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05348

1995  
002

# Serie Research Memoranda

## In Search of Sustainable Transport Systems

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Research Memorandum 1995-2

vrije Universiteit *amsterdam*



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## 1. Introduction

At a world-wide **scale**, transport by road and air have grown rapidly and are **projected** to continue this growth **pace** in the coming decades. There is **also** a broad **recognition** that further mobility growth would become unacceptable, as transport and mobility are among the major sources of environmental degradation. And it is therefore conceivable that in recent years intense **debates** have started on the question as **how** to curb the environmental stress from our mobile network society (see **also** the Green Paper of the European Commission 1992). In **principle**, several options **can** be envisaged in order to alleviate the **external costs** of modern transport systems: moral conviction, **strict** regulations (and enforcement thereof), user charge **principles** (e.g. ,road pricing, Pigovian taxation), sophisticated environmental-benign **technologies** (e.g., route guidance, zero-emission **cars**) and alternative modes of physical planning (e.g. ,**compact** city design). Whatever the **ultimate** options **chosen** **may** be, it is **clear** that **any** reduction target in environmental stress has to be assessed from both an environmental sustainability viewpoint and from a **cost-effectiveness** viewpoint (cf. Tisdell 1991). **Such** an assessment **may** be based on evaluation criteria that are internal to the transport system or on criteria that mirror an overall systemic efficiency and sustainability . This provokes the question of the most appropriate level of reduction of environmental pollution by the transport sector vis-à-vis other **economic** sectors.

The nowadays popular notion of **sustainable development** (see WCED 1987) does not offer quantitative criteria which would guide policy-makers and planners in their efforts to **reach** a **process** of change in which resource use, **productive** investments, technological development and **institutional changes** are brought in harmony with one another. Consequently , a policy strategy **aiming** at a more sustainable transport system has to **identify** quantitative criteria which would offer guidelines on the maximum allowable contribution to environmental degradation by the transport sector (cf. **Verhoef** and Van den Bergh, 1994; Vleugel, 1994). This presupposes knowledge on the total permissible pollution in a given area and in a given **time** frame, as **well** as know- ledge on the share of the transport system in this total volume of pollution (for different emittents). The aim of this paper is to develop some thoughts on the question of **identifying** the maximum allowable pollution share by the transport sector, assuming a critical level of maximum resource use, a maximum carrying capacity , a maximum environmental utilisation **space**, a maximum sustainable yield or some other critical threshold level for environmental **decay**. We **will** use here the notion of **maximum environmental capacity use** (MECU) to **indicate** the maximum resource use of a given environmental capital stock that - in a given **time** period - is compatible with both socio-economic **objectives** and environmental quality conditions now and in the future. The question we want to answer in this paper is whether at the **sectoral** level, viz. that of the **transport system**, the idea of a transport-specific MECU - denoted here as **MECUTS** - **can** be operationalized. We **will** look in particular at alternative new possibilities, with particular emphasis on **economic backgrounds**, to **control** pollution emission in the transport sector. Before commencing this task, we **will** first in the next **section** offer some background information on the issue of

sustainable development in the context of transport systems.

## 2. Environmental Stress: Backgrounds

Most **human** activities (including transport and mobility) **generate** environmental stress. **Often** the **nature** or the **size** of this effect does not cause serious harm, but in our modern network economy the spatial interaction in terms of physical movement of people and goods has **risen** to an unprecedented degree, with the **result** that modern transport systems are causing severe environmental degradation. This **holds** for **all** modes of transport, although some modes - notably road transport - cause significantly more damage (see for an illustrative overview **Tables 1 and 2**).

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

It is **clear** from **Tables 1 and 2** that **each** transport mode - be it private or public - **contributes** to environmental degradation. There is no environmentally benign transport activity, but some modes are less harmful than others.

A peculiar feature of transport is its **integrating** function in a network economy: transport is a derived activity which is dependent on and determined by **all other economic** activities. Besides, transport - and its necessary **infrastructure** - has **also** a structuring impact on the **space-economy**. Consequently, the assessment of environmental impacts of the transport sector is not an easy task, as transport is only a small part of a long chain of subsequent activities. This chain **can** be decomposed as follows:

- production (including delivery of **raw** materials) and sales of goods;
- ownership and use of transport vehicles:
  - individual modes
  - **collective** modes
  - integrated multimodal transport systems
  - logistic chains and **structures**;
- depreciation and **scrap** policy for old vehicles;
- extraction of **raw** materials for physical **infrastructure**;
- construction and maintenance of **infrastructure**.

Effective environmental policy in the transport sector presupposes **sufficient** insight into the driving **forces** of **human** activities, in terms of both **nature** and **size** in our 'post-Fordist' way of living. Two **main categories** are (see Opschoor 1992):

- **material processes**, such as **economic** progress or technological innovations.

These **processes** also include 'counter production' serving to alleviate environmental degradation **caused** by the economy (e. g. , catalytic **converters**,

antinoise **screens** etc). Given this bias in our GNP composition and definition, the plea for a green GNP is conceivable.

- **structural** factors, **such** as institutional factors (e.g., the social security system) and ideological motives (e.g., belief in **economic** progress). These **backgrounds often** lead to a situation **where** a choice in favour of more polluting • **rather** than less polluting • activities is made, as is **also** witnessed by the popularity of individual transport modes.

In our modern society an in-built automatism to favour less sustainable activities • and hence **also** less sustainable modes of transport • appears to exist. This **can** be explained from three background factors in a network society which **will** now concisely be **discussed**, viz. **separation**, **market failure** and **policy inertia**.

**Separation** in a network **means** a **lack** of direct behavioural connectivity among actors, so that **causes** and impacts show a distance in terms of **scale** (e.g., **micro** versus macro interests), **time** (e.g., current versus future generations) and **geographical space** (e.g., the NIMBY phenomenon). Separation in the transport sector takes **place**, since:

- individual contributions to environmental pollution (e.g., the use of a single **car**) are usually only **marginal**;
- the link from a global (or macro) environmental problem to individual behavioural adjustments is not straightforward;
- behavioural **changes** by (a group of) individuals **will** discourage other (groups of) individuals to adopt the same strategy (the so-called **prisoner's dilemma**).

Consequently, most actors in the transport sector follow a **free rider** strategy. This **means** that voluntary behavioural **changes** are not likely to take **place**, so that rational individual behaviour appears to provoke the so-called **tragedy of the commons** (Hardin 1968). This intrinsic conflict between individual (or group) interests and **collective** (or macro) values is **often** referred to as **the social dilemma**.

**Market failure** refers to the **lack** of a proper **price** system for market transactions. Since environmental goods **such** as fresh air or quiet do not have an unambiguous value mirrored in a commonly **accepted** and paid for **price** level, a distortion in choice behaviour takes **place**. **Such** externalities lead to underpriced goods and **cause** a **higher** level of use than would be desirable from a social perspective. This phenomenon of market failure in the transport sector has provoked recent **debates** on 'user charge' and 'road pricing' **principles**. It has to be admitted that a policy for **coping** with market failures is from an **economic** viewpoint a sound strategy, but in **practice many** impediments appear to exist (e.g., **lack** of information, distributional **effects**, etc.). A survey of arguments **can** be found in Emrnerink et al. (1994).

Finally, **policy inertia** has to be mentioned. The **existence** of market failures has generated a wide array of policy initiatives in order to alleviate the associated external **effects**. In **many** cases **however, such** initiatives were uncoordinated or insufficiently based on reliable information on behavioural responses of travellers. Examples are incompatible combinations of regulations, subsidies and charges in the transport sector. As a **result**, an improvement did not • or insufficiently • take

place, so that then a case of so-called **government or invention** failures emerged (see e.g. **Barde** and **Button** 1990). In Table 3 a concise overview of various failure processes in the transport sector is given.

Table 3 about here

The problem is **however** that - in view of government interests in public transport - a 'clean' **economic** framework for the transport sector as a **whole** is hard to identify, so that a frame of reference for **effective** environmental **policies** for the entire transport sector is badly missing. As a **result**, we observe a great deal of **inertia** in policy initiatives, so that environmental management in this sector is characterized by second-best or even third-best strategies. Sustainable transport **policies** are therefore extremely rare.

### 3. Maximum **Environmental** Capacity Use of the Transport Sector (**MECUTS**)

There is no doubt on the need to **reduce** environmental emissions of the transport sector. Table 4 contains - in summary form - the results of three distinct Dutch scenario's for the year 2010, followed by the required reduction in emissions in the same year. These figures illustrate clearly that the **accepted** environmental standards **will** hardly be met in the year 2010.

Table 4 about here

Next, in **Tables** 5 and 6 the necessary reductions in emission by the transport sector - both passenger transport (Table 5) and goods transport (Table 6) - implied by formulated **policies** are given. These figures cover transport by road, rail and air. It is **clear** from this information that the air pollution by road transport has to be reduced significantly, while at the same **time** **also** the personal mobility has to decline. Finally, substitution from road to rail is foreseen. **Such** goals **can** of course only be achieved, if these **policies** are supported by progress in transport technology, new ways of physical planning etc.

Table 5 about here

Table 6 about here

Before addressing in greater detail the issue of (the identification and measurement of) **MECUTS**, we will first pay some more attention to MECU in

**general**. Environmental capacity has to be interpreted in terms of **functions** provided by environment and **nature** (cf. Costanza and Daly 1992; Turner 1993). **Such** functions concern in particular:

- **economic** functions (e.g., a resource base, recreational opportunities)
- **ecological** functions (e.g., regulation, absorption, signalling)
- **cultural** functions (e.g., landscape beauty, educational values)

The question then is whether it is possible to establish a **tolerance** level of maximum use of **such** functions based on principles of environmental sustainability. It goes without saying that **the** identification of **such** critical threshold levels (e.g., in terms of carrying capacity, maximum load, maximum sustainable yield) is fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, in policy **practice** we observe that governments are increasingly inclined • despite some degree of ambiguity and arbitrariness • to accept **such** critical threshold levels as signposts for environmental strategies, using the minimum regret **principle** (or **any** other meaningful risk **principle**) as a major justification. Consequently, notwithstanding some ranges of uncertainty, more and more countries **define** standards on carbon dioxide, nitrous oxides, methane and other greenhouse **gases**.

One **may** in general assume that **such** environmental envision standards are fixed according to a level that keeps the existing stock of environmental resources more or less intact (see Pearce et al. 1989). This then defines in operational terms the MECU in **general**, but it does not yet show the distributional consequences of **such** generic sustainability **policies**. Thus the sector-specific reduction of pollution is at stake here. In this framework various policy principles **can** be distinguished:

- an equal percentage reduction of pollution in **all** sectors
- a sector-specific reduction in pollution that is proportional to the environmental stress **caused** by that sector
- a sector-specific reduction in pollution that is based on **sectoral** cost-effectiveness measures for pollution abatement
- a sector-specific reduction in pollution that is inversely proportional to the **intensity** of environmental measures taken by that sector in the past
- a sector-specific reduction in pollution that is proportional to the growth **rate** of its pollution in the past years.

**Such** distinctions are **also** loosely related to the concept of strong and weak sustainable development, depending on the question whether overall environmental quality improvement is strived for or whether environmental quality decline in some sector or region **can** be compensated for by improvement elsewhere.

Clearly, in a **dynamic economy** technological progress **may** alleviate some of the problems inherent in the limits of a MECU, but this **needs** to be supported by behavioural and institutional responses (e. g . , the potential offered by global computer networks).

The above observations apply to a large extent **also** to **MECUTS**, **where** two problems appear to emerge: (i) which is the share of the transport sector in overall reduction of pollutants, and (ii) which is a share of sub-sectors within the transport



system in terms of the pollution reduction ? The answer to **such** questions depends on various evaluation **factors**, viz.:

- cl the **nature** and **size** of effluents by the transport sector
- the **costs** of emission reduction in the transport sector
- the modal split and composition of passengers and freight in the transport sector
- cl the spatial externalities caused by various transport activities
- the volume and distribution of renewable and non-renewable resources used by subsectors in the transport system.

In trying to assess a proper level of **MECUTS**, it has to be recognized that **such** levels **may** be **site-specific** due to **lack** of other choice (e.g., modal) opportunities in transport (Whitelegg 1993). For example, Newman and Kenworthy (1991) found in their **comparative** study on energy consumption and automobile **dependence** that land use intensity is in **many** cities the **decisive** factor. The more intensive urban land use, the shorter the travel distances and the **higher** the opportunities for public transit. Differences of 20 to 30 percent in gasoline consumption have been found between American and European cities. This suggests that urban land use intensity might **also** act as a **principle** for allocating a certain level of environmental utilisation to segments of the transport sector. A related problem is of a distributional **nature** (see **Sachs** 1983): **higher income** people appear to live in general in lower densities and hence are **forced** to use the **car** because of **absence** of profitable public transport in low density **areas**. This, if quota systems based on the **MECUTS** notion would be allocated to (segments of) the transport sector, it **may mean** that certain groups are disproportionately hit, which **may** lead to **much** public opposition. Clearly, the above remarks do not only apply to residential density, but **also** to industrial density, retail and service density etc. (see **also** Kasanen and Savolainen 1993).

A **specific** problem is caused by the modal split of the transport sector. **Once** a level of **MECUTS** has been established and **accepted**, the next question is **how much** the share of rail systems vs. road systems vs. waterway systems etc. would have to be. This would imply a confrontation of the performance of **each** transport mode (e.g., in terms of **person** km or tonne km) with the volume of effluents caused by it. Again the same type of policy **principles** as mentioned above for distributing the emission constraints **may in principle** be used.

Clearly, at the **very** end one **may** even raise the question **how much** individual vehicles would have to be **affected** in their operation. This brings us into the area of so-called **mobility quota**, which would **mean** that a maximum permissible distance to be driven by a vehicle in a certain period (or the maximum amount of **fuel** to be consumed by a **car** in a given period) - without **any** extra charge (in the form of a Pigovian tax) - would have to be established. Needless to say that theoretically **such** an option is comparable to quota systems in resource management, but this solution **may** lead to substantial problems regarding implementing and controlling **such** a system because of the 'large numbers' case in transport. In future, this problem **may** be solved by smart technology , **however**.

Two types of approaches **may** in **principle** be envisaged to solve the above choice problems. One would be to **compose** packages of policy measures (charges, technology solutions, prohibitions etc.) and to evaluate the feasibility of **each** of them by **means** of a cost-effectiveness strategy, taking for granted a given level of **MECUTS**, established e.g. by a government or transport authority. Another approach would be to investigate different reduction scenarios in subsectors of the transport system and to evaluate **such** policy scenarios against the background of the above evaluation factors by **means** of multicriteria analysis. An intermediate approach might be to specify in **advance** achievement levels of environmental quality, so that **also** a **tension index** **can** be created for the discrepancy between actual and desirable performance. This index **may** then be used for assessing weight factors in a goals-achievement multicriteria analysis.

It is **clear** that the above issues require **much** more substantive research, notably (see **also** Vleugel, 1994):

- identification of relevant and proper **MECUTS** indicators
- fixation of **acceptable** critical threshold levels
- measurement and monitoring of actual environmental performance of the transport (sub)sector(s)
- assessment and evaluation of various **MECUTS** options (including spatial alternatives **such** as **car-free** cities, technology options **such** as telematics, and behavioural **changes** in mobility and life-style patterns)
- **cost** and **benefit** assessment of alternative pollution abatement strategies in a **MECUTS** context.

In reality, policy decisions seem to be based on consensus formation incorporating **compromise** choices regarding ecologically sustainable development of various sectors, including the transport sector (cf. Nijkamp and Blaas 1994). This **also means** that **effective** policy strategies based on **MECUTS** guidelines are hard to **find**. This **can also** be explained by returning to the above mentioned three impediments which **caused** the **social** dilemma.

The first problem, **viz. separation**, **can** be coped with by voluntary individual internalisation of **social costs** of environmental **decay** (e.g., less use of **cars**), by market internalisation (e.g., Pigovian taxes), or by **forced** internalisation (e.g., parking prohibitions). **All such** measures **may** have a substantive impact on sustainable development, but the public resistance and the policy **inertia** during several decades do not offer **many** hopeful perspectives, although recently the **tides** in Europe are changing. Examples are **policies** for **car-free** cities or even 'zero-emission cities'.

**The second** issue, **viz. market failure**, **may** be dealt with by a system of standards that is compatible with **MECUTS** indicators. Here maximum load factors, maximum emission standards or quota for resource use **may** be **introduced**. In this context, **advances** in information and transport (systems) technology **may provide** new departures for more sustainable mobility (e.g., telematics, telecenters **policies**). Actually, in most cases neither mobility substitution nor reduction is achieved by **means** of telematics, **however**.

Finally, the problem of **policy reform** **may** be **tackled** by seeking for

institutional reforms, **such** as the organization of countervailing powers (e.g. ,public transport **lobbies**, international cooperation and agreements on environmental-benign transport modes).

In view of the social dilemma and the conflict between efficiency and equity , it seems that a 'packaging' of **policies** - with sufficient emphasis on financial incentives, but **also** with **strict** constraints whenever needed - is offering the best opportunities.

#### 4. Concluding Remarks

The above observations **mean** that in **practice** a fair balance has to be found between incentives and penalties, between **economic** and institutional (e.g. , standards) measures, and between behavioural and technological responses. An interesting approach **may** be added here, viz. in order to make sure that **also** future generations would have sufficient options for environmental quality, it **may** be useful to think in terms of insurance strategies. The estimated annual insurance premiums that would have to be paid in order to guarantee **such** options would have to be attributed as additional social **costs** to be borne by the current **economy** (including the transport sector). It **goes** without saying that our paper on **MECUTS** has provoked more questions than answers, but it is **clear** that transportation science **will** need to intensify its research efforts to make sure that the transport sector **will** not continue to be a perseverant unsustainable evil in a mobile network society.

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Table 1 Important environmental effects per transport mode

Topic	Road	Rail	Air	Water
Climate change <sup>1)</sup>	x	x	x	x
Squander <sup>2)</sup>	x	x	x	x
Acidification <sup>3)</sup>	x	x	x	x
Diffusion <sup>4)</sup>	x			x
Spatial needs and intersection <sup>5)</sup>	x	x		
External safety <sup>6)</sup>	x	x		
Smell <sup>6)</sup>	x		x	
Noise <sup>6)</sup>	x	x	x	
Degradation of built environment <sup>6)</sup>	x			
Aridification <sup>7)</sup>	x			
Removal <sup>8)</sup>	x			

Source: Van Wee et al. (1992), Table 2.1.1 (modified).

Notes:

- 1) contribution to the greenhouse effect because of energy consumption and the reduction of the **ozone** layer by **CFCs** in cooling and painting
- 2) e.g., **inefficient** use of fossil **fuels** and (rare) **metals**
- 3) incl. emissions by power stations
- 4) especially **toxic** chemicals like cadmium, **asbestos** and lead
- 5) for infrastructure, vehicle use and parking
- 6) disturbance and damage to non-users
- 7) infrastructure construction consumes large amounts of sand and other filling materials, which drastically **changes** the landscape, as large holes remain, which are increasingly turned into **lakes**
- 8) vehicle bodies, tires etc.

Table 2 Contribution of the transport sector to environmental pollution in the Netherlands

Source Data 1985	Road	Mobile, other	Mobile, total	Other	Total
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton)	21	5	26	156	182
NO <sub>x</sub> (kton)	262	79	341	211	552
SO <sub>2</sub> (kton)	11	23	34	237	271
NH <sub>3</sub> (kton)	0	0	0	285	285
H <sup>+</sup> (10 <sup>9</sup> mol)	5.0	2.1	7.2	27.9	35
VOS (kton)	221	10	231	277	508
CO (kton)	923	42	965	356	1321
Lead (ton)	1180	0	1180	223	1403
Particulates (ton)	17	9	26	68	94
Waste (Mton)	0.6	0.02	0.6	48	49
Oil (kton)	35	8	43	59	102
Wrecks (kton) <sup>1)</sup>	510 <sup>1)</sup>	p.m.	510+p.m.	0	510+p.m.
Tires (kton)	61	12	73	0	73
Noise	59/19 <sup>2)</sup>				
Smell	61 <sup>3)</sup>				

Source: Van Wee et al. (1992), Table 2.1.1a.

Notes:

1) 1986 data

2) questionnaire data: percentage of people (severely) hindered

3) idem: by traffic in 1989.

Table 3 Actors and failure processes in transportation

Process		Specific processes	
Government failure	Policy aims <b>Instruments:</b> <b>legal, prices</b>	Policy <b>inertia</b> Separation	Misjudgements , (awareness of) underestimation of environmental concerns <b>vis-à-</b> vis competing concerns
Market failure: public transport operators	Decisions regarding investments , cooperation, competition, product quality	Separation Market failure	Unwillingness or inability to supply adequate alternatives for the private <b>car</b> Externalisation of costs
Market failure: transport user	Choice of mode, mobility level etc.	Separation Market failure	Few people choose environmentally more benign transport modes Externalisation of costs



Table 4 Emission reduction scenarios for the Netherlands; All sources

	Reductions expected in 2010 (%) <sup>1)</sup>			Reductions needed in 2010 <sup>1)</sup>
	Scenario I	Scenario II	Scenario III	
CO <sub>2</sub>	+ 35	+ 35	-20 à -30	-20 à -30
SO <sub>2</sub>	-50	-75	-80 à -90	-80 à -90
NO <sub>x</sub>	-10	-60	-70 à -80	-80 à -90
NH <sub>3</sub>	-33	-70	-80	-80 à -90
HC	-20	-50	-70 à -80	-80
CFCs	-100	-100	-100	-100
Effluents into river Rhine and North Sea	-50	-75	-75	-75 à -90
Waste dumping	0	-50	-70 à -80	-80 à -90
Noise, severe <sup>2)</sup>	+ 50	0	-15	-70 à -90
Smell <sup>2)</sup>	+ 10	-50	-60	-70 à -90

Source: VROM et al. (1989), p. 107, Table 5.1.1.

Notes:

1) percentage reduction with respect to 1985 levels

Scenario I = current (so-called NMP-1) environmental policy package

Scenario II = maximum use of all conceivable policy measures

Scenario III = mix of measures aimed at emission reduction and source related measures

2) idem, in terms of number of people hindered.

**Table 5 Emission reduction and mobility targets for passenger transport according to recent Dutch policy memoranda**

	1986	1994 (NMP/ +)	2000	2010
NO <sub>x</sub> <sup>1)</sup>	163	100	40 (-75%)	40
HC <sup>1)</sup>	136		35 (-75%)	35
CO <sub>2</sub> <sup>1)</sup>	23.000	26.400	23.000	20.700
Spatial needs <sup>2)</sup>	100	100	<sup>3)</sup>	<sup>3)</sup>
Noise: • dB(A) <sup>4)</sup>	80		74	70
• number of hindered (severely) % <sup>5)</sup>	61% (20 %)		10-15%	0
Foreseen mobility level with no policy changes (index)	100	124	140	172
SVV-11 policy		120	126	156
SVV-11 + NMP- policy		117	120	148
NMP-2 policy			130	135

Source: VROM et al. (1989), pp. 194-196, 205; VROM et al. (1990), p. 50; VROM et al. (1993), p. 142 and 146; and RIVM (1993), p. 22 (note 5).

Notes:

- 1) NO<sub>x</sub> and CO<sub>2</sub> in kilotonnes per year
- 2) index 1986 = 100, no targets **after** the year 2000
- 3) no further intersection in **rural areas** and compensation elsewhere if new links are still needed. These targets are hard to **reach where car** ownership is forecasted to grow from **5,5** million to 7 or 8 million **cars**; 'stand-still' seems therefore illusory
- 4) peak level dB(A) per **car**
- 5) 1990 data.

**Table 6 Emission reduction and mobility targets for freight transport according to recent Dutch policy memoranda**

	1986	2000	2010
NO <sub>x</sub> <sup>1)</sup>	122	72 (-35%)	25 (-75%)
HC <sup>1)</sup>	46	30 (-35%)	12 (-75%)
Noise <sup>2)</sup>	81-80	75-80	70
Mobility	100		<b>140<sup>3)</sup></b>

Source: VROM et al. (1989), p. 195-196,205; VROM et al. (1990), p. 50.

Notes:

- 1) NO<sub>x</sub> and HC in kilotonnes per year
- 2) in dB(A) per bus/lorrie
- 3) wishful thinking, as in NMP (p. 194) the foreseen growth of mobility is 70 to 80%.