QUEENSLAND'S ANNEXATION OF PAPUA: A BACKGROUND TO ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION

by PETER OVERLACK, B.A., Dip. Ed.

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INTRODUCTION

New Guinea, situated as it is, has pushed itself several times in our history into Australian consciousness as a sword of Damocles, a weak point in the far north. The first time was the period of colonial annexation in 1883-4. Last century, the eastern Australian colonies and New Zealand felt considerable anxiety about areas in the Pacific which had not been annexed by Britain, and pressure was brought to bear on the Imperial Government to declare a Protectorate over that part of New Guinea not annexed by the Dutch, as well as over the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands.

The Queensland Government led by Sir Thomas McIlwraith attempted to force Britain's hand by sending Mr. H. M. Chester from Thursday Island to annex the non-Dutch areas in 1883. However, the annexation was disowned by the Imperial Government. Considerable pressure led to the New Guinea and Pacific Jurisdiction Act of 1884, embodying an arrangment whereby the Australian colonies, New Zealand and Fiji agreed to contribute varying amounts to a total of £15,000 per annum to meet the expenses of establishing control over New Guinea. Queensland throughout took a leading part.

Australasian pressure for several years met with masterly inactivity in the Colonial Office during a period when prior to 1884, a momentous year in the development of German colonial consciousness, Britian could have annexed any island group in the western Pacific without fear of antagonising any other Power. But by the time the Government was ready to claim New

Mr Overlack is German master at Brisbane Boys' College. He is an authority on Germany's former colonial presence in the Pacific - a subject with which he deals in his current Master's thesis for the University of Queensland.

Guinea in the real or imagined interests of the Australians, her freedom of action was substantially curtailed, and New Guinea became a pawn in the complicated manoeuvres of European diplomacy. Queensland's rash action caused German trade interests to fear Australian designs on those areas settled by Germans; but in the event, only the southern coast was claimed under the formal Protectorate declared on 6 November 1884. Nevertheless, it was this action which only a month later prompted the German Government to declare a similar Protectorate over the areas settled by her nationals on the northern coast and islands. Agreement on a common boundary was reached in May 1885, and in September 1886, Papua was anexed as a Crown Colony - British New Guinea.

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EARLY COLONISATION SCHEMES

The lure of New Guinea as a source of wealth was persistent from the earliest days of Australian settlement. The Rev. John Dunmore Lang was a leading light behind the New Guinea Company floated in Sydney in 1867. This enterprise was abortive, but in 1871 Lang's enthusiasm helped the New Guinea Prospecting Expedition on its way.1 In England in 1876, the opposition of the London Missionary Society and the Anti-Slavery Society put an end to the ambitions of Lt. R. H. Armit and the Colonising Association Limited to establish a model colony using imported labour from Asia as a work force. In fact there was no large-scale influx of Europeans into New Guinea. No one commodity of great value which could have attracted Europeans in large numbers was ever found. The discovery of gold in 1877 on the Goldie River near Port Moresby caused a minor rush, but the initial promise of the strike was not maintained. New Guinea's value was to be in its strategic position.

Prior to the attempted Queensland coup in 1883, the pressure for British intervention was intermittent and uncoordinated. In the 1870s and early 1880s, Australasian Colonial Governments occasionally passed resolutions requesting annexation. Members of the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute wrote from time to time to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, pointing out the desirability of adding New Guinea to the Empire, while missionaries and humanitarians sought the imposition of the Queen's peace in order to protect the natives from gold diggers, land grabbers and blackbirders.²




Photo: Commonwealth Information Centre

After the annexation of Fiji in 1874, the British Government asked for the Australian Governments' financial assistance for the administration of the new colony. Lord Carnarvon, Colonial Secretary under Disraeli, wrote to the Governors of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and New Zealand in 1875 and reminded them that it was at the repeated insistence of their Governments that Fiji had been placed under British rule, and that if further annexations in the Pacific were to take place, then they must bind themselves to contribute to the costs involved. At this time, both Liberal and Conservative Parties were reluctant to add unprofitable Pacific islands to the Empire. Carnarvon argued:

... it must be obvious that the future of these islands is of the most direct and material importance to the Colonies of Australasia, while it would be impossible for a very large proportion of the taxpayers of this country to understand on what principle they should bear ... the burden of any expenditure. If ... a Colony should recommend the intervention of this country and the expenditure of money in a neighbouring territory, amongst the first questions to be considered would be, what amount the Colony would ... expend... ³

In 1873, Captain John Moresby named and claimed three islands off the eastern extremity of New Guinea, fearing, like many of the Australian colonists in subsequent years, that foreign annexation so close to Australia, and Australian trade routes, would be dangerous. The ceremony performed by Moresby did not have the effect of annexing these islands, as ratification by the Crown never took place. It is probable, however, that the publication of his *Discoveries and Surveys in New Guinea* in 1876 did much to stimulate interest in the area. Nevertheless, at this time it was financial considerations which decided events.

THE PROBLEM OF FINANCE

In August 1875, the *Sydney Morning Herald* criticised proposals which the New South Wales Ministry had tabled in the Legislature, advocating the annexation of New Guinea and other islands by the Imperial Government. It accepted the view of Lord Carnarvon that if there were to be British annexation, a substantial proportion of the costs involved should be borne by the Australasian Colonies, since annexation would be in their interests. *The Herald* criticised the Premier, Robertson, for not realising the weight of this argument, and for failing to offer a practical solution to the problems involved: The management of such (Crown) Colonies can rest in no other hands than those of the British Parliament, in which we have no representation. The difficulty is how to reconcile our being subject to taxation with the necessity of leaving the administration in the hands of the Imperial authorities... That is the question.⁴

As the Australasian Colonies did not have independent control of their external relations, they could not, either individually or collectively, annex New Guinea. The Imperial Government was unwilling to annex on their behalf unless they paid for it. The *Herald* article also pointed out that there was great unwillingness to pay for Imperial intervention if there were to be no say in the direction of the annexed areas. It was not until 1887 that a complicated arrangement was made, whereby Queensland, on behalf of the eastern colonies, was given a share in the administration of the possession she was helping to finance.

GERMAN INTERESTS

The oldest and leading trading firm in the Pacific was that of Johann Cesar Godeffroy & Sohn, based in Hamburg, which began operations at Apia in Samoa in 1857.⁵ The first settlement in New Guinea was made in 1874 on the island of Mioko in the Duke of York Group (Neu Lauenburggruppe)⁶. It was followed by two other Hamburg houses, Robertson und Hernsheim, and the Deutsche Handels - und Plantagen Gesellschaft (DHPG which absorbed Godeffroy in 1883 when the latter was moving to bankruptcy).⁷ The firm of Hernsheim in 1875 established a trading post on Makada, the northernmost island of the Duke of York Group. It then extended to the island of Matupi in Blanche Bay on the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain (Neu Pommern); then followed a string of posts on New Britain, the Duke of York Islands, and New Ireland (Neu Mecklenburg). The main item of trade was Copra, with trepang and mother-of-pearl.


All these companies secured favourable financial terms at home. Their copra was readily saleable in Europe; their working expenses were low and labour cheap; and the steamers of the Norddeutscher-Lloyd carried their produce to Hamburg at an economic rate. Under such conditions the companies became established on a solid commercial basis, and though the output of New Guinea alone was small, the later years of the century were profitable for German commerce as a whole in the Pacific. With their extensive interests and various projects for future development, German traders viewed with some concern the growth of Australasian demands for far-reaching annexations in the same areas. Annexationist fears formed a vicious circle, for the German traders and settlers began to demand action from their own Goverment.

There was an increasing amount of irritation in Berlin over what was considered to be Anglo-Australasian indifference to German interests in the Pacific. This is exemplified by two incidents of interference. In August 1883 on the island of Yap, the DHPG trader Amery, an Englishman, was attacked and nearly killed by natives. He and other white traders then burned down houses in the guilty village as a reprisal. For this action, Amery was brought before a court on the British warship Espiegle and fined £20.8 The German firm was upset at having to reimburse as a result of British action. More importantly, an unsatisfactory correspondence was carried on between Berlin and London with regard to the depredations on German stations by labour-trade ships licensed by the Queensland Government. The worst of these occurred in April 1883, when the schooner Stanley under Captain Davis of Maryborough was on a recruiting expedition in the Laughlan Island Group. The Hernsheim agent, Karl Tetzlaff, could see three years work with the natives gone if he allowed Davis to recruit, and so forbade him to do so. A boat from the Stanley fired at the station, but when the party landed it found the place deserted. Davis then set fire to twenty tons of copra, which spread through the rest of the station and burned it to the ground. After strong protests from the German Ambassador in London, Count Muenster, the gunboat Raven arrested Davis and took him to Fiji, where he was tried by the High Commissioner. The Queensland Government paid £550 compensation to Hernsheim & Company.⁹

After repeated pleas, the firms finally received active Government co-operation at the end of 1883, when a permanent Imperial Commissioner supported by the *Hyaene* was stationed at New Britain. His duties included the enforcement of regulations concerning the recruiting of labourers, protection of German traders' rights, and the prevention or limitation of disputes between Germans and other nationals.¹⁰ As yet, no official territorial claims had been made.

QUEENSLAND MOVES

Few Australians realise how intimately associated with their own Federal movement, in its earlier stages, was the history of New Guinea. Although it was not entirely successful, there seems to be little doubt that the united Australian attempt to secure British annexation as early as 1883 was really a first step



A German medical officer at Herbertshohe (now Kokopo, New Britian) in 1906. The Germans established missions and developed copra on a large scale.

towards federation of the Australian colonies. Though neither the desired annexation nor the federation resulted at this time, it was the first movement that was Australia-wide in its scope. The Premier of Queensland, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, wrote to the Administrator, Sir Arthur Palmer, on 2 August 1883 that

The revival of the subject of certain necessary annexations and clear recognition that only through Federal action can their desires in this direction be carried into effect have suddenly brought the question of Federation . . . within the range of practical politics . . .¹¹

Annexation of New Guinea had been talked about for years. In 1864, 1874, 1878 and 1879, New South Wales, with the support of Mcllwraith, had strongly urged the necessity for immediate action on the Imperial Government, but it, equally definite in forbidding action, declared that the fear of German annexation which was so widespread was groundless. Gold discoveries and the increasing settlement in New Guinea were, however, bringing events to a head. Following on the reports of the gold discoveries, colonial authorities already in 1875 were apprehensive of foreign intervention. Finally, Mcllwraith decided that if no support were forthcoming from the Imperial Government, then the colonies would have to act by themselves, and Queensland had the greatest interests in the area.

McIlwraith was also prompted by a newspaper scare which occurred in November 1882. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* on 27 November published an article urging German annexation of New Guinea:

That other nations would not despise the colonisation of New Guinea if they were not too powerfully engaged elsewhere, is well known. Captain Moresby even affirms, in the appendix to his book about the island, that it is for the English nation a "duty" to annex and colonise New Guinea. Perhaps we might, with quite the same right, affirm it is the duty of the German nation ...¹²

The article was reproduced in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, causing much alarm. The Royal Colonial Institute, which at this time was strongly advocating annexation, drew the attention of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, to this article.¹³ The Colonial Office view was that the newspaper article would have little or no influence on the German Government. The Secretary of the Royal Colonial Institute was informed that Lord Derby

has no reason for supposing that the German Government contemplates any scheme of colonisation in the direction indicated by the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of 27 November ... 14

Not surprisingly, when the German Protectorate was established in 1884, the article was dug up and flung at the British Government together with much other abuse from Australia.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it is improbable that the article had any influence on Bismarck; his decision to establish a Protectorate in New Guinea was influenced by other domestic and European considerations.

McILWRAITH'S "GRAVE STEP"

On 26 February 1883, McIlwraith cabled his Agent-General in London with a message for the Government offering to bear the expense of administration of New Guinea, and to take formal possession on receipt of authority by cable. Lord Derby pointed out that this was a grave step; he would need to be assured that public opinion in the colony would approve, and that the Legislature would adopt the necessary resolutions. He awaited fuller explanation before committing himself.¹⁶ Derby was procrastinating, in the hope that colonial excitement would abate. Instead of explanation came action. Alarmed by the departure of the German corvette SMS Carola from Sydney on 18 March, McIlwraith two days later sent instructions to the Thursday Island Magistrate, Henry Chester, to take possession of all New Guinea east of the Dutch border, and the adjacent islands between 141' and 155' E. Chester raised the flag at Port Moresby on 4 April, and his Proclamation was read in the presence of thirteen Europeans and about 200 Papuans.¹⁷

It was recognised in Queensland that Chester's annexation would be ineffective without subsequent ratification by the British Government; Nevertheless, his action did constitute an assertion of rights in the area which would have priority over any German claim. The British Government discounted the possibility of German intervention in 1883, and persisted in doing so until the German Protectorate was actually established in the north the following year. Though repudiated, the Queensland annexation of 1883 did bring the New Guinea issue to a head. The way was left open for formal British intervention when a formula could be worked out which was satisfactory to both the Australians and the Colonial Office.

It is of interest that the Queensland Governor, Sir Arthur Kennedy, supported the annexation. It might have been expected that as the representative of the Imperial interests in an internally self-governing Colony, he might have opposed this excursion into the Imperial preserve of foreign affairs, but in a despatch to Derby dated 26 April, he expressed his "entire satisfaction'' with the action of the Queensland Government, and echoed Mcllwraith's view that there was a danger that New Guinea might be annexed by Germany.¹⁸

Kennedy was Governor of Queensland between 1877 and 1883. His approval of McIlwraith's scheme came at the very end of his career; he left Brisbane for England and retirement in May 1883, but died at Aden on 3 June. On 11 July, Derby sent a despatch disapproving of the annexation to the Administrator of Queensland, in which he stated:

... (H. M. Government) are unable to approve the proceedings of your Government in this matter. It is well understood that the officers of a Colonial Government have no power or authority to act beyond the limits of their Colony ... It has been stated in the press that one reason for which some persons in Queensland desire the annexation ... is the facility ... for obtaining a large supply of coloured labour for the sugar plantations ... the fact ... indicates a special difficulty which might present itself if the request of the Colonial Government were complied with ...

He went on to state that the Government must continue to decline proposals for annexation of large areas adjacent to Australia, in the absence of proof of the necessity of such measures. The powers of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific extended to New Guinea, and were seen as sufficient. If the Colonies were willing to provide the money for Deputies to be placed along the coast, the Imperial Government would strengthen its naval presence in New Guinea waters.¹⁹

The repudiation of Mcllwraith's action was widely criticised and led to much ill-feeling in Queensland, which will be considered in a moment, but the decision should be viewed in the light of the fact that there was a powerful suspicion that Queensland's motives were not entirely disinterested because of her immediate concern with the labour question. Sir Arthur Gordon, Governor of Fiji, declared that it was

not at all desirable to place the control of relations between natives and settlers in the hands of the local Colonial Ministers responsible to a Parliament in which one of the interests concerned is exclusively represented.²⁰

McIlwraith, in his subsequent despatch to Derby through the Administrator, best explains the reasons motivating him:

The present condition of New Guinea, uncontrolled by a civilized Government, and liable at any moment to be taken

possession of by a foreign nation, is a constant source of uneasiness to the colonists of Queensland . . .

He definitely denied that Queensland was seeking native labour for its sugar plantations, and referred to the pressure of public feeling and to the support given Queensland by the Governments of the other Colonies.²¹ Alfred Deakin, himself an advocate of the British control of the Western Pacific, described Mcllwraith as "a man of action, capable and resolute". Comparing him to Samuel Griffith, who replaced Mcllwraith as Premier later in 1883, Deakin wrote,

Sir Thomas was a man of business, stout, florid, choleric, curt and Cromwellian; Griffith, the leading barrister of his Colony, was lean, ascetic, cold, clear, collected and acidulated.²²

For months, the whole nation was stirred in protest at the British decision. The Colonial Office was scarcely understating the case when it told Bismarck that "a bitter feeling of resentment against the Mother Country had been aroused".23 In the Queensland Parliament on 4 July, McIlwraith stated that the refusal of the Imperial Government to sanction the annexation was due to the expense it would entail, the enormous extent of territory involved, and the hostility of the natives. If the Australian Colonies desired an extension of their territory, they should federate, as they were unable to accomplish the task singly. Though the action had not been sanctioned, "There can be no question that ... New Guinea ... must form part of the future Âustralian Nation''.24 McIlwraith looked on the annexation as an accomplished fact, and indeed questioned the legality of the decision of the Imperial Government:

I believe that it was perfectly legal, and that we were fully entitled to annex ... without formal sanction ... New Guinea ... must be a colony of itself, with interests like ours, or it must be a portion of Queensland.²⁵

On 17 July, while a public meeting in the Melbourne Town Hall was considering what steps might be taken to secure New Guinea, the Queensland Executive Council was discussing "immediate action".²⁶ Public opinion was unanimous that no foreign power should achieve a position of such strategic importance so near to Australia.

CONVENTION CALLED

One result of the agitation was a convention of the Colonies, including New Zealand and Fiji. Convened by the Premier of Victoria, James Service, the Convention sat at Sydney in November-December 1883, and expressed emphatically the opinion that

such steps should be immediately taken as will most conveniently and effectively secure the incorporation with the British Empire of so much of New Guinea and the islands adjacent thereto as is not claimed by the Netherlands.²⁷

The debate in Parliament on the report of the Convention gave opportunity for feelings to be vented. Mr. Morehead stated that without the prompt action of Sir Thomas, the resolutions of the Convention would never have been brought forward. He saw perfectly well "the great danger ahead if these islands did not very soon come under the sway of the British Crown".²⁸

The continual pressure from the Colonial Governments finally paid off, for in 1884, formal recognition of the annexation was forthcoming. The reluctance of successive Liberal and Conservative adminstrations to involve themselves in further annexations can be explained largely in terms of finance: there was no evidence that any new colony in the Pacific could pay its way. Carnarvon had made the point very clear to the Governors in a circular in 1885²⁹.

On 6 November 1884, Commodore J. E. Erskine arrived in Port Moresby with instructions to proclaim a Protectorate over southeastern New Guinea. This was formalised in the New Guinea and Pacific Jurisdiction Contribution Act of 1884, which shows the compromise reached between Britain and the Colonial Governments, Queensland in particular. Britain would provide the military presence if the Colonies underwrote the costs to 15,000. Although Queensland became primarily responsible for this sum, all contributed to varying degrees between 1884 and 1888. That there was no precise commitment as regards the geographical extent of British jurisdiction in New Guinea led to further dissatisfaction in Australia, and provided grounds for the basis of the declaration of the German Protectorate the same year — which was what the Colonies had been hoping to prevent.

On 5 January 1884 the German Foreign Office instructed the Ambassador in London to convey the German Government's irritation over continuing articles in the colonial press which denied the existence of any real German interests in New Guinea.³⁰ Their statements on Germany's expected annexation were seen as an excuse to justify Colonial projects of the same nature. 1884 also saw the emergence of a more active German colonial policy in all areas of the world. This was inaugurated by the annexation of the Angra Pequena region in Southwest Africa

in April. On 19 August, a telegram was sent to the Consul-General in Sydney:

Inform Imperial Commissioner von Oertzen in New Britain that it is intended to hoist the German flag in the archipelago of New Britain and along that part of the north-east coast which lies outside the sphere of influence of Holland and England, where German settlements are already existing or are in the process of formation, and that he is authorised to support purchases of land by Germans ...³¹

The establishment of the German Protectorate inflamed Australian opinion. Hostility was directed not only towards the Germans for poaching on what was regarded as an Australian preserve, but also against the British Government and the Colonial Secretary Lord Derby in particular. He was blamed for giving the Germans the opportunity by his repudiation of the 1883 Queensland annexation, his failure to meet Australian demands for Imperial annexation of all eastern New Guinea, and his inaccurate assurances of Germany's lack of interest in the area.³² Vigorous Australian protests to the Foreign Office induced a number of more diplomatic complaints to the German Government, aimed more at excusing the Gladstone Government in Australian eyes, than at removing the Germans from New Guinea. The appeasement of Germany was more important to the British at this time than the satisfaction of Australian demands for total annexation. Since the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, relations with France had become strained, since the French considered Egypt within their sphere of influence. If Germany were antagonised as well, as a result of British expansion, then an alliance of Continental Powers against Britain might occur. This had to be prevented at all cost.

In Australian eyes, the establishment of the German Protectorate involved the realisation of their long-standing fears of foreign intervention in an Australian sphere of influence. It was a factor inducing unity of action among the Colonial Governments and, ultimately, their federation. For it was seen by some Australian leaders that only with the establishment of an Australian Federal Government, with powers to conduct external relations, was there any hope of effective independent action in Australian interests in the Pacific.³³ In 1885, Sir Charles Dilke told Count Herbert Bismarck that

About New Guinea there is evidently a misunderstanding on both sides . . . the vagueness of the drafting of the terms [of the British declaration] gives you some justification ... But I have now no doubt that we have arrived at a mutually satisfactory understanding, and I consider the affair settled. I myself would have wished that we had let New Guinea go altogether. *This was prevented by the absurd line Australia takes* [author's italics]. Nevertheless, I think that annexation by Germany is a mistake ... In a generation or two, when perhaps she may have broken away from us, she will feel strong enough to wage war ... and will clear out all foreigners from her neighbourhood.³⁴

Colonial feeling was bitter: Derby and Gladstone were pilloried, and there was more than a hint that Germany and Britain had reached some understanding in 1884 as to the partition of eastern New Guinea, at the very time when assurances were being given that no foreign intervention was likely. In the Queensland Parliament, McIlwraith stated that the period

marks an era in Australian history. It is the grossest piece of treachery on the part of the English Government that has ever been perpetrated.³⁵

SMOOTHING RUFFLED FEATHERS

In a note to the German Ambassador on 7 February 1885, the British Government sought both to blame the Germans for establishing a Protectorate, and to justify the extension of the British Protectorate beyond the southern coastline. Ultimately, the same argument probably justified or excused the action of both Governments: namely, that there was no agreement between them precluding the establishment of Protectorates in the area, and that once one of them did so, there was little the other could do about it.

There was now the need for some definite arrangement between the Imperial Government and the Colonies. The first proposal was that the colonies, in the interests of efficient government, should double their guaranteed contribution of 15,000. This was unlikely to be accepted when the Protectorate was being curtailed in size to appease Germany. However, the Government made a wise choice in the person of Major-General Peter Scratchlev as Commissioner. It was left to him to ascertain Colonial contributions. He arrived in Melbourne on 4 July 1885 to find Victoria still most unhappy with Imperial policy, so he suggested that if the Colonies contributed £15,000, the Imperial Government would provide £18,000 for a vessel. With ruffled feathers thus somewhat smoothed, on 13 August Scratchley set sail in the Governor Blackall for New Guinea. The partition of New Guinea was now fact, and the British administration had begun.

From an Australian point of view, the campaign for possession of New Guinea is one aspect of the hesitant move toward federation. There is also the factor of the unifying fear of a foreign presence in the near north. Britain, for her part, needed German support in Europe and could not afford to antagonise her, for fear that she would move closer to France. Germany's trade interests had grown to the extent that some form of formal protection was required. North-east New Guinea and the northern Solomons remained under German control until the Australian military occupation in 1914. In the British Protectorate, legal problems arose making it desirable to change the status of the area to that of a Colony. After four years of intermittent haggling, mostly over administrative details, and Australian financial backing, British New Guinea was declared a Crown Colony on 4 September 1888. Thus concluded a colourful chapter in Oueensland and Australian colonial history.

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- 9. Ibid., 8429
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- 13. Staatsarchiv, Bd. 43, 8198, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18 December 1882.
- 14. Ibid., 8199, Colonial Office to Royal Colonial Institute, 4 January 1883. Pressure was also coming from the Governor of New South Wales, Augustus Loftus, cf. letter to Derby 19 February 1883, ibid.. 8200.
- 15. See Melbourne Argus, 29 December 1884.
- 16. Parliamentary Papers, 1883, xlvii, Derby to Kennedy, 8 May 1883.
- 17. Staatsarchiv, Bd. 43, 8201, 4 April 1883. Chester was born in London in 1852 and had a varied career in India, and for a time was British Political Agent at the court of the Imam of Muscat and the Sultan of Oman. He was appointed Magistrate on Thursday Island in 1877, and died in Brisbane in 1914. The Australian Encyclopaedia, sub. nom. Chester.
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 A. Deakin, *The Federal Story* (Melbourne, 1944), 10-11.
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