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Discontented Geopolitics of Other European Spaces

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ABSTRACT

The European Union claims in its speeches, documents and its latest foreign policy program that a feeling of belonging to the European Union is possible. Moreover, it claims that there are indications of a European identity. This discourse of European identity is especially embodied in the belief in 'Europeanization' which refers to the transportation of European values beyond the formal borders of the European Union. I argue that current hegemonic visions of Europe, based on a dubious mix of different connotations of Europe and the misleading distinction between the metaphors Europe and the European Union (EU), turns out to be problematic and result in what I would subsequently call Europe's *discontented geopolitics*. In confusion, Europe is presented as a homogeneous thing-in-itself with the ideal of one name (Europe), one website (*Europa.eu*), a capital (Brussels), one market, one currency (euro), one identity that is characterized by diversity and, one external border.

In the grey and rather fuzzy zone between Europe and the European Union the fabrication of a limited version of Europe leads to new processes of (spatial) inclusion and exclusion. I argue that Europe is increasingly losing its historically voluntary and open meaning, and instead aiming to become a spatially defined EU-topia with membership, values and citizenship. In many occasions these ideal imaginations as scripted by the EU do not match the complex local realities and every day lives across Europe. In order to theorize the gap between the prevalent normative discourse and the contradicting local realities I use Michel Foucault's concept of *heterotopias*. I will search for places that disturb the utopian image and will follow the several principles that define heterotopias, not by simply reflecting on its possible meanings but by discussing the principles of resistance to the level of real places in the EU and in its neighbourhood. Heterotopias are the 'other' spaces of Europe that do not represent one single place, but also incorporate complex processes in which difference or alternative spaces unfold. In this, the overall questions stands strong: Can Europe and the EU remain two separate concepts. Can Europe keep up with its promise of democracy, stability and dialogue? These are the central questions in this dissertation.

Keywords: Europe, Critical Geopolitics, European Union, Identity, Geopolitics

ABSTRAKTI

Puheita, asiakirjoja ja uusimpia ulkopoliittisia ohjelmia lukiessa Euroopan unioni vakuuttaa, että Euroopan unioniin kuulumisen tunne on mahdollista. Se vakuuttaa, että on olemassa merkkejä eurooppalaisesta identiteetistä. Tämä eurooppalaiseen identiteettiin liittyvä diskurssi ilmentää tiettyä uskoa "eurooppalaistumiseen", mikä viittaa eurooppalaisten arvojen siirtymiseen EU:n muodollisten rajojen yli. Väitän, että hegemoniset näkökulmat nykypäivän Euroopassa, jotka perustuvat kyseen-alaiseen sekoitukseen Euroopan sivumerkityksistä ja harhaanjohtaviin Eurooppaa ja Euroopan unionia käsitteleviin metaforiin, osoittautuvat ongelmalliseksi ja johta-vat siihen mitä tutkimuksessani kutsun Euroopan *tyytymättömyyden geopolitiikaksi*. Hämmennyksen tilassa Eurooppa esitetään näennäisesti homogeenisena ja itses-tään olemassa olevana kokonaisuutena, jolla on idealistisesti yksi nimi (Eurooppa), yksi Internet-kotisivu (*Europa.eu*), pääkaupunki (Bryssel), yhdet markkinat, yksi raha (euro), yksi monimuotoisuuteen perustuva identiteetti ja yksi ulkoraja.

Harmaalla ja varsin epämääräisellä Euroopan ja Euroopan unionin välisellä alu-eella rajallisen Euroopan tuottaminen johtaa uusiin sisällyttämisen ja poissulkemi-sen (tilallisen) prosesseihin. Väitän, että Eurooppa menettää kasvavassa määrin his-toriallisesti vapaaehtoista ja avointa merkitystään ja että siitä on tulossa tilallisesti määritetty EU-topia, jolla on oma jäsenyys, omat arvot ja kansalaisuus. Monesti nämä tiettyihin ihanteisiin perustuvat ja EU:n rakentamat mielikuvat eivät kuitenkaan vas-taa sen enempää paikallista todellisuutta kuin elämääkään eripuolilla Eurooppaa.. Tarkastellakseni normatiivia diskursseja ja ristiriitaisten paikallisten todellisuuksi-en kuilua teoreettisesti, käytän tutkimuksessa Michel Foucaultin käsitettä *heterotopia*. Tarkastelen utopistisia mielikuvia häiritseviä paikkoja ja seuraan useita heterotopiaa määritteleviä periaatteita. En kuitenkaan käsittele vain käsitteen mahdollisia merki-tyksiä vaan pohdin vastustuksen sääntöjä todellisten paikkojen tasolla EU:ssa ja sen lähialueilla. Heterotopiat ovat Euroopan "toisia" tiloja, jotka eivät edusta yhtä tiettyä paikkaa vaan sisältävät monimutkaisia prosesseja, joissa erilaisuus tai vaihtoehtoiset tilat kehittyvät. Tässä yleiset kysymykset ovat keskeisiä: Voivatko Eurooppa ja EU py-syä eri käsitteinä? Voiko Eurooppa pysyä mukana demokratiaan, vakauteen ja dialo-giin liittyvissä lupauksissaan? Nämä ovat väitöskirjani keskeisiä kysymyksiä.

Avainsanat: Eurooppa, kriittinen geopolitiikka, Euroopan unioni, identiteetti, geo-politiikka

Foreword

I would like to start this dissertation with a personal note. I guess right from the start of my studies in geography I have been interested in writing on Europe. But when thinking back, the interest started much earlier. I remember that I was truly fascinated by Europe when I was attending high school. Actually, it was the main reason for me for studying geography. The excitement about Europe was not so much something particular, but, I think, the immense idea of openness, possibility and an innumerable amount of impressions, feelings and sightings that came to me during holidays, and also reflected in music, film and books. In a sense I felt a bit like German filmmaker Wim Wenders. He expressed: 'I was relieved as a kid to realize that I could be something other than German. I realized there was a different definition for somebody like me, a German coming out of the war. This idea of being European came without all the pitfalls of nationalism. So I've been an ardent European since I was 10 years old! I loved the idea of Europe, because it freed me from the burden of belonging to a nation, something I never wanted'.

I very much, share this feeling. And up to today my passion for Europe has not changed over the years, what changed, however, seems the idea of Europe. Today, the idea of Europe itself has become an important subject in political explanations. And where once Europe was able to free me 'from the burden of belonging to a nation' in providing a meaningful idea, it seems now increasingly promoted as a nation, a European institution with banalities such as a flag and anthem, a particular place to which European citizens can belong and not-belong. Not only as a political geographer, but also because of that lively memory in me, I felt too much has been claimed for 'my own private Europe'. This was for me the main motivation for writing this dissertation, for I would defend that Europe is always more than any definite vision or claim. So, is it written out of anger? No, I would say, it is written out of a deep concern with an idea that that means much to me.

At the final stage of my search for what is left of 'the open idea of Europe' I am happy to say that my own private idea about Europe is much in tact, not in the last place because of the pleasant people I was lucky to work with. I would like to thank Ruben and Roald for support and company during my years in Nijmegen. I am also grateful to James and Paul, who made it possible for continuing my exploration of Europe in Joensuu and for the interest in my work, the discussions and the useful help in the process of writing. Thanks to James D. Sidaway for suggesting the strong title, the drinks and talks at CREA Amsterdam and for being one of the examiners of the final work. I also would like to thank Anssi Paasi for his inspiration, thoughtful insights: it is a real honour to have you as examiner of my work. Finally, I would like to thank the Karelian Institute and especially Joni and Ilkka for granting me a doctoral position at the Russia in Europe Graduate School. The last words I leave to someone where words fall short. Henk: *All* this writing would not have been there without you. You are not only an inspiring colleague but after all as true soul mate. It is to you I dedicate this book.

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1 General Introduction

'Europe as ideal (let us call it 'Europeanism') defies monopolistic ownership. It cannot be denied to the 'other', since it incorporates the phenomenon of 'otherness: in practice of Europeanism, the perpetual effort to separate, expel and externalize is constantly thwarted by the drawing in, admission, accommodation and assimilation of the 'external'' (Zygmunt Bauman, 2004, Europe an unfinished adventure)

1.1 THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

The raison d'être of this dissertation must be seen in the light of current geopolitical transitions that are taking place in Europe and its expanding spheres on the continent. These expanding spheres have been conceptualised as 'wider Europe' and by the European Union specified as a neighbourhood that 'invites our neighbours to the East and to the South to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that we enjoy in the European Union and which aims to create a ring of friends around the external borders of the European Union' (COM, 2003, 393 final). Moreover, the EU regards these new incentives as 'sharing the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned' (ibid).

European Union policies linked to 'wider Europe' as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have materialised not only as a response to the continuing territorial and geopolitical expansion over the past decades, but also as a result of the development of the EU towards a political community. These policies have one overarching objective; namely the role in contributing to stability in multilevel context. Stability here is defined in terms of 'the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development' (ibid).

The promise of EU membership to the candidate member states in the past have turned out to be an influential policy instrument for transferring the EU's model in its most fundamental sense, and in all fields from economics, politics, and society to identity, and which means sooner or later accepting the whole Acquis Communautaire (Emerson, 2002). The continuation of the EU enlargement process, however, is believed to be indefensible in the future, and if anything, the EU discourages long-term membership expectations with states that haven't been candidates (Emerson, 2002). In order to reimburse for potentially damaging consequences on stability and development as well as any long-term forms of exclusion, the EU has introduced new geopolitical strategies in order to facilitate the geopolitical transitions along the new external borders of the European Union. These challenges have resulted in different initiatives for participation in EU activities, via increasing political, economic and cultural co-operation and different forms of regional and national assistance. These

procedures have been worked out in a new doctrine, which instead of concentrating on EU membership, aims at institutionalising and strengthening the existing geopolitical relations in a partnership, through shared values, common ideals and common goals, and ultimately replacing existing bilateral agreements. And with the launch of its new external relations policy in 2004 – The European Neighbourhood Policy – the European Union indeed entered a new stage in its history. The focus was no longer solely put on economic integration, but shifted with the introduction of this policy to a deeper European integration that moved beyond the formal structures of European Union membership. The European Neighbourhood Policy was designed to develop 'a zone of economic prosperity and consequently a friendly neighbourhood with whom Europe enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations' (COM 2003 104 final). This new policy meant a next step in formalizing the EU's relations with its neighbouring countries and at the same time expanding its sphere of influence.

   External relations among EU countries with its neighbouring countries is not in itself new, but what is new with the introduction of the ENP is the coherent and direct way of influencing and structuring its sphere of influence. The ENP is centred on the belief that the EU neighbouring states can be 'Europeanized' (Europeanization according to the European Union entails the endorsement of particular European values like democracy, good governance, market economy, minority/human rights etc.). This is done by means of policies and practices in which neighbouring states can become 'close' partners but without the direct prospective of becoming EU member (at least in the near future). Following the enlargement of 2004 with ten new member States, it could have been perceived that the EU opened the door for further enlargement by introducing the ENP, but this move could also be simultaneously explained as an alternative for membership and thus keeping the confusing geographies of Africa, Middle-East and Russia at a distance.

   The choice to use the term 'neighbourhood' illustrates this seemingly fuzziness between the gradients of European integration. The conventional meaning of a neighbour usually refers to someone who lives close by but belongs to a different family with slightly other values and habits. And because of the differences and nearness, neighbours are mostly kept at a psychological distance. The subsequent question that comes up is why most neighbours are characterised as those living in the house next door, behind a fence, hedge or other symbolic border. This characterization more or less indicates that the signification of the word neighbour contains an a-priori difference (between 'us' and 'them') for, 'if and when one defines one's neighbours, implicitly, one defines one's borders' (van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011, 121). In the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the neighbour seems more or less defined as those countries outside the structures of EU membership and those behind the EU external border, which raises the question of whether the neighbour is regarded as fully European or as not quite European. From this perspective, the term neighbour contradicts with the highly regarded premises of equality and co-ownership (highly regarded by the EU according to its documents). Moreover, by referring to other countries in terms of one's own neighbourhood without specifying the names of the countries indicates that the new policy seemingly has a largely unilateral origin and interest.

   Likewise, this is emphasized by the fact that neighbours are referred to without the connotation 'European'. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy suggests

a certain Europeanness of its neighbours, the quotes from ENP documents refer to the neighbours of Europe. The absence of the use 'European' neighbourhood seems not only at odds in the context of the confusion between Europe and the EU but also separating various areas from Europeanness. Kostadinova, (2009, 246) has in similar terms pointed out that 'the inclusion of the eastern neighbours in the same policy framework as the Southern Mediterranean states may indicate that the former, just as the latter, should not be considered European'. Therefore, the first motives behind the ENP seem to indicate that being European involves a certain nearness, recognition and empathy based on particular values and a common historical background. Not considering neighbours a-priori, Europe involves the practice of distancing and 'othering' as an obligation of membership, European integration, citizenship, or other grants are linked with Europeanness do not automatically apply. Seen in this light, for the first time since its existence, the EU pre-defined in clear language its external relations and subsequently defined its (symbolic) borders.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Consequently, as wider Europe and the European Neighbourhood Policy is getting its shape, and becoming most notably the important issue on the EU's external policy agenda for the coming years, the overall implication of the new EU geopolitical agenda remain ambiguous--not only on interstate relations and the ability to progress its own foreign policy capacities but also in defining a geographically restrictive notion of European space. The geopolitical ambiguity as reflected in the European Neighbourhood Policy echoes the current discussion of what (wider) Europe today is or should be. This seems to count even more in the situation where the EU seems to present itself as a state-like institution in which polarities such as European –Non European, the EU and its neighbours and the confusion between Europe and the EU increasingly lead to political implications.

   As a result, the question remains as to how on-going institutional and perceptual changes that approve closer political relations with neighbouring countries can take place despite simultaneous and selective processes of inclusion and exclusion (Scott, 2005). What are the implications and difficulties of this paradox for communities, states and institutions within and beyond the borders of the European Union? The implications of this paradox is particularly represented in two divergent imaginary visions on Europe: When looking at the first, it is important to remark that the current political confusion of the status of 'wider Europe' is inherent to the confusion between Europe and the European Union, which as Annemarie Pieper (1996, 183, 186) remarks, was and still is an ideal imagination. She uses the word utopia in which she argues that utopia today has a rather negative connotation. She explains that when a project is considered utopian, it means that although interesting, it is normally rejected on grounds of being unrealistic if not a phantasm that must be shared under fiction (she uses the words 'dream word' or imaginary world). The word utopian seems therefore not related to a realistic or at least realizable empirical reality. In case of the European Union, the idealistic vision is represented by the homogeneous image of a stable and good Europe surrounded by neighbouring countries that are friendly

to Europe and share the same values. This is what I would like to call EU-topia: the gradual process where representatives of the institutionalized EU put forward new forms of social spatialization (ideas of a certain version of Europe) and spatial socialization (the construction of a European 'we' via the use of identity narratives and other symbols that are mediated to citizens). In the next chapters I will further outline the particular meaning of EU-topia.

The rather opposite is to be found in the second heterogeneous vision of Europe as represented by heterotopias. In the subsequent section on heterotopias we will learn from Michel Foucault that heterotopias are disturbing places that from below confront utopias with their impossibilities. The heterogeneous heterotopias can be understood as something that undermines the utopian homogeneous imaginations, as a disturbance, or in other words as resistance in which they resist the idealistic picture. This dissertation takes the principles of utopia and heterotopia as guideline in the search for 'other spaces of Europe' that resist the hegemonic vision of Europe. The examples of hegemonic utopias and heterotopias provide an overview of the geopolitical visions of Europe in their own particular way. Whereas the first utopian vision represents a clear visions of what Europe is or should be (represented in the map of the EU and its neighbourhood as shown on the ENP website), the latter geographies of resistance are complex, vibrant and resists the static meaning of geographical determinists.

By looking with the critical geopolitical eye, this dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of the changing concept of Europe and its borders and the political, societal and symbolic transitions that have taken place. With the fluctuation of the European Union border zones, it is important to scrutinise the extent to which structures of bordering practices, security issues and symbolic and political action are emerging at the borders of the European Union, and what their implications are for the people involved. With this dissertation I will reflect on the EU's external policy and its borders not so much on an empirical level, but by trying to look beyond the policies and rationales to its 'nature' and 'ethics' and how the European Neighbourhood Policy acts as an vehicle to transport 'European values' beyond the formal border of the EU. The research executes this analysis by exploring political discourses, societal and political perceptions and representations, the context in which they operate and the position of the EU in shaping its relations within 'wider Europe'. The geopolitical transitions within the European Neighbourhood Policy will therefore be investigated and based on one central question:

- Can the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU live up to its promise of contributing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe?

For the purpose of the dissertation, the central question will be scrutinised in terms of four themes:

1. The emergence of a European Union geopolitical framework: What is its geopolitical vision in relation to its external borders and the construction of a wider European neighbourhood?
2. Judging concrete policies of the European Union by assessing the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Action Plans.

3. What are the impacts of the EU's notion of Europeanization towards wider Europe and how are these reflected and perceived in everyday realities?
4. Highlighting transitions in political discourse and symbolic representations with respect to the EU's emerging geopolitical notions, including issues like partnership versus membership, and ideas about stability and democracy in the context of securitisation on the one hand and dialogue/cooperation on the other.

1.3 EXPECTED OUTCOMES

The expected outcome draws on two major debates: (1) Should we indeed draw on the assumption that the transition of Europe and its borderlands is heading towards a new European entity of overlapping sovereignties, multiple decision making centres and multiple layers of scale and therefore a new economic, political and social authority aiming at exclusion/inclusion of "wider Europe"? (2) Or are the current transitions of European borders more an indication of a neo-liberal global capitalist epoch driven by national economies of scale that has neo-colonial aspirations and thus aiming at forms of exclusion and exploitative relations?

The critical approach of the research is expected to contribute to the state of the art on both theoretical and empirical grounds in the following ways: (1) Document the evolution of EU policies and strategies towards the external borders and "wider Europe"; (2) Focus on the political and socio-economic impacts of the enlargement process: (3) Synthesise and complement the existing literature on the EU's present external borders.

This is done by researching the contradictions within 'wider Europe' that could result from tensions between official EU policies and more pragmatic interaction processes on the one hand and real-time processes of inclusion and exclusion on the other. For example, processes of 'securitisation' and border-management and social-political dialogue. The thesis studies the development of political language and the notion of what the EU and Europe means, in terms of dominant discourses. This is and remains a difficult topic with regard to 'wider Europe'. Furthermore, the thesis analyses how the EU and EU policies and practices impact on regional interaction and development for communities, enterprises and political actors and, finally research how the idea of shared European values affects regional neighbourhood cooperation. Does the EU acquis contribute to a politics of difference with regard to non EU Europe and its neighbourhood which could lead to exclusion? These questions contribute to the general output of the thesis, in terms of scientific articles.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

As such, this dissertation is devoted to a critical scrutiny of the representation of Europe and its borders. The research will reflect on the intrinsic geopolitical complexity and multiplicity of various ways Europe is represented. As have been highlighted in the introduction, there are complex realities in Europe that unfold the contradictions and intentions of the political imaginations as reflected in today's 'wider'

Europe. Using the critical lens as a tool, this dissertation is shaped by different analytical methods in order to gain a thorough understanding of the temporal and spatial organisation, and the complex interaction, of economic, social, political and cultural processes (Kitchin and Tate, 1998). This research shares the idea of Lefebvre (1991) and Foucault (1967) that space is a fabricated and ever changing product shaped by representational practices of power relations. The state of the art of critical border studies indicates that in addition to geopolitical shifts, borders are being redefined through more immediate social practices and perceptions (see for example O'Dowd, 2010 and Scott and van Houtum, 2009). The major conceptual shift in border studies lies in acknowledging that state borders are complex political institutions transecting social spaces not only in administrative but also in cultural, economic and functional terms (Scott, 2011). Central to this latter perspective are multiple interpretations of border significance, border-related elements of identity-formation, socio-cultural and experiential basis for border-defining processes, power relations in society and geopolitical orders, as well as critical analyses of geopolitical discourses.

Lefebvre's 'the production of Space' points out that the production of 'social space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity—their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder' (Lefebvre, 1991, 73). The introduction has also uncovered that space in the view of Foucault is never a neutral place but the form of relations among places, in which the imagination of space is the form of subjective imaginations, not neutral or free: 'social space is produced and reproduced in connection with the forces of production. (…) 'forces (that) are not taking over a pre-existing, empty or neutral space, or a space determined solely by geography, climate, anthropology' (Lefebvre, 1991, 72). Lefebvre has proposed the triad of social concepts as analysis of space in order to understand how complex social relations are constantly shaped and reshaped by subjective representations and practices (see figure 1).

1.*Spatial Practice* – 'In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society's relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance' (Lefebvre, 1991, 33).

2. *Representations of space* – refer to spaces that 'are tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to 'frontal' relations' (Lefebvre, 1991, 33). Also to: 'conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanist, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of whom identify what s lived and what is perceived with what is conceived' (Lefebvre, 1991, 38).

3. *Representational space* – Spaces that 'lived' directly "through its associated images and symbols and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'…" (Lefebvre, 1991, 39).

Figure 1: Triad of social relations

The three moments of the triad, perceived, conceived, and lived, must be understood through their inter-subjective relationships. The triad contributes to the fabrication of space in different combinations according to the mode of production and the historical time frame. It is important to note that the relations between the three moments are never simple or stable, nor are they entirely conscious. In addition, they appear in constant shifting relations allowing for multiple interpretations and meanings and also to the production of new meanings (Peet, 1998, 104). According to Lefebvre 'the reproduction of the social relations of production within this space inevitably obeys two tendencies: the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the generation of new relations on the other. Thus, despite—or rather because of—its negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall call that new space "differential space", because, inasmuch as abstract space tends towards homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences'. (Lefebvre, 1991, 52).

The traditional geopolitical features of territoriality as described in traditional geopolitics collide with the idea of representational spaces, In order to come to terms with the diversity of meaning the empirical analysis of this research will focus on policies/discourse, perceptions and practices and fieldwork. Policies/discourse are given in by spatial action and supported by public opinion. Perceptions do not rely on action as such, for the reason that they are not limited or excluded by borders. It is therefore likely that perceptions both support and undermine policies and inform practices. Practices relate to the most part to policies and discourse and shape the actual space though activities. Furthermore, policies, practices and perceptions will be scrutinised from different spatial levels: the European (EUtopia) and the sub-national (Heterotopia). This will allow a description and explanation of the difficulties of specific areas. The next section further elaborates on the research framework.

Policies/discourse: are characterized by official political bodies and supported by dominant norms and values that govern European Union external relations and give direction to various policies by defining programs, Action Plans as well as the preconditions for membership. The importance concerning the EU's external relations policies are first and foremost embedded in the fabrication of the European Union as political entity (which started with the Schumann declaration, the Maastricht treaty, Copenhagen European Council). Once the EU was constructed as it is today, particular documents further defined the political framework of the EU—most notably in this respect is the Schengen treaty. The last step in defining a European external policy, are the specific policies related to the external relations—most notably the COM and SEC documents on the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Common Neighbourhood treaty with Russia and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The construction of a European political entity with an official external relations policy is supported and informed by particular strong discourses of a shared common European history. These imaginations have been strengthened by the relative success of the European Union especially since the Delors administrations in the years preceding the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The idea of a makeable Europe with common roots can only be understood from selective historical interpretations that voice specific interest and bring forward concrete objectives. These particular imaginations in their turn are

communicated by political speeches to public opinion, media and civil society in order to support the prevalent picture.

Perceptions/thought: Mentioned earlier, perceptions represent a certain freedom not restricted by borders and sheltered by representation. Perceptions are subjective and idealistic parts that influence the way in which the geopolitical position of borders is understood. Perceptions include visions on European borders in the context of EU integration not only at the level of the state but also by regions and ordinary people. Perceptions are under the influence of many societal elements including the official political discourse of a state or the EU, by public discussion, via (multi)media and within civil society, by societal opinions and historical sentiment or emotion. In addition, state-society concepts with respect to fear, populism and societal mobilisation are seen to play an important role in influencing policy decisions (see Scott, 2001).

Practices: relate to different forms of regionally specific activities that contribute to the construction of the European Union's external relations. They are supported by the different policies and discourses and informed by thought. Practices construct and reconstruct Europe as well as its borders; and are the outcomes of cooperation/ partnership, the implementation of policies and informal interaction. Practices embody the actual translation of geopolitical imagination in the local context but also the resistance on a local level. In this dissertation the practices of European geo-political imaginations have been made visible in the contexts of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The institutional forms of cooperation in the different neighbouring countries, for example, are in the local context differently explained in a way that they suit the interest and safety concerns of the local actors each on one side. A second example can be found on the southern fringes of the EU where harsh border-practices have not quite matched the intentions of more openness as described in the various EU documents. In order to understand the complexity of practices, their historical and socio-economic backgrounds have been extensively analysed by scholars in different fields (many of these examples of concrete analyses have been used in this dissertation). However, the understanding of practices is different from thinking of practices. Understanding involves a comparative approach where regional variations in EU policy making and the categories of actors involved are recognised. The understanding of practices is useful for a pragmatic level of understanding but fails to think beyond the actual phenomena for practices related to EU external relations. The case studies that are often involved in the research of practices examine the extent to which local communities tend to be included and/or excluded from EU/ENP decision-making processes, whereas thought reaches beyond the symptoms into the field of perspectives. Subsequently, the combination of geo-political research and philosophy is of great use in this dissertation.

Fieldwork During my work as a researcher for the FP5 and FP6 European framework programs 'EXLINEA' and 'EUDIMENIONS' (projects supported by the European Commission under the Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme that examined opportunities and constraints to local/regional cross-border co-operation along the EU external border) I carried out extensive fieldwork in Cyprus and the Canary Islands. The combined case studies under scrutiny covered the entire external borders of the European Union. The case studies I carried out together with my colleagues at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR) typify the unique situations of

both remote places along the external EU. Cyprus and the Canary Islands represent in their distinct ways geopolitical fringes within the larger European context. More importantly, however, each of these specific border region contexts is characterised by stark social and political asymmetries compared to EU policies and proposals. They represent the resistance towards the ideal picture of an enlarged in several stark ways: at these borders, problems of accommodating the rights of ethnic minorities often coalesce with issues relating to trade, public security, migration, the environment and identity. These particular constellations of border-sensitive issues are a result of complex and difficult histories and geographies (Scott, 2001). Our more local oriented fieldwork perspectives revealed a complex and divergent image of subareas, groups, cities, borders in their everyday lives. The results of the fieldwork are no strict methodological justification for this dissertation. They rather helped me to see the gap between generalizing European policy proposals and the rigid local realities on Cyprus and the daunting situation with migrants on the Canary Islands. The results of the fieldwork have been published in several articles and newspapers that are not part of this dissertation but appear in the various chapters to highlight the empirical gap between EU geopolitics and the more local level (see Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2007, Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 2007a, Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2008 and 2009).

1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE METHOLOGY

The methodology of the research is based on so-called 'triangulation', which supports the deconstruction of representations of space and history. This empirical method involves the use of all available means of 'evidence' in order to reconstruct a whole from all scattered material and which does justice to the reproduction of space. Research activities focus on preparatory work, conceptual research, archival work and desk research, fieldwork and the synthesis of findings in order to draw conclusions that can be related back to the conceptual framework of the thesis. A large share of the research time envisaged is devoted to the conceptual level of analysis, where the most detailed and extensive theoretical data collection has taken place. This entails uncovering the geopolitical significance in terms of EU discourse and specific policies. As such, the constitution of the EU's policies towards its external borders is thoroughly investigated. The formation of the EU policies with impacts on border areas are analysed as a process conditioned by the following factors:
  • As principles defined in the basic EU documents and in the particular documents and initiatives regarding borders and transnational development (ENP)
  • As geopolitical strategies of the EU and nation states (e.g. ENP, EU Common Strategies)
  • As resulting from continuities and changes in border policies prevailing before a certain border became an EU external border.
  • Local and regional cultural/political and economic activities as they have affected border transitions will be researched.

Drawing from various sources, the thesis aims to shed light especially on tensions between (sub)national understandings in terms of demarcations based on ethnicity,

citizenship, language and socio-cultural characteristics, etc., and broader supranational/transnational understandings which address Europe and its external borders as areas of contact (and, to an extent, transition) between civilisations, and political and economic actors and institutions.

A major research task lies in understanding the complex construction of borders. This is done here by adopting an approach that expresses the multilevel complexity of European borderlands – from the geopolitical to the level of social practices at and across the border (e.g. using Europe's borderlands as a coping strategy, developing crossborder cultural, economic and personal networks, using the border as a 'place-making' strategy).

This has been done in the following way:

1. The collection and survey of relevant official documents, political statements, press material, newspapers, reports of debates, brochures, local archival work, academic publications and books, theories on geopolitics, EU policies and border studies EU data (mostly data sources from euro-barometer), archive data (from the European Union website), images (taken during fieldwork), policy documents (all available COM/SEC documents on EU external relations), political statements (from speeches, conferences, seminars), media (film, music, internet), reports and debates (EU related), self-reinforcing argumentation and above all books that have been used to reconstruct a broad palette of information and visions .

2. The collection of ethnographic data involving notes from meetings and seminars during my work for FP5 'Exlinea' and FP6 'EUDIMENSIONS' across Europe. Next to that it involves the collection of notes from interviews with different actors during fieldwork for both FP5 and FP6 and the analysis of participative observation. This collection will be used to gain insight into perceptions and practices and not so much as 'hard data' used as empirical evidence . That is to say that there will be no substantial 'clear' evidence of such data in any of the papers. As an alternative, the arguments in the different papers are constructed via a mixture of discourse analysis and original synthesis inspired by the ethnographic data.

Methodology should not be understood from its strict form of comparison or cross-sectional examining. By that contrary, this proposed research will take the form of critical reflections. For that reason, the research will be descriptive to allow approaching bordering processes in specific geographical and social contexts, both in European borderlands but also wherever a specific border has impacts, is represented, negotiated or displaced. Triangulation means verifying the explanatory values of the various data sources as well as evaluating the analytical domain chosen. The empirical sources attempt to reconstruct and re-think the geopolitical imaginations (Scott, 2001). The overview of the methodology is outlined in figure 2. This overview provides a good insight in the process of triangulation and how these various methodological hints inspire and enrich the discourse based articles. The reason for including this overview as made by Scott (2001) is that most of the empirical work of this thesis has been based on this research model as applied in the both FP5 Exlinea and to some extend in FP6 EUdimensions. The output in terms of the written articles followed for a great part this methodological model for reasons of theoretical synthesis within the projects.

It has been a clear choice to inspire the articles with the available data as I believe this strengthens the overall intention of the articles. The available ethnographic data is largely based on snippets, ideas, and subjective observations by the participants and not so much constructed of a formal structure of closed/fixed set of interviews and other data. My intention with the articles is on the one hand to question the dominant institutional discourses by appealing to their sometimes problematic moral and second to contribute to an alternative geopolitical vision that takes into account local and historical sensitivities. The methodological approach is, furthermore, a combination of an extensive study of different border locales and thematic investigations, as defined, which intersect with them. While writing, I am well aware that this process is never ending and always repeating. However, the aim will be gaining a sufficient amount of perspectives to validate, enrich and extend the geopolitical debate on European geopolitics.

Sources	Methods	Objectives
Patterns of political, social and economic interaction (practices)	The collection of written sources	Gaining insights in the political/social/cultural situation in European Political decision-making and power practices.
Strategic and political plans, documents and brochures stemming from different governance scales (EU and the neighbouring states involved in this dissertation)	Reading, text analysis, observation and documentation	Insights into the policies, interpretations and interests of the EU as well as other political actors in the neighbouring states.
Scientific and philosophical debates on Europe, the fabrication of meaning, production of space	Text analysis, reading, observation and documentation	Insights into various academic debates and traditions
Insights from strategic actors at the supranational level (EU/ENP)	Speech analysis of ENP documents	Insights into the policies, practices, narratives, interpretations and interests of the relevant political actors

(Based on Scott, 2001)

Figure 2: Overview of the methodology

In addition to the aforementioned, I would like to make a point concerning the methods of research that allows obtaining a coherent and trustful picture of the heterogeneous spaces of everyday life. This is in similar terms remarked by Gerard O'Tuathail (2010, 8): 'How is ground-level expertise to be acquired and what are the ethics of the research methods employed?' He points to the difficulties and time management of extensive fieldwork (in his case ethnographic research) and the fact that these methods 'require significant intellectual labour investment'. O'Tuathail has a valuable point when he states that 'while extended fieldwork and local language competence are undoubtedly desirable, full time academic employment does not necessarily allow this'. Other methods like survey research, elite interviewing and focus groups, are

according to O'Tuathail of similar importance and can enable 'comparative research and analysis.' Next to fieldwork and ethnographic research, other means of gathering information might also be considered. In case of Belarus in in this dissertation, the genre of travel writing provides a valuable insight in the everyday reproduction of nationhood and alternative personalized narratives. Moreover, I argue that alternative ways of voicing a geopolitical situation might be powerful alternatives as the case of Cyprus has exemplified.

Next to that, an alternative way of practicing the study of geopolitics might involve considering platforms of publication other than academic journals and conferences (this is also proposed by Antonsich, 2009). Newspapers, magazines (for example the well written and influential articles by Tom Junod for Esquire, and in particular his 2003 article 'The falling man' which is widely considered to be one of the best articles on 9/11), multimedia but also music and documentaries (for example the Dutch 'Tegenlicht') directly engage with the lives of people at a different but nonetheless powerful level. The impact of these platforms should not be underestimated and the translation of academic material into broader and more popular material might be one of the challenges (Together with my colleagues I tend to translate most academic publications into newspaper articles and magazine publications. The result has been positive and the public reactions overwhelming (See for example the publication by van Houtum, Boedeltje and Fumero-Padron in the Spanish newspaper El Pais on the situation on the external borders between Spain and Morocco in the references). However, while exploring new grounds of research, I would like to recall O'Tuathail's (2010, 8) remark that 'the issue of research ethics is extremely important and can only be underscored here. The admonition "do no harm" is a useful starting point but certain conflicts and situations require clear moral situatedness and normative principles transparently expressed'. In a time of changing societies, globalization and contested geopolitics, I would like to add that an important task for critical geopoliticians is defending the ongoing movement of research in exploring new conceptual boundaries.

1.6 INNOVATION/ORIGINALITY

This thesis aims on the one hand to inform and enrich the scientific debate over the political significance of the transition of Europe and its borders within the context of European integration. In doing so the project contributes to a new conceptualisation of Europe as spaces created by social interactions, institutions and rules operating at different spatial levels. On the other hand, it seeks to enrich policy debate by critically discussing the experiences and lessons learned since 1990 in areas located on the EU's external borders. Building on the wealth of available research, the thesis provides a sophisticated theoretical framework and research design with which to better understand the significance of changing European spaces as a process of socio-political transformation.

As the EU's boundaries shift geographically, it is necessary to investigate the extent to which meaningful forms of collective action are emerging on the external borders of the EU. The transition of European borders presents a major political, economic and social challenge for the European Union. It will also have far-reaching effects on the

neighbouring countries (and their regions) who must deal with fundamental societal transformations and rapid structural change. In border regions diverse socio-economic conditions and practices increasingly confront each other, opening prospects for trade and co-operation but, at the same time, often encouraging undesirable and problematic activities and even resulting in misunderstanding and conflict.

1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

With this introduction I have tried to capture the momentum of European geopolitics to serve as a starting point for this dissertation while providing a consistent basis in coming to terms with the transition of European geopolitics.

Next to this general introduction, I further clarify the transitions in European geopolitics in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. I start with indicating the role of European geopolitics within the broader geopolitical conceptual framework, which in its own way has established a rich literature marking the evolution of geopolitics in the past decades. Chapter three introduces Europe as research case. Here I argue that the conceptualization of geopolitics in Europe is characterized by a rather new geopolitics of shifting territorialities, blurring identities and new forms of geographies emerging from the changing role of society. Rather than analysing and advising, geographers tend to focus on the implications of the shifting patterns of (European) geopolitics, by emphasizing new forms of inclusion and exclusion, inequalities, social justice and marginalized groups and people.

Subsequently, I argue that critical geopolitics is a useful sub-discipline to reflect on the geopolitical and territorial confusion between Europe and the EU. From the critical viewpoint I develop two distinct conceptualizations of Europe. I argue that the first image foresees a homogeneous Europe that is eventually capable of replacing the state, an ideal place in which the citizens of Europe can enjoy their diversity by unity. From the perspective of the EU, this desire of a good, secure and prosperous Europe reflects very much a geography of desire or what I would will call EU-topia (the ideal place). The fourth chapter makes a careful analysis of the construction of the EU-topia. How it foresees a distinct future for Europe and how it foresees its ideal geopolitics.

This image is in itself not harmful or undesirable, however, by means of the introduction of a geography of resistance (heterotopias) I argue that the hegemonic discourse of the European Union increasingly makes a distinct difference between Europeans and non-Europeans, between neighbours and citizens, between European and non-European neighbourhoods and that this contradicts with the complex realities and everyday lives of people along and across the EU borders. As these ideal images make their way along the policy- making decision line, the gap between the ideal image and the complex realities becomes visible. The heterogeneous geographies of resistance that will be called heterotopias are the disturbing places, images and voices that undermine utopias and counter the dominant EU discourse. In a sense they relate to Lefebvre's 'differential spaces'. Chapter five searches for distinct heterotopias across Europe.

Tensions arising from the gap between EU-topia and empirical reality are outlined in two examples. The first example is Belarus and reflects the tension between

on the one hand EU-topia as ideal and on the other the invisibility of Belarus on the European map. This tension between imagination and invisibility embodies the question where the ideal version of Europe begins, and where it ends. The second example is Cyprus. During my work as a researcher for the FP5 project 'Exlinea' I carried out extensive research on the EU enlargement process of the island in 2004. The outcomes of the research reflect the tension between two divergent versions of Europeanness. How bearable is it for a community to have a different view and to be part of a community that is separated between the ideal image given in by the European Union and the complex local historical context. In the last part of this chapter I outline how heterotopias can lead to alternative geopolitical vision within European geopolitics. This is followed by a conclusion in which I will be in search for the answers as questioned in research objective. Subsequently, the implications for future research will outline how a different way of looking at European geopolitics contributes to an alternative geopolitical way of seeing Europe.

The choice why to include the distinct empirical cases of Cyprus and Belarus has risen from the 'otherness' of both cases. The choice to incorporate Cyprus and Belarus as empirical cases comes from the fact that both countries undermine the 'normality' of an institutionalized version of Europe. Both examples share that they do not follow the logic of the institutional policy logic of Brussels. They help us to see a different version of Europe, which is different from the increasingly dominant institutionalized vision. Both cases share that they reveal a different social spatialization (which is not the bounded homogeneous Europe) and also a different spatial socialization (the construction of European otherness, by using for example identity narratives and also politicized symbols mediated through citizens and pressure groups). Especially the institutional European discourse on Cyprus lacks the historical and local sensitivities in its policy approaches. The same is in a sense true for Belarus, where the difficult lingual mixture that divides the country is not taken into account and that the institutional focus is solely bounded to the absence of European values such as democracy and economic liberalism.

Both examples add a critical and different geographical understanding to the increasingly dominant institutional discourses on Europe. From my own experience it is also important to notice that the institutional discourse is increasingly becoming the dominant perception within academic discourse. For example, many curricula in spatial planning, environmental studies, international relations and geography take institutional discourses of the EU as objects of analysis in their programs. While it is certainly a favourable development of taking European Union discourse as object of analysis, a critical stance towards this development is needed. A critical questioning of the dominant institutional discourse through the use of heterotopias helps to see the totality of representations contained in the space. According Ed Soja (1995) heterotopias increase and broaden the theoretical understanding of geographers by helping them to generate new ideas and new visions to rediscover the spaces and places that contest, reshape and refresh the existing discourses.

2 European Geopolitics in a Wider Perspective: a Conceptual Framework

2.1 CONTEXTUALIZING GEOPOLITCS

The wider perspective of the geopolitical framework of Europe is analysed in this chapter. In the broader angle of geopolitics the following axiom seems to matter: Deconstructing the meaning of Europe means deconstructing the meaning of borders (relating to the question where wider Europe ends and where it begins). In the transition of European external borders, the notion of territory and geopolitics is of significant importance. This idea of borders as socially constructed and non-static is relatively new in the practice of geopolitics. For many decades border studies, territoriality and border conflicts were studied from the definition that borders and boundaries were fixed lines separating sovereign territories, dividing the world into bounded political units, commonly referred to as states. As political scientist Kari Laitinen (2003, 26) points out 'the charm and success of traditional geopolitics has been based on its ability to make a comprehensive political map of the world. Along with the map it is possible to locate and organise the relationships and dynamics between local and regional/national and global, and to form an understandable politico-security entity'. From this point of view, borders were associated with territoriality and the meaning or identification with this territoriality. In similar terms David Storey (2001, 17) has remarked that 'territory provides an essential link between society and the space it occupies primarily through its impact on human interaction and the development of groups spatial identities'.

Bordering political space in Hobbesian terms replaced pre-modern medieval structures with the emerging of the modern Nation-State in the 18th century. Borders functioned here to bound and secure the socio-political settlement and economic administration into sovereign entities creating a collective ethos of interdependencies in what Pierre Bourdieu once called Habitus (1987). In this sense, the meaning of borders is historically contingent, and part of a continuous reproduction of territories and notions of territoriality even if they are always more or less arbitrary lines between territorial entities, they have deep symbolic, cultural, historical and religious, often contested, meanings for social communities and manifest themselves in various social, political and cultural practices (see Newman, Paasi, 1998, 187/188).

The Hobbesian bordering of territory is related to the traditional study of geopolitics. Geopolitics according to Laitinen (2003, 25) is 'a political doctrine where geography is used to argue for political ends and purposes'. He defines three different models through which traditional geopolitics operates: Geopolitics as 'analytical model

studies the causal relations between environment and politics'. As scientific model 'geopolitics explores the meaning of physical environment of human being in the context of certain social action' and thirdly as political agenda 'geopolitics means a political projection directed against the environment'. In this conventional meaning, geopolitics has a strong connection to 'scientific positivism' and also 'the discipline of political realism of international relations as a component of deterministic environmental conception'. The bordering of political space according to traditional geopolitical thinking has been related to the security of a defined territory against possible threats by the stranger and the unknown 'Other' behind the border something the traditional Hobbesian state still stands for and as Laitinen (2003, 25) remarks 'symbolises the legitimate monopoly of violence and spatial order of a certain area and denotes the discursive field of a state, which includes people, symbols, institutions and the machinery of coercion'. In this respect diverging languages of belonging and not belonging on both sides have fostered and strengthened ideas about difference. If the state is able to define itself as political entity or as supranational institution then it is at the same time defining itself through the territorialisation of space

An important point is that the characteristics of contemporary Europe is indeed significantly different from the traditional geopolitical bordering of space. Borders, identity and the dynamics of power are far from being static and the on-going process of globalisation and communication has had significant influence on these geopolitical concepts. The current geopolitical map is far from clear in the current era of confusing geographies and globalisation since it, in the words of O'Tuathail and Dalby (1998, 16), 'disturbs its time-worn conditions of possibility, its conventional geographical rhetoric, its traditional territorial objects, and its ontological purities'. Next to that Laitinen (2003, 26) remarks that today's geopolitical landscape is more complicated and therefore needs more sophisticated analytical tools by pointing to the fact that geopolitics today is heavily influenced by globalisation and geo-economics, eco-politics and religious issues play an important role in international political discourse

The basis for this more critical geopolitical approach on the changing circumstances of contemporary geopolitics has, to some extent, its roots in the rise of critical geography in the 1970s. I have to remark that the connection between critical and geography is in itself not special or new. The general and considered task of geographer has always been to look critically at spatial processes. However, the contemporary meaning of critical geography relates to the more modern variant of 'radical geography'. Radical geography dates back to the 1970s and was inspired by two major events: Environmental and societal concerns contested the fixed views of positivist Hobbesian geopolitics and radical geographers mainly in the United States responded by creating a movement that was 'anarchic and exuberant, naive yet nuanced' (Blomley, 2006, 89). The second important event took place in the second half of the 1970s and implied a more widespread critique on quantitative domination in geographical research. This was especially inspired by Marxists theories and most notably introduced by people like David Harvey. Blomley (ibid) remarks that these events resulted in a fragmentation of geopolitics in directions as wide as humanistic, feminist and Marxist that moved away from 'structural' or deterministic geographical theories that were dominant. These changes in the discipline of geography to some extent explain the rise of a more critical political geography at the end of the 1980s.

However, perhaps even more crucial in the emergence of critical geopolitics is the impact of post structural 'constructivism' in International Relations Studies. Critical IR scholars like Ashly (1987), Luke (1989), Campbell (1992), Shapiro (1981, 1984, 1988) developed new approaches in which diverging textual materials became objects of critical research, in particular in the analysis of foreign policy discourses and how a narrow state centric vision is constructed in these discourses. Much of this criticism is in fact criticism of interventionist, top-down approaches. What is criticized are some of the assumptions that play a role in global geopolitics, including the predominance of the free market and discourse of the 'Other'. The reasons for this criticism not so much include the lack of imagination to think of alternatives for western solutions; but more the ease and dominance of the Western discourse. The critique by these authors on specific western political discourse refers to its implicit moral superiority –taking the Western democratic state as a norm for countries throughout the world– coupled with undue optimism about the extent to which faraway, troubled countries can be reformed. According to Shapiro 'the violent process of state consolidation was in part driven by legitimation-oriented projects. The intent was to create states that contain unitary and coherent national cultures. Neglecting the institutionalized violence exposed in counter-narratives pointing to the violence of state consolidation, much of American social and political science has been "professional" in the sense that what has been professed is a trained inattention to the historical meta-politics of their political imaginaries' (Shapiro, 2004, 6).

Other radical critics have argued that the hegemonic discourse is in the first place not in the interest of 'weak' non-western states but primarily aims at enhancing political and economic interests of the west, significantly overlooking as Dalby, (2008, 426) remarks the geographies that geopolitical discourse carefully ignores in its imaginations of its enemies and its rationales for military intervention.

The rise of post structuralist criticism in IR studies can be read in the context of a significant increase in the global willingness to intervene in domestic conflict since the Reagan era and the violent conflicts in Latin America. The more critical oriented direction was strengthened by the zeitgeist surrounding the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the general mood that inspired a more post-structural approach that contested the state as central focus of research. This was further motivated by post-Cold War optimism about international intervention, exemplified by the idea of what became known as an emerging US led 'new world order'. These geopolitical interventions (Megoran coins George H. W. Bush's 'New World Order' wars in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992), Bill Clinton's Bosnian (1995) and Kosovo (1999) wars, and George W. Bush's 'War on terror' invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)) were motivated by more ambitious goals like regime change and societal transformation, the strengthening of the rule of law, good governance and democratization. No longer was peacekeeping the sole aim, but under influence of a global sense of neo-liberalism 'peace building' was introduced as the new international strategy to deal with global conflicts, which included a wide array of civil tasks, from the organization of elections to the writing of laws.[1] The post-cold war idea of a global geopolitical framework inspired by a neo-liberal peace emerged as Dalby (2008, 414) out

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[1]   Such thinking was exemplified in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 'Agenda for Peace', and its 1995 supplement.

of the 'new geopolitics" of the 1980s and the American foreign policy of the Reagan administration with its explicit attempts to shore up a declining hegemony through the use of military force'.

In this perspective it is also of interest to refer to O'Tuathail and Agnew's (1992, 194) article on Geopolitical reasoning which was published in the early nineties. (Practical) geopolitical reasoning is explained as 'reasoning by means of consensual and unremarkable assumptions about places and their particular identities. This is the reasoning of practitioners of statecraft, of statespersons, politicians and military Commanders'. According to O'Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 194) 'geopolitical reasoning begins at a very simple level and is a pervasive part of the practice of international politics. It is an innately political process of representation by which the intellectuals of statecraft designate a world and 'fill' it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas. All statespersons engage in the practice; it is one of the norms of the world political community. For example simply describing a different or indeed the same place as 'Western' is silently to designate an implicit foreign policy'.

The consensus of such norms of western, non-western, failed states or evil 'others' is normally based on the hegemonic vision represented by a discourse implied by the dominant world power. In case of the post-cold war period the hegemonic discourse was increasingly embodied by the United States after the disintegration of the Soviet-Union. As O'Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 195) argue, the hegemonic status of the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War represents by definition the 'rule-writer' for the world community. They continue to remark that 'those in power within the institutions of the hegemonic state become the deans of world politics, the administrators, regulators and geographers of international affairs, Their power is a power to constitute the terms of geopolitical world order, an ordering of international space which defines the central drama of international politics in particularistic ways'. One of the consequences of hegemonic geopolitical reasoning is that a coherent common or international doctrine or agreed-upon set of necessary institutional arrangements never emerged (Goodhand 2006, 179).

The instable and often contradictory status of shifting geopolitical visions has resulted in a rather fragmented scope of arguments. This can partly be explained by the domestic, personal and international geo-economic interest of the 'rule writer'. O'Tuathail has recognized this point by observing that administrations often bypass internal expertise or ignore the people in office: 'They make blatantly domestic political calculations about foreign policy and its discourse' (O'Tuathail, 2010, 8). Next to that hegemonic discourse and alterations are often further simplified and coloured by public opinion and, in particular, the mass media. O'Tuathail (1996, 173) has in a different writing remarked that 'this discourse and the structured way of seeing that accompanies it inevitably reproduces the state-centric and essentialist identity reasoning (i.e. there is no language for hybridity) of the various parties involved. Rather, the most significant clash is one of discourses and not of institutions or essential subject positions'.

What this reveals is that liberal discourses embody certain trends. Though geopolitical interventions are usually presented as instrumental and value-free, they often represent a coherent, western, liberal political agenda (Richmond, 2006). There is a striking convergence in all contemporary geopolitical intervention practices, in

emphasizing a particular package of interventions: coupling democratic governance reform, the promotion of human rights, the encouragement of civil society and a free market economy, and the advancement of the rule of law, good governance and a viable and functioning state. One particular example in this context is made by Dalby (2008, 422) who remarks that 'the view from Washington during the Clinton administration shifted focus a number of times with attention paid to the dangers of collapsing states, genocides and environmental threats. New emphasis on such matters contributed to a focus on key pivotal states in the South, those whose political stability was judged to be essential to regional stability, and hence a matter of priority for security planners given the threats these regions might potentially pose to global order'. What these examples indicate is that these discourses, policies and practices in post-conflict countries aim to transform societies in the image of Western, market-oriented democracies (Chandler, 2006, Duffield, 2001, van Leeuwen, 2009) in which universal values are promoted as a remedy for local problems (van Leeuwen, 2009).

Dalby (2008, 421) sharply observers that this perspective indicates that global geopolitics is very much security oriented and 'Explained in terms of external threats issued from someplace beyond the sphere of political action to which military or political management strategies should be applied to impose solutions'. From this perspective the security discourse seems silently living on in 'New word Order' following the collapse of the Soviet Union. New threats were imagined and invented in order to maintain the face of the external enemy.

More specifically, critics within the broader discipline of geopolitical analysis question the feasibility and moral desirability of interventionist, 'top-down', social engineering in far-away societies. This leads them to call, for example, for more local perspective (as pointed out by the later work of O'Tuathail, starting from his later work on Bosnia).

Inspired by post structural ideas and the radical dissidents of IR studies, critical geopolitics gradually shifted to cultural, representational and identity questions on not only local but also supra-national levels of geographical analysis. In particular feminist geography played an important role in the ongoing transition of traditional geopolitical visions to a thorough analysis of the production of power. Jennifer Hyndman (2010, 317) recently emphasized the important role of feminist geography within changing geopolitics. She argues that a critical way of looking at geopolitics 'decentres the nation state, but in its quest to destabilize the normative, it rarely engages in transformative or embodied ways of knowing and seeing. Feminist geopolitics has offered up a fix to this conundrum'. What she refers to is a distinct way of seeing and what Jennifer Fluri (2009 260) has termed 'examining the personal, private and everyday scales of resistance to existing power hierarchies and the role and power of reproduction as significant geopolitical projects'.

As a result of these developments and the progress towards approaches that look at alternative geopolitical narratives, sophisticated literature now largely corroborates the relevance of more critical approaches to changing European geopolitics at many scales (O'Dowd, 2010, Scott and van Houtum, 2009, Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999, Newman and Paasi, 1998, van Houtum et al, 2002 are just a few examples). As a consequence, it is hard to even think anymore about European borderlands as mere landscapes of rivers, mountains and trees, the physical landscapes of traditional geo-

political interest in idiographic aerial differentiation. It is not just the physical 'place' that is necessary for the existence of identity and social consciousness but more important, historical facts, myths and images are important elements in the construction of identity and social consciousness (Boedeltje et al., 2006).

Of these varied perspectives, the critical geopolitical viewpoint in particular has offered us a powerful conceptual framework for apprehending the complex set of forces producing and reproducing institutionalised relations of difference across the current political borders in Europe (see for example Paasi, 2001 and Kramsch and Hooper, 2004). This means that a border, whether international or national, is not only a real representation of something visible but also the idea of an invisible border wandering through our head and that is constantly re-shaped by political discourse, collective cultural discourse and social authority. Subsequently, borders are, according to Newman and Paasi (1998, 196), 'one part of the discursive landscape of social power, control and governance, which extend itself into the whole society and which is produced and reproduced in various social and cultural practices. The boundary does not limit itself merely to the border area or landscape itself, but more generally manifest itself in social and cultural practices and legislation'. In this complexity critical-geopolitics is able to interpret the wires of today's European geopolitics in a way that has been nicely described by Gerard O'Tuathail (2010, 2) as something that 'disaggregates rather than homogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather than globalizes analysis and explanation' (O'Tuathail, 2010, 2). Here geopolitics functions as tool to gaze beyond traditional geopolitical narratives as used by EU geopolitics towards more alternative political narratives.

However the euphoria surrounding the renewed theoretical directions should not be over-exaggerated, critical geopolitics itself has recently been contested in geographical scholarly debate not only by on-going realpolitical realities across the globe, but also by the relatively marginal impact of these critical voices within public opinion and politics (media, think tanks, NGO's etc). Laitinen (2003, 26) sharply observes that European geopolitics still remains characterized be 'certain elements of traditional geopolitical thinking' that includes a particular focus on borders as lines of demarcation and territorial makers. Furthermore, in various recent calls in Political Geography (Megoran, 2010 and Antonsich, 2009) the question of 'influence' and 'impact' of critical geopolitics was discussed in relation to an article written by the influential journalist Robert D. Kaplan that appeared in the dominant American journal Foreign Policy. Kaplan's (2009) argument in 'The revenge of Geography' is - in the traditional geopolitical tradition - deterministic and written from a universal liberal perspective in which he describes the potential threat of Eurasian 'shatter zones'. Marco Antonsich, one of the authors who responded to Kaplan's article, recalls the long list of critiques on such geopolitical determinations (among them Simon Dalby) but sharply observers that most contemporary critical geographers shy away from tackling big geopolitical questions like Kaplan. Moreover, Nick Megoran (in press) also replied that Kaplan's article 'is a painful reminder to political geographers of the need to take neoclassical geopolitics seriously', not in the last place because Kaplan is politically influential as national correspondent for the Atlantic and senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security.

Kaplan's realist argument is, as he mentions himself, all about geography and not so much about ideas, an argument far from new or groundbreaking. However, he sees

geography in a rather different way by provoking critical geopolitics. Kaplan starts his article with a remark on the Global War on Terror and especially on the War in Iraq, which he supported for various reasons. What he, according to himself, learned from the war was the return of realism after the failure of what happened in Iraq. Those who opposed the war were right according to Kaplan, but on different grounds than he suggests in his article. Critical geographers who opposed the war in Iraq did that on grounds given by morality and social justice, on grounds of people and ideas. However, realism according to Kaplan (2009, 97) means quite the opposite namely 'recognizing that international relations are ruled by a sadder, more limited reality than the one governing domestic affairs. It means valuing order above freedom, for the latter becomes important only after the former has been established'. Instead of thinking in possibilities, equality, social justice and inclusion as critical geopolitics does, Kaplan (ibid) proposes that the focus should aim 'on what divides humanity rather than on what unites it, as the high priests of globalization would have it'. In other words realism for Kaplan is 'about recognizing and embracing those forces beyond our control that constrain human action—culture, tradition, history, the bleaker tides of passion that lie just beneath the veneer of civilization'. And indeed instead of asking the critical 'why' question, Kaplan (ibid) turns immediately to the political questions by posing what he calls the central question in foreign affairs: 'Who can do what to whom?' What divides us most and turns out to be the greatest 'unsavoury truth in which realism is rooted, the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic of all: Geography.'

This is a surprisingly different view from the critical viewpoint. Kaplan presents geography as revenge and as something definite that divides the world into a clear map of natural spaces. He brings geography back to what he calls its honoured position as formalized and distinct discipline in which 'politics, culture, and economics were often conceived of in reference to the relief map.' On this relief there were first and foremost the mountains and rivers before anything else. Then there were men who grow out of them that formed the first sequence of reality; ideas, however uplifting, came only second (Kaplan, 2009, 97).

Geography as deterministic factor in which men appear in particular places on the map serves according to Kaplan (ibid) 'to qualify human freedom and choice with a modest acceptance of fate'. In this context, fate has determined that particular people are born in particular places. In which their freedom seems limited by geography. Kaplan seems to suggest that it is almost impossible to escape fate and that migration or globalisation seems to have not succeeded in providing more freedom. He rather suggests that globalisation is reinforcing the importance of geography instead of changing it. He points out that 'mass communications and economic integration are weakening many states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting themselves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains, they are best explained by reference to geography' (Kaplan, 2009, 97). Kaplan doesn't link particular people in particular places (the notorious blut und boden as proposed by those who believe that a certain geographical zone belongs to a certain people with distinct values and characteristics), but rather situates fortunate and less fortunate people on the map, which for him is the principle of fate. The political future of the unlucky part of the world that is born in remote war zones or the dry deserts of Africa defined by

conflict and instability operates according to Kaplan under the deterministic logic of geography. Globalisation and the effects of the global financial crisis as well as fast population growth reveals the increasing relevance of geography even further in which the natural frontiers of the globe act as the only restraining borders in a world that is characterized by weakening and disintegrating social orders and other creations of humankind (Kaplan, 2009, 97). Therefore Kaplan's new map is of surprising simplicity in an otherwise complex world. In this new reality socially constructed (or artificial) borders will be contested and porous, leaving only the 'enduring facts of geography' (Kaplan, 2009, 102). His future scenario sketches the physical features of the landscape as the sole reliable guides left in the understanding of future conflict.

As Kaplan is senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security, his new map of the shatter zones of Eurasia is at the same time also a new map of security risks. Simon Dalby (2008, 421) has on a different occasion observed that security remains 'explained in terms of external threats issued from someplace beyond the sphere of political action to which military or political management strategies should be applied to impose solutions'. The geopolitical discourse is given in by the fact that the danger of a renewed enemy has to be found in the external world (for example in the shatter zones). According to Dalby, this way of seeing security is seen by nearly all 'security intellectuals' in Washington. In this security discourse Kaplan remarks that there is no peaceful map of the world. It is geography that divides the world forever in claustrophobic shatter zones that are an imminent security threat. As Kaplan (2009, 105) remarks 'this was always the case, and it is harder to deny now, as the ongoing recession will likely cause the global economy to contract for the first time in six decades. Not only wealth, but political and social order, will erode in many places, leaving only nature's frontiers and men's passions as the main arbiters of that age-old question: Who can coerce whom?' From the perspective of Kaplan and other deterministic geographers the security discourse of a threatening world full of remote and dangerous zones seems to be as strong as ever.

When returning to the recent call of critical political geographers of not shying away from engaging directly in bigger political questions, the observation learns that Kaplan has significantly more influence on the political decision making progress than most critical geographers. Kaplan is determined to spread liberal capitalism, but after the failure in Iraq and Afghanistan he comes to the conclusion that geography remains the main enemy of liberal capitalism to flow. His direct political engagement becomes clear in the final part of the article in which he advises the political centre in Washington that it is wise 'to look hard at the map for ingenious ways to stretch the limits it imposes, which will make any support for liberal principles in the world far more effective. Amid the revenge of geography, that is the essence of realism and the crux of wise policy making—working near the edge of what is possible, without slipping into the precipice' (Kaplan, 2009, 105). This is Kaplan's contribution of the limits of military intervention: Don't change what geography has decided to be instable and chaotic. Nonetheless, this surprisingly simple conclusion that is able to indicate complex lives, realties, contradictions and processes with just a dot on the map has found great support among policy makers in Washington.

In this simplified but nonetheless realistic world of policy makers and political advisors Kaplan (2009, 105) concludes by stating that 'geographical determinists must

be seated at the same honoured table as liberal humanists'. When we take into account that all hegemonic policy models including that of the European Union and its external policies towards the neighbouring countries, downscale the world into a simplified map, it might well explain the current frustration to translate critical geography into an alternative and transformative geopolitics that directly engage on the level of the political world. However, Kaplan suits the political discourse of policymakers for the reason that he 'speaks' a similar language. This particular geopolitical discourse is a completely different world in which 'practical use' is the key indicator. Critical voices seem, by their persistent questioning, not directly of 'practical' use, since they interrogate the logic of causal relations. This seems to be another explanation of why deterministic geographers like Kaplan engage easier with political visions especially since they are security oriented. However, Kaplan's article might well function as a call for critical geographers to push the boundaries and taboos by seeking new ways in bringing ideas and alternatives to the table while simultaneously continuing with unravelling the hidden geopolitical intentions of policy makers who are engaged in traditional geopolitics.

When taking this critique seriously it is important to note the words of Laitinen (2003, 27) when he remarks that critical geopolitics 'does not take for granted politics or scientific 'truths', but one does want to question the, often implicit, underlying assumptions which affect the way we understand the world and reality and accordingly relieve borders, space and security of the burdens of the Cold war in order to have a possibility for change'. Therefore, one of the gains of critical geopolitics is that it opened up a space for geographical diversity. The result might indeed be, as noted by Blomley, that contemporary geopolitics lost its ability to speak with one (traditional) voice, or with a distinct theoretical identity. As this theoretical overview has indicated contemporary geopolitics loosely shifts between contradictory critical concepts, realist and positivist concepts, border studies, post-modern critical geopolitics, governmentality and feminist insights that are simultaneously used. However, despite its diversity and contradictory status as discipline geopolitics and its sub-discipline critical geopolitics can nonetheless act as what Gerard O'Tuathail (1996, 173) famously described as 'a disturbing way of seeing that disrupts the framework of the hegemonic geopolitical eye that structures the seeing in contemporary foreign policy discourse'. I agree with Blomley (2006, 92) that critical geographers should seek for 'change not only through transformative insight but also through forms of progressive praxis' for the reason that they not only question the normative and dominant discourses, but also engage in transformative and alternative ways of seeing.

3 EUROPE – as Research Case

3.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENP

When descending to the level of geopolitics in Europe it is worth noticing that the complexities of policies concerning 'wider Europe' impose challenges related to traditional forms of geopolitics but at the same time demands a critical perspective. In order to grasp these challenges it is important to make a thorough diagnosis of the broader evolutional geopolitical context in which the ENP progressed. The remark has to be made that the first ideas of an external EU policy were advanced by the northern member states for some of the northern neighbours (as a follow up of the stronger historical and the northern dimension), but were soon sustained by the southern member states for their Mediterranean neighbours. Moreover, after 9/11 the awareness of possible security threats invoked a geopolitical re-thinking drawing from processes in the Arab neighbourhood (Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 30).

Following this, the European Neighbourhood Policy was primarily presented by the European Commission in 2003 in its communication titled 'Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours' (COM 2003 104 final) a progressive integration proposal for the countries bordering the European Union. After permission of the council, the communication was further worked out in a follow up called 'Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument' (COM 2003 393 final). These communications provided the basis for further discussions, communication and a series of Green and White papers resulting in progress reports in the autumn of 2003 and early 2004. In May 2004, the communication wrote a Strategy paper (COM (2004 373 final) and held exploratory talks with neighbouring states which were followed by country reports of the candidate states (SEC, 2004).

In November 2004 the commission wrote two proposals for the implementation of the Action Plans (COM (2004) 795 final) and the establishing of a European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (COM 2004 628 final). The first Action Plans were presented in December 2004 under responsibility of the Barroso Commission. Action plans are political documents based on the European Neighbourhood Policy framework and contain concrete tailor-made individual priorities, targets and policies agreed with partner states for the duration of at least three years with the option of renewal on mutual agreement and will draw on the legal basis set by the different existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and Association Agreements, such as the 1995 Barcelona Process (Speech/04/141). Action Plans can be regarded as the equivalent of the Copenhagen criteria for the candidate states mainly linked to domestic policy programs, with an endless list of criteria to be fulfilled. They outline in approximately 25 pages of commitments from both sides in various areas and issues (Speech/04/141) such as:

- 'Enhanced political co-operation in addressing common security threats and conflict prevention;'
- 'Economic reform and development, and a functioning market economy;'
- 'Issues relating to the internal market, including trade liberalisation, co-operation in areas such as energy, and transport;'
- 'Co-operation in the field of Justice and Home affairs;'
- 'Development of infrastructure networks and markets for energy, transport and telecommunications, and co-operation on the environment;'
- Policies to promote people-to-people contact, for instance in education, research and development, culture, and through the gradual opening-up of certain community programmes'.

A peculiar absent in the sum up of the Action Plans content is the prospect for liberation on the movement of persons (visas or migration), one of the four freedoms (freedom of movement, goods, services, capital and persons) (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 9). Moreover, a strong accent is placed on bilateral relations which Johansson-Nogues (2004, 224) describes as 'a step backwards' and continuing the pre-partnership condition of hub-and-spoke relations'.

Enhanced political co-operation, however, has so far not been a strong point of the EU and has never been profoundly activated through any clause in the various policies and agenda's. Therefore, the scope to concretely intervene in political transformation processes is heavily constrained by the fact that the Action Plans have been agreed on non-exploitational terms by both sides and are not defined in operational or legally binding terms (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 9). In this context the EU policies to support political and even societal transformation and reform will to a great extend rely on bilateral action of member states, the so called 'track 2' actions which are executed by NGOs, think-tanks and scientists supported by the EU, and finally technical assistance in the field of democracy, rule of law and civil society nexus where it is desired, provided by the EU (Jones and Emerson, 2005, 21).

Regional and transnational co-operation programmes addressed in the various Action Plans are facilitated through EU financing instruments, regulated through the European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI) and consist of nearly 12 billion Euro for the ENP region for the period 2007-2013. The ENPI incorporates all former geographical instruments promoting sub-regional and transnational co-operation are all governed by different regulations.

The INTEREGG instrument based on the European Union's structural funds is intended for cooperation between European Union regions and can currently not be used for projects at the external borders. The second contemporary instrument that is incorporated in the new ENPI is the PHARE CBC program focusing on sub-regional cooperation between current member states and candidate countries and co-operation among candidate states. The third instrument is the MEDA program. This financial program was created as a result of the 1995 Barcelona declaration and the EMP (Euro-Mediterranean partnership) and is focusing on closer relations between the European Union and its Mediterranean neighbouring states. Its objectives are supporting and providing assistance in the field of economic transition, regional integration and socio-economic development with a budget of 5,350 million Euros for the period 2000-2006

(Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 3). The EMP used to be one of the most advanced and strongest institutionalised of the EU's foreign policy partnerships based on socialisation, creating a network of cooperation with state and non-state actors across a remarkably range of policy areas, combined with a developmental agenda mainly focusing on poverty reduction, showing parallels with World Bank and IMF approaches (Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 20, Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 4). The integration of the Barcelona declaration in the ENP has, according to the EU, result in a of Euro-Med relations towards a system of 'positive conditionality' of rewards since past cooperation within the Barcelona Process has hardly led to create a greater extent of a shared understanding around democratic transformation and reform (most notably the ongoing failure of the Middle East Peace Process), and the southern member states were unwilling to apply active conditionality policies on their neighbours (COM 2005, Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 21, 33). The last financial instrument is the Tacis CBC program that facilitated projects on the eastern borders and the Northern Dimension of the EU particularly on the borders with Russia, Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine. These different programs and instruments are subjected to different complex procedures and according to the EU caused therefore difficulties to implement coherent projects between member states and neighbouring countries (COM 2003 393 final 6).

As a consequence, the ENPI is the main financing and operational instrument to support the implementation of the ENP and its Action Plans and has been invented to improve the coherence and simplicity of procedures by brining together the existing financing instruments and responsible for management in terms of programming, control, monitoring and evaluation (COM, 2005). Despite its explicitness, the exact conditions to determine the allocation of the ENPI remain unclear and are vaguely defined and a source for speculation. Moreover, ongoing uncertainty over the EU's future budget and the extensive lobby machines operating on behalf of the member-states limit the scope for specifying the incentives on offer (Jones and Emerson, 2005, 19). This speculation and vagueness indicate the immense bureaucratic machine concerning EU budgets and the actual funding processes. Preparation, reporting, evaluation again reporting cross-examination etc. all exemplify the un-user-friendly sources of funding and as the EU should stand for exploiting synergies and economies of scale, the EU's financial regulation head towards the wrong direction, leading to diseconomies of scale (Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 34).

A special new focus has been the attention for cross-border cooperation (CBC) projects and the development of integrated regional development within the ENPI. This can be seen as a strategy of bringing together regions of member states and neighbouring countries sharing a common border and developing in the words of the EU 'An area of good "neighbourliness" and the avoidance of the creation of new dividing lines' (COM 2004 628 final, 3). The main aim to achieve closer cross-border cooperation will be through promoting people-to-people contacts, community cooperation programmes in areas including youth, education, training, research, environment, culture and audio-visual via programs, projects and third party involvement. Action Plans will identify concrete openings for partner states to participate (COM 2004 373 final, 20). Regional cooperation initiatives so far have focused on common issues such as cooperation in the field of economics, business, employment and social policy. Examples are joint infrastructure in environmental projects, cooperation of chambers of commerce,

employment regulation, poverty reduction and management of pollution. Other areas of regional CBC cooperation are justice and home affairs focusing on migration issues, border management and visa regulation and people-to-people issues, aiming at stimulating civil society development, activities in the field of journalist and media exchange, academic and student exchange and cooperation in the field of culture, education, science and other societal organisation (COM 2004 373 final, 21).

The Three P's

The main features of the ENP are, according to the EU, the strengthening of the relations between the Union and its neighbouring states in order to create a prosperous and stable ring of friends around the European Union and to safeguard two of its strategic foreign policy priorities: avoiding short/medium-term further enlargement and how to manage the new external borders (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 241). The relation is not the same as it is between member states and candidate countries that are written under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The ENP countries are excluded from any medium and long-term accession and pre-accession processes. The main objective of the ENP is therefore to share the benefits of the countries within the EU to some extent with its neighbouring states. This is the chief interest of the EU itself as EU representatives write: 'Strengthening stability, security and well-being for all' and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines. Moreover, the EU offers its neighbouring states a variety of programmes and activities aiming at increasing cooperation on economic, political and social issues. However, in return for this offer neighbouring states have to commit to certain European values as the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and good neighbourly relations (COM 2004 795 final, 2). These new challenges and opportunities concerning the new neighbourhood as the EU them observes are centred on three P's; Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty.

Proximity

Proximity relates to the geographical dimension of 'nearness' to the Union reflected through close associations and partnerships based on historical links and common values. However, in practice, geographical proximity relates to issues typified as the management of the external border, which aims on the one hand to promote cultural links and cross border cooperation and on the other hand management in combating mutual security threats. In the interest of the EU 'border management' suggests that it is security orientated, but formulated in a way that it emphasizes the positive aspects of relations with the involved neighbouring states. Therefore, security is defined by cooperation in various policy fields, including economic and social development and pursuing transnational cooperation. Or, in the words of Emerson (2004, 16), cooperation in the sense that the new members of the EU 'become special friends and mentors of selected neighbourhood partners and states or regions'. In this sense the European Union is creating a political understanding that has been built on the interdependence of economic, political and social/cultural concerns (Scott, 2005). The addressing of a 'zone of security' around the EU has been encouraged by the Seville European Council in 2002 and made concrete in the European Security Strategy adopted at the Brussels European Council in December 2003 (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 241). This more formal politics is revealed through 'securitisation'. This concept is related to

various issues, concerning cooperation in the fields of justice and home-affairs, for example the institutionalization of efficient 'border management' in securing the European Union against terrorism, preventing drug smuggling, human trafficking and controlling illegal immigration (COM 2003 393 Final).

Prosperity and Poverty

The other challenges and opportunities concerning the new neighbourhood reflect on issues like prosperity and poverty. By addressing these challenges the EU clearly regards its neighbouring states as economically less developed or developing countries (COM 2004 628 final). The EU has a clear interest in addressing the root causes of economic vulnerability, political instability, institutional deficiencies, poverty and social exclusion to prevent political and economic destabilisation and political confrontation (COM, 2003 104 final). Consequently, as the European Neighbourhood Policy is beginning to get its shape, economic integration, sustainable development and the acceleration of economic growth of the neighbourhood becomes most notably the important issue on the EU's agenda for the coming years. In tackling the root causes the EU seeks to provide its neighbours with increased financial and technical assistance, improvement of the investment climate and foresee privileged trade relations by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and indirectly bringing the neighbouring states closer to the EU's economic model (COM 2004 373 final). Although the EU mentions the neighbouring countries as partners, the improvements of economic conditions and the connected benefits will not be implemented via the principle of equal dialogue but more as an offer to accept; as the actual delivery of reimbursements require implementation of agreed measures, structural reforms and policies not only based on capital movements liberalisation but also policies that address poverty and financing (COM 2004 373 final).

3.2 TRANSITIONAL EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS

The main objective behind the Neighbourhood policy suggests a certain security-orientated direction when taking the evolution of the ENP into account. The more traditional geopolitical orientated policies are formulated in a way that they emphasise the positive aspects of relations with the involved neighbouring states. In the vast anthology of European Union discourse contextualized in documents, papers and communication on the ENP the terms and language used have been carefully chosen and contains diplomatic narrative built on mediating bridge building axiom (with references to democratizing, the rule of law, modernization and transformation from within) in order to avoid any neo-imperial hegemonic suspicion and providing a normative foundation that can be found in the Kantian notion of eternal peace. But it is the in between lines however, that articulate ambiguous proprietary and realpolitik connotations as expressed in the use of the term interest in the internally policy based representations (Emerson, 2002, 13). This opens the discussion how the ENP must be interpreted when it proclaims of 'sharing everything with the Union but institutions', by meaning that through regulations and commitments European values are shared with neighbours in what Emerson (2004, 1) calls 'Europeanization' beyond the traditional western Europe.

The term 'Europeanization' appeared first at the European Summit in Copenhagen in 1993 in order to define accession criteria for candidate states before entering the EU, and has turned out to be a major motivation for candidate states to imply economic reforms and political transformation (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 11). 'Europeanization' of the continent's periphery is what Emerson (2004, 2) describes as 'combining rational institutionalism through policies of conditionality, and sociological institutionalism through norm diffusion and social learning' and are made concrete in the ENP framework as democracy, good governance, the respect for human rights and minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, rule of law, and the principles of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development in order to start or speeding up the 'Europeanization' process in the EU's 'ring of friends'. Consequently, 'Europeanization' can be understood as a normative process of hooking up with modern European norms and values through the interaction of three dynamics which can in their turn be divided into two complementing processes: conditionality and socialisation' (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 4);

• The legal binding norms of the EU for democracy and human rights
• Transformation of objective interests of enterprises and individuals due to increasing integration
• Transformation of subjective values and identities and the societal level

Rational institutional changes (conditionality) may occur within short or medium term when countries accept the legal obligations via the signing of Action Plans that have been classified by Prodi as the 'Copenhagen proximity criteria' a sort of Acquis for neighbouring countries. Consequently, through economic and political transformation and reform and the closer relationship with the EU objective changes can be seen as one of the mechanism of 'Europeanization'. Emerson and Noutcheva (2005, 14, 15) identify three broad categories of conditionality: (1) Normal sectorial policy conditionality, which relate to every category of incentive offered to partner states involving all traditional sorts of aid and trade policies such as macro-economic aid, program aid, trade concessions and internal market access. Individual priorities are defined in the different Action Plans. (2) Negative conditionality – from sanctioning, shaming, and war, may not be totally inappropriate for the 'encouraging' policies of the ENP, for example in the case of Belarus where authoritarian president Lukashenko and his parliament is not welcome anymore in the EU and his financial balances have been frozen after widespread fraud and intimidation. Sanctions may eventually encourage change and may be in strategic interest for the EU in order to act as a unanimous political entity. (3) Positive conditionality and incentives into overdrive aim at achieving overarching policy inducements in order to offer extra financial and technical support to partner states that are willing to reform faster and deeper, mostly partner states with eventual membership aspirations or with strong political and societal interests towards the EU (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005, 14, 15).

But as positive conditionality remains unclear and not always credible in order to enforce or allow for a strong and strict process, socialization might well be its stronger brother. Subjective behavioural changes (socialisation) which are more deeply rooted and contextualised through identity, culture, ideas and convictions are less subjected for short-term transformation, and it will only be through the success of institutional

transformation, than in the long run societal transformation will succeed only if civil society in the involved countries is willing to adopt European values, norms and politics and thus fits itself into further 'Europeanization' (Emerson, 2004, 2). This can be reached through the idea to explain in a friendly manner what the EU's model of governance is and to recommend that partner states learn about it and eventually hook up with it, in this the proximity and attractiveness of the EU is of importance since socialization worked well with an eventual membership promise (the 'return to Europe' idea) but could in this case be perceived as an aggressive form of foreign policy and imply counterproductive tendencies especially in the Arab neighbourhood (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005, 16).

The process of expanding 'Europeanization' to its neighbourhood and beyond the candidate states is a model based on what the Brussels think-tank CEPS calls the geopolitics of 'soft-power' that the EU applies as a strategic instrument and which has a strong normative democratic essence, and simultaneously relates to the empowerment of EU institutions (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005,1). It makes effective use of its democratic quality and reputation and the attractiveness of its open market and highly developed democracies in their intention to develop liberal engagement (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005, 20). The willingness of neighbouring states to join or be part of this liberal democratic centre depends on its proximity and openness. When economic and political integration into the centre is possible and not completely restricted by closed borders but by a certain freedom of movement, shared border management, visa regulation etc. then the process can become one of conditionality with commitments to be made on the high standards of liberal democracy whereby further progress and ongoing politico-economic transition and reform will be rewarded with deeper inclusion into the core of the democratic centre and consequently the borders of the internal and external can be softened (Emerson, 2004, 5). However, as Emerson (2002) observes, there are existential threats to be curbed, when keeping in mind the contemporary fear of international terrorism, and therefore ENP geopolitics associates in a sense also to a more hard-line kind of security politics. This more hard form of politics is revealed through 'securitisation'. This concept is related to various issues, concerning cooperation in the fields of justice and home-affairs, for example the institutionalisation of efficient border management in securing the European Union against terrorism, preventing drug smuggling, human trafficking and controlling illegal immigration (COM, 2003 393 Final). Moreover, securitisation according to EU documents means the prevention of political and economic destabilisation and political confrontation. These policies are extensively worked out in the various Action Plans and enable the EU to classify the neighbourhood into different zones (for example the zones of concern typified by weak state structures, democratic deficits or organised cross border crime). Progress is measured and defined clarified by the following quotations: 'overall the pace of reforms has slowed particularly in democratic reforms and human rights standards' (COM 188/3 (2009), 2). And: 'the overall lack of progress on governance issues observed in 2008 underlines the need for the EU and its partners to redouble their efforts, both with intensified political dialogue and with tailored assistance, including the Governance Facility which remains an important political incentive' (COM 188/3 (2009), 11).

But the contradiction between 'soft' and 'hard' power seemingly have lead to a series of problems; the 'soft power' strategy worked wonderfully well with the can-

didate states in the immediate proximity of the EU and with long geo-historical ties to the democratic centre of the EU. This is different for the wider Europe countries. As soon as the wider Europe initiative got into construction the first critical comments and resistances floated to the surface. Critical voices argued that the EU now had defined its very own empire like cosmos creating its own 'Schmittean grossraum'. In broader terms the EU's Wider Europe intention was understood by its critics as a reaction on the enlargement process, whereby its power weakened with every 'concentric circle' further away from its epicentre of Brussels (see for example Aalto 2002, 144), or in other terms a subversive 'empire' like core-periphery model. These circles represent a hierarchy of categories, qualified by the character of the affiliation with the EU: the newly accessed candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) the future candidates (Balkans), the European neighbours that aspire membership (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia and Armenia), the Mediterranean neighbours with no accession prospective (Tunisia, Morocco), Turkey with a separate status and Russia with its special strategic partnership. What this seems to suggest is that the higher the hierarchy, the more dominated by the Copenhagen Criteria and the execution hands of Brussels' 'conditionality machine' (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 29). Emerson (2003, 4) calls this the 'cobweb system' of concentric circles around the leading power, Brussels, as with around every circle a system of multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations with Brussels. The 'Rubik cube system' can be added as a second system representing the strategic partnership with Russia, representing multiple leading centres.

The significance of both securitisation and cooperation and partnership is in itself paradoxical and can be seen as a possible source of concern (I have explained this in the introduction). The paradox of Wider Europe is expressed by competing validations for establishing a neighbourhood of stability, prosperity and security, made visible in various policies regarding migration issues, visa regimes, citizenship issues and access to labour markets. Besides, the thin line between membership and partnership is controversial. Countries on the eastern edge of Europe like Ukraine, Belarus and the southern Caucasus have no prospects of joining the European Union in the foreseeable future. Former colonial countries with strong socio-economic and political ties to Europe, like Morocco and Tunisia have never been considered serious candidates for future EU membership. Therefore, barriers of exclusion (be it political, cultural or social) operate parallel with partnership policies of inclusion aiming at economic, political and social development and creating a zone of prosperity (Scott, 2005).

The process faced with internal contradictions is holding back the EU's particular role. One possible explanation can be found in the contradictions that are related to certain geopolitical sensitivities of the individual member states (See box below). These sensitive issues reflect subjective syndromes like different proximities and historical processes with various involved states and partners and conflicting visions of Europe, its direction and worldviews. Traditional state-centred geopolitics still play an important role in this, since northern and southern member states have different economic and political and ideological 'tactical' agendas concerning their immediate neighbourhood, for example, on issues related to the opening of markets, critical comments of neighbours' democratic performances, post-colonial sensitivities and the aversion to enforce political conditionality (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 22, 30). One of the recent tactical differences concern the aim of the ENP, where the northern and new

eastern member states regard the ENP as a framework to ensure closer cooperation with European states in the east that are currently without any short-term perspective on membership, while the southern member states are pushed for more inclusion and ongoing integration within the southern Mediterranean both camps strongly differ on financial sources and other funding resources (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 23). These contradictory visions make it difficult for the EU to obtain a democratic foreign policy agenda based on promoting democracy and at the same time 'Europeanization' (Emerson, Aydin et.al. (2005,1). For some this stagnating process provides a source for conventional wisdom about the EU's international impotence (Aalto, 2002, 144).

The geopolitical differences of member states with regard to the ENP may well be related to the deepest institutional tension affecting the foreign policies of the EU and that are the geopolitical visions of the EU itself; to prioritize Europe's power and identity and to bring further enlargement to a complete stop, or the extension of European Democracy up to 30 or 40 member states. Parallel on this cleavage are arguments concerning the ungovernability of the EU and its cultural identity (particularly with regard to Turkey and the inclusion of a large Muslim population). So far the ENP can be seen as a continuation of the cleavage status-quo since EU political western-liberal values are prominently featured in the ENP and Action Plans which the involved neighbours leave them little more than to apply voluntary to the near Copenhagen Criteria and with that the EU neither shuts nor opens the accession door (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 31, 32).

Several syndromes and cleavages among the EU's member states
Preferences from geography • North prefers North • South prefers South
Sensitivities of former colonial powers: • France and Spain towards the Maghreb • Austria towards the Balkans
Sensitivities of the formerly colonized or occupied • Baltic and Central European states towards Russia
Sensitivities from World War II • Germany towards Israel and Russia
Alternative European visions • A united democratic Europe • A powerful, controllable core Europe
Alternative World Views New Europe Atlanticism Old Europe Gaullism

Source: (Emerson, Aydin et.al. (2005, 6)

Figure 3: Several syndromes and cleavages

3.3 SCHOLARLY CONSIDERATIONS ON EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS

In the context of an emerging European geopolitics, it is important to note how the EU's role as a geo-political institution has been conceptualised within the state of the scholarly debate, in order to define its geopolitical steps within the broader discipline of geography. The section interferes upon two dominant assumptions among scholars and experts of geopolitical processes within the European Union that take into consideration the changing circumstance of the transformation of European borders.

1.) The first geopolitical assumption centres on the idea that the EU is in a continuous pragmatic process of ordering its geopolitical space through defining itself, its neighbours, and its complex multilateral and bilateral relations. Moreover, it is in an ongoing interactive negotiation process in which the EU itself is changing through enlargement and developing relations with its neighbours and consequently emphasizing the 'post-national' connotation of the non-fixity of the borders of Europe (Scott, 2005, 434, Aalto, 2002, 150). This scholarly debate seeks answers to the changes taking place within European geopolitics in the shift from Hobbessian state-centred debates to a European project of different scales and multi-layers as has been discussed in the previous section. For example, Jan Zielonka (2001) has contributed to this debate by expressing the evolution of a new European Framework. It is this debate that focuses on the growing dominance of the European entity on political, economic and cultural issues. This so called 'post-Westphalian' notion of Europe centres on a changing Europe and challenges the state as a sovereign control centre. This model of overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements and multiple identities focussing on interdependencies have been taken over by many other scholars. Interpretations of the concept used to capture these debates vary from 'post-modern' to 'post-national', questioning singular identity politics and theorising the upcoming Europe of multiple decision making centre's and multiple layers of scale (Among them the groundbreaking work in this field by Diez (2002), Emerson (2002, 2005), Zielonka (2001) and Paasi (2002, 2001, 1996).

Thomas Diez (2002, 7-9) in particular gives several careful motivations for his idea of Europe as a 'post-national polity'. The first is that the EU allows for multiple representations. Sub-national regional entities have their own voice, for example in various councils, as long as they are authorised to do so on behalf of the entire member state, which allows for a multi-tier structure. The second reason is that within the EU, sovereignty is not seen as an absolute concept. EU regulations undermine any absolute ideas about internal sovereignty. The third reason is that the EU can foster a sense of multiple identities. The notion of shared sovereignty goes hand in hand with the acknowledgement of multiple identities and co-ownership. The process of 'Europeanization' can be regarded as an additional form of citizenship. Argument number four is that special EU funds can be utilised to undermine borders. According to Diez (2002 7-9), reducing the significance of borders between member-states has always been a core ethos of European integration. The last motivation is that transition periods and deregulations have in the past demonstrated the EU's sensitivity to community identities. The intention of 'wider Europe' in promoting shared values and prosperity and avoiding new lines of division and exclusiveness is present in this

scholarly debate, however to speak of the notion of a new emerging post-Westphalian geopolitics of inclusiveness and corresponding agendas of moving away from traditional nation-states remains ambiguous.

Within this 'post-national' empirical context of the ENP the EU has been defined through the conceptual concept of 'geopolitical subjectivity' as described by political scientist Pami Aalto in his 2002 publication in Geopolitics. In this the EU is conceptualized as geopolitical 'subject' instead of 'agent' or 'actor', since subject leaves space for both the ability to act and at the same time to abstain from acting in another particular context and therefore allowing for third party subjects to recognize the EU as both an able and legitimate subject and as an internally weak constitution of subjectivity not wanting the EU to respond through any goal-orientated action in particular situations (Aalto, 2002, 148). Aalto classifies this 'geopolitical subjectivity' as a process of ordering. He defines it in the following way: 'goal orientated ordering of territories and political spaces, extending from one's own sphere of sovereign rule to broader regional contexts' (Aalto, 2002, 148). Aalto structures his 'geopolitical subjectivity' framework on the notion that Gerard O'Tuathail and John Agnew (1992/2005) make on geopolitics and discourse in understanding the complex processes around contemporary geopolitical processes as the EU, which itself consist of a multifaceted interplay between various actors, institutions and discourses. Aalto's 'geopolitical subjectivity' brings together four theses defined by O'Tuathail and Agnew (1992/2005, 81, 82) on conceptualizing critical geopolitics. The first thesis they opt is formal geopolitical reasoning by strategic thinkers and public intellectuals which are professionally embedded into civil society producing a complex codified system of formalized ideas and principles to channel the performances of statecraft. The second is practical geographical reasoning based on discourse that depends on narratives and binary distinctions constructed through societal folklore that gives meaning to places, performed and made operational by politicians and political leaders. The third thesis is the production, reproduction and modification of geopolitical reasoning by media, education and others through a cross transfer of geopolitical, geographical knowledge and reasoning and the common sense meaning of both. The last thesis the authors use is the operation of geopolitical reasoning in the world-system and how influence and power is represented by competition for hegemony in the international political space.

In this meta-concept of 'geopolitical subjectivity' the EU member states have remained the principles based on recognition of geopolitical interdependence (Scott, 2005, 433). The Commission and the Council's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy have been the agents of the principles and thus representing the inter-subjective geopolitical character of the union, of whom the council's High Representative has the least institutional power as he is the tightest controlled agent (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 32). Thus, the EU's capacities to portray itself as a geopolitical subject depends to a large extend on its member states' recognition of this connotation. Yet, the EU can be best regarded as an unfinished and ongoing construction process that among other things takes the form of a geopolitical subject; not necessarily subjectivity represented simultaneously by all member states. In some cases the EU has the ascendancy; in other situations or circumstances only the most powerful member states have it (Aalto, 2002, 155).

From this definition three associations can be made with the EU/ENP strategy. The first connection is that ordering is always goal-orientated in means and aims of creating a certain desirable social and material relation. In the case of the rational goal behind the ENP ordering can be seen as extending the 'EU order' via the process of 'Europeanization' instrumentalised through social learning and other forms of socialization that are aimed at promoting and stimulating democracy and European values in order to increase its security interests and to avoid political confrontation and destabilizing regional conflicts (Scott, 2005, 435, Aalto, 2002, 149). These two goals always feature in the discourse, and in the long run democracy and security are viewed as being almost synonymous (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 32).

The second connection Aalto describes, relates to the fact that EU ordering practices allow for different spatial geopolitical contextualizations and multi-tier structures. The EU's concentric core-periphery 'cobweb system'/ Rubik cube system' which extends from its core old-Europe to new-Europe and 'wider Europe including Russia and with every category of circles a different complex set of systems of multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations with Brussels. These relations are contextualized in the different existing financing instruments, programs and regulations responsible for management, financing, programming, controlling, monitoring and evaluating. These more regional programs allow geopolitical subjects to vary from non-sovereign sub national, national or trans national groups to states and state actors that are able to order their spheres of influence and their immediate neighbourhood as well (Aalto, 2002, 149).

The third EU/ENP connection deriving from the 'geopolitical subjectivity' definition is power, which is contextualized through positive and negative conditionality, which is another aspect of the 'Europeanization' process. Negative power refers to sanctions or eventually to military action, but can also be understood as a counterproductive conditionality as the eventual outcome of the tight criteria for the different Action Plans may turn out to have a negative effect on partner states since the ultimate rewards will not lead to EU membership. Positive conditionality may be reached through the mutual character of the Action Plans as well as the EU offer for additional financial and practical support to partner states that are willing to reform faster and dive deeper into European values (Aalto, 2002, 149). In this third connection the commission has become the agent that has been acquiring such extensive mandates and instruments of action that it partly turned into a principal of its own in the promotion and execution of the 'conditionality machine' (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005,32).

The ambiguity regarding the 'geopolitical subjectivity' of the EU stands out in the major contradictions that result from tension between formal 'Realpolitik' emphasized by policies of conditionality and socialization on the one hand and everyday simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion on the other (Scott, 2005, 445). This relates to the fact that geopolitical discourses and subsequent policies refer to a sufficient degree of institutionalization that enables effective implementation. The problem however, is that the 'geopolitical subjectivity' of the various EU/national/non-national institutions putting forth formal, practical and popular geopolitical discourses are competing and not coherent. This is emphasised by the fact that the ENP on the one hand allows for securitisation, which means the prevention of political and economic destabilisation and political confrontation, tight border regimes and strict visa and migration regula-

tion and police control (critics would speak of 'Fortress Europe') and at the same time a politics of cooperation and dialogue with joint ownership, a stake in the internal EU market and common European values (Scott, 2005, 445). The significance of both securitisation and cooperation is in itself paradoxical and can be seen as a possible source of concern. The paradox of Wider Europe is expressed by competing objectives for establishing a neighbourhood of stability, prosperity and security. The EU has not a good record when its comes to formal geopolitics and its institutions lack a coherent tool-box and mandate to effectively order its influence spheres. Consequently the contradiction of securitisation versus cooperation within the ENP will not be sorted out without leading to new and forms of inclusion and exclusion.

In line with this, the second dominant assumption in theorizing the evolutional geopolitics of the EU focuses on the idea that it is highly unlikely that a supranational overlapping European Union identity will replace national identities and recognise the ambiguity towards the objectives of the European Union's notion of wider Europe. Agnew (2001, 2005), Amin (2003), Böröcz and Kovacs (2001), Brenner (2000) Pickels (2005), Minca (2003, 2005), Hakli and Kaplan (2002) Kramsch (2006a and 2006b) Engel-Di Mauro, 2006; Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006), Newman and Paasi, 1998), Mitchell (1997), Paasi (2001), Scott (2009, 2005), Scott and van Houtum (2009), Sparke (2002, 2000), Swyngedouw (2010, 2000) are among these scholars. Their concerns are far more focused on the traditional geopolitical motivations of the EU. Here the territorial ambitions of the EU are considered problematic and reflect on the strengthening of the external borders and the consequences for neighbouring states. The critiques of these scholars seem mainly based on a different notion of sovereignty in the contextual meaning of Europe, not the subsidiary version of sovereignty stands central in their critiques but the notion of Empire (empire as featured in the 2000 homonymous book by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt) as process at work in Europe became the main theorized focus in the critique. Through this perspective, 'post-National' connotations applied to an understanding of cross-border dynamics have become increasingly problematic, allowing EU member states to subject themselves voluntarily to supra-national authorities, while maintaining completely heterogeneous attitudes with respect to traditional aspects of sovereignty (border management, migration issues, monetary policies and military alliances) and consequently the exclusive analytical focus on socially constructed representations of nationalising self/other relations (Boedeltje et al. 2006, 33).

Against this background Luiza Bialasiewitcz et al. (2009, 83) recently mentioned the growing belief among European elites that Europe can actually be made or at least reshaped. In particular, the term neighbour/neighbourhood/wider Europe has gained much attention in critical debate. And, although Europe and the EU are two different concepts, they increasingly seem connected, interchanged and even confused, which makes the question of 'what Europe actually is—or is not—an urgent one. This mix of different connotations of Europe and the often misleading distinction between the metaphors Europe and the European Union (EU) have not remained unnoticed by political geographers.

The gradual confusion about the status of Europe was already noticed in the mid 1980s. It was Roger Lee (1985) who wrote about the distinctions between experienced, structural and institutional versions of Europe. The major questions that arose out of this discussion are, in a way, how the institutional version of Europe (as represented

by the EU) has surpassed the structural and experienced versions of Europe. Lee suggested that the institutional version of Europe tempts to exclude local and historical elements or at best solely seen as abstractions that have lost all their social content.

Recently James Anderson et al. (2009, 86) have rightly observed that the European Union is not the same as Europe. He added: 'Too much is claimed for it', making the metaphors 'misleadingly self-congratulatory'. According to another distinguished political geographer John Agnew the misleading distinction is based on the mixing-up of the 'idea' Europe and 'project' Europe. The 'idea' refers to subjective State construction. It operates through the canonization of history supported by imaginations of feeling, belonging and identity. 'Project' Europe, on the other hand, refers to politics in which formal treaties between states have led to the European economic common space and eventually to the partnership of today. 'Project' Europe is regulated, formalized and can be traced. As any other organization, it has 'founding fathers'. Schumann and Monet are regarded as those who made the EU possible (Agnew, 2005, 578). It is important to remark that 'project' Europe as a partnership based on multilateral cooperation made no claims on geographical or historical togetherness (see also Boedeltje and van Houtum forthcoming, 2011). In line with this Bialasiewicz and Minca (2005) once suggested that many scholars working on the European project depart from the meaning that the European Union provided and what it constructed made sense to them and thus might confuse the connotations and claims about Europe.

Implicit in all these question remains whether the EU can succeed in establishing a flexible politics based on mutuality and local concern through a system of multilateral and bilateral multi-tier dialogue rather than one of top-down, hard 'empire-like' security orientated self-interest through a one-sided tight conditionality machine and a politics inspired by an internally orientated security rationale. In other words, will according to the critics a regionalized, decentralized EU prevail over the 'empire' like core-periphery EU.

3.4 CONSIDERING CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

After analyzing the conceptual and evolutional transition of European geopolitics within the broader context of the study of geopolitics, I read an important and ongoing role for critical geography and the sub-discipline of critical geopolitics. The critical approaches as reflected by respected political geographers like Laikinen, Aalto, Scott, Agnew and others are indeed valuable critiques on European geopolitics of the past decade and reflect the complex, heterogeneous and confusing idea of a contemporary Europe that cannot be fitted in a simple policy or definition: A Europe of complexity instead of generalization.

The example of the European Neighbourhood Policy seems to indicate that the current status of Europe relates increasingly to a complex singularity inspired by the rather Eurocentric belief that the neighbouring states can be 'Europeanized' (the promotion of particular European values like democracy, market economy, minority/human rights etc.) through a fuzzy mix of traditional and alternative geopolitical methods such as conditionality and socialization without the prospective of becoming EU members. Moreover, its subjective status keeps on allowing confusing policies

and practices of simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion. These transitions have provoked an appeal for a different and more critical geopolitics (O'Tuathail, 2010, Anonsich, 2009, Hyndman, 2010). The duality between the generalizing policies and the often contradicting local realities seem to have a disturbing effect not only on neighbouring states but also on Europe itself, torn between John Agnew's 'idea' and 'project' and the geopolitical randomness of Pami Aalto's concept of geopolitical subjectivity. The tensions between on the one hand a generalizing 'EU-topia' and on the other hand a heterogeneous 'heterotopias' arising from the gap between political imaginations and empirical reality are embodied by the question where the ideal version of Europe ends, and where it begins.

From my own point of view I share the belief that it is highly unlikely that a supranational overlapping European Union identity will replace national identities. In fact, I believe that the new external policy is not so much an example of overlapping European identities but far more an ordinary copy of national identities transported to 'wider Europe'. In this sense traditional geopolitics is still very much alive in Europe. By copying the Hobbesian nation-state model onto the neighbouring state, the EU seems not very keen of take away the worries of those who believe that the EU is building a new empire. I believe that critical geographers are in the positions to take into account the contradictory circumstances of European geopolitics by confronting European geopolitics with its own simplicity, contradictions and fuzziness. In this perspective, Jennifer Hyndman (2010, 317) remarks how difficult it is to speak outside normative discourse when taking into account that hegemonic discourse tempts to consider normal people as 'right-bearing liberal subjects who are part of a discourse of universal principles'. But, despite this difficult task, this dissertation reflects the question of how critical geopolitics could function as resistance to dominant discourse by means of foreseeing scenarios that reflect the daily lives of people across Europe affected by European geopolitics. I believe that critical geographers are in the positions to take into account the changing circumstances of European geopolitics by engaging the political as spaces of resistance, places that resist the dominant state-centred narratives that subvert reality and that confront politics with their own homogeneity. It is inherent to the discipline of critical geopolitics that it has provided a progressive ('radical') space for political geographers in exploring different directions away from geography that helped to establish a rich and creative literature on the resistance to dominant and hegemonic political visions. These shifts indicate that critical geopolitics of Europe today have fewer answers, but raises more questions instead. In that powerful change where questions become more important than answers, I will follow a critical grounded geographical approach that takes the lives of people that are constituted through a specific normative discourse either because of their deviant character and 'otherness' or their specific place in society as central focus. I believe that critical geopolitics should be able to open up contesting political representations by seeing people beyond their constituted political classifications as European and non-European, neighbour, immigrant, good or bad. As O'Tuathail (2010, 2) remarked earlier, this way of seeing indeed 'disaggregates rather than homogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather than globalizes analysis and explanation'. It is here that an integer interpretation of complex lives of people can be a powerful means to make a difference.

4 Homogeneous Europe: EU-TOPIA

4.1 THE FABRICATION OF EU-TOPIA

As the previous chapters have clarified, the implications of the geopolitical ambiguity in European geopolitics are particularly represented in two divergent imaginary visions of Europe. As mentioned in the research objective these are: EU-topia (the homogeneous political view as represented in EU policies, discourses and practices) and Heterotopia (the heterogeneous view from below). The subsequent chapters investigate both visions in order to grasp the 'nature' of the paradox of simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion in European geopolitics.

Although the idea of EU-topia is, to some extent, present in policies and practices, it originates on the level of ideology. Not so much in its traditional banal meaning, but more embodied by the 'fabrication' of a symbolic idea. This next chapter makes a careful analysis of the construction of the EU-topia. How it foresees a distinct future for Europe and how it foresees its ideal. Although, the question of what Europe is – or should be – fits the characteristics of a utopian vision, it nonetheless appears in a rather clear political vision by the European Union. Gail Lewis (2006, 89) has written an interesting article on what she calls 'the symbolic struggle over what it means to be European, where Europe begins and ends, who can stand for and be of Europe and the European (who) has assumed a far-reaching intensity'. Her perspective of Europe is interesting from the point of view of seeing Europe as both an ideological idea and an idea that has exceeded itself in the projection of an idealistic political project (the EU). She specifies the idea more on the side of ideology. In this context the ideal Europe functions as a 'symbolic construct organizing individual and collective imaginings as to Europe's peoples, behaviours, morality, world-views, institutional forms and geographical borders' (Lewis 2006, 91). The exceeding ideological idea is reflected in the political project in which a 'zone' is constructed. This European zone is materialized in an active bordering regime in which active lines of demarcation mark the end and the beginning of Europe. From this perspective, which to some extent has been described by Aalto (2002) as 'geopolitical subjectivity', there seems to be a general belief among certain European elites of the existence of a symbolic basis of a particular Europe, on which policies are based (European Union).

The fabrication of the symbolic is particularly reflected in two examples. The first example relates to an event that occurred in 2007. That particular year in many ways was a milestone for the European Union as it celebrated its 50th anniversary. The celebrations marked the fifty years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, which among European elites is regarded as the beginning of the EU. This celebration was decorated by a whole series of events and projects during 2007 and 2008. Examples of the celebrations were the introduction of Europe day and a

series of European branding events 'Europe in your pocket', 'Euro visions', 'destination Europe', 'Europe in-transit', 'upload your Europe', 'getting on the European train', 'Your Europe Your future', 'Setting Europe to Music', 'Europeans take the Stage', 'United in Europe', 'How Erasmus changed my life', 'Imaging Europe', 'Europe a Cultural Commonwealth', 'From Common Market to People's Europe', 'European art knows no boundaries', 'On the Frontline of Democracy' etc. One special element of this commonness is expressed in the special logo that has been designed particularly for this extraordinary occasion. The design of the logo cannot hide the forced character of the whole enterprise. The word in Anglo-Saxon, the German umlaut on the O and the French accent aigu on the E insist that we should not forget the limited diversity of Europe, of which it is so proud. Obvious the word together, emphases its dialectic antonym alone and individually because between all the languages, accents, regions and colours, he is called to become consume®.

In this way philosopher Slavoj Zizek (2005, IR, 241) speaks of a 'fantasmatic spectre' that fills the gap between the imaginations and empirical reality with images fantasises, symbols and appearances that represent a certain politics. Here Europe has become a product or a brand, which can be desired. There is a rich tradition of authors referring to the fabrication of meaning across various academic disciplines. For example French philosopher Alain Badiou (2005, 2006) refers to Europe as endless multiplicity filled with meaning and substance. In his philosophy, Europe can never be presented as a single entity because it can never exclude anything that is also Europe. As soon as Europe is fabricated, it is closed to any alternative vision. In this perspective, the brand Europe always remains an entity filled with a selective interpretation. Badiou (2005, 2006) continues by referring to a contemporary capital ideology behind today's western politics. Although capitalism consequently denies itself as ideology, for him, it has presented itself in two ways. The first is the appearance of an economic moral on which European politics is based. Humanitarian interventions (for example conditionality politics towards EU neighbouring states) are justified in name of neo-liberal values. Second is the totality of this ideology, exemplified by the domination of the economy and the limited space for alternative ideas. From the neo-liberal viewpoint, alternatives that do not follow the logics of capitalism are among many economists and most politicians considered utopian. The ideological motivation is given in by maintaining its market economy competitive.

In a different context, Etienne Balibar discussed the difficulties of a single fabricate called Europe. Balibar (2009, 210) recently termed Europe `borderland Europe', starting with the idea that a political space could (and perhaps should) be imagined in terms of overlapping open regions. In which he furthermore suggests that the interior and exterior are no longer entirely separable. For him Europe as 'borderland' is the name of an imagined place where the opposites flow into one another and where the internal and the external have moved beyond and within European soil. Moreover, Balibar (2009, 209, 207) remarks that 'a great deal in the future of Europe as a "community of citizens" depends on whether and to what extent the mass of citizens in Europe will have access to this practice which represents their real "common' idiom"' instead of a symbolic fabrication based on selective historical connotations. With access Balibar means to what extent this idiom is translatable (in which he remarks that linguistic difference has become one of the most sensitive marks of 'collective identity'.)

Zygmunt Bauman wrote extensively on Europe, which he once called an 'unfinished adventure'. Bauman (2000, 87) remarks that in neo-liberal dominated societies like Europe, identities are increasingly fluid. He remarks that 'the loose, "associative" status of identity, the opportunity to "shop around", to pick and shed one's "true self", to "be on the move", has come in present day consumer society to signify freedom. Consumer choice is now a value in its own right; the activity of choosing matters more than what is being chosen, and the situations are praised or are censured, enjoyed or resented depending on the range of choices on display'. Europe is filled with products, being itself a product, a brand, a desire. Bauman (2004, 2/4): Like all facts of the matter, Europe is expected, in defiance of everything that made it what it has become, to be a reality that could (should?) be located, taken stock of and filed. In an age of territoriality and territorial sovereignty, all realities are presumed to be spatially defined and territorially fixed - and Europe is no exception. Neither is the "European character", nor the "Europeans" themselves.'

This in a sense relates to the geography of desire as mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari. In Anti-Oedipus (1983), the authors take 'the production of desire as a (…) primary force, a free-floating energy, immanent and unconscious, uniting nature with humans conceptualized as "desiring machines". (…) Desire is a dynamic machine ("desiring production"), producing things, running in discontinuous flows, making connections with objects and other desiring machines' (Deleuze and Guattari. cited in Peet, 1998, 211). From this position, the branding of Europe can be explained through the desire for geopolitical clarity. The politics of desire by the EU can be read as a self-defined geopolitics that begins with a process of 'othering' and defining its borders. It then produces power statements and power statements produce difference between time and space (our time and our space versus their time and space). This is finalized by the 'container-ization' of people (van Houtum, 2006 unpublished lecture).

The second example of a distinct territorial desire was the major exhibition on 50 years of Europe titled:

source: EU-Website

Figure 4: Celebrating Europe!

'Celebrating our history! 50 years of the European adventure'. The exhibition opened on October 26, 2007 and was planned to serve as a foundation for a permanent exhibition of the history of Europe, which was to be opened within the newly constructed EU parliament in Brussels. When the exhibition opened it was characterized as 'The "place of memory" that Europe needs, (offering) all Europeans (and their guests) a reasoned history of a union portrayed as a diverse but unique civilisation' (taken from the folder of the exhibition).

The exhibition has been designed with a touch of entertainment with visual and auditory elements that 'touches the heart as well as the mind, to make you, the audience, not only think, but also feel'. The multimedia bites flash, in the style of videoclips, a confusing mix of messages on the diversity of European culture, language and traditions, common values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and equality on celebration, remembrance, re-building, integration, and expansion from six to 27 countries.

The visit exposes the everyday life of 'ordinary' Europeans. Twenty-seven ordinary representatives of Europe guide the visitors through the exhibition, which is one person of each member state of the Union. All stories start in 1945 after World War II. The exhibition follows their fate. These individual stories are more or less dramatically linked to the grand narratives of EU history, leading from 'efforts of the "Fathers of Europe" to rebuild a continent in the throes of decolonization' to the 'downfall of Western dictatorships, revolutions in everyday life and of a Cold War between East and West'. The exhibitions continue with the traditional marker of the contemporary EU, which is the fall of the Berlin Wall and ends with today's Europe, which is 'naturally riddled with questions about the future of European construction and with the challenges that are facing Europeans at the beginning of the 21st century' (again from the folder of the exhibition). As such accumulation the exhibition is a carefully constructed collection that not so much aims at exposing the reality of Europe, but a desired reality of the EU. This was perhaps unintentionally emphasized in the folder of the museum stating that the exhibition was still only a project that had 'germinated in the minds' of a small group of historians and cultural promoters from civil society.

What this exhibition and celebration of Europe indicates relates to Bauman's (2004, 2/4) diagnosis that 'Europe is not something you discover; Europe is a mission – something to be made, created, built. And it takes a lot of ingenuity, sense of purpose and hard labour to accomplish that mission'. When taking this in mind, the unification of Europe provided contemporary EU the political means in completing its desired image. The 27 stories in the exhibition are linked by common historical events leading to a bond of EU membership. However, the consequence of a common history by membership is that Europe only exists in the 27 EU countries with a 'common history'. Those who are outside or even the neighbours do not officially share this history. Celebrating Europe seems therefore to represent a dream of territorial togetherness, which in itself is not problematic. However, in combination with the political anniversary of 50 years and a personal visit of European Commission president Barosso the political value gains a peculiar meaning, certainly when keeping in mind that spaces of desire are especially located in the zone of overlap between ideal imaginaries and real actions (see also Boedeltje 2011 under review).

4.2 SPACES OF DESIRE

In the process of writing I came across a very good article written by Annemarie Pieper in which she describes the conceptual background of a European geography of desire. In her analysis of utopias, Pieper (1996, 184) makes notice of the 'classic state-utopias'. In her description, many classic state-utopias are situated on remote

islands, in geographical nowhere places (i.e. everywhere). Where, in their remoteness and isolation they are able to create a new legitimate ground of human coexistence with exemplary meaning.

Although presented as a policy, the idea of a wider Europe seems much more of an autobiographic sketch on how the European Union desires the future geographies of Europe to be. And because it is almost written like a utopia, the policy documents on its external relations and in particular the ENP represent what Pieper (1996, 194) observes, a utopia in the sense of an 'experiment of practical reason' which is an appropriate medium of imagining a desirable future. The European Neighbourhood Policy sketches a mutual future of the EU and its neighbouring countries (including North Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia and Russia) in sharing a zone of stability, security and well being. This sketch focuses on three central objectives[2]: The EU foresees a prosperous European neighbourhood ('promote prosperity in our neighbourhood by supporting our neighbours' economic reform processes and offering significant economic integration'). Second, it foresees a free and democratic neighbourhood ('to advance freedom and democracy in our neighbourhood by deepening political cooperation, on the basis of shared values and common interests'). The last sketch draws on a secure and stable Europe ('to promote security and stability by working with neighbours to address development, environment, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism issues').

 Pieper concludes by observing that 'U-topia' is consequently not only the placeless nowhere, but also 'Eu-topia' (the good place/ the good human) that presents a perfect final state in which every development towards a higher cultural or political state has become unnecessary. Moreover, The Eu-topia is placed outside time and the transitions of empirical reality. In relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Greek Eu-topia of the good place reveals an odd similarity in which the Eu not only linguistically, but also in its meaning overlaps with EU-topia as the ideal of the good Europe. The ideal of good Europe is in this context especially signified by what the European Union has named 'Europeanization' (of the neighbourhood). The term Europeanization has been around for some time and is widely discussed in various debates on EU policy making (for example see Kostadinova 2009, Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008 and forthcoming 2011). In its institutional meaning we have learned that Europeanization departs from a belief in the process of ongoing 'Western' civilization set around distinct universal moral values (good governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratisation, scientific progress etc.). The imagination of a 'good Europe' is nicely put forward by Luiza Bialasiewicz (2008, 74) who cites Mark Leonard's idea of Europe's 'Invisible power' as a 'Transformative power' that in the long run will cumulate in 'a perfect world'. The transformative power of the EU is such that once 'sucked into its sphere of influence, countries are changed forever'. This so-called 'power of attraction' doesn't mean transformation by the threat of military invasion, but the threat of being left out and excluded.

The core argument of the EU's ideals and its power of attraction is represented in the speeches of various EU policy makers (see for an extensive analysis Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). Especially the speeches of former Commissioner for External

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[2]   The three central objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are taken from the European Neighbourhood Policy Website. To be found http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner stand out. For the EPP 'PanEuropa" group in Strasbourg on December 14, 2005 her core argument presents the ENP as a 'bridge-building policy which applies Europe's soft power, since Europe does not aim for regime change, but it rather does system change (or regime transformation). Soft power requires carrots as well as sticks and is contextualized through a range of policy instruments such as development aid, trade policy, civilian and military crisis management, diplomacy and humanitarian assistance' (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). What she has in mind is an ENP making a 'united Europe a pole of stability and a beacon of prosperity using its ideas as weapons as they are the raw materials of politics' (Ferrero-Waldner 2005). Although Ferrero-Waldner refers to soft power in the geopolitical framing of the ENP, the use of the word 'weapons' must be taken seriously as we shall see. Ferrero-Waldner calls this Europe's strategic idealism. On the international conference at the Institute for Human Sciences on 20 January 2006 in Vienna she mentioned the ENP as the 'latest edition to our democratization tool-box' in which strategic idealism is brought by 'encouraging the spirit of democracy' (Ferrero-Waldner 2006b). Or what she described in a consequent speech on 'the EU in the world' (Brussels, 2 February 2006) as follows: 'In more geo-political terms our ENP is presented as a mix of carrots and sticks, mobilizing the neighbourhood states in support of our political objectives in order to benefit fully from the leverage we possess' (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). In this speech she focused on Europe's ideal role in the world aiming at becoming a strong and mentor and guide for its neighbours.

Between the lines of the consequent speech she delivered at the Swedish Institute for International affairs and the European Commission representation in Stockholm on march 7 2006 (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a), the Europeanization agenda is clearly visible. The speech continued with the summing up of what she expressed as some of the EU's citizens most pressing concerns. These concerns are to some extent obvious and understandable that is to say they involve everyday concerns like security and stability, but what is most striking is that this speech tops energy supplies as the EU citizen's top concern. This sudden overt expression of strategic economic interest certainly contradicts the generous offers of a mutual equal partnership agreed on common interests as described in the earlier documents and even continues to be emphasized in the current documents. The other concerns are formulated in equal geostrategic terms. To illustrate, migration is described as 'welcoming those migrants we need for our economic and social well-being, while clamping down on illegal immigration' (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a).

Hence, not only is the commission's perception towards the neighbourhood one of mistrust but also of a distancing moral superiority, which together, make the pillar on which the relationship with that same neighbourhood a rather shaky one. This makes the ENP from the start an asymmetric policy, emphasized by 'the fact that its content and format had not been the 'subject of a democratic dialogue' (Darbouche, 2008, 377). As the speech indicates common associations and old partnerships based on historical links and values are seen by the EU as important to urge the neighbours to recognize European values and involves a complex range of bordering and ordering practices that urgently demand a cooperative attitude. But, as Kostadinova, (2009, 249) sharply observed, even if Europeanization not openly claims its universality 'there is clearly the feeling that the EU's way for doing things is better and

therefore necessary to ensure that the neighbouring countries will take it on board'. In effect, states that are reluctant to accept European values will either be excluded from the benefits of the ENP or adopted to repressive strategies as the example of Belarus indicates. Yet, the constant hammering on the recognition of common values apparently also implies the current perceived lack of these values among the neighbours and has put an uneasy pressure on the relations between the EU and its new-neighbours. Kostadinova (2009, 243) in this respect remarks the EU's expectations to 'undertake fundamental and often painful reforms in the name of eradicating the existing dangers' contradicts the absence of full European integration through membership. In so doing, the European Union creates a political discourse that is built on the interdependence of economic, political and social/cultural determinations and can be 'located somewhere in the undefined space between the EU's partnerships and full membership' (Sasse (2008, 297). From the speeches we have also learned that a distinct way of carrot and stick policies with neighbouring partners is what has been typified as 'shaming', or 'name-and-shame' strategies. Although in her work on accession for CEPS Tocci (2008,3) mainly referred to candidate states, the same is certainly applicable to the EU's neighbourhood policy when she mentioned that the 'commission progressively felt comfortable to criticise and shame the candidates' shortcomings by publicly announcing policy recommendations'. Klitsounova (2008, 12) explains shaming strategies as 'creating an international and domestic climate of opinion critical of national human rights violations' and other values. Another way of provoking regime transformation that is used is through the strategy of subjective behavioural changes (social learning). Here the Western neo-liberal agenda is supposed to be spread through civil-society via education, NGOs, cultural exchange, media, school, cultural assistance and perception (see for a more extensive description van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011).

A special and interesting point in this fusion of confusing geographies and invisible power is the fact that the EU's external borders are no longer solely to be found where one would expect them to be. The increasingly invisible European frontier strengthens, as Foucault observes, the illusion: we think we enter where we are, by the very fact that we enter, excluded. Invisible and flexible bordering is strongly related to social learning like the exchange programs, cultural diplomacy, education, signing contracts, gaining grants, Erasmus programs, flexible visa regulations etc. But it is also at these increasingly invisible frontiers where the system gives the illusion of being cooperative that we can find flexible exclusion for those entering (conditionality, carrot and stick policies). One of the EU's 'invisible' strategies is to support civil society across its borders within neighbouring states and empower them with European values, democratic politics and neo-liberal engagement but without the possibility of EU citizenship. The civil society partners that fully cooperate with incorporating European values are financially and politically rewarded with 'further inclusion' into the EU. Saying no to these European moral conditions can eventually only be the 'uncivil' choice which will be answered by exclusion, indicating that conditionality and socialization processes are designed not primarily to strengthen the neighbouring states in their own struggles but to bring them into order and to play according to the rules and expectations of the dominant European order by teaching them to be better stakeholders (Butler and Ntseng, 2008). Instead of battling inequality and stimulating

cross-cultural traffic, the Europeanization of civil society encourages dependencies and only accepts differences in accordance with the differences set by the European Union and not vice versa. Grass-root organisations and other stakeholders are only accepted as such if they accept the values set by dominant European standards. This leaves them little than to mediate and control what the EU delivers to them. True difference and alternatives to the standards set by the ENP are not accepted as they are counted as irrational, militant, and/or ideal. This leaves true alternative stakeholders often outside the official discourse of civil society. The construction of a European civil society therefore involves the loyalty to dominant values through a system of rewarding and financial privileges as set by the European Union and the consequent devaluation of local alternatives set by its neighbours.

Source: ENP website

Figure 5: How the EU sees itself and its neighbours

4.3 UTOPIA VERSUS ANTI-UTOPIA

When taking a closer look at the proposed intentions, ENP 'Europeanization' of the neighbourhood seems indeed not to be desiring a revaluation and reversal of neo-liberal values but are contrarily designed to keep revaluations that resist or danger these values at a distance. This entails that from the position of the EU-topia of good Europe, anti-utopia is seen as a threat, a serious disturbance of the final state of Europe, a revenge of time and empirical reality. The figure of the anti-utopian is particularly embodied in the usage of the term 'neighbour' (in the European Neighbourhood policy). As I already remarked, the conventional meaning a neighbour lives close by but belongs to a different family with different values and habits. And because of the differences and nearness, neighbours are kept at a psychological distance. This more or less seems to indicate that the signification of neighbour

contains difference. Difference in the European context seems to be understood as the right of difference but only within the parameters of European values. That is to say, that difference is tolerated as long as the respect for the symbolic standard of humanity is respected. Therefore, the prevailing political discourses in the European Union as EU-topia has indicated that true difference has to be overcome through the sake of democracy, liberalism and equality and a particular desired relations between women and men. The overcoming or erasure of difference can be reached by employing different strategies (such as certain policies of conditionality and social learning as well as promotional campaigns). This overcoming of difference however, seems to entail a certain hegemonic vision of Europeanness, which not only applies to those who subscribe to this vision, but also to neighbouring states who might have a different perspective on their role in society. In this context, the notion of Europe within the dominant discourse seems rather one sided when taking into consideration that freedom and also tolerance has a rather limited European scope.

In the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy the neighbour is instantly defined as the distant other (them behind the external EU border) which raises the immediate suggestion whether the neighbour is regarded a good neighbour with similar values or not. ENP documents seem to signify this difference by referring to the current anti-utiopian tendencies in the European neighbourhood countries, the lack of (economic) development, state-oppression, authoritarian rule, possible threats, economic backwardness, and societal chaos (all mentioned in the key documents of the ENP as well as the European Security strategy).

Here suddenly 'good Europe' seems threatened by the potential presence of the anti-utopian. Indeed, one particular drawback of this example of the classic state-utopia is that it is not situated in a remote nowhere place, but that we talk about a very central place close to empirical reality and the transitions of time. Here, the nearness of the real world seems a source of concern for the EU-topia.

The modern anti-utopian future visions that are especially reflected in the work of George Orwell and Aldous Huxley take as Annemarie Pieper (1996, 184/185) remarks, the 'basic human conflict as social-political principle' and sketch a 'satirical antitype' of an outright manipulated people – 'robbed from his humanity' – who exist as cartoon of his classical counterpart. Where in EU-topia the ideal consist of a prosperous, stable, democratic Europe, the anti-utopian ideal is embodied by a threatening and chaotic state (like the Orwellian ideal of the eternal war). Charity and peace in EU-topia is countered by hatred, chaos and state oppression in the anti-utopian ideal. Pieper (1996, 185) sharply observes that the EU-topian principle of equality is replaced by inequality in Huxley's Brave New World, where good Europe faces its horrific scenario in which people have become monsters developed to serve the state as well functioning animals. This fearsome future represented by the nightmare scenario of a Europe driven by chaos and hatred has not remained unnoticed in the contemporary European debate. Fabrizio Tassinari (2009) of EU research institute CEPS recently characterized the neighbourhood relations as Europe's development of a 'Siege mentality' in which the European Union seems increasingly fearing its neighbours and this is according to Tassinari, reflected in Europe's identity crisis in which the European neighbourhood mirrors the EU's 'Institutional paralysis, ineffectual foreign policy, and morbid fear of migrants and multiculturalism' (see also Boedeltje,

2011, under review). This fear and anxiety involves a sense of neighbouring anonymity without a clear known identity or characteristic; in many documents it is either considered a good or troubled neighbourhood. Bialasiewicz (2009, 83) has made a remark on this by stating that especially the southern neighbours have been typified by European elites as a 'geopolitical space without any significant degree of political or ideational collective identity'. When taking a closer look at the policy documents, the use of neighbourhood never refers to complex realities, local processes, particular places, families, people or cities. The structuring of these documents relies on statistics, maps, intelligence and policy documents and consequently seems to create a bureaucratic codification out of complex realities.

In this perspective, Bialasiewicz et al (2009, 83) recently mentioned the 'growing belief among European political elites that a (European Neighbourhood) can be 'made'. This believe (or codification) in geo-political make-ability is emphasized by the homogeneous tendencies of supranational politics. EU barometers provide figures on children, economic backwardness, illnesses, unemployment, criminals, migrants etc. on which opinions rely. Neighbours are counted and placed in relation to EU standards. Political transformation, civil society and economic figures are monitored and evaluated in subsequent policies for further improvement. Statistics are interpreted in relation to each other on which budgets are based. In support of numbers, the promotion of Europeanization has been extensively advocated by speeches of EU commissioners and representatives in relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy (for extensive analyses on EU speeches on the ENP see for example Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011 and Kostadinova, 2009). French philosopher Alain Badiou (2005 and 2006) refers in this perspective to a contemporary European ideology based on neo-liberalism and it has presented itself in two ways. The first is the appearance of an economic moral on which European politics is based. Humanitarian interventions (for example conditionality politics towards EU neighbouring states) are justified in name of neo-liberal values. Second is the totality of this ideology, exemplified by the domination of the economy and the limited space for alternative ideas. And indeed the onset of the ENP following the 2004 enlargement, the growing belief of a makeable Europe has not remained at the table. Imaginaries of this 'ideal version of Europe increasingly informs the EU's "real" actions in the international arena' (Bialasiewicz 2008, 77, 2009). She points to the examples of Frontex patrols in the Mediterranean and the UK's initiatives for offshore and juxtaposed borders.

In these examples, the fear and anxiety of losing its own competitive position could well be given in by the anti-utopian horror scenarios as described by Orwell and Huxley. The desired ideal of the EU in which it has sketched its own EU-topia, partly outside empirical reality and constructed by geopolitical imaginations that do hardly connect with empirical reality is as Klitsounova (2008, 12) sharply observed 'fundamentally been shaped by the belief that the EU can act as a normative "norm-sender", i.e. can succeed in inducing its neighbours to conform to its norms and rules and thus trigger policy changes in the new EU neighbourhood'. The urging need for distinction between the European Union (as norm setter) and its neighbours (to which norms have to be sent) has been emphasized in the various policy documents, but especially made clear in the European security policy where it claims that it is in the 'European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who

are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations' (European security Policy, 2003).

Seemingly this document uncovers not only the classic utopia in the sense of a being together as born Europeans in a good place with good values, but also an anti-utopian scenario of a chaotic and threatening neighbourhood. This has been outlined in the publication in Antipode (Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2009). In this publication we refer to Badiou (2005a) notion of the Law, by which he means the state of the situation, as a "prescription of reasonable order". The difference between the subsets of neighbours and illegal migrants is the result of an obstinate ideology of "ethics" (Badiou 2005b:28, 29). According to Badiou, this ideology of the Law decides which parts are accepted as normality under the predicative order and which parts are forbidden—considered abnormal and un-lawful, illegal. Recently, Agamben has similarly explained the working of this inclusive exclusion in the normalization process of the sovereign (Agamben 2002). Earlier, Schmitt made a comparison of the construction of the exception, which, in his words, is a consequence of the processes of Ortung (claiming a location) und Ordnung (bordering and ordering) (Schmitt 1950). The political classification has nothing to do with any political truth based on justice (= equality). Equality can only exist if all subsets, all possible constructible subsets, are equal under the law. Under the predicative order of the European Union the ethical difference between these two subsets is the a priori recognition and consensual identification of evil vis- a-vis the good.

In a similar vein, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has, in a commanding way, argued that the construction of fear has to be explicated from a feeling of being deluged by unnamable, potentially immense hordes, masses and streams of "others" who threaten to negate the existing and familiar world, or worse, to make it disappear (see Harari 2001; Lacan 2004; Zizek 1997). This influx of "others" is considered overwhelming when there is an apparent shortage of space for identity construction. The influx of the unnameable is considered and imagined to be dangerous for the fulfilment of being "European" in terms of authority, citizenship and identity, and for the economic well-being and public safety (protection) of Europeans. Moral panic incited by the media is the general factor for the imagined lack of space which makes people feel uncomfortable and the familiar alienated. The erection of a border is an often used strategy when the sequential "threat" of the unnameable increases. Installing a border is basically saying, keep your distance (van Houtum, Boedeltje, 2009, 235/236).

The interesting and relevant viewpoint in the construction of EU-topia is the link between certain symbolic European particularities (for example market-economy as liberation model for third world countries, but also a certain order in the relationship between good Europe' and second and third world nations) that have been translated into political actions. From this perspective European policy makers use the politicized idea of Europe as a zone in which particular norms are applied. Norms which not only count as imagination but also norms that set a certain standard of what is considered right and wrong in the relation between individuals. Lewis mentions

this link between a certain imaginative Europeanness and the political actions in quite similar terms: 'It is a symbolism that positions Europe and the European as the standard of humanity and closes down questions as to whose identity, autonomy, family and privacy are to be respected, at whose cost and with what consequences for Europe's potential for an economy of equality' (Lewis, 2006, 92, 93).

Annemarie Pieper has in an earlier stage remarked that we need utopias for our orientation and guidance in constructing a desired and preliminary image of the future. But they need to be realistic. Their abundance of idealism should not lead to delusion and a distance to reality. The danger of confusing an ideal EU-topia with political action is an all too dangerous one, as history has taught us. Unfortunately, in the vast stream of EU documents on external relations the question of European and non – or at least less — European is increasingly discussed and even politicized.

5 Heterogeneous Europe: Heterotopias

5.1 SPACES OF RESISTANCE

What seems lost in the ENP visions of a single neighbourhood where political and cultural reality is levelled to an abstract picture of the neighbourhood as an object of Europeanization, is the sense of everyday life, a sense of local realities, a sense of geography, not defined through its desired image, but in the sense of actual places, real faces and villages. What I mean with that is that the EU constructs its neighbourhood more like a film, as Foucault remarked in relation to the heterotopias: bringing, onto stage 'One after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another; thus it is that the cinema is a very odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two-dimensional screen, one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space'. In a similar perspective, Etienne Balibar (2004, 16) relates the difficulty of translating the complex realities of a three-dimensional space into a simplified two-dimensional screen to 'the impossibility we struggle against, the impossibility of inventing a new image of a European people because this invention has been reproduced throughout history'. The invention of an objective bounded entity was resilient through the colonial era into the era of Cold war and post-cold war Europe, and already dramatic in nationalities, they are again replicated in today's European Union. This so called will-to-power of Europe, is in reality a demonstration of its incapacity to regulate differences and conflicts within its own limits'.

The later work of Gerard O'Tuathail stands out as one of the first early examples of critical geopolitics with distinct interest in actual places, real faces and villages. His earlier contributions on Northern Ireland and the Americas reflect situations in which complicated lives are often overlooked by simplified normative policies (see O'Tuathail, 2010). Since, critical geopolitics has taken its responsibility by criticizing the descent of geopolitical complexity. Throughout his work since 1996 O'Tuathail expresses the need for a more heterogeneous perspective on geopolitics. In his recent contribution in Political Geography O'Tuathail (2010, 2 and 3) proposes a 'ground-level critical geopolitics: a more geographical geopolitics that disaggregates rather than homogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather than globalizes analysis and explanation'. Here he emphasizes the 'disjuncture and contradictions in the relationship between the grounded local and the foreign policy discourse and practices of the major powers'. Moreover, he remarks that 'a grounded critical geopolitics could also focus on how localized conditions, structures and power struggles mediate and subvert international interventionist practices'. O'Tuathail's call for a more geographical transformative geopolitics reflects his earlier call for a different way of seeing geopolitics. In one of his extensive studies on Bosnia he calls for 'elaborating the provisional category of an anti-geopolitical eye, a disturbing way of seeing that

disrupts the framework of the hegemonic geopolitical eye that structures the seeing in contemporary (dominant) foreign policy discourse' (O'Tuathail, 1996, 173).

The anti-geopolitical eye is to some extent reflected in heterotopias. Heterotopias are the central concept of a more grounded geopolitics in my dissertation. Heterotopias as a concept has been introduced by Michel Foucault and reflect disturbing places that confront utopias with their impossibilities. Michel Foucault had the ability to think differently on the meaning of space, which for me became a way of seeing Europe differently. His visions cannot be classified as a-political, however, without giving explicit geographical locations or representing a clear geo-political vision (in fact they often referred to anonymous spaces to escape the political burdens of mapping). Foucault was able to sketch a geography that is social, inclusive and far away from geopolitical power practices, nationalism, flags and distinct borders. His world very much represents a space that is open to everyone and excludes no one out of distinct claims of territorial belonging.

Some time ago I came across a small article written in 1967 but was only published after his death in 1984. This little piece became essential in my theoretical search for geographies of resistance and has a prominent place in my article on Foucault's work: 'The Other Spaces of Europe, Reflections on the geo-political imaginations in the European Neighbourhood.' (forthcoming 2011 in geopolitics). Although it relates to the symbolic notion of 'place' it had long been left aside by geographers until it was eventually picked up by critical scholars like David Harvey, Henri Levebvre and Ed Soja, who referred to it in explaining power practices in urban spaces. Titled of Other spaces (heterotopias) Foucault used the idea of a mirror as a metaphor for the duality and contradictions, the reality and the unreality of utopian projects. A mirror is metaphor for utopia because the image that is seen does not exist, but it is also a heterotopia because the mirror is a real object that shapes the way you relate to your own image. Foucault calls for a society with many heterotopias, not only because these places affirm difference through its multiple interpretations, but also as a means of escape from authoritarianism and repression. Stated metaphorically the ship is the utmost heterotopia, claiming that a society without ships is inherently a repressive one. Foucault believed that politics did not serve what he himself thought were its intended anti-authoritarian principles.

In the discipline of geography most notably David Harvey and Ed Soja have introduced the concept to the discipline. Ed Soja introduced Foucault's heterotopias to encounter a post-modern explanation of the city in the early 1990s. Soja uses the work of Foucault to refer to the heterotopic space that 'draws us out of ourselves, in which we assist in the erosion of our lives, our time and our history, the space that claws and gnaws at us' (Soja, 1995, 15). In this postmodern explanation, social power and its relation to space is explained as a shifting movement between 'the power of the place' and 'the place of power'. According to Bonazzi (2002, 44) Soja used the 'problematic geography of Foucault to show that the confusing multiplicity of appearances does not merely signify anarchic dispersion with no order and function but, according to the concept of heterotopia that Soja put forward, it is precisely this form of dispersion that constitutes the social order; in other words, he linked the totality of the representations contained in the space in question'. According to this explanation Soja seems to introduce heterotopias as a new direction for geographers by helping

them to generate new ideas and new visions to rediscover the city by looking with the critical eye for spaces that contest, reshape and refresh the existing modern vision of the city. Soja used the example of downtown Los Angeles to emphasize the post modern spaces that reveal the ideologies, the hidden knots, and the entanglements (Bonazzi 2002, 44).

For David Harvey, Foucault's work on heterotopias provides an opening to contest the dominant institutionalized discourses of spatializations. According to Harvey, heterotopias 'allows us to think of the multiple utopian schemes that have come down to us through history as not mutually exclusive (feminist, anarchist, ecological and socialist utopian spaces can all coexist). It encourages the idea of what Marin (1984) calls "spatial plays" to highlight choice, diversity, difference, incongruity and incommensurability. It enables us to look upon the multiple forms of transgressive behaviors (usually normalized as "deviant") in urban spaces as important and productive' (Harvey, 2000 no pages). Harvey regards heterotopias as spaces of difference, spaces of otherness. 'The cemetery and the concentration camp, the factory and the shopping malls, the Disneylands, Jonestown, the militia camps, the open plan office, New Harmony, gated communities are all sites of alternative ways of doing things and therefore in some sense heterotopic. What appears at first sight as so open by virtue of its multiplicity suddenly appears as banal: an eclectic mess of heterogeneous and different spaces within which anything "different" – however defined – might go on' (Harvey, 2000). Harvey relates the Foucauldian idea of heterotopias to the premise of escape. If the Disneylands are a form of escape from normality, where is the critical, liberatory and emancipatory point, Harvey asks? He criticizes Foucault for presenting a more or less 'banal' concept void of substantial clarification of his spatial metaphor. By refusing again and again to elaborate on the material grounding for his incredible arsenal of spatial metaphors, he evades the issue of a geographical knowledge proper to his understandings (even in the face of his use of actual spatial forms such as panopticans and prisons to illustrate his themes) and fails to give tangible meaning to the way space is "fundamental to the exercise of power" (Harvey, 2000).

Harvey was criticized by fellow geographers Castree and Gregory (2006) of solely focusing on the spatial aspect of Foucault's work and not taking into consideration his broader visions of society (e.g. biopolitics). 'If Foucault only interests Harvey for what he has to say about space (which seems a needlessly flattened reading, what about biopolitics?) how is it possible to say so little about Birth of the clinic and Discipline and Punish? And how can Harvey constantly reduce material that recurs in so many of Foucault's studies to mere metaphors (Castree and Gregrory, 2006, 21)?

However, despite this criticism Harvey and also Soja remain sources of inspiration for enriching the discipline of geography with thoughtful philosophical insights. In a recent publication, feminist geographer Gail Lewis has nicely described the Foucauldian metaphor of the ship in relation to immigrants. In her research on the role of the immigrant women in Europe the Foucauldian ship acts as a 'container category for all that is not Europe/European even while this figure is the symbolic site upon which Europe makes claim to its status as the cradle of humanity and civilization' (Lewis, 2006, 89). The role of the immigrant women as metaphor for anti-geopolitics in European societies has been of importance in feminist geography. As Jennifer Fluri (2009a, 251) remarks, bodies are often 'key sites for representing

and monitoring modernity and resistance to modernity. The body acts as the site for the imprinting of social constructions of gender, race, sex and sexuality as well as the countering of these social norms' something Foucault dedicated his entire oeuvre to. This is, according to the work of Lewis, also reflected in the political idea of Europe. This idea of a Europe with specific symbolic qualities (minority rights, good governance, respect for human rights and neo-liberalism) is transcended above the particularities of individual nation-states and cultural nationalities.

Foucault reflects in this little work on this transcendence of particularities. He saw that this geopolitical 'obsession' (he called it obsession) with specific norms of the present day clearly contradicts with the 'obsession' of the nineteenth century, which according to Foucault was obsessed with history. The obsession of the present day is the 'Epoch of space'. He takes this present 'obsession' with space as starting point for his analysis on distinct places.

Foucault starts his essay with an analysis on the structure of space, which he thought was linked to the historical understanding of space. The structuring of space involves a historical process of causes and consequences ordered by time. In this particular context, space is considered a historical process of structuring the human horizon. By taking this angle, Foucault deliberately refuses to give space a neutral value. Instead he considers it as a social construct prone to power practices and reflected in the example of Galileo who linked time to historical being, placing mankind in the centre of his own universe. Galileo replaced the 'space of emplacement' which Foucault called medieval space. Medieval spaces are timeless hierarchical spaces exclusively defined by meaning (also to be referred to as communal spaces). Foucault defines sacred places, profane places, urban places, rural places and celestial places as opposed to the super celestial places. Foucault heavily criticized the consequences of Galileo's objective constitution of an infinite open space in which a 'things place was no longer anything but a point in its movement'. The timeless medieval space was dissolved by science and according to Foucault; 'extension was substituted for localization for connections and networks but also for demography'. As a consequence Foucault considers space as the form of relations among sites, in which imagination of space is the form of our imaginations, not neutral or free.

From this explanation Foucault elaborates on the utopian and heterotopian spaces. The homogenous space represents the relational world (in which we live in, interact and communicate), the space in which time and history occur is what Foucault identifies as 'heterogeneous space'. This latter space is always subjected to power that redefines and renegotiates this space. Foucault takes the connection between the homogenous space and infinite space as defined by Galileo, to consider a 'common locus' beneath them. He does that twofold by defining utopias and heterotopias. 'utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical' (Foucault, 1967, xviii). They are no real places and represent society's ideal projected imaginations in a perfect form. Heterotopias on the other hand, are a complex phenomenon. They respond to the heterogeneous character of external space and the connection of elements of utopia to real places. That is to say they represent places 'in which elements of existence otherwise unconnected to each

other connect' (Dumm, 2002, 39). Heterotopias are what Foucault characterizes as counter-sites that simultaneously represent, contest and invert all other places within society by acting as a mirror to society. This mirror reveals the relation between the external relational world, the celestial space and the infinite open space. According to Foucault (1967, xviii) 'Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy "syntax" in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to hold together' (see also Boedeltje, 2011 forthcoming).

Heterotopias are contradictory and disturbing spaces and for that reason conflicting to utopias as they represent not an ideal utopian picture but the ambiguity of the situation in a way that they contest the homogenous space (Johnson, 2006). Foucault (2006) articulates several types of heterotypic spaces within his article:

1. A 'crisis heterotopia' is a separate space that has been designed to host those who are, in relation to society, in a state of crisis. These situations generally take place out of sight of society. For example the military service for young men takes place outside home and manifest a certain stage of coming to age. According to Foucault, these places have almost disappeared.
2. 'Heterotopias of deviation' are places where individuals are held whose behaviour is outside the norm of society (mental institutions, prisons, refugee camps).
3. Heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. A cinema is a heterotopia because it is a real place where on a two-dimensional screen the three-dimensional world is projected
4. 'Heterotopias of time' such as museums and festivals enclose in one place objects from all times and modes.
5. 'Heterotopias of ritual or purification' always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable. To get in one must have permission or apply to certain protocols.
6. 'Heterotopias have a function in relation to all of the remaining spaces. The two functions are: heterotopia of illusion creates a space of illusion that exposes every real space, and the heterotopia of compensation is to create a real space—a space that is other. Foucault refers to the former colonies as spaces of compensation.

The various heterotopias are capable of gaining different perceptions over time. As history unfolds, Foucault observes, society can make an existing heterotopia function in a different way. The shifting function of heterotopias occurs according to the synchrony of the culture. On the first sight heterotopias seem to be operating on a different spatial scale than to be found in the European neighbourhood (another example of heterotopias on a different spatial scale is the use of the term thirdspace by Soja in his analysis on imagined and real places in city spaces), however, in a second thought the geopolitical imaginations of the European Union indeed seem to represent a contradictory space where utopian imagination and real places come together in various disturbing realities. It is at the borderline between desired imaginations,

which I earlier called 'EU-topia' and the political realities in Europe where the 'Other places of Europe' manifest themselves as heterotopic places of resistance that resist and confront these ideal imaginations with their disturbing contradictions (see also Boedeltje, 2011 forthcoming).

Foucault's heterotopias have no explicit geographical locations (in fact he referred often to nowhere spaces to escape any distinct mapping). In the following sections I will describe two distinct heterotopias that reflect Foucault's ideas in Europe not by simply reflecting on its possible meanings but by translating the principles of resistance to the level of real places in the EU and in its neighbourhood. In their variety, they represent places that disturb the European dream of a makeable neighbourhood. They are the 'Other' spaces of Europe that not only represent one single place, but also incorporate complex processes in which difference or alternative spaces unfold. Through the critical scrutiny of European heterotopias of Belarus and Cyprus, I seek to outline that distinct local realties disturb and resist the hegemonic visions of policy makers. Simplified policy models collapse in the contradictory and confusing geographies of Europe's borderlands. Belarus reflects the tension between on the one hand EU-topia as ideal and on the other the invisibility of Belarus on the European map. This tension between imagination and invisibility embodies the question where the ideal version of Europe begins, and where it ends. Cyprus reflects the tension between two divergent versions of Europeanness. How bearable is it for a community to have a different view and to be part of a community that is separated between the ideal image given in by the European Union and the complex local historical context.

5.2 BELARUS

The choice for Belarus as heterotopia is given in by extensive analysis on speeches and documents as represented on the EU website and the ENP website. What interested me in the analyses of the documents was the particular neo-liberal perspective throughout the documents. This was also reflected in the documents on Belarus not only by the EU/ENP but also by EU think tanks such as CEPS. Belarus is a peculiar case in the European Neighbourhood. The first major point of interest is that Belarus as a country is virtually absent in EU critical geopolitics. Belarus seems not to relate to the EU and hardly admissible. Its political non-existence is peculiar as Belarus is in the centre of the European Neighbourhood and only an overnight train journey from Berlin. Apart from North Korea, which uses its 'threatening' invisibility to reinforce its geopolitical position, it is unusual in an era of spectacle and globalization to find a state which is virtually invisible and absent from visual imaginations. The increasing desire of a certain understanding of Europe (i.e. the world) contradicts with the realities in Belarus. Therefore, the main achievement of the authoritarian regime of Lukashenko might well be his persistent invisibility, how bleak this may seem.

Bialasiewitcz et al. (2008, 77) have earlier mentioned the tendency that geopolitical imaginations increasingly inform the EU's actions. However, Belarus is exactly the embodiment of the impossibility to grasp Europe in a single picture. To put it stronger, there exists no picture of Belarus. No visual image of its Europeanness or its identity, but more like a black hole. On several occasions, the EU made Belarus the offer of

participating in its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which the 'EU wishes to share with its neighbours the prosperity, stability and security which its own citizens enjoy. This requires political, economic and administrative reforms from our partner countries' (ENP website). However, Lukashenko's regime and the EU's offer to Belarus of joining the ENP is comparable to a cat offering cheese to a mouse (like the famous rivalry between Tom and Jerry in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer cartoon). With accepting that offer, Lukashenko would certainly dig his own political grave, something which the EU emphasized: 'Unfortunately, at this stage, the policies pursued by President Lukashenko's authoritarian regime prevent us from offering Belarus full participation in our neighbourhood policy. The EU cannot offer to deepen its relations with a regime, which denies its citizens their fundamental democratic rights. The people of Belarus are the first victims of the isolation imposed by its authorities and will be the first to reap the benefits on offer to a democratic Belarus' (ibid). Belarus excluded itself from the EU's agenda. Left aside, isolated to the extent that there is hardly information. From both sides the invisibility was further fuelled by a series of measures that wiped out political interaction: ignorance, shaming strategies, travel and trade restrictions (including restricting Lukashenko to travel to EU countries) and a freeze of assets. Through these actions, the geographical presence of Belarus was further put under pressure in the imagined geopolitical picture of the EU.

Does this make Belarus the embodiment of resistance to the geographies of desire and the EU-topia? What it does seems to make clear is that the European geographies of desire (EU-topia) takes the local sensitivities too much for granted. One of today's most frequently used sources in EU geopolitics are the publications by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). Although independent as an EU think-tank, CEPS is closely related to the European Union and represents on many occasions the dominant liberal discourse. Its 2008 publication on Belarus (titled: The EU's Limited Response to Belarus' Pseudo 'New Foreign Policy') exemplifies this perspective with a strong favour for 'European Values'. The paper attempts to analyse the dynamics of EU-Belarus relations and 'Whether the EU has succeeded in increasing its leverage over the country'. Furthermore 'it speculates on how the EU can engage with the people of Belarus more effectively' and puts forward 'A series of short-term and longer-term measures that the EU might consider, on the condition that Belarus commits to addressing the most basic requirements in the field of human rights and democratisation'. Certainly, the policy brief makes no notice of a cultural elite that is 'Split between the Westernisers and the people with pro-Moscow orientation'. It also makes no notice that this split transcends politics, and reflects 'The heart of hearts of what it means to be a Belarusian' to the point that 'Belarusians suffer from a collective split identity. That their identity is Janus-faced, and so is Belarusian nationalism' (this all is pointed out in the extensive research by Grigorry Ioffe, 2003, 1266/1267)). As a consequence EU geopolitics can find itself unintentionally in the service of the prevailing hegemonic visions owing to their total reliance on geographical information provided by those biased visions and strategic (political) interests, to wit, the CEPS. Moreover, there is a significant danger that EU critical geopolitics becomes one-sided focused on Western European perspectives.

This danger of reduction of everyday life in which complicated realities are squeezed into a simple geopolitical map has become problematic, as we have seen in

the course of this dissertation. And 'Because heterotopias are disturbing, Foucault (1967, xviii) remarks, 'This is exactly why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contests the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences'.

Seen from this perspective, the revenge of Geographies of resistance might well relate to Gerard O'Tuathail's (1996, 173) 'provisional category of an anti-political eye, a disturbing way of seeing that disrupts the framework of the hegemonic geopolitical eye that structures the seeing of places (…) in contemporary foreign policy discourse'. What comes to my mind are the words of the Moscow based American travel writer Jeffrey Tayler (2001, 342): 'Belarusian friends of mine have praised Lukashenko and described a quiet life at home, free of the market chaos and anarchy of Russia, words that do not jibe with press reports that demonize the president and blame him for curtailing of civil liberties that recalls the Soviet days. I have come to Belarus to travel the land and find out what is going on'. Although travel writing is a particular genre with its own features and conventions, for Tayler, travelling is indeed geography and the gradual changes in landscape, climate, smell and people are all perceived in detail (in their changes and differences). In fact, detail matters in travelling. 'We toast to our new friendship and dig in. I remark that the daughters are watching Russian, not Belarusian, television. 'Yes you see, it was really tough in the beginning, after 1991. Shushkevich changed the school language to Belarusian, and out daughters began doing badly. But then Lukashenko came and switched the language back. How could we expected to change languages, and why? We're Belarusian, but our language is Russian. We watch the news from Russia. Everything here comes from Russia' (348-349).

For travellers like Tayler but also Paul Theroux who remarked that 'luxury is the enemy of observation, a costly indulgence that induces such good feeling that you notice nothing', the everyday experiences of geography are represented by a simple observing question to the local driver. 'I ask Dmitry if the Kurapaty memorial means anything to him. He shrugs. We Belarusians are used to being occupied by one people or another. We're tolerant people – we've had to learn tolerance – and we wouldn't have done such a thing ourselves. Our tolerance has been our undoing, in fact. But I don't have time to think about it. I have a wife and a daughter to feed." (347).

The stories of these ordinary people provide a different geopolitical picture that is not reflected in the dominant discourses.

5.3 CYPRUS

The need for transformative alternatives is particularly urgent in a time when Europe and the EU are increasingly connected, interchanged and even confused. This counts even more in the situation where European politicians are increasingly convinced by new maps that present an ideal representation of Europe and its neighbours. After I personally experienced the consequences of this confusion during fieldwork on Cyprus I argue that the duality between Europe as scripted by the homogeneous

political imaginations of EU policy makers and the local and complex realities and everyday lives on Cyprus has resulted in a geopolitical discontent that is increasingly problematic.

One other particular aspect of heterotopias that Foucault defines is that heterotopias occur in relation to other spaces. According to Foucault, this function opens out in two extremes. The first is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space. The second is the space of compensation that compensates for the lacks and ills of current society. Foucault wonders if the European colonies have not functioned in the role of heterotopias. In the European Neighbourhood Cyprus undoubtedly represents the tragic role of a heterotopia of compensation. During extensive fieldwork on Cyprus in 2004 and 2005 for the FP5 project 'Exlinea' I was able to witness the rigid complexities of local historical contexts in relation to EU policies.

In order to understand this particular Foucauldian heterotopia Emerson eds. (2005, 217) noted in relation to the Neighbourhood Policy that the 'syndrome of post-colonial sensitivities translating into reluctance to impose political conditionality towards the neighbours seems to be fading away'. Earlier I have stated that the European Neighbourhood Policy is a two-dimensional space of illusion (a European Dream of a ring of stable partners). Foucault uses the example of certain colonies in the Americas of the seventeenth century. These settlements represented the perfect condition of human life in which daily life was regulated by the ringing of church bells. Everyone woke up at the same time and even the meal times were set. The village was constructed around two axes with the church on the foot of the central axes. These two axes reproduced the sign of Christ and consequently 'Christianity marked the space of the American world with its fundamental sign'. Europe's colonial history has for a long time been a true syndrome as Emerson noted. Europe's colonial rule in combination with the cleaning out of resources, products and people has left deep traces mostly in the former colonies. The Algerian Frenchman Franz Fanon (1961) observed that 'colonialism is not satisfied merely holding a people in its grip and emptying their brain of all form and content. It turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it'. Society turned towards the past and away from the actual events and all they embraced are in fact the cast-off of thought, its shells and corpses. In the colonial tragedy Fanon (1961) continues, 'the colonised man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones against his own people'.

The analogy with the current neo-colonial references to the European Neighbourhood has been widely debated among scholars (see for example the work of James Anderson, 2006). Like historical colonial practices, the current Europeanization of the neighbourhood could to a certain extent be explained as an act of compensation through the reproduction of European values and the structuring of geography, in which each neighbour carries out its duty.

One particular example connected to the colonial heterotopias is Cyprus. Cyprus entered the EU as a divided island in 2004 after the UN Annan Peace plan and referenda on unification between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots failed in a last attempt. For its part, the United Nations, because it embodies an unresolved tension between principles of human security and state-centric notions of sovereignty, failed to offer an adequate normative framework recognizing both sides in the conflict, while

variously complementing and undermining the goals of EU integration. Since, the Greek Cypriot government is acknowledged as sole representative of Cyprus in the EU. Up to today the political situation in Cyprus is unclear and fuzzy. The EU-acquis in all its complexity is not officially applicable to North-Cyprus. Despite 'Special rules' regarding facilitating flows of goods and persons to bring the Turkish Cypriot society closer to the European Union, everyday practices at the border indicate that this is frustrated by the Greek-Cypriot authorities. Current Greek-Cypriot resistance makes it impossible for the northern part to make use of EU funds and assistance, direct flights or trade and participate actively in EU programs. Cyprus as such represents the EU's impossibility to grasp Europe in a single picture. To put it stronger, on official maps of Cyprus, there exists no visual image of the Turkish Cypriot society apart from its status as 'Area inaccessible because of Turkish occupation'.

This ambiguity has also been recognized by sources close to the EU. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) recently remarked that 'the obstacles to implementation, both legal and political, have proved formidable, exemplifying the difficulties the EU has in acting decisively on Cyprus now that one party to the conflict is a member state. Having established its right to veto, the Greek Cypriot government has blocked all initiatives to approve and implement the regulation, insisting on its sole right to certify and verify origin of Cypriot exports, objecting to the use of Turkish Cypriot ports, and arguing that the regulation would lead to a creeping recognition of the 'illegal' Turkish Republic of North Cyprus'. As a consequence, the EU produces an institutional incapacity to treat Cyprus along a course that would diverge from that of traditional geopolitics, serving in the end to alienate the Turkish-Cypriot community in such a way as to doom any a priori political settlement. Specifically, European Union intervention on the issue of Cyprus relied to a great extent on a 'carrot and stick' policy whose governmentalizing logic attempted at first to determine the physical and statutory division of the island according to traditional geopolitical principles on which its earliest member states were founded (see Boedeltje et al. 2007).

With the Cyprus issue EU geopolitics finds itself with an implicit conflict of interest by granting one part of society to be European policymakers while simultaneously claiming to provide valid measures to bring the other half of society closer to European integration. When facing the rubble of the buffer zone that divides Nicosia today the need for an alternative geographical European geopolitics becomes all too clear.

The situation in Cyprus reflects a rather different 'Europe' than what has been designed as EU-topia in Brussels. The European promise might have worked well with the candidate states, however, it became clear that it did not work for Cyprus. For, the Turkish Cypriot neighbour, who has not become and cannot become fully European, will always be subjected to shifting policies of which they have no democratic influence, hard border management and other excluding reminders that it is not part of the EU. The willingness of the people to be part of this buffer zone and container politics of the European Union is therefore not self-evident

In this context the call for geographical geopolitical alternatives seems genuine, however the real question remains how a more geographical geopolitics can do justice to a politics of peace and dialogue in Cyprus. I repeat Jennifer Hyndman strong remarks on how difficult it is to speak outside normative discourse, however when taking into account that political decision-making can only count when representing the lives

of ordinary people, I would argue that a transformative geopolitics should always start from the complicated lives of people who want to see an end to the tragedy what is going on in Cyprus. I believe together with Jennifer Hyndman that shared commonalities as love, loss and suffering can resist the dividing normative political discourse.

When searching for an appropriate way to voice our fieldwork experiences, I (together with my colleagues), felt the dissatisfying gap between writing distant policy recommendations for the EU project and the things we saw along no-man's-land in Nicosia. We all agreed that the appropriate way to voice the situation in Cyprus was to bring together the lives of people who we met during our fieldwork in a seminar that we organised in the middle of the geopolitical heart of Cyprus. Here musicians from north and south who joined together in the Olive tree project, children from bi-communal schools, common NGO's working on environmental projects, academic visions, architects and politicians shared their common ground for a peaceful future. That very seminar represented an alternative representational space that gave voice to a transformative geopolitics not only because it created a grounded geopolitical osmosis that incorporated various voices but also because of its location in the UN controlled buffer-zone right in the middle of Nicosia.

The meeting resulted in various publications that reflected the feeling of the seminar. Through a personal and involved style, away from judgements or moralizing, we tried to write our contributions in such a way that they very much challenge conventional political representations by seeing people beyond their constituted political image of politically wrong, illegal or even criminal (see Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 2007a). Although this style of writing might be prone to criticism for not being sufficiently empirical or methodological or even prophetic or activist, I argue that it is not so much pure objectivity that matters when taking into consideration that only one part of society is represented in Europe. Euan Ferguson remarks in the Observer that truthfulness is 'Embodied in listening, re-evaluating one's own prejudices, trusting his subjects and winning trust back'. That truthfulness matter on a local geopolitical level has become clear on Cyprus. Despite the current partitioning people interact across the line to work, shop, go to school, sport and meet. Here at street level in the city of Nicosia the changes in cityscapes, smell, noise and products are perceived in their diversity (Boedeltje, forthcoming, 2010).

Through the grey zone of the acquis communautaire, north Nicosia profits from European modernisation and the common market. Although the northern part of the island is still often labelled as 'occupied territory', this grey, self-created option means that the EU has indeed had a significant effect on the 'Cyprus issue'. For the Greek Cypriot authorities, their hoped-for advantage of a stronger negotiation position in Europe did not turn out as expected. For the north, their fragile socio-economic structures appear to have benefited from the common market with the Republic of Cyprus (see Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 2007a). This complex reality that unites rather than divides reveals the city's potential resistance to traditional geopolitical discourse. Cyprus heterotopic position might prevent the EU from politicising its dreams. Indeed, the neighbourhood is not a utopian site presenting society in a perfected form. Foucault has stretched that utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces. In that sense is the neighbourhood a space of compensation; an unreal space of what wider Europe and certainly Cyprus would never be.

The particular examples of Belarus and Cyprus reflect a disturbing way of seeing. What these examples indicate is that these European regions are transit places, literally in between isolation and penetration, between being welcome or being unwelcome. The contradictions between illusionary and real practices, between inclusion and exclusion marks as Zizek (2006, 21) 'a frontier between those who succeeded in remaining 'within' (the 'developed', those to whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., still apply) and the others, the excluded (the main concern of the 'developed' with regard to them is how to contain their explosive potential), even if the price to be paid is the neglect of elementary democratic principles'. It is therefore that these shifting borderlands on the edges of the political imaginations of European policymakers are true heterotopic spaces as they forcefully undermine democratic principles of which the EU stands strong. These spaces of resistance force the EU to show its power, to measure the people who enter. They are both the excess of the imagined ideal and the proof of a true heterotopia. As such Heterotopias are disturbing places for the Brussels dream of shared prosperity, democracy and well being for all. They 'unstitch, undermine and transform utopias' (Johnson, 2006, 85). They produce 'impossible' or 'unthinkable' spaces and do not promise solutions, but highlight the inverted norm. They are the spatial embodiment of the impossibility of a smooth common European space.

5.4 HETEROTOPIC DISCIPLINES

Next to the heterogeneous examples of Cyprus and Belarus, I would like to make a note on a third and different example of heterotopias. In a time where the technocratic policies of the European Union seems increasingly lacking a meaningful and inclusive social agenda, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have taken the difficult but important task in sketching alternative visions of a more social Europe. Broader societal questions and the option of true societal and geopolitical alternatives have been raised by influential philosophers in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial crisis and mainly focuses on the neo-liberal ideology behind the European policies (among them Slavoj Zizek, Alain Badiou, Zygmunt Bauman and Peter Sloterdijk most of them inspired by the work of Foucault). The name of these thinkers appeared frequently in the radical geographical journal Antipode (see for example van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2009). These scholars to some extent represent the theoretical heterotopias (theoretical activism) undermining the dominant theoretical discourse.

With the broader support of these influential thinkers, contemporary political geography has delivered some valuable contributions in which the dividing and exclusive tendencies of technocratic policies like the ENP have been linked to the dominating neo-liberal ideology. In 2006, Ray Hudson (2006, 385) expressed the continuing need to question neo-liberalism 'in order to address these issues of inequality and to grasp the ''why'' and not just the how, what and where of capitalist economic geographies'. The question of why geography needs critical thinkers is in the first place given in by Hudson's call to acknowledge the domination of neo-liberalism over the last two decades. In his view capital domination has both considerably intensified

and increased. Noel Castree (2010, 207) emphasized this by remarking that 'capitalism will morph and adapt as it has always done: the operating hardware will remain intact, even as the all-important details will alter quite profoundly'. He quite rightly asks at what cost this will be? Nonetheless, these critical question are in sharp contrast to what is debated today among most intellectuals as well as policy-makers focusing on deregulation, control, bureaucracy, efficiency and technocratic governance.

As this dissertation has made clear, the EU seems increasingly faced with the contemporary difficulties of neo-liberalism as the questioning of the ENP emphasized. Economic problems, xenophobia, populism, renewed nationalism, border management, exclusion are among the problems that have also been recognised by scholars. Castree (2010, 207) remarks that critical Europeans 'have not just to hope for, but work vigorously towards, a future that can set capitalism on a path of much greater social and environmental justice.'

In a recent television lecture broadcasted on Dutch television philosopher Slavoj Zizek expressed that neither the market nor political institutions can and will be capable of providing durable solutions for more solidarity in Europe. The big dilemma according to him is situated in the ideas of Francis Fukuyama as set out in his early 1990s book 'The End of History'. His ideas were centred on the idea that with the rise of social democratic capitalism (after the collapse of Communism) a particular socio-political form remained as the only realistic option: 'The dream of global capitalism with a human face'. However, EU policies need less and less democracy to work efficiently as the ENP revealed. Technocratic politics based on regulation, laws, control and evaluation is increasingly a de-politicized 'empty spectacle' with experts who take distinct economic measures. Zizek sees this as the systematic dismantling of the social political system of the state. Here freedom is not suspended, but explained in a different way where all the small individual freedoms are available (consumerism, hedonism, making fun) but in the background the fundamental freedom and equality is slowly reduced.

Hence, when following this rather pessimistic trend, this renewed form of capitalism in Europe could be a foreground of what might come. From this perspective the critique of critical geopoliticians on the neo-liberal European values and the geopolitical narrative based on regulations, measures, conditionality and socialization can be read as a renewed call that opts to think of alternatives for neo-liberalism in times where the need for new ideas is exemplified by neighbouring states who are given the rather bleak choice between liberal democracy and barbarism. The theoretical directions are not particular easy or paved, but the desire to come up with true transformative and progressive alternatives that can counter the prevailed hegemonic visions remains daunting and necessary. In his last public speech before his death, historian Tony Judt gathered all his remaining energy to say some intriguing words on 'what is living and what is dead in social democracy':

> 'The task of social democracy now is to remember not only what was achieved but the consequences of the failure to achieve it. The consequences of failure to recall what happened to liberal society when it enters the stage of uncertainty and insecurity. Social democracy, public goods, collective welfare, state provision of the services we today inadequately provide privately. They are not the perfect answer.
>
>   'What we have learned from the 20th century that the perfect answers are frighteningly imperfect. But my feeling, my sense of social democracy as a

possible language, a possible alternative, a possible way to begin to talk publically about our collective goals is all we have. We should be angrier than we are, much angrier than we are about what we have lost rhetorically, collectively, ethically in the three decades that we moved away from the astonishing achievements of the previous 100 years.

'There is something to return to, something worth fighting for, something worth collectively inspiring to. I leave you with that thought. Thank you.'

6 Conclusion: of Other European Spaces

Now that the analysis of a transitional European geopolitics nearly has come to an end I have to return to the important question I posed in the research objective: Can the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU live up to its promise of contributing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe? In the course of formulating an answer I have gone through a critical scrutiny of several interrelated themes. These themes have been constructed around a distinct geopolitical framework, which can be seen as a strategic geopolitical response by the EU in order to deal with the new situation following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The changing circumstances have led to new challenges and opportunities based on two geopolitical rationales: 1) to cope with its new external borders and neighbours, and 2) to find a solution for a further enlargement problem, whereby both rationales attempt to avoid potentially damaging consequences of stability and development, and new inducements for multilevel cooperation are seen as necessary in order to 'include' the neighbouring states and create a prosperous and stable 'ring of friends'. The new challenges and opportunities are according to the EU centred on three P's: Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty, whereby proximity relates to the geographical dimension of historical and relational closeness to the EU and Prosperity and Poverty relate to developmental issues and stability to prevent political and economic destabilisation and possible political confrontation. In addition, these policies are contextualized in various Action Plans. The various Action plans will be budgeted through the European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI).

In the sizeable collection of European Union discourse as found in various documents, papers and communication on the ENP the language contains diplomatic narratives built on internal transformation and 'Europeanization'. 'Europeanization' of the continents periphery is part of the common foreign policy rationale of the ENP and can be seen as a normative process of sharing European norms and values (this must be understood in terms of 'the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, the principles of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development). 'Europeanization' is made concrete in the ENP through policies of conditionality and socialization. Conditionality is a rewarding system based on rational institutionalism, whereby the level of integration depends on the performances of the partner states. Socialization is based on a system of social learning and assistance in the field of civil society, education, culture and governance. This process of expanding 'Europeanization' beyond the EU borders is according to the EU based on the geopolitics of 'soft-power' that the EU applies as a strategic instrument, but sometimes collides with internal contradictory regional and historic interests of the different member states.

In broader geopolitical terms the EU's geopolitical intention can be understood as a reaction to the enlargement process, whereby its weakening power towards the outer circles of its peripheries forced the centre to obtain an active agenda to expand its core based model of 'Europeanization'. The circles constructed through a hierarchy of categories of 'old' and 'new' accession, pre-accession, candidate, non-candidate and non-Europe represent a system of multilateral and bilateral relations and institutions in which the EU can be conceptualized as geopolitical 'subject' instead of 'agent' or 'actor'.

The process of 'geopolitical subjectivity' is defined through ordering, in which the EU is thus in a continuous process of ordering its geopolitical space through defining itself, its neighbours and its complex multilateral and bilateral relations emphasizing a post-national connotation of Europe. The problem however, is that the EU's 'geopolitical subjectivity' is putting forth geopolitical discourses that are competing and hardly coherent. This is emphasized by the fact that the ENP on the one hand allows for securitisation, which means the prevention of political and economic destabilisation leading to new forms of exclusion and border management and on the other hand a politics of assistance, cooperation and dialogue (creating new forms of inclusion).

In order to analyse this paradox of simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion I made an effort to investigate the broader geopolitical field within the practice of geography that has paved the path for a critical geopolitical framework of analysis and opened up a whole new way of looking critically at spatial problems. I explained how critical geopolitics could function as a method that is able to cope with the changing geopolitical circumstances in the 21st century Europe. By looking with the critical geopolitical eye at the different policy documents, publications and observations, I have tried to argue that the ideal version of Europe carries the characteristics of utopia as exemplified in the classic fictional state-utopias. In what I have called the construction of EU-topia, the EU has with the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) made careful steps in which these ideals increasingly inform contemporary political actions. The implications of the overlap between utopian ideals and political actions have resulted in vague and unclear territorial claims and practices, Action Plans and policies, sometimes intervened or overruled by power-politics of individual member-states and in many cases ignoring the needs of the complicated realities of everyday life.

I have made an effort to outline that a territorial ideal version of Europe fits uneasy with the everyday life of the people and communities in Europe. The increasing belief in a makeable Europe among EU policy makers has far-reaching and complex implications on different levels. In these remote transit places the distinction is made between European citizens and non – or less – European neighbours. Under the flag of shared prosperity, the construction of the neighbourhood promotes the projection of an idealized common future with neighbours sharing everything but European institutions. If this silent power strategy may have worked well with the EU candidate states in the past it becomes clear that it did not work as well with the neighbouring states. For those people and communities who can not become 'fully European', will always be subjected to shifting policies of which they have no democratic influence, hard border management and other excluding reminders that they are not part of the desired version of a EU-topia.

In a way to grasp the impacts of the EU's notion of security and citizenship towards wider Europe and how they are reflected in everyday realities in the areas concerned, I have introduced Michel Foucault's concept of heterotopias in order to theorize the gap between the perceived desired EU-topia and the contradicting local realities. Distinct contradictions resist the utopian image. Through the critical scrutiny of Belarus and Cyprus I have tried to outline that distinct local realties disturb and resist the hegemonic visions of policy makers. As such, a bounded economic political Europe with a fixed identity seems to collapse in the contradictory and confusing geographies of Europe's borderlands. Foucault himself was well aware of the importance of heterotopias. The reason he wrote On Other Spaces in 1967 was because of his criticism on the (static) meaning of space (after all the article was written for a conference on architecture). His article has broadened the understanding that heterotopias as real and imagined spaces represent space as social construction. Foucault foresees a society with many heterotopias, not only for the affirmation of difference, but also as a way to escape repression, stating metaphorically that if we take the ship as the utmost heterotopia, a society without ships 'dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates'.

So can I say that the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU has lived up to its promise of contributing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe? After I personally experienced the consequences of this during my fieldwork for the FP5 and FP6 projects on Cyprus and the Canary Islands (projects supported by the European Commission under the Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme that examined opportunities and constraints to local/regional cross-border co-operation along the EU external border) I can say that it is difficult to share the claims in which the European Union decides what Europe is - or is not – and what makes a European citizen with distinct rights and privileges. The duality and confusion between 'Europe' as scripted by the homogeneous political imaginations of EU policy makers and the 'Other Europe' of local and often complex realities and everyday lives has resulted in a discontented geopolitics that is increasingly problematic.

In the spirit of an alternative geopolitics of Europe I would like to suggest that the common ideal of a more social and democratic Europe might after all be a Europe that as an open idea(l) is capable of representing all different lives equally. The question is how far this is universally translatable without excluding people. The stories of dissidents, teachers, immigrants, workers and mothers do matter in politics. These voices deserve an equal representation in policies, practices and plans. As the Cyprus example revealed, different ways of voicing the fieldwork results can make a difference. But also different sources outside academia deserve a more proper place within the search for a more grounded geopolitics. Although one should be careful with the authenticity and reliability of the sources, the current multimedia landscape proves to be a fruitful platform for people to share their lives. Alternative geopolitical imaginations should incorporate local sensitivities, complex lives and historical narratives that provide a different but inclusive European geopolitics. Next to that we have to find a new way of dealing with the transitions and difficulties that come along with increasing globalisation, communication and neo-liberalism.

As I am writing this conclusion, the current Left in Europe is struggling in finding answers to these transitions. These transitions are an easy target for right-wing politi-

cians to turn them into fear and anxiety that divides instead of unites. The current right-wing mobilisation in Europe indicates that we have to find new ways of organising Europe, not via neo-liberal logic that defines neighbouring states according to their market potentials and security risks, but by redefining politics altogether. What is very much alive is the current gap between generalizing politicians and left-alone citizens. Their right-wing vote is very much a protest vote, as they want to be taken serious. For many people (at least in the Netherlands) the EU represents an elite organisation that takes their money and opens the borders for migrants. How unjust this perception might be, it represents the current discontent of European geopolitics and the difficulties of coping with changing circumstances. Closing the gap between citizens and politicians must involve an accurate and empathic response from politicians to citizens' concerns in which expectations and outcomes are to some extent logically sequenced. On the supranational European level these ambitions seem hard to realize. It is therefore of importance to downgrade the ambitions of a state-centred European Union with neighbours, identity and a foreign policy. These makeable ambitions only strengthen the current discontent and xenophobic tendencies, as they do not communicate on the level of citizens.

Why is it so difficult to imagine genuine alternatives to hegemonic geopolitical models? We can think of the dominance of institutional interests of those engaged resulting in a West-centred way of seeing the world. Thus Western-European solutions are promoted, even when these solutions are actually coming under increasing debate in the West itself as the economic crisis has lead to diminished faith in the market, and some also signal a crisis in democracy in the West. The same goes for the centrality of the state, which has steadily decentralized over the past half century but which continues to be promoted.

Next to that, the dominance of the neoliberal discourse should not be underestimated. The thing about a hegemonic discourse is that when you are part of it, it is difficult to see it. It has come to define what is 'normal'. Even those who do may be reluctant to do so openly, as challenging the dominant way of thinking is not easy. It may be that some people in fact have different aims but strive to present them in terms of the politically correct discourse of the time.

Another possibility of why people shy away from thinking about real alternatives is interest. People and organizations have become invested in the worldview that they promote, and to question it would mean to lose face and be shaken their own identity. In addition, people are understandably attached to the security of their jobs and organizations. What these examples indicate is that these vision on the current asymmetric situation in Europe all 'help to nurture a reworking of the types of conceptual frameworks, methodologies and empirical examples that have previously delimited critical interrogations of geopolitics' (Jones and Sage, 2010, 2).

In order to cope with these complexities, an important role for the EU would be to guard the values of solidarity, justice and democracy not by drafting new policies, external borders and pretending to be a state, but by carrying these values on the level of discourse, in the background as an institution that protects Europe from hard border management, xenophobia and wild excesses of neo-liberalism. I am convinced that citizens can relate to this, only if they can relate to their everyday lives and to the countries they live in. The responsibility lies with the citizens as well. They are not

victims or people who need to be freed. It is the responsibility of the people of Europe to reinvent the social-democratic heritage of our parents in new ways that appeal to the changing and confusing geopolitics of our time. What comes to my mind is the work of Laura Burkhalter who together with Manuel Castells is founder of the institute for bionomic urbanism in Los Angeles. The aims of the IBU think tank is creating experimental catalyst projects in areas of social, economic and environmental need (for example the establishment of the U.S. largest inner city organic farm, promoting multiple aspects of bionomic urbanism and a consciousness for sustainability within the local and extended community. In addition, educational programs including a think-tank and host roundtable discussions, symposiums and presentation of the research and theories being developed by IBU and subsequent affiliated programs. These projects serve as a bottom up approach to changing the current destructive development patterns. They shall also serve as educational examples, informing the public as well as policy makers and planners about the sustainable alternatives of urban politics.

I became fascinated by her work and her alternative ideas of community, environment and the city. In her work the sense of community is becoming much more important. Certainly after the economic crisis hit California very hard, people now depend more on each other than before. Being asked by a journalist if the end of the gold rush also meant the end of the American dream she answered: 'I think the American dream is much larger than that. It is just one part of the American Dream. The American dream has to do with self-expression and freedom. It has been caught up in this kind of wanna-have materialistic aspect of it. I think the Americans are very optimistic people, and they will get back up, so I think freedom is now redefined in a way that it is less dependent on the capitalistic system, and I truly think that this is the essence of the American dream. One thing about Americans is that they are very flexible cause people change their lives all the time here. It's kind of the way it is like "Oh its over….what's next: Let's start over!" '

Even though her ideas are contextualized in Los Angeles, they can nonetheless serve as a testing ground for similar projects and ideas on the other side of the Atlantic who face similar problems and challenges and the similar effects of the economic crisis. Next to that, I believe the American dream not so much differs from the European idea as posed by Wim Wenders (the subjective parameters of self-expression and creative freedom). Laura Burkhalter's dedication, for me, proved that developing theory and experimental and project based applications based on personal experiences can contribute to sustainable alternatives. Therefore, even though this thesis has now come to an end I will not conclude this manuscript as such. Instead, the experience of research and writing brought a change I could not foresee. Therefore, it might be better to speak of a new beginning in which I will dedicate my future work even more to the level of personal experience that fosters change and movement.

In the meanwhile Europe will be there, in its heterogeneity in the hermitages of Saint Petersburg and the nice coffee houses of North Cyprus, but also where a former custom building on the Belgian-Dutch border now hosts a restaurant where you can pay with the same money, where Polish trucks carry German trailers, and where you can work in Finland and live in Amsterdam. All these things are magnificent and enjoyable only if you can return to the source of where it all starts, a place where you

can relate to, feel safe and at home, wherever this may be. This is both the beginning and end of Europe.

6.1 FUTURE RESEARCH AND THE ONGOING NEED FOR CRITICAL VOICES

From this urgent context future research on EU critical geopolitics should take into account that cooperation between states united in an organisation like the EU certainly has advantages. Many benefit from cooperation and cooperation in itself implies a form of solidarity and collective responsibility in tackling global problems and requires no membership, prescribed values or external borders. It should also take into account that a more local geopolitics (as voiced by the critical geographers in this dissertation) that is able to give voice to the complexities of local realities is able to resist the problematic political imaginations that increasingly inform political action. From this perspective alternative and transformative geopolitical research should focus on how the European Union as a truly democratic institution that on an equal basis offers cooperation and dialogue to those countries alongside the European Union, can and should be able to democratise itself. The first and foremost task in this is making the clear distinction between Europe and the European Union that leaves aside strategic interests packed up in unrealistic imaginations of universal values and a true and good Europe. In addition, giving voices of resistance a proper place in research might unfold that indeed too much is claimed for Europe. The complex realities of a more local version of Europe might reveal that Europe is always more than what is inevitably claimed. There are more heterotopias to prove that Europe's reality never really is what it seems to be. The bordering of Europe in name of this or that has the destructive and inevitable outcome that something is excluded which is also Europe. Returning to Foucault, who valued the need for heterotopias to escape from repressiveness and to celebrate difference, we so far have seen that they indeed recall contradiction and undermine authority in the shifting territorial spaces of Europe/EU. After 6 years ENP the conclusion might be drawn that the desire of Europeanization of a ring of neighbours has turned out to be problematic in its practical workout and its relation amongst its neighbours. From this perspective a more local geopolitical future research might indeed discover that the European neighbourhood is a heterotopic space and able to open up the affirmation of contradiction and resistance, the possibility to escape from dull sameness and repressive economical and political ideals. In this discussion critical geopolitics and in particular feminist geopolitics continue to play a central role. Gail Lewis (2006, 101) calls for a renewed attention to history (by taking into account earlier connotation of 'global interconnection', 'inequality' and 'epistemological privilege') and a re-conceptualization of scale (which takes into account the unique and shifting relation between people and place as we have seen in the examples of Belarus and Cyprus). It is these more local spaces below the hegemonic normative policy frameworks that require ongoing and critical studying in order to increase a 'nuanced' awareness of society and spaces and the sweeping effects of and resistance to political actions. Jennifer Fluri, 2009, 264) comes to the same conclusions in which she mentions the recent feminist political geographers'

request for 'scalar analyses of political geography, which include local politics as part of rather than separate from geopolitical analyses'. As we have learned from the work of Gerard O'Tuathail a more local approach is necessary to capture the consequences and challenges of the transition of European geopolitics in the 21st century. Only a more heterogeneous understanding of geopolitics is able to reinvent the valuable concepts of unity and solidarity that undermine the rigid lines that continue to divide between migrant/stranger/European.

> "It is not by confining one's neighbour that one is convinced of one's own sanity".

> Dostoievsky, in his Diary of a writer

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Freerk Boedeltje
Discontented Geopolitics of Other European Spaces

This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the changing concept of the European Union's external borders in the 21st century and the geopolitical and symbolic implications that are taking place on both the supranational arena, and on the more local level of everyday life. With the continuing fluctuation of European bordering practices, it is important to scrutinise the extent to which, security-issues, symbolic and geopolitical actions are emerging at and beyond the external borders, and what their implications are for the people involved.

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