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Voting LPF: Stratification and the Varying Importance of Attitudes

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ABSTRACT *Large differences exist between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats in the extent they voted for the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), showing us that support for the party was aligned by social class. Distinguishing between the two specialist types provided the opportunity to test Kitschelt's hypothesis on the importance of communicative experiences and capabilities in the labour market and the importance of cultural and economic ethnic threats. Cultural ethnic threat explains social class differences in LPF voting better than economic ethnic threat, though we cannot claim that the latter is of no relevance. We show this using the Dutch sample of the European Social Survey (n = 2,260). Moreover, we show that socio-political attitudes that affect voting for the LPF do so to a much smaller extent among lower-educated people and non-socio-cultural specialists. The interactions between socio-political attitudes and education and social class are significant.*

Introduction

In the Dutch election campaign of 2002, the political establishment was woken up by a newcomer: Pim Fortuyn. With his messages over immigrants and “the arrogant politics” of the government and established parties, he was either loved or hated. In the municipal elections earlier that year, an unexpected result in Rotterdam made other politicians fear the worst for the general elections. After the murder of Fortuyn, just a week before the general elections of May 2002, his party (LPF: List Pim Fortuyn) gained huge success by winning 26 seats, just as the polls had predicted before the murder of the politician – a result previously unknown in Dutch politics with a brand new party. The party subsequently formed a controversial coalition government with Christian democrats and liberals. Mainly on account of disorganisation within the LPF, the coalition fell after only 87 days. And in the 2003 elections the LPF lost a majority of its seats, retaining only eight seats in Parliament.

Van der Brug (2003) shows that the LPF support resembles many far right-wing electorates in European countries (Kitschelt, 1995; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002). Certainly, an unfavourable attitude towards immigrants turned out to be an important predictor

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of the LPF vote in 2002. Moreover, Van der Burg also showed that political distrust correlated strongly with LPF voting. Akkerman (2005) meanwhile depicts the LPF programme as liberal-nationalist, combining leftist ethical issues with strict neutrality in the public domain (where Islam was identified as an anti-liberal religion). Ignazi (2003) also addressed the party in his comparative work on right-wing extremism. The party strongly dissociated itself from European extreme right-wing parties, and accused the left-wing parties of defamation and carrying out a policy of political correctness. Support from “the man in the street” ensued. Overnight, the voice of ordinary people became the one to listen to. According to Fortuyn, they had been kept in silence by the political and socio-cultural elites with their multicultural dream. In this contribution we investigate to what extent socio-cultural specialists were indeed less likely to vote for the LPF in 2002, and if so why. We also question whether Pim Fortuyn gave a voice to the less privileged *per se* or whether they were also attracted mainly by the political distrust and anti-immigrant sentiments the party leader proclaimed.

Theory

The moderated relevance of social class in shaping political preferences has often been corroborated in studies on simple left-wing and right-wing distinctions (Clark *et al.*, 1993), but discussion within this tradition reveals that a negative trend parameter does not hold for all countries (Brooks *et al.*, 2006). Moreover, the importance of social cleavages can be distorted due to the emergence of new political parties that do not easily fit within the simple left/right distinction. In this way, the inclusion of new-left parties (Gijsberts & Nieuwebeerta, 2000; Brooks *et al.*, 2006) as representative of the left-libertarian policy axis (Kitschelt, 1995) may result in a smaller diminishing influence of social class than is found based in a one-dimensional model. For the Netherlands, however, De Graaf *et al.* (2001) conclude that the formation of the Green party did not affect the influence of social class. And, in this tradition, less attention has been paid to the inclusion of far right-wing parties as representative of authoritarian politics (Billiet & Swyngedouw, 1995; Kitschelt, 1995).

Research on far right-wing voting provides some evidence for an overrepresentation of the lower occupational positions. In countries where these parties form merely splinters, it is particularly manual workers who turn out to be overrepresented (Lubbers *et al.*, 2002). For France and Belgium, with somewhat larger far right-wing parties (Front National and Vlaams Blok, respectively), a less convincing overrepresentation of lower manual workers was accompanied by an overrepresentation of routine non-manual workers (Mayer, 1996; Lubbers *et al.*, 2000).

According to Kitschelt (1995), the importance of social class for the contemporary far right is reflected in the nature of these parties. Unsuccessful “racist authoritarian” or “welfare chauvinist” parties would be characterised by an overrepresentation of blue-collar workers. Successful “populist parties” would not, however, be characterised by alignment by social class; the Austrian FPÖ serves as an example. For the “new radical right parties” – the Front Nationale being the ideal

typical party – Kitschelt expects a cross-class alliance of voters, with blue-collar workers and small businessmen overrepresented and white-collar professionals underrepresented. The market liberal programme that is combined with authoritarian appeals would attract the social categories. Iversflaten (2005a) also points to the cross-class alliance of voters in explaining the success of the far right, but argues that economic alignment is not the reason for this traditionally unnatural alliance. She claims that merely the authoritarian dimension – read unfavourable attitudes towards migrants – causes this unusual combination of manual workers and small businessmen.

Iversflaten's findings (the result that economic interests are of minor importance) contrast with the core ideas surrounding the New Radical Right (NRR) parties. Kitschelt (1995) expected people working in technical and commercial jobs to be more likely to vote the far right-wing because international competition in these jobs is heavier than in socio-cultural public sphere jobs – the latter being more dependent on state financing. People with higher-risk jobs would be more supportive of a programme favouring tax cuts for the welfare state, which would have become a burden for hardworking taxpayers and their internationally operating firms. Because in many Western European countries immigrant groups are dependent on government support to a larger extent than natives, a far right-wing party with anti-immigrant sentiments and a market liberal view would be perceived by natives to be in their interest. One of the criticisms to this approach, however, is that the political programme from the new radical right was less market liberal than Kitschelt suggested (Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Iversflaten, 2005a). The LPF's focus on the economy was minimal, and it was less of a concern among voters – the reason Van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003) emphasised in their explanations of the rise of the LPF, "it is not the economy, stupid!" Nevertheless, the attention paid to the economy in the 2002 election programme (LPF online) focused more on a market liberal approach than a socialist one, in accordance with Kitschelt's expectation for successful far right-wing parties. Fortuyn argued, for example, that taxes and social insurance contributions should go down, and that mortgage allowances should not be abolished.

Another way to centralise economic interests of certain social categories is to depart from ethnic competition theory (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002). Here it becomes apparent that the authoritarian dimension can well be fuelled by economic interests. In this theory, the proposition is formulated that workers and self-employed people are more likely to vote for parties that take anti-immigrant stances as their main focus, because these social categories fear their position most strongly due to larger (perceived) competition with ethnic out-groups (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers *et al.*, 2002). Far right-wing parties, which claim to serve the interests of natives by emphasising the importance of national identification and assimilation of ethnic groups – as Fortuyn did – are expected to be a more attractive option for those who are most likely to be in competition with such out-groups (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002). For Europe, Kiehl and Werner (1999) show that ethnic minorities are (strongly) overrepresented in occupations at

the lower end of the labour market. The Dutch SCP (2004) provides a similar, more detailed picture for the Netherlands.

A parallel motivation derived from ethnic competition theory has been expected and supported for the lower-educated. These groups have stronger competition, not only over labour, but also over housing, schooling and lifestyles. In this way, the importance of the attitude towards ethnic minorities in voting far right can still be motivated economically – contrary to the argument of Iversflaten (2005b). Lower-educated people, manual workers and self-employed people are expected to be more likely to vote LPF because they are more dissatisfied with the economy and give support to less government intervention in the economy. This relation should then be interpreted by perceptions of perceived economic ethnic threat.

The crux of the matter is that measurements of economic ethnic threat and cultural ethnic threat are empirically (as tested with factor analyses) not distinguishable (Sniderman *et al.*, 2004). Therefore, often unbalanced economic and cultural explanations are taken into account, of which one is mostly closer to the phenomenon to be explained than the other (Iversflaten, 2005b), warranting false interpretations. Sniderman *et al.* also found multicollinearity in their models, but nevertheless showed that parameters of cultural ethnic threat were stronger related to stereotypes and ethnic distance than economic ethnic threat. Thus, we may expect that even though both cultural ethnic threat and economic ethnic threat may interpret the differences between social classes this should be stronger so by the perceptions of perceived economic threat. Moreover, we expect that both forms of ethnic threat are affected by perceptions of economic dissatisfaction, but perceived economic ethnic threat stronger than cultural ethnic threat.

Socio-cultural Elite

Contrasting the rationale of economic threat of why certain occupational categories would be more likely to vote extreme right is Kitschelt's argumentation on why white-collar professionals are expected to be the least likely to do so. This would be the result of their communicative experiences and specific capabilities. Kitschelt (1995: 19) claims that due to lack of data, exploration of the proposition is missing. With the development of a new class division by Güveli *et al.* (2005, 2007), in which socio-cultural specialists and technocrats are divided, we argue that we may answer the question of the extent to which the proposed occupational experiences are relevant to voting for the LPF.

Güveli *et al.* (2005) adjusted the frequently used EGP class scheme initially constructed by Erikson *et al.* (1979). They show that the large group of service workers in Western societies are a combination of socio-cultural specialists and more technocratically oriented specialists. Dividing the labour market into these groups has brought new insights into the relation between voting behaviour and social class in Western European societies since the 1960s. The changing labour market structure was one of the reasons to reconsider the structure of social class in

their empirical research, as the percentage of service workers has increased relative to the proportion of manual workers.

Employment relations or work situations are considered to form the basic criteria for distinguishing social classes (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000). Goldthorpe (2000: 206), for example, claims that “class positions can be understood as positions defined by employment relations”. Additionally, Kitschelt (1995:7) argued that work relations are not only characterised by their competitiveness but by their communicative experiences and capabilities as well:

Individuals who work in symbol- and client-processing organizations where social relations are at the heart of the work process have a much stronger orientation toward a reciprocal, egalitarian design of democratic politics and cultural institutions than do individuals who work in strategic and instrumental economic settings where they manipulate objects, documents and spreadsheets generated by other instrumental players.

Despite the emphasis on these occupational characteristics, most survey researchers did not take it into account, either because of a shortage of suitable surveys or because of the lack of a consensus on how to categorise occupations (Kitschelt, 1995: 9, 19). That said, the distinction between public service workers and others has been included in previous research. We argue that the systematic categorisation of higher service jobs according to skills, level of autonomy and possession of specialised knowledge provides a better test of Kitschelt’s proposition. The adjusted EGP class scheme provides an opportunity to test this proposition. Inspired by Kriesi (1989), Güveli *et al.* (2007) distinguished a class of socio-cultural specialists and one of technocrats within the service class of the EGP class scheme. Kriesi (1989) asserts that “a basic antagonism of interest” exists between these classes. Technocrats are supposed to preserve the integrity of the organisation they work for, while the specialists are more client-oriented or their objective is to act within the body of knowledge of the discipline they belong to. And Güveli *et al.* (2006) show that the socio-cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their socio-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour.

Güveli *et al.* (2005) argue that the classes of socio-cultural specialists and the technocrats differ in their employment relations. Next to the economic basis of social classes, social and cultural capital and skills are becoming essential classification devices in the employment structure and in the class mechanism in the post-industrial societies. It is relatively harder for employers to monitor socio-cultural specialists than technocrats in their work tasks. Furthermore, socio-cultural specialists have specific skills and knowledge involving social services and socio-cultural issues. According to Güveli *et al.* (2007), the egalitarian and progressive attitudes held by socio-cultural specialists owe much to the relative autonomy they enjoy in their work tasks. Members of these occupations also tend to possess more humanistic and value-laden knowledge, which makes them more sensitive to non-economic issues. The relevant criteria that distinguish between technocrats and socio-cultural

specialists lead to the hypothesis that socio-cultural specialists are less likely to vote for the LPF than technocrats. The differences between the occupational categories should result in different attitudes. We expect the skills, knowledge and work experience of socio-cultural specialists to have created stronger support for the importance of stressing social attitudes. Because of their experiences with people in their jobs and differences between people they have to cope with, we also expect that in particular a lower level of perceived cultural ethnic threat may explain why socio-cultural specialists are least likely to vote LPF.

Importance of Attitudes to Explain LPF Voting

We propose that although higher-educated people and higher-status groups are less likely to vote for the LPF, they are more likely to relate their attitudes to their voting outcome. Politics are complicated, and political knowledge is an important determinant in voting behaviour (Inglehart, 1990). It is therefore remarkable that previous research has hardly tested to what extent attitudes are of different relevance for different social groups in explaining far right-wing voting behaviour. Previous research showed that people are likely to choose the parties that are closest to the issues they support (Tillie, 1995; Van der Brug, 2003). The question is to what extent this relationship between attitudes and party preference is equal for social categories. We expect that for the higher-educated it is easier to find a party that corresponds most with their attitudes. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) also formulated that the relation between attitudes and behaviour can be distorted because of social norms. We expect, however, that the social pressure among the higher-educated on attitudes towards minorities is as large as on voting LPF, and will therefore not affect this relation. On the other hand, we might expect that people within groups where Fortuyn was highly popular, but without unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic minorities, were likely to vote LPF due to group pressure, also resulting in a lower correlation between attitudes and voting LPF. From this argument and the notion of consequential acting corresponding to their attitudes, we expect that political distrust and ethnic threat increase the likelihood of voting for the LPF among the higher-educated and socio-cultural specialists more strongly than among the lower-educated and other social classes. Likewise, we formulate that a stronger emphasis on the importance of social attitudes decreases the likelihood of voting for the LPF to a larger extent for higher-educated people and socio-cultural specialists than it does for lower-educated people and other social classes.

Data and Operationalisation

To test the hypotheses we use the Dutch survey from round 1 from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2004a). The ESS project is funded by the European Commission's 5th Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in participating countries. The ESS team emphasises the exceptionally high standards of the design and operation of the project. Since the response

rate for the Netherlands is quite high (at 68%, higher than other Dutch surveys) and the number of respondents is large enough to distinguish between more categories than in the standard EGP class scheme ($n = 2260$), we believe the data are well suited to test our hypotheses. For a comprehensive guide to the data and sampling procedure, see the ESS data documentation (Jowell *et al.*, 2003; ESS, 2004b).

Social Class

Social class is the crucial independent variable in our analyses. In the data, respondents' occupations are coded as ISCO88 values. These values are entered into the EGP classification using Ganzeboom's recoding programme (Erikson *et al.*, 1979; Ganzeboom & Treinman, 1996). As the numbers of farmers and farm workers are quite small in the Netherlands, we subsumed them into one single category. Retired or unemployed people were categorised according to their last occupation. People who never have had an occupation were taken as a separate category of "other".

To work with a more detailed occupational classification, we used the categorisations as proposed by Güveli *et al.* (2005, 2007). In these categories, the service class (Classes I and II of the EGP class scheme) is divided into higher and lower technocrats and socio-cultural specialists. This distinction was based on level of autonomy and possession of specialised service or socio-cultural knowledge. Next to this standard division used by Güveli *et al.*, we applied the same principle of client-based specialisations to routine non-manual workers, even though for this category the second criterion of autonomy cannot be applied. We distinguished lower service workers from lower sales workers, which are subsumed in the lower routine non-manual jobs in the EGP division. Typical occupations from these distinguished categories are presented in Table 1.

The other occupational categories are comparable to the ones in the original EGP class scheme (self-employed people with and without employees; manual supervisors; skilled manual workers; unskilled manual workers; farmers and farm labourers). Table 2 presents the distribution of the social class measurement. Here we find that technocrats and socio-cultural specialists make up large categories in social class divisions, showing that labour in the Netherlands is to a large extent

Table 1. Typical jobs in occupational categories of service and non-manual workers

Category	Typical jobs
Higher technocrats	Computer professionals, engineers, higher managers
Lower technocrats	Technicians, safety inspectors, lower managers
Socio-cultural specialists	Psychologists, physicians, social scientists, teachers, nurses, social workers, artists
Routine non-manual workers	Clerks
Lower service workers	Nursing associates, police officers
Lower sales workers	Salespersons, demonstrators

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of social class

Social position category	<i>N</i>	%
Higher technocrats	333	14.7
Lower technocrats	438	19.4
Socio-cultural specialists	379	16.8
Routine non-manual workers	204	9.3
Lower service workers	144	6.1
Lower sales workers	50	2.2
Self-employed with employees	59	2.6
Self-employed without employees	62	2.7
Manual supervisors	96	4.2
Manual skilled workers	101	4.5
Manual unskilled workers	233	10.3
Farmers and labourers	45	2.0
Never had a job/not classified	116	5.1
Total	2260	100.0

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003.

specialised. Other large categories are routine non-manual workers and manual unskilled workers, both making up around 10% of the population of people aged 18 and older.

Other Social Background Characteristics

Education was measured with the Dutch measurement of educational categories. As we only use the Dutch data from the ESS project, we argue that this measurement provides more detailed information than the available standardised education measurement (either by level or in years). Educational level runs in seven categories from “primary or less” to “tertiary scientific”. As research into voting behaviour has shown that religion is an important predictor, we have also included a measure for this (Billiet, 1995). Research on far right-wing voting behaviour has predicted and corroborated that non-religious people are more likely to vote for these parties (Billiet & Swyngedouw, 1995; Lubbers *et al.*, 2000; Van der Brug, 2003). To include a measurement of religiosity, we used church attendance. Four categories divide between “never attends”, “seldom attends”, “attends once a month” and “attends once a week”. Age (18 and older) and its quadratic term are included too, as from disintegration theories it is expected that younger people are more likely to vote for the far right. Finally, gender is included, since research has shown that men are much more likely to vote for the far right (Rippl & Siepel, 1998; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Van der Brug, 2003; Givens, 2004).

Party Preference

To estimate the likelihood of LPF voting, we used responses from the question asking which party people voted for in the last general elections. As the survey was conducted between the general elections of May 2002 and those of January 2003, it referred to the situation where the LPF had performed best. The percentage of LPF voters (excluding non-voters) in the data was 13.6% ($n = 261$), something of an underrepresentation, given that the actual result was 17%. As is usual in survey data, the percentage of non-voters (13.5%) is lower than the actual turnout. In the 2002 elections, 21% of electors did not vote. To test our hypotheses we constructed a dichotomous variable “voted for the LPF” versus “not voted for the LPF”. In this measurement we excluded those who did not vote in the elections.

Socio-political Attitudes

For the measurement of *perceptions of economic ethnic threat* (with a higher score referring to more threat), we used three bipolar items that appeared to be reliable measurements. (“immigrants take jobs away versus create new jobs”, “immigrants take more services in versus take more services out than they put in”, and “immigration is bad versus good for the economy”) and three items with answer categories running from strongly agree to strongly disagree (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.75$) (“average salaries and wages are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here”, “people who come to live here generally harm the economic prospects of the poor more than the rich” and “if people who have come to live and work here are unemployed for a long time, they should be made to leave”).

For *perceptions of cultural ethnic threat* (again with a higher score referring to more threat) we used three items. The item “it is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions” was also used by Iversflaten (2005b). The two other items were the bipolar scale whether “immigrants undermine the cultural life versus enrich the cultural life” and “if a country wants to reduce tensions it should stop immigration”. The α for this scale of cultural threat was 0.69. Economic and cultural threats are factorially not distinguishable. Nevertheless, comparable to the procedure of Sniderman *et al.* (who use single items for economic and cultural threat) we continue with the distinction between the scales to test whether they produce different effects and interpretations.

Political distrust was measured with four items (“politicians in general care what people like respondent think”; “politicians are interested in votes rather than in people’s opinions”; “trust in country’s parliament”; and “trust in politicians”). The items were transformed into items with similar scale lengths, running from 0 to 10, where 10 means “no trust”. After factor analyses showed single dimensionality and reliability analyses provided satisfactory statistics (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.76$), we computed one scale of political distrust by taking the mean of the scores on the four items. The *importance of social attitudes* was measured with three items, asking respondents to what extent they believed it to be important “to understand different

people”, “that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, and “to help people and care for others’ well-being” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.60). We took the mean from the three items to compute the scale. *Satisfaction with the economy*, referring to the Netherlands at the time of the interview, was measured as such with a single question. The extent to which people object to *government intervention in the economy* was also measured with one item, since no other related measurements were available to construct an appropriate scale. We also take into account left/right placement, as it turned out to be of relevance in previous research, even though the placement will be partly the result of positions people take on the addressed attitudes. *Left/right placement* was measured with a single scale running from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) on which people could indicate their position. All the attitudes were transformed into z -scores.

Descriptive Analyses

Before testing our hypotheses, we describe to what extent social class categories voted for the LPF. Table 3 presents the results, also showing the differences between categories in non-voting, because this also varies and is the reason for the different n of the categories compared with Table 2. The non-voting pattern is somewhat different than that of LPF voting. The abstention level of the self-employed is low. Socio-cultural specialists score on the lower end too, as with technocrats. Reported non-voting is more common among manual workers, farmers and people who never had a job, of whom between one in four and one in five did not vote.

Large differences are found in LPF support between social class categories. It is lowest for socio-cultural specialists (5.5%) and highest among self-employed people without employees (26.8%). Within the higher occupational categories, we also find large differences in LPF support. The percentage found for socio-cultural specialists doubles and triples for higher and lower technocrats, respectively. Routine non-manual workers, lower services workers and sales workers do not differ very strongly in their support for the LPF. All categories score around the average of 13.6%. The percentage of LPF voters among manual workers and their supervisors lies around 17%.

Table 3 also gives the average scores on the attitudes (z -scores). Socio-cultural specialists stand out in their social attitudes, whereas self-employed people with employees and farmers and farm labourers stress the importance of social attitudes to a lower degree. Satisfaction with the economy is higher among farmers, and among both the higher technocrats and socio-cultural specialists, whereas satisfaction is lower among routine non-manual workers and skilled manual workers. Opposition to government intervention in the economy is more widespread among farmers and self-employed people, and less so among socio-cultural specialists. Economic ethnic threat is clearly below average among technocrats and socio-cultural specialists. This also holds for cultural ethnic threat, with the differences that the socio-cultural specialists deviate somewhat more extreme from the mean of zero as compared to their position on economic ethnic threat, whereas for the higher

Table 3. Descriptive statistics: percentage of LPF voters, percentage of non-voters, and average scores on socio-political attitudes (*z*-scores) by social class

Social class category	% votes for LPF	<i>N</i>	% non-voters	<i>N</i>	Importance of social attitudes			Economic			Cultural		Political distrust	Left/right placement
					<i>N</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>N</i>	Satisfaction economy	Contra gov. intervention	ethnic threat	ethnic threat	ethnic threat		
Higher technocrats	13.5	296	9.9	333	0.03	0.12	-0.05	-0.23	-0.15	-0.23	0.07	-0.23	0.07	
Lower technocrats	16.9	384	10.7	438	0.00	0.01	-0.10	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	0.06	-0.08	0.06	
Socio-cultural specialists	5.5	346	7.1	379	0.16	0.13	-0.20	-0.32	-0.42	-0.31	-0.21	-0.31	-0.21	
Routine non-manual workers	13.2	159	20.1	204	-0.13	-0.20	0.03	0.19	0.17	0.21	-0.06	0.21	-0.06	
Lower service workers	13.2	114	19.4	144	0.10	-0.09	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.08	-0.12	0.08	-0.12	
Lower sales workers	15.2	46	6.0	50	0.00	-0.04	0.02	0.11	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	-0.03	0.05	
Self-employed with employees	16.7	54	3.4	59	-0.21	-0.08	0.09	0.19	0.30	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	
Self-employed without employees	26.8	56	9.9	62	0.05	-0.02	0.20	0.14	0.09	0.19	0.09	0.19	0.09	
Manual supervisors	16.7	84	10.4	96	-0.16	0.07	0.07	-0.08	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.13	
Skilled manual workers	17.7	79	20.8	101	-0.05	-0.23	0.11	0.42	0.41	0.37	0.04	0.37	0.04	
Unskilled manual workers	17.0	182	20.2	233	-0.06	-0.06	0.14	0.24	0.22	0.34	-0.03	0.34	-0.03	
Farmers and labourers	8.8	34	20.0	45	-0.29	0.26	0.30	0.32	0.28	-0.08	0.16	-0.08	0.16	
Never had a job/not classified	9.4	85	25.0	116	0.01	-0.12	0.39	0.44	0.58	0.28	0.20	0.28	0.20	
<i>Total</i>	13.6	1919	13.5	2260	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003.

technocrats the reversed is found. Economic and cultural ethnic threats are prevalent, particularly amongst skilled manual workers, farmers and farm labourers, and people who never had a job. With regard to political distrust, again technocrats and socio-cultural specialists score at the lower end, and manual workers at the opposite end. Finally, socio-cultural specialists place themselves furthest to the left. Self-employed people with employees place themselves furthest to the right.

Results

Our first exercise is to compare the relevance of the detailed social class measurement in voting for the LPF compared with the traditional EGP classification. Second, we control the effect of the best-fitting social class determinant for other relevant determinants of LPF voting behaviour, i.e. education, gender, age and church attendance. Hereafter we include socio-political attitudes to find out how much these explain differences between social categories. Finally, we show to what extent the interactions as expected exist between education and social class and socio-political attitudes. We use logistic regression to test our hypotheses.

Table 4 presents two models to predict LPF voting. The first model provides differences in LPF voting between social class categories according to the EGP classification. The second model presents differences between social class categories according to the proposed more detailed classification, distinguishing between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats. The fit statistics at the lower end of the table show that the model fit improves significantly at the $p < 0.01$ level in the second model only, where the more detailed class measurement is included. In the first model, inclusion of the EGP measurement only improves model fit significantly at the $p < 0.10$ level. In other words, this traditional model discriminates less strongly between categories in the likelihood of LPF voting. When we turn to the parameters in the first model, we see this corroborated. Self-employed people without employees are clearly more likely to vote LPF than higher controllers, the reference category. Moreover, unskilled and skilled manual workers are more likely to vote LPF than higher controllers. Hence, based on this model we should conclude that social class is a minor predictor and that self-employed people without employees are more likely to vote LPF. This is comparable to findings in previous research.

The second model includes the more detailed class scheme. This model has a much better fit, and is highly significant. With the socio-cultural specialists as the reference category in this model, we see that almost all social categories are significantly more likely to vote the LPF compared to the socio-cultural specialists. The exceptional position of the socio-cultural specialists makes the predictor of social class highly relevant, as they are much less likely to vote LPF than all other categories. In particular the self-employed are much more likely to vote LPF as compared to the socio-cultural specialists, with the odds ratios for the self-employed with and without employees being 3.44 and 6.30, respectively. But also the well-educated category of higher technocrats has a significantly higher likelihood of voting LPF. The outcome is very close to the prediction Kitschelt made for the new radical-right

Table 4. EGP versus more categories of social class predicting the likelihood of voting LPF

<i>Model 1</i>	<i>B</i>	s.e.	Odds	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>B</i>	s.e.	Odds
Social class:							
Higher controllers (Ref)				Socio-cultural specialists (ref)			
				Higher technocrats	0.99**	0.29	2.69
Lower controllers	0.07	0.20	1.07	Lower technocrats	1.26**	0.27	3.51
Routine non-manual workers	0.16	0.28	1.17	Routine non-manual workers	0.97**	0.33	2.64
Lower sales and service workers	0.11	0.26	1.11	Lower service workers	0.95**	0.36	2.58
				Lower sales workers	1.13**	0.47	3.09
Self-employed with employees	0.42	0.40	1.53	Self-employed with employees	1.24**	0.44	3.44
Self-employed without employees	0.96**	0.34	2.60	Self-employed without employees	1.84**	0.38	6.30
Manual supervisors	0.39	0.34	1.48	Manual supervisors	1.24**	0.38	3.44
Skilled manual workers	0.60~	0.32	1.82	Skilled manual workers	1.31**	0.38	3.71
Unskilled manual workers	0.48*	0.22	1.62	Unskilled manual workers	1.26**	0.31	3.53
Farmers and labourers	-0.30	0.62	0.74	Farmers and labourers	0.51	0.65	1.67
Others	-0.14	0.40	0.87	Never had a job/not classified	0.58	0.44	1.79
Intercept	-2.04				-2.84		
-2 log likelihood	1509.34				1470.74		
Chi-square model improvement; compared to null model (df)	16.55~(10)				38.96** (12)		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.01				0.04		

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$.

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003, own computations; $N = 1888$.

type of extreme right-wing parties. It is not the cross-alliance of manual workers and self-employed people, though. More important is that all categories are almost as likely to vote for the LPF, with the exception of socio-cultural specialists. Furthermore, we find that the distinction between service and sales workers does not add much to the understanding of LPF voting. Both categories vary to a similar extent from the socio-cultural specialists.

Now that we have ascertained that a more detailed social class measurement, including the distinction between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats, determines voting for the LPF more effectively than the traditional EGP measurement, we continue our analyses controlling for other relevant predictors. In Model A of Table 5 we include education, gender, age and church attendance alongside to social class.¹

Comparable with previous research, we find that the higher the level of education, the less likely one is to vote LPF. What is remarkable though is that the model fit increases less than expected due to the inclusion of education. Additional tests show that social class contributes more strongly to the model fit than does education. The improvement in model fit in Model A can, to a large extent, be attributed to the measurement of church attendance. In keeping with previous research, we find that people who attend church once a week or more are less likely to vote LPF than people who never attend church. Remarkably absent are the effects of age and gender. Gender effects are widely reported in far right-wing research, with men being more likely to cast such a vote (Givens, 2004), and contrasts the finding from Van der Brug (2003). The small difference between men and women (the parameter is still in the expected direction) is comparable to other less outspoken far right-wing parties. Thus, the LPF seems more comparable with Alpine far right-wing parties such as the FPÖ (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005) than to the Belgian, French and Scandinavian extreme right parties (Evans, 2005). In Model A, social class parameters decrease – compared with those presented in Table 4 – implying that educational differences and differences in Church attendance explain a part of the differences between social categories when voting LPF, particularly between socio-cultural specialists, manual workers, and self-employed people. However, the difference between socio-cultural specialists and higher technocrats remains highly significant, and we conclude that, next to education, the division of social classes into technical and socio-cultural specialists accounts best for the explanation of LPF voting.

Effects from Socio-political Attitudes

In Model B in Table 5 we include three of the socio-political attitudes: social attitudes, satisfaction with the economy, and opposition to government intervention in the economy. All of the three terms are significant, implying that as expected, people who strongly subscribe the importance of social attitudes are less likely to vote LPF. Moreover, people who are more satisfied with the economy are less likely to vote LPF, and stronger opposition to government intervention in the economy increases the likeli-

Table 5. Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of voting LPF

	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model D	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Social class:								
Socio-cultural specialists (ref)								
Higher technocrats	0.88**	0.30	0.88**	0.30	0.84**	0.32	0.77*	0.32
Lower technocrats	0.99**	0.28	0.98**	0.28	0.88**	0.29	0.80*	0.30
Routine non-manual workers	0.59~	0.35	0.52	0.35	0.44	0.37	0.37	0.37
Lower service workers	0.68~	0.38	0.64~	0.38	0.71~	0.40	0.62	0.40
Lower sales workers	0.67	0.49	0.62	0.49	0.56	0.51	0.63	0.51
Self-employed with employees	0.95*	0.45	0.81~	0.45	0.42	0.49	0.35	0.50
Self-employed without employees	1.42**	0.40	1.35**	0.41	1.20**	0.42	1.16**	0.43
Manual supervisors	0.83*	0.40	0.83*	0.40	0.74~	0.42	0.62	0.43
Skilled manual workers	0.87*	0.41	0.82*	0.41	0.59	0.43	0.50	0.44
Unskilled manual workers	0.76*	0.34	0.73*	0.34	0.58	0.11	0.57	0.36
Farmers and labourers	0.24	0.67	0.21	0.69	0.16	0.69	0.14	0.70
Never had a job/not classified	0.48	0.47	0.35	0.48	0.09	0.50	0.02	0.50
Education	-0.20**	0.05	-0.17**	0.05	-0.10~	0.06	-0.07	0.06
Gender: male	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.16	0.10	0.17	0.04	0.17
Age	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03
Age-quadratic term	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Church attendance								
Once a week	-1.35**	0.31	-1.32**	0.32	-1.61**	0.33	-1.63**	0.33
Once a month	-0.44	0.27	-0.32	0.27	-0.25	0.28	-0.33	0.29
Seldom	-0.19	0.16	-0.15	0.16	-0.17	0.17	-0.17	0.17

Table 5. Continued.

	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model D	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Never (<i>reference</i>)								
Importance of social attitudes (z-score)			-0.18**	0.07	-0.06	0.07	-0.03	0.07
Satisfaction economy (z-score)			-0.24**	0.07	-0.10	0.08	-0.12	0.08
Contra gov. intervention in economy (z-score)			0.25**	0.07	0.16*	0.07	0.16*	0.07
Left/right scale (z-score)					0.62**	0.08	0.55**	0.08
Political distrust (z-score)					0.41**	0.09	0.35**	0.09
Economic ethnic threat (z-score)					0.30**	0.08		
Cultural ethnic threat (z-score)							0.57**	0.08
Intercept	-2.23		-1.82		-2.13		-2.04	
-2 log likelihood	1426.56		1392.63		1262.13		1225.71	
Chi-square model improvement; compared to previous model (df)	44.19** (7)		33.93** (3)		130.50** (3)		166.92** (3)	
Nagelkerke R ²	0.08		0.11		0.22		0.25	

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $\sim p < 0.10$.

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003, own computations; $N = 1888$.

hood of voting LPF. Surprisingly, the inclusion of the three attitudes hardly explains the differences in chances between the socio-cultural specialists and the other social class categories, as the parameters in Model B are largely comparable with the parameters in Model A. Only the larger likelihood of the self-employed people voting LPF as compared with the socio-cultural specialists has decreased slightly. The effect of education is also somewhat smaller in Model B, implying that the attitudes partly explain why a higher education results in a lower likelihood of voting LPF.

In the subsequent Model C, we find that LPF voting is strongly determined by left/right-wing placement, political distrust, and economic ethnic threat. Of these three attitudes, it is left/right placement that has the strongest influence ($B = 0.62$), followed by political distrust ($B = 0.41$). In Model D, we replace perceived economic ethnic threat by perceived cultural ethnic threat. Now we find that the strongest influence is from cultural ethnic threat ($B = 0.57$). This effect is larger than the effect from left/right placement in this model ($B = 0.55$). Even though economic and cultural ethnic threats are not factorially distinct, the different consequences of the measurements are strong. We cannot conclude that economic ethnic threat has no influence on LPF voting, but we can conclude that the cultural ethnic threat has more.

Let us turn to the comparison of the models in explaining the effects of the other attitudes and differences between social categories. We do so both by comparing the changes in the parameters between Models B, C and D, respectively, and by the results of additional regression analyses of the attitudes (see Appendix 1). The effect of social attitudes on voting LPF is explained by the attitudes “ethnic threat”, “political distrust” and “left/right placement”. Appendix 1 shows us that social attitudes reduce both economic and cultural ethnic threat – almost to the same extent. Moreover people with a social attitude distrust politics less and place themselves further to the left. The influence of satisfaction with the economy on voting LPF is explained by the other attitudes as well. Importantly though, satisfaction with the national economy has a quite strong effect on perceived economic ethnic threat ($B = -0.18$; Appendix 1) and a more modest effect on perceived cultural threat ($B = -0.09$; Appendix 1). However, greater satisfaction with the economy leads to a decrease in political distrust. Based on these findings we have to conclude that economic evaluations do affect ethnic threat and consequently LPF voting – the cultural threat explanation turns out to be of greater importance. The effect of opposition to government intervention remains significant after controlling for ethnic threat, political distrust and left/right placement.

The effect of education on voting LPF is largely explained by political distrust, ethnic threat, and left/right placement. Interestingly, education affects cultural ethnic threat more than economic ethnic threat (Appendix 1). Consequently, the effect of education is explained better in Model D as compared with Model C. Social class differences are also partly explained by the introduction of political distrust, ethnic threat, and left/right placement. In Models C and D – when attitudes are controlled for – it is the same group of categories that remain significantly more likely to vote for the LPF than the socio-cultural specialists: higher and lower technocrats, and self-employed people without employees. But it is the cultural ethnic threat that provides

a better explanation of the differences between the social class categories voting LPF as compared with the economic ethnic threat. We can see this comparing Models C and D, where in Model D the parameters of social class have diminished somewhat more. The exception is the category of the unskilled manual workers. In Appendix 1, we see this finding corroborated. The effects of social class are more pronounced on cultural ethnic threat than on economic ethnic threat. Higher and lower technocrats as well as self-employed people *with* employees are more likely to perceive a larger cultural ethnic threat than the socio-cultural specialists, whereas they do not differ in their perceived economic ethnic threat. For unskilled manual workers and farmers, it remains the case that they perceive a larger economic ethnic threat than the socio-cultural specialists, but not a significantly larger cultural ethnic threat.

Interactions

To answer the question of whether socio-political attitudes increase the likelihood of voting LPF for higher- and lower-educated people, socio-cultural specialists and other social classes to the same extent, we added interaction effects to the last model presented in Table 5. The results of the interactions with education are presented in Table 6, and the interactions between socio-cultural specialists and attitudes are shown in Table 7.

The interactions between education and attitudes are significant, except in the case of cultural ethnic threat. The main effect of education is its effect for people with an average attitude (the value 0 on the *z*-scores of the attitudes). The main effect of the socio-political attitude is within the category of the lowest-educated people (the value 0 on the education variable). The interaction term can be interpreted as the change in the effect of socio-political attitude when education increases. Most remarkable is that three of the four socio-political attitudes have no significant effect on voting LPF for the least educated people. This changes rapidly when education level increases. For lower-educated people, for whom the likelihood of voting LPF is larger, it does not matter much whether people perceive an economic ethnic threat or not. For the higher-educated this is highly relevant. Higher-educated people without perceptions of economic ethnic threat are far less likely to vote for the LPF; for those who perceive an economic ethnic threat, the likelihood of voting LPF is comparable to the likelihood of the lower-educated people with a strong economic ethnic threat perception. This interaction effect is depicted in Figure 1.

We make similar findings for political distrust and social attitudes. These are highly discriminatory among the higher-educated, but far less so among lower-educated categories. As education increases, so does the importance of political distrust and social attitudes as determinants of LPF voting. Regarding a cultural ethnic threat, we find no significant interaction effect. The term is positive, and hence comparable with the interaction between education and an economic ethnic threat, but it is not sufficiently strong to reach statistical significance. So, for both the lower- and higher-educated it holds that a stronger cultural ethnic threat increases the likelihood to vote LPF to a similar extent (Figure 2).




Figure 1. Effects of economic ethnic threat on voting LPF for the lowest and highest educational categories. *Source:* ESS Netherlands 2002.

Socio-cultural specialists were less likely to vote LPF than the many other social class categories. We could only partly find an explanation for this in the different attitudes. But do these attitudes determine LPF voting for socio-cultural specialists similarly, as compared with the other categories? All interaction terms indicate that the effect of attitude is stronger within the category of socio-cultural specialists, although the interactions with ethnic threat are not significant (see Table 7). Among the socio-cultural specialists, voting LPF is more likely than among other social class categories when one perceives an ethnic threat to be stronger, distrusts politics more strongly, or when one stresses to a lower degree the importance of social attitudes.

Social Class and Voting Other Parties

To compare the extent to which it applies specifically for voting for the LPF that the distinction between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats is a good predictor variable, we calculated kappa indices that provide the relation between social class

Table 6. Interaction between education and economic and cultural ethnic threat, political distrust and social attitudes on voting LPF

	Economic ethnic threat		Cultural ethnic threat		Political distrust		Importance of social attitudes	
	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.
Education (0–6)	-0.12*	0.06	-0.08	0.06	-0.14*	0.06	-0.12*	0.06
Socio-political attitude (z-score)	0.07	0.13	0.43**	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.13
Education * socio-political attitude	0.09*	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.12**	0.05	-0.08*	0.04

Controlled for all other characteristics from Model C of Table 5. *Source:* ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003; *N* = 1888.




Figure 2. Effects of cultural ethnic threat on voting LPF for the lowest and highest educational categories. *Source:* ESS Netherlands 2002.

and voting, controlling for number of categories being used (Gijsberts & Nieuwebeerta, 2000).² We provide kappa indices both for the traditional EGP social class measurement as well as for the measurement proposed by Güveli *et al.*, distinguishing between technocrats and socio-cultural specialists. We calculated these kappa indices for the bivariate relation, hence regressing LPF voting on social class.³ The results are presented in Table 8.

Table 8 shows the indices for voting for various parties and party combinations. We find that the class voting index based on the distinction between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats (EGPG) is highest for LPF voting (0.26), although when it comes to abstention from voting the index is even higher. Social class turns out to be related particularly strongly to abstention (0.46). For all parties and party combinations other than the LPF, the class voting index based on the distinction proposed by Güveli *et al.* is lower. After the LPF, it is strongest for the social democratic PvdA

Table 7. Interaction between socio-cultural specialists and economic and cultural ethnic threat, political distrust and social attitudes on voting LPF

	Economic ethnic threat		Cultural ethnic threat		Political distrust		Importance of social attitudes	
	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.	<i>B</i>	s.e.
Socio-cultural specialists (compared to higher technocrats)	-0.85**	0.33	-0.87**	0.35	-0.98**	0.35	-1.00**	0.35
Socio-political attitude	0.28**	0.08	0.56**	0.08	0.38**	0.08	-0.00	0.08
Socio-cultural specialists * socio-political attitude	0.15	0.26	0.34	0.26	0.65*	0.30	-0.57*	0.27

Controlled for all other characteristics from Model C of Table 5.

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003; *N* = 1888.

Table 8. Class voting indices (kappa)

	EGPG	EGP
LPF	0.26	0.12
Liberal (VVD)	0.16	0.23
Liberals (VVD, D66)	0.16	0.22
Christian Democrats (CDA)	0.07	0.09
Christians (CDA, SGP, CU)	0.07	0.09
Old left (PvdA, SP)	0.17	0.17
Social Democrats (PvdA)	0.22	0.22
Greens	0.14	0.11
Left (PvdA, Greens, SP)	0.13	0.14
Cultural (Greens, D66)	0.12	0.14
Abstention	0.46	0.43

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003, own computations.

EGPG: EGP classification added with the distinction between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats, as proposed by Güveli *et al.* (2005).

EGP: Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero social class classification.

(0.22). The relation between class and voting is especially low for the Christian parties.

Comparing traditional EGP class divisions and the proposed distinction between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats, (EGPG) shows that EGPG provides a better explanation for voting LPF and Greens as well as for abstention. The LPF and the Greens can be considered to be the parties at the extremes of the authoritarian dimension as worked out by Kitschelt (1995). For the other parties, the EGPG index is somewhat lower or comparable to the class voting index based on the EGP classification.

Conclusions and Discussion

In this study we contributed to the research on political parties that emphasise national identity and assimilation of immigrants, by focussing on explanations of voting LPF. First, we addressed the question whether the distinction between social class categories by their level of autonomy and specialised knowledge contributes in explaining voting for the LPF. Second, we tested explanations of why these and previously corroborated social class differences exist, by focussing on the importance of social attitudes, and the distinction between economic and cultural ethnic threat. Third, we showed to what extent attitudinal explanations interact with social-structural characteristics.

We found large differences between socio-cultural specialists on the one hand and technocrats on the other, the latter being much more supportive of the LPF. Although small businessmen were found to be most likely to vote LPF, the differences between technocrats, routine non-manual workers and even manual

workers turned out to be small. Taking the differences between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats into account instead of merely distinguishing between lower and higher service class workers (or lower and higher controllers) provides a better explanation of LPF voting behaviour. More remarkably, this measurement even competes with educational attainment in the strength of its effect on LPF voting. With these findings we refute the idea of the LPF being a party that would not be aligned by social class. Kitschelt's formulation that occupational categories should be divided not only according to lines of competitiveness but also according to specialised knowledge has proven to be correct.

A cross-class alliance of voters (referring to an overrepresentation of self-employed people without employees and manual workers) was not found to be consistently supportive of the LPF. Small businessmen did turn out to be in favour of the LPF, but manual workers were not found to deviate significantly from either technocrats, routine non-manual workers or lower sales and service employees. Once more, the basic divide in voting for the LPF lies between socio-cultural specialists and all other occupational categories. We showed that subscribing the importance of social attitudes hardly explained differences between social classes in their likelihood to vote LPF. Only lower technocrats and self-employed with employees turned out to be somewhat less in support of the social attitudes. Because social attitudes affect other important determinants of LPF voting (ethnic threat, political distrust and left/right placement), an indirect effect of these social attitudes exists.

The differences between cultural ethnic threat and economic ethnic threat turned out to shed some light on the lower likelihood of the socio-cultural specialists to vote LPF compared with the technocrats. Higher and lower technocrats perceive a significantly stronger cultural ethnic threat than the socio-cultural specialists, whereas they do not differ in their perceived economic ethnic threat. Where economic ethnic threat also explains the larger likelihood of the unskilled manual workers to vote LPF, cultural ethnic threat does so to some extent for the technocrats. Technocrats stay significantly more likely to vote LPF though, even after controlling for the attitudes. Hence, there must be other explanation why they do so.

Previous research has not focused on the extent to which attitudes are equally important for different social categories. We find that the answer to this question is relevant. The interaction effects between social attitudes and education and class are significant. People who perceive an economic ethnic threat or distrust politics are more likely to vote LPF, regardless of their education or class. People disassociating themselves from these attitudes are less likely to vote LPF – much more so when they are higher-educated or socio-cultural specialists. We have to conclude that consequential acting does not differ between lower- and higher-educated people when they support LPF core programmatic aspects. For the lower-educated without support for the core ideas of Fortuyn, we may speculate that they are either driven by sentiments about the murder of Fortuyn or by possible group pressure to vote Fortuyn.

We are aware that our findings are based on the Dutch political and occupational structure. However, almost all advanced economies have moved from an industrial to a post-industrial employment structure and the criteria for distinguishing the socio-

cultural specialists should apply to other countries as well. Furthermore, almost all Western societies experience a rise of a (far right-wing) party that emphasises national identity and assimilation of immigrants. Therefore, we encourage scholars to use the adjusted EGP class schema, the details of which are reported in Appendix 2. Future research should reveal whether our conclusions apply to other countries as well.

Notes

1. We are aware that sector of employment is an important factor to control for. We expect that sector of employment explains a part of the differences between the socio-cultural specialists and the other class members in voting for LPF. Unfortunately, we could not distinguish between the private and public sector in the ESS data.
2. Calculated as the sum of squares of the deviation parameters of all social class categories, divided by the product of the number of voting outcomes and the number of categories of social class.
3. We dropped the category of farmers and farm labourers from the computation of class voting index because within this category no one voted D66 or GroenLinks (Green Left), making estimation of the respective outcome impossible. As the category is small, we think distortions are minimal.

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Appendix 1. Regression of Socio-political Attitudes

	Social attitude	Satisfaction economy	Contra economy intervention	Political distrust	Economic ethnic threat	Cultural ethnic threat	Left/right
Social class:							
Socio-cultural specialists (ref)							
Higher technocrats	-0.02	-0.00	0.08	-0.02	0.08	0.16*	0.19*
Lower technocrats	-0.15*	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.11	0.17*	0.24**
Routine non-manual workers	-0.28**	-0.06	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.16~	0.06
Lower service workers	-0.17	0.04	0.12	0.09	-0.03	0.08	0.05
Lower sales workers	-0.12	0.03	0.19	0.07	0.14	0.08	0.21
Self-employed with employees	-0.33*	-0.11	0.23	0.31*	0.19	0.32*	0.26*
Self-employed without employees	-0.09	0.12	0.36*	0.28*	0.30*	0.28*	0.21
Manual supervisors	-0.10	0.01	0.17	0.19~	0.06	0.10	0.18
Skilled manual workers	-0.03	-0.16	0.12	0.32**	0.34**	0.30*	0.11
Unskilled manual workers	-0.07	0.04	0.19~	0.25**	0.25*	0.12	0.02
Farmers and labourers	-0.45*	0.30	0.21	-0.13	0.31~	0.14	0.01
Never had a job/not classified	-0.16	0.14	0.38**	0.00	0.30*	0.37**	0.29*
Education	0.02	0.07**	-0.05**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.16**	-0.04*
Gender: male	-0.28**	0.19**	0.08	-0.05	-0.17**	0.07	0.15**
Age	0.01**	0.02**	0.00	0.03**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Age-quadratic term	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00

Appendix 1. Continued

	Social attitude	Satisfaction economy	Contra economy intervention	Political distrust	Economic ethnic threat	Cultural ethnic threat	Left/right
Church attendance:							
Once a week	0.05	0.16*	-0.06	-0.20**	0.03	0.13*	0.53**
Once a month	0.22**	0.16*	-0.17*	-0.19**	-0.06	0.09	0.21**
Seldom	0.02	0.09~	-0.02	-0.13*	0.07	0.04	0.15**
Never (ref.)							
Importance of social attitude (z-score)				-0.04*	-0.10**	-0.13**	-0.17**
Satisfaction economy (z-score)				-0.27**	-0.18**	-0.09**	0.04
Contra government intervention economy (z-score)				0.17**	0.04	0.04	0.05*
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.21	0.12	0.19	0.08

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$.

Source: ESS Netherlands 2002, Jowell *et al.*, 2003, own computations; $N = 1888$.

Appendix 2. ISCO88 Codes of Classes of Technocrats and Socio-cultural Specialists (Güveli *et al.*, 2005, 2006)

Higher Technocrats (1000 1100 1110 1120 1200 1210 1220 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1239 1250 1251 2000 2100 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2120 2121 2122 2130 2131 2140 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2411 2420 2443 3143 3144).

Socio-cultural Specialists (2141 2213 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2229 2230 2300 2310 2320 2321 2322 2323 2330 2331 2332 2340 2350 2351 2352 2359 2400 2412 2419 2421 2422 2429 2430 2431 2432 2440 2441 2442 2444 2445 2446 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2460 2470 3131 3200 3210 3229 3240 3241 3242 3470 3471 3472 3473 3474 5150 5151 5152).

Lower Technocrats (1130 1140 1141 1142 1143 1240 1252 1300 1310 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 2132 2139 2148 2410 3000 3100 3110 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 3120 3121 3122 3123 3130 3132 3133 3139 3140 3141 3142 3145 3150 3151 3152 3211 3212 3213 3220 3221 3222 3223 3224 3225 3226 3227 3228 3400 3410 3411 3412 3413 3414 3415 3416 3417 3419 3420 3421 3422 3423 3429 3431 3432 3434 3440 3441 3442 3443 3444 3449 3450 3451 3475).