

***Mapinduzi Daima* – Revolution Forever: Using the 1964 Revolution
in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar**

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* * *

But politics also brought shocking things to the surface. We liked to think of ourselves as a moderate and mild people. Arab African Indian Comorian: we lived alongside each other, quarrelled and sometimes intermarried. Civilized, that's what we were. We liked to be described like that, and we described ourselves like that. In reality, we were nowhere near we, but us in our own separate yards, locked in our historical ghettos, self-forgiving and seething with intolerances, with racisms, and with resentments. And politics brought all that into the open.

- Abdulrazak Gurnah: *Admiring Silence* (1996) -

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party. The ruling party in Zanzibar from the revolution in 1964 until 1977 and the birth of CCM.
CCM	<i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i> , "The Party of the Revolution". Founded in 1977, when TANU and ASP joined together.
CUF	Civic United Front. The main opposition party in Zanzibar, led by James Mapalala on the mainland and by Seif Sharif Hamad in Zanzibar.
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union, the ruling party in mainland Tanzania until 1977.
ZIORI	Zanzibar Indian Ocean Research Institute
ZNA	Zanzibar National Archives
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party, led the first independent government in Zanzibar until the 1964 revolution.
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

CAST OF POLITICAL CHARACTERS IN ZANZIBAR

Salmin Amour President of Zanzibar, 1990–2000.

Abdulahman Mohamed Babu (1924–1996) Founder of the Umma Party, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Planning in the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar; imprisoned 1973–1978; active political and academic figure.

Seif Sharif Hamad ("Maalim") (1943–) Minister of Education 1977–1980; Member of the Central Committee of CCM 1977–1987; Chief Minister of Zanzibar 1984–1988; imprisoned 1989–1991; Secretary general of CUF and the presidential candidate for Zanzibar 1995–2005.

Ali Sultan Issa (1931–) Umma Party Member, Pemba Area Commissioner, Minister of Health and Education (years?), imprisoned 1973–1978.

Sultan Jamshid bin-Abdullah (1929–) The last Sultan of Zanzibar 1963–1964.

Omar Ali Juma (1941–) Chief Minister of Zanzibar 1988–1995; Vice President of Tanzania 1995–2001.

Mwinyi Aboud Jumbe (1920–) Organizing secretary of the Afro-Shirazi Party; Minister of Health; President of Zanzibar and Vice-President of Tanzania 1972–1984.

Abeid Amani Karume (1905–1972) President of the Afro-Shirazi Party, President of Zanzibar and Vice-President of Tanzania 1964–1972.

Amani Abeid Karume (1948–) Current president of Zanzibar, 2000–.

Sheikh Thabit Kombo Jecha (????–1986) Secretary general of the ASP.

Ali Muhsin al-Barwani (1919–2006) One of the ZNP leaders; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1963–1964 (until the revolution).

Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1925–) President of Zanzibar 1984–1985; President of Tanzania 1985–1995.

Julius Nyerere ("Mwalimu") (1922–1999) President of TANU, President of Tanganyika and Tanzania until 1985, Chairman of CCM until 1990.

John Okello ("Field Marshal") (1937–1971?) Member of the Youth League of the Afro-Shirazi Party. Played active military role in the revolution but was exiled soon after the revolution.

Seyyid Said bin Sultan al-Said (1790–1856) The Omani Sultan who moved the capital of Oman to Zanzibar in 1840.

Idris Abdul Wakil (1925–2000) President of Zanzibar 1985–1990.

1. INTRODUCTION

The range is spectacular: from the islands full of aromatic flavour of various spices to a former slave trading centre; from an embryo of African socialist revolution to Cuba of Africa; from an Islamic yolk of Africa to nucleus of Communism in Africa; from a former commercial intermediary between the African interior and the capitalist industrialized West to a country with excessive centralized economy; from a country of calm, polite, civilised, cosmopolitan community to hot, volatile and unpredictable revolutionaries. -- All these associations confirm one simple fact, that Zanzibar has always been like a social laboratory, a place that has endured continuous and complex social, political, cultural and economic changes.

– Omar Ali Juma, Chief Minister of Zanzibar 1990

When sitting on board of a dangerously creaky *dala-dala*¹ and fearing for your life on the windy roads of Pemba, one can literally see the politics in Zanzibar. No village lacks the flags of both the main party *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, "Party of the Revolution") and the opposition party *Civic United Front* (CUF). When walking on the narrow streets of Stone Town, political posters and graffitis cover the walls. Pictures of president Karume decorate the walls of restaurants and the word *mapinduzi* ("revolution") is repeated over and over again on different government publications, buildings and slogans. Green-and-yellow CCM offices and Maskanis² dot the scenery everywhere, whereas CUF buildings and meeting places, of unpainted cement boast less with appearance. A white foreigner (*mzungu*) visiting a CUF office in Stone Town attracts attention: a young man hooks up with me instantly asking: "Do you like CUF?" (*Unapenda CUF?*). The situation is somewhat different when trying to enter a CCM office in Wete, Pemba: an elderly female member inquires sharply on my intentions before I even manage to lay my feet on the first doorstep. She turns me away politely, remarking half-jokingly: "How do we know, you could be a spy!". Politics is all over Zanzibar.

Zanzibar is a complex place. It is challenging to grasp historically, culturally and politically because of so many different influences and sudden turns of history – turbulent is an adjective often used to describe Zanzibar, from the 1960s until today. Zanzibar is a small place, an archipelago on the East African coast and an autonomous part of the United Republic of Tanzania. The main island Unguja is often referred to simply as Zanzibar and its smaller sister island, named by the Arabs as El-Huthera, "The Green One", is called Pemba. Together they measure only 2469 km², and have a bit over

¹ The most frequent mode of collective transport in Tanzania: a minibus with a fixed route.

² In general, *maskani* is a place of leisure, but it has turned to mean a meeting place for CCM party members: for drinking coffee, playing cards or bao and talking about daily news and politics.

1,000,000 inhabitants. Despite its tiny size, Zanzibar has had a great influence over the African mainland. It had it historically during the Omani era, when a common Swahili saying was "when one pipes in Zanzibar, they dance on the lakes", referring to the massive slave and ivory trade from the inlands to the Swahili coast, to be shipped forward. Moreover, during the last decades Zanzibar has made foreigners dance even overseas: Western powers feared the growing influence of Communism in the whole of Eastern Africa after the 1964 revolution, whereas the spread of radical Islamism from the 1990s onwards has worried especially the US and UK governments.



Figure 1. Map of Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba.
 (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/zanzibar_77.jpg)

Zanzibar is often described as the crossroads of West and East, the Orient and Africa: as a cosmopolitan mixture born out of the monsoon winds during centuries of trade, migration and marriages. Mosques, churches and Hindu temples characterize the main city of Stone Town whose centre consists of a maze of narrow alleys with Arab-style houses. The edges of the city are more spread out, with huge, East European-style apartment blocks changing slowly into small houses, huts and countryside. The most

audible testimony of all the different influences in Zanzibari cultural heritage is *taarab* music, developed in the East African coast in the Omani Sultan's court in the 19th century. Tunes and instruments were originally imported from the Middle East and Egypt, but gradually *taarab* integrated local and global influences, such as Indian tabla, Western electric keyboards, local *ngoma* rhythms, Congolese disco music and Bollywood film music into an inextricable blend – into a truly Zanzibari sound.

1.1. Revolutionary politics in Zanzibar

How Zanzibaris remember the revolution
— as either the original sin or the triumph of the independence era —
often determines whom they call their friends,
with whom they share a cup of coffee,
or whom they welcome to their homes as in-laws.

– Thomas Burgess 2009

Zanzibar experienced the first post-independence coup in Africa on the 12th of January in 1964. Only a month earlier, on the 19th of December in 1963, Zanzibar was granted its independence from the United Kingdom and declared as a constitutional monarchy under the Sultan. During and after the 1964 revolution thousands of people were killed in riots during a few days, and thousands more fled the island. Abeid Amani Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was appointed as the president of the People's Republic of Zanzibar. On the 24th April 1964, one hundred days after the revolution, president Karume signed the Union treaty with Julius Nyerere, the president of also newly-independent Tanganyika. However, Zanzibar continued to have very independent grip on its internal matters and its development has differed distinguishably from that of the Tanzanian mainland.

Tanzania has been regarded as one of the few post-colonial African countries which have succeeded in building a common national identity surpassing ethnic divisions. Nyerere as a very strong and beloved leader had a big part to play in this, but he is much less admired in Zanzibar. The separate identity of Zanzibar from the mainland Tanzania is proclaimed both by mainlanders and Zanzibaris themselves, and at times mutual dislike has been manifested in the demands to break the Union. This separation of mainland

Tanzania and Zanzibar is present in scholarly books as well: Zanzibar usually has its own chapter or is completely left out in texts on politics, history or society of Tanzania.

The Zanzibar Revolutionary Government (*Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar*, SMZ) adopted a radical socialist leaning in its politics and rhetoric. The revolution was labelled "African revolution" and the "African-ness" of Zanzibar was strongly advocated. Due to the government policies and expulsions, most of the educated elite – branded as privileged "foreign" minorities – escaped the country and formed a network of expatriates around the world, notably in Kenya, the Middle East and European countries. However, important changes have occurred during the last 15 years: economy has been liberalized, tourism has spread on the islands and multiparty politics have been introduced for the first time since the 1963 elections in Zanzibar. New, popular opposition party CUF has spoken about the revolution in less honorable terms, and simultaneously the amount and diversity of texts dealing with the revolution has practically exploded in Zanzibar. Democratization process and new media, both private newspapers and online sources have allowed more diverse voices to be heard. The old discourse on "race", national identity and politics has risen again on the forefront of political debate, and the value of revolution has been discussed.

1.2. Object of the research

This thesis focuses on Zanzibari-ness (*Uzanzibari*) in the historical context of the 1964 revolution and in the political context of today. The narratives on the Zanzibari past differ more than the official history script admits. Democratization in the 1990s brought about diverging voices in revolutionary history besides the hegemonic view of the Party of the Revolution and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government. While the main party relies on the "old" version of the revolution, the opposition and nationalist movements contest and re-evaluate the meaning of the slogan "revolution forever" (*mapinduzi daima*) in present-day Zanzibar. The discussion on the revolution extends beyond the event itself, into debates on the identity of Zanzibaris, their past, from the achievements of the revolution to its legacy and legitimacy. Different narratives concerning the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar are an example of an extremely politicized use of historiography.

The 1964 revolution has increasingly attracted scholars both in Tanzania and abroad. Agenda and actions of the revolutionary government have been explored, and the connections of the pre-revolutionary party politics and the current multiparty politics have

been examined. Several experienced historians have already mapped the different interpretations of the revolution, but I wanted to look at these interpretations in the context of two opposing nationalist discourses: that of the ruling party CCM and that of the "new nationalists", mostly composing of the main opposition party CUF and Zanzibari diaspora in the Middle East. I have searched for definitions of Zanzibari identities by looking at the ways in which the narratives of the revolution are told. The new perspectives arise particularly from the latest writings of those whom I call "new nationalists" in Zanzibar. They strive for constructing a different political history for Zanzibar, appreciating the distinct Zanzibari culture over a more general "African" culture. In this project of building a deviant way of seeing the past, the 1964 revolution proves to be the crucial point.

These two perspectives are not the only narratives of the 1964 revolution. They were selected as the focus because of the ongoing debate between them on questions of national identity, ethnicities and "true" history. Yet, it is clear that inside these main currents of thought, opinions and perceptions vary – they are not in any sense fully coherent and unanimous groups. The majority of those still in power belong to the old generation, but the youth tend to be more Zanzibar-orientated even inside CCM, and they are no longer that afraid to speak out their mind. There are also differences between the moderate nationalists who stress harmony and tolerance as Zanzibari basic values, and radical Islamists who denounce all foreign or non-Islamic inventions.

My object is to study the ways in which different representations and versions of the past, particularly the 1964 revolution, influence the present politics. I analyze the historiographies on the 1964 revolution: how is the 1964 revolution being used, defined and defended to construct national and political identities? How is Zanzibari-ness (*Uzanzibari*) defined in the two discourses? What kind of dichotomies of "us" against "the others" or "insiders" and "outsiders" do different texts in Zanzibar present? Why has the revolution been especially contested since the 1990s and what are the impacts of multiparty politics?

The term "race" is placed within inverted commas or struck out (~~race~~) in most academic texts to stress its dubious character and the fact that scholars only use it to study social and cultural meanings of "race", its social construction. However, even when speaking of "race" as something which does not really exist, the mere usage of the term can strengthen the validity of the concept even though the scholarly intention would be the opposite. This thesis also faces the problem: as a part of the colonial heritage, Zanzibaris talk about themselves as "Africans", "Arabs", "Indians" or "Shirazis". Whether it is only a

matter of inaccurate or even impossible translation³ from Swahili to English, the word "race" is still used in ordinary discussion. Even if I had decided to discard the term altogether, my research material would still have the "race talk" inside, because the issue of "race" is a recurrent weapon in Zanzibari politics. Yet, the vagueness of "racial" boundaries in Zanzibar is confusing: intermarriages, ancestors from various ethnicities and constant flux of people moving in and out of Zanzibar has created a situation in which it is impossible to tell for sure who is an "Arab" or an "African". The distinction is not simple even for Zanzibaris themselves: I witnessed an encounter in which an "Arab" was taken for an Indian – by an Indian – and the clearing of the situation took quite some time before the mistaken party believed that this indeed was the case.

Besides "race", also the concepts of ethnicity, identity and group-making are central concepts in this thesis, all of them placed in the constructivist theory. My analytical framework consists of overlapping concepts and theories – those of nationalism, belonging, identity formations and the role of history and stereotyping in these discursive formations. I focus on the politicized usages of the past and on the ways in which nationalist ideologies are built through rhetorical methods. Representations of "us" and "them" or "insiders" and "outsiders" are constructed through different discursive strategies, such as stereotypes or demonizing the "others".

For the definition of nationalism, I opt for one presented by sociologist and professor emeritus of nationalism and ethnicity, Anthony D. Smith: "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation" (Smith 1999: 18). This definition is broad enough but includes the core concepts of this thesis (ideological movement, identity, social group) to make it apply as a valid definition. I examine how the "triadic structure" of nationalist rhetoric fits with the nationalist discourses in Zanzibar. The triadic structure refers to a triangle of past-present-future continuum in which the myth of a primordial "golden age" is a central theme (Levinger & Lytle 2001).

I gathered most of the research material during my fieldwork period in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar between September and December in 2007, and some new material from online sources in the spring of 2009. Political speeches, interviews, memoirs and newspaper articles are combined to track the changes in revolutionary discourses, from

³ Of Swahili words, *kabila* means literally "tribe", and *taifa* either "nation", "race" or "tribe", in any case a larger group than *kabila*.

1964 until today. I concentrate on the articles and speeches published around the yearly Revolution Day which is celebrated on the 12th of January, but also the election periods are important from the 1990s onwards. The Zanzibari society was saturated by revolutionary discourse during the first 15 years, but material from the 1980s is scarce: the Zanzibar National Archives function under a 30 year-rule, there was no independent press and basically the discussion on the revolution had frozen to a standstill. In the 1990s however, Zanzibar, being a part of Tanzania, began to open up and other political parties besides CCM were allowed to register. Critical discussion on the legacy of revolution and its ownership has become possible in private newspapers, diaspora publications and online fora.

This study compares the views of the official revolutionary discourse as opposed to the oppositional discourse. I argue that the representations of the past, present and future of Zanzibar culminate in the 1964 revolution which is the turning point of the dual aspect of honor/respect (*heshima*) for the two opposing discourses. Stereotyping of "us" and "them" and the creation of in- and outgroups are also based on these representations. The 1964 revolution is the central defining event for Zanzibar: the way in which the revolution is interpreted is inextricably linked to different national identities. Although both the ruling party and the oppositional views are granted equal amount of space in the study, the recent Zanzibari nationalism which I call "new nationalism" has been researched less extensively so far and offers more novel contributions.

The thesis follows the usual structure. First, I present the theoretical and methodological framework on which the premises of the study are based. Theories of nationalism, identity formations and politized use of history are supported by theories and methods of language analysis, particularly of discourse analysis focusing on ideologies. After introducing the research material in the third chapter, I continue with the main events of political history in Zanzibar, concentrating on developments in the 20th century. The fifth chapter analyzes the material and examines the strategies of nation-building and identity construction in the focus texts. The last, concluding chapter assembles the findings and discusses the case of Zanzibar in a broader context.

2. METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The word "nationalistic" in the title implies that communities, social belonging, drawing borders and talking about "us" and "them" belong to the topics of this thesis. This chapter examines the relevant methodological and theoretical concepts, starting with discourse, power and ideology and continuing to ethnicity, "race" and nationalism. This study is based on the premises of social constructivism which opposes essentialism and stresses the importance of context in the creation of social phenomena. Constructivists believe in the contingency of the truth: conceptions, ideas and beliefs do not exist in a vacuum, but are a part of the social reality which includes institutions, laws and media, all affecting and changing the surrounding world. Individuals have a major role in creating the social reality surrounding them – the structures and values of a society do not exist independently of human beings, but they are created by someone. Creating identities, ingroups and outgroups are all matters of discourse: fluid, debatable, and dependent on power relations.

2.1. Power, discourse and ideology

Power is not a means, it is an end.
One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution;
one makes a revolution in order to safeguard a dictatorship.

– George Orwell

When people communicate, they create discourse, social interaction which both represents and creates the society. Studying discourse means studying actual instances of expression, focusing on extended sequences of expression and directing interest in the relations between linguistic and non-linguistic activity (Thompson 1984: 8). There is a dialectic relationship between the texts and the society: although texts are formed socio-culturally, they also shape society and culture in creative and renewing ways (Fairclough 1995: 34). Briefly put, this section deals with the power of language and the tension between the two aspects of the language: language as a social product and language as a social force.

Language analysis was used for researching society already in the ancient Greece where the study of rhetoric constituted "political science". The more recent popularity of discourse analysis in diverse disciplines of social science follows largely

from Michel Foucault's work. For Foucault, discourses are systems of representation which combine language with practice, with the social reality surrounding it, as different rules have ordered the production of discourses in different historical eras. Knowledge about a particular topic or event is always reproduced in a certain way, constructing a language of talking about something. Discourse defines the topic, both rules out and includes the acceptable ways of talking. (Hall 1997: 44.)

Other scholars in various social sciences have continued from Foucault's notion of discourse, including linguists, sociologists and political scientists. Linguists Norman Fairclough and Teun A. van Dijk have contributed mainly to discourse analysis research in the field of ideology, media and racism. They have coined the terms critical discourse analysis (CDA, Fairclough) and social discourse analysis (van Dijk) which emphasize that social context and power relations affect the discourses in question and must be accounted for in the analysis.

Among the writings of Norman Fairclough, especially two of his books are relevant for this study: *Media Discourse* (1995) focuses on the ways in which the media build and represent discourses, and *Language and Power* (2001) deals with power structures and different texts. Fairclough's strength lies in the way he pools together two different views on discourse: a) the predominant view taken in linguistics, of discourse as social action and interaction, and b) the Foucaultian view of discourse as a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge closely linked to power and domination (Fairclough 1995: 18). Van Dijk reminds us that language users not only are speakers, listeners, writers or readers, but they occupy different social roles. These memberships and identities are both constructed and displayed through discourse in social situations. (van Dijk 1997: 3.)

Power belongs to those fuzzy concepts which continuously trigger fierce arguments about its nature. According to Merriam-Webster online dictionary, power can mean the ability to produce an effect; political control or influence; the right to rule or govern; and it can imply possession of the ability to use force, permissive authority, or substantial influence ("Power" 2009). A standard definition for power is the ability to make others act as we wish, but the ways in which this can be done are numerous. Van Dijk describes power as the control of action and mind either through force, persuasion or hegemony. The first type of power, as physical coercion, is typical for the police or the army. Persuasive power refers to the mental control of the mind: influencing people not by threatening them, but through argumentation or other forms of influence. Authorities, such

as bosses or teachers, may plainly ask or suggest others to do something, and the subjects comply, even if only to avoid negative consequences. The third type of power, hegemony, is unconscious: it makes people act as if their actions were natural, as if they were only performing their own free will. This form of social power, described by Gramsci and Foucault, requires no commands or suggestions. (van Dijk 1997: 17-19.)

Foucault rejected the idea that power is sustained through propagating ideologies or "false" knowledge and challenged the thought of power being merely repressing and forbidding (Gordon 2000: xix). For Foucault, there is a constant battle around "truth" which is produced in historical discourses and is neither true nor false. "Truth" is diffused and consumed through apparatuses of education and information and produced under the control of political and economic apparatuses, such as university, army or media. (Foucault 2000: 130-131.) Foucault looks at the effects of "truth" and at the discourses in which the "truth" manifests itself: whom does the discourse serve? He claims:

"Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true." (Foucault 2000: 131.)

In Foucault's view, discourses and other control mechanisms are used by all societies, not only to those labelled as "ideological" in a negative sense. Those who have the power to define, produce and regulate the "truth" in a society have the unquestionable hegemony during that particular historical era. "Truths" change when societies or their leadership change.

Language is a form of social practice, and language of politics is a political practice. In political language, ambiguity is more of a rule than an exception. The meaning of words such as "democracy", "equality" or in Zanzibar's case, "revolution", often turns into a political issue. Chilton and Schäffner present four different strategic functions of political discourse: coercion, resistance, dissimulation, and legitimization. Examples of *coercion* include speech acts supported by sanctions, either legal or physical, or control of others' use of language through censorship, for instance. For *resistance*, the opposition may use the dominant discourse strategies against the powerful themselves, often through particular media types, such as posters, or through specific linguistic structures, such as slogans, petitions and chants. *Dissimulation* refers to the control of information: keeping

secrecy and preventing people from receiving information is the opposite of censorship, of preventing people from giving information. Outright lying, cunning denial or smart euphemisms are examples of dissimulation in practice. Finally, *legitimization* is related to the principles of a state: people obey regimes because they believe them to be legitimate. The reasons and persuasion for legitimization are communicated linguistically, and the techniques involved in this process include using ideological principles, portraying charismatic leadership and giving positive self-presentation. For de-legitimization of the enemy similar methods are used: presenting "the others" negatively, blaming or insulting the foreigners or insider enemies and using the ideas of boundaries and differences. (Chilton & Schäffner 1997: 212-213.)

Sociologist John B. Thompson has written extensively on ideologies, turning away from collective values and rather studying the mobilization of meanings to maintain relations of domination. In a similar vein to discourse analysts, Thompson stresses the social and historical aspects of language which is entangled in human conflicts. He views ideology as a power struggle: according to the power they possess, different individuals or groups have varying capacities to "make a meaning stick". Thompson suggests that studying the interrelations between language and ideology explores "the ways in which expressions serve as a means of action and interaction, a medium through which history is produced and society reproduced" (Thompson 1984: 2). Language use is a creative activity which produces new meanings through metaphors, word-play and interpretation (Thompson 1984: 6). Because meaning is an open, indefinite phenomenon, it can be used to legitimate, dissimulate or reify the existing situation. (Thompson 1984: 132.)

Van Dijk tries to comprehend the social functions of ideology and rejects the classical definition of ideology simply as a creation of dominant groups in order to reproduce and legitimize their control. He doubts whether all dominated groups are "merely ideological dupes", unable to think themselves or to develop their own ideologies of resistance. For him domination is a specific case of ideology, and ideology can have many other functions. Ideologies, as languages, need to be shared by people. However, van Dijk continues that languages are developed and used for the internal purposes of a group, whereas ideologies coordinate social practices, both inside the group and with members of other groups. Thus, ideologies define groups and create social identities, answering questions such as: Who are we? What do we do? What is good or bad? (van Dijk 1997: 25-26.) Van Dijk believes that ideology includes shared knowledge and attitudes of a group, and he describes ideologies as "the mental representations that form the basis of social

cognition". Furthermore, groups and their members acquire and reproduce these mental representations through discourse: understanding, sharing, abstracting and generalizing issues. (van Dijk 1997: 28-31.)

Van Dijk presents tools for expressly ideological analysis. First of all, language users are speaking or writing as group members, often polarizing "us" and "them". Hence, there are discourse expressions of group identity and representation of social position: *ingroups* versus *outgroups*, associated with good or bad. Most likely in ideological discourse "our" good things and "their" bad things are emphasized, and conversely "our" bad things and "their" good things are denied or mitigated. (van Dijk 1997: 32-33.) For example, when describing positive action, the ingroup ("us") will be presented through some of the following structures: emphasis, hyperbole, topicalization, headlining, detailed description, explicitness, narrative illustration, argumentative support and impression management. In contrast, the outgroup ("them") are de-emphasized, understated, de-topicalized, marginalized, and described vaguely with implicitness, without storytelling, argumentative support or impression management. (van Dijk 1995b: 144.)

Basic social characteristics which are mentally represented in the ideology of a group include identity, tasks, goals, norms, values, positions and resources. Questions related to these characteristics focus particularly on the group's self-identity: "who are We, where do We come from, what are Our properties, what is Our history, how are We different from Others, what are We proud of; but also: boundary statements with respect to others: Who will be admitted, what are the criteria of admission, who may immigrate, etc." (van Dijk 1995b: 146-147). All these questions are pertinent also for defining a nation, a group of people with real and/or imagined common qualities.

Van Dijk suggests focusing on those discourse structures which express opinions, perspective, positions or interests of groups. The surface structures include phonological and graphical elements, such as special stress or large printed type which may be used to emphasize specific meanings. On the syntax level, word order and transactional structures may imply semantic importance. For example the agency of ingroup members – "us" – who participate in negative actions would be syntactically softened by using passive sentences or nominalizations. Transitivity and pronoun reference are particularly salient here: who is active in the sentence, do things just happen by themselves or are there individuals, groups or institutions affecting the result? Another example for constructing discourse on syntax level is sentence complexity which restricts the understanding of "outsiders" and thus controls access to public discourse. Lexicon use

is one of the most visible forms of discourse: van Dijk quotes the well-known "terrorist" versus "freedom-fighter" pair as one case. Many words are used to refer to same persons, groups or social issues depending on the context. Political actors are polarized and euphemisms used – most often the ingroups are marked positively and outgroups negatively. Furthermore, unfavourable information regarding the ingroup remains implicit, whereas the negative points of the outgroup are made explicit and vice versa. Van Dijk continues that the levels of generality and specificity also vary according to "us" and "them". If "our" mistakes are revealed, they are explained in euphemistic or abstract terms or attributed the blame outside of our control. However, when describing "their" faults, specific and raw details are likely used. (van Dijk 1995a: 22-29.)

Rhetorical structures in discourses include surface structure repetition such as rhyme and alliterations. Other forms of rhetoric, more attached to the meaning of words are semantic: metaphors, metonyms, hyperboles, over- and understatements, euphemisms and mitigations. Often the aim of these semantic operations is to belittle, marginalize or dehumanize the "others". (van Dijk 1995a: 29-30.) Metaphor means comparing seemingly unrelated ideas to one another, equalling two subjects. In political language, metaphors of war and sports are often used. In metonymy the name of the subject is replaced by something associated with the thing, such as "Wall Street" referring to the stock market exchange in New York. Many central metaphors of political language emphasize the confrontational aspect, implying that politics always involve winners and losers or enemies fighting with each other, not negotiation and cooperation. (Beard 2000: 19-22.)

Figure 2 below condenses Fairclough's analytical framework of discourses, stretching from the context to the text itself. All critical or social discourse analysis begins with recognizing the situational context and the discourse type, the outermost rectangle in figure 2. Context includes, on the one hand, aspects such as economic and political power and ideology, and on the other hand, cultural questions of values and identities. After defining the context in which the target text is created, the researcher can move on to studying the discourse itself. Fairclough proposes four basic questions to ask for the analysis: 1) "What is going on?", including the topic and purpose of the text, the actual content; 2) "Who is involved?", the subjects of the text and their subject position; 3) "In what relations?", meaning the relations of power and the social distance presented in the text; and 4) "What is the role of language in what is going on?", the connections between the action and the language (Fairclough 2001: 122-124). Some hints for the researcher to follow are inter-textual context, presuppositions and negations. These clues can either be

sincere, manipulative or ideological. (Fairclough 2001: 127-128.) It is also important to distinguish the type of action: is the topic described in the discourse an act, an event, a state of affairs, mental or verbal action?




Figure 2. Discourse as text, interaction and context (Fairclough 2001: 21).

Fairclough attaches representation to the choice of inclusion and exclusion, placing something primary and something secondary, "foregrounding" and "backgrounding" topics purposely. He asserts that any part of a text can represent the world, build identities and form relations simultaneously. (Fairclough 1995: 4-5.) Sensitivity to absences in the text are just as important as analyzing the representation of what is clearly "there" in the text. Fairclough adds categories of visibility to this scale of explicit-implicit: things can be 1) absent, 2) presupposed, 3) secondary, 4) primary. These grades of visibility also affect the representation of ingroups and outgroups. Sequencing, placing elements of a clause in an order is another way of emphasizing and thematizing certain elements by placing them in initial position. Ordering makes a difference both in individual phrases and in the global structure of a text. (Fairclough 1995: 105-107.) Representation is closely linked to lexical choice. A violent death caused by others can be named as "murder", "killing" or "massacre", and metaphors, such as "holocaust" or "extermination" broaden the spectrum of choices even more (Fairclough 1995: 109).

Representations are thus closely linked to discourses and ideologies. Fairclough suggests three questions for examining the possible ideological content of a particular argument whenever it is represented in a certain way: (a) *from where* and *from whom* does this option emerge, what are its social origins? (b) *why* was this choice made,

what are its motivations? (c) *how* does it effect, including the interests of those involved in this choice of representation or construction? (Fairclough 1995: 14-15.) Representation and ideological language continue to occur in the topics of the following sub-chapters: first, the concepts of ethnicity, "race" and identity are critically examined, after which follow the theories on nationalism and the role of the past in political discourses.

2.2. Ethnicity, "race" and identity

Ethnicity, race, and nationhood are fundamentally ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world. They are not things *in* the world, but perspectives *on* the world. These include ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting).

– Rogers Brubaker 2004

Using the labels of "African" and "Arab" or "Mainlander" and "Zanzibari" belong to the core discourse of politics in Zanzibar. This chapter looks at the concepts of "race", ethnicity and identity and their relevance critically: neither "race" nor ethnicity are biological facts but social constructs often used for political purposes. A statement presented by political scientist Martin Doornbos serves as my starting point: ethnicity by itself does not explain anything, but it needs to be explained. Ethnicity is constructed in the dynamic interplay of power, class and other social factors. Even choosing to use ethnic identities in a particular political strategy is contextual: for some groups it can be profitable to ethnicize issues, while others may prefer to de-emphasize the ethnic factor. (Doornbos 1998: 19-21.) Similar observations apply for identity as an analytical concept which is linked to the discussion on "race" and ethnicity. Overlapping themes in ethnicity and identity discussion include fluidity, impacts of the context and the importance of the "other", "difference" in creation of the own identity or ethnicity. This study is heavily influenced by social constructivism, and to some extent post-modernist ideas. Among scholars with a critical view towards "groupism" and essentialism are sociologist Stuart Hall who has focused on cultural studies, identities and racism, and sociologist Rogers Brubaker, whose collection of analytical essays, *Ethnicity without Borders* (2004) sketches novel ways of seeing ethnicities and nationalisms.

Theories of identity point out binary oppositions as essential in the production of meaning: identities are defended in relation to the "outsider" or to the

"other". Difference can either be understood negatively, in terms of exclusion and marginalization of the "other", or difference can be celebrated on the account of producing enriching diversity. (Woodward 1997: 35.) With the help of the "other", one knows who s/he is *not*: this dialogic relationship with the "other" is central for identity. In the words of Stuart Hall, "[t]he Other is not outside, but also inside of the Self, the identity". Identity is also linked to history, discourses and representation: it is a narrative of the self, and the relationship of the "other" to oneself. (Hall 1996: 345.) Othering specific groups of people in order to stigmatize them and to create collective belonging and feeling of "us" is a recurrent technique in ethnicization and nationalist propaganda. Strategies for forming different groups, be it nations, ethnic groups, or political movements, are thus the same – the form repeats itself, and only the content changes.

Identity can mean "self-understanding", "collective sameness" "foundational core-aspect of selfhood", "contingent product of social or political action" or post-structuralist "unstable, fluctuating and multiple self" which changes according to context (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 6-8). Although the meaning of identity is often too broad, too ambiguous and too trivial, it has still been deemed indispensable in social sciences. Brubaker suggests replacing the fluid concept of "identity" by clusters of terms: "identification and categorization, self-understanding and social location, or commonality and connectedness" (Brubaker 2004: 4). Broad and vague meanings of "identity" can be divided into this spectrum of aspects which the researcher can grasp more easily and focus on in the analysis. This thesis examines particularly the aspects of identification and categorization: the way people are being grouped, stereotyped and identified by themselves and others. Identity in this study is understood as a socially created role performed in relation to a larger community. People redefine themselves when they create and re-create their identity through myths, language, appearance or ancestry.

The roots of the word "ethnicity" go back to ancient Greece, where the word "ethnos" was used to describe foreign, barbaric⁴ nations opposed to "our own people" – Homer also used the word for large groups of animals or warriors (Chapman et al. 1989: 12-13). Only in the 19th century "ethnic" began to refer to racial characteristics, and finally in the 1960s anthropologists adopted the word and linked it with group relationships and classifications (Eriksen 2002: 4). Although the usage of the word has changed, the aspect of otherness has remained. Nowadays ethnicity is preferred over the concept of "race"

⁴ Though not necessarily "barbaric" in the same, pejorative sense as we think now: more commonly "heathen" or just a group different of our own.

which carries a heavy historical burden and is considered politically and morally improper. The same applies to another pejorative term in Africa, tribe⁵ which is seen as welling from the "traditional", pre-colonial past of African communities. (Chapman et al. 1989: 14-16.) It is often claimed that ethnic relations are not seen as hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual in the same way as racial relations are. Ethnicity and "race" are both defined in genealogical terms, but ethnicity lacks the theoretical pseudo-science base of racism. Belonging to an ethnic group has been defined as somewhat voluntary and flexible whereas belonging to a racial group is not – ethnicity would be about inclusion and racism about exclusion. "Race" would thus mean categorizing people in exclusive, negative terms, and ethnicity in inclusive, positive terms. However, Richard Jenkins notes that this division is not that straightforward in practice. He even suggests thinking of "racial" differentiation and racism only as historical forms of the general social phenomenon of ethnicity. (Jenkins 1994: 208-209.)

When the ethnicity discussion was spreading in anthropology in the 1960s, emphasis was laid on its primordial qualities such as common language, name and myth of descent or shared history. Enculturation, learning specific behaviour patterns and common symbols epitomizing the peoplehood of a certain ethnicity were also mentioned when conceptualizing ethnicity. (Poluha 1998: 32.) Social anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1969) brought boundaries and "difference" into the ethnicity discussion: a group would not be solidified by its presumed primordial qualities if there were no other groups to compare with. Barth considered ethnic groups as forms of social organization and concentrated on the *process* of creating a common culture as a final result. He elevated self-ascription and ascription by others as the most critical factors when defining an ethnic group. When ethnic groups are defined as exclusive groups, their continuity depends on the maintenance of a boundary: members and outsiders must be dichotomized in order not to blur the dividing invisible boundary. Barth stated that instead of the "common culture", the cultural stuff inside the group, it was the boundary which defined the group. Furthermore, he

⁵ Discussion on the usage of the word "tribe" has been fierce for some decades now in African Studies. The word *tribus* has similar roots as *ethnos*: it was a Roman concept used to categorize the cultural groups beyond Roman borders, regarded as barbaric and unable to form "proper" state-like structures. The derogatory and racist connotations of "tribe" and its associations with primitivism are now recognized and the usefulness of it as an analytical concept is highly contested. However, the term is still widely used in the media: the political crisis in Kenya in 2008 was immediately categorized as a "tribal conflict" between the Luo and the Kikuyu. More discussion on "tribe" is available for example in an article by Africa Action: "Talking about 'Tribe': Moving from Stereotypes to Analysis", accessible from <http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethall.htm>.

stressed that only those features are accounted for which the group itself regards as significant. (Barth 1969: 11-15.)

Africanist Crawford Young has defined ethnicity having three dimensions: 1) foundation of common attributes including language, cultural practices and symbolic resources, such as a belief in common ancestry; 2) shared consciousness of belonging to a named group; and 3) boundaries, demarcation of the self from the "other". Young also divides approaches on cultural pluralism into three major strands: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Primordialists treat ethnicity in an essentialist way, as a social given fact that unites the community. Instrumentalists stress the politicized use of ethnicity in power struggles over resources. Constructivists believe in the modernity of ethnicities and claim that they have only developed during the last one or two centuries. Young asserts that the character of ethnicities in Africa is, in fact, less primordialised than in Europe or Asia. Fluidity and complexity are salient traits of ethnic identities in many parts of Africa. Although Young dismisses the assertions of ethnicities as mere colonial inventions, he acknowledges the role of the colonial state in shaping the contemporary ethnicities in Africa. Dividing the native population into "tribal" units, each with their own function was a general strategy particularly among the British colonialists. The population was codified into different identities, simplifying and partly forcing people into different groups and rewarding collaborators with appointments to colonial posts. (Young 2007: 250, 252.)

Political scientists Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz note that ethnicity is "thought to combine considerations of origin, kinship, race, language, history and culture with a strong sense of distinction from other, equally well-delineated, groupings" (Chabal & Daloz 2006: 113). According to them, these characteristics of ethnicity lead to two essential presuppositions: 1) that it is possible to identify these features which separate different ethnic groups from each other, and 2) that the groups value these characteristics as being important or even determinant for their members. Chabal and Daloz remark that *in the West*, ethnicity is seen as an emotional attachment to a community or a basis for lobbying, whereas looking *from the West* towards the "developing" nations, ethnicity is perceived more as a primordial sentiment over which people have little power. In the end, this conception of ethnicity as easily recognizable comes down to the colonial method of classifying the "natives" into neat categories. Chabal and Daloz point out that identities in pre-colonial Africa were not solely based on one's ethnicity, but that people had multiple identities, ethnicity being only one among them. (Chabal & Daloz 2006: 113-114.)

Ethnicity is not the only identity people possess, inherit or choose from, but instead everyone has multiple roles and overlapping identities: ethnic, class, gender, age, religious, local, political, linguistic, kinship, national and so on.

The concept of ethnicity has been blamed of being an irrelevant concept obstructing proper analysis, merely replacing the old "tribes" and "races"; and consequently not being a useful analytical category at all. Anthropologist Marcus Banks describes ethnicity as "a collection of rather simplistic and obvious statements about boundaries, otherness, goals and achievements, being and identity, descent and classification, that has been constructed as much by the anthropologist as by the subject" (Banks 1996: 190). Ethnicity has been cited as the explaining factor for the genocide in Rwanda and for numerous other conflicts. According to the newspaper reporting on violent conflicts in Africa it would seem that African politics is all about tribalism – that the reason behind wars and misery is "ethnicity". Yet, what the newspaper articles fail to see is that group polarization may, in fact, be the result of violence instead of being the cause. Brubaker asserts that "[v]iolence becomes 'ethnic through the meanings attributed to it by perpetrators, victims, politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers, and others". He claims that violence is not only interpreted, but also constituted as "ethnic" by insiders and outsiders, although violent confrontation usually has very complex, often economic reasons. (Brubaker 2004: 16.) In addition, dramatic events and violence can even work as tools for group-making or strengthen the existing groups (Brubaker 2004: 14).

Brubaker prompts scholars to focus on the ways in which ethnicity works, not only on "bounded groups", but also on "categories, schemas, encounters, identifications, languages, stories, institutions, organizations, networks, and events". Social constructivism has definitely entered the ethnicity discussion: Brubaker conceptualizes ethnicity, "race" and nation as "perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world". (Brubaker 2004: 4.) He wants to retire from "groupism" in which the researcher views bounded groups as homogeneous and unitary actors with common purposes – even if the participants themselves represent their groups, whether ethnic, racial or national, in primordial terms, the analysts do not need to do so (Brubaker 2004: 8-10). The next subchapter turns towards the theories of nationalism, but continues with the themes of discursive strategies, group-forming and primordial identities which are all salient factors in the process of nation-building.

2.3. Nationalisms – "who are we?"

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for nationality.

– Ernest Renan 1872

Nationalism has been defined in various ways: "idea", "form of behaviour" or "doctrine" (Kedourie 1994: 1), "ideological movement" (Smith 1991: 51), "political principle" (Gellner 1983: 1), or "discursive formation" (Calhoun 1997: 3). Scholars agree that no single theory of nationalism exists and instead they have developed different typologies and categories of nationalism. For example, nationalist movements are divided according to the historical era, their aims and geography: anti-colonialism is based on different principles than national romantic nationalism in 19th century Europe. Rather than summarizing all different theories at length, I overview the core scholars of nationalism and focus on the concrete ways of building the nation and creating the national identity. The nature of nationalism as an ideology is less pertinent for this thesis; strategies for achieving it, including discourses, stereotypes and using the past are the focal issues.

Theories of nationalism are roughly divided into three different perspectives: "primordialists" (also called essentialists), "modernists" (or constructivists) and "ethno-symbolists". Primordialism is based on the Herderian German Romanticism in the 18th century, claiming that there are ancient nations as elements of a divine plan or nature with their own "national spirit" based on language and cultural traditions. Primordial view on nationalism has been largely abandoned ever since the modernists began to present their theories on nationalisms, first 40 years ago, but particularly in the 1980s. Modernists believe that nations are novel products of modernization, urbanization and industrialization. It has been claimed that nationalism was born in the early modern era, when the political elites confronted problems on two different levels: on the one hand, an intellectual problem of legitimizing state action, and on the other hand, a political problem of securing the support of the masses. Nationalist ideology helped to construct a common identity for different social groups inside the state territory. (Özkirimili 2000: 107.)

Benedict Anderson launched the constructivist and more mainstream modernist movement with his famous *Imagined Communities* (1983) in which he claims that nations are imagined by its members who are unable to see each other face-to-face – people have to construct their nation socially. According to Anderson, modern nationalism

was made possible by the rise of literacy, especially because of print-capitalism, the conjunction of capitalism and print technology. Another driving factor was the decline of sacred communities which made people search for other ways to connect with each other after they had abandoned the cosmological or divine "truths". (Anderson 1983.)

Another modernist, philosopher and sociologist Ernest Gellner, published his book *Nations and nationalisms* the same year as Anderson (1983). Gellner concentrates on the form instead of the content of nationalism and believes that nationalism works through education and the loosening bonds of earlier agricultural small-scale units. In a similar vein with Anderson, his argument rests on economical and historical roots: nationalism was born because of industrialism: modern industrial society needed nationalism to bind its members together. Gellner's theory has been criticized later for being too functionalist and focusing only on industrial societies, although forms of nationalism have emerged both in pre-industrial and post-industrial societies.

Ethno-symbolism is founded by Anthony D. Smith who challenged the modernists by claiming that nations have pre-modern ethnic origins – that there are continuities between ethnic groups which he calls *ethnies* and modern nations. Although I do not embrace Smith's main theory on the origins of nationalism, Smith has written extensively on the central role of the past in nationalist rhetoric that I find valuable. According to Smith, nationalism gathers its strength from myths, traditions, memories and symbols which modern nationalist intellectuals use and reinterpret (Smith 1999: 9). Smith wants to find out *why* nationalism has resurfaced again in different historical periods: what is the reason behind its success. He stresses the social, psychological and cultural explanations. Even the strongest party has to rely on the nation:

"For the Party has only its short, revolutionary history; the nation can boast a distant past, even where much of it must be reconstructed or even fabricated. Even more important, it can offer a glorious future similar to its heroic past. In this way it can galvanize people into following a common destiny to be realized by succeeding generations. But these are generations of 'our' children; they are 'ours' biologically as well as spiritually, which is more than any class or Party can promise." (Smith 1991: 161.)

History and destiny are intertwined in this conception of the nation as a "political super-family" which promises those who have been deprived of power a status reversal. Smith uses the term of "ethno-history" when writing about the need for a "glorious past, a golden age of saints and heroes". The nation to-be must have a distant past onto which to base its

immortality and its assurances of the restoration and dignity in the future. (Smith 1991: 161.)

Historian John Breuilly has defined nationalism as a political project which requires mobilization and organization. According to him, national identity becomes politically important only after a group of people shares its meaning and has an effective organization. (Breuilly 1994: 6.) In addition, people only respond when the message is relevant for them, and this depends on their prior views. Breuilly notes that a central motif in the nationalist message is to re-establish the past state when "the nation" was most fully itself. Unlike in abstract belief systems such as liberalism or socialism, nationalists celebrate themselves and are strongly self-referential. (Breuilly 1994: 68.)

In state nationalism, the idea of fraternity and national identity is promoted through rituals and ceremonies: parades, anniversary celebrations, monuments to those fallen for their country, or eulogies of heroes (Smith 1991: 162). "National fetishes" reproduce the nationalist ideology in everyday life in the form of flags, uniforms, anthems, national cuisines and architectures, team sports, military spectacles, mass rallies and popular culture, among others ([McCormack 1996: 274], quoted in Özkirimli 2000: 195).

Nationalist movements and ideologies, although having many common qualities, are extremely diverse and dependent on the context. What unites all these different nationalisms is the rhetoric of "national interest" as the over-arching concept. Political scientist Umut Özkirimli presents "an umbrella definition" of nationalism which focuses on the ways of constructing social reality. Instead of writing endless lists of characteristics of nationalisms such as common religion, language or history, we should concentrate on the discourse which the nations use to justify, define and reproduce themselves. Özkirimli lists three main points of a nationalist discourse: 1) it asserts that the values of the nation outrun all other values; 2) the nation is the only source of legitimacy, justifying all sorts of actions which would not otherwise be condoned; 3) the discourse uses binary divisions between "us" and "them", and it draws precise borders and defines "us" in relation to the "other". (Özkirimli 2000: 229-230.) This perception of nationalism encompasses all the concepts presented in this chapter, from ideologies to different strategies of discourse, and Özkirimli's third point is particularly pertinent for this thesis.

Breuilly states that for success, nationalism needs repetition, simplification and concreteness. He continues that construction of stereotypes, incorporating history, racial characteristics or cultural practices of the nation and of its enemies are recurrent tools of nationalist discourse. (Breuilly 1994: 64.) Like all classification systems,

stereotypes help the individual to grasp the surrounding society better, to create order around him/herself by dividing people into different groups. Stereotypes combined with power relations may justify privileges to different resources of the society. Negative stereotypes of those in power can alleviate the feelings of powerlessness and give a symbolic revenge to those who are left out. Stereotypes also help defining the borders of "our" group, emphasizing "our" virtues and "their" vices or demonstrating "our" superiority against the "others". (Eriksen 2002: 25.) Politicians use stereotypes to homogenize ethnic signifiers, to facilitate identification and to establish borders between insiders and outsiders. Anthropologist Thomas Eriksen describes stereotypes as reductions of social complexity into a minimal set of traits, both of the demonized "other" and the collective "self". Internal differences are secondary when compared to the boundaries delineating "us" and "them". (Eriksen 2002: 159-160.) Stereotypes are often inspired by oral histories of "how things used to be", or the genuine resentment that members of subjugated groups feel towards their oppressors (Poluha 1998: 34-35). Stereotypes need not always be viewed in negative terms: they can also be neutral, cognitive structures which include concrete examples, behavioural expectations and beliefs about certain social groups (Brubaker 2004: 72).

Some of the most central questions in nation-building include the definition of whose nation it is – who are included as citizens? Usually nationalism promotes the image of an "internally homogeneous national identity", based on the idea of each people having an "essential", unified identity which differs from all others (Calhoun 1997: 7). Calhoun claims that the idea of the nation often includes a group with a "trump" status over all other forms of identity. Racial thinking is frequently linked to nationalism to stigmatize "aliens in our midst" and to reinforce national solidarity against internal cultural distinctions. (Calhoun 1997: 35.)

During an ethnification process, group leaders seek to strengthen the image of the group and emphasize the primordial aspects: who are the members of the group, where they come from, what they are going to be. Boundaries are drawn to demarcate the group from other groups, and while embellishing "us", the "others" must be belittled or even denigrated. (Poluha 1998: 34.) Politics of belonging based on ethnic divisions have been deployed in many African countries for nation-building. Dorman, Hammett and Nugent state in their introduction to the book *Making Nations, Creating Strangers* (2007) that because of their overlapping common ground, the discourses of ethnicity and nationalism have in many cases coincided, clashed or strengthened each other. The

weakening of central authority has enabled divisions on politicized ethnic grounds, when one-party states have been replaced by a nominal multiparty democracy in many African countries. (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent 2007: 3-4.) The authors argue that the fear of being excluded has driven leaders "to manipulate citizenship and redefine nationhood; making nations by creating strangers" (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent 2007: 8). They call this process strategic and exclusionary nationalism, focusing on the discourses of inclusion and exclusion, "us" and "them", and excluding marginal or minority groups from nation-building (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent 2007: 8-9).

The view adopted in this study is not founded on any particular theory of nationalism, but combines aspects of different models and interpretations. Nationalism is seen as a modern phenomenon, although the movements may have historical or ethnic bases for mobilization. Nationalism is not a purely political project, but the nationalist discourse includes everyday realities and answers to people's contemporary problems. Calhoun states that traditions used in nationalist discourses are powerful not because of their antiquity, but because of their immediacy, closeness, being a part of people's everyday lives. Some national identities have better appeal than others because they succeed in making their claims more meaningful. (Calhoun 1997: 34-35.) The strength of nationalism lies in its tangible nature: nationalism is constructed according to context. The core of nationalist ideology is often formed around the past of the nation which also defines its identity. The importance of historical context and using the past in for political or ideological purposes is presented in the following subchapter.

2.4. Past and history – "who were we?"

Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central element in the socialization of individuals, in the maintenance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness therefore is pre-eminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary phenomenon.

– Immanuel Wallerstein 1991

Understanding and interpreting historical contexts is a necessary part of nearly all research in social sciences. Since the 1970s, a historic turn has taken place in many human sciences, such as anthropology, sociology and geography. On the one hand, history is not seen anymore as unproblematic, coherent narrative of the past, and on the other hand for

example in anthropology, "traditions" are no longer depicted as permanent and timeless phenomena, but situated in a historical context. This chapter clarifies the role of history in creating both the past and the present, and particularly the importance it has in creating ideologies and identities. A central question is: how do nationalist ideologues claim, reconstruct and use history to mobilize people for nationalist projects? After describing the usages of history in the construction of the past and the present, the chapter continues with the themes of nation-building and the invention of traditions. Finally, the chapter connects history and ethnicity, and reviews the usages of the past in political rhetoric.

It is not enough to say that the past has simply led to the present – history is also being selectively used, experienced, remembered and created in multiple different ways (Chapman et al. 1989: 1). Whether to call it "past" or "history" is a matter of emphasis: historical anthropologist, Elizabeth Tonkin has chosen to use the concept "representations of pastness" instead of "history", because by "representing how things were, we draw a social portrait, a model which is a reference list of what to follow and what to avoid" (Tonkin 1990: 25-27). The past is commonly adapted to present needs: people recreate the past through new histories and myths, hence serving their present needs and seeking solutions to contemporary problems. Different narratives are frequently rejected by those who strive to preserve a certain version of history for their own interests. A fruitful question is why certain political organizations and ideologies become dominant at particular moments, and others are silenced. The study of these absences is equally important, and to examine this problem one should look at the key episodes where decisions have been taken, or not taken, leading to a change in policy or to continuity. (Drew 2007: 349.)

History can be used in nation-building either to emphasize or to forget certain issues. Special facets of this narration are "invented traditions", which have been on the research agenda ever since historian Eric Hobsbawm, together with Terence Ranger, edited a book called *The Invention of Tradition* in 1983. Hobsbawm advances the idea that "traditions", though superficially old, are often quite recent, and sometimes even specifically invented. The purpose of "invented traditions" is to demonstrate continuity with the past through repeating a set of symbolic or ritual practices, aiming at instilling particular values and norms. (Hobsbawm [1983] 1997: 1.)

Hobsbawm distinguishes "real" and "invented" traditions: if the old ways are truly still alive, the tradition does not need to be invented. He separates three overlapping types of invented traditions: a) those symbolizing social cohesion and group membership,

b) those legitimizing institutions or authority and c) those aspiring to socialize, embedding beliefs and value systems. (Hobsbawm [1983] 1997: 8-9.) Some relatively novel "traditions" linked with nationalism are flags, images, ceremonies and music. Hobsbawm stresses that in order to examine these newly invented traditions, a wider study of the history of society is needed. He states that "all invented traditions, so far as possible, use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion." (Hobsbawm [1983] 1997: 12.) History is selected and institutionalized by a particular nation, state or movement to create the desired ideology, and invented traditions and symbolic politics help in this process.

The search of symbolic categories may be more rewarding than looking for the immediate reality content, the "truth" revealed in the documents. Myths are constructed of such symbolic categories; of stories, emotions and feelings transmitted through generations, each individual story drawing on a common culture. The repressions and the silences in memory may reveal important aspects of the subject. Characters are idealized or demonized, and they become valuable hints to discover "unrealized hopes or hidden fears". (Samuel and Thompson 1990: 1-7.) Eriksen also emphasizes the importance of symbolic politics which combine political legitimation and emotional power. He argues that politics require symbols for creating loyalty and a feeling of belonging. This symbolism can be violent: often military parades are being marched during national festivals, and martyrs who have died in a war for their nation are commemorated. (Eriksen 2002: 100.)

Both the political elite and the dissidents of the nation employ the possibilities of a mutable past and the reinterpretation of history. Often a common history based on oppression or subjugation is promoted, and through this history the "other" is created as the negative outgroup while the positive ingroup identity is consolidated. Historical grievance can be a tool for building national solidarity which is based on common suffering. (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent 2007: 13.)

Marxist philosopher Etienne Balibar states that the history of nations is presented in a form of a narrative and that each narrative contains only one founding, revolutionary event (Balibar 1991: 86-87). He continues that the myth of a national origin is linked to a specific historical event which reproduces the social community through traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (Balibar 1991: 93). Here Balibar follows the theories of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (1983) and with Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in *Invented Traditions* (1983), raising the imagined or invented traditions in the main focus. Although individual identities exist, all identities are

historical and situated within a social field of values, norms and symbols. Balibar believes that the state has a major role to play in fabricating public consciousness. Externally the state uses force and education, but internally people begin to believe in "the religion of modern times", nationalism. (Balibar 1991: 94-95.)

Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle (2001) develop the notions by Anthony D. Smith on the "glorious past" and the "dignified future" of a nation. They strive at bridging the gap between constructivist and instrumentalist theories on nationalism, by focusing on the dynamics of nationalism and particularly its rhetoric in which the history of the nation is presented in a story form, as a narrative. Although the primordialist view of nationalism has been discarded in academic discussion, nationalists frequently use primordialist fantasies in their own rhetoric. Nationalists often claim that in the past, the nation used to be a pure, unified and harmonious community but has been degraded into a state of decay in the present. Usually the sources for this decay are identified as an agency or traumatic events that divided the national community. The last phase of this "triadic structure" is the promise of a utopian future which corrects the mistakes: through working together and reversing the conditions that caused its degradation, the nation will recover its original harmonious state again. (Figure 3.) According to Levinger and Lytle, this rhetoric strategy is effective in mobilizing people for nationalist action, and therefore a tactic often used. Besides mobilization, invoking history is important for two critical functions: on the one hand, it strengthens legitimacy and emotional appeal, and on the other hand, it defines the nation through these images of glorious past. The essential features of the "original community" are those that need to be recovered in the future project of collective struggle: the past influences the present action for the future. (Levinger & Lytle 2001: 176-181.)




Figure 3. The nationalist rhetoric triad. Source: Levinger & Lytle (2001: 178).

The past can be degraded through various means, both internal and external agents that destroy the community. Levinger and Lytle identify different diagnoses for the degradation: loss of territory, linguistic or racial purity, internal political division or general moral decline are among the most often quoted diagnoses. These "illnesses" need to be cured and inversed in order to develop the nation towards redemption or national re-birth. The prescription ordered by the nationalists inverts the diagnosis – the reason for the decline – and calls for immanent mobilization. Those who participate in the collective struggle to retain the past are counted as members of the national community. Levinger and Lytle recommend examining nationalist myths seriously instead of disregarding them as "bad history and pernicious propaganda". The rhetoric not only frames the nationalist demands, but it also defines the identity of the actors. (Levinger & Lytle 2001: 186-188.)

3. RESEARCH MATERIAL

This chapter presents the research material gathered in Tanzania, from the Internet, from the libraries in the University of Helsinki, Finland and in the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. The material is divided into two parts: that of the official revolutionary party discourse, and that of the more diverse voices which have emerged particularly since the beginning of the multiparty era (1992–). The material cited and analyzed in the text includes: a) official publications by the government of Zanzibar between the years of 1964–2000, b) presidential speeches during the Revolution Day or Union Day celebrations, c) articles of Tanzanian newspapers from the 1990s onwards, d) memoirs and political pamphlets, e) online blog postings, opinion pieces or articles from four different websites, and e) interviews and personal communication from Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and Uppsala. However, before presenting the material for this thesis, I first list the exclusions that had to be made, and then review the existing research on Zanzibari politics and ethnic relations after the 1964 revolution.

Aspects that had to be ruled out from this thesis include a) gender, b) relationship of the local spirit world and politics, c) divide between Pemba and Unguja and d) the land question. The voices of women, as a whole, are very much absent from the narratives on the revolution. All my main sources are written by men. Zanzibari women have not talked about the revolution and its consequences publicly, although it has been acknowledged that rapes and harassment were commonplace both during and after the revolution. Laura Fair seems to be the only one who has done research on the experiences of Zanzibari women in the context of *taarab* music: how it was not "fun anymore" after the revolution when men from the government dictated that they had to sing about the revolution instead of love songs and personal troubles. Fear, sexual harassment and other restrictions under Karume's regime are also featured in Fair's article. (Fair 2002.)

The connection between the spirit world and politics has been researched by several anthropologists (Arnold 2003; Larsen 1995; Motta 2009; Nisula 1999). Historical and political context influences the relations between identity and power also in the spirit world: new spirits (*masheitani*) are born and others disappear according to their salience in the society of that time. The division between Pemba and Unguja, referred to on many occasions when speaking about discrimination, Zanzibari ethnicities and party affiliations requires another study altogether. The land question is another critical issue which Greg

Cameron (2004) even believes to be the most determinant factor also in the current political debate.

Critical research on the 1964 revolution has only begun during the last few years. Previously only political scientist Michael Lofchie had laid the groundwork for practically all research on the political history of Zanzibar in his study on the setting of the 1964 revolution (1965). Most researchers who have tackled the sensitive issue have been foreigners, due to the repressive political atmosphere still governing in Zanzibar. Historian Thomas Burgess has written extensively on the activities of the young pioneers in Zanzibar and on the role of the youth both in the revolution and in the post-revolution nation building (1999; 2002; 2005). Historian Ariel Crozon has concentrated on the Union of Tanzania and the relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland in her PhD thesis and articles (1991; 1998; 1999). Issa Shivji, Tanzanian researcher of law and development issues has also published books on the Union, most recently *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union* (2008) in which he discusses some aspects of the 1964 revolution. Mohamed Bakari, Zanzibari political scientist has written articles and his doctorate thesis on the democratization process of Zanzibar, including a lengthy review on the historical background (2001). Several articles have focused on the multiparty elections and the democratization process since the 1990s, but mostly have only a brief mention of the political background (Cameron 2002; Killian 2008; Mpangala & Lwehabura 2005; Rawlence 2005).

Historian Roman Loimeier reviews in his article⁶ (2006) the conflicting strands of revolutionary stories and memories and divides them into different groups: emic perspectives as opposed to non-Zanzibari texts; "victim" and "victorious" perspectives; and the theoretical and ideological paradigms of explaining and interpreting the revolution. Loimeier notes that the amount of texts written from an emic perspective has doubled from 1984 onwards, compared to only 13 texts written between the years of 1964–1984. According to Loimeier, the total number of texts written on the revolution by 2004 was 67, not including newspaper articles or internet publications which are featured extensively in this study. Loimeier divides the texts into three different ideological perspectives: nationalist, socialist and racist. He cites mostly Western scholars, such as Lofchie (1965), Clayton (1981) and Glassman (2000) belonging to the nationalist pattern. Those who believe that the revolution had a socialist nature include *Umma* party members, the

⁶ The article was published in a shorter form in German in *Afrika Spectrum* 41: 2, but the author kindly granted me the possibility to read the longer, un-published English version of the article.

above-mentioned Burgess, and Zanzibari researchers such as Abdul Sheriff and Mohamed Bakari. The racist pattern includes many of those who support the nationalist explanation, together with scholars such as Crozon (1991) or Maliyamkono (2000). In addition to these three major patterns of interpretation, Loimeier notes that two new patterns of argumentation have emerged particularly since the 1990s: the view of seeing the revolution as a civil war and the emphasis of the "non-Zanzibari" character of the events, the revolution as an "invasion". (Loimeier 2006.) This "foreign invasion" aspect of the revolution is one of the focus points of this study.

Another insightful article is written by Garth Myers, a geographer who has researched urban life in Zanzibar. In his article "Narrative representations of revolutionary Zanzibar" (2000) Myers concentrates on the stories dealing with the revolution. He notes that examining the way how the story is told can be more useful for analysis than trying to find out what really took place. After analyzing and categorizing the collected stories from different sources – scholarly accounts, partisan histories, literature and even private letters – Myers concludes that "[d]ifferent versions of the revolution are often used today to speak to Zanzibar's contemporary political crisis: the revolution stories are the core of many Zanzibaris' political and social identities". As an example he mentions the contested book written by Omar R. Mapuri (1996) which was simultaneously nominated for a book award in Tanzania in 1997 and burned at a public rally organized by CUF, the main opposition party in Zanzibar. (Myers 2000: 430.) Although Myers focuses on geography and place imagery, race and ethnicity are noted to "play roles in the discursive struggle over the revolution and subsequent union" (Myers 2000: 435). He maintains that the narratives supported by the leading party not only influence the political scene but also have an impact on a cultural and social level: they stress the African racial unity against "Arab outsiders" (Myers 2000: 444). This stance repeats in this study as I go through the material produced by the ASP/CCM cadre.

3.1. Finding the material

When I left to Tanzania in September 2007, I only had Zanzibari nationalism in a broad sense as my topic. Already during the first days, after browsing old Tanzanian newspapers in the Dar es Salaam University library, I noticed the central role of the 1964 revolution in Zanzibari politics. This perception was later confirmed by a Zanzibari journalist,

Mohammed Ghassani, who stated that Zanzibari nationalism, the revolution and the Union of Tanzania are intertwined and impossible to separate.

During my first week in Tanzania I browsed some newspapers from the period just before and after the 1964 revolution, and began to extend the search into the newspapers from the 1990s, focusing especially on the political debates during elections (1995, 2000, 2005) and during the yearly Revolution Day (January 12th). Unfortunately the newspaper folders of the East Africana collection in the university library of Dar es Salaam were in disorder, and a substantial number of newspapers were also missing. Systematic browsing and gathering of information was unattainable, but I took notes and copied those articles dealing with the 1964 revolution that I could get hold of.

In my second week, I arrived at the islands of Zanzibar and began the process of applying for a research permit for consulting the Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) which operates under a 30-year-rule. After some weeks, request letters and several visits in different offices, I managed to acquire both the research permit and the admission to the archives. By this time, I had already discovered another valuable place for anybody doing research in Zanzibar: the newly founded Zanzibar Indian Ocean Research Institute (ZIORI), an institution led by a Zanzibari historian Abdul Sheriff. Their library had most of the books ever published on Zanzibar, together with a growing article collection and newspaper cuttings. I spent numerous afternoons there, absorbing information on the history of Zanzibar, writing notes and copying articles. The Zanzibar National Archives were particularly useful for finding most of the speeches and official publications of the government.

Getting Zanzibaris to talk about politics in general and the revolution in particular proved to be tricky. After almost 30 years of strict one-party rule, the Zanzibari Government still guards its reputation and controls opinions aired against it. This makes a confidential relation between a foreign researcher and local people difficult: people were afraid to express their opinions openly, and in the worst case, they might face bad consequences because of talking to an outsider. In the beginning, I evaded attention and often told people that I was only studying Swahili, but towards the end of my three months in Zanzibar I began to talk more about my actual topic, the 1964 revolution. I followed current newspaper discussions, met journalists and former political figures. One contact led to another and during my last two weeks in Zanzibar I was busy conducting interviews, copying books, newspaper articles or official documents found from ZIORI or from the ZNA and scouting for possible new material. I knew that foreign researchers, even if they

are only doing their Master's theses, are often watched. I was also called to the office of an immigration officer because of misunderstandings on the dates in my research permit and was questioned on my topic. Perhaps with more time I would have been able to gather more extensive material and to interview more people – perhaps I would have been deported from Zanzibar altogether because of suspicious research.⁷

3.2. Official Revolution

The official political rhetoric dominates the research material between the years of 1964–1980. The first years after the revolution were consecrated for nation-building both in the physical and mental spectra: distributing wealth according to socialist principles; building new houses, schools and health centres; establishing youth and women's groups; renewing school curriculum; and giving ceremonious speeches on the achievements of the revolution. President Karume's yearly Revolution Day speeches together with other political speeches were published by the Government Printer and distributed in schools and libraries. The Zanzibar National Archives has a good collection of the two first presidents, Abeid Amani Karume's and Mwinyi Aboud Jumbe's speeches. Some years were missing for various reasons, for example in some cases there were years without official publications. Nevertheless, until the 1980s, it is fairly easy to find most of the relevant speeches of the state leaders, either in Swahili or translated into English.

Besides presidential speeches, the one-party-state published other political material. First the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), later the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) publications concentrated on party meetings, resolutions and annual reports. Fastidious details were printed on the numbers of shoes, eggs, soap or clove crops produced, and the glory of the revolution was advocated. The ASP published photographic books on the achievements of the revolution which were emphasized in every turn, not only during the January celebrations. These publications followed closely the model and the rhetoric of other Marxist-Leninist governments around the world: the United States was the evil counter-part, and by following the socialist road the Zanzibari people would eventually

⁷ Deportation of a researcher has actually taken place in contemporary Zanzibar. Anthropologist Geoffrey Ross Owens recounts his experiences in his article "What! Me a Spy? Intrigue and Reflexivity in Zanzibar" (2003) in *Ethnography*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 122-144. Also anthropologist Gørill Husby who wrote her Master's thesis on the intersections of religion and politics in contemporary Zanzibar (2001) was compelled to leave the islands during the 2000 elections.

become equal. Counter-revolutionaries were fought against even with harshly violent means if needed.

Zanzibari books focusing solely on history and the revolution include *Mapambano ya Ukombozi Zanzibar* by Mrina and Mattoke (1980), and Omar R. Mapuri's *Zanzibar The 1964 Revolution* (1996). Mrina and Mattoke were schooled in the political education institution of CCM, installed in the old Sultan's Palace in Stone Town and renamed "People's Palace". The book epitomizes the official doctrines of the Zanzibari state and has been the main reference point for Omar R. Mapuri⁸ in *Zanzibar The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects* (1996). Mapuri's book, however, is born in a different context than Mrina and Mattoke's. After the first multiparty elections in the 1990s, Mapuri attacks the opposition in Zanzibar for their anti-revolutionary opinions and brands them as an "Arab party". The back cover of Mapuri's book states that "it places current events in the context of history" and that "[i]t is a call to the people of Zanzibar to remember their past and reassert the values of the Revolution in order to bring stability and harmony to the islands." Besides Mapuri's book, the political strife on the islands is overviewed from the side of the ruling party in a government pamphlet called *Zanzibar Politics: a proper perspective* (2000) and in the memoirs of the former secretary general of ASP, Thabit Kombo (1999).

3.3. Pluralist Revolution

The Zanzibari media in general continue to be biased in favour of the ruling party – there is no independent television or radio based on the isles (Freedom House 2008). The official view sponsored by the government held – at least on the surface – until the 1990s, but following the transition to multipartyism and the liberalization of economy, ideas began to change as well. Part of the Zanzibari diaspora returned back home, foreigners were allowed more openly inside the country, and tourism economy began its boom. Newspapers were set up and books were printed on the meaning and the value of the 1964 revolution especially outside Zanzibar: on the Tanzanian mainland in Oman or in the United Arab Emirates. Most significant "different" voices on this issue have been the newspapers *Dira* ("compass" or "vision") and *Fahamu* ("understand"), both written in

⁸ Omar Ramadhan Mapuri is a long-standing CCM official who has previously been appointed to the posts of Tanzanian Minister for Home Affairs, Publicity Secretary of CCM, Deputy Chief Minister of Zanzibar and currently holds the post of Ambassador to the People's Republic of China (2007-).

Swahili and supporting the opposition, together with memoirs and stories of former prominent figures in Zanzibar politics, such as Abdulrahman Babu or Ali Sultan Issa. Besides *Dira* and *Fahamu*, also other Tanzanian newspapers have published several articles on the 1964 revolution and its role in present Zanzibar politics, some of them more pro-government, some more critical. Newspapers that I familiarized myself with include *The African*, *The Guardian* (Dar es Salaam), *Daily Nation*, *Mwananchi*, *Sunday News*, *Sunday Observer*, *The Citizen*, *East African* and *Majira*. The ones cited in the text are listed in the bibliography section, the ones unmentioned in the Appendix. Some of these newspapers were available in the university library in Dar-es-Salaam, and some were preserved as newspaper clippings in ZIORI.

I managed to get hold of all the issues of the well-known *Dira* newspaper which was banned by the Zanzibari government in November 2003, only one year after its founding. In its time, *Dira* was accused of several things: of inflaming the political competition between CCM and CUF; of agitating people and causing animosity among the Zanzibaris towards their government; of not writing news articles, but commenting and merely mediating the feelings and ideas of the writers and the founders of the journal; and of *Dira* being the newspaper of the opposition (Nabwa 2002, December 20-26 and 2003, June 6-13). The government of Zanzibar charged *Dira* with publishing denigrating articles of the government, the main party CCM and the 1964 revolution. However, the Zanzibaris had received this alternative newspaper with enthusiasm, and it had quickly become the best-selling weekly paper in Zanzibar. Zanzibari journalist Ally Saleh⁹ mentioned that many people have kept all the numbers of *Dira*, because "it is not something you would wrap *maandazi*¹⁰ with". Besides private persons and the ZIORI, also CUF office in Stone Town held a full collection of *Dira* newspapers, and they helped me to find the missing numbers which I could not locate elsewhere.

The editor of *Dira*, Ali Nabwa, had been an adamant spokesperson for the multiparty system. However, due to his critical views in *Dira*, Nabwa was stripped of his Tanzanian citizenship on the basis of having also a Comoro passport in 2003. In the end of the year 2004, *Dira* was banned for being "a threat to national unity" and publishing "false and harmful" information on the children of the current president, Amani Karume

⁹ Ally Saleh has worked for the BBC, *Fahamu* and previously also for *Dira*. He has been jailed several times for approaching sensitive political, electoral and human rights issues, see for example <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1002318.stm>.

¹⁰ *Maandazi* are Zanzibari doughnuts which are often wrapped in newspaper after selling them to the customers.

(Reporters sans frontières 2006). A few years later Nabwa began working as the consulting editor of *Fahamu* ("understand", "consciousness"), which is privately-owned and published on the mainland but sells mostly in Zanzibar. Its articles are often polemics about current or historical topics, but always related to the society, politics and economics of Tanzania and Zanzibar. Many writers of the editorial team of *Dira* have continued to write in *Fahamu*, including the earlier mentioned Zanzibari journalists Ally Saleh and Mohammed Ghassani.

Other printed matters on the revolution include memoirs and pamphlets by Zanzibari ex-patriates or former political figures in Zanzibar. Some of the most well-known opposition pamphlets include *Ukweli ni huu (Kuusuta Uwongo)* ["This is the truth (to Banish the Lies)", 1995] by Amani Thani Fairouz, and *The Aftermath of Zanzibar Revolution* (1994) by a pseudonym "Babakerim". Political scientist Suleiman Said bin Shahbal (1999) began to write his doctoral thesis on the pre-revolutionary political history of Zanzibar, but eventually decided to publish it as purely his own personal project and not as an academic work. Ali Muhsin al-Barwani, a former Zanzibari politician living in diaspora has written memoirs *Conflicts and Harmony in Zanzibar (Memoirs)* (1997). The biography of Ali Sultan Issa, whom I interviewed, is now available together with the opposition leader Seif Sharif Hamad in a recently published book *Race, Revolution and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar* (2009) by Thomas Burgess – a significant addition to the discussion on the 1964 revolution.

Blogosphere and free, easily updatable websites have increased the possibilities for political communication also in Zanzibar. Before, newspapers mostly picked quotes and paraphrased parts of the speeches, but the opposition side was frequently left out completely. For example the government-supported daily *Zanzibar Leo* publishes articles focusing on the sayings and doings of the ruling party and has no critical discussion. Now many speeches of the opposition politicians are available online in the blog *Haki na Umma* ("Justice and the People") of the opposition party CUF. An active journalist and a Zanzibari nationalist, Mohammed Ghassani has also his own blog, *Zanzibar Daima* ("Zanzibar Forever") in which he discusses both history and recent developments in the politics, economy and culture of Zanzibar. Another online source that I followed briefly was JamiiForums, a Tanzanian discussion forum, in which there were two very recent debates on the history of Zanzibar, the 1964 revolution and the identity of Zanzibaris.

This fairly recent expansion of revisionist and contesting narratives of the 1964 revolution shows the importance of this particular watershed in the history of Zanzibar. In practice the analysis consisted of a lot of reading: I went through the research material and chose the most relevant parts, paragraphs or phrases. The analysis phase included also substantial amounts of translating the material from Swahili to English. Translations are included in the text in the analysis part, and the original text in Swahili is available in the footnote. After reading and translating I coded the target texts with different keywords into preliminary classes and searched answers to questions presented by both Fairclough and van Dijk above. From the side of the theoretical framework, the questions of belonging, nationalism and politicized ethnicities came to play. Focusing on the dynamics of defining groups is central: how do people use categories, exclude outsiders and characterize themselves or others? How are history, memories and narratives incorporated into this making of categories? Descriptions on "us" and "them" or "self" and the "other" are probed, both from the perspective of the ruling party and the oppositional script. Self-images and enemy images are often represented through stereotyping, naming, and using the past to explain the present. The next chapter illustrates the context of these discourses by describing briefly the main phases of the political history of Zanzibar.

4. FROM PAST TO PRESENT ZANZIBAR

Although the 1964 revolution itself was a brief event, of merely 8 hours of actual fighting, both its roots and consequences extend further. Due to space limitations, this presentation on the political history of Zanzibar is nowhere near extensive, and each time period has several scholarly books written on it. This chapter recounts the events of political history in Zanzibar, beginning with the pre-revolutionary history: slaves, sultans and emerging nationalisms. Alongside political history, also social history deserves a brief survey, particularly the creation of more rigid ethnic and racial categories before the revolution. These tightening conceptions were born out of a multi-faceted process which included Omani sultans, British colonial administration and Zanzibari intellectuals and politicians. The chapter culminates with the actual revolution and continues until the present day, looking at the dilemmas of the revolutionary legacy in the context of a multiparty democracy.

4.1. Slaves, spices and sultans

*Zanzibar...remains...the meeting ground of African and Oriental,
and affords one of the most notable instances in the world of satisfactory cooperation
between diverse racial and social groups within a single community.*

– Walter F. Fitzgerald 1939

Zanzibar has been the crossing point of many cultures: Portuguese, Arab, Persian, African, Indian and British conquerors, merchants and immigrants have all contributed to the present cultural mixture. The favourable position of the islands in the Indian Ocean with its monsoon winds made long-distance sea trade and further cultural encounters possible, creating what is now known as Zanzibar.

The trinity of slave trade, spice farms and Omani sultans dominates the pre-revolutionary history of Zanzibar. Zanzibar was part of the Portuguese empire from 1503 to 1698 before it fell under the control of the Sultan of Oman. The Omani grip tightened gradually, and finally Sultan Sayyid Said of the al-Busaidi family moved the capital of Oman from Muscat to Zanzibar's Stone Town in 1840. The Omani Sultan had introduced cloves in Zanzibar in 1818 and by the mid-19th century Zanzibar had become the world's leading clove producer. The plantation economy created a slave society with slaves brought from the mainland. Slaves were also shipped abroad, and soon Zanzibar became the largest slave trading centre on the East African coast.

After the death of Sultan Sayyid Said and a power struggle between his sons, Zanzibar and Oman were divided into two separate principalities in 1861. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890, meaning that the Sultan continued as the official head of Zanzibar but the British appointed Viziers (1890-1913) and British Residents (1913-1961) for indirect rule in Zanzibar. The Sultans of the al-Busaidi family had little real power under the British Protectorate. Although they were ceremonial rulers, protectorate officials – mostly Zanzibari Arabs – had the executive power.

Slavery was banned in 1897, after the establishment of a British Protectorate in Zanzibar. The end of slavery meant significant changes not only for the slaves, but also for the farmers, when they suddenly needed costly wage-labour. In addition to freed slaves, labourers from the mainland began to work and cultivate as squatters and some worked as domestics or in the industries in towns. (Sheriff 1994: 148.) Mainlanders, mostly former slaves, their descendants or migrant laborers came from different parts and ethnic groups of Africa, predominantly from Tanganyika. Many mainlanders settled in *Ng'ambo*¹¹, Stone Town's African quarter and came to work for the clove harvests or waged labour in town (Burgess 1999: 32). According to the census of 1948, this African community amounted to 21 percent of the total population of Zanzibar against 61 percent of Shirazis and 18 percent of Arabs (Lofchie 1965: 250). Norman Bennett, for example, has opposed Lofchie's judgment on Arabs being an "alien" oligarchy in Zanzibar, noting that the Arabs totalled 50,000 out of 300,000 Zanzibaris, and were just as integral members of the society as Africans. According to Bennett, the designation of being an "Arab" had more cultural than ethnic content in the East African context in the late 19th century, and that it was possible for Africans to merge with the Arab community. (Bennett 1978: 252; 267-268.) Only around 10 percent of the Arabs were owners of big plantations, others were farmers, traders, functionaries or sailors (Prunier 1998: 96).

Many scholars have stressed the impact of British colonialism constructing clear-cut racial categories (Mukangara 2000; Bennett 1978: 267-268). Yet, historian Jonathon Glassman points out that the groundwork for racial differentiation was laid by the Omani sultans who encouraged Arab settlers and Indian financiers to move to Zanzibar and brought slaves from the African mainland (Glassman 2000: 401-402). The British continued and enforced these categories in which "race" indicated function: Arabs were automatically

¹¹ Literally *ng'ambo* means "the other side" - a creek separated this part of Stone Town from the Arab-influenced center. *Ng'ambo* consisted of mostly small mud house dwellings, but was transformed in post-revolutionary period through President Karume's major building projects. Garth Myers has written several articles on *Ng'ambo*, focusing particularly on the post-revolution era, see for example "Making the Socialist City of Zanzibar" (1994) in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 451-464.

landowners, Indians were traders, and Africans were labourers. The British preferred the Arabs and the Indians when recruiting officials for colonial administration, in education and even in food rations. This preference led to an "arabisation" of Zanzibar: beginning in the 1920s, many Shirazis acquired an Arab name, and respectively many former slaves preferred the name Shirazi instead of Swahili, a term indicating a slave past. The term "Shirazi" was commonly used by indigenous Zanzibaris who perceived themselves as descendants of their Middle Eastern ancestors, believed to have come from the Persian town of Shirazi. Glassman supposes that those who claimed for a Shirazi identity did so intentionally to distinguish themselves as "natives" from the barbaric immigrants from the mainland. However, not only mainlanders were perceived as the "others", but some Shirazis also regarded "Arabs" as outsiders conquering their land. This ambivalent attitude of the Shirazis towards the two different groups of "others" and "non-natives" was later visible in party politics, when most of the Shirazis in Unguja side joined the "Africans" whereas the Pemban Shirazis founded their own party. (Glassman 2000: 402-404.)

4.2. Time of Politics and the nationalist movements

Before the actual nationalist movements, community associations based on ethnicity had been formed to advocate vital issues for each community. The Arab Association was the first group to be defined on a solely racial basis. It was founded in the beginning of the 20th century to fight for financial compensation to the slave owners after the abolition, but later the Arab Association supported the general interests of landowners. The Indian Association was formed before World War I and represented commonly the interests of the Asian commercial and financial classes. The African Association was formed to protect the interests of the mainland Africans in 1934, whereas the Shirazi Association, formed in 1939, focused on the "indigenous" Zanzibaris especially in Pemba. (Lofchie 1965: 99-100.) Shahbal asserts that during the late 1940s, a new generation had emerged in the Arab Association which felt that the Association addressed only the more privileged rich farmers and neglected the majority of Arabs. They were also adopting a new sense of identity, that of a Zanzibari with a mixed Afro-Arab origin. Shahbal claims that "[t]he question who is an Arab and who is not, was becoming increasingly irrelevant" (Shahbal 1999: 104).

The years preceding the independence of Zanzibar (1963) were filled with heated political fighting, both figuratively and literally. This period is generally called "Time of

Politics" (*zama za siasa*). Ali Muhsin al-Barwani and Amour Zahor belonged to the new, less racially concerned generation of the Arab Association. They were the first Arab members to join the first political party in Zanzibar, "The National Party of the Subjects of the Sultan" (NPSS, *Hizbu l'Watan l'Riaia Sultan Zanzibar*) and they also changed its name into Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). ZNP's programme was patriotic and anti-colonialist, but also non-racialist, stressing the essential unity of all Zanzibaris, the cosmopolitan nature of the islands and the binding force of a common religion, Islam¹². Lofchie claims that the Arab intellectuals of ZNP created "Zanzibari nationalism" to strike first, before the majority, the African population did: ZNP combined idealistic and religious motives with a political strategy. (Lofchie 1965: 147-154.) ZNP sought the support of one of the largest population segments, the Shirazi, by appealing to their fears of mainland influence: the Mainlanders were portrayed as intruders in a land where ethnic groups had always lived harmoniously. Lofchie asserts that particularly Pemban Shirazis were prejudiced against the mainlanders who were seen as infiltrating Zanzibar with Christianity, playing a major role in incidents of political violence, lowering the wages and stealing the Shirazis' priority for government and other jobs (Lofchie 1965: 250-251).

According to Lofchie, the African nationalism acted as a response to the Arab nationalism. This type of nationalism movement was formulated by Afro-Shirazi Union (ASU), later renamed as Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). In contrast to ZNP, the Afro-Shirazi Party had an explicitly racialist programme. They stressed the African-ness of Zanzibar and sought support from the mainland's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party and from the Pan-Africanist movement at large. ASP's flag and anthem were borrowed from Tanganyika, photos of Julius Nyerere (president of TANU) and Jomo Kenyatta (leader of Kenya African Union) were put next to those of Abeid Karume (president of ASP) and Thabit Kombo (secretary general of ASP), and famous African leaders were invited to speak at ASP meetings. Although ASP officially subscribed to multiracialism and loyalty to the Sultan, they declared that they would accept neither British nor Arab colonial institutions. (Lofchie 1965: 199.) In addition they stressed that ASP worked for the deprived African majority, the landless who were living in poor conditions. In political rallies ASP speakers referred repeatedly to Arabs as the source of evil in Zanzibar and told denigrating stories of slavery. They also claimed that ZNP was aiming at returning Arab dominion on the islands (Shahbal 1999: 257). Particularly Pemban activists were not appealed by this anti-Arab rhetoric and finally Pemban ZNP

¹²There are several verses in the Qur'an referring to the brotherhood of all Muslims, transgressing differences of skin colour or languages, see for example Qur'an; 30, 21; Qur'an; 49, 13.

followers created their own party, Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) which contested the elections in 1961.

Glassman has researched racial identities in newspapers published by these nationalist parties and their predecessors, the Arab Association and the African Association. The "Arab" newspapers, *Al-Falaq* and *Mwongozi* stressed in their articles the unity of Zanzibaris and the binding force of Islam which abolishes all concepts of racial differences. The newspaper of the "Africans", *Afrika Kwetu* ("Our Africa") opposed this view and adhered to more rigid conceptions of racial identities. Its writers stated that Zanzibar was a part of Africa already because of geography, and thus its owners should also be Africans. Racial differences were taken for granted in the articles of *Afrika Kwetu* and in Karume's first political speeches in the late 1950s: Africans, Asians and Europeans all had their own continents and their exterior features revealing their true origins. Glassman asserts that the propagandists at *Afrika Kwetu* portrayed "Zanzibari identity" as unnatural: people were either Africans or Arabs and nothing in between, otherwise they were only betraying their race and origins. It is particularly surprising to have this type of racial rhetoric in Zanzibar which was filled with people of mixed origin, and only newcomers could be readily distinguished from each other. Accordingly, *Afrika Kwetu* alleged that the Africans on the islands had pure blood, and not a drop of "foreign" blood in them. The African propagandists purported that this talk of a mixed Zanzibari descent was merely used to deceive the Africans into being Zanzibaris and to give the chance for "foreigners", colonialist intellectuals, to govern the islands as legal citizens. (Glassman 2000: 408-418.)

The heritage of slavery was little discussed before the Time of Politics began in the 1950s (Glassman 2004: 746). Glassman claims that the ZNP nationalism encouraged ASP to take a more explicit stand on the race question: inclusive, multi-racial nationalism of ZNP rested on the civilized nature of Zanzibar, and particularly on "Arabcentric high culture". In pre-independence era, this civilized culture was not, however, attainable for everyone. Poor were excluded, and most of the poor were former slaves or recent immigrants from the mainland. Thus, the African Association/ASP seized the opportunity and accused the Arab intelligentsia for excluding rural workers and the urban poor from their vision of harmonious, multicultural Zanzibar. The African Association propagandists attacked the Arabs by narrating stories of their conquest and slavery, included some of the Pan-Africanist rhetoric and wanted to define national identity in terms of race instead of civilization. (Glassman 2004: 732-733.) These stands by the Arab and African Associations carried over to the party politics and were

further exacerbated in political rallies. Main goals, threats and targets for political campaigning of the two main parties, ZNP and ASP are presented in the table 1 below.

ISSUES	Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)	Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)
Appeals to...	- multi-racial / non-African sense of national unity based on Islam - common cultural and historical past	- "Africans" and former slaves - landless and poor people
Portrayed threats	- indigenous (Shirazi) fears of mainland influence and Christianity	- fears of Arab domination - return of the slavery
Foreign-ness	- Mainlander Africans as aliens	- Arab rulers as aliens
Goal	National independence under the Sultan	African domination of Zanzibar

Table 1. The differences between the ZNP and the ASP in their appeals and perceptions on the nature of the Zanzibari, ingroups and outgroups. Based on Lofchie 1965: 174-175.

Before the independence of Zanzibar in December 1963, elections were held in the years of 1957, 1961 and 1963. ZNP lost the 1957 elections to Afro-Shirazi Union, the predecessor of ASP clearly on the Unguja side, but in Pemba the results were more diverse. In 1961 elections, however, ZNP joined forces with the newly formed ZPPP and their coalition won 13 out of 23 constituencies in the islands, making ASP an opposition party. Even if ZNP was claimed to push for the "Arab" cause particularly by its opponents, at least the voting results showed a much larger support base than what could have been provided by the Arab part of the population (around 10-15 percent) on its own.

The violence which erupted into a full-scale revolution in January 1964 was bubbling under the surface already earlier. After ZNP won the general elections in 1961, ASP supporters resorted to violence, looting and murdering especially on plantations in Unguja during the first days of June in 1961. The official death toll was 68 persons, mostly Manga Arabs¹³ who were usually petty traders and fairly recent immigrants in Zanzibar. In addition hundreds of people were injured and beaten. (Lofchie 1965: 203-204.) Since the beginning of multiparty politics in the 1950s, both ZNP and ASP had employed heavily armed para-military youth wings which tantalized and boasted with abusive language on the streets of Zanzibar. This history of violent demonstrations and political conflicts leads Lofchie to reason that

¹³ The name "Manga Arab" refers to the second wave of Omani migration to Zanzibar who had a lower status than the Omani aristocracy that had arrived in the 19th century. The Manga Arabs mostly worked as small farmers, plantation overseers, small traders or caravan managers. (Valeri 2007: 484.)

Zanzibar has a tradition of political violence which "was a natural corollary of the diffusion of political conflict into all realms of social life". (Lofchie 1965: 205-206.)

Another fraction in party lines occurred before the elections in 1963. Some young radicals were expelled and imprisoned from ZNP because of their socialist leanings, including Abdulrahman Babu, a Marxist intellectual educated in the UK. After Babu was released from prison in early 1963, he formed the Umma Party¹⁴ together with other like-minded youth, such as Ali Sultan Issa. They wanted to withdraw from the ethnic politics of both ZNP and ASP and lead the way for a socialist future. Babu believed that the British had divided Zanzibaris into "Arabs" and "Africans" through their propaganda, and that the only reason for having more Arabs in ZNP was because of the racial politics of ASP. According to Babu, the Umma Party made "political Nationalism, not racial Nationalism". (Babu 2001: 51-52.)

The elections in June 1963 were scarcely won by the ZNP/ZPPP coalition – although the ASP had had the majority of the votes, the division of the voting districts dictated the final result. The ZNP/ZPPP government began to tighten their measures against political opponents by diminishing freedom of speech and closing down associations. For example, the Umma party which had been training some of its youth in Cuba, was banned and confiscated during the first week of January in 1964. The government also fired most of their police force originating from the mainland, intending to replace them later with Zanzibaris, which left hundreds of trained policemen unemployed and dissatisfied on the islands. Only 34 days after gaining its independence from Great Britain as a constitutional monarchy under the Sultan, Zanzibar evidenced the next great upheaval: the revolution.

4.3. 12th of January, 1964 and its aftermath

An air of weird unreality hung over the sleepy, sun-baked capital of the world's newest 'people's republic'. Cuban-trained 'freedom fighters' sporting Fidelista beards and berets stalked the narrow twisting streets. Carloads of whooping blacks careened through the Arab and Indian quarters, looting and shooting. Radios blared ominous messages of doom and death. From the hood of one car dangled a grisly trophy: the testicles of a murdered Arab.

– *Time*, 1964, January 24

The events of the revolution remain blurred and different stories inconsistent. Only a few foreigners resided on the islands during the revolution and the official information has been

¹⁴*Umma* means "people" or "community" in Swahili.

scarce. In the early recounts of the revolution, "General-Marshall" John Okello, apparently a policeman born in Uganda, was dubbed as the leader of the troops and of the revolution. Later official versions only mention his part briefly or leave him out altogether and concentrate on the contribution of Afro-Shirazi Party under its president Abeid Amani Karume. Okello has also written his own, vivid account of the 1964 revolution (Okello 1967). A basic version on the events of the revolution is presented below, but as the following chapters show, there are many contesting views on the actors and nature of the revolution in Zanzibar.

Okello's men, a troop of a few hundred men invaded the armory of the police force early in the morning of 12 January, 1964. It was the night of *Idd al-Fitr*, when most Zanzibaris concentrated on celebrating the end of Ramadan. The revolutionaries took easily over the radio and telegraph stations, together with most of the government buildings in a few hours. The Sultan Jamshid managed to escape by boat. Many scholars, for example Thomas Burgess believe that the revolution was organized by ASP Youth League leaders such as Seif Bakari who managed to gather ASP youth and some of the policemen who were dismissed by the ZNP government after independence (Burgess 2007: 275). Professor Abdulaziz Lodhi confirms this, having himself participated in student politics and post-revolutionary politics in Zanzibar (personal communication 13.6.2008). The official version of the Zanzibar Government names Karume as the leader of the revolution, but he was most likely on the African mainland that night. However, soon after the revolution Karume was announced as the president of Zanzibar.

Estimates on the number of the victims of the revolution range from a few hundred to 20,000 victims. The death toll during the revolution night could not have been great, but the violence continued for weeks, even months against the Arab and Asian population in Zanzibar. The official numbers given right after the revolution mention some hundred victims; John Okello declares as the absolute amount of the first days as 7,994 killed; al-Barwani purports the number being 13,000; whereas Don Petterson estimates about 5,000 people being killed. Most probably the figure amounts to several thousands, among them also "Africans". The number of people who fled after the revolution is, however, substantially greater. Sheriff approximates that a quarter of the Arab population might have been affected by the revolution, which "can be fairly described as genocidal in proportions". (Sheriff 2001: 314-315.) Nevertheless, a large pool of educated people were killed or exiled in the years following the revolution. Martin estimates that there were only 6,000 Asians and Arabs who remained in Zanzibar by the year of 1970, all the others had fled to Dar es Salaam, Kenya or the Middle East (Martin 2007: 69). Most Arabs settled in Dubai, Kuwait and Cairo, many also to different

European countries. Right after the revolution Oman was not openly welcoming the fleeing Zanzibaris of Omani origin, but accepted nevertheless around 3,700 refugees. The situation in Oman changed when Sultan Qaboos ousted his father in 1970 and invited the Omani elite abroad to come and revive the country, making around 10,000 Zanzibaris return to Oman by 1975. (Valeri 2007: 485.)

At the height of the Cold War, Western countries viewed Zanzibar suspiciously: the country was feared to become "the Cuba of Africa". Part of this fear was due to rumors of Cuban soldiers participating in the revolution – they were later on recognized as the eighteen members of the Umma youth who indeed were trained on the Cuban soil and had grown themselves Castro-style beards. It is hard to estimate why Zanzibar took such a strong Marxist path, because the Umma Party with their more radical leaning towards Marxism was in the minority of the new government. Burgess describes Marxism as "a rather exotic plant" in Zanzibar, advocated by students who were impressed by socialist nations of the North. The Umma Party was only formed in 1963, and two of its most prominent figures, Abdulrahman Babu and Ali Sultan Issa had both received education in the Marxist circles in the UK and in socialist countries, particularly Soviet Union, China and Cuba. (Burgess 2007: 265.) Somehow these relatively few socialist-minded intellectuals managed to convince the rest of the newly-chosen revolutionary government of the functionality of Marxist principles for Zanzibar's development. Favourable reactions from the socialist countries surely aided – Burgess mentions of Soviet newspapers reporting about the revolution as a racial conflict twisted into a class pattern, with "Arabs" as feudal landlords and "Negroes" as popular masses (Burgess 2007: 275). This was also the position adopted in later ASP rhetoric on the liberation of Zanzibar. Student committees were another important factor affecting the inchoate policies of the newly-formed government: for example the request of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Students Union to nationalize banks, trade and means of production in March 1964 was later realized at least to some extent (Burgess 2007: 278).

An ASP publication states the main goals of the revolution being: 1) African majority rule to be implemented through a one-party system; 2) the nationalization of the land and the abolition of the capitalists; and 3) ending the racial discrimination, including easier access to education, jobs, medical treatment and land ownership (Triplett 1971: 612). The revolution of Zanzibar was quickly labelled as a socialist revolution which joined the chain of Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions, followed by Algerian and Vietnamese liberation wars. Colonial names were replaced by Communist ones: within a few weeks the stadium was renamed for Mao Tsetung, a school for Fidel Castro, and a hospital with Chinese doctors

practicing acupuncture for V.I. Lenin (Smith 1973: 124). Most of the Western countries withheld their recognition, whereas aid came pouring in from the Eastern bloc: the Soviet Union sent arms, the East Germans assisted with technical aid for building projects and for training security forces, and the Chinese donated money.

4.4. From Karume to democracy and again Karume

Small nations are like indecently dressed women – they tempt the evil-minded.
– Julius Nyerere, quoted in *The Reporter*, 1964, April 9

One hundred days after the revolution, on the 24th of April in 1964, Zanzibar formed a Union with Tanganyika, and the name chosen for this new country was Tanzania. President Karume signed the Union treaty¹⁵ with the President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere. Both domestic and international factors were involved: the stability of Eastern Africa was thought to be best preserved through the Union treaty. Moreover, president Nyerere was one of the founding fathers of the pan-African movement and he saw the Union as the first step towards realizing the dream of "the United States of Africa". (Crozon 1998: 113.) The Union has been regarded as a result of the Cold War, because as mentioned above, the strong Marxist ideology in Zanzibar was seen as a threat by Western countries, especially by the United States (Wilson 1989). During Karume's rule, the Union was more formality than reality: Karume led his country brusquely and consulted Nyerere rarely for his decisions. Thus, although the mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar referred to their socialisms both with the term *Ujamaa* ("extended family" or "familyhood"), their policies on the ground differed vastly. Nyerere adopted his moderate version of the African Socialism, whereas Karume's Zanzibar used strongly Marxist language and policies, being a country born out of a revolution and heading for "scientific socialism". (Askew 2006.)

The following decades under the sole legal party, Afro-Shirazi Party, included great amounts of pompous speeches, grand building projects, and massive civil rights restrictions in Zanzibar. The revolution and its legacy were taught extensively in schools as well as through government newspapers and other state-controlled media. The general

¹⁵The Articles of Union contained the following areas as Union matters: (i). the Constitution and Government of the United Republic; (ii). External Affairs; (iii). Defense; (iv). Police; (v). Emergency Powers; (vi). Citizenship; (vii). Immigration; (viii). External Trade and Borrowing; (ix). the Public Service of the United Republic; (x). Income Tax, Corporation Tax, Customs and Excise Duties, and (xi). Harbours, Civil Aviation, Posts and Telegraph.

atmosphere behind "the Clove Curtain", as Zanzibar was nicknamed, has been described as oppressive, full of suspicion and silencing any opposing voices. Zanzibar acquired quickly the distinctive marks of a socialist one-party state: ASP was declared as the sole legal party, public freedom was limited, independent press suppressed and gatherings of more than five persons forbidden. Nonetheless, to outsiders Zanzibar presented itself as a modern Marxist nation – part of the Union of Tanzania and of Africa, but also very independent and self-reliant, capable of taking care of its own development with a little help from their comrades. "Local culture" was used to build the "African unity" in Zanzibar. The youth were particularly targeted through cultural education programmes. The Young Pioneers, following closely Soviet and East German examples taught the youth discipline, proper behaviour and skills needed for achieving the revolution. They were also responsible for transmitting the correct "tradition and culture". (Burgess 2002.)

The revolution aimed at bringing about modernity and development in Zanzibar. Grand building projects, supported by East Germans belonged to Karume's modern housing scheme:

"After all, a mud hut, however well constructed, cannot possibly compare with a modern flat...I personally had twelve such huts, and they have all been demolished. The purpose is to provide each family with a flat, for a person who lives in a miserable ramshackle hut rather than a modern flat cannot truly said to be free." (Karume 12.1.1969, BA 68/15.)

Modernity meant, in Karume's opinion, abandoning old, traditional mud huts. A free person lived in a modern flat, and the aim of the revolutionary government was to provide each family with one. In general, development was presented in numbers: the yearly publications focusing on the achievements of the revolutionary government cited production rates of various commodities and numbers of houses, roads, schools, wells or bridges built by the ruling party.

Pemba was intentionally left aside from economic development after the revolution. Although majority of the clove farms which produced the revenues for the government were in Pemba, the money was used for grand building and development projects mostly in the Stone Town area. Karume knew that most Pembans had not voted for ASP in the elections and they did not participate in the revolution. Instead of reconciling with the Pembans, he used harsher methods. Arnold was repeatedly told by Ungujans and government officials that "because Pembans did not 'take up machetes', they had to be *taught* what the Revolution meant". Initially this "teaching" included a visit by Okello's troops in Pemba two

weeks after the revolution, but it continued for several years with "the days of caning" and anti-witchcraft campaigning. (Arnold 2003: 292.)

Karume was assassinated in 1972 when he was playing *bao* with his colleagues, and a former teacher Aboud Jumbe was chosen as the next president. Karume's assassins were called in party publications as "traitors" and "enemies", although many people were also relieved to be freed from the deepening dictatorship and police state. However, the murder of Karume strengthened the party's distrust towards former ZNP, ZPPP and Umma members, and many of those still residing in Zanzibar were imprisoned. Suspicious people were labelled "politically undesirable" and all candidates for responsible political positions were screened very carefully, stressing the political factors over ability (*ASP Resolutions 1973: 5*).

The newspapers of the early revolutionary period were strictly state-owned and the only one published in Zanzibar was *Kweupe* [The Light], a newspaper in Swahili which was distributed three times per week in 6,000 copies until it was replaced by another governmental newspaper in 1970. This second newspaper was known as "Truth Prevails Where Lies Must Vanish" in English, and was simultaneously published in Swahili under the name *Kweli Ikidhihiri Uwongo Hujitenga*. Mainly meant as a media for President Karume's policies and fairly unpopular among the Zanzibaris, both weeklies disappeared after Karume was assassinated in 1972. For almost 20 years, there were no proper newspapers edited in Zanzibar. Some mainland newspapers circulated on the islands, and other media, such as the radio and the television – also regulated by the state – replaced the newspapers as devices of mass education. (Sturmer 1998: 289-295.) As another proudly presented sign of Zanzibar's modernity, Zanzibar was the first sub-Saharan African country to start colour television transmissions in 1973. In a stark contrast, on the Tanzanian mainland television transmissions were begun 20 years later.

ASP joined forces with the mainland TANU in 1977, creating "the Party of the Revolution", *Chama cha Mapinduzi* which is still in power both in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The first constitution for the revolutionary Zanzibar was enacted only in 1979. The Union question and the degree of autonomy granted for Zanzibar rose to the forefront of political discussion in the 1980s. The first row took place in 1983 when debating the new constitution, mainly designed by CCM Tanzania, president Jumbe defended the autonomy of Zanzibar and had to resign.

Jumbe's presidency was followed by Ali Hassan Mwinyi who stayed in power in Zanzibar only for two years before being elected as the Union president.

However, Mwinyi's economic policies, such as trade liberalization, made a lasting impact on the islands. In the 1986 presidential elections Idriss Abdul Wakil beat Seif Sharif Hamad only by a few percent, but Hamad was chosen as the prime minister. In 1988 Hamad was fired from his post, alleged of planning a coup and imprisoned for three years. Wakil's presidency was followed by Salmin Amour (1990–2000) who concentrated on maintaining the status quo while adapting to the new circumstances of the beginning of multipartyism.

The falling price of the main export product, clove, threw Zanzibar into economic decline in the 1980s and eventually forced the islands to open up to the world. Zanzibar began to receive development aid from Western countries and international organizations – previously unwanted partners included the enemy of the early revolutionary years, the United States. Besides plane-loads of tourists coming to relax on the beaches, new flight connections to the Middle East, particularly Oman testified of the growing connections between the diaspora and Zanzibaris. Some of those who had fled after the revolution returned to the islands and even bought back their old property or started businesses. Constantin and Le Guennec-Coppens believe that the resurgence of cooperation between Zanzibar and the Gulf countries increased xenophobia in Zanzibar, and even contributed to the ministerial crisis of 1988, when Seif Sharif Hamad had to resign for "anti-government" activities. (Constantin & Le Guennec-Coppens 1988: 19). Bell argues that the liberalization of economy has, in fact, reconstructed the old networks. Although the financial aid of Oman is not as important as the EU aid, it has a strong symbolic meaning. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Arab Emirates and Yemen have also strengthened their position in Zanzibar by constructing mosques, delivering books and teachers for coranic schools or even sending sheep and dates for Muslim festivities. (Bell 1998: 146-147.)

Anthropologist David Parkin has also noted the growing interest towards the East and efforts of conciliation with the Omanis after many cold decades. For example the consulate of Oman is located in Zanzibar, and not in the mainland like other embassies and consulates in Tanzania. In an international conference in 1992, the Sultan of Sharjah, one of the Arab Emirates, urged "mutual forgiveness between Arab and African and pledged the rebirth of an old Arab Islamic relationship with Zanzibar". (Parkin 1995: 205.) Arabic expressions are increasingly incorporated into mosque sermons, and Muslim clerics criticize domestic and international politics, commenting on the situation in Iraq or Palestine. (Parkin 1995: 207; Sanders, *Los Angeles Times*, 2005 October 30.) In 1992 Zanzibar joined the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) independently without the

permission of the Union government which is responsible for all foreign affairs. The political leadership of the Union was enraged and Zanzibar was forced to withdraw its OIC membership. These events caused the first notable anti-Zanzibari opinions: Zanzibar behaved as an independent country and by joining a community based on religion it threatened the secular basis of Tanzania (Crozon 1999: 265).

Demands for democracy grew gradually in Tanzania until the multiparty era officially began in 1992. The first multiparty elections in 1995 ended with a marginal victory of CCM whose presidential candidate Salmin Amour got 50,24 % of the votes against Seif Sharif Hamad of CUF who got 49,76 % of the votes. Election observers, however, noted serious irregularities in the polls and CUF denounced the results rigged. In the next elections in 2000, surrounded by violence and electoral irregularities, CCM won again and Amani Karume, the son of the first president of Zanzibar, took the presidency. Electoral administration was markedly improved for the 2005 elections when CCM, led again by Karume took the elections with a seven percent margin. (National Democratic Institute 2005; Rawlence 2005.)

Two political accords called as *Muafaka* ("agreement") have been signed after long peace negotiations between CUF and CCM, the first one in 1999 and the second in 2001. By the end of 2003, the *Muafaka* II had been largely implemented and especially the electoral conditions had been significantly improved. Yet, as the opposition lead figure Hamad has noted, the most important items of the agreement have not been implemented, including the permanent voter register, reform of the judiciary and state media and employment in state organs without political ideological bias. (Mpangala & Lwehabura 2005: 66-67.) On the mainland Tanzania, CCM always wins with an overwhelming majority of 80-90 percent, CUF or other opposition parties gathering only 10-20 percent of votes, whereas in Zanzibar CUF regularly wins half of the votes. Thus, in mainland Tanzania, the ruling party continues without any outstanding challengers, but in Zanzibar the situation is even – to the extent of having to manipulate the elections in order to win (Burgess 2009: 1). The next chapter analyzes the impacts that the 1964 revolution has had on Zanzibari political and national identities, particularly in the current context of multipartyism.

5. REVOLUTION AND ZANZIBARI IDENTITY

Baada ya dhiki faraja. / After hardship comes relief.
– Swahili proverb

The 1964 revolution is not a casual topic for Zanzibaris who tend to evade the subject, and say that it belongs to the past or simply note that because of the revolution the people of Zanzibar were liberated. Purpura states that the revolution used to be a cultural taboo in the society, something never mentioned or referred to in public, but still very present in people's minds (Purpura 1997: 389-390). Nevertheless, the ever-growing number of diverging texts dealing with the revolution demonstrates that the revolution is a contested issue, as do the titles of newspaper articles such as "Zanzibar marks Revolution in a dilemma" (*The Guardian* 11.1.1995) or "Zanzibar Revolution has 'lost direction'" (Ngurumo 13.1.1999, *The African*). Most Zanzibaris today are born after the year of 1964, and have thus no memories of their own from the pre-revolutionary times – as one of the old generation revolutionaries sighed: "The youth do not care about the revolution anymore" (Fadhil Ibada Makame, interview, 17.11.2007).

This chapter examines two contrasting discourses of the revolution and their impacts on constructing, upholding and renewing political identities in contemporary Zanzibar. The revolution turned the foundations of society upside down¹⁶ and changed the entire rhetoric of speaking about Zanzibari identity. The dynamics between different ethnic or "racial" groups were overturned: it was not a matter of pride to be an "Arab" anymore. Zanzibar was declared to be an African state, governed by Africans, and those adopting another identity were treated as possible traitors and foreigners. The revolution which overthrew the Arab oligarchy is the anti-Arabist foundational myth of the new African nation: to be against the Arabs equals to approve the revolution, and to be on the Arab side equals to oppose the revolution (Crozon 1991: 192-193).

The first part of the analysis concentrates on the official revolutionary discourse: how it constructed the African identity of Zanzibar, from the initial wave of the revolutionary fervour, strong Marxist vocabulary and pan-Africanist ideas to democratization and multiparty politics of today. First ruling as ASP, then merging with the mainland TANU in 1977 and forming CCM, "the Party of the Revolution", the party upholds the revolutionary legacy high on its priority list. CCM proceeds with its slogan of

¹⁶ The verb root of the word *mapinduzi*, revolution, is *-pindua*, which literally means "to turn upside down".

"Revolution Forever" (*Mapinduzi Daima*) even during the multiparty era when other parties are questioning the policies and developmental successes of the revolution. The core material of this part includes publications and pamphlets of the party, Revolution Day speeches and books by ASP/CCM functionaries, such as Mrina and Mattoke (1980), Omar R. Mapuri (1996) and Thabit Kombo (1999)

The second part focuses on the diverging narratives which have emerged particularly since the 1990s: the voices presented by the opposition party CUF and other new nationalists who claim that the revolution led to decline, concentrated power into few hands and alienated a large part of the population. I chose to call this group "new nationalists" to differentiate them both from the "old" nationalists of the ZNP in the Time of Politics and from CCM nationalists who have a completely different agenda. Even though some of the aims and presuppositions of the ZNP nationalists and CUF nationalists coincide, CUF is not a direct descendant of the ZNP, as several CCM texts and even some scholarly interpretations assume. CCM downplays the fierce political contestation as "history repeating itself", but the context in which the new nationalist movement functions today differs greatly from the Time of Politics before the independence and the revolution of Zanzibar. The material examined in the second part consists of books and pamphlets published abroad, such as in Oman or Dubai, newspapers known as "opposition newspapers", *Dira* and *Fahamu* together with some mainland newspapers, and online sources: independent blogs, discussion forums and websites dedicated to Zanzibar.

5.1. Revolution of the Ruling Party



Our Mother: *Afro-Shirazi!*
Our Father: *The Revolution!*
Our Stand: *The Union!*
Our Policy: *Socialism!*
Our Goal: *The African Unity!*
Colonialists, Betrayers, Imperialists, Feudalists,
Traitors, Reactionaries, Capitalists: *Down with them!*
Revolution: *Forever.*

– ASP greeting

The Zanzibar revolution is one type of a brand: just as companies want their customers to perceive their products in a certain way, advocating this image of the brand through commercials and different media, the ruling party has branded the 1964 revolution as "the

liberation struggle of Zanzibari Africans". The present governance in Zanzibar is based on the revolution. The party in power has been in power ever since 1964, most of the presidents have been revolutionaries or proclaimed as such, and the current president is the son of Abeid Karume, the first president of Zanzibar and the one who was credited for planning, executing and implementing the revolution and its promises. In addition, the 1964 revolution prompted the leaders of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume to establish the Union of Tanzania, a symbol of pan-African cooperation. This legacy is reflected in the official discourse which has been propagated for more than 40 years through diverse methods: educating Young Pioneers, teaching in class rooms, writing and controlling newspapers and other media, speaking in Revolution Day ceremonies and political rallies. Even *taarab* groups were harnessed to proclaim the nationalist and revolutionary message in which the party promised to bring peace and development to Zanzibar and to give the power to those who were weak and oppressed, the "Zanzibari Africans". Children choirs praised the revolutionary leader, "Baba Karume" on the radio. Any critics towards the ASP/CCM were severely punished, and Zanzibaris were afraid to speak about their lives and politics to foreigners for a long time – to some extent even in today's Zanzibar (Martin 2007: 63-64; Husby 2001).

This subchapter is divided into three parts: the ruling party discourse is reviewed from the perspectives of past, present and future. The section focused on the past presents pre-revolutionary times as seen by the ruling party, whereas the second part, the present, stretches over a period of 30 years, from the revolution until the multiparty era. The third part studies the future, challenges confronting CCM from the early 1990s until today. Although CCM still claims to be the party for the majority of Zanzibaris, multipartyism has created problems of credibility and the very real danger of losing its status as the leading party.

5.1.1. Past: Slaves challenging their Masters

The official version recounts the past as a time when the colonialists exploited, oppressed, despised and teased the "Zanzibari Africans". Slavery, colonialism and the origin of Zanzibaris are central themes of the ruling party discourse: the gruesome period of slavery and discrimination was ousted by the African liberation, the 1964 revolution. During several centuries of colonial yoke "the African inhabitants of Zanzibar and Pemba were

conquered, divided and ruled in accordance with the wishes and abilities of waves after waves of alien settler elements" (SA 1/6: 268). Mrina and Mattoke describe the contrasts between the Africans and the other, privileged groups through living conditions: "British, Asians and Arab landlords lived in big stone houses which had electricity and clean water, when Africans lived in inferior clay houses"¹⁷ (Mrina & Mattoke 1980: 31). According to them, inequality existed only between different groups, not inside them. Yet, in one speech Karume noted the differences inside the Arab population and separated Arabs into "real" Arabs, those with big palaces or large houses (*wale wa majumba makubwa*) and into "countryside Manga Arabs" (*Wamanga wa mashamba*) (Karume 1967: 6).

"Us": united Africans

A party booklet from the 1970s, *History of the Zanzibar Africans and the Formation of the Afro-Shirazi Party* tells the story of the reunion of Zanzibari Africans who fought against the "divide and rule" policy of the British and the Sultan. On the one hand, the British divided Africans into two main groups of Shirazis and Mainlanders, and on the other hand, the Sultan advised Arabs to ally themselves with the Shirazis, labelled as the "indigenous people" of Zanzibar. The publication notes that the African community, originating from various parts of the mainland, was also fragmented because of the multitude of languages. (*The History of Zanzibar Africans...* SA 1/6: 1-11.) However, the policies of colonialists are given more weight than linguistic differences inside the African community. As his earlier counterparts, Mapuri admits that there were "minor" religious and geographical differences between Zanzibari Africans which were "magnified through a very well designed, sophisticated and persistent campaign by the colonialists and rulers" (Mapuri 1996: 45). The "divide and rule" policy of the British ("colonialists") and the Arabs ("rulers") was successful for a while, but they only managed to delay the common African struggle which was begun by the foundation of ASP in 1957.

Uniting the African population in Zanzibar is, consequently, one of the greatest efforts and a central theme in the ASP rhetoric. The ASP founders created a party for Africans (and Shirazis) "after understanding that it was their responsibility to contest for these islands and to return the African humanity to its homeland"¹⁸ (*Historia ya Afro-Shirazi Party 1964-1974*, BA 74/18: 1). The original African nature of Zanzibar could only

¹⁷Original in Swahili: "Waingereza, Wahindi na mamwinyi wa Kiarabu waliishi katika nyumba kubwa za mawe zenye umeme na maji safi wakati Waafrika wakiishi katika nyumba duni za udongo."

¹⁸Original in Swahili: "-- baada ya kutambua kuwa lilikuwa jukumu lao kuvigombea visima hivi na kurudisha utu wa Mwafrika katika nchi yake"

be retrieved through a common, African party. The unifying African experience was related to colonialism:

"Up to 12 midnight on the 11th January, 1964, we had been 'sold' by Britain to foreigners in the same way as other parts of Africa were 'sold' to foreign minorities by being brought under their dominion...A foreign power remains a foreign power be it from Portugal, Arabia, Britain or France...We fully understand the shame, the difficulties, the oppression and the anguish of being under a foreign rule." (Jumbe 12.1.1973.)

Jumbe underlines that although Zanzibar was governed differently than most of the African continent, the Arab rule was no less colonization than the French rule, for example. The British act here in only as cooperators who signed away Zanzibar to the "foreigners", the Arabs who were the primary exploiters. In his last Revolution Day speech in 1983 Jumbe states that the revolution wiped out 450 years of colonialism – Portugal and Oman are mentioned as colonizers, but the British are disregarded altogether (Jumbe 12.1.1983, BA 69/23). More recently, Mohammed Shamte emphasizes in his article in *Dira* that the foreign rule in Zanzibar began when Sultan Sayyid Said moved the capital of Oman to Zanzibar, and was only ended by the revolution in 1964 (Shamte, *Dira*, 2003, February 14-20). Also Shamte's view supports the idea that the Omani Arabs were the initial foreign colonialists, and that the independence granted by the British meant still being under "foreign rule", under the Sultan of Oman. The British colonialism is downplayed and the Omani colonialists are stressed as more significant "oppressors", with the goal of demonizing the former rulers and their descendants.

The assertion of African identity manifests itself in texts dealing with the question of the origin of Zanzibaris. President Karume proclaimed in his Revolution Day speech in 1968:

"Our origin is Tanganyika, that is where we come from. We came from nowhere else, let noone tell that to you. Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasa, Kongo, it is our origin. People here, where do we come from: Muscat, Kuwait, Basra, India, or Baghdad? We are from here."¹⁹ (Karume 12.1.1968, BA 68/5.)

"From here" in Karume's speech refers to Africa as the origin of Zanzibaris. The Swahili word used in the original text, *asili* (translated here into "origin") has ambiguous translations, ranging from "traditional", "temperament", "source", "root", "reason", "origin", "nature", "foundation", "essence", "ancestry" to even "home". *Asili* might relate

¹⁹ Original in Swahili: "Tanganyika ndiyo asili yetu tunakotokea. Hatukutokea pengine, asikwambie mtu. Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasa, Kongo, ndiyo asili yetu. Watu wa hapa tunatoka wapi: Maskati, Kuweti, Basra, Bara Hindi, au Baghdadi? Tunatoka humu humu."

both to the nature or temperament of a group, but also to people's roots, ancestors and home. *Asili* is close to the term *ukabila*, translated most often into "ethnicity". Translations for the noun *kabila* in English are "tribe" or "ethnic group", both referring to a group with a common descent. The original root consonants of the word *kabila*, q-b-l, have a broader meaning in Arabic: the q-b-l root does not necessarily involve only ancestral relations among a group, but it can be translated into "accept", "receive kindly" or "be close", thus referring to an inclusive, open and friendly community (Cleaveland, 2005, August 5, H-net discussion.) However, I was told that in Zanzibar the word *kabila* is used to refer to smaller ethnic groups inside the "African" or "Arab" groups (*makundi*), such as the *Wahadimu* or *Washirazi* (Saleh Mohammed Saleh, e-mail communication, 22.4.2009). *Kamusi ya kiswahili sanifu* (1981) defines *kabila* as a small group of people in a nation, united by language, customs and culture, thus very close to the description of an ethnic group.

Karume builds unity among the Zanzibaris by stressing the common origin of all Zanzibaris, even of those who call themselves as "Arabs" or "Comorians":

"These latter are Zanzibar people, Arabs and Comorians whose grandmothers are 'Wamatumbis' (an indigenous tribe). Racial distinctions are a recent creation. In the past we were all one. The people here have intermarried a lot. Arabs kept African concubines and had many children by them. Those who call themselves Arabs today have in fact a lot of African blood. Those who call themselves Comorians are in fact the offsprings of the 'Wamatumbis' most of whom worked as road menders and were well known to my grandparents. We are all related. We are all one people. We should not be misled by a person with a fair skin because most likely his grandmother is an African whom you know and is still living." (Karume 12.1.1972.)

Karume affirms the African descent of all Zanzibar people. The fact of having "a lot of African blood" even in the veins of those calling themselves "Arabs" makes all Zanzibaris related and belonging to one big people – Africans. Still in the 1990s, Mapuri reduces the origin of Zanzibaris into a matter of colour:

"-- the Zanzibari population is predominantly black: the colour of indigenous Africans. It is evident, therefore, that the colonial desire to develop Zanzibar as an Arab state lacked any historical, ethnographic or linguistic support, but was an expedient political decision forced upon Africans so that they could be effectively kept indefinitely under Arab subjugation." (Mapuri 1996: 41.)

According to Mapuri, the skin colour of Zanzibaris confirms his argument of Zanzibar being a part of Africa. Before this passage Mapuri had already discussed the origin of Zanzibar from archaeological and linguistic perspective: that the first inhabitants of

Zanzibar came from the African mainland and that Swahili, despite its many Arabic loans, is structurally a Bantu language and of African origin.

Karume juxtaposed the indigenous African civilization with "foreign" or acquired civilizations: "We are a civilized nation, well known, because ours is an indigenous African civilization, not an acquired one." (Karume 12.1.1970, BA 70/22.) This "our civilization", is exclusively African without any outside influences, probably implying to "alien" Arab civilization. Because the African civilization is said to have no foreign dimensions, any positive cultural traits brought by non-Africans to the islands are silenced. Eradicating ethnic identities and forging a new, national identity instead was a common effort in many newly-independent African countries in the 1960s. On the Tanzanian mainland, president Nyerere campaigned effectively for a unified Tanzania by stressing the authentic African identity of the new nation. Swahili, an African language was chosen as the other official language besides English, and "African culture" in general was encouraged. "Foreign", particularly Western, influences were rejected in Zanzibar as well: the Young Pioneers promoted various forms of "African culture", from games and cuisines to clothing, and the ASP issued decrees which, for instance, prohibited foreign cinema, bell-bottom trousers and long hair for men (Burgess 2002). However, in some cases "foreign-ness" was differently interpreted on the mainland and in Zanzibar: the government of Zanzibar embraced *taarab* music as its mouthpiece, but on the mainland *taarab* music with its strong Indian and Arab influences was viewed too "foreign" to be used for nation-building until the 1990s (Askew 2002).

"Them": cruel Arabs

In the ASP texts the Omani Arabs are presented as conquerors and invaders: "[T]he people of Zanzibar, of whom the majority are Africans, suffered in the hands of foreigners from different parts of Asia and Europe and particularly those from Oman who ruled these islands arrogantly and by force" (*The ASP Revolution 1964-1974*: 1). Majority of the people were "Africans" who were ruled by minorities of "foreigners". During the pre-revolution elections, ASP politicians evoked memories of slavery and concentrated on the cruelty of Arab trader and slave-owners. Comparable stories were told in villages by elders to the younger generations, face-to-face repetition granting more authenticity to these legends. (Lofchie 1965: 209.) An ASP newspaper described the ferocious nature of the Arabs:

"The Arabs made the people sweep with their breasts; the Arabs pierced the wombs of the women who were pregnant so that their wives could see how a baby was placed. The Arabs shaved the peoples' hair and then used their heads as places for knocking their toothbrushes." (*Sauti ya Afro-Shirazi*, May 5, 1961, quoted in Lofchie 1965: 209.)

This strategy carried over to post-revolution times when ASP used the frightening imagery of slavery to justify the necessity for a revolution:

"Babu and Badawi for instance went to the extent of telling one of the ASP leaders in front of witnesses that when the ZNP attained power the Africans would be subjected to worse indignities than their ancestors, in the days of slavery. Their women would be forced to sweep the roads naked and their men would be castrated to serve their masters and their ladies." (*The History of Zanzibar Africans...* SA 1/6: 250.)

Exaggerating the bleak future under the rule of ZNP helped to construct the idea that the Arabs would never treat the Africans as fellow citizens, and only the revolution would change their ways of behavior. ZNP was also accused of planning a genocide with the help of American and British guns and hand granades to wipe out all the ASP members: "Some Manga Arabs in the rural areas had already dug out deep trenches for burying the A.S.P. supporters, who, it was learnt from very reliable sources, were to be killed on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1964" (*Afro-Shirazi Party – A Liberation Movement* 1973: 264). Having forestalled this slaughtering, the ASP attacked first.

Don Petterson, the American consul in Zanzibar (1963-1965) described his impressions on the attitudes of the ex-slaves still living in 1963: "-- they and their children and grandchildren were passionate in their hatred of slavery and the Arab slavers. Numerous other Zanzibaris, especially those of mainland ancestry, shared that hatred, which many applied to all Arabs." (Petterson 2002: 25.) Assessing the validity of Petterson's observations is difficult, for he admits having very limited contacts with Zanzibaris at the time. He also assents to some of the reports made by the British who were pro-Arab in their orientation: "Perhaps there was some truth to the assertion made in reports written by successive British consuls that the slaves who were kept in Zanzibar 'were generally speaking not unkindly treated'" (Petterson 2002: 24).

The ASP historiography stresses that the initial puppet independence of Zanzibar simply restored the political power to the Arab colonialist hands of the Sultan. Although the ZNP/ZPPP government was supported by half of the Zanzibari population, the ASP declared them as minority government under which the oppressed Africans of the islands could not live. The fate of Zanzibar was compared with that of South Africa:

British left the power to the hands of the minority, in Zanzibar to the ZNP/ZPPP government, in South Africa to the white government. Among the suppressors were the Sultan, "aristocrats" (*wabwanyenye*) and "capitalists" (*wabepari*), and they had to be wiped out in order to achieve a real independence (*The History of Zanzibar Africans* SA 1/6: 250-253). The Sultan was a tyrant, a form of foreign governance that was rightfully banished from Zanzibar: the ASP texts maintain that the Sultan had left his own country and come to Zanzibar to rule its people and to make them "fools" (*wajinga*) (*Karume na siasa...* 1973: 17). The independence granted by the British was only a "sham freedom" (*uhuru wa bandia*) or "Arab freedom" (*uhuru wa waarabu*) (Mrina & Mattoke 1980: 90; Petterson 2002: xvi). Moving forward from this fake freedom to the rule of the majority required violent measures – overthrowing the Arab oligarchy in an African Proletarian Revolution. A mass struggle against evil oppression was culminated in the revolution which finally brought about "the true freedom" (*uhuru wa kweli*).

5.1.2. Present: African Proletarian Revolution

The representation of the past in the ruling party discourse already sketches the main outgroups, the "foreigners" who do not belong to Zanzibar. Texts dealing with the revolutionary realities of Zanzibar continue from this past by using class-based Marxist rhetoric and discussing the relationship of Zanzibar with the Tanzanian mainland. Other groups of outsiders are constructed, such as possible "anti-revolutionaries" and "exiles" who fled the country after the revolution.

The first official written version of the Revolution was published in the Tanzanian newspaper *The Nationalist* on the first anniversary of the revolution in 1965. The article purports that the revolution was planned well in advance: it was a project of the Afro-Shirazi Party under the guidance of its leader, Abeid Aman Karume who was chosen as the president after the revolution. The main responsibility was laid on the shoulders of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League, a core group of politically orientated youth that executed the Revolution. The role of John Okello was shunned altogether in this version. Apparently Okello had had leadership ambitions in the government, but during one of his trips to the mainland a few weeks after the revolution, he was told not to return to Zanzibar anymore. Later Okello's participation in the inner circles of the revolutionaries was acknowledged also in the official version but he was given no role in the planning or execution of the

revolution. The ASP maintained that Okello was only accepted in order to "keep a close and careful watch on this ambitious man who seemed capable of betraying the Revolution". A party publication claimed that his voice with a strong mainlander Swahili accent was only used on the radio "to frighten the well-armed Manga Arabs" right after the night of the revolution. Okello was described as a coward who tried to run away before the actual revolution day. (*The History of Zanzibar Africans...* SA 1/6: 266-267.)

African liberators – Arab exploiters

Officially the "People's Revolution" was carried out by ASP under the direction of its "great commander", Abeid Aman Karume. Sometimes the Committee of the Fourteen²⁰ is named for the leading role, but for example *The ASP Revolution 1964-1974* only mentions "the people" in general as actors: "The weapons used by the people in taking over these various points were: Their unity; Spears; Arrows; Pangas; Axes; Stones" (*The ASP Revolution 1964-1974*: 7).

Revolution Day speeches define the revolution in Marxist terms as a project led by the ASP for the downtrodden and oppressed majority, overthrowing the combined might of colonialism, capitalism and bourgeoisie. The Revolution Day speeches and party booklets often emphasize the origin of the "exploiters" against the liberators of Africa, the "downtrodden" Zanzibaris. The overlapping socialist and racist vocabulary of the revolutionary texts has already been noted for example by Mapuri and Western scholars: "workers" and "peasants" (*wakulima*) equalled Africans, "bourgeoisie" Arabs, "capitalists" (*mabepari*) most often Indians and "colonialists" (*wakoloni*) either British or Arabs. (Mapuri 1996: 4; Burgess 2007: 289, n64.) Translations of these classes between English and Swahili are not that clear: for example *bepari* has dictionary entries for "imperialist", "capitalist", or even "bourgeoisie", and these terms have more validity in the European historical context. Despite the vagueness of these concepts in Swahili, juxtaposition of the "good" and the "bad" groups of people is evident. The great evils of capitalism and feudalism, referring to systems controlled by Indians and Arabs, were replaced with Zanzibari socialism. All "foreigners", "non-Africans" belong to the mixed group of "bad

²⁰ Committee of the Fourteen is cited to have planned and executed the revolution. It was mostly composed of ASP Youth League members and had as its fifteenth extra member John Okello, who is sitting in the middle in the often printed photo of the Committee of the Fourteen. The members were: Muhammed Abdulla, Abdulla Mfarinyaki, Khamis Darwesh, Said Idi Bavuai, Abdullah Said Natepe, Hamid Ameir, Hafidh Suleiman, Pili Khamis, and Said wa Shoto, Ramadhan Haji, John Okello, Seif Bakari, Yusuf Himid and Khamis Hemedi.

ones", exploiters in one way or another, whereas the majority of the people, "workers and peasants" or Zanzibari Africans belong to the other side, to the good group.

The Afro-Shirazi Revolution was a part of the African Revolution, "which in turn is part of the World Revolution against racism, exploitation, tyranny self-aggrandizement, and the arrogance of might" (Jumbe, 12.1.1975, BA 69/5). The revolutionary victory was a victory for the whole of Africa in the liberation fight against colonialism.

"The Zanzibar Revolution signifies the armed conflict that was waged between the class of exploiters and that of the downtrodden. Like their counterparts elsewhere in Africa, the latter comprises the indigenous population exploited by Arabs and others who invaded Africa." (*The ASP Revolution 1964-1974*: 2)

The African unity manifested itself in the creation of the Union of Tanzania: its aim was to restore the unity which had already existed before colonialism between Tanganyika and Zanzibar (*Historia ya Afro-Shirazi Party 1964-1974*, BA 74/18: 76-77). Similarity between Zanzibar and Tanganyika was demonstrated in an ASP publication titled "New Zanzibar" (*Zanzibar Mpya*): "We and Tanganyikan comrades have the same language, same customs and there is a big familyhood between the brothers of Tanganyika and Zanzibar"²¹ (*Zanzibar Mpya*, BA 74/1: 3). The Union linked Zanzibar to the African continent ideologically, thus fortifying the African-ness of Zanzibar and legitimizing the strong presence of mainlanders on the islands. Mrina and Mattoke express the unity of Tanzania by referring throughout their book to Zanzibar as *Tanzania Visiwani*, meaning "Tanzania Isles"²², whereas the concept of "Zanzibaris" (*Wazanzibari*) is completely absent and replaced by the general term of "Africans" (*Waafrika*) (Mrina & Mattoke 1980).

By the end of the 1960s, after leading a relatively unstable country for a few years, Karume's paranoia towards his political opponents had grown to phenomenal proportions. Many former colleagues from the ruling party were imprisoned, executed or transferred to the Union government. Foreign powers were still suspected of infiltration and espionage, but more important was to watch "collaborators and fifth-columnists in our own midst" (Karume 12.1.1969, BA 68/15). Being on guard against the traitors inside

²¹ Original in Swahili: "Sisi na ndugu wa Tanganyika tuna lugha moja, mila moja na upo Ujamaa mkubwa baina ya ndugu wa Tanzania na Zanzibar."

²² Nationalistically orientated Internet site Zanzinet Forum notes on the use of *Tanzania Visiwani*: "The use of the Tanzania Visiwani instead of Zanzibar in Swahili is viewed by Zanzibaris as a tactical step toward a complete union with only one government." (<http://www.zanzinet.org/zanzibar/nature/mipaka.html>).

Zanzibar was a special topic in the 1969 Revolution Day speech. To identify these traitors, Karume advised the citizens to "watch out for people who grumble and complain or who desert the country" (Karume 12.1.1969, BA 68/15). Accordingly, the day before this speech Karume had talked about those who had fled after the revolution:

"--these people, runners, who argue for democracy with yesterday's words have run away from Zanzibar, they went to President Nyerere and journalists in London to tell them that they want democracy in Zanzibar...- They have not named the type of democracy they want and obviously we can consider that the democracy they demand to be returned is the one we had, the one they used in the past – Africans shall be slaves of Arabs, and would be sold at the market like in 1869..."²³ (Karume 11.1.1969, BA 68/19.)

Karume uses the ambiguity of the term democracy: he questions the plans of these exiled people whom he calls literally "runners" and accuses them of wanting to restore slavery in the name of democracy. The past is brought again into the discourse of speaking about "them", the exiled old rulers trying to oppress "the Africans". This view has been reiterated on several occasions, and the exiles abroad still pose a threat to the government of Zanzibar, at least in their rhetoric. This "Arab threat" is discussed in the next section focusing on the future in the ruling party discourse (chapter 5.1.3).

Rhetoric based on religion was absent in the early years of the revolution when more fervent Marxists advocated atheism, and president Karume discontinued religious education in schools in the late 1960s. He also banned the religious gatherings of Sufi brotherhoods, *ziyara*²⁴ pilgrimages and collective *dhikr*²⁵ recitations to control possible anti-governmental activities (Purpura 1997: 138). Nevertheless, Karume occasionally used religious leaders to mobilise popular support for his political agenda – many khalifas of the Qadiriyya brotherhood achieved high political positions in the revolutionary government (Husby 2001: 76). By the early 1970s, attitudes towards religion had changed so that party publications made remarks on God whom the "oppressors" had blindly bypassed:

"All this proved of little avail, for power ultimately lies with God, a fact these oppressors, in their blindness, had missed. They also forgot that God

²³ Original in Swahili: "--watu hao hugombania demokresi ya maneno Juzi wakimbiaji kutoka Zanzibar walioko huko London, walikwenda mbele ya Rais Nyerere na maandishi wakieleza kuwa wanataka demokresi Zanzibar... -- Hawakutaja demokresi gani wanataka na wazi tunaweza kuchukulia kuwa demokresi wanayoidai irejee ni ile waliokuwa nayo, wakiitumia zamani – Waafrika wawe watumwa na Waarabu, na wauzwe sokoni kama mwaka 1869..."

²⁴ *Ziyara* is a pilgrimage or a visit to a tomb of a Muslim saint.

²⁵ *Dhikr* is a collective ritual ceremony in which the participants may recite verses of the Qur'an, sing, dance or fall into a trance.

invariably sides with those whose cause is just." (*We have completed...* 1971: 1.)

Now, the revolution was legitimized even by the highest authority, God who supports the oppressed ones. Jumbe replicates this thought in his Revolution Day speech in 1973:

"Several times since the revolution these evil people tried to bring chaos and put the clock back so that they could retard the progress which through all the centuries of their rule they could not even try to bring about in these islands. - In their ignorance they have become blind to the words of God." (Jumbe 12.1.1973)

Jumbe states again that the Omani rule has not brought about any progress on the islands during hundreds of years. The scorn is directed towards these evil people whom are identified in this post-revolution context as anti-revolutionaries wanting to return the islands back to chaos and oppression. Jumbe uses historical evidence to back up the claim that even God is against these people who have thus become un-believers. In another occasion Jumbe declares that the revolution pushes people to raise both their material and moral status to a higher level: "I see both Jesus Christ and Prophet Muhammad in their own ways as great revolutionaries" (Jumbe 1977: 155).

Discrimination vs. equality

The revolutionary government takes pride in the fact that because of the revolution, racialism and discrimination were eradicated: according to them, the revolution restored the honor and dignity (*heshima*) of Zanzibari Africans after centuries of colonization (*Tumemaliza mwaka wa saba 1971...* BA 75/5: 3; *Mafunzo ya Siasa 1969: 2*). Creating unity among Zanzibaris of different origins was the next task to take care of in order to maintain peace and harmony. A book on Mzee Karume's teachings states that the Qur'an says that all people are equal, and that "ethnic pride does not build a good nation" (*fahari za ukabila hazijengi taifa bora*). Karume continues that the separation of people by colour, into white, black or red, ended on the 12th of January in 1964. (*Karume na siasa...* 1973: 61-62.) Division of time into *before* and *after* is a prominent trait in all narratives on the revolution: disparity between the majority and the minorities is stated as belonging to the past.

In the name of equality, the early revolutionary government nationalized land and property previously owned by private people. A land reform was done to correct the colonial history by returning the land to those "to whom it rightfully belonged" from the hands of "a few aliens" (*The ASP Revolution 1964-1974: 6*). Texts describing the land

reform give no indication of what happened to those whose lands were taken when nationalizing the big plantation farms of "the aliens" and "minorities". Voices of the losing side are effectively silenced in the official discourse which focuses on the "masses", the majority of Zanzibaris. Around 20,000 poor families, particularly mainland Africans, are estimated to have received three acre land plots for themselves in Zanzibar. The effects of the land reform were less convincing, as many urban families left their plots untended in the countryside (Abdul Sheriff, personal communication, 15.11.2007). The plots could not be inherited, but only held for the productive life of the cultivator. Furthermore, expropriated land is considered illegal (*haramu*) in the Islamic law, and some "big men" (*Wakubwa*) in beneficial positions acquired more plots than one family was supposed to have. (Cameron 2004: 110.)

Whenever minorities are mentioned in the post-revolutionary discourse, it is only in negative terms. In 1969 Karume addressed the Asians who wanted to keep their British Commonwealth passports: "Foreign nationals who were born in this country had better make up their minds by 1st March of this year whether or not they truly want to become citizens of Tanzania. If they don't, they must pack and go." (Karume 12.1.1969, BA 68/15.) Indians were criticized again the following year when Karume scolded clove-smugglers for betraying their country and freed several Zanzibari prisoners who had participated in smuggling: "Indians are notorious clove smugglers for it is they who are most avaricious. There is not a single Indian among the prisoners you see there. All of them have fled leaving those whom you see to languish in prison." (Karume 12.1.1970.) Karume claimed that the "master-minds" of clove-smuggling were Indians who lived abroad and had harshly left Zanzibaris, the "indigenous" people to suffer in prison.

The ASP texts describe "alien people" as those vested with privileges and "unwilling to renounce their privileges for the sake of equality". Equality, one of the main goals of the ASP included ending discrimination in education which was declared free for all on the 23rd of September in 1964. However, particular quotas were installed to ensure equal treatment of "Africans", "the sons and daughters of the country" among the more privileged "minority immigrant races":

"These are now bygones! State of affairs have been revolutionized and every one receives education without any sort of discrimination or injustice. Even the interests of the culprits are equally being looked after." (*We have completed...* 1970: 48)

The ASP texts proclaim that even the "culprits" are taken care of, but in practice the principle of equality was not followed for those outside the category of "Zanzibari Africans". Karume tried to emphasize that skin colour was not important when he declared that a fair skin tells nothing about the person's descent (Karume 12.1.1972). This perception was not, however, visible in the practices of the revolutionary government which ordered racialist policies for the minorities, most prominently those of Arab and Asian origin after the revolution. Besides quotas in education which made further education for children of Arab or Asian origin nearly impossible, many teachers were also dismissed and accused of being "exploiters". Only the party could grant permission to leave Zanzibar – also for going to the Tanzanian mainland – and it was difficult to obtain a passport without a party membership. A membership card was required to even receive food aid during the food scarcity in the end of the 1960s. (Abdul Sheriff, interview, 15.11.2007; Haroub Othman, interview, 17.11.2007.) Yet, the membership applications of suspicious people, such as members of pre-revolutionary parties or their descendants were mostly denied. The application form includes questions on the applicants' "race", descent and prior memberships of political parties of the applicant and his parents. The applicants must also belong to "the class of workers and peasants". An ASP publication states that out of 5,952 party membership applications between the years 1973-1975, 400 were accepted and 1,951 rejected. (*The 6th ASP Congress...* 1975: 8-9.) A significant amount of Zanzibaris could not obtain the party membership because of their "racial" background or family heritage, and consequently working in the civil service or acquiring any of the benefits reserved for the ASP members was difficult, if not impossible.

Although the official aim of Karume's policies was to end the racial discrimination and to produce "new Zanzibaris", a new nation, Kelly Askew goes as far as calling two of Karume's campaigns "ethnic cleansing" (Askew 2006: 26-27). First Karume forced Shirazis to sign proclamations denying their Shirazi identity and embracing an "African" identity instead – a contradictory move considering that Karume was still leading a party called *Afro-Shirazi Party*. Another incident which evoked international criticism was the Marriage Decree in 1970, leading to forced marriages of mostly women of Asian and Arab origin with several members of the Revolutionary Council. President Karume proclaimed: "-- in colonial times the Arabs took African concubines without bothering to marry them. Now that we are in power, the shoe is on the other foot." (*East African Standard*, 6.10.1970, quoted in Martin 2007: 69.) Laura Fair describes the extreme misogyny of Karume's revolutionary government, women's fear of moving outside for the

risk of being raped or forced to marriage (Fair 2002: 71-72). Seif Sharif Hamad mentions that the task of one security officer was to find preferably Asian or Arab girls who were even captured from the street for Karume several times a week (Burgess 2009: 205-206). Nyerere tried to talk Karume out of the practice of forced marriage and even the United Nations was asked to investigate the matter. Three girls managed to escape their husbands two and half years later and gave interviews to the international press in Teheran about their wedded lives in Zanzibar. (Martin 2007: 69-71.) Hence, the practices of the revolutionary government went against its official doctrines of "racial" equality and all Zanzibaris being "Africans": Zanzibari minorities, or those perceived as such, were treated differentially from "Zanzibari Africans" who occupied most of the powerful positions in the government.

Heroes and sacrifices

The ruling party rarely refers to the victims of the revolution. It is unusual to hear any apologies or condolences for those who lost their family or property during and after the revolution. In his speech in 1972, president Karume talks about sacrifices that had to be done in order to build something (Karume 12.1.1972). Although Karume refers to the coconut trees that had to be cut in order to build the Amaan Stadium where the speech was held, his speech might allegorically imply to the crucial sacrifices needed for building society at large. Old things are cut away in order to clear the space for something new, just as the roots of the old rule had to be demolished for the new rule to take place in Zanzibar.

The number of the casualties is not discussed in Revolution Day speeches. The perished revolutionaries are revered as "Martyrs" or "Heroes", but those killed on the other side are silenced. The deceased "others" are present in the official discourse only in a roundabout way, when referring to the violent nature of revolutions in general. Kombo notes in his memoirs that revolutions everywhere are bloody: "-- its end is happy, but before reaching this end a lot of blood has been spilled"²⁶ (Kombo 1999: 135). President Salmin Amour uses a similar phrase in his 30th anniversary Revolution Day speech: "-- a good time to do bad things is this time of the Revolution. Its aim might be good, but the acts of individuals during this Revolution in the society can lead astray from the intended

²⁶ Original in Swahili: "-- hatima yake huwa heri, lakini mpaka kuipata hiyo hatima damu nyingi huwa imemwagua."

good objectives."²⁷ (Amour 12.1.1994.) Amour assents that there were misdoings during the revolution but pleads people to forget and forgive the mistakes done in the past.

However, the tone of political rhetoric by CCM changes considerably when moving on to the first multiparty elections, held one year after Amour's reconciliatory speech. Suddenly the past is remembered again, the revolution is honored and the opponent party CUF is blocked on the basis of their "Arab-ness". Mapuri lashes against those who tell "false stories" on the mass killings of Arabs, only trying to instill "hatred and retributive stance among Arabs against Africans" (Mapuri 1996: 1). He denies any racial reasons for the revolution which was only a reaction of the oppressed against their oppressors. Mapuri suspects that those who add weight on Arab casualties by telling these stories value an Arab life more than an African. He incites the youth to become aware of the fact that also Africans died during the revolution. (Mapuri 1996: 55; 65.) The next subchapter deals with this topic: how the Party of the Revolution deals with democracy and the demands of the future.

5.1.3. Future: How to Save the Revolution from Democracy

CCM relies on its historical achievements: ensuring peace and stability, assuring the "true" independence for Zanzibar and destroying the earlier exploitation. The foundation of CCM lies on the heroism of the revolution which abolished past brutalities and discrimination. Presidential candidate of the elections in 2000, Amani Karume, the son of Abeid Karume, was directly linked to the revolutionary heritage through his blood and he vowed to defend the two pillars of CCM Zanzibar: the 1964 revolution and the Union. (Cameron 2002: 316-318.)

Reasons uttered for the Revolution Day celebrations have remained unchanged until the 21st century: the revolution "laid the basis for the emancipation of the weak people in this country as well as the emancipation of all Zanzibaris" (Karume, 12.1.2002). Instead of using ethnic designations, young Karume focuses on the power relations of the pre-revolutionary era and emphasizes those who were "weak". He vows not to let the differences "based on colour, ethnicity, place of origin, tribe, religion and class" to resurface ever again. A noteworthy reason for Revolution Day celebrations is to remember the past and those who contributed by "defending, honoring and implementing

²⁷ Original in Swahili: "-- wakati mzuri wa kufanya mambo ovyo ni wakati huo wa Mapinduzi. Nia yenyewe huenda ikawa nzuri, lakini vitendo vya mtu mmoja mmoja wakati wa Mapinduzi hayo katika jamii, vinaweza vikapotosha shabaha njema iliyokusudiwa."

the pledges of the Revolution". (Karume 12.1.2002.) Revolutionary heroes are still venerated in the time of multipartyism.

The Arab threat

The promises of the revolution began to crumble with the down sliding economy in the 1980s, and the "Arab threat" landed in Zanzibar again. Economy was liberalized in the mid-1980s and the borders of Zanzibar were opened, causing a gradual influx of former Zanzibaris returning to the isles from Oman and other Middle Eastern countries. Crozon writes about a pamphlet circulating in 1987 which claimed that Zanzibar is being sold to the rich Omanis aspiring to bring back slavery and wanting to make money out of Africans again. The pamphlet also warned people that the "Hizbu" (ZNP) still exists and has infiltrated CCM and the government. Another incident took place in 1988, when Seif Sharif Hamad, the future presidential candidate of CUF, was expelled from his post as the Prime Minister and accused of planning a coup. Hamad was branded as a greedy "Arab" wanting to break the Union. (Crozon 1991: 191-192.)

The fear of the old rulers returning from exile is frequently reiterated in the ruling party rhetoric. One year after the first post-revolutionary multiparty elections in which the opposition party CUF contested CCM in a tight voting, Mapuri writes that there has been a "recent obvious desire of the minority of the population to dominate the Zanzibari Africans once again" (Mapuri 1996: 83). He notes that after the revolution many Arabs "left Zanzibar with deep-hearted bitterness at seeing the oppressed African majority take reins of power" (Mapuri 1996: 66). These exiled Arabs are said to be making noise and telling lies about the Zanzibar revolution abroad. In a collection of speeches, Omar Ali Juma²⁸ (1990) says that these exiles "seek revenge and in their blind hatred go to all length to spread rumours, lies and malicious campaigns particularly to our friendly Arab countries". In addition, they have begun to send money to Zanzibar "to corrupt youth and some leaders". (Juma 1990: 11-12.) Nostalgia of certain groups "with vested interest like discontented politicians, racists, opportunists and self-exiles" is lifted as the reason for spreading this misinformation about the past. According to Juma, those believing in the Arab-ness of Zanzibar are "racial diehards" who mainly reside outside the country and present their claims "for their own mischievous ends". (Juma 1990: 27-28.)

²⁸ Omar Ali Juma is a prominent CCM politician who served as the Chief Minister of Zanzibar (1988-1995) after Seif Sharif Hamad was expelled and as the Vice-President of Tanzania (1995-2001).

The ruling party describes the multiparty politics as history repeating itself. CUF is labeled as an "Arab" party which merely reduplicates the old ZNP/ZPPP propaganda and uses similar tactics to lure voters and scare CCM supporters. Mapuri claims that CUF uses "the same coercive, dictatorial, deceptive and unethical techniques in winning members and votes that were used by the ZNP in the sixties". He concludes that CUF appeals to the same allies as the ZNP/ZPPP government did: the Arab states and Western powers under British influence. (Mapuri 1996: 88.)

In a similar vein with Mapuri, Sheikh Thabit Kombo links the Arab threat from the past with the multiparty elections of the present:

"By using democracy these troublemakers have got the chance to bring us chaos in the isles...It is not harmful to say that the Hizbu is not here anymore, or that the ZPPP is not here anymore; but there are still people who were in the ZPPP and the ZNP or who believed in these parties, that another time their thoughts and their actions still follow their old ideology of hating the mainland, wanting to have the Sultan back or maintaining discrimination."²⁹ (Kombo 1999: 182-183.)

Kombo maintains that the opposition politicians are "troublemakers" who employ democracy to disturb peace in Zanzibar. Kombo also links these people to ZNP/ZPPP ideology, anti-mainlander sentiments, pro-Sultan activities and continuation of exploitation. His rhetoric follows not only Mapuri's line of thinking, but both of them actually echo the ASP discourse of the early revolutionary years. It is claimed that the ideas of the "Hizbu", ZNP/ZPPP coalition still linger on in the form of disliking the mainland and wanting to return discrimination and the Sultan to the isles. CCM still has the authority and legitimacy to defend Zanzibar against those who threaten the very basis of the revolution – by any means, as they proclaim and show in practice.

Mapuri accuses CUF of denouncing the revolution and "portraying it as an unjustified event that brought in brutality and injustice, and undermined what they alleged was the just and tranquil social order existing in Zanzibar before the Revolution" (Mapuri 1996: 1). Mapuri echoes the earlier ASP texts when he reconstructs the history of Zanzibar, the 1964 revolution and the roles of "Africans" and "Arabs" in these struggles.

"Hangovers of the slave/master relationship between Africans and Arabs continued to linger in the heads of the 'masters' after the abolition of slavery

²⁹Original in Swahili: " Kwa kutumia demokrasia, wakorofi hao wamepata nafasi ya kutuletea misukosuko visiwani...Haidhuru tunasema kuwa sasa Hizbu hawapo, au ZPPP hawapo; lakini, bado wapo watu waliokuwa ZPPP na ZNP, au waliokuwa wanaviamini vyama hivyo, ambao mara nyingine mawazo yao na vitendo vyao bado yanafuata itikadi yao ya zamani ya kuchukia Bara, kumtaka Sultani au kudumisha ubaguzi."

and indeed until the 1964 Revolution, at least in part because they were being encouraged by the British colonial administration. -- these feelings have re-surfaced with the advent of political pluralism." (Mapuri 1996: 87.)

Mapuri claims that the "masters", Arabs, are still longing for the old days of slavery and multiparty elections have only made these feelings reappear again. Besides Arabs themselves, the blame is on the British colonial administration which strengthened this slave/master relationship through their choices in the rule and administration of Zanzibar. Babu has made similar observations on the impact of slavery to people's psyche – he believes that Zanzibar was not only a slave market, but also a slave society which has the mentality of slavery deeply ingrained in the collective unconscious. Babu believes that those classifying themselves as "Arabs" are categorized as the privileged masters (*mabwana*), and those classifying themselves as "Africans" are identified as the victims of the old slave society. Furthermore, Babu asserts that loyalties to political parties are similarly divided – one either affiliates with the masters or their victims. (Babu 2001: 60.) Karume even accused Hamad of wanting to reintroduce a new kind of slavery by encouraging youth to work abroad where they only earn little for their work, thus a type of a modern slavery (*The Guardian*, 2000, September 4).

A government publication *Zanzibar Politics* justifies the violent response of the Zanzibari security forces towards the opposition demonstrators, blaming them of "un-nationalistic attitudes" which threaten peace and security of the country (*Zanzibar Politics* 2000: 8). On the accusations of human rights violations, it is simply declared that because nobody has lodged a case in court, the charges are mere political propaganda, overstated by CUF and "other people outside the country" (*Zanzibar Politics* 2000: 26). Already printing this publication in English instead of Swahili, the most widely used language in political discussion in Zanzibar, shows that the publication is targeting non-Zanzibaris. The ruling party is well aware of the influence of Zanzibari diaspora and the support CUF receives from abroad. Accusations of political violence are belittled as mere propaganda, created by "Arabs" and other foreigners who want to attack the "Africans" in power.

Zanzibar Politics admits no fault from the side of the government for the political violence, but the guilt is transferred to CUF whose "-- leaders motivated by greed, personal lust for power and the drive to settle old scores went as low as to utilise unethical racial and religious political strategies during their political campaigns". The book deplores the fact that these "un-nationalistic attitudes opened up old colonial wounds long buried". (*Zanzibar Politics* 2000: 6.) The allusion of "settling old scores" demonstrates that the

opposition leaders are branded as direct descendants of the losers of the revolution. Opening of the colonial wounds refers to the racial discrimination practices enforced during the Omani and British colonialism. After a long list of discriminating tactics by CUF, such as "CUF men divorcing women CCM supporters" or "burning of CCM offices and Maskanis (clubs) in Pemba", the publication concludes that "-- these atrocities...began with the inception of that party. It seems therefore that terrorism, sabotage, humiliation, infringement of the law, creation of disturbance etc. is an essential ingredient of CUF policy." (*Zanzibar Politics* 2000: 42-46; 54.) CUF members and supporters are stereotyped as terrorists who want to disturb the peace of the nation for their own benefit.

Peace, stability and the Union

Nationalism for the ruling party CCM is closely linked to the Union: it means thinking of the benefit of Tanzania. Zanzibar by itself is not important, but is a part of a larger struggle, of "African liberation" and defending the rights of those who were once oppressed. The Union of Tanzania has been strengthened in two occasions: first in 1977 with the creation of CCM, common party for the mainland and Zanzibar, and in 1984 with the new constitution which led to president Jumbe being resigned. Although separatist groups in Zanzibar began to criticize the Union already in the 1980s, the true contestation has really begun in the 1990s, especially since the multiparty elections.

Mapuri accuses multipartyism for opening up "opportunities for unruly and irresponsible politicians deliberately to distort history to serve their own political interests" (Mapuri 1996: 1). He maintains that Mzee Karume's opinion on democracy –that no elections should be held for 50 years – was foresighted. According to Mapuri, more than 28 years would have been needed for "old habits to die out" in Zanzibar society. (Mapuri 1996: 66.) He claims that certain parts of the population have clung more strongly to these "old habits", including racial hate speech, history and electoral violence:

"-- the advent of multipartyism has clearly revealed that racial sentiments had not been buried completely, but remained intact among die-hard racists, especially amongst those Arabs who still harbour a mentality of and desire for retribution" (Mapuri 1996: 4)

The efforts to abolish all discrimination and racial thinking have failed, and Mapuri points to the direction of the Arabs who are bitter for losing their property and still yearn for retribution. Mapuri refers to racism only as a one-sided Arab phenomenon: "they" are the

ones who are still bitter and the democratization process has contributed to this outburst of "racial sentiments".

Maintaining peace on the islands after the violent period of Time of Politics is a source of pride for the revolutionary government. Mapuri confirms:

"The first and probably most impressive achievement of the Revolution has been the thirty years of peace and tranquility which the islands have since enjoyed. Against all predictions at the time and against all odds the Revolution has been able to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect among Zanzibaris of all races and creeds." (Mapuri 1996: 59.)

The importance of preserving peace was already mentioned in the 1970s when ASP declared to be "all the more prepared to preserve and defend the peace of the islands at all times and at any cost" (*We have completed...* 1972: 16). In the 2000 elections, Amani ("peace"), the first name of the young Karume, was raised as the main campaign message, and CCM stickers had texts such as "Choose Amani So That He Brings Peace" (*Chagua Amani Alete Amani*) (Cameron 2002: 322). After being chosen for the first term, president Karume expressed his special gratitude for "all the citizens for maintaining tranquility, friendship, peace and stability in the country" (Karume 12.1.2002).

Young Karume relies on "patriotism and respect" as the way for unity and peace: "If we create cooperation and competition on the basis of patriotism and respect for each other we shall be in position to preserve unity, tranquility, peace, friendship and development for our people." (Karume 12.1.2002) Karume omits overtly negative words and talks about "political conflicts" or "quarrels" between the different parties. Besides "threatening the peace and security of the country and its people", these quarrels also "began to tarnish the image of Zanzibar and Tanzania abroad" (Karume 12.1.2002). Indeed, political violence attracted attention also outside Zanzibar. A major clash took place after the elections in 2000, on the 27th January, 2001, when the police forces clashed with demonstrators, killed between 30 and 70 people and wounded hundreds of people in various districts, especially in Pemba. Besides thousands of people fleeing to the mainland, more than 2,000 Zanzibaris, mainly Pembans, fled to Kenya as refugees. (Human Rights Watch 2002.) Many Western donor countries suspended their development aid for Zanzibar and demanded action to be taken. However, the government of Zanzibar responded that they "were prepared to eat sand", some of its officials proclaiming that because "they had obtained power with *machete*, they will not give it up with mere pieces of paper" (Cameron 2002: 326; Ali Sultan Issa, interview, 17.11.2007). CCM blamed CUF

for the aid freeze because their activists had complained about the allegedly fraudulent elections to the donors (Cameron 2002: 317).

The government vehemently denies all allegations of election fraud. Mapuri blames the Western countries for supporting CUF, because the election observers "concentrated on only minor and insignificant issues" and left the offences made by the opposition unheeded (Mapuri 1996: 79). *Zanzibar Politics* makes similar observations when recounting the 1995 elections. This scolding of the international community towards the rigged elections in Zanzibar is interpreted by CCM as neo-colonialism and duplicity. According to Mapuri, oil-producing countries such as the Gulf states are not forced to adopt "Western models of democracy", whereas "Zanzibari Africans" continue to be "victims of their humility", and only poor African nations are being punished for not obeying the rules. (Mapuri 1996: 83.) Donors meddling with the internal affairs of Tanzania harass them in their own land and break their rights of sovereignty.

In the ASP/CCM discourse, peace and stability of Zanzibar are inextricably linked to the Union of Tanzania. Young Karume even states that out of all the achievements done after the revolution, the survival of the Union is the greatest (Karume 12.1.2002). He was echoed on the 40th anniversary of the Union by the Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa who proclaimed that not only the revolution, but the Union was also for forever (*Muungano Daima*) (Mkapa 26.4.2004). Mapuri also merges stability of the country, the revolution and the Union together. The exiled diaspora constituted a danger to the revolution which was secured by the Union:

"The Union was a decisive blow to the enemies of the Revolution both internal and external. It deeply frustrated and angered all those who harboured hopes of returning to power. Those dared to try failed and there is now no way others can succeed. This fact is well known to the enemies of the Revolution; hence the extensive campaigns they have consistently been running against the Union. They know that the only hope for them to arrest the Revolution and restore oppression, humiliation and exploitation of the peasants and workers, lies in the weakening and eventual break-up of the Union." (Mapuri 1996: 67.)

On one hand, the union makes it harder for the pre-revolution regime to return, and on the other hand these "enemies of the Revolution" are now attacking the Union in order to restore their old rule. Mapuri emphasizes that the dissolution of the Union would, in fact, lead back to the time of exploitation. Another view on the Union is offered by Zanzibari Prime Minister Omar Ali Juma who states in his speech in 1988: "-- were it not for the Union Zanzibar would have been in permanent blood bath. Zanzibaris would have

slaughtered other Zanzibaris like chicken. It is good to bear in mind that this truth is still valid today." (Juma 1990: 19-20.) Juma maintains that the Union prevented the resurgence of violence in Zanzibar and secured peace in the country. Juma adds an interesting reference of the present: that the Union was still protecting Zanzibar from a potential bloodbath.

Nevertheless, divisions among Zanzibaris have become more visible in the contested multiparty elections which, according to Mapuri, are "the most serious challenge" the revolution has had to face. He urges Zanzibari Africans to re-unite and to safeguard Zanzibar staying "African" also in the future:

"After surviving the big test of the 1995 elections, they must prepare themselves for bigger tests ahead so as to ensure that the Great 1964 Revolution remains for ever and that Zanzibar remains African. That is the only way Africans as the majority Zanzibaris can determine their own fate and the destiny of Zanzibar." (Mapuri 1996: 83.)

Mapuri repeats the idea that "African unity remains the only hope and weapon for defending the Revolution and its achievements", although economic self-reliance is still the ultimate goal (Mapuri 1996: 83). The opposing discourse presents another kind of unity as the way to the future – that of a Zanzibari unity which surpasses all ethnic or "racial" divisions.

5.2. Ruptures in Revolutionary Rhetoric

Hasira, hasara. / Anger brings loss.
– Swahili proverb

Competing versions of the 1964 revolution have emerged from different locations: from the diaspora in Middle Eastern and European countries, particularly Oman and Dubai, and from the opposition in Zanzibar. Contestation on whether the revolution was detrimental or beneficial for creating unity among Zanzibaris was fierce on the pages of the newspaper *Dira* during its year of existence. After *Dira*, the discussion has carried on in the newspaper *Fahamu* and in online discussion forums and blogs. This chapter focuses particularly on the new nationalist views which see the revolution as an invasion by foreigners. Other issues are reflected in this discussion, such as the Zanzibari identity which is linked to the history of slavery, ethno-racial cleavages, the Union of Tanzania and the on-going battle for political power.

Combining the views of the diaspora – mostly "old" Zanzibari nationalists, members of the ZNP party or the "privileged minorities" in general – with those of the "new" nationalists under one rubric does not mean that they would agree on everything regarding the past, present and future in Zanzibar. These two discourses overlap in most instances, but the language used by the opposition, for example, is notably less harsh than that of the diaspora. Yet, many articles by diaspora writers have been published in *Dira* and *Fahamu*, both classified as opposition newspapers. The diaspora and the new nationalists have similar aims and they also cooperate in political affairs: CUF leaders have visited some of the former political leaders living in diaspora in Dubai and Oman, and foreign monetary flows support the Zanzibari opposition (Bakari 2001: 190-201). Nevertheless, this does not mean that CUF as a political party would be a mere puppet of the former Zanzibari political forces. They have major grass-root level support especially among the young, educated population of Zanzibar. Most of CUF political figures have participated in CCM machinery before the multiparty era and as opposed to CCM claims, have no family connections to the pre-revolutionary parties.

Before continuing with the new nationalist interpretation of the revolution, I review briefly two other views which emerged during the 1990s. The first view is vehemently supported by Abdulrahman Babu who partly adapts the official proletarian version and sees the 1964 revolution as a class revolution in which racial lines and economic classes coincided. According to Babu, one major component was left out from the official version: the Umma Party had intervened to transform a "lumpen uprising" from an "-- anti-Arab, anti-privilege, anti-this and anti-that perspective into a serious social revolution --". Babu denies the allegations of massacres and asserts that the true number of casualties was "minimal", and that the perpetrators of violence were severely punished by the revolutionary government. (Babu 1991: 240-241.) He deplors the fading of a "brilliant revolutionary star of Africa" after Zanzibar joined the Union of Tanzania when most of the Umma Party cadre, deemed too dangerous for the ruling party, were dispersed to posts in the mainland. Yet, Babu still believes that socialism is the solution for a unified Africa – that was for him "the meaning and legacy of the Zanzibar Revolution". (Babu 1991: 244-246.) Amrit Wilson, Babu's partner follows his lines of thought, but adds the pressure of the US as the driving factor for the Union of Tanzania after the revolution. CIA files demonstrate the interest the US showed towards Zanzibari issues, related to the fear of Communism and the rivalry of the Cold War. Wilson states that after the promising

revolutionary start in Zanzibar, the influence of foreign powers gave birth to the Union, and ultimately to the demise of the revolutionary aims. (Wilson 1989.)

The second view on the revolution is particularly forwarded by Zanzibari historian Abdul Sheriff: the revolution as "civil war" instead of "an overthrow of an Arab oligarchy by an African majority" (Sheriff 2001: 313). He asserts that the post-revolutionary government failed to heal the wounds of the revolution and has even exacerbated the pre-revolutionary social and political cleavages. (Sheriff 2001: 301, 314.) The society was not split between "Arabs" and "Africans" but between two halves of the nation – also Shirazis were divided into ASP and ZNP/ZPPP supporters (Sheriff 1994: 151). Sheriff asserts that "[b]y declaring Zanzibar a one-party state and banning the overthrown political parties, the revolution essentially disenfranchised nearly half the population" (Sheriff 2001: 315). Particularly Pembans have been alienated from politics, and as a consequence the Pembans' support for the ruling party has declined from 43 percent in 1963 to 17 percent in 1995 (Sheriff 2001: 315-316). According to Sheriff, Zanzibari leaders have not succeeded in forging an inclusive nationalism which would encompass all the different groups of the population. This failure, combined with the lack of reconciliation still poisons the present Zanzibar with bitterness. (Sheriff, interview, 15.11.2007.)

5.2.1. Past: Foreigners invading the Jewel of the Indian Ocean

It was not a "REVOLUTION" nor is it suitable even a bit to be called "revolution" in the original meaning of the word. It is an "INVASION".

– Amani Thani Fairouz (1995). *Ukweli ni huu* [This is the Truth]

The past has a very different role in the new nationalist discourse when compared to the ruling party. ASP/CCM usually recounts the national history of Zanzibar to begin from the year of 1957, the birth year of ASP. In contrast, the new nationalists like to point out that Zanzibar has a long history and regard the pre-revolutionary history of Zanzibar as more than slavery and oppression of the majority by the minority. Whereas the official history downplays the era of Zanzibar Sultanate as colonialism and exploitation, new nationalists cherish this time as an era of independence. For them, the Sultan's time offers a chance to feel national pride – Zanzibar has a prosperous past full of dignity/respect (*heshima*) and

harmony between different groups of people. Mohammed Ghassani³⁰ describes the history of Zanzibar in his blog:

"Zanzibar has a political history which is revered by one side and is entangled by the other side. It is history that is revered because this is a country which was ahead of all other countries in this part of Africa in adopting civilized ways of international politics. For example, Zanzibar was a free state, nation and country more than one hundred years before Tanganyika was even known to become Tanganyika. This is a political history to boast and to be proud of."³¹ (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima.)

Ghassani accentuates how Zanzibar preceded other Eastern African countries in matters of independence and freedom, implying that Zanzibar's political history is longer and better than that of the mainland: richer, independent and well-known in the world. He uses the word *ustaarabu* which means "civilization", "cosmopolitanism" or "good manners" but also "adopting Western or Arab ways". In any case, whether it is the Arab or Western world which is being imitated, *ustaarabu* is opposed to barbarism. A person who is *mstaarabu*, "civilized", is not only someone who is enlightened and educated, but also someone who would never exchange his or her image for material wealth (Saleh 2004: 147). Ghassani accentuates that already during the Sultanate, Zanzibar was "civilized", had *ustaarabu*, and was a part of the world unlike the rest of Eastern Africa: a cosmopolitan nation among other nations. He contrasts the history of Zanzibar with that of Tanganyika in particularly sharp terms: Zanzibar was a "free state" long before Tanganyika even existed on the map.

Honor and harmony

The new nationalists present the pre-revolutionary period as a time of harmony and prosperity, ruptured by the revolution which turned this paradise-like nation into a havoc of massacres. A pamphlet written by the pseudonym "Babakerim", *The Aftermath of Zanzibar Revolution* (1994), depicts a straight-forward view on the revolution: it flared up because of jealousy and lust for Arab blood, and the aim of the revolutionaries was not only to

³⁰ Mohammed Ghassani is a Zanzibari journalist who wrote regularly to *Dira*, *Fahamu* and nowadays to his own blog, <http://zanzibardaima.wordpress.com> on Zanzibari nationalism. We met briefly in Dar es Salaam and discussed on the 1964 revolution and current politics in Tanzania.

³¹ Original in Swahili: "--Zanzibar ina historia ya kisiasa iliyotukuka kwa upande mmoja na iliyochafuliwa kwa upande mwingine. Ni historia iliyotukuka, kwa kuwa hii ni nchi iliyotangulia sana kwenye ustaarabu wa siasa za kilimwengu kuliko nchi nyengine yoyote ile katika eneo hili la Afrika. Kwa mfano, Zanzibar ilikuwa dola, taifa na nchi huru zaidi ya karne moja kabla ya Tanganyika hata kujulikana kuwa itakuwa Tanganyika. Hii ni tareikh ya kisiasa ya kujivunia na ya kujifakharishia."

overthrow the throne, but also to "humiliate and oppress all Arabs in their entirety and to squeeze them out of the islands" (Babakerim 1994: 3).

Babakerim declares that the revolution brought into power "Tyrants" who governed the former paradise islands turned into "Hell-on-Earth" Islands in which "thousands of innocent Arabs and members of the ZNP lost their Lives, Freedom, Honor, Careers and Property" (Babakerim 1994: 28; 1). "Honor" is mentioned as one of the things lost in the revolution, and this is a very important point to make: besides lives and property, also honor and respect were lost. *Heshima* is an Arabic loan word and its meaning encloses issues related to character, respectability and Islamic virtue. *Heshima* is acquired first through nobility of rank, then through nobility of character by behaving with courtesy, goodness and sensitivity towards others (Iliffe 2005: 33-34). W.H. Ingrams describes his perceptions on the importance of *heshima* to the Zanzibar Arabs during the British colonialism:

"To the Arab it is the most important thing in life, a thing to be jealously guarded and augmented, and it is also a term that includes, besides respect, something of the meaning of honor." (Ingrams 1967 [1931]: 206)

Zanzibari scholars also stress that *heshima* belongs to the fundamental characteristics of Swahili culture, and thus Zanzibari culture. Mohammed Saleh writes that Swahili moral values – including *heshima* – are fundamental to one's *utu*, "dignity" or "humanity" (Saleh 2004: 146). A common utterance is *mtu mwenye heshima* which means "respectable person", whereas an exclamation of *hana heshima* means "s/he has no manners" or "s/he shows no respect". Someone without *heshima*, the dual honor/respect aspect of behaviour is not a worthy person and has broken the fundamental rules of the culture. Consequently, losing honor is actually worse than losing mere property, because even a poor person can have dignity and respect, but lacking those traits, money and possessions are useless.

Pembans who did not participate in the revolution received particularly degrading treatment in the weeks and months following the revolution. Seif Sharif Hamad testifies seeing humiliating treatment in Pemba after the revolution:

"For Arabs from Oman, their beards were a status symbol and a sign of respect; if they were shaved dry and in public, it was a great humiliation. Under normal circumstances, they would have fought to defend their honor, but at the time, they were subdued and forced just to take it." (Burgess 2009: 187-188.)

The beard was, after all, a symbol of Islamic piety and also of ethnicity, more common among the "Arabs". Nathalie Arnold describes the post-revolutionary campaign in Pemba

as a "whole-sale strategic humiliation" which was especially aimed at the older generation, *wazee* ("elders") to show them who the new leaders were. Respected elders were beaten in public by young men, and their daughters were raped or taken away to marry government officials. (Arnold 2003: 293-295.)

The nature of the dignified past is less precisely described than the atrocities performed during and after the revolution. As other writers who criticize the revolution, Babakerim evades the issue of slavery from the perspective of those enslaved and presents slavery in apologetic terms. He simply explains that "the accused revolution unceremoniously upset the whole traditional social set-up and most remarkable civility so characteristic of the people in Zanzibar and Pemba" (Babakerim 1994: 30). Instead of a "real" revolution it is claimed to be a bitter uprising which led to mass killings of Arabs and destroyed the "traditional", peaceful and civilized Zanzibar. Treatment of slaves was not regarded as always discriminatory, but even as a beneficial bond. Al-Ismaily transfers the blame of slave trade from the Arabs' shoulders to Europeans and Africans: he claims that Europeans started slavery, and later all "races", Arabs, Whites, Asians and also Africans participated in the slave trade (al-Ismaily 1999: xxxi). Hamad subscribes to al-Ismaily's views in his biography and dismisses the stories of harsh treatment and enslavement as "all fabricated". He admits the existence of slavery in Zanzibar, but stresses that "no Shirazi here was ever enslaved", and reminds that Africans were also involved in the slave trade. (Burgess 2009: 199.) Fairouz claims that before the revolution, discrimination (*ubaguzi*) existed only on the African continent, not in Zanzibar: "Discrimination was begun in Zanzibar during the government which calls itself 'revolutionary'"³² (Fairouz 1995: 7-8.). He presents that only the Europeans governing the African mainland had discriminating practices, but in Zanzibar, tolerance and mutual harmony between different groups of people reigned until the revolution. Fairouz sees that the "invasion", called "revolution", legitimized the discrimination of non-Africans in Zanzibar and ended the harmonious co-existence of different "races".

Harmonious mixture of peoples of different origin and "multiracialism" form the core of the discourse on Zanzibari-ness in the nationalist forces. This multiplicity of ethnic identities merging into one Zanzibari identity confronts the view of the ruling party which maintains that Zanzibar is a part of Tanzania and essentially "African". Salim Ameir Khami purports in his article titled "Zanzibari-ness was truly killed by the Revolution"

³² Original in Swahili: "Ubaguzi umeanzishwa Zanzibar wakati wa serikali yenye kujiita 'mapinduzi'."

(*Kweli Uanzibari umeuliwa na Mapinduzi*): "--revolutionaries fought to wipe out the traditional structure of the Zanzibari society. This structure is that of a mix of people of different origins and ethnic groups."³³ The revolutionaries enforced African "ethnic identity" (*kabila lililoitwa WAAFRIKA*) on Zanzibaris and opposed the "traditional" multiracialism, represented to be the basis of Zanzibari society. (Khami, *Dira*, 2003 June 16-22.)

"Them": foreign invaders

Seeing the Zanzibar revolution as an invasion of "foreigners" who shattered its "glorious past" is a focal point in the discourse which denies the legitimacy of the revolution. This view was first printed in 1967 in a book called *Zanzibar: Africa's First Cuba* by Ahmed Seif Kharusi. I was not able to locate this book, but Garth Myers reviews the content of the book in his article. Kharusi mocks the mainlanders who are presented as ignorant savages, opposed to Zanzibaris who are connected to Arabia and Persia ever since antiquity. The book blames the revolutionaries of blasphemy, being "foreign atheists" and disgracing Islam and Muslims in Zanzibar. Kharusi also scorns the revolutionary government for "neglecting" Stone Town, the Arab quarters, by focusing on urban planning on the "other side", *Ng'ambo*, the African side of town. (Myers 2000: 440-441.)

Similar attacks against the revolutionaries, especially against the mainlanders have been published since the 1990s, most prominently in two books printed in Oman: "This is the Truth" (*Ukweli ni huu*) by Amani Thani Fairouz (1995) and "Slavery and the Scramble for Zanzibar" (*Zanzibar – Kinyang'anyiro na Utumwa*) by Issa Nasser Issa Al-Ismaily (1999). Both are available in Zanzibar, although sold somewhat under the counter. Yet, I was told by the person who showed me the book by Fairouz that these books are "very dangerous", being very anti-regime and anti-revolution, and thus not proper reading for Zanzibaris who respect the revolution and the history of the Party of the Revolution. Fairouz lists names of dozens of people who were killed or imprisoned during Karume's dictatorship, and also recounts his own prison experiences between the years of 1964-1972. *Ukweli ni huu* is now also available online both in Swahili and in an English translation³⁴.

Fairooz declares that the revolution in Zanzibar cannot be called a revolution "in the original meaning of the word" (*kwa maana asili ya neno*), but that it should be

³³ Original in Swahili: "-- wanamapinduzi walifanya jitihada ya kufuta muundo wa asili wa jamii ya Kizanzibari. Muundo huu ni ule wa mchanganyiko wa watu wa asili na makabila mbalimbali."

³⁴ The English translation online somewhat differs from the Swahili version. The translations here are mine from the original text in Swahili.

called "invasion" (*mavamizi*) (Fairooz 1995: 5). He insists that a true revolution is one that is planned, led and executed by the citizens of the country, whereas in Zanzibar it was an affair conducted by "foreigners", people who were not "citizens by birth" (*si wananchi kwa kuzaliwa*) (Fairooz 1995: 6). Fairooz continues that the true founders of ASP are colonialists and Nyerere, not the "Zanzibari Africans" themselves as the ASP history books claim (Fairooz 1995: 26). This line of thought is continued by Abu Hafidh in his column in *Dira* called "Letter from the Gulf" (*Barua kutoka Ghufa*). Hafidh asserts that the concern the mainland shows for all issues regarding Zanzibar proves that it was these "foreigners" who were in charge in the revolution. The importance of the words "invasion", "revolution" and "mainland" is emphasized by capitalizing them in the text. Hafidh reacts with rage to an earlier article written by a CCM cadre, M. Shamte who claimed that Zanzibari-ness was created by the revolution:

"No, Zanzibar-ness was wiped out by the Revolution and this every true Zanzibari who loves Zanzibar, his country, he knows it completely! I SWEAR TO GOD! I SWEAR TO GOD! LOSS, LOSS! Again a very great loss."³⁵ (Hafidh, *Dira*, 2003, April 18-24)

Thus, a "true Zanzibari" knows that the revolution had detrimental consequences for Zanzibari identity. From this follows that those who defend the revolution cannot love their country – they are not acceptable Zanzibaris. Hafidh divides people into two opposing groups just as CCM cadre does, and the line of division is on the moment of the revolution. The way one treats the revolution defines which kind of a Zanzibari one is: a good, "nationalistic" Zanzibari, or a bad citizen supporting "the others".

Ghassani divides the versions of the revolution into three categories: a) Babu's version, b) CCM version with an ethno-racial character, advocated by Julius Nyerere, and c) thirdly the foreign invasion version, of "one country against another" (*dola moja dhidi ya nyengine*). He compares the events in Zanzibar with those of other small, former colonies who have been invaded by their neighbors: Portugal leaving East Timor and Indonesia consequently invading it, or Spain leaving West Sahara and Morocco and Mauretania taking it over. Ghassani also lists reasons for Tanganyikans to invade Zanzibar. The first is based on fear and envy: Nyerere could have been afraid of the prosperity and the higher level of development in Zanzibar compared to that of the mainland, in case Tanganyikans might ask for the same quality of life. The second explanation Ghassani

³⁵ Original in Swahili: "-- La, Uzanzibari umefutwa na Mapinduzi na hilo kila Mzanzibari khalisi mwenye kuipenda Zanzibar, nchi yake, analijua fika! WALLAHI! WALLAHI! KHASARA KHASARA! Tena khasara iliyo kubwa sana.

offers is related to the weakness of the local army and security forces, since the UK had refused to protect Zanzibar as it had done in other East African colonies. A third motive for Nyerere would have been his dream of building the United States of (East) Africa, beginning with Zanzibar. Ghassani concludes in his blog post that the present Tanzanian president Kikwete has every reason to defend the revolution: "[i]t was done by his country against another country and he has the full responsibility to ensure that it lasts"³⁶. (Ghassani 2.2.2009, *Zanzibar Daima*.)

Al-Ismaily claims that the revolution was not justified because the ZNP/ZPPP government was legitimately chosen by the citizens and had ruled for only a month, too short of a time to conduct any serious mistakes. He maintains that none of the former ministers escaped or were prosecuted after the revolution, proving that a legitimate government was overthrown because of injustice, not because of its errors. (al-Ismaily 1999: 95-96.) Also al-Ismaily believes that "foreigners" were behind this unjustified revolution, and besides John Okello as the obvious foreigner, Julius Nyerere is cited as an important figure having already contributed to the birth of the ASP in 1957 (al-Ismaily 1999: 130). Al-Ismaily asks: "-- what kind of law in the world can permit a revolution of invasion like that one with people, many of whom were foreigners, not citizens, invading a country which was not theirs?"³⁷ (al-Ismaily 1999: 96.) In order to crush Zanzibar, they used "-- Africans and especially these mainland Africans, speaking about the bitterness of slavery on political podiums against Arabs and Muslims, with the goal of destroying Zanzibar which had truly become a fortress of Islam in Eastern Africa."³⁸ (al-Ismaily 1999: 97.) In a similar fashion with Kharusi, Babakerim and Fairouz, Al-Ismaily firmly professes that hatred and anger of the mainlanders was directed against "Arabs" and "Muslims", Zanzibar being a prominent centre in the Indian Ocean for Islamic knowledge at the time. Christian mainlanders, notably John Okello with his messianic posture, and Nyerere are portrayed attacking the Zanzibari Muslims through the revolution.

³⁶ Original in Swahili: "Yalifanywa na nchi yake dhidi ya nchi nyengine na ana kila wajibu wa kuhakikisha kuwa yanadumu."

³⁷ Original in Swahili: "-- iko sharia gani duniani inayoweza ikahalalisha mapinduzi ya uvamizi kama hayo ya watu ambao wengi wao walikuwa wageni wasiokuwa raia kuvamia nchi isiyokuwa yao?"

³⁸ Original in Swahili: "-- Waafrika na khasa wale Waafrika wa asili ya Bara, kukhutubia chuki za utumwa katika majukwaa ya siasa dhidi ya Waarabu na Waislamu kwa lengo la kuiangamiza Zanzibar ambayo ndiyo iliyokuwa ngome ya Uislamu katika Afrika Mashariki."

5.2.2. Present: We do not want "their" Revolution

The revolution has earned many bitter names from the vanquished side. Besides the often used "invasion" (*mavamizi*), other names given include "rape" (*ubakaji*), "mass murder" (*mauwaji*), "Black January" and "The Holocaust". (Nabwa, *Fahamu*, 2006, June 24-30; Al-Ismaily 1999: 130; Al-Barwani 1997). Abu Hafidh, a Zanzibari living in Dubai describes the revolution harshly: "This Devil was brought to us by foreigners so that they could suck the BLOOD of us Zanzibaris"³⁹ (Hafidh, *Dira*, 2003, April 18-24). Hafidh calls the revolution celebrations as "Day of Mourning" (*sherehe ya huzuni*), as the revolution has only led to "agony, wretchedness, weakness, trouble and poverty" (*mateso, madhila, unyonge, shida na ufukara*) (Hafidh, *Dira*, 2003, January 10-16). The first CUF publication called *Whither Zanzibar?* notes in less dramatic terms that Zanzibar has been in a decline ever since the Union, a direct consequence of the revolution:

"Almost thirty years after that fateful day of 26th, April 1964, Zanzibaris find themselves in worse dire social and economy conditions than those that existed before the Union Day." (CUF 1993: *Whither Zanzibar?*)

Mohammed Ghassani makes similar notions and asserts that before 1964, at least the government of Zanzibar was wealthy enough to give aid to other countries, even though a large part of its citizens were poor. Now both the government and its people are impoverished (Ghassani, *Fahamu*, 2006, June 26-30).

"We": civilized victims

The opposition version of the revolution turns "Arabs" as its oppressed victims and objects: those who were killed, raped and denigrated during the revolution and later oppressed through economic, political and social policies. For example Babakerim sketches out in vivid details the offences of the revolutionaries during and after the revolution: houses set on fire, women raped, elderly Arabs pushed into wells, Arabs detained in schools and then sent to sea in dhows (Babakerim 1994: 3). He describes how the Party ridiculed Arabs and Indians in their meetings and how they overstressed the role Arabs played in slave trade and economic exploitation. However, Babakerim claims that these "allegations and naked lies" did not unify, but created even more discord amongst Zanzibaris. (Babakerim 1994: 9-10.)

³⁹ Original in Swahili: "Shetani hilo tumeletewa na wageni ili wapate kuzinyonya DAMU zetu Wazanzibari."

After describing the negative actions of the "other side", Babakerim highlights the cultural and economic achievements of the Arabs and blames the Africans for being "ungrateful". He believes that the Africans have an inferiority complex coupled with their "natural jealousy" and greed, leading to violent behavior and retribution. Although Arabs were after the revolution among the "oppressed people of Zanzibar", for Babakerim they were still superior to Africans, "a good many of whom are lazy and indolent fellows who never showed any inclination for work". (Babakerim 1994: 9-16.) Babakerim acknowledges that the government was also "exploiting its fellow Africans" by paying low prices for clove and other products, but he focuses on the wrongdoings against the Arabs. Government acts, such as the forced marriages between Arab and Indian women and African men were only done "to crush the pride of the Arabs and to smear their social dignity and moral uprightness". (Babakerim 1994: 7; 19-20.) Babakerim's racist depictions on the moral and behavior of "Arabs" and "Africans" aim to demonstrate that after the revolution "Arabs" were made the undesirable outgroup who were oppressed by the revolutionary government.

Opposition texts present CCM as a party of injustice: torturing, beating and harassing Zanzibaris who long for democracy. This political violence is claimed to have an ideological goal: the Union rulers want to hinder the unity of the Zanzibaris. Hamad quotes President Mkapa's Revolution Day speech of 2002 as an example of "divide and rule": "[w]e greet the grandfathers of those who oppose the Revolution, their great-grandchildren, their grandchildren do not rule here"⁴⁰ (Hamad 31.1.2009, *Haki na Umma*). Mkapa's phrase has been interpreted to mean that those who have belonged to any other parties than the ASP/CCM will never rule Zanzibar again (Ghassani, personal communication, 30.11.2007). The opposition has a very strong feeling of being the victim in the present: victim of injustices conducted ever since the revolution, victim of human rights abuses and, most of all, victim of the Union (colonialism).

The mainland threat

The new nationalists like to point out that not only Zanzibaris lost their *heshima* as individuals, but also Zanzibar as a country lost its respect and dignity. From being an independent state for only a few months, it fell under another colonialism, that of Tanganyika. Mainlanders, emanating from the disliked Union, are not a favoured group

⁴⁰ Original in Swahili: "'Tunatoa salamu kwa mababu za hao wapinga Mapinduzi, vijukuu vyao, vitukuu vyao hawatawali hapa."

among Zanzibaris. Larsen notes the division of Zanzibaris into categories of "Zanzibari" and "Zanzibara", meaning those "loyal to Zanzibar as a separate entity" and those "primarily loyal to the mainland-based government of Tanzania and the 1964 Union" (Larsen 2004: 124).

CUF takes a clear stance on the Union which is presented to be signed "in dubious circumstances" and "against the popular will", enforced upon Zanzibaris without asking for their opinion (CUF 1993: *Whither Zanzibar?*). The new nationalists continue calling Zanzibar as a country (*nchi*), an independent entity, while the Union government, "the colonizer", is referred to as "the Union" (*Muungano*), "Tanganyika" or even "Dodoma colonialism" (*ukoloni wa Dodoma*). Not only the nationalists, but Zanzibaris in general prefer to call themselves Zanzibaris instead of Tanzanians. Rejection of the Tanzanian identity strengthens "us", the Zanzibaris against the Union which controls much of the economy and politics. The division between the mainland and Zanzibar has been increasingly noted on the mainland side as well, particularly since the attempt to join the OIC in 1992. When criticizing the Union, mainland opposition parties have even used arguments based on identity, branding Zanzibaris as "foreigners" of Arab origin and consequently not Tanzanians (Crozon 1999: 267).

Resentment towards the Union has been manifested in various ways in Zanzibar: for example Askew's research reveals that the songs of lamentation, published all over Tanzania after Nyerere's death to honor and mourn the beloved *Mwalimu* were not recited at all on the islands. Zanzibaris do not share the strong veneration of the late president Nyerere with the mainland. Nyerere, after all, is thought to be behind the Union which took away the sovereignty of Zanzibar. (Askew 2006.) Other cultural symbols of insular nationalism challenging the Union have emerged later on. Zanzibar has its own national anthem and a new flag which was adopted in January 2005. Some islanders still revoke the thought of independent Zanzibar, such as in April 2006, when a group of ten people filed a case in Zanzibar High Court. They claimed that the Union is illegal and should be nullified, but their case was dismissed. The national football team of Zanzibar applied for a membership in FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and CAF (Confederation of African Football), being denied the membership from FIFA on the basis of not being an independent country, but receiving an associate membership in CAF.

Ghassani describes sarcastically his experience as an owner of a "foreign" Zanzibari vehicle in a government office in Dar es Salaam. He recounts the disapproving behaviour after having declared that he wants to retain his Zanzibari register plates, and scorns

at the forms which only ask for "address in Tanganyika". Ghassani concludes: "-- the truth is that Tanganyika exists, and that we Zanzibaris do not belong there. [We are] only foreigners like those from Rwanda or Burundi."⁴¹ He concludes that calling Tanzania as one country has only meaning when it comes to elections: "They will show that this is a country when going towards the elections. They will sit in Dodoma and decide who will be the presidential candidate of Zanzibar. If Zanzibaris decide otherwise, these are the ones with the power to rule and to stop their decisions. There we are together as one country."⁴² (Ghassani, *Fahamu*, 2007, November 26-December 2.)

Ali Nabwa names the present division of political power as the "New Sultanate" (*Usultani Mpya*) in his article in *Dira*. Nabwa divides Zanzibaris into two classes: 99 percent of regular people (*watu wa kawaida*) and one percent of "big people" (*wao wakubwa*), the ruling political elite. Nabwa states that a "Sultanate" can mean any person, family or a group which places itself above others, believes to have the right to rule and to do whatever they want without being questioned. This way he compares the ruling elite of today to the Sultanate, thus to the very thing that the revolutionaries wanted to abolish. Nabwa's article was published in the revolution day issue of *Dira* in 2003, and it stirred discussion also in later issues. (Nabwa, *Dira*, 2003, January 10-16.)

President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete brought up the issue of revolution and slavery in his speech in January 2009. After telling the opposition to come up with better development plans in order to challenge the ruling party, Kikwete is quoted as saying: "if you mock the Revolution you send people back to slavery, you send people back to villainy. This went away on the 12th of January, 1964 and it will not come back...it is not possible."⁴³ (quoted in Saleh 30.1.2009, *Zanzibar Daima*.) This "mocking" or "playing with" the revolution caused heated discussion among the opposition. It was interpreted as another threat coming from the mainland government: if you meddle with history, you will see what happens to you.

Secretary general of CUF, Seif Sharif Hamad declares that the rulers of the mainland are afraid of Zanzibari unity, and this is why Kikwete attacked those "playing with" the revolution. He claims that the Union government sees Zanzibaris as *too* united

⁴¹Original in Swahili: "-- ukweli ni kwamba Tanganyika ipo, nasi Wazanzibari hapa si petu. Tu wageni kama walivyo wa Rwanda na wa Burundi."

⁴² Original in Swahili: "Wataonesha kuwa ni nchi wakati wa kuelekea uchaguzi. Watakaa Dodoma waumee nani awe mgombea uraisi wa Zanzibar. Hata kama Wazanzibari watakuja na maamuzi mengine, wao ndio wenye nguvu za kuamua na kusimamia maamuzi yao. Hapo tuko nchi moja."

⁴³ Original in Swahili: "-- ukiyachezea Mapinduzi unawarudisha watu kwenye utumwa, unawarudisha watu kwenye utwana. Hili liliondoka Januari 12, 1964 na halitarudi tena. ...haiwezekani."

and wants to stop them. Just as the British tried to divide Zanzibaris during colonialism, the ruling party wants to divide Zanzibaris again "by using the anthems of the Revolution" (*kwa kutumia wimbo wa Mapinduzi*) to secure their victory in the next elections. Hamad addresses Kikwete in his speech:

"This is why he wants to use these anthems to separate us, but he is late. He is late. We are not divided again, [expression of refusal]! Again I say to Jakaya wa Mrisho wa Kikwete, stop, stop, stop! Stop bringing about quarrel in our country. Stop, stop coming to divide us Zanzibaris. Do your provocations there on the Mainland."⁴⁴ (Hamad 31.1.2009, *Haki na Umma*.)

The rhetoric used by Hamad resembles that of the ASP/CCM speeches which blamed the British of the exactly same thing: implementing their "divide and rule" policy to stop "Zanzibari Africans" from uniting. The Union government is paralleled with the British colonial rule, being the only obstacle for Zanzibar to implement its true essence as a nation. Hamad declares a war against Kikwete in his speech:

"Now he makes himself ready to kill us Zanzibaris again. We ask him to come. But we tell you, we tell you, we tell you: Inshallah this time, this time, this time, the way you will beat it, we will play it the same way."⁴⁵ (Hamad 31.1.2009, *Haki na Umma*)

"Again" refers to the killings conducted by the ruling party earlier under other presidents. Hamad began his speech by remembering the clash of January 27, 2001 between police forces and opposition demonstrators in Zanzibar. This time, however, Hamad promises that "we", Zanzibaris, will respond to the violence and play the game as CCM wants it to be played. Later in his speech Hamad asserts that "'their Revolution' is not the Revolution of Zanzibaris, never" (*'Mapinduzi yao' si Mapinduzi ya Wazanzibari, jamani*). (Hamad 31.1.2009, *Haki na Umma*.)

Ally Saleh writes that ever since the revolution, Zanzibaris have been told repeatedly that to play with the revolution is to play with fire. He wonders against what this revolution should still be protected after 45 years; who those "playing with" it are; and what this "playing with" the revolution really means. Saleh argues that only those with different opinions are blamed for being anti-revolutionaries, whereas those who were revolutionaries but have used their heritage for malign purposes, continued injustice,

⁴⁴ Original in Swahili: "Kwa hivyo, anataka kutumia wimbo huo atugawe, lakini kachelewa. Kachelewa. Hatugawiki tena ng'o! Tena namwambia Jakaya wa Mrisho wa Kikwete akome, akome, akome! Akome kutuletea fitna katika nchi yetu. Akome, akome kuja kutugawa Wazanzibari. Fanya chokochoko zako huko huko Bara."

⁴⁵ Original in Swahili: Sasa anajiandaa kutuua tena Wazanzibari. Tunamwambia aje. Lakini tunakwambia, tunakwambia, tunakwambia: Inshallah mara hii, mara hii, mara hii, utakavyoipiga, tutaicheza hivyo hivyo.

amassed wealth for themselves and pressured the spirit of democracy are not accounted for any of their actions. Furthermore, he asks if "playing with" the revolution means examining it, offending it, or asserting that the legacy of the revolution is concentrated into the hands of only one group instead of the whole community. (Saleh 30.1.2009, *Zanzibar Daima*)

They are destroying our culture

Writings of the new nationalists argue that being a Zanzibari is not related to descent or birthplace as such, but that it is a feeling of belonging to the Zanzibari culture. Anthropologist Kjersti Larsen defines Zanzibari-ness as a way of being in the world, including customs such as hospitality, friendliness, the correct etiquette, aesthetics, the common language of Swahili and Islam (Larsen 2004: 123). This is the culture that is represented to be under threat or already destroyed by the policies of the Union of Tanzania.

New nationalists maintain that post-revolutionary Zanzibar is not what it used to be during its heyday under the Sultan. They like to point out that not only Zanzibaris lost their *heshima* as individuals, but also Zanzibar as a country lost its respect and dignity. From being an independent state for only a few months, it fell under another colonialism, that of Tanganyika. Shifting most of the political power from Stone Town to Dar es Salaam and Dodoma has not only affected political, but also cultural dimensions in Zanzibar, something that the new nationalists address frequently in their writings. "The glorious age" of the past has passed away because of moral decay which was begun when the ruling party set in. Ali Nabwa, a famed Zanzibari journalist names the main culprits who were involved in the "Rape of Zanzibar", the 1964 revolution: Julius Nyerere aided by the British government and the Mozambican liberation party FRELIMO. Nabwa pinpoints the moment of the revolution as the day on which Zanzibar's decline began, when "these islands famous for civilization, wealth and education have died the death of a cockroach"⁴⁶ (Nabwa, *Fahamu*, 2006, July 24-30). Zanzibar as a small country was crushed by a more powerful one, just like a cockroach is killed by a bigger creature – the revolution and the subsequent Union were not voluntary but forced upon Zanzibaris.

Salim Ameir Khami describes how the work done by the government under the slogan "revolution forever" has transformed Zanzibar into its present wretched state:

⁴⁶ Original in Swahili: "--Visiva hivi maarufu kwa ustaarabu, utajiri na elimu vimekufa kifo cha mende"

"Today if you come to Zanzibar you will be received by four major things: beggars, carvings, push-carts and cars full of alcohol and prostitutes in every corner. All this is a step backwards and does not befit at all with Zanzibari-ness but under the slogan...this is what Zanzibar is."⁴⁷ (Khami, *Dira*, 2003, June 6-12.)

Through his examples Khami argues that the policies under the slogan "revolution forever" have brought about the reversal of Zanzibari values. Begging, selling carvings from the mainland, alcohol and prostitution are not a part of "Zanzibari culture" and they defame the high moral standards Zanzibar is claimed to have had in the past. One of the former ZNP leaders, Ali Muhsin al-Barwani writes in his memoirs:

"To steal, to swindle, to defraud, to purchase and sell confiscated property – all considered normal by the majority. If the revolution of 1964 has brought us nothing but the destruction of our moral standards and values then indeed that revolution has done enormous mischief, and deserves every condemnation." (al-Barwani 1997: 282)

The disgraced moral values that al-Barwani writes about refer to the loss of respect, *heshima*. He also reminds about the property confiscated after revolution and distributed mainly among the revolutionary leaders. Corruption, stealing and crime in general are presented as non-Zanzibari culture, deriving from the 1964 revolution. Humiliation and the loss of *heshima* is a recurrent theme in the new nationalist discourse, presented to have taken place on four different levels: economic, political, cultural and physical. Economically Zanzibar has lost its respect, being now under the command of the mainland and the Western countries; politically Zanzibar has lost its independence by joining the Union of Tanzania 100 days after the revolution; cultural humiliation appears in forms such as showing disrespect towards elders or disgracing religion and Zanzibari cultural values; and physical denigration has included acts such as violence, raping or shaving off hair in public.

Religion is raised on a special position as the main binding factor of Zanzibari culture, whereas Tanzanian mainlanders are represented as "Christians" who invaded Zanzibar in 1964. Ali Nabwa believes that the aim of the African Association was to penetrate with Christian faith into the Zanzibari society, proven by their singing of church hymns in the meetings (Nabwa, *Fahamu*, 2006, July 10-16). Hamad H. Omar writes in a text published in Ghassani's blog that the amount of churches in Zanzibar has

⁴⁷ Original in Swahili: "Hivi leo ukiingia Zanzibar unapokewa na mambo nne makubwa: ombamba, vinyago, mikokoteni na magari ya ulevi na wanawake Malaya kila pembe. Haya yote ni kinyume na hayakubaliani kabisa na Uanzibari lakini chini ya Slogan..ndiyo yaliyopo Zanzibar."

increased from four to almost three hundred since Zanzibar gained its independence on the 10th December in 1963. Following other radical new nationalists, Omar claims that Nyerere wanted to crush Islam in Zanzibar: Nyerere began his mission with the revolution and continued with the Union which followed soon after. (Omar, 4.4.2009, *Zanzibar Daima*.) Many Zanzibaris believe that the revolution had religious motives, arising from Nyerere who would have convinced the Americans and the British to attack the Muslim Zanzibar (Ghassani, personal communication, 30.11.2007). Yet, the more moderate new nationalists emphasize tolerance: religious minorities are tolerated as long as they do not try to proselytize others. While recognizing that the overwhelming majority of Zanzibaris are Muslims, Ghassani notes that also Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism have a legitimate home in Zanzibar (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima).

The revolutionary government is cited for several offences leading to racial, civic and political insecurity, but its lack of respect for religion is particularly disapproved by nationalists . Babakerim accuses Mzee Karume for banning the teaching of Islam, Qur'an and Arabic classes in schools; allowing people to burn copies of the Qur'an and Arabic books on the street; and demolishing mosques and graveyards for building flats and roads (Babakerim 1994: 6; 21). During the election campaign in 2000, the opposition party called the members of the ruling party as "kafirs", referring to its religious meaning as an unbeliever or infidel, ungrateful towards God. Mwalimu Muhammad Idris, a religious teacher whom Husby interviewed explains that "[a] kafir is somebody who hides the truth. Kafir in Arabic means to hide the seed in the ground. -- CCM in my opinion hides the truth. -- The people of CCM pretend to believe something, but they don't." (Husby 2001: 63.) Calling someone a "kafir" has a double-meaning of an unbeliever or a liar even outside the religious context, but it is also related to the question of being a good Muslim: deceiving and lying is against Islamic moral. Someone "hiding the truth" is a "kafir" also in the sense of being a bad Muslim. Cameron made analogous observations on the use of religious rhetoric around the same election period: "Another CUF supporter said CUF would win because God does not favour the sinful CCM leaders..." (Cameron 2002: 322).

New nationalists value the Arabic elements of Zanzibari culture and call for the recognition of the pre-revolutionary history of Zanzibar, including the era of independence, both before and after the British. In an interview by Husby, a CUF politician Muhammad Dedes mentions "the old Islamic values" as something that the "Arabs" appreciate and hope to restore in the future. A young man in a CUF rally had told Husby in a similar fashion that the face of the "Islamic Zanzibar" was changed after the

revolution. (Husby 2001: 48). In the past, almost hundred years ago, Zanzibar used to be a center for Islamic learning – nowadays young Zanzibaris head abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Iran to study Islamic sciences. Besides honoring the long history of Zanzibar, they use Arabic expressions abundantly in their writings and speeches. Basic interjections, greetings and accentuating words, such as "inshallah" or "asalaam alaykum" are frequently used for example in Hamad's speeches, or in Ghassani's articles – perhaps a conscious way of emphasizing the Arabic heritage of Zanzibar.

5.2.3. Future: "Zanzibar is a peacock"

The moral, economic and political decline assumed in the previous chapter is a source of mourning for the new nationalists. Their main message is that by relying to the "traditional" ways of living in Zanzibar, the country can rise again to its former glory. The new nationalists offer "multiracialism" as an escape from the decline towards a more peaceful and prosperous future in Zanzibar. CUF texts focus on economic and political goals, but many of the less formal nationalist texts stress the cultural aims, of returning back to the "old harmony". "Revolution Forever" is disowned as an empty slogan of CCM, needing to acquire new content. Ghassani insists that it is time to step into a new era of "Revolution Forever": into openness, truth and responsibility, with rulers who listen and answer to the calls of their citizens. Under these conditions he is ready to continue the revolution. (Ghassani, *Dira*, 2003, 28 February-6 March.) Another conciliator, Ally Saleh suggests that it is time to widen perspectives and leave the "ancient thoughts" (*fikra kongwe*) behind. New groups should be included in the process of the revolution, not only those who brought it about (i.e. ASP/CCM). (Saleh, 30.1.2009, *Zanzibar Daima*.) For Saleh, building unity in the society is more important than revering an event in the past which divided Zanzibar into true revolutionaries and suspect people.

Zanzibari cosmopolitanism, based on the history of Zanzibar as the meeting point of cultures, is a central part of the new nationalist discourse. Fair writes that the Swahili on the East African coast have commonly referred to themselves as cosmopolitans, and that moving around has been regarded as a crucial part of their identity (Fair 2001: 31-32). Early 20th century Zanzibari cosmopolitanism combined the diverse cultural heritage in families and aimed at creating a "more inclusive fabric of citizenship within the isles". Fair claims that "cosmopolitanism" had similar connotations for the early 20th century

Zanzibaris as in English dictionary: "being free from provincial prejudices" and "sophisticated, urbane, worldly". (Fair 2004: 13.) Burgess also emphasizes Zanzibari cosmopolitanism and defines it as the transnational ties in the islands, especially the receptiveness of foreign people, ideas and commodities (Burgess 2009: 315, n46). He describes the pre-revolutionary urban life as "a cosmopolitan feast of senses", with food, cinema, music and merchandise from all over the world (Burgess 2009: 17-18).

Also the new nationalists stress the enriching qualities of diversity and write about the "multiracial" nature of Zanzibar. They refer less to multiculturalism as such, because many nationalists claim that Zanzibar has only one, unified culture which is bound by language, religion and history. The new nationalists claim that their patriotism (*uzalendo*) is more inclusive, diverse and accepting than CCM nationalism.

From decline to "second liberation"

According to the first CUF publication in English, the first liberation was freedom from the British colonialism. The opposition demands for a second liberation "against the forces of internal dictatorship". The notable aspect is that the revolution is not regarded as a "liberation" of any kind. What matters are the events *after* the revolution, and against which this second liberation is needed: "against all evil deeds as manifested in decadent practices as despotism, corruption, nepotism and the raping of national wealth". (CUF 1993: *Whither Zanzibar?*) The need for a new leadership is stated in sea-faring terms: "It is obvious that the country has gone off the course for too long and it now needs a new vision to steer it off the deadly storms." (CUF 1993: *Whither Zanzibar?*) The old leadership has been misguiding Zanzibar towards dangerous storms on the sea, but the new captain with a better vision, CUF will lead towards the right course again.

The slogan of CUF, "equal rights for all" (*haki sawa kwa wote*) extends from human rights to economics. The human rights discourse of CUF springs partly out of the fact that both of its founders, James Mapalala and Seif Sharif Hamad suffered prison sentences before the transition to democracy began. Mmuya and Chaligha note that this human rights stand claims indirectly that under the rule of CCM not all citizens enjoy equal rights. Furthermore, this implies that the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government has failed in its mission to deliver better living conditions for all, and consequently that the Revolution itself has failed. CCM revolutionaries responded to these first accusations by CUF by making posters with the inscription "Equal Rights Means Karume" (*Haki Sawa maana yake ni Karume*). They referred to Mzee Karume's achievements and his

interpretation of the revolution: free education, free medical care and cheap accommodation – things that were unattainable for the African population before the revolution. In the eyes of the veterans of the revolution, CUF was ridiculing and betraying the revolution which had brought equal welfare to all Zanzibaris. (Mmuya & Chaligha 1993: 96-97.) However, CUF and other new nationalists see that the ruling party targets only the population of more "African" origin and discriminates against other ethnicities, if they can be called as such in Zanzibar. ASP/CCM emphasizes the good of the majority, whereas the new nationalists stress the equal rights of all people, not only the majority.

CUF criticizes the economic policies of CCM government and advocates a liberal view leaning strongly towards the East, both Arab and Asian countries. They want to encourage foreign direct investment for small-scale industries to tackle the unemployment in Zanzibar (Cameron 2002: 319). Ghassani writes that because of the geography and history of Zanzibar as a maritime trade hub, it has a great opportunity to become something like Hong Kong, Dubai or Singapore have become during the last decades. The Union, however, controls the taxation and foreign policies of Zanzibar and is quoted as "the enemy number one" (*adui namba moja*) for the economic development in Zanzibar. (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima.)

Cameron mentions that many CUF members do not really dispute the outcome of 1964, but they point out the excesses of CCM and the lack of reconciliation and compensation to victims. CUF focuses on the undelivered promises of the Revolution, such as better education and better health services. CUF supporters told Cameron sarcastically that "[f]or those gravely injured or ill showing up with empty pockets at empty hospital wards, *Mapinduzi Daima* ("Revolution Forever") would not help ward off premature death". (Cameron 2002: 320.) This is a frequent question coming from the opposition: where is the revolution now and what has the revolutionary party done to progress it? Ghassani reproaches politicians for talking about the revolution as it had happened only yesterday and for profiting from people's feelings – either irritated, motivated or offended – related to the revolution. Dividing Zanzibaris on the basis of the revolution is, according to Ghassani, a tool of control used by the government politicians. The real problems of Zanzibar, including poverty or the lack of political autonomy and medicines, are left aside from the Revolution Day celebrations. Ghassani scorns the amount of money spent for the celebrations which would be enough "to begin at least one development project in one of our villages"⁴⁸. (Ghassani, *Dira*, 2003, 17-23

⁴⁸ Original in Swahili: "kuanzisha mradi mmoja wa maendeleo katika moja ya vijiji vyetu".

January.) Organizing lavish celebrations for an event, the importance of which not all Zanzibaris agree on is seen as humiliating and unnecessary when compared to more urgent needs of the nation. Newspaper *Majira* from the mainland – also banned in Zanzibar for a period of time because of allegedly anti-government articles – criticizes the spending on celebrations instead of equipping hospitals or paying salaries for the state functionaries (*Majira*, 2000, January 12).

Back to harmony and diversity

New nationalist writers often evoke the concept of "Zanzibari-ness" (*Uzanzibari*) in their texts. Ghassani declares that his main belief is Zanzibari-ness, "a matter of pride for every Zanzibari" (*jambo fakhari kwa kila Mzanzibari*) (Ghassani 2008: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima). His main point is that being a Zanzibari surpasses skin colour, origin or political orientation: it lies in the nature and history of Zanzibar as a cosmopolitan, mixed society.

"Zanzibar is a country of mixed people – mixture of colour, origin, religion and faith. Zanzibar is the home of everyone who loves and believes in the Zanzibari-ness and all these people have the same rights."⁴⁹ (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima.)

Ghassani declares that Zanzibari-ness is "patriotism" (*uzalendo*): if a person believes in Zanzibar as an independent nation, having its own history and culture, that person is a Zanzibari, no matter what his or her skin colour or parents' origin is. *Uzalendo* is a word used by CCM nationalists alike – they state for example that it was the true "patriots" or "nationalists" (*wazalendo*) who conducted the revolution (Shamte, *Dira*, 2003, February 14-20). Usually if someone in Zanzibar describes him/herself being *mzalendo*, a patriot, that person refers to nationalism related specifically with Zanzibar, whereas *utaifa* refers to nationalism in the Union context, the whole country of Tanzania (Saleh, e-mail communication, 22.4.2009). According to *Kamusi ya Kiswahili Sanifu* (1981), *mzalendo* is either a person who has been born in a specific place, is indigenous and has origins there or a person who loves his country passionately and is ready to die for its cause. *Taifa*, "nation" is the community of people living in the same country and under the same government, united by history, economy and culture.

Ali Muhsin al-Barwani, a ZNP nationalist of the old generation also denies the significance of origin and ethnicity in his memoirs:

⁴⁹ Original in Swahili: "Zanzibar ni nchi ya watu mchanganyiko - mchanganyiko wa rangi, wa asili, wa dini, na wa itikadi. Zanzibar ni nyumbani pa wote ambao mapenzi na imani yao ni Uzanzibari na hao wote wana haki sawa."

"The deciding factor for civilized man is not ethnicity, what race one belongs to, but nationality, one's birthplace or one's choice of a country to belong to. Neither is it a question of who came first." (al-Barwani 1997: 128.)

Al-Barwani implies that those who use ethnicity and "race" for nationalist purposes are not "civilized" in their behaviour. For him, nationality is a question of birthplace or one's choice of belonging to a certain country, whereas descent has less importance.

The new nationalists claim that there is a common national identity of a "Zanzibari" which has no particular colour or "race". Ghassani takes the peacock as a metaphor of Zanzibar:

"-- if it was only white it would not differ from a dove and if it was only black it would not differ from a crow. The peacock nature of the peacock lies in its mixture of colour and qualities; and it is the same with the Zanzibari-ness of Zanzibar."⁵⁰ (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima.)

Ghassani argues that the unity of Zanzibar lies in its cosmopolitan heritage, in the mixture of cultures and religions (Ghassani, *Fahamu*, July 3-9). According to Ghassani, this unity is forged only in everyday life, among Zanzibaris themselves and not by the leaders of political parties: "the unity of Zanzibar is being discussed in marketplaces, bars, daladalas, funerals, weddings, mosques and other places"⁵¹ (Ghassani, *Fahamu*, 2006, July 3-9). This "new revolution", or "true revolution" (*mapinduzi halisi*) as Ghassani calls it, is a period of openness, truth and responsibility – for this kind of revolution Ghassani is willing to join the cry of "Revolution Forever" (Ghassani, *Dira*, 2003, February 28-March 6). By calling this second revolution as "true" or "legitimate", Ghassani also states the illegitimacy of the first revolution, or at least the governance following it. In addition Ghassani wishes this revolution to be led by people who build bridges instead of walls between each other and asks Zanzibaris to surpass those who build these different walls between "African-ness" and "Arab-ness", Pemba and Unguja, North and South, revolutionaries and those who were overthrown, and between "indigenous" (*wa asili*) and newcomers (*wa kuja*) (Ghassani, *Fahamu*, 2006, July 3-9).

The opposition has replied with force to the Africanizing discourse of the ruling party ever since the beginning of the democratization. A CUF pamphlet from 1993 proclaims to be "dedicated to the peoples of Zanzibar in their struggle for democracy" and

⁵⁰ Original in Swahili: "-- kama angelikuwa mweupe tu asingekuwa tafauti na njiwa manga na kama angelikuwa mweusi tu asingekuwa tafauti na kunguru. Utausi wa tausi ni mchanganyiko wake wa rangi na maumbile yake; na basi Uanzibari wa Zanzibar ni vivyo hivyo."

⁵¹ Original in Swahili: "-- umoja wa Zanzibar unazungumzwa masokoni, vilabuni, kwenye daladala, mazikoni, harusini, misikitini na mwenginemo --"

uses the slogan "let us be diverse but united" (CUF 1993: *Whither Zanzibar?*). Diversity in unity which overrides ethnic and racial questions, and peoples in a plural form – these outline the central message of the opposition and the new nationalists. They admit readily that Zanzibar consists of different peoples that should all have the same rights, as opposed to only "Africans" having rights after the revolution. Ghassani insists for a colour-neutral future:

"-- although it is true that Zanzibar consists of islands which belong to the African continent, it is not true to translate the African-ness of Zanzibar into people's colour, i.e. to believe that those who rule over Zanzibar are Black Africans only and all others, those who are not of black colour or who do not come from the African mainland, are foreigners who have just arrived at the islands of Zanzibar and thus do not have the rights of the 'indigenous'."⁵² (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima.)

Similar statements are found in other online forums and websites discussing the fate of Zanzibar: what matters is not the ethnic identity, but the feeling of being a Zanzibari, belonging to this "mixture of mixtures" in which no group can claim being more indigenous than the others (al Barwani, Zanzinet Forum). Being Zanzibari is significant, as the pseudonym "Pakacha" concludes in an online discussion forum, JamiiForums after other writers have insisted on the African-ness of Zanzibar:

"In Zanzibar today, there is no such thing as Arab or Indian or Comorian or Chinese or **African** or Shirazi but there is only Zanzibari. Now whether s/he is white, red or light brown – s/he is Zanzibari."⁵³ ("Pakacha" 8.4.2009, JamiiForums.)

Zanzibari nationalists blame CCM government of racism. Abu Hafidh complains that a person is accepted to be an "African" only when born in Ghana, Uganda or anywhere on the African continent, but not when a person is born outside Black Africa, such as in Libya, Algeria or Morocco. Hafidh accuses CCM of racism (*uguzi*): they are not seeking African unity of the whole continent, but only African unity defined by the complexion. (Hafidh, *Dira*, 2003, April 18-24.)

Al-Ismaily wonders why Zanzibar, such a small "people of one nation, one religion, one country, who live together, speak the same language, are born together, play

⁵² Original in Swahili: "-- wakati ni sawa kwamba Zanzibar ni visiwa vinavyopatikana kwenye bara la Afrika, si sawa kuutafsiri Uafrika wa Zanzibar kwa kutumia rangi za watu, yaani vile kuamini kwamba wenye miliki ya Zanzibar ni Waafrika Weusi tu na kwamba wengine wote, wasiokuwa na rangi nyeusi na au wasiotokea ndani ya Bara la Afrika, ni wageni wa kuja tu visiwani Zanzibar na hivyo hawana haki walizonazo hao 'wenyeji.'"

⁵³ Original in Swahili: "Sasa hakuna pale Zanzibar kitu kama Mwarabu au Mhindi au Mngazija au Mchina au **Muafrika** au Mshirazai bali kuna Mzanzibari tu. Sasa awe mweupe mwekundu hudhurungi - Ni Mzanzibari."

together, go to schools together and sometimes meet at the mosque five times a day"⁵⁴ are unable to agree with each other and to protect Zanzibar from being swallowed by another country. He concludes that instead of reason, they are governed by hate. (al-Ismaily 1999: 281.) Although al-Ismaily does not name the culprits for creating this atmosphere of hate, he makes clear that the British colonialism together with the second type of colonialism, that of CCM regime are to blame. As the solution al-Ismaily suggests compassion as a cure for the past "sicknesses" (*ndwele*), needed "to protect Zanzibar from being swallowed and destroyed and through reconciliation to return their humanity, and to return Zanzibar itself to its prosperity and glory"⁵⁵ (al-Ismaily 1999: 282). Al-Ismaily leaves unmentioned who the other party, the swallower is, but his stance is unambiguous in the earlier text: Tanganyikans are the invaders, first led by Julius Nyerere and later by other CCM leaders. Returning to harmony and prosperity requires a change among the Zanzibaris themselves – they need to turn to goodness and respect the human values of the Zanzibari culture. No matter what the divisions and troubles of today are, the country may still stand united in front of the "foreign" mainlander enemies, the Tanganyikans who definitely as "colonialists" do not belong into the peoples of Zanzibar.

New nationalists are well aware of the political division between Zanzibaris but believe firmly that it can be overcome, that the unity of Zanzibaris is achievable: "Zanzibar was a country before the Union, it has been a country during the Union, and it will continue to stay as a country even after this Union"⁵⁶ (Ghassani: KARIBU Zanzibar Daima). This statement was repeated by the presidential candidate of CUF, Seif Sharif Hamad who proclaimed that Zanzibar "will continue to be a country until the doomsday" (*itabaki kuwa nchi mpaka Kiama*) (Hamad 31.1.2009, *Haki na Umma*). Eternality of Zanzibar is even visible in the title of Ghassani's blog, "Zanzibar Forever...Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" (*Zanzibar Daima...Jana, Leo na Kesho*), which also alludes to CCM slogan "Revolution Forever". Al-Barwani concludes in his memoirs: "The contradictions and conflicts in ourselves and in our society may ultimately result in unity and harmony" (al-Barwani 1997: 300). This is a goal shared by old and new nationalists alike.

⁵⁴ Original in Swahili: "-- watu wa taifa moja, dini moja, nchi moja, wanaishi pamoja, wanasema lugha moja, wamezaliwa pamoja, wamecheza pamoja, wamekwenda chuoni na skuli pamoja na pengine wanakutana msikitini kutwa mara tano pamoja--"

⁵⁵ Original in Swahili: "-- kuinusuru Zanzibar kumezwa na kuangamizwa na kwa masilahi ya kurudisha utu wao, na Zanzibar yenyewe kurejea katika neema zake na utukufu wake."

⁵⁶ Original in Swahili: "-- Zanzibar ilikuwa nchi kabla ya Muungano, imekuwa nchi wakati wa Muungano, na itaendelea kubakia kuwa nchi hata baada ya Muungano huu."

5.3. The Clash of Discourses and the Remaking of Zanzibari Identity

This last section of analysis assembles together the main themes of this thesis and reflects on the nature of Zanzibari nationalisms. First the role of the 1964 revolution in the nationalist discourses is examined: what types of strategies, metaphors and stereotypes are used for nation-building, and why? Then the two opposing discourses are reviewed from a more theoretical point of view: what kinds of nationalism do they represent, and are they comparable with other countries?

5.3.1. Myths, metaphors and stereotypes of the 1964 revolution

Nationalist movements in general favour events which include times of heroic struggle against aliens (Breuilly 1994: 66). Nationalist symbolism has often violent character in which death and suffering are important, and martyrs who have died for their nation are particularly venerated ([Kapferer 1988; 1989] in Eriksen 2002: 106). The obvious symbolic event defining CCM nationalism is the 1964 revolution: the heroes of the revolution are remembered in several speeches, and the ways in which they armed themselves with knives and stones against the foreign enemy are described in detail. Celebrations of the Revolution Day include presidential speeches held on a stadium either in Unguja or Pemba, military parades and other stately program.

During the first years after the revolution, a large number of foreign leaders and representatives mainly from socialist countries participated in the Revolution Day festivities, but lately only few African leaders, such as another revolutionary, president Mugabe from Zimbabwe has honored the ceremony with his presence. The Revolution Day divides Zanzibar politically: the whole day is consecrated for the achievements and legacies of CCM, whereas the opposition politicians have refused to join because they have not been "invited". Revolution Day festivities have also included plays depicting the humiliation of Arabs after the revolution, or the mistreatment of Zanzibari Africans by Arabs before the revolution. Hamad from CUF participated in the celebrations as a sign of cooperation and reconciliation for the first time in 2008.

When writing about the politics of commemoration, Brubaker uses the commemorations of the 1848 events in Europe as an example. The narrative framing of commemorations can either particularize and tell about the local events from an individual point of view, or generalize the event and compare it to universal processes. Brubaker notes that in state commemorations the particular events are generally de-emphasized and

silenced, whereas more general processes of modernization, liberation or democratization are emphasized. (Brubaker 2004: 169.) This is also the case for the official commemorations of the 1964 revolution: negative consequences of the revolution are downplayed, and the participation to a larger international liberation struggle, both African and socialist, is stressed. The advantages of the revolution cited in the official discourse are vague and grand: liberation of Zanzibari Africans; equality; and modernization. Individual consequences, whether negative or positive, are silenced – the masses, "people", are the ones who are told to have benefited from the revolution.

The new nationalist discourse uses both narrative frames. Their memoirs and pamphlets testify of the suffering during the revolution and under Karume's dictatorial regime from the individual point of view. Many writers, such as al-Ismaily and Babakerim stress the mainlanders' hate and fear towards Islam as one of the leading reasons for the revolution. In order to generalize Zanzibar with similar situations in the world, Ghassani compares Zanzibar with other small, defenceless regions such as Western Sahara, East Timor or Palestine which are taken over by larger countries, thus being another form of colonialism. New nationalists like to point out that without the invasion by "Dodoma colonialism", Zanzibar could have achieved the status similar to that of Singapore or the Maldives, two small regions in the world which are doing relatively well economically.

CCM and CUF use extremely harsh stereotypes of each other and bring history to the present electoral campaigning. A veteran Zanzibari politician Abdulrahman Babu notes the remaking of the presumed earlier differences which are represented as continuities from the past until today. He writes that any CCM activist stirs his party members by referring to CUF as "HIZBU", literally meaning the "party" in Arabic, the common name used for ZNP in its time; and similarly a CUF activist evokes fear by referring to CCM as "GOZI", meaning "skin politics", the racial political language that the ASP used in pre-revolution elections (Babu 2001: 72). Nowadays the opposition calls the CCM Maskani youth wing, claimed of harassing CUF supporters in Zanzibar as "Janjawidi". The term is probably used in the meaning of Janjawidis being armed groups supported by the government, and not as "Arab tribes" attacking "Africans", as the Darfur case is often presented to the outside world.

Table 2 below summarizes the main issues of the official and the Zanzibari nationalist discourse. Many of the strategic moves in discourses presented by van Dijk (1995b) are present in the focus texts of this study. Negative comparison, emphasizing the bad qualities of the "other" by comparing them with a generally recognized "bad" outgroup

is used by both sides. During the socialist era, government texts used Marxist vocabulary frequently. All foreigners – Arabs, British, Indians and other Asians – were "exploiters", opposed to the downtrodden "Africans" who were the true owners of Zanzibar, African islands next to the mother continent. Arabs were described as "aristocrats" and "feudal lords", opposed to "workers and peasants" who were solely "Africans". Through history, the Arabs have already been defined as proud, greedy, only looking for their own benefit and wanting to exploit the Africans again. This strategy overlaps with generalization, identifying a whole group of people as sharing a common trait. Arabs are identified as "masters" and Africans respectively as "slaves", or the very least, "oppressed".

Issues	Official discourse	New nationalist discourse
Revolution	African proletarian liberation struggle against colonialism, feudalism, capitalism and racism; returning Zanzibar back to Africa	"Invasion of foreigners", "Rape", "Mass murder", "Devil", "genocide", "civil war"; loss of lives, honor and property; the Union ending the independence of Zanzibar
Outside Support	African countries; Eastern bloc	Diaspora in the Gulf countries and Europe
Silences	Status of minorities still residing in the country; the number of people killed in the revolution; positive aspects of the Arabs or Arab culture	Negative effects of slavery
Threats	Anti-revolutionaries, both inside and outside the country; radical Islamists	Mainlanders (Tanganyikans) trying to divide Zanzibaris; CCM ruling through force especially during elections
Obstacles	Lack of money; low clove prices and people still smuggling cloves	Lack of human rights; political inequality and media censorship; fear
Resources	Media control, public financing, historical authority and support of the mainland	Support from the mosques and from the diaspora, family networks
Ingroups	(Zanzibari) Africans	"Patriotic" Zanzibaris
Outgroups	Those who do not support and believe in the revolution; "foreigners", Arabs and other non-African minorities	Mainlanders and others who do not believe in the distinctiveness of Zanzibar as a nation

Table 2. Main issues of the opposing discourses.

Based on his observations on the elections of 1995 and 2000, Cameron summarizes that the ruling party others CUF as an "Arab" party which brings "disturbance" or "trouble" (*fujjo*). Cameron claims that the racial and regional stereotypes of the opposition party have even been exacerbated due to its lack of access to certain campaign

areas in Unguja. He assumes that when options have been either an "Arab" party invading the State House or sticking with the old and safe CCM, many voters have opted for the latter. After the contested elections of 2000 and the "victory" of CCM, Cameron reports seeing thousands of CCM youth marching on the streets and shouting phrases such as "Return to Arabia!" (*Rudi Arabuni!*). (Cameron 2002: 318, 326.) Any clearer message to CUF supporters of their exclusion and foreign-ness is hard to give, and informal statements such as this reveal that ethnic divisions are still strongly recreated by the political parties.

Political quarrels are feared to lead to a more serious future: for example Tanzanian Guardian newspaper wrote about the danger of Zanzibar turning into another Rwanda (*The Guardian*, 2000, 25 August 2000). The risk of ethnic antagonism, perceived to spread in Zanzibar, could transform to genocide. Cameron calls these rhetoric strategies "coded threats" which entail the possibility of deep violence (Cameron 2004: 108). Threats generated by the "others" lead to another tactic, that of a warning in which the "others" are demonized and those belonging to "us" should act and take these warnings seriously. Rhetorical strategies cited by van Dijk for warning purposes include religious prejudice and concretization (van Dijk 1995b: 156). CCM, for one, calls CUF followers as people succumbing to ruthless terrorist acts, "troublemakers" and "people of violence" and motivated by "Islamic fundamentalism" (Rawlence 2005: 516, 520; *Zanzibar Politics* 2000, Mapuri 1996). Their evilness is concretized by describing their negative acts in detail, and comparing the alleged scare tactics of the opposition party with those of the ZNP before the revolution. However, also the opposition uses the terrorist card by reminding of the risks when people are denied of their opportunities to influence politics through voting:

"In the aftermath of last year election, a CUF official, Othman Juma, captured the mood of the situation in the following words: "When you unfairly lose once, it is bad enough. When you do so three times, you lose hope. When you have lost hope, you can do anything." Then came the ominous line from CUF official: "We must be prepared to face the challenge of the al Qaeda taking advantage of the bad situation here." (Mbuvi 10.2.2006, *Daily Nation*.)

Western countries have already expressed worry over the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Zanzibar, particularly Pemba. After all, the first prisoner from Guantánamo to stand trial is a Pemban-born member of al Qaeda, who is charged of taking part in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Saudi money shows also in the opulent mosques built in the otherwise very poor island of Pemba, or in

the scholarships granted for Zanzibari youth to study Islamic law or Arabic abroad. Also the first university founded in 2002 in Zanzibar was privately owned and funded by a Saudi Arabian non-governmental organization called *Darul Iman Charitable Association*.

CCM politicians have begun to use concepts such as "Arab nationalism" or "Islamic fundamentalism" when referring to the opposition (Bakari 2001: 208). CCM has also claimed that CUF uses Islamic fundamentalist groups to castigate CCM and preach radical Islamic ideology in the mosques (Bakari 2001: 186). CUF is branded as an "Arab" and a radical Islamist party, but it seems that the relationship between religion and politics has been adverse to CCM claims: Islamists have become more sympathetic towards the opposition because of these accusations and because Islamic parties are forbidden, not the other way around. Husby argues that the reluctance of those in power to make the full transition into multiparty democracy has made the religion as a tool for the opposition (Husby 2001: 62). In short, CUF has become the non-official protest party enclosing different groups, from Islamists to new and old nationalists and in general all those who want a change in the present governance.




Figure 4. Factors influencing the new nationalist discourse.

Figure 4 above presents an overview of the different factors affecting the new nationalist discourse. Particularly in the 1990s, the influence of the Zanzibari diaspora, the "old" nationalists living in European and Gulf countries was significant, but in the beginning of the 21st century more Zanzibaris living on the isles have begun to write nationalist articles. A common language, Swahili, and a small geographical area have surely contributed to the spread of nationalism. Imams of the mosques have also begun to talk about politics at least since the elections in 2000, which is a very efficient way to spread information. Lastly, the establishments of new media, including privately-owned newspapers and Internet sources have enabled the Zanzibari nationalists to speak out about their beliefs on the 1964 revolution and on the present situation. Some of the nationalist opinions can certainly be regarded as anti-revolutionary and anti-governmental, and would have led to serious disciplinary action before the democratization process.

The opposition, concentrating on human rights and equal opportunities, aims to show the discrimination practiced by the ruling party towards the opposition, including Pembans and other people of "wrong" descent. Hamad has proclaimed CCM guilty of corruption and economic mismanagement, discrimination of Arab and Pemban "ethnicities", abuse of human rights and politization of the security forces (Rawlence 2005: 516). These abuses are concretized in various forms: for the old days, victims of the revolution have written memoirs which have been published abroad but circulate widely in Zanzibar, but for the recent elections, dozens of photos on alleged abuse, beatings and other political violence have been published online (<http://www.flickr.com/photos/hakinaumma/>).

Norm and value violation is another discursive strategy: emphasizing how the "others" violate the norms and values "we" appreciate. The concept of *heshima*, respect/honor occurs frequently in both discourses. The ruling party advocates that the revolution created Zanzibar as a nation and brought back *heshima* to the hitherto oppressed and exploited "Zanzibari Africans". The ASP/CCM values include equality and rights of the majority and the rightful owners of the islands, the "Zanzibari Africans". For example Mapuri purports that CUF, being the opposition "Arab" party violates the right of the majority to rule and only wants to bring back discrimination and exploitation of the past. The new nationalists, for their part assert that the revolution almost abolished the "true" nature of Zanzibar and stole their *heshima* which was replaced by discrimination, corruption and human rights violations.

The new nationalists rely on the scheme of overall moral decay in Zanzibar, both in economic and spiritual matters. Respecting the values of "Zanzibari culture" (*utamaduni*) has been replaced by the corruption of morals. The revolution violated them, and the current political violence by the mainland security forces continues to violate them. Many Zanzibaris believe that because the police and army are Union matters, governed from the mainland, the state brutality is not for maintaining law and order but for "stealing" elections (Oloka-Onyango & Nassali 2003: 44). The viewpoint of all evil coming from the mainland and threatening the Zanzibari culture is not only attached to Zanzibari nationalists, but to Zanzibaris in general. Oloka-Onyango and Nassali note in their study that this belief "was exacerbated by a recent spate of prostitution and armed robberies in Zanzibar committed by criminals/gangsters who were allegedly from the Mainland" (Oloka-Onyango & Nassali 2003: 44).

Zanzibaris in general are very patriot-minded, also according to many mainlanders. Oloka-Onyango and Nassali confirm that party affiliations do not necessarily determine the rigorousness of patriotism:

"The Mission found Zanzibaris to be extremely nationalistic and proud of their island heritage and culture, irrespective of political affiliation. Indeed, the Mission felt there was a widespread conviction that Zanzibar is a state, and the Union is widely regarded as an agreement between two sovereign states, and must be treated as such. (Oloka-Onyango & Nassali 2003: 31.)

They imply that also members of CCM Zanzibar can be nationalist-minded outside the official discourse which supports the Union unequivocally. Also Larsen has noted that although people distinguish themselves according to their specific place of origin, they simultaneously stress they they are all Zanzibari, different from the mainland Tanzanians (Larsen 2004: 123).

Cultural, political and religious aspects are deeply intertwined in the new nationalist discourse. Religious fundamentalism is related to the idea of restoring the ideal moral order and mobilizing traditionalism for political goals. It has been stated that in the Islamic world, contemporary social and political problems are often identified as "ultimately moral in nature" ([Hoffman 1995: 211] in Cooper 2006: 38). The thinking patterns of Islamist and nationalist movements converge in the area of moral discourse which follows the continuum of moral decay → God's wrath → moral purification needed → regeneration and development. Both Islamists and nationalists present a need to restore the idealized past in order to overcome the moral failings of the state which are due to foreign intrusions and the lack of "right" beliefs. Although many writers stress the

importance of holding on to the moderate and tolerant Zanzibari Islam, more radical Islamist influences colour the discussions on tourism, Western influences and female dress in Zanzibar. I remember reading an article in an Islamist-orientated newspaper which blamed Western countries, and particularly the United States for introducing homosexuality to Zanzibar. Other "foreign" influences include bars, alcohol, prostitution, and mainland cultural expressions such as *tingatinga*⁵⁷ paintings or sculptures. Anti-American attitudes come from the most unexpected directions: a little Zanzibari boy shouted insults to a white, Swiss friend of mine when he was walking on the street in Stone Town, accused him of being an American and threw stones at him. Parkin has explained this counter-attack against Western ways as the distinctive sense of Zanzibari cultural identity being under threat (Parkin 1995: 202-203). Islamism is one of the answers for battling this cultural decay coming from the outside, from foreign sources.

5.3.2. Cultural, ethnic or civic nationalism?

Based on the way in which the "nation" is perceived in a particular nationalist ideology, theorists have categorized nationalism into civic, ethnic, cultural and sometimes cosmopolitan or multicultural types of nationalism. Civic or "political" nationalism is founded on democratic and liberal principles: the nation is the body of citizens who have equal political rights. Civic nationalism is mostly used in countries with many different ethnicities and origins, particularly in former settler colonies such as the United States and Canada. In cultural nationalism the nation is defined by a shared culture which is not directly based on ethnicity, but on some sort of descent, continuity and history. Cultural nationalism has been described as standing in between of civic and ethnic nationalism. Examples of cultural nationalism include *hindutva* ideology in India, or Zionism in Israel and Jewish diaspora. Will Kymlicka offers cosmopolitan nationalism as an alternative for multicultural societies in a globalizing world. "Emancipated individuals" with a cosmopolitan identity would see that they have options outside their inherited cultural groups as well. (Kymlicka 2001: 204.) Kymlicka believes that liberal (civic) nationalism and cosmopolitanism can be reconciled. Although their values seem to conflict, in some cases they even share many traits such as respect for international law, including human

⁵⁷ Tingatinga paintings are colourful, glossy paintings which often feature animal motifs and are very popular souvenirs especially on the Tanzanian mainland.

rights; constitutionalism, equality of opportunity, religious tolerance and openness to cultural pluralism. (Kymlicka 2001: 218.)

Civic nationalism is generally described in positive terms: as liberal, voluntarist, universalist and inclusive, based on the territory more than peoples' ethnic identities. Ethnic nationalism is often linked with violence and described as illiberal, particularist and exclusive. Brubaker criticizes this dichotomization either having a very negative, abusive type of nationalism (ethnic nationalism) or a very positive one, of "praise" (civic nationalism). He asserts that all nationalisms are both inclusive and exclusive, only the criteria vary. For example acquiring citizenship, the basis of civic nationalism, is far from self-evident in many countries. Controlling the rules of citizenship is an alternative way to define who belongs to the nation. (Brubaker 2004: 140-141.)

Brubaker also questions the place of "culture" in the civic-ethnic continuum. He mentions that Smith treats "ethnic" identical with the term "cultural", consequently broadening the concept of ethnic nationalism very wide. Yet, if ethnicity is only understood as common descent, nationalistic rhetoric emphasizing common culture instead of common descent could be coded as civic nationalism. (Brubaker 2004: 137-139.) To overcome this reality of overlapping "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms, Brubaker suggests dividing nationalism into state-framed and counter-state categories. State-framed nationhood can include ethnicity or culture, whereas counter-state nationalisms are not necessarily ethnic, but may be based on territory or distinct political history. (Brubaker 2004: 145.)

Using these terms, the understanding of the nation propagated by the ruling party in Zanzibar, is both state-framed *and* ethnically defined, if "African" can be counted as an ethnicity. This was particularly the case during the early revolutionary years, until the 1970s, but there are still government-influenced publications which stress the African-ness of Zanzibar (Mapuri 1996; *Zanzibar Politics* 2000). The ASP/CCM nationalism was based on anti-colonial, pan-Africanist and Marxist ideologies through which Zanzibar was a part of global projects. However, the ASP/CCM discourse asserted that Zanzibaris were not "cosmopolitans", but "Africans", and those who resisted this definition were labelled as un-nationalistic and anti-revolutionary. Pan-Africanism strived to invert the racism confronted by Africans during centuries. Originally begun by diaspora of African origin in the Caribbean, the movement emphasized the value of "African-ness" and African unity in the world. Frantz Fanon predicted that nationalism in postcolonial states and the cry for "African unity" would quickly turn into another kind of chain, and the Africanist racism of

the nationalist elites would replace the racism of the former colonial powers. Fanon also declared that Africa is split into Black and White parts: North Africa is attached to the Mediterranean culture, Europe and Greek civilization, whereas Black Africa is savage and uncivilized. (Fanon 1963: 125-130.)

The new nationalist agenda can be placed on the counter-state side where the opposed state is the Union of Tanzania. For the new nationalists the foundations of their nation, Zanzibar, are both civic and cultural. They emphasize the difference of Zanzibar through its common culture and history which is separate from the African mainland. Yet, the new nationalists stress constantly that their ideology is not racial like that of CCM, but their patriotism, the feeling of Zanzibari-ness is based on tolerance, respect and multiracialism. Human rights, liberalism and democracy are mentioned as important values which distinguish the new nationalists from the "other", "bad" state nationalists of the mainland. Brubaker identifies similar use of civic nationalism in many separatist movements, the rhetoric being "self legitimating language" which separates the "good", legitimate civic nationalism from the illegitimate ethnic nationalism propagated somewhere else (Brubaker 2004: 134).

Modern political history of Zanzibar has similarities with other African countries, particularly Zimbabwe. The liberation war in Zimbabwe and the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar offer comparable points of identification for the nation and for the ruling party. In Zimbabwe the current ruling party ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) led by Mugabe fought against the white minority government as revolutionary guerrillas between the years of 1964-1979. Zimbabwean state nationalism was formulated on Marxist and Africanist principles and developed into a critique of neo-colonialism and the Western economic hegemony in the 1980s (Bull-Christiansen 2004: 61). ZANU was elected into power in 1980 and still relies on its historical achievements and revolutionary legacy, whereas the main opposition party MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) has been branded as a lackey of the Western powers, particularly of the old colonial masters, the British. In the elections of 2002, MDC was accused of wanting to abolish the history of liberation war and to submit Zimbabwe once again as a British or American overseas territory (Ranger 2004: 219). The case of Zimbabwe implies that a common strategy to denounce and demonize the opposition is to accuse them for bringing back the past that the ruling party has fought against in a liberation war.

6. CONCLUSIONS: REVISING THE ZANZIBAR REVOLUTION

Every generation needs a new revolution.
– Thomas Jefferson

History has a crucial role in identity-building. Knowing one's roots, knowing where one belongs to or is coming from are pertinent questions for identity. Major violent events often become the focal points of national identity, and such was also the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar. Using the past to legitimize political power or to forestall opposing opinions have been common strategies in Zanzibar, and memories of the revolution have been mobilized and enlisted for the service of present political aims. For CCM, the Party of the Revolution, the 1964 revolution begins the history of Zanzibar as a part of Africa after centuries of imperialism, oppression and discrimination against Africans. The ruling party draws its legitimacy from the revolution and, when necessary, evokes old memories of Arab rule and the Sultanate, African enslavement and racial discrimination, all in extremely negative terms. CCM labels those supporting the revolution "nationalistic", good citizens and true patriots (*wazalendo*), and those opposing or denying the value of the revolution "un-nationalistic", bad citizens. For the new nationalists, the revolution and the Union succeeding it ended the glorious era of Zanzibar as an independent state and began the time of moral and economic decay, that of "Dodoma colonialism".

The revolution itself has earned many names. CCM describes the 1964 revolution as "glorious", a time of great achievements, whereas the new nationalists call the events in derogatory terms: "rape" (*ubakaji*), "invasion" (*uvamizi*), "genocide" (*mauaji*), "Holocaust" and "Black January", among others. Naming the event is already a statement in itself, and for example Issa Shivji, a Tanzanian scholar refers to the revolution moderately as either "insurrection" or "the 1964 event" to maintain impartiality (Shivji 2008).

Past, present, future

The young generation has not even lived in the pre-1964 era and relies on the stories they have heard from the previous generations: either stories of slavery and cruel treatment of the Africans, or of prosperity, harmony and tolerance among Zanzibaris. One generation of Zanzibaris has completely missed out on history education in school, and many have only been taught the party history of ASP which begins from the year of 1957. In the ASP/CCM

discourse, the past is a time of oppression, inequality and colonialism. The revolutionaries certainly do not yearn for those times, and fight actively against it, including all groups which want to return to the "bad old days". Furthermore, colonialism is seen as the uniting factor of African countries, among which the Zanzibar revolutionary government also wanted to belong. In contrast, for the new nationalists, "the past" is nostalgic, an idealized period of independence, glory and respect/honor, *heshima*, which the revolution abolished. The new nationalists omit any negative aspects of the past or describe them in apologetic terms: for example slavery can be depicted as having positive aspects, and besides Arabs, also Europeans and Africans are attached to the cruelest versions of slave trade.

"The present" is understood in this study as the period stretching from the 1964 revolution until the multiparty era. For the first three decades, the official historiography of the ruling party ASP/CCM had virtually no challenger in Zanzibar. After the 1964 revolution the islands were governed as a socialist dictatorship which affirmed its African identity and denounced all previous rulers as "foreigners", making those foreign populations still residing in Zanzibar outsiders. All "foreign" traits, such as aspects of Arab or Western cultures were rejected, and "traditional" African culture promoted instead. Those holding on to the revolutionary legacy see these decades in terms of development and equality: at least in principle everybody has the possibility to educate themselves and live as free people without discrimination which is associated with the past. The 1964 revolution is the source of this development, and the ruling party is its legitimate upholder. In contrast, the new nationalists assert that the revolution began a period of misery, denigration and injustice based on skin colour favouring only those who could claim themselves "African" enough. They claim that instead of promoting equality, the revolution exacerbated the differences between Zanzibaris based on "race". Furthermore, the new nationalists maintain that Zanzibar has sunk into a deep moral and economic decline because of the Union of Tanzania.

Although the Marxist vocabulary and the hope of the early revolutionary years are gone, CCM still bases its future on the revolutionary legacy and Revolution Forever (*Mapinduzi Daima*) continues to be their slogan. However, the study illustrates that the way the 1964 revolution is being used in current political rhetoric of the ruling party has changed from the early years of the revolutionary rhetoric. Liberalization of economics and politics has transformed the status of CCM since the early 1990s: their focus has shifted from future-orientated nation-building to preserving the status quo and keeping the party in power through the legacy of the revolution. During multipartyism the

revolution has turned from being a symbol of liberation into a scare tactic, and those "playing with" it are threatened to see the consequences of their actions. If the revolution is denounced or criticized too much, "played with", as president Kikwete has expressed, the legitimacy of CCM diminishes. Also, if the new nationalists succeed in convincing Zanzibaris that the pre-revolutionary period was better and more prosperous than the present time, the development claimed by the ASP/CCM would lose its foundation. Since the ruling party discourse defines the pre-revolutionary past in solely negative terms, their talk about the return of history if the opposition party is let to gain power forms a clear warning. If peace and stability, assured by CCM, are not maintained even by forceful means, Zanzibar might return to the bad old days. Current president Karume has assured that the revolutionary guns are still held in store and ready to be used against those who try to challenge the revolution. The Union is crucial for keeping CCM in power in Zanzibar – but the way in which this matter is presented to Zanzibaris is that the Union protects, in fact, against the "Arab threat" and the return of slavery with the old rulers.

The new nationalist vision for the future includes a revival of the "traditional" Zanzibari unity. They envision Zanzibar full of prosperity and dignity again, among other small states such as the Maldives, Singapore or Dubai. In their opinion Zanzibar could be re-established as a passage way and a significant port of the Indian Ocean. Other traits from the past include returning to traditional moral and cultural values, such as tolerance, cosmopolitanism and respect (*heshima*) towards each other.

"Us" – "them" and Zanzibari-ness

Dividing people into binary groups, "us" versus "them" and "insiders" against "outsiders" is a central strategy for identity-building. Usually identities are strengthened when they are faced with a threat, an enemy. Both of these discourses use the revolution as the central point of reference when differentiating people into stereotypes. The "others" are demonized because of their descent or own identification into "Arabs" and "Africans" or "Zanzibaris" and "mainlanders". Subsequently, xenophobia and racial discrimination are justified on the basis of the revolution.

In the official discourse the revolution linked Zanzibar back to Africa: it was presented as an African liberation, a part of the global revolutionary and socialist struggle. The state nationalism propagated by ASP/CCM in the early revolutionary years can be defined as an ethnic nationalism in which "African" constitutes the desired ingroup, depicted as a homogeneous community. The Africans – from the African continent – are

proclaimed as the sole owners of the Zanzibar islands and the Zanzibar revolution. Discourse of the ruling party focuses on Tanzania as the nation, belonging to a larger community of "Africans" who all fought against colonialism, and in the early revolutionary phase also to the worldwide community of liberation strugglers against capitalism.

Although the context in which the contemporary political parties function is completely different when compared to the 1950s-60s, the ways in which enemies are constructed and portrayed have remained eerily similar. The overthrown Arabs are still portrayed in CCM texts as the ultimate "foreigners" and "oppressors" who exploited the "Zanzibari Africans". Imagery of past suffering and injustice are evoked, such as of slavery and oppression practiced by the "Arabs" against the "Africans". The Arabs, "masters" and "rulers" of the pre-revolution era were a threat right after the revolution and continue being such, CUF named as their representative in the current political scene. The "Arabs" were greedy, lusted for power and despised "Africans" before the revolution and also during the first weeks of the "false independence" – this is what they still are in the context of multipartyism. It could be said that contrary to the continuous claims of CCM, the history is not repeating itself in Zanzibar, but it is being repeated advisedly by CCM itself.

Stereotyping made by CCM has, however, somewhat changed with the international environment. Only remains are left of the Marxist rhetoric which has been abandoned after the collapse of Communism. Present economic realities and the reliance on foreign aid limit the audacity of the ruling party discourse, but a novel addition has been incorporated: that of terrorism and the fear of radical Islam. CUF is not only a party of "Arabs", it is also a party of "Islamists" and "terrorists". Besides scaring moderate Zanzibari Muslims from voting for the opposition, linking CUF with radical Islamism is also likely aimed at retaining the support of Western countries and donors who have criticized the government of Zanzibar on the violence and mismanagement of elections.

Following Nyerere's legacy, Tanzania is still strong in the pan-Africanist ideology. Although the mainland Tanzania has been spared from ethnic or separatist tensions in politics, Zanzibari nationalists demand for more autonomy and want to differentiate themselves from the mainland. The way in which the revolution has been propagated by the ruling party as Africanist racialism has excluded a significant part of the Zanzibari population, and consequently failed to convince all Zanzibaris of their inherent "African origin".

The new nationalist "we" encloses the truly patriotic Zanzibaris who are not defined by descent, "race" or the degree of "indigenous-ness", but who subscribe to

Zanzibari cultural values – harmony, tolerance and cosmopolitanism instead of the divisiveness, hate and racism offered by CCM. The new nationalists believe in the distinct Zanzibari-ness which needs no Union, or the very least no leadership from the mainland Tanzania. On the surface this definition of Zanzibari-ness is based on civic qualities: anyone who believes in the feeling of being a Zanzibari is a true patriot. However, mainlanders (*watu wa bara*) or mainlander Zanzibaris (*wazanzibara*) are excluded as outsiders from the diversity of Zanzibari peoples. The new nationalists perceive the mainlanders as colonialists, Christians and immoral people trying to rule by force the country of Zanzibar. Because the primary nation for the mainlanders is believed to be the Union of Tanzania instead of Zanzibar, they do not fit into the new nationalist conception of Zanzibari-ness. For the new nationalists, those who support the revolution and subsequently the Union cannot be "true" Zanzibaris. Mainlanders also vote for CCM which is unwilling to submit power to anybody else and clutches stubbornly to the past.

The mainstream of the new nationalist ideology in Zanzibar could be located somewhere between cultural nationalism and civic nationalism in which the exclusion of the "others" is based on political and cultural reasoning. On the one hand, it stresses the shared culture of Islam, language of Swahili and common history, but on the other hand it maintains the importance of following human rights and respecting diversity in Zanzibar. The older generation, those who experienced the revolution themselves appear to have a more emotional attitude towards it, whereas the youth want to move on and continue with another kind of a revolution. Some of the youth lean more towards the radical Islamist path and emphasize the Islamic heritage of Zanzibar. Other young nationalists simply want a change in the governance, wider political autonomy, and less influence from the mainland Tanzania. The opposition party CUF seems to appeal to both of these groups. Therefore, Zanzibari new nationalism is not a unanimous movement, but withholds several competing claims and goals. What unites them is the perception that a change is needed; that things were better in the past, before the revolutionary government; and that the present regime does not support "Zanzibari-ness" enough and merely plays by the rules dictated by the mainland government.

Violence conducted by foreigners or outsiders is a central theme in both discourses. The new nationalists believe that the mainlanders, "invaders" (*mavamizi*) were responsible for making the revolution so bloody – it is a common statement that "true" Zanzibaris could not have been capable of engaging in such crude violence against each other. The political violence of the multiparty era has parallels with the violence of the

revolution. The new nationalist discourse claims that "foreigners", Tanganyikans invaded their country in 1964, and that these same "outsiders", "colonialists" are still the ones generating violence. The same stance repeats in the electoral and political violence since the 1990s: the worst crimes are said to be committed by mainland police and security forces, or the very least, the commands to strike against the opposition have come from the "Dodoma government" from mainland Tanzania. The culprits for violence both in the revolution and in the multiparty era are not our "own" people, but outsiders. This way the source of all evil is isolated outside "us" who are incapable of such violence, being "good" and "tolerant" people.

The "other" side is often seen aligned with the British colonialists and other Western powers. For the ruling party, the West has been the enemy first in the sense of being capitalists, then because of the post-colonialist economic power used to pressure African countries into "democracy". ASP/CCM claims that Western countries support the opposition which has lured them with their speeches of human rights, just as the British backed up ZNP before the revolution. The new nationalists also blame the Western countries for their contributions in the past: they allege that the British and Americans were involved in the 1964 revolution together with the Tanganyikans, and that they pressured for the Union of Tanzania, fearing the growth of communism in Zanzibar right after the independence. One thing that both discourses agree on is the influence of the British on the strengthening of racial differentiation in Zanzibar – new nationalists only add that the revolutionary government has done its share to further exacerbate these differences.

Roles of victims and winners or oppressed and oppressors are focal in both discourses. In the ruling party discourse, the oppression of the Zanzibari Africans ended with the revolution which lifted them from exploitation to dignity and freedom, transforming them from victims into winners. Even the current political violence is justified by branding the opposition party as "troublemakers", foreigners and descendants of the former rulers, thus including aspects of a legitimate revenge. The new nationalist discourse presents victims of two kinds: those on the losing side of the revolution and those fighting for democracy and human rights in the 1990s. They have been discriminated against by nationalizing their property, prohibiting their access to political power and even forcing their daughters to marry party leaders. Diaspora writers emphasize the crimes and atrocities committed during the revolution and describe "their" bad actions in particularly vivid details. Similar rhetoric is found in the narratives of electoral violence: "them", the ruling party and the police of the mainland Tanzania are abusing "us", defenders of

democracy and human rights. The new nationalists portray the ruling party CCM as corrupted, not fulfilling its revolutionary promises and functioning on a racial basis: approving only people of black colour to the leadership.

Besides violent behaviour, the "other" is demonized by immoral behaviour and improper cultural customs. The new nationalists portray the mainlanders as evil "foreigners" who invaded Zanzibar because of their hatred against Islam and envy of the Zanzibaris. Furthermore, they assert that the mainlanders imported reverse values, "barbarism" (*ushenzi*) and uncivilized manners to Zanzibar with the revolution. With the growth of the tourism industry, also Westerners are blamed for "spoiling our culture". Mainlanders are said to be responsible for committing crimes, such as theft, restraining democracy and violating human rights, whereas Western tourists are accused of promoting prostitution and the use of alcohol. The new nationalists present that the only cure for the corruption of morals is the return to the "glorious past". If the theory of Levinger and Lytle (2001) on the nationalist rhetoric triad holds, the diagnosis of the degradation also includes the cure. "Foreigners" with their "bad" culture who have infiltrated the country – mainlanders and tourists in the case of Zanzibar – must either leave or respect the local customs. This is a recurrent statement in right-wing nationalist rhetoric in general: "our ways", our culture must be safeguarded from foreign influences, and "outsiders" are tolerated as long as they adjust themselves to the local culture.

Reflections

Writing this thesis has definitely been a learning process – there are several things that I would approach differently if it was possible to start everything from the beginning. One of the main challenges is related to the language of my material which is partly in English, partly in Swahili. Some of the material exists in both languages, but I was not always able to locate the documents in both languages and had to content myself with either the Swahili or the English version. Translating some concepts into English was not simple either, and because of my still limited skills in Swahili, I might have missed many nuances and dual meanings of phrases and idioms.

Besides the language of publications, there are also other gaps left in the material. Compared to the early revolutionary years, few speeches from the multiparty era have been published either online or in printed publications, and I found only one speech from the 1980s. Thus, concentrating solely on the presidential speeches would not have yielded significant results as the government was also speaking less about the revolution.

This is why I decided to compile more information from newspaper articles and books published on the theme of the revolution, which again broadened the spectrum perhaps too wide. It might have been wiser to concentrate only on articles published in *Dira*, for example, but it felt necessary to gather material from a wide range to form a more inclusive picture of the nationalist discourses at the moment.

The material available for this study suggests that the discussion on the 1964 revolution has only begun. The old mass media, such as radio and television are still under governmental control, but the new media are harder to censor and restrict. It is still risky to criticize the government – or the revolution – under one's own name in Zanzibar, which makes online discussions and the possibility for anonymous writing even more appealing. Continuing research on this topic could thus include active following of discussion forums and blogs on Zanzibari politics. Another option is to interview ordinary Zanzibaris: to ask them to tell about their memories and/or perceptions of the revolution. Whether the memories and stories are "true" or not is of lesser importance: what matters is how and why people tell their stories and see the past the way they do. Many from the revolutionary generation have already passed away, and time is running out if the stories of the eyewitnesses and participants are to be collected. It is a challenge to win people's trust, as Zanzibaris are still reluctant to talk about sensitive political issues – and this is related to another difficult task, making sure that those telling their stories will not be harmed by those in power.

Interviewing Zanzibaris could also help in answering some central questions which are left open when reading only texts written by intellectuals, politicians and journalists. How do ordinary Zanzibaris see themselves in the middle of this debate on the revolution? Would they choose a side or have their own views on the past? What have been the impacts of the Africanist discourse for Zanzibari identity? How about the beginning of multiparty politics: how do Zanzibaris interpret these "Arab" threats and the return of the past? How wide-spread is the support for the new nationalist movement? There are also many Zanzibaris who are content with the Union, and half of the people still vote for CCM. Peace and stability promised by the ruling party are, after all, safe options in contrast to the violence of the past.

In this thesis I have argued that the 1964 revolution is the single most defining event for contemporary Zanzibari national and ethnic identities. The revolution redefined Zanzibari-ness as "African" instead of diverse ethnic origins. However, the Africanist discourse of the ruling party has failed to convince and unite all Zanzibaris, and

the transition to multiparty democracy together with new media have enabled more pluralist interpretations of the Zanzibari national identity. Besides the "old" nationalist definitions of Zanzibari identity as cosmopolitan, tolerant and multiracial, some of the new nationalists have added anti-Western aspects to the definition, perhaps due to the popularity of radical Islamism among the discontented youth, the economic hardship or the growth of tourism industry. Although the Arabic heritage and cosmopolitanism have become more acceptable parts of Zanzibari-ness again, the past, present and future of Zanzibar continue to be controversial, fragmented and contested.

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