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ABSTRACT

This article presents the historical and political trajectory of Kitchanga town in North Kivu, to demonstrate how current processes of urbanization in a context of civil war in Eastern Congo are strongly intertwined with regional politics of refuge. Kitchanga, an urban agglomeration that emerged from the gradual urbanization of IDP and refugee concentrations, has occupied very different positions through different episodes of the wars, ranging from a safe haven of refuge, to a rebel headquarter, to a violent battleground. On the basis of a historical account of Kitchanga's development, the paper argues for a spatial reading of broader geographies of war, displacement and ethnic mobilization in North Kivu. It shows that these urban agglomerations as 'places' and their urbanization as 'processes' are crucial to better understand the spatial politics of refuge in North Kivu. The article builds on original empirical data.

On 6 March 2010, part of the population of Kitchanga, an agglomeration located in the North Kivu province of the D.R. Congo, took the streets to demand the 'urban status' ('le statut d'une ville') for their town.[1] The hundreds of people demonstrating based their demand on the fact that Kitchanga had doubled in demographic size in less than five years' time. What was in the early 1990s a small village with limited economic (or political) significance developed during the civil wars into a town with population figures estimated around 80,000.[2] It stands in sharp contrast with its rural surroundings as a result of its relatively developed infrastructure, commerce, and economic markets. The case of Kitchanga is symptomatic of an important tendency observed in the whole of the Eastern Congo. A remarkable outcome of protracted violent conflict is a steady rural-urban transformation of the densely populated Kivu provinces. Kitchanga's expansion is a direct outcome of dynamics of conflict and conflict-related (forced) mobility. Since the start of the Congolese civil war in the early 1990's (see below), immigration and internal displacement have been central to the town's development. Its social-demographic composition, its economic profile and its political dynamics are strongly influenced by its position as a 'safe haven'. Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)

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settled both in the centre as well as in its peripheral IDP camps, becoming main drivers of the town's expansion and transformation.

Kitchanga is just one example of emerging 'boomtowns' that characterize Eastern Congo at present; other examples of war-induced urbanization are Hombo (Kalehe, South Kivu), Faraje (Haute-Uele), Rubaya (Masisi, North Kivu) and Nyabibwe (Kalehe, South Kivu). Like Kitchanga, some of these towns also claim the 'urban status' of their agglomeration based on demographic size, as population numbers is one of the criteria in the 2008 'decentralization law' to be eligible to become a *commune*.[3] However, in the Kivu provinces, characterized by fierce military struggles for political representation and territorial control, this claim is often politically inspired. In Kitchanga's case, for example, the march claiming the city status was perceived as 'ethnically' engineered (see below).

We argue that the emergence and urbanization of Kitchanga is a process that is as much about politics as it is about spatial patterns of (forced) mobility, settlement and expansion. The case of Kitchanga shows that those agglomerations as 'places' and their urbanization as 'processes' play an important role in the spatial politics of displacement and migration in North Kivu. A historical analysis shows how Kitchanga's growth and urbanization have been shaped by these politics. Politicians, other elites or armed groups have used the presence, mobility and settlement of refugees and IDPs in and around Kitchanga for political mobilization. Consequently, the urbanization of Kitchanga has been the outcome of the agency of very different actors. The focus on a single case allows for a spatial reading of broader geographies of war, displacement and ethnic mobilization in North Kivu, in which urban agglomerations like Kitchanga represent spatial nodes of protection, military mobilization and political ambitions.

From a historical account of its development between the 1990s and 2016, this article elaborates on different 'episodes' in Kitchanga's urbanization trajectory: from a safe haven, to a rebel quarter, to a violent battleground, to a contested 'city'. Each episode represents spatial 'windows' to study the contested, politicized and militarized presence and permanent settlement of refugees and IDPs. This case contributes to academic debates on the urban dimensions of 'refuge'[4] and forced displacement in Africa. More specifically, it critically engages with the concept of the 'camp city'[5] and questions the notion of the 'accidental city'[6] by highlighting the political dimension of Kitchanga's growth and urbanization. With its highly mobile population, large numbers of IDPs, a long history of transborder migration and a political mobilization of 'autochthony' discourses, North Kivu province offers a particularly interesting research setting. Kitchanga's case demonstrates that urban centres in rural areas serve in several ways as important locations from which to study the spatial politics of mobility, of presence and of return in a context of violent conflict.

The article starts with a theoretical part addressing the relevant academic debates and introducing the conceptual framework, followed by an introduction of the case, zooming in on the urbanization process of a 'camp-city'. Our analysis is structured around different moments and elements of urban expansion as part of broader politics of forced displacement: Kitchanga becoming a site of protection, a rebel stronghold, a battlefield, and finally a 'contested city'. The article builds on empirical data; on the one hand it is informed by more than eight years of ethnographic and historical research experience on dynamics of violent conflict, urbanization and mobility in the North Kivu region, on the other hand it

uses data from semi-structured interviews with several stakeholders collected in and around Kitchanga town during February-March 2015 and May 2016 with the indispensable help of several researchers.

Between war, camp and city: urban dimensions of violent conflict, forced displacement and refuge

A growing body of literature on wartime mobility in the Great Lakes and the broader conflict affected East African region investigates the urban dynamics of protracted displacement or refuge. On the one hand, there has been a particular interest in the urban integration process (social, economic and political) of refugees and IDPs who 'settle' in urban areas. Examples are case-studies of Nairobi, Kampala, Juba, Karthoum, Gulu and Dar es Salaam.[7] For the DRC, a number of studies have focused on the relationship between forced displacement and urbanization. The IDP crisis in the Kivu region that resulted from different waves of violence has an important urban element. The majority of people who were forced by violence to flee stay outside of IDP camps with 'host communities'.[8] In their search for security, people tend to flee to those locations that present a minimal connection to state security services and infrastructure.[9] Besides presenting spatial entities of protection,[10] urbanized environments in the Kivu provinces are also attractive because of livelihood opportunities.[11] Some studies analyzed the emergence of urban 'IDP economies' in Eastern Congo[12], or the living conditions of urban IDPs in Goma and Bukavu.[13] It has for example been well documented how the urban settlement of internally displaced people has shaped and transformed the urbanization process in Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu.[14]

On the other hand, researchers have studied the urbanization process of (protracted) camp-settlements in Africa. Two well-known case studies in this regard are Kakuma and Dadaab, Kenyan refugee camps with histories that go back to the early 1990s. Agier has called these urbanized camps 'naked cities' and Jansen used the concept of 'accidental city' to analyze the spatial and socio-economic transformation of refugee concentrations into permanent cityscapes with urbanized infrastructure, markets, livelihoods and identities.[15] The urbanity of camps has been a topic elaborated upon by several other academics outside the African context to interrogate the spatality of refuge.[16] According to Agier, emphasizing the importance of an urban anthropology of refugee camps, the 'city-camp' (or 'camp-city') represents a 'novel socio-spatial form between war and city' in which people stay not only because of the continuation of violence preventing them from returning 'home', but also because of the urban characteristics of the place.[17] The protractedness of human concentration, the infrastructural capacities, and the function of these camp-cities as trading hubs and labour markets, further define their urban character.[18] The notion of camp-cities points at the spatial translations of an often strained cohabitation of urbanization and forced displacement. For the DRC, there has been no particular literature dealing with the urbanization process of spaces of refuge. Yet, this concept of 'camp-cities', as further elaborated by for example Branch,[19] can be useful to analyze emerging urbanities in eastern Congo, as our case of Kitchanga will demonstrate.

The concept of the 'accidental city', the outcome of an unforeseen, un-planned urbanization of a place never intended to become permanent, also seems useful to understand Kitchanga's evolution; a town that has developed from a concentration of refugees and

IDPs. Yet, upon closer inspection and analysis of Kitchanga's historical trajectory, the very notion of its emergence and urbanization as 'accidental' is challenged. Looking more carefully at how Kitchanga became an urban agglomeration reveals the highly political nature of this urbanization process. When authors like Jansen or Agier mention politics in their work, this is often restricted to framing the accidental city or the 'camp-city' as a 'distinctive political space', in which politics are formed by a humanitarian regime.[20] In his analysis of the accidental city, Jansen presents the dynamic social processes of place-making by different actors (refugees, humanitarians, former rebels) that turn the camp eventually into a city. The case of Kitchanga adds an extra political dimension to these processes of place-making and urbanization, not only from actors within but also actors outside the settlement. Darling and Saynal have argued that to unpack the urban character of refuge, the political should be put in the centre of the discussion.[21] By doing so in analysing Kitchanga's development, the camp-city and its urbanization process emerge as a political rather than an accidental project. We use insights from Darling's work to analyze the mobilizing potential of the urban in broader political geographies of refuge.[22] The political mobilization of urban spatialities of refuge, visible for example in the politics of presence, clearly reflect the important place of 'cities of refuge' like Kitchanga in the broader military and identity politics of forced displacement and migration in North Kivu.

We argue in this article that both the town of Kitchanga in itself (as a political space) as well as its urbanization (as a political process) has been part of militarized identity politics. While the initial phases of Kitchanga's development might have been triggered by an 'accidental' permanent settlement of people seeking refuge, under the influence of elites, armed groups and politicians, its 'consolidation' into a permanent town was an outcome of its strategic function within the politics of refuge, presence and return. With these 'politics of refuge, presence and return', we refer to dynamics of the (im-)mobility of populations for political agendas, the political use of historical narratives on forced displacement or the political manipulation of the relations between identity and territory. These different dynamics have been studied in the DRC, revealing the mobilization of historical narratives by armed groups, politicians and other elites for political or economic gains.[23] Kitchanga, just like the camp-cities described by Jansen or de Montclos, is the arena of entangled agency of several actors, including IDPs and refugees, rebel leaders, big men and politicians.[24] While humanitarian actors also play an important role, they are not particularly addressed in this article.

Kitchanga, a camp-city: the ambiguities of the urbanization of refuge

Kitchanga is located in the hills of North Kivu overlooking Lake Kivu. The town stretches across the border of Masisi and Rutshuru Territories. On the ground however, this administrative division is physically almost impossible to discern, and Kitchanga presents itself as one agglomeration. The Masisi part of Kitchanga is the current – but not historical – seat of the customary authorities of the Hunde Bashali royal family. While people with diverse ethnic backgrounds are present in this part of Kitchanga – primarily Nyanga, Tembo, and Nande – it is one of the largest settlements with a Hunde majority in Masisi. On the side of Rutshuru, Kitchanga's population consists mainly of Hutu and Tutsi although Hunde and other ethnic groups are also present.

Over the past 20 years, the town has experienced a fast demographic expansion and today Kitchanga stands out from its rural surroundings with a demographic and spatial extension that is much bigger than surrounding centres. Other 'urban' characteristics further differentiate Kitchanga from its environment, reflecting the material forms of city-camps in general, as they have been described in detail by for example Agier and de Montclos.[25] The nature of the housing infrastructure (besides wooden houses also houses of brick, and multi-story houses), the presence of roads, public services and a diversified local economy with several commercial and service activities, all add to the fact that Kitchanga is referred to as a town, both by its inhabitants as well as by outsiders. As argued by Jansen, these diversified entrepreneurial activities and services give these places the 'cosmopolitan appearance' that distinguishes them from their rural surroundings.[26]

In 2015, official available population figures for Kitchanga were 18,927 for the part located in Masisi, and 25,157 for the side located in Rutshuru, without counting the population in the IDP sites of Kahe and Mungote bordering Kitchanga. In Rutshuru Territory, the *Kahe* site harboured 5760 IDPs and some refugees coming from Rwanda; the *Mungote* site in Masisi housed 14,599 people in 2015.[27] Probably the real population figures (excluding the IDP sites) were higher, and closer to 80,000.[28] As is the case elsewhere in the Kivu provinces, these demographic statistics form an important basis to claim its 'urban' status, as population numbers are one of the most important legal criteria to elevate a locality into a *commune* or a *ville* even if these decisions are in many cases politically motivated (see below).[29]

Apart from its demographic composition, a number of Kitchanga's spatial and socio-economic characteristics reflect the fact that the town grew out of the protracted presence of refugees and internally displaced people. The Mungote site emerged during 2007–2009 at the height of the clashes between the CNDP rebel movement (*Congrès National pour la Défence du Peuple*, see below), the Congolese army, and other armed groups.[30] Its population mainly consists of Hutu mixed with some Tutsi. Whilst the site of Kahe was recognized officially during that same period (January 2008), it housed Congolese returnees from refugee camps in Rwanda already from 2002 onwards. The Kahe camp site's population is until today predominantly Tutsi. For both camps the largest part of the population originates from the immediate vicinity of Kitchanga and whilst most of them have been displaced as a result of the ongoing conflict, a considerable amount consists of the former plantation labour (*anciens ouvriers*) that have been chased from the former tea plantations (see below).[31]

As elsewhere in situations of protracted displacement in eastern DRC, the relation between IDPs and their 'host area', or the relation between displacement and local 'emplacement' is complex.[32] In a 2015 survey, 39% of IDPs in Kahe and 28% in Mungote indicated that they wanted to integrate locally.[33] Numbers among those IDPs staying with host families might well be higher. While many displaced in the camps cite 'insecurity' or 'conflicts over land' as reasons not to return to their locality of origin, others as well admitted staying because 'life in Kitchanga offers more opportunities',[34] a reality which is a thriving force beyond the urbanization of camp-cities in general.

Camp-city development did not only lead to the growth of Kitchanga *town,* the IDP camps themselves increasingly 'urbanized' as temporary infrastructures transformed into more permanent settlements, services and markets developed etc. Through the processes of 'urban integration' and 'place making' (described by de Montclos and Jansen)

expressing people's connection and long-term engagement to the place, camp-cities transform from temporary to permanent settlements.[35] At present, several IDPs are in the process of buying plots of land in the town as well as within the IDP camps. Even people referred to as 'autochthonous' by those living in the camps, are buying plots in the camps.[36] Those who built a semi-permanent construction within the camp (house in wood), are those who have bought a plot. There seems to be active encouragement by private landowners of the campsites to make IDPs buy land. IDPs from the Mungote site indicated they had been approached by the landowners in this regard.[37] This indicates how the process of place-making in Kitchanga and becoming a 'permanent' agglomeration is not entirely 'accidental': it is not only shaped by IDPs' livelihood strategies but by elites as well. With parcelled land being more expensive then agricultural land, Kitchanga's growth has led to the commercialization of land. We observe similar dynamics in other urbanizing areas in Eastern Congo. The Mugunga urban neighbourhood of the city of Goma originally was an IDP camp which gradually urbanized and became part of the urban agglomeration.[38]

The permanent settlement of IDPs is not the only 'urbanizing' effect of forced displacement in Kitchanga. As we observe in similar cases, population concentrations, and the development of a humanitarian industry offered an investment opportunity for all kinds of commercial and service activities (retail shops, catering, hotel- and restaurant facilities, pharmacies, etc.) resulting in a relatively diversified local economy. It has been demonstrated how the 'emerging urbanity' in camp-cities is strongly connected to their concentration of infrastructure, economic activities and diversification of livelihoods.[39] Many IDPs cite commercial opportunities that can complement or replace agricultural activities as reasons to stay in Kitchanga. The humanitarian economy (by which IDPs were given cash instead of goods) also reinforced capital circulation and commercial transactions in town. As can be observed in camp-cities in general, humanitarian assistance in the IDP camps is however sometimes also a source of tension.

> We easily see the difference between the IDP camps, Kahe and Mungote camp where they give food and humanitarian assistance and these camps are occupied essentially by Hutu and Tutsi whilst the other communities, the Hunde, have problems and they are never helped, it is the case of 27 March 2012 (sic.) Kitchanga has been burned down but everybody has struggled on their own to reconstruct their houses.[40]

This statement expresses the existing tensions between IDPs and the 'host' or 'autochthonous' communities, even if the population density in 'town' (or *cité*) is also partly the outcome of earlier dynamics of forced displacement. The presence of the camps, as demographic concentrations of Kinyarwanda-speakers (both Hutu and Tutsi), is a much-contested issue in Kitchanga.[41] These Kinyarwanda-speakers are often well aware of this problematic cohabitation with the Hunde community. As one IDP of Mungote camp expressed:

> The relations with [the autochthonous] are not good. Our Hunde friends want the IDP camps to be destroyed as soon as possible. (…) There are people that want to return but under the condition that peace is restored where they came from. A part wants to stay here. Especially me, I already have a plot in Kitchanga, I do not want to return, here it is better for me. Those who have commercial or agricultural activities in Kitchanga that are successful will not want to return either. The only obstacle we are confronted with is the

cohabitation with our Hunde brothers that is still very fragile and might even end up in other ethnic wars if we do not accept each other mutually.[42]

In the wake of security incidents, these tensions can become very palpable. In February 2015 for example, after three people of the Hunde community had been killed during a wake, tensions between the population of Kitchanga *cité* and Mungote camp erupted as it was rumoured that the assailants came from the camp.[43] According to the Mungote camp authorities, in the aftermath of these killings, rumours circulated about plans to burn down the camp.[44] While this cannot be confirmed, members of the Hunde community wanted to demonstrate against these murders, but had to be calmed down by the *mwami*[45] and the police.[46] After these incidents, the Mungote camp was raided by the police and searched for weapons.

Rumours about weapon stocks within the camps are no exception, as are allegations that members of armed groups have found refuge in the camps.[47] For people in the *cité*, Kitchanga's camps are sometimes conceptualized as sources of insecurity, especially because they escape the control of local authorities:

> The camps are politicized. [...] The camps are not controlled by the local authorities, they do not have the same power. Moreover we know that the camps destabilize this place (*ce milieu*). The authorities do not have a grip on the camp. The administration of the camps does not depend on them [local authorities]. They are free. The camps are occupied by one ethnic group. They are free to do what they want in the camps.[48]

Historical layers of Kitchanga's ethnic tensions: the politics of autochthony

The events described above illustrate the ambiguous capacity of camp-cities; on the one hand they embody safety and protection, on the other hand they embody a perceived potential for insecurity and violence.[49] Yet, the politicization of forced displacement goes far beyond the recent history of the Kahe and Mungote IDP camps. The emergence of Kitchanga as a site of political contestation between Hunde and Kinyarwanda-speakers is the result of historical patterns of migration and displacement in North Kivu.

During the nineteenth century, the majority of people in the highlands of Masisi where Kitchanga is located were Hunde, organized in small Hunde polities. The part of Kitchanga nowadays located in Masisi was ruled by the Bashali royal family. The Masisi highlands were ecologically perfectly suitable for plantations. Yet, to make them profitable for the European settler economy, they needed labour. Thus, from 1937 onwards, the Belgian administration planned and organized a migratory movement towards Masisi consisting of labour coming from neighbouring Rwanda.[50] These 'Banyarwanda'[51] (Hutu and Tutsi) settled at first predominantly in the Gishari chieftaincy, a chieftaincy erected by the colonial authorities on land that had been taken from the Hunde. It was administered by a Rwandan chief who had accompanied these labour migrants.[52] Others settled on land in what is nowadays the Bashali chieftaincy under the control of Hunde chiefs, and often also directly on the plantations where they worked.[53]

Over 100,000 Banyarwanda settled in North Kivu during the colonial period.[54] Today, the descendants of these people are locally sometimes called *les immigrés* or *transplantés*. Their Rwandan background had important ramifications on identity politics, as today they are locally framed as 'non-autochthonous'.[55] In this article, when speaking of the post-

colonial period, we use the term Kinyarwanda-speakers or Rwandophones for this group, although many other Kinyarwanda-speakers were present in Congo before its political borders were traced.[56]

Seeds of labelling these Hutu and Tutsi immigrants as non-autochthonous seem to have sprouted from the Belgian's minds. In 1954 already the Belgians talked about protecting the 'indigenous authorities'. Furthermore, they started to fear what they called 'Rwandan irredentism', and called into question their earlier decision to organize these Banyarwanda in an independent chieftaincy.[57] Partly as a result of these problems, the Gishari chieftaincy was abolished by the Belgian administration in 1957 and control was given back to the Hunde customary authorities.[58] This abolishment meant that Banyarwanda in Masisi were in effect no longer represented by any customary authority. As demonstrated in the final parts of this article, the absence of 'customary' representation was (and is) an important motivator in the struggle for political representation of the Kinyarwanda-speakers in Masisi.

Especially in Masisi, electoral competition and local struggles over resources, land and public authority have often resulted in sharp divisions between on the one hand those labelled as 'autochthonous' (status claimed by Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga) and the 'Banyar-wanda', 'Rwandophones', or 'Kinyarwanda-speakers' (the Hutu and Tutsi communities). They clashed for the first time between 1963 and 1965 in the wake of local elections during what is called 'the Kanyarwanda war'.[59]

At that time Kitchanga consisted mainly of people who had settled there in order to work as labour on the colonial tea plantations.[60] According to one inhabitant who arrived in Kitchanga in 1961, 'at that time the whole of Kitchanga was a forest, and we could see wild animals in the midst of Kitchanga'.[61]

While Kitchanga became gradually more important in the years after independence, it remained a small village with very few inhabitants, used by travellers between Goma and the more important centres of Pinga, Mweso and Birambizo. It already had some commercial importance as it was located on the junction of several roads used to transport for example palm oil and beans to centres such as Goma and Butembo.[62]

It is only in the 1990s and at the onset of the First and the Second Congo wars that Kitchanga became gradually more important. From this period onwards, different phases of violence in North Kivu caused large scale population movements with hundreds of thousands of people fleeing their homes seeking for protection. In this context of forced displacement, Kitchanga increasingly evolved as a 'zone of refuge', attracting displaced people from different ethnic backgrounds. These demographic shifts further influenced historical antagonisms.

Kitchanga as *'ville de réfuge'*: a site of protection and mobilization

Logics of protection and politics of presence go a long way in explaining people's movement towards – and settlement patterns in – Kitchanga. These dynamics turned Kitchanga into an important space for mobilization, often around notions of identity, and into a strategic place in elite's struggles for power and control.

Between 1992 and 1994 localized conflict erupted in Masisi. Populations identifying themselves as 'autochthonous' (Hunde, Nyanga, and Tembo) opposed those they labelled as non-autochthonous (Rwandophones, and in this period mainly Hutu).[63] Local ethnic

militia were formed. While the immediate cause of this conflict were the local elections, violent clashes of this era were also the result of the weakened state of Mobutu's regime. The latter used 'autochthony' as a fulcrum of ethnic politics, further fuelling these tensions.[64] These clashes lasted for six months, with as many as 10,000 casualties, and at least 250,000 being displaced.[65] Many Hunde, including *mwami* Sylvestre Bashali, fled to Kitchanga during this period.[66] His resettlement possibly explains why so many displaced Hunde followed to Kitchanga.

After a tense period of 'peace' the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees into Congo dramatically shifted the political landscape of the eastern Congo. At least 850,000 of these refugees were located in North Kivu, in the vicinity of Goma and Sake.[67] Congolese Hutu teamed up with the Hutu refugee leadership, elements of FAR (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*), and the *Interahamwe*, who were responsible for committing the genocide in Rwanda. The local antagonisms of the 1992–1994 era took on a regional dimension as the interests of these radical Rwandan Hutu refugees collided with those of the Congolese Hutu militia.[68] The refugee camps in Congo were used to launch attacks on Rwanda, and on Congolese soil Congolese Tutsi and 'autochthonous' populations were attacked by Hutu militias, causing further waves of displacement.[69]

The ensuing violence reinforced Kitchanga's status as a '*ville de réfuge*'. As a result, 19,000 IDPs had gathered in Kitchanga in 1996, most of them Hunde. This made Kitchanga the largest single concentration of 'autochthones' in that part of Masisi.[70] Given the numerically weak position of Hunde in the whole of Masisi territory (Hutu have the majority) this made Kitchanga an important site of ethnic mobilization. One possible reason why the previously rather unimportant Kitchanga attracted many displaced Hunde was the presence of a regiment of 30 DSP (*Divison Spéciale Presidentielle*) in town. In their fight against the Hutu militias this regiment allied with the Hunde population and their local militias.[71]

The large concentration of Hunde and IDPs, but also Hunde militia using Kitchanga as a strategic base for attacks on surrounding villages, turned it into an important target for local Hutu militias and Rwandan Hutu, who repeatedly attacked the locality.[72] Hunde were however not the only ones finding some form of refuge in Kitchanga. Almost all Tutsi from Masisi and Rutshuru became displaced, the largest part of them finding themselves eventually in Rwanda.[73] Tutsi were relatively safe in Kitchanga because of the strong Hunde presence over Hutu, and, according to Scott, the local integration of Tutsi in the region at that time.[74] In May 1996 Kitchanga offered refuge to over 1000 Tutsi escaping the massacre by Hutu forces in the nearby Mokoto monastery.[75]

The Rwandan refugee crisis on Congolese soil escalated and led to the 'First Congo War', during which Laurent Kabila's AFDL (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Zaire*), supported by the Rwandan regime, overthrew Mobutu in May 1997.[76] This AFDL-rebellion was perceived in North Kivu as Tutsi-dominated. It offered already existing militias a new cause: that of an anti-Tutsi force fighting against foreign occupation.[77]

The following year marked the start of the Second Congo War (1998–2003). Laurent Kabila had a fall-out with his Rwandan allies and tried to expel them. During this war, virtually the whole of eastern Congo came under the rule of the RCD rebel movement (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*). This movement was dominated by Kinyarwanda-speakers (both Hutu and Tutsi) and backed by Rwanda and Uganda.

Kitchanga remained a site of refuge during the RCD era. As in other places under RCD control, 'customary' authority was reshuffled.[78] For example, the RCD replaced the *mwami* of Bashali-Mokoto, *mwami* Bashali Nyanguba, by a crony of the RCD, a certain Kapenda Muhima, son of a local Hunde notable.[79] Rebel rule over Kitchanga led to elite involvement aiming at putting local resources under control of (mainly) Congolese Rwandophones. In and around Kitchanga, political and military elites linked to the RCD acquired large land concessions, sometimes through dubious semi-legal means and in some cases by violently 'grabbing' it to turn it into pasture land.

Most importantly, Kitchanga became an important site of Congolese Tutsi 'returnees' from Rwanda, and as such gained strategic importance in the RCD's politics of return. These Tutsi, who fled the DRC between 1994 and 1996 (see above), had returned in consecutive waves under RCD control, with the active (and sometimes forced) encouragement of RCD elites.[80] For Kitchanga, most of these returnees settled around 2002 in Kahe (see above), on the land of a former tea plantation belonging to a RCD politician. This elite involvement again indicates the political stakes in turning Kitchanga into a permanent agglomeration.

The emergence of Kitchanga as a real 'site of refuge' thus began during the First and Second Congo wars. At the same time, events during this period also carried the seeds for future politicized and militarized struggles over Kitchanga.

A safe haven, for whom? From rebel-stronghold to battlefield

I was with you during the war of 92–93. […] I remember that at this time, Kitchanga was a meeting place for everyone. People displaced from the hills around came to Kitchanga. Today, I am joyful that many people have come from nearby hills to settle in Kitchanga, which is now a cosmopolitan town. All of us, we can take Kitchanga as a place of reconciliation, a place of change where everybody can live in peace.[81]

These are the words of Laurent Nkunda, speaking to the population of Kitchanga in 2006, not long after he had founded the CNDP rebel movement. These words clearly reflect the entanglement of Kitchanga's growth with histories of displacement and its status as a place of refuge. The reference to a 'cosmopolitan town' refers to the demographic 'diversity' and urban characteristics of Kitchanga in relation to its rural surroundings.

In 2003, after several peace agreements, peace had ostensibly come to the Congo. Unfortunately, it did not last long, as many former rebels felt disgruntled by the peace settlement. One of them was Nkunda, a dissident Tutsi general linked to the former RCD government. He launched a new rebel movement in 2005, under the guise of the need for protection of the Tutsi community.

Not long after his return to the political and military stage, Nkunda relocated to Kitchanga where he had been a teacher in the beginning of the 1990s.[82] Defections from the Congolese army FARDC (*Forces Armées Republique Democratique du Congo*) followed, and many of these defectors directed themselves to Kitchanga.[83] CNDP extended its influence over certain parts of the North Kivu province and especially in Masisi and Rutshuru. The rise of the CNDP sparked the emergence of other armed groups in the region.

It seems that it was only in 2006 that Nkunda's base in Kitchanga became more permanent and turned into one of the CNDP capitals in Masisi. Being a rebel stronghold reinforced the political importance of Kitchanga. Apart from its geographical location

at the connection of three different territories (Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale), there are probably several other reasons why Kitchanga was chosen as Nkunda's stronghold. As with CNDP's other bases (Kilolirwe and Mushaki), Kitchanga had a large concentration of Congolese Tutsi returnees; their return was one of the CNDP's key action points.[84] CNDP also controlled large swathes of land in and around Kitchanga (sometimes acquired during the RCD era), and land grabbing continued.

These dynamics of 'rebel-led' urbanization of Kitchanga resonate with what Jansen describes as 'rebelization' of the city-camp; yet, they mean something different in this context. Whereas 'rebelization' refers to the role of violence and (former) rebel affiliation in everyday processes of place-making within the camp-city, Kitchanga's development under CNDP's control reveals the political and military mechanisms behind its permanent urbanization in broader strategies of violent conflict and military struggle over territorial control.

CNDP's official integration into the Congolese army in 2009 after Nkunda was arrested did not end the movement's control over the area. From within the FARDC, CNDP kept a separate command structure and remained in control. During this period, Kitchanga became referred to as a 'state within a state', run under the CNDP flag by a parallel administration. The police force in Kitchanga was administered by CNDP and taxes were gathered to the benefit of the CNDP instead of the provincial government.[85]

With its large demographic concentration, Kitchanga presented a steady tax base for CNDP as well as a pool of labour. Taxes on livestock, road transport, commercial activities, markets and house rent were amongst CNDP's urban revenue sources.[86] According to local sources, commercial activities were blooming under CNDP administration.[87] Even after the official integration of CNDP into the army, FARDC regiments consisting of former CNDP soldiers continued taxation mechanisms on the population and on road traffic, and force was used to obtain labour for the exploitation of timber and charcoal in the National Park.[88]

In the wake of the emergence of the CNDP, clashes between the Congolese army, Nkunda's CNDP, and local armed groups such as the APCLS (*Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain*) had once again destabilized North Kivu. Almost all armed groups active during this period cited CNDP as the reason for their (renewed) mobilization.[89] APCLS, founded in 2008 and dominated by Hunde, is but one example of such a group. As with many of these other groups, it mobilizes against the return of Tutsi refugees and around access to land for the Hunde-community, even though opportunism often trumps ideology.[90] Violence peaked between October 2007 and November 2008 leading again to large waves of displacement in Masisi and Rutshuru. The IDP camps around Kitchanga are a remnant of this period. The presence and influence of armed groups increasingly militarized existing ethnic tensions and rendered them more violent.

M23 (*Mouvement du 23 Mars*) emerged in 2012 as a follow-up of CNDP, led by General Bosco Ntaganda and part of the former CNDP elite. Even after FARDC had nominally taken control of Kitchanga, M23 (and former CNDP) proxies still managed to exert some control over the agglomeration. In February 2013, this led to one of the most violent episodes of Kitchanga's history, when members of APCLS clashed with the 812th Brigade of the Congolese army. The commander of this Brigade, colonel Mudahunga, was a Congolese Tutsi and former CNDP commander who remained rather close to Bosco

Ntaganda, former leader of M23. Allegedly, Mudahunga was trying to establish Kitchanga as a rear base for M23 in the region.

In January 2013, 300 men of APCLS were sent to Kitchanga in an attempt to integrate them into the army but without any real measures to accompany this integration.[91] These ex-APCLS used their presence in Kitchanga to arrest people whom they suspected having links with M23, but Mudahunga tried to stop them from interfering. Mudahungu accused the Hunde population in Kitchanga of supporting the demobilized APCLS, whilst there were suspicions that he himself was arming youngsters in the Kahe IDP camp.

After APCLS soldiers entered Kahe IDP camp and burnt huts on 26 February 2013, the simmering tension deteriorated into full-blown conflict. On 27 February 2013, APCLS from outside Kitchanga started advancing towards the agglomeration and attacked Mudahunga's 812th regiment. Ostensibly to stop their advance, Mudahunga fired mortar rounds into Kitchanga, landing on civilian areas.

During this fierce fighting over Kitchanga, 146 people died (most of them Hunde), 518 houses were burned and many businesses were looted and destroyed.[92] These events again demonstrate the sometimes violent ways in which spatial settings of forced displacement can be used as a source of mobilization by different actors. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of this paper, Kitchanga's strategic position in regional (ethnic) struggles does not only emerge from the politics of refuge and forced displacement, but from the politics of urban expansion as well.

Localité, commune or *ville*? The politics of urbanization

Kitchanga's urbanity is the outcome of a complex history of contested mobility and forced displacement in a political context of violence and militarization. Ethnic tensions and contested claims over the town have sometimes materialized in the urban landscape. For example, a statute was erected by a Hunde businessman in 2015, symbolizing the Hunde 'dominance' over Kitchanga. The statute depicts the *mwami's* mother, Queen Namulisi, bearing three children on her shoulders. Its meaning is contested. For some, the three children represent the founders of different branches of the Hunde Bashali chieftaincies. According to others, they represent the three most important communities in Kitchanga: Hunde, Hutu and Tutsi.[93]

In the most recent phase of this complex history, the process of urbanization itself, and Kitchanga's administrative status as a 'city' have become part of political struggles for control over the town. In this final phase, the politics of urbanization become most explicit, rendering the concept of an 'accidental city' inadequate to analyze the struggle over Kitchanga's city status. This political struggle points at the mobilizing potential of urban identities and socio-political forms of place-making, but also at the mobilizing potential of urbanization in a context of violent conflict and decentralization.[94] In sharp contrast with Kitchanga's increasingly urbanized characteristics, the administrative statute of Kitchanga has not changed accordingly, even though in theory the decentralization law would allow for it to be turned into a *commune* – depending on the answer to the question if Kitchanga is *chef-lieu* of the chieftaincy or not.[95] There are strong indications that this is a political decision, interwoven with broader politics of autochthony.

In principle Kitchanga (on the Masisi side) is administratively considered as a conglomerate of several villages or hills headed by village chiefs, within the larger administrative

context of the chieftaincy, which has a distinct legal persona in the 2008 decentralization law. In practice, these subdivisions are invisible and in Kitchanga people refer to *quartiers* [neighborhoods] and *chefs de quartiers*, using an 'urban' vocabulary rather than referring to villages and village chiefs. Agier has referred to the use of this kind of urban vocabulary as characteristics of the urbanization process of dynamics place-making in city camps.[96] The official administrative status of Kitchanga is a determining factor in the way it is being governed, as this status decides who has the authority within any given administrative entity. For Kitchanga, this means that the customary authorities of the *chefferie* are those governing the place, with the Hunde *mwami* as the local supreme authority – who is never elected, but rather appointed by the customary structures. The *mwami* is the local representative of state power, whilst at the same time retaining a considerable amount of autonomy. The *chefferie* also has the right to levy taxes and controls land.

If the administrative status of Kitchanga would be transformed into a *commune,* all this would drastically change. Given the fact that Hunde are numerically a minority in their own *chefferie* (Hutu are the majority) this could possibly shift the power balance in and over Kitchanga. Moreover, in the absence of 'customary' representation for the Rwandophone community – and thus often local political authority – in Masisi territory, gaining political control over certain localities becomes all the more important as it is the only way to gain *official* access to forms of local political authority.

Similar challenges can be found in other boomtowns in the Kivu provinces. In Nyabibwe (South Kivu) for example, this decentralization agenda and the administrative shift into a *commune* was proposed by the provincial government in 2012 but was boycotted by local customary authorities. This caused fierce conflicts between different scales of power and authority for control over the town.[97] In Rubaya (North Kivu) local Hutu big men strongly lobbied at the Provincial government for a recognition as a *commune*, which also resulted in strong tensions amongst local Hutu and Hunde communities.

As these places occupy strategic nodes in broader dynamics of political and military control, such local power struggles are easily being brought to a higher level by the involvement of regional and national elites. During discussions over altering the administrative status of Kitchanga into a *commune* at the level of the Provincial Parliament in 2010, fierce resistance was mounted by the Hunde members of the Provincial Parliament.[98] The argument they used was a legal one, namely that Kitchanga is *chef lieu* of the chieftaincy, and as such cannot become *commune*.[99] However, depending on the interlocutor, this idea of Kitchanga as *chef lieu* is contested. Some inhabitants, mainly those belonging to the Rwandophone community contend that the official *chef lieu* of the *chefferie* is in Kiusha, some kilometres away from Kitchanga.[100] Similar resistance was mounted against changing the administrative status of Mweso, another large agglomeration close by (and not a *chef lieu*) into a *commune.* In addition*,* several agglomerations far smaller and less urbanized with few commercial opportunities have been erected into *communes*, indicating that this struggle has more to do with who would control these agglomerations rather than with legal preoccupations.

Thus, the aforementioned demonstration in 2010 demanding Kitchanga's city status needs to be seen within this political context, as it took place at the same time the matter was discussed at the Provincial Parliament. Given the sensible and political nature of such decisions, it is not surprising that according to some informants, the

instigators of the march were non-Hunde-politicians, and especially those having links to CNDP, or the Rwandophone community in general. Rumours about plans to elevate the agglomeration to a *commune* were locally framed in Kitchanga as a political ploy to chase the Hunde from power.[101]

The decentralization reforms got only half implemented before they were put on hold by the postponement of the local elections. This created a political vacuum and a general context of confusion over local authority.[102] In the wake of the 2008 decentralization law, in North Kivu, the Governor officially abolished the '*postes de territoire*'. To fill this vacuum between local and provincial authorities, the provincial government of North Kivu appointed Provincial Delegates (*Fonctionnaires Délégués*), using Kitchanga as a test case.[103]

The decision of the Provincial Governor to appoint a Provincial Delegate in Kitchanga was perceived by the local Hunde community in Kitchanga as a strategy for politicians to reinforce their control and to interfere with customary matters.[104] Although the first Delegate was of the Tembo ethnic community (locally considered as 'autochthonous'), he was also an ex-RCD official and therefore locally considered by some as being sent to Kitchanga to defend the interest of the Rwandophone community. One person saw it as an extension of the former claims of those associated with the CNDP to change the status of Kitchanga into a *cité,* or as an attempt to place Kitchanga under a special regime.[105] Others went even a step further, and contended that there were plans at the level of the provincial government to construct the *chefferie* offices and the residency of the *mwami* elsewhere, so that Kitchanga could in theory obtain the status of a *commune.*[106]

These local conflicts and popular perceptions of them, thus have to be understood within the context of wider conflicts over political authority in Masisi. The political mobilization of the complex 'autochthony' issue is reflected in local conflicts down to the lowest administrative scale. It clearly emerges from the recent political struggles over Kitchanga, where different ethnic communities claim the town to be 'theirs', and ethnicity and autochthony become, as is often the case, the dominant discourses of reference in which this struggle is framed. The words of this Rwandophone member of the civil society in Kitchanga, in 2015, shortly after the first Provincial Delegate was appointed, are telling:

> It is we (Hutu and Tutsi) who since long time have asked for a *Fonctionnaire Délègue* for Kitchanga who is of another community in order to resolve those problems related to identity. We think that this resolves the problem, and it is a festivity for us, and I think Kitchanga is large enough to no longer be administered by the customary authorities. Unfortunately the Hunde are not happy, and they even wrote a letter to protest against his nomination and in reaction we have also written a letter in order to support the nomination of the Delegate.[107]

On 30 January 2017, the Delegate was suspended from his function by the Provincial Governor, based on accusations of land grabbing and other forms of 'acting in disrespect of the law'.[108] This seems to be a confirmation of the activities of land grabbing, illegal taxation, and exploitation of resources in the Virunga National Park that Kitchanga's inhabitants, irrespective of their ethnic community, were accusing him of in 2016.[109]

Conclusion

Current political tensions over Kitchanga's administrative recognition as a city can only be understood by studying its historical trajectory from a village into an urbanized zone of

refuge. This trajectory has been part of more general dynamics of rural-urban reconfigurations in the context of violent conflict and forced displacement in Eastern Congo. Our case-study of Kitchanga helps closing the gap in the academic literature on the urban dimensions of forced displacement and migration in Eastern Congo. Whereas urban forms of 'refuge' have been studied in Kivu's large cities such as Goma and Bukavu, smaller urban agglomerations developing from historical patterns of forced mobility have been largely neglected. Not much is known about the urbanities emerging from 'camp-cities' such as Kitchanga.

One thing that we have learned from Kitchanga's case is that in a political context of violence and militarization, this urbanity is highly conflictual. Local power struggles for political control and economic gain have been intensified by the involvement of armed groups and political elites. Furthermore, Kitchanga's case shows that the notion of an 'accidental city' can be misleading while studying the urbanization process of sites of forced displacement and refuge, as it may hide the political character of its expansion and its development into a permanent urban agglomeration. The pull factors attracting people to Kitchanga, the protracted presence and permanent settlement of IDPs, the development of its markets, its position as a rebel headquarter were influenced by political mechanisms. The strategic position Kitchanga has held for RCD, CNDP, and even APCLS, is one example of the political importance of the town and the political character of its expansion. Kitchanga's historical trajectory raises the question if emerging boom-towns in the Kivu-provinces developing from concentration of refugees and IDPs should be conceptualized as cities that were 'never meant to be'. While recognizing the tremendous contributions Jansen's work on 'accidental cities' has made to the debate on the urbanization of refuge, this article shows that the political dimensions of this urbanization process should be more closely scrutinized.

This study has offered an original spatial starting point to study the politics of refuge, mobility, presence, and return in North Kivu. It has underlined the importance of urban centres as spatial nodes in more regional political geographies of migration and forced displacement. By further investigating the urbanization of camp-cities in war-torn regions like North Kivu, we can add an important spatial and historical component to the political analysis of conflict dynamics. Through this approach, rural-urban transformations appear not only as the outcome of, but as a mechanism in itself of politics of refuge, violent conflict, and forced displacement.

Notes

1. See http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/03/05/kitshanga-des-gens-ont-marche-pour-reclamer-le-statut-d%25e2%2580%2599une-ville (accessed 5 December 2017).
2. See http://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-15932.html (accessed 5 December 2017). We think this number is more truthful to the actual number of inhabitants than the official figures indicated below. Some estimate its population at 120,000. See http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/253267 (accessed 5 December 2017).
3. These reforms were launched in 2006 (see: Loi organique n° 08/016 du 07 octobre 2008). While on paper they aim to improve accountability, undermine corruption, and bring government closer to the people, Englebert and Mungongo have argued that 'decentralization had instead increased the degree to which the state extracts the resources and incomes of its citizens'. Englebert and Mungongo, "Misguided and Misdiagnosed," 1.

4. In line with the work of for example Darling ('Forced Migration') and Sanyal ('Urbanizing Refuge'), 'refuge' is used here referring to spatial configurations of war-time displacement and migration.
5. Agier "Between War and City."
6. Jansen "The Accidental City"; Murray and Malan, "Johannesburg Fortified"; Powel, "The Accidental City".
7. Campbell, "Urban Refugees"; Bernstein and Okello, "To Be or Not to Be"; Dryden-Peterson, "I Find Myself"; Walraet, "Displacement"; Adam Branch, "Gulu in War"; Sommers, "Fear in Bongoland."
8. Around an estimated number of 75%, for September 2015 (UNOCHA (DRC), 'Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees', 'White', 'Now What?'). Self-settled IDPs often rely on family or friendship relations to find a host, but these can also be just strangers. The level of solidarity towards IDPs may not be underestimated; yet, just like the term IDP, 'host' is a term introduced by a humanitarian discourse and is marked by particular power relationships (Brun, "Hospitality"). The relationships between IDP's and 'hosts' is an often fragile and complex relationship.
9. Norwegian Refugee Council, "Living Conditions"; Branch, "Gulu in War"; Focus group with IDPs, Goma, December 2009.
10. Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, "Cities, Conflict and State Fragility"; Branch, "Gulu in War."
11. Markus, "Humanitarian Response."
12. Raeymaekers, "Not Going Home."
13. NRC, "Living Conditions."
14. Verhoeve, "Conflict and the Urban Space"; Büscher, "Conflict and Social Transformation."
15. Agier, "Between War and City"; Jansen, "The Accidental City."
16. Sanyal, "Urbanizing Refuge"; Bulley, "Inside the Tent"; Ramadan, "Spatialising the Refugee Camps."
17. Agier, "Between War and City." Camp-city and city-camp are both used in the literature, referring to the same process.
18. de Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja, "Refugee Camps or Cities"; Jansen, "The Accidental City."
19. Branch, "Gulu from War." We prefer his non-normative use of the concept of the camp-city.
20. Jansen, "The Accidental City"; Agier "Between War and City."The urbanization process in itself is seen as in conflict with the humanitarian politics of 'temporariness', trying to prevent these spaces to become permanent settlements.
21. Darling, "Forced Migration"; Sanyal, "Urbanizing Refuge". See also Herz, "From Camp to City."
22. Darling, "Forced Migration."
23. Bøås and Dunn, "Peeling the Onion"; Mathys, "Bringing History"; Murison, "Politics of Refugees."
24. Agier, "Between War and City"; De Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja, "Refugee Camps or Cities."
25. Ibid.
26. Jansen, "Digging Aid."
27. Figures for November 2015. CCM, "Statistiques sites de déplacement du Nord-Kivu."
28. See note 2.
29. More precisely, a locality can become a *commune* if it has at least 20,000 inhabitants. For the status of a *ville* it needs at least 100,000 inhabitants and it needs to dispose of certain social and economic infrastructures. See: Loi organique n° 08/016 du 07 octobre 2008.
30. Kahe in January 2008 and Mungote in February 2009.
31. Ongoing research by Mathys.
32. IDPs are not a homogenous group. However, here, we do not focus on how diversity within the group of IDPs has an influence on displacement patterns and local integration. Markus' study ('Humanitarian Response') provides many examples of how age and gender influence the experiences of IDPs with these issues in urban contexts such as Kitchanga.
33. RDC, Ministère de l'Agriculture, "Résultats préliminaires."

34. Several interviews IDPs, March and April 2015.
35. Jansen, "The accidental city"; de Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja, "Refugee Camps or Cities."
36. Interview IDP Kahe, interview IDP Mungote, March 2015.
37. Interview IDP Mungote camp, March 2015.
38. Verhoeve, "Conflict and the Urban Space"; Büscher, "Urban Governance."
39. Jansen, "The Accidental City."
40. Interview member of "customary" authorities, Kitchanga, February 2015.
41. The terms Kinyarwanda-speaker and Rwandophone we use in this article are elusive. Many targeted in these discourses do not have Kinyarwanda as a mother-tongue – nor is the ability to speak Kinyarwanda limited to those contained in this group. The term 'Congolese Banyarwanda' is also problematic because it implies a continuing link to Rwanda.
42. Interview IDP Mungote camp, April 2015. Similar sentiments are expressed by IDPs elsewhere, see Markus, "Humanitarian Response," 24.
43. UNOCHA, "Rapport Zone de Kitchanga."
44. Interview IDP Mungote camp, March 2015.
45. Kiswahili: 'king, "customary" chief'.
46. UNOCHA, "Rapport Zone de Kitchanga."
47. Fieldwork observations and informal conversations Kitchanga, March 2015 and May 2016.
48. Interview with Hunde member of civil society, Kitchanga, February 2015.
49. Branch, "Gulu in War"; Beall et al., "Cities, Conflict."
50. For more see Tegera, "Les Banyarwanda"; Mararo, "Land, Power."
51. Literally meaning 'people from Rwanda'.
52. In the current *chefferie* Bashali-Kaembe. The Gishari chieftaincy was de facto and de jure independent from *Hunde customary authorities*.
53. See for example the annual reports for Masisi for the 1940s and 1950s, African Archives Brussels (AAB), RA/AIMO 142–143.
54. AAB, RWA 355, Directeur de l'AIMO Delcourt, 'Note pour monsieur le chef du service du contentieux. Emigration des Banyarwanda au Kivu, 1953'. Between 1959 and 1963 and in 1973 Tutsi who fled political violence and persecution in Rwanda also settled in North and South Kivu.
55. For detailed discussions on the citizenship-issue: Huening, "Making Use"; Jackson, "Of 'doubtful Nationality'"; Jackson, "Regional Conflict"; Malengana, *Nationalité*.
56. They are not the only Kinyarwanda-speakers in North Kivu. In the adjoining Rutshuru territory they are the majority, and there they were present since long before the colonial demarcation of the political border.
57. Mathys, "Bringing History," 477.
58. Mararo, "Land, Power," 513, fn. 49.
59. Although the *guerre des Kanyarwanda* is widely referenced by scholars, remarkably little empirical research is available. For more: Mararo, "Land, Power," 519–25; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 68–70.
60. Interview local business man, Kitchanga, May 2016.
61. Interview chef de quartier, Kitchanga, February 2015.
62. Interview local business man, Kitchanga, May 2016.
63. Also in Rutshuru, Walikale, and parts of Kalehe. For more, see Mararo, "Land, Power" Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration"; Mathieu et al., "Compétition foncière."
64. Mararo, "Land, Power," 530–2.
65. Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration," 146; Mathieu et al., "Compétition foncière," 133.
66. OHCHR, "Mapping Exercise," 59.
67. Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 25.
68. Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration," 147.
69. The best overview of this is probably Longman and Fleischman, *Zaire: Forced to Flee*.
70. UN, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Masisi Report."
71. AI, "Anarchie et Insécurité," 20.
72. UN, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Masisi Report."

73. Stearns, *PARECO*, 16.
74. Scott, *Laurent Nkunda,* 81.
75. OHCHR, "Mapping Exercise," 62.
76. For more details, see Turner, "The Congo Wars."
77. Vlassenroot and Van Acker, "War as Exit," 52.
78. Hoffmann, and Vlassenroot, "Armed groups."
79. CODHO, "RDCongo/Province du Nord Kivu: tortures."
80. Pole Institut, "Le retour." On the use of force, see e.g.: US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "The Forced Repatriation."
81. Transcript from Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, "Le Pèlerinage de la Réconciliation," DVD, July 2006.
82. According to Scott, Nkunda used his stay in Kitchanga to recruit people for the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). See: Scott*, Laurent Nkunda*, 76.
83. Barouski, "Laurent Nkundabatware," 208.
84. Pole Institut, "Le retour."
85. An analysis of CNDP's taxation and other income-generating strategies has been documented by UN GoE, 2009, especially p. 7–10.
86. Stearns, "CNDP Tighten Control"; Stearns, "CNDP and the Logic"; Faul, "Emerging Congo Mini-States"; Interview local observer Pole Institute, Goma, May 2016.
87. Interview local business man, Kitchanga May 2016; Interview official of state agency, Kitchanga, May 2016.
88. For more details, see: UN Group of Experts, "UN GoE Report 2011."
89. Stearns, "Causality and Conflict."
90. Stearns, "Causality and Conflict," 164. See also, Stearns, *North Kivu*, 27–34.
91. UN Group of Experts, "Un GoE Report 2013," 27. For example, the demobilized APCLS were housed in host families.
92. The narrative of these events is based on: Ibid., 27–8; "Rapport synthèse."
93. Informal conversations Kitchanga, May 2016.
94. Darling, "Forced Migration in the City."
95. Loi organique n° 08/016 du 07 octobre 2008.
96. Agier, "Between War and City."
97. Büscher, Cuvelier, and Mushobekwa, "La dimension politique," 2014.
98. Interview member of Provincial Parliament, Goma, June 2016.
99. Loi organique n° 08/016 du 07 octobre 2008.
100. The 2008 decentralization law does not stipulate how the chef-lieu of a chieftaincy is determined. The 'Loi stipulant le statut des chefs coutumiers', art. 4 from August 2015 however states that "Depending on the case, the customary chief resides, in the *chef-lieu* of his chieftaincy, of the *groupement*, or in his village."
101. Interview with member of local customary authorities, Kitchanga, March 2015.
102. Englebert and Mungongo, "Misguided and Misdiagnosed."
103. Interview *Fonctionnaire Delegué*, Kitchanga, May 2015.
104. Several interviews in March 2015 and Focus group with members of the Hunde community in April 2015.
105. Interview member of local customary authorities, Kitchanga, March 2015.
106. Interview member of Hunde civil society, Kitchanga, March 2015.
107. Interview with Rwandophone member of civil society, April 2015.
108. ACP, "Suspension du délégué."
109. Several interviews and informal conversations Kitchanga, May 2016.

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