



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November-December 1994

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS



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The proceedings of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
	KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
	KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
	Van der MAELEN Dirk	SP
	PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
	SARENS Freddy	CVP
	SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM.	De DECKER Armand	PRL
	GHESEQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
	LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
	MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
	OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
	THISSEN René	PSC
	WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
	BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
	COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
	COUVEINHES René	RPR
	DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GEOFROY Aloys	UDF
	GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
	JACQUAT Denis	UDF
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
	MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
	SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM.	BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
	BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
	BRIANE Jean	UDF
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	DANIEL Christian	RPR
	DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
	DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs.	DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM.	EHRMANN Charles	UDF
	HUNAUT Michel	RPR
	LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
	LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
	de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
	MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
	MIGNON Jean-Claude	RPR
	PROPRIOL Jean	UDF
	ROGER Jean	RDE
	VINÇON Serge	RPR

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr.	ANTRETTTER Robert	SPD
Mrs.	BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr.	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM.	BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
	BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	IRMER Ulrich	FDP
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
	SOELL Hartmut	SPD
	SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
	STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs.	TERBORG Margitta	SPD
MM.	VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU
	WOLFGRAMM Torsten	FDP

Substitutes

MM.	BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
	FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs.	FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM.	JUNGHANNS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	LUCYGA Christine	SPD
MM.	LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
	MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
	MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM.	MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
	PFUHL Albert	SPD
	PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
	REIMANN Manfred	SPD
	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHLÜCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs.	von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr.	ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	ARATA Paolo	Forza Italia
	BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
	BIANCHI Vincenzo	Forza Italia
	BRUGGER Siegfried	Pact for Italy
	DIONISI Angelo	Rif.-Com.-Progr.
	FASSINO Piero	Progr. Alliance
	LA LOGGIA Enrico	Forza Italia
	LA RUSSA Vincenzo	Chr. Dem. Centre
	LATRONICO Fedè	Northern League
	MATTINA Vincenzo	Progr. Alliance
	MITOLO Pietro	AN-MSI
	PARISI Francesco	Italian Popular Party
	PETRUCCIOLI Claudio	Progr. Alliance
	POZZO Cesare	AN-MSI
	SALVI Cesare	Progr. Alliance
	SELVA Gustavo	AN-MSI
	SERRA Enrico	Northern League
	TABLADINI Francesco	Northern League

Substitutes

MM.	CARCARINO Antonio	Rif. Com.-Progr.
	COVIELLO Romualdo	Italian Popular Party
	DEL GAUDIO Michele	Progr. Alliance
	DOLAZZA Massimo	Northern League
	FRONZUTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem. Centre
Mrs.	GAJOTTI de BIASE Paola	Progr. Alliance
MM.	GHIGO Enzo	Forza Italia
	LAURICELLA Angelo	Progr. Alliance
	LORENZI Luciano	Northern League
	MAZZONE Antonio	AN-MSI

Mrs. MELANDRI Giovanna	Progr. Alliance				
Mrs. PRESTIGIACOMO Stefania	Forza Italia				
Mr. RAGNO Salvatore	AN-MSI				
Mrs. RIVELLI Nicola	AN-MSI				
MM. RODEGHIERO Flavio	Northern League				
SCAGLIOSO Cosimo	Progr. Alliance				
Mrs. SCOPELLITI Francesca	Forza Italia				
Mr. SOLDANI Mario	Pact for Italy				
LUXEMBOURG					
Representatives					
Mrs. ERR Lydie	Soc. Workers				
Mr. GOERENS Charles	Dem.				
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.				
Substitutes					
Mrs. BRASSEUR Anne	Dem.				
MM. REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Workers				
THEIS Alphonse	Soc. Chr.				
NETHERLANDS					
Representatives					
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour				
Mr. DEES Dick	VVD				
Mrs. GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT Hanneke	D66				
MM. van der LINDEN René	CDA				
VERBEEK Jan Willem	VVD				
WOLTJER Eisso	Labour				
ZIJLSTRA Rinse	CDA				
Substitutes					
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	VVD				
van den BOS Bob	D66				
EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA				
LEERS Gerd	CDA				
Mrs. van NIEUWENHOVEN Jeltje	Labour				
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian	CDA				
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine	Labour				
PORTUGAL					
Representatives					
MM. AMARAL Fernando	Soc. Dem.				
BRITO Raul Fernando	Socialist				
CANDAL Carlos	Socialist				
FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim	Soc. Dem.				
MACHETE Rui Manuel	Soc. Dem.				
PINTO Carlos	Soc. Dem.				
ROSETA Pedro	Soc. Dem.				
Substitutes					
Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela	Soc. Dem.				
MM. ALEGRE Manuel	Socialist				
CURTO Atilio Aleixo	Socialist				
MARTINS Alberto de Sousa	Socialist				
POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro	Soc. Dem.				
REIS LEITE José Guilherme	Soc. Dem.				
RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano	PCP				
SPAIN					
Representatives					
MM. ALVAREZ Francisco				People's Party	
CUCO Alfons				Socialist	
HOMS I FERRET Francesc				C.i.U.	
LÓPEZ HENARES José Luis				People's Party	
LÓPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago				People's Party	
MARTÍNEZ Miguel Angel				Socialist	
PUCHE RODRIGUEZ Gabino				People's Party	
de PUIG Lluís Maria				Socialist	
ROMAN Rafael				Socialist	
SAINZ GARCIA José Luis				People's Party	
SOLE TURA Jordi				Socialist	
VAZQUEZ Narcis				United Left	
Substitutes					
MM. BOLINAGA Imanol				Basque Nat.	
BORDERAS Augusto				Socialist	
CABALLERO Abel				Socialist	
GRAU I BULDU Pere				C.i.U.	
Mrs. GUIRADO Ana				Socialist	
Mrs. MORENO Carmen				Socialist	
MM. OLARTE Lorenzo				C. Canarian	
PALACIOS Marcelo				Socialist	
RAMIREZ PERI Carlos				People's Party	
ROBLES FRAGA José				People's Party	
ROBLES OROZCO Gonzalo				People's Party	
Mrs. SANCHEZ DE MIGUEL Ana				Socialist	
UNITED KINGDOM					
Representatives					
MM. ATKINSON David				Conservative	
BANKS Tony				Labour	
COX Thomas				Labour	
Sir Anthony DURANT				Conservative	
Dame Peggy FENNER				Conservative	
Lord FINSBERG				Conservative	
Mr. HARDY Peter				Labour	
Sir John HUNT				Conservative	
Sir Russell JOHNSTON				SLD	
Lord KIRKHILL				Labour	
Mr. LITHERLAND Robert				Labour	
Lord NEWALL				Conservative	
MM. RATHBONE Tim				Conservative	
REDMOND Martin				Labour	
Sir Dudley SMITH				Conservative	
Sir Keith SPEED				Conservative	
Sir Donald THOMPSON				Conservative	
Mr. THOMPSON John				Labour	
Substitutes					
Mr. ALEXANDER Richard				Conservative	
Sir Andrew BOWDEN				Conservative	
MM. CUMMINGS John				Labour	
CUNLIFFE Lawrence				Labour	
DAVIS Terry				Labour	
DICKS Terry				Conservative	
Earl of DUNDEE				Conservative	
Mr. DUNNACHIE Jimmy				Labour	
Sir Peter FRY				Conservative	
Dr. GODMAN Norman				Labour	
Baroness GOULD of POTTERNEWTON				Labour	
Baroness HOOPER				Conservative	
MM. HOWELL Ralph				Conservative	
HUGHES Roy				Labour	
Lord MACKIE of BENSHE				SLD	
Mr. MARSHALL Jim				Labour	
Sir Irvine PATNICK				Conservative	
Mr. TOWNEND John				Conservative	

AGENDA

**of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 28th November - 1st December 1994**

I. Report of the Council

Fortieth annual report of the Council
(second part)

II. Political questions

1. A European security policy
2. WEU's relations with Russia

Report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee

Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee

III. Defence questions

1. The readiness and capabilities of air-forces in WEU member states
2. A European defence policy

Report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Defence Committee

Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Defence Committee

IV. Technological and aerospace questions

1. Transatlantic co-operation on European antimissile defence
2. Co-operation between European space research institutes
3. The development of a European space-based observation system - Part III
4. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón

Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

Report tabled by Mr. Galley on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

Report tabled by Mr. López Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

V. Budgetary questions

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
2. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement
3. Supplementary draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 - the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

VI. Rules of Procedure and Privileges

1. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member

Report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

VII. Parliamentary and Public Relations

1. The WEU Institute for Security Studies *Report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations*

2. Western European Union *Report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations*

DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 28th November - 1st December 1994

MONDAY 28th NOVEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
6. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member:
Report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Vote on the draft decision.
8. A European security policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.

TUESDAY 29th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.

10.15 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council – Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council.
3. A European defence policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Defence Committee.
4. A European security policy;
A European defence policy:
Joint debate.

At noon

5. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.
2. A European security policy;
A European defence policy:

Resumed joint debate.

Votes on the draft recommendations and draft order.

3. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. López Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
6. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft supplementary budget.
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

WEDNESDAY 30th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. The development of a space-based observation system – Part III:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Co-operation between European space research institutes:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Galley on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution

At noon

3. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Afternoon 3.30 p.m.

1. Transatlantic co-operation on European antimissile defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.
3. The WEU Institute for Security Studies – achievements and future prospects:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Western European Union:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.

6 p.m.

5. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France.

THURSDAY 1st DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. WEU's relations with Russia:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia.
WEU's relations with Russia:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1993*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993 – 3rd May 1994.

LETTER FROM THE AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY – 20th July 1994.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993 – 20th July 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1st JANUARY TO 31st DECEMBER 1993 – 20th July 1994.

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1993 – financial position as at 31st December 1993.
 - II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1993.
 - III. Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1993.
 - IV. Provident fund – account for the financial year ended 31st December 1993.
 - V. 1993 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.
 - VI. 1993 balance sheet for the Liberal Group.
 - VII. 1993 balance sheet for the Socialist Group.
-

*Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
for the financial year 1993*

3rd May 1994

Dear Dr. Czasche-Meseke,

In accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1993 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1993 (Appendix I).

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II).

(c) Contributions (Appendix III).

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 581 862, whereas the final statement

of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 578 926. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 2 936, shows an excess of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	12 858	
- Sundry receipts	22 748	
- Sale of publications	35 624	
- Contributions 7 %	<u>800 834</u>	
		872 064
- Receipts for 1993 estimated in the budget		<u>875 000</u>
		<u>- 2 936</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads III and V of the operating budget and Head I of the pensions budget amounting to F 601 537 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. The statement of contributions for the financial year 1993 received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, is given at Appendix III.

5. Amounts in the provident fund of the Assembly staff on 31st December 1993 stood at F 4 090 440 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained one loan to a staff member, amounting to F 275 000.

On 31st December 1993 the amounts in the provident fund for all the organs of WEU were held by the Crédit Lyonnais in Paris.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; they give details of the use of credits included in Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Dudley SMITH
President of the Assembly

Dr. Hedda CZASCHE-MESEKE
President of the Federal
Court of Accounts
Berliner Str. 51
D-60284 FRANKFURT

***Letter from the Auditor
to the President of the Assembly***

20th July 1994

Dear President,

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1993 together with my opinion and report on these accounts.

Yours sincerely,

Hedda CZASCHE-MESEKE
*(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor*

Sir Dudley SMITH
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Président-Wilson
75116 PARIS

***Report of the External Auditor
to the Assembly of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1993***

20th July 1994

I have audited the accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 in accordance with Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping. Certain savings and profitability criteria in the operation of the budget have been taken into account.

The 1993 budget provided for income and expenditure of F 32 644 830, of which F 31 769 830 came from contributions from member states and F 875 000 from sundry receipts. Actual expenditure was F 32 062 968, representing a saving of F 581 862 as compared with estimated expenditure.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows that actual expenditure was F 32 062 968 and income F 32 641 894 (of which F 31 769 830 in contributions and F 872 064 in sundry receipts) resulting in a credit balance of F 578 926 of actual income over effective expenditure.

The difference, between surplus receipts and budget savings, shows a deficit of - F 2 936. This amount is identical to the difference between actual sundry receipts and estimated receipts (F 872 064/F 875 000).

The saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	Total credits after transfers F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
<i>Part I:</i>			
<i>Operating budget</i>			
Head I			
Permanent staff	17 719 930	17 513 718	206 212
Head II			
Temporary staff	3 776 250	3 410 408	365 842
Head III			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	2 137 000	2 136 167	833
Head IV			
General administrative costs	2 085 500	2 077 356	8 144
Head V			
Other expenditure	2 572 000	2 571 344	656
<i>Part II:</i>			
<i>Pensions budget</i>			
Head I			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	4 354 150	4 353 975	175
Total	32 644 840	32 062 968	581 862

The results of the 1993 budget are in line with those for previous financial years in as much as there are again substantial budget savings, as shown in the following comparative table for the last five years.

Final statement of income and expenditure on 31st December of the financial year	Saving on expenditure	Difference between estimates and income
1989: + 106 133	+ 42 793	+ 63 140
1990: + 720 333	+ 710 837	+ 9 496
1991: + 514 471	+ 418 488	+ 95 983
1992: + 118 248	+ 314	+ 117 934
1993: + 578 926	+ 581 862	- 2 936

Receipts exceeded budget estimates for two of the four heads concerned and were below estimates for the two remaining heads:

	Estimates	Actual receipts
- Bank interest	60 000	12 858
- Sundry receipts (social security reimbursements)	10 000	22 748
- Sale of publications	40 000	35 624
Pension contributions 7 %	<u>765 000</u>	<u>800 834</u>
	<u>875 000</u>	<u>872 064</u>

There is a deficit balance of income over expenditure under these various heads of - F 2 936. It should also be noted that bank

interest earned was F 22 646 and interest owing F 9 788, the latter amount resulting mainly from the somewhat erratic nature of contribution payments (see below).

*
**

For the financial year 1993, contributions by member states stood at F 31 769 830 including F 501 830 carried forward from the previous year, representing an increase of just over F 2.9 million (+ 10.1%). In comparison, the increase for 1992 as compared with 1991, again taking account of sums brought forward, was approximately F 1.8 million (or 6.5%). A large part of the increases in credits requested - and hence of the increased payments made by the member states - resulted from an increase in expenditure on permanent staff under Head I of 1.5 million francs (+ 9.3%) as compared with the previous year. Fixed-scale salary adjustments decided during 1993 were in large part responsible for this increase.

The rhythm of the payment of contributions is not entirely satisfactory. At the end of the first half-year - 30th June 1993 - only F 12.8 million, or 40.3%, and at the year end F 27.7 million or 87.1% of the contributions had been paid. At closure of the accounts for the financial year 1993 on 31st March 1994 contributions of F 117 806 were yet to be paid.

*
**

Situation of transfers between heads in 1993

	+	-
<i>Part I:</i>		
<i>Operating budget</i>		
Head I		
Permanent staff	200 700	297 900
Head II		
Temporary staff	9 100	345 100
Head III		
Expenditure on premises and equipment	311 000	141 000
Head IV		
General administrative costs	40 000	210 000
Head V		
Other expenditure	354 100	18 100
<i>Part II:</i>		
<i>Pensions budget</i>		
Head I		
Pensions, allowances and social charges	149 750	52 550
Total	<u>1 064 650</u>	<u>1 064 650</u>

As the retirement date of one official cannot be forecast with certainty, Part II Head I (Pensions budget) has been increased by F 97 200, chargeable to Part I under Article 6.2 of the Financial Regulations. At its meeting held on 12th April 1994 the WEU Council granted the necessary authorisation for this transfer. Other transfers totalling F 714 200 were made between Heads II to V of Part I, Head III (Expenditure on premises and equipment) being increased by F 170 000 and Head V (Other expenditure) by F 336 000. In particular, Sub-Head 27 of the latter (Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk) was increased by F 248 600, from F 590 000 to F 838 600. Expenditure under this head was F 838 504 (cf. 1992: F 750 595; + 11.7%). Similarly expenditure on other items under this head have again increased sharply:

- Sub-Head 24 (Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs):
F 259 760 (1992: F 140 119; + 85.4%)
- Sub-Head 25 (Expenses for representation):
F 361 003 (1992: F 326 242; + 10.7%)
- Sub-Head 29 (Expenditure on information; especially newspapers and periodicals):
F 510 581 (1992: F 441 751; + 14.8%)

By contrast, a reduction was possible in expenditure under Sub-Head 28 (Expenses of experts and the auditor) from F 79 210 during the 1992 financial year to F 45 284 (- 42.8%).

The auditor feels that the extensive nature of transfers as they have been effected towards Head V is disturbing both in general terms and from the point of view of the rights of the responsible bodies in matters of establishing and authorising the budget.

In the previous year's report it had already been noted that excessive recourse to transfers carried the danger of distorting the budget (initially) adopted. Apart from this somewhat technical factor, the fact should be borne in mind, primarily, that large credit transfers between heads raises the question of the supplementary budget (Article 5 of the Financial Regulations). Major savings achieved within one budget head (in this case by the translation service during sessions) should be transferred to other heads in accordance with normal budgetary procedures - and not merely through the management of the budget - to the extent that it is regarded as essential substantially to increase the amounts under those heads. This is particularly true in cases where a transfer is intended to cover expenditure or increases in

expenditure which are neither an essential constraint (in other words not based on a legal obligation) nor unavoidable for other reasons.

When the payment process extends beyond the term of the financial year, it is necessary to ensure that such operations are not only accounted for internally, but are also transparent externally. If, as we have noted, invoices issued by one and the same creditor, among which one relates to the previous financial year prior to closure and the other to the new financial year, are settled by a single transfer or cheque, this fact must at very least be noted on the two payment orders. Another possibility would be to settle such invoices by two separate cheques or transfers. The administration has undertaken to follow the auditor's suggestion in the interests of transparency in budget management.

*
* *

Having completed this audit, I thank the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their valuable co-operation in the exercise of my duties as auditor.

Hedda CZASCHE-MESEKE
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor

***Certificate of the Auditor for the financial year
1st January to 31st December 1993***

20th July 1994

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1993.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary.

As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements faithfully record the book-keeping operations for the financial year and that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the Financial Regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1993.

Hedda CZASCHE-MESEKE
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1993

(in French francs)

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)		31 769 830
<i>Miscellaneous</i>		
(A) Sundry receipts		
Bank interest	12 858	
Sundry receipts	22 748	
Sale of publications	35 624	
(B) Pensions		
Contributions (7%)	800 834	
		<u>872 064</u>
Budget credits		32 641 894
Total expenditure (see Appendix II)		<u>32 062 968</u>
Excess of income over expenditure		<u>F 578 926</u>

Financial position as at 31st December 1993

<i>Assets</i>		
Contributions received	4 110 520	
Miscellaneous debtors	5 885	
Recoverable taxes	448 505	
		<u>F 4 564 910</u>
<i>Liabilities</i>		
Balance at the bank	2 041 173	
Miscellaneous creditors	1 073 061	
Sums paid	871 750	
Excess of income over expenditure	578 926	
		<u>F 4 564 910</u>

Sir Dudley SMITH
President of the Assembly

Henri BURGELIN
Clerk of the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration

Certified correct:
Dr. Hedda CZASCHE-MESEKE
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE
(in French francs)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1993
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	12 614 950
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances	
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	1 243 280
2.2.	Household allowance	554 060
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	610 000
2.4.	Rent allowance	60 000
2.5.	Education allowance	83 000
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000
2.7.	Overtime	60 000
2.8.	Home leave	50 000
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges	
3.1.	Social security	1 727 707
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	590 000
3.3.	Provident fund	209 133
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	-
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	-
4.3.	Removal expenses	-
4.4.	Installation allowance	-
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	13 000
Total of Head I		17 817 130

X II

ID UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993

(cs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		227 900	12 387 050	12 241 397	145 653
20 700			1 263 980	1 263 939	41
8 000			562 060	562 005	55
23 800			633 800	633 725	75
2 900			62 900	62 859	41
27 500			110 500	110 408	92
-		-	2 000		2 000
30 900			90 900	90 819	81
-		-	50 000	46 063	3 937
		70 000	1 657 707	1 653 656	4 051
27 900			617 900	617 874	26
-		-	209 133	162 970	46 163
15 600			15 600	15 582	18
2 000			2 000	1 946	54
16 800			16 800	16 760	40
24 600			24 600	24 592	8
-		-	13 000	9 123	3 877
200 700		297 900	17 719 930	17 513 718	206 212

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1993
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly	
6.1.	Sittings service	1 397 000
6.2.	Interpretation service	711 550
6.3.	Translation service	1 056 000
6.4.	Other services	85 000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	638 000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	25 000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges	
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	9 500
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	182 960
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	7 240
Total of Head II		4 112 250
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT		
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	570 000
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	10 000
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	645 000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	105 000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	40 000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	10 000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	572 000
Total of Head III		1 967 000

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		9 100	1 387 900	1 339 929	47 971
	-	-	711 550	682 312	29 238
		336 000	720 000	676 018	43 982
	4 100		89 100	89 006	94
	-	-	638 000	440 951	197 049
	5 000		30 000	29 946	54
	-	-	9 500	8 147	1 353
	-	-	182 960	139 807	43 153
	-	-	7 240	4 292	2 948
	9 100	345 100	3 776 250	3 410 408	365 842
		74 400	495 600	495 584	16
		10 000	-	-	-
	41 000		686 000	685 953	47
		56 600	48 400	48 315	85
	1 000		16 000	15 888	112
	24 600		64 600	64 546	54
	218 500		228 500	228 110	390
	25 900		597 900	597 771	129
	311 000	141 000	2 137 000	2 136 167	833

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1993	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents	630 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	240 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 185 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	75 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	125 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 255 500	
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	246 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	350 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	590 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	50 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	430 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	534 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	
Total of Head V		2 236 000	
Total		28 387 880	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	40 000		670 000	667 841	2 159
		16 000	224 000	223 115	885
		140 000	1 045 000	1 043 607	1 393
	-	-	75 000	72 760	2 240
		54 000	71 000	69 839	1 161
	-	-	500	194	306
	40 000	210 000	2 085 500	2 077 356	8 144
	13 800		259 800	259 760	40
	11 100		361 100	361 003	97
		5 000	-	-	-
	248 600		838 600	838 504	96
		4 600	45 400	45 284	116
	80 600		510 600	510 581	19
	-	-	534 000	534 000	-
		2 500	500	278	222
		6 000	22 000	21 934	66
	354 100	18 100	2 572 000	2 571 344	656
	914 900	1 012 100	28 290 680	27 708 993	581 687

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1993	
HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	3 401 750	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	497 750	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	64 150	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–	
1.5.	Leaving allowances	–	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances		
2.1.	Household allowances	156 750	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	31 550	
2.3.	Education allowances	–	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	105 000	
Total of Head I		4 256 950	
Total		32 644 830	

Sir Dudley SMITH
President of the Assembly

H
Clerk

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	83 700		3 485 450	3 485 435	15
		48 450	449 300	449 258	42
	28 850		93 000	92 951	49
	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-
		4 100	152 650	152 624	26
	1 350		32 900	32 871	29
	-	-	-	-	-
	35 850		140 850	140 836	14
	149 750	52 550	4 354 150	4 353 975	175
	1 064 650	1 064 650	32 644 830	32 062 968	581 862

URGELIN
 e Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
 Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1993

	F	F
1993 budget [Doc. 1325 Addendum]	31 268 000	
Brought over from 1992 [Doc. A/UEO/BA (93)2]	<u>501 830</u>	
NET TOTAL	31 769 830	
Contributions received for 1993:		
27th January 1993		967 929.62
22nd February 1993		1 418 206.00
23rd March 1993		2 448 883.00
19th May 1993		5 315 560.00
9th June 1993		2 657 780.00
8th July 1993		630 172.00
19th July 1993		1 305 439.00
21st July 1993		2 657 780.00
6th August 1993		1 913 757.00
17th September 1993		1 419 288.00
30th September 1993		3 067 768.50
15th November 1993		679 121.00
19th November 1993		18 000.00
8th December 1993		1 242 743.00
10th December 1993		1 026 489.00
13th December 1993		23 500.00
21st December 1993		246 816.50
24th January 1994		218 903.50
7th February 1994		1 242 743.00
22nd February 1994		1 266 396.00
4th March 1994		21 928.00
24th March 1994		1 242 743.00
Amount from 1994 budget		117 805.82
Brought over from 1992		<u>118 248.06</u>
Sub-total		31 268 000.00
Carried over from 1992		<u>501 830.00</u>
TOTAL NET		31 769 830.00

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1993

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1993	7 008 216	Withdrawals	3 700 957
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	250 036	Management fees	3 205
Repayments of loans by staff members	108 000	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1993	4 090 440
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1993	428 350		
	7 794 602		7 794 602

Sir Dudley SMITH
President of the Assembly

Henri BURGELIN
Clerk of the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

APPENDIX V

**1993 Balance sheet for the Federated Group
of Christian Democrats**

<i>Assets</i>		F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)		35 758.34
2. Interest		24 000.58
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993		<u>146 699.81</u>
Total		206 458.73
<i>Liabilities</i>		
I. Expenditure		
1. Allowance for the Secretariat		24 000.00
2. Estimates for the Symposium		120 000.00
3. Share of the PPE group operating expenses (Council of Europe) (7 months at F 5 000)		35 000.00
4. Other expenditure		<u>1 397.85</u>
Total		180 397.85
II. Surplus at 31st December 1993 (bank accounts, cash)		<u>26 060.88</u>
Total		206 458.73
Signatures of the Treasurer and two auditors of the group		

European Democrats (37 members out of 96 Fed. Group)

<i>Assets</i>		F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)		77 969.19
2. Interest		3 427.58
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993 (37 members)		<u>91 998.19</u>
31st December 1993 total credit		173 394.96
<i>Liabilities</i>		
I. Expenditure		
1. Secretarial staff (salary, insurance)		39 500.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone)		1 509.00
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs		-
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff)		<u>21 827.70</u>
Total expenses		62 836.70
II. Surplus at 31st December 1993		<u>110 558.26</u>
Balance 31st December 1993		173 394.96

Treasurer (Sir John HUNT)
Auditors (Mr. B. SCHREINER)

APPENDIX VI

*1993 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)	84 654.48
2. Interest	2 449.42
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993	<u>107 421.00</u>
Total	194 524.90

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	38 840.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	9 280.00
3. Seminars and meetings	23 700.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	11 000.00
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	16 700.00
7. Sundry expenses	-
Total	99 520.00

II. Surplus at 31st December 1993 (bank accounts, cash)	<u>95 004.90</u>
Total	194 524.90

Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group

APPENDIX VII

*1993 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)	179 325.81
2. Interest	9 354.03
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993	<u>187 881.00</u>
Total	376 560.84

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	92 640.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	4 260.06
3. Seminars and meetings	37 335.50
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	7 664.00
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	-
7. Sundry expenses	826.00
II. Surplus at 31st December 1993 (bank accounts, cash)	<u>233 835.28</u>
Total	376 560.84

Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1993*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993¹**

*submitted on behalf
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1993, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Biefnot (Alternate: Pécriaux), Branger, N..., Büchler, Curto, Daniel (Alternate: Hunault), Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, N..., MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell (Alternate: Cummings), Jurgens (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), N... (Alternate: Mattina), Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez (Alternate: Robles Orozco), MM. Pinto (Alternate: Roseta), N..., Thissen.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1995*¹ *

*submitted on behalf
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur

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* See 10th sitting, 30th November 1994 (previous question, Document 1447, agreed to).

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Biefnot (Alternate: Péciaux), Branger, N..., Büchler, Curto, Daniel (Alternate: Hunault), Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, N..., MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell (Alternate: Cummings), Jurgens (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), N..., (Alternate: Mattina), Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez (Alternate: Robles Orozco), MM. Pinto (Alternate: Roseta), N..., Thissen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

General

1. In the medium term, the Assembly will pursue its work in four main directions in line with its general mandate, agreed by the Presidential Committee and in parallel with the initiatives taken by WEU ministers.
2. For purposes of this document, the general political direction may be summarised as follows:
 - (i) to deepen understanding of the implications for WEU of the goals laid down in the Maastricht Treaty regarding the implementation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and preparations for the intergovernmental conference in 1996;
 - (ii) to ensure appropriate participation of associate members, associate partners and observers in the activities of the Assembly;
 - (iii) to develop relations and consultations with non-member countries in accordance with successive declarations by WEU ministers;
 - (iv) to re-assess the operational rôle of WEU, taking into account in particular the decisions reached at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994;
 - (v) to promote close co-operation between member countries, associate members, associate partners and observers in the field of armaments;
 - (vi) more broadly, to continue examining issues relating to European defence and security in general.
3. In pursuing these objectives, the WEU Assembly will act in close liaison with other national or international parliamentary bodies and institutions active in related fields, in particular:
 - (i) governments and parliaments of member countries;
 - (ii) governments and parliaments of other countries with a special status in WEU;
 - (iii) governments and parliaments of other countries concerned with European security;
 - (iv) the newly-elected European Parliament;
 - (v) NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly, and its governments;
 - (vi) the CSCE Assembly; and
 - (vii) the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
4. The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly will continue to play an important rôle in shaping the programme of work of the Assembly, making its own proposals and reviewing those prepared by the various committees of the Assembly, taking into account the need to make the most efficient use of scarce resources.
5. The WEU Assembly, its Rapporteurs, together with the Office of the Clerk, will continue to analyse problems and examine the issues they raise by applying consistently the working methods of a parliamentary body, i.e. making the best possible use of available resources to obtain information at source from those who are the authorities on the issues in question. The quality of reports prepared by Rapporteurs and consequently the level of the discussions which result from them depend on the necessary effort being made. From a budgetary management point of view, this implies that the corresponding heads of the budget are appropriately funded.

General management objectives

6. Considering these substantive objectives from the viewpoint of the general management of resources (human, financial, premises) of the WEU Assembly, the following objectives may be formula-

ted for 1995, it being well understood that with its yearly rhythm the WEU Assembly budget cannot claim to provide a perfect setting for taking into account medium-term international political developments:

- (i) to organise effectively relations with non-member countries with associate member, associate partner or observer status, without diverting attention from the important ongoing activities of the WEU Assembly stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) to ensure that the work of the WEU Assembly as an important actor in the definition of a common European foreign and security policy obtains commensurate public attention and coverage in WEU countries and outside;
- (iii) to increase European public awareness of the requirements of the security and defence of Europe;
- (iv) to ensure that the WEU Assembly, including its committees, has the resources and skills needed to carry out its mandate, and in particular appropriate facilities to accommodate the rapidly increasing number of countries associating with WEU.

Main budget policy issues for 1995

7. There are essentially three major budget policy issues underlying the preparation of the attached budget proposals for 1995: (i) the question of the *accommodation* of the WEU Assembly, its committees, the Delegations and the Office of the Clerk, given the rapidly increasing number of countries with observer, associate member and associate partner status; (ii) the implementation of a *communications strategy* of the WEU Assembly aimed at member and, under the circumstances, particularly at non-member countries, at the media and other policy-shaping bodies; (iii) the *consolidation and modernisation* of available resources and modernisation of the working environment.

8. As regards *accommodation*, discussions at both political and staff levels between the Assembly and the Council will intensify during the autumn of 1994. It is therefore not possible, in the budget proposals that follow, to take account of the possible outcome of these discussions. However, the issue of accommodation is of critical importance to the WEU Assembly to enable it to pursue its objectives within those set for WEU as a whole by the WEU ministers. The result of the ongoing discussions between the Assembly and the Council may lead to the need to present a supplementary budget for 1995 in the autumn of 1994.

9. The budgetary proposals for 1995 presented below do not therefore attempt to anticipate the results of the discussions referred to above. However, in order to ensure continuity, it is necessary to plan current expenditure related to limited improvements in the premises used by the WEU Assembly, its committees and the Office of the Clerk.

10. The issue of accommodation, however serious in its own right, is only one aspect of the much broader issue of how to associate effectively the quickly increasing number of countries with the process of European integration and the formulation of a European common foreign and security policy. To respond to this challenge efficiently, the WEU Assembly has to implement a *communications strategy* with major attendant budgetary implications. Such a strategy must take into account a broad range of aspects. There is a strong need for the WEU Assembly to extend and deepen its relations with the executive and legislative branches, particularly of non-member countries, be it, in the first place, through their embassies or permanent representations to WEU or NATO on the spot, and, more important, through visits to the capitals. In addition, the Office of the Clerk is faced with a rapidly-growing interest in the work of the WEU Assembly and many requests for participation in symposia and conferences. This interest and these invitations come from a large number of institutions representing the media and communications organisations and other policy-shaping bodies and research institutions dealing with foreign, defence and security policy matters.

11. In budgetary terms, the implications of such a communications strategy are reflected mainly in Chapter I, Permanent Staff (regarding assistants and the language service), and several sub-heads under Heads IV and V. It may be noted that these efforts may not systematically result in increases in resources but in a more targeted and efficient use within the existing level of resources.

12. As regards *consolidation and modernisation* of the existing resources of the Office of the Clerk, the budget proposals for 1995 cover two facets: (i) a proposal for the regrading of two posts in the Office of the Clerk; and (ii) a proposal to introduce a new budget line devoted to staff training with some limited funding.

13. A justification for the proposed regradings is given below.

14. Efforts to adapt the structure of posts to the requirements of new technologies must be complemented by an equally great endeavour to adapt the qualifications of existing staff members in order to enable

them to make the most effective use of new and, in particular, information technologies. It is therefore proposed to introduce a new sub-head 29 in the budget with the title "Expenses for staff training", with, attached to it, a relatively modest proposal for appropriations. This should allow some immediate needs to be satisfied, particularly in the information technology training area, until a more comprehensive approach is developed.

II. Head I – Expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

15. On the basis of the above main budget policy issues, the draft budget for the financial year 1995 includes the following proposals under Head I of the budget of the WEU Assembly:

Post creations:

- creation of a grade B5 post in the Press and Information Office;
- creation of a grade L2 post of translator in the Translation Service (English section).

Post regradings:

- regrading of two grade C4 posts to grade B3 in the storage and accounting of equipment and reprographic unit.

Justification – proposed creations

16. *Creation of a grade B5 post in the Press and Information Office:* The request for the creation of this post is in direct relation with the overall communications strategy referred to above: a substantial increase in the political and operational activity of WEU, a tripling of the number of countries with which the WEU Assembly has to develop increasingly close relations and a substantial increase in the targets of a WEU Assembly communications strategy. Initially, the increases were absorbed through intensive use of information technologies. More recently, the workload of the Press and Information Office has increased to an extent where a full exploitation of the technology in turn requires an additional investment in human resources, to avoid running the risk of not being able to satisfy needs in full and in good time (a job description is attached at Appendix III).

17. *Creation of a grade L2 post in the Translation Service (English section):* The rapid expansion in the WEU Assembly's relations with the governments and parliaments of European countries, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, and also countries outside Europe, makes it necessary to strengthen the English translation team consisting at present of one reviser and one translator. The creation of a grade L2 post of translator in the English section with as wide a range of languages as possible is therefore proposed again in this budget to ensure that the Office of the Clerk is able to translate from the seven languages of the Assembly.

Justification – proposed regradings

18. *Regrading of two grade C4 posts to B3 in the storage and accounting of equipment and reprographic units:* These proposals for regradings had already been considered for inclusion in the budget for 1994 last year. However it proved to be impossible to accommodate them, despite the very modest increase in expenditure they entail, within the limits imposed for that budget. These regradings are being proposed again this year, because they are justified "per se" considering the substantial evolution in the content of these positions, where technological developments have led to more sophisticated equipment, requiring new and improved skills on the part of the operators.

19. To sum up, these proposals for restructuring the Office of the Clerk included in the draft budget for the financial year 1995 result in the following increases in the budget:

– creation of a grade L2 post	F	570 000
– creation of a grade B5 post	F	440 500
– regrading of two C4 posts to grade B3	F	5 500
TOTAL	F	1 016 000

*
* *

20. The cost calculations for basic salaries and allowances of permanent staff are based on the salary scales approved by the WEU Council following the proposals by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR) and applicable as of 1st January 1994. These scales have been adjusted to take account of

the second part of the increase, delayed for reasons of "budgetary feasibility", i.e. 1.9% calculated on the same bases (see fortieth report of the CCR), the result being increased by a projected 0.6% for 1995. Those for temporary staff are the result of collective agreements between co-ordinated organisations and the representative professional organisations, the scales for permanent staff salaries being frequently used as a reference. In those cases where a real price adjustment was called for, in other sections of Head II and in Heads III to V, an inflation rate of 2.2% for France for 1995 was assumed.

III. Operating budget

21. Estimates under Heads II to V have been calculated so as to permit the efficient pursuit of the objectives developed from the guidelines given by ministers. Nevertheless, in view of the financial constraints in member countries, and their effects on resources made available to WEU, the proposals put forward by the Office of the Clerk are already the result of carefully-considered compromises. Detailed explanations are given for individual heads and sub-heads, as appropriate, in the paragraphs following each table.

22. The introduction of information technology equipment together with rationalisation of work procedures made it possible to carry out substantial savings in the temporary staff of the English and French translation sections. For the same reasons, it was possible to abolish the temporary English typing pool. These savings compensate in part the statutory increases.

Implications of Greece's accession to WEU

23. The process of ratifying the agreement on Greece's accession to WEU is under way, and it may therefore be expected that this country might soon participate as a full member in the work of the Assembly. This participation will give rise to non-negligible cost increases in a variety of areas, e.g. offices for the Delegation and their equipment, interpreters and translators and their accommodation, additional expenses for political groups. Preliminary estimates for such expenditure items had been included in the draft budget for 1994 (see document 1383) as a contingency item.

24. In line with observations made concerning the accommodation of the Assembly generally, additional offices for the Greek Delegation cannot be made available at this stage pending a general agreement with the Secretary-General regarding, in particular, the use of offices in the Wilson wing. For reasons of budgetary transparency, it was considered preferable to include all the costs involved by the accession of Greece to WEU in the planned supplementary budget for 1995 to be presented in the autumn of 1994.

Programme for the modernisation of equipment

25. The five-year programme for the modernisation of equipment has been updated for the period 1995-1999 (see Appendix V), and shows a reduction in estimates of F 56 000 for 1995 compared to appropriations for 1994 under Sub-Heads 15 to 17. This result could be achieved because of efforts being made to constrain the cost of indexed maintenance contracts and to lengthen periods of economic use of existing equipment.

Other operating expenditure

26. As indicated above, the implementation of a communications strategy will have important budgetary implications for those sub-heads of the budget providing for all movements of persons and information, such as Sub-Head 24: Missions and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs; Sub-Head 27: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk; Sub-Head 18: Postage, telephone, facsimile and transport of documents; Sub-Head 19: Duplication paper, headed notepaper and other office supplies. Detailed comments can be found in the explanations given after Table 4.

27. Details on the proposals for increases in appropriations will be given in the explanations accompanying each table.

IV. Pensions budget

28. Two pensions projections are included in the estimates for the financial year 1995. One pension may become payable to one grade B4 official taking early retirement with effect from 1st January 1995, the other will be payable on 1st August 1995.

29. The estimates for basic pensions and allowances are based on the salary scales approved by the WEU Council following the proposals by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR) report and applicable as of 1st January 1994. These scales have been adjusted to take account of the second part of the increase (see fortieth report of the CCR) i.e. 1.9% calculated on the same bases, the result being increased by a projected 0.6% for 1995.

30. With effect from 1st June 1994, following the decision of the WEU Council based on the proposals by the CCR, the contributions by the permanent staff to the pension scheme have been increased from 7% to 8% (of basic salary). By the same decision it was agreed that the temporary levy of 0.5% should be reimbursed to staff.

31. A sum of F 44 500 francs has been included on the receipt side to account for contributions by the new posts to be created or for posts to be regraded.

V. Conclusions

32. In conclusion, as shown in Table 1, the general net total of estimates in the draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1995 (operating budget plus pensions minus receipts) amounts to F 35 440 500 which, compared with the general net total for the financial year 1994, shows a growth rate of 7.69%. The operating budget (expenditure under Heads I to V) shows a growth rate of 7.48%, whereas the corresponding figure for overall estimates under Heads II to V, where the Assembly has budgetary autonomy, is 5.91%.

33. It should be noted that: (i) real growth (taking account of the inflation rate assumed for France in 1995) of these estimates can be assumed to be lower by 2.2 percentage points; (ii) a substantial part of the increases relating to Heads I and II are outside the control of the WEU Assembly and Office of the Clerk because the corresponding decisions are taken by the CCR; (iii) the increase proposed in the ordinary budget is the lowest for the last six years. This illustrates quite clearly the substantial effort made by the WEU Assembly and the Office of the Clerk at a time when the guidelines agreed by the WEU Council have considerably increased their workload.

Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts for the financial years 1994 and 1995

	1995 a	1994 b	% $\frac{a-b}{b}$
A. Operating budget			
<i>Head I.</i> Permanent staff	19 911 000	18 369 000	+ 8.39
<i>Head II.</i> Temporary staff	4 176 500	3 952 500	+ 5.67
<i>Head III.</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	2 147 000	2 074 000	+ 3.52
<i>Head IV.</i> General administrative costs	2 350 500	2 238 500	+ 5.00
<i>Head V.</i> Other expenditure	2 730 000	2 503 000	+ 9.07
Total expenditure	31 315 000	29 137 000	+ 7.48
Receipts	95 000	95 000	
NET TOTAL A	31 220 000	29 042 000	+ 7.50
B. Pensions budget			
Pensions and leaving allowances	5 258 000	4 756 000	+ 10.56
Receipts	1 037 500	887 000	+ 16.97
NET TOTAL B	4 220 500	3 869 000	+ 9.09
GENERAL NET TOTAL (A + B)	35 440 500	32 911 000	+ 7.69
TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET	11 404 000	10 768 000	+ 5.91

PART I : OPERATING BUDGET

Section A – Expenditure

Table 2
Head I – Permanent staff

Sub-Heads	Budget for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	13 768 000	12 727 500	12 642 150	12 241 397
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	1 531 000			
2.2. Household allowance	669 500			
2.3. Children's and other dependants' allowance	692 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	59 500			
2.5. Education allowance	139 500			
2.6. Language allowance	3 000			
2.7. Overtime	80 000			
2.8. Home leave	50 000			
	3 224 500	2 974 000	2 849 530	2 769 818
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 928 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	625 000			
3.3. Provident fund	112 500			
	2 665 500	2 521 000	2 490 000	2 434 500
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and the departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	40 000			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	20 000			
4.3. Removal expenses	110 000			
4.4. Installation allowance	68 500			
	238 500	133 500	133 500	58 880
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	14 000	13 000	8 500	9 123
TOTAL OF HEAD I	19 911 000	18 369 000	18 123 680	17 513 718

*Table 2 : Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st January 1994¹ set out in the thirty-first co-ordination report. These scales have been adjusted to take account of the second part of the increase for 1994, delayed for reasons of "budgetary feasibility" (see fortieth report of the CCR) i.e. 1.9% calculated on the same bases, the result being increased by a projected 0.6% for 1995.

These estimates also take account of the financial implications of creating two new posts (one grade L2 and one grade B5) and the regrading of two existing posts. Expenditure involved in these proposals amounts to F 1 016 000.

The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)²;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)³;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Social charges (F 103 500) relating to the creation of two new posts and the regrading of two existing posts are included in the total for this sub-head.

Sub-Head 4

These estimates relate to the expenditure involved in recruiting new officials.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the annual medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo in accordance with Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

1. These scales are worked out by the Inter-organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices and approved by the WEU Council and the Councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA, ECMRWF).

2. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from the French social security scheme, with the exception of family allowances and retirement pensions.

3. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

Table 3
Head II – Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly:				
6.1. Sitting service 1 435 000				
6.2. Interpretation service 753 500				
6.3. Translation service 803 000				
6.4. Other services 95 000				
	3 086 500	2 899 500	2 752 640	2 787 265
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	828 000	793 000	793 000	440 951
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	75 000	75 000	75 000	29 946
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 9 000				
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 169 000				
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 9 000				
	187 000	185 000	182 000	152 246
TOTAL OF HEAD II	4 176 500	3 952 500	3 802 640	3 410 408

Table 3: Explanations

Sub-Head 6

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

- (a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.
- (b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, information technology office equipment technician, guards for the security service, etc.).

Salaries for temporary staff are calculated on the same bases as those for permanent staff.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4 step 8 staff, increased by 6%.

Savings referred to above are the result of a reduction in the number of assistants in the English section and of translators in the French section in each case by 2 persons. The abolition of the typing pool resulted in a net saving of 5 assistants.

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (see Sub-Head 6 (b) above).

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May 1988.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

Table 4
Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	599 000	585 000	560 000	495 584
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	10 000	0	0
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	809 000	690 000	788 000	685 953
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	60 000	55 000	55 000	48 315
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	20 000	15 000	17 000	15 888
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	40 000	40 000	40 000	64 546
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reprographic and other office equipment	9 000	25 000	25 000	228 110
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reprographic and other equipment	600 000	654 000	6000 000	597 771
TOTAL OF HEAD III	2 147 000	2 074 000	2 085 000	2 136 167

Table 4 : Explanations

Sub-Head 10

Estimates under this sub-head have been raised by 2.4% on the basis of information furnished by the administrative services of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for the management of the WEU premises in Paris. The estimates represent a fixed share of 30% of the total costs for the building.

Sub-Head 11

The participation of representatives of countries with observer, associate member or associate partner status in meetings of committees or political groups may require the renting of meeting rooms outside

WEU premises offering appropriate seating and interpretation equipment or the installation of temporary interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. A total of F 10 000 is foreseen under this sub-head to allow such expenditure to be met, if necessary.

For meetings outside Paris, the national delegations concerned normally make available committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment.

Sub-Head 12

This sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, a seventy-five seat television area in the lobby, facsimile, screens, a detection gate and other installations on the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. The temporary nature of these installations makes them highly labour-intensive and subject to intense wear and tear. Taking these factors into account and based on experience in 1994, this estimate has been increased by 15% in real terms.

Sub-Head 13

Estimates under this sub-head relate to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, use of reprographic equipment on free loan, etc.) and are based on experience.

Sub-Head 14

As in the past, this sum is expected to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk. The estimate has been raised based on experience in 1994.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Estimates proposed under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year maintenance and modernisation programme for equipment given at Appendix IV. As indicated in the introduction, it was possible to reduce the estimates under this sub-head by F 54 000 as a result of efforts to constrain the rise of indexed maintenance contracts and to extend the useful life of existing equipment.

Table 5
Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, facsimile and transport of documents	853 000	646 000	700 000	667 841
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	237 000	237 000	200 000	223 115
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 100 000	1 215 000	1 100 000	1 043 607
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	75 000	75 000	75 000	72 760
Sub-Head 22 – Official car	85 000	65 000	65 000	69 839
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	0	194
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2 350 500	2 238 500	2 140 000	2 077 356

Table 5 : Explanations

Sub-Head 18

The estimate for 1995 is the result of a major effort of communication by post, telephone, facsimile and, on occasion, courier services, directed in particular towards countries having observer, associate member or associate partner status in WEU. The estimate has been increased by 30% in real terms.

Sub-Head 19

Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.

Sub-Head 20

The estimates under this sub-head have actually been reduced in value terms by F 115 000 following a general tightening up on the costs of the printing workload.

Sub-Head 21

Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.

Sub-Head 22

Estimates under this sub-head include mainly the cost of hiring a car with driver for the President of the Assembly. They take account of the fact that the post of usher/driver/messenger was not granted in the 1994 budget, thus increasing the need for a hired car with driver.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged in value terms.

Table 6
Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	346 000	295 000	305 000	259 760
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	404 000	360 000	400 000	361 003
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	0	0
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	830 000	708 000	800 000	838 504
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	60 000	60 000	60 000	45 284
Sub-Head 29 – Expenses for staff training	10 000	0	0	0
Sub-Head 30 – Expenditure on information	510 000	510 000	510 000	510 581
Sub-Head 31 – Expenses for political groups	534 000	534 000	534 000	534 000
Sub-Head 32 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	0	278
Sub-Head 33 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	28 000	25 000	21 934
TOTAL OF HEAD V	2 730 000	2 503 000	2 634 000	2 571 344

Table 6 : Explanations

(Expenditure under all these sub-heads reflect experience to date (1994) as well as the anticipated rise in costs due to the Assembly's increased activities in 1995)

Sub-Head 24

The Assembly bears only the cost of official missions by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these missions are connected with the preparation of a

report or the work of the Assembly. Missions by chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

The estimates under this sub-head have been increased by 15% in real terms, to take account of increased contacts, in particular with countries having observer, associate member or associate partner status.

Sub-Head 25

One result of the present communication effort is a substantial increase in the number and rank of official speakers and the increasing number of visits to the Assembly by parliamentary delegations from countries connected with WEU in various ways, together with rising prices in the labour-intensive catering industry, which together justify the increase of 10% in real terms in the estimates under this sub-head.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary and unforeseeable expenditure for study visits by committees. The estimate remains unchanged in value terms.

Sub-Head 27

Estimates under this sub-head are based on the programme of work of the Assembly and the various Assembly committees in 1995. The increase takes account of past experience and also reflects the present increases in contacts with countries in and outside WEU.

Sub-Head 28

This sum is to cover the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts and the participation of experts in symposia organised by the Assembly.

Sub-Head 29

As indicated above, this sub-head for staff training is new and the sums in question are to be used in 1995 only if necessary, pending the development of a policy on staff training.

Sub-Head 30

The estimate under this sub-head remains unchanged in value terms.

Sub-Head 31

In accordance with the decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, each of the political groups of the Assembly is allocated the same flat rate amount and a further sum proportionate to the number of members listed. All the groups have to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to examination by the auditor.

The estimate has been calculated on the basis of a total of nine member countries.

Sub-Heads 32 and 33

The estimates under these sub-heads remain unchanged in value terms.

Table 7
PART I : OPERATING BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected receipts in 1994	Actual receipts in 1993
1. Sale of publications	25 000	25 000	24 000	35 624
2. Bank interest	60 000	60 000	0	12 858
3. Receipts (reimbursements, social security, etc.)	10 000	10 000	26 000	22 748
TOTAL RECEIPTS	95 000	95 000	50 000	71 230

Table 7 : Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on past experience.

PART II : PENSIONS BUDGET*Section A – Expenditure***Table 8**
Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges

	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected expenditure in 1994	Actual expenditure in 1993
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	4 489 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	197 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	251 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	0			
1.5. Leaving allowances	0			
	4 937 000	4 404 000	4 274 713	4 027 644
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	163 500			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	17 000			
2.3. Education allowances	4 000			
	184 500	200 000	157 182	185 495
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	136 500	152 000	125 194	140 836
TOTAL OF HEAD I	5 258 000	4 756 000	4 557 089	4 353 975

Table 8 : Explanations*Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

It is forecast that the Office of the Clerk will be paying nineteen pensions in 1995, as follows:

- sixteen retirement pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- two survivors' pensions.

Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules on the basis of the scales set out in the fortieth co-ordination report.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the collective convention in force.

Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II : PENSIONS BUDGET

Table 9
Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1995	Budget for 1994	Expected receipts in 1994	Actual receipts in 1993
Contributions by permanent officials	1 037 500	887 000	867 000	800 834

Table 9 : Explanations

Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the thirty-eight permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (8% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme. By a decision of the Council taken on the basis of the thirty-fourth co-ordination report, this contribution has been raised from 7% to 8%.

At the same time, the Council agreed to reimburse to staff members the temporary levy of 0.5% decided originally on the basis of the fifteenth co-ordination report. The receipts expected for 1994 take account of this decision.


APPENDIX I

*Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff
of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly
proposed in the 1995 budget*

Grade	Duties	1995 budget (proposals)	1994 budget (approved)	+ or -
HG	Clerk	1	1	0
A6	Clerk Assistants	2	2	0
A5	Counsellors	5	5	0
A4	First secretaries	2	2	0
L4	Translator-interpreter	1	1	0
L2	Translator	1	-	+ 1
A2	Head of general services; Head of private office	2	2	0
A2	Translators; Documentalists	4	4	0
A2	Chief accountant	1	1	0
B5	Principal assistant: informatics	1	-	+ 1
B4	Principal assistants	7	7	0
B4	Inventory clerk, Head of reprographics service	1	1	0
B3	Accountant	1	1	0
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	6	6	0
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	0
B3	Offset operators	2	-	+ 2
C4	Offset operators	-	2	- 2
		38	36	2

APPENDIX II

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly



*Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly**Notes*

- [.] Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly
Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1995
- * Posts proposed for regrading in the 1995 budget
- (1) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
 - (2) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs together with his assistant.
 - (3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service.
 - (4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section, Security Officer and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are carried out by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Finance together with his assistant.
 - (5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation Services.
 - (6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.
 - (7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for the Mail and Archives Service.
 - (8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for reprographing documents.
 - (9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of these duties by his assistant.
 - (10) The assistant in the Private Office of the President is responsible for the reception desk.
 - (11) The Clerk Assistant (Political Affairs) and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Standing Committee.
 - (12) The assistant to the Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is also the assistant to the Research Office.
 - (13) The Clerk Assistant (Administration and Finance) supervises protocol work and the reception desk.

APPENDIX III

Description of proposed B5 post

Service: Press and Information

Title: Principal Assistant - Informatics

Grade: B5

Summary

Under the supervision of the Head of the Press and Information Service, to handle the service's computer equipment for the production of information documents, to update its data-base regularly and be responsible for the electronic circulation of information.

Main duties

Under the authority of the Head of the Press and Information Service, the holder of this post will be responsible for :

- typing, page-setting and printing of documents necessary for preparing press conferences, press communiqués and sessions;
- layout, correction and follow-up of the Letter of the Assembly;
- transmission, reception and circulation of all documents on the Internet data network;
- management of the photographic archives of the Press Service;
- keeping press files up to date;
- all desktop publishing for the Office of the Clerk;
- management and daily updating of the service's information data-base; data-base monitoring; amendment and possible development of its structure; regular production of indexes and lists from the data-base;
- indexing the Press Review;
- production and updating of visual presentation materials for briefing visitors.

Qualifications

- Very good knowledge of the computer hardware used in the Office of the Clerk and of:
 - the use of desktop publishing software
 - the use and development of relational data-bases
 - computer and communications networks.
- Excellent typing ability.
- Taking dictation (from tape-recorder).
- Ability to correct and amend existing texts.
- Good knowledge of the two working languages of the organisation.

APPENDIX IV

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**I. Sitings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration *	Total	Total
			F	F	F
Counsellors to the President of the Assembly	1 a	14	1 283	17 962	52 810
	1 b	16	2 178	34 848	
Heads of sections	2 a	8	1 406	22 496	73 118
	1 b	10	2 301	23 010	
	1 b	12	2 301	27 612	
Sergeant-at-arms	1 b	10	2 034	20 340	20 340
Parliamentary secretaries	2 a	8	1 139	18 224	58 904
	2 b	10	2 034	40 680	
Précis writers	3 a	8	1 139	27 336	88 356
	3 b	10	2 034	61 020	
Verbatim reporters	6 a	8	1 139	54 672	339 432
	14 b	10	2 034	284 760	
Editors	2 a	8	1 139	18 224	58 904
	2 b	10	2 034	40 680	
Assistants to the President's counsellors	1 a	14	511	7 154	17 344
	1 b	16	1 084	17 344	
Principal assistants	2 a	8	741	11 856	52 560
	4 b	10	1 314	52 560	
Assistants assigned to other services	14 a	8	650	72 800	332 934
	14 b	10	1 223	171 220	
Ushers	8 a	8	539	34 496	
Messengers	3 a	10	539	16 170	
Installations attendant	1 a	14	423	5 922	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	8	539	4 312	60 900
Photocopier-assemblers	4 a	10	539	21 560	21 560
	94				1 107 258
Adjustment for 1994 (1.865%)					20 650
Adjustment for 1995 (0.60%)					6 767
					1 134 675
Travelling expenses					300 000
					1 434 675
				Rounded up to	1 435 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1994.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	14 a	8	406 224
	6 b	10	231 228
	20		637 452
Adjustment for 1994 (1.865%)			11 888
Adjustment for 1995 (0.60%)			3 896
			653 236
Travelling expenses.			100 000
			753 236
		Rounded up to	753 500

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

Note: On 1st January 1994, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3 627. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half-days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily Remuneration F	Estimates ¹ F	Total F
Revisers	5 a	1 432	143 200	235 200
	2 b	2 300	92 000	
Translators	5 a	1 132	113 200	315 900
	5 b	2 027	202 700	
Principal assistants.	1 a	583	14 575	43 475
	1 b	1 156	28 900	
Assistants.	4 a	511	51 100	159 500
	4 b	1 084	108 400	
	27		754 074	754 075
Adjustment for 1994 (1.865%)				14 063
Adjustment for 1995 (0.60%)				4 609
				772 747
Travelling expenses.				30 000
				802 747
			Rounded up to	803 000

1. Based on 20 days for revisers and translators and 25 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris

APPENDIX V

*Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk**(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	
1	<i>A. Reprographic and printing equipment</i>							
	<i>Photocopiers</i>							
1.1	1 RX 1090	Hire since end of 1991 (rate blocked). The contract expires at end of 1996. Maintenance contract for 240 000 copies per quarter included in the hire cost.	104 500	104 500				
1.2	1 RX 5380	Hired since June 1993. The contract expires in June 1998 (rate blocked). Maintenance contract for 225 000 copies per quarter (indexed). Maintenance calculated on the basis of the number of copies excluding the abovementioned limits.	74 600	74 600	74 600	37 300		
			74 500	74 500	74 500	37 250		
1.3	1 Gestetner 2382 ZDF	This is leased for a five-year period. The contract expires in January 1996. Cost of hire. The cost of maintenance depends on the number of copies made.	11 000	11 000	11 000	5 500		
			31 700	8 000				
1.4	2 RX 5034	Hired since 1992. Cost of hire. The cost of maintenance depends on the number of copies made.	8 500	8 500	8 500	8 500	8 500	
			29 000	29 000	960			
1.5	1 RX 5317	Hired since June 1993. Assigned to the archives and mail office. The cost of maintenance is calculated on the basis of a fixed number of 4 500 copies per quarter.	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000
			3 000	3 000	3 000	1 500		
2	<i>Offset machines</i>							
2.1	1 Gestetner 311	Purchased in 1984.						
3	<i>Electrostatic stereotypers</i>							
3.1	1 Gestetner DT 1	Purchased in 1985. As these machines are not often used, the maintenance contracts have been cancelled.						
4	<i>Binding machines</i>							
4.1	1 Gestetner 100							
4.2	1 Orpo Planax							
4.3	1 Orpo Thermatic	Property of the Assembly. This machine is in good condition. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.						

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	
5	<i>Miscellaneous equipment</i>							
5.1	1 Logabax-Ordina 7630 collating machine with stapler	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. It is no longer considered necessary to replace it as the printing workshop was equipped in 1991 with photocopiers that collate.						
5.2	1 AM international 5000 Addressograph	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	4 300	4 300	4 300	4 300	4 300	
5.3	1 Fortematic 655	Purchased in 1976.						
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>							
6	<i>Office of the Clerk</i>							
6.1	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in good condition.						
6.2	1 ET 221 Olivetti	Purchased in 1983 – in good condition						
6.3	1 ET 2400 Olivetti	Purchased in 1989 – in excellent condition.						
6.4	4 calculators	These machines are in good working order.						
7	<i>For use during the sessions</i>							
7.1	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboard)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.						
7.2	2 ET 109 Olivetti electronic typewriters (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters.						
7.3	1 Olivetti Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian summary reporters.						
7.4	2 Olivetti electronic typewriters ET 2400: 1 Portuguese keyboard 1 Spanish keyboard	Purchased in 1989, assigned to the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations.						
7.5	Hired typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: – 4 electric machines with French keyboards – 3 electric machines with German keyboard	2 100	2 100	2 100	2 100		
8	<i>Typewriters in reserve</i>							
8.1	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters: 19 English keyboards 2 French keyboards							

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and Equipment programme	Budgets					
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	
9	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>							
9.1	<i>Dictaphones</i>							
9.1	7 Sony BM	Purchased between 1987 and 1994. These dictaphones are in very good working order.						
9.2	3 Grundig stenorettes	Purchased between 1963 and 1987; replacement started in 1992.	10 000	10 000				
9.3	2 facsimile copiers	Purchased in 1988 and 1993.						
9.4	1 stenotype machine Grandjean	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.						
10	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>							
10.1	<i>Word processors and computers</i>							
10.1	6 Olivetti M 300 3 Olivetti M 300/05 2 Olivetti M 300/08 6 Olivetti M 300/15 2 Olivetti M 300/30	These have been hired on a five-year lease. The contracts expire in May 1995, January 1998 and July 1998. Cost of hire.	142 000	103 500	103 500	71 000		
10.2	1 Olivetti M 24 15 Olivetti M4-40	Property of the Assembly.						
10.3	3 Macintosh SE SE 30 II CI	Maintenance contract (indexed) for all word processors and computers described in paragraphs 10.1. Purchased in 1988, 1990 and 1991.	67 500	67 500	67 500	50 000	50 000	
		Maintenance contract (indexed).	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	
11	<i>E.</i>	Estimate intended to cover repairs of any equipment not under maintenance contract.	13 000	13 000	13 000	13 000	13 000	
12	<i>F. Office furniture</i>							
	Office of the Clerk	Purchase or replacement of various items of furniture in the Office of the Clerk	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	11	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000
III	16. Purchase of reprographic and other office equipment	9.2	10 000	10 000			
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reprographic and other office equipment	1.1	104 500	104 500			
		1.2	160 100	160 100	160 100	80 050	
		1.3	40 200	16 500			
		1.4	49 000	49 000	20 960		
		1.6	3 000	3 000	3 000	1 500	
		5.2	4 300	4 300	4 300	4 300	4 300
		7.7	2 100	2 100	2 100	2 100	2 100
		10.1	142 000	103 500	103 500	71 000	
		10.3	67 500	67 500	67 500	67 500	67 500
		10.4	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000
		11	13 000	13 000	13 000	13 000	13 000
	TOTAL		599 700	537 500	388 460	253 450	100 900
	ROUNDED UP		600 000	538 000	389 000	254 000	101 000

APPENDIX VI

Implications of the various heads for the 1994 and 1995 operating budgets

	1994			1995		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
<i>Operating budget</i>						
Expenditure						
Head I. – Permanent staff	18 369 000	63.04	63.25	19 911 000	63.58	63.78
Head II. – Temporary staff	3 952 500	13.57	13.61	4 176 500	13.34	13.38
Head III. – Premises and equipment	2 074 000	7.12	7.14	2 147 000	6.86	6.88
Head IV. – General administrative costs	2 238 500	7.68	7.71	2 350 500	7.51	7.53
Head V. – Other expenditure	2 503 000	8.59	8.62	2 730 000	8.72	8.74
A. TOTAL	29 137 000	100.00	100.33	31 315 000	100.00	100.30
Receipts	95 000		0.33	95 000		0.30
B. NET TOTAL	29 042 000	100.00	100.00	31 220 000	100.00	100.00

Column A = Total of expenditure

Column B = Net total (expenditure less receipts)

The WEU Institute for Security Studies

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur*

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on the WEU Institute for Security Studies

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submitted by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Masseret* (Chairman); Sir Russell *Johnston*, Baroness *Gould of Potternewton* (Alternate for Dr. Godman) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Amaral*, *Benvenuti*, *Birraux*, *Bühler* (Alternate: *Junghanns*), *Decagny*, *Dionisi*, Sir *Anthony Durant*, Mrs. *Err*, Mr. *Eversdijk*, Mrs. *Fischer* (Alternate: *Müller*), MM. *Ghesquière*, *Gouteyron*, Sir *John Hunt*, MM. *Kempinaire*, *Martins*, *Mattina*, *Mitolo*, *Pfuhl*, *Reimann*, *Robles Fraga*, *Sainz Garcia*, Mrs. *Sanchez de Miguel* (Alternate: *Roman*), Mrs. *Verspaget*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the WEU Institute for Security Studies

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction that the WEU Institute for Security Studies has successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to it since its creation;
- (ii) Stressing the importance of the activities of the Institute for the emergence of a European awareness of security and defence questions;
- (iii) Welcoming the vital rôle played by the Institute in the development of relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, associate partners of WEU;
- (iv) Noting with interest the initiatives taken by the Institute to make WEU and other European organisations aware of the problems of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that the Institute's expertise was called upon in the context of the International Conference on Peace in former Yugoslavia, thus demonstrating the reputation enjoyed by the Institute among European research institutes;
- (vi) Stressing the Institute's active policy of openness towards European countries seeking membership of the European Union and WEU;
- (vii) Noting that the enlargement of WEU entails an increase in the Institute's responsibilities towards new members, associate members, associate partners and observers, but that there has been no adjustment of the Institute's means to meet this new situation;
- (viii) Noting that the present structure of the Institute is not such as to be able to meet all expectations arising from enlargement and from the emergence of a new European security and defence identity;
- (ix) Recalling the declaration of the WEU member countries, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, in which the Council undertook to study "the transformation of the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy";
- (x) Recalling Recommendation 474, requesting the Council to "take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement";
- (xi) Regretting that the Assembly may not always be in a position to take advantage of closer and more direct co-operation with the Institute, to their mutual benefit,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider forthwith the Institute's transformation into a European security and defence academy, in accordance with the Council's own wishes as expressed in 1991;
2. Encourage member countries to resume holding advanced European defence study sessions, with the support of the Institute, and to ensure the continuity of such sessions;
3. Provide the Institute with appropriate means for handling the increase in its requirements and activities stemming from the enlargement of WEU and the development of relations with countries seeking membership of the European Union and with the Mediterranean countries;
4. Redefine, as necessary, the tasks of the Institute assigned to it at the time of its creation and adapt them to the new European situation in view of whatever changes may result from the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
5. Permit the development of co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly, without the former having to request the permission of the Council on each occasion in order to respond to a request for information or collaboration from the Assembly;
6. Ask the Institute to make declassified versions of its studies available to the Assembly and ensure that, in its work, it takes account of the Assembly's point of view on topics of common interest;
7. Associate the Assembly with the process of examining the transformation of the Institute into an academy, and, if necessary, establish procedures for close co-operation between the latter and the Assembly with a view to achieving the openness and transparency necessary for fostering European awareness of security and defence matters.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Among the European and world-wide research institutes studying defence and international relations, the WEU Institute for Security Studies is an institution unique of its kind.
2. Its European dimension, its structure, its methods of operation and its tasks contribute to the original character of this institution, created by a ministerial decision of the Council on 13th November 1989.
3. Unlike governmental, non-governmental and international research institutes and national think tanks (be they private or attached to an international organisation) the Institute, in addition to traditional research and consultancy activities, was assigned the rôle, from the outset, of promoting a European security identity¹. This objective gave the Institute a unique European and international dimension, thus distinguishing it from other research institutions working in the same area.
4. Since it started work on 1st July 1990, the Institute has developed in various directions ranging from research to establishing contacts with institutions dealing with defence and security matters in most European and several non-European countries and including the promotion of a European awareness of security issues² in academic circles and public opinion.
5. After four years of work, the overall result is positive and the Institute has won its place in the research world through the quality of its work and activities – seminars, colloquies and study groups – and through its European spirit and efforts at openness towards third countries in Europe and elsewhere.
6. However, attention should also be drawn to certain aspects of its tasks and rôle in WEU that reflect a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty on the part of the Council towards the Institute and the latter's relations with the Assembly.
7. In the framework of the present report, which, together with the reports of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the WEU

Satellite Centre³ and the Defence Committee on the WEU Planning Cell⁴, constitutes a tripartite study of the subsidiary organs of the Council, an attempt will be made to describe the Institute, its tasks and achievements and also to analyse its rôle in WEU and make proposals which seem appropriate for guiding co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly in a direction profitable to the two institutions, with the aim, ultimately, of contributing to the emergence and development of a European security and defence spirit.

II. The origins and tasks of the Institute

(i) Stages in the Institute's creation

8. The ministerial decision on the creation of the Institute, reached by the Council in Brussels on 13th November 1989, was the outcome of thinking regarding the development and future of WEU which began in Rome in 1984⁵ and was implemented with the adoption of the Hague platform on 27th October 1987⁶.
9. The WEU Assembly played an important rôle in the Institute's creation as far back as in 1986 by recommending that the Council "Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen co-operation between existing European institutes for security studies" (Recommendation 438, 2nd December 1986).
10. In Recommendation 442 (Luxembourg, 27th April 1987), the Assembly asked the Council to ensure "co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988"⁷ and the "development of subsequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all member countries". Further to this recommendation, the Council entrusted the Secretariat-General with the task of participating in the preparatory work for this European seminar.

1. Ministerial decision concerning the setting-up of a WEU Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, 13th November 1989, Document 1219, Annex I.

2. Document 1253, reply of the Council to Recommendation 484, 30th November 1990.

3. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part II, Document 1393, 8th November 1993, Rapporteur Mr. Valleix.

4. The WEU Planning Cell, Document 1421, 19th May 1994, Rapporteur Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

5. Rome declaration, Document 989, 27th October 1984.

6. Platform on European security interests, Document 1122, 27th October 1987.

7. During the meeting of the Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, the French Government proposed organising a first European defence seminar in 1988.

11. In the light of the success of this undertaking, other European defence courses were scheduled and it was decided to set up an association of alumni under the auspices of WEU and with WEU logistic support⁸.

12. On 16th March 1989, at the initiative of the Presidential Committee, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 467 on the creation of a European institute for advanced security studies. This text recommended that "a European institute for advanced security studies be established under the terms of Article VIII, paragraph 2⁹, of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence".

13. In London, on 3rd April 1989, the ministers "instructed the Permanent Council to continue its efforts to review the question of an institute for strategic studies (...) with a view to a further discussion at its next meeting"¹⁰. Further to this decision, the Permanent Council reconstituted the Institutional Working Group with the task of considering the mandate, tasks and structure of the Institute.

14. The Institutional Working Group, which met four times: on 1st June, 3rd July, 18th September and 19th October 1989, prepared a report which was transmitted to the Council of Ministers. Meeting in Brussels on 13th November 1989, the Council adopted the report and decided to create the WEU Institute for Security Studies, recalling at the same time the Assembly's rôle as a catalyst.

15. On 17th January 1990, the Council appointed Mr. John Roper to the post of Director of the Institute. Mr. Roper took up his post on 1st April and on 13th June the Council approved appointments by the Secretary-General, on the proposal of the Director of the Institute, to the four research fellow posts. The Institute became operational on 1st July 1990.

(ii) *The Institute's tasks*

16. While the need for the creation of the Institute seemed obvious to the Assembly and the majority of the Council¹¹, discussion of tasks

8. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (July 1988 - December 1988), Document 1177, 17th March 1989.

9. This text stipulates that "[the Council] shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary".

10. WEU Ministerial Council, London, 3rd April 1989, Document 1180, 10th April 1989.

11. At the June session 1989, Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, and then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, stated before the Assembly: "The United Kingdom approaches the idea with an open mind but it is not self-evident that there is a need for such an institute. There are already over twenty in the field... We will therefore need to be convinced that a new institute would have a genuinely distinctive and useful rôle."

reveals differences of assessment likely to affect relations between the Assembly and the Institute.

17. The common point of departure for the examination underway is to be found in the address by Mr. Michel Rocard, then Prime Minister of France, to the first European session of the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, on 15th November 1988.

18. In his speech, Mr. Rocard stated that he wished to see "the creation of a European institute for advanced security studies, attached to WEU under arrangements still to be defined. This would enable WEU, still uncertain of its course, better to choose its direction... The tasks of such an institute would be training and teaching, in order to propagate a common defence spirit and create an awareness among national public opinions of the notion of European collective security... In the absence of a shared grammar, how can one speak with a single voice?"¹²

19. In June 1989, the Assembly adopted a report by the Political Committee, section IV of which broaches the question of the creation of a European institute for advanced security studies attempting to define its tasks and its operation. According to the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden, the Institute should have a threefold task: information, study and training and "aim to promote an awareness of security questions among national public opinions by acting on those in influential positions in a wide range of capacities".

20. The Institute thus created was to benefit from a large measure of autonomy, indeed independence, and "it should be directed by an administrative board on which all parties are represented, composed of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Clerk with whom might be associated a small number of persons... This administrative board would appoint a director-general of the Institute who would select his own limited staff".

21. "The Institute would organise conferences on general topics ... and seminars on well-defined topics with a smaller number of participants. It would also have the support of existing national institutes and ensure the continuity of the European sessions organised by the latter."¹³

22. Addressing the Assembly at the same session, Mr. Chevènement, then Minister of Defence of France, declared himself in favour of a lightweight structure, divided into three units corresponding to the three tasks of the Institute: re-

12. Défense Nationale, January 1989, page 25.

13. Future of European security - reply to the annual report of the Council, Document 1185, Rapporteur Mr. van der Sanden.

search and publications, liaison with independent institutes with authority in the field, follow-up of the sessions of the Institute for advanced European defence studies. According to the Minister, "the common underlying objective of all three units might be defined as the harmonisation of the security doctrines of the member countries"¹⁴.

23. Two aspects, information and co-ordination with other institutes, are the common points of these two approaches. This emerges clearly from the description of the Institute's tasks by the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, in his information letter on the activities of the intergovernmental organisations according to which "there is undoubtedly a rôle for such an institute... in the area of co-ordination of both security research... and the promotion of public awareness of the European security identity in the member countries"¹⁵.

24. Finally, in its ministerial decision of 13th November 1989, the Council decided to assign five main tasks to the Institute:

- to carry out research, principally for the Council, and in consultation with the Secretary-General...;
- to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states promote a greater awareness of European security issues and particularly to organise seminars and courses to that end;
- in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes and countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Central and Eastern European countries;
- to establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and studies relating to European security;
- to contribute to academic work on the same topic.

25. The development of relations with the Central and Eastern European countries will eventually become one of the most important tasks of the Institute. As Mr. Schäfer, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Germany, stated in his speech to the Assembly at the 1989 December session, the Institute must as a priority "contribute to the development of concepts for a new form of European security thinking, in part through contact with comparable institutions in Central and Eastern Europe"¹⁶.

14. Official report of debates, first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session, June 1989.

15. Information letter on the activities of the intergovernmental organs (June - September 1989), Document 1196.

16. Official report of debates, second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session, December 1989.

26. The use of the Institute as a bridge between WEU and the Central and Eastern European countries receives clear mention by the Council in the communiqué issued after its meeting in Brussels on 23rd April 1990 which calls upon the Institute to play "an active rôle in pooling ideas and in drawing together the new strands of thinking being developed in both the East and the West"¹⁷.

27. As the start of the Institute grew closer, the nature and content of its tasks became increasingly specific. According to the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, the Institute was assigned two essential tasks¹⁸:

- study and research for the governments of the member states of WEU represented by the Council and in consultation with the Secretariat-General...;
- stimulating the wider debate on European security issues..."

28. In December 1990, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, defined the two main tasks of the Institute as deepening the debate on matters of European security and developing dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe¹⁹.

29. From the information presented above, the three major tasks for the Institute finally emerge:

- that of assisting the Council (through reports and studies provided to it on request or on the initiative of the Institute, or possibly through oral presentations by the Director of the Institute);
- that of stimulating debate on European security, a task translated into practice by the organisation of seminars, colloquies and study groups, establishing contacts with other such institutions and publication of studies directed towards a wide readership;
- external relations directed towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and other non-WEU countries of varying closeness to the organisation (for example, the Nordic countries, Slovenia and the Maghreb and Mediterranean countries).

30. Although some of the Assembly's proposals on the tasks of the Institute have been taken up by the Council - such as the information function, thinking on European security, autonomy in the implementation of the Institute's tasks, organi-

17. Document 1224, 4th May 1990.

18. First part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council (1st January - 30th June 1990), Document 1247.

19. Official report of debates, second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly, December 1990.

sation of seminars, relations with Central and Eastern European countries – it should also be noted that, aside from certain declarations of limited scope²⁰, the Council, by placing the Institute under its sole authority, ruled out any possibility of the Assembly subsequently having an influence on the tasks and activities of the Institute. By acting in this manner, the Council contributed to reducing the scope of a co-operation between the two institutions, which had nevertheless frequently been termed desirable²¹.

III. Structure and activities of the Institute

31. Since the start of its work the structure of the Institute has remained stable, without significant alteration from that decided by the Council in 1989 and 1990: namely a lightweight structure, a small staff complement and a fairly rapid turnover of research staff (contracts limited to three years). In the Ministers' view, these options are justified on the one hand by budgetary considerations, and on the other to emphasise the Institute's European character by encouraging a continual flow of research staff from WEU countries.

32. This has not prevented the Institute, from the outset, from developing an intensive programme of work, organising open or restricted seminars and other activities directed towards government circles, other research institutions in Europe and elsewhere, and university circles. This work of contact and stimulation of the debate on European security has been accompanied by the publication of various studies, reports and other works deriving from the deliberations and information tasks pursued by the Institute.

(i) Structure and operation

(a) The Director

33. The Director is appointed by the Council of Ministers on the basis of nominations submitted by the WEU member countries. Experience in research, in political and military analysis and in managing a research institute are some of the fundamental criteria in the appointment of the Director of the Institute. Other criteria are linguistic

20. At the June 1990 session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, stated that "the creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies should enable the Council and the organisation as a whole, and hence the Assembly, to benefit from academic expertise in security matters". Official report of debates, June 1990.

21. In its reply to Recommendation 474, the Council stated that "dialogue between the Assembly and the Council regarding the tasks to be carried out by the Institute is desirable in that the Institute's work will be widely available to the public and that its thinking will naturally complement the Assembly's discussions". Document 1233, 1st June 1990.

skills and also, although this is not an overriding factor, being a national of one of the major WEU member countries.

34. The term of office of three years has been extended by two years for the current Director (the three-year term expired on 30th June 1993). It might be desirable, when the new Director is appointed in 1995, for the Council to consider the possibility of offering a longer contract or of making it renewable for at least one further term. This will prevent recourse to extensions of the term of office and contribute to increasing the stability of the office of Director who has important management as well as research duties.

35. Broadly speaking, the Director's functions are as follows:

- (a) determining the work programme of the Institute, leading its research team and contributing to its outputs;
- (b) liaison with the Council;
- (c) responsibility for the Institute's publications; approval of subject and content, "quality control";
- (d) external representation of the Institute and following up contacts with other institutions;
- (e) selection and appointment of Institute research staff;
- (f) management and control of the budget;
- (g) managing and ensuring the smooth running of the Institute.

36. On 17th October 1990, it was also decided that, "subject to the views of the Council or its working groups, and depending on the agenda, the Secretary-General would invite the Director of the Institute to attend or be represented at their meetings"²².

(b) Research staff

37. Proposals for the appointment of research staff are sent to the Council by the Director. The Council gives its approval and may also reject an applicant if it feels the latter does not fulfil all the necessary criteria for working in the Institute.

38. Contracts are for three years and may not be renewed and selection of applicants also takes account of nationality distribution. At the time of appointment, priority is given to countries not yet represented. Alongside the nationality criteria, age, experience in the areas of defence, European affairs, international relations and other fields of interest to the Institute are taken into account.

22. Second part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council (1st July - 31st December 1990), Document 1265, 19th April 1991.

39. The diversity of geographical origin and age represented in the Institute appears to correspond to the wishes of the Council to enable qualified people from different backgrounds to work together in a European environment. The fixed-term contracts allow a constant flow of staff, even although, according to the Director, it would be desirable to be able to renew contracts, if only for a further year.

40. The activities and functions of the research staff are of varying kinds:

- undertaking research work on topics falling within the province of the Institute and of WEU;
- organising and preparing seminars and other external activities of the Institute;
- follow-up of the Institute's work in a specific field of expertise; for example relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean;
- keeping abreast of the current situation in one's own country; establishing contacts with national institutes;
- written or other contributions to the activities of similar institutions in fields relevant to the Institute's activities.

41. Assessment of the work of the research staff and the Institute is carried out in varying ways. The research team itself assesses the documents sent to the Council and undertakes an analysis of seminars and other external activities. There is no formal evaluation of publications, the Chaillot Papers or other written contributions. Acceptance of and interest in these documents from similar institutions, researchers and other recipients is in itself an assessment of the quality of the Institute's work. In certain cases the advice of experts outside the Institute may be sought on specific subjects.

42. Alongside its research staff, the Institute also accepts, for short periods (normally three months) award-holders working on subjects relating to European security and WEU, selected according to their academic attainments and their experience in political and military research. They may participate in the preparation and organisation of seminars and the results of their research may be published in the Chaillot Papers.

(c) *Organogram and budget*

43. In 1990, the Institute's organogram consisted of 23 posts: the Director (hors grade), the Head of Administration (grade A), four research staff (grade A), two translators (grade L), secretaries, an accountant and a member of staff in charge of documentation (grade B) and six grade C staff. In 1994, the Institute has 26 posts, includ-

ing two part-time posts. A revision of the staff rules was required to accommodate the part-time contracts.

44. Within the Institute, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to an intellectual hierarchy than one of grades or responsibility. With the exception of the Director, for obvious reasons, relations between research staff are rather the product of their personal experience and background than of an administrative grading system.

45. The Institute's budget has shown modest regular increases over the years: F 11 380 000 for 1990, F 12 908 400 for 1991, F 13 516 000 for 1992, F 15 205 000 for 1993 and F 15 676 050 for 1994²³. These increases correspond to the expansion in the activities of the Institute, particularly in relation to travel and increased contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

46. So far, the Institute is just able to live within its budget. Nevertheless, the enlargement of WEU and the development of associate member, associate partner and observer statuses will have an impact on the activities and functioning of the Institute, which will lead to an increased budgetary requirement.

(ii) *Activities*

(a) *Reports and studies for the Council*

47. The Institute works in a spirit of intellectual independence without being submitted to direct control by the Council as regards choice of topics and the manner of dealing with them. The latter is entitled to request the Institute to provide it with studies and other work on questions within its specialist remit. These requests give rise to a dialogue between the Institute and the Council on the topic to be dealt with in which the ideas and suggestions of the two parties are taken into consideration.

48. Equally, the Institute may take the initiative towards the Council, as this also falls within the framework of the Institute's powers. As a research institute its rôle is to monitor current developments and indicate subjects deserving of attention to the Council. The studies are in response to a need for information and provide the Council with conceptual tools (as, for example, in relation to associate partner status and the development of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe).

(b) *Other studies and works*

49. In addition to the preparation of documents for the Council, the Institute also co-operates with other institutions in preparing studies within its

23. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs: 1990-1994, Documents 1264, 1303, 1399 and 1425.

purview. These studies are undertaken either at the initiative of the Institute or in co-operation with national or international research institutes. The topics are discussed and selected at meetings of the research team.

50. Thus the Institute prepared a study on the settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia at the request of Lord Owen within the context of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in 1994. Another example, on co-operation, is the research into transatlantic relations produced in conjunction with the Rand Corporation (United States, 1993).

51. Some of the Institute's research is published in book form (for example, the study on transatlantic relations) and in its Chaillot Papers. These publications are directed principally towards governmental organisations (in WEU member countries and other countries with which the Institute has contact), research institutions and the like active in the fields of defence and international relations (both public and private bodies), universities, parliaments and the press.

52. As a general rule, the Chaillot Papers, which are published five or six times a year, cover topical subjects, are intended to have policy relevance and seek to express a European rather than a national point of view. These works are well-received in specialist circles as illustrated by their reviews in the specialist press or the use made of them by universities and other such institutions in their own work.

(c) *Seminars and study groups*

53. One of the most important activities of the Institute is organising seminars and study groups on European security and other related matters (minorities, nuclear and ballistic proliferation, co-operation between regional and international organisations, etc.).

54. A number of seminars are held each year. The open seminars are directed towards a larger audience including participants from other research institutes as well as the governments of WEU member countries, associate partners and observers. In addition, representatives are invited from other European organisations. The restricted seminars are open only to senior civil servants in the defence and foreign affairs ministries of WEU member countries and other countries, as determined by the subject under discussion.

55. These activities enable the Institute to become better known and to develop its contacts abroad (with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia). The seminars are held in Paris and sometimes in other countries. The subjects dealt with are prepared by the research team on the basis of documents and studies by the Institute and may be published in a Chaillot Paper.

56. The study groups bring together Institute members and specialists from government bodies (such as the armed forces, foreign affairs specialists, etc.) or from other research institutes and the universities. Some of these groups (task forces) operate on a virtually permanent basis, their work extending over several months (such as, for example, research work into the defence industries, in preparation for a seminar on this topic in 1995). The subjects tackled, which may form the basis of a Chaillot Paper, relate to questions concerning WEU and the security and defence of Europe in a wider, non-exhaustive perspective (problems pertaining to the Mediterranean, for example).

57. The seminars and study group activities are subject to regular assessment by the Institute and reports are sent to the Council on the outcome of such assessments, together with the seminar or study group conclusions on the subject under discussion.

(d) *The Institute's external relations*

58. Since 1990 the Institute has established a wide network of contacts with other similar institutions, universities, international and regional organisations in Europe and on other continents.

59. The Institute has close relations with research institutes in the member, associate member, associate partner and observer countries. It is strengthening its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states and developing contacts with institutes in the Maghreb countries and Egypt.

60. Initiatives in this area are many and varied. The Institute also offers researchers from non-member countries the opportunity of working in other European research institutions through a programme of research awards. It also supports the organisation of conferences and training courses for senior political and military officials of the countries with which it co-operates.

61. Beyond the circle of WEU member countries and others with links with the organisation, the Institute has on-going relationships with several political and military research institutes in Russia and with the Rand Corporation, in the United States.

62. As regards international and regional organisations, the Institute has contacts with the European Union, NATO, the CSCE and the United Nations including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. This list is by no means exhaustive and the Institute's energetic efforts in this area are amply demonstrated by the range and frequency of its outside activities.

IV. Achievements and prospects

63. The Institute has established itself firmly on the European security and defence research scene where it is vigorously accomplishing the tasks assigned to it by the Council within the limits of the staffing and material resources available to it. Nevertheless, this success has also raised the question of how the institution should evolve.

64. This issue is one of major importance at a time when WEU is growing, not only by opening up to other European countries, but also in developing its structures and seeking new fields of action, as the creation of the Satellite Centre and the Planning Cell and the transfer of IEPG's responsibilities to WEAG²⁴ all serve to demonstrate. Such development makes it essential to examine the rôle that the Institute might play in this process.

(i) *The Institute and the question of the academy*

65. In spite of its present flexible and efficient structure, the Institute will have difficulties, from a financial and logistical point of view, in meeting the requirements of the enlargement of WEU. Furthermore, the framework in which it operates is far from being that of an academy, a matter to which the Ministers proposed, in their declaration on the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, to give consideration.

66. Paragraph C of this text on the operational rôle of WEU states "Other proposals will be examined further, including: ...development of the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy"²⁵. However, the Council has not subsequently clarified further what it meant by the word "academy" nor as to when examination of this question might begin.

67. Transforming the Institute into an academy in fact involves providing it with the structures and means of undertaking a training and teaching rôle in addition to its research work. This approach was developed in the address by Mr. Rocard, then Prime Minister of France, at the first European session of the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, on 15th November 1988²⁶. In 1991, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl also stated that they were in favour of trans-

forming the Institute into a European security and defence academy²⁷.

68. At the same time, this implies a reform of the Institute's structures and logistical and budgetary means in line with the objectives to be achieved. Perhaps for this reason the Council did not yet appear to be in a hurry to reach a clear decision on this matter. However, it is also possible that this lack of action may be due to an absence, within the Council, of a consensus on what the present and future tasks of the Institute should be and on the rôle the latter should have within the European security and defence structures.

69. The ministers' hesitation is in part justified by the forthcoming reviews in 1996 and 1998. The 1996 intergovernmental conference on the European Union, which must to some extent deal with the achievements of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) will have implications for WEU which, since the Treaty of Maastricht, has been identified as the "defence component of the European Union"²⁸.

70. In 1998, the modified Brussels Treaty is due to expire²⁹. Under Article XII thereof "after the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto". This does not in any sense mean that the treaty is dissolved, but that any decisions that are taken at the 1996 intergovernmental conference (in which all WEU members will take part) might determine what will happen after 1998.

71. In the meantime, it is difficult to envisage the Institute's transformation into an academy in the short term. Moreover, when reference is made to the various descriptions of its tasks the ministers and the Secretariat-General have presented to the Assembly, all the uncertainties and questions over the future rôle of the Institute immediately become obvious.

72. In these descriptions, some of which are discussed in the first part of this report, the Institute's rôle is considered primarily in a national rather than a European perspective. France has seen it as a political planning cell for producing independent strategic analyses (Mr. Chevènement, June 1989) and for in-depth examination of European defence issues (Mr. Dumas, December 1990), Italy has attributed it "ambitious tasks" of

24. The Western European Armaments Group was formed following a decision by the Council on 4th December 1992 which led to the transfer of the IEPG's activities to WEU.

25. Document 1315: second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, Annex III; 25th May 1992.

26. Défense nationale, January 1989, page 25.

27. Document 1290: information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs, 25th November 1991.

28. Document 1315: second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council to the WEU Assembly, Annex III, 25th May 1992.

29. The start of the fifty year period referred to in Article XII is the subject of a debate in the Assembly and the Council. According to the latter, the treaty period starts from the entry into force of the Brussels Treaty on 17th March 1948.

stimulating ideas and research (Mr. Vitalone, December 1989), Germany has emphasised the rôle that the Institute might play in contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Mr. Schäfer, December 1989), Belgium considered that it should enable the entire organisation, including therefore the Assembly, to benefit from academic expertise in security matters (Mr. Eyskens, June 1990).

73. Only a United Kingdom minister, Mr. Younger, questioned the need for the Institute (June 1989), but at a time, if truth were known, when discussions on its formation were in progress. The Secretariat-General initially envisaged the Institute as a co-ordinating structure between universities, those responsible for planning and other institutions (Mr. van Eekelen, December 1989). The Assembly envisaged that the Institute should function on two levels: those of research and analysis work and of co-ordinating the European activities of national institutes with similar objectives (Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly, June 1989).

74. Once the Institute was established, the matter of its rôle and activities no longer tended to be discussed. The Council makes regular reference to the activities of the Institute in its annual report and in its communiqués and declarations. With the exception of a passing mention in 1991, at the time of the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, no further indications have come from the ministers on the future of the Institute. The Secretary-General referred to the matter in his information letter on the activities of the ministerial organs in 1992, but without giving any details³⁰.

75. The Institute, for its part, has submitted proposals for its development into an academy on several occasions, to which the Council has not as yet responded. This issue remains a crucial one for the future of the Institute. Were it to become an academy, its co-ordinating and European rôles would be strengthened and consolidated, contributing to its development and to the emergence of a true European security and defence thinking. As to the Assembly, although suggestions have not been lacking, the fact remains that its relations with the Institute are neither as open nor as close as it would originally have wished.

(ii) Relations between the Assembly and the Institute

76. In June 1989, in answer to a question from Mr. Baumel on the future status of the Institute, Mr. Chevènement, then Minister of Defence of France, replied that it would be desirable for this institute to be under WEU's authority. It would

30. Document 1391: information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs, 22nd March 1992.

draw up its own programme of work, report to the Assembly and be responsible for its publications."³¹ This reply concurred with the position frequently expressed by the Assembly that the Institute should carry out its work in co-operation with the Assembly.

77. With this in mind, in December 1989, the Assembly, in its Recommendation 474, had requested that the Council "take no measures that may involve relations between the new Institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement"³². The Council replied that "during its discussions on the practical arrangements for establishing a WEU Institute..." it had taken the Assembly's point of view on that question into account³³ and reiterated its position, when the decision was taken on 13th November to establish the Institute, that "the Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the Institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities".

78. In point of fact, this effectively limited any possibility of direct co-operation between the Assembly and the Institute or of establishing co-ordination in joint actions in the interest of the two institutions (for example, seminars or developing studies on topics of common interest). The situation, in short, is as follows: if the Assembly has need of the Institute's expertise for a study on a topic within its area of responsibility, the latter must refer to the Council, which will decide, solely on its own criteria, on the appropriateness of such a step. As decisions of the Council are collegiate decisions taken by consensus, the question must necessarily arise of the time-scale required for obtaining a reply, not to mention the matter of on which other topics the Assembly might obtain the Institute's co-operation in such instances.

79. It was inevitable that in this situation areas of disagreement should arise between the Assembly on the one hand and the Council and the Institute on the other, even though the latter is protected by the decisions of the ministers. The first area of disagreement emerged in 1991, when the Presidential Committee requested the Permanent Council and, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General, the Institute, for information on the situation in former Yugoslavia and on the conditions under which WEU might possibly intervene. The Institute could not provide the information requested, not having been authorised to do so by the Council³⁴.

31. Thirty-fifth ordinary session: official report of debates, Volume II, June 1989.

32. Document 1233; Recommendation 474 on WEU in the single European market - reply to the half-yearly report of the Council, paragraph 4.

33. Idem.

34. Official report of debates, December 1991, second part of the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly.

80. This case in point serves to illustrate the narrowness of the Council's interpretation of the possibilities of co-operation between the Assembly and the Institute. In the four years the two bodies have existed side by side in Paris, the Institute has prepared one document only for the Assembly – on relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, in the framework of the colloquy organised by the Assembly on this topic in Berlin in 1992. A request for a study on national and reserve forces of WEU countries³⁵ has seemingly also been rejected by the Council.

81. As far as direct relations between the two institutions are concerned, the picture is far from being wholly negative. The Institute endeavours, within the limits that are permissible to it, to inform the Assembly of its research and activities. Parliamentarians and officials of the Office of the Clerk are regularly invited to seminars organised by the Institute and the Chaillot Papers and the Letter of the Institute are sent to the Assembly on a regular basis, thus giving the latter the opportunity of being informed of the Institute's current activities.

82. The Director of the Institute, himself a former member of the Assembly, was invited to speak to the Presidential Committee in 1992, thus contributing his specialist knowledge to a discussion on topics of common interest and he, and his research team, have assisted in preparing the present report. Nevertheless, co-operation between the two institutions is far from satisfactory and its sporadic nature, on a case-by-case basis, is far from meeting the wish for co-operation expressed by the Assembly throughout the process of the Institute's formation and the four years of its existence.

83. In its recommendations, the Assembly has on several occasions asked the Council to request the Institute to study one or other subject and, in so far as possible, to associate the Assembly with its work, particularly in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Although the ministers have sometimes accepted its recommendations, the Assembly has never truly been able to profit from the work of the Institute, as it would have wished. This situation is the more reprehensible in that the Assembly, composed of representatives of the national parliaments, is denied any co-operation with the Institute by ministers who are answerable to those same parliamentarians in their respective countries.

35. Recommendation 534 on European security – reserve forces and national service, paragraph 10, 3rd December 1992.

84. Is it conceivable that the British, Spanish or French Governments would seek to prevent their parliaments from approaching a national defence institute to request studies and information on the political and defence orientations of governments? A situation such as this, which is unacceptable at national level, should not be tolerated in WEU.

V. Conclusion

85. Through its work, the reputation of its research for quality and its dynamic contacts in Europe, both in the framework of WEU and beyond, the Institute has fulfilled the hopes engendered by its creation. Discussion must now begin on reforms to consolidate its position as a genuine European research institute. Transforming it into an academy is one possible solution and doubtless the one which can contribute most effectively to the emergence of a real European awareness in security and defence matters which is not simply the existence, side by side, of national positions, a sort of European lowest common denominator.

86. Another option might be to retain the present structure of the Institute and concentrate its activities on developing WEU's contacts with the associate partners and the countries of the Mediterranean, as the Council and also the Assembly have both suggested on several occasions; however, this would restrict the Institute to the rôle of a liaison body with these countries until their status evolved within WEU and the European Union, which does not really correspond to the tasks assigned to it. However praiseworthy the work of the Institute in this area may be it should not be used to gloss over the absence of consensus in the Council as regards WEU's relations with these countries.

87. The Assembly, for its part, intends to pursue its policy of seeking closer and more direct co-operation with the Institute, which is in the interest of the two institutions and of WEU in general. In so doing, it is aware that the Institute is not responsible for any obstacles that might arise. The Institute, on the one hand, should know that it can count on the Assembly to urge the Council to direct its efforts towards reforms that might strengthen every aspect of WEU's operational capabilities – political, military and space, not to mention research and the stimulation of intellectual debate. Together, the Assembly and the Institute are better placed to participate fully in the establishment of a true defence Europe, in the interests of peace and the security of the continent.

Western European Union (WEU)
(Draft of a new booklet)

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the
*Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations*²
by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur

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DRAFT ORDER

on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur

Draft Order

on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Orders 75 and 84;
- (ii) Noting the information report on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (iii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the wider public in member, associate member, associate partner and observer countries,

INVITES ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet on the report submitted is published in the languages of the WEU member states, associate members, associate partners and observers;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date regularly and in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Masseret (Chairman); Sir Russell Johnston, Baroness Gould of Potternewton (Alternate for Dr. Godman) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Benvenuti, Birraux, Bühler (Alternate: *Junghanns*), Decagny, Dionisi, Sir Anthony Durant, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Müller*), MM. Ghesquière, Gouteyron, Sir John Hunt, MM. Kempinaire, Martins, Mattina, Mitolo, Pfuhl, Reimann, Robles Fraga, Sainz Garcia, Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel (Alternate: *Roman*), Mrs. Verspaget.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)

1. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations thought it necessary to bring up to date the information report, published in 1993, in the light of recent developments in the organisation. Since Petersberg, WEU has been expanded considerably towards European countries, members of the European Union and NATO, and Central European countries.

2. The meetings of the Council in Rome in May 1993 and Kirchberg in May 1994, confirmed this evolution, initially by establishing the WEU Forum of Consultation and subsequently by creating the status of associate partner. At the same time, the organisation was assigned greater responsibilities in European security and defence

following the summit meeting of the Atlantic Alliance which expressed its support for the development of a European security and defence identity.

3. The purpose of the present text, like that of previous issues, is to provide parliamentarians and the wider public with information on the evolution of WEU, its structures and its prospects. At a time when political, military, scientific and other events in Europe and elsewhere are increasingly intertwined and occurring in rapid succession, the present text is also intended as an invitation to give considered thought to the future which is the reason, in part at least, for its provisional and constantly evolving nature.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 556 to 564

RECOMMENDATION 556¹

on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU²

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlantic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe;
- (ii) Welcoming the WEU Council's readiness to offer an enhanced status of association to those member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation which have or are likely to have "Europe Agreements" with the European Union, but regretting that the term "*associate partnership*" may be used for this arrangement;
- (iii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries;
- (iv) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the countries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides;
- (v) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's rôle with a view to helping to maintain stability and security in the East;
- (vi) Also emphasising the importance of the greater rôle played by WEU in the framework of its co-operation with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions;
- (vii) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU;
- (viii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has become an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and implement the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications;
- (ix) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important decisions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased responsibilities entrusted to it;
- (x) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions;
- (xi) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and European Union bodies;
- (xii) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity;
- (xiii) Hoping that the new European Parliament to be elected on 12th June next will refrain from adopting resolutions that seek – contrary to the spirit and the letter of Maastricht – to hinder WEU efforts to contribute to the definition of a European defence policy,

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Paris on 3rd May 1994.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1410).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accorded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO;
2. Employ the term "associate member" for the relationship already being established with Iceland, Norway and Turkey and choose "*associate*" to describe the new status of the Central European and Baltic states which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and which have or are likely to have "Europe Agreements" with the European Union;
3. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
4. Decide before the end of this year:
 - to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the feasibility study;
 - to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European industry for building the European military transport aircraft;
 - to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
 - to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with SACEUR;
 - to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
 - to create a European armaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of matériel;
5. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true rôle of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU;
6. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
7. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercussions on its co-operation with NATO;
8. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management questions;
9. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a structure of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between:
 - chiefs of defence staff;
 - military delegates belonging to national delegations;
 - the Planning Cell and
 - the WEU Secretariat-General;
10. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political powers including:
 - the right of initiative;
 - the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
 - primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies;
11. Take the appropriate measures to transform the Planning Cell into a powerful operational centre for WEU co-ordination and planning, with all the resources in equipment and staffing required to achieve this;
12. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency, complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO;
13. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 4 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas of responsibility by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government of the member countries.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 556

1. Following the work of the Permanent Council pursuant to the mandate given in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, the foreign and defence ministers on the WEU Council and its nine partners of the Forum of Consultation came to an agreement on a status of association with WEU at their meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994. Under this status, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic become associate partners of WEU.

To promote the gradual integration of associate partners into WEU activities, this status enables them to participate in the meetings of the Council and to be kept regularly informed on the activities of its working groups and paves the way for a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.

The Permanent Council confirms to the parliamentary Assembly that the "document on a status of association with WEU", adopted in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, in no way modifies the "document on associate members", adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.

The status will formally be achieved when:

- the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers, become associate members;
- the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.

2. The Permanent Council can assure the parliamentary Assembly that the term "associate member" will continue to be applied to Iceland, Norway and Turkey, in their status as European members of the Atlantic Alliance. As stated in the Kirchberg declaration, the name adopted for the former consultation partners of the WEU Forum of Consultation will henceforth be "associate partner" of WEU.

3. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the results of the WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS) will be submitted to the CHODS meeting in spring 1995. This study is being conducted in two stages. In the first phase, WEU's strategic mobility requirements are being assessed by simulating the projection of force packages over short, medium and long distances, using strategic transport models. These deployments will be modelled on a computer with the help of national experts. In a second phase, the study will define a WEU strategic mobility concept. The findings of the study will be reported to the ministerial Council.

- 4.
- In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers "reaffirmed their will to set up an independent European satellite system. A decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the merits of the proposed system, of other WEU alternatives and affordability. To prepare a possible decision of launching such a programme, ministers tasked the Space Group to prepare, for their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for decision".
 - In the case of the future military transport aircraft, a feasibility study funded by some of the WEU member countries is currently being conducted by the EUROFLAG industrial consortium, which includes several European enterprises operating in the aviation field. This study, which was launched in October 1993 on the basis of preliminary work done within the framework of the former Independent European Programme Group (IEPG, now WEAG), should be completed by the end of the year. It will be in the light of the findings of this study that the countries concerned will reach a decision in the course of 1995 on the launching of a further phase with the aim of defining the project.
 - Regarding the creation of a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components, the Italian proposals for a multinational ground force within the context of maritime co-operation will be submitted to the Permanent Council for discussion once they have been finalised in conjunction with France and Spain.
 - The Council reminds the Assembly that, at their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers endorsed "the adoption of the joint declaration laying down the conditions for the use of the European Corps in the WEU framework and interpretations in this respect".

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.

- The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation " to make arrangements for associating with the European Corps the other forces answerable to WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created ".
- Concerning the European Armaments Agency, an Ad Hoc Study Group was tasked with analysing the legal framework within which such an agency could operate. The conclusions of the Study Group and the recommendations of the National Armaments Directors will provide the basis on which ministers will be able to take a decision at the appropriate time concerning the possible establishment of an agency and the definition of its precise tasks and responsibilities.

5. With regard to an increase in the means assigned to the Planning Cell, the Council draws the attention of the parliamentary Assembly to the fact that, in the declaration following on from the document on " associate membership " of 20th November 1992, the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994 decided that " the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey may nominate officers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable WEU to draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the Petersberg declaration. The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey should be connected as soon as possible to the WEUCOM network for all communications concerning meetings and activities in which associate members participate ".

On the " true rôle of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO ", the Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that this function is assigned to the Planning Cell's " co-ordination " section. Under the circumstances, no new terms of reference are needed. More generally, links between the WEU and NATO will be developed to improve co-ordination across a range of actions.

6. The Council is aware of the need to harmonise criteria for the use of CJTF Headquarters with NATO, in particular with regard to the framework created for relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

To this end, the Permanent Council has set up a Politico-Military Working Group, which has formulated a joint WEU position which has been introduced into the framework of the alliance consultation process.

7. In adopting the Kirchberg declaration, ministers " welcomed the fact that working relations with the European Union were now being developed. They also recalled their endorsement at their last meeting of the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU contained in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and approved by the European Council on 29th October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this context the need to improve co-operation, particularly in the management of crises and looked forward to close co-operation between the two organisations in order to respond rapidly and efficiently in the event of crises ".

8. On the intensification of relations between WEU and CSCE, the Council draws the attention of the parliamentary Assembly to the Kirchberg declaration, which states that " Ministers agreed that the CSCE, as the only European and transatlantic forum covering all of Europe, must be strengthened to avoid the emergence of new divisions. To this end, they reaffirmed their governments' resolution to commit the necessary resources and to continue working for a reasonable division of labour with the CSCE, giving effect to the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions developed in the 1992 Helsinki declaration ".

9. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the sharing of responsibilities among the Chiefs of Defence Staff, Military Delegates, the Planning Cell and the WEU Secretariat General was specified when the Permanent Council transferred to Brussels at the beginning of 1993, pursuant to the Petersberg declaration.

This declaration states that: " Ministers agreed that the Chiefs of Defence Staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers also agreed that, following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with military delegates to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the Planning Cell and to monitor the professional standards of the Planning Cell's work ".

The provisions applicable to the Planning Cell's relations with the said bodies are set out in the Planning Cell's terms of reference approved by WEU ministers in Petersberg on 19th June 1992.

The responsibilities of the WEU Secretariat General are the organisation, chairmanship and follow-up of meetings organised in Brussels, and any other work that the Council may require it to do.

Regarding the political guidelines that may be given to the CHODS, the Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to the fact that the agendas for their meetings are prepared by the WEU presidency in office.

10. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that WEU is an intergovernmental body in which the WEU presidency in office performs the functions mentioned with appropriate involvement of the Secretary-General.

11. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the Planning Cell is tasked with:

- preparing contingency plans for the use of forces under the WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary arrangements for the command and control of operations and communications, including standing orders for those headquarters which may be chosen;
- establishing an updated inventory of the forces and force packages that might be assigned to WEU for specific operations.

Within the budgetary limits determined by member states, the Permanent Council provides WEU bodies with “ all the resources in equipment and staffing required ” so that they can perform the tasks with which they have been entrusted.

12. The Council reminds the Parliamentary Assembly that Annex IV of the document on the implementation of the Treaty on European Union, approved by the General Affairs Council and endorsed by the ministerial Council in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, states on this subject that “ this collaboration includes cross-participation of collaborators from the two secretariats in relevant meetings in the two organisations according to decisions taken on a case-by-case basis, after consultation of the two presidencies at the appropriate level. This applies to meetings at working group level, as well as with regard to relevant agenda points in meetings at ambassadorial level and at ministerial level ”.

13. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers “ recalled the importance they attach to the continued operational development of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance ”.

They also recalled “ the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands ”. In the meantime, the Netherlands presidency has circulated a draft discussion paper on this subject, which will be discussed in the months to come.

Regarding the convening of an extraordinary meeting for the end of the year at the level of heads of state and government of the WEU member states, it is the responsibility of the presidency to evaluate the necessity and desirability of convening such a meeting if it is formally requested by a member state.

RECOMMENDATION 557¹

***on the European armaments agency – reply to the
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking account, on the one hand, of the declaration of the member countries of WEU annexed to the Treaty on European Union, which, with reference to WEU's operational rôle, provides inter alia for examination of "enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency" and, on the other hand, the Petersberg declaration which follows the same direction;
- (ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Bonn in December 1992 by the Defence Ministers of the thirteen IEPG countries to transfer the functions of that group to WEU and the decisions taken at the meeting in Rome in May 1993 on the practical measures relating to this transfer, in particular the new name for the IEPG which has become the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the report on armaments co-operation prepared by the National Armaments Directors and submitted for examination by the WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993;
- (iv) Similarly welcoming the creation of an ad-hoc working group for the purposes of identifying the tasks of a European armaments agency and determining the legal grounds on which it should be based;
- (v) Welcoming the transfer to WEU of certain activities of Eurogroup, specifically the information activities, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM;
- (vi) Considering furthermore that a European armaments agency should be based on a common European industrial and defence policy, an integrated armaments market and a common export policy for such armaments;
- (vii) Noting that the ultimate objective of a common defence policy involving agreement on political guidelines in military and armaments matters is far from being achieved;
- (viii) Considering that in present circumstances a European armaments agency must be regarded as a point of departure for an undertaking that will be developed until it achieves its full capability as European positions converge in security and defence questions;
- (ix) Convinced nevertheless that the creation of a European armaments agency, initially with a minimum of specific tasks, meets a clear need, as testified by the present dispersal of the armaments sector in Europe, the many bodies responsible for various co-operative programmes, the need to make the most of diminishing resources, to increase industrial trade, to improve and widen co-operation in the research sector and to continue work on the principles of harmonisation and standardisation including in particular their political, administrative and legal aspects;
- (x) Bearing in mind that the increasingly multinational composition of armed forces in Europe implies interoperability of military units, which must be accompanied by a firm move towards armaments co-operation;
- (xi) Welcoming the decision of the French and German authorities to create a joint armaments agency;
- (xii) Considering the importance of a European armaments agency in securing a competitive presence for Europe in the world armaments market;
- (xiii) Regretting that the Kirchberg declaration in no way tackles the question of creating a European armaments agency,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Have a study made for the harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 13th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (1st sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1419).

2. Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information on its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmonisation;
3. Insist on the need to ensure and document parliamentary control either through national parliaments or the Parliamentary Assembly over defence procurement as well as arms exports;
4. Examine fiscal and employment legislation governing the defence industries of the member countries, with a view to their possible harmonisation;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the report by the ad hoc working group on the tasks to be assigned to the European armaments agency and the legal grounds on which it should be based;
4. Complete the integration of the armaments secretariat into the Secretariat-General in order to promote synergy between WEU's armaments activities and the other activities of the organisation;
5. Strengthen the means of the armaments secretariat so that it might afford more active support to the work of WEAG panels and working groups;
6. Establish forthwith a European armaments agency as a subsidiary body of the Council, initially tasked as follows:
 - (a) management of co-operative programmes;
 - (b) management of the EUCLID programme;
 - (c) management of joint research and testing facilities;
 - (d) technological and operational studies;
 - (e) establishment of information and data services and a register of patents relating to innovation in the defence sector;
 - (f) research into and evaluation of the world armaments market; the agency would be assisted in this task by industrial groups such as EDIG, which already has extensive experience in this sector.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 557

1. The Council supports, in principle, the Assembly's call for harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries. The Council considers this harmonisation process to be a desirable long-term aim. The co-operative activities carried out in WEU within the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) are helping to achieve this aim.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the question of harmonisation and co-ordination of national arms export policies is dealt with in the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Furthermore, the national regulations on arms exports are already a matter of public record.
3. The Council informs the Assembly that parliamentary control over defence equipment procurement and exports is at present provided by national parliaments in accordance with the procedures and regulations in force in each country.
4. The Council informs the Assembly that fiscal and employment legislation are among the topics on which a process of harmonisation is in progress within the framework of the European Union. Consequently, the application of this process to the European defence industry is a matter for the European Union.
5. The Council informs the Assembly that the Ad Hoc Study Group on a European Armaments Agency is pursuing its work under the authority of the National Armaments Directors and pursuant to the mandate it received from ministers on 22nd November 1993 in Luxembourg. A report of the group and proposals will be presented by the National Armaments Directors at the next meeting of the WEAG defence ministers on 14th November 1994. The ministers will decide on the follow-up to be given to this report.
6. The Council informs the Assembly that the Armaments Secretariat has been a part of the WEU Secretariat-General since 1st April 1994, in accordance with the decision in principle taken by ministers on 22nd November 1993 in Luxembourg. Staff recruitment is in progress.
7. The Council takes note of the Assembly's recommendation to strengthen the Armaments Secretariat and will consider the possibility of doing so in good time on the basis of proposals drawn up by the National Armaments Directors and in the light of the progress of work carried out by the WEAG and of the experience gained.
8. The Council informs the Assembly that an examination of the tasks which could be given to a future European Armaments Agency is in progress within the Ad Hoc Study Group. This group is also analysing the legal framework within which such an agency could operate. The conclusions of the Study Group and the recommendations of the National Armaments Directors will provide the basis on which ministers will be able to take a decision at the appropriate time concerning the possible establishment of an agency and the definition of its precise tasks and responsibilities.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1994.

RECOMMENDATION 558¹

on WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the Assembly of WEU, as part of the organisation of Western European Union under the terms of the agreement on the status of WEU signed in Paris on 11th May 1955, is an integral part of the development of the European Union as provided in Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union;
- (ii) Underlining that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the Council to keep the Assembly better informed than hitherto about developments in the CFSP and other sectors of the Union in all matters which come within the competence of WEU in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iii) Disapproving the Council's delay in transmitting Annex IV, on the links between the Union and WEU, to Chapter IV of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty;
- (iv) Deploring also the poor information contained in the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the new working relations between WEU and the Union;
- (v) Considering that the wording of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union gives reason for doubts about the sharing of responsibilities between WEU and the Union;
- (vi) Considering also that the hitherto agreed "practical arrangements" contained in Annex IV on the links between the Union and WEU restrict the areas of action for WEU in a way which is not compatible with WEU's far-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Deploring in fact that these arrangements and the lack of political will are some of the many factors which contributed to WEU's marginalised rôle in international crisis-management particularly regarding the conflicts in former Yugoslavia;
- (viii) Underlining the important rôle WEU has to fulfil on behalf of the Union in maintaining transatlantic solidarity and co-operation in security and defence matters;
- (ix) Welcoming the successful outcome of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden regarding their accession to the European Union;
- (x) Welcoming also the firm commitment of all the acceding states to include in their accession, in full and without reservation, the provision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of a common foreign and security policy;
- (xi) Expressing the hope that the referenda to be held in Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden will be positive;
- (xii) Recalling the important contribution and experience of the four EFTA countries in peace-keeping operations within the United Nations;
- (xiii) Convinced that defining a common European defence policy should now commence even though all members of the European Union are not yet full members of WEU and welcoming therefore the decision of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the formulation of such a policy;
- (xiv) Noting that the countries called upon to accede to the European Union have not applied for membership of WEU with the exception of Norway which seeks full membership of WEU once it becomes a member of the European Union;
- (xv) Welcoming the fact that the Council's Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994 recognises the significant contribution of the three associate members of WEU to European security and stability;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ferrari on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1417).

- (xvi) Convinced however that the Council's wish to reinforce the relationship of these three countries with WEU in order to strengthen its position as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance could be achieved better if the Council invited them to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (xvii) Recalling that the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 did not agree to the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any of the member countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
- (xviii) Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following paragraph 1 of Recommendation 556 in granting simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation a status of association with WEU;
- (xix) Earnestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a system of co-operation ensuring security, stability and peace for Europe as a whole;
- (xx) Hoping that the necessary conditions can be created for other countries, such as Slovenia and Moldova, to acquire the new associate status in the future, on the basis of the same historical, geographical and political considerations which allowed this status to be granted to the countries of the Forum of Consultation;
- (xxi) Considering that the devolution of the exercise of matters within the competence of WEU to other international institutions or to countries which are not members of WEU or NATO might paralyse any steps towards joint action on defence and security in Europe;
- (xxii) Recalling the importance of maintaining, in any future parliamentary system required to supervise a common foreign security and defence policy, the possibility of bringing together delegations from the parliaments of member countries in an Assembly which represents the will of the peoples of Europe in this particular area,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference planned for 1996 in line with its declaration I D8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
2. Fully associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 conference;
3. Retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the European Union will be able to accede to its provisions;
4. Seek, in conjunction with the authorities of the European Union, to clear up the ambiguities of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and implement decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility;
5. Reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Encourage all member countries of the European Union and those acceding to it to become full members of Western European Union;
7. Study the possibility of creating a WEU peace-keeping training centre on the basis of experience gained in this area by the Nordic countries and especially Finland;
8. Improve the information communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the Council's activities in the framework of the Union.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 558

1. Being fully aware of the need carefully to prepare the agenda of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) scheduled for 1996, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the language adopted in paragraph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994:

“ Ministers recalled the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands. ”

In the view of the Council these conclusions can be considered as a first preparation for the substantive aspects of the 1996 WEU review.

2. Always welcoming the positive contributions made by the WEU Assembly to the development of the European security and defence identity through its reports, recommendations, written questions and colloquia, the Council will continue to consider with great attention any substantive input from the Assembly in this context.

3. The Council reminds the Assembly of the declaration of the WEU member states issued on the occasion of the 46th European Council on 9th and 10th December 1991 at Maastricht, which stated that:

“ States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. ”

4. According to Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union. It may be requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. This aim will be achieved through the development of pragmatic working relations between the institutions of the Union and of the WEU.

At their meeting on 22nd November 1993, ministers agreed to reduce the period of the WEU presidency to six months from 1st July 1994 as suggested by the European Council. They requested the Permanent Council to consider further the question of harmonising the presidencies of the European Union and WEU and to report back.

Since WEU remains institutionally autonomous and responds to the Union's requests in the framework of its own decision-making procedures, the Council does not see the need to obtain a general mandate to elaborate and implement decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility.

5. Since the Union, with at present twelve member states, relies on WEU and its nine members for elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions which have defence implications, it was logical to invite those EC members which are not yet members of WEU to become members of WEU or, if they so wished, observers. With a view to strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, an invitation to become associate member of WEU was addressed simultaneously to the other European members of NATO, in order to give them the opportunity of participating fully in the activities of WEU. The Kirchberg declaration underlined the need to reinforce the relationship of the associate members with WEU in a way that would enable them to make an even stronger contribution to WEU as it faces new challenges and opportunities.

The Council is of the opinion that “ reconsideration of the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to granting the European members of NATO, which are not members of the European Union, the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty ” is not foreseen under the present arrangements.

6. The Council considers that the decision to become a full member of WEU is a national one.

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 31st October 1994.

7. Being fully aware of the valuable experience gained by all Scandinavian countries in the area of peace-keeping, the Council recognises the benefit to be drawn from this experience. Norway (as an associate member) and Denmark (as an observer) participate in WEU's Council and working groups and provide valuable information on this topic whenever it is addressed. Moreover, increasingly member countries benefit from the possibilities offered in the context of NATO's partnership for peace programme. In this framework, Finland has explicitly offered its facilities at the training centre at Niinisalo to all allies and all partners. The Council does not see the need for the creation of a WEU peace-keeping training centre at this stage.

8. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request for information on developments in the CFSP and will treat it as a matter of priority to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly as fully informed as possible especially on aspects relating to WEU. Meetings between the presidency and the Assembly Presidential Committee either before and/or in the wake of the ministerial Councils will continue in accordance with the existing arrangements.

RECOMMENDATION 559¹

*on European security: crisis-prevention and management*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Deploring the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war between the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it to an end;
- (ii) Concerned by the Council's silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the terrible massacres perpetrated in Rwanda;
- (iii) Concerned at North Korea's nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea;
- (iv) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing future crises constituting a threat to peace and security;
- (v) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened must be authorised by the United Nations;
- (vi) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE;
- (vii) Welcoming paragraph 1 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats;
- (viii) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make " suggestions " to the Council but recommendations that have been formally adopted;
- (ix) Noting with interest of the work of the Council on;
 - WEU's rôle in peace-keeping;
 - anti-missile defence;
 - intelligence policy;
 - missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace;
 - WEU policy on exercises;
 - the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
 - progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system;
 - air and naval co-operation in WEU;
- (x) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly operational in crisis-prevention and management;
- (xi) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe areas in former Yugoslavia;
- (xii) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security;
- (xiii) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and draw the consequences therefrom for Europe;
2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-prevention and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1418).

3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on “ mutually reinforcing institutions ” carried out by the CFSP working group on security and of the Council’s own contribution to this study;
4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offices, in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insisting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers;
5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on crisis-prevention and management;
6. Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members of WEU;
7. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation 556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating to:
 - the space-based observation system;
 - strategic means of transport;
 - the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so as to enable a European rapid action force to be created;
 - armaments co-operation;
 - interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the WEU Secretariat-General;
8. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-management, particularly in the area of restoring peace;
9. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent representation in these two organisations;
10. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their efforts to seek the necessary political consensus;
11. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed;
12. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
13. Support the United Nations’ call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately;
14. Examine at the earliest opportunity the rôle that WEU might play in terminating the killings in Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that country;
15. Hold consultations on the consequences for European security of North Korea’s nuclear policy and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 559

1. The Council considers that the regular meetings of its working groups and the item topical questions on their agendas provide opportunities for regular assessment of risks and threats affecting peace, security and European interests. It goes without saying that the Council will draw the consequences of its findings when they are perceived as affecting European security.

2. The Council has already taken several initiatives in the field of crisis-management and conflict prevention in the context of the emerging common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

The most promising aspect of today's preventive diplomacy is that the EU, WEU, and NATO have taken measures to involve at least some of the former Warsaw Pact states as active partners in a common security dialogue. In the case of the European Union, the signing of Europe Agreements, as well as in the case of WEU, the adoption of a status of association to WEU, are recognition of these states' aspiration to full membership of both organisations.

In its relation to the institutions involved in crisis-prevention, mainly the United Nations, the CSCE and the EU, and their array of approaches and sanctions to attain their goals, WEU's supporting and implementing rôle will grow in importance when operational assets are deployed, as demonstrated by the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp Guard, by the initiative on the Danube and by the participation of a WEU police element in the EU administration of Mostar.

Furthermore, the Council considers that the deployment of inspection and evaluation teams under current and future arms control treaties and agreements on confidence- and security-building measures will provide a useful instrument for early warning and information-gathering, confidence-building and crisis stabilisation during preventive diplomacy operations. Full implementation of arms control treaties will make an essential contribution towards building confidence and security, hence WEU's dedicated efforts aimed at implementation of the Open Skies Treaty.

3. The Council cannot report on the results of work undertaken by working groups of the European Union dealing with CFSP matters.

4. As the defence component of the European Union, it was appropriate that WEU was present at the inaugural conference on stability in Europe as one of the organisations supporting a Pact on Stability in Europe. Enhancing security and stability throughout Europe has been one of WEU's priority tasks over recent years. The establishment in June 1992 of the WEU Forum of Consultation with its nine Central European partners had this aim in mind.

The Council reminds the Assembly that a status of association existing since 9th May 1994 between WEU and the associate partners is based on the following criteria :

- settlement of differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations from the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter and the generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- refraining from the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

This new status will therefore enable WEU and its associate partners to actively support, when appropriate, the conference for a pact on stability in Europe.

5. Paragraph 9 of the Kirchberg declaration adopted by the WEU ministerial Council states to this effect that " Ministers, in the context of the growing rôle of WEU for promoting peace, security and stability in Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues of common concern between WEU and Russia ".

6. The Council draws the Assembly's attention to paragraph 8 of the Kirchberg declaration which reads :

" Ministers reviewed the developments in the Mediterranean region and welcomed in particular the recent breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. Stressing the importance of security and stability in the Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe, they agreed further to develop the dialogue already initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean states. "

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.

7. The Council refers the Assembly to its reply to paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation 556.
8. As for co-ordinating with NATO the means available for crisis-management, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to paragraph 3 of the Kirchberg declaration in which ministers:

“ welcomed the summit's endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU's own planning procedures and capabilities.

(...)

Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command. ”

The Council also reminds the Assembly of paragraph 2 of the Luxembourg declaration of 22nd November 1993 in which ministers:

“ Welcoming the further development of close working links in Brussels between WEU and the alliance, they recalled that the relations between the two Organisations continued to be based on transparency and complementarity. They reaffirmed their decision to intensify their co-ordination on alliance issues representing an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance.

(...)

In future crises, WEU and NATO should hold consultations, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on whether and how they might co-operate. ”

9. The mission to the United Nations and to the CSCE of the country holding the WEU presidency acts as a contact point at the United Nations and at the CSCE. It is responsible for presenting WEU's contributions to the competent United Nations or CSCE bodies. Therefore the Council is of the opinion that WEU is already permanently represented in these two organisations.

10. The Council can assure the Assembly that member states, through the debates taking place at all levels, always make maximum efforts to seek political consensus, especially in the event of crises where WEU is likely to play a rôle. The Council considers the successful mounting of the Sharp Guard and Danube operations, as well as the deployment of a WEU police element in support of the EU administration in Mostar, to be excellent examples.

11. Expressing its satisfaction with the results of the contacts and meetings held so far by the WEU presidency and the Secretariat-General with representatives of the Maghreb countries in Brussels, the ministerial Council has decided to develop the dialogue further and to expand it gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean countries.

The Council will keep the Assembly informed of the development and the results of this dialogue.

12. The Council informs the Assembly that the presidency and the Secretary-General are willing to hold an exchange of views on issues of common concern with representatives of the ASEAN if so requested.

13. The Council has fully supported the United Nations' call for the ceasefire in Yemen to be respected immediately.

14. At the time of drafting this reply, the Council has already met five times since 17th June 1994 to discuss the situation in Rwanda. A number of member states confirmed their readiness to contribute to the initiative to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the population, subject to a new decision from the United Nations Security Council, taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of expanded UNAMIR. In this context, the Council has decided to give WEU's support to the efforts of its member states by ensuring the co-ordination of their contributions.

To this end, the Council confirmed the mandate given at its last meeting to the Planning Cell and instructed it to act as a contact and co-ordination point between contributing states and the headquarters commanding the operation.

The Council welcomes the readiness of certain African states to contribute to the international humanitarian efforts in Rwanda, which it considers essential.

The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Rwanda, notably in the light of decisions of the United Nations Security Council and of the activities of the European Union in this respect.

15. The Council is fully aware of the possible consequences of North Korea's nuclear policy and will inform the Assembly of any conclusions reached by the Council in this respect.

RECOMMENDATION 560¹

*on parliamentary co-operation with
the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 528, 547 and 548 requesting the Council to:
 - (a) Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue, duly organising discussions on topical questions, and including the states of Central Europe in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest;
 - (b) ensure that consultations held with the Central European states at Ministerial Council and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by the Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
 - (c) establish WEU information points in the capitals of the Central European states;
 - (d) develop WEU's relations with the countries of the Forum of Consultation by seeking greater cohesion with the work of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation giving it a structured programme of work, encompassing inter alia, joint development of risk and threat assessment;
- (ii) Stressing the importance for peace and stability in Europe of the consolidation of democratic structures and the success of economic reforms in the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
- (iii) Warmly welcoming the Council's decisions to associate the consultation partners more closely in the work of WEU;
- (iv) Welcoming the signature by several countries, members of the Forum of Consultation, of Europe Agreements with the European Union and wishing all members of the Forum of Consultation to become party to such agreements;
- (v) Stressing the importance, repeatedly confirmed in the Council's declarations, of the development of relations and co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the member states of the Forum of Consultation with a view to integrating these countries into European political and security structures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep the Assembly regularly informed on the activities of the Forum of Consultation and of decisions taken at meetings of the latter at ministerial and Permanent Council level and in the Counsellors' Group;
2. Invite the Assembly to participate on a regular basis in symposia and seminars on subjects of common interest to WEU and the Forum of Consultation, organised by WEU or by the Institute for Security Studies;
3. Ensure that the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council's own expressed wish.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (Document 1414).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 560***

1. The Council informs the Assembly that meetings within the Forum of Consultation have been suspended upon implementation of a status of association with WEU for the Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States. This also applies to meetings of the Counsellors' Group of the Forum of Consultation. Accordingly, meetings of the Forum of Consultation at ambassadorial level have already been replaced by meetings of the Council with associate partners, these meetings taking place at least twice a month.

The meetings of the Counsellors' Group have also been suspended; now the associate partners participate in the Council Working Group when it is preparing for Council meetings which they are to attend.

As far as information of the Assembly is concerned, the Council takes due note of this point and will treat it as a matter of priority to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly informed of its meetings, especially those at ministerial level. The current WEU presidency will also carry on the established tradition of meetings between the presidency and the Assembly's Presidential Committee immediately after the ministerial Councils.

2. The Council noted with great satisfaction the highly successful WEU seminar on peace-keeping, organised by the Luxembourg presidency and attended by representatives of 19 full, associate and observer members of WEU and of the Forum of Consultation and by representatives of the WEU parliamentary Assembly. The excellent work of the 77 participants greatly contributed to the success of the gathering.

Furthermore, the Council will ask the Director of the Institute for Security Studies to invite the Assembly whenever possible to seminars and symposia organised under its auspices.

3. As for ensuring that the Assembly has the adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the associate partners, the Council recalls an exchange of views held with the Assembly at the meeting between the Council and the Presidential Committee on 27th September 1994.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.

RECOMMENDATION 561¹*on the WEU Planning Cell – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 on strengthening WEU's operational rôle through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks;
- (iii) Welcoming the fact that in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU has confirmed the importance which they attach to the continued operational development of WEU;
- (iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence component of the European Union;
- (v) Welcoming the NATO summit meeting's decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU;
- (vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the highest priority to strengthening WEU's operational rôle;
- (vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition of WEU's requirements for the implementation of the CJTF concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and control structure providing the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations;
- (viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from NATO and national intelligence;
- (ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communiqué of NATO's January 1994 Brussels summit meeting,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to provide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU;
2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in the Petersberg declaration:
 - keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific operations;
 - preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices;
 - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;

while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the CJTF concept which is vital for WEU's operational rôle;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1421).

3. Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
4. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning Cell implement its basic tasks;
5. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York;
6. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace;
7. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a corresponding enlargement of its staff;
8. After assessing the Planning Cell's activities and its internal organisation by 1st October 1994, make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or establishing a military planning centre which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and other activities which the Council may have in mind;
9. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of discontinuity;
10. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staff members are remunerated in accordance with standards similar to those used for all other WEU staff.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 561

1. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly of paragraph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration issued by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994:

“ Ministers recalled the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands. ”

In the meantime the Netherlands presidency has circulated a draft discussion paper on this subject which will be discussed in the months to come.

The Council can therefore reassure the Assembly that the formulation of a common European defence policy is high on its agenda.

2. The Council informs the Assembly that the main point of focus of the Planning Cell's activities is the three tasks as formulated in the Petersberg declaration.

As far as participation in and work on the implementation of the CJTF concept is concerned, the PC, mandated by the Council, has made a preliminary analysis of the impact of CJTF on the WEU operational concept and has submitted it to the Council. The Council has decided to continue the work in a special Politico-Military Working Group. The terms of reference for this group were approved by the Council on 15th March. In accordance with these terms of reference, the PC is authorised to take part in the meetings of the group in order to support its work.

3. The Council informs the Assembly that an automated data processing (ADP) plan is being drawn up in the PC and the Secretariat-General. Its objective is to conclude the organisational and functional studies so that the PC and SG requirements can be defined.

4. As for the PC infrastructure and communication links with NATO, the Council informs the Assembly that the work completed in mid-April now provides a useful basis for further progress.

Furthermore, the Council informs the Assembly that through direct contact with the respective MODs, discussions with the Military Delegates and through the WEUCOM network, a good co-operation between national capitals and the PC is already in place. Relations between the Planning Cell and NATO are one aspect of the general dialogue that exists between the two organisations, which is aimed at ensuring complementarity and transparency, so that the Planning Cell may undertake its tasks in an effective manner.

5. The Council reminds the Assembly of its reply to Assembly Recommendation 542 on United Nations operations – interaction with WEU, and especially of paragraphs 4 and 5 which state:

“ 4. (...) WEU contributions in the field of planning and periodic contacts between the Planning Cell representatives and the United Nations staff responsible could be of real value. The Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to a letter dated 25th June 1993 from the WEU Secretary-General to his United Nations counterpart, in which it is planned to step up contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations.

“ 5. WEU is prepared to envisage, with the United Nations Secretary-General, the development of contacts and exchanges of information between the WEU Secretariat-General and Planning Cell on the one hand and the appropriate United Nations bodies on the other. ”

On the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations a meeting has taken place with representatives of several international organisations, i.a. WEU, on the topic of crisis-management.

6. The Council reminds the Assembly that there is no single, generally accepted definition or even terminology of “ peace support operations ” and related activities, and it must be borne in mind that it is a highly evolutive and dynamic concept. However, the Council is aware that there is a need to develop a common understanding of this concept, proceeding from the existing terminology as set out in the relevant

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.

United Nations, CSCE and NACC documents, including the United Nations Secretary General's agenda for peace; the latter also constituted the basis for the conceptual work on definitions of the 11th June 1993 "Report to ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peace-keeping".

Since the terminology used in this field is constantly changing, it is important to keep related definitions under review.

7. The Council draws the Assembly's attention to Part III of the Kirchberg declaration issued by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994.

Therein, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that:

"the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey may nominate officers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable WEU to draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the Petersberg declarations."

Furthermore, the Planning Cell review will be an opportunity to assess how the PC's capabilities can be further improved.

8. The Council does not wish to prejudge its decision in this respect, which will take full account of the findings and proposals of the PC, the military delegates, the DRG and the CHODS.

9. The Council can assure the Assembly that the rotation of PC personnel will be achieved as smoothly as possible, taking full account of the CHODS' deliberations on the rotation of the Director and Deputy Director appointments, from which the subsequent rotation of all other personnel will ensue.

10. The Council reminds the Assembly that all military personnel in the PC are paid nationally, whereas the remuneration of the civilian WEU staff is based on criteria common to the co-ordinated organisations.

As this issue is strictly national and is therefore not discussed in the Budget and Organisation Committee, the Council sees no scope for following up this part of the Assembly's recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION 562¹*on an operational organisation for WEU:
naval and maritime co-operation*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced of the importance of a WEU capacity to carry out naval and maritime operations, given the fragile nature of international relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at stake;
- (ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 confirmed WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally recognised the European defence identity;
- (iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single major NATO Commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command which, created by the Western Union, antedates NATO;
- (iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current naval, maritime and riverine operations;
- (v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to:
- " ...create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, air-borne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war; " (1988);
 - " ...give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
 - (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
 - (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult; " (1989);
 - "...examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force; " (1990);
 - " Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the same ends; " (1991);
 - " Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel – taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the Planning Cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge. " (1992);
 - " Re-examine the respective tasks and rôles of the United States and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination; " (1993),

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1415).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordinating national capabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring compatibility with NATO's naval doctrine wherever possible;
2. Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;
3. Consult the North Atlantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the European dimension in the new NATO command structure is not neglected – establishing WEU liaison teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution;
4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a "Mediterranean Committee" to encompass all Mediterranean full and associate members;
5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the Heads of European Navies forum a formal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy in conjunction with the Planning Cell;
6. Staff the Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the following areas:
 - joint task force planning;
 - command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
 - logistics (including transport by sea);
 - merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
 - policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
 - a coherent naval exercise policy and programme;
7. Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one carrier amongst appropriate member nations and to maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force;
8. Encourage the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug trafficking which undermines European security;
9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement – hulls as well as systems – through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dimension of satellite observation when developing WEU's Torrejón Satellite Centre and the WEU Earth Observation Satellite programme;
10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who participate in operations under the aegis of WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 562

1. Recognising the need to strengthen European co-operation on defence in the framework of WEU, WEU member states also pay more attention to maritime forces. WEU's usefulness for European co-ordination in crisis-management having been proven in maritime action in two Gulf wars and in the Adriatic, WEU member states have agreed to develop a mechanism for generating WEU maritime forces on a mission-oriented basis, as envisaged in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992.

The compatibility with NATO's naval doctrine and procedures is based on Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty and is ensured by the prevailing co-operative working methods of western navies.

2. The Council is aware of the need to establish links with European maritime bodies and countries wherever possible. The establishment of a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate for Maritime Transport could be set up in the framework of Annex IV to Chapter IV of the document on the implementation of the Treaty on European Union concerned with the links between the Union and WEU.

As for the development of links with appropriate international maritime agencies as well as with maritime-oriented non-member countries in strategic areas, it is generally agreed that the relevant diplomatic mission of the country holding the WEU presidency acts as a contact point for the organisation.

3. The Council considers that the disbandment of Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) and the absorption of this area into the Allied Command Europe (ACE) is the result of a careful assessment of evolving requirements mainly based on the changed politico-military situation in Europe and is not due to any neglect of the European dimension in the new NATO command structure.

Taking due note of the Assembly's recommendation to establish WEU liaison teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders, the Council will consider this recommendation in the context of the deepening working relations between WEU and NATO.

4. As stated in the Honourable Parliamentarian's report, on which the present recommendation is based, the decisions of the members of the Channel Committee not to abandon their independent rôle and to continue to meet and ensure the continuity of European interest in this important area is also considered very positive by the Council.

They constitute a high level forum whose advice will be of benefit to NATO as well as to WEU.

The same would apply for the establishment of a "Mediterranean Committee". This idea could be the subject of a preliminary examination by the Council's Mediterranean Group, reinforced by naval delegates from capitals.

5. The Heads of European Navies forum has a wider membership than WEU. It is intended to enhance maritime co-operation in Europe, from which also WEU will benefit.

6. Although personnel from the navies of member countries are represented in all operational sections of the Planning Cell, the question of adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel on the PC staff can only be thoroughly addressed once the issues of rotation of PC personnel and the review of the internal organisation have been examined.

As regards the development of co-operation in the areas of:

- joint task force planning;
- command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
- logistics (including transport by sea);
- merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ships as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
- policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
- a coherent naval exercise policy and programme

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 31st October 1994.

these aspects are covered to a large extent by the PC's work on the

- WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour
- list of FAWEU
- WEU strategic mobility study
- WEU generic evacuation planning
- WEU command and control
- the PC's exercise observation activity
- study on multinational formations
- intelligence policy long-term objectives,

and by virtue of the experience gained from two operations in the Gulf and the current combined operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.

7. The Council informs the Assembly that maritime assets can also be FAWEU.

In accordance with its terms of reference, the PC is tasked to compile a list of FAWEU and a questionnaire was prepared and distributed to nations. The aim was to produce a list of FAWEU from which appropriate force packages for use in future planning could be developed. A detailed progress report on FAWEU activity has been forwarded for the information of ministers. Meanwhile, the process of checking the individual contributions with the nations concerned is proceeding. It is intended that the complete list of FAWEU should be ready for the next ministerial meeting in autumn.

As far as the maintaining and furthering of amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force is concerned, the Council considers that the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force is a readily available large unit that is already available for military tasks under WEU auspices.

8. The Council considers that the fight against drug trafficking at European level is the responsibility of the European Union pursuant to the "provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs" in the Treaty on European Union.

WEU remains fully prepared to play its rôle in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Maastricht declaration to respond to requests from the European Union concerning its decisions and actions having defence implications.

9. The Council takes note of the Assembly's recommendation to "seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement - hulls as well as systems - through the Western European Armaments Group".

This recommendation could be the subject of a preliminary examination by the Euro-longterm Sea Sub-Group, whose aim is to promote effective long-term military planning by establishing a sound conceptual basis for co-operation between WEU nations with a view to determining military capabilities and equipment requirements beyond a ten year time-frame. In the meantime, work continues in the WEAG towards the opening of defence markets through competition and the maximisation of opportunities for European collaboration through the harmonisation of requirements.

Since the main tasks of the WEU Satellite Centre are aimed at:

- treaty verification;
- various aspects of crisis-monitoring;
- environmental monitoring,

which all have a maritime and naval dimension, the Council can assure the Assembly that this dimension will be taken fully into consideration when developing the WEU Satellite Centre and deciding on the WEU earth observation system.

10. The Council fully endorses the Assembly's recommendation to create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who participate in operations under the aegis of WEU. The presidency is preparing a proposal in this respect.

RECOMMENDATION 563¹

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1994²***

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that:

- (a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1994;
- (b) the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to the study on medium- and long-term studies on space and section E to the Planning Cell;
- (c) the Torrejón Satellite Centre has entered its second experimental phase and the Ministerial Council is proposing to discuss the future of the Centre towards the end of 1994;
- (d) the Council has allocated WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1994 under a special procedure and that this budget is financed by thirteen countries;
- (e) the Council still has not undertaken the study recommended earlier by the Assembly leading to possible approval of a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Communicate to it any decisions that are taken on the operation of the Torrejón Satellite Centre after completion of the experimental phase at the end of 1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrangements for the preparation and management of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance scheme upon termination of the current agreement with the health insurance branch of the French national social security scheme.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Covi on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1425).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 563***

1. The Council will keep the Assembly duly informed by means of regular reports on the decisions it will take on the operation of the WEU Satellite Centre after the completion of the experimental phase.

2. The Council informs the Assembly that the 1994 WEAG budget has already been approved by the National Armaments Directors (NADs), the Budget and Organisation Committee and the Council. Calls for contributions were also issued after the approval.

As for the remaining budget-balance of the Permanent Secretariat of WEAG in Lisbon, this has been transferred to WEU Brussels and will be reimbursed in 1994 (or carried over to 1995 if member states prefer).

The WEAG budget is in preparation.

3. The Council considers that the necessary measures to be taken for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance scheme should be considered in the general context of relations with the host country; the Council could ask the Head of Administration of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to consider this question in greater detail.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1994.

RECOMMENDATION 564¹*on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the large reductions in both the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals as a consequence of the START I and START II treaties and the end of the cold war;
- (ii) Conscious that START I and START II will not be fully implemented before the year 2003;
- (iii) Noting that the United States is at present making a full reassessment of its nuclear posture and is showing true political determination to prepare a new reduction in strategic arsenals in the framework of a future START III treaty;
- (iv) Noting, however, that Russia, for its part, is increasingly tempted, mainly due to the decline of its conventional forces, to make its strategic nuclear capability the centrepiece of its defence policy;
- (v) Assessing present political instability in Russia and the former Soviet republics and the ensuing dangers;
- (vi) Noting that there are still doubts about whether Russia really wishes to ratify and implement the START II treaty;
- (vii) Noting that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the signing of the historic nuclear arms reduction treaties, the mutual relationship of deterrence between Russia and the western nuclear powers is still topical, including the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons which is still the keystone of the doctrine of deterrence everywhere;
- (viii) Noting that, notwithstanding recent efforts to establish confidence between the former cold war adversaries at the level of political leaders and experts, there is still an astonishing lack of reciprocal confidence, wish for transparency and mutual understanding in many other circles;
- (ix) Conscious that if greater account is not taken of lingering suspicions, prejudices and fundamental differences in military doctrines and diverging interests in foreign policy, the establishment of new relationships of security, stability and confidence between the members of the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and of the Russian Federation on the other may be jeopardised;
- (x) Hoping, in this respect, that Russia will agree to join the partnership for peace proposal proposed by the Atlantic Alliance;
- (xi) Welcoming the bilateral agreements reached between the United States and Russia and the United Kingdom and Russia to detarget nuclear arms, even if the value of these agreements is symbolic rather than intrinsic;
- (xii) Believing that other measures, such as taking most strategic missiles off alert status and separating nuclear warheads from their missiles should be envisaged;
- (xiii) Expressing in general the wish that the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should be replaced by a policy of mutual assured co-operation (MAC);
- (xiv) Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy " which might in time lead to a common defence " without closely examining the rôle of the French and British nuclear forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European Union;
- (xv) Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine which among other things has confirmed that there are many points of convergence in the assessments made by the two countries;
- (xvi) Aware that the existence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia continues to determine the structure and deployment of the nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1420).

(xvii) Noting that, regarding proliferation, there are doubts about whether the possession of nuclear weapons by the official nuclear weapon states plays a rôle in deterring third countries from procuring their own nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;

(xviii) Recognising that, particularly in the United States, the weight of nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war tends to diminish while extended nuclear deterrence is also losing credibility;

(xix) Noting that the 700 United States B-61 nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe after NATO's October 1991 decision play a purely political and symbolic rôle;

(xx) Noting that, increasingly, nuclear deterrence in circumstances today is truly credible only if the vital interests of a nation or group of nations are under direct threat from the power to be deterred;

(xxi) Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework of WEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital interests which are protected by their nuclear means;

(xxii) Regretting that there is not sufficient cohesion in the defence policies of European countries and, despite bold general declarations, there is not yet cohesion and understanding between our countries regarding the development and future of their strategic relationship with Russia, although this would be indispensable for introducing any lasting system of security in Europe;

(xxiii) Welcoming the granting of associate status to the Central European countries of the Forum of Consultation;

(xxiv) Emphasising, however, that WEU's policy of stronger security links with its Central European partners will contribute little to Europe's security if it is not accompanied by frequent political and military consultations with Russia and the other European republics of the CIS aiming at the establishment of a strategic relationship based on a thorough understanding of, and respect for mutual interests;

(xxv) Noting that it is of the greatest importance to intensify and further improve international co-operation in the struggle against proliferation, in particular by extending the non-proliferation treaty in 1995, improving the missile technology control régime and establishing a follow-up organisation with extended membership as a successor to Cocom;

(xxvi) Aware that none of these existing or future non-proliferation régimes can guarantee that a country with sufficient financial resources and zeal will not acquire ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction;

(xxvii) Noting that there is an urgent need for a coherent and co-ordinated policy among official nuclear weapon states to cover contingencies in which a proliferant third country might threaten to use a nuclear weapon;

(xxviii) Recognising that there is a need to define a coherent European counter-proliferation policy, drawing inspiration from the discussions which are already being held in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance following the recent United States initiative;

(xxix) Recalling the results of the Assembly's Rome symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe (20th-21st April 1993) and in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the Council decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system for Europe;

(xxx) Taking note of the fact that the WEU Council, in its reply to Recommendation 540, has pointed out that nuclear questions are not, at the present time, on its agenda;

(xxxi) Insisting, however, that the preceding considerations should be an incentive to redefine the rôle of nuclear weapons for the security of Europe, realising that they cannot be disinvented and, if only for that reason, they will continue to be deployed and will continue to play an important rôle in the foreseeable future in international relations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Establish a strategic study group within WEU:
 - to examine the rôle and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;

- to examine the rôle all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear strategy;
 - then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear co-ordination body within WEU;
 - to examine the military aspects of an active European counter-proliferation policy;
 - to examine the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons;
2. Take steps to intensify relations with the European republics of the CIS, in particular Russia and Ukraine, in particular to ensure that the definition of a European defence identity does not arouse new suspicion or provoke reactions which might run counter to the final goal of creating a collective European security order;
 3. Ensure that the abovementioned initiatives are pursued in an atmosphere of absolute transparency with Western Europe's North American allies in order to make certain that they support the development of a European security and defence identity.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 564

1. Under the present circumstances there is for European defence, for the foreseeable future, no alternative for a strategy - to protect peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion - based on conventional and nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable.

Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field. In addition to their rôle of national deterrent, the British and French nuclear weapons contribute to the global deterrence of the North Atlantic Alliance and Europe in accordance with the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 1974 in Ottawa, and the The Hague platform of WEU of 1987. NATO's new strategic concept of 1991 has recognised that "the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent rôle of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the allies."

In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers recalled the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, which might lead in time to a common defence compatible with the alliance. In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at the next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands.

As far as the examination of military aspects of a European non-proliferation policy are concerned, the Council informs the Assembly that with the alliance policy framework on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 9th June 1994, NATO has been directed to consider the areas to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts, to reduce the proliferation threat and to develop the protection against it.

In accordance with the strategic concept, the alliance also serves as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issue that affects the members' vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

In this context, the Council believes that WEU meetings on non-proliferation should take place on an ad hoc basis and back-to-back with NATO's Defence Proliferation Group, when there is a rôle for WEU to contribute to work on proliferation.

Furthermore, the Council refers to efforts in the field of non-proliferation within the framework of the CFSP, notably the joint action regarding the extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Considering that "the examination of the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons" is an issue of common concern, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the language of paragraph 9 of the Kirchberg declaration:

"Ministers, in the context of the growing rôle of WEU for promoting peace, security and stability in Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues of common concern between WEU and Russia.

Ministers welcomed the Moscow trilateral statement on 14th January 1994 on the elimination of nuclear arms from Ukraine as an important contribution to security and stability in Europe. They agreed that the fulfilment of these commitments widens the basis for the development of dialogue and exchanges of information with Ukraine on issues of common concern. Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to examine appropriate ways in order to achieve this objective."

2. The Council is of the view that developing dialogue and exchange of information with Russia and Ukraine will lead to full understanding on the part of our interlocutors of the nature of the developing European security and defence identity.

3. The Council recalls that the relations between WEU and NATO continue to be based on transparency and complementarity, as already often underlined in WEU's ministerial communiqués and declarations.

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.

*First part of the fortieth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly*

(1st January to 30th June 1994)

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ANNEX

Kirchberg declaration, Luxembourg, 9th May 1994 (see Document 1422, Volume I, June 1994)

I. Introduction

The reactivation of WEU was completed with its member states' adoption of the WEU declaration of Maastricht in November 1991. A first and particularly fruitful phase in the history of the reactivated organisation came to an end with the Kirchberg declaration and the switch from annual to six-monthly presidencies of the WEU Council.

With enlargement to include nine Central European associate partners, 24 countries now sit on the Council for consultation and joint thinking on the conditions for European security, including its operational aspects. This major step forward towards constructing the security dimension of Europe is the outcome of a political initiative of the utmost importance, developed in the context of the rapprochement between the states of Central Europe and the European Union. WEU is thus in the forefront of the process of preparing for the accession of these states to the Union and, as a consequence, to WEU. It is also called upon to contribute towards implementing other forms of

co-operation - the partnership for peace and the stability pact - whose aim it is to defuse conflicts in the continent of Europe.

Lastly, the Kirchberg declaration reflects The Hague platform, in that the Ministerial Council has directed the Permanent Council to begin work on defining a common European defence policy. The preliminary conclusions will be presented to the Ministerial Council to be held in Noordwijk in November 1994. WEU is thus embarking once again upon deepening the doctrinal and operational concepts of a European defence, viewed as an essential element of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military tool designed to support joint actions defined and conducted by the European Union under the common foreign and security policy.

In setting up a Politico-Military Working Group, the Council has also acquired the means of conducting thinking within WEU on European requirements for the effective use of multinational joint force packages, where appropriate under its command. WEU will thus help to gear the alian-

ce's command structures to the demands for rapid, flexible reaction and to the modalities for making the alliance's collective assets available on the basis of consultations within the North Atlantic Council.

As regards the new operational missions defined in the Petersberg declaration, a basic document on peace-keeping operations has been presented to ministers, who have taken note. In planning the organisation and supervision of Mostar police under the administration mandate given to the European Union, WEU has once again demonstrated its flexibility and readiness to exercise responsibilities outside the strictly military field.

WEU is now in a position to become an operational organisation that can meet the expectations of its member states and, within the framework of its institutional autonomy, carry out any mandates it may be given.

II. Activities of the Permanent Council and the Council Working Group

Apart from those meetings where circumstances dictated that a specific subject be addressed, the Council's agendas have continued to contain an item devoted to the report on working group meetings and an item on topical questions.

The Permanent Council has paid particular attention to the preparation of draft decisions for submission to the Ministerial Council and to their implementation once adopted. In the context of relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the Council unanimously welcomed the spirit of the deliberations of the heads of state and government of the alliance and their intentions and initiatives set out in the summit declaration, in particular the full support given to the development of a European security and defence identity within the renewed transatlantic partnership and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through WEU.

The Council also welcomed the readiness of the alliance to make available its collective assets, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for Western European Union operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy.

In the spirit of complementarity and transparency needed for the effective implementation of the work of both organisations, the Council kept regularly on its agenda all the issues which had emerged from the summit.

The Council agreed on the text of the terms of reference for a Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) operating under the Council's

authority, as part of the follow-up to the declaration by the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg and to the alliance summit, especially aspects of the emergence of a European security and defence identity (ESDI).

The Council discussed relations between WEU and the European Union, and more specifically the implementation of Annex IV, concerning working relations between the WEU Secretariat-General and the EU Council Secretariat as well as relations with the European Commission.

The Council has been kept directly informed on the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, the establishment of the Satellite Centre in Torrejón and the work of the Planning Cell. It has continued to acknowledge the vital importance of the institutional dialogue with the Assembly, and followed with great interest the debates and votes of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session. Lastly, the Council took a number of administrative and budgetary decisions on the basis of opinions submitted by the Budget and Organisation Committee.

Apart from preparing the ground for the Permanent Council's discussions, the Council Working Group's agenda ranged over specific questions concerning the implementation of the modalities document in the status of association, evacuation planning, the formulation of criteria for receiving high-ranking officials, staff recruitment procedures, use of the WEUCOM network, the possible purchase of the WEU building in Brussels, the residual functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the arrangement of meetings of the Council and its working groups as well as participation in the session of the WEU parliamentary Assembly.

(a) Topical questions

(i) Situation in former Yugoslavia

The Greek Representative, on behalf of the presidency of the Twelve, has regularly briefed the Permanent Council on the activities and démarches of the European Community aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

The Permanent Council has closely monitored developments on the ground, its discussions focusing on the implementation of the Danube embargo, participation of naval forces of WEU member states in the Adriatic embargo, and WEU's police contribution to the EU's administration of the Mostar district. The Experts Groups and the Mostar Working Group, in co-operation with the Planning Cell, dealt mainly with this possibility.

The presidency has regularly briefed the Council on developments in the WEU Danube operation. The Council discussed the "Han Kubrat" incident involving a convoy carrying some 5 000 tonnes of fuel which, on 5th March 1994, refused to stop when challenged. The findings of the enquiry carried out by the Bulgarian authorities showed that this was clearly a criminal act in which the threat of environmental terrorism prevented any intervention by force. Following this incident, Bulgaria and Romania have taken additional administrative and legal measures to prevent any recurrence.

The Council also closely followed the conduct of the WEU/NATO combined operation Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo in the Adriatic.

The main point of focus of the Council's discussions on the situation in former Yugoslavia was the WEU police contribution to the European Union administration in Mostar.

Following the Washington agreement between the Croats and the Bosnians, WEU was approached for a possible contribution to the EU administration of Mostar, as envisaged by this agreement. WEU has, at the request of the EU, focused on the possibility of a contribution to the supervision of the local police forces, their future organisation as a single, unified force and some of the ways in which WEU could contribute to the discharge of police duties.

The missions of the WEU police contribution to the European Union administration in Mostar would consist in providing advice for the EU administrator, recruitment and training of local police forces, assistance in establishing appropriate communications systems and participation in police functions.

WEU's involvement is contingent upon the negotiations on Mostar between the European Union's troika and the parties on the spot. Throughout the negotiations, the presidency has kept in close touch with the EU bodies and has been involved in the negotiations with the parties on the ground. Likewise, WEU has taken part in the preparatory mission decided on by the European Union.

At this mission's request, WEU sent two senior police experts to Mostar to act as advisers to this mission, to examine the conditions under which WEU might contribute police forces and to promote confidence-building measures between the local forces to help create those conditions.

The Mostar Council Working Group also discussed draft personnel requirements, initial costs for establishing the WEU police element in Mostar, organisational aspects and the distribution of financial responsibilities between WEU and the EU.

(ii) *Situation in Rwanda*

The WEU Permanent Council met on 17th and 21st June to discuss the situation in Rwanda.

A number of member states confirmed their readiness to contribute to the initiative to alleviate the terrible sufferings in Rwanda, subject to a new decision from the United Nations Security Council, taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of the expanded UNAMIR II.

In this context, the Council has decided to give WEU's support to the efforts of its member states by co-ordinating their contributions.

To this end, the Council confirmed the mandate given at its first meeting to the Planning Cell and instructed it to act as a contact and co-ordination point between contributing states and the headquarters commanding the operation.

The Council welcomed the readiness of certain African states to contribute to the international humanitarian efforts in Rwanda.

The Council continued to monitor the situation in Rwanda in the light of the decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

(iii) *Relations with the countries of Central Europe*

At their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers reaffirmed the importance they attached to WEU's relations with Central European consultation partners. In this context, ministers requested the Permanent Council to reflect on an enhanced status and its content, including the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993, for those consultation partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Union. Thereafter, the Permanent Council undertook to define the precise modalities by which its relations with its consultation partners could be qualitatively enhanced.

On 17th January, the Counsellor's Group of the Forum of Consultation met to prepare for a meeting at ambassadorial level on 25th January; that meeting provided an opportunity for a detailed exchange of views on their preferences as regards the content of the enhanced status likely to be offered them.

In the light of these discussions, the WEU Council formulated proposals on an enhanced status to be submitted to consultation partners.

The enhanced status which was subsequently proposed reflected the Council's wish firstly to bind these countries more closely into a security relationship with Western Europe and secondly to enhance their relations with WEU, the defence component of the European Union, at a

time when they were developing their links with the European Union itself in the perspective of becoming a member of the Union in the future.

The last meeting of the Forum of Consultation before formal approval of the status of association took place at ambassadorial level on 3rd May 1994.

The Forum had a final exchange of views on the proposed enhanced status and prepared the meeting of the Forum of Consultation at ministerial level to be held on 9th May 1994 in Luxembourg. Partners discussed the ministerial agenda, the draft communiqué and organisational arrangements.

Meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, the WEU Council of Ministers and the ministers for foreign affairs and defence of the nine partners in the Forum of Consultation agreed on the status whereby the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic will become associate partners of WEU.

Following the WEU Ministerial Council, the first Permanent Council meeting with the associate partners took place on 27th May. The Council "at 24" has met three times since the new status entered into effect. Its agenda has covered topical questions, information on WEU activities, the follow-up to the Kirchberg declaration, the European security environment and the situation in former Yugoslavia.

Several government representatives from the states of Central Europe paid courtesy calls on the WEU headquarters: on 27th January, the Lithuanian President, Mr. Algirdas Brazauskas; on 3rd February, the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Waldemar Pawlak; on 14th February, the Latvian Prime Minister, Mr. Valdis Birkovs and, on 8th March, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Geza Jeszenszky.

On 6th-8th April the Secretary-General paid a visit to the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his deputy and the Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.

The Institute for Security Studies has continued to play an important rôle in WEU's contacts with the countries of Central Europe.

III. Activities of the intergovernmental bodies

(a) Council working groups

At each of its meetings, the Council took note of the results of its working groups' activities since the previous meeting. The summary records were discussed as necessary.

(b) WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

The Institute Director attended all those Council meetings where the agenda warranted his presence. The Institutes' quarterly reports to the Council provided an opportunity for exchanges of view on the current work of the ISS.

(c) WEU Satellite Centre

The Centre's Director attended Council meetings to brief the Council on the progress of the Centre's activities during its experimental period.

IV. Activities of the Special Working Group

The Special Working Group had only one meeting during the first half of the year. The meeting focused almost exclusively on the enhanced status to be offered to the consultation partners. The group discussed the four main subjects in connection with the offer: the nature of the enhanced status and the document to be agreed, the scope of the enhanced status, the arrangements for enhanced political consultations and participation in WEU's activities.

The results of the SWG's discussions were thereafter submitted to the Council for further consideration.

The SWG also had an exchange of views on the document of WEU's rôle in peace-keeping and on anti-missile defence, notably in the light of the decisions of the NATO summit.

V. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group

Pursuant to the mandates given by the Permanent Council, the Defence Representatives Group, in close co-operation with the Planning Cell, focused on the following issues:

- Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and humanitarian missions
- WEU involvement in peace-keeping missions
- Air-maritime co-operation
- WEU command and control
- Strategic mobility

Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and humanitarian missions: In close co-operation with the nations replying to the defence planning questionnaire (DPQ) and an additional WEU-related questionnaire, a full list of FAWEU indica-

ted by the nations, including certain forces identified as especially suited for humanitarian operations, is being compiled and will be completed for the next ministerial meeting. Further to the proposal from one of the partners on force modules for humanitarian operations, the Planning Cell has undertaken to contact the military authorities in the various states to finalise the list of these forces.

WEU involvement in peace-keeping missions: The DRG finalised its examination of the operational document drawn up by the Planning Cell which formed part of the report to ministers on WEU's rôle in peace-keeping.

Air-maritime co-operation: The DRG finalised its work on WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour (which is designed to provide a mechanism for the generation and deployment of WEU maritime forces in accordance with the Petersberg declaration). The operation plan was endorsed by the CHODs at their meeting on 29th March 1994, and was approved by the Council of Ministers.

WEU command and control: The DRG has examined the analysis made by the Planning Cell of the possible structures for the Command and Control of WEU operations. The DRG placed this subject among the priorities on its agenda.

Strategic mobility: The DRG supported the Planning Cell in producing the WEU strategic study by providing co-ordination. Details of the study are contained in the Planning Cell's report.

Among the other specific tasks carried out by the group, mention should be made of:

- the preparation of the agenda for the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 29th March 1994,
- examination of the follow-up to be given to the CHOD and ministerial meetings,
- examination of the issue of generic planning,
- examination of future DRG activities,
- the issue of vacancies in the Planning Cell.

VI. Activities of the Planning Cell

Further progress has been made in the areas of the Planning Cell's overall organisation and planning capability. The Planning Cell's main effort was in long-term planning activity concerning the future modus operandi of the WEU. In addition the Planning Cell has been involved in several areas of contingency activity including Sharp Guard, Mostar and Rwanda.

In more detail, the work of the Planning Cell has centred on the following topics:

WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour (WEU OPLAN 001): The aim of this OPLAN is to provide a mechanism for the generation and deployment of WEU maritime forces (WEU-MARFOR) in response to a specific requirement of the WEU Council in order to accomplish missions in accordance with the Petersberg declaration. During their meeting on 9th May, the ministers approved the document.

List of FAWEU: One of the Planning Cell's terms of reference is to compile a list of FAWEU, and a questionnaire has been prepared and distributed to nations. The aim was to produce a list of FAWEU from which could be developed appropriate force packages for use in future planning and in which specific forces for employment in humanitarian operations could be identified. Meanwhile, the process of checking individual contributions with the nations concerned is proceeding.

WEU-related aspects of the adaption of alliance structures: After the meeting of NATO ministers in January, the Planning Cell immediately began an internal study on the needs and the possible ways ahead to implement the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept which emerged from the summit declaration. Mandated by the Council, the Planning Cell made a preliminary analysis of the impact of CJTF on the WEU operational concept and submitted it to the Council in February. The Council decided to continue the work in a specific CJTF politico-military working group. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Planning Cell is authorised to take part in the meetings of the group to support its work.

WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS): The study is being conducted in two phases. Phase 1 evaluates the WEU's current strategic mobility capabilities. Phase 2 of the study will define a WEU strategic mobility concept to improve WEU's current capabilities in the field of strategic mobility. During phase 2, it will be essential to co-ordinate the Planning Cell's work with that of NATO's new Movement, Transportation and Mobility Management Advisory Group (MAG), in order to comply with the CHODs directive that the WEU strategic mobility capability should be complementary to and compatible with that of NATO. At their meeting on 29th March 1994, the CHODs endorsed the methodology for the study and supported the Planning Cell's participation in the NATO/MAG.

WEU involvement in peace-keeping missions: The Planning Cell drafted the operational part of the document "WEU involvement in peace-keeping missions". This document describes basic principles, the conditions for any

WEU involvement, the missions and tasks of peace-keeping forces, generic planning considerations and the characteristics and composition of forces. The operational part was finalised and integrated into the overall paper of the DRG.

WEU humanitarian missions: The field of humanitarian missions remains a key area of future work for the Planning Cell, building on the recommendations made in the report CM (93) 19 to ministers on 22nd November 1993. A data base for contingency planning, created in parallel with the work on the list of FAWEU, is at an advanced stage. Some preliminary links with other international organisations are already well developed, particularly with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and the European Community Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO).

WEU generic evacuation planning: In the area of humanitarian missions, the Planning Cell received a mandate from the Permanent Council in September 1993 to prepare a report on a possible contribution by WEU in the field of evacuation planning of the EU. In parallel with this work, the Planning Cell developed a draft generic plan on evacuation. In January the report, together with a second draft of the generic plan, was sent to the CWG. Currently, a third draft plan is being studied in capitals. In this context, the Planning Cell has undertaken a study of lessons learned in the Rwanda evacuation operation.

WEU - command and control: A "first step analysis of command and control of WEU operations" was distributed in March to all military delegates as a starting point for further debate. The matter is particularly relevant in the context of the emerging CJTF concept. In this initial phase, the C2 study is being conducted at a purely technical level.

Exercise activity: In accordance with WEU exercise policy, the Planning Cell is in close liaison with the United Kingdom Planning Staff for CPX Purple Nova 1994 (humanitarian missions). It will be the first time that such an exercise is planned and conducted within a WEU framework. Spain is the host nation for the trinational (with France and Italy) FTX Tramontana (evacuation). Other WEU member nations may also participate. Within both exercises, the Planning Cell's aims include the analysis of command, control and communications structures for WEU evacuation operations and a study of HQ SOP and ROEs.

Rotation of Planning Cell personnel and review of internal organisation: CHODs had invited the Planning Cell and the military delegates to examine the timetable and procedures for the rotation of Planning Cell personnel and, by 1st October 1994, to review the internal organisation of the Planning Cell. In March, the Planning Cell

submitted to military delegates its analysis of the rotation of Planning Cell personnel. It presented the means to achieve rotation with a minimum of discontinuity and included a timetable for the way ahead. This document was forwarded to the CHODs for their consideration. With regard to the review of its internal organisation the Planning Cell will present a detailed report in July/August 1994.

WEU headquarters ADP (automatic data processing) plan: At their meeting in December 1993, the Communications Information System Committee (CISC) recommended that information from the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell related to the ADP plan should be gathered by a team tasked with the subject. The CIS section of the Planning Cell was tasked to lead the team. In the short term the objective is to conclude the organisational and functional studies, in order to define Planning Cell and Secretariat-General requirements. Later, with the co-operation of national ADP experts, the security requirements and the technical concept will be defined. The final goal is to identify an implementation strategy for the ADP plan. Work with the Secretariat started on 11th March 1994 and a series of actions are ongoing in order to complete the plan as soon as possible.

Contingency activity: The Planning Cell presents weekly written reports to the Permanent Council with the aim of informing the Council about developments in the situation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, current operations like Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the ongoing Danube embargo operation.

In December 1993, the Planning Cell submitted a general plan to the Council for the possible contribution by WEU to the EU Administration in Mostar in the field of medical assistance, underlining that, as the situation changes, the plan will have to be updated based on accurate information provided by forces in the field and/or fact-finding missions sponsored by the EU. In April, under the aegis of the EU, two members of the Planning Cell joined an advance party to prepare for a the EU administration for Mostar. Their specific responsibility was to assess the security environment.

Most recently, in the context of the Rwanda activities, the Planning Cell, as mandated by the Council acts as a contact and co-ordination point between contributing states and the headquarters commanding the operation.

Linkage with other institutions and fora: Planning Cell personnel have been involved in a wide range of other activities including:

- active participation in the WEU peace-keeping seminar in Luxembourg (February 93);

- attendance of relevant courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau;
- attendance of meetings within the relevant fora of:
 - the United Nations,
 - NATO, including regular informal working level discussions with designated POCs within IMS and SHAPE,
 - the European Union, and
 - WEU fora, including WEAG (Western European Armaments Group), WELG (Western European Logistic Group), Eurolongterm and Eurocom.

VII. Activities of the Space Group

(i) The group's meetings were partially devoted to monitoring progress with the setting up of the Satellite Centre on the site and in the building provided by the Spanish Government at the Torrejón airbase. The group heard regular reports by the Director of the Satellite Centre on its recent activities.

The Council and member states continued to give the Centre a number of experimental tasks, and prototype dossiers have been produced.

The group also furthered its discussions on the need for contacts between the Satellite Centre and NATO and the possibility of acquiring imagery commercially from new sources.

(ii) Having assessed the Consortium's MSFS report, the SMT produced a final report which was discussed by the Space Group. In the light of the conclusions of this report, the group presented a calendar of activities and decisions for the approval of ministers.

Subsequently, meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, the WEU Ministerial Council:

“ ... tasked the Space Group to prepare, for their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for decision, including the preparation of a draft memorandum of understanding containing the detailed specifications, to be concluded between the present WEU member states. ”

In the meeting following the WEU Ministerial Council, the Space Group focused its attention mainly on the follow-up of the decisions taken by the WEU Council of Ministers on the activities of the Space Group.

(iii) Lastly, the group furthered its discussion on the regulations applying to future equipment procurement.

VIII. Activities of the Open Skies Working Group

During the last six months, the Open Skies Experts Group has made substantial progress.

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) for WEU as a group of states parties under the Open Skies Treaty have been developed in further detail. When fully agreed, the SOPs will be referred to WEU ministers for approval. The group is confident that negotiations can be finalised by November 1994.

Since the SOPs also have implications for other states parties to the treaty, the group asked WEU ministers' permission that the presidency give a briefing on those principles at the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) in Vienna to other states parties to the treaty. The acting presidency has explained and defended its views with regard to the kind of group of states parties its members form on 16th May in Vienna.

Two trial flights have taken place at the initiative of the United Kingdom in order to test the draft SOPs in as realistic a situation as possible. The United Kingdom, Germany, France and the acting Netherlands presidency were involved in the flights, and other WEU members were invited to be present at the mission planning consultations and the demonstration flight. The trials proved to be very useful and resulted in several practical recommendations that have found their way into the SOPs.

IX. Activities of the Mediterranean Group

At the three meetings of the Mediterranean Group held since December 1993, there was discussion and adoption of general terms of reference which will provide the framework for the group's future activities; the topics to be discussed will be defined and agreed on a case-by-case basis.

In its future activities, the WEU Mediterranean Group will take account of the implications for its work of:

- the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the implementation of the CFSP, WEU's rôle as the defence component of the European Union and measures aimed at ensuring close co-operation between the European Union and WEU;
- the close working relations between WEU and NATO, based on transparency and complementarity.

At the Council's request, the Mediterranean Group will undertake an analysis of such questions referred to it by the Council and may be

assigned aspects of the work of other groups coming within its field of competence. The group may continue to call, via the Council, on the expertise of the Institute for Security Studies.

Having considered the stage of the development reached in the dialogue with the Maghreb countries, the group proposed that Egypt be included in this dialogue and that the dialogue be placed on a multilateral basis at experts level. It submitted for ministers' approval the terms of reference which it approved at its meeting on 21st April 1994, as well as a mandate for the dialogue with non-WEU Mediterranean countries.

The group had an exchange of views on the practical modalities of the twice-yearly sessions of the group with experts nominated by the governments of the non-WEU countries participating in the dialogue to be organised following the ministerial mandate given to this effect on 9th May 1994.

X. Transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup activities

(i) At the direction of the WEU Council at 13, the prime aim of Eurocom is to promote interoperability between tactical communications systems of the land forces of the WEU nations. A subsidiary aim is to exploit opportunities for interdependence in systems and equipment development and production, thereby making the best uses of national resources. So far, Eurocom has pursued these aims by agreeing and documenting the necessary operational requirements and system parameters recorded on baseline documents:

- a document which defines operational concepts, requirements and performance characteristics;
- a document which defines basic system parameters and one which defines the enhanced system;
- a document which defines interoperability test specifications.

(ii) The aim of Eurolongterm is to promote effective long-term military planning by establishing a sound conceptual basis for co-operation between WEU nations with a view to determining military capabilities and equipment requirements beyond a 10-year time-frame.

Upon transfer to WEU from 1st January 1994, Eurolongterm has given priority to its organisation in WEU context and to the identification of its way ahead. The Eurolongterm Steering Group is currently drafting new terms of reference for its activities.

(iii) The transfer to Western European Union of Eurogroup's publicity activities became effective

on 1st January 1994. Since their transfer, these activities have been the responsibility of the Council Working Group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities (CWG/TPA). The chairmanship will continue to rotate among these nations on 1st July each year. The current Norwegian chairmanship ends on 30th June 1994. The United Kingdom assumes the chairmanship on 1st July 1994.

The transatlantic publicity activities offer various opportunities to convey European views to a range of audiences. They have been structured around the following activities:

- a seminar in Europe in the spring, organised by the chairmanship;
- a ministerial-level conference in Washington in June, also organised by the chairmanship;
- panel tours to North American cities in the autumn, co-ordinated by the chairmanship with the assistance of other nations.

Since the transfer became effective, the Council Working Group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities has met six times at the WEU Secretariat under the Norwegian chairmanship.

During these meetings, the group has discussed its planned activities in 1994, their budgetary aspects and the choice of the chairmanship. The group prepared the annual seminar in Europe, held in Bodø (Norway) from 31st May to 1st June 1994. The group has also prepared the Washington conference on WEU-European security and defence identity and the strengthening of transatlantic security, held on 20th-21st June. The group has also discussed the organisation of panel tours to North America in autumn 1994.

XI. Activities of the Western European Armaments Group ("at 13")

The WEAG National Armaments Directors met at WEU in Brussels on 18th March 1994, under Danish chairmanship. In a discussion on the future development of European co-operation on armaments matters, they confirmed the need to develop and enhance that co-operation, realising that it would call for not only a determined commitment on the part of nations but also further political guidance from defence ministers. NADs also agreed that the Euclid programme could benefit from the creation of a research cell, which might be the first step towards establishing a European Armaments Agency.

Further work should be undertaken, however, before NADs could reach a conclusion on this issue for submission to defence ministers.

The 13 WEAG defence ministers were to meet on 14th November 1994, prior to the WEU Ministerial Council, to examine WEAG activities.

Current activities

The main results of the current work of the three panels and various working groups in the first half of 1994 were:

- Following the ministerial decisions of May and November 1993 and agreement on the practical arrangements, the Permanent Secretariat in Lisbon was closed down on 1st April 1994, and the European Armaments Secretariat is now established within the WEU Secretariat.
- It was formally established that the WEAG Staff Group, while retaining its normal functions for the benefit of the WEAG under the authority of NADs, would also be the group responsible for informing the Council on WEAG activities.
- WEAG *Panel I* has continued to promote co-ordination and collaboration on European armaments matters. A more efficient form for the equipment replacement schedule (ERS) was produced by the use of data processing.
- The Euclid programme now has 42 research and technology projects approved by *Panel II*, of which 22 have contracts placed with industry. A Euclid symposium is to be held in Noordwijk on 2nd-3rd November 1994.
- WEAG *Panel III* has pursued its work on investigating the future of the European defence industry, including cross-border competitions and technology transfer, and on analysing the data provided for the assessment of the European defence equipment market, the aim being to present a report for consideration by the NADs in the autumn.
- The *ad hoc Study Group on the Armaments Agency* has continued its work on this issue, with the aim of presenting its second report to NADs in the autumn. The objective would be to provide advice on the legal mechanism for the establishment of such a body under the modified Brussels Treaty and on the structure for armaments co-operation in this field, including the handling of Euclid and other armaments-related tasks which might be centralised.

XII. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)

In 1994, the Agency for the Control of Armaments continued with its remaining tasks associated with atomic, biological and chemical weapons, in compliance with the Rome declaration of 1984.

The Rome declaration stated, *inter alia*, that "the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time".

In the first half of this thirty-ninth year of controls within the WEU framework, the legal sources used to justify the levels of control and its procedures have remained unchanged.

The Agency has called on member states to provide the information defined in Protocol No. IV to the modified Brussels Treaty. In accordance with the view expressed by the Council¹, the request for information to member states was made with reference to the ACA questionnaire, but only concerning ABC weapons.

The Agency has conducted two permitted tests for the non-production of chemical weapons in plants located in the continental territory of the member state that has undertaken not to manufacture this type of weapons. On completion of these tests, the Agency forwarded the certificates specified by a resolution adopted by the Council². These certificates state that the Agency, in the course of conducting the control measures, has observed nothing in conflict with the undertakings not to manufacture chemical weapons.

In selecting the plants that might be the subject of non-manufacture tests the Agency has, as every year, forwarded two requests for information to the competent authorities of the member state concerned, one on the plants that manufacture products included in the list of substances subject to control, the other on plants that might use such products.

No tests have been conducted in relation to atomic and biological weapons.

XIII. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies

During the period 1st January to 30th June 1994 the Institute organised three seminars: "Factors shaping the development of a European

1. 659th meeting of the Council, 26th March 1986 [CR (86) 6].

2. 649th meeting of the Council, 11th December 1973 [CR (73) 19].

common foreign and security policy”, “The reinforcing of the dialogue between Europe and the Maghreb on foreign and security policy issues” and “Security issues facing an enlarged European Union”, which was held in Niinisalo, Finland.

The Institute also organised two meetings of the task force on Russia and the CIS, two meetings of authors of the Chaillot Paper on “The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe’s foreign relations” and a meeting on “Recent experience of conflict prevention in Europe”. The Institute and the RAND European-American Center for Policy Analysis held a joint meeting on “The challenges to European security in 1994”. Lastly, the Institute wrote a report on “Regional stability measures in the Balkans” for the group of neighbouring states of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia at the request of the co-Chairmen of the Conference and organised a working group to examine the draft report.

Four documents were sent to the Council: “*Development of the Institute into an academy*”; “*Enhanced status for Central European countries – the contribution of the WEU Institute*”; “*WEU’s relations with Maghreb and Eastern Mediterranean countries*”; and “*Developing relations between WEU and Russia and Ukraine*”.

Roberto Zadra left the Institute at the end of June on completion of his three years as a research fellow.

Institute fellowships were awarded to Fernanda Faria (Portugal) and Frédéric Oberson (France), who spent three months and two months respectively at the Institute.

Mr. Eitvydas Bajarunas (Lithuania) and Mrs. Mare Haab (Estonia) spent the months of April/May and May respectively at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, as study award holders.

Training and information meetings were held by members of the research team for Permanent Representatives, members of the Council Working Group, officers from the Norwegian Defence College, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, diplomats from Central Europe, and students from Staffordshire University, the School of Public Affairs of the American University (Washington, DC), the CHEAR, the IHEDN and the Mediterranean Institute for Strategic Studies.

During this period the Institute published Chaillot Paper 13 on *Ukraine, Russia and European security: implications for Western policy*, by Peter van Ham, Chaillot Paper 14, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, by Nicole Gnesotto and Chaillot Paper 15/16, *Preventing armed conflict in Europe: lessons from recent experience*, by Gabriel Munuera. The newsletter was also published in April.

XIV. Administrative questions

In the first half of the year the Council Working Group prepared the Permanent Council’s discussions and decisions on an amendment to the WEU staff rules, the adjustment of salaries and pensions of the staff of the WEU Assembly for the period 1st July to 31st December 1992, regulatory and legal questions associated with the renewal of all Secretariat-General contracts of employment and the position of seconded, nationally paid WEU Secretariat personnel.

The annex to the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council has already been published in Volume I (June 1994) as Document 1422 dated 24th May 1994.

*Co-operation between European space research institutes*REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Galley, Rapporteur*

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Glossary

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, *Borderas* (Alternate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arata, *Atkinson*, Biefnot, Blaauw, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Coviello, *Curto*, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. *Guidado*, MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Litherland (Alternate: *Alexander*), Lorenzi, *Marshall*, Poças Santos, Pozzo, Roger (Alternate: *Galley*), Sarens, *Theis*, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. *Valleix*, Wolfgramm.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

on co-operation between European space research institutes

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that space research is essential for meeting the challenges of guaranteeing the scientific standing, economic competitiveness and political autonomy of Europe;
- (ii) Reaffirming that only an integrated Europe will be able to take up the challenge of space;
- (iii) Considering that European co-operation in certain sectors of space is an example of the achievements to which our countries can aspire by uniting their efforts;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that space research has enabled our continent to attain a high level of technology and goals which were almost inconceivable quite recently;
- (v) Believing that this considerable progress is largely due to the existence and the rôle of the European Space Agency;
- (vi) Welcoming likewise the remarkable work done by the national space research institutes;
- (vii) Noting the present need for ever more investment, which is increasingly difficult for states to meet in isolation, is encountering ever tighter budgets;
- (viii) Noting furthermore that the absence of an overall strategy on a European scale is leading to the duplication of efforts by the various countries;
- (ix) Considering that this dispersion is leading to competition, excess capacity and overlapping programmes and infrastructures;
- (x) Believing that WEU member states must co-ordinate their research policies if they wish to use available funds more efficiently, thus avoiding their dispersal and contributing to the creation of new synergies;
- (xi) Considering that Europe is lagging behind to some extent in the military uses of space as compared with the United States;
- (xii) Taking account of the fact that there is insufficient co-operation at present in military space research and that such co-operation is essential for the security and political independence of Europe;
- (xiii) Believing that it is essential to exploit existing synergies between the civil and military sectors of space in order to give impetus to the technological and industrial development of space applications;
- (xiv) Welcoming moreover the major contribution of national space research institutes to following up and evaluating feasibility studies for the future European space-based observation system;
- (xv) Warmly appreciative of the initiative of the various European space research institutes in moving towards a convergence of their work on aeronautics,

INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To create a study group composed of representatives of governments and national space research institutes with the following aims:
 - (a) lay the foundations for an overall European space strategy;
 - (b) promote a more rational use of available resources, be they economic, technological, human or infrastructure, in order to avoid as far as possible excess capacity, competition, and, in short, duplication of effort and expenditure;
 - (c) establish the bases for close co-operation between national space research institutes similar to that already existing between them in the aeronautics sector;
 - (d) foster greater harmonisation between the national space research institutes and ESA so as to achieve greater coherence in existing programmes and derive optimum advantage from closer co-operation between these institutes;

- (e) give priority to the military space sector in order to develop European independence in space matters and also to take account of the fact that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications;
- (f) study the possibility and expediency of amending the ESA Convention so as to enable ESA also to devote its efforts to certain very specific areas of the military space sector;
- (g) reflect on the need to establish a co-ordinated strategy for the national space research institutes, ESA, the European Union, WEU and other organisations concerned with space in order to achieve a more efficient use of available resources;
- (h) take steps to ensure that the national space research institutes develop closer working relationships with establishments working in related or complementary branches and that they maintain the same type of relationship with industry in order to enable the results of their research to be transferred and applied;
- (i) invite WEU associate member countries, associate partners and observers to participate in this study group.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Galley, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. It is now recognised that space is a key factor of power in the modern world and must be regarded as a major platform for nations to demonstrate their scientific, technological and industrial capabilities. It is therefore extremely important in every respect for Europe to play an active rôle in space research.

2. The volume of European public expenditure on space has not to date equalled that of the United States. Europe has nevertheless developed very substantial expertise in many space sectors thanks to the successes of ESA (European Space Agency), the ambition of certain national space programmes and the very high level of expertise among the scientific community. Europe's achievements in space matters are therefore very positive and enable our continent to be ranked among the first on the world technological scene.

3. European co-operation in space matters is an example of the best our countries are able to do when they join forces. Indeed, ESA is a remarkable example of success in European integration and collaboration.

4. However, Europe cannot rest on its laurels. It must strengthen its cohesion and increase its efforts to meet, under optimum conditions, the challenges thrust upon it by a period in which achieving or maintaining a degree of competitiveness is the more difficult as growing numbers of large new countries are demonstrating their intention of gaining a leading position. This situation, together with budget constraints everywhere, calls for ever-increasing levels of investment which cannot readily be borne by each state in isolation. The space challenge can only therefore only be met effectively at the scale of Europe as a whole.

5. Various European countries have often large national programmes which are advancing in parallel with European co-operative programmes. There is a perceptible trend towards a proliferation of effort by each country in an attempt to carve out for itself the best or even the largest "slice" of a space Europe. This situation is indicative of the relative absence of an overall strategy in the area of space research.

6. For this reason, the Technological and Aerospace Committee has decided to devote a report to co-operation between European space research institutes.

II. What is at stake in space research?

7. Various reasons (national prestige, support for advanced science and technology, industrial and commercial factors, the decisive rôle of space technology in security and defence matters, etc.), may be at the root of involvement in numerous space programmes, but ultimately space research is essential above all, as has already been stressed, for meeting the scientific and technological challenges that will allow us to build our future and thus safeguard our scientific edge, our economic competitiveness and our political independence.

8. However, space must not be regarded as an area apart; many of the results of space research find application in industrial production and scientific and technological know-how. They thus contribute to maintaining industrial and technological centres in Europe.

9. Major challenges face our countries today and in the immediate future. Military space, an area in which our continent lags well behind the United States, must be considered as the main sector of our activity, not only in order to be able to develop our autonomy in defence matters, but also because military space applications, in large measure, overlap with civil applications. Europe must follow this course in order to allow the space industry to maintain a degree of competitiveness vis-à-vis the space industry of the United States.

10. Launch systems, for which space Europe has had outstanding industrial and commercial success, space-based communications, which have a very large growth potential and earth observation, the applications of which are very wide-ranging indeed, are so many areas in which it is essential for us to have expertise.

11. Scientific programmes, even if not directly linked at the outset to commercial markets, are the source of space equipment and applications and the laboratories for the space industry; this justifies a more ambitious approach commensurate with the excellence of the skills and knowledge available.

12. There are still further areas which may act as catalysts in the development of the European space industry and open up new prospects. Your Rapporteur is thinking in particular of research activities linked with a weightless environment, which seem interesting for high added value industrial applications; optical intersatellite links providing high information flow by low power

transmission; space-based radio communication; mini-satellites, space robotics, rendez-vous sensors, etc.

13. The whole range of space-based applications is therefore a source of major industrial and commercial opportunities, either existing or potential. It is imperative for Europe to provide backing for their development and testing, to enable our industry to compete on the market for the new products or services, some of which are mentioned in very futuristic studies but which evade us today.

III. National frameworks

(a) Germany

(i) DARA (*Deutsche Agentur für Raumfahrtangelegenheiten*)

14. Germany founded the German Space Agency (DARA *Deutsche Agentur für Raumfahrtangelegenheiten*) as a central management organisation of German space matters in the summer of 1989; the federal government is the sole shareholder. As it has developed, DARA has been steadily invested with growing responsibilities: the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT), for example, has delegated responsibility for managing its space programmes to DARA¹.

15. DARA's legal status as a company with limited liability (GmbH), guarantees the necessary flexibility and the desired proximity to industry. The Cabinet Committee on Space Activities² is responsible for advising the federal government on space policy decisions as well as fundamental strategic and planning aspects. Funds are made available to DARA from the budgets of the responsible ministries. The Cabinet Committee's work is prepared by a State Secretaries' Committee on Space chaired by the Secretary of State in the BMFT³.

16. DARA's functions can be summarised as follows: to draw up plans for German space policy for approval by the federal government by planning German participation in international programmes and projects, planning national pro-

1. Today, DARA manages approximately 500 current projects and studies and awards contracts to around 130 institutes and firms (the close partner in this context is the DLR).

2. Under the chairmanship of the Federal Chancellor, the Cabinet Committee has the following members: the Head of Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Minister, the Ministers of Finance, Economy, Defence, Transport, Research and Technology and Posts and Telecommunications.

3. The Technical and Scientific Advisory Board is made up of representatives of the scientific community and industry. The specialist advice provided by the Board ensures that scientific and economic requirements are taken into account by DARA when drawing up and implementing space programmes.

jects with due consideration for European, bilateral, and multilateral programmes, providing technological, economic, and financial recommendations, analyses, and project proposals; to implement German space programmes and to award contracts and grants to industry and to scientific and research bodies by advising the federal ministries and public institutions involved, promoting, directing and monitoring projects, evaluating their results, planning and coordinating operating facilities, providing initiatives to promote commercialisation, allocating funds from the space budget in accordance with its statutory authority and determining financial requirements; to represent German space interests in the international arena, particularly within the European Space Agency.

17. Germany participates in most areas of space activities. In manned space flight, attention in 1993 should focus on the MIR mission, a joint project of the former Soviet Union and Germany and the national D-2 Spacelab mission, with the participation of NASA, ESA, CNES and a consortium of Japanese firms. In space exploration, the German programme is concentrated on the provision of instruments and additional flight opportunities through participation in long-term multilateral and bilateral projects. In launch rockets, German programmes have always been concluded as a part of European co-operation in ESA. Germany is also very active in satellite communications, earth observation, space flight and space flight systems. It is possible for management of military space programmes to be assigned to DARA.

18. The 1994 programme budget is around DM 1.37 billion, 74% of which is allocated to ESA.

(ii) DLR (*Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.*)

19. Today, the DLR⁴ is the main scientific and technical research institute in Germany, with approximately 4 000 collaborators (1 170 in the space sector) and a budget of DM 700 million (some 340 million of which are devoted to space). It has research centres in Berlin-Adlershof, Braunschweig, Göttingen, Köln-Porz, Lampoldshausen, Oberpfaffenhofen and Stuttgart.

20. DLR is a multi-mission research organisation engaged in aeronautics (45% of total human resources), space (35%) and energy-related research (20%).

4. The DLR (*Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.*) was created in 1969 from the merger of *Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt Göttingen e.V.*, *Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt* and *Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt*; until March 1989 it went by the name *Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (DFVLR)*.

21. In essence, DLR's rôle is to bridge the gap between basic research in academia and technology development by industry, to operate large test facilities for the benefit of scientific and industrial users and to provide expertise for national authorities.

22. DLR's technical expertise lies with the institutes of its five scientific research departments: Flight Mechanics/Guidance and control (Institute of Flight Mechanics, Institute for Flight Guidance, Institute for Flight Systems Dynamics and Robotics, Institute for Aerospace Medicine, Aerospace Psychology Section, Transport Research Division); Fluid Mechanics (Institute for Theoretical Fluid Mechanics, Institute for Experimental Fluid Mechanics, Institute for Propulsion Technology, Institute for Design Aerodynamics); Materials and Structures (Institute for Structural Mechanics, Institute for Aeroelasticity, Institute for Materials Research,; Institute for Space Simulation, Institute for Structures and Design); Telecommunications Technology and Remote Sensing (Institute for Telecommunications, Institute for Radio Frequency Technology, Institute for Optoelectronics, Institute for Atmospheric Physics, Institute for Planetary Research, Institute for Space Sensors) and Energetics (Institute for Technical Physics, Institute for Technical Thermodynamics, Institute for Physical Chemistry of Combustion, Institute for Chemical Propulsion and Chemical Engineering).

23. The scientific-technical facilities include the German Space Operations Centre (GSOC) in the research centre at Oberpfaffenhofen and the division crew operations and astronauts office, central data processing, flight operations and wind tunnels, applied data technology, and the German remote sensing data centre (DFD).

24. DLR's involvement in space research and development is closely co-ordinated with the German space effort. Under national space policy, co-operative European and bilateral programmes are the preferred modes of operation. Less than one third of Germany's space budget is reserved for purely national activities. The domestic space programme currently does not foresee the creation of national space orbital infrastructure or space transportation assets. Unlike CNES, therefore, DLR is not engaged in technology work for fully-fledged space systems, but concentrates on specific areas of strength.

25. DLR's space competence relates mainly to:

- space vehicle and experiment operation: the German Space Operations Centre (GSOC) of the DLR is responsible for preparing and staging manned and unmanned space projects with the tasks of communication with space missiles via

ground station and data-relay satellites; measuring orbits, predicting place and speed, as well as planning out-orbital corrections; determining and controlling the orientation of satellites and probes in space. Because of DLR's unique experience with manned Spacelab flights, the BMFT made an offer to ESA in 1987 that gives GSOC the responsibility for all manned space laboratory flight operations within the Columbus programme; substantial national advance funding was made during the period 1987-92 with the installation of the Manned Space Laboratories Control Centre (MSCC) consisting of a control centre building equipped with a basic flight operations infrastructure, as well as a high-bay area to house operations mission sequence simulators (OMSS) for the attached laboratory and the free flyer. EPOS (European proximity operations simulator) test facility for rendez-vous and docking of spacecraft will be developed jointly by the DLR and ESA which is affiliated to the MSCC.

The GSOC operates mobile rocket launches for carrying out Germany's high-altitude research rocket programme and, in addition to space missions, the GSOC also conducts research and development work to support these programmes in the field of future technologies (particularly dynamics and control of space-travel structures).

- Space propulsion systems testing: there are 5 test facilities at DLR's test site at the Institute for Chemical Propulsion and Engineering in Lampoldshausen. The Institute's main objectives are the provision and operation of test facilities for space propulsion systems and research and development in energetics and propulsion technology. A major objective of the Institute is the design and contract test facilities for space propulsion systems which are operated on behalf of European space agencies (ESA, CNES) and in co-operation with the European space industry. Test facilities are provided for the development and qualification of liquid propellant rocket engines and complete stages of rocket launchers, including propulsion systems for satellites and interplanetary space problems. Work focuses on development and qualification of the 900 KN Vulcain hydrogen/oxygen engine designed to power the main stage of Ariane 5. An important activity of the Institute, partly in co-operation with the CNES, is research and development in energetics and propulsion technology.

- Remote sensing⁵ : DLR has developed a variety of optical and microwave sensors which were successfully flown and operated on various shuttle missions. DLR has established a national remote sensing data centre to serve users nationally and worldwide. In addition, a processing and archiving facility (PAF) has been set up under ESA contract as part of the European Earthnet infrastructure. Concerning data interpretation, DLR is one of Europe's leading authorities in remotely sensed data product generation and it has special expertise in Algorithms for radar image interpretation. DLR remote sensing efforts are currently organised in two institutes (one for optical and one for microwave remote sensing) and in the German remote sensing data centre (DFD) in Oberpfafenhofen⁶.
- Microgravity: Germany's scientific competence in microgravitational research is internationally recognised⁷. The payload for the D-2 April 1993 mission included facilities to be used by the astronauts, and instruments operated automatically. One might recall the semiconductor experiments, in which two different heating facilities were used within the Medea payload (material sciences experiment double-rack for experiment modules and apparatus); Anthorack, a special medical research facility developed by ESA (for this laboratory Germany provided some important experiments), the robotic technology experiment (Rotex), and the newly-developed photographic system MOMS-02 (modular optical multispectral scanner)⁸. For supporting the spacelab payload elements Anthorack, and Medea on D-2, DLR developed a ground support programme equipment (GSPE) to acquire, process and store realtime measurement data. DLR is the host of ESA's European Astronaut Centre (EAC).

5. DLR's remote sensing activities are not solely of a civilian nature; radar-related work is being co-funded by the Ministry of Defence.

6. The DFD has so far been involved in balloon launches in the South of France and Sweden and, as a part of the national Atmos programme, a stabilisation system for the Mipas (Michelson interferometer passive atmospheric sounder) balloon was developed and represents a new generation measuring equipment in environmental research. Mipas was selected by ESA as a sensor for the polar platform.

7. The German Government took the initiative which led to the development of the space laboratory spacelab under the supervision of ESA in 1983. The first flight was on board the NASA space shuttle. The first German Spacelab mission, D-1, followed in 1985 and D-2 in April 1993.

8. A variant of MOMS will be flown on the European polar platform.

26. To conclude we have to remember that DARA and DLR advise national defence and intelligence authorities on the use and potential of space-based observation means. Moreover, DLR is involved, on behalf of the German Government, in WEU's satellite observation study and data interpretation.

(b) Spain

27. Spain does not have a specific national space plan. Activities related to space are spread among several organisations (ministries, public research centres, universities etc.); there is no centralised government body in charge of a national policy on space matters. The CDTI (Centro para el Desarrollo Técnico y Industrial) represents Spain in ESA; the CICYT (Spanish Commission for Science and Technology) is an interministerial agency for co-ordinating and funding research and development projects within the research and development national plan. This national plan gives institutional support for scientific, technical and industrial initiatives in various disciplines, among them space activities.

(i) INTA

28. INTA (National Institute for Aerospace Technology) is an independent organisation with a legal personality and its own assets which falls within the area of responsibility of the Secretary of State for Defence. Since its foundation in 1942, it has become the true Spanish centre for the development of aeronautics technology to which space technology has been added.

29. Under the Science Act of 1986, the Institute acquired the status of public research body specialising in research and development in aerospace technology and was given specific functions allowing it to administer and implement national and sectoral programmes assigned to it by the CICYT (Spanish Commission for Science and Technology), the Ministry of Defence or other relevant government departments.

30. INTA's mission is to raise technological standards in the Spanish aerospace industry in its specialised fields through its own research and technology development programmes or programmes undertaken in collaboration with industry and other centres of research and development, with emphasis on areas of interest; INTA must also have the necessary means at its disposal to manage aeronautical and space programmes of national interest at the request of government and particularly of the Ministry of Defence; it must provide quality services through various establishments for experimental testing and through specialisation; lastly, it should encourage advanced technology transfer, while providing efficient backing to industry and government and in particular the Ministry of Defence.

31. At 31st December 1993, INTA employed 1 364 staff; its investments stood at 12 billion 569 million pesetas (666 million in 1989). Increases in investment over the last five years demonstrate the effort made to equip the Institute with facilities adapted to the rôle it was soon to play in the development of Spain's aeronautical and space industries and of its armed forces.

32. The principal research and development activities of the INTA laboratories are centred around four major technology programmes: Minisat, Capricornio, SIVA and SAR. A large number of research activities have been undertaken in parallel with these major programmes.

33. The aim of INTA's mini-satellite programme (Minisat) is to provide the Spanish aerospace sector with the means of designing, manufacturing, testing and operating a full space-based system and its associated ground sector so as to enable space-based devices of 100-200 kg weight to be placed in orbit. In 1993, technical research began on the TTC (tracking, telemetry and command) antenna to be installed on Minisat and providing ground control of the platform and on board instruments; the development of instruments to be carried on board the satellite has also begun.

34. Three scientific experiments will be conducted from the first Minisat (launch scheduled for 1995): EURD (an instrument for studying diffuse radiation from outer space in the far ultraviolet band); CPLM for studying the physical deformation of a liquid bridge subject to different acceleration conditions within a weightless field, and LEGRI (a technological demonstration device designed to test the feasibility of constructing a new generation of telescopes).

35. The aim of the Capricornio programme is to provide INTA and the Spanish aerospace industry with the technology necessary to develop a microsatellite launcher for exclusively civil applications. In view of the increasingly marked tendency towards ever smaller and cheaper satellites, INTA has selected a microsatellite launcher capable of launching a payload of 50 kg to an altitude of 600 km in polar orbit. The development phase as such will boost work on propellants in Spain; the establishments of the Institute working in this area have received additional support to this end.

36. The present programme envisages the development of a wholly national two-stage solid propellant demonstration vehicle. Thanks to this vehicle, it will be possible to conduct in-flight testing of all Capricornio's basic technologies. A study has begun of a launch site on the Canary Islands.

37. SIVA (integrated aerial surveillance system) will supplement military satellite observation capabilities.

38. The synthetic aperture radar (SAR) programme begun by INTA in January 1993 aims to develop technology for producing high-quality SAR images; initially this technology will allow a prototype system to be designed, manufactured and tested on board an aircraft with a view to obtaining certification of this technology. It is proposed, in a second phase, to design and produce a system for use in space that could be installed on a small-size platform of the Minisat type.

39. INTA is establishing a vast programme of research in advanced materials. In collaboration with the DLR, it has launched a programme for reciprocal certification of materials, procedures and measurement techniques used by the two institutes for composite materials. The aim of the programme is to arrive at a joint method for certifying materials used in space which might benefit ESA in its work.

40. At ESA's request, studies have begun for developing a rendez-vous mechanism and a Ku band antenna for communications from the polar platform. In the framework of the Eureka programme and in co-operation with other European centres, a start has been made on the I-Ares project (an experimental model for a planetary vehicle for exploring Mars). Furthermore, a programme for building a space manipulation arm is underway, again managed by INTA in collaboration with other European research centres. This arm will be used for maintenance and repair of satellites in orbit. INTA, together with DLR, has also embarked on a programme for developing intelligent composite material structures.

41. In space technology, the Institute has completed the connecting cabling, manufacture and certification testing of energy sources for the Golf and Virgo instrumentation of ESA's Soho scientific satellite.

42. In the course of 1993, INTA has continued its technical and scientific participation in developing the X-Spectrum (Russian astronomic observatory). It has carried out the environmental testing of the mirrors of the telescope used for the Sodart experiment (detection of X-ray astrophysical sources) and has also collaborated with the Danish Space Research Institute in continuing to develop a mass memory unit for this experiment.

43. As to the Integral satellite, besides participating in the scientific side, INTA is responsible for the design and manufacture of the real time image processing system of the optical chamber.

44. In the field of space antennae, the Institute has been involved particularly in the design and manufacture of the TTC S band antennae of the Italsat satellite and the Eureka platform. It hopes to acquire technological means for designing TTC antennae for Ku band communication satellites. These technologies are being obtained in the fra-

mework of ESA's advanced systems and technologies programme (ASTP).

45. The Institute has generated its own research in astrophysics and the atmosphere. In terms of energy use in space, it has become the official certification body for the solar batteries used in ESA space programmes.

46. It should also be noted that the Institute has provided substantial backing, both in terms of technology and management, to the Spanish Hispasat satellite communication system⁹ (INTA is a 15% shareholder in Hispasat SA). Technical supervision of the Helios programme has been assigned to INTA by the Spanish Ministry of Defence as has management of the CICSAT (initial capacity of satellite communications) programme which is to start using the full potential of the Hispasat system for the communications infrastructure of the armed forces.

47. The El Arenosillo experimental centre, the southern and westernmost launch site in Europe, has taken part in many scientific and technological campaigns for studying the structure and composition of the atmosphere. For the last 17 years, this activity has been supplemented by the joint organisation with the ASI and the CNES of annual campaigns using large stratospheric research balloons launched from Sicily which drift over the western Mediterranean towards the Iberian peninsula.

48. Under international agreements, INTA owns or is responsible for three space stations: the Canaries space station, one of the most important installations of which is the Maspalomas station integrated into the ESOC network and ESA's Earthnet network, the Robledo space station which belongs to the network for monitoring NASA space vehicles and, lastly, the Villafranca station, which depends on the ESOC network and is managed by INTA.

(c) *France*

49. The French space programme is currently the most wide-ranging in Europe. France makes the largest national contribution to ESA and has the most important civil space programme as a nation and in terms of bilateral co-operation. Moreover, France has the most ambitious military space programme in Europe.

(i) *CNES (Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales)*

50. Created under a law dated 19th December 1961 as a scientific and technical establishment of

9. Made up of two geostationary satellites, the first launched in September 1992 and the second in July 1993, and linked to a ground sector.

an industrial and commercial nature, the CNES has led France's space programme since 1st March 1962.

51. The essential tasks of the CNES are, on the one hand, to analyse the long-term challenges and trends in space activities in order to submit proposals for action and means of implementation to the French Government and, on the other hand, in application of government decisions on space policy, to conduct major development programmes both at national level and in the framework of ESA.

52. In the pursuit of its tasks, the CNES has many and diverse rôles. In association with the scientific community, it implements a programme of basic research in space matters based on the laboratories of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the universities; it develops partnerships with French space users (the national headquarters staffs of the armed forces, France Telecom, Météo France, etc.); it seeks to develop expertise and innovative capacity in industries by awarding them prime contractorship and implementation of programmes whenever possible and starting research and technology programmes through them. The CNES also has an important rôle in operational use and evaluation of technical assets, as it encourages the formation of companies for marketing the space-based applications which may be either public limited companies in which the CNES is a shareholder (such as Arianespace, Spot Image, Novespace, etc.), or economic interest groupings of which it is a member (Satel Conseil, Prospace, etc.). Lastly, and in conjunction with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it represents France in ESA.

53. In 1994, the CNES employed 2 446 staff across its various establishments in Paris, Evry, the Toulouse space centre (preparation and development of programmes, use of operational systems, heavy equipment) and the CSG (Guyana Space Centre).

54. The budget for 1994 stands at a little over F 11 000 million (+1% as compared with 1993), more than F 9 200 million is met through state subsidies, and the remainder from its own resources. This global budget is shared between participation in ESA programmes (47.95%, + 1.15%), bilateral co-operation (5.65%, + 0.13%), the national programme (19.44%, - 1.3%), functional technical programme support (15.06%, + 0.12%) and general operating costs (11.90%, - 0.10%).

55. The activities of the CNES are divided into three main areas: space transport, applications programmes and scientific programmes.

56. In space transport, the CNES is prime contractor for the Ariane family of launchers developed in the framework of ESA, which has given Europe a high-performance means of trans-

port. The CNES, with the CSG, also provides Europe with one of the best situated and most modern space bases in the world – the Kourou base, located in Guyana.

57. For applications programmes, mention should be made of the Spot earth observation satellites in which Belgium and Sweden also participate; Spot 1, 2 and 3 are in orbit (the latter operational since November 1993) and Spot 4 is in the process of development with an anticipated launch date during the last quarter of 1997 and from mid-1995 if necessary. The Spot 5 programme is in preparation with the aim of providing a continuous service after Spot 4.

58. The CNES, in co-operation with the European Commission, Belgium, Italy and Sweden, is developing the on board "Vegetation" instrumentation for Spot 4 which is of great interest for monitoring natural ecosystems and agricultural systems.

59. Mention should also be made of the Telecom 2 communications satellite family (A was launched on 16th December 1991, B on 15th April 1992 and C is to be launched in 1995, followed by D with a scheduled launch date of 1996).

60. With regard to military space, the CNES is participating in the studies of the future military communications system by satellite, Syracuse 3, and in the military observation satellites Helios 1 and 2 (which will share the platform and the integration and test equipment of Spot 4 with the participation of Italy and Spain). Spain has just withdrawn from the Helios 2 programme for budgetary reasons.

61. To conclude with applications programmes, the CNES is also involved in monitoring a definition of new generation platforms for the geostationary Spacebus 3000 satellites; in conjunction with ESA, it is developing the test programme for Silex (interorbital optical links) on board the Artemis satellite; it is in charge of the Argos space sector (data localisation and gathering system) of which third generation instruments are being developed which will be installed on the American NOAA advanced Tiros N satellite platforms and last but not least it is one of the founders and suppliers of the space sector of the Cospas-Sarsat programme, in which there is wide international co-operation.

62. The CNES's scientific programmes are, for the most part, carried out in a framework of multilateral co-operation in ESA or bilaterally with the United States, Russia and other countries such as Italy or Japan. The national programme specifically covers the "balloon" programmes, space geodesy, weightless flight and ground activities in support of space-based programmes. In order to participate in such missions, the CNES requires the back-up of the CNRS laboratories, universities or other bodies.

63. In astronomy, solar physics and planetary exploration, the CNES participates in the Ulysses (ESA), Iso (ESA), Soho (ESA), Cluster (ESA), Cassini and Huygens (ESA-NASA), Magellan (Venus study/NASA), Galileo (Jupiter study/NASA) missions and in the Russian Mars 94-96 programme (exploration of Mars). Furthermore, the CNES participates, by providing the image compression system, in the Clementine (DoD/NASA) mission which will make a cartographic study of the moon and the asteroid Geographos; it is also involved in the first flight of the Pronaos submillimetric telescope (for studying cosmic rays and areas of star formation) and provides the on board Sygma telescope for the Russian Granat satellite. French participation in the XMM (ESA) programme is based on a major development contribution to the Epic camera.

64. In terms of programmes for studying our own planet, its climate and more generally its environment, the CNES pursues a policy of balance and complementarity between its contribution to the ESA's ERS and Envisat 1 programmes and bilateral co-operation. It is conducting, jointly with NASA, the Topex-Poseidon oceanographic mission (whose performance is now proving to be twice as good as anticipated); in co-operation with Russia it has developed the Scarab instrument for measuring the earth's radiation, launched on 25th January 1994 on board the Russian Meteor 3 number 7 satellite and also to be carried on Envisat 1. It should also be noted that the Polder instrumentation (imaging radiometer polarimeter) will be installed in 1996 aboard NASDA's Adeos satellite (first co-operation with Japan) and that the IASI infrared atmospheric probe¹⁰ (studied in co-operation with the ASI) will form part of the nucleus of the payload of the Météop satellites of the future European low orbit meteorological network. The CNES is also beginning a study of the stratosphere using the French-Canadian Wind ii instrument.

65. In addition to all of the above, the Stella laser reflector satellite (Spot 3), the Doris positioning system (Spot 2, and 4 are also to be used with the European Envisat-1 mission) and participation in the Danish Oersted study mission of the earth's magnetic field, for which the CNES is developing a scalar magnetometer, are contributing to the progress of research into the core of the earth.

66. As to microweight, CNES teams are currently involved in research programmes and are participating in the main missions listed below, which are either being implemented or scheduled for the coming years: Antares (July-August 1992) and Altair (July 1993) on the MIR space station

10. By providing temperature and humidity profiles and profiles of certain minor constituents, this will meet both the requirements of the world climatic research programme and the need for operational digital prediction of the weather.

(manned flights, physiological, biological and materials testing) and the Cassiopée flight (scheduled for 1996); IML 1/International Microgravity Laboratory 1 (manned flight, physical and life sciences, January 1992) and Microgravity Laboratory 2 on Spacelab which, in the framework of co-operation between the CNES and NASA, will carry the Ramses electrophoresis instrumentation in the development of which the CNES has been associated with a consortium of French, Spanish and Belgian industries brought together in the Eureka Space Bio Separation project; Mephisto (October 1992 and March 1994) on a USMP platform of the American space shuttle; Eureka-1 (August 1992) on a platform launched and recovered by the Bion 10 shuttle (December 1992-January 1993); Gezon (April 1994) and the Ibis biology laboratory (October 1994) on Russian recoverable capsules.

67. Lastly, the national programme has two major focuses: the network of Spot satellites and the system for exploiting them and the research and technology programme. Action in the framework of the research and technology programme undertaken in 1994 will contribute to achieving three major objectives: (i) improving competitiveness in radiocommunications, maintaining the technological edge in earth observation and developing advanced instrumentation; (ii) continuing the effort already undertaken in the priority areas of new uses of the orbital infrastructure; (iii) developing basic and prospective research techniques linked to future launch equipment (propulsion etc.). Such action is accompanied by studies providing a permanent research basis which helps to maintain the technical and technological base necessary for all space-based activities.

68. The national programme also includes an important component of scientific research thanks to the balloon programme (in particular in the framework of the campaigns and research programmes backed by the European Union) and national support actions for space-based transport programmes (Ariane, MSTP).

(ii) *ONERA (Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aéropatiales)*

69. ONERA is a scientific and technical public body of a commercial and industrial type under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence and financially independent.

70. ONERA's task is to develop and guide research in aerospace matters; to plan, design and implement the necessary means for carrying out its own research and testing for manufacturers; to ensure dissemination of the results and encourage their use by the aerospace industry; to facilitate the application of these results outside the aerospace area whenever possible and to assist with training policies.

71. Apart from its basic (24% of its activity) and applied (55%) tasks, ONERA plays an important rôle between science research bodies and industry; its position, in short, is that of scientific and technical expert to official departments.

72. ONERA's activity extends to a number of areas, the main ones being aircraft (31% of its activity), space (16.8%) and military systems (15%). Other activities cover turbomachinery, helicopters and tactical and strategic missiles.

73. 1993 funding stood at F 207 million provided in large measure from grants from the French Ministry of Defence (68.4%) and the regions (2.8%), the remainder being obtained from contracts and through self-financing.

74. At 1st January 1994, ONERA employed 2 320 staff at its Châtillon, Chalais-Meudon, Palaiseau, Fauga-Mauzac and Modane-Avrieux centres, the Toulouse Centre for Study and Research, the Lille Fluids and Mechanics Institute and the ONERA-Ecole de l'Air research laboratory.

75. With regard to space, one can mention the testing of cryogenic propellants (Mascotte assembly), the ASSM (aerodynamics of segmented solid motors) programme and the TOP (thrust oscillations programme) which give rise to theoretical research and testing by CNES. The Prepha programme (research and technology programme for advanced hypersonic propulsion) for space launchers and hypersonic vehicles in the next century studies the possibility of super-ramjet propulsion; there has been aerodynamic testing of space shuttles.

76. ONERA is also involved in satellite programmes and projects: the transportable test bench using the synthetic aperture radar technique has been delivered to the CELAR to complete the Siros simulator and thus aid the definition of requirements for future military satellites.

77. The Ramses (multi-spectral airborne radar for signature research) station has been improved and has been involved in several inflight testing campaigns; progress has been made in discrete radar; lastly, a study of a system which might be a European one for monitoring space-based activity from the ground has been completed: this led to the launch of a new operation which aims to develop over three years a specific experimental space watch radar. In parallel, studies on an optical system capable of identifying objects in space, have been carried out.

78. ONERA constantly uses and improves upon a range of aerospace test facilities at world level with their associated instrumentations. In particular, a bank of research and industrial wind tunnels covers all of France's requirements and meets the needs of major foreign manufacturers.

Discussions have begun with agreed European organisations with a view to greater co-operation in the area of heavy equipment. ONERA is a 31% shareholder in the ETW (European trans-sonic wind tunnel), sited in Cologne.

79. In 1993, its international volume of business accounted for approximately 10% of ONERA's total budget; in space matters, it co-operated with European bodies while funding of its own research was met either by a French state body or by a European agency (ESA, WEU).

80. Its most important activities are still bilateral exchanges in Europe and co-operation actions are sometimes long term but more often short term, since they tend to be terminated when funding dries up and states' annual budgets can often be unpredictable.

81. In this context, the main partner country is Germany and the DLR co-operates in some 40 areas with ONERA; among those worthy of mention are the studies on unmanned operations and flexible structures in an ESA framework, the parallel theoretical research in the framework of the MSTP programme and analysis of materials. Bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom has mainly taken place with the DRA (Defence Research Agency) in the framework of the AFDRG (Anglo-French Defence Research Group). Co-operation with other Western European countries is on a modest scale.

82. ONERA has particular areas of responsibility in instrumentation used for scientific purposes. The research is funded by the CNES or ESA but ONERA makes a contribution to it from its own resources. Examples of this are the grating spectrometer (an instrument for measuring components present in small quantities in the atmosphere) which was aboard the American shuttle (Atlas project) and will also be used on board MIR; this instrument has been developed in close co-operation with the IASB (the Belgian Institute for Space Aeronomy).

83. As to third countries, ONERA has links with Australia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, Israel, Japan, Russia and the United States.

(d) Italy

(i) L'ASI (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana)

84. In just a few years, Italy has evolved into one of Europe's key space powers with the third largest contribution to ESA and has invested in ambitious national projects. With a large budget deficit, Italy has recently been forced to rein in its spending on space, but has still managed to pour huge sums into important programmes.

85. In May 1988, the Italian Parliament established the Italian Space Agency, ASI (Agenzia Spa-

ziale Italiana) with the legal status of a public corporation. Its activities are conducted under the supervision of the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Scientific and Technological Research.

86. The agency has the responsibility of promoting, co-ordinating and managing national programmes and bilateral and multilateral co-operation programmes, promoting and supporting Italian scientific and industrial participation in ESA programmes in harmonisation with national programmes.

87. A national space plan (Piano Spaziale Nazionale) was established to promote, support and control a co-ordinated programme for the scientific, technological and commercial applications of space activities as well as to promote new technological capabilities in the Italian Aerospace Industries¹¹. The PSN is defined by ASI for a five-year term, with annual up-dating, for the approval of the Ministry of University and Research and final approval of CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning).

88. Through the eighties, the Italian civil space budget rose significantly and reached almost \$500 million in 1993, shared between ESA and national activities.

89. Major national programmes have been developed in many fields such as telecommunications with the Italsat programme which is a domestic preoperational communication satellite, with a highly-sophisticated communications payload, working at 20/30 GHz.

90. For space infrastructure, the Tethered satellite (TSS)¹² has been created. This is a co-operative programme with NASA¹³ for a reusable multidisciplinary facility to conduct space experiments in earth orbit. The first Italian astronaut, Franco Malerba, flew as payload specialist with the first TSS mission.

91. In space geodesy, a geodesic satellite was developed to improve the performance of the system for measuring movement of the earth's surface in co-operation with NASA. Lageos II¹⁴

11. A minimum of 15% of the annual plan budget is earmarked for scientific research activities.

12. TSS-1 is a spherical satellite, with two fixed booms; the Tethered system consists of two elements, the "deployer" (TSS-D) that permits the tether to be deployed and retrieved, and the satellite (TSS-S), the two elements being interconnected by a 20 km thin conducting tether.

13. NASA was given responsibility for the development of the cable deployment and retrieval mechanism, for engineering activities at system level and for the integration of the scientific experiments located on the shuttle. For its part, ASI took responsibility for the development of the satellite system and of the core equipment and the integration of the scientific experiments carried on board the shuttle.

14. The Lageos II spacecraft is composed of two separate elements, i.e. the satellite and its propulsion stage LAS (Lageos Apogee Stage).

(laser geodynamics satellite). Lageos is designed to provide a reference point for laser ranging experiments that will monitor the motion to the earth's crust, measure and understand the wobble in the earth's axis of rotation, collect information on the size and shape of the earth and determine more accurately the length of the day.

92. For space science, Sax, an X-ray astronomy satellite, was set up in co-operation with NIVR (Netherlands) to perform spectroscopic, spectral and time variability studies of celestial X-ray sources in the energy band from 0.1 to 200 Kev.

93. The Iris (Italian research interim stage), a solid-fuelled perigee stage, within the framework of space transportation, is an upper stage used in conjunction with NASA's space shuttle. Iris is capable of boosting a 1000 kg payload into high orbit (5 900 km) starting from the space shuttle's nominal parking orbit of 296 km; the system contains two modules, the Iris spinning stage (ISS) and the airborne support equipment (ASE).

94. For remote sensing, X-SAR was created to elaborate a co-operative programme with DARA and NASA to develop an x-band synthetic aperture radar to be flown on board the shuttle with the spaceborne imaging radar-C (SIR-C) as part of the space radar laboratory (SRL) for multispectral radar observation.

95. There is a ground infrastructure, which is the I-PAF, a multimission facility, located at ASI/CGS Matera, for archiving, processing and distributing remote sensing data.

96. There are other important activities under development and realisation, such as microgravity - Carina - a re-entry capsule for microgravity experiments; telecommunications with Italsat 2; for earth observation the IASI has been created and this is a co-operative programme with CNES for the development of a sounder for meteorology and atmosphere chemistry; for robotics the Spider (space inspection device for extra vehicular repairs); for space infrastructure, logistic modules have been created for the space station, in co-operation with NASA and the last one is a scientific programme, Cassini/Huygens which is an interplanetary mission to Saturn and Titan.

97. Italy, with roughly an 18% contribution to ESA's total budget, is the third member country after France and Germany. It participates in many ESA programmes, the most important of which are the following: for telecommunications, the Artemis/DRS programme, and EMS programme (mobile communications payload to be flown on Italsat F2); for earth observation, the ERS 1/ERS 2, Envisat 1, Metop 1, polar platform and meteorological second generation programmes; in-orbit infrastructure, the Columbus attached laboratory programme; for space transportation, Ariane 5 and MSTP programmes and finally for the scientific

programme there is a significant Italian scientific and industrial involvement in the horizon 2000 programmes, and in particular in Soho, Cluster, ISO, XMM.

98. Italy is equipped with operational facilities such as the Centro di Geodesia Spaziale "Giuseppe Colombo" in Matera for space geodesy, remote sensing and robotics. In Trapani-Milo (Sicily), ASI has developed a modern stratospheric balloons launch in a favourable geographic position which guarantees long duration flights on the Mediterranean sea from Sicily to the western Spanish coast; besides the Odissea programme, co-operation between ASI, CNES and INTA for trans-Mediterranean flights during summer months and a collaboration memorandum with NASA, many technological and scientific activities have been planned.

(ii) *CIRA (Centro Italiano di Ricerche Aerospaziali)*

99. CIRA was established on 9th July 1984 by the Campania region and the main Italian aerospace industries with the aim of developing scientific and technological research and testing in the aerospace sector in order to implement the PRORA (national aerospace research programme).

100. CIRA's tasks are twofold, consisting in:

- acting as a catalyst for national aerospace research and technology by providing the industry with research and development support, encouraging the development of applied research and technology acquisition, providing public authorities with assistance in approval and control and developing basic research;
- international relations, acting as a point of reference for other research centres.

101. In January 1994, CIRA employed 149 staff¹⁵.

102. Many research activities are being developed at CIRA in several scientific areas such as aerothermodynamics, sub-transonic aerodynamics, flight mechanics and control, propulsion, vibration and acoustics, crash analysis, high-temperature resistant materials and structures and aerospace technologies.

103. Activities in fluid dynamics began in early 1987 when the Italian Ministry for Research and Technology appointed CIRA as co-ordinator of the Italian contribution to the Hermes fluid dynamics research and development programme of ESA. The renewed interest in hypersonics and the involvement of CIRA in the Scirocco plasma

15. Staff numbers are expected to rise to 500 over the next five years.

wind tunnel project brought about the formation of a hypersonics section; activities are presently grouped around three main areas:

- manned atmospheric re-entry; CIRA is active in the European Hermes re-entry shuttle (currently included among the MSTP) particularly in experimental research;
- supersonic civil transport;
- the winged launcher.

104. CIRA is also involved in other lesser research activities on specific problems, among them the study of irreversible thermodynamics with special emphasis on the impact of real gas effects, and numerical investigation of fundamental problems (under ASI-contract).

105. In flight mechanics and control, the activities of the relevant departments have mainly been focused on stability analysis and automatic control of vehicles and dynamic system modelling and analysis, in relation both to aeronautics and space. At the request of ASI, CIRA participated in a joint research programme to study the feasibility of a flight control system for microgravity experiments. In space matters, research is centred around two main themes: guidance and control problems for reusable re-entry modules (problems dealt with include aeroassisted orbit transfers and re-entry phase of these modules) and orbital altitude control of spacecraft with manoeuvrable flexible structures (particular attention has been paid to the modelling phase of these mixed structures).

106. As to CIRA's operating capabilities, the CIRA PWT (plasma wind tunnel) is one of the largest and most advanced facilities in the world for manned vehicle trajectory studies and is a development facility for materials and structures for all possible configurations of space transport systems. This facility is, moreover, a research and development tool applicable to supersonic propulsion systems development and obrothermodynamic research studies. The project is co-funded by ESA and the Italian Ministry for Scientific and Technological Research. The facility will be operational by mid-1997.

107. The CIRA myogenic propulsion plant (CRYP) facility is a test bench for development and approvals testing of CRYP propulsion systems. The facility has been designed with reference to approvals specifications for the IOX turbopump in Ariane 5's Vulcain MK11 engine. The CRYP test facility will be available from July 1997.

(e) The Netherlands

108. In the Netherlands, various organisations, industries and scientific institutes are active in space research and the development of space systems.

(i) NIVR (Nederlands Instituut vor Vliegtuigontwikkeling en Ruimtevaart / Netherlands agency for aerospace programmes)

109. Founded in 1946 by the Netherlands Government, the NIVR is a semi-governmental, non-profit-making agency with the general aim of promoting industrial aerospace activities in the Netherlands.

110. This general aim is translated into the following tasks for NIVR: to advise the Netherlands Government on all policy aspects of aerospace industrial activities; to initiate and monitor aerospace development programmes carried out by the Dutch aircraft and space industry funded by NIVR and using financial resources provided by the government; to initiate, monitor and fund aerospace research and technology programmes carried out by the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) and other research institutes as well as by Dutch industry; to represent the Netherlands Government in international projects in which the Dutch aircraft and space industry participate and for which NIVR provides the financial resources; to act as the Netherlands' national space agency, participate in the national space consultations process and provide delegates and/or advisors for the Netherlands delegation to the ESA Council, boards and committees.

111. NIVR thus acts as a management agency for government-sponsored aerospace research and development. The agency itself does not execute research and development activities, but monitors the definition and execution of research and development activities conducted by the Netherlands industry and laboratories, both in national projects and in international collaborative projects. As the Netherlands national space agency, NIVR has many contacts with sister organisations and especially with NASA, the CNES, DARA, ASI and others.

112. Responsibility for the general policy of NIVR is shared by government (Ministries for Economic Affairs, Transport and Public Works, Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Education and Science), industry and the scientific community all of which are represented on the NIVR Board.

113. Since the development of successful aerospace programmes is impossible without advanced research, NIVR also sponsors a programme of aerospace research, mainly carried out at the NLR. This programme provides for continuous research in the various fields of aerodynamics, structures, materials, flight mechanics and space sciences.

Space Programmes

114. This NIVR policy is implemented by executing national satellite programmes and by participating in ESA programmes. So far, two national satellites have been launched: the astronomical

Netherlands satellite (ANS) in co-operation with NASA, launched in 1974 and the infrared astronomical satellite (IRAS) in co-operation with NASA and the British Science Research Council, in January 1983.

115. The success of ANS and IRAS has greatly contributed to the Netherlands' knowledge and reputation in space research, space technology and industrial space activities. Following these space projects, it was decided to take a modest participation in the Italian X-ray satellite Sax to which Dutch scientists and companies contribute the wide field cameras and the attitude control system. NIVR is responsible for programme management of the Dutch share and co-operates with SRON (Space Research Organisation Netherlands) and the Italian Space Agency (ASI).

116. The major part of the Netherlands' space activities is in the framework of participation in ESA programmes.

117. Part of the Dutch contribution to the ESA earth observation programme is to supply (in co-operation with DARA) the Sciamachy instrument for the Envisat-1 satellite. Development of this instrument will be the most important national space project of the mid-nineties.

118. To stimulate national technological developments, NIVR is conducting a multi-year NIVR space technology programme (NRT). Partly financed by the NRT programme, studies and pre-developments are carried out by industry and research organisations.

119. NIVR also monitors the space activities sponsored by the Netherlands Defence Department. In this connection a NIVR senior project officer is a member of the WEU study management team which supervises industrial study/development efforts to define a European earth observation satellite system for crisis-management and treaty verification.

120. Funding for space programmes in the Netherlands is provided by various government departments. The Netherlands space budget for 1994 (240 million Dutch guilders) is made up as follows: contribution to ESA and Eumetsat: 193 million; NIVR technology programme: 13 million; SRON space research: 20 million; participation in SAX and Sciamachy: 14 million.

(ii) *SRON (Space Research Organisation Netherlands / Stichting Ruimteonderzoek Nederland)*

121. SRON has a total staff of approximately 150 with 90% of its budget funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and 10% commissioned research.

122. SRON is a foundation within the framework of the NWO. It is responsible for the space research programme which is carried out by the

three laboratories for space research, located in Utrecht, Leiden, and Groningen (collectively referred to as the National Space Research Institute). Activities comprise the design, development and manufacture of space instruments and data-processing and interpretation – the latter in close co-operation with university groups.

123. Additionally, SRON co-ordinates all space research activities on a national level, advises the Dutch Government in all matters concerning space research and, as the Netherlands Space Research Agency, endorses co-operation in international scientific programmes.

124. SRON's laboratories are mainly engaged in X-ray and gamma-ray astronomy. At present, this includes inter alia the following projects: the development of wide field X-ray cameras (two WFCs are being developed for the Italian X-ray satellite SAX, to be launched in 1994); the development of an infrared short-wavelength spectrometer for the ESA ISO (infrared space observatory) satellite; development of a low-energy transmission grating for cosmic X-ray spectroscopy with the NASA satellite AXAF (advanced X-ray astrophysics facility); the development of a reflecting grating spectrometer for the ESA "X-ray multi-mirror" cornerstone (XMM) mission; analysis of data obtained from Comptel (Compton telescope, launched April 1991), one of the four instruments in the NASA gamma-ray observatory, Exosat (European X-ray observatory satellite, 1983-1986), IRAS (infrared astronomical satellite, 1993) and Comis.

125. Through its present involvement in the development of infrastructures like GOME (for ERS-2, to be launched in 1994), Sciamachy and MIPAS (for Poem) SRON prepares itself for a future rôle in earth observation programmes.

126. SRON co-ordinates and stimulates other space research activities in the Netherlands, such as microgravity research, and earth oriented space research (solid earth physics, oceanography, atmospheric physics). Presently, SRON is funding some 17 experiments in the field of life sciences and materials sciences.

(iii) *NLR (Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium / National Aerospace Laboratory)*

127. The National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) is the central institute in the Netherlands for aerospace research. It provides scientific support and technical assistance to aerospace industries and organisations, civil and military aircraft operators, and government agencies concerned with aviation and space flight. In space flight, NLR takes part in ESA programmes. NLR co-operates closely with Fokker in various space-related projects supported by the Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programmes (NIVR).

128. The annual turnover of NLR is around 141 million guilders. About 70% of turnover stems from research under contract to industries and institutes and 30% stems from a government subsidy for NLR's basic research programme. NLR employs a staff of about 900, of which two-thirds are graduates from universities or advanced technical colleges.

129. The laboratory operates a series of large wind tunnels, including the transonic HST and supersonic SST that are used extensively in test programmes for the development of Ariane launchers and the former ESA programme Hermes.

130. NLR operates facilities for research in structures and materials used in space projects. Expertise in load and use monitoring is combined with structural response analysis and materials characterisation to perform damage tolerance assessments. Advanced dynamic and non-linear analysis and test systems are applied to solving problems associated with design and verification of spacecraft structures.

131. Materials science and engineering projects include evaluation of properties of metallic, composite and hybrid materials, also at elevated temperatures.

132. For the development and application of space technology, NLR uses special facilities for testing and simulating satellite units and subsystems. Test and simulation systems are developed for attitude and orbit control systems. In the area of thermal control, research takes place on two-phase flow and heat transport systems in a low-gravity environment. Several studies are performed on instrumentation of fluid physics experiments in microgravity.

133. NLR acts as national point of contract for the dissemination of remote sensing data to Dutch users. Optical and microwave remote sensing systems are developed and are operated from NLR's Metro II and Queen Air 80 laboratory aircraft.

134. Recent work in space technology includes: development of test and simulation assemblies for the attitude control systems of ISO and SAX; development of on-board attitude control software for SAX; studies on the modelling of dynamics simulation; development of a two-phase quality sensor, support of industry to produce heat transport components for in-orbit demonstration; development of telescience equipment including tele-operated optical diagnostics instrumentation; data acquisition and control equipment for microgravity experiments in Maser flights; development of an ejectable fluid physics experiment in a Maser flight; research in space automation and robotics; participation in definition studies for the Columbus user support organisation; development of a satellite ground station (Artemis) for monitoring vegetation and rainfall in Africa, operated by the

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.

135. NLR's extensive computer network featuring a supercomputer is used for theoretical research, especially in computational fluid dynamics and structural design of aircraft and spacecraft. The network is also used for processing data from wind tunnel tests and flight tests. Standardised connections to national and international networks are available.

(f) The United Kingdom

(i) British National Space Centre (BNSC)

136. The British National Space Centre (BNSC) was established as a result of an administrative decision by the British Government in 1985. It acts as a focus for the civil space interests of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Cabinet Office, the Department of the Environment, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Education and Science, the Meteorological Office, the Science and Engineering Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council.

137. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has overall governmental responsibility for United Kingdom civil space policy, but other departmental ministers are involved in major policy decisions where they have funding responsibilities.

138. Most BNSC activities are carried out with ESA (60% of the annual budget of £160 million; the United Kingdom is the fourth contributor). The Centre has some 230 staff at its London headquarters and technical centres. The Rutherford Appleton Laboratory co-operates with research establishments, companies and universities in the study of astronomy, solar/terrestrial physics, earth observation and advanced space communications systems. It also co-operates with universities in the design, development and building of space instruments. The Space Department of the Royal Aerospace Establishment, RAE (part of the Defence Research Agency, DRA) is active in research and development on spacecraft and remote sensing, mission analysis, orbital dynamics and ground facilities. BNSC's national programme of research and development in satellite telecommunications is managed by DRA's Satellite Communications Division at Defford.

139. Among the main areas of space activities of interest to Britain are earth observation, satellite communications, space science and space transportation. Earth observation, with 50% of United Kingdom space expenditure, is the centre-piece of British space policy.

140. ERS-1 carries two instruments developed

in Britain: AMI, the active microwave instrument is an integrated radar system that operates both as a SAR and as a scatterometer and enables ERS-1 to see through clouds as well as in darkness and ATSR (along track scanning radiometer), an advanced four-channel infrared imaging radiometer.

141. ERS-2 will include a replica of the ATSR with additional land channels (ATSR-2). There are plans for BNSC partner SERC (Science and Engineering Research Council) to fly instruments like HIRDLS (high resolution dynamics limb sounder), SAFIRE (spectroscopy of the atmosphere using far infrared emission) and EMLS (enhanced microwave limb sounder), on NASA's EOS (earth observation system) series of satellites.

142. Britain contributed two complementary atmospheric analysis instruments for UARS (NASA's upper atmosphere research satellite), the improved stratospheric and mesospheric sounder (ISAMS) and the microwave limb sounder (MLS).

143. Britain's Meteorological Office (BMO), partners in BNSC, will fly AMSU-B instrument (advanced microwave sounding unit), a five-channel microwave radiometer, for the next generation of NOAA satellites. Measurements of water vapour from Envisat-1 will be given greater accuracy by MHS (microwave humidity sounder) being developed by BNSC partners in the Meteorological Office. Also for the future, Britain is defining and studying designs for a new instrument, OMI (the high resolution optical mapping instrument), as candidate for a bilateral mission with France.

144. The Earth Observation Data Centre (EODC) at Farnborough is the national centre for acquiring, processing, storing and disseminating remotely sensed data; EODC was developed for the BNSC and it incorporates an important international space facility, one of the four ESA PAFs (processing and archiving facilities)¹⁶.

145. Space science represents 26% of the United Kingdom's space expenditure. BNSC funding through SERC (Science and Engineering Research Council) supports the universities and RAL (Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) in developing and producing instruments for science missions and interpreting their data.

146. International collaboration is an essential element in the United Kingdom's space science programme and is undertaken primarily through

ESA. However, in some bilateral programmes with, for example, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States, current and projected space science programmes are:

- X-ray astronomy, the current programme includes analysis of data from past missions and exploitation of their Germany-United Kingdom-United States ROSAT mission (X-ray satellite) for which Britain provided the wide field camera. Britain is also leading a European consortium to build an X-ray telescope (Jet-X) for the planned Russian Spectrum-X mission, and has provided the X-ray instruments for Japan's Yohkoh mission, which is studying high-energy aspects of solar flares. RAL and universities have a major involvement in all three instruments (camera, spectrometer and optical monitor) selected by ESA for its XMM mission. In the field of optical astronomy and astrometry, the Hubble space telescope (ESA-NASA) carries a United Kingdom designed faint object camera and the United Kingdom is involved in the processing of data from the Hiparcos mission.
- In infrared astronomy, current activities are devoted to the development of instruments for ISO (infrared space observatory) with a United Kingdom contribution to all four instruments; United Kingdom participation in the ESA First mission is also planned.

147. In solar-terrestrial physics, the United Kingdom is involved in ESA's missions Ulysses, Soho (with the coronal discharge spectrometer) and Cluster (with the fluxgate magnetometer, plasma analyser and digital wave processing package).

148. The United Kingdom has a major involvement in the NASA/ESA major planetary Cassini-Huygens mission; the University of Kent has the leading rôle in the ESA surface science package for the Huygens Titan probe and Imperial College, London, for the dual technique magnetometer on the NASA Cassini orbiter, together with other contributions which reflect the range of British expertise in the planetary and solar-terrestrial field.

149. Satellite communications represent 12% of United Kingdom space expenditure. Through BNSC, the United Kingdom takes part in a number of ESA satellite communications programmes, like the DRTM (data relay and technology mission), in the two elements Artemis will provide a pre-operational data relay capability and demonstrate links with land mobile terminals, optical intersatellite data linking and electric propulsion) and DRS; the ASTP-4 (advanced sys-

16. A private sector company, NRSC Ltd. (National Remote Sensing Centre) will operate EODC on a progressively more commercial basis, initially with financial support from BNSC.

tems technology programme) and ARTES (advanced research in telecom system) PSDE.

150. BNSC, at the national level, has encouraged and supported a number of innovatory applications via ESA's large experimental Olympus satellite, has sponsored feasibility studies of aeronautical and integrated cellular/land mobile communications via satellite.

151. The Ministry of Defence, a BNSC partner, sponsors a comprehensive military satellite communications programme. Three Skynet-4 satellites currently serve the needs of the United Kingdom's armed services and there is a widespread ground segment. Feasibility studies for Phase 2 of Skynet-4 are under way and the Ministry of Defence's communications research and development programme is co-ordinated with BNSC's national programme; both are executed through the Defence Research Agency (DRA). DRA operates as a corporate organisation, supplying on a commercial basis to the Ministry of Defence and a range of other customers an expert, comprehensive, scientific, and technical service. It has a headquarters at Pyestock, and its four main operating divisions are Portsmouth, Fort Halstead, Malvern, and the Royal Aerospace Establishment at Farnborough, as well as the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (RSRE) at Defford.

152. Technology and transportation programmes account for 3% of United Kingdom space expenditure. BNSC supported research to help develop the performance, life and reliability of spacecraft (particularly in earth observation), and to support and encourage the United Kingdom space sector.

153. The United Kingdom is a minor player in ESA's launcher programmes, involved only in the Ariane-4 research and technology accompaniment programme.

154. Your Rapporteur regrets that he cannot include any information about space research establishments in Belgium and Portugal, as no reply has as yet been received from these establishments.

IV. The European Space Agency (ESA)

155. European co-operation in space matters dates back to the early 1960s. In 1962, six European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in association with Australia) came together in ELDO (European Launcher Development Organisation) and, in the same year, the same six countries, together with Denmark, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, formed ESRO (European Space Research Organisation). Some ten years later, in Brussels, in July 1973, the European Space

Conference in which the ministers of these ten countries participated, agreed in principle to create ESA (European Space Agency)¹⁷ replacing ELDO and ESRO.

156. The member states assigned ESA the task of providing for and promoting collaboration among European states in space research and technology, exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article 2 of the convention).

157. ESA is developing a European space programme with the aim of bringing it to a successful conclusion. Its expertise covers the areas of science, earth observation, communications, space sector technologies including orbiting space stations and platforms and earth-based infrastructure, space transportation systems and microgravity research. Its rôle is also to co-ordinate the agency's own actions and the national programmes of its members so as to integrate them progressively into the European programmes. Finally, ESA also has an industrial rôle in developing and implementing a policy appropriate to its programmes while ensuring that each member receives a fair financial return on its investments and an equitable share of technological spin-offs.

158. ESA's activities fall into two categories: compulsory and optional programmes. Compulsory programmes are concerned with studies for future projects, technological research, joint technical investments, information systems, training programmes and the development and use of scientific satellites. All member states contribute to these on the basis of national income. Programmes described as optional are of interest only to some of the member states who decide freely on the extent of their participation in them. Optional programmes include earth observation, communications, space transportation, space stations, platform projects and microgravity research.

159. In the pursuit of its programmes, ESA devotes the main part of its budget to contracts with industrial firms in the member countries. Its policy ensures that each member receives a fair financial return on its investments and an equitable share of technological spin-offs. Thus each unit of account from a member state contributed to the agency's budget should, strictly speaking, come back to that country in the form of an industrial contract.

160. The headquarters of ESA is in Paris, where its general directorate is based. However, the organisation has several other establishments (ESTEC, ESOC, ESRIN, EAC) and a launch base at Kourou (in French Guyana).

¹⁷ Ireland joined the organisation and the founder members were joined on 1st January 1987 by Austria and Norway. Finland will become the fourteenth member state on 1st January 1995 and co-operation contracts have been concluded with Canada.

161. Situated at Noordwijk, in the Netherlands, the European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) is ESA's largest establishment. Scientific, communications, earth observation, microgravity research projects and projects for manned orbital infrastructure and unmanned platforms for which responsibility has been given to European industry are managed from ESTEC, the true nerve centre of ESA. ESTEC also has responsibility for defining future scientific satellite or applications programmes and programmes for the development of the new technologies necessary to achieve them.

162. The European Space Operations Centre (ESOC) in Darmstadt (Germany) is responsible for monitoring that orbital space vehicles are working properly.

163. Despite its name, the European Space Research Institute (ESRIN) is primarily ESA's data management centre for information from remote sensing satellites. Situated in Italy, at Frascati, not far from Rome, ESRIN is responsible for processing, archiving and distributing data obtained from a large number of ground-based stations throughout the world. Moreover it is responsible for several services such as European Space Information Service (ESIS) or the Information Retrieval Service (IRS)

164. As the most recent of ESA's establishments, the European Astronauts' Centre (EAC) in Cologne (Germany) is responsible for recruiting and training men and women who will participate in a few years time in flight missions on the Columbus Laboratory linked to the international station "Freedom".

165. Scientific programmes are as follows: of the ten satellites and scientific probes launched by ESA between 1975 and 1990, five are at present operational or in orbit. These are the international ultraviolet explorer (IUE) which, launched in 1978 in the framework of a NASA, ESA and United Kingdom joint programme, is still continuing in 1994 to supply data to a scientific programme despite some minor deterioration due to its obsolescence; the Giotto probe (launched in 1985); the high precision parallax collecting satellite (Hipparcos)¹⁸, an astronomy satellite for determining with greater precision the positions and parallax of more than 1 000 stars in our galaxy; the Ulysses probe (launched in October 1990 in the framework of a joint ESA/NASA mission) which is to take measurements above the poles of the sun; the Hubble space telescope (outcome of a joint ESA/NASA project launched in 1990) which is one of the most ambitious astronomy projects ever conceived and which, despite a defect in its

18. Communication with the satellite was terminated on 15th August 1993 at the end of a remarkable mission lasting over three years.

mirror, corrected in spectacular fashion at the end of 1993, has obtained far better results than those of ground-based observatories.

166. ESA foresees the following programmes for the future: the infrared space observatory (ISO) programme, (launch scheduled for September 1995) with a low-temperature cooled telescope equipped with four scientific instruments. The unit will take pictures and carry out photometric, spectroscopic and polarimetric observation. The Horizon 2000 programmes whose four "cornerstones" missions, namely the solar terrestrial science programme (STSP), the X-ray multi-mirror mission (XMM, to be launched in June 1999) and the First (far infrared and submillimetric space telescope) missions devoted to submillimetric wavelength astronomy and Rosetta (envisaged as a collaborative project between ESA and NASA with an anticipated launch date in 2003, the aim of which is to bring back to earth samples taken from the head of a comet) are the basic elements of ESA's scientific programme. STSP brings together two missions, Soho (the solar and heliospheric observatory with an anticipated launch date in July 1995) which will carry out research on the internal structure and dynamics of the sun and Cluster (scheduled launch date in December 1995) which includes four satellites with a payload of ten instruments, whose aim is a three-dimensional study of turbulence and small-scale structures of the plasma surrounding the earth.

167. Lastly, mention should be made of the Cassini/Huygens planetary exploration mission of Saturn and Titan (undertaken jointly by ESA and NASA) which will include a NASA probe orbiting round Saturn, linked to ESA's Huygens probe which will be released into Titan's atmosphere¹⁹ and Integral (international gamma ray laboratory) a gamma-ray astronomy mission based on the service module common to XMM²⁰.

168. For observation of the earth, ESA relies on the following programmes:

- Meteosat²¹, Europe's first geostationary meteorological satellites, equipped with an imaging radiometer allowing pictures to be taken in the visible and infrared spectrum and in the water vapour wavelength designed basically to take pictures of the

19. The particular interest in Titan derives from the fact that its atmosphere has properties closer to that of the earth than any other body in the solar system.

20. This project will be conducted jointly with Russia and NASA. The Russians are to provide the launcher (Proton) free of charge in exchange for observing time. NASA is to take part in the development of the payload (spectrometer) and might contribute one or two ground stations in addition to the ESA stations.

21. Ownership of Meteosat satellites was transferred to the European organisation Eumetsat from the time of its formation in 1987. ESA continues to be responsible for their exploitation and technical management.

earth, broadcast meteorological data and collect environmental data recorded by unmanned stations on the ground; Meteosat 6 was launched on 20th November 1993.

- ERS-1 (European remote sensing): a European radar satellite placed in polar orbit by Ariane in July 1991. Since then, thanks to its main instrumentation, a synthetic aperture radar (AMI) (active microwave instrument), a wind scatterometer, a radar altimeter (RA) and a radiometer and sounder (ATSR-M) (along-track scanning radiometer and microwave sounder), ERS-1 carries out detailed observation of the structure of the earth's surface. Production of the second flight model, ERS-2²² has continued with a launch date in prospect at the end of 1994.
- Envisat and Metop: these are two series of missions in polar orbit developed by ESA: a first and initially experimental series of environmental study platforms (Envisat) and a meteorological series (Metop), oriented rather towards operational observation. Envisat, one of the most wide-ranging and ambitious satellites ever produced by ESA (with a payload three times greater than those of the ERS satellites) has a projected launch date of 1998. The first meteorological mission will not, however, be launched until the year 2000, following a joint ESA/Eumetsat programme.
- The Meteosat second generation (MSG) programme is being conducted in close co-operation with Eumetsat and the first satellite launch is envisaged for the year 2000.

169. In communications, ESA has been present since 1979 in the geostationary arc through experimental orbital test satellites (OTS), then preoperational European communications satellites (ECS) constituting the first generation of European telecommunications satellites developed by ESA²³. In addition to the ECS, there are the Marecs (Maritime ECS) satellites designed by ESA to provide communications capabilities with moving vehicles and in particular with ships at sea and leased to Inmarsat (international maritime satellite organisation) for the period of their use. Lastly, the Olympus satellite (launched in July

1989 by Ariane rocket with a payload consisting of four different missions: direct satellite broadcasting, Ku band communications, Ka-20/30 GHz band communications and a beacon for propagation studies) was withdrawn from service in August 1994 following a failure.

170. ESA's principal objective in proposing a programme of data-relay satellites, essential for maintaining continuous and immediate contact between ground control teams and European orbital infrastructures, is to ensure Europe's total independence in data transmission from orbiting satellites or platforms to ground stations in Europe.

171. In this area, the Artemis (advanced relay technology mission) satellite should be launched at the end of 1996 with an optical laser beam communications payload on board, along with satellites in low earth orbit²⁴, a demonstration communications payload for the mobile service for land vehicles and a data-relay payload for preparing the operational data-relay system (DRS). ESA foresees placing up to two geostationary data-relay satellites in orbit (the first in 1999); these will contribute to optimising the future European orbital infrastructure and will be compatible with other similar networks (the American TDRS and the Japanese DTRS) in the framework of international co-operation.

172. Finally, in order to ensure that Europe has the necessary means of maintaining its capabilities and commercial competitiveness in the sector of communications by satellite, ESA has proposed the Artes (advanced research in telecommunications systems) programme²⁵.

173. Reference must be made in connection with manned space flight and microgravity of the first joint German/ESA/Spacelab mission in October 1985 carrying 75 microgravity and life sciences experiments; participation in Astro-1 missions (December 1990), SLS-1 (Spacelab space science, June 1991), IML-1 (January 1992), Atlas-1 (April 1992), the USLM-1 (United States microgravity laboratory) flight in June 1992, the joint mission with the Japan Spacelab-J in September 1992 and lastly the Spacelab D2 mission in April 1993. The European unmanned retrievable platform, Eureka (European retrievable carrier), an ideal laboratory for microgravity studies, was retrieved on 24th June 1993 by the Endeavour space shuttle after eleven months in low earth

22. ERS-2 should provide continuity of data transmitted by ERS-1 and also offer new possibilities for monitoring the ozone layer on a global scale.

23. The European space communications organisation, Eutelsat, is responsible for the exploitation of the ECS, renamed Eutelsat I after their entry into operational service.

24. Artemis's optical payload will communicate with an optical terminal on board Spot-4. Manufacture of this terminal led to Spot-4 being supplied with the first complete model, offering good optical, thermal and mechanical precision.

25. Activities within the Artes programme fall into the following categories: promotion of new improved services in communications by satellite; co-operation with users; improving industrial competitiveness and international co-operation.

orbit. In 1993 also, the European microgravity research programme, Emir-1, was adopted.

174. European participation in the large international space station "Freedom", agreed by the Council of ESA meeting in the Hague in 1987, took the name Columbus programme. The attached laboratory programme had to be adapted to the constraints arising from the decisions taken at the Council meeting at ministerial level in Granada at the end of 1992 and the evolution of the international space station programme that took place in 1993. Two series of studies on possibilities for technical co-operation and future partnership between the ESA member states and Russia were carried out in the framework of the "future station Columbus" programme unit. The first of these series dealt with a limited range of contributions by ESA to the Russian MIR-2 space station, the second with possible wider co-operation after the year 2000 and the construction of MIR-2, in relation to major components of orbital infrastructure.

175. The Ariane programme (the first flight of which was on 24th December 1979) gave ESA its own reliable launcher, making it independent in terms of space transportation. The initial Ariane 1 gave way to the more powerful Ariane 2 and 3 from 1984 and these were withdrawn in turn with the arrival on the scene of Ariane 4 in 1988. The latter are available in six models, including a basic version and five other models equipped, depending on the satellite mass to be placed in orbit, with two or four high tech solid or liquid propelled booster engines. Ariane 5, with a radically different architecture, will be a new generation launcher, shorter and squatter, capable of giving rise to a new family of rockets adapted to the satellites of early next century. ESA has opted for a rocket in two stages: a lower stage, identical for all missions and an upper stage that can be adapted to the mission and the payload to be placed in orbit.

176. Given the evolution of projects for future space-based infrastructure, the concept of a winged re-entry vehicle which figured in the Hermes programme has been abandoned. The revised Hermes programme is now known as the manned space transportation programme (MSTP) and envisages further research and predevelopment work on which will be based the decisions to be taken as regards Europe's capability in equipment and cargo transportation and in carrying out repairs in orbit.

177. ESA is developing a range of co-operative relations in Europe and with the United States, Russia and Japan. In Europe, in accordance with the wish expressed at the Granada conference, complementarity with various international organisations (Eutelsat, Eumetsat) has been sought. Priority has been given to relations with the European Commission through strengthening regular

contacts and improving consultation and co-ordination. Promising new areas for co-operation have been identified such as navigation, promoting remote sensing in developing countries and training.

178. ESA is, in short, at the root of a massive European effort in space matters to which, it should be stressed, the CNES has contributed in large part. There is possibly no other area as European as space technology. Last, but not least, ESA has no mandate to concern itself with the non-civilian use of space. In fact, whether or not its convention permits it to deal with this area is not a legal problem but basically a political one. Not all ESA member countries are interested in military space, but it is obvious that in maintaining a watertight partition between civil and military space (military space systems such as Helios or Eumilsatcom are developed outside ESA) does not encourage the most rational use of the available financial means and technological capabilities and often, moreover, stands in the way of synergies which would allow an integration of military and civilian objectives.

179. The problem is there and a solution must therefore be considered as soon as possible in order to derive the greatest possible benefit from our financial and technological capabilities.

V. The state of European co-operation

180. From this general overview, certain aspects can be discerned which are of interest to our national space research institutes.

181. It should be stressed at the outset that these institutes, intended as wholly national bodies, are intended first and foremost to be of service to national interests.

182. At European level, there is still a degree of divergence as regards the evolution of the space sector in individual countries and the political importance accorded to this sector, as revealed by major differences between space budgets and their allocation between ESA programmes and national programmes.

183. National space research institutes are often multidisciplinary and engaged in other fields of research such as, for example, aeronautics and energy. Their size, budgets, aims and the links they have with the military sector vary considerably.

184. A degree of overlap is evident in European space-based activities, both between various national programmes and between these and ESA programmes. There is a great deal of duplication in infrastructure, training and remote sensing and co-operation with third countries.

185. Your Rapporteur feels, however, that it is necessary to stress existing examples of co-operation and collaboration between national space research institutes outside ESA programmes. Among these, the programmes already considered in the descriptive account of the national space research institutes are worthy of note: Spot, Vegetation, Helios, Iasi, Sax, etc.

186. Moreover, in the framework of research and technology programme 9.1 of the Euclid programme, devoted to a feasibility study of optical and/or radar monitoring satellites, teams from state organisations with the task of identifying problems likely to prove sensitive in the future have been formed and trained. The following teams are contributing their particular expertise to this programme: ETCA and the University of Liège (Belgium), DLR (Germany), Alenia Spazio (Italy), NLR, TNO and Fokker (Netherlands), NDRE (Norway), INETI (Portugal), INTA (Spain) and ONERA (France). Each country participates equally and where there are no government establishments in the area concerned industries have been selected.

187. WEU is also involved in bringing the national space institutes closer together: WEU studies on satellite systems are monitored by the study management group in which engineers from the state bodies referred to above participate. Moreover, additional studies have been launched in order the better to identify needs; ONERA and DLR are working on synthetic aperture radar and INTA, NLR and ONERA on problems relating to optical payloads.

VI. The future of European space research (forms of research and interaction)

188. Your Rapporteur believes convergence between ESA and the national space research institutes is necessary in order to bring greater coherence to the programmes undertaken and maximise the advantages that might be obtained from wider co-operation between national space centres. Measures must be taken now to implement a co-ordinated strategy between the various national space research institutes, ESA, the European Union, WEU and other organisations such as Eumetsat, Eutelsat, etc.

189. Countries will have to abandon policies that seek to maintain their presence in the different sectors, an attitude which leads to resources being spread between numerous programmes instead of developing synergies. Individual countries must concentrate on doing what they know how to do best.

190. Co-ordination of the research policies of member states is essential if it is hoped to achieve more efficient use of funds allocated to research;

such co-ordination could contribute to the emergence of new synergies and avoid fruitless dispersal of effort. When acting thus it is, however, necessary to ensure that a distinction is drawn between an unnecessary overlapping of effort and useful parallel research.

191. Since space technology now has a crucial rôle in defence and security matters (the C3I concept in space on a planetary scale) and given the high cost of military space programmes, increased European co-operation in military space matters is proving to be an essential condition for our security and political independence. Defence Europe must make a single and coherent collective response to the challenge of military space. To this end, co-ordination between the military and civil uses of space is essential for the technological and industrial development of space applications. The national space research institutes must be able to find a solution to this problem.

192. In the context of strengthening co-operative ties with countries embarking on space programmes and consequently potential partners or customers of Europe, joint rather than competitive action must be envisaged. It would also be desirable, starting from existing know-how in research and development of new space technologies, to encourage the creation at European level of new innovative commercial structures in conjunction with financial and industrial circles. The models adopted by the CNES in this area might be taken as an example.

193. Due to the complexity and variety of problems tackled, research activities cover disciplines and technologies extending beyond what might be strictly defined as the boundaries of space. Your Rapporteur considers it necessary for the national space research institutes to develop working ties with establishments covering related or complementary disciplines and to maintain very close ties with the industrial fabric in order to be able to apply and transfer the results of their research.

194. The national space research institutes must identify research sectors of mutual interest in order to define joint activities. Exchanges of scientific personnel and joint training can strengthen interaction.

195. All space agencies and research institutes are therefore encouraged to take these considerations into account and to envisage new forms of co-operation.

196. The aeronautics research institutes of seven European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have taken the initiative of starting a process of convergence of their activities in aeronautics. Several of these institutes are also working in the space sector. The convergence of work in aero-

nautics is favourable to closer relations in space matters and could serve as an organisational model.

197. The Maastricht Treaty sets out the need for co-ordinating efforts in terms of technology policy and research.

198. For some time now, the Commission has made use of observation satellites, the information from which enables it to implement its various sectoral policies, in particular, agriculture, environment and development aid. Moreover, the Institute for Remote Sensing Applications provides scientific backing for such applications and directs high technology research on environmental change. The Commission also maintains close and regular co-operation with ESA and, additionally, participates as an observer in the Committee for Earth Observation by Satellite (CEOS). Moreover, in co-operation with ESA, it has started a new activity – the Centre for Earth Observation (CEO).

199. Lastly, the Commission should also encourage co-operation between the national space research institutes; such co-operation, as has already been noted, should if at all possible, avoid excess capacity and the major difficulties arising from abusive application of the principle of fair return and encourage a more integrated approach to space research.

VII. Conclusions

200. It is clear that space research has generally developed in relation to national interests and with the aim of achieving supremacy or at least of obtaining a certain political standing.

201. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union, in large measure, brought an end to bipolarism and at the same time to the space race. Détente, too, has also opened up wider possibilities for international co-operation; to all the above must be added the arrival of new countries on the space scene and the emergence of new commercial opportunities.

202. In any event, space policy remains a matter for states and it does not seem likely that this situation will change very much in the immediate future; nor would it be realistic or desirable to seek to bring about such change.

203. In the framework of space policy, the defence sector is acquiring very specific importance as this sector is essential to national sovereignty. It retains considerable interest despite the generalised process of disarmament and the reduction of military budgets in most of our countries.

204. If this interest is sustained, it is mainly for two reasons: first, a consequence of disarmament

is a new type of armed forces, technologically far more sophisticated and, second, verification of disarmament agreements calls for ever more complex means.

205. These two factors give space a leading rôle. On the one hand, it is an attested fact that the use of space for military ends is a source of high-technology generation for civil use, a situation which could, nevertheless, be reversed. On the other, from a political as well as from a purely economic point of view, there is a general consensus on the need for and expediency of international co-operation in space matters, mainly because of the considerable difficulty of meeting the major expenditure involved in space projects. However, other reasons also weigh in favour international co-operation; participation in industrial consortia and joint ventures; participation in international bodies and networks in order to expand markets; maintaining industrial positions; exchange of personnel, etc.

206. European co-operation in space matters has largely been conducted through programmes undertaken in the framework of the European Space Agency to which should be added other co-operative programmes between various European countries. In this connection, it should be recalled that the Maastricht Treaty highlighted the principle of subsidiarity which, when applied to the situation under consideration, might be summarised as follows: whenever a project might be carried out jointly, the country concerned should endeavour to propose this to its European allies with a view to partnership. If, however, a project derives solely from national concerns, the country concerned should implement it alone, leaving open the possibility, however, of subcontracting certain aspects of the project to its partners.

207. Moreover, your Rapporteur considers the agreement between six European research institutes on the possibility of closer co-operation in aeronautics as being of very great interest. The progress of this agreement should doubtless be followed most closely in the hope of drawing useful lessons for space research.

208. All the aims to which reference is made throughout this report should contribute to promoting the European space industry. Even if it may appear to be very difficult and quite illusory to standardise the political ambitions of each of the European countries in this sector, co-operation between space research institutes should be strengthened and areas of interdependence identified as soon as possible.

209. In order to enable the various countries to maintain their position and fulfil their ambitions without jeopardising existing investments and expertise already acquired, it is necessary to sustain and intensify efforts in space research as a

guarantee for the future. Indeed, space programmes themselves, their development and implementation depend in large measure on expertise that has been accumulated through research.

210. Such efforts also imply the need to maintain a strong basic research potential on a European scale (for example, in universities) essential for guaranteeing the credibility of the national institutes and European industry.

211. One of the major constraints weighing upon public support for space research is that of finance. It would therefore be extremely risky for expertise to be dispersed too widely when European resources are limited. The purpose of joint

action should be to reduce excess capacity and to identify future needs.

212. Thus, the first consequence of financial restrictions should be rationalisation of the use of resources and concentration of effort.

213. Lastly, it should be suggested that in the future our committee might study the possibilities for co-operation between space research institutes in our own countries and in those of Central and Eastern Europe; the main objective of such co-operation would be to direct the work of these institutes into peaceful channels and to foster their integration and that of their scientists into the international community.

APPENDIX

Glossary

- AFDRG** – Anglo-French Defence Research Group
- AMI** – Active Microwave Instrument/Instrument actif hyperfréquences
- AMSU** – Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit/Sonde perfectionnée à hyperfréquences
- ANS** – Astronomical Netherlands Satellite/Satellite astronomique néerlandais
- ANTHORACK** – Medical research facility developed by ESA for D – 2 mission
- ARGOS** – Système de localisation et de collecte de données
- ARTEMIS** – Advanced Relay Technology Mission (ESA)
- ARTES** – Advanced Research in Telecommunication Systems/Recherche de Pointe sur les Systèmes de Télécommunications (ESA)
- ASI** – Agenzia Spaziale Italiana
- ASSM** – Aerodynamics of Segmented Solid Motors/Aérodynamique des propulseurs segmentés à combustible solide (ONERA)
- ASTP** – Advanced Systems Technology Programme/Programme de systèmes et de technologies de pointe
- ATSR-M** – Along-Track Scanning Radiometer & Microwave Sounder
- AXAF** – Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (NASA)
- BMFT** – Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (Germany) Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie
- BMO** – British Meteorological Office
- BNSC** – British National Space Centre
- CAPRICORNIO** – Programme de lanceur de microsattellites espagnol
- CARINA** – Re-entry capsule for microgravity experiments (ASI)
- CASSINI-HUYGENS** – Mission ESA-NASA d'exploration planétaire de Saturne et de Titan
- CDTI** – Centro para el Desarrollo Técnico y Industrial/Centre pour le développement technique et industriel
- CGS** – Centro di Geodesia Spaziale (I)
- CICSAT** – Capacidad Inicial de las Comunicaciones por Satelites
- CICYT** – Comission espagnole chargée de la science et de la technologie
- CIRA** – Centro Italiano di Richerche Aerospaziali
- CLUSTER** – Satellites pour l'étude de la structure à petite échelle de la magnétosphère (ESA)
- CNES** – Centre national d'études spatiales
- C.N.R.S** – Centre national de la recherche scientifique (F)
- COLUMBUS** – Programme de l'ESA sur les vols habités
- COMPTEL** – Comptom Telescope
- CRYP** – Cryogenic Propulsion Plant Facility/Banc d'essai de propulsion cryogénique (CIRA)
- CSG** – Centre spatial guyanais
- D-1/2** – German Spacelab missions
- DARA** – Deutsche Agentur für Raumfahrtangelegenheiten
- DFD** – German Remote Sensing Data Centre/Centre allemand des données de télédétection
- DLR** – Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.
- DORIS** – Système d'orbitographie fine et de localisation précise de balises (F)
- DRA** – Defence Research Agency (UK)
- DRPP** – Data Relay Preparatory Programme (ESA)
- DRS** – Data Relay Satellite/Satellite-relais géostationnaire
- EAC** – European Astronaut Centre/Centre des astronautes européens

ECS – European Communications Satellite (ESA)
ELDO – European Launcher Development Organisation
EMIR-1 – Programme européen de recherche en micropesanteur (ESA)
EODC – Earth Observation Data Centre
EOPP – Earth Observation Preparatory Programme
EOS – Earth Observation System/Système d’observation de la terre (NASA)
EPOS – European Proximity Operations Simulator/Simulateur européen d’opération de proximité (ESA – DLR)
ERS – Earth Remote Sensing Satellite
ESA – European Space Agency
ESIS – European Space Information Service (ESA)
ESOC – European Space Operations Centre/Centre européen d’opérations spatiales (ESA)
ESRIN – European Space Research Institute (ESA)
ESRO – European Space Research Organisation
ESTEC – European Space Research and Technology Centre/Centre européen de recherche et de technologie spatiales (ESA)
ETW – Soufflerie Transsonique Européenne/European Transsonic Wind Tunnel
EURD – Instrument pour l’étude du rayonnement diffus provenant de l’espace dans l’ultraviolet lointain
EURECA – European Retrievable Carrier (ESA)
EUTELSAT – Organisation européenne de télécommunications par satellite
FIRST – Far Infrared and Submillimetric Space Telescope
GALILEO – Mission d’étude de Jupiter/NASA
GEZON – Cristallogénèse sous champ magnétique (Russie)
GRANAT – Observatoire X/gamma (Russie)
GSOC – German Space Operations Centre/Centre allemand d’opérations spatiales
HELIOS – Satellites militaires d’observation de la terre
HIPPARCOS – High Precision Parallax Collecting Satellite
HIRDLS – High Resolution Limb Sounder/Sondeur du limbe dynamique à haute résolution
HISPASAT – Satellite militaire espagnol
HUBBLE – Télescope spatial (programme conjoint ESA-NASA)
IASB – Institut d’aéronomie spatiale de Belgique
IASI – Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer (ASI-CNES)
IML 1 et 2 – International Microgravity Laboratory
INMARSAT – Organisation Internationale de Communications Maritimes par Satellites
INTA – Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial
INTEGRAL – International Gamma Ray Laboratory
I-PAF – Italian processing and archiving facility
IRAS – Infrared Astronomical Satellite (NL-UK-USA)/Satellite d’astronomie infrarouge (PB-RU-EU)
IRIS – Italian Research Interim Stage
IRS – Information Retrieval Service (ESA)
ISO – Infrared Space Observatory/Observatoire Spatial dans l’Infrarouge (ESA)
ITALSAT – Italian pre-operational communication satellite
IUE – International Ultraviolet Explorer (NASA-ESA-UK)
LAGEOS – Laser Geodynamics Satellite (ASI-NASA)
MAGELLAN – Mission d’étude de Vénus/NASA
MARECS – Maritime ECS (ESA)
MARS 94-96 – Etude de Mars (Russie/Coopération internationale)
MEDEA – Material sciences Experiment Double-rack for Experiment modules and Apparatus/Expérience DLR embarqué sur D-2

- MEPHISTO** – Etude de la solidification des alliages métalliques et des semi-conducteurs sur une plateforme USMP de la navette spatiale américaine (F)
- MSG** – Météosat de seconde génération
- METEOP** – Satellite d'observation météorologique depuis l'orbite polaire
- METEOSAT** – Satellites météorologiques géostationnaires (ESA)
- MHS** – Microwave Humidity Sounder
- MINISAT** – Programme de minisatellites de l'INTA
- MIPAS** – Michelson Interferometer Passive Atmospheric Sounder/Sonde atmosphérique passive à interféromètre Michelson
- MLS** – Microwave Limb Sounder
- MOMS** – Modular Optical Multispectral Scanner (D-2)/Scanner multispectral à balayage optique modulaire
- MSCC** – Manned Space Laboratories Control Centre/Centre de contrôle des laboratoires spatiaux habités
- MSTP** – Manned Space Transport Programme (ESA)
- NASA** – National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- NIVR** – Nederlands Instituut voor Vliegtuigontwikkeling en Ruimtevaart/Netherlands agency for aerospace programmes
- NLR** – Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium/National Aerospace Laboratory
- NOAA** – Agence américaine pour l'étude des océans et de l'atmosphère/National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration
- NRSC Ltd** – National Remote Sensing Centre (UK)
- NWO** – Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
- ODISSEA** – Co-operation programme between ASI, CNES and INTA for transmediterranean balloon flights
- OERSTED** – Mission danoise d'étude du champ magnétique de la terre
- OLYMPUS** – Satellite de télécommunications ESA
- OMI** – High Resolution Optical Mapping Instrument/Instrument de cartographie optique à haute résolution
- ONERA** – Office national d'études et de recherches aérospatiales
- OTS** – Orbital Test Satellite (ESA)
- PAF** – Processing and Archiving Facility/Etablissement de traitement des données et d'archivage
- PNS** – Piano Spaziale Nazionale (I)
- POLDER** – Radiomètre polarimètre imageur (F-J)
- POP** – Programme oscillations de poussée (ONERA)
- PREPHA** – Programme de recherche et technologie pour la propulsion hypersonique avancée (ONERA)
- PRONAOS** – Nacelle ballon d'astronomie submillimétrique (F)
- PRORA** – Programma Nazionale di Ricerche Aerospaziali (I)
- PSDE** – Payload Spacecraft Development on Experiments Programme
- PWT** – Plasma Wind Tunnel (CIRA)
- RAE** – Royal Aerospace Establishment (UK)
- RAL** – Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (UK)
- RAMSES** – Radar aéroporté multi-Spectral d'études de signatures (ONERA)
- RKA** – Russian Space Agency
- ROSAT** – X-ray Satellite (D – U.K – USA)
- ROTEX** – Robotic Technology Experiment (D-2)/Expérience de robotique
- RSRE** – Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (UK)
- SAFIRE** – Spectroscopy of the Atmosphere Using Far Infrared Emission/Spectroscopie de l'atmosphère utilisant l'émission dans l'infrarouge lointain
- SAR** – Synthetic Aperture Radar/Radar à synthèse d'ouverture
- SAX** – X-ray astronomy satellite (ASI-NIVR)
- SCARAB** – Radiomètres destinés à l'étude du bilan radiatif de la terre (France/Russie)

SCIAMACHY – Scanning Imaging Absorption Spectrometer for Atmospheric Cartography
SERC – Science and Engineering Research Council (UK)
SIGMA – Système d'imagerie gamma à masque aléatoire (France-Russie)
SILEX – Semi-conductor Interorbit Link Experiment (télécommunications)
SIR-C – Space-borne Imaging Radar-C/Radar d'imagerie en bande C
SIVA – Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Aérea/Système intégré de surveillance aérienne
SOHO – Solar and Heliospheric Observatory/Observatoire du soleil et de l'héliosphère
SPACELAB – Space Laboratory
SPIDER – Space Inspection Device for Extra-vehicular Repairs/Système d'inspection spatiale pour les réparations extra-véhiculaires (ASI)
SPOT – Satellite pour observation de la terre (F-S-B)
SRL – Space Radar Laboratory/Laboratoire radar de l'espace
SRON Space Research Organisation Netherlands/Stichting Ruimteonderzoek Nederland
STELLA – Instrument pour la cartographie du champ de gravité dans les zones polaires (F)
STSP – Programme de physique des relations terre-soleil (ESA)
SYRACUSE – Système militaire de télécommunications par satellites (F)
TELECOM – Satellite de télécommunications français
TOPEX/POSEIDON – Satellite océanographique scientifique (USA)
TSS – Tethered Satellite System (ASI-NASA)
UARS – Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite/Satellite d'étude de la haute atmosphère (NASA)
ULYSSE – Mission polaire solaire internationale (ESA)
USLM-1 – US Microgravity Laboratory
VEGETATION - (Commission Européenne – F – B – I – S) Instrument pour le suivi des écosystèmes naturels et des systèmes agricoles
WINDII - Mesure des vents et de la température dans la haute atmosphère (Canada/F)
XMM – Mission miroirs multiples dans le rayonnement X
X-SAR – X-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (ASI-DARA-NASA)

Co-operation between European space research institutes

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti di Biase

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out paragraph (e) and insert:
“ take account, in developing Europe’s autonomy in defence matters, of the fact that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications; ”

Signed: Gaiotti di Biase

1. See 11th sitting, 30th November 1994 (amendment withdrawn).

Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur*

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on transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Alternate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arata, Atkinson, Biefnot, Blaauw, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Coviello, Curto, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. Guirado, MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Litherland (Alternate: Alexander), Lorenzi, Marshall, Poças Santos, Pozzo, Roger (Alternate: Galley), Sarens, Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Valleix, Wolfgramm.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the need for Europe to determine the risks for its security of the proliferation of ballistic technologies in the countries of the third world and in particular in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
- (ii) Recalling the need for the discussion already started in WEU to be taken further in order to contribute to identifying these risks and their effects on Europe and for giving this discussion real impetus;
- (iii) Taking into consideration the need for European countries to reach a joint position on anti-missile defence, in order to avoid a dangerous delay in relation to the evolution of the threat;
- (iv) Recalling its earlier conclusions on the need to envisage a system of protection which takes account of European needs and also of work done in this area by the United States;
- (v) Considering the many advantages that co-operation in the widest sense and based on equality between the transatlantic partners could obtain for the two sides in the area of anti-missile defence;
- (vi) Considering however that certain programmes launched by the United States, such as THAAD, have reached a very advanced stage, which precludes co-operation from the outset;
- (vii) Recalling moreover that the missile technology control régime provides for the signatory countries to strengthen the principles upheld by that agreement through their respective legislations;
- (viii) Taking into account the differences now separating countries that used to be members of Cocom in identifying the countries which constitute a strategic threat to their security;
- (ix) Considering that the countries which are at present establishing the bases of the new Cocom must reach a consensus, particularly with regard to prohibition of certain transactions with given countries or for a specific purpose;
- (x) Considering that the system which is to succeed Cocom must have as its main objective to prevent the countries constituting a true proliferation risk and a real threat to regional stability from procuring conventional armaments and associated technology;
- (xi) Judging necessary that agreements directed to this end should be concluded as quickly as possible;
- (xii) Emphasising the importance for WEU to define a joint policy for the exportation of armaments;
- (xiii) Taking account of the need to take the necessary steps as soon as possible for preparing a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give the Assembly precise information about progress made in the study being conducted by the Special Working Group on European anti-missile defence;
2. Let the Assembly know whether a meeting of experts has been held in order to prepare an analysis of risks and, if so, what conclusions were drawn from that meeting;
3. Ask member countries to strengthen in their respective legislations the principles upheld by the MTCR;
4. Encourage the adoption in member countries of a joint position on the definition of the countries that constitute a strategic threat to their security;
5. Seek a consensus among member countries on the bases of the régime to replace Cocom;
6. Promote among member countries the introduction in the very near future of a joint policy towards the exportation of armaments to third countries;
7. Speed up examination of the development of a European space-based observation system and the taking of decisions in that respect;
8. Create a study group on a European early warning system;

9. Discuss the possibilities of co-operation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile defence; such co-operation should be on a basis of equal partnership in development and production and might cover the following areas:

- (a) programmes on an endo-atmospheric system currently under study in Europe and the United States and which might possibly lead to joint implementation of a single programme;
- (b) exo-atmospheric systems;
- (c) airborne systems, adapted in any event, to European Rafale and Eurofighter combat aircraft;
- (d) study of the possibility for Europe to adopt a joint position on the possible procurement of the American THAAD programme;

10. Reach a joint position on the various possibilities described above in the interests of Europe and our transatlantic allies.

11. Establish contacts between WEU and the BMDO for discussion of the problems already described.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In November 1992, the Technological and Aerospace Committee adopted the report by Mr. Lenzer (Document 1339) on anti-ballistic missile defence, the main aim of which, as the report stated was "...to draw the attention of the Council and the public to a problem of a new kind that makes it necessary for Europe to assess the risks to its security that may arise from the increasing proliferation of ballistics technology in third world countries, particularly those along Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks".

2. The conclusions of the above report revealed the need to open up an in-depth discussion which would contribute to identifying the nature of these risks and also to understanding their possible implications for Europe and the urgency for our continent to reach a joint position on anti-missile defence, so as to avoid a dangerous time-lag in relation to the development of the threat.

3. A few months later, in April 1993, the Technological and Aerospace Committee organised a symposium in Rome on anti-missile defence for Europe, which made a very important contribution to the above debate.

4. The first conclusion to be drawn from this symposium was the need to create a space-based observation and early warning system, following which an anti-missile defence system could subsequently be chosen. Furthermore, the conclusions stressed the need for the WEU Assembly to formulate "recommendations regarding a protection system with due regard to European requirements and taking into account the work already done by the United States. This might lead to a co-operative system, perhaps drawing other countries into what might be a security partnership. First, however, there would have to be risk assessment and risk description. In a second stage, WEU member countries should define their security requirements and pool the means at their disposal to find an appropriate answer to the different risks. In doing this it was obvious that Europe also had to consider the American offer of participation in a global protection system. Technical options could not replace political decisions. But a policy could function only if it had operational leeway and for this it needed technical and military options. It was therefore necessary to come to grips with reality".

5. The Council's reply to Recommendation 533 on anti-ballistic missile defence was fully consistent with the opinion of the Assembly on the need for assessment of the risks for Europe of the development of ballistic capabilities and the proliferation of ballistics technology in countries close to Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks. The Council indicated, moreover, that a global antimissile protection system (GPS) was an item for discussion on the Special Working Group's agenda.

6. In response to the Assembly's recommendation that a European position be established on the United States' projected global protection against limited strikes (GPALS), the Council stated that the establishment of such a position should necessarily be preceded by an in-depth study of the questions relating to a global protection system.

7. The first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly (1st January - 30th June 1993) states that the work of the Special Working Group had been in large measure devoted to the development of the American initiatives for a global protection system and to anti-missile defence in Europe and that "discussion centred on the assessment of the risks which Europe might face and the implications for Europeans of American thinking on this matter. The group noted with great interest the content of the contributions made at the Assembly's seminar in Rome on 20th and 21st April and the conclusions of that seminar".

8. The subject continued to have priority on the agenda of the Special Working Group as the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly indicates. This states that among its tasks the Special Working Group continued to be engaged in more detailed European thinking on an anti-missile defence system.

9. The report also states that given the change of direction in American government policy (after Mr. Clinton's arrival in the White House), the group decided to stop using the term "GPS" in its documents and to take over the term "anti-missile defence" used by the Assembly.

10. Finally the group agreed that WEU should concentrate on the defence aspects, having regard to the work carried out in other bodies on non-proliferation, and recommended to the Council that a meeting of experts be held to prepare a risk

analysis. The resulting document would then be submitted to the Special Working Group.

11. In this context the present report proposes to present a series of suggestions that might contribute to establishing transatlantic co-operation with a view to a European anti-missile defence, and would also take the fullest account of the declaration of heads of state and of government participating in the North Atlantic Council summit meeting in Brussels on 10th and 11th January 1994. Since this meeting, which recognised the existence of a European security and defence identity and endorsed its development, there has been steady progress towards greater and ever closer co-operation between NATO and WEU.

12. In drawing conclusions about the timeliness and viability of co-operation in the above-mentioned area, the present document will take account of work undertaken under the missile technology control régime (MTCR) and the proliferation of missile technology; it will analyse the strategic defence initiative and global protection against limited strikes and the present policy of the United States as regards an anti-missile defence system; lastly, it will study current initiatives by NATO and the WEU member countries in the area of anti-ballistic missile defence.

II. The missile technology control régime (MTCR) – the proliferation of missile technology

13. Although the committee has already made a study of MTCR (Document 1305: Arms export policy, 30th April 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Aarts) it is fully relevant at this juncture to recall certain aspects of this report and bring certain information it contains up to date.

14. The first such aspect is that the MTCR is not a treaty but an unofficial agreement and the actual controls remain the national responsibility of the individual participating countries. It is therefore an agreement, the implementation of whose established rules rests solely on the good will of the countries party to it.

15. The principles established under the agreement are not intended – and this is explicitly stated – to impede national space programmes or international co-operation in such programmes as long as such programmes do not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of the agreement is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological) by controlling transfers that could contribute to supplying technology used in the production of such weapons.

16. The agreement, initially signed in April 1987, was revised in early 1993. Although originally the agreement referred to control of techno-

logies to handle a 500 kg payload over a range of 300 km, the present text makes no reference to either payload or range. The signatory countries, and logically therefore, firms inside their territories, are to refrain from supplying another country with any hardware or technology for use in missile manufacture, regardless of payload or range.

17. Your Rapporteur is informed that the following countries are at present members of the missile technology control régime: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States; these include the seven countries that signed in 1987. Other states have declared their adherence to the principles of the MTCR or are in the process of doing so; these include Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Romania, Russia and South Africa. It should be noted that all the member countries of the European Union and those that will presumably form part of the Union from 1995 are members of the MTCR.

18. The MTCR covers transfers of equipment and technology relevant to missiles. In the evaluation of transfer applications the following factors will be taken into account:

- (i) the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- (ii) the capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programmes of the recipient state;
- (iii) the significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of systems for producing weapons of mass destruction;
- (iv) the assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the assurance of the recipient state that they will be used only for the purpose stated, that neither such use nor the items transferred will be modified or duplicated without the prior consent of the supplier government and that neither the items nor any replicas nor derivatives will be retransferred without the consent of the supplier government.

The MTCR provides that governments should enforce these principles through their respective national legislations.

19. Despite the fact, noted previously, that many countries are already party to the MTCR or have stated their intention of joining in future, and despite the importance of these countries, the fact of the matter is that this control mechanism, which is certainly unique of its kind, is not entire-

ly fulfilling its objectives, even though the MTCR admittedly constitutes a major obstacle to attempts by certain countries to acquire such equipment and technologies.

20. According to data provided by the United States Defence Department, the current situation of third world countries in relation to theatre ballistic missiles is that shown in the following table:

250 km to 600 km	Afghanistan (Scud-B) China (M-11, M-9) DPRK (Scud-B, Scud C) Egypt (Scud-B) India (Prithvi) Iran (Scud-B, Scud-C) *Iraq (Scud-B, Al-Hussein) Israel (Jericho-1) Libya (Scud-B) Pakistan (Hatf-2, M-11, Hatf-3) Syria (Scud-B, Scud-C, M-9) Yemen (Scud-B)
> 600 km	*Iraq (Al-Abbas) Taiwan (Tien Ma)
1 000 km to 1 500 km	DPRK (No Dong-1) Israel (Jericho-2) South Africa (Arniston)
2 000 km to 5 000 km	China (CSS-2, CSS-5, JL-1 SLBM) DPRK (Taepodong-1 , Taepodong-2) India (Agni) *Iraq (Tammuz-1) Saudi Arabia (CSS-2)
> 5 000 km	China (CSS-3, CSS-4)

In Development.

* Prohibited.

21. Moreover since the demise of Cocom (Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) at the start of 1994, differences over a successor organisation to take over its responsibilities are beginning to surface between the former Cocom members (Australia, Japan and NATO members except for Iceland), as the Americans and Europeans are unable to reach agreement on the aims of export controls.

22. In the first place there seem to be differences of opinion about which countries constitute strategic threats. This means that a wide multilateral consensus has to be achieved which takes account of specific transactions that may not be licensed for a given destination or particular end-use. Moreover there is apparently as yet no agreement on the list of items to be subject to controls.

23. The new successor régime to Cocom will have to be directed towards conventional armaments and their related technology, and concentrate on those countries that represent proliferation risks and threats to regional stability – which from the United States' point of view means countries such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

24. Adherence to the new régime will be open only to countries that already belong to existing multilateral non-proliferation régimes, the MTCR, the Australian Group (biological and chemical weapons) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and which additionally subscribe to armaments control standards such as the START agreements.

25. It therefore seems obvious and necessary for the partners on either side of the Atlantic to reach specific agreements as soon as possible, making an effective contribution to controlling real and potential threats that will inevitably be amplified if there is no suitable joint response on our part.

26. The United States is currently opposed to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union being founder members of any new successor organisation to Cocom, because, according to Washington, these countries continue to supply armaments to hostile countries (mainly Russia which supplies Iran), basically on account of their desperate need for cash. During his recent visit to Washington in late September 1994, President Yeltsin gave an undertaking to end Russian arms sales once outstanding contracts (some dating from 1988) were fulfilled.

27. The most recent and obvious example of such a threat has been North Korea, a country which has pushed itself far beyond its true economic capacity in order to acquire a nuclear capability together with ballistic missiles such as the Taepodong 1 and 2 – the latter, with a possible range of over 3 000 km, reported to be available quite soon (and consequently available for export).

28. The European Union for its part is preparing to draw up regulations for armaments exports. It is seeking to establish a community system for armaments exports to third countries. Your Rapporteur has learnt that work is being done on product lists on which products are to be counted as dual-use and the régime that should govern them. The legal principles which are to apply have yet to be clarified.

29. From the above, it is quite clear that export controls are not an entirely effective solution for avoiding ballistic missile proliferation. The MTCR and the new Cocom will be useful tools, provided there is no hesitation about their being interpreted more rigorously and an attempt is made to win the support of the largest number of countries possible for their principles.

30. In short, the range of measures for avoiding the risk of proliferation, or at least reducing it as far as possible must be directed primarily towards prevention, with the assistance of political and economic measures, measures for preventing technology transfer (MTCR, new Cocom ...), preventive military action and also deterrence measures implying the threat of reprisals and protection including active and passive defence.

31. All of the foregoing must be accompanied by confidence-building and regional security measures, as this committee has observed already in the report referred to earlier (Document 1305) at least as far as Asia is concerned and, to a far lesser degree, South America. In the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East, the situation is far more problematic and complex and the idea referred to elsewhere of a CSCM (or Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean) could be helpful in contextualising the problem as part of the process of analysis and search for a solution.

III. United States policy on missile defence systems

32. On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan announced the strategic defence initiative (SDI), a long-term technology research programme consistent with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, to examine the feasibility of developing defences against ballistic missile attacks and to attempt to create a space shield which would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". The SDI was devised as an alternative to the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine which, for several decades, had based deterrence on the threat of massive retaliation and subsequent destruction of United States and Soviet societies. The mission of SDI was to redefine deterrence by giving the United States (and its allies) the means to protect people and military assets from Soviet attacks.

33. The Reagan administration established the SDI programme in January 1984 and in April 1984 the Strategic Defence Initiative Organisation (SDIO) was chartered to manage the efforts of the Department of Defence (DoD). The administration's first SDI budget submission to Congress requested \$2 billion for FY1985 and Congress authorised a total of \$1.621 billion. By 1985, SDI had become the Department of Defence's largest single research and development programme.

34. In January 1985, a White House paper acknowledged that, while the ultimate objective was still a defensive system which would protect the population of the United States directly, the more immediate goal was to make nuclear retaliation

more effective. Under this rationale, SDI would help deter a nuclear attack by complicating Soviet planners' efforts to destroy American nuclear forces in a first strike. Together with air defences, effective defences against ballistic missiles would substantially lower the possibility of nuclear war.

35. Much of the technology needed for SDI was already under way before 1983, which allowed the programme to move quickly to a high funding level. The army already had a substantial ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology programme moving forward in surveillance and tracking, interceptor missiles and terminal battle management. The air force and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had several technology development programmes under way in directed energy weapons (DEW) and space surveillance. At least 25 Department of Defence programmes were aggregated and restructured to form the SDI programme.

36. A breakthrough in BMD technology occurred in June 1984 when Lockheed's homing overlay experiment (HOE) successfully intercepted and destroyed a mock ballistic missile warhead in the midcourse phase of its flight. This non-nuclear intercept was the first such experiment demonstrating the homing guidance system and the potential of kinetic energy weapons (KEW) to destroy ballistic missiles and their warheads by colliding with them at great speeds. HOE, managed by the army's ballistic missile defence systems command, represented a decade of research and development, data-processing and optical technology. This experiment laid the foundation for the exo-atmospheric re-entry vehicle interceptor system (ERIS), a technology researched under the SDI programme.

37. Other key experiments included:

- in September 1985, a ground-based directed energy experiment using the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) device conducted at the White Sands missile range: the target, a Titan booster rigged to simulate a thrusting booster, was successfully destroyed by the laser. SDIO also conducted the first successful demonstration of the ability to track a sounding rocket in space with a low-power, ground-based laser after adjusting the beam for atmospheric distortion;
- in April-June 1986, a series of flexible lightweight agile guided experiments (FLAGE): these kinetic energy experiments demonstrated the guidance technologies necessary to intercept a warhead both in and beyond the earth's atmosphere;
- in July 1986, SDI's first particle beam experiment irradiated a miniature re-

entry vehicle with a high-intensity proton beam, demonstrating that the explosive contained in the re-entry vehicle was highly vulnerable to the particle beam.

38. In 1987, the Heritage Foundation published a study arguing that the SDI programme was still too vaguely defined. The paper proposed an architecture for the SDI consisting of a three-tier system with space- and land-based components capable of destroying ICBMs at various stages in their flight. This near-term, kinetic-kill, layered strategic defence system would cost approximately \$100 to \$121 and would include:

- space-based kinetic-kill vehicles targeted at the incoming missile's boost phase and post-boost phase;
- a ground-based component, similar to Lockheed's exo-atmospheric re-entry interceptor system (ERIS), to shoot down missiles in the mid-course of their trajectories;
- a terminal defence, similar to McDonnell Douglas's high endo-atmospheric interceptor (HEDI), to destroy those few missiles which get through the other two layers;
- radar sensors of different types for each of the three layers, to track and target ICBMs;
- battle management and command, control and communications (BM/C³) capabilities to guide and manage the overall system.

39. The study recognised DEW (lasers and particle beams) as having the potential to fulfil SDI's mission but it pointed out that those technologies would require ten to fifteen years of research and development before deployment.

40. The SDI programme was given a structure and a strategy. The goal of the programme was reduced to "near-term deployment of limited ballistic missile defences as a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM treaty" (SDIO report to Congress on the SDI, April 1988). The "Paul Nitze criteria" of military effectiveness, survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin was introduced as a prerequisite to deployment. The administration defined and adopted a specific SDI deployment concept for the 1990s and beyond, referred to as "phased development". The strategic defence system (SDS) envisaged by the Department of Defence would be the culmination of several different SDI deployment phases consisting of ever-evolving SDI technologies.

41. Phase one of the SDS consisted of space-based kinetic energy interceptors to attack ballistic missiles and warheads in the boost and post-

boost phases. For that purpose, various sensors would be used during the various phases of flight, as recommended by the Heritage Foundation study:

- a sensor system concept called boost surveillance and tracking system (BSTS) would be used to track missiles in the boost phase;
- for intercept during the post-boost and mid-course phase outside the atmosphere, two other sensor system concepts would be required: (i) a space surveillance and tracking system (SSTS) – an orbiting satellite sensor; and (ii) a ground-based surveillance and tracking system (GSTS) – a system that launches sensors into space by rocket booster after warning of an attack from the BSTS;
- a ground-based radar (GBR) would provide a late mid-course and terminal phase sensor system to track and discriminate re-entry objects that have survived the defences in the boost, post-boost and mid-course phases.

42. An exo-atmospheric re-entry vehicle interceptor system (ERIS) would be used on the ground to complement the space-based interceptor (SBI). The SBI concept was eventually superseded by a smaller, low-cost, mass-produced, individually-deployed space-based interceptor called Brilliant Pebble. A constellation of these smaller interceptors would be deployed in space, revolutionising the SDI architecture (see Appendix I). Reportedly, the phase one system was supposed to take out 50% of the Soviet SS-18s launched and about 30% of the total attack. Deployment of this system would have to be done in sub-phases due to budget and technology constraints.

43. Follow-on system concepts, to be used in phases two and three of the SDS included:

- space-based neutral particle beam (NPB) weapons;
- a high endo-atmospheric defence interceptor (HEDI);
- an airborne optical system (AOS);
- a ground-based radar (GBR);
- a space-based laser (SBL);
- a ground-based hypervelocity gun (HVG); and
- a ground-based laser (GBL).

(see Appendix II).

44. As early as March 1985, the administration emphasised that the SDI programme was designed to enhance allied security as well as United

States security and solicited allied participation. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and Norway declared that they would not participate in the SDI. However, their private industry could contract directly for SDI work. Other countries signed agreements regarding government and industrial participation in the SDI: the United Kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United States on 6th December 1985, followed by West Germany in March 1986, Israel in May 1986, Italy in September 1986 and Japan in July 1987. The Netherlands signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in July 1987. At the beginning of 1988, eighty contracts had been awarded to foreign companies for a total of \$127.2 million (not including foreign subcontractors).

45. The SDI played a significant rôle in the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations: it prompted the USSR to reopen the START talks. From 1985 onwards, the United States and the Soviet Union held several rounds in Geneva to negotiate a strategic arms reduction treaty (START I) aimed at reducing each side's nuclear warheads by half. Between 1985 and 1991, United States and Soviet differences over the SDI programme caused an impasse in the START negotiations, but SDI was one of the key factors which led the Soviets to begin serious discussions on arms reduction and eventually to sign the START treaty in July 1991. The SDI also played a significant rôle in the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) negotiations leading to the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987. The administration consistently argued that a major objective of the SDI programme was to provide arms control leverage over the Soviet Union.

46. At the beginning of 1990, responding to changes in the international and domestic climate, the SDIO began redefining its plans for the development of strategic and theatre defences. Former United States defence and space talks chief negotiator Henry Cooper was hired by Defence Secretary Dick Cheney to review the SDI programme and recommend how it could be revised to meet the changing international scenario and the new threats, i.e., the decreasing threat of a massive Soviet nuclear attack and the increasing threat of a third world attack.

47. Mr. Cooper developed a plan called global protection against limited strikes (GPALS). The goal of GPALS was to protect the United States completely from an unauthorised, accidental or third world nuclear attack of up to 200 warheads or re-entry vehicles. The plan also envisaged the improvement and co-ordination of theatre defences with the United States strategic defence and emphasised global protection in addition to deterrence. In July 1990, Henry Cooper became SDIO's director to carry out his plan and, in

January 1991, President Bush endorsed the change to GPALS.

48. The GPALS anti-missile system concept consisted of three distinct defensive spheres:

- (i) theatre missile defence (TMD), composed of stand-alone defences against theatre/tactical ballistic missiles;
- (ii) national missile defence (NMD), providing national coverage to the United States including Alaska and Hawaii, in about six United States deployment areas, and involving space and mobile ground-based sensors as well as about 750 ground-based interceptors (GBIs)-about half the number required to meet SDI's phase one objectives;
- (iii) global missile defence (GMD) elements, i.e., the space-based interceptors that would assist the two ground-based systems. This element would be a constellation of about 1000 kinetic-kill vehicles known as Brilliant Pebbles.

49. About 50 space-based sensors would provide early warning, cueing, some discrimination, and kill assessment to both the theatre and the United States system. The two ground systems would also have GBRs to measure object slowdown as it hit the atmosphere to help distinguish light and heavy objects. The system realigned the GSTS (a ground-based infrared sensor probe that can be launched on demand in case of attack) as a technical back-up to both Brilliant Eyes and GBRs.

50. The first step in the three-tier GPALS plan was the development of theatre defences because theatre defence technologies were more mature than those needed for a United States or global defence, and also because theatre forces in a changing international scenario faced a more immediate threat from ballistic missiles than the United States homeland. The initial plan envisaged an improved theatre defence deployed in the mid-1990s and the United States and global systems in place by the end of the century. SDIO emphasised that the elements of the GPALS system "could be deployed sequentially, and need not await the development of an entire system. Nor would the deployment of [the] system be contingent on the technical maturity of follow-on systems", as was the case with phase one of SDI. However, SDIO promised that research on follow-on technologies would continue to be funded. While still relying on space assets for surveillance and communication, GPALS represented a shift away from a space-based shield to a ground-based defence.

51. In 1991, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee (led by Sam Nunn and John

Warner) started crafting a compromise which would push theatre and ground-based ABM treaty-compliant United States defences to deployment while providing research funds for Brilliant Pebbles. The result was the Missile Defence Act of 1991, which for the first time put Congress on record as supporting deployment of a United States missile defence (see Appendix II). The act endorsed the concept of a limited defence designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic-missile threats. One of the key provisions was a mandate to develop NMD by 1996 or as soon as the technology would be ready. The single United States defensive site was to contain 100 GBIs and to be fully compliant with the ABM treaty. The act also called for robust funding for Brilliant Pebbles and other follow-on technologies. However, in April 1992, Mr. Nunn contended that the SDIO was spending too much on its plan for space-based assets (Brilliant Pebbles and Eyes) at the expense of the ground-based systems that Congress wanted. The FY 1993 Department of Defence authorisation revised the Missile Defence Act by dropping the 1996 target deployment date and reiterating that the goal of the United States was to abide by the ABM treaty. While the Senate Armed Services Committee urged the administration to "pursue vigorous changes" to the ABM treaty, it directed SDIO "to plan the architecture for the initial, treaty-compliant ABM site on the basis of the treaty as now constituted and not as it may be revised". The new target date for deployment was postponed to 2002. In April 1992, Mr. Cooper estimated the cost of GPALS at about \$35 billion for 5 to 7 sites, Brilliant Eyes and BM/C³.

52. With the election of Bill Clinton as President, United States policy on missile defence systems shifted significantly away from the strategic emphasis of previous Republican administrations. Shrinking defence budgets, the lessons drawn from the Gulf war, major changes on the international scene and a new political orientation all contributed to placing the pursuit of effective TMD on top of the priority list. The Clinton administration put GPALS on hold in favour of TMD – involving the protection of a smaller area against tactical ballistic missiles (as opposed to ICBMs) – while relying more on the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and on the strengthening of the MTCR to discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The main task of theatre ballistic missile defences was to protect expeditionary forces deployed by the United States and its allies.

53. In early 1993, the Secretary of Defence restructured the SDIO and renamed it the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO). The BMD programme was restructured to respond to the "here and now" theatre ballistic-missile threat and to an uncertain, but evolving, threat to the

United States. It was founded upon the President's endorsement of the 1993 Department of Defence bottom-up review (BUR) and on the Missile Defence Act (MDA) of 1991 as subsequently amended in FY1993 and 1994 national defence authorisation legislation. As amended, the MDA directed the administration to "maintain the option to deploy an ABM system capable of providing a highly-effective defence of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles and to provide highly-effective theatre missile defences to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United States and as appropriate to friends and allies". The BUR, in its assessment of the ballistic missile threat, pointed out that both deliberate or accidental launches from China or the former Soviet Union (FSU) were highly unlikely. As for potentially hostile third world nations, the possibility of a limited, long-range ballistic missile threat some time in the first decade of the next century could not be excluded. The BUR also identified a new, more urgent threat: the proliferation of shorter-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. It stated that, "in recognition of the low probability of a long-range ballistic missile attack from the FSU or China, but to preserve a hedge against acquisition or indigenous development of a long-range ballistic missile capability by another potentially hostile nation, national missile defence (NMD) efforts were designated as a second priority relative to TMD".

54. The overall TMD programme objectives of the Clinton administration were to field a TMD capability rapidly by upgrading existing systems and developing more advanced systems for acquisition later in this decade. The proposed budget to support those goals was \$12 billion for FY1995-1999. The BMDO requested a budget of \$3 250 million for FY1995, including \$1 770 million for TMD research and development and \$270 million for TMD procurement efforts. An array of service programmes reinforced the joint and combined nature of the TMD mission. The TMD initiative (TMDI) involved the army, navy and air force and included several core programmes:

- Patriot advanced capability level-3 (PAC-3), an upgrade of the PAC-2 which was used against the modified Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf war. PAC-3 would provide greater lethality, range and accuracy, and more effective capability against tactical ballistic missiles. The first PAC-3 systems should be fielded by FY1998;
- navy lower-tier TMD (Aegis/Standard Missile-2 Block IVA). The navy and BMDO have been co-operatively working to develop an enhancement to the Aegis/SM air defence system which

would provide a sea-based tactical ballistic missile defence capability (similar to that provided by the PAC-3);

– theatre high altitude area defence (THAAD). As the most critical element in the “core”, THAAD represents the first TMD system which has been designed to match fully the existing ballistic missile threat. The THAAD system would allow multiple shot opportunities to intercept longer-range and more capable theatre ballistic-missile threats. It has been developed for endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric defence and consists of interceptor missiles, launchers, BM/C³I units, and a theatre missile defence ground-based radar (TMD-GBR). It would provide approximately twenty times the capability of existing air defence assets, employing the latest hit-to-kill technology. The Department of Defence would like to give THAAD the capability to intercept short-range or *tactical* missiles with a range of up to 3 500 km travelling at up to 5 km/second – only slightly less than the speed of a *strategic* vehicle (6 to 7 km/second). It would operate as an autonomous weapon system, but it is required to be interoperable with lower-tier defences. THAAD thus represents the centrepiece of a two-tiered defence system. \$495.69 million were requested in FY1995 for the THAAD programme and deployment of the objective THAAD system was planned for FY2002. However, a prototypical THAAD battery as a user-operational evaluation system (UOES) should be developed at the end of the demonstration/validation phase in 1996 for early operational assessment and possible deployment should a contingency arise. Provision of the UOES has been a major thrust and priority of the TMD programme.

55. The abovementioned two-tiered defence system would rely on a theatre missile defence ground-based radar (TMD-GBR) as well as on a command and control centre. The TMD-GBR would provide surveillance and fire control support for the THAAD missile system and cueing support to lower-tier systems such as Patriot. It would utilise state-of-the-art radar technology in order to provide a capability to perform threat classification against theatre tactical ballistic missiles and kill assessment after intercept. As for battle management and command, control and communication capabilities, BMDO has taken the lead to establish an architecture upon which all the services can build and to ensure an effective and joint BM/C³I. The National Test Facility

(NTF) at Falcon AFB, Colorado, centrepiece of the National Test Bed (NTB), is the only facility under direct control of the BMDO and seeks to provide the comprehensive capability to compare, evaluate and test alternative SDS key technologies (such as BM/C³) in a system-level context. The NTB network of research facilities currently has sixteen remote nodes linked together and located throughout the United States.

56. Additional TMD efforts will involve concept exploration activities for a potential sea-based upper-tier wide area defence system. Sea-based upper-tier technologies include the light-weight exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP). The LEAP-equipped SM-2 would follow the above-mentioned Block IVA. By the end of 1994, the BMDO will conduct the first at-sea exo-atmospheric experimental intercepts, designated FTV-3 and FTV-4. Other TMD efforts include defence for manoeuvring ground forces (corps SAM, a new mobile air and missile defence system), and a boost phase interceptor system (airborne boost phase intercept) which would offer the potential to destroy attacking missiles over enemy territory and would be effective particularly against advanced delivery system countermeasures. It is worth noting that these three programmes are competing for funds since the TMD programme will only fund a single new system (starting FY1998).

57. The new TMD programme as a whole has incorporated some technologies and components derived from the SDI programme but, for the most part, space-based elements have been shelved or put on hold. In August 1994, an agreement on how to structure a demonstrator programme for an endo-atmospheric missile interceptor to destroy ballistic targets in the boost phase was reached by the air force, the BMDO and the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD). Despite possible funding difficulties, Defence Secretary John Deutch approved the plan which relies heavily on existing technologies. The United States air force and the BMDO emphasised that the boost phase interceptor (BPI) would supplement other portions of a layered ballistic missile defence such as Patriot or THAAD.

58. In August, the Senate Appropriation Committee chopped BMDO's budget to \$2.5 billion and changed programme elements: Patriot and the extended range interceptor (ERINT) risk reduction programme obtained more money than requested; THAAD lost money for some flight tests; sea-based area theatre ballistic missile defence also suffered a reduction; TMD-GBR funds were increased to make sure that good radar systems are available to support THAAD; and finally, BM/C³I funds were held to FY1994 levels. As far as NMD is concerned, the committee consolidated all national missile defence technology readiness programmes in a single new pro-

gramme element and funding was reduced. Funding for follow-on TMD technologies was also reduced compared to the administration's request. The Senate panel transferred \$120 million in Brilliant Eyes funding to the air force and earmarked \$50 million for a high-energy laser research programme outside of BMDO. The panel declared that early deployment of Brilliant Eyes in the next five years coupled with no NMD technology demonstrations would not be consistent with the BUR. It also recommended that BMDO continue developing and testing more mature technologies, such as ERIS and LEAP, rather than concentrating on miniaturising interceptors and kill vehicles. This represents a direct attack on Brilliant Pebbles and a clear indication that United States ballistic missile defence will increasingly emphasise ground-based systems to the detriment of space-based concepts.

IV. Anti-missile defence – architecture and systems

59. After more than twenty years of technical investigation of this area, more particularly in the United States but in Europe too, the nature of the specific systems required or needing to be developed has become clear in recent years, together with their effectiveness and relative interest, allowing a distinction to be drawn between what is feasible now and areas for research.

60. The table given in Chapter II shows two types of threat: the first is the threat of a theatre attack from missiles with a range of under 1 000 km, calculated statistically as between 300 and 600 km. The other is a strategic threat from missiles with a much greater range.

61. Theatre missiles are normally fired from mobile launchers. The target area of these missiles is necessarily more restricted if merely for reasons of their range. Strategic missiles, if not launched from submarines, as is the case for Russia, are fired from fixed silos, usually located well within the borders of the enemy country.

62. Two different defence systems to counter two types of threats can be envisaged on the basis of the following systems:

(i) Endo-atmospheric systems, mainly:

- American systems: Patriot, the PAC-3 version of which is currently being developed from the Erint missile and Corps SAM currently in the study phase;
- European systems: the German TLVS, in its study phase, and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, also under study, based on the anti-aircraft SAMP/T combining the Aster missile

with either Empar or Arabel radar systems for naval and earth applications respectively;

- Russian systems: SA-10 and SA-11 which have been operational for some years.

63. Endo-atmospheric systems protect the nerve centres of the armed forces: headquarters, communication centres and military bases and surrounding areas of from 5 to 15 kilometres. These systems are designed to counter theatre missiles of up to a 1 000 km range and their effectiveness is very weak against missiles in the 2 000 km range. The Russian SA-12 is effective against missiles with a 3 000 km range.

64. These systems are mobile and generally have a dual anti-missile and anti-aircraft function.

(ii) Endo-exo-atmospheric systems: the only current project is the American THAAD programme in its development phase. THAAD (theatre high altitude area defence) with its ground-based radar, is heavy but transportable nevertheless. It protects an area of 100-200 km in diameter against missiles in the 300-3 000 km range.

(iii) Exo-atmospheric systems: at present these systems exist only in the study phase or as prototypes. They are based on the LEAP (light exo-atmospheric projectile) concept, which, with a velocity of the order of 4 km per second, can defend an area 2 000 in diameter against missiles with a 1 000 km plus range, in other words strategic and no longer theatre missiles.

65. In general the systems under study here are sea-based using for example the SM-2 missile equipped with Aegis fire control. These systems can be based on land but are difficult to transport.

66. Three or four systems based in the Mediterranean would be sufficient to protect the greater part of Europe against threats from the south and south-east. Nevertheless, to be fully effective, these systems require enormously powerful radar systems which must have fixed locations. The ranges of the ship-based Spy radar systems equipped with Aegis are far less effective.

(iv) Boosted interceptor systems: these systems, unlike those preceding, are airborne on Eurofighter or Rafale aircraft and require very little infrastructure. Each aircraft in flight can block an enemy missile in its initial launch phase if the missile is fired at a distance of a few hundred kilometres or so from the plane. These scenarios are theatre scenarios where the dimensions

of the firing areas are between 200 and 400 km and are within firing range of their target (600-800 km maximum).

67. Antimissile missiles are relatively light and allow the plane to undertake other defence missions at the same time. Moreover, they can be used against strategic missiles, provided they are within range of the firing point, which is possible if at the same time there is a declared in-theatre crisis involving the enemy country.

(v) Early warning systems: All the systems studied above operate satisfactorily provided one has access to early warning systems. The only existing systems are Russian and American (DSP) but these only operate with strategic or long-range theatre missiles. Projects are being studied in Europe and in the United States for warning systems that are effective against all missiles, including theatre ballistic missiles (Esat in Europe, Alarm in the United States). These are all space-based systems and are of varying complexity depending on the size of the area under observation.

68. One or two geostationary satellites are enough for continuous observation of a sensitive launch area of 2 000 km × 2 000 km. The zone to be observed can be determined from earth and changed in a few hours over one third of the earth's surface observed from an altitude of 36 000 km.

69. This early warning system may include purposes other than active anti-missile defence. In particular it permits surveillance of countries guilty of proliferation by identifying the nature of their fire: tests or fire against other countries, including when Europe is not involved. The system can also determine the type of missile used.

70. It is thus possible to detect launch areas to an accuracy of 1-5 km depending on the a priori information available about the missile launched; it is therefore possible to confirm that one country rather than another has launched a missile and to strengthen the deterrent attitudes European countries might possibly adopt.

71. Identification of the launch area also allows operational units to take action against batteries or to destroy launch systems by means of conventional bombers or laser or cruise missiles.

72. The early warning system also allows the target areas and the approximate arrival time to be identified, thus triggering the necessary warning systems and all possible passive defence measures.

73. Thanks to these different systems Europe can build one or several defence architectures:

- a theatre defence architecture could be established with a minimum number of

endo-atmospheric systems over each potential flash-point, preferably associated with an early warning system. To these might be added airborne systems (with which some aircraft are equipped) and three or four THAAD units, depending on theatre size;

- a defence architecture protecting Europe might be made up of THAAD systems defending major centres and towns with three or four sea-based exo-atmospheric systems and an early warning system with three fixed ultra long-range radar systems. Airborne systems may also be used in the event of initial in-theatre engagements.

V. Present-day co-operation on theatre missile defence (TMD)

74. In line with the report to Congress on the plan to co-ordinate development and implementation of theatre missile defence programmes with allies, the United States Department of Defence has established a series of priorities for the ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme. The highest of these involves the development and deployment of TMD systems to meet growing threats from ballistic missiles directed towards United States troops, allies and friends. According to the Department of Defence, the United States is seeking to co-operate in developing its anti-missile defence programme in development and deployment of theatre defences with allies who share the problems arising from proliferation of ballistic missiles.

75. The Department of Defence approached international participation in the development and deployment of TMD systems by building on bilateral research and development programmes, which aimed to encourage sharing of advanced technologies and, at the same time, achieve a better understanding of political and military factors capable of influencing the defence architecture in various regions around the globe. Moreover, such participation provided America's allies and friends with further knowledge enabling them to make their own decisions on the basis of their anti-missile defence requirements.

76. The result of this co-operation over research and development programmes has been wider agreement on the likelihood and impact of the use of missiles in theatre conflict and on the need for an effective response to the threat. This latter point was brought home forcibly by the Gulf conflict. Indeed, the interest in theatre anti-missile defence dates principally from that time. This interest has been shown in unilateral and multilateral actions, principally through the thin-

king developed or now being developed by NATO and by WEU.

77. Israel and Japan, countries facing immediate threat, might be regarded as cases in point. Israel, in co-operation with the United States, has developed a BMD programme based on the Arrow missile and has prompted Japan, for its part, to enter into bilateral discussions with the United States on anti-missile defence, basically in the light of the threat from North Korea.

78. In the following pages, consideration will be given to the activities of various European countries in relation to BMD. Also, in NATO, a group of member states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States) has established an ad-hoc working group under the Conference of National Armaments Directors, exclusively to try and find ways of co-operating in TMD programmes. Additionally, NATO has already made several studies on BMD.

79. The Department of Defence wishes to capitalise on all of this interest through all possible modalities of co-operation through an approach tailored to varying circumstances, taking account of national programmes and plans and the capabilities of each nation.

80. Inter alia, the following possible actions have been identified:

- sharing early-warning formulae;
- continued bilateral and multilateral co-operation on research and development;

- improving present anti-missile defence capabilities;
- strengthening participation in joint development and joint production programmes;
- subsequent deployment of advanced capabilities.

81. All of the above should lead to increased regional security, cost reduction, an improvement in security relations and greater operational interoperability with regard to national defence procurement and deployment plans.

82. The Department of Defence's TMD programme is based on an evolutionary development of anti-missile defence capabilities. This would imply improving Patriot capabilities by deploying the PAC-3 and adding the standard missile Block IVA on to present Aegis capabilities to provide a sea-based lower tier defence against short-range theatre ballistic missiles.

83. The talks that the Department of Defence is engaged in with countries that operate with American export equipment, produce American systems under licence or are simply considering joint development or future equipment purchase are based on this same strategy.

84. The Department of Defence's plan to coordinate the development and commissioning of TMD programmes shown in the following table seeks to avoid duplication, reduce cost and increase interoperability.

TABLE 1

Approach for allied participation

	Time	Activity
"Build upon/improve existing capabilities" Incremental enhancement Interoperability	Now	Identify and consolidate current studies, plans, programmes
	Near Term	Pursue improved early warning and tracking capability
"Qualitative new capability" "Defence-in-depth"	Longer Term	Pursue improved communication/data transmission
		Improve/develop lower tier defences Expand/improve lower tier defences Develop/deploy area defense capability

85. This plan is based on the defence needs worked out by the political and military authorities. The co-ordination process ensures that TMD is integrated into the existing air defence and air space command/control systems. The plan takes account of the analyses by NATO's Advisory

Group on Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the BMDO-supported missile defence architecture studies for Europe, the Middle East and Japan, along with other reports such as those prepared by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG).

86. The short- and medium-term programme identifies the potential for immediate low-cost, low-development, feasible improvements to existing systems and/or operational concepts that will result in measurable improvement to early-war-

ning and TMD capabilities. The following table shows those countries (allies and friends of the United States) with one or more existing systems able to provide an infrastructure for an advanced TMD capability.

TABLE 2

Friends and allies: existing TMD-related capabilities

Nation	TPS-59 FPS-117	Hawk	Patriot	AWACS	Aegis
Belgium	xxxxxx	xxxxxx			
Canada	xxxxxx				
Denmark		xxxxxx			
France		xxxxxx		xxxxxx	
Germany	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx		
Greece		xxxxxx			
Iceland	xxxxxx				
Italy	xxxxxx	xxxxxx			
Luxembourg					
Netherlands		xxxxxx	xxxxxx		
Norway		xxxxxx			
Portugal		xxxxxx			
Spain		xxxxxx			
Turkey	xxxxxx				
United Kingdom	xxxxxx			xxxxxx	
United States	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx
Sweden		xxxxxx			
NATO				xxxxxx	
Egypt	xxxxxx	xxxxxx			
Israel		xxxxxx	xxxxxx		
Jordan		xxxxxx			
Kuwait	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	Contract		
Saudi Arabia	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	
UAE		xxxxxx			
Japan		xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx	xxxxxx
Singapore		xxxxxx			
South Korea	xxxxxx	xxxxxx			
Taiwan	xxxxxx	xxxxxx			

87. Short- and medium-term strategy consists of building on the capabilities shown in the above table, in approving them and in introducing further new capabilities. Thus, the Department of Defence considers that the first element of its plan for international co-ordination should include statement of all existing early-warning capabilities and the existing planned and possible future means of sharing information on these systems. To summarise, this would include the following:

- examination of space-based sensors and the means of sharing their data;
- identifying ground- and sea-based sensor capabilities for theatre surveillance (United States and foreign) and associated modifications to enable improved detection and tracking of missiles;
- pursuing a possible modification of airborne surveillance systems. The United States is at present trying to develop a co-operative programme with NATO, the United Kingdom and France which already have E-3 AWACS;
- determination of the adequacy of existing battle management/command, control, communications and intelligence (BMC³) systems;
- the identification of evolutionary command and control operational concepts;
- the distribution of improved early-warning information which could significantly enhance the performance of fielded TMD systems, particularly as the TMD systems themselves are improved;
- planned modification of Patriot beyond the fielded PAC-2 with consultations centred on allied plans to incorporate short-term improvements for PAC-2 and their planning for PAC-3;
- Hawk improvements and the intent of some of the nations that currently deploy improved Hawk to upgrade their systems with the improvements planned by the United States marine corps;
- upgrades will be made to the Aegis combat system, to support detection, tracking and engagement of theatre ballistic missiles using the SM-2 Block IVA missile;
- Aegis standard missile Block IVA or an indigenous missile incorporating similar TBMD capabilities.

88. The long-term plan will be based on the achievements of the short- and medium-term plan with the objective of further enhancing lower tier

capabilities and adding the upper tier capability necessary to account for advanced theatre missiles for both (a) defence-in-depth of military forces and (b) territorial theatre defence.

89. In the Department of Defence's view, the earlier allied nations and friends become involved in the programme, the better the opportunities for co-operation. When discussions are held early in the development of a programme, the opportunities for joint development and production are greater. Participation later in the programme may be restricted to licence production, purchase of a system or development of a system variant with the addition of allied technology.

90. At the present time, the United States Corps SAM programme is in the concept definition phase, providing, according to the American authorities, an opportunity for international participation. It is possible during this phase to harmonise allied and United States requirements, define responsibilities and contributions and negotiate the terms and conditions of requisite international agreements.

91. Conversely, the THAAD (theatre high-altitude area defence) high-priority programme, now in its demonstration and validation phase, for the time being offers little opportunity for foreign involvement. Although limited participation might be possible, it would not be possible to accommodate interruptions for negotiations or modifications to the prime contract.


92. Foreign participation would be possible at and beyond the engineering and manufacturing development stage. In short, the Department of Defence considers that initiating early discussions on co-operation enables both sides to reduce costs, avoid a duplication of effort and improve operational concepts. In its view, such discussions would not be detrimental to established plans for improving capabilities in the force structure as quickly as possible.

93. The present position is that activities with allies have tended to move from research and development towards development and procurement programmes.

94. Since 1985, there has been allied participation in technical co-operation in research and development programmes. Memorandums of understanding were signed at the time between the United States and Germany, Italy, Israel, Japan and the United Kingdom for strategic defence initiative research. In addition, memorandums of agreement were signed with France, the Netherlands and the SHAPE technical centre.

95. The table hereafter shows total foreign participation since the beginning of the programme.

TABLE 3
Foreign participation



96. The next table shows the major co-operative programmes with allies; all of which refer to research and development activities.

TABLE 4
Major cost share co-operation arrangements with allies

Country	Programme	Total value \$ million	United States/ally funding (approximate)
United Kingdom ..	Data fusion	26.00	42%/58%
United Kingdom ..	2 flight test series	65.0	59%/41%
United Kingdom ..	Extended air defence test bed	19.20	58%/42%
United Kingdom ..	Artificial intelligence	3.50	80%/20%
Israel.	Arrow experiment	158.00	80%/20%
Israel.	Arrow continuation experiment (ACES)	322.00	72%/28%
Israel.	System engineering and integration	3.15	75%/25%
Israel.	Theatre missile defence (TMD) test bed	33.00	72%/28%
Israel.	TMD test bed enhancement	5.20	80%/20%
Israel.	TMD test bed experiment programme	6.00	50%/50%
Israel.	Hypervelocity launcher programme	4.06	75%/25%
Israel.	Boost phase intercept (BPI)	5.7	75%/25%
France.	Free electron laser (FEL) MOA	6.50	90%/10%
Netherlands	Hypervelocity gun test	17.25	30%/70%
SHAPE.	EADTB	32.30	59%/41%
France.	EADSIM	.68	35%/65%

97. Since 1985, the United Kingdom and the United States have co-operated on BMD research experiments, flight trials and information exchanges under an overarching memorandum of understanding. This co-operation is at both government and industry level.

98. The United Kingdom Government is now about to proceed with a study to determine national BMD requirements including TMD for protection of its military forces deployed abroad.

99. The United States Department of Defence will work closely with the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence to ensure "that the government modalities associated with possible co-operation on or direct sales of United States TMD systems are properly reflected in their study result... American contractors will be invited to support British industry as part of the United Kingdom strategy effort. Their requirements will necessarily include area defences".

100. Co-operation between the United States and Germany in anti-missile programmes began with the implementation of the United States-German Roland Patriot agreement in 1984. Currently, the German and United States Defence Ministries are working together to ensure harmonisation of requirements between the German TLVS (tactical air defence system) programme and the American Corps SAM. BMDO and the army will also work closely with the German Ministry of Defence with respect to their plan for the incorporation of PAC-3 with their existing systems.

101. France, in concert with Italy, has an ongoing effort to develop an improved air defence system with a TMD capability based on the future surface-to-air family of missiles. This system will use the Aster missile and Arabel and Empar radars.

102. Earlier this year, France and Italy suggested a data exchange agreement with the United States to facilitate improved operability with Corps SAM. France is also studying the possibility of developing an upper tier TMD system.

103. France's defence white paper accords greater importance to BMD. Accordingly, the French have embarked on a five-year BMD technology programme which provides for the possibility of co-operation with other countries.

104. At the beginning of this chapter, reference was made to the extended air defence/theatre defence ad hoc Working Group established by the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors. The group is composed of interested nations with resources to contribute to TMD and its aim is to exchange views on the tactical ballistic missile threat to the alliance and to define future methods of collaborating in TMD.

105. Topics under discussion at present include early warning, BMC³ (battle management, command, control, communications), lethality, infrared plume phenomenology, Hawk upgrades and upgrades to existing air defence systems such as putting an infrared search and track sensor on AWACS aircraft.

VI. Opportunities for co-operation

106. When we speak of co-operation this should, in our view, cover development and production as pursued in Europe between Europeans. Europe should adopt a definite position towards such co-operation if it wishes it to be genuinely profitable for the continent and to bring all partners together on an equal footing.

107. The various systems set out hereafter might give rise to intra-European co-operation and co-operation between Europe and the United States.

(i) Early warning systems

An early warning system might be implemented at European level under the auspices of WEU or for its use. The system might thus include a European early warning and data communication network, interoperable with American systems.

(ii) Endo-atmospheric systems

As we have already seen, international discussions are now being held on three-way co-operation between the United States, Germany and France which would allow co-ordination of the SAMP/T, TLVS and Corps SAM programmes or even the joint development of a single programme, international Corps SAM.

(iii) Endo-exo-atmospheric systems

Given that the development of THAAD is already very far advanced in the United States, collaboration in this area is hardly feasible. Europe might envisage purchasing systems from the United States although this transaction might not cover the early warning or command systems.

(iv) Exo-atmospheric systems

In this area co-operation may be envisaged between European countries and possibly with the United States. This would involve the installation of an interceptor system against strategic missiles directed against Europe. Without dismissing the possibility of American participation, it might reasonably be thought that co-operation between Europeans might prove adequate and satisfactory.

(v) Airborne systems

In this instance also, collaboration with our transatlantic allies is possible, with a view to developing a missile and airborne optical sensors adapted to European Rafale and Eurofighter aircraft.

108. In short, it should be stressed that WEU should first stimulate a debate on a European early warning system to follow up the studies which have already been started on developing a

European space-based observation system; this European early warning system, which would naturally be implemented through co-operation, should be followed by another system of exo-atmospheric and airborne defence corresponding to agreed priorities, either for protecting Europe itself or its troops in-theatre.


109. The success or failure of our action in the face of this challenge will no doubt depend on the achievement of the foregoing through European and/or transatlantic co-operation.

APPENDIX I


SDI Architecture Concepts

- Goals:**
- Highly Effective Defenses Of The U.S. Against Limited Attacks Of Ballistic Missiles — Consistent With Strategic Stability
 - Highly Effective Theater Missile Defenses For Forward Deployed And Expeditionary U.S. Forces, Friends And Allies


**Initial Site Defense System
(FY 96 - 97)**




**Limited Defense System
(FY 98 - 02)**



**With Space Based Interceptors
(FY 00 - 03)**



Theater Missile Defense (FY 92 - 05)



- (BE) Brilliant Eyes
- (GBR) Ground Based Radar
- (BP) Brilliant Pebbles
- (C²E) Command And Control Element
- (GBI) Ground Based Interceptor
- (X) Missile Defense Site
- (TMD) Theater Missile Defense
- (NMD) National Missile Defense / Limited Defense System

Source: SDIO

APPENDIX II

TABLE 1-2

Fundamental Missions of Strategic Defense

<i>Enhance Deterrence</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deny Soviet confidence in ability to plan or execute a successful attack - Influence Soviet correlation of forces
<i>Limit Damage to the U.S., its Forces and its Allies</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protect U.S. assets from Soviet attack - Preserve U.S. ability to sustain and support its allies - Defeat limited or unauthorized attacks
<i>Deny Soviet War Aims</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deny "maintain continuity of CPSU control" - Deny "defeat and occupy NATO" - Deny "neutralize the United States" - Deny "dominate the postwar world"

TABLE 2-1

Phase I System Concepts

<i>System element</i>	<i>Function</i>
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Detection of missile launches - Acquisition and tracking of boosters and PBVs - Kill assessment
Space-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Acquire and track PBVs, RVs, and ASATs - Discrimination
Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Acquisition - Tracking - Discrimination
Space-Based Interceptor (SBI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs and ASATs - Sensors on carrier vehicle (CV) could provide enhanced mid course sensor capability
Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disabling of RVs in late midcourse
Battle Management/Command and Control, and Communications (BM/C3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Man-in-the-loop control - Engagement management - Maintaining track data - Target assignment - Communications

TABLE 2-2

Follow-on System Concepts

<i>System elements</i>	<i>Functions</i>
Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) Weapon	– Interactive discrimination – Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs and ASATs
High-Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI)	– Disabling of RVs after reentry
Airborne Optical System (AOS)	– Midcourse and terminal acquisition and tracking
Ground-Based Radar (GBR)*	– Terminal acquisition and tracking – Discrimination
Space-Based Laser (SBL)	– Disabling of boosters and ASATs – Interactive discrimination
Ground-Based Hypervelocity Gun (HVG)	– Disabling RVs in terminal phase
Ground-Based Laser (GBL)	– Disabling of boosters

* GBR is being considered as an option for Phase 1

APPENDIX III

*Missile Defense Act of 1991**Goal*

- Deploy an ABM system, including one or an adequate additional number of ABM sites and space-based sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the US against limited attacks of ballistic missiles.
- Maintain strategic stability.
- Provide highly effective theater missile defenses to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of US forces and to US friends and allies.

Initial Deployment (INMD)

- Develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology, or by FY 96, a cost effective, operationally effective, and ABM treaty compliant ABM system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment of the ABM system described in the 1991 Missile Defense Act
 - 100 ground-based interceptors (the design of which will be determined by competition and down selection)
 - fixed, ground-based ABM battle management radars
 - optimum utilization of space sensors including sensors capable of cueing ground-based ABM interceptors and providing initial targeting vectors.

Limited Defense System (NMD)

- Development of systems, components and architectures for a deployable ABM system capable of providing a highly effective defense of the US against limited strikes, but below a threshold that would bring into question strategic stability
 - includes activities necessary to develop and test systems, components, and architectures capable of deployment by FY 96 as part of an ABM treaty compliant initial site defense system
 - for purposes of planning, evaluation, design, and effectiveness studies, such programs, projects and activities may take into consideration both the current limitations of the ABM treaty and modest changes to its numerical limitations and its limitations on the use of space-based sensors.

Theater Missile Defenses (TMD)

- Aggressively pursue the development of advanced theater missile defense systems with the objective of down selecting and deploying such systems by the mid-1990s.
- Capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United States.
- Cooperation with friendly and allied nations in the development of theater defenses against tactical or theater ballistic missiles.

ABM Treaty Negotiations

- Congress recognizes the president's call for "immediate" concrete steps to permit the deployment of defenses against limited ballistic missile strikes and the Soviets undertaking to consider such proposals from the US on non-nuclear ABM systems.
- Congress urges the president to pursue immediate discussions with the Soviets on the feasibility and mutual interests of amendments to the ABM treaty to permit
 - additional ground sites and interceptors
 - increased use of space sensors for BM/C³
 - clarification of development and testing
 - flexibility for advanced ABM technology.

Space-based Interceptors (GMD)

- Conduct research on space-based kinetic-kill interceptors and associated sensors that could provide an overlay to ground-based ABM interceptors.
- Robust funding for research and development, for follow-on technologies, including Brilliant Pebbles, is required.
- Deployment of Brilliant Pebbles is not included in the initial plan for the limited defense system architecture.
- Report on conceptual and burden sharing issues associated with deploying space-based interceptors (including Brilliant Pebbles) for the purpose of providing global defenses against ballistic missile attacks.

Review of Deployment Options


- Interim report due May 94 on progress of negotiations.
- Assess progress and consider options to the US as now exist under the ABM treaty.

Deployment Plan

- Within 180 days, submit deployment Plan for TMD systems and the ABM system established by the goals of the 1991 missile defense act.

APPENDIX IV


Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)




Source: SDIO

APPENDIX V

Limited Defense System/National Missile Defense Architecture



Ballistic Missile Defense Challenges



Source: SDIO

*The development of a European space-based
observation system – Part III*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the development of a European space-based observation system – Part III

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submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Alternate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arata, Atkinson, Biefnot, Blaauw, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Coviello, Curto, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. Guirado, MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Litherland (Alternate: Alexander), Lorenzi, Marshall, Poças Santos, Pozzo, Roger (Alternate: Galley), Sarens, Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Valleix, Wolfgramm.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft Recommendation**on the development of a European space-based observation system – Part III*

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of control over space beyond the earth's atmosphere in the global management of crises;
- (ii) Noting that Europe still does not have operational means of observation and detection by satellite with the military capabilities necessary for strengthening its defence;
- (iii) Stressing the need for the WEU countries to equip themselves with independent space-based means of observation and detection in order to be able to take appropriate measures in the event of crises affecting Europe's interests;
- (iv) Concerned over the future implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistics technology in the Mediterranean region;
- (v) Recalling Recommendations 410, 482, 523, 533 and 555 in which the Assembly requests that the Council:
 - (a) set clear European space policy objectives and priorities;
 - (b) reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system;
 - (c) design the planned system in such a way as to contribute to the security of WEU member countries and to be useful to other organisations with a European, Atlantic or international vocation;
 - (d) assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from the proliferation of ballistic and nuclear technology;
 - (e) take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities entrusted to the study management team and the industrial consortium commissioned to design WEU's main observation system;
- (vi) Stressing the importance of equipping Europe with early-warning and navigational satellite systems necessary for the efficient operation of a European anti-missile defence system;
- (vii) Aware of the high cost of space-based systems and the need for close co-operation between states, industry and scientific circles for these projects to succeed;
- (viii) Noting with regret the absence of consensus in the Council over the necessary development of the work of the satellite centre and starting the programme for the main observation system;
- (ix) Deploring that the Council provides so little and such inadequate information on WEU's space policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Commence examination of a European space defence policy, taking all aspects of the problem into account;
2. Take the decisions necessary for the development of the satellite centre and for starting work on the main observation system, on the basis of a strategic analysis of what is at stake in the medium and long term;
3. Instruct its Space Group to begin a study of a European space-based defence system, paying particular attention to the need for communications, early-warning and navigational satellites and their protection;
4. Develop its contacts with the space industries of the member countries and with ESA in order to obtain information on current programmes and technologies that might be useful for implementing a European space-based defence system;
5. Foster co-operation in early-warning and navigational satellites with the United States and Russia on a basis of reciprocity and without jeopardising the independence of European systems;
6. Examine the expediency of creating a European space defence agency in WEU with responsibility in this area;
7. Keep the Assembly better informed of its decisions on WEU's space policy.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Space questions are a permanent thread running through the debates and activities of the Assembly of WEU. In recent years, the interest in space-related issues has led to quite considerable progress in terms of practical achievements.

2. In the early nineties, events in Europe and in the Gulf led to a vigorous resurgence of the debate on the expediency of Europe¹ having a space-based observation system allowing it to affirm its rôle as a world power.

3. With the signature of the CFE-1 and CFE-1A agreements, the question of the verification and control of the process of arms reduction in Europe assumed paramount importance since on its reliability depended the success of commitments entered into by the two opposing military alliances, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

4. The European states, primarily concerned by this process, found themselves in a somewhat uncomfortable position, being dependent largely on American satellite data², which led to difficulties over sharing the information thus gathered. This situation helped to intensify discussions on the need for Europe to have its own observation satellites for military purposes.

5. This was the context in which a symposium, organised by the Assembly of WEU on the subject "Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament" was held in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990, during the course of which the different aspects of the question were examined in depth³. Following this initiative, the Technological and Aerospace Committee submitted a report on the findings of the symposium at the June 1990 session, which was adopted by the Assembly.

6. In Recommendation 482, resulting from this report, the Assembly stressed "the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verification satellite capability in

order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation...". It recommended that the Council "decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency;" and "reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system without delay..."⁴.

7. The Council replied positively to the recommendation, stating that a group of experts had been tasked to make concrete proposals and that a detailed report had been submitted to the Council and adopted at its meeting of 10th December 1990. It stated also that "the establishment of a WEU satellite centre ... would be an important factor in European co-operation on space-based observation."

8. Moreover "feasibility studies should also be launched so that a European satellite surveillance system can be set up without delay, with a view to the verification of arms control agreements and to the monitoring of crises and ecological problems."⁵.

9. The will expressed to make progress in military space matters was largely due to the Gulf crisis and the lessons drawn from it regarding the use of observation satellites and the conduct of military operations. Participation of European forces in monitoring the embargo and subsequently in air- and land-based actions revealed how very dependent they were on satellite intelligence supplied by the United States. This contributed to awareness of the need to act at European level in order to be able to respond to future crises using European space-based means. The relative detachment of the United States in the face of the crisis in former Yugoslavia also served to strengthen these views.

10. Thus the Council, meeting at Vianden (Luxembourg) on 27th June 1991, decided to "set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European experts ... to compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of verification ... crisis-monitoring and environmental monitoring." Moreover, the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space was assigned the task of pursuing "studies

1. The word Europe is used here to designate the European Union, WEU and European members of NATO.

2. With the exception of France, which has a space policy independent of those of the then major powers.

3. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament; Symposium, Rome, 27th and 28th March 1990, Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU.

4. Document 1230, 25th May 1990; Rapporteur: Mr. Lenzer.

5. Document 1276, 29th May 1991, reply of the Council to Recommendation 482.

on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.”⁶

11. The Vianden decision and the Satellite Centre, its structure and operation have already been mentioned in two previous reports on the development of a European space-based observation system. With this third part, the debate is far from being closed, but it is important to review European achievements and co-operation in military space matters, the better to understand what is the way forward and the choices to be made to make this ambitious project a reality, the success of which will largely depend on a credible common European security and defence policy worthy of the name.

II. Military satellite programmes

12. The Gulf crisis provided a graphic illustration of the use of satellites, both civil and military, in crisis-management and the conduct of military operations. Intensive use of this medium contributed greatly to the success of the United Nations coalition and the very low loss of life and equipment on the United Nations side.

13. Of the range of hardware used, covering a wide spread of tasks: observation, monitoring, communications, navigation and meteorology, two types of satellites played a major rôle: optical or radar intelligence satellites and communications satellites.

14. The former enabled continuous monitoring of Iraqi military forces on the ground, either by identifying strategic targets (command centres, air and missile bases, industrial complexes, etc.) or military detachments in the theatre of operations, identifying their equipment and the number of personnel.

15. The latter provided contact between the (political) decision-making centres and the military units based in the Gulf area, thousands of miles apart, and allowed orders to be relayed and action reports to be received in real time.

16. This system of observation and communication satellites operating in tandem emerged as one of the aspects necessary for the conduct of peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions, sometimes taking place at vast distances from decision-making centres and sometimes in geographic and climatic environments somewhat hostile to the direct presence of military units or their presence in sufficient number (lack of forward positions, for example).

(i) Observation and communications satellites

17. The military uses of space are very varied and can be summarised briefly as follows: information-gathering, telecommunications, navigation (global positioning system), meteorology, oceanography, space-based surveillance (analysis and identification of orbiting objects and tracking) and early-warning systems (anti-missile, nuclear explosion detection), in all of which observation and communications play a very important rôle.

(a) Observation systems

18. There are basically two types of observation system: optical and radar. In the first group are satellites with visible optical and/or infrared sensors with various degrees of resolution, approximately ten metres in the case of the European Spot satellite, one metre in the case of the Helios 1 satellite and less than a metre for the American systems KeyHole, KH 11 and KH 11S⁷. Optical reconnaissance satellites are nonetheless subject to two limitations: first, atmospheric turbulence imposes a resolution limit of some 10-15 cm; second, and not the least important, they can be used only in clear weather. These satellites are primarily strategic intelligence tools.

19. Radar observation provides images of a different nature and texture to those of visible images. For example, radar imaging allows one to detect camouflaged or buried targets which would have remained undetected by optical satellites and also barbed wire networks or certain decoys. Resolution varies, that of the American Lacrosse satellite lies within a range of 0.60 to 3 metres⁸. The radar satellite's all-weather capability makes it a prime tactical intelligence instrument and a necessary complement of the optical satellite. The limitations of this system are its high cost, its processing requirements on the ground and the difficulty of interpreting radar images.

(b) Communications

20. Satellites provide communications over very long distances, without requiring rigid infrastructure. The two main types of satellites are telecommunications and relay satellites. The first of these may be geostationary, in other words stationary over a given point of the globe, or non-geostationary; in the case of geostationary satellites, communications can be transmitted inside its area of radio-electrical cover; in the case of non-geostationary satellites, communications are discontinuous – the satellite receives signals from a given point and retransmits them while overflying another.

6. Document 1282, 14th October 1991: first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council – communiqué of the WEU Ministerial Council on 27th June 1991.

7. International Defense & Technologies, No. 7, page 26, December 1991.

8. Idem.

21. Geostationary relay-satellites transmit between low-satellites in low orbit and a satellite data-receiving station situated at a point on earth. Thus, three relay satellites orbiting around the earth provide a constant link between the observation satellite and a land-based receiving station.

22. Satellite communications have distinct qualitative advantages over earth-bound communications as follows:

- increased projection capability over very short spaces of time, while remaining in contact with decision-making centres;
- ability to offer high-capacity, good quality communications;
- ability to guarantee secure links, even in the event of aggression;
- possibility of broadcasting information to isolated units over vast geographic areas.

23. Military satellite communications have existed in Europe for more than twenty years. The British Skynet programme launched in 1969 was the first, followed by NATO in 1976, France's Syracuse system in 1984 and Spain's Hispasat/Secomsat in 1992.

(ii) National military space programmes in Europe

24. Research and development of civil and military space-based systems is a long-term and extremely costly process, the outcome of which is uncertain. For a space programme to be successful, the necessary human, technical and financial resources must be made available and the aims of the programme clearly defined.

25. In WEU, only France and the United Kingdom have space-based military programmes that are operational. These cover telecommunications and, in the case of France, observation by satellite. Spain and Italy have also embarked on studies and programmes for acquiring space-based facilities for military use in a more modest framework and, frequently, in co-operation with other countries.

(a) France

26. France's military space policy was specifically designed to be independent of the space-based capabilities of the United States and Russia. Moreover, its telecommunications and observation satellites provide links between metropolitan France and French military forces stationed in many regions of the world thousands of kilometres distant.

27. To these considerations of a political and military nature are added a major research and development component, the economic spin-off

from which is substantial and has made France a civilian and military space power in Europe.

(i) The Syracuse programme

28. In 1964 the French Délégation ministérielle pour l'armement started the first studies on satellite systems for military use. However, it was not until 1979 that the first French military space telecommunications programme, known as Syracuse (radio communications system by satellite), came into operation.

29. This system's first military payload was taken on board the civilian satellite Telecom I on 1st August 1984. Further launches followed in 1985 (Telecom IB) and 1988 (Telecom IC). The Syracuse II programme was launched in 1988. This involved an improved telecommunications payload on board Telecom II satellites commissioned in late 1991.

(ii) The Helios programme

30. In 1977 the preliminary studies were carried out for the Samro military optical observation satellite, in parallel with the launch of the Spot civilian programme, which obtained 30% funding from the ministry of defence.

31. 1986 saw the start of the Helios programme, which was opened to co-operation from Italy in 1987 (14%) and Spain in 1988 (7%). The first Helios observation satellite is to be launched in February 1995. A Helios II programme is being studied, but financial difficulties are an obstacle to its implementation (costs are in the region of 8 billion francs and, to date, no other European country has come forward as a partner). Helios II is scheduled to be launched into orbit by the year 2000 and could have a resolution of 50 cm (compared with 1 metre for Helios II).

32. Alongside the Syracuse and Helios programmes, France has commenced design studies for the Osiris and Zenon satellites. Osiris is a high resolution radar observation satellite for specific observation tasks, on a continuous basis, irrespective of atmospheric conditions. Osiris will be fully complementary to the Helios optical observation satellites. France wishes other European countries to become associated with the project, especially Germany, to which overtures have been made.

33. Zenon is a military electronic surveillance satellite providing electromagnetic surveillance for collecting data on the preparation of military operations and locating radars. Unlike Osiris, where European co-operation is to be invited, Zenon, because of its specific tasks, is intended solely for national use.

(b) The United Kingdom

34. Unlike France, which is committed to a complex military space programme, the United Kingdom has concentrated its efforts on military space-based telecommunications through the Skynet programme.

35. Studies were carried out in the sixties on a system of telecommunications by satellite. In 1969 and 1970, the two satellites in the first generation, Skynet I, were launched, but the second launch failed. In January and November 1974, Skynet II satellites replaced the first generation which ceased to be operational in 1972.

36. In 1980, the decision was taken to produce the Skynet IV series, Skynet III having never materialised. In 1982, the Falklands war contributed to revealing the gaps in British satellite communications. Only one Skynet II satellite was operational at the time and was poorly placed to cover the route to the Falklands followed by British naval forces. To guarantee communications, the United Kingdom had to use American space-based facilities and it would seem that the United States also provided the United Kingdom with satellite images of the region.

37. Awareness of this deficiency contributed to the development of the Skynet IV system and to a study being launched on a space-based intelligence satellite, the Zircon programme, which seems to have been abandoned in 1987⁹. Three Skynet IV satellites were launched in 1988, 1989 and 1990 and were used during the Gulf crisis to provide communications between British forces stationed in the region and the United Kingdom.

38. In 1994, contracts were signed for the development and launch of two new Skynet IV satellites (series 2) and studies were begun on a new generation, Skynet V, to replace Skynet IV next century. According to the United Kingdom authorities European co-operation will be invited for this new project.

39. Nor has the United Kingdom neglected space-based observation, as might be assumed from a comparison of its progress in space-based technology with that of France. In point of fact, the British presence in this field is assured by close collaboration with the United States.

40. This collaboration takes place partly at the level of industry, the British technology and defence industries having a long tradition of co-operation with their American counterparts¹⁰, and

9. According to certain sources, Zircon may have been launched under cover of a Skynet IV satellite and could well be operational – *Military Technology*, Volume XVI, No. 6/92, page 17.

10. The United Kingdom was the United States' initial foreign partner for projects linked to the strategic defence initiative and has co-operated in subsequent anti-missile defence projects.

partly through intelligence within the framework of the 1947 agreements on co-ordination of intelligence-gathering. In this area the British authorities probably receive information from various American optical and radar observation, surveillance and early-warning satellites. The United Kingdom thus has satellite intelligence at its disposal without having to bear alone the management and maintenance costs of a space-based observation system.

(c) Spain and Italy

41. (i) The Hispasat/Secomsat programme is Spain's first space-based telecommunications project for civil and military use. It consists of three satellites (two operational and a third in reserve), together with the ground-based logistics necessary for receiving and processing the data obtained. The two satellites were launched by Ariane rocket in September 1992 and July 1993. Spain has thus acquired a communications system similar to the French Syracuse system, in other words a civilian satellite supplemented by components for military use. Hispasat/Secomsat has had its baptism of fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it relays communications between the Spanish UNPROFOR forces and Spain.

42. (ii) The Italian Sicral project is a satellite telecommunications programme with defence and civil protection applications. Participation of Italian forces in United Nations operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and Somalia has revealed the need for a satellite communications system to monitor their action. The Sicral system will provide national, European and international cover of Italian armed forces and will be managed from ground-based military control stations under the supervision of Italy's combined headquarters. In principle, it should be operational before the year 2000.

43. In spite of the efforts and progress achieved, it is clear that no European country alone is able to acquire a minimal military satellite system providing adequate space-based cover for its national defence requirements. Only France is pushing forward on all fronts, but with increasingly limited resources. Co-operation between European countries will be an unavoidable necessity if any savings are to be made in the cost of programmes and overlapping national systems are to give way to a European military space-based policy.

III. Prospects for co-operation in Europe

44. European countries (in the broad sense) have developed co-operation networks for military and civilian programmes at both state and industry level with varying degrees of success.

Europeans are carrying out joint space programmes, both at international level with Intelsat and Inmarsat, and at regional level with ESA, in fields ranging from earth observation to meteorology and including environmental and sea-bed monitoring, telecommunications, etc.

45. The results are far less impressive on the military side, largely due to differences in perception. France sees space-based technology, (together with nuclear weapons) as the means of affirming its status as a regional and international political and military power, hence its military space programme, which is backed by a viable industrial base (Aérospatiale and Matra, to name but two companies, are at the forefront of technology in the field, not merely in Europe but in the rest of the world as well) and a national vision of the military use of space¹¹.

46. The United Kingdom is engaged in three-pronged development of its military space activities: the Skynet telecommunications satellite (of United Kingdom design), NATO (the NATO satellites are replicas of the Skynet satellites) and co-operation with the United States. This last aspect enables the United Kingdom to share military space technologies and information with the United States, as for instance in the framework of anti-missile defence.

47. In June 1994, for example, two microsatsellites, STRV-1A and STRV-1B (space technology research vehicles), manufactured by the British Defence Research Agency were launched by Ariane rocket, with American Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation¹² experimental material on board.

48. Limited financial and technical capabilities or doubts in the face of challenges offered by the military use of space make it difficult for the other European countries to engage in real co-operation and the formulation, in the longer term, of a European military space policy.

(i) Co-operation between WEU countries

49. Of the WEU member countries, four are currently engaged in or have plans for military space-based observation and telecommunications programmes: France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The other members also have a presence, since all of them participate in the activities

11. Medium- and long-term forecasts for space are drawn up by the Groupe d'études spatiales (Special Study Group) of the Ministry of Defence and compiled in a classified document, the Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (long-term military space plan). The first version of this plan dates back to 1984 and the plan is updated every two years.

12. The body which succeeded the Strategic Initiative Defence Organisation in 1991-1992 and which is responsible for study and design of anti-missile defence in the United States.

of the WEU Satellite Centre and the work of the study management team¹³.

(a) Inter-state co-operation

50. The Helios observation programme was the first real test of European co-operation in military space-based observation satellites, bringing together France, Italy and Spain. The Helios project was launched by France in 1986, joined by Italy and Spain (with their respective contributions of 14% and 7% of the financing of the overall budget of F 8-10 billion. Helios's specification (resolution of 1 metre as compared with approximately 10 metres for Spot) makes it unique in Europe and it is surprising that France and its Helios programme have not attracted the interest of other partners within WEU – doubtless because of political and economic considerations.

51. Nevertheless, the success of co-operation in the framework of Helios I appears to be a special case, considering the fate of Helios II. France has not, in point of fact, succeeded in finding other partners for this second generation satellite, incorporating technologies more advanced than those of its predecessor¹⁴, as Italy and Spain did not wish to commit themselves to it.

52. The Osiris radar satellite project seems likely to be of interest to Germany but no concrete decisions have been taken. Moreover, the cost of German reunification, which has already had implications for the budget and various ESA programmes, has put a brake on any major commitments by that country to civilian and military space developments.

53. However, the possibility acknowledged by the Constitutional Court¹⁵ of German military units being posted outside the NATO area within the framework of United Nations operations raises the issue of communications and intelligence and might be an argument in favour of German participation in European observation and communications satellite projects.

54. The United Kingdom and France also co-operate in the Eumilsatcom and Inmilsat space programmes.

55. Eumilsatcom is a programme for a future military satellite communications system intended to replace the Skynet and Syracuse systems in the twenty-first century. Germany, Italy, the

13. The activities of the Satellite Centre and the study management team are described in a previous report of the committee: the development of a European space-based observation system – Part II, Document 1393, Rapporteur – Mr. Valleix (Recommendation 555).

14. Helios II was supposed to have a resolution of some 50 cm which would place it at the level of American satellites of the same category.

15. Decision of 12th July 1994.

Netherlands and Spain have also been invited to participate.

56. Inmilsat is an international military project for communications by satellite¹⁶. The United States is also associated in this project, along with France and the United Kingdom. Eumilsatcom and Inmilsat are now in their study phases.

57. However, it must be acknowledged that despite the number of projects, there are few examples of inter-state co-operation and those that exist would appear to result from a case-by-case approach rather than an overall strategy for the future, due to the lack of a common perception of the challenges involved in the military use of space and its advantages for a defence Europe. In the framework of WEU, an embryonic form of space-based co-operation has been started with the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the pursuit of a feasibility study on a satellite observation system.

(b) *WEU's main observation system*

58. Alongside the Satellite Centre, whose present tasks are to demonstrate the applications of space imagery for monitoring disarmament treaties, crises and the environment, to train a nucleus of analysts for interpreting images and develop computer techniques for the interpretation of images and to supply member states with operational image interpretation products, a study management team exists, with responsibility for the feasibility study of WEU's main satellite observation system.

59. This industrial consortium of thirty or so European firms led by the German firm, Dornier (of the DASA aerospace group) is responsible for the feasibility study which is in two parts (approved in February and December 1993). The first examines the choice of possible configurations and the second makes a detailed technical analysis including cost estimates of the configurations best suited to the Centre's needs.

60. Final selection is the responsibility of the WEU Council which is to take a decision on starting the programme for an independent European satellite system in 1995. At the ministerial meeting held at the Kirchberg European Centre, Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994, the ministers tasked the WEU Space Group to prepare "a proposal for decision including the preparation of a draft memorandum of understanding containing detailed specifications...¹⁷".

16. Statement on the defence estimates 1994; Chapter IV - defence equipment programme, page 63.

17. WEU Council of Ministers, ministerial meeting of 9th May 1994 (Kirchberg, Luxembourg); Document 1422, 24th May 1994.

61. According to the conclusions of the first part of the study, the elements of the WEU system would be as follows:

(i) The space sector, defined as all satellites in orbit belonging to the system, comprising:

- nominal satellites, operating in low orbit (660-570 km). This category includes two optical satellites and two synthetic aperture radar satellites;
- small satellites (of the optical and SAR type) operating at very low altitude as complements to the nominal satellites. These small satellites may have a resolution and life-span inferior to that of the nominal satellites (approximately five to seven years), but allow a greater number of images to be taken each day across a predetermined area. The number of these small satellites will depend on their life-span, the tasks assigned to them and their availability;
- data-relay satellites in geostationary orbit (approximately 36 000 km) for transmitting images and other data gathered by the low orbit satellites.

62. Clearly, there must be at least two satellites of each type, or better still, three (two operational, one reserve) for the system to be exploited efficiently. This would allow several crisis areas to be monitored on a virtually permanent basis.

(ii) The ground sector, including ground-based facilities and installations necessary for control and use of the system: operating, processing, archiving and interpretation centres; one or more stations for tracking, telemetry and control of the data relay and other satellites; means of communications capable of connecting all the stations, transmitting data and receiving requests for data from political and military authorities.

(ii) *Other military space programmes*

63. Apart from the instances of co-operation in WEU and inter-state co-operation, other players in the domain of military space in Western Europe, NATO and the European space industries, also have contributions to make.

(a) *NATO and space*

64. In 1966, the North Atlantic Council decided to begin a study for a NATO satellite communications programme. In 1970, the first satellite, NATO 2A, was launched (the first phase of the programme was devoted to research and testing). In 1971, phase 2 of the NATO programme, relating to ground-based facilities, was completed and a second satellite was placed in orbit. Phase 3 led to the development of the ground sector of the

system which today consists of over twenty fixed and one mobile station and a fourth satellite was launched in November 1984.

65. In January 1987, it was decided to build new satellites based on the model of the British Skynet satellites: NATO IV. Two of these satellites were launched in 1991 and 1993 and will be operational until the year 2000, after which it will be necessary to provide for their replacement.

66. Communications by satellite are taking on special importance with the changes now being made in NATO, particularly as regards the use of its forces in the framework of peace-keeping operations and the greater need for force mobility. According to a document produced by the NATO National Armaments Directors Group (NADs), interoperability between national communications systems must be developed at battalion level and below and between peace-keeping forces in the field and command centres and sea- and air-borne support forces. Communications satellites are the ideal means of meeting these requirements because of their wide cover and ability to protect communications¹⁸.

67. However, the future of the NATO satellite system still hangs in the balance. Budget restrictions affecting infrastructure projects and the organisation's new reform programmes have raised questions about pursuing the NATO V programme, intended to take over from the NATO IV satellites. The suggestion that recourse might be had to existing commercial satellites, such as those of Inmarsat, seems increasingly plausible in the absence of any thinking on NATO's space communications policy beyond the year 2000¹⁹ (the date on which the Skynet IV satellites become obsolete).

(b) Industrial co-operation

68. The European space industries, although more involved in civilian than military programmes, have a very important co-operative rôle to play. The high cost of space systems, international competition between satellite launcher manufacturers, the appearance of new competitors (particularly in Asia) are so many arguments in favour of industrial co-operation.

69. This will not necessarily follow automatically, in the absence of a medium- and long-term policy on civilian and military space matters. However, responsibility for defining such a policy lies with states, while industry must put forward proposals regarding the systems and means necessary to achieve the objectives which have been decided. At present, Europe has a surfeit of space

industries, sometimes in partnership, frequently in competition. There are more satellite manufacturers in Europe than in the United States for a market 10% smaller than the American market²⁰.

70. Because of this, major European firms have started a process of acquisition and mergers with the longer-term objective of creating an industrial space complex able to meet external competition, particularly from the United States, on equal terms. Two examples are worth noting, the acquisition of British Aerospace Space Systems (the manufacturer of the Skynet satellites) by Matra Marconi Space (an Anglo-French company 50% jointly owned by Matra Défense Espace, which manufactures the Helios satellites, and GEC Marconi) and the possible merger of the satellite divisions of Deutsche Aerospace (Germany) and Aérospatiale (France), responsible for the Helios optical systems.

71. Ultimately, this process can only lead to a more rational approach to space matters in Europe, as in the case of the Ariane launcher (Arianespace Consortium) and also the aeronautics industry (Airbus). In regrouping in this way, European industry is in a good position to achieve the necessary harmonisation of procedures and technologies without which European co-operation in space matters cannot advance further.

72. Space industry associations bringing together firms in several countries are also increasingly involved in lobbying governments and the national and European space agencies (ESA).

73. Eucosat, an association made up of twenty or so firms and parliamentarians from seven major countries of the European Union, submitted a project in June 1994 for a European monitoring system by dual-use (i.e. civilian and military) satellite²¹. According to Eucosat, existing or planned observation satellites have certain deficiencies in terms of resolution, all-weather capability (infrared or radar) and the predictability of their return over a given site. Moreover, present ground sectors are not adapted to future needs.

74. To be efficient, an observation system has to be "open", in other words, capable of exploiting data from civilian and military satellites or air-borne sensors. The ground component must provide comprehensive support to the decision-makers of Europe. The structure of the proposed system is the classical one: optical and radar satellites, small support satellites and relay satellites.

75. The system would be implemented in three phases: the first making use of existing civil and military capabilities (Helios and Spot, for example), the second being the development of new sensors and improving the processing and

18. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 27, page 2; 11th-17th July, 1994.

19. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 35, page 1; 12th-18th September 1994.

20. Defense Magazine, No. 7, page 29; December 1993.

21. Air & Cosmos, No. 1479, page 5; 4th-10th July 1994.

dissemination of information and the third, equipping the system with new satellites, improving the frequency of passes, data-access time and resolution. The anticipated time-scale for completion of the project, more or less in its entirety, is some fourteen years at a cost of F 16-20 billion.

76. Eurospace, which groups some thirty European firms, has presented a programme for small satellites. According to Eurospace, Europe is lacking in launchers suited to small satellites and this gap must be filled to avoid this sector being monopolised by competitors such as the United States. The ESSMI (European small satellite missions) project, although its aims are essentially commercial (small, low-cost satellites are a potential market, but one hampered by the lack of suitable launchers) also has military dimensions, particularly in relation to the projected observation systems (proposed for WEU or by Eucosat), requiring small supporting satellites with flexible launch methods according to need, in the event of crisis. However, for the moment there are no firm projects in view, either at state level or in ESA, because of financial restrictions²². In the United States, where the market for small satellites is growing, the military view is that they lend themselves to more flexible use than the larger systems, as they can be launched quite quickly, for a specific mission, in the event of crisis. A system of several small satellites would also make it possible to mitigate the effects of possible failure or destruction of the larger observation and warning satellites²³.

IV. Conclusions

77. Space Europe is a thriving and tangible reality. The launchers, satellite systems and technologies that have been developed confirm the existence of means and know-how equal, if not superior, to those of the other space powers. At the same time, however, technological and commercial success cannot mask one vital issue: the absence of a European space policy, in both its civilian and military dimensions.

78. The success of co-operation over the Ariane rocket, the Spot and ERS-1 earth observation satellites for civil use and other programmes (space probes, meteorological observation, ocean research), is undeniable, despite the fact that certain major projects have been shelved for the time being (for example, the Hermes shuttle). However what is lacking overall is a long-term view and a political and military analysis of the challenges presented by the use of space.

79. Space is also an attribute of power, hence the importance accorded to it by the United States,

22. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 22, page 4; 30th May-12th June 1994.

23. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4; 1st-7th August 1994.

Russia, France and other nations, such as China, Japan²⁴ and India. As the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Edouard Balladur, stated, in space co-operation "virtue and necessity coincide since space is a particularly propitious area for building defence Europe"²⁵.

80. However, there is a wide gulf between fine words and reality, as France's difficulties in finding partners for its Helios II programme or in associating Germany in the Osiris radar satellite project bear witness. Yet both correspond to a need which is not just national but European too.

81. Differences of assessment and financial restrictions mean that space Europe is taking shape only with difficulty, particularly in the military sphere. In the absence of co-operation and the development of a space policy, albeit minimal, efforts undertaken are likely to be affected by short-term considerations, basically of a financial order. Space is undoubtedly a high-cost area, it mobilises technological and human resources which may be lacking in other sectors, it is often difficult for public opinion and indeed decision-makers to grasp any other than the commercial implications, yet the advantages deriving from its use are out of all proportion with the results obtained by the use of more traditional methods.

82. The applications and usefulness of space-based observation systems in armaments control, monitoring proliferation, identifying targets and in telecommunications is already proven, as testified by their intensive use during the Gulf crisis. Today, in the face of manifold crises, from former Yugoslavia to North Korea, space-based technology comes fully into its own, allowing virtually day-to-day monitoring of the situation on the ground, even where a direct presence is difficult or impossible.

83. This being the case, the challenges must first be understood before proceeding further. The high cost of space does not allow wastage at a time when resources are increasingly scarce. Although military and civilian dual-use equipment allows savings to be made, the performance and levels of protection of such equipment²⁶ are not identical. Furthermore, the missions initially envisaged (disarmament control in Europe, for example) have evolved and new uses of space are opening up, in the area of anti-missile defence, for example. Detection and early-warning satellites

24. Japan has recently embarked upon the study of a military space-based observation and anti-missile early warning system; Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4, 1st-7th August 1994.

25. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France, to the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN), Paris, 8th September 1994.

26. Compare Spot's 10 m resolution with that planned for Helios of 50 cm.

are an essential element today for setting up an efficient space-based observation system.

84. In the United States, where early-warning duties were assigned to DSP (defence supporting programme) system satellites, launched in the 1970s and now close to the limit of their operational life, the Pentagon has just proposed a plan for their replacement by more modern satellites, the ALARM (alert locate and report missiles) system to meet the threat of ballistic proliferation. Funds have been allocated to this end by Congress in the 1995 defence budget²⁷ and the first launches are scheduled for around 2002-2005.

85. Another factor which must be taken into account is the possibility of the emergence in the future of anti-satellite systems, based either on advanced technologies or on less advanced equipment (scrambling systems, use of laser technology). An important debate is in progress in the United States²⁸, with crucial implications for the future of any European space-based observation system.

86. In a recent document from the American Presidency, entitled "National security strategy of engagement and enlargement", reference is made to the need for "detering threats to United States' interests in space and meeting aggression [against space interests] if deterrence fails"²⁹. According to Mr. Dunbar Lockwood of the Arms Control Association in Washington, the theatre high-altitude area defence anti-missile system could be modified to intercept satellites instead of missiles³⁰.

87. Another important area of action is that of navigation by satellite. To date only the United States and Russia have this system of space beacons (Global NavStar and Glonass). These are constellations of several satellites (roughly 24 in either system) enabling users on the ground to determine their exact positions on earth, on the sea and in the air, to ascertain their speed and to obtain time reference. During the Gulf crisis, NavStar was extremely valuable for accurate missile launches, helping to adjust the trajectory of the Tomahawk cruise missiles to which observation satellites had previously transmitted images of the terrain the missiles would overfly³¹.

27. The total cost of the ALARM project, coupled with the Brilliant Eyes satellite programme, led by the BMDO – Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation – is estimated at \$11 billion up to 2015; Space News, Vol. 5, No. 32, page 4, 15th-28th August, 1994.

28. The White House is opposed to any operational development of an anti-satellite system but advocates of the latter are still continuing to press their case; Space News, Vol. 36, page 7, 19th-25th September 1994.

29. Defense News, Vol. 9, No. 37, page 20, 19th-25th September 1994.

30. *Idem*.

31. *La guerre en orbite*, Serge Grouard, Éd. Economica, page 121.

88. With the proliferation of ballistic weapons, particularly in the Mediterranean region, it is becoming necessary to consider the need to acquire an early warning satellite system if Europe is one day to have an efficient anti-missile system (whether from the south or the east, the time between the departure and arrival of a missile in Europe would be extremely short – an argument in favour of a system of detection from the moment of ignition of the missile).

89. Any projected space-based observation system must take account of these factors. Moreover, the area for discussion should perhaps be widened to that of a European space-based defence system, including observation (optical and radar) facilities, relay and communications satellites (providing links between forces answerable to WEU and those of the NATO allies), a system of navigation by satellite, an early-warning system for anti-missile defence and a satellite defence system³².

90. This space-based system would be completed by a ground sector data receiving station and facilities for processing and transmission of data to political and military decision-makers. Conventional means of detection, radar stations, land or sea based or airborne (for example, on AWACS), would be connected to the system allowing information received to be handled more quickly.

91. To achieve this, it is necessary above all for the major objectives of this system to be identified and the military space-based requirements of all the countries concerned to be co-ordinated. The cost of a space-based defence system far exceeds the resources of a single country and a joint space policy is the only means of achieving its implementation. Recourse to technologies already in use and developed in the context of the civilian space sector, such as launchers, optical equipment, radar and various types of sensors, allow considerable savings to be made, in terms of money and time. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the only European civil space organisation, ESA, has no responsibilities in defence matters.

92. In order to manage the design and implementation of a European space-based defence system, consideration might be given either to giving ESA defence responsibilities (not an easy approach, in view of the differing interests and defence policies of the member countries) or to creating in WEU or between the European countries wishing to participate in such a system, a space-based defence agency with responsibility for supervising and co-ordinating efforts in this

32. This last point remains controversial but all options should be considered, above all because of high costs, the difficulty of replacing equipment rapidly and the vulnerability of that equipment..

area, conducting studies on the requirements of the system, making proposals and dealing with the implementation of the decisions taken by the participant states.

93. Alongside this technical-type structure, consideration might be given to establishing a European military space command, similar to the United States Military Space Command, formed by the military authorities responsible for space matters in the WEU countries or the countries participating in the space-based defence system. The space defence agency would also be responsible

for anti-missile defence in the context of early-warning satellite systems.

94. There is doubtless a long way to go, but defence Europe cannot afford not to engage in serious thinking on the military uses of space if it wishes to avoid remaining in a dependent and vulnerable position in military space matters. Space is necessary for its existence as a power in its own right, commanding credibility and respect, and confident of being able to meet the challenges of the future in its dealings with its adversaries and also its allies.

The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. López Henares, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. López Henares (Chairman) ; MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Alternate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arata, Atkinson, Biefnot, Blaauw, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Coviello, Curto, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. Guirado, MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Litherland (Alternate: Alexander), Lorenzi, Marshall, Palacios, Poças Santos, Pozzo, Roger (Alternate: Galley), Sarens, Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Valleix, Wolfgramm.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the WEU Satellite Centre has achieved its logistical targets;
- (ii) Congratulating the Spanish authorities responsible for building the centre for having provided it with the means of operating effectively;
- (iii) Recalling that this centre is unique as a result of international co-operation and has been designed to contribute to peace-keeping and international security;
- (iv) Congratulating the Director and the staff of the centre on the very substantial sterling work they have done there;
- (v) Judging very favourably the number and nature of the treaty verification and crisis-monitoring tasks assigned to the centre;
- (vi) Regretting, however, that environmental monitoring tasks assigned to the centre are few and far between;
- (vii) Noting that so far certain member states have not tasked the centre at all and wondering about the reasons for their not doing so;
- (viii) Believing that the period for assessing the work of the centre is not long enough for the assessment to be entirely fair and valid;
- (ix) Considering that there is a risk of the satellite centre's present temporary status being prolonged and that it might not therefore be able to carry out its work in the optimum conditions for achieving its aims;
- (x) Considering moreover that the centre, although in its infancy, is an important example of measures to be taken for the progressive creation of a European defence identity;
- (xi) Taking account moreover of the fact that the centre will be able to have the benefit of Helios satellite images only after summer 1995 at best;
- (xii) Reaffirming that the Torrejón Satellite Centre must be the cornerstone of a complete European space-based system covering intelligence, early warning and defence;
- (xiii) Believing in any event that the future of the centre should not be indissolubly linked to that of a European space-based observation system;
- (xiv) Insisting on the urgent need for the centre to be as widely supported as possible by public opinion if it wishes to attain its goals of providing Europe with a useful security instrument in the widest possible meaning of the term,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take a decision as soon as possible that will guarantee the continuity of the Satellite Centre by making it permanent, so as to avoid a temporary situation being maintained to the detriment of its work;
2. Establish a method for continuously assessing the work done by the centre so as to optimise its capabilities at all times;
3. Keep the Assembly informed of the practical details for implementing the memorandum of understanding on the Helios satellite signed by WEU and the governments of France, Italy and Spain;
4. Encourage the member states to avail themselves of the services of the centre, especially those which have not yet done so;
5. Urge member countries to make use of the services of the centre more regularly, in particular by giving it environmental monitoring tasks (disaster relief, control of water supplies, population movement, hazardous activities, control of nature of terrain, control of illicit movements);

6. Establish relations with the European Space Agency in order to determine possibilities for co-operation between the two organisations in space-based observation;
7. Study the possibilities of technical and commercial space co-operation with the CIS countries in order to allow the technical and human resources of those countries to be used for preventive and peaceful purposes;
8. Inform public opinion in Europe of the tasks and work undertaken by the Torrejón Satellite Centre in order to promote a better understanding of such tasks among the citizens of the European countries and to obtain their support for the aims of the centre.

Explanatory Memorandum*(submitted by Mr. López Henares, Rapporteur)***I. The WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón – the position today**

1. On 27th June 1991, the WEU Council of Ministers, meeting in Vianden, Luxembourg, decided, under Article VIII.2 of the modified Brussels Treaty, to establish a Satellite Centre: "With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU and giving concrete expression to that co-operation, ministers decided to: set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of arms control agreements, crisis-monitoring and environmental monitoring. The activities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into operation."
2. The WEU Council of Ministers subsequently decided at its meeting in Bonn in November 1991 that the centre for interpretation of satellite data and training was to be located in Spain.
3. To this end an agreement was signed between WEU and the Kingdom of Spain whereby


Spain would make available land situated at the Torrejón air base and a building thereon for the headquarters of the Satellite Centre. This agreement was signed in Paris on 1st December 1992 and submitted two months later to the Spanish Parliament for ratification.

4. The centre's facilities were officially inaugurated by the Spanish Minister of Defence and the Secretary-General of WEU on 28th April 1993. The Technological and Aerospace Committee had the opportunity of visiting these facilities in November of the same year and noted with great satisfaction the high architectural standard of the building and its functional suitability for this first tangible project initiated by WEU.


5. Thus the centre, under the management of Mr. Blaydes and a steering committee composed of a representative from each of the nine member countries, embarked upon its experimental phase with a budget ceiling of 38.25 million ecus.

6. This first or experimental phase includes staff recruitment, building conversion work, installation of equipment, staff training and definition of tasks (Table 1).

TABLE 1
WEU Satellite Centre experimental phase



7. The organogram of the centre is shown in Table 2. Recruitment of staff has now been completed.



8. Moreover since March of this year the centre has had all the equipment necessary for the experimental phase and the training phase has been satisfactorily completed. Until now there have been no outside requests for training, which is perhaps only to be expected given the centre's present stage of development.

9. The tasks assigned to the Torrejón Satellite Centre for 1994 were as follows:

(i) *Treaty verification:*

- support to CFE and CSCE inspection visits 4
- support to Open Skies missions 2
- non-proliferation treaties 0

(ii) *Crisis monitoring:*

- preparation for humanitarian aid 5
- support in preventing non-compliance with sanctions 1
- detection of military movements 7

(iii) *Environmental monitoring:*

- disaster relief 0
- control of water supplies 0
- population movement 0
- hazardous activities 0
- control of nature of terrain 2
- control of illicit movements 1

10. The various dossiers are made up by interpreting and blending data from optical satellites (mainly Spot and Landsat) and ERS-1 radar satellites with other non space-based information.

11. Anticipated future sources of data might include high resolution satellite and radar and airborne imagery.

12. Additionally the centre pays close attention to collateral information which it regards as most important. This includes: geographic data: paper maps and digital terrain data; treaty related data; data bases of militarily significant installations and structures; locally generated situation reports and aerial imagery.

13. Users of the centre in order of priority are: first, the Council of WEU and its subsidiary bodies, second, the member states in preparing WEU actions and decisions and third, the member states for their own needs. At present, according to the information available to your Rapporteur, only three member states (Spain, France and Portugal) have not yet tasked the centre. Apart from the users referred to above other non-WEU organisations may task the centre if the WEU Council sees fit.

14. The procedure followed in relation to tasking by a member state is as follows: once the task has been commissioned the centre prepares a task

analysis report. The user and the centre then negotiate the details of the task, including any collateral data to be supplied. Next the user committee fixes the priorities of the tasks and finally the centre gathers the images, interprets them and produces the dossier. Any other member state may request a copy of a completed dossier.

15. The building in which the centre is accommodated, as stated above, is ideal for the work carried out there. The main buildings consist of an operations centre where image interpreting is carried out, a quality control area, the photographic laboratory and the archives and documentation room plus administrative offices. Additionally there are rooms fitted out as "National Cells", to be occupied by staff from the different member states and which are intended as points of contact between the latter and the centre.

16. Reference was made earlier to the fact that the equipping of the centre was completed in early March 1994 by the Falcon consortium consisting of ten companies, led by the British company Cray Systems. The information your Rapporteur has on this equipment indicates that the system can be fed by satellite scenes arriving at the centre through various media. After image quality control, these scenes are fed in to the on-line library.

17. The library contains all the other information in the centre's data-base (a list of this information was given previously). Access to this data base may be gained through one of the centre's six "Browse" work stations.

18. The scenes for interpreting are sent to one of the eight dual-screen workstations for processing high resolution images. In addition to the software which gives access to the data base these stations use the Ocap and Erdas packages for handling and blowing up the images, taking measurements and creating new products such as annotated diagrams of the site to be analysed. A further five workstations handle quality control and network management. All the system facilities are connected up through a flexible, high-speed network, which also allows data to be transferred to the photographic laboratory while the digital data is transferred to films using the high resolution laser film writers. The processed version of these films and the end product are produced in the laboratory. Finally one should add that the centre is capable of interpreting not only images captured from satellites but also airborne images.

19. All the foregoing information shows first that the implementation of the logistical aspects of the programme – building, staff, installation of equipment, training and methodology – was carried out highly satisfactorily.

20. There is no doubt that congratulations are due given the progress achieved starting from

nothing. They are especially due to the Director of the centre and his staff for the work they have done which is now starting to show results.

21. An assessment still has to be made of the work done and the results obtained: this assessment should basically be undertaken by the centre's users, an aspect discussed further below.

22. At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held at the Kirchberg Centre, Luxembourg on 9th May, ministers confirmed "the aim of further developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes. In this context, they envisaged establishing the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejón as a permanent body of the organisation and would take a decision on this point in the light of the assessment of the work undertaken by the centre during its experimental period. They recognised the need to take appropriate decisions in November 1994 to ensure the continuity of the centre's work until that assessment was completed". Moreover, the Ministers reaffirmed "their will to set up an independent European satellite system. A decision would be taken subject to assessment of the costs and merits of the proposed system and of other WEU alternatives and affordability. To prepare a possible decision of a launch of such a programme, ministers tasked the Space Group to prepare, for their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for a decision, including the preparation of a draft memorandum of understanding containing the detailed specifications, to be concluded between the present WEU member states".

23. As far as the Torrejón Centre is concerned it would be reasonable, before reaching a decision which would give it permanent status, to have the result of the assessment of its initial phase and of the work done. This assessment would be based on evaluations from the Council and the centre's users.

24. It must first be recognised that such an assessment will lack a sufficiently distanced perspective to be entirely fair and valid. Moreover, it should be stressed that the risk of the present temporary status of the centre being prolonged is hardly helpful to the work of the centre and does nothing to contribute to the peace of mind of the staff who work there.

25. It should also be remembered that the day before the inauguration of the Satellite Centre, the Secretary-General of WEU, the French and Spanish ministers of defence and the Italian ambassador to Spain signed a memorandum of understanding for the Torrejón Centre to have access to images obtained from the Helios I satellite; these images, when processed by the centre, will be particularly suitable products for implementing its aims of verifying disarmament treaties, crisis-management and environmental monitoring.

26. The Helios I programme, a co-operative venture between France, Italy and Spain, will use optical observation satellites for military purposes. The launch, initially scheduled for last September, will now take place around February 1995. In any event the centre will not be able to receive Helios images before autumn 1995. The centre is presently also studying the practical aspects of implementing the memorandum of understanding reached between WEU and France, Italy and Spain, and is to submit a series of requests in this connection and await the replies.

27. From the above, it is clear that the assessment cannot possibly take account of work based on Helios 1 data, which manifestly limits the scope of the assessment.

28. Finally, it should be added that your Rapporteur will not discuss the question of the European space-based observation system as this is the subject of another report by the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

II. Conclusions

29. It should be emphasised at the outset that our particular committee and the Assembly in general have in recent years constantly reiterated that the Torrejón Centre should be the cornerstone of a complete European space-based system covering intelligence, early warning and defence. The Torrejón Centre might become the integrated data-receiving and interpretation centre of this space-based observation system and its earth sector. Having said this, it must also be stressed that even in the undesirable event of the space sector of the future European observation system never coming to pass, the Torrejón Centre would continue to be absolutely necessary. Apart from image interpretation, its tasks might include all types of military intelligence work, leading ultimately to the preparation of a final report with tactical and strategic value.

30. Recent Iraqi troop movements close to the border with Kuwait have again demonstrated the need for Europe to have its own means for obtaining accurate knowledge of risks and threats to its security and of their source. Your Rapporteur wrote to the ministers of defence of the member states participating in the Torrejón Centre inviting their governments to give their opinion on the future of the centre. Two months after the letter was sent to the defence ministers, followed by a reminder a fortnight later, only the ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom had replied.

31. Mr. Delcroix, Minister of Defence of Belgium, informed us that he was not able to anticipate his government's position on the future of the Satellite Centre even though it seemed to him rea-

sonable to think that Belgium would agree to financially acceptable proposals for extending the experimental phase in order to draw conclusions from information that was as extensive as possible. Moreover, the minister asked a number of questions, inquiring particularly as to whether it was possible to continue with this experiment in the absence of a common position on the nature of WEU's needs and on identifying them; he also wondered if the decision to give the centre permanent status and the decision as to whether or not to develop a European space-based observation system should be closely linked. Mr. Voorhoeve, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, which now has the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU, replied that discussions in the organisation on the future of the centre had barely begun and the centre's experience in processing and analysing satellite images would, moreover, still be very limited at the end of 1994. Therefore, in his opinion, at the meeting on 14th November 1994, the ministers might decide on an interim evaluation of the work of the centre and, on the basis of this interim evaluation, take a decision on the future of the Satellite Centre, probably at the ministerial meeting in spring 1995.

32. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, expressed himself more openly during his recent address to the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (Paris, 6th September 1994), when he stated: "In WEU, in a resolutely multilateral framework, the Torrejón satellite image interpreting centre shows the way. From next year the centre will benefit from Helios satellite imaging. From then on, matters should be taken further and consideration given to implementing a fully-fledged European space-based satellite observation system. Europeans have both the technological capability and the financial means. The decision was taken last May by the WEU foreign affairs and defence ministers to examine how such a project might be implemented. I hope that this decision will be implemented in full in the years to come as precise intelligence and real time surveillance of situations and their development are now essential factors in present-day crisis-prevention and management. I am counting in large measure on the bilateral co-operation structure created with Germany to give the necessary impetus to these projects."

33. The Council of Ministers of WEU which is to meet in Noordwijk on 14th November 1995 will agree to extend the Satellite Centre's experimental phase by one year to enable the evaluation of its work to be completed so that a final decision can be taken. In any event, your Rapporteur feels that the decision to be taken next year cannot once again be a provisional one and should be based on the obvious need for the centre rather than merely on its practical use as demonstrated by the evaluation. The evaluation by users and member coun-

tries, once completed, is to be presented by the Space Group to the ministerial meeting in May 1995 and will cover both technical and operational aspects. According to information in the possession of your Rapporteur, a possible pre-operational phase is at present being considered for the period 1996-97 when Helios I will be in operation and it will be possible to verify the usefulness and effectiveness of its images.


34. If the centre were to be made permanent a whole range of problems, not least that of staffing, would be resolved; however, additionally and independently of this fact, there could be regular evaluations of its work which would contribute to maintaining operational levels and capabilities necessary for our security needs and for providing Europe with efficient independent means in this area.

35. Our committee, with commendable perseverance, has, in recent years, exerted unremitting pressure in favour of Europe's acquiring autonomous space-based observation capabilities; these, when linked to an early warning sys-

tem, would make it possible for Europe to have its own defence system; we have stressed both the political need for such a venture and the presence of industrial capacities necessary for achieving it; we have moreover suggested opportunities for co-operation – particularly with our American allies – which ought to cover both production and development and be pursued as in Europe between Europeans. At present, WEU is on the threshold of a number of decisions tending in the direction just described. There is no other way forward if our organisation is to become the defence arm of the European Union than to progress with caution down this road, subject to such financial and budgetary constraints as may be necessary, but with the firm intention of making sure that space is a means of political independence for Europe: the use of space can indeed contribute to security in the widest sense, extending beyond military applications to environmental tasks, agriculture and into areas such as the monitoring of certain forms of illicit traffic by sea which are currently giving rise to major anxiety.

APPENDIX

Earth observation and interpretation systems – WEU Satellite Centre perspective



*Evolution of the logistical requirements of the Assembly
to take account of enlargement*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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on the evolution of the logistical requirements of the Assembly to take account of enlargement

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, Büchler, Curto, Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell, Lauricella, Leers, Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez, MM. Pinto, Regenwetter, Scaglioso, Thissen.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- III. Occupation of areas on the various floors of the WEU building
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Draft Recommendation

***on the evolution of the logistical requirements of the Assembly
to take account of enlargement***

The Assembly,

Considering:

- (i) That present and foreseeable Assembly requirements now necessitate measures to make it possible to accommodate in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council the parliamentarians of the member countries, associate member countries, associate partner countries, observer countries and other countries invited by the Council to attend Assembly debates, also members of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General and the secretaries of the national delegations and political groups;
- (ii) That for Greek to be adopted as an official language simultaneous interpretation facilities must be supplemented by further interpretation facilities once the ratification process has been completed;
- (iii) That, even after the interpretation facilities for sessions have been transferred to the meeting rooms in the Wilson wing, the limited number of seats in the official gallery makes it necessary to continue to use and improve the television area installed in the lobby of the French Economic and Social Council in order to achieve better television coverage of all Assembly speeches, votes and procedures;
- (iv) That the meeting rooms cannot accommodate more than 40 participants, they will be too small once representatives of all participating countries are present and that it would be necessary to resort to the hire of meeting rooms elsewhere in Paris;
- (v) That offices need to be allocated to all new parliamentary delegations and that this will be possible only if the remaining offices on the second floor and all the offices on the third floor can be made available to the Assembly in the immediate future for use during sessions and committee meetings;
- (vi) That in the foreseeable future the Assembly will no longer be able to operate properly in its present location and it will soon become essential to provide the Assembly with new premises;
- (vii) Welcoming the progress made on reaching agreement on provisional solutions aimed at alleviating pressing immediate needs arising from enlargement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take note of this report including in particular Appendix V;
2. Press ahead with the implementation of the measures referred to in Appendix V, in particular :
 - (a) Take the required action to release the remaining office on the second floor in time to accommodate the new Greek Delegation;
 - (b) Authorise the Institute for Security Studies, in close consultation and agreement with the Assembly, to proceed expeditiously with the proposed refurbishing of Room A, thus enabling the Assembly to use this room for meetings larger than those that can be accommodated in Rooms B and C;
 - (c) Approve the funds required by the Assembly to proceed with the work necessary to accommodate parliamentary delegations in the facilities relinquished finally or temporarily and with the other proposals contained in Appendix V and concerning in particular the "electronic office" intended specifically to make more efficient and flexible use of insufficient seating capacity of the ESC chamber;
3. Support the Assembly and its President in their efforts to promote a comprehensive plan to meet the future requirements of the Assembly, in particular :
 - (a) Reach agreement with the French Government for the transfer of the Institute for Security Studies to alternative premises nearby, thereby releasing the offices on the third floor for the use of parliamentary delegations, in all categories;

- (b) Alternatively, reach agreement now with the French Government for the Assembly to be installed in new premises suitable for foreseeable future needs;
- 4. In any case, be prepared to start consultations with the President of the Assembly and the French Government on a relocation plan for execution immediately following the 1996 review of all European institutions, in anticipation of new members in various categories joining in that and subsequent years.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. At the Presidential Committee meeting held in Brussels on 4th October 1993, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was asked to present a report on the logistical requirements of the WEU Assembly as of now and the position after the enlargement of WEU.

2. Any examination of this problem must of necessity take account of changes in the composition of the Assembly over its forty years of existence and measures already taken to adapt its facilities to its progressive enlargement.

3. With the above in mind it is necessary first to consider the changes in the composition of the Assembly and improvements made to the Assembly's premises (chamber, conference rooms, offices of national delegations) and second the evolution of the Office of the Clerk and adaptations to the premises and other facilities required as a result of enlargement.

4. For a better understanding of the situation it is helpful to recall first and foremost the agreements on which the allocation of the various premises available to the Assembly for its work is based.

5. The wing of the Palais d'Iéna on the avenue du Président Wilson was built in 1961, under two agreements between the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the WEU Council. The first of these related to the long lease (for a term of 99 years) to WEU of the land on which the building was to be built and the second to the arrangements for the construction work involved in building the premises.

6. The building has six floors. Of these the French Government owns the lower ground floor (court-yard level) and one fifth of the basement while WEU owns the four upper floors and four-fifths of the basement.

7. Before Spain and Portugal's accession to WEU, the areas belonging to WEU were allocated as follows:

4/5 of basement:	Bar/restaurant, equipment storage and archives
Ground floor:	Meeting rooms, offices of national delegations
First floor:	Office of the Clerk

Second and third floors:	Paris-based organs of the Council.
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8. In 1989 improvement works were authorised by the Council to enable two new member countries, Spain and Portugal, to be accommodated satisfactorily. As the agencies responsible for security questions had been disbanded in the meantime, the premises were reallocated as follows:

Basement:	Bar/restaurant, equipment storage, archives, archives, rest-room, bank and travel agency, telephone booths
Ground floor:	Meeting rooms
First floor:	Office of the Clerk
Second floor:	Offices of national delegations and of the Clerk
Third floor:	Institute for Security Studies.

9. The two agreements referred to in paragraph 5 should have been supplemented by a third agreement between WEU and the French Economic and Social Council establishing terms for the use of the chamber and other areas of the Palais d'Iéna during plenary sessions of the Assembly.

10. In fact this agreement was never signed and the allocation of the chamber and other areas to the Assembly is done by tacit agreement and according to practices that have evolved over time and are confirmed each session by mutual agreement.

11. It should be emphasised that on 2nd December 1960, the Assembly, in recommending that the Council authorise the financing of the new building for WEU, had specifically recognised that:

"... the failure to utilise the fifth floor for WEU will have the following undesirable consequences:

- (i) inadequate accommodation for national delegations and political groups in the Assembly;
- (ii) no margin for an expansion of the work of WEU in the future, nor possibility of accommodating the WEU staff at present in London should it be decided at some future date that all WEU staff should be placed together"

II. Evolution in the composition of the Assembly and adaptations required to the premises

(a) Chamber

12. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that the Assembly of WEU shall be composed of the representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. It should be recalled that the number of representatives of these countries ranges from 2 to 18 and that within these lower and upper limits the number of representatives allocated to each is proportionate to the size of its population. Thus, from the outset, the Assembly was composed of 89 representatives and 89 substitutes, broken down as follows:

- Belgium	7 + 7
- France	18 + 18
- Germany	18 + 18
- Italy	18 + 18
- Luxembourg	3 + 3
- Netherlands	7 + 7
- United Kingdom	18 + 18

13. This composition remained unchanged until 1991, when Spain and Portugal became members of WEU and were entitled to the following seats (corresponding to the number they held in the Council of Europe):

- Spain	12 + 12
- Portugal	7 + 7

14. Following the accession of these countries the number of representatives rose to 108 and 108 substitutes.

15. Under Rule 17 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, a number of parliamentary observers are invited to attend the plenary sessions of the Assembly. Their number was very small until after the Maastricht declaration of 10th December 1991, after which it rose substantially. The post-Maastricht situation can be summarised as follows:

15.1. Three member states of the European Community (Denmark, Greece and Ireland) have been invited to join WEU; of these Greece alone has signed an accession agreement which is still in the process of being ratified. The number of representatives for these countries is as follows:

- Greece	7
- Denmark	2
- Ireland	2

15.2. The status of associate member has been offered to three other NATO member states (Iceland, Norway and Turkey). The number of representatives for these countries is as follows:

- Norway	5
- Turkey	12
- Iceland	3

15.3. On 30th November 1993, at the eighth sitting of its thirty-ninth ordinary session, the Assembly adopted the necessary modifications to its rules for the new statuses that were to take effect on the date of ratification of the protocol of accession of the Hellenic Republic. In the meantime, all the countries concerned have permanent observer status.

15.4. This status has also been granted to the nine countries of the Forum of Consultation created following the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic. These countries each send two parliamentary representatives to the Assembly¹.

15.5. Five other countries (Austria, Finland, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and Ukraine) may continue to be invited to the sessions as was the case in 1993. Each of these countries would have two representatives.

15.6. The present position is that there are a total of 287 parliamentarians (108 representatives, 108 substitutes, 61 permanent observers and 10 guests). To this number must be added – for the purposes of allocating seats in the chamber, representatives of the Council, the Secretariat-General and the guest speakers, together with honorary members and secretaries of national delegations and political groups – in all 82 people.

16. As the plan showing the use of the CES chamber shows (see Appendix I) given the maximum number the chamber can accommodate (228 seats) it has not been possible since the accession of Spain and Portugal to allocate a seat to all participants. Hence only 14 seats (6.14%) could be allocated to substitutes not standing in for titular members, 51 seats (22.37%) to permanent observers and 23 seats (10.09%) to honorary members, secretaries of national delegations and secretaries of political groups. The three central rows in the chamber comprising 32 seats (14.03%) continue to be reserved for members of the Council, the Secretariat-General and official speakers.

17. On the date of ratification of Greece's protocol of accession the composition of the Assembly will be as follows:

- 10 founder members or members of more recent accession (115 representatives and 115 substitutes)
- 3 associate member countries (20 representatives and 20 substitutes)
- 2 observer countries (4 representatives)
- 9 countries, associate partner countries (30 delegates)¹.

1. By decision of the Presidential Committee of 18th October 1994, the delegations of permanent observers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic were increased from two to four members.

18. To these must still be added the observers that the Assembly may admit to the chamber under Rule 17, whose average number can be estimated at around 16. These observers attend the Assembly without being entitled to vote but may speak if authorised to do so by President of the Assembly.

19. Hence in future there will be 414 delegates (including representatives of the Council, the Secretariat-General and the official speakers). As there are 228 seats, only representatives of the associate member countries and observer countries and the delegates of associate partner countries can be accommodated in the chamber in addition to the representatives of the 10 member countries. Observers other than permanent observers can be allocated 16 seats and the Council, Secretariat-General and official speakers 32 seats, as previously. However the number of seats allocated to secretaries of national delegations and political groups will need to be reduced to 23, while substitutes not standing in for titular members and honorary members will be able to occupy any available seating in the official gallery.

(b) Simultaneous interpretation equipment

20. Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly states that speeches given during plenary sessions in the official language of each member state must be simultaneously interpreted into the other official languages. As the CES is not equipped for simultaneous interpretation, at each session of the WEU Assembly mobile three-place interpretation booths have to be installed in the official gallery. Originally there were five booths but their number rose to seven after Spain and Portugal's accession and will increase further to eight after the accession of Greece. It is understood that permanent and other observers have to address the Assembly in one of the eight official languages.

21. It should be stressed that the CES premises cannot in any event accommodate further mobile interpretation booths. The installation of the eighth booth for the Greek language interpreters will, moreover, entail a reduction in the number of places available in the official gallery, where, for safety reasons, 70 people at most can currently be accommodated. Hence the gallery will in future be able to accommodate only 40 or so people at most and access to it will be more difficult.

(c) Closed-circuit television viewing area and offices in the premises of the French Economic and Social Council (CES)

22. To make up for the loss of available seating in the official gallery due to the installation of the Spanish and Portuguese interpretation booths, a

closed-circuit television area where debates can be followed on screen has been set up in the lobby. However the number of seats in this television area, which was increased to 100 for the December 1993 session can be further increased but at the expense of other facilities. This arrangement has the disadvantage of the fact that the camera is trained throughout on the presidential tribune and the audience is therefore unable to see speakers addressing the Assembly from other points in the chamber. A temporary improvement was achieved during the last session by having a technician train a camera on the speaker, although this only offered coverage of one area of the chamber. The system could be improved by having roving cameras home in on the speaker, wherever he or she happened to be in the chamber.

23. As Appendices II.1 and II.2 show, the offices allocated to the sittings office and the French language verbatim reporters and summary reporters are located next to the chamber and on the mezzanine floor. During sessions, two open-plan areas are created in the lobby, one for the office of the sergeant-at-arms, which is also used as a VIP suite for official speakers, and the other for the bureau of the Socialist Group. The two other political groups – the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats and the Liberal Group – respectively have the use of a room next to the chamber and a conference room in the CES basement.

(d) Conference rooms

24. These conference rooms are largely for the use of the Presidential Committee, the Standing Committee and the committees of the Assembly, the compositions of which are as follows:

– Presidential Committee	20 members
– Standing Committee	42 members
– Defence Committee	34 members
– Political Committee	34 members
– Technological and Aerospace Committee	26 members
– Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration	26 members
– Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges	26 members
– Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations	26 members

25. The figures above relate only to titular members. There are the same numbers of alternates for members of the Standing Committee other than members of the Presidential Committee and for the other committees of the Assembly. The political groups also hold their meetings in these rooms, in particular during the Assembly sessions. Their composition is as follows:

- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats : 99 members
- Liberal Group : 34 members
- Socialist Group : 71 members

26. Until 1990, the organs of the Assembly were able to hold meetings outside plenary sessions in three conference rooms on the ground floor of the Assembly building. The arrangement of these rooms was as follows:

- Room A: 34 seats around the table, 52 seats for observers, 3 two-place interpretation booths;
- Room B: 26 seats around the table, 1 mobile two-place interpretation booth;
- Room C: 28 seats around the table, 20 seats for observers, 3 two-place interpretation booths.

27. After Spain and Portugal's accession to ECU, the Council authorised work to reorganise the Assembly's premises, including the conversion of Rooms B and C so as to make use of all the ground-floor space where the offices of the national delegations were situated. Major works were thus carried out in 1989 and 1990, with the result that the Assembly currently has three conference rooms (see Appendix III.1 ground-floor plan) with accommodation as follows:

- Room A: Layout unchanged.
- Rooms B and C each with:
 - 40 seats around the table,
 - 20 seats for observers,
 - 7 three-place interpretation booths.

28. Rule 21 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly merely requires the Office of the Clerk to provide simultaneous interpretation in committee from all the official languages to French and English, consequently making use of only two booths. The presence of the 7 booths in rooms B and C should allow all possible requirements by national delegations for simultaneous interpretation towards their own languages to be met, given that the cost of recruiting interpreters would be met by them.

29. The accession of Greece and the resultant need to add Greek as a passive language for interpretation into the Assembly's working languages (French and English) therefore entails only minor adjustments to the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the conference rooms. Moreover it should be noted that further expansion of interpretation requirements is not anticipated - unless there is a further dramatic increase in the number of members.

30. However the amendment to Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure will involve admitting Greece, Norway, Iceland and Turkey to membership of the committees in the following numbers: an additional 20 members (10 representatives and 10 alternates) for the Political and Defence Committees; an additional 16 members (8 representatives and 8 alternates) for the other permanent committees and an additional 8 members (2 Greeks, 2 Norwegians, 3 Turks and 1 Icelander) for the Standing Committee. It seems clear that the 40 available seats around the table and the 20 observer seats in each of Rooms B and C (Room A is basically not suitable for such meetings because of the limited number of interpretation booths) would not be sufficient to cope with very large attendances in certain parliamentary work such as joint committee meetings or meetings of the Standing Committee. In the present circumstances converting these rooms or the construction of new ones with greater accommodation capacity cannot be envisaged due to the lack of available space, quite apart from any cost considerations. Recourse must therefore be had as necessary to renting suitable conference rooms in Paris: examples might be the Palais des Congrès, Porte Maillot, the Centre du Commerce Extérieur, avenue d'Iéna. The cost of hiring rooms suited to the needs of the Assembly might be reckoned at between F 17 000 and 25 000 per day.

(e) *National delegation offices*

31. Until the June 1990 session the national delegations were accommodated in part of the ground floor, the remainder being occupied by the conference rooms. The larger national delegations each had an office area of 25-29 m² while the three Benelux countries had office areas of approximately 20 m² each. The use of this space to enlarge the conference rooms forced the Assembly to transfer the delegation offices to the second floor which had become vacant as a result of the winding down of the agencies responsible for security matters. Thus the nine national delegations acquired a larger area and either one large or two or three smaller offices were allocated to each depending on its size. However these arrangements are far from satisfactory for the national delegations when the Assembly is in session. Appendix III.3 contains a plan of the current distribution of the various offices among the national delegations. This also shows the offices on the same floor allocated to the staff of the Office of the Clerk.

32. The accession of Greece will mean that this country must be allocated at least one office comparable to that of the Spanish delegation. Office 202 on the second floor, which is at present only occasionally used by the Institute for Security Studies will be allocated to the Greek Delegation,

which is effectively the last delegation it will be possible to house in the Assembly's premises.

33. The associate members, permanent observers and the countries of the Forum of Consultation have no accommodation at all at present. However some provision should be made in advance of their status becoming officially effective. Making available the third floor of the Assembly building, occupied by the Institute for Security Studies would be the only practicable solution. Such a solution would necessitate the French Government making other suitable premises close to those of the Assembly available to the Institute, so that the latter could continue to use the same conference rooms as it uses at present.

34. This problem has been raised several times by the Presidents of the Assembly in meetings with the French authorities. On the most recent occasion, the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, in his letter of 13th October 1993 to Mr. Lamassoure, Deputy Minister for European Affairs, recalled this request for the third floor of the Assembly premises to be made available. Mr. Lamassoure replied on 30th November, acknowledging the very real problem that existed but stressing that "the matter is one that the Council and the Assembly must resolve together, since it is a question of allocating space within premises owned by WEU. France cannot take the place either of the Council or of the Assembly in reaching a possible solution".

35. One cannot reasonably object to this position, but it does seem clear that the Council and the Assembly can only reach agreement over the use of the third floor once it is unoccupied, in other words once the Institute has moved to other premises which only the French Government is in a position to provide for it.

36. It is clear that a decision on the matter is urgently required, as the Institute's move into new premises and the alterations to the offices on the third floor need to be completed very quickly, in other words before permanent observer, associate member and Forum of Consultation member country status take effect.

37. Thus as the plan (Appendix III.4) shows, the third floor consists of 32 offices. Most of these would need to be allocated to the national delegations of the new countries (associate members, permanent observers and member countries of the Forum of Consultation). The alterations required to them would depend on the state in which they were handed over to the Assembly. In any event they would need to be properly equipped, in the same way as the delegation offices on the second floor. Apart from furniture, a relay system for each delegation to listen to the debates would have to be provided and two video/message display screens installed in the third floor corridor.

III. Evolution of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly and new requirements arising from enlargement: premises and other facilities necessary for the work of the Office of the Clerk

(a) Permanent staff

38. Up until 1989 the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly had 31 permanent staff in grades A, B and C. This staffing level had been attained by gradually increasing the permanent staff complement from 21 in 1959 to 25 in 1962, 26 in 1964, 27 in 1965 and 28 in 1966. It fell to 27 in 1984 (due to the withdrawal of two hors grade posts) and rose to 31 in 1988. It was at this juncture that a new, more rational structure of the Office of the Clerk was introduced, the merits of which were acknowledged by the committee of experts commissioned in 1990 to carry out a study of the organisation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. This structure is still in place today (see Appendix IV).

39. It should be recalled that this committee comprised three officials with an indepth knowledge of the way parliamentary assemblies operate. Its members were in fact the Head of the Sittings Services of the Council of Europe and senior parliamentary administrators, one each from the British House of Commons and the French Assemblée Nationale.

40. On completion of their analysis, the experts reached the following conclusions:

"The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly ...works well but in precarious conditions which may have a considerable impact on any development in the Assembly's rôle. If it works well, this is mainly due to the standard and devotion first of its senior staff and then of the staff as a whole. All the officials are motivated and spare neither effort nor time.

The question is whether they could do even more if circumstances required. This is not certain...

The standard of work in the Office of the Clerk is therefore closely linked with the Assembly's rôle in WEU and the very rôle of WEU. It can already be foreseen that this will grow in the years ahead, thus raising, here and now, the question of strengthening the staff of the services."

41. Subsequent to the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU and in accordance with the opinion expressed on 11th April 1990 by the committee of experts as cited above, staffing levels rose to 32 in 1990 and 34 in 1991. These increases represented a gradual implementation of the experts' opinion which recognised the need for

three categories of new posts to be created within the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, as follows:

- “– a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a grade B3 assistant. This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to carry out his new tasks in full;
- a grade A3/A4 head of the research and documentation service and a grade B3 assistant. The creation of an efficient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is essential to allow the presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work. This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in particular, to ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentation (national parliaments, specialised institutes etc.). However, the attribution of enough staff from the outset is a condition for the success of this operation;
- another assistant for the administrative services, mainly in order to cope with the increase in the quantity of work involved in managing the Assembly's relations with its members. Favourable consideration should also be given to the recruitment of a permanent driver.”

42. With reference to the experts' opinion, three Grade B3 posts have still to be created. Two of them have been reinstated in the 1994 budget which has now been confirmed by the Council. The current staffing level will therefore be 36 in the second half of 1994.

43. Furthermore the same experts had anticipated that the rôle of the WEU Assembly might evolve towards:

- “– enhancement of the ability to study, criticise and make proposals to the WEU Council;
- greater participation in the East-West security dialogue by contributing to intergovernmental relations with links at the level of people's and national representations. In this context, the rôle of the presidency of the Assembly, in particular, should increase considerably as should that of the committees;
- making the WEU Assembly the leading media instrument for informing public opinion about the progressive establishment of European defence;

- enlargement of WEU to include new member states as the logical consequence of the two points above. Portugal and Spain have already acceded to the treaty. This is particularly important since the European Parliament can examine defence questions only in part.”

44. This forecast was confirmed in the ministerial declarations that followed the Maastricht Treaty and in the Petersberg declaration. Certain essential points are worthy of mention here.

Maastricht declaration, 10th December 1991:

“The member states ... are determined, taking into account the rôle of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European states on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe.”

Petersberg declaration, 19th June 1992:

“In their Maastricht declaration of 10th December 1991, the member states of WEU proposed that states which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

...

Ministers agreed that, in view of the profound changes in Europe of the last few years, intensifying the relations between WEU and the states of Central Europe will contribute to stability and the emergence of a new peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation, greater security and confidence, as well as disarmament.

...

The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations.

...

Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned."

45. These projected future developments, taken into account by the experts, justify the creation of new Grade A posts, particularly in connection with the organisation of the secretariats of the three committees whose work is primarily political and the translation service. It should be stressed that in the initial draft budget for the financial year 1994, the Assembly had already asked for the creation of a translator post, two other secretarial posts and a post of usher/messenger/driver, but that this request had had to be withdrawn as a result of the restrictions on the budget imposed by the Council.

46. Account must also be taken of the fact that in the event of the third floor of the building being allocated to the Assembly, the Office of the Clerk would become responsible for providing all the services relating to management and safeguarding the building which are currently the responsibility of the Institute for Security Studies. This includes management of the security service comprising six security officers, the telephone exchange, the buildings maintenance service and supervision of the management of the bar/restaurant. The staffing needs of these services cannot be quantified exactly at present, however in this connection an effort must be made to achieve the same cost effectiveness ratio as that of the current organisation of the Institute for Security Studies.

47. The 36-strong staff of the Office of the Clerk is at present structured as follows:

Grade A/L officials: 17
Grade B officials: 16
Grade C officials: 3

48. In staffing, efforts are always made to achieve a balance of nationalities. Such efforts should continue. But it should be noted that top priority must continue to be given to appointment of the best person for the post.

49. Until 1990 the staff of the Office of the Clerk occupied the offices on the first floor under difficult conditions since these offices were inadequate for providing all members of the staff with normal, acceptable working conditions. Moreover, some of these offices had to be vacated during the plenary sessions to accommodate the staff of the various temporary services set up during the sessions.

50. The situation improved slightly when the second floor of the Assembly building was made available to the Assembly, for the offices allocated to the secretariats of two committees and the translation service were accommodated there, as well as the national delegations.

51. It is impossible at present to draw up a finalised plan for the use of all the accommodation areas available to the Assembly in the event of its acquiring the third floor of the building. A review would need to be conducted at the appropriate time of the arrangements for all services, permanent and temporary, on the assumption that the Office of the Clerk would at that point have sufficient room for its needs, despite the fact that during sessions some offices on the first floor would continue to be allocated to temporary staff. Allocation of offices to the new national delegations and to certain services of the Office of the Clerk are shown, as a working hypothesis, on the third floor plan in Appendix III.4.

(b) Temporary staff

52. During sessions, as the organogram shows (Appendix V) the Assembly is obliged to set up a number of services of a specifically parliamentary nature, such as:

- a sittings office: French and English languages
- verbatim reporting: English, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese languages
- summary reporting (French and English languages)
- interpretation: seven teams of three interpreters and
- miscellaneous services including: doctor, ushers, messengers, maintenance technician, security guards, etc.

53. Moreover to meet the additional workload certain permanent services such as the press office, the reprographics department, the postal service etc. have to be supplemented by taking on temporary staff.

54. Finally, after sessions, the translation service is supplemented by teams to prepare the official report of the proceedings in the French and English languages from the verbatim records in the official languages of the Assembly.

55. Approximately 125 people are recruited to the services referred to in paragraph 52, another 15 or so to supplement the permanent services referred to in paragraph 53, and 29 temporary staff to the translation service referred to in paragraph 54.

56. As explained above, these staff work under cramped conditions both in the offices in the vicinity of the chamber made available to the Assembly by the CES and in the first-floor offices vacated for the purpose by the permanent staff. The situation improved when the Assembly obtained the use of the second floor (the translators are accommodated in the national delegation offices once the sessions are over) and other offices on

the mezzanine floor made available by the CES after recent improvement works. The mobile interpretation booths in the chamber are very uncomfortable for the interpreters (unsuitable seating, absence of proper ventilation) and very cramped, and there is no rest room nearby for their occupants.

57. The present allocation of offices for temporary staff belonging to the different services is shown on the floor plans in Appendices II and III of this report. This situation could be improved if the Assembly had the use of the third floor, but it must be borne in mind that the verbatim reporters and summary reporters cannot be accommodated in offices too far away from the chamber. Given this constraint, it might be possible to accommodate both the French and English verbatim reporters and the summary reporters on the CES mezzanine floor and to transfer the other reporters to the first floor offices, which, as in the past, would have to be vacated by the permanent staff. The problem would involve a wholesale reorganisation of office arrangements for both permanent and temporary staff, as explained in paragraph 51.

58. Following a decision by the Presidential Committee meeting on 16th June 1994, a procedure was put in place to arrive at temporary and provisional solutions for problems encountered by the Assembly to accommodate the arrival of new representatives. A delegation of civil servants composed of representatives of the Clerk's Office, the Secretariat-General with the participation of the Institute met on 19th July in Paris and 1st September in Brussels to prepare proposals. These were accepted during a meeting between a delegation of parliamentarians led by the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and a representative of the Dutch permanent delegation representing the country holding the chairmanship of the WEU Council of Ministers on 26th September 1994 in Brussels and finalised by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly at its meeting on 27th September 1994. The results of these successive discussions is presented in Appendix V attached to this report.

IV. Conclusions

59. The considerations set out in the earlier sections of this report lead to the conclusion that the Assembly's facilities are inadequate to meet present needs. If the third floor of the Assembly building were to be made available, the Assembly's facilities – other than the conference rooms, which could be hired as the need arose – could be adapted to meet requirements arising from Greece's accession to WEU and the introduction of the new associate and observer statuses, including that of associate partner countries. It would not be possible to deal with any future enlarge-

ment of the Assembly as there is no additional space either in the Assembly building or in the area occupied by the CES.

60. Any conversion work to the building to meet current needs would involve extraordinary expenditure under various budget heads, the extent of which it is impossible to evaluate at the present time, but which would certainly not amount to less than F 2 million. Once the decisions were taken therefore, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration would need to draw up a supplementary budget covering this extraordinary expenditure in accordance with the procedures implemented when approved works were carried out in 1989.

61. The point must also be made that, of all the European parliamentary assemblies, the WEU Assembly is the only one which is so poorly accommodated that it does not provide parliamentarians or staff with normal working conditions.

62. It is common knowledge that very superior facilities are available at the European Parliament's three seats in Strasbourg, Luxembourg and Brussels and that the Council of Europe is very well accommodated in the "Maison de l'Europe". The NATO Assembly, which is not an institutional assembly, has a secretariat whose permanent headquarters is in Brussels and holds assembly sessions in the parliaments of its member countries.

63. The WEU Assembly is therefore the only one facing the problems of an inadequate Assembly building, which affects its work substantially; only the governments of the member countries can resolve this problem. The present report offers an essential basis for discussion and serious consideration of the question to enable a viable solution to be put to the Assembly.

64. It should be stressed that this report takes account of the situation of the Assembly as defined in its Charter and Rules of Procedure. It goes without saying that any change in these provisions leading to a simplification of the logistical problems raised by this situation (eg: a reduction in the number of official languages) would allow the consequences of enlargement to be considered in a different light. This would also be the case if any amendment were envisaged to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which deals with the composition of the Assembly. However this assumption can be discounted under present political circumstances, at least until the revision provided for in 1996 under the Maastricht Treaty.

65. In any event, if the Presidential Committee were to decide to consider a possible modification of the Assembly's Charter and Rules of Procedure along the lines described above, the matter would first have to be placed before the Committee on

Rules of Procedure and Privileges for a report to be submitted to the Assembly. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration would then have to take steps to assess the financial implications in order to prepare the appropriate supplementary budget.

66. The considerations and conclusions set out above take account of WEU's evolution as this can be envisaged on the basis of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers and the directions in which these decisions would seem to point. However in the longer term, in other words looking forward over the next five years, it is possible to foresee that the enlargement of the European Union would make it necessary to strengthen the structures of the WEU Assembly.

67. It is highly likely that such enlargement will involve other countries like Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland joining

the European Union, along with some countries that currently make up the Forum of Consultation.

68. This is tantamount to saying that one must reckon on a considerable increase in the number of representatives and substitutes making up the Assembly who will have the same rights as its present members.

69. The problems set out above will therefore take on a new dimension – whether in relation to the availability of seats in the chamber, the capacity of the seat of the Assembly to accommodate the new members, the need for further restructuring of the staff organisation of the Office of the Clerk or improvements in working facilities.

70. The future development of the Assembly must be considered in the much wider framework of the evolution of WEU and the European Union.

APPENDIX I


Table showing use of Economic and Social Council chamber

Country	Till June 1991		After accession of Spain and Portugal		After accession of Greece	
	No. of delegates	Seats allocated	No. of delegates	Seats allocated	No. of delegates	Seats allocated
<i>I. Representatives</i>						
<i>1. Member countries</i>						
Germany	18	18	18	18	18	18
Belgium	7	7	7	7	7	7
Spain			12	12	12	12
France	18	18	18	18	18	18
Italy	18	18	18	18	18	18
Luxembourg	3	3	3	3	3	3
Netherlands	7	7	7	7	7	7
Portugal			7	7	7	7
United Kingdom	18	18	18	18	18	18
Greece					7	7
<i>2. Associate member countries</i>						
Iceland					3	3
Norway					5	5
Turkey					12	12
<i>3. Observer countries</i>						
Denmark					2	2
Ireland					2	2
Sub-total	89	89	108	108	139	139
<i>II. Substitutes</i>	89	89	108	14	135	—
<i>III. Associate partner counties</i> .					30	30
<i>IV. Observers</i>	10	10	59	51	16	16
<i>IV. Council, SG and guest speakers</i>	24	32	32	32	32	32
<i>VI. Sec. Nat. Del.</i>	10	10	20		32	18
<i>Political groups</i>			5	23	5	5
<i>Honorary members</i>			25		25	—
Grand total	222	230	357	228	414	240


APPENDIX II

1. Palais d'Iéna – Chamber level

Allocation of offices as of December 1993




2. Palais d'Iéna - Mezzanine
Allocation of offices as of December 1993



3. Palais d'Iéna - Basement

Allocation of offices as of December 1993




APPENDIX III


Occupation of areas on the various floors of the WEU building

1. WEU building – Ground floor

Allocation of offices as of December 1993




*2. WEU building - 1st Floor 780 m²
Allocation of offices as of December 1993*




3. WEU building
2nd Floor – National Delegations and Secretariat 780 m²

Allocation of offices as of December 1993




4. WEU building – 3rd Floor 780 m²
Allocation of offices (working hypothesis)



APPENDIX IV

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly



APPENDIX IV

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

Notes

- [•] Service organised/Staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly.
Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1995.
- * Posts proposed for regrading in the 1995 budget.
- (1) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
 - (2) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs together with his assistant.
 - (3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service.
 - (4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section, Security Officer and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are carried out by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Finance together with his assistant.
 - (5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation Services.
 - (6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.
 - (7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for the Mail and Archives Service.
 - (8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the reproduction of documents.
 - (9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of these duties by his assistant.
 - (10) The assistant in the Private Office of the President is responsible for the reception desk.
 - (11) The Clerk Assistant (Political Affairs) and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Standing Committee.
 - (12) The assistant to the Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is also the assistant to the Research Office.
 - (13) The Clerk Assistant (Administration and Finance) supervises protocol work and the reception desk.

APPENDIX V

*Summary of conclusions of the meeting on 1st September 1994
concerning problems with the WEU building in Paris*

*WEU Headquarters, Brussels
4, rue de la Régence,
1000 Brussels*

Present: Clerk of the Assembly, Mr. Burgelin
Clerk Assistant of the Assembly,
Mr. Loutz
Head of Administration of the Institute,
Mr. Vaineau
Head of Administration of the
Secretariat-General, Mr. Messineo

The Clerk of the Assembly pointed out that the Assembly's position had been set out in document UEO/CP (94) 28, dated 30th May 1994, and that he was not in a position to express a different opinion. However, he had understood that the aim of the secretariat's representative was to find a temporary solution to the urgent problems that were being faced. The purpose of the Clerk's remarks therefore was to enlighten the secretariat and assist it in presenting solutions to the Assembly which the latter could accept provisionally.

The three major problems presented by the Assembly were the following :

1. reception capacity of the ESC chamber;
2. reception capacity of meeting rooms in WEU's Paris building;
3. the Institute providing office space for the parliamentary delegations.

1. *Reception capacity of chamber*

The following two proposals were considered feasible by the Clerk of the Assembly, although the cost and practical implementation aspects would have to be looked into:

- (a) the installation of an *electronic office* in the chamber, which would enable identification of the parliamentarian in each seat and requests to speak and vote. It would therefore be possible not to assign a seat to each representative. Given the consistently high level of absenteeism, the chamber could thus be used by significantly more representatives than the actual number of seats would suggest. This installation required the approval of the Economic and Social Council which, given its own interest in the matter, could be requested to contribute to the cost, but the response to this request could not be anticipated;

- (b) the removal of the temporary interpretation booths in the galleries and use of the permanent booths in WEU's meeting rooms. This would free considerable space in the galleries and would require an audio-visual link between the booths and the chamber.

2. *Meeting rooms in the WEU building*

The Clerk of the Assembly expressed satisfaction with the use of rooms B and C, built in 1990. As regards the third room (A), the Director of the Institute had drawn up a proposal to transform it into a conference room able to accommodate approximately 100 people. This met the Institute's future needs for WEU events organised in Paris, which would be attended by representatives of 24 or even 28 countries.

According to the Director of the Institute, the cost of the work to be done for this conversion should be relatively limited (F 460 000) given that the present number of interpretation booths (3) would be maintained.

The Clerk of the Assembly considered that these changes would also be beneficial to the work of the Assembly. He requested that detailed plans be forwarded to him for approval and that arrangements be made for interpretation booths in room B to be used by room A during meetings of the Assembly. He expressed some reservation concerning the use of the infrared system for interpretation.

On this last point, the Institute considered that the most effective system had to be acquired in order to achieve the highest sound quality since using the infrared system enabled maximum flexible use to be made of the space available.

As far as funding was concerned, the operation could be carried out under a supplementary budget for 1994 put forward by the Institute, without having to resort to additional contributions from member states, given that the Institute had a sufficient credit surplus at the close of the 1993 financial year.

3. *Parliamentary delegations' offices*

On its accession to WEU as a full member, Greece had to have a permanent office at its dis-

posal. The proposed solution was to allocate office 202 to the Assembly which, under a decision taken by the Council in 1990, had been set aside for the Secretary-General. If this office were transferred to the Assembly, the Institute would take steps to accommodate the Secretary-General and his colleagues during sessions.

This left 14 national delegations which may need to use offices, either solely during sessions or also during committee meetings. Under a temporary arrangement, it was conceivable:

- (a) to use office 317 during sessions *and committee meetings*¹;
- (b) to put the Institute's reading room and library at the disposal of delegations during sessions;

For the Assembly
Clerk Assistant,
R. LOUTZ

For the Institute
Head of Administration
G. VAINEAU

For the Secretariat-General
Head of Administration
F. MESSINEO

Clerk
H. BURGELIN

(c) to clear the room currently occupied by the telephonists with a view to it being used by the Assembly;

(d) *to consider in due course putting the bar-restaurant area at the Assembly's disposal*¹.

The Clerk of the Assembly remarked that the parliamentary delegations would probably be dissatisfied with the abovementioned proposals but that the fact they could evolve should make them acceptable.

For its part, the Institute believed that the implementation of these proposals would cause considerable disruption but that it could support them given the temporary nature of the measures which would help the Council and the Assembly to come to a final arrangement.

Done at Brussels, 1st September 1994

1. Text in italics deleted at the meeting on 26th September 1994.

A European security policy

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee*²
by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on a European security policy

DRAFT ORDER

on a European security policy

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Differing interests and attempts to achieve harmonisation
- III. Organising European security – an institutional problem?
- IV. The problems of enlarging WEU
- V. Some suggestions for a pragmatic approach to a European security and defence policy
- VI. Implications for the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference
- VII. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. de Puig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alegre, Sir Andrew Bowden, MM. Caballero, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fassino, Feldmann, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Kaspereit (Alternate: *Baumel*), Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, *van der Linden*, *de Lipkowski*, *Müller*, Péciaux, Mrs. Prestigiacomo, MM. Puche Rodriguez, Reddemann, *Rodeghiero*, Rodrigues (Alternate: *Mrs. Aguiar*), Salvi, Selva, Seeuws, *Seitlinger*, *Soell*, van Velzen, Vinçon, Ward, Wintgens, Woltjer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on a European security policy

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing that the aim of WEU is to achieve the effective strengthening of European security and that institutional concerns must in no case weaken efforts to this end;
- (ii) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the essential bases for ensuring this security;
- (iii) Regretting, therefore, that the Council has failed to take advantage of the opportunity of the fortieth anniversary of the treaty, which also coincided with that of the tenth anniversary of the reactivation of WEU, to draw the attention of the public at large to progress achieved by WEU since 1984;
- (iv) Convinced that the development of a European defence policy by the Council of WEU is conditional upon the achievement of a European security policy based on a common perception of risks and dangers and on a joint concept regarding the means of countering them;
- (v) Deploring the lack of information from the Council regarding its co-operation and contribution in this respect in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
- (vi) Recalling Recommendations 556, 558 and 559;
- (vii) Rejecting paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 559, in which the latter refuses to provide the Assembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (viii) Voicing its protest that the Council transmitted to the Assembly the first part of the fortieth annual report on its activities only on 9th November 1994 and deploring that the WEU Secretary-General no longer sends the Assembly his information letter;
- (ix) Aware that it is crucial to settle the substantive issues relating to the development of a European security and defence policy and that the Council seems to be giving priority to studying these questions;
- (x) Convinced nevertheless that the Council should not defer discussion of institutional problems in this connection until 1996, leaving the initiative in the interim to other European institutions;
- (xi) Recalling the decision of the European Council to create a study group in preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference which is to start work in June 1995 with the participation of two members of the European Parliament;
- (xii) Reaffirming that the supervision of security and defence policy in Europe is a prerogative of the national parliaments;
- (xiii) Insisting therefore that the WEU Assembly should participate fully in the preparations for WEU's planned review of the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the common foreign and security policy, in accordance with declaration ID8 of the WEU member countries annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
- (xiv) Fearing that the refusal of certain countries participating in the CFSP to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty might diminish the effectiveness of co-operation between the CFSP and WEU;
- (xv) Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the European NATO member countries to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's rôle as the European pillar of NATO;
- (xvi) Wishing WEU to act as a political driving force vis-à-vis the authorities of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance and not consider that its main task is to carry out decisions taken by these two organisations;
- (xvii) Recalling nevertheless that since the Council has promised the European Union to provide assistance in policing the town of Mostar, it is of the utmost importance for the latter to honour its commitments in full;
- (xviii) Deploring that meetings of the WEU Council are divided into four different categories of participant countries – full members, associate members, associate partners, observers – raises the problem of multi-speed co-operation within WEU and the attendant risk of its political action being paralysed by institutional infighting, as was the case over the issue of Rwanda;

- (xix) Wishing WEU to examine subsequent accession by its associate partners by basing itself essentially on the criteria of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (xx) Stressing that it is WEU's primary responsibility to ensure that, in the framework of harmonising procedures with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance for linking these countries with Euro-Atlantic structures, security considerations are a means of speeding up this process and not a pretext for holding it back;
- (xxi) Recalling that the Assembly cannot grant associate member and associate partner delegations rights which exceed the status the Council has granted them;
- (xxii) Stressing that the enlargement of WEU towards the East is intended to reinforce the security and stability of Europe as a whole and not to create new divisions;
- (xxiii) Recalling in consequence the importance of strengthening the collective security system in the framework of the CSCE and of establishing a stable partnership with Russia and the other members of the CIS;
- (xxiv) Wishing the problems raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union to be settled quickly in order to ensure the continuity of WEU's political action;
- (xxv) Recalling the important rôle of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in reinforcing the impact of the work of the Assembly with parliaments, public opinion and the governments of the member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In accordance with its declaration ID8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, create a special working group tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
2. Decide that this working group will begin work in early 1995 and that the Assembly will be associated with it;
3. Play the rôle of a political driving force vis-à-vis the authorities of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance with a view to developing guidelines for linking the Central and Eastern European countries with Euro-Atlantic structures;
4. Open up real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner countries, irrespective of whether or not they belong to other European organisations;
5. In so doing, ensure that any future enlargement of WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. On the same basis, examine whether conditions have been met for granting Slovenia associate partner status;
7. Include in its present studies the French Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a white paper on European security and ensure that the outcome of its examination of the development of a European defence policy provides the main source of inspiration for the thinking process to be conducted in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
8. Inform the Assembly of the areas and the content of its co-operation with the CFSP and NATO;
9. Contribute actively to the success of the conference on the stability pact in Europe;
10. Work out a joint position with a view to its contribution to the CSCE ministerial conference in Budapest and inform the Assembly of the action taken to follow up its declared intention of 9th May 1994 of strengthening the CSCE "to avoid the emergence of new divisions" and to work for "a reasonable division of labour with the CSCE";
11. Make its views known in a more convincing and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange for WEU to speak with one voice in the Security Council of that organisation;
12. Follow closely the problems of security in the Mediterranean and inform the Assembly of the action it has taken on Recommendation 538 as it undertook to do in its reply to that recommendation;
13. Inform the Assembly of the results of studies undertaken by the Council on unresolved questions relating to the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union;

14. Avoid the effectiveness of WEU's action being jeopardised by the development of work conducted with different forms of participation within the organisation and at different speeds in specific areas;
15. Study the conditions in which the WEU Council might meet as a European security and defence council, either as necessary or on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
16. Organise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between "WEU" departments established in ministries for foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of government of member states;
17. Comply immediately with its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty by submitting its annual report to the Assembly so that the latter can reply before the report loses its topicality, account being taken of the fact that this is not the first time that the report has arrived very late;
18. Continue to inform the Assembly of all activities under the modified Brussels Treaty, even if exercised in other European or transatlantic bodies.

Draft Order
on a European security policy

The Assembly,

(i) Considering:

- (a) the document on a status of association of WEU with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic;
- (b) the declaration further to the document on associate membership of WEU of 20th November 1992,

which texts were transmitted by the Council to the Assembly following the ministerial meeting held at Kirchberg, Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994;

- (ii) Considering that the declaration referred to in paragraph (b) above states that it “ does not entail any changes to the document on associate membership adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992;
- (iii) Taking the view therefore that this declaration does not contain elements requiring a re-examination of the measures drawn up by the Assembly for the participation of delegations of associate member countries;
- (iv) Recalling nevertheless its Recommendation 558; •
- (v) Recalling also Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states that the WEU Assembly is composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
- (vi) Noting that the “ document on the modalities ”, dated 3rd May 1994, stipulates that:

“ The provisions of this document apply as from today.

The status will formally be achieved when:

- the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers, become associate members of WEU;
- the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.

In the meantime the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect to the provisions of their new status. ”;

- (vii) Recalling the decision taken by the Presidential Committee on 18th October 1994 to enlarge the permanent observer delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from two to four members and to invite the nine associate partner countries each to appoint one observer to the Political, Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees and to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations without prejudging the eventual adoption of a status for the delegations of these countries;
- (viii) Considering the brief assigned by the Presidential Committee to the Political Committee to propose a substantive text on the adoption of an appropriate status for the delegations of countries that became associate partners prior to the question being placed before the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;
- (ix) Recalling its Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU and in particular paragraph (vii) of the preamble drawing attention to the fact that “ any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommodation and budget ”;
- (x) Noting with surprise that, despite its repeated approaches to the Council, the latter has not taken action on the pressing demands formulated by the Assembly in this respect;
- (xi) Regretting also that the Council has not provided any information on the arrangements for financial contributions by the associate partners to WEU's budget;
- (xii) Stressing the need nevertheless to avoid any further delay in making official participation of parliamentarians from states which have become associate partners of WEU,

INVITES ITS COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

To study the creation of a specific “ associate partner ” status for the representatives of associate partner states.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The task of beginning work on the definition of a common European defence policy, entrusted to the Permanent Council of WEU in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, marks the beginning of an ambitious and difficult enterprise, as it closely affects areas in which the sovereignty of the states concerned has so far been absolute.

2. However, as stated in its Recommendation 558 adopted on 14th June 1994, the Assembly of WEU is convinced that now is the time for WEU to undertake this task as a matter of priority. It therefore warmly endorses the Council's initiative. The Assembly nevertheless recalls that the best studies by diplomats and military experts are not enough to get a project off the ground, realisation of which depends primarily on the political will of the member countries. Hence in assigning this task to the Permanent Council, the Council cannot absolve itself of its own political responsibility, namely the pursuit of a European security policy, having been created expressly for that purpose in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the modified Brussels Treaty.

3. A European defence policy and, even more so, a European defence is dependent on the achievement of a European security policy based on a joint perception of risks and threats to European security, and a joint concept of the ways in which this security should be guaranteed, including institutional questions – in short, on harmonisation of political interests and objectives in external security matters. It is clear that all these necessary conditions for the creation of a common policy have not as yet been met. One must therefore work towards creating the conditions necessary for a common European security policy. This falls to WEU both under its founding treaty and under the Maastricht Treaty, given that any direction Europe is preparing to take in external security policy matters will inevitably have implications in the defence field.

4. In order to remove the obstacles that continue to stand in the way of development of a true common European security and defence policy, these must first be identified and their causes established so that the appropriate means of overcoming them can then be sought. The present report therefore proposes to make a contribution to the

work that is essential if Europeans wish to take control of their own security to meet the challenges of the future and avoid Europe's being unable to act or react in the event of a crisis (as in the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, in Somalia or Rwanda); at the same time this report can be regarded as an initial contribution to the preparation of the intergovernmental conference on the review of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty scheduled to begin in 1996.

5. This report, moreover, provides an opportunity to reaffirm the vital responsibility of the parliaments of our member countries in developing a European security and defence policy. A demonstration of this responsibility was the colloquy held by the WEU Assembly in Paris, on 17th October 1994, on the subject "organising our security" to which were invited the chairmen of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the national parliaments of the WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and observer countries together with a delegation from the two houses of the parliament of the Russian Federation. This first colloquy of its type, organised on the initiative of Mr. Baumel, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Assembly, allowed a very lively debate to be held around addresses given, inter alia, by the ministers of defence of France and the Netherlands; it was thus regarded as an initial step towards strengthening co-operation between our parliaments, and one which would be followed by other meetings of a similar nature.

II. Differing interests and attempts to achieve harmonisation

6. A rough comparison of the defence white papers published recently by three WEU member countries (France, the United Kingdom and Germany) can provide a useful insight into the similarities and differences that exist at present between these three countries in their views on security and their policy objectives in security and defence matters.

7. The primary objective of France's defence policy, as set out in the 1994 French defence white paper, is "to defend France's interests". This states specifically that:

"The primary objective of France's defence policy is therefore to defend the country's

vital and strategic interests and those with a bearing on France's international responsibilities and position in the world... ”

8. The second objective is summarised under the heading: Build Europe and contribute to international stability. “ ... France's ability to maintain its position in the world will be linked in large measure to its ability to influence the building and the future development of Europe. ” In the context of building Europe in security and defence matters, the French white paper states that “ two extreme options are to be ruled out: sole reliance on ad hoc coalitions and the option of trying to create an integrated military organisation in a federal-type European framework ”.

9. “ ...the building of defence Europe is dependent on the willingness of three states (France, the United Kingdom and Germany) to harmonise their view of their security interests by deepening their co-operation and, as necessary, pooling their military assets... Specific relations should also be developed with our other partners ... ” Among such partners the white paper specifically mentions Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.

10. In matters relating to the international framework of France's defence policy, the European ambition – which provides the context for the wish to strengthen WEU – is placed before the description of a renewed Atlantic Alliance which, according to the white paper, “ must also become a place for asserting the European defence and security identity ”.

11. The French white paper makes several references to the country's interests in relation to the security and stability of specific regions of the world such as *Africa*, for example, where France's action “ is more an acknowledgement of its international responsibilities in an area where it can exercise its influence than a strategic concern ”.

12. Moreover, “ ...the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, with whom a series of bilateral agreements have been concluded in a matter of years, will have greater priority in the allocation of the resources of military co-operation ”.

13. As to the *United Kingdom*, the Secretary of State for Defence, in a statement on the 1994 defence budget, defined national defence policy in the following terms:

“ From our immediate security perspective, perhaps the key factor will be the evolution of Russia; and we have a keen interest in the continuing independence and integrity of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

...

The United Kingdom's defence policy is designed to support our wider security policy, which is to maintain the freedom and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its dependent territories, and its ability to pursue its legitimate interests at home and abroad. ”

14. However:

“ As our political and economic interests become increasingly linked to those of our international partners, so our security interests will increasingly be pursued in a multilateral context. ... Thus, whilst our defence and security policies are likely to retain specifically British elements with a commensurate ability for national action, and whilst healthy bilateral defence relationships with the United States, our European partners and with others will remain important both for constructive policy-making and for our own defence effectiveness, the multilateral dimension will increasingly influence our judgments about the programmes we choose to implement. It may also affect the types of operation in which our armed forces become involved and the scale of their commitment. ”

15. Chapter 3 of *Germany's* white paper on national security and the situation and future of the Bundeswehr, published in April 1994, defines the “ values and interests ” of Germany in the following terms:

“ The values laid down in the Basic Law guide the interests on which Germany bases its action in the field of security policy. By establishing a constitutional mandate to safeguard peace, to work towards European unity, to settle conflicts by peaceful means and to join a system of collective security, the Basic Law has laid major cornerstones for determining German security interests.

...

German security policy has to take account of constant political factors and parameters with a long-term effect: the geopolitically central location of Germany, as the country with the most neighbours in Europe; its economic situation as an industrialised nation dependent on exports and firmly interwoven with the world economy; and finally the experiences of German and European history. All this sets standards for the objectives, substance and procedures of German policy and plays a part in the way in which it is perceived by Germany's neighbours.

...

German foreign and security policy is guided by five central interests:

- preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
- integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for democracy, the rule of law and prosperity in Europe mean peace and security for Germany, too;
- the lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the United States is indispensable for international stability;
- the familiarisation of our neighbours in Eastern Europe with western structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a new co-operative security order embracing all the states of Europe;
- worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world economic order based on market principles, for the security of the individual states is guaranteed only in a system of global security with peace, justice and well-being for everyone.

...

Germany is not impacted by all risks to the same extent. Its security is directly affected by how the situation in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe develops. It is indirectly affected by unstable conditions in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South-western Asia. Germany's security is also affected by destabilising developments in other parts of the world."

16. While these three documents all allude in one way or another to the importance of European and transatlantic co-operation, it is nevertheless clear that the aims of the policies of the countries in question are defined in terms of purely national interests. Only the German white paper regards the promotion of the integration of European democracies into the European Union as one of the country's essential interests. However, in the foregoing documents there is nothing to imply that the harmonisation of national interests constitutes an important goal, nor is inspiration drawn from the objectives of the common foreign and security policy described in Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty.

17. One could no doubt go on to examine the position of the other WEU member countries in

this regard – to arrive at the conclusion published at the end of July by an expert of the WEU Institute for Security Studies¹, which states that "what has been missing up to now is an identity of interests between the states of the Union in matters of security policy and a common strategic concept regarding when and where it would be essential to make a commitment in the area of military management of crises".

18. In this situation the proposal presented by Mr. Lellouche on behalf of the delegation of the French National Assembly to the European Communities, according to which the European Union should prepare a white paper on European defence², is interesting, but it should be used to exert pressure on the European countries concerned to harmonise their ideas and policies not only from a strictly military viewpoint but also from a security angle in the broadest sense. It would therefore seem that the initiative announced at the end of August by the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur³ for drafting a white paper on security in Europe which would highlight Europe's specific interests and define the means necessary for defending them in liaison with the Atlantic Alliance is a move in the right direction.

19. In this connection, your Rapporteur supports the analysis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies expert in the article referred to above according to which:

"... Above all it is necessary to agree on a concept of security policy specific to the Union which takes account of the whole range of possible political, economic and military reactions. This can but be based on the precise determination of joint interests in security matters towards given regions (Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, North and Central Africa). The simple enumeration of objectives in matters of peace policy and stability that are general and therefore not binding to any great extent, such as those mentioned so far in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, is of little use."

20. It should be recalled once more in this context that the WEU Council's obligation to agree on common principles extends to any region of the world where a situation arises that might constitute a threat to peace.

21. Public debate on the method or methods for achieving the desired objective, in other words

1. Mathias Jopp: Langer Weg – Kühnes Ziel: Gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik in Europa Archiv, Folge 13-14/1994, page 397.

2. Europe and its security – an information report received by the Presidency of the National Assembly on 31st May 1994.

3. The Figaro, 2nd September 1994.

reaching agreement on a common concept for organising European security, is growing more intense: the larger the European Union and WEU become, the more these two organisations and the Atlantic Alliance are opening up towards the East, as 1996, the year in which the intergovernmental conference to review the Maastricht Treaty is due to start, approaches.

22. This debate concerns both the basic substance of security policy and fundamental institutional questions, two aspects that are closely linked. On matters of substance, three main concepts are still competing even if they are considered to be complementary.

23. The first is the concept of a collective security system according to which crisis-management and prevention are based on rules of co-operation between all the participants in the system. This is the principle on which the United Nations, the CSCE and other forms of regional organisations of the United Nations are based. The second approach is to ensure security by defensive alliances such as WEU and NATO, while the third favours security through integration of a group of states, as proposed by the European Union.

24. In Recommendation 559, the Assembly asked to be informed of the results of the study on mutually reinforcing institutions, recently completed within the framework of the "security" group of the common foreign and security policy, which establishes criteria for better co-operation between the United Nations, the CSCE, the European Union, WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe in conflict-prevention and crisis-management.

25. The Council's reply to this recommendation is revealing. First it informs the Assembly that "the Council has already taken several initiatives in the field of crisis-management and conflict prevention in the context of the emerging common foreign and security policy (CFSP)" and then states that "the Council cannot report on the results of the work undertaken by working groups of the European Union dealing with CFSP matters".

26. The Assembly cannot accept this refusal to provide information which fails to accord with the obligations of the Council under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly must remind the Council that it still has responsibility for supervising the application of the treaty as a whole and that it must reply to recommendations and questions concerning the application of the treaty even if exercised in a framework other than that of WEU and especially when the Council contributes to the work of another organisation. So far, the Council has always accepted this principle, and in the past has even transmitted certain Assembly recommendations to other organisations, NATO for example, in order to be able to

reply to them. Quite recently the Council, in its answer to Written Question 326 put by Mr. Goerens, stressed "its determination to exercise its powers, even though – in order to avoid duplication – it may acknowledge that certain work is best conducted within the context of NATO or the European Union".

27. In the same answer, the Council also stated that it did not "consider its competences to be modified since the reactivation of WEU" and that it had "moreover, replied to all the Assembly's recommendations and *will continue to do so in the future.*" Nevertheless this answer is not entirely unambiguous. Hitherto, the Council has always drawn a clear distinction between the exercise of its competences and its competences as such. Thus the transfer of the exercise of its social and cultural responsibilities to the Council of Europe affected *the Council's activity and not its responsibilities as such*, as the Council itself stated in its annual report on its activities in 1959. Its decision in 1970 to cease its activities in economic matters was taken in accordance with the same principle.

28. It is all the more surprising to learn now, though the Council's answer to Written Question 326, that:

"The Council is of the view that WEU, which ceased to exercise its economic competences in 1970, *does not have the competence*⁴ to deal with the issues of financial compensation for the riparian countries implementing the Danube embargo."

Unless this is mere legal sloppiness in the drafting of this answer, it would mean that the Council has abandoned the distinction between the exercise of its powers and those powers in themselves, which would have extremely serious consequences at a time when WEU must give practical expression to its rôle as an integral part of the development of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

29. Nor can the Assembly accept that, in the answer referred to above "the Council devotes special attention to questions and recommendations relating to WEU's *direct responsibilities*⁵, and merely indicates to the Assembly the organisation primarily competent for other issues which are raised". What are these "direct responsibilities" if the Council is maintaining at the same time that its competences have not been modified since the reactivation of WEU? The Assembly therefore insists that the Council continue to provide information on all of its activities in the areas of its responsibilities and, in this connection, specifically recalls paragraph 8 of Recommendation 558.

4. Rapporteur's italics.

5. Rapporteur's italics.

30. This information is the more necessary as the *raison d'être* of the traditional defence alliances such as NATO and WEU seems to be increasingly called into question, both within and without. An example that might be quoted of such questioning from outside is Russia's attitude towards NATO following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the wish of the majority of Central and Eastern European countries to become members of NATO in order to benefit from the reliable protection of the American umbrella.

31. For Russia, there is no longer any place for traditional NATO missions, namely to ensure the defence of Europe, as there is no longer an enemy. On the basis of this reasoning, Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, recently proposed making the CSCE the central organisation for maintaining security and stability on the European continent. If the CSCE were to coordinate NATO and WEU efforts, the latter would then become subordinate to the CSCE.

32. The Russian proposal to develop the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in close liaison with the CSCE is, however, the consequence of an evolution which started in NATO itself according to which the latter might be transformed into a Euro-Atlantic security system based on a strategic concept giving precedence to a wider vision of stability and security. Under this new philosophy it becomes difficult to make the distinction between an enlarged NATO mandate and the global approach of the CSCE⁶. The introduction of the partnership for peace, offered to all NACC and CSCE member countries, reinforces this trend and places participants in peace-keeping measures either under the authority of the United Nations or under CSCE responsibility.

33. Another reason why the traditional missions of the alliances are being called into question is because the Secretary-General of the United Nations is tending to restrict the right of legitimate individual and collective defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to strengthen instead the rights and powers of the Security Council. This tendency is reinforced, as far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, by a reduction in the importance accorded to mutual assistance obligations in the event of armed aggression in favour of a wider interpretation of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty which allows NATO to intervene "out of area" to maintain and enforce peace within the framework of crisis-prevention and management. Although NATO stresses its independence in relation to the

United Nations in this area, it has to be admitted that NATO action not authorised by the United Nations is hardly conceivable.

34. Questioning from inside is evident in European efforts to substitute for the traditional alliances in Europe an integration of states in a new type of entity in which decision-making through intergovernmental co-operation would gradually give way to supranational procedures and decisions by qualified majority. Some are even calling for a new transatlantic treaty to take the place of the present alliance.

35. Divergences between advocates of retaining an intergovernmental system and those of a supranational system remain, as also between those who favour first deepening the European Union and those who stress the importance of enlarging the Union or who are convinced that it is possible to go deeper without abandoning enlargement.

36. Even before this enlargement of the European Union becomes a reality, a new debate has recently arisen, particularly in France and Germany, on the expediency of a multi-speed Europe, to consist of circles of co-operation of varying intensity. The Rapporteur is however of the opinion that the aim of further advancing matters European cannot be achieved by creating a central nucleus, since even among the small number of participants in such a nucleus, differing interests still persist.

37. Study of the various proposals put forward, among others by Mr. Lamassoure, the French Minister for European Affairs, for a new founding contract⁷, by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, for a Europe organised in three concentric circles⁸ and by the Christian Democrat Group of the German Parliament⁹, influenced in part by a study published in 1994 by the Bertelsmann Foundation on "Europe 96: reform programme for the European Union" reveals that these proposals merit careful analysis above all in the area of the organisation of security and defence.

38. It is not the Rapporteur's intention to discuss the timeliness or otherwise of launching a public debate on the usefulness of creating a nucleus in the context of building Europe and designating the countries of which it might consist when preparations are underway in three Scandinavian countries for difficult referendums on entry into the European Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are wondering whether they will be accepted into the European and Atlantic institutions, when and under

6. Werner Bauwens, Bruno Colson etc.: The CSCE and the changing rôle of NATO and the European Union, NATO Review, No. 3, June 1994.

7. *Le Monde*, 31st May 1994.

8. *Le Figaro*, 30th August 1994.

9. *Le Figaro*, 6th September 1994; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6th September 1994.

what terms. However the initiatives referred to above have the merit of raising fundamental problems and enabling them to be debated publicly before government civil servants and officials in Brussels begin their work. The Rapporteur would nevertheless wish to stress, first, that he is not in favour of the creation of an exclusive club of member states; second that the criteria for the advancement of Europe should be defined by all participant states; third, that those who remain outside the discussions will have no right to contribute to the decisions to be taken; fourth, that the national parliaments must participate in the work on reform and fifth that a nucleus exists in security and defence matters, namely WEU (see paragraph 49 below).

39. It will first be noted that none of the ideas or projects put forward in the recent past proposes a complete merger between the European Union and WEU in the foreseeable future. While the Institute for Security Studies expert¹⁰ does not foresee the incorporation of WEU in the Union until after 1998, "at the earliest", if certain conditions are met, the CDU/CSU document is asking for the 1996 conference to lead to a "reorganisation" of relations between WEU and the European Union with a view to "transforming NATO into a balanced alliance between the United States, Canada and Europe, as a unit capable of acting."

40. According to the study by the Bertelsmann Foundation the most that would be achievable in the foreseeable future would be a mixture of intergovernmental co-operation on the one hand and supranational crisis-management and intervention on the other. In this context, the authors of this document are asking that WEU be "finally consolidated as the security and defence instrument of the European Union and as such as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

41. The thoughts expressed by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, tending towards "pursuing efforts to make Western European Union a true European alliance that will enable the European Union to ensure, itself, the security of its members"¹¹ follow the same lines.

42. However, at the end of the day, while there is general agreement on the need for the European countries to acquire an identity of interests and a capability of acting together in matters of security and defence, an in-depth examination of how this might be achieved is still lacking and none of the projects referred to above provides a recipe for identifying the real difficulties and overcoming them.

10. See paragraph 17 above.

11. *Le Figaro*, 30th August 1994.

III. Organising European security – an institutional problem?

43. In practical politics, it can be observed that the constitutional approach represents the essential means of promoting Europe's security and defence identity. There is general agreement in thinking (although this conviction is not well-founded) that the harmonisation of positions and joint decision-making will be facilitated if the process of co-operation extends beyond the purely intergovernmental stage. While the Maastricht Treaty has retained the intergovernmental component and Title V on a common foreign and security policy has strengthened the hand of the presidency, it has introduced the decision-making process by qualified majority in certain cases, in particular for implementing joint action and has granted the European Commission – the main supranational component of the Union – rights of initiative and of participation. It is certain that advocates of a tighter community approach to decision-making regard the treaty in its present form merely as a stage on the road towards a true community system.

44. On the assumption that interests relating to key fields which have until now been the exclusive province of national sovereignty could be better harmonised in a European Union evolving towards a community, moves were started in the period between the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 leading up to the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, to encourage the Twelve to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security in order finally to create, with the Maastricht Treaty, a true foreign and security policy, comprising the whole range of questions relating to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy.

45. Concerning areas relating to the security dimension, the European Council stated at its Lisbon meeting on 26th and 27th June 1992 those that might, from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, give rise to joint action, namely:

- the CSCE process;
- the policy of disarmament and arms control in Europe, including confidence-building measures;
- nuclear non-proliferation issues;
- the economic aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms exports.

46. For considering the elements which will be necessary to the Union in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, the European Council, at the same meeting, formed an ad

hoc security working group within the Political Committee in accordance with Article J.8, paragraph 5, of the Maastricht Treaty. The status and tasks of this group, like those of the common foreign and security policy Political Committee, have still not been made known to the WEU Assembly. Nor does your Rapporteur know whether the WEU ministerial organs are co-operating with the aforementioned groups and to what extent. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the security working group is closely examining several areas of European security including risk assessment, the implications for European security of developments in Central and Eastern Europe, the situation in the Mediterranean and the Maghreb, disarmament and arms control. The defence implications of much of its work are undeniable.

47. In talks your Rapporteur had with the new Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Mr. Trumpf, on 13th October 1994, brought him no specific information about the new structures of the common foreign and security policy, nor about the way co-operation might work between that body, the WEU authorities and the European Commission. It appeared, however, that the new Secretariat-General of the Council considers itself to be at the same level ensuring continuity and upholding European interests in face of a strong presidency of the Union. Subsequently, the Secretary-General of the Council of the Union should be invited to explain in detail to the Political Committee the working of the security structures created within the Union.

48. However, in the context of a gradual transfer to the European Union of powers hitherto belonging to WEU as sole organisation responsible for European security and defence, we are witnessing an assignment of responsibilities in security matters to the CFSP and of those with defence implications to WEU.

49. However, in view of the fact that security and defence are closely intertwined, it is difficult to imagine that the assignment of the former to the common foreign and security policy and the latter to WEU can succeed in the long term if it is hoped to advance towards procedures allowing Europeans to reach joint positions on these matters and to act together. Suffice it to recall that the structure of the Political Division of the WEU Secretariat-General now includes a "Defence Policy" section as well as a "Politics and Planning" section, indicating that the WEU ministerial organs are aware of the importance of these close links and of the need to harmonise and co-ordinate security and defence aspects in a single institutional framework.

50. However, the governments of the Twelve preferred a different solution and decided that it fell to the Council of the European Union to examine, case by case, whether security questions discussed in the framework of the CFSP had

implications in the defence area and whether decisions should be taken on the basis of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, in other words, whether WEU should be called in ¹².

51. Admittedly, the European Union and WEU have agreed on arrangements to facilitate co-ordination of the work. However, the provisions contained in Chapter IV, Appendix IV, of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty ¹³ entitled "Relations between the Union and WEU" envisage only "mutual information" and "cross-participation" of collaborators from the two secretariats at CFSP and WEU meetings and it is hardly likely that such arrangements can resolve the fundamental problem.

52. All full members of WEU are of course represented at the Council of the Union and in the CFSP institutions and it will therefore be up to them to make sure that WEU positions are duly taken into account. But is this situation satisfactory? This, however, is not the real issue. It should be recalled first and foremost that the CFSP includes two European countries that are not prepared to become members of WEU: Ireland and Denmark. Moreover, in 1995 Austria, together with Finland, Norway and Sweden, depending on the results of the referendums to be held in the latter two countries, will become members of the European Union; Norway alone has stated its intention to apply for accession to the modified Brussels Treaty.

53. Furthermore, the two European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union (namely Turkey and Iceland) whose accession to the European Union is not to be expected in the foreseeable future are associate members of WEU, with all the afferent rights excepting those under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

54. Additionally, WEU has granted nine Central and Eastern European countries associate partnership status, offering these countries a wide range of options for co-operation and participation in the work of its Council and subsidiary organs. The European Union has, for its part, concluded Europe Agreements with only six of these countries, while agreements on a free trade area have been signed with the three Baltic countries.

55. Under such circumstances several questions arise: given that the countries which belong to the CFSP group of the European Union and those of the WEU group are not the same, the problem of a multi-speed Europe emerges in relations between these two organisations, raising an issue which has not yet surfaced in public debate.

12. See Chapter IV, Appendix I, of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.

13. Document 1412, 8th April 1994.

56. There is undeniably a nucleus in European defence and security matters – namely WEU. This nucleus includes the full member countries, in other words the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty and the countries that have acceded to the treaty. Mutual assistance obligations under this treaty and the development of joint positions in the event of a threat to peace bind the member countries together more firmly than obligations under any other European or Atlantic treaty currently in force.

57. It should therefore first be noted that, as compared with the European Union and the CFSP, WEU member countries have reached a more advanced stage of co-operation, thanks to the reactivation of WEU which has led to full application of the treaty. Moreover, WEU's intergovernmental system has not prevented its member countries from taking a large number of decisions of a political, structural and operational nature. WEU is not yet fully operational but it is making progress thanks to the homogeneity of its membership.

58. Co-operation in the CFSP framework is not yet as close or as advanced, partly because it is founded on a treaty entailing far vaguer obligations and partly because its participants include one neutral country (and soon perhaps four) and one NATO member country, Denmark, which refuses nonetheless to take part in closer co-operation in defence matters in the framework of WEU.

59. The parallelism between WEU and the CFSP and the procedures envisaged for interaction between them should not therefore act as a brake or block. WEU's political action should agree in the CFSP framework appear impossible or if CSFP decision-making is reduced to the lowest common denominator.

60. With a revision of the treaties in prospect during the intergovernmental conference in 1996, several matters therefore have to be settled: first, WEU must be made fully operational and able to act. It must then be ensured that the organisation can continue to develop its political action in autonomous fashion and according to its own rules, even after 1998. Your Rapporteur shares the opinion expressed by the French Ambassador to WEU on 29th September last in Brussels in an address given at the Centre for European Policy Studies which holds that the problem of merging WEU and the European Union as such is a secondary problem; what matters is that there should be something going on in WEU so that there is something to merge with the European Union. Any premature attempt to replace the modified Brussels Treaty or incorporate it wholly or partly into a new treaty of European Union between sixteen member states would endanger WEU "acquis" and cause the mutual obligations of the partners to

be weakened. For this reason it might be interesting to have more details of ideas, recently referred to in the United Kingdom press¹⁴, which suggest that defence policy might become the fourth pillar of the Union, which would be separate from the CFSP.

61. Third, it should be stipulated that several WEU member countries will be able to take independent political initiatives, either on WEU's own behalf or on behalf of the European Union, without first having to have received a mandate from the latter, contrary to the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Should the European Union be unable to reach agreement on an initiative from WEU, the latter should be free to forge ahead.

62. Mr. Léotard, Minister of Defence of France, stated very pertinently, during the colloquy that the Assembly organised in Paris on 17th October 1994:

“ I believe that in future WEU will gain greater credibility and political efficiency. Those who hesitate about this organisation developing a rôle of its own should realise that Europe's credibility on the international scene depends on that. ”

In developing a true joint security and defence doctrine which might be set out in a white paper on security, WEU should, as the French minister emphasised on this occasion, receive a mandate from the highest European authorities.

63. To facilitate decision-making in areas within its purview and to achieve the necessary political impetus, the WEU Council should be constituted, when necessary, as the “ European security and defence council ” at the level of heads of state and of government that might meet when necessary on the occasion of meetings of the European Council.

IV. The problems of enlarging WEU

64. To follow a coherent European security policy based on the nucleus formed by WEU, solutions must be found to problems stemming from the fact that neither the member countries of the Union and the WEU member countries, nor the European members of NATO and the members of WEU are one and the same. Before the Maastricht Treaty was concluded the WEU Council's policy on admitting new member countries was rightly based on criteria stating that enlargement should not prejudice in any way the “ acquis ”, cohesion or homogeneity of WEU but should contribute to strengthening European security. In

14. The Independent, 21st September 1994.

this context, the Assembly had immediately supported Portugal and Spain's request for accession to WEU.

65. When Turkey and Greece also made known their wish to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty (in summer 1988 and December 1988 respectively), the Assembly expressed its firm view that the two countries should first settle their bilateral disputes to avoid any weakening of WEU's internal cohesion and particularly of the scope of Article V of its treaty. However with the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, Greece was invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, while WEU had to abandon the policy referred to above and was obliged to stipulate in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 that the founding treaties of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance would not be invoked in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

66. The weakening of the scope of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will therefore become a reality once the process of ratification of the protocol of accession of Greece to WEU is completed. Moreover the continuing conflict between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the crisis that has developed recently between Greece and Albania, along with Greece's ambiguous position towards the conflict raging in former Yugoslavia, are together likely to increase WEU's difficulties in reaching agreement between the ten on a security policy.

67. As to WEU's relations with the European members of NATO that are not members of the European Union, the WEU Council had to draw the consequences of the decision it took at Maastricht to link full membership of WEU with membership of the European Union. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty considers WEU solely as an integral part of the development of the European Union without referring to the nature of its relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Conversely, declaration I of the WEU member countries appended to the Maastricht Treaty states that "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance"¹⁵.

68. However, it appears that the same importance is not being attached to this second aspect of WEU's rôle as to the first. For this reason the WEU member countries decided to invite the European members of NATO not members of the European Union to become, not full members, but associate members only of WEU. This decision specifically concerns Iceland and Turkey. To date, Iceland has not applied to become a member of the European Union but political discussion

within the country reveals that a change of heart towards the Union is in progress, influenced by the decision of the Scandinavian countries to join. If Iceland were to apply this would not present a major problem for the European Union. However the situation with Turkey is different. Although, since 1987, the latter has applied to join first the European Community, then the European Union, the prospects of its being admitted in the foreseeable future are hardly realistic. The association agreement between Turkey and the European Community dates from 1964 and the European Union is currently engaged in negotiations for establishing a customs union with Turkey in 1995.

69. Turkey's importance to European security has not lessened, despite the end of East-West confrontation and of the Soviet threat against the south-east flank of the alliance. Rather, Turkey's rôle and influence continue to grow, as evidenced by the development of its relations with Russia, with the Islamic countries bordering on Russia and in the Caucasus, with the countries of the Near and Middle East and of its Balkans policy. At the summit meeting in Istanbul that ended on 19th October 1994 between the heads of state of six Turkish-speaking republics – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – discussions included the diverse hostilities in the region, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the hope was expressed that the United Nations and the CSCE would play a more effective rôle in these matters, which incurred the irritation of Moscow¹⁶.

70. Again, under fire on account of human rights violations and/or for its handling of the Kurdish problem, Turkey is experiencing a number of difficulties in obtaining recognition as a full member of the Western European group of democracies. Additionally, the unresolved status of Cyprus (which has applied for membership of the European Union) and the other differences that still exist between Turkey and Greece continue to weigh upon the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and against Turkey's efforts to draw closer to the European Union and to WEU. A petition submitted to the President of the Assembly of WEU on 25th June 1994 by Mr. Monnot, a writer, even requests that Turkey be refused associate member status in WEU.

71. It remains to be seen whether the recent appointment of Mr. Mumtaz Soysal as Minister for Foreign Affairs should be regarded as a sign of change in Turkish policies towards the West, and if so, a change in which direction. In any event, it must be entirely in Western Europe's interest for Turkey again to become a factor of stability in the region and for it to retain as close links as possible with western security and defence structures.

15. Rapporteur's italics.

16. Le Monde, 21st October 1994.

72. Similar considerations, it would appear, led the WEU Council to agree at its Kirchberg meeting on a declaration intended to strengthen the status of WEU associate members, while stressing that this declaration did not entail any changes to the "Document on Associate Membership" adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.

73. The Council therefore decided that associate members had "full rights to nominate forces answerable to WEU", to "nominate officers to the Planning Cell" and that they should be "connected as soon as possible to the WEUCOM network for all communications concerning meetings and activities in which [they] participate". Lastly the Council invited the Assembly to "examine further the present arrangements for the participation of parliamentarians from associate member countries". All these declarations cannot meet the aspirations of Turkey which has always pressed to be admitted to full membership of WEU. The meeting on 24th June 1994 between the President of the Assembly and the President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey together with the letter sent to the President of the Assembly by two Turkish parliamentarians on 14th June 1994 testify to this.

74. It should be stated from the outset that the Assembly cannot substitute for the Council when the latter is unable to reach a clear decision. Among the member countries, opinions are divided on the substantive issue of whether membership of WEU should continue to be linked solely to membership of the European Union. The discussion embarked on in the Political Committee, and at the plenary session when Recommendation 558¹⁷ was adopted requesting the Council to "reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty", demonstrates that there was no unanimity among parliamentarians on this question either.

75. Furthermore, in accordance with the brief it was given by the Presidential Committee, the Political Committee carefully examined the Council's invitation to review the arrangements the Assembly made for the participation of parliamentarians from associate member countries on the basis of the Council's declaration further to the document on associate membership of WEU of 20th November 1992 published on 9th May 1994. The Political Committee reached the conclusion that this declaration included no factors calling for a reexamination of the arrangements agreed by the Assembly in Document 1416

17. See the report by Mr. Ferrari on WEU in the process of European Union – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 1417, 10th May 1994.

regarding the participation of parliamentarians from associate member countries.

76. However, the development of the European Union and WEU's relations with Turkey will constitute a crucial element in any European security policy and must therefore remain on the agenda; when preparing "Maastricht II", the European countries members of the European Union must know whether they wish to regard Turkey as an integral part of the area the future Union is to occupy and the WEU member countries must decide to what extent they are ready to integrate Turkey into the structures guaranteeing Europe's external security.

77. The proposal put forward by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Edouard Balladur, in his speech on 8th September 1994 to course participants at the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN)¹⁸, which inclined towards participation by the Central and Eastern European countries concerned in a European Council meeting devoted to discussion of a white paper on European security, highlights another institutional aspect of a European security policy, namely harmonisation of WEU, European Union and NATO policies towards the Central and Eastern European countries.

78. At an informal meeting of the European Union foreign affairs ministers on 11th September 1994¹⁹, the sixteen discussed the overall guidelines prepared by the German presidency, the aim of which was to bring ten Central and Eastern European countries closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures, namely the European Union, WEU and NATO. These guidelines envisage rapprochement of the countries concerned – the four Visegrad countries, Romania and Bulgaria, the three Baltic countries and Slovenia, – according to three models described below.

79. – The first option advocates parallel admission of all of the countries concerned to the three organisations.

– The second allows the possibility of separate accessions, according to the specific interests of the applicant countries.

– The third involves a stage-by-stage procedure for individual accessions over a specified period but requiring all countries involved to attain membership status of the three organisations within roughly ten years.

80. It is clear that discussions on such an approach, details of which are not known to your Rapporteur, are only at a very early stage. It should therefore be recalled that a parallel approach by

18. *Le Monde*, 9th September 1994.

19. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12th September 1994.

WEU, the Union and NATO to the Central and Eastern European countries is at the moment still a very long way off and that the objectives of this policy of convergence are far from being clearly formulated.

81. The decision taken by the WEU Council at Kirchberg, on 9th May 1994, granting the nine countries of the Forum of Consultation, namely the four Visegrad countries, Bulgaria, Romania and the three Baltic countries the status of associate partner of WEU does not concern Slovenia. The recent differences between Italy and Slovenia on minorities and other questions of neighbourliness should be settled quickly in order to avoid them having negative repercussions on questions of security and preventing this former Yugoslav Republic from also obtaining a status of associate partner in WEU. The European Union on the other hand is linked by "Europe Agreements" only to the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and Romania, while the three Baltic countries have for the time being concluded free trade agreements with the Union. However at its Corfu meeting on 26th June 1994, the European Council recalled that the goal of the Union remained the conclusion with these countries of Europe Agreements, intended to help them prepare for accession at a later date. Hence the Union is in contact with Slovenia with a view to examining terms for the conclusion of a Europe Agreement. As to NATO, the ten Central and Eastern European countries mentioned are all NACC members and have joined the partnership for peace while Lithuania has made an official application to become a full member of the Washington Treaty.

82. As far as the objectives that the three organisations concerned are pursuing in their relations with Central and Eastern Europe, only the European Union has clearly decided that associate countries that so wish may become members of the European Union as soon as they are able to fulfill the appropriate conditions. At its Corfu meeting, the European Council stated that "the subsequent implementation (of the Europe Agreements) is one of the essential conditions of membership" ²⁰.

83. NATO, on the other hand, without opening up any definite prospect of membership for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, merely stated at its summit meeting on 10th-11th January 1994 "that the alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." The communiqué continued: "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach

to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."

84. The use of the term "democratic states to our East" is liable to give rise to all kinds of conjecture particularly regarding Russia, as the recent controversy between the German and United States defence ministers on the prospects of a NATO enlargement to the East serves to demonstrate ²¹. It is now necessary to await the results of the recent steps taken by the United States in NATO in order to be able to be more specific about enlarging NATO towards Eastern Europe without including Russia ²².

85. Nor does the purpose of the WEU Council's decision to grant the nine countries participating in the WEU Forum of Consultation associate partner status in WEU emerge sufficiently clearly from the document issued at the time ²³. The reference made in this document to the decisions of the European Council and the intention, explicitly stated, of preparing the countries concerned for integration into the European Union, and, in the longer term, for their accession, is nonetheless indicative of the direction taken, but without opening up a real prospect of the accession of these countries to WEU.

86. Rather the document states that the status of associate partner of WEU does not involve any change to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the Council representatives continue to stress that it has no legal effect. Nevertheless the Council has agreed with the associate partners on a system, described in detail, which allows them limited participation in the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs. The degree of such participation and of information available to the associate partners on the activities of the organs of WEU is very variable, and the only common principle is that they may not block a decision on which consensus has been reached by the member states.

87. The complexity of the modalities of the new status established at Luxembourg is such as to offer little encouragement to the Assembly when it takes up the Council's invitation to consider the possibility of participation by associate partners in its work. In accordance with the mandate which the Presidential Committee gave the Political Committee for proposing an operative text on the adoption of an appropriate status for delegations or countries becoming associate partners before the matter is placed before the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, your Rapporteur has proceeded to reexamine these questions.

21. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12th September 1994.

22. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1994.

23. Document 1422, 22nd May 1994.

20. See Europe No. 6260, 26th June 1994.

88. Such an examination nevertheless requires clarification from the Council on several points: firstly on the date of implementation of the status. According to the Document on the Modalities of 3rd May 1994, the provisions apply from that date; however, it is stipulated that the status will officially take effect when:

- " the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers, become associate members of WEU;
- the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union. "

89. This latter condition relates to the Baltic countries. Lastly there must be clarification of the meaning of the following statement: " In the meantime the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect to the provisions of their new status ". Moreover the financial contribution arrangements arising from the participation of the associate partners in WEU activities should be made known once these are established. In this connection on 15th June 1994, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressing the plenary session of the Assembly, stated:

[This new status] " will certainly have financial consequences. One of the presidency's tasks will be to persuade the member states' governments to provide the finance for carrying out these political obligations. I also see it as the task of every member of this Assembly to urge their government, and in particular their minister of finance, to ensure that their country's financial contributions to WEU are increased in next year's budget. "

The Presidential Committee's meeting with the Permanent Council of WEU in Brussels on 27th September 1994 unfortunately provided no enlightenment on the position regarding financial contributions to the WEU budget from associate partners.

90. Moreover, account must be taken of the administrative and financial consequences of the increase in the parliamentary delegations of associate partners participating in the work of the Assembly. Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU²⁴ rightly emphasised that " any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommodation and budget. " Unfortunately, the Assembly's approaches in this regard

24. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th April 1993, Document 1360.

towards the Council have not yet led to results that might lead it to believe that it will be able to pursue its future activities stemming from a considerably enlarged membership in normal working conditions. Furthermore, on 15th June 1994, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council confirmed to the Assembly that the entry into force of this status was immediate, that meetings of the Permanent Council were being held in the presence of the new partners and that the latter would also attend the forthcoming ministerial meeting.

91. In order not to delay further the participation of parliamentarians of the states which have become associate partners of WEU, the Presidential Committee decided on 18th October 1994 to enlarge the delegations of permanent observers of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from two to four members and to invite the nine associate partner countries each to appoint an observer to the Political, Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees and to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, without prejudging the adoption of a status for the delegations of these countries. This new status, which is to be worked out in detail by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, should enable the representatives of the associate partner countries to participate in committee meetings with consultative voting rights and in plenary sessions of the Assembly without voting rights. The delegations of these countries should be constituted in conformity with the provisions in force in the Council of Europe.

92. The Bureau of the Assembly has referred to the Political Committee a petition submitted by Mr. Jarolimek, Chairman of the Committee of Free Czechs and Slovaks in the Netherlands, to the President of the Assembly, requesting him to " deny any form of membership of WEU to the Czech Republic and to the Slovak Republic, as long as they discriminate, confiscate and do not prosecute (ex) communist torturers, i.e. as long as they do not respect the basic human rights and are unjust ". Identical petitions were presented to the Assembly by Dr. Radvakova, a chemist, and Mr. Hajek, a scientist. To decide what action should be taken on these petitions, the committee requested the opinion of the Council of Europe on the grounds for them. The committee was informed that the problems referred to in these petitions had been dealt with in full by the Council of Europe. It is therefore not necessary for the Assembly of WEU to re-open a debate on these questions.

93. However, while it is necessary to define the status of the delegations from states which become associate partners of WEU, one must not lose sight of the basic task which is to define the conditions in which associate partners might subsequently be invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. If the wish is to avoid different security zones being

set up in the regions in question, it is not enough to make accession to WEU dependent merely upon membership of the European Union.

94. For the conditions fixed by the European Union for countries wishing to become members are only partly dictated by external security considerations. It is necessary therefore to examine the question more deeply to ascertain what significance and weight should be attached to security concerns as compared with other considerations, of an economic nature for example. Is it not possible to conceive of a situation that would require accelerated convergence of WEU and the associate partner countries on account of overriding security considerations, even before other conditions for entry had been met? Nowadays, the impression often is rather that security policy arguments are used as a pretext for not making progress.

95. The WEU member countries have in point of fact already overtaken the European Union in terms of their policy towards the East, without waiting for the European Union to negotiate Europe Agreements with them. The concern to ensure consistency between WEU, European Union and NATO initiatives towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which, according to the second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly²⁵, has until now guided the work of the Council's Special Working Group, is wholly justified. Nevertheless WEU cannot dispense with its own assessment of the importance of the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe for the security of Western Europe and the implications for the development of a common defence policy in its own framework. It is on the basis of such an analysis that WEU must decide to what extent convergence with its associate partners can be speeded up. WEU will furthermore have to present and sustain its conclusions to the European Union and NATO. To do so WEU may of course take into consideration studies and thinking in these two fora to ensure consistency. As to current thinking within NATO, it is worth noting the recent declaration by Mr. Alexander Vershbow, Foreign Affairs Adviser to President Clinton, stating that there is no need to wait until the Central and Eastern countries are integrated into Europe before NATO opens up to them²⁶.

V. Some suggestions for a pragmatic approach to a European security and defence policy

96. Joint assessment of risks to European security remains an essential basis for formulating a common security and defence policy. Such

assessment depends in large measure on harmonising the interests of the various member countries. To this end, it is necessary first for each country to be asked – possibly by questionnaire – to state its basic concerns and to specify the areas in which, in its opinion, a joint, multilateral approach would be required and those for which states should retain a national responsibility.

97. In a speech given the University of Leyden on 7th September 1994, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Major, observed for example that:

“ With France, Britain is one of only two nations in the Union which still have a global reach to their foreign policies. Alone in Europe, the United Kingdom is a member simultaneously of the United Nations Security Council, the Economic Summit and of the Commonwealth which now comprises one third of the world's nations. We have a deep involvement in all of the continents of the world. ”

and also quoted Hong Kong as an example, as the United Kingdom regards the territory as being solely a matter for domestic policy, an argument which will hold good only until 1997.

98. Starting from a drawing-board where each member country identified its essential interests and the areas it felt to be of most direct concern, areas of approximate convergence of interests would need to be defined. Agreement would then have to be reached, based on this definition, as to what crisis or conflict situation might be likely to affect European security and other common interests in such a way as to require joint military action. In this connection it is possible to draw on the following criteria set out in the report on the probable evolution of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) addressed to the European Council in Lisbon on 26th and 27th June 1992:

“ It is possible at this stage to list certain factors determining important common interests ...

- the geographical proximity of a given region or country;
- an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country; ”

To these criteria might be added other factors to be determined such as perception of dangers to the security of citizens of member states etc.

99. There will undoubtedly always be cases where a particular area of interest will be more important to some member countries than others. For this reason there must be agreement, so that the attitude of all member countries in any given

25. Document 1411, 5th April 1994.

26. Le Soir, 9th September 1994.

situation is governed by the principle of solidarity that must come to constitute the pillar of their co-operation. The entire modified Brussels Treaty is based on this principle, even if the most explicit reference to the "close community of interests" of the WEU member countries is in Article I which deals with economic co-operation.

100. Differences of perception have been observed in many western European countries as to the origins of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and a certain mistrust noted between European partners, in particular Paris, London and Bonn, as to their respective intentions with regard to the management of this crisis²⁷. These differences have demonstrated how much still remained to be done to establish unqualified solidarity between all the member countries.

101. There are numerous ways of reinforcing this spirit of solidarity which must permeate the political classes of the nations concerned and not simply their leaders. From this perspective, the regular exchanges of senior civil servants taking place between the foreign affairs ministries of the CFSP member countries might also be undertaken within the framework of WEU and should be extended to defence ministries and possibly even to the private offices of heads of government.

102. In political terms, the senior political figures with responsibility in WEU must be made to understand that the organisation should remain free to take initiatives in the areas of its remit when the European Union has not made an explicit request. In particular, the Council must be reminded that if political initiatives and impetus were to come from WEU, this could assist the progress of the European Union as a whole. If, however, the WEU leadership confines itself to waiting upon the outcome of deliberations in other European fora, WEU will rapidly become a secondary organisation, carrying out subordinate tasks only, like administering the police force in Mostar, for which, as the Chairmanship-in-Office observes in its Luxembourg report on Mostar, WEU is invariably dependent on the outcome of the negotiations between the European "troika" and the parties.

103. WEU has a substantial work of analysis to undertake on European security matters, extending far beyond the specific problem of a common defence policy currently being examined in the Permanent Council. This policy has been defined by the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies as: "a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member states of the European Union"²⁸. Such analysis is

essential but must be approached in a wider perspective. According to information published in the press²⁹, the WEU study concerns mainly the technical aspects, whereas Germany is believed to be preparing its own study on the more political problems, and France would also make a separate contribution. Moreover, the United Kingdom would no longer be so categorically opposed to any integration of defence under the umbrella of the European Union. The foregoing sections have already referred to the interest there is in coherence in the thinking of WEU, the European Union and NATO on enlargement to the East. WEU must therefore monitor closely progress achieved within the framework of the conference on the pact on stability, the results of which are to be presented at a second ministerial-level conference in spring 1995. To this must be added the assessment of the implications for European security of developments in Russia and the CIS countries and the consequences for the relations of (a possibly enlarged) WEU with Russia, a subject which will be dealt with in the report by Mr. Baumel. What implications might arise from the prospect of a long common border between Russia and the European Union if Finland and Norway join? In this respect, one should draw on Norway's experience of which the observer to the Political Committee had noted that it was infinitely better to establish clearly-defined borders than to create grey areas. The result of the Finnish referendum on 16th October last when the people of Finland voted by a comfortable majority in favour of the country's accession to the European Union has greatly contributed to such clarification, irrespective of the way in which Finland now decides to organise its relations with WEU.

104. What interaction is there between WEU and the European Union over the Maghreb countries and security in the Mediterranean? To what extent are WEU members able to reach agreement on actions directed towards crisis-management and peace-keeping should situations similar to those in Bosnia, Somalia or Rwanda arise? Is the co-operation that has been established between the United States, Russia and certain European countries representing the European Union with a view to establishing a peace plan for Bosnia a sign of a return to ad hoc coalitions and the balance of power politics of former years?

105. During the discussion of the working paper which your Rapporteur presented to the meeting of the committee held on 26th September 1994, one member wished the present report to contain a description of the world security situation including the Mediterranean and crisis-flashpoints on other continents. Your Rapporteur naturally recognises the importance of continuous assessment of the risks of such crises to the world and their

27. Matthias Jopp, *Europa Archiv*, 28th July 1994, No. 13-14.

28. *Institute Bulletin* No. 12, July 1994.

29. *The Independent*, 21st September 1994.

consequences for Europe's security. He would recall however that these questions were debated in particular in Recommendation 559 on European security: crisis-prevention and management, adopted by the Assembly in June 1994. In paragraphs 25 to 28 above, your Rapporteur has explained the reasons why certain parts of the reply of the Council to this recommendation cannot be accepted. However, in this reply the latter states *inter alia*: "that the regular meetings of its working groups and the item "Topical questions" on their agendas provide opportunities for regular assessment of risks and threats affecting peace, security and European interests. It goes without saying that the Council will draw the consequences of its findings when they are perceived as affecting European security".

106. In the same reply the Council states that it "can assure the Assembly that member states, through the debates taking place at all levels, always make maximum efforts to seek political consensus, especially in the event of crises where WEU is likely to play a rôle". Unfortunately this did not work in the case of Rwanda, nor in that of Somalia. And what consensus has emerged in WEU over ending the war in Bosnia which now seems set to escalate further? Admitting that WEU has virtually no political rôle whatsoever in this conflict, the address given by Mr. Voorhoeve, Defence Minister of the Netherlands, at the colloquy organised by the Assembly in Paris on 17th October 1994, was particularly interesting since it recalled WEU's responsibility in the management of international crises, referring specifically to the crises in North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, the southern Sahara, southern Sudan, Burundi, the Persian Gulf etc. Moreover he did not rule out WEU's playing a pacifying rôle on the Golan Heights in the event of a peace agreement being reached between Syria and Israel; he mentioned the rôle of Iran in central Asia and, lastly, the problems in the Caribbean and Haïti where he advocated that the WEU member countries contribute to re-establishing a police force.

107. The minister rightly recalled that the WEU member countries have neither the will nor the necessary military means to promote peace in every area of instability. In this connection he declared himself in favour of a procedure by means of which each member country should evaluate, case by case, "whether our national interests and values prompt us to get involved or stay out". However, does not the development of a European security and defence policy in fact make it necessary for joint criteria to be established in order to be able to act together?

108. A large part of the thinking on a European security policy consists in defining the new factors which, from now, characterise Europe's relations with NATO, and above all the United States,

since the development of a European security and defence identity was confirmed at the last NATO summit meeting. However it would appear – at least if information published by the press is to be believed – that the emergence of this identity and the strengthening of WEU, its means and autonomy are at present marking time³⁰. According to these reports, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom take a minimalist view of WEU. Moreover the Assembly learned only from the Council's reply to Recommendation 556 that the Permanent Council had created a new Politico-Military Working Group which has formulated a joint WEU position on the CJTF (combined joint task forces) concept, which has been introduced in the framework of the alliance consultation process. According to the last half-yearly report that the German Government transmitted to the Bundestag on WEU's activities, this position of WEU was communicated to NATO on 29th June 1994. What was the outcome? Other questions arise. How will the United States react if Europe tries to commit it to guaranteeing the security of the Central and Eastern European countries through an association with WEU? This would be as unacceptable to the United States as it would be unacceptable to Europeans to give the Americans a right of veto over the way applicant countries to the European Union should be dealt with³¹. There must therefore be close co-operation between WEU and NATO over the policy of enlargement to the East and WEU must define its thinking in this regard. According to Mr. Léotard, Minister of Defence of France, it seems inevitable that the security guarantees provided by the Brussels Treaty, on which WEU is founded, and by the Treaty of Washington in respect of NATO will be extended to the new members of the European Union³². Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, stated on 6th October 1994 that a country belonging to the Union wishing to join WEU should also be admitted to NATO³³. The proposal of the President of the Russian Federation might be recalled in this context, suggesting that a security guarantee be given jointly by NATO and Russia to the Central and Eastern European countries. These proposals have been rejected out of hand by the countries concerned, particularly Hungary and Poland. It will also be recalled that the United States has a tendency to seek to settle world-wide strategic questions through bilateral co-operation with Russia, to the detriment of Western Europe. The increasingly frequent calls for a new "transatlantic contract" reflect a growing anxiety: are the instruments of transatlantic

30. See for example *Le Monde*, 29th September 1994: article on the redistribution of rôles between Americans and Europeans within NATO.

31. Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, 12th May 1994.

32. *Le Figaro*, 30th September 1994.

33. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7th October 1994.

security created during the cold war period sufficient to meet the challenges presented by the factors that now determine international relations?

109. WEU must, furthermore, continue to develop a coherent concept of its own rôle vis-à-vis the United Nations, particularly in the context of peace-keeping and crisis-management. Recent talks between the United Nations Secretary-General and the representatives of the majority of regional organisations seem to have yielded no concrete results. It is important therefore that WEU should state its position as clearly and convincingly as possible at the United Nations, the more so as the decisions it has taken over the Petersberg missions have lent it credibility as a player. Moreover, is WEU assured of being able to speak with one voice in the Security Council where it is represented by two of its member countries? The matter needs to be looked into further. The Rapporteur would refer in this connection to Recommendation 549 and to his report on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU³⁴.

110. The same applies to WEU's relations with the CSCE, which is to hold its next ministerial conference in Budapest on 5th-6th December 1994. The WEU ministers in their Kirchberg communiqué agreed:

“ that the CSCE, as the only European and transatlantic forum covering all of Europe, must be strengthened to avoid the emergence of new divisions. To this end, they reaffirmed their governments' resolution to commit the necessary resources and to continue working for a reasonable division of labour with the CSCE giving effect to the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions developed in the 1992 Helsinki Declaration. ”

111. What will WEU's position be and what will it do to make known these intentions at the Budapest conference? Moreover, how will it react to the Russian proposals to subordinate its work to the co-ordination of the CSCE?

112. To return finally to efforts aimed at strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the instruments available to WEU for discharging its responsibilities, there will also need to be discussion of the problems described below. After the decision to reduce the term of office of the WEU Presidency to six months from 1st July 1994, the Assembly should be informed of the results of the studies by the Permanent Council on questions raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European Union and WEU which are still pending. It is interesting to note in this connection

that the study published by the Bertelsmann Foundation on Europe 96 contains a programme of reforms for the European Union that proposes extending the term of office of the presidency of the Council of the Union and the European Council by at least a year in order to ensure continuity of work. One of the systems under discussion provides, for example, for the replacement of the alphabetical rotation of the presidency by a system that would achieve a better allocation of the presidential terms between the large and small countries. Another proposal from the French Senator, Mr. Jean-François Poncet³⁵, aims at the free election of the President of the European Council for a term of two years. In any event, this problem must remain on the agenda in order to achieve a solution that increases the effectiveness of the work of the organisation. To this end, WEU's policy planning and decision-making must also be strengthened and the political section within the Secretariat-General considerably reinforced.

113. When considering the future rôle of WEU within the range of mutually reinforcing organisations, one must also consider the risk that certain institutions are developing within WEU with different levels of participation and at different speeds; inter alia the Council and its subsidiary organs can now meet as 24, 15, 13 (in the case of WEAG) or nine participant countries. In another context the following development can be observed: certain member countries reach agreement within a bilateral framework and then invite other member countries of WEU to join them. A case in point is the creation of the European corps which was originally a Franco-German initiative. There has recently been another initiative that aims to reinforce bilateral co-operation in armaments matters by setting up a Franco-German armaments agency. These last two initiatives, intended as they are to facilitate and speed up projects whose progress is running into difficulties in the framework of WEU and benefit member countries as a whole, must obviously be supported. However, one should avoid such initiatives developing independently and giving rise to structures separate from those of WEU.

VI. Implications for the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference

114. On a procedural level, it should be recalled that the European Council decided, at its meeting in Corfu on 24th and 25th June 1994, to create a “ think tank ” to prepare for the 1996 intergovernmental conference, made up of representatives of the foreign affairs ministries of member states and the President of the Commission. This is to be

34. Document 1389, 8th November 1993.

35. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19th September 1994.

chaired by a personality designated by the Spanish Government and will begin work in June 1995; the conclusion of this work will be the presentation of a report in due course to the European Council meeting at the end of 1995. It has furthermore been decided, following a German proposal, reception of which was initially somewhat unenthusiastic on the part of the majority of countries, that two representatives of the European Parliament will participate in the work of the think tank.

115. This procedure, based on the provisions of Articles N, paragraph 2 and J4, paragraph 6 of the Maastricht Treaty has as yet no equivalent in WEU, despite the fact that the declaration of the WEU member countries annexed to the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that: "WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance." It will again be noted that the WEU declaration distinguishes itself from the parallel provisions of the Maastricht Treaty by its added transatlantic dimension.

116. If WEU wishes to assert its own thinking and attitudes in the framework of the 1996 conference and to avoid being faced with a *fait accompli*, as was the case in the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, it is essential that those with responsibility should begin their analysis immediately and ensure that their conclusions are taken account of from the outset in the work of the think tank set up by the European Union.

117. Given the importance of this matter, the task of reviewing the existing provisions should be assigned to a WEU working group created exclusively for that purpose. The Permanent Council and its working groups are already too overburdened with other tasks to be able to take on this particular work. The new group should be established at the next ministerial meeting and be made up of representatives of the foreign affairs and defence ministries, the Secretariat-General and a representative of each subsidiary body. There should also be participation by the WEU Assembly in this work.

118. This "WEU think tank" must begin work in early 1995 in order to be ready to present its views in time to the European Union authorities. In view of the working relationships established between WEU and the Union, the two organisations should inform one another on the progress of their work, providing, for example, for "cross-participation" of collaborators from both secretariats at the relevant meetings of the two groups. However, care must also be taken that the WEU group keeps the NATO institutions duly informed of its studies. As to the chairmanship of the WEU think tank, this should be offered to a personality chosen in consultation with the Assembly.

119. Among the various subjects for examination, the Assembly should concentrate in particular on organising control by parliamentary representatives over a future European security and defence system, taking account of experience gained within the framework of Western European Union. It should be noted in this context that the presidents of the national parliaments meeting in Bonn on 13th September 1994 stressed the need for increased participation by national parliaments in preparing the European Union reform due in 1996³⁶.

120. It should be recalled in this connection that in several member countries of the Union, particularly France and Germany, the constitutional courts have been called upon to examine whether the Maastricht Treaty is in conformity with the national constitution. In France, the Constitutional Council clarified in its decision of 9th April 1992³⁷ that the European Parliament did not constitute a sovereign assembly with overall powers and which might contribute to the exercise of national sovereignty. In its decision of 12th October 1993³⁸ pronouncing the Maastricht Treaty in conformity with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, the Constitutional Court of Germany stipulated clearly that, in the context of European integration, the transfer of duties and powers to the European institutions should not jeopardise the legitimacy of the Bundestag and its influence on the exercise of state power in such a way as to violate the principle of democracy guaranteed by the Basic Law.

121. With a view to developing a series of models for a system of parliamentary control, the basic assumption should be that the 1996 conference will not change the system whereby decisions on questions with defence implications remain the exclusive province of national governments, meeting in WEU in an intergovernmental structure. Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, Secretary of State for the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom recently put forward the following arguments in favour of such an arrangement:

"This arrangement has a number of important advantages. The different forms of membership and relationship embodied in WEU's variable geometry – full members, associate members, associate partners and observers – are essential to accommodate the different positions and interests of current, and imminent, European Union members in the defence field. WEU's institutional separation also offers a way of getting

36. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14th September 1994.

37. Journal officiel de la République française, 11th April 1992, page 5354.

38. Zeitschrift Europäische Grundrechte, 18th October 1993, No. 17, pages 429-448.

around the practical problem of taking account of the extra-European obligations and interests of various Union members. The time is not yet ripe to try and squeeze these different interests into a single strait-jacket. This would mean either forcing states into false positions, which will prove untenable in the long run, or weakening the nature of the mutual defence commitment which lies at the heart of WEU. We have to recognise that common defence is deadly serious. It must be a matter of deeds, not words, of deep-reaching solidarity, not simply the highest common denominator – especially at a time when Europe faces new risks and new responsibilities.

...

NATO shows beyond any doubt that in the defence field intergovernmentalism is not second best; it is what works. I do not believe that any realistic observer can think that European governments are ready to delegate decisions on defence, which are ultimately decisions about the lives and deaths of their soldiers, to a supranational body or, even less likely, to majority voting.”³⁹

Under these circumstances, the Christian Democrat Group of the German Parliament’s idea of granting the European Commission the powers of a European government, while the European Parliament would have the character of a legislative body on an equal footing with the Council, the latter being called upon to take on the rôle of second chamber, cannot serve as a realistic basis of discussion for organising a defence Europe.

122. It is furthermore interesting to note that an earlier document, prepared in August 1993 by the same parliamentary group, stressed the need to consider another bicameral system based on representation of national parliaments at European level, thus forming a European Senate. In a recent article⁴⁰, Mr. Jean-François Poncet took up this concept in the following terms:

“ ... For as long as there are no political parties, trades-unions, professional associations at European level, for as long as there is no European government and opposition, democratic legitimacy must continue to be provided largely through national states. This means that the dual nature of the Union, its supranational and intergovernmental structure, must be maintained for many years to come. This is why it might be useful to create a European Senate representing the national parliaments ... ”

39. The next step for Western European Union: a British view, *The World Today*, July 1994.

40. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19th September 1994.

Therefore, to avoid the public debate running off course, it is essential very quickly to develop and present convincing models which propose that national parliamentarians are represented in a European assembly such as that of WEU, an essential instrument of democratic control for any defence organisation that continues to be based on a system of intergovernmental co-operation. For unlike the European Parliament, only the national parliaments and their committees can exercise direct control over governments and have the right to participate in the decision-making process.

123. In this instance, it would perhaps be appropriate to draw on the relevant provisions of the European Defence Community Treaty, Article 38 of which provides for “ the constitution of an Assembly of the European Defence Community, elected on a democratic basis ... based on the principle of the separation of powers and having, in particular, a two-chamber system of representation.

124. But before proceeding with these various trains of thought, one basic question must be raised: in two or three years, will the time really have come to exercise the right laid down in Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty to terminate a treaty which has only in recent years again shown its worth; would there not then be a risk of endangering the gains achieved by the reactivation of WEU and the success of all the efforts to make it operational? The more dynamic the organisation shows itself to be and the more successful its activities, the less reason there will be to call its treaty basis into question.

VII. Conclusion

125. Political Europe is currently being recreated on several fronts. The difficulty of bringing all of these together to achieve a single structure is the result, for the time being, of the lack of a clear vision in relation to several fundamental aspects essential to the final design of a coherent structure. In the first place, the outer limits and size of the structure are not clearly defined: these depend, *inter alia*, on developments in the regions bordering on Europe. Then there is the problem of the dimensions of the different buildings making up the overall structure which have to meet different requirements and accommodate inhabitants drawn from different families.

126. Under these circumstances, both flexibility and firmness are necessary. In matters concerning European security and defence, any initiative which seeks to reform the present system must be directed by a need to strengthen and improve the security of European citizens and preserve the stability of Europe. As to opinions on the rôle of WEU in the context of building a unified Europe,

the situation today is very different to the period prior to the negotiations over Maastricht I. WEU is now in a position to claim substantial gains in several areas that have been acknowledged as such and should not be jeopardised by experiments based solely on institutional considerations.

127. To avoid revised conceptions relating to the building of a Europe of security and defence leading to a weakening of that security, the Assembly and the Council should co-operate more closely in the coming years and the Assembly in particular should be more closely associated with the thinking and the results of the research and studies of the Council, its subsidiary bodies and its working groups. In the words of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressing the plenary session of our Assembly on 15th June 1994:

“ On the question of the Assembly’s participation, I have said on several occasions that it is up to the relevant presidency to ensure that the procedures are pragmatic and to consult the Assembly at an early stage of decision-making. That will also be possible within the new group set up by the Council to consider the common European defence policy to be put before the 1996 intergovernmental conference. This task is expected to take eighteen months. It will be quite possible in that period for your Assembly to offer its own input to the Council, for the Council to refer back to the presidency of the Assembly and for this to result in very effective co-operation. ”

A European security policy

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. de Puig and others

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 6 and insert:
“ Make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status; ”

Signed: de Puig, Martinez, Fassino, Benvenuti

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment agreed to).

A European security policy

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Soell

2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, before “WEU” insert “the member states of”.

Signed: Soell

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment fell).

A European security policy

AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8¹

tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ countries ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ taking into account the progress made on the way to EU membership; ”
4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ European security ” insert “ in connection with the Noordwijk preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy ”.
6. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the success of the conference on the ” and insert “ a meaningful ”.
7. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ arrange ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of that organisation; ”.
8. Leave out paragraph 13 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Blaauw

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendments 3 and 4 negatived; 5, 6 and 7 agreed to; 8 withdrawn).

A European security policy

AMENDMENT 9¹

tabled by Mr. De Decker

9. Leave out paragraph (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Signed: De Decker

Explanatory Memorandum

Only countries which are members of both NATO and the EU may become full members of WEU. To act otherwise would be tantamount to disrupting the balance provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and would prevent WEU from continuing to be the defence component of the European Union.

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment negated).

WEU's relations with Russia

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur

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APPENDIX

Maps

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *de Puig* (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. *Roseta* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alegre, Sir Andrew Bowden, MM. Caballero, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fassino, Feldmann, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit (Alternate: *Baumel*), Lord *Kirkhill*, MM. Kittelmann, *van der Linden*, *de Lipkowski*, *Müller*, Péciaux, Mrs. Prestigiacomo, MM. Puche Rodriguez, Reddemann, Rodeghiero, Rodrigues (Alternate: Mrs. *Aguiar*), Salvi, Selva, Seeuws, *Seitlinger*, *Soell*, van Velzen, Vinçon, Ward, Wintgens, Woltjer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on WEU's relations with Russia

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the importance of the Russian Federation, the main successor to the Soviet Union as a world power, for the management of international relations and in particular for the establishment of an order of stability, security and peace at world and European level;
- (ii) Gratified that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of Western Europe, but recalling nevertheless that, in terms of conventional and nuclear armaments, it is still the greatest military power in Europe and still has the largest army and the highest defence budget of all the countries of Europe;
- (iii) Recalling that after the withdrawal of the last military units from the states of Central Europe, Russia still maintains troops in at least ten member countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
- (iv) Considering that the Russian Federation is, on the one hand, at a difficult juncture in the consolidation of its internal political, economic and social situation and, on the other hand, at a stage where it is defining its rôle in the world with particular regard to its place in a new security architecture in Europe;
- (v) Convinced that such a security architecture in Europe is inconceivable without the participation of the Russian Federation in the process of concerting approaches in the various international bodies destined to strengthen confidence, stability and collective security, particularly in the framework of the CSCE, NACC and the partnership for peace;
- (vi) Also convinced that the improvement in the domestic economic situation in Russia is an important factor for strengthening political stability and security on the Eurasian continent;
- (vii) Believing it essential to consolidate democracy and respect for human rights in Russia;
- (viii) Calling consequently for the conditions to be created without delay for Russia to be associated with the work of the appropriate international organisations for economic and financial co-operation;
- (ix) Wishing relations between the Russian Federation and European authorities and countries participating in the process of European integration to be governed by the principle of partnership and co-operation;
- (x) Welcoming, therefore, the conclusion of an agreement of partnership and co-operation between the European Union and Russia;
- (xi) Believing that WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance must also improve its relations with the Russian Federation;
- (xii) Convinced that the new relations with Russia should result in a permanent system for information, dialogue and consultation and also co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest;
- (xiii) Emphasising the importance of establishing contacts and dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the two chambers of the Russian Parliament;
- (xiv) Consequently welcoming the re-establishment of a regular interparliamentary dialogue in the framework of these new relations;
- (xv) Stressing the importance of the controlled dismantlement of nuclear and chemical armaments on Russian territory and that of the CIS in conformity with the international treaties in force;
- (xvi) Concerned at the dangers that might stem from possible shortcomings in the control of Russian nuclear arms and the clandestine traffic of Russian nuclear material abroad;
- (xvii) Insisting that all activities in crisis-management and the maintenance and re-establishment of peace in crisis areas in the territory of the CIS should be conducted in conformity with the rules fixed by the United Nations and the CSCE and in co-ordination with those bodies;
- (xviii) Also wishing the appropriate western organisations and their member countries to show greater readiness in providing assistance in maintaining or re-establishing peace in the crisis areas mentioned above;

(xix) Calling the attention of the Council in particular to the consequences of present developments in the Caucasus and in the Turkish-speaking republics of the CIS for the future evolution of relations between Russia and Turkey;

(xx) Wishing WEU to start a specific dialogue with the Russian Federation for harmonising their respective concepts concerning the future development of the CSCE, particularly in the light of the summit meeting that organisation is preparing to hold in Budapest;

(xxi) Emphasising that outstanding questions between Russia and Ukraine should be settled to the satisfaction of both sides, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each one;

(xxii) Wishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to continue to develop in such a way as to become a factor of security and stability from which all its member countries might benefit;

(xxiii) Wishing all the problems of neighbourliness between Russia and the countries that have become associate partners of WEU to be resolved with due respect for the principles of international law and to the satisfaction of all the partners concerned in such a way as to increase security and stability in the regions in question;

(xxiv) Convinced that co-operation between WEU and Russia in the framework of the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty should be a prelude to the enlargement of this co-operation to other specific areas;

(xxv) Emphasising the importance of establishing close relations between the appropriate Russian research institutes in security and defence and the WEU Institute for Security Studies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Offer the Russian Federation permanent co-operation including a regular system for information, dialogue and political consultation at ministerial level and at that of the chairmanship-in-office, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the ministerial organs of WEU;
2. Determine, in co-ordination with the Russian authorities, the specific areas in which WEU might offer the Russian Federation practical co-operation that might include questions within the purview of WEAG and possibly space questions;
3. Offer its good offices to the Russian Federation:
 - (a) in its struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian nuclear material by creating a joint WEU-Russia monitoring committee;
 - (b) for implementing the destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons;
4. Offer, in co-ordination with the CSCE and using the framework of the conference on the stability pact, its good offices for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remaining between the Russian Federation and certain countries that have become associate partners of WEU and which might jeopardise security in the regions in question;
5. Encourage its Institute for Security Studies to increase its contacts and co-operation with the appropriate Russian research institutes in the field of security policy;
6. Establish with Ukraine and Belarus similar relations to those proposed in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Draft Order
on WEU's relations with Russia

The Assembly,

(i) Emphasising the importance of establishing a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the two chambers of the Russian Parliament in the framework of increasing relations between WEU and Russia;

(ii) Consequently, wishing the contacts established between the WEU Assembly and the Russian Parliament on the occasion of the visit by a delegation from this parliament to Paris from 17th to 19th October 1994 and the visit by the Political Committee to Moscow from 24th to 29th October to be followed by the establishment of regular meetings outside plenary sessions of the Assembly,

INVITES ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To take a decision allowing the exchange of views started with the two chambers of the Russian Parliament to be pursued on the basis of regular meetings, specifying the regularity and ways and means of the participation of the committees of the Assembly in such meetings;
2. To ask the President of the Assembly to transmit appropriate proposals to the Presidents of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament;
3. To study the possibilities of establishing a similar dialogue with:
 - (a) the parliamentary Assembly of the CIS;
 - (b) the Parliament of Ukraine;
 - (c) the Parliament of Belarus.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Drawing up guidelines for the development of relations between WEU and Russia might appear a very ambitious, indeed overly ambitious project. For until now sufficiently clear points of reference have been lacking which might form the basis of a specifically "WEU" policy towards a country which regards itself as the principal heir to the defunct Soviet empire, now in the midst of transformation and still searching for its identity and rôle on the international scene.

2. During the final phase of the Soviet Union's existence, initiatives by the WEU Assembly permitted the development of a regular dialogue between the Presidential Committee and the committees with a political function and representatives of the Supreme Soviet, even before the WEU ministerial organs had established their initial contacts at governmental level with the Soviet leaders. It should be recalled that this dialogue was started in April 1987 with the visit by a delegation of the Bureau of the Assembly to Moscow which had been assessed from the political point of view in the report presented to the Assembly by Mr. Pécriaux at the plenary session in autumn 1987¹. With the collapse of the Soviet Union it proved difficult, if not impossible, to resume regular parliamentary dialogue and, for a time, the attitude of the Russians to WEU seemed to waver between ignorance and indifference and a degree of mistrust.

3. However, certain recent indications would seem to suggest that the Russian authorities wish to intensify the dialogue with WEU and establish special relations with the organisation. The character of these remains to be defined, based on mutual interests that the two parties are to make known. Under the present circumstances, WEU is in point of fact the only western organisation which has no institutionalised relations with Russia. The European Union has just signed a wide-ranging partnership and co-operation agreement with that country which provides, inter alia, for political dialogue to "bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern, thus increasing security and stability;" (Article 6 of the agreement).

1. See the report on recent developments in Soviet external policy presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Pécriaux, Rapporteur, Document 1111, 15th October 1987.

4. The Atlantic Alliance has also established relations with Russia, offering the latter participation within the framework of the North Atlantic Council. Russia also decided to join the partnership for peace programme which NATO proposed at its last summit meeting to all states participating in the work of NACC and "other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme".

5. WEU has therefore several reasons for wishing to determine the aim, nature and scope of the relations which it can and should enter into with Russia. The first of these is based on WEU's calling and function as an integral part of the process of European Union and as the European pillar of NATO, which make WEU the nucleus of a European security and defence identity. In initially offering the nine Central and Eastern European countries a Forum of Consultation within WEU, then a status of association within the organisation, WEU has demonstrated in a meaningful way how it intends to shape the outlines of a European security order that includes a specific and determinate number of Central European countries – a perceptibly different concept from that chosen by NATO through NACC and the partnership for peace.

6. Russia cannot remain indifferent to WEU's approach at a time when that country is in the process of developing its own concepts in relation to a new European security order, since this approach includes the three Baltic countries that formed part of the former Soviet Union and were, until now, regarded by Russia as "near abroad" countries in spite of their refusal to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moreover, WEU's approach does not include countries like Belarus and Ukraine, or indeed Russia itself and the other CIS member countries.

7. However, there is another factor strengthening the need to establish an intensified dialogue with the Russian Federation: already with respect to the three Baltic states and Poland, which became associated partner countries of WEU, but also with the imminent enlargement of the European Union to include three Scandinavian countries and the prospects thus opened to the latter of becoming either full members or observers of WEU, the emergence is apparent of a new development whereby the European Union (and perhaps WEU) and Russia will, in the foreseeable future, become direct neighbours with a common border over 2 000 km in length.

8. However, the question is not merely limited to relations between neighbours. It is above all a matter of reaching a more specific mutual understanding of the way in which Western Europe and Russia each regards their own and the other's place, calling and rôle in the world and in the management of international problems, with the specific concern of strengthening international security and stability. Western Europe and Russia are both at a stage of redefining their rôle in the world, the first with the objective of becoming a credible player in world events on the basis of a true common policy, the second facing the challenge of once again finding a rôle that enables it to fill the vacuum left by collapse of the Soviet Union and which reflects the fact that Russia still represents one of the major world powers. However, the signals emitted by the huge geographical area occupied by the twelve of the successor countries of the Soviet Union, of which Russia is the powerhouse, are still too contradictory and too incoherent to enable a clear idea to be obtained of the direction which Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States are about to take.

9. The main purpose of the visit the Political Committee made to Moscow from 24th to 29th October 1994 was therefore to gather more detailed information on the political situation in that country, the working of the various organs of state and their co-operation and, above all, the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. The committee's various exchanges of views with the Vice-President of the Duma, the appropriate committees of the Duma, the Council of the Federation, representatives of the ministry for foreign affairs, defence and co-operation of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and also representatives of the Institute of Europe and the Institute of International Relations were most instructive. These meetings, however, also showed that many questions were still outstanding and that much remained to be done to increase reciprocal knowledge and understanding. This visit should therefore be considered as the start of a dialogue that should be pursued in a more regular manner.

II. The situation in Russia

10. Through the parliamentary elections held on 12th December 1993 and the adoption of its first democratic constitution based on a multi-party system, a market economy and civil rights, Russia has doubtless taken an important step towards democracy. The constitution rests on the principle of the separation of powers, with a very strong centralised executive power in the hands of the President, while the powers of par-

liament, which comprises two chambers, are relatively limited. However, it is still difficult to ascertain, in practice, who really governs the country. A very important question seen from the outside is who is responsible for defining its strategic policy in general and its foreign policy in particular. Is it the President alone and his minister for foreign affairs? What is the extent of parliament's influence? What rôle does the Security Council of the Federation of Russia play? The constitution is, unfortunately, unclear on these points. Even at the level of the executive, it is not easy to understand the operation of the present system where power is shared between the President and the government. What is the rôle of the army which is still deployed in the majority of Russia's neighbouring countries?

11. After the departure of the last Russian military units from Estonia, Germany and Latvia on 31st August 1994 and signature of the agreement, on 10th August 1994, between the negotiators on behalf of Moldova and Russia for the withdrawal over a period of three years of the fourteenth Russian army, stationed in East Moldova, Russia still maintains troops in Belarus (25 000-30 000), in Ukraine (approximately 17 000), in Georgia (approximately 5 000), in Armenia (approximately 9 000), in Azerbaijan (approximately 500), in Turkmenistan (approximately 15 000), in Kazakhstan (approximately 1 000), in Uzbekistan (approximately 5 000), in Kirgizstan (approximately 3 500) and in Tajikistan (approximately 24 000)².

12. However, above all, it is the uncertain future of the Russian army once repatriated inside the borders of the Russian Federation that is tending increasingly to cause problems for the country's domestic policy. During the cold war period, the Soviet army, on the strength of an offensive military doctrine, played a leading rôle; present in all the component parts of the Soviet Union and in the majority of Warsaw Pact countries, in 1989 it still numbered 4.2 million troops. On 5th May 1992, the "official birthday" of Russia's armed forces, it numbered only 2.8 million and this figure had fallen to 2.2 million in 1994. Between now and the end of the year, its number will fall to 1.9 million and then subsequently to 1.5 million³. Furthermore, the fact that the troops are available only in part due, on the one hand, to massive desertion and, on the other, because the inadequacy of logistical means and poor maintenance of equipment reduces even further the operational part of the army. Troops very rarely receive their pay on time. Conversely, the new KGB and the military

2. The situation in May 1994; figures taken from *The Economist*, 21st May 1994.

3. *Le Figaro*, 8th September 1994.

intelligence service, the GRU, have lost none of their efficiency. Furthermore, the arsenal of strategic nuclear forces is still in an excellent operational condition.

13. The crisis in government caused by the army, the substantial reduction in the defence budget, the uncertainty as to the future rôle of the armed forces in a Russia that is no longer involved in a global confrontation with a strategic adversary, have all contributed to diminishing the political and social standing of the army, inevitably causing tension and discontent among the military. Material factors are also having a negative impact. Low salaries and delays in payment, a lack of decent housing for the families of officers repatriated from abroad, especially from Germany, although the latter has financed the building of thousands of housing units in Russia, are among the factors exploited by various political elements seeking to take advantage of the anger and disappointment evident within the army.

14. A case in point is Mr. Zhirinovskiy, whose LDP party may have picked up a third of the military vote⁴; another is Mr. Aleksandr Rutskoi, the former Russian Vice-President, who at the end of May 1994 succeeded in bringing together the opposition communist and nationalist parties in a "Front for National Unity", thus strengthening an already powerful extra-parliamentary opposition. Recent rumours and discussions on the holding of parliamentary elections, which might be deferred by two years, for fear that the advocates of reform obtain an even more mediocre rating in the event of early elections, are evidence of the difficulties in which those close to President Yeltsin find themselves.

15. When the question of deferring the elections of both parliament and president was brought up during the visit by the Political Committee to Moscow in October 1994, it aroused mostly strong opposition. Mr. Karaganov, vice-director of the reputed Moscow Institute of Europe and counsellor of President Yeltsin, for example, said that the postponement of the elections would be a major blow to democracy in Russia. Once deferred, nobody would be able to say authoritatively when they would be held.

16. President Yeltsin's proposal to convene a "pan-Russian" assembly to discuss questions of local management and ways of organising the

4. However, a recent poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation among more than 650 officers in the Russian army whom they trusted revealed that support for Zhirinovskiy, if it had ever been high at all, had plummeted sharply. According to the poll, which was published in the Moscow Tribune of 28th October 1994, 70% distrust him. The highest rating (58% approval) was scored by General Lebed, Commander of the 14th army, currently stationed in the Transdniestr region of Moldova.

legislative and executive powers more rationally has further added to the confusion. Moreover, rumours abound that a real hand-to-hand struggle is being played out between the President and the government on the one hand and the defence minister and the military authorities on the other⁵. At the root of this crisis are both the revelations of fraudulent practices in the army stationed in Germany until the end of August 1994 and the dissatisfaction of the defence minister with the meagre budget allocated to him. More important still, however, is the loss of control by the political authorities to the military, who are playing an ever-increasing rôle in the foreign policy decision-making process. Such is the case in Moldova where General Lebed, Commander of the Russian army, conducts his own policy independently of the usual ministry of defence hierarchy and in Georgia, where Russian soldiers have set themselves up as defenders of Russia's geostrategic interests.

17. During its stay in Moscow, the Political Committee was able to note the keen tension between the Duma and the Russian executive, and particularly the defence minister, when the defence ministry refused to receive the committee at political level. A motion of censure against the government, only just negated by the Duma, had repercussions on the programme planned by the parliamentary authorities for the committee's visit, and it was therefore not possible to go to Sochi as planned to meet representatives of the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia. The last repercussion of this political crisis was the Russian President's dismissal on 1st November 1994 of Mr. Burlakov, First Deputy Minister of Defence and former Commander-in-Chief of Russian forces in Germany.

18. The consequences of the acquittal of Mr. Valentin Varrenmikov, former Soviet under-secretary for defence and one of the authors of the failed coup of August 1991 against the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, cannot yet be accurately assessed. It is clear nevertheless that this decision strengthens the hand of the former communists and nationalists grouped around Mr. Rutskoi, with their incessant claims for the re-establishment of the former Soviet Union.

19. Although there is no immediate prospect of conservative forces returning to power in Moscow, the political crisis is still disturbing. Even if there is temporary stability, one cannot exclude several possible scenarios that might stem from the present political crisis. Your Rapporteur would quote four:

- (i) President Yeltsin manages to retain power;

5. Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.

- (ii) Conservatives and/or nationalist forces take control;
- (iii) Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin takes over;
- (iv) a chaotic situation arises in which the army takes over.

20. As to the economic situation in the country, the indicators and information are conflicting. What is certain is that the economic crisis is continuing. The economic system is still marked by Soviet dirigism, particularly in regional industrial centres far from Moscow. Although a reduction in the inflation rate has been possible, there is as yet no prospect of a recovery in industrial production. Rather the reverse – according to recent research carried out in Moscow, industrial production has again fallen by 27% for the first half of 1994 as compared with the previous year and the Russian economy is suffering increasingly from insolvency. According to estimates by the Vienna Research Institute in October 1994⁶, 30 million Russians have incomes below the vital minimum and 9 million are unemployed. Russians have little confidence in their economy. The Institute's experts estimate the drain of capital from the country at between \$5 and \$25 billion since the collapse of the USSR. In the same period, international investment was less than \$2.7 billion.

21. The economic system is still far from perfect. Economic activity is at times completely uncontrolled. The state cannot manage adequately to protect those in the market and prevent corruption. Many would like to see a more stable system. Regrettably, those who trade on the black market seem to be the first to get rich quick. The underworld elements ("mafia racketeers") have naturally no interest in changing the status quo. The state's weakness is their strength. The more their political influence grows, the longer it takes to achieve reform and to establish the rule of law. To inspire greater confidence in the market system, it is necessary to improve and strengthen the commercial code so as to support the development of a spirit of enterprise within an orderly environment. Moreover, it is absolutely essential for the rules of commerce to be underpinned by state guarantee in order to create an attractive climate for international investment.

22. Moves to establish a private sector are underway with the implementation of the first privatisation phase. In this initial stage, the State distributed free privatisation vouchers with a face value of 10 000 roubles to all Russians. It was intended that these could be traded for company shares. An entire new class of entrepreneurs emerged at a stroke in the commercial and service sectors and then in industry. The business and ser-

vice sectors are the first to take off since they are not weighed down by the economic heritage of the old Soviet Union, as is the case, for example, with industry. The banking system still needs to be improved and the tax system modernised. The first cannot offer a system of financing that functions adequately and the second does not bring in enough revenue to a state which substantially lacks the financial means to mitigate the social consequences of radical economic reforms. Consequently, social inequality is on the increase.

23. After the first private enterprises went bankrupt on 13th July 1994, parliament, which is dominated by opponents of the reform, blocked the implementation of the second privatisation wave. In this phase of cash sales, Russians would have been able to sell their vouchers to interested investors who in turn would have been able to raise capital. The government was hoping that a new class of investors would emerge around banks and insurance or financial groups. The programme has now been referred back to the parliamentary committees concerned for review. On 19th July 1994, President Yeltsin announced that he would have recourse to a decree if parliament continued its opposition. A decree might certainly be one solution; however, given the extent of privatisation, it would be better to have the support of the majority of political forces.

24. The description of the process of transforming a planned economy into a market economy given by the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, during the annual session of the Mont Pélerin Society in Cannes⁷ is also valid for the Russian economy. The process of transformation should be a mix of spontaneity and deliberate action. In other words, the private economic activities of thousands of participants in the market should be conducted freely in an economic framework fixed by the state. Economic reconstruction is not the result of the omnipotence of one group of reformers or another. It is therefore in the interest of the West to support further the development of private business. The more private entrepreneurship emerges and the more private property rights are awarded, the higher the pressure on the Russian Government becomes to continue with economic and democratic reforms. Also, the higher the price will rise for Russia to pay, if it decides to march backwards.

25. As to the cohesion of the Russian Federation, completely contradictory signs are also observable here. There is evidence of both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in a country that covers more than three quarters of the territory of the former Soviet Union and houses more than half its population – around 148.5 million inhabitants, 81.5% of them Russian. Geographically,

6. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5th October 1994.

7. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5th October 1994.

Russia is still the largest country in the world, with a vast wealth of natural and human resources. More than 25 million Russians now live outside the borders of the Federation. Internally, Russia seems to have trouble in defining its identity, whether at national, state or international level. History offers no precise guidelines, other than the fact that Russia has never been a nation state, but has invariably conducted itself as an empire. With more than 100 nations and races, it is a multi-ethnic country which today must carve out its destiny without reference to the past. Of very recent birth, in one sense it represents the world's most modern form of state with enormous reserves of potential. Time alone can tell in which direction it will turn: towards Europe, the East or possibly in both directions at once.

26. However, a major preoccupation for its political leaders is the problem of controlling the centrifugal forces in evidence in several regions of the country. From its very foundation, the Russian Federation has suffered from a degree of disintegration and is prey to secessionist elements. The Federation of Russia has 89 parts: 21 republics, six territories, 49 regions, two cities of federal importance (Moscow and Saint Petersburg), one autonomous region and ten autonomous districts. The statutes of the parts of the Federation republics are different. For instance, the republics have a constitution which enables them to establish their own structures of power. Thus, several of them have elected a president who sometimes develops his own ideas on the future of his territory. The integrity of the country is threatened, particularly by separatist and nationalist tendencies and especially in the Caucasus, Siberia and the Urals. This phenomenon illustrates Russia's heterogeneity. Moreover, without being able to offer adequate incentives, the state can no longer manage adequately to justify to the different peoples making up the country why a strong central leadership should be retained. It is not only the prosperous regions that are beginning to demand the right to organise themselves more independently⁸. Boris Yeltsin has tried to stabilise the process by offering the separatist regions agreements granting very wide autonomy which, in his terms, would be tantamount to real federalism⁹. Tatarstan, a republic in the southern Urals, with a wealth of oil resources, was the first to conclude such an agreement on 15th February 1994, followed on 3rd August 1994 by its neighbour, the independent republic of Bachkortostan which also has oil deposits. The agreements provide for a greater autonomy in economic decision-making particularly with regard to the exploitation of petroleum resources.

8. For example, on 10th August 1990, Tatarstan asserted its sovereignty by claiming the right to exploit its own natural resources (Ramses 1992, page 53).

9. Financial Times, 4th August 1994.

27. It is perhaps understandable that a country as large as Russia should never achieve a distribution of wealth that is completely equal or development that is entirely even. However, the fact remains that the various discrepancies in supply, infrastructure and salaries can threaten the stability, peace and existence of Russia. Very often, such differences of economic and social status underlie a so-called "ethnic" conflict. Russia undoubtedly has its share of civil strife, disasters inflicting heavy losses of human life and damage to the environment¹⁰ and extreme tension between different populations, both internally and in the territories of the newly independent republics. Several cases of violent hostilities, some of them dating back to early this century and often exacerbated down the years as a result of Stalin's policy of deportation, have either erupted or are currently threatening to do so. These give rise to waves of refugees which neighbouring countries have difficulty in absorbing and which add to problems of secession.

28. Among the latter one might note in particular the Chechen rebellion under the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet airforce general who assumed the presidency in October 1991 following elections that were probably rigged. An independent Muslim republic was proclaimed on 23rd November 1991. Chechnya had been conquered by the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. Although the Russian Government decreed a state of emergency in the region at the end of 1991 and maintained an economic blockade against the self-proclaimed republic, refusing to grant it independence, it had, nevertheless, for a considerable time remained virtually silent, trying, without any real success, to establish an opposition government. It changed its policy at the end of June 1994 stating that Chechnya was the major destabilising factor in the northern Caucasus¹¹ and that the time had come to take definite decisions¹². The government did not, however, specify the content of these decisions in detail, while ruling out Russian military action. On 8th August 1994, Mr. Dudayev declared himself ready to give up power if Russia and the international community recognised the Chechen republic's independence. So far, no country has recognised the break-away republic. Moscow seems to be supporting the provisional Council, an opposition group led by businessman Oumar Avturkhanov. He is to control a part of the territory of the Chechen republic, namely the Nachteretchni district. The Chechen Government has

10. For instance, the recent oil spill in Usinsk due to poor maintenance of an oil pipeline or the catastrophic shrinking of the Aral sea, now belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, caused by the diversion by Soviet authorities of its feeder waters for irrigation purposes.

11. Le Figaro, 3rd August 1994.

12. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4th August 1994.

tried to involve Turkey in this dispute by asking President Demirel to help the Chechen people in their struggle for independence and freedom¹³. Also of note is the independence claim put forward by the national Council of the Balkars people¹⁴ and the intention Eduard Rossel, President of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma, has stated of creating an independent republic of the Urals¹⁵.

29. There are doubtless limits, both theoretical and practical, to the pursuit of the process of federalisation in Russia. Firstly, although there are over 100 nations and ethnic groupings on Russian territory, these are numerically too few to constitute a true majority among the populations of the territories they claim under the right of self-determination of peoples. Only in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Northern Ossetia, Chechnya, Tchuva-chia and Tuva do such majorities exist¹⁶. How can these autonomous republics be prevented from again splitting up in response to demands from increasingly tiny and localised nations or ethnic groupings? It seems highly dangerous to combine the right of self-determination with that to secede. The suggestion of allowing all the inhabitants of a particular region and not just those of a given ethnic grouping to vote on its independence would not resolve the problem. This would ignore the deportations and displacement of populations carried out during the years of Soviet rule, which have substantially changed the compositions of the populations of such regions.

30. We have already noted that regions with abundant resources were the first to claim independence. Others could certainly not survive without "outside" support from Russia, not necessarily confined exclusively to those without a border with a third country. Does agreement on independent federal status not therefore depend more on a local concentration of a particular people than on a traditional demarcation of a region regardless of its inhabitants? For Russia, the reply to that question may become crucial to its survival. Analysis leads to one important conclusion: Moscow today fully controls only a part of Russian territory.

III. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation

31. Following the accession to independence of fifteen republics that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a degree of difficulty in deciding whether it should regard itself as a European, an Asiatic or a Eur-

asian country or quite simply as a power with global ambitions. The determining factors will be the evolution of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the way in which Russia interprets the purpose of this grouping, initially founded on 8th December 1991 by the Minsk accord, signed by the Presidents of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

32. On 21st December 1991, eleven of the fifteen former Soviet Socialist Republics (minus the three Baltic countries and Georgia) joined the CIS, envisaged as a voluntary association of equal and sovereign states, certain of whose structures have only gradually come into being. The major trends in its development are, as is often the case on this massive continent, contradictory, oscillating between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. However, the CIS has seen a remarkable strengthening of its rôle. Initially, it seemed very weak. After its foundation in 1991, the newly-independent republics joined the commonwealth only very reluctantly. They suspected Moscow of wanting to use it as a means of restoring the position of the former Soviet Union. They themselves viewed the CIS rather as the instrument of a peaceful and controlled separation from the former USSR. Consequently, unlike Russia, which has always sought to strengthen the CIS, the other countries were reluctant when it came to concluding agreements on important matters. The member countries could not, for example, reach in-depth agreement on security questions, economic and monetary co-operation or co-ordination of their reform policies. Additionally, the eastern republics of the old Soviet Union began to evolve in an opposite direction with their projected participation in the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), originally founded by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. Turkmenistan is much sought after by Iran and Turkey. Indeed, the latter is making enthusiastic overtures to all Turkish-speaking republics and the Gagauz minority, a people of Turkish origin in southern Moldova. At the second summit meeting of the Turkish-speaking republics – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – the heads of state affirmed their intention to strengthen their relations independently of Moscow. While, admittedly, some 350 agreements have been signed under the auspices of the CIS, no important agreement has yet been signed by all the member countries. Furthermore, the republics have often taken the liberty of amending or of ignoring the decisions of the Council of presidents or of prime ministers.

33. The basic CIS document is its Charter, signed on 22nd January 1993 in Minsk by seven countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This stipulates, first, that the CIS is based on the sovereign equality of all its members and that it is not

13. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5th October 1994.

14. RFE/RL News Briefs, 20th-24th June 1994, page 2.

15. RFE/RL News Briefs, 16th-20th May, 1994, page 2.

16. Christoph Mick, Probleme des Föderalismus in Russland, Osteuropa, July 1994, page 612.

a state; nor does it include supranational elements. The Charter contains two important chapters on collective security and military co-operation and conflict-prevention between member countries; these chapters envisage the creation of a Council at heads-of-state level for defence and protection of the foreign borders of member countries. It also established a Council of Defence Ministers and a high command of the united armed forces. Finally, a CIS parliamentary Assembly was created, which sits in Saint Petersburg.

34. On several occasions, the member countries of the CIS have stated that they were prepared to create a defence union, but they have not yet concluded an agreement in this sense. Admittedly, there is the Treaty of Tashkent on collective security, but in May 1992, the treaty had been signed by only six members of the CIS: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Later, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia followed suit. When Armenia attempted to invoke it, no reaction was forthcoming from the signatory countries¹⁷. Today, the treaty, which includes an article establishing a very restrictive assistance obligation, has still not been ratified by all the parliaments of the signatory states and it has still not been signed by Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan. Moreover, the new republics, including Russia but excepting Kirgizstan, have created their own armies. They have abolished the Soviet army and replaced it by the "armed forces of the CIS" with a fairly weak joint military command and without any operational basis for the time being.

35. What are the factors that militate in favour of the evolution of the CIS and for strengthening its rôle? First, Russia has meanwhile succeeded in integrating all the new republics, with the exception of the Baltic countries, into the CIS¹⁸. Moreover, Russia has sought to make the CIS acceptable to the international community as a regional or international organisation and has requested financial support from the United Nations. The West's reluctance to become involved in the conflicts raging in the former Soviet republics, particularly in the Caucasus and Moldova, has encouraged Russia to try to assign itself a peace-keeping rôle, with or without the agreement of the United Nations, with or without the agreement of the CSCE or with the more or less willing agreement of the other members of the CIS. The fact that most of the latter refused to take part in peace-keeping operations with the Russians, in particular in Georgia or in Tajikistan, even strengthened Russia's rôle in peace-keeping in the territory of the CIS. If Russia were to succeed in convincing the international community to grant

17. Ramses 1994, page 104.

18. Moldova has never ratified the Treaty of Minsk, the founding document of the CIS, however, it participates more or less fully in CIS structures.

the CIS an identical status to that, for example, of the Organisation of African Unity, which has carried out numerous peace-keeping interventions, it would have an instrument that enabled it to conceal its international ambitions behind a respectable organisation.

36. At the institutional level, the Russian Government in January 1994 stressed the importance it attached to the CIS by creating a ministry for co-operation with its member countries. Both chambers of parliament created committees for CIS affairs – which had not existed under the previous parliament – that of the Duma also being responsible for ties with fellow countrymen. Vladimir Shumeiko, President of the Russian Federal Council and the interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS and close to President Yeltsin, requested on 29th July 1994 that co-operation between the member countries of the CIS be intensified. In his opinion, such co-operation would be followed by the creation of a confederation of CIS member states¹⁹.

37. As regards co-operation in security matters, Russia has let it be known that it would be ready to go even further. It has put forward a proposal for a military alliance that could extend nuclear cover to the newly-independent countries, specifically by grouping countries in possession of nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), but also the other CIS member countries nearest to Russia²⁰. There are reasons for fearing that Russia is increasingly succeeding in dominating the CIS, while reinforcing and restructuring it as an international organisation. Thus it will find in the latter a very useful adjunct to its international ambitions.

38. However, Russia's interest in extending its influence over its neighbours has limits. In the face of the enormous economic difficulties the new republics, particularly Belarus and Ukraine, are experiencing and reacting to a proposal for monetary union with Belarus specifically, the Russian Government made quite clear that it would not be prepared to finance their budget deficits. This astonishing fact was apparent to all before the presidential elections in Belarus and in Ukraine, when all the major opposition candidates declared themselves in favour of the re-establishment of closer relationships between their countries and Russia. For similar economic reasons, Moscow continues to oppose the entry of Tajikistan into the rouble currency area²¹. The Russian Government is therefore aware that the cost of

19. RFE/RL News Briefs, 25th-29th July 1994/1st-5th August 1994, page 10.

20. International Herald Tribune, 31st August 1994.

21. Demonstrating the struggle within the Russian authorities to agree on a coherent policy with respect to the CIS member states is President Yeltsin's harsh comment on those supporting a tough fiscal and monetary policy that so far has excluded Tajikistan from the rouble currency area. President Yeltsin strongly supported Tajikistan's wish to join the rouble zone. Financial Times, 22nd October 1994.

maintaining a traditional imperialist policy might be too heavy for the Russian people to bear. It is highly unlikely that Russia will succeed in establishing a thriving democratic state and a market economy if it continues to fritter a large part of its resources away outside the country instead of concentrating on reconstruction at home. It also seems clear that systematic destabilisation of the economies on the periphery of Russia would detract from this goal.

39. Nevertheless, efforts to create a new executive body of the CIS with the task of strengthening its economic union, possibly leading to financial union, have led to a decision by the member countries at the CIS summit meeting on 21st October 1994 to form an inter-state economic committee. The supranational body, in which Russia will control 50% of the votes while decisions are taken by an 80% vote, will be based, unlike other CIS structures presiding in Minsk, in Moscow. The ultimate goal of the committee is to create a customs union and a payments union within the CIS. However, many of the signatory states retained the right to opt out of the agreement and the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr. Vitaly Masol, immediately declared that Ukraine would not take part in the payments union²².

40. Although Russia's interest in a stable CIS currently seems limited to the desire to see it develop for its own benefit as an effective economic entity, the last summit of the CIS member countries in Moscow proved the continuation of a trend which has been visible for some time now: Moscow is making itself more and more the centre of the CIS, its ulterior motive being that in future this may lead to full reintegration of CIS territory around Moscow. Such calls come not only from Russia but also from various CIS member countries.

41. In September 1994, Russia's head of foreign intelligence, Yevgeni Primakov, published a report entitled "Russia - CIS, must the West change its approach?", in which he considered that the CIS would be the only organisation capable of avoiding nationalist, authoritarian or fundamentalist tendencies among all the members of the CIS.

42. During talks the Political Committee held in Moscow in October 1994 with Mr. Medvedev, vice-Minister for co-operation with CIS states, he and his aides supported a proposal, initially put forward by the Kazakh President Nursultan Nasarbaiev, to form a Eurasian Co-operation Council with stricter rules of adherence and stronger political and economic ties. Membership rules would also include the provision of human rights standards and the condition that member states must be free of civil war. However, they admitted

that respective plans were far from being achieved and that even Russia would have difficulties in meeting the proposed criteria.

43. The causes of CIS's evolution are still to be assessed, particularly in view of the fact that in certain CIS regions, centrifugal forces continue to present the Moscow leadership with difficult problems: for example, fighting has continued between Armenia and Azerbaijan for six years in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in western Azerbaijan whose population is roughly 80% Armenian. The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan in Armenia, which Armenia has claimed since 1987, were created by the 1921 treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The two parties to the conflict have committed atrocities which have cost thousands of lives. Today, Armenia occupies 28% of Azeri territory. Armenians living in Azerbaijan had to flee the country to Armenia while Azeris living in Armenia moved towards Azerbaijan. In December 1991, the Armenian region declared independence. Russia proposed deployment of its buffer forces, but Azerbaijan demanded that peace-keeping forces be sent that were drawn from the CSCE, particularly from the member countries of the Minsk mediators group. Azeri authorities have often accused Russia of backing Armenian forces. A Russian peace plan currently envisages independent status for Nagorno-Karabakh. The signing, on 20th September 1994, of an oil contract between Azerbaijan and a western majority oil consortium revived tension between Moscow and Baku after the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs made it known that he did not recognise the agreement²³. Clearly, Moscow wishes to keep strategic control over trade in and transportation of oil in the region.

44. Several flashpoints exist in Georgia, particularly in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions where violent hostilities broke out in 1993. Until now, only the Ajaria region has remained at peace - albeit a very uncertain peace. Russia is suspected of having for a time supported the rebel regions to put pressure on the government of President Shevardnadze. President Shevardnadze replaced the first President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1992, under highly suspicious circumstances. Mr. Gamsakhurdia had been elected President of Georgia in May 1991. Russian forces took up positions close to the River Inguri, with the go-ahead, after the event, of the United Nations, to monitor a truce between the Abkhazian secessionists and the Georgian Government²⁴. The conflicts in the Caucasus are threatening to extend to the Kuban region in the

23. *Le Monde*, 22nd September 1994.

24. On 21st July 1994, the United Nations Security Council requested the deployment of Russian forces for peace-keeping in Abkhazia.

22. *Financial Times*, 22nd October 1994.

North, which supplies Russia with a large part of its cereal consumption.

45. A bloody civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992. At the origin of this conflict was a confrontation between the representatives of the former Soviet régime and the opposition Islamic-democratic alliance, which has now taken refuge in Afghanistan. In September 1991, the opposition succeeded in taking control of the country, but was then ousted, with support from Russia and Uzbekistan, by the government of the President of the Supreme Soviet, Enomali Rakhmonov. Uzbekistan contributed to bringing the situation under control since it feared that the one million Uzbeks or so living in Tajikistan might take refuge in Uzbekistan. President Rakhmonov stands accused of subjecting the population to a highly authoritarian régime. The country is suffering from the chaotic way in which he handles economic policy. In May 1993, Tajikistan and Russia signed a friendship and co-operation treaty. The agreement included military assistance to the Rakhmonov government. Since August 1993, Russian forces with some support from troops from three CIS member countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan, have been helping the present government to protect Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan and avoid infiltration from Afghanistan. Negotiations carried out under United Nations' auspices to bring about a cease-fire between the opposing sides have been unsuccessful. The Tajiks, a people with language and cultural ties with Iran, account for roughly 60% of the population of the country.

46. In Moldova, the fourteenth Russian army, stationed in Transdnestr, in the east of the country, and led by the very General Lebed²⁵, sided with the Russian-speaking inhabitants of that area, when, in June 1992, the Moldovan Government tried to establish control over the territory by force. In September 1991, the Russian-speaking inhabitants had demanded independent status for the territory on the left bank of the River Dniestr in the east of the country (Dniestr Republic). Since 1990, skirmishes between Moldovan nationalists and Russian-speaking separatists, particularly in eastern Moldova, have become increasingly frequent. About 800 000 of the Moldovan population of 4.4 million live in the Transdnestr region. The rest of Moldova was part of Romania until the second world war. The main language there is Romanian. However, Russian- and Romanian-speaking groups live on both sides of the Dniestr river. The presence of several very important Russian military bases confers a major geostrategic interest on the region in the eyes of Russia, which is seeking to preserve a sphere of influence in the region between the Black Sea and the Balkans. The Moldovan Government is

25. See footnote 3.

demanding the withdrawal of the Russian forces, but the majority of the soldiers of the fourteenth army who come from Transdnestr are opposed to it²⁶. The agreement, signed on 10th August 1994, between the Moldovan and Russian negotiators, on the withdrawal within three years of troops stationed in eastern Moldova, where the majority of the inhabitants are Russian or Ukrainian, leaves open the question of the status of this so-called Dniestr Republic. The text of the treaty states merely that the withdrawal will be synchronised with definition of a special status for the Moldovan territory of Transdnestr²⁷. Chances to unify the split country are weak. The Moldovan Government accuses Romania of further complicating the issue, referring to Romanian declarations that deny the existence of Moldovan nationality and claim that Moldova was a part of Romania²⁸.

47. As to the Caucasus region, in 1993 Russia succeeded in obtaining the accession of Georgia and Azerbaijan to the CIS, in return for support to the governments concerned. Georgia even accepted the presence of military bases on its territory. In June 1993, the Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, after months of calls for intervention by international troops under United Nations auspices going unheeded, became so desperate that he yielded to Russian troops being stationed in order to control the border between Georgia and Abkhazia. As western nations took no interest in the issue, the United Nations Security Council decided, on 21st July 1994, to authorise Russia to keep the peace in this conflict. Moscow now hopes to obtain a similar mandate to deploy Russian peace-keeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States Government has already declared that it would not oppose this²⁹. In Georgia, in particular, Russia has succeeded, with the unwitting help of western countries not only in justifying its military presence there but also in achieving other ends³⁰: firstly, maintaining access to the Black Sea and the Georgian ports; second, accession by Georgia to the CIS and the retention of Russian military bases located on Georgian territory; third, protecting access to Armenia; fourth, stabilising its frontier with the Caucasus and, lastly, protecting the frontier between Turkey and Georgia.

48. Other neighbours of Russia are subjected to Russian political pressure by other means. The

26. In the New York Times of 24th October 1994, General Lebed said that "they were born here" and that "they will stay and call themselves the 'National Liberation Army'".

27. *Le Monde*, 12th August 1994.

28. *New York Times*, 28th October 1994.

29. *Le Figaro*, 11th August 1994.

30. Allen Lynch, *Der Einfluss des Militärs auf die Aussenpolitik Russlands*, Europa-Archiv, Folge 15/1995, pages 441-442.

Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus, have often suffered from the fact that they were economically dependent on Russia. In regard to the Black Sea Fleet and the resulting dispute with Ukraine, Russia has openly pursued an arbitrary policy towards its energy supplies.

49. The problem of managing the various conflicts on CIS territory has also influenced Russia's attitude in the framework of the discussions within the United Nations and the CSCE on the rôle of regional organisations in crisis-prevention and management and particularly as regards peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. There is, at least theoretically, a basic rule at CIS level for peace-keeping operations. This is the collective security agreement signed in Kiev in March 1992, followed, on 28th September 1993, by the Tashkent protocol on collective peace-keeping forces. However, none of the current operations quite fits in the framework of these agreements. The Kiev agreement requires that a truce be signed and that all parties to the conflict accept the deployment of buffer forces. This was not the case when CIS forces intervened on Tajikistan's frontier with Afghanistan³¹. Furthermore, the Kiev agreement only allows the use of troops of countries that are not party to the conflict. However, until now, CIS peace-keeping forces have invariably been made up of nationals of countries parties to the conflict, among them Russia³². Indeed, peace-keeping policy is, for Russia, a means of preserving its influence over neighbouring countries. It is also an instrument for justifying the presence of troops and the maintenance of military bases in several new republics.

50. The Russian Government still regards the external borders of the member countries of the CIS as Russian borders. After the attack by the Tajik Islamic opposition against a border post in August 1994, leading to the death of four Russian soldiers, the chief-of-staff of the Russian border guard units described the situation as "no longer a domestic issue for Tajikistan" but rather "a gauntlet thrown down to Russia"³³. And the Russian First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Anatoli Adamichin, has again described the Tajik-Afghan frontier as the border of both the CIS and ...Russia"³⁴.

51. In this context, Russian policy tends to promote recognition of the CIS (in which Russia feels impelled to play a driving rôle) as a United Nations regional organisation with the status des-

cribed in Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. Its recognition as such by the United Nations could make the CIS relatively independent as regards peace-keeping on its own territory, and it is not insignificant that a CIS representative participated at a meeting that the United Nations Secretary-General organised in New York in early August 1994 with representatives of regional organisations, at which were also present, inter alia, representatives of the CSCE, the European Union, WEU and NATO.

52. In a joint declaration of the ministry for foreign affairs and ministry of defence of the Federation of Russia, issued on 29th March 1994, the Russian leaders stressed that peace-keeping actions undertaken in the CIS would fully accord with:

"the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which a possibility of dealing with matters of peace-making on the basis of agreements of the states concerned not only is accepted but welcomed (Article 52 of the United Nations Charter). The only exceptions are enforcement actions, which, according to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, should be taken under the Security Council's authority. But all current peace-making operations on the territory of the former USSR do not fall under this provision, because they do not involve enforcement and are taken with the consent of all conflicting sides. The United Nations and the CSCE are informed on these operations on a regular basis.

Russia is consistently favouring the widest involvement of the United Nations and the CSCE in the settlement of conflicts in the CIS countries. There is no need, however, for any "permission" on the part of the United Nations and the CSCE to conduct peace-making operations in accordance with the abovementioned criteria, in which Russia and its neighbours take part. The operations are carried out on the basis of the sovereign rights of respective states enshrined in the United Nations Charter and do not require additional legitimisation."

53. Should any doubt remain as to whether all Russian troop activities in the crisis flashpoints in the CIS are in line with the above statements, it is for western authorities to show greater interest and greater commitment in terms of pacification of the regions in question than they have to date. It is perhaps too soon to say whether the organisation of the first joint Russian-American manoeuvres undertaken in the Urals³⁵ in a peace-

31. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping – a new task for Russian military doctrine, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1994, pages 307 - 309.

32. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping – a new task for Russian military doctrine, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1994, pages 307-309.

33. *Le Monde*, 21st/22nd August 1994.

34. *Le Monde*, 21st/22nd August 1994.

35. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3rd September 1994 and *International Herald Tribune*, 7th September 1994.

keeping framework can be regarded as the first sign of increased interest by the West in possible participation in peace missions in crisis flash-points in CIS territory. It would also be useful for Russia and Europe to enter into consultation on the division of peace-keeping rôles and tasks throughout the world; WEU would offer the most appropriate framework for this.

54. As to the attitude, rôle and rank to which Russia aspires in affairs of world policy, the country's position is not yet fully defined. Notwithstanding the infighting between the "isolationists", "neo-Eurasists" and the advocates of rapprochement with the West, it is abundantly clear that Russia is determined to play a full rôle among the international ranks of the great powers. It is therefore interested in participating in the work of all the international bodies and in strengthening any international organisation offering it maximum opportunity of being associated in the decision-making process.

55. Moreover, account has to be taken of the fact that Russia, which regards itself as the principal heir to the former Soviet Union, has still not accepted the loss of major territories – both those belonging to the Soviet Union and to the former Russian empire – a loss which has, for example, brought the western borders of Russia to within a few hundred kilometres of Moscow. As Mr. Yeltsin stressed in late June 1994, in an address to students from military academies, given in the Kremlin, Russia was a Eurasian state with security interests to protect both in Europe and in Asia. Russia could not be exempted from its political and moral responsibility in relation to the destiny of the countries and peoples which, for centuries, had marched alongside the Russian state. Of course, your Rapporteur doubts whether such an explanation can justify for instance Azerbaijan being refused the right to exploit its oil resources, in other words, to exercise its sovereignty.

56. For a long time, there have been doubts about there being a consensus in political circles in the country regarding what was in the national interest. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, President Yeltsin initially pursued a policy very much directed towards the West. However, in face of political opposition that accused him of neglecting national interests – an ill-defined concept, even by his opponents – he started to define them in a more specific manner. It is now evident, at least since the Russian-American summit meeting in September 1994, that Russia considers the former republics as being within its sphere of vital interests. Addressing the 49th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Yeltsin considered that Russia's economic and foreign policy priorities were in the countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-

pendent States³⁶. He continued that when it was a question of maintaining peace on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the main burden was the responsibility of the Russian Federation alone. The army seems to share this view and military doctrine provides for the deployment of the army in countries abroad if national security or Russian citizens are threatened.

57. The rationale of the Russian approach requires the government to support the strengthening of the CSCE and NACC, while remaining extremely aloof from NATO, opposed even to any enlargement of that organisation to include the Central and Eastern European countries. Russia's attitude to the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO has, from the outset, been ambiguous and hesitant. It initially welcomed what it considered to be a means of preventing the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to NATO. However, even though it finally signed an accession document to the partnership for peace, opinions on the usefulness of this undertaking are still hotly disputed in Moscow, and the arrangements for participation in the partnership, to which the Russians subscribed at NATO, have not even been made public.

58. Russia's thinking, recently formulated by its minister for foreign affairs, tends towards making the CSCE the main collective security organisation contributing to the maintenance of security and stability in Europe, with other organisations such as the CIS, NACC, the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO and WEU subordinate to it. To achieve this, Russia has proposed creating a management body of the CSCE of the same type as the United Nations Security Council.

59. It seems clear that these ideas and proposals have no real chance of finding favour with the majority of Russia's partners in the CSCE, as already noted at one of the recent meetings, held in Prague, of the group of senior officials of the organisation³⁷. If it appears that Russia's proposals to promote its rapprochement to European and Atlantic security and defence structures and to improve the quality of its participation in their decision-making processes have little chance of succeeding, there is a strong risk that Russia might feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be in anyone's best interest.

60. The problem of Russia's possible isolation is less acute in the area of economic co-operation at European and world level than in security matters and this requires examination, particularly in the CSCE, NATO and WEU frameworks, in order to develop guidelines according to which relations with Russia can progress towards a partner-

36. *Le Monde*, 28th September 1994.

37. *Financial Times*, 17th-18th September 1994.

ship based on information, consultative and even co-operative mechanisms. This presupposes in particular co-ordination between WEU and NATO, while taking account of the peculiarities of each of these organisations.

61. In order to achieve such an objective, it is necessary first to be aware of the political parameters and preoccupations of Russia in security matters. Such assessment should begin with a study of the Russian military doctrine adopted in November 1993 by the Russian Security Council and ratified by the President of the Russian Federation. Analysis of the provisions of this new doctrine, the published text of which is merely a summary of the fundamental principles set out in the document, and seemingly not a final text, reveals several passages deserving of attention.

62. It should be noted at the outset that the terms "vital interests of the Russian Federation" are used at least seven times in this document, without this notion being clearly defined. Thus the Russian Federation considers it essential to have armed forces to "defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the vital interests of the Russian Federation in the case of aggression against it or its allies;".

63. The document refers, inter alia, to "territorial claims by other states on the Russian Federation and its allies;" as the main sources of danger, in military terms and from without, for the Russian Federation. This may apply specifically to on-going disputes with Estonia and Latvia because of the former's territorial claims on Russia, resolution of which must be sought around the "regional tables" of the conference on the stability pact.

64. The Russian military doctrine also inveighs against the danger of "suppression of rights, freedoms and legitimate interest of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign countries", which can be applied not only to the problems of Russian-speaking nationals in Estonia and Latvia, but also in other "near abroad" countries where approximately 25 million Russian nationals live.

65. One crucial point is the severe criticism of any "expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of military security of the Russian Federation". It should be recalled in this connection that Russia continues to regard NATO as a military bloc and is therefore not in favour of an enlargement of this organisation to the East which would exclude Russia. Russia does not, however, take a negative position on enlargement of the European Union to include the Central and Eastern European countries, but it is more ambiguous when it comes to enlargement of WEU.

66. It should be recalled in this connection that when WEU granted the nine Central and Eastern European countries a status of association, the

Russian minister for foreign affairs issued a declaration to the press on 12th May 1994 to the effect that this decision by WEU:

"... cannot be evaluated in a one-dimensional fashion. We see this as an attempt to find some new form of military and political co-operation within a defined area of Europe. This is in contradiction with the need to establish a truly pan-European system of security and stability. It is wrong to bank on co-operation where there is no place for a country like Russia. If this trend is confirmed, it will carry with it the danger of creating artificial barriers, of a new division of Europe.

We are in favour of another way, one based on the principles of a truly broad co-operation between all European states. We are in favour of WEU becoming an in-prospect component of pan-European security structures under the auspices of the CSCE. We wish to stress once again Russia's earnest interest in developing constructive dialogue and practical co-operation with WEU and its member states."

67. The contacts pursued on this subject in the meantime between the representatives of Europe and Russia seem to indicate that the latter might accept a gradual convergence between the countries in question and WEU on condition that this is not a pretext for bringing them into NATO by the back door.

68. Among the other sources of concern can be counted the dangers resulting from "the increase in contingents deployed on the borders of the Russian Federation to such a level as to destroy the established balance of forces" and "the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of states bordering on Russia (if not linked to peace-enforcement or peace-keeping measures in conformity with a decision of the United Nations Security Council or a regional collective security organisation with the agreement of the Russian Federation)". It will be recalled that Russia had argued in this connection that any deployment of NATO forces in the territories of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact "2 + 4" treaty on final settlement of the German question which prohibits NATO forces being stationed in the territory of the former GDR without authorisation from the German Government.

69. The significance must also be evaluated of the Russian military doctrine as regards the use of nuclear weapons and the use of Russian armed forces in the event of attack against Russian citizens, a large number of whom live abroad.

70. Moreover, a large number of other questions will need to be clarified in the framework of a more intensive dialogue between the western authorities and the Russian leadership; these

include, first and foremost, the importance that Russia attaches to its relations with the United States, which has provided it with vital help, through a trilateral agreement, in resolving the problems of the military denuclearisation of Ukraine, a country that is still Russia's most important and difficult partner. Russian policy towards Ukraine is somewhat less than transparent to a western observer and the future evolution of Russian policies towards the Baltic countries is equally uncertain.

71. Many experts believe Russia's conduct towards Belarus, and in particular, Ukraine, reveals the imperialist or non-imperialist nature of Russian policy. Regarding the latter, which is a very important factor in Russian history, Russians on the whole have difficulty in realising that this territory where they find their roots and origins can become an independent and foreign state. It is therefore necessary to look closely at the Russian attitude towards the questions of the Black Sea Fleet, the autonomy of Crimea or the linking up of the eastern part of Ukraine, where the majority of the population is Russian and where the new President of Ukraine, Leonid Kutchma, obtained the most votes.

72. Regarding relations between Russia and the United States, in recent months a tacit agreement seems to have taken shape between the two countries, in particular at the last American/Russian meeting, on their respective zones of influence in the CIS, Latin America and the Caribbean. European countries, and in particular WEU, should analyse this tendency very carefully and prepare a response because inaction by Europe might encourage the idea in Russia that only the United States is a political partner of equal standing. Russian/American domination would then be inevitable.

73. Because of the conflicts in the Caucasus, Russia requested that the provisions of the CFE Treaty concerning deployment of troops on the southern flank should be amended; however, another major question remains outstanding, namely, how Russia intends in future to use its enclave in the Kaliningrad region, which it has declared a special defence zone, causing particular concern to the Baltic countries, primarily Lithuania as a transit country, and to Poland.

74. For Poland and, even more, for Lithuania, the question of an agreement with Russia on military transit to and from its Kaliningrad enclave is serious cause for concern about their national security³⁸. If asked to monitor arrangements for this transit, the WEU Council would have to take such a proposal very seriously. It should be recalled that WEU had already shown its ability in such matters with its contribution to ensure res-

pect for the resolution of the United Nations Security Council on the embargo on the Danube. Regarding relations between the Baltic countries and Russia, it should also be noted that with the Skundra radar station, Russia maintains a presence in Latvia although its troops left the country on 31st August 1994. Some territorial questions still remain to be resolved between Russia and Estonia.

75. Another subject of prime importance is Russia's rôle in relation to attempts at international level to find a solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, where Russia has played such an active part that it is inconceivable that this conflict can be resolved without its involvement. This is bound to have an effect on Russia's ambitions as regards settlement of future conflicts of the same type.

76. As to Russian policy towards the defence industry and armaments production and export, whereas concerns were previously concentrated on the conversion of military assets to civil use, it would appear that a new policy has since been adopted directed towards increasing exports, a policy which, according to Mr. Kozyrev, constitutes an essential component of Russia's foreign policy. Russia has some reason for concern when it sees the countries of the Visegrad Group and several other countries of Central and Eastern Europe turn towards NATO for their military procurement. Indeed, Russia has already lost a very large part of the armaments market.

77. The military-industrial complex including the Russian nuclear industry, is in a period of great change. This time of uncertainty in an industrial sector that was a major stake in the economic policy of the former Soviet Union is a threat to world security. First, it is increasing the danger of a black market in nuclear and military equipment. WEU should perhaps look more closely at this problem.

78. Regarding Russian commitments towards Asia, particular note should be taken of the arrangement recently reached with China with the aim of establishing a new partnership, one of the essential elements of which is the decision by the two countries to cease training their missiles on the other's territory. Relations with Japan are still difficult because of the unresolved problem of the Kuril islands, however, it is apparent that Russia is seeking to develop productive relations with several Asian partners, among which the ASEAN countries, and specifically with India, to which it provides aid, particularly in the area of ballistic missile production technology – regularly giving rise to negative reactions on the part of the United States. The impression is, however, that the centre of gravity of Russian policy remains Europe and the United States, which opens wide the door to the development of concepts for intensifying dialogue with Russia.

38. Atlantic News, 2659, 5th October 1994.

**IV. Some guidelines
for the development of relations between WEU
and the Russian Federation**

79. At present, matters are still at the stage of declarations of intent. Thus the communiqué of the WEU Council of Ministers, issued in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, states that "ministers, in the context of the growing rôle of WEU in promoting peace, security and stability in Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues of common concern between WEU and Russia." Given the very meagre substance of this declaration, the Permanent Council in Brussels should be requested to give clarification. In particular, information should be given on the content of recent contacts between the WEU Secretary-General and the Russian Embassy in Brussels and/or on other contacts between WEU and the Russian authorities.

80. On the Russian side, several signs denoting an increasing interest by the authorities of that country in WEU are observable. First, representatives of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament participated in the colloquy organised by the Assembly on 17th October 1994 and then met with the Political, Defence and Presidential Committees in Paris. Moreover, the participation of a delegation of Russian parliamentarians at the next Assembly session seems virtually certain.

81. Regarding the policy of the Russian Government, the Russian Embassy has recently provided information about a document defining that country's policy towards WEU. This document, which would appear to have been approved by the Russian Head of State on 9th June 1994, may be summarised as follows:

Russia's aims would appear to be:

- (i) to establish special partnership relations between Russia and WEU, the objective being to synchronise co-operation with WEU and the development of relations between Russia and the European Union in economic and political matters. It is not a matter of replicating the status of the associate partner countries of WEU but of a stable partnership with Western Europe in political and military matters;
- (ii) to give more regular form to Russia's contacts with WEU through meetings between Russian foreign affairs and defence ministers and the Secretariat-General and the ministers of the countries holding the Presidency of that organisation;
- (iii) to pursue further the institutionalisation of a consultation mechanism bet-

ween Russia and WEU, parallel to that existing between Russia and the European Union. Such consultations would concern current problems relating to European and international security. A start could be made with discussions on peace-keeping matters, the Yugoslav crisis and the pact on stability in Europe. Moreover, possibilities might be raised of co-operation with Western Europe on defence matters, particularly co-operation on tactical missile defence;

- (iv) bearing in mind that the WEU Assembly plays an important part in defining the future evolution of the Union, to contribute to developing stable links between the Russian Federal Assembly and the WEU Assembly;
- (v) to establish contacts between Ros Voorongenie (the Institute assigned responsibility by the presidency for studying the problem of arms sales, chaired by General Chaposnikov) and WEAG;
- (vi) to take measures towards establishing co-operation, on a commercial basis, between the Torrejón Satellite Centre and the Russian ministry of defence and other bodies working in this area;
- (vii) to develop exchanges, including joint events, between Russian scientific centres and the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

82. It goes without saying that all of these suggestions should be examined with particular care. A basic factor of note, it would appear that the Russian use of the term "partnership" is entirely in the sense WEU would wish. The vital interest which the establishment of relations with Russia should present for WEU lies in the setting up of a regular political dialogue the purpose of which must be to exchange information in order to improve transparency and establish a climate of confidence.

83. The WEU approach is determined by the organisation's rôle as an integral part of the development of the European Union and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its first objective must be confidence-building and the avoidance of a feeling of isolation on the part of the Russians.

84. As to the nature of the dialogue, a system of mutual information must first be established which might develop into one of consultation and even – depending on how matters progress – move towards co-operation in certain specific areas to be determined. A decision must also be taken in this context as to whether it is hoped to

the same degree to establish relations with Ukraine, Belarus and other CIS countries. Subjects for inclusion in the framework of the dialogue are those falling within WEU's area of responsibility on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty and this approach should be in parallel with that of the European Union, and complementary to the relations which NATO is preparing to develop with Russia.

85. One of the main objectives of this dialogue with Russia should be to allay Russian fears by an assurance to the effect that the Central and Eastern European countries' moving closer to WEU and the enlargement of the European Union to the Scandinavian countries and Austria do not constitute any danger whatsoever for Russia's own interests and will not have the effect of establishing new demarcation lines across Eastern Europe. In fact, it should be made clear to the Russian side that stable and reliable political conditions in Eastern and Central Europe contribute to Russian security and are therefore in its own interest.

86. In order to achieve this, it would be useful to support every effort tending to give Russia the widest possible participation in decision-making in other forums; furthermore, the proposals Russia has put forward for the transformation of the CSCE should not be rejected out of hand, but should be the subject of consultations on the basis of counter-proposals developed in Western Europe, WEU having an important contribution to make in this area.

87. The Russian proposals to discuss peace-keeping matters, the Yugoslav crisis and the stability pact seem entirely acceptable, but should be supplemented by other subjects for discussion, for example, joint risk assessment, disarmament, the problems of dismantling chemical arsenals in Russia, the proliferation of nuclear material, armaments export policy, etc.

88. It should not be forgotten that in all the more specific areas proposed by Russia, such as for example anti-missile defence co-operation, co-operation with WEAG and the Torrejón Satellite Centre, a large part of this co-operation still takes place in WEU within fairly restricted frameworks, from which a certain number of associate or observer countries are excluded. It is therefore necessary to avoid giving Russia a more privileged position than WEU observer or associate partner countries. It should be recalled, however, that technical co-operation between WEU and Russia already exists in the framework of the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. The WEU Council should consider if, and to what extent, bilateral co-operation of certain member countries with Russia might be developed in the area of defence equipment and the defence industry so as to offer it co-operation specifically in areas where WEU has developed initiatives.

89. The Russian proposal on the organisation of exchanges and joint events involving Russian research institutes, many of which are extremely prestigious, and the WEU Institute for Security Studies, seems especially useful and should be very warmly welcomed.

90. Regarding the modalities of the dialogue, consideration should be given as to how institutionalised it should be. It will be advisable, for various reasons, not to seek to make it too formal in order to retain a certain freedom of action and initiative, as circumstances demand. From another point of view, it is important not to give the Russians the impression that they are being held at a distance; a degree of institutionalisation could therefore be useful, both at parliamentary level and in intergovernmental relations. Within the framework of the European Union's agreement with Russia, it has been decided to create a "parliamentary co-operation committee" which would determine the frequency of its own meetings. There are also provisions for holding summit meetings twice yearly between the President of the Union and the Russian President, and for the creation of a co-operation council which will meet annually. There will also be regular meetings of top civil servants.

91. The Russian proposals dealing with the institutionalisation of the mechanism of consultation between Russia and WEU should be studied carefully, however, at the present stage the time for reaching definitive conclusions does not as yet seem ripe. However, it would appear essential at the very least to establish regular meetings between the Russian Parliament and the WEU Assembly.

V. Conclusions

92. The Political Committee's impressions during its recent visit to Russia are varied: on the one hand it heard Mr. Churkin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, express the conviction that the 21st century would be Russia's century. Again, it was struck by the silence among the students of the Institute for International Relations in Moscow when a member of the committee asked them for their views on the future evolution of Russia and the CIS as a whole.

93. Furthermore, its meetings with the various bodies revealed that Russians still knew very little about the rôle and duties of WEU and its Assembly in the European and transatlantic framework. The feelings that emerged from most of the meetings were fear of isolation and being sidelined by the European institutions, persistent mistrust of NATO and hostility to the enlargement of NATO towards Central Europe and the wish to make itself better known in the West.

94. Reverting to more specific questions, one must take very seriously the information provided by Russian parliamentarians on the difficulties of the Russian authorities, despite their goodwill, in tackling the destruction of enormous arsenals of chemical weapons. In the framework of the development of relations between WEU and Russia, the Council should examine the question of the extent to which its member countries might offer the Russian authorities their assistance in this matter. Furthermore, it appears that several member countries of WEU have concluded or are


negotiating bilateral agreements with Russia in various areas of military co-operation, although the Assembly has not been informed of this. It would be essential for the WEU Council to ensure co-ordination between these various initiatives and keep the Assembly informed. Any strengthening of relations between WEU and Russia should replace the lack of knowledge by information, mistrust by confidence and the feeling of isolation on the Russian side by the building of a European security architecture in which Russia might find a place commensurate with its importance.

APPENDIX

Maps ³⁹



39. Keesing's, 1994, page 39969 (Russia) and the Economist, 6th August 1994 (Caucasus).



*Draft supplementary budget
of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1995 **

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. At the time of the presentation of the draft budget for the financial year 1995, your Rapporteur stressed that Greece's accession to WEU and the creation of specific statuses for associate members, associate partners and observers would imply the adaptation of the facilities available to the Assembly. At successive meetings, initially at the level of officials (on 19th July and 1st September 1994) and then between a delegation of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and a representative of the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (on 26th September 1994) various solutions were examined and proposals agreed. The Chairman of the Assembly subsequently informed the Permanent Council (on 27th September 1994) that in view of the Council's invitation to the Assembly in its Kirchberg declaration and taking the agreed proposals as a starting point, a supplementary budget for 1995 would prove essential. These proposals were ratified in their entirety at the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 27th September 1994.

2. In accordance with these guidelines, the draft supplementary budget submitted to you sets out the needs of the Assembly arising from the accession of Greece and the reception of associate members, associate partners and observer countries in the Assembly of Western European Union. These proposals take account of the limited and ad-hoc nature of certain solutions retained in the agreement ratified on 26th/27th September 1994, dealing in particular with placing at the Assembly's disposal certain 2nd and 3rd floor premises, either permanently (Office 317 on the 2nd floor) or on a temporary and occasional basis (access to the reading room and library of the Institute during sessions). The budgetary requirements deriving from this agreement are grouped under two items:

* See 10th sitting, 30th November 1994 (previous question, Document 1447, agreed to).

1. Adopted unanimously by the Presidential Committee on 3rd November and by the committee on 4th November 1994.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Alternate: *Lord Mackie of Benshie*) (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, *Büchler*, Curto, Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell, Lauricella, Leers, Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez, MM. *Pinto*, Regenwetter, Scaglioso, Thissen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

A – Accession of Greece

B – Arrangements in the chamber

making a distinction in each case between sums requested by way of ordinary and extraordinary expenditure. In view of the temporary and ad hoc nature of the points of agreement reached with the Council for the use of the Institute's premises, no provision has been made in this supplementary budget for additional expenditure for furnishing and equipping these two areas. The area occupied in the past by the telephone exchange operators will be furnished from existing stock, pending a decision on its final allocation.

The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure refers in the first case, to current operating expenses which will also affect the budgets of future financial years; in the second, to once only investment expenditure. Analysis of the amounts provided for under each of the two items is therefore presented separately in the draft supplementary budget for 1995.

II. A – Accession of Greece

3. To enable the Greek Delegation to participate in the work of the Assembly in conditions comparable to those of the other delegations of member states, it will be necessary to broaden the range of languages used in the Assembly and to furnish and equip the second floor office to be made available to the Greek delegation (see A/WEU/BA (94) 6 Appendix V).

(a) Ordinary expenditure

4. As already announced in the draft budgets of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial years 1994 (Document 1383) and 1995 (Document 1429), Greece's accession to WEU has made it necessary to strengthen services organised for the sessions, namely:

(a) Interpretation services: for this service – since Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly provides that the Office of the Clerk must provide simultaneous interpretation of speeches made in the official languages of the member states into the other official languages – simultaneous interpretation must be provided from eight and no longer seven languages. This means recruiting four Greek interpreters for the new Greek team. The sums necessary for this requirement can be estimated at around F 242 000 at present salary scales.

(b) Stenographic services: to organise this service two Greek verbatim reporters are required. The amount necessary is estimated at F 81 000 at present salary scales.

(c) Translation service: the translation team must be strengthened by recruiting a reviser and translator from Greek to both English and French. The necessary additional amount involved is F 61 000 at present salary scales.

5. Overall the amounts necessary for strengthening the three abovementioned services, totalling F 384 000, have been included under sub-head 6: Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly of Head II of the budget: Temporary staff.

6. An additional sum of F 116 000 should be included under sub-head 7: Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions, of Head II of the budget: Temporary staff. This should cover the additional cost of recruiting a third interpreter in each of the two booths in use during committee meetings to provide simultaneous interpretation into French and English. Rule 21 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly states: "Speeches in committee may be made in the official languages of member states. The secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpretation of these speeches into French and English."

7. The recruitment of temporary staff mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 will also imply the inclusion in sub-head 9: Social charges, of budget Head II: Temporary staff, of a further sum of F 31 000 for social charges.

8. The considerations set out in paragraph 3 (a) above also serve to justify the inclusion under sub-head 12: Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions, of budget Head III: Expenditure on premises and equipment, of the operating budget of a further sum of F 80 000. This amount is to cover the cost of temporarily connecting an eighth booth in room B to the seven booths in room C, and equipping it with audio and video facilities, so as to be able to use it during sessions, on the assumption, still to be tested in practice, that the booths in the meeting rooms would be used for simultaneous interpretation of the debates in plenary sessions of the Assembly, in order to make additional seats available in the gallery.

9. Finally these considerations also serve to justify the inclusion under sub-head 30: Expenses for political groups, of budget Head V: Other expenditure of a sum of F 35 500. The Greek delegation will in fact have 14 members (7 representatives and 7 substitutes).

10. A: [Accession of Greece – ordinary expenditure] thus shows additional ordinary expenditure of F 648 500.

(b) Extraordinary expenditure

11. The considerations set out in paragraph 3 (a) above serve to justify the inclusion under sub-head 15: Purchase or repair of office equipment, of budget Head III, of a sum of F 20 000 to furnish and equip the second-floor office to be allocated to the Greek Delegation.

12. Similarly the Greek verbatim reporters and the delegation office will probably have to be provided with computer equipment. Therefore a sum of F 30 000 for the purchase of three stand-alone microcomputers with appropriate keyboards and software packages, two printers, cabling and a printer sharing device must be included under sub-head 16: Purchase of reprographic and other office equipment.

13. In total A: [Accession of Greece] shows an additional sum of F 698 500 in respect of ordinary and extraordinary expenditure.

III. B – Arrangements in the chamber

14. In response to encouragement from the Council of Ministers, the Assembly is preparing to receive a large number of parliamentarians from very many non member countries, with different statuses and voting rights in various Assembly bodies. Their arrival poses major problems of accommodation, particularly in the chamber, because the number of delegates will very considerably exceed the 228 places available. Until now, each representative had, as is normal in continental parliamentary assemblies, his or her own specific seat. This enabled the President of the Assembly to ensure that the debates progressed smoothly since he was able to identify without difficulty each of the parliamentarians present according to position and each parliamentarian was guaranteed his or her own seat.

15. The reception of numerous delegates in a chamber which can no longer guarantee the principle of “one delegate, one seat” makes it necessary to manage the available space more flexibly. After study and reflection and drawing on experience on the spot in international, national or regional assemblies, electronic methods have proved to be the only effective way of managing the situation. The solution advocated, moreover, recalls in some measure that employed by the WEU Council which involves the permanent installation of an electronic system enabling the President of the Assembly:

- (i) to identify each representative rapidly and correctly wherever he or she is seated in the chamber;
- (ii) to identify each representative, wherever he or she is seated in chamber by a badge, to be inserted in the machine of the seat he or she occupies;
- (iii) to be aware of representatives' intentions to speak and thus be able to draw up a list in the order they will be called upon to speak;
- (iv) to be able to count with absolute certainty, each representative's vote and in particular to take into account the different types of votes cast;
- (v) to record and display in the two official languages the voting results and other messages as necessary, quickly and unambiguously.

16. As the chamber in which this facility should be installed belongs to the French Economic and Social Council, these arrangements will require its agreement in principle, and, if the installation is to be permanent, account must be taken of the particular working methods of that assembly. In this event also, one might envisage the CES sharing part of the cost. Nevertheless, no formal commitment has been given at this stage by the CES. In view of the time needed to obtain this agreement, draw up the final specifications and negotiate the breakdown of costs and, finally, the cumbersome nature of budget procedures on both sides, it has been necessary to deal with all of these aspects at one and the same time.

17. In order to obtain facts for examination, SATI has been asked, on the basis of its experience, to provide an initial estimate of the possible cost of such an installation. The figures which follow are based on this estimate and are submitted, subject to the usual reservations, at the express request of the Budget and Organisation Committee of the Council.

18. A distinction can be made, as in the case of the accession of Greece, between costs which will continue to affect the budgets in future years and once only investments. An initial breakdown of the estimates gives the following information which all relates to sub-head 12 of the Assembly's budget: Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions, with the exception of expenditure on staff training which relates to new sub-head 29: Staff training.

(a) Ordinary expenditure

19. Within this category of expenditure might be included expenditure basically on consumables such as the purchase of badges and a machine (or the cost of an external service) for programming the badges. A sum of F 53 000 per session should therefore be included, *ie* F 106 000 per annum for this sub-head.

(b) Extraordinary expenditure

20. Three types of expenditure fall within this category which should be included under sub-head 12 referred to above:

- (i) Central management unit: this unit will be the heart of the installation. It will carry the information on each representative: status, voting rights, country, necessary to identify him or her to the system and run the installation: frontal calculating machine, microcomputer, software, RS 485 interfaces, group distributors, power supplies – F 295 000;
- (ii) Chamber equipment: The equipment will comprise (a) a terminal installed on the presidential tribune giving the President all the information necessary to allow him to chair the proceedings with the help of his assistants: *i.e.* identify representatives wherever they may be seated, determine the order in which they are to speak, communicate with individual representatives through their personal display units; (b) individual units, installed at the seats in the chamber, for use by the representatives: an optical reader to read the badge inserted by the occupant of the seat; a microphone enabling him or her to speak while standing, buttons to ask for the floor and switch the microphone on and off; buttons for voting, including for the small display unit referred to above, and for use also in communicating with the central management unit and for user assistance; a large digital display unit installed above the tribune and visible to all present, showing voting results and messages for general information. The individual units run off an internal microprocessor and are equipped with I/O ports, an RS 485 link, and cabling – F 2 105 000;
- (iii) Installation: This equipment needs to be fitted to the existing installation in the chamber, cabled, adjusted, tested and delivered with fitness certificate – F 392 000.

21. Furthermore there should be provision for staff training expenses (sub-head 29) in the use of new technologies and badge programming and management: 3 people for 9 days or F 162 000.

22. It might be estimated that the total extraordinary expenditure will not exceed F 3 364 000.

23. Total expenditure attributable to fitting out the chamber can therefore be estimated at F 3 470 000.

24. In short, the supplementary budget, as compared with the ordinary draft budget for 1995, includes the following amounts:

Heads and Sub-Heads	Budget 1995 (proposed)	Supplementary budget 1995	Budget 1995 (revised)
<i>Part I : Operating budget</i>			
Section A Expenditure			
<i>A – Accession of Greece</i>			
Ordinary expenditure.....	–	648 500	
Extraordinary expenditure.....	–	50 000	
<i>Total : Accession of Greece</i>	–	698 500	
<i>B – Arrangements in the chamber</i>			
Ordinary expenditure.....	–	106 000	
Extraordinary expenditure.....	–	3 364 000	
<i>Total: Arrangements in the chamber</i>	–	3 470 000	–
Total expenditure	31 315 000	4 168 500	35 483 500
Section B – Receipts	95 000	–	95 000
Net total operating budget	31 220 000	4 168 500	35 388 500
<i>Part II : Pensions budget</i>			
Section A – Expenditure	5 258 000	–	5 258 000
Section B – Receipts	1 037 500	–	1 037 500
Net total of pensions budget.....	4 220 500	–	4 220 500
GRAND NET TOTAL	35 440 500	4 168 500	39 609 000

Part I – Operating budget

Heads and Sub-Heads	Budget for 1995	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1995 (revised)
SECTION A – EXPENDITURE			
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	13 768 500	–	13 768 500
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances	3 224 500	–	3 224 500
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges	2 665 500	–	2 665 500
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	238 500	–	238 500
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	14 000	–	14 000
TOTAL	19 911 000	–	19 911 000
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly	3 086 500	384 000	3 470 500
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	828 000	116 000	944 000
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	75 000	–	75 000
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges	187 000	31 000	218 000
TOTAL	4 176 500	531 000	4 707 500
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	599 000	–	599 000
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	–	10 000
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	809 000	3 388 000	4 197 000
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	60 000	–	60 000
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	20 000	–	20 000
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	40 000	20 000	60 000
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reprographic and other office equipment	9 000	30 000	39 000
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reprographic and other equipment	600 000	–	600 000
TOTAL	2 147 000	3 438 000	5 585 000

Part I – Operating budget

Heads and Sub-Heads	Budget for 1995	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1995 (revised)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone fax and transport of documents.....	853 000	–	853 000
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed paper and other office supplies.....	237 000	–	237 000
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 100 000	–	1 100 000
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	75 000	–	75 000
Sub-Head 22 – Official car	85 000	–	85 000
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges.....	500	–	500
TOTAL.....	2 350 500	–	2 350 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs.....	346 000	–	346 000
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation.....	404 000	–	404 000
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions.....	5 000	–	5 000
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk.....	830 000	–	830 000
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	60 000	–	60 000
Sub-Head 29 – Expenses for staff training	10 000	162 000	172 000
Sub-Head 30 – Expenditure on information.....	510 000	–	510 000
Sub-Head 31 – Expenses for political groups	534 000	37 500	571 500
Sub-Head 32 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for.....	3 000	–	3 000
Sub-Head 33 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	–	28 000
TOTAL.....	2 730 000	199 500	2 929 500
TOTAL SECTION A – Expenditure.....	31 315 000	4 168 500	35 483 500
TOTAL SECTION B – Receipts.....	95 000	–	95 000
NET TOTAL OF OPERATING BUDGET.....	31 220 000	4 168 500	35 388 500

Part II – Pensions budget

Heads and Sub-Heads	Budget for 1995	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1995 (revised)
SECTION A – Expenditure	5 258 000		5 258 000
SECTION B – Receipts	1 037 500		1 037 500
NET TOTAL OF PENSIONS BUDGET	4 220 500		4 220 500
GRAND NET TOTAL (Operating budget and pensions budget)	35 440 500	4 168 500	39 609 000

*Written questions 325 to 327 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 325**

*put to the Council by Mr. Pécriaux
on 6th April 1994*

Has WEU played a rôle so far on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and more particularly in Sarajevo? Does it intend to play a rôle there in the near future and, if so, what rôle?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly on
13th October 1994*

The Council informs the Honourable Parliamentarian that the rôle WEU is currently playing on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is confined to implementing WEU's contribution to the administration of Mostar by the European Union.

At the European Union's request, WEU has agreed to organise the supervision of local police forces, their future organisation as a single, unified force and certain aspects of participation in the exercise of police functions by means of a WEU contribution in the framework of the EU administration of Mostar, that took effect on 23rd July 1994.

The deployment of WEU's police contingent in Mostar, which depends on contribution by member states, is in progress. A programme to integrate the two local police forces (a Croat and a Muslim one) into a Unified Police Force of Mostar (UPFM) is being developed by the WEU-police Commander in Mostar in agreement with the EU administrator.

As regards a possible rôle for WEU in Sarajevo, the Council does not wish in any way to pre-judge how it might follow up any initiative or action by the European Union, CSCE or United Nations calling for specific WEU contributions or support.

QUESTION 326

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 25th April 1994*

Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty confers the power "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat

should arise, or a danger to economic stability". Moreover, paragraph 2 of the same article stipulates that the Council "shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" and paragraph 1 states that it is empowered to "consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty".

What is the basis of the Council's statement to the effect that:

1. It "cannot allude to the decisions of European Community countries regarding their relations with the successor states to the former Yugoslav Federation", or to "relations between the member states of WEU and those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)", in view of the threat to international peace from the situation in certain of these countries (Replies to Recommendations 548, 552 and 554)? Under such circumstances, what are the "topical questions" that the Council regards itself competent to consider and deals with, as we are led to believe from Chapter II of the second part of the thirtieth annual report? Has the Council not for many years essentially devoted its meetings to bilateral relations between member countries and non-member countries of the organisation? Does the Council consider that its competences have been modified since reactivation of WEU and, if so, by what acts?

2. The issue of possible financial compensation for the riparian countries implementing the Danube embargo "does not come within the competence of the WEU Permanent Council" even though WEU is participating in the implementation of this embargo (Reply to Recommendation 548)?

3. "Advanced technologies are outside the WEU Council's field of competence" when these concern the security of Europe, and that neither is it "within the competence of the WEU Council to recommend the creation of a European data centre nor even to discuss it" when it is "aware of the need to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use" (Reply to Recommendation 554)?

4. The Permanent Council has separate competences from those attributed to the Council by the modified Brussels Treaty and that the Council need not reply to recommendations from the Assembly if the Permanent Council does not discuss the questions addressed by such recommendations (Reply to Recommendations 548 and 554)?

Does the Council no longer admit it should reply to Assembly recommendations dealing with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if certain WEU competences are entrusted to other organisations? What is the point of exchanges between WEU and NATO or the European Union if they do not permit the Council to make such reply, despite the fact that it undertook to do so before such exchanges were organised?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly on
13th October 1994*

Although the Brussels Treaty modified by the Paris Agreements gave Western European Union wide powers, it also evidenced its signatories' concern that the body they had set up should not duplicate other intergovernmental organisations.

Article IV of the treaty states that the signatory countries and any organs established by them will "work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation", and emphasises "the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO".

The same concern to avoid any duplication led the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, with the approval of the WEU Council, to transfer in 1960 the exercise of the social and cultural competences conferred on WEU by Articles II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe, except for those formerly exercised by the WEU Public Administration Committee.

When negotiations on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome were undertaken between the United Kingdom and the Communities on 14th September 1970, the Council decided to cease to exercise its competences in the economic field.

The Council's political activities have been further reduced since the development of political consultations within the framework of European political co-operation (EPC), set up within the European Community, which are now taking place within the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in the European Union.

The Council assures the parliamentary Assembly of its determination to exercise its powers, even though – in order to avoid duplication – it may acknowledge that certain work is best conducted within the context of NATO or the European Union. The Council is, moreover, convinced that the modified Brussels Treaty is an important instrument for the promotion of the

European security and defence identity of the European Union.

1. On the basis of the foregoing, the Council, with reference to its statement that it cannot allude to the decisions of European Community countries regarding their relations with the successor states to the former Yugoslav Federation, nor to relations between the member states of WEU and those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (reply to Recommendations 548, 552 and 554), took as its basis the fact that these decisions and relations are already discussed and evaluated in the appropriate fora of the European Union. To discuss these questions in the WEU Permanent Council would amount to repeating discussions that have already taken place elsewhere.

This state of affairs does not, however, exclude any debate on threats to peace and stability in Europe arising from the situation in certain states.

Under the agenda heading "topical questions", the Council discusses any issue that a member state or the Secretary-General may wish to raise. In May and June, the subjects raised have included the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse, the launching of the conference on stability in Europe, the Secretary-General's visit to the headquarters of Eurocorps, Russia's attitude to the status of association with WEU, developments in Hungary following its elections and the United Nations operations in Rwanda.

The Council has not for many years essentially devoted its meetings to bilateral relations between member countries and non-member countries of the organisation. It has done so only in special cases with the goal to contribute to greater understanding and to the strengthening of bilateral relations between WEU as a whole and third countries.

The Council does not consider its competences to be modified since the reactivation of WEU. While bearing in mind the vital need to avoid duplication with other organisations having a rôle to play in the various economic, social and cultural fields and in European defence and security, the Council is actively pursuing the conceptual and operational development of a European security and defence identity, in accordance with its twofold vocation as the defence component of the EU and as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. The Council may draw the parliamentary Assembly's attention to the following characteristics of the Danube embargo operation:

- it is based on Security Council Resolution 787 of 16th November 1992, which in turn is linked with Resolutions 713 and 757;

- the purpose of this action is to render assistance, at their request, to riparian states responsible for adopting their own measures to assure compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions;
- the operation is complementary to and supportive of the efforts deployed by the CSCE and the European Union.

The Council is of the view that WEU, which ceased to exercise its economic competences in 1970, does not have the competence to deal with the issues of financial compensation for the riparian countries implementing the Danube embargo.

3. The Council's statement that "advanced technologies are outside the WEU Council's field of competence", and that it is not "within the competence of the WEU Council to recommend the creation of a European data centre nor even to discuss it", when it is "aware of the need to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use" (reply to Recommendation 554) should be viewed in the overall context of the Council's reply to the parliamentary Assembly. In point 1 of the recommendation in question, the Council states that "as regards the strengthening of contacts at regional and plant level, the Council considers that it should not pre-judge the results of specific initiatives taken by the United Nations, the World Bank, the EBRD, the OECD and the European Union in this context nor the effects of government incentives to promote bilateral co-operation agreements".

4. The Council would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that it did not state in its reply to either Recommendation 548 or to Recommendation 554 that it has competences separate from those attributed to it by the modified Brussels Treaty.

Nor could such a statement be inferred from the replies given, although, in the exercise of its competences, the Council takes account of the institutional division of labour which in practice exists between European and transatlantic organisations as it has developed to date.

The Council has, moreover, replied to all the Assembly's recommendations and will continue to do so in the future.

On the question of exchanges between WEU and NATO or the European Union, these serve mainly to promote transparency and complementarity among the three organisations.

In order to provide timely responses to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions, the Council devotes special attention to questions and recommendations relating to

WEU's direct responsibilities, and merely indicates to the Assembly the organisation primarily competent for other issues which are raised.

QUESTION 327

*put to the Council by Mr. Pécriaux
on 12th September 1994*

Was the WEU Council informed of France's intention to use its armed forces in a humanitarian mission to Rwanda between June and August 1994? Did it discuss the matter? Did it take measures with a view to associating its partners with France in this initiative? Were the Planning Cell and the WEU Satellite Centre called upon to participate in this intervention? Did the withdrawal of the French troops in August alter the arrangements made by WEU in this matter?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly on
10th November 1994*

At the urgent request of several delegations, the Permanent Council met on 17th June 1994 to consider what action could be undertaken within the WEU framework to help co-ordinate contributions to United Nations efforts to stop the slaughter of civilians and alleviate the suffering of refugees in and around Rwanda. The Council then decided to monitor the situation in Rwanda closely, especially after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 on 22nd June.

On this occasion the French Permanent Representative informed the Council that France was prepared to send troops for a humanitarian mission to contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Since the start of Operation Turquoise on 23rd June 1994, the Council was kept regularly informed by the French Representative on developments concerning the operation.

Subsequently the WEU Permanent Council had several meetings, including ad hoc meetings, to discuss further the situation in Rwanda and humanitarian needs. A number of WEU states then confirmed their readiness to contribute to the initiative to help remedy the Rwanda tragedy.

In this context, the Council decided that WEU would support the efforts of contributing states by ensuring the co-ordination of their contributions if and when necessary. To this end, the Council confirmed the mandate given to the Planning Cell to closely monitor the situation and

to act as a contact and co-ordination point between contributing states and the relevant operational headquarters.

The Planning Cell received daily reports through its officer seconded to the French operational headquarters. WEU countries continued to provide all relevant information on needs and

contributions. Links were established with the United Nations. WEU states were kept informed on a regular basis by the Planning Cell.

Furthermore, the WEU Satellite Centre was tasked by Belgium to update national information in preparation of eventual humanitarian operations.

*Texts transmitted by the Council to the Assembly
at the close of the ministerial meeting
on 14th November 1994, Noordwijk*

WEU Council of Ministers

14th November 1994

Noordwijk Declaration

1. To mark a new step on the path towards enhanced co-operation in the field of security and defence in Europe, ministers of foreign affairs and defence meet today in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, for the first time with the participation of their colleagues from the nine associate partner countries in the Ministerial Council of Western European Union.

I

2. Ministers reaffirm their countries' dedication to the principles upon which their democracies are based and are resolved to preserve peace, stability and freedom in Europe and elsewhere. They recall that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

3. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Treaty on European Union were important steps in this process. Inspired by the same ideals, other states are progressively being associated with WEU and the European Union.

4. The ministerial meetings in Petersberg, Rome, Luxembourg and Kirchberg have set the stage for the revitalisation of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, and its development as an effective defence organisation with full operational capacities to carry out the Petersberg tasks.

5. Ministers endorsed the document, approved by the Permanent Council, containing the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy. They are determined to elaborate to the full the recommendations and considerations contained therein so that an effective common European defence policy can be established in the years to come. The aim of WEU ministers is that the present policy document will evolve into a comprehensive common European defence policy statement in the perspective of the intergovernmental conference of 1996.

6. Ministers considered that WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and observers should now reflect in common on the new European security conditions, with due regard for the work already undertaken, in order to arrive at a common analysis of the problems, including those related to the security and stability of the Mediterranean basin, with which they are faced and to reach agreement as to the appropriate responses. Ministers asked the Permanent Council to initiate reflection in this area, including the proposal put forward by France to draft a white paper on European security.

7. Ministers agreed to consider the possibility of holding a WEU meeting at summit level before the IGC in order to finalise its political input to the conference.

8. Ministers stressed their intention to continue to work together in close association with the North American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America.

9. Further reinforcement of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and of WEU's rôle in peace-keeping and crisis-management will permit Europe to contribute to peace and security in a manner which will strengthen the transatlantic partnership.

II

10. Ministers feel that the participation of associate partners in the meetings of the Council, according to the Kirchberg arrangements, contributes to a true strengthening of WEU and they are convinced that their greater participation in WEU activities and closer consultations and further co-operation on security questions are instrumental in enhancing stability in Europe. They express their satisfaction with the pro-

gress made in implementing the agreement on the content and modalities of a status of association reached at their Kirchberg meeting and asked the Permanent Council to exploit fully the possibilities provided in those agreements, in particular those relating to the participation of associate partners in working groups and liaison arrangements with the Planning Cell. Ministers are resolved to continue in this direction, thus complementing developments in the European Union. They also express their appreciation of the readiness of some associate partners to contribute to WEU operations.

11. Ministers also reviewed the progress made in implementing the decisions taken at Kirchberg on 9th May 1994 to reinforce the relationship of the associate members with WEU. They express their satisfaction that associate members are now in the process of nominating forces answerable to WEU and officers to the Planning Cell, and are being connected to the WEUCOM network. These measures will considerably strengthen the significant contribution associate members are already making to WEU.

12. Ministers warmly welcome the successful outcome of the referenda in Austria, Finland and Sweden on their accession to the EU and they reiterate their hope that Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway will accede to the EU by 1st January 1995. Bearing in mind the WEU declaration of Maastricht, they are looking forward to discussing with them their relations with WEU once they become members of the EU.

13. Ministers attach great importance to security and stability in the Mediterranean basin, which are fundamental for the security of Europe, and express satisfaction at the intensified dialogue that is being conducted on the basis of decisions taken at Kirchberg. In this respect, they note the encouraging results of the first meetings of the Mediterranean Group with government experts from Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. They welcome the initiative for a presidency seminar on the subject.

14. In order to increase transparency and promote stability throughout Europe, ministers underline the particular importance of establishing appropriate relationships with Russia and Ukraine.

15. Ministers acknowledge the constructive contributions from the Assembly to the further strengthening of European security.

III

16. Ministers stress the importance of developing closer relations with the EU. In the light of the review of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union that will take place during the intergovernmental conference of 1996, ministers decide that WEU should make a timely contribution to the work of the conference on the basis of its own review of the provisions of the declaration on the rôle of WEU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance of December 1991.

17. Ministers welcome the co-operation between WEU and the EU in the administration of Mostar as the first example of the implementation of Article J (4) 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. Close co-operation is an important condition for the success of the EU administration.

18. Ministers note with satisfaction that detailed arrangements for close co-operation between the WEU and EU Council Secretariats and the modalities for exchanging information and holding consultations between WEU and the European Commission have now been agreed and are being implemented.

19. The setting-up of an informal group of government experts of WEU/WEAG and EU member states to study options for a European armaments policy is an example of practical co-operation in dealing with issues which regard these bodies.

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20. Ministers considered WEU's relations with NATO since the Council's move to Brussels and the alliance summit of January this year. They agree that there is further scope for developing closer working relations between the two organisations on the basis of transparency and complementarity. In this context, they note with satisfaction progress made in NATO's discussion on the issues and expressed their confidence that concrete proposals would be made to increase these relations by practical measures. Ministers recall the significant possibilities that the results of the alliance summit of January 1994 offer for the further development of WEU, and have taken note of the work done in WEU as a follow-up to these decisions. In particular they welcome the contribution WEU has made to the ongoing work in the alliance on combined joint task forces by formulating criteria and modalities for effective use by WEU of CJTFs. They look forward to intensified co-operation in these matters, in particular between the corresponding working groups, and to further close consultations between the two organisations, which will contribute to a further strengthening of WEU's operational rôle and to ensuring that the CJTF concept can be implemented to the full satisfaction of all allies.

IV

21. Ministers discussed the document containing preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, in the longer term perspective of a common European defence policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Ministers consider that the operational part of the document contains useful guidelines for direct, concrete follow-up in the respective WEU bodies. Along these lines they task the Permanent Council to proceed swiftly with further elaboration of the operational rôle of WEU.

V

22. Ministers discussed the ongoing regional armed conflicts, particularly in Europe. They expressed their deep concern at the recent developments with respect to former Yugoslavia, which at the moment present a growing risk of escalation.

23. Ministers express their full support for the continued efforts by the EU, the United States and the Russian Federation, including through the Contact Group, to search for a political solution to the conflict. In this respect, they express their concern at the continued refusal by the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of which hostilities continue. The deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly the attacks on the United Nations-protected safe areas of Sarajevo and Bihac, as well as on Mostar, should be effectively addressed. Ministers agree on the need for the United Nations Security Council to consider the appropriate measures.

24. Ministers reiterated their view that lifting the arms embargo would cause the conflict to escalate further, pose grave risks to the civilian population and to organisations in the field, leading to a situation in which United Nations forces had to withdraw¹.

Ministers take note with regret of the United States measures to modify its participation with respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo in the combined WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. In this context, they particularly stress the importance that the United States in NATO structures will continue to observe fully the mandatory provisions of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions¹.

Ministers emphasise that the United States measures will not affect the determination of WEU to continue ensuring compliance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Ministers reiterated their intention to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all embargoes. Ministers received a report by the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, on discussions within NATO on these measures. They request the Permanent Council, in co-ordination with NATO, to consider the impact of the measures on Operation Sharp Guard and, if necessary, to adopt provisions so as to ensure its continued effectiveness while preserving the unity of effort. In this context, they affirm their commitment to continue contributing the necessary resources to Operation Sharp Guard¹.

Ministers also underline the importance of the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube in the implementation of the embargo and the economic sanctions and express their appreciation for the work of the personnel made available by WEU nations in this regard.

25. Ministers recognise the full development of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an essential factor in a political settlement which should be based on the principle of balanced treatment of all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ministers emphasise the crucial importance of the efforts to arrive at a single, multi-ethnic administration of the city of Mostar. Ministers today received an extensive account by the EU administrator, Mr. Hans Koschnick, on the progress made in the administration of Mostar, including the establishment of a unified police force. They expressed their appreciation and gratitude for the work done by Mr. Koschnick and his staff. They reviewed the implementation of WEU's contribution to date and expressed their appreciation for the important efforts of the WEU police contingent. They welcome the individual contributions to the WEU contingent offered so far and confirm that they should be fully deployed as soon as possible. Ministers agree that the deployment of the WEU police contingent in its entirety is crucial in restoring public order and building confidence between the two sides in Mostar. They also express their satisfaction at the close co-operation between WEU and EU, which constitutes an important condition for the success of the administration.

1. Turkey wishes to dissociate itself from these paragraphs.

26. Ministers stress again the unacceptability of ethnic cleansing and the acquisition of territory through aggression.

They welcome the important decision by Belgrade to support the peace plan and to close the border with Bosnia in order to make the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan. The continued closure of the border must be verified internationally in an effective way. Ministers reaffirm the need for further effective pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.

27. They expressed the need for continued consultations and renewed urgent efforts between the EU, United States and the Russian Federation, including in the Contact Group at the political level, and other efforts, to make progress towards a lasting peace settlement. They underlined the importance that the Contact Group fully share relevant information with non-Contact Group members who, through the contribution of troops, military assets or otherwise, contribute to the international effort to establish peace in former Yugoslavia.

28. Ministers believe that, at the appropriate time, the introduction of arms control and confidence-building measures, including in the political field, should be envisaged in order to help preserve peace and stability in the Balkan region. In the longer term, a régime aimed at wider rehabilitation could also be considered in this context.

VI

29. Ministers support efforts by the CSCE towards a stable and lasting peaceful solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, including the possibility of a CSCE peace-keeping operation based on the principles of Chapter III of the Helsinki document 1992.

30. Ministers stress the importance they attach to the place of the CSCE in the European security architecture and its growing rôle, notably in the field of early-warning, conflict-prevention and crisis-management. They undertake to make the ongoing review conference and the forthcoming summit in Budapest a success in terms of critically evaluating the implementation of existing standards and procedures with a view to better preparing the CSCE for its future tasks. They support proposals to enhance the CSCE's rôle as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter by giving it greater responsibility for conflict-prevention and resolution and crisis-management, in compliance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, in the CSCE area.

31. Ministers note that substantial progress has been made in the field of arms control and disarmament in recent years. In the light of the new challenges, they reiterate their intention to promote all arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability and security in Europe as well as in other regions.

32. Ministers reiterate their hope that all instruments of ratification necessary for the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty will have been deposited at the time of the CSCE Budapest summit. In this context, ministers welcome the adoption of the standing operating procedures for the WEU group of states parties. These procedures will contribute to the effective implementation of the treaty.

33. Ministers welcome the success of the process initiated in Paris aimed at the conclusion of a pact on stability in Europe. The launching of the two "regional round tables" has shown the progress that can be achieved through rapprochement between European states. This initiative is a major contribution to stability on our continent. Ministers recommend that this close co-operation aimed at the conclusion of the pact on stability in Europe should be continued so as actively to further good neighbourly relations in Central and Eastern Europe.

34. Ministers welcome the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states, which represents a significant contribution to the security situation in the region and enhances general stability in Europe.

VII

35. Ministers underline the importance of developing further the operational rôle of WEU in accordance with the declaration of Petersberg and the operational considerations of the document on a common European defence policy.

Recent events have underlined the importance for WEU to be able to play a more significant and effective rôle in facing humanitarian emergencies caused by international crises or natural catastrophes. Taking account of the leading rôle of the European Union as a major body for coordination of European humanitarian assistance, ministers stress that it is one of the rôles of WEU to provide for a European instrument of reaction in cases where, due to the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the need for military pro-

tection, military means must be employed. Consequently, WEU has to be able to count on immediately available capabilities and arrangements which allow a rapid response to such emergencies. Ministers endorse the report regarding the setting-up of the arrangements and the provision of the means for a humanitarian task force and mandate the Permanent Council speedily to implement this initiative.

36. Ministers took note of the initial report, approved by the Permanent Council on WEU's rôle in evacuation operations. Ministers request the Permanent Council to continue work on this subject in close co-ordination with the relevant EU bodies.

37. In reaction to appeals to WEU to become active on the Danube and in Mostar, WEU has demonstrated its ability to perform combined civilian/military activities, which require close co-operation between civilian and military authorities. Ministers decide that WEU's operational rôle in this field should be further developed. They request the Permanent Council to develop proposals so as to facilitate the incorporation of non-military aspects in planning processes.

38. Ministers consider that the Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and procedures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter alia through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be reinforced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency. The support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military field need to be reinforced accordingly so that the Secretariat can fully support the work done by the Council and its politico-military working group. The Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be complemented by capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis-management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg declaration: for instance, a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under study. The studies being conducted in this field should be submitted to the Permanent Council so that it can take the appropriate decisions.

39. Ministers welcome progress accomplished in bringing the European corps up to full operational readiness and the incorporation of Spain, which has also recently subscribed to the joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the corps in the framework of WEU.

40. Ministers take note with interest of the positive development of the initiatives currently under consideration by France, Italy and Spain envisaging both an air maritime force and a ground force answerable to WEU.

41. Ministers take note with interest of the discussions of the Chiefs of Defence Staff during their meeting in The Hague of 3rd November.

42. Ministers reiterate their commitment gradually to develop the Institute for Security Studies into a European Security and Defence Academy and request the Permanent Council to take this matter forward as a priority.

43. Ministers considered that the finalisation of the appropriate financing arrangements was essential for the development of WEU's operational capabilities. They tasked the Permanent Council to examine at the earliest opportunity the necessary arrangements, including the setting-up of a WEU operational budget.

VIII

The Defence Ministers of the 13 nations of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) met before the WEU Council meeting to review the armaments co-operation activities carried out by the group. Ministers noted with satisfaction the successful establishment of an Armaments Secretariat within WEU and the greater focus this provides for European armaments co-operation. Ministers agreed to establish in spring 1995 a research cell to support the conduct of the EUCLID programme and welcomed other steps to improve the arrangements for its implementation, in particular a recent EUCLID symposium. Ministers welcomed the German initiative to set up an informal group of experts to study the options for a European armaments policy and endorsed the guidelines for the group. Ministers also took note of further work on a European armaments agency and approved the principles for the operation of such an organisation. Ministers agreed that national armaments directors would continue their considerations on this subject, recognising that conditions do not currently exist for the creation of an agency conducting the full range of procurement activities on behalf of member nations. They agreed to consider favourably the Franco-German initiative to create a new armaments co-operation structure as a subsidiary body under the modified Brussels Treaty, when introduced to the WEU Council. The agreements by defence ministers were subsequently adopted by the Council at 13.

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Ministers said farewell to Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen and thanked him for his invaluable contribution to the development of WEU over the past five and a half years. They paid tribute to Dr. van Eekelen's inspiring leadership which was instrumental in the transformation of WEU.

Ministers endorsed the decision by the Permanent Council appointing Ambassador Jose Cutileiro of Portugal as the new Secretary-General of WEU.

Preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy

Part A: perspective of a common European defence policy

I. Introduction

1. The reflection on the formulation of a common European defence policy is based on the conviction expressed by ministers in the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987 according to which "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence".

The essential political conditions for the new rôles and tasks of WEU have been created at Maastricht. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty states that the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) shall include all questions related to the security of the Union. Furthermore, in the WEU declaration adopted on that occasion, WEU members agreed to strengthen the rôle of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is being developed as the defence component of the EU, and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

In paragraph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at its next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands. The present document is an initial contribution on the objectives, scope and means of a common European defence policy.

II. Common European defence policy: definition and scope

2. Being an element of security policy in a wider sense, the common European defence policy is directed towards the reduction of risks and uncertainties that might threaten the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union and its member states and towards contributing to the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter.

A common European defence policy will need to incorporate elements on the necessary structures, mechanisms and capabilities, as well as on the definition of principles for the use of the armed forces and armaments of WEU states.

3. A common European defence policy should enhance security and stability by ensuring a commensurate European participation in collective defence, and by an active engagement in conflict-prevention and crisis-management in Europe and elsewhere, in accordance with Europe's importance. Institutionally and substantively, the development of a common European defence policy in WEU must be seen in the context of broader European and transatlantic relationships, which are closely intertwined. This common policy should lead to an increased European contribution to the objectives of collective defence and a new sharing of responsibilities, which should not only be compatible with the defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance but should also be a means of strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership.

4. A common European defence policy will need to be formulated against the background of a thorough analysis of European security interests and should take as its basic assumption the collective co-operative approach to defence, as established in collective defence alliances under the Brussels and Washington treaties. It should take into account the following four levels of European responsibilities and interests in the field of defence:

- WEU governments have a direct responsibility for the security and defence of their own peoples and territories.

- WEU governments have a responsibility to project the security and stability presently enjoyed in the West throughout the whole of Europe.
- WEU governments have an interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability in the southern Mediterranean countries.
- WEU governments are ready to take on their share of the responsibility for the promotion of security, stability and the values of democracy in the wider world, including, through the execution of peace-keeping and other crisis-management measures under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the CSCE, acting either independently or through WEU or NATO. They are also ready to address new security challenges such as humanitarian emergencies; proliferation; terrorism; international crime and environmental risks, including those related to disarmament and the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons.

5. In carrying out these potential rôles, consideration should be given to which interests are specifically European and which interests are more widely shared beyond Europe. WEU should be ready to explore actively options for working with the widest possible range of non WEU partners and allies in a particular set of circumstances, not least because of the important possibilities of additional resources this will open up. This in no way detracts from the requirement that European governments maintain the necessary levels of resources to provide, on an equitable basis, suitable, properly equipped, trained and maintained defence capabilities and military forces for the purposes of carrying out commitments arising from the above considerations, as well as ensuring the necessary support of their parliaments and more widely of their publics for the goals pursued.

Adapting ourselves to the changing security environment and the evolution of the transatlantic partnership, the responsibility towards the whole of Europe requires the involvement of the associate partners of Central Europe in a reflection on changing conditions with respect to security and defence in Europe as a whole. Developing dialogue and exchanges of information with Russia and Ukraine on issues of common concern is also vital for wider European security and stability.

6. The full development of a common defence policy will require a common assessment and definition of the requirements and substance of a European defence which would first require a clear definition of the security challenges facing the European Union and a determination of appropriate responses. This will in turn depend upon a judgement of the rôle the European Union wishes to play in the world and the contribution it wishes to make to security in its immediate neighbourhood and in the wider world.

Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear field. In addition to their rôle of national deterrent, the British and French nuclear weapons contribute to global deterrence in accordance with the Ottawa Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 1974 and The Hague platform of WEU of 1987. The alliance's new strategic concept of 1991 recognised that "the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent rôle of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the allies."

III. The rôle of Western European Union

7. According to Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union may request WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. As laid down in the WEU declaration adopted on that occasion and through several declarations since then, WEU is being developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. More recently, WEU is developing its relations with the Central European countries in the context of the evolutionary process leading to their closer integration into European institutions. Furthermore, WEU is taking an interest in establishing relationships with countries in the Mediterranean area.

8. In the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, ministers declared the preparedness of member states to support the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. It was stated that, apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, can be deployed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making. The participation of associate members in such tasks was also allowed for in this declaration and further elaborated in the Kirchberg declaration, which also allowed for the participation of associate partners.

9. Some important results have already been achieved on the organisation and functioning of WEU in times of crisis on WEU humanitarian missions and on WEU's rôle in peace-keeping. The preliminary list of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) provides an indication of units available for WEU operations.

10. In 1996, the European Union will hold an intergovernmental conference. As far as the CFSP is concerned, it was agreed that the relevant provisions may be revised on the basis of a report that the EU Council of Ministers will present to the European Council. The conference will address Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and therefore issues of defence policy. WEU will contribute to the work of the conference as far as defence-related issues are concerned and will itself undertake a review of its declaration of December 1991. This review will take account of the progress made and the experience gained until then and will also extend to the relationships between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. The relationships between EU and WEU will be re-examined in 1996. In the meantime, links between both organisations are being further strengthened. To this effect, the Permanent Council should complete its examination of the question of harmonisation of presidencies in accordance with the ministerial mandate of November 1993. Also, the Permanent Council continues to develop practical measures to enhance relations with NATO.

IV. The relationship between WEU and the European Union

11. The European Council meeting in Brussels on 29th October 1993 has adopted important measures on the implementation of the CFSP. The CFSP working group on security has done substantial work on the development of a theoretical framework for a European security policy. It has stated general principles which could provide a basis for the further development of a CFSP. It has formulated several criteria that might apply to thinking and decision-making on possible joint actions and serve as guidance. It has also studied ways and means of reducing duplication between the activities of different security organisations.

12. It has made an analysis of European security interests in the new strategic context and of the risks for European security, which provides a good basis for the development of a common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, the working group has studied the implications for European security of the situation in various neighbouring regions (Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Middle-East). These studies should be complemented with a WEU military analysis, so as to take account of their defence implications for the further elaboration of a common European defence policy.

Thus, some important steps have been taken to develop a more coherent vision of a European security and defence policy, helping to ensure an integrated approach to security by making use of Europe's economic, political and security instruments.

13. The defining of a common European defence policy will be a substantial contribution to the elaboration and implementation by WEU of decisions of the European Union having defence implications. In this respect, reference can be made to the ongoing co-operation between the European Union and WEU in Mostar.

V. The relationship between WEU and NATO

14. Continued security and stability is underpinned by the transatlantic political, security and defence links embodied in NATO. Its basic operating principle – solidarity – translated into practical collective defence arrangements, ensures that no single ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. The result is a sense of equal security amongst members, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities. Solidarity should also be expressed by the willingness of each country to share fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of the common effort as well as its benefits.

15. WEU is being developed in harmony with, not in competition to, the wider framework of transatlantic defence co-operation in NATO on the basis of transparency and complementarity. When undertaking military operations, which will use existing national and collective capabilities, NATO and WEU should continue their efforts to avoid unnecessary duplication. We recall that the multinational European structures answerable to WEU would also contribute towards reinforcing the allies' capability to work together for their common defence. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.

16. At the same time, it is recognised that the alliance could benefit from a more balanced sharing of risks, responsibilities and burdens, through the development of WEU's operational rôle. At the NATO

summit of 10th and 11th January 1994, the heads of state and government supported strengthening the European pillar of the alliance through WEU. They stated that NATO stands ready to make collective assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken in pursuit of the CFSP of the European Union.

17. The full support which the NATO summit has given to the development of a European security and defence identity points the way to a new level of mutually reinforcing co-operation between NATO and WEU. The CJTF concept offers an innovative model to combine European security and defence co-operation with political solidarity within the alliance, while making economic use of resources and offering the possibility for non-NATO members to participate. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers welcomed the endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities can be made available for WEU operations, preserving WEU's own planning procedures and capabilities. Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU and, in that case, under its command. Both from a European and an Atlantic perspective it is important that this concept be developed and implemented soon, as this could provide WEU and NATO with an increased capability to undertake contingency operations, including peace-keeping.

VI. WEU and the CSCE

18. The CSCE is the only European and transatlantic forum in which all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok participate. In order to avoid the emergence of new divisions in Europe, WEU states support further strengthening of the CSCE. CSCE will have to play a leading rôle in particular in the field of preventive diplomacy, in the building up of co-operative structures and in the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human and minority rights. WEU reaffirms its resolution to support CSCE with its own resources and to continue working with the CSCE, thus giving effect to the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions developed in the 1992 Helsinki declaration.

VII. The ties with Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean

19. Another element of the broader context in which WEU is functioning is its relationship to the countries of Central Europe. At the May 1994 Kirchberg ministerial meeting, WEU has upgraded the relationship with nine Central European countries that have concluded or will conclude Europe Agreements with the EU, to the status of associate partners. Their participation in meetings of the WEU Council gives them the opportunity to contribute to collective European policy-making in the field of defence. The enhanced dialogue is an important contribution to stability in Europe. They may also be invited to participate in working groups on a case-by-case basis, they may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell and they will be able to participate, in principle, in the implementation of Petersberg tasks as well as in relevant exercises and planning. Through these arrangements WEU is making a contribution to the gradual process of integrating these countries into Western security institutions. This developing network of relations with the Central European countries will have to be taken into account when a common European defence policy is being formulated.

The development of these relations contributes to the stability of the European continent, in parallel to their progressive involvement in a process of reflection within the CFSP framework. This process, complementary to the one pursued by the Atlantic Alliance in particular through the partnership for peace, is an essential element for future stability on the European continent.

20. European security also has a Mediterranean dimension, and the framing of a European defence policy will have to take this into account. The problems of this area are primarily of a political, economic and social nature and have to be addressed mainly through political and economic means. The security implications are however more and more relevant. The importance of the rôle of the Mediterranean has been recognised by WEU, which established in 1987 a working group on security in the Mediterranean, as well as by the EU which, within the framework of the CFSP, has recently conducted an analysis of the implications of the Mediterranean situation for European security. The CFSP Security Working Group has concluded that stability and equilibrium in the Mediterranean region, which are fundamental for European security, are a responsibility of the European Union as a whole. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers agreed further to develop the dialogue already initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean states.

Part B: The construction of a common European defence policy

21. In the 1996 intergovernmental conference the future relationship between WEU and the EU will feature prominently. WEU should through its own review provide an input into this conference. Whatever the outcome of the IGC will be, the intrinsic link between a common European defence policy and NATO will remain.

I. WEU's political rôle

22. The formulation of a common defence policy requires a detailed analysis of risks to European security. To that end the aforementioned analyses of the CFSP working group on security should be complemented by a military analysis, to be prepared by WEU taking account of risk analyses carried out within NATO. These analyses will provide insight in the relationship between security concerns and defence issues and what rôle defence instruments can play vis-à-vis the range of other instruments, notably economic and diplomatic, available to Western European governments, including through the European Union.

23. Solidarity should continue to be the fundamental principle of any common defence policy, and should be the basis for multinational military action. For situations which might call for its involvement, WEU should formulate criteria which could play a rôle in the decision-making process within WEU, in particular on the basis of common interests, including those related to the security of citizens of WEU states.

The level of involvement of different states can vary according to the circumstances. Decision-making should be sufficiently flexible in order not to frustrate joint activities by WEU states who have expressed the will to undertake such activities.

24. WEU should examine developments in the transatlantic partnership which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance.

Another aspect that could merit consideration, while taking into account the particular situation of some member states, is the relationship between the development of the FAWEU planning process and the NATO force planning process. Equally, it is necessary to consider possible relations in times of crisis between, on the one hand, forces and headquarters answerable to WEU and, on the other hand, NATO.

In taking up these questions, further thought may also be needed on the procedural aspects such as the introduction of WEU views into the alliance, joint meetings of the respective Councils, and other working relationships such as enhanced co-operation between civilian and military institutions (secretariats, HQs, staffs). These questions have become even more topical in the light of the new tasks of NATO in the field of crisis-management, including peace-keeping.

II. WEU's operational rôle

25. WEU should be in a position to elaborate and implement European Union decisions and actions having defence implications, in accordance with Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union. As the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU should strengthen its operational capabilities, developing the military and operational aspects of security such as:

- institutional aspects of defence;
- exercising, preparation and interoperability of forces;
- generic and contingency planning;
- strategic mobility;
- the question of anti-missile defences in Europe;
- defence intelligence in Europe (including the space component);
- mechanism for the sharing of burdens and the pooling of resources.

26. WEU needs more comprehensive and continuous access to information on emerging and ongoing crises. Satellite information can provide one possible way of contributing to this requirement. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent European satellite system and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and merits of the proposed system and of other WEU alternatives and affordability. The Space Group is preparing a proposal for such a decision with a view to a 1995 ministerial meeting.

The Space Group has also assessed the requirements to ensure the continuity of the operation of the Satellite Centre until the completion of the evaluation of its capabilities. Based on this assessment, the Centre will be able to continue its activities until the end of 1995 without additional funding. At the spring 1995 ministerial meeting, an evaluation of the Centre's work should be completed, so as to permit a decision to be taken on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a permanent body of WEU.

Planning requirements and operational capabilities

27. A more systematic approach to identifying and meeting contingencies for European military deployments is called for. Building upon concrete experiences, and in accordance with the three main missions defined at Petersberg, the Planning Cell should address the mechanisms for identifying the necessary assets and capabilities as well as possible shortages. Generic planning should provide a better insight into the needs and requirements. A generic plan, based on precise data and a plausible scenario, should contain the necessary detailed specifications and/or assumptions of capabilities such as the size and composition of the force (including support capabilities), reaction time and command and control arrangements. Taking into account such generic planning, the Planning Cell should examine existing FAWEU and allied assets – including CJTF – that might be made available in order to identify and make proposals as to which headquarters and forces can be used for particular scenarios. This could result in realistic force packages for a range of options, which would allow for quick implementation in case of (an emerging) crisis. Building on activities in this field, WEU will refine the concept of “forces answerable to WEU”.

28. The tasks and composition of the Planning Cell need further consideration in the light of the decisions taken at Kirchberg. Priority should be given to the development of appropriate plans and procedures for humanitarian and rescue operations, including evacuation operations.

29. WEU should continue its activities in the field of strategic mobility and intelligence policy.

30. WEU can also offer the assistance of the Planning Cell to the European Union, should it decide to develop a capacity for forecasting and analysis of crises. In this case, the Planning Cell could provide a complementary military risk analysis. WEU shall continue its efforts in harmonising its security regulations with NATO in order to reach agreement on the exchange of information and data transmission procedures.

Mixed civilian and military activities

31. The assistance of WEU to riparian states for implementation of United Nations sanctions on the Danube and the contribution of a police force to the EU's administration of Mostar show that WEU is also able to perform combined civilian/military activities. This can be the case for WEU humanitarian or rescue missions, which are among the Petersberg tasks. Thought could be given to appropriate ways and means of integrating such activities into WEU policy.

Decision-making, command and control and burden-sharing

32. WEU will need appropriate mechanisms for political decision-making and military command and control. WEU's operational rôle should be developed in a flexible way, ensuring the capacity to, on the one hand, operate autonomously (where appropriate in close consultation with NATO) and, on the other hand, to operate together with non-WEU countries.

The Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and procedures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter alia through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be reinforced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency. The support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military field need to be reinforced accordingly so that the Secretariat can fully support the work done by the Council and its politico-military working group. The Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be complemented by capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis-management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg declaration: for instance, a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under study. The tasks of the Military Delegates in support of the Chiefs of Defence Staff as well as the members of the Council also need to be defined more clearly in this context.

33. During operations, WEU command and control structures and arrangements will have to allow for the use by WEU of collective assets and capabilities made available by the alliance and for the use of national assets of non-WEU members, as well as for the participation of non-WEU nations in WEU operations, where appropriate. WEU should aim at the highest possible degree of multinationality at all levels of the command chain, particularly at the level of force and operations headquarters. Multinational headquarters should be available for use by both WEU and NATO. On the level of force headquarters, the consequences of the CJTF concept are already under consideration. A similar approach to multinationality should be developed for operations headquarters.

WEU exercise policy should be actively implemented in order to determine whether its procedures for command and control and for activation of FAWEU need to be adjusted.

34. Participation in a specific operation is and will remain based on a sovereign decision of each member state. However, a common defence policy presupposes, in the operational sense, the readiness of participating nations to share in practice the responsibilities in the execution of operational tasks. The principle of European solidarity, or even "European burden sharing" would seem to be relevant here. The following mechanisms may need to be examined further:

- rotation of forces: Nations may find it difficult to participate in any particular operation because of a lack of capability to sustain their contribution over a longer period. A solution to this problem may be found by accepting a rotation scheme at the start of a WEU operation. More generally, a rotation scheme may be helpful in reaching an equitable share of responsibilities;
- pooling of capabilities and resources: This may apply, for example, to transport capabilities (especially aircraft), simulation equipment, special munitions and spare parts;
- operational budget: For WEU operations, WEU must have available the necessary decision-making procedures and mechanisms to ensure adequate and timely resourcing and financing of the preparation and implementation of these operations. The necessary arrangements including the issue of budgets and fixed contribution keys should now be examined at ministerial level as a matter of priority;
- task specialisation.

Development of the WEU Institute into an academy

35. The development of the Institute into a European security and defence academy, as stated in the Maastricht declaration of 10th December 1991, should be gradually pursued.

Armaments co-operation

36. The necessary development of a European armaments policy as part of a common European defence policy is being advanced by the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) within WEU. As agreed at Maastricht, further proposals for enhanced armaments co-operation are also being actively pursued with the aim of creating a European armaments agency. In addition, an informal group of experts, composed of governmental experts of WEU/WEAG and EU member states, to study the options for a European armaments policy has been set up. Issues to be addressed among others in advancing European armaments co-operation and the development of a European armaments policy include:

- the rôle of armaments co-operation in strengthening the European defence identity;
- the improvement of the interoperability of armed forces, through inter alia the promotion of harmonised requirements and standardised equipment;
- the reduction of duplicative national research, development and production costs;
- the creation of conditions for an integrated, rationalised and competitive European defence industry;
- identification of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more competitive approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;
- as far as extra-European exports are concerned, within the context of the informal group, a study of the possible harmonisation of national practices, taking into account developments under a common European foreign and security policy in the area of arms export controls, and a study of ways to translate the developments of the CFSP into practice in the area of arms export controls.

*The readiness and capabilities of airforces
in WEU member states*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur*

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on the readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states

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submitted by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The strength of airforces
- III. Demands
- IV. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bianchi, Borderas, Briane, Brito, Cox, Dees, Dolazza, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Hardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Parisi, Pécriaux, Petruccioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate: *Cuco*), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, López Valdivielso (Alternate: *López Henares*), Vazquez (Alternate: *Bolinaga*), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the readiness and capabilities of airforces
in WEU member states***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that WEU member states should review the national capability of their airforces to meet their obligations within the alliance and to provide a proper contribution to the exercise of international authority and humanitarian obligations;
- (ii) Recalling that, for member states, it is not enough to possess appropriate numbers of military aircraft since such numbers are of little use if the aircrews are not capable of current operational activity or if the aircraft themselves are not maintained in serviceable condition;
- (iii) Expressing concern about the quality and relevance of flight training and stressing that low-level flight training is necessary to sustain the possibility of operational survival;
- (iv) Drawing attention to the absence of, or inadequacy of, low-level flight training in a number of member states which fails to provide reasonable assurances that the nature and the scale of flight training in their airforces meets the standards to which they are committed;
- (v) Regretting possible shortcomings in logistic support capacity and the reliance upon civilian transport aircraft for military purposes especially where pursuit of peace in the service of humanitarian causes may require both aircrew and aircraft to be prepared to face a hostile environment, which testifies to the need, in the long term, to build a European military transport aircraft;
- (vi) Considering existing anxieties about the need for adequate air defence, in particular in terms of all-weather capability, air-to-air refuelling and reconnaissance and early warning in airforces of WEU member states;
- (vii) Considering that the aircraft in service in several member states are obsolescent thus extending the considerable range and variety of different types, there being, for instance, some thirteen different types of strike aircraft;
- (viii) Considering that rather more attention should be paid to making provision for adequate air-to-air refuelling in view of the increased capacity this might provide;
- (ix) Noting that the airforce exercise Purple Nova held in November 1994 under WEU auspices is an interesting development and trusting that further similar exercises will be held in order to assist co-operation between airforces of member states to enable them to develop further co-operative capacity in response to crises and international need,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Remind member states that more attention should be paid to the provision of sufficient military aircraft and aircrews capable of operations in support of international need and to ensuring that sufficient personnel are trained and employed to maintain the numbers of military aircraft which their commitment to the alliance requires;
2. Urge member states to recognise that whilst their services need to be operated efficiently, the defence of their realms and their obligation to both the alliance and the international community require the retention of a sufficient number of uniformed personnel to ensure that support as well as operational requirements can be permanently secured;
3. Pay close attention to the success of the recent airforce exercise Purple Nova with a view to extending such arrangements on a regular basis.

Draft Order

***on the readiness and capabilities of airforces
in WEU member states***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that, in the near future, further budget reductions in WEU member states may have a negative influence on their ability to respond to threats to European security;
- (ii) Stressing that WEU member states will increasingly need to support international stability or sustain the humanitarian cause for which they must have available the appropriate aircraft and personnel;
- (iii) Considering that opposition to training at low altitudes is at present leading to its prevention or inhibition and, as a consequence, to the diminishing quality of aircrew training,

INSTRUCTS ITS DEFENCE COMMITTEE

1. To meet representatives of the WEU Planning Cell in order to consider these matters and to provide an analysis of the conditions in airforces of WEU member states during 1996;
2. To monitor the response to the present report and to inform the Assembly of the state of national airforces during 1996.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Political changes in Europe in recent years persuaded governments and people that defence expenditure could be reduced substantially and diverted to areas which commanded greater priority in the form of social provision and the reduction of taxation or the reduction of total public expenditure.

2. Until this drawing down of defence provision, a large part of the expenditure was incurred to face the possibility of east-west conflict either to respond to any aggression or to deter it. It is accepted that these dangers have diminished markedly.

3. Obviously, ministers must make a careful assessment of existing or emerging risks and threats to security and although at this stage governments have not yet entirely dismantled their capacity to respond to potential aggression within Europe, the available capacity to provide such response has been and is still being greatly reduced.

4. At the same time, it can be perceived that the cold war with all its perils did contribute to a greater degree of stability in Europe than we have witnessed in the last five years. The fact that for the first time in half a century there has been serious conflict in Europe recently may illustrate that instability.

5. Whilst one is hopeful that European and international effort will see peace achieved in former Yugoslavia and reduce the possibility of any conflict within Europe, it does seem reasonable to point out that the ability to effect such purposes may not be helped if there is little in the way of defence capacity readily available to reinforce political argument and underline diplomatic endeavour.

6. Unfortunately, instability and localised conflicts experienced in Europe have been accompanied by other crises elsewhere. The invasion of Kuwait and the horrors of Rwanda are but two examples and they illustrate the need for the exercise of international authority. After all, points of conflict do seem to increase remorselessly.

7. Perhaps few Europeans now believe that the United Nations is able to exercise effective and swift response to dreadful crises. Certainly, we seem to have little ground for confidence that the international community could be able to guarantee international peace-making yet alone provide any real peace-keeping effort. But that capacity is desirable and its achievement does require the commitment of men and material from member states prepared to contribute to a particular cause at the behest of international authority.

8. Whatever the need for international and European effort may be, the exercise of international authority, the adequate support of the humanitarian cause, or the protection of endangered minorities, then our operational involvement is essential. That is being demonstrated in the skies over Northern Iraq, the Gulf and Bosnia today. These matters have considerable relevance for WEU and its member states for few other countries possess the aircraft and the skills to make such sustained operational activity possible. At the same time, both WEU itself and its member states might acknowledge that it is scarcely sensible for the exercise of international authority to be wholly dependent upon one state even if that be the superpower.

9. Inevitably, there will be groups and perhaps countries which balk at both the cost or even the principle of such involvement. However, if European countries are to support the case for international stability and the sustenance of the humanitarian cause, then it is both right and logical for them to accept that the capacity to respond to need must be available. It is therefore inherent in this report that I should offer an assessment of the contribution which member states are capable of making, both in regard to the security requirement within our alliance and in providing meaningful contribution in the international cause. That is the purpose of this report. What follows is my own assessment. I trust that it is not unrealistic.

10. The various national airforces possess a wide range of aircraft in both numbers and types. For the purposes of this report, I have listed only the strengths of aircraft which are in the combat/strike, reconnaissance, tanker and transport rôles possessed by each member state together with other directly relevant information including the total numbers of personnel engaged in these services (see tables hereafter).

II. The strength of airforces

11. I had hoped to include the numbers of aircrew and of these the numbers who could be des-

Strength and inventory of national airforces

Country	Air Defence	Strike	Air Defence /Strike (dual use) ¹	Recon-naissance	AWACS Early Warning	Transport ²	Tanker/Transport ³	Tanker	Maritime Patrol	Total number of personnel
Belgium	35 F-16		100 F-16	Mirage F-5	–	12 C-130 2 B-727	–	–	–	12 100
France ⁴	98 F-1 132 M-2000	134 Jaguar 93 M-2000 N & D 37 M F-1 CT		51 F-1 CR	4E-3 F Sentry	12 C-130 71 C-160 2 A-310 4 DC-8		11 KC-135	16 Atlantic 9 Atlantique 5 Gardian	na v y 89 800 (incl. 33 300 conscripts)
Germany	143 F-4 20 MiG 29	182 Tornado		36 Tornado		4 B-707 3 A-310 85 C-160			14 Atlantic (navy)	82 900 (incl. 24 600 conscripts)
Greece ⁴	36 M2000	92 A-7 72 F-5 54 F-4 78 F-104	35 F-16 26 F-1	6 RF-5 10 RF-4		15 C-130				26 800 (incl. 14 400 conscripts)
Italy ⁴	99 F-104	70 Tornado 54 AMX 58 G-91		15 AMX	1 G-222 VS 12 PD-808	2 DC-9 12 C-130 44 G-222		2 B-707	18 Atlantic (navy)	73 000 (incl. 25 000 conscripts)
Netherlands			166 F-16	19 F-16		2 C-130 10 F-27		2 DC-10	2 F-27 M 13 P-3 C	na vy 16 220
Norway	48 F-16		15 F-5			6 C-130 3 DHC-6			6 P-3	7 900 (incl. 4 000 conscripts)
Portugal ⁴	20 F-16	37 A-7 26 G-91		18 G-91	4 Falcons	6 C-130			6 P-3	11 000 (incl. 1 800 conscripts)
Spain ⁴	17 F-1	22 F-5 30 F-1	70 F-18	8 RF-4 11 RF-5	2 Falcons	7 C-130		3 B-707 5 KC-130	7 P-3 3 F-27	28 400 (incl. 12 000 conscripts)
Turkey			146 F-16 149 F-4 134 F-5	37 F-4		13 C-130 19 C-160 13 CN-235				56 800 (incl. 28 700 conscripts)
United Kingdom	135 Tornado F-3	98 Tornado 54 Jaguar 50 Harrier		29 Tornado 7 Canberra 13 Jaguar	7 ESD Sentry 3 Nimrod	55 C-130 3 Tristar	6 Tristar 13 VC-10 5 C-130		26 Nimrod	72 500
TOTAL AIRCRAFT	783 7 types	1 191 13 types	841 5 types	238 10 types	33 5 types	360 12 types	24 3 types	23 4 types	125 7 types	

1. In several forces dual use strike/air defence is unstated but available.
2. Does not include smaller transport/communications aircraft.

3. Dual use transport/air-to-air refuelling may be available but not listed.
4. States which did not respond.

*Strength and inventory of national airforces*¹

	Airforce	Avg. annual flying hours	Fighter ground attack	Interceptor	Reconnaissance	Transport	Helicopters
Belgium.....	12 100	165 (combat pilots)	4 sqn	2 sqn	1 sqn	2 sqn	5
France.....	89 800	180 (fighter/FGA pilots)	9 sqn	9 sqn	2 sqn	20 sqn	137
Germany.....	82 900	150 (Tornado aircrews)	8 sqn	7 sqn	–	4 sqn	130
Greece	26 800	–	6 sqn	10 sqn	1 sqn	3 sqn	22
Italy	73 300	–	8 sqn	7 sqn	1 sqn	3 sqn	122
Netherlands	9 000	180 (F-16 aircrews)	8 sqn	1 sqn	1 sqn	1 sqn	54
Norway.....	7 900	–	4 sqn	1 sqn	–	2 sqn	34
Portugal.....	11 000	–	4 sqn	–	–	4 sqn	31
Spain	28 400	180 (EF-18/Mirage F-1) 165 (F-5)	4 sqn	8 sqn	–	7 sqn	51
Turkey	56 800	–	14 sqn	6 sqn	2 sqn	6 sqn	173
United Kingdom.....	75 700	220 (FGA)	5 sqn (FGA/Bomber) 6 sqn	6 sqn	2 sqn	5 sqn	186

1. Source: IISS Military Balance 1994.

cribed as "current", i.e. fully capable of immediate involvement in operational activity, but this information is not included since adequate response was not received in time. Had the necessary request been dispatched earlier, then this important aspect of the matter could have been very usefully included.

12. The Assembly might care to note that the Rapporteur felt it to be essential to avoid reliance on published reference since, in a number of cases at least, the open record available may not reveal an entirely accurate picture for reduction in strength has been made in several services since such works were published.

13. It should also be understood that statements simply conveying aircraft strengths could be misleading. If such aircraft were inadequately maintained then the numbers which are readily available could be very much less than in services where maintenance is satisfactory and availability of spares is significant. The same comment could be applied to aircrew. If training and flying hours have been limited then availability is very much affected. Both the quality and nature of the flying is also relevant. If such flights are made to avoid complex manoeuvres and highest speeds then that training is less relevant and the Assembly should not assume that the military capacity is quite so great as mere numbers might suggest. With these reservations in mind, it would be appropriate for relevant information about the position in each member state to be considered.

14. It should be noted that these lists may not offer an accurate assessment of serviceability of aircraft or competence and currency of aircrew.

15. There do seem to be grounds to believe that the quality of aircrew training might be questionable, for example, where training at low altitudes is prevented or inhibited then there are grounds to question capabilities and it is suggested that this may be further considered in the report which is recommended for one of the part sessions in 1997. It does seem questionable that some airforces lack relevant experience.

16. A further note of caution is expressed in regard to the accessibility and stocks of spare parts. There is some anxiety that supplies of this kind may not always be readily available if extensive need arose. No doubt this matter could be further considered in the suggested follow-up report.

17. It could also be noted that the inventory of aircraft types within some member states reveals a considerable range stretching from ancient to modern.

18. Certain anxieties may develop not least in regard to air-to-air refuelling capacity since such provision enables range and operational duration to be effectively extended.

III. Demands

19. Substantial demands have been placed upon and met by some WEU member states' air forces. This is illustrated by the experience of the United Kingdom's airforce.

20. In order to maintain adequate levels of experience, substantial participation in NATO exercises continues. Between April 1993 and March 1994, the Royal Air Force took part in thirty NATO exercises and thirty bilateral exercises with other partner states.

21. Locations of these exercises varied. Forty-two were in Europe but exercises also took place in Alaska, Canada, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Belize and Australia.

22. Such exercises are essential parts of training and help to fulfil the need for co-operation between member states' airforces.

23. That co-operation is necessary in the fulfilment of obligations as with Operation Warden which commenced in September 1991 and involves the continuing commitment as part of the international force engaged in the policing of Northern Iraq under the terms of the agreement made after the Gulf conflict. The Royal Air Force has flown over 3 000 sorties and well over 6 000 hours in this theatre.

24. Operation Jural began in August 1992 in supervision of the air exclusion zone over southern Iraq (south of latitude 32 N). Well over 6 000 hours have been flown by the Royal Air Force detachments with around 2 500 sorties.

25. Operation Cheshire describes the large number of flights made by RAF Hercules aircraft carrying supplies in the humanitarian relief of Sarajevo. This effort began in July 1992 and thousands of sorties have been flown in addition to many others to various airfields in former Yugoslavia.

26. Operation Sharp Guard – the monitoring of activities over and around former Yugoslavia involved the deployment of E-3D and Nimrod aircraft of the RAF from July 1992.

27. Operation Deny Flight followed Sharp Guard and involves the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. RAF Tornado F3 and Jaguar combat aircraft and VC10 and Tristar tankers have been deployed since this responsibility commenced in April 1993. The Jaguar and Tornado sorties involved in this exercise approach 2 000 hours.

28. During the last two years, every type of operational aircraft in the RAF has been committed to operations and these demands must have required more flying hours than were previously authorised or anticipated.

29. These additional strains may provide emphasis not only of the need for adequate stores, supply and maintenance programmes but they underline the necessity of a programme of replacement aircraft for both operational and logistic purposes.

30. It is interesting that as this report is being completed exercise Purple Nova is underway. This involves aircraft from France, Portugal, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The command centre is at joint headquarters, Northwood. It may be the first formal WEU air exercise.

IV. Conclusions

31. I would have preferred to have submitted a fuller and more detailed report. Unfortunately, the brief questionnaire I compiled in December 1993

was not sent out until late spring and then it omitted a question concerning the numbers of aircrew regarded as "current" – the numbers readily available for operational flying in the particular aircraft type.

32. It is also unfortunate that as late as early November, as I write this, a number of member states have not yet provided the necessary information. As far as these countries are concerned the information listed is that available from public sources, information which the Rapporteur considers may be a little out of date, since during the present year a number of member states have effected significant cuts in provision or proposed reduction in relevant areas of expenditure.

33. Again, it would be appropriate for a further report to be prepared in due course. This could allow the Assembly to consider the actual reality of

A European defence policy

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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on a European defence policy

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. Members of the committee: Mr. *Baumel* (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bianchi, *Borderas*, Briane, Brito, *Cox*, Dees, Dolazza, Dumont, *Fernandes Marques*, *Hardy*, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Parisi, Péciaux, Petruccioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate: *Cuco*), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, *Sir Keith Speed*, MM. Steiner, López Valdivielso (Alternate: *López Henares*), Vazquez (Alternate: *Bolinaga*), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Draft Recommendation
on a European defence policy

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as announced in the declaration on Western European Union attached to the Maastricht Treaty;
- (ii) Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;
- (iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been developed;
- (iv) Stressing that the operational rôle of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the ambitions set out in the Maastricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational rôle is due partly to the lack of political guidance from a common European defence policy on which it should be based;
- (v) Stressing that the transformation of NATO, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at NATO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;
- (vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NATO and not replace a failing NATO;
- (vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO is accompanied by a reduction in WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recalling that the possibility of making NATO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
- (ix) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inventory may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
- (x) Recognising that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks while at the same time defence budgets are being reduced in most European states, perhaps even in some cases below a level compatible with the maintenance of credible armed forces;
- (xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
- (xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided significant opportunities for the countries concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible future WEU operations of all kinds;
- (xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time stressing that WEU should pay closer attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic dialogue;
- (xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia, should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and military level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
- (xv) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks for the United Nations forces on the ground;

(xvi) Regretting the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;

(xvii) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in Iraq and the decision of the United States to stop policing the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the rôle of the Secretary-General, while at the same time defining clearly WEU's responsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NATO;
2. Reinforce the operational rôle of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staff and providing it with the appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active rôle in the Planning Cell, in particular by drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equipment on the African continent and to take responsibility to train African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought to a common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting of a white paper on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying the rôle, tasks, joint command structures and political/military interface procedures of WEU for approval at a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states in 1996 at the latest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative programmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German armaments agency now being established;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In the Kirchberg declaration of 24th May 1994, the WEU Council tasked the Permanent Council "to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands".

2. The Assembly greatly welcomed this initiative and expressed its wish to play an active rôle in the formation of this common European defence policy. It is recalled here that in Article J4 of the Treaty on European Union the Union requested WEU, as an integral part of the development of the Union, "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".

3. In the declaration on Western European Union which is attached to the Treaty on European Union, the WEU member states agreed "to strengthen the rôle of WEU in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance". They also stated that WEU would "formulate a common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational rôle".

4. According to the last paragraph of the abovementioned Article J4, the provisions of this article "may be revised (...) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then".

5. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, WEU started to implement the abovementioned declaration on WEU and an important first step was made with the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, which in particular laid the foundations for the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle. It appears, however, that the member states were far more reluctant to formulate a common European defence policy which logically should have preceded the future development of WEU's operational rôle. The timely initiative of the Council to start work on this issue is therefore fully endorsed by the Assembly and in the present report an effort is made to discuss a number of issues which are bound to play a rôle in Europe's common defence policy.

6. The transformation of NATO, set in motion after the fall of the Berlin wall, is considered to be of vital importance. In addition to providing more flexible forces for many new and different tasks, it also envisages including the states of Central and Eastern Europe in a process of building security in an area which extends far beyond that covered by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, it is emphasised that, without the transformation of NATO, WEU will not be able to play a significant operational rôle. Prospects for the CSCE as an all-encompassing European security forum are reviewed. For a discussion of the issues related to the enlargement of NATO and WEU, reference is made to a parallel report of the Assembly's Political Committee¹.

7. The present state of affairs in Russia, in particular as related to defence issues and the specific position of the Baltic states, is discussed succinctly. Then follows the inevitable inventory of major risks and threats to European security.

8. Finally, an account is given of developments in WEU and its member states.

II. The transformation of NATO

(a) The early phase

9. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, the Atlantic Alliance understood that it had to transform itself from a purely defensive organisation, created to protect its members against a massive attack from the East, into something quite different.

10. The foundations for this transformation were formulated in the London declaration of 5th and 6th July 1990. While maintaining the original objective of providing common defence, it was thought that the alliance should also help build structures of a more united European continent, "supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the right of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes"².

11. Reaffirming that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, it sought

1. A European security policy – report submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, Document 1439.

2. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 2.

to enhance the political component of the alliance as provided for by Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It recognised that: "The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe³".

12. It was decided that NATO should build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe and extend the hand of friendship to the countries of the East which were its adversaries.

13. Arms control agreements were considered essential and, with their implementation, the alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy would change fundamentally to include the following elements:⁴

- "NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up large forces if and when they might be needed."

14. Important decisions were also taken to reduce the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons⁴.

15. Finally, it was stated that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe. A number of recommendations regarding the rôle and institutionalisation of the CSCE were made, which were formalised at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris, in November 1990.

16. A new allied military strategy would be prepared "moving away from forward defence, where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons"⁶.

3. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 3.

4. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 14.

5. This subject has been dealt with in a recent Assembly report: The rôle and future of nuclear weapons, Rapporteur Mr. De Decker, Document 1420.

6. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 20.

Copenhagen meeting, June 1991

17. One year later, the North Atlantic Council met in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991 providing an opportunity for a first evaluation of a changed security environment in Europe. Although the general feeling could still be called optimistic, it was clear that the first lines of division in the "Europe whole and free" of the London declaration became visible. Certain Central European states were seeking to establish a close relationship with, if not membership of, NATO. These states were still feeling uncomfortable with the Soviet Union at their eastern frontiers and were trying to obtain formal security guarantees from the alliance. For a number of reasons, the alliance was reluctant to provide NATO membership or security guarantees and in Copenhagen it could only state that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe."

18. It further stated that: "The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris."

19. Common security, it said, could best be safeguarded through "the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements."

20. Furthermore, it stated that it did not "wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free"⁷.

21. The alliance strongly emphasised the central rôle of the CSCE "in expanding the network of co-operative relationships across Europe". In particular, it would try "to reinforce the CSCE's potential for conflict-prevention, crisis-management and the peaceful settlement of disputes by appropriate means".

22. Further steps were also taken to develop a security partnership with the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states.

23. As regards the emerging common European foreign and security policy and defence rôle, the final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen stated that the alliance would "develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance. There will be a need, in particular, to establish

7. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th and 7th June 1991, paragraph 3.

appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security”⁸.

24. In fact, this paragraph reflects the clear determination of the Bush administration to maintain its influence on new developments in the establishment of a European defence identity.

Rome declaration, November 1991

25. In the Rome declaration, issued by the heads of state and of government on 7th and 8th November 1991, the concept of a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America in order to prevent instability and divisions was confirmed. A new strategic concept was published along the lines set out in the London declaration and it was stated that the alliance’s security was “based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability”⁹.

26. The declaration stated that “the development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance”¹⁰.

27. The enhancement of the rôle and responsibilities of the European members was called “an important basis for the transformation of the alliance”. On the other hand, it was stated that the alliance was “the essential forum for consultation among its members”.

28. Further, it was stated that the alliance’s new strategic concept “should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process”¹¹.

29. As a next step in the alliance’s relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance announced the establishment of a more institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation on political and security issues in the framework of a North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

8. Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 6th and 7th June 1991, paragraph 3.

9. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 4.

10. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 6.

11. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 7.

30. Finally, the alliance was said to remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process “which has a vital rôle to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe”¹². It made many suggestions to enhance the CSCE’s rôle.

(b) NATO’s co-operation programmes: NACC, PFP and the issue of enlargement

31. Implementing NATO’s November 1991 summit meeting in Rome, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was created in December 1991 assembling the NATO member states, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union. NACC, with its annual work plans, provides the allies with an excellent opportunity to give support for reforms through practical assistance in a broad range of activities while building confidence through increased contacts. The annual work plans include consultations on security-related matters and extensive military contacts.

32. Very soon, however, experience showed that these activities had given rise to a dynamic process which obliged NATO to move faster than initially thought. There was also a need for more flexibility in the co-operation process which would enable programmes to be set up that were adapted to the individual needs and wishes of the different participants without giving up NACC’s general co-operation programme.

33. The Brussels summit meeting of January 1994 therefore created the partnership for peace (PFP) with significantly different scope and intensity, while remaining within the overall framework of NACC.

34. According to its framework document, the objectives of the PFP are:

- (i) to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- (ii) to ensure democratic control of defence forces;
- (iii) to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- (iv) to develop co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises¹³

12. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 13.

13. The first exercises of this kind have meanwhile been held in Poland and the Netherlands.

in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and

- (v) to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

35. Slightly different from the NACC, the PFP has been designed to provide the partners with an opportunity to develop progressively closer relations with the alliance on the basis of their own interest and actual performance.

36. It is also noted that, although the PFP does not provide the formal security guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the framework document contains an article similar to Article 4 providing for a commitment to consult with any active participant if a partner perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

37. In order to carry out the military co-ordination and planning needed for the implementation of PFP programmes, a Co-ordination Cell has been established at Mons, near SHAPE, where representatives of the participating countries are now taking office. Liaison offices for NACC/PFP partners are being established in permanent facilities at NATO's headquarters in Brussels.

38. The framework document, which is a public text, common to all partners and setting out the objectives of the programme, has at present (October 1994) been signed by 23 countries. Of these, 14 partners have submitted their presentation document which addresses the political and military aspects of the partnership, provides an indication of the co-operative activities and indicates military forces and other assets available for PFP activities. With four partners, an individual partnership programme has been developed.

39. A Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) has been established to facilitate the implementation and, if need be, co-ordination of the different individual programmes.

40. The PFP could eventually lead to membership for some partner states although it is emphasised that this is not an automatic consequence of a country's decision to participate. Implementation of the PFP has only just begun and NATO and its partners should allow time to bring it to fruition. While emphasising that a future enlargement of the organisation to include Central and Eastern European countries is not excluded, most NATO member states think that it would be premature to set a timetable for this process. Enlargement, it is said, will have to be co-ordinated with Russia and it should be done only if it improved stability in

Europe. It is also noted that at present any decision to enlarge would, for a number of reasons, involve a choice to include some nations, excluding others. Ratification of a limited enlargement by the 16 member states might not be a smooth and swift process and there might even be divisions between members over the fundamental issues at stake. A premature discussion of enlargement issues might also lead to divisive debates over the rôle of Russia and its thoughts and ambitions and jeopardise a difficult but very important and precious process of co-operation with Russia.

(c) Combined joint task forces and the transformation of NATO

41. A major step forward on the road towards the creation of operational capabilities for WEU was taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 1994.

42. At this summit meeting, it was decided that the alliance's organisation and resources would be adjusted so as to facilitate the development of WEU as the defence component of the European Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood ready to make collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations.

43. In their declaration, the heads of state and of government further said: " We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations... " To improve, among other things co-operation with WEU and to reflect the emerging European security and defence identity, they endorsed " the concept of combined joint task forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the alliance ".

44. The North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, was directed to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. In co-ordination with WEU, it would work on implementation in a manner that would provide " separable but not separate " military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU.

45. The CJTF plan calls upon the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic to designate a notional general officer and headquarters staff that could be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure. NATO " would then deploy them to a theatre of operations for the purpose of conducting the command and control of a contingency. "

46. In an early working definition, military authorities at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters as a deployable, multinational, multiservice head-

quarters of variable size, formed to command joint forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NATO nations, for the purpose of conducting peace operations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO CJTF headquarters could also be detached for European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed that, for the composition of a CJTF headquarters, elements will be drawn from CINCENT, AFSOUTH and AFNORTHWEST.

47. In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the WEU Council stated that:

“ They welcomed the summit’s endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU’s own planning procedures and capabilities.

Ministers stressed the importance of work under way in WEU on the WEU-related aspects of the adaptation of the alliance structures. In order to enhance WEU’s ability to carry out the tasks defined in the Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed the approach to identify the assets and capabilities required to perform the necessary military functions.

Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command.

While recalling their commitment to strengthen the operational capabilities of WEU, they also agreed that WEU would benefit from careful management of resources as well as existing standardised procedures.

Ministers requested the Permanent Council to take discussions on these matters forward as fast as possible with a view to the timely presentation of joint positions into the process of consultation in the alliance.”

48. The final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at Istanbul, 9th June 1994, made it clear that little progress had been made on this subject:

“ Close co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and WEU will continue to be developed in accordance with principles of complementarity and transparency. The summit decisions have set the course for

our co-operation, including the readiness of the alliance to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy.”

49. After thorough preparation by a specific CJTF political-military working group, on 29th June 1994, WEU tabled a document with its guiding principles for the implementation of the CJTF concept. Since then, little progress has been made and no decisions regarding this subject were taken at the Seville meeting of NATO’s defence ministers on 28th-30th September 1994.

50. Initially, it was hoped that final conclusions on the CJTF concept could be presented to NATO’s defence ministers by the end of 1994, but in view of the slow progress being made, only an interim report will be presented. Final decisions are now expected to be taken in late spring 1995.

51. It was pointed out in an earlier Assembly report¹⁴ that CJTF will make little sense for WEU if the organisation fails to create the appropriate political-military infrastructure to deal with it effectively. Even if some progress has been made, existing infrastructure is still largely ad hoc.

52. For command and control of operations as envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic interface is required between political and military structures, an element still missing in WEU. The prevailing command and control regulations in WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc basis, lacking universality.

53. While CJTFs were originally conceived as mechanisms for providing command and control for non-Article 5, out-of-area operations, there is a growing feeling in NATO that non-Article 5 operations may easily develop into Article 5 operations. Most NATO authorities are therefore in favour of robust CJTFs, which could also provide complete command and control for a large-scale alliance operation. This idea is running counter to the original idea of having adaptable structures and flexible procedures conceived to be used in relatively minor but possibly complicated and autonomous, multinational operations.

54. NATO’s SACEUR, General Joulwan, has stated that he wants specific authority to approve any operational requirements for a CJTF, but it should be noted that this would leave any European operation without participation of the transatlantic allies still completely dependent on the decision of a United States commander. It really seems illogical to have an American general as

14. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur, Document 1421.

the linchpin of Europe's security and defence identity.

55. In recent negotiations, however, some progress has been made, *inter alia* because the United States has relinquished its emphasis on the rôle of major NATO command, while adopting a more positive approach to the flexible modular concept.

56. It is also noted that CJTF makes little sense without a European command, including a general staff reflecting the armed forces commitments of each of the participating nations with the preparation of political decisions and operational planning in the hands of the Europeans.

57. In order to solve a number of these and other outstanding questions, it has been proposed to start experimental exercises with CJTF general staffs.

58. Altogether it is quite clear that the Atlantic Alliance quite naturally prefers to maintain existing structures insofar as possible, while among Europeans there is insufficient consensus to present a distinct and logical European view. In fact, in negotiating the implementation of the CJTF concept, WEU is working out details for its operational rôle while the basis for this rôle, a coherent European defence policy, has not yet been established. Here again, with agreement on the general principles of a future redistribution of rôles and responsibilities, it appears difficult to mobilise the consensus needed to put them into practice.

(d) France and NATO

59. In particular, since last year, France has made certain moves in the direction of NATO, indicating that it was prepared to give up some long-standing taboos as regards this organisation.

60. The French Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, signed an agreement with SACEUR enabling the French division in the European corps to be placed under NATO command in certain circumstances. Also, since 1993, the French representation at NATO has been participating in meetings of military organs which may have consequences for French armed forces deployed in such operations as in former Yugoslavia.

61. At the end of September 1994, the French Defence Minister, François Léotard, attended a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Seville for the first time since France withdrew from the integrated military structures of NATO. There should be no misunderstandings regarding this development in France's position towards NATO. France will keep clear of NATO's integrated military structures and will decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is appropriate for the defence minister or the chief-of-staff to attend meetings of the Atlantic Alliance's organs.

62. On 1st July 1994, France created a French military mission under General Patrick Woillez at CINCNORTHWEST, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Western Europe, at High-Wycombe, which combines the former CINCNORTH¹⁵ and CINCUKAIR¹⁶ in the framework of the restructuring of the different allied commands in Europe.

63. In 1993, France had already created a military mission with CINCSOUTH, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, some of whose units are involved in monitoring the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic.

64. Since summer 1994, France also has a military mission with CINCENT, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe in Brunssum.

65. At the same time, it should be noted that the increased French participation in NATO is closely linked with the implementation of NATO's January 1994 decisions to adapt its structures and to make arrangements which should enable WEU to act on its own, making use of NATO assets without being subjected to NATO command.

66. France considers the possibility of joint action with the transatlantic partners as being of great importance for the security of the European continent. Shared values and solidarity are the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance which are still vital.

67. However, it should be noted, as stated by the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur¹⁷, that the alliance cannot do everything. It should not stand in the way of a proper European defence identity and should leave room for Europeans to act on their own if they wish and are able to do so.

68. If the United States and Canada wish to act together with their European allies, then NATO is the appropriate framework. In that case, France would not hesitate to co-operate, but for France to be fully available, two conditions must be met:

- NATO should be transformed, in particular in the field of peace-keeping, where the usual mechanisms of the integrated structure cannot be used, along the lines decided by the alliance's summit meeting in January 1994;
- member states must be prepared to deploy their forces in joint action in order to defend peace and liberty should the need arise.

15. Commander-in-Chief North Europe, commanding the allied forces of Norway and the Baltic coast.

16. Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Air Force, commanding the airforce of the United Kingdom, attached to NATO.

17. Address of the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, at the IHEDN on 8th September 1994.

III. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

69. What has become of the CSCE's rôle after the signing of the Charter of Paris in November 1990 and the many initiatives taken since then to strengthen the CSCE process and to enhance its rôle?

70. Apparently, in recent years the CSCE has not been able to play the key rôle attributed to it after the collapse of the Berlin wall.

71. What has happened and what are its prospects at present?

72. Indeed, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, in particular the "third basket" with its focus on human rights, it has been a key instrument in the unravelling of the dictatorship in the Soviet Union and its firm control of its Warsaw Pact allies. However, once that process was accomplished, expectations of its rôle in maintaining peace and stability in Europe have been far too high.

73. It should be noted that despite many efforts made in the recent past, the CSCE's core structure has remained weak. Its different institutions are scattered all over Europe, the permanent staff is far too small to provide internal strength and continuity and the position of its Secretary-General is such that this official has only administrative responsibilities and no real authority.

74. Recent history has demonstrated that it has only been able to play a useful rôle in crises or conflicts where both parties were convinced that consultations and negotiations were the only possible way to find a satisfactory solution.

75. In fact, while theoretically it has a unique potential for an effective rôle in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, this has come to almost nothing because of the attitude of Russia which is clearly determined to re-establish its influence in what it calls its "near abroad", to name only Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. A notable exception should be made for the successful CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, where it helped defuse tension between ethnic Russians and the indigenous population, but here clearly both parties had understood that there was no other solution.

76. In the preparatory negotiations for the CSCE summit in Budapest (30th November – 1st December 1994), Russia had proposed the creation of a CSCE Security Council with permanent seats including a veto right as well as a system under which limited groups of states would handle issues of direct concern to them. Furthermore, Russia had proposed that the CIS be recognised as equivalent to the CSCE, NATO and the European

Union, and that Russia or CIS peace-keeping activities be supported by the rest of the CSCE.

77. It soon appeared that these proposals were not supported by a majority of other CSCE member states.

78. Speaking at the opening of the CSCE review conference in Budapest on 10th October 1994, Mr. Yuri Ouchakov, the head of the Russian delegation, said that the CSCE should be the "major moving force in European security" but that there was no need to set up a "hierarchical system". Apparently, Russia has understood that there is little chance of transforming the CSCE into Europe's most powerful security structure with the CIS, NATO and WEU subordinated to it. The present review conference will provide an important indication of the success or failure of Russia's diplomatic offensive.

79. It is known that Russia is seeking international support for its peace-keeping operations in its near abroad, where it recently has been playing at both arsonist and fireman. In particular, Russia is asking for a CSCE mandate to act as mediator and peace-keeper in disputes in former Soviet states.

80. On this specific issue, the policy of both European countries and the United States has been particularly ambiguous and unhelpful. It seems that no one is prepared to give Russia a free hand in these matters, but on the other hand it is quite clear that neither Western European states nor the United States are prepared to send their soldiers to Tajikistan to co-operate with Russian troops in what is, to say the least, a doubtful peace-keeping mission.

81. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, approved Russia's peace-keeping rôle within the CIS, while stressing that it fell short of the best solution for settling disputes in the region. She stated that the burden of proof was on Russia to demonstrate that what it sees as peace-keeping activities are benign, but she made it clear that the United States was prepared to accept the continued presence of Russian peace-keeping forces in the more volatile republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

82. According to Mrs. Albright, it would be preferable for the United Nations to police the trouble spots in the former Soviet Union, but she added that this was impractical because of the demands on its resources¹⁸.

83. One month later, at the CSCE review conference, the United States delegate, Sam Brown, said that if Russia wanted international approval for such peace-keeping activities, it would have to be genuinely and independently

18. Financial Times, 7th September 1994.

invited to intervene in conflicts and its intervention would have to be for a limited duration and with clear goals.

84. Germany, speaking on behalf of the European Union, proposed strengthening the CSCE by suggesting members use its conflict-resolution mechanisms.

85. Altogether, it seems that the most promising part of the CSCE's activities may be conflict-prevention. In this field, the CSCE has established a number of procedures and mechanisms intended to provide early warning of tensions of any kind which may lead to crisis or conflict. An important element of early warning within the CSCE framework is the "intensive use of regular, in-depth political consultations" for which the possibilities were expanded with the establishment, in December 1993, of the CSCE's Permanent Committee in Vienna, which now meets at least once a week in a formal session. The two-yearly review conference, such as the present conference in Budapest, also offers an opportunity to examine possible violations of CSCE commitments and the degree of implementation of confidence- and security-building measures can also serve as an early warning indicator.

86. The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities plays an important rôle with his two-fold mission, on the one hand of trying to contain and de-escalate tensions concerning minority issues and on the other alerting the CSCE whenever such tensions threaten to develop to such a level that he would not be able to contain them with the means at his disposal.

87. The conclusion of a European stability pact, which is now being negotiated at different regional round table conferences, will contribute another important element in the CSCE conflict-prevention mechanism.

88. On the other hand, it should be emphasised here that in the timely exchange of information over rising tensions, early consultations over possible crisis situations and efforts to prevent conflicts, European states, also within WEU, have an individual responsibility which they cannot simply pass on to the CSCE and it would seem that in this respect there is still room for improvement.

IV. The situation in Russia

(a) Position of the armed forces in Russia

89. In Russia, the military accounts for some 1.7 million men and women; police and paramilitary account for another 1 million. During the Soviet era, the country was militarised to a high degree and it is well known that the industry's best plants were geared to produce weaponry, while the best engineers, technicians and scien-

tists were set to work on military output and research.

90. There can be little wonder that the legacy of this huge defence machine is causing numerous problems for the present government. Its main tasks in this field are to redefine the rôle of the Russian military in the post-cold war world, to restructure the armed forces and to convert the industry from being defence oriented towards one responding to a civilian consumer market. A first step was taken recently with the publication of a new military doctrine.

91. Notwithstanding its present-day problems, Russia still regards itself as a superpower and a regional leader. On the other hand, it feels liable to be isolated by surrounding states, vulnerable and deprived of protection. Naturally, it is therefore trying to protect itself by concluding agreements with the newly independent former Soviet republics to have their borders policed by Russian troops as well as by native border guards.

92. Isolation from the international community from which it is expecting help and support in the process of transforming the country's economy and society would be disastrous for Russia. This is a good reason why both the government and the military are interested in international co-operation, be it on a multi- or bilateral basis.

93. On the other hand there are concerns that positive public declarations, in particular in the field of disarmament, are not always followed up by action. Recently, on 16th September 1994, the Clinton administration decided to put off new strategic arms reduction talks with Russia because of uncertainties of reform in Russia and the slow pace of nuclear weapons reductions. It should be noted indeed that the START II treaty has not yet been ratified. On 28th September, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to speed up the timetable for the 1993 START II agreement, saying that their countries would begin to dismantle the warheads as soon as that agreement was ratified, but this can barely be called a new development¹⁹.

94. The United States administration is also suspicious that Russia is still concealing its efforts to develop binary chemical weapons, despite its pledge in an understanding on chemical weapons reached between the United States and Russia in 1989 to disclose details of its poison gas programme to the United States. Apparently, Russia also has problems in devising an effective plan to destroy its huge 40 000 ton stock of chemical weapons agents²⁰.

19. International Herald Tribune, 29th September 1994.

20. International Herald Tribune, 24th June 1994.

95. Most recently, on 18th October 1994, the Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Questions of Geopolitics, Victor U. Ustinov, stated that preparations for destroying the stock were "slack and inefficient". He said that no destruction technology had been fully developed and that there was no central management nor control of the programme. Storehouses may be completely inadequate within five years. Mr. Ustinov also suggested that co-operation in this field with the United States might have to be intensified. The Defence Committee planned to ask President Yeltsin to speed up the submission of draft laws on chemical disarmament.

96. For the time-being, conscription will be maintained even though there is widespread evasion, but there are not enough financial resources to implement the long-term objective of creating a professional army. At present, there is a huge oversupply of officers and generals compared to other ranks while the officers often remain badly housed and sporadically paid.

97. On 31st August 1994, the last Russian troops left Estonia and Latvia under an earlier agreement which had been negotiated with some difficulty. While at the peak of its power, the Soviet Union had about 350 000 troops stationed at over 1 000 military bases in the three Baltic states, then an integral part of the empire. Russia will now leave only 210 military behind to dismantle the nuclear submarine base at Paldiski in Estonia and about 300 at the Skrunda radar installation in Latvia up until the end of the century.

98. This does not mean, however, that all problems between Russia and these two Baltic states have been solved. Most Latvians are not satisfied with the continuing presence of Russian military at Skrunda, Russia is accusing Latvia of discriminating against Russian citizens in its citizenship law and there is no final agreement over the question whether Estonia will grant residency to the 10 000 retired Russian military personnel on Estonian soil. Moreover, Russia and Estonia are still involved in a dispute over their common border.

99. Also at the end of August, the last Russian soldiers left German soil where, before the collapse of the Berlin wall, 400 000 Soviet troops had been stationed.

100. With the accomplishment of these troop withdrawals, it is the first time now since 1939 that Russia has no soldiers west of its state borders which are roughly the same as those it had three centuries ago.

101. It goes without saying that these inevitable consequences of the end of the cold war have caused some uneasy feelings in the ranks of both politicians and military in Russia.

102. All in all, some 640 000 military of the former Red Army have been withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe and now independent former Soviet republics since 1990, of which around 240 000 came back to Russia in 1994. With little to do and often non-existent or insufficient housing, chaos and general discontent is increasing in the armed forces.

103. Morale in the armed forces is said to be low. Budget cuts have limited the number of exercises and the state of readiness is thought to be low.

104. A recent extensive survey of Russia's senior military officers, carried out for the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, has clearly demonstrated that the military do not feel at ease with Russia's place in the world and with their own place in Russia. Although they do not endorse the more extreme nationalist politicians and parties, they are overwhelmingly in favour of a strong hand to guide the state and evidently feel that such a hand is lacking at present.

105. In popularity ratings, President Yeltsin scored a little over 25% with a disapproval rating of 50%, while Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, scored 20% with a disapproval rating of more than 50%. Most military were very pessimistic over the immediate future with possibilities of uprisings, strikes and a putsch but few foresaw a return to socialism, the cold war or a planned economy. Understandably, the most popular foreign policy goal, endorsed by 55%, was the re-establishment of Russia as a great power enjoying respect throughout the world²¹.

106. Traditional loyalty and subservience to civilian leadership has not yet been broken, but the danger is greater than before.

107. The government publicly suspects a number of generals and other military of misappropriation of funds attributed to the armed forces. It is said that frequently billions (milliards) of roubles disappear. A recently published report of the Deputy Military General Attorney, Grigori Nossov, mentions the names and other details of military accused of fraud, embezzlement, active corruption and misappropriation of funds²².

108. Russia's top brass is losing its grip over regional commanders throughout the former Soviet Union. Its efforts to oust the Commander of the 14th army in the Trans Dniestr enclave on three different occasions in August 1994, remained unsuccessful, to name only one example²³.

21. Financial Times, 8th September 1994.

22. Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.

23. Financial Times, 6th September 1994.

(b) Defence spending

109. At the end of June 1994, the Russian budget for 1994 passed both Houses of Parliament. According to initial figures, total spending would amount to 194.5 trillion roubles (\$ 97.25 billion), with military spending fixed at about 40 trillion roubles (\$ 20 billion). The parliament, supported by the Russian military, had demanded a military budget of 55 trillion roubles, an amount the military consider essential to maintain basic effectiveness. Initially, the military had insisted on a budget of 80 trillion roubles.

110. According to the government, the 40 trillion roubles would include 22.1 trillion for basic military financing, 8.5 trillion for arms purchases, 4.8 trillion for capital construction, 2.5 trillion for scientific research and testing and 1.9 trillion for pensions²⁴. At the end of September 1994, the Russian budget, with its income cut almost in half because of a huge shortfall in tax revenues, again came under heavy attack from the military. They say that lack of money is causing Russia to default on its commitments to disarm, because only 22% of the planned budget for disarmament had been received.

111. According to Colonel General Alexander Kuznetsov, in the first nine months of 1994, the Defence Ministry had received only 14.6 trillion roubles, or 53% of the 27.2 trillion roubles it should have received. In a hearing before the State Duma's Defence Committee, the situation in the defence industries was called catastrophic. With 95% of the defence plants having stopped working and no new weapons research work being financed, the Defence Ministry would not receive a newly developed piece of equipment until the year 2000²⁵.

112. The 1994-95 edition of the IISS Military Balance put the complaints of the military into perspective, asserting that Russian defence budgets have been effectively static in real terms since 1992 with "perhaps a small increase in 1994". Contradicting official statistics which show a real decline in defence budgets based on the evidence of GDP decline statistics, the institute has roughly doubled its previous estimates for the 1992 and 1993 Russian defence budgets to \$ 74.6 billion and \$ 76.6 billion, from \$ 39.7 and \$ 29.1 billion respectively, by using a new measure of purchasing-power parity. The figure provided for the 1994 budget is \$ 79 billion, adding that even this estimate makes Russian military expenditure "in real terms substantially higher than that of any country apart from the United States"²⁶.

24. Financial Times, 25th-26th June 1994.

25. Financial Times, 27th September 1994.

26. The Military Balance 1994-95, London 1994.

113. It should also be noted that Russia has not stopped all activities in the development and production of new military equipment.

114. As a consequence of the START agreements, there will be more emphasis on sea-based strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is expected to start the production of a new SSBN, a successor to the Delta III, Delta IV and Typhoon class by the end of this decade.

115. Recently, submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet have resumed their Atlantic Ocean patrols from their Murmansk base. Icelandic authorities stated that for the first time for two years these submarines have shown up in the seas between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Training purposes have been mentioned as the most obvious reason for the resumption of these routine patrol missions²⁷. A recent Norwegian study argues that Russia's northern fleet, based in the Arctic, is emerging as the most important part of the former Soviet navy²⁸.

116. In 1993, the operating tempo of the most modern classes of Russian SSNs and SSBNs did not decline for the first time in six years. In the same year, Russia launched four submarines and another four are expected to be launched in 1994. A new cruise missile will be in operation in the next three or four years and several new anti-ship missiles have been developed²⁹.

117. A new attack aircraft, the Su-34, made its first flight at the end of 1993³⁰ and Mig is developing the MFI future air superiority fighter for the Russian airforce. The funding for several other aircraft development programmes has been made available³¹.

118. On the other hand, a shortage of fuel is affecting the Russian airforce and the whole training programme is only available for the best pilots.

(c) Russia's relations with its near abroad

119. A large part of the Russian political and military elite is seeking ways to reassert the Russian authority to protect former Soviet republics with Russia's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal. To that purpose, the Collective Security Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has endorsed a draft agreement for a military alliance, to be submitted to the CIS leaders in early 1995. This military alliance is intended to provide a shield against "possible aggressive intentions against all CIS participant states".

27. NRC-Handelsblad, 26th August 1994.

28. Financial Times, 7th October 1994.

29. Jane's Defence Weekly, 21st May 1994.

30. Jane's Defence Weekly, 23rd April 1994.

31. Jane's Defence Weekly, 9th April 1994.

The draft agreement calls for the eventual creation of joint armed forces, collective peace-keeping forces and a joint air defence system and would in this way restore a cohesive, co-ordinated military force under unified control and under Russia's nuclear protection.

120. At the same time, Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the Russian parliament's Committee for Commonwealth Affairs, is proposing a strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine, hinting that if such partnership came about, the issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament would not be a top priority for Russia³².

121. It can be argued that Russia's frontiers with the three Baltic states, apart from a still lingering border dispute with Estonia, now have the same legal status as other long-established international frontiers such as those with Finland and Norway.

122. On the other hand, the exact status of Russia's borders with the eleven former Soviet republics linked with Russia in the CIS is still fluid. Five of these eleven states – Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan – have officially agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on their territory. Others agree that they share certain security interests with Russia, while maintaining their attachment to strict sovereignty and independence.

123. On 22nd September 1994, Yevgeny Primakov, the head of Russia's foreign intelligence service, publicly stated that the re-integration of most of the former Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States was an undoubted fact. He added: "If a negative attitude toward this becomes accepted in western capitals, then it could very adversely affect relations between them and Moscow." In the report which he released on this subject, it is said that an economic union of the CIS states is inevitable and a defence and political union desirable, and that such unions would safeguard the independent and democratic development of these states. The report further states that a federal structure would diminish the threat of ethnic and interstate conflicts within the CIS³³.

124. In fact, Russia's endeavours to reintegrate all the former Soviet Republics except the three Baltic states into the CIS, which was created immediately after the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, is clearly meeting with only a lukewarm response from the other partners. The problems are many-fold. Most of the newly independent republics are tied to Russia hand and foot. They lack financial resources, are dependent on Russia's energy supplies and other natural resources, their

industrial production is in shambles and Russia is their natural trading partner. Still, they are reluctant to hand over their national sovereignty to CIS structures. On the other hand, there is Russia which wishes to control the situation in what it repeatedly calls its near abroad, partly also to re-establish its former superpower status on the Eurasian continent. There are clear signs that Russia wants to retain control over the oil export pipelines from vast energy reserves in the Caspian sea region, while some observers assert that it wants to re-exert control over the energy resources of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, it is aware that supporting other CIS republics and the establishment and maintenance of a Russian rouble zone will cost money, which it does not have. A full-blown fiscal crisis (in the first nine months of 1994, the Russian federal government collected only 37.3% of the tax and other revenues it counted on receiving this year) and the steep decline of the rouble in October 1994 are clear indications of the chaotic economic situation in the country.

125. At the last summit meeting of the twelve CIS republics in Moscow on 21st October, a number of new political and economic agreements were signed, but many of the participating states expressed reservations and retained the right to opt out of CIS agreements.

V. The position of the Baltic states

126. After regaining independence in August 1991, the three Baltic states went through a turbulent period in their new relationship with the Soviet Union and later with Russia.

127. The withdrawal of all Russian troops by 31st August 1994 has heralded a new era for these states. Many reports by international bodies, amongst others the Council of Europe and the CSCE, have refuted Russian allegations of infringement of human rights for Russian speakers in the Baltic countries. Certainly, there are obvious problems remaining to be overcome and the Latvian legislation on citizenship is one of these.

128. At present, Russia has fully and wholly recognised the independence of the Baltic states. Any questioning of the integrity of the Baltic states or any serious crisis in relations between Russia and these states would no doubt have an immediate impact on the overall relationship between Russia and the West.

129. On the other hand, strong western support for the efforts of these states to secure their independence and to transform their economies and societies is vital.

130. Understandably, the Baltic states are making great efforts to enhance their security. The

32. International Herald Tribune, 31st August 1994.

33. Financial Times, 22nd September 1994 and Le Monde, 27th September 1994.

objective of all three is full membership of NATO as soon as possible, but everyone knows that this is unlikely to happen at short notice. Not only because NATO would be reluctant to provide security guarantees which it might not be able to put into practice, but also because an extension of NATO's treaty area to the very borders of Russia could play into the hands of Russian hardliners.

131. The next best solution for these countries which they are now implementing is to forge diplomatic and military ties which draw them into the western sphere and out of Russia's orbit. In fact, the Baltic defence strategy is to raise the political price of any Russian interference.

132. All three are participating in the partnership for peace and a Baltic battalion, which will be trained by Scandinavian and British soldiers, is being created for United Nations peace-keeping operations.

133. In this framework, they have to completely rebuild and reform their armed forces. This is a tall order, since there are no indigenous military structures and there is a lack of equipment and proper barracks. Moreover, most of the regular officers have served in the Soviet armed forces and are used to a different military culture and doctrine, not compatible with those of western forces. The most urgent need of all three Baltic states in the defence field is therefore to have their military trained according to western standards.

134. A sensitive problem which has been pushed to the backstage at present, but will return to a more prominent position in the future is the situation of the Russian region of Kaliningrad, which has common borders with Poland and Lithuania and not with Russia. Kaliningrad is playing an important rôle as a transit camp for Russian troops which have been withdrawn from Central European countries.

135. Lithuania and Russia are now negotiating transit arrangements for the transport of Russian troops and equipment from Kaliningrad to the mainland of Russia. This issue is causing acrimonious debates in Lithuania.

136. With the exception of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Union of Poles, all political groups represented in the Lithuanian parliament have demanded of President Algirdas Brazauskas that no agreement be signed with Russia on military transit and that Lithuania limit itself to the regulations which it had made earlier. The CSCE might play a rôle in guaranteeing the smooth pursuit of the operation.

137. On 27th September 1994, the representative of Lithuania raised this transit problem in WEU's Permanent Council and asked the Council to consider the possibility of making WEU observers available to monitor the transit arrangements

once they are agreed between Lithuania and Russia. The proposal was fully supported by the representative of Poland. At that meeting, the Permanent Council agreed to consult national capitals, but since then no further news has filtered through.

138. Once this problem has been solved, one might still wonder how the Kaliningrad area will be able to subsist without direct land connections with mainland Russia and without resources of its own.

VI. The new dividing line in Europe

139. What about the Europe whole and free, so much hailed in the London declaration of 1990? It should be recognised now that this concept has been over optimistic. Indeed, progress has been made through efforts to create frameworks of co-operation and consultation, but there is now an understanding that Russia cannot be an integral part of either NATO or the European Union, if only because of its size. Both organisations would collapse under the weight of Russia's membership.

140. Russia has also clearly understood that there is no room for it in either of these organisations. It has tried in vain to subject them to a European superstructure – the CSCE in which it had proposed a right of veto for itself.

141. Apparently there will be no all-encompassing security system in Europe and there is no denying that a new western and a new eastern group of countries are emerging. On the one hand there is the European Union with WEU which will, in the not too distant future, gradually incorporate the Central and Eastern European countries not belonging to the CIS. On the other hand there is Russia and the now independent former Soviet republics which are members of the CIS.

142. The central challenge for European security is to make sure that this new and inevitable dividing line will not develop into a new line of confrontation. Vague rhetoric over the possibilities of partnership will not help, even less if at the same time this is accompanied by ambiguous language over Russia's ambition to intervene in the near abroad. A policy of words without follow-up would only reinforce the idea that the West is not really interested in security in the former Soviet Union.

143. In this constellation, NATO, the bulwark of western co-operation, seems to be leaning towards a rôle of mediator and all-encompassing organisation, covering all states on both sides with NACC and offering them an à la carte co-operation of much wider scope with its PFP programme.

144. The European Union and Western European Union have chosen a different policy. They cannot and will not stretch further eastward

beyond the borders of the CIS, if only for reasons of internal strength and political and economic coherence. This policy was confirmed at a meeting of twenty-two ministers for foreign affairs in Luxembourg on 31st October 1994.

145. With the states of the CIS, however, they should make sure to maintain the closest possible relations in an atmosphere of full transparency in order to prevent any resurgence of alienation while, at the same time, preparing a framework of narrower relations which could come to fruition in a more distant future when the present situation of political and economic transformation in that part of Europe has settled into a new balance.

146. It seems that the European Union, Western European Union and NATO, in a natural way, have developed different policies which are in no way contradictory but rather complementary and perfectly adapted to the situation today.

VII. Risks and threats to European security

147. Many developments on the Eurasian continent and elsewhere after the fall of the Berlin wall have demonstrated that, despite revolutionary changes, the world has not become more secure than before. Although by now the new risks and threats to Western European security are sufficiently well-known, it seems useful once again to provide an overall review in the framework of the present report.

(a) Balkans

148. It is no secret that the Balkans, with the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia at the centre, will remain an area of interest and instability for many years to come. All the efforts of the contact group (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to present a peace agreement which would be acceptable to the parties involved in the Bosnian conflict have so far been in vain. It would seem that the situation is still deteriorating and that violence is again the only language of first and last resort between the parties.

149. Moreover, the conflict has brought into the open many debates and disagreements between Europe and the United States and also between NATO and the United Nations over the best way to put an end to it and how to act and react in the protection of humanitarian aid, own troops and safe areas.

150. Apart from the violence raging in the Bosnian conflict, unrest is still simmering around Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, where frontiers do not coincide with ethnic populations and where minorities feel threatened by the ruling class.

151. Furthermore, no solution has yet been found for those regions of the republic of Croatia which are occupied and claimed by Serbs. At present, there are rumours that a formal reconciliation between Belgrade and Zagreb is under active consideration, since President Milosevic has come under strong pressure from western countries and Russia to recognise the Croatian government and acknowledge in principle Croatia's territorial integrity³⁴. Recently, a dispute over confiscated Italian properties and other claims of the Italian minority in the peninsula of Istria has divided Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Vojvodina, a region in Serbia where around 300 000 Hungarians are living, is now out of the limelight but it may be a focus of attention at a later stage.

(b) Minorities and frontiers

152. Problems of minorities and frontiers in Central Europe may remain on the agenda for some time to come, but there are hopeful signs.

153. The new socialist-liberal coalition government in Hungary has clearly stated its determination to obtain a historic reconciliation with its neighbours, in particular Slovakia and Romania, where, respectively, more than 500 000 and 1.7 million to over 2 million ethnic Hungarians live. Immediately after coming to power in July 1994, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Horn, paid a visit to Bratislava in September. It is not yet clear, however, what action will be taken by the new Slovakian government.

154. The Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to Budapest in early September 1994 where he used conciliatory language while not hiding the fact that negotiations between the two countries would be long and complicated. Here as well, the situation may become more complicated, now that the ultra-nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity has been included in the government. So far, both Romania and Slovakia have stipulated that the inviolability of frontiers should be written into the bilateral agreements, while Hungary claims guarantees for the rights of minorities. According to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Kovacs, Hungary would be prepared to consider the question of minorities separately in order to accelerate negotiations and to mention it in an annex to the bilateral treaties.

155. The European stability pact, now being negotiated and later to be inserted in the CSCE framework, will certainly play an important rôle in defusing possible tensions between Central and Eastern European states, especially as regards minorities and frontiers.

34. Financial Times, 12th October 1994; Le Monde, 27th October 1994.

(c) Mediterranean

156. The situation in the southern Mediterranean is extremely volatile.

157. In Algeria, since the cancellation in January 1992 of a general election which the fundamentalist Salvation Front was expected to win, an armed Islamic power struggle between Islamic fundamentalists has wrought havoc in the country involving the violent death of thousands of civilians, military and police officers. While the Algerian government says that 10 000 people have been killed since the beginning of the conflict, foreign experts provide estimates of up to 30 000.

158. In spite of more than two and a half years of dour struggle, the government has not succeeded in eliminating Islamists from Algerian politics and eradicating armed Islamic groups. In September 1994, the government released some of the leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), including the two most senior leaders, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, from prison hoping that they could give support to the objective of stopping the violence. It is by no means clear, however, that these leaders can command the loyalty of younger fundamentalists who have taken charge of the armed revolt and until now there have been no signs of the violence diminishing. It is no secret that both the Islamic movement and the government are divided over practically all the main issues now at stake, and negotiations would be long and difficult without there being any guarantee of positive conclusions in sight.

159. Meanwhile, on 29th October, the Algerian President, Liamine Zéroual, publicly declared that the government's efforts to start a dialogue with the Islamist movement had failed, while accusing the representatives of the ISF of having continued to encourage terrorism and extremism. The President announced that presidential elections would be organised before the end of 1995.

160. It remains to be seen how serious the divisions within the Islamic movement are, but there are signs that there is an increasing similarity with the Afghan Islamic movement, which has divided into different camps which fight each other. The recent agitation by the Berber movement will certainly not ease the already tense situation in the country.

161. In the neighbouring countries, Morocco and Tunisia, the situation is still under control, but understandably the governments of both countries are extremely worried over developments in Algeria. The governments of both countries are reluctant to relax their hold on power for fear that Algeria's political unrest might spread across the border. The Algerian government's decision to try and negotiate with the Islamic fundamentalists has only increased these worries.

162. Libya is to a large degree still isolated from the other North African countries, being suspected of secret support for Islamic fundamentalist movements. United Nations sanctions, imposed in November 1993 after Libya failed to co-operate with investigations of the PanAm and UTA disasters over Lockerbie and Niger respectively are troubling the régime of Colonel Kadhafi. The country's annual oil revenues have plummeted from \$ 21 billion a decade ago to \$ 6 billion at present.

163. Egypt too has to cope with a rebellious and violent campaign of Islamic fundamentalists which the government, despite sustained efforts, has not been able to quell.

164. Little progress is being made regarding the situation in Western Sahara. In April 1994, the pro-independence Polisario Front had agreed to abide by United Nations Security Council Resolution 907 for organising a long-delayed referendum on the territory's future before the end of 1994, but recently the process incurred new delays because of Moroccan claims.

165. Although the five-country Arab Maghreb Union³⁵ held its delayed sixth Supreme Council meeting in Tunis on 2nd and 3rd April 1994 with a final communiqué stressing the need to continue working towards the ultimate goal of Maghrebian unity, it appears that, in practice, very little progress has been made.

166. A recent document of the Commission of the European Union rightly says that political, economic and social conditions in a number of North African countries are sources of instability leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime. The Commission has therefore launched a proposal to create a Euro-Mediterranean economic area, akin to the European economic area, set up with the EFTA countries earlier in 1994. In this initiative, the European Commission has proposed to more than double the European Union's aid to help participants restructure their economies. The target date for a full Euro-Mediterranean free trade area is 2010. Meanwhile, special association agreements are being negotiated with Israel, Tunisia and Morocco.

167. It should be noted that North African countries are still worried that they receive less attention from the European Union than the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1993, all non-European Union Mediterranean countries received 407 million ecus in aid, compared with 1.04 billion ecus for Central and Eastern Europe.

168. It seems, however, that with the present volatile situation in mind, WEU cannot sit and

35. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

wait to see what will happen next. It will have to prepare for a situation which may give rise to greater concern over Europe's southern flank than is the case at present.

169. In its Luxembourg meeting on 9th May 1994, the WEU Council, after having stressed "the importance of security and stability in the Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe" agreed "to develop the dialogue already initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean states."

170. This is all very well and the Council's activity and intentions should certainly be welcomed, but one may question the effectiveness of these modest steps, which are little more than an exchange of information with the diplomatic representatives of these countries in Brussels. Moreover, the existing divisions and wide differences of views among the abovementioned countries is almost a guarantee for low effectiveness and little progress in this dialogue.

171. This should not discourage Europeans from continuing their efforts in political dialogue and discussions. The idea of creating a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) in the mould of the successful CSCE should not be discarded, even if its establishment may take a long time.

172. On the other hand, Europe will also have to prepare itself for an even more volatile situation in North Africa, which may result in a direct threat to its southern flank which traditionally has been its soft under-belly. Security and defence policy is not just dialogue, it is also vigilance and preparedness to act physically if circumstances demand.

173. The French-Italian-Spanish initiative for a reaction force in this region should be encouraged and a link should be established between this force and other forces answerable to WEU which could reinforce its operations.

(d) The Caucasus

(i) Georgia

174. The war between Georgia and Abkhazian separatists is only one example of how the military have taken control in different conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. While Georgia's leader, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, was seeking an accommodation with the Abkhazian separatists, his Minister of Defence, Tengiz Kitovani, invaded Abkhazia without his approval. The tide turned when in September 1993 the Abkhazians, supplied with weaponry, money and operational planning by Russians, drove the Georgians back to their own territory. It is generally believed

that hard-liners in the Russian military authorised support to Abkhazians at the time when President Yeltsin was entangled in a serious conflict with hard-liners in the Russian parliament.

175. The only way for Georgia to make Russia stop giving covert aid to Abkhazian separatists was to agree to accept permanent Russian military bases on its soil. At the end of June 1994, President Shevardnadze had to accept 3 000 Russian troops to monitor the border between Georgia and Abkhazia. On 21st July 1994, the presence of these troops was legitimised by the United Nations Security Council, allegedly in exchange for Russian support for an invasion of Haiti by the United States with the backing of the United Nations.

(ii) Nagorno-Karabakh

176. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is still not solved, and it is obvious that a solution can be found only if it has the full agreement of Russia.

177. Recently, negotiations between President Geidar Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Levon Ter-Petrossian of Armenia meeting in Moscow almost reached agreement on a peaceful settlement. Parties involved in the conflict have now asked for an international peace-keeping force to police a cease-fire, but there are still some issues outstanding. There is no agreement over when Armenian forces will withdraw from Azeri areas seized outside the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, over the final status of the enclave and over the exact size and composition of the peace-keeping force.

178. A request for a peace-keeping force has now been made at a CSCE meeting in Prague on 30th September which could lead to the first CSCE peace-keeping operation.

179. At the beginning of October, political unrest caused President Aliyev to impose a state of emergency followed by the dismissal of Prime Minister Suret Huseinov who was accused of siding with opposition forces trying to incite a coup.

180. Whatever may happen in the Caucasus, Russia will always make sure that it will keep a firm hand on developments in this strategically important region with oil and rising Islamic fundamentalism as important ingredients.

181. Here, it should be recalled that in September Azerbaijan signed an \$8 billion oil production agreement with a consortium of western oil companies to drill in the Azeri section of the Caspian Sea. Following this agreement, Russia has proposed the establishment of a multinational co-ordinating committee to decide on the exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea to which,

it stated, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had already agreed³⁶. At the initiative of Russia, on 12th October 1994, representatives of all the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea met in an effort to reach agreement over claims to the region's natural resources³⁷.

(iii) *Chechnya*

182. Russian efforts to regain control over Chechnya have so far been less successful. Three years ago, Dzhokar Dudayev, a former Soviet air-force general, declared Chechnya's independence from Moscow. President Yeltsin is now openly supporting Mr. Dudayev's opponents with money and arms, partly because he cannot tolerate flagrant defiance, but also in order to pre-empt his nationalist critics by appearing tough against independence in other restive regions, to name only Tatarstan and Bashkiria. Moreover, all three autonomous republics mentioned here are oil-producing regions. It should be noted, however, that the most conspicuous opponent of Mr. Dudayev is Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former speaker of Russia's parliament, who was released from prison in February last.

183. Russian military forces in neighbouring regions have been put on full combat alert to prevent the Chechen conflict from spreading to other parts of the Caucasus. Recently, the Russian deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Chakrai, has stated that in Chechnya, being part of Russia, troops of the Ministry of Interior should re-establish order³⁸.

184. On several occasions, both political and military leaders in Russia have called for a renegotiation of the CFE Treaty in view of the unstable situation in the Caucasus. The Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, has stated that the amount of equipment authorised "in no way corresponds to the military needs entailed by an adequate defence capability". The Minister also noted that according to the treaty, after 1995 Russia will be limited to "700 tanks, 580 armoured troop transport vehicles, and 1 280 artillery systems for the military regions of Leningrad and the Northern Caucasus". However, in his view, these regions require about 1 500 tanks, 3 000 armoured transport vehicles, and 2 100 artillery systems of which 600, 2 200 and 1 000 respectively would be required in the Caucasus.

185. NATO has stated that it is against a renegotiation of the treaty, but that, in accordance with Russia and the states of the Caucasus, changes would be possible, provided that the global ceiling authorised by the treaty for these countries were not exceeded.

(e) *Tajikistan*

186. Russia has deployed a 25 000 strong military force in Tajikistan, mainly in this country's southern region on the border with Afghanistan.

187. The Russian troops have been instrumental in overthrowing a coalition of intellectuals, democrats and Islamics which had come to power in autumn 1992 and re-installing a government of old guard hard-liners from the previous communist administration under the interim head of state, Imamali Rakhmonov. In this power struggle, tens of thousands have been killed while many others have fled the country into Afghanistan.

188. At present, Russia claims that these troops play an important rôle in protecting the former territory of the Soviet Union against Islamic fundamentalist forces from Afghanistan, but more probably they have become heavily tangled in the power struggle between different clans inside Tajikistan.

189. Meanwhile, several rounds of negotiations have been held in Islamabad between representatives of the Tajik government and opposition covering such issues as a permanent cease-fire, the return of refugees from Afghanistan and Tajikistan's government system. A temporary cease-fire monitored by United Nations military observers came into force on 19th October. On 6th November 1994, Imamali Rakhmonov was elected president in elections which were not recognised and boycotted by the opposition and to which the United Nations and the CSCE declined to send observers.

(f) *Ukraine*

190. The election in July 1994 of Leonid Kuchma as the President of Ukraine, who during his election campaign had promised closer links with Russia, seems indeed to have a positive influence on the relations between the two states.

191. On 18th August, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on the repayment of Ukraine's debt to Russia for the supply of gas. In early September, a number of agreements were prepared for signature on the occasion of President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kiev. Some agreements were prepared on economic and trade issues, but Ukraine also stated that it would agree to split the on-shore facilities of the Black Sea fleet. This agreement would clear the way for the solution of questions which remained after the basic agreement on the division of the Black Sea fleet, concluded in April 1994³⁹.

192. It should be pointed out, however, that Ukraine has clearly stated that it does not intend to change its status as an associate member of the CIS

36. Financial Times, 27th September 1994.

37. Financial Times, 12th October 1994.

38. Le Monde, 28th September 1994.

39. Financial Times, 5th September 1994.

economic union, wishing to keep its distance from a closer union with this Russian dominated body.

193. Mr. Kuchma's election may also lead to an easing of tension in Crimea, the autonomous Ukrainian peninsula which earlier in 1994 elected the separatist Yivu Meshkov as its President. Crimea is dominated by ethnic Russians for whom there seems to be little distinction between calls for independence and reintegration in Russia of which Crimea was part until 1954. At present it appears, however, that Russia is giving priority to good relations with Ukraine and its new leadership, rather than support a Crimean secessionist movement. It seems that this new reality has been understood by Crimean politicians.

(g) Moldova and the Trans-Dniestr region

194. The republic of Moldova which declared its independence in August 1991, shortly after the failed coup in Moscow, is still facing a multitude of threats to its very existence as an independent state. While two-thirds of its population is of Romanian origin, the idea of reunification with Romania is no longer topical. With no other important markets for its agricultural and industrial production and completely dependent on Russia for its energy, Moldova had no choice but to integrate into the economic union of the CIS in October 1993.

195. The Gagauz, Turkish-speaking christians living in the south of the country, have obtained a statute of autonomy. No solution has yet been found for the Trans-Dniestr region inhabited by the largest part of the Russian and Ukrainian minority. This region declared its independence and, after a short but violent armed conflict with the central authorities of Moldova, is now being protected by the 14th Russian army.

196. At present, Russia is keeping its 14th army in Moldova without any formal agreement or any other accord on military bases. Repeated efforts of the Russian government to replace the commanding general of the 14th Army have all been in vain. One may doubt whether the government has full control over this part of its armed forces.

197. On 21st October 1994, at the CIS summit meeting in Moscow, the Russian and Moldovan Prime Ministers agreed on the withdrawal of the Russian 14th army from the breakaway Trans-Dniestr region by 1997. It is by no means certain, however, whether this agreement will be ratified and implemented.

198. The Moldovan government has declared that Trans-Dniestr could be given the statute of autonomous region while sharing a common foreign policy and armed forces, but Trans-Dniestr itself insists on being an independent republic.

(h) Proliferation of nuclear weapons

199. In the spring of 1995, a conference is to be held in New York to decide, in accordance with Article X 2 of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), whether the treaty should "continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". The decision on extending the treaty must be taken by a majority of the present 164 signatories. Many have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NPT, but it should be noted that at present only three countries (India, Israel and Pakistan), which have not signed the NPT, are "threshold" or "suspect" states meaning that either they have a nuclear weapon or are actively developing one. Algeria, another potential "suspect" has now promised to join the NPT and has accepted a safeguard agreement for its nuclear reactors.

200. The nuclear status of Israel may be considered as potentially the most destabilising since it has incited a number of Arab states not to ratify the chemical weapons convention. These states may also refuse to support NPT extension unless the United States can convince Israel to denuclearise.

201. The breaking up of the Soviet Union into a series of new independent republics has created new nuclear weapon states with an uncertain status as regards the NPT. It seems, however, that most of the problems caused by this development not provided for in the NPT have now been solved. All tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union have been transferred to Russian territory, the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons is under way and Belarus and Kazakhstan have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Ukraine had agreed to do the same and finally, on 16th November 1994, the parliament of Ukraine ratified the NPT by a wide margin. Ukraine will, however, only formally accede to the treaty as a non-nuclear state once it has received assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia about its territorial integrity. The parliament had not been in a hurry to ratify Ukraine's NPT accession, also because it accused the United States of dragging its feet on the implementation of a \$ 350 million promise in disarmament aid⁴⁰. Meanwhile the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory is under way and those remaining on Ukraine territory cannot be targeted or fired without Russian co-operation. Ukraine has also agreed to an audit by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of all nuclear materials on its territory.

202. Two states, Iraq and North Korea, have managed to establish a nuclear weapons development programme despite IAEA monitoring, but Iraq has been deprived of the programme while

40. Financial Times, 2nd September 1994.

North Korea has frozen its programme and on 21st October 1994 signed an agreement with the United States to restructure its nuclear programme.

203. A proposed world-wide ban on nuclear tests is high on the agenda of the 1995 NPT review conference, in particular because a very large number of the non-nuclear weapon states consider adherence to a test ban treaty by the nuclear weapon states as a litmus test of their good faith.

204. Many NPT signatories are accusing nuclear weapon states of failing to fulfil their side of the non-proliferation bargain, which, under Article 6 of the NPT, commits them "in good faith" to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and eventual nuclear disarmament.

205. Altogether, it should be noted that the prospects of indefinite NPT extension, as supported by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States is not yet assured.

206. When establishing a common European defence policy, European nations should therefore take into account that, early in the next century, some more states may have acquired weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation of these weapons remains one of the major challenges for international security and for European defence. There may be not only a threat of such weapons to Europe's territory, but European armed forces operating overseas will also need new strategies and protective capabilities in possible crises or conflicts with adversaries who are in possession of mass destruction weapons. A ballistic missile defence capability of some kind will have to be developed which not one single European country will be able to afford. European and trans-atlantic co-operation in this field is urgently required.

207. The initiative taken at NATO's summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994 "that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce on-going prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it" should therefore be welcomed.

208. An issue which is perhaps even more difficult to handle is the theft and smuggling of plutonium and other nuclear materials, mostly from the Soviet Union, to would-be proliferators elsewhere. The German authorities have been particularly active and successful in tracking down cases of nuclear smuggling, not only because it is a crossroad of trade routes but also because it has acquired a thorough knowledge of Central and Eastern European criminal activities through the reunification process and the gradual withdrawal of the former Soviet forces from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. The number of cases of suspected nuclear smuggling

investigated in Germany has increased alarmingly, from 4 in 1990 to 41 in 1991, 158 in 1992, 241 in 1993 and 90 in the first half of 1994.

209. Little is known about nuclear smuggling at the southern border of Russia into Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, but there is no reason to feel comfortable about that. Not all nuclear smuggling is alarming to the same degree, sometimes it is just a sniff of plutonium from a smoke detector. Other cases, such as those reported in May and August 1994, however; involve weapons-grade plutonium 239.

210. Why is it suspected that these nuclear materials come from Russia? This country is now dismantling almost 10 000 nuclear warheads, returning the plutonium to store, where it is easier to steal⁴¹. Moreover, it has a large quantity of highly enriched uranium and civil reactor-grade plutonium which also may be hazardous if handled by malicious people. Without modern western barcoding and computerised stock systems, Russia has great difficulty in accurately keeping track of all its nuclear material.

211. Smuggled plutonium is more likely to come from nuclear stockpiles or research laboratories than from one of the three manufacturing centres for weapons-grade plutonium. In this framework, it should also be noted that Russian nuclear scientists, who in the Soviet era were part of a highly-privileged community, have suffered a serious decline in status, income and motivation, which, each in themselves, may easily lead to compensatory activities.

212. The risks, caused by nuclear smuggling and the brain-drain of nuclear scientists are almost too obvious to be mentioned here. Some non-nuclear weapon countries are interested in the establishment of a nuclear weapons programme and wish to acquire the knowledge and material to do so. Others are already one stage ahead and may try to improve existing programmes. Nor can the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear material be excluded.

213. What has so far been done to curb the risks involved? In order to counter the threat of a nuclear scientists brain-drain from Russia, the European Union, Japan, Russia and the United States set up the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow in March 1994, which has now approved more than 50 research projects and committed \$ 30 million to sponsor 3 000 scientists over the next three years.

214. This is a good start but, knowing that these 3 000 scientists may represent only 10% of the

41. In the framework of recent nuclear disarmament agreements, the United States and Russia will each have to store at least 50 tons of plutonium extracted from dismantled warheads.

Russian scientists who have knowledge that is useful to anyone intent on building a nuclear bomb, it seems to be just a drop in the ocean. The \$ 30 million committed is also ridiculously little when compared to the \$ 4.5 billion which an international consortium is going to spend in order to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programme and replace it with new energy supplies and safer light water reactors⁴².

215. Since 1991, the United States Congress has authorised \$ 988 million to help diminish the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. In July 1994 only \$ 58 million of this formidable sum had been spent. An amount of \$ 4.2 million has been spent on improving export controls for the accounting of nuclear materials, of which only \$ 1 million has been spent in Russia⁴³.

216. It is said that, to a large degree, the programme was only very fragmentarily implemented because of friction with Russian nuclear experts, low funding and lack of attention from the top level of the United States administration.

217. It should be noted here that while the United States is contemplating methods to make its surplus of weapons-grade plutonium as unusable as possible, most Russian experts consider such behaviour as sacrilege. For many years, Russia has spent a disproportionate part of its national income on plutonium production and now thinks that, in the next century, plutonium may become an attractive fuel for nuclear energy plants.

218. Apparently, there is an urgent need for more co-ordinated multilateral action in order to produce the highest standards to control stocks of nuclear material, in particular plutonium, and to prevent theft and smuggling. Positive results can be expected only if such action is the result of careful negotiations among equal partners.

219. Moreover, agreements should be concluded to provide mechanisms for the continuous and swift sharing of intelligence on nuclear smuggling. In this respect, Germany has set an example in its agreement with Russia on this subject. At an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers from the European Union on 7th-8th September, Germany pressed for Europol, the European police agency, to be given greater responsibility for fighting this sort of crime. WEU could make an important contribution to non-proliferation by creating a nuclear non-proliferation research and monitoring centre at WEU level, which could co-ordinate European efforts in this field.

42. Of the total amount of \$ 4.5 billion, South Korea is expected to provide 55%, the rest being split among the five United Nations Security Council members and Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan.

43. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1994.

220. The large plutonium stocks resulting from the bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements between Russia and the United States make it imperative for them to meet their specific responsibilities. The possibilities include proposals to put their surplus plutonium into internationally controlled safe storage, where it could be properly monitored; also, both countries could agree on the stocks to be degraded and offer a more open audit of their total plutonium stocks.

VIII. The rôle of WEU

(a) Recent operations – outside and inside the framework of WEU

221. In recent years, WEU has taken responsibility for several operations which have been, or are still being, conducted successfully. Mention is made here of the mine-clearing operation in the Persian Gulf. Currently, the WEU mission on the Danube and the Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, both monitoring the sanctions against the different republics of the former Yugoslavia, are still continuing. Earlier Assembly reports have discussed these missions in detail.

222. The following paragraphs will review missed opportunities in Rwanda and WEU's activities in Mostar. Sadly enough, on both occasions and for different reasons, WEU did less well than could have been expected if its member states, represented in the Council, had shown greater promptness of action and political will to act together.

(i) Rwanda

223. Events in Rwanda have again clearly shown the futility of the nearly endless discussions on peace-keeping and humanitarian action in recent years. On 6th April 1994, the death of President Juvénal Habyarimana appeared to be the signal leading to a genocide in which more than 500 000 people were killed while many more fled their homes and country. A large number of the refugees died from cholera and dysentery. From 9th to 14th April, both Belgium and France deployed troops to evacuate their nationals. On 22nd April 1994, the United Nations reduced its United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2 500 to 270 members.

224. On 17th May, the United Nations Security Council agreed in principle to expand UNAMIR to 5 500 troops in order to protect civilians under attack in special humanitarian zones and help guard international relief convoys. Implementation of this decision proved difficult because eight of the nine African countries which had volunteered troops had stipulated conditions, such as the supply of arms and equipment, which took time to be met.

225. Meanwhile France took the initiative of sending troops to Rwanda in the framework of a humanitarian action. At the request of France and Italy, the Permanent Council of WEU held an extraordinary meeting on 17th June to discuss the situation in Rwanda.

226. The Permanent Council instructed the Planning Cell to act as a point of contact and co-ordination between the member countries contributing to the action and the headquarters commanding the operation.

227. Later, a member of the WEU Planning Cell was incorporated in the Centre opérationnel inter-armées (COIA) at the French Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate the support in material and troops that was provided by other WEU member states. This was the first time that the WEU Planning Cell participated operationally in a force deployment⁴⁴.

228. On 21st June, the Permanent Council again met in the configuration of fifteen countries.

229. It appears that the Permanent Council tried not to oppose the French initiative of sending troops while at the same time trying to become involved as little as possible. The communiqué issued after the meeting on 21st June stated that a number of member states had confirmed that they were prepared to contribute to the initiative to ease the terrible suffering in Rwanda, provided the United Nations Security Council reached a new decision and due account being taken of the time needed to build up the means necessary for the effective deployment of an enlarged UNAMIR.

230. It was decided, however, that the support provided by member states would not be announced in the framework of WEU, but directly by the capitals concerned.

231. At a later stage, logistical and humanitarian support was indeed provided by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

232. One really wonders why, with eight of the nine full member states providing some form of tangible support in material and human resources, and the involvement of the Planning Cell, the Council took so many pains to ensure that it was not called a WEU operation.

233. It should be noted that France, when it took the initiative of sending troops, had taken into account all the lessons that had been learnt from recent humanitarian operations. It would not act without a United Nations Security Council mandate, only in a multinational operation, Article VII of the Charter was to be applied in order not to be dependent on the parties involved in the conflict, and both the length and the objective of the operation were to be determined in advance.

234. With the approval of the United Nations Security Council, France, on 23rd June then launched Operation Turquoise, deploying 2 500 troops in two bases in Zaire, Goma and Bukavu. Of these, some 1 000 troops would cross the frontier with Rwanda to provide humanitarian aid. As regards the objective, the French government had clearly stated that it had no intention of fighting anyone nor of becoming involved in internal political problems. Contact was being maintained with the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) to ensure that France's action was seen as purely humanitarian. It wished to help and encourage non-governmental organisations by protecting human lives. French soldiers had strict instructions to avoid any contact with areas of hostilities and not to take issue with the RPF.

235. Why, in the face of a major humanitarian disaster, was there so much reluctance in Europe to act? Indeed, it has been said that not all the reasons for this passivity are shameful, one of them being that civil war in Rwanda was not a threat to stability in the region or in Africa as a whole. On the other hand, it was quite surprising that the United Nations had withdrawn its troops just when they could have at least done something to reduce the killing and make less difficult the creation of a new civil order.

236. In fact, Rwanda was an excellent instance of the theory and logic of the common European foreign and security policy being put to the test. Joint European action would have been in accordance with WEU's Petersberg declaration. It would have spread the cost and risks of a humanitarian or military intervention and it would have reduced suspicion of individual actors having potential national agendas, providing a balance between the more interested and the less interested countries. Instead of deciding to act together, most of the WEU member states used the Council meeting on Rwanda to stammer excuses while incriminating others of trying to act with the wrong motives or in self-interest.

237. Indeed, in Rwanda "something" has been done, but it could have been done better if WEU had been better prepared for the type of operation that after some years of experience with the "new world order" could be anticipated. The Planning Cell could have done more if it had not been trapped in the vicious circle where the Council does not provide more resources in the belief that the Planning Cell is not operational.

238. The situation in Rwanda would also have offered an excellent opportunity to involve the associate partners in a WEU operation. The full possibilities of this new statute, as defined in the Kirchberg declaration of May 1994, should be implemented. If there is no compelling reason to leave them on the side lines, they should be involved and participate in meetings of the Permanent Council.

44. Le Monde, 30th June and 1st July 1994.

239. Rwanda is not a unique case. Africa is boiling, and one needs barely mention Burundi, Somalia, Liberia and Angola to realise that the political situation is still far from stable. If the WEU Council considers the preparation of contingency plans to be a serious matter and not merely a pretext for keeping its Planning Cell busy, Africa is a point in case. WEU should create a European humanitarian action force which could function as a fire brigade in case of urgency.

240. At the same time, because the United Nations Security Council correctly tries, in the first place, to rely on regional forces, WEU should help in establishing an African action force composed of troop contingents from different African nations, trained and equipped by WEU member states.

(ii) *WEU's activities in Mostar*

241. In the presidency report on Mostar of 5th May 1994, it is mentioned that at the request of the Council of the European Union, preliminary work on a possible WEU contribution was carried out in 1993.

242. The options presented ranged from merely supervising a specific agreement among the parties on the policing of Mostar to the possibility of WEU establishing a police force proper, carrying out its duties directly on the spot.

243. Later, WEU focused on the possibility of a contribution to the supervision of the local police forces, their future organisation as a single, unified force and some of the ways in which WEU could contribute to the discharge of police duties.

244. WEU has taken part in a preparatory mission decided on by the European Union and it is pointed out that under the auspices of the preparatory mission and with WEU participation, the local police chiefs have held their first joint meeting for over a year.

245. On 12th October, the European Union Administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick, stated that the support of WEU "until then had not been very encouraging". He asked WEU to lose no time in sending the police force it had promised. WEU had promised to send 180 police officers to Mostar of which only 100 were in place by the end of October 1994, including some 40 French and German. At that time, one quarter had not yet been committed by member states. At present, the Muslim and Croat parts of the city each have their own police force. The intention now is to provide the local police with the opportunity to work together in order to guarantee security throughout the city.

246. Considering the rather limited activities of WEU, one might well wonder why it takes so much time to send a small police force of 180. Again, this is an operation which fits perfectly into WEU missions as formulated in the Petersberg declaration. The theoretical framework exists, but apparently the political will among the changing coalitions of member states to implement a policy to which everybody has agreed is still lacking. The reluctance to act, which is particularly manifest in the time-consuming beating around the bush and procedural battles in the Council, is tarnishing the image of the organisation. This is especially exasperating when it concerns limited operations such as Mostar where swift action would be possible with a coalition of the willing.

247. As the Dutch Defence Minister, Joris Voorhoeve, rightly said: "In Mostar WEU's credibility is at stake. It should not fail this test."

(b) *Reinforcing the operational organs of WEU*

(i) *The WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejón*

248. The establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, which started its three-year experimental phase in April 1993, has been an important step forward. It is a first concrete proof of the Council's recognition that satellite observation is a vital element of a European security and defence identity. Many issues regarding the Centre are discussed in the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee "The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón", submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur⁴⁵.

249. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress achieved by the Satellite Centre, which has been justly welcomed in the abovementioned report, it is thought here that some additional comments should be made in the light of the development of a European defence policy. With increasing European security and defence responsibilities and the changing attitudes of the transatlantic partners over their rôle in Europe, it is steadily becoming more evident that initial ideas regarding the rôle and functioning of the Satellite Centre in its experimental phase were too limited in regard to the tasks and objectives of the Centre. At present, some of these limitations prevent the Centre from developing a more operational rôle. When taking decisions in spring 1995 to ensure the continuity of the Centre's work, the Council should take the opportunity of redefining the rôles and responsibilities of the Satellite Centre in order to give it a far more active and operational rôle. The first is that the equipment and premises should be adapted in such a way as to be able to put into effect

45. Document 1437.

the memorandum of understanding concerning the interpretation and use of Helios I images. It is well known that this can be done without fundamental changes in the Centre's equipment and without involving disproportionate financial commitments.

250. The second is that a working relationship should be established between the Centre and the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels. From the very start it was thought that the Centre could become more operational by using data from the Helios satellite. It should also be recalled that the terms of reference of the Planning Cell include its task, in times of crisis, to provide advice to the WEU authorities on the practicability and nature of any WEU involvement.

251. It would be only logical to establish such links between Satellite Centre and Planning Cell as to enable both organs to acquire the necessary experience in their support tasks for crisis-management. An organisation which claims to play an important rôle in the European security and defence identity can be effective only if its various parts are able to co-operate on a practical level so that the options for a decision may be presented to those responsible in the event of emergency.

(ii) *The Planning Cell*

252. At its June 1994 session, the WEU Assembly discussed a report on the WEU Planning Cell⁴⁶ and adopted recommendation 561 on that subject. The Council has given its reply to this recommendation on 2nd November 1994⁴⁷.

253. Since then, the situation has not changed basically. It is useless to repeat the conclusions of the Defence Committee's earlier report which are still valid. The main problem is clearly that the Planning Cell does not get enough political support to do its work properly. A year and a half after its establishment, the Planning Cell is expected to present a full list of forces answerable to WEU. The development of an inventory of force packages which should enable WEU to carry out the tasks conferred on it has only just started.

254. Once again, it is not the Planning Cell itself that should be blamed for this, but rather the member states of WEU which, through their shuffling, reluctance, and hesitant, slow actions, are blocking any real progress.

255. With contingency plans and force packages available, it should have been a matter of days to send a humanitarian mission to Rwanda. At pre-

sent, even a very limited operation such as sending a modest police force to Mostar takes many months to materialise.

256. If the Planning Cell is meant to be a useful organ which would contribute to the operational capabilities of WEU, the Council should provide it with the appropriate equipment and staff to develop it into a real headquarters for the co-ordination of European operations.

257. According to the document on a status of association for the nine Central European states, published as part of the Luxembourg declaration of 9th May 1994, the associate partners may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell. At present, this means no more than that each of these states can ask the Planning Cell to be informed about specific activities of the Cell, or that the Planning Cell can take the initiative to inform them of such activities as deemed appropriate.

258. According to the abovementioned document, associate partners may associate themselves with decisions taken by member states concerning humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making.

259. The document further states that associate partners "will be able to participate in their implementation as well as in relevant exercises and planning unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise. They will be invited to provide information on forces. They will also be able to offer forces for specific operations. When it is agreed that they join such WEU operations by committing forces, they will have the same obligations as other participants, as well as the right of involvement in the command structures and in the Council's subsequent decision-making process. The precise modalities of their participation, including their rights and obligations, in each such WEU operation will be agreed on a case-by-case basis".

260. Given the fact that an open invitation has been extended to associate partners to participate in WEU's main operational tasks, it would seem appropriate for the Planning Cell to prepare a list of the forces associate partners might make available to WEU and to include such forces in the force packages which are being prepared for contingency plans.

261. It is also noted here that the scope of associate partnership as defined in the Kirchberg document would justify a closer permanent link with the Planning Cell than the present liaison arrangement which seems unsatisfactory for partners who might wish to make full use of the opportunities thus offered.

46. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur, Document 1421.

47. Assembly document A/WEU/DG (94) 23.

IX. Defence spending in Europe

262. If Western European states are serious in their assertion that there may be situations where they will have to act on their own, without the participation of their transatlantic allies, they will have to stop cutting their defence budgets, mainly because they currently have so little useable defence capability.

263. One may well wonder how the WEU member states will ever manage to develop the famous European defence identity if there continues to be such a wide and even increasing gap between their words and deeds. To a certain degree, it may be understandable that the share of defence expenditures in the GDP has decreased in recent years as shown hereafter:

of the burden or the increased responsibilities to which the WEU member states lay claim.

266. It should be recalled that the United States, with 250 million people, wishes to maintain a capability to conduct simultaneously and successfully two regional wars, while the European Union states, with more than 320 million people, cannot even conduct one without significant outside help.

267. In an interview, General George Joulwan, NATO's SACEUR has expressed concern about the recent drop in force levels among NATO member states⁵⁰. Most nations are falling short of their commitments to the multinational force structure of Allied Command Europe and the rapid reaction forces. General Joulwan confirmed

**Gross domestic product and defence expenditure
annual variation (%) in NATO countries⁴⁸
(based on constant prices)**

Country	Average 1970- 1974	Average 1975- 1979	Average 1980- 1984	Average 1985- 1989	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993e	Average 1970- 1974	Average 1975- 1979	Average 1980- 1984	Average 1985- 1989	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Gross domestic product										Defence expenditure								
Belgium *	4.7	3.1	0.4	2.6	3.8	3.4	1.9	0.8	-0.7	4.9	4.4	0.1	1.4	-2.4	-1.2	-1.5	17.9	-4.0
Canada.....	6.0	4.8	1.7	3.8	2.3	-0.4	-1.3	0.1	3.1	-1.1	2.0	6.4	2.1	-0.6	1.8	6.8	0.4	0.9
Denmark	3.3	3.7	1.5	1.8	0.6	2.0	1.2	1.2	0.7	-1.6	2.6	0.2	1.0	-1.0	0.3	1.6	-2.6	0.3
France	4.5	3.8	1.5	2.9	4.0	2.4	0.6	1.2	-0.8	1.2	4.3	2.6	0.6	6.9	0.2	0.4	-2.3	-1.5
Germany	3.5	4.0	0.4	2.4	3.4	5.1	2.0	-1.2	-1.2	5.3	0.5	1.2	-0.5	-0.1	4.6	-7.7	-5.1	-6.5
Greece.....	6.5	5.3	0.5	1.6	3.5	-0.1	1.8	1.5	2.0	6.2	4.6	8.0	-3.7	-5.4	1.0	-5.2	4.4	0.1
Italy.....	3.4	5.0	0.7	3.2	2.9	2.2	1.4	0.7	1.5	5.4	-0.2	2.4	3.1	-0.9	-5.3	-1.9	1.3	..
Luxembourg.	5.1	2.5	1.3	4.6	6.7	3.2	3.1	2.4	1.2	6.6	3.9	3.8	7.5	-8.1	4.5	9.2	4.7	-1.8
Netherlands..	4.0	3.4	-0.1	2.1	4.7	3.9	2.2	1.5	-0.3	0.4	2.3	2.7	2.0	1.2	-2.6	-2.7	-0.3	-6.9
Norway	4.7	5.2	2.0	2.2	0.6	1.8	1.9	3.3	1.5	-0.6	2.4	2.6	1.6	3.0	0.8	-3.3	5.3	-0.9
Portugal	7.4	5.5	1.1	4.5	5.2	4.4	2.1	1.4	0.6	6.4	-9.5	0.1	4.7	4.6	2.0	0.2	-0.7	-2.0
Spain.....	6.3	2.5	0.8	4.5	4.8	3.6	2.4	0.8	-0.8	2.1	0.5	3.3	-6.9	-3.9	-8.1	-5.4
Turkey.....	6.0	5.5	5.2	6.0	0.9	9.1	1.0	5.5	5.0	7.1	7.6	1.0	6.5	12.0	15.0	2.8	4.9	2.3
United Kingdom.	3.1	2.8	1.5	4.3	2.3	0.1	-1.6	-	1.0	-0.7	-1.4	2.5	-3.1	2.1	-0.1	0.5	-7.8	-4.9
United States...	3.6	4.5	1.4	3.0	2.6	0.7	-1.3	2.1	2.6	-7.6	-0.7	6.0	2.0	-0.4	-2.5	13.3	6.7	-5.5

* From 1992 Belgian defence expenditure reflects the decision by the Belgian Government to demilitarise the Gendarmerie.

264. This is a general trend, occurring in almost all NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, which can be ascribed to the remarkable change in international relations.

265. It is completely incomprehensible, however, that the member states of WEU which accounted for 36% of the Atlantic Alliance's defence expenditures in 1983, only accounted for 28% in 1993⁴⁹. This is a far cry from the fair share

that the Europeans are relying too heavily on the United States to fulfil their needs in the areas of communications and airlift.

268. Now that the cold war has made way for a far less stable and secure world than initially expected, it is time to stop taking peace dividends. Too many European nations still think they can afford to use their defence budget as a money-spinner to solve all other budgetary problems.

269. In fact this is rather the moment to mark time and reconsider defence spending from a different angle, taking into account a far less pro-

48. Source: NATO review, April 1994.

49. Report by Mr. Jacques Genton, Senator, on behalf of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee on the military programme bill for 1995-2000, page 67. (Second ordinary session, 1993-1994, No. 489).

50. Jane's Defence Weekly, 17th September 1994.

missing security situation. Knowing that there will be circumstances where it can no longer rely on its transatlantic partners to intervene, Europe will have to make its own specific threat-risk analysis and evaluate its own security environment in the framework of WEU.

270. In the following paragraphs, mention is made of recent developments in some WEU member states.

(a) Germany

271. A white paper on the security of the German Federal Republic and on the situation and the future of the Bundeswehr, published on 5th April 1994, has advocated a complete reorganisation of the armed forces. The white paper proposes the establishment of a core of crisis-reaction forces, integration into multinational structures and a two-tier conscript army.

272. The crisis-reaction forces will be assigned primarily to international missions in multinational formations within the framework of NATO or WEU or under the auspices of the United Nations or the CSCE. They will, however, also be available for ensuring territorial defence under plans for the full mobilisation of main defence forces. These crisis-reaction forces will comprise about one fourth of the ground forces, one third of the airforce and about 40% of the navy, and will enjoy equipment and funding priority. As regards equipment, priority will be given to enhancing C³I and transport capacities.

273. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has announced that Germany's armed forces budget will be increased slightly and will remain untouched over the next four years. While in 1994 the defence budget stood at DM 47.5 billion, it would be increased to DM 47.9 billion plus inflation over the next four years. The length of military service will be shortened from 12 to 10 months and the size of the Bundeswehr will be reduced to 338 000 men and women by the beginning of 1996. Both these decisions will produce savings, as a consequence of which it will be possible to use 30% of the defence budget for new investments instead of the present 22%⁵¹.

274. Germany is also planning to build an all-purpose ship to be used as a troop transporter and floating headquarters. It is designed to show that Germany is taking its new international responsibilities seriously.

275. With the army structure 5 reorganisation almost completed, the German army now comprises eight divisions, one air mobile command and 24 brigades. According to the German Chief of Defence Staff, General Klaus Naumann, the

German contribution to the NATO rapid reaction forces will be as follows: the army is to provide five fully ready brigades plus the German component to the Franco-German brigade to NATO's allied rapid reaction corps, the multinational air-mobile division and the Allied Command Europe mobile force as well as the Eurocorps.

276. The Luftwaffe is to provide six squadrons for attack, air defence and reconnaissance, two mixed SAM wings and two to three mixed transport wings. The navy will make available two to three task force groups.

277. For deployment outside the NATO area, the army has been directed to earmark up to one division, while the Luftwaffe is expected to prepare all transport assets as well as a number of combat aircraft to be specified at the time.

(b) Italy

278. In August 1994, the new Italian Government endorsed the proposals of the Defence Minister, Cesare Previti, to restructure the armed forces. The length of military service will gradually be shortened from the present twelve months to six months in 1999. The total strength of the armed forces will be reduced from 330 000 to 250 000. There will be an increased reliance on specialised volunteers.

279. The main objective of the present restructuring proposals is the creation of specialised units which could be deployed at the request of the United Nations or WEU. Italy is planning to create a rapid reaction force together with Spain and France, to be based in Tuscany.

280. Around 80 billion lire in the next ten years have been earmarked for modernisation, in particular for new equipment. The share of defence spending in Italy's GNP would increase from the present 1.6% to 2%.

(c) United Kingdom

281. The United Kingdom has drastically reduced its defence budget in recent years. A November 1993 review of public spending cut defence spending by almost £900 million over the next three years, following a budget cut of more than £1 billion announced in 1992. The budget allocation for 1994-95 (£23.49 billion) and the provision for 1995-96 represent cuts of 3.5% and 6.8% respectively in real terms.

282. The United Kingdom's regular armed forces numbered 254 488 on 1st April 1994, a reduction of more than 7% from 1993 and 17% from the "Options for change" defence reductions baseline of 1st April 1990. Under present plans, the army strength will be 119 000 personnel and 40 battalions by 1997.

51. Financial Times, 29th August 1994.

283. Two divisions, 3 (UK) Division and 1 (UK Armoured Division) are assigned to NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Moreover, 24 Airmobile Brigade is assigned to the ARRC's Airmobile Multinational Division (Central).

(d) France

284. The French government has proposed a defence budget of F 202 253 for 1995, representing a 1.5% increase as compared with the 1994 budget. According to the government's white paper, presented in March 1994, the French army should have a stand-by force of 120 000 to 130 000 troops that could be quickly projected to a distant theatre.

285. The military programme law 1995-2000 adopted in spring 1994, pledges to raise defence spending by 0.5% annually until the end of the decade. However, since it takes neither future inflation nor economic growth into account, military spending will in fact decline from 3.3% of gross domestic product in 1994 to 2.9% in the year 2000.

286. The programme law calls for an army of 227 000 men with eight divisions by the year 2000. The total of armed forces personnel will drop from 609 000 in 1994 to 579 000 in 2001. On the basis of the military programme law and the white paper mentioned earlier, the French army is now planning a new internal structure of general staff to be approved by the government in early 1995. The basic principle is that the army should be able to project abroad a force of 40 000 troops. In fact, this force will have to be rotated, which means that 120 000 should be available for this task, reinforced by support and logistic units. This objective may be a tall order, when one recalls how much trouble it took to send 17 000 troops to the Gulf in the framework of Operation Daguet. Recently when 2 500 troops, 700 vehicles and 9 000 tons of freight had to be transported to Zaire-Rwanda for Operation Turquoise, logistics was a problem, and Russian transport aircraft had to be chartered to do part of the job.

(e) The Netherlands

287. In the Netherlands, the coalition partners in the new government have concluded an agreement to economise 2.4 billion guilders in the defence expenditures for the 1995-98 period. It was agreed that these reductions should not affect the implementation of the 1993 Defence priorities review, which, if fully implemented would bring about a reduction of 44% of the total armed forces personnel in 1998 as compared with the situation in 1990. The government has now made proposals for implementing the budget cuts, which will be discussed in parliament at the beginning of next year.

X. European armed forces co-operation

288. On 13th September 1994, France and the United Kingdom concluded an agreement to twin the French Rapid Action Force, (FAR, 45 000 troops) and the British Field Army (57 000 troops), both qualified to be developed for action in theatres abroad. The agreement envisages exchanges of instruction, joint training and participation in joint manoeuvres. A first practice is planned to take place in 1995, when high ranking officers will participate in simulated manoeuvres in order to discuss military doctrines and tactics.

289. More co-operation between French and British armed forces is being prepared. A Franco-British summit in Chartres on 18th November 1994 will be devoted largely to defence and security issues. Both countries are now planning to establish closer co-operation in military aviation which would make it easier for their airforces to co-operate in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations overseas under the aegis of the United Nations. Such operations, it is said, could take place in the framework of NATO or WEU.

290. The Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine⁵² is continuing its work and will present a report at the Anglo-French summit meeting.

291. The airforces of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway have recently concluded agreements making air transport assets available to each other in order to improve airlift capability and reduce costs.

292. The agreements cover the whole spectrum of possible military operations, including peace-keeping and rescue operations.

293. The Defence Ministers of Germany and the Netherlands have signed an agreement to create a German-Netherlands army corps which will be operational at the beginning of 1995. The army corps will consist of 40 000 to 50 000 men, 15 000 being provided by the Netherlands. Mixed units will be stationed in both Germany and the Netherlands and the headquarters of the corps is to be located in Münster.

294. On 7th September 1992, a Franco-Spanish-Italian proposal was launched to constitute an aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling missions under the auspices of WEU. The guiding principle for this proposal was a desire to co-ordinate aero-maritime forces so that a maximum number of assets between the three countries were available

52. The work of this committee has been discussed in the report on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, Document 1420.

at any one time. Having been placed on the table of WEU, the proposal led in part to Combined Endeavour, a WEU maritime operation plan for the use of maritime forces answerable to WEU.

295. In fact, the Combined Endeavour solution elaborated by WEU with the help of the Planning Cell did not meet the expectations of the three initiators. Pursuing the earlier initiative, Italy has suggested a ground element to complement the air and naval components. The French Defence Minister, François Léotard, speaking in March 1994, linked the earlier proposal with a suggestion to create "European intervention forces, commanded by a European General Staff and which would be both multinational and have integrated (air, land and sea) forces". At WEU's colloquy on 17th October 1994, Mr. Léotard insisted on the achievement around the European corps of a network or reserve of variable-geometry air, sea and land multinational forces with flexibility allowing the governments of member states to respond in an appropriate manner to the requirements of a given crisis.

296. No further details have been provided about the creation of the common intervention force planned by France, Italy and Spain, which could be particularly useful for operations in the Mediterranean. Recently, the Spanish Defence Minister declared that there are no problems with the naval component for this force, but that there are still problems to be solved with the army component. It is hoped that some of the remaining obstacles can be overcome in the framework of the trilateral manoeuvre Tramontana which is to take place in Spain, in November 1994⁵³.

297. In June 1994, Poland established a rapid reaction force, the 25th Air Cavalry Division, which is on five hours' notice to be deployed anywhere within Polish territory. The division will consist of three independent regiments, combining paratroop elements and 150 helicopters when at full strength. The principal helicopter, the PZL W3W will be completely modified with western avionics and a new air-to-surface missile and chin-mounted canon.

298. The Netherlands and Poland have signed a naval co-operation agreement which, it is hoped, will lead to increased interoperability between Polish naval forces and those of NATO. The main objectives of the agreement are:

- exchange of information and experience;
- participation in training and joint naval exercises;
- joint training of mine countermeasures and search and rescue units in the Baltic;

- maintaining regular working contacts between the Hydrographic Office of the Polish Navy and that of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

299. Many similar agreements have been or are being concluded between WEU member states and associate partners with the aim of making the armed forces of partner states familiar with practices and procedures in Western European armed forces and preparing possible future joint operations.

300. On 28th June 1994, the Defence Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands signed an agreement on the reinforcement of co-operation between their naval forces. The agreement envisages the creation of a bilateral operational headquarters in 1995 to manage the surface ships of both navies. Both Ministers have asked their air-force chiefs to study co-operation possibilities between the airforces.

XI. European equipment co-operation

301. Europe must get its act together to improve co-operation in procurement and arms production. The protracted policy of fiddling and make-shift measures which has been characteristic in past decades, with varying success and many failures, should now be renounced. With decreasing defence budgets on the one hand and new equipment requirements on the other, European nations which state that they wish firmly to establish a European security and defence identity can no longer afford merely to dabble with equipment co-operation.

302. The importance of and need for European armaments co-operation has been recognised by the WEU member states in many official declarations, to name only the 1984 Rome declaration on WEU's revitalisation and the 1987 The Hague platform on European security interests. In the declaration by member states of WEU, which are also members of the European Union, on the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance which is attached to the treaty on European Union, it is stated that enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments will be examined further "with the aim of creating a European armaments agency".

303. In December 1992, the defence ministers of the thirteen countries united in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) decided to transfer IEPG's functions to WEU.

304. Since then, IEPG has been transformed into WEAG, the Western European Armaments Group, based in Brussels within the framework of WEU. However, many problems still have to be solved to make it an effective organisation and it is said that the creation of a European armaments

53. Le Monde, 1st October 1994.

agency, now actively under study, will take many more years if not decades⁵⁴.

305. The time has come for Western European governments to think collectively and urgently about the dimensions of the defence industrial capabilities and the technological expertise they wish to maintain in Europe, the techniques they could use to maintain these capabilities and the costs they are willing to incur. Action should be taken urgently.

306. Should Western European states become involved in a conflict in the future, they should be able to rely on the appropriate industrial support.

307. Even when defence spending is low, desired basic capabilities have to be maintained on the assumption that the international political situation may deteriorate in the longer term and the need for defence increase once again.

308. Despite occasional co-operative programmes, the European defence industry is still strongly divided and the size of different national companies is not great enough to face strong competition in international defence markets. Rationalisation in the United States' defence industry began earlier than predicted with the taking over of Grumman by Northrop, Lockheed buying General Dynamic's F-16 fighter plant and the recently announced merger between Lockheed and Martin Marietta Corporation as the most spectacular events. This may not be the end of the process. A comparative table of turnover in defence business of the largest United States and European companies is revealing.

*Turnover in defence business 1993*⁵⁵

(\$ billion)

Lockheed.....	10.06
McDonnell Douglas	9.40
Martin Marietta	7.55
Northrop Grumman.	6.95
British Aerospace...	6.06
GM Hughes.....	6.05
Thomson CSF	5.00 (estimate)
Raytheon	4.79
GEC-Marconi.....	4.21
DASA.....	3.40
Aérospatiale	3.30

309. The continuing consolidation of the United States' defence industry presents European manufacturers with a powerful challenge and they will have to be tough and aggressive about doing the same.

54. The subject of a European armaments agency has been discussed in a recent Assembly document: The European armaments agency – reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur.

55. Source: Lehman Brothers.

310. European governments should not hamper the transnational consolidation of their defence industries. Political and legal barriers must be cleared. WEAG may have been a laudable initiative but, since its establishment almost two years ago, little progress has been made apart from the usual political declarations.

311. Arms co-operation can help bring down procurement costs, but in co-operative projects, the principle of fair return in individual programmes may have to be given up, being applied rather to a range of collaborative programmes. Squabbles in coming months and years over national workshares in vital co-operation programmes such as the future large aircraft, the only just-revived NH-90 helicopter and the Eurofighter 2000 will merely increase the cost of such equipment and will make Europe's defence industry resemble a three-ring circus rather than the lean and mean industrial base which is needed.

312. If European states are serious in their ambition to rationalise procurement on a European level, they may have to reduce the degree of national preference which they exercise at present in awarding contracts.

313. Implementing the decision taken at the Franco-German summit meeting at Mulhouse in May 1994, both countries are now settling the establishment, legal statute, working methods and internal organisation of the structure which will have to link them in armaments matters. Before the end of 1995, this will lead to the creation of a Franco-German armaments agency, which should manage co-operative procurement programmes such as the Tiger attack helicopter, the VBM light-armoured vehicle, the future large aircraft and possibly the Helios II reconnaissance satellite.

314. This Franco-German armaments agency could be the nucleus of a future European agency which still seems many years away.

XII. The need for more air-lift capability

315. Earlier Assembly reports have already emphasised the need for more air-lift capability in WEU member states if they want to enable WEU to intervene independently. The Gulf war and all recent humanitarian and peace-keeping operations have clearly demonstrated the serious shortfall in air-lift which has forced European nations to rely on the United States' air-lift capacity or to charter such means on the civilian market, often using Russian large transport aircraft.

316. Indeed, NATO has taken decisions which would make certain collective assets available to WEU if needed, but a distinction should be drawn between the collective assets of NATO and the national assets of member states of the alliance, in

particular the powerful resources of the United States. It should also be noted that there may be circumstances where, for a number of purely practical reasons, the United States will not be able to meet requests from its European allies.

317. The United States airforce's Air Mobility Command (AMC) has now limited its 241 C-141 Starlifters to 900 hours flying time per year in order to prevent these aircraft from reaching their expected lifetime prematurely. Moreover, the C-141 cannot accommodate many of the newer types of equipment.

318. The C-5 Galaxy fleet has an average reliability of under 75% but the 20 C-5s recently deployed in Europe, inter alia for support operations in Rwanda, had maintenance problems which kept 35-40% of them out of commission for the first two or three weeks.

319. The new C-17 programme, with an originally planned procurement of 120 aircraft, may be capped at 40 aircraft⁵⁶.

320. According to the Pentagon's 1993 bottom-up review, the United States armed forces should be able to fight two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts by 1999, but planned reductions in the defence budget are thought to create an important gap between air-lift requirements and capacity available by the end of this century⁵⁷.

321. European countries cannot afford to wait until it comes to the worst. They will have to take decisions in the near future if they want to have sufficient air-lift capacity to meet contingencies in the first decade of the next century.

322. A consortium of European aircraft manufacturers⁵⁸ is now developing a tactical transport aircraft, the future large aircraft (FLA), which is intended to replace existing fleets from 2002. This consortium has now decided to charge a military equipment subsidiary of Airbus with the development and production of the FLA, a positive sign in view of Airbus's good recent record in developing and marketing aircraft in a relatively short time. The intention is to provide customers with a fixed price, fixed specification programme to reduce the risk of cost over-runs. The consortium estimates that over the next 20 years there may be a market for 350 FLA in Europe alone.

323. As usual, up until now in European co-operative equipment programmes, the sharing of work in any FLA production depends on the financial commitments of the companies involved

and their respective governments, and the number of aircraft required by each specific country.

324. The feasibility study now being conducted in which France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are participating, with Belgium and the United Kingdom as observers, will be completed at the beginning of 1995. This should be followed by the pre-development phase, culminating in the formal launch of the programme in mid-1997 through firm orders. First deliveries could then be made at the end of the year 2002.

325. The FLA, which would be able to meet the requirements of practically every WEU member state, would be an excellent method to unite these countries in research, development and procurement and could be instrumental in bringing together European aircraft manufacturers to meet the challenge of the United States' defence industry.

XIII. The establishment of an independent European satellite system

326. As is known, the WEU Council has asked the Space Group to prepare, for its spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for decision to set up an independent European satellite system. This proposal should also include a draft memorandum of understanding containing the detailed specifications to be concluded between the present WEU member states.

327. The industrial studies which were conducted under the supervision of the (so-called) Study Management Team, chaired by Mr. Leonardo Gagliardi, have concentrated on the technical aspects of satellite system concepts providing optical, infra-red and radar imaging capabilities. Comparisons have been made between satellite system concepts and programme steps with respect to capabilities, cost, development timescales and risks. There can be little doubt that these studies offer a sound basis for the Space Group to prepare a proposal for decision by the Council.

328. An important question still to be addressed, however, is which organisation will be responsible for managing the establishment of an independent European satellite system. This, in itself, is a complicated task, requiring specialised knowledge. The limited size and human resources of the Secretariat General of WEU in its present state would certainly not be able to accomplish this task.

329. Another question, closely related to the creation of a satellite system and to be addressed urgently, is the establishment of a proper common European intelligence policy, which is a vital prerequisite for a European security and defence policy. It would be unwise to leave this question open, because of the many problems which it may

56. Jane's Defence Weekly, 10th September 1994.

57. Jane's Defence Weekly, 21st May 1994.

58. The consortium consists of Aérospatiale (France), Alenia (Italy), British Aerospace (United Kingdom), CASA (Spain) and Deutsche Aerospace Airbus (Germany) with FLABEL (Belgium), OGMA (Portugal) and Tusas (Turkey) as associated partners.

indeed evoke, one of them being the need for a European electronic intelligence satellite.

330. The sudden and short-lived crisis in early October last when Iraq began a massive deployment of armed forces near its border with Kuwait, is the most recent illustration of the apparent shortcomings in this field. At that time, the United States raised the alarm and responded by immediately sending tens of thousands of troops and supplementary equipment. In the absence of proper intelligence-gathering equipment such as sufficiently high performance earth observation satellites, European countries had no choice other than to believe what the United States told them, using among other things a selection of their own satellite images.

331. In this framework, it should also be recalled that the NATO air command and control system (ACCS)⁵⁹, an automated command and control system, combining the control of air defences, offensive air and air support missions, does not include the essential fields of intelligence and threat evaluation. For these fields, ACCS, at a cost of \$25 billion over 15 to 20 years, to be financed by NATO infrastructure funds and individual NATO member states, will have to rely on information provided by the United States.

332. Altogether, there are enough reasons to study the political and military aspects of a truly common European intelligence policy without delay.

XIV. Conclusions

(a) The transformation of NATO

333. The transformation of NATO initiated with the London declaration of 1990 has since continued. NATO has become a more politically-oriented organisation. Any enlargement would be a revolution in the European geopolitical balance which cannot take place without further fundamental conceptual and structural changes.

334. When implemented, the decisions taken at the Brussels summit meeting of January 1994, will establish a new balance in the alliance between Europe and North America. This may still be difficult to achieve since the United States, having accepted a strengthening of Europe's defence identity, will not easily share the highest responsibilities in the alliance.

335. A real European defence policy can exist only if Europeans have the military means needed to act together with their transatlantic allies accepting to intervene out of the NATO area, or to act alone with their own forces, possibly reinforced

with NATO assets placed at the disposal of WEU with the agreement of the United States. To this end, the Brussels summit meeting has developed the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) opening the possibility of separable but not separate forces and enabling European forces to operate efficiently without the participation of the United States.

336. The implementation of the CJTF concept is taking longer than expected but final decisions are expected to be taken in late spring 1995.

(b) The rôle of the CSCE

337. Immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the signing of the Paris Charter in November 1990, expectations of the CSCE's rôle in maintaining peace and stability in Europe have been far too high.

338. Russia's recent proposals to make the CSCE the umbrella organisation for European security to which all others, including NATO, would be submitted would not be the right solution for anybody.

339. It seems, however, that the CSCE can play a useful rôle in conflict-prevention for which appropriate mechanisms have been developed. In this framework, the rôle of the High Commissioner on National Minorities should not be underestimated.

340. The conclusion of a European stability pact, possibly in 1995 and now being negotiated at various regional round table conferences, will be another important part of the CSCE conflict-prevention mechanism.

(c) Russia

341. The situation in Russia is bound to be a determining factor for Europe's security. Nobody would venture that at present, or in the foreseeable future, Russia poses a serious threat to Central or Western Europe. On the other hand, there is no denying that the process of transforming Russia into a market-oriented democracy is taking place in a context of political instability and economic crisis which are both equally disquieting. In Russia, the armed forces have traditionally been a reliable instrument under full control of the political authorities and, in general, this is still the case. Increasing pressure on the defence budget, however, is causing growing dissatisfaction in the armed forces and this could be exploited by nationalist extremists. At the moment, defence expenditures are lacking transparency and this is causing serious shortcomings in democratic control of the military budget, which is still taking too large a share of the overall federal budget. A strong Russia will suit Europe's security, but it should be a democratically-

59. This subject has already been dealt with in Document 1229.

controlled constitutional state, where human rights and rights of minorities are fully respected. Understandably, Russia wishes to develop a close relationship with its neighbouring states in the framework of the CIS, but this should not lead to a restoration of imperialism with its negative aspects of blackmail and divide and rule policy. Because of its factual status of nuclear superpower, Russia is entitled to a special relationship with the United States, but this should go hand-in-hand with close practical relations with European states, on both a bilateral and multilateral level. Russian membership of the Council of Europe is a fully-justified prospect, provided the conditions are met, but membership of the European Union, WEU or NATO is out of the question. On the other hand, these organisations should make sure that they entertain the closest possible relations with Russia on a permanent basis.

342. There is no doubt about Russia's intention to dismantle its nuclear weapons as agreed in START I and START II, but little progress is being made because of technical and financial problems. Russia should accept western assistance in this area.

343. Although it is recognised that Russia is not the only possible source of illegal trade in nuclear material, no counter-proliferation policy can be successful without its full participation.

(d) The Baltic states

344. By now, the independence of the three Baltic states is fully confirmed and after many initial problems also recognised by Russia, which is aware that any infringement of their sovereignty would be considered by western states as an act profoundly destabilising to Europe's security. These states are facing numerous problems in their efforts to build credible armed forces for which they need help from Western European states. This process has now been started and necessary agreements have been or are being concluded.

345. Notwithstanding these positive developments, it should be recognised that, for their security, they will always be dependent on good relations with Russia and political and military protection from other states. They have signed up for NATO's partnership for peace and are associate partners of WEU. On the other hand, they have not been included in the list of the next six candidates for European Union membership which has recently been made public, nor have they been included in the list of candidates for a possible enlargement of NATO. It is understood that, in relations with the Baltic states, delicate diplomacy is required vis-à-vis Russia, but they cannot be left on their own. WEU will have to make sure that they are included among its members as soon as the six Central European coun-

tries join the European Union and, as a consequence, WEU.

(e) Risks and threats to European security

346. There is no need to repeat the rather long list of possible risks and threats to European security; it is well known, although it does not always seem to be taken into account. In some cases the threat may be immediate, others are less explosive and of more remote importance. Two regions at Western Europe's frontiers stand out: the Balkans and the southern Mediterranean.

347. In the Balkans, the Bosnian conflict is still a subject of daily concern for all countries involved in one way or another. The risks of escalation and of extension of the conflict to the rest of the Balkans with possible intervention from neighbouring countries can still not be excluded. Strained relations between NATO and the United Nations, between European and transatlantic allies and between different members of the contact group over the policy to be followed, air strikes and other issues are practically always the order of the day. If finally the arms embargo against Bosnia is lifted, it may well lead to chaos and the United Nations blue helmets will have to withdraw in extremely difficult circumstances and the conflict will continue. If, on the other hand, a final ceasefire is concluded, a huge peace-keeping operation, requiring more than 50 000 troops will have to be set up. Europe should be better equipped and prepared to prevent such conflicts.

348. As regards the southern Mediterranean, it is indeed extremely difficult to control developments but Europe cannot afford to neglect a situation which might threaten its exposed under-belly. The establishment of a cautious dialogue, ideas to create a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and the perspective of a special relationship with the European Union in the next century should be welcomed, but that is not enough. It is also important to establish a European humanitarian intervention force and to accelerate the setting-up of an Italian-Spanish-French aero-naval force.

349. Close relations with Russia at all levels, both bilateral and multilateral, must be established and maintained in order to prevent Russians feeling isolated. At the same time, a way must be found to agree, with them, on the most appropriate way of peace-keeping in Russia's near abroad, without turning this into a new source of conflict or new imperialism.

(f) WEU

350. By now, it is generally accepted that, in order to face future risks and threats to its security, Europe must shoulder more responsibilities in

defence and security and create a real European defence identity reinforcing its operational capabilities. However, this is easier said than done.

351. In the Maastricht Treaty, WEU is asked to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications. This leads to fundamental political questions such as whether in defence matters the European Union can take autonomous decisions, independently from NATO and the United States. There is also the question of how the European Union and WEU will handle defence matters if, inevitably, they have different membership. Will WEU be able to remain autonomous in its own specific field of action? Will future WEU member states have to be NATO members in order to be protected by the security guarantees of the modified Brussels Treaty? If no unequivocal answer is found to these questions, there will never be a European defence policy.

352. Some of the abovementioned questions, in particular those regarding the relations between WEU and the European Union with their different membership and different authority, could be solved if both were prepared to consider the idea of a joint European Security Council.

353. A European defence policy also depends on the availability of the military means needed for Europeans, either to act together with their transatlantic allies outside NATO territory, or to act alone with their own forces, reinforced with collective assets of the alliance on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council. In this framework, implementation of the CJTF concept is of crucial importance for Europe's defence identity.

354. The establishment of a valid European defence policy will have to go hand-in-hand with a reinforcement of WEU's operational capabilities. A prerequisite is for the Ministerial Council to give up its extreme caution and gradually develop WEU into a decision-making centre rather than limiting itself to the rôle of a security organisation, waiting for others to act. In this framework, the Council should also vest the Secretary-General with more power. At present, too many subjects are dealt with in ad hoc working groups. The Secretariat-General should be extended in order to make more knowledge directly available to the Council, thus enhancing its performance and efficiency. Following the example of the Planning Cell, a permanent "Think Cell" should be created which could contribute to the development of European strategic thinking.

355. The staff and equipment of the Planning Cell should be increased in order to transform it into a headquarters for European co-ordination. In its present state, the Planning Cell lacks the capacity to act in a crisis situation such as Rwanda.

356. Supporting the non-proliferation initiative taken at NATO's Brussels summit meeting in January 1994 and co-ordinating European efforts in this field, a nuclear non-proliferation research and monitoring centre should be created at WEU level.

357. A fully-fledged European satellite intelligence system will have to be established in order to provide Europe with the intelligence needed to make an independent judgment on crisis situations and, if needed, take its own decisions. The WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, if employed in an appropriate manner, could be a first step towards a satellite system which can be achieved only through European co-operation.

358. There is an urgent need to establish a European humanitarian intervention force and to accelerate the establishment of the air and naval intervention force composed of French, Spanish and Italian units announced earlier.

359. The various multinational forces which have been or are being established such as the allied rapid reaction corps, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the European corps and others, should prepare the best possible co-ordination in case they are needed for operations on a European scale. Such co-ordination between different intervention units in Europe should result in the establishment of a European rapid reaction force.

360. For all these forces, European nations will have to provide logistics and, in particular, appropriate air-lift capacity. The future large aircraft, a co-operative project which includes the major European aircraft manufacturers, could meet existing needs in this important area. This programme should be given the support it needs so that the first aircraft might be delivered in the early years of the next decade.

361. Co-operation in the European defence industry needs to be further developed. The establishment of a European armaments agency must be accelerated in order to combat American competition and achieve standardisation of the equipment of European forces such as the European corps.

362. Finally, WEU must make a common analysis of the new security situation, taking into account the work of the "Think Cell" proposed in paragraph 354 of the present report. This work should be given a new dimension, as proposed by the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, by progressively including WEU's associate partners in the analysis. It should lead to the drafting of a white paper on European security, to be submitted to a summit meeting of European heads of state and of government of all the countries concerned. Approval of this white paper would be the first evidence of European solidarity in defence matters.

A European defence policy

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Socialist Group

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ under a United Nations mandate ” insert “ in agreement with the Organisation of African Unity ”.
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force ” and insert “ readily available multinational European force which would protect the humanitarian organisations on the ground and ”.

Signed: Borderas

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendments 1 and 2 withdrawn).

A European defence policy

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (x) and insert:
“ Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and that defence budgets of European countries must consequently provide for a sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks; ”

Signed: Gaiotti de Biase

1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment agreed to).

A European defence policy

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mr. López Henares

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ Give further thought to common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting of a white paper ” and insert “ Give further thought as soon as possible to a common security and defence policy, so that a white paper may be drafted forthwith ”.

Signed: López Henares

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1994 (amendment agreed to).

The situation in Bihac

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION¹

*tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Liberal Group
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious for the safe areas decreed by the United Nations Security Council in former Yugoslavia to be respected;
- (ii) Recalling the urgent need to prevent further massacres,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Decide to send immediately a European buffer force to Bihac and recalls to this end the latest decisions of the North Atlantic Council for making the alliance's rapid action forces available to WEU.

Signed: De Decker, Brasseur, Verbeek, Blaauw, Mackie of Benshie, Wolfgramm, Feldmann, Dees, Aguiar, Poças Santos, Reis Leite, Latronico, Rodeghiero, Ehrmann

1. See 7th sitting, 28th November 1994 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1995*

*Draft supplementary budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995*

PREVIOUS QUESTION¹

*moved by Mr. Rathbone
on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the procedure for approving the Assembly's budgets;
- (ii) Considering that the opinion of the Council has not yet been communicated to the Assembly;
- (iii) Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on the budgets for 1995,

DECIDES

That the draft ordinary and supplementary budgets are withdrawn from the agenda of the session.

Signed: Rathbone

1. See 10th sitting, 30th November 1994 (previous question agreed to).

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1995*

*Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1995*

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

*submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

The Assembly,

- (i) Having heard the report by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (ii) Noting the absence of the opinion of the Council on the draft budget and draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1995;
- (iii) Noting that this is the first time since the year 1985 that the Assembly has not received the opinion of the Council on its draft budgets in time for consideration at its autumn session;
- (iv) Noting that preliminary views expressed by delegates in the Council Budget and Organisation Committee were unsupportive of the Assembly's plans to meet satisfactorily the requirement of expanded membership including guest members and observers;
- (v) Considering that the Council had, in its Kirchberg declaration, invited the Assembly to welcome new members and to adjust its rules accordingly;
- (vi) Regretting efforts by budgetary experts to curtail the establishment and maintenance of parliamentary contacts according to the Kirchberg declaration and its intentions;
- (vii) Reiterates its support for the outlined plans to meet the logistics of the Assembly in the foreseeable future in particular the requirement to accommodate over 400 members in a chamber conceived to seat 228;
- (viii) Expresses its disappointment at the Council's delay in giving its opinion on the draft budgets of the Assembly,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To negotiate urgently with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU, taking into account in particular the Kirchberg declaration and its requirements;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budgets for 1995 to fulfil that rôle as speedily as possible.

1. See 10th sitting, 30th November 1994 (Motion agreed to).

*The need to strengthen WEU in the light
of the worsening situation in former Yugoslavia*

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION¹

tabled by Mr. De Decker and others

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned at the unilateral decision of the government of the United States no longer to participate in enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- (ii) Noting that this decision, at the behest of Congress, does not take into account the interests of the European states with troops participating in UNPROFOR;
- (iii) Noting that the United States has always refused to participate in the United Nations protection force deployed in the territory of former Yugoslavia;
- (iv) Noting, however, that the United States has not opposed the use by Europeans and the United Nations of NATO military structures;
- (v) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the UNPROFOR troops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed;
- (vi) Questioning whether NATO is adapted to security tasks in Europe in the post cold war period when divergent interests appear to be causing division in the alliance between Americans and Europeans;
- (vii) Questioning also the applicability of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the event of threats to detachments of NATO forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina on behalf of the United Nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intelligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces;
2. Request the convening of a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in order to examine the situation and measures to be taken.

Signed: De Decker, Baumel, Soell, Baarveld-Schlaman, de Puig, Fassino, Martinez, Latronico, de Lipkowski, Finsberg, Blaauw, Gelderblom-Lankhout

1. Motion withdrawn.

***The situation in Bihac
and the need to strengthen WEU***

Draft Recommendation¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee²
by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious for all the security zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina defined by the Security Council to be scrupulously respected;
- (ii) Noting nevertheless that the fact that Bosnian Serb forces have penetrated the safe area around Bihac shows the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in implementing Security Council resolutions authorising it inter alia:
 - to deter attacks against the safe areas,
 - and to take the necessary retaliatory measures, including recourse to force, against bombing of the safe areas by either side, armed incursions or any obstacle to free movement by UNPROFOR;
- (iii) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the UNPROFOR troops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed;
- (iv) Disturbed that profound differences have emerged between the United States and its European allies regarding the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions and to restore peace in the regions concerned;
- (v) Convinced that the lifting of the embargo on Bosnia is not an appropriate means of facilitating the resolution of the conflict in the region in question;
- (vi) Regretting nevertheless that neither the United States nor the countries of Europe have been prepared to send in a buffer force that is large enough and equipped to be able to put an end to hostilities;
- (vii) Noting also that the contact group's efforts to achieve a cease-fire that is complied with and a political solution to the conflict have so far failed;
- (viii) Determined to do everything possible to prevent a further massacre occurring on former Yugoslav territory;
- (ix) Still convinced that, to avoid escalation, efforts to find a political solution to the conflict acceptable to all parties concerned must not be relaxed;
- (x) Recalling nevertheless that, for such a solution not to remain a dead letter, the parties concerned must be convinced that its implementation will be guaranteed by effective measures of enforcement,


1. Adopted by 13 votes to 2 with 2 absentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. de Puig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alegre (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Sir Andrew Bowden, MM. Caballero, Ehrmann, Fassino, Feldmann, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit (Alternate: Baumel), Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Marshall), MM. Kittelmann, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Müller, Pécriaux, Pozzo (Alternate: Ragno), Mrs. Prestigiacomo, MM. Puche Rodriguez, Reddemann, Rodeghiero, Rodrigues, Salvi (Alternate: Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase), Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Vinçon, Wintgens (Alternate: De Decker), Woltjer, Zijlstra.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Immediately hold an urgent joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council with a view to:
 - (a) appealing to all governments and all competent international organisations to make a new effort to find a political solution to the conflict, in view of the negotiations in progress on the basis of the proposals of the contact group, and demonstrate the responsible attitude of the international community by opposing with great determination and firmness those responsible for prolonging an unjustifiable and nonsensical war;
 - (b) considering the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent further massacres and to end the fighting in Bihac;
 - (c) ensuring that the unilateral decision of the United States Government no longer to participate in monitoring the embargo on Bosnia cannot affect NATO's commitment nor its operational capabilities in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intelligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces.

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