

THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY

QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEEN-NINETIES

by

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PREFACE

The "Nineties" has always exercised a fascination for Australian historians. The decade saw a flowering of Australian literature. It saw tremendous social and economic changes. Partly as a result of these changes, these years saw the rise of a new force in Australian politics - the labour movement. In some colonies, this development was overshadowed by the consolidation of a colonial liberal tradition reaching its culmination in the Deakinite liberalism of the early years of the Commonwealth. Developments in Queensland differed from those in the southern colonies. The labour movement was more militant, but less influential during the Nineties. The liberalism best exemplified by Sir Samuel Walker Griffith did not survive the tumultuous events of the decade which began with a bitter strike and culminated in Federation. In between, Queenslanders endured the most severe depression they had yet known. It is not surprising then, that the period is rich in political incident, and represents a fertile field of study.

Writing the political history of a decade presents peculiar difficulties, both in methodology and selection. The thesis is conceived as a study of the Parliament, and of the elections which determined its composition and

character. So much of that which is called "politics" occurs outside Parliament and elections, but rigid selection is necessary in determining priorities. Consequently, there is scant attention paid to public opinion, and to the social mores which give rise to that opinion. Indirectly, one can gauge the state of the public mind from election results, which are covered in Sections Two and Three of this thesis.

Sections Two and Three are roughly chronological. Section One attempts to introduce and analyse the problems and issues reaching their culmination in the Nineties. A purely chronological approach was found to involve tedious repetition, and also to cloud an analysis of the parliamentary scene. Thus, Section One discusses the various decisions and problems which confronted Queensland governments during the Nineties without analysing their parliamentary and electoral repercussions. Sections Two and Three analyse just these repercussions.

There are many people I would like to thank for their help and encouragement. In particular, I am indebted to my supervisor, R.M.S. Hamilton, and to the Head of my Department, Professor Gordon Greenwood, who has shown such admirable patience. I must also thank my typist, Merle Grinly for an excellent job, completed under considerable difficulty. May I also thank Peggy Burke for her truly magnificent proof reading.

INTRODUCTION

Queensland has not been well served by political historians and, for the most part, general histories are rare and of questionable quality. C.A. Bernays' Queensland Politics during Sixty Years 1859-1919¹ is a narrative account of Queensland Parliaments with little interpretative value and a considerable amount of bias. There are some regional histories of great value such as D.B. Waterson's Darling Downs study, Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper, and G.C. Bolton's A Thousand Miles Away,² a general history of North Queensland. And as Waterson remarks, too often has Queensland been relegated to the footnotes of histories of New South Wales and Victoria.³ Edited by D. Murphy, R. Joyce and C. Hughes, Prelude to Power is an attempt to partly remedy this deficiency. It is a study of the rise of the Labour Party from 1885 to 1915.⁴ The years between 1890 and 1900 naturally receive much attention, but primarily as a crucial

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1. Bernays, C., Queensland Politics during Sixty Years 1859-1919 (Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1919)
 2. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper (Sydney Univ. Press, 1968).
Bolton, G.C., A Thousand Miles Away: A Brief History of North Queensland to 1920 (Jacaranda, ANU, 1963).
BRISBANE, CANBERRA.
 3. Waterson, D.B., op.cit., p.1.
 4. Murphy, D., Joyce, R.B., & Hughes, C.A., Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1970).

decade for the labour movement. Indeed, this decade is usually seen as a period where the main political theme is the rise of the Labour Party throughout the eastern colonies. In Queensland, this picture is only partially valid, for what gave the decade its especial significance was the decline of the Liberal Party, and the complete dominance of a political philosophy based on property, rather than the rise of a labour movement dedicated to the philosophy of "socialism".⁵

Queensland held a unique place in the political history of Eastern Australia. During the Eighties, the Parliament had shown a relatively clear cut bi-partisan division, so unlike the factionalism of New South Wales.⁶ During the Nineties, there was no evidence of the Lib-Lab coalition which characterized southern developments. While Victoria experimented with liberal legislation, Queensland remained, sunk, it seemed forever, in the mire of conservatism and

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5. The historical debate surrounding the question of Labour's socialism is too well known to need repeating here. For the "orthodox" view of earlier years, see Lloyd Ross, William Lane and the Australian Labour Movement (Sydney, N.D.); V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs (2nd Ed., M.U.P., 1964). For more recent interpretations, D.W. Rawson's "Labour, Socialism and the Working Class" (A.J.P.H., VII, I, p.77), and Labor in Vain? (Melbourne, 1966) and Dalton, J.B., "An Interpretative Survey", in Murphy, Joyce and Hughes, op.cit., p.3.
 6. Loveday, P. & Martin, A.W., Parliament, Factions and Parties (M.U.P., 1966).

reaction. This thesis then is partly an attempt to explain the nature of Queensland politics during this very controversial decade.

While the two-party alignment of the Eighties showed considerable stability, it was not supported by any extra-parliamentary or intra-party organization. Were they then, simply two giant factions, revolving around two powerful leaders, Samuel Griffith and Thomas McIlwraith? Perhaps they may, more properly, be described as cohesive groups, sharing a similar social and political outlook.⁷ Fundamental differences between Liberal and Conservative did exist, but they shared a common vision, the economic advancement of the colony. Where they diverged was in the practical application of this vision. In as much as either side could be said to possess a philosophy it was a philosophy of material progress from which social progress would almost inevitably follow.

Liberals, however, did tend towards the belief that with a little "engineering", the benefits of economic progress could be more equitably diffused. This attitude, for the most part paternalistic in the extreme, was not shared by their opponents, who tended to pin their faith on

7. "Parties" are defined on p.v.

free enterprise, at least as far as it was compatible with the economic realities of Queensland's climate and distances. Liberals worked upon the assumption that if the State provided greater opportunities to acquire land, to exercise the franchise, and to enjoy equitable labour conditions, all citizens would be able to advance their aims. This entailed an enormous amount of intricate legislation, involving the State in the promotion of economic progress, but not in the protection of those unable to partake of this progress. The old, poor and infirm continued to remain firmly outside the largesse of the State. In the boom conditions of the Eighties, such policies had proved relatively successful, but the Depression of the Nineties had vastly increased the number of people enmeshed in the net of economic hardship, and Liberal rejection of, and by, the working population.

The Nineties thus saw the demise of what had been known as the Liberal Party. In 1890, the electorate was stunned by the coalition between Griffith and McIlwraith. This threw the old political order into chaos; the old divisions disappeared to be replaced by an agglomeration of individuals, led mostly by the old conservatives. If we could not call the well-disciplined groups of the Eighties "parties", how are we to describe this new development?

Parties may be defined as groups possessing a coherent leadership, a cohesive philosophy, machinery for the selection of candidates and machinery for the conduct of elections. The Ministerialists of the Nineties exhibited all these characteristics, but to only a limited extent. Throughout the decade, Robert Bulcock and R.P. Adams, formerly organizers for the Liberal Party, strove to build up the organization of the Ministerialists, both within the "party" and for electoral purposes. The Queensland Patriotic League and its successor, the Queensland Political Association, were quite effective in the engineering and scrutiny of electoral rolls. Their attempts to define common policy objectives, and to pre-select candidates often were met with considerable hostility. Moreover, branches were rarely in contact with the central offices, and most parliamentarians objected to attempts to curtail their freedom of action. The Ministerialists, who did not evolve a more formal title throughout their long period in office, therefore lacked the attributes of the modern party. On the other hand, they did share a common philosophy which was not simply based on hostility to the Labour Party, and this guaranteed a fair degree of discipline within and without parliament.

A spirit of materialism seemed to pervade the whole decade, perhaps not surprising after the hardships induced by the depression. Nowhere was this materialism highlighted

more than in the Queensland Parliament, dominated by men who were fairly typical products of colonial capitalism. They reflected the peculiar economic and social conditions of Queensland. They needed to be tough, self-reliant and above all, wealthy. Men like McIlwraith, Philp and Nelson were self-made men, who had capitalized on the boom conditions to achieve their position and wealth. Pastoralism and its associated trading activities, along with mining, provided the basis of the Queensland economy and these men controlled it. From their position of power and influence they expounded at great length the virtues of self-help, and certainly were not inclined to favour government sponsored social amelioration. Colonial society produced many such men, and they had little sympathy with those who had failed to take advantage of the "boundless opportunities" offered by the economic system.

The political elite closely corresponded with the socio-economic elite, and capitalists, as closely associated in business and society, as they were in government, controlled the decision-making process. This was inherently undesirable, as it created a situation where graft and corruption were facilitated. The Nineties produced many examples of political jobbery, and the involvement of parliamentarians in such scandals as the Mirani-Cattle Creek railway, the Clifton Lands transaction, and last but certainly not least, the

Queensland National Bank failure, demoralized Queensland public life, along with her finances. This close connection between politics and finance created a monopoly of power, which led to poor administration, a lamentable absence of political principle, and a complete disregard for the political rights of many Queenslanders.

Thus there was a remarkable degree of homogeneity among the leaders of the Ministerial Party, and they shared a common vision of a capitalist society based upon property and free enterprise. The idea of property as the basis of society and the arbiter of political privileges was also embraced by the opposition radicals and the Labour Party. Both enthusiastically supported the Cooperative Communities Land Settlement Act, providing for small farming units worked on a "cooperative" principle. This principle, however, usually involves the acceptance of, firstly, the individualistic impulse, not essentially different from capitalism. Moreover, the Act was the fullest expression of the agrarianism and yeoman farmer ideal, so fully embraced particularly in the northern colony.

Opposition to what became known as the Continuous Ministry came from a small group of ex-Liberals who could not join the Coalition, and from the Labour Party. The fledgling party of the working man exhibited all the party characteristics we have already discussed, but as the decade

wore on, it too began to fray around the edges, culminating in open rupture in 1907. Moreover, the party failed to transcend its highly regional character, increasing its seats by only eight between 1893 and 1899.⁸ Why was there no Lib-Lab compromise in Queensland? This was probably the result of economic rather than purely political reasons, as suggested by Ian Turner.⁹ Queensland was industrially backward, her farming was limited to small areas isolated from each other, and pastoralism was relatively more powerful than in the southern colonies. The smaller craft unions WERE correspondingly weak, compared to their mass pastoral counterparts. The unskilled workers in the mass unions were more militant and less inclined to compromise. But it was the weakness of the Liberals which was the key to the situation, and this had both economic and political elements. Faced with the necessity to re-assert themselves after the 1890 Coalition, the Liberals found they did not have a sufficiently strong power base. Many small farmers and businessmen, traditional Liberal supporters tended to support the conservatives because of the notorious financial inability of the old Liberal Party. There also appeared to

8. Labour Party strength was concentrated in the north and west, and the Party failed to establish a base in metropolitan or farming areas.

9. Turner, I., Industrial Labour and Politics (A.N.U., Canberra, 1965), Ch. 1.

exist a general timidity, a reluctance to change and experiment within the whole community caused primarily by the tremendous psychological shock engendered by the depression. This climate was not designed to help either of the opposition forces.

The failure of the Liberals and the Labour Party to compromise meant that the Coalition, its hegemony established after the 1893 Elections, was free to pursue its course with little possibility of defeat. The Continuous Ministry produced six Premiers - Griffith, McIlwraith, Nelson, Byrnes, Dickson and Philp, each more mediocre than the last. The absence of a strong leader meant not only the growth of factionalism within the government, which at times threatened to endanger its existence, but a gradual downturn in government activity. What activity there was was saturated with the morality of expediency and political cynicism. Above all, there was the crushing sense of reaction, and the Continuous Ministry fell, characteristically, not because of its repressive nature, or because of its conservatism, but because by 1903, its own weight prevented it from satisfying the needs of the business community upon which it depended. Bereft of ideas, weakened by the mediocrity of its unchanging personnel, the Government brought about its own sorry downfall.

The final collapse of the Continuous Ministry brought to power the long-needed Lib-Lab Coalition, whose task was to rescue Queensland from the drift and muddle, from the repression and corruption and from the all pervading expediency which had characterized the preceding decade.

SECTION ONE - THE SUBSTANCE OF POLITICS

CHAPTER 1

THE MEN OF POLITICS

The Parliament between 1880 and 1890 had witnessed the consolidation of a clear-cut, and unquestioned bi-partisan party division. A Liberal Party, led by Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, and a Conservative Party, led by Sir Thomas McIlwraith, were clearly recognizable. In 1890, however, the personal coalition of these two lifelong political enemies destroyed the traditional political alignment. The next decade saw the development of a new, and very different party division, caused by the rise of a radical Labour Party. In a sense, the new situation changed the role of personalities in the politics of the Colony, for the growing political consciousness of Labour meant that basic goals also tended to change, and the political division tended to become greater than the sum of personalities.

Whatever their political differences, Parliamentarians during the Eighties belonged to, and represented, the economic elite of the Colony. Liberals tended to represent urban business, the miners and the agricultural community, while Conservatives represented large-scale finance and pastoralism.

Their primary political aim, despite these differences, was economic development, although they may have seen its means of attainment in a different light. The Liberals saw economic development in the light of social justice, and therefore evinced concern for the conditions of the working man. The rise of labour however, meant that the working man was now represented by the working man, and not the middle class Liberal, with his paternalistic attitude born of immense social differences. Property tended to retreat before this new political force, with the result that the distinguishing characteristics of Liberal and Conservatives became blurred as the Liberal Party merged with its old enemies.

During the Eighties, Griffith and McIlwraith dominated politics. They were able to do so because there were few irreconcilable differences between the parties, and the maintenance of party solidarity depended upon the strength of its leaders. Moreover, their very pre-eminence deprived either party of alternative leaders. Confronted with the need to contain the challenge of Labour, the Coalition Party, after the departure of Griffith and McIlwraith, had no leader of their prestige. It became a loose knit group ruled by what could only be described as a junta. The Continuous Ministry, which had begun with the Coalition in

1890 was to govern Queensland until 1903. It provided a procession of six premiers - Griffith, McIlwraith, Sir Hugh Muir Nelson, T.J. Byrnes, J.R. Dickson and Robert Philp. The Cabinet rarely changed, except for an occasional reshuffle in portfolios, and these few men controlled Queensland Government. The absence of a single strong leader meant a growth in petty jealousies and factionalism amongst a group of ambitious, and yet mediocre politicians, and this was reflected in the aridity of Queensland politics in the Nineties. Nor were the opponents of the Continuous Ministry men of great individual appeal, but the organization of the Labour Party was such that personalities tended to be less important than in the ruling party. On the whole, it may be argued that during the Nineties, Queensland political life was as devoid of great men as it was of great principles and yet, however colourless, it is men who participate in politics, and give character to political action. Who were the men of Queensland politics?

During the first three years of the decade, the domination of Griffith and McIlwraith continued. Until 1890, they had been deadly enemies in public, and were scarcely friends in private life. They were two enormously different characters, but they shared a certain charisma, which gave colour and excitement to political life.

Samuel Griffith was born in Wales, of humble ancestry, his early life circumscribed by the narrow confines of evangelical Protestantism. His father, Edward, a Minister of the Congregational Church, had arrived in New South Wales in 1855. Edward then journeyed to Queensland to undertake missionary work. He "was a founder of a frequent contributor to the Queensland Evangelical Standard¹ and was unashamedly partisan in his political activities".² Not surprisingly, Samuel Griffith took an early interest in politics and public questions. Even before his graduation from the University of Sydney, he began to watch and listen to the debates of the Queensland Parliament.

Griffith was admitted to the Bar in 1867, and five years later was elected Liberal representative for East Moreton. His career and religious background were essential influences in his political development. His turn of mind was legalistic and logical in the extreme, and he seemed to appreciate social issues in an academic rather than a practical way. He could draft excellent Bills, such as the Employers Liability Bill, but seemed emotionally uninvolved with the problems of the working class. More effective in opposition than in power,

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1. See below, Chs. 2 and 8 for further discussion of the relation between Protestantism and the Liberal Party.
 2. Vockler, J.C., "Sir Samuel Walker Griffith" (Unpub. B.A. thesis, U. of Q., 1953), p.23.

Griffith combined trenchant critical ability with a type of opportunism. Essential in an opposition, this combination was often detrimental to party unity while in power.

The close association between Protestantism and the Liberal Party may have contributed to Griffith's early success. The son of Edward Griffith, it was thought, would greatly assist the Protestant cause. Yet, often he found the association more of an embarrassment than a blessing. He fought the attempts of the Queensland Evangelical Standard to merge religion with politics, and in general tried to divorce himself from the factionalism inherent in such a situation. According to Vockler:

Griffith, himself, was not a total abstainer, nor was he a thoroughly convinced non-conformist. There can be no doubt that he found the activities of the sectarians unpleasant. Nor can I readily conceive that he found his own father's active electioneering ... an unmixed blessing ... but these same interests were a power which the Liberals could ignore only at their peril.³

Griffith tried, with only moderate success, to draw in all the factions of the Liberal Party into one homogeneous unit. While his success was certainly not complete, the unity of the party by 1885 had reached a degree hitherto unknown. Even the public split with Dickson in 1887 was not so damaging as had been anticipated.⁴

3. Ibid., pp.114-5.

4. See below, Ch. 2.

The ability to compromise, which was the greatest reason for his success, was, however, limited by Griffith's austerity of nature. Sir Charles Dilke observed:

Sir Samuel Griffith is the ablest lawyer in Queensland, and is for that reason perhaps less successful as a statesman in office. He is, as his foes declare - cold of temperament - an argumentative rather than a thinking leader. He is a man of education and an unblemished character but he lacks sentiment, and is a little inclined to be overbearing. He lost when in power some of his ablest colleagues, who would not submit to his rule, and in his last appeal to the electors⁵ was at a disadvantage not only through the weakness of his leading supporters, but through the lukewarmness of his friends...⁶

The "coldness of temperament" often noticed in Griffith did not characterize his greatest political opponent - Sir Thomas McIlwraith. McIlwraith was a man of often violent proportions, with a romantic vision of Queensland, and a great Australian nationalist. He was forever an optimist. His schemes for the giant transcontinental railways⁷ show his faith in the future of Australia, and of his place in it. A capitalist, he shared many of the characteristics of his American counterparts - the confidence of a selfmade man, an overall vision which subordinated parts to the whole,⁸ and a complete lack of appreciation that economic progress

5. In the 1888 Election.

6. Dilke, C., Problems of Greater Britain. (Lond., 1890), p.204. ^{Macmillan,}

7. See below, Chapters 2 and 4.

8. His rupture with the squatters in 1883 over proposed land resumption for the Transcontinental Railway Bill is an indication of this trait.

did not necessarily mean social progress.

Thomas McIlwraith was born in Ayrshire in 1835, and emigrated to Australia twenty-one years later. While in Victoria he was elected an associate of the Institute of Civil Engineers, and worked for the Railway Department. He emigrated to Queensland, and with considerable resources at his disposal he began to build up a small pastoral empire. By 1881, McIlwraith and J.C. Smythe held between them 620 square miles of prime pastoral land.⁹ A few years later, the Scotsman branched into other areas of investment, particularly banking, pastoral finance and sugar. Entering Parliament in 1870, he was appointed Minister for Works in McAlister's Government in 1873, only to resign two years later. Discussing his resignation, the Brisbane Courier gives some insight into the style of his whole political career:

He brought to Government a considerable reputation for energy and independence and a commanding knowledge of railway construction. He appeared to put out of sight all but practical considerations in the exercise of his official authority; and provided he secured economy and efficiency he cared little what political animosities he stirred up. This feature of his Ministerial dealings had probably not a little to do with the unpleasantness which culminated in his resignation.¹⁰

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9. Dignan, D.K. "Sir Thomas McIlwraith" (Unpub. B.A. Thesis U. of Q. 1951)
10. Brisbane Courier, 7 November 1875.

This stubbornness, energy and lack of caution characterized McIlwraith in his later career, and was to cause unpleasantness on more than one occasion.

A clumsy and often very bad speaker, he often took refuge in bluster, not a very effective political weapon. When roused, however, he could sometimes be remarkably effective. Francis Adams remarked:

It is in the hours of passionate debate or turbulent public gathering that this clumsy and ineloquent orator should be seen by those who would comprehend something of the vehement enthusiasm of his followers. Then the torrent of his fiery words is overwhelming.¹¹

In his dealings with his friends and colleagues, McIlwraith showed generosity and tolerance, but in return demanded absolute loyalty and obedience. He was not a devious politician, and approached a problem in a clear-cut straightforward manner, often causing uproar in his own party, but usually able to persuade his colleagues to place their trust in him.^{11A}

McIlwraith emerges as a more appealing character than Griffith, but he "was ever subject to the philosophical outlook of the Conservative, who fails to appreciate the outlook of the dissident group and is prone to argue that if various groups sink their differences and pull together, the good

II. Adams F., *The Australians* (T. Fisher UNWIN, London, 1893) pp 75 ET. SEC.

11A. When these tactics failed, it usually meant painful public splits as in 1883 and 1888. See Chapters 4 and 9.

fortune of the privileged will automatically be bestowed on the enterprising members of the underprivileged."¹²

McIlwraith had no real conception of social issues; his various grandiose schemes took no account of the human element, which might have been almost incidental. He had no sympathy with the unsuccessful, who had failed to capitalize upon the same conditions that he had. It seems that in the vastness of his schemes, he failed to appreciate that men make dreams - not cattle, bricks or railway tracks.

Despite their manifest failings, both Griffith and McIlwraith could win the confidence of large sections of the colony's population. Perhaps their stories end in failure during the difficult Nineties¹³ and yet they, of all Queensland public men of their time, still retain their place in the history of the colony.

Perhaps because of the strength of Griffith and McIlwraith, their followers and successors were men of far more limited appeal and capacity. Nelson, Philp and Dickson, were not men of outstanding character, and on the opposite side of the House, labour leaders did not attract zealous personal support. Outside the House, men such as Lilley still exerted some influence, while the party organizers Robert

12. Dignan, D., op.cit., p.69.

13. See below, Chapters 3, 7 and 12.

Bulcock for the Conservatives and Albert Hinchcliffe for Labour wielded great power. The relative power of a number of individuals, as opposed to the political domination of two personalities, is one of the major characteristics of the decade.

There was a remarkable degree of homogeneity among the leaders of the Conservative Party, particularly as its composition did not change dramatically from the pattern of the Eighties. The political elite of the colony corresponded with the socio-economic elite, with very few exceptions. The following table gives some indication of the socio-economic background. It includes three men who exerted great influence, but who never became Premiers during the hegemony of the Continuous Ministry - Hugh Tozer, A.J. Thynne and J.M. Macrossan.

Birth Place	Religion	Occupation	Education
Australia	Anglican	Pastoral and Investment	Private or Grammar
Byrnes	Tozer	McIlwraith	Morehead
Morehead	Dickson	Nelson	Philp
Tozer		Morehead	

Birth Place	Religion	Occupation	Education
England	Roman Catholic	Law	Tertiary
Dickson	Byrnes	Byrnes	Griffith
Dalrymple	Thynne	Thynne	McIlwraith
	Macrossan	Griffith	Thynne
			Tozer
			Nelson
Scotland	Protestant	Other	Little formal
McIlwraith	Griffith	Macrossan	Macrossan
Nelson	Philp		
Philp	Nelson		
	McIlwraith		
Ireland			
Macrossan			
Thynne			
Wales			
Griffith			

Macrossan then, is the odd man out. He was not reputedly wealthy, he was engaged in various occupations, at one stage

a miner, at another a selector, and had received little formal education. And yet, in the late Eighties he was regarded by many as the real power behind the Government of Boyd Dunlop Morehead.¹⁴ Byrnes too, was somewhat atypical. He was the first native born Queenslander to become Premier, and one of the few Roman Catholics in Australia to reach such a high office. Born in Brisbane in 1860, the boy early showed scholastic promise, and after attending the Brisbane Grammar School continued his studies at the University of Melbourne from where he graduated as a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Laws. According to G.W. Power,

At the University he retained the characteristics which distinguished him at school - an even temper and well balanced mind, a thorough interest in his fellow men, a sturdy common sense, relieved by a keen appreciation of humour, and a tendency to show brilliance rather than industry.¹⁵

In 1890, Griffith chose the young barrister to represent the Government in the Legislative Council as Solicitor-General. He was elected to the Assembly in 1893, and was appointed Attorney-General. In his early years, Byrnes was not a very popular member¹⁶ and his strong and successful advocacy of the Peace Preservation Bill¹⁷ earned him the undying enmity

14. See below, Ch. 9.

15. Sketches and Impressions of T.J. Byrnes. (Alex Muir & Co., Brisbane, 1902), p.37.

16. McIlwraith's opinion of him was very low. He regarded him as far from conscientious.

17. See below, Ch. 13.

of the Labour Party. In his position as Attorney-General, Byrnes managed to avoid the battles of Parliamentary life, and to a great extent his career was one of unfulfilled promise. His death in 1898, after less than a year as Premier, left an impression of great loss. Men had felt he could perhaps raise the standard of political life, and recapture some of the personal appeal of his mentor, Sir Samuel Griffith.

The death of Byrnes deprived the Continuous Ministry of one of its keenest intellects. Yet the Ministry, and the party which had supported it, continued to be dominated by business and financial interests. The early Conservative alliance with the pastoral industry had shifted slightly, and the 1896 Elections returned a party with a far greater proportion of businessmen.

Byrnes' brief reign held promise of uniting the Ministerial Party, which had, three years after the departure of McIlwraith, become factionalized. Factions led by E.B. Forrest, John Leahy and John Macdonald-Paterson had been clearly evident during the 1896 election, and these groups proved far from amenable to party discipline. The absence of a strong leader meant that extra-parliamentary organizations tended to exert more influence. The Queensland Political Association was the medium through which some sort of control

was attempted. It was an outgrowth of the Queensland Patriotic League, formed in 1890 by Robert Bulcock to combat the challenge thrown out by the formation of the Australian Labour Federation. The later organization was far more powerful, and the Premier, Hugh Muir Nelson, was the chairman. The Political Association attempted to build up a sophisticated pre-selection system, and the absence of strong parliamentary leadership allowed Bulcock to gain a position of extraordinary power.¹⁸

The influence of the Q.P.A. tended to decline after 1896, but six years later, continued dissension within Ministerial ranks led to the formation of the National Liberal Union, which exercised wider powers than either of its predecessors. This growth of organizational politics was partly the result of the inability of the Ministerialists to produce a leader who could reconcile individuals and individual loyalties. Gradually, extra-parliamentary organizations gained greater power, and began to infringe upon selection of candidates and general policy.

The lack of unity observable in 1896 was one of the reasons why Nelson had recommended Byrnes for Premier rather than Robert Philp, member for Townsville, and long time

18. See below, Ch. 10.

Cabinet Minister. It was felt that Philp was too much a Northern man, and that this would cause further dissension. Philp was a foundation member of the colonial export company, Burns-Philp and was closely associated with many other exporting and financial concerns. A sound business man, Philp did not have great qualities as a Premier, or even as a financier of the colony. By far the most conservative of the Ministerial leaders, Philp lacked imagination and colour. He may be described as an able, but unimaginative administrator, competent in performing allotted duties, but unable to command the respect necessary to strongly assert his leadership.

The parochialism which characterized Queensland politics was still evident throughout the Nineties. Many members regarded themselves as delegates rather than representatives. They regarded Parliament as the forum in which to make the views of their electorates public, rather than a place to legislate for the entire colony mindful of all interests rather than sectional demands. One such politician was W.H. Groom. Groom had been elected to the first Parliament of Queensland, and was known as the "father of the House". Yet because he was primarily a "constituency" politician Groom remained outside the main corridors of power, even though his liberal philosophy made him a bulwark in the

disorganized opposition forces after 1890. Unfortunately he did not have sufficient personal prestige to unite the forces of opposition to the government. Sectional interests often tended to overshadow the considerations of "national" policy. Thus, in 1883 and in 1892, much opposition to McIlwraith's proposed land grant railways centred around the parochial jealousies.¹⁹

At its inception, the Labour Party was understandably free of these sectional and factional divisions. Throughout the first half of this decade, there was little division within Labour ranks. And yet, this was not caused by the presence of a strong leader, but by his absence. The structure of the party was such that strong leadership in parliament would be divisive rather than cohesive. The relatively sophisticated extra-parliamentary organization of the party²⁰ meant that it shared, and at times controlled, the policy-making function. Parliamentarians were regarded as only one facet of the Labour movement, and a strong leadership in Parliament was not regarded as conducive to the party's effectiveness. Moreover, such leadership was felt to be contradictory to the democratic aspirations of the movement. William Kidston, of all the Labour leaders in this early period, came closest to the leadership ideals of the non-Labour

19. See below, Ch. 4.

20. See below, Ch. 10.

parties. He emerged as one of the party's major leaders in 1899, and was the moving force behind the Lib-Lab coalition of 1903. K.J. Wanka describes the attitude of many sections of the party to his leadership:

To strong sections of the Labour movement, Kidston was coming to represent Bonapartism, which has been and remains a strong fear in labour ideology. He was the "strong man" who, by virtue of his personality, popular appeal, skill, and ruthless determination, could take control of the mass movement ... the strange quirk of the Labour Party, to seem to prefer the opposition benches to domination by a strong capable leader with a touch of arrogance, but with a clear view of the party's purpose, has been one of its lasting features.²¹

This suspicion of individuals and the faith placed in strong extra-parliamentary organization is illustrated by the role of two labour stalwarts - Albert Hinchcliffe, Secretary of the Australian Labour Federation, and Thomas Glassey, the first Labour Parliamentary leader.

Born in Northern Ireland in 1844, Glassey arrived in Brisbane in 1884. Here, he created and became the first Secretary of the Miners Association at the Bundamba Mines. Pugnacious, painstakingly thorough, and at times long-winded, Glassey provided the infant Labour Party with the steady, if not outstanding, leadership that it needed, but as the party matured, his limitations became more apparent. His position

21. Wanka, K.J., "William Kidston" in Murphy, Joyce & Hughes, Prelude to Power. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1970), pp.203-4.

was well described by S.A. Rayner:

Glassey was not a good parliamentary leader, though he was successful as an organizer. His lack of early education had hampered his intellectual development and this proved a disadvantage in a party where many of his followers were more widely read, had a greater knowledge of Queensland conditions, and possessed a greater mental alertness His obstinate determination that had proved such a valuable asset when facing large majorities single-handed was not appreciated by his own party when opinions ^{DIFFERED} He seems to have lacked the tact and especially the capacity for diplomacy and intrigue so necessary to maintain his position and to keep his party united.²²

During the growing split in the Labour ranks beginning in 1896 Glassey's chief opponent was Albert Hinchcliffe, organizer of the Trades and Labour Council, and later Secretary of the Australian Labour Federation. Hinchcliffe was in many ways Glassey's complete antithesis. His mind was agile, and he was adept at the in-fighting which characterized so much of the history of early labour. Unlike Glassey, he was the spokesman for Queensland unionism, and while he was never elected to Parliament²³ Hinchcliffe's influence in the party was probably greater than any other individual. His position was one of considerable power, and during his entire career, he constantly aspired to the socialist goal, to be achieved by the capture of the Government by a strong, union based

22. Rayner, S.A., "Thomas Glassey" in Prelude to Power, pp.196-97.

23. He eventually entered the Legislative Council during the Morgan-Browne Coalition.

political party.²⁴ It was his influence which prevented the formation of a Lib-Lab Coalition before 1903, and it was only his temporary eclipse by William Kidston which eventually allowed such a combination. While Willian Lane inspired a vision of a new socialist society, Albert Hinchcliffe provided it with its radical, non-doctrinaire, pragmatic character. Nevertheless, he was not prepared to compromise the party's principles in order to gain power. His two closest associates, Mat Reid and Henry Boote, were determined that even after the Coalition in 1903, Labour "would not become 'too respectable' nor would it forget that it was a party born to seek radical, socialist goals".²⁵

The practicality of men such as Hinchcliffe, Fisher and Reid was tempered by a continuing faith in socialism. For this reason, the party tended to lack the opportunism which characterized their opponents during this period. It was a man such as Kidston who combined the two ingredients and gained a dominant position in Queensland politics. But in doing so, he had lost the motivating force of the socialist ideal, and alienated men like Fisher, Reid and Hinchcliffe. Nevertheless, during the party's slow, but

24. Murphy, D.J., "Two Administrators" in Prelude to Power,
p.222.

25. Ibid., p.230.

steady progress during the Nineties, this problem was only foreshadowed, although all its elements were present in the growing hostility between the leaders of the A.L.F. and some of the parliamentary leaders.

During the Nineties, Labour parliamentarians were not men of great individual appeal, but the party was more than the sum of its parts. Held together by a comparatively well defined ideology, the Labour Party possessed a basic unity which was entirely lacking in their opponents. The Ministerial Party was simply a conglomeration of individuals, who would give their allegiance to this leader or that, but who were not united in a common vision or ideology. If a strong leader emerged, then the party retained a degree of unity, but in the absence of such a man, Parliament witnessed a debilitating factionalism which eventually led to the eclipse of conservatism.

CHAPTER 2POLITICS IN THE EIGHTIES

Queensland politics during the decade of the eighties operated within a two-party, rather than a factional framework. A democratic franchise enabled Queenslanders to participate in a parliamentary system which exhibited all the characteristics of balanced and mutually opposing party alignment, buttressed by mutually opposed economic interests. Two Premiers dominated political life - Thomas McIlwraith (1878-1883) leader of the party commonly called Conservative, and Liberal Party leader, Samuel Griffith (1883-1888). The dominance of these two individuals led to the stabilization of party life after the chaotic factionalism which had characterized Queensland politics prior to 1878. Parties were nevertheless somewhat amorphous. Existing groupings were not consolidated by extra-parliamentary organization. Leaders therefore depended primarily upon political patronage, and their position was reinforced by the existence of a solid core of support from a small group of faithful adherents. This lack of formality did not mean that the existence of parties merely depended upon political whim. On the contrary,

the eighties saw the emergence of two relatively tightly-knit organizations. They were united in a common aim - the economic development of the Colony, but differed in their conception of the best means by which to fulfil this ambition.

The development of Queensland meant the development of the primary industries of the Colony by the increase in communications, labour and efficiency. Many Queenslanders thought that primary industry would benefit by closer settlement of the land. Others felt that efficiency would be maximized by a system of large-scale freeholding. Throughout the decade, land, labour and communications were the major issues around which parties revolved, and it was on these issues that battle was joined between Liberal and Conservative. It is therefore the intention of this chapter to examine the nature of the political system, and the issues which occupied the attention of its participants.

ELECTORAL MACHINERY

Electoral arrangements may be characterized as overtly democratic. The Legislative Assembly Act of 1867 provided that any person who was qualified to exercise the franchise could stand as a parliamentary candidate, with the exception of Ministers of Religion, members of the nominative Legislative

Council, and any person holding office of profit under the Crown.¹ The franchise was determined by the 1867 Elections Act.² The vote was thus conferred upon all natural born, or naturalized adult male citizens, who met at least one of the following conditions - who had resided in his electoral district for a minimum period of six months, or who owned or leased property with a clear value of £100.00, or an annual value of £10.00. Individuals who owned property in more than one electorate were entitled to one vote per property in all electorates save that in which he held his residence qualification. Prohibited from voting were women, all men in the armed services and police force, as well as convicted felons and those certified insane. Thus, the principle of manhood suffrage was embodied in the Elections Act. In practice, however, it was open to considerable abuse. The very existence of a plural vote negated the ideal of manhood suffrage, and while it is difficult to ascertain the effect of its establishment and maintenance, it remained a rallying point for radical, and later, labour politicians.

Most of the abuses were primarily the result of the laws which covered the registration of voters. Originally,

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1. Q.G.G., 1399.
 2. Based on the N.S.W. Act of 1858.

electors were required to ensure that their names appeared on the rolls, which were collected annually. Courts of Petty Sessions employed collectors to gather names, and compiled the electoral rolls. An Act was passed in 1872 to prevent impersonation. It introduced forms called voter's rights, which were required to be produced by each voter before polling. These however, soon became negotiable, and as a result the system proved a failure. On introducing an amending bill in 1874, the Postmaster-General explained:

A man might get possession of half a dozen Voters' rights and vote for them too, at half a dozen polling places. The Voter's right promoted bribery under the ballot.... It was easy for an unscrupulous person to buy up Voters' rights and so prevent electors recording their votes.³

The abolition of the rights did not solve all problems. Justices of the Peace and members of the Revision Courts were too often open to political and pecuniary pressure, and were often political appointees. In 1879, the law was again revised. The earlier Act of 1874 had appointed police and other "suitable" officials to collect the names, which the Petty Sessions Courts would revise. The new Act made provision for civilian collectors. Griffith did not think this would curtail the appointment of partisan collectors:

He had noticed in some country papers that police were insufficient, and that a majority

3. Q.P.D., XVII, (1874), 696.

of the bench, consisting of political partisans, appointed collectors who were political partisans and electioneering agents.⁴

Registration was automatic, by written application.

Quarterly Registration Counts revised the rolls and Clerks of Petty Sessions were responsible for disqualification, while Returning Officers actually prepared the rolls.

Elections were held every five years, and usually extended over a number of weeks. The number of candidates was not limited in any seat, voting was by secret ballot, each vote being single and non-transferable.

In operation, the electoral system was characterized by two major abuses - roll stuffing (the placing of illegal names on the roll), and the disqualification of fully qualified voters.⁵ Moreover, staggered elections meant that if a candidate was defeated in one electorate, he could contest another on a different polling day. While this was no doubt of advantage to all candidates, it was of particular advantage to the Government, empowered to arrange the order of elections.⁶

4. Q.P.D., XXIX, (1879), 242.

5. As Party organization became more sophisticated, Electoral Committees organized groups especially to criticize the rolls.

6. In 1883, aware that urban sentiment was against him, McIlwraith ensured that all non-urban contests in the first batch of elections were relatively safe Government Seats. Moreover, the system allowed influential candidates to contest doubtful seats without endangering their place in Parliament. In 1883, B.D. Morehead attempted to win Fortitude Valley, was defeated, and returned to the safety of Balonne.

PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PATRONAGE

Leaders depended to a great extent upon personal patronage to maintain party unity, but both parties possessed a steady and consistent core of adherents. Of those members who sat in both Eighth and Ninth Parliaments, twenty displayed a consistent voting pattern behind one of the two leaders. The table below indicates the composition of these groups:

THE PARTY STALWARTS

McIlwraith	Griffith
A. Archer (Blackall)	W. Bailey (Wide Bay)
J. Hamilton (Cook)	S. Grimes (Oxley)
P. Lalor (Maranoa)	A. Rutledge (Kennedy)
B.D. Morehead (Balonne)	J. Horwitz (Warwick)
J.M. Macrossan (Townsville)	J.R. Dickson (Enoggera)
A. Norton (Port Curtis)	F. Kates (Darling Downs)
P. Perkins (Aubigny)	W. Kellett (Stanley)
J. Stevenson (Normanby)	J. Macfarlane (Ipswich)
	W. Miles (Darling Downs)
	W.H. Groom (Drayton and Toowoomba)

These men constituted a factor of enormous strength in the

party system, a nucleus around which other members grouped themselves. The membership of these small groups also indicated the major areas in which the opposing leaders gathered voting support. None of McIlwraith's adherents represented the metropolitan area or its environs. Perkins was the only Darling Downs representative. With the exception of Macrossan, all belonged to pastoral electorates, and Archer, Lalor, Hamilton, Stevenson, Perkins and Morehead were either pastoralists or engaged in pastoral investment. In contrast, Griffith's support was derived primarily from urban electorates, or south-eastern farming electorates. Electoral support thus reflected differing economic interests, constituting one basis of party division.

Election results in 1883 further reinforce this argument, indicating a very clear pattern of regional support. In 1883, nearly all Griffithite members, except those representing the Darling Downs⁷ represented urban electorates.⁸ On the other hand, a great majority of those who supported McIlwraith were returned from Northern and Western constituencies, primarily concerned with pastoralism or sugar.⁹

In the absence of any coherent system of pre-selection,

7. Horwitz, Kates, Kellett, Miles, Groom.

8. See Appendix 2.

9. The exceptions were Logan (Stevens), Murilla (Nelson), Dalby (Jessop) and Aubigny (Perkins).

candidates were chosen either by fairly select electoral committees, or, more rarely, by public demand in the form of requisition. There is some evidence that as early as 1882, Liberal Robert Bulcock buttressed his activities as a roll scrutineer by gradually developing a rudimentary pre-selection system at a meeting attended by Liberal leaders and others. Bulcock engineered the selection of W. Brookes in preference to W. Widdop, as Liberal candidate for the 1882 by-election in the North Brisbane electorate¹⁰. Pre-selection was, however, still in its infancy, as were other aspects of party organization. Such procedures held more advantage for the Liberal Party, less homogeneous than their opponents, who possessed the great unifying characteristic of common economic interest in the form of pastoralism.

While there was little formal party organization, it was nevertheless clearly recognized that "parties" did exist. Leaders in the house employed various methods of securing individual and group loyalties. The Liberal Party was closely associated with several politicized extra-parliamentary groups. The Workingmen's Political Reform League, sponsored by Arthur Rutledge, had branches in Brisbane, Ipswich and Rockhampton. Like the Anti-Coolie League, it was primarily interested in

10. Morrison, A.A., "Liberal Party Organizations before 1900". (Typescript Fryer Library) p.8.

preventing the importation of coloured labour.¹¹ These singular groups were an electoral advantage because they helped to attract and organize voting power, but any attempt to form a complex and general extra-parliamentary organization received little support.¹²

One method of gaining support, employed by both parties, was that of providing personal or monetary aid to aspirants for parliamentary honours. In 1883, McIlwraith undertook to pay a third of the costs of Patrick O'Sullivan's campaign in the electorate of Carnarvon.¹³ Another means of gaining support was to bestow favours on various electorates. This was especially effective where groups of representatives formed a solid, regional "bunch" within Parliament.

Discussing the career of W.H. Groom, D.B. Waterson gives an example of this type of mechanism:

Between 1879 and 1890, Groom was a loyal supporter of Griffith's Parliamentary Liberal Party. While he was prepared to log-roll with the other Downs members during this period, his record in divisions on confidence motions and matters of party solidarity was remarkably consistent. This devotion was certainly rewarded by extraordinary government expenditure whenever the "Liberals" were in power, but it was also responsible for a sharp decline in investment during McIlwraith's first term of office between 1879 and 1883. 14

11. Ibid., p. 13.

12. One such attempt, The Queensland Political Reform League, was virtually ignored by Parliament and Press.

13. Morrison, A.A., op.cit., p.7.

14. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector, Storekeeper. (Sydney Univ. Press, 1968), p.230.

In employing such methods, the leaders were primarily concerned with gaining voting strength inside Parliament. Many members, however, valued their independence and freedom of action. According to biographer, B.A. Knox, Arthur Morgan's "whole parliamentary career, up to the time when he formed the Coalition of 1903, displays an insistence on the independence of a parliamentary representative to act upon his own initiative where necessary, and on his own judgment at all times".¹⁵ Nevertheless, this cherished ideal of independence was often subordinated to the greater advantages of parliamentary solidarity, for the furtherance of individual ambitions, and those of the electorates.

PARTY ISSUES

Throughout the eighties, three issues dominated the political scene - land, railways and coloured labour. Their significance is increased by the observation that these same issues continued to dominate political action in the next decade, at times with even greater intensity.¹⁶ The period saw two general elections, and it is possible, on the basis of policies enunciated in the campaigns, to discover the different attitudes of the major parties. The election of

15. Knox, B.A., The Honourable Sir Arthur Morgan. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1955), p.12.

16. See Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

1888 is the subject of a separate chapter, but issues in 1883 in which the Liberals were victorious give a good indication of policy differences.

In 1883, a number of smaller issues, such as temperance in some metropolitan electorates, calls for triennial parliaments, and payments of members, occupied some of the election platforms. But the overriding issues were land grant railways, land settlement and coloured immigration. The election had been preceded by the resignation of Thomas McIlwraith's Government after the parliamentary defeat of the transcontinental railway bill, in which was embodied the principle of railway construction by private enterprise. Proposals for the importation of coolie labour to work the sugar plantations had also caused considerable public uproar. Land policies of the Conservative administration had come under severe attack from their opponents, who alleged that their policies were unduly favourable to large propertied interests.¹⁷ These issues dominated the 1883 election. The major concern for Governments was the economic development of the Colony, and this implied efficient utilization of land, labour and communications. Thus, it is not surprising that

17. Sir Charles Dilke argued that land was the major divisive issue in the Colony - Dilke, C., Problems of Greater Britain. (London, ^{Macmillan,} 1890), pp.205-210.

such questions dominated the period between 1883 and 1888.

Economically, the time could not have been more propitious. The decade was a period of expansion, in which a widespread belief in the abundance and bounty of Queensland's great natural resources held sway. T.A. Coghlan estimated that between 1876 and 1880, £8 million was invested in Queensland's public and private investment areas. In the first half of the new decade, the figure expanded to £20,000,000.¹⁸ Developing at a tremendous rate, the Queensland economy was nevertheless inherently unstable, for there was a sectoral imbalance, caused by overdependence upon building and pastoral industries.¹⁹ Harold Finch-Hatton, an English aristocrat and squatter in Queensland, observed with alarm that speculation in sugar was reaching huge proportions:

There is very little doubt that a great deal of money will be dropped in these northern sugar speculations.... It is probable that in the future the growing of sugar will develop into an enormous industry... but it is certain that numbers of people will be ruined in the process of developing it... the prices paid for land during the run on sugar growing were far too high to allow any profit... by and bye, the reaction will set in ²⁰

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18. Cited in Crook, D.P., "Aspects of Brisbane Society in The Eighteen-Eighties". (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1958).
 19. See Chapter 3.
 20. Finch-Hatton H, Advance Australia. (Allen & Co., Lond., 1885), p.157.

In the first half of the decade, however, public confidence was enormous. Success and fortune were to be found, and Queenslanders, while looking to the State to encourage industry, still retained great faith in the efficacy of private enterprise. Short, sharp recessions, like that of 1879, could not dampen the spirit of enterprise and investment.²¹

RAILWAYS

Under conditions of economic bouyancy punctuated by sudden, short slumps, the McIlwraith Government announced deficits of £169,000 in 1879 and £22,000 in 1880. Most of the deficit in 1880 had been caused by a sharp drop in railway revenues. Since the development of the colony was seen partly in terms of increasing communications, the inefficiency and costliness of government railways was highly disturbing. The railways were showing a consistent loss, so McIlwraith introduced the Railways Companies Preliminary Act in 1880. This was designed to "provide for and encourage the construction of railways by private enterprise." McIlwraith described the purpose of the Bill several years later:

21. This recession came at a time when Queensland was still recovering from the effects of severe drought (1876-8) and was caused by a brief balance of payments crisis. Butlin, N.G., Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900. (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), p.10-

The great object of the Bill was to be an intimation to the world that if they offered to construct railways in the interior of Australia on the principle laid down in the measure, and on terms that would commend themselves to the Government, then the Government would accept their agreement.²²

This Preliminary Act was passed without division, with only two dissenters, W.H. Groom and George Thorn. This is strong indication that, at this time, the majority of Queensland parliamentarians shared the Premier's faith in the ability of private enterprise to build and maintain profitable railways, without ensuing social disruption. The Government preferred that the risk of railway construction be undertaken by private companies, and the Parliament accepted the idea, as yet unaware of the liabilities and responsibilities implied by private control of essential communications.

The first railway proposal under the 1880 Act was the Warrego Railway Bill, narrowly passed in 1882. McIlwraith had subsequently withdrawn the Bill, and in 1883 introduced the Transcontinental Railway Bill, intending to pass a more ambitious scheme, before presenting the clearly unpopular Warrego proposals to Parliament. The Telegraph commented:

The Premier has declared it to be his fixed determination to carry the Transcontinental Railway Bill and the Warrego Railway Bill through Parliament this session, if possible

22. Q.P.D., XXXIX, (1883), p.67.

by a purely party vote, and there is no doubt whatever that he means what he says.²³

The Transcontinental Railway Bill (T.R.B.) was a measure in which was planned a railway from Point Parker on the Gulf of Carpentaria to Charleville. The project was to be undertaken by a private syndicate, under the direction of General W. Fielding, and was to be financed mainly from Britain. The Telegraph hinted that McIlwraith was financially involved in the scheme²⁴ and while this was unlikely, he had done much to encourage the formation of various syndicates. It was generally supposed that Collier and Co. had been encouraged by McIlwraith to participate while he was Minister for Works in 1874.²⁵ The formation of the Transcontinental Railway Syndicate had coincided with a visit by McIlwraith to London, although there is evidence to suggest that he did not know of it until after its formation.²⁶ Nevertheless, it was still widely rumoured that McIlwraith was not a disinterested advocate of the scheme.²⁷

The syndicate opened negotiations with the Government

23. Telegraph, 3/7/83.

24. Telegraph, 4/7/83.

25. Mem^o Col-Sec. to Collier & Co. (Undated Q.S.A.).

26. McIlwraith to Kimber & Co., 1/1/80 (Q.S.A.).

27. According to the Rev. W. Lilley, "Sir Thomas McIlwraith and his friends, whether true or not were strongly suspected too of not being uninterested promoters of this projected syndicate of Land Grant Railways", Lilley, W., Life of the Hon. W. Brookes. (City Printing Works, Brisbane, 1902).

in January 1882, with final agreement being reached in the following year.²⁸ Seven and a half years were allowed for the construction of the line, and land was to be granted to the syndicate in alternate blocks at the rate of 10,000 acres per mile south of the Gulf watershed, and 12,000 acres north of that point. The total area to be granted was twelve million acres.²⁹

McIlwraith, on the evidence of the reaction to the Warrego Railway Bill, expected a tough battle over the new proposal. Hostility from squatters, faced with the loss of about half their runs, had been gathering momentum since 1881. Oscar de Satge was prepared to fight an election on this issue alone:

I became a candidate with the co-operation and promise of support of a number of neighbours and powerful friends, with the view of opposing the famous Warrego and Transcontinental Railway schemes.³⁰

McIlwraith, when introducing the Bill, attempted to reassure the squatters. He argued that "the squatter, through whose land the line goes will derive a benefit from the line equal to, or greater than, the damage he suffers on account of the land taken from him".³¹ His arguments failed to convince

28. Q.P.D., XXIX, (1883), p.79.

29. Q.V.P., II, (1883), pp.545-49.

30. De Satge, O., Pages from the Journal of a Queensland Squatter. (Hurst & Blackett, LONDON, 1901) p91.

31. Q.P.D., XXXIX, (1883), p.79.

colleagues and opponents alike. Griffith, who had voted for the 1880 Bill explained his new opposition in terms of greater knowledge of the evils of private ownership of railways. Much Liberal opinion had changed when they had familiarized themselves with the results of such schemes in the United States, and many now believed that such ownership could only lead to fraud and corruption. The large amount of land which would be handed over to the companies had also been unforeseen. Suspicion that McIlwraith and his friends were financially involved also alienated some sections of public opinion.³² Thus the self-interest of the squatters, combined with the opposition to private ownership of railways, made McIlwraith's task almost impossible. Most men professed to agree with de Satge:

It was a scheme, in fact, for setting up an independent sovereignty in the heart of Queensland, according to which foreign capitalists concerned in it might do everything in its own territory even coin money, and in all trade, defy competition.³³

While it was expected that McIlwraith would find it difficult to pass the Bill, most commentators were surprised by the ease with which he was defeated. The T.R.B. was defeated by 27 votes to 16, with eleven abstentions. Only

32. T.C., 10/7/83

33. De Satge, op.cit, p.339.

four Government supporters actually crossed the floor, of whom only one, William Allen, was influential within the party.³⁴ Of the eleven absentees, eight were Ministerialists.³⁵ The majority of those Ministerialists opposed to the Bill represented squatting constituencies. It appears however, that the desertion was only temporary, caused by objection to the T.R.B. and not to the Government in general. Those Ministerialists who voted against the Bill or had abstained, all sat on the opposition benches after McIlwraith's defeat in the 1883 election.³⁶

The defeat of the Government by such a wide margin left McIlwraith little alternative but to tender the resignation of the Ministry and to call for a new mandate. The Toowoomba Chronicle observed that:

It is perfectly clear that a majority of the present Legislative Assembly are not only opposed to the particular application of the land grant principle of making railways known as the Transcontinental project, but to the abstract principle itself.³⁷

The furore which surrounded the T.R.B. masked to a certain extent its primary purpose - to develop the communications of the colony. This aim was common to Liberals

34. Stevens, Weld-Blundell, Ferguson, Allen.

35. Baynes, Feez, Govett, Persse, Walsh, Morehead, Jessop, McWhannell.

36. Only McWhannell, Stevens, Ferguson, Govett, Morehead were re-elected.

37. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.7.83.

and Conservatives. Their differences were rooted in the question of control. McIlwraith cherished the principle of responsible private enterprise; Griffith felt that only the State should control such enormous undertakings. The Liberals in office were as enthusiastic as their opponents about the extension of railways. In 1886, the Government proposed the construction of eight major lines, stressing in the proposals the need to open up land for farming as opposed to pastoral areas. The close link between land and railways was expressed by the Telegraph:

Progress has ever been the watchword of liberalism in Australia, the greatest good for the greatest number. The land for the people, population, settlement and no class legislation.... It is quite consistent with all that the party has always done or tried to do, that the leaders of real progress... are now proposing an expenditure of £6,000,000 for the construction of railways in the Colony.³⁸

CLOSER SETTLEMENT

In keeping with the movement in the southern colonies to unlock the lands, land policy in Queensland attempted almost from the beginning to promote closer settlement. Most of the land laws from 1860 aimed at preventing the alienation

38. Telegraph, 13.6.84.

of large tracts of cultivatable land. The Unoccupied Crown Lands Occupation Act of 1860 made provision for fourteen year leases for unoccupied land, held in runs not less than 25, and not more than 100 square miles. Also in 1860, the Crown Lands Alienation Act had authorized the Governor in Council to sell by auction Crown Lands at an upset price of £1 per acre, and to set aside 100,000 acres in agricultural reserves. In 1863, an Agricultural Reserves Act allowed the selection for purchase of up to 320 acres of land for agricultural purposes. The coastal and Darling Downs districts were declared settled districts in 1868, and an Act provided for the resumption of half the property in these areas for the purposes of closer settlement.³⁹

The move towards legislative encouragement of closer settlement was continued in the seventies, with several Acts designed to tighten pastoral leasing conditions and to ease conditions on agricultural settlement. Such legislation was, however, insufficient to curb the gradual extension of huge pastoral holdings. Waterson describes the results:

The result was always the same. Whatever the conditions imposed, capital and the lawyers always found a way, and the early land acts were no real impediment to the freeholding of

39. This spate of legislation ended in 1868, when the same Act defined the limits of selections - 80 acres maximum for agricultural land and 60 acres minimum for pastoral.

great estates. The squatters thus wanted things all ways. Secure in their knowledge that they could circumvent any legislation devised by political men, they desired immense acreage at little cost and with few onerous conditions.⁴⁰

With their great capital resources, pastoralists retained the advantage thus created, particularly at times when general capital was short, and they were usually able to buy up good land with little competition. In the administration of the Land Acts can be found another reason for the success of the squatters: "Divided control between the survey office and the Lands Department, administrative confusion, political influence ... were almost as important in affecting the ultimate fate of resumed lands as the Acts themselves".⁴¹

The usual methods of family selection, dummyming, and deliberate evasion of residence and improvement conditions were used by pastoralists to circumvent Acts designed to promote closer settlement.⁴²

By such methods, repeated all over the colony, the liberal land laws were ignored and negated. Land reform

40. Waterson, D.B., op.cit., p.26.

41. Ibid., p.34.

42. One flagrant example of such activities occurred in 1867. A Leasing Act of 1866 was accompanied by a Memorandum by which free selection in agricultural reserves before survey was granted in lots between 80 to 320 acres at a rental of 2/6 an acre. Receiving advance warning, squatters selected 14,878 acres near Warwick in less than two weeks. Waterson, (Ibid., p.40-41) remarks, "False declarations, blank powers-of-attorney and transfer forms were as abundant as confetti. Men made a jest of the swindle".

became a major political issue, intensified by the close connection between McIlwraith and the pastoralists. It had been clear during the 1883 elections that Griffith intended to propose sweeping land reform measures, and on his accession to the Premiership he appointed squatter C.B. Dutton as Minister for Lands, Dutton, well informed and well educated, was a late convert to the ideas of Henry George, and non-alienation of land was a major part of his programme. Griffith's Ministerial programme contained the principles upon which the Government intended to base its land policy:

It may be as well to say that the objects we shall try to obtain by our land legislation ... will be to deal with the pastoral lands of the interior in such a manner as to encourage the pastoral tenants to spend money upon them in improvements while at the same time securing to the country an adequate return for the lands occupied.... We shall in every way discourage the alienation of pastoral land.⁴³

The Crown Lands Bill of 1884 was the clearest expression of Liberal land policy. Dutton described its three major aims as (i) providing "the amplest and readiest means of obtaining land on most moderate terms by all men in the community"; (ii) preventing "the general tendency of a certain class of people who have exhibited a very inordinate greed for the acquisition and monopoly of land"; (iii)

43. Q.P.D., XLI, (1884), p.36.

checking the tendency to acquire land fraudulently and using it for speculation.⁴⁴ The Government sought to realize these aims by asking the squatters to pay for the benefit of increased transport facilities by higher rents, which in turn would pay the interest on the £10,000,000 loan raised for the purposes of extending communications. The squatters would also suffer the resumption of part of their land to provide for closer settlement in the settled areas. In return, Griffith promised the squatters greater security of tenure. The Land Board, composed of two civil servants and set up to try to curb administrative abuse, was a major target of opposition attack. McIlwraith regarded it as a major weakness in the Bill:

The Bill, instead of strengthening land administration by judiciously enlisting the aid of trusted representative men possessing local knowledge ... would universally entrust the entire administration in a Central Board, hampered by legal technicalities and delayed by difficulties and cost of procuring local administration.⁴⁵

The Land Bill was regarded as a "cause célèbre" by Liberals and radicals. The language of Dutton's attack on the squatters indicated that he regarded it with almost crusading zeal. The Week commenting on opposition to the Bill

44. Q.P.D., XLIII, (1884), pp.251-253.

45. Ibid., p.317.

demonstrated this attitude: "The leader of the opposition ... spoke avowedly as the advocate of the squatters ... but he has, at present, an almost hopeless task if he tries to do more than modify the 'people's' bill."⁴⁶

The bill attacked the principle of freehold as the most desirable form of holding property, and replaced it by the principle of leasing. Pastoralists felt that if they could afford to buy land, there was no reason why they should not do so. Their individualist philosophy had not changed since 1866, when a pastoralist described their attitude: "If they had run a race and won it, there was no reason why they should be prevented from running any more."⁴⁷ Nevertheless, most squatters agreed to come under the provisions of the Act, thus releasing about 100,000 acres for closer settlement.⁴⁸ Despite all its manifest virtues, the Bill did not fulfil Liberal hopes. In attempting to limit the privileges of the squatters it met with a small degree of success. But as an attempt to promote closer settlement it failed, as it failed to raise revenue to any significant extent. It tried to do too many things, and succeeded in none. The Act was

46. Week, 18.10.84.

47. Q.P.D., III, (1866), p.369.

48. Q.P.D., XLVII, (1884), p.1106.

to produce many amendments in the following decade, as pastoralists, beginning to feel the effects of depression, began to agitate for relaxation of leasing conditions.

LABOUR FOR THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

The sugar industry of North Queensland was regarded as a potential source of great wealth, provided that planters could get sufficient cheap labour for the fields. It was, moreover, a common belief that white men could not work in the North⁴⁹ and that the industry would perish without some form of cheap labour. During the Eighties, there were two proposed sources of such labour - India and the Islands of the South Pacific. Throughout the Eighties and through the Nineties, a continuing source of political problems was the acceptance of such labour as part of Queensland life. The attitude of the planters is well expressed by Finch-Hatton:

The planters are a small community; but the absolute identity of their interests, and the fact that numbers of them live close together, makes it easy for them to co-operate ... they are absolutely dependent for their existence upon being able to obtain a sufficient supply of coloured labour to do their work in the cane fields ... the result of any attempt on the part of the Brisbane Government to stop black labour would inevitably be to make the North of Queensland insist on separation from the South.⁵⁰

49. The 1890-91 proposals for indentured Italian labour raised the question - "Were Italians considered White"?

50. Finch-Hatton, op.cit., pp.158-161.

COOLIE LABOUR

A major issue in the 1883 election campaign was the proposal of the Ministry to import coolie labour for the sugar industry. In 1862, an Indian Immigration Act had provided for the importation of Indian coolies by agreement between the Indian and Queensland Governments. Until 1883, the Act had remained on the Statute Books, but had not been utilized because the Indian Government refused to sanction such a policy. In 1881, however, McIlwraith had made provision in the estimates for the appointment of an immigration agent to India. The issue was one with which the McIlwraith Government was closely identified. In May 1883, J.M. Macrossan wrote to McIlwraith that "Coolies will be a great thorn in our side".⁵¹ After the election, he expressed great relief that his support of coolie labour had not proved as damaging as he had anticipated.⁵² Nevertheless, the threat of coolie labour alarmed many Queenslanders, and the Liberals entered the elections pledged to abolish any legislative encouragement of such labour.

The Bill to repeal the Indian Immigration Act was passed in the Assembly without division. The opposition's main

51. Macrossan to McIlwraith, 25.5.83. (McIlwraith correspondence, Oxley Library).

52. Macrossan to McIlwraith, 25.8.83. Ibid.

argument was that repeal was both unnecessary and harmful, and could open the door to negotiations between private individuals and the Indian Government.⁵³ Such arguments were unrealistic in view of the Indian Government's refusal to negotiate with the Queensland Government, and the threat of coolie labour was successfully destroyed.

PACIFIC ISLAND LABOUR

The repeal of the Indian Immigration Act did not unduly alarm the sugar planters, or directly threaten their interests. There was another source of labour, which was both cheaper and easier to obtain - black labour from the Islands of the South Pacific. The attitude of the Liberal Government to "Polynesian" labour was thus crucial to the planting interests.

The question of Pacific Island labour had always been a divisive one, not least, as Finch-Hatton recognized, because it also affected the question of North Queensland separation. It was recognized that Griffith was determined to prohibit the importation of such labour, particularly because many Pacific Islanders, intended only to work in the canefields, had gradually ~~moved onto~~ other parts of the industry. In 1884, Griffith introduced an Act aimed at restricting them

53. Q.P.D., XLI, (1884), p.57.

to work in the fields. His primary concern was the maintenance of the conditions of work for white labour, although he was also alarmed at the growth of absentee landlordism:

If we go on introducing black labour into this colony we shall have a number of large estates managed by a few owners; but more frequently by managers for absentee owners with large gangs of inferior races.⁵⁴

The opposition provided little resistance to this Bill, although the remarks of Maurice Hume Black indicated the strong interconnection between black labour and separation:

It was impossible ... for a Parliament, sitting in Brisbane to legislate for the various industrial conditions (in Queensland).... When he cast his eyes over the Ministerial benches what did he see? He saw nothing but the southern portion of the Colony represented. It was essentially a Brisbane Government.⁵⁵

Given the basis of electoral support for each party, it is not surprising that northerners felt they would receive more favourable treatment from McIlwraith. On the other hand, it was not merely parochialism which induced Griffith's stance on black labour. The working population of the north was also hostile to the trade in men. The men of the gold fields, who primarily returned Liberal members, were staunch opponents

54. Ibid., p.134.

55. Ibid., p.137.

of cheap black labour. For this reason, J.M. Macrossan, a long-standing representative of the miners, was opposed to "Polynesian" labour.

Pacific Island labour was not a strictly partisan question; there were many shades of opinion among parliamentarians. At one extreme, there was a group of southern Liberals, who during the 1884 debate, pushed for a poll tax of £50 on each imported labourer.⁵⁶ William Brookes led this group, a man who "lent his energies most fully to oppose the systematic importation of alien races to work upon the sugar plantations of Queensland.... He regarded it as a horrible denial of human rights, and contrary to the best traditions of the British people".⁵⁷ Liberals who represented sugar constituencies, however, tended to support the planters. In McIlwraith's party, Macrossan was opposed to such men as M.H. Black and B.D. Morehead, who thought cheap labour desirable, not only on the sugar plantations, but in all other areas where it would be found profitable. The majority of this party, however, agreed with the opinion of Governor Musgrave who wrote in 1885:

I do not, however, share the opinion of Mr. Griffith that it will eventually be found possible to successfully prosecute the cultivation of sugar

56. Brookes, Isambert, Smyth, White, Buckland, Higson, Grimes, Salkeld, Jordon, Foxton, Midgely, MacFarlane.
 57. Lilley, op.cit., p.105.

cane in the tropics by means of white labour. I believe this to be physically impossible.⁵⁸

Griffith, fixed in his intention of abolishing the trade, introduced a Bill in 1885 to curtail the importation of Polynesians after 1890.⁵⁹ Once again, the Bill passed without division. To soften the blow, Griffith planned to institute a system of central sugar mills, subsidized by the State, and thus to reduce the costs of employing white labour. McIlwraith had "no doubt that the Premier would be able to carry his scheme for subsidizing planters with sugar mills. It would receive support from both sides, but he did not believe that one fifth of the members who supported it believed it.... At the present time, it was unpopular to advocate black labour, because the working classes were deceived on the subject".⁶⁰

The planters had thus failed in their attempts to convince the public that the sugar industry could not survive without black labour. More persuasive had been the humanitarian and political arguments of Brookes and Griffith. Sir Charles Dilke expressed these arguments better, perhaps, than anyone:

The Queenslanders have not yet solved the problem of the settlement of a tropical country by Englishmen

58. Musgrave to Sec. of State (Colonies) Confidential, 13.4.85.
 59. See below, Chapters 5 and 12.
 60. Q.P.D., XLVII, (1884), p.1144.

and of its cultivation by English hands....
 If the other colonies permit their northern
 sister to continue her course of importing
 dark skinned labourers to form a peon
 population, a few years will see her a
 wealthy cotton and sugar growing country,
 with all the vices of a slave holding
 Government, though without the name of
 slavery.⁶¹

CROSS CURRENTS IN PARTY LIFE

The large majority gained by the Liberals in 1883 had the effect of robbing party life of much excitement. At no time did the Griffith Government appear in danger of defeat, and in July 1887, the Courier, noting the political tranquillity, if not apathy, called upon the Government to seek a fresh mandate.⁶² The apparent consensus shared by the parties was destroyed a month later when J.R. Dickson resigned from the Ministry on the question of the imposition of a property tax. The public unanimity of the Liberal Party was shattered. While division on party questions⁶³ had shown a remarkable cohesion in Liberal ranks, significant nuances of opinion can be gauged on such questions as social services, temperance and reforms in the parliamentary system.

61. Dilke, C., op.cit.

62. Brisbane Courier, 8.7.1887.

63. Callaghan, P., Political Alignments in the Queensland Legislative Assembly. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1968),
 Nominates five party divisions - election of speaker (1883) Crown Land Bill (1884) Customs Duties Bill (1885) Warwick St. George Railway (1886) Committee of Ways and Means (1887).

An analysis of division lists on such issues may prove instructive:

DIVISIONS

AYES	NOES
<hr/>	
1. TRIENNIAL PARLIAMENTS BILL	SECOND READING
<hr/>	
Rutledge: Griffith: Dickson: Dutton Sheridan: Fraser: Brookes: Aland Smyth: Isambert: Jordan: White: Salkeld: Bale: Mellor: Kates: Grimes: Buckland: Campbell: Stevens: Foote: MacFarlane: M. Patterson: Foxton: Bailey: Beattie 26	Norton: Archer: Morehead: Chubb: Black: Stevenson: Nelson: Higson: Palmer: Ferguson: Donaldson: Hamilton: Moreton 13
<hr/>	
2. MEMBERS EXPENSES BILL	SECOND READING
<hr/>	
Aland: Annear: Bailey: Brookes: Brooks: Brown: Bulcock: Campbell: Dickson: Dutton: Foxton: Fraser: Griffith: Grimes: Higson: Horwitz: Isambert: Jordan: Kellett: Lissner: Mellor: Miles: Moreton: Rutledge: Sheridan: White: Buckland: McMaster 28	Black: Donaldson: Govett: Hill: Murphy: Nelson: Norton: Philp: Stevens: Stevenson: Palmer: Jessop 12
<hr/>	
3. BEER DUTY BILL	SECOND READING
<hr/>	
Annear: Beattie: Brookes: Dickson: Dutton: Foote: Fraser: Griffith: Grimes: Hogson: Isambert: Jordan: Kates: MacFarlane: Mellor: Midgely: Miles: Moreton: Rutledge: Salkeld: White: Wakefield: Bailey 23	Archer: Black: Chubb: Horwitz: Ferguson: Jessop: Lalor: Macrossan: McIlwraith: Norton: More- head: Palmer: Hamilton: Lissner 14
<hr/>	

AYES	NOES
4. REPEAL OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACT	
Brookes: Buckland: Bulcock: Ferguson: Fraser: Grimes: Jordan: Kates: MacFarlane: Miles: Rutledge: Sheridan: Wakefield: McMaster: Salkeld.	Chubb: Dickson: Dutton: Foxton: Griffith: Hill: Horwitz: Kellett: Lissner: Moreton: Norton: Pattison: Philp: Hamilton: Murphy
Groom - Casting vote 15	15
5. LICENSING BILL AM. TO CLAUSE 114	
Annear: Archer: Bailey: Black: Chubb: Foote: Govett: Lissner: Macrossan: McIlwraith: Norton: Palmer: Smyth: Ferguson	Aland: Brookes: Campbell: Dickson: Dutton: Griffith: Grimes: Groom: Jordan: Kates: MacFarlane Mellor: Miles: Norton: Rutledge: Salkeld: Sheridan: Wakefield: White: Buckland: McMaster
14	21
6. LICENSING BILL MacFarlane's Amendment⁶⁵	
Aland: Beattie: Buckland: Campbell: Donaldson: Foote: Grimes: Salkeld: Higson: Jordan: McMaster: Mellor: Wakefield: White: MacFarlane: Midgely	Archer: Black: Brookes: Chubb: Dickson: Dutton: Ferguson: Govett: Griffith: Groom: Hill: Isambert: McIlwraith: Miles: Moreton: Norton: Palmer: Rutledge: Sheridan: Smyth: Stevenson: Bailey: Stevens:
16	23
64. McIlwraith moved that 1/5 rather than 1/10 of ratepayers were needed to provide sanction for a local option poll.	
65. MacFarlane moved an amendment to omit the clause which exempted persons selling liquor in Military canteens.	

 7. EMPLOYERS LIABILITY BILL AMENDMENT TO CLAUSE 4 (Hill)⁶⁶

Adams: Bailey: Black: Brown:
 Donaldson: Foote: Grimes:
 Hill: Horwitz: Jessop: Kates:
 Kellett: McWhannel: Murphy:
 Pattison: Smyth: MacFarlane:
 Mellor

Aland: Brookes: Brooks:
 Bulcock: Chubb: Dickson:
 Dutton: Ferguson: Griffith:
 Hamilton: Isambert:
 Lissner: McMaster: Midgely:
 Miles: Moreton: Norton:
 Philp: Rutledge: Salkeld:
 Sheridan: White: Wakefield:
 Buckland

18

24

THE PROTESTANT FACTION

Divisions 3, 4 and 6 were concerned with the moral questions of temperance and prostitution. The close connection between Protestantism and the Liberal Party is indicated by the solid core of Liberals voting in the affirmative. In these divisions some members voted together on all three issues, (MacFarlane, Jordon, Grimes, Wakefield). The size of the temperance group may be estimated by voting in divisions 3 and 6.⁶⁷ They were not joined by any Conservative members and constituted a solid core within the Liberal Party. Most of the members of this group were engaged in small business - Foote, MacFarlane,

66. To omit sub section 2 of clause 4 - to cover injury to workmen "By reason of negligence" on the part of an employee in a capacity of superintendence.

67. MacFarlane, Beattie, Foote, Grimes, Higson, Jordan, McMaster, Wakefield, Mellor, Midgely, White.

Salkeld and McMaster were all engaged in the retail trade, Grimes was a farmer and Jordan a civil servant. Jordan, Mellor and Macfarlane were Wesleyan Methodists. Many of these members voted, in opposition to Griffith, to repeal the Contagious Diseases Act. This Act, based on an English counterpart, had been passed in 1868, and required that "certain women" were to undergo periodic health checks to prevent the spread of venereal disease. Unfortunately the Act did not specify which women were to come under its provisions. Throughout 1885, Parliament was flooded with petitions from women's organizations and religious groups, primarily Protestant. Many regarded the Bill as an infringement of civil rights. Jordan, introducing the motion for repeal, argued that it was degrading in concept and a denial of female rights.⁶⁸ Macfarlane considered the Bill not only ineffective in preventing prostitution but also discriminatory.⁶⁹ Most speakers also regarded the Bill as inherently immoral, because it practically gave a State licence to practise prostitution. This line was followed by Jordan, Grimes and Macfarlane who were especially concerned with its effect on poorer members of the community, often driven

68. Q.P.D., L, (1886), p.1527.

69. Ibid., p. 1532. Macfarlane argued that "A man might steal away the virtue of the daughters of our working class with no redress whatsoever".

to prostitution by intense poverty. It is significant that the extreme opponents of coloured labour largely corresponded with this Protestant - Humanitarian faction.⁷⁰

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Debate on the Contagious Diseases Act also brought to light intra-party divisions on the question of the role of the State. Griffith and Rutledge represented two opposite shades of opinion. Griffith in opposing the motion argued:

Of course we cannot stamp the disease out; but if we find a number of persons engaged in an unlawful occupation, which is likely to have the effect of spreading the disease, has the State not a right to say, "We cannot stop the practice of your unlawful occupation; but so long as you continue to practise it we will take care that you do not affect the people of the colony?"⁷¹

Rutledge maintained that this exceeded the limits of the duty of the State:

Is syphilis the only form of hereditary disease; are not consumption and insanity hereditary diseases? And yet, what Statesman was ever yet bold enough to say that because the children of consumptive parents will suffer all kinds of miseries, we should enact a law forbidding consumptives to marry?⁷²

Griffith's conception of the role of the State was also responsible for the introduction of the Employers Liability

70. See footnote 56.

71. Q.P.D., L, (1886), p.1528.

72. Ibid., p.1539.

Act, a transcript of an English Act passed in 1880, with the aim of extending the responsibilities of the employers. It did not cover injuries caused by faulty machinery, unless it could be proved that this stemmed from the negligence of the employer. The Bill did cover, however, injuries received through the negligence of an employer in a delegatory capacity. In Committee, the amendment proposed by Lumley Hill was aimed at deleting this clause. While the second reading had passed without division, votes in Committee did not follow party lines. Several Ministerialists voted against the clause.⁷³ The majority were employers of a large labour force, although small farmers and pastoralists, who delegated so much authority to managers, also felt it to be directly threatening. Many felt State interference was being taken too far. Grimes remarked: "I quite agree that the employer should be made responsible for any damage which is sustained through his carelessness, but I do not go so far as to make him liable for the carelessness of those employed."⁷⁴ Foote agreed with his colleague: "I think we are going a little too far in some of our legislation".⁷⁵

73. Bailey, Foote, Adams, Grimes, Horwitz, Kates, Kellett, MacFarlane, Mellor, Smyth.

74. Q.P.D., p.296.

75. Ibid., p.294.

This laissez-faire attitude was shared by many Liberals, and may have been responsible for the dearth of social legislation in the Liberal period. During the sessions of 1884, 1885 and 1886, four Bills were introduced aimed at controlling the liquor trade.⁷⁶ In 1884, a Health Bill and an Insanity Bill were passed, a very mild excursion into the field of public health. The Offender's Probation Bill slightly eased criminal punishment, and the Criminal Act Amendment Bill was largely formal and unconcerned with social welfare. Apart from one Bill designed to prevent the sale of opium to Aborigines, and several to protect the Polynesians, these were the only Bills designed to increase the scope of welfare legislation.

The Liberals, with their opponents, believed that if national wealth was increased, social wealth would naturally follow. Thus if they provided greater opportunities to acquire land, equitable labour conditions, and greater opportunities to exercise the vote, the stage would be set for all citizens to advance their aims. This entailed an enormous amount of intricate legislation, involving the State in the promotion of national progress, but not in the protection of individuals unable to partake of economic

76. The Licensing Bill, Beer Duty Bill, Liquor Bill, Queensland Spirits Duty Bill increased duties on beer and spirits, and placed greater restrictions on their sale.

advances.

RAISING REVENUE

Until 1887, the Liberals, despite differences of opinion on such issues as temperance, presented a harmonious appearance. On no great issue did the Liberals disagree to such an extent as to cause a public split. In 1887, however, Griffith's proposal to levy a tax on property split the party, and greatly reduced the Ministry's chances of re-election in the following year.

The failure of the Land Act to realize expected revenue had, by 1887, led the Government into considerable financial difficulty. The Governor's speech in 1887 indicated continued confidence:

The Public finances have however, not escaped the natural consequences of the long continued adverse seasons, but have no doubt that with careful administration, they will shortly exhibit their usual satisfactory condition.⁷⁷

Many commentators forecast that differences would arise between Griffith and his Treasurer, J.R. Dickson, as to the best method of recovering the deficit. The Brisbane Courier thought that Griffith was likely to favour increased taxation, while Dickson sought the remedy in increased land sales.⁷⁸

77. Q.P.D., LII, (1887), p.5.

78. Brisbane Courier, 10.8.87.

The resignation of Dickson on the eve of the presentation of the Financial Statement therefore caused little surprise. In his explanation Dickson wished it to be "distinctly understood that in retiring from the Government I do not cease to be a Liberal member I do not consider that when a member differs from the Griffith Government he must necessarily retire from Liberal ranks. I have yet to learn that the new Gospel which has been propounded by the Premier must necessarily embrace all, and surround all and contain all the principles of Liberalism".⁷⁹

Dickson could see no necessity or justification for a land tax, particularly as the necessary revenue could be raised by the far less painful means of increased land sales. Several other leaders, including party organizer Robert Bulcock,⁸⁰ agreed with him. The Ministerial split was not however regarded as serious by the Telegraph, which observed that "the political situation, while it is full of interest, is not theoretically, full of difficulty".⁸¹ The newspaper was confident that Griffith could fill Dickson's place in the Ministry and still retain the confidence of the Ministry. Griffith, however, was not prepared to press the

79. Q.P.P., L11, (1887), p.266.

80. Bulcock, Kellett, Foote, MacDonald, Paterson, Brooks, Hill.

81. Telegraph, 6.8.87.

issue, and even though he carried his land tax proposals, he announced their withdrawal on 31 August.

Griffith was thus prepared for the electorate to decide the issue. The importance of the split can be over-estimated. Its chief significance lay in the electoral harm done by the publicity surrounding the trouble. Because the composition of the party was heterogeneous, differences of opinion inevitably arose, none of which proved insurmountable at this time. The situation was not inherently dangerous to the maintenance of the prevailing system of two balanced and mutually opposing parties.

A PHILOSOPHY OF DEVELOPMENT

Between 1883 and 1888, it was clear that fundamental differences between the two parties existed. With the same primary aim, the economic development of the Colony, they differed as to the methods by which these aims might best be achieved. In as much as either side could be said to possess a philosophy^{it was} of material development, material progress, from which social benefits would inevitably follow. In many ways, the manner in which they conceived these aims reflected the sectional economic interests within the parties - mining on a large scale, pastoralism and sugar on the one hand, and merchandizing and agriculture on the other. Their differences were as significant as their similarities, and were conducive to the maintenance of the two party system.

CHAPTER 3THE DEPRESSION

In February 1892, the Brisbane Courier described the economic situation of the colony in the following manner:

General business is paralysed, property is practically valueless, and even sovereigns are of small account because of the fear of losing them, and the doubt whether value can be obtained in any business transaction whatsoever. The Government of the Colony is weighted with a certain measure of responsibility for the depression. It has indulged in a wasteful expenditure of borrowed money... [It] cannot be permitted to rest with folded hands now that the collapse in values has set in.¹

Depression in business which had reached perhaps its lowest point in 1892, had been in evidence as early as 1890, when the Queensland correspondent of the Australian Insurance and Banking Record commented that "Money with us is very tight, and extreme caution still continues on the part of monetary institutions and private individuals alike. The banks keep up their restricted rates and show no sign of change".²

According to Lewis, the depression in Queensland began as early as 1886, caused primarily by a sectoral imbalance in

1. Brisbane Courier, 10.2.92.
2. A.I.B.R., IV, 6, June 1890, p.455.

colonial investment patterns.³ This imbalance was the result of overinvestment in residential and pastoral property. Government economic behaviour was also partly responsible because of flagging government revenue at a time when the public sector needed considerable buoyancy to counter-balance the contraction in private investment. Moreover, evidence that the Government could not balance their accounts was contained in every yearly budget report.⁴ The chronic deficit of the Queensland Government had one result which was unique in the Eastern Colonies - in Queensland, fiscal policy was regarded not as a total theoretical approach to government finance, but simply as a means of raising revenue. Fiscal policy was thus not unconnected with the depression in Queensland, and could be regarded as partly a consequence of the economic circumstances of the Colony.

Political and social consequences of the depression were enormous. In many ways, depression conditions contributed to the rise of militant labour for, as working conditions deteriorated, the labour unions became more demanding. The depression also contributed to the decline

3. Lewis, F.G., The Crisis Years (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1964).

4. Liberal financial ineptitude was one of the primary causes of the defeat in the 1888 General Election.

of liberal fortunes during the nineties, because the economic methods of Sir Samuel Griffith were unable to meet the new needs of the colony. Large-scale unemployment and depression in all industries therefore had great repercussions which were to be felt long after business had begun to revive.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR

In 1885, the pastoral and building industries controlled about 80% of the gross private investment, a percentage which had not altered to any significant extent a decade later.⁵ According to Butlin, there had been a sharp rise in pastoral investment beginning in 1882 and continuing till 1891.⁶ The reasons for this increased investment lay in an increase in overseas borrowing, by colonial governments as well as banks and other specialized financial institutions. In the southern colonies, good seasons throughout the Eighties were a further inducement to investment. In Queensland, serious droughts in 1884-6 and 1888-9 do not seem to have weakened confidence, given such buoyant conditions in the South. Butlin observes however that "From this high point, sustained after other major sectors had begun to contract, the level

5. Butlin, N.G., Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1901. (C.U.P., 1964), pp.36-8.

6. Except for a general disarray in¹⁸⁹⁰, Maritime Strike.

of pastoral investment fell heavily to touch bottom in 1897".⁷

The process of overseas borrowing in pastoral investment tended to be self-complicating. Banks and finance companies multiplied as it became ever easier to obtain finance. An overseas correspondent for the London Times reported in 1893 that "At present, it is generally held that the pastoral industry is suffering from the malady of overcapitalization".⁸ The correspondent noted that the interest rate on capital grew in geometric relation to the multiplication of sources of finance:

The English investor lends money into a land and mortgage company and receives a fair rate of interest. The company lends it at a higher rate to an Australian Bank. The bank lends it at a still higher interest to the station owner, and by the time it gets to the land it must pay profit to the owner, interest to the Bank, interest to the company and interest to the English investor.⁹

Under these conditions, it should not have been surprising that investors found their profit margin narrowing. Banks and finance companies, moreover, exercised little control over how their money was utilized. In Queensland, pastoralists ploughed more money into their land in order

7. Butlin, N.G., op.cit., p.47.

8. The Times (London), Letters from Queensland. (Macmillan, Lond., 1893), p.69.

9. Ibid., p.71.

to recoup the losses of the late seventies. It was not until too late that the dangers of overstocking and non-replenishment of pastures were perceived. L'Huillier maintains that the pastoral industry had reached the limits of its productive capacity by the late eighties, "and investment expenditure added little to future productive capacity and export earnings. In fact, the excessive flow of funds until 1891 from Britain and at home increased the already dangerous situation of excessive capacity."¹⁰

A similar situation existed in urban residential investment. Lewis argues that the production of building materials did not seriously fall away until 1890, thus contradicting Butlin's assertion that "the clearly marked slump from 1885-7 was the end of the main building phase in Queensland."¹¹ Neither the value of production, nor the size of the workforce contracted to any significant extent until 1890, but by 1892, values had dropped to levels below those pertaining in 1884.¹² Lewis argues that in the Queensland context, Butlin's emphasis upon the importance of the building industry was misplaced, given the small percentage of the workforce engaged in the industry during the period.

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10. L'Huillier, "Depression and a national economy", N. Griffin (ed.) Essays in the Economic History of Australia. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1967).
11. Butlin, N.G., op.cit., p.116.
12. Lewis, F.G., op.cit., p.166.

Moreover, Brisbane, the centre of the industry, did not appear to experience the extremes of the building boom which had occurred in the southern capitals. Despite this relative moderation, land purchased at inflated and unrealistic prices was left unsold, and new buildings remained unoccupied as the depression worsened in intensity.¹³

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

The dominant place occupied by the pastoral industry in the private sector was paralleled in the sphere of government investment. The financial policies of the Queensland Government were heavily weighted in favour of rural, particularly pastoral, industries. The greater part of most government expenditure was concentrated in primary industry, particularly in the provision of communications throughout the vast colony. Between 1860 and 1915, gross investment in railways alone totalled about 72% of the gross public investment, and from 1871 until 1891, the number of persons employed in transport and communications industries rose four-fold.¹⁴ In order that this expansive railway policy be implemented, the Queensland Government, along with those of all other Australian colonies, had engaged in extensive overseas

13. Brisbane Courier, 10.2.92.

14. Laverty, J., "The Queensland Economy, 1860-1915". Murphy, Joyce, Hughes (eds), Prelude to Power, (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1970), p.31.

borrowing. On a per capita basis, Queensland borrowing equalled that of the southern colonies between 1883 and 1893. The loan policy of the Queensland Government was, however, considered irresponsible by the A.I.B.R.:

For several years past, Queensland politicians have been so deeply engrossed in the excitement of party warfare that the public financial position has received scant attention at their hands. It has been the general practice to rely incautiously upon the future of the great underdeveloped resources of the country.¹⁵

Many commentators also criticized the utilization of public money. The greater part of the proceeds from loans was poured into the construction of railways. The A.I.B.R. described the cavalier manner in which these loans were raised:

Hitherto, loans have been obtained supported by a list of proposed lines, with estimates which were little better than guesses. The Government then found it convenient to spend the money in accordance with the exigencies of their position, and to apply for parliamentary sanction of the expenditure incurred by them at the next parliamentary session.¹⁶

Moreover, as public money continued to pour into railway development the return was becoming visibly less. There were several reasons - inadequate surveys often led to spiralling costs; most railways followed settlement, and

15. A.I.B.R., XIV, 9 (Sept. 1890), p.633.

16. I.B.I.D., p.632.

therefore expanded into areas already reaching maximum capacity. In addition, too many railways were built as a result of political pressure. One example of this was the second section of the Cairns-Herberton railway, the contract for which was described by the Courier as "grossly improper in its inception and calamitously expensive in its sequence ... it was essentially a political transaction throughout."¹⁷ According to the Warwick Argus, "the whole of the Government work in connection with this contract for the second section of the Cairns-Herberton railway has been a muddle of incompetency and favouritism".¹⁸

In many areas, the value of railways was lessened by exorbitant freight costs. In 1892, the Warwick Argus described this situation:

Not a few of our farmers are living on credit, not because they have nothing to sell, but because the railway and other charges render it impossible to sell at a profit just now.¹⁹

Unfortunately, this was a vicious circle. While revenue continued to fall, it was impossible to reduce freight charges, but the shrinkage of revenue had led to the situation in the first place. McIlwraith, in his 1890 Financial Statement concluded that it was the failure of land revenue which had

17. Brisbane Courier, 24.1.93.
 18. Warwick Argus, 27.2.92.
 19. Warwick Argus, 6.9.92.

led to the disastrous financial state of the Queensland railways, as it was from this source that interest on railway loans was to be met.²⁰ While this was to some extent true, the A.I.B.R. also pointed out that under the Morehead Government, the "policy of constructing payable main trunk lines has been perverted into the opportunist plan of making little country branches and extensions, ostensibly as feeders, but which have now become recognized as "leeches and blood-suckers".²¹

Whatever the reasons, the deficit continued to grow. In 1883-4 the net revenue from 552 miles of line stood at £148,295.0.0. In 1889-90 the return was £77,692.0.0 from 919 miles of line.²² The importance of railways is recognized by Butlin:

It was Queensland's uncertainty of the future of railway investment which induced the early slackening of public capital formation. Moreover the decline in financial performance reflected the much more serious difficulty, that the inability to expand freight income was due, in large measure, to the failure of railway investment, in the late eighties, to continue to stimulate export earnings.²³

This policy of extensive borrowing created an artificial economic environment, and was self-defeating, because on most occasions, new loans had to be raised to meet interest

20. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.576.
 21. A.I.B.R., XIV, 9, (Sept. 1890), p.633.
 22. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.577.
 23. Butlin, N.G., op.cit., p.446.

on already borrowed capital. The Maryborough Chronicle expressed this opinion:

Our State borrowing policy while it brought about a specious prosperity, in liberal expenditure of money throughout the colony, which we foolishly accepted as genuine while it lasted, is responsible almost solely for the stagnant depression that now afflicts us.²⁴

FISCAL POLICY

The continued unsatisfactory state of Government finances was a major reason for McIlwraith's introduction of a policy of full-scale protection in 1888. Prior to this date, Queensland had followed a policy of only very limited protection, based on 1870 legislation. In 1870, the Government was forced to choose between imposing a land tax or an income tax for the purposes of raising revenue. In a squatter dominated Parliament, the former was very unlikely, and the income tax was generally unpopular. The Government thus decided to introduce customs duties. The new tariff mainly aimed at replacing the difficult to police ad valorem duties by fixed duties on the same articles. The ad valorem duties which remained were increased from 7.1/2% to 10%. The Government exempted certain raw materials which were used in industries which the Government hoped to develop. The taxes remained fairly moderate, but opponents

24. Maryborough Chronicle, 9.6.92.

of the pastoralists argued that the tariff was a cynical piece of class legislation. They argued that the most efficient and fair method by which to raise revenue was to place an export tax on wool, rather than to spread the tax burden into areas where people could least afford it.

McIlwraith introduced a thorough-going revision of the tariff in 1888. He explained:

The Government have done everything they possibly could to reduce the expenditure. They found that under the ordinary rate of taxation, a large deficit had accrued which must be provided for. That deficit they propose to provide for by increasing the Customs Duties of the colony, and in one item (25) abolishing the excise. The duties proposed ... are not calculated, from their weight to depress trade, but they are sufficient to encourage industries in many directions.²⁶

This decision had not come as a surprise. Brisbane merchants had long been aware that McIlwraith was a strong protectionist, arguing that the colony needed a protective tariff to encourage native industry. The Brisbane Courier in 1889 indicated that the revision was expected in criticizing Donaldson's membership of the Chamber of Commerce:

Mr. Donaldson's position as President for the last six or seven months has been a difficult and anomalous one. It was known that the new Government was committed to a revision of the

25. The Beer Duty, an 1888 Election issue.

26. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.215.

tariff along protectionist lines, which involved the subordination of the ... mercantile interests to the industrial interests. 27

Brisbane merchants, who constituted a fairly large group within McIlwraith's National Party (a name coined for the 1888 election) were directly opposed to the policy of protection. If the finances had been healthier, it is doubtful whether McIlwraith, despite his enormous prestige, could have defeated the combination of free traders, merchants, pastoralists and northerners. Thus, while the onset of depression was not directly responsible for the advent of a high protective tariff in Queensland, only the necessity to raise revenue in a sagging economy gave McIlwraith the opportunity to implement the policy.

Pastoralists opposed protection as they were primarily interested in the export market, and a low tariff enabled them to import necessities as cheaply as possible. In 1888, John Murray argued:

I have always looked upon protection from a producer's point of view, and I hold that no protective tariff can possibly benefit the producing interests, from the simple fact that our staple products are articles of export. 28

27. Brisbane Courier, 1.1.89.
 28. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.340.

Free traders believed that a high protective tariff could only lead to an unstable, because artificial economy, and that Queensland would have to import labour to provide for local industries which would be artificially fostered by protection.²⁹ Yet, freetraders could not deny the slow development of Queensland industry, and thus had to pay lip service to "the encouragement of native industry" which could only be fostered through protection. Thus, until 1896, no major politician actually declared himself a free trader.³⁰ Protection was not a contentious issue during the 1893 General Election, but in 1896, Nelson promised a further revision of the tariff. The Courier, discussing claims for protection on Queensland foundry machinery, indicated the changing climate of opinion in April 1896:

The Government should be infinitely more concerned about the foundations of prosperity than about one of the many and comparatively insignificant superstructures.³¹

Northern opinion throughout the period was decidedly anti-protection, as most Northerners felt that their population, consisting largely of adult males importing necessities from the South could only suffer. Louis Goldring reflected

29. Ibid., p.341.

30. One exception was B.D. Morehead who described protection as "a most heretical system of taxation". Q.P.D., LXVIII, (1892), p.1050.

31. Brisbane Courier, 8.4.96.

this attitude in 1888:

As a Northerner, I am bound to be a free trader. I always was averse to protection ... the tariff which has been presented will affect the residents of the North more than those of the South To make protection successful we must have a large population, and unfortunately we have not got it.³²

Nevertheless, the free traders had less than a fighting chance in 1888 and the issue was not again to become significantly contentious until the late nineties, when the threat of inter-colonial free trade forced them to take up the cudgels against federation.³³

The debate surrounding fiscal policy had one most fundamental characteristic - it rarely revolved around a question of principles. Because the 1888 and 1893 tariffs possessed primarily a revenue raising character, shrill cries were heard from those adversely affected, but none expressed opposition to protection in principle. The depression contributed to the advent of full-scale protection in Queensland, and as economic conditions began, and continued to improve, so also did the strength of protection wane.

THE BANKS

The beneficial effects of the 1888 tariff upon

32. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.325.

33. Free trade, protection, federation, arguments are discussed in Ch. 6.

Government finance were largely dissipated by a government borrowing policy which was both foolish and reckless. The general ineptitude, at times bordering on corruption, which was evident in spending policy was also a feature of its dealings with the financial institutions of the Colony. The Government made no attempt to curtail speculation in the private sector or the operations of the Banks. There had been considerable early support for local banks, particularly after the early and spectacular success of the Queensland National Bank.³⁴ There was not, however, a favourable ratio between local and overseas investment. At the beginning of 1890, local deposits stood at £10.1/4 million, while deposits elicited from outside the colony totalled about £11 million.³⁵

In early 1891, the Government needed £1 million to pay interest on loans falling due. The usual practice was simply to raise a new loan. British investors, however, already made cautious by the failure of the giant British Baring Company, refused to invest, The A.I.B.R. commented, not without some satisfaction, "Queensland has at length met with a rebuff on the London money market ... the result

34. See below, Ch. 7.

35. Lewis, F.G., op.cit., p.226.

of the application was as complete a failure as has yet been suffered by an Australian colony".³⁶ British investors were no doubt becoming impatient with the manner in which Queensland loan money was being utilized. It was local conditions such as these, rather than the external conditions of the Baring crisis, which initially led to the decreasing willingness of British investors to take chances in Queensland.

Throughout 1891 and 1892 these investors began and continued to withdraw money from the Queensland Banks and finance companies. In March, April and May, 1892, £310,000.0.0 was withdrawn, particularly from the Q.N.B. Only the action of the Government saved it from closing.³⁷ McIlwraith continued to negotiate loans from the Bank of England, in order to pay interest on British loans, rather than to disturb the deposits in the Q.N.B. In December 1892, the Government borrowed £600,000.0.0 in order to prop up the bank. This dangerous expedient could not continue indefinitely, and the Q.N.B. with thirteen of its counterparts, was forced to suspend payments in May, 1893.

The reasons for the bank failures, which proved the low point of the depression years, are many. A severe

36. A.I.B.R., XV, 6 (June 1891).

37. See below, Ch. 7.

drought had again left the pastoral industry in a state of partial paralysis. Huge floods had occurred in Brisbane and its environs, spreading as far as the Mary River. Combined with these natural disasters was Government policy. L'Huillier maintains that:

In two respects, investment expenditures of colonial governments were just as contributory to the crisis as those of the private sector. Firstly, the capital outlays of the late eighties added little to the productive capacity. And secondly, public capital formation contracted at a time when the economy badly needed some stimulus.³⁸

In following a policy of rigid retrenchment as the signs of depression became ever more apparant, Queensland politicians were following conventional theory and practice. The eventual cessation of all public works, as well as retrenchment in the Civil Service, only led to a worsening unemployment situation, which in turn further depressed the economy.

The depression reached its nadir as the banks closed their doors. Hasty remedial legislation avoided further disaster, but it was too late to halt its already tremendous socio-economic, and hence political effects. The worsening economic situation in part explains the failure of political liberalism, and the rise of political - industrial labour.

38. L'Huillier, op.cit., p.190.

More immediate, however, was the sudden, sharp rise in unemployment, and the deterioration in working conditions.

QUEENSLAND WORKING CONDITIONS

Conditions of work for most Queenslanders were far from salubrious. Factory legislation was almost non-existent, and very little protection was afforded the average worker. The decade of the eighties had seen boom conditions and correspondingly high wages, but as the depression set in, the growth of unemployment destroyed the bargaining power even of skilled workers. For the semi-skilled and unskilled, the situation was disastrous. Even before the depression, working conditions were often completely insanitary and hours were long.³⁹ In the slaughtering trade men worked from 14 to 17 hours a day. The retail trade was equally demanding, from 8 to 11 hours per week day, and up to 14 hours on Saturdays. The Royal Commission into Shops, Factories and Workshops drew attention "to the fact that women and young girls are working in factories the same number of hours as the men, whilst wages paid them barely reach one-half the amount earned by their stronger co-workers."⁴⁰ Exploitative child labour was common, and the Royal Commissioners found

39. Most of the material for the following section has been drawn from the Report of the Shops, Factories and Workshops Commission. Q.V.P., 11 (1891), p.959.

40. Ibid., p.959.

children of 10 and 11 years in many factories.⁴¹ Whitfield argues that:

Overcrowding, bad lighting and ventilation, insanitary conditions, danger from machinery and fire, even "sweating" were factors which both groups of opinion admitted did obtain in a large number of factories and shops.⁴²

"Sweating" was indeed a common occurrence in Queensland industrial life. In the conditions of depression, employees would take home enough work to occupy several people. In other cases, middlemen could sub-let material for others to work, and would make enormous profits. The firm which received the work was not concerned how and by whom the work was done, and the "sweated" workers were often swindled and abused.⁴³ Moreover, the long hours of work, frequently combined with overtime, for which only tea money was usually paid, were rarely interrupted by paid holidays. The Royal Commission was told by one butcher that if he dared to ask for a holiday, he would be immediately dismissed.⁴⁴

With such conditions, it is not surprising that the majority report of the Royal Commission recommended sweeping state intervention. Among their more important demands were:

41. Ibid., p.961.

42. Whitfield, G., The Early Factories and Shops Legislation of Queensland, (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1968), p.34.

43. Ibid., p.17.

44. Ibid., p.21.

- (1) That 6.00 p.m. be legally declared closing time
- (2) That no child (under 14) be employed in any shop, factory or workroom
- (3) The appointment of special sanitary inspectors
- (4) All apprentices to be engaged by written agreement
- (5) A law to enforce a weekly pay day
- (6) A statutory eight hour day⁴⁵

In other areas of Queensland employment, conditions were better regulated. Stoodley points out that miners often resented the amount of regulation in this industry:

The evidence suggests that the lead in agitations for reform came from the press ... and was taken up only by a few miners and managers, but that the great majority of miners were either too afraid, too conservative or too naturally careless to seek safety regulation; comfort seems to have been more important to them than safety.⁴⁶

Miners however, had little to fear from wage reductions. Gold was not a commodity greatly affected by falling world prices, and it retained its price while other primary products declined disastrously. Pastoral employees, however, were in a very different position. Because much work was seasonal, job stability was considerably reduced. Chances of re-employment must have worried many shearers. In 1891,

45. Report of Commission, op.cit., p.691.

46. Stoodley, The Queensland Gold Miner in the Late Nineteenth Century (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q.).

pastoralists reduced wages in many branches of the industry, While shearing rates remained stable at 20/- per hundred sheep, various classes of labourers' rates were cut severely. Further reductions followed in 1893-4 and despite long and bitter strike action, the new rates remained in force.⁴⁷

These wage cuts were paralleled in many other Queensland industries. Worst affected were shedhands and shepherds, agricultural labourers, carpenters and painters. In some cases, the reductions did not reach serious proportions until 1895,⁴⁸ and wages climbed only slowly after this date.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The hardship caused by falling wages was compounded by growing unemployment, although the exact rate is difficult to determine, as neither the Government nor contemporary journals published accurate assessments. In June 1892, however, the Brisbane Courier reported that unemployment demonstrations were becoming a daily occurrence.⁴⁹ On 6 June, 1892, a deputation claiming to represent 1,000 unemployed, sought and was granted a meeting with Griffith, who offered sympathy but little else.⁵⁰ The reports of the Government Labour Bureau, beginning in 1893, also give some

47. See below, Ch. 12.

48. Lewis, op.cit., p.237.

49. Brisbane Courier, 21.6.92.

50. Ibid., 6.6.92.

indication of the unemployment rate, although it is impossible to ascertain how many men did not apply to the Bureau for work. The following table, abstracted from these reports, indicates that unemployment was worst in areas where infant industries had become economically important.⁵¹

UNEMPLOYMENT - 1893-96

Place	Total Registrations	Demand	No. Unprovided For
Brisbane	10,988	9046	1942
Bundaberg	2,812	1481	1332
Ipswich	3,051	511	2540
Mackay	55	130	
Maryborough	83	85	
Rockhampton	2,984	932	2022
Toowoomba	1,798	1798	
Townsville	1,793	4705	

Thus, of those men registered for unemployment during the period, nearly 8,000 could not be found work. The worst

51. Extracted from yearly report, Govt. Lab. Bureau.

year was 1893, when a little over 2,500 men could not be found work. The general labourer suffered most severely, although in 1893 carpenters were almost impossible to place following the collapse of building industry. The figures also indicate a situation of undersupply in the North, probably due to climatic conditions and the fact that migrants tended to move to the more temperate southern regions.

The Government made only feeble attempts to rectify the situation. This was partly the result of its own retrenchment policy, and its unwillingness to provide public works. Prevailing attitudes towards unemployment were also contributory. The general belief in the virtue of self-help and laissez faire was succinctly conveyed by the Courier:

The functions of Government cannot be held to cover a supply of work and wages for those who may be elsewhere crowded out of employment.⁵²

Relief works, such as employment in the Botanic Gardens, were regarded as ultimately degrading, even by the unemployed. The Government, however, showed no inclination to offer more useful work. The Worker advocated land grants to place the unemployed on the land, coupled with the complete cessation

52. Brisbane Courier, 14.1.91.

of State aided immigration. In reply, the Courier, while agreeing that the use of the land was a logical solution, and that loans to farmers were more defensible than relief works,⁵³ still maintained that "the socialist doctrine that the State must provide work for those willing to work is impractical and intolerable".⁵⁴

Employers continued to feel the effects of this disastrous depression long after general business had revived. By 1895, most commentators believed the worst was over. The A.I.B.R. commented upon the economic situation in January 1895:

It is true that all trades connected with construction in all its manifold forms are still suffering severely, and that for them there is as yet no ray of dawn; but for all this, the reorganization or absorption of the industrial forces is making much headway ... as regards ... colonial indebtedness, it is much less as far as the absolute amount of yearly remittance is concerned While moreover, colonial borrowing in England has been stopped except for conversion purposes, the heavy calls made on British shareholders by banks and squatting companies ... have greatly alleviated any strain on the Australian financial resources.⁵⁵

53. Ibid., 6.2.91.

54. Ibid., 24.1.94

55. A.I.B.R., Jan. 1895, p.1.

CHAPTER 4RAILWAYS

The size and terrain of the Colony of Queensland, with its basic economic structure of primary industry, meant that the development of communications was one of the first concerns of Queensland governments. The faith in the natural resources of the colony was underpinned by what may be described as a "philosophy of development", shared by both liberals and conservatives. The building of railways was seen as the most necessary of the Government services if the colony was to aspire to wealth and productivity. Unfortunately, the extension of railways was also the most financially hazardous of the Government operations. It has been argued in Chapter Three that it was the uncertainty of future railways development which was one of the initial causes for the withdrawal of capital from the colony. The financial failure of Government railways naturally led to discussion of the merits of private railways. During the Eighties, the McIlwraith Government had fallen on the issue of railways built by private companies on the land grant principle. The Liberal Government of 1883-1888 had been

equally concerned with the extension of railways, but into agricultural rather than pastoral areas. But the problem of making railways remunerative was a constant source of worry for the administration, for losses on the railways meant retrenchment in other, less vital areas. Industries dependent upon haulage suffered from high railway rates, but the rates could not be reduced because the railways were still "in the red". The preoccupation with railways - private or government, agricultural or pastoral, continued into the nineties and this chapter is designed to examine this facet of administration.

GOVERNMENT RETRENCHMENT

Despite the great importance of communications, the decade of the nineties saw very little actual construction. During the eighties, the length of line in use had jumped from 635 miles to 2003 miles, but the next decade saw that total increased by only 798 miles.¹ Moreover, some of the railways had been laid by private companies and local authorities, rather than by the government. The depression was thus taking its toll. In 1894 and 1895, only six miles were added, with a further seven miles in 1896. Construction

1. These and subsequent figures have been abstracted from the yearly reports of the Railway Commissions, found in the Q.V.P.

began to pick up in 1897, with an average yearly increase of 115 miles until 1900. Even this was a relatively modest programme, compared with the giant schemes envisaged in the eighties and early nineties. By the end of the decade, agitation for railway extension was becoming more strident, and many commentators argued that ~~if~~^{the} Government was not prepared to extend the lines, private companies should be enabled to do so. Such an opinion was expressed by the Mackay Mercury in 1900:

Queensland obviously cannot borrow, and the question is whether we are prepared to allow railways to be built and mining fields developed by outside capitalists, or whether we prefer to remain without railways and with our mineral resources locked up for an indefinite time The essential thing is that Queensland is years behind in railway construction, and her development is being hampered thereby. The people want railways, and so long as provision is made safeguarding the interests of the Country, there is no valid objection to our getting railways by the only available method.²

THE RAILWAYS CONSTRUCTION (LAND SUBSIDY) ACT

These arguments had been caused by the proponents of the Transcontinental Railway Bill in 1883, and again in 1892, when the coalition Government introduced the Railways Construction (Land Subsidy) Act. The Toowoomba Chronicle

2. Mackay Mercury, 28.7.1900.

foreshadowed the arguments of the Mercury:

It must be recognized that the borrowing powers of the Colony have reached their limit Under these circumstances we are placed now in a very different position from that which we occupied previously, and a well digested scheme for the construction of railways on the land grant system would no doubt be acceptable to the Country.³

While the Transcontinental Railway Bill (T.R.B.) had been a concrete, well planned and specific Act, the 1892 proposal was a very general measure designed to clear the way for the construction of land grant railways, rather than proposing any particular line or lines.

The major clauses of the Bill covered the conditions and types of contract. There were three alternative contracts:

- (i) The railway should remain the property of the company for a fixed period not exceeding fifty years and then revert to the State.
- (ii) The line should become the property of the State as soon as completed.
- (iii) It should remain the property of the Company subject to right of purchase by the Crown.

The value of the land to be granted was limited by the above

3. Toowoomba Chronicle, 20.3.92.

terms. Under the first contract, the land should be equal to twice the cost of construction; under the second alternative, land equal to the sum of the cost of construction; and under the third, the cost of construction plus the value of the land, which was to be valued before signing the contract. Clause 14 provided for parliamentary ratification of the contract within fourteen days of its completion. Reasonable compensation on expenses already incurred if the contract was not ratified was provided in clause 16.⁴

The news of the Government's intention had been foreshadowed by the Wide Bay Times, a newspaper published in Maryborough.⁵ There had been, moreover, many proposals made to the Queensland Government by overseas firms. Late in 1891, an advertisement calling for investment in a new Queensland syndicate appeared in the London Times. In consequence of this, F.W. Fox had written to Griffith in March, 1892:

I would be glad to again organize, as I did in 1881 a syndicate which would be composed entirely of new parties and groups of capitalists, but which might include, if you desired it, some of the members of the old syndicate.⁶

4. Q.P.D., LXVII, (1892), pp.345-9.

5. Reported in the Warwick Argus, 12.1.92.

6. Fox to Griffith, 9.3.92. (Premier's Dept. in Letter, Q.S.A.).

Griffith's reply is not available, but presumably Fox received some encouragement. In October 1891, the House had talked out ~~a~~ motion in favour of land grant railways⁷ but by June 1892, it was evident that a considerable section of Parliament would be favourable to such proposals. There was lengthy debate on the Bill, although, with so small an opposition⁸ its passage was a foregone conclusion.

Opposition to the Bill was centred around three major criticisms - that the Bill itself was inadequate, that the principle on which it was based was inherently vicious, and that it was unconstitutional. Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Nelson, admitted that "so far as I can see, the House is unanimous on the main principle", but he regarded, "the machinery for carrying out the system ... radically bad all through".⁹ Nelson argued that the syndicate, which was to carry out its own survey, could place lines wherever it wished, and that fourteen days was insufficient time to allow Parliament to exercise sufficient control. Charles Powers examined the Bill, clause by clause. He objected to the amount of land proposed to be alienated, to the lack of Parliamentary control over contractual arrangements, and

7. Brisbane Courier, 23.10.91.

8. At this time, it consisted of three Labour Members, a few Ex-Liberals, and a few disgruntled McIlwraithians, see Ch. 14.

9. Q.P.D., LXVII (1892), p.348.

described the Bill as one of vague generalities:

The only way such proposals should be dealt with is not in a general act, but in an act dealing with specific agreements that are thought good enough by the Ministry to submit to the House.¹⁰

J.G. Drake attacked the Bill as unconstitutional, as it reversed the policy laid down in the 1888 Elections without recourse to the electorate.¹¹

The major argument in favour of the Bill was based upon expediency - Queensland had to have land grant railways or no railways at all. That only fourteen members opposed the Bill indicated the strength of such arguments.¹² The Bill thus passed into law. The Warwick Argus with the Maryborough Chronicle argued that the Bill would be practicable only in pastoral areas, because land was to be granted in blocks contiguous to the line. This would preclude the closely settled districts, where most of the land had already been alienated. It was impossible, for example, to build such a railway from Warwick to St. George, where a line was desperately needed, or from Brisbane to the border.¹³ The Maryborough Chronicle stated its position forcefully:

The Land Grant Railway Act will be an acceptable and serviceable tool in the hands of the Government

10. Ibid., p.365.

11. Ibid., p.419.

12. See Ch. 12 for further political details.

13. Warwick Argus, 23.5.92.

at the General Elections, therewith to curry favour with the western and northern electorates, by promises of lines built on this principle and secure the return of Ministerial candidates. We anticipate that this is about the only use to which this reckless and unpopular Act will ever be put.¹⁴

The Government had thus secured parliamentary sanction for land grant railways; early in 1893, it proposed a number of lines to be built on the principle. They included four major lines - from Charleville to the western boundary; from Longreach to the western boundary; Hughenden to the border; and Normanton to Cloncurry. Thus it was only the western and northern pastoral areas which would benefit from the Bill. The seven minor trunk lines, also envisaged in the proposals, likewise served pastoral areas. Immediately prior to the 1893 elections, the Worker published its famous "grid-iron" map, indicating the amount of land which would be alienated to the syndicates. In round numbers, the railways would traverse about 2,500 miles at an estimated cost of £12.1/2 million sterling. The Worker pointed out that no syndicate would construct a line which was to become the immediate property of the Crown, when it could gain twice as much from either of the other two contractual alternatives. The map showed that under the

14. Maryborough Chronicle, 2.7.92.

first type of contract, 200,000,000 acres would be alienated to the syndicates.

The Government, mindful of the coming elections, published its own map and calculations. It valued the land at 6/8 an acre instead of the Worker's 2/6. Instead of estimating the cost of construction at £5,000 per mile, the Government valued it at between £2,500 and £3,500. Moreover, the Government estimated the length of line at 1640 miles, even though Parliament had authorized 2,500 miles. The Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that none of the western railways had cost less than £5000 per mile, and that the value of land on the Ministerial map was three times that set down by the last Parliament. The same journal felt that Parliament had blindly committed a "terrible legislative blunder".¹⁵

Those opposed to the proposals found they had nothing to fear. The original reason for the land grant Bill was Queensland's inability to float a loan. The bank crash in 1893 had further weakened Queensland's financial standing in London and British investors were as unwilling to invest in private as in public enterprise. As early as October, 1892, London bankers Freshfields and Williams informed

15. Toowoomba Chronicle, 18.3.93.

W.H. Wilson, M.L.C., Minister without Portfolio that:

If we were to express our own views on the subject, we should say that it would be very difficult to raise capital in this country on the security of the land grant principle only, and we should doubt very much whether capital could be raised, on sufficiently economical terms, without a government guarantee, in addition to the advantages of the land grant principle.¹⁶

Such a guarantee was not forthcoming, with the result that, for all the furore surrounding the Bill, no land grant railways were actually built in the Colony.

RAILWAY MANAGEMENT

The depression had effectively halted railway construction, particularly the building of large main lines. Moreover, the lines already laid down were becoming less remunerative. This was the result of inadequate survey and spiralling costs, as well as exorbitant freight charges. As early as 1891, the Warwick Argus reported that committees were being appointed in each of the Downs Electorates to request a reduction in costs. The Argus maintained that "The present railway rates render profitable farming an impossibility; and unprofitable farming means general stagnation".¹⁷ The Government's reaction to persistent demands for reduction was described by the same journal as

16. Freshfields and Williams to W.H. Wilson, 20.10.92. (Premier's Dept. Q.S.A.).

17. Warwick Argus, 20.1.91.

"miserably inadequate".¹⁸ The Government refused to reduce rates on general farm and dairy produce, although there was a slight reduction in rates for fruit and vegetables. The Railway Commissioners had increased the charges in January 1891, and there was little doubt that greater costs reduced the farming traffic, and much produce lay rotting in barns and fields. The Toowoomba Chronicle commented on the situation:

For how much of the depression the Commissioners are directly responsible cannot of course ever be known; that they have caused a large proportion of it is doubted by few on the Downs.¹⁹

The argument between the producers and the Railway Commissioners continued throughout the decade. Demands for relief flared up again in 1894, and again in 1899. In 1894, the Brisbane Courier which consistently opposed reduced rates, discussed the alternatives:

It seems to us that the real issue the Government has to determine is whether the existing rate is a fair one as between the consumer whose bread is made dearer by it and the general taxpayer who has to make up the deficit. A lower rate would give consumers cheaper bread, but at the expense of the whole community.²⁰

The Government's general policy with regard to railways

18. Warwick Argus, 31.5.92.
 19. Toowoomba Chronicle, 5.6.92.
 20. Brisbane Courier, 27.3.94.

was also called into question. The former policy of paying enormous sums for land reclamation in order to lay lengthy main lines was now out of the question. The Queensland Times expressed a fairly common opinion:

The idea of building short branch lines as "feeders" ... is well worth considering Being merely short branches there would be no necessity for such lines to be costly in construction. Even a very narrow gauge might be admissible, the main object being the carriage of goods at a low freight.²¹

This was about all the Queensland finances were able to absorb, and most lines constructed in the decade were feeders. Even when public works resumed in 1897, all the lines were small in scope. In 1897, all the lines were constructed in the southern division of the colony, and this caused considerable regional jealousy. Parochialism can be detected in nearly every railway debate. In 1894, the residents of Bundaberg and Maryborough were incensed by government refusals to build a branch line to Pialba and extensions to the Isis line. The Maryborough Chronicle urged that "our district railway association should be resuscitated, and closely watch and influence the coming railway policy of the Government".²² Similarly, most of the

21. Queensland Times, 11.1.94.

22. Maryborough Chronicle, 13.3.94.

provincial journals were markedly hostile to Brisbane. The Gympie Miner urged "the idea of centralizing everything in Queen Street must be fought inch by inch in the provinces".²³

During Nelson's Premiership, all groups interested in railway extension were becoming restive. The 1895 estimates had provided for several new railways, after Nelson had previously announced severe public works retrenchment. It appeared that Parliament was being asked to sanction railways for which it would later have to authorize a loan.²⁴ Some discontent was allayed by the passage of a Railways Construction Guarantee Act. This was a Bill to enable local authorities to build railways, with half the cost being borne by the councils, and half guaranteed by the Government.²⁵ The Act was welcomed by many provincial councils, and under it, the Maryborough Council began to build the much vaunted Pialba line.²⁶ The Act was not popular with the Railway Commissioners. In 1897, Matheson urged upon the Government "the necessity for extreme caution in dealing with proposals for making lines under this system".²⁷ The Commissioner felt that local authorities would attempt too much, and too much financial responsibility would fall onto the guarantor. In

23. Gympie Miner, quoted in Maryborough Chronicle, 18.3.94.

24. Brisbane Courier, 21.10.95.

25. Q.P.D., LXXIII, (1895), p.665.

26. Q.V.P., IV, (1897), p.659.

27. Ibid.

1899 Commissioner Gray reported that, for this very reason, the system had been an unqualified disaster.²⁸

PRIVATE RAILWAYS

The guarantee system had proved uneconomic²⁹ and the Government was still unwilling to undertake the risks attendant upon railway production. Thus, private railways seemed to provide the only other alternative. It was made clear that only lines which would promote closer settlement would be laid. This precluded railways into areas where the terrain made settlement unlikely. Thus, far western and mining districts were the major areas where private lines were envisaged. The Western Champion, published in Barcaldine, regarded private railways as a necessary evil:

The railway is a necessity and without it, nothing can be done ... so whatever are the terms they must be accepted. Unfortunately for the western country there is every indication that for this year and some after the drought is ended, there will be a great scarcity of employment for bush workers; but should the Government accept the offers of syndicates for constructing railways, there will be employment for everybody, work will last till the good seasons return.³⁰

The labour movement, which had so fiercely condemned the land grant railway scheme, was unlikely to be convinced by such transparent reasoning. By the end of the decade, private

28. Q.V.P., IV (1898), Report of the Railway Commissioner.

29. Most of the lines were uneconomic to start with.

30. Western Champion, 5.6.1900.

and syndicate railways were still being strenuously opposed by the Labour Party and other opponents of the Government.³¹

Meanwhile, the vitality^{WHICH} had been injected into government construction in 1897 and 1898 had again been dissipated, so much so that in 1900, only 55.1/2 miles of track had been laid in two years. Once again, the administration came under attack for the drift and muddle of its public works policy.³²

During the Eighties, Queensland Governments had undertaken to provide the colony with sufficient, and efficient means of communication. It has been argued in Chapter Three that the failure of Government railway policy, which contributed so much to the public revenue, had in part caused the contraction of investment at the onset of the depression. Two alternatives, the land grant system and the guarantee system, had failed, and the third, private railways, was also doomed to failure. In 1883 opposition to land grant railways had been so fierce that a Government had fallen. In 1892, the system had been sanctioned by Parliament, with only 14 dissentients. In 1899 and 1900, the battle against private ownership was renewed in earnest.

31. See below, Ch. 17.

32. Ibid.

Meanwhile, Government construction had languished. This failure on the part of the Government, allied with its performance in other economic fields, was partly responsible, after thirteen years of almost uninterrupted office, for its ignominious downfall in 1903.

CHAPTER 5LAND, LABOUR AND IMMIGRATION

The huge area and climatic diversity of Queensland, with her unlimited and largely untapped resources, had predictable repercussions in Queensland politics. Confronted with an often unfriendly environment, Government was required not only to promote, but to actively participate in the economic development of the colony. The Government was required to open up land for settlement, to promote its maximum productivity and to ensure a sufficient supply of labour. During the nineties, one of the constant pre-occupations of Government was the efficient utilization of the land, particularly in the west and the north. In the tropical north, this entailed providing cheap labour for the sugar industry still suffering from the depression. In agricultural areas, a supply of suitable agricultural labour was regarded as a government function.

LAND AND CLOSER SETTLEMENT

By the Nineties, the slogan "closer settlement" had lost much of its political force. The 1884 Land Act¹ was

1. See above, Ch.2.

the most consummate expression of the philosophy of the yeoman farmer which had been so prevalent in that decade. Griffith and his fellow Liberals believed, in almost Jeffersonian terms, that the small farmer was the backbone of the State, inherently good, kind and virtuous. In Queensland, the move towards legislative encouragement of closer settlement had begun immediately after separation, but was frustrated by the greater resources of the already entrenched pastoral group. The Nineties exhibited the same characteristics - Government legislation at once tried to promote closer settlement and pastoral expansion. The policy had the same net result - the resources of pastoralism triumphed over the more equitable division of land.

The 1884 Land Act produced many amendments, most of which were contrary to the expressed intention of the original Bill. The Crown Lands Act of 1891 ostensibly promoted closer settlement by introducing unconditional selection. This meant that selection was made conditional, not on improvements or residence, but upon the payment of rent. Such provisions, however, made it a simple matter for large capitalists to lock up the available land. The Pastoral Leases Extension Act seemed to express more clearly the nature of most of the Nineties' Legislation. The Bill was brought down as a result of direct pressure from the

United Pastoralists Association, through its parliamentary representatives.² The Act provided that the Government would extend the tenure of pastoral leases, for a fixed term of seven years, provided rabbit proof fences were erected and kept in good order. A clause was also included in which compensation was paid on land improved in this way.³ The provisions for fencing, however, were naturally difficult to enforce, and Macfarlane (Ipswich) regarded the entire act as a hoax, perpetrated "by the man behind the scenes ... for getting squatters an extended lease".⁴

Another example of the ambiguous nature of Government land policy was the Agricultural Lands Purchase Bill. This was designed to repurchase land in some settled areas, for the purposes of subdivision and closer settlement.⁵ Like all Government attempts to promote settlement this was "chiefly remarkable for its utter absence of enthusiasm, and gave rise to doubts as to whether the Government was merely playing with the question".⁶

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2. While the U.P.A. did not actually field candidates, almost all pastoralists belonged to it and strove to pursue its aims.
 3. A clause inserted at the insistence of the U.P.A.
 4. Q.P.D., LXVII, (1892), p.1713.
 5. Doubt is cast upon the intentions of the Government by a special clause, inserted after the main debate on the bill, which enabled the Government to purchase the Clifton Estate, owned by the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Co. of which McIlwraith was a director. See Ch. 14.
 6. Warwick Argus, 6.10.94.

Nevertheless, the belief in the virtue of the small farmer, so entrenched during the Eighties, lingered into the next decade, and found expression in two facets of Government activity - immigration policy until the onset of depression and a peculiar piece of legislation called the Co-Operative Communities Land Settlement Act.

IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

The aim of Queensland's immigration policy was two-fold, to increase population, in which it was successful, and to promote closer settlement, which met consistent failure. In the early years of Queensland's existence, the immigration Acts were aimed primarily at increasing the labouring population of the colony. Hence, early legislation provided assisted and free passages for this type of immigrant.⁷ In 1869, the Government granted 40 acres of land to any immigrant who paid his own fare. Queensland was thus beginning to look to immigration as a major method of "filling her spaces". By the Eighties, this had become a virtually ~~and~~ unchallenged assumption. Archibald Archer, a former Agent-General for Immigration did, however, criticize the delusion of the "agrarian myth":

7. The 1864 Act provided free passages to labourers and domestic servants, assisted passages to skilled workers, and nominated immigrants, whose sponsors paid half the fare.

It is ridiculous to tell men, who in a different climate, have farmed with the assistance of lots of ploughs and horses and men, that they can come out here and do exactly the same as those who have been here for years ... those who really know what farming is in this country will deprecate any attempt to bring English farmers out here with the idea that they will be able to conduct their farms in the way in which they conducted them in the old country.⁸

The Government consistently failed to promote closer settlement by its immigration policy. This was primarily due to the strangeness of the environment, although lack of Government aid, once the immigrants had arrived, was a contributory reason. The Government did make some attempt to alleviate the problems of the new arrivals. In 1886, the land order system was revived. Clause 25 of the Crown Lands Amendment Act provided that the Agent-General might issue a land order to every European immigrant who paid his own fare.⁹ The failure of this experiment may be attributed to a general lack of interest among immigrants, and the small amount of good agricultural land available. In 1890, the Under-Secretary for Land reported the complete failure of the experiment.¹⁰ Also in 1886, the Government established a Labour Bureau within the Immigration Department. It is

8. Q.P.D., XLVIII, (1886), p.290.

9. This was to the value of £20. for each adult (which could buy a homestead of up to 160 acres) and £10. for each child between 1 and 12.

10. Q.V.P., III, (1890), p.181.

somewhat significant that a General Labour Bureau was not set up until 1891.

The new settlers received little else in the way of Government assistance with the result that immigrants usually stayed in their ports of disembarkation. Crook points out that the urban areas held significantly higher proportions of inhabitants from England, Ireland and Scotland than other areas. In 1886, the proportion had increased by 7.8% in Brisbane, compared with a general increase of 3.7%.¹¹ The myth of the yeoman farmer, which had been the basis of so much political thought in Queensland, had proved, indeed, a myth. Agricultural conditions were not conducive to success and subsistence farming in self-contained units had no place in the harsh Australian environment.

Despite the failure, the Queensland Government still aimed at increasing the labouring population of the colony. The more practical aim of securing a large supply of agricultural labourers also met with failure. Many immigrants who, in order to gain more favourable terms of passage, classed themselves as agricultural labourers, were in fact

11. Crook, D.P., Aspects of Brisbane Society in the Eighteen-Eighties. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.7.

mechanics and factory hands. The agricultural labourers who did arrive found better wages as general labourers in urban areas, with the result that Queensland farmers remained chronically short of skilled agricultural labour. Moreover, the large number of immigrants who remained in the towns only served to swell the unemployment rate during the depression.

THE DEPRESSION AND IMMIGRATION

As depression settled over the land, the Government was compelled in 1892 to halt state aided immigration. Prior to this, immigration figures were not markedly down on those of the Eighties. During this decade, the Government had been able to attract nearly 110,000 immigrants. Their national origins, abstracted from the reports of the Agent-General, are given by Crook:¹²

NATIONAL ORIGINS OF QUEENSLAND IMMIGRANTS

	English	Scots	Irish	Others	Total
Number	60,295	16,889	26,253	6,119	109,556
Percentage	55.03	15.4	23.9	5.67	100

Crook argues that the rate of assimilation was rapid, and that

12. Ibid., p.10.

there was not so much a dislocation of social life, ~~as~~ a significant strengthening of already entrenched social values. The predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Irish origin of the new arrivals meant there was only a small degree of cultural differentiation, particularly as most non-British immigrants tended to move into rural areas, isolated in relatively homogeneous social units, at the same time accepting their adopted socio-political environment.

Waterson's research indicates that the Germans on the Darling Downs, while they remained a coherent and consciously cohesive social group, nevertheless took an active part in Downs politics:

The Germans were attracted to personalities rather than 'parties' and problems. Most were relatively poor selectors whose economic aspirations drew them to the side of the country town radicals who were attempting to redistribute the land.... Groom negotiated their land orders, transacted their business and smoothed the difficulties that alien immigrants inevitably encountered.... After the wave of German immigration subsided, the memory of these services remained, and was passed onto the Australian born.¹³

Another reason for the staunch support given by the Germans to the Liberals was undoubtedly the clear alliance between Protestants and that party. This allegiance was strengthened

13. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector, Storekeeper. (Sydney U. Press, 1968), p.262.

by the cohesive nature of the Lutheran Church, a cohesion which, however, was not strong enough to cement a sealed and isolated German community on the Downs.¹⁴

While the Eighties had been a peak period in immigration, the depression of the Nineties sharply halted Queensland's annual intake, with the result that there "arose a hitherto unknown phenomenon in Queensland history, for continuously during the following years, the increase in population due to natural increase outnumbered the increase due to net immigration".¹⁵

During the first two years of the Nineties, about 6,000 immigrants had entered Queensland, although by 1891, this rate had fallen slightly. The type of immigrant conformed to the pattern of the Eighties, being predominantly Anglo-Irish and lower working class.¹⁶

NATIONALITIES 1890-1891

Year	English	Scots	Irish	Others
1890	1549	352	1045	155
1891	1299	263	892	455

14. Ibid., p.132.

15. Tomkys R., Queensland Immigration Policy 1859-1901 (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1930).

16. Extracts from Reports of Agent-General, Q.V.P., pp.1891-2.

Of these, 2,003 were classed as farm labourers, and 2042 as female domestic servants. The free passages thus appeared to be attracting the kind of immigration Queensland required. But the Maryborough Immigration Agent pointed out: "A far greater number of immigrants could have been absorbed had they been of true agricultural class and capable of doing the work required on a farm. I regret to say that many who represent themselves as such have been proved otherwise".¹⁷

On the 2nd March 1892, State aided immigration was suspended, with the result that in this year, 729 immigrants landed in Queensland, all engaged prior to that date. No labourers were indented. This situation continued until 1897. The intervening years were remarkable only for the small amount of independent immigration, although this was characterized by an increasing national diversity. Immigration Agents in Great Britain were not optimistic about Queensland's chances of attracting fully paying migrants. In 1896, the Agent-General explained the reason:

... The reports which I have received from the Agents have been disappointing as to the number of enquiries The reason, I believe, is the general contentment of the farming class, owing to lately improved conditions.¹⁸

17. Report of Agent-General, 1890.

18. Report of Agent-General, 1896.

As late as 1896, the Labour Party was stoutly opposing proposals to reintroduce free and assisted passages for farm labourers and domestic servants.¹⁹ The Gympie Truth made clear the Labour viewpoint when the Treasurer indicated that the Government was considering such a renewal:

Of all the fatuous, mischievous, evil and foul smelling 'remedies' put forward as safe cures for the present appalling depression, that of State aided immigration stands out prominently for extra-special condemnation.²⁰

This extreme view was not shared by a majority of Queenslanders. Among farmers, still ~~plagued~~ plagued by labour shortage, the opinion was strong that immigration should be renewed. The Warwick Argus applauded the reappointment of George Randall as Immigration Agent in February, 1897:

It must not be forgotten that it is becoming more and more difficult as time goes on to induce the rural Britisher to migrate ... Mr. Randall is familiar with the methods most likely to prove successful, and the Government have done the right thing in deciding to send him back.²¹

Remarkable activity attended the immigration programme in 1897 and 638 persons obtained passage, of whom 125 were full paying passengers and 46 nominated passengers. In keeping with the trend developing in 1895-6, the number of non-

19. Proposed in the Assembly by J.R. Dickson, Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.208.

20. Gympie Truth, 10.10.96.

21. Warwick Argus, 9.2.97.

British migrants continued to rise.²² Once again, Queensland was looking to immigration to provide labour for the developing industries of the Colony.

THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNITIES LAND SETTLEMENT ACT

An experiment in cooperative farming, the Cooperative Communities Land Settlement Act, passed in 1893, contained elements both old and new. It was a culmination of the agrarian myth, stimulated by the needs created by the Depression. A favourite Labour panacea, the Bill was introduced primarily as a defence of the unemployment policy of the government, as well as to give the unemployed some outlet for their frustration. The Courier had suggested in 1891, that, "of all the remedies for the unemployed difficulty, the most natural, the most sensible and the most practical is the placing of the people on the land."²³

The Act was introduced by A.H. Barlow. It was a relatively non-contentious measure, incorporating the principle of the self-contained community, settled on a selected area, which they could later convert to freehold. The settlers were to be given substantial government aid. This had been the final recommendation of the Select Committee

22. In 1897, 42 immigrants came from Italy, Germany, Russia and Scandinavia, while in 1899, 525 Scandinavians emigrated to Queensland.

23. Brisbane Courier, 6.2.91.

on Assisted Land Settlement (1891), consisting of Barlow, J.G. Drake and M.H. Black. Barlow had dissented from the majority opinion, and this fact does tend to cast doubt upon the Government's sincerity in the matter. The Committee had rejected two other suggestions. The first, the employment of men in the clearing of land, was rejected as it was merely relief work, and the second, providing "working men's blocks" on perpetual lease, because it was too expensive.²⁴

Reaction to the Bill varied. Most farmers were sceptical. In 1891, the Warwick Argus had agreed that, "to facilitate and encourage settlement is well within the province of the State, but we are persuaded that no amount of coaching by experts, however zealous, ... however well-meant, will result in anything but disaster to all concerned."²⁵ The Queensland Times probably echoed prevailing conservative opinion:

Time alone will tell whether these State aided colonization schemes will be an unqualified success. Cooperation on an extensive scale in the practical affairs of everyday life is yet in the experimental stage There can be no two opinions that the policy of getting idle hands away from the towns and settling them to the work of production is a wise one at the present juncture.²⁶

Farmers and graziers felt that the reduction of freight charges,

24. Report of Committee on Assisted Land Settlement, p.viii, Q.V.P., 1891.

25. Warwick Argus, 21.2.91.

26. Queensland Times, 31.1.94.

and similar encouragements would give a sufficient boost to primary industry to significantly reduce the unemployment figures.²⁷

The experiment was doomed to failure from the start. Many factors militated against the scheme. Each individual was given his own separate section for agricultural purposes, while grazing land was held jointly. This was an unwieldy arrangement, and the groups soon reported severe dissensions within their ranks. Most of the settlements were around Rockybank, Chinchilla and Wetheron. The land was quite productive, but inexperience proved to be the most common cause of failure. Moreover, government aid was often tardy and insufficient, even though the selectors received two years free rent, and free railways for persons and goods. It was not enough. Most groups had abandoned the experiment by 1895. The Cooperative Communities Act had failed as an experiment in agricultural organization, but it had succeeded in what was perhaps its primary aim - to keep the unemployed off the streets.

FURTHER LAND LEGISLATION

FOXTON'S LAND ACT OF 1897

The years which had elapsed since the 1884 Land Act had seen so many amendments to the original that Queensland

27. Ibid.

Land Law was in a hopeless state of confusion. For this reason, J.F.G. Foxton brought down a Land Act which, while far from innovatory, was intended to simplify and improve existing laws. The trend towards closer settlement had been ostensibly continued. In 1895, the Grazing Homesteads Act "was passed by Parliament for the purpose of enabling shearers, carriers, and casual labourers generally, to select grazing homesteads in the western interior on which they could make permanent homes for themselves and their families ... with the exception of a few carriers, those for whose benefit the Act was intended have availed themselves of its provisions to only a limited extent".²⁸ The Act had proved only a partial success because too often the land put aside for selection was of inferior quality, and because the conditions, such as fencing and residence, were often too great to be met by those with only a little capital.²⁹

The 1897 Bill attempted to ease conditions on grazing farms, while ensuring that priority of selection went to the man who proposed to reside on the land. There were a few other major changes. The Land Board, set up in 1884, was replaced by a Land Court, consisting of three officials, any

28. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.647.

29. Ibid., p.722 (Hardacre).

one of whom could make conditions. The right of appeal was incorporated in the Act. Pastoral leases were fixed at twenty-one years, but this disturbed no existing rights, except for one sub-section dealing with the lowering of pastoral rents. Many members argued that as an attempt at simplification, the Act was a singular failure, and that in reality it only complicated the position still further. The plethora of small Acts remained in existence.³⁰

The land policy of the Government was subject to an enormous difficulty, pointed out in debate by W.H. Groom:

In considering the Land Bill I think we ought to start with this important fact in view. Unfortunately for Queensland - probably for all the Australian colonies - we are compelled to look to the land as a source of revenue.³¹

This difficulty had been pointed out in 1891 by Arthur Morgan:

It is a very easy thing to bring in a Land Bill which will promote settlement; it is a very difficult thing to frame a law which will do one and the other at the same time.³²

The need to raise revenue militated against the desire to promote closer settlement, and vice versa. This almost

30. Some of these laws inducted: Pastoral Leases Act of 1869 (Am. 1890) Land Act of 1884 (AM. 1885-86-89-91-92-94); Special Sales of Land Act of 1891; timber regulations, Mineral Land Sales Act of 1892; Co-op. Communities Act 1893; Pastoral Leases Extension Acts of 1892 and 1892 etc. Ibid., p.721.

31. Ibid., p.884.

32. Q.P.D., LXIV, (1891), p.195.

insuperable difficulty was complicated by the fact that the Government did not co-ordinate other aspects of its policy, i.e. finance, the tariff, rural credit, to a sufficient extent to allow each aspect of land policy to complement the other. Moreover, even good intentions sometimes led to unexpected results. The 1897 Bill included a provision to reduce grazing leases from fifty years to twenty-one years. As Hardacre pointed out, "It may be proposed with a view to protect the lands of the colony from being locked up for long terms, but it will not conduce to settlement. I think that selectors might have been given a shorter term of lease, with a preferential right of renewal".³³

Other reasons militated against an equitable division of land. While the activities of squatters and banks³⁴ were no doubt fairly successful in gaining advantages for large capitalists, agriculturalists often squandered their resources. In 1894 the Agricultural Department reported that:

33. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.721.

34. Banks leased large tracts of Queensland land - Queensland National Bank, 578 square miles; Bank of N.S.W. 1000 square miles; Union Bank, 277 square miles; Mercantile Bank of Sydney, 142 square miles; Queensland Investment Co., 620 square miles; Mutual Life Association, 478 square miles. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.722.

Perhaps the greatest annual loss comes to the agricultural community through the practice of haphazard system, or rather lack of system which may be called farming for prices rather than profits ... about one year ago, maize by reason of short supply commanded very high prices on all markets ... the result of this boom in maize growing is seen in the great crop of the present year with the inevitable accompaniment, glutted markets and prices below the cost of production...³⁵

On the other hand, the Government was slow in providing agricultural colleges and other trained expert help to farmers coping with a still unfamiliar environment. The agricultural industry also suffered from a chronic under-supply of labour, caused by the Government's failure to attract bona-fide agricultural labourers.

LABOUR FOR TROPICAL INDUSTRY

ITALY

Providing labour for Queensland's industries provided constant problems for the Government, none more vexatious than labour for tropical industry. It was almost impossible to attract British labour to the tropical north, particularly for the sugar industry. Griffith's decision in 1885 to abolish the importation of Pacific Island labour after 1890 had dealt a severe blow to the industry, and ^{to} the planters who now had to find an alternative source of labour. Both

35. Q.V.P., III (1894), pp.1494-96.

the Queensland and Indian Governments had vetoed the indenture of Indian labourers.³⁶ Thus, a new source was contemplated - Italy. The early months of 1891 saw long drawn out negotiations to secure indentured Italian labour for the canefields.³⁷ In June 1891, a prominent sugar firm, centred in Mackay, wrote to the Under-Colonial Secretary:

If our mill is to be kept going after the Polynesians leave us, we must get cane grown by some other labourers These few Italians who we propose to get are likely to be suitable for cane growing; they will work under one of their own countrymen here, who is a farmer, and speaks English.³⁸

While the Government, for financial reasons, refused to implement an official policy regarding the negotiations, it nevertheless sanctioned private arrangements between Queensland Agents and the Italian Government.³⁹ The first shipload of Italians arrived in Queensland in December 1891.⁴⁰ Italians however were more expensive and less efficient than Polynesians, with the result that the indenture of Italians was abandoned in 1892, after the reintroduction of coloured labour. Labour leaders were relatively unconcerned with Italian labourers, but they had proved that white men could work in the tropical north.

36. See above, Ch. 2.

37. Q.V.P., 1891-92.

38. Long and Robertson to Und.Col.Sec., 20.6.91 (Q.V.P.)

39. Und. Col. Sec. to Long and Robertson, 25.7.91 (Q.V.P.)

40. Report Agent-General, 1891.

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The abolition of Pacific Island labour had long been an objective of Liberal-radical policy. Until 1892, Griffith had steadfastly refused to sanction employment of coloured labour on the sugar plantations. In April 1885, he expressed these views to the Governor of Queensland, advancing three major arguments against the employment of such labour. Firstly, he doubted the validity of the assumption that the climate made it impossible for white men to work in the North:

I believe that the land can be cultivated by Europeans and that it will so be cultivated, although under different conditions.⁴¹

By different conditions, Griffith meant that the plantation system would have to be replaced by one based on small farming, in accordance with his views on closer settlement. He was also concerned with the political consequences of the labour trade:

It is not desirable, regarding Queensland, or the northern portion of it, as a country which is to be civilized and governed on the model adopted, to create a class without a share of political power, and whose interests will need protection by a paternal government.⁴²

41. Q.V.P., I (1885), p.308.

42. Ibid., p.318.

Thirdly, Griffith believed that "there is no country in which Asiatic and European labourers are found working side by side on terms of equality."⁴³ Following this, he had brought down 1885 legislation. He warned planters that "if they wished to exist, it would be their business to work with the rest of the community and not go against the rest of the community with regard solely to their own interests".⁴⁴

The expiration of the five years grace coincided with deepening depression in North Queensland. In 1891 and early 1892, agitation for the renewal of black labour reached almost hysterical proportions. The 1885 legislation was seen as the sole scapegoat for the troubles of the sugar industry, and to investigate its position, a Royal Commission had been appointed in 1889. The Commission had consisted of W.H. Groom, H.E. King and A.S. Cowley. Groom, a journalist and leader of Downs radicalism, was not expected to favour any concessions to the industry, but his appointment was balanced by that of A.S. Cowley, a sugar planter. The reports of the Commission may well have affected Griffith's attitude to coloured labour.

The majority report, from King and Cowley, gave the opinion that the depression in the industry was due to a

43. Ibid.

44. Q.P.D., LVI, (1885), p.1143.

combination of many factors - mismanagement and inexperience on the part of the planters, the fall in the international price of sugar, competition from the South. They felt that another reason was "loss of confidence in the industry, which it is alleged, is owing to the abolition of black labour in the future, and which prevents planters from obtaining the necessary advances to carry them on".⁴⁵ The report continued that "the present cost of black labour in the colony has increased by more than 50% since 1883, and we find that the increase in working expenses, concurring with the great fall in the price of sugar and unfavourable seasons has caused the working expenses of the plantations generally to exceed the value of their produce".⁴⁶ They went on to recommend the introduction of new sugar strains, duty free export to the South, and the reintroduction of "Polynesian" labour.⁴⁷

W.H. Groom, in his Minority Report, assigned the *CAUSE OF* depression primarily to the fall in prices, and also to the competition of beet sugar. He pointed out that a return to black labour, to which the southern colonies were markedly hostile, could hinder or even destroy federation.⁴⁸ He also

45. Q.V.P., I (1889), Report of the Royal Commission, p.XXVI.

46. Ibid., p.XXX.

47. Ibid., p.XXXVI.

48. Ibid., p.XLVIII.

argued that many planters, caught up in the boom of the Eighties, held unnecessarily large amounts of land, much of which was unproductive, and which engendered unremunerative interest upon unused land. Groom also rejected any reciprocity agreement with the southern colonies, fearing this would damage other branches of agriculture. He was convinced that the industry would profit from a system of smaller, more intensely cultivated farms.⁴⁹

There was no doubt that the industry was languishing. Export values, as the table below indicates, had dropped considerably.⁵⁰

EXPORT VALUE OF QUEENSLAND SUGAR (£)

Year	Value	Year	Value
1885	179,927	1891	105,257
1886	233,575	1892	589,753
1887	154,468	1893	753,983
1888	167,764	1894	886,834
1889	107,187	1895	796,116
1890	156,161		

49. Ibid., p.XLXII.

50. Lewis, F.G., The Crisis Years. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.; p.91.

The shrinkage in export value was due largely to the fall in the world price of sugar, but also to falling productivity. The recovery in 1892 was so rapid that it must have been connected with the reintroduction of "Polynesian" labour. This was not, however, the only reason. Another was the increasing success, after a slow beginning, of the system of central milling, introduced by Griffith in 1885. In 1890 the Colonial Sugar Refining Company had organized their Queensland works along the lines of central milling. The Sugar Works Guarantee Act, by which the Government guaranteed the construction of new mills, had met with some success late in the year, making capital more easily available. The growth of mechanization also contributed to recovery. The Mackay Sugar Journal commented that "White men who are working for themselves and using the best labour saving devices are displacing the coloured workers rapidly. The large estates are rapidly becoming peopled with small farmers."⁵¹

Thus, while the report of King and Cowley was accurate, it was Groom who recognized the great value of central milling and closer settlement. In 1885, he had written:

The position now is: Better perish the sugar industry than perpetuate the atrocities of an unjust traffic in human beings.⁵²

51. Ibid., p.106.

52. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.10.85.

Objecting to the system on humanitarian grounds, most opponents of the trade couched their arguments in these terms. In 1892, the Courier remarked that outside the Labour movement, the humanitarian argument was the only one advanced against reintroduction.⁵³ An example of the type of argument used by the planters may be taken from the Mackay Sugar Journal:

The Government of Queensland has a clear duty to perform if it wishes the third greatest industry in the colony to thrive and grow apace If it wishes to do its duty by the country, it must keep the industry supplied either with some cheap labour or its equivalent.... The planters do not need to agitate; their wishes are clearly defined.⁵⁴

In their stress on the importance of the sugar industry, the planters had a strong case. The table below indicates the relative export earnings of the major producing industries.⁵⁵

COMPARATIVE EXPORT EARNINGS (£)

Year	Wool	Meat	Sugar
1885	1,799,682	117,286	179,927
1886	2,258,365	181,119	107,187
1891	3,453,548	222,358	105,257
1895	2,986,989	985,391	796,116

53. Brisbane Courier, 12.2.92.

54. Mackay Sugar Journal, I, I, (1892), p.4.

55. Lewis, F.G., op.cit., pp.15, 115, 91.

The sugar industry was thus an extremely valuable asset to Queensland primary industry, and even in 1888, a bad year, the export value of the industry exceeded that of all other agricultural industries combined.⁵⁶

With its importance established, and its difficulties clearly apparent, what was the real value of Polynesian labour to the sugar industry? There appears to have been a considerable narrowing in the wage rates for black and white labour. In 1867, the white labourer enjoyed an advantage of about 10:1.⁵⁷ This had considerably shrunk by the eighties. There is no doubt that strict government regulations increased the cost of Pacific Islanders. On the other hand, there was an increasing demand for their labour as the industry moved further north. There was also the added factor of the increasing productivity of the labourers who had signed on for a second term. Birch argues that, despite decreasing numbers of Pacific Islanders, the number of white labourers was not increasing.⁵⁸ After 1890, when recruiting stopped, the number of black labourers remained fairly constant. This was probably due to increased productivity in 1889. The Maryborough Chronicle reported

56. Ibid., p.91.

57. Birch, A., "Pacific Island Labour in the Queensland Sugar Industry", B.A.H., (1968), p. 68.

58. Ibid., p. 68, the percentage of white labour was 13.8% in 1888; 23.4% in 1892; and 11.6% in 1895.

"a feverish activity pervades the recruiting trade. The vessels employed in it cannot go and come fast enough to meet the insatiable demand".⁵⁹ In 1892-3 there was a considerable jump in the number of white labourers employed, caused by the time lag between the reintroduction and the arrival of the first shipments. It was also caused to some extent by the conditions of depression, with unemployed white labourers taking work which they might otherwise have refused. Despite these considerations, which certainly seem to indicate the importance of kanakas to the industry, it remains doubtful if many employers tried to use white labour with maximum efficiency. According to the Maryborough Chronicle, they had not.⁶⁰ On the other hand, opponents had to admit that white labour was notoriously hard to find.⁶¹

This would seem to imply that there was no viable alternative but to employ coloured labour. Griffith in 1885, had suggested two - a greater supply of white labour, which had singularly failed, and central milling. Encouraging white immigration, particularly that of Italians, was also a politically unpopular move at a time when the labour force

59. Maryborough Chronicle, 25.5.90.

60. Ibid., 22.5.90.

61. Ibid., 12.12.92.

was already too large to fill the jobs available.

The central milling scheme, at least until 1894, was also a qualified failure. It was primarily an attempt to aid the small farmer by giving him easy access to an inexpensive co-operative method of crushing. The smaller farmers, however, simply could not afford the higher initial cost of central mills. Most had always relied on coloured labour.⁶² Thus economic and productive circumstances, rather than preference, contributed to the failure of the scheme. As the depression deepened, the number of mills, whether independent or state aided, fell very rapidly. Admittedly these sixty-four were far more efficient than previously, which did aid in the successful recovery of the industry. But by this time the whole purpose of the scheme had collapsed, because in order that the State might not lose its capital outlay, the Government allowed the mills to be thrown open to cane harvested by coloured labour.⁶³

Thus by 1892, with the failure of both his experiments, Griffith could see little alternative but to abandon his former position. He published his Manifesto on February 13 1892. He felt, according to his statement, that it was now

62. Of the 176 northern sugar planters employing coloured labour between 1886 and 1888, 132 employed less than a dozen. Bolton, G., A Thousand Miles Away. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1963), p.155.

63. Ibid., p.154.

safer to employ Polynesians, because the large estates no longer existed, considerably lessening the danger of slavery. He believed the depressed state of the industry necessitated the reintroduction of recruiting for a further period of ten years:

By that time, I have no doubt that such further development will have taken place as will enable the sugar industry to be carried on without reverting to the former system ... and in the meantime, I believe that a valuable impetus will be given to the producing industries of the Colony.⁶⁴

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The enormous responsibility which the State undertook with regard to land, labour and immigration clearly emerges throughout this period. The Government had undertaken to provide land for those who wanted it and to provide labour to work that land. In both areas, it achieved at least partial success. The failure of the immigration programme to provide bona-fide agricultural labour was compounded by its failure to provide good land on reasonable terms, for agricultural selection. While the former was only partly the fault of the Government, the latter was due almost wholly to its insistence that land should bring in revenue. The Government did achieve the doubtful success of providing

64. Brisbane Courier, 13.2.92.

labour for the sugar industry, although the voracious planters were to turn next to Japan for an even cheaper source of labour. Just as the success which attended Government policy was piecemeal, so was the policy itself. Each separate strand was regarded as a separate entity; there was little co-operation between the civil service and the Ministers; one policy often cancelled out the other. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous activities of the State achieved some remarkable successes in lifting the primary industries of the Colony out of the quagmire of depression.

CHAPTER 6SEPARATION AND FEDERATION

The normal pattern of political life during the Nineties was disturbed by two movements - agitation for the separation of North and Central Queensland from the Southern portion of the colony, and the movement towards a long established Australian ideal - the federation of all the colonies. These constitutional changes provided a strong counter current, cutting across party battles over land, immigration and railway policy. The separation issue, particularly, was a continual source of disturbance, without ever reaching a position where success appeared imminent. Northern and Central members formed a powerful voting bloc within the House, and Governments had always to be aware of their potential voting power. Federation, however, involved a far greater constitutional (and emotional) change, and while a federal sentiment was slow to emerge in Queensland, a predominantly anti-federalist government was eventually forced to bow to public opinion and join the Federation.

AGITATION FOR SEPARATION

Until 1890, the separation movement, while it had been

aggressively vocal, had achieved little success, failing to influence decision-makers in either Australia or the United Kingdom. Confronted by what they considered a southern dominated Parliament in the Colony, the separationists had tried to influence the Imperial Government and British public opinion. An 1886 Petition, signed by nearly 1500 citizens of Townsville, stated the reasons why Northerners wished to become separated from the rest of the Colony. The petition listed six major reasons why separation should be granted by the Queen:

- (1) North Queensland was more populous and more wealthy than was the colony of Queensland on its separation from N.S.W.
- (2) North Queensland was inadequately represented in Parliament.
- (3) The revenue obtained from North Queensland was constantly in excess of the expenditure in the division.
- (4) Inordinate distance from the Capital.
- (5) The tropical environment and industries of North Queensland were at variance with the rest of the colony.
- (6) The Government had failed to supply an adequate source of labour for tropical industries.¹

1. Q.V.P., I, (1886), p.434.

While the first five arguments would find sympathy in the mother country, the issue of labour proved extremely damaging to the cause of separation. The London Times regarded the movement as inspired chiefly by the sugar planters and commented:

Their pretensions to a separate administration may and ought to be repulsed, while their circumstances and numbers give no security against the abandonment of a magnificent domain to the cultivation of produce rather than free men.²

The argument that the planters wanted separation simply to enable them to employ what was virtually slave labour was constantly reiterated during the Eighties. In 1885, the Brisbane newspaper, the Week argued that the agitation for separation was primarily "in order that the Northern districts of the colony should be turned into a second Mauritius on a larger scale where white unskilled labour would be impossible and unnecessary through an ample supply of coolies from British India".³ Griffith regarded the decline in the movement for Northern separation, observable in 1892, as the result of the reintroduction of coloured labour in that year.⁴

The Queensland Government proved consistently hostile

2. Ibid., pp.431-2.

3. Week, 14.3.85.

4. Moles, I., A Brief History of the Separatist Movements in North Queensland. (Unpub. B.A. Pen. Thesis, U. of Q.).

to Northern separation. In 1887, Griffith proposed to combat separatist agitation with measures of decentralisation. In a letter to Governor Musgrave, he made his views clear:

I am disposed ... to think, that, although no reasonable ground for complaint exists with respect to the expedition (sic) used in respect of public works in the northern districts, considerable advantage might be gained by making provision for the administration of some departments ... locally and without reference to the Ministerial head at the capital.⁵

The result of Griffith's plan was the Financial Districts Bill introduced in August 1887. It was Griffith's intention to divide the Colony into three parts, each having separate accounts for expenditure and revenue. The revenue accounts were divided into local and general accounts, the former including customs, land and excise receipts.

The Bill was not popular in the House and was carried by a small majority of 25 to 21, although the poor attendance indicates the relative lack of interest on the part of southern members.⁶ The division, while not strictly on regional lines, shows that the issue was non-partisan. Five of those members who voted against the Bill (Nelson, Allan, Donaldson, Lalor and Jessop) did not represent either

5. Griffith to Musgrave, undated, Q.V.P., I, (1887).
6. Negative votes: Norton, Morehead, Chubb, Macrossan, Nelson, Hamilton, McWhannell, Murphy, Wallace, Allan, Philp, Brown, Stevens, Palmer, Scott, Pattison, Donaldson, Allen, Black, Lalor, Jessop. Q.P.D., LII, (1887), p.496.

central or northern electorates, but belonged to the squatting section of the Opposition. The Bill did not please separationists. Macrossan warned the Government that:

I am certain that it would not satisfy the people of the North in the slightest degree, because what we want is control over our own expenditure. I shall record my vote against it, because it is unsatisfactory and unsatisfactory to the demands of the people of Northern Queensland.⁷

Speaking for Central members, William Pattison remarked:

I am sure that this measure will not be acceptable to any reasonable man in the Central District ... what we want is the right to tax ourselves to a certain extent, or rather that, while submitting to taxation, we demand the right of controlling our own expenditure.⁸

The movement in North Queensland, however, lost momentum when the Bill became law, not because Northerners were in any way satisfied, but because there was now less hope of immediate success.

There was little evidence that separation was a contentious issue during the 1888 Election Campaign, and indeed the number of northern members returned who were committed to separation had declined. One reason for this was that Griffith's 1887 Redistribution Act⁹ had created three new northern mining seats, areas traditionally hostile

7. Ibid., p.468.

8. Ibid., pp.471-2.

9. See below, Ch. 8.

to separation.¹⁰ Moreover, northern interests felt they would receive a more sympathetic hearing from McIlwraith, than from Griffith, dependent, as was the latter, upon southern electoral support.

By October 1890, however, Northern separationists had again become vocal, and Macrossan introduced a separation resolution to the House. In an amendment to the motion, Griffith proposed "that it would be to the advantage of the colony to establish in the southern, central and northern districts, separate legislative and executive authorities." Griffith's motion was carried by 32 votes to 26.¹¹ The division was on party lines only in the sense that the majority of the northern members had been elected in 1888 as members of the National Party, primarily because of the industrial and demographic characteristics of the area. These McIlwraithians, however, would oppose their leader if he announced his hostility to the movement.

Griffith's amendment is a good illustration of his tactics in regard to separation. Whenever the movement appeared to be gaining strength, he would propose some alternative, stopping short of complete separation, but

10. Woothakata and Charters Towers (2), M.H. Black commented on separationist apathy in mining areas. Q.P.D., XLIX, (1885), p.49.

11. Four southern oppositionists (Morehead, Perkins, O'Sullivan and Casey) voted against the motion, and one Northern Ministerialist voted with Griffith.

designed to mollify the less extreme of the agitators. In the 1880's Griffith had raised the spectre of slavery, but by 1890 the movement had struck another problem, the depression. Then, Morehead countered demands with a financial argument:

The separation of Queensland into two or more provinces is to a very large extent a financial question, and when the amount of the public debt which is now £28,000.000 is taken into consideration, together with the large interest thereon ... it must be evident that a very serious responsibility to the public creditor is involved in the question of the separation and dismemberment of the colony.¹²

Morehead, despite his voting record in favour of separation while in opposition, proved no more amenable to separationist demands than had Griffith. The result was that by the time of the Coalition discontent had again become manifest, and Griffith once more felt constrained to make some sort of concession to separationist sentiment.

The Central Queensland movement, centred in Rockhampton, had by 1890 begun to organize itself. The central movement was not possessed of the same mass character as its Northern counterpart. According to V.R. de V. Voss "Agitation in the centre began and was maintained as the result of the efforts of a conscious, and ambitious, minority within Rockhampton

12. Chief Sec. to Gov. of Qld., Q.V.P., I, (1891), p.1160.

itself. Essentially Central Separatism was a Rockhampton movement. At no time outside Rockhampton and its immediate district was the separatist feeling even strong".¹³ Because it was a limited and dedicated movement, Central agitation was far better organized, and Central members far more disciplined in Parliament. Archer's motion in favour of separation however, received no better treatment than had Macrossan's a month earlier, and was defeated by 34 votes to 19.

Meanwhile, Griffith was preparing to follow up his amendment of October 1890. In early 1891, he moved that the House resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole to consider resolutions on the institution of separate Provincial Legislatures. Despite a comfortable majority of 31 to 23 on this division¹⁴ the first Resolution was defeated by a similar margin. This resolution was a very general statement of principle:

That it would be of advantage to the colony to constitute as separate and autonomous provinces with separate legislative and executive authorities, having full powers of legislation and government as far as regards matters of local concern; but so that matters of general concern including the administration of the public debt should remain under the control of one legislative and

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13. V.R. De V. Voss, Separatist Movements in Central Queensland in the Nineteenth Century. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.2.
- 14 22 of those voting against the resolution represented Southern constituencies. See Appendix 5.

executive authority for the whole united provinces, having jurisdiction over the whole of the present colony of Queensland until the establishment of an Australian Federal Government.¹⁵

The defeat of this resolution indicates the strength of southern opposition to separation, and this once again disposed of the question for a time. The Brisbane Courier, consistently anti-separationist, commented:

Whatever may have been the view taken by Sir Samuel Walker Griffith before last night's division, it is impossible that a Bill ... could in any case have been passed through the existing Parliament. There must have been an appeal to the people, and a new mandate from the constituencies, before such a measure be seriously entertained, not to say passed by our legislature.¹⁶

With the colonial battles consistently ending in defeat for the separationists, the various groups appealed to the Imperial Government. The Executive Committee of the Central Separation League wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1890, pointing out "the neglect of the interests of the people of this division" and the consistency with which all petitions had been ignored.¹⁷ In reply to requests for Imperial intervention, the British Government maintained a discreet policy of non-interference, referring the question back to the Colonial Parliament. In May 1892, Lord Knutsford,

15. Q.P.D., LXIV, (1891), p.1750.

16. Brisbane Courier, 20.10.91.

17. Q.V.P., I, (1890), p.1180.

Secretary of State for the Colonies, in answer to a deputation from the Central Separation League, gave his opinion that the time was not opportune for Imperial interference, at least until Griffith's Provinces Resolutions had again been considered by the Queensland Parliament.

THE QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL

These resolutions were to provide the basis for the first Queensland Constitutional Bill, introduced in 1892. A constitution along the following lines was proposed:

- (1) The colony to be divided into three provinces.
- (2) Each province should have a separate Lieutenant Governor, and Executive Council appointed by him, and a Legislature consisting of one or two Houses, one to be elected upon an unspecified franchise.
- (3) There should be a Central Government with a Governor and an Executive, with a Legislature of two Houses, one elected by the Provincial Legislatures, and one by the electors in proportion to population.
- (4) Customs to be raised by the provinces, leaving all other taxes and duties to the central Government.
- (5) The Central Government to distribute all revenue.
- (6) On the attainment of Federation, the duties of the Central Government to be taken over by the Federal

Government.¹⁸

This complicated scheme, very similar to early schemes for federation, was received coldly by the North Queensland Separation League. The provision for the election of representatives to the Central Government was attacked on the grounds that it would lead to the over-representation of the South. It was also argued that Federation would wreck the whole arrangement, while it would deprive northern citizens of their right of appeal to the Crown.¹⁹

With Northern Separatists displeased with the proposals, and southern opinion still strongly against any change, it was unlikely that the Bill would pass the House. Moreover, by 1892, another argument was being used by anti-separationists, directly expressed by the Courier when commenting on the Central agitation:

The movement has really assumed a quixotic aspect since the late disturbances in the western districts and amidst the disquietude that now affects the London bondholders.²⁰

Thus, while previously the anti-separation cry had been "beware the slave", now it was "beware the worker". Fear of a labour dominated North and Central West was converting many former separationists.

18. Q.V.P., I, (1891), p.1184.

19. Ibid., pp.1185-6.

20. Brisbane Courier, 12.8.92.

The movement was also confronted by regional hostility in areas other than the South. The Maryborough Chronicle feared northern separation:

Maryborough has a very deep-seated interest in the Northern separation question. The North is a great market for our foundries and saw mills, and we enjoy a practical monopoly there under the protection of a high tariff Our interest therefore as a community lies in the shutting off of Northern separation, and a modified form of self-government, if acceptable to the north would command our support as a last resort, in as much as the power of regulating the tariff would rest with the general Assembly of the whole colony.²¹

The northern districts felt that their interests would best be served by free trade. A largely export economy was combined with an extremely high cost of living, with the result that the southern areas exporting to the tropical North continued to talk of "tariff wars" when attacking separation. The Warwick Argus, on the other hand, approved Northern separation with reservations and reported a general feeling on the Downs that the Central District "should unite their destiny for another generation at least with that of the people of Wide Bay, East and West Moreton and the Darling Downs".²²

The Queensland Constitution Bill was introduced on

21. Maryborough Chronicle, 27.7.92.

22. Warwick Argus, 10.5.92.

August 2nd, 1892, On Griffith's motion for the second reading, A.H. Barlow moved an amendment: "That this House approved of the division of the colony into two provinces on the basis of this Bill". Central claims were thus completely ignored. Such an amendment meant that the two branches of the separation movement simply could not combine, with a consequent certainty that the Bill would not pass. On the first division for the abandonment of the second reading, Barlow secured a 34 to 22 victory and on the second, for the adoption of the amendment, the result was an alternative vote of 38 - 19.

Northern and Central members voted almost to a man against Barlow's amendment and they were joined by Cabinet members Tozer and Unmack, two Maryborough Ministerialists, Annear and Hyne, Perkins, Griffith and McIlwraith. Of those voting with Barlow, Sayers and Rutledge represented Northern constituencies. On the second division, those opposed included only one Northerner, Stodart, and five Central members, Callan, Murray, Paul, Corfield and Stevenson. Apart from these five, the rest of the opposition could be described as opposed to any regional self-government at all. On August 18, Griffith withdrew the Bill, and subsequently reintroduced it on the basis of Barlow's motion. The third reading was carried by 30 votes to 13. The smallness of the

House, at times so small that a quorum could not be formed, indicates that the Bill was now regarded in a most apathetic light. Nevertheless, Northern members accepted the Bill as better than nothing, but it appeared they had little faith in its eventual implementation. The Maryborough Chronicle shared this opinion.

We still adhere to the opinion previously expressed that this cleverly drafted and voluminous Bill has been brought into existence with no other object in view than to divert the attention of northern malcontents from the more serious question of territorial separation.²³

For this reason, there appeared to be little reaction in the North when the Council rejected the Bill.²⁴ Indeed, there appeared to be more comment outside the colony. The Sydney Morning Herald was of the opinion that:

The result is to be regretted, for this was an Australian question, the project of Federal provinces having been moulded in the spirit of Australian Federation, with the object at once of satisfying the reasonable demands of North Queensland, and of preventing difficulties that might stand in the way of the greater union of the States.²⁵

The rejection of the Bill by the Council dealt an effective blow against the separation movement. One reason why it was not again to gain the political limelight, except briefly in 1897, was pointed out by McIlwraith, "In 1893 the success

23. Maryborough Chronicle, 1.11.92.

24. Bolton, G.E., A Thousand Miles Away. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1953), p.206.

25. Reprinted Warwick Argus, 5.11.92.

of Labour in the Elections has alarmed employers of labour and has finally forced them to the conclusion to which they have been gradually coming for the last twelve months, that their own interests are better protected by the colony as a whole than they would be if separation took place. Thus, but for the Labour representatives, separation is dead in the North, and their chances of agitating effectively here are nil."²⁶

The eclipse of the separatist movement was also a result of the Cabinet policy of the Queensland Premiers, pointed out by Labour member George Kerr at the 1893 Separation Convention:

Sir Thomas has nobbled the leader - Mr. Hume Black - and sent him to England. He placed Mr. A.S. Cowley in the Speaker's Chair, he gave Mr. R. Philp the portfolio of Mines, and he gave Mr. Dalrymple and Mr. Chataway, the members for Mackay, a sop in the form of a central sugar mill.²⁷

The Separation movement had thus been badly damaged by the Queensland Constitution Bill, in the sense that moderate supporters gradually drifted away, due both to the rise of the Labour Party and the realization that unless separatists could combine, there was no remote chance that they could achieve their ambitions.

26. McIlwraith to Qld. Agent-General, 28.10.92. Q.V.P., I, (1894), p.516.

27. Q.V.P., I, (1894).

SEPARATION AND FEDERATION

With both Central and Northern separation movements apathetic and disorganized, the prospects of the Federation of Australian Colonies gave separationists much food for thought, and it was regarded with mixed feelings.

Most separationists regarded federation as a more desirable alternative than remaining under the Queensland Parliament, which they still regarded as dominated by the southern portion of the colony. The Commonwealth, many felt, would be more amenable to the demands for a separate existence. In 1890, Macrossan had expressed his view at the Federal Convention:

My Honourable Colleague ... thinks that the people of Queensland might be opposed to Federation because they are opposed to centralisation, being separatists in some parts of the colony; but the honourable gentleman ought to know that the strongest separationists are ardent federationists Centralisation has no terrors for anyone who thinks on the subject if sufficient local autonomy is left to local legislatures.²⁸

This opinion was shared by most separatists until the 1898 Federal Convention passed Clause 124 of the draft Constitution, which stated that "a new State may be formed by separation of territory from a State, but only with the consent of the

28. V.R. de Voss, op.cit., p.107.

Parliament thereof". As Queensland was not represented at the Convention²⁹ it was left to Waller, a New South Wales representative with sympathy for separation, to suggest that the Royal Prerogative be retained in the Clause. This move was immediately negated by a telegram from Sir Hugh Nelson, in which he pressed the views of his Government:

We do not think the clause would tend to promote the cause of federation in this colony.³⁰

The Queensland Government had thus remained adamant in its attitude to any dismemberment of the Colony. The clause remained as it had been proposed, despite a strongly worded, but useless protest from the Central Queensland Separation League.

In 1899, the Federation Enabling Bill was introduced to the Queensland Parliament, and Central members took the opportunity of recording their vote against the second reading of the Enabling Bill. They maintained that the retention of Clause 124 would "extinguish all hope of self-government for generations to come."³¹ The fears of Central separationists were expressed by William Kidston, when he echoed the words of Macrossan nearly a decade before:

29. For the political reasons for this, see below, Ch.13.

30. V.R. de Voss, *op.cit.*, p.109.

31. Q.P.D., LXXXI, (1899), p.121.

I am a federalist, but I am also a provincialist It is unfair to allow provincial ideas to block the way to union of the Australian Colonies, but no wise scheme of federation will injure the provinces For the proper development and good government of a vast territory like Australia, we should have a strong central Government, but it is no less desirable that there should be effective local autonomy.³²

Central separationism, however, had always remained a movement confined to Rockhampton and its immediate environment, having its roots in the civic ambitions of that city. Serious opposition to federation then, was primarily confined to that city, and the results of the federal referendum support this contention.³³

Northern separatism, more disorganized, as well as being more a movement of the people, had, by 1898, become a dead issue. Wallace Nelson, Radical and former Separatist, noted with regret:

So far as separation is concerned there is little enthusiasm in the Centre and absolute apathy in the North, and in the face of these facts, the accomplishment of territorial autonomy is at the present moment impossible.³⁴

While Rockhamptonites had felt their civic interest, as a port and industrial centre, would be furthered as a capital of a separate territory, the economic basis of the Northern

32. Ibid., p.402.

33. Only Rockhampton recorded a No Vote.

34. Progress, 19.8.94.

movement had been a desire for free trade. An impossibility while the North remained part of Queensland as a separate colony, free trade would, in all likelihood, be attained upon the federation of Australian States. Thus, little opposition to federation was expressed by former Northern separatists. Northerners argued that the removal of intercolonial trade barriers would reduce the cost of living in the North. P.F. Hannan, Ministerialist member for Townsville, estimated that the reduction would be as great as 20% to 25%.³⁵

Queensland separationist fervour retreated before the greater force of federalism. While some separationists remained staunchly anti-federalist, the great weight of opinion in Central and Northern Queensland negated their efforts. The movement had died a natural death in the North. It had been unable to overcome the consistently antagonistic attitude of the Queensland Government, and because it could not co-operate with its Central counterpart, the movement had been gradually fragmented until it ceased to exist. Central separationism had managed to survive longer. Perhaps if some common goal could have been reached between Rockhampton and Northerners, they may have entertained some hope of success. But Rockhampton was not interested in

35. Q.P.D., LXXI, (1899), p.400.

free trade, and the North would not sacrifice that long held policy, merely for the civic ambitions of Rockhampton.

Clause 124 of the Federal Constitution drove the final nail into the coffin of separatism. It is significant that of the Central electorates, only Rockhampton voted against Federation. In the North, the electorates were overwhelmingly in favour. Federation had thus effectively negated the separation movement in Queensland.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND FEDERATION

It can be argued that if a federal sentiment existed in Queensland it was almost entirely negative. The North Queensland Register commented in February, 1893:

The Federal Council has broken up, and its labours have been small. There is nothing to justify a meeting of delegates from the various colonies, as the people take no interest in their deliberations, and their legislation is simply useless ... until the people of Australia show more interest ... politicians should stay at home and attend to local matters.³⁶

Nevertheless, as the decade grew older, the movement towards federation began to capture the attention of Queenslanders. Many now had to decide to what extent federation would affect their livelihoods.

Broadly speaking, those interests associated with

36. North Queensland Register, 15.2.93.

industries which were dependent upon an export market favoured federation, while those whose industries relied upon internal consumption regarded union as inimical to their interests. Industries and crafts which had grown behind the protection of intercolonial customs barriers felt especially threatened. The incipient manufacturing sector in Queensland had been built up under the protection of a high customs tariff imposed in 1888. Much progress had been made since McIlwraith had introduced his tariff. Infant industries had developed, but manufacturers still did not feel secure enough to withstand Southern competition. Frank McDonnell argued in 1899 that Queensland industry was in no position to compete with Victoria:

I say Queensland is not in that position; that if we are placed in that position under a policy of inter-colonial free trade, and have to compete with Victoria and New South Wales on equal terms, the manufacturing industries will not be able to stand.³⁷

The manufacturers had a good case. The table below indicates the great strides taken in three branches of the manufacturing sector since 1888. In that time, imports from interstate in certain lines had dropped dramatically:³⁸

37. Q.P.D., LXXXI, (1899), pp.282-3.

38. Ibid.

IMPORTS - LEATHER, DAIRYING, GROCERIES

Year	Boot and Shoe	Grocery Items	Butter and Cheese
1888	179,097	57,845	93,328
1897	51,097	17,249	12,197

This impressive drop in import figures, at a time when Queensland population had increased by about 97,000, was certainly a strong argument against federation. It is indicative that on the referendum, the two areas of the greatest manufacturing strength in Queensland, Brisbane and Rockhampton, both recorded No Votes.

For dairy farmers and some wheat producers, the situation was much the same. The butter and cheese industry had made great strides since 1888, and those dairy farmers producing for the internal market feared intercolonial free trade.³⁹ The export of such produce had been encouraged by various Meat and Dairy Produce Encouragement Acts, but these had operated almost solely to the advantage of the pastoral industry as had the various schemes of refrigeration.⁴⁰

39. Warwick Argus, 28.5.98.

40. See below, Ch. 13.

Thus, dairy producers still were almost completely confined to the internal market and were thus hostile to federation.

The wheat industry, centred in the Darling Downs, found itself in a somewhat more complicated position. The Northern Downs, a newly established wheat growing area, and producing almost solely for the internal market, was decidedly hostile to federation. On the other hand, farmers on the southern downs, closer to the N.S.W. border and mindful of their trading advantages over their northern counterparts, were more friendly to the cause. Moreover, the southern downs, was, of necessity, aiming at an export market, and therefore welcomed the destruction of inter-colonial trade barriers.⁴¹ Many Downs farmers agreed with the sentiments of the Warwick Argus:

If we join our neighbours, we will do so at considerable sacrifice to our struggling industries, but to remain as we are would probably expose us to still greater dangers.⁴²

It was argued that if Queensland stayed outside the federation, she would be excluded in all southern markets, whereas, if she joined federation, her markets would expand, despite temporary dislocation. Once Queensland could gain a foothold in this expanded market, production increase would automatically

41. Green, Queensland Attitudes to Federation. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.31.

42. Warwick Argus, 28.5.98.

follow.

The pastoralists had little problem. George Thorn, representative of Fassifern, indicated that pastoralists generally favoured federation, maintaining that in his "own electorate ... with the exception of a few pastoralists and a few agents, the people ... are against the Commonwealth Bill".⁴³ Pastoralism was an export industry, and thus did not fear free trade. Many pastoralists however were in the somewhat peculiar position of favouring federation as an economic benefit, but fearing the "democratic tendencies" which might then be let loose.⁴⁴

FEDERATION AND COLOURED LABOUR

The political domination of conservatism in Queensland was in part due to the economic structure of the colony, with its almost complete dependence upon primary industry. Pastoralists provided a large section of conservative support, while the sugar planters provided another. Sugar producers regarded the use of cheap coloured labour as the basis of their successful industry. They had fought hard and long to retain their supply of Pacific Islanders after Griffith had announced the cessation of the trade in 1884, and had

43. Brisbane Courier, 4.3.99.

44. See below, Ch. 13.

won the battle in 1892.⁴⁵ It seemed likely that Federation would threaten the labour supply, and hence this industry, more than any other primary industry in Queensland, was hostile. It had long been recognized that federation would mean the end of coloured labour and would introduce the strict maintenance of a White Australia. Green indicates the basis of the anti-kanaka movement in the decade:

While the desire to expel alien labour was one of the chief reasons for the development of national aspirations, once these aspirations had been formed their realization demanded that Australia should be made the preserve of the white race, or more particularly of the English people. 46

There was however, some suspicion in anti-federalist circles that Federation was a gigantic hoax, perpetrated in order that a black state could be set up in the Northern Territory. There was some basis for this somewhat paranoid opinion. In 1893, Miss Shaw, a London Times special correspondent (in reality Lady Lugard, wife of the great colonial administrator in Africa) had visited the colony, and had proposed that a black state might be desirable. This proposal had received wide publicity, and had been endorsed by the British Colonial Party. Such proposals drew bitter criticism from labour

45. For a discussion of Coloured Labour, see above, Ch. 5.

46. Green, op.cit., p. 17.

member Joe Lesina. In one anti-convention Bill article, he maintained that "at home and abroad, it would appear that there is a movement afoot to fasten upon the shoulders of Australia for all time and for the paltriest of commercial reasons, the curse of alien blood".⁴⁷

It is doubtful that many Queenslanders took these assertions very seriously, but there is no doubt that the planters were unwilling to abandon Pacific Island labour. The Pacific Islander was still of tremendous value to them. In 1902, they constituted 88.55% of the field workforce, and while the expenses associated with their employment had continued to rise throughout the decade, the Polynesian was still cheaper and more efficient than the average white worker in the canefields.⁴⁸

In an economic sense, the planters could gain much from federation. The Townsville Bulletin was confident that "after the improvement in prices which is likely to result from federation, the planters would be enabled to do away with coloured labour".⁴⁹ The well publicized sugar bounty had also done much to mollify the planters. The Mackay Sugar Journal felt that once the bounty was in

47. Lesina, J., Federation, Black Labour and Monopoly. (1899 pamphlet published by the Worker).
48. Birch, A., "The organization and economy of Pacific Island Labour in the Australian Sugar Industry 1863-1906". (B.A.H., VI, I, 1966).
49. Quoted in Brisbane Courier, 15.4.99.

operation, "Federation will give us a sure market for our present production of sugar".⁵⁰ Moreover, many planters were aware that if Queensland hoped to remain outside the federation, the bounty would also apply to them, and the industry could not hope to compete with cheaper sugar from other parts of the world.⁵¹

The economic arguments should have been enough to convince most sugar producers. They did not fail to see the advantages of federation, but their psychological attachment to black labour remained firm, so that "it could be argued that it took the decisive and overriding force of federal authority, representing of course, the political forces fixed upon social ideals, to secure the acquiescence of the planters to the abolition of one of the foundations of this branch of tropical agriculture".⁵²

THE IDEAL OF FEDERATION

The Federal conventions throughout the decade generated their own type of Australian nationalism, but, as Crisp remarks, "even Alfred Deakin's oratory was not of the order which makes hard-boiled intercolonial politicians fall weeping on each other's shoulders amid universal protestations

50. Mackay Sugar Journal, 8, 12 June 1899, p.16.

51. Maryborough Chronicle, 4.12.96.

52. Birch, A., op.cit., p.75.

of "indissoluble federal brotherhood".⁵³ This applied equally to the Australian public. In Queensland, the federal movement simply did not capture the imagination of the people, at least until the referendum forced them to think about it. Conservatives, Liberals and the Labour Party all had different conceptions of the nature of the new Federal Government. The conservative, not to say reactionary, government of Sir Hugh Nelson, thus refused to send delegates to the 1896 Convention, because such delegates were to be elected by popular franchise. The Government if it could not have its views presented by Parliamentary nominees, preferred to remain outside the mainstream of the federal movement.⁵⁴ While the Labour Party had included a federation plank in its platform since its inception⁵⁵ the Worker was pessimistic about the prospects for labour gains under a federal parliamentary system.⁵⁶ Many Labour politicians, such as Joe Lesina, regarded federation as a vast capitalist trick, particularly during the battle for popular election of delegates. Lesina regarded federation as simply the means towards imperialist plundering of the great natural resources of Australia, and ridiculed pro-federation meetings,

53. Crisp, L.F., The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. (Longmans, Melbourne, 1954), p.2.

54. See below, Ch. 13.

55. Labour regarded federation with suspicion, but as more desirable than imperial federation.

56. Worker, 24.12.94.

with their "showman attributes of flaunting flags, big drums, organ solos, Federal haloes, and florid and meaningless appeals to the audience to arise and become a great nation".⁵⁷

There were some federalists in Queensland, however, who shared the view of Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, when he exhorted Queenslanders to decide "the question whether they will be citizens of a great Australian Dominion, prepared to step at once into a place amongst the nations of the world, or whether they prefer to remain a small and separate community, liable to all the disadvantages of isolation, and at the mercy, in many respects, of a powerful and overwhelming neighbor with whom they are too diffident or too distrustful to cast in their lot."⁵⁸

For Queenslanders unconvinced by such faith, the dictates of prudence were equally as compelling. Many felt it would be far safer, despite some temporary disadvantages, to join the other colonies, rather than to try to exist in isolation. Even so, interest in the federation of Australia was far from consuming. In the Federal Referendum of 1899, only 66.19% of eligible voters went to the polls, slightly less than in the average General Election.

57. Lesina, J., op.cit.,

58. Griffith, S.W., Australian Federation And The Draft Constitution Bill. (Govt. Printer, Brisbane), p.22.

THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM 1899

The heated partisanship displayed during July and August 1899 made federation, almost for the first time, a real issue in Queensland life. Voting, undertaken on the principle of one man - one vote, showed that a majority of only 53.39% of Queenslanders were favourable to federation.

A brief analysis of the results confirms the impression that it was economic interest which dictated the attitudes of most Queenslanders. The four south-eastern electoral districts - inner urban, suburban, the south-eastern farming areas and the Darling Downs-all returned negative votes, while the south-western pastoral district was favourable to union. In Brisbane, the ratio was largest, with almost a 2 - 1 majority against federation.⁵⁹ This ratio was maintained in the south-eastern farming district, but on the Darling Downs, voting was closer and results less clear-cut. Of the Downs electorates, Warwick, Carnarvon, and Cunningham returned a favourable vote, and Dalby was evenly divided. Cambooya, Aubigny and Toowoomba, in the northern part of the Downs, determinedly opposed any form of union. Thus, the manufacturers and retail traders of Brisbane, jealous of their commercial domination,

59. See Appendix 6 for referendum results.

along with the farmers of the south east and northern downs, voted firmly against Federation.

On the other hand, only two other electorates, Rockhampton and Rockhampton North, voted against union. The hard core of separationists may have had some effect on this vote, but economic considerations no doubt influenced many. Rockhampton was becoming the manufacturing centre of the central and northern areas. Thus, manufacturers there regarded southern competition in the same way as the Brisbane business men. Moreover, the civic ambitions of Rockhampton, which had long provided a basis for the separation movement had also come into play, and Rockhamptonites feared the loss of the town's hard won status.

Perhaps the most remarkable federal victory was in the north, where the vote was 12,376 in favour of federation and only 3,330 against. It can thus be said that it was the north which carried Queensland into the Commonwealth, for the rest of Queensland had been carried by the gigantic No Vote of the south-eastern area.

Queensland thus entered the Commonwealth of Australia, as one State, and not two or three. Separation had given way to Federation and Queensland entered the new Federation, with all the rights and duties, advantages and disadvantages thus entailed.

CHAPTER 7THE QUEENSLAND NATIONAL BANK

The Queensland National Bank¹ was the colony's premier financial institution from its inception in 1872 until the turn of the century. It had been founded by a group of businessmen, with a paid up capital of £106,000. Its first directors were F.H. Hart, A.B. Buchanan and John Bramston, and its first General Manager was E.R. Drury. Drury was an experienced banker and became the close friend and associate of Thomas McIlwraith. McIlwraith's connection with the bank began when he joined the Board of Directors in 1874, and although he resigned in 1879, he kept a link with the Q.N.B. through his brother-in-law, Arthur Palmer, who took his place on the Board. Many politicians were to become shareholders in the bank. In 1896, the Board of Directors included three members of the Council - B.D. Morehead, Palmer, and Robert Hart. Other Council members owned substantial blocks of shares - Wilkie Gray, Ferguson, Marks, Mosman, Power, Raff, and of course, James Tyson. Several members of the

1. There is a lot of material relating to the Bank in the Queensland State Archives, but much of it has yet to be released by the Justice Department.

Assembly are also to be found on the list of shareholders - Callan, Crombie, Dickson, Lord, McMaster, Stodart and George Thorne.²

In 1879, McIlwraith had given Drury the Government Account. The bank made spectacular headway during the boom conditions of the early Eighties. Its deposits more than doubled between 1884 and 1889. But, like all Queensland Banks, there was an unfavourable ratio between British and colonial capital, a characteristic which did not promote stability. The bank had a number of major weaknesses. Firstly, because it conducted all Government business, its reserves tended to fluctuate with fluctuating government demand. The link with Parliament was strengthened by the fact that of all the members who were shareholders only one, George Thorne, was an active oppositionist.³ This left a wide avenue for attempted pressure on the Bank's directors. General policy was one of extreme speculation, a far more serious fault. McIlwraith, and men like him, tended to spurn immediately profitable enterprises such as land improvement, for the greater anticipated benefits of long term speculation. Improving pastoral land, the colony's great asset, was not profitable enough; buying up land in the expectation

2. Worker, 21.11.96.

3. Dickson's loyalties tended to fluctuate.

of railway construction⁴ was profitable; mining was profitable; but gambling in land values exceeded these in attraction. This type of speculation is dangerous, even if only practised by private investors, but when the banks also speculate, the situation becomes disastrous. To make matters worse, it was not Queensland money that was used; it was imported capital, borrowed in the expectation that profits would pay the interest. Throughout the decade of the Eighties, this ruinous speculation, practised by small and large investors alike, proceeded apace, with no restraining hand placed on it by the banks, who themselves were caught up in the fever.

In 1898, The Committee of Inquiry into the Q.N.B.'s affairs and management, had severely criticized this policy:

To invest in one year £2,500,000⁽⁵⁾ in a young colony, during a period of inflated values without undue risk, required on the part of those charged with the responsibility, quite exceptional experience and sagacity. But the money had to be lent, because the interest had to be paid on the deposits It was, we believe, the disastrous turning point in the history of the Bank.⁶

Even so, with sound management the bank could have been salvaged. And this was not to be had from E.R. Drury.

Drury was given a free hand in the management of the

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4. The Mareeba-Chillagoe Railway scandal is a good example.
 5. Particularly with a paid up capital of only £1,050,950.
 6. Further report of the Committee of Inquiry into the business and affairs of the Queensland National Bank Ltd. and its past management. Q.V.P., II, (1897), p.700.

Bank, and the Head Office was never inspected. Branch managers were also given far too much discretionary power. None in authority at the Bank saw fit to try to put a brake upon its speculative transactions. Prior to 1893, however, there was no lapse of confidence in the Bank. The rapid growth of the institution had owed much to the security gained from the government account, but depression placed the Bank in a perilous position, particularly as cautious British investors had been steadily withdrawing most of their capital.⁷ In 1892, the Bank admitted to the Government that it would have difficulty providing funds to meet the withdrawal of capital. The Government then borrowed £600,000 from the Bank of England, ostensibly for official purposes. It was admitted to the 1898 Committee, however, that "this money was not borrowed by the Government to meet the interest on the public debt, but ... was really negotiated in the interest of the Bank."⁸

Despite this desperate measure, The Q.N.B., faced with shrinking Government business, was forced to suspend operations on 15 May, 1893. The effect in business circles, and on the general public, was nothing short of catastrophic.

7. See Ch. 3.

8. Further Report ... op.cit., p.701.
ON THE QNB.

Even now, few Queenslanders realised the severity of the crisis, or that the Government had on two occasions, during 1892, borrowed substantial sums from Great Britain to avoid disturbing its account. Now the time had come to face the consequences of such a foolish and short-sighted policy.

The Government acted swiftly. Griffith appointed H.M. Nelson, a respected financier, and A.H. Barlow, to inquire into the affairs of the Bank. After a rapid examination they pronounced the Bank solvent. The Government then decided to prop up the failing reserves by guaranteeing the holdings.⁹ Despite some temporary success in restoring confidence, the action was a palliative rather than a cure.

On Drury's death in February 1896, Walter Ralston became Manager. He found, to his astonishment, that the Bank was in an almost unbelievable state of insolvency. After informing the directors, Ralston then approached the Queensland Government which agreed to investigate the situation. In August 1896, Labour member Charles McDonald tabled the following question in the House:

Is it the intention of the Government to cause an independent inquiry to be made into the affairs of the Queensland National Bank before any legislation is introduced?¹⁰

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9. The Government and the Bank agreed that £2,000,000 was to be placed in fixed deposit for 6 to 12 years, while £360,000 was to be repaid at an interest rate of 4.1/2% per annum.
10. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.605.

McDonald received little satisfaction from the Premier at this time, but on 2nd September, Nelson announced that a Committee had been set up "to ascertain the position of the Affairs of the Q.N.B. Ltd.". The Committee consisted of E.B. Forrest M.L.C., John Cameron, former President of the United Pastoralist Association and Employers Union, and E.V. Reid, a prominent Queensland businessman. The satisfaction with which the news of the committee was received was somewhat lessened when its membership was announced. Labour and Opposition members alleged that two members were shareholders of the Bank. Nelson replied that there was only one shareholder, and that he was only a trustee.¹¹ McDonald countered:

I know that Mr. Forrest is a shareholder, according to the list filed in the Supreme Court ... to show that he is connected with the Queensland National Bank, I may mention that he is a shareholder in a certain firm in the colony, who have [sic] a very big overdraft at the Bank.¹²

This firm was Parberry Lamb and Co., which had extensive business relations with the squatters.¹³ Forrest was also a close personal friend of McIlwraith and Palmer. E.V. Reid was a director of Walter Reid and Co., also with close connections with the pastoral industry. The Worker pointed

11. Ibid., p. 720.

12. Ibid., p. 721.

13. Worker, 5.10.96.

out that Walter Reid were agents for the A.U.S.N. Co., a shipping firm owned by Robert Philp and James Burns, whose Manager, E.S. Dawes, was a director of the London branch of Q.N.B. If this were not enough to question the appointment of Reid, the Worker listed several other shareholders of Walter Reid: McIlwraith, McEachern & Co., McEachern, A.J. Callan, Ferguson, A.H. Palmer.¹⁴ That the Nelson Government could have appointed such an obviously partisan Committee was an act of either supreme cynicism or unmitigated stupidity. Continued pressure from the opposition benches eventually forced the Premier to include the Auditor-General, E. Deshon, in the Committee.¹⁵

The report of the investigators stated that the liabilities of the Bank exceeded its assets by £2,435,423.¹⁶ It avoided any judgment on the past management of the Bank save an admission that "it must be obvious that grave mistakes have been made".¹⁷ The Committee recommended:

To prevent the stoppage of the Bank, to avert what most people would regard as a public disaster ... we have resolved, notwithstanding our strong aversion to any form of State guarantee, to recommend the Government to guarantee temporarily the balances at credit of current accounts, and also, such of the now fixed deposits as may mature during the same period.¹⁸

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14. Ibid.
 15. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1895), p.721.
 16. Q.V.P., II, (1896), p.721.
 17. Ibid., p.510.
 18. Ibid., p.511.

In accordance with this, the Government introduced the Queensland National Bank Ltd. Guarantee Bill in November 1896. The Bill aimed at guaranteeing all the deposits of the Bank, including the fixed accounts which had been opened after the reconstruction of 1893. The Bill did not affect overdrafts, simply current accounts in credit. The accounts were to be guaranteed for a period of 12 months.¹⁹

C.H. Buzacott, former prominent Liberal, and at one time owner of the Brisbane Courier and Maryborough Chronicle, regarded the Bill as an explosive political issue. He wrote to Nelson that he felt that it might have a difficult passage, particularly as many other banking institutions opposed such a course. He continued that, "evidently the Labour Party could not be counted upon. Many Labour members are, I know, favourable to giving the bank substantial aid, but my impression is that they would be carried away in an epidemic of demolition which could seize an opposition once they saw the opportunity of thrusting out the Government".²⁰ J.C. Smyth later believed that the fate of the Ministry was involved.²¹

The attitude of the Labour Party was therefore crucial. A variety of opinions was expressed during debate on the

19. Q.P.D., LXXVI, (1896), p.1453.

20. Buzacott to Nelson, 31.8.96 (QNB Papers, Q.S.A.).

21. Smyth to McIlwraith, 27.11.97 (QNB Papers, Q.S.A.).

Bill. Anderson Dawson opposed guarantee, wondering "whether we are justified in keeping alive by means of public money an institution which must inevitably fall. Will it not by doing so, create a false public confidence?"²²

Thomas Finney expressed an opposite view:

We must look at the fact that if the bank stops, hundreds of people will be thrown out of employment all over the colony, business will be crippled and it will be a great misfortune to the whole community.²³

Many labour members feared the repercussions of unemployment which might follow the closing of the bank. George Sim, at a meeting in Ipswich early in 1897, maintained Labour parliamentarians had been given complete freedom of action:

In regard to the Q.N. Bank question, it was determined at a meeting of labour representatives that each member should be entitled to vote as he thought best ... he was answerable to the party on any matters affecting the platform of the party, but in regard to other affairs, his constituency was his only tribunal.²⁴

The Worker, however, condemned those who had voted for guarantee:

Seldom, if ever, do we venture to publicly question the acts of Labour members of the House ... there are occasions, however, when it would be neglect on our part to remain silent We heartily support the actions

22. Q.P.D., LXXVI, (1896), p.1461.

23. Ibid., p.1463.

24. Brisbane Courier, 8.1.97

taken by Messrs. Dawson, Turley, McDonald, Dunsford, Fitzgerald and Kerr, in opposing the Government Guarantee Bill If the bank is to close, the sooner it goes into liquidation the better ... we think every member of the Labour Party who voted for the Guarantee legislation will regret his action at no distant date.²⁵

The Worker maintained that the Q.N.B. case was a matter of party platform, and was covered by the referendum platform. All those who had voted with the Government had directly contravened this principle, and all agreements made between the Executive and an outside body should be submitted to Parliament for ratification.²⁶

Many Labour men felt there was merit in Glassey's views. He felt that it would be the small depositor, the man who could least afford it, who would suffer most if the bank was forced into liquidation. Labour members who voted for guarantee also tended to agree with the arguments of Finney, and believed that if the bank did close its doors, more businesses would be forced into the bankruptcy courts, and the unemployment rate would rise even further. The Worker disagreed. It insisted that the situation made too many businesses inherently unsound, and that it would be even more dangerous to carry on with money received from Q.N.B.

25. Worker, 21.11.96.

26. Ibid.

overdrafts.²⁷

Had this dissension within Labour ranks been merely the result of differing attitudes to the Bank, the party may have survived this public bickering with little harm to its image. The causes, however, went deeper than this particular issue. Rivalry between the Glassey faction, and the A.L.F. Worker faction, had been evident during the 1896 Election campaigns, and in the following three years, this rivalry became more intense, finally resulting in open rupture.²⁸

When the first Report of the Committee had been published, the issue of the Bank's past management had been carefully avoided. But, the "great mistakes" mentioned in the first could not be ignored indefinitely. The Committee was thus given a second commission, to inquire into the "past management" of the bank. Meanwhile, the Reconstruction scheme went ahead. It soon became obvious that the scheme did not embody the leading recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry, which had not favoured the establishment of prior claim for the Government despite the fact that Queensland public opinion favoured such prior claim. The A.I.B.R. felt

27. Worker, 13.12.96.

28. See below, Chs. 13 and 15.

that the "attitude of the Queensland Government is, under all circumstances, a peculiar one. If merits only were taken into account, it is beyond question that the Government would abandon its claim to priority. That it does not do so, shows how easily the dictates of a high sense of honour can be disregarded by Governments".²⁹

If the A.I.B.R. was hinting that the Government was trying to protect some of its more prominent members, the Courier was inclined to agree:

Let the possibility of good motive be frankly conceded ... but such mixing up of politics and finance is always dangerous. The party historically associated with the Bank is largely the Ministerial Party of today. We believe that all the directors may be accurately described as Ministerialist in their political sympathy. All, or nearly all, the people intimately connected with the Bank are personal or political friends of the Government. In proposing State concessions, Ministers were open to suspicion that they were trying to save their friends.³⁰

It was not until November 1897, that the second Report of the Committee of Inquiry was published, and only after a prolonged delay on the part of a Government, unwilling to publish facts automatically detrimental to its reputation. After persistent questions in Parliament and the Press, the

29. A.I.B.R., XXI, 20.2.97.

30. Brisbane Courier, 28.3.97.

Report was finally tabled in the House. It was clear in its condemnation of Drury's management, but it did not accuse the directors, Hart, Morehead, and Palmer of complicity in the corruption of the Drury regime. Of Drury, the report stated:

It would appear that the late Mr. Drury, as General Manager of the Bank made large-scale advances to himself, without the sanction of the Board, on security that might or might not have been considered full cover at the time.³¹

Moreover, the Bank had imprudently helped promote speculation, particularly in the mining industry. According to the Report, "It is difficult to estimate the actual loss sustained by the Bank through the mad traffic in shares, but it may be moderately computed at £350,000. The evil, however, did not end here, because large speculations on the part of certain clients of the Bank imperilled the safety of many otherwise excellent accounts. Solvent men, who were induced to speculate by the fatal facilities ~~at~~ their disposal went down".³²

The general lending policy of the Q.N.B., reckless as it was, was characteristic of most financial institutions during the boom period of the eighties. More serious was the

31. Further report ... op.cit., p.701.

32. Ibid., p.2.

fact that Drury, as manager of the bank, not only aided his friends and misappropriated bank funds, but also manufactured fictitious returns in order to mislead the public and the Government. Drury himself owed the Bank £67,744 at the time of his death, of which £46,700 could not be redeemed. Sir Thomas McIlwraith owed the Q.N.B. £251,700 in June 1896. The Committee valued McIlwraith's security at £60,700 leaving a deficiency of nearly £200,000.³³ The report also attacked a number of accounts held jointly by McIlwraith and Drury.³⁴ According to Hart and Morehead, "they had no idea that the late General Manager was so heavily indebted to the bank, nor did it occur to them that Sir Thomas McIlwraith owed so much".³⁵

The Committee was also of the opinion that the financial policy of the Griffith Government in 1892 had contributed to the false position of the bank. Griffith, in a long letter sent to the Committee and the Press, defended this policy, saying that he was at all times thinking of the colony and not of the Bank. The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin commented that "the facts show clearly that all through 1892, the Griffith Government was directing its

33. Ibid.

34. Including accounts for Mount Morgan Shares, land in Adelaide Street, Dotswald Station and Newcastle Brewery.

35. Report of Committee, op.cit.

financial policy to save the Queensland National Bank ... it would have better become Sir S.W. Griffith's position if ... he had ... acknowledged candidly that the Government of which he was head worked to save the Bank in the honest belief that it was thereby doing the best thing possible in the circumstances for the colony".³⁶

The publication of the report had immediately serious political repercussions. The Government stood condemned on every side, both for the long delay in publishing the report, and the serious implications contained therein. The Brisbane Courier criticized the relationship between Drury and McIlwraith:

Here is a partnership, or whatever you like to call it, between the general manager of the bank which transacted the large business of the Government, and a prominent politician who filled the offices of Treasurer and Premier while the partnership ... continued in existence: Ought such a relation between banker and politician be approved or disapproved by Parliament and the country? Can there be any hesitation as to the answer?³⁷

McIlwraith, far away in England, objected to his condemnation before he had had the opportunity of effective reply. He wrote to Nelson:

You and the Ministry and the House, and following you the press of the colony generally, ignoring the fact that I had been charged without any

36. Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 19.11.97.

37. Brisbane Courier, 5.3.98.

evidence from me whatever ... proceeded to pass and execute judgment with a ferocity unparalleled even in Colonial warfare.³⁸

In Queensland, Glassey moved in the House that "No Government of which McIlwraith, Barlow and Nelson are members can have the confidence of the House".³⁹ The Governor reported to the Secretary of State that "Sir Thomas McIlwraith is still a member of the Executive Council, but until he has had full opportunity of reply ... I do not propose to take any steps with a view to his resignation."⁴⁰

Nelson wrote to McIlwraith that within the Ministerial Party, "while a very small section were prepared to fight the motion as it stood, the large majority were of opinion that they would never again be able to face their constituents unless they showed in some manner their dissatisfaction with your action in entering, while a Minister of the Crown, into a virtual partnership with the General Manager of the Bank holding the Government account".⁴¹ The subsequent debate quickly developed along party lines, and the Government moved an amendment which cut out Nelson and Barlow from the censure motion, which was subsequently passed by 39 votes to 26.

38. McIlwraith to Nelson, 5.1.98. (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.).

39. Q.P.D., XXXVIII, (1897), p.1633.

40. Govt. Despatches to Sec. of State (Secret) 18.11.97.

41. Nelson to McIlwraith, 27.11.97, (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.).

McIlwraith, in his absence, had been made the scapegoat, and was forced to shoulder the blame for what must have been an executive decision. Both Barlow and Nelson had purported to have examined the accounts in 1893. There was indeed some justice in McIlwraith's anger, expressed to Cecil Palmer:

I am waiting for the arrival of the Bank report; there has been very little of the substance of it cabled to the Press, and that little shows me what complete traitors the Ministry has been to me.⁴²

The Warwick Argus felt the Ministry had been unjust:

As a political factor in Queensland, Sir Thomas McIlwraith's days are numbered ... Sir H. Nelson and Mr. Barlow occupy a different position. It has not been proved that they were culpable ... [but] they assured Parliament that they had made a minute and searching analysis of the Bank's position, whereas the facts now disclosed, show that their examination was superficial and practically valueless.⁴³

Nevertheless, McIlwraith's position had been a culpable one. He had been associated with Drury in several ventures, and had been advanced £86,000 by the Bank. McIlwraith had insisted that all transactions had been undertaken between 1887 and the middle of 1888, when he was not a member of the Government nor even a member of Parliament.⁴⁴ While this

42. McIlwraith to Palmer, 26.12.97, (McIlwraith Papers, Oxley Library).

43. Warwick Argus, 27.11.97.

44. McIlwraith to Nelson, 5.7.98, (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.).

assertion was perfectly correct, nevertheless McIlwraith continued the association while a Minister of the Crown, and more importantly while Treasurer. His personal overdraft was considerable and in itself should have precluded him from taking part in decisions concerning the Bank. The Toowoomba Chronicle thought it "incredible that a Minister of the Crown should have assisted in the preparation of a measure, and in passing it through Parliament, when he was both directly and indirectly interested in its provisions".⁴⁵

The absence of McIlwraith gave Ministerialists the opportunity of condemning the past association of Government and the Bank without endangering the Ministry or their own positions. Most, therefore, were able to overlook the negligence of Nelson and Barlow. However, the scandal did much to undermine confidence in the leadership of Nelson, which had already been weakened by the Premier's stance on the Federation Enabling Bill.⁴⁶

After the publication of the report, it remained only to fix responsibility. The A.I.B.R. was of the opinion that this was of criminal proportions⁴⁷ and in 1898, the Attorney-General instituted criminal proceedings against the surviving

45. Toowoomba Chronicle, 26.2.98.

46. See below Ch. 15.

47. A.I.B.R., XXI, (1898), p.819.

members of the Board, Hart and Morehead, and against the Accountant, A.C. Webster.⁴⁸ There was ample evidence that the Bank had, on many occasions, charged interest on overdrafts and taken this to profit. There was agreement that the existence of a Morehead-Pattison-Drury Trust Account was highly improper.⁴⁹ Moreover, it could be easily proved that the Bank was sustaining large personal losses on the part of its directors and their friends. But it could not be proved that Hart, Morehead, and Webster had conspired with Drury, and the defendants were acquitted on all three counts.

Thus, with Drury dead, and Palmer dead, with McIlwraith living in obscurity in London, and with Hart and Morehead freed of responsibility, this sordid chapter in the history of Queensland Government was closed. It had destroyed forever the political reputation of Sir Thomas McIlwraith, and had cast great discredit on Nelson. It had caused the first major split in the ranks of the Labour Party. Indeed, it would be a very long time before the ghosts of the Queensland National Bank were laid to rest.

48. They were charged with conspiracy with Drury and Palmer to
 (i) deceive and defraud the shareholders by inflating
 the value of shares fraudulently
 (ii) deceive and defraud the creditors and
 (iii) deceive and defraud the public.

49. In debt to the Q.N.B. for £8,502.

SECTION TWO - THE POLITICS OF REALIGNMENTCHAPTER 8THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1888ELECTORAL CHANGES

The formal conduct of the Elections of 1888 was governed by a new electoral law, introduced by the Griffith Government in 1885, and by a redistribution of electorates in 1887. Mainly concerned with voter registration, the former legislation had little material effect upon the campaign or the results. The preparation of the rolls was now undertaken by an Electoral Registrar and a Registration Court. The Court was to be composed of Justices of the Peace resident in the district together with any Judge or Crown Prosecutor who might be present. Interested persons, however, were now able to peruse the rolls. This provision aimed at preventing wholesale disqualifications. Impersonation was to be impeded by marking the ballot papers against the roll. Papers not initialled by the presiding officer, without official numbers, with additional numbers or too many names were declared

invalid.¹ While these changes still did not prevent abuse, it nevertheless became more difficult to engage in electoral manipulation.

The Electoral Districts Act of 1887 increased the number of seats in the Assembly to seventy-two. The re-distribution was based upon population, although there were three other considerations: areas where there was a large proportion of adult males such as mining areas; geographical considerations; and the necessity that the metropolitan area should be under-represented on a strict population basis.²

To a certain extent, the Bill favoured urban areas.³ In Brisbane, Fortitude Valley was given an extra member, and two new constituencies were created, Nundah and Toowong. Townsville was given an extra member, and Charters Towers was detached from Kennedy and given two members. Cairns was detached from Cook, Gympie was given an extra member, and the Herberton mining area detached from Musgrave and named Woothakata. Darling Downs was divided into two new electorates, Cambooya and Cunningham. Several large pastoral constituencies were divided.

1. Q.P.D., XLVIII, (1885), p.120.
 2. Q.P.D., LII, (1887), p.449.
 3. See Appendix 2.

The Northern district, with only a slight increase in population, gained an extra six seats, while the Central area received no additional representation.⁴ While this may have appeared remarkably inequitable, the nature of the new seats shows that the increase was justified. Townsville's population had increased fairly rapidly, and three extra seats were gained by mining areas Charters Towers and Woothakata, where there was a very large proportion of adult males. Gympie was in the same category, while the new electorate of Burrum was also a mining area. The waning influence of the Darling Downs is reflected by the few changes made in this area, although the new electorate of Murilla was on the fringe of the Tableland. The redistribution had little other significant effect outside Brisbane. Areas close to Brisbane, however, fared well. East Moreton gained an extra three seats, of an average population of 1316, instead of the previous average of 2000.

By all accounts, the redistribution was expected to favour the Liberal Party. Griffith's support was almost overwhelmingly urban. Twenty-four of the Ministerialists returned in 1883 represented electoral districts in the

4. It was a triumph for the centre to retain all their seats, as it was originally intended that it should be represented by only ten members. Central pressure forced the Government to create Rockhampton North.

Metropolitan area, the south-east farming districts, the suburban seats and the Darling Downs.⁵ Cairns could be expected to return a Liberal candidate, as could the mining electorates. The only changes expected to benefit the opposition were the creation of a second Townsville seat, and the two new electorates of Bulloo and Maranoa. The election proved so disastrous for the Liberals, however, that no amount of redistribution could have aided them.

ELECTION ISSUES

The election campaign was opened with Griffith's Manifesto to the electors of North Brisbane on March 6, 1888. McIlwraith's Manifesto was presented to the same electorate a week later. It was a bold move to confront the Premier in North Brisbane, regarded as a blue ribbon Liberal seat. McIlwraith emphasized that he spoke for all those opposed to the Liberal administration, in the name of a truly "National" Party. A new name for the Conservatives had thus been coined. Bassett remarks:

Candidates did not contest elections as Liberals or Nationals, but none would have denied the existence of these bodies, for if "Ministerialist" and "Opposition" betrayed attitudes to a particular Government, "Liberal" and "National" made clear men's views on society at large.⁶

5. See Appendix 1.

6. Bassett, P.G., Queensland Politics 1889-93 (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1968), p.2.

Judging from the Manifestos of the two leaders, the election issues were fairly clear-cut. Griffith and McIlwraith reached the appearance of agreement on the questions of coloured labour, Chinese immigration, protection and, fairly loosely, naval defence.⁷ While McIlwraith was conspicuously silent on the issue of land grant railways, Griffith attacked the opposition for their stand on this issue, emphasizing the Liberal policy of extending railways into closely-settled, rather than pastoral areas. McIlwraith attacked the financial ineptitude of the Liberal administration, the failure of the Land Act, and Griffith's proposal to institute a land or property tax. Separationists, an ever present problem for Queensland Governments, were not very active in these elections. Neither was sectarianism. In the absence of any significant issue, such as denominational endowment, sectarianism played only a local part. Similarly, temperance proved prominent only locally. It can be argued therefore that there were two main areas of disagreement - railway extension and finances. It was, however, the financial policy of the Government, the failure of which was due to the failure of the Land Act to raise revenue, and the upshot of which was Griffith's land tax proposal, which

7. McIlwraith was more extreme on the question of Chinese immigration, being prepared to abolish it outright, while Griffith expressed concern at the Imperial repercussions of such a policy.

was responsible for the downfall of the Liberals.

While McIlwraith had reached a "Modus vivendi" regarding the Naval Defence Bill, his opposition to it was well known, and this gained him some electoral advantage. The problem of Queensland defence had arisen in 1887, after the Australian representatives at the 1886 British Australian Naval Defence Conference, had agreed to help finance the defence of Australia.⁸ It was agreed that the British Government would furnish the ships, while the colonies paid for their maintenance plus 5% annually of their cost. The ships were to remain under the control of the British Commander in Chief of the Australian Station. Initially, public and editorial opinion had been favourable to this agreement, until British proposals that the colonies should bear the whole cost of fortifying and defending King George Sound. Somewhat heatedly, the Courier argued:

If we are still to remain children, let England do a parent's duty and provide for our security, but if we are men and called upon to undertake the responsibilities of nationhood, let us see to it that we also have the privileges of our position.⁹

If Australia was to bear the whole cost of the King George Sound operation, argued the colonies, then she should have

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8. O'Rourke, T., Problems of Queensland Defence, 1878-1901. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1969), p.152.
 9. Brisbane Courier, 25.7.87.

full command of the squadron. Nevertheless, all Australian Governments had agreed to introduce the Bill simultaneously. In Queensland, Griffith's tenure was nearly over, and the opposition considered it irresponsible to introduce the Bill to a dying Parliament. The Bill was attacked on the grounds that Queensland was "being asked to tax the people of the colony to support what is practically an Imperial thing."¹⁰ Most of the opponents of the Bill regarded it as an insult to Australian nationality and felt that Imperial policies could endanger Australia unnecessarily.¹¹ Another argument was "that Britain, having required the colonies to provide defences on shore ... should undertake freely the defence of the shipping trade".¹² The extent of the Opposition forced Griffith to withdraw the Bill, even though it was ratified in Victoria, Tasmania, New South Wales, South Australia and New Zealand.

While McIlwraith tended to de-emphasize the Bill in his Manifesto, he nevertheless regarded it as a reflection of colonial servility. He agreed, however, to aid in its passage in the interests of unity with the other colonies. McIlwraith had a reputation for nationalism, and many felt

10. Q.P.D., LIII, (1887), p.1626 (Morehead).

11. Brisbane Courier, 24.11.87.

12. O'Rourke, op.cit., p.164.

he was aligned with the Courier, which argued that Griffith "has sought to commit the colony to an odious agreement which for ten years at least will make us helpless dependents rather than independent allies of the United Kingdom".¹³

Another area where Griffith and McIlwraith reached agreement was fiscal policy. During the Eighties, Queensland had pursued an only mildly protectionist policy. Griffith, formerly a staunch free trader, had been gradually moving in the opposite direction. The tide had begun to turn against free traders.¹⁴ The Courier remarked in August 1887:

With one enthusiastic protectionist leader in retirement crouching for a spring [McIlwraith] and the other a new convert in actual possession of the vantage ground of power, it would be the height of folly for free traders to look on with unconcern.¹⁵

In general, both Brisbane merchants and some western pastoralists favoured free trade, the former in order to stimulate business, the latter because of the export aims of the industry.¹⁶ W.H. Groom, representative of Downs agriculturalists who were afraid of competition from the

13. Brisbane Courier, 15.3.88.

14. There were divisions in both parties over this issue. Liberal free traders included Fraser (Brisbane South), Brookes (Fortitude Valley), Smyth (Gympie), Hardgrave (Moreton), Fox (Normanby), and Bullock (Nundah). Among their opponents, free traders included Morehead, Nelson, Murray, Norton (all pastoralists), and Campbell and Gibbs (Brisbane Merchants).

15. Brisbane Courier, 16.8.87.

16. See above, Ch. 3.

South, reflected the views of protectionists:

The whole tariff requires remodelling ... until we have a national protective tariff, I am thoroughly convinced that the manufacturing industries of the colony will never advance and become permanent, nor will the increasing population of the colony find profitable avenues of employment.¹⁷

Both leaders avoided being dogmatic on this issue, causing editorial comment from partisan newspapers.¹⁸

In North Queensland, the issues of free trade and separation were closely linked.¹⁹ There was little strong feeling for separation manifest in this campaign, despite the lip service paid to it by both leaders. Griffith had made some concessions to the separatist movement in his proposals for district representative assemblies, but McIlwraith did not appear to consider the subject significant. He did, however, propose a compromise solution in his Manifesto:

I thoroughly believe that a measure which would give them, [the Northern people] through their representatives, the complete control of their own revenue, would satisfy their present requirements, and honestly administered, would obviate the demand for separation.²⁰

17. Brisbane Courier, 20.3.88.

18. The Courier (8.3.88) accused Griffith of trying to introduce protection under another name in his proposals to lower railway rates. The Warwick Argus (10.3.88) felt neither leader had sufficiently committed himself.

19. Brisbane Courier, 11.4.88.

20. Ibid., 17.3.88.

While some of McIlwraith's supporters - Macrossan, Hamilton, Black, Dalrymple and Goldring - came out in favour of separation, the movement had nevertheless lost ground. Before the redistribution, nine out of the ten northern members had been separationists. In 1888, of the sixteen candidates elected, only eleven were in favour of separation.²¹ W.H. Corfield, standing unopposed for Gregory, wrote later that he stood primarily as an anti-separationist.²² He felt that the separation cry had been caused by the maladministration of Griffith, and that once the National Party were returned to power, the need for separation would end.²³ John Murray, candidate for the Central Queensland seat of Normanby, declared himself opposed to separation and implied there was little feeling on the subject in his region.²⁴

Just as separation was a continuing problem in Queensland politics, sectarianism had been rife during the late sixties and seventies. The Roman Catholic Church was traditionally favourable to the more conservative party, particularly as the Protestant alliance with the Liberal Party was still tacitly accepted. In 1875, the Rev. F.T. Brentnall first

21. Warwick Argus, 2.6.88.

22. Corfield, W.H., Reminiscences of Queensland. (Frazer, Brisbane, 1921), p.51.

23. Brisbane Courier, 19.3.88.

24. Ibid, 11.4.88.

published the Queensland Evangelical Standard whose editorial council was composed of leading churchmen from the major Protestant denominations.²⁵ The Standard alleged the existence "of a compact between the squatters and the Catholics to enable the first group to retain control of the lands of the colony and the second to secure the retention of State aid".²⁶ This somewhat paranoid attitude led to political alliance with the Liberals, the trend being strengthened when the son of the Rev. E. Griffith began to play a prominent part in local politics. The Standard was also a moving force behind the drive for political organizations, but the Protestant faction failed in their attempt to incorporate Protestantism and Liberalism within one party. Nevertheless, Brentnall and his friends, including Robert Bulcock, tended to accelerate sectarian feeling during the seventies, and the residue of such activities drifted into the Eighties.

Militants on both sides, however, had no issue on which to stir up sectarian feeling. No doubt McIlwraith hoped his Nationalist reputation, and stance on the Defence Bill, would appeal to Irish Catholic voters²⁷ and the Catholic

25. Morrison, A.A., "Religion and Politics in Queensland to 1881", J.R.Q.H.S., IV, 1952, p.468.

26. Ibid.

27. Gilley, S., Catholic Social and Political Attitudes, (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.180.

newspaper, the Australian, quoted approving articles on his attitude.²⁸ Indeed McIlwraith's expectation was realized. The Week, analyzing the results, had at first doubted Archbishop Dunne's assertion that no official attempt had been made by the Church to influence the Election:

The Irish vote in North Brisbane was no doubt solidly given for Sir Thomas McIlwraith. The incontrovertible fact temporarily shook many people's faith in the absolute candour and honesty of Archbishop Dunne's disclaimer ... the evidence in North Brisbane was in favour of such remarkable unanimity as to create doubts of individual freedom from ecclesiastical influence ... but as the provincial returns came in ... the monopolist party's candidates were in such a pitiful plight that it was no longer possible to conclude that the Roman Catholic body had given them solid support.²⁹

The strong Catholic vote in Ipswich, Toowoomba and Gympie had not been exercised in favour of the National Party. In Warwick, Patrick Higgins failed to attract the Catholic vote. John Fogarty, also a Catholic, had been defeated by Groom and Aland in Toowoomba, although this was probably due to the great electoral strength of Groom, more than to Fogarty's religious affiliations. On the whole, it can be concluded that in the absence of any great issue such as education, sectarianism had had only local significance in this election.

28. Ibid., p.181.

29. Week, 12.5.88.

Temperance, so closely related to the religious issue, was also important locally in several electorates.³⁰ The strong temperance advocates in the House were all members of the Liberal Party, which had introduced both local option and an excise tax on beer and spirits during its term of office.³¹ The Licensed Victuallers, however, were very well organized. The Courier commented on this situation:

Temperance reformers, impressed as they are with the vital connection of their movement with the general welfare have not yet ... formed themselves into a separate political party ... but the licensed victuallers have no such scruples ... they have constituted themselves into a third party in the State ... [pledged] to vote only for such candidates ... as shall support their object.³²

The publicans had powerful support within the National Party. McIlwraith had included in his manifesto the abolition of the Beer duty. Present at a dinner given by the Licensed Victuallers Association (L.V.A.) in 1885 were McIlwraith, Morehead, Thynne, Perkins and Lissner.³³ According to the Toowoomba Chronicle the L.V.A. was very active in this election; "they banded together as a solid body to support Sir Thomas McIlwraith and his party and they sent circulars to all country electorates advising the publicans to follow the

30. Particularly Fortitude Valley and Toowoomba (Brisbane Courier, 14.3.88).

31. Robert Bulcock was President of the Temperance League.

32. Brisbane Courier, 13.4.88.

33. Week, 31.10.85.

same tactics ... on polling day, the whole of the Licensed Victuallers at Brisbane voted in a solid body, plumping for Sir Thomas McIlwraith, and in country districts, the publicans largely supported the McIlwraith candidates".³⁴

Such issues as the Naval Defence Bill and temperance, while they exercised some effect on voting in several electorates, were not the central issues of the election.

According to the Warwick Argus:

The chief point of difference appears to be upon the all important questions of dealing with the lands and the construction of railways.³⁵

The differences between Griffith and McIlwraith over railway extensions were well known - State control versus private ownership, extension into agricultural districts versus pastoral areas. Similarly, it was well known that McIlwraith favoured auction sales of Crown Land to raise revenue, while Griffith pinned his faith to the doctrine that the public estate should be alienated only as required for bona fide settlement. But it was equally obvious to electors that the Liberal land policy, which had received expression in the 1884 Land Act, had been a disastrous failure in two respects - as an attempt to raise revenue and as an attempt to promote

34. Toowoomba Chronicle, 17.8.90.

35. Warwick Argus, 10.3.88.

closer settlement. According to McIlwraith, "never in the history of the colony has there been less settlement on the land."³⁶ But it was the failure to raise revenue which had the greater electoral impact, because this led to Griffith's proposal to levy a property tax. This had been made clear in his manifesto:

I hold that the present situation in Queensland is such that the possessors of realized wealth, whether in the form of land or invested money ought to make a larger contribution to the public income, and whenever additional revenue is found necessary, it is from these sources that I shall seek it.³⁷

It was clear from such an uncompromising statement, that Griffith was prepared to stand or fall on this issue alone. McIlwraith attacked the proposal as an unfair burden on the successful and responsible citizens of the colony, and approved only a property tax for the purposes of carrying out public works undertaken by local bodies.³⁸ This attitude was shared by many Liberals. Had Griffith confined himself to the imposition of a land tax, perhaps the stand he had taken would not have been so disastrous. But by including invested wealth, he alienated one of the traditional areas of his support - urban business.

36. Brisbane Courier, 15.3.88.

37. Ibid., 11.4.88.

38. Ibid., 8.3.88.

Investment in urban development, particularly the building trade, had been slowly gaining impetus during the Eighties, and the threatened property tax was regarded by investors as a paralysing blow. The issue had already split the Liberal Party, and a number of influential candidates, including Bulcock, Brooks and Theodore Unmack expressed their open hostility to it. Many other Liberals avoided mentioning it altogether, realizing that the advocacy of the property tax was hardly an electoral asset.³⁹ It was this facet of Griffith's policy which was the major reason for his defeat. Had he been able to hold his ground in urban areas, he may have just managed to retain the Premiership but by alienating the business community he lost whatever chance he had.

THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign was marked by the supreme importance of the two party leaders, more disparate in personality, perhaps, than in policy. Their electoral meetings were accompanied by much cacophony, particularly those of McIlwraith, who was constantly attacked by the more radical liberals and members of the infant labour movement as a landgrabber and proponent of servile labour. Griffith, on the other hand, was attacked

39. Brisbane Courier, 2.5.88.

as an imperialist, content to remain forever under the control of the mother country. Rowdy meetings were the order of the day, with beer and whisky flowing freely. While meetings were well attended and showed considerable liveliness, the percentage of electors who recorded their votes was not high. Only five electorates were keenly enough contested to record over 80% of votes,⁴⁰ while the premier seat of Brisbane North, featuring the clash between Griffith and McIlwraith, drew only a meagre percentage of 72.06.⁴¹ The election campaign was not as fierce as that conducted in 1883, as there was no single great issue over which parties divided. But on a number of issues there was a clear-cut choice between Griffith and McIlwraith, and it was the former who had to contend with the failures of his previous administration.

RESULTS

The results of the election proved a triumph for McIlwraith and the National Party. Of the 72 seats, the conservatives had gained 44⁴² and the Liberals 25, with 3

40. These were Drayton and Toowoomba, Fassifern, Ipswich, Lockyer, Rosewood, Toowong, and Warwick, all except Lockyer going to the Liberals. There appears to have been no single policy issue which had caused the high percentage of votes cast, but Liberals in the electorates worked very hard to retain their seats.

41. Q.V.P., II, p.1006.

42. Leahy can be regarded as an Independent.

independents. Such a high majority was unexpected, although it had been confidently anticipated that Griffith would be defeated. Such an overwhelming defeat defies comparison with the election of 1883, as on that occasion, the great victory had been Griffith's.⁴³ Nevertheless, some comparison can be made. In 1883, the Conservative Party had been the squatter party, but Griffith had managed to wrest three squatting constituencies (Kennedy, Leichhardt and Clarmont) from his arch rival. Kennedy in 1888 was retained by McIlwraith, but Charters Towers now separated from that electorate returned two Liberals. Rockhampton and Stanley also constituted defeats for sitting Liberals. But we must go elsewhere to find the great reversal - into the urban areas. Liberals were defeated in South Brisbane, Fortitude Valley, Nundah and Toombul. Griffith was relegated to the status of junior member by his defeat at the hands of McIlwraith. Many factors contributed to this reversal in Brisbane. In the electorate of Fortitude Valley, a split anti-McIlwraith vote led to the victory of an Opposition candidate. Three candidates, McMaster, S.W. Brooks and the new Labour candidate, W. Colbourne, effectively split the vote to allow John Watson to head the poll, and the intervention of

43. The task is made more difficult by the redistribution.

Labour candidate Albert Hinchcliff contributed to the defeat of Dickson in Toombul.

The party also lost ground on the Darling Downs, a traditional Liberal stronghold. Here, the eight seats were evenly divided between Griffith and McIlwraith. The Liberal Party lost the two new seats of Cunningham and Cambooya, as well as Aubigny. In Cunningham, William Allan defeated former Darling Downs representative, Francis Kates. Both men were personally popular, but with the set taken against the Government by the electorate, Allan managed to win the seat. Like most Darling Downs members, Allan regarded himself as an independent member, though he stood on an Opposition ticket. The prosperous son of an Edinburgh Attorney, Allan, a pastoralist, owned three properties in Queensland, Braeside near Warwick, and two stations on the Balonne and Maranoa Rivers. He spoke for the larger pastoralists of the Downs, threatened as they were by the terrors of the property tax.

In the north, Griffith could hardly hope for any support, given his stand on Polynesian labour and separation. A comparison of the regional representation⁴⁴ of the parties in 1883 and 1888 shows the areas where the Liberals lost ground.

44. The redistribution makes this very rough.

THE ELECTIONS OF 1883 AND 1888

1883			1888		
	Griffith	McIlwraith		Griffith	McIlwraith
Metropolitan	6	-	Metropolitan	2	4
Suburban	5	-	Suburban	4	2
South-East	5	1	South-East	5	4
Darling Downs	6	2	Darling Downs	4	4
South-West		3	South-West	-	5
Wide Bay	5	2	Wide Bay	5	4
Central	1	5	Central	-	6
C-West	2	3	C-West	-	5
North		3	North	1	6
North-West	1	3	North-West	3	6

It can be thus seen that the reversal took place in the metropolitan suburban and south-eastern regions, and to a lesser extent the Darling Downs. There are two reasons for this result, one of which directly concerned a question of policy, and the second of which is more intangible. The threatened property tax made clear the failure of Griffith's land policy to raise revenue, This would have alienated southern property, as well as the business class of the

metropolitan area, which regarded sound financial administration as the first prerequisite of government. The Darling Downs reverse may have been due to the unfulfilled promise of the Land Act, as well as fear of the property tax among small farmers.

There is, however, another reason for McIlwraith's great success. His Manifesto was moderate, indeed almost negative. The moderation shown on the questions of black labour, railways and naval defence was calculated to alienate as few voters as possible. It was not that he believed that the sugar industry could survive without black labour⁴⁵ or that land grant railways were no longer desirable, but that he recognized he could no longer rely on a purely pastoral vote. Nor had he forgotten his desertion by the squatters over the Transcontinental Railway Bill. But neither did McIlwraith do or say anything which might alienate that section of the community, realizing that Griffith's land policy had assured him (McIlwraith) of squatter support. McIlwraith was now fighting for a larger proportion of the urban vote. Griffith's financial policy had alienated urban property, so McIlwraith severed his connection with black labour and moderated his stance on

45. See above, Ch. 2 p.42.

protection in an attempt to capture this section of the community. McIlwraith, indeed, had no positive policy to offer, except that of a government run on sound business principles. In this appeal to urban business, he was remarkably successful. Luya, Watson, Gannon and Agnew were all prominent business men, who could persuade electorates primarily concerned with business.

It was McIlwraith's great virtue that he recognized that political conditions were changing and was able to adapt to the new situation. There was no mysterious force working against the Liberals. The failure of land and financial policies, the unpopularity of Griffith's stand on the Naval Defence Bill, and the threat of the property tax, all combined to bring about their downfall. McIlwraith, with a moderate policy designed to alienate few, provided a reasonable alternative. Had his connection with the squatters been so obvious as had previously obtained, his success would not have been so great. But since 1883, he had moved away from this section of the party, and had been replaced as leader of the squatters by Morehead. The results of the election were a measure of his success.

CHAPTER 9THE COALITION OF 1890

In 1890, two momentous developments changed the whole complexion of Queensland political life. In August, the Australian Labour Federation was formed. Henceforth, labour was to become a political force of great strength.¹ And in September Sir Samuel Walker Griffith and Sir Thomas McIlwraith fashioned a coalition, inaugurating what became known as the Continuous Ministry, which was to hold office until displaced by another Coalition in 1903. This development had not been altogether unexpected, and had been preceded by a series of events which had culminated in the complete estrangement of McIlwraith from the party he had led to victory in the 1888 Elections.

The new Government, which met the House in June 1888, appeared to have a bright future. McIlwraith had chosen a very able Cabinet² which seemed to transcend the regional

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1. See below, Ch. 10.
 2. McIlwraith (Premier and Treasurer), B.D. Morehead (Colonial Secretary), M.H. Black (Lands), J.M. Macrossan (Mines and Works), H.M. Nelson (Railways), J. Donaldson (P.M.G. AND Pub. Instruction), W. Pattison (Without Portfolio).

jealousies and economic diversity of the Colony. At first sight, the Cabinet looked like the pastoralist dominated assortment of 1883, and yet it represented a far greater variety of interests. Morehead, like his chief, was described by the Week as "a city man of commerce intimately connected by business with the squatters".³ Morehead was, however, closely connected with other areas of investment, primarily in the liquor and export trades. Maurice Hume Black had long been recognized as a spokesman for the sugar industry. William Pattison, as a Director of Mount Morgan, could presumably represent the mine owners, while Macrossan had long spoken for those who worked in the mines. Donaldson and Nelson were pastoralists. While it may have appeared strange that Pattison was to represent the predominantly pastoral central districts, he was probably chosen to redress the balance of the Cabinet, already weighted in favour of pastoralism. Northern separationists were represented by Hume Black and Macrossan.

The necessity for such diversity was clear. The party was a congerie of interests, and no longer as closely associated with pastoralism as the followers of McIlwraith had been in 1883. Griffith in tendering the former Government's

3. Week, 16.6.88.

resignation remarked that the National Party was "a new name supposed to consolidate the variety of discordant opinions held by different groups of Honourable Gentlemen sitting opposite me now".⁴ Still the Cabinet consisted, with the exception of Macrossan, of men who had intimate connection with the financial world, particularly directed towards the financing of Queensland's premier industry, pastoralism. Despite this fairly general identity of interest among the leaders, the Cabinet did show some diversity in regard to matters of policy. Two examples were black labour for the sugar industry and fiscal policy. While the National Party had announced its opposition to black labour in the elections, Morehead and Black remained avowed supporters of the labour trade, and Macrossan was just as strongly opposed to it. On fiscal policy Norton (the Speaker), Nelson and Morehead were free traders, while McIlwraith had always been a staunch Protectionist. Nevertheless, despite such differences, it appeared that the new Government would enjoy a long life.

In May 1889, however, McIlwraith resigned the Premiership on the grounds of ill health. He retained his place in the Ministry as Minister without Portfolio, Pattison assuming

4. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.3.

control of the Treasury, and Morehead becoming Premier. McIlwraith's resignation caused little comment as his health had been uncertain. In September, he resigned from the Ministry. The Courier reflected surprised public reaction:

Rumours have been persistent for some time past that matters were not running altogether smoothly in Cabinet ... but no one dreamed that open rupture would come from the leader of the Party now in power. The immediate cause of the resignation was a difference of opinion between Sir Thomas and his colleagues on the Loan Estimates.⁵

In October, the Courier hinted at other reasons for McIlwraith's resignation:

It is alleged that a very large number of Members on the Ministerial benches are politically embarrassed by Mount Morgan obligations. So much has not been stated openly in Parliament, but outside Parliament it is in everybody's mouth.⁶

MOUNT MORGANISM

These allegations of excessive pressure being brought to bear by Mount Morgan interests bear some examination. If such influence did exist, it would have been through the agency of William Pattison, the only unexpected member of McIlwraith's Cabinet. His appointment as Minister without Portfolio was unusual as this position was normally filled by a man of long parliamentary experience. Why then was

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5. Brisbane Courier, 6.9.89. (This difference of opinion was over the construction of the Ann Street Railway terminus, an electoral promise made by McIlwraith to his electors.)
6. Brisbane Courier, 10.10.89.

Pattison appointed? Was it simply because McIlwraith liked the man, and had confidence in his financial ability; or is there a more sinister explanation? McIlwraith had bought 5,000 Mount Morgan shares under very generous terms from Pattison,⁷ a deal which had been closed just two months before the general election. Pattison and McIlwraith were personal friends, and such a transaction would have been beneficial to both, McIlwraith as an individual and Pattison as director of a company desirous of further investment. Moreover, McIlwraith had similar business dealings with many other men in the colony, and did not feel obliged to include them in the Ministry. Stoodley, after careful examination, finds little evidence that there was any attempt to use Pattison's position as either Minister without Portfolio or as Treasurer, to directly foster the interests of the Mount Morgan Company.⁸

With a Cabinet largely composed of men of finance, it was unlikely anyway that any action would be directly taken to harm such a large and profitable company as Mount Morgan. Many other parliamentarians possessed shares in the Company.

7. 5,000 shares at £9 payable by promissory notes, at 7% interest and purchaser's option to cancel the contract. Stoodley, J., The Queensland Goldminer in the 19th Century, (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.95.

8. Ibid., pp.120-133. ¹⁹⁶⁴

Morehead, Lyons, Callan, Philp, Griffith, Stevenson, R. Jones, Perkins, Archer, Hamilton, Dalrymple, Casey and Sir Arthur Palmer all held shares. This was not unusual in itself, but with Pattison, Callan, Morehead and Jones all holding enough shares to qualify as directors, the potential for influence existed. It was recognized that the existence of such a clear-cut avenue of influence was contrary to the best interests of the colony. Opposition newspapers were also particularly concerned that Morehead, McIlwraith, Pattison, Palmer and E.R. Drury, all large Mount Morgan shareholders, had also all been, at one time, Directors of the Queensland National Bank. The pernicious influence of that institution has already been chronicled. However, after exhaustive investigation of the available sources concerning Mount Morgan, June Stoodley has reached the general conclusion that no direct and reprehensible influence was exercised by Mount Morgan upon the actions of Government.⁹ But, as with the Q.N.B., this close connection between business and finance was inherently undesirable and destructive of the political harmony of the colony.

THE RESIGNATION OF McILWRAITH

The resignation of McIlwraith caused much disturbance in

9. Ibid., p.140.

the House. The Government called a Caucus meeting, and, according to W.O. Hodgkinson, "The wavering rank and crowd were cemented to adhesive party loyalty, and poor Sir Thomas was treated as a political Jonah, and thrown overboard by the very men to whom he had given political prominence".¹⁰ The position of Minister without Portfolio was one in which McIlwraith was uncomfortable, and while Hodgkinson had described the issue of the Ann Street railway as a "trumpery item"¹¹ the question was whether McIlwraith could override a majority Cabinet decision. McIlwraith was not a man to brook opposition, and loss of control over the Ministry must have been infuriating. Moreover, it was Morehead, and not McIlwraith, who now held the allegiance of the more conservative pastoralists.¹² The Premier was as volatile a personality as Sir Thomas and most probably resented dictation from the latter.

Sir Thomas did not mention "Mount Morganism" when he resigned in September. But in July 1890, when attacking Donaldson's Financial Statement he maintained that "In the very manner of the Cabinet there demonstrated a strong influence, that was dominating. I will call it Mount

10. Hodgkinson, W.O., "A Memorable Chapter in Queensland Politics", Centennial Magazine, II, 1890, p.603.

11. Ibid., p.602.

12. Probably a result of the Transcontinental Railway Bill, See Ch. 2.

Morganism".¹³ It appears unlikely, however, that McIlwraith resigned because of Mount Morganism. The appointment of Pattison in the first place was probably the result of personal patronage rather than financial pressure. This is reinforced by McIlwraith's later opinion of Pattison:

This is not the first time I have failed to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.¹⁴

McIlwraith's final resignation then may be seen as the result of a growing cleavage, both personal and political, between Morehead and Sir Thomas. His allegations of Mount Morganism however, severely damaged the prestige of the Ministry, and this would appear to be the main significance of the whole curious shabby episode.

THE MOREHEAD GOVERNMENT

The Courier felt confident that the Ministry would still be able to function competently without McIlwraith.

Oppositionist Hodgkinson realized that the Cabinet "dis-integrated as it is by a variety of circumstances fostering innate discordance, may, individually, be fairly deemed, a strong one. Its members rank as men of more than average intellectual calibre".¹⁵ Perhaps it was the very strength of the individuals within the Cabinet which precluded their

13. Q.P.D., LX, (1890), p.518.

14. McIlwraith to Pattison, Nov. 1899. (McIlwraith Papers, Oxley Library).

15. Hodgkinson, op.cit., p.602.

harmonious co-operation. But it soon became obvious that the Ministry was losing its cohesion along with the confidence of both press and public.

The Government was finding it increasingly difficult to control the House. Financial policy was all drift and muddle, a characteristic of most Government business. An intimation of the way it conducted land policy is given by Arthur Palmer in a letter to the Minister for Lands, Hume Black, "Referring to our conversation of this morning, I beg to suggest that before proceeding further with the land applied for ... [it] should be thoroughly surveyed ... the department seems to be proceeding on guess work".¹⁶

Morehead's difficulties may be illustrated by the "Great Stonewall", the subject of Hodgkinson's article in the Centennial Magazine. The stonewall arose over a Government proposal to grant a loan of £1,000,000 for the general construction of railways. This was debated from the 21st October to the 1st December, resulting finally with the withdrawal of the proposal. The Government was completely unable to control the proceedings of the House, but the Courier foresaw little danger to the Ministry, because "there

16. Palmer to Min. for Lands, 31.12.90. (McIlwraith Papers, Oxley Library).

are not two defined political parties in our Legislative Assembly, for on a motion of confidence, probably nine tenths of the members would be found voting with the Ministers if the Government was really in jeopardy".¹⁷ This would seem to indicate that the clearly defined party groupings of 1888 had already begun to dissolve. Hodgkinson however, seemed to have little doubt that parties, antagonistic to each other, still existed.¹⁸ The resignation of McIlwraith, however, had significant repercussions on general party groupings. He must have retained the first allegiance of a group of Ministerialists who would follow his lead in a division. Thus, there was probably a three way division - adherents of Griffith, McIlwraith and Morehead. The absence of significant parliamentary divisions in the period between September 1889 and July 1890 makes this contention difficult to illustrate, but in July 1890, the voting upon Griffith's want of confidence motion should indicate which Ministerialists had drifted away from the Premier.

THE FALL OF MOREHEAD

The Morehead Government was described by the Courier in

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17. Brisbane Courier, 13.11.89.
 18. Hodgkinson, op.cit., p.607.

October 1889:

So long as Sir Thomas McIlwraith held his incompetent team in hand, they managed to travel with fair security along the administrative road. Directly his guiding spirit and restraining hand were removed, the ill assorted lot displayed their political vices and broke free from all harmony of action.¹⁹

The finances of the Government had been slipping into almost complete disarray for almost a year, and Donaldson, who had replaced Pattison as Treasurer, was compelled to admit a deficit of £969,000.²⁰ The Treasurer saw two alternatives to remedy this - to reduce expenditure or to increase taxation. He excluded the former possibility and instead proposed:

The Government have decided to resort to what they believe the best form of direct taxation, and the shape which it will take will be a property tax of 1d. in the £1.0.0 on all property above the value of £500.0.0.²¹

This immediately provoked scathing attack from McIlwraith. Referring to the policy of the National Party in 1888, he maintained that "if there was one principle more than another that gained for us the election it was the principle of no land taxation".²² On 31st July Griffith joined the attack and proposed that "the financial proposals of the Government are

19. Brisbane Courier, 10.10.89.

20. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.366.

21. Ibid., p.374.

22. Ibid., p.377.

not satisfactory to the House".²³ After protracted debate, the division was taken, resulting in a majority of two for Morehead.²⁴ With McIlwraith in so hostile a frame of mind, Morehead was aware that this majority was insufficient and so tendered his Government's resignation.²⁵

In his Secret and Confidential Dispatches, the Governor Sir Henry Wylie Norman made little comment. He observed that Griffith was supported by McIlwraith and several Ministerialists while "various members on the same side, while intimating that they would not support the amendment, very plainly stated they had strong objections to the property tax." He continued that he had "no option" but to accept Morehead's resignation, and that while Griffith had agreed to form an administration, the Leader of the Opposition had admitted to him "that he will have a difficult task before him" with the financial question.²⁶

23. Ibid.

24. For the Govt: Morehead, Macrossan, Black, Nelson, Powers, Donaldson, Casey, Jessop, Dunsmure, Callan, Stevenson, Crombie, Jones, Campbell, North, Plunkett, Agnew, Murphy, Battersby, Little, Jones, Cowley, Luya, Dalrymple, Hamilton, Stevens, Gannon, Lissner, Archer, Allan, Philp, Palmer, O'Sullivan, Pattison, Paul. 35.
Against: Griffith, McIlwraith, Rutledge, Perkins, Groom, Aland, Foxton, Barlow, Isambert, Hodgkinson, Stephens, Mellor, Buckland, McMaster, Tozer, Hyne, Unmack, Drake, Grimes, Wimble, O'Connell, Murray, Corfield, Watson, Salkeld, Sayers, Morry, Annear, Glassey, Morgan, Smyth, MacFarlane, Smith. 33.

25. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.529.

26. Gov. Sec. and Conf. dispatches to Sec. of State, 8.8.90.

THE COALITION OF 1890

The new Ministry was sworn in on the 16th September 1890. It consisted of Griffith as Premier and Attorney-General, W.O. Hodgkinson (Mines and Public Instruction), A.S. Cowley (Minister for Lands), Horace Tozer (Colonial Secretary), McIlwraith (Treasurer), T.J. Byrnes (Solicitor-General) and W.H. Wilson (Minister without Portfolio). Thus a Coalition had been formed between Griffith and McIlwraith. Even though its possibility had been discussed in political circles for some months,²⁷ it still provoked shocked response from many journals. The Toowoomba Chronicle recognized that "the amount of support they can jointly command will be very uncertain and perhaps unreliable".²⁸ McIlwraith could probably command the support of those Ministerialists who followed him in the division - Stevens, Smith, Watson, Murray, O'Connell, and W. Stephens. The lure of a Cabinet post for A.S. Cowley would probably placate most Northern members. Griffith could count on losing only a little support in his own party. Yet, the success of the Coalition was not a foregone conclusion and the Government would have a testing time if

27. In the debate on Griffith's Confidence motion, McIlwraith denied the two had come to any arrangement. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.818.

28. Toowoomba Chronicle, 9.8.90.

the ~~dis~~affected members on both sides could effectively combine.

The reason for the Coalition remained uncertain. The paucity of private material makes it difficult to assess motives, but a letter from J. Thornloe-Smith to McIlwraith indicates that Griffith had approached McIlwraith in August 1890.²⁹ Vockler, however, produces some evidence that the latter had first approached Griffith through Charles Hardie Buzacott, a Liberal of longstanding.³⁰ There seems little other evidence to end the confusion. Both men were, however, in a virtual political wilderness, and both realized that the Morehead Government was too inept to cope with the impending financial crisis. Griffith knew from bitter experience that the Liberal Party had no member who could match the reputed financial ability of McIlwraith. McIlwraith was still smarting from the attacks made on him by the Morehead Ministry. He was not a man to remain off the Treasury Benches for long, and his animosity towards the Morehead Cabinet prevented his joining his former colleagues. Some commentators hinted at other reasons for the Coalition. Henry Hardacre, in the 1897 debate on the Queensland National

29. J. Thornloe-Smith to McIlwraith, 12.8.90. (McIlwraith correspondence, Oxley Library).

30. Vockler, op.cit., p.117.

Bank, suggested that "in 1890, influence was brought to bear to bring together the two men who had been lifelong political opponents. Probably the bank compelled him [Griffith] then, on account of his overdraft, to join Sir Thomas McIlwraith".³¹ Griffith's debts at this time were considerable, most of which had been incurred by losses on Mount Morgan shares, bought at a peak price of £15.0.0 in 1888.³² But this debt was not to the Q.N.B. but to his personal friends T.S. & W. Hall, directors of Mount Morgan.³³ They showed him great generosity, and it seems unlikely that Griffith felt compelled by them to join McIlwraith.

It is possible that the reasons for the Coalition were far less sinister than such accusations suggest. Griffith was well aware of the difficulty of the financial situation, just as he believed that McIlwraith was the most capable Treasurer the Colony could produce. There is little doubt that both men regarded the Coalition as a temporary expedient in order to restore the finances of the colony and to once again assume political control. Griffith, always an opportunistic politician admitted that:

The essence of politics was compromise, if not opportunism, meaning that sometimes, even a

31. Q.P.D., LXXVIII, (1897), p.1677.

32. Stoodley, J., op.cit., p.117.

33. Vockler, Sir Samuel Walker Griffith . (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), Appendix 2.

statesman must do that which is possible, even if it is not the best.³⁴

Perhaps here is the explanation of the Coalition of 1890.

The Coalition created a political watershed. Bassett described the new situation:

Voting behaviour in 1889 reveals well defined blocs indicating a further reinforcement of the party groupings established in 1888. In 1890, the unusual alliances which resulted from the "Griffilwraith" Coalition, were reflected in generally uneven voting. The movement away from the well regulated and party patterns of former years continued in 1891 and it had not been checked when the tenth Parliament drew to a close in 1892.³⁵

It may be suggested on the other hand that the political disparity between the two parties has been exaggerated. It has been argued in Chapter 1 that while fundamental differences of opinion did exist between the two parties prior to 1888, their primary aims were at all times similar. Both looked to the State to promote industry and to aid in increasing productivity. They differed as to the best means by which to fulfil this role. The Liberals favoured closer settlement; the National Party, while admitting the theoretical advantages of such a policy, regarded large freehold

34. Ibid., p.286.

35. Bassett, P.G., "Queensland Politics 1888-93". (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.4.
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estates as more practicable. The Liberals looked to the extension of railways and communications under the patronage of the State; the National Party tended to favour private enterprise.³⁶ The Conservatives too, were not averse to cheap foreign labour, provided this was efficient and remunerative; the Liberals remained adamantly opposed to this expedient. And yet, these differences represented a different conception of the same idea of progress, and to the majority of members, if one failed, the other might be tried. Under the boom conditions of the Eighties, however, neither side was prepared to admit the wrongheadedness of their conception.

There were certain indications that opinion was changing on some questions. The hostility which Griffith's land tax proposals had aroused in 1887 was one of the major strengths of the National Party during the 1888 Elections. In 1890, it was this same party which was proposing to levy a land tax. Moreover, to some extent the National Party had abandoned the treasured freehold principle.³⁷ During the 1888 Election, the policies enunciated by the two leaders had not been radically opposed. They agreed upon fiscal

36. Most favoured this in a somewhat negative way, because of the costliness and inefficiency of government railways.

37. Brisbane Courier, 4.9.89.

policy and Chinese immigration, and did not clash seriously on the issues of Polynesian labour and land grant railways. Still the National Party remained the more conservative, even though Liberals were to become closer to their old rivals in the years ahead.

It is nevertheless possible to argue that by 1890, the issues which had separated Griffith and McIlwraith for so many years had lost much of their urgency and that a compromise could be reasonably effected. On Griffith's side, there appeared little sacrifice of principle. He held the majority in the Coalition. Previously, the Morehead Government could count on 43 votes to Griffith's 27. Only seven National Party members had followed McIlwraith on division, and of these some had expressed reservations.³⁸ Of the former Government, only Stevens, Adams, Corfield, Murray and Watson sat behind the new Government.³⁹ The rest went straight into opposition, led by John Donaldson, even though the majority regarded themselves as Independents rather than Oppositionists. There was some disaffection in Liberal ranks also. Of the Liberals, Aland, Barlow, Isambert, Buckland, Groom, Foxton, Grimes, Drake, Macfarlane and Glassey crossed

38. Perkins, for example, maintained he was voting only against the property tax.

39. Toowoomba Chronicle, 14.8.90.

the floor, while refusing to join the National Party.⁴⁰ Thus the Coalition could count upon only 27 votes, with 35 Morehead supporters against it, with the eleven Liberals somewhere in between, holding the balance of power until new divisions solidified. The old party groupings, while they had not disappeared entirely, had been thus thrown into complete chaos. It may be admitted that the parties had been fraying around the edges but it is nevertheless true that the Coalition was a relatively sudden and traumatic development.

The breakdown of the two party system in 1890 was the result of inner stresses - the inability of the Government to come to terms with finance. The breakdown, too, could be regarded as temporary. With the Morehead group standing firm, there were still two mutually opposing groups in the House. But this situation was not to endure long. The great labour unrest of 1890 and 1891 and the steadily deteriorating economic conditions had the effect of drawing the two ex-parties together around their two influential leaders. The two parties drew together to face new trials and the coalition which had probably been regarded by both leaders as temporary became a permanent arrangement.

40. Ibid.

Nevertheless, in 1890, these developments were not foreseen. Most commentators believed the Coalition to be a temporary expedient, and perhaps the Toowoomba Chronicle can express the opinion of many Queenslanders:

It is said that expediency justifies right now the attempt to form a Coalition party in the Assembly, instead of seeking a readjustment of parties on definite lines by appealing to the constituencies ... such a system of deferring principle to expediency is not in accordance with the traditions of Sir Samuel Griffith's political career, nor of the party which he had led.⁴¹

41. Toowoomba Chronicle, 9.8.90.

CHAPTER 10PARTY ORGANIZATION

The decade of the Eighties had seen the development of a clear-cut two party division in the Queensland Legislative Assembly, with members grouping themselves around two influential leaders - Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas McIlwraith. While there was no doubt that two parties existed, it can be argued that their aims were at all times identical, and that differences arose only in the implementation of these aims. There was little formal party organization, and parties tended to depend upon the personalities of their leaders.¹

The Coalition of 1890, however, tended to destroy this delicately balanced system. Former adherents of Griffith and McIlwraith now had to find a new position in the House. This situation, at first chaotic, was gradually consolidated. The old factionalism was ruled out by the emergent force of labour in politics. What began as a temporary expedient between two former political enemies became a permanent alliance against a new force. The rise of the Labour Party

1. See above, Ch. 2.

was thus a catalyst in the identification of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition. The Nineties exhibited a similar bi-partisan division to that which had pertained in the previous decade, but the parties were entirely dissimilar. No longer was there a virtual identity of aims, no longer a similarity of membership. Parties very rapidly assumed what might be called a class character, and peculiar Queensland conditions precluded the Liberal-Labour compromise which occurred in the southern colonies and New Zealand. The possibility of such a compromise definitely existed, but it did not come to fruition until 1903. The development of party organization was slow and spasmodic, and even the Labour Party, which had began its existence with fairly sophisticated extra-parliamentary organization, did little to refine it during the decade.

In July 1891, the Brisbane Courier had observed that "there is really no Opposition Party in the House."² The Coalition of 1890 had originally maintained a tenuous two party division in the House, but gradually those members who had chosen to oppose the new government drifted back to their old leaders. Between 1890 and 1892, there were four Opposition leaders - Donaldson, Morehead, Nelson and

2. Brisbane Courier, 2.7.91.

Powers. Only Powers remained in Opposition, with Donaldson vacillating between Government and Opposition. Most prominent National Party members - Black, Perkins, Stevens, and Allan - rejoined the Government along with some Liberals, notably Sayers, Barlow and Macfarlane. In 1891 the only members voting consistently against the Government were Groom, Drake, Hoolan, and Powers, joined on several occasions by Cadell, Isambert, Morgan and Grimes. During this session, many members from both former parties classed themselves as Independents,³ but although they occasionally challenged the Government on specific instances, they did not threaten its continued existence. This was primarily because there was no alternative leader who could challenge the leadership of Griffith and McIlwraith.

Thus, the Ministerial Party was largely an amalgamation of old parties, united in the strength of its two leaders and a common fear of labour. Labour militancy was bound to draw the traditional parties together. Members were men of property all, and they could see only danger in the political organization of the working class. Over 1/3 of the members were in some way connected with pastoralism.⁴

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3. Aland, Barlow, Isambert, Salheld, Macfarlane and Sayers of the Liberals, and Allan, Archer, Black, Donaldson, Morehead, Luya, Palmer, Paul, Nelson, Stevens and Cadell.
 4. See Appendix 2.

In 1892, every member of the Executive of the Pastoralists Association, with the exception of Vice President John Cameron, was a member of Parliament.⁵ Moreover, many members were associated with various large business and banking institutions, indicated in the table below.

FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Queensland National Bank:	Hart, Palmer, Morehead, Unmack, McIlwraith.
Bank of North Queensland:	Black, Cowley, Dalrymple, Lissner, Philp, Hodgkinson, Thynne, Wimble.
Queensland Deposit Bank:	Agnew, Donaldson, Moreton, Brentnall.
Imperial Deposit Bank:	Stephens, Stevenson.
Queensland Investment-Land Mortgage Co.:	Dickson, Forrest, Stevens, McIlwraith.
Stock Exchanges	Stevenson, Unmack, Paul.

Many members also belonged to the Federal and Queensland Employers Unions.⁶ The Queensland Parliament was indeed a Parliament which represented the propertied interests and in consequence, hostile to the aims of Labour.

The rapid development of Labour organization gave

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5. Allan, Donaldson, Black, Crombie, Casey, Murphy, Dunsmure, Morehead (M.M.L.A.), Lalor, Brentnall (M.M.L.C.).
 6. Allan, Black, Crombie, Brentnall, Agnew, Luya, Watson.

Conservatives reason to be fearful. In 1885, a group of energetic unionists had formed the Trades and Labour Council in Brisbane, and in the same year, Queensland sent her first representatives to the Trades Union Congress of Australia, held in Sydney. Nevertheless, union organization up until 1887 was slow in developing, particularly in Queensland. There were few unions for the unskilled workers which had large memberships. In 1887, only 16 registered unions existed in Queensland, but by 1888, this number had doubled, while membership had more than doubled.⁷ W.G. Spence had formed the Amalgamated Miners Association in 1882, but it was not until 1886 that the Queensland Miners joined the A.M.A., endorsing the aspiration of Spence:

My ambition was to unite all unions - gold, silver, copper and coal in one body, with an Intercolonial Council to deal with large issues and arrange for financial aid in time of need, leaving each colonial district self governing in its own sphere.⁸

After 1888, union organization spread throughout Queensland. Co-ordination was now a necessity. This was provided by the Provincial Council of the Australian Labour Federation. This replaced the T.L.C. in June 1899, and was at first confined to Brisbane Unions. In January 1890, the Barcoo

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7. Murphy D, Joyce B, Hughes C, Prelude to Power. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969), p.315.
8. Spence, W.G., Australia's Awakening. (The Worker & Trustees, Sydney, 1909), pp.23-4.

unions joined, followed by those in Wide Bay and Burnett, Townsville, Charters Towers and Rockhampton. The structure of the A.L.F. in 1890 appears below.⁹

AUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

(5) MEMBERS

CHARTERS TOWERS COUNCIL	BRISBANE COUNCIL	CENTRAL COUNCIL	WIDE BAY & BURNETT COUNCIL	TOWNSVILLE COUNCIL	ROCKHAMPTON COUNCIL
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INDIVIDUAL UNIONS
AFFILIATED WITH
DISTRICT COUNCILS

In March 1890, the Worker began its controversial career. In August of the same year, the A.L.F. held its first General Meeting, to draw up its own constitution as well as a People's Parliamentary Platform.¹⁰ The structure was completed by the formation in Blackall of the Official Parliamentary Labour Party. Thus, by December 1890, all the elements necessary for a successful and well organized labour movement

9. Murphy, Joyce, Hughes, op.cit., p.300.
10. See Appendix 4.

had been established - a central union organization with a constitutionally strong Executive, a Parliamentary party and a financially sound newspaper through which to propagate the aspirations of the movement.

The Labour Party consisted of unions affiliated with the A.L.F., as well as unaffiliated unions, and individuals sympathetic to the aims of labour. Selection and endorsement of candidates was left in the hands of the exclusively "political" Worker's Political Organizations. The importance of local conditions was recognized; this decentralization allowed considerable latitude in the selection of candidates. Every candidate was supposed to sign a pledge in support of the political programme of the party, thus keeping public dissension to a minimum. Murphy described the evolution of the Labour Party through the decade.

Between 1892 and 1916, the Labour Party evolved from a loosely linked, localized political organization to a closely knit centralized body which was able to have its own permanent secretariat. This evolution was not an even continuing process. The origins of the political party had stemmed from the increasing desire of sections of the working class to have representation in the colonial Parliament and from the tremendous increase in trade union membership between 1887 and 1891; but with the decline in union strength after 1893 the initial impetus was lost and the Party struggled through the remainder of the decade It had to wait for the resurgence of

unionism beginning around 1907, for the return of the political fevour which had marked its first steps into the political arena.¹¹

The radicalism of the Labour Party was tempered by the pragmatism of most of its leaders. Very rarely did the two ideals clash; and the early parliamentary success of the party militated against extreme radicalism. The first platform of the A.L.F. called for the nationalization of the means of production. ~~All~~ the same, Labour's Parliamentary programme was not much more radical in its proposals than the views held by radical Liberals of the middle Eighties. Albert Hinchcliffe, first and only Secretary of the A.L.F., believed wholeheartedly that the only way for organized labour to achieve its aims was by capturing the machinery of the State.¹² Consequently, the central tenet of the first parliamentary platform was universal, adult male suffrage. Even after humiliating defeat in the 1891 Shearer's Strike,¹³ Hinchcliffe retained his faith in the ballot box.

The great need for education was recognized in the call for free, compulsory education, provision for adult education and free libraries. The party also constantly pressed for the amelioration of working conditions, stressing legislative

11. Murphy, D.J., "The Changing Structure of the Party" in Prelude to Power, p.94.

12. See above, Ch. 1.

13. See below, Ch. 11.

enforcement of the eight hour day, a Shops and Factories Act and a State Department of Labour. Such a department should seek to provide work at a minimum wage for all workmen who registered. Old age pensions were demanded; "not as a charity but as a right".

This pragmatism was early recognized by William Lane, regarded as the most "revolutionary" of Labour's early leaders. He never tired of repeating that:

Those who accuse the A.L.F. of mere anarchist agitation do not usually know that its socialist teachings are in its platform only, and that on its industrial side it has persistently attempted to replace more violent methods of righting wrongs by conciliation and arbitration.¹⁴

It may even be argued that initially, Labour was prepared to co-operate with Government and Capital to the mutual advantage of all. The 1890 Shops and Factories Commission exhibited a high degree of co-operation between Labour members, led by Thomas Glassey, and such Liberals of long standing as B.B. Moreton and Thomas Crawford and Frank McDonnell, a prominent union leader, worked hand in hand with Conservative storekeeper Thomas Finney in an effort to achieve early closing. There did seem a possibility of compromise in 1890, but a hardening of attitudes took place after the 1891 strike,

14. Hannan, G., "William Lane" in Prelude to Power, p. 182.

and such a compromise proved impossible until 1903.

The Labour Party continued to show moderation in both doctrine and parliamentary practice. John Dalton presents a forceful argument:

It is clear ... that the Labour Party was regarded not just as a trade union party, but also as a party of reformers opposed to the powerful privileged groups of Queensland society The Labour Party was evolving into the Liberal Party of Queensland politics ... the keeper of the Liberal ethos as the party of reform.¹⁵

Even so, Labour, if carrying on an old tradition, introduced two entirely new elements into Queensland politics - organization on a colony wide basis, and the representation of the working man by working men.

Former Liberals and Conservatives, who now formed the Ministerial Party, were slow to match the development of Labour organization. Members of Parliament who had always operated within the established pattern of patronage were loath to accept rigid controls upon their actions and opinions. There were some attempts to promote organization for the purposes of more efficient electoral activity. The Queensland Patriotic League was founded by Robert Bulcock and T.E. White in 1890. White gave some indication of the raison

15. Dalton, J., "An Interpretative Survey" in Prelude to Power, p.9.

d'etre of the League when he maintained that he did not fight the A.L.F. because it was a Labour organization but "because it was a socialist conspiracy against the State".

Dire consequences were foreshadowed:

The victory of the A.L.F. would mean the spreading of insecurity in the land, no further imports of money, and the exit of as much capital as could be taken out of the Country ... and they might go even further; because some of them believed in abolishing marriage, and also in abolishing christianity. 16

The Provisional Executive of the League was composed of many prominent commercial identities. J.E. Leresche was a joint manager of the A.U.S.N. Company, owned in partnership by Robert Philp. Both T.E. White and Arthur Midson were ex-presidents of the Employer's Association. J.J. Kingsbury had signed the Minority Report of the Shops and Factories Commission.¹⁷ The President, Robert Bulcock, was described by the Warwick Argus in 1894:

He has long been known as one of the stormy petrels of Queensland politics, and what he does not know about engineering an election is scarcely worth studying. In the old days before the Coalition he was generally found fighting on the Liberal side ... but he took fright at the methods of the New¹⁸ Unionism and made common cause with the enemy...

The formation of the Patriotic League was the result of fear

16. Brisbane Courier, 21.7.91.

17. Worker, 30.7.91. The Executive consisted of R. Bulcock, J.E. Leresche, A. Midson, J.J. Kingsbury, R. Newton, R. Porter, T.E. White.

18. Warwick Argus, 1.9.94.

engendered by the organization of labour. It was a far more cohesive group with more far-reaching aims than any other of the traditional parties had developed. It rented an office in the Brisbane Courier building, and its operations included a tight scrutiny of the electoral rolls, and the attempted selection of suitable candidates. During the 1893 Elections, the League was unable to assert its will over Sir Thomas McIlwraith, and other individuals also refused to submit to its pre-selection procedures.

During the years between 1890 and 1894, the Queensland Patriotic League remained in existence but did not extend the scope of its political activities. In 1894, the Q.P.L. was superseded by the formation of the Queensland Political Association. The Q.P.A. was also the work of Bulcock. The Labour Party had just won two by-elections in Wide Bay and Ipswich, and Ministerialists now recognized the need for greater organization. The new body did not express the same wild anti-labour sentiments as had its predecessor, but it was, nevertheless, simply the League rejuvenated. R.P. Adams was its paid Secretary. The Q.P.A. carried on the work of scrutinizing the rolls and pre-selection.¹⁹ Morrison

19. Its success was only limited - The 1896 Elections - See below Ch. 13.

describes the activity:

It must be granted that an extremely competent organization had been developed to supervise electoral rolls ... Bulcock or one of his associates, seated in the committee room during the actual periods of polling were able, through their pre-election canvassing and the contacts they had established to ensure that their own supporters had all recorded their votes ... they were thus able to assess the actual result of the election within a few votes.... A system of pre-selection of candidates had been established, which though it had not gained universal acceptance, was still a very considerable factor in preventing the loss of seats through the splitting of votes.²⁰

The Q.P.A. still had not, however, tried to enter the policy making field. The political influence of Bulcock was enhanced by the fact that Sir Hugh Muir Nelson was Chairman of the Q.P.A. at the same time as he was Premier. Its organization was still haphazard and it lagged far behind the growing sophistication of the Labour machine.

One of the reasons for the failure to develop a coherent extra-parliamentary organization was pointed out by the Western Champion:

There is always a disagreement among persons who oppose the Labour Party as to their status in the political cosmos. Many people who are not democrats object to be called Conservatives ... it ... becomes difficult to fix upon a rallying title to which none can object.²¹

20. Morrison, A.A., "Liberal Party Organizations before 1900", (Typescript, Fryer Library), p.20.

21. Western Champion, 2.9.98.

The furore which had surrounded the North Brisbane election in 1896²² had effectively reduced the prestige of the Q.P.A.²³ In November 1901, the Mackay Mercury indicated that "the organization, which at one time held the government together in this district, is now entirely lacking".²⁴

The continued parochialism of Queensland politics hindered the growth of extra-parliamentary organization. This was manifested in two ways. Regional branches of the Q.P.A. often had little contact with the central offices in Brisbane. Secondly, some areas or sectional groups established their own political organizations. The Darling Downs produced the Queensland Farmers Alliance, formed at Clifton in September 1891. The platform had been drawn up in August of that year, mainly at the instigation of W.H. Groom. Among its planks were:

1. The proper representation of farming interests in Parliament.
2. Electoral reform, including one man, one vote.
3. State aided farm settlement.
4. Protection.
5. A State Loan Bank to assist selectors.

22. See below, Ch. 13.

23. In the same article, the Western Champion remarked that the whole anti-Labour organization was "quite dormant".

24. Mackay Mercury, 12.11.1901.

6. Courts of Conciliation.²⁵

The Farmers Alliance was essentially the product of long established Downs radicalism, and easily established links with the Labour Party, and opposed the ideals of organizations such as the Q.P.A.

While this lack of efficient extra-parliamentary organization did not weaken the Coalition in the first years of the decade, this was only due to the presence of strong leaders. The absence of a leader of strength and prestige after the retirement of Griffith and McIlwraith meant that party discipline and cohesion was bound to suffer. Signs of Ministerial disunity were clearly discernible by 1896, and the factionalism increased after the elections. The Labour Party too was exhibiting a disunity hitherto unknown and the internal problems of both parties tended to blur the clearcut division between Labour and Conservative. This would eventually result in a Liberal-Labour Coalition in 1903. Throughout the Nineties, party organization was still in its infancy, and until the development of extra-parliamentary bodies on both sides, the Parliament of Queensland would continue as a Parliament of shifting alliances and instability.

25. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper
(Sydney U.P., 1968), p.296.

CHAPTER 11THE RETREAT OF LIBERALISM

In December 1888, an article entitled "Wealth and Want" appeared in the Boomerang in which Sir Samuel Walker Griffith argued that:

It is the duty of the State to undertake the task of insisting upon a fair division of the products of Labour between the possessor of raw material and the producer Is it not to a great extent an intuitive perception, not perhaps articulately expressed, of these and allied principles that has given rise to the strong and increasing sense of the injustice of the land monopoly and the fierce objection to the competition of alien races? Is it not beginning to be felt that unrestricted competition, instead of being the result of a natural law of good, is a dangerous social evil?¹

It was with such ideas that Griffith, and other middle class radicals, appealed for the vote of the working men of Queensland. That the ideas were sincerely held is not open to doubt, but the paternalistic expression of them had little contact with social realities. The Eighties had been a decade of fairly high and continuing prosperity, with the result that employees had not been militant in their demand

1. Boomerang, 21.12.88.

for a greater share of accumulated wealth. The lack of aggression was probably due to the slow industrial development of the colony. Until the Eighties, Queensland's secondary industries were slight, but that decade showed an accelerated growth, with the number of industrial establishments more than doubling.²

A greater concentration of labour began to emerge during the Eighties, a development which was conducive to labour organization. Government immigration policy also provided an impetus in this direction. It has been argued in Chapter 3 that a large proportion of immigrants tended to congregate in the ports of disembarkation, swelling the urban workforce, thereby creating unemployment problems as depression set in. Immigration had another, equally significant effect. Many Labour Parliamentarians who were prominent during the Nineties had arrived on the immigrant ships the decade before.³ For an incipient labour movement, the arrival of men like Thomas Glassey and Frank McDonnell, already experienced in union organization, was a tremendous asset. Equally important,

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2. In 1870, only 470 industrial establishments existed; in 1880 this had increased by only 100, while 1890 saw the operation of 1322 establishments. Lavery, J. "The Queensland Economy 1860-1915" in Murphy, Joyce, Hughes (eds.) Prelude to Power, (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969), p.38.
 3. Rawlings, Givens, Hamilton, Kidston (1882), Hardacre (1883), Glassey (1884), McDonnell, Reid (1887).

the drive to halt state-aided immigration, which began in the late Eighties, was an immediate political issue around which the forces of labour could be concentrated.⁴

While political labour had been slow to develop, it was nevertheless in an infant state of organization by 1890. The depression of the late Eighties and early Nineties had led to large-scale unemployment, wage cuts and general hardship. The Government, despite expressed concern, had neither the desire nor the ideological equipment to cope effectively with this new situation.⁵ It was the primary producer, also affected by the slump, and not the wage earner, who received the great bulk of government aid. This development was due to the retreat of Griffith from the radical position exemplified in "Wealth and Want". This in turn was caused by the inability of Liberal ideology to cope with the economic measures necessary for relief from the depression, and more dramatically, by the series of events during the great shearing strike of 1891.

THE 1891 STRIKE

In April 1891, the Worker described the situation in which Queensland shearers saw themselves:

4. See above, Chs. 5 and 10.

5. See above, Chapter 3 for Government attitudes to unemployment.

The last fortnight has seen the climax of the capitalist conspiracy against unionism ... with 1500 or so police and military occupying a few places along railway lines, the Government has felt strong enough to invite lawlessness by the wholesale arrest of union officials on evidently trumped up "conspiracy charges" ... it is for freedom of contract which will degrade wage earners that the Government is fighting - not for the suppression of lawlessness which is mostly on its own capitalistic side.⁶

By this time, the strike had been in progress for nearly two months, and it was to continue until 16th June, when it was called off by the A.L.F. due to insufficient funds.

The strike was the result of intransigent attitudes on the part of both the Pastoralists Union and the A.L.F. towards the principle of freedom of contract. The insistence upon freedom of contract by employers meant that unionism's greatest strength, collective bargaining, was placed in immediate jeopardy. There could be no union control over wages, and under such conditions the working man had no redress. The strength of the Pastoralists was enhanced by their greater resources and organization and by the failure of the Maritime Strike. In December 1890, the Pastoralists Associations of the various districts had combined to form the Queensland Pastoralists Association, a tightly knit

6. Worker, 4.4.91.

group complete with a Central Executive to co-ordinate activities and policies.⁷ The Australian Labour Federation, with which the shearing unions were affiliated, had also been formed in 1890. Both organizations were well integrated and disciplined, with the result that the strike took on the character of a head-on clash between capital and labour. In this way it differed from previous strikes in Queensland, which had exhibited the characteristics of isolated disputes between private parties.

The strike had begun in January 1891, when the new shearing agreement had been published, which the shearers at Logan Downs had refused to sign. While it included no reduction in shearing rates, it did contain reductions of up to 33% in labourers' rates.⁸ Moreover, the pastoralists, by proposing that the contract should take place between individuals, also meant to by-pass the unions. The challenge to collective bargaining was thus clear, and the shearers in other regions soon followed the Logan Downs men out on strike. The Brisbane Courier indicated that the pastoralists would have no hesitation in importing outside labour:

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7. Ranson, F., History of the United Graziers Association of Queensland. (Typescript, U.G.A., Brisbane) pp. 9-10.
 8. Kenway, "The Pastoral Strikes of 1891 and 1894" in Prelude to Power, p. 112.

It is probable that the pastoralists will wait a few weeks to see if the men will give in, and if not, will then make arrangements to obtain a supply of free labour from the south.⁹

The U.P.A. later claimed that no such arrangements were made prior to the publication of the Queensland Shearers Union Manifesto on 18th March. But evidence of such negotiations as early as 7th January appear in the Minutes of the Association.¹⁰ In the bitter weeks which followed, there appeared daily press reports of bloodshed and violence on the part of the shearers. Not all these reports were accurate, but there is no doubt that the decision of the Government to send troops to the Central districts exacerbated an already explosive situation. While Griffith had been away at the Hobart Federation Conference during most of the strike, the decision to despatch troops rested with him and was taken with his full knowledge.¹¹ In a letter to Mr. C. Holyer, Secretary of the General Labour Union of Queensland, he said "The first duty of every civilized Government is to maintain law and order, and to protect peaceable citizens in pursuing their lawful associations without molestation".¹² Thus, with Government troops "protecting" the free labourers imported from the south and

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9. Brisbane Courier, 7.1.91.
 10. Cameron, R.E., "Pastoralists Organizations in Queensland 1884-1900" (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1956), p.41.
 11. Telegraph, 3.3.91.
 12. Vockler, J.C., Sir Samuel Walker Griffith (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1953), p.258.

the pastoralists refusing to come to the Conference table, the strike dragged on.

On the whole, it was the U.P.A. who proved the more intractable. Despite repeated requests for negotiation on the part of Albert Hinchcliffe, Secretary of the A.L.F. to Sir Thomas McIlwraith, as a member of the U.P.A. and an influential public citizen, the latter refused to aid in any way. McIlwraith argued that unless the unions first accepted the principle of freedom of contract, conference would be useless.¹³ Free labourers had every right to work if they wished, and it was the duty of the Government to ensure that work was possible. An employer had the right to employ whom he wished, when he wished.¹⁴ McIlwraith thus reflected the intransigence with which the pastoralists regarded freedom of contract. At no time did he attempt to bring his pastoral colleagues to the conference table. His attitude was shared by most members of the House, including the Premier. He wrote to Hinchcliffe that "for his part, Sir Samuel Griffith had no hesitation in repeating that the claim that employers should not be allowed to employ any but union men on union terms is in his own union altogether

13. The Correspondence is reprinted in Prelude to Power, op.cit., Appendix A - McIlwraith to Hinchcliffe, 1.3.91.

14. McIlwraith to Hinchcliffe, 2.3.91.

inadmissable in a free country and amongst free men".¹⁵ Hinchcliffe argued that "Queensland workers [have] the right to have a voice in the conditions of labouring ... to talk of equal law is bombast. There is no equal law at present. It is capitalist law, pure and simple".¹⁶ This is certainly not much different from Griffith's 1888 assertion in "Wealth and Want" that "unrestricted competition ... is a dangerous social evil".

Despite all requests for a conference the strike continued. The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin reported a conciliation proposal from A.J. Thynne. He suggested a Board of Conciliation, composed of impartial members, with two advocates from each side. The Bulletin reported that this was acceptable to Hinchcliffe, but not to the pastoralists.¹⁷ Inflammatory press reports created an impression of organized rebellion on the part of the workers of the west, led by communist rabble-rousers. Griffith considered that if troops had not been dispatched "there would have been nothing less than armed insurrection in the rest of Queensland",¹⁸ That a revolutionary situation existed in Queensland at this time is extremely doubtful. Even the partisan Courier reported

15. Ranson, F., op.cit., p.19.

16. Hinchcliffe to McIlwraith, 3.3.91.

17. Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 29.4.91.

18. Q.P.D., LXIV, (1891), p.116.

early in the strike that it felt Magistrates were exaggerating the danger of the situation.¹⁹ Even if this danger was illusory, the strike generated a fear of revolution in men's minds, unused as they were to direct labour action of this type and magnitude. And while the failure of the strike damaged the cause of Labour in Queensland, its very occurrence damaged that of Liberalism.

THE 1891 STRIKE AND THE LIBERAL PARTY

Griffith and his colleagues had regarded themselves as sympathetic to the cause of the working man, but the strike proved to them that this concern was misplaced. So traumatic were the events of 1891, that most Liberals now regarded Labour with fear rather than patronage. Griffith felt almost personally insulted, with the result that he treated the strike with a severity that was in no way warranted. He joined McIlwraith in refusing to heed calls for compulsory arbitration, even from former colleagues. Traditionally anti-pastoralist, some Liberals remained steadfast in their sympathy. They agreed with W.H. Groom, who believed the strikers perhaps had a just cause:

There is an inherent desire in the minds of some men to get as much as they possibly can out of the machine called "the labourer" Freedom of contract is a phrase that looks very well on

19. Brisbane Courier, 7.1.91.

paper, but is likely to be abused.²⁰

Most Liberals however, tried to avoid taking a stand. Sir Charles Lilley suggested compulsory arbitration, although, as he made clear in a letter to the Australian Socialist League, "I have not on any occasion expressed or implied approval of the doings of either party in the present dispute."²¹ Reaction on the part of Liberals was nevertheless mostly negative - already, perhaps, they recognized that their old ideology was becoming irrelevant in a new political situation.

The strike tended to change parliamentary alliances. Dissident members of the National Party, including Morehead, Donaldson, Macrossan, Black, Dalrymple and Perkins now drifted back to the Ministry. The death of Macrossan early in 1891 had already deprived the faction of much of its vitality, and in 1892, most had become strong consistent supporters of the Coalition. The combination of dissident McIlwraithians and dissident Liberals could not have been expected to survive. By 1892, the Coalition was opposed only by a small group of former Liberals, disgruntled and disorganized.

20. Toowoomba Chronicle, 23.5.91.

21. Worker, 5.5.91.

THE ELECTIONS BILL

The years between 1890 and 1893 were marked by cynicism and demoralization in Queensland public life. Unable to comprehend either the Depression or the Strikes, the Queensland public endorsed actions which had previously generated extreme antipathy. Queenslanders were prepared to accept a Government, of whatever political affiliation, so long as it promised relief from economic distress. The Liberal financial failure of the Eighties had contributed to the Coalition of 1890, and it precluded the continuation of Liberal dominance in the new Government. Griffith was no longer the embodiment of Liberal aspirations. The demands of industry for relief from the depression, combined with the great force of character and alleged financial ability of McIlwraith, and with the shock engendered by labour militancy, all served to drive Griffith into the camp of political conservatism.

No single piece of legislation illustrated this better than the Elections Bill, introduced in June 1892 by Griffith. In its original form, the Bill contained two major changes. The first tightened residence qualifications, effectively striking at nomadic workers in the pastoral and mining industries. Griffith justified this flagrant attack on democratic principles by asserting the greater political

rights of property:

When men are wandering about and do not settle down at all, I, for one, do not think they are entitled to as large a share in the Government of a country or the making of its laws, as persons who are really settled in it.²²

A second clause was concerned with voter registration. It provided that if an objection was lodged against a prospective voter, the onus was placed upon the voter, rather than the objector, to prove his case. Thus, it was to be made far more difficult to place an elector's name on the roll, and easier to strike it off. Such a provision well suited the activities of such organizations as the violently anti-Labour Queensland Patriotic League. Moreover, the ordinary working man was unlikely to find either the time or the resources to attend Registration Courts to prove his right to vote.

With the House in a disorganized State, and with Opposition strictly limited, the passage of the Bill was a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, it was withdrawn at the suggestion of A.H. Barlow, and reintroduced in September. The two new clauses remained intact, but a new provision was added - the contingent vote, or optional preferential voting.

The Opposition made some attempt, however forlorn, to

22. Q.P.D., LXVI, (1892), p.313.

prevent the passage of the Bill in its new form. Opposition leader Charles Powers moved an amendment embodying the principle of one man, one vote, or the abolition of the plural vote. He received support from only ten members.²³ J.G. Drake argued that the contingent vote was only another device in an attempt to secure the continuance of the Coalition, by making it difficult for third parties to gain electoral success. Under the system, all but the top two candidates were eliminated in the first count of votes. Thomas Glassey dubbed the Bill "The Prevention of the Workingman from Voting Bill". He estimated, on the basis of the 1891 census, that under this and other election Acts, the total of 26,491 adult males were deprived of the franchise, and that the new enrolment procedures were designed to increase that number.²⁴

Attitudes to the Bill varied among Parliamentarians. Some members, who could be counted Oppositionists, supported the Government. John Macfarlane (Ipswich) feared the abolition of the plural vote, believing that this would lead to the overrepresentation of labour at the expense of capital.²⁵ He believed this could only lead to class legislation, and

23. Sayers, Hyne, Hall, Hoolan, Glassey, Salkeld, Gannon, Drake, Mellor, , O'Connell.

24. Q.P.D., LXVI, (1892), p.472.

25. Q.P.D., LXVII, (1892).

seemed unable to comprehend that the Bill he was supporting was a piece of political chicanery designed to ensure the political supremacy of another class. Many of Glassey's amendments, however, received the support of only three Labour members - Hoolan, Ryan and Hall. Nevertheless, whatever the political differences between Opposition and Labour Party, those opposed to the Bill recognized that it was designed almost exclusively to deprive workers of as many votes as possible.

The Elections Bill was the result of middle class over-reaction to the labour troubles of 1891. The Liberal retreat made impossible any sort of compromise between Liberal and Labour in order to achieve the social amelioration necessitated by the disastrous effects of the depression upon the poorer members of the community. The Government did indeed heed some calls for relief - from the sugar planters and from pastoralists. The provisions for land grant railways, sales of land, reductions in pastoral rents were all intended to aid the pastoral industry.²⁶ The reintroduction of Pacific Island labour meant, or was intended to mean, the salvation of the sugar industry.²⁷ And yet, despite the recommendations of the

26. See above, Ch. 4.

27. See above, Ch. 5.

Shops and Factories Commission,²⁸ nothing significant was done to aid the unemployed, to better working conditions, or to help the underprivileged in any way. Thus, the period can only be termed one of complete expediency, in which industrial oppression was unmitigated by social legislation, of the type observable in the southern colonies.

THE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The Coalition Government had, within two years, become a Conservative Government, dominated by Sir Thomas McIlwraith, dedicated to the maintenance, at all costs, of the privileges of Queensland vested interests. Opposition was limited and disorganized, and after 1891, too small to make any impression upon executive decisions. A glance at the division lists of the period gives an indication of the extent of opposition to the Government, and its constitution. The divisions have been chosen as examples of significant issues which caused considerable bi-partisan disagreement during the previous decade, characterized by party solidarity. No division was affected in any significant way by regional cross pressures.

28. See above, Ch. 3.

1891

DATE	LEGISLATION	RESULT	OPPOSITION
7 July 6	Second Read. Naval Defence Bill	42-1 0	Agnew, Black, Corfield, Gannon, Luya, Donaldson, Groom, Isambert, O'Sullivan, Powers, Drake, Glassey
29 July	Second Read. Elections Am. Bill	36-11	Groom, Hoolan, Hyne, Perkins, Archer, Cadell, Donaldson, Gannon, Powers, Luya, Glassey.
26 Aug.	Third Read. Partnership Bill	27-15	Aland, North, Gannon, Glassey, Hoolan, Isambert, Lissner, O'Sullivan, Paul, Plunkett, Powers, Smith, Stevens, Drake, Salkeld
22 Sept.	Third Read. Spec. Sales Land Bill	33-8	Hoolan, Glassey, Salkeld, Sayers, Isambert, Plunkett, Foxton, Powers 29
3 Sept.	Committee Crown Lands Bill Am. Glassey	26-15	Luya, Murphy, Powers, Salkeld, Gannon, Grimes, Hoolan, Jessop, Allan, Black, Cadell, Foxton, Sayers, Drake, Glassey.

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29. See above Ch. 5.

30. In opposition to unconditional selection.

1892

DATE	LEGISLATION	RESULT	OPPOSITION
6 April	Pacific Is. Labour Am. (Prop. by Drake)	37-15	Drake, Ryan, O'Sullivan, Hoolan, Isambert, Cadell, Aland, Salkeld, Gannon, Glassey, Groom, Sayers, Barlow, Macfarlane, Mellor 31
20 Sept.	Reduction Payment of Members	29-17	Battersby, Black, Drake, Hall, Isambert, Hamilton, Jessop, Lissner, Macfarlane, Murray, O'Sullivan, Paul, Powers, Ryan, Sayers, O'Connell, Gannon. 32
4 Nov.	Third Reading Judges Salaries Bill	23-14	Barlow, Cadell, Foxton, Gannon, Glassey, Groom, Hall, Macfarlane, McMaster, Plunkett, Powers, Salkeld, Stephens, Watson 33

The opposition proper, judging from these divisions, may be said to consist of four Labour members, Glassey, Ryan, Hoolan and Hall, plus eight former Liberals, Drake, Aland,

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31. That the Bill should be read again six months hence.
 32. From £300 to £150 per year.
 33. Griffith was given a £1000 per annum raise in salary on accepting the position of Chief Justice.

Isambert, Salkeld, Sayers, Groom, Cadell and Macfarlane, and three former members of the National Party, Powers, O'Sullivan and Plunkett. There were, however, a number of members who maintained an independent attitude - Lissner, Plunkett, Foxton, Murray, Jessop, Corfield and Black all on several occasions voted against the Government. Black's participation in so many opposition votes may be explained in part by his hostility to the Coalition in general, and McIlwraith in particular. Foxton and Jessop represented Darling Downs constituencies, and consistently voted against the Government on matters of land policy. The Darling Downs representatives provided one source of constant opposition to the Government, but the clique was weakened by the absence of W.H. Groom for the greater part of the 1891 Session. However, for most of the period, the Opposition proper consisted of only fifteen members, hardly enough to influence decisions in a House of seventy-two.

THE DEMANDS OF INDUSTRY

It has been argued that two developments directly caused the failure of liberalism in Queensland, the depression and the 1891 strikes. Griffith, the former Liberal Premier, embarked upon a course of complete capitulation, throwing overboard the principles he had held for his entire political

lifetime. The Elections Bill was one example, but there were many others. The Pacific Island Labourers (Extension) Act was the result of continued pressure for governmental sanction of black labour on the part of the sugar planters. When this Bill was introduced into the House, there was little effective protest. Most of the Northern members favoured reintroduction, particularly after the failure of the scheme to import Italian labourers.³⁴ Foremost among the agitators was A.S. Cowley, the only Northern Cabinet Minister, ably assisted by M.H. Black, long an advocate of cheap labour, and a former Minister for Lands. Charles Powers, as Leader of the Opposition, found himself in a difficult position. As a representative of the sugar constituency of Maryborough, Powers had little choice but to voice the opinions of those he represented, but he expressed concern at Griffith's volte-face in a letter to the Telegraph:

As an advocate all along of Polynesian labour on Plantations, I can only feel pleasure in seeing the cause of all the trouble a convert; but such a declaration from the head of a Ministry must cause a dissolution and an appeal to the country. As a Queenslander, I feel it would be a sad thing for the colony, if these political somersaults could be made, and pledges broken by leaders, without reference back to the people.³⁵

34. See above, Ch. 5.

35. Maryborough Chronicle, 18.2.92.

The motion for the second reading was carried by 37 votes to 16.³⁶ Among those dissenting were the Labour members, W.H. Groom and his colleague for Toowoomba, William Aland, and Independent Northern member John Sayers. Of the other members opposed to the Bill, nearly all were from south-eastern electorates - Barlow and Macfarlane, (Ipswich); Isambert (Rosewood); O'Sullivan (Stanley) and Salkeld (Fassifern). Smith, Murray and Cadell represented pastoral districts. J.G. Drake was one of the strongest opponents of the Bill. During an election meeting at Kelvin Grove, he made his position clear:

He was undoubtedly pledged as an opponent of black labour. The planters are trying to lead the public to believe that if the restriction on Polynesian labour were removed, there would be a sugar boom, but there was not a scrap of evidence to support such a supposition.³⁷

It can be seen that opposition in Parliament, while small, came from a variety of groups. Smith and Murray were both former members of the National Party; Sayers, Cadell and O'Sullivan regarded themselves as Independents, while the rest were former Liberals.

The reasons for Griffith's actions are somewhat contradictory. His biographer, A.D. Graham, quotes him as saying:

36. Q.P.D., LXVIII, (1892), p.151.

37. Brisbane Courier, 16.2.93.

What ought a politician to do if he is confronted with the alternative of abandoning the convictions which he has consistently held during all his political life, or of adhering to them with the knowledge that the result would be that there would not be one shilling to pay the salary of any civil servant in Queensland on the following payday?³⁸

While the economic situation was somewhat exaggerated, Griffith was probably well aware that Liberal financial policy, which had failed in boom conditions, was unlikely to be able to cope with depression finance. Graham asserts that there was considerable pressure brought to bear on the Premier by pressure groups interested in sugar.³⁹ Accusations that financial pressure was brought to bear on him personally, seem to have little foundation, as his debts seem to have little relation to the sugar interest groups.⁴⁰ It would appear that the apparent failure of other suggested alternatives - central milling and cheap white labour-left him with little choice. Whether there were other alternatives or not is largely an academic question; suffice it to say that Griffith, whether it be due to personal or political limitations, saw none.

According to the Courier, Griffith's change of heart was generally well received.⁴¹ The Northern Mining Register

38. Graham, A.D., Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, (U. of Q., 1938), p.47.

39. Ibid., p.47.

40. Vockler, J.C., op.cit., p.356.

41. Brisbane Courier, 15.4.92.

observed that outside labour circles, particularly in Charters Towers, there was little opposition to Griffith's Manifesto in the North.⁴² The Maryborough Chronicle, while it had long stood as an opponent of black labour, could see little other alternative if the sugar industry were to be saved.⁴³ Not all journals agreed.⁴⁴ Most objections were similar to that of the Gladstone Observer:

We can see no sound argument for asking a dying Parliament, and one moreover that is pledged almost to a man against black labour to dishonour itself by a shameful and unwarrantable breach of trust.⁴⁵

The Premier received support from a somewhat surprising source. The Brisbane Ministers Union, a Protestant group, announced its approval. Their opinion was probably influenced by the comments of many of the clergy who had had some missionary experience in the South Sea Islands. Bishop Selwyn, a former Bishop of Melanesia, considered that adequate protection was given the labourers, and that there was now no question of slavery.⁴⁶ The Bishop of Tasmania reported to the Governor, Sir Henry Norman, that "no complaint

42. Northern Mining Register, 6.4.92.

43. Maryborough Chronicle, 12.2.92.

44. The Toowoomba Chronicle quoted opposition articles from the Gympie Times, Gladstone Observer, Wide Bay Times, Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, Lockyer Star and Queensland Times. Toowoomba Chronicle, 17.3.92.

45. Ibid.

46. Vockler, J.C., op.cit., p.267.

is made by the Natives against the Queensland system ... it is conclusive of the fact that the old traditions of cruelty and deceit have finally passed away ... I believe these sentiments ... are those of the majority of the clergy of the Mission".⁴⁷

In Labour circles, the effect of Griffith's Manifesto was little short of devastating. The 1891 Strikes, and the Government actions in reaction to them, had had the effect of propelling the more radical to direct political organization. But many Queensland workers, such as members of craft unions and non-unionists, still regarded Griffith as a popular leader. Even after the strikes, it is possible he might have reasserted this position. His actions in March 1892 now made this politically impossible, reinforced by the Elections Act, and his sanction of land grant railways. Few workers would now disagree with the Worker:

If we analyse Griffith's conduct we shall see that his dominant motive is an insane desire to hold office at any cost ... lacking the courage and determination necessary to maintain his position as a popular leader ... he concludes that he can save himself as a politician by joining hand and glove with the reactionary party.⁴⁸

47. Gov. in Letters, 14.11.92. (Q.S.A.).

48. Worker, 5.3.92.

THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY

While the Worker tended to castigate Griffith personally, his position was an extremely difficult one. In a way, the events of the first three years of the decade were a natural outcome of the previous decade. Nearly every measure of importance during this period had been in answer to the demands of industry for relief from the depression. The whole ethos of the Eighties had been based on the necessity of economic development, from which social welfare would necessarily flow. While this may have been defensible in conditions of economic stability, it was no longer defensible once the finances and economy of the colony had crashed. And yet, the political traditions of the old parties of Queensland were no longer able to cope effectively with the new situation, and, at the same time, to secure social justice. The severity of the 1891 strike precluded the necessary broadening of outlook to enable the Government to sympathetically deal with the labour problems arising from the depression. The result was that politics in Queensland were reduced to simple questions of economic and political expediency. Principles were jettisoned; the public demoralized; the continuous Ministry had begun its inauspicious history.

CHAPTER 12THE 1893 ELECTION

In 1893, the depression in Queensland had reached its nadir. Political life too, had become cynical and corrupt. The Coalition of 1890, had, despite all expectations, survived to create a reputation for callous expediency almost unknown in the colony. Several developments almost immediately prior to the election had further cast Queensland politicians into disrepute. Sir Samuel Griffith had resigned the Premiership to become Chief Justice. Sir Charles Lilley had suddenly resigned from that office. The Robb Arbitration Case had given striking evidence of political dishonesty. The elections were also to prove the harbinger of two very important political events - the entry of the Labour Party into the House as a significant force, and the final evidence of the complete eclipse of the old Liberal Party, which after Griffith's coalition with McIlwraith, had developed into a sad disorganized opposition.

THE PRELUDE

The Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company included among its directors Sir Thomas McIlwraith and Sir

Arthur Hunter Palmer. In 1891, charges of fraud had been brought against the Directors and Accountants of the Company. The trial began in November 1891, and the Solicitor-General, T.J. Byrnes, led the defence. Sir Charles Lilley, however, in his capacity of Chief Justice, had disregarded much evidence produced by the defence to reach a verdict unfavourable to McIlwraith and his colleagues.¹ His resignation on the heels of the trial caused considerable comment, particularly as it had been widely hinted that McIlwraith intended to force such an obvious political opponent from the bench. Because of Lilley's partiality during this trial, in overruling evidence, and in allowing the Crown to change its plea without hearing defence objections, McIlwraith was, according to Morrison, "determined that Lilley had to be driven from the Bench According to Bernays, he swore he would pass a resolution through both Houses of Parliament, removing him from his position. But he was fully aware of the difficulties and dangers of such a course: he must above all avoid the appearance of using Parliament against the judiciary simply to satisfy a political feud".² Sir Charles Lilley, however, resigned on

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1. The decision was later reversed on appeal to Justice Windeyer.
 2. Morrison, A.A., "Charles Lilley", Q.R.A.H.S. I, p.23.

the grounds of ill-health, thus relieving McIlwraith of the necessity of such an action. E.R. Drury described the resignation of Lilley in a letter to McIlwraith:

The C.J.'s exit was not a grand one. Griffith intimated the resignation to Harding, but absented himself from the Court. Harding mourned over Sir Charles - was "labouring under deep emotion" - and eulogized the retiring colleague. Real sat by looking on grimly. Byrnes - sent by Griffith to represent the leader of the Bar - sat mute.³

While Lilley had been in poor health for some time, there was no doubt that the major reason for his resignation was his intention to re-enter political life. Premier of Queensland in 1868, Lilley had never really been happy away from the intrigues of politics. From the middle of the Eighties he had been in close contact with the Labour Electoral League in New South Wales. He found it difficult to act impartially in his position of Chief Justice,⁴ and now harboured the desire to lead the forces of radicalism against Sir Thomas McIlwraith, his lifetime political enemy.

Lilley was succeeded by Sir Samuel Walker Griffith.

While he was eminently qualified for the position, his elevation was accompanied by a £1,000 a year raise in salary. Many commentators felt that the raise in salary was sheer

3. Drury to McIlwraith, 29.2.93. (McIlwraith Papers, Oxley Library).

4. Morrison, A.A., op.cit., p.2.

political dishonesty, particularly at a time when the Government was severely reducing Civil Service salaries.⁵ Griffith had by this time, tired of politics, and his complete lack of enthusiasm had been noticed by all. The gradual abandonment of political principles had so disheartened him that he welcomed the new position. McIlwraith too was glad to see Griffith go. He had become almost an embarrassment, in the sense that he still represented an old Liberal Party which had come to have no place in the Coalition.

The Robb Arbitration case, which concerned the Government contract for the Cairns - Herberton railway, gave more evidence of political dishonesty. It showed that "the whole Government work in connection with the contract has been a muddle of incompetency and favouritism".⁶ The reintroduction of Pacific Island Labour, the land grant railway legislation⁷ and the Elections Act of 1892, had all contributed to the demoralization of the Liberal Party.

The Elections Act had disfranchised about 30% of voters by tightening residence qualifications. Particularly affected were nomadic bush workers and miners, and according to W.H. Groom:

5. Only 14 members of the Assembly opposed the Bill.

6. Warwick Argus, 1.4.93.

7. See above, Ch.4.

The influence and power of the Government were used to disfranchise 25,000 electors, and an Act was passed which in the sparsely peopled districts of the colony means, and was intended to mean, total disfranchisement.⁸

Moreover, the Payment of Members Bill, which had reduced the salaries of members by half, was seen by many critics "as a blow aimed specifically at the Labour Party".⁹

THE PARTIES

THE MINISTERIALISTS

The Elections surprised many in their tardiness. As early as January 1892, the Courier had felt that the Ministry, which had so changed since 1888, did not have the mandate of the people and should call for new elections.¹⁰ The Labour Party, late in 1891, had felt that elections could be expected reasonably soon.¹¹ Therefore, most groups were relatively well prepared when the date of the Elections was announced. The Queensland Patriotic League provided the Ministerialists with some form of extra-parliamentary organization although McIlwraith retained full control. McIlwraith insisted that J.J. Kingsbury should stand as his colleague in North Brisbane, and not the Q.P.L.'s candidate,

8. Toowoomba Chronicle, 15.4.93.

9. Ibid.

10. Brisbane Courier, 16.1.92.

11. A.L.F. Platform, See Appendix 4.

J.D. Campbell, a well known Brisbane merchant.¹² In South Brisbane, Bulcock organized a private meeting to cut down the number of candidates.¹³ Only partial success attended the League's activities. A.F. Luya, a League reject, still contested South Brisbane with the result that the split Government vote allowed the election of Labour candidate, Henry Turley. Luya reflected the attitude of many Parliamentarians to such outside control. He insisted that he "would not submit to the Premier. It [is] the endorsement of the people of South Brisbane [I want] not of anyone else".¹⁴

THE OPPOSITION

The opposition was under the great disadvantage of lacking a strong and prestigious leader who could capture the public imagination. Late in 1892, Hugh Muir Nelson had become Acting Premier while Griffith and McIlwraith were out of the colony. The appointment was not welcomed by Cabinet or public.¹⁵ The general effect of the new political situation was well described by the North Queensland Register:

The recent startling Ministerial changes, by which parties have been fused in a most perplexing manner have bewildered the majority of electors.

12. Morrison, A.A., Liberal Party Organizations Before 1900. (Typescript, Fryer Library), p.12.

13. Ibid., p.13.

14. Brisbane Courier, 3.5.93.

15. Brisbane Courier, 12.12.92.

The most pathetic figures, however, are the once blind supporters of Griffith and McIlwraith. While party lines were sharply defined, their politics admitted of no doubt, but now they are too dazed to have any political opinions at all. They have lost all confidence in party backers and nothing short of a miracle will awaken their old fire and enthusiasm.¹⁶

In Charters Towers, Labour member Charles Fitzgerald asked the party to invite Sir Charles Lilley to come forward. The party leaders refused but indicated they would support the ex-Chief Justice should he come forward.¹⁷ Sir Charles intimated early in 1893 that he was prepared to stand against McIlwraith in North Brisbane, as an Independent Oppositionist. With all his old independence of mind, Lilley thus threw his vast prestige into the fray.

Lilley was a great acquisition to the disorganized forces of opposition. For reasons both of personal rancour and political principle, he was prepared to co-operate with all anti-ministerialists, although his natural radicalism placed him to the left of many opponents of the Government. Never a party man, he was not prepared to undertake the arduous task of forming a new party.¹⁸ The Labour Party, despite the rebuff at Charters Towers, looked forward to the association. According to the Worker "A tacit understanding between Sir

16. North Queensland Register, 4.1.93.

17. Drury to McIlwraith, 28.2.93. (McIlwraith Papers, Oxley Library).

18. Brisbane Courier, 5.4.93.

Charles Lilley and his friends, and Mr. Glassey and his friends is of the very most importance.... With Sir Charles Lilley, Mr. Glassey may reasonably look forward to prolonged and friendly association".¹⁹

The Opposition formed a semi-official party around Lilley. It included W.H. Groom, Arthur Morgan, J.G. Drake,¹ John Donaldson and Charles Powers. The Courier felt it could rely upon the support of the Central constituencies, with the members of which they had voted against the Queensland Constitution Bill.²⁰

The Labour Party's organization has already been discussed. For these elections, they agreed to leave several safe opposition seats unchallenged. The Opposition extended the same courtesy to Labour.²¹ Tightly organized as it was, however, Labour still showed its inexperience by fielding too many candidates in several electorates - Balonne, Townsville, Cambooya and Woothakata. In Townsville, Ogden certainly would have been successful if there had not been three labour candidates. The Government was no wiser. Six electorates (Fortitude Valley, South Brisbane, Lockyer, Fassifern, Croydon and Rosewood) were endangered by a plethora

19. Worker, 1.4.93.

20. Brisbane Courier, 5.4.93.

21. Enoggera, Maryborough, Wide Bay, Port Curtis and Burnett.

of candidates. Of these, the Government lost Croydon and Enoggera. Extra-parliamentary organization was still a fairly haphazard process.

THE ISSUES

The McIlwraith Government entered the elections pledged to maintain its retrenchment policy, to enforce law and order, and to increase the scale of Government borrowing to resume public works. The Government offered little in the way of positive legislation, content to rest upon its past record. Critics of the Government were not loath to take up the challenge. The major issues of contention were Polynesian and other coloured labour, land grant railways, the 1892 Elections Act, and the complete cessation of immigration. The Opposition, appealing to traditional areas of Liberal support, also included proposals for lower freight charges, a bonus on dairy produce and mining on private property.²² Sir Charles Lilley issued a separate Manifesto, more radical than that of the Opposition, advocating the repeal of the land grant railways legislation, and a favourite Labour platform, ~~and~~ a progressive land tax, the issue which had split the Liberal Government in 1887.²³ The Labour Party

22. Warwick Argus, 11.4.93.

23. Brisbane Courier, 14.4.93.

issued its Manifesto somewhat later than the other parties. There was little in it which might provoke fears of revolution. Among its planks were included adult suffrage, a land tax, and state aid for the unemployed.²⁴ The new party attacked the Government on black labour, railway policy and its general failure to implement election pledges. The Courier could find little to criticize, so contented itself with commending Labour's moderation, while insisting that "its iconoclastic designs are only thinly veiled The aim is to destroy existing institutions, to blacken the names of public men whose careers have made them worthy of the confidence of the people".²⁵

While most election debates revolved most fiercely around these issues, other areas provided discussion. All parties paid some attention to separation. Opposition and Labour Parties advocated a separation referendum, while the Government promised to give the movement its consideration. Nevertheless, separation was not a major electoral pre-occupation. The North Queensland Register, commenting on McLarty's independent candidature for Cunningham, felt his separation platform unwise. "Were Mr. McLarty otherwise acceptable to the electors, we do not believe his separation

24. Worker, 22.4.93.

25. Brisbane Courier, 19.4.93.

plank will affect his chance, for just now there is no strong feeling on that question. The reply of Lord Ripon,²⁶ and the financial crisis which has overtaken the colonies, puts the division of Queensland outside the realm of practical politics".²⁷ Thus, in both North and Central Queensland, separation had become a quiescent, albeit still live, issue in 1893.

The fiscal question was also relatively non-contentious. Basically, a belief in the efficacy of free trade held sway in North Queensland.²⁸ The North Queensland Register gives an indication of the strength of free trade sentiment in that region: "Bad times are converting protectionists. Mr. Sayers²⁹ was a believer some time ago but has fallen away from grace and is now on the high road to free trade".³⁰ The Queensland Protection League endorsed four candidates in the first batch of elections - McIlwraith, Kingsbury, John Watson and J.G. Appel.³¹ In the second batch, Foxton, Groom, Drake, Luya, and Midson were endorsed.³² Of these, Appel, Drake and Groom were Oppositionists, thus indicating that a belief in protection was not the sole preserve of any

26. Referring the Separation question back to Parliament.
 27. North Queensland Register, 26.4.93.
 28. See above, Chs. 3 and 6.
 29. Independent candidate for Charters Towers.
 30. North Queensland Register, 3.5.93.
 31. Brisbane Courier, 11.4.93.
 32. Brisbane Courier, 14.3.93.

single party.

While the sectarian issue was not strong, the Worker alleged that "on the very eve of the battle, the Catholic Church took the field against the Labour Party But for that, Mr. McCarthy would in all probability have been returned for Dalby, Sir Charles Lilley would have stood a better chance in North Brisbane, and one, if not both candidates would have almost certainly been successful in the Valley".³³ There is however, little overt evidence that any of the Churches took an active part in the elections. The Protestant Churches made their usual calls for action against drinking and gambling, but this does not seem to have affected the results in any electorate.

Thus the parties faced each other over the battlefield of the previous three years - land grant railways, black labour, European immigration, and the franchise provided the main issues upon which Queensland electors were to decide.

THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS³⁴

The McIlwraith Government was returned with a convincing majority in the elections, held during April and May 1893.

33. Worker, 13.5.93.

34. The results are tabled as fully as possible in Appendix 1.

The Government gained 42 seats, the Labour Party 16, and the Opposition 7. Seven Independents were returned. Governor Norman commented upon the results to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

It can be seen therefore that the Ministerialists have a slight majority over the other three parties combined, but this does not show the real strength of the Ministerialists, for certainly half, and possibly more than half, of the Opposition and Independent members would on nearly every vital question range themselves on the side of the Government.³⁵

It would seem, however, that Norman was slightly astray in his estimation. The voting record of the Opposition members returned show that all had consistently voted against the Government. Groom, Drake, Powers and Boles would certainly not align themselves with the McIlwraith Government, and Morgan and Thorn were also consistent in their hostility to it. Among the Independents, four were from the Central districts, and would probably vote with the Government on all issues but separation. It would, however, need a leakage of thirteen Government votes to bring the Ministry down. McIlwraith had reason to feel secure.

REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

The most distinctive feature of the Elections was the

35. Gov. Dispatches to Sec. of State for the Colonies (Conf), June, 1893.

great success of the Labour Party. Their success was, however, tempered by its regional nature. Of the sixteen members returned, seven were from North-western electorates (Kennedy, Leichhardt, Charters Towers, Woothakata, Flinders and Croydon); and three were returned from the Central-west (Clermont, Barcoo, Burke). Maranoa, also carried by Labour, was west of the Diving Range. Two Labour members were returned from Brisbane electorates, and one each from Gympie, Cambooya and Toowoomba.

The excellent results in the North were due to several factors. To some extent, the rise of labour was a reaction against the separation movement, which appeared to many workmen as simply a pretext under which coloured servile labour would be introduced.³⁶ The association of the planters with the separation movement, Griffith's skilful use of anti-black labour sentiment, and the direct link of the planters with the National Party all contributed to this impression. Griffith's actions, in 1892, tended to convert many former Liberals into supporters of the Labour Party.

A second factor of major significance is that many electorates won by labour were mining constituencies - Croydon, Woothakata, Gympie, Charters Towers were actually

36. Bolton, G.C., A Thousand Miles Away (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1963), p.193.

gold-fields, while Flinders, Kennedy and Clermont contained the major fields of Ravenswood, Cloncurry and Clermont.

This direct link between working class radicalism and the mining industry has been analysed by June Stoodley.³⁷ It was particularly centred in Charters Towers, which was described by the Worker in 1891:

[Charters Towers] as the most settled and concentrated place necessarily gives decided tone to the whole North Country Unionism at Charters Towers, ~~after~~ all has been said that can be said after local jealousies, means really unionism in North Queensland.³⁸

To a certain extent, mining areas had always been centres of Liberal-radical strength so that in Charters Towers, Labour replaced Opposition rather than Ministerial candidates. In this seat, R.J. Sayers ran as an Independent, in complete opposition to the McIlwraith Government. His platform was a radical one, including repeal of the Immigration Act and coloured labour, the state ownership of all railways, reservation of all minerals and the right to mine on private property with compensation. Along with a general support for separation, Sayers also advocated two favourite labour platforms, a land tax and one man one vote.³⁹ That he was

37. Stoodley, J., The Queensland Goldminer in the 19th Century" (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1964)

38. Worker, 5.9.91.

39. Northern Miner, 20.4.93.

relegated to third place, six hundred votes behind Dunsford, indicates the complete dominance of Labour. In this election, however, most Opposition candidates avoided the mining electorates, thus leaving the field clear for a straight-out battle between Labour and the Ministry.

Labour strength in the mining areas was weakest at Mount Morgan and Gympie, as well as in the South-eastern coal district of Bundamba. In 1888, Glassey had won Bundamba, primarily because of a split Opposition vote. Opposed in 1893 only by Thomas, a local mine owner, Glassey failed to retain his seat. This indicates the strength that mine owners could muster in small mining electorates. According to the Worker, Glassey's defeat was attributed to Thomas's threat to close the mines unless elected.⁴⁰ While this rumour may have had some effect, Glassey's defeat was brought about rather by the far greater resources commanded by his opponent. Mount Morgan is a better illustration of the power of owners and managers, and the growing split between Labour and capital. The Worker maintained that "of all the elections in Queensland, none equalled Mount Morgan for intimidation".⁴¹ In 1893, McCarthy, standing in the Labour

40. Worker, 20.5.93.

41. Worker, 10-6.93.

interest against Director A.J. Callan, was dismissed after the election. There were constant reports of intimidation and lack of secrecy in the ballot. On the other hand, Stoodley points out that the Company was particularly mindful of the safety of employees. W.R. Hall, a personal friend of Griffith, was particularly popular with the miners, and is described by Stoodley:

One gains the impression of a paternal despot governing Mount Morgan kindly but rigidly; one facet the provider of comforts and amenities, the other an autocrat very likely to resent union organization and action as disloyalty and ingratitude. This reading may perhaps explain the paradox of the Company's attention to the welfare, and yet apparant restriction of the political independence of its employees.⁴²

It would appear then that party representation may be partly defined in regional terms. The Darling Downs returned three opposition candidates and two Labour representatives from eight seats; the mining areas were predominantly Labour; the inner urban and manufacturing areas were primarily Ministerial. The greatest areas of Ministerial strength were the Northern coastal areas,⁴³ centres of the sugar industry, the Brisbane metropolitan area, the South-eastern farming belt and Wide Bay.

42. Stoodley, J., op.cit., p.399.

43. One exception, at least until 1893, was Cairns, not so much confined to sugar production.

That the Darling Downs was predominantly a centre of political radicalism was the result of the long struggle of the selectors and small businessmen against the overriding influence of the squatters. That it remained a Liberal stronghold after this influence had faded, as it had by 1890, is probably the result of two factors - the entrenchment of personalities actively engaged in Downs politics, and the neglect shown by the Coalition towards the agricultural industry. Moreover, with land more equally divided, Labour was not as militant on the Downs as it was further west.

In the south-east, the farming areas exhibited similar conditions of land equality. But this area remained with the Ministerialists because it lacked the tradition of radicalism and also received more government patronage. A third factor was the lack of an Opposition press apart from the Worker, of the standard of either of the Downs Opposition newspapers, the Toowoomba Chronicle and Warwick Argus.

In the metropolitan electorates, labour and opposition candidates fared badly. Some of this may have been due to the plural vote. McDonnell, Labour candidate for Fortitude Valley, claimed that 500 votes were cast against Labour by absentee landlords.⁴⁴ The failure in metropolitan areas is

44. Sullivan, R., 'Early Labour in Queensland with Special Reference to Albert Hinchcliffe' (M.A. Qual. Thesis, U. of Q. 1969), Ch.5, p.20.

however explainable in less specific terms. Lacking the special characteristics of mining and farming areas, the metropolitan businessman could only fear the radicalism of Labour. Many former Liberal voters could not vote Labour, and with such a small Opposition, were left with little alternative but to vote for McIlwraith. Moreover, McIlwraith's financial reputation would have swayed many of those voters who were severely hit by the closing of the banks. Despite the enormous prestige of Sir Charles Lilley, the Opposition could field no candidate with the financial ability, real or supposed, of McIlwraith.

A CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT

That there was no formal Liberal-Labour alliance probably did not affect the result. The 1893 Elections had shown that, despite all evidences of political dishonesty on the part of the Government, the electors, suffering from empty pockets, were not prepared to accept an alternative. The Labour party had emerged with tremendous regional strength, the Opposition had managed to retain seven seats, but it was the Ministry which emerged victorious. Perhaps the Toowoomba Chronicle best described the new Government, which was to hold office until 1903:

Coalition cannot be decently applied to it. It is purely and simply conservative, and conservative in its worst sense.... It is the old National Party revived, with renegade Liberals thrown in to catch the votes of the groundlings.⁴⁵

45. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.3.93.

SECTION THREE - THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCYCHAPTER 13THE FIRST NELSON GOVERNMENT

The 1893 Election had destroyed any semblance of Coalition Government in Queensland, a development which had already been hastened by the elevation of Griffith to the Chief Justiceship in 1892. Political life was in the future to exhibit a new bipartisan division, following three years of confusion. The solidarity of the sixteen Labour members, combined with a consistent Opposition bloc, meant that effective opposition was possible. Between the two election years of 1893 and 1896, the Government, first under the leadership of McIlwraith and then under that of Sir Hugh Muir Nelson, was defeated on several occasions, but at no stage was it possible for Opposition and Labour to combine, with the result that there was little defection from Government to the Remnant Opposition, which at no stage seemed likely to gain power.

The period may be described as one of general political stability, characterized by an enormous amount of "roads and bridges" legislation, as the Government continued to

answer the needs of Queensland industry, which had only partially recovered from the effects of depression. To other, non-economic demands, the Government maintained a deaf ear. It was also a period of continued labour unrest, culminating in the 1894 Shearers Strike and an incredible piece of repressive legislation called the Peace Preservation Act. The continued hostility on the part of a reactionary Government towards labour activity, only tended to strengthen the resolve of Labour Parliamentarians to remain an independent force within the political framework, and to resist Opposition overtures towards Coalition.

THE DEMANDS OF INDUSTRY AND ITS PRESSURE GROUPS

Of all Queensland industries, pastoralism was the most organized, and most insistent in its demands. Its demands moreover were those most promptly answered. Sugar too, which had improved since 1892, was also given encouragement, while agriculture ran a poor third in the battle for Government assistance.

While the Pastoralists Association had come into existence in response to challenges from trade unionism, its members had decided to use it as an instrument of pressure in the legislative field. According to Ranson, one time Secretary of the U.P.A., "it was found that the Government of that day

was not averse to having some competent authority to whom it could look for information from the practical point of view in regard to any legislation proposed for submission to Parliament".¹ The introduction of a Bill to Encourage the Manufacture and Export of Beef and Dairy Produce was largely the result of pressure from the U.P.A. This Bill placed a tax on stock, the proceeds of which were to be placed in a loan fund for the establishment of meat and dairy processing works.² The legislation received a mixed reception. Pastoralists situated near ports where meatworks would be built preferred this to either a bonus system or guarantees. Those in the far west felt that a guarantee system was preferable, whereby pastoralists could avail themselves of Government aid only if they wished.³ While the Encouragement Bill was all inclusive, the Toowoomba Chronicle regarded the Bill as aimed exclusively at the pastoral industry:

It may, and we hope it will, have a beneficial effect in providing some outlet for our surplus meat supply, but as regards the encouragement of dairy produce, we are sadly afraid the results would be the reverse of encouraging.⁴

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1. Ranson, F., A History of the United Graziers Association in Queensland. (Typescript, U.G.A., Brisbane), p.36.
 2. The tax was to be levied on all sheep and cattle depastured in Queensland at the rate of 15/- per 100 cattle and 1/6 per 100 sheep.
 3. Warwick Argus, 15.8.93.
 4. Toowoomba Chronicle, 24.8.93.

The sugar industry had benefited from the reintroduction of coloured labour, and received further aid in the sugar works Guarantee Act, which provided a guarantee on a ~~£~~for ~~£~~ basis on all milling works constructed. But the agricultural industry, which had always been the poor relation of the four primary industries received little government assistance, except where this coincided with the aid given to the pastoral industry, such as remission of rents on construction of rabbit-proof fencing.

THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIES

The period saw a tendency towards far greater organization on the part of the producing industries. This may be attributed, directly or indirectly, to the needs created by the depression. The development of labour organization may be seen as partly a response to depression, and the formation of the U.P.A. was in reaction to the growth of unionism. The Queensland Farmers Alliance⁵ may also be seen as the result of declining prosperity. The Alliance was seen as a pressure group because "for the first time, the utterances of those who believed in pressure politics on a sectional basis and conducted by farmer representatives were taken seriously by

5. See above, Ch.10.

the majority of Downs settlers."⁶ The radicalism of the alliance precluded it from achieving the success of the U.P.A. Farmers had never been solid supporters of Conservative Government in Queensland; more often than not they had supported the old Liberal Party, and now were to be found in opposition. The Sugar Industry too had its own organizations. The Pioneer River Farmers Organization was primarily an organization of the sugar planters. The Mackay Sugar Journal had observed in May 1892 "the necessity of some form of combination amongst growers, manufacturers, and others interested in sugar is gradually forcing itself upon the people who at present are acting singly, or in small coteries, in the different sugar districts."⁷

POLITICS AND THE PRESSURE GROUPS

Some of the pressure groups were overtly political, such as the United Pastoralists Association and to a lesser extent the Farmers Alliance, while others professed to be non-political, as advocated by the Sugar Journal:

The Sugar Journal is absolutely indifferent to party politics, its sole desire being to assist such measures as will lead to the protection and expansion of our tropical industries.⁸

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6. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector, Storekeeper (Sydney U.P., 1968), p.72.
 7. Mackay Sugar Journal, I, IV, 1892, p.61.
 8. Ibid., II, I, 1893, p.1.

However, the Pioneer River Farmers Association was very hostile to labour objectives, and many Conservatives feared such organizations as the Farmers Alliance. The Darling Downs Gazette argued that:

Farmers should look to assistance within themselves and not to Parliament. The former resolve is noble and the latter contemptible. The one will land the country in peace and prosperity, the other precipitate it into anarchy and misery.⁹

Few producers agreed with this point of view. The A.P.R. indicated that pastoralists had no hesitation in appealing to the Government or its agencies. It called for the Railway Commissioners to build freezing works at depots to facilitate meat export:

The contention that it is a matter for private enterprise is no doubt a sound one, but in the present exceptional conditions ... it is believed that unless the matter is taken up by the railway authorities, it may lie in abeyance for years.¹⁰

Just as the pastoral industry relied on its parliamentary representatives to propagate its views, agriculture was also represented. The members from farming communities did, to some extent, form a group which cut across party distinctions. In 1894 they had formed themselves into a Parliamentary Agricultural Union, which met weekly in order

9. Darling Downs Gazette, 3.10.91.

10. A.P.R., IV, II, p.59.

to discuss matters affecting the agricultural industry.

Its members included eight Ministerialists, three Oppositionists and two members of the Labour Party.¹¹ The group, according to the Courier, was a useful innovation:

The union of members who represent farming constituencies will be able to render valuable assistance to the industry if it is left clear of party passion and aims.¹²

Despite this promising beginning, however, party cleavage was becoming too great for combination along these lines.

J.V. Chataway, a future Minister for Agriculture, addressing the Pioneer River Farmers Association, lamented the lack of Government interest in agriculture and advised farmers to build up a political organization. But, he continued, this should be "bitterly hostile" to Labour.¹³ Labour attitudes were not always conducive to rapport with the farmers. The Queensland Times indignantly reported Mat Reid's remark that if the farmers put in as many systematic hours of work as the man in town, they would be in a 10% better position than they are now. The Ipswich newspaper commented: "The member for Toowong and his colleagues in the Labour Party will scarcely advance their project of "capturing the farmer" by

11. Ministerialists: Stevens, Grimes, Cribb, Armstrong,
Allan, G. Thorn, Thomas, Lord.
Opposition: Groom, Morgan, Plunkett.
Labour: Daniels and King.

12. Brisbane Courier, 1.8.95.

13. Ibid., 6.2.95.

that sort of talk",¹⁴

McILWRAITH AND THE PASTORALISTS

The strength of the Queensland pastoralists is illustrated by the stormy history of the Railway Border Tax Bill introduced by McIlwraith early in the session of 1893. The Bill was the outcome of differences between the Queensland and New South Wales Railway Commissioners. N.S.W. officials had instituted a system of lower freight rates, and had attracted considerable Queensland traffic. McIlwraith, by placing a tax on all outgoing produce, hoped to put a stop to this practice which was depriving Queensland lines of much needed revenue.

It was apparent that Ministerial members from southwestern areas, where most pastoralists used the N.S.W. lines, would oppose the Bill, and the Premier prepared for a tough battle. He was to win by only the barest of margins. Debate on the Bill was protracted. Most of those opposed to the Bill purported to oppose it on principle. John Leahy argued that, "This is not a railway tax. It is a wool tax ... if a wool tax is desirable, why not tax the whole of Queensland. Why penalize a few people?"¹⁵ J. Hoolan, leader of the Labour Party, took a similar line:

14. Queensland Times, 28.6.94.

15. Q.P.D., LXX, (1893), p.151.

... as a measure of taxation it must be condemned by every fair minded person, seeing that it applies only to a few persons, and not to the whole colony, or to the whole of those engaged in the particular industry concerned.¹⁶

The vote on the Bill resulted in a 29-29 draw. Governor Norman attributed the close vote to the fact that all the non-Ministerialists voted together, joined by some Ministerialists, with several Government supporters abstaining. Of those Ministerialists who did not vote, Hamilton, Foxton, Bell, Chataway and Dalrymple were in the precincts of the House, and therefore had refused to vote.¹⁷ Ministerialists voting with the Opposition were Agnew, Murray, Phillips, Crombie and Allan. Independents Leahy and Harding voted with the Opposition and Archer and Callan abstained.

McIlwraith had already indicated that he regarded the issue as a party question, and so announced his resignation. The Governor however was "determined to decline as far as I could do so to accept the resignation of Sir Thomas McIlwraith."¹⁸ With the inexperience of the other major party in the House, Labour, and the smallness of the Opposition, no alternative Government could be found, and McIlwraith proceeded to do his utmost to push the Bill through. The

16. Ibid., p.163.

17. Warwick Argus, 8.7.93.

18. Gov. Conf. Despatches to the Sec. of State, 13.7.93.

near destruction of the Government rallied Ministerial supporters, and Dalrymple, Callan, Thorn and Petrie came to the rescue of the Ministry. Commenting on the events, the Courier drew attention to the composition of the House:

The incident brings to light the inconvenience of the House being split up into distinct sections, only one of which is entitled to the designation of a parliamentary party. The Labour group has the numbers, but not the experience or the leadership. The remnant of the old Opposition is helpless even for effective criticism, although they have able leaders. The other section comprises the Central members, the majority of whom express Ministerial sympathies, except on the question of separation.¹⁹

This incident, while not of great significance in itself, illustrated the ability of the Government to control fractious supporters, and the extent to which it relied upon the pastoral vote. If once that vote was alienated, it would have scant hope of survival, even with the House still in such a fluid state.

NON-ECONOMIC DEMANDS - EDUCATION

While the Queensland Government was quick to recognize the need for state aid to some sectors of Queensland industry, non-producing fields were neglected in the allocation of moneys. The depression was affecting the education system as

19. Brisbane Courier, 6.7.93.

well as other areas of social life. In 1893, the Queensland Parliament had reduced the education vote from £20,000 to £10,000. In order to meet this vote, "the classes for the instruction of teachers in drawing, kindergarten and drill were done away with; children under the age of six were no longer admitted; the number of grammar school scholarships reduced from 120 to 52 ... the allowances of teachers were considerably lowered, and this diminution was additional to the special 10% deduction from the salaries of all civil servants; and promotions in classification were arrested."²⁰

Understandably, the Queensland teachers felt they were being singled out for excessively harsh treatment. The Queensland Teachers Union, formed in 1889, rapidly became severe critics of the Government, attracting considerable support from those interested in Queensland education. This attempt to "retrench education" was typical of the Government's complete indifference to matters other than economic development and labour militancy. Calls for a system of State secondary and tertiary education fell on deaf ears. In 1895 O'Connell moved in Parliament that superior schools be established. This meant that children in areas where there were no grammar schools could benefit from higher education.

20. Q.V.P., II, (1894), p.564.

The Government reacted halfheartedly to the affirmative vote received on this occasion. An amendment Act was introduced, which increased the number of secular subjects which might be taught in fifth and sixth grades, under the control of the Governor in Council. Even this concession was disapproved by some members. Battersby maintained that, "my contention is that if we confined ourselves to teaching the "three R's" in State schools, we would be doing all that is necessary; parents who wish their children to be taught more than that should pay for it themselves. The sooner the Government recognize that this is the principle they ought to adopt, the better for the taxpayers of the colony".²¹

Similar arguments attended debates surrounding the establishment of a University in the Colony. Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Charles Lilley had long promoted the cause of tertiary education, and university extension had been a politico-educational topic for nearly two decades. But it was to no avail. Tertiary education suffered the same fate as other fields of education. During the Nineties, it was also confronted by labour hostility. In 1898, Glassey illustrated the attitude of the majority of his party: "the establishment of a university would merely benefit those who

21. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.999.

are in a position to give their children a higher education in some other part of the world".²²

Throughout the Nineties, then, the needs of education were ignored. The Government was evidently satisfied with the system as it stood. The system of Grammar Schools was felt adequate for the needs of the colony in the field of higher education. Under the provisions of the Grammar Schools Act, a grammar school could be established in any area where a sum of not less than £1000 had been raised locally. The Governor in Council could authorize a subsidy equal to the amount raised. Secondary education then was regarded as the responsibility of private individuals.

THE QUESTION OF STATE AID TO DENOMINATIONAL SCHOOLS

The private schools of Queensland, existing alongside those of the State, had also been affected by the depression, and some of the denominations again began to agitate for state aid. This period saw a revival of the demands for state aid on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, and for religious instruction by the other denominations. The education issue had been settled in 1880, when, in accordance with the 1875 Education Act, all State aid had been withdrawn from Church schools. Provision had been made for Ministers

22. Q.P.D., XXLIX, (1898), p.3.

of Religion to visit the State Schools for the purposes of religious instruction, but the idea had never been popular and had been attended only by apathy. In 1894, the Inspector General of Education reported that "there is no stir in regard to biblical education, except in some of the Church Courts; apparently, those who would like to see the Religion of the Bible taught in our schools ... are too hopelessly in the minority to secure a hearing for their views in the political arena".²³ Nevertheless, the Bible in State Schools League had been formed in 1891, and its activities steadily increased throughout the decade. The "free compulsory and secular" system of education was well established by the Nineties, but in 1895, the Roman Catholic Church made clear its determination that the State should pay a subsidy for the secular instruction carried out in Church schools.

In this aim, the Catholic Church was opposed by all other denominations. In January 1895, Anglican Bishop Webber, stated:

For the Government of Queensland to make grants to denominational schools would be to go back on the whole principle which distinguished the Australian from the English system of education. The English is for the State to subsidize; in Australia the State undertakes the work of education.²⁴

23. Q.V.P., II, (1894), p.613.

24. Brisbane Courier, 3.1.95.

Despite their opposition to State aid, it was becoming clear by 1895 that the Protestant denominations were dissatisfied with the system as it stood. Throughout the period, the Bible in State Schools League tried to reconcile differing opinions among the various groups, and their failure to achieve unanimity was partly the reason for the failure of their campaign in the Nineties. The denominations simply could not agree about the type of instruction or the time in which it should be given.

Throughout the decade, the Government turned a deaf ear to the demands of both Catholic and Protestant Churches. By 1901, the movement was beginning to lose patience, a development indicated by the Presbyterian journal, Austral Star:

If the Government persistently refuses to accede to the reasonable request of the majority of the electors of Queensland, viz. the members of the Anglican, Presbyterian and Wesleyan Churches, we will have no alternative but to join hands with those who demand a return to denominational endowment.²⁵

Nevertheless, the demand for religious instruction in state schools did not become an immediate political issue until the turn of the century. The potential for action remained, but it was the Catholic challenge to the education system

25. Austral Star, Sept. 1901.

which provided a sectarian reaction during the 1896 Election campaign.²⁶

PARLIAMENTARY LIFE

While the struggle for increased educational opportunities, either secular or religious, continued, it was a struggle conducted largely outside Parliament. Parliamentary life was characterized by the growing experience of the Labour Party, the determined resistance of the Opposition to complete loss of identity, and the entrenched conservatism of the Ministerialists. The period was for the most part fairly uneventful, but one sequence of events brought the Queensland Parliament under Australia-wide scrutiny. These events were described by the Warwick Argus in October 1894:

Neither the Government nor the country can be congratulated on the character of the proceedings in Parliament last week.... Ministers brought down a measure to preserve the peace ... by which means, no other British colony, so far as we are aware, has ever yet found it necessary to employ.²⁷

Drastic words indeed. And yet the measure the journal described, the Peace Preservation Bill, remained a shameful blot on Queensland Statute Books. It had been brought down as a result of events during the 1894 Shearers strike,

26. See below, Ch. 14.

27. Warwick Argus, 22.10.94.

and while it was never put into operation, it illustrated the reactionary nature of the Queensland Government.

THE 1894 STRIKE

In September 1894, the Australian Pastoralists Review observed that "the feeling of depression in pastoral circles is, at the present time, more intense than has been the case for many years".²⁸ There are several reasons for this - the breakdown of American tariff negotiations, shearing trouble, and static wool prices. It surprised no one when the pastoralists proved as intransigent towards the unions as they had in 1891. At the beginning of the year, the A.P.R. had made its attitude very clear, when it had warned that "the maintenance of union on the part of the pastoralists was never more necessary. To be prepared for war is, under the present circumstances, the first condition of peace".²⁹

Pastoralists were therefore well prepared for trouble when they published the new shearing agreement. The Agreement included a new clause which gave the shed overseer much more authority than he had previously exercised. He could interpret the rules of the agreement and could decide

28. A.P.R., IV, 7, 1894, p.1.

29. Ibid.

whether sheep were, or were not, "wet". Shearers believed that shearing wet sheep would lead to arthritis and that the decision should remain with them.³⁰ A second contentious article was the discharge system whereby the employer, the shearers feared, could use the reference system to blacklist unionists they considered dangerous.³¹ Even the Courier felt the pastoralists were being needlessly intransigent on this issue:

The doubtful point in the situation is the apparent indisposition of the squatters to entertain a proposal for a conference. A request for one was made as long ago as January, but it cannot be considered by the Queensland Pastoralists Council until June, and even then it must be remitted to the Federal Council for decision. This delay does not look well.³²

The strike of 1894 began in late June, after the U.P.A., two months after the Courier's editorial, had again refused to confer with the A.L.F. The strike did not last as long as its counterpart in 1891, but was marked, if possible, by even more bitterness. The pastoralists were in a strong position and were not seriously affected by the strike, particularly as it was not as widespread as that of 1891. The strike was officially called off on 26th September 1894.

30. Brisbane Courier, 20.4.94.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 26.4.94.

The Government again proved as partisan as in 1891. Instead of employing the Army, it used the police, and under Tozer's Instructions to Justices of the Peace and Police the forces of the law were given almost unlimited powers of arrest at the slightest sign of trouble. The Sydney Daily Telegraph described the instructions as a "ghastly official announcement" and continued:

Not even in the most autocratically governed country of Europe has a more cold-blooded incitement to take human life been issued with official sanction.³³

THE PEACE PRESERVATION BILL

Tozer's instructions were followed by legislative legitimization in the form of the Peace Preservation Act, introduced on 5th September, 1894. It gave the Government power to arrest any man on the grounds of suspicion and to hold him, without trial, for thirty days with a provisional warrant, or for two months with a special licence. Clause 11 prevented a man from refusing to answer questions on the grounds that he might incriminate himself.

The Bill produced extraordinary scenes in the Assembly. Labour members, Browne, Dawson, Dunsford, Reid, Turley and McDonald were suspended for disorderly conduct, and were

33. Reported in the Worker, 8.9.94.

voluntarily followed out of the House by their colleagues. The stormy passage of the Bill through Parliament showed that the labour members were still too inexperienced to be a maximally effective political force. Together, the Opposition and Labour members could perhaps have amended the Bill out of existence. By allowing themselves to be suspended, the Labour Party allowed the Government to gag the Bill through the House, which together, the opposition could have prevented.

The Bill, and the proceedings which accompanied it, were regarded by many Queenslanders as being contrary to the traditions of British justice and parliamentary practice. The Warwick Argus was of the opinion that "the expelled members were denied the rights clearly contemplated by the Standing Orders of the House and established by precedent ... the question ... ought to be taken to the Supreme Court."³⁴ Nelson defended the actions of the Speaker and the Government in a letter to Governor Norman. He accused the Labour Party of "flagrant obstruction" and continued that he failed to see any grounds for legitimate complaint.³⁵ Opposition members, Drake, Boles, Groom, Morgan, Powers and

34. Warwick Argus, 18.10.94.

35. Nelson to Norman 25.10.94 (Premiers Dept. Q.S.A.).

William Thorn consistently opposed the Bill, and all except Boles signed, with the Labour members, a petition to the Governor requesting him to withhold assent to the Bill.³⁶ The Governor, however, felt that he was constitutionally unable to do so, and the Bill duly received royal assent.

LABOUR AND THE OPPOSITION

The Peace Preservation Bill had given evidence that there existed the possibility of a far greater degree of co-operation between the Labour and Opposition members. This, however, failed to reach any definite position of coalition. Prior to the introduction of the Bill, Glassey, as Leader of the Labour Party, had declined to accept Powers as leader of a combined Opposition. Labour was not prepared to accept the position of constitutional Opposition.³⁷ Powers had made every overture possible to promote such an alliance. In an address to his constituents he had said:

The Opposition was prepared to meet the Labour Party and sign a practical radical programme He could support all that was practicable, but if they wanted more than that, their remedy was in the next Parliament ... he condemned the principle of sending members to Parliament bound to the political platform of the A.L.F. and also subject to the dictation of that body.³⁸

36. Ibid.

37. Warwick Argus, 1.10.94.

38. Maryborough Chronicle, 9.6.94.

The Worker made it clear that it would countenance no such combination:

There must be no compromise either with the Opposition or the Government supporters Why should Labour coalesce ... the duty of the Labour Party is now more distinct than it ever was. It must give no quarter and take none.³⁹

Without some sort of Liberal-Labour coalition the likelihood of bringing the Government down was very distant indeed. The Opposition suffered from a lack of dynamic leadership. The Courier discussed alternatives;

There is in fact, no leader of the Opposition proper ... who is politically qualified for the leadership. Mr. Groom a veteran politician, though powerful on the platform and saturated with parliamentary practice has never been a good fighting man within the walls of the Assembly ... Mr. Powers ... shrewd, indefatigable and fluid, fails to command the intelligence of the House Perhaps a better lieutenant than Mr. Powers could not be desired by a natural leader.⁴⁰

FURTHER CHALLENGES TO THE GOVERNMENT PAYMENT OF MEMBERS

Payment of members had always been a ~~bi~~bipartisan issue in Queensland politics during the Eighties, and continued to be as the new ~~bi~~bipartisan division of the Nineties emerged. In 1892, the salaries of members had been cut, and in August 1893, the Government was defeated by seven votes on Hamilton's

39. Worker, 2.4.94.

40. Brisbane Courier, 16.4.94.

resolution: "That it was desirable to introduce a bill to amend the Payment of Members Act of 1890 and 1892". On this occasion seven Ministerialists crossed the floor, and four Independents voted for the motion.⁴¹ Most of the Ministerialists were from far distant electorates - Musgrave, Cook, Mackay and Normanby. While defeat on such a resolution did not constitute sufficient reason for resignation, the Government was bound, by custom, to introduce legislation along the lines suggested. It soon became obvious that the Nelson Government had no intention of acting upon majority opinion. According to the Government, it would be unfair if parliamentarians increased their salaries while those of most of the Civil Service had been cut. On the other hand, the Opposition felt that the Government resisted every measure which may have increased the strength of the Labour Party.

The question arose next session, when Hamilton introduced a Bill to increase payment of members. The Government was defeated a second time when the second reading was passed by 32 votes to 22, and on the third reading by 31 to 28. The second reading saw two more Ministerialists cross the floor -

41. Ministerialists were Battersby, Bell, Chataway, Hamilton, Murray, O'Connell, Duffy. Independents were Leahy, Curtis, Cadell and Harding.

Dalrymple (Mackay) and Duffy (Bundaberg). Even though the third reading had been passed, the Bill did not become law, as the Legislative Council rejected it by 24 votes to 2.

As this Bill was regarded by most members as a money Bill, the action of the Council was widely condemned on constitutional grounds. Ministerial journals defended the Council. The Queensland Times could see no flouting of the constitution:

Had the Bill been sent to the Upper Chamber by the Government, the Upper Chamber would naturally have been chary in refusing its passage into actual law, but it must be remembered that it did not emanate from the Ministry.⁴²

Few members agreed. Hamilton, with unusual tenacity, tried again, proposing that the increase be laid aside in the Estimates. After a fierce struggle, the Government carried the Estimates by 31 votes to 30. The threat of Nelson's resignation had brought some of the recalcitrant Ministerialists, O'Connell, Duffy and Battersby, out of Opposition ranks, and the numbers were increased by the presence of Tooth and Phillips. The Governor commented to the Secretary of State: "A very serious crisis involving dissolution or the resignation of Ministers was thus avoided".⁴³

42. Queensland Times, 15.10.94.

43. Gov. Sec. Despatches to Sec. of State for the Colonies 13.12.94.

THE POSITION OF THE NELSON GOVERNMENT

The course of the payment of members crisis shows very clearly that although the Opposition could defeat the Government with the aid of Ministerial leakage, the leakage was not reliable. The rebels who voted against the Ministry on the Railway Border Tax Bill and Payment of Members were not the same, and it cannot be said that there was a hard core of Ministerial dissent. Opposition within Government ranks was usually the result of pressure from the constituencies, or personal views on individual issues, but not of cleavages on political principles. This situation continued until 1896, but the last four years of the decade were to show a greater cleavage upon broad political principles resulting in the fall of the Ministry.

Despite the relative ease with which the Nelson Government held office, its first three years were characterized by a very marked lack of enthusiasm on the part of both public and press. The Warwick Argus commented in 1894:

The fact seems to be that in the absence of Sir Thomas McIlwraith his colleagues in the Ministry have but a very vague notion of what the policy of the Government will be during the next session ... and in the meanwhile, the colony must continue to wallow in the depths of depression.⁴⁴

44. Warwick Argus, 24.3.94.

The Courier, while giving general support to the Government, was concerned with the lack of direction shown, particularly in the field of public works.⁴⁵ The A.P.R. complained of the "indifference of the Government concerning the land laws and their administration, and railway rates".⁴⁶

The first two years of Nelson's Premiership had been far from inspiring, but the difficulties experienced during the depression had taught the public to prefer caution to experimentation. By 1896, the Queensland economy was showing signs of recovery and the forces of conservatism were becoming much more effectively organized. Whether economic improvement and remedial legislation would triumph over vacillation and the Peace Preservation Bill was to be shown during the General Election of 1896.

45. Brisbane Courier, 21.10.95.

46. A.P.R., VII, X, p.520.

CHAPTER 14THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1896

In May 1895, a new party had been formed in Queensland - The Progressive Democratic Party. Formed by parliamentarians known as the Remnant Opposition, its major aim was to gain support in the forthcoming General Elections. The Elections were held in early March, 1896, a month earlier than usual. All parties were by this time, fairly well prepared. The Elections was to prove that, once again, Queenslanders preferred a "safe" policy of general development to the challenge of change and reform presented by Labour and Opposition Parties. Once again, the Continuous Ministry was to be returned by a sizeable majority, in an election marred by the return of sectarianism so prevalent in Queensland political history.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

Paradoxically, it was the Labour Party which was least well prepared for these Elections. The decline in union membership after 1891 meant that Labour's funds were shrinking. The shearers' strike of 1894 had almost exhausted the coffers of the party, and Labour prepared for

the elections without an Executive Council and with a platform which had not been revised for over four years.¹ The growth of disunity within the Labour Party was manifest in the incipient hostility between the Central Executive and the Regional Councils. Moreover, there was considerable evidence of dissatisfaction among Labour members such as King and Hoolan, and dispute over the effectiveness of Glassey's leadership. The general disorganization of the party was in marked contrast to its appearance in 1893, and the plebiscite ideal had been dissipated by lack of funds. The members of Parliament and the Executive of the A.L.F. were thus responsible for the final selection of candidates and the management of the Election.

The monolithic unity of the party had been one of Labour's major electoral assets in 1893. In 1896, this unity, while far from destroyed, was definitely somewhat frayed. In 1896 also, Labour's attitude to the opposition had changed. In 1893, the Worker had welcomed and encouraged the cooperation of Sir Charles Lilley and Thomas Glassey. In sharp contrast, Andrew Fisher's Gympie Truth maintained that with the exception of Drake and Boles, the

1. Murphy, D., "The Changing Structure of the Party" in Murphy, Joyce, Hughes (eds.) Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969), p.95.

opposition was "merely the Government out of Office".²

In some ways, this deterioration of relations is difficult to understand. The official platform of the Progressive Democratic Party was radical, if somewhat vague:

1. Electoral Reform - Universal Suffrage, abolition of the plural vote and staggered elections.
2. Opposition to black and servile labour in any form.
3. Encouragement of Agriculture.
4. Equality of opportunity.
5. Democratic Administration.

Since 1894, the Opposition had been making overtures to the Labour Party.³ Most influential Labour Parliamentarians, however, were determined that Labour should remain completely independent in its political stance. Oppositionists were equally determined to remain an independent Liberal force inside Parliament. Neither side being prepared to compromise to the extent needed, co-operation remained beyond political realities. The resignation of Charles Powers in February, 1896, was evidence of the complete breakdown of negotiations. Powers, in his announcement, gave his description of the relations between the two parties:

2. Gympie Truth, 29.10.96.
 3. Dawson asserted that it was Labour which had made the first advances, to be repulsed by the Opposition. Maryborough Chronicle, 29.2.96.

I do not see how I can do the country any good by continuing in politics ... I would not support the present Ministry, or join a Labour Ministry, and we as an Opposition Party cannot come to any arrangement with those who are allowed to decide the matter for the Labour Party, or come within any reasonable distance of an arrangement about (1) a platform for the election (2) an agreement as to the seats to be contested (3) the formation of a party after to work out any policy ... I know that the only reason why the Ministry was not ousted from office last session was because the Labour Party was under the leadership of Mr. Glassey and because nothing short of the whole Labour programme at once will satisfy him ... the position the Opposition found they were expected to accept was absolutely absurd.⁴

On the breakdown of negotiations, Labour was insisting that in return for nine Opposition seats uncontested by Labour, the Opposition were to concede thirty-seven. Powers and his colleagues felt the conditions untenable and the Leader of the Opposition continued that "he wished it to be distinctly understood that whatever he had said that evening about the Parliamentary Labour Party, he sincerely hoped that the Labour members who had been in the House would be returned."⁵

The Opposition was thus to enter the elections as a separate political entity. Most Queensland journals felt

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

that the group was fighting a losing battle, particularly as they refused to take a stand on the issue of socialism. According to the Maryborough Chronicle the Opposition should take one side or the other.

The way out of his present predicament for Mr. Powers is to sign the hitherto repugnant pledge to the whole platform, or to find an honourable means of assisting the Government to thwart it.⁶

The Brisbane Courier was decidedly hostile:

Let the Opposition, following the now justified precedent of the late leader, make haste to efface itself.... The country at large will do well we think to look upon the Opposition as a dead party. Let it join the beloved ghosts of 1888. The two real parties with real policies are the Ministerialists and the Labour-Socialists. The choice that is to determine the political history of the next three years is between them.⁷

The Ministerialists had learned from the Labour success in 1893 and subsequent by-elections, and the Queensland Political Association was early in the field, selecting candidates and examining electoral rolls. The efforts of the Q.P.A. were often far from welcome. In the seat of North Brisbane, T.J. Byrnes received the endorsement of the Q.P.A. (of which Premier Sir Hugh Nelson was President) during a Cabinet meeting attended by several prominent members of the Q.P.A.⁸ The electors of North Brisbane,

6. Maryborough Chronicle, 8.8.95.

7. Brisbane Courier, 28.2.96.

8. Ibid., 11.3.96.

however, did not like this new way of selecting candidates. In reply to the selection of Byrnes and Kingsbury by the Q.P.A., they requisitioned Thomas Macdonald-Paterson, and the Mayor of Brisbane, Robert Fraser. Nelson, in the next round of the battle, indicated that although the two were standing as Ministerialists, he did not regard them as supporters of the Government. According to the Week:

The electors of Brisbane North, who hold the strongest position of any electorate in Queensland are told that the Premier will disfranchise them, or will nullify their choice if they elect Messrs. Macdonald-Paterson and Fraser.⁹

Thus, North Brisbane was to be contested by four Ministerial candidates - two selected by the traditional method of requisition, and two supported by the Premier and the Queensland Political Association.

THE ISSUES

Some issues, grounded in executive decisions of which Parliament knew little, tended to overshadow the formal manifestos of the major politicians. The Clifton Lands Transaction, the activities of the Q.P.A. and the Government's handling of the Queensland National Bank provided much ammunition for the Opposition forces. Overshadowing other

9. Week, 20.3.96.

issues too, was the ugly ~~mien~~ of sectarianism which was to play a significant part in these elections.

The Premier opened his campaign with a Manifesto to the electors of Murilla. The government programme was not designed to capture the imagination, but it was a sound and safe exposition, buttressed by the anti-socialist spirit in which it was conceived. The major elements in the Manifesto were:

1. A refusal to enter the Anglo-Japanese treaty on the grounds that it would interfere with colonial trade, and make impossible the prohibition of the importation of Japanese Labour.
2. A revision of the Customs Tariff.
3. A Bill to facilitate the entry of Queensland into the Commonwealth.
4. No change in the Education Act.
5. Simplification of the Land Laws.
6. A refusal to abolish the property vote.¹⁰

The Labour Manifesto, incorporating the 1892 Platform,¹¹ attacked the Government on the Mirani-Cattle Creek Railway, the Clifton Lands and the Q.N.B. Labour and the Opposition were also unanimous in the condemnation of the date of the

10. Brisbane Courier, 25.2.96.

11. See above, Ch. 12.

elections and the continued use of staggered elections as a political manoeuvre.¹² The major issues of the election then were Education, Government misdemeanours alleged by its opponents, the tariff and the threat of Japanese Labour entering the colony under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

Education policy in Queensland had always been interwoven with the theme of sectarianism, and the election campaign proved no exception to the rule. The question had been sparked off by the Roman Catholic Church and its challenge to the education system. The period between 1893 and 1896 had seen a revival of demands for state aid to denominational schools by the Roman Catholics, and for religious instruction by other denominations. Queensland educational policy had been settled in 1880, when in accordance with the 1875 Education Act, all state aid had been withdrawn from Church Schools. Provision had been made for ministers of religion to visit the state schools for the purposes of religious instruction, but the idea had never been popular and was attended only by apathy. In January 1896, the Pastoral Letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of Australia in Second Plenary Council Assembled was published in the Brisbane Courier. The heads of the

12. Worker, 7.3.96.

Roman Catholic Church showed tremendous hostility to the state education system:

You, Catholic parents, would not commit your children's education to teachers who make no secret of their wish to proselytise them. We can conceive of no Catholic parent so callous.... The Catholic child who is compelled to attend a secular non-Catholic school, not only runs risks to his faith; his morals may also be imperilled.¹³

This paranoid attitude was more than matched by the Brisbane Courier, in describing the letter as:

... an appeal to the country and the Government, or that part of it supposed to be amenable to Catholic authority, to turn its back on the State School, or inaugurate an antagonistic system ... it seems to us that on the eve of a general election, it is the bounden duty of the Government to say that it will uphold the State School No political considerations of the moment should be allowed to weigh against the obligation to promptly defend the character of the State School....¹⁴

The Press, however, appeared to take the issue more seriously than did the politicians. Discussing Nelson's attitude to it in his Manifesto, the Week commented "He has thrown down a marrowless bone - [to] be quarrelled over by two parties that are fast ranging themselves under two separate sectarian banners".¹⁵ The Queensland Political Association, formed by

13. Brisbane Courier, 3.1.96.

14. Ibid., 18.1.96.

15. Week, 28.2.96.

founder members of the Queensland Evangelical Standard and largely Protestant Temperance League,¹⁶ made it impossible for Catholic T.J. Byrnes to take a neutral stand by endorsing him for North Brisbane, a centre of the controversy. Nevertheless, while the education issue was a significant election theme, much of the virulence which might have accompanied it was dissipated. The religious political alliance so obvious during the Seventies and to a lesser extent, the Eighties, had definitely broken down with the general merger of political parties in 1890. Results in several electorates, however, may have been affected by the attendant sectarian feeling.¹⁷

Opposition policy is perhaps best indicated by W.H. Groom. Groom expressed approval of the Government's stand on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, opposed any drift to free trade, (clearly indicated in Nelson's Manifesto), called for substantial electoral reform and criticized both the timing of the elections and the muddled public works policy of the Government.

The elections were held in early March, about a month earlier than usual. Nelson argued that this was to avoid

16. Particularly Robert Bulcock, See above Ch. 1.

17. See below.

the clash with the close of the financial year, but according to the Toowoomba Chronicle: "The real reason why the elections are to take place immediately is ... to prevent those persons whose names were registered in the January Registration Courts from voting".¹⁸ The Chronicle amassed considerable evidence that the registrations could quite possibly effect results to the detriment of the Ministry, a fact certainly not missed by the Political Association. The table below indicates the more crucial electorates which would be effected.¹⁹

Electorate	Ministerial Majority 1893	January Registration
Carpentaria	3	34
Stanley	9	40
Bundaberg	21	56
Lockyer	28	41
Gympie (1)	29	41
Warrego	33	34
Carnarvon	37	51
Townsville (1)	62	98
Mitchell	68	75
Balonne	136	163

18. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.2.96.

19. Ibid.

The continued staggering of elections also came under attack. The first batch of elections included twenty-seven of the thirty government held seats.²⁰ T.J. Byrnes, for example, if defeated on a sectarian vote in North Brisbane, could always contest another seat. On the other hand, leading Opposition and Labour seats such as Toowoomba and Charters Towers, normally in the first or second batches, were now included in the third batch. These sorts of tactics, while fairly common during the Nineties, were rarely pursued with such open political dishonesty.

The Queensland Political Association also came under fire from another source. As early as 1895, questions were asked in Parliament concerning the activities of Robert Bulcock. On 7th August, Glassey asked the Colonial Secretary, Hugh Tozer, whether he had hired Bulcock to issue instructions to the electoral registrars with the object of purging the rolls. Receiving a denial, Glassey, the next day, produced a circular signed by Bulcock and Nelson which was sent to the electoral registrars. It suggested:

As we are anxious to have the rolls purged of all names that are not entitled to be thereon,

20. Carnarvon, South Brisbane, Herbert, Murilla, Bundaberg and Fortitude Valley were in the second batch, which Bundamba and Lockyer were in the third.

we have taken the liberty of requesting our friends to try to assist you by forwarding such information as they may be in possession of, and hope it will be of service.²¹

According to Powers, "The charge is that somebody outside the Government service has attempted to tamper with the electoral registrars of this colony, and that he has sent to them instructions different from those properly sent by the Colonial Secretary".²² In a purely party vote, the Government defeated Glassey's adjournment motion. Nevertheless, this incident is an example of the scope of the Q.P.A.'s activities. The Toowoomba Chronicle reported that an Electoral Registrar had received a telegram from the Association enquiring whether the January Registration lists were likely to favour the Government or the Labour Party.²³ Such activities pursued so openly, produced further evidence of the complete cynicism with which the Government conducted these elections.

In two other areas, Government actions gave its opponents much room for criticism - the Mirani Cattle Creek railway line²⁴ and the Clifton Lands transaction. The transaction had been carried through just prior to the election. The lands had originally been sold as small

21. Q.P.D., LXXIII, (1895), pp.511 & 532.

22. Ibid., p.533.

23. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.2.96.

24. See below, Ch. 16.

farming units on a system of deferred payments, the Clifton Estate at that time being owned by a syndicate headed by Parliamentarian M.B. Gannon. It was later taken over by the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company, of which McIlwraith was one of the Directors. At the time the Agricultural Lands Purchase Bill was passed, a special clause had been inserted covering the Clifton Estate, under which the Clifton farmers applied to the Government to buy back the land from the Investment Company. The Government would then re-sell it to the present owners as Crown Land. The Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that at the time the amendment was passed, negotiations with the Company were already under way.²⁵ The Courier felt that the insertion of the clause was illegal in the first place,²⁶ while the Worker was suspicious that the Government was acting solely in the interests of the Investment Company.²⁷ A.H. Barlow defended the Administration, arguing that the only alternative was the eviction of the farmers. The Clifton farmers, however, had not been mentioned the previous session, and the Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that "it is difficult to understand the secrecy shown in this matter,

25. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.2.96.

26. Brisbane Courier, 11.2.96.

27. Worker, 7.3.96.

and the manifest unwillingness of the Government to state the case in Parliament."²⁸

Despite the attempts of Labour and Opposition candidates to capitalize on these equivocal Government actions, the elections were determined by the tactics of the Ministry in stressing the danger of socialism, and the futility of trying to continue an Independent Opposition. A.H. Barlow pursued this line of attack. According to him, there could be only two parties in the Colony, "the party which would maintain the rights of the people to do that which was lawful in their own eyes, and the party who, either by open violence or concealed sympathy, must go on opposite lines."²⁹ As the campaign drew to a close, the Queensland Times commented that "never perhaps in the history of the colony have the issues been so clear and distinct as they are at the present election".³⁰ The Ministry constantly stressed that the Labour Party was a source of anarchy and to vote for Labour representatives would thereby be clearly unpatriotic.³¹

Local and secondary issues seemed subordinate to this one overriding theme. Labour appealed to the farmers, but

28. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.2.96.

29. Queensland Times, 8.2.96.

30. Ibid., 19.3.96.

31. Ibid., 17.3.96.

their land tax stand was not designed for this section of the population, particularly as Nelson promised them easier credit. Ministerial newspapers constantly attacked the danger of the land tax to farmers:

The farmers have never had any say in formulating the programme that the Labour Party wish to see carried into effect. The A.L.F. which practically controls the Queensland Labour Party, is made up of units whose interest it is to buy produce and commodities as cheaply as possible.³²

Nelson's promise to lighten the protective tariff may have had some effect on voting in the North,³³ but this would have been compensated by a decrease in the southern portion of the colony. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this issue materially affected the election.

THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign was marked by three major characteristics - the stress upon the dangers of socialism, the influence of sectarianism and the clear evidence of party disunity. The Opposition and Labour leaders attacked the Government as reactionary and Nelson as an opportunist. Groom was particularly scathing:

I believe in gentlemen sticking to their principles. I do not believe in a gentleman who makes a pretence - for it was only a pretence - of leading the Opposition, who goes to Goondiwindi, delivers a speech to his constituents, and tells them that

32. Queensland Times, 15.3.96.

33. See above, Ch. 3.

the Coalition Government are a miserable failure ... and then goes back to Brisbane, and two weeks afterwards becomes the locum tenens of the Premier and afterwards takes charge of the finances of the Coalition Government ... I say the Coalition ... has demoralized the public life of the colony.³⁴

The sectarian feeling which had been aroused by the education issue had been exacerbated by charges of sectarian bias in the public service. Two Roman Catholic Ministers - A.J. Thynne (Posts and Telegraphs); and T.J. Byrnes (Justice) - came under particular attack. Hugh Tozer denied any sectarianism was operative in the public service:

It had been said that Mr. Thynne had been guilty of sectarian unfair play. As a Protestant, and one who had worked with him, he said there was no scintilla of foundation for the charge.³⁵

It was the Government which was mainly disturbed by the issue as it stormed directly around two senior members. Moreover, the Ministry was also labouring under the disadvantage caused by the retirement of A.H. Barlow, compounded by a rumour of jealous rivalry between Byrnes and Tozer. Byrnes indeed was very unpopular with Ministerial journals, particularly due to his evinced determination to contest North Brisbane rather than Cairns.³⁶ Further evidence of general disunity came from the announcement that

34. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.3.96.

35. Queensland Times, 11.2.96.

36. Ibid., 10.3.96.

J.R. Dickson would stand as an Independent. The Courier felt this a quixotic move, but Dickson defended himself in a letter to the Courier:

If I felt assured that Mr. Nelson and his colleagues of today would personally conduct the administration of the country for the next three years ... and an Opposition with clearly defined views existed, then I admit that as an Independent member I would be but an isolated unit in the Assembly Am I ... to be condemned because I cannot subscribe myself to be a follower of the Government, of a Ministry which is itself about to change some of its members...?³⁷

Despite evidence of growing factionalism within the Ministry, the Labour Party had little to gain from it, because of growing disunity in their own ranks. The allegations made by Powers of the overweening influence of the Q.C.E. at the expense of Parliamentarians were not lost upon electors, particularly as both Robert King³⁸ and prestigious John Hoolan had refused to sign the pledge.³⁹ The Darling Downs Gazette rather gleefully reported Henry Daniels:

They [The Labour Party] were unfortunate in the choice of a leader, as Mr. Glassey lacked the qualifications essential in a leader, but the position of choosing him was forced upon the party He was certain that if Messrs Hoolan and Glassey were both returned to the

37. Brisbane Courier, 3.3.96.
 38. Queensland Times, 24.3.96.
 39. Maryborough Chronicle, 25.2.96.

next Parliament, the leadership would be offered to Mr. Hoolan but he was equally certain that Mr. Hoolan would refuse in favour of Mr. Glassey.⁴⁰

RESULTS

The results of the election show that despite a relatively uninspired and uninteresting programme, the Government was still able to persuade the electorate to choose the familiar rather than the unknown quantity - the Opposition. The Ministerialists gained 42 seats, Labour 20, the Opposition 6. There were two Independents (Leahy and Curtis) and one Farmers representative.

The most serious reverses suffered by the Government were in North Brisbane and Bundaberg. The defeat of Kingsbury and Byrnes showed that the public was not yet ready to accept extra-parliamentary organization in the form of the Q.P.A.⁴¹ Bundaberg, a strong black labour constituency, fell to Thomas Glassey. Sectarianism may have been partly responsible for the defeat of some Government candidates. All of the Ministerialists returned in the first batch of electorates were Protestants. Roman Catholics, Byrnes, Agnew, Plunkett, Duffy and Watson were defeated. Other factors however, probably contributed to

40. Queensland Times, 12.3.96 & Maryborough Chronicle, 12.3.96.

41. Byrnes later stood for Warwick, where the impregnable Arthur Morgan had retired from political life.

their defeat. The activities of Q.P.A. caused the defeat of Byrnes. There was a split Government vote in Fortitude Valley where Watson was defeated. The defeat of Duffy in Bundaberg was probably due to the strength of Glassey as an opponent. Plunkett was defeated by fellow Ministerialist R.M. Collins, who declared himself "not entirely opposed to state aid."⁴² Nevertheless, sectarian bias must have had some effect, for after the first batch of elections, from a population which was 1/4 Roman Catholic only three Catholics were returned - Keogh (L), McGahan (F.R.) and McDonnell (L). While the proportion of Catholics in the Assembly was at no time high, this was considerably lower than usual.

The pattern of labour representation remained similar to that of 1893. Twelve of Labour's seats were western constituencies, seven of these in the North-West. Two seats were won in the Central district, Rosewood was gained in the South-East, and there was a gain of one seat in the metropolitan area. Sitting members, Reid, Ogden, Wilkinson, and Fisher⁴³ were defeated. The defeat of Reid and Fisher was a serious blow to the party, as both were strong party men, and their defeat left the leadership unchallenged at

42. Brisbane Courier, 2.3.96.

43. Standing for Toowong, Townsville and Gympie.

a time when Glassey was becoming more and more unpopular in the party.

Given the hostility of both the Labour and Ministerial Press, Drake's Opposition made a remarkably good showing. While Maryborough was lost after the resignation of Powers, Drake was entrenched in Enoggera, Groom and Fogarty in Toowoomba, and Boles in Port Curtis. Bridges gained Nundah for the Opposition, and William Thorn retained Aubigny. McGahan (Cunningham) while standing as a Farmer's representative, could also be called an oppositionist.

On the whole then, Labour and Opposition parties had failed to make significant inroads into the strength of the Government, resting on a solid and unwavering southern vote. The election had shown that the two party system, which was gradually reappearing, was still far from consolidated. The defeat of Reid and Fisher, to give way to men like William Kidston, reinforced this, as the latter was far more favourable to co-operation with other parliamentary groups. The election also indicated that Queenslanders were not yet prepared for such an extra-parliamentary organization as the Q.P.A. The Week reflected this sentiment:

During the campaign just closed, the Political Association was very much in evidence. Electorates were dictated to ... they overreached themselves in many instances and as in

North Brisbane their own candidates were thrown back in their faces Surely there was enough evidence to be deduced from the results ... to convince the Premier and his friends that the public are decidedly of the opinion that such associations must cease to exist.⁴⁴

The elections over, the new members prepared to take their seats. The strength of parties had not altered to any significant extent. Yet the following years were to see a growth in party factionalism and a decline in Government popularity, to culminate in the formation of the first Labour Ministry under the leadership of Anderson Dawson.

44. Week, 14.5.96.

CHAPTER 15FOR WANT OF AN OPPOSITION

In July 1896, it must have appeared that the Continuous Ministry, which had scored such a decisive victory in the General Elections, could look forward to three years of power, uninterrupted by party strife. The economy had shown signs of considerable improvement. Sir Hugh Muir Nelson remained Premier, even though his imminent retirement was widely rumoured. The Opposition had failed to significantly increase its strength, and the Elections had shown considerable disunity within the Labour Party. All appeared calm and untroubled as the Ministry met the House. And yet, the period between 1896 and 1900 was to exhibit a growing factionalism, caused by discontents within Ministerialist ranks, a development which was to culminate in the accession to power of the first Labour Government Australia had experienced.

During the period between the 1896 Elections and 1899 the parliamentary alignment continued to exhibit a bi-partisan division between Labour and Conservatism, with the

hapless Remnant Opposition, unable to join either group. This Parliament however saw the number of members who constituted a "swinging vote" within the House grow larger and more coherent, creating a greater problem for the Government. There was also considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the public. In April 1898, the Warwick Argus observed:

The most remarkable feature of the situation in this colony is that the need for a strong and responsible opposition is as urgent as the necessity that the offices of Government be placed in capable hands.¹

Both major parties were beset with leadership problems. The Labour Party clearly was seething with dissatisfaction - and the 1896 Elections had shown that Thomas Glassey was losing his hold on the leadership of the party. He was opposed with especial fervour by those members who formed what Rayner called the "A.L.F. clique",² - Dawson, McDonald and Dunsford within the House, and Hinchcliffe, Reid and Seymour outside. They were not yet prepared to undertake the role of formal Opposition, and criticized Glassey's decision to do so. This decision was made easier by the fact that Tozer, as Acting Premier while Nelson was away in

1. Warwick Argus, 9.5.98.

2. Dalton, G. "An Interpretative Survey" in Murphy, Joyce, Hughes Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969)

England, adopted a far more conciliatory tone towards the Labour Party. Yet Tozer had been the instigator of the notorious "Instructions to the Police" during the 1894 Shearing Strike, and the Worker felt that Glassey was betraying the Labour movement by co-operating with such a man. In April 1897, the Gympie Truth led a bitter attack on several Parliamentarians:

Mr. King is one of a little band of Labourites, who, finding labour principles to stand in the way of Parliamentary promotion, are for keeping them out of sight as much as possible, consistent with the safety of their seats. They want nothing more than to be old time Liberals in action ... Mr. J.P. Hoolan is another of this little band - its leader probably.³

The Truth thus pointed to the main source of discord within the party - most older Parliamentarians had not been closely connected with the unions, and had entered Parliament while the strength of the Liberal ethos still survived. Many regarded themselves as partly Liberals, albeit Liberals more closely associated with the working men they represented. They represented the Labour Party, and remained staunch to Labour principles as they saw them, but they had little connection with the unions or the A.L.F. which aspired to extra-parliamentary control of the actions of Parliamentarians.

3. Gympie Truth, 30.4.97.

The Ministerialists found themselves in a not dissimilar position, with several discontented factions causing unrest. In February 1897, J.R. Dickson was appointed Minister for Railways.. This seemed a wise move, with the Premier attending the Jubilee celebrations in England. According to the Warwick Argus, "It became necessary that thought should be taken of what might befall the party in the absence of its leader, and precautions adopted to, as far as possible, prevent disaster. Thus the choice fell upon Mr. Dickson who outside might prove the most dangerous opponent of a headless Government".⁴ The appointment of Dickson, whose independent stance and position on the cross benches was well known, caused considerable stir within the party. Other, similar appointments added to the discontent. John Murray, invulnerable in the Central Queensland seat of Normanby, resented the appointment of A.J. Thynne, a member of the Council, as Minister for Agriculture. The appointments of William Allan and John Archibald to the Council were equally unpopular. John Leahy discribed the appointments as "scandalous".⁵ Many regions, notably Wide Bay and the Western areas, were not represented

4. Warwick Argus, 27.2.97.

5. Q.P.D., LXXVIII, (1897), O'Connell was equally scathing in his criticism of the appointments.

in the Council, whereas Allan and Archibald represented areas already well treated in Council appointments.⁶

It was expected, as the new session approached, that the Government would be received with some hostility by members on its own side. John Murray, during the address-in-reply "was particularly hostile, denouncing the land administration, the Minister and all his works, with a fervour which we believe was altogether genuine".⁷ The Western Champion, was of the opinion that in any move to censure the Government, Murray could rely on the support of Curtis, Fraser, Leahy and J.T. Bell. While these discontents appeared minor, they certainly weakened the Government in the eyes of the public, whose confidence had already been shaken by the Queensland National Bank revelations. The Western Champion observed that "many firm supporters of the Government in 1895 have had good reason to change their opinions concerning the honesty and efficiency of Sir Hugh Nelson and his colleagues".⁸ The Brisbane Courier indicated that the Government was losing ground even before the storm broke over the Queensland National Bank:

6. Warwick Argus, 29.6.97
 7. Western Champion, 13.7.97.
 8. Ibid., 11.1.98.

During last session, it lost much of its former hold on its own party and in the country. The loss was its fault and not its misfortune. Legislation proceeded on no definite plan resolutely adhered to It did not inspire respect The Government exists now more on the general want of confidence in their opponents than of confidence in themselves.⁹

THE BILL TO ENABLE FEDERATION

The attitude of the Government of the Federal Enabling Bill caused further accusations of vacillation from public and press. The question of federation however, also showed further evidence of disunity within Labour ranks, as well as among Ministerialists. The Federation Enabling Bill had been dragged through two sessions without agreement in the Assembly. When introduced by Nelson in 1896, the Bill had been regarded in a very apathetic light. Nelson had said:

It is not a question upon which the Government are in any way tied down, but it is a question upon which we ought to show a friendly feeling towards the whole of Australia.¹⁰

Many Ministerialists were demonstrably anti-federalist. Early in 1895, T.J. Byrnes had said "I cannot see that Queensland could gain any benefits from Federation at the present moment".¹¹ In 1899 McIlwraith had written to Cecil Palmer:

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9. Brisbane Courier, 21.3.97.
 10. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.135.
 11. Brisbane Courier, 15.2.95.

I think Jimmie Dickson a veritable prig ... he believes in Federation no more than I do, and yet for the sake of carrying federation while he is Premier, he stands at the head of it.¹²

Other less prominent Ministerialists opposed federation - representatives of the Northern Downs, Bell, McGahan and Thorn; Brisbane merchants, McMaster, Stephens and Fraser and some pastoralists.¹³

The attitude of the Premier was at best half-hearted, and if he had sincerely desired federation, he gave little indication of it. The Government also hindered the cause of federation by its insistence that the colony should have the right to use any method of securing the approval of the people, both in the election of candidates to the Conventions, and of Federation itself.¹⁴ The Courier took it for granted that Queensland would follow the other colonies, gaining such approval by a direct vote.¹⁵ This was not to be. When it was brought down, the Australasian Federation Enabling Bill made provision for the Parliamentary election of delegates to the Federation. When the inevitable amendment for direct election was proposed, Nelson threatened that the Bill would be withdrawn.¹⁶ Thus,

12. McIlwraith to Palmer, 2.6.99 (McIlwraith Palmer Papers, Oxley Library).

13. See above, Ch. 6.

14. Brisbane Courier, 19.2.95.

15. Ibid.

16. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.138.

the Ministry had assured that a non-partisan attitude to the Bill was impossible. According to Hoolan, "the Government seem to have some latent fear that if they fall in with the views of the adjoining colonies ... I may say, views to which they are indelibly pledged, certain dangerous demagogues and arch agitators might become councillors at this Convention".¹⁷ The Bill was carried by a purely party vote and the direct election amendment, made by Curtis, was defeated by 36 votes to 26.¹⁸ It was evident, however, that the Government had little intention of proceeding with the Bill, which was subsequently allowed to lapse.

The Bill, almost in its original form, was reintroduced in 1897. With the Federal Convention set down for September, the Government was expected to be more in earnest, and consequently determined anti-federalists were also expected to oppose the Bill. Once again an amendment incorporating direct election was moved, this time by Glassey. During the debate, a motion for adjournment was moved, for which Labour members, Glassey, Cross, Jackson and Stewart voted with the ayes. This immediately provoked a hostile reaction

17. *Ibid.*, p.153.

18. Dissenting were the Labour Party plus Dickson, Drake, Groom, W. Thorn, Fogarty, Armstrong, Macdonald-Paterson.

from the Worker which called for the resignation of the party's leader.¹⁹ The Gympie Truth also attacked Glassey:

It was known, almost for a certainty, that had the division been taken on Tuesday night, Mr. Glassey would have carried with him the majority of the House.... The Labour Party ... have good grounds of complaint against their leader. He committed them to the adjournment without consultation and by doing so, compelled them to flatly contradict him in division, and subject him to the humiliation of seeing his followers publicly repudiate his action.²⁰

The actions of Glassey hardly seemed to warrant such a vicious attack. Glassey, Stewart and Cross all defended their actions by appealing to standard procedure regarding adjournment time. McDonald and other Labour members, however, conscious that they might defeat the Government, were becoming impatient of the delays and wasted time which characterized the debate.²¹ It was obvious that the adjournment vote was used only as a pretext, and he was criticized only on the principle of tight party discipline, under which he was visibly beginning to chafe.

The motion for direct election was carried a week later by 36 votes to 28. Joining Opposition and Labour were Ministerialists Bell, Stephens, Fraser, Bartholomew, Petrie, Stumm, Smyth, Murray, Annear and George Thorn.²² Once again

19. Worker, 6.7.97.

20. Gympie Truth, 9.7.97.

21. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.217.

22. These men were mostly anti-federalists, hoping to force the withdrawal of the bill.

the Bill was withdrawn. This combination of Labour, Opposition and anti-federalists on the Government side defeated yet another Bill late in the Session, when Curtis moved yet another direct election amendment. This amendment was carried by 21 - 19 votes, although the size of the House indicates that interest in the Bill had flagged considerably. Once again the Bill was withdrawn, and once again, the charade culminated in the refusal of the Government to make any positive step towards federation.

THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP

Both major parties were faced with leadership problems during this period. Thomas Glassey was no longer the commanding leader he had been in the inexperienced days after 1893. He continued to maintain a tenuous hold on the leadership until 1899, although under constant attack from the more radical wing, led by Hinchcliffe, Reid and Fisher. There was a growing split between the two factions, as one, led by Dawson and Kidston, began to make tentative overtures towards Liberal groups in the House. More and more, Glassey began to appear only a figurehead and in 1899, he ceased any pretence of leading the party.

Factionalism within the Ministerialist Party however, had perhaps more far-reaching consequences. The anti-federalists were a splinter group within the party, and the

impending resignation of Nelson, to go to the Council, created further intrigue. There was no obvious successor. Tozer, Byrnes, Philp and Dickson all had some claim to the Premiership, while Dalrymple had an outside chance. The Warwick Argus reported that the Government would split in all directions if Byrnes rather than Philp were chosen to succeed Nelson.²³ There were also rumours that Tozer was planning to form a third party.²⁴ His appointment to the position of Agent-General in January 1898 lends some evidence to the view that Tozer was planning to fight the appointment of Byrnes, who acceded to the Premiership on 13th April, 1898.

The appointment of Byrnes was regarded by many Queenslanders as heralding a period of liberalization. The Toowoomba Chronicle remarked in 1899:

There can be no doubt that had he lived and put forward the democratic policy which he had privately confided to a few of his more intimate political friends he would undoubtedly have changed political parties.²⁵

His untimely death in 1898, however, left only an impression of unfulfilled promise, and there was little in his inaugural speech which indicated any liberalization. According to the

23. Warwick Argus, 16.2.97.

24. Ibid.

25. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.1.99.

Worker, "there is not a vestige of the Democratic programme which the public were led to expect".²⁶

While the appointment of Byrnes was a generally popular one with the public, several Ministerialists were disappointed with the allocation of portfolios. But the way had been well prepared for the appointment of Byrnes. According to the Mackay Mercury the resignation of A.J. Thynne would "certainly weaken the Cabinet by depriving it of one of its most courteous, shrewd and diplomatic members, but on the other hand it will relieve it of the accusation made at the last election ... that two powerful Ministers of one particular religious persuasion exercise a predominating and undue influence in the Government of the country".²⁷ The portfolio of Agriculture was then taken over by J.V. Chataway. Chataway was an acknowledged expert on tropical agriculture, but his appointment was primarily an attempt to placate those Northerners who felt that Philp, not Byrnes, should succeed Nelson.

Other individuals were no doubt disappointed. John Stephenson, proprietor of the Queensland Times, showed distinct hostility to the new Government. The appointment

26. Worker, 30.3.98.

27. Mackay Mercury, 6.1.98.

of John Murray as Minister for Railways received a mixed reception. Diehard Central Separationists saw it as just one more attempt to weaken the separation movement. Public and Press in Central Queensland, for the main part, saw the appointment as entirely beneficial for the district, and, exhibiting a provincialism which still characterized Queensland politics, the Western Champion observed, "We must make hay while the sun shines."²⁸ The appointment was not popular with southern representatives. William Armstrong, member for Lockyer, felt that Murray was consistently hostile to the farming industry, and publicly absolved himself of loyalty to Byrnes.²⁹ But according to the Warwick Argus in July 1898:

Mr. Byrnes ... appears to have managed to reunite the great bulk of the Ministerialists and the chances are he will have a working majority in the Assembly. The members for North Brisbane, Bulloo and Lockyer [30] may make some show of independence, but there is not the faintest chance that they will unite with the Labour Party.³¹

The opening of Parliament in 1898 saw some hope of a more progressive government programme. Although there was little in Byrnes' programme that was expected to prove contentious, there was hope that at least something

28. Western Champion, 30.4.98.

29. Ibid., 3.5.98.

30. Macdonald-Paterson, Fraser, Leahy, Armstrong.

31. Warwick Argus, 12.7.98.

constructive would be done. The previous two sessions had been barren of worthwhile legislation, and even so staunch a Ministerial journal as the Mackay Mercury had admitted that "the Government had not succeeded in pushing business through the Assembly as rapidly as it might have done".³² It was in this session that Glassey again assumed the role of Constitutional Opposition, and this was seen in many quarters as reducing the possibility of defection from Ministerial ranks.³³ The session promised to be productive, with the Government "evinced ... a readiness to adopt a policy of expansion when the proper time arrives".³⁴

The death of Byrnes in September, however, effectively removed any such possibility. Who now was to become Premier? Byrnes had only fractionally united the Ministerial factions, and it seemed unlikely that any other man could even achieve this small modicum of success. The field of candidates was narrowed down to three - Dickson, Dalrymple and Philp. Dalrymple's reputation as a "keen and sparkling debater" with a prodigious capacity for work³⁵ was well known, but it was thought unlikely that he could command a majority in the House. Philp was regarded as perhaps best

32. Mackay Mercury, 30.12.97.

33. Ibid., 1.8.98.

34. Warwick Argus, 23.4.98.

35. Memoirs of the Hon. Sir Robert Philp, K.C.M.G. 1851-1922. (Watson & Ferguson, Brisbane, 1923), p.52.

qualified for the leadership, but the Mackay Mercury pointed out that "as member for Townsville, it is very questionable if he could secure a majority on appeal to the country; but if he stood for a southern constituency, many of the objections to him would be removed."³⁶ Dickson was by no means popular in the House, but he was a Brisbane man, and therefore had more chance of securing a majority in the South, where the strength of the Government lay. The Western Champion, however, pointed out the most salient feature of the new situation:

The appointment of Mr. J.R. Dickson in succession to Mr. Byrnes is the best that could have been done under the circumstances. He is not a brilliant statesman, but an eminently practical politician. A Ministry which has been reconstructed under the leadership of five successive Premiers is a curiosity in its way. Had the original custom of making it compulsory upon newly appointed Ministers to be re-elected by their constituents [been continued] it is quite possible that the "Continuous Ministry" as it is called, would long since have ended its career.³⁷

By now, most commentators felt that the Government was losing ground and that the sooner Dickson called for a new mandate the better. Nevertheless, Dickson decided not to hold the elections until the scheduled time, early in 1899. Given

36. Mackay Mercury, 1.10.98.

37. Western Champion, 10.10.98.

his tenuous hold over Parliament, it is not surprising that little was achieved during the rest of the session, with one exception being the defeat of the Government on the Officials in Parliament Bill. This was the creation of Byrnes, a seemingly innocuous piece of drafting "intended to convenience Ministers who have occasion for temporary purposes to leave their offices, and to ask some of their colleagues to perform their duties during their absence".³⁸ Any member of the Cabinet or Executive Council, according to the Bill, could perform such duties. While Dickson refused to regard the Bill as a party measure, the Government had made it difficult for themselves by the appointment of J. Wilkie Gray to the Executive Council immediately prior to the introduction of the Bill. Many Government members resented the appointment, particularly as Gray was a member of the Legislative Council. According to Macdonald-Paterson "there are other members who are older members of Parliament and had longer experience than the gentleman who had the honour to be appointed the other day".³⁹ Opposition members regarded the Bill as ultimately dangerous, and feared that "these appointments might go on ad infinitum".⁴⁰ After

38. Q.P.D., LXXIX, (1898), p.753.

39. Ibid., p.757.

40. Ibid., p.760.

a short debate, the division was taken, resulting in a 34 - 27 defeat of the New Ministry. Ministerialists voting against the new Premier were Bell, Armstrong, Macdonald-Paterson, Stephens, Leahy, Petrie and Moore. It is unlikely that any objected strongly to the principle of the Bill, but voted with the Opposition simply with the intention of making life difficult for the Ministry. Dickson, however, refused to claim the Bill as his own, and refused to treat the vote as one of confidence. The Ministry thus continued in office.

The prospects of the Ministry did not appear very bright after this defeat. Throughout the Parliament the factions continued to cause trouble. During the 1897 session, it was a section of the pastoral supporters of the Government who were most noticeable in their dissidence, together with anti-federalists. Stephens, Luya, Petrie, Fraser and Macdonald-Paterson were often found allied with George Thorn, John Leahy and John Murray. Leahy, invulnerable in Bulloo, continued to provide a constant source of irritation. He was a man of great influence and, in 1898, he made plain his dislike of both Foxton and Dickson:

Mr. Foxton and Mr. Dickson are understood to be the particular objects of the member for Bulloo's aversion - the former because he is unfriendly to the pastoralists, the latter because he "moves in a narrow commercial

groove and is incapable of taking a wide view of the requirements of the Colony".⁴¹

Nevertheless, few people contemplated the fall of the Government. Ministers had come and gone, Governments had been defeated, but there seemed no chance that the basic personnel of Government would change. Early in 1898, the Remnant Opposition, led by Drake, had proposed Coalition with the Labour Party. However, Drake refused to serve under Glassey, and Glassey under Drake. Kidston's proposals for a dual leadership were also rejected. Thus the Liberal-Labour coalition again proved impossible of attainment. Electors were faced in 1899 with the same choice as in 1896 - a Government which had lost much public confidence, the Labour Party, which entered the elections virtually without a leader, and an Opposition attempting to continue the traditions of a party which had died nearly a decade before.

41. Warwick Argus, 31.5.98.

CHAPTER 16THE 1899 ELECTIONS

The General Elections of 1899 were conducted in apparent tranquility. Overshadowed by the impending federation of the Australian Colonies and by interest in the progress of the Boer War, the elections were marked only by a noticeable lack of enthusiasm on the part of both politicians and the public. No major issue dominated the campaign. Attitudes to federation had already been clearly enunciated, and the people awaited in "suspended animation", the millennial event which federation promised to be. If any one issue came close to capturing the imagination of the public it was Japanese labour. Even this failed to stir more than a ripple of enthusiasm.

As far as party organization was concerned, both parties showed little development from previous encounters. There seemed to be almost a total lack of interest in improving organization and, on the part of non-Labour groups, of giving it more far-reaching powers. The National Liberal Union, which was formed in 1902, was little different from its

predecessor, the Queensland Political Association, which was far from active in these elections. Yet the party situation was full of interest. Both major parties were exhibiting the factionalism so prevalent in colonial politics, and it may be argued that politics in Queensland were in a state of flux. The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin gave some indication of the general situation:

It is one of the curiosities of the present position that no-one expresses any satisfaction with the Government. Even avowed supporters of the Ministry declare they have no regard for it and would gladly see it replaced.... Only one defence is offered for it - that if the Government goes out, the Labour Party comes in - was there ever a more contemptible appeal made for support?¹

THE PARTIES

The Labour Party entered the elections more obviously divided than their opponents. Factionalism within the party had been obvious since 1896 and was caused by splits between the older members of the party who had entered Parliament without union aid or endorsement, and the new members, more directly allied with Queensland unionism. This problem was manifested primarily by differences in political tactics, most obvious in the public censure of

1. Quoted in Toowoomba Chronicle, 31.1.99.

Glassey when he decided to undertake the role of Constitutional Opposition.²

These problems were clearly seen in the Clermont electorate, where the local Worker's Political Organization endorsed Joe Lesina rather than J.M. Cross, after Cross had refused to sign the Labour pledge. John Hoolan contested Cairns as an Independent, and was opposed by Labour candidate, Thomas Givens. In February, Hoolan attacked the A.L.F. faction in Brisbane:

They call themselves the A.L.F. but there is not a decent mechanic among them ... all the political reform they have done up to the present is to bring about endless disturbances, to build up endless rivalries, and to create interminable law suits.³

Glassey made little attempt to lead the party in these elections, and supported both Hoolan and Cross. He had one ally, William Kidston, who insisted that G.S. Curtis, and not a member of the Labour party, should run with him for Rockhampton.⁴ The Labour splits created embarrassments for the whole party. In the campaign for Mitchell, the Western Champion observed that "in his speech, Mr. Fitzgerald carefully abstains from any laudation of the political association which "endorsed" him. Probably he is extremely

2. See ~~above~~, Ch. 15.

3. Telegraph, 3.4.99.

4. Wankar: "William Kidston" in Murphy, Joyce & Hughes. Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969), p.201.

sorry now, that he did not tacitly claim exemption from this humiliating ceremony [the pledge] as Mr. Kerr has done."⁵

Evidence of Ministerial disunity was not so clearly apparent. There were some rumblings from the West. The Western Champion complained of its past representation by Labour:

The Government must recognize there is something wrong here and, if they introduce electoral reform in any shape it will be in the direction of giving the pastoral districts some more equal representation. Let the miners and bush workers have their own representatives by all means. They have them now, in fact, but that is no reason why the rest of the community should be disfranchised.⁶

The leadership of J.R. Dickson also created rifts within the party, many members preferring Robert Philp as Premier.⁷ Federalists and anti-federalists, discontent among the farmers, northern hostility, all served to factionalize the Ministerial Party, and members could be forgiven for feeling the election could be a close one.

THE CAMPAIGN

The Queensland Political Association was far from inactive, and found prospective candidates unwilling to

5. Western Champion, 28.2.99.

6. Ibid., 4.4.99.

7. See Chs. 15 and 17.

submit to its authority.⁸ The Government had once again carefully arranged the staggered elections, giving the Ministerialists the advantage of the majority of safe electorates in the first batch. The third batch contained most of the strong Labour seats, as well as some Opposition strongholds, thus depriving Labour and Opposition of any psychological advantage of early success. The Central Political Executive of the Labour Party had agreed not to oppose members of the Independent Opposition in seats held by them, in a reciprocal agreement with Drake's small party.⁹

The Manifesto of J.R. Dickson was a decidedly colourless one. He was content to await New South Wales developments before rushing into federation. He placed considerable emphasis on railway extension, which had been ignored by the Government since the onset of depression, and proposed a public works committee, a type of parliamentary corporation, to deal with the endless requests for railways. He defended the immigration policy of the Government and gave some vague hint of electoral reform. The Rockhampton Bulletin mounted a hostile attack on the Manifesto:

8. Toowoomba Chronicle, 7.2.99.
9. Warwick Argus, 10.1.99.

Mr. Dickson has not disappointed the public. He has produced a prodigiously long and amazingly empty address ... trotting out a great number of trivial subjects which he treats with tremendous solemnity. His address might justly be termed the glorification of the commonplace.¹⁰

Similarly, Labour and Opposition policies showed only a degree of consequence. Once again, both called for electoral reform, and criticized the Government's public works policy, or lack of it. Both questioned the sincerity of the Government with regard to federation, and also their policy towards Japanese immigration. The Labour platform was little changed, and much of the attack upon the Government lacked fire and enthusiasm.

Once again the question of labour for the industries of the tropical north had come to political prominence. In 1897, W.H. Browne had brought the Japanese to the attention of the House. He noted that as early as 1894, the junior member for North Brisbane J.J. Kingsbury had asked the Government what it intended to do about the immigration of Japanese. The Government had, in fact, done nothing in the years elapsed. In answer to Browne, Tozer, the Acting Premier, explained that after protracted negotiations with the Imperial authorities "our proposal for excluding labourers

10. Toowoomba Chronicle, 5.1.99.

and artisans has been accepted - the arrangement being terminable on twelve months notice by either party".¹¹ The agreement had been part of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and was simply a temporary expedient. Nevertheless, Browne and the Labour Party regarded the negotiations as a start and withdrew the motion.

The Japanese had been emigrating or jumping ship, or imported through the Southern Colonies to work on the sugar plantations. Most were used in the mills, but were inferior to, as well as dearer than, kanakas in field work.¹² The Mackay Mercury defended the employment of Japanese:

No one will regret more than the sugar growers themselves the necessity which compels them to use Japanese labourers for the harvesting of their crops ... it is not the cost, but the lack of any labour which has compelled sugar growers to hire Japanese. By all means let us find a substitute ... if we can get it. Possibly some good may come from the present influx of the subjects of the Mikado. It may force upon the attention of the Opposition and less clearly defined enemies of the sugar industry, the necessity of either killing the industry, or finding some labour in addition to that already at the disposal of the farmers.¹³

Between the debate on Browne's motion and the elections, the position in regard to Japanese labour had not changed.

11. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.347.

12. Buxton to Lord Lamington, 16.11.96 (Premiers Dept. Q.S.A.).

13. Mackay Mercury, 19.7.98.

The Government now avoided the issue by referring to it as a federal matter. W.H. Groom criticized the secrecy of the negotiations with Britain and Japan: "We do not know, even now, nor has Parliament been made acquainted with, the actual conditions of the treaty between Queensland and Japan."¹⁴ Dickson indicated that it was the intention of the Government to exclude all those "races whose introduction has not been already sanctioned and regulated by law". Such a statement was so general that it was practically meaningless. The Labour attitude showed a clear racist bias:

For any Government to tolerate this influx of coloured aliens is the basest kind treachery to, not only the white race in Queensland, but also the whole race throughout Australia, and if the immigration is permitted to continue, it can only end disastrously. The price we are being asked to pay for the sugar industry is too much. Coloured and inferior races cannot remain for, and be confined to that industry by law ... the banner of "white Australia" needs raising, and that quickly too.¹⁵

Nevertheless, as with federation, much of the ferocity had left the debate on the Japanese by the time of the elections.

One feature of the campaign was the concerted hostility shown by the Ministerialists towards the Independent Opposition. Charles Powers, in his bid to re-enter Parliament, found himself in a quandary as to whether to

14. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.1.99.

15. Worker, 19.6.98.

stand as a Ministerialist or an Independent Oppositionist.

The Maryborough Chronicle discussed the alternatives:

The success predicted for Mr. Powers would depend very largely on the party he would be prepared to give at least a general support. To oppose Mr. Glassey is to be either a Ministerialist or an Independent Oppositionist, .. and Mr. Powers has been both in his time. If Mr. Powers will announce his adherence to the Dickson Ministry, his chances may be regarded as excellent but if he comes out as an Independent Oppositionist ... they are doubtful. Ministerialists would rather have Mr. Glassey as an opponent and would vote accordingly.¹⁶

Powers duly announced himself a Ministerialist, and stressed that there was now no third party for which to vote -

electors had only two choices: The Ministry or Socialism.

This theme was constantly reiterated: "the Coalition party, under the internal influences ... of what is known as the Continuous Ministry, and the external influences ... of the gathering strength of the party of socialism, has become more and more consolidated and homogeneous.... Individualism and Socialism.... This is to be described as the great bed-rock issue before the country."¹⁷

This stress on the dangers of socialism had proved an electoral advantage in 1896, and was expected to do so again. The emotionalism attached to the "battle" between individualism

16. Maryborough Chronicle, 21.1.99.

17. Ibid., 7.2.99.

and socialism tended to obliterate any real issues during the campaign. There appeared to be an air of unreality about this election.

THE RESULTS

The Elections proved once again a triumph for the Ministry. The final result gave the Ministerialists 42 seats, including those who classed themselves Independent Ministerialists. Labour captured 21 seats and the Opposition 8. J.G. Drake was well pleased with the performance of his party:

The triumph of the Independent Opposition was the most significant feature of the Elections. Despite all the attempts at ridicule, misrepresentation and calumny ... the electors have emphatically set the seal of approval upon those members who, whilst refusing to become merged with the Labour Party, have constantly opposed the Government.¹⁸

Once again, the Labour Party had failed to extend its strength beyond the regional boundaries set in 1893. In South Brisbane, Turley was defeated, although there was some compensation in the victory of Higgs in Fortitude Valley. Gympie was carried by Fisher and Ryland, while Givens and Lesina defeated rebels Hoolan and Cross. King and Daniels, two strong supporters of Glassey, were also defeated, in Maranoa and Cambooya. The final result gave Labour an aggregate gain of three seats, but Ministerialists had in

18. Toowoomba Chronicle, 20.3.99.

some cases been defeated by only small margins. The results for Labour had a double aspect. Many regarded the defeat of Hoolan, Cross and King to be ultimately strengthening, as it removed one of the more obvious sources of disunity, and left the increasingly unpopular Glassey isolated. On the other hand, Cross and Hoolan were two of the most experienced labour parliamentarians. The Western Champion commented that "what they have gained in numbers, however, has been lost in effectiveness. Four of their best debaters - Messrs Sim, Turley, Hoolan and Cross are gone, and their places will be poorly filled by men of the Givens - Lesina type".¹⁹

One feature of the Labour performance was the complete alienation of the farmers from the party. The defeat of Daniels severed the last link between the party and the south-eastern farming areas. The pattern of representation remained the same, with these areas solidly Ministerialist. This allegiance was even more solid than in previous elections, caused by a decline in the Opposition vote in this area. The only reverses suffered by the Ministerialists were the loss of Albert, where Plunkett turned the tables on R.M. Collins who had defeated him in 1896, and the loss of

19. Western Champion, 23.3.99.

Gympie. The Ministry remained invulnerable in the metropolitan area, where Labour could make no inroads into their power.

The Ministry's power, however, was in many ways more apparent than real. The fate of the Government rested upon the support of the Independent Ministerialists²⁰ and most of these were extremely antagonistic to the Northern interests so strong in the Ministry. Philp was always a danger to the position of Dickson, and therefore he had to be included in the new Ministry. It was probable that two other Northerners - Dalrymple and Chataway (Mackay) would also be Cabinet appointees.

In a party in which 31 of its 42 members represented southern districts, this was likely to cause considerable unrest. Moreover, Ministerial disunity had been only temporarily healed. In the next six months, the rifts would deepen to such an extent that the Government would find itself out of office before the year was out.

20. Toowoomba Chronicle, 30.3.99.

CHAPTER 17THE MORGAN - BROWNE COALITION

The Government had reason to be delighted with the results of the 1899 Election. It had apparently been losing public confidence during 1898, but had been returned with a convincing majority. And yet, the Dickson Government had fallen before the end of the session, as had that of Anderson Dawson, which, as the first Labour Government seen in Australia, had lasted only six days. These momentous events were followed by three years in which Robert Philp managed to alienate sufficient support to force his resignation. The period closes with the formation of the long awaited Liberal-Labour Coalition between Arthur Morgan and William Henry Browne.

THE FALL OF DICKSON

The electoral unity of the Ministerialists was again shattered by the announcement of the Ministry. Dickson was Premier and chief Secretary, Rutledge, Attorney-General, Foxton was Home Secretary. Philp was given two Portfolios, the Treasury and Mines. Dalrymple was in charge of Public Lands, Murray Public Works and Chataway Agriculture. Of

the forty-two Ministerialists, 31 had been elected from southern constituencies, nine from the North and two from the Central Division. Dissatisfaction naturally arose when the North produced three Cabinet Ministers,¹ while the South was represented by only Foxton and Dickson. It could justly be argued that the Ministry was a Northern Ministry, held in power by a southern vote. These regional jealousies, compounded by the anti-federalist sympathies of many southern representatives, constituted a potential for considerable disruption.

The first two sessions of 1899 were however dominated by two events which had their origin outside Queensland politics - the Boer War and Federation. In September 1899, the Federal Referendum was held, in which the giant favourable vote in North Queensland carried the Colony into the new Commonwealth.² But the first half of the second session of 1899 was dominated by heated discussion surrounding the Transvaal contingent. While the House had been in recess, the Government had provided for a volunteer force of Queenslanders to be sent to the aid of the British beleaguered in the Transvaal. In October, the Premier took the opportunity

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1. Rutledge, though elected by a southern constituency, had long represented Cairns.
 2. See above Ch. 10, and Appendix 7.

of defending the action of the administration. He maintained that the small number of troops would make no difference in the military sense, but that "this is an object lesson that shows that the Australian States recognize that they are a part of the great British Empire".³

The attitude of the Labour Party to the Boer War was similar in most of the Australian Colonies.⁴ The leader of the Labour Party, Dawson, felt that the Premier was affected by "the war craze, this thirst for blood, the jingoistic spirit, the overwhelming desire to hit somebody ... and knock him out."⁵ McDonnell regarded the war as "unjustifiable and unrighteous" and objected, "We are asked to take part in a quarrel that does not concern us, and that the people of this colony have not had the slightest opportunity of voicing their opinions on."⁶ The Labour attitude in October was therefore that the war was as unnecessary as it was immoral, and that Dickson had no right to authorize the dispatch of troops without the prior assent of Parliament and people.

By December-January, however, Labour had to some extent changed its opinion, as a result of international interference and significant Boer victories. The party had already been

3. Q.P.D., LXXII, (1899), p.341.

4. For attitudes to the War see Grimshaw, C., "Some Aspects of Australian Attitudes to the Imperial Connection 1900-1919" (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q.)⁹⁵¹

5. Q.P.D., LXXII, (1899), p.343.

6. Ibid., p.479.

divided on the issue, with Glassey and Jackson in favour of British and Queensland participation, while the Worker still regarded the war as "being waged in the interests of Rhodes, the Johannesburg mine-owners and British capitalists".⁷ By December, however, opinion had changed to such an extent that Dawson seconded Philp's motion for a second contingent. While Labour was no doubt aware of the electoral disadvantages of its largely unpopular stance on the war, it is more likely that the Labour attitude changed as Britain's position worsened. Dawson feared the interference of Germany:

The struggle today is not a struggle between the Boers and Great Britain, urged on by a coterie of land grabbers headed by Cecil Rhodes . . . it is a matter of national existence - whether the prestige of the British Empire is to be sullied and to suffer humiliation in South Africa at the hands of its traditional enemies on the Continent.⁸

On the domestic front, far less momentous events were taking place. In September, the Western Champion had predicted that these Ministerialists who were opposed to Federation would make one last ditch attempt to wreck the Ministry.⁹ This faction was led by W. Stephens, who, on the occasion of the death of A.F. Luya, had threatened that if the Government attempted to nominate a federalist for the by-election, he

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7. Rayner, S.A., "The Evolution of the Queensland Labour Party 1901-1925" (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.170.
 8. Q.P.D., LXXXIII, (1899), p.1473.
 9. Western Champion, 12.10.99.

would vote for the Labour candidate, Henry Turley.¹⁰ A second faction, led by Leahy and Forrest, had always opposed Dickson, and preferred Philp. McIlwraith, writing to Cecil Palmer, felt that, "Leahy is a curious character and had managed to get himself into various confidences, he representing the squatters and squatting firms in the House of Assembly.... If his intimacy and working with the Labour Party was thoroughly understood, I think that would soon drop through."¹¹

These factions were led by strong and devious men who were prepared to await their opportunity. This came when Dickson, fulfilling his election pledge to set up a Standing Committee on Railways, introduced the measure. The petty jealousies, diplomatic appointments, anti-federalism and unwise Cabinet choices all came into play, and on November 22, Ministerialists who crossed the floor were Stephens, Cribb, Petrie, Forrest and Leahy. Dickson, regarding the division as one of confidence, resigned. The political manoeuvrings following this vote have not been fully documented, but according to Rayner, Dawson offered both the Remnant and the discontented Ministerialists two Portfolios each, and had been to all intents and purposes, accepted.¹² When the first

10. Brisbane Courier, 19.7.99.

11. McIlwraith to Palmer, 12.4.1900 (McIlwraith-Palmer Papers, Oxley Library).

12. Rayner, S.A., op.cit., p.174.

Labour Ministry¹³ took office, however, only the Labour Party sat behind the Government, with the Independent Opposition on the cross benches. It was believed that Leahy would not have joined, but would have supported the new Government, had the Opposition co-operated. Drake, however, promised only a general support to the new Government. While it is impossible to imagine men like Stephens and Forrest being able to give loyalty to a party which stood in direct opposition to their economic and social interests, it seems odd that Drake refused to join the Labour Party in a Coalition Government. Possibly, Philp had offered a portfolio, or more probably the majority of the Remnant knew that, even with their aid, the Labour Government had slight chance of survival. There was also a legacy of doubt and mistrust which was a result of the years of fruitless negotiation, which militated against successful combination at this stage.

The following events were a mere formality. Dawson called for an adjournment to allow the Government time to formulate a policy. While he was supported by Drake and the Independent Opposition, the motion was lost by 36 votes to 26.

13. Dawson, Fitzgerald, Turley, Kidston, Browne, Hardacre, Fisher.

Once again, a Government had fallen.

Two days later, a new Ministry, headed by Robert Philp, was sworn in. Philp "probably knew when Mr. Forrest and his three followers crossed over to the Opposition benches to vote against Mr. Dickson that the defeat of that politician meant only the substitution of himself in a reconstructed Ministry."¹⁴ It was indeed the intention of Forrest and Leahy to dispense with Dickson, and they settled down in support of Philp. Once again the Continuous Ministry had survived. It was to survive for another three years, amidst declining prestige and deepening disillusionment on the part of both Parliament and public.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ROBERT PHILP

Like all its predecessors, the last Government of the Continuous Ministry was one dominated by business and finance. The best word to describe it was "mediocre". Whatever his personal failings, no Government headed by Sir Thomas McIlwraith could be called mediocre. Even Sir Hugh Muir Nelson had given the Ministry strength and skill. Dickson had never been trusted, and had never really been a party man. Robert Philp, however, had always remained

14. McIlwraith to Palmer, 12.4.1900 (McIlwraith-Palmer Papers, Oxley Library).

loyal to the party which best promoted his, and other business interests - in the Eighties, the National Party; in the Nineties, the loose collection known as the "Ministerialists". Perhaps exhausted by long years in Parliament, Philp failed to assert his leadership, or indeed any positive qualities at all. O'Sullivan describes the character of the administrative elite:

They took the view of the average successful businessman. Most men of that type had started on the lowest rung of the ladder and had achieved success by industry, self denial and persistency. They thought the average man should be able to succeed in the same way and that if he did not, it must be his own fault. They considered that progressive legislation interfered with business by increasing current expenses and lessening the control of the employer over his employees. They regarded it as opposed to their interests.¹⁵

From such a Government, the Labour and Opposition Parties managed to wrest a significant victory in the election of Arthur Morgan as speaker. One of the most respected men in the House, Morgan seemed infinitely preferable to A.S. Cowley who had already shown himself markedly hostile to the aims of Labour. After long and almost unprecedented debate, Morgan was finally installed in the Speaker's Chair. His

15. O'Sullivan, T., "Reminiscences of the Queensland Parliament (Unpub. M.S. Parliamentary Library), p.2.

independent stance had been long recognized¹⁶ and it was felt that no better speaker could be found.

While the election of Morgan could be described as a defeat for the new Government, the position of Philp was much more secure than that of either of his two immediate predecessors. He had the support of Forrest, Leahy and MacDonald-Paterson, who had largely brought about the demise of Dickson. He also managed to capture the former leader of the Independent Opposition, J.G. Drake. This switch of sides, and to the Upper House, was probably due to personal reasons. It was rumoured that Drake had been in poor health for almost a year, and this, combined with his Parliamentary duties, had had a detrimental effect on his career at the Bar. Fruitless opposition over nearly a decade had no doubt exacted a heavy toll on Drake, as it had on Powers, and he probably welcomed the quieter atmosphere of the Legislative Council. His Portfolio of Public Instruction did not promise to be an easy task, but it is probable that Drake already had decided to seek a place in federal politics. His appointment was not received well in several quarters. A.J. Stephenson, once again disappointed for office, criticized Philp through the pages of the Queensland Times:

16. Knox, B.A., "Hon. Sir Arthur Morgan" (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.).

Certainly tactics of this kind offer no inducement to the loyal and consistent government followers to remain steadfast in their support, and are by no means calculated to promote what is so greatly to be desired - viz, the complete consolidation of the party.¹⁷

The only other slightly controversial appointment was that of O'Connell, long a spokesman for the sugar industry.

Although he had been obviously chosen as representative for the long neglected Wide Bay area, many felt that with Chataway a good spokesman for the sugar industry, already in the Cabinet, another member might have been chosen. Nevertheless, Philp appeared to have effectively disposed of the problem of regional jealousies, which had so continuously plagued the Dickson Ministry. Dickson, Drake, Foxton and Rutledge represented southern electorates, Dalrymple and Chataway the North, Murray the Centre and O'Connell, Wide Bay. The Western Champion could not foresee any imminent political upheaval:

Mr. Philp is a man under whom we may be quietly governed. He is not likely to do anything which can offend even the most bitter of his opponents ... Mr. Dawson and his followers must be content with their present position as critics, in which they can do the Government great service.¹⁸

The two parliamentary sessions prior to the General

17. Queensland Times, 9.1.99.

18. Western Champion, 16.1.1900.

Elections of 1902 seemed to reflect the Premier's style. The session of 1900 produced little of value. The finances of the colony were far from buoyant, and the Government found an extensive public works policy impossible. There was a marked decline in productivity, caused by severe drought in 1899 - 1901, and a decline in revenue when customs duties were surrendered to the Commonwealth. In 1900, Queensland had only just managed to float a loan on the London market.

It was under such circumstances of general economic stagnation that the Government faced its first serious challenge. It was impossible to satisfy all the demands for railways which had accumulated since 1896. Therefore in June, 1900, Philp intimated that the Government was considering numerous railway proposals, made on the basis of private industry. The Government was prepared to accept any legitimate mining proposition which covered the building of railways to places "where the nature of the country makes the risk too great for the Government". Such a proposal was bound to cause uproar in Labour circles, and the chances of preventing the implementation of the Government programme were considerably increased by the prior failure of Dickson to carry his Railways Standing Committee Proposal.

Most of the energies of the Session were thus expended on stonewalling the Estimates. By September, no progress had been made. Philp declared his Government would stand or fall on its railway programme, which included railways in the Callide, Mr. Garnet, Albert River, Lilydale and Normanton districts. After three months nothing had been achieved but wasted time. The destroyers of the Dickson Government, Forrest, Leahy and Macdonald-Paterson were again becoming restive and assumed a collective threatening stance. Macdonald-Paterson "declined to endure this any longer, and if those who had charge of the team could not keep the coach going, he and his colleagues were determined to take the whip out of their hands and give it to somebody else".¹⁹ Given their past history, the two could not be ignored, and the greatly alarmed Ministry saw, with great relief, the session close without incident. Once again splits had appeared, to be partially healed. Most of the railways had been eventually carried, but at the expense of all other legislation.

The dreariness of the session of 1900 was repeated in 1901, with the difference that the opposition forces were weakened by the federal elections, which removed from the

19. Western Champion, 16.10.1900.

State Parliament, Dawson, Glassey, Higgs, Fisher and Groom. The Cabinet was deprived of the services of J.R. Dickson. This was a dubious loss, for Dickson must have harboured some resentment against Philp and other members of the Government, and may not have been reliable in a crisis. The year was chiefly notable for a declining financial position and continued Government torpor. To augment falling revenue, the Government offered Crown Lands for auction, only to withdraw the offer under threat of severe Labour pressure and opposition among some members of its own party. A Bill designed to widen the franchise did not come to fruition. In the public view, the Government was not only inactive, but lacked the courage of its convictions. Late in 1901, the Queensland Times observed that "if there is any policy of the Government to which objection might be raised by a rational and dispassionate mind, it is that of putting away Ministerial responsibility."²⁰ It was under such inauspicious circumstances that the Conservatives prepared for the 1902 elections.

1902 ELECTIONS

As the elections approached, the activities of the National Liberal Union, formed in July 1901 under the aegis

20. Queensland Times, 1.10.1901.

of A.J. Thynne, had become more obvious. The old Queensland Political Association still existed, but its vitality had disappeared. The aim of the N.L.U. was ostensibly to prevent an overlapping of candidature in the various electorates".²¹ There was no attempt at policy formation. Yet, like its two predecessors,²² the N.L.U. was essentially an anti-Labour organization, its objectives clearly stated by ever faithful R.P. Adams:

To relieve the electors of Queensland from Trades Hall domination, and from interference with the liberty of the employer to engage the services of whomsoever he feels inclined to hire; to secure to working men the right to work for which employers they choose; to protect individual enterprise, industry and thrift; to prevent the nationalization of industries and other matters as against dangerous socialistic and class legislation.²³

The N.L.U. seems to have had some success in organizing Ministerial candidates, although in Fortitude Valley, Bundaberg and Maryborough the Union failed to impose its will.²⁴ On the whole, its efforts were rewarded and were not attended by the same degree of hostility which had characterized the activities of the Queensland Political Association.

The formation of a Darling Downs Combination early in 1902 indicates that once again the farmers were restive. The

21. Brisbane Courier, 19.1.1902.

22. See above, Ch.10.

23. Brisbane Courier, 22.5.1902.

24. Ibid., 5.2.1902.

meeting was attended by Morgan, (Warwick), Foxtor, (Carnavon), Mackintosh, (Cambooya), Kates, (Cunningham), Moore, (Murilla), Fogarty and Tolmie (Toowoomba), Thorn, (Aubigny), and Bell (Dalby). Unlike the Farmers Representative Union, which had been a purely informal organization during Nelson's Premiership, the new Combination issued a specific Manifesto, calling for lower railways rates, closer settlement and further export aid. It declared its opposition to the land tax, and to any increase in centralisation.²⁵ The "Downs bunch" carefully refrained from commenting on political questions, and did not attempt to propagate a political programme as had the Farmers Alliance a decade before. It was primarily the result of purely agricultural grievances and purely agricultural demands. But the Philp Government was well aware of the timing of the Manifesto and its signatories. All except Fogarty were Ministerialists, and coming so close to the Elections, the Manifesto forced some sort of acknowledgement of agricultural claims.

The Courier felt that the main issues of the Election were clear:

There are only two political parties in Queensland - that which is dominated by the Socialism of the Trades Hall and that which seeks to be fairly representative of the varied interests of the whole

25. Knox, B.A., op.cit., p.64.

State ... (but) the discussion of abstract political principles must give place to the need of dealing in a businesslike way with financial difficulties ... the question of ways and means is really the most important one at present.²⁶

Philp's Manifesto contained little to which much objection could be made. He concentrated on "ways and means", promising general retrenchment, a cessation of public works, and a reduction of members and Ministers. To the farmers he promised Government aid in finding export markets, and announced himself in favour of the re-purchase of large estates in the interests of closer settlement.²⁷ Morgan reacted with pleasure:

Although the new found importance of the Darling Downs amply justifies the formation of the Combination, we do not think it will have any occasion to interfere while the present Government holds office, the policy ... being so strongly in the direction the Combination had been formed to uphold.²⁸

While the finances of the Labour Party had been greatly depleted by the Federal election, its organization was efficient. Its Manifesto was a most reasonable one, in which the socialist objective was almost ignored in favour of constant stress on the "new liberalism" of the Labour

26. Brisbane Courier, 14.1.1902.

27. Ibid., 4.2.1902.

28. Warwick Argus, 1.3.1902.

Party in contrast to the laissez-faire liberalism of the older parties. The Labour Manifesto condemned the Government for its failure to implement its proposed electoral reform, and once again called for universal adult suffrage.²⁹ Included in its programme were calls for the institution of a minimum wage and a land tax, two planks hardly designed to appeal to an electorate which wanted, above all, retrenchment and economy.

As the results of the elections flowed in, it appeared that the new century had not changed political affiliations one whit. The Government lost four seats, and returned 38 members. The Labour Party gained 24 seats, two Independent Ministerialists were returned, (Bridges and Lindley) and one Farmers Representative, Hodge. The Independent Opposition was hanging on with courage, if not conspicuous success, and managed to retain six seats. Thus, if all members who were not Ministerialists were counted as Oppositionists, the Government still maintained a majority of six. According to the Western Champion however, Armstrong, Kates, Bell, Forrest, Macartney, Boles and Stephens were Ministerialists of rather dubious loyalty.³⁰

29. Brisbane Courier, 18.2.1902.

30. Western Champion, 17.3.1902.

The Labour Party lost four of the more prominent members of the A.L.F. faction - Turley, Reid, Bowman and Fitzgerald. Kidston and Browne thus retained undisputed leadership of the party.³¹ Even though they had only gained three extra seats, the elections might be deemed encouraging for Labour. The party lost several of its western seats, often on local issues, but gained seats in areas never before conquered. Barton and Norman won the double electorate of Maryborough, Martin won Burrum, and Barber Bundaberg. Support in the metropolitan area also seemed a little more solid, and many commentators felt Labour could look to a greater diversity of representation in subsequent elections.

THE SECOND PHILP MINISTRY

The Labour Party had gained three seats and the Ministry had lost four, but Philp could congratulate himself on winning the mandate of the country. His position in the Parliament was relatively secure, and he could now fulfil his promises of retrenchment and development. He showed the same wisdom as regards geographical representation in the new Cabinet, and as a gesture towards retrenchment cut down the size of the Ministry to six.

31. Kidston, due to Browne's ill health, emerged as the real leader.

Philp himself undertook the Portfolio of Mines, J.C. Cribb was appointed Treasurer, Rutledge remained Attorney-General, and Foxton was once again Minister for Lands. Dalrymple was given two portfolios - Agriculture and Education, and John Leahy was given charge of the Railways and Public Works. John Murray had been appointed to the Council just prior to the Elections, and remained in the Cabinet as Vice President of the Executive Council. Thus, Philp had accommodated two sources of discontent - the West Moreton "bunch" by the appointment of J.C. Cribb, and the lure of a Cabinet Post for the ubiquitous John Leahy. This appointment of Dalrymple as Minister for Agriculture was somewhat provocative, as his only familiarity was tropical agriculture. This was not designed to appease Downs discontent. Cribb, moreover, was a doubtful quantity in the important Treasury post.

THE GOVERNMENT COMES APART

In the year following the elections, the Philp Government showed itself completely incapable of carrying out its twin programmes of development and retrenchment. To develop the country, the Premier and his colleagues could suggest only an increase in loan moneys. The traumatic experience of 1892-3, however, had made such a course very

unpopular, and it was to prove the undoing of the Government. The Government rested on its strength in metropolitan areas, upon the support of business-investment groups, along with the solid support of the south-eastern farming communities. A sound progressive financial policy was thus a necessity. Cribb and Philp could not handle the financial situation which had almost reached crisis point, and consequently they began to forfeit support from the commercial community. A sure barometer of the attitude of the business world was the Brisbane Courier. Prior to the beginning of the second session, the Courier was far from enthusiastic about Philp:

Mr. Philp, in the prolonged tour which has terminated at his own constituency at Townsville is hardly to be credited with having any talent or visability. At Charters Towers, he gave some indication of the proposed work of the session in the way of electoral reform. Otherwise there was but little worthy of note in his utterances.³²

In March, the Western Champion had pointed out that there had been little progress in development and the Government had ignored requests for further aid, particularly for railways and irrigation.³³ The same newspaper, along with other country journals, protested when Leahy, in June 1902,

32. Brisbane Courier, 6.6.1903.

33. Western Champion, 8.3.1903.

proposed to raise railway rates, including passenger charges.³⁴ The Mackay Mercury, faithful as ever, could not avoid admitting: "the Government was spending money too fast some time ago and ... it did not reduce expenditure as soon as it might have tried to do so".³⁵

By June 1903, the finances of the Government had gone from bad to worse, and a deficit of £300,000 was anticipated. The Courier warned that the electors would not tolerate any increase in taxation.³⁶ Thus inept financial administration was gradually alienating the traditional supporters of the Government. Philp was also in trouble from another, more significant source. He had had to face a number of motions of censure from his own supporters, and those had arisen primarily as a result of the degree of conservatism exhibited by the Ministry. Arthur Morgan, along with three new members, Blair, Hodge and Denham, was becoming increasingly uncomfortable under the reactionary government of Philp. As early as January 1903, the Western Champion remarked that the election of C.M. Jenkinson in the by-election of Fassifern would strengthen the forces of opposition:

Could this party be reinforced by some of the discontented Ministerialists and strengthened by the election of more men like Messrs. Cooper,

34. Western Champion, 23.6.1902
 35. Mackay Mercury, 17.10.1903.
 36. Brisbane Courier, 16.6.1903.

Blair and Hodge, assisted by the most independent members of the Labour Party, such as Jackson, Kidston and Hardacre, it could be quite possible to put out the present Government and form another having the confidence of the country.³⁷

The high correlation between the more progressive of the Ministerialists and their representation of agricultural communities meant that any new Government would be forced to rely heavily on country support. Without the co-operation of the Labour Party, however, there would be no chance of forming an alternative Government. The discontented Ministerialists - Denham, Lindley, Plunkett, Tolmie, Kates, Bell, Morgan, McCartney and Thorn, together with the Independent Opposition could not hope to succeed without solid Labour support. The attitude of that party was therefore crucial.

The 1899 Elections had, to all appearances, strengthened, by the defeat of Cross, Hoolan and King, and the return of Fisher, the faction which continued to insist on complete independence. Glassey had been completely alienated, and had even refused to serve in the shortlived Dawson Ministry. But the party had again been weakened by the decision of most of its able leaders to enter the Commonwealth Parliament. Browne was not the nominal leader, but his ill health was such

37. Western Champion, 11.1.1903.

that most of the work devolved on William Kidston. In 1899, Kidston had insisted upon G.S. Curtis as his running mate, in preference to a Labour man. In many ways like Arthur Morgan, Kidston had always pursued a relatively independent course in Parliament and was unusually suspicious of creeds and ideologies which clouded clear-cut political issues.³⁸ At a public meeting in January 1903 Kidston had incurred the ire of the Worker by his suggestion of fusion with the Independent Opposition.³⁹

The relatively poor showing of Labour in 1902 may have convinced several members of the party that a change of tactics might be beneficial. O'Sullivan remarked that:

The Labour Party had been in impotent isolation for some years and Kidston thought it was likely to remain so, unless it would adopt a system of prudent alliances which had brought many gains to Labour in the South.⁴⁰

William Browne, like Kidston, was a man of compromise, whose long years in Parliament allowed him to see the advantages of such a Coalition. In indicating his willingness to co-operate with other groups to oust Philp, and in not insisting upon the implementation of the whole Labour programme at once, Browne drew reluctant praise from the Courier:

38. Wanka, K., "William Kidston" in Prelude to Power, p.200.

39. Worker, 24.1.1903.

40. O'Sullivan, op.cit., p.3.

The leader of the Opposition and his lieutenant have shown themselves not only temperate in their utterances but commendably desirous of joining hands with some of their nominal opponents.⁴¹

Moreover, as Crook points out, the ascendancy of the parliamentary party within the Labour movement had been ensured by the departure of Fisher, Dawson, Reid and Higgs. The local Workers Political Organizations also tended to support the more moderate leaders.⁴² He continues that "the militant left ... had become gradually reconciled to the inevitable. Particularly compelling was the prospect of attaining universal suffrage, an entrenched article of faith in the Labour creed".⁴³ It would appear then, that with moderate politicians in control of the party, and their willingness to coalesce with other groups, all that was needed to oust Philp was opportunity.

THE FALL OF THE CONTINUOUS MINISTRY

The opportunity was not long wanting. With no improvement in the finances, Philp could see no other way of raising revenue than a heavy increase in stamp duties. Nothing could have alienated the business community more. Most businessmen felt the taxes were unnecessary, and "as

41. Brisbane Courier, 12.6.1903.

42. Crook, D.P., "The Crucible" in Prelude to Power, p.61.

43. Ibid.

a prominent Brisbane merchant put it, it would be better to increase income tax slightly than to adopt the Government's proposals".⁴⁴ There was no doubt, however, that any attempt to raise income tax would have alienated a much greater proportion of the community.

The Government's stamp tax resolutions were carried by two votes. Three Ministerialists who had indicated their dissatisfaction with Philp, (Boles, Bell, Kates) voted for the Government and nine members were absent. Those absentees included five members who probably would have voted against the Government (Thorn and Armstrong, and Labour members Woods, Lesina and Sumnerville.) Morgan, still speaker, had the casting vote, so it was unlikely that the Government could have survived a second vote. In this vote, the Labour Party was joined by three Ministerialists, Cooper, Denham and Tolmie, three Independent Oppositionists, Blair, Fogarty and Plunkett, and two Independents, Lindley and Hodge.

Always regarding the issue as one of confidence, Philp tendered the resignation of the Ministry, and called upon Browne to form a Ministry. Browne, without the outright support of the Independent Opposition and disaffected

44. Mackay Mercury, 1.10.1903.

groups, could not hope to achieve success. After conferring with the Speaker, he advised the Governor to send for Morgan. Morgan subsequently named his Coalition Ministry on 17th September, 1903:

Morgan: Premier, Ch. Secretary and Minister for Railways

Browne: Secretary for Mines and Public Works

Kidston: Treasurer

Bell: Minister for Lands

Blair: Attorney-General

Denham: Secretary for Agriculture and Home Secretary

Barlow: Secretary for Public Instruction M.L.C.

Governor Chermside reported:

... Of the prospects of the duration of the present Government it is premature to judge. The Labour Party is the controlling factor, but in view of its inability to undertake the administration alone, it's prepared to relegate to the background its own advanced programme.⁴⁵

While the Labour Party insisted on complete autonomy and freedom of action, Morgan insisted that two Labour representatives should share Ministerial responsibility. Thus the Morgan-Browne Coalition was indeed a partnership, the Lib-Lab compromise so long sought, and so long denied by personalities and circumstances. Never in the previous

45. Gov. Sec. Despatches to the Sec. of State, 30.9.1903.

decade had defections from Ministerial ranks been on a matter of political principle. Always before, Ministerialists had objected to specific policies or principles - payment of members or border taxes, or railway rates or federation. The combination of agricultural discontent and political progressivism had proved crucial and the dissensions could no longer be contained by a politically impotent Ministry. Never before had the Continuous Ministry been so weak in the area of its greatest strength. In this way, circumstances favoured Coalition. Moreover, Kidston, Browne and Morgan were relatively unaffected by the disappointments, frustrations and distrust which had wrecked the efforts of Powers, Drake, Glassey and Dawson.

Once again, financial and economic circumstances had brought about a Coalition in Queensland politics. The circle had turned - from the time of the Coalition of Liberal and Conservative in 1890, through the long, dismal, often incompetent, sometimes corrupt years of the Continuous Ministry to a new Liberal-Labour Coalition in 1903. The future of the Morgan-Browne Coalition was far from assured, but the liberation of Queensland from the reactionary stranglehold of the Continuous Ministry brought once again a fresh and exciting atmosphere to political life.

CONCLUSION

"Expediency" is defined by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as that which is politic rather than just. Nothing more aptly described the condition of Queensland politics during the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. Time and again, political principle was sacrificed to expediency; time and again the Government flew in the face of long established traditions of justice and parliamentary precedent. Why then, did the Continuous Ministry hold office for thirteen long years while Queensland settled ever deeper into a slough of conservatism, indeed reaction, and corruption, governed by a political elite, posturing, self-important, but in the end, very, very mediocre?

The decade had been ushered in by a depression as severe as any Queenslanders had ever known. The collapse of the building industry heralded the collapse of the banks. The reckless spending policy of the governments led to rapid and debilitating retrenchment when overseas loan sources dried up. Unemployment reached levels never before anticipated, and only feeble attempts were made to aid those thousands thrown out of work. The unemployed were regarded as social outcasts, failures in a land where self-help was a primary virtue and the self-made man often

the pinnacle of social and economic success. Samuel Smiles reigned supreme in society but so did government handouts to large-scale industry. It was not a land where the aged, poor, ill or unemployed were accepted as a social or political responsibility.

The Queensland Parliament was very definitely a parliament which represented the interests of property. Leaders such as Morehead, McIlwraith, Nelson and Philp are typical products of a colonial elite based upon property. Of those leaders who had received a tertiary education, only one, T.J. Byrnes, had done so in Australia, and only Griffith showed any interest in its promotion in the colony. This reflected two attitudes - perhaps an attempt to maintain the privileges of an existing elite but certainly it was an indication of the values of a society based upon material progress and material possessions.

The Eighties had seen a stable bipartisan political division, resting upon the personal magnetism of Griffith and McIlwraith and supported by a complicated web of intrigue, patronage and to a certain extent differing political values. But all shared the common vision of progress, material and moral, concomitant with the economic development of the colony. The 1890 Coalition did not change this vision, but it did create a political watershed. While it may be argued that the political disparity between the two parties has been

exaggerated, it remains true that the Coalition was a profound shock to the body politic. A far greater shock was the 1891 pastoral strike which cemented what had been largely an opportunistic expedient into a long-term political reality. The strike sounded the death-knell of what had been known as the Liberal Party, which had, however, already lost much of its identity in the conservative 1890 coalition. By 1893, a new challenge had emerged - a Labour Party with eighteen seats in the Assembly, representing a working population no longer content with their former paternalistic representation. While the party steadily gained seats, it remained unable to transcend its regional character. Partly this was a result of Ministerial electoral machinations - redistributions and carefully staggered elections designed to keep the Continuous Ministry in power. In 1892 an Election Act had directly struck at the nomadic bush workers by tightening residence qualifications. By 1899 too, the Labour Party's solidarity was beginning to disintegrate with serious tussles between the industrial and political wings.

What, meanwhile had happened to the Liberals? Some stalwarts struggled on as a rump opposition, but their numbers were small and morale increasingly low. It was not until 1899, when some Ministerialists, mostly standing for farming electorates, breathed some new life into the

Ministerial back benches, that the Liberals saw some hope of breaking the reactionary stranglehold of the Ministry. The failure of attempts at a Liberal-Labour Coalition meant that the Government continued in office as long as it did. Its popularity had steadily sagged from 1895. Perhaps, in part, this survival may also have been due to the apathy or timidity of the Queensland people. Perhaps, suffering from the physical and spiritual hardships engendered by the depression and the disastrous 1893 floods, they simply did not care what sort of government they had. Or perhaps they simply lacked the will to change.

Meanwhile, they were titillated, but also shocked, by one financial scandal after another dominated by the affairs of the Queensland National Bank. The long drawn out Enquiry, the reluctance of the Government to table the Report so damaging to some of its members and former members, and finally the criminal trial of those implicated certainly demoralized the public at a time when many needed confidence and a fresh start.

Ironically, the Government was finally defeated by rebellion from within rather than challenge from without. The Peace Preservation Bill, the Queensland National Bank, the Federation Enabling Bill, the Mirani-Cattle Creek Railway

scandal, counted for nothing when it came to its failure to satisfy the needs of business. The reintroduction of coloured labour and land grant railways were insignificant compared to financial ineptitude and a failure to balance the budget. Political chicanery and social irresponsibility did not compare to a deficit of £300,000 in 1903. So the Continuous Ministry came to an end. Once again a coalition came to office - a Liberal-Labour coalition which promised a new and energetic approach to Government. Cynicism and expediency had, perhaps, given way to enthusiasm and political principle.

APPENDIX ONE

M

ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902 (1)

(1)

ELECTORATE	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902	
ALBERT 1	T. PLUNKETT (N) 533 T. LENNEBURG (N) 424 G. GRIMES (L) 154 F. RAWLINGS (N) 38	PLUNKETT (O) 578 MCNAMARA (O) 244 CASTLES (M) 195	COLLINS (M) 456 PLUNKETT (M) 442 BRADFORD (L) 161	PLUNKETT (O) 571 COLLINS (M) 511 MCNAMARA 166	PLUNKETT (I.O) 922 CURRIE (M) 616	
	AUBIGNY 1	J. CAMPBELL (N) 315 G. WITTELTON (L) 277	LOVEJOY (L) 628 CAMPBELL (M) 231	THORN W. (O) 790 LOVEJOY (L) 342	THORN (O) 859 O'BRIEN (IL) 349	THORN (O) 699 LOVEJOY (L) 635
	BALONNE	B. D. MOREHEAD U/C	MOREHEAD (M) 293 DAVIS (L) 157	STORY (M) 301 CLOWES (L) 284	STORY (M) 472 CLOWES (L) 455	STORY (M) 460 ADAMS (L) 392
BARCOO	MURPHY (N)	KERR (L) 303 BROWN (L) 265 PARNELL (M) 227 BANKS (I) 15	KERR (L) 450 NEWTON (M) 435	KERR (L) 580 CAMERON (M) 521	KERR (L) 627 McCULLOGH (I) 478	
BOWEN	R. SMITH (N) 242 G. COLLING (L) 65	SMITH (M) 217 WATTE (L) 144 STANFIELD 44	SMITH (M) 240 BAMFORD (O) 194 AHEARNE (M) 123	SMITH (M) 325 BAMFORD (O) 291 TAYLOR (IF) 28	KENNA (L) 391 ANNEAR (M) 177 HERON (O) 13	
BRISBANE NORTH 2	McILWRAITH (N) 1761 GRIFFITH (L) 1127 BROOKS (L) 1009	McILWRAITH (M) 1576 KINGSBURY (M) 1482 LILLEY (O) 947 GLASSEY (L) 766 RAVEN (T) 55	MAC-PATERSON (IM) 1538 FRASER (IM) 1250 BYRNES (M) 1155 KINGSBURY (M) 1011	FORREST (M) 1283 MAC-PAT (M) 1159 FRASER (M) 823 ST. LEDGER (O) 576	FORREST (M) 1615 CAMERON (M) 1668 McNAB (L) 936	
	BRISBANE SOUTH 2	JORDAN (N) 1001 LUYA (N) 921 FRASER (L) 915	MIDSON (M) 1132 TURLEY (L) 932 EDWARDS (M) 719 BOWMAN (L) 835 HARGRAVE (IM) 243 LUYA (M) 613	STEPHENS (M) 1172 TURLEY (L) 1138 MIDSON (M) 966 BOND (L) 738 EDWARDS (IM) 586	STEPHENS (M) 1432 LUYA (M) 1241 TURLEY (L) 1176 BOND (L) 842 STRAWSON 42	BOND (L) 984 PRINGLE (L) 934 STEPHENS (M) 1689 LAMONT (M) 1627 LUCAS (I) 341
BULLMBA	J. BUCKLAND (L) 526 G. BELL (N) 421	DICKSON (M) 933 DONALDSON (O) 733	J. R. DICKSON 720 M. GANNON (O) 703	J. R. DICKSON (M) 1044 MIDDLEY A (L) 453	BARNES W. H. (M) N.C.	

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ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

ELECTORATE	1888		1893		1896		1899		1902		
	LEAHY (M) (Unopposed)	(M)	LEAHY J (Unopposed)	(M)	LEAHY J (I) BREEN W (L)	(I)	LEAHY (I) (Unopposed)	(I)	O'SULLIVAN W (L) LEAHY J (M)	(L)	(M)
BULLOO	LEAHY (M) (Unopposed)	(M)	LEAHY J (Unopposed)	(M)	LEAHY J (I) BREEN W (L)	(I)	LEAHY (I) (Unopposed)	(I)	O'SULLIVAN W (L) LEAHY J (M)	(L)	(M)
BUNDABERG	W. ADAMS (L)	(L)	DUFFY HALL	(M)	T. GLASSEY (L) M. DUFFY (M)	(L)	T. GLASSEY (L) C. POWERS (M)	(L)	G. BARBER J. WHITE	(L)	(M)
BURKE	HODGKINSON (L) E. HUNTER (L) G. GARDINER (N) J. HOOLAN (L) W. MORGAN (N) (FIGURES UN- AVAILABLE)	(L)	HOOLAN (FIGURES UNAVAILABLE)	(L)	HOOLAN (L) FULFON (M)	(L)	MAXWELL (L) J. LACEY (IL)	(L)	MAXWELL J. LACEY	(L)	(L)
BURNETT	G. JONES (N) B. MORETON (L)	(N)	CADELL MAIR	(I)	MCCORD DENT	(M)	W. KENT (M) DENT (L)	(M)	T. ARDENT W. KENT	(L)	(M)
BURRUM	C. POWERS (N) T. BRONLEY (L) T. PRICE (N)	(N)	TOOTH WILLARD	(M)	TOOTH (M) DAWSON (L)	(M)	TOOTH (M) DAWSON (L) RANKIN (M) BIDDLES (FR)	(M)	MARTIN TOOTH DAWSON	(L)	(M)
CAIRNS	F. WIMBLE (L) R. KINGSFORD (N) T. THOMAS (L)	(L)	BYRNES GIVENS	(M)	LISSNER GIVENS	(M)	GIVENS (L) HOOLAN (I)	(L)	GIVENS LYONS	(L)	(M)
CAMBOOYA	P. PERKINS (N) W. VICKERS (L)	(N)	DANIELS PERKINS BOLAND	(L)	DANIELS (L) MACKINTOSH (FR) TYSON-DONNELLY (O) MULLINS (O)	(L)	MACKINTOSH (M) DANIELS (L)	(M)	DANIELS MACKINTOSH EVANS	(L)	(M)
CARNARVON	J. FOXTON (L) B. HUDSON (M) (FIGURES UN- AVAILABLE)	(L)	FOXTON CAMERON	(M)	FOXTON (M) GOUGH (L)	(M)	J. F. G. FOXTON (M) W. BEGG (L)	(M)	FOXTON TURLEY	(M)	(L)

ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

ELECTORATE	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902
CARPENTARIA		PHILLIPS (M) 177 RAFFERTY (L) 174	SIM (L) 230 PHILLIPS (M) 188	FORSYTH (M) 467 BRODIE (IM) 327	KIDDELL (L) 233 FORSYTH (M) 297
CHARTERS TOWERS	R. SAYERS (L) 1201 A. RUTLEDGE (L) 1188 J. MACDONALD T. O'KANE (L) 317 W. DAVIES (LAB) 287	DAWSON (L) 2139 DUNSFORD (L) 1923 SAYERS (O) 1307 McLARTY (I) 1052	DAWSON (L) 1981 DUNSFORD (L) 1808 SAYERS (M) 1431	DAWSON (LD) 2341 DUNSFORD (LO) 2265 PAULL (M) 1255	DUNSFORD (L) 2087 BURROWS (L) 1975 ST. LEDGER (M) 1888 PAULL (M) 1784
CLERMONT	J. STEVENSON (N) 264 W. O'SHEA (L) 144	CROSS (L) 331 STEVENSON (M) 292	CROSS J. M. (UN- OPPOSED)	V. J. B. LESINA (L) 674 J. M. CROSS (L) 562	LESINA (L) 635 HULLEN (IL) 472
COOK	<u>FIGURES UN-AVAILABLE</u>	HAMILTON (M) 323 SHANAHAN (L) 259	HAMILTON (M) 322 RIDDELL (L) 290 CLUNN (I) 70	HAMILTON (M) 425 RIDDELL (L) 226	GOUGH (L) 406 HAMILTON (M) 432
CROYDON	<u>FIGURES UN-AVAILABLE</u>	BROWNE (L) 706 MORGAN (M) 236 HUNTER (M) 62	BROWNE (L) 682 MUNGOVAN (I) 199	BROWNE (LO) 569 ROGERS (IO) 325	BROWNE (L) 558 WARAN (M) 196
CUNNINGHAM	W. ALLEN (M) 499 F. KATES (L) 290	ALLEN (M) 586 BREWER (FR) 459	McGAHAN (FR) 523 GORDON (M) 450 RANSOME (M) 87 FINLAY (M) 73	KATES (IM) 719 McGAHAN (M) 566 PATTERSON (L) 74	ASPINAL (L) 6 KATES (M) 731 WATSON (M) 214 DEACON (FR) 198 McGAHAN (IFR) 512
DALBY	J. JESSOP (N) 354 F. MCKEON (N) 156	BELL (M) 301 McCARTHY (L) 237 CALLAN (I) 149	BELL (M) 457 McCARTHY (L) 316	BELL J (M) 442 FEGAN T (L) 291 TAYLOR W (M) 86	BELL (M) 499 DILLON (IO) 481
DRAYTON TOOWOOMBA	GROOM (L) 1662 ALAND (L) 925 GARGET (N) 616 FOGARTY (I) 409	GROOM (O) 1210 FOGARTY (O) 1261 ALAND (IL) 598	GROOM (O) 970 FOGARTY (O) 962 CAMPBELL (M) 769 ALAND (M) 572 TRENOWITH (L) 464	FOGARTY (O) 1627 GROOM (O) 1323 TOLMIE (M) 1042	SMART (L) 1383 TOLMIE (M) 1451 FOGARTY (O) 1407

APPENDIX ONE

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ELECTION RESULTS -1888 - 1902

	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902
ELECTORATE	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902
ENOGGERA	J. D. DRAKE (L) 309 GIBBS (N) 212 PARK (N) 162 GEBBIE (L) 664	J. D. DRAKE (O) 473 PATEN (M) 406	DRAKE (O) 501 THURLOW (M) 437	DRAKE J. D. (O) 604 REID W. T. (M) 388	DICKSON UNOPPOSED
FASSIFERN	W. SAIKELD (L) 363 E. BULLMORE (N) 272	THORN G. (M) 542 SAIKELD (I) 327	THORN G (M) 431 MOFFAT (L) 283 MURRAY-PRIOR (IM) 151 BENNET (FR) 106	G. THORN (O) 641 MOFFAT (IO) 467	G. THORN (M) 445 MURRAY-PRIOR (O) 514 KRETCHEMER (I) 117
FITZROY	R. LYONS (N) (UNOPPOSED)	CALLAN (I) 454 MCCARTHY (L) 401	CALLAN (M) 678 HENDERSON (L) 372	CALLAN (M) 748 WEIGHTMAN (L) & (O) 522	COWAP (L) 940 MACPHERSON (IM) 800
FLINDERS	L. GOLDRING (N) FIG. UNOBTAINABLE J. JOLSON (N)	MACDONALD (L) 301 GOLDRING (M) 288	MACDONALD (L) 457 PALMER (IM) 258	MACDONALD (LO) 548 CROTHERS (M) 434	ALREY (L) 665 GOLDRING (IM) 486
FORFTUDE VALLEY	WATSON (N) 1433 MCMASTER (L) 1062 BROOKS (L) 817 COLBOURNE (LAB) 623 BURTON (N) 151	MCMASTER (M) 1553 WATSON (M) 1494 MCDONNELL (L) 1100 HINCHCLIFFE (L) 889	MCMASTER (M) 1297 MCDONNELL (L) 1039 WATSON (M) 1012 HIGGS (L) 720 KEOGH (I) 400 PROE (I) 343	MCDONNELL (L) 1467 HIGGS (L) 1359 MCMASTER (M) 1049 WELSBY (M) 987 WATSON (M) 499	MCDONNELL (L) 1493 THOMSON (L) 1042 BRADFORD (IL) 44 MCMASTER (M) 1229 WELSBY (M) 989 BROOKS (M) 702 MAUGHAN (IO) 155 KING (I) 226
GREGORY	CORFIELD (UNOPPOSED)	CORFIELD (UNOPPOSED)	CORFIELD (M) 167 HUTCHESON (L) 115	HAMILTON DOOD (M) 220	HAMILTON (L) 390 RILEY (M) 170
GYMPIE 2	SMYTH (L) 1065 HELLOR (L) 1061 FERGUSON (N) 641 POLLOCK (N) 593	FISHER (L) 1009 SMYTH (M) 812 RYLAND (L) 783 STUMM (M) 734 CHAPPEU (IL) 249	SMYTH (M) 1318 STUMM (M) 1238 FISHER (L) 999 McCORMACK (L) 969	FISHER A (L) 1143 RYLAND G (L) 1101 POWER F (M) 1081 SUTHERS W (M) 1011 MULCAHY D (I) 116	MULCAHY (L) 1385 RYLAND (L) 1441 REID (M) 1361 DAVIDSON (M) 1191

ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

ELECTORATE	1888		1893		1896		1899		1902	
	NAME	(P)	NAME	(P)	NAME	(P)	NAME	(P)	NAME	(P)
IPSWICH	BARLOW	(L) 1009	BARLOW	(M) 960	CRIBB	(M) 1348	STEPHENSEN	(M) 1162	RYOFT-	
	MACFARLANE	(L) 907	McFARLANE	(O) 745	STEPHENSON	(M) 1238	CRIBB	(M) 1106	MAUGHAN	(L) 533
	THORN	(I) 671	WILKINSON	(L) 712	WILKINSON	(L) ---	WILKINSON	(L) 806	CRIBB	(M) 1124
	CRIBB	(M) 397	FARRELY	(L) 522	SUMMERVILLE	(L) 718	WYMAN	(O) 691	STEPHENSEN	(M) 855
							BLAIR	(IO) 1206	JACKSON	(L) UN-
KENNEDY	LISSNER	(N) 246	JACKSON	(L) 282	JACKSON	(L) 603	G. JACKSON	(L) 390	JACKSON	(L) UN-
	SIMPSON	(L) 163	LISSNER	(M) 250	HOUGHTON	(M) 256	W. BOYCE	(M) 149	OPPOSED	
			McCULLA	(IL) 44						
LEIDHARDT	PAUL	(N) 233	HARDACRE	(L) 217	HARDACRE	(L) 517	HARDACRE	(L)	HARDACRE	(L) 383
	DUTTON	(L) 165	PAUL	(M) 261	HINTON	(M) 256	UNOPPOSED		HOGAN	(M) 229
			FORREST	(I) 93						
LOGAN	E. J. STEVENS (I) UNOPPOSED				DONALDSON	(M) 442	J. STODART	(M) 572	KERWAN	(L) 239
					GRIMES	(M) 300	W. BRIGGS	318	STODART	(M) 564
					CASTLES	(FR) 252				
LOCKYER	NORTH	(N) 447	HODGKINSON	(O) 417	ARMSTRONG	(O) 796	ARMSTRONG	(M) 898	ARMSTRONG	(M) 846
	HALL	(L) 393	ARMSTRONG	(M) 445	WILLARD	(L) 419	POLLOCK	(L) 542	O'KEEFE	(IO) 757
			HALL	(L) 317						
			KELLETT	(I) 69						
MACKAY	BLACK	(N) 925	DALRYMPLE	(M) 906	DALRYMPLE	(M) 791	CHATAWAY	(M) 1113	SHANNON	(L) 748
	DALRYMPLE	(N) 881	CHATAWAY	(M) 770	CHATAWAY	(M) 773	DALRYMPLE	(M) 1075	SWAYNE	(F. R.) 702
	HEDGES	(L) 543	BLACK	(M) 540	BLACK H. B.	(I) 750	BLACK H. B.	(IO) 830	PAGEE	(M) 940
				TAIT	(I) 407	SHANNON	(FR) 402	DALRYMPLE	(M) 917	
						SHELDON	(IL) 304			
MARANO	DUNSWORTH	(N) 362	KING	(L) 435	KING	(L) 483	RUTLEDGE	(M) 520	RUTLEDGE	(M) 664
	HUNTER	(L) 144	KATES	(M) 337	KATES	(FR) 468	KING	(L) 503	WARD	(I) 332
						LAWSON	(L) 40			
MITCHELL			CAMERON	(O) 329	FITZGERALD	(L) 572	FITZGERALD	(L) 757	FITZGERALD	(L) 549
						EDKINS	(L) 353	COOPER	(I) 653	
						MAGOFFIN	(IO) 48			

APPENDIX ONE

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ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

ELECTORATE	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902
MORETON	BATTERSBY (N) 427 HARDGRAVE (L) 354 McLENNAN (L) 90 RENDLE (I) 34		BATTERSBY (M) 590 FRANCIS (O) 436	J. D. CAMPBELL (M) 754 J. MAIR (L) 393 LANG (M) 194 BATTERSBY (M) 161 WALKER (L) 4	CAMPBELL (M) N-
MARYBOR- OUGH	ANNEAR (L) 974 HYNE (L) 866 KING (N) 714	ANNEAR (M) 837 POWERS (O) 773 NORMAN 672 FOOTH (M) 733 HYNE (I) 525	BARTHOLOMEW (M) 1281 ANNEAR (M) 1204 McGHIE (L) 695 NORMAN (L) 827	BARTHOLOMEW (M) 1034 ANNEAR (M) 998 STAFFORD (M) 684 McGHIE (L) 625 MITCHELL (L) 361	NORMAN (L) 1171 BARTON (L) 1102 BARTHOLOMEW (M) 611 LILLEY (M) 407 CORSEY (I) 503
MURILLA	NELSON (N) (UNAPPOSED)	NELSON	NELSON (M) 305 MAQUIRE (L) 168	MOORE (M) 337 CAMPBELL (L) 102	ADDISON (L) 287 MOORE (M) 313
MUSGRAVE	O'CONNELL (N) (U/O)	O'CONNELL (M) 558	O'CONNELL (M) (NO POLL)	O'CONNELL (M) 525 McRORIE (L) 278 NEWITT (IO) 17	NELSON (L) 477 O'CONNELL (M) 686
NUNDAH	AGNEW (N) 394 BULCOCK (L) 381	AGNEW (M) 579 BRIDGES (O) 437 APPEL (O) 287	BRIDGES (O) 587 AGNEW (M) 545	BRIDGES (M) 755 SUMMER (LO) 472 BOYCE (IO) 33	COTTEL (L) 175 AGNEW (M) 213 BRIDGES (IM) 759
OXLEY	GRIMES (L) 405 BUZACOTT (N) 278	GRIMES (M) 542 CULPIN (IL) 239 CROWE (I) 121 O'CONNOR (I) 78 NEILSON (I) 75	GRIMES (M) 472 CULPIN (O) 409	GRIMES (M) 489 CULPIN (O) 480 LILLEY (IO) 409	CLOUDS DALE (L) 404 GRIMES (M) 587 BURTON (IM) 269 CROSS (IO) 60
PORT CURTIS	NORTON (N) 223 LUMLEY HILL (L) 163	BOLES (O) 263 NORTON (I) 253	BOLES (O) 347 FOOTE (M) 292	BOLES (O) 1258 BRUCE (M) 367	DAVIES (L) 448 BOLES (IO) 535

APPENDIX ONE

ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

(vii)

ELECTORATE	1888	1893	1896	1899	1902
ROCKHAMPTON	PATTISON (N) 776 ARCHER (N) 759 MORGAN (L) 559 PEBERDY (L) 553	ARCHER (I) 1070 CURTIS (I) 1021 KIDSTON (L) 821 LARCOSME(L) 728	KIDSON (L) 1031 CURTIS (I) 808 FIDDES (I) 759	CURTIS (O) 1258 KIDSTON (L) 1208 BURNS (IM) 670	KIDSTON (L) 1291 GRANT (L) 1154 CURTIS (M) 1076
ROCKHAMPTON NORTH	R. JONES (M) 351 D. MacDONALD(L) 174	HARDING (I) 427 STEWART (L) 335	STEWART (L) 416 HARDING (O) 387	STEWART (L) 648 PATTERSON (M) 367	TURNER (L) 590 BEAR (M) 500
ROSEWOOD	ISAMBERT (L) 513 FARRELY (N) 325	CRIBB (M) 567 HARDGRAVE(L) 245	KEOGH (L) 336 HARDGRAVES(M) 323 COLVIN (L) 121 ARNDT (O) 30	KEOGH (L) 502 HARDGRAVE (M) 387	ISAMBERT(L) 61 KEOGH (M) 397 BECKER (IM) 168 HODGE (FR) 436
STANLEY	P O'SULLIVAN (N) 355 KELLETT (L) 203 WERNER (L) 49	LORD (M) 360 O'SULLIVAN (L) 351	LORD (M) 445 MAIR (L) 363	LORD (M) 477 SUMMERVILLE (L) 404 O'SULLIVAN(M) 164	SUMMERVILLE (L) 492 LORD (M) 403
TOOWONG	UNMACK (L) 507 COOPER (N) 393 VALENTINE(LAB) 152 LOGAN (N) 7	REID (L) 780 UNMACK (M) 717	FINNEY (M) 873 REID (L) 866	FINNEY (M) 1072 REID (L) 986	SPINK (L) 802 MACARTNEY(M) 1236
TOOMBUL	GANNON (N) 388 DICKSON (L) 351 MINCHCLIFFE (LAB) 227	PETRIE (M) 756 GANNON (I) 366 ELLISON (I) 338	PETRIE (UNOPPOSED)	PETRIE (M) 949 COLLINGS (L) 387	COLBOURNE(L) 481 PETRIE (M) 1152 BIRKBECK (I) 175
TOWNSVILLE	PHILD (N) 716 MACROSSAN (N) 688 HENRY (L) 490	PHILLIP (M) 747 BURNS (M) 686 OGDEN (L) 495 MCKIERMAN(L) 172	PHILLIP (M) 1013 CASTLING (M) 945 OGDEN (L) 803 FOLEY (L) 698	R. PHILIP (M) 1310 P. HANRAN (M) 1151 W. LENNON (I) 716 A. OGDEN (L) 614 T. FOLEY (O) 471	ENRIGHT (L) 570 OGDEN (L) 558 PHILIP (M) 859 HANRAN (M) 769

APPENDIX ONE

ELECTION RESULTS - 1888 - 1902

(viii)

ELECTORATE	1888			1893			1896			1899			1902		
	NAME	(P)	(V)	NAME	(P)	(V)	NAME	(P)	(V)	NAME	(P)	(V)	NAME	(P)	(V)
WARREGO	CASEY	(N)	229	CROMBIE	(M)	281	CROMBIE	(M)	390	HOOD	(M)	440	BOWAN	(L)	384
	TON	(L)	66	FRANCIS	(L)	248	BREEN	(L)	211	BOWMAN	(L)	439	LEAHY	(L)	441
WARWICK	MORGAN	(I)	472				BYRNES	(M)	594	MORGAN	(M)	552	MORGAN	(M)	722
	HIGGINS	(N)	281				ARNOTT	(IF)	245	WILSONJ	(I)	214	WILSON	(IO)	196
WOOLLOONGABBA															
	STEPHENS	(I)	441	STEPHENS	(M)	744	DIBLEY	(L)	699	DIBLEY	(L)	750	DIBLEY	(L)	896
	SWANWICK	(N)	381	DIBLEY	(L)	617	SINCLAIR	(M)	565	BLOCKSIDE	(M)	551	BLOCKSIDE	(M)	839
	JOHNSTON	(LAB)	259	OVEREND	(M)	206	RAYMOND	(O)	287	DUTHIE	(IO)	158	O'SULLIVAN	(L)	112
WOOTHAKATA	LITTLE	(N)	422	RAWLINGS	(L)	407	NEWELL	(M)	487	NEWELL	(M)	467	WOODS	(L)	1023
	CAIRNS	(L)	298	LITTLE	(M)	321	RAWLINGS	(L)	340	MCMAHON	(L)	321	DOWEL	(M)	478
				BONER	(I)	233									
WIDE BAY	TOZER	(L)	286	TOZER	(M)		FIGURES			JENKINSON	(L)	589	BAILEY	(L)	302
	FLOOD	(N)	273	UNOPPOSED			UNAVAILABLE			CHIPPENDALE	(M)	458	LINDLEY	(IM)	501
													JENKINSON	(M)	839

(1) THE FIGURES BELOW ARE TAKEN FROM HUGHES & GRAHAM B.D., VOTING FOR THE QUEENSLAND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1890-1905 (CANU., 1974)

BUNDANBA	GLASSEY (L)	322	THOMAS (F)	674	THOMAS (F)	52	CAIBB (F)	457	CRIBB (F)	N/C
	THOMAS (N)	293	GLASSEY (L)	402	RHOE-THURMAN (L)	356	SYDES (F)	194		
	SHILOTO (LIB)	292			LLOYD-OWEN (F)	27	HAN (L)	319		
NORMANBY			HURRAY (F)	N/C	HURRAY (F)	N/C	HURRAY (F)	296	FOX (F)	372
							PEGARDY (L)	202	WHITELEY (L)	212
HERBERT			COWLEY (F)	361	COWLEY (F)	N/C	COWLEY (N)	N/C	COWLEY (F)	599
			COSTELLO (L)	148					EDLEY (L)	644

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES1888

<u>McILWRAITH</u>	<u>GRIFFITH</u>	<u>INDEPENDENTS</u>
Plunkett	Griffith	Stevens
Smith	Buckland	Stephens
Leahy	Adams	
G. Jones	Glassey	
Perkins	Hodgkinson	
Allan	Wimble	
Campbell	Foxton	
McIlwraith	Sayers	
Murphy	Rutledge	
Morehead	Drake	
Jordan	Salkeld	
Luya	McMaster	
Powers	Smyth	
Stevenson	Mellor	
Jessop	Barlow	
Lyons	Macfarlane	
Goldring	Annear	
Watson	Hyne	
Corfield	Grimes	
Cowley	Lambert	
Lassner	Unmack	
Paul	Groom	
North	Aland	
Dunsmure	Morgan	
Black	Tozer	
Dalrymple		
Crombie		
Battersby		
Nelson		
Agnew		
Norton		
Pattison		
Archer		
Jones		
O'Sullivan		
Casey		
Gannon		
Philp		
Macrossan		
Little		
O'Connell		
Murray		
Callan		
Donaldson		

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES

1893

<u>MINISTERIALIST</u>	<u>OPPOSITION</u>	<u>LABOUR</u>	<u>INDEPENDENT</u>
Plunkett (M)	W. Thorn	Kerr	Leahy (M)
Morehead (M)	Groom (G)	Turley	Cadell (L)
Smith (M)	Drake (G)	Hodan (G)	Callan (M)
McIlwraith (M)	Powers (M)	Daniels	Curtis (M)
Kingsbury	Cameron	Dawson	Stevens (I)
Midson	Boles	Dunsford	Archer (M)
Dickson (G)	Morgan (G)	J.M. Cross	Harding
Thomas		Browne	
Duffy		Fogarty	
Tooth		MacDonald	
Byrnes		Fisher	
Foxton (G)		Jackson	
Phillips		Hardacre	
Hamilton		King	
Allan (M)		Reid	
Bell		Rawlings	
G. Thorn		Wilkinson	
Watson (M)		Ogden	
McMaster			
Smyth (G)			
Corfield (M)			
Cowley (M)			
Barlow (G)			
Macfarlane (G)			
Armstrong			
Dalrymple (M)			
Chataway			
Annear (G)			
Battersley (M)			
Nelson (M)			
O'Connell (M)			
Murray (M)			
Agnew			
Grimes (G)			
Cribb			
Lord			
Petrie			
Philp (M)			
Burns			
Crombie (M)			
Tozer (L)			
Stephens (I)			

* Appearing in brackets are 1888 Identifications (M) McIlwraith
(G) Griffith

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES1896

<u>MINISTERIALIST</u>	<u>LABOUR</u>	<u>OPPOSITION</u>	<u>INDEPENDENT</u>
Story	Kerr	Plunkett (M)	Leahy
Smith	Glassey	W. Thorn	Kates
Macdonald-Paterson	Maxwell	G. Thorn (M)	
Forrest	Givens	Fogarty (L)	
Stephens	Dawson	Groom	
Luya	Dunsford	Drake	
Dickson	Lesina	Boles	
Cribb	Browne	Curtis (M)	
Kent	MacDonald		
Tooth	McDonnell		
Mackintosh	Higgs		
Foxton	W. Hamilton		
Forsyth	Fisher		
Hamilton	Ryland		
Bell	Jackson		
Callan (I)	Hardacre		
Cowley	Fitzgerald		
Stephenson	Kidston		
Cribb	Stewart		
Armstrong	Keogh		
Stodart	Jenkinson		
Chataway	Dibley		
Dalrymple			
Rutledge			
Bartholomew			
Annear			
Campbell			
Moore			
O'Connell			
Murray			
Bridges			
Grimes			
Lord			
Finney			
Petrie			
Philp			
Hanran			
Hood			
Morgan (O)			
Newell			

*Appearing in brackets are 1893 Identifications where they are changed.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES1899

<u>MINISTERIALIST</u>	<u>LABOUR</u>	<u>OPPOSITION</u>	<u>INDEPENDENT</u>
Thorn (O)	Kerr	Plunkett	Cooper
Story	Kenna	Fogarty	Bridges (O)
Forrest	Barber	Murray-Prior	Hodge
Cameron	Maxwell	Blair	Lindley
Stephens	Martin	Boles	
Lamont	Dunsford		
Barnes	Burrows		
Leahy (I)	Lesina		
Cribb	Browne		
Kent	Cowap		
Foxton	Airey		
Forsyth	McDonnell		
Hamilton	Hamilton		
Kates (I)	Mulcahy		
Bell	Ryland		
Tolmie	Jackson		
Dickson	Hardacre		
McMaster	Norman		
Cowley	Barton		
Cribb	Kidston		
Stodart	Grant		
Paget	Turner		
Dalrymple	Summeville		
Rutledge	Dibley		
Campbell	Woods		
Moore			
O'Connell			
Fox			
Grimes			
Petrie			
Macartney			
Philp			
Hanran			
Morgan			
Lyons			
Mackintosh			

OCCUPATION AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP - 1888

PASTORALISM		VARIED BUSINESS		MINING	LAW	SUGAR
McILWRAITH (N)		CORFIELD (N)		MACROSSAN (N)	JONES (N)	ADAMS (N)
MOREHEAD (N)		LISSNER (N)		PATTISON (N)	LYONS (N)	COWLEY (N)
BLACK (N)		LUYA (N)		LITTLE (N)	POWERS (N)	
DONALDSON (N)		WATSON (N)		LYONS (N)	FOXTON (L)	
DALRYMPLE (N)		GANNON (N)		HAMILTON (N)	RUTLEDGE (L)	
CROMBIE (N)		GOLDRING (N)		SAYERS (L)	DRAKE (L)	
JONES (N)		STEPHENS (N)		SMYTH (L)	TOZER (L)	
NELSON (N)		ALAND (L)		MELLOR (L)	GRIFFITH (L)	
PALMER (N)		ANNEAR (L)		GLASSEY (L)		
LYONS (N)		PERKINS (N)		HUNTER (L)		
MURPHY (N)		UNMACK (L)				
DUNSMURE (N)		ISAMBERT (L)				
STEVENSON (N)		BARLOW (L)				
COWLEY (N)		HYNE (L)				
ARCHER (N)		SALKELD (L)				
O'SULLIVAN (N)		MACFARLANE (L)				
SMITH (N)						
MURRAY (N)			<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>
PLUNKETT (N)						
BATTERSBY (N)						
ALLAN (N)						
CASEY (N)		JOURNALISM		OTHERS		
JESSOP (N)		GROOM (L)	(L)	PAUL (N)		
NORTON (N)		MORGAN (L)	(L)	HODGKINSON (L)		
STEVENS (I)		WIMBLE (L)	(L)	JORDAN (L)		
MACFARLANE (L)		HOOLAN (L)	(L)	GRIMES (L)		
CADELL (I)				NORTH (N)		
LEAHY (I)						
PERKINS (N)						
<u>30</u>			<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>		

* Some members are repeated in different groupings

N - NATIONAL PARTY

L - LIBERAL PARTY

I - INDEPENDENT

A P P E N D I X 3THE LABOUR PROGRAMMEAUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION PLATFORM - 1890POLITICAL AIMS OF THE FEDERATION

1. The Nationalisation of all sources of wealth and all means of producing and exchanging wealth.
2. The conducting by the State authority of all production and all exchange.
3. The pensioning by the State authority of all children aged and invalid citizens.
4. The saving by the State authority of such proportion of the joint wealth production as may be requisite for instituting, maintaining and increasing national capital.
5. The maintenance by the State authority from the joint wealth production of all educational and sanitary institutions.
6. The just diversion among all the citizens of the State of all wealth production, less only that part retained for public and common requirements.
7. The Reorganisation of Society upon the above lines to be commenced at once and pursued uninterruptedly until social justice is fully secured to each and every citizen.

MEANS TOWARDS POLITICAL AIMS

The general council is satisfied that political aims worthy of the Australian Labour Federation are

impossible of attainment so long as political power is withheld from the people.

Queensland is so happily situated that a true People's Parliament would certainly be favourable to the Reorganization of Industry, yet as Parliaments are at present constituted the capitalistic minority rules, and has only to express its opinions to have them duly registered. Therefore, the General Council recommends the adoption of a People's Parliament platform and the subordination of all other measures to that all important step. In one year a People's Parliament will give Queensland workers more justice than can be wrung from Capitalistic Parliaments in a generation.

AUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION ELECTION

PLATFORM 1891

The Special General Council of the Australian Labour Federation, having regard for the approaching elections and the necessity for putting forward distinct legislative steps towards the political aims of the Federation, suggests to the various districts and unions the following measures to be advocated by all Labour Party candidates, as to be brought forward and the feeling of the Assembly tested thereon in the next Parliament, all Labour Party candidates to pledge themselves not only to vote for these measures, but to insist to the utmost of their power upon a fair hearing being accorded to the immediate claims of Labour.

Electoral Reform -

UNIVERSAL AND EQUAL ADULT WHITE SUFFRAGE

The Right to Vote

ABOLITION OF THE NOMINEE CHAMBER

National Work -

STATE WATER CONSERVATION AND IRRIGATION

STATE AIDED VILLAGE SETTLEMENT

STATE BANK

Educational -

COMPULSORY EDUCATION - absolutely free in State Schools

FREE LENDING LIBRARIES - Compulsory in all municipalities

Regulation of Industry -

STATUTORY EIGHT HOUR DAY

SHOPS AND FACTORIES ACT - With elected inspectors

MINES ACT - Giving complete protection to miners

MACHINERY ACT - providing for inspection of land
boilers and machinery

Labour Rights -

STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR - to which man can apply for
work at a minimum wage - AS A RIGHTWAGES ACT - Giving complete lien for wages over work
performed and full security for wages against all
forfeiture, whether by agreement or court orderSTATE PENSION - Of all persons over 60, who have been
in Queensland for 10 years, and of all orphans under
school age NOT AS A CHARITY BUT AS A RIGHTAMENDMENT OF TRADE UNION ACT - Declared by Chief Justice
Lilley to be "a sham and a delusion"

Repeals -

ABOLITION OF STATE AIDED IMMIGRATION

ABOLITION OF ALL CONSPIRACY LAWS - including Masters
and Servants Act

ABOLITION OF NOMINEE JUSTICES - All Magistrates to be
elected

ABOLITION OF C.D. ACT

The General Council urges all districts and unions to immediately consider those measures, and to notify the General Secretary if any measure of pressing importance has been omitted. Districts are requested to notify the General Executive of their decision by May 1, as the probability of a General Election necessitates immediate action. The putting forward measures of local interest is left entirely in the hands of the various District Councils.

Worker 7-3-91.

FIRST ATTEMPTS AT PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION (1)

1888 General Election

TOOMBUL (2)

Gannon (N) 387

Dickson (I.Lib) 351

Hinchcliffe (L) 226

By-Elections

BURKE

Hoolan (I) 491

Browne (L) 458

Sim (L) 299

FORTITUDE VALLEY

Watson (N) 1448
 McMaster (Lib) 1007
 W. Brooke (Lib) 826
 W. Colborne (L) 620
 Burton (I) 153

BARCOO

Ryan (L) 452
 (N) 252

WOOLLOONGABBA

Stephens (Lib) 441
 Swanwick (N) 388
 Johnson (L) 259

BUNDABERG

G. Hall

TOOWONG

Unmack (Lib) 507
 Cooper (N) 395
 Valentine (L) 153

BUNDAMBA

Glassey (Lib) 322
 Thomas (N) 293
 Shiloto (Lib) 292

(1) N. National Party, I. L. Ind.-Liberal, L Labour

(2) Hinchcliffe's large vote may have been due to a

Liberal backlash caused by Dickson's actions in 1887.

THE 1899 FEDERAL REFERENDUM.

<u>INNER URBAN</u>	<u>FOR</u>	<u>AGAINST</u>
BRISBANE NORTH	1028	1182
BRISBANE SOUTH	960	1651
FORTITUDE VALLEY	960	1646
TOOWONG	543	1116
WOOLLOONGABBA	543	971
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	3764	6566
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>SUBURBAN</u>		
BULIMBA	534	795
ENOGERA	299	619
NUNDAH	303	683
OXLEY	363	690
TOOMBUL	502	817
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2001	3604
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>DARLING DOWNS</u>		
AUBIGNY	169	974
CAMBOOYA	278	938
CARNAVON	542	132
CUNNINGHAM	715	638
DALBY	324	324
DRAYTON AND TOOWOOMBA	982	1129
WARWICK	529	209
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	3549	5444
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>SOUTH EAST</u>		
ALBERT		
BUNDAMBA	272	497
FASSIFERN	253	729
IPSWICH	622	1146
LOCKYER	387	887
LOGAN	257	514
MORETON	483	771
ROSEWOOD	144	668
STANLEY	194	589
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2612	5801
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>SOUTH WEST</u>		
BALONNE	609	187
BULLOO	283	23
MARANOVA	562	404
MURILLA	318	192
WARREGO	587	176
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2359	983
	<hr/>	<hr/>

THE 1899 FEDERAL REFERENDUM.

		<u>FOR</u>	<u>AGAINST</u>
<u>WIDE BAY</u>	BUNDABERG	793	320
	BURNETT	727	343
	BURRUM	732	288
	MARYBOROUGH	1165	449
	GYMPIE	1337	712
	MUSGRAVE	629	205
	WIDE BAY	443	395
		<u>5826</u>	<u>2712</u>
<u>CENTRAL</u>	FITZROY	1254	579
	NORMANBY	271	223
	PORT CURTIS	590	210
	ROCKHAMPTON	368	530
	ROCKHAMPTON NORTH	982	1290
		<u>3465</u>	<u>2832</u>
<u>CENTRAL WEST</u>	BARCOO	579	352
	CLERMONT	832	373
	GREGORY	359	52
	LEICHHARDT	350	215
	MITCHELL	721	326
		<u>2841</u>	<u>1318</u>
<u>NORTHERN</u>	BOWEN	516	96
	CAIRNS	931	89
	HERBERT	484	51
	MACKAY	1337	307
	TOWNSVILLE	1494	359
		<u>4462</u>	<u>1102</u>
<u>NORTH WEST</u>	BURKE	395	19
	CARPENTARIA	931	89
	CHARTERS TOWERS	2581	1718
	COOK	503	53
	CROYDON	809	41
	FLINDERS	684	86
	KENNEDY	418	180
	WOOTHAKATA	793	54
		<u>7914</u>	<u>2230</u>

APPENDIX FOUR

(i)

ELECTORAL ROLLS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1886

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ELECTORATES</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>ADULT MALES</u>
<u>NORTHERN DIVISION</u>			
1	BOWEN	3020	1143
1	BURKE	5387	3489
2	COOK	7257	3323
2	KENNEDY	11305	3985
1	MACKAY	7491	2377
1	MUSGRAVE	4181	1850
2	TOWNSVILLE	9063	2909
<u>10</u>		<u>48256</u>	<u>19499</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	4826	1945
<u>CENTRAL DIVISION</u>			
1	BARCOO	4800	2207
1	BLACKALL	6970	1884
1	CLERMONT	1864	607
1	GREGORY	2621	1841
2	LEICHHARDT	4261	1339
1	MITCHELL	3198	1776
1	NORMANBY	1690	673
1	PORT CURTIS	2467	813
2	ROCKHAMPTON	9957	2462
<u>11</u>		<u>37828</u>	<u>13602</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	3439	1237
<u>WEST MORETON</u>			
1	BUNDAMBA	5676	1607
1	FASSIFERN	5811	1601
2	IPSWICH	8974	2192
1	ROSEWOOD	3994	899
2	STANLEY	8685	2318
<u>7</u>		<u>33140</u>	<u>8617</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	4734	1231

APPENDIX FOUR

(ii)

ELECTORAL ROLLS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1886

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ELECTORATES</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>ADULT MALES</u>
<u>EAST MORETON</u>			
1	BULIMBA	7212	2038
2	ENOGGERA	22072	5416
1	LOGAN	5879	1667
1	MORETON	6656	1862
<u>1</u>	OXLEY	<u>4283</u>	<u>1102</u>
6		46102	12085
<u>AVERAGE</u>		7683	2014
<u>METROPOLITAN</u>			
2	FORTITUDE VALLEY	13828	8615
2	NORTH BRISBANE	13002	4893
<u>2</u>	SOUTH BRISBANE	<u>21078</u>	<u>5618</u>
6		47908	14126
<u>AVERAGE</u>		7984	2354
<u>SOUTHERN DIVISION - WIDE BAY AND BURNETT GROUP</u>			
1	BURNETT	1589	512
1	GYMPIE	7612	2049
2	MARYBOROUGH	10561	2448
1	MUEGRAVE	8158	2377
<u>2</u>	WIDE BAY	<u>10585</u>	<u>3394</u>
7		38506	10780
<u>AVERAGE</u>		5501	1540
<u>SOUTHERN PASTORAL</u>			
1	BALONNE	3132	1172
1	MARANOVA	4700	1388
1	WARREGO	5296	2972
1	AUBIGNAY	4418	1044
1	CARNARVON	3006	881
1	DALBY	2449	543
2	DARLING DOWNS	8765	2212
2	DRAYTON AND TOOWOOMBA	8948	1920
1	NORTHERN DOWNS	2573	907
<u>1</u>	WARWICK	<u>3445</u>	<u>740</u>
9		33604	8247
<u>AVERAGE</u>		3734	916

APPENDIX FOUR

(iii)

ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION - 1887

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ELECTORATES</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>ADULT MALES</u>
<u>NORTHERN</u>			
1	BOWEN	2771	972
2	BURKE	1614	1208
1	CAIRNS	1989	858
1	CARPENTARIA	1700	909
2	CHARTERS TOWERS	8342	2769
1	COOK	3997	2002
1	FLINDERS	2575	1513
1	HERBERT	2873	1345
1	KENNEDY	3600	1482
2	MACKAY	7491	2376
2	TOWNSVILLE	8528	2680
1	WOOTHAKATA	3199	1475
<u>16</u>		<u>48679</u>	<u>19589</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>3042</u>	<u>1226</u>
<u>CENTRAL</u>			
1	BARCOO	3990	1791
1	CLERMONT	3155	1164
1	FITZROY	1511	591
1	GREGORY	2067	1444
1	LEICHHARDT	3237	998
1	MITCHELL	2654	1578
1	NORMANBY	3467	1149
1	PORT CURTIS	2316	653
2	ROCKHAMPTON	10554	2560
1	ROCKHAMPTON NORTH	3292	885
<u>11</u>		<u>36243</u>	<u>12812</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>3295</u>	<u>1165</u>
<u>SOUTHERN PASTORAL</u>			
1	BALONNE	2856	1261
1	BULLOO	2237	1459
1	MARANDA	4820	1474
1	MURILLA	2792	1034
1	WARREGO	2318	1234
<u>5</u>		<u>15023</u>	<u>6492</u>
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>3004</u>	<u>1292</u>

ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION - 1887

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ELECTORATES</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>ADULT MALES</u>
<u>DARLING DOWNS GROUP</u>			
1	AUBIGNY	4006	1012
1	CAMBOOYA	3929	953
1	CARNARVON	3571	1062
1	CUNNINGHAM	4654	1104
1	DALBY	3701	965
2	DRAYTON AND TOOWOOMBA	9290	1990
<u>1</u>	WARWICK	<u>4276</u>	<u>1046</u>
8		<u>33427</u>	<u>8132</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>		4178	1016
<u>WIDE BAY AND BURNETT GROUP</u>			
1	BUNDABERG	3900	1030
1	BURNETT	2648	975
1	BURRUM	3989	1283
2	GYMPIE	9747	2659
2	MARYBOROUGH	10405	2411
1	MUSGRAVE	3458	1112
<u>1</u>	WIDE BAY	<u>3885</u>	<u>1352</u>
9		<u>38032</u>	<u>10822</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>		4226	1202
<u>WEST MORETON GROUP</u>			
1	BUNDAMBA	4665	1344
1	FASSIFERN	4285	1207
2	IPSWICH	8974	2191
1	LOCKYER	4196	988
1	ROSEWOOD	4913	1049
<u>1</u>	STANLEY	<u>3692</u>	<u>1126</u>
7		<u>30725</u>	<u>7905</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>		4389	1129
<u>EAST MORETON GROUP</u>			
1	ALBERT	4942	1462
1	BULIMBA	4604	1224
1	ENOGGERA	4931	1216
1	LOGAN	4458	1174
1	MORETON	4799	1443
1	NUNDAH	5226	1243
1	OXLEY	4609	1191
1	TOOMBUL	5291	1325
<u>1</u>	TOOWONG	<u>6399</u>	<u>1572</u>
9		<u>45259</u>	<u>11850</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>		<u>5028</u>	<u>1316</u>

APPENDIX FOUR(v)ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION - 1887

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ELECTORATES</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>ADULT MALES</u>
<u>METROPOLITAN GROUP</u>			
2	BRISBANE, NORTH	14931	5291
2	BRISBANE, SOUTH	14796	3989
2	FORTITUDE VALLEY	14938	3906
<u>1</u>	WOOLLOONGABBA	<u>6419</u>	<u>1629</u>
7		51084	11815
—		—	—
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	7298	2116

SEPARATION VOTING RECORDFOR SEPARATIONAGAINST SEPARATION29 October 1890 : Griffith's Amendment to Macrossan's Motion

Cowley, Donaldson, Macrossan, Perkins,
Black, O'Sullivan, Goldring, Paul,
Dalrymple, Arcer, Pattison, Philp,
Casey, Smith, Murphy, Murray, Little,
Corfield, Palmer, Nelson, Callan,
Stevenson, Crombie, Lissner,
Hamilton, Morehead

(26)

Griffith, McIlwraith, Unmack,
Powers, Hodgkinson, Hyne,
McMaster, Morgan, Drake, Glassey,
Wimble, Aland, Stephens, Allan,
Smyth, Morry, Gannon, Hoolan,
Campbell, Barlow, Annear,
Isambert, Macfarlane, Salkeld,
Buckland, Grimes, Sayers, Watson,
Jessop, Tozer, Rutledge, Foxton

(32)

18 Sept. 1891 : House to Resolve itself into Committee to discuss
Griffith's Provincial Legislatures Resolutions

Griffith, McIlwraith, Unmack,
Tozer, Cowley, Hyne,
Hodgkinson, Rutledge, Stephens,
Philp, Callan, Black, Pattison,
Stevenson, Dalrymple, Crombie,
Hamilton, Corfield, Little, Murphy,
Brown, Sayers, Barlow, Cassey,
Isambert, Annear, Archer, Grimes,
Mellor, Smith, Paul.

(31)

Nelson, Donaldson, Perkins,
Morehead, Groom, Powers, Jessop,
Glassey, Watson, McMaster, Allan
North, Luya, Plunkett, Battersby,
Macfarlane, Salkeld, Morgan,
Gannon, Aland, Stephens, Morry,
Hoolan

(23).

: First Resolution

Griffith, McIlwraith, Unmack,
Hodgkinson, Tozer, Archer, Cowley,
Smith, Casey, Jones, Hamilton,
Hyne, Philp, Murphy, Paul, Sayers,
Annear, Little, Corfield, Murray,
Lissner, Callan, Mellor, Black,
Pattison, Stevenson, Crombie,
Dalrymple

(28)

Nelson, Donaldson, Morehead, Powers,
North, Plunkett, O'Sullivan,
Hoolan, Aland, Allan, McMaster,
Stevens, Gannon, Battersby, Salkeld,
Barlow, Morry, Macfarlane, Groom,
Luya, Isambert, Grimes, Foxton,
Buckland, Campbell, Perkins,
Glassey, Drake, Cadell, Stephens,
Agnew, Watson, Jessop

(33)

14 Nov. 1890 : Archer's Motion for Central Separation

Archer, Paul, R. Jones, Goldring,
Macrossan, Stevenson, Crombie,
Callan, Pattison, Little, Hamilton,
O'Sullivan, Dalrymple, Black,
Corfield, Murray, G. Jones, Palmer.

(19)

(34)

: QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (1) That this House approves of the division of the Colony into Two Provinces.

(38)

Callan, Donaldson, Drake, Hoolan,
Gannon, Hall, Hoolan, Jessop,
MacFarlane, Murray, Nelson, O'Sullivan
Paul, Plunkett, Powers, Ryan, Allan,
Stevenson, Stevens
(19)

9 August: QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (1) Barlows Amendment.

Annear, Black, Callan, Corfield,
Cowley, Dalrymple, Griffith, Hamilton
Hyne, Hodgkinson, Lissner, Little,
Paul, McIlwraith, Perkins, Philp,
Smith, Tozer, Stevenson, Unmack,
Jones, Murray

(22)

Aland, Barlow, Battersby,
Crombie, Dickson, Donaldson,
Galssey, Grimes, Hoolan, Isambert,
Jessop, Luya, MacFarlane, Mellor,
McMaster, Morgan, Nelson, Morehead,
O'Sullivan, Palmer, Hall, Powers,
Plunkett, Rutledge, Ryan, Salkeld,
Sayers, Smith, Stephens, Drake,
Stevens, Watson, Gannon
(34)

13 October 1892: THIRD READING QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (2)

Agnew, Aland, Annear, Barlow, Callan,
Battersby, Corfield, Cowley, Crombie,
Dalrymple, Dickson, Griffith,
Hodgkinson, Jones, Little, Luya,
McIlwraith, McMaster, Mellor, Morehead,
Perkins, Philp, Smith, Stephens, Tozer,
Unmack, Watson, Wimble, Lissner,
Foxton.

(30)

Allan, Black, Cadell, Drake,
Nelson, O'Sullivan, Paul, Ryan,
Powers, Plunkett, Sayers, Salkeld
Gannon

(13)

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Governor's in letters.

Confidential Despatches from the Secretary of State.

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