

The Clem Lack Memorial Oration

QUEENSLAND'S ANNEXATION OF NEW GUINEA IN 1883

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On Tuesday 3 April 1883 Henry M. Chester, Police Magistrate on Thursday Island in Torres Strait, arrived at Port Moresby on the orders of the Premier¹ of Queensland, Sir Thomas McIlwraith. The next morning at 10.00 he formally annexed to Queensland eastern New Guinea and adjacent islands in the name of the British government. A stout, bearded, somewhat pompous figure, he was proud of his role in Queensland's attempted annexation, then the high point in his career: almost thirty years in the East India Company Navy and the Queensland Public Service. Chester read his proclamation to the crowd: 200 Motu-Koita people from around Port Moresby, thirteen Europeans (eight of whom were resident in Port Moresby and three were from his ship) and several Polynesian missionary teachers and their wives. The Union Jack was hoisted and £50 of trade goods were distributed to the Papuans. That night the London Missionary Society missionaries gave a banquet to honour the occasion. The toast was "Prosperity to the latest gem added to the British Crown".²

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Chester read his proclamation in English, after which Rev. James Chalmers translated it into Motu:

I, HENRY MAJORBANKS CHESTER, resident magistrate at Thursday Island, in the Colony of Queensland, acting under instructions from the Government of the said Colony, do hereby take possession of all that portion of New Guinea and the islands and islets adjacent thereto, lying between the 141st and 155th* meridians of east longitude, in the name and on behalf of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs, and successors. In token whereof I have hoisted and saluted the British flag at Port Moresby in New Guinea, this fourth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three.

God save the Queen!

HENRY M. CHESTER

Chalmers had tried to explain the significance of the proclamation to the Papuans at morning service. What they actually made of it all we will never know. At any rate they were pleased with Chester's presents and gave gifts in return later in the day.³

Chester returned to Thursday Island, well pleased with his part in history. The Queensland government cabled news of the annexation to London where the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Colonies, announced it to the House of Commons on 16 April. The reaction was not the tacit approval of the provisional annexation which the Queensland government expected. Instead the British government expressed its annoyance at what it saw as an audacious act of unwarranted imperialism by a mere colony and refused to give its recognition to Chester's proclamation. The explanation of the annexation and its rebuttal, followed on 6 November 1884 by an authorized British claim over part of the same area of New Guinea, can be found in the history of European international politics, and European expansion into northern Australia and the Pacific islands over the previous twenty years. Before examining the political and diplomatic background to the annexation, it is necessary to outline the various facets of the early connections between North Queensland and New Guinea:-

first, the establishment of government on the Cape and in Torres Strait, part of which was the gradual extension of Queensland's boundary towards the New Guinea coast;

second, the establishment of the London Missionary Society in Torres Strait and along the south eastern coast of New

*Which included all of modern Papua New Guinea except southern Bougainville.

Guinea, with their interest in promoting the British annexation of New Guinea;

third, the 1878 Laloki gold rush, an extension of the North Queensland gold rush to New Guinea and the consequent involvement of the Queensland government;

fourth, the Queensland labour trade in Melanesia and its extension to New Guinea waters during the 1870s and 1880s.

The establishment in 1863-4 of a government station at Somerset on the tip of Cape York, a joint venture by Britain and Queensland, and its transfer to Thursday Island in 1877, is indicative of the interest of Britain and the east coast Australian colonies in the shipping passage through Torres Strait and in the establishment of government in the far north of Australia. The existence of the Strait was definitely known in Europe from 1606 when the Spanish mariner Luis Vaez de Torres ventured his ship through the dangerous waters.⁴ It also seems certain from cartographic evidence that the existence of the Strait was known or guessed at a few decades earlier than the Torres expedition.⁵ The British seem not to have known of its existence until 1762. Captain Cook sailed the *Endeavour* through the reef-strewn Strait in 1770, and in the years following the establishment of New South Wales in 1788, ships began to use the Strait as one of the northern routes to Asia. From the 1790s ships using the coastal route inside the Barrier Reef explored the North Queensland coast as a route to the East Indies and beyond. Mercantile and naval vessels plied along the coast; today their names remain on unexpected reefs, passages and shoals which they encountered.

Doubtless some called for 'refreshments' — principally water and wood — but there is little direct evidence. Some were merchant ships with cargoes bound for India or China. Others were famous naval vessels, and on board yet others were the men remembered by Australians as early coastal explorers: Captain Matthew Flinders on the *Investigator* in 1802; Lieutenant Philip King on the *Mermaid* and the *Bathurst* in 1819, 1820 and 1821; Captain J.L. Stokes on HMS *Beagle* in 1839; and Captain F.P. Blackwood on HMS *Fly* in 1842-3.⁶ John Singe in his book *The Torres Strait* records that in 1848 alone thirty-two vessels from Sydney passed through the Strait.⁷ The total number of voyages passing through the Strait by the early 1850s must have been around one hundred in each year, the number escalating as European settlement spread into North Queensland. Torres Strait Islanders gradually came more and more into contact with the passing ships and earned themselves a reputation as warriors not to be treated lightly.

The first land-based exploration of the Cape was by Edmund Kennedy, who in 1848 set out to trek from the base to the tip of the Cape. Kennedy began with thirteen men, twenty-eight horses, one hundred sheep, four dogs and three carts. The trek ended disastrously at Escape River. Kennedy was speared by Aborigines and the only survivor was Jackey Jackey his Aboriginal guide.⁸

For the northern Aborigines the sudden and unexpected appearance of Europeans was often an awesome event, but they did not arrive unannounced. News of the European invasion of the south and the slow spread north travelled well in advance of the explorers and settlers. Often straying domestic animals, 'bovine pioneers', preceded the European advance and Aboriginal trade routes carried European commodities up to the Cape tribes.⁹

BASE AT SOMERSET

After Queensland's separation from New South Wales in 1860, there were several official expeditions to the Gulf of Carpentaria and Cape York. In 1861-2 William Landsborough led an expedition through central Queensland to the Gulf in search of the ill-fated Burke and Wills expedition. In 1864 Frank and Alex Jardine led an expedition up the western side of Cape York to newly established Somerset where their father, John Jardine, was the first Magistrate. Somerset was established to provide a harbour of refuge on the Cape, a supply centre in the far north, and the beginnings of European government.

Queensland's first Governor, Sir George F. Bowen, envisaged Somerset as Australia's Singapore, a maritime gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In 1861 he wrote to the British government that:

In a naval and military point of view a post at or near Cape York would be most valuable, and its importance is daily increasing with the augmentation of the commerce passing by this route especially since the establishment of a French colony and naval station at New Caledonia.¹⁰

The British government agreed, and Somerset came into being, on the mainland rather than on an island, to allow for expansion of the envisaged great trading city.

When John Jardine and the government party arrived to set up a base at Somerset in July 1864 they found a Captain Edwards already living on Albany Island opposite Somerset. He had built a store and a stone curing-house for *beches-de-mer*. Jardine remained as Police Magistrate until late 1865, but accomplished little. Few ships bothered to call; and in truth many actively avoided Somerset. The *beche-de-*

mer, pearling and labour trade vessels had, until the establishment of Somerset, enjoyed the freedom of the Strait, and preferred to continue their activities untrammelled by law.¹¹

Jardine was replaced by Captain Simpson but Simpson called it quits after less than a year of his three-year appointment in the lonely outpost. The next Magistrate was John Jardine's son Frank. Frank Jardine concentrated his efforts more on the pacification of the local Aborigines than on the maritime affairs of the Strait. He served until 1869, then was replaced by H.M. Chester while he took leave. Chester persevered, despairing of his white-ant-riddled outpost of empire, but turning his attention more to the affairs of the Strait than had either of the Jardines or Simpson. Frank Jardine returned in 1871 and served again as Police Magistrate until May 1873.¹² Next came C.E. Beddome in 1873-4 who was invalided south, and G.E. Dalrymple for less than a month in 1874, also invalided south.

Hopes for this "Singapore of the north" faded as the 1860s progressed. It became obvious that the harbour was poorly sited for passing ships and also that it was not suitable as a port for the Cape hinterland. After 1868 a pearling industry developed in Torres Strait, and in 1874 the Queensland government, by then no longer in joint venture with Britain at Somerset, decided to shift the settlement to one of the Torres Strait Islands, on the main shipping route. The most immediate event that decided the relocation of the northern port was Britain's authorization in 1872 of Queensland plans to annex all of the Torres Strait Islands within sixty miles of the Queensland coast. This extended Queensland's northern frontier to within twenty miles of the Papuan coast and made an island base even more sensible.¹³

Dalrymple, like Chester, was an old hand at administering outposts of Queensland government. He arrived in Queensland in 1857: in turn station manager, explorer, Land Commissioner, Gold Commissioner and Police Magistrate, he was used to frontier life and was a very suitable candidate for the job of representing Queensland in the north. His initial reports on the down-at-heel settlement signalled its demise. Dalrymple suggested a shift to Hammond (Keriri) Island, by his reckoning a far more suitable site for the great northern commercial emporium still fondly imagined by many. His reports pictured Hammond Island as a fortress commanding the Strait and he advocated the further step of British annexation of eastern New Guinea. An old friend from his Brisbane days was Sir Robert Herbert, Queensland's first Premier 1859-1866, who was in 1874 Under-Secretary for the Colonies in the new D'sraeli government. Dalrymple knew that Herbert favoured British annexation of New Guinea to forestall German imperial moves. Well aware of the possibilities, Dalrymple looked forward to exploring New Guinea from his new base in Torres


Strait. But, struck down by a recurrent fever and a stroke within his first month at Somerset, he too joined the list of Police Magistrates who were invalided south.¹⁴

By this stage Somerset must have had quite a reputation among Queensland's leading Public Servants as a good place to avoid. After Dalrymple came D'Oyley Aplin who lasted less than a year and had less luck than his predecessors: he died in Somerset. But it was Aplin who suggested shifting Somerset to Thursday (Waiben) Island; and, although not at the site he chose, it is at Thursday Island that the northern headquarters town remains today. H.M. Chester was re-appointed to Somerset in 1875. Although Queensland had some reservations about the loss of the mainland base, Premier Douglas accepted advice and had a government reserve proclaimed on Thursday Island in December 1876. Within a year Chester was installed in the Residency at Vivien Point on Thursday Island.¹⁵

FEELERS TO THE NORTH

Queensland faced the problem of how, legitimately, to give the Thursday Island Magistrate power over other islands in Torres Strait. In 1878 Queensland solicited an appointment for Chester as Deputy Commissioner for Darnley (Erub) and Murray (Mer) Islands under the Western Pacific High Commission. The Commission came into operation in February 1878. Based in Suva, it included under its jurisdiction New Guinea to 143°E and "all other islands in the Western Pacific Ocean not being within the limits of the Colonies of Fiji, Queensland, or New South Wales, and not being within the jurisdiction of any civilised power".¹⁶ This presumably included the islands of Torres Strait. During 1878 there was a minor gold rush at Laloki, just outside Port Moresby. Queensland sent a Gold Fields' Warden to Laloki to control the miners and Chester paid an official visit to Port Moresby in August 1878. Then in late 1878 Britain offered Queensland the chance to shift its boundary north, this time to include Warrior Reef and Saibai, Tuan, Boigu and Talbot Islands, hard up against the coast of mainland New Guinea. Queensland accepted, and in early 1879 returned Chester's Deputy Commissionership with an intimation that a Queensland colonial officer could not with propriety hold an appointment emanating from another source.¹⁷ With this gradual extension of the northern border and of government control, it would have seemed quite a logical step to Chester when he received his orders in 1883 to proceed to Port Moresby to make a provisional annexation of eastern New Guinea.

Although the north coast of New Guinea and the islands to its east were well known to European navigators by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the south coast was not. Bougainville explored



Mr. H.M. Chester, representing the Queensland government, proclaiming the annexation of south eastern New Guinea, 4 April 1883. (Australasian Sketcher, 4 June 1883, p. 10)

around the south coast in 1768 and Cook visited the south west coast in 1770. Blackwood on HMS *Fly* discovered and explored the Fly River in 1845. In the following year Lieutenant Yule visited the south east coast, naming Yule Island. In the late 1840s Captain Owen Stanely on HMS *Rattlesnake* made a rough sketch of the south east coast. The charting of the south east coast was not completed until the 1873 voyage of Captain John Moresby on the 1074-ton paddle wheel steamer HMS *Basilisk*. Charting of this part of the coast had long been neglected because of the dangerous shoals, reefs and strong south east winds which made the eastern end of the island difficult to negotiate. Moresby was acclaimed for his accurate surveying work; his family name lives on in Port Moresby which he named after his father Admiral Sir Fairfax Moresby.¹⁸

Close in the wake of Moresby's visit came the London Missionary Society (LMS). The LMS Mission to New Guinea was inaugurated in 1871, though no mission station was begun on the mainland until late in 1872. The LMS, a British Protestant mission, began its work in the Pacific at Tahiti in 1797, gradually spreading north west through the Pacific. The large, unknown, dragon-shaped island, New Guinea, had long presented a tantalizing challenge to the LMS missionaries but they made no moves towards the island until 1870. Because of friction between LMS and Catholic missionaries in the Loyalty Islands the LMS decided to move north and sent two experienced missionaries, S. MacFarlane and A.W. Murray, to inaugurate a mission in New Guinea. Accompanied by two Polynesian teachers they pro-


ceeded to Darnley Island in Torres Strait with the intention of using this base from which to extend their activities to New Guinea. In 1871 they advanced through Torres Strait, placing Polynesian teachers and their wives on several islands. LMS policy was to create safe stepping stones leading to the great unknown island. This cautious advance culminated when they landed at Katau on the coast not far from the border of the area claimed by the Dutch since 1828 as Dutch New Guinea. At Katau they established the first mission station on the eastern half of New Guinea.¹⁹

The LMS laid evangelical claim to the southern coast of the eastern half of New Guinea: from the Louisiade Archipelago to Saibai in Torres Strait. Although not adverse to other Protestant denominations they made it clear that Catholic missionaries were not part of their plans.²⁰ In 1872 A.W. Murray moved from the Loyalty Islands to Somerset to establish the headquarters of the LMS New Guinea mission and was pleased to find that tenuous footings were already established on several islands in the Strait. Late in 1872 Polynesian teachers were placed at Katau and Manu Manu in Redscar Bay. This first Papuan mission collapsed within a year of its founding, its chances of success destroyed by malaria, short rations and isolation. The LMS had no shop by which the Somerset headquarters could maintain contact with the isolated mission. Captain Moresby visited the Manu Manu mission on the *Basilisk* in 1873. He found the mission teachers starving and in ill-health and evacuated them to Somerset.²¹

Moresby scathingly attacked the LMS for risking the lives of the Loyalty Islanders in conditions under which no European missionary would be sent. The dispute between Moresby and the LMS was protracted and attracted the attention of the Australian press. The *Brisbane Courier* labelled the Manu Manu mission “evangelical manslaughter” and called for Queensland government inquiry.²² But Moresby also did the LMS a favour in his discovery of what became Port Moresby, the first successful LMS base on the mainland. In 1873 four Rarotongan teachers, two with wives, settled in Hanuabada, the biggest of villages at Port Moresby. They were joined in 1874 by Rev. W.G. Lawes, his wife and family. Thus was established the first permanent European settlement on the eastern half of New Guinea.

In its early years the LMS Port Moresby mission fared little better than its Manu Manu predecessor. The missionaries suffered from malaria, and in 1875 a measles epidemic killed many Hanuabadans, four Rarotangans and Lawes’ son. Exhausted, Lawes temporarily retired south, and was replaced by James Chalmers. Chalmers arrived at the end of a long dry season, the time of year when Port Moresby’s

hills assume an unattractive burnt brown hue. He was not impressed.²³



Map of northern Australia and the island of New Guinea. (J. Singe, The Torres Strait: people and history (Brisbane, 1979, Map 1 (Preface).))

Chalmers took over the central part of the mission from his Port Moresby base; Murray worked in the west based on Murray Island in Torres Strait; and MacFarlane worked from a base in China Strait at the tail end of eastern New Guinea. Lawes returned in 1881 and worked in partnership with Chalmers. Due to the combined efforts of the LMS missionaries and most particularly their Pacific Islander teachers, by the end of 1882 there were sixteen mission stations, sixty-eight church members, thirty candidates for baptism and an average daily school attendance of 282. By 1884 there were 140 pupils at school in Port Moresby and 1000 throughout the mission. Nine Papuan evangelists were at work and there were more than twenty mission stations.²⁴

DISCOVERY OF GOLD

The first non-missionary European to put his faith into Port Moresby was a trader, Andrew Goldie. Commercial faith also sometimes has its rewards. In 1877 Goldie discovered gold at Laloki close to Port Moresby. The missionaries were distressed at the possibility of a gold rush and its effects on their small settlement and the surrounding Motu-Koita people. Nevertheless, out of friendship to Goldie, Lawes took a sample to Sydney with him when he was repatriated for his health in late 1877. On his voyage he wrote of his fears:

the effects of the specimens Mr. Goldie is now sending by me to Sydney will probably be a rush of gold-seekers to Port Moresby — Alas for the poor natives If this takes place we had better get in strongly for annexation.²⁵

Although gold prospecting and mining had been important in southern Australia since the 1850s, in the initial years of settlement in North Queensland little interest was shown in gold. Settlers were preoccupied with opening up new country and stocking it with sheep and cattle. Then gold was discovered on Star River station west of Townsville in November 1865, which began a wider search for gold in the north. North Queensland, except in one area at that time unexplored, was not rich in alluvial gold, the mainstay of the early rushes in the south.

Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, as exploration opened North Queensland, large gold fields were found, principally around Ravenswood and Charters Towers, Etheridge, and in the far north behind Cairns and Cooktown in the Hodgkinson and Palmer River areas. Gold was discovered on the Palmer River in 1873. The Palmer boomed between 1873 and 1876 when European and Chinese miners poured onto the fields: 20,000 to 30,000 people made their way to the Palmer field or to Cooktown in those early years. During the late 1870s prospectors scoured Cape York looking for a new Palmer. Once this penetration of Cape York was under way the jump across the Strait to the Laloki gold field was a logical progression.²⁶

LMS fears of the Laloki gold rush of 1878 were ill-founded. Some gold miners came direct from Sydney and others left the North Queensland fields for New Guinea, but their number was small and the impact of their presence was not as anticipated. There was only a limited amount of gold and the miners fell victim to the harsh climate and poor conditions, worse even than the difficult conditions they had faced in North Queensland. Few clashes occurred between them and the Motu-Koita people. The miners appreciated the kindness of the LMS missionaries who nursed their sick. The Queensland government awake to the possible clash between avaricious miners and the local people, and with an eye on its future interests in New Guinea, allowed W.B. Ingham to go to Port Moresby in 1878 as Gold Fields Warden to supervise the miners. Ingham, during his short reign, established a sort of miniature government similar to that which followed the miners on the North Queensland diggings. He set up judicial and executive machinery to make and enforce laws on the Laloki gold field. Police Magistrate H.M. Chester from Thursday Island also visited Port Moresby while the rush was in progress.²⁷

Although Ingham's jurisdiction was confined to Laloki and its environs, inexplicably he and his men led an expedition to Brooker



*Etching of Hanuabada, showing mission premises and government buildings, circa 1884. (M.E. Turvey, *London Missionary Society Missionaries in New Guinea, 1871-1884: agents of Empire?* (M.A. thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1976), p. 149.)*

Island* and were murdered. The missionaries wrote to the Queensland Premier urging a visit from a British warship to punish the offenders. Ingham was not replaced, no warship came and the gold rush ended. The most useful result of it all seems to have been a dozen or so horses left behind by the miners, which formed the nucleus of a herd at Port Moresby.²⁸ The gold rush emphasized the missionaries' dilemma. They had no effective power to control Europeans such as the miners, nor could they deal with attacks by Papuans on Europeans such as in the case of the murder of Ingham and his party. All pointed inexorably to the assumption of control by some European government, and from an LMS point of view, preferably British.

LABOUR TRADE ISSUE

One factor usually held to be partly responsible for Queensland's interest in New Guinea, if not actually instrumental in the annexation, was the labour trade linking Melanesia and Queensland. Recruiting of labourers from the Pacific Islands to work in Queensland began in the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) in 1863. In the early 1860s some Queenslanders hoped that cotton growing could provide the infant colony with an agricultural staple, but cotton soon ceased to be Queensland's major tropical crop. In its stead sugar cane plantations were established from the mid-1860s; these similarly required large numbers of labourers to work in the fields and mills. Attempts to import Asian labourers to work on these plantations failed. For the

*In the Calvados Chain in the Louisiade Archipelago, 11°4' S and 152°27' E.

remainder of the century Melanesian labourers became the major labour supply for the plantations and the smaller cane farms which eventually replaced them.²⁹

The European settlement of North Queensland occurred in the 1860s when capital was readily available for pastoral investment, as a result of the 1850s' gold rushes in the south. Some of this capital flowed directly on to the 1870s' sugar plantations as there were close connections between pastoral and plantation interests in North Queensland. In the early 1870s Australian banks which had accumulated funds in London were investing in Australia to take advantage of attractive interest rates. Moreover, in the 1870s and 1880s many Anglo-Australian business houses were lending English capital for use in a wide range of investments in Australian pastoral and agricultural industries. By 1880-84 investment in the sugar industry had almost outstripped pastoral investment. In 1884 over £6,000,000 was invested in the Queensland sugar industry, one-third of this amount in the leading sugar producing region, at Mackay.

In excess of 63,000 Pacific Islanders were contracted to work as indentured labourers in Queensland between 1863 and 1904. Historians have attempted to make numerical estimates of the degree of illegality in the total Queensland labour trade. Dr. Kay Saunders seems to have come close to the truth in estimating that twenty-five to thirty per cent of all enlistments "were in varying degrees illegal" under the terms of the Acts and Regulations, "though probably less than 5 per cent would have been kidnapped". Saunders also suggested 1885 as the cut-off date between an early increasingly legal period and the later predominantly legal period of the labour trade. Her estimate is paralleled by my own research into the migration of Malaitans from the Solomon Islands to Queensland during the years 1871 to 1904, 14.7% of the total number of labourers involved.³⁰

The most recent research into the Queensland labour trade has all reached basically the same conclusion: the initial recruits came from coastal areas where the Islanders had direct access to vessels; recruiting in its initial stages was primarily by deception. Equally, research findings stress that kidnapping is not a continuing theme as the recruiting trade progressed onto the 1880s, 1890s and early 1900s. Recruiting became a voluntary affair. The change came not from any substantial alteration in European attitudes to Melanesians or from better government of the Pacific Islands. Rather it developed with increasing awareness amongst the Islanders of the real nature and benefits of the labour trade and life on the plantations, an awareness which made kidnapping unnecessary and almost impossible in the final years of the labour trade.

Recruiting in New Guinea waters clearly falls within the period delineated above as primarily illegal. By 1883-84 recruiters had moved north of the Solomons to the Bismarck and Louisiade Archipelagos off eastern New Guinea, kidnapping labour in a manner not seen since the 1860s in the New Hebrides and the early 1870s in the Solomons. The already high mortality rates amongst the labourers increased alarmingly in 1884-85, primarily because of the inability of the New Britain and New Ireland recruits to adapt to life on the plantations. Cultural dislocation, the change in climate, work regime and epidemiological environment, caused the deaths of many first-indenture Melanesians; but men and women from New Britain and New Ireland fared worst of all. The increased mortality, coupled with blatant kidnapping, was too much for the exasperated government of Premier Griffith. A Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into recruiting in New Guinea waters, and several legislative moves followed in quick succession. The wretched New Guinea Islanders were repatriated at Queensland government expense. Indigenous black Australians and New Guineans were no longer to be employed on ships in Queensland waters. As a *coup de grace* Griffith gave notice in 1885 that recruiting of Melanesian labour for the Queensland sugar industry was to cease in 1890; although when economic circumstances forced him, in 1892, to revoke his ban, recruiting actually continued until the end of 1903.

The owners of Queensland's sugar plantations were influential in colonial politics and were not short of powerful friends in Britain. In matters concerning the annexation of New Guinea they made it clear that they valued the large island as a potential source of labour for the



The interior of a Motu Lakatoi, circa 1890. The Motu people from around Port Moresby sailed these large boats on annual expeditions to the Gulf of Papua and back. (Original of photo is held by the Museum fur Volkerkunde, Dresden, Germany.)

sugar industry. But how much their interests were served by McIlwraith when he sent Chester to annex eastern New Guinea is a matter of conjecture.³¹

A PERSONAL DECISION

The remainder of this paper will concentrate on McIlwraith and his motivation in authorizing Queensland's attempted annexation of New Guinea. Of two things we can be certain: it was his personal decision and it was carefully timed. Sir Thomas McIlwraith was a forceful, domineering man, large of bulk and direct and business-like of nature. Born in Ayr, Scotland, in 1835, he trained as a civil engineer at Glasgow University, emigrating to Australia in 1854. Initially he based his business interests in Victoria, concentrating on railway construction. He first visited Queensland in 1862, moving there permanently in 1870; he soon became involved in large-scale pastoral, mining, banking and commercial speculation; and also in Queensland politics. McIlwraith entered the Queensland Legislative Assembly in 1870 and served consecutively as member for a number of southern electorates until 1896.³² A Conservative, he joined the Cabinet in 1874, and served as Premier and Treasurer from 1879 until 1883. His government won the 1883 elections but was defeated in the House on its second day back.

McIlwraith readily mixed his business and political interests, a characteristic feature of Queensland politics for more than a century. By the late 1870s McIlwraith was leader of the small commercial elite in Queensland. He had easy access to finance through the Queensland National Bank and had numerous commercial interests, especially in land and shipping, and, notably, in relation to this paper, in Torres Strait. W. Ross Johnston, in his history of Queensland *The Call of the Land* described McIlwraith in the following way:

He tried to develop the frozen meat industry; he proposed private railway schemes; he was involved in the importation of steel rails for the government, at apparently excessive freight rates. He and political colleagues seemed not too concerned about the separation of public and private interests, using their official positions to assist and further their private business affairs. .³³

A contemporary assessment, a description of McIlwraith was given by Australia's second Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, a politician of similar colonial vintage:

He was a man of action, capable and resolute . . . a man of business, stout, florid, choleric, curt and Cromwellian.³⁴

It is clear that McIlwraith was business-like and sharp of temper and action. His annexation bid fits what we know of his character. On 24 February 1883 he sent a cable instructing Queensland's Agent General in London to urge Lord Derby, British Colonial Secretary, to "annex New Guinea to Queensland". Agent General Archer delivered this request to Lord Derby on 28 February. On 26 February McIlwraith wrote to Sir Arthur Kennedy, Governor of Queensland. Governor Kennedy forwarded his letter to Lord Derby on 14 March. Without waiting for a reply, McIlwraith went to Queensland's Executive Council on Thursday 15 March, gaining permission to send a Queensland government official (H.M. Chester) to annex eastern New Guinea, pending a reply from London. The actual order to Chester was not despatched until Monday 19 March, plenty of time for McIlwraith to have cabled London for permission if he had so wanted, stating the reasons for the urgency. McIlwraith always gave as the main reason for his action the general rumour that a German navy ship was about to annex unnamed Pacific Islands, and that just such a ship, the *Carola*, did sail from Sydney 'for a cruise', destination unknown, on 19 March.³⁵

Sir Arthur Kennedy left Brisbane for retirement in England in May 1883. Lord Derby wrote to Queensland's interim Administrator, President of the Legislative Council, Sir Arthur Palmer, on 11 July 1883, refusing to uphold Queensland's annexation of eastern New Guinea. He put forward four main reasons for the refusal: first, that Queensland had no power or authority to act beyond the boundaries of the colony, which bordered with but did not include New Guinea; second, that there was no substantiated evidence that any foreign powers were likely to annex New Guinea; third, that it was impracticable to govern New Guinea from Brisbane, given the great distance and the more pressing need to complete the settlement of North Queensland; fourth, that Queensland had a bad reputation internationally over its treatment of the colony's Aboriginal population and for the constant abuses of its labour trade in Melanesia. To hand over another estimated one million Melanesians to Queensland, given that colony's poor reputation, would cause an international scandal and not augur well for the New Guineans.³⁶

On 10 July 1883, the day before Derby wrote his letter to the Antipodes, Sir Thomas McIlwraith defended Queensland's annexation of New Guinea in a memorandum to Sir Arthur Palmer, Administrator of the Government in Council. McIlwraith was already aware that Lord Derby had refused to confirm the annexation so he was fighting a rearguard action after defeat. He put forward six major reasons supporting and justifying the annexation: first, that the annexation had been under discussion since 1875, the only real drawback

being the cost to the British taxpayer; second, that the cost need not be greater than the pittance spent by the Dutch to maintain their western half of New Guinea; third, that Queensland was willing to share that cost and would raise the matter of financing the administration of New Guinea with the other Australian colonies; fourth, that the introduction of government in New Guinea would be beneficial to the indigenous and the European population of New Guinea; fifth, that such an annexation was the collective wish of the Australian people; sixth, that given the frustrations of the colonial bond the Australian colonies should speed up their discussions intended to lead to a federation of the colonies.³⁷

Derby's judgement, viewed one century later, appears to have been sound in all but one, major, aspect; he was deluded in his belief that no other European nation was likely to annex New Guinea in the near future. Germany annexed north eastern New Guinea on 4 November 1884, forcing Britain, hastily, to annex the remaining south eastern section. Had the Queensland 1883 annexation been accepted there would never have been a German colony in northern Melanesia. J. Legge in the 1940s and M.G. Jacobs in the 1950s uncovered the fascinating government-to-government negotiations concerning New Guinea, involving Britain, France, Germany, and their colonies in Africa and the Pacific. The Germans had the British bluffed over the New Guinea question. Derby's information on possible German initiatives in New Guinea was inadequate, but the remainder of his assessment, particularly in regard to Queensland's race problems, has stood the test of time. Colonial Queenslanders were callous in attitude toward the indigenous population of Queensland and the Pacific. Papua New Guineans should be thankful that they never became subject to the special laws which govern Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Queensland today.

McIlwraith's argument is sound and cogent in what it discusses, but leaves aside one key point crucial to any argument about New Guinea in 1883: the labour trade. His assessment of the chances of German annexation proved to be more accurate than that of the expert Foreign Office staff who assured Derby to the contrary. His omission of the labour trade is the key to the timing, style and motivation of the annexation. McIlwraith knew that humanitarian groups in London and Australia would try to block any attempt by Queensland at annexation, solely on the joint issues of Queensland's treatment of its Aboriginal population and the colony's labour trade to Melanesia. Not willing to face such a debate, which Queensland could only lose, he attempted to present Britain with a *fait accompli*: annex first and talk about it afterwards. His main argument, fear of German annexation, proved true, although it may in part have been motivated by

McIlwraith's audacious annexation of 1883. The labour trade motive, here argued to be the real overriding motive, will form the subject of the discussion during the remainder of this paper.

. SOME FORTHRIGHT VIEWS

Derby was firm in his view that Queensland had a lamentable reputation in regard to its Aboriginal and immigrant Melanesian population. To add New Guinea to Queensland's territory was unacceptable. Derby was diplomatic in his wording; other high-ranking British officials were less so. On 16 October 1883 the Commissioners of the Western Pacific Royal Commission submitted their report, which firmly opposed making New Guinea part of Queensland. They argued that such an action would remove from Imperial control the labour trade around New Guinea, as it would then become a coasting trade subject only to Queensland laws. They added that:

Admitting all that may be urged by the most zealous defender of the Queensland planters, it cannot be the less unwise to place them in a position of temptation such as it would require almost superhuman virtue to resist. If a vast population of blacks, amounting in the lowest estimate to some millions, be put under the absolute control of a handful of white land-owners, it is impossible not to contemplate with apprehension the very serious results which are, to say the least, quite within the bounds of probability.³⁸

One of the Commissioners, the influential Sir Arthur Gordon, Governor of Fiji and Western Pacific High Commissioner, was even more forthright in private correspondence. A confidant of Prime Minister Gladstone, Gordon wrote to Gladstone on 20 April 1883:

The habit of regarding natives as vermin, to be cleared off the face of the earth, has given to the average Queenslander a tone of brutality and cruelty in dealing with "blacks" . . .³⁹

Gordon went on to stress that the labour trade would become a coasting trade with its legislation totally controlled by Queensland.

Whether those who are directly interested in the employment of immigrant native labour are those to whom the regulation of its introduction can be most fitly committed I need not ask.⁴⁰

He urged Gladstone not to allow Queensland dominion over the races of northern Melanesia.

Soon after news of the attempted annexation reached London in April 1883 Derby queried the Queensland government as to the veracity of press reports that Queensland-licensed labour vessels had begun recruiting in the waters off New Guinea. Governor Kennedy

had completed his term and in the interregnum Sir Arthur Palmer cabled a reply on 31 May:

Cannot ascertain that any labour ships have gone to New Guinea. Vessels clear for South Sea islands only; no labourers have come from New Guinea.⁴¹

Palmer was quite truthful in saying that there was no information available on the islands which ships proposed to visit. Licences specified the number of recruits any ship could carry and listed the names of their future employers but did not specify which islands the ships could visit. But Palmer was at best misled and at worst lying in stating that no New Guinea labourers had entered the colony: 102 men and women from New Britain, Duke of York islands and New Ireland had been in Queensland since 21 May. The Brisbane offices of the Immigration Department would have received a telegraph report of their arrival, so the information would have been readily available to Palmer.

During the initial debates following the attempted annexation McIlwraith denied the existence of any sinister motives - labour trade motives - behind his action. He stood firm in his denial over many years. In his Address in Reply in the Assembly on 15 August 1888, while once more Premier, he tried to shift the blame for recruiting in New Guinea waters to Griffith, who followed him as the next Premier of Queensland after the annexation bid. To set the scene: McIlwraith's government was re-elected in the August 1883 elections; on the second day of the new parliament, 8 November, the government was defeated; McIlwraith resigned on 13 November and the parliament adjourned until early 1884; on 10 January Griffith was sworn in as Premier,⁴² a position he held until April 1886.

After reading out a list of eight labour trade voyages investigated by the 1884 Royal Commission into recruiting in New Guinea waters McIlwraith went on to say:

Those were almost all the ships that sailed for recruits during the Griffith Government regime. I want also to challenge a statement the hon. gentleman made - that he made no alteration to the system. I say now, and I have repeated it in this House over and over again - and the hon. gentleman only contradicted me on a technicality - that no ship was allowed to recruit in New Guinea before the hon. gentleman came into office. The hon. gentleman met that today by saying that I had not said before that I had given instructions that none should be recruited. Technically that is wrong - actually it is right. The way it is done is this: Licences are granted according to a form, and I could not say in the form that they were not to go to

New Guinea or what islands they were to go to. They were licensed according to the form to go to the South Sea Islands, but everyone was given to understand, and did understand, and as a matter of fact during my time obeyed that understanding, that no ships were to recruit in New Guinea, and as a matter of fact up to the time I left office no ship did recruit in New Guinea.⁴³

Palmer and McIlwraith were themselves importers and employers of Melanesian labour. Many of their associates were also employers of Melanesian labour. Gossip of any new developments in the labour trade was common talk in coastal Queensland of that time. Officially, both could have availed themselves of exact information on Melanesian migration from the Immigration Department in Brisbane. That they did not speaks for itself.

Queensland had an efficient telegraph service and the Assistant Immigration Agent in each port always reported immediately by telegraph to Brisbane the details of each newly-arrived labour trade ship. Fuller details were despatched south by ship soon after each arrival. Both Palmer and McIlwraith seem to have overlooked the undeniable fact that the schooner *Hopeful* returned from the Bismarck Archipelago with 102 labour recruits on 21 May 1883. The *Hopeful* was owned by Robert Philp of Burns Philp and Company, and licensed to carry up to 186 recruits. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company through their agents Parbury Lamb had contracted with Philp to procure them 100 labourers for their plantations; Gairlock and Hamleigh plantations contracted for the other eighty-six places.⁴⁴ The *Hopeful* departed empty from Townsville on 6 February and returned to the same port on 21 May 1883 with 102 labourers on board: four from New Britain, forty from Duke of York Islands, and fifty-eight from New Ireland. Philp grossed well in excess of £2,000 from the venture, a tidy sum in 1883.

McIlwraith is quite specific in his 1888 speech that up until the time he left office no ship recruited around New Guinea because he had given instructions that none should. If we are to believe the Premier, even allowing him a few technical points as to what was meant to be included in his definition of "New Guinea", we must then disbelieve the overwhelming evidence presented in the Appendix to this paper. The Appendix contains details of the recruiting voyages from Queensland into waters now included in Papua New Guinea, and is limited to the 1883-1884 period, generally reckoned to be the New Guinea years of the Queensland labour trade. Actually the period is longer, 1878 until about 1888. One reliable source indicates thirty-five recruits from the North Solomons between 1878 and 1882, and some Bismarck Archipelago recruits were returned at the end of their three-

year contracts in 1888.⁴⁵ Dealing here with only the 1883-1884 voyages, there were forty-one voyages during these years on which there were labourers from islands now part of Papua New Guinea. On these forty-one voyages there were more than 3,700 Melanesian labour recruits, probably about 2,100 to 2,500 of whom were from the islands off eastern New Guinea.

Dealing specifically with McIlwraith's protestations of innocence, nineteen of the voyages left Queensland while he was Premier and eight returned while he was Premier, that is, before 13 November 1883. More than 600, possibly 700, labourers from the New Guinea islands entered labour contracts in Queensland while he was Premier.⁴⁶

Some further light is thrown on all of this from a recent survey of Queensland press attitudes to the annexation question and their treatment of the labour trade issue over the same period. Roger C. Thompson in *Australian Imperialism in the Pacific* reports that

a clear majority of eleven newspapers which commented on the New Guinea question in March and April 1883 considered the labour trade a likely reason for McIlwraith's action.

Significantly also, after April all but one of those papers dropped that suggestion about the labour trade like a proverbial hot potato. Only the *Telegraph*, the one Queensland paper opposing annexation of New Guinea, kept up that theme.⁴⁷

Dr. Thompson attributes the silence to reports "that missionaries and humanitarian groups in Britain were remonstrating against Queensland's annexation of New Guinea because of the labour trade connection."⁴⁸

It is clear that Queensland's Administrator and premier were less than honest with the British Colonial Office and the parliament and people of Queensland. Their suppression of the true importance of the labour trade and the sudden silence from the newspapers shows just how destructive they all thought the issue would be to Queensland's chances of successfully annexing New Guinea. When Britain finally relented and annexed south eastern New Guinea to the Empire on 6 November 1884 all hope was lost for Queensland. When a Royal Commission was appointed on 23 December 1884 to inquire into the labour trade to the New Guinea archipelagos the secrets and scandals of the New Guinea labour trade to Queensland began to emerge. The importance of the labour trade has never been given sufficient prominence in studies of the annexation, perhaps because the denials of the time have always been taken on face value and not matched by statistics. The closer analysis here provides conclusive evidence of the connection.

APPENDIX

QUEENSLAND LABOUR TRADE VOYAGES 1883-84 WHICH INCLUDED ISLANDS NOW INCLUDED
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA.

(The numbers in brackets under the ships' names refer to the number of the
voyage in relation to the total voyages in the trade since 1863*)

Ship	Ports and dates of departure and arrival*		Male Females Total			Origins of labourers recruited and numbers if known. Islands now included in PNG are underlined.
			M	F	T	
HOPEFUL 1 (355)	Townsville	6-2-1883	0	0	0	<u>New Britain</u> (4); <u>Duke of York</u> (40); <u>New Ireland</u> (58)
	Townsville	21-5-1883	100	2	102	
JESSIE KELLY 2 (363)	Brisbane	22-3-1883	0	0	0	<u>New Ireland</u> , <u>New Britain</u> , <u>Buka</u> , <u>Shortlands</u> , <u>Omba</u> , <u>Epi</u> , <u>Efate</u> , <u>Emae</u> , <u>Tongoa</u> , <u>Ambrim</u>
	Bundaberg	29-6-1883	111	9	120	
FANNY 3 (366)	Mackay	13-3-1883	0	0	0	<u>New Britain</u> , <u>Nusa</u>
	Mackay	13-7-1883	128	1	129	
LORD OF THE ISLES 4 (369)	Brisbane	22-3-1883	0	0	0	<u>Guadalcanal</u> (13), <u>Vella Lavella</u> (2), <u>New Britain</u> (71), <u>Duke of York</u> (4), <u>New Ireland</u> (10)
	Ingham	23-7-1883	100	0	100	
JESSIE KELLY 5 (380)	Bundaberg	25-7-1883	0	0	0	<u>Simbo</u> , <u>Fauro</u> (13), <u>Feni</u> (2), <u>New Ireland</u> , <u>Tanga</u> (97), <u>Nissan</u>
	Brisbane	20-9-1883	120	0	120	
LOCHIEL 6 (381)	Bundaberg	9-7-1883	0	0	0	<u>New Britain</u> (165), <u>Lihir</u> (8)
	Bundaberg	11-10-1883	154	19	173	
CEARA 7 (383)	Townsville	24-7-1883	0	0	0	<u>New Britain</u> (67), <u>New Ireland</u> (7), <u>Duke of York</u> (1), <u>Tabar</u> (1), <u>Lihir</u> (52), <u>Woodlark</u> (6), <u>Lachlan</u> (5)
	Townsville	19-10-1883	113	26	139	

*Ships that were wrecked are listed in order of sailing from Queensland, at the end of each year.

Ship	Ports and dates of departure and arrival	M	F	T	Origins of labourers recruited and numbers if known. Islands now included in PNG are underlined.
ALFRED VITTEY 8 (386)	Maryborough 7-7-1883 Maryborough 7-11-1883	0 92	0 8	0 100	San Christoval (1), Guadalcanal (6), Malaita (16), Florida (2), Savo (2), Ysabel (6), Rannonga (9), Bougainville-Shortland (9), <u>Vella Lavella</u> (47), <u>Ndai</u> (2)
FREDERICKA WILHELMINA 9 (387)	Brisbane 26-7-1883 Mackay 17-11-1883	0 173	0 5	0 178	<u>Buka</u> (35), <u>Nissan</u> (114), <u>New Britain</u> (23), <u>New Ireland</u> (2), <u>Feni</u> (4)
HERON 10 (391)	Maryborough 23-9-1883 Ingham 21-11-1883	0 89	0 0	0 89	<u>Vella Lavella</u> (16), <u>Buka</u> (4), <u>New Britain</u> (26), <u>Lihir</u> (43)
ARIEL 11 (394)	Brisbane 8-8-1883 Cairns 1-12-1883	2 87	0 19	0 106	San Christoval (5), Guadalcanal (2), Bougainville-Shortland (2), <u>New Britain</u> (37), <u>Tabar</u> (11), <u>Lihir</u> (46), <u>Tanga</u> (3)
FANNY 12 (395)	Mackay 22-8-1883 Mackay 3-12-1883	0 115	0 25	0 140	<u>New Britain</u> (57), <u>Lihir</u> (83)
<u>SHIPS WRECKED DURING 1883</u>					
STANLEY 13 (400)	Maryborough 31-3-1883 (WRECKED 1-6-1883) 90 Recruited before wrecked: 12 died in and after; 78 survived, transferred to VENTURE	0 90	0 0	0 90	<u>New Britain</u> (66), <u>Lachlan</u> (12)
ALFRED VITTEY 14 (401)	Maryborough 25-11-1883 (WRECKED early February 1884) 50 Recruits transferred to LOCHIEL	1 56	3 0	4 56	Guadalcanal (3), Ysabel (4), Simbo (3), Bougainville-Shortland (6), <u>Nissan</u> (40) <u>Tanga</u>
LOCHIEL 15 (402)	Brisbane 27-11-1883 (WRECKED early 1884) SS YARALLA took ALFRED VITTEY and LOCHIEL Recruits to Mackay	0	0	0 103	<u>Nissan</u> (4), <u>New Britain</u> (28), <u>Tabar</u> (4), <u>Feni</u> (2), <u>Lihir</u> (51), <u>Tanga</u> (8)

HERON 16 (404)	Ingham 30-11-1883 Ingham 11-1-1884	0 78	0 12	0 90	<u>Feni</u> (7), <u>Lihir</u> (58), <u>Tanga</u> (25)
STORMBIRD 17 (405)	Maryborough 16-8-1883 Mackay 12-1-1884	16 121	0 10	0 131	<u>Tana</u> (13), <u>Epi</u> (8), <u>Ambrim</u> (2), <u>Santo</u> (7), <u>Pentecost</u> (3), <u>Makura</u> (2), <u>Malaita</u> (18), <u>Florida</u> (1), <u>Ysabel</u> (1), <u>New Britain</u> (5), <u>Lihir</u> (71)
EMILY 18 (406)	Mackay 23-7-1883 Mackay 12-1-1884	0 68	0 1	0 69	<u>Santo</u> (2), <u>Santa Cruz</u> (36), <u>Choiseul</u> (25), <u>Rannonga</u> (3), <u>Bougainville-Shortland</u> (3)
JUVENTA 19 (409)	Townsville 1-11-1883 Townsville 26-1-1884	0 91	0 10	0 101	<u>New Britain</u> (2), <u>Lihir</u> (8), <u>Tanga</u> (85)
LAVINA 20 (410)	Mackay 25-10-1883 Mackay 4-2-1884	4 87	1 10	5 97	<u>Malekula</u> (5), <u>Malaita</u> (37), <u>Nissan</u> (12), <u>New Britain</u> (41), <u>Duke of York</u> (2)
RODERICK DHU 21 (412)	Maryborough 20-9-1883 Maryborough 11-2-1884	0 56	0 8	0 64	<u>Malekula</u> (1), <u>San Christoval</u> (1), <u>Guadalcanal</u> (15), <u>Florida</u> (1), <u>Choiseul</u> (11), <u>Nissan</u> (1), <u>New Britain</u> (31), <u>Feni</u> (3)
CEARA 22 (413)	Brisbane 3-1-1884 Townsville 16-2-1884	0 107	0 0	0 107	<u>E. Louisiade</u> (27), <u>W. Louisiade</u> (80), <u>Piron</u> , <u>Sud-est</u> , <u>Rossel</u> , <u>Kassewai</u> , <u>Joannet</u> , <u>Flat</u> , <u>Renard</u> , <u>Redlick</u>
LIZZIE 23 (414)	Townsville 24-12-1883 Townsville 17-2-1884	0 126	0 0	0 126	<u>W. Louisiade</u> (126), <u>Teste</u> , <u>Mewstone</u> , <u>Redlick</u> , <u>Warry</u> , <u>Joannet</u> , <u>Grass</u> , <u>Sud-est</u> , <u>Piron</u> , <u>Brierley</u> , <u>Garden</u>
FOREST KING 24 (415)	Bundaberg 7-11-1883 Mackay 29-2-1884	0 104	0 21	0 125	<u>New Britain</u> (11), <u>Tabar</u> (9), <u>Lihir</u> (105)
HOPEFUL 25 (416)	Townsville 20-12-1883 Townsville 17-3-1884	2 128	1 3	3 131	<u>New Britain</u> (39), <u>Feni</u> (10), <u>Lihir</u> (11), <u>Tanga</u> (71)

HERON 26 (419)	Ingham 29-1-1884 Mackay 1-4-1884	0 67	0 18	0 85	<u>New Britain</u> (6), <u>Tabar</u> (1), <u>Lihir</u> (72), <u>Tanga</u> (6)
CEARA 27 (421)	Townsville 14-3-1884 Townsville 28-4-1884	0 137	0 0	0 137	<u>Teste</u> , <u>Bentley</u> , <u>Moresby</u> , <u>Tarrahvava</u> , <u>Tubi-Tubi</u> , <u>Nuakata</u>
HEATH 28 (424)	Townsville 19-1-1884 Mackay 27-5-1884	0 58	0 31	0 89	<u>Tabar</u> (2), <u>Lihir</u> (38), <u>Tanga</u> (46), <u>Nuguria</u> (3)
LIZZIE 29 (425)	Townsville 13-3-1884 Townsville 2-6-1884	0 66	0 0	0 66	<u>Teste</u> , <u>Moresby</u>
ARIEL 30 (427)	Brisbane 31-1-1884 Cairns 25-6-1884	43 35	6 17	49 52	<u>Pentecost</u> (1), <u>Ureparapara</u> (1), <u>Malaita</u> (9), <u>Buka</u> (5)
HOPEFUL 31 (429)	Townsville 3-5-1884 Ingham 17-7-1884	1 123	0 0	1 123	<u>Teste</u> , <u>Moresby</u> , <u>Basilisk</u> , <u>Killerton</u> , <u>Burra Burra</u> , <u>Aloma</u> , <u>Bau</u> , <u>Lilahuta</u> , <u>Ouou</u> , <u>Wararai</u> , <u>Bentley</u> , <u>Bay</u> , <u>Taputa</u> , <u>Fergusson</u> , <u>Normanby</u> , <u>Harris-Sanaroo</u> , <u>Iwai</u> , <u>Woodlark</u> , <u>Ketawai</u> , <u>Corawata</u> , <u>Gowa</u>
FANNY 32 (430)	Mackay 12-2-1884 Mackay 23-7-1884	6 19	0 0	6 19	<u>Choiseul</u> , <u>Vella Lavella</u> , <u>Bougainville</u>
ETHEL 33 (433)	Maryborough 22-1-1884 Maryborough 14-8-1884	87 12	14 4	101 16	<u>New Ireland</u> , <u>Tabar</u> , <u>Malaita</u> , <u>Guadalcanal</u> , <u>Paama</u> , <u>Ambrim</u> , <u>Tana</u> , <u>Tongoa</u> , <u>Merlav</u> , <u>Pama</u> , <u>Duke of York</u> , <u>New Britain</u>
HERON 34 (434)	Maryborough 2-6-1884 Rockhampton 1-9-1884	0 63	0 19	0 82	<u>Simbo</u> , <u>Rannonga</u> , <u>Shortland</u> , <u>Treasury</u> , <u>Bougainville</u> , <u>Buka</u> , <u>Feni</u> , <u>Tanga</u> , <u>Lihir</u> , <u>Tabar</u>
LAVINIA 35 (436)	Mackay 2-4-1884 Mackay 6-9-1884	7 38	0 1	7 39	<u>New Ireland</u> , <u>Malaita</u>

			M	F	T	
STORMBIRD 36 (438)	Maryborough 28-3-1884 Mackay 11-9-1884	43 32	0 3	43 35	<u>Malaita, Lord Howe, New Ireland</u>	
SYBIL 37 (440)	Mackay 22-4-1884 Mackay 3-10-1884	72 45	12 2	84 47	<u>S. Ana, Gaua, Malo, Torres, San Christoval, Rossel, Piron, Sud-est, Pig, Grass, Normanby, Goulvain</u>	
FORREST KING 38 (443)	Brisbane 15-5-1884 Brisbane 31-10-1884	0 23	0 0	0 23	<u>Rossel, Sud-est, Brierley, Teste, Bentley, Watts, Skelton, Moresby, Normanby, Fergusson, Anchor Bay</u>	
HEATH 39 (446)	Mackay 19-7-1884 Townsville 29-11-1884	63 19	31 0	94 19	<u>New Ireland, Feni, Tanga, Lihir, Tabar, Woodlark, Misima, Renard, Lachlan, Trobriand, Teste, Sud-est, Bennett, Normanby</u>	
ARIEL 40 (457)	Brisbane 8-9-1884 Cairns 23-2-1885	3 46	0 4	3 52	<u>New Ireland</u>	
SHIP WRECKED DURING 1884						
FREDERICKA WILHELMINA 36 Recruits transferred to ARIEL 41 (448)	Mackay 3-1-1884 (WRECKED 31-3-1884)	0 19	0 17	0 36	<u>Bougainville-Shortland (1), Nissan (5), Feni (6), Lihir (3), Tanga (21)</u>	

Source: This Appendix has been compiled from research in progress on Queensland Labour Trade Voyages 1863-1904. Although its major source is Queensland government published statistical tables, some of the information comes from a variety of sources collected over the last decade.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term of the day was 'Colonial Secretary' not 'Premier', but 'Premier' has more meaning to today's readers.
2. *Brisbane Courier*, 23 April 1883.
3. *Ibid.*
4. O.H.K. Spate, *The Spanish Lake. The Pacific since Magellan*, V.I. (Canberra, 1979), pp. 139-141,; B. Hilder, *The Voyage of Torres: the discovery of the southern coastline of New Guinea and Torres Strait by Captain Luis Baez de Torres in 1606* (Brisbane, 1980).
5. O.H.K. Spate, *Monopolists and Freebooters. The Pacific since Magellan*, V. 2 (Canberra, 1983), pp. 41-42.
6. H.L. Roth, *The Discovery and Settlement of Port Mackay, Queensland* (Halifax, 1908), pp. 1-14; D. Jones' three books *Cardwell Shire Story* (Brisbane, 1961), pp. 1-14; *Hurricane Lamps and Blue Umbrellas* (Cairns, 1973), pp. 1-16; *Trinity Phoenix: a history of Cairns and district* (Cairns, 1976), pp. 1-10.
7. J. Singe, *The Torres Strait: people and history* (Brisbane, 1979), p. 46.
8. N. Loos, *Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-European relations on the North Queensland frontier, 1861-1897* (Canberra, 1982), pp. 16-19; Singe, *The Torres Strait*, p. 40
9. H. Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier: an interpretation of the Aboriginal response to the invasion and settlement of Australia* (Townsville, 1981), p. 6.
10. Singe, *The Torres Strait*, p. 47.
11. *Ibid.*; J. Farnfield, *Frontiersman: a biography of George Elphinstone Dalrymple* (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 138-141.
12. Jardine was suspended on an allegation that he was using government employees on his own pearling and fishing boats. A Board of Inquiry exonerated him as the vessels were licensed to another member of the Jardine family. Nevertheless the incident illustrates the interweave of the Jardines' business and official interests in the Cape region. They actually served the government well in establishing a presence in the far north and the continuity of government representation on the Cape and in the Strait during the 1860s and 1870s owed much to them.
13. Loos, *Invasion and Resistance*, p. 21.
14. D.B. Waterson, *A Biographical Register of the Queensland Parliament* (Canberra, 1972), pp. 44, 83; Farnfield, *Frontiersman*, pp. 146-147.
15. Singe, *The Torres Strait*, pp. 95-98.

16. *Votes and proceedings of the Queensland Legislative Assembly* (1884) Vol. 2, p. 947. Hereafter cited as *QVP*.
17. *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Torres Strait Treaty; report and appendixes* (Canberra, 1979), Annex G.; P.W. van der Veur (Comp.), *Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea's Boundaries* (Canberra, 1966), pp. 21-22; M.G. Jacobs, 'The Colonial Office and New Guinea, 1874-84', *Historical Studies* (1952), Vol. 5: 18, pp. 110-111; G. Griffin, 'Territorial Implications in the Torres Strait'; and, 'Status of the Islands of Kawa, Mata Kawa and Kussa; Comments by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Attorney General', in P. Boyce (ed.), *The Torres Strait Treaty: a symposium* (Canberra, 1981), pp. 92-140.
18. N. Gash and J. Whittaker, *A Pictorial History of New Guinea* (Brisbane, 1975), p. 18.
19. M.E. Turvey, London Missionary Society Missionaries in New Guinea, 1871-84: Agents of Empire? (M.A. thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1976), pp. 52-74.
20. The Catholics did not have any mission on the south coast until they established a mission at Yule Island in June 1885.
21. J. Moresby, *New Guinea and Polynesia: discoveries and surveys in New Guinea and the D'Entrecasteaux islands . . . HMS Basilisk* (London, 1876), pp. 163-166.
22. Turvey, London Missionary Society, p. 69.
23. D. Langmore, *Tamate - a King: James Chalmers in New Guinea, 1877-1901* (Melbourne, 1974), pp. 3-5.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
25. Lawes-Mullens, 17 December 1877, in London Missionary Society Letters, Reports and Journals, quoted in Turvey, London Missionary Society, p. 110.
26. G.C. Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away: a history of North Queensland to 1920* (Canberra, 1963 (reprint 1972)), pp. 44-70; N. Kirkman, 'The Palmer River Goldfield', in K.H. Kennedy (ed.), *Readings in North Queensland Mining History*, Vol. 1 (Townsville, 1980), pp. 113-144; Farnfield, *Frontiersman*, pp. 122-137; LMS (Mullens) to Colonial Office, 3 June 1878, in Whittaker *et al.*, *Documents and Readings*, pp. 441-442; H. Nelson, *Black, White & Gold; goldmining in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra, 1976), pp. 76-82; H.J. Gibbney, 'The New Guinea Gold Rush of 1878', *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, Vol. 58:4, pp. 284-296.
27. *Brisbane Courier*, 23 April 1884. The official intervention by these two Queensland officials seems to have been approved by the Colonial Office. Mead to LMS, 13 June 1878, quoted in Whittaker *et al.*, *Documents and Readings*, p. 442.

William Bairstowe Ingham had a rather swash-buckling style and it is in character that he suddenly decided to lead a party to Brooker island in the Louisiade Archipelago, where they were all murdered. Ingham had arrived in North Queensland in 1873, lost a fortune on Ings plantation after the 1875 rust epidemic in Queensland's sugar cane, shifted to Cardwell, then to newly-established Cairns where he owned the first saw mill and explored the coast. By 1878 he was involved in the *beche-de-mer* trade in Torres Strait and was available to act for the Queensland government at the Laloki rush. The town of Ingham in North Queensland is named after him. Jones, *Cardwell Shire Story*, pp. 147-8, 155, 201, 211, 212-3, 215, 217.

28. *Brisbane Courier*, 18 April 1883.
29. J. Farnfield, 'Cotton and the search for an agricultural staple in early Queensland', *Queensland Heritage*, Vol. 2:4 (1971), pp. 20-25; A. McGrath, "Exile into Bondage": an analysis of Asiatic indenture in colonial Queensland (B.A. Hons. thesis, University of Queensland, 1976), pp. 1-50, 81-94.
30. C.R. Moore, *Kanaka Maratta: a history of Melanesian Mackay* (Ph.D. thesis, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), pp. 91-92. (An abridged version of the thesis is published as *Kanaka: a history of Melanesian Mackay* (Port Moresby, 1984). In press.
31. Moore, *Kanaka Maratta*, pp. 232-247.
32. Waterson, *Biographical Register*, pp. 74, 118.
33. W.R. Johnston, *The Call of the Land: a history of Queensland to the present day* (Brisbane, 1982), p. 88.
34. A. Deakin, *The Federal Story: the inner history of the Federal Cause 1880-1900*, (Melbourne, 1963 (first published 1944), pp. 11-12.
35. *Brisbane Courier*, 25 April 1883; *Queensland Parliamentary Debates* (hereafter *QPD*) (1883), Vol. 39, pp. 89-91; J. Legge, 'Australia and New Guinea to the Establishment of the British Protectorate, 1884', *Historical Studies* (1949), Vol. 4:13, pp. 34-47; J.L. Whittaker *et al.*, *Documents and Readings in New Guinea History: prehistory to 1889* (Brisbane, 1975), pp. 435-465.
36. Derby to Administrator of the Government in Council, 11 July 1883, in Whittaker *et al.*, *Documents and Readings*, pp. 448-449.
37. McIlwraith to Administrator of the Government in Council, 17 July 1883, in Whittaker *et al.*, *Documents and Readings*, pp. 449-451.
38. *QVP* (1884), Vol. 2, p. 952.
39. P. Knaplund, 'Sir Arthur Gordon on the New Guinea Question, 1883', *Historical Studies* (1956), Vol 7:27, p. 330.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
41. Administrator Palmer to Derby, 3 May 1883. *QVP* (1884), Vol. 2, No. 25, p. 70.
42. Waterson, *Biographical Register*, p. 74 shows Griffith as Premier from 13 November 1883 to 1 April 1886.
43. *QPD* (1888), Vol. 5, p. 26.
44. Colonial Sugar Company Archives, in Archives of Business and Labour, Australian University, 142/3286: Philp to Parbury Lamb, 28 December 1882; Parbury Lamb to Philp, 12 January 1883; Philp to Parbury Lamb, 19 January 1883; Cowley to Parbury Lamb, 7 June 1883.
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46. Refer to the Appendix.
47. R.C. Thompson, *Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: the expansionist era, 1820-1920* (Melbourne, 1980), p. 57.
48. *Ibid.*