This description of the Islamic staff's hermeneutical and dialogical task helps to clarify the reasons for adopting the current policy. One objection was that the Faculty should not have appointed Muslim lecturers who stem from the Netherlands' more or less traditional Islamic community. It has been suggested that we would have been better advised to bring in liberal Muslims from other countries, individuals capable of steering the more traditionally-minded students in the direction of modern Islamic thought. The answer, rather predictably, is that inculturation is a hermeneutical process involving those who have responsibilities within a community. Muslim lecturers have to find their own way, free of compulsion by others. The re-interpretation of a living tradition cannot be achieved by brainwashing. While the programme includes an introduction to contemporary Islam, this is intended to challenge students to study topics such as secular ethics, comparative theology and philosophy, other religions and secular world-views, and *then* to re-think *shari'a*. This is why I believe that a dialogical programme of this kind would be much more helpful than a separate Islamic institution. These students have to follow classes with students from other backgrounds. Together they set the norm, question one another, and – hopefully – they may learn to talk about their beliefs. All of their lecturers, not just the Muslim members of staff, are part of that process.

#### ***The need to bridge the gap between tradition and 'modernity'***

Finally I would like to outline the challenges that have to be met. Candidates who were educated at a Mediterranean university or *madrassa* have received excellent training. Those who have been training to be imams since they were twelve years old know the *Qur'an* by heart, can recite beautifully, are familiar with the various schools of *shari'a*, and are able to debate on the topic of how Muslims should live. On the other hand, they trained in a traditional Muslim culture, and have had little or no exposure to other cultures and religions. This means that most of the students who are required to follow pre-Master's courses A and B tend not to discuss new and difficult issues from an independent viewpoint. They mainly repeat what they have been taught. This enables them to deal with traditional ethical questions, however, many young Moroccans in this country face very different problems.

In addition, these individuals have not yet mastered the Dutch language. Many of the better candidates that we have admitted are incapable of analyzing texts in Dutch, or of understanding exercises that are given to all students. While they are committed people, they are not used to the Dutch educational system. Here, students are required to write numerous papers, and to learn how to debate with those holding other beliefs. In this system, students are helped to form their own opinions in a multi-cultural and religiously plural society. These candidates are willing to study. They readily acknowledge that they have to grow, develop and adapt to what for them is a new situation, here in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, they face a Herculean task.

At this point I would like to cite a few examples. I should add immediately that these students completed their studies several years ago, that they studied at different institutions, and that I am sure that university programmes in Morocco and Turkey have chan-

ged in the intervening years. We asked some of the candidates about their knowledge of Judaism. One commonly heard answer was that they had covered Judaism in their studies of the Revelation, and that the *Qur'an* accurately describes the beliefs of Jews and Christians. This answer alone was sufficient cause for the full committee to conclude that these students required further studies before they could enter the Master's programme. The underlying issue here, however, concerns the nature of revelation. If the behaviour and beliefs of Jews and Christians is not exactly as set out in the *Qur'an*, how does this affect the way in which you deal with *Qur'anic* texts? The hermeneutical question is inescapable.<sup>8</sup>

Another example concerns the meaning of 'postmodernism' and 'Enlightenment'. Very few candidates were able to outline the background to the problems faced by a pluralist society. They have little or no knowledge of the history of Western philosophy in particular, or of European history in general. Their task is not simply to translate Islam into another language. Instead, they must learn to re-think the tradition and the implications for life as a minority within a secularized, plural culture. Accordingly, they must study both of the above aspects!<sup>9</sup>

The students in pre-Master's course A were required to write a short paper taking up only a single sheet of A4. This was to consist of a thesis, its relevance, arguments for and against, and their conclusion. One topic might be the cognitive element in a conversation between the student and his neighbour or – why not? – a soul's debate with itself. 'What kind of thesis?', many asked. The answer was e.g. 'God exists'. Set out the pros and cons.' Question: 'But He does exist, and I would not know how to formulate an argument against this.' So we take this as a starting point for a learning process which most of the students find both difficult and challenging.

The problem of language makes it very difficult indeed. Our committee posed the following question to a very capable young person. A baby is born prematurely, in the thirtieth week of pregnancy. It has serious health problems and a bad medical prognosis. Its life will be difficult, painful and short, no more than six or seven years. Should the doctors treat this baby to prolong its life, or should they not? Very reasonably, the student explained how he could answer that question on the basis of Islamic sources. In several such cases the outcome was always the same: 'murder'. That word was used as the sole translation for a range of different Arabic words. The Islamic community in European countries must find equivalent terms in European languages for all of the nuances in *fiqh*. Only then they can participate in ethical discussions and further develop their tradition. An additional problem is that many individuals in this generation of Muslims in the Netherlands speak neither English nor German, which is understandable in itself. For the younger generation this will be different.

<sup>8</sup> Quite a few professors at our Faculty have acquired expertise on these hermeneutical questions during debates in the churches, as well as from the Faculty's international Master's programme in Cross-Cultural and Contextual Theology.

<sup>9</sup> As do Tariq Ramadan, Farid Esack and other Islamic theologians.

Such are the problems that we have to face. I anticipate that theological training at many Islamic universities has changed considerably in the intervening years. In the course of their studies, modern-day students probably learn English, are taught more about world history, and reflect more upon hermeneutics and other religions. The difficulties that I have described do not detract from the fact that the candidates we have met are deeply committed, want to develop as individuals, and to contribute to a re-thinking of their tradition in their new context.

Frans van der Velden

## *Ijtihad* and Moroccan family law<sup>1</sup>

### **Introduction**

On the fifth of February 2004, a new Moroccan Family Code came into effect.<sup>2</sup> The code that it replaced had been in effect since 1957, although it had been slightly revised in 1993. Compared with the 1957 version, this new family code is unmistakably progressive. It takes account of up-to-date human rights concepts such as the equality of husband and wife within a marriage and within the family.

Article 6 of the 1996 Moroccan constitution, which has not undergone any fundamental changes, states that Islam is the official state religion in Morocco. One wonders, therefore, which religious notions might form the bases for progressive attitudes such as favouring the rights of women. In this article, we will attempt to reveal some of the policies behind this change.<sup>3</sup>

### **History of family law legislation in Morocco**

It was only during the period of the French protectorate that Morocco started to codify its laws. Immediately after independence, King Mohamed V ordered the drafting of a code of personal status and succession, the *Mudawwana*. Part of this code came into effect in 1957, and the remainder in 1958. It was an important token of regained self-esteem and a clear reaction to the French occupation, during which attempts were made to dominate and westernize the country. The dramatic Berber *dahir* of 1930, in particular, was seen by the people of Morocco – and indeed the entire Islamic world – as an attempt by France to divide Morocco into Arabic and Berber areas. By granting Berbers the right to use customary laws instead of the *shari'a*, it was viewed as an attempt to destroy the religious unity of Morocco, which would enable the occupying power to govern the country more easily.

On most points, the general tenor of the 1957 Code was very traditional and ortho-

<sup>1</sup> This article is directly related to the article by Judge Mohammed Azzine. His article gives more specific information about the Islamic sources on which the new Moroccan Family Code is based.

<sup>2</sup> The Code introduced in 1957 (partly 1958) was called the *Mudawwana al-'Ahwal ash-Shakhsiyya* (Code of Personal draft family code, as well as remarks in the Guide pratique du Code de la Famille, published in 2004 by the *Mudawwana al Usra* (Family Code).

<sup>3</sup> The Moroccan Family Code does not have an explanatory report, which refers to general principles of law, nor does it indicate the targets of the code and its provisions. Therefore this article is based on more or less indirect sources, such as speeches by the king, answers and reflections of the government on parliamentary questions and proposals during the debate of the draft family code, as well as remarks in the *Guide pratique du Code de la Famille*, published in 2004.

dox. It followed the prescriptions of the classical Maliki School of Jurisprudence, which is followed in Morocco.<sup>4</sup> The problem of incompleteness in the code was resolved by references, in several articles, to the doctrinal works of the Maliki School, such as the *Mokhtasar* of Khalil ben Ishaq al-Kairuwani.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after the 1957 Code came into effect, its traditional character engendered considerable opposition. Fearing social unrest, King Hassan II refused to allow a public debate on the need for revisions. In 1993, however, he did allow a slight, although not unimportant, revision to be made. Given that many years of demands and public debate had preceded the publication of this revision, when it finally came into effect in September 1993 this was seen as a remarkable event. It was timed to take place on one of the final days of the interregnum between the June parliamentary elections and the inauguration of the new parliament in October. This is a period of time during which, according to the Constitution, legislative power devolves to the king.

Just before the turn of the century, the king and his government became increasingly aware that the position of women in Moroccan society needed a fundamental re-evaluation. In May 1999, the new Moroccan government – the country's first socialist based government – published a 'National Action Plan for the Integration of Women into Development'. This Action Plan had four targets: increasing literacy, improving health care for pregnant women and young mothers, integrating women in the process of economic development, and reinforcing the legal position of women. The latter target set out fifty-one items for legal action, of which almost half pertained to family law, in particular to improvements to the 1957 Code.

Soon after the demise of King Hassan II, the new king decided to push ahead with the Action Plan's last target, regarding the legal position of women. He constituted an ad hoc committee consisting of *shari'a* specialists, sociologists, lawyers, psychologists, social workers, women's representatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights specialists. The committee's mission was to reflect on ways of harmonizing and updating the Moroccan family code in particular, taking into account all of the legal measures identified in the action plan.

The legal paragraph of the action plan had an unexpected side effect, which took the form of serious social disturbances. Hundreds of thousands of people from Women's Lib groups and other progressive organizations marched through the streets of Rabat demanding more radical changes. Conservatives and religious traditionalists claimed that even larger numbers of people, many of them women, took part in marches in Casablanca opposing any modernization that might conflict with Islam. In the course of this conflict, conservatives even issued fatwas declaring progressives to be heretics. This compelled the progressives to break with a long-held principle by demanding that the king intervene, which he did.

<sup>4</sup> See the contribution of Lotfi in this book.

<sup>5</sup> Art. 82, 172, 216 and 297 of the 1957 Code prescribed that for cases not provided for in the Code, one had to consult the jurisprudence of the School of Imam Malik. Article 400 of the new Family Code gives the same reference, although in a more liberal way.



On Coronation Day, 30 July 2003, the king proclaimed that, as the *Amir al-Muminin* (leader of the faithful), he was the ultimate authority in religious matters in Morocco and that no-one else was entitled to claim that right. Such a warning was well understood, especially by his most outspoken opponent, sheikh Yassine, the intellectual leader of the *Al 'Adl wal-Ihsan* Party. Two months later, on 10 October 2003, in a speech to mark the opening of the new parliamentary year, the king presented the outlines of the newly drafted Family Code.

### **'Ijtihad' as a legal phenomenon**

In concluding his presentation of the eleven revisions, the king made three explicit (and many implicit) references to *ijtihad*, 'thanks to which, Islam is a suitable religion for all times and places', he is quoted as saying in this context. What is this *ijtihad*? According to textbooks on Islam and *shari'a*, as well as legal dictionaries, in a very general sense *ijtihad* is the right to elaborate and explain Islamic law, the *shari'a*.

As many are aware, the two primary sources of Islamic law are firstly the holy Koran and secondly the *Sunna*. The latter contains, in general terms, the religious rules or traditions, *ahadith* (plural of *hadith*) given by the Prophet through his words and by his example. However, these two sources of *shari'a* ceased when the Prophet passed away. Some questions of religious law remained unresolved, while in other areas there was a lack of clarity with regard to meaning. During its early period of rapid expansion, the Islamic world needed secondary sources of law. Accordingly, in Sunni Islam, two more sources were added. One was the *ijma'*, the consensus of the community, represented by its religious lawyers. The other was *qiyas*, or analogy.

The existence of *ijtihad* enabled these additional sources to come into existence and to play an important role in religious law. Accordingly, it is through *ijtihad* that Islam can respond to the requirements of modern life. Without *ijtihad*, Muslim society in our century would only be left with *taqlid*, the strict obedience to *shari'a* rules of times long past. The literal meaning of *ijtihad* is 'effort'. It is derived from the Arabic root *jahada* 'to do your best'. The form *ijtahada* of this root means 'to do your very best', primarily in relation to religious matters. *Ijtihad* is the right to give a legal opinion either in a specific dispute, or on the interpretation and application of the legal rules of the *shari'a*. It is the right to elaborate and explain Islamic law using one's intellectual creativity or '*ray*', (therefore also called *ijtihad ar-ray*). Santillana, a renowned Italian orientalist, expresses the process of *ijtihad* as follows:

By concentrating all his mental facilities on the penetration of the spirit and precise meaning of the law, and not merely upon this or that specific provision, but upon the totality of the law, the lawyer relies upon his conscience, thus illuminated and supported, to find the solution for a case in question. *Ijtihad*, therefore, is not the arbitrarily objective, personal opinion of lawyers, but a carefully considered opinion. It is based upon a lawyer's legal conscience, refined and disciplined by the intense and profound contemplation of the law in its entirety.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Santillana (1938) 71.

An important question in discussions concerning *ijtihad* is the matter of an individual's competence to use *ijtihad*, and to reform current law through the use of *ijtihad*. In other words, is the individual in question entitled to refer to himself as *mujtahid*, which means 'entitled to exercise *ijtihad*'? Even those who are recognized as *mujtahid* may not be allowed to question and re-interpret the entire corpus of *shari'a* rules. Instead, such action may be limited to those rules that are characteristic of one particular school, possibly just those associated with an even more restricted sub-category. So it is important to determine an individual's right of *ijtihad*, in terms of the kind of interpretation and supplementation of the *shari'a* that it encompasses. One thing is certain, however. The only rights and duties of those who are not *mujtahid*, is *taqlid* – strict obedience of the *shari'a*.

### ***Ijtihad and the revision of the Family Code***

After the publication of the above mentioned Moroccan Action Plan, with its proposals for revising Moroccan family law, the question of who exactly is competent to propose revisions became a matter of the utmost importance. Soon after the publication of the Plan, conservative groups, headed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Abdelkebir Alaoui Mdaghri, intervened. They claimed that any review of family law could only be initiated by the king, as *Amir al-Muminin*, and that it must be based on the sacred texts and the *ijtihad* of the religious lawyers or *ulama*. Liberal politicians reacted to this by stressing that, in Islam, the right to interpret the sacred text is exclusive to any privileged group. *Ijtihad* is a right possessed by every believer.<sup>7</sup>

A conservative *fatwa*, condemning all Moroccans with more reformist views as heretics, forced the progressives to appeal to the king. They asked the king to intervene, and to make use of the centuries-old Malakite tradition which gives the king, as the *Amir al-Muminin*, the right to exercise *ijtihad*. As stated, the king subsequently referred to his right to *ijtihad* in the speech that he made in October 2003. Going one step further, he made it a constitutional issue by stating that: 'I have decided that the proposed family law should be submitted to Parliament (...), in view of its implications with respect to civil law. As for those provisions of a religious nature, these fall within the competence of *Amir al-Muminin*, the 'commander of the faithful'. According to the king, any *ijtihad*-based provisions in the new code were excluded from parliamentary debate for religious reasons.

This really peaks our curiosity. Under the Malakite *shari'a* law of Morocco, is the right of *ijtihad* solely restricted to the *Amir al-Muminin*, or does it also extend to the legal specialists or *ulama*, or is it a right enjoyed by all believers? As Mohammed Azzine's article elsewhere in this book shows, when using *ijtihad*, the king is not exercising his rights as the monarch, but is instead acting as a simple *mujtahid* with a special mission. Being the *Amir al-Muminin*, he was not chosen by God but elected by the Muslim community of Morocco. By taking an oath of allegiance, members of this community gave him their trust and submission, so that he could fulfil his task. Legislation comes from Allah through the Holy Koran and was completed by the Sunna of the Prophet. The *mujtahids*

<sup>7</sup> The history of the Moroccan Family Code from 1957 to 2003 is extensively described in Buskens (2003).

are responsible for interpreting this to conform with contemporary requirements. When the king intervenes, he is not acting as a *khalifa* (a successor to the prophet) but as an ordinary *mujtahid*, who also happens to be the head of the Council of Ulama. The King does not often invoke his rights as *Amir al-Muminin*. He generally asks for the opinion of suitably qualified specialists. He will only use these rights to give an example to his people, or to instruct the judges or *qadis*.

In Morocco, this way of justifying the king's competence to use *ijtihad* to transform family law remains a subject of debate. However, let us turn to the major innovations in Morocco's new family code. We must try to determine how, in the light of *ijtihad*, these innovations can be seen as being consistent with Islamic law. The king very clearly indicated that it was his wish, and that of the Moroccan government, that the new family code should conform with the rules of Islamic law. When presenting the code, he declared that: 'in my capacity as Amir al-Muminin, I cannot make legal what God has forbidden, nor forbid what He has made lawful'.

Turning to the provisions of the new Family Code, it is not difficult to identify those modifications which are most innovative in the light of the *shari'a*. These concern the chapters on marriage and divorce. Very few innovative rules have been inserted into the chapter on parent-child relations and personal status, and fathers are still entitled to the sole right of tutorship over their children. In the chapters on succession almost nothing has changed, which is to the detriment of women who inherit together with male heirs.<sup>8</sup>

### **Marriage**

In Islamic countries, family law and succession are the legal disciplines most influenced by Islamic law. Under Islamic law, and in the codifications of Islamic countries, the family remains the cornerstone of society. Marriage defines the framework within which a stable and fertile family may be created. Divorce is the ultimate sanction in this context. When attempting to update the law of marriage and divorce without departing from the principles of *shari'a*, the individuals responsible for drafting the new Moroccan family code used quite different instruments.

#### *1) Innovations through procedure*

One instrument is traditional in nature. It involves the use of formal/procedural requirements, such as both spouses appearing in person. If one or other of them cannot appear then they can only be excused by obtaining the permission of the court. With the aim of combating forced marriages, both man and wife are obliged to be present in person at the signing of the marriage contract. The permission of the court is required for the use of proxies, which is only allowed under very special circumstances (Art. 17 Family Code). Measures have also been included to reduce the incidence of rash divorces. Repudiation (*talaq*) now requires the permission of a court, and it must be preceded

<sup>8</sup> In succession law, the Code enlarged on the rules concerning obligatory bequests, which give an ex lege testamentary disposition to the children of the predeceased sons, so that it now also includes the children of the predeceased daughters.

by a reconciliation procedure. Such permission is conditional upon the man depositing a sum of money to cover his financial obligations towards his wife. However effective it may be, the use of procedural measures to structure family law is not the subject of this exposé.

### 2) *Innovations through ijtiḥad*

A second instrument used for innovating the Moroccan Family Code is the one we are discussing here, the *ijtiḥad*. Many aspects of the new Code cause one to question whether the new rule was in fact a direct result of an *ijtiḥad* procedure carried out by the king and his Commission. The most important of these aspects, which are discussed in more detail below, are: abrogation of a wife's duty of obedience to her spouse; abrogation of a wife's duty to be represented by a male person at the conclusion of the marriage contract; divorce on the grounds of sustained discord; and the introduction of an option for the spouses to select a matrimonial property regime involving the joint ownership of gains.

### 3) *Definition of Marriage*

The change of the definition of marriage is particularly noteworthy. The *Mudawwana* 1957 stated in its first article that:

'Marriage is a convention ... between a man and a woman, aimed at loyalty and chastity and a desire for procreation through fertility, on stable foundations and under the supervision of the husband, of a family that allows them to meet their mutual obligations and to enjoy security, peace, affection and mutual respect'.

This definition was unmistakably taken from a Koranic verse (4:34), which reads:

'Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made one of them to excel the other, and they spend of their property (to support them).'<sup>9</sup>

or in a slightly different translation:

'Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means.'<sup>10</sup>

The *Mudawwana* 2004, however, makes man and wife jointly responsible for the family, as it no longer refers to the guardianship of the husband but to the supervision of both spouses. In its Article 4 it explains that:

<sup>9</sup> Translation by Pickthall (1938).

<sup>10</sup> Translation in Doi (1984) 129.

‘... the purpose of marriage is loyalty and chastity and the foundation of a stable marriage under the supervision of the two spouses, in conformity with the provisions of this code.’

To those who have studied *shari‘a* for many years, this change came as something of a surprise. *Ta‘a*, the wife’s duty of obedience, was always held to be one of the pillars of Islamic family law. It was strongly advocated in several *ahadith*, like the one reported by Hakim from Aisha, when she asked the Messenger of Allah: ‘who has greater right over a woman’, and the Prophet replied: ‘her husband’.

In his inaugural lecture, the king explained the change to the definition of marriage in the 2004 Code by quoting from another *hadith*: ‘only an honourable man will honour them (the women), and only an ignoble man will humble them’. This seems to be a rather weak defence against both the above-mentioned Koranic verse and a variety of *ahadith*.

As Mohammed Azzine’s article elsewhere in this book shows, the duty of obedience was the price a woman paid to her husband for his duty to spend his money to maintain her (Koranic verse 4:34). This obedience should not be the fruit of constraint but of love and respect. As the Prophet in a *hadith* has said, men and women are equal in the light of the law. This equality, which is enshrined in the Moroccan Constitution, has now been incorporated into the Family Code. Marriage and the family are now the joint responsibility of both spouses. The man no longer has rights over his wife, instead all rights and duties are reciprocal.

The new Moroccan Family Code devotes sixty-five articles to marriage, eighteen more than the previous code. Fundamental revisions and new procedural rules are used to guarantee the code’s goal of equality between man and wife, within a marriage that is based on the free will of both spouses. This starts with the rules on the conclusion of the marriage, in which important changes have been made.

#### 4) *Essential marriage requirements*

The new Family Code involves substantial changes to the conditions governing the conclusion of a valid marriage. Article 13 lists the five classical conditions, which are also set out in the 1957 Code. These concern issues such as minimum age, impediments to marriage, bride gift, witnesses, and the *wali nikh*. At least two of them are of major interest, in the context of *ijtihad*. Let us briefly discuss these five conditions.

Classical *shari‘a* set out no minimum age for spouses. It allowed a father to give his child in marriage whenever he wished. Twenty-century codification in the Islamic world has nevertheless led to the introduction of a minimum marriageable age in almost all such states, although different ages apply to males and females. In 1957, Morocco introduced a minimum of eighteen for boys and fifteen for girls, subject to possible dispensations. In the new code, marriageable age is set at eighteen for both men and women, subject to the possibility of a judicial dispensation.

An obvious question is whether the introduction of a minimum age is in conformity with the *shari‘a*. Perhaps we should not pursue that particular issue, however, since very few Islamic states allow marriages between young boys and girls.<sup>11</sup>

As to impediments to marriage, no changes have been introduced. The degrees of blood relationship and milk-relationship as well as of affinity, and the prohibitions for diversity of religion, have remained.

The bride gift (*mahr/sadaq*) is an essential element of the marriage contract. An Islamic marriage contract is only valid if the man offers a gift to his future wife and pays at least part of it at or before the wedding. The Maliki School requires that the amount of the bride gift be stipulated in the marriage contract. The remaining three Sunni schools do not oblige parties to mention the *mahr*, as long as the marriage contract does not acquit the man of this obligation. The new Family Code abandoned this requirement and accepted the rule of the three other Sunni schools. Here we can see that although followers of Sunni Islam are supposed to follow the school of their descent (*taqlid*), they are also free to adhere to the rules of other schools (*ikhtiyar*) which may be more in line with their religious ideas.

A fourth requirement is publicity. From the beginning of Islam, there has been a requirement for marriages to be concluded in public. The presence of at least two witnesses of honourable and trustworthy character (*adl*) guarantees that this requirement is met. In Morocco, the role of the witness has been formalized, and is nowadays carried out by two *adoul*.<sup>12</sup>

As stated, in Islam marriage is a contract between a man and a woman. Classical Islam stipulates that during the negotiation and conclusion of a marriage contract the woman, regardless of her age, must be represented by a male member of her family: the *wali nikeh*. The *wali nikeh* may be her father or grandfather, her brother or uncle or even her son if he is of age. Maliki Islam countenanced no exemptions to this rule, while the Hanefite School allowed an adult woman whose father had died to conclude a marriage-contract without a *wali nikeh*. Morocco adopted this rule in its 1993 legal reform. The new Moroccan Family Code goes still further, allowing every woman aged eighteen and above to conclude a marriage without the need for a *wali nikeh*. This rather radical change was motivated by the argument that while women were entitled to have a *wali nikeh* present at the conclusion of their marriage contract, they were not obliged to do so. Such an innovative reformulation of the requirement for a *wali nikeh* is only feasible through the use of *ijtihad*. However, it is not known which *shari'a* rule can be used to account for this drastic U-turn.

With regard to the requirement for a *wali nikeh*, Mohammed Azzine's article shows that this has been a topic of discussion for many centuries, possibly even from the beginning of Islam itself. In the case of brides who have come of age<sup>13</sup>, the Hanefite school of jurisprudence, and others, take the view that she has no obligation to be represented

11 Iranian Civil Code art. 1041 requires that girls be aged at least thirteen and boys at least fifteen, the marriage of individuals below these ages is only possible with dispensation from the court.

12 *Adoul* are notaries charged with the drawing up of authenticated acts marriage and divorce. They are constantly supervised by the court (*qadi at-tawtiq*), which certifies the acts of the *adoul*.

13 She could even ask for an annulment if her wedding was concluded before she reached the age of majority, if her interests were not served by the marriage.

by a male member of her family. The general opinion of the Maliki and Shafiite schools is that a marriage concluded without *wali nikh* is null and void. However, even the adherents of the Maliki school were not unanimous on this point. For instance, the famous Maliki scholar, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), declared this requirement to be inconsistent with the Koran. The passage to which he alluded reads: 'Do not prevent them from marrying when they have agreed among themselves to marry in a lawful manner'. There is also a *hadith* of the Prophet, which allows a woman to marry independently, without a *wali nikh*, whether it is her first marriage or not.

The new code introduced a large amount of additional paperwork. This was intended to safeguard the completion of the formalities required at the conclusion of the marriage and to prevent forced marriages.

### 5) Polygamy

The king did not feel free to abolish polygamy, and he expressed this in the following way: 'in my capacity as *Amir al-Muminin* I cannot make licit what God has forbidden, nor forbid what he has made lawful'. The question of polygamy is mentioned in the Koran, and so it is part of the Moroccan Family Code (art. 40-46). However, further restrictions have been imposed on bigamy. It now requires court permission, which may only be given in exceptional circumstances and only if the man has sufficient financial means to support two families equally. The court is also required to inform both wives and to ask for their formal acceptance of the bigamous relationship.

### **Divorce**

In addition to the Moroccan law governing marriage, major changes have been introduced into the law governing divorce. The new Moroccan Family Code devotes twice as many articles to divorce as does the 1957 code.<sup>14</sup> Many of these articles introduce formal requirements. In particular, the courts now have substantial influence in the dissolution of family ties. The intervention of the court in such cases is a quintessential part of its duty to protect the interests of the weaker party.

#### 1) Reconciliation

Reconciliation was not generally required in the 1957 *Mudawwana*, which had only a single reference to the matter, in Article 56. Reconciliation was also mentioned in Article 179 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where it was part of the proceedings to acquire the court's permission for a repudiation. In conformity with *shari'a*, the new code requires that all divorce cases be preceded by a reconciliation procedure. So, as far as reconciliation is concerned, the legislature did its utmost to comply with the Koranic requirement set out in Sura 4:35, which reads: 'And if you fear a breach between them, appoint an arbiter from his folk and an arbiter from her folk.'

<sup>14</sup> The new Code includes 72 articles on divorce, while the 1957 Code had only 37. As to marriage, the new Code has 65 articles, while the former one had 43.

## 2) Types of dissolution of marriage

The new Moroccan family code enumerates six different types of dissolution of a marriage, three of which (*talaq*, *khula* and *tatliq*) were already codified in the former *Mudawwana*. Not only were the other three, *muba'arat*, *tamlik* and *shiqaq*, not mentioned in the former code, they may not even have been known when that code was drafted. As provided for in 1993, and in conformity with restrictions introduced in the Tunisian family code of a 1957, the marriage can only be dissolved by a *talaq* once the court has granted its permission to repudiate. Such permission will only be given once the man has deposited at the court's registry a sum of money covering his financial obligations to his wife and children. *Talaq*, as a rule, entitles the man to revoke his *talaq* within three months of the *iddah*. The new Family Code recognizes this right of revocation, but only under the court's supervision and with consent of the wife. If she refuses to resume marital life, she may start divorce proceedings.

In the past, frequent use was made of the *khula*. In classical law, *khula* is a means of dissolving the marriage at the wife's initiative, although the proceedings end up in the hands of the man alone. It is a *talaq* based on a contract between man and wife, one that has been initiated and paid for by the wife. In classical law and under the former code, the man was entitled to name his own price as payment for his *talaq*. The new code, however, limits the man's rights in this regard. The new code provides that, if the parties fail to reach an agreement on the price to be paid, the wife may request the court to fix a fair price (art. 120). If the wife is not satisfied with the sum stipulated by the court, she may start a divorce proceeding referred to as *shiqaq*, disharmony.<sup>15</sup>

Divorce by court ruling, or *tatliq*, is a third classical means of dissolving a marriage. *Tatliq* is a *talaq* issued by a court in lieu of the man. It is especially important in Malikite law. The court represents the man in situations in which current circumstances dictate that he should have pronounced a *talaq* but – either willingly or unwillingly – did not so. In Malikite law, there are six distinct circumstances under which the court uses *tatliq*. These are when the man fails to meet his obligation to pay maintenance, protracted absence, an incurable illness, maltreatment of the wife (*darar*), the oath of chastity (*ila*) and the oath of continence (*zihar*).

The new family code adds three further grounds for divorce. The first of these is the *tamliq*, a mandate by the husband to his wife by which she acquires the right to exercise the man's right of repudiation and to repudiate herself.<sup>16</sup> The mandate will as a rule – but not necessarily – be included in the marriage contract and will indicate the conditions under which the right of self-repudiation may be exercised. Although mentioned in Article 44 of the 1957 Code, the wife's right to opt for divorce by self-repudiation has hardly ever been used as it was seen as flying in the face of Moroccan tradition. In devoting a provision of the new Code to *tamliq* (Article 89), the legislature clearly advocates *tamliq* as a means of striving for equality between men and women. *Tamliq*, as a legal institution, is widely known in *shari'a*. In particular, it is used by schools in which

<sup>15</sup> To be discussed below.

<sup>16</sup> Also called *tafvid*.



courts have only a restricted right of *tatliq*.

The second novelty of the new Code is a divorce 'à l'amiable' (Article 114). Here, the spouses conclude a contract to end the marriage contract, subject either to no conditions whatsoever or to only a few necessary arrangements. This divorce contract is often called *mubara'at*. Under the code, execution of the contract requires the court's permission.

By far the most surprising innovation of the new Family Code is the introduction of a judicial divorce on the basis of discord between the spouses, which is set out in Articles 94 to 97. This *shiqaq* procedure starts with a request, submitted to the court by one or both spouses, to settle a dispute which might otherwise result in long-term discord. The court must first attempt to reconcile the parties in question, in an attempt to prevent a divorce. However, if these attempts at reconciliation fail and the cause of the discord cannot be resolved, then the court will pronounce the divorce and give its rulings on the associated repercussions. This *shiqaq* was previously unknown in Islamic law. In spite of its modernistic appearance, it must have a basis in the *shari'a*, and is certainly a product of the *ijtihad* to which the king alluded during his presentation of the draft code in October 2003. As is explained in the article by Azzine, such grounds for divorce may be based directly on the Koranic verses 4:128 and 4:130:

'If a woman fears ill-treatment from her husband, or desertion, it is no sin for them if they make terms of peace between themselves....', 'But if they separate, Allah will compensate each out of His abundance...'

According to Moroccan authors *shiqaq* has the potential to replace in practice all other grounds for divorce since it can be used in a very liberal way and has few formal requirements.

### ***Matrimonial property***

The final item to be discussed in this study of *ijtihad* concerns marriage and money or, in legal terms, matrimonial property. At the time of their marriage, the parties may each have some property, some money, and (as is often the case) many debts. During the marriage, the economic situation of each spouse will change. It may improve or worsen. The man's capital may have increased as a result of the wife running the household, looking after the children and much besides, without any compensation whatsoever. The wife's capital may have decreased if she has voluntarily paid household expenses. In classical *shari'a*, absolute separation of the man's property and that of his wife is the rule. However, this is not the case in the new Moroccan Family Code. Under this code, the individuals in question are free to convene a process for dividing up both parties' gains and losses during their marriage. The code goes on to stipulate that, in the absence of any such matrimonial property convention, the division of such gains and losses during the marriage must be decided by the court. Within the *shari'a*, this provision on the division of matrimonial property must of course have been justified through *ijtihad*, but exactly how was this done? A detailed explanation of this approach is set out in our

French article. It refers to the *fiqh*, or Islamic jurisprudence, which - on the basis of the principle of '*autonomie de la volonté*' - grants everyone freedom of action, as long as they do not disregard the mandatory rules of religious law.

### **Conclusion**

It is not easy to draw conclusions from our research. There is an unmistakably progressive atmosphere in the new provisions of the Family Code. As mentioned, the Moroccan authorities have not published any explanation of the legislator's competence to formulate innovative solutions. Details are also lacking concerning the acceptability of the new marriage and divorce provisions in light of the *shari'a*. Although the innovations are based on *ijtihad*, their justification remains veiled. In the Koran and *Sunna* one can find grounds for justification, but it is not known which of these formed the basis of the new rules. An authoritative interpretation of the new code would therefore be of great value, not only to legal researchers and practitioners, but to the Moroccan people in general.

Mohamed Azzine

## *Ijtihad* et le droit de la famille marocain<sup>1</sup>

### **Introduction**

Le code du statut personnel a connu des modifications substantielles.<sup>2</sup> La caractéristique la plus importante de ses modifications du 5 février 2004 est qu'elles ont touché un texte juridique, considéré, bien qu'il soit une loi positive, comme un texte d'une spécificité particulière. Il est désacralisé puisqu'il quitte les cercles religieux et peut être soumis au parlement.

La réforme de la *moudawana* découla d'une volonté royale exprimée par sa Majesté le Roi Mohamed VI commandeur des croyants (*Amir al Muminin*) qui a placé depuis son accession au trône, la promotion des droits de l'homme au centre du projet sociétal démocratique et moderne. Ce projet se propose notamment de rendre justice à la femme, de protéger les droits de l'enfant et de préserver la dignité de l'homme tout. Il demeure fidèle aux desseins de tolérance de l'islam en matière de justice, d'égalité, de solidarité, d'effort jurisprudentiel et d'ouverture sur l'esprit de l'époque et les exigences du développement et du progrès. En vue de la réalisation de cet objectif suprême le roi a confié à une commission royale consultative composée d'éminents et d'experts, tant hommes que femmes, la mission de faire une révision du code de la famille. Il a veillé en permanence à donner ses instructions à cette commission en vue d'élaborer le projet d'un nouveau code de la famille. Il a insisté sur le respect de la *charia* et des desseins tolérants de l'islam. Il a incité à l'effort intellectuel *l'ijtihad* pour la déduction des prescriptions légales en évitant un décollement entre la réalité sociale et la jurisprudence.

### ***Ijtihad* de l'émir des croyants**

Qu'est ce que *l'ijtihad*? *L'ijtihad* c'est l'adaptation du texte au contexte, nul ne songe en effet à ignorer le rôle que peuvent jouer les *mujtahids*, docteurs capables de faire œuvre d'*ijtihad*, d'interprétation et jurisprudence créatrice de droits, dans les réformes en fonction de l'évolution des mœurs et des idées par le droit et le reflet de l'évolution de la société. Est-ce que le commandeur des croyants possède le droit de légiférer voir de *l'ijtihad*?

La responsabilité de faire respecter l'ordre de dieu est elle-même une obligation religieuse directement prescrite par le coran: 'Allah vous ordonne de rendre les dépôts à

1 Cette contribution est directement liée à la contribution du prof. van der Velden à ce livre. Sa contribution, en langue anglaise, inclut de l'information plus générale et se réfère plusieurs fois à cette contribution-ci qui est plus spécifique quant aux sources religieuses.

2 Le Code introduit en 1957 (partiellement en 1958) portait le nom de '*Mudawwana al-'Ahwal ash-Shakhsiyya*' (Code du statut personnel et des successions); en 2004 il a été remplacé par le '*Mudawwana al-Utra*' (Code de la famille).

leurs ayants droits et, quand vous jugez entre les hommes, de juger avec justice.<sup>3</sup> Les docteurs de l'interprétation coranique comprennent le terme 'dépôts' dans le sens général de toute obligation confiée à la responsabilité des hommes. Sur le même sujet les versets 26 et 27 de la sourat Sâd (n° 38) disposent d'une manière encore plus claire: 'David, nous t'avons fait vicaire sur la terre, arbitre entre les hommes par le moyen de la vérité! Ne suis pas la passion car elle t'égarerait loin du chemin de dieu'.

Le fondement religieux de la magistrature suprême ne fait pas, de doute la conséquence rapidement tirée, surtout par les occidentaux et de croire que le caractère religieux de l'institution du califat implique un califat identique à la monarchie de droit public européen du moyen âge et de la renaissance. La différence entre les deux institutions demeure très nette. En droit musulman l'émir des croyants exécute l'ordre de dieu, il reste un sujet humain ayant strictement le même statut que tous les autres sujets de dieu. Il ne bénéficie d'aucun droit exorbitant, ou avantage particulier accordé par dieu. Il n'est ni envoyé, ni élu de dieu, il reste l'élu et le mandataire de la communauté musulmane qui lui accorde sa confiance et sa soumission pour qu'il puisse remplir convenablement la mission indiquée. Le pouvoir législatif revient à dieu qu'il a exercé en révélant le coran. La *soumna*, ce que le prophète a dit et fait selon la tradition, le complète. Pour les questions temporelles et incidentes les *mujtahids*, docteurs capables de faire œuvre d'interprétation et jurisprudence créatrice de droits, en ont toujours eu la responsabilité.

Lors qu'un souverain intervient dans ce domaine il n'agit point en sa qualité de Roi, il exécute plutôt son devoir de simple *mujtahid*. Observons que même dans ce cadre les exemples restent rarissimes. L'attitude inverse paraît particulièrement dominante au Maroc où les califes des différentes dynasties font systématiquement appel à l'avis des docteurs par le biais des consultations 'fatwa' à l'exemple de leurs sujets et des juges (cadis). L'unification des pouvoirs exécutif et judiciaire entre les mains du calife constitue une application littérale de l'ordre coranique. Le calife est à la fois administrateur et juge. Seuls les contraintes pratiques de l'exercice de ses fonctions l'obligent à déléguer la mission de juger à certains de ses sujets.

Ceci étant, il est intéressant de noter certains nouveautés introduites dans le nouveau code, grâce aux efforts de l'*ijtihad*, comme l'abolition de l'obéissance de la femme envers son mari (a), la suppression de la tutelle matrimoniale pour la femme majeure (b), l'introduction du partage des biens conjugaux après le divorce (c) et celle de la discorde en tant que motif de dissolution des liens du mariage (d).

## **Mariage**

### *a) L'obéissance*

Le nouveau code de la famille a suivi une nouvelle voie pour définir les effets du mariage par rapport aux deux conjoints en tant que droits et devoirs réciproques. Chacun des conjoints doit s'en acquitter à l'égard de l'autre conformément au principe de l'égalité consacré par le code de la famille. Cette égalité se manifeste dans la responsabilité atta-

<sup>3</sup> Sourate 4, Les Femmes, verset 58.

chée à la gestion et la protection des affaires de la famille. Elle se manifeste à l'intérêt qui doit leur être porté à la concertation en ce qui concerne les décisions relatives au foyer conjugal. Elle se manifeste en plus à l'éducation et à l'orientation des enfants et à la planification familiale.

La concertation découlant de l'égalité a pour but de parvenir à dégager un avis commun, consensuel loin de l'attachement intransigeant à une opinion personnelle. Sinon l'égalité conduirait à la ruine de la famille au lieu de poursuivre le but qui en est escompté et qui consiste à contribuer à l'édification de la famille à travers l'instauration d'un dialogue serein, d'un esprit de coopération, de solidarité et d'altruisme.

Mais la question qui se pose, est-est-ce que la femme doit obéir à son mari? Le coran stipule: 'Les femmes vertueuses sont obéissantes conservant le secret de ce que dieu a conservé.'<sup>4</sup> Selon l'ancien code de la *moudawana* et dans le cadre du fonctionnement de la famille qui est la première institution de la vie humaine et dont la préservation est essentielle dans le régime islamique, la femme 'doit' obéir à son mari. Vu les dépenses que les hommes effectuent sur leurs biens en faveur des femmes, il s'agit du versement de la dot à l'épouse de son entretien. Mais l'obéissance n'est pas le fruit de la contrainte mais celui de l'amour et du respect qui doivent régner entre les deux parties d'une âme unique. Par ailleurs le coran stipule que les femmes ont des droits comme elles ont des devoirs conformément à l'usage, de même le prophète a dit 'les femmes sont égales aux hommes au regard de loi' et 'les femmes sont les sœurs germaines des hommes'.

Donc les femmes et les hommes sont égaux selon la Constitution, article 5, c'est pourquoi la *moudawana* a adopté une formulation moderne et a placé la famille sous la responsabilité conjointe des deux époux et il n'y a plus les droits du mari à l'égard de sa femme mais des droits et devoirs réciproqués entre conjoints. Ceci marque la fin de l'inégalité juridique entre l'épouse et son mari et permet à la femme de devenir un partenaire à part entière de l'homme en jouissant des mêmes droits que lui.

#### b) La *wilaya* (tutelle) matrimonial

La *wilaya* dans le mariage a été traitée dans des ouvrages d'exégèse et du *fiqh* (jurisprudence) sur la base des interprétations qui divergent selon les écoles, étant donné qu'il n'existe pas de texte catégorique dans ce domaine. L'érudit Ibn Rochd qui appartient à l'école malikite, l'école suivie au Maroc, a longtemps espacé l'argumentation des uns et des autres en relevant que l'imam Malik et l'imam Chafei ont considéré l'accord du *wali* ou de celui qui en tient lieu comme une condition de validité de l'acte de mariage.

Mais l'imam Abou Hanifa et de plusieurs autres érudits ont tous établi qu'en l'absence d'une prescription claire dans le livre saint ou la *sounna* la femme n'est pas obligée de présenter un *wali* et qu'elle peut disposer librement de sa personne pour la conclusion du mariage, sans distinction entre la jeune fille et la divorcée. En l'absence d'un texte précis les *ouléma* ont fait preuve d'*ijtihad* les uns et les autres, selon qu'ils conditionnent l'acte de mariage à la présence ou non du *wali* et ils ont recouru à l'interprétation de versets du coran ou du hadiths pour corroborer leur avis autorisé.

4 Sourate 4, Les Femmes, verset 34.

L'érudit Ibn Rochd cite le verset suivant: 'ne les empêchez pas de ce (re)marier avec leurs (nouveaux) époux s'ils se sont mis d'accord conformément à l'usage' (Sura 2 : 232). C'est le même verset qui a été cité par sa majesté dans son discours sur le projet du code de la famille devant le parlement, pour soutenir que la femme n'a pas besoin de l'autorisation du *wali* pour contracter mariage alors que les *ouléma* d'avis opposé font remarquer que le verset concerne la femme divorcée dont le désir de se remarier ne doit pas être contrarié par le premier époux qui rechigne à consommer la séparation.

Un autre auteur Chams al-Haq cite un fait rapporté par Ibn Abbas selon lequel une femme s'est plainte au prophète d'avoir été mariée par son tuteur contre son gré. Elle s'est vue confirmer dans son droit de disposer librement de sa personne. En s'y basant, il conclut que la contrainte en la matière est prohibée de façon catégorique. Il conclut qu'il n'y pas lieu d'invoquer l'autorisation du *wali* puisque le prophète a reconnu à cette femme la liberté de disposer de son destin sans différencier entre le fait si elle se marie pour la première fois ou si elle est divorcée.<sup>5</sup>

Abderahman Aljaziri a résumé la position des quatre grandes écoles du fiqh.<sup>6</sup> Chez les malikites, les hanbalites et les chaféites, explique t'il, la femme ne peut prendre l'initiative exclusive de disposer de son destin en matière de mariage, et le *wali* ne peut non plus imposer le mariage à la femme sous sa tutelle jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne l'âge requis et qu'elle puisse donner son consentement. Les hanafites exigent la présence du *wali* pour la fille en bas age, et pour celle souffrant de démence quelque soit son âge, alors que la femme majeure vierge ou non peut contracter mariage de son propre chef. Il apparaît de ce qui précède que la condition de la présence du *wali* relève d'interprétations ne reposant sur aucune indication claire et expresse du Livre ou de la *sounna*. Par conséquent, le code de la famille a opté pour la suppression de la tutelle pour la femme majeure lors du mariage, parce qu'il considère que cette pratique est désuète et n'a guère fait le consensus des grands rites malikite et hanafite.

## **Divorce**

### *a) La discorde*

Le code a élargi le droit dont dispose la femme pour demander le divorce par l'adjonction du cas de la discorde (*chiqaa*) aux autres causes prévues à l'article 98. La discorde est le différent profond et permanent qui oppose les deux conjoints au point de rendre impossible la vie conjugable. La procédure prévue à cet effet consiste à demander par l'un des conjoints ou par les deux à la fois qu'une solution soit apportée par le tribunal qui doit entreprendre une tentative de conciliation. Il délègue à cet effet deux arbitres ou toute personne qualifiée pouvant en tenir lieu conformément aux paroles de dieu: 'Si vous craignez-vous un désaccord entre les époux, déléguez un arbitre pris dans la famille du mari et un autre pris dans la famille de la femme, s'ils désirent sincèrement se réconcilier dieu les fera vivre en bonne intelligence.'<sup>7</sup>

5 [http://www.map.co.ma/mapfi/moudawana/textes/wilaya\\_fiqh.htm](http://www.map.co.ma/mapfi/moudawana/textes/wilaya_fiqh.htm)

6 [http://www.map.co.ma/mapfi/moudawana/textes/wilaya\\_fiqh.htm](http://www.map.co.ma/mapfi/moudawana/textes/wilaya_fiqh.htm)

7 *Sourate 4, Les Femmes, verset 35.*

Si la tentative des arbitres aboutit à une réconciliation des époux ils dressent un rapport qui consigne les causes du différend et les solutions convenues. Si la tentative n'a pas aboutit, un rapport est adressé au tribunal pour faire le nécessaire, voire prononcer le divorce pour cause de discorde en déterminant les droits dus à l'épouse et aux enfants le cas échéant. Le tribunal peut également décider dans le même jugement de l'octroi d'une indemnisation au profit de conjoint lésé sur sa demande.

### **La répartition des biens**

Chacun des deux époux dispose d'un patrimoine distinct du patrimoine de l'autre. Mais il a conféré aux conjoints la possibilité de se mettre d'accord, en vertu d'un acte séparé, sur la gestion des biens à acquérir après la conclusion du mariage. Il a fait cela afin que chacun d'eux puisse de son côté assumer les charges familiales. Il a fait cela dans le cadre de la nouvelle vision du législateur et de la dimension qu'il a souhaité donner à l'esprit d'entraide qui doit régner au sein de la famille. Il s'agit d'un accord optionnel basé sur les actes qualifiés selon le *fiqh*, la jurisprudence musulmane, et la loi d'actes entrant dans le cadre du principe de l'autonomie de la volonté qui confère à toute personne le droit de gérer ses affaires, d'administrer ses biens et d'en disposer de la manière qui lui paraît convenable sans en freindre les règles impératives. L'accord susvisé doit fixer la part de chacun des conjoints des biens acquis après la conclusion du mariage.

Cette règle n'a aucun rapport avec celle prévue par certains lois en ce qui concerne la conclusion d'acte de mariage dans le cadre de la séparation ou la communauté des biens, du fait que la nouvelle disposition diffère totalement de ce qui précède. De même que la dite règle n'a aucun lien avec les règles de l'héritage étant donné qu'il s'agit de la disposition des biens durant toute la vie de l'individu, à l'instar même des autres actes réalisés à titre onéreux ou à titre gracieux, telles la donation aumônière (*sadaka*), la donation, la vente ou autre.

Il arrive que les conjoints ne parviennent pas à conclure un accord à propos de la gestion desdits biens et que l'un d'eux prétend avoir droit sur les biens acquis par l'autre durant la période de mariage. En cas de litige, chacun peut apporter la preuve de sa participation au développement des biens de l'autre. Dans ce cas, il est fait application des règles générales de la preuve. Le juge évalue la contribution de chacun des époux. Ainsi, la décision à prendre en ce qui concerne la prétention ci-dessus ne portera jamais sur les biens que possédait chacun d'eux avant la conclusion de l'acte de mariage. Elle se limitera uniquement aux biens acquis durant la période du mariage et ce, à la lumière du travail accompli, des efforts déployés et des charges assumées par le demandeur pour le développement et la mise en valeur des biens.

Le droit au bénéfice du travail et des efforts fournis n'implique pas le partage des biens acquis en deux parts égales. Ce que les *fuqaha* (pluriel de *faqih*, docteur de jurisprudence) stimulent dans la jurisprudence des cas d'espèce, c'est que la femme bénéficie de la fortune acquise relativement à sa participation et à ses efforts pour créer cette fortune. Sa part pourrait donc être la moitié, ou moins ou plus. Évidemment l'évaluation des efforts appartiennent au tribunal qui doit en apprécier l'importance, la nature et leur effet sur les profits réalisés durant la période du mariage.

**Conclusion**

Ces nouvelles dispositions du code de la famille ne font aucune entorse à la *charia* islamique et répondent aux normes des états modernes à l'instar de l'occident. Cela traduit ainsi le souci de Sa Majesté d'épouser l'air du temps, à savoir la globalisation. Cela fait du Maroc un pays qui plonge sa tête dans le modernisme, mais garde ses pieds dans les riches traditions ancestrales.



Arne Musch

## Local government and Morocco's political and administrative transition

### **Introduction**

After the national elections of 1997, Morocco experienced a period of political and administrative transition. Seen from afar, the subsequent course of events looks simple: the reforms lasted from 1997 until the fundamentalist attacks in Casablanca in 2003, and they have stagnated since. But seen from up close, the picture becomes more complex. Inside Morocco, the forces of the old order and the new continue to wrestle with one another in the *Makhzen*<sup>1</sup>, there are fundamentalists of very different hues, and the ruling social democrats are increasingly embattled. Internationally, Morocco is seen on the one hand as a relatively liberal friend of both the West and the world of Islam and as such, it is handsomely rewarded with aid. On the other hand it is regarded as a troublesome neighbour of the European Union and as a place where Islamist extremism is rife. All this makes Morocco's political and administrative transition a kind of shadow play that is hard to understand.

Most commentators tend to focus on national politics. But local government has been changing too. I will argue that while reforms may have run out of steam at national level, the wind of change is still blowing steadily at local level. To what degree does local politics point the way to Morocco's future? The trends identified at the end of this chapter can be seen as tentative answers to this question. It is in focusing on local government that this chapter seeks to make a contribution to the debate about Morocco's political and administrative transition.

It is structured as follows. Firstly it outlines the recent history of reform at national level. Secondly it presents the state of affairs with regard to local government. Lastly it suggests a number of trends at local level, observed over the last five years in the Platform for Intermunicipal Cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco, in which Dutch local authorities work together with Moroccan local authorities.

### ***The history of reform: is reform now history?***

At national level, incremental but sweeping changes have come to Morocco's political and administrative landscape since 1997. That year, parliamentary elections were held and the next year, the social democrat party USFP (*Union socialiste des forces populaires*) and

<sup>1</sup> The *Makhzen* – the palace – is a word that signifies the power of the King and the political forces close to him. Morocco's constitution assigns a formidable position to the King, and his influence is especially strong when the country is torn over issues. Since the accession of Mohamed VI in 1999, the connotation of conservatism no longer applies to the *Makhzen*.

the former communist party PPS (*Parti du progrès et du socialisme*) took up seats in government, with social democrat Youssoufi as the prime minister. This took place within the context of greater respect of human rights and humanitarian gestures by King Hassan II, such as the release of political prisoners.

However, the bureaucracy and the security services were left essentially unaffected. That is, the early reforms concerned the outward aspect of the state but not its internal workings. King Hassan II, ever the deft puppet master, allowed more actors into the governance system. But he had no desire to have it crash, becoming Morocco's Honecker in the process.<sup>2</sup> This did not happen. Hassan II died in 1999, after which his eldest son took over as King Mohammed VI.

Under Mohammed VI, the outward aspects of reform, apart from the important new law governing marriage and the family,<sup>3</sup> concerned greater – but not complete – press freedom and more respect of the rule of law. Its inward aspects have been focused on decentralization and curbing the power of the security services.<sup>4</sup> A tentative coming to terms with the country's repressive past and attention to disadvantaged regions have been the further hallmarks of Morocco's recent history. The parliamentary election in 2002 resulted in a balance between the social democrats and the conservatives in parliament, and in a cabinet around Prime Minister Jettou, a non-party politician who announced that reforms would go ahead.

In short, Morocco seemed to be on the right governance track until 16 May 2003, when Casablanca became the scene of a series of bombings and attacks perpetrated by a group of Moroccans calling themselves *Salafia Jihadia*. Prominent among the targets were a hotel and a restaurant, both foreign owned. At least thirty three people died. The reaction to the bombings was fierce, both on the part of the security services, which soon arrested thousands of 'extremists', and on the part of civil society, which organized mass demonstrations against violence. The King visited the scene of the bombings soon after, and his shaken people rallied around him.

The implications of the bombings for Moroccan politics and administration are still unclear. The events shattered Morocco's self-image as a nation coming to terms with pluralism, under a young, modern King beloved by all. The security services were quick to capitalize on this opportunity to redeem themselves in the public eye. The bombings presented opponents of reform with the argument that the changes had gone too far, because it was the reforms that allowed pockets of extremism to arise in deprived urban areas.

A sketch of Moroccan politics today shows three 'movements': a social-democratic one, a fundamentalist one, and one close to the *Makhzen*. These movements are made up of loose groupings of political parties, civil society organizations, associations for social

2 Erich Honecker, leader of the German Democratic Republic ('East Germany'), famously lost his touch in 1989, greatly accelerating the disintegration of the state and the eventual absorption of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany.

3 See the contributions of Van der Velden and Azzine elsewhere in this book.

4 Relieving Driss Bachri, the dreaded Minister of the Interior and public face of the repression, of his post was the most visible sign of further change.

work, and in some cases sections of the bureaucracy. Each movement has its own problems. First, the social-democratic movement lacks legitimacy because it seemed to have the opportunity to change the political system but failed to do so. Second, the fundamentalist movement has the most solid grassroots organizations and a good record of delivering social services in slum areas, but it now suffers from the insistent image that it is window dressing for terrorists.<sup>5</sup> And third, the Casablanca bombings demonstrated the *Makhzen's* inability to protect its people from harm. This view was compounded by the authorities' response to the subsequent earthquake in the north of the country, which was widely seen as inadequate.

So these days, the three main political movements all have their own particular legitimacy problem. Handling extremism is now Morocco's central political issue. For the moment, this rules out the broad consensus needed for further reform at national level, even when this is needed to address the causes of extremism. But what about the impact and the prospect of reform at local level?

### ***Local government in Morocco: its state of affairs and its politics***

The municipal level of administration used to be the least-developed level in French colonial times. It was firmly under the control of administrators dispatched by the central government. At one point in time, these administrators were even called *commandant du cercle*, a martial term which says it all: local populations were not supposed to have any real influence. Rural areas were left to their own devices and were paid only scant attention by colonial administrators.

As the state started growing in the decades after independence (1956), ministries such as education and health created local units. The officials that head them are called *délégués*. This was a form of de-concentration of the state, with the *délégués* answering to the centre and receiving their funds from it. Municipal councils, which elect a president who serves as the mayor, have been in place since the 1960s.<sup>6</sup> But they had little influence on the *délégués*. And everyone in local politics and local administration, including *délégués* and mayors, was very much subordinate to the *wali*, the administrative head of the region, chief representative of central government and governor of the forces of law and order.

The essence of the system of central control survived until the period of reforms, when decentralization hit home in two important respects. In the first place, a revised

<sup>5</sup> Much like *Sinn Fein* in Northern Ireland or *Fatah* in Palestine. To the dismay of Moroccan parties like the PJD (*Parti de la Justice et du Développement*), which calls itself moderate and peaceful, others hint that its participation in the political system is little more than a cynical front while other parts of the fundamentalist movement plot more violence.

<sup>6</sup> As always in Morocco, the rural areas were given their governance structures later than their urban counterparts. Essentials such as the civil registry, the tax registry, and some services have been introduced to rural areas since independence, but rural communes are still markedly different from urban municipalities to this day. There are now about 1,500 communes, urban and rural taken together, spread over sixteen regions and thirty nine provinces. Casablanca, Morocco's largest city, has its own special structure.

local government law gave municipalities competencies in policy areas such as services, waste and the environment, culture and sports, and town planning. The boundaries of these areas are still fuzzy, but it is now clearly up to the local councils to draw up the budget for some of these policy areas. The Ministry of the Interior has to check and approve the budget. When executing the budget, there are autonomous policy areas – these tend to be the less glamorous ones – and other policy areas where councils have to work together with *délégués* or the regional bureaucracy of the *wali*.

In the second place, 2003 saw the first local council elections based on a party list system rather than an electoral district system. That is, in 2003 people from all over town voted for parties which in turn occupied the seats on the council. Before, the people of an electoral district – a neighbourhood – voted for individual candidates to occupy that particular district's seat on the council. It is important to detail the ramifications of this change in the system.

Before decentralization, local politics worked more or less as follows. Citizens had an interest in voting for the 'big man' of the neighbourhood, in the hope that he would bring home benefits in the form of jobs, services, and public infrastructure. These favours needed to be extracted from the centre, to the disadvantage of other neighbourhoods. The system resulted in inefficient allocation of resources and reinforced patronage.<sup>7</sup> The deal in the electoral district system was attractive to both sides: with a unanimous block of support, the citizens of a neighbourhood would have a better chance of obtaining benefits, while the big man stood a chance of being propelled into national politics if he delivered the block of votes at parliamentary elections.

The new system of the 2003 municipal elections did not, of course, rid local politics of patronage overnight. But there has been a noticeable change in incentives. Local politicians now have an incentive to consider the interests of the town as a whole. If they want votes, local party branches have to come up with programme content, giving citizens more choice. This may in fact be the first time that party affiliation has really started to matter at local level. New themes such as town planning and youth policy have made their entrance, now that the relentless grind of bringing benefits to electoral districts has abated.

Local governments have yet to establish their position in the political and administrative landscape of Morocco, and there is still an ingrained habit of waiting for orders from above. But the reforms have had a significant impact at local level, in terms of new competencies for municipalities and altered incentives for local politicians. The next section of this chapter is about the changes that this has brought about.

### ***Local government in Morocco: trends***

In the context of reform, the following trends or phenomena can be observed at local

<sup>7</sup> By the end of the 1990s, the demand for drugs had soared in some parts of Europe and cultivation in Morocco intensified. It became an uncomfortably common phenomenon that families with an interest in the drug trade had members on local councils, much to the dismay of European countries.

level. Because the reforms are so recent, it is still impossible to say whether these transitions will stand the test of time. Nor does this chapter seek to claim that they are occurring everywhere in Morocco.<sup>8</sup>

In the first place, local civil society is taking over local councils. Many people who ran non-governmental organizations (NGOs)<sup>9</sup> critical of the state have been elected councillor. This background and the fact that local councils have yet to become an undisputable feature of the political and administrative landscape makes local government a place where much criticism of central government can be heard.

But what about local government and fundamentalist parties? Is it not the case that such parties emerge directly from civil society, with strong grassroots associations? Are they taking over? These questions are often raised in the West and are tinged with awkwardness. In fact, the number of local council seats occupied by the moderately fundamentalist *Parti de la Justice et du Développement* (PJD) and the like is nowhere very large. This forces fundamentalist parties to forge local coalitions, thereby tempering any extreme standpoints they might have. There are persistent rumours that fundamentalist parties could have won more seats in 2003 but chose to limit the number of candidates fielded, due to pressure from the *Makhzen*. It is impossible to know what really happened. It is clear, however, that both the fundamentalist parties and the *Makhzen* have an interest in cultivating this story: the fundamentalists because it implies they are more important than they would otherwise seem, and the *Makhzen* because it reinforces the belief in its power.

The second trend which can be observed is a weakening of party affiliations, especially in Morocco's peripheral areas. Local politics often offers a similar general picture to national politics: it is divided between a social-democrat, fundamentalist and *Makhzen*-related movement. But there is also ample evidence of conflicts between local party branches and central party organizations. New local parties are established as a result, or the local party branch ends up openly disagreeing with central office. Even the PJD, famous for its discipline and social networks in local communities, suffers from this. The weakening of party affiliations may seem to contradict the conclusion above that parties are starting to matter at local level. But it is quite possible to distrust central party structures while adhering to local party branches. Morocco has a long tradition of distrust of the centre.

8 The Moroccan municipalities involved in the Platform for Intermunicipal Cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco, of which the author is the secretary, are: Maârif (part of Casablanca), Sisi Maarouf (part of Casablanca), Ben Msik (part of Casablanca), Al Alaroui, Zaio, Figuig, Nador, Oujda, Larache, Assilah, Guercif, Jerada, Al Hoceima, Imzourene, Tetouan, Midar, and Berkane.

9 Contrary to widespread use of the term in Morocco, the definition of civil society used in this paper stresses that merely being non-governmental – not being part of the state – is not enough. After all, football clubs and bakeries are also non-governmental. Civil society organizations need to be active in the political landscape and critical of the state to be worthy of the name: to monitor, criticize or take action against the state, or to publish on such issues. This sort of definition has been pioneered by the Indian academic Neera Chandoke.

Local parties are also criticizing their own central organizations because of the third observed trend. This is a nascent administrative culture of negotiation and compromise. To get things done, local governments have to engage in deals with the state, represented by the *walis* of the Ministry of the Interior and the *délégués* of the line ministries. The positive side to this is a modest switch away from the old habit of waiting for orders. The problematic side is that local populations can be profoundly intolerant of compromise with the state, especially if the local government in question is composed of old civil society hands of Berber origin. Compromise with the state gets things done, but also makes one vulnerable. The strategy of criticizing the state in such circumstances helps to mask the underlying process of negotiation and compromise.

The fourth observed trend is that local governments are increasingly engaging with local NGOs for service delivery, especially for implementation of social policy. This is hardly surprising, since many of today's councillors come from an NGO background. Local governments in Morocco these days are wondering how to contract with NGOs, whether the Ministry of the Interior will allow greatly expanded budget lines for local NGOs, what sort of NGO influence to allow over local government policy, and how to organize participation generally. Most of this is purely local stuff, which again flags a move away from waiting for orders from above.

The fifth and last observed trend is the politicization of local media. As local governments are given the power to spend more money as a result of decentralization, the media have taken an interest and now have the courage to report on a wider range of issues, regardless of the consequences. This is a sign that real politics has finally arrived on the local scene. However, the media sometimes seem less interested in reporting facts, and challenging local governments to come up with different facts, thereby holding them to account, than in speculation about power struggles, allegations of corruption, or rumours of involvement in the drug trade. While it is certainly true that some of the scandals are outrageous and some of the allegations are founded, this type of politicization of local media makes life hard for local governments in an awkward and counter-productive way: it puts local governments in the dock of public opinion, and it distracts councillors and officials from their tasks.

### **Conclusion**

This short overview of recent trends is certainly far from complete and probably fails to take into account the great regional differences in Morocco. Nevertheless, it does allow us to draw a number of conclusions. The most significant conclusion is probably that when reforms were stopped in their tracks at national level, they continued unabated at local level. It is also fair to say that a genuine transition is taking place from local administration by the centre to local government. Decentralization has resulted in local political scenes, which are drifting away from national politics and taking on their own characteristics. This does not automatically mean better local government, but it has certainly resulted in more pluriform local government. It marks the impact of decentralization, cementing Morocco's reputation as one of the trailblazers of change in the Muslim world.

Whether this transition is irreversible is too early to tell. The scandals and media pressure could be used as a pretext for placing local governments under stricter central control again. A take-over of councils by fundamentalist parties at the next elections could have the same effect. Public statements by King Mohamed VI, however, indicate that decentralization is here to stay. So local governments will likely see a second electoral cycle in accordance with the new system. In the end it will come down to delivering real services to citizens, both with regard to local politics - allegations and negations - and national politics - the merits and risks of decentralization. Hopefully local governments in Morocco will soon be in a position to present a reasonably consistent record of delivering real services to the population, irrespective of the political colour of the majority.

*Mustapha El Qadéry*

## Abdelkrim and the struggle for the past

### **Introduction**

In Morocco today we see a territorial organization of state power and governance that derives from a French Jacobean and colonial model. This offers us a standpoint for discussing social and political changes and recent events in the Rifian north or the Saharan south.

The present Kingdom of Morocco is the result of five systems of colonization under the regime of the Protectorate. The city of Tangier was once administered by a council of representatives of European states, as part of the International Zone. The north of Morocco was ruled by Spain, with Tetuan as its capital. The centre of Morocco down to the Sahara was under French rule, with Rabat as its capital. This French zone included the enclave of Ifni and the Ait Baamrane tribal area, which were under Spanish rule. In the south of the French Saharan zone, the Seguia Lhamra and Rio d'Oro were also under Spanish rule. All of these territories had been seized by military force. Hostilities in the north ended in 1927, following the defeat of Abdelkrim. In the French zone, fighting stopped in 1934 with the conquest of the entire mountain area and the Sahara as far as Tindouf (which is in modern-day Algeria). In the south, Spain conquered Ait Baamrane in 1932 and Smara in 1934.

The Sultan signed the Protectorate treaty with a French emissary in May 1912. In November 1912, as a result of the congress of Algeciras in Spain in 1906, France signed a convention with Spain on the repartition of Moroccan territory between the two conquering nations. This decision was taken after all of the European powers had agreed in principle, in the presence of a delegation from the Sultan of Morocco, regarding the conquest of Morocco by France. Moroccan territory was then ruled by two powers, with different regimes of governance and different relations with the conquered tribal territories.

The case of Bin Abdelkrim – or *Mmis n Abdkrim* as he is known in the Tamazight spoken in the Rif area<sup>1</sup> – provides us with an example of 'symbol recuperation'. Stories about a leader's life and death can be seen as the result of ideological actions by various groups. The Moroccan socialist movement and the Moroccan Amazigh Movement differ in their interpretations of the historical significance of Abdelkrim.

<sup>1</sup> The real name of the so-called 'Berber' language is 'Tamazight'. The Tamazight expression *mmis n* means 'son of' like the Arabic and Hebrew *bin* (or *ben*). The full name of the Rif-leader was Mohammed ben Abd al-Krim al-Khattabi. As a shortened form 'Bin Abdelkrim' or just 'Abdelkrim' is often to be found, which in spoken Tamazight became 'Abdkrim'.



### ***Bin Abdelkrim and symbolism***

In 1973, the socialist leader and later Prime Minister Abderrahman Youssoufi organized a colloquium in Paris. Several Morocco specialists were invited to talk about Abdelkrim (1882-1963) and the Rif Republic (1921-1926).<sup>2</sup> The objective of this colloquium was to present Abdelkrim as a 'testator' for the spirit of the party's future plans. The Rif experience was presented as a frame of reference for the continuation of the struggle against colonialism, as well as so-called neo-colonialism and its agents in Morocco. The Moroccan left represented Bin Abdelkrim as an 'internationalist leader' of 'popular struggle' acknowledged by guerrilla leaders around the world.

This event occurred at a time when the violent wing of that same socialist party sent an armed commando from Algeria to the Moroccan Eastern High and Middle Atlas mountains in March 1973, three months after the Paris colloquium. It was hoped that tribal solidarity among all 'Berbers' would launch guerrilla attacks and make armed forays from the mountains to the coastal cities. The commando had selected a region close to the Algerian border in the hope of gaining the support of local tribes. In this region, the Party had at its disposal some remaining networks of the former Liberation Army organization. It is worth noting that, with the exception of their chief, who was from Rabat, the members of the commando were all from 'Berber' regions and tribes. Their chief was the brother-in-law of the socialist leader Mehdi Bin Barka.<sup>3</sup>

The events of March 1973 took place under the auspices of a tentative attempt by the 'left' to seize power by violence. This followed two *coups d'états* against the king in 1971-1972, in which the principal protagonists<sup>4</sup> were a group of officers from the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains who were described as 'Berber'.<sup>5</sup> It is also worth noting that the regions in which this left-wing commando operated were subjected to a collective regional punishment after this adventure. Following the intervention of state forces and the destruction of the commando, various alleged collaborators were arrested. Public declarations to this effect have recently been made in the Tamazight language, by tribesmen and tribeswomen from these regions. These declarations were made before the 'Equity and Reconciliation Authority', which was created by the King in 2004, to clarify the circumstances of human rights violations in the period from 1959 to 1999. Another point worth noting is that the socialist party considered itself to be part of the Arabo-Islamic movement which had fought for an 'authentic' Morocco, one which was part of the Arab nation.

The Amazigh Movement today prefers to see Abdelkrim as a central and iconic figure in the history of the country. This is because he embodied the Rif struggle against

2 In 1921 the Spanish army was defeated by a confederation of tribes in the Rif region. On February 1 1923 Abdelkrim proclaimed the Rif republic. In his contacts with Britain and Germany he emphasized that the new Republic would have not only a government and a flag and its own money, but also a constitution and a modern system of law. Pennell (1986) and *Abdelkrim et la République du Rif* (1976).

3 Bennouna (2003).

4 Coram (1972).

5 Coram (1972).

European conquests, while the Sultan on the other hand had signed the Protectorate treaty, thereby accepting foreign domination. Seeing Abdkrim as *mmis n tmurt* ('son of the country'), the Amazigh Movement takes the view that, in addition to being the leader of the Rif Republic (1921-1926), he was the *de facto* leader of the National Liberation Army (1955). Under the leadership of operations chief, Abbas Msaadi, and based in the northern Spanish Zone, this organization launched military strikes against French outposts.<sup>6</sup> Before initiating operations in the Rif, Msaadi had obtained the blessings and backing of Abdelkrim, who was in Cairo at that time. Abdelkrim believed that there should be a union of North African countries, as a matter of necessity. He considered joint military actions with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), seeing this as a way of liberating of those still living under the yoke of colonization. In fact, he had no ambition whatsoever to become the leader of a worldwide international socialist struggle. While in exile in Cairo, he maintained close relations with the leaders of the renewed Rifian revolt, in 1958-59, against the new system of government in the 'independent' and 'unified' Morocco.

For the Amazigh Movement, the story of *Mmis n Abdkrim* is a heritage that has been passed down by word of mouth. This oral transmission takes the form of poetic verse which relates past events to more recent ones. The struggle at the time of the colonial and postcolonial conquests remains alive today in the collective memory. It has been augmented with local versions of events that took place both during and after the Rif War. One poem in particular is so well known that everyone can quote parts of it. These verses portray a period covering the battle against the Spanish army in Dhar Ubarran (1921) but also the events in Asgwas Iqbbaren, where the Moroccan Army invaded the Rif, in 1958-59. They also refer to the tragic earthquake of 2004-2005 and the protests against the way in which the state managed its social repercussions. No-one is sure how many verses this poem actually contains.

As in the *Odyssey*, details of the tragedies and heroism of past actors are chanted in a social language which makes particular use of local cultural references. The poem describes the great suffering endured by the tribesmen and convey brutal images of the death and destruction. The situation in the region around Al Hoceima after the recent earthquake is perceived in the same light.

Even today, the position of the Rif within the state is still a complex issue. This is a result of the state system devised by Morocco, when organizing its institutions of governance. It is worth noting that the Sahara region in the south has a similarly complex position within the state system. Both regions were formerly part of the Spanish Protectorate. Given that the Spanish zones were absorbed by the French zone in the name of unity and unification, the similarity of their current situation is hardly surpris-

<sup>6</sup> Hailing from the Middle Atlas, and sent with others from Casablanca by an urban guerrilla movement to start armed guerrilla warfare, in collaboration with the Algerian National Liberation Front, in the Spanish zone against French zone, he was shot just after independence, probably by a para-military faction of the Istiqlal Party under the supervision of Bin Barka.

sing. The repercussions can still be seen in numerous collective confrontations in these regions today.

***Modernity and tradition and the Imazighen: the case of the Rif***

In 1930, the French promulgated a decree that the *shari'a* should not be enforced among the 'Berber' populations of Morocco. Instead, their own customary laws were to apply, the so-called *dahir berbère*. Those who considered themselves Arabs, Muslims or Arabo-Muslims, accused the Amazigh Movement in the Rif of attempting to reformulate this French *dahir berbère*. This seems rather odd, since the Rif area was part of the Spanish Protectorate at the time, and was therefore unaffected by the laws within the French zone of the Moroccan Empire. In the nineteen thirties, 'nationalists' declared that this *dahir berbère* represented the birth of their movement. Today, their political heirs consider all movements that do not adhere to the Arabo-Islamic ideology as creations of colonialism, and as instruments of neo-colonialism against Arabo-Islamic nations.

The Rif region offers us an interesting opportunity to discuss the question of notions of 'modernity' and 'tradition' in the Moroccan context, with particular reference to the history of issues relating to power, the state, and culture, as well as intellectual matters. What is meant by 'tradition' in Morocco? And what is 'modernity'? For a long time, the two concepts were seen as total opposites. These are universal paradigms, however, and the Moroccan view of them is by no means unique. The materials and arguments used by 'modernists' and 'traditionalists' are no different from those seen elsewhere in the world.

The experience of the Rif Republic can be presented as the result of applying a 'modern' concept of power structures to the north of Morocco. However, anyone taking this view may well be jumping to conclusions. Before launching hostilities against the Spanish army, Bin Abdelkrim's first act was to organize a congress at Adrar n Qamt, in the Tamsaman tribal area. A general convocation of the tribes, to agree on specific matters, is a tradition found in all great Moroccan political movements. Recently published documents give us some idea of the context within which tribal confederation has continued to grow throughout Moroccan history.<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, some tribal confederations concentrated power over a very large territory. This applied to certain dynasties during the Islamic period, from the Almoravids in the tenth century to the Dila dynasty in the sixteenth century. The same is true of the present-day Alawites, from the seventeenth century onwards. Other tribal confederations had a much more restricted power zone. These include Aït Yafman in the seventeenth century or Aït Umalou in the nineteenth century, in the centre of Morocco. Other examples are Aït Atta in the sixteenth century, the Taguzult, from the eleventh to the twentieth century, and the Tekna from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, in the south. These attempts at confederation provide points of reference that are essential for an understanding of the country's political and territorial history. Similar attempts are still very much in eviden-

<sup>7</sup> For more information on these historical facts see: Hart (1976) Guennoun (1933); Mezzine (1987); Hart (1984); Azaykou (2002); Naïmi (2004).

ce today. Mmis n Abdkrim therefore used the traditional system of tribal confederation as a vector of a modern system of governance. This reflected events in other countries, especially Mustapaha Kemal's new Turkish Republic.

Robert Montagne, a leading ethnologist, dealt with various issues affecting the 'Berbers'. He worked for the French Residency, and was based in Rabat. Sent on a mission by Lyautey, Montagne found himself in close contact with Abdkrim. In his last book, while preparing to be discharged from the French Army, Montagne accurately portrayed the man and made his *mea culpa* concerning French colonial practices in Morocco.<sup>8</sup> Montagne worked within the tribal context, trying to understand the Berber life, which involved 'legitimate violence' within a 'Republican' system.<sup>9</sup> He also worked with the Berbers in Casablanca, trying to understand the changes occurring within the urban proletariat at the end of the 1940s and 1950s.<sup>10</sup> Having joined the struggle for Moroccan independence, this proletariat demonstrated its readiness for political action by organizing armed resistance in Casablanca and by setting up the National Liberation Army in the northern Spanish zone.

Robert Montagne certainly enjoyed considerable influence during the colonial period. In a chapter entitled 'Trois Hommes'<sup>11</sup>, he accorded a pre-eminent position to Lyautey, the conqueror of Morocco and the first French Resident. Montagne reserved the second place for Abdelkrim in his Rif and Cairo periods, and the third place for Sultan Mohammed Bin Yousef, who became King Mohammed V, following independence. Montagne refers to Abdkrim as a figure representing archaic tribalism. He takes the view that Abdkrim never had a chance of victory against the two colonial powers, France and Spain, nor of being recognised by them as an independent power. Furthermore, as a tribesman, he would never have been totally accepted by the new Moroccan nationalists in Cairo, who were creating a new logic of identity. This image of Abdelkrim can be seen as a 'condemnation' of his modernist project. However, it can also be viewed as a recognition of the fact that his concept of the tribe as a real political force is still in operation today.

Needless to say, the tribe is projected by Montagne as a static notion in a classical anthropological sense. This is the way he used it in his first published thesis on tribes in the south, as a static alliance and individual groups.<sup>12</sup> An alternative and more realistic approach would be to see the tribe instead as dynamic, as an element representing a political attitude in a territorial arena. It is important to be aware of the fact that, like tribes, all political groupings and parties have their own territories, social roots, political alliances, interests, leaders and strategies.

During the period of the Republic, Mmis n Abdkrim abolished all 'customary laws' in the Rif. The context of this decision was his attempt to achieve a concentration of power. Does this make him a modernist? Probably not. In fact, Mmis n Abdkrim him-

8 Montagne (1953).

9 Montagne (1930).

10 Montagne (1950).

11 Montagne (1953) 127-177.

12 Montagne (1930).

self later expressed regret at having abolished the customary laws during the period of the Republic. This was revealed in a paper by Attilio Gaudio, an Italian journalist and specialist in Moroccan nationalism. Gaudio's paper, which was entitled '*J'ai bu le thé avec Abdelkrim*'<sup>13</sup>, was based on an interview with Abdelkrim in Cairo (1953). How should we interpret this contradiction? Perhaps the emergence of the Rifian Republic as an experiment in Islamic puritanism could have been predicted, given that its objective at the time was to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of other tribes and regional powers, or at least their support.

In the past, political movements attempting to gain power or achieve independence have resorted to declaring a *jihad* against heretics or Christians as a source of legitimacy and a means of gaining tribal loyalty. The abolition of customary law can only be properly understood within the context of the struggle against foreign, non-Muslim conquerors. In trying to consolidate his power and authority, Mmis n Abdkrim needed to demonstrate that he monopolized the use of legitimate violence and the management of public affairs within the Republic. By eliminating competing powers such as the Râisouli and the Darkawi Zawya on the western and southern slopes of the Rif Mountains of Jbala, he won the right to be the sole leader of all the tribes. This may explain why tribes under French authority offered their loyalty to Abdelkrim and accepted him as a chief, thereby causing the French to take up arms against him. His attempts to consolidate his power base and to unite the tribes under his command, by abolishing customary law, should be seen in the light of his need to eliminate any potential competition from local powers.

An ethnographic study of tribal laws in the Rif, including the texts of laws, judiciary procedures and sanctions, which was carried out by a Spanish officer, has recently been published by David M. Hart<sup>14</sup>. This remains, for the moment, the only published study in this field. There is a need for further investigations, and for the publication of much more historical material. We still have too few details concerning the historical events that influenced the development of the judiciary system, and about the legitimate local violence used by elected groups before and after the period of the Republic.

The French Jacobean system considered Moroccan and North African tribal positive law to be customary, in a strictly judiciary sense. Following independence, the post-colonial leaders and intellectuals, like the state structures and the system of government, felt that it was unqualified to be source of law for the judicial system of independent Morocco. How can independence mean anything for the people of the Rif, or for any Amazighs in Morocco, when the new power's agenda takes no account of the way of organizing local and public affairs that is their heritage?

### ***The struggle for Morocco's past and the Imazighen***

In his first published work on Morocco and the collective tribal system of managing religious and secular issues, Ernest Gellner devoted a whole chapter to 'nationalists' and 'the

13 Gaudio (1991).

14 Hart (1999).

struggle for Morocco's past'.<sup>15</sup> He later published another paper under this title, containing an analysis of what he meant by this stage of the 'struggle' in the Moroccan political context just after independence<sup>16</sup>, together with substantial information on this topic. In both publications, Gellner refers to two books published immediately after independence by two intellectuals affiliated to the Moroccan 'nationalist' movement. At that time, this movement was divided along political lines into so-called 'modernists' and 'traditionalists'. Each group presented itself as the principal actor of the political independence movement.<sup>17</sup>

The first book was prefaced by Allal el Fassi, the leader of the 'traditionalist' wing of the dominant Istiqlal Party. The second was prefaced by Mehdi Bin Barka, the leader of 'modernist' and 'progressive' wing of the *Istiqlal* Party. In 1958, the latter became the *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP). Another transformation, in 1975, produced the present *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* (USFP). For Gellner, the writing of these prefaces by two political leaders was a part of the struggle for the Moroccan past, a past which had previously only been documented in colonial studies.

What Gellner failed to appreciate was that the nationalists on both wings essentially wanted to redefine the 'crucial' position of the 'Berbers' within the building of a Moroccan 'Arabo-Islamic' national state. They saw the 'Berbers' as a group that had been the object of French policy. They felt that the French had ignored the fact that it was Arabo-Islamic culture that had brought civilization to the Berbers. This culture was the fruit of the intellectual efforts of Arab and Andalusian thinkers, jurisprudence and theological reasoning. It spanned all material and immaterial aspects of Moroccan civilization during the Islamic period. Therefore both books can be seen as a translation of the views of many French Orientalists, who drew no distinction between Muslims and Arabs, and who classified all manuscripts in *Arabic* as *Arab* intellectual production. They saw the Maghreb as a consumer of thought elaborated by civilized Muslim Arab intellectuals. By the same token, they considered the 'Berbers' to be a barbaric people, less Muslim in faith than the Arabs who were seen as the civilized producers of high culture!<sup>18</sup>

It is important to remember that the 'nationalist' movement believed that its origins lay in a struggle against the 'French Berber policy' in Morocco. By means of the *dahir berbère*, the Berber Decree, the Protectorate had promulgated the customary law for 'Berber' tribes as a replacement for *shari'a*.<sup>19</sup> The nationalists represented this *dahir* as an attempt to divide 'Berbers' from their 'Arab brothers'. They saw it as a kind of rebirth of traditions that were heretical to Islam and as an attempt to push the 'Berbers' into embracing Christianity. In fact, traditional forms of jurisdiction had always remained impor-

15 Gellner (1969) 22-29.

16 Gellner (1973).

17 Abdellah (1958), Lahbabi (1958).

18 Qadéry (1995).

19 There is a great ambiguity about the so called Shari'a law and its application in Morocco during and after colonial period. To this day it remains a polemic subject in the Moroccan political arena, even after the French judiciary system in Morocco was adopted and generalized following independence.

tant among Muslims living in the mountainous regions of Morocco.

Today, researchers are increasingly viewing this interpretation of the so-called '*dahir berbère*' as an imposture, nothing more than a 'nationalist' creation directed against the 'Berbers' and their secular institutions.<sup>20</sup> Once again, we should not lose sight of the fact that the 'Berber-decree' was issued by France, for its own political and colonial purposes. This was at a time when some 'Berber tribes' were fighting against the 'French Colonial *Makhzen*', the new conquering power. The story of the *dahir berbère* is of fundamental importance. Until the year 2000, all Moroccan newspapers celebrated this as a 'national' memorial event, one that should be seen as pivotal to the struggle against colonialism, by 'Moroccans'.

Since this 'nationalist' interpretation of the 'Berber-decree' emerged, any reference to the 'Berbers' was seen as heretical and rebellious, and as an instrument of colonialism, separatism, regionalism and division. Accordingly, from 1930 on, there was a conscious effort to cultivate a negative image of the 'Berbers'. This involved memorial rituals, like the one mentioned above, undertaken by the mass media and incorporated into the curricula of schools and universities.<sup>21</sup> Tamazight and Imazighen came to be seen as barbarous, and as folkloric commodities for tourist attractions, certainly not as a patrimony or cultural legacy for the future of the country.

The remarkable thing about the *dahir berbère*, therefore, is that the Moroccan nationalist movement identifies the birth of its legitimacy with the struggle against the 'Berber policy' (and, de facto, against all things 'Berber') rather than against the 'colonial policy' as such. The Moroccan intellectual market offers an abundance of literature for the study of this construction in connection with various 'modern' as well as 'traditional' ideologies. Written mainly in Arabic and French, these are the works of political leaders and writers. During the period in which the 'Arabo-Islamic' views of society and nation were in the ascendant, all intellectually and politically dominant leaders exploited the theme of the *dahir berbère* for their own purposes. They essentially reduced the entire colonial period to that single event and its consequences. In this way, the Amazigh movement was reduced to a mere phantom. Despite the fact that Tamazight-speaking peoples had been the fiercest and most tenacious adversaries of French colonialism, the movement's roots came to be defined as a residue of French Berber policy, encouraging ethnic division, promoting racism and reinforcing separatism.

### **Conclusion**

Today Mmis n Abdkrim's remains still lie in Egypt, and the Rif region is still caught up in various 'struggles' against nature and the Moroccan system, in a symbolic as well as a political sense. Emigration is still the only way out to achieve social mobility. The Amazigh movement is increasingly insisting on its right to reclaim a place in the memory and the real history of the country. At the center of these demands, of course, is the name of Mmis n Abdkrim. Other regions of the former Spanish zone are still engaged

<sup>20</sup> Mounib (2000).

<sup>21</sup> Qadéry (1998).

in a 'struggle' for autonomy (Sahara) or for a change of administrative status (Sidi Ifni). Fifty years after independence, we still find analogous elements in the struggle between the post-1956 concept that governed the building of the national state and the questions currently being posed by the Amazigh movement. For the last fifty years, the 'Arabo-Islamist' view of the world has been the official ideology throughout the educational system. The triumph of 'Arabo-Islamist' ideology in Morocco can be seen in the results of modern-day public policy. Half the population of Morocco are still illiterate. Poor socio-economic conditions still prevail in the rural areas. The periphery is still seen as a danger to the centre.

The Spanish and French colonial past must be seen as a period in which Moroccans became an indigenous people at the service of foreign powers and states, which collaborated with an indigenous elite and its economic interests. Independence transformed the indigenous peoples into nationals within a strict new colonial vision, one in which the nation is seen as being at the service of the state and those in command. That was the beginning of a new system of relations between the centre of the state and all peripheral regions, between Morocco and Moroccans. This period was marked by various 'events' in some 'peripheral' regions, in the former French or Spanish zones. There was the revolt of Addi U-Bihi, the Governor of the south-eastern region of Tafilalet (1957), the Sellam Amzian revolt in the northern Rif (1958-59), the Middle Atlas (socialist) commando in the central region (1973), and the Saharan guerrilla war in the south (1975). The motivations underpinning all of these events are analogous. They clearly demonstrate the attitude of the independent national power and the nature of the political and territorial system used to organize regions with an identity and history of their own, and a new set of problems. These movements can be seen as forms of resistance against the nationalist Jacobean conception of the Moroccan independent state.

A better understanding of its past and of its history may be the key to a better future for Morocco. That is one way to build the foundations of national cohesion, in the sense of Gellner's view of nations.<sup>22</sup> There can be no clear understanding of Morocco's history without due recognition of the all-pervasive role of Amazigh values and organizational forms within Moroccan institutions.




22 Gellner (1993) 29-46.





*Part III*

Economy  
and migration



Hans Visser

## Morocco and the European Union: the economics of association

### **Introduction**

On 26 February 1996, Morocco and the European Union (hereafter referred to as the EU) signed an Association Agreement. This association forms part of the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, which was established at Barcelona on 27–28 November 1995, at a meeting between the EU and the majority of the non-European Mediterranean countries. It is known in Euro-speak as the ‘Barcelona Process’. The agreement, which came into effect on 1 March 2000, should lead to the creation of a free-trade area by the year 2010. This will give Morocco free access to EU markets, at least as far as industrial products are concerned. The agreement also aims to achieve the progressive liberalization of trade in agricultural and fishery products, but without any firm commitment by the parties concerned. It also requires Morocco and the EU to explore ways of liberalizing trade in services, above and beyond their WTO (World Trade Organization) obligations.

What benefits can Morocco expect from this association? In order to answer this question, we will start with some background information on international trade theory, with an application to Morocco’s trading situation. We will then proceed to discuss the process of trade liberalization. This, in turn, is followed by an analysis of the problems associated with Morocco’s economic integration with other countries. The next section deals with the costs and benefits deriving from the Association, and from a higher degree of integration in the world economy in general. From here we move on to examine the preconditions that must be fulfilled if this integration is to be successful. The final section draws conclusions on the basis of the discussions and empirical data contained in the preceding sections.

### **International trade**

The positive effects of international trade can be said to derive from three sources. Firstly, specialization dictated by comparative advantage. If countries, like individuals, specialize in those activities at which they excel, or are most efficient, then production and income will be maximized. This is explained by the Ricardo and Heckscher–Ohlin models, which form the core of international trade theory.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, economies of scale. Free trade provides opportunities for large-scale production, as well as the chance to exploit the economies of large-scale production, i.e., to reduce the production and marketing costs per product unit. Thirdly, competition effects. When borders are open-

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) 26, 50, 76.

ed, competition increases. This means that firms will have to constantly improve the goods and services they produce, to prevent their customers from shifting their allegiance. The same applies to these companies' production technology and marketing methods.

In view of these benefits, why is there no free trade on a global scale? There are basically three reasons for this. Firstly, trade affects the distribution of income. If we liberalize trade and import more goods produced using unskilled labour, while at the same time exporting more goods produced with highly skilled labour, this will have several effects. The demand for poorly-skilled labour falls, the demand for highly-skilled labour increases, and the wage gap between the two will widen. This may then result in attempts by trade unions to prevent trade liberalization.

Secondly, when a country liberalizes trade, industries competing with the imported goods will suffer. This will cause some firms and industries to contract, while others may even disappear completely. People will have to be retrained. There may be an anxiety that new jobs are not being created fast enough to compensate for the disappearance of the old ones. Again, those affected will resist liberalization. A very curious case of resistance against freer imports occurred in the mid-1990s, when tomatoes from Morocco were granted freer entry into the EU. Fully aware that this would impinge on their profit margins, tomato growers in the EU conducted a successful lobbying campaign in Brussels. It was subsequently ruled that, in the month of April, the door would be closed to Moroccan tomatoes<sup>2</sup>. The reason for this was that, in April, EU tomato production is low and prices are high. The ban on Moroccan tomatoes enabled EU tomato growers to fleece the consumer in times of scarcity.

Thirdly, trade restrictions in the form of import tariffs also serve an entirely different purpose, the generation of tax revenue. The perception costs of import tariffs are likely to be substantially lower than those associated with income tax or a turnover tax. Poor countries in particular, including Morocco in the early 1980s, often derive some thirty per cent of their total tax income from import tariffs.<sup>3</sup>

There is no question that international trade is essential to Morocco's welfare. It has a comparative advantage in phosphates, a number of agricultural products, and the simpler kinds of industrial processes, such as garment manufacture and electronics assembly. Morocco's export revenue derives mainly from these products and activities (see Table 1). It is better to specialize in these areas and import those industrial products that require highly skilled labour and a large amount of capital and/or are dependent on high volumes for efficient production. A case in point is truck assembly. In the year 2000, some two thousand trucks were assembled in Morocco by no less than nine producers. This is a waste of resources.<sup>4</sup>

It serves as a reminder that Morocco is a relatively small market. In 2003, Morocco had 30.6 million inhabitants and its gross domestic product or GDP amounted to €39 billion (bn). By comparison, the Netherlands had 16.2 million inhabitants and a GDP of

2 *Trouw* (1995).

3 Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999).

4 WTO (2003) 85.

\$454 bn. For most industries, the domestic market is simply too small for them to be able to exploit economies of scale. Trade liberalization is of the essence. Products which are expensive to produce in Morocco should be imported. This will free up production factors that can be used to better advantage in the export industries.

*Table 1. Morocco, percentage share of commodity exports, 1995 and 2002*

	1995	2002
textiles	31	40
agriculture	32	20
electronics	3	17
fertilizer (phosphates)	9	3

*Source: Söderling (2005).*

The EU is the country's natural partner when it comes to international trade. In 2003, the EU accounted for no less than 71% of Morocco's exports and 58% of its imports.<sup>5</sup> It is a sad fact that the EU has not allowed Morocco to fully exploit its comparative advantage. Under the Association Agreement, industrial imports from Morocco have unrestricted entry into the EU, but there has been little progress on trade in agricultural goods. The trade agreement of October 2003 imposed tariff quotas on a number of products, such as tomatoes. This means that imports carry a low tariff, possibly even a zero tariff, up to a certain volume. Additional imports are subject to a higher tariff.

Such agreements are only concluded for short periods. This uncertainty does little to stimulate investment. A fisheries agreement, for example, which was due to take effect on 1 March 2006, is only valid for a period of four years. The agreement regulates the activities of EU fishing fleets – mainly Spanish and Portuguese – in Moroccan waters. It contains detailed stipulations regarding the percentage of the catch that has to be unloaded on Moroccan soil. This was in response to Moroccan demands, which were aimed at boosting employment and tax income. In addition, it was hoped that the measure would stimulate the development of local fish processing industries.<sup>6</sup> However, it remains to be seen whether or not people will be willing to make substantial investments on the basis of an agreement with a lifetime of just four years. As for services, prior to 2005 the EU had not even started to think seriously about discussing the subject.

<sup>5</sup> European Commission (2005). Trade statistics should be taken with a grain of salt. Exports of goods from Morocco officially totalled €8230 million over 2003, European Commission (2005), but illegal drugs exports are estimated to have brought in no less than €3 billion, Bergh (2005) 9.

<sup>6</sup> *L'économiste* (17 July 2005, 23 December 2005).

### ***Trade liberalization***

The import of Moroccan industrial products into the EU had already been liberalized before the 2000 Association Agreement was concluded. So one might well ask 'What is in it for Morocco?' After all, Morocco will bear the brunt of the necessary adjustments. It is under an obligation to liberalize its imports, especially those involving industrial products. Nevertheless, countries generally benefit considerably from import liberalization. In the past, Morocco has used quite high rates of protection. According to 2002 figures from the World Bank, the weighted mean import tariff in Morocco was 25.8 %, against 1.80% for the EU. If anything, this still paints a too favourable picture.<sup>7</sup> Some goods are subject to prohibitively high tariffs. The maximum rate was a whopping 339%.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the goods that fall under this tariff scarcely figure among the country's imports. This means that they are not included in the weighted average, which is therefore subject to a downward bias. Such high levels of protection are detrimental to a country's welfare. They enable inefficient industries to survive. This in its turn makes life harder for industries operating in those areas in which a country has a comparative advantage.

Three mechanisms are involved. The first derives from the fact that protection results in reduced demand for foreign goods, which in turn causes a reduction in the demand for foreign exchange. Accordingly, the external value of the country's currency will be higher than it would have been under free trade conditions, which means that exports suffer. Secondly, more labour and capital remain tied up in the protected sectors, which translates into higher labour and capital costs in the other sectors. Thirdly, potential exporters see their competitiveness impaired by the higher cost (or sheer unavailability) of imported inputs. In the case of Morocco, agricultural exporters have suffered from the high prices of such imports as tractors and seeds, which are a direct result of import duties. As a result, a large number of industries have seen their growth reduced by the unavailability of inputs.<sup>9</sup>

In Morocco, things are made even more complicated by the enormous variation in import tariffs. This leads to a completely opaque structure of effective protection. Effective protection differs from nominal protection (import tariffs on goods), in that it refers to the protection of domestic activities, taking account of tariffs on imported raw materials or semi-finished products. Consider the case of carpenters involved in the manufacture of tables. The amount of timber required to make one table costs \$100 on world markets, whereas complete tables cost \$200 on world markets. If timber is subject to a 5% import tariff and complete tables are charged 10%, then the domestic price of the imported timber is \$105 and the domestic price of an imported table is \$220. The work of transforming the timber into a table can cost up to \$115 before domestic carpenters lose the fight against imports. This means that the effective protection on domestic activity is 15%, which is higher than the nominal tariff on tables. However, if

<sup>7</sup> *Economic Review of EU Mediterranean Partners* (2003) 7.

<sup>8</sup> WTO (2003) Statistical Appendix Table AIII.3.

<sup>9</sup> Bergh (2005) 8.

timber is subject to a 15% tariff, for example, while tables only carry a 5% tariff, the result is negative effective protection. Imported timber will cost \$115, while imported tables cost \$210. Domestic carpenters will therefore be handicapped, since they can charge no more than \$95, which is \$5 less than their colleagues abroad receive.

It may very well be that activities in areas where Morocco enjoys a comparative advantage cannot prosper because of adverse effective protection. According to the WTO and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the existing tariff structure stacks the odds against industries producing semi-finished products, in which Morocco is said to have a comparative advantage<sup>10</sup>. However, it might be more accurate to say that Morocco has a comparative advantage in the area of relatively simple industrial processes. In the textile industry, for instance, there is considerable outsourcing and/or intra-firm trade by Spanish and British firms. This means that there are substantial imports of intermediate goods from Spain and Britain, and that the finished goods are exported to these same countries. The export of finished textile products to the UK and Spain increased 18-fold and 26-fold respectively, in nominal terms, between 1995 and 2002.<sup>11</sup>

Morocco will undoubtedly benefit from the phasing out of import tariffs on industrial goods. However, the sequencing of this process will involve adverse side effects. This is because the tariffs for final products – an area in which Morocco has no comparative advantage, at least not for sophisticated goods –, will be the last to go. As a result, these products will continue to receive protection while others do not, which will give false signals to producers.

While the effects of import liberalization are generally beneficial, as we have seen, there may be a cost in terms of tax income foregone. In the year 2000, import tariffs accounted for 4.8 % of GDP, or 17.9 % of government income.<sup>12</sup> If import tariffs are to be drastically reduced, then Morocco needs to find other sources of tax revenue. The problem appears to be manageable, however. Since 1988, increases in the amount of VAT (Value Added Tax) collected on imported goods at the country's borders seem to have matched the reduction in import tariffs, thanks largely to increased international trade.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Problems of economic integration***

The phasing out of import tariffs is not the only measure that will help Morocco improve its economic performance. The country is also adopting a large part of the EU *acquis communautaire*<sup>14</sup> in fields such as intellectual property, competition policy and government subsidies. This will impose a temporary, but nevertheless heavy, administrative burden. However, it will also make for a more efficient economy, in which clear rules are observed. It will, furthermore, reduce the risk of Morocco becoming involved in trade disputes with other countries as a result of 'unfair' trade practices. Even with these mea-

10 WTO (2003).

11 Söderling (2005).

12 IMF (2003) 18.

13 Bergh (2005) 8 nt. 17.

14 The body of EU legislation and regulations.

tures, however, the risk of such disputes cannot be completely excluded. Aside from its free trade agreement with the EU, Morocco has entered into a similar agreement with EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, which is made up of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The country opened other avenues to free trade in 2004, when it signed the Agadir Agreement together with Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. In that same year, Morocco also concluded bilateral free-trade agreements with Turkey and with the United States. The latter deal, which is to be implemented in the period from 2006 to 2021, is particularly likely to result in all kinds of complications.

Consider the following case. Under their bilateral free-trade agreement, Morocco imports certain goods from the US, free of duty. However, these same American goods are subject to an import tariff when they enter the EU. In this situation, traders would be tempted to import the goods into Morocco free of duty, and then to re-export them to the EU. This phenomenon is referred to as *deflection of trade*, and such imports are not welcomed by the EU. The EU therefore requires *certificates of origin*, stating that at least some minimum percentage of the added value of the goods in question originates from Morocco. The US naturally operates a similar scheme. Aside from being extremely expensive in terms of the administrative burdens that they impose, these measures open the way to corruption and may also sour relations with trade partners. People will always try to cheat.<sup>15</sup> In fact, the rules of origin included in the various free trade agreements concluded by Morocco are very diverse. This is not helped by the complex structure of import tariffs. The World Bank and the IMF have put pressure on the Moroccan government to harmonize and simplify the system.<sup>16</sup>

There is one bright spot, however. The EU wants to stimulate trade between the Mediterranean countries and to counteract the hub-and-spoke effects that have characterized trade ever since French colonial rule.<sup>17</sup> It therefore allows what is referred to as the *cumulation* of certificates of origin. This means that the minimum requirements pertaining to the sources of added value include value added in other Mediterranean countries, a rule which applies to the Agadir Agreement, for instance. While this is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, in itself it is not sufficient to bring about an intensification of trade between the Mediterranean countries. Morocco and its neighbours could do much more in this respect. In the year 2000, four neighbouring countries provided no more than 2.5% of Morocco's imports and took a measly 1.9% of its exports.<sup>18</sup> More regional liberalization and integration would create opportunities to exploit the economies of scale. Such steps would also make the region more attractive for direct foreign investment, which would help to introduce better technology, management and marketing. Between them, the three Maghreb countries of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco

15 More on the problems associated with free-trade areas and the points of difference with customs unions in Visser (2004).

16 *L'économiste* (13 December 2005), IMF (2005a) 15.

17 This refers to the fact that there has been very little trade between the Maghreb countries; most trade has been with France, which is seen here as the centre or hub.

18 WTO (2003) 22.



have more than 75 million inhabitants. The importance of this fact is that there is solid evidence that larger regional economic areas tend to attract more direct foreign investment.<sup>19</sup>

Cooperation between the Maghreb countries was slow to take off, but it seems to be gathering pace at last. A conference on trade facilitation in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia was held in Algiers on November 21–22, 2005. Those attending included ministers, the presidents of various central banks, and the managing director of the IMF. Working groups were set up to formulate proposals on issues relating to closer regional economic cooperation. One such issue concerns the harmonization of trade regulations linked to the implementation of free trade agreements, with particular reference to procedures and rules of origin. Other issues are the modernization of administrative procedures within the customs service, the streamlining of document processing, the improvement of cross-border payment systems, and a review of logistical chains, including transportation. Dates have been fixed for follow-up meetings and there seems to be a fair chance that the respective governments will keep up the momentum, perhaps with some prodding from the IMF and the World Bank.

#### ***What can be expected from trade liberalization?***

Full-scale model estimates of the benefits of economic association with the EU are few and far between. An idea of the quantities involved can be gleaned from a World Bank study of Tunisia, which is also involved in the Barcelona Process.<sup>20</sup> The static reallocation effects of association with the EU were estimated to permanently increase GDP by 1.7 per cent. These effects derive from the reallocation of economic resources to bring them more into line with the country's comparative advantage. In addition, there are dynamic effects, resulting from economies of scale and from the effects of harmonizing health and technical regulations that were forced upon Tunisia by the European Union. Another factor is the increased trading efficiency brought about by improved financial, telecommunication and transport facilities, which were upgraded with EU assistance. The gains for Morocco are likely to be of the same order of magnitude, with the static gains in one study estimated to be in the range of 1.5 – 2 per cent.<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that the effects may turn out to be much larger in reality. This is because the World Bank study did not address the effects of increased competition from abroad, such as the adoption of best practices, improved technologies, and better marketing techniques from other countries.

It will take time to reallocate resources between the various branches of industry. Nor can it be assumed that this process will be entirely cost-free, in terms of frictional unemployment. Rutherford *et al.* expected that it would take a full five years before any static reallocation effects become visible.<sup>22</sup> When labour and capital have to move from one

19 Jaumotte (2004).

20 Rutherford *et al.* (1995).

21 Rutherford *et al.* (1993).

22 Rutherford *et al.* (1993).

industry to another, the expansion of new industries may very well lag behind the contraction of old ones. Firstly, businessmen have to exploit new opportunities created by trade liberalization and secondly, part of the labour force will have to be retrained. Rutherford *et al.* estimated that the cost of such retraining was roughly equivalent to one year's salary.

The reallocation of labour may be especially difficult in poor agricultural districts. Under the free trade agreement with the United States, import tariffs on cereals, which run at up to 100 per cent, are to be phased out. It has to be said that cereal production in Morocco is not very efficient. It takes up scarce resources, water in particular, that would give higher yields if channelled into the production of other goods. Nevertheless, the World Bank has expressed concern that duty-free imports of cereals from the United States will only serve to exacerbate rural poverty. The Moroccan government has been singularly slow in preparing support measures for those affected.<sup>23</sup>

These costs must be balanced against the additional benefits that can be expected from trade liberalization, over and above the efficiency gains from production which exploits the country's comparative advantage. These benefits accrue from the possible reduction of 'rent-seeking activities', which would free up resources for more productive activities. What are 'rent-seeking activities'? In a system of regulated trade, politicians and civil servants have discretionary power over the granting of import permits and tariff exemptions. Import licenses and exemptions are important sources of income. Import restrictions reduce the supply of goods, which means that higher prices can be charged. If the reduction of supply is brought about by a licensing system rather than import duties, there will be a large gap between the prices paid by importers and the prices they can charge on the domestic market. They will receive a much higher price than is required for them to stay in the market, in other words, they earn a 'rent'. The same applies to exemptions from import duties, of course. Licenses and exemptions have a monetary value, so importers will devote time and other resources trying to secure them. From the point of view of society as a whole, such 'rent-seeking activities' are extremely wasteful. Moreover, they easily result in shady dealings. Politicians and civil servants grant permits and exemptions, then pocket a share of the 'rents' created by the import restrictions as payment. Even if they can withstand the temptation to accept a bribe, their control over import restrictions gives them considerable power. Such power is seldom used to allocate licenses in an equitable and efficient way. There tends to be a coterie of politicians, civil servants and leading traders, to which small businessmen have no access. Furthermore, the whole system is detrimental to efficiency. Entrepreneurs are compelled to divert time and energy into maintaining good contacts with the state bureaucracy, to the detriment of innovative activity.

23 *L'économiste* (25 January 2005).

### *Additional requirements for success*

International trade theory is unclear about whether trade should be seen as an engine of growth or as nothing more than its handmaiden.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps this question will never be satisfactorily answered. This is because, in the peculiarly un-erotic universe of the metaphors that make up a large part of economic theory, it is difficult to distinguish 'handmaidens' from 'engines'. But even assuming that trade is an engine, it would only run in fits and starts unless a number of conditions are fulfilled.

First of all, while Morocco has concluded various free trade agreements, this does not necessarily mean that trade is genuinely free. Trade in manufactured goods with the EU may indeed leave less room for the restrictions that create 'rents'. Nevertheless, there are still plenty of opportunities to impose such restrictions in trade with other countries, and in agricultural trade. Not only does this hinder trade, it also impedes the development of industries that are able to compete on world markets.

Furthermore, trade liberalization must be accompanied by similar liberalization on the domestic front, to bring about an efficient allocation of resources. More importantly still, this will allow talented individuals to give full rein to their entrepreneurial abilities. Domestic liberalization includes a reduction of the costs of doing business, mainly by doing away with red tape. It may also include the privatization of government enterprises. Unfortunately, this does not always help to create the sort of competitive environment in which entrepreneurs are constantly introducing innovations: new products, new production methods, new markets, new sources of supply of raw materials or semi-finished goods, or the re-structuring of an industry. Such Schumpeterian 'new combinations' are essential to ongoing economic development.<sup>25</sup> It is all too easy, and unfortunately all too common, for governments to sell assets cheaply to favoured buyers. During the late 1980s, some thirty large families with close ties to the royal palace in Morocco seem to have profited in this way.<sup>26</sup> This favours the development of oligopolies, in which individual firms are left in peace in their cosy corner of the market. They have little incentive to innovate and create new jobs. There are signs, however, that the privatization that has taken place in recent years has been more successful. In addition, foreign investors are taking up a large proportion of the assets put up for sale.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, there is the question of education. According to World Bank figures, in 2002 illiteracy rates in individuals above the age of 14 were 37% for males and 62% among females.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the emphasis on Arabic, coupled with a neglect of French and other foreign languages, means that education is not well geared to the needs of a developing economy. Nor does it help that there are no less than four different ministries of education.

24 Linnemann (1996).

25 Schumpeter (1969) 66.

26 Bergh (2005) 9.

27 Bergh (2005) 9 nt. 21.

28 [www.worldbank.org->Morocco->datapofile](http://www.worldbank.org->Morocco->datapofile)

There are other requirements for faster economic development and job creation, which we can only mention in passing here. One is a sophisticated financial system that is subject to clear rules and efficient supervision. A further cause for concern is the limited availability and high cost of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises.<sup>29</sup> An efficient, low-cost transport infrastructure is also essential for economic growth, yet the charges levied for the use of Moroccan ports are outrageously high.<sup>30</sup> Things are likely to improve, however, as the Tanger-Med (Tanger-Méditerranée) port complex, which will be accessible to ships carrying up to 2000 containers, is nearing completion.

### **Final observations**

There is every reason to believe that Morocco will benefit from the Association Agreement, but not to the full extent possible. The EU should liberalize imports of agricultural products and, for its part, Morocco could do more to stimulate trade with its neighbours. Furthermore, the country can only fully profit from liberalization if domestic markets are also opened up, and if entrepreneurs are not hindered by excessive red tape. In addition, educational levels are too low for Morocco to profit fully from the opportunities provided by more openness. While the liberalization of trade helps to fight poverty, it is by no means a panacea. This is a vital first step, nothing more. When compared to developing countries as a whole (see Table 2) and to its neighbour Tunisia in particular, Morocco's economic growth to date has been quite lack-lustre.<sup>31</sup>

Table 2. GDP Growth, 1971–2004 (in percent)

	Real GDP growth		Real GDP per-capita growth	
	Morocco	Developing countries	Morocco	Developing countries
1971–2004	3.81	4.47	1.75	2.58
1971–1982	4.75	0.74	0.09	2.58
1982–1991	4.32	3.75	2.16	1.80
1991–1998	2.11	4.20	0.42	2.51
1998–2004	3.33	5.35	2.05	3.84

Source: Morocco: *Selected Issues*, IMF Country Report No. 05/419, p. 6; based on Moroccan National Accounts; WEO database; and IMF Staff estimates. The group of developing countries encompasses 152 nations.

<sup>29</sup> IMF (2005a) 16.

<sup>30</sup> *L'économiste* (13 December 2005). For a more comprehensive review of recent developments see *10 Years of Barcelona process* (2005).

<sup>31</sup> IMF (2005b) 6.

Although badly affected by a series of droughts in the 1990s, growth has now picked up again. It is difficult to say how much of the increase in growth is due to the impact of the Association Agreement with the EU. However, econometric studies have revealed a positive relationship between Morocco's increased openness in trade and its economic growth.<sup>32</sup> The official unemployment figures have dropped steadily from 14.5 per cent in 1999 to an estimated 10.8 per cent in 2004. However, the latter figure disguises the fact that urban unemployment stood at 18.4 per cent in 2004.<sup>33</sup> There is still a long way to go and one can only hope that the groundwork for sustained growth has been laid.

32 IMF (2005b) 27. Trade openness is the ratio of this volume of trade (real exports plus imports) over GDP, adjusted for the size (area and population) of the country, per capita GDP, whether it is landlocked, and whether it is an oil exporter.

33 IMF (2005b) 62.

Omar Aloui and Saad Belghazi

## The 'Barcelona Process': ten years after

### **Introduction**

This chapter evaluates the Barcelona process, which aimed at 'turning the Euro-Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange, and co-operation, guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity', according to the 'Barcelona Declaration' of 1995.<sup>1</sup> The most widely-known aspect of the Declaration is its intention to create a free trade zone in the Mediterranean area by 2010. A great many trade agreements, meetings, and financial aid efforts were channelled through this process, but even from an official point of view, progress has been too slow to adapt to the new international and regional contexts. This chapter uses recent documentation about the process, and is based on an analysis of external factors and internal policies. We comment on its prospects for success. The chapter is organized in three sections. The first is a general presentation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona process. The second provides comments on the partnership's achievements over the past 10 years. The third presents an analysis of internal and external strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the partnership. We conclude with an analysis of relevant scenarios and prospects for the Barcelona process.

Our analysis shows that it will be difficult for the process to survive if it cannot deal rapidly with several controversial questions, including extension of free trade agreements to agriculture and services, inclusion of a migrations management policy in the regional framework, and reallocation of funds to sustain effective taxation reforms and attract more foreign direct investment to the southern Mediterranean countries. We conclude by stating our concern for the combination of external challenges and internal obstacles that represent major handicaps to the Barcelona process: the various protection and subsidy policies in the northern countries and governance issues in the southern ones. Especially important is the question: can the integration issue be tackled more efficiently by combining Euro-Mediterranean Partnership *acquis*<sup>2</sup> with the opportunities offered by the European Neighbourhood Policy to extend free trade to agriculture, services, and mobility to labour on a bilateral basis?

### **The Barcelona process**

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995, was an integration initiative to provide regional stability

1 <http://www.euromedrights.net/english/barcelona-process/main.html>.

2 The '*acquis communautaire*' is the total body of European Union (EU) law dealing with freedom, justice, and property-rights in economy and society that forms the basis for negotiations with other countries.

through free trade and financial aid. This conference marked the start of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona process. It dealt with a broad framework of political, economic, and social relations among the 15 member states of the European Union and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The climate in 1995 was favourable to this effort. In 1994 an official report by the European Commission first perceived 'European security' as being threatened by the economic and social gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries. In addition, in the international arena, following the Madrid Conference in 1991, the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority begun in Oslo in 1994, along with the end of the first Gulf War, seemed to be promising for long-term peace in the Middle East. Balanced against this, southern EU countries felt that their interests were not fairly represented in the aid programmes: too much had been done for East European partners to benefit German interests and too little for southern Mediterranean countries, the traditional partners of France, Spain, and Italy. On the other hand, some of these countries justified their demand for increased aid by the cost entailed in managing border issues related to migration with the southern Mediterranean countries. This last point, a classic argument in 'border' states,<sup>3</sup> may be what has been most commented on in the press. Moreover, some of the EU states wanted to achieve greater political influence on the Middle East peace process through this regional initiative and break the traditional division of roles between the USA and the EU. These differences consisted of 'soft' issues in the west Mediterranean for the EU and 'hard' issues in the east Mediterranean for the USA. Finally, the apparent success of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and the multiplicity of international regional agreements about other regions, concerning about half the international trade, were probably motivating factors for the Barcelona process.

The thrust of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was to reduce instability and promote peace through economic prosperity by means of market unification, free trade, and financial transfers. This idea was at the heart of the formation of the EU in the 1950s. Based on this experience, the philosophy of the Barcelona process aimed at regional peace and stability through 'irreversible' economic and political reforms that increase the cost of war and confrontation to the belligerent parties. War between wealthy democracies was believed to be counter-productive. The expectation of economic gains was based on the potential for liberalization of trade and capital transfers to increase income and reduce migration flows. Moreover, it was believed that economic prosperity promotes democracy. International commitments can sustain the political reforms required by this prosperity, which is critical in southern Mediterranean countries, since regional conflicts lead to prudence on the part of leaders when adopting new policies with long-term benefits but immediate social costs. It is true that this kind of virtuous circle has greatly contributed to EU growth and prosperity, especially for latter EU entrants such

<sup>3</sup> This argument is ambiguous because it stresses the cost rather than the benefits for the integration process. It can provoke anti-integration political reactions.

as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.

In the Barcelona Declaration, the twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean partners laid down the three main objectives of the partnership. The section on politics and security defines a common area of peace and stability as one that reinforces political and security dialogue. The economic and financial section aims to build a zone of shared prosperity by means of an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade zone. The social, cultural, and human section aims at a rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural, and human partnership to encourage understanding and exchange among cultures and civil societies. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises two complementary dimensions: a bilateral dimension (i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements) and a regional one. This 'regional dialogue' represents one of the most innovative aspects of the partnership, covering political, economic, and cultural areas.

The Barcelona process takes account of the substantial north-south asymmetries in the Mediterranean region. According to the World Bank, the gross national income per capita ratios, after correction for the price level in France, is six times that of Morocco, Italy, and Egypt; in Spain it is four times the level of Algeria. On average, the per capita income in the EU is about ten times the southern Mediterranean countries. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the Maghreb States (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), with a population of 66 million, is less than that of Portugal, which has a population of 10 million. The GDP of the Mashreq States (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria), with a total population of 86 million, is roughly equal to Greece or Finland, which have populations of 10 and 5 million, respectively. One problem in the area is that intra-regional trade accounts for only 5 percent of the twelve Mediterranean partners' trade volume. Another problem is that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership incorporates major exceptions that represent vital interests for southern Mediterranean countries, such as agriculture and labour mobility. It excludes liberalization of services that can be of interest to both parties. In addition, countries such as Morocco or Tunisia depend greatly on customs incomes. Free trade will thus entail important fiscal effort.

It is also important to note that the Barcelona process does not support some of its basic arguments, as it links free trade with an increase in foreign direct investment and a decrease in emigration. Free trade cannot always substitute for labour movements, nor is it a complement to the movement of capital. In theory, the reverse can also be true, as has been noted by Schiff and Winters in their examination of the details of the links.<sup>4</sup> For example, liberalization can make imports more attractive than direct investment in southern countries. Liberalization can promote increased emigration by reducing its costs.

### ***Evaluation of the Barcelona process***

In this section we discuss the various Euro-Mediterranean Partnership instruments, evaluate some of their results, and comment on the lost opportunities to co-operate. The

<sup>4</sup> Winters and Schiff (1998).



Barcelona process envisions the association agreements as replacing the co-operation agreements of the 70s. Each agreement includes the three main areas covered by the Barcelona Declaration: political dialogue, economic relations, and co-operation in social and cultural affairs. All agreements contain a clause that includes respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights as essential elements of the agreement. They all contain clauses dealing with political dialogue, free movement of goods, services, and capital, economic co-operation, social and cultural co-operation, financial co-operation, and institutional arrangements. The main financial instruments for implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are the bilateral provisions for Mediterranean European Development Aid (MEDA) that include agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Tunisia. From 1995 to 2002 MEDA accounted for € 5731 million. Over this period 86 percent of the resources allocated to MEDA were channelled bilaterally; the rest were devoted to regional activities. MEDA II (2000-2006) has a budget of € 5350 million.

In 2002 the political and security partnership centred on the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, and training for diplomats, the Middle East peace process, and human rights. The economic and financial partnership centred on industrial co-operation, economic transition, the European Investment Bank's new facility for Euro-Mediterranean investment and partnership, employers' organizations, dialogue among business communities in the Mediterranean, research on Mediterranean economies (the Femise network), energy, transport, regional statistical cooperation (Medstat), the information society (Eumedis), and water. In addition, there is the Euro-Mediterranean programme for the environment, whose main aim is to counter 'desertification'. The social, cultural and human partnership in 2002 comprised the Euro-Med audio-visual programme, programmes on 'Cultural heritage – Euro-Med heritage', the museum with no frontiers: a way to learn about one another, young people – Euro-Med youth action, civil society, the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum, women, justice, and home affairs, and information and communication education. The Commission's delegations in the Mediterranean were key players in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

From official reports established by the European Commission, we can draw some general assessment of the results of the process. Hardly any progress has been made in the political and security area: this is mainly a result of the persistence of tension and conflict in the Mediterranean region. The Middle East peace process does not progress well, and the initial project for a regional Charter for Peace and Stability has not been achieved. On the political side, substantial power is generally concentrated in the heads of state in southern Mediterranean countries. There is now increasing recognition of the need to liberalize the political systems across the region to harness the energies and increase popular participation.

Results in the cultural area include highly successful activities as well as less useful ones.<sup>5</sup> This extremely sensitive component of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is

5 For a good description of some successful projects in this chapter, see Ammor (2004).

also the weakest. Notwithstanding a number of achievements, it appears to be focused on the problem of immigration. Will it end up simply as a number of readmission agreements that make the EU the much decried 'Fortress Europe'? The spirit of Schengen and the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the member states have relegated the partnership to a virtual reality by barring entry in the European states to the other half of the partners, thus sapping the credibility of the partnership.

We will concentrate on the economic area, which has indeed progressed: several association agreements have been adopted, especially in such areas as textiles, because of the competitive pressure from China. But there has not really been any progress in sub-regional integration, except for the Agadir accord among Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. Nor has there been much progress in the liberalization of services, in the problem of 'rules of origin accumulation', in the liberalization of the food sector, or in trade and non-trade issues. Moreover, trade relations and foreign direct investment flows have failed to increase at the anticipated rates.

In the areas of trade and investment, the legacy of structural heterogeneity and frequent political instability in the Mediterranean is reflected in the present economic marginalization of the partners from the mainstream of global trading patterns, and in its inadequate growth. Mediterranean Partners represent a heterogeneous group of small economies. Three countries (Cyprus, Israel, and Malta) have income levels similar to those of some EU countries, and account for almost a quarter of the regional GDP, but this includes only three percent of an area population of more than 220 million. The nine other countries have a per capita income ranging between € 1000 and € 3000 per year. While previous policies focused on inward looking and state-directed development, over the last decade nearly all partners have begun to undertake substantial programmes of structural adjustment. These were designed to restore macro-economic balance, to open their economies to the outside world, and to transition from state sector economies to private sector supporting policies. Today the economic situation of the Mediterranean Partners shows progress in macroeconomic stabilization, along with considerable market liberalization, albeit this is not equal across the region. Nevertheless, real GDP growth – mostly in the range of two percent annually – has been insufficient to raise living standards, given the rapid population growth. The growth of the GDP has been very volatile, since most economies are still agricultural, and unemployment – ranging from 12 to 24 percent – is especially acute among the urban young and educated.

Noteworthy is that a substantial flow of investment to emerging economies has passed the Mediterranean partners by. Foreign investors still shy away from the Middle East and southern Mediterranean region, preferring to invest in the central European or Mercosur countries.<sup>6</sup> The proportion of EU foreign direct investment going to Mediterranean partners fell from 2.2 percent in 1992 to below 1 percent in 1999. Starting from roughly similar levels in the early 1990s, annual EU investment flows to the central European countries have increased nine fold, to some \$21 billion, while

<sup>6</sup> Mercosur is the name for the agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay for a common market.

investment to the Mediterranean partners has increased only threefold over the entire decade, to just over \$7 billion.

The openness of the Mediterranean partners to foreign trade has improved somewhat since 1992. Still, the region ranks behind Southeast Asia and the countries of central and Eastern Europe. Above all, intra-regional trade accounts for no more than 5 percent of the total, despite the fact that successive Euro-Med conferences have underlined the importance of intra-regional integration. The north-south pattern has changed little since the Barcelona Declaration, with the EU being the Mediterranean partners' main trading partner, in roughly the same proportion. The export base of all but the most industrial of the Mediterranean partners is still too narrow, or it relies too much on low-level processing. On the whole, therefore, the figures for growth in trade and foreign direct investment in the Mediterranean region fall short of those achieved by Latin America, and economic integration with the EU and openness to the world at large is proceeding too slowly.

As to trade in agricultural products, there have been many lost opportunities to cooperate. The bilateral agricultural trade balance between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries remains clearly favourable to the EU. In 1998-2002 the average value of EU agricultural exports to southern Mediterranean countries was \$1.3 billion greater than the average value of EU agricultural imports from southern Mediterranean countries. While agriculture is an area of great importance to both the EU and its Mediterranean partners, so far the discussion of topics related to agriculture has mainly taken place in the framework of negotiations of association agreements, reflecting the intense dependence of the Mediterranean partners on agricultural exports. Closer economic integration, however, will require a broad discussion of agricultural policies among the twenty-seven partners. On both sides of the Mediterranean, the agricultural sector is subsidized. To bring about increased exchange of goods, there must be a co-ordinated approach to this highly sensitive issue, one that coordinates all the economic and social dimensions. Dissatisfaction with the management of agricultural trade in the Barcelona process has become a constant during the negotiations and reviews of the trade arrangements among the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries.

Such dissatisfaction has appeared on both sides of the Mediterranean basin, as reflected by southern Mediterranean exporters' desire for greater EU market access and EU producers' fears of increased competition that would come about from a loss of community preference. While the Barcelona process called for a progressive liberalization of agricultural trade based on traditional flows, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements do not consider full liberalization of agricultural trade. Because of this 'controlled' approach, no priority was given to agriculture in the definition and implementation of the agreements. Negotiations concerning agriculture were usually considered last in bilateral trade talks between the EU and the Mediterranean partners.

Under the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area agriculture was largely treated on an ad hoc basis, and commercial concessions varied with the sensitivity of the product for EU markets and the export competitiveness of each partner. There were no in-depth discussions at top-level meetings (e.g. ministerial conferences) about the pros and cons of a

common approach for agricultural trade and rural development in the Mediterranean basin. In the last section we will point to the future prospects for Euro-Mediterranean agricultural trade relations. Only a reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can help overcome existing political constraints on full inclusion of agricultural trade in the Barcelona process.

### ***Labour mobility***

With respect to labour mobility, we note the same lost opportunities to co-operate. The declared objective of labour immigration policies in European Mediterranean countries is to protect their labour markets, preventing undesired flows and sending back migrants to their countries of origin, through incentives or by force. Recent studies on the economic effects of demography reveal several facts that are worthwhile to recall in this context.

On the demand side Europe is increasingly dependent on immigration. Without immigration, Europe's total population could fall by twelve percent by 2050. The migratory experience of the 1950s and the 1960s was marked by a growing labour demand, particularly in manufacturing industries in the period of rapid industrialization. The migration flows of the 1980s and 1990s, on the other hand, were characterized by increased internationalization and globalization, as well as de-industrialization, and by the 'tertiarization' of the advanced industrial economies. Southern European countries have become immigration countries in the last fifteen years, but the dynamics of labour migration in the Mediterranean basin started to change in the mid-1980s. Flows comprised of workers in agriculture, construction, and services that add little value, such as hotels and restaurants, now go to Italy and Spain. These workers do not receive any documents to legalize their activities, thus, they do not benefit from immigration and labour laws. Because agriculture and the informal economy are relatively less important for the overall French economy than in Italy or Spain, flows of undocumented migrants now go to the southern countries. It is worth stressing, however, that the informal economy is still mainly composed of national workers. The opposite side of the labour spectrum is comprised of skilled workers, for which there is greater demand in Europe, and these are increasingly being recruited formally. France has already developed special visas for computer engineers.

On the supply side, global skills are emerging: medium skills in information technology may be viewed as global in character, while traditional craft skills such as sewing, tailoring, leather processing, and many relatively low skills also have a high degree of transferability. Although family reunion has been the major type of immigration since 1974, spontaneous, economically motivated asylum-seeking has been the other major type. Illegal migration continues to increase, and the illegal migrants are able to find relatively unskilled work in the European labour markets. Moreover, most of the migrants do not come from the lowest income countries, but rather from middle income ones. Those that do come from low income countries tend to have a middle class background. Emigration only occurs when a certain level of development has been reached that allows the first generation of potential emigrants to acquire the necessary means for lea-

ving their home country. Therefore, in the short run, a successful development process could lead to an increase in migration rather than a decrease – the ‘migration hump’ – before it had any lasting impact on the outflow of people.

The effect of these demand and supply factors has been that on average, the annual net gain from migration to the EU-15 is just over one million people per year, about 2.2 for every 1,000. This accounts for almost four-fifths of Europe’s population growth. In addition, there has always been some immigration – including labour migration – into Western Europe, and the costs of emigration have been reduced. With higher unemployment and increased participation rates for the indigenous populations, there is no longer any perceived need for importing unskilled immigrant labour to cope with surplus demand, but nevertheless, selective immigration and regularization are likely to increase. Some issues have become especially complex and sensitive; for example, the migration that often goes along with arms and drug trafficking, international terrorism, international organized crime, and the traffic in people. For political analysts such as Huntington,<sup>7</sup> the internal threat to identity posed by migrants from other civilizations also carries with it a security threat. At the same time, the image of the European Union, particularly in the southern Mediterranean, is closely linked to the way it treats immigrants and refugees.

While demographic equilibrium in the Maghreb is impossible without emigration to EU countries, economic growth in EU countries needs immigration and southern Mediterranean countries need the emigrant’s remittances. Moreover, global skills are emerging, selective immigration has never stopped, and the costs of migration are falling. It is clear that co-management is possible for issues such as joint border management, agreements on visa regimes and labour permits, orderly departures and safe travel arrangements, and for living and working conditions for migrant workers and permanent immigrants. But issues such as the brain drain and skill formation, transferability and portability of claims for social security, dual citizenship, channels and average costs of remittances also need to be considered. Such migration-related issues may also become elements of future trade, co-operation, and association agreements between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries.

### ***Prospects for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership***

The table below shows a summary of the strategic analysis of external factors in the Barcelona process. The main threats are economic: that is, loss of external competitiveness in the Euro-Med region as a whole through globalization, demography, expansion, and American competition. This external factors analysis also opens up new opportunities. For one, complementary strengths between both shores of the Mediterranean can become valuable assets in global competition. But these opportunities will require a stronger process of integration, which is not compatible with existing lobbies and protective policies.

<sup>7</sup> Huntington (1996).

External factors	Threats	Opportunities
Demography and ageing population	Reduces potential growth in the northern countries	Promotes demand for co-management policies with respect to migration
Globalisation	Preference erosion, diversion of foreign direct investment, competitive pressure	Increases value of complementary strengths as an asset in global competition (see Euro-Med textiles)
Enlargement	Preference erosion, diversion of foreign direct investment, competitive pressure, splitting of EU countries	Increases export prospects for southern Mediterranean countries
American initiatives through a greater Middle East	Selective partnership	Requires a strategic response

The next table summarizes the current internal strengths and weaknesses that have emerged from the debate on the Barcelona process. I believe that the ability of the Euro-Med region to tackle external challenges will greatly depend on internal decisions among the northern countries on agriculture, labour market regulations, outsourcing, and internal cohesion. Each of these areas has enormous potential for co-operation, which can be unleashed when protectionist policies or subsidies that limit prospects for growth in the southern countries are overcome. In the present situation, a Common Agricultural Policy dramatically reduces export prospects within the Euro-Med area. Without any internal reforms, however, association agreements are useless. The same is true for the potential of migration management to support economic growth on both

Strengths	Weaknesses linked to decisions in the northern countries	Weaknesses in decisions in the southern countries
Assets such as resources, common history, historical heritage, human exchange; complementary strengths between sub-regions; comparative advantages in some key industries such as tourism; success stories in co-operative endeavours	Agriculture and Common Agricultural Policy reforms; migration and labour policy regulations; foreign direct investment outsourcing and industrial policies; splitting up of the EU	Political reforms; inadequate fiscal basis; importance of the informal economy; poorly developed importance civil society

Prospects	Comments
More resources from northern countries vs. more reforms in southern countries	Economic reforms in northern countries are more important than financial aid
Dilution of the Barcelona process in globalization and other regional agreements (main proposals include some kind of Muslim coalition that includes some Asian countries or an American kind of coalition)	Ignores the critical importance of complementary economic complementarities strengths in forging international alliances.
Complementing the Barcelona process with a European Neighbourhood Policy <sup>8</sup>	Important are references to agriculture and services, free trade, and to labour mobility, in a case-by-case approach.

sides of the Mediterranean. While this has been studied and documented, the current policy is not consistent with internal market regulations.

If not managed correctly, the likelihood for the Barcelona process to survive is not very great. External factors reveal the low level of regional competitiveness, as well as its strategic and political dependence. At the same time, there is little progress internally in critical areas. Policy reforms in agriculture and labour market regulations among the northern countries, which are very important for the southern Mediterranean countries, are still only in their initial stages. Political or governance reforms in the southern countries are in an even worse state. The last table shows some prospects and comments and thus summarizes possible scenarios for the future of the Barcelona process.

The first scenario is relatively optimistic. It assumes that if the EU gives more money, it will result in more reforms in southern Mediterranean countries and the other way round. This assumption misses a basic point: internal reforms in the northern countries are indispensable; it is absolutely necessary for shared prosperity to become a serious objective. The second scenario is put forward by strategy analysts motivated mainly by non-economic considerations, such as strategy and culture. They point to the possibility of alternative coalitions, insisting on the irrelevance of the Barcelona process and that other international alliances be substituted for it. This scenario does not take into account the critical importance of complementary economic strengths in forging international alliances. There is also a third scenario that is based on the prospects of progressive integration between individual neighbours and the EU.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040071.htm>: €1.2 billion will be disbursed during 2005-2006 under the EU's MEDA program', €275 million of which for Morocco.

EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said in May 2004:

'We are determined to continue developing the Barcelona process to foster democratic stability, security and sustainable development throughout the Euro-Med region, against a background of increasing interdependency between the EU and its southern neighbours. I am confident that the coming Euro-Med ministerial meeting in Dublin on 5-6 May will take us another step forward in this direction. In parallel, we will soon outline our strategic thinking to develop our Neighbourhood Policy, which will build on the achievements so far of the Barcelona process.'<sup>9</sup>

This scenario may work if it opens the door to new areas of co-operation, especially in agriculture, services, and labour mobility, which until now have been lost opportunities.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040071.htm>



*Hans van der Veen*

## Morocco, the state and illegal practices

### **Introduction**


In 1995/1996 the Moroccan government initiated a coercive campaign known as the '*campagne d'assainissement*' or 'sanitization campaign'. It targeted a number of unlawful practices such as contraband and other forms of tax evasion, fraud, influence-peddling, corruption and drug trafficking. Drugs had been targeted earlier in similar campaigns. The 1995/6 campaign was a landmark assault on many practices that were formally outlawed but had been widely tolerated for decades. This chapter reflects on the interactions between the state and illegal practices in Morocco, focusing on the 'war' on drugs as compared to those elements of the campaign aimed at 'moralizing' state and business behaviour in other sectors of the economy.

The reason for taking up the issue of the state and illegal practices in this chapter is the ambivalent attitude that can be perceived in Morocco regarding pervasive informal and illicit practices. Exchanges with Morocco – be they in the sector of trade, diplomacy, development cooperation, migration, or judicial collaboration – would benefit from a judicious understanding of this ambivalence and of possible ways of dealing with it. A second rationale for this essay is to draw attention to the repercussions that the pervasiveness of informal and illicit practices in Morocco may have for Moroccan communities in Europe, particularly those in Belgium and the Netherlands, and for their relations with state and society. The third reason for writing this piece is more theoretical, and aims to take issue with an offhand criminalization of state and society in Morocco. It is easy to simply outlaw people and their social activities and to opt for 'solutions' within the orbit of a coercive state apparatus, rather than opening up the issue to a distributional political economy in which various state and societal interests could be calibrated. It might be important to analyse, not only the differences, but also the similarities between criminal behaviour and social control, extortion and taxation, repression and law enforcement, and between state-run protection rackets and social contracts.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section delineates the theoretical approach and sketches an analytical framework that fosters an understanding of the prevalence of illicit practices. Section two presents a cursory discussion of the scope and nature of informal and illicit activities in Morocco. Section three analyses the implications of the existence of such well-established informal and illegal activities. In the conclusion, the lines of enquiry and reflection in these three sections are drawn together in an attempt to clarify the demeanour of the state regarding illegal practices in Morocco.

### *State-building and the organization of production*

The starting point for this study is rooted in approaches in political sociology and market sociology which seek to understand how states, markets and societies interact to produce institutions that regulate their relations and that generate certain types of rule.<sup>1</sup> Essentially the approach looks at the competences of extraction and violence that were fundamental to bringing about state structures, and the mutual dependencies between those that control the means of violence and those that control capital. The result is a negotiation process in which resources are exchanged for provisions for protective needs. This results in institutions delineating respective rights and obligations. The basic analytical framework employed here is derived from Charles Tilly (1985) and can be depicted as follows:



*Figure 1. Analytical framework: relations between the core activities of states and the nature of rule.*

The purport of this scheme is that, in order to establish their rule, governments have to perform these core regulatory functions. Rulers have to extract resources from economic activities, protect at least part of the population and employ violence against foreign and domestic competitors, otherwise they will be overthrown by another ruler who performs and combines such functions more efficiently.

Within this general scheme, there are many different ways in which such basic functions of statehood can be performed and combined. Extraction can take the form of normal taxation but it may also more closely resemble extortion, with the threat of violence being used to extract resources. Similarly, the protection function can be performed so as to provide genuine services to specific economic actors and society at large or it may resemble a protection racket in which case the state itself poses much of the threat against which it offers protection, and for which it exacts a price. A similar differentiation can be made in uses of organized violence, which can either take the shape of enforcing norms and regulations that carry the consent of large sections of the population and by which justice is done, or which can aim to damage selected targets and weaken their protective institutions in order to establish an altogether different system of profit, power and protection. Many different systems of extraction, protection and enforcement exist by which governments manage lawful and illicit practices. By combining these capaci-

<sup>1</sup> Elias (2000), Evans (1989), Levi (1988), Tilly (1985), Tilly (1997), North (1980).

ties, governments establish their rule and how they do so largely determines the nature of a regime.

The basic bargaining mechanisms mentioned above imply that the formation of states, markets and societies are mutually constitutive. Creating institutions that enable the development of markets and the organization of production is part of state-building.<sup>2</sup> In order to understand how the state gains obedience and conformity from its population, it is fruitful to apply a process-oriented view of the state-in-society, instead of isolating the state and analysing it as a freestanding organization.<sup>3</sup> Organizing production and instituting government are processes that come about through state-society interactions. In cases where the state fails to provide protection or itself becomes a threat to the freedom, property and security of citizens, alternative organizations may fill the void and offer or impose their protection, e.g. in the form of mafias and other armed groups.<sup>4</sup>

The ways in which interests of state, market and society are calibrated, translated into laws and regulations, and enforced by formal and informal means of social control, will therefore determine the nature of rule. For analytical, comparative and explanatory purposes, such regulatory systems can be placed on a continuum between warfare, protection rackets and social contracts. This is based on an assessment of the institutions that regulate relations between the state, market actors and wider society, and that ultimately determine the distribution of costs and benefits that such systems produce.

This chapter applies this scheme to the analysis of the articulations between the Moroccan state and illegal practices, to evaluate the coercive campaigns that the Moroccan state organized in the 1990s against its legal and illegal business community, and to assess the capacities of Moroccan society to bring coercive state powers and harmful and illicit market forces under control and to make them responsive to wider goals of society.<sup>5</sup>

2 Fligstein (1996).

3 Migdal (1997).

4 For such an argument applied to the role of the mafia and other violent entrepreneurs in regulating markets in the post-Soviet economy, see e.g. Vadim Volkov (2002). State failure of this kind may be all the more persistent where the law itself prevents state and society from exercising their full regulatory capacities, as is the case with drug prohibition. In countries where broader conflicts over the terms of inclusion and exclusion in the political system take a violent turn, the very control over (illegal) markets may become contested and alternative protectors may also take the shape of guerrillas, paramilitaries and other armed groups. In Colombia and Algeria for example those economic sectors in which the state fails to perform its protective and regulatory functions are indeed most susceptible to impositions by such armed groups (see Zemni (2000) on Algeria). Once the social body is sufficiently weakened, the role of protector could ultimately also be taken up by another state.

5 The underlying issues defining the nature of rule in Moroccan state and society can only be dealt with in a cursory manner within the scope of an essay such as this. For an extensive discussion of the country's political economy and the system of protection sustaining the power structure, see Hibou (1996). On the sanitization campaign, see Denoëux (1998) and on the organization and control of the drug trade, see OGD (Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues) (1994) and Van der Veen (2004). Akasbi (1997) provides a very interesting discussion of the workings of the extraction function that feeds the state and power structure.

### ***The hidden economy***

The scope of illegal and informal activities in Morocco is relatively large, both in terms of employment and as a share of the total economy. The informal and the illicit sector represented 40% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991/92 according to Hibou.<sup>6</sup> More elaborate estimates indicate a similar size of the hidden economy of Morocco and put it at a steady 38%, as a ratio of recorded GDP over the period from 1975 to 2000.<sup>7</sup> The Moroccan Accounting Office divides the hidden, i.e. unrecorded, economy in three sectors: a) the informal sector and domestic service activities; b) the underground economy, i.e. essentially those activities not declared for fiscal reasons, and c) the illegal sector.<sup>8</sup> The same study found that in 2000 the informal sector alone represented 40% of non-agricultural labour and 20% of the total workforce, together contributing 17% of the country's gross national product. The majority of the informal economic units are in commerce and repairs (53%), the others in small industry and artisan production (21%), in construction (6%), and other services (20%). Activities in the informal sector are defined by their deficiency in abiding by accountability laws and their lacking compliance with formal regulations, including tax payments. In general, informal sector units tend to operate outside all such regulations, as well as outside the juridical framework that defines legal enterprises. The majority of the 1.2 million informal sector units in Morocco tend to be small, precarious and lack protections such as labour contracts. Most of them have no social security provisions, and only a handful of operators belong to a sector association that could further their collective interests.

The dimensions of the underground economy are equally sobering. In spite of substantial reductions in import duties, smuggling is very pervasive and may amount to some three billion euros. The Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla play an important role in this respect as depots and conduits for smuggled goods, but the port of Casablanca is also known to facilitate transshipment of huge quantities of undeclared or improperly declared goods. Import smuggling constitutes an estimated 30 per cent of registered imports and is thought to deprive the government of an estimated 500 million euros in revenue, i.e. one-sixth of the total government budget.<sup>9</sup> This category should also include the remittances sent home by Moroccan migrants, totalling some 1.5 billion euros, half of which enters the country unreported.<sup>10</sup> The unreported money flows escape monetary regulations, e.g. those that set exchange rates and could therefore have benefited state coffers. Tax evasion is also widespread in the formal economy. According to the Minister of the Interior in 1996, the fiscal system only covered 15 per cent of the country's non-salaried residents who are required to pay taxes.<sup>11</sup>

The illegal economy comprises predatory crimes, the provision of illegal services and the drug trade. The nature and extent of domestic crime is not known to the author. As

6 Hibou (1995) 26.

7 Alaoui (2005).

8 Direction de la Statistique (2003).

9 Dialmy (1992) 40.

10 Bouddouft (2001) 74.

11 Le Point (23 March 1996).



Fig. I: Cannabis production in Morocco is concentrated in the northern provinces enclosing the Rif Mountains. Aerial surveys conducted in 2003 and 2004 by the UNODC and the Moroccan Government covered most of this area. The surveys estimate that 96,600 households or some 800,000 people are involved in cannabis cultivation; 66% of rural households in the survey area. Cannabis cultivation covers 27% of arable land in that area, or some 120,500 ha. Gross cannabis production is set at 98,000 tons; potential resin production at 2,760 tons. Total farmer income from cannabis is estimated at €263 million; €2,700 per household; €330 per capita, 0.7% of GDP. Annual turnover of international trade in cannabis resin is estimated at €10.8 billion (UNODC 2004). No recent data is available to show how much of this enters the Moroccan economy. Cannabis cultivation has soared in recent decades, with the area under cultivation almost doubling every ten years, and a 10% decline over 2003/2004. This map has been adapted from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.

to activities with international ramifications, substantial activities are thought to include the smuggling of stolen vehicles from Europe, prostitution, and the trafficking of women and illegal migrants to Europe.<sup>12</sup> However, the largest activity in the illegal sector by far is the production, processing and export of cannabis products. In economic terms, the *cannabizz* contributes \$263 million to the households of some 100,000 farmer families and – according to an old estimate – brings in approximately 1.5 billion euros in foreign exchange.<sup>13</sup> That would make it Morocco's largest export sector, and the business has been growing since (see fig. I).

There are important links between the various sections of the hidden economy, between the hidden economy and the formal economy, and between the operation of these economic sectors and that of the state. For example, import smuggling is widely belie-

12 The Lower House of the Dutch Parliament (1996).

13 OGD (1994).

ved to be financed with drug earnings, whereas the smuggled commodities are ultimately sold through the informal sector. However, drug earnings will also partly be invested in legal enterprises and boost consumption. On the other hand, formal businesses may have to compete with the various sections of the hidden economy: smuggled goods, non-protected labour, non-fiscalized activities, and investments with dirty money that may be cheaper to obtain and that will tend to be less concerned with profit margins. To the extent that the formal and underground economy compete with each other, certain of their characteristics are likely to become similar.

Since the modern legal sector and Morocco's state bureaucracy cannot generate employment for a large part of the population, the informal, illegal sector has become the main conduit for their survival strategies. Yet part of the expansion and operation of the hidden economy is more directly related to the way the state performs its regulatory roles. In fact, many of these informal and illegal activities flourish thanks to rather than in spite of government-induced market imperfections. Outdated governmental regulations aimed at protecting local industry, controlling economic actors and filling state coffers may benefit some actors, but they also lead to artificial scarcities, inefficient resource allocation, high transaction costs and tariff-induced price rises. The latter effects are partly remedied by smuggling, tax evasion and other types of illicit behaviour. World Bank studies insist that the protection of labour also tends to lead to similar outcomes, inflating the number of people employed in the informal sector.<sup>14</sup> Such responses undercut society's capacity to regulate the economy and set norms for business behaviour and exposing local industry to the competition of foreign imports. What is more, they erode the fiscal ability of the state to provide basic services to the wider population. Accordingly, there are also important qualitative and distributional consequences to the expansion of such activities. The remainder of this essay will scrutinize more closely the links between informal and illegal practices and the functioning of the state.

### *Ambivalences of the law*

Having a large part of its population reliant on the hidden economy presents the Moroccan state with very serious problems. The people dependent on the hidden economy are a political force to be reckoned with, and simply enforcing the laws on drugs, smuggling, taxation and other regulations is not only beyond the administrative capacity of the state but politically dangerous as well. Uprisings in Nador and Tétouan in 1984 were closely linked to discontent among smuggling networks.<sup>15</sup> Their opposition could become yet more politicized as shown by the Algerian experience, where the FIS initially drew firm support from the informal sector.<sup>16</sup> In the Moroccan context, the informal or illegal economy is generally perceived as a cushion that absorbs much of the potential for social conflict, yet fears have been expressed that drug barons could associ-

14 Alaoui (2005).

15 Dialmy (1992).

16 Luis Martinez (1995) provides an account of how the clash between the modern and the informal/traditional has divided Algeria.

ate with political movements such as Islamic fundamentalism or Berber insurrectionism to finance an armed front in opposition to and as a defence against the state.

Turning a blind eye to import smuggling, the cannabis trade and the informal sector has long been perceived as acceptable, since it was thought that what the state lost in taxes and support from legal industries would be compensated in social and political stability.<sup>17</sup> Yet in reality such a *laissez-faire* attitude is likely to produce economic, political and financial powers that could challenge the authority and legitimacy of the government. These powers surely weigh heavily on a society which lacks the means to set norms for business operations or social and political ascendancy. This means that seriously antagonizing the permanent hidden sector may only accelerate such opposition and further endanger social stability.

However, once a decision is taken to manage outlawed activities instead of repressing them, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between legal and institutional practices and those that are illegal and informal. The contradictions arising from this approach may be difficult to contain when the informal and illicit sectors outgrow the legal and institutional ones. This may imply an increasing convergence between business conduct in both sectors, and between business and government practices. To a certain extent, both sectors compete with each other and feed off each other's existence. State agents seeking to manage these sectors are obliged to strike deals with outlawed market actors.<sup>18</sup> This is particularly true of the management of the cannabis industry. Unlike the informal sector that largely comprises precarious economic activities and is highly dispersed and incoherent, the cannabis sector is concentrated in the northern provinces and generates large sums of money for some of its higher-level operators. In the informal and underground economy, there are formal rules and regulations that could be enforced to set norms for business operations as well as for the activities of government institutions. Such a legal alternative is altogether absent in the cannabis sector. Here the state formally forfeited most of its regulatory capacities, since international treaties now prohibit the sector and effectively also its regulation.<sup>19</sup>

Despite prohibition, drug entrepreneurs and state officials still seek to engage with each other in order to organize the production and trade in cannabis products, as well as to regulate the investment and distribution of the proceeds from the drug trade.

17 Dialmy (1992) 40.

18 For an analysis of how the growth of illicit enterprise can influence the behaviour and attitudes of actors in legal sectors of the economy, in politics and in society see e.g. Simon Strong (1995) on Colombia. For Morocco, I know of no research that fully addresses the social consequences of how the relations between drug money and state power influence patterns of security for the wider population. Abdessamad Dialmy (1992) and Najib Akasbi (1997) give us an impression of how this informalization has influenced attitudes in Moroccan society. Arbitrary state power, the ascendancy of parallel power structures (*Makhzen*) and a faltering enforcement of (outdated) business regulations, if not a complete absence of such regulations, appear to have been the rule rather than the exception in the Moroccan political economy (see e.g. Philippe Brachet, 1992). Or rather, such arbitrariness may be at the heart of the political system's control of the economy and society (Béatrice Hibou, 1995).

Exchanges between the two also prevent the collapse of state institutions in the northern region. Under the present prohibition regime, however, many such regulatory activities towards the drug trade resemble extortion, the running of protection rackets and the arbitrary use of violence rather than the enforcement of a social contract between the state and wider society. The money extracted from the drug industry generally does not end up in the state treasury and cannot therefore be used for budget outlays that benefit the general public. Operators of the drug trade who do enjoy protection are selected on the basis of their loyalties to the political regime and its parallel power structure, the *Makhzen*, as well as on their willingness to buy such services. The selection of targets against which repressive state powers are mustered seems to be determined by the inverse criteria.

This means that, no matter how primitive, at least some basic regulatory functions are performed in a sector where the organization of production and trade has to deal with unprotected property rights, difficulties in contract enforcement and the persecution and exploitation of its workforce. Yet many of the institutions through which formal rights and obligations could be established for drug traders and their regulators have been abolished by prohibition. Their dealings fall outside the institutions for public decision-making and lack the normative guidelines and transparency through which citizens could make them responsive to their needs. Justice therefore tends to be the first victim of law enforcement practices in this field. They strengthen the political order and enrich the criminal justice system, but leave wider society defenceless against impositions by both of these free-floating state and market forces.

### ***Coercive campaigns***

The problems Moroccan society faces in controlling both the drug trade and its regulators may in the end not be all that different from the conditions it faces in making its government and economy responsive to its needs. Problematic relations between the law, the economy and social justice, as we have seen, also pertain to the large informal sector and the import-smuggling sector. It could even be argued that the modalities by which the state and the hidden sector constitute each other do not differ greatly from the ways in which power, wealth and coercion also operate in the legal sectors of the country's

<sup>19</sup> The international prohibition regime is rooted in a number of international treaties that require signatory states to adapt their national laws to the treaties' stipulations. Of these, the 1961 UN Convention and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention and the 1988 (Vienna) UN Convention are the most important. The first set out a maximum 25-year period within which states had to withdraw their regulatory functions over that part of the cannabis trade that was not for medical use, and take action against it (1961, Article 49 f. and g.). The 1988 Convention aimed to bring a whole series of drug-related practices under criminal law, such as money laundering and organized crime. These UN treaties are amended by bilateral and multilateral treaties that establish the terms of cooperation in the field of drug control. The signing of these treaties is one of the conditionalities the EU imposes on the countries with which it enters into an association agreement. In practice, truly unilateral enforcement activities also take place, in which law enforcement officers try to collect incriminating information beyond their jurisdiction.



political economy. As Béatrice Hibou asserts, the delinquent economy should not be seen as a marginal symptom of a dysfunctional economy; it is better understood as an integral part of the economic system, functioning at the heart of Morocco's political economy.<sup>20</sup> Yet, although the modality of rule over the hidden economy shows important similarities with such practices in other fields of social, political and economic life, there are also important differences. These can be illustrated by means of a brief comparison of the sanitization campaign with the wars on drugs.

In the 1990s, or to be more specific in 1992 and 1995–96, Morocco launched several coercive campaigns against drugs, smuggling, corruption and other such practices, including fraud and tax evasion. Guilain Denoeux gives four broad motives for this widespread use of force against activities and actors that for decades had largely been tolerated with impunity.<sup>21</sup> Firstly, the government tried to pre-empt criticism and protect its international image with an eye to future relations with international creditors (the World Bank) and the European Union. Secondly, the *Makhzen* set out to reassert control over the sources of wealth in the country and its economic actors by eliminating potential challenges to its control. Thirdly, the campaigns were aimed at enhancing the government's legitimacy in the face of the threat of losing initiative to opposition movements. Fourthly, they followed fiscal imperatives, aiming to diminish the budget deficit.

The campaigns were orchestrated by the Ministry of the Interior, which put severe pressure on the business community and parts of the bureaucracy in order to 'moralize' their behaviour and bring it back into line with long-neglected regulations. Their execution can only marginally be understood as law enforcement, which would have required it to be impartial and guided by procedures of the judicial system and less by political concerns. Rather than seeking retribution or redress for past behaviour, the means chosen were aimed at enhancing the willingness of people in business and the bureaucracy to abide by established rules and regulations. Many people were arrested and brought to trial. However, they constituted only a relatively small group of offenders, whereas some notorious lawbreakers were left untouched. The campaign did partly succeed, in that it left large sections of the business community in fear and near-paralysis, and sparked negotiations with the state. This resulted in a 'gentlemen's agreement' by which the regime agreed to call off the sanitization campaign in order to give entrepreneurs more time to adjust to new conditions, and to make it possible to update laws and regulations on taxation and imports.<sup>22</sup> Tax receipts increased considerably thanks to this campaign, which enabled the government to agree a new social contract with the employers' syndicate and with the labour unions, resulting in a 10% increase in the minimum wage and public sector salaries.<sup>23</sup>

The targeting of the drug trade was less sophisticated. It eliminated those operators that were considered potentially disloyal to the throne, most of whom were based in the

20 Hibou (1996) 29.

21 Denoeux (1998).

22 Denoeux (1998)106.

23 Denoeux (1997)118.

Rif, siphoning of their wealth and concentrating the management of the drug trade in well-oiled and better connected networks closer to the central power structure.<sup>24</sup> The drug campaigns were also much more brutal than those against other sectors. The number of people arrested on drug charges rose from just under 9,000 in 1991 to some 19,300 in 1995. Unlike the 'sanitization campaign', the drug wars did not bring about any civilizing improvement in state-society relations. They failed to set norms for business operations and for the way the state should perform its regulatory functions in extraction and protection. Nor did they set limits on the use of coercion in their dealings with the sector. The sanitization campaign did bring about some circularity in state-society relations, providing better social protection at least to some sections of the population in exchange for more discipline in compliance with tax and other regulations. In the Rif, however, the provision of such protective services to the wider population has largely been made dependent on generous donations by the European Union and its member states. This is not particularly helpful in enabling Morocco to bring the cannabis trade under normative regulations.

### *The nature of rule*

Informal decision-making mechanisms, patronage networks and primordial relations and obligations continue to constitute the main ingredients of the power structure in Morocco. Although Morocco has a parliament and elections are held regularly, it remains in essence a patrimonial state. Many observers illustrate this by pointing out the autocratic, central authority – embodied in the king – that subordinates all other political institutions, whether legislative, executive or juridical.<sup>25</sup> The monarchic regime protects its position of power and regulates social relations by playing off the interest groups against each other. It incorporates or co-opts new social actors through ties of patronage, clientelism, traditionalism, neo-patrimonialism and the like. It keeps a firm grip on key government ministries, and directly controls the military and other security agencies. This produces a political system that is hard to separate from the economic system. Economic and political power are fused within multi-layered networks through which administrative privileges and opportunities for wealth creation are exchanged and distributed. Political control over economic actors still mainly serves to protect the privileges of a relatively small elite who, together with the royal court, form a power structure superimposed on the state, the *Makhzen*. The concentration of power and wealth within this ruling elite effectively blocks the ascent of new social and economic forces.

In such a system, where the extraction function is to a large extent based on informal levies, basic rights are for sale and fiscal obligations can be paid off.<sup>26</sup> In a system where those institutions that could make government transparent and accountable are sidelined by an informal power structure, the very concept of what is legal and what is illegal are bound to be highly contestable. In a system where the government does not shy away

24 OGD (1994).

25 E.g. Bendourou (1996).

26 Akesbi (1997), Dialbi (1992).

from abusing the law to further its goals, law enforcement may be closer to repression than to the enforcement of a social contract between state and citizens. In a system where a government fails to provide justice, many crimes may be understood as forms of self-help.<sup>27</sup> In a system where the state fails to provide protection and citizens have as much difficulty finding protection by the law as from the law, they cannot be expected to pay up voluntarily without feeling that the state owes them something in return. Nevertheless, the sanitization campaign has shown that, even in Morocco, there is a way out of this deadlock.

At the time of writing, a majority in Dutch parliament is once again preparing to demand that the government formally regulates the production and trade of cannabis in the Netherlands. A similar proposal was vetoed by the cabinet in 2001. Acknowledging that the Netherlands is also engaged in a long and difficult fight to bring coercive state powers and exploitative market ventures under control might help generate a greater understanding of the problems Moroccan society is facing in this respect. This notion may be all the more important since the large majority of Moroccan immigrants living in the Netherlands originate from the Rif. I believe it would be interesting to research the extent to which the notorious lack of cohesion in the Moroccan community and the many difficulties it faces in establishing a social contract with Dutch state and society are related to obstacles brought about by the prohibition of the main economic activities that link the Rif to European countries. It may be that the failure to establish institutions that could have mediated conflicts of interest in their country of origin by defining and enforcing mutual rights and obligations between state, market and society, is being replicated in the Netherlands. In this situation, the preservation of a social taboo regarding the role and importance of the cannabis trade is not very helpful. Mustering countervailing powers requires civil society institutions through which civic rights and obligations can be enforced. These institutions cannot exist without some sort of authority like the state to protect them.

<sup>27</sup> Black (1983).

Hein de Haas

## The social and cultural impact of emigration on Moroccan communities: a review

### **Introduction**

Over the past four decades, Morocco has evolved into one of the world's leading emigration countries. Since the mid-1960s, Morocco has experienced large-scale migration of mostly unskilled workers to Western Europe. The migrants primarily went to France, but also increasingly to the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and, since the mid-1980s, Spain and Italy. Following the economic recession and the tightening of immigration policies after the 1973 oil crisis, relatively few Moroccan migrants have returned to their country of origin. Migrant networks, combined with a sustained demand for migrant labour, explain why policies aiming at curbing migration have had only limited effects. Although most migrants originate from Morocco's three main migration belts, the Rif, the Sous, and the southeastern oases, there has been a process of spatial diffusion in which more and more rural and, increasingly, urban areas have become firmly integrated in the Euro-Mediterranean migration system.

Moroccans form not only one of the largest, but also one of the most dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. From a total population of 30 million, over 2.2 million people of Moroccan descent were living abroad in 2005. The actual number may be substantially higher because of substantial undocumented migration. Moreover, the figure does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent living in Israel. France is home to the largest number of legal residents of Moroccan descent (more than 1,025,000). This is followed by Spain (397,000), the Netherlands (315,000), Italy (287,000), Belgium (215,000), and Germany (99,000). Smaller communities live in Scandinavian countries (17,000), the United Kingdom (50,000), the United States (85,000), and the Canadian province of Quebec (70,000).<sup>1</sup>

There is a lively and wide-ranging theoretical debate on the effect of migration on development in source areas. Despite its status as one of the world's leading emigration countries, empirical evidence from Morocco has been largely absent from this debate.<sup>2</sup> Recent theoretical insights concerning migration and development are largely based on micro studies carried out in Latin America, particularly Mexico. Most of the empirical studies that have been conducted in Morocco have remained isolated and largely unknown, especially outside the French-speaking world. Consequently, recent attempts to review migration impacts in Morocco have ignored most earlier, Francophone empirical work.<sup>3</sup>

1 De Haas (2005a).

2 De Haas (2005b), Massey *et al.* (1998), Taylor *et al.* (1996a), and (1996b), Taylor (1999).

3 Leichtman (2002) and Nyberg-Sørensen (2004).

It would be erroneous to see or depict migration as a purely economic phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> In terms of its causes and consequences, migration is also a largely social and cultural event. The social and cultural dimensions of migration cannot realistically be separated from its economic aspects. The fact that migrants send remittances is itself an expression of the close social bonds they tend to maintain with family members in the home country.<sup>5</sup> Through its effects on socio-ethnic stratification, migration may also challenge traditionally established power relations and the functioning of village institutions. This may also affect economic production, especially where agriculture is collectively managed. Changing value systems and social stratification can also affect the extent to which the social and economic benefits – and costs – of migration are distributed among ethnic groups, households, and sexes.

Moreover, the very social and cultural changes that are driven by migration are themselves likely to affect future propensities to migrate. In this context, the literature refers to a ‘culture of migration’ in which international migration is associated with personal, social, and material success, where migration has become the norm rather than the exception, and staying home associated with failure. This cultural connotation is often said to generate its own dynamic by further strengthening migration propensities. It has even been argued that migration can be characterized as a modern *rite de passage*.<sup>6</sup>

The aim of this paper is to address the social and cultural impact of international migration on migrant sending communities in Morocco. This is done through a review of part of the empirical literature, which has mainly been published in the form of conference proceedings, theses, reports, or books with limited distribution. The paper will focus on the extent to which we can speak of a culture of migration in Moroccan migrant-sending communities, and on this culture’s characteristics.

### ***Migration, inequality and social stratification***

There is evidence that the inflow of remittances substantially contributes to income growth and poverty alleviation in Morocco.<sup>7</sup> In addition to bringing about considerable reductions in poverty, the remarkably reliable remittance transfers have improved living conditions and housing, enhanced incomes and education, and spurred economic activity through investments in agriculture, real estate, and business. This has transformed migrant-sending regions into relatively prosperous areas that now attract internal ‘reverse’ migrants, although the developmental potential of migration has not been fully realized because of several structural constraints, such as corruption, excessive bureaucracy, and a general lack of trust in governments on both sides of the Mediterranean.<sup>8</sup>

In relative terms, the middle and higher classes profit more from remittances than groups that have the lowest incomes because migration has itself proved to be a selecti-

4 Reniers (1999).

5 De Haas (2003).

6 Massey *et al.* (1993) 453.

7 Testas (2002).

8 De Haas (2005b).

ve process, as most Moroccan migrants do not generally belong to the poorest groups.<sup>9</sup> In regions having high outward international migration, the contribution to income growth can be far higher. In several communities in Morocco's three main migration belts, one-fifth to over a half of all households has at least one member who has migrated abroad. One study in the Todgha valley found that the average international migrant household's income was 2.5 times higher than the non-migrant household's income.<sup>10</sup>

It is a common assumption that migrants are less inclined to remit as they become integrated in the host societies, as family reunification increases, and as their family obligations back home decrease. However, this decline is much more protracted and the slope of decline in these perceived obligations is flatter than was once assumed. Transnational bonds are more durable than was previously thought, and sending communities continually renew the remittance potential through new migration.<sup>11</sup>

As further evidence of their attachment to the sending communities, migrants also establish many 'home town' and development associations. Such 'development networks' play an increasingly important role in sending regions; for example, through the establishment of public infrastructure such as road construction, electricity, drinking water, irrigation systems, mills, and dams, as well as social development projects such as community centres, literacy projects, schools and dormitories, and mosques. Other projects aim at improving local economies; these include workshops, women's co-operatives, handicraft groups, vegetable oil and milk productives and tourist development projects.<sup>12</sup> Until recently, the operational freedom of migrant association activities used to be very restricted, but increasing civil liberties in Morocco in the 1990s have led to a remarkable increase in such activities.

Aside from their profound effect on regional economies, migration and remittances have also changed the social face of many communities. Both internal and international migration have played a pivotal role in the 'landslide of social, political and economic changes' currently being experienced in rural Morocco.<sup>13</sup> Migration is not only an attempt to secure a better livelihood, but also a clear avenue to upward social mobility. For instance, in addition to improving the economic well-being and quality of life, the construction of a house – a typical investment priority for migrants – is also an expression of the newly acquired social status. Likewise, migrants' contributions to the renovation or construction of mosques, as well as the *hadj*, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, not only fulfil an intrinsic religious function, but also add to their social prestige.

Migration has accelerated the breakdown of ancient socio-ethnic hierarchies in migrant-sending communities. In fact, in rural Morocco, migration has often contributed to the creation of a new social stratification, with international migrant households forming a new kind of 'migration elite'.<sup>14</sup> In many respects the new socio-economic

9 Teto (2001), Schiff (1994) 15.

10 De Haas (2003), Schoorl *et al.* (2000) xv.

11 Collyer (2004), De Haas (2003), and Saa (2003).

12 Lacroix (2005), Gallina (2004).

13 Crawford (2001) 21.

14 Fadlollah *et al.* (2000) xxii, Mter (1995).

dividing line in Moroccan migrant-sending communities is now between households that receive international remittance income and those that do not.<sup>15</sup> On the basis of such observations it could be concluded that migration and remittances cause increasing intra-community inequality. However, there is an apparent absence of formal, statistical tests on the effect of migration on income inequality in Moroccan communities. We know from the literature that this impact is heterogeneous and highly contingent on migration selectivity and migration stage.<sup>16</sup> We should therefore be extremely prudent to conclude that migration has increased inequality based on rather superficial observations.

Furthermore, it is important to avoid romanticizing the past. We must acknowledge that traditional communities tended to be inherently unequal. In southern oases, for instance, with their caste-like socio-ethnic stratification, most people lived in grinding poverty, while subaltern, generally 'black' ethnic groups such as the *haratin* and *abid* were restricted to serfdom or slavery.<sup>17</sup> Now, however, new forms of inequality have arisen. These are based mainly on access to monetary resources, which are to a considerable extent defined along the lines of access to international migration. The new forms of inequality have been largely superimposed on the traditional forms of structural, hereditary inequality, which are based on kinship, complexion, and land possession. The rise of new elite groups is often accompanied by the relative demise of traditional ones. This exemplifies the ambiguity and subjectivity entailed in judging whether such migration-induced shifts should be regarded as beneficial or adverse.

For several formerly subaltern groups, migration literally constituted their liberation and has been their main avenue to upward socio-economic mobility. Migration and remittances have at least partially enabled emancipation for individuals belonging to socially and ethnically subaltern groups. Throughout Morocco, migration has offered new opportunities to earn money outside the constraints set by traditional peasant society. Formerly landless and hence powerless men now earn wages that allow them to buy land and gain increasing influence in local affairs.<sup>18</sup> In Moroccan oases, their new financial resources have enabled many *haratin* to acquire a higher social status.<sup>19</sup> These migration-induced shifting patterns or sometimes complete reversals of social stratification explain why even individuals belonging to traditional high-status groups, who had not thought about migrating, now aspire to emigrate abroad.<sup>20</sup>

Consequently, members of formerly subaltern groups increasingly reject traditional authoritarian structures. Nowadays, they often refuse to work as sharecroppers or agricultural labourers for traditional elite groups.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the *jema'as* or traditional village councils (the most important local political institutions) have lost much of their

15 De Haas (2003).

16 Jones (1998).

17 De Haas (2003), Ensel (1999), and Ilahiane (2001).

18 Crawford (2001), Otte (2000).

19 Ilahiane (2001), Bellakhdar *et al.* (1992), Ensel (1999), Mter (1995), and Naim (1997).

20 McMurray (2001).

21 Kerbout (1990), De Haas (1998).

effective power to settle intra-community conflicts and organize collective labour.<sup>22</sup> An unfortunate consequence for traditional agriculture is that collective agricultural tasks, such as maintenance of irrigation systems, may not be carried out properly; moreover, common law that regulates land and water use has become less respected.<sup>23</sup> Especially in fragile anthropogenic labour-intensive agricultural systems, such as traditional oases and mountain terraces, the short-term result may be a general decline in traditional agricultural systems and land degradation. Nevertheless, in the longer term, migration and remittances may also enable revitalization of agriculture through investments in land, crops, and machinery.<sup>24</sup>

### ***Migration, family life, and the position of the women left behind***

Intra-household relations in Morocco tend to be based on strong patriarchal principles. Historically, only men have been allowed to migrate alone. Traditionally, migrants left their wives and daughters behind with their extended family to guard the women's chastity. In this context DeMas interpreted remittances to the entire extended family household as the price a migrant pays for this role.<sup>25</sup> In this way, men were able to migrate without risking their family's honour. In the past several decades, however, nuclear family households have increasingly become the norm.

The impact of Moroccan migration on gender roles has received relatively scant attention, since most research focuses on the position of the – mostly male – migrants, and interviews tend to be held with – supposedly male – 'household heads'.<sup>26</sup> The only attention research has paid to women has been on the consequences of migration on women's well-being, and on conjugal and family life in general. This research, done by predominantly male scholars, usually portrays these consequences in a negative light. For example, Aït Hamza stated that migration

'has contributed to the desaggregation of traditional institutions, and to the devastation of society without yet resulting in any female wellbeing ... The behaviour of international migrants has engendered a disproportionate dream. Marrying a migrant has become the ideal of anyone. From their side, the migrants ... indulge in the abuse of marriage, divorce and remarriage.'<sup>27</sup>

The position of migrants' wives seems indeed vulnerable, as they may live under threat of being repudiated by their spouses. This seems especially true for international migrants, whose relative wealth can make it tempting to find a new and younger spouse in Morocco. Furthermore, the presumed lack of 'paternal authority' is said to increase delinquency among youngsters.<sup>28</sup> However, such assertions tend to be based on general impressions rather than on systematic empirical inquiries.

22 Aït Hamza (1988), Otte (2000).

23 De Haas (1998), Kerbout (1990), and Otte (2000).

24 De Haas (2001) and (2003).

25 DeMas (1990).

26 Hajjarabi (1995).

27 Aït Hamza (1995)159,164; translation from French by author.

28 Fadlollah et al.(2000) 130.



It is a common assertion that migration has encouraged the emancipation of women. In the absence of their husbands, women's responsibilities, autonomy, and power have been said to increase.<sup>29</sup> However, it is a different and complicated question whether women's growing autonomy and responsibilities should be equated with women's emancipation or their increased well-being. A recent comparative study among non-migrants' and migrants' wives refuted the hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gender roles. The lives of migrants' wives remain largely confined to housekeeping, child-rearing, and agricultural work.<sup>30</sup> Although they tend to have more control over the use of their husbands' earnings and child-rearing, this gain in authority is mainly temporary, since migrants resume their position as patriarchs as soon as they return.<sup>31</sup>

Because the material situation of wives of international migrants is better and more secure, and their power and status are increased with respect to non-migrant women, they are generally able to hire non-migrant women and men for some domestic and agricultural tasks, which eases their physical labour burden compared to other women.<sup>32</sup> Spouses of international migrants generally gain in power and status vis-à-vis non-migrant women. However, Steinmann<sup>33</sup> argued that the increasing emphasis on a capital-based economy as well as the one-sided dependency on their husband's remittances have adversely affected women. Moreover, changes in gender roles are not necessarily advantageous to women; for example, if, as a result of migration, women must perform traditional male tasks such as harvesting, some of the younger men may refuse to work in what has now become 'women's work'.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high. Migrants' wives do not necessarily appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and tasks: they did not have to perform these within the normative context of traditional society, and they did not always aspire to them.<sup>35</sup> So, the rapid transformation of gender roles can lead to feelings of shame and uneasiness with the new situation, especially for the often illiterate women who were themselves raised in a strongly patriarchal context. This explains why 'emancipation' is not always regarded as a positive experience by the women themselves.

As these new roles are generally not assumed voluntarily, but are forced upon women by the situation, these developments should not automatically be equated with emancipation in the sense of making conscious, independent choices against the prevailing norms of gender roles. Migration itself apparently has no direct influence, or only a limited one, on such norms. Gradual changes in these norms and the improving position of women reflect general processes of cultural change within Moroccan society rather than

29 Ait Hamza (1988) and (1995), Bouzid (1992), Fadlollah *et al.* (2000) XIX, 130.

30 Van Rooij (2000); for similar observations, see (Bouzid) 1992, Steinmann (1993).

31 Van Rooij (2000).

32 Ait Hamza (1995) 165, Steinmann (1993), and Van Rooij (2000).

33 Steinmann (1993)122.

34 Nyberg-Sørensen (2004) 10.

35 Hajjarabi (1995) 106-7, Van Rooij (2000).

any particular effect of migration.<sup>36</sup>

There may, however, be less visible, more indirect and long-term effects of migration on the position of women. First, international migration seems to have a positive influence on the educational participation of migrants' daughters. Two different empirical studies indicate that despite the fact that international migration has not been – or hardly been – selective for education, international migrants' children are better educated than children in non-migrant households.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, both studies suggest that this has also favourably impacted on young women, and that international migration therefore plays an accelerating role in closing the gender gap in education.

Besides factors such as a higher age for marriage, increased female labour force participation, and improved education, the migration of Moroccan families to European countries may have contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms. In this way migration may have accelerated Morocco's demographic transition.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Migration, and the nucleation and spatial segregation of family life***

Migration-related tensions on remittance use are said to have played an accelerating role in the breakdown of extended families and the nucleation of family life. Nevertheless, it is difficult to disentangle the specific role of migration from the *general* tendency in Moroccan society towards the establishment of nuclear families along with the decline of the traditional extended families.

Migration and remittances tend to motivate and enable migrants' spouses to establish independent households in newly-constructed houses for their nuclear family, thereby escaping control by in-laws and gaining personal freedom.<sup>39</sup> Migration is seen as a major cause of the generally increased divorce rates and the increasing number of female-headed households in Morocco. One study found that the proportion of female-headed households among migrant households is almost double that among non-migrant households, 15 percent as against 8 percent.<sup>40</sup> One recent study concluded that, mainly because of migration, female-headed households accounted for one-third of all the households interviewed.<sup>41</sup>

Women's quest for autonomy is a major, but often neglected explanation for the high priority given to investing in housing by migrant households: all Moroccan migration impact studies agree that housing construction is the migrants' first investment priori-

36 Until recently women migrated almost exclusively in the context of family migration. Since the 1990s, however, a rapidly increasing proportion of independent labour migrants to Europe and North America are female (De Haas 2005a; Salih 2001). This feminization of Moroccan labour migration also seems to be the result of *general* economic, social, and cultural change in Morocco.

37 Bencherifa (1996) 418-9, De Haas (2003) 325-335.

38 Courbage (1995), Fargues (2004).

39 De Haas (2005b).

40 Fadloulah *et al.* (2000) 130.

41 De Haas (2003).

ty.<sup>42</sup> In migrant-sending areas throughout Morocco, a building fever has transformed some villages into towns, where migrants also prefer to locate their other investments.<sup>43</sup>

Researchers and policy makers tend to lament the migrants' priority for real estate investments, their 'mentalité de pierre' (stone mentality).<sup>44</sup> The researchers almost 'accuse' international migrants of building large, richly-ornamented houses in an 'exaggerated' urban style that reflects an 'irrational' use of money for unnecessary status symbols.<sup>45</sup> This discourse is typically accompanied by a call for policies to 'divert remittances to productive sectors of the economy' by 'guiding' migrants towards more 'rational' investment behaviour.<sup>46</sup>

Yet there is good reason to criticize this attitude as patronizing because it blames the migrants' irrational mentality *a priori* rather than trying to comprehend their motives.<sup>47</sup> Houses do indeed seem to function as a status symbol, expressing the upward social mobility achieved through migration,<sup>48</sup> although some researchers have argued that the luxury of migrants' houses is often exaggerated as a result of superficial observations.<sup>49</sup> However, it appears to be mistaken to reduce the desire to construct houses as a quest to erect status symbols. There is evidence that migrants' real estate investments can be highly rewarding and relatively low-risk investment in a relatively insecure investment environment, and they potentially enable migrant households to secure and increase their income. Moreover, home ownership tends to provide 'life insurance' for migrant households.<sup>50</sup> The importance attached to housing is primarily motivated by a universal quest for space, safety – especially for protection against earthquakes and flooding –, privacy, reduction of family conflicts, and better health. In fact, by suggesting that migrants should stay in their mud brick houses, wealthy and urban-based social scientists apply other standards to them than they would probably do to themselves. Hajjarabi has pointed to the legitimacy of the desire for decent housing and basic hygienic facilities, which have a direct and favourable positive impact on the quality of family life.<sup>51</sup> Such improvements in living conditions are particularly appreciated by women who are usually confined to household tasks.

It is equally important not to ignore more specific social and cultural reasons for the priority on housing construction. In extended families remittances are generally not sent directly to the migrant's wife, but to one of the men within the household.<sup>52</sup> This situ-

42 De Haas (2003), Fellat (1996), and Hamdouch (2000).

43 Fadloulallah et al. (2000).

44 Kaioua (1999) 124.

45 Ben Ali (1996) 354, Ait Hamza (1988).

46 Kaioua (1999) 124, De Haas (2005b), and Agoumy (1988) 159.

47 In this context, Taylor *et al.* (1996) 411 writes of 'diatribes by academics and policy makers against migrants for their profligate and unproductive ways.'

48 Mezdour (1993) 182.

49 Berriane (1997), De Haas (2003).

50 Ben Ali (1996), De Haas (2005b).

51 Hajjarabi (1988).

52 Hajjarabi (1988) 180-1.

ation generates numerous conflicts between migrants' wives and their in-laws.<sup>53</sup> Because the wives expect to gain significantly in personal liberty and privacy, the wish to have their own house is a top priority. In their very architectural design, traditional houses reflect patriarchal norms and the domination of the mother-in-law, and hence impede private nuclear family life.<sup>54</sup>

This is an incentive for migrants' nuclear families to establish their own households by constructing a new house either in the native village or in nearby towns. Besides increasing the personal liberty of migrant wives, it can also be an effective strategy for migrants to escape from the heavy financial burden of supporting large extended families. Household tensions about how the remittances are used seem to accelerate the break-up of extended families and the nucleation of family life, as well as physically separating the nuclear family members from their extended families.<sup>55</sup> This may take the form of building their own house in the village, transferring the family from the village to nearby towns, or family reunification abroad.

Studies conducted in both north and south Morocco indicate that not only returning migrants prefer to transfer their nuclear households, i.e. spouse and children, to towns; many of those who are still abroad prefer to do so as well.<sup>56</sup> The presence of public services and economic opportunities enter into the decision to relocate the entire family to towns, as well as the frequent occurrence of conflicts between the migrant's spouse and her in-laws. Another important factor is to avoid material claims by the migrants' extended families.<sup>57</sup> Remittance-enabled investments in children's education may also motivate nuclear migrant households to move to towns with educational facilities.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, the above processes of family nucleation and extended-family tensions also provide an incentive for migrants' nuclear households to opt for family reunification. The ultimate wish of a migrant's wife is generally family reunification abroad. The relative power of women tends to increase significantly with family reunification, not only because women generally enjoy more rights in Europe, but also because it allows them to gain independent residence permits and social security rights after three to five years.<sup>59</sup> Along with progressive nucleation of Moroccan family life, there is an increasing tendency towards reunification of households as soon as legally possible, in contrast to the former 'guest worker' pattern of many years or even decades of separation.<sup>60</sup>

### ***A culture of migration?***

Migration and close confrontation with other cultural models also have a profound influence on local culture and perceptions of those who live in the migrant sending

53 De Mas (1990), Hajjarabi (1995) 107.

54 Hajjarabi (1988) 182-3, Van Rooij (2000).

55 Ait Hamza (1988) and (1995), Berriane (1996), De Haas (2003), and De Mas (1990).

56 Berriane (1996), De Haas (2003).

57 Berriane (1996) and (1997), De Mas (1990).

58 Berriane (1996) 376.

59 Ait Hamza (1995) 165-8.

60 De Haas (2003).

communities. International migrants have often become role models in these communities.<sup>61</sup> The migrants' annual massive return during summer holidays and the exposure of those who stayed behind to the relative wealth of the migrants and their direct relatives have increased the sense of deprivation and aspirations of those who stayed.<sup>62</sup> Replacing the importance of the sowing and harvest seasons in autumn and spring is the July–August holiday season, which is now the yearly economic and cultural peak season, when markets are at their busiest and most marriage feasts take place.

One study found that migration had increased the use and knowledge of Arabic in a Berber-speaking community. Paradoxically, this had also led to an increased consciousness of, pride in, and affection for the mother tongue.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, migration is said to influence local tastes and styles, which is especially apparent in the construction of urban-style houses and villas by migrants.<sup>64</sup>

There is hardly any research on the impact of migration on local religious life in Morocco, although these are potentially important factors.<sup>65</sup> In the south Moroccan Todgha valley, internal and international migrants have played an accelerating role in the rise of orthodox, relatively puritan Islam, which is not fundamentalist but clearly deviates from the declining popular Islam. On their return from cities and abroad, labour migrants as well as students tend to criticize allegedly pre-Islamic practices of popular Islam in rural, often Berber, areas. Among these practices are the veneration of *marabuts* (local saints) and mountains, sorcery, the tradition of *ahidus* (mixed dancing and music making during village feasts), and the traditional custom of tattooing women's faces and bodies. Indeed, most of these practices are rapidly declining under the combined influence of migration, formal education, state-controlled mosques, and the media, which are all channels for promoting the 'correct' version of Islam. It is nonetheless difficult to distinguish the influence of migration from other influences, which are likely to be more important.<sup>66</sup>

One comparative study of migration from Ghana, Senegal, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco concluded that Morocco had the strongest migration tradition and that migration had become an 'all-pervasive phenomenon' in Morocco.<sup>67</sup> Many have characterized the exposure to migrants' relative success, wealth, and status symbols as giving rise to a 'culture of migration'. International migration is perceived as the main or only avenue to upward socio-economic mobility. Ambitions, life projects, and dreams are generally situated *elsewhere* in people's thoughts.<sup>68</sup> It is commonly believed that migrants tend to

61 Kerbout (1990) 54.

62 Ait Hamza (1995).

63 Crawford (2001) 23.

64 Ait Hamza (1988).

65 For instance, research in Sudan has demonstrated that migration to Saudi Arabia has led to an influx of new religious norms that have stimulated the rise of fundamentalist Islam and the parallel decline of popular Islam. As return migrants had a higher status, fundamentalist Islam is therefore identified with progress and prosperity (Bernal, (1999) 26–28).

66 De Haas (2003).

67 Schoorl *et al.* (2000) xv.

68 Fadlollah *et al.* (2000) 132–46, Hajjarabi (1988).

exaggerate their success, and that economic and social problems or outright failure are generally hidden, which would create exaggerated images of social and economic opportunities in Europe. For many young people, the question is not so much whether to migrate, but rather *when* and *how* to migrate. The hopes of many young non-migrants are focused on marriage to an international migrant as the most secure way of migrating abroad.

This fixation on migration is said to be so overwhelming that in Moroccan migrant sending areas a large number of young men are not only jobless but are not even looking for work.<sup>69</sup> Many non-migrants think that it is a good choice for their daughters to marry a migrant.<sup>70</sup> Migration culture is also strong among women who are often still dependent on men to achieve this ambition.<sup>71</sup>

In this way migration has increased feelings of relative deprivation among those who have not migrated, and stimulates the desire to migrate among them. Nevertheless, it is not only material factors that incite people to leave: migration tends to be associated with the idea of personal liberty.<sup>72</sup> Confronted with economic stagnation and political and social lack of freedom and insecurity, as well as a general lack of prospects for the future, many young people aspire to live in open, democratic societies in which they have more possibilities for personal development.

The perception that migration is *the* ultimate road to social and material well-being is further encouraged by special programmes on national television that interview successful Moroccans abroad.<sup>73</sup> In the 1990s satellite dishes penetrated even in Morocco's smallest and most remote villages; the almost universal availability of television has intensified confrontation with alternative cultural models and the economic affluence usually depicted on foreign channels.<sup>74</sup>

This positive image of 'elsewhere' and 'the other', combined with circumstances of economic stagnation and high unemployment in Morocco, accounts for why migration is often seen as the main avenue for upward social mobility.<sup>75</sup> It has been commonly argued that migrants create an unrealistic perception of Europe as an Eldorado of almost unlimited opportunities.<sup>76</sup> The media and the tendency for migrants to show off during holidays and to conceal their failures would have created overly optimistic images of life in Europe among non-migrants. However, the simple fact that salaries in Europe easily

69 Schoorl *et al.* (2000) xvi.

70 Fadloulah (2000) xx.

71 Hajjarabi (1988), Salih (2001).

72 Ossman (1997).

73 Fadloulah *et al.* (2000) 89.

74 Davis (1989), Davis and Davis (1995).

75 Fadloulah (2000) 132-46.

76 Chattou (1998) 236.

77 The typical salary of a day laborer doing unskilled work in Morocco is around 5-6 US\$ per day. Even *undocumented* agricultural workers in the Spanish province of Andalusia earn about 26 US\$ for an eight-hour day (*Migration News* 7, 6 (2000)). Regular salaries in western and northern European countries tend to be significantly higher. The average agricultural or construction worker in the Netherlands earned a net salary of 106 and 133 € per day in 2001, respectively.

exceed Moroccan salaries by five to ten times, as well as the prospect of increased personal freedom and access to public health care, education, and social security seem to justify the strong desire to migrate at least to a significant extent.<sup>77</sup> Even the prospect of becoming an undocumented migrant does not discourage many people. Prospective migrants are rightly optimistic about their chances of obtaining legal status, given the fact that, over the past decades, a large proportion of previously undocumented Moroccan migrants have succeeded in obtaining residence permits through legalization or marriage.<sup>78</sup> The massive legalization campaign in Spain in 2005 further justified prospective migrants' optimism.

Furthermore, there is good reason to question the uncritical way the culture of migration has been viewed as a reified entity and subsequently projected onto perceived realities. For example, in a recent quantitative study of the role of migration culture and networks in perpetuating Moroccan migration, migration culture was included in the model as a dummy variable. It was assumed that regions with established traditions of high international out-migration 'had' a migration culture and regions without such a tradition did not 'have' one.<sup>79</sup>

Apart from making for obvious measurement problems, the term 'culture of migration' itself can be misleading because it suggests that rising aspirations and an outward-oriented mentality are mainly the consequence of exposure to the perceived success of migrants. It is important, however, to recognize that migration *itself* is a constituent part of a complex set of radical social, cultural, and economic transformations that have affected Morocco, as well as an independent factor in perpetuating and probably intensifying, magnifying, and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels. Migration is not only a factor that explains change, it is also an integral part of change itself, to the same degree that it may also enable further change. Other processes, such as improved education, increasing exposure to electronic media, improved infrastructure, and increased tourism also play key roles in opening people's eyes to the wider world and helping to raise aspirations. Since these are part of more general and universal processes, 'culture of migration' is perhaps not the most appropriate term to use.

The socio-cultural impact of migration tends to receive a bad press. Migration is said to have caused people to disdain local wages and manual, particularly agricultural, labour, and has led to agricultural decline.<sup>80</sup> It has often been hypothesized that, as a consequence of the migration culture, young people cannot imagine that their own initiatives will lead to any local improvements; they do not believe they can build a future in Morocco.<sup>81</sup> The ensuing passivity and unwillingness to work and invest is evaluated as

78 A recent survey demonstrated that among Moroccan migrant workers who reported illegal entry or overstay, the proportion reporting success in their attempts to attain legal status is two-thirds or more (Heering and Van der Erf (2001) 6; Schoorl et al. (2000) xix). Nevertheless, this figure may be skewed because of an overrepresentation of previously legalized migrants.

79 Heering (2004).

80 Bencherifa (1991), De Haas (1998), and Heinemeijer et al. (1976) 88.

81 Schoorl et al. (2000) xvi.

harmful to regional development. But empirical evidence for this is mixed, and some evidence points to the contrary. At least in some communities migration and remittances have in fact led to increased local economic activities, although presumably not at levels sufficient to respond to the even faster increased aspirations.<sup>82</sup>

Fadloullah *et al.* stated that migration culture can become ‘a collective psychosis [in which] the group becomes almost totally obsessed by the idea of leaving, at any price.’<sup>83</sup> But this seems to be a caricature if we consider the empirical facts. According to their own survey, 29 percent of men intended to emigrate, but only 3 percent had undertaken concrete steps in that direction. Moreover, the survey is likely to be biased because it was conducted only in regions of high out-migration. In fact, international migration is a highly selective process, mainly occurring among specific sections of the population of twenty to twenty-nine-year olds.<sup>84</sup> Moroccans do not want to leave at ‘any price’, and this is likely to be the reason why only a minority turns its intentions into action. Migration demands significant costs and risks, and is therefore generally a well-considered and well-prepared decision in which family and community members are often closely involved.

In fact, valuation of a strong desire to emigrate is an inherently normative matter. From one perspective, migration is a kind of rejection that drains migrant-sending regions of valuable human resources. From another perspective, however, out-migration can be the inevitable corollary of broader development processes in which people’s horizons widen and their capabilities and aspirations increase. Such rising aspirations inspire people to exploit their talents and capacities, to become more productive and to increase their well-being. It would be naïve to assume that such aspirations could all be realized in the proverbial native village. This seems to be the more fundamental reason why economic and social development –e.g., improved education, access to information, income, infrastructure – is initially associated with increasing migration.<sup>85</sup>

It seems to be unrealistic to think that young people would do better to stay to help develop the sending area if we bear in mind the high unemployment and the few resources available. These factors hinder young people from ‘developing themselves’, while international migration is the means for the young to acquire such capabilities. It therefore seems a rational choice to migrate.

### **Conclusion**

Four decades of intensive international migration have fundamentally transformed sending communities, as well as Moroccan society. Migration has become an all-pervasive phenomenon that has affected the perceptions and increased aspirations of Moroccans. There is evidence that migration and remittances have enabled the emancipation of formerly subaltern socio-ethnic groups, helping them escape from the constraints of traditional peasant society, sometimes to the detriment of ancient elite groups. Although

82 De Haas (2005b).

83 Fadloullah *et al.* (2000) xxiii; translated from French by the author.

84 De Haas (2003), Schoorl *et al.* (2000).

85 Skeldon (1997).



remittance-induced construction of houses destined for nuclear families generally improves living standards of migrants' wives, and remittances enable their daughters to go to school, migration rarely changes norms about gender roles because these reflect *general* processes of cultural change.

The socially differentiated nature of the impact of migration exemplifies the inherently ambiguous, value-laden nature of assessments of this impact. Ultimately, different valuations relate to different *a priori* assumptions about what actually constitutes 'development'. This is apparent in the widely divergent opinions about how to evaluate migrants' consumption and investment behaviour as well as various processes of social change, such as the demise of traditional peasant communities and extended families. The same applies to the culture of migration. Although this type of culture is often evaluated negatively because it tends to perpetuate emigration, it can also be interpreted favourably, as a developmental consequence of the increasing capabilities and aspirations of young people.

The impact of migration is notoriously difficult to disentangle from the general processes of social and cultural change with which it is closely and reciprocally intertwined as both cause and consequence. Changing norms and increasing knowledge of the outside world, especially through improved education, media exposure, infrastructure development, and confrontation with migrants' as well as tourists' relative wealth, have boosted life aspirations for many non-migrants too. Along with increasing income and the migration facilitating role of migrant networks, these factors continue to provide Moroccans not only with the material possibilities but also with the necessary aspirations to migrate abroad.

It also allows for a different evaluation of the 'culture of migration', which is often erroneously assumed to be simply 'there' as a reified entity. It is not only difficult to measure, the term 'culture of migration' can itself be misleading, since it suggests that rising aspirations and an outward-oriented mentality are mainly a consequence of exposure to the perceived success of migrants. It is important, however, to recognize that migration *itself* is a constituent part of a complex set of radical social, cultural, and economic transformations that have affected Morocco, accelerating its integration in global social, economic, and migratory systems; it is also an intermediate factor in perpetuating and probably intensifying, magnifying, and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels.

Migration is the inevitable corollary of development and globalization processes that broaden horizons and increase capabilities and aspirations. Paradoxically, economic and social development tends to go hand-in-hand with *increasing* migration. Notwithstanding empirical evidence that migration and remittances have led to increased economic activities and income growth, such growth has not yet reached levels sufficient to respond to increased aspirations. Hence, migration continues. Even if the migrants' impressions of Europe are too rosy and their problems many, the perception that international migration is a relatively secure way to social and economic opportunities and freedom is more than a mirage.

*Mohammed Boudoudou*

## The three ages of international migration from the Maghreb to France and Europe

### **Introduction**

Emigrants from the Maghreb have been described as 'colonial labourers', 'colonial soldiers', 'requisitioned war-labourers', 'French subjects' or 'protégés', 'French Muslims working in the metropolis',<sup>1</sup> and as 'emigrant-immigrants'. More recently, they have been referred to as 'immigrant-citizens', while at the same time being simply 'citizens'<sup>2</sup> This range of chronologically ordered notions reflects the main periods of Maghreb migration, and spans a century of their social history.

The Algerians were the first. They produced the most massive and long-lasting waves of migration. They were soon followed by Moroccans, who often travelled via Algeria where they traditionally worked as seasonal agricultural labourers.<sup>3</sup> After World War II, there was a break in Moroccan emigration which lasted until 1960. During this period, the only immigrant workers permitted to enter France were those from Algeria. The last of the natives of the Maghreb to emigrate to France were the Tunisians. Each of these migration flows reproduced the classic process of the 'three ages', but they did so in their own way, each to a different rhythm. Algerian emigration-immigration was the first to develop this process to its full extent.<sup>4</sup> The more recent the emigration, the more rapid this evolution.

Because similar causes produce similar effects, this story is pretty much the same in all three Maghreb countries. In each case, the migration process is characterized by the same initial event, colonization. It is true to say that developments proceeded differently in each case. It is equally true that the twentieth century was characterized by all kinds of transformational processes, social, economic, political and cultural. Yet, in terms of migration, the constellation of the Maghreb was unequivocally three emigration countries and a single immigration country. In the case of the Algerians, there was an exclusive migration relationship. This applied to a lesser extent to Tunisians. In the case of the Moroccans, however, there was a very broad relationship, which meant that they became widely distributed throughout various European countries. At the present time, the strong North African representation in Europe is reflected by statistics for the entire region and by figures at a national level in a number of European countries.<sup>5</sup> With the exception of the special situation in France, where there has also been large-scale immigration from

1 Ageron (1962).

2 Ray (1938).

3 Sayad (1977) 59-79.

4 See Dr de Haas's article elsewhere in this book.

5 Noiriel (1988).

Algeria and Tunisia, this phenomenon is mainly due to the Moroccan presence, which increased almost threefold from 1975 to 1990.

The Moroccans are the most numerous of the North African communities in Europe. In the seventies, they represented 30 per cent of the North African population here. By the beginning of the nineties, this figure had risen to over 50 per cent. One characteristic of the Moroccan population is that it is widely distributed throughout all European countries. Already evident in the seventies, this aspect has been further accentuated in recent years.

As a former colonial power, France is an obvious receiving country. Its status as an immigration country dates back to the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup> While France was host to 68 per cent of the Moroccan population in Europe in 1975, by 1993 this figure had fallen to 51 per cent. During the same period, the percentage of Tunisians present in Europe and established in France declined from 86 per cent to 73 per cent. In a number of European countries, there is a strong Moroccan representation among resident foreigners from non European Union member states. Moroccans are the most numerous members of this group in Belgium, Italy and Spain. They occupy second place in France (after the Algerians) and the Netherlands (after the Turks).<sup>7</sup>

### *The First 'Age'*

When examined retrospectively, the first 'age' of the historical-cultural processes inaugurated by Algeria, can be seen as a sort of 'Golden Age' for emigration-immigration. This mainly applied to the immigration country, of course. As the head of a colonial empire, France exercised absolute control over both ends of the migratory chain, i.e. the ebb and flow of the labour force and of soldiers. As long as the emigration country perceived this situation to be merely transient, involving only a 'temporary' absence of its emigrants, there was no threat to the cohesion and equilibrium of its overall internal social order. Finally it will not have been perceived as an adverse experience by those most directly concerned. This was especially true for those who clung to an illusion as a means of coping with the pressures of being emigrants/immigrants, and as a way of giving meaning to their situation. The illusion in question was that their 'absence/presence' was no more than a temporary diversion, with no serious consequences for their long-term destiny.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand however this first 'age' can be considered as the engineered displacement of population by the colonial power, as a means of satisfying its urgent need for soldiers and colonial labourers. This was in spite of the illusion that the 'operation' in question was limited in time and space. If you set out to find evidence of the arrival in France of the first Algerian immigrants – who at the time were not identified as such – you may find more than you bargained for. In a context that underlines its innovative

6 ILO, Migration from Maghreb, 1-4.

7 Boudoudou (1985), Sayad (1985).

8 Sayad (1985).

character, you will see that this was a deliberately well-planned and implemented enterprise. During World War I, 240,000 Algerians – more than one third of the male population aged 20 to 40 – were either mobilized or required for labour. Given the magnitude of the effects of induced enrolment in the French army, there is no doubt that the initial immigration of Algerians was engineered.<sup>9</sup> This view is further supported by the scale of the effects produced by the requisition of labourers for the war industry, or for trench-digging during World War I.<sup>10</sup>

During the same period, Moroccans were subject to the same process, with the same objectives. This is a fact of which French historians are very well aware.

‘The Great War broke out soon after we had established ourselves in Morocco. In the interest of national defence, many French emigrants were required to return to France. As financial flows ground to a halt, it was the turn of Moroccans to emigrate. Moroccan soldiers landed on our soil as early as August 1914. Before the close of 1916, thousands of Moroccan labourers has responded to the call from our factories and our metropolitan construction sites’.<sup>11</sup>

The French military was one of the most fundamental instruments of control in Algeria and Morocco. It depended primarily on indigenous soldiers who were coerced by French colonial policies while, at the same time, being instrumental in their implementation. Conscription was the principal means of channelling ‘ex-fellahs’ into the French army. In the case of Morocco, four major military units had been established and were under the effective control of French officers even prior to the signing of the Protectorate treaty on March 1912. From 1908 to 1956, Moroccan colonial troops participated in various military campaigns both within Morocco and elsewhere. These included Morocco (1908-1934), France (1914-1918), Tunisia (1942-1943), Corsica (1943), Italy (1944), France (1944), Germany (1944-1945), and Indochina (1948-1954).<sup>12</sup>

‘Voluntary’ enlistment in the army was clearly the only way of escaping from the life of unmitigated hardship led by these deprived peasants. It can be seen as a collective response to the colonial challenge and to the ensuing economic uncertainty. Its real significance has nothing whatsoever to do with the colonial ideology of ‘voluntary’ recruitment. One of the fundamental conceptions perpetuated by colonial discourse was the notion of voluntarism. The attractiveness of a career in the Goums, or other regiments, can be explained by the existence of various forms of social benefit which acted as ‘sweeteners’ for a ‘voluntary’ recruitment. Unlike Algeria, there was no system of conscription in Morocco. In 1912, because it was considered to be a French *département*, Algeria was made subject to the same rules of recruitment that were instituted in a French law of 1872. In Morocco, however, this was not the case. The *Tirailleurs* were allowed to enlist for a period of four years only, after which they had the opportunity to re-enlist.<sup>13</sup>

9 Ray (1938) 45.

10 Maghraoui (1998).

11 Ibidem 73.

12 Boudoudou (1991).

13 Beaujeu-Garnier (1976) 2-74.

Due to the colonial domination which generated it, the first 'age' of emigration from the Maghreb to France is historically seen as an 'illegitimate' presence. The phenomenon of Maghrebians in France and later on, throughout Europe, is viewed as what might be described as an 'illegitimate birth'. Much more information is required concerning the economic, legal, social, and political conditions that mould this presence, and by which it in turn is defined. Only by this means can we arrive at a better understanding of the polemic notion of 'community'. This in turn will enable us to understand how this group constitutes a 'particular' community. An unwarranted view of its history led to the 'stigmatization' of this community, thereby hampering its assimilation. The fact that the community was rooted in a dominated 'civilization' was another contributory factor.

Its distinct colonial past places Maghreb emigration-immigration in a class of its own. In this respect it differs from other migration movements to France, mostly involving southern-European immigrants. It also differs from Maghrebian immigration in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and more recently, Spain and Italy. Its specific history results in an essential '*alterité*', which today still defines the Maghrebian presence in France, and throughout Europe.

Indeed, this is not simply a matter of representation. The same 'essentialist' representation is the defining principle of current immigration policy, aimed as it is at administering the presence of foreign populations on home soil, as well as within the nation.<sup>14</sup> As a result, this 'particular history' had a profound effect on 'immigration policy' that was unprecedented in the history of immigration into France. People had to face the 'dilemma' of 'choosing' between 'labour immigration' and/or 'settlement immigration'.

In the seventies, many people deplored the fact that France lacked a coherent immigration policy. However, this simply meant that France was unable to decide – although, in fact, it had no 'choice' in the matter – to opt for either a 'settlement immigration' or a 'labour immigration'. Settlement immigration was thought to be associated with 'dangers of inassimilable cores becoming encysted in the country'<sup>15</sup>, as a result of the immigrants' different geographical, social, and cultural origins. A 'labour immigration' involves temporary settlement only. This ambivalence was maintained, especially during the period between the two wars. At that time, France needed to compensate for a mainly male demographic deficit of 2.5 million. This deficit was due to the effects of a long-term decline in birth rate, combined with military mortality and other human casualties incurred during the hostilities.<sup>16</sup> We should bear in mind, however, that even now it is not possible to formulate a policy other than a 'lack of policy', or a policy that is as contradictory as the issue itself. However many controls are imposed, labour immigration will always include a component of settlement immigration. For France, this was especially true at a time when such matters were not subject to 'contractual agreements' (i.e. agreements between states), and during the colonial period. Aside from the matter of whether 'settlement immigration' is either desirable or useful, it is obvious that some

14 Bonnet (1980) 4.

15 Sayad (1985) 29.

16 Sayad (1975).

human settlements will not be totally French, and that they will not automatically turn people into French citizens.<sup>17</sup>

### ***The Second 'Age'***

The second 'age' corresponds to the adoption of a new form by the foreign labour force. This was when the Maghreb countries drew up sovereign agreements called 'Conventions of labour force and social security'. The idea that this would not result in a definitive transfer of population was, of course, an illusion.

What we witnessed during this second 'age' was therefore a form of 'temporary presence/absence'. The parties to this were those involved in any migration: the emigration country, the immigration country, and the migrant himself. Logically, any 'temporary' status ends when immigrants return to their homeland. Since 1977, this vision has caused the immigration country to draw up all kinds of measures intended to encourage immigrant labourers to return to their native county, for the purpose of '*réinsertion*'.

Paradoxically, while both sides concerned in the phenomenon of migration were debating the topic of '*réinsertion*', the implementation of measures to meet the massive increase in demand to reunite families was in full swing. In reality, no one pays much attention to this contradiction. Legislation is aimed at making the stay dependent on employment, which would be the sole source of legitimacy. As babies were born to Maghrebian emigrants-immigrants, whether to mixed parentage or solely immigrant parentage, a new form of 'immigration presence' arose. This involved 'immigrants who emigrated from nowhere'<sup>18</sup>. This paradoxical situation compels us to re-define the immigration problem. Therefore,

'those who were previously involved in the processes of institutionalizing the 'aid to migrants' are urged to 'redirect' their focus to the new generation. From this standpoint, it is the impending administrative division of labour that now makes it vitally important to devise a new definition of immigration'.<sup>19</sup>

An inevitable 'human settlement immigration' emerged from the great economic recession of 1974. Every attempt to 'promote' the immigrants' final return to their homeland had failed. Lone immigrants, having benefited from the provisions for family reunification during the 'second age', decided to stay. This was followed by the birth of a 'second generation', and a third....etc.

Accordingly, a new definition of immigration became imperative. Especially from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, this constituted the third 'age' of Maghreb-France emigration-immigration. This heralded the completion of a migratory cycle in France, and in other traditional immigration countries throughout Europe.

17 Lapeyronnie (1987) 287-318.

18 Zerroti (1984).

19 Sayad (1987).

### ***The Third 'Age'***

The emigration of entire households obviously meant that assimilation had to take place, regardless of how it was defined: 'adaptation to social reality', 'insertion', 'integration', etc. These terms are all euphemisms relating to this inevitable social reality. No one harboured any illusions in this regard. Certainly not those concerned about family or household emigration because they feared the dissolution of ties with the mother country and a more or less slow identification with the host society. Nor indeed those who were repelled by the immigration of such families, whom they considered (on the basis of prejudice rather than experience) to be 'inassimilable'.

This 'sudden' awareness of the evolution of this process led to the institutionalization of the debate about integration and 'integrative' actions on 'cultural' grounds, particularly in the educational field and mainly in schools.<sup>20</sup> This led to the emergence of new concepts, such as 'pluricultural', 'intercultural', 'multicultural', 'pluriethnic' and 'multiethnic' etc. These notions constitute a 'social usage' of the immigrant's culture,<sup>21</sup> especially in the context of Maghreb immigration and its cultural characteristics, or its 'intrinsic exogeneity'.

It was therefore no surprise when, at the end of the past decade, the problem of 'integration' began evolving toward a 'culturalist' defining principle. This led to the 'essential' characterization of Maghreb immigration as a 'radical alterity', Islam.<sup>22</sup> Of course, this totally contradicts that which – in the context *'cela-va-de-soi'* – is seen as the basis of the French 'national identity'. According to this view, *laïcité* and secularization form the cement of veritable ciment 'national community cohesion'. At this point, it is legitimate to wonder whether one can be more integrated, in cultural terms, than those who were born and socialized in the host society. Is this affected by whether the process of identification with that society takes place naturally or, as we usually say, *'par la force des choses'*?

It is not by chance that, as this migratory cycle approaches completion, the processes of integration are becoming more efficient. After all, more and more Maghrebians are applying for the nationality of the host country, regardless of 'resistance' by the partners involved in the Maghreb immigration in France and elsewhere in Europe. Such resistance is merely a negotiation 'strategy' in the wider issue, namely the social and political status of a permanent presence. Only now are people starting to appreciate the consequences of this situation. In other words, this presence is increasingly being defined on economic, social, cultural, and political grounds i.e. as an 'established social fact'.

There are still 'immigrants' who, even though they have spent all of their active years (in some cases their entire lives) in the host country, do not have access to the legitimacy of citizenship<sup>23</sup> (which is not only a matter of law and regulations). It has to be said that this will continue to cause 'cultural' conflicts and issues for the partners involved in

20 Sayad (1983).

21 Fondation Diderot (1988).

22 Boudoudou (1998) 55-70.

23 Fondation Diderot (1988).

the 'Maghreb-Europe migration system', whether in France or elsewhere in Europe.

### ***Conclusion***

There is an unprecedentedly urgent need for a synthetic review of this kind, dealing with the Maghreb migratory process in France and throughout Europe, if we are to improve our understanding of the issues. Immigration has indeed become one of the most controversial public policy issues in immigration societies. Politicians, the media, and citizen advocacy groups are making a variety of claims about the forces driving international migration, and about the consequences of immigration for 'national interests'. Our understanding should be conditioned less by speculative hazards (i.e. actuality, with its sometimes tragic aspects) and more by fundamental causes. What we need is objective research into the wider process and the structural determinants of emigration and immigration.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Boudoudou (1998) 55-70.





## *Part IV*

# Youth

*Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning*

## For Allah and myself

### **Introduction**

Young people of Moroccan-Dutch origin are currently the centre of attention in the Netherlands. In some ways this focus is positive, as in the case of the popular rap artists Raymzter and Ali B., or the Moroccan writers Abdelkader Benali and Naima El Bezaz. More often, however, there are negative aspects such as criminality and radicalism. One example concerns the murder of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch commentator and film maker, in Amsterdam in November 2004. His killer, a Moroccan-Dutch man, declared that he acted in the name of his religion, Islam. As a result, attention has primarily focused on the radical element among young Muslims, who were also the subject of a recent AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) report.<sup>1</sup> But how are things going with 'normal' young Moroccan boys and girls who are not involved in criminal activity and who have not been radicalized? What is their approach to Islam here in the Netherlands? What was their response to events such as the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the murder of Theo van Gogh?

In this article, we attempt to answer these questions in three ways. Firstly, we examine discussions between young Moroccans and their peers, parents and imams. Secondly, we analyse the impact that the social debate on Islam is having on these young people. Finally, we investigate their activities on the Internet. As a part of this effort, we also turn our attention to the radical element among these young people. This article is based on a 6-year anthropological fieldwork study carried out in a Moroccan mosque and in the mosque's homework assistance programme in Gouda, a small town of 70,000 people, in the western part of Holland. The research into the Websites started four years ago as a part of the anthropological research into the meaning of religion for young Moroccans. The research focused on Moroccan Muslim youth aged between ten and twenty. In these six years, about two hundred boys and girls were monitored almost every day in the mosque and on the streets and sometimes in their homes and schools. During the final year, interviews were held with twenty boys and twenty girls who were monitored on a daily basis for two years. The selection of the Websites is based on the choices made by young Muslims in Gouda. At the sites and discussion groups (on MSN and Yahoo) they visited, other sites are linked and/or used. They have been analysed as well. In total, this involved about eighty Websites and MSN and Yahoo groups. The central focus of our analy-

<sup>1</sup> Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst: General Intelligence and Security Agency. The report is: *Van dawa tot jihad. De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde.* [From dawa to jihad. The various threats to democratic legal order posed by radical Islam] Den Haag: Ministerie van BZK, 2004.

sis is a search for the pure, unadulterated or real Islam and the form that this search takes in the everyday lives of young Muslims in the Netherlands.<sup>2</sup>

We view Islam as a complete repertoire of activities, a type of tool-chest containing a range of practices (such as prayer and fasting, the wearing of the headscarf) and regulations (such as *halal* and *haram*).<sup>3</sup> In the public debate Islam is generally seen within a fixed and clearly delineated context. However, research (including our work among Moroccans in Gouda) shows that the reality is very different.<sup>4</sup> Young Muslims are confronted with choices from different repertoires of activities. Girls, for instance, have a choice of wearing or not wearing a headscarf. Christians are viewed either as heathens, or as representatives of a 'people of the book' – which calls for an entirely different approach.

Young people develop their identity by choosing a particular interpretation of their faith. This always occurs in interaction with others, both inside and outside their own cultural group. There is a balance of power within and between these divergent groups. That is why the terms *identity politics* or *Muslim politics* are used within this context. These relate to the negotiation of one's personal identity and to the struggle for acceptance of this identity via a strategy.<sup>5</sup> The definition of Islam, its significance and its importance are continually under negotiation, both implicitly and explicitly. This process takes place between individuals within one's own group and with outsiders. Accordingly, rather than being a self-evident given, Islam instead serves as a source of reflection, study and discussion, within a process of identity formation.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Continue to ask questions***

From a very early age, Moroccan boys and girls become familiar with the concepts of *halal* and *haram*. The term *haram*, in particular, is often used. Those young people that took part in our study in Gouda had no problem in citing examples of behaviour that fall into this category: lying, sex before marriage, drinking alcohol, eating pork, etc. However, most of them were unable to name more than two or three examples of *halal*.<sup>7</sup> The concepts of *halal* and *haram* are most often used in connection with food, clothing, male-female relationships, and when judging one another's conduct. These are not objective categories, but rather religious-cultural concepts that young people use to demarcate their environment and to form their identity. Young people almost always use these

2 Young Muslims use the words 'pure', 'real' or 'true' in relation to Islam, to emphasize an Islam that is different from the faith of their parents; an Islam that is free of Moroccan cultural influences. This is not necessarily the same thing as the 'pure Islam' of the various Salafi groups in the AIVD report. In order to avoid misunderstanding we use the term 'real Islam' in relation to the Muslim youth in our research and the term 'pure Islam' for the *Salafi* groups.

3 *Halal* is what is allowed and *haram* is what is forbidden according to Islamic traditions.

4 Edien Bartels has done research among Moroccan Muslims in Gouda since 1995 and Martijn de Koning since 1997.

5 See: Eriksen (1993) and Eickelman & Piscatori (1996).

6 See: Eickelman (1992) and Roy (2004).

7 Examples given of *halal* are *halal* meat, wearing a headscarf for girls and no sex before marriage.

terms when framing questions about Islam. Is it *haram* to eat at the home of non-Muslim friends? Is it permitted to wear make-up, as Dutch girls do? Is it *haram* to work as a student intern in a restaurant where alcohol and pork are served? Is it permissible for a girl to take off her headscarf at school if the wearing of this garment is prohibited there? These are the questions that young people repeatedly put to imams or others, who in their eyes are authorities on Islam. These questions usually pertain to everyday life in the Netherlands and often imply a comparison with the – reputed – practices of young, native Dutch non-Muslims.

Although young Muslims discuss these types of questions with their parents, they often seek answers from others. This is because they are too embarrassed to discuss certain subjects – such as male-female relationships – with members of their family. Another reason is that they believe their parents' view of Islam to be permeated with cultural artefacts. Young people want to 'strip' Islam of what they see as purely Moroccan traditions. In the case of girls, for instance, this means that they appeal to Islam to support their desire to study, to work and to argue for equal rights between men and women. The tradition of mothers staying at home and taking care of the children is seen by them as 'a Moroccan custom', rather than something that is dictated by the 'real' Islam. Boys interpret the 'real' Islam as something that restricts the freedom of girls. It is noteworthy that the drive to seek the 'real' Islam is not restricted to those young people who strictly and carefully observe their religious obligations, such as prayer and the avoidance of contacts between boys and girls. The same phenomenon can be seen among boys and girls who take a more liberal view. This search is not restricted to the young Muslim radicals who are the subject of the AIVD reports, it is also seen among 'normal' young Muslims.

In addition to their role as categories of norms and concepts that are used to form a personal identity, *halal* and *haram* are also used as negotiating tools in discussions. This is revealed by the answer given by an imam in Gouda to the question 'am I obliged to wear a headscarf?' The question was asked by a girl who attended a school where the wearing of the headscarf was not permitted at that time.<sup>8</sup> His answer to her question was 'Yes, it is required.' Unlike the imam, a number of adult women who were present at the time were aware of the girl's situation. The following discussion then ensued:

'But what should you do if it is prohibited?'

'You should wear it regardless, because it is prescribed.'

'But what if this means that you have to leave school?'

'Then you should fight for the right to wear it!'

'What if the school continues enforcing the ban regardless?'

'Then you should talk with the school authorities.'

After about ten minutes of this, the imam's final answer was:

<sup>8</sup> Not only was there a ban on headscarves, neither baseball caps nor other head coverings were allowed. The ban has now been lifted.

'When you go to school, you should wear the headscarf. Once you enter the building, remove it. When you return home, put the headscarf back on.'

This was exactly what all girls that wore a headscarf to school were doing every day. The women who continued asking for clarification later commented that they had in fact been hoping for this very answer. Although the norm was clearly stated, the girls were allowed to obey their school's regulations, with the consent of the imam. It was important for them to hear the imam's view, because they had felt guilty every time they removed the headscarf and every time they put it back on. This issue was raised for discussion by other Muslims. One commented 'That is playing around with your religion, which you shouldn't do. It is *haram*.' The imam's statement, however, conferred legitimacy on the solution that the girls had come up with themselves.

A second example shows a different side to this negotiation process. An imam had declared that women were not permitted to work or ride a bicycle. This aroused the ire of many adults, who found this to be a complete denial of the situation in the Netherlands. Boys were particularly enthusiastic about the imam's statement. 'The imam is speaking the truth and our parents find it hard to accept. But it is the truth, this is demanded by Islam!' Still, many boys and girls themselves chose not to obey these statements 'What I do privately is my business. It is between me and Allah. I do it for Allah and myself.'

In the Nour mosque at Gouda, where we conducted our study, young people were given ample opportunity to discuss their questions and needs.<sup>9</sup> Imams, mosque council members, volunteers and assistants in social-cultural activities were always willing to answer questions and to organize activities. But this is not the case at all mosques. Many mosque councils and imams are not well informed about the everyday experiences of young people in the Netherlands. Imams often speak no Dutch. Young people, in turn, speak little or no Arabic. This means they do not understand the sermons on Friday. Young people tend to continue asking questions about things that are described in the Koran. They want to understand why things are the way they are. Although they are clearly looking for norms, they also want to know why one thing is permitted while something else is prohibited. Parents do not always have a ready answer. They sometimes feel that their children's persistent enquiries are not compatible with the view that one must accept Allah's creation as it is.<sup>10</sup>

Young people feel that their views are not reflected by mosque organizations, nor by umbrella organizations such as the UMMON<sup>11</sup>, the Moroccan mosques association. They see both types of organizations as representing male first generation immigrants only. These organizations focus on issues that are quite different from those faced by

<sup>9</sup> The Nour Mosque cooperated with a foundation for youth care: RCJ/Het Woonhuis. See: De Koning (2002).

<sup>10</sup> Religious upbringing by parents seems to be limited to explanations of how to pray and fast, and to telling stories about the life of the Prophet Mohammed.

<sup>11</sup> *Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland*: Union of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands.

young people. When young people become serious and devout, their parents applaud them. However, some parents also think that young people are too strict in their doctrinal beliefs. When meetings outside the mosque are addressed by speakers who the parents think are too strict in their interpretation, this can cause a commotion. As a result, such groups of young people gradually become isolated, or are banned from the mosque entirely.

### ***The view of people on the outside***

When identities are formed through a process of negotiation, it is important to know who is negotiating with whom. Young Muslims consult each other and a wide range of authorities in their search for Islam. At the same time, the reactions of Dutch society also influence their development as Muslims.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, it is important to find out how Muslims are viewed by those outside the faith. What significance do people outside the Islamic tradition give to a Muslim identity, and how are their opinions in this regard received by Muslims?

Most native Dutch people see Islam as a foreign element in society. This became especially clear following the events of 11 September 2001. It was also highlighted during the election campaign involving Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and in the ongoing debates on integration. On these occasions, terms such as 'immigrants', 'Muslims', 'ethnic minorities' and 'foreigners' were used interchangeably. For Muslims themselves, 11 September marked an important turning point. When cycling down the street, the day after the attacks in America, one of the girls in our study at Gouda was cursed by someone she passed. She later identified that as the moment when she realized that she 'did not belong to Dutch society'. She spoke Dutch very well and had a job, but she felt that she was not a part of the 'imagined community' in the Netherlands.<sup>13</sup>

This impression was reinforced by the public statements made by various politicians, in Parliament, following the murder of Theo van Gogh. Those involved included Rita Verdonk, the Minister for Immigration and Integration, Jozias van Aartsen, the leader of the Liberal Party, and Geert Wilders, a right-wing extremist who broke away from the Liberal Party. Muslim organizations were expected to distance themselves publicly from the murder. This contrasted sharply with events following the murder of Pim Fortuyn by an environmental activist in 2002, when no such demands were made of environmental organizations. Many Muslims see themselves as the victims of double standards. It confirms their belief that they are second-class citizens.

The murder of Theo van Gogh was not denounced by all Muslims, many of whom had been deeply offended by his use of terms such as 'goat-fuckers' and 'the fifth column'. His collaboration on the film *Submission I* was seen as just one of many insults to Muslims. Nevertheless, there were some Moroccans who didn't see the film as an insult, primarily those for whom Islam had little significance and older people who were not familiar with the film. However, many young people were enraged by *Submission I*.

<sup>12</sup> Jenkins (1994).

<sup>13</sup> See Anderson (1991).

It was not the first time that Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Somali refugee and now a liberal member of parliament, had asserted that all Muslim men use passages in the Koran to justify beating their wives. The film was doubly offensive because this message was conveyed in the form of a veiled, naked woman with holy scripture written on her body. After Van Gogh's murder, a change occurred within Muslim organizations. Many of them are now openly talking about the radicalization of young people, and are making every effort to combat the process. Nevertheless, the predominant impression is that Muslims are not accepted in the Netherlands.

This lack of acceptance of Islam tends to negate an important strategy used by young Muslims. In their search for Islam, young Muslims are seeking ways of making a place for themselves in Dutch society. They are looking for a separate Muslim identity. The aim is to free themselves, as far as possible, of the stigma associated with being Moroccan, a nationality that currently has a bad name and is associated with crime. Being Moroccan implies being non-Dutch. Islam, on the other hand, is a universal religion. It is international and therefore not tied to a particular nationality or even a given ethnicity.<sup>14</sup> Seeing Islam as an identity that transcends ethnicity is the result of a *cognitive shift*. Young people are orienting themselves increasingly towards Dutch society instead of towards their parents' country of origin.<sup>15</sup> But the fact that Islam is often considered to be foreign to Dutch society and culture does not make this change of identity any easier. It shows that integration is a two-way process, requiring changes in Dutch society itself, as well as in Muslims themselves.

Another strategy that young people use to 'be a part of society' involves an explicit definition of their interpretation of what it means to be a Muslim. However, this strategy has also run into opposition. During a debate at *Vrije Universiteit* in Amsterdam, shortly after Van Gogh's murder, a Muslim girl stated that Islam stood for peace, tolerance and love. A native Dutch person, who was a non-Muslim, retorted that this was not true. He pointed out that the Koran states, after all, that un-believers may be killed. In this way, non-Muslims force their own definition of Islam onto Muslims. This definition differs from the one formulated by Muslims, and is more negative in nature. Ayaan Hirsi Ali's stated opinions about 'true' Islam and its dangers also fall into this category.<sup>16</sup> In an open letter to Job Cohen<sup>17</sup>, she explains that true Muslims have an agenda of their own which, unlike Cohen's, does not include any attempt to reach a consensus. According to Hirsi Ali, the true Muslim has an anti-Semitic streak and relegates women and children to a subordinate role.

Paul Cliteur, a philosopher and commentator, avails himself of a similar strategy – which he directs not only against Muslims, but also against Christians. He states that a society composed of real Muslims and real Christians would not be viable.<sup>18</sup> Geert Wilders took the same line when he said 'I expect nothing from people. I only want

14 See Bartels (2002).

15 See Sunier (1996).

16 NRC Handelsblad, 29 November 2004.

17 Ayaan Hirsi Ali in Trouw, 6 maart 2004.

18 See Cliteur (2002) 87.

them to obey Dutch laws and regulations. Yet, if you take Islamic rules at face value, they won't be able to do this. A liberal Islam is impossible.<sup>19</sup> In making statements of this kind, those such as Hirsi Ali, Wilders and Cliteur ignore the fact that young Muslims are trying to interpret Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace. In other words, non-Muslims first create their own definition of 'true' Islam, and then proceed to criticize it. However, the basis for their definition of Islam remains unclear.

### ***Cyber Islam***

Radical Muslims are not participating in the social debate on Islam. They are holding their own discussions within a virtual *umma* (international Islamic community). However, this is not to say that all debates on the Internet are radical in nature. The Internet is a new arena, one where negotiations are initiated into what Islam is and what being Muslim means in terms of an individual's daily life. As with all young people, the use of the Internet among young Moroccan-Dutch people has expanded enormously.<sup>20</sup> This is reflected by Websites such as Marokko.nl, Maghrebonline.nl, Maroc.nl and Mocros.nl. These sites discuss a wide range of subjects, varying from the news of the day up to and including sex & Islam. There are also countless Websites whose goal is to educate the visitor, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, about Islam. These include al-islam.com, Selefiepublikaties.com, redouan.nl and al-yaqeen.com. Their function is characterized as an electronic *da'wah* or 'invitation to Islam' via the Internet. Some sites feature a 'cyber imam'<sup>21</sup> who will answer questions sent by e-mail or placed on a Web forum. Sometimes a question is typed into a database search engine, and an answer is supplied. There are also intermediate forms, in which the most frequently asked questions are grouped together.

Almost all Websites provide space for discussion, and people make full use of this. Young people take positions which they base on the Koran, *hadith* and the statements of scholars. In this way, they actually create their own *fatwas*. The advantage of the Internet, of course, is that they can participate in these discussions under a pseudonym, which gives them the freedom to ask all kinds of questions. In this way, discussion forums and chat rooms provide a platform where young people can develop a (virtual) identity. Sites such as Marokko.nl and Maroc.nl are aimed primarily at a single ethnic group: Moroccan-Dutch people. Islamic Websites, on the other hand, are aimed at Muslims in general, irrespective of their ethnic background. That is not to say, however, that all ethnic groups are equally represented. Moroccan and native Dutch individuals (converts to Islam) seem to predominate, particularly on the *Salafi* sites. The latter sites are so named because they appeal to people to follow the 'way of the *Salaf*'. The *Salaf* were the companions of the prophet Mohammed. The Muslims associated with these sites are saying that they have returned to the era of the prophet Mohammed, before Islam became 'contaminated' with a range of non-Islamic (Western) elements. The *Salafi* sites are clearly the

19 Magazine Elsevier, 15 January 2005.

20 See also Brouwer, this volume.

21 Maroc.nl also has a 'cyber imam'.



most dominant Islamic sites on the Internet.<sup>22</sup> They seem to be regarded by young people as having particular authority. This becomes clear when we look at the debates on the Internet concerning *halal* and *haram*. Most of the answers given are derived from *Salafi* sites. Although all *Salafi* sites appeal to the Salaf, there are a number of differences between them. Some sites challenge one another. Not all *Salafi* sites are expressly anti-Dutch or anti-Western. However, they do contain considerable social criticism concerning, for example, the sexual objectification of Western women.

In addition to Websites, there are also online communities, the so-called MSN groups. Some of the more prominent examples are *WareMoslims* (TrueMuslims), *Moslimsdeenigeechte* (Muslimstheoneandonly) and *IslamenMeer* (IslamandMore). *Salafi* dominance at such sites seems to be greater than on the Websites. The MSN groups usually have fewer permanent members than the Websites, which is not to say they reach a smaller audience. Messages from these MSN groups can regularly be found on sites such as Marokko.nl. The larger groups, such as *IslamenMeer*, which can have up to a couple of thousand members, are more moderate than the smaller groups and reflect a more varied range of opinions concerning Islam.<sup>23</sup> The smaller groups are generally short-lived. Once complaints have been made concerning inflammatory texts and the exchange of threats, such groups are quickly closed down by the provider. The discussions and messages within the groups vary widely. The subjects covered range from the devil to sex, and from demonstrations to *jihad*. One common theme is that they all discuss ways of dealing with the Western world. 'The West' stands primarily for the US, Israel and the Jews, and the Netherlands. Some *Salafi* MSN groups strongly reject Dutch society, while others seek a rapprochement and reject violence.<sup>24</sup>

The *Salafi* MSN groups and Websites base their approach on the concepts of *halal* and *haram*. The emphasis here differs from that in discussions between 'normal' young people. All matters that are seen as being 'Western' are *haram*, such as demonstrations, music and similar things. The position of women is a major issue about which people hold a wide range of views. Some have a problem with women working outside the home. Others only see it as a problem if both sexes are present in the workplace. Some Salafis emphasize the '*jihad* of the heart', which is the individual's internal struggle to resist a range of temptations that violate the rules of the faith. Other Salafis support the '*jihad* of the sword', the defensive war or holy war. They reject the *jihad* of the heart because it is based on a weak tradition. Most *Salafi* sites and MSN groups have few, if any, real discussions. They are primarily meeting places for like-minded individuals seeking an ideal, who want answers about how to follow the right path.

Issues affecting young people's daily lives in a non-Muslim society, such as the wearing of make-up, the headscarf, etc., do not appear on *Salafi* sites. These issues are discussed in the MSN groups and the larger non-*Salafi* sites, where Salafis nevertheless take the lead in providing answers to questions. In this way, Salafis extend their influence

22 Examples are Al-Islaam.com, Al-Yaqeen.com and Selefiepublikaties.com.

23 This is not a *Salafi* MSN group although Salafis do take part in it.

24 For example the MSN group Sirat al Mustakiem.

beyond their own, restricted discussion groups. However, it is difficult to determine the full extent of this influence. The Internet is anonymous, and it is almost impossible to unmask the person behind the pseudonym. Nevertheless, their influence does seem to be quite extensive. Many young people sympathize with the Salafis because they are seen as 'serious' and consistent. They do not draw the line at promulgating 'pure' Islam and acknowledging its sources, they also live according to its tenets. These Salafis are often young people themselves. Clearly aware of young Muslims' desires and needs, they are quite capable of providing answers to their questions.

On the other hand, their influence should not be overestimated. While *Salafi* statements set the norm in terms of *haram* and *halal*, many young people say that this is not particularly useful in practice. While numerous people, both young and old, may appreciate the Salafis' efforts to adopt a serious approach to the faith, they also disagree with them on many points. For example, they take issue with the Salafis' attitude towards unbelievers and less consistent fellow Muslims. The aggressive manner in which Salafis spread their message creates opposition and causes commotion. For many, this is sufficient reason to avoid any contact with them. In some cases, it is even given as a reason for refusing Salafis access to a mosque. This may cause these groups to become still more isolated. While their isolation from the rest of society is partly a result of their own doing, it is also caused by the reactions of other Muslims.

### ***Gap in the market***

The Muslim identity of young Moroccan-Dutch people is based on a search for the 'real' Islam. This quest involves choosing from a range of interpretations of the Islamic faith, through negotiations about the definition of the religion. Such negotiations are conducted with peers, parents, imams and non-Muslims. The 'real' Islam that many young people seek is quite different from the Moroccan traditions of their parents. It provides them with ways to be Muslim in the Netherlands. The concepts of *halal* and *haram* also play an important role in this endeavour.

However, those searching for the 'real' Islam are faced with struggles of their own. Moroccan religious organizations are not always willing to comply with these young people's wishes and needs. They take the view that non-Muslims exclude Islam on the grounds that it is a foreign religion. As a result, many young Moroccan-Dutch people feel that they are not accepted as Muslims. With the help of Islam, they try to navigate a path between two worlds. They do not feel at home in mosque organizations and national umbrella organizations. At the same time, they are alienated from the non-Muslim population of the Netherlands. The Internet is an important instrument in their search.

In the public debate that is currently taking place in the Netherlands, all attention is focused on radical young Muslims. 'Normal' young people are overlooked, even though they are the key to fighting such radicalization. Both Muslim organizations and the government should work together to ensure that these 'normal' young people do not go off the rails. Mosques should open their doors to a wider range of religious and social-cultural activities aimed at women and young people. This could take the form of coun-

selling, assistance with schoolwork, groups for girls, religious classes, etc. The mosque at Gouda, where our study was conducted, is an exception to the rule. It has been catering to activities of this kind for many years. This mosque could serve as a source of inspiration for other mosques, and for organizations in the area of social assistance. It deserves clear government support, but none has been forthcoming.

Our analysis has revealed a gap in the identity market. In this market, young people form the demand side. Mosque organizations and non-Muslims are the supply side. Mosques and government should work hand-in-hand to keep young people on the right track. Effective measures to prevent young people with radical ideas from isolating themselves will have a significant preventative impact. A good example of this collaboration is the 'contract with society' that was concluded after the murder of Theo van Gogh. The parties to this contract were the Pakistani mosque Moka Ghousia Masjid, the Turkish Aya Sofia, and the city district of *De Baarsjes* in Amsterdam.<sup>25</sup> This contract states that all parties will make an effort to protect freedom of expression and that those with a tendency towards radicalization will be monitored and confronted. This latter promise will not be easy to keep, since a devout Muslim is not necessarily a radical Muslim and a radical Muslim is not necessarily an extremist. Religious organizations should strive to make voices other than those of the radicals clearly heard in the community. Non-Muslim commentators should use their influence on the native Dutch population to build bridges. Instead, individuals such as Ellian – a former refugee from Iran, and now a scholar in international law –, Wilders, Cliteur and Hirsi Ali prefer to seek confrontation by voicing radical opinions. Wilders' proposal to amend both the constitution and international treaties in order to combat against radical Islam will actually have the opposite effect. This reinforces the feeling among young Muslims in the Netherlands that they are not accepted. We must avoid blaming a single group for the impasse we face. By definition, peaceful coexistence involves us all.

25 The Aya Sofia Mosque is part of the the *Milli Görüş* movement, a religious movement in Turkish Islam.

*Lenie Brouwer*

## The meaning of Moroccan Websites: A new social space

### **Introduction**

‘Too much is written *about* Moroccan youths and too few people speak *with* them. We want this site to give Moroccan youths a voice.’ This statement was made by the Dutch-Moroccan young men who set up the Website Yasmina.nl. It is also the main motivation of other Dutch-Moroccans to start Moroccan Websites with forums such as Maroc.nl or Maghreb.nl. They criticize the Dutch integration debate in which the views of Moroccan youths are not heard, and their religion has been over-emphasized. The first Moroccan Website in the Netherlands – Maroc.nl – was launched in 1999, and soon became very popular among Dutch-Moroccan youth. They raise sensitive topics in these forums: religion, relationships or marriage, but also talk about topical or social events, all anonymously. No topic is taboo.

The success of this and other Websites has caused other groups to launch Websites of their own. These included Berbers, who felt they were not represented in the Moroccan Arabic dominated sites. They started Berber Websites (Amazigh.nl), recalling their specific history and traditional heritage, and discussed their own identity, history, language, culture, or ‘what is typically Tmazight?’

These discussion boards are interesting new aspects of the information society that can be of great significance for the participants. An increasing number of studies have shown the importance of online groups for social support and exchange of information. For example, religious questions can be a good reason to join an online group, as is shown in research on an international Muslim women’s mailing list.<sup>1</sup> The opportunity to extend their social network through the Internet is of great value for most users, especially those with shared experiences.<sup>2</sup> Along with anonymity, the forums can also offer emotional support. They can stimulate people to reflect about their position in society and how they perceive themselves.

We argue here that Moroccan Websites reflect the ambivalences of Dutch-Moroccan youth who are faced with the process of constructing an identity in Dutch modern society. Born in the Netherlands of parents who came as migrants from Morocco, and having strong feelings of loyalty to Morocco, this second generation is not Moroccan in the same way as their parents. Similarly, their relationship with Dutch society is not uncomplicated: although they speak Dutch fluently, most of them do not consider themselves Dutch.

1 Bastani (2000), and see also the chapter by Dr Bartels and De Koning in this volume.

2 Nettleton *et al.* (2002) 181.

Their identity is not only formed through self-definition, however, but is also influenced by ascription, the way other people perceive them.<sup>3</sup> One of the outcomes of the current Dutch integration debate is that Islam has been so over-emphasized that Moroccan migrants are now primarily perceived as Muslims.<sup>4</sup> This is not a static relationship, but a very dynamic one, and it can have different meanings depending on the social context. These meanings are not fixed, but are contested in the animated debates of the forums. The second generation may feel they are Moroccans in the Netherlands, but when they go for a holiday visit to a Moroccan village they discover how Dutch they really are. Identity formation includes the interrelationship between ascription by others and the way people see themselves. Hence, we will call this group Dutch-Moroccans to show their relationship with both ethnicities.

This chapter focuses on the role of discussion forums on Moroccan Websites in the construction of identity for Dutch-Moroccan youth in the Netherlands. These online forums create a new space for communication between Dutch-Moroccan youth, and this new medium can give these groups a voice that can stimulate reflection about their social identity.<sup>5</sup> This chapter is based on qualitative research on discussions on the forums of Moroccan Websites as well as on several online and offline interviews with Dutch-Moroccan users.<sup>6</sup> We will first discuss some other research on the Internet and then examine the Yasmina Website and examples of the debates to be found there.

### ***The Internet***

The pattern of online interaction among a group of Muslim women and the support these women provide one another was studied in an online research effort.<sup>7</sup> Participants in this forum are dispersed across the globe, and interact via an electronic mailing list. They discuss problems in a way they would not have done in public face-to-face meetings; the anonymity allows them to speak more freely, without having any information about the other users. Furthermore, the interactions gave the participants a sense of belonging; they discover that there were others who shared similar problems, and they were able to learn from their advice.

It is also clear that the Internet offers a new context for thinking of identity and community: it has its own rules and potential. For ethnic communities the Internet has become a new way of direct communication, an alternative to mainstream media and community discourse.<sup>8</sup> The second generation experiments with the Internet; they participate in their own online forums and express alternative points of view to the homogeneous, bounded national cultures. In the online forums individuals can claim space, have a visible presence, challenge their own ethnicity, and imagine a community where

3 Verkuyten (1999).

4 Vasta (2005).

5 Nettleton *et al.* (2002) 177.

6 Brouwer (2002, 2004), Wijma (2005).

7 Bastani (2000).

8 Georgiou (2002) 13.

they can have a different opinion and be proud of it.<sup>9</sup> In addition, it can be a place where people can adopt and adapt the Internet to their own needs and views.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the Internet is a tool that supports many uses: it includes individuals who seek to build consensus as well as alternative discourse.

Most people in the Netherlands – 76 percent – and nearly all of those between fifteen and twenty four – 96 percent – have access to a computer with an Internet connection.<sup>11</sup> Although this percentage is much lower for migrant families – 42 percent in 2002<sup>12</sup> –, fortunately a large number of community centres, libraries, and schools provide almost free access to the Internet. It is assumed that visitors to Moroccan Websites generally reflect the diversity of Moroccan youth: girls tend to participate in forums about marriage, social relationships, and Islam, while boys tend to be more interested in forums that focus on news and matters related to Islam. The most popular Website is the virtual community, Marokko.nl. It has more than eight forums and over 68,000 members, and receives more visitors than Maroc.nl, which has 36,700 members (April 2005). The site's owners claim that 15,000 Moroccan young people access it daily, and that in its four years of existence the 160,000 themes discussed have provoked almost 3.5 million reactions (May 2005).

According to the site's owner, some 85 percent of the members of the Yasmina Website are Moroccan, 10 percent are Dutch, and 5 percent are from other ethnic groups. About 70 percent of the members are female. To become a member of the Website, it is only necessary to choose an I.D. name to register, as it is open to everyone. These I.D. names often reveal how the users see themselves: they can express the owner's nationality ('Marocgirl') or city of origin ('Casablanca25'). The number following the name usually refers to the person's age. Some use the name of a popular Moroccan dish (*couscousje* – 'little couscous'), some choose a musical preference ('missrapster'), or a common epithet ('womanpower'). The age of the visitors ranges from fifteen to thirty.

The girls have various reasons for participating in online discussions. Active members post between ten and thirty emails a day. One of them wrote, 'it has become such a habit that I cannot live without it.' Others told me: it is 'cool' to have such a forum, where you do not have 'to explain your background all the time', because 'we Moroccans just understand each other.' They also emphasized the importance of having 'a space of their own', a space where they can meet with 'other believers'. Another reason for participating is to disagree with somebody and to debate. Or they have a personal problem and want to know what other members think about it: 'to hear another view can be very interesting and you can learn something.' Similarly, it is fun to read debates and make a contribution. There are also a great many jokes among the postings.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, 10.

<sup>10</sup> Wheeler (2002) 3.

<sup>11</sup> De Lange (2004).

<sup>12</sup> Steyart (2003).

### *Examples of debates*

One of the issues frequently raised in the forums is whether to choose education or marriage. For example, there was the following posting: 'Dilemma: give preference to study or marriage?' In two days thirty five responses were posted to the forum, and almost three hundred people had read the debate (1 December 2003). The dominant theme in this debate is that most people prefer to study and advise postponing marriage. There was one male visitor, however, who had a negative attitude towards education and women; he represented the traditional mainstream opinion that women should marry rather than study.

Another woman began a discussion about her future husband; he will not allow her to study when she is married and demands that she will wear a headscarf as a married woman. She wants to finish her education before she gets married, and she does not want to be forced to wear a scarf: 'it must be my own choice,' she emphasized. She asks for advice. What would women do in her situation? In two days thirty one responses are posted on the forum, which records three hundred people as having accessed the page. The visitors have all kinds of different interpretations. The general opinion is: 'don't accept it.' There was a variety of advice, including: 'talk with your husband', or 'challenge the dominance of men by saying "no"', 'send him away', 'you are your own boss', etc. Another participant adds: 'if a man makes such demands, I would feel oppressed; this does not fit with the image of marriage. Be happy you know this before your marriage; such marriages mostly end in a divorce.' Several advise her not to marry: 'If you are not allowed to study', they say, 'how can you develop yourself in your marriage? Man and woman are equal in a marriage, and they have to deal with each other. Or am I wrong?'

The dominant theme in these debates is quite clear: a woman should first study and then marry, although this is not the main attitude within their community. The participants try to support the one who asked for advice and seek to give a modern meaning to marriage as part of their identity. They try to share the same ideas and ambitions and thus become an opposing voice to the dominant male view.

### *Virginity*

Virginity is a central value for a Muslim adolescent woman; it usually means that a man may not touch her before marriage, but it can also mean she may not have a boyfriend or engage in premarital sex. Virginity also symbolizes purity and modesty, and is closely related to honour and shame codes of the family.<sup>13</sup> In the Netherlands, however, girls have to attend school, at least until they are sixteen, and at school they meet boys, even though it is not proper for a Muslim girl to be seen with a boy. Girls are aware of their vulnerable status when they walk in a town or city with a group of friends. Gossip can ruin a girl's reputation and have severe consequences for the honour of the family. As long as virginity is still a prerequisite for a good marriage, Moroccan girls will be very involved with and emotional about this topic.

As a consequence, virginity is a very popular issue in all the debates of the forum,

<sup>13</sup> Brouwer (1997).

although some visitors and respondents complain about the predominance of this subject. The meaning of virginity is often disputed in these discussions. For example, one girl posted a message asking whether it is possible to get a declaration of virginity from a Dutch doctor, because she is planning to marry the next summer. She wrote: 'I know I'm a thousand percent a virgin, but you never know, there's much gossip in our community.'

There were thirty responses to this in two days, and the posts were viewed 440 times. Only three visitors claimed to understand her attitude, although most of the posters criticized the fact that she wanted an official declaration to prove her virginity, rather than challenging the demand for virginity. One member said that the hymen does not exist, while another framed the question as an Islamic discourse: 'it is better to fear God than your gossiping neighbour.' The posters challenged the traditional community's control and encouraged the girl to make her own decision, because they defined virginity as a private matter between two individuals, the woman and her future husband.

Thus, the girl who asked for help did not receive the kind of support she was looking for. Although nobody challenged the demand for virginity as a prerequisite to marriage, they sought to give it another meaning, to make it an aspect of individual choice. In this tension-laden area, Islam becomes an important frame of reference in the way visitors see themselves.

### **Islam**

In many other discussions visitors to the forums refer to Islam when talking about moral issues; they want to know the Islamic standpoint. Because they believe they lack information about the correct interpretation of their religion, they submit a question to the forum. This was confirmed by most of the girls I emailed or spoke with. They use the Website to find information about Islam and to discuss the 'right' behaviour for a good Muslim girl in Western society. Debates about wearing a headscarf, at what age, and in what manner are key issues in the construction of their identity.

Most of the debates are also influenced by the negative image Islam has in Dutch society and how Muslim women are seen by Dutch people. As Muslims, they feel discriminated and use the forum as an outlet to express their anger. For instance, one Muslim girl said she is very angry about the anti-Islamic attitude of the media, and is 'extremely irritated' by people who consider Muslim women to be oppressed and who want to help those 'pitiful' Muslim girls. She said that her headscarf does not hinder emancipation, but that 'this narrow-minded mentality' does. She continued by stressing that she has to justify daily why she covers her hair.

Compared with other debates, such as those on education or virginity, the discussions on Islam are dominated by the struggle against the negative stereotypes in society, and do not allow space for internal reflection. The participants in forums are not very willing to accept criticism of their faith and are quite defensive. One girl opened a discussion by stating provocatively that girls with headscarves are weak, and wondered why girls should hide from men's eyes. Within two days there were fifty seven responses, which were accessed 530 times. Nobody agreed with the girl's statement; in fact, everybody thoroughly disagreed. They claimed that a woman with a headscarf is not weak but



strong. This is the problem faced by girls who consider themselves liberal and try to challenge the mainstream discourse on the forum. As one girl wrote: 'For them, Islam is sacred; they see me as a traitor.' It is difficult to develop an alternative discourse about Islam, because it is too close to discourse in the public media.

Discussions on Islam become very sensitive because Dutch people perceive Islam and Muslim girls as oppressed. These discussions are influenced more by the anti-Islam discourse in daily life than by internal reflection about Islam or the desire to develop a more open-minded perspective.

### **Conclusion**

Dutch-Moroccan youth has found a new place on their Websites for expressing and exchanging views. This can be seen as an example of the new ways marginalized groups can make their opinions known.<sup>14</sup> The need for discussion and information makes such Websites very successful among Dutch-Moroccan youth, especially girls. Their restricted freedom of movement and vulnerable position as Muslim girls in Western society make them more prone to participate in forum discussions on social issues. Recognition of shared experiences stimulate them to visit the Website, and as a consequence, to extend their social network.

These forums give girls an opportunity to raise topics they are interested in, and the fact that they can contribute anonymously encourages them to talk about sensitive issues.<sup>15</sup> In addition to using the forums for entertainment, they are also used for debating significant issues, such as the choice between school and marriage, how to deal with virginity, or the meaning of Islam as a moral frame of reference. The discussions about these social issues stimulate visitors to reflect about their identity and about what they believe is important to identify with as Dutch-Moroccans.

Most visitors agreed that a girl should first finish school before getting married. This dominant theme in the forum is not yet true for all Moroccan families. This fact leads to a form of counter discourse on the forums as one of the possibilities of the Internet.<sup>16</sup> Schoolgirls who are obliged to marry can find social support in these online discussions, especially when they have to struggle to postpone marriage and contest the traditional meaning of marriage.<sup>17</sup>

The girl who brought up the question about the declaration of virginity did not feel supported. The dominant discourse on female virginity before marriage as part of their identity is generally accepted, but the meaning of virginity as a more private, individual matter was open to discussion. Because Muslim women are considered oppressed in the Dutch public debate, most of the girls perceive it is important to stress that they make their own decisions, especially concerning Islam. These decisions are not forced on them

14 Wheeler (2002).

15 Bastani (2000).

16 Georgiou (2002).

17 Bastani (2000).

by their family, culture, or religion. In that sense Dutch-Moroccan youth are involved in a process of individualization.

The various lively debates stimulate them to reflect about issues that are of great significance for their identity formation. Visitors discuss many different issues and sensitive topics in a way they would never do in public face-to-face meetings. This anonymity lets them speak more freely and is a vital outlet. Furthermore, the interactions with other visitors give the participants a sense of belonging when they discover there are others who have similar problems and they can learn from their advice. The debates also help make Dutch society aware that a new generation of Dutch-Moroccans has emerged, one that is assertive, emancipated, and finds its inspiration in Islam.

*Els Vanderwaeren*

## Perceptions of Islam among highly educated Muslims in Flanders

### **Introduction**

This article is based on the results of a study into the role of Islam in the daily lives of young, highly educated Muslims of mainly Moroccan or Turkish origin, living in Flanders, Belgium.<sup>1</sup> The collection of qualitative data for the study was conducted in Flanders between September 2001 and February 2003. I will first give some background information on the Muslim population in Europe before presenting some results of our analysis, which indicate the importance of Islam as a factor for social cohesion in Europe.

### ***The Muslim population in Western Europe***

Approximately 11 million Muslims<sup>2</sup> live in Western Europe.<sup>3</sup> This number covers an average of four percent of the total European population. This relatively low percentage of Muslims in Western European countries contrasts sharply with the high visibility of this population group, which is mainly concentrated in urban regions.

As elsewhere in Western Europe, the presence of different Muslim communities in Belgium results from migration from non-European countries. This migration has changed the local population's social scene profoundly, and it continues to do so.

On the other hand, for European Muslims, affinity with a global religious movement that transcends national boundaries has become a basis of moral solidarity.<sup>4</sup> It allows them to participate in a type of group solidarity that is legitimized by supranational discourse. This is a movement that transcends people's precarious socio-economic situations and accepts them as individuals, regardless of their personal status.

Three distinctive circumstances account for the growing visibility of Islam in Belgium and elsewhere in Western Europe since the end of the 1980s. The first is the international revival of Islam, the second is the nature of the institutionalization of Islam in Belgium, and finally there is the significance of Islam as an 'identity marker' for an increasing group of citizens. However, numerous factors are involved, and the situation varies considerably from one European country to another. For instance, there are differences in national and local community building, as well as different migration histories and motivations for migration.<sup>5</sup> As in other European countries, the Islamic landscape in

1 Van der Heyden, Geets, Vanderwaeren & Timmerman (2005).

2 Included in this number are both practising and non-practising Muslims, as well as those of Muslim origin who have become atheist or agnostic.

3 Dassetto (2001) 17.

4 Cammaert (1985); Ghequière (1998); Hermans (1994); Timmerman (1999).

5 More information about the factors influencing the development of Islam in Belgium: Lesthaeghe (2000) 130.

Belgium is quite diverse. The two main Muslim communities in Flanders (Turkish and Moroccan), are separated by ideological and ethnic differences. Some ascribe these distinctions to differences in perceptions of Islam in their respective home countries.<sup>6</sup>

In Belgium, religions<sup>7</sup> that have been formally recognized by the state can obtain financial support towards for example the cost of setting up a representational organization for secular affairs. The Muslim communities had been established in Belgium for twenty-five years before they were able to take advantage of these opportunities. As in other European countries, Belgium has seen Islam rise to become the second most commonly professed religion in the country. However, not until in 1993 was a resolution formulated that was acceptable to both Muslim communities and public authorities alike. The Executive Body of Muslims in Belgium, a temporary interlocutor with limited public powers, was set up following long negotiations between the various Muslim communities. It is essential that this representative body be recognized unanimously by all Muslim groups, however, internal ethnic differentiations and disputes still hamper its smooth operation.

In addition to the above-mentioned differences within the Muslim community, and amid tensions related to both local and global issues, a 'local Islam' is emerging among highly educated young Muslims in Belgium.<sup>8</sup> In this chapter, we attempt to elucidate the beliefs and praxis of these young Muslims in our society.

### ***Subgroup of highly educated Muslims***

The present study investigates the perceptions Islam of among highly educated, mainly second generation Muslims in Flanders. There is a special focus on the differences between men and women in this regard. Our decision to select highly educated Muslims from Moroccan or Turkish backgrounds as our target group was prompted by the assumption that they represent subgroups within their communities. From our perspective, these subgroups occupy a valuable position in Flemish society. In general, school-going children from a Moroccan or Turkish background have fewer opportunities to succeed in education than members of the indigenous population. This limits their options within society, such as entering the labour market.

To obtain an idea of the importance of Islam among less disillusioned young Muslims, we decided to restrict our interviews to past and present students with successful educational careers. Sixty-one in-depth interviews with highly educated Muslims were used in our analysis. The topics covered included the role played by Islam in the individual's daily life, the subject's education, and their religious identity (or their search for such an identity). Even within our relatively small subgroup of highly educated Muslims, we found an enormous diversity in terms of their perceptions of Islam.

6 Lesthaeghe (1997).

7 In Belgium the state recognizes and financially supports various religions (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican, Jewish and Muslim).

8 Dassetto (2001).

### ***Being the 'other'***

This analysis has established that our respondents define themselves as different. They see themselves as differing from groups such as the first generation, the less well educated members of their peer group, and members of the indigenous community. The Turkish man in the following interview is talking about the differences between him and his less well educated friends:

- interviewer: And your other Turkish friends?
- respondent: Those who are not highly educated? Yes, well, they are more conservative. They are not open-minded to other religions and cultures. That is actually something of a problem. (...) I think a student, or highly educated Muslim, has a completely different opinion about Islam and about other religions.
- interviewer: So you noticed a difference?
- respondent: Difference? Mmm, that's what I noticed. Most highly educated individuals, about 90%, share a common vision in this regard.
- interviewer: Ninety percent of highly educated Muslims you mean?
- respondent: Yes, they have the same vision. (*man, Turkish origin*)

In the construction of identities, people generally give greater emphasis to any differences between themselves and others. This is a common phenomenon in the process of defining oneself. One's self only exists by virtue of 'being different'.

The pressures of having to reconcile the demands of different living environments have contributed to the development of a complex religious identity structure in our respondents. Beyond the confines of their immediate living environment, as members of a Muslim community in Europe they find themselves in the middle of a debate about how believers should live in non-Islamic societies. As a consequence of this search at the communal and individual level, in their discourses our respondents see Islam as flexible and open to interpretation (or re-interpretation):

- respondent: In principal, that is what is said. The book is finished. It is made forever. That might be true. That is true. Yes, but the book is from a certain historical time period, it has to be interpreted to meet the needs of modern society. So, I say it does not have to be fixed. There has to be space for interpretation, but this does not mean a rewriting of the Qur'an. (*man, Turkish origin*)

At the same time, we found that their religion functions as a stepping stone, and as a highly individual way of observing the world around them:

- respondent: We grew up as Muslims. Eh, the Muslim identity is very important now. And was very important in the past. It was our *leitmotiv* in the educational process. (*woman, Moroccan origin*)

Their perception of Islam is not a static one. The shifts in these individuals' perception

of their belief are part of an ongoing and lifelong process. The 'alienation' of a community in diaspora, and its separation from the 'natural setting' of the homeland, give rise to an intensive search for identity, and to discussions regarding its nature.<sup>9</sup>

Our respondents illustrate the ongoing and lifelong nature of this process by drawing a clear distinction between their current perceptions of Islam and the views that they held during their primary socialization. The respondents describe how their parents, first generation migrants, developed, duplicated and preserved their own identities, cultural traditions and their religion after migrating to Belgium. They invested in the development of migrant networks, mosques, Islamic butcheries, and migrant organizations. They had little or no interest in building bridges with the indigenous society. On the contrary, the older Muslims had a profound and sustained fear of losing their core identity, as well as a distrust of indigenous groups in Belgian society. The respondents taking part in the present study felt that they had a more individualized interpretation of religious prescriptions and symbols:

- respondent: There are basic rules in Islam. You may not violate them, whatever your level of education.
- interviewer: And what are your own views on this matter?
- respondent: I think it is bullshit. I try to understand why some people really believe and accept everything that exists in the religious book. They do, don't they? But, I believe that the Book is too stiff. We need some flexibility. Things are written in the Book that are not possible anymore. (*woman, Moroccan origin*)

The respondents find support in the diasporic notion of a universal Islam that transcends the borders of nation states. In our study, we found that ethnic territorial disconnection (such as that experienced by those living in the context of a diaspora) has prompted our respondents to develop other 'identity markers'. These markers designate their membership of the universal Muslim community or *umma*<sup>10</sup> rather than of the local Muslim community established by first generation Muslim migrants:

- interviewer: What do you understand by *umma*?
- respondent: Belonging, belonging to a group. This time a religious belonging. It means belonging to a group wherever you are. (*man, Syrian origin*)

### ***A successful symbiosis***

Our respondents are searching for a constructive symbiosis between their families' values and norms and the perceived values and norms of 'the others' at high school, college and university. When an individual commences a course of higher education, their borders concerning what is 'tolerable' shift almost automatically:

<sup>9</sup> Mandaville (2001) 136.

<sup>10</sup> The headscarf is such a symbol of another 'identity marker'. More information can be found in Van der Heyden, Geets, Vanderwaeren & Timmerman (2005).

respondent: At home, education is seen as being very important. And I soon realized that when I tried harder at school and got good results, I was allowed to go out and to stay out a bit longer. ... I noticed that things became easier as a result. As long as everything went well at school, I was allowed more freedom.  
(*man, Moroccan origin*)

The parents of most of our respondents are conveying a complex message. On the one hand they see integration as undesirable because they fear that this will inherently involve the loss of their ethno-religious identity. On the other hand, they have to safeguard their socio-economic future in Flemish society at formal levels of participation, such as education. For many Muslims, their first intense contact with the indigenous population and society occurs at secondary school. This is all the more true of those who are transferred to a school that has no clear ethnic concentration of pupils. Experiences of this kind are described as difficult but useful. It gives such Muslim pupils a different perspective on their own ethnic, cultural and religious identity. Particularly in situations like this, our respondents can relate to the parental message of retaining their ethno-religious identity. While the schools in question often verbally expressed our respondents' 'right to individuality', the Muslim pupils perceived non-verbal signals conveying a negative attitude towards their ethno-religious identity. Our respondents describe the pressure they experience from both sides, and reveal how any tendency on their part to favour one side immediately results in punishment by the other side:

respondent: I grew up between two worlds. I have no problem being in the company of Belgians, but it can sometimes be easier to be among Moroccans. I do not always have to explain, tell untruths or the like, so it is easier. (...) But if I were to marry a Belgian rather than a Moroccan, then I certainly wouldn't get off easily. It would cause a break with my family. Yes, oh dear! (*woman, Moroccan origin*)

Without wanting to make a choice, respondents seek a worthy middle course in their search for an identity. In doing so, they rely less on cultural, traditional and ethnic aspects, which they consider to be conservative, traditional and often 'negative'. They reframe their religious identity from a new Islamic point of view. This Islamic framework is an individual construction in which Islam is disconnected from territorial boundaries and replaced by the universal elements of their religion.

A growing number of young Muslims define their religion in terms of their own choices, i.e. those observances that they are prepared to follow, and those that they are not. The fact that they live in a secular environment forces them to undertake their own personal quest, characterized by individual choice rather than traditional Islam. For our respondents, this leads to a real search for understanding rather than the passive adoption of a religion. Their praxis is privatized and internal, rather than shared and public:

respondent: Look, when I turned seven, my parents told me that I had to pray. So I would go upstairs for five minutes and let them think I had prayed. That's what my cousins do. So, okay, I do not always pray, I am not a perfect religious person, but I am more honest. Now, when I pray, I do so with conviction. I feel a connection with God while I am praying. (*woman, Moroccan origin*)

Many respondents oppose the cultural traditions that their parents brought with them when they migrated, because they see them as old-fashioned:

respondent: No. There are differences between my parents and me. But at the same time there are similarities as well. There will be differences between my children and me. That is clear, and surely logical? Do we not have to move with the times? (*man, Turkish origin*)

The respondents argue that certain usages and practices are not so much Islamic but more part of the culture of their country of origin. Their parents find this quite shocking, having spent their entire lives believing that their culture was based on Islamic foundations:<sup>11</sup>

interviewer: Are there ideological differences between your grandparents, your parents and yourself?

respondent: Not concerning Islam, but certainly with regard to culture. Yes. But that is not Islam, just culture. It was passed down to them by their parents, but it does not always make sense in religious terms. (*man, Moroccan origin*)

When discussing the aim of creating a transnational Islam, our respondents talked about the concept of the *umma*. On this basis, they espoused the idea of a 'Muslim being' that is related to values and behaviour, rather than to the country that you are from or where you live. This brings religion into the sphere of individual choice, doing away with its social dominance and its strong ties to the surrounding culture.<sup>12</sup>

When Muslim migrants came to Western Europe, they brought their Islamic belief with them. This Islam included popular local religious practices and local references to religious authority. As a result, many different local forms of Islam sprang up in the host societies. Now, Muslim communities everywhere have to decide which aspects of their Islam are contextual and negotiable and which must remain intact because they are essential and universal<sup>13</sup>. In doing so, the main problem facing the communities of the Islamic

11 Vertovec (2001) 111.

12 Cesari (1998).

13 In the spread to non-Islamic societies and cultures, Islam is subjected to a dual process of universalization and localization. This means that a distinction has to be made between what is essential and not open for negotiation (or the process of universalization) and what is changeable and adaptable to local customs and needs (or the process of localization); Van Bruinessen & Allievi (2002).



diaspora assumes a new urgency. How are they to acquire religious legitimacy, authority and knowledge for their own discourse when it often contradicts that of the traditional *ulama*?<sup>14</sup> In addition, these Muslims typically lack a well founded theological and theoretical knowledge of Islam. The main group of Muslims in Belgium received little education in Islam, and then only at a very basic level.<sup>15</sup> This engendered a need, in subsequent generations of Muslims, to seek out the roots of their religion. Our respondents want to read and analyse the religious scripts personally. They are trying to separate cultural tradition from belief. In their view, conflicts between Islam and modernity, for example, are based on an 'incorrect reading' or 'different interpretation' of Islamic sources:

respondent:            There are indeed different interpretations. A scholar in Morocco may have one interpretation, while in China a totally different interpretation is used. These are different interpretations of Islam.  
(*man, Moroccan origin*)

To narrow the gap between different interpretations, they develop arguments to support a personal reading of Islam that would allow Muslims to participate actively in a secular Western society. In this way, as European Muslims<sup>16</sup>, they provide daily proof that their religion is indeed compatible with modernity, and with the preservation of a critical attitude towards Western values:

respondent:            Tarik Ramadan's renewal is removing the distinction between the area of war and the area of Islam. For him, a secular context can be an Islamic context. And as a Muslim in a secularized society, you have to accept secularity while remaining a good Muslim. You do not need to de-secularize the context to be a good Muslim. Individuals can have a personal Islamic programme for the society in which they find themselves. When you become aware that something in economy goes against your principles, you can simply search for an alternative, or create one. (*woman, Moroccan origin*)<sup>17</sup>

The appearance of local forms of Islam involves a struggle for emancipation that is oriented towards the traditional interpretation of Islam. These local, European forms of Islam involve shifts in the meaning of various religious concepts. They lead to the development of personal interpretations, which represents a breakthrough in terms of the monopoly on religious knowledge. This gives highly educated people an opportunity to become the new shapers of opinion.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, we notice among the respon-

14 Van Bruinessen & Allievi (2002).

15 Renaerts (1994).

16 What the content of a European Islam is, is still unclear and is not a central issue of this contribution.

17 Ramadan (2003).

18 Bartelink (1994) 28-29; Babès (1997) 17,115; Nielsen (1995); Sunier (1996) 218; Bunt (2000); Allievi (2001).

dents a general interest in an 'orthodox', or pure Islam. They feel that this gives them the progressive dynamism to distance themselves from their traditional family roots, which – being more alienated – reject Western cultural norms. Nielsen<sup>19</sup> indicates here also that the emphasis is increasingly on underlying ethical values and spiritual principles.

The religious orientation of the respondents in this study is the result of a massive tangle of forces, which cannot easily be untangled. It does not exist in a linear relationship with a given generation's educational level or socio-economic stratum. The reality is far more complex than that.

<sup>19</sup> Nielsen (1987) 392.

Anas Talbi

## Jeunes immigrés de culture musulmane en Hollande entre traditionalisme et modernité

Dans une société en pleine mutation, les individus et les collectivités se trouvent confrontés à la question du difficile équilibre entre traditionalisme et modernité, soulevée par la mondialisation de l'économie et de la culture. Cette question est corrélativement liée à celle de la personne et de son identité. En fait, ce sujet, que j'ai déjà abordé dans mes recherches antérieures,<sup>1</sup> bénéficie d'un intérêt accru dans la mesure où les changements qui affectent les sociétés de l'époque moderne mettent à l'épreuve nos systèmes de valeurs et nos identités. Au moment où l'insécurité, la criminalité et le terrorisme international donnent lieu à des obsessions sécuritaires, nous constatons non seulement une diminution de la justice sociale et des libertés individuelles, mais aussi une tentation du repli identitaire. Qu'en est-il pour la communauté marocaine en Hollande?

Si l'immigration marocaine a connu d'importantes transformations sociologiques et démographiques, avec un processus d'implantation largement avancé et une volonté d'intégration de plus en plus affirmée, les cas de réussite sociale de certains jeunes ne sauraient masquer l'impact du chômage qui frappe les jeunes immigrés dans une proportion beaucoup plus large que la moyenne nationale. Ainsi s'accroît chez eux un sentiment d'exclusion et de marginalisation. La précarité socio-économique les pousse parfois à se manifester dans des comportements déviants ou délinquants. De plus, depuis les années 1990, la violence intégriste est de plus en plus perçue comme un dangereux phénomène émergent dans 'les quartiers islamistes'.

Vu les limites des analyses classiques socio-économiques, pouvons-nous avancer l'hypothèse de la crise identitaire comme explication des troubles de comportement chez certains jeunes immigrés, qui ont du mal à vivre entre deux pays et deux cultures? A vrai dire, les troubles psychologiques qui affectent la population mondiale constituent un sujet auquel s'intéresse, à juste titre, l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé (OMS). En effet, dépression, suicide et autres troubles de l'enfance et de l'adolescence sont des phénomènes qui inquiètent désormais toutes les sociétés et qui seraient directement liés à la crise de l'identité.

Cette étude vise à souligner l'importance de la santé mentale des immigrés, rendus particulièrement vulnérables par le choc des cultures. Elle a ensuite pour objectif de chercher des réponses en vue du maintien des équilibres socio-psychologiques chez des jeunes qui vivent parfois difficilement leur double culture, leur double identité, leur double nationalité et des valeurs tiraillées entre traditionalisme et modernité. La problématique traite donc l'emprise de la crise identitaire chez les jeunes issus de l'immigration marocaine sur le processus psychopathologique et analyse la relation entre identité et inté-

<sup>1</sup> Talbi (2002a) et Talbi (2002b).

gration d'une part, et identité et culture d'autre part pour souligner ensuite le rôle de l'apport identitaire dans la construction d'une personnalité équilibrée et bien intégrée.

### ***Maturation criminelle ou immaturation identitaire?***

Le tragique assassinat du cinéaste Theo Van Gogh par un jeune néerlandais d'origine marocaine a soulevé sur la scène publique l'importante question de la place et de l'avenir du million de musulmans vivants aux Pays-Bas. Ce crime, qui a indigné les Néerlandais, qui y voient une atteinte à la liberté d'expression, intervient dans un contexte de radicalisation du débat politique national et européen sur des questions liées à l'immigration, telles que notamment l'intégration des jeunes de culture musulmane. Il s'est ajouté à un climat pesant, survenu après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, dans lequel Arabes et musulmans font l'objet de stigmatisations et de discriminalisations.

La question qui s'est aussitôt posée était de savoir si cet assassinat était un crime banal ou un crime idéologique prémédité, dans le droit fil de l'intégrisme islamiste.

Dans les deux cas, bien que la deuxième piste soit définitivement privilégiée, puisque, selon la police, l'assassin, Mohammed Bouyeri, jouait 'un rôle clé' dans le groupe terroriste islamiste Hofstadgroep, il serait judicieux d'en tirer les leçons qui s'imposent.

Pour traiter le sujet, nous avons choisi, comme fil directeur, le thème de l'identité, qui constitue un des problèmes centraux des sciences sociales et qui ne cesse de poser des interrogations, à la fois à l'intégré et à l'intégrateur.

Lorsque nous parlons de l'identitaire, nous sous-entendons, bien sûr, cette dynamique conflictuelle qui risque de se transformer parfois en dynamique criminelle, voire terroriste. Nous retrouvons cette dynamique au cœur même de l'itinéraire de certains jeunes issus de l'immigration marocaine. Les conflits jalonnant leur parcours personnel découlent des différents antagonismes qui les empêchent d'être en symbiose avec leur soi identitaire. La description des antagonismes constituant cette dynamique commence par celle de l'antagonisme socioculturel, qui développe le contrôle social par le biais des travailleurs sociaux, et l'antagonisme socio-politique, qui développe le contrôle policier et judiciaire, plus répressif. Ces deux types de contrôle sont motivés par la sécurité des biens, des personnes et de l'État. Dans ce cadre, les jeunes issus de l'immigration marocaine souffrent de la xénophobie raciste, du rejet et de l'indifférence. 'Les marginaux des banlieues, les minorités, les jeunes qui 'galèrent' ne sont pas exploités comme autrefois les classes ouvrières ... Ils sont ignorés et méprisés. Ils n'accèdent plus à la représentation politique. Ils sont relégués à la périphérie de nos villes ... La violence, les émeutes trahissent la brutalité de l'exclusion subie et l'ampleur des frustrations éprouvées, notamment par les jeunes privés d'avenir.'<sup>2</sup>

La stigmatisation au niveau individuel et collectif constitue un autre mal dont souffrent ces jeunes. Ainsi, après le chômage qui les frappe doublement, arrive, en 1989, l'affaire du voile islamique, qui stigmatise quatre millions de musulmans de France. Il s'agit là d'indices du grand vide politique, du fatalisme et du sentiment d'abandon qui s'installent finalement dans les banlieues. Selon Goffman, 'la société établit des procédés ser-

<sup>2</sup> Dubet et Lapeyronnie (1992).

vant à répartir en catégories les personnes et les contingents d'attributs ordinaires et naturels chez les membres de cette catégorie.<sup>3</sup> Ces attributs circonscrivent des identités sociales. Goffman appelle 'stigmatisation' ce processus de catégorisation lorsqu'il a pour effet de discréditer la personne en l'enfermant dans une présentation dévalorisée. Il distingue trois types de stigmates désignant les anomalies du corps, des déviances – aux yeux d'autrui – du caractère comme délinquance, drogue, homosexualité, ou encore des attributs collectifs comme ethnies, nationalités, religion.

Selon Moumen-Marcoux, 'les stigmates dont la population maghrébine peut souffrir sont liés au mot 'immigré'. Les jeunes 'immigrés' qui, rappelons-le, ne le sont pas pour la plupart, sont des 'Beurs', des 'Arabes' ... des 'bougnoles'<sup>4</sup>... des banlieusards<sup>5</sup>. Derrière la désignation 'étranger' se cache un caractère discriminatoire par rapport à leur culture, leurs croyances et coutumes ... Avec l'image de l'islam, leur religion deviendrait elle-même un stigmate les excluant et les rejetant.

Plusieurs chercheurs en sciences sociales, qui ont traité la question identitaire chez les populations immigrées, se sont posé les questions suivantes: l'identité est-elle un facteur d'intégration nationale ou de repli communautaire? Et dans quelle mesure peut-elle constituer un facteur de crise ou, au contraire, d'équilibre psychosocial?<sup>6</sup>

La situation de crise issue du 11 septembre 2001 a donc obligé les sociétés occidentales à formuler des questions autour de leurs citoyens de culture musulmane, ainsi que sur leurs politiques d'intégration. Or, c'est dans un contexte d'intégration difficile, sur fond de crise identitaire et sous la pression croissante de revendications socio-économiques et politico-religieuses que la délinquance des jeunes risque de s'aggraver. La thèse de la crise identitaire ne servirait pas seulement à expliquer les troubles de la personnalité, mais aussi ce mal des banlieues qui frappe des populations reléguées, les poussant ainsi à retrouver de nouvelles racines, origines ou groupes d'appartenance.<sup>7</sup> Dans la mesure où la violence intégriste a durement frappé la société néerlandaise, ce phénomène y apparaît comme le paroxysme de l'inadaptation psychosociale de certains jeunes immigrés de culture musulmane ayant du mal à vivre entre traditionalisme et modernité.

Il est important de souligner que le processus de la violence commence souvent à un âge précoce et qu'il est jalonné par une suite de troubles de comportement, de déviances et d'actes de délinquance graves. Nous avons pu déduire lors de nos recherches antérieures sur les jeunes délinquants d'origine maghrébine en France<sup>8</sup> que leur délinquance est en majeure partie une délinquance d'acquisition de biens. Nous avons conclu que, si le problème socio-économique était à la source des délits contre les biens, le terrorisme islamiste serait quant à lui plutôt lié aux troubles identitaires et aux carences cul-

3 Goffman (1968) et Goffman (1975).

4 Ce mot, utilisé comme injure raciste, vient du wolof.

5 Moumen-Marcoux (1998) 34.

6 Bayart (1996), Beauchard (1981), Liauzu (1999), Moessinger (2000), Gurr et Harff-Boulder (1994), Thual (1995).

7 Duprez & Hedli (1992).

8 Talbi, op.cit.

turelles. Dans le cas néerlandais, il est nécessaire de souligner que les idées obscurantistes ou salafistes-jihadistes qui s'infiltrèrent de plus en plus parmi les jeunes immigrés exposent les plus vulnérables d'entre eux à la manipulation mentale, voire à la violence intégriste.

Le phénomène n'est pas propre à la France, à l'Espagne ou aux Pays-Bas. Il touche aussi le Maghreb, dont l'Algérie en premier lieu, mais aussi le Maroc. En effet le terrorisme islamiste local a frappé le 16 mai 2003 Casablanca, faisant quarante quatre morts, outre les quatorze jeunes kamikazes. Bien qu'ils soient tous autochtones et provenant de bidonvilles et des quartiers défavorisés, où règnent ignorance, misère et chômage, il est nécessaire de chercher les causes de leur violence, non seulement dans la crise socio-économique, mais aussi dans la crise identitaire. Cette crise devient parfois très destructive en raison du choc culturel qui les frappe dans un Maroc qui se veut moderne, alors que les possibilités de profiter des avantages de la modernité y sont extrêmement rares et que les mentalités y sont encore conservatrices et conformistes.

Comment est-il possible pour ces jeunes, notamment pour ceux issus de l'immigration marocaine, de maintenir l'équilibre d'une personnalité épanouie et d'une identité bien intégrée dans leur milieu de vie? Comment serait-il possible d'observer le bon équilibre entre traditionalisme et modernité?

### *L'identité, vers un équilibre souhaité*

La violence intégriste serait-elle la preuve d'un échec et d'une remise en question de la politique d'intégration des jeunes immigrés de culture musulmane? Pour répondre à cette interrogation, il faut savoir, tout d'abord, que l'identité immigrée se fabrique par l'affirmation de son contenu propre. Elle n'est pas seulement l'autre de l'identité dominante. Elle est basée sur un héritage et une histoire spécifiques, que les groupes immigrés cherchent à conforter en les appuyant sur des formes d'organisation sociales et collectives, et dont elles veulent obtenir la reconnaissance en revendiquant leur légitimité dans la société d'accueil, au besoin en lui donnant un prolongement politique. Cette action identitaire est traduite par des demandes d'accès à l'espace public et par la recherche d'une visibilité culturelle. Cependant, les multiples conflits locaux autour de la construction des mosquées et de l'affaire du foulard islamique, à titre d'exemple, ont montré toute la difficulté pour la société d'accueil du migrant à accepter intimement la présence musulmane au-delà de la simple rhétorique de la tolérance.

Aussi, l'intégration s'avère profondément paradoxale. Son succès suscite l'apparition de cette différence au cœur même de l'identité collective. En effet: l'on voit l'Arabe et pas la personne. Pour les groupes dominants, cette construction ne constitue pas une mise à distance, mais une purification. Elle relève d'une logique du soupçon. La différence est vécue comme une sorte d'opacité de l'immigré, sommé d'être transparent et sujet de débats publics. Certes, il est bien devenu un individu qui a accédé à la modernité et à la rationalité et s'est pleinement assimilé: il a oublié sa langue d'origine, et ne pratique plus la religion de ses parents, son conjoint est un national, son identité a été digérée et ne se manifeste plus, ou presque plus, dans des pratiques culturelles spécifiques. Cependant, en marge de grands sacrifices, une véritable intégration citoyenne reste hypothétique et lui est même refusée.

Pour les immigrés, l'identité fonde une zone intermédiaire, une sorte de sous-société dans laquelle l'immigré peut trouver les appuis et les ressources nécessaires pour affronter le choc social et culturel de la société d'accueil. Telle est l'une des conclusions les plus anciennes d'enquêtes sociologiques effectuées au début du 20<sup>ème</sup> siècle par les sociologues de l'École de Chicago: l'intégration est un processus actif et collectif, qui se traduit par la construction d'une identité intermédiaire, permettant aux immigrés de gérer les tensions affectives, religieuses, culturelles et sociaux propres à toute forme d'exil.

Pourquoi donc la communauté musulmane serait-elle plus réfractaire à l'intégration? Parce que celle-ci serait synonyme d'assimilation intégrale. Cependant, il n'y a aucune raison pour ne pas être Arabe ou musulman et Européen à la fois, répliquent d'autres.

Par ailleurs, le racisme et l'humiliation pousseraient une minorité, se sentant culturellement agressée, à reproduire des mécanismes de repli identitaire et de rejet de l'autre. De cette représentation péjorative, les jeunes issus de l'immigration marocaine, par dépit identitaire ou par pure provocation, utilisent l'islam comme un instrument de contestation contre une société qui les stigmatise. Ervin Goffman explique la stigmatisation par un processus qui a pour effet de discréditer la personne en l'enfermant dans une présentation dévalorisée. Derrière la désignation 'étranger' ou 'issus de l'immigration' se cache un caractère discriminatoire par rapport à la culture, aux croyances et coutumes des immigrés.

Avec l'image de l'islam, leur religion devient elle-même un stigmate facteur d'exclusion et de rejet. Alors, certains jeunes, incapables d'agir positivement face à leur environnement, trouvent parfois dans la drogue et la délinquance un moyen d'exorciser leurs peurs ou de surmonter les échecs. D'autres se retournent vers les valeurs spirituelles et la pratique religieuse comme une stratégie leur permettant de surmonter la violence dont ils se sentent victimes<sup>9</sup>. L'exclusion et la montée du racisme, dont ils souffrent, ont favorisé la renaissance du mouvement communautaire s'exprimant par une certaine islamisation des quartiers.

Toutefois, la très grande majorité des jeunes qui se 'convertissent' à l'islam pratique, en réalité, une religion largement laïcisée, qui vise avant tout à reconstruire une identité collective<sup>10</sup>. En fait, ce qui pose aujourd'hui problème, c'est le décalage entre l'intégration culturelle des minorités d'origine étrangère et leur non-intégration sociale<sup>11</sup>. Face aux incidences de la modernité et de la mondialisation, face à la misère socio-économique, à la désintégration politique et aux multiples appréhensions culturelles, l'identité collective d'un groupe humain redevient le seul point stable. L'identitaire et le groupe d'appartenance deviennent pour la communauté et pour l'individu un des seuls repères structurants.

### **Conclusion**

Si l'on en croit l'adage 'plus les racines de l'arbre sont profondes, plus il peut monter haut', il serait souhaitable que nos jeunes puissent se munir d'une identité reliant la cul-

<sup>9</sup> Wieviorka (1999) 291.

<sup>10</sup> Cesari (1997) et Khosrokhavar (1997).

<sup>11</sup> Mucchielli (Internet).

ture d'origine à celle de la société actuelle. La pratique de l'islam serait perçue comme un avantage au service d'une intégration citoyenne, qui ne se fait pas par l'élimination des traits culturels, mais au contraire par leur mise en valeur. Voilà pourquoi il faudra rationaliser et moderniser ce référent culturel afin de concevoir un islam européen adapté à son nouveau contexte. Ceci implique aussi la nécessité de l'expliquer, de l'organiser et de le banaliser, attendu qu'il fait désormais partie intégrante du paysage sociologique européen. Il s'agit d'une question de reconnaissance et d'estime de soi nécessaire au bien-être personnel, dans la mesure où, pour l'équilibre de la personnalité, il est nécessaire de trouver l'équilibre de son soi identitaire, sans déficit, ni excès.

Nous soulignons sur ce plan l'importance du rôle, à réactiver, des grands intégrateurs sociaux, à commencer par la famille qui est le berceau d'une personnalité équilibrée et le premier agent de socialisation de l'enfant. Les enfants des familles immigrées sont les premières victimes du dysfonctionnement de l'institution familiale, mise à rude épreuve sur le plan social et culturel. L'absentéisme des parents dans le processus éducatif de leurs enfants, tout comme le manque de communication dans les familles, constituent un des principaux facteurs de dysfonctionnement social.

Il sera aussi nécessaire de réviser les mécanismes d'intégration et l'importance du rôle des partis politiques dans l'encadrement des jeunes, ainsi que celui de l'école. En effet, l'éducation et la formation sont certainement à la base de toute insertion socioprofessionnelle.

Néanmoins, un travail supplémentaire sur soi s'imposera aussi, d'autant plus que ce soi évolue inéluctablement dans une situation de métissage et d'acculturation. Cette situation constitue, certes, une richesse, mais aussi une complexité qu'il faut savoir gérer. Comme toute idéologie, la religion pourrait être bénéfique dans la modération ou maléfique dans l'excès. Le génie de l'islam réside justement dans sa souplesse et dans sa grande capacité d'adaptation loin de toute interprétation archaïque ou fanatique. Afin de pouvoir vivre en symbiose avec leur nouvel environnement occidental, tout comme ils ont droit au respect de leur identité religieuse, les musulmans devront, à leur tour, respecter les libertés fondamentales, favoriser le dialogue et rejeter la violence.

Une meilleure compréhension de l'islam, ainsi qu'un réel investissement personnel et communautaire dans le projet national, permettront certainement aux jeunes de profiter positivement de la dynamique entre traditionalisme et modernité.



Rachid Touhtouh

## Gender identity in a high school in the North of Morocco: resistance to *hshouma* culture

### **Introduction**

Philosophers, psychologists and sociologists argue that the act of speaking or any form of expression that guarantees communication is fundamental to a human being's social and personal development. Those who defend this approach to the role of education in creating spaces for speaking are also the defenders of democratic schools. The question is, how can school educate their pupils democratically, and offer them an education in democracy? This paper proposes an approach based on Gender Theory.

Gender education is a necessary prerequisite to the democratization process, bearing in mind the role that schools play in the socialization process and in the construction of identity. Gender education is a cornerstone for the promotion and integration of human rights values in schools. Gender education, or engendering education, is an essential component of an education based on equality and citizenship. In fact, this paper sheds light on the idea that any pedagogical reform necessitates integrating gender education as the core area of the process of modernizing our educational system.

The question this paper attempts to answer is: how can educators promote and integrate an education based on gender theory? The present paper attempts to answer this question by adopting a bottom-up approach, that is to say, by teaching these values and sensitizing students to them. This requires a knowledge of students' perceptions and representations because they are the basis of processes through which meaning is produced. One must also allow them to express their thoughts and feelings, and consider them as active actors in the process.

Practically and methodologically, this paper is the result of fieldwork that was conducted at the *Lycée Imam Shoutaibi*, a high school in the Ghafsai region, in the north of Morocco. Students at this school were interviewed during lessons in the classroom. The method adopted for the interviews was specifically chosen to elicit students' perceptions on gender identity in an educational space.

The present paper, which answers and analyzes these issues, is organized as follows. The first part is mainly methodological in nature, providing information on methods of research. It also explains the purpose of the paper and its importance to gender studies. The second part is purely theoretical. A set of concepts will be defined and conceptual frameworks will be debated. The third part sets out the practical aspects of the paper. It sets out and analyzes the results of the fieldwork. Its final section deals with recommendations, suggestions and measures for effective engendered co-education.

### ***Gender role socialization: theoretical framework***

Feminist theorists and activists argue that it is the very transmission of culture and social hierarchies in schools that reproduces gender differences. They evaluate the way in which teaching contributes to the maintenance of sexual divisions in schools. The approach used is to research overt and hidden curricula which represent the conscious or unconscious ideology of such institutions. They argue that all curricula reinforce sex-role stereotyping by encouraging girls to study 'female' subjects such as arts and biology. This reinforces existing gender stereotypes, and reduces girls' future employment opportunities. Classroom dynamics is also a critical part in the process, because it contains implicit messages about the status of men in society.

This gender gap in educational attainment gives girls a lesser status in the classroom, affecting their performance and hindering their commitment to subjects. At an international conference on Women and Education, the same line of reasoning was followed:

'Scientific research must aim to pinpoint the tools that can be used to make changes in social attitudes, as well as policies in favour of women. School and family are two spaces where the image of women has to be polished and improved. School manuals are generally imbued with a great deal of sexism and gender discrimination.'<sup>1</sup>

Institutions involved in socialization, especially family and schools, play a central role in gender socialization. The education system, which is a very complex space made up of assorted variables and factors, contributes to the process of inculcating dominant cultural values and beliefs on feminine and masculine identities.

### ***Representation, sexuality and adolescence***

Feminists argue that there is no separation between real relationships and representations, since the latter are also part of real experience. In a gendered world, stereotypes are framed in constructed images. Stereotypes are the only means by which children form concepts of femininity and masculinity. Representation is a process through which meaning is produced. It can also be described in the following terms:

'Feminists argue that representation continually creates, endorses, or alters ideas of gender identity. Feminist analysis...has produced many strategies for feminist practice...[so as] to use the concept of representation to move from content analysis to understanding the functions of femininity in society and how it is represented in terms of class, race and gender.'<sup>2</sup>

One aim of the development of a feminist culture, both in theory and practice, is to achieve productive social change. Such development requires a recognition of the fact that representation is a political issue, as it is of strategic importance to analyze women's subordination within patriarchal forms of representation.

1 Ennaji (2002).

2 Humm (1989) 189.

Representation functions very effectively in educational spaces, as students are not aware of it, and its supporting structures are least visible. It gives students a ready-made matrix in which to position themselves as females and males:

'The nature of femininity and masculinity is one of the key sites of discursive struggle of the individual ... it is a struggle which begins at birth and which is central to upbringing and education. At the centre of struggle is the common-sense assumption that there is a natural way for girls, boys, women and men to be. This gives rise to a battle to fix particular versions of femininity and masculinity as natural.'<sup>3</sup>

Gender identity is fixed through various activities, roles and behaviours. In the context of adolescents, it enables them to understand their bodies and sexualities. Social representation of sexuality as an identity of the adolescent guarantees social positioning of the individual in his/her milieu. Sexual orientation is a crucial component of one's identity. Adolescents interpret their sexuality as the core of their self and of gendered identity. Adolescence – though a universal and civilizational phenomenon – is coloured with various particularities and specificities according to culture, tradition, stereotypes, and archetypes. In Morocco, as in other Arab-Islamic countries, adolescence is a painful phase of life for young men and women. It is a period of *hshouma*, of fear and taboo. Many girls shed tears during their first menstruation, thinking that they have been raped by God or a man while they were sleeping.

Biological difference creates cultural difference. This is an essentialist view of the socialization/acculturation effect:

'Separation creates an enormous gap in understanding. Men do not understand women...and women do not understand men and it all starts when little girls are separated from little boys in the *hammam*. At that point a cosmic frontier splits the world into two halves. The frontier demarcates the line of power. Wherever a frontier is drawn on Allah's Earth, the powerful will be on one side and the powerless on the other.'<sup>4</sup>

Adolescence and sexuality in Morocco and other Arab-Islamic countries are mystified by control strategies involving honour and shame. Adolescents have the perception that all aspects of their behaviour is subject to chronic censorship. They react by rejecting any temptation to express themselves either verbally or non-verbally. These teenagers seem to have evolved ways of surviving within a society teeming with control mechanisms for gendered identity and for any anomalies that do not meet the criteria of normalcy or cultural nurturing.

### ***Becoming gendered: gender role socialization through school discourses***

In a previous paper, I dealt with the image of women presented by school textbooks in

3 Sunderland (1995) 167.

4 Mernissi (1994) 242.

general, and those used in the teaching of English in particular. This study dealt with the role of this image in gender identity construction by means of written text and illustrations. I attempted to unveil the sexism prevalent in such textbooks. The paper provided an analysis of gender as a socio-cultural variable or construct produced by the way in which females are represented. It shows that these representations reproduce the tools of male domination and reflect attitudes towards women. Course content analysis reveals judgments, opinions and behaviours which segregate between the genders. These results indicate possible directions for future research. The course content is based on a biased division of roles, involving sexual roles that are geared to society's collective self. The women in these textbooks occupy a dependent social position, leading a life of subordination. Women are depicted either as housewives or family care-givers. The image projected by primary school textbooks is even more extreme<sup>5</sup>. These roles, which are echoed implicitly by school textbooks, have both a pedagogic function and a cultural impact:

'L'action pédagogique qui implique le travail pédagogique comme travail d'inculcation qui doit durer assez pour reproduire une formation durable, un habitus, comme produit de l'intériorisation des principes d'un arbitraire culturel capable de se perpétuer après la cessation de l'action pédagogique et par là de perpétuer dans les pratiques les principes de l'arbitraire intériorisé.'<sup>6</sup>

The cultural construction of gendered students is secured in a sustainable way through the use of such textbooks. However, these books are not the only tools for framing the identities of future citizens. The structure of the classroom and the teaching methodologies used, as well as language, are all factors that guarantee the coherent and harmonious inculcation of the values echoed by textbooks.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that other subjects also create a hierarchical division of roles, is revealed by an examination of the textbooks used in History, Geography, Islamic Education, and Philosophy. These ideological effects were deconstructed in a study of the Moroccan social model, via school debates:

'La famille, selon ces manuels repose sur un certain nombre de vertus...qui font de la famille musulmane une institution sociale où l'harmonie est la règle entre l'époux et l'épouse. Cette harmonie est basée sur la distribution des tâches et sur la complémentarité des rôles de l'homme et de la femme. La femme en tant qu'épouse et mère représente l'affection, elle doit obéir son mari qui en contrepartie doit être bon et bienveillant envers elle. Son rôle est de prendre soin de son époux, de son foyer et de ses enfants; l'homme, en revanche, détient l'autorité. Il assure la subsistance et la sécurité de la famille.'<sup>8</sup>

5 See Lemrini (1993).

6 Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) 47.

7 See Sadiqi (2002).

8 El Ayyadi (1983) 218.

The basis of personality is produced through a model of subordination/domination. School discourse perpetuates the status-quo, male domination in a society based on sexual division of labour. Acculturation through school ideologies is efficient, effective and sustainable.

A study of the significance of illustrations and images in history books, concluded that only 20% of illustrations in these textbooks depicted both sexes, the remaining 80% depicted only men. These history books made no mention whatsoever of female leaders.<sup>9</sup> School projects women's invisibility in society to inculcate in students (of both sexes) an ideal concept of family, of gender identity and of the division of space.

### ***Methodology: research design***

This paper describes the socializing effects of co-education, and their role in gender identity construction. One key issue in the promotion of gender education is sexuality, another involves values linked to being male or female. To ensure that any data collected was reliable, I spent an entire year promoting a culture of dialogue and participation in the classroom. The goal was to break with the traditional role of a teacher as the only source of knowledge and with the student's classical role as a passive receiver. Increased emphasis was also given to the teaching method used:

'Pour notre part, nous pensons que les approches qui considèrent l'élève comme un acteur à part entière sont plus propices à favoriser des valeurs basées sur l'autonomie, le sens de l'initiative de même qu'à contribuer au développement et au plein épanouissement de la personnalité de l'enfant et à son intégration dans une société libre et démocratique.'<sup>10</sup>

This atmosphere enables students to talk freely, to express themselves, and to voice their thoughts and feelings. Students are taught how to listen, speak and develop an opinion. It is a liberating approach, in the sense that this methodology is based on democracy, respect and participation.

The fieldwork involved four classes (two baccalaureate classes, one second-level class, and one first-level class). The number of students in these classes ranged from 40 to 42. I interviewed 10 or 12 students from each class, most of whom were female. I found female students to be more courageous and daring than their male counterparts. A total of 40 students were interviewed, more than 30 of whom were female. I found most female students to be intelligent and hard working. Their ages ranged from 15 to 18.

### ***Methods of research***

In the course of my research, I relied mainly on interviews as a means of data collection. Interviews are authentic in the sense that informants speak freely, without interruptions, and express themselves better. Interviews provide direct quotes that can be used later, during data-analysis and interpretation.

<sup>9</sup> Chichi and Chabli (1991) 115.

<sup>10</sup> See Sadiqi (2003), Ennaji (2005).

For greater reliability, I depended on participant observation. This meant carrying out my teaching duties while observing students' behaviour, language, and relations with other students (both in the classroom and in the school-yard). This gives me the status of outsider-insider, as far as my position as a researcher is concerned. In order to obtain additional information, I sometimes conducted informal interviews with school officials, teachers, and students from other classes. Document analysis was also part of the investigation, as were surveys of previously published studies. The study is predominantly qualitative in nature, due to the constraints of time and space.

### ***Purpose and importance***

One objective of this paper is to analyze students' perceptions of femininity and masculinity. Another is to unveil the values associated with being male or female. The third objective is to deconstruct female identity and gender ideology in an educational space. The rationale behind these objectives is to explore the effects of socialization and co-education in the construction of a gendered identity. This will help us identify the elements that need to be incorporated into a pedagogical reform based on a gender perspective.

The results of this fieldwork are of great importance to both gender studies and education studies. The aim is to employ gender as an analytical tool in deconstructing the impact of education on gendered beings, especially adolescents.

### ***Gender identities within a northern high school: students' testimonies***

As a social space, school is a site of resistance for these adolescents. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, school is a contested terrain within which these young adolescents' identities are being constructed. Secondly, it is a powerful tool in the process of identity formation. School in Morocco is a public space that brings different groups into contact with one another. Both materially and symbolically, teachers and students embody competing discourses.

Morocco is a country in which social structures are characterized by two modes of thinking: traditional and modern.<sup>11</sup> These two tendencies oppose and contradict one another in many ways. Adolescents establish an in-between space and create a harmonious link between these two ways of life. This necessitates a continual reworking of identity and self. Adolescents successfully negotiate this construction. In this context, I would like to quote De Lauretis and Allcoff's definition of identity<sup>12</sup>:

'Identity – a necessary component of the subject's agency – is attained through an on-going process of people's self-analysis, interpretation and reworking of their actual social positions, and of the meanings given to these positions through discourse.'

11 In Raissiguier (1995) 80.

12 Truchot (2000) 39.

Identity in this sense is the fruit of an individual's (or group's) interpretation and reconstruction of their personal history and particular social location, as well as the discursive context within which they find themselves.

Accordingly, gender identity formation in schools is a process of self-definitions and practices through which these students constantly modify this construction. The ways in which these young adolescents understand and interpret their position as adolescents necessitates a careful negotiation and recording of the symbols and common-sense ideas that permeate mass culture. It also necessitates exchange and communication.

Gender identity interacts with various factors. In an educational space, construction of gender identity is one of the most problematic processes of identity formation. This derives from the space itself, the age of the adolescents in question, and the changing factors within this space. Any definition of the way in which adolescents perceive femininity and masculinity necessitates an analysis of the values associated with being male and female in this particular context. The goal is to unveil female identity in particular and gender ideology in general.

### ***Co-education and gender identity construction***

The aim of this section is to analyze students' perceptions of femininity and masculinity, and the values associated with being male and female. The students interviewed discuss the importance of co-education and its effects on the relationship between girls and boys. Each wants to understand the other. Co-education allows them a space in which to meet, hold discussions, and establish friendships. At the same time, they resent the control imposed on them by parents, school officials, and teachers.

Students prefer mixed classes, in which boys and girls can interact, as they feel that this will better equip them to deal with life's challenges in future. Fatemzahra (aged 18) says: 'a mixed class is a microcosm of life ... it teaches us how to talk to boys and how to get to know their character and personality<sup>13</sup>...' Aziz (aged 19) argues that co-education is the best type of education students can receive: 'at primary school there was an enormous gulf between us. Girls sit with other girls, and boys with other boys ... at the *lycée* there is greater freedom. There is also more space for talk and interaction, although the administration is keeping a close eye on us ... as are our parents'. Shaimaa, one of the students, points out that school offers a space in which meetings with the opposite sex can take place: 'the contact with your classmates, especially boys, teaches you a lot ... I prefer co-education ... even though teachers avoid certain subjects, such as sex, for example'.

The subject to which Shaimaa is apparently referring is becoming a necessity in public schools. Most students see sexual education as an important subject and feel that it is high time they learned about it. They suggest that teachers should address these themes, since there are strict taboos against discussing such issues within families. At the same time, however, sex segregation continues to dominate the ways in which these students

13 I have personally translated all of the students' testimonies (RT).

and groups of students associate with one another. In the school-yard, for example, you will rarely see groups of male students associating with groups of female students.

Hind (aged 15) says 'Next year, I hope that school officials will create spaces for us girls to discuss feminine topics with the female teachers ... this is badly needed ... Morocco is a very patriarchal society ... we should start by discussing matters between ourselves ...'. Her strategy is to form a kind of sisterhood between females while, at the same time, opting for co-education, because she feels that this gives her power, solidarity and new ideas.

Shaimaa, a particularly daring student, broached the issue of sexuality because she is convinced that this is one of the tools of female subordination and control in schools, on the street and at home. 'I think that in school the theme [i.e. sex] should be discussed ... I wish I were a boy ... parents do not trust me ... my mother always tells me: "if you were a boy, I would not try to control you" ... I would do whatever I like ...'. Many girls suffer from this lack of confidence. Girls reject such discrimination. It alienates them at home, on the street and in class.

Maryama, another formidable girl, complains about the way her parents brought her up: 'Maryama ... wear loose clothes ... do not wear tight ones ... Maryama ... do not be late ... do not talk to boys ... boys are different from you. They have all the privileges ... we girls are controlled in everything we do ...'. Maryama deplores the socialization of girls in families and in schools. As far as she is concerned, teachers actively discriminate between boys and girls. Administrators also control girls, but not boys. The educational system reproduces the tools of subordination for girls and domination for boys.

In the *lycée*, girls are obliged to wear a garment that conceals their bodies completely. They have to wear a similar type of garment during sporting activities. Worse still, these discriminatory measures have been legally incorporated into the *lycée's* internal regulations. One teacher told me that he allows boys to be absent without permission. In the case of girls, however, he told the administration 'I don't trust girls ... a boy will lose nothing ... for a girl it creates problems for me ...'. The 'taming' aspect of the education system involves a web of discriminatory and control mechanisms that reproduce the same gender relations seen in society at large. It guarantees the continuity of the type of gender ideology and power that permeate the culture as a whole.

In another study, 73% of the adolescents interviewed described their ideal woman as one who cares for her husband, does the domestic chores, and educates her children. They added that what they appreciate in a woman is her patience and house-management skills.<sup>14</sup> This study revealed that this same idealized image of a Moroccan woman is found in all school discourses, and especially in textbooks used as reading material. The same image is found in the *Mudawwana* (the Moroccan Family Code). It is also projected at home, by subordinated grandmothers, mothers and sisters. Only 12% of these adolescents believe in, and insist on, equality between men and women.

Fatima, a brilliant baccalaureate student, is proud of her femininity. She is determined

<sup>14</sup> Ouzi (1988) 120.



to advance herself within society, so as to achieve a feeling of independence. 'Society, family, and school are a network of controlling mechanisms, they subordinate and jail boys as well as girls ... they impose a certain mode of dress, of language and behaviour on both boys and girls ... girls continue to experience discrimination in their homes, their schools, on the street, and throughout society as a whole ...'. This girl sees this web of controlling mechanisms, and their interrelatedness, in the various factors imposed by society and controlled by its institutions.

School as a tool of knowledge, par excellence, creates identities, subjects, and gendered selves that are poorly equipped for a future role as active and equal citizens. Educators should be careful and vigilant with regard to human rights, equality, tolerance and the establishment of well-balanced roles between the genders. To this end, they must also strive for the continual reform of discourses within schools.

The interviews suggest that students are acutely aware of gender asymmetry at school and within their families. Hind voices her outrage, feeling much more controlled than her brothers or other boys: 'School rules compel girls to wear blouses, while boys are free of such restrictions ... school rules oblige girls to wear a garment that conceals their bodies completely during sporting activities ... everyone controls us. Textbooks also present girls as angels ... wherever you go, eyes control you ...'. Girls resent the existence of such controls. Yet, despite their criticism, they continue to toe the line. It is a negotiation of subversion, with strict limits on the space and freedoms that they are permitted.

Shaimaa hints at the driving force behind such control: 'when we go out with boys, people assume that we are doing dishonest things'. These young adolescents are quite aware that their use of space is tightly controlled, to maintain checks on their sexuality. These controls are exerted by their parents, teachers and school officials, as well as their brothers.

On the other hand, they seem to accept the legitimacy of such constraints, to a certain extent. Ibtissam insists that she is free. 'I do not feel such control ... it is natural ... some boys and girls should be controlled ...'. Nawal explains that 'boys and girls befriend each other ... their friendship is not innocent'. Fatemzahra says that 'I should obey my parents ... I will behave the way society wishes because I am not yet independent'. These testimonies illustrate the complex nature of the cultural construction of gender identity. It is an ongoing process of self-formation and self-definition.

For these adolescents, school should be a space of freedom, democracy, participation and access to the same privileges on an equal footing. Boys and girls should enjoy these privileges without discrimination. Discrimination negates adolescents' personality, identity and creative abilities. It negates critical and reflective thinking.

### ***Elements of a pedagogical reform: Aspects of a gendered co-education***

The revision of pedagogical tools is not an easy task. It requires the involvement of specialists from every field of knowledge, but it also needs the political will to make it succeed. Any pedagogical reform must have a human face. Educators must target the human element in their discourses. For this reason, I believe that an international reference point – the values of human rights – should provide the theoretical underpinning for any such

reform. Gender theory should also provide a guideline in this regard. Sex discrimination should be firmly avoided, with equal opportunities in the teaching process as the goal.

At the level of school textbooks and pedagogies, the following aspects are worth taking into consideration. Firstly, sexual stereotypes and common sexist references are to be avoided. Textbooks should promote task-sharing between men and women both outside and inside homes. These textbooks and school discourses should project an appropriate image of women, rather than one that is adversely biased. They should stress the importance of women's participation in all spheres of life. Secondly, there is the option of creating a specifically feminist pedagogy. Here, the feminist teacher or pedagogue acts as a facilitator or coordinator in a non-hierarchical classroom environment. Failing that, the existing pedagogies, methodologies, and approaches should, at the very least, incorporate gender analysis (both as a concept and as a tool) into the practice of teaching. Thirdly, female models should be diversified, valued, and given enough space in textbooks. Fourthly, cooperative learning should be introduced. This would involve small groups of students working together to create a group dynamic, and to give girls the opportunity to emerge as group leaders. Fifthly, the classroom setting should be rearranged to create an atmosphere of cooperation, leadership and competition. The sixth point in this first level of revision is that teachers should adopt a fluid conception of gender identity. Last but not least, teachers should be aware of gender ideology, and of the fact that extreme gender ideology leads to exploitation.

Sex education and gender analysis should be integrated, to create a well-balanced gender identity in schools. These elements are of paramount importance. First and foremost, there must be a democratic climate within the school. The schools are challenged to change their whole philosophy, since this is the only way to achieve democracy, participation, access to information and freedom of expression.

At the pedagogical level, efforts must be made to sensitize mothers, bearing in mind their early and decisive role in socialization. Mothers can also play an essential role during their children's adolescence, when boys and girls turn to their parents for advice and help. As stated, schools participate in the gender construction of identities. Accordingly, students should be sensitized to gender analysis. Furthermore, schools should also provide sex education, either as a separate subject or as a component of other subjects. Gender analysis should permeate school discourses at all levels.

While encouraging adolescents to be happy and proud of what they are, school discourses must avoid perpetuating the idea that males are superior to females.

Gender analysis workshops must target teachers, administrators and students, to sensitize them to gender roles. Teacher training centres should also provide instruction in gender analysis, as part of psycho-pedagogy. All in all, more profound studies and more exhaustive analyses should be conducted on gender identity construction in Moroccan schools, in order to obtain more results.

These recommendations are the result of fieldwork, involving analysis and observation. They derive from a knowledge of the terrain. They are very practical measures, aimed at achieving a better understanding of adolescents' gender identities, and of the effects of socialization on their sense of self. There is the option of conducting a more

thoroughgoing analysis in future, as the paper presents extensive data from a fertile field of research.

### **Conclusion**

'You kill and I bury'. This sentence is uttered by many parents when taking their children to school for the first time. It reveals the foundations of our socialization system within schools and homes. This socialization involves the 'killing and burying of mal-adjusted behaviour'. In fact, both family and school, the very institutions responsible for children's education, work together to shape children's thoughts and to reconfigure them to fit the norm. School kills maladjustment and families bury it. This conscious educational strategy creates gender hierarchies in terms of behaviour and of self. By influencing our identities, this hierarchy also influences our roles in society. Gender, sex, and sexuality are interrelated variables which guarantee an ideal construction of identity.

The results of this study are qualitative in nature. They throw light on essential aspects of our educational system, aspects that are usually neglected in school reforms. In terms of research, the field of co-education and its relation to gender identity in Morocco is very much virgin territory. These studies tackle new elements in the system of education as a whole, such as textbooks, different approaches, the way in which the classroom environment and school administration are organized, as well as students' relationships and identities. The paper is a step towards the incorporation of gender education, education for equality, citizenship and human rights.

It recommends the integration of gender analysis at all levels of education, from primary schools to universities. This would facilitate a well-balanced education, greater democracy, and more participation, as well as access to rights and obligations. Integrating gender in education is the first step towards greater social equity and equality among students.

Zakaria Zakri

## Youth in the postmodern condition and the ideology of resentment

### *Introduction*

As you may have noticed, part of my title is taken from Jean-François Lyotard's book *The Postmodern Condition*. Nowadays there are a host of 'post' discourses, emerging together with postmodernism as the preferred mode of criticism and analysis. In very simple terms, postmodernity can be defined as the condition of existing in the present era of late capitalism. My aim is to discuss the position of Moroccan and Dutch youth in the context of such a condition. I would also like to approach youth as a category within our social structures, a category that tends to be politically exploited most of the time.

To return to postmodernity for a moment: a recurring element within postmodern discourse is legitimacy. The conference for which this paper was written is part of a larger event focusing on 400 years of relations between Morocco and the Netherlands. My point of departure is to investigate whether the proposal for staging such an event is legitimate or not.

Legitimacy in the postmodern condition is directly related to issues of value and position. In other words, we need to prove that a paper like this has any value. To put it another way, is this going to be a reproduction of existing relations, if indeed there are any, or is it going to form the background for producing a new mode of interaction? It is important to make sure that a contribution like this paper has a position of some kind, or, in other words, that it is put in the right context. In answering these questions, my approach will be based on proving value through positioning. I will endeavour to draw a parallel between value and position.

### *The global context*

My hypothesis is that the legitimacy of talking about Moroccan and Dutch relations lies in the context and value of such a discussion. But what is the essence of such context? I believe the present context can be identified in terms of what is known as 'the New World Order'. This in turn prompts the question: what is the nature of this order?

The term 'world order' refers to a group of political units that interact on a regular basis so as to attain mutual reliance and interdependence. The world order could therefore be said to incorporate the interaction between nations such as Morocco and the Netherlands. Another crucial point is that the hallmark of such an order is the widespread phenomenon called globalization. Globalization can roughly be defined as a historical event whose main tenet is to maximize the interconnectedness between the different parts of the world.

This interconnectedness and interdependence leaves us no option but to resist a dangerous myth, that of exceptionality. In this regard, it is crucial to realize that Moroccan officials have been committing an immense error in thinking that Morocco represents a fabulous exception with respect to Arab geopolitics. This idea has been all-encompassing. The evidence that Morocco's exceptionality is a myth was provided by the attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, which heralded its demise. Due to changes occurring in the late modern condition, such as the circulation and flow of capital across national borders, the line between what is local, national and international has become inescapably blurred. What Moroccan officials need to realize is that the world to which we citizens belong extends far beyond the territorial state of Morocco.

To sum up the first part of my paper: it is legitimate to speak of Moroccan-Dutch relations since they form part of an attempt to maximize interconnectedness and interdependence. It is this endeavour that lends 'value' to a paper such as this.

### ***The ideology of resentment***

This brings me to the heart of the matter: youth and the ideology of resentment. Last year, 2004, I attended a conference entitled '*Européen et Musulman, une espèce en voie d'apparition*' (European and Muslim: an emerging species) organized by the *Fondation Orient-Occident*. Its thesis was based on 'constructive destruction'. It set out to destroy the fashionable discursive notion of 'the endangered species'. There is a prevalent discourse that our modern environment is too negative and unhealthy to allow the emergence of new species, be they biological or cultural. The presenter placed his thesis against this backdrop. For me, however, the big question was whether or not we really have an environment in which this new species of 'European and Muslim' can appear. If we are to grasp the meaning of such a phrase, we must first study the context in which it is utilized.

The conference for which the present paper was written was organized with the aim of working towards founding a new vision of Moroccan-Dutch relations. This new relationship between Morocco and the Netherlands can therefore also be seen as a kind of emerging species. Biologically speaking, a species needs an appropriate environment in order to emerge. But do we really have this environment? My answer to this question has to be 'no' but it is even more crucial to ask: why is this the case?


At this point I would like to introduce Lyotard's concept of 'the Differend'. What is the 'Differend' all about? Consider a situation in which we have two persons, A and B, neither of whom knows the other, and each one of whom has the keys to the same apartment. If they both find themselves in the apartment at the same time, of course, one will invite the other to leave. If neither of them decides to back down, they can take each other to court. This type of conflict between two people is therefore resolvable. Each disputant is required to provide valid proof that he or she is entitled to live in the apartment. In this case, there is a common yardstick against which positions in the conflict can be measured.

In the case of a Differend, there is no way of measuring the conflict. A Differend is a conflict irresolvable 'for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments'.<sup>1</sup> As I

<sup>1</sup> Lyotard (1991) 11.

see it, this is the case between Morocco, as a part of the Arab world, and the Netherlands, as part of Europe. Although I have just placed Morocco and the Netherlands in two separate categories, it is important to realize that they come face to face through a variety of channels. The positive channel is the previously discussed interdependence and interconnectedness. A negative one is what I would like to discuss as the ideology of resentment. There is a slogan saying: 'They hate, because they hate us' which reflects deeply ingrained cultural and religious attitudes. Some analysts justify such hostility as the outcome of Western foreign policy with respect to decisive issues such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, to name but a few.

Now let us have a look at the dynamics of such an ideology. I have chosen to use a figure published by Daniel Brumberg in his study of Arab public opinion to trace the operation of such an ideology.<sup>2</sup>



At the centre, there are committed ideologues who are informed by an ideology of resentment which subscribes to the theory of conspiracy, a theory of sinister forces bent on the fragmentation of the cohesion of the Muslim community, as well as decrying the complexity of the Western individual. Consequently, such an ideology is very much characterized by identity, power and, above all, extremes.

The second circle consists of people like me: youth. We, university students, members of cultural associations and adherents to political parties are the immediate audience of such an ideology. This part of the social structure represents a source of potential recruits for the political activists at the centre of these three circles of influence.

The outer circle consists of the populace in general. It is made up of individuals and collectivities struggling for survival and, at best, achievement. Once again, youth are a pervasive presence in this circle. They are a mass who might be mobilized to espouse an ideology of resentment and there is a suitable environment for this enterprise: unemployment and the general conditions of regional and domestic crisis.




<sup>2</sup> Brumberg (2002).

I therefore consider radicalism in both the Dutch and the Moroccan context as being empowered by context, rather than being essentially powerful. The same is true of every living ideology. In other words, radicalism grows through the medium of circumstances. For instance, radical Islamists address their audience with respect to experienced conditions. They articulate the anger and alienation of youth, who because of these characteristics are predisposed to becoming recruits of resentful radicalism.

### **Conclusion**

To conclude: Moroccan-Dutch relations are characterized by a subtle state of conflict, which I have tried to identify using Lyotard's concept of the 'Differend'. There is no yardstick for resolving a conflict of this kind. Evidence for the validity of this hypothesis can be found in the answers to the following questions:

- How many institutes for European studies are there in Morocco? None.
  - How many international relations departments are there in Moroccan universities? None.
  - How many institutes for comparative theology are there in Morocco? None.
- The concept of an international orientation as something of value for Moroccan university students does not really seem to be on the agenda of Moroccan society. The absence of these elements reflects the absence of a yardstick for the present conflict between the Arab world and the West. Morocco and the Netherlands are in no way separate or exceptional cases in this conflict.










## *Part V*

# Culture



*Ouafaâ El Mesmoudi*

## Une captive hollandaise au Maroc entre tradition et modernité

### **Introduction**

L'histoire du Maroc des dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles a suscité l'intérêt de l'Europe. La course, l'esclavage, la rédemption des esclaves, le commerce, la diplomatie, l'esprit de découverte, ont fait l'objet d'une riche littérature qui témoigne de l'ampleur considérable de cet intérêt. Cette littérature européenne reste une source importante qui nous renseigne sur l'image du Maroc qu'avaient les Européens, grâce à la description qu'elle donne du Maroc et de la société marocaine vue par des gens issus de sociétés différentes, notamment en Europe.

Je m'intéresserai ici à la perception du Maroc par l'Europe vu par les yeux d'une captive. J'étudierai certaines manifestations des tensions, tantôt conflictuelles, tantôt positives, entre des aspects de modernité du personnage étudié et des sociétés – celle de sa communauté hollandaise et celle du Maroc – imprégnées de valeurs traditionnelles. Certes, l'image que se faisaient les Européens du Maroc a fait l'objet de nombreuses études. Toutefois, il faut noter que l'accent a toujours été mis sur les textes français, anglais et espagnols. Par contre, la référence aux textes hollandais reste un exercice très peu exploré.

J'entends par cette contribution présenter certains aspects de la société marocaine au dix-huitième siècle à travers la vision d'une prisonnière hollandaise, en l'occurrence, Maria ter Meetelen. J'ai fait le choix d'approcher cette question en présentant un résumé de sa vie comme il est paru dans l'introduction de son récit.

### **Qui était Maria ter Meetelen?**

Maria ter Meetelen fut baptisé dans la religion catholique le vingt juin 1704 à Amsterdam. A treize ans, elle commença à errer à travers l'Europe. Elle fut enrôlée de force pour peu de temps dans un régiment espagnol. Elle fut prisonnière à Meknès au Maroc de 1731 à 1743, et est décédée à une date inconnue, sans doute entre 1753 et 1774 à Medemblik aux Pays Bas. On ne sait à peu près rien d'autre d'elle.<sup>1</sup>

Dans son récit intitulé *L'annotation ponctuelle de la description de voyage étonnante et de la captivité remarquable et triste durant douze ans de moi Maria ter Meetelen et de l'heureuse délivrance d'icelle et mon joyeux retour dans ma chère patrie, le tout décrit selon la vérité et mon expérience personnelle*, Maria ter Meetelen relate avec minutie son vécu de captive, et plus particulièrement sa vie quotidienne au Maroc depuis le jour où elle tomba en esclavage en 1731 à l'âge de vingt-sept ans jusqu'à sa libération en 1743.

<sup>1</sup> Ter Meetelen (1956) 7.

Il ressort de la lecture du texte que sa captivité fut une expérience très riche, durant laquelle elle côtoya les hauts dignitaires du Maroc. Elle a ainsi servi successivement plusieurs rois du Maroc. Chaque fois qu'un nouveau roi accède au trône, elle devient son esclave. Ainsi, elle a passé une période de sa vie dans les palais, les bagnes des rois et les maisons réservées aux captifs mariés. Ce vécu lui a permis de décrire la situation politique, économique et sociale au cours d'une époque d'anarchie totale après le décès du grand empereur Moulay Ismail et avec les conflits de ses successeurs sur le trône.

### ***La situation politique du Maroc***

Maria ter Meetelen est arrivée au Maroc quatre ans après le décès du grand roi Moulay Ismail (1672-1727), autrement dit alors que le Maroc traversait une période de trente ans d'anarchie totale due à l'accession au trône par plusieurs sultans incompetents et pour de très brèves périodes. Cette période a connu aussi l'hégémonie du corps de l'armée noire sur l'administration et la gestion des affaires de l'état. Maria n'a pas essayé de décrire ou d'expliquer les répercussions de la situation politique de l'état sur le pays. Néanmoins cela est appréhendé au fil du récit lorsqu'elle décrit sa situation ou celle de sa famille, et sa relation immédiate avec le sultan et ses proches, et lorsqu'elle évoque la situation des captifs après un changement de sultan, attendu qu'à cette époque, les esclaves au Maroc étaient tous la propriété du roi.<sup>2</sup>

Ainsi, Maria a vécu au Maroc pendant le règne de plusieurs rois notamment: Moulay Abdellah qui a régné pendant quatre périodes,<sup>3</sup> Moulay El Moustadi qui a gouverné le Maroc pendant deux périodes, Moulay Ali El Araj, Moulay Zine El Abidine, Moulay Mohammed Ould Arbiya. Ces derniers ont régné chacun une seule fois. Nous ne nous attarderons pas sur les rois qui n'ont gouverné que pour de très courtes périodes, fait qu'elle a mentionné en parlant du troisième et du quatrième règne de Moulay Abdellah, lorsque pendant huit jours l'armée noire a proclamé la succession de quatre rois, dont certains n'ont gouverné que pendant quelques heures.

Elle a aussi mis l'accent sur le rôle important des femmes du palais dans le gouvernement du pays, surtout sous les règnes de Moulay Abdellah et de Moulay El Moustadi, qui furent les seuls rois, pendant cette période, à gouverner plus d'une fois, et dont les mères jouaient un rôle dans la gestion de l'État. Je citerai ici l'exemple le plus intéressant, à savoir celui de Khnata Bent Bekkar, mère du sultan Abdellah qui a pu rétablir l'ordre dans le pays.<sup>4</sup>

### ***La situation économique et sociale***

Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, Maria ter Meetelen a vécu au Maroc au début du dix-huitième siècle. Cette période a connu, outre le désordre politique, des crises économiques et sociales dues à la sécheresse et à la sous-production, qui plongèrent le pays dans une période de famines, de vie chère, de révoltes et d'épidémies. Maria a donné une

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem 54.

<sup>3</sup> Ibidem 28, 42, 54.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem 57.

description très riche de cette situation, qui a connu son apogée au moment du règne du roi Mohammed Ould Arbiya, entre 1737 et 1738:

‘Pendant le règne de ce roi, nous traversâmes une lamentable époque de vie chère et cela dura de 1737 jusqu’en juin 1738. Mille personnes moururent de faim, les vivants dévorèrent les morts, les mères leurs enfants, il ne resta ni un chien ni un chat, tous furent mangés, on sortit de terre les os des animaux et on les brisait entre deux pierres et on les avalait avec une gorgée d’eau, on mangeait le ciment des murs et de la paille comme les bêtes par manque d’herbes, les captifs du roi recevaient chaque jour au lieu de pain quelques poignées d’olive décortiquées de leur écorce dont l’huile avait été extraite. Jusqu’à dans la maison royale on manqua de nourriture mais on n’y mourut pas de faim. Pourtant il arriva, par centaines des pays chrétiens des bateaux chargés de blé mais cela ne servit pas à grand chose pour la ville royale, car les convois du roi et des citoyens de la ville furent pillés par les campagnards qui étaient révoltés contre le roi de sorte que la cherté dans la ville de Mekhnès était beaucoup plus considérable qu’ailleurs. Nous dûment maintenant payer deux ducats pour dix livres de froment et on n’en obtenait pas toujours et les autres éléments étaient à l’instar. Les gens n’avaient plus d’argent mais dieu fit merveille pour nous autres chrétiens car d’abord le roi libéra les Espagnols dans l’année 1736 au milieu de novembre et le dix août de l’année 1737 au début de l’époque de la cherté il laissa aller les Français de sorte que nous autres Hollandais ne restâmes que vingt huit ainsi que trois Portugais.<sup>5</sup>

### ***Tradition et modernité à travers un récit de captivité***

Dès son arrivée au Maroc, Maria ter Meetelen fit preuve d’une forte personnalité et d’une intelligence remarquable, qui l’aiderent à parvenir à ses fins. Sa situation de captivité ne l’a pas conduite à renoncer à sa personnalité de femme européenne libre et avérée par sa grande expérience du voyage. Ainsi, lorsqu’elle dû se présenter devant le roi après son arrivée à Mekhnès pour regagner son harem et se convertir à l’Islam, elle refusa avec force de renier sa foi devant le roi, prétendant qu’elle était enceinte pour y échapper. Devant son insistance, le roi décida de ne pas l’y contraindre. Elle osa même lui demander l’autorisation d’épouser l’homme qu’elle avait choisi, qui était le chef de la nation hollandaise au Maroc.<sup>6</sup>

Par ailleurs, Maria a su s’intégrer parfaitement à la vie du palais, de sorte qu’elle assurait même parfois certaines intermédiations entre le palais et des représentants de pays européens, dont témoigne sa rencontre avec l’ambassadeur de France au Maroc. Ainsi, à l’occasion du retour de pèlerinage de la mère du sultan Moulay Abdellah et de l’arrivée de l’ambassadeur de France au Maroc pour la libération des prisonniers français, ce dernier lui a confié la tâche, à l’époque considérée comme règle nécessaire de bienséance dans ce genre de missions, de présenter le cadeau qu’il avait ramené pour la mère du sultan.<sup>7</sup>

Sa personnalité et son style lui permirent également de tisser des relations d’amitié avec la famille royale, particulièrement avec la mère et la sœur du roi El Mostadi et avec

5 Ibidem 44.

6 Ibidem 26.

7 Ibidem 28, 29.

le roi lui-même. Ceci devait lui permettre de jouir d'un traitement spécial et très généreux, et de bénéficier de divers avantages. Dans son récit, elle a décrit le moment d'adieu avec la mère du roi avec une grande affection. Après l'obtention de sa liberté et dans sa dernière discussion avec le roi Almostadi – raconte-t-elle – ses compliments à la turque furent tellement beaux que le roi en fut ravi et déclara 'aussi vrai que je vis, cette chrétienne est digne d'être princesse.'<sup>8</sup>

Sur ce point, on ne peut ignorer que cette différence de caractère qui la distinguait, était perçue positivement comme un signe de personnalité féminine forte et moderne par l'élite de la société marocaine de l'époque. Ainsi, à titre d'exemple, le pacha de Tétouan, ayant beaucoup entendu parler de cette femme, fut très curieux d'avoir une conversation avec elle. Il saisit l'occasion de son voyage de retour à son pays après sa libération et son passage par Tétouan, fit venir tous les esclaves devant lui, il lui parla devant tout le monde, et, lorsque leur conversation fut terminée, 'il dit à ses gens: 'en vérité cette chrétienne est digne d'être reine.'

En lisant son récit, on s'aperçoit qu'elle expliquait ce succès et cette admiration généralement par ses qualités d'éloquence et d'audace. Elle parlait, dit-elle, de manière très polie et aimable, et était aussi capable, plus que le plus avisé des gens du pays, de faire un compliment à quelqu'un selon son rang. Elle était très à l'aise et sans crainte lorsqu'elle parlait, de sorte qu'elle osait dire ce qu'aucun d'autre dans le pays n'osait seulement penser. 'Les Maures s'exclamaient devant le pacha qu'ils n'avaient jamais entendu ou vu une femme qui sache tout dire comme Maria.'<sup>9</sup>

La forte personnalité de Maria ter Meetelen n'aurait cependant pas été pu s'épanouir si elle ne s'était pas trouvé un climat adéquat, de tolérance et de modernité. On remarque même à ce niveau une chose très importante qui peut paraître, *a priori*, paradoxale: sa personnalité 'moderne' révèle une tension avec les valeurs traditionnelles issue sous certains aspects de sa société plus que celles de la société marocaine. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne son attitude à l'égard de la conversion à l'Islam, l'on observera que ni le roi Abdellah ni la mère et la sœur du roi Mostadi ne l'avaient obligée à renier sa foi.<sup>10</sup> Ils faisaient toujours une demande qu'elle était libre d'accepter ou de refuser. Néanmoins, au sein de la communauté hollandaise au Maroc, il existait une certaine rigueur en matière de religion. C'est ce que nous avons relevé lorsque Maria relate que, lors de la maladie de son premier mari, les prêtres qui se trouvaient au Maroc, qui étaient catholiques, lui refusèrent l'entrée à l'église lors de son agonie parce qu'il était protestant. La même chose s'était produite lorsqu'elle avait voulu épouser le chef de la nation hollandaise au Maroc qui était également protestant, les prêtres exigeant son baptême et sa conversion à la religion catholique.<sup>11</sup>

De même, il est, à mon sens, intéressant de noter que dans une société considérée comme traditionnelle, en l'occurrence le Maroc, il y avait un respect des qualités 'moder-

8 Ibidem 60, 63.

9 Ibidem 65.

10 Ibidem 24, 61.

11 Ibidem 17, 19.

nes' qui se révélait dans le bon traitement dont jouissait une captive comme Maria, sans accorder une grande considération à la différence d'origine. Il est aussi important de noter que la situation des captifs chrétiens en général n'était pas aussi dramatique si on la compare avec la période de crise générale que connaissait le Maroc à l'époque. Parfois même l'on s'étonne en remarquant que Maria, quand elle parle de la libération des prisonniers chrétiens, le fait sans éprouver aucune envie envers eux et sans le moindre sentiment de nostalgie pour son pays,<sup>12</sup> sentiment dont nous remarquons la présence, par contre, dans presque tous les récits des captifs.

L'on note aussi des aspects de modernité dans la façon dont les captifs chrétiens étaient traités. Alors que les prisonniers célibataires vivaient dans les bagnes, le roi du Maroc offrait aux captifs mariés des maisons pour y vivre avec leurs familles. Les captifs chrétiens mariés étaient aussi exonérés des travaux pénibles et étaient libres de chercher du travail pour nourrir leurs familles.<sup>13</sup> Nous faisons observer que, bien que Maria ait toujours considéré Moulay Abdellah comme le roi le plus cruel pour les prisonniers, elle n'hésite pas à citer que, lorsqu'elle se plaignit de n'avoir personne pour la nourrir avec ses enfants, alors que la ville était pleine de voleurs, et qu'elle vivait seule tandis que son mari travaillait au palais de Fès, le roi lui accorda une ration équivalente à celle qu'il consentait à ses femmes légitimes, et qu'elle avait une juive à son service ainsi qu'un chrétien. Il lui a remis un pistolet avec de la poudre et des balles ainsi qu'une épée, avec l'autorisation de tuer quiconque l'accosterait pour la voler.

### **Conclusion**

Tout en signalant les limites de cette analyse micro-historique du récit, dues notamment à l'objectif de cette contribution, il est certain que la relation de Maria ter Meetelen garde son importance comme source historique qui nous renseigne sur une facette peu explorée des relations entre deux sociétés appartenant à des cultures différentes, à savoir celle du dialogue des civilisations.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem 44.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem 45.

Marianne Hermans

## Moroccan writers in the Netherlands

### *Introduction*

Since the Second World War, the Netherlands has frequently experienced flows of immigration from non-western nations. There were immigrants from former colonies in the East and the West, as well as guest workers from Spain, Italy, Turkey and Morocco. As elsewhere in the western world, non-western immigrants blend the perception of their host country with memories of their homeland. The recent growth of interest in 'hybrid' or multicultural literature shows this to be a fruitful concept for interesting narratives. The authors elaborate upon the migrant experience, also defined as 'the experience of dislocation, displacement and hybridity'.<sup>1</sup>

Literature by Moroccans in the Netherlands is frequently classified under the term 'migrant literature'. This is something of a misnomer, since most of these individuals are not really immigrants. They have either lived in the Netherlands since they were very young or they were born here. Alternative designations are 'minority literature', literature written by 'newcomers', 'multi-cultural' or 'ethnic' literature.<sup>2</sup> Hafid Bouazza refers to this discussion in his essay in *Een beer in bontjas* (*A Bear in a Fur Coat*) (2001) when he ironically proposes the term N.S.M.A.N.N. for *Nederlandse Schrijver van Marokkaanse Afkomst met een Nederlandse Nationaliteit* (Dutch Writer of Moroccan Descent with Dutch Nationality).

Whatever name is given to it, defining a piece of literature in terms of the author's cultural origin remains problematic, primarily because this practice seems to oblige authors to confine themselves to exotic themes.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, in their debut works, most multicultural writers play it smart and create an 'imaginary homeland' as Rushdie named it. Their parents' homeland is an enlivening presence in the scenery of the narrative. The protagonist, usually young and bi-cultural, experiences feelings of loss and is in search of a new identity.

Critics like to group these authors by emphasizing internal thematic commonalities and by pointing at external differences to mainstream literature. However, as Rushdie stated in his essay entitled *Imaginary homelands*, 'Literature is not in the business of copy-righting certain themes for certain groups'. Is there a specific thematic affinity that characterizes multicultural literature, besides the fact that it is written by authors who come from a different, i.e. non-western culture? If there is, then it is not so much the quest for one's roots, but rather an attempt to look forwards, into the future. In other words, to

1 Hall (1996).

2 See also Paasman (1999).

3 See also Heijne (2001).



look into the position that one chooses to take in today's multicultural society.<sup>4</sup> The protagonists in these multicultural books have to navigate between who they themselves want to be and who society wants them to be. In other words, the focus is on the subject's need to define themselves, rather than having their identity defined by others.<sup>5</sup>

### ***A short history***

Dutch publishers first focused on literature from non-Western countries in the seventies, mainly due to ideological motives.<sup>6</sup> In the eighties, the field of what was then referred to as 'Third World Literature' was divided up between a few publishing houses, each serving their own segment, such as Caribbean literature or African literature. In 1994, the publishing house *Vassallucci* was founded. *Vassallucci* claimed that they wanted to promote a new type of Dutch literature. They broke down the barriers to literary bastions by pro-actively seeking out multicultural literary talent at literary festivals, by organizing writing contests and poetry readings. Another element that should not be underestimated is the *El Hizjra* Foundation in Amsterdam. Since 1987, they have provided a platform for Arabic writing by organizing literature contests for talented young individuals from an Arabic background. Among their discoveries were Mustafa Stitou, Abdelkader Benali, Rashid Novaire, Khalid Boudou and Said El Haji, for whom *El Hizjra* functioned as a springboard to the Dutch publishing field.

The nineties saw the breakthrough of new, multicultural literature into the Dutch market. The subsequent debuts of some Moroccan-Dutch authors unleashed a storm of media attention. People focused mainly on the social value of these writer's work, trying eagerly to present them as a group, and ignoring literary standards. The theme of the National Book Week in 2001 was taken from E. du Perron's famous autobiographical novel *Het land van herkomst* (Land of Origin). This work, which was published in 1935, dealt with the Dutch East Indies. The Book Week was organized by the *Stichting Collectieve Propaganda van het Nederlandse Boek* (Foundation for the Collective Promotion of the Dutch Book). The Foundation added to the hype by asking Salman Rushdie to write the Book Week gift, a free book given to anyone who buys a book during National Book Week.

### ***The first Moroccan-Dutch authors: Moustapha Stitou, Naima el Bezaz and Hans Sahar***

Who are these authors and why is it legitimate to consider them as a group? Let's take a closer look at these questions by focusing on the debuts of some young authors from a Moroccan background. The enormous amount of media attention that greeted their debuts can be seen as a multi-cultural plot. Some of these authors succeed in creating a dazzling mixture of Dutch language, Moroccan *couleur locale*, and exotic sounds. The resultant exuberant style is something that was hitherto quite uncommon in the Calvinistic tradition of Dutch literature. Critics quickly agreed that these authors were

4 Wolffers (1999).

5 Ibidem.

6 Kuitert (2001).

innovative both in their use of language and in the subjects that they chose as their main themes. These include a father who lives in the past – imagining that he is still in his native country, a new generation abandoning their religion, and the search for a new identity by those who have grown up between two incompatible cultures.<sup>7</sup>

It all began in 1994, when the poet Mustafa Stitou made his debut with *Mijn vormen* (My forms) at the tender age of nineteen. Stitou was supported by the celebrated Dutch author Remco Campert. From the very start, his work received rave reviews. The few critical reactions, based on suspicions as to the motives for publishing ‘squabbling’ that is generally typified as authentic, were probably from those who had never seen a Moroccan at first hand. Stitou’s earliest poetic works reveal a mixture of Moroccan and Dutch culture. This is typified by the verse in which he refers to himself as ‘the young Moroccan and his non-Dutch thoughts’.<sup>8</sup> His poems frequently feature a father who works abroad and who can no longer get along with his sons. In the wicked Netherlands, these sons lose their faith in Allah and in their fathers. Stitou’s second collection of poems (*Mijn gedichten* – My poems), which was published in 1998, received a similarly positive response from the critics. His third piece of work, which was published in 2003 (*Varkensroze ansichten: gedichten* – Pig-pink cards: poems), was even awarded the VSB Poetry Prize.

Naima El Bezaz, a Moroccan-Dutch prose author, published her first work in 1995. Entitled *De weg naar het Noorden* (The way to the North), it describes a Moroccan illegal immigrant’s flight to the Netherlands. This book was awarded the Jenny Smelik IBBY (International Board on Books for Young People)–Prize for children’s literature. Though the work was not initially published as a children’s book, the jury felt that its theme, language and style made it accessible to readers of this age group. In 2002, Naima El Bezaz published *Minnares van de Duivel* (Satan’s mistress), a collection of interwoven stories about the djinn Farzi and his female accomplice Lalla Rebha, a *seherra* or sorceress. Scenes involving ghosts, djinns and magic gave her stories a touch of macabre suspense, which enlivened the underlying theme of the oppression of Muslim women.

Like El Bezaz, Hans Sahar also published his first novel in 1995. Entitled *Hoezo bloedmooi* (What do you mean ‘stunning?’), this centred on the figure of Abi, a Moroccan gigolo, and was based on stories that he had heard during a two-year spell in prison. Sahar’s second novel, *Zoveel liefde* (So much love), which was published one year later, also explored life at the fringes of society. While many view his work as an interesting *document humaine*, others have sharply criticized his novels for their lack of literary quality. Another of his works is a collection of short stories entitled *De heimweekaravaan* (The caravan of homesickness). Hans Sahar and Naima El Bezaz have often been invited to appear together at interviews and to give joint performances, even though their work has very little in common, except for the Moroccan background of the protagonists and the writers.

<sup>7</sup> Anbeek (1999).

<sup>8</sup> In the poem *Zomaarcafé* (Just café), in his first book.

### ***Hafid Bouazza and Abdelkader Benali***

In 1996, two authors succeeded in attracting the attention of literary critics and in remaining in the literary spotlight, Hafid Bouazza and Abdelkader Benali. Bouazza wrote a collection of seven stories entitled *Abdullah's feet*. The book derives its name from the title story, in which a young warrior is killed in action. Somehow, his feet manage to return by themselves, where they are welcomed as if it was Abdullah himself who returned home. Five of the seven stories are situated in a tiny village populated by eccentrics. They are told from the viewpoint of an adolescent Muslim boy living in Morocco. Two of the stories are set in Holland, and these describe the loves of a Moroccan-Dutch boy. The cast of characters includes numerous Fatimas and Abdullahs, a dishonest imam with an active interest in local boys, and the owner of a grocery store selling what is quite literally forbidden fruit. The stories are brimming with sexual tension. As Bouazza himself put it, a repressive atmosphere is the best setting in which to describe the frustration of inarticulate sexual desire.

The book, which was nominated for literary prizes on three occasions, remained among the top ten best-selling books for months on end. In 1997 it was awarded the E. du Perron Award for its intercultural value. The jury expressed their astonishment at the fact that Bouazza had managed to free himself of the appellation 'immigrant writer' at one fell swoop. Dutch reviewers praised Bouazza's baroque style, with its abundance of neologisms and, at first sight, strange and seemingly exotic words. It turned out that he made frequent use of the *Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal* (Dutch Dictionary) in search for long-forgotten words that expressed exactly the nuance he had in mind. He seems to be obsessed with finding a way of translating perceptions and sensations into written language. This results in an extremely sensory style that is filled with sounds and associations. One reviewer in the UK described the collection of 'naughty fairy tales' as an example of the 'vomit novel': 'The book contains a strong element of bawdy comedy (...) this brief novel charms the reader by taking a wry look at youth. Bouazza has come up with a witty and original work, which rejects many of the easy conventions of novel-writing'. A Dutch critic put it this way: 'a novel that reports the discovery that language is a means of furnishing the world.'<sup>9</sup>

Following this overwhelmingly successful debut, Bouazza published a novella in 1998. This work, *Momo*, does not refer to Morocco in any way, instead it concentrates on language and imagination. Momo is a dreamy child surrounded by invisible ghosts who direct his gaze and whisper things into his ear. In this work, the road to the imagination is paved with words. However, this approach had become mere irritating trickery by the time Bouazza finished his third book, *Solomon* in 2001. The poor reader was bombarded by seemingly endless sentences full of fantastic findings. Reviewers became irritated by the way in which even the simplest statements were embroidered with bombastic language. One reviewer writing for a national paper described *Solomon* as a 'completely ridiculous form of linguistic pathos, the poetic or visionary qualities of which were

<sup>9</sup> Biswell (2000).

rather hopefully expected to catch the reader's eye. Instead I am reminded of the dictations that we had to do in school, which were full of strange and difficult words.<sup>10</sup>

In 2003, Bouazza dispensed with this critique by writing what is by far his best work to date, *Paravion*. The novel reads like a fairy-tale, and parodies the experiences of Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam. It reminds the reader of Rushdie's words: '... that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind.'<sup>11</sup> The book received rave reviews and was awarded the Flemish Prize for Literature, the *Gouden Uil* (Golden Owl) in 2004.

The first novel by Abdelkader Benali, who also made his debut in 1996, was *Bruiloft aan zee* (Wedding by the Sea). Initially, the novel did not attract much media attention and, for the first twelve months, critics took no notice of it. However, the novel was then short-listed for the Dutch equivalent of the Booker, the *Libris Literatuur Prijs* and won the Best Literary Debut (*Geertjan Lubberhuizenprijs*). The book was quickly translated into several other languages and, in 1999, Benali won the French *Prix du Meilleur Premier Roman Etranger*. It is a family fable featuring twenty year-old Lamarat Minar, who is of Moroccan parentage but was raised in Holland. He returns to his family's village to attend the marriage of his sister and his uncle Mosa. When Lamarat arrives in the border town it turns out that Mosa is missing. Lamarat mainly conducts his search for the vanished bridegroom from the back seat of a dilapidated taxi, while telling the taxi-driver, Chalid, the story of his life. This plot forms the backbone of the book but there are numerous digressions, dealing, for example, with the double standards concerning premarital sex by males and by females. Other story lines involve the respective families of Lamarat's parents and the poorly constructed house that they are building in Morocco. Reviewers praised Benali's 'dazzling, quasi-chaotic style' and his 'exuberant, playful use of language'. They all spoke highly of the way in which he blends different languages and cultures. The public also seemed to be captivated by his writing. By the summer of 1998 *Bruiloft aan zee* was already into its fourteenth printed edition.

Benali continued his festive approach to storytelling in his second novel *De Langverwachte* (The Long-Awaited), and once again his style received critical acclaim. However, Benali's preference for long, complex sentences, and for experimentation with language, gave some critics the impression the work had been completed too hastily, with too little control. The title is ambiguous, it refers to the long-awaited but still unborn baby from whose viewpoint we hear the story. The title also refers to the baby's 17-year-old father, Mehdi, whose name also means 'the long awaited'. It also refers to the long period preceding the publication of the book, due to a case of writer's block. The unborn baby who is still in her Dutch mother's womb is quite an unusual narrator.

10 In Dutch: 'een volstrekt potsierlijke vorm van taalpathetiek, waar vermoedelijk van verwacht wordt dat de dichterlijke of visionaire kwaliteiten in het oog zullen springen. Maar ze doet eerder denken aan de dicteezinnen die we vroeger op school moesten schrijven en die boordevol zaten met lastig te spelling rarigheden.' In: Van Deel (2001).

11 Rushdie (1991).

Her thumb and a special gift from her grandmother give her the ability to discover everything about the cast of characters that populate the book. With a fine sense of symbolism, Benali places the baby's birth at a time of transition, the turn of the millennium. *De Langverwachte* won the Libris Prize in 2003.

Benali's latest novel *Laat het morgen mooi weer zijn* (Let the weather be fine tomorrow), however, received generally poor reviews. The opening sentence 'Malik Ben weighed 140 kilos the day he decided to have his name deleted from the Yellow Pages' did not live up to expectations. Looking back in time, we see Malik Ben as a young man in 1995, the year his father sent him on a cruise on the SS Latina. Malik soon falls under the spell of a fellow passenger, the beautiful Spanish widow, Carmen. The story goes back-and-forth, giving detailed descriptions of every minor character in the book, but the story's lack of suspense fails to keep the reader's interest.

***A second generation: Said El Haji, Khalid Boudou and Najoua Bijjir***

Said El Haji and Khalid Boudou are two young Moroccan authors who made their debuts in 2000 and 2001 respectively. Their novels resemble one another in having the same theme, a young adolescent's attempt to come to terms with his environment and to find his own way, and both use their biculturalism as a source of inspiration for their literary work. In *De dagen van Sjaitan* (The days of Shaytan), Said El Haji's protagonist is shy little Hamid, who needs an alter ego to stand up to his father. The story of young Hamid is interwoven with passages about his alter ego, Sjaitan, the Arabic word for the Devil. Hamid becomes increasingly rebellious in the face of his authoritarian father's dualistic moral standards, at the same time Sjaitan vents his rage at the hypocritical imam of the small, provincial Muslim community. El Haji's portrait of a rebellious son was strongly influenced by Herman Hesse's novel *Siddharta*, also about an adolescent boy who leaves his father because he wants to find out what life is all about. In a way, as he says himself, El Haji tried to get even with his strict Islamic upbringing. The novel was labelled 'a typically Dutch novel'. It has been compared to the work of Jan Wolkers, a celebrated Dutch writer whose books also elaborate on the theme of an oppressive religious upbringing. Wolkers' stories, however, were set in the Holland of the nineteen fifties.

The other coming of age novel, *Het Schnitzelparadijs* (The Schnitzel Paradise) by Khalid Boudou, tells the story of 19-year old dropout, Nordip, who, after spending two years asleep, wants to make a comeback to everyday society. To this end he gets a job in a restaurant, working as a dishwasher in a kitchen that is a tiny world in itself. Here, too, the theme owes less to Moroccan culture than to the relative youth of the writer and his protagonist. One of the outstanding qualities of this novel is the use of vernacular to make the characters realistic. Khalid Boudou has creatively blended the Dutch language with neologisms, English words and Arabic idiom. One example is *salaamize*, which means to greet someone. In 2001, the book won the *Gouden Ezelsoor* (Golden Donkey's Ear) for best debut of the year. It was subsequently translated into several different languages. Abdelkader Benali's response to his colleague's work was 'Adapt it for the screen, immediately!' His advice was apparently taken, as the movie was successfully released in

2005. Boudou recently published his second novel, *De President* (The President, 2005), a satire of Dutch politics.

A young female author, Najoua Bijjir, of this second generation of Moroccan writers in the Netherlands, made her debut in 2001 with *El weswes* (The obsession). The title refers to suspicion and paranoia, but also to finding the inner strength to overcome fear and weakness. Najoua Bijjir gives in-depth descriptions of the secret life of three Moroccan girls and a Moroccan boy. The protagonists waste most of their energy in keeping up appearances, by trying to be someone other than who they really are. Toeria happens to be no longer a virgin when her mother has found her the perfect husband, shy little Chadija decides to wear a headscarf and finds out how hard others treat her from that moment on and Kenza, the artistic dreamer, suffers from anorexia. Student Nabil dresses to impress and makes fake phone calls using a mobile telephone whose credit has expired. Her debut was hardly spectacular. As a review in *El weswes* concluded, Toeria, Chadija and Kenza are quite similar to some of the characters in *Sex and the City*, or to those in so-called chick literature.<sup>12</sup> They hang out in cafés, just like Western girls, and are just as attracted by fashion and electronic gadgets as any other girl. From there on, however, there is a parting of the ways. The Moroccan girls are continuously steering a middle course between tradition and modern temptations, between the life of a career woman and that of a housewife, between marriage and making their own choices, between virginity and sex.

In fact Bijjir's themes are not unlike those of Zohra Zarouali who in 1989 was the first Dutch-Moroccan writer to publish a book about the double lives led by Moroccan girls in the Western world. She published four books between 1989 and 2001, all about intelligent Moroccan girls growing up in the Netherlands or Flanders. Zarouali's books, however, failed to meet common literary standards. Her books are extremely popular with young girls, particularly those of the Muslim faith. They are classified as children's literature, despite the fact that her protagonists face what are actually very complex problems. Bijjir has succeeded in producing more incisive characterizations.

### ***Dutch-Moroccan authors as a group?***

Is it legitimate to lump the chosen authors together as a subgroup within modern Dutch literature? What meaningful comparisons, if any, can be drawn between their work, their writing styles, or their language? They are alike in the way that they started their careers, they are of a similar age, they all received a boost from media attention, and they won prizes. Furthermore, there are some commonalities in the setting and subjects of their literary work that cannot pass unnoticed. Most of the narratives are set at the crossroads of cultures. They feature a young Moroccan protagonist and, to a degree, touch on rebellion against religion and against family traditions. They also make use of sharp irony to create a safe distance between their depicted worlds and the real world of migrant issues. Most of these authors also exhibit a playful use and blending of language and genre, even though they differ in the way that they elaborate these elements. And last but not

<sup>12</sup> Drayer (2001).

least, the author's land of origin plays a distinct role in the works of Hafid Bouazza, Moses Isegawa, Kader Abdolah and Mustafa Stitou.<sup>13</sup> The mixture of Dutch and vernacular employed by Boudou, Sahar, or Bijjir, the neologisms and Dutch-English used by Benali, or Bouazza's baroque style all give the Dutch language a fresh, new sound. The same holds true for Stitou's poetry, whose simultaneous use of different registers and sporadic dancing rhythms take the reader by surprise.

However much we may want to emphasize commonalities in their literary work and careers, there are actually some quite striking differences between the members of this group of Moroccan-Dutch authors. A critical reader is particularly aware of the division along gender lines. The most successful Moroccan-Dutch writers are male. They write about conflicts with an authoritarian father, alienation from the Islamic religion, and double standards towards women. The female voice speaks in totally different terms. Authors like Zohra Zarouali, Naima El Bezaz and Najoua Bijjir choose to write about the position of Islamic women in the Western world, or, in the case of *Minnares van de duivel*, the non-western world. They depict a life that is furnished with the do's and don'ts of self-respecting Islamic women.

### **Conclusion**

Western *readers* share a common horizon of expectation with regard to such works. They assume that migrant characters are in search of their own identity, that they feel torn between their home culture and the country in which they live, and that they somehow experience a permanent feeling of loss. Accordingly, non-western *writers* are expected to live up to these expectations and pick a theme involving nostalgia, homesickness and quests for identity. However, if we examine the careers of the most successful Moroccan writers in the field of Dutch literature, they seem to have outgrown the migrant theme to which they were initially so indebted. These authors have extremely close ties to the Netherlands, where they were raised, and few if any links with Morocco, the country in which they were born.

It seems to be an inescapable trend. In their debut works, Moroccans make grateful use of their biculturalism by exploring the Moroccan and Dutch facets of their protagonists and settings. However, their later books show that they are starting to transcend this limited field. The narrow-mindedness of critics who want to lump them together as 'the Moroccan experience' causes them to respond by attempting to free themselves from Morocco-related topics. Some may switch to slightly different themes, only to return to multicultural issues indirectly, but in a more sophisticated way, as Bouazza did in *Paravion*. Mustafa Stitou, Hafid Bouazza, and Abdelkader Benali are just some members of the Moroccan-Dutch avant garde who have successfully taken this road.

<sup>13</sup> Bresser (2001).

*Moha Ennaji*

## Language, identity, and the impact of globalization in Morocco<sup>1</sup>

### ***Introduction***

This chapter is concerned with the issues of language and identity, as well as with the impact of globalization/Westernization, in the Moroccan context. It deals with the language-culture interface and stresses that mother tongues are vitally important for identity-building. I take the view that the experience of colonization was quite dramatic. This was because it highlighted a strong conflict between the values and beliefs of two different cultures, Muslim and Western. By 'Muslim culture', I mean the social behaviour, beliefs, and traditional way of life that are connected to Islam. By 'Western culture', I mean the modern way of life, values and way of thinking of Westerners in Europe and North America in particular.

In the years following independence, as part of their effort to modernize the country, the Moroccan ruling elite adopted French-Arabic bilingualism as a political option. Today there is tension between French-Western values and Arab-Islamic beliefs. Furthermore, tension also exists within the Moroccan context itself, between Berber and Arab languages and cultures. The situation, as it pertains to language, highlights a clash of interests and ideological tensions which themselves mirror the struggle for power at various levels. I should point out from the outset that, in many issues, the interaction between the languages and cultures of Morocco is characterized by contrasts and paradoxes.

### ***Language and identity***

Definitions and formulations of the concept of 'identity' vary from one academic discipline to another, yet identity as a 'process' within specific power constellations is a recurrent image. Identity has been a persistent problem for sociolinguistic theory. However, the terms of debate seem to have shifted from identity as a problem to a consideration of what kind of problem it represents. Theory has moved towards the recognition of the diversity of identities that such an all-encompassing term obscures. It is also starting to acknowledge that identity is far less static than previously conceived, and that it is more of a construct than a structure. The existence of a multiplicity of identities entails that people have many different social and cultural identities, which they somehow merge together. In the same way, numerous joint identities are often smoothly combined, e.g. Afro-American, Franco-German, Dutch-Moroccan, etc.

<sup>1</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to Jan Jaap de Ruiter, Petra Bos, and Wantje Fritschy. This paper benefited from their comments and from the questions of the audience at the conference 'Tradition and Modernity: Morocco and the Netherlands', which was held in Amsterdam, on 30-31 May, 2005.



Identity conflict may arise if a person has many different competing identities, which sometimes contradict each other. This applies to many Moroccan French-educated intellectuals. These individuals feel guilty because they are more immersed in the French culture than in their own, and because they speak excellent French while struggling to master standard Arabic. This is also the case with some Moroccan immigrants in Europe, who are torn between their original culture and the culture of the host country. As a result, identity conflict hampers their creativity, as well their integration. Identity is the dynamic relationship between the ancestral heritage, with all its components – oral tradition, literature, beliefs, etc. – and the language or languages which give birth to a specific cultural identity.<sup>2</sup>

The language and identity link has itself been subjected to a great deal of analysis and scrutiny throughout the history of scholarship. However, the topic remains controversial to this day. There are two major trends within the scientific inquiry in this domain.<sup>3</sup> The first argues that race, political affiliation, social class, and nationality are more important factors than language in the determination of one's identity.<sup>4</sup> The second trend asserts that language is directly linked to identity, along with cultural heritage and values. Language and identity can be seen as closely related, especially when the members of a linguistic community have a favourable attitude toward their own group.<sup>5</sup> I, for one, would stress the important link between language and identity. However, I should add that other factors such as race, nationality, religion, social class, cultural heritage, gender, and attitude also determine the formation of identity.<sup>6</sup> At any rate, research has shown that language is intimately linked to cultural identity, and that both factors interact on a daily basis, in many interesting ways.

Languages, and more particularly mother tongues, are important for identity-building. They have a symbolic role as they represent cultural elements that affect the first identity of individuals. They are used by the child for early socialization. Mother tongues help to define the specificity, culture, and ideology of both individuals and groups. They also shape people's personalities and ways of thinking.<sup>7</sup> Mother tongues have social functions that are fundamentally related to identity, everyday life, family, and friends. This is because they express people's feelings, values, aspirations, and beliefs. The mother tongue is the vehicle of a rich oral literature, in all its facets, songs, poems, anecdotes, proverbs, riddles, etc., and the voice of many forms of art and culture.

However, in some situations, a bilingual shift to a second language may not lead to the absolute erosion of the original identity. For instance, Moroccan immigrants in Europe may maintain their original languages and cultures. This may cause them to develop a sense of cultural boundaries between their native language and the language of their European host country. A person or group may even give up their language without

2 Fishman (1999).

3 Ennaji (1999).

4 cf. Appel and Muysken (1987) 15.

5 Fishman (1977).

6 Ennaji (1999).

7 Milner (1978).

necessarily losing their original sense of identity.<sup>8</sup> This is the case with many Berbers in Morocco and many native Americans in North America, who still feel that these are their true identities, even though they no longer speak their native language.

Cultural identity is closely related to variables like nation, nationalism, identity, and the individual. It overlaps with context, geography, gender, class and ideology. Attitudes in this regard are crucial. A positive attitude toward a language would create a positive cultural identity, and this contributes to the maintenance and promotion of the language. On the other hand, a negative attitude would inhibit and crush identity, eventually leading to language loss. In short, identity is closely related to the individual's linguistic, cultural, and historical backgrounds. Several studies have independently confirmed the relationship between language and cultural identity.

Over the centuries, Morocco has been shaped by Berber culture, Islam, and Arab influence. To these, we can add the Hispano-Moorish and Jewish cultures, which have immensely enriched the dialogue among different communities. Pluralism is both a historical tradition and a way of life in this region of the world. This is one of the reasons why most Moroccans do not view multilingualism and multiculturalism as dangers to national unity. Morocco is a complex country, in the sense that it is linguistically and culturally diverse. Islam, Arabic, Berber, and French are the main pillars on which Moroccan national identity is built. In the following section, I will focus on the interaction between Arab-Islamic and Western cultures, and on the relationship between these major cultures and civilizations.

### ***The encounter between Muslim and Western cultures in a globalizing world***

The recent interaction between Arab-Berber-Islamic and Western cultures goes back to the French colonial period. It can also be traced further back to the conquests of Morocco by other foreign powers: the Phoenicians, the Byzantines, the Romans, the Portuguese, and the Spanish. As mentioned earlier, in the period of re-birth, from 1798 to 1905, the interactions between Muslim and Western cultures were both enriching and progressive. During the period of decline, i.e. the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the period of colonization in the twentieth century, however, these contacts were antagonistic. This resulted in the imposition of biculturalism.

Colonization was a dramatic experience, highlighting a yawning gap between the values and beliefs of two very different cultures: Arab-Muslim and Franco-Western. The French colonizers sought to marginalize the Arab-Muslim culture through the assimilation and alienation of the *Maghrebi* peoples. This assimilation policy was criticised by Islamic institutions like the Qarawiyyine University in Morocco, as well as by nationalist leaders such as Allal Al Fassi who created the *Istiqlal* (Independence) party. The birth of the Moroccan nationalist movement is also associated with the Berber Decree of 1930, which sought to divide Berbers and Arabs. The 1940s saw the rise of nationalist movements in Morocco and throughout the Arab world. One of the aims of the struggle against the colonizers was to protect the country's indigenous cultural identity.

<sup>8</sup> Trudgill (1974) 57.

Nationalist thinkers and leaders like Jamal Eddine Al Afghani, Muhamed Abdu, and Rachid Rida, all three in Egypt, Ibn Badis in Algeria, and Mohamed Ben El Hassan El Ouazzani in Morocco contributed to the spread of nationalist feelings and to the struggle against colonization across the Arab-Muslim world. Pan-Arab and Pan-African cultural nationalism was a response to colonialism and the resultant cultural domination. European colonizers wrongly accused Arabs, and Africans in general, of being lazy, unsophisticated, unskilled, and unproductive. Colonizers also made the negative value judgement that those who were unskilled and non-creative were uncivilized.

The contemporary period is characterized by a relative balance between modernity and tradition. Modernity is a complex notion, as it is linked to the transfer of ideas generated by the European Enlightenment (in which science and progress were adopted as the bases of a more rational and civilized world). Modernity is often contrasted with tradition, which is closely associated with a conservative system of beliefs and archaic cultural values. This is exemplified by the supremacy of religion, which often restricted individuals' freedom and self-expression. Modernization, on the other hand, involves the pursuit of scientific, technological, economic, sociocultural and constitutional change that is in conformity with the present level of human development and knowledge. Accordingly, skills and values are at the core of this process. Modernization is linked to development, taking society's needs into consideration, as well as its global environment.<sup>9</sup> In the modern period, however, modernity has been equated with Western values. This has led to the devaluation of other cultures, which are considered unsophisticated and backward. Unfortunately, this idea of modernity degenerated during the colonial era, when colonialism justified itself by pretending to have a 'civilizing mission'. Liberation movements challenged the assumed superiority of the West. They demanded respect for cultural diversity which, until recently, has been under attack.

Historically speaking, Moroccans have always sought contact with other cultures. In terms of languages and cultures, neither Berbers nor Arabs have ever shunned or feared interactions with Europeans. In the past, this most notably involved Latin, today it is French.<sup>10</sup> In post-independence Morocco, French is widely used in education, science and technology. It is a means of social promotion and upward mobility. The increasing number of French-Arabic bilinguals in the country are making their presence felt.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, in this context, Classical Arabic is strongly associated with cultural independence and with the affirmation of Arab-Islamic identity. The latter has been described as 'the only identity recognised as legitimate in the postcolonial era'.<sup>12</sup> This polarization bestowed a 'sacred' status on Classical Arabic, which is used by traditionalists and nationalists as a symbol of religion, authenticity and nationalism. Many researchers argue that this

9 cf. Mazrui (2002).

10 cf. Ayache (1956); Fitouri (1983) 83.

11 What I mean here is that the number of French-Arabic bilinguals has quantitatively increased due to the efforts made in education and as a result of the post-independence population increase. At the qualitative level, however, these individuals' competence in French may be questionable, because of the influence of Arabization in schools and universities.

12 Gill (1999).

attitude reflects existing tensions between tradition and modernity, as well as the resistance among traditionalists to the modernizing movement that stems from the West.

However, it seems difficult to ignore the fact that there is a crisis of identity in Morocco today. Furthermore, the situation is far more complex than it would at first seem. On the one hand, Morocco is witnessing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. This is reflected by the existence of dozens of Islamist associations, the most important of which are *Al-Islah wat-Tawhid*, *Al-Adl wal-Ihsan*, and *Shabiba al-Islamiya*. It has also prompted the creation of an Islamist party (*Le Parti de la Justice et de Développement*), which won forty four seats in Parliament after the elections of September 27th, 2002. Islamism is linked to Arabism, which demands that Morocco, as an Arab country, should align with the Arab world in the interests of Arab unity.

On the other hand, there is Berberism. This purports to revive the Berber language and culture, with a view to unifying Berber territories across the Maghreb. Thus, Moroccans are apparently unable to agree on the kind of societal project that they want to achieve. Furthermore, the socio-cultural situation is more paradoxical than it seems. Berber activists fervently defend the Berber cultural identity, and Islamists their Muslim and Arabic roots, to reduce the effects of Western hegemony. Yet, most of these individuals also send their children to French-style schools, so that they can acquire a modern education. By contrast, Francophone urban intellectuals openly argue that French and Western values are good for the future of Morocco.

The preamble to the Moroccan constitution, states that Arabic is the official language of Morocco, and Islam the state religion. However, Article 9 states that the constitution 'guarantees all of its citizens freedom of expression in all its forms'. This article provides for the right of any group of citizens to preserve their language and culture. Nonetheless, the constitution does not allude specifically to Berber, Moroccan Arabic, or even to French. In reality, however, French prevails throughout the media, the administration, and higher education, as well as in science and technology.

The expansion of free education in post-independence Morocco inevitably meant that more and more people would encounter and experience the interface between the Arabic and French languages and cultures. It also exacerbated people's feelings of acculturation. Young people in general suffer from alienation, due to the gulf between modernity and tradition. Their attitudes fall into one of three categories. Those from the urban middle and upper class advocate a total immersion in Western culture, which they see as the sole model and means of progress. Educated young people from a lower middle class background favour a possible marriage of Arab-Islamic and Western cultures. Finally, those belonging to the urban working class want to fully embrace Arab-Islamic culture. The latter view is shared by young fundamentalists, who see Arab-Islamic beliefs and values as the only solution to the country's social and economic woes.<sup>13</sup>

Muslim fundamentalist groups vary in their interpretations of Islam, they also hold differing views of modernity and Western culture. There are moderate, less moderate and extremist fundamentalists. While the moderates accept modernity and are open to

13 See Laroui (1997).

Western values, the extremists totally reject modern lifestyles and modes of thought. Fundamentalists generally reject Western culture, folk culture and modernity in the name of authenticity and Islam. They argue that only Islam can lead the nation to social stability and economic well-being.<sup>14</sup> Their awareness of the yawning gap that exists between Arab-Muslim culture and French-Western culture, means that young people are particularly torn between these two modes of life. They waver between a strong attachment to local traditions and a favourable attitude to the Western way of life. Many educated young people see the latter as a means of progress and development. At any rate, there is a feeling of uneasiness among people in this age group, which is amplified by economic difficulties such as unemployment. In 2004, according to official statistics, Morocco had an unemployment rate of 12.1%.<sup>15</sup> Although the country's economy is growing at an impressive 4.4%, the goals of development and modernization still seem far away.

It has been more than forty years since Morocco gained its independence. During that time, the country has experienced numerous changes at the political, economic and social level, which has led to constantly shifting attitudes and ideas. This period has involved psychological setbacks, coupled with ambivalent attitudes toward modernity and tradition. The entire post-independence generation is torn between a Western way of life and Islamic conservatism.

This wavering between modernism and tradition is characteristic of post-independence Morocco. Conservative forces within the country feel more secure with traditional Islamic values than with the modern values of the new world. They cling more to the Muslim tradition and identity than to Western thoughts and values. Moroccans feel more comfortable with the old traditions. They are fearful of the changes that may flow from globalization and from the West. With the growth of Muslim fundamentalism in the region, the pendulum seems to have swung back towards tradition, which means Arabic, Islam, cultural identity and authenticity.

Since independence, schools have been an efficient instrument of modernization. Teachers have played a positive role in the reshaping of education and administration. They have fostered the acquisition of Western culture and the adoption of modern values, including openness to the advanced societies of Europe and North America. This is exemplified by many highly educated people and nationalist leaders like Allal Al Fassi, Abderrahim Bouabid, Mohamed Ben El Hassan El Ouazzani, Mahjoubi Aherdane, and Mohamed Chafik. These individuals encouraged their daughters to go to school unveiled, and to study science and technology at institutions of higher education, both at home and abroad. These enlightened Moroccan intellectuals have actively participated in the struggle for democracy and the rule of law. Working through political parties and education, in general, they have succeeded in establishing the basis of a democratic society.<sup>16</sup> However, schools are now being targeted by Islamists, whose aim is to disseminate

14 See Burgat (1988) and Laroui (1997).

15 [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook)

16 See Mernissi (1987a).

religious fundamentalism. Indeed, many Islamist teachers have turned their backs on modernity. They are now propagating radical Islamist ideologies among schoolchildren and university students, in an attempt to return to Muslim religious precepts and to Arab-Islamic roots.<sup>17</sup>

These contradictory attitudes toward modernity and tradition have had an impact on family, school, and various other institutions.<sup>18</sup> The ambivalence in attitudes is making people increasingly uneasy, especially the young. School consolidates this uneasiness, as it accentuates acculturation and a sense of insecurity. This does not mean that the two cultures are incompatible. What is needed is a favourable social and educational context within which the two cultures could be presented fairly, without any prejudice or falsification. An environment of this kind would enable educators to ameliorate this feeling of acculturation. Students should first have a good knowledge of the Arab-Muslim culture before they are introduced to Western culture. This would reduce the feeling of tension and profound frustration that they are currently experiencing.

Pedagogical reforms must take into account the sociolinguistic and cultural backgrounds of pupils and students. These reforms must address the interaction of traditional and Western values, by encouraging tolerance, mutual acceptance and co-habitation. Social reforms, on the other hand, must ensure social justice and equity. Schools must allow pupils and students from different social backgrounds to further their education and to improve their social positions. The modernization efforts made by Morocco after independence reinforced acculturation and dependence on Western culture. This is an almost inevitable consequence of globalization, which to some extent implies borrowing from modern societies and cultures.

Globalization in this sense means the adoption of a set of borrowed Western cultural strategies to achieve socio-economic development. However, this also involves the loss of the country's traditional Arab-Islamic identity. One way of limiting cultural and scientific dependence on the West is through indigenization. This involves greater use of native languages, techniques, personnel and approaches, to achieve purposeful change. The effect of engaging indigenous languages in this way is to make them more scientific which, in turn, means that they are better adapted to the new needs of society. Moroccan and African cultures continue to be affected by the hegemony of Western civilization and by the power of Western languages. Socio-cultural change in Africa is a prerequisite for reducing the linguistic and cultural gap which separates that continent from the West.

Another strategy for transcending dependency on the West is to adopt projects that are relevant to the needs of developing societies. This means that it is important to make European languages more relevant to African needs. For instance, instead of using French and English to promote Western civilization, these languages could better be used to serve Moroccan – or African – culture and civilization. Great novels in French by novelists like Tahar Ben Jelloun or Kateb Yacine are landmarks in the process of domesticating Euro-colonial languages. Similarly, such cultural achievements must also be made

17 See Ali Oumlil in *Al-Itihad Al-Ishtiraaki* of January 3rd (2001).

18 Cf. Suleiman (1999).

accessible to the West, for instance, by translating Arabic works into European languages, and vice versa. One wonders which individuals, and what social groups, stand to benefit from globalization and Westernization. The problem is that the majority of the people are traditionally minded. They have reservations about the way Westernization has been processed and applied since independence.

After four decades of independence, the process of Westernization is still under way. Its influence today is probably even greater than it was during the period of colonization. For example, French has never been so widespread as it is nowadays.<sup>19</sup> Decision-makers opted for Westernization as a means of modernizing the country. This was simply because the ruling elite believes that Western methods and ideologies are an appropriate and efficient means of achieving development. The conservatives' resistance to the modernizing process is levelled not only against Western values as such, but also against the way in which these values have been introduced. The speed with which the modernizing reforms have been implemented did not take the conservative forces into account. The modernizing reforms were led by enlightened political leaders who had been educated in the West, mainly in France, namely the late Kings Mohammed V and Hassan II.

### **Conclusion**

Globalization is a worldwide process which has both benefits and drawbacks. One of its great advantages is that it encourages communication and exchange between different peoples and cultures. Its disadvantages include the risk that local and national cultures will become westernized. Morocco is characterized by cultural contacts that have led to its Westernization. Over time, Western culture has been imposed on the population by various European powers, most recently by France during the period of colonization. The aim of the latter was to assimilate the indigenous population into French culture. This was in the interests of the French colonizers, who aimed to alienate the Moroccan people from one another. By this means, the colonial masters would be able to rule over and exploit the natural and human resources of the country. However, the French paid little heed to the needs of the indigenous people or to their development. Accordingly, they failed to provide schooling and healthcare for the majority of the population. Today, after so many years of independence, French culture is still predominant in education, administration and other dynamic sectors. At the personal and psychological levels, the Westernization of Moroccan culture is a powerful force.

The modernization efforts made by Morocco after independence reinforced acculturation and dependence on Western culture. This is the almost inevitable consequence of modernization and globalization, which partly involves borrowing from modern societies and cultures.

<sup>19</sup> This is because of the positive impact of free education, in which French is taught as a second language. Other factors are the increase of the population in general and of the educated population in particular. During the period of French rule, only a few Moroccans (a tiny educated elite and French collaborators) were able to use French. Today, however, about a third of the Moroccan population (i.e. ten million people) can speak French with varying degrees of competence.

One way of limiting cultural and scientific dependence on the West is through indigenization. This involves greater use of native languages, techniques, personnel and approaches, to achieve purposeful change. The effect of engaging indigenous languages in this way is to make them more scientific which, in turn, means that they are better adapted to the new needs of society. Moroccan and African cultures continue to be affected by the hegemony of Western civilization and by the power of Western languages. Socio-cultural change in Africa is a prerequisite for reducing the linguistic and cultural gap which separates that continent from the West.

We live in a globalizing world, which imposes conflict and which represses the human will to do good, to love, and to appreciate beauty. Now, more than ever, there is a need to reinforce dialogue and communication between cultures, civilizations and religions. Only in this way can we ensure coexistence between the peoples of the East and West, and their ultimate survival. One enduring lesson from human history is that the most important civilized relationship between contemporary cultures is the maintenance of a genuine dialogue. The antithesis of dialogue is conflict. The goal of dialogue is to understand the other party, and to appreciate its cultural, moral and rational basis. Conflict seeks only to invade, crush, conquer, and defeat the other, in order to exert control.

Contemporary cultures must continue to talk to one another. The future of humanity is contingent upon the ability of different civilizations and religions to hold a civilized and reasonable dialogue with one another.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, the relationship between the Arab-Islamic culture and other cultures must rest on a sound dialogue, on civilizational and cultural coexistence, and on the desire to learn from anything new and useful. If a dialogue between cultures is established on this basis, it will lead to intercultural understanding and peace. The recognition and preservation of cultural diversity has today become a basic tenet of Human Rights. Article 1 of the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation states that 'Every culture has its own dignity and value that must be respected and preserved. It is the right and duty of every people to develop their culture. All cultures constitute, with their rich diversity and mutual influence, part of the heritage which belongs to all humans'.<sup>21</sup>

20 Cf. Tjomsland (2003).

21 [www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/n\\_decl.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/n_decl.htm)



*Hanane Bouchtalla*

## L'architecture dans la zone de tension entre tradition et modernité

La tradition, cette polémique du 20ème siècle. Pourquoi parler du conflit entre tradition et modernité à l'ère actuelle et non pas avant? Pourquoi a-t-il suffi d'un siècle pour remettre en question l'histoire et le vécu humain dans leur ensemble? Après tout l'homme est toujours le même, n'ayant pas connu de transformations physiologiques ou psychologiques capitales depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours. Nous nous sentons toujours éphémères sous la lumière tachetée par les arbres d'un ciel de printemps. Si nous admirons tant les temples grecs, c'est certainement parce que nous portons encore les mêmes fragilités que nos ancêtres. Face à une œuvre d'une telle valeur artistique, tout être humain a les mêmes émotions, et ou réactions, indépendamment de son contexte culturel ou de son appartenance ethnique ou géographique. Il est clair que nous gardons certaines choses gravées en nous pour l'éternité. L'être humain de l'antiquité, du moyen-âge ou de l'ère moderne, possède toujours les mêmes sensibilités.

Pourquoi la tradition cause-t-elle alors un tel sentiment de gêne? Pour quelle raison l'homme tend-t-il de plus en plus vers la modernité? L'on ne peut pas se contenter de répondre que la tradition est un produit passéiste, en effet, nous la portons toujours en nous. Que nous voulions ou pas, nous sommes encore conditionnés par certaines de ses valeurs; voilà pourquoi nous en parlons encore. Par ailleurs l'ère moderne n'est pas le fruit du néant, mais le résultat d'une sédimentation de quelques centaines d'années. Il existe donc bien un certain lien entre tradition et modernité, même s'il ne se traduit pas par une véritable continuité, et, si nous continuons à parler de confrontation, voire même dualité entre tradition et modernité, c'est parce que nous n'arrivons pas à nous détacher de nos origines, même lorsque nous adhérons aux nouveautés.

Cette tension actuelle entre tradition et modernité est due de prime abord à l'accélération du processus de l'évolution humaine, ainsi qu'à l'attitude de l'être humain durant cette évolution. Il est tout à fait logique que ce passage d'un modèle traditionnel, conservateur, chargé de valeurs et de vécu historique, qui a régné pendant plusieurs siècles, à un autre modèle complètement nouveau dont le rythme est accéléré, cause le déséquilibre la perte d'identité que nous connaissons actuellement.

Cette accélération du processus de l'évolution humaine a créé une faille entre le passé traditionnel et l'époque moderne. La révolution industrielle du 19ème siècle a permis l'épanouissement des sciences et des techniques, qui s'est reflété dans le mode de vie de la nouvelle société assoiffée du progrès, devenant si vite adepte de nouvelles références et ayant d'autres leitmotivs. L'ère nouvelle a ouvert la voie à une industrialisation sans précédent, d'où l'émergence de valeurs récentes accompagnant ce changement radical des fondements traditionnels. Cette ère est celle de la production matérielle par excel-

lence, ayant pour devise gain, profit et rentabilité. L'homme du 20ème siècle s'est trouvé face à multiples choix, alors que le cadre traditionnel restreint et réserviste est perçu comme un handicap au développement, d'une part, parce qu'il impose un seul et unique modèle et d'autre part car la tension et le contrôle de la société traditionnelle est vive voire même insupportable, dans une société moderne qui se voit libérale, laissant une plus grande place à l'individu.

Il est certain que ce changement a chamboulé le cours de la vie et a trouvé des expressions dans tous les domaines de l'ère moderne. Gardant à l'esprit que le progrès ou la décadence d'une société se révèlent avant tout dans son cadre spatial, il était indispensable de voir comment le cadre architectural arrive à cristalliser les valeurs d'une société moderne ou traditionnelle et comment se traduit le passage d'un monde à l'autre.

Il n'existe pas de société qui puisse se passer du cadre architectural, quelle que soit sa nature physique ou son degré d'évolution, son époque historique ou son aire géographique. Afin de subvenir à leurs besoins matériels et de manifester leurs aspirations spirituelles, toutes les sociétés ont besoin d'un territoire et d'un lieu, qui soit un témoin privilégié de leur présence. Pour tout être humain, le cadre architectural est fortement porteur de sens et d'émotions, offrant un refuge et un abri contre les agressions du monde extérieur. Néanmoins cette interaction entre l'espace et l'individu passe par le contrôle de la société, qui décide de la nature de ce contact. Plus ce contrôle est présent, plus le cadre architectural ou l'espace est apte à véhiculer la culture et à cristalliser les valeurs de la société.

Le cadre traditionnel permet un modèle dans lequel les valeurs d'une société se reflètent à travers l'espace pour la simple raison que les individus y partageaient le même mode de vie et visaient les mêmes fins. Il représente un modèle unique, construit par tous et pour tous, car toute les membres de la société se posaient les mêmes questions et tous proposaient les mêmes réponses.

Pendant des années, voire des siècles, tous les individus de la société traditionnelle vivaient suivant un seul cadre architectural, représentant d'ailleurs tout le poids de la tradition. Elle a pu assurer pendant longtemps l'équilibre et la stabilité de la communauté. L'architecture traditionnelle est une expression culturelle, dans laquelle le concepteur et l'utilisateur se trouvent confondus. Le cadre physique est un produit social issu de la culture. L'on distingue dans le modèle traditionnel généralement deux types d'expressions architecturales, à savoir les édifices profanes et les édifices sacrés, qui sont étroitement liés. Nous pouvons même dire que le profane ne prend forme ce par le biais du sacré.

Dans le cadre moderne, l'on note une complexité et une pluralité de spécialisations, avec plusieurs modèles de références, dans lesquels chaque produit est original. En effet, les individus ne se posent plus les mêmes questions et par conséquent ils n'ont plus les mêmes réponses. Désormais, chaque question a plusieurs réponses, et la valeur de référence n'existe plus. L'on a plutôt affaire à des valeurs institutionnalisées, et l'on pourrait dire que, contrairement à la situation du cadre traditionnel, la culture appartient désormais à l'élite. Le cadre architectural n'est plus un indice permettant d'évaluer la société, le concepteur et l'utilisateur n'ont plus les mêmes valeurs, les règles et les lois étant faites par un troisième membre, à savoir les institutions. La société et la culture ne sont plus com-

patibles; l'on ne peut plus parler de cadre communautaire, mais d'une société formée par des individus, et l'on ne construit plus pour une société mais pour des individus. Ceci explique la variété de modèles et l'infinité de solutions architecturales.

L'accélération du rythme de vie a exigé le rapprochement de l'espace, ainsi le changement de la notion du territoire, autrement dit des limites géographiques accessibles à un être humain. La mobilité de l'ère moderne a permis l'apparition de nouveaux modes de communication et d'innombrables possibilités de rencontres, entraînant la perméabilité des valeurs locales aux valeurs étrangères. Nous n'avons plus besoin de nous déplacer pour connaître la culture de l'autre. Il suffit en effet de se connecter à un réseau de communication par satellite ou à l'Internet, pour être rapidement projeté dans son monde. Je peux suivre un défilé de mode au japon, sans même quitter ma chaise, je sais à présent comment l'on décore sa maison en Chine, le mode de vie américain n'a pratiquement plus de secrets pour moi, tandis que je peux apprécier le design en vogue cette année des bureaux russes. Il est normal que l'usager profane en matière d'architecture se trouve désorienté devant le nombre de modèles qui se présentent à lui. Les concepteurs ne le sont pas moins, ce qui se reflète dans le cadre architectural. Au bout du compte, l'on récupère un produit sans aucune valeur identitaire, parfois même sans aucune dimension artistique, un pastiche dénué de toute qualité. Je pense que le problème émane avant tout de notre incompréhension de la modernité et de notre mauvais usage de ses outils.

Nous ne devons nier en aucun cas les avantages de l'ère moderne, la modernité étant le résultat normal de l'évolution humaine. Notre tendance à parfois trop mythifier le cadre traditionnel et à l'opposer continuellement au moderne nous fait tomber dans des jugements souvent subjectifs, plus motivés par la nostalgie que par tout autre sentiment. A mon avis il ne s'agit pas de valoriser le cadre traditionnel ou le cadre moderne, mais bien plutôt l'homme. Nous devons nous focaliser sur la dimension humaine, respecter la nature de l'homme et surtout sa fragilité.

Il est vrai que l'espace traditionnel a su d'une manière ou d'une autre protéger l'individu, et le ramener à une origine dans laquelle il partage l'identité du groupe. Par contre il lui a laissé peu d'expression, non pas au point de la réprimer mais prétendant l'avoir apprivoisée. L'espace moderne quant à lui, a proposé une multitude d'expressions à chaque individu, mais aucune n'a su parfaitement contenir sa sensibilité et respecter sa vraie nature. L'objet architectural moderne s'est lancé dans une recherche éperdue de la plasticité formelle et de l'abstraction scientifique, omettant complètement la dimension assurée par la présence humaine et séparant ainsi le sentiment de la pensée.

Certes, les humains ont les mêmes sensibilités, mais ils n'ont ni le même vécu, ni la même culture, ni la même manière d'être. L'architecture est avant tout conditionnée par le lieu qui résume la culture, le vécu, et le mode de vie, la modernité exprimant le changement et l'évolution. L'architecture moderne est appelée à assurer le changement dans la continuité, respectant à la fois le lieu et la sensibilité. Autrement dit le nouveau est appelé à contenir l'ancien.

A l'époque moderne, seules très peu d'architectures sont arrivées à résoudre ce dilemme. Le lieu exprimant le milieu immédiat dans lequel se passe la vie de chacun de nous, est seul capable de nous offrir une compréhension qualitative du quotidien et lui don-

ner une identité. Aucun lieu ne ressemble à un autre, chacun possède une atmosphère propre, mais chacun nous submerge du même bien être, du fait de son interaction avec l'humain. Arracher l'architecture à son contexte c'est aliéner l'usager et perturber ses références. Comprendre ces différences et les convertir en sensibilités est, quelque part, la voie qui mène vers la solution.

L'architecture moderne du début du 20ème siècle se voulait respectueuse du lieu et de la présence humaine. Rattraper l'écart entre pensée et sentiment était sa raison d'être. Les pionniers du mouvement moderne tel que Le Corbusier, Louis Kahn, Mies van der Rohe, et d'autres cherchaient à accompagner le changement dans la continuité. Pour ce faire, ils ne reproduisaient pas la forme traditionnelle, mais réservaient plutôt son essence et ont par ailleurs le mieux exprimé sa présence. La dimension humaine occupait toute leur attention; ils ne cherchaient pas à loger l'homme dans de belles sculptures, mais dans des lieux qui respectent sa nature, ses sensibilités et ses différences. Pour ces architectes, les techniques récentes sont la seule nouveauté apportée par la modernité, rendant désormais réel ce qui relevait autrefois de l'imaginaire. Ils ont conçu une architecture sublime et atemporelle, nous indiquant comment comprendre la modernité en architecture. Le nouveau est une expression ininterrompue de l'ancien.

Actuellement nous sommes pratiquement confrontés à un nihilisme de l'architecture, l'objet architectural étant devenu un moyen d'exhibition et le concepteur ayant complètement perdu la référence humaine. Nous avons affaire à des projets signés, exprimant de prime abord le formalisme et la spécificité propres à chaque architecte. Dans chaque partie du monde, le concepteur conçoit selon un même style afin que son architecture soit reconnaissable et distinguable. Tout ce que nous craignons aujourd'hui, est de tomber dans une standardisation de l'architecture ou pire encore, dans sa commercialisation. Que reste-t-il si nous écartons le facteur humain et culturel de la conception?

La modernité a mis à la disposition des architectes de l'ère moderne les moyens matériels et techniques pour traduire leurs pensées en sentiments. Les contraintes techniques qui empêchaient jadis nos ancêtres de pousser leurs réflexions sur l'espace architectural sont aujourd'hui pratiquement dépassées. Les architectes de la modernité sont priés de poursuivre leur quête de l'objet architectural à la fois beau et original. Tant qu'ils préservent la sensibilité de l'être humain et n'estompent à aucun moment son identité, le rapprochement des cultures et l'apparition de l'individu doivent être compris comme une richesse et non pas comme une offense à la tradition. Que nous ayons affaire à une architecture traditionnelle ou moderne, ce sont l'essence de l'œuvre et son pouvoir de procurer à l'être humain une dimension dans l'espace et dans le temps, qui doivent nous intéresser. Le changement ne doit pas nous faire peur. Tant que nous le contrôlons, le progrès ne pourra que servir le culte de l'humanité. La continuité est importante dans la mesure où elle nous permet de nous évaluer par rapport à une référence, car toute arrivée est déterminée par un point de départ. Je conclurai sur une citation de Christian Norberg-Schulz, architecte norvégien et théoricien de l'art: 'demeurer le même sans être jamais pareils'.<sup>1</sup>

1 Norberg-Schulz (1997) 298.

Fatima Sadiqi

## A feminist view of the architecture of the medina of Fes

### Introduction

Architecture is related to people and to their various ways of life. The evolution of architecture reflects the evolution of society, which itself is a product of the evolution of its constituent men and women. Accordingly, there is a chain of interaction between the physical environment in which we live (space) and our socio-cultural background. All of these systems are interrelated and this relationship is dynamic and functional.

The architecture of the medina<sup>1</sup> of Fes is rich with historical influences, and constitutes a valuable heritage. It makes Fes one of the leading Islamic cities in the world. In his typology of Islamic cities, Taha El Ouali<sup>2</sup> categorizes them into two major types: administrative cities and military cities. He goes on to classify military cities into four sub-types: *thaghr* (place at the mouth of a river: harbour places), *ribat* (horse-shoeing place), *asima* (capital), and *askar* (military place). According to this author, the medina of Fes was first conceived as an administrative city, hence its importance from the key and related aspects of politics and religion, both of which are intricately related to the 'control' of women. Women's/Gender studies increasingly involve the investigation of architecture as a way of exploring male-female relationships throughout various stages of history. The architecture of the medina of Fes is particularly relevant in this respect.

The medina of Fes was founded by Moulay Idriss II some twelve centuries ago, during a crucial period in the history of Morocco. The indigenous tribal communities were encountering Islam for the first time, and there was a need to spread the religion and to establish order by various means. It is the important socio-political context in which it was constructed that makes the medina interesting. If we compare the architecture of the *ville nouvelle* with that of the medina, it is immediately apparent that the architecture of the former is based on purely economic needs. The architecture of the medina, however, clearly expresses a strong desire to transcend space. The passage from the *ville nouvelle* to the medina is indeed a passage from one logic to another, and from one vision of the world and space to another. Mosques, *medersas*, *suqs*, baths, tombs, etc. were built with the intention of 'sense-making' (assigning an abstract value to things that transcends the physical objects themselves). This paper is an attempt to interpret this original 'sense-making' from a feminist perspective. Some of the opinions given in this paper remain valid to this day, others do not.

1 The term 'medina' means 'city' and is semantically and formally connected to the term 'madaniyya' (civilization, urbanity). It usually refers to the oldest part of a town that is surrounded by a wall.

2 El Ouali (1982).

### ***The architecture of the medina and the overall perception of women***

The primary architectural characteristic of the medina of Fes is that the houses are very large. They were designed to accommodate entire households, which usually included paternal grandparents, uncles, and aunts, as well as the smaller nuclear families of their various offspring. These houses usually have two (sometimes three) floors, which open on to a spacious inner courtyard. The houses usually have luxuriously appointed interiors, which contrast sharply with the small, crooked, low and shabby-looking front entrance. This outdoor 'apparel' of the medina resembles women's veils, whose plainness masks the beauty of their wearers. The outer walls of the houses of the medina have neither windows nor balconies. This lends an introverted feel to the overall architecture of these dwellings. The only points of access to the outside world are the front door and barred 'openings' in the walls of the upper floor, which is usually occupied by women. In territorial terms, some areas within the houses of the medina are reserved for men while other places are reserved for women. There are also common areas that are used by both sexes. Women usually occupy smaller rooms in the upper floors and areas towards the back of the house, which include cooking places and spaces where animals are kept. The places that women occupy are 'hidden' from strangers coming into the house. The expression *diru triq!* (free the way!), which is still in use in Morocco, is uttered by the male members of the household before a male guest is ushered into the house. It literally means 'get the women out of the way'.

Between the houses, the streets of the medina are narrow and tortuous. When the medina was first built, animals (especially donkeys and mules) were the sole means of transport for people and goods. Some streets in the medina are so narrow that people can only traverse them in single file. There are numerous sacred and religious places in the medina, such as mosques, religious schools, tombs of saints, etc. The majority of the saints buried in Fes were male. It is these sacred and religious places that earned Fes its appellation of the 'spiritual capital of Morocco'.

The overall (internal and external) aspects of the medina's architecture were certainly dictated by specific logics. Given the historical era in which the medina was built, these logics were probably motivated by two powerful, historically complimentary but contradictory trends: the predominance of the tribal mentality and the need to enforce Islamic law. On the one hand, Islam has never completely uprooted the tribal system that preceded it. On the other hand, the central authorities in Morocco needed Islamic law to establish and maintain order in the newly established urban centres.

The first of these trends, the tribal mentality, was (and still is) mainly evidenced by an eagerness to ensure, maintain and protect the paternal line of descent. Girls from 'good' (wealthy) families were only permitted to marry boys from 'good' families. As in all Arab-Islamic cities, the original architecture of the medina was intended to ensure tribal segregation. Each tribe needed to keep to its own quarters, and each ethnic group was associated with a specific trade (cf. *najjarin* 'carpenters', *dabbaghin* 'leather men', etc. which are still in use today). By enforcing integration within groups (tribes), this policy enabled new identities to emerge. In a sense, the architecture of the medina of Fes was an expression of the tribal and patriarchal 'inner self', in the face of a hegemonic Islamic influen-

ce. If these influences were to succeed, it was necessary for women to be secluded and controlled.

As for the second trend, namely the enforcement of Islamic law, the medina was also called *dar al-Islam* (the house of Islam). Its architectural design was geared towards producing legal entities, in the sense that women, like men, could own money and property, and pass them on. However, as women do not inherit in the same way as men under Islamic law, it was necessary to control them. The net effect of both the tribal mentality and the logic underpinning Islamic law required that women be denied the right to move freely in mixed-sex public spaces, which could lead to 'mixed' marriages and to a loss of family wealth. In spite of this convergence in the logics underpinning the tribal mentality and Islamic law, there is a blunt contradiction between the two. On the one hand, the tribal mentality meant endogamous marriages and resistance to Islamic assimilation, and on the other hand, Islam needed to be powerful enough to impose Islamic law on all Muslims regardless of tribe or social rank. From the Islamic perspective, the architecture of the medina was conceived as a way of transcending tribal divisions. The idea was to create a space (the medina) where different identities could integrate under the banner of Islam, thereby acquiring a religious and universal identity. From the dual perspective of these two trends, the architecture of the medina reflects both tribal racism and a desire to maintain hegemonic power. The seclusion of women was a pre-requisite for both.

In addition to tribal mentality and Islamic law, the design and shape of the buildings of the medina were meant to express an immense 'public' pride in a glorious past. Both the artistry evident in the decoration of religious structures and the size of their doors contrast sharply with the shabbiness of the entrances to ordinary houses. The large number of museums are evidence of the fact that the architecture of the medina also reflects traditions, especially religious ones. The public display of wealth and strength required male-only places. Furthermore, the medina of Fes has a circular layout, which expresses a strong desire to protect wealth and valuables. This layout was preferred to a linear design, which was thought to grant easier access to strangers.

### ***The linguistic aspects of the architecture of the medina***

According to Lévi-Strauss<sup>3</sup>, '*l'espace est une société de lieux-dits*'. He meant that when we name places within a given space, we socially construct this space, appropriate it, and make it our own. Although the inter-borrowing from the body to the space and vice-versa is usually symmetrical, space borrows more from the body than the body does from space. Since they are seen as sexual parts, some places are named after parts of the body. In this case, it is the body that lends terms to space. For example, the word *thaghr* (mouth) for 'city', mentioned above, is case of the body lending a term to a space because the term in question pre-dated the 'city'. Boughali<sup>4</sup> cites the following body expressions, which designate parts of the house: *ras dderb* (head of district) for 'street quarters', *fum*

3 Lévi-Strauss (1966) 86.

4 Boughali (1988).

*ddar* (mouth of the house) for 'entrance door', and *sder lbit* (chest of room) for 'male guest room'.

These terms are not interchangeable, each applies to one specific place. Street quarters are public spaces where males, rather than females, usually congregate. The linguistic referent includes the term *ras* 'head', a noble appendage often associated with wisdom. According to the dominant Arab-Islamic social constructions, women possess no reason, or at least much less reason than men. *Fum ddar* or 'entrance', refers to a place where older women usually sit and supposedly 'gossip'. This place is constructed as female. Indeed, in the Arab-Islamic mentality, the house is generally associated with women. It is seen as a woman's 'natural' place. Hence, whereas the head/reason quarter is male, the mouth is female. *Sder ddar* (chest of the house), designates a large and luxuriously furnished sitting room that is reserved for male guests. This room is usually used to convey an impression of the household's wealth. In Morocco, these and similar terms are acquired by children in their mother tongues, thereby shaping their views of the world.

Far from being arbitrary, the association between given places and corresponding lexical terms is founded on a symbolic mode of the gender-space relationship. These terms show that communities unconsciously acquire important values through their mother tongues. Sacred, noble and taboo things are considered important within a community, and this importance is sometimes encoded linguistically by assigning the names of parts of the body to them. The aim of assigning linguistic terms to places is to render the latter sacred. For example, the head is not only associated with wisdom but also with control; the mouth is not only associated with gossip, but also with passage; the chest is not only associated with male power, but also with pride and 'showing off'. It is an established fact in linguistics that polysemy (several different meanings of one word) is never arbitrary; it derives from an unconscious logic in which literal, figurative, as well as metaphoric meanings acquire significant symbolic dimensions in people's lives. Like the mouth of the house, the mouth of a woman should not open without the authorization of the man (who is the symbol of power). The Arab-Islamic mentality feels that houses and women should have closed mouths, and that sharing these mouths with others may lead to the destruction of male power.

### ***The psychological aspects of the architecture of the medina***

According to Merleau-Ponty, the human body dictates spatial logic. From this perspective, houses, and perhaps architecture in general, are extensions of our bodies. They are outer bodies, which protect the self. The architecture of the medina offers the following psychological interpretations: men and male places inside and outside houses are generally perceived as 'seen', 'clear', 'straight', 'pure', 'central', and 'clean'; whereas women and their places are perceived as 'unseen', 'ambiguous', 'crooked', 'impure', 'peripheral', and 'dirty' (with reference to menstruation). These oppositions are established on the male-female dichotomy, itself the result of the traditional patriarchal universe whose starting-point is the human body. The male body is attributed positive values and the female body negative ones. From the psychological perspective, the architecture of the medina appears to have been based on a sexist ideology in which women are excluded from the holy public pla-



ces such as the mosques, the *zawiyas*, the *qisriyats* (trade centres) etc. which harbour the tribal and Islamic selves. Women are indeed considered sources of chaos (*fitna*) in the public space. On the other hand, the tortuous and labyrinth-like streets of the medina are also seen as a womb (a symbol of birth and passage to light). Motherhood is highly valued in the tribal and Islamic logic, so long as the woman reproduces 'good' subjects she is valued but she is never socially and culturally valued as a woman in her own right.

### ***The symbolic aspects of the architecture of the medina***

According to Lévi-Strauss<sup>5</sup>, some objects are perceived as masculine and others as feminine. The house is symbolically associated with the female body and the medina with the male body. The house is where women spend most of their time, looking after the family. The medina is *dar al-Islam* (the house of Islam) where Islamic law must be enforced. The medina is meant to be the opposite of rural areas, where tribal traditions and disorder prevail. However, there are specific elements that make the house male and the medina female. The medina is also *dar* (from *daara*, 'be circular') and being circular, the medina forms a unity, which ensures *lhkam*, 'control and the rule of law'.

Symbolically, the external aspects of a thing can be explained in terms of its internal logic. The circular form of the medina, as well as that of the interior parts of houses, are important symbolically. The circle is a symbol for the protection of that which is valuable. Since women are valuable to men they need to be protected. The circular form also symbolizes the maximum possible protection of women's honour in their own places (involving special efforts to shield women from the gaze of outsiders). The wealthier the family the greater the protection provided in terms of architecture, such as high walls, big fences, impasses, etc.

### ***Conclusion***

The architecture of the medina of Fes differs from that of the *ville nouvelle*. The modern aspect of the latter contrasts sharply with the 'sense-seeking' (the profound human search for an abstract value for things that transcends the physical objects themselves) and 'sense-making' (assigning an abstract value to things that transcends the physical objects themselves) aspect of the former. Part of this 'sense-making' relates to the way in which women and the roles they were expected to play were perceived. This is attested in various social, linguistic, psychological, and symbolic feminist readings of the architecture of the medina of Fes. The importance of these readings is linked to the fact that the architecture of the medina reflects the abrupt meeting of tribal and Islamic world-views. These traditionally see women as mere instruments in a heavily patriarchal system that depends on men acquiring and maintaining power both inside and outside the household.

This paper provides just a glimpse of the many ways in which architecture can inform us about the status of women, as well as the nature and extent of their active or passive influence. The topic is fascinating and ground-breaking, and certainly needs further investigation.

<sup>5</sup> Lévi-Strauss (1966).

*Monique Eleb*

## L'évolution de l'habitat et des modes de vie à Casablanca

### **Introduction**

En travaillant depuis 1989 sur l'architecture et l'urbanisme de la ville de Casablanca<sup>1</sup>, j'ai visité de très nombreuses habitations, de la pièce unique pour une famille dans une maison à cour de la medina ou du quartier des Habous, pastiche réussi construit dans les années 20, à la luxueuse villa entourée de jardins des hauteurs d'Anfa, en passant par des logements d'immeubles modernes des quartiers populaires et par des pièces dans les bidonvilles. Je ne faisais alors pas d'enquête sur les façons de vivre des Marocains d'aujourd'hui, mais mon activité habituelle à Paris consiste à analyser les modes de vie de mes contemporains du point de vue de leur habitat ainsi que les transformations qu'ils opèrent dans ces logements. Aussi ai-je posé mes questions habituelles sur les pratiques quotidiennes et ai-je acquis peu à peu un savoir que je n'avais jamais songé à synthétiser. Pour cet article j'ai refais une campagne d'enquête sur le terrain en avril 2005.

Mes recherches sur l'espace domestique ont une hypothèse commune: l'organisation de l'habitat, la distribution, rend compte des valeurs d'une société et des structures des rapports interindividuels. Cet art d'organiser les espaces de l'habitation est étudié à travers des catégories ou des variables: la partition, la hiérarchie entre les pièces, la proximité ou la distance entre elles, les liaisons, la contiguïté, le type de mobilier et d'objets décoratifs, etc. Dans l'habitation, le dispositif mis en place propose un mode de relations interindividuelles (hommes/femmes, parents/enfants, maîtres/domestiques) mais inclut aussi la dimension économique (espace de travail, de production) et la sociabilité large (accueil, réception, mise en scène...). La notion de dispositif<sup>2</sup> est comprise ici comme l'organisation d'éléments assemblés de façon particulière pour produire un effet, concernant les conduites, et les pratiques mais aussi les valeurs d'une société.

À Casablanca, ville nouvelle du XXe siècle, qui s'est développée jusqu'en 1956 sous le colonialisme français, on trouve aujourd'hui toutes les figures des façons de vivre des Marocains, dont la plupart se sont retrouvés dans des habitations qui avaient des caractéristiques bien éloignées de la maison à cour traditionnelle qu'ils connaissaient. Beaucoup sont passés d'un habitat vernaculaire, souvent construit sans architecte, à un habitat 'moderne', 'européen' comme on dit ici. Et cela a contribué à mettre en question les pra-

1 Cf Cohen & Eleb (1998) et Cohen & Eleb (2003).

2 Cette notion pourrait être rapprochée de celle de Michel Foucault, mais le champ dans lequel elle s'inscrit est plus pour moi celui du dispositif de la cure psychanalytique freudienne où la position des meubles, des objets ou tableaux dans la pièce, celle des corps, ainsi que la maîtrise des vues et des regards constituent une mise en scène qui doit produire des effets. Cf. Eleb & Debarre (1995).

tiques sociales, les structures des relations entre homme et femmes, entre parents et enfants. Cela a changé aussi les codes spécifiques des rapports du privé et du public.<sup>3</sup> Les coutumes et les usages traditionnels, parfaitement intériorisés par certains, sont mis en question par d'autres au nom de l'appartenance au monde moderne. D'autres, encore, qui se veulent modernes tiennent à montrer chez eux leur attachement à certains traits de la culture marocaine. La présence ou l'absence d'un salon marocain dans l'habitation en est l'indice le plus frappant, mais on observe aussi une montée de la conjugalité et de la famille restreinte.

Cette ville nouvelle du XXe siècle qu'est Casablanca est aujourd'hui entourée de bâtiments et de quartiers qui enserrant son périmètre initial. Dans une ville de plus de quatre millions d'habitants, l'appartenance à une classe sociale structure les modes d'habitat. On oppose ici comme une évidence la distance très grande entre les extrêmes car les plus misérables et les nantis se côtoient, mais il existe aussi une classe moyenne de plus en plus nombreuse qui peut soit faire des choix de vie quotidienne très proches des habitudes ancestrales, soit préférer vivre 'à l'européenne', ou 'de façon moderne', selon l'interprétation qu'ils en donnent eux-mêmes. Ces choix sont donc fondés sur des valeurs, des idéologies, des croyances. Et le degré de modernisation des lieux (distribution de l'habitat, confort, hygiène, équipements) dans lequel vivent les casablancais est en partie lié à cette appartenance. Cela émerge clairement quand on regarde de plus près le mobilier et les systèmes distributifs des différents habitats: la plupart des Marocains sont fidèles à certaines façons de faire incorporées, même quand ils vivent dans des espaces qui semblent à priori modernisés, voire occidentalisés. Mais les mêmes valeurs peuvent conduire à des modes de vie et des pratiques fort différents. Il y a donc hétérogénéité des comportements.

Des casablancais habitent, encore aujourd'hui, dans une maison marocaine traditionnelle. Quelles sont ses caractéristiques? Un des premiers permis de construire de la ville nous montre ce qu'était une maison au début du siècle. C'est le relevé d'une habitation à laquelle l'architecte doit ajouter une chambre, dans un quartier de l'ancienne médina en 1918.<sup>4</sup> Les 'chambres', (*bit*) sans autre qualificatif, organisées autour de la cour, sont plus longues que larges, pour des raisons constructives, elles font en général 2,50 mètres mais sont très hautes – 3,50 mètres – seul un WC (*bit l'ma*), où l'on peut se laver, équipe cette maison et le hammam du quartier complète le dispositif. La cuisine est vraisemblablement faite dehors, sur un *kanoun* (brasero) posé au sol, au-dessus duquel la femme se penche, comme dans le monde rural. Un auvent la protège parfois de la pluie.

Les relevés sont une autre source pour comprendre les qualités de la maison marocai-

3 De très nombreux travaux ont démontré comment l'organisation culturelle était étayée par l'organisation de la maison, pour des aires géographiques très différentes. Parmi les classiques: Mauss (1960), Bourdieu (1972). D'autres travaux ont mis en relief la rupture que constituait le passage d'un habitat traditionnel à l'habitat imposé, d'une autre culture: Lévi-Strauss (1955), Bourdieu & Sayad (1964).

4 Demande de permis de construire pour agrandir une maison, rue 15, quartier de Bousbir (ancienne médina) en 1918. cf. Cohen & Eleb (1998), 54.

ne. L'architecte Laprade a fait au début du siècle des relevés 'de l'ancienne maison musulmane qui est, à quelques nuances près, celui de l'antique maison méditerranéenne', dit un commentateur de l'époque<sup>5</sup>. Pour créer une ville nouvelle marocaine près de la ville nouvelle européenne de Casablanca, Laprade prend comme modèle 'les maisons pauvres de Rabat et Salé'<sup>6</sup> et construit de toutes pièces, avec Cadet et Brion en 1917, un quartier, les Habous, pour les classes populaires marocaines, utilisant les observations et les relevés de l'architecture ancienne du Maroc. Certaines de ces maisons, que j'analyse ici, apparaissent luxueuses aujourd'hui.

### ***Recomposition: maintenir la pièce de famille traditionnelle et organiser une nouvelle spécification des pièces***

On peut observer actuellement des recompositions de l'intérieur, que ce soit dans la maison traditionnelle ou dans l'immeuble collectif. Alors que le caractère de la distribution au Maroc suit les règles d'une affectation des pièces selon le temps de la journée, des saisons et de l'année – ce qui peut être public le jour peut devenir privé la nuit, et l'on peut manger où l'on dormira – on assiste actuellement à une tendance à la spécification des pièces liée à plusieurs variables. Il y a tout d'abord celle liée au bâti, à la configuration de la distribution des habitations: l'organisation 'à l'européenne', (en réalité souvent issue des réflexions sur l'habitat minimum du Mouvement moderne, quand il s'agit de collectifs des années 50), est un point de vue sur la structure de la famille et sur le statut de la personne. A chaque type de pratiques correspond un espace et l'individu est protégé dans sa chambre. Ces conceptions ne sont pas celles du monde marocain musulman, arabe ou berbère ni en général du monde rural, mais les habitants s'y sont adaptés de diverses façons.

Plusieurs hypothèses sont à vérifier: la présence des Espagnols et des Français a joué un rôle pour suggérer d'autres façons d'habiter et d'organiser l'espace domestique et rendre désirables des façons de vivre étrangères. Mais une autre variable semble aussi avoir eu son importance. Les modèles d'organisation de l'habitat et du décor proposés par le cinéma et la télévision, depuis les années cinquante ont laissé une empreinte dans certains milieux urbains. Ces modèles montrés par les films égyptiens en particulier, tant appréciés des Marocains, proposaient un autre art de vivre, ou mode de vie, dans un pays musulman, celui de la bourgeoisie égyptienne qui alliait coutumes orientales et pratiques occidentales. Ces films ont peut-être conduit à une réflexion sur les coutumes locales et les ont fait évoluer, de même que, comme partout ailleurs, le décor des *sitcoms* occidentales.

### ***Des salons qualifiés***

Comment expliquer qu'aujourd'hui, ceux qui le peuvent, possèdent trois types de pièces pour la vie en commun, du plus public au plus privé: *bit ed dyaf* (pièce de réception des invités), *saloune roumi ou saloune ou sala* (empruntée aux étrangers: *roumi* vient de romain, terme générique pour désigner les étrangers, *saloune* vient du français et *sala* de

<sup>5</sup> Vaillat (1930), 225.

<sup>6</sup> Laprade (1932), 97-98.



*Bit la glass (salon de famille) Famille Fadhil, Immeuble Asayag*

l'espagnol), et enfin *bit la glass*, (pièce où l'on s'assoit, où l'on se tient, où l'on séjourne) ce qui la distingue du *saloune roumi*, 'à l'occidental'. Cette multiplication courante dans la bourgeoisie permet en fait d'atteindre, selon les moments, le degré d'ostentation ou d'intimité désiré.

En se souvenant de la plasticité de l'espace et du fait que son affectation change selon les moments du jour, de l'année et des saisons, on peut dessiner grossièrement un schéma des pratiques courantes dans les maisons organisées selon le modèle traditionnel. *Bit la glass* pièce à tout faire est l'équivalent de notre séjour mais il se différencie selon la taille de l'habitation et les classes sociales. La pièce est entourée de banquettes continues, des *sdader*, achetées au mètre et faites sur mesure selon la configuration de la pièce. Elles sont souvent recouvertes de lourds tissus et bordées de coussins assez durs pour soutenir le corps.

*Bit la glass* est une salle de famille où la femme se tient pour faire des tâches ménagères propres, ou se reposer et où la famille peut se retrouver pour manger et regarder la télévision. Elle reste dans les milieux populaires, la ressource qui permet à chacun de disposer d'un lit. Les enfants dorment directement sur les banquettes ou sur des matelas posés au sol qu'on range tous les matins pour que cet espace conserve son aspect de pièce de réception. Quand cette pratique perdure les pièces gardent leur caractère pluri-fonctionnel, les petits meubles courants (table basse, tabourets, poufs, etc.) étant rangés après utilisation.



*Salon à sdader, bit la glass, de Brahim et Zeina A.*

Dans les milieux plus aisés, cette pièce est souvent à l'écart de l'espace de réception ostentatoire, et près de la cuisine. Elle peut servir aussi de chambre d'enfant la nuit et à accueillir la famille en visite. C'est la pièce la plus privée de la maison que l'on n'ouvre qu'aux intimes quand on en a d'autres.

Un chauffeur de maître, Brahim A., originaire de Taroudant, (il a une épouse qui ne travaille pas au dehors, un enfant qui dort dans *bit la glass* sur la banquette) habitant un deux pièces dans un petit immeuble situé en banlieue, aux limites de la ville, explique que ses parents ont depuis toujours, comme il est de coutume dans sa région, dormi sur un tapis sur lequel on pose un matelas, rangé le matin. Dans les familles très pauvres, récemment urbanisées il arrive qu'on réserve le lit à l'enfant et que les parents dorment sur un tapis dans ces logements bricolés sur une terrasse qui sont légion à Casablanca. Brahim qui a donc conscience d'avoir grimpé dans l'échelle sociale, insiste sur le fait qu'avoir deux pièces est nécessaire pour les visites car les hommes s'installent dans *bit la glass*, tandis que les femmes se réunissent dans la chambre conjugale, dont ils sont tous les deux très fiers et qui tient alors lieu d'espace de réception. Elles s'assoient sur le lit conjugale, à boldaquins.

Mais ça n'est encore pour lui peut-être qu'une étape car avoir deux types de salons est



*La cour recouverte d'une verrière est le salon le plus public, mais de grandes portes ouvrent sur bit la glass, bit ed dyaf et bit el makla (salle à manger). Maison d'Abdelhamid S., dans le quartier des Habous*

devenu une aspiration dans la classe moyenne. A ce premier séjour qu'est *bit la glass*, on peut associer un salon à l'euro péenne avec fauteuils, canapés et table basse. Et quand on est plus riche un troisième salon. Dans les familles aisées aux mœurs traditionnelles quand il est nécessaire de dissocier des activités masculines ou féminines, les femmes se tiennent dans *bit la glass* tandis que les hommes iront plus volontiers dans la *bit ed dyaf*, si on en dispose, surtout quand il y a un visiteur. Les petits garçons et les hommes y font la sieste ou y dorment de préférence, alors que comme l'a remarqué aussi Navez-Bouchanine<sup>7</sup>, les filles peuvent se contenter *bit la glass*.

Mais *bit ed dyaf* peut être aussi dans certaines circonstances festives, le lieu d'une réception entre femmes. Le statut élevé de cette pièce, la met cependant, dans les classes populaires ou nouvellement urbanisées, du côté du masculin.

Dans les grandes maisons à cour une inversion apparaît car le centre de la maison est le plus public et les femmes peuvent donc se retrouver entre elles dans un salon plus petit ou comme chez Abdelhamid S., (commerçant) avoir le choix de s'installer dans la salle à manger, nouvelle spécialisation très luxueuse. Cette maison n'est occupée que par une famille ce qui dit son niveau financier élevé. Quand plusieurs générations d'une famille

<sup>7</sup> Navez-Bouchanine (1997), 16.



*Entrée et salon de melle F. (employé)*

élargie y cohabite une pièce est dévolue à chacune d'elle.

De plus en plus, les habitants ayant accédé à la classe moyenne évoquent l'existence de la pièce poly fonctionnelle comme un moment passé de leur vie ou espèrent qu'un progrès dans leur carrière professionnelle pourra éliminer. Cette pratique qui a pourtant été la règle depuis des siècles au Maroc est maintenant perçue par eux comme une contrainte, liée à une mauvaise situation financière. Quand ils ne sont pas parvenus à vivre dans un logement à pièces spécialisées, ils en rêvent, font des projets de déménagements ou d'extension de l'habitation.

L'autre symbole de progrès social, outre la chambre conjugale sur laquelle je vais m'attarder, sera, dans les classes moyennes de posséder un deuxième salon meublé à l'euro-péenne. Il arrive même que dans ces classes celui-ci soit si prestigieux que si l'on ne peut en avoir qu'un, on choisisse le *salone roumi*, avec les attributs, signes de modernité, qui l'accompagnent: télévision avec magnéscope et téléphone fixe notamment. Les francophones le nomment tout simplement salon ou grande pièce.

Dans les riches villas des bourgeois, cadres ou professions libérales, la règle est d'avoir une multiplicité de salon pour les diverses circonstances de la vie quotidienne et festive, pour le prestige ou la sociabilité familiale. On peut observer que les salons en tout genres – marocains, 'à l'euro-péenne', coin lecture, coin musique etc. – sont rarement séparés par des cloisons mais plutôt par des éléments de décor ou de construction qui les différencient: grilles légères de fer forgé à mi-hauteur, différences de niveau du sol ou simp-



les tapis définissant des espaces, niche ou loggia, etc. La fluidité des espaces est donc privilégiée et la grande surface et les doubles hauteurs, sont un signe de prospérité recherché dans ces classes possédantes. S'y ajoute le salon de jardin qui peut être 'marocanisé' par une tenture, des tapis et des banquettes traditionnels, où l'on peut dormir à l'occasion, pendant la canicule, par exemple.

Ces multiples salons ne sont pas sans lien avec le sens de l'hospitalité et le rapport au temps des Marocains. Les règles très contraignantes de l'appartenance à une famille élargie impliquent qu'on accueille avec effusion les membres de celle-ci quand, par exemple, elle débarque de province sans prévenir et qu'on n'évoque pas le terme de la visite, sur lequel il n'est pas courtois de poser une question directe. C'est une pratique banale encore qui embarrasse bien aujourd'hui les habitants des petits logements collectifs et qui complique la vie de bien des femmes qui travaillent car elles doivent être des hôtes parfaites dans des conditions difficiles. Les banquettes nombreuses jouent alors leur rôle et un désordre passager dans cette pièce est perçu comme normal. Il est rare qu'arrivant à l'improviste dans une maison casablancaise modeste, on ne vous présente pas le grand-oncle ou la cousine de province, allongés sur les banquettes.

Certains, qui vivent complètement 'à l'européenne' justifient les banquettes et la large table dans un coin de salon, par ailleurs organisé comme dans les salles d'exposition de grandes marques de mobilier populaires en France ou en Suède, en expliquant: 'c'est plus convivial'.

#### ***A la recherche de la pièce centrale: permanence d'un dispositif***

Nombreux sont les marocains qui tentent de retrouver la pièce de famille qui soit le centre de la maison. Appelée *wast-ed-dar* (littéralement: le centre de la maison) ou *wastiyya* ou *oustia*, la pièce centrale, tradition séculaire ici, célèbre le groupe familial. De nombreux exemples de cette volonté de créer un espace central, distributif et dédié à la famille a été noté par divers auteurs.<sup>8</sup> Certains immeubles de l'entre-deux-guerres construits à Casablanca s'y prêtent plus ou moins quand les appartements ont des distributions qui associent une entrée et une grande pièce dans la continuité, flanquée de deux pièces latérales, comme c'est le cas dans certains des trois pièces de l'immeuble Assayag de Marius Boyer (1930), obéissant pourtant à des préceptes chers à Le Corbusier ou Henri Sauvage. Un salon marocain ou un séjour, lieux centraux de l'appartement et de la famille, satisfait les membres de la classe moyenne. On y accède souvent après un petit hall et c'est véritablement une spatialisation de la notion de foyer, lieu de toutes les activités quotidiennes des différents membres de la famille, mais surtout lieu de la femme quand elle ne travaille pas.

L'architecte Elie Mouyal, dans des logements récemment construits à Marrakech cette fois, a eu l'idée de dessiner un couloir élargi près de la cuisine au centre du logement qui est immédiatement devenu une véritable pièce distributive, sur laquelle les autres ouvrent, éclairée en second jour par les portes jamais fermées, de la cuisine et du salon marocain. Cet espace devient alors la salle de famille où l'on mange et se retrouve entre

<sup>8</sup> Notamment Pinson & Zakrani (1987), 104-117.

soi. Dans plusieurs de ces logements la famille n'a pas de chambre conjugale mais ce séjour, 'pour tous les jours', le salon 'à l'occidental' et le salon marocain. Où dorment-ils? Selon les cas, ils ouvrent le canapé du salon ou dorment sur les banquettes du salon marocain. Dans l'un d'eux, le jour de ma visite, la grand-mère se reposait. Et la femme rencontrée dit le plaisir d'avoir conquis cette pièce où l'on se tient et où les enfants mangent et font leur devoir en sortant de l'école.

Cette tendance à trouver un centre à la maison est un fait culturel connu et étudié par les ethnologues, et il est alors frappant d'observer que les raisons données par les habitants sont le plus souvent fonctionnelles: 'C'est pratique que les enfants mangent et fassent leur devoir dans une pièce qui n'est pas la pièce de réception' dit une des habitantes. Mais ce choix renvoie en réalité à des raisons plus symboliques liées à l'idée qu'une vraie maison a un centre qui relie toutes les pièces. Peut-on y voir un attachement au type de la maison centrée sur la cour et aux habitus inscrits dans les pratiques des cheminements qui y sont liés? La distribution de la maison à cour, faite de pièces non communicantes entre elles, oblige à passer par la cour pour aller d'une pièce à l'autre. La maison est donc centrée et même quand la cour est recouverte d'une verrière, ou quand ce dispositif n'existe pas, on observe que les gestuelles traditionnelles tendent à être retrouvées. C'est un exemple frappant de la force des habitus. La valeur de *centralité* est si intriquée avec l'idée d'habitation qu'elle est recherchée dans des espaces qui ne sont pas organisés autour de cette notion. Et l'on trouve dans les logements les moins proches de cette configuration des tentatives pour la retrouver: couloirs élargis, cuisine 'bien placée' (comme dit une habitante), position qui permet de la transformer en pièce centrale de la maison, pièce de famille qui permet de se sentir bien sans contraintes, entre soi, de prendre le thé avec ses intimes et de regarder la télévision avec ses enfants.

### ***L'apparition de la chambre conjugale (bit en-na'âs, 'la chambre où l'on dort')***

L'autre changement d'importance est la diffusion dans la société marocaine de la chambre conjugale, ce que de nombreux chercheurs interprètent comme un symptôme de l'autonomisation des individus. C'est une pratique observable dans toutes les classes sociales. Ainsi Brahim A., chauffeur de maître, explique-t-il dans un raccourci saisissant: 'On dormait sur les tapis à Taroudant. Vers douze ans, on a eu des banquettes et quand je me suis marié, on a tout de suite eu une chambre'. Et Abdelhamid S., commerçant, insiste, avec une pointe de fierté et de provocation peut-être car il a affirmé son appartenance à une tradition religieuse militante: 'Mes parents en avaient déjà une!' La chambre conjugale apparaît alors comme un signe de progrès social et économique et parfois quand plusieurs générations cohabitent, elle indique la place dans la hiérarchie de la maison. Arrif évoque l'exemple d'un jeune couple habitant un quartier très populaire et dont les deux membres travaillent. Il a droit, de ce fait, à une chambre, alors que leurs parents continuent à vivre selon la tradition, ce qui est perçu comme une baisse de leur statut.<sup>9</sup>

Il est devenu d'avant-garde dans certains milieux de posséder un ensemble de chambre à coucher avec lit, armoire et tables de nuit assortis. Est-ce une mode esthétique ou

<sup>9</sup> Arrif (1999), 111-127.

un mode relationnel choisi? Si c'est une mode, elle n'a pu se transformer en pratique durable que parce que l'aspiration à une relation duelle privilégiée, selon le modèle du couple occidental, s'est développée. Et avec l'arrivée dans les grandes villes et la généralisation du salariat féminin, la pression du groupe familial s'est quelque peu relâchée. D'autre part, certaines femmes revendiquent un statut égalitaire par rapport à l'homme, ce qu'elles sont en train d'obtenir légalement, et la chambre conjugale peut être la preuve de ce statut, elle peut jouer un rôle d'étayage, de preuve de l'égalité. Dans les représentations, elle en est un peu le garant: il s'agit de partager un espace où chacun a sa place reconnue et il est une métaphore du lien privilégié et du colloque conjugal. La conjugalité choisie a comme corollaire l'idée du couple autonome face au groupe de la famille élargie. Est-ce un signe d'individualisation? Peut-être pas, cela reste à approfondir. Arrif voit dans cette 'autonomisation de l'espace de sommeil des parents [...] la transformation la plus notable dans les modes d'habiter' dans les classes populaires casablancaises.<sup>10</sup>

La mono-fonctionnalité des pièces est aujourd'hui perçue par de nombreux Casablancais comme un signe de luxe, comme une aspiration, un progrès. Il est courant qu'ils évoquent leurs projets d'agrandissement, de déménagement, d'achat (les Marocains sont très attachés à la propriété) d'une habitation qui permettrait que tous les membres de la famille disposent d'une chambre ou, au moins que les filles d'une part et les garçons de l'autre, aient une chambre. Pour les moins favorisés, c'est l'accès à la chambre du couple qui est mise en avant. Et comme en France et ailleurs, chacun imagine qu'une pièce de plus calmerait les conflits de la vie quotidienne.

A travers ces différents modes de vie, tous casablancais, apparaît bien une mosaïque sociale, caractérisant particulièrement la vie dans les grandes villes. Casablanca est une ville multipolaire regroupant toutes les figures des habitus marocains car y coexistent des pratiques et des ethos traditionnels, peut-être même ancestraux – façons de faire, gestes transmis liés à des valeurs culturelles, morales ou religieuses et incorporées – mais adaptés aux conditions de logement et de développement technologiques actuels. Certaines pratiques semblent se rapprocher de celles des occidentaux, mais les façons de faire marocaines ne sont pas annulées pour autant. Ainsi la tendance à la spécialisation des pièces peut à tout moment et selon les circonstances de la vie quotidienne être remise en question. Des pratiques exogènes ont été amalgamées aux pratiques locales et selon les circonstances, les unes ou les autres, plus pertinentes *ici et maintenant* sont convoquées, sans état d'âme semble-t-il. Les enfants des familles aisés, qui ont une chambre, peuvent dormir dans celle-ci ou sur les banquettes du salon si le sommeil les a saisis dans cette pièce. Les parents n'auront pas toujours le réflexe de les porter dans leur chambre, la banquette leur semblant parfaitement adaptée. Un jeu libre semble s'être mis en place. Est-ce le signe d'une acculturation réussie qui ne mettrait pas en question la culture principale? Ce jeu permet d'emprunter à d'autres des pratiques perçues comme plus prestigieuses parfois, comme plus pratiques ou plus confortables à certains moments, des usages adoptés car interprétés comme plus modernes, voire comme symboles de moderni-

<sup>10</sup> Arrif (1999) 122.

sation, de transformation et d'épanouissement personnel. Ce jeu n'oblige pas à renoncer aux aspects des modes de vie et des habitus marocains empreints de valeurs qui laissent tout leur sens aux lois de l'hospitalité et au respect des autres, ainsi qu'à un rapport au corps spécifique. La façon particulière qu'a la culture marocaine de hiérarchiser les rapports entre hommes et femmes, parents et enfants et maîtres et domestiques peut continuer à avoir cours dans cet espace hétérogène. Ainsi la force des dispositifs spatiaux apparaît: ils aident à accompagner des changements quand le désir d'évolution était latent.

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


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