AFFATUS: NATURAL SCIENCE AS MORAL THEOLOGY

(Part two)

Part Two: Affatus as Moral Theology

The first part of this study has reviewed the medieval physiological and psychological doctrines regarding speech that Ramon Llull adapts in his proposal of *affatus*. From this review, it is possible to see how Llull’s arguments reorganize conventional Scholastic theories and to recognize certain difficulties in his collocation of speech among the external senses. We can even point to at least two of those doctrines, the attribution of a *virtus vocalis* to the motive power of the sensitive soul and the conception of a “mental discourse” in the operations of the soul, as the principal bases for Llull’s proposal of *affatus*. Nonetheless, Anthony Bonner has not unjustly suggested that all this scientific lore bears only “marginal or secondary interest” for understanding *affatus*. The non-“homologable” relationship between contemporary doctrines and Llull’s proposal should convince us that the sixth sense is not comprehensible simply as a contribution to the natural science of the medieval schools. This is hardly unexpected: for Llull, these Scholastic theories explain at best how language works, but not *what purpose* language should achieve. The latter question only finds an answer through consideration of the universal metaphysico-moral ends of being that Llull called first and second “intentions”. More than any other element from his Art, the intentions define the comprehensive dynamic organization of all creatures to their Creator. It is surely this

\[^{171}\text{EL 25 (1981-83): 280.}\]
\[^{172}\text{On Llull's intentions as principles of metaphysical and moral finality, see the author’s *Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull* 16-18.}\]
contribution to the right ordinatio of creation that Tomàs and Joaquim Carreras i Artau recognized when they noted the “Anselmian” character of affatus.\textsuperscript{174}

Llull’s arguments regarding the proper uses of language cover a wide range of ethical issues. In general, however, all his explanations of how affatus achieves its first intention assume two fundamental moral ideals of medieval Christian culture: the subordination of the material body to the spiritual soul in human nature, and the general commandment of love for God and neighbor. Many of the physiological and psychological doctrines analyzed above have already implicated these ideals. The remainder of this study will review how Llull develops their consequences for the use of language in his proposal of affatus. In reviewing these consequences, we follow a suitably Lullian trajectory from the many vitia linguæ of the body to the one virtus verballis of the soul.

Subordination of the body to the soul

Virtually all of Llull’s basic assumptions about the nature of language depend upon long-standing Western beliefs concerning the unequal natures of the body and soul, which none of his Christian, Jewish, or Muslim contemporaries would have questioned. Scripture offers ample instruction concerning the conflicts of flesh and spirit.\textsuperscript{175} By Llull’s day, Scholastic analysis of the union of body and soul brought the whole apparatus of Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology to bear upon questions of the nature and origin of sensuality. Thus, Aquinas cites the Scriptural authorities, but explains reason and will as the proximate, and sensation and appetite as the remote, causes of sin.\textsuperscript{176} Llull offers an exhaustive analysis of the psychosomatic dichotomy in the Libre de contemplacio, where it embraces virtually all of the theological and philosophical issues that he confronts in his career. Both the problem and the solution that the relation of body to soul poses for the use of language appear in Chapter 155 devoted to “the concord and contrarity that exist between the intellect and speech”.\textsuperscript{177} Llull’s arguments there comprise a sort of account of theological language that anticipates the role of affatus as a means for serving God.\textsuperscript{178}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{174} Ca I, 534.
\item \textsuperscript{175} E.g. Cal. 5.16-25.
\item \textsuperscript{176} 1a.2ae.72,2 and 75,2.
\item \textsuperscript{177} OE 2: 446a-49b.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Cf. Aquinas’s preliminary questions 1a.1,9 and 13,1-12.
\end{itemize}
The explicit point of departure for Llull’s analysis, in this chapter as elsewhere, is the strict separation of speech from thought, which necessarily exists by virtue of their disparate status as sensible and intelligible beings. Speech pertains to the inferior realm of the sensible, exists outside the soul and is less bound to it, and is therefore less disposed to demonstrate truth. The intellect pertains to the superior realm of the intelligible, exists within the soul and is more bound to it, and is therefore better disposed to demonstrate truth. The innate imperfection of corporeal existence makes it impossible for the powers of hearing or speech to function perfectly. Finite words are incapable of “comprehending or attaining” the infinite nature of God. This last observation is a distinctly uncharacteristic concession to the traditional theologia negativa of the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition, and contrasts especially with the function of naming God that Llull later assigns to affatus in connection with the praises of God expounded in his poem on the Cent noms de Déu. All these distinctions between the capacities of sensible communication and intelligible thought were already axiomatic for Prescholastic writers. Llull’s later classification of affatus as a sense retains the association of language with the body, and this supports his claims about the capacity of affatus to move other senses to perceive delight.

Such arguments about the failings of corporeal communication align the events in human linguistic development with the typology of sin in sacred history from the Fall to the Judgement. When Llull cites the weakness of corporeal hearing as a reason for difficulty in understanding foreign languages, his remarks evidently assume the Biblical explanation of the diversity of languages as the divine punishment for sin imposed at Babel. The limitations of corporeal hearing will not afflict the blessed in Paradise, since, according to accepted doctrines, they will enjoy the perfection of the resurrected body. Thus, the Liber de praedicatione

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179 155.1-3 (OE 2: 447a).
180 39.9, 125.12, 16, and 227.25-6 (OE 2: 180b, 375a-b, 673a).
181 127.1-3 (OE 2: 379b).
182 ORL 19: 75-17. On the use of affatus to recite the Cent noms, see Medicina de peccato 3.16 (lines 1525-7) (OCL 20: 60).
185 Libre de contemplació 127.5 (OE 2: 374b). Cf. Bonaventure, Breviloquium 7.7,
explains that the blessed who hear the voice of Christ in Paradise will perceive the *Verbum Dei* as *affatus*. Speculation on the condition of the resurrected and blessed had become a common topic of theological debate in Llull’s day, perhaps in response to Catharist claims, but also as part of the disputes with Jewish theologians.

Llull’s accounts of the differences between sensible speech and intelligible understanding clearly treat their relationship as an ethical and not simply a psychological question. This perspective is evident in numerous allusions to commonplace moral precepts and principles. Llull’s acquaintance with these is hardly surprising. The correct use of speech is an almost obligatory topic in all medieval literature on wisdom, courtesy, chivalry, Classical ethics, and moral theology. Llull’s writings notably include many obvious references to the so-called “vices of the tongue”. These sins appear as a recognized hamartiological category already in Patristic authorities and in the thirteenth century achieve the status of an eighth capital sin, as in the *Summa de vitis et virtutibus* of Guillaume Perrault. Some authorities specifically identify this eighth sin as lying, and Llull gives particular notice to mendacity in Chapter 48 of the *Libre de contemplacíó*, explaining how the tongue serves both error and truth. Especially pertinent to Llull’s classification of speech as a corporal sense is the fashion in popular virtue and vice tracts of identifying each sin with particular organs or parts of the body, which the “vices of the tongue” already recognize. Analogical and schematizing associations of this sort appear everywhere in Llull’s works. For example, the *Libre de Sancta Maria* of 1290-92 notes that the mind maintains goodness in the external senses and speech just as the soul maintains goodness in the body. Dagneais sees in this passage the first classification of speech among the senses from any of Llull’s writings, but it already appears in the *Libre de con-

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186 2.B.1.40.2.4 (ROL 4: 157).
191 15 (OE 1: 1198b).
templació and therefore probably came from hamartiological schemes long known to him.192

Even though affatus might appear to mitigate the conflict between corporeal language and spiritual mind, Llull’s attention to the faults of the tongue certainly does not diminish after the discovery of affatus. The sins of the tongue—from lying to discourtesy to scurrility—receive especially full exposition in the Medicina de peccat of 1300.193 He apparently classifies speech as an eighth sin in his Mil proverbis of 1302.194 His adoption of this scheme of eight sins and his proposal of affatus during the same period is probably not coincidental. When he notes that affatus is the only sense “to lie against nature” and the one most obliged to spread truth or that it most deviates from its end in lying, his remarks clearly assume the role of mendacity as the paramount vice of the tongue.195 The Liber de virtutibus et peccatis of 1313 argues that lying through speech betrays the truth of the mind, while pride and mendacity arise in the mind but are signified through speech.196 These vices do not undermine the classification of speech as a sense, but rather provide premises for arguments regarding recognition of affatus as a sense. For example, Llull argues that since people exercise virtue and vice more through affatus than through any other sense, then affatus itself is a sense.197 This appeal to the virtues and vices as evidence in an argument about psychology neatly demonstrates the fundamental contribution of moral categories to Llull's arguments concerning the operations of body and soul.

Opposing this broad identification of speech with the defects of the body and of thought with the excellences of the spirit is the equally ancient Western tradition of associating language and mind as logos.198 The long-established notion of the “language of the mind”, discussed above, is the perduring expression of this tradition. This association includes both

194 This classification is at least implicit in the order of chapters 41-8 (ORL 14: 362-9).
196 2.8.16, 4.4.4.66 (ROL 15: 159, 277).
197 Liber de forma Dei 5.10.98 (ROL 8: 99).
an idealized receptive relation of hearing to speech and an idealized expressive relation of thought to speech. Each of these relations plays a major role in Llull’s model of *affatus*. The first, receptive relation assumes the anthropocentric view of vocal sounds as the preeminent object of hearing, which appears in virtually all ancient and medieval authorities. Llull develops similar arguments throughout his early writings. The *Libre de demostraciones* offers two especially interesting analogical arguments regarding this relation. First, vocal sounds are the most worthy objects of hearing, because hearing is naturally proper to animals with voices; since hearing is more worthy in rational than irrational animals, humans most properly possess the power of speech. Second, sound could not be a sensible species without hearing: the cry or collision of bodies is insufficient in itself to be a sensible species, just as length is insufficient to be a body without width and depth; hence, just as form is the complement of the body, so hearing is the form that is the complement of sound and the voice. Aristotle explains that the actualization of the active sounding object and of the passive hearing faculty both occur in the latter. Llull, applying the conventional definitions of active form and passive matter, reverses the roles of sound and hearing, arguing that hearing is the active form and sound the passive matter. This modification anticipates similar reversals of active and passive roles in *affatus*. Another step toward Llull’s new theory appears in the *Libre de Sancta Maria*, which explains that speech is nobler than hearing because it externalizes the internal where hearing does the reverse. As noted already, the participation of internal and external is one of the major advantages that Llull attributes to *affatus*. In all these arguments, the distinctions of form and matter, active and passive, or internal and external are not simply neutral descriptive categories applied to observed natural processes, but universal truths whose authority validates the idealized relation of association of speech to hearing that Llull urges.

Similar arguments regarding the immediate appurtenance of speech to hearing appear throughout Llull’s explanations of the new sixth sense. Speech is the first kind of sound mentioned in the *Liber de affatu*. Other
texts flatly aver that speech is the natural object of hearing and that sound without voice is good for nothing. Thus a strict relation exists between *affatus* and hearing. For example, Llull argues that sound is an active correlative element in hearing and a passive one in *affatus*; *affatus* contracts sound to voice, hearing simply receives sound; *affatus* is an active sense that manifests the internal, while hearing is a passive one that manifests the external. As Perarnau well notes, this last claim expressly invokes Llull’s valorization of internally (i.e. essentially) generated activity over externally (i.e. non-essentially) received passivity. It is obviously inconsonant with his advocacy of *sensus agens*, which he ignores in favor of defining a superior position for *affatus*. From this complementary, even if unequal, relationship, Llull deduces a common nature: because hearing needs speech, *affatus* must be a sense as well. Hence, they perform common functions: *affatus* and hearing both contribute to apprehending the *ens metaphysicum*; *affatus* and hearing are the only two universal senses because only they can receive the objects of all the other senses. This last claim evidently ignores the diverse character of the sensation caused by the different types of sense objects, which Aquinas strictly distinguishes. Instead, it simply claims the likeness between all sensible species as the source of concepts for the mind to express in speech. Perarnau suggests that Llull uses the term *affatus* to designate the capacity for vocal sounds common to both humans and animals and *parlar* or *locució* to designate the capacity for language found in humans alone. The traditional anthropocentric esteem for language as the preeminent object of hearing tends to render such a sharp distinction superfluous.

Corollary to the idealized receptive relationship between hearing and speech stands the idealized expressive relationship of speech to thought. Regard for language as the superlative manifestation of mind virtually

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205 *Liber de virtutibus et peccatis* 4.4.4.66 (ROL 15: 278) and *Proverbis de Ramon* 184.13 (ORL 14: 197).
206 *Ars mystica* 4.6.358 (ROL 5: 439).
207 *Metaphysica nova* 2.5.2.1.5 (ROL 6: 39).
208 *LA* 288; cf. SS 240-1.
209 “Lo sisi seny” 79.
211 *Liber de ascensu et descendu intellectus* 10.2.10.101 (ROL 9: 164-5).
212 *Liber de ascensu et descendu intellectus* 4.1.1 (ROL 9: 60).
213 “Lo sisi seny” 78-9. Hence he sees an improper “leap of logic” in the shifting terminology of this passage of the vernacular text: “Parlar és major necessitat que odorar... E encara per efatus los homens s’amen més” (SS 227). However, the Latin text begins with the gloss “Locutio alias fari” (LA 287) so that the shift from *locutio* to *affatus* is less drastic.
defines the Western academic philosophical tradition. It is a basic premise of Llull’s arguments in Chapter 155 of the *Libre de contemplacio*. Hence, Llull avers that the sixth sense participates most with reason; *affatus* is the *denuntiatio* of the truth conceived in the mind; between the conception of thought and hearing stands *affatus*; and *affatus* is an image of the intellect, and hearing of the memory.

These idealized relations of speech to hearing and to mind necessarily conflict with the definition of language as an imperfect instrument of human corporeal nature. The language of the body and the language of the soul remain irreconcilable in Western Christian culture. The inadequacy of speech to express thought truly is a favorite topic of Augustine. Monastic writers on spiritual psychology develop it very broadly. Llull explains that this conflict creates error regarding many things, for it often happens that the intellect comprehends one thing, and speech signifies another. The solution to this dilemma lies in the superior soul rather than the inferior body. The more powerful intellect must seek the truth that speech weakly expresses. Llull cites as a paradigmatic example the case of a wise man who understands the meaning signified in the garbled words of a babbling infant. This understanding is the work of the “ears of the soul”, which perceive the spiritual meanings signified by the material words and cries sensed in the body’s sense of hearing. As noted above, these contemplative faculties were a cornerstone of spiritual

215 E.g. Aristotle, *De interp.* 1.1 16a3; Boethius, *In De interp.* ed. see 1 (PL 40: 394BC); Aquinas 1a.91.3 ad 3.
216 155.3 (OE 2: 447a).
217 *Proverbis de Ramon* 262.5 (ORL 14: 286); *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* 2.9.1 (ROL 9: 422).
218 *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* 3.5.5 (ROL 9:53).
220 *Proverbis de Ramon* 262.13 (ORL 14: 287).
223 155.5 (OE 2: 447a).
224 155.12, 29 (OE 2: 448a, 449b).
225 155.6 (OE 2: 447a-b).
226 125.8 (OE 2: 375a).
psychology from Augustine to the Prescholastics.\textsuperscript{227} Llull devotes most of Chapter 125 in the \textit{Libre de contemplació} to the vicissitudes of spiritual hearing.

This interpretation of language through the internal senses is an axiological process. For example, when speech states that God was crucified and died, the intellect completely ignores the inferior meanings of speech in favor of its own superior understanding of God's immortality.\textsuperscript{228} Llull notes that references to the arms, hands, or eyes of God are to be discounted in this way, where Aquinas explains such expressions specifically as metaphors of God's functions.\textsuperscript{229} The intellect selects the true and leaves the false meanings that speech signifies, just as the grain is whinnowed from the chaff or good chosen over bad foods.\textsuperscript{230} As noted already, these naturalistic analogies bear demonstrative value for Llull. Here, they define a universal natural intention toward the good or true.\textsuperscript{231} This procedure produces the Augustinian "inner word" of true knowledge by seeking the first intention of oral or written language.\textsuperscript{232} Understanding language becomes for Llull an exercise in spiritual allegory.

Llull perhaps attempts to reassert this application of spiritual allegory, which recalls the \textit{theologia antiqua} of the Fathers, as an alternative to the intricate grammatical and logical analyses of theological language developed in the schools since the eleventh century.\textsuperscript{233} He seems to implicate the arts of the trivium in this conflict when he illustrates deviant speech with the commonplace logical and grammatical problems of equivocation, barbarism, and paranomasia.\textsuperscript{234} These are specifically "faults of language" in the school tradition.\textsuperscript{235} Among the Prescholastics, Richard


\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Libre de contemplació} 155.9 (OE 2: 447b).

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Libre de contemplació} 155.11 (OE 2: 447b-448a). Cf. 1a.13,3 ad 3.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Libre de contemplació} 155.12 (OE 2: 448a).

\textsuperscript{231} This universal natural intention also plays a critical role in the relationship between faith and understanding. It probably corresponds to the early Scholastic theologians' category of \textit{affectus} or appetite for the good (see Minnis \textit{Medieval Theory of Authorship} 121-2). In later writings Llull apparently identifies it with the Scholastic category of \textit{syndaeesis}, or natural disposition to the good (see the author's \textit{Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull} 124).

\textsuperscript{232} Cf. \textit{De trinitate} 9.7.12.

\textsuperscript{233} On these developments, see Gillian R. Evans, \textit{Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Libre de contemplació} 155.17 (OE 2: 448b).

\textsuperscript{235} As explained by a logician such as Peter of Spain, \textit{Summule logicales} 7.24, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972) 96 or a grammarian such as Alexander de
of St. Victor severely contrasts the concern for correct language with the pursuit of spiritual truth, suggesting that the two enterprises are fundamentally contrary. Llull, however, readily assimilates these concerns to his own. He explains that the discord of literal and spiritual meanings produces paralogistic argument, while the concord of literal and spiritual meanings produces syllogistic argument. His use of logico-linguistic problems as moral exempla recalls the “grammatical metaphors” that were tremendously popular in many genres of medieval Latin and vernacular literature. His arguments more broadly imply that correct use of philosophical methods will always yield theological truth. They offer a superb example of practical moralization in their correlation of logico-linguistic and ethical disciplines through appeal to a common value or purpose. These moral analogies are not transitive relationships: Llull’s attention to the “first intention” of speech ensures that ethical values readily moralize logico-linguistic doctrines, but logico-linguistic doctrines do not naturalize ethical values.

The concluding remarks on this corrective interpretation in Chapter 155 of the Libre de contemplació explicitly invoke the Pauline distinction between literal and spiritual meanings, aligning the former with speech, the senses, and reason, and the latter with the intellect and faith. Llull’s arguments assume the fundamental Augustinian correlation between allegorical interpretation and spiritual comprehension. The conflict between corporeal language and spiritual mind thus finds its resolution in the right exercise of faith and reason. The relationship between faith and reason is one of the most controverted issues in Llull’s work and leads far beyond the scope of our inquiry here. We will consider below the contribution of affatus to the propagation of the Faith. For now it suffices to recognize that the exercise of right understanding described in Chapter 155 of the Libre de contemplació and the proposal of speech as a sixth sense are both solutions to the same problem, namely how to transcend the material

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Benjamin minor 46 (PL 196: 34).

Libre de contemplació 155.22 (OE 2: 448b).


155.25-7 (OE 2: 449a). Cf. 2 Cor. 3.6.


See the author’s Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull 296-308.
realm of mundane knowledge in order to attain the spiritual realm of
divine wisdom.242

Love of God and neighbor

From the preceding discussion we can see how Ramon Llull's accounts
of language throughout his career strive to describe the means through
which it might best fulfill its first and second intentions. The Libre de
contemplació explains that the purpose of hearing is to perceive different
languages, hear God's praises, and conduct commerce, law, or other hu-
man affairs; similarly, the purpose of speech is to glorify God and speak
the truth.243 Through oral communication knowledge of the arts and sci-ences
flourishes.244 The Libre de Sancta Maria dramatizes especially well
the exercise of virtue in speech: the allegorical figures of Lady Prayer,
Lady Praise, and Lady Intention answer questions posed by a hermit re-
arding thirty qualities of the Virgin. They note, among many other things,
that the purpose of human ears and tongue, like that of the hands and
feet, is to praise God, but that no heart, mouth, or ear is capable of think-
ing, saying, or hearing fully the praises of the Virgin.245 The comparative
analysis of the contribution of heart, hands, and mouth to the practice
devotion was a commonplace of Prescholastic and monastic spiritual
literature, epitomized in Saint Bernard's sermon De triplici custodia.246
Dagenais has suggested that these comments from the Libre de Sancta
Maria anticipate the theological premises of affatus, but those premises
are scarcely peculiar to speech in Llull's work.247 Another argument from
the Libre de contemplació also anticipates the unique medium that lan-
guage gives to humans for honoring, knowing, and loving God. Llull care-
fully explains that words are beautiful, pleasing, or noble according to
the relative beauty, pleasure, or nobility of their referents. It is better, he
avers, to speak of lions than of dogs, of princes than of barons, of popes
than of bishops, and so forth. Since God is the most beautiful, pleasing,

242 As Dagenais concludes in “Speech as the Sixth Sense—Ramon Llull's Affatus”, Actes
del Primer Colóqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amèrica, ed. Albert Porqueras-Mayo et al.
(Montserrat: Publicacions de l'Abadia, 1979) 157-69 (at 169).
243 39.7-9, 12 (OE 2: 180a, b).
244 Libre de contemplació 127.28 (OE 2: 381b).
245 5.19 (OE 1: 1173a, 1207b).
246 “De triplici custodia manus, cordis et linguæ”, Sermones de diversis 17, Opera, ed.
247 “Origin” (see n. 192 above), p. 120.
and noble being, speech about Him is likewise so. Thus, the *Libre de meravelles* also explains that God gave speech to humans so that they would find pleasure in speaking words of praise about Him. These arguments broadly recall conventional Scholastic teaching regarding the status of beauty as a transcendental property of both material and spiritual beings. At the same time, they assume the logocentric premise that language and mind both attain the same object.

In all Llull’s reforming and evangelizing projects, language is necessarily the principal means of promoting universal understanding of Divine Truth and thus of realizing the two great commandments of love for God and for one’s neighbor. The ramifications of these first and second intentions of language comprise the basis for Llull’s definition of the purposes of his new sixth sense. *Affatus* bears the primary function of knowing, honoring, and serving the Creator, and the secondary function of knowing, honoring, and serving Him through his creatures. The order of the first five arguments in the second half of the second part of the *Liber de affatu* neatly suggests the range of functions that *affatus* serves: speech is necessary for the “participation” of humans or animals, liberal arts, mechanical arts, morality, and fulfillment of Providential history.

The primary purpose of *affatus* is, of course, to promote love for God. Although all creatures serve the creator, only humans possess a direct orientation toward God, according to established doctrine. This anthropocentric assumption belies the attribution of *affatus* to both humans and animals, but rightly corresponds to its primary moral theological function. Given the jointly moral and metaphysical character of the Lullian intentions, it is not surprising that Llull extends this conception of the purpose of language into an argument about the status of *affatus* itself. Hence he repeatedly calls *affatus* the “noblest” sense. This judgement of value seems irrelevant to physiological or psychological doctrine in a modern view, but is common in Scholastic analyses of the senses. Aquinas explains

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248 359.10-21 (OE 2: 1216a-1218a).
249 57 (OE 1: 405a).
251 Mt. 22.36-9.
252 LA 287; cf. SS 228. Comments like this tend to belie Tusquets’s emphatic claim that the treatise “nada diga acerca de emplearla [el Habla] con finalidad apologética” (“Lenguaje como argumento” —see n. 3 of Part. I—, p. 181).
253 LA 290-1; cf. SS 310-35.
254 *Metaphysica nova* 2.5.2.7 (ROL 6: 39). See the explanation by Aquinas 2a.2ae.2.3.
255 Cf. LA 296; cf. SS 482-4; *Arbre de science* 16.3.3.21 (OE 1: 865b); *Liber de praedicatione* 2.B.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4: 141); *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* 2.9.1 (ROL 9: 42).
in detail how vision is the noblest sense, because most spiritual.\textsuperscript{256} Nonetheless, Llull does not, like Saint Thomas, judge the senses’ contribution to the effective operation of the dual human corporeal and spiritual nature, but instead evaluates their service to the purely spiritual first intention that governs all creatures. In his later \textit{De experientia realitatis Artis Generalis}, he claims that \textit{affatus} and hearing have the greatest end or purpose “objectively” because they speak and hear the greatest object, God.\textsuperscript{257} He especially insists that \textit{affatus} is the corporeal sense \textit{best} able to “perceive” God, by naming Him. Llull repeats this claim more often than any other regarding \textit{affatus}, and in some texts it is virtually his only comment on the sixth sense. In every case it is a chief justification for his claim that \textit{affatus} is the noblest sense.\textsuperscript{258} Indeed, this function of “apprehending” God is the \textit{paramount} function of the sixth sense.\textsuperscript{259} Naming God enables \textit{affatus} to realize the status of “pure signifier” and directly serves the “philosophical anagogy” of Llull’s whole project.\textsuperscript{260}

This fundamental connection between Llull’s new sense and its preeminent object almost compels association with the doctrine of Christ the Verbum.\textsuperscript{261} It provides him with a powerful basis for his most emphatic claims regarding access to the Divine through language. The Proverbis de Ramon aver that in this world, participation with God is impossible without speech and the Son of God has more concordance with \textit{affatus} than with any other sense act.\textsuperscript{262} The \textit{Liber de affatu} declares that without speech there would be no Incarnation of the Son of God, sacraments, or Day of Judgement.\textsuperscript{263} Perarnau suggests that this last statement refers to the Annunciation.\textsuperscript{264} However, the mention of the Last Judgement probably alludes to Revelation 21.3. The role of Christ the Verbum as Judge and the verbal expression of the Judgement were standard catechetical
questions of the era. For Llull, the Verbum comprises the whole of sacred history from creation to glory. When he declares that affatus allows knowledge of the past, the future, and God the glorious, he appeals to the typology of the providential plan for the Old Age and the New. The Liber de praedicatione explains that God became incarnate in order to give through affatus the greatest glory to the blessed, who hear the voice of Christ in Paradise. John Dagenais has suggested that Llull “saw in the descent of his sixth sense from the conceptions of the rational soul to the fleshly world of the senses, at the very least, a reflection of the incarnation of Christ”. Yet Dagenais also notes that the analogy between human language and the Divine Verbum had long been discouraged by theological authorities. Even Vincent of Beauvais rehearses the established opinions concerning its acceptable limits. Llull’s typically analogical arguments tend to obscure such limits. Moreover, since affatus presents the operations of the soul as “mental language”, his remarks probably assume the traditional doctrine that the soul exists for God to participate with corporeal creatures, which he rehearses in his Libre de anima racional. Llull could have found ample expositions of this doctrine in Prescholastic authoritites or in contemporary apologetic and didactic works. Llull’s reference to affatus as the instrument of the Eucharist ultimately suggests that language shares in the Divine mystery, perhaps through some analogy per contrarium with traditional doctrines regarding the symbolic value of the sacraments.

Through affatus, the soul asserts its preeminence over the body in the exercise of communication and knowledge. Llull recognized that his entire proselytic and didactic project depended upon the cooperation of body and spirit. His proposal of speech as a sense attempted to promote that cooperation. Affatus does not downgrade language to the inferior function

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266 Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus 2.5.2 (ROL 9: 36). Note the earlier version of this same argument in Libre de contemplació 125.17 (OE 2: 375b).
268 “Speech as the Sixth Sense” (see n. 242 above), p. 169.
269 Speculum naturale 27.7-8.
270 4.12.6 (ORL 21: 232).
271 E.g. Alcher of Clairvaux, De spiritu et anima 36-47 (PL 40: 806-16); Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 4.42; Bonaventure, Breviloquium 4.1.
272 Liber de praedicatione 2.B.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4: 142). See the discussion of these doctrines by Stock, The Implications of Literacy (see n. 133 of Part I), pp. 253-8, and Perarnau’s note (“Lo sisi seny” 86).
of material sensation, but rather helps insinuate the senses into the superior exercise of spiritual cognition. It gives to the soul a means for using the material body to communicate spiritual knowledge, where the corporeal senses would otherwise allow only their use to receive material knowledge. An example from the Liber de novis fallaciis of 1308 therefore correlates affatus and the mind with the opposed operations of reason and faith.

His promotion of affatus is thus a corollary to his preoccupation with defining the relationship between faith (whose knowledge is self-conceived, infused, or otherwise innate to the soul) and reason (whose knowledge derives wholly from the senses). It is surely not coincidental that Llull's major writings on the relationship of faith to reason all appear in the same period that he advocates most zealously his new theory of affatus.

The capacity of affatus to promote love for God enables its second preeminent function, promoting love for one's neighbor. The founding role of speech in human society was a commonplace of Classical rhetorical lore. In the first place, affatus maintains the order of society as the medium of human knowledge and learning. Language, both oral and written, is essential to the translatio studii so often lauded and expounded by medieval writers. The propagation of knowledge in Western medieval culture unquestionably depended upon the "idea of the book", but still acknowledged ancient habits of learning through oral communication.

The identification of direct speech and instruction was an established commonplace. Llull often praises the role of affatus in the propagation of the arts and sciences. As speech, affatus is the de facto subject of gram-

274 E.g. Disputatio fidei et intellectus, Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto, Liber de modo naturali intelligenti, Liber de fide sancta catholica, Liber reprobationis, Liber de fallaciis, Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae.


278 E.g. Aristotle, De sensu et sensato 1 437a10-16 and the authorities compiled by Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum naturale 25.51.

279 LA 290; cf. SS 318-21. Cf. Proverbis de Ramon 170.2. 262.20 (ORL 14: 179, 287);
Questions of the era. For Llull, the Verbum comprises the whole of sacred history from creation to glory. When he declares that affatus allows knowledge of the past, the future, and God the glorious, he appeals to the typology of the providential plan for the Old Age and the New. The Liber de praedicatione explains that God became incarnate in order to give through affatus the greatest glory to the blessed, who hear the voice of Christ in Paradise. John Dagenais has suggested that Llull “saw in the descent of his sixth sense from the conceptions of the rational soul to the fleshly world of the senses, at the very least, a reflection of the incarnation of Christ”. Yet Dagenais also notes that the analogy between human language and the Divine Verbum had long been discouraged by theological authorities. Even Vincent of Beauvais rehearses the established opinions concerning its acceptable limits. Llull’s typically analogical arguments tend to obscure such limits. Moreover, since affatus presents the operations of the soul as “mental language”, his remarks probably assume the traditional doctrine that the soul exists for God to participate with corporeal creatures, which he rehearses in his Libre de anima racional.

Llull could have found ample expositions of this doctrine in Prescholastic authorities or in contemporary apologetic and didactic works. Llull’s reference to affatus as the instrument of the Eucharist ultimately suggests that language shares in the Divine mystery, perhaps through some analogy per contrarium with traditional doctrines regarding the symbolic value of the sacraments.

Through affatus, the soul asserts its preeminence over the body in the exercise of communication and knowledge. Llull recognized that his entire proselytic and didactic project depended upon the cooperation of body and spirit. His proposal of speech as a sense attempted to promote that cooperation. Affatus does not downgrade language to the inferior function

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206 Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus 2.5.2 (ROL 9: 36). Note the earlier version of this same argument in Libre de contemplació 125.17 (OE 2: 375b).

207 2.B.1.40.2.4 (ROL 4: 157).

208 “Speech as the Sixth Sense” (see n. 242 above), p. 169.

209 Speculum naturale 27.7-8.


211 E.g. Alcher of Clairvaux, De spiritu et anima 36-47 (PL 40: 806-16); Aquinas, Summa contrà Gentiles 4.42; Bonaventure, Breviloquium 4.1.

212 Liber de praedicatione 2.B.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4: 142). See the discussion of these doctrines by Stock, The Implications of Literacy (see n. 133 of Part I), pp. 253-8, and Perarnau’s note (“Lo sísé seny” 86).
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\textsuperscript{275} E.g. Disputatio fidei et intellectus, Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto, Liber de modo naturali intelligenti, Liber de fide sancta catholica, Liber repubtions, Liber de fallaciis, Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae.


\textsuperscript{278} On these developments, see now Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy and Jesse M. Gellich, The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages: Language Theory, Mythology, and Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

\textsuperscript{279} E.g. Aristotle, De sensu et sensato 1 437a10-16 and the authorities compiled by Vincent de Beauvais, Speculum naturale 25.51.
mar, traditionally praised as the first of the arts of the trivium and foundation of all learning.\(^{280}\) Since Llull composed both a *Rethorica nova* and *Logica nova*, it is tempting to imagine that his treatise on *affatus* served as a sort of *grammatica nova*. At the same time, the distinction of a general science of language, broader in scope than the trivium, was not unknown among Western and Islamic authorities.\(^{281}\) *Affatus* may have been Llull’s attempt to define a *scientia linguae* suitable to his aims of universal evangelism. As Tusquets has recently reminded us, Llull’s own experience as a missionary preacher and prolific writer must have instilled in him a keen personal appreciation for both the capabilities and the limitations of language.\(^{282}\) *Affatus*, like Llull’s proposal to adopt Latin as a universal language, attempts to advance the remedy given to the apostles: in a typically Lullian move, one tongue will replace many.\(^{283}\) The evangelism and reform pursued through Christian communication comprises a sacred parallel to the organization of secular society credited to speech. In the Providential typology of old and new, *affatus* is the *nova lingua*.

Llull’s conception of the interactive roles of speech and hearing in *affatus*, the internal exercise of these as “spiritual senses” in the “language of the soul”, and the sixth sense’s status as a successor to the right interpretation proposed in the *Libre de contemplació* all suggest its possible affiliation with the meditative reading developed in the centuries of monastic *sacrum studium*. In the era before the widespread adoption of silent reading, the careful pronunciation, consideration, and meditation of texts was an integrated experience that Jean Leclercq rightly dubbed “active...
reading”. The structure of “word, text, and experience” established in the monastic lectio divina also provided organizing values for the community of religious at large, as the sermons of Bernard of Clairvaux reveal.

Llull faces a universal community, embracing believers in need of reform as well as infidels in need of conversion, and thus he develops a universal medium of communication, the power of speech. His most detailed directions for using that medium appear in his Rethorica nova, which attempts to provide an ars praedicandi based on the manipulation of words bearing the Divine Dignities. Although the Rethorica nova does not mention affatus (probably because Llull had composed most of it in earlier years), the publication of its Catalan and Latin versions in 1301 and 1303 certainly helped promote the same kind of naturally effective oral communication as affatus.

Most of Llull’s explanations of how language promotes knowledge concern, however, mental discourse rather than oral or written exercise of the artes sermocinales. The Quaestiones per artem demonstrativam solubiles already explains that the habit of knowledge is confected from intelligible species verborum and the likenesses of the imagination. The Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus gives the outstanding account of this mental language. Vision judges that two rocks differ in species, and because “affatus truly predicates, and hearing truly hears, and the imagination truly imagines this same thing, the intellect ascends to knowledge with these truths and from this truly creates knowledge.” Thus the mind grasps the ens metaphysicum that exceeds the capabilities of mere sensation and imagination.

Throughout this text, the faculties speak, doubt, judge, insinuate, and so forth in a mental dialogue that offers a sort of psychomachy of Scholastic disputation.

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285 Stock, Implications of Literacy 403-54 and esp. 408 on lectio divina.
287 Qu. 76 (MOG 4: 90). Llull’s remarks assume commonplace Aristotelian doctrine regarding the exercise and growth of habits; see the explanation by Aquinas 1a.2ae.52.2.
288 “Affatus uere praedicat, et audittis uere audit, et hoc idem imaginatio uere imaginatur, intellectus ad scientiam ascendit cum istis ueritatibus, et de hoc scientiam uere factit” (2.8.2; ROL 9: 41).
289 2.5.6, 2.10.6 (ROL 9: 37, 44).
290 Cabré, Ortin, and Pujol (see n. 8 of Part I) note that this use of personified abstractions frequently occurs when Llull compares different levels of physical or metaphysical reality for moralizing purposes (“Conéixer e haver moralitats bones” 146). Tusquets regards this use of personified affatus as the most fully “semiotic” argument in Llull’s apologetic (“Lenguaje como argumento” 204). On the use of psychomachic personifications, see
Affatus promotes not only the communication of Christian veritas, but the exercise of caritas as well. Humans help, understand, or love each other more through affatus than through any other sense.\(^{291}\) Speech thus contributes directly to realization of the supreme virtue. Llull explains this function economically through analogical argumentation, where a schoolman such as Aquinas traces a long series of causes that lead from charity to social virtue to the sins of the tongue.\(^{292}\) We have already noted that Llull’s early writings abound in commonplace precepts regarding the vices of speech. His accounts of the cardinal and theological virtues in speech offer equally numerous parallels to doctrines from the various genres of medieval moral literature. Guides to chivalry, widely diffused in vernacular versions, would have been readily accessible and may well have formed part of Llull’s own courtly education. His own very popular contribution to this literature, the Libre de l’orde de cavalleria, nonetheless says little about courteous speech.\(^{293}\) His accounts of courtesy in his proverb collections do include numerous precepts on polite speech, however.\(^{294}\) The practical coincidence between affatus as charitable communication and courtly affabilitas as openness to dealing with all persons suggests the possible debt of Llull’s neologism to the vocabulary of courtly literature.\(^{295}\) The virtually ubiquitous diffusion of ethical literature based on Cicero, Seneca, and other Classical authors, especially as elementary school texts, make them even more probable resources for Llull’s moral ideals regarding speech.\(^{296}\) A favorite topic in such writings is advice on when to speak and when to keep silent, best-known as the maxim from


\(^{291}\) LA 287; cf. SS 228 and *Proverbes de Ramon* 262.7,11 (ORL 14: 287).

\(^{292}\) OE 1: 513-45.

\(^{293}\) E.g. *Mil proverbis* 37.2, 4, 11, 12, 15 (OE 1: 1264) or *Proverbes de Ramon* 244.2-9, 20 (ORL 14: 267).


Ecclesiastes 3.7. This counsel appears often in the precepts of proverb collections, such as the widely disseminated Facetus. It provides the entire organizing theme for the little treatise by Albertano da Brescia, De arte loquendi et tacendi. Llull devotes an entire chapter of the Libre de contemplacio to this issue. His remarks there reveal clear echoes of Scriptural loci and such well known florilegia of Classical auctores as the Moralium docmu philosophorum attributed to William of Conches, the Pseudo-Senecan De verborum copia, or Martin of Braga’s Formula vitae honestae. Needless to say, Llull’s own proverb collections, the Proverbis de Ramon and Mil proverbis, include numerous maxims on this and related topics regarding speech.

Affatus comprises, then, a dual system of caritas verbalis and veritos verbalis, a medium for communicating the highest objects of desire and knowledge alike. Through affatus, human beings separated materially from each other and from God establish a spiritual link between themselves and their creator. Josep Perarnau, in his study of affatus, wonders that Llull focusses so exclusively on relations of “intersubjective communication” among human beings alone or between humans and God. From Llull’s perspective, of course, it would be foolish to speak, feel, imagine, or consider any other.

Conclusion

To conclude this long inquiry, we will simply summarize the most important aspects that we find in Llull’s proposal of speech as a sixth sense. To begin with, the conception of affatus depends above all on its Lullian first intention of promoting love, honor, and knowledge of God, and consequently, of one’s neighbor. As a result, his accounts of affatus assume a broad range of moral theological ideals concerning the subor-

\[208\] Ed. Carl Schroeder, Palaestra 86 (Berlin: Mayer and Müller, 1911).
\[209\] Ed. Thor Sundby in Della Vita e delle Opere di Brunetto Latini (Florence: Le Monier, 1884) 475-506.
\[210\] 210 (OE 2: 618b-21a).
\[211\] Ed. John Holmberg (Uppsala: Alqvist and Wiksells, 1929).
\[214\] “Lo sisè seny” 55.
ordination of body to soul, the exercise of spiritual understanding through the "language of the mind", the role of language in faith or reason, and the virtues and vices of speech. Llull regards these moral ideals as necessary consequences of the natural or artificial features in the language used by humans and animals. Hence, his explanations of affatus also include numerous details concerning the physiology of vocal sounds and the psychology of sensation or cognition relevant to speech. Following his conviction that creation exists to manifest the Creator, he strives to organize this scientific knowledge of how language functions in such a way that it demonstrates the moral theological purposes that language ought to serve. The "discovery" of affatus results from Llull's efforts to establish a scientific model of human nature that displays the important role played by oral and mental language in the pursuit of virtue and knowledge. The gradual development of this process and his creative adaptations of conventional doctrines make it difficult (and probably unnecessary) to pinpoint any single "source" or "precedent" for affatus. Nonetheless, the definition of speech as a function of the motive power of the sensitive soul, a doctrine developed in various fashions by many medieval authorities, might easily have provided Llull with an inspiration for his discovery.

In order to understand best the arguments that Llull marshalls in defense of his proposal, we must recognize that its moral truth takes precedence over its scientific truth. Affatus demonstrates perfectly the "pervasive medieval willingness to submit empirical to devotional or interpretative necessities". It is no less audacious than his idiosyncratic classifications of the vices and virtues or sacraments, his "discoveries" of a new theological virtue and logical fallacy, or composition of new plans for existing academic disciplines. These discoveries did not depend so much on Llull's new familiarity with previously unappreciated doctrines from Western or Islamic learning, but rather on the fundamental impetus of "evangelical allegory" and "philosophical analogy" that informs all his projects for moral and intellectual reform. Even more than the use of idiosyncratic terminology or promotion of Latin as a universal language, affatus helps achieve the "communicative" ideal inherent in

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305 J. B. Allen, Ethical Poetic (see n. 5 of Part I) 192.
307 The Liber de aequalitate potentiarum animarum in beatitudine of 1308 proclaims the recognition of Wisdom as a virtue wrongly neglected by the ancient theologians (ROL 11: 152).
308 The Logica nova of 1303 introduces Contradiction as a new fallacy unknown to Aristotle (see the author's Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull 264-82).
309 E.g. the Metaphysica nova, Rethorica nova, Nova geometria, etc.
310 See Vicente Servera, "Utopie et histoire" (see n. 260 above).
Llull’s entire enterprise.\footnote{As noted by Tusquets, “Lenguaje como argumento” 172.} \textit{Affatus} fortifies the moral and ontological bond between creation and Creator by facilitating the interaction of body and soul that occurs in sensation and cognition. The sixth sense allows the mind to "communicate" with material as well as spiritual objects by explaining the processes of both expression and reception through the same physiological and psychological means. In his new theory, Llull evidently found the conjunction of sensitive and cognitive functions that his particular enterprise of natural theology required. \textit{Affatus} thus provides at least a partial solution to the fundamental problem of his entire philosophical and theological project, from the contemplative schemes of the \textit{Libre de contemplació} to the combinatory machinery of the \textit{Ars Generalis Ultima}. The ultimate interest of his \textit{affatus} for us today may well be the insight that it provides into the scope of medieval attitudes toward language.\footnote{These extend well beyond the purely academic or philosophical arguments surveyed in a study such as Marcia Colish, \textit{The Mirror of Language}, 2nd. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).} \textit{Affatus} shows us how doctrines from fields as disparate as moral theology, physiology, and logic might combine to define linguistic behavior. Llull’s proposal is especially remarkable as a Christian medieval solution for the ancient pagan problem of the relationship between eloquence and virtue: it defines a mode of communication where the sacred and spiritual objectives of Divine honor, love, and knowledge completely infuse the secular and material exercise of human language.

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