

A History of the Thembu and
Their Relationship With the Cape, 1850-1900

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PREFACE

Present day Thembuland is situated roughly between the Mthatha and Kei rivers. It lies within the south-western portion of the political unit which has been known since 1906 as the Republic of Transkei. It comprises the territories formerly known as Emigrant Thembuland (now the districts of Cala and Cofimvaba) and Thembuland Proper, i.e. the districts of Mqanduli, Umtata, Engcobo and Bomvanaland. We have evidence that Thembu people had already settled in Thembuland Proper, at the Mbashe river, by the beginning of the 17th century. Pioneering clans many have entered the territory at a much earlier date.¹ In the 1830's some clans broke away from the Mbashe settlement, and moved to the region of present day Queenstown. In 1853 their lands were included in the so-called Tambookie Location, which in 1871 became the district of Glen Grey.² Emigrant Thembuland came into existence in 1865 when four chiefs from Glen Grey accepted Sir Philip Wodehouse's offer to settle on the lands across the White Kei whence the Xhosa chief Sarhili had been expelled in 1857.³ This thesis deals with the history of the people who lived in these territories between 1850 and 1900.

This period deservedly engages the attention of the historian for various reasons, among them the lack of a good historical reconstruction of the events relating to the complex history of the paramountcy. The most important of these events were the western migration of a section of the Mbashe Thembu, and their alienation from the parent society; the Cattle-killing of 1857; the emergence of

Emigrant Thembuland; the extension of Colonial control over Thembu territories; the outbreak of the war of Ncgayecibi in 1877; the Transkeian Rebellion of 1881; the annexation of Thembuland in 1885; the decline of chiefly powers; the emergence of an intellectual and politically aware class who replaced the chiefs as spokesmen for the people.

Social and economic contact between the Thembu and the white community, produced a conflict of cultures and a consequent difference in needs amongst the various Thembu groups. This thesis explores the situation of the Thembu who lived in immediate contact with the Cape Colony, and those who were cushioned from it by the territories of their neighbours. The latter section had their own disagreements with surrounding tribes, as opposed to those on the frontier whose conflict was in the first instance with the Cape Colony itself. These conflicts across the Colonial border brought the needs of this section in line with those of other black peoples on the eastern frontier who became united in their struggle against Cape Colonial intrusion.

After 1870 Colonial penetration and British imperialism put an end to the isolation of the Mbashe Thembu, so that the people who lived there were also brought into the main stream of Cape politics. Thembu reactions to European onslaughts on their traditional cultures form the main theme of this thesis, and they were remarkably divergent.

Research in this area is hampered by the fact that virtually no work has been done on the history of the Thembu. Letters of early

missionaries, which often provide valuable information with regard to other chiefdoms, are almost non-existent as far as the Thembu are concerned. The Rev. Peter Hargreaves who worked in both Thembuland and Pondoland kept a regular diary while in Pondoland, but neglected to do so during his Thembuland years. The manuscript of E.G. Sihele, Councillor of the Thembu king, which was written in 1933, is one of the few sources which offer interesting perspectives on early Thembu history. Sihele writes well, but his perspectives are predictably influenced by loyalty to the rulers he served.⁴

Conquered people have often been known to make common cause with their conquerors in order to preserve the residue of shattered power. In the subtle rivalry of the Transkeian people, once tribal wars had been brought to an end, there was a tendency among the Thembu to highlight the extent of their cooperation with the Cape Colony. The work of the amateur border historian, Dr. A.W. Burton, reflects uncritically this Thembu point of view. This makes his manuscripts interesting but not comprehensive.⁵ An interesting document written in 1925 by W.T. Brownlee, who was chief magistrate of the Transkeian territories in the 1920s showed the same kind of bias.⁶

In an attempt to justify the Thembu claim to precedence over other black races, Brownlee maintained that this question of precedence had arisen in 1920, during the visit of the Prince of Wales to the Transkei. Disregarding the fact that Umtata was - and still is - the capital of the Transkei, and thus the place where royal visitors would naturally have been received, he wrote that the Prince of Wales was

received in Umtata, on Thembu territory. He then concluded: "And so important was this matter of precedence among the native tribes that no chief of higher rank would visit a chief of lower rank to his own lest his precedence been called in question. According to custom any chief of another tribe coming into Thembuland tacitly admits the precedence of the Thembu chief." Brownlee does not in any way indicate what other arrangements could have been made on this occasion that would not have reflected on the status of any of the Transkeian chiefs. Writings such as these must obviously, even though coming from a high-ranking official, be treated with circumspection.

Although this thesis deals specifically with the period 1850 to 1900, it was necessary to provide a historical background that would explain the complex relationships between the Thembu and other peoples at the start of the narrative. Chapter one, then, starts with the rule of Ngubengcuka in 1810. This chapter is mainly concerned with the rift that developed within the Thembu nation in consequence of the westward migration of a large number of Ngubengcuka's subjects. The divergent reactions of the eastern and the western Thembu, first to the War of the Axe, and then to the War of Mlanjeni is then traced. It was the participation of a large number of Thembu on the side of other black nations that led to Governor Cathcart's settlements, at the end of the war, which made provision for the proclamation of the Tambookie Location - the later Glen Grey. The mainstream of events after 1853 is then followed chronologically in chapters two to five, with the emphasis on those important events referred to earlier.

Chapter six diverges from the chronological line to deal with three prominent Thembu chiefs. Each of these chiefs provides an interesting case study of the responses of a 19th century chief to the Colonial onslaughts on traditional lands and cultures. In Thembuland Proper the young and inexperienced Ngangelizwe became the victim of a vilification campaign as his expansionist ideals clashed with Colonial and British expansionism in the 1870s. Too weak to resist the militarily superior enemy, he abandoned his plans and, through a policy of cooperation with the Cape Colony, sought a means of securing for his people their ancestral lands. In Emigrant Thembuland, Matanzima rose to prominence after 1881, at a time when most other Thembu leaders in consequence of their participation in the Transkeian Rebellion, had disappeared from the scene. By means of shrewd tactics he managed to maintain a workable relationship with the Cape Colony while retaining as much power as possible under the white umbrella, and growing rich in the process. The story of Glen Grey's Mfanta differs remarkably from those of his two brothers. He was caught up in the general spirit of discontent in the 1870s, partook in the War of Ngcayecibi, and died in prison in Cape Town.

Although political and economic factors are inter-related, the economic dimension as such could not easily have been dealt with adequately in the main narrative chapters without confusing the argument. Chapter seven therefore deals specifically with the economic aspects of the Thembu territories after 1870. Three territories have been singled out for special attention. They are the district of Glen Grey which fell within the boundaries of the Cape

Colony; Emigrant Thembuland and Thembuland Proper.

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1. M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds.): The Oxford History of South Africa, I, pp.78-84.
 2. See pp.
 3. See p.
 4. Sihele was not only councillor to the Thembu king, but the introduction to his manuscript reveals a close association with the Jumba clan of which he was most probably a member. Between this clan and the Royal Thembu House there were very close links. There are two translations of Sihele's manuscript in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, one by N.D. Sandi, and one by Tani Tšani, the former suffers from having been translated too literally. In this thesis the Tšani translation has been used.
 5. Burton Papers, MS 14.636 (in Cory Library): Glimpses from History. Burton relied on oral interviews for information.
 6. W.T. Brownlee: The Precedence of the Thembu, Butterworth, 7 February '25, File 6/12/1, (Cory Library).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Acc.	Accession
AYB.	Archives Year Book For South African History
BPP.	British Parliamentary Papers
CPP.	Cape Parliamentary Papers
CMT.	Chief Magistrate of Thembuland
CO.	Colonial Office
DSAB.	Dictionary of South African Bibliography
F.A.M.P.	Frontier Armed and Mounted Police
GH.	Government House
GTJ.	The Grahamstown Journal
Hansard	Hansard's Parliamentary Debates
JAH.	Journal of African History
Lt.Gen.	Lieutenant General
MLA.	Member of the Legislative Assembly
NA.	Native Affairs
PMO.	Prime Minister's Office
Sec. of State	Secretary of State (Usually Secretary of State for Colonies)
Col. Sec.	Colonial Secretary
SNA.	Secretary for Native Affairs
SP.	Southey Papers
RM.	Resident Magistrate
USNA.	Under Secretary for Native Affairs
USPG.	United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
WMMS.	Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society

NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Following the accepted orthography for African names, the use of all prefixes such as ama- and aba- has been dropped. The matter of orthography, however, remains a tricky one. In official letters, the names of tribes and people vary in spelling. An attempt has been made in this thesis to follow the most generally accepted forms of the African names. However, in quotations, and in official references the spelling has, as a rule, not been changed. Hence, for example, the name Ngangelizwe is used in the text, but footnotes will refer to the Resident with Gangelizwe. Similarly the modern form, Sarhili has been used for the Gcaleka chief, but footnotes will refer to Resident with Kreli.

The Thembu were also known as the Tambookie. Around this term many theories have developed. Some authors thought it was a remnant from the remote past when pioneer Thembu clans intermarried with the San of the Tsomo Valley. (The 'Tam'buki Bushmen as they were called.) A modern day historian, Jeff Peires, is of opinion that the word Tambookie is a Khoi version of Thembu. Qwa is a suffix meaning people; hence Thembu-Qwa. In this thesis the term Thembu has been used, except in quotations. However, the Thembu location, proclaimed in 1853 by Sir George Cathcart (the later district of Glen Grey), was known as the Tambookie Location, and always referred to as such in official letters. This term has therefore been kept.

Chapter 1

The Era of Ngubengcuka, Mtirara and Maphasa (1800-1850)

(a) Domestic Conflicts

In 1810¹ Ngubengcuka (Hyena's cloak) also known as Vusani (he who wakes others) succeeded his father, Ndaba, as king of the conglomeration of clans - collectively known as the Thembu - who lived between the Mbashe and Mthatha rivers in the present Transkei. Among these clans there were those who believed themselves to be the descendants of a common ancestor, Thembu, who had lived many hundreds of years earlier.² His followers, according to tradition, migrated from central Africa along the east coast via Pondoland into the present Transkei, where they were firmly established by 1600.³ Besides these clans, there were also groups other than Thembu who, in the course of time, had settled on Thembu territory. We can thus see that Ngubengcuka's subjects were not of homogeneous descent, but they developed as a single, loosely-structured political entity which comprised various kinship groups (clans). The term Thembu, therefore, denoted those people who owed allegiance to the Thembu royal family, the Hala, and its head, the king.

The installation of the Hala as the royal family dates from 1680. In that year, the two sons of king NxeKwa fought for supremacy in a battle on the Msana river. Dlomo defeated his elder brother, Hlanga, and the main section of his clan later took the name of the former's chief son, Hala.⁴ The paramountcy of the Hala king was acknowledged

by most of the Mbashe clans, but in varying degrees. Even those clans which were directly descended from the royal house lived as semi-independent groups. Two such cases were the Ndungwana and the Tshatshu.

The Ndungwana took their name from NxeKwa's first born son,⁵ apparently an ambitious usurper who grasped the opportunity, while on a royal friendship mission, to establish his authority over some immigrating amaFene and other Sotho clans. According to one Thembu tradition he later sided with the victorious Dlomo in the Battle of the Msana, and the two brothers thereafter ruled jointly over the Thembu.⁶ We have no other evidence that such a partnership existed nor how long it lasted. What we do know is that when Ngubengcuka became king, the Ndungwana lived as a separate group under their chief Quesha, who at times openly defied the Thembu paramountcy.

Tshatshu, a contemporary of Quesha, was a particularly restless and troublesome chief. A descendant from Hala's right hand house, he succeeded in building up his power to a point where it exceeded that of the monarchy itself.⁷ Furthermore, his linkage by marriage to Hintsas⁸ gave this Xhosa chief, who already harboured pretensions to authority in Thembuland, the opportunity to meddle in Thembu affairs.

The Thembu hegemony was further weakened by the presence of foreign clans such as the Gcina, of Mfengu origin, and the Vundhli, of Sotho origin, who nominally acknowledged the Thembu king, but had preserved their chieftaincy and territorial integrity. The Qwati, of Xesibe origin, lived independently, and, being more formidable warriors than

the Hala, they considered themselves to be the real rulers of the Mbashe area.⁹ Lastly, there were those clans which, though living on Thembu territory, did not acknowledge the Thembu king. Both the Ngabi and the Nshilibile paid allegiance to the Xhosa paramount.¹⁰ The inherent weakness of a nation thus composed manifested itself in the Thembu's inability to produce strong leaders, and in their military inferiority. Under a succession of insipid rulers, they became an easy prey for surrounding neighbours who despised them, considering them cowards.¹¹

When Ngubengcuka became king in 1810, the tottering monarchy had reached its lowest ebb. The reign of his father, Ndaba, a notorious trouble-maker, was marked by a series of disasters which culminated in the king's flight to Gcalekaland following a revolt instigated by the Ndungwana. They were assisted by the Qwati chief, Fubu, and the Xhosa king, Rharhabe, to whom the Ndungwana chief was linked by marriage. Ironically Ndaba, too, was linked by marriage to Rharhabe, being married to the latter's daughter, Bede. She followed her husband into exile, and Rharhabe, finding this an untenable situation, generously forgave his offending son-in-law and offered him asylum. Given the ex-king's record as a trouble-maker, it seems more than likely that his attitude fomented trouble in the Great Place.¹² When Rharhabe fell ill, his diviners were quick to blame his sickness upon Ndaba and warned: "Have two horns ever existed without sharing the same head? Exactly what are you trying to cure? Please go back to your country, otherwise your chief will die."¹³

His life once again endangered, Ndaba turned to Ntlanzi, who now acted

as Thembu regent, for help. Ntlanzi wished to save the Thembu people the humiliation of seeing their king killed by foreigners. He enlisted the help of Fubu to "steal" Ndaba. The Qwati, seeing an opportunity to strengthen their own position, fulfilled their mission, not only returning the king, but bringing a handsome quantity of booty as well. Soon afterwards war broke out between Rharhabe and Ndaba. Soga maintained that the dispute dated back to the time of Ndaba's marriage to Bede, when the Thembu king had insulted Rharhabe by sending him inferior cattle as lobola,¹⁴ while Sihele maintained that Rharhabe wanted to recover his cattle which had been taken by the Qwati.¹⁵ Be that as it may, Rharhabe was routed in 1782 and killed by a Qwati army. This strengthened the Qwati claim to supremacy over the Mbashe area.

The Thembu, more vulnerable than ever before, suffered inroads by surrounding nations, notably the Xhosa. The latter invaded Thembuland, burned down houses, raided cattle and carried Thembu away as servants.¹⁶ To add to their dilemma, new threats emanated from the territory between the Mzimkulu and the Mzimvubu rivers where refugees from Natal were incorporated by the chief Madikane into the Bhaca chiefdom.¹⁷

These, then, were the internal and external challenges that confronted Ngubengcuka at the beginning of his rule. As king, he remains a somewhat controversial figure. The Xhosa historian, J.H. Soga, found his rule totally insignificant.¹⁸ By contrast, Thembu and some European chroniclers, especially those who wrote at the beginning of the century, portrayed him as a hero, the architect of a united

Thembu nation, and a shrewd diplomat.¹⁹ They point out that his policy of cooperation with the militarily stronger Cape Colonial Government, as with Ngqika, greatly enhanced Thembu ability to withstand attacks from surrounding nations,²⁰ and, above all, that as a brave and skilled military leader, he restored the self-respect of his battered nation. His death, in 1830, as a result of a wound inflicted upon him during a revolt of the Great House was deeply lamented by his people. Sihele remarked that his death marked the end of a great man. "A dark cloud," he wrote "descended upon the Thembu nation. Gone was the leader who could not easily be replaced in Thembuland."²¹ However, one should treat these eulogies with circumspection. The aura around the person of the king may have been inspired by his own charisma or by the political ideologies of interested people whose writings may not be without bias.²² An investigation of the political realities that sprang from his regime could open up other perspectives. The story of the incorporation of the Qwati into the Thembu kingdom, is of relevance in this context. According to tradition it took place shortly after Ngubengcuka became king, and it is seen as one of his major achievements. Sihele tells that the Qwati (after the Ndaba debacle) became more contemptuous than ever before, claiming supremacy over the Mbashe area. Qwati boys, when playing, had a saying: "Chiti, chiti, gxotisha bu Hala." This meant that if one were chasing an opponent, one had to do it in such a way that the opponent would flee like a Hala."²³ Inevitably, the simmering dispute culminated in a battle in which the warring parties used knives, spears, bows and arrows and other sharp weapons. Ngubengcuka, aided by his half-brother, Jumba, first defeated the Qwati and thereafter reconciled them by relieving them of the war tax

they were traditionally expected to pay. A humble and submissive Fubu so we are told, said to Ngubengcuka: "I am pleased to have had a day like this, so that I had an opportunity to experience your manliness, because your cowardly father never gave me enough support against other nations." This battle, according to Sihele, ended the strife between the Qwati and the Hala. Ngubengcuka, as proud victor, issued a warning that unity is strength and that therefore no nation in his domain could in future stand aside if he was engaged in war.²⁴ It is dubious whether Ngubengcuka ever managed to exert full authority over either the Qwati, or the Gcina, whom he was also said to have incorporated during his reign. Later events imply that these clans retained their autonomous status. This is corroborated by the observations of a young trader, John Thackwray, who visited Thembuland in 1827 and wrote: "There are numerous chiefs of whom Vusany, king of the Mahala tribe, king Foubau of the Macqcutee and Galeyka of the Machadulu are the most important."²⁵ This observation would hardly have been possible had Ngubengcuka's paramountcy been complete.

While the partial subjection of the most troublesome chiefdoms brought greater stability to the Mbashe area and enhanced, to some extent, the Thembu's capacity to withstand external pressures, the continued existence of these semi-independent states within the Thembu state, made it very difficult for the king to carry out his titular responsibilities and to preserve unity.

It seems, furthermore, that Thembu military achievements during Ngubengcuka's reign have been exaggerated by sympathetic historians. Sihele refers, for instance, to his victory over the Sotho under

Moshoeshoe,²⁶ but in his book, Survival in Two Worlds, Leonard Thompson gives well-documented evidence that Thembuland was twice invaded by the Sotho, who each time carried away a handsome booty. These mafisa cattle enabled Moshoeshoe to add many people to his chiefdom.²⁷ It was only in 1835, five years after Ngubengcuka's death, that a Sotho expedition into Thembuland ended in disaster.²⁸ The Thembu were also not capable of defending themselves effectively against Gcaleka and Bhaca inroads. In 1828 attacks by the Bomvana, who were subordinates of Hintsa, forced them to move further north, abandoning the coast. War was only averted by missionary and possibly Cape intervention.²⁹ The Bhaca were a formidable enemy, and their continual inroads greatly sapped the strength of the monarchy. Ngubengcuka's greatest defect as ruler was his inability, at such a critical time, to reconcile dissident groups under his rule.

Internal disputes resulted in a wave of north-westward migration in the 1820's.³⁰ The first tribe to break away was the ever-restless Tshatshu under Bawana.³¹ They were followed by the Ndungwana and the Gcina.³² The settlement of these clans on the banks of the Black Kei river, then the Cape frontier, marked the beginning of an epoch characterized by group formation and by military alignment and re-alignment, as the Thembu, like the Xhosa before them, came face to face with white colonists.

In other respects, too, the migration was a crucial event in Thembu history. Territorially there were tremendous gains. During their period of forced dispersal, the Emigrant Thembu, as they were later termed,³³ had spread themselves thinly over the territory between the

Stormberg in the north and the Winterberg in the south, and from the Indwe river in the east to the Black Kei and Klaas Smit rivers in the West. By 1830, then, the Thembu king ruled over an area stretching from the Mbashe river to the present district of Queenstown, and from the coast to the Stormberg in the north. The most important result of these migrations, was the breaking up of national cohesion.

An accumulation of factors contributed towards the alienation of the new settlements from the parent society at the Mbashe river. The emigrants, having penetrated territory bordering on the Cape Colony, were brought into close contact with the European economy, and were introduced to the use of money, and the application of western agricultural methods. Furthermore they were in a favourable position for conducting trade with their white neighbours.

While a certain measure of acculturation to white norms was forced upon the emigrants, the Mbashe Thembu, contained within territory fringed by other black tribes and thus cut off from the European communities both in the Cape Colony and Natal, were anchored to ancient traditions. Despite some missionary contact they remained untouched by the new influences that were beginning to shape the history of their kinsmen on the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony. Economically and socially the interests of the two Thembu factions thus diverged. Political factors widened the gap.

Ngubengcuka's death was followed by a civil war which left the fertile Colosa river valley desolated.³⁴ The government now devolved upon the regent Fadana (often spelled Vadana in official letters) who,

according to traditional custom, ruled on advice of his councillors, his paternal uncle and his brothers. It is generally accepted that a regent wielded less authority than the paramount. Furthermore, the increasingly independent attitude taken on by emigrant chiefs, whose hands were strengthened by a constant stream of refugees from the Mbashe, undermined the authority of the central government to a point where it became almost impossible to exercise control over the outlying districts.

But although the cleavage of the Thembu into an eastern and a western bloc had by 1830 already taken tangible shape, there was still one common factor that preserved some semblance of homogeneity. This was an acute sense of vulnerability in the face of Bhaca, Gcaleka and assumed Difaqane threats.³⁵ It was for this reason that all the chiefs from the Mbashe to the Black Kei followed a pragmatic policy of friendship towards the Colony.³⁶ Once these two blocs became divided upon this important issue, a process was set into motion that culminated in the final fragmentation of the nation thirty years later.³⁷

By 1830 a breach between the Thembu sections became inevitable as demographic changes led to mounting tension between the emigrant Thembu clans and their white neighbours. The simultaneous influx of farmers from the eastern frontier and Thembu refugees from the Mbashe led to a jostling for land. The situation was further complicated when large numbers of Thembu, attacked from the north by the militarily advanced Kora and Griqua,³⁸ were driven into the Cape Colony where they swelled the numbers of those Thembu who had sought refuge there during the Difaqane wars. The farmers found their

presence irksome and complaints about cattle raiding were soon pouring in.

At this critical time Bawana was murdered by the Gcina.³⁹ His successor, Maphasa, was intensely disliked by white frontier officials. The Commissioner General of the Eastern Districts, Andries Stockenstrom, denounced him as an "apathetic barbarian",⁴⁰ while Capt. Henry Somerset wrote derogatorily of the "ill-disposed, ignorant, grasping savage."⁴¹ Sihele painted a very different picture of the new leader: he described him as a great warrior "who dared situations that were usually avoided by others", an eloquent speaker, and a capable leader, "always unwilling to take up a neutral stance."⁴² These contrasting views need not be mutually exclusive. They are merely judgements on a man and his actions, seen from different perspectives. In the final analysis they all confirm the image that emerges from the pages of history: that of a shrewd and ambitious leader, whose aspiration to establish Tshatshu autonomy over the emigrant Thembu clans did not allow room for his father's conservative policies of goodwill towards the Cape Colony. Apart from the deteriorating relationship with his white neighbours, he also suspected his father's close friends, the Moravian missionaries, of being hand-in-glove with his main rivals, the Gcina. The Brethren first aroused his suspicions in 1828 when Colonial forces aided the Gcina in recovering cattle raided from them by Bawana's people. For some or other reason Maphasa felt that the missionaries had, on this occasion, betrayed him. When his father was killed by the Gcina he once again accused the missionaries of having sided with the Gcina, and he consequently attacked the mission station.⁴³ Having turned

his back on the traditional friendly Tshatshu-European alliances, he became increasingly associated with the restless Ngqika. Not only did his settlement in the present district of Whittlesea bring him into close proximity with this clan, but he was also related to them by marriage.

For some time, however, Maphasa's attitude towards the whites remained ambivalent. Despite the constant friction between the two groups, his position was far too precarious to risk an immediate and complete breakdown of the traditional alliance. In 1831 his opportunistic attempt to solicit the aid of surrounding chiefs against the Gcina to avenge his father's death did not pay off.⁴⁴ Although he received considerable support, he was defeated by the Gcina in January 1831 in a battle near the Klipplaats river, and his people were once again driven into the Cape Colony, where they met with a very cool reception. In 1833 a Griqua attack forced the chief himself into the Colony, and in the following year he had to ask for Colonial assistance against Ndhlabi. The event that eventually seemed to have caused the chief's radical breach with the Cape Colony was the outbreak of the Sixth Frontier War.

While the Mbashe Thembu confirmed their alliance with the Cape Colony by harbouring missionaries,⁴⁵ Maphasa resorted to what can best be described as a benevolent neutrality.⁴⁶ His precarious position precluded active participation on the side of his Ngqika associates, but he made his lands available for the harbouring of cattle raided from the Colony by the warring clans. His own people certainly made use of the opportunity to fish in troubled waters, and white farmers

increasingly complained of thefts committed by the Thembu. Clearly Maphasa's lands could not be seen as immune from the complex eastern frontier situation, a fact which Sir Benjamin D'Urban kept in mind when he finalized his post-war settlements in September 1835.⁴⁷ These settlements, although a radical modification of the Governor's initial proposals which envisaged the expulsion of the "irreclaimable savages" forever beyond the Kei, subjected the chiefs in the annexed area between the Kei and the Keiskama rivers - the so-called Province of Queen Adelaide - to British rule. Maphasa's lands fell within the annexed area; hence a chief who was not guilty of any proven act of hostility was robbed of his independence. D'Urban sent Col. Henry Somerset to Maphasa to make the final arrangements regarding his lands. Somerset duly arrived at Shiloh with an armed force of two hundred men. Maphasa was put to the choice of staying on his lands under British protection - implying subjection to the British Government - or removing himself beyond the Kei. Maphasa chose to remain on his own lands and said that without British protection "he was a dead man".⁴⁸ Somerset was satisfied; he could report to his superiors that Maphasa had welcomed the offer of receiving British protection, as he was too weak to defend himself against all his surrounding enemies. This is debatable. A signatory to the treaty, the Rev. Bonatz of the Moravian Missionary Society, was convinced that Maphasa, overawed by the armed force, expected an attack upon himself should he not accept the offer. Sir Andries Stockenstrom in later years maintained that it was the bitterness caused by the annexation of his lands that led to Maphasa's participation in the frontier war of 1846. It should be kept in mind, though, that Stockenstrom was severely opposed to D'Urban, and he let no opportunity pass by to

denounce the actions of the Governor. Sihele also indicated that Maphasa accepted the offer, but was soon disappointed when the Government started to interfere in his internal affairs.⁴⁹ In view of all this evidence it seems reasonable to assume that the Somerset-Maphasa agreement further bedevilled the Tshatshu's shaky relationship with the Cape Government. The agreement was also, for other reasons, of considerable importance. The Tshatshu were now, for the first time, politically separated from their independent kinsmen at the Mbashe, so that their interests became more closely interwoven with those of the other restless tribes. The gap between the eastern and western Thembu therefore widened.

The annexation of Maphasa's lands was of short duration. Sir Benjamin's settlements were rejected in Britain where both treasury officials and philanthropists opposed the annexation of tribal lands. Amongst the philanthropists were prominent men like Fowell Buxton and Lord Glenelg; the latter was the newly appointed Secretary of State and Colonies. It was at the instigation of Buxton that a Select Committee was appointed to investigate, amongst other things, the policies concerning the black races on the Cape frontier. This committee which met in July 1835 under the chairmanship of Buxton, was strongly influenced by the former Commissioner-General of the Eastern Districts, Andries Stockenstrom, who was highly critical of both the Colonists and the Colonial government.⁵⁰ Acting largely upon Stockenstrom's evidence, the Committee condemned the D'Urban settlements as costly and inhumane. There then followed the well-known Glenelg despatch which put the blame for the war on the colonists, and informed D'Urban that Andries Stockenstrom had been

appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Districts, in which capacity he was to implement the Glenelg System. The Province of Queen Adelaide was to be abandoned; the chiefs were to be freed from their allegiance to the Queen, and treaties were to be made with border chiefs. Diplomatic Agents were to be appointed for each tribe. Henry Fynn was appointed as Diplomatic Agent to the Tambookies, and he took up residence at Tarka Post.⁵¹

In accordance with the Glenelg policy, a treaty was made with Maphasa in June 1837. If the Glenelg treaties were aimed at bringing about a more amicable relationship between the Colonists and the independent chiefs - which certainly was what Lord Glenelg had in mind - it failed hopelessly in the case of Maphasa. The basic problem was that the complexities of the north eastern frontier situation had not been taken into account when the lengthy treaty had been drawn up. Maphasa had to promise to do everything in his power to promote the tranquility of the several tribes by whom he was surrounded and to preserve peace with the colonists." Not only did he have to accept responsibility for the Bushmen under Mandoor - the original inhabitants of the area - but certain Thembu clans, who acknowledged the Mbashe paramount, were also placed under his jurisdiction.⁵² Thus, estranged from the parent society at a time when tension was building up in consequence of the shortcomings of the treaty system, Maphasa became increasingly caught up in the local black movements. Such movements were manifested in the rise of prophets whose call for the consolidation of all frontier people cut right through existing alliances. In a way, Maphasa became the spiritual ancestor of those Thembu who, in the 1870s, came to believe that the interests of the

Thembu were interwoven with those of other blacks rather than with the militarily superior whites.⁵³

The pattern of future divisions between collaborators with the Colony and non-collaborators had thus clearly crystallized by the 1840s. As the decade progressed, the cleavage between the adherents of the two opposing policies became widespread.

An opportunity to fuse the rival Thembu groups into some form of homogeneity presented itself when Mtirara became king in 1844. Five years earlier, Bhaca attacks had caused the removal of the royal house from the Mbashe to Hohito on the Imvani (White Kei) river.⁵⁴ Thereby the main theatre of Thembu activity had shifted to the Cape frontier, and since the king was now in close touch with his emigrant subjects, the consolidation of the Thembu people seems to have been a realistic possibility. Available evidence is far too scanty to allow definite conclusions as to the measure of consolidation that Mtirara achieved during the very first years of his reign. It would seem that he succeeded in bringing the Gcina and Ndungwana under his umbrella, but his relationship with the Tshatshu remained problematic. In September 1845 Governor Maitland tried to restore peace on the frontier by yet another modification of the existing treaties. This time the Thembu treaty was signed with Mtirara, while Maphasa signed as one of the sub-chiefs. Later events proved that Maphasa's acknowledgment of Mtirara's authority was only nominal. As the years passed, his influence increased. Not only was he older than Mtirara and possessed a stronger personality,⁵⁵ but his policies were more attractive to young malcontents. This made it more and more difficult for the

Thembu king to exercise his monarchical powers. The fragile solidarity that Mtirara managed to bring about could hardly withstand the strains of the crucial years between 1839 - 1853 which witnessed two frontier wars, and increasing interference from the Cape Colony in Thembu affairs.

The first of these wars, commonly known as the War of the Axe, because of the opening incident, had its roots in the unstable frontier conditions that followed the new Maitland treaties. Not only did these treaties fail to address the main grievances resulting from previous settlements, but they were also insensitively implemented.⁵⁶ Trouble was therefore fermenting when in March 1846, Tsili, a follower of the petty Ngqika chief, Tola, was arrested after having stolen an axe from a Fort Beaufort farmer. His friends staged a rescue, cut off the hands of the Khoi-prisoner to whom Tsili was handcuffed, and left the unfortunate man to die. Sandili, the Ngqika chief, refused to hand over the murderers, and Maitland decided to act swiftly, setting out for the frontier with troops and burghers.

The war, which was to last till the end of 1847, gave Mtirara the opportunity to promote his own interests. His attitude during the time was nevertheless ambivalent. He could hardly rally open support for the Colony without estranging the militants within his own clan, and thereby strengthening Maphasa's position. Alternatively, participation on the side of the Colony could give him the opportunity of not only getting rid of Maphasa, but also of settling his land-disputes with Mandoor and the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili. Moreover, ominous signs were coming from the Mbashe area where Pondo attacks had

once again forced a number of Thembu to seek refuge across the Indwe river.⁵⁷ An alliance with the Cape Colony must thus have been more vital than ever before. Mtirara, cleverly waited for the propitious moment to act against Maphasa.

The opportunity came in August when Maphasa was in open conflict with the Colonial forces. This chief's participation in the war was triggered off by two unfortunate incidents. The first was the decision of Henry Fynn to make use of Mandoor's people who were residing at Joseph Read's "Bushman Institution", to protect the Shiloh mission station against possible Thembu attacks. As previously noted there was strong enmity between the Thembu and Mandoor's people. Maphasa set off with two hundred men to protest against this decision. Inevitably a fight ensued during which Maphasa's people were driven back. Reinforced by his Ngqika allies, he launched a counter-attack the next day, but was again repulsed and this time he suffered a loss of numerous cattle, captured by the Colonial forces. The infuriated Tshatshu could not be controlled when, a few days later, Maphasa's brother was accused without proof of guilt, of having murdered a trader. In defiance Maphasa set fire to the Imvani mission station which was situated in his country.⁵⁸ In the skirmishes that followed he lost almost all his cattle, the final blow being dealt when Mtirara attacked him in the rear, seized 4,000 cattle - left over from the original 12,000 which the chief was said to have raided from the Colony - and broke his power temporarily.⁵⁹

For the rest, Mtirara's part in the war is rather obscure. Thembu

chiefs later claimed - and this was also the opinion of J.C. Warner, at that time lay preacher with the Thembu king - that he rendered valuable service.⁶⁰ They are, however, very vague on this point. Theal argued that, besides having captured Maphasa's cattle, he took no active part and that, in fact, he had harboured cattle raided from the Colony.⁶¹ Given the unstable frontier situation, both views might contain an element of truth.

With Maphasa's power temporarily broken, Mtirara had settled his internal problems for a while, but his military adventure did not bring other benefits. Governor Maitland's proposals in December 1846 would, had they been accepted by the British Government, have given him the rewards he was hoping for, but nothing came of them. These proposals envisaged the extension of the Colonial border to the Keiskama river, the subjection of the chiefs between the Fish and the Keiskama to British rule and the appointment of a magisterial commissioner to rule over them. The area was to be divided into three parts, with Mtirara's people located in the northern portion. Mtirara was the only chief who would be allowed to exercise "such a chieftain's power as would not be inconsistent with the paramount authority of the British Magistrate."⁶²

In a further attempt to strengthen his position, Mtirara met Maitland at Block Drift, where he implored the Governor to place him under British protection, the reason for his request being the vulnerable position of his people after the war. Maitland was easily persuaded to recommend Mtirara's request to the British Government, and in his draft proposal he defined the Thembu boundaries in such a way that

they included lands at that time occupied by both Mandoor and Sarhili.⁶³

Mtirara was soon to be disillusioned. Before Maitland's proposals could even have been considered, the Governor, weary of war, had resigned. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Pottinger. "In that way a new Pharoah that did not know Joseph had come," Sihele wryly commented.⁶⁴ Pottinger, an impatient man, had no intention of making a careful assessment of Maitland's promises to Mtirara, and he condemned his predecessor's recommendations outright as "an extraordinary and inadmissable scheme."⁶⁵ The rejection of Maitland's proposals can be seen as a unilateral abrogation of an agreement with the Thembu king, and it undermined Mtirara's confidence in his white allies. Greater disappointments were to follow.

In December 1847 Pottinger was succeeded by Sir Harry Smith, who viewed the frontier problem as a strategic one which could not be solved on a piecemeal basis. In effect, his design was to extend British sovereignty over the greater part of South Africa. Within three weeks after his arrival he proceeded to Grahamstown and annexed the old Ceded Territory between the Fish and Keiskama rivers under the name Victoria East. The territory between the Kei and Keiskama was proclaimed a separate British dependency, to be known as British Kaffraria. This territory was not annexed to the Colony, but was directly ruled by Smith in his capacity as High Commissioner,⁶⁶ on behalf of Britain. To ensure firm control over the tribes, Kaffraria was divided up into counties with British names. In allocating these counties to the various tribes, Smith gave recognition to the separate

existence of the Tshatshu people. Initially Mtirara was to be settled at Howick, and Maphasa at Alnwick.⁶⁷ However, following an agreement with Smith soon afterwards, Mtirara moved to the lands between the Colonial boundary and the Indwe river where he was promised protection against Sarhili as compensation for his neutrality in the war. The chiefs Tyopo, Fadana, Jumba, Kelelo, Kolobeni, Mali and Qesha were placed under him. The inclusion of Maphasa's lands in Kaffraria, where this chief now lived as a British subject, led to further estrangement between the Tshatshu and the Hala.

The agreement with Mtirara proved to be an over-hasty and ill-conceived plan. The fact that his people were thinly spread out over an area of 2,400 square miles, which bordered on the two large districts of Cradock and Albert, soon gave rise to friction. Adjacent farmers coveted the uninhabited patches of land, and a well-known frontier situation - European intrusion on tribal lands and raiding of cattle by Africans in retaliation - inevitably followed. The farmers claimed that the increasing cattle raiding was unwarranted, and they could easily persuade Sir Harry Smith to reconsider his earlier promise to Mtirara.⁶⁸ It was now argued that since the Thembu received the lands between the Klaas Smits and Indwe rivers on condition of good behaviour, they had forfeited their claim to independence. In July 1848 Mtirara's lands were consequently annexed to the Cape Colony.⁶⁹

In later years J.C. Warner maintained that the annexation of Mtirara's lands was the major mistake in the history of Colonial relations with the western Thembu. Smith blundered further, according to Warner, by

sending a police force with the commission that was to administer the new territory. These police, who were recruited from the Ngqika, taunted the Thembu saying: "Yes we fought against the white man, and you did not help us, and now we are to govern you." Another galling incident, Warner claimed, took place at Smith's notorious meeting with black rulers at King William's Town. Sir Harry put his foot on Mtirara's neck, as he did with the other chiefs so as to illustrate their submissiveness to the British Government.⁷⁰

In Maphasa's territory conditions were no better. In the final delineation of boundaries this chief was, as we have seen, excised from Thembuland and legally located in Kaffraria. His position was indeed anomalous. He himself and part of his clan was located in British Kaffraria under the Smith system, but the boundaries were drawn in such a way that a section of his clan was excluded from Kaffraria and did not really fit into any form of territorial pattern. His authority over the inhabitants was still, in theory, that of an unalloyed chieftainship, but he could not in practice exercise it. In Kaffraria he was in practice a chief, but his functions were limited.⁷¹ Under these circumstances the location of the chief in Kaffraria, in close contact with the core of Xhosa turbulence, was indeed inexpedient.

The Thembu clans were now not only deeply divided amongst themselves, but the royal clan was once again split. Sihele tells us that when Mtirara felt his end approaching, he warned his people to return to the Mbashe so as to avoid further trouble with the Whites.⁷² The Great House under his brother, Joyi, heeded this advice, taking with

them the child-heir, Qeya. Most members of the Right Hand House remained behind. Mtirara died in 1848. Not only did his followers now lack his clear guidance but, not unusually, the death of the king sparked off suspicion and internal dissent.⁷³ The regency was first offered to his senior brother, Ncapayi, who had by then returned to the Mbashe. Ncapayi, presumably unwilling to rule over people subjected to Colonial control, declined the offer. Shweni, his second brother, a man greatly respected by the Cape Town authorities, was then appointed, but he accidentally shot himself.⁷⁴

For the Colonial Government which had, for some time, been thinking along the lines of a divisive policy of regionalism as a solution to frontier problems, the golden opportunity had now arrived.

Among the Thembu who remained behind with the Right Hand House, was a remarkable woman, Nonesi, Mtirara's foster mother.⁷⁵ Like Mtirara, she had close relations with J.C. Warner, whose advice on Thembu matters was well received by the Government. Warner used his considerable influence and in an unprecedented move, two regents were appointed: Nonesi to rule over the western Thembu and Joyi over the Mbashe section. As Sihele points out, two people could not be regent for one person. He maintains that if Nonesi was regent, then Joyi was to be an ordinary chief.⁷⁶ Not only was this an unusual situation, but it was unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the Thembu.

By 1850, then, the Thembu seemed to have been subjected to the vagaries of fortune. They were territorially, as well as politically,

divided amongst themselves, and were jostled on the one front by white farmers, and on the other by the Gcaleka. The annexations of 1848 had weakened the influence of those chiefs who had traditionally been friendly to the Colony, and many young malcontents were waiting with Maphasa, as frontier tension was once again mounting, to join a war against the Colony.

The eighth frontier war, the War of Mlanjeni, broke out in December 1850. Maphasa, after some hesitation, joined the Ngqika, thereby bringing into the war, not only his own people, but many young activists from Nonesi's people whom he seemed to have attracted like a magnet. It was reckoned by frontier farmers that, at the commencement of the war, Maphasa was more influential than Ngqika himself.⁷⁷

Not only did Maphasa's participation strengthen the numbers of the warring tribes tremendously,⁷⁸ but the whole area of conflict was extended. In some parts, his men resorted to a devastating type of guerilla warfare, in others they joined in concerted movements with the Ngqika and Gcaleka to attack strategic points.

The attitude of the Hala was, as in 1846-1847, uncertain. Nonesi earned for herself the title "Nonesi the faithful", and proved her loyalty by moving with her clan to the border of the Cradock district so as to protect this part of the frontier. Her example was followed by Quesha and some other chiefs who were supplied with arms. The fact, however, remained that Nonesi's control over her people was not absolute, and the Colony could not count on the neutrality of her whole clan. The excitement of war, backed by the Mlanjeni promises,

was contagious to young men who had probably never accepted Nonesi's regency. An incident which took place in January 1851 would certainly have estranged a number of Colonial supporters. A commando under Gideon Joubert claimed that they were attacked by a section of Nonesi's people under her Chief Councillor. In revenge, Joubert fell upon Nonesi's people, dispersed them completely and then demanded a war tribute of 2,000 head of cattle and 150 horses. Nonesi was further ordered to retreat beyond the Mbashe.⁷⁹ The fact that Nonesi complied with this demand indicated either an admission of guilt or her realization that she lacked control over her people and that it would be safer to remove them from the danger zone.

The turning point in the war came in 1852 brought about, amongst other factors, by the unexpected death of Maphasa while on his way to the Klaas Smits river to join in a combined attack on Turvey's Post. The fighting spirit of his people was now temporarily paralysed, not only because they lacked leadership, but also because disputed claims to leadership led to internal discord and suspicion.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, military success finally seemed to have come within Sir Harry Smith's grasp, but the British Prime Minister, Lord John Russell as well as the Colonial Secretary, Earl Grey, had convinced themselves that Smith had prolonged the war through his leniency to Khoi-khoi rebels and inadequate vigour against the enemy. He was recalled, and on 31 March 1852, Sir George Cathcart arrived as new Governor and High Commissioner.

Cathcart found the tribes semi-starved and weary of war but by no

means subdued. Determined to bring the war to a speedy end, he acted swiftly, conducted successful operations in the Amatola and Waterkloof mountains and then appointed a commission to discuss the possibility of peace with the Thembu.

Despite strong protests from the farmers who believed that they had been robbed of complete victory over their enemy, Cathcart was convinced that the time had come to put an end to hostilities, and, after having dealt with the Gcaleka chief Sarhili, he granted pardon to the rebellious Thembu chiefs who were now prepared to surrender arms.

The peace terms which Cathcart dictated were largely aimed at the relocation of rebellious tribes beyond the Cape Colonial boundary and the resettlement of forfeited Thembu territories by European settlers. As he was of the opinion that Maphasa had surpassed all the other chiefs in guilt, this chief's lands were forfeited and the name and independence of his tribe were to cease. The remnants of the tribe were allowed to place themselves under a "responsible" Thembu chief.⁸¹ The other tribes, living on the lands formerly annexed by Smith, were to be resettled in locations. Nonesi and her followers were invited to return from the Mbashe and to occupy the location west of the Indwe river - the so-called Tambookie Location⁸² which later became the district of Glen Grey - where J.C. Warner was placed as a government representative.

For the Thembu the war of 1853 was in many respects decisive. Some tribes emerged stronger after the war (Nonesi's people), others lost all their lands, while others remained behind at the Mbashe under the

regency of Joyi. The question now remained as to whether tribal ^{cohesion} coherence would stand the strain of the enforced peace and the political division.

(b) Missionary and Colonial Influences on the Thembu (1800-1853)

The geographical situation of the Mbashe Settlement, far from European communities and barricaded by black nations, influenced early Thembu-European relations in various ways.

While the Thembu were economically adversely affected by being barred from the lucrative markets in the Cape Colony and Natal, so readily accessible to the Mpondo and the Xhosa,⁸³ their insulation was politically advantageous. Cushioned by the frontier peoples against the onslaughts of European expansionism, they enjoyed a long period of tranquility at a time when their Xhosa neighbours were fighting desperately against a militarily superior enemy. It was only by the mid 1820's that this "splendid isolation" was shattered by various external factors that stimulated closer contact between European and Thembu. One such factor was the perennial Bhaca and Mpondo attacks upon the Mbashe people that forced thousands of Thembu north-westwards where they encountered European farmers. Another was the inevitable influence of the British policy of aggressive expansionism, the gist of which had been made clear in their dealings with the Xhosa after the Frontier War of 1819.

Parallel with these developments was the missionary influence which commenced with the establishment of the fifth link in the chain of Wesleyan mission stations at Clarkebury in 1829. In comparison to other frontier nations where the London and Glasgow Missionary Societies were already firmly established by 1825, this was a late start a delay which was in part due to the hesitancy of missionaries

to start work in a far-off, sparsely populated and unsettled country, as well as to the attitude of Ngubengcuka.⁸⁴

While the Thembu king's counterparts on the frontier had willingly accepted missionaries as a matter of political expediency, Ngubengcuka, who evaluated the position from a safe distance, distrusted the motives of the newcomers. Attempts by various societies after 1821 to gain a foothold in Thembuland met with a negative response. Whether his eventual compliance could be ascribed to the discreet behaviour of the Rev. Shepstone who took up temporary abode in Thembuland after the closing of the Morley Mission Station, as is sometimes maintained,⁸⁵ is debatable.

It is more likely that after an initial delay the king at last responded to the political exigencies of the late 1820's created by the simultaneity of black invasions into Thembuland and Cape Colonial expansionism on the eastern frontier. Aware of the expediency of coming to terms with the militarily superior Cape Colony in order to buttress his own vulnerable position, Ngubengcuka, having observed missionary activities amongst his neighbours, spotted the possibility of obtaining, with missionary help, a useful link with the Cape Government.

With the establishment, then, of the Clarkebury Mission Station, by the Rev. J. Haddy and the lay preacher Joseph Cox Warner, and the subsequent emergence of sub-stations on the north-eastern frontier, the foundation was laid for a long tradition of close, albeit often uneasy, friendship between the Wesleyan missionaries and the Thembu

monarchs, a relationship which forms one of the dominant themes in Thembu historiography. Although Christianity at first made little headway in Thembuland,⁸⁶ the missionaries made their presence felt in various ways.

On the north-eastern frontier the Moravian missionaries played a considerable role in the socio-economic field. They established a station at Shiloh, near the present day Queenstown, in 1828. The decision to do so was, in part, a result of a period of great progress experienced by the society and, in part, a response to the political and economic need of Bawana's people. Separated from the parent society and exposed to attacks from other tribes, on uncertain terms with the neighbouring Ngqika as well as with the white farmers, the Tshatshu were in a precarious position. Under these circumstances the presence of a missionary, which had come to be regarded by chiefs as a means of protection against surrounding enemies as well as a prestige symbol, was most desirable. Furthermore, having settled in an area suitable for agriculture, Bawana realized his people's need for instruction in this field. Therefore, on the advice of the landdrost of Somerset, he applied for a missionary. Governor Lord Charles Somerset supported such a project for political reasons, and his successor, Bourke, requested the Rev. Hallbeck to establish a station where the Tshatshu could learn trades and agriculture. The Moravians hoped - in vain - that the tribulations endured by the Tshatshu would make them more receptive to the Gospel and that through them, access might be gained to other chiefdoms.⁸⁷

There were marked differences between the Moravian approach to

evangelization and those of other societies. While the Glasgow and London Societies, and to a lesser degree the Wesleyans, were often at loggerheads with the farming community as well as with the administration, the Moravians were regarded with far less suspicion. D. Williams suggested that it was because the administration was not afraid that they would set up a state within a state.⁸⁸ During his travels of 1839, James Backhouse noticed that the Moravian missionaries at Shiloh maintained a distance between themselves and neighbouring Thembu chiefs. He ascribed this to fear on the part of the missionaries that too much familiarity could subject them to the caprice of the chiefs as had happened with missionaries from other societies.⁸⁹

The significance of the Moravian work in the north-east is not to be found in the extent of their work - in 1853 the Thembu, Mfengu and Bushmen at Shiloh numbered about four hundred,⁹⁰ and no other stations were established. However, the missionaries undoubtedly contributed to the rise of a so-called civilized class.⁹¹ Since the Moravians inculcated a desire for work among their followers,⁹² and the farmers wanted labourers, it follows that a relatively large number of Thembu made contact with the western way of life. Their communication with the farmers was facilitated by the fact that the Moravians instructed the children through the medium of Xhosa and Dutch.⁹³

While the Moravian activities were confined to the Tshatshu, the Wesleyans did substantial work among the other Thembu chiefdoms on the north eastern frontier. One such a station was the Lesseyton Station. The Rev. William Shaw bought a farm on the Zwart Kei for the benefit

of ex-slaves, Mfengu and Thembu. During the war of 1847 the inhabitants assisted the Colony and in recognition for their services, Sir Harry Smith gave them land at Lesseyton. At this station, there lived mainly people of the Gcina chiefdom, but there was also a large Bushman population.⁹⁴ It was a prosperous station and the pride of the Wesleyan Mission Society. In 1855 good progress was reported and in 1858 a sub-station was built. The industrial school made provision for the training of wagonmakers, carpenters, smiths and shoemakers and it gave guidance in the agricultural field especially in the planning of orchards and quince hedges.⁹⁵

We have very little information on the Glebe station, established by Rev. Patten for work among the Ndungwana, but in the light of later events it would seem that he made a great impact on the chief Ndarala.⁹⁶

The acceptance of European ways of life inevitably penetrated traditional institutions. Tyopo and Nonesi adopted a system of granting patches of land for cultivation to influential Christians in an attempt to induce such people to settle among them,⁹⁷ Two Mfengu farmers who gave evidence before the Thembuland Land Commission in 1881, referred to Tyopo's policy of giving land in individual tenure, a custom which, they claimed, was later continued in Emigrant Thembuland by his son, Gecelo.⁹⁸ J.C. Warner followed the same policy when he was appointed Thembu Agent in the newly established location.⁹⁹ The introduction of the European system of landownership by some Thembu certainly accentuated the schism between the "westernized" Thembu - a term which became synonymous with

"Christianized" - and the large majority of traditionalists who suspiciously regarded the mission stations as alien, perhaps even disruptive, communities. The assimilation of western thoughts and ideas which often followed on the adoption of western modes of living, was a further cause for suspicion. The chiefs themselves could not afford the dilution of their power by their acceptance of a foreign religion, but they were not averse to their close relatives being christianized. Ndarala's two sons, Joseph and Benjamin were educated by the Bishop of Grahamstown, while Mtirara entrusted the education of his heir, Ngangelizwe, to J.C. Warner.¹⁰⁰

Although missionaries had definite instructions not to meddle in political matters, they could, in the long run, not keep out of secular affairs. In Inter-tribal matters for instance, they jealously guarded the interests of their particular tribe. Annual reports from Thembuland are studded with references to occasions when war between the Thembu and their traditional Gcaleka enemies was prevented by missionary interference.

It was, however, with regard to Thembu-Cape Colonial relationships that the missionaries played their most important role. To the Warners, Pattens and many others - zealous evangelists that they were - the spread of Christianity was inseparably linked with the expansion of British rule. After the annexation of Thembu territories in 1848, they preached loyalty to God in the same breath as loyalty to the Queen.¹⁰¹ The black people were introduced to two foreign abstract concepts: the invisible unknown God of the white man in heaven, and an equally invisible and unknown ruler across the sea. To what extent

the chiefs themselves differentiated between these concepts is not clear. The praise song composed by Ndarala for his 1,500 followers, to be sung for Prince Alfred on his visit to Grahamstown in 1858, suggests that the images could sometimes be confused, even allowing for the fact that these might have been metaphoric^{al}, implying a compliment:

"We have seen the child of heaven

We have seen the son of our Queen"

Sir George Grey's address on this occasion also seems to have some biblical allusions. Talking about the Queen's great interest in the welfare of all the people, he emphasised that "a greater proof of this could not have been given than that of sending her son, whom she so dearly loved, to this distant country as her representative."¹⁰² Admittedly, this may be reading too much into what may be purely political remarks,¹⁰³ but, that there did exist in the minds of both missionaries and converts a link between Christianity and imperialism cannot be denied. The convergence of political and religious concepts brought the role of the missionary as preacher of the Gospel, adviser of the chiefs and communicator between the chiefs and the Cape Colonial government into sharp focus. By the time that the Thembu felt the brunt of British expansionism, the way had already been paved for the creation of loyalties towards the Cape Government. This facilitated the process of imperial conquest.

A study of Thembu-Cape Colonial relationships in the period 1800-1853 reveals two clearly discernible periods. During the first, up to 1847, nearly all relationships between the two groups were cooperative. The exception was the Tshatshu whose policies had by

1830, diverged from traditional Thembu policies.¹⁰⁴ After 1847 a growing alienation between the Thembu and their white allies, became apparent. It culminated in the participation of a large section of the western Thembu in the war of Mlanjeni in 1853.¹⁰⁵

The close relationship in the early period is understandable. By 1820 Britain had already been involved in four costly wars against the Xhosa and the frontier situation had remained unstable despite Somerset's declaration of a neutral belt between the Xhosa and White farmers. Under these circumstances, an alliance with Ngubengcuka, who, through his missionary, had made friendly overtures to the Cape Colonial Government, was most valuable. In the not unlikely event of another war, the Thembu could attack the Xhosa from the rear. On the other hand, Ngubengcuka was as much in need of an ally against perennial Bhaca, Mpondomise and Xhosa attacks.

The relationship between the Cape Colony and the Thembu was further cemented by the events of 1828, when the Cape Colony sent a force to Thembuland in response to Ngubengcuka's appeal for help against Shaka who demanded his submission on threat of invasion. Earlier, the Ngwane chief, Matiwane,¹⁰⁶ had settled near Ngubengcuka's Great Place, and in the confusion that followed, the Ngwane were mistaken as Zulus and routed by a combined Colonial-Xhosa-Thembu Army in the Battle of Mbholompo.¹⁰⁷ Nothing came of the expected Zulu invasion, but the episode had once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the Thembu if attacked from the rear. Thus, throughout the last turbulent years of his life, Ngubengcuka nurtured his friendship with the Cape Colony. This policy was continued after his death by the regent,

Fadana, who in the Sixth Xhosa War incurred the wrath of surrounding chiefs by harbouring missionaries.¹⁰⁸

In the north-east, where white farmers and Emigrant Thembu lived in common insecurity, the relationship was even closer. Problems did arise from time to time when Thembu fled into the Cape Colony for protection, and we certainly have to accept that some friction was unavoidable in a frontier situation. Theal alleged that, while a refugee in the Cape Colony in 1827, following attacks by Matiwane, Bawana was guilty of causing damage which "was little less than if they had been avowed enemies",¹⁰⁹ but official reports do not substantiate this statement. On the contrary, the Bawana-Macomo dispute of 1829 demonstrated very clearly the close association which Bawana had with both Cape officials and frontier farmers.¹¹⁰

This dispute dated back to the time when some stray Thembu, having escaped Ngwane attacks, settled on, or near, Macomo's lands. The opportunity to get rid of these intruders came in 1829 when Bawana's mind was occupied with his quarrels with the Gcina chief, Mtayelele. Macoma's attack on Bawana's people in 1829 led to Cape Colonial interference and the eventual expulsion of the Xhosa chief from the Kat River area.¹¹¹ The attitude of the Cape Government at the time of the dispute was explained by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province, in his evidence before the Aborigines Committee in 1836. He made it clear that the Thembu had been living peaceably on the Cape border and that "the Government were always in the habit of threatening any tribe that disturbed them." Other tribes, so Stockenstrom claimed, were aware that they would give

the Government offence by plundering the Thembu, who, in turn, would have no alternative other than to rush into the Cape Colony and plunder the farmers.¹¹² Stockenstrom's evidence was supported by Major Dundas who referred to the Thembu as "useful neighbours".¹¹³

The good relationship between the greater part of the Thembu and the Cape was still evident. Although Mtirara did not receive the rewards he hoped for in 1846, the Cape Colony did benefit from Mtirara's indirect aid during the Seventh Frontier War, as well as by the more substantial aid given by Christian converts at the Haslope Hills and Lesseyton stations.

Increasing alienation between the Thembu and the Cape Colonial government after 1847 was certainly rooted in Sir Harry Smith's unprovoked annexation of Mtirara's lands and his treatment of the king at the King William's Town meeting.¹¹⁴ The establishment of the Tambookie Location on the annexed land after the War of 1853,¹¹⁵ was in fact, a perpetuation of a morally indefensible act, and, like Sir Harry Smith, Sir George Cathcart hoped to veil its full implications by allowing the Thembu chiefs to rule according to their own customs, thereby creating an illusion of independence. Thus there developed a situation that can best be described as a client-patron relationship. This arrangement was still workable in 1848, not only because a policy of Colonial non-interference could be observed, but because the Thembu, probably looked upon annexation as a means of securing protection against their enemies. The 1853 settlement after the war of Mlanjeni, in which the Thembu were formally declared British subjects, was made in the aftermath of the Mlanjeni War under far more

strenuous circumstances. Although the war ended in the military defeat of the frontier nations, the rising tide of black nationalism was not stemmed. From 1850 onwards Cape Colonial policy was mainly directed by the fear of a black alliance against the Colony.

1. It is difficult to establish the correct date. The Thembu genealogy produced in A History of South Africa to 1870, by M. Wilson & L. Thompson, p.94, gives the date as 1809, but Lt. Genl. Richard Collins wrote in 1809 that Vooserine (sic) was then still a minor and that the government was directed by his uncle Ochacho. (Ochacho might well have been Tshatshu.) Collins could mistakenly have believed that Tshatshu was the paramount Thembu chief, while, as will be seen later, he was only chief of an important clan.) W.D. Hammond-Tooke in The Tribes of the Umtata District, p.17, gives the date of his birth as between 1780-1800).
2. See Appendix 1. Thembu Genealogies. J.B. Peires in The House of Phalo, p.13, points out that the belief that all culturally related peoples belong to a single genealogy, derives more from an understandable wish to bring order into history, than from historical fact.
3. M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds): The Oxford History of South Africa 1, pp.78-84.
4. J.H. Soga: The South-Eastern Bantu, p.20.
5. J.B. Peires: Phalo, p.30 explains that in oral societies more than in literate ones, it is the victors who record history. Genealogies are therefore not so much accurate chronicles of genetic relationship as indexes of relative political standing. He refers to Xhosa history where minor sons are to-day remembered as great sons of Right Hand houses.
6. E.G. Sihele: Who Are The Abathembu And Where Do They Come From?, (Tisani translation in Cory Library, Rhodes University.), p.20.
7. J.B. Peires: Phalo, p.85.
8. Hintsa was married to Sutu, the daughter of Tshatshu.
9. E.G. Sihele, p.28.
10. J.B. Peires: Phalo, p.85.
11. E.G. Sihele, p.28.
12. J.H. Soga: The South-Eastern Bantu, p.131.
13. E.G. Sihele, p.26.
14. Soga: South-Eastern Bantu, p.131.
15. E.G. Sihele, p.27.
16. J.B. Peires: Phalo, p.84.
17. W.D. Hammond-Tooke: The Tribes of the Umtata District, pp.14, 38.

18. J.H. Soga: The South-Eastern Bantu, p.477.
19. E.G. Sihele , pp.28-32, 60; M. Nkopo: Ms A/13/2/23 (Ethnol Sec.), Pretoria; W.T. Brownlee: The Precedence of the Thembu, File 6/12/1, Butterworth, 7 February '25. The Burton Papers: Glimpses of History, Ms. 14,636 (Cory Library, R.U.)
20. See below, pp.34-5.
21. E.G. Sihele, p.60.
22. See Introduction.
23. E.G. Sihele, pp.28-9.
24. Ibid., p.31.
25. The Colonist, 11 October '27, John Thackwray's letter. Galeyka was probably a corruption of Mtyalele, who was a Gcina chief.
26. E.G. Sihele, pp.23-4.
27. L. Thompson: Survival in Two Worlds, p.55. See also P. Sanders: Moshoeshoe, Chief of the Sotho, p.41; D. Ellenberger: History of the Basuto, Ancient and Modern (written in English by J.C. Macgregor), pp.192-195.
28. L. Thompson: Survival, p.83.; P. Sanders: Moshoeshoe, p.54. According to Sanders the Thembu had been forewarned, and allowed Moshoeshoe's men to seize 4000 head of cattle before attacking them in the late afternoon as they withdrew with their booty.
29. J.B. Peires: Phalo, p.87.
30. E.G. Sihele, p.38; Stanford Papers B 376,6: Statement by chief Mguldwa, 1908; McLoughlin Papers, Ms.14304 (in Cory Library): Thembu History per chief Mguldwa at Qumanco, 18 June '35.
31. Theal: The History of South Africa since 1795, 5, p.233. See also D. Moodie: The Record, p.14.
32. BPP.252-'35: Native Inhabitants ii, Maj. Genl. R. Bourke-Visc. Goderich, no.4, 15 October, 1827.
33. To-day the name Emigrant Thembu is commonly used for those Thembu who settled in Emigrant Thembuland in 1865. (See chapt. 3 and 4) In early official letters this name was used for Bawana's dispersed people. See E. Wagenaar: A Forgotten Frontier Zone: Settlements and Reactions in the Stormberg Area: (AYB 1982), pp.145, 162. See map 1.
34. Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, July 1830, Haddy's Report. In consequence of the civil war led by the chief Magwa who was said to have stabbed the king to death, the densely populated Colosa

river valley became completely depopulated. See also E.G. Sihele, p.36.

35. The term Lifaqane (phonetically, Difaqane) is the Sotho equivalent for Mfecane, a Xhosa term perhaps derived from uKufaca, to be weak from hunger. Difaqane conveys the notion of crushing. (See T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa, a Modern History, p.15. J. Omer-Cooper in The Zulu Aftermath, p.5 states that the term Mfecane is a Nguni word used for the wars and disturbances which accompanied the rise of the Zulu. In a yet unpublished paper, J. Cobbing from Rhodes University has attacked the Afrocentricism and Zulucentricism of South African historians on the Difaqane period. He sees the means of the Cape to obtain labour as a fundamental cause of destabilisation and famine of the middle Orange area in the 1820s. African societies, he maintains, were simultaneously caught by a second destabilising labour plunder system: the Portuguese slave trade at Delagoa Bay. Further disturbances were caused by Griqua raids for 'slaves', mobilised by the missionaries Moffat and Melville. (See J. Cobbing: The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo.)
36. See below, pp.32-6.
37. See chapter 3.
38. For the history of the Kora see I. Schapera: The Khoisan People of South Africa, pp.444-49; J. Engelbrecht: The Korana. For the history of the Griqua see: J.S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, chapter 11; R. Ross: Adam Kok's Griqua. See also J. Cobbing's paper, pp.14-16; 30-2.
39. When the Gcina chief Mtyalele died in 1829, Bawana's people were suspected of having poisoned him. The Gcina, in revenge, murdered Bawana.
40. A. Stockenstrom: Autobiography 11, p.72.
41. CO.2756: H. Somerset-H. Campbell, 26 May '34.
42. E.G. Sihele, p.140.
43. B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms, pp.172-173.
44. He tried to convince the chiefs that the Tshatshu was the clan from which the great Xhosa chiefs obtained their wives, thereby entitling their children to inherit "royal blood". See Wagenaar: Settlements., p.121,130-2.
45. Cory III, p.218. See also Warner's speech at Ngangelizwe's accession to power, p.239 and Sihele, p.65.
46. B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms, p.192.
47. For D'Urban Settlements and reaction to them see Wagenaar:

- Settlements, pp.134-44.
48. BPP.503-'35: Kaffir War (Government Notice), 18 December '35), p.6.
 49. Cory: The Rise of South Africa III, p.249; Kruger: Pear Tree, p.193. BPP.538-'36: Select Committee on Aborigines (Q 3044-3049), pp.337-338. E.G. Sihele, p.133. For Maphasa's participation in the war of 1846 see pp.16-19.
 50. J. Urie: A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries Stockenstrom before the Aborigines Committee in 1835. (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1953), pp.186-192. J. Galbraith: Reluctant Empire, p.133.
 51. See appendix 2.
 52. See appendix 3.
 53. See pp.162-72, and chapter 6, Mfanta section.
 54. GH.19/4: History of the Tambookie (anonymous), Stanford Papers B 261.3, J. Warner-Parents, 7 May 1840; E.G. Sihele, p.67. Mtirara established his Great Place at Roda.
 55. Cory 5, p.476.
 56. For the reaction to the Maitland Treaties, and for the War of the Axe see W.M. MacMillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.264; J. Galbraith: Reluctant Empire, p.155; J. Peires: Phalo, p.132-134; E.G. Sihele, pp.69-71, Cory 4, pp.486-87, 123-4, 139, 148, 150-60.
 57. Theal 3, p.30.
 58. Cory 4, pp.475-476.
 59. Theal: History of South Africa (1834-1854), pp.280-288;
 60. NA.245: Hammond-Tooke's comparative review; CPP.G4-'83: J.C. Warner's evidence before the Native Laws Commission, p. 336;
 61. Theal: 7, p.32., BPP.912-'48: Maitland-Earl Grey, 20 January '47.
 62. BPP.912-'48: Correspondence re Kaffirs, Maitland-Col. Sec., 20 January '47, pp.8-12.
 63. BPP.912-'48: Maitland-Earl Grey, no.4, 20 January 1847.
 64. E.G. Sihele, p.71.
 65. BPP.912-'48: Pottinger-Col. Sec., 20 January '47, p.38.
 66. In 1846 the Governor at the Cape was also made High Commissioner for "the settling and adjustment of the affairs of the

- territories adjacent or contiguous to the Colonial frontier." See BPP.912-'48, p.5. Pottinger was the first to hold the new office, but he never made use of his powers, as he had to concentrate upon the war on the xhosa frontier. Smith was to make full use of the de facto plenitude of power that the High Commission placed in the hands of the Governor. See J. Benyon: Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa, pp.32-6.
67. BPP.969-'48 : Government Proclamation, enclos. 6 in no 17, 25 December '47; GTJ., 27 January '48.
 68. GTJ., 20 January '48, D.S.G.E.P., 54, Calderwood-Smith, 24 February '49; Ibid. Shepstone-Calderwood 14, December '49. Calderwood was Civil Commissioner of Victoria East, the district under which the newly annexed territory now fell. See also E. Wagenaar: Settlements, pp.164-165.
 69. Government Gazette, 1848, Proclamation, 5 July '48.
 70. Stanford Papers D10: E.J. Warner's biographical sketch of his father. J.C. Warner was an influential lay preacher at Clarkebury. In 1839 he accompanied the Royal House to Rode. For a full description of his rôle during these years, see p.47.
 71. E. Wagenaar: Settlements, p.162.
 72. E.G. Sihele, p.74.
 73. GH.22/3: C.M. Cole-H. Smith, no. 48, 25 March 1848. It was generally believed by the Thembu that Mtirara's last words were: "My mother poisoned me." His mother accused his aunt and eventually both women were put to death.
 74. GH.22/2: C. Cole-R. Southey, no 171, 22 June '48; E.G. Sihele, p.74. Sihele does not specifically mention that it was an accident.
 75. Nonesi, a Mpondo princess, was Ngubengcuka's Great Wife. She was childless, and according to custom, one of his minor wives gave birth to a child in her house. Mtirara was "born on Nonesi's knees."
 76. E.G. Sihele, p.97. See also p.51-2 for a further discussion of Nonesi's position.
 77. GTJ., 6 November '52. Report from Whittlesea.
 78. GTJ., 6 November '52, 15 February '52, Report from Whittlesea. BPP.1334-'50 Tylden-H. Smith, 26 January '52, p.19.
 79. GTJ., 15 March '51. North Eastern Frontier Important. BPP.1380-'51, Correspondence re Kaffirs J. Thomas-Appleyard, 26 February '51, p.17. The Cape Frontier Times took a different view. It blamed Joubert for having attacked a tribe with whom the Colony was at peace and gloomily forecast that this incident would

excite tribes which up to then had been quiet. See Cape Frontier Times, 11 February '51, Kaffir War. Notes of the Week.

80. Not unusually, it was rumoured that he was poisoned, (He died, in fact, of a heart attack) and amongst others, his Chief Pakati became suspect. In the end it seems as if Xosa, the father of Maphasa's Great Wife, was guilty of all the intrigues in an attempt to get rid of Maphasa's Great wife and her son, his heir. GTJ., 10 January '52, Death of Tambookie Chief, Mapassa.
81. Correspondence of Sir George Cathcart (Proclamation 22 November '52), pp.238-240.
82. For explanation of the term "Tambookie" see Note on Terminology.
83. Oxford History: pp.234-238. Although there was evidence of early European trade in ivory with the Thembu, such trade relations seem to have been limited and irregular. See also W. Beinart: The Political Economy of Pondoland, pp.22-6.
84. D. Williams: Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, pp.81-82; 164-165. When the Scottish missionaries Ross and McDermid visited him in 1829, he accused missionaries of having been instrumental in bringing commandos into black territories to recover their own lost cattle. He referred to Ngqika who was constantly harassed by commandos since missionaries had been allowed in his country.
85. B.E. Seton: Wesleyan Missions and the Sixth Frontier War, 1834-1835. Ph.D., 1962, U.C.T.). D. Williams: Missionaries, 1799-1853 (Ph.D. 1959, Wits Univ.) pp.164-5.
86. In 1839 James Backhouse found that there were only 35 adult members of the church at Clarkebury See J. Backhouse: A Narrative of a Visit to Mauritius and South Africa, p.318. On the north eastern frontier the number of converts was equally insignificant. For later progress of Christianity see pp.324-26 where the influence of missionaries in Emigrant Thembuland is discussed.
87. B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms, pp.166-168.
88. D. Williams: Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier, p.137.
89. J. Backhouse: Narrative, p.318.
90. Ibid.
91. See pp.63-5; 307-8.
92. D. Williams, p. 137.
93. James Backhouse: Narrative, p. 202.
94. Ms., 1158 (Cory Library) Extract from a letter H.B. Warner-W.E.

- Stanford, 23 February 1913.
95. W.M.M.S., 1855, pp.46-54.
 96. See pp.97.
 97. BC.500, Judge Papers: A. Judge-M. Blyth, 9 March 1873. See pp.307-8.
 98. CPP.666-'83: Thembuland Land Settlement Commission Report, p.65.
 99. Stanford Papers D10: E.J. Warner's Manuscript. See also pp.307-8.
 100. Ibid.
 101. M. Wilson and L. Thompson: A History of South Africa to 1870, p.267. See also GTJ., 24 October '80. Editorial. The Rev. Chalmers said in a speech in Glasgow that the rebels (in the war of 1881) might have been patriots. The editor expressed the hope that missionaries would continue to teach blacks that Christianity necessarily demanded loyalty to Queen Victoria. (My emphasis)
 102. Prince Alfred's Progress through South Africa, p.67.
 103. Ibid: The chiefs were reported to be "loud in their expressions of gratitude and promises of loyalty...calling him (Grey) their father...and promised implicit obedience.
 104. See pp.9-11.
 105. See pp.22-4.
 106. In the course of disturbances in Natal, the Ngwane were scattered. See above, footnote 35.
 107. See J.B. Peires: Phalo., pp.86-88. See also Cobbing: The Uteane as Alibi.
 108. See footnote 45.
 109. Theal 1, p.392.
 110. BPP.538-'36: Select Committee on Aborigines, pp.82, 132, 356.
 111. Theal 2, pp.6-9; Wagenaar: Settlements and Reactions, pp.119-121.
 112. BPP.538-'36: Q 966-969, p.82.
 113. BPP.538-'36: Q 1173, p.132.
 114. See pp.20-1.
 115. See p.25.

Chapter 2

The Tambookie Location: Uneasy Pacification

Cathcart's settlements after the War of Mlanjeni, which made provision for the creation of a Thembu location, the boundaries of which were drawn in accordance with the conditions of strategic defence, were typical of a man who was inclined to view frontier affairs from a military rather than an administrative point of view. The northern and western boundaries stretching from the point where Bram Neck runs into the Black Kei river, across a range of high mountains up to Theodorus Rand and thence to the Stormberg, enclosed the Thembu within a well-defined mountain barrier.¹ The Governor deluded himself into believing that they were "perfectly satisfied and most grateful", having been provided with "ample space and a fair amount of good land."²

Cathcart's hope that a mountain barrier would eliminate cattle raiding and reciprocate trespass by farmers and Thembu on each others' lands soon foundered upon the rocks of frontier realities. The concept of a "well-defined boundary line" proved to be nothing but an illusion as a look at the map will show. First, it will be noted that the north-eastern boundary on the Indwe River, was adjacent to Sarhili's country, while the southern limit bordered on the Ngqika Location, so that the Location Thembu were, in fact, an extension of the vast Kaffrarian population. Secondly, the Stormberg, which formed the boundary between the Location and the sparsely populated Albert district, was by no means impassable, and it was here, as will be seen, that friction arose as white farmers and Thembu jostled for

land.

Tensions that arose on the one hand from ineffective boundary arrangements, and on the other from internal rivalry between diverse groups forced to live together within a confined area, underlined the shortcomings of the administrative system of indirect rule, set up to deal with the many complex problems of the Location. This policy, as applied in various parts of the British Empire in the 19th century rested upon the belief that Europe and Africa were culturally distinct and that the form of government that was most suited to the latter, was that devised by Africans themselves.³ In Southern Africa its most successful exponent was Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent in Natal between 1845 and 1850 and, after the redesignation of the post, Secretary of Native Affairs until 1875.

Shepstone's policies of indirect rule, divide and rule, the exemption of Africans from tribal law and the recognition of Christian marriages, all of these also featured prominently in the Location system as applied by Warner. The latter believed, like Shepstone, that no system of management half as effective, at even ten times the cost, could be substituted for tribal organization. In accordance with the conviction, Shepstone devised an ^{administrative} administrative system whereby well-disposed, traditional chiefs were recognized while at the same time commoners were appointed as new chiefs. Such commoners, having gained from their appointments, were usually more amenable to control by the white government. Although these chiefs and headmen functioned, in theory, under the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, it was Shepstone who acted as "supreme

chief."

In the Location, too, there were, at the base, traditional as well as appointed chiefs and headmen under four principal chiefs. These chiefs were Nonesi (Hala), Tyopo (Gcina), Quesha (Ndungwana) and Yiliswe, the mother of Maphasa (Tshatshu). Nonesi was appointed as the "Paramount" of all the Location Thembu.⁴ At the top of the pyramid was the Thembu Agent, J.C. Warner.

There were good reasons to assume that Warner was well-qualified for his task. The son of an 1820 Settler, he was brought up on the Eastern Frontier, and at the age of seventeen took up the post of lay-preacher at Clarkebury. James Backhouse, who visited the mission station in 1839 was greatly impressed by the young man whom he considered to be "one of the finest kafir scholars in the country, having gained much of his practical acquaintance while working with the people as an artisan."⁵ Although some of the stories regarding Warner's activities in war-torn Thembuland - such as his unarmed approach to invading Difaqane armies, and his persuading an invading Bhaca expedition to release Thembu women prisoners and children⁶ - may be dismissed as apocryphal, there nevertheless is reason to believe that he gained considerable prestige in Thembuland. When Mtirara left the Mbashe for the Black Kei he took Warner with him and, throughout the king's life, they remained in close touch, even after Warner had taken up a post at the Lesseyton Mission Station. It was while he was at Lesseyton that Warner experienced an emotional crisis that led to his resignation from the ministry. "I did not leave", he confided to his friend, Robert Godlonton, "from any distaste to the work, nor on

any account of any alteration in my views of the doctrine and description of the Wesleyans, for I hope to live and die a Methodist, nor for worldly gain, but merely and solely because my own soul is not prospering in personal piety and I feel that I am utterly unfit for so holy an office."⁷ He took up residence at Alice, from where he viewed the frontier developments with apprehension. Shocked by the annexation of Mtirara's lands⁸ he prepared himself to start a crusade on behalf of the Thembu. He maintained that he had been appointed as their "Regent" (presumably by Mtirara) to act as Secretary and Agent for them to take their case, if necessary, to the Aborigines Protection Society and the British public.⁹ Nothing came of the intended crusade, and for some time Warner faded into oblivion, until 1853 when his name was linked to a rather strange incident. In 1853 the Albert farmers sent a petition to the Governor signed, amongst others by Warner, in which they lodged complaints against the chief Tyopo. They claimed that at the beginning of the war, the chief had entered into a treaty with them whereby he promised to move his people away from Cathcart's proclaimed boundary. The removal never took place. Cathcart rejected the silly petition, pointing out that treaties could only be made between lawful governments. He also expressed his indignation at this illegal procedure.¹⁰ However, Cathcart did not seem to have taken the matter seriously and soon afterwards he offered Warner the post of Thembu Agent in the newly proclaimed Tambookie Location. A supporter of D'Urban's policies, Warner had little confidence in the Cathcart system, which he regarded as far too lenient, but he accepted the post, hoping perhaps that he could bring some stability to this turbulent area.

The ideas underlying Warner's policy epitomized frontier official thought of the day: a belief in what they considered to be a firm and just policy towards the Blacks and the conviction that a potential black alliance could only be avoided by the extension of British rule across the Kei river. His political credo, which constituted the essence of his Location policy, was best expressed, right at the end of his career, in his election manifesto when he stood as M.L.A. for Queenstown: "They (the black people) should be kept in order by a firm and manly policy and be taught that we as a master race are not to be trifled with. It must never be forgotten that they consider us as intruders in South Africa - a sort of common enemy and the Colony a fair field in which to exercise their predatory propensities. Hence, in dealing with them we should - while always treating them justly - shape our policy accordingly."¹¹

As Thembu Agent, Warner undoubtedly had aspirations of becoming a second Shepstone, acting the part of the benevolent white chief. Unfortunately for him, he lacked not only personal qualities such as a sound legal training, diplomatic skill and cool judgement in times of crises, but he was also severely handicapped by the very system under which he had to operate. Incomprehensible as it may be, his executive functions were never carefully circumscribed and had not even been legalized; nor did the chiefs know the limits of their power under the new dispensation. There was the constant danger that those who had to carry out the laws could come into collision with the judicial department of the Cape Colony. Swift and determined action was simply not possible.

In an attempt to normalise the situation, Warner suggested in 1855 that the Thembu be exempted from the laws of the Cape Colony, and be considered as falling within Kaffraria, and therefore to be governed by their chiefs under the Thembu Agent.¹² A bill to that effect was introduced by Governor Grey and passed in the Upper House, but it was thrown out when sent to the Lower House. The status of the Location Thembu and their relationship with the Thembu Agent was uncertain. Were they Cape Colonial subjects or not? Nobody seemed to know for sure. To a certain extent their separate identity was recognized: the chiefs were allowed to govern their people according to their own laws and customs,¹³ and in May 1856 it was stipulated that none of the laws in force in other parts of the Colony would be applicable to the Location.¹⁴ Legally however, there were no safeguards. The Location dwellers had no political status distinct from that of other Colonial subjects; the chiefs were, like Warner, operating without having their powers legalized, and as late as 1865 Warner could not say for sure whether the Thembu were Colonial subjects or not.¹⁵ We can understand Warner's dilemma when he once complained: "I am placed in a most unpleasant position, for whilst I am expected to manage 15,000 barbarians in such manner as to ensure peace and tranquility of this part of the frontier, I am not in possession of a particle of legal power to enable me to do so; for although the Executive Government has always supported my authority and approved of the manner in which I have hitherto governed these people, and will no doubt continue to do so...I cannot lose sight of the unpleasant fact that the authority I exercise is, strictly speaking illegal, and that the 'charter of justice' recognizes no such powers as I am almost daily necessitated to exert, and that consequently both myself and the

chiefs under my supervision, frequently subject ourselves to the liability of civil actions being entered against us; or even to the more unpleasant and serious liability of being called to account by the Attorney General."¹⁶

To add to the confusion, there was Nonesi. Her position had always been something of an enigma. It is not possible to ascertain to what extent she was accepted by the Thembu as regent in 1849. It could be that some ambitious chiefs approved of her appointment as they might have felt that the division of power and the appointment of a woman would lessen the chances of usurpation by a young regent. After all, tribal chiefs wanted the central monarchy to be weak. It is equally possible that many of the young activists of the Mlanjeni War rejected her authority. The Cape Government's reasons for having appointed her are obvious. After the death of Mtirara a ruler was desperately needed to control the large number of Thembu on the frontier, and Joyi had no intention of leaving his Mbashe abode. No better person could be found than Nonesi. She proved her loyalty during the Mlanjeni war by removing her people to the Mbashe river, but her presence between the Mbashe and Umgwali rivers, where she took up abode, annoyed the Gcaleka. They were determined not to make room for her. She therefore welcomed the Cape Government's invitation, after the war, to return to her former lands where she was offered the paramountcy over the newly-created Location. This appointment turned out to be a thorny issue. The term paramount would seem to imply permanency and absolute authority, but it is doubtful whether either the Government or the Location dwellers themselves viewed it in this light. Nonesi soon experienced the problem that arose from what could be termed a

government appointment not supported by traditional claims. Given the Thembu concept of one nation under the paramountcy of Joyi, it is understandable that they would not unanimously and willingly have accepted the diversion of the monarchy. Rival claims were soon set up, the most formidable being that of the ex-regent Fadana, who retained much of the support he had held at the time of his regency after the death of Ngubengcuka. Furthermore, Nonesi had to reckon with the Tshatshu and their allies of 1853, who resented the dismantling of their traditional tribal leadership and their land losses in terms of the Cathcart settlements.

This meant that after the proclamation of the Location there were within the boundaries of the Cape Colony some 30,000 people, a large number of whom were of dubious loyalty, ruled by chiefs whose powers had never been defined, and subjected to a regent who had no traditional claims to her position. As long as matters were fairly stable, Nonesi could exercise some semblance of authority; but the tranquility of the Location rested precariously upon the stability of her Kaffrarian neighbours, her own ability to appease disgruntled groups, and the unwavering support of the Thembu Agent. The Cattle-Killing episode was to show how weak these foundations were.

This tragic event, at one time referred to as the "National Suicide of the Xhosa" by the neighbouring tribes, originated in British Kaffraria where a number of prophets had become active in the 1850's. The most influential of these prophets was a young girl, Nongqawuse who was assisted by her uncle Mhlakaza.¹⁷ Common to all the prophesies was the promise of a coming millenium provided that all cattle would be

killed and all crops destroyed. Such prophecies swept through Kaffraria and adjacent chiefdoms, leaving a trail of destruction as thousands of people destroyed their property, waiting in vain from full moon to full moon for the resurrection of the dead, which event was to introduce the new era. Rumours grew in extent, and even news of the Crimean War that filtered through was distorted to suit the prophecies. It was said that the English had been defeated, that the Russians were actually black people who would come to the assistance of the tribes to drive the English into the sea, that the Russian leaders were in fact the great Xhosa prophets and leaders, Macomo, Mlanjeni and Lynx - who had been resurrected and were now fighting the English.¹⁸ As the movement gained a pathological momentum of its own,¹⁹ even those chiefs who did not believe the prophets were unable to restrain their people. It was estimated that when eventually 21 February 1857 - the final date set aside for the fulfillment of the prophecies - passed uneventfully, eighty five percent of the Xhosa people had responded to the call and that two-thirds of all their cattle were killed.²⁰

There is no mono-causal explanation for the Cattle-Killing. With Sir George Grey's policy of civilization and westernization that struck at the heart of tribal traditions,²¹ with the chiefs desperately experiencing their loss of authority, with people demoralized after having lost eight major wars, with the last symbol of their pride - their cattle - being wiped out by the devastating lungsickness²² which sowed havoc in 1855, with crops destroyed by blight and drought, with all these problems and no possible solution in sight, many theories can be mooted as to why the Xhosa people were driven to these suicidal

acts. Monica Wilson saw it as a pagan reaction to the imposition of a foreign culture; a spontaneous movement not instigated by one person.²³ J.B. Peires believes that lung-sickness was one of the root causes. The Xhosa explanation, according to him, was that sick cattle had been contaminated by the witchcraft practices of the people, and these cattle had to be slaughtered lest they infected the pure new cattle which were about to materialize. The ban on cultivation was also associated with the destruction of old food stocks and the expected dawning of a new era.²⁴ In this connection mention can be made of incidents in the later Emigrant Thembuland when in the 1880's people started killing their pigs on a large scale. Some people then maintained that they were acting on the instructions of witchdoctors, while others said that the animals were causing a fatal disease - believed by the resident-magistrate to be measles - and that they were infecting the others.²⁵ The killing of contaminated animals may then not have been such a unique occurrence among tribesmen, but it was only under unbearable stress that it assumed fanatical proportions.²⁶

In contrast to Peires and Wilson, who, despite differences, agree that rumours about the prophecies originated within the tribal communities, there are black historians who have put forward a theory - still widely believed by the Xhosa - that the plot was designed by Sir George Grey and the missionaries who hoped to destroy Xhosa military power and make land available for white settlement.²⁷ Such theories, however, lack weight as they are not supported by any evidence linking those suspected with actual involvement.

A fourth theory, rejected by most present day historians,²⁸ is of great importance for our discussion. This theory, adhered to by Sir George Grey, suggests that the whole episode was a grand strategy of political revolt, instigated by Sarhili and worked out in conjunction with Moshoeshoe, who, when trouble in the Orange Free State was mounting, looked southward for allies. John Maclean, the Chief Commissioner for Kaffraria, maintained that the killing of cattle and the general excitement in Kaffraria reached a zenith at times when war between the Orange Free State and Moshoeshoe seemed imminent.²⁹ Charles Brownlee, the Ngqika Commissioner, believed at the time that it was a plot to enable the chiefs to force their people on the Cape Colony in a state of desperation, but thirty years later he changed his mind and confined himself to the opinion that Sarhili instigated Mhlakaza to spread the rumours.³⁰ J.C. Warner believed that the movement was directed against the white man. "The Kafir tribes", he wrote in 1856, "have become so thoroughly imbued with hatred to 'the white man', and appear resolutely determined on his destruction..."³¹ Convinced, then, that Sarhili master-minded the whole plot, Sir George Grey took punitive actions. In 1857, following rumours of the Gcaleka king's intention to invade the Cape Colony, which in view of the plight of the tribe after the Cattle-Killing could not have been well-founded, Grey ordered an expedition against him. Sarhili was expelled from the territory between the Kei and Mbashe rivers by the F.A.M.P. under Walter Currie, assisted by farmers from Queenstown. He fled into Bomvanaland where he lived for the next six years on a tract of land which he received from the chief Moni.

As we are particularly concerned with the Thembu here, we should now

examine more closely their reactions towards the Cattle-Killing, and analyze its far-reaching results on their history. Although, as we will see, there was no large-scale Thembu participation in the movement, there were those who in two frontier wars had fought against the Cape anti-^{Colony}Colonial-movements, and who could not now remain aloof. It is suggested here that the Cattle-Killing was a local pan-African movement which strove to cut right through tribal divisions and affiliations in its call to unity. But it was in effect bound to be divisive.³² It divided the Xhosa people, and it divided the Thembu. It was crucial because the killing of cattle, the breaking of tools and pots, the destruction of seed - all ritual acts - were overt acts by which a man's allegiance to the movement was openly declared. Discreet and diplomatic equivocation was no longer possible. Therefore those Thembu who adhered to the prophecies, by implication rejected the authority of their chiefs who opposed the cattle-killing movement.

The Mbashe Thembu found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Hitherto they had experienced none of the socio-political changes that had had such a disruptive effect upon the Kaffrarian tribes. Participation in a destructive movement would have had little meaning.³³ On the other hand overt neutrality could have been risky in the extreme. Rumours were rife that Sarhili had been trying, either by persuasion or by threats, to win the Thembu over to his side. In 1856 a certain Fabu - a rather shadowy figure, though described in official sources as an influential chief - returned to Thembuland after having visited Gcalekaland allegedly on the invitation of Sarhili who promised to show him the people who had arisen from the dead. He brought with him

a message from the Paramount which promised victory over the "white things" (the English) as soon as all cattle were slaughtered, and called for the peaceful unification of all the black tribes.³⁴ From other sources came news of an alliance between Sarhili and the mighty Moshoeshoe, hitherto the only black chief who had succeeded in defeating a British army.³⁵ Joyi certainly realized that should the rumoured war on the Colony take place with the Gcaleka and the Sotho in ^{alliance} alignment, it would be necessary for the Thembu to redefine their allegiances. He therefore sent conciliatory messages to Gcalekaland. Sarhili's reply was that the river was not broad, it might be crossed without difficulty. At the same time he warned that the Thembu would not escape the general destruction if they disobeyed the prophet.³⁶ But in the end these ventures made little headway. It could be that Joyi was not interested in promoting what seemed to be a Gcaleka scheme in which the Thembu were likely to be an inferior partner.

Tradition has it that Joyi informed Sarhili that he would take part in the movement provided a prophet from among his own people would tell him to do so. Joyi may also have considered the possibility that the Sotho-Gcaleka alliance might fail, the white man might emerge victorious and the Thembu, through their participation might then have lost a valuable ally. Furthermore, should they refrain from killing their cattle, and the movement did fail, they would have a great advantage over the impoverished tribes. Whatever the reason for his non-participation, Joyi was one of the chiefs who succeeded in restraining his people from taking the road to self-destruction.

In the Location, conditions were less favourable. By the beginning of

1857 Nonesi had to admit that she could no longer restrain her people from yielding to external pressures. While Warner adhered to the opinion that, being a woman, she was regarded by her people as a mere cipher,³⁷ she blamed all the trouble on the weak administrative system, which forced her to cajole her people at a time when swift and effective action was necessary. In the end both Nonesi and Warner had to admit having lost control over the Location, and they realized that it was only by recognizing the authority of the Mbashe regent that trouble could be averted. As nothing came of the intended reconciliation between Joyi and Sarhili, the way was clear for Nonesi to invite Joyi to the Location. His visit showed that despite all their divisions, the Thembu were still united in their loyalty to a monarchy in which undisputed authority was vested. A favourable reaction began almost immediately, and by the time the killing of cattle came to an end about 2000 Thembu had lost their lives - a relatively low figure.³⁸

But long after the movement had died down, echoes of the prophecy in distorted form were still to be heard. The hesitancy of farmers to risk adding to the crisis by taking action against famished marauders was exploited by those leaders who participated in the killing, foremost amongst whom was Fadana.³⁹ In the following months he and the Ndungwana chief, Quesha, in conjunction with some of Sarhili's Gcaleka undertook extensive raids into the Albert and Queenstown districts, causing trouble in the Location. Not only did they attack Quesha's grandson, the loyal Ndarala, but they allegedly threatened to kill Warner. Many Thembu fled to nearby farms for protection. The episode came to an end when the two chiefs were captured in 1858 with

the aid of Nonesi and other loyal Thembu, many of whom were followers of Ndarala. Quesha was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and Fadana to seven. Sir George Grey's conviction that Sarhili was also a leading spirit in these raids strengthened him in his decision to expel this chief from his lands.

The Thembu had emerged numerically as the strongest border tribe. Their main enemy, the Gcaleka, had suffered a reduction in numbers which had rendered them, for the time being, militarily inferior, and they were deprived of Sarhili's strong leadership. The need for Colonial protection, hitherto the cornerstone of the Thembu-Cape relationship, had consequently lost its urgency. From a Cape Colonial point of view the once trusted allies became potential enemies. The resident-magistrate of Queenstown, G. Shepstone, warned that "the kaffir tribes to some extent look upon the Tambookie in the Queenstown district as the nucleus on which to build further resistance."⁴⁰

Clearly then, the relationship between the Thembu Location and the Cape Colony could collapse under provocation and this danger underlined the untenable way in which Thembu affairs were managed. The Colonial Government found itself in a dilemma. It was believed that for the sake of peace, firmer control over the chiefdoms had become imperative. Sir Harry's much criticized annexation of Thembu territory would have to be carried to its logical conclusion, and Colonial rule be extended over the Location. But such a step was sure to estrange those chiefs who had hitherto remained loyal. The introduction of Colonial law was thus hardly a recipe for peace. It

was under these circumstances that Warner first proposed an emigration scheme that would not only, so he hoped, solve the Location problem, but would also deal with the danger that loomed largely in official minds - the possible return of Sarhili to reclaim his lost lands. Warner suggested that the full implications of the introduction of Colonial law should be explained to the chiefs, and should they object, they were to be offered part of Sarhili's lands⁴¹ where they could govern themselves according to their own laws and customs. The emigration suggestion was not favourably received at the time. Sir Richard Southey thought such a step unwise as it could lead to the reunification of the two Thembu sections.⁴²

Warner's suggestion to have Cape laws in modified form introduced in the Location was based on assumptions which later proved to be unsound. One such assumption was that after the Cattle-Killing the chiefs were more humble and ready to submit to Cape rule. Another was that the Nongqawuse delusion had finally destroyed the feelings of veneration which the Thembu had developed for their chiefs.⁴³

Convinced that his assumptions were correct, he claimed divine approval for the implementation in the Location of Sir George Grey's policy of westernization: "The Kafir tribes now...have so resolutely and perseveringly refused to give to the Gospel even an attentive hearing, it seems to me that the way on which they themselves are so obstinately bent is the one which God will make use of to bring about this desirable object; and that the sword must first - not exterminate them, but break them up as tribes, and destroy their political existence, after which...civilization and Christianity will

no doubt make rapid progress among them."⁴⁴ Of his own accord Warner now assumed the title of "Head of the House of Ngubengcuka,"⁴⁵ in which capacity it became easy to rule autocratically under the guise of paternalistic concern. His recommendations of 1858, aimed firstly at the compensating of "well-disposed chiefs", and secondly, at weakening their authority to a point where they would become mere puppets.⁴⁶ Chiefs were appointed and dismissed as he saw fit, the object being to cultivate collaborators who could contribute towards the maintenance of law and order. Lineage claims were not infrequently disregarded in the appointment of so-called "first class chiefs" - those who had traditional rights to chieftaincy - while the appointment of "second class chiefs" rested upon favouritism. An example here, is that of Petrus Mahonga. Although related to chief Tyopo, he himself did not rank as chief, but, in recognition of his services during the Cattle-Killing, was made a "second class" chief.⁴⁷

Nonesi was the first to feel the full brunt of Warner's new policy. Up to 1857 he had tacitly made allowance for her disregard of the 1853 settlements, the aim of which was to prevent the Location from coming under her sole influence. Although she was still recognized as "Paramount of all the Location Thembu", there was now a contradiction between this recognition of her paramountcy and the firmness with which Warner, for the first time since 1853, insisted that the people should keep within the limits of their respective locations. Nonesi certainly would have grasped something of the irony of the situation. For nearly a decade she was "Nonesi the Faithful". She restrained her people from participating in the cattle-killing and she was instrumental - even though she might have acted in her own interest -

in crushing the Quesha and Fadana rebellions in 1859. Now, she found herself in exactly the same position as the Kaffrarian chiefs who had for years desperately struggled against the power of the white man. Thus ended her long history of friendship with the Cape Colony. Although she was not in a position to offer effective resistance, she managed to get up a strong party to oppose Warner and to insist upon the several locations being placed once again under her sole authority.⁴⁸ Her efforts failed, but Warner was acutely aware of increasing restlessness in the Location, especially among the Hala. Their dissatisfaction became manifest in increasing reluctance on the part of the chiefs to submit to Warner's decisions in cases of cattle lifting, and he noted that, incidentally, the malcontents were those whose lands bordered on the locations of the chiefs Anta and Sandile in British Kaffraria. This, coupled with the fact that the Thembu could boast a thousand warriors, contributed to an obsessive white fear of a combined attack by hostile chiefs.

Discontent among the Location dwellers at the time resulted not only from official interference in tribal affairs and from the conflicting interests of the Location Thembu and neighbouring white farmers, but also from social and economic changes that were taking place within the tribal structure. Warner suggested that the Thembu were passing through a transitional stage when old social, political and religious customs were falling away, leaving both the chiefs and the common people in a state of uncertainty. This view, however, is not altogether correct, as there was never a complete transformation from traditional to westernized society. It would be more accurate to say that the inhabitants of the Location were passing through a period of

instability since many of the new modes of adjustment to white contact struck at the very pillars on which the traditional society was founded.

It is difficult to determine exactly to what degree acculturation to western norms had taken place by 1865, but we can reasonably expect that four decades of close contact with Europeans would have had considerable influence on the traditional way of life. The long periods spent in the service of white farmers (in some cases up to twenty years), the accumulation of wealth during periods of farm labour,⁴⁹ the expansion of missionary activities and the need for readjustment to new experiences thrust upon them during the governorship of Sir George Grey - all these would have been strong inducements for the acceptance of European standards. It could be argued that the application of Sir George Grey's policy of "civilization" was then only a recent development, but comparative studies indicate that length of exposure is not necessarily a determining factor in an acculturation process. Melville Herskovits, who studied changing cultural patterns in Africa, concludes that "just as culture, being learned, makes cultural learning a matter of opportunity and not of generation, so learning the ways of another culture depends on motivation and not on antecedent tradition... complex forces making for cultural readjustment, the factor of the length of exposure should not be given undue importance."⁵⁰ Although the acceptance of western standards did not happen on a revolutionary scale, the white impact became more and more marked. In his report of 1864, Warner mentioned that many Thembu were anxious to adopt "civilized habits".⁵¹ There were, he said, already a large

number who could read and write perfectly.⁵² By 1865 about 200 men were granted certificates of citizenship of the Cape, chiefly on account of what was then termed, 'civilization'.⁵³

The most conspicuous aspect of westernization was to be found in the conversion to the white man's concept of money and private property. The acquisition of large flocks of woolled sheep and valuable herds of cattle, as well as an inclination to invest money in land - even paying up to £1,500 for a farm,⁵⁴ all these developments indicated a new approach: the number of cattle was ceasing to be the sole determinant of a man's wealth. It follows that where such changes took place in a traditional society, characterized by the close relationship between land tenure and tribal authority, not only the system of authority, but also the whole social pattern of the chiefdom, would be subjected to strains.⁵⁵

Private ownership brought into question factors such as inheritance, which were incompatible with the traditional marriage system,⁵⁶ and it was in this respect that the difference between the so-called civilized and the uncivilized classes became most marked. While the westernized, and more particularly the Christianized woman, would have welcomed the legalization of the Christian marriage since it would have afforded both herself and her children protection, the undermining of the traditional marriage system, linked as it was with concepts such as polygamy, lobola, division of labour - all of them crucial in upholding the existing social pattern - was resented by those who still adhered to traditional laws. It became impossible to reconcile Christian and non-Christian practices within the same

administrative system.

Warner alleged that Sir Harry Smith had, in 1848, prohibited the "buying and selling of wives",⁵⁷ but it would seem that Warner, not infrequently, was inclined to put his own interpretation on laws, and he was not following official instructions when, in certain cases, he refused to recognize traditional marriages. Such mishandling of matrimonial matters was yet another example of administrative clumsiness in dealing with sensitive issues. In 1863 Warner, reacting to a government circular concerning passes and marriages, asked in desperation: "What does the government mean by marriage?"⁵⁸ Confusion further arose from the fact that verdicts in adultery cases could depend upon whether a plaintiff was a Christian or not. In one particular letter Warner referred to a case where the plaintiff - a man converted to Christianity who had taken a second wife - claimed compensation from another man who had committed adultery with the plaintiff's first wife. According to the arguments used by Warner, it would seem that he was of opinion that a person, on accepting the Christian faith, exercised a choice. By doing so he automatically accepted the western custom of monogamy, and had therefore, according to Warner's argument, become divorced from his first wife before remarrying. By doing so he had forfeited his common law right to his first wife, and was not entitled to compensation on the grounds of adultery. Warner's letter on this subject makes it clear that the man would have been entitled to compensation had he not been a Christian. This letter illustrates effectively that both African subject and Colonial ruler were confused by the superimposition of Colonial rule on a tribal society.⁵⁹

Women in particular were adversely affected by Warner's interference in matrimonial affairs. Many fathers in the Location looked among their kinsmen who worked on European farms, for prospective husbands for their daughters. If these daughters had been living in a tribal society, beyond the boundaries of the Location, their marriage would have been solemnized according to the usages of the particular clan to which they belonged, and they would have been given certain rights and privileges. In the Location wives married under common law, were looked upon as concubines, and they, as well as their children, had no conjugal rights. A man could therefore cast off a woman at will because no legal marriage existed between them.⁶⁰

It is important to notice that at this stage Colonial law had not been introduced in the Location, and it is once again doubtful whether in his dealings with marital affairs, Warner carried out official instructions. Sir Philip Wodehouse, who succeeded Sir George Grey in 1863, definitely discouraged any attempts to meddle with black customs. In 1862 John Maclean, then Lieutenant-Governor of British Kaffraria, sent a circular to his magistrates to the effect that, while he could not legally suppress polygamy or the lobola custom, it was advised that they should refuse any case in which cattle or other property was claimed on account of a wife leaving a husband. The Governor directed Maclean to withdraw the circular and the matter was referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Newcastle, who supported the Governor's views that official interference in black customs was highly impolitic and dangerous. He added that, by interfering in black customs, Maclean had virtually contravened the Royal Instructions which preserved the laws, customs and usages

prevailing among Africans. The power of amending such laws and providing better administration of justice among Blacks was reserved by the Crown.⁶¹ Although the administrative systems of British Kaffraria and the Location differed, there is no reason to assume that both the Governor and the Colonial Secretary would have approved of actions in the Tambookie Location while disapproving of the same steps being taken in another British dependency. This confirms the view that Warner was acting on his own, and his motives for doing so are quite clear. He had an aversion to the system of polygamy, which he regarded as one of the chief causes of stock theft. This problem became more serious in the late 1860's as the number of women from the Location who married men from outside began to increase. If a constant stream of Thembu should be allowed to enter the Colony in order to obtain cattle from white farmers, the farmers would soon object as this would increase the frequency of stock thefts. Acting once again on his own initiative, Warner now instructed that a pass had to be obtained from him before a man could take his daughter to be married to someone beyond the boundaries of the Cape Colony. He refused to comply with any such requests unless satisfactory proof could be given that the girl in question was willing to go.⁶²

Warner's radical approach towards marriages not only left many men without redress to which they were justly entitled under their own customs, but also tended to degrade women honestly married. Moreover, when cases of inheritance were brought before him, he was compelled to follow the traditional law, thereby indirectly recognizing the form of marriages which he ignored in other cases.

Wodehouse realized that the Government could not "in justice abstain much longer from recognizing in some form native marriages and inheritance resulting from them." He told Warner that he could see nothing improper in the exchange of cattle as a legalization of such a marriage."⁶³ Warner nevertheless continued to act on his own in his efforts to abolish polygamy.

It has been stressed that once customs were tampered with, the whole system of authority was affected. The chiefs found themselves ruling over people no longer bound by the same restrictions as of old. Their authority was further undermined by the constraints of the system under which they had to operate as neither their own authority, nor that of Warner - on whose support they had to rely - had the force of law. It naturally follows that unpopular measures, such as those that arose from the application of the system of collective responsibility, became increasingly difficult to impose on the people.⁶⁴ This system by which a whole village was kept responsible for the trespasses, real or alleged, of an individual member, was resented wherever it was followed, as it was open to many abuses. Warner was not blind to the disadvantages of this system, but at the same time he was convinced that the mass of Africans could not be controlled by Colonial laws, and that there was no other way of preventing cattle raiding. The more westernized people rejected a system that was both ineffective and unfair. Increasingly they turned to law agents who, either for humane reasons or for financial gain, began to interfere in the Location affairs. Such interference was bound to expose the irregular way in which Warner and the chiefs executed their judicial powers.

The fact that he was treading on thin ice in his application of the spoor system was brought home to Warner when a court case arose in 1864, following the theft of a valuable ram and ewe possessed by a certain Mr. Goddard.⁶⁵ The spoors of the animals were traced to the vicinity of Nonesi's village where they disappeared. Neither the animals nor the thieves could be found, and therefore, according to the system of collective responsibility, compensation was demanded from the village. Some of the inhabitants voluntarily clubbed together to make redress while others did so under protest. Those who lived nearest to the spoor had to pay the most. As they considered this to be unfair, they resisted the chief's orders. Convinced that they had acted on the advice of certain law agents, Warner asked for governmental support in applying the principle of collective responsibility which, he stated, was the only way "in which 30,000 barbarians could be managed". He recommended that the chiefs should be entitled to make seizures should the people refuse to pay. The Governor approved, and a month later Warner confirmed the seizure of twenty head of cattle, twenty sheep and two mares to compensate the farmer for his losses that were estimated at £107. Goddard claimed that this was still less than his actual losses. Then, in May, the actual thief was arrested and brought to trial. He pleaded guilty, but objected to the fine imposed upon him as he maintained that he had already been punished by Warner. The latter's explanation that the stock claimed from his village was not meant as punishment, but as compensation for the farmer, did not satisfy him. The people from whose village cattle had been seized also felt that since the guilty man had been brought to justice, their case should be re-examined, and they turned to a law agent for advice. The agent informed Warner that

legal action could possibly be taken against him since he had acted illegally in seizing the cattle. The agent argued that in terms of the Cape laws the Governor's approval of the chiefs' seizure of cattle carried no weight, as such seizures could take place on instruction of Warner who in turn could only act on the direct instructions of the Governor. This argument exposed the dangerous situation that had arisen. Should it happen that the Governor lose one case, it could be the signal for the opening up of every single case since 1848. There is no evidence of any court cases brought against Warner, but he was cautioned, in a private conversation, by Judge Watermeyer that even if the system of management applied in the Location was effective, it was completely illegal, and should therefore either be abolished or legalized by an act of parliament. Acting on the judge's advice, Warner again urgently requested the legalization of the system of collective responsibility under which the Thembu themselves had become a police force to be reckoned with.

Three matters had now become clear. First, it had become impossible for the Thembu Agent to operate under an illegal system. Secondly, there was no effective way of reconciling traditional Thembu and western customs within one administrative system. Thirdly, and most important, should Cape law be imposed, it would mean that the Thembu, who had always been allies of the Colony, would be brought, against their will, under Colonial control. This the chiefs would resist with all their might. There seemed to be only one solution and that was to revert to the abortive 1858 plan of a Thembu settlement across the Indwe river. Such a plan had the whole-hearted support of the European farmers in the adjacent Albert and Wodehouse

districts, who coveted Thembu lands.⁶⁶

The Albert district had hitherto been in part a transit camp, in part the territorial outlet for farmers in need of cheap lands. As the district became more prosperous and the value of property rose, it could no longer provide its growing population with cheap land. Eastward expansion was hampered by the San: hence the increasing number of farmers who coveted the green pastures of the Location.⁶⁷ Over the years white farmers had ignored the boundaries: and the Location had hardly been proclaimed when squatters, in defiance of the Government, settled on de facto Thembu lands. They were probably encouraged to do so by the presence of farmers, illegal and legal, who had already been living in the Location at the time of its inception. Illegal squatting on Maphasa's lands had, in fact, been going on since 1849. The farmers had regarded uncultivated land there as waste land. An order by the civil commissioner, Shepstone, to evacuate these lands was evaded by the farmers, who cleverly bribed the people with gifts of blankets and tobacco, to "invite" them to stay on their lands despite the chiefs' prohibitions.⁶⁸

The farmers who were legally living in the Location were there as a result of an oversight by Cathcart. Having been ill-informed about the Smith Settlements of 1848,⁶⁹ the Governor had extended the boundaries of the Location to include farmers who had been given land south of the Stormberg. These farmers were as disinclined as were the squatters, to move. The Government, despite former promises that they would support the Thembu in keeping their lands clear of white settlers, remained silent, and indignant chiefs demanded an explana-

tion from the civil commissioner. A deputation led by chief Tyopo who acted as Nonesi's chief councillor, wanted to know whether the Government merely connived at intrusions on the Theodorus Rand area, or whether they were incompetent in controlling their own people.⁷⁰ The truth was that the Government had no intention of diminishing the white population; in fact officials were recommending exactly the opposite. Concerned about the increase in the Thembu population after the Cattle-Killing, Shepstone recommended in 1859 that the lands east of the Location, formerly occupied by Sarhili and Fadana, should be settled by white farmers in sufficient numbers to be able to defend themselves. He argued that these fertile lands could be divided into 500 farms, supporting at least 1000 to 1500 men, "sufficient to overawe the Tambookies when combined with the Queenstown force."⁷¹

While there was, from a Colonial point of view, justification for the settlement of Europeans on the lands from which Sarhili had been expelled as punishment, no case could be made out for the occupation of the so-called Fadana's lands between the Umgwali and the Indwe rivers. These lands, to which the ex-regent retreated when Mtirara became king, were included by Cathcart in 1853 in that part of the Location allocated to Nonesi, and were, in fact, transferred to her. White farmers, either ignorant of Cathcart's settlements, or out of indifference, disregarded Nonesi's authority over the Fadana lands, and, claiming that the chief had forfeited his rights in consequence of his participation in the war of 1858 and his imprisonment, petitioned for possession of these lands. Shepstone's suggestion as to their redistribution among white farmers, was not carried out at the time; nor did the Government take steps either to declare the

lands legally forfeited or to annex them to the Colony. Conflicting grazing right claims by white and Thembu farmers created tension, especially when Thembu cattle trespassing on lands claimed by white farmers, were impounded. Warner watched these irregular procedures with dismay and he warned the farmers that should a court case arise, matters would be decided in favour of the Thembu. He emphasised that the lands should either be restored to the Thembu or legally be declared forfeited, and annexed to the Colony. A formal annexation was not carried out, nor were the farmers removed, and during a locust plague Hemming allowed more farmers to settle there. For all practical purposes the Thembu had been robbed of their lands. Annoyed by their land-losses, they retaliated with cattle raids.⁷² In turn, white farmers, notably those from the Albert district, renewed their attempts to have the Thembu evicted from the Location. The desire for land was certainly the reason for such appeals, but in pressing for the eviction, they maintained that the Thembu posed a threat to the stability of the area. They argued that, in consequence of their numerical superiority, the Thembu could play a dominant role in any black alliance against the Colony. Fear of such an alliance had come to dominate the minds of farmers and frontier officials. Tension was augmented by the increase in the number of black farmers who, by the acquisition of individual property, would be in a position to claim the right to vote.⁷³

We can understand why white attempts to evict the Thembu became absolutely pivotal in the history of the Location. The years between 1865 and 1885 witnessed various resettlement schemes, the first and most important of which was the Emigration of 1865.

1. See Map 2.
2. Correspondence of General Sir George Cathcart: Cathcart-Earl Grey, p.216.
3. As a named concept, indirect rule was the invention of Frederick Lugard, who was appointed High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Nigeria in 1900 where he vigorously introduced this system. Lugard described indirect rule as government through the chief. It was basic in his thinking, though clearly not in those of people like Warner, that the traditional local government of the people should be modernised.
4. For discussion of Nonesi's position see pp.51-2.
5. J. Backhouse, p.203.
6. Stanford Papers, D10: E.J. Warner's Manuscript. Such stories were not unprecedented in the annals of other missionaries.
7. J.C. Warner-R. Godlonton, Private Letter, Lesseyton, 30 January '50. Ms 19, Reel 1. (Cory Library). Godlonton, the editor of the GTJ described Warner in a letter to Southey, as being in "ill health and great lowness of spirit". See SP: Godlonton-Southey, 29 June '50.
8. See p.19.
9. Cumming Papers: Warner-Cumming 10 September '50. This letter was typical of Warner. He wrote to Cumming: "I am now making preparations for this unthankful task. I fully expect to become a marked man by the Government and have plenty of odium heaped on me by my fellow Colonists; But, as all their friends seem to have forsaken them, the task of defending these shamefully oppressed Aborigines of South Africa, is apparently left to me alone. And be the consequence to myself what they may be, I am determined to do all I can." (Warner's emphasis) See also D. Williams: Missionaries of the Eastern Frontier 11, p.537.
10. Cathcart Correspondence: pp.211-243. The names of the signatories are not printed here, but Cathcart, in his reply, referred to Warner's signature.
11. GTJ 19 May '71, The Queenstown Elections. Warner was elected as M.L.A. for Queenstown. He died on his way to Cape Town for his first session.
12. Commission of Native Affairs, 1865: Warner's evidence, 11 February '65, p.68.
13. Cape of Good Hope Annexures, 1858: E. Warner-R. Southey 6 April '58, p.65.
14. Government Gazette, no 2715: 9 May '56.

15. Cape Commission of Native Affairs, 1865 Q677: Warner's Evidence, p.68.
16. Cape of Good Hope Annexures, 1858: p.65.
17. Nongqawuse lived under direct control of Sarhili. For an authentic account of her story see J.B. Peires: The Central Beliefs in Xhosa Cattle-Killing in J.A.H., Vol. 28, 1987 (1).
18. BPP.2202-'57: State of the Kafir Tribes, J. Reeves, Magistrate to Khama-J. Maclean 7 March '56, p.16.
19. E. Wagenaar: Settlements, pp.185-188.
20. J. Peires: "Soft" Believers and "Hard" Unbelievers in the Xhosa Cattle-Killing in J.A.H., Vol 27, 1986 (3).
21. Sir George Grey's policy was aimed at the westernization and detribalization of the border tribes. Reduced to its simplest elements it meant the provision of schools and hospitals and the provision of employment opportunities. He encouraged the foundation of villages under supervision of headmen and the limitation of the power of the chiefs.
22. For the extent and effects of this disease see J. Peires: Unbelievers in J.A.H., Vol 27, 1986 (3).
23. Oxford History: p.285.
24. J. Peires: The Late, Great Plot, The Official Delusions Concerning the Cattle-Killing, (Typescript Lecture) (3).
25. CMT.1/42: R.M. St. Marks - CMT., 24 October '89.
26. See E. Wagenaar: Settlements, p.186. It is suggested here that the Cattle-Killing must not be viewed in isolation. Through the ages people under stress have committed absurdities in the hope of bringing about a Millenium. Norman Cohn in The Pursuit of the Millenium, p.313, explained such reactions as follows: "It may be that the social and economic horizons expand too rapidly...It may be that traditional groups, especially kinship groups, disintegrate to the point where many individuals find themselves deprived of...material and emotional support to which they had been accustomed,...It may be that society as a whole is deprived of its status and independence and forced into humiliating subjection...Finally, it may happen that contact with alien cultures shakes assumptions which are essential to the accepted view of the world and which for that very reason had remained unquestioned." The striking resemblance between such conditions and those that existed in Kaffraria after 1854 cannot be overlooked.
27. N. Majeke: The Role of the Missionary in Conquest, p.73.
28. See especially J. Peires: The Late, Great Plot; Oxford History:

- p.299; J.S. Bergh: Die Lewe van Charles Pacalt Brownlee tot 1857 (AYB. 1981), p.551.
29. BPP.2202-'57: Grey-Labouchere, 30 April '56, p.31; Ibid: 2352 - '57 Grey-Labouchere, 27 September '57, pp.25-27; J.W. Sauer-G. Theal: Basutoland Records ii (Struik ed.) pp.230-232, 267-277; GH.8/31: Letters received from the Chief Commissioner, J. Maclean-Sir G. Grey, 20 March '57, (enclos. 417 of 20 March '57), n.p. For Maclean see footnote Appendix VI. See also Peires: The Late Great Plot, for a discussion of Maclean and Grey who he accuses of having manipulated information for their own purposes.
 30. C. Brownlee: Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History, p.153.
 31. J. Maclean: Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, Warner's notes, p.112.
 32. See Peires: "Soft" Believers and "Hard" Unbelievers.
 33. This raises the questions as to Peires's Lungsickness theory. If lungsickness was the prime cause then certainly the Mbashe Thembu would have been more amenable to the prophecies.
 34. BPP.2352-'57 Enclos. 3 in no 15: Communications of Chief Tzatzoe to Maclean, 15 October '56, p.51. Even taking into account that the Grey-Maclean Despatches must be treated with circumspection, as Peires has shown in the "The Late Great Plot", the recurrence of rumours from various sources, would indicate that there was a possibility of a Gcaleka-Sotho alliance which alarmed the Thembu. It is difficult to understand the origin of such rumours, had they been completely unfounded.
 35. Ibid: See also Warner-Grey, 9 January '57, p.53. Thembu from Basutoland told their relatives in the Location that in Moshoeshoe's country all prophecies had been fulfilled, the earth had been removed and the dead had arisen.
 36. Ibid. See Sir George Grey-Earl Grey, enclos. in no 9, Warner-Shepstone, 23 September '56, pp.31, 32.
 37. This contradicts Warner's later allegations against Nonesi, which, if they were true, would have shown her to be a formidable woman. See pp.102-8.
 38. CPP.G6-'57: Warner-Southey, 9 December '57, p.203.
 39. LG.410: Warner-Southey, 14 July '57.
 40. CO.2978: G. Shepstone-Rawson, 23 February '59.
 41. CPP.A40'58: Communications from Agent with the Tambookies, Warner-Southey, 6 April '58.
 42. CPP.A40-'58: enclos. 4 in no 59, Southey's Memorandum, p. 86.

43. CPP.A40-'58: Communication from Agent with the Tambookies, 19 January '58. In 1855 Warner still believed that the Thembu could not be ruled in any other way than through their chiefs. After the Cattle-Killing he wrote: "Providence has interfered on their side and now the sooner they be brought under colonial control, the better."
44. Warner's notes in Compendium of Kafir Laws, p.112.
45. He often referred to himself in this way. This was clearly following Shepstone's example of supreme chief. See CPP.A40-'58: Copies of Communications from the Agent with the Tambookies, pp.615-617.
46. Ibid.
47. The terms "first" and "second class" chiefs were used by Warner, but there is no evidence that it became official terminology. For Warner's recommendations re the appointment of first and second class chiefs see CPP.G6-'57: Warner-Southey, 9 December '57, pp.203-205.
48. GH.8/4: Warner-Southey, 4 October '59.
49. See p.36.
50. M.T. Herskovits: The Human Factor In Changing Africa, p.82.
51. Commission on Native Affairs: Warner's Evidence, 10 February '65, p.68. Certificate of Citizenship were issued to the Mfengu. By Act 24 of 1857 all Mfengu who resided within the Cape Colony were granted "Certificates of Citizenship" by which they were exempted from the Pass Laws. Article 11 of the Act made provision for the granting of such certificates to "any Tambookie or other person belonging to any kindred race, settled and domiciled in the Cape Colony." (See Cape of Good Hope Statutes, Act 24 of 1857. The conditions on which such certificates were to be issued are not subscribed in any of the Acts dealing with this matter.)
52. CO.3076: Tambookie Agent's Report, 1 January '66.
53. It would seem that the granting of certificates of citizenship on grounds of civilization was arbitrarily awarded by officials.
54. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 19 August '63.
55. For further discussion of this, see p.68.
56. For traditional laws of marriage and inheritance see Warner's remarks in Maclean: Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, pp. 70-75; CPP. G4-'83, Appendix B, p.18.
57. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 19 August '63.

58. Ibid: 5 November '63.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid: 5 November '63.
61. A.E. du Toit: The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy With Special Reference to the years 1854-1865 (AYB 1954) p.165.
62. CO.3062: Warner-Southey 5 November '63.
63. Ibid.
64. For the introduction and application of this system of recovering stolen cattle, originally known as the Spoor System, see MacMillan: Bantu, Boer and Britain, pp. 77-79; 98-105; 263-75: 82 ff.
65. CO.3075: 13 May '64 and letter included in cover letter, Warner-Col. Sec., n.d.
66. See L.C. Duly: British Land Policy at the Cape 1795-1844, for a reassessment of factors that encouraged white expansionism in the 19th century.
67. LG.592: Papers Relative to squatting in the Tambookie Reserve, W. Shepstone-Major Hope, 6 February '56; pp.189-98. See also memo. enclosed in cover letter. See also Wagenaar: Settlements, p.182.
68. LG.592: Papers Relative to Squatting in the Tambookie Reserve, W. Shepstone-Major Hope, 6 February '53.
69. See pp.24-5.
70. LG.592: W. Shepstone-Major Hope, 6 February '56, pp 168-184.
71. CO.2978: W. Shepstone-Rawson, 23 February '59.
72. BPP.1969-'55: Sir George Grey-Earl Grey, 22 December '84, p.37.
73. In the late 1860's black voters did not constitute a significant percentage of the total black population, but white fears were not without foundation. In 1882 there were, in the Queenstown constituency 2,080 voters on the voters role of which 220 were black. In 1886 the number of black voters had risen to 1,770 out of a population of 3,769. See J.L. McCracken: The Cape Parliament 1854-1910, p.80. See also p.69.

Chapter 3

The Emigration: Territorial Consolidations vs. Political Fragmentation

A swelling black population; the stratification of Thembu society; the collapse of the traditional Thembu-European alliance; inter-faction rivalries; administrative problems arising from attempts to reconcile within the same system traditional and western customs, and the desire of white farmers to obtain fertile Thembu lands - all these factors had nullified Cathcart's hopes of bringing stability to the north-eastern frontier by the inclusion of the western Thembu within the boundaries of the Colony. No wonder that, soon after the demarcation of the Location, the Cape Government and its officials were already beginning to suspect what a Transkeian magistrate said bluntly many years later:

"It is a great pity that the Glen Grey district exists at all. It is a pity that the natives were not removed from the district."¹

Warner's suggestions of 1858² which, amongst others, made provision for the resettlement of the Location Thembu on Sarhili's old lands must be seen against a background of the general disillusionment with what was meant to be a grand scheme for the pacification of Black and White. At first there was little enthusiasm for Warner's proposals in Cape Town, mainly as a result of Richard Southey's attitude, but the final word on resettlement had not been spoken. Negotiations between J.C. Warner and the chiefs, notably Nonesi, continued throughout 1860. Warner obviously impressed upon Nonesi the consequences of the pending

introduction of Cape rule in the location, to which Nonesi reacted by saying that rather than to submit to the Cape courts, she and her people would remove themselves beyond the Kei where her chieftainship could be preserved.³ It was, however, only after the arrival of Sir Philip Wodehouse in January 1862 as Governor and High Commissioner that the matter was given serious consideration.

The new governor was an ardent imperialist who believed in the extension of British rule beyond the Kei as a way in which to preserve the peace, protect the black people from domination by the whites, and fulfill the civilizing mission of the British Empire in which he believed so fervently. Therefore, when confronted on his arrival by the unresolved problems surrounding British Kaffraria and the lands evacuated by Sarhili,⁴ he envisaged the extension of British rule over the whole of the Transkei with the exception of Pondoland. Similar suggestions had earlier been made by his popular predecessor Sir George Grey, who had thereby raised the hope of land hungry farmers to obtain cheap farms. Unfortunately for Sir Philip, the time was unsuitable for such grandiose schemes, as his arrival coincided with a particularly lugubrious period in the history of the Cape Colony. A trade depression, viticultural diseases, a prolonged drought and a severe economic recession, all these had greatly sapped the economy. While reports of black unrest reached his office almost daily, the Governor not only had to face a deficit budget, but he also had to satisfy the Home Government, whose declared policy it had become since the 1850's to cut expenditure and to reduce military commitments in South Africa.⁵ This implied that Whitehall would only be willing to support Wodehouse's plans for the colonization of the Transkei should

this not mean an increase in the cost of defence.

Wodehouse pinned his hopes upon the incorporation of British Kaffraria into the Cape Colony as the way least costly to the British treasury of preserving the peace. The rationale behind such thinking was that since British Kaffraria was created to protect the Cape Colonial frontier, it was the duty of the Cape to take it over.⁶ The British treasury would then be relieved of the cost of the defence of *British* Kaffraria which, ever since its proclamation in 1847, had been considered to be a military risk of which Britain was eager to rid herself. Moreover, Sir Philip would be able to embark upon his Transkeian experiment. The Governor was greatly encouraged in his plans by what he considered to be his successful dealings with Sarhili. Acting on instructions from Whitehall, shortly after his arrival, to move Sarhili into a tract of country sufficient for the needs of his people, Wodehouse sent Walter Currie, commander of the F.A.M.P., to settle the boundaries of Sarhili's location. The latter readily agreed to an offer already made the previous year to settle east of the Mtatha river, and he was willing to accept a magistrate. The Thembu regent, Joyi, also asked to come under control of a British magistrate. It was now a matter of urgency to settle Sarhili's evacuated lands as quickly as possible in order to thwart any attempts by him to take repossession. Meanwhile Wodehouse had already received almost a thousand applications for lands in this forfeited area.⁷

At this juncture the Thembu in the Location once again entered the scene. As part of his Transkeian scheme the Governor envisaged a land

deal whereby the Thembu would evacuate the Location in exchange for part of Sarhili's former land between the Tsomo and the Indwe rivers. With this he possibly had a dual purpose in mind: to satisfy European demands for farms in the fertile Location and to provide a buffer of loyal blacks on the border of the Colony.⁸ Sir Philip visited the Location early in 1864, and, after negotiations with the principal chiefs,⁹ J.C. Warner was sent to finalize matters. On the 8th of April Warner could report that meetings had been held at which the chiefs unanimously consented to move into a tract of land, the boundaries of which were laid down by themselves. They further demanded that the country should be secured to them, only to be forfeited in case of war, and their independence was to be guaranteed as far as this was consistent with humanity and the paramount authority of the Queen. Another condition was that their stipends should be continued and that they were to enjoy all privileges which up to then they had possessed. In conclusion they asked that the removal should take place as soon as possible as they were desirous of building their homesteads before the winter set in, and they wished to be settled on their new lands by the beginning of August in order to take advantage of the cultivating season.¹⁰ The chiefs, in fact, asked for a considerably larger portion of territory than the Governor had had in mind,¹¹ and he was not prepared to purchase the Location at so dear a rate. Sir Philip's counter-proposal of granting the Thembu all the territory east of the Tsomo - a piece of land about one-third in size of the later Emigrant Thembuland¹² in return for the Location, was also rejected by the chiefs.¹³ The question of Sarhili's evacuated lands thus remained unresolved.

In the following months a settlement with regard to these lands became a matter of urgency. Sarhili was beginning to show greater determination to return, and there was strong suspicion that he was in communication with Moshoeshoe, with whom, it seemed at times, the Afrikaners of the Orange Free State were engaged in a losing battle.

From a Colonial perspective the ideal solution to all these problems still seemed to be the large scale colonization of the Transkeian territories with the exception of Pondoland, but Sir Philip was left in no doubt as to Whitehall's feelings on such a venture. "You must understand", Cardwell had already informed him in 1863, "that the paramount object of Her Majesty's Government is not to obtain extension of territory, but only to secure that frontier which is most likely to be tranquil or would in case of disturbance be most easily defended".¹⁴ Under these circumstances he gave serious consideration to the annexation of British Kaffraria, but his bill for its incorporation was refused by the Cape Parliament. The Governor now faced a series of crises. First, there were the financial difficulties in Kaffraria. Secondly, there was the increasing power of the black chiefdoms from Moshoeshoe in the north-east to Sandile in the east. Thirdly, there were the large masses of Africans in the Cape who had to be controlled. Lastly, and perhaps most important, there was Sarhili who, from beyond the Mbashe, was as much a factor on the frontier as if he had been physically there. In May 1864, for instance, the frontier was thrown into a state of panic by rumours that he was preparing to cross the Mbashe. Walter Currie,¹⁵ who hurried to the frontier, strongly advised an attack on him. Frontier officials were, however, by no means unanimous in their condemnation

of Sarhili. There were even suspicions that Currie instigated the rumours so as to give himself the opportunity of driving Sarhili beyond the Mtatha, thereby clearing a large area for white settlement.¹⁶ Although Currie did not receive sanction for a punitive expedition, Cape officials feared that rumours could be the precursors to real problems.

From a distance the Governor, although at the time severely criticized for his views, gauged the situation correctly. If there was to be no financial support from the Home Government to protect a white settlement in the Transkei, and if the Cape Colony was unwilling to take over the administration of British Kaffraria, thereby easing the burden of the Home treasury, then the logical step would be to pacify Sarhili, abandon all expansionist ideals and settle Africans, either Mfengu or Thembu, on at least a part of Sarhili's former lands, thereby preventing him from taking repossession of the entire area. The Governor's assessment was shared by Richard Southey, hitherto a firm opponent of a Thembu settlement in the Transkei which could serve as a bridge between the eastern and western Thembu and lead to the eventual unification of the two sections.

Meanwhile Sarhili had been sending conciliatory notes to the Governor. Warner, in his capacity as newly appointed British Resident for the Transkei, was therefore sent to the Gcaleka to negotiate the best course to be followed. His report, which emphasised the deplorable situation of the Gcaleka¹⁷ jolted the Governor into action. Dismayed frontier farmers had to accept that not only was the work of their idol, Sir George Grey, being undone and their arch-enemy allowed to

return to a part of his former lands, but Wodehouse also made it clear that the Kei was to be the limit of British sovereignty and that all imperial troops were to be withdrawn from the frontier.

Criticism of Wodehouse had been building up before his Transkeian policy had been made known, the gravamen against him having been, not undeservedly, that he tended to favour the interests of the Home Government rather than those of the Cape Colony.¹⁸ He was now faced with vociferous opposition from both white farmers and Cape politicians who used every possible means to vocalize white apprehensions. George McCall Theal, the first clerk for Native Affairs, in later years maintained that this "retrograde movement" (i.e. the abandonment of plans to extend British control over the Transkei), was believed by the vast majority of the Europeans to have been a severer blow to the prosperity of South Africa than even the abandonment of the Sovereignty ten years previously had been.¹⁹ The editor of The Kaffrarian Watchman launched a stinging attack upon the Governor: "D'Urban's policy" he wrote, "was aggressive, Andries Stockenstrom's submissive, George Grey's progressive, Philip Wodehouse's retrogressive."²⁰

His popularity with the Colonists at a low ebb, the Governor was at the same time severely criticized by the Home Government for what they considered to have been his unsatisfactory handling of the separation question.²¹ His renewed attempts in 1865 to achieve a land exchange with the Location residents might then have been an attempt to satisfy both the Home Government and the farmers - the former by strengthening the eastern frontier through the creation of a black buffer between

the Cape Colony and the Transkeian people, and the latter by making farms available in the Location. Commenting on events during this period, Theal cynically remarked that it was an attempt by the Governor to save a few planks from the wreck.²² Theal's observation certainly contained an element of truth, but the land deal was to be undertaken for far sounder reasons, of which the most important was the key role that the proposed Thembu settlement could play in Thembu-Gcaleka relationships.

The abandonment of plans for a European settlement in the Transkei left the Cape Government with a choice between what seemed to be two evils - the restoration of the whole Kei-Mbashe area to Sarhili or the settlement of Thembu and other Blacks on part of this territory. To follow the first option, thereby strengthening Sarhili's position, would, Southey argued, be hazardous in the extreme and another war in a few years' time would be certain.²³ The second choice, which could lead to the emergence of a strong united Thembu kingdom, seemed from the European point of view to be the lesser of the two evils as the whole idea of the resettlement of the Thembu was coloured by one dominant consideration: the fear of Sarhili. To stop any devious designs from his side, both Sir Philip and Richard Southey relied upon a policy of divide and rule, which aimed at the weakening of black chiefs by making use of their mutual rivalries and the fostering of their antagonistic interests. "In dealing with the natives", Sir Philip wrote to Cardwell: "we can only hope to neutralize their dislike of whites by use of their feuds among themselves."²⁴ The location of Thembu, Gcaleka and Mfengu in a restricted area could therefore be the best insurance against a coalition of tribes on the

border of the Cape Colony. The three tribes, so the Governor believed, would be jealous of each other and ready to betray each other in serious fighting.²⁵ The decision to settle the remainder of Sarhili's lands with people potentially hostile to the Gcaleka was not a device by Sir Philip to restore some of his lost credibility with the Colonists, but a move based on carefully calculated political considerations.

At the beginning of 1865 Warner was once again instructed to open up negotiations with the principal Thembu chiefs in the Location, a task which he accepted with mixed feelings. Though still broadly in favour of the land exchange, he took umbrage at having been insufficiently consulted. In later years when the flaws in the scheme became apparent, and accusations and counter-accusations were rife, he apologized for his share in promoting it by pointing out that the whole thing had been worked out beforehand by Wodehouse in conjunction with Walter Currie, and that he himself was presented with a fait accompli, so that he had to execute a plan of which he was highly critical.²⁶

Whether this was absolutely true or whether it was Warner's hypersensitivity and his almost paranoiac suspicion of his co-officials which blinded him to the fact that he had often been consulted - as Theal maintained²⁷ - is difficult to establish, the problem being our lack of authentic and unbiased evidence for this period. Our main source of information on the Emigration comes from Warner himself who kept up an almost daily correspondence with the Colonial Secretary. In addition he wrote frequently to the Governor

as well as to other officials.²⁸ Although the factual information that these letters contain is very useful, Warner was by no means an unprejudiced observer, and unfortunately there are few letters from the other two people closely associated with the movement, Walter Currie and Charles Griffith, the Resident Magistrate at Queenstown, to balance his views.

It is also difficult to get a balanced and clear idea of both Imperial and Cape policies concerning the Emigration. When asked by Sir Walter Stanford in 1884 to give his views on the subject, Theal noted that the records for that period were in great confusion as Wodehouse was in the habit of writing semi-officially to almost every official, and a portion of the correspondence had been lost.²⁹ It is therefore not surprising that officials complained about the contradictory and conflicting instructions received during this period.³⁰ Inevitably misunderstanding arose from such confusion. Wodehouse had possibly never accepted that the rejection of his 1864 proposals signalled the end of negotiations with the Thembu chiefs on the question of their emigration; hence he saw the 1865 negotiations as a continuation of those started in 1864. As far as Warner was concerned, the events of 1864 and those of 1865 were two entirely different issues.

Under the 1864 agreement, the Thembu were to have a certain part of Sarhili's lands in exchange for the Location, while the greater part of the Transkei was to be settled by Europeans and annexed to British Kaffraria under protection of the Irregular Horse. This scheme had Warner's wholehearted support, as he had always regarded the presence

of a strong, white settlement as a pre-requisite for the peaceful settlement of the Thembu in that part of the Transkei.³¹ The 1865 land deal was planned under entirely different circumstances. The plan for a white settlement had fallen through and Warner had to supervise a scheme of which he was highly critical, but despite his reservations, he was willing to give it his support. Abiding by his long-held conviction that a mass of black people could not be ruled by Colonial law, he argued that the evacuation of the Location would at least put an end to the undesirable situation of "a kingdom within a kingdom" as he described the Location.³²

Another consideration was that Warner's personal ambitions were at stake. Although his active involvement in Thembu affairs had already started in the 1830's, it was in the wars of 1846-1847 and of 1850-1853 that he rose to prominence as mediator between the Thembu rulers and the Cape Government, and during this time that he earned for himself the title of "the uncrowned king of Thembuland". He often referred to himself as Head of the House of Ngubengcuka, thereby insinuating that he had the right to interfere in Thembu household affairs.³³ It was therefore with great frustration that he worked as Thembu Agent in the Location where his influence on Thembu affairs, both within the Cape Colony and across the Kei, was inhibited by the system under which he had to operate. The 1865 efforts to resettle the Thembu, which coincided with his appointment as British Resident in the Transkei, opened new avenues along which he could channel his administrative zeal. He was now not only in a key post which he hoped would bring him autocratic powers,³⁴ but he also found himself in a position where a network of official and personal obligations

from those serving under him put him in a position of paternal control. His son, E.J. Warner, who succeeded him as Thembu Agent, was to be placed in charge of the proposed new settlement across the Indwe river (the White Kei). In the Idutywa Reserve, another son, H.B. Warner, was appointed officially as clerk to the British Resident, but in reality to act as his father's eyes and ears.³⁵ Lastly, his "adopted son", Qeya, had just been installed as the king of the Thembu.³⁶ Through him Warner hoped to gain influence over the core Thembu settlement on the Mbashe.

Warner's commitment to the emigration scheme, despite his many reservations about its practicability, is understandable. This was his great opportunity to regain the title of "uncrowned king of the Thembu", or, even better, to become a second Shepstone. With some luck on his side he could even improve upon that great administrator's game. It was with myopic optimism rather than a sense of realism that he assured the Governor at the beginning of 1865 that he foresaw no obstacles in the way of a large scale Thembu emigration. But his hopes soon evaporated. The scheme was so ill-conceived and badly planned that it had little chance of succeeding. Conflicting and contradictory instructions from Cape Town to the officials on the spot led to misunderstanding and disagreement between these officials over details. In fact, Warner differed from his superiors on almost every point.

The first point of disagreement was related to the strategies to be followed once it became clear that the majority of the Thembu, contrary to Warner's expectations, were not going to emigrate. Richard

Southey, like Wodehouse, wanted the move to be voluntary, and while they urged Warner to get the Thembu out of the Location as quickly as possible, they would not allow him to use any force. Warner, faced with the task of resettling 30,000 people, the majority of whom refused to cooperate, regarded some form of coercion as inevitable. He therefore advocated the immediate introduction of Colonial law in the Location. The chiefs, so he believed, rather than allowing the erosion of their powers by the transfer of tribal judiciary to the Cape courts, would exert themselves in getting their followers across the Indwe where they would rule according to their own customs.³⁷ Southey's hesitancy to comply with Warner's requests delayed the emigration. Many Thembu began to doubt whether Colonial law was ever going to be introduced. After all, when the Thembu Location was proclaimed in 1853 they had also been warned that this was going to happen; but now, twelve years later, the chiefs were as firmly in control as ever before.

When it became clear, by May 1865, that there was to be no mass emigration, Warner proposed more stringent measures. Among the suggestions set out in his letters of May and June 1865,³⁸ he asked that the Thembu Agent should be transferred immediately across the Indwe to the newly created Emigrant Thembuland, thereby leaving the Location residents without the go-between through whom they had access to the Government. Warner hoped that this would convince those who refused to emigrate that the Government was determined to see the plan carried out. He further recommended the use of force to ensure the total eviction of the residents. Should some be allowed to stay, he feared, many of those who had left would return and the Thembu would

get hold of land on both sides of the Indwe river. Earlier, in an attempt to protect prospective emigrants against intimidation,³⁹ Southey ordered Walter Currie's F.A.M.P. to the frontier, and he strengthened the police force at Glen Grey.⁴⁰ He now proposed the immediate occupation of any evacuated lands by these F.A.M.P.

A third suggestion set out in Warner's letters, dealt with the young Tshatshu chief Gungubelle and his 15,000 followers. Initially Gungubelle indicated his willingness to move, but the influence of the Ngqika upon this section of the Thembu had remained very strong. Part of Wodehouse's Transkeian scheme made provision for the settlement of this Xhosa tribe on lands south of the proposed Thembu settlement. Sandile first accepted the offer, but by March 1865 it became known that he had backed out, partly out of fear of Sarhili who, it was rumoured, was determined to recover his lost lands, and partly because he feared that the position of the Gcaleka paramount could be jeopardized. When the Tshatshu also refused to move, Warner feared the possible unification of Gungubelle's and Sandile's clans who were divided only by the Kei river, and he proposed stern measures to forestall such a possibility. Critical of the Government for having failed to implement the Cathcart Settlements of 1853, according to which the name and separate existence of the Tshatshu had to be forfeited,⁴¹ he now suggested that the Tshatshu should be made to understand that they had no claim to lands in the Location, and that they would have to be content with any land allocated to them by the Government should they refuse to move.

Lastly, Warner focussed attention upon the chiefs. The "praise-

worthy" ones - those who supported the move - were to receive stipends, while petty chiefs like Uglincuba, who opposed the Government, were to lose their subsidies.

Nonesi had meanwhile joined the anti-emigration faction, and her position as paramount of the Location, would have been profoundly affected by the implementation of Warner's suggestions. The latter, thoroughly disgusted with what he regarded as Nonesi's treacherous behaviour, insisted that she should be made to understand that she was not chief in her own right, but that Ngangelizwe, then still known as Qeya, was paramount and his orders were to be obeyed.⁴² Ngangelizwe was at that time, for various reasons, still a staunch supporter of the emigration movement.

Warner hoped to gain support for his suggestions by emphasising that should the land deal fail, there would not be enough land available for white farmers in the Location. But his suggestions met with a lukewarm reception in Cape Town, as had his suggestions in August 1865 which aimed at further undermining the power of the chiefs as well as restricting the movement of the Location residents by putting an end to the issuing of passes. And so all Warner's attempts to gain official sanction to coerce the Thembu into moving out of the Location failed, and merely served to highlight the accumulating divergencies between Southey and himself. As for his suggestion that everything short of physical force should be used,⁴³ Southey adhered to Wodehouse's principle of "moral persuasion". Nonesi, Southey argued, had to be made to feel, rather than be told, that she might lose her authority, and that the Tshatshu, instead of being threatened with

resettlement had subtly to be made aware of their insecure position. Warner's suggestion that well-disposed chiefs should be rewarded, drew the retort that the people had to be strengthened against the chiefs and not vice versa. Earlier in 1865 Southey had, in an entirely private letter, advised Warner that money should be spent to acquire the goodwill of influential men.⁴⁴ While Warner believed that the scheme could only succeed if all the Thembu were removed, and that those who refused to go, should run the risk of losing their land and being resettled wherever the Government preferred, Southey held diametrically opposed views. He had never expected all the Thembu to move. "I have from the first", he informed Currie, "contemplated that some Thembu would remain behind, and was prepared to treat with such as having no chief and to give them individual titles of land, of course in small quantities."⁴⁵ In a letter to Griffith he emphasised that "it was never the intention of the government to deprive of land those who elected to remain behind in the Location which they hitherto occupied".⁴⁶ The failure to reach agreement on these points left Warner without any muscle to carry out his decision. Furthermore, he had often told the chiefs that some form of Colonial control was going to be introduced, only to find there was no governmental approval for carrying this out. He consequently lost credibility with those chiefs who began to look at the emigration scheme as Warner's measure."⁴⁷ This idea was reinforced by the unfortunate relationship between Warner and Charles Griffith, the civil commissioner of Queenstown, under whose jurisdiction the Location fell. Griffith was never officially informed about the emigration of a large number of people from his district, nor did he receive any instructions as to the treatment of those who remained

behind. Offended by this treatment, he distanced himself from the move and at times sympathized with the chiefs who, he believed, had reason to feel that they were being coerced in an underhand way. Feelings between the two men were exacerbated when Southey, as a personal favour to Warner, dismissed one of Griffith's most trusted headmen, Carolus, who allegedly supported Nonesi in her opposition to the move and then went around boasting that he had beaten Warner.⁴⁸ Griffith angrily reminded Southey that since he himself, as government officer, had never been invited to any of Warner's meetings, the chiefs understandably regarded the whole scheme as Warner's, and consequently treated it with contempt. Carolus's actions were, Griffith maintained, not directed against the Government, but against Warner personally.⁴⁹ Griffith further differed from Warner in that he believed that the introduction of Colonial law, far from driving people out of the location, would be an incentive for them to stay there, since they preferred Colonial law to the arbitrary rule their chiefs.⁵⁰ He furthermore regarded the transfer of the Thembu Agent as a grave mistake which had thrown the administration of the Location into confusion. As to Warner's suggestion that he, Griffith, should be made responsible for the good government of the Location in addition to his magisterial duties, he waspishly remarked that "it was an absurdity that could only have been thought up by old Warner".⁵¹

Griffith was not the only official with whom Warner fell out; in time he became embroiled with almost every other official except his own sons.⁵² Temperamentally unfit to work with people - as he himself had on occasion admitted - he acquired a reputation of arrogance, uncooperativeness and egoistic ambition. His most severe critic was

Walter Currie. Currie was entrusted by Wodehouse with the task of settling Mfengu on a part of the Transkeian lands originally set aside for the Thembu.⁵³ The Governor had taken this decision once it became clear that a large number of Thembu were not going to move. Currie acted promptly and the Mfengu were well settled ^{while} long before Warner was still trying desperately to persuade the Thembu to move.

Major Charles Cobbe was put in charge of the Mfengu Settlement. Warner resented both the presence of Mfengu on lands originally promised to the Thembu, and the presence of Cobbe, a man whom he neither liked nor respected.⁵⁴ He further resented the fact that Currie was entrusted with the task of resettling the Mfengu and he was dubious of the methods which he used to achieve his goal. Currie on the other hand, having completed his task to his own and the Government's satisfaction, watched, sometimes with haughty ruefulness, at other times with disdain, as Warner stumbled on, estranging both his fellow officials and Thembu chiefs in the process. "The poor man" he once wrote to the Governor, "seems bewildered and not at all equal to the task he has undertaken. His nervous and timid conduct all tend to create difficulties at a time like the present...He sinks under difficulties in a most melancholy manner, and he discovers imaginary obstacles. He has certainly disappointed me after his great experience of the native character."⁵⁵ In a less generous mood, he advised Southey to "give old Warner a retiring allowance on condition that he resides nowhere in Transkeian territory or in Glen Grey."⁵⁶

Thus discredited by his fellow officials in the eyes of the Governor, Warner was blamed in Cape Town for the failure of the emigration

scheme. This was rather unfair. The removal of 30,000 people from a country in which they had resided for many generations was a task which could not have been accomplished without the use of force. In the final analysis it is doubtful whether anybody else would have succeeded where Warner failed. The fact is that the Thembu did not want to go.

When finally the move came to an end, only four chiefs with their followers - about one-third of the inhabitants of the Location - had accepted the Governor's offer to settle across the Indwe in the area that became known as Emigrant Thembuland.⁵⁷ These chiefs were Matanzima (Hala), Gecelo (Gcina), Ndarala (Ndungwana) and Sitokwe ~~Nalela~~ (Qwati). Warner maintained that they were the most influential chiefs, but this is highly debatable. On the contrary, it would seem that it was exactly because they lacked influence in the Location that they accepted an offer which the majority of their kinsmen found unattractive. Matanzima was an ambitious man, but under Nonesi's rule in the Location he was a nonentity. Across the Indwe he would be a chief in his own right, and being the brother of Ngangelizwe, he would certainly gain ascendancy over the other chiefs.⁵⁸ Gecelo was no chief in his own right, but acted as regent for his brother Mpangela. Since the latter was nearly of age, Gecelo would soon have had to make way for the younger chief. Ndungwana's situation was slightly different. He became paramount of his tribe in 1853 when his grandfather, Qesha, voluntarily handed over power to him. His position was, however, very insecure. Of all the chiefs he could be singled out as the most loyal to the Colonial Government and he had the strong support of his own missionary, the Rev. Patten. But within

his clan there was a faction strongly opposed to the Cape Government, and during the Fadana-Quesha Rebellion of 1857⁵⁹ there had been attempts by his uncle Matshoba to seize power. Although the plot had failed, the anti-Government faction enjoyed considerable popular support, as could be seen from the warm welcome that Quesha received on his return from Robben Island, where he served a two-year term of imprisonment.⁶⁰ There were also rumours that Ndarala was in trouble over debts⁶¹ and this may have influenced his decision to move. The fourth chief, Sitokwe Ndlela was the son of a Qwati chief who held a subordinate position under the Gcina. Like the other three, he had little influence in the Location.

The decision of these four chiefs to move was in part a reflection of a personal ambition, but it was also an expression of a spirit of independence - a Thembu Great Trek undertaken to preserve their ethnic identity and traditional way of life. They held a utopian vision of a country where a strange marriage between "complete independence" and "acknowledgment of the paramountcy of the British Queen" would allow them the freedom to rule as independent chiefs while at the same time enjoying the physical protection of the Colonial Government against surrounding enemies as well as the psychological satisfaction of remaining part of the Thembu nation. What must be emphasised here is that their move had nothing to do with the land deal. They moved independently, and the Location people were not bound by their decision. There is no support for Warner's argument that they were the real contracting power, and that their decision was binding on the Location people.

The majority of the Thembu chose to remain the Location under Cape law, even though this meant the further erosion of the power of the chiefs and of Thembu traditions. In view of this it may well be asked why the chiefs had first accepted the offer of independence across the Indwe and then, suddenly it seemed, changed their minds. To understand this decision it is necessary to look at the story of Nonesi and her resistance to the emigration movement.

When Ngangelizwe became king in 1863, Nonesi was still the recognized "paramount" of the Location and for the time being her authority remained unquestioned.⁶² It was, however, already clear that her contumacious resistance to any restrictions upon her authority had become an embarrassment to her former allies. Nonesi, the faithful - as Sir George Cathcart had dubbed her - had obviously served her purpose. After March 1865, when she decided to work against the Emigration, her position as head of the Location Thembu was questioned. The official argument, as presented by Warner, was that, with Ngangelizwe's assumption of power, her authority over the Location Thembu had legally and rightfully expired,⁶³ and that all powers had devolved upon Ngangelizwe with whom negotiations were to be carried on. Nonesi did not accept this abrogation of her power. She based her argument on the fact that she had been invited back from the Mbashe after the war of 1853 and that the recognition of her paramountcy over the Location was a reward for services rendered. The title of paramount, as far as she was concerned, implied permanency.⁶⁴ Warner based his claim on the legal complexities and the western concept of regency. His arguments would perhaps have had validity in a court of law, but they were most confusing for people not entirely

familiar with the language and customs of those with whom negotiations were conducted. It would seem further that the legitimacy of Nonesi's position was only called into question after 1865 when she fell foul of Warner in consequence of her refusal to move across the Indwe river. In his report of 1864, Warner had mentioned that Nonesi was getting old and had lost much of her former energy and character. He then made the statement, significant in this context, that Raxoti would soon replace her as deputy for his brother.⁶⁵ By implication he had thus re-affirmed the 1853 decision of having a separate regent over the Location.

Nonesi was a woman with a remarkably strong personality, and her cooperation was essential for the successful execution of the emigration scheme. It was therefore with great relief that Warner could report at the beginning of 1865 that she had accepted the Governor's offer to move across the Indwe where she could retain her power as chief, which she would lose in the Location upon the introduction of Colonial law. There were several reasons for her sudden volte face soon afterwards, one of the most important being Fadana's return from Robben Island in 1865. The ex-regent, as high-spirited as ever despite his weak physical condition, soon mustered considerable support for his opposition to the emigration. Rumours were rife. Warner was told that Fadana had assured the Thembu that the introduction of Colonial law was an empty threat, already used at the time of his imprisonment seven years earlier. At the same time he was said to have urged the people not to emigrate should the Government this time decide to carry out the threat, as a strong united people, he believed, would be in a better position to resist

the implementation of Colonial law. He allegedly also tried his utmost to win the common people over to his point of view by saying that, if united, it would be possible for them to resist both the chiefs and the Colonial Government.⁶⁶ Fadana told Griffith that on his release from prison he was ordered in Cape Town to go to his land, stay there and behave himself. This he saw as another proof that the emigration was Warner's scheme.⁶⁷ Rumours such as these reached Warner's ears via his headmen, who obviously hoped to strengthen their own position by keeping the Thembu Agent informed about possible unrest. Warner, in turn, could use the information to convince the Cape Government of the expediency of immediately introducing Colonial law, thereby curbing the power of those chiefs who were opposed to the scheme. Most likely, Fadana's reasons for opposing the scheme were far simpler than Warner suggested. Like other Thembu chiefs, he may have argued that the land exchange would be a bad bargain. In comparison with the Location, the territory across the Indwe was badly watered. The former was fed by about eight or nine streams while there was only one significant river in the trans-Indwe area. The pasturage in the Location was also vastly superior. Furthermore, it was clear that, after the settlement of the Mfengu on proposed Thembu lands, there was not sufficient land left for the Thembu. The territory allotted to them was only sixteen to eighteen miles in width and sixty to seventy miles long, and it was estimated that only one-third was suitable for cultivation.⁶⁸ Rumours were also rife that Sarhili had sworn vengeance on the Thembu and on Warner, whom he blamed for his land losses. Why then would the Thembu exchange their peaceful country for one where they might feel insecure. The chiefs were influenced by traders who were strongly opposed to the move.

In view of the above, Nonesi's behaviour after 1865 is understandable. What was at stake was, first, her chieftainship and, second, the Thembu claim to their ancestral lands. She was willing to sacrifice the second for the sake of the first, but she would only be able to retain her paramount position in the new country if she could take a significant number of followers with her. Once the majority had shown their reluctance to move, she was no longer prepared to go. But if she stayed, she had to prevent her followers from joining her ambitious grandson, Matanzima, across the Indwe. Hence her anti-emigration activities, which brought her into conflict with Warner, whom she accused of having told lies to the Government when he said that she consented to go. Warner was not slow in taking up the cudgels, making use of every opportunity to vilify her in the eyes of the Government. In official correspondence, "Nonesi the faithful" now became "the old liar", "the feeble-minded old woman", "the old creature", "the drunkard". Yet it was on this feeble-minded old woman, so Warner believed - or at least tried to make the Government believe - that the success or failure of the movement depended.

It is difficult to know whether Warner actually believed that it was solely Nonesi's influence that kept the majority of the Thembu in the Location. After all, he himself had admitted to Southey: "It is a gigantic task to remove 30,000 souls out of a country they love and which they had inhabited for several generations past into a country which they don't like so well and with the chance of exchanging peace for war into the bargain."⁶⁹ Be that as it may, Warner had convinced himself that Nonesi was the cause of all his troubles, and that once she had experienced the effects of Colonial law, she would be

more amenable to his wishes. His first opportunity to humiliate her came in 1866 when some of her people stole and slaughtered oxen belonging to a certain Klaas Mayekiso. Gilfillan, who was then at the head of the F.A.M.P. called on her for assistance. She acted promptly: the thief was traced and some of his stock confiscated to compensate the owner. When, however, Gilfillan demanded the compensation on behalf of the Cape Government, whose laws had been violated, she refused to hand the cattle over. She had, in fact, already distributed them among her followers. When this incident became known, Southey reprimanded Gilfillan for having, by implication, acknowledged Nonesi's authority in asking her assistance. Griffith was ordered to inform all chiefs that henceforth they would have no more judicial authority. Southey held that Nonesi was actually guilty of a crime when she confiscated the cattle.⁷⁰ It is difficult to understand the ground on which Southey could justify these instructions. Colonial law was not yet proclaimed; a law could certainly not be applied before it was promulgated.

Griffith interpreted Southey's instructions as meaning that he had to hold a public meeting of all chiefs to inform them on the latest developments, and he immediately convened such a meeting. It turned out to be a most unfortunate affair. As Griffith disagreed with the Government on this issue, he found it difficult to handle the meeting, and he appeared to be aggressive and unsympathetic. He bluntly told the chiefs that they had lost all power, and any questions they asked were brushed aside by a reminder that he was there to carry out the Government's orders and not to answer questions.⁷¹

In her response to Griffith's announcement, Nonesi emphasised the two aspects of the Emigration that directly concerned herself: the maintenance of her paramountcy over the Location and her resistance to the alienation of the Thembu ancestral lands. Speaking sadly, but with dignity, she challenged Griffith on these issues: "I am an old chief", she said, "one of an old race. I never agreed to cross the river, and it is not known what I have done that the Governor should be angry with me...I am a chief, why should I be treated as less than a chief? I have always been loyal to the British Government. I was loyal when the chiefs were fighting. In the cattle killing I was on the English side. I have all the country this side of the Indwe river and have kept it loyal. We do not deny being under government. The Tambookie wherever they may be, are under the government. We do not wish it otherwise. I am the government's child, but the land is mine."⁷²

This speech had no impact upon official policies, but it inspired compassion in certain white circles. The Rev. W. Holden was the most outspoken in his criticism of both the Cape Government's policies and Griffith's handling of the meeting. He saw it as a blot on the name of "proud Britain", that the questions of "a great, widowed chief" could not get an "honest and manly reply". Castigating Griffith, he wrote: "It must have been galling to the magistrate...if he was capable of feeling."⁷³ Upset by this unsought publicity given to the Emigration Southey reprimanded Griffith severely for having convened a meeting, instead of having spoken to each chief privately. "The question at issue", he made it clear, "seems to be whether, when you received instructions for your guidance, it was necessary and proper

to hold a meeting for the purpose of making those instructions known."⁷⁴ Griffith had an intense dislike of what he called "hole and corner" meetings, but orders had to be obeyed. There were no more public meetings.

It could be that the moral support which she received after the meeting strengthened Nonesi in her determination not to leave the Location. Shortly afterwards, a deputation of Thembu chiefs informed the acting civil commissioner, J. Hemming, that they had no intention of leaving, and that Warner had never been justified in telling the Government that they had promised to do so. They further objected to Warner's threats that "all kinds of disagreeable things would happen to them should they not move across the Indwe." They emphasised that the Thembu had never been guilty of any act that would justify their expulsion from their ancestral lands.⁷⁵ Warner was understandably aggrieved by these accusations and henceforth he became almost obsessed with Nonesi and her "intrigues".

Meanwhile Warner also became disillusioned with his other ally, Ngangelizwe.⁷⁶ Negotiations as to the evacuation of the Location had started between the two men in March 1865. In return for his promise to forfeit all claims to the Location, the Thembu king was to be "given" all the lands across the White Kei up to the Tsomo. This promise disregarded the claims of the four chiefs who emigrated on the understanding that they would receive complete independence in their new country. Ngangelizwe at first welcomed the Emigration as a means to further his own interests. Once again a united Thembu nation had become a realistic possibility. Initially he acted with great zeal,

in curbing Nonesi's influence. But when he found that the large majority of Thembu were not inclined to move and that the Government was not going to allow him to use force to achieve his aims, he adopted new strategies. Working against the Emigration was now a far more expedient course to follow. If a large number of Thembu remained in the Location, he seems to have argued, it could mean that the whole area south-west of the Mbashe and the Stormberg could be brought under his influence.⁷⁷ In that case it would be sound policy, first, to win the friendship of the anti-Emigration faction so as to enable him to put up a united front against the Cape Government should this become necessary, and secondly to prevent a mass exodus of Location residents that would strengthen the hands of the Emigrant chiefs. Warner was therefore certainly correct when he suspected Ngangelizwe of trying to prevent the emigration of the Location Thembu and of encouraging Nonesi to remain on her lands.⁷⁸ Once Ngangelizwe had fallen foul of Warner, the latter turned against him. The most hair-raising stories about his cruelty reached the colonial office almost daily.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Matanzima had emerged as the favourite, whose friendship and loyalty Warner was keen to cultivate. Matanzima was quick to take advantage of Warner's support, and he let no opportunity pass without discrediting Ngangelizwe as an interfering autocrat. At the same time he appealed to Warner to take action against Nonesi whom he accused of keeping his people away from him.⁸⁰

We do not know Nonesi's side of the story, but Warner and Matanzima succeeded in portraying her as a troublesome old woman whose subversive activities not only prevented many Thembu from emigrating, but also disturbed the peace both in the Location and in Emigrant

Thembuland.⁸¹ At one stage, according to their reports, she asked for a farm in the Location, indicating her willingness to settle down under colonial law. When a surveyor turned up, she chased him away, claiming that the Location was under her authority, and that he had to obtain her permission to survey farms. Thereafter she twice crossed the Indwe to settle under Matanzima, but each time she clashed with her grandson. Matanzima maintained that he tried his utmost to accommodate her, having offered her one of the best plots in Emigrant Thembuland. This, he said, she had refused, and had asked for a plot which belonged to one of his chief councillors. During the ensuing dispute she sounded the war cry, which brought her followers from the Location into Emigrant Thembuland where war was only prevented by Warner's interference.⁸² An uneasy truce followed, with Warner suspecting Nonesi of carrying on with her intrigues in the Location, although she was now living in Emigrant Thembuland. At last the Governor, influenced by the constant stream of reports on the unsettled state of affairs in the Location, decided to mete out exemplary punishment. Nonesi played into her enemies' hands by entering the Location without a pass. (The pass laws by which intercourse between the Location and Emigrant Thembuland were restricted, were issued in 1867). She was arrested and sent to her brother, Damas, in Pondoland.

There are two versions of Nonesi's arrest. Major Hook in Sword and Statute quotes J.M. Grant as saying that three troops of F.A.M.P. under direction of C.D. Griffith captured her without firing a shot. Hook himself recalled that they reached the queen's homestead at daybreak in advance of the Civil Commissioner, who was coming along

with the main body. As they feared a rising of the tribes, they got her as quickly as possible into a mule wagon, attempts at rescue being prevented by relief police all along the route.⁸³

The Free Press gave a completely different version. Early one morning, the report stated, police pounced upon her and she and her councillors were brought to Queenstown where they were tried by Griffith for being in the Colony without passes. They were sentenced to one month's imprisonment. The jail was filled with Africans and there was much sympathy for the "illustrious prisoner." This imprisonment, the report continued, was just a cover up, as early the next morning a mule wagon, properly furnished, turned up, escorted by fifty police. The report ended: "The queen was very unwilling to undertake the journey and had to receive assistance. The wagon soon rolled off. Nonesi was gone and let us hope the last scene has been played in the Tambookie difficulty."⁸⁴

As we come to the end of Nonesi's story one question remains: Why did the Government find it necessary to take such harsh actions against her? It is clear that at the time of her arrest the Emigration had in any case come to a standstill, and her opposition to the movement was no longer an issue. Furthermore, some years earlier Warner himself had referred to her as a "mere cypher", unable to command the obedience of her people.⁸⁵ Why then was it now believed that she could wield such strong influence both in the Location and in Emigrant Thembuland? Major Hook hinted that the whole thing was an attempt to get hold of her lands. He wrote: "The exact quality of her offending or intriguing I never learnt. Certainly the arrest happened at a time

that claims for extension of territory on the border were exercising the minds of many."⁸⁶

The most likely explanation seems to be the one given by E.J. Warner many years later in his evidence before the Glen Grey Commission: "Nonesi, finding that her chieftaincy was gone and Colonial law likely to be enforced, wished to move over into Matanzima's location, but he objected and when she tried to force her way in, he appealed to the government, and so Nonesi was apprehended and sent to Pondoland."⁸⁷ It would then seem as if Nonesi's arrest was a ploy devised by Warner to uphold his prestige among the Emigrant Thembu and to strengthen his bond with Matanzima.⁸⁸

The Emigration was one of the most significant episodes in Thembu history. It signalled the final fragmentation of the Thembu nation. Instead of the eastern and western factions, united despite deep-seated differences, by a common loyalty to the Mbashe paramount, there were now the Thembu in the Location under Colonial rule, the Emigrant Thembu who in varying degrees acknowledged the paramount, and the Mbashe Thembu who lived independently. But it was not only the nation that was broken up, the polarizing of the pro- and anti-Emigration factions cut right across earlier allegiances. Within the Hala, Ndungwana and Gcina clans there now emerged divergent groups, the ruling Hala clan being the most broken up of all. Thus the position of the paramount was severely weakened. This would, in part, explain why the Thembu could not in the 1880s effectively resist Colonial expansionism.⁸⁹

European farmers and frontier officials gauged the situation from a different angle. They saw reasons for anxiety in two developments: first in the consolidation of Thembu territory with the creation of Emigrant Thembuland which now linked the Colonial Thembu with the core settlement at the Mbashe river and, secondly, in the survival of Thembu ethnic ties - despite political fragmentation - as reflected in their common loyalty to the paramount. There was now the danger that territorial consolidation could lead to greater political cohesion. Apprehensions of a united Thembu nation, in league with other black tribes, gave urgency in the 1860s to appeals by the press, traders, missionaries, farmers and frontier officials for the extension of British influence over the Transkei.⁹⁰ As far as the white farmers were concerned the irony of the situation was that the Emigration, far from having dissipated tension in the Location - as it was intended to do - not only augmented it, but extended the area of possible conflict.

Looking at the Location in the post-emigration era we can distinguish three major developments. First, following the failure to remove the Thembu from the area, the Cape Government used more strenuous methods to obtain Thembu lands for white settlement, and this led to the resettlement schemes of the 1880s. Secondly, the introduction of certain land and administrative policies paved the way for the introduction of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. Lastly, attempts by the Cape Government to extend its control over the Location led to discontent that culminated in armed resistance in the 1870s.⁹¹

There can be no doubt that the main object of the emigration scheme

was to make more land available for white farmers. This did not happen. In some cases Thembu who emigrated left an influential relative behind to take hold of their evacuated farms. In other cases many of those who originally emigrated returned. Other farms were taken up by labourers who returned from the Colony.⁹² By 1872 the population of the Location was numerically stronger than in 1865, and all hopes that the Queenstown area would become safe for white settlement were nullified. But Europeans, having once casted their eyes upon the fertile Location, were not going to give up the struggle.

In the following years, the legitimacy of Thembu claims to the Location was called into question. It was argued that since the Thembu had refused the offer of emigration, the Glen Grey district had become crown land; the Thembu were consequently regarded as squatters with no legal rights and could be removed at any time. According to evidence given in 1892 by Jenner, resident magistrate in Queenstown, the Thembu had held the land in tribal tenure before 1870, but thereafter they had resided upon crown land.⁹³ In this connection it is important to consider a statement made by Hammond-Tooke in 1891, when the introduction of individual landownership in Glen Grey was debated. Since the Thembu had refused to move, he said, neither loyalty nor legal rights entitled them to consideration for private ownership.⁹⁴ These opinions were highly debatable. Warner had argued in 1865 that the Governor had agreed to his negotiating with the chiefs in "their representative character" and that the decisions would thus be binding on their people,⁹⁵ but from later correspondence it emerged that neither Southey nor Wodehouse regarded the negotiations as being conducted by the chiefs as representatives

of their people. Southey emphasised that no man was to be deprived of his land as a result of his refusal to emigrate.⁹⁶ The Thembu themselves did not accept Warner's view. In a petition presented to the Governor in 1884 by certain Thembu chiefs, when this resettlement of a section of the Glen Grey people became a matter of public debate,⁹⁷ they emphasised that the four chiefs had accepted Wodehouse's offer after the exchange had failed, but that the people as a whole had positively refused to go. The arrangement with the chiefs was therefore a special arrangement which did not concern the inhabitants of the Location.⁹⁸

George McCall Theal upheld Warner's argument when he responded to the claims put forward by the Thembu chiefs in 1884. He informed the Governor that "no common man was asked to consent to the exchange for the reason that they were under tribal government, and consequently bound by the acts of these chiefs and headmen. Individuals were not asked to move for that was just what was not wanted, but the Emigrant Thembu as a body were invited through their chiefs to go".⁹⁹ The argument that negotiations were carried on with the chiefs in their representative character was accepted, despite all arguments to the contrary, and from 1870 onwards the Thembu were made aware that they were living on sufferance on lands from which they could be evicted at any time. The 1880's did in fact see a series of resettlement attempts.¹⁰⁰

The failure of the Cape Government to evict the majority of the Thembu from the Location once again emphasised the problem of governing a large mass of people within the Cape Colonial boundaries according to

their own laws and customs. The decision to introduce Colonial law was therefore treated with greater urgency. Also, the competition between white farmers and Transkeian Thembu for lands evacuated by the Emigrants, forced the Cape Government to revise its land policies. Since the Land Tenure Act of 1868, which made provision for some form of individual landownership, did not solve the above-mentioned land problems, a commission was appointed to investigate matters. This commission consisted of E. Judge, J. Ayliff and R. Southey.

In its report the Judge Commission emphasised the great population increase in the Location and suggested that in order to facilitate its administration, the Location should be divided into two, with one half joined to the Dordrecht district and the other to Queenstown. A block of European farms was to separate these two sections. The European farms were to be acquired gradually by the substitution of black homesteads in the proposed block by homesteads elsewhere, but with the understanding that there was nothing to prevent the ultimate exclusion of Thembu chiefs from this block by refusing to renew their claims at any time. As for the administration of the Location, the Commission advised the abolition of white superintendents. Such superintendents, the Commission felt, contributed towards a feeling of independence among the clans since the people saw them as the executives of their own laws and not those of the Cape Colony. In order to bring home the idea of the paramountcy of the Cape Colony more effectively, the system of chieftancy had to be broken down once and for all, and magistrates were to replace superintendents.

The Judge Commission further recommended that the whole Location

should be surveyed, and then divided into blocks with a senior headman in charge of each block. The blocks were then to be divided into farms under a headman. These recommendations were carried out promptly, and after farms were surveyed, Judge visited each one in order to appoint a headman. As far as possible, chiefs were replaced by headmen who assisted the Government in collecting taxes and applying Colonial laws. Since they were well-compensated, often by the granting of a small farm, they were useful collaborators. Furthermore, they could be dismissed at the Government's discretion without causing trouble, as would possibly happen when a chief was dismissed. In years to follow the Location Thembu became thoroughly acquainted with concepts such as individual landownership and rule through appointed headmen. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 was broadly based upon these principles so that, when it was eventually introduced, it was merely the legal confirmation of an already existing situation.¹⁰¹

The extension of Colonial rule over the Location and the implementation of the recommendations of the Judge Commission were not accepted complacently by the Location dwellers. Discontent, as people felt themselves subjected to alien laws and customs which they did not understand, created a spirit of resistance to the Cape Government. This spirit became more marked as land shortage, resulting from the subdivision of the Location, set in. It was under these circumstances that young pretenders, such as Mfanta, the brother of Ngangelizwe, and Gungubelle, the son of Maphasa, stepped into the vacuum left by the Emigrant chiefs. Their close association with black resistance movements on the Eastern Frontier, culminated in their participation

in the Ninth Frontier War.¹⁰² They failed to muster large-scale support for their military ventures: the majority of the Location dwellers were not prepared to settle their grievances by means of armed resistance against a militarily superior power.

Looking at Emigrant Thembuland, the Emigration was important for two reasons. First, since the Emigrant Thembu settled in their new country under paramountcy of the British Government, Britain now obtained a foothold across the Kei. The way was thus paved for British interference in the affairs of the Transkeian Thembu. Secondly, the chief Matanzima, backed by the Cape Government, succeeded in establishing himself as chief of Emigrant Thembuland. In this way the foundations of the House of Matanzima were laid - a development which played an important part in 20th century South African and Transkeian history.¹⁰³

A last observation with regard to the consequences of the Emigration, concerns Thembuland Proper. Inevitably disputes arose from time to time between the paramount and those chiefs whom he regarded as subordinates, but who viewed themselves as independent from him. Even though Sihele maintains that Ngangelizwe respected the authority of Matanzima over Emigrant Thembuland,¹⁰⁴ there are suggestions in Warner's correspondence with Southey between 1865 and 1969, that commoners did appeal to him against sentences imposed by the Emigrant chiefs. In consequence of Ngangelizwe's opposition to the Emigration he became the object of a vilification campaign, while Matanzima emerged as the favourite of the Cape Government. This way Ngangelizwe's position was weakened. This situation enabled those who

wished to see the extension of British rule across the Kei, to meddle in Ngangelizwe's internal affairs. The disturbances in Thembuland in 1872 and Ngangelizwe's eventual deposition as chief, to be discussed in the next chapter, can directly be linked to conditions created by the Emigration.

1. BPP.63-'94: Levey's Evidence, p.94. In 1870 the Tambookie Location was proclaimed the district of Glen Grey. See p.
2. CPP.A40-'58: Warner-Southey, 6 April '58, p.7.
3. CO.48/402: J. Warner-R. Southey, 19 March '60, enclos. in letter Wyngard-Newcastle.
4. See p.55.
5. R.E. Robinson & J. Gallagher: Africa and the Victorians, pp.50-60.
6. C.C. Saunders: The Annexation of Transkeian Territories (AYB, 1976), p.5.
7. A.E. du Toit: The Cape Frontier, a study of Native Policy with Special Reference to the years 1847-1866 (AYB, 1954, 11), p.191.
8. In this he was strongly supported by the Colonial Secretary, Richard Southey, who believed in the separation of various tribes by European settlements. See SP.611/53: Southey-W. Currie, 3 June '65.
9. GH.8/4: Warner-Wodehouse, 8 April '64: Presumably these were the chiefs whose names appear in the Census of Tambookie Chiefs inhabiting the Tambookie Location by 1857 in Cape of Good Hope Annexures, 1857. They were: Hala Chiefs: Nonesi (Paramount), Manel, Jlela, Ketelo, Petrus Mahonga; Gcina chiefs: Gecelo, Guwado, Kelelo; Ndungwana Chief: Ndarala. Tshatshu Chiefs: Yiliswe (Mapassa's widow), Vizi, Talbaya, Uytinyaki, Umnuwila.
10. ECO.5/1/3/1: Stanford-CMT., 27 August '81. Stanford wrote this in reply to a letter from the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland, when in the 1880s the Thembu claim to Glen Grey became a matter of urgency. See pp.198-200.
11. Theal 4, pp.45-46.
12. The territory on which the Thembu were eventually settled became known as Emigrant Thembuland as distinct from Thembuland Proper, the core settlement at the Mbashe. See Map 3.
13. CPP.A1-'93: Glen Grey Commission's Report.
14. BPP.3436-'65: Copy of Despatch from Cardwell-P. Wodehouse, 5 July '64, p.24.
15. In 1852 Sir George Cathcart announced the formation of a mounted police force "to patrol roads and intercept marauders, as well as to protect property. Four commandants were appointed, Curry being placed in charge of the Albany Mounted Police. He was responsible in 1857 for the capture of Fadana and Qesha, and in the next year for the expulsion of Sarhili from his lands. See GTJ. 14 June '72; DSAB, Vol. 11: pp.193-195.

16. Du Toit: Cape Frontier: pp.187-195; C. Saunders: Annexation pp.41-45; King William's Town Gazette 20 June '64, (Letters by "Junius"); GTJ. 30 September '64. Tiyo Soga-Dr. Summerville, 14 June '64.
17. BPP.3436-'65: pp.6-7, Warner referred to Sarhili as "a voice crying in the wilderness".
18. On leaving the Colony, Sir Philip openly admitted: "I have never been a colonist. All my sympathies are enlisted in close connection of the Colony with England." (Quoted by W. Wilmot: The Life and Times of Sir Richard Southey, p.181.
19. Stanford Papers B212: Theal-Stanford, 5 January '85.
20. The Kaffrarian Watchman, 6 August '66. The Native Question.
21. The separatist movement had as its aim the establishment of a separate Colony in the East. At times, however, the movement had more moderate aims. See J. Stead: Eastern Cape Separation Movement, (AYB, 1984).
22. Stanford Papers B212: Theal-Stanford, 5 January '85.
23. SP.611/57: Southey-Warner, 8 April '68.
24. Wodehouse Papers: Wodehouse-Cardwell, 12 July '67, quoted by J. van Otten, Sir Philip Wodehouse: (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Oregon, 1971).
25. Wodehouse Papers: Wodehouse-Cardwell, 15 July '65, quoted by Van Otten, p.38.
26. SP.611/31: Warner-Southey, 28 March '68. Warner wrote: "I must persist in calling it Currie's scheme. He and he alone put it in the Governor's head."
27. Theal 8: p.50.
28. Most of these letters are preserved in the Southey Papers, now housed in the Cape Archives.
29. Stanford Papers, B212.1: Geo. M. Theal-W. Stanford, 1 November '84; SP.611/40: Warner-Southey, 9 August '70. In 1870, when Warner started with a series of articles on the Emigration, he was severely rebuked by Southey for using confidential official information. Not to offend his old friend, Warner stopped the series. In a letter to Southey he wrote: "In comparing some of Sir Philip's notes to me with some of yours during that anxious time...I subsequently became more convinced of the fact that he said one thing to you and another to me."
30. See CO.3140: Tambookie Agent's Report, 13 January '69.
31. SP.611/37: Warner-Southey, 24 December '69.

32. SP.611/19: Warner-Southey, 22 September '65.
33. See pp.237, 239, 249.
34. SP.611/26: Warner-Southey, 13 November '67; 1 June '67. (Warner asked in these letters that his position be paramount, with all blacks and whites in the Transkei under his jurisdiction); 16 October '68; 24 December '68. (He complained that when he took over, the Government told him that his authority was paramount, but since then his authority had been delegated to the chiefs); 27 February '69. (In this despatch he actually claimed the right to interfere when and how he liked in the affairs of those he was told were under him). See also SP.611/65 Southey-Warner, 22 November '67. (Southey remarked that if Warner was granted the powers he asked for, he would become a tyrant).
35. See map 3. The Idutywa Reserve where Mfengu from Gcalekaland were settled, was established by Col. J. Gawler in 1858. For Warner's attempts to gain full control over the activities of this reserve see: SP.611/21: Warner-Southey, 12 March '66. Warner successfully blocked the appointment of a Special Magistrate for Idutywa so that H.B. could act in that capacity. When complaining about his position in Mfenguland where Cobbe was in charge (see below, p.96) he added. "In Idutywa it is different: there if anything goes wrong I can step in and take matters in my own hand without offending the clerk in charge, and the case is the same with reference to the Tambookie Agent's District."
36. He was later known as Ngangelizwe. Warner maintained that on his deathbed, Mtirara entrusted Qeya to his care. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 26 February '63.
37. CO.3082: Warner's Memorandum, 19 August 1965.
38. GH.8/4: Warner-Wodehouse 13 June '65; SP.611/18: Warner's "entirely private" letter to Southey, 10 August '65.
39. Feelings between the Emigrants and those in the Location were at times hostile. The two sections gave each other nicknames: the amaTyutyutyu (the Whistlers - or those acting with nervous haste and the amaKngume (the wait-a-bits - or those who were startled and stunned. See Stanford Reminiscences, p.25.
40. In 1879 the Thembu Location was proclaimed the district of Glen Grey. Up to 1870 the name Glen Grey, as used in official papers, only referred to the mission station.
41. See p.30.
42. For discussion of Nonesi's paramountcy over the Location, see pp.53-4; 65, 98.
43. SP.611/18: Warner-Southey, 26 August '65.
44. SP.611/53: Southey-J Warner, 21 February '65.

45. SP.622/35: Southey-W. Currie, 9 May '65.
46. NA.245: Glen Grey Papers, Southey-C.C. of Queenstown, 4 January '66.
47. SP.611/18: Warner-Southey, 4 July '65; 5 July '65; 611/18 Griffith-Southey, 8 August '65.
48. Ibid: 14 September '65.
49. SP.611/18: Griffith-Southey, 19 September '65.
50. Ibid: 29 August '65.
51. Ibid: 8 August '65.
52. SP.611/27: Warner-Southey, 12 October '67, (Warner wrote: "At least if my hand is not against every man's, every man's hand seems against me.") See also SP.611/27 Warner-Southey, 30 May, '67. (In this letter he complained about Davies, a clerk of Cobbe who had deliberately told him a lie, and that Cobbe, aware of that, did not rebuke Davies. He then continued with great bitterness: "Does the highly educated Capt. Cobbe despise me because I am an 'old settler', or does friend Currie hate me because I have unfortunately had to differ from him in politics sometimes...all I want from them is to let me alone for the sake of peace.") He was also constantly at loggerheads with Gilfillan, the head of the F.A.M.P. See SP.611/32 Warner-Southey, 10 October '68; 17 October '68, and various references in 611/30.
53. See map 3.
54. SP.611/29: Warner-Southey, 28 March '68; 611/32 Warner-Southey, 31 October '68.
55. SP.611/18: Currie-Southey, 10 July '65.
56. SP.611/19: W. Currie-Southey, 19 September '65.
57. See map 3.
58. See pp.262-3.
59. See p.58.
60. GTJ: 15 February '59, Queenstown. Quesha told the people that in Cape Town Warner and Nonesi were blamed for the rebellion and that it was said that they should have been banned to Robben Island.
61. SP.611/18: Griffith-Southey, 29 August '65.
62. See pp.67, 98.

63. When Ngangelizwe became king, he received the same stipend as Nonesi. This would indicate that Nonesi was still recognized as paramount of the Location.
64. SP.611/18: Warner-Southey, 11 August '65. See also p.
65. Ngangelizwe had assumed power in 1863.
66. SP.611/17: Warner-Southey, 31 March '65.
67. Ibid: 11 April '65.
68. SP.611/19: C. Griffith-R. Southey, 29 August '65; CO.3140: Thembu Agents Report, 19 June '65.
69. SP.611/53: Warner-Southey, 4 October '65.
70. Ibid: Southey-Griffith, 19 October '65.
71. W.C. Holden: The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p.404-6.
72. CO.3082: Griffith-Southey, 24 November '68. (My emphasis)
73. W.C. Holden: Past and Future, pp. 404-405.
74. SP.611/54: Southey-Griffith, 7 December '65.
75. CO.3082: J. Hemming-R. Southey, 5 December '65.
76. For detailed discussion of the Warner-Ngangelizwe vendetta see pp.239-45.
77. See Map 3.
78. For further discussion of Ngangelizwe and the Emigration see pp.241-44.
79. See pp.235, 246-8.
80. See p.262.
81. SP.611/35: May-September 1868.
82. SP.611/31: Griffith-Southey, 27 June '68. Griffith maintained that Warner made a mountain out of a mole-heap.
83. Major Hook: With Sword & Statute, p.174.
84. GTJ: Over the Kei, 1 January '69.
85. See p.58.
86. Hook: With Sword & Statute, p.174.

87. CPP.A1-'93: Glen Grey Commission, E.J. Warner's evidence, 9 May '92.
88. See pp.262-4 for Warner-Matanzima alliance.
89. See pp.171-2.
90. The Free Press pleaded that all Thembu should be ordered across the Kei thereby leaving a valuable piece of land which, divided into farms, would be readily and more profitably occupied by others than "red, half-savage kafirs". See GTJ., June 1870.
91. All these will be discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 7.
92. See pp.312-13 for discussion of land-shortage in Glen Grey after 1870.
93. NA.245: Glen Grey Commission Report: p.46.
94. NA.245: Glen Grey Papers, Comparative Review of address presented to H.E. the Governor at Dordrecht by Glen Grey Natives, 30 October '91.
95. SP.611/53: Warner-Southey, 2 May '65.
96. SP.622/35: Southey-W. Currie, 9 May '65.
97. NA.225: Comparative Review of address presented by Glen Grey Natives, G. Hammond-Tooke, 30 October, '71.
98. NA.225: Glen Grey Papers, Comparative Review of address to Governor by Glen Grey Natives, 30 October '71.
99. Ibid.
100. See pp.198-204.
101. For individual landownership in Glen Grey see pp.317-323. Glen Grey title was granted to much smaller parcels of land, than those received by the headmen.
102. See p.162.
103. See pp.178-188.
104. See conclusion.

Chapter 4

The Restless Years: British Expansionism:
the Annexation of Thembuland and Thembu Reactions (1870-1881)

i. British Expansionism

Thembuland Proper

The years 1870 - 1881 not only witnessed strong Thembu resistance to intensified Cape and British expansionism across the Kei; they also saw widening divisions within the Thembu nation as, under European influence, the interests of Christian and non-Christian, of communal landholder and private entrepreneur, and of government-appointed headman and traditional chief came into conflict. If during the years 1865 - 1869 - the period of the Emigration - the Thembu had been offered their last opportunity of uniting in a peaceful way, then in 1877 - the year of the Ninth Frontier War - and 1880 - the year of the "Rebellion",¹ they were to have their two last opportunities to combine in armed resistance against the Cape Government's intrusion upon Thembu lands and culture. In each case the ideal of Thembu unity foundered on the rocks of sectional interest, successfully encouraged and exploited by the Cape Government in its own interest.

Apprehensions of a united Thembu nation in league with other hostile tribes gave new urgency, in the late 1860's, to appeals by the Cape press and missionaries, farmers, and white officials for the extension of British influence over the Transkeian territories.² Although the official policy of the Cape Government did incline towards an interference in the affairs of extra-territorial chiefdoms, its

approach was conservative, with the emphasis on a gradual process of integration. On the other hand, the attitude of the Imperial Ministry under Gladstone, between 1868 and 1874, was decidedly anti-expansionist. Admittedly the British Prime Minister, supported by the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, was not averse to accepting responsibility for territories already acquired, provided the colonies, particularly those with frontier problems, could be self-reliant.³ He therefore envisaged the incorporation of Natal, Griqualand East and Basutoland into the Cape Colony, and he urged the introduction of responsible government as a pre-requisite to the successful federation of these states. The granting of self-government was rejected by Governor Wodehouse who found the handing over of large native territories to a country "unfit for independence" incompatible with his sense of justice. It was accomplished in 1872 by his successor, Sir Henry Barkly.⁴

The simultaneous introduction of responsible government and the new office of Secretary for Native Affairs in 1872, engineered a period of greater Colonial control over the black people both within and without its borders. The regulation of extra-territorial relationships, hitherto the prerogative of the Cape Governor in his capacity as High Commissioner, now passed into the hands of a Cape official who had to take cognizance of an elected parliament. But the first man to be appointed to this important post, Charles Brownlee, followed an independent line. Often heavy-handed and autocratic in his ways, he managed to gain undisputed authority in respect of African affairs: so much so that he has been credited by an admirer as the person who "deliberately and designedly" laid down the lines of the Transkeian

native policy.⁵ This policy, with its emphasis on detribalization and civilization, was based on the vision of Sir George Grey of whom he had been a close confidant and admirer. Initially he moved cautiously, in full agreement with Barkly whose concept of gradual extension of power over the black tribes, embraced the idea of the old chiefs being allowed to die off and being replaced by Christianized and educated men.⁶ As far as extra-territorial chiefdoms were concerned, Brownlee intended a policy of non-intervention. However, he had to give priority to the defensive needs of the Cape Colony, and Sarhili was still regarded as a real threat to the safety and stability of the frontier districts. As Thembuland formed a buffer against Sarhili, the Cape Colony was drawn into the Thembu-Gcaleka feuds as the long-standing land disputes escalated in the 1870's. The focal point of these disputes was Bomvanaland, an area over which Sarhili wished to extend his influence.

Bomvanaland stretched from the Mbashe river in the north along the coast and was bordered by vacant lands which were desired by both Sarhili and Ngangelizwe.⁷ The Thembu believed that the Bomvana, under their chief Moni, were living on Thembu lands and by acknowledging Sarhili as paramount, they had created an intolerable situation. The Thembu claim rested upon an old tradition that during the time of Hintza, the Bomvana under Gambusha, fled into this area where permission to settle was granted by Ngubengcuka. When some Thembu were driven eastward in 1827, the Bomvana were at the same time expelled from their lands and found refuge with Sarhili in Gcalekaland where they lived until well up to 1850. While some Thembu believed that these Bomvana had returned at the beginning of the War of

Mlanjeni, it was generally accepted that they had returned during the Cattle-Killing as they did not want to slaughter their cattle. The Rev. Peter Hargreaves was amongst those who believed that, on their return, they acknowledged the Thembu chiefs. In 1872, as evidence before the Judge Commission, he quoted an incident in 1858 when Joyi prevented Walter Currie from following Sarhili into Bomvanaland as he said that the Bomvana were Thembu. A European trader in Bomvanaland supported the Thembu claim. It was customary, he said, that a trader gave presents to a chief, and that while he had usually given presents to Moni, thus recognizing that chief's independence, he also, on occasion gave presents to Ngangelizwe, but never to Sarhili. Most Thembu chiefs, however, maintained that the lands belonged to the Thembu, but that the Bomvana acknowledged Sarhili's paramountcy. There was furthermore a conglomeration of Pondo and Gcaleka people who had settled in Thembuland during the Cattle-Killing, but who accepted Sarhili's authority. A situation such as this was bound to lead to trouble.

The land dispute reached a crisis at a time when Ngangelizwe was confronting grave internal and external problems. The deteriorating relationship with another traditional enemy, the Mpondo, had culminated in the outbreak of war in 1869. Ngangelizwe's position was precarious, not only because the Pondo were a formidable enemy, but also because many of his people - amongst others his uncles Mngqaneni and Fadana - were unwilling to fight a war which they thought could have been avoided. When some dissidents fled from Thembuland, Ngangelizwe took punitive measures. His confiscation of the cattle of a certain Xego, who sought refuge in Gcalekaland, led to a drawn-out

dispute.⁸ Xego took revenge by raiding all the cattle on the Wesleyan mission station. The newly appointed Resident with Ngangelizwe, E. Chalmers, rushed to the trouble spot. Xego reacted by sounding the war cry in answer to which Mpondo and Gcaleka rushed in from the eastern bank of the Mbashe. They surrounded Chalmers who had considerable difficulty getting away from this situation. Ngangelizwe admitted that the son of Xelo, his Chief Councillor, had made a mistake in confiscating Xego's cattle, but although the latter was compensated, he refused to give up mission cattle. This episode embittered Ngangelizwe. He felt that Xego had been compensated, but not those Thembu on the mission station who had lost their cattle. Chalmers feared that Ngangelizwe was waiting for the opportune moment to take revenge. He also noted with concern that Mpondo raids on Thembu cattle occurred at times when friction between Sarhili and Ngangelizwe reached a zenith. He therefore had reason to believe that all these people were in an alliance against Ngangelizwe.⁹

A new round of trouble started when Mnqanqeni after having tried in vain to gain sanction from the Cape Government for his efforts to set up an independent chiefdom, left his abode at the Mbashe and settled with some followers nearer to the borders of Emigrant Thembuland.¹⁰ Among these followers was Mnqanqeni's brother, the ex-regent, Fadana. When Ngangelizwe, in an obvious attempt to strengthen his own position, invited neighbouring Mfengu to settle on the lands thus evacuated, his uncles objected, and turned towards the Mfengu Agent, Matthew Blyth, for interference on their behalf. Although Blyth did not approve of Ngangelizwe's invitation to the Mfengu, he had little sympathy with the rebel chiefs. Snubbed by Blyth, they took matters

into their own hands, and attacked the Mfengu. Ngangelizwe retaliated, and after a short and indecisive battle, Blyth was invited by both warring parties to act as mediator. Convinced that Sarhili was the instigator of the trouble, Blyth hoped to settle the Ngangelizwe-Mnqanqeni dispute once and for all. He therefore arranged a meeting with both chiefs, Mnqanqeni admitted guilt and promised to restore the cattle. Ngangelizwe, in return, modified his demands for the expulsion of Mnqanqeni from Thembuland, allowing him to stay on, but as a commoner. Mnqanqeni not intending to give up his chieftainship, raided cattle from Ngangelizwe's people that very same night. Thereafter he fled to Idutywa where he was sympathetically received by J. Cumming, the resident agent of the Reserve who, as it happened, distrusted Ngangelizwe. Cumming believed that Mnqanqeni had a just cause, having taken up the battle for "institutional government" against Ngangelizwe's despotism. He also believed that Mnqanqeni was a friend of the Cape Colony and therefore needed support against Ngangelizwe.¹¹ Mnqanqeni's settlement in the Idutywa Reserve was bound to lead to further trouble. When Ngangelizwe decided to remove his cattle from a camp near his uncle's new abode, he had to make use of a footpath through the Reserve. Cumming, having been warned by some informers that there was going to be a fight between the two chiefs, immediately ordered ten policemen to the trouble spot to prevent the Reserve people from becoming involved. These policemen confiscated the cattle as they were under the impression that Ngangelizwe had removed them illegally from Mnqanqeni's people. Ngangelizwe was enraged, and although his cattle were restored, the incident exacerbated the ill-feelings that had existed between the Idutywa people and the Thembu ever since the establishment of the

Reserve.¹² By that time mutual cattle-raiding had increased to such an extent that war seemed inevitable.

While all these disputes were on the go, rumours regarding Ngangelizwe's ill-treatment of his wife, Nomkhafulo (Novili) added fuel to the smouldering fire. This ill-fated marriage had been arranged in 1866 by Sarhili, either in an attempt to secure a united Gcaleka-Thembu kingdom for a future grandson, or in the hope of lessening tension between the Gcaleka and their Thembu neighbours. As a diplomatic marriage it was a hopeless failure. In 1870 Novili fled back to Sarhili who claimed that she had been badly maimed by her husband.¹³ As far as Sarhili was concerned this assault on his daughter possibly came at a propitious moment. For some time he seems to have had problems controlling the more militant faction among his people who wished to solve the land question by means of war. This was a risk he could not take as the Cape Colony would certainly have come to the aid of the Thembu. Now Ngangelizwe's behaviour provided him with a casus belli which even the Colonial Government would find justifiable.

As the possibility of war increased official reports from the Transkei became contradictory and confusing. W. Cumming branded Ngangelizwe as the aggressor, and he believed that this chief had, through false accusations, bedevilled the relationship between the Cape Colony and both the Gcaleka and the Idutywa people.¹⁴ In Gcalekaland, where the relationship between W.R.D. Fynn,¹⁵ the Resident Magistrate, and Sarhili posed a problem, the former, not surprisingly, blamed Sarhili for having caused the unrest. He maintained that Sarhili was acting

in an underhand way by professing to seek peace while at the same time encouraging his people to commit thefts.¹⁶ Fynn was supported by Matthew Blyth, a confidant of Richard Southey. Blyth had apparently decided to manipulate the situation in the interests of the Cape Colony, and he believed that these interests could best be served by supporting Ngangelizwe. He advised the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the assault case, at the same time warning the Government that any weakening of Ngangelizwe would strengthen Sarhili.¹⁷

A special commission was appointed by Sir Henry Barkly to settle the lingering disputes. The three commissioners, Charles Griffith, James Ayliff and Inspector Grant failed to submit constructive proposals for the attainment of peace, but they recommended the extension of British control over the area: "The result of our inquiry, and observations during the time we have passed in Kaffirland," they wrote, "has served to convince us that the time for making a stride in that direction (i.e. extension of control) has now come."¹⁸ In Cape Town it was, however, felt that the time was not yet ripe for the implementation of the commissioner's findings.¹⁹

Sarhili had meanwhile reluctantly agreed to submit the assault case to Colonial arbitration. He was convinced that the Cape Government was biased in favour of Ngangelizwe, their "pet chief". As time went by, without the Government taking active steps to settle the case, he became increasingly suspicious of its impartiality, and he regarded the appointment of E. Chalmers as Resident to Ngangelizwe, as yet another attempt from Cape Town to strengthen the Government's ties with that chief. When Brownlee, then still commissioner to the

Ngqika, was sent on a peace mission, he found Sarhili's intransigent attitude an obstacle in the way of a satisfactory settlement. Sarhili insisted that it would be humiliating for him "not to accept blood" as compensation for the assault on his daughter. This led Brownlee to the conclusion that Sarhili wanted war since the outcome would enable him to occupy a part of Mnqanqeni's country. At the same time he accepted as genuine Ngangelizwe's wish to make atonement. This, he realized, was certainly not because the Thembu king was not equally keen to make war on the Gcaleka, but because he was afraid of the Cape Government.²⁰ From Balfour, Abercrombie-Smith, though admitting that Ngangelizwe had behaved shamefully, nevertheless expressed the opinion that Sarhili was trying to make capital out of this dispute, since his heart's desire was to get more land. At an earlier meeting with Smith, Sarhili had complained that he had been waiting for nine months for an answer from the Cape Government, and he had threatened to take the matter into his own hands.²¹

The case was settled in April 1871 when Ngangelizwe was fined forty head of cattle. By this time the dispute had become too complicated to be solved. It was clear that if Ngangelizwe were to pay the fine, and his wife was not returned, he would claim the dowry, in which case Sarhili would set up a counter claim. Moreover, Sarhili regarded Ngangelizwe's crime as unpardonable and the forty head of cattle did not satisfy him. Reports that he was "biding his time" seem to have been correct. Meanwhile, assuming the role of peace-maker, he sent a message through Fynn to Ngangelizwe, in which he stated that he had no desire to go to war on the Thembu; that he would put an end to cattle raiding by his people; and that he was willing to settle their

disputes once and for all. Ngangelizwe's answer was less amenable. He listed many grievances, referring amongst others to the confiscation, during the Xego-Xelo affair, of Thembu cattle which had not yet been returned.²² And so, despite all attempts by the agents to restore some kind of peace, the years 1871 - 1872 saw a rapid deterioration in the relationship between the two chiefs with an increase in mutual cattle raiding. There was also increasing excitement in the Reserve. Cumming complained in August 1872 that stock raided from the Reserve had been seen in Thembuland, but that the Thembu were so hostile that the Idutywa people would not dare to cross the border to recapture their property. Cumming accused the Thembu of having held a meeting in the presence of Chalmers, where they spoke openly of their desire to attack the Reserve people.²³ Chalmers immediately refuted all such allegations. He, in turn, assured the Government of Ngangelizwe's goodwill towards the Reserve people and his continued efforts to stop cattle raiding.²⁴ In this situation where emotions had become so tense that the least provocations could spark off a war, Chalmers injudiciously allowed Ngangelizwe to accompany him incognito when he took a surveyor to Bomvanaland to investigate the Thembu-Gcaleka border dispute.²⁵

During this visit to the troubled area a meeting between Chalmers and Moni ended on an unsatisfactory note. Moni emphasised that he was an independent chief who, although living on Thembu lands, acknowledged Sarhili's paramountcy. He refused to discuss the possibility of recognizing Ngangelizwe's authority should the disputed lands east of the Mbashe be awarded to the Thembu. Meanwhile somebody had recognized Ngangelizwe, and the news of his presence at the meeting

was greeted with dismay by Sarhili, who was now more convinced than ever that he could not rely upon the Cape Colony's impartiality. In the next couple of months, various incidents strengthened his suspicions. When in 1871 there was trouble between Moni and a subordinate chief, Mtatla, Chalmers ignored the fact that the border dispute that led to the disagreement was still under investigation, and claimed the right for either himself or Ngangelizwe to be consulted should the problem not soon be solved. On top of all this it became known that Ngangelizwe was planning a second trip to the sea.²⁶ This never took place as he wanted to take more men with him than Chalmers thought advisable.²⁷ Ngangelizwe's motives in planning these visits to Bomvanaland remain a mystery, but it seems reasonable to assume that, having been accompanied by a government agent, he hoped to impress Moni. Sarhili, still harbouring grudges because of what he felt had been an unsatisfactory settlement of the assault case, was justified in assuming that Ngangelizwe had undertaken these trips in an attempt to establish his authority over Bomvanaland. He was now more convinced than ever that the Bomvanaland dispute would not be settled in his favour, and since land was at the root of all disputes, war became inevitable. It broke out in October 1872.

The war was short and ended in disaster for the Thembu. Sarhili took up a position just beyond the Mbashe, in Moni's country, on a peculiar spot which formed a sort of basin with a number of thickly wooded kloofs leading away from it. Ngangelizwe attacked Sarhili there with five divisions, of which the centre division was to make a feint attack upon the centre of the kloof, so as to provoke Sarhili, after which the right and left armies were to close in from the rear. The

left division attacked prematurely and met with fierce opposition. When this division was forced to give way, a general retreat of the Thembu armies followed, during which the entire left division was wiped out. A feature of this battle was the astonishing number of fire-arms used by the warring parties, especially the Thembu.²⁸

The news that Ngangelizwe was hemmed in caused great commotion among the Mfengu who, but for Blyth, would have rushed to the aid of the victorious Gcaleka.²⁹ Sarhili followed up his success by sweeping through Thembuland, burning huts as far as he went and sowing panic among the Thembu. Ngangelizwe's chief councillor sought refuge in Emigrant Thembuland. Ngangelizwe himself, his Great Place having been burnt down, fled to Chalmers, who received him sympathetically, and justified Thembu participation in the war as though Ngangelizwe had only acted in self-defence.³⁰ In a moment of panic Ngangelizwe asked that his country should be taken over by the British Government as he had no hope of retaining it against onslaughts by his surrounding enemies. Chalmers, acting with considerable foresight, proposed that the matter should be postponed for a week so as to give the Thembu chiefs the opportunity to express their opinions.³¹ When the matter was raised during the investigations led by the Judge Commission, most chiefs objected to Ngangelizwe's request. The Paramount himself withdrew his request when he realized that by implication it would mean the complete loss of his jurisdiction over his tribe.³² The vulnerability and military weakness of the Thembu, illustrated by their ignominious defeat, nevertheless called for interference by the Cape Government, which could not stand aloof while Sarhili was strengthening himself at the cost of the Colony's

potential ally. Although it was officially stated at the time that Hargreaves had persuaded Sarhili, after his victory, to withdraw from Thembuland,³³ Brownlee was secretly convinced that the Gcaleka were overawed by the presence of a police force concentrated at the Bram Neck.³⁴

Although Peace was nominally restored, the Thembu-Gcaleka disputes were by no means resolved; in fact the activities of Colonial officials in the post-war years led to increased tension. The members of the Judge-Edmonstone Commission, far from having tried to find a workable solution to the Bomvanaland dispute, emphasised the expediency of maintaining two antagonistic blocs in the Transkei. On their own admission they made no attempt to bring the two chiefs together, as they thought it the "worst policy possible" to encourage amicable relationships. Their report further emphasised that nothing should be done to weaken Ngangelizwe. In laying down guidelines as to future Cape Colonial policies, they advised: "It is of the greatest importance to the Government of the Colony that Ngangelizwe's weaknesses and silly disputes should not destroy him. He had always been a faithful ally to the Colony and every opportunity should be used to assist him in the improvement of his government and of checking his exercise of despotic power in that country and, if possible, land unoccupied should be filled by colonial Tambookies. This would restore the balance of power in the Transkei and with Mfenguland and Idutywa in good order, the Government could dictate its terms to surrounding tribes". As for the Bomvanaland dispute, the Judge Commission admitted that Ngangelizwe had no claim to the territory, but they warned at the same time that Sarhili's claims

should also be rejected.³⁵

The sentiments expressed in this report were echoed by C.D. Griffith, ex-magistrate of Queenstown and at the time Government Agent to Moshoeshoe. He impressed upon the Government that "the Tambookies have always been looked upon by the other Kafirs as Government people, and now it will be said that Kreli had beaten Government, and I am afraid it will have a very bad effect on the whole of Kafirland." With reference to the positive part played by the Thembu in the campaign against Sarhili in 1858 he concluded: "I consider the Thembu to be our own allies and that by accepting their services in the way above mentioned, we morally bound ourselves by an offensive and defensive treaty as binding as any written document made by the three Emperors now at Berlin."³⁶ I have no hesitation in saying that we are bound by every principle of honour and justice to see Ngangelizwe and his Tambookies are not deprived of an inch of ground. If Kreli is allowed to do so, then as far as any intercourse with natives in Kafirland is concerned, it will cease, and I shall even be ashamed to call myself an Englishman - to have been loyal to the British Government will be synonymous, in the eyes of the natives, to be called a fool".³⁷

While still at work, the Commission already warned the Cape Government that Sarhili's defiant conduct could provoke another Thembu-Gcaleka war. Brownlee was consequently asked to proceed to the Transkei for the purpose of bringing about peace.

On his arrival in the Transkei, Brownlee found both chiefs in a sulky

mood. Sarhili made no secret of his misgivings regarding the Government's impartiality in the Thembu-Gcaleka dispute. The previous year Brownlee had rejected his request to be allowed to take possession of the lands that he had conquered from the Thembu in 1872, or, as an alternative, to demand a thousand cattle from the Thembu as war indemnity. He now accused Brownlee of having "screened" Ngangelizwe, and he maintained that if he, (Sarhili) had been the aggressor, he would have been punished. His renewed demand at his meeting with Brownlee, for the territory conquered from the Thembu in the 1872 war was once again brushed aside, and Brownlee warned him to be careful lest he find himself once again a fugitive, as he had been in 1858 when he had been expelled from his land for his part in the cattle-killing. By this time Sarhili must have realized that only another war could bring him the land he needed and desired. Ngangelizwe, who hoped that he would have been compensated for his long friendship with the Colony, was dismayed to learn that his right over Bomvanaland would under no circumstances be recognized. Brownlee's visit had therefore merely served to accentuate the ill-feelings that still existed between the chiefs. With the land issue unresolved, the fertile Nechana Valley, which Sarhili claimed by right of conquest, became the most hotly disputed area.

The war of 1872 had proved that the Cape Colony's policy of non-intervention would no longer work. This Brownlee made clear in his report of 1873: "Our first object is the protection of our frontier districts from violence and disturbance... With the chiefs beyond our borders there should be no unnecessary interference, and interference should be resorted to only under circumstances when the peace and

tranquility of our borders are endangered by the acts of our neighbours, and when their actions are clearly detrimental to the interests and welfare of the Colony. While laying it down as a fixed principle that interference with matters beyond our borders is to be avoided, there are cases, however, which force themselves on us which we cannot disregard...There are weak tribes imploring our protection.³⁸ In a confidential letter to the Governor he admitted: "Not the tribe, but Ngangelizwe himself is our weak spot in the Transkei."³⁹

In his instructions to W. Wright, who in 1873 succeeded Chalmers as Resident to Ngangelizwe, Brownlee explained the new direction his policy had taken, more clearly. Wright was instructed to make the most strenuous effort to maintain a good understanding with the Thembu, detaching them and keeping them separate from any scheme which might endanger the peace in Thembuland, and more especially the peace with the Cape Colony. Furthermore, it was emphasised that he should seek to gain such an influence over the chiefs as in course of time would enable him to exercise a beneficial control over the internal affairs of the tribe.⁴⁰ In an "entirely private" letter he went much further. In line with the policy of divide-and-rule he advised Wright to cultivate the friendship of the semi-independent chiefs Dalasile and Mgudhlwa. The former resented Ngangelizwe's actions which had plunged the Thembu in 1872 into war. It was also Dalasile who overruled Ngangelizwe's proposal that the Thembu should be placed under British rule. Incidents like these, Brownlee told the Resident Agent, should be used "to obtain such an influence as to be able to bring pressure on Ngangelizwe's authority and bring him more directly under your influence."⁴¹

That Brownlee was by this time already thinking in the direction of British expansionism across the Kei, is borne out by views he expressed in a confidential letter to Sir Henry Barkly. He suggested that Gatberg⁴² should become "a strong advanced post, from which we can gradually extend our influence and protection to such tribes as desire it...overawe the Pondos, support the Tambookies and Umhlonhlo, and prevent any combination for evil between the Amapondas and Kreli..." In this way he hoped that eventually the influence of the Cape Government could be extended over Natal. He assured the Governor that "the main motive is to maintain peace on our borders."⁴³

Brownlee certainly would have preferred to extend Colonial control over Thembuland immediately, but he could do so only should a request for such intervention come from the Thembu themselves. When Ngangelizwe tried to solicit Colonial aid in settling his long-standing dispute with the Mpondo, he was informed, through his agent, that the Thembu could not, as a matter of right, claim Cape Colonial protection. Should they, however, require such support they could, like the Sotho and other tribes, place themselves under the Cape Government, and if their submission was to be accepted, they could then claim protection as British subjects.⁴⁴ When Ngangelizwe defaulted by not restoring Mpondo cattle raided by his people, Brownlee issued a stern warning to him in which he was reminded of his vulnerability: "For you are surrounded Chief, upon all sides, with powerful tribes who are all your enemies. The Government is trying to befriend you. But it will not be able to do so if you allow your people to make raids without your authority...And you cannot help knowing from your past experience that your enemies are on every side,

and that they are too many and too strong for you."⁴⁵

Brownlee's somewhat cautious approach became more dynamic after 1874, following the return to power of Disraeli's Conservative Party in Britain. The Prime Minister's appointment of Lord Carnarvon as Secretary of State ^{for the} Colonies, was seen as a confirmation of the expansionist trend in the Government's policy.⁴⁶ Confident then, that there would be no interference from Whitehall, official letters from 1875 onwards reflect an increasing tendency on the part of the Cape Government to interfere in Transkeian affairs.

Therefore when Sarhili and Ngangelizwe both laid claim to the Nechana Valley, we may well be justified in suspecting that it was the attitude of the Cape Government that exacerbated the issue. Sarhili, fearing Colonial retribution, was rendered impotent; he could no longer settle the matter in the traditional manner through raiding cattle or waging limited warfare. Ngangelizwe, on the other hand, was reminded by the Secretary for Native Affairs, through the Thembu Agent, of his indebtedness to the power which had helped him to maintain his independence against Sarhili at a time when he was facing defeat. The matter seems to have been further complicated by the fact that each paramount might have become aware, not only of the advantage of appealing to the Cape Government against the other, but also of capitalizing on events which seemed likely to result in an outcome favourable to his interests. This is exactly what happened in 1875. Sarhili at this stage was faced with the realization that only some astute diplomatic manoeuvre on his part could bring about a settlement of the Nechana dispute that would be favourable to the Gcaleka. The

opportunity he needed presented itself when rumours regarding the ill-treatment and, subsequently, the death of his niece, Nongxokozelo, started to circulate.⁴⁷

When Novili married Ngangelizwe, NongxoKozelo accompanied her to Thembuland, and she remained behind as Ngangelizwe's concubine after Novili returned to her father. NongxoKozelo had been forgotten for almost three years; but on 17 March 1875 Sarhili requested that she should return home as it had been some time since her friends had last seen her. In response to repeated requests, Ngangelizwe gave evasive replies. In May it was rumoured that she was actually dead. Sarhili, still unable to obtain a satisfactory response from Ngangelizwe, now formally handed over the matter to Ayliff and asked for a governmental enquiry. On 27 July Ngangelizwe reported that the woman was ill, and on the 29th he reported her death. Sarhili reacted by saying that the matter was in the hands of the Cape Government to whom he looked for an impartial judgement.

The satisfactory settlement of this case was of the utmost importance to the Cape Colony, and Brownlee immediately took matters in hand. In a detailed letter to the Colonial Secretary he outlined the strategy to be followed. The matter could either be left for the chiefs to settle themselves - which Sarhili would have preferred - or be settled by the Government, which Brownlee presumed Ngangelizwe would have preferred. He warned that should the first course be followed, there was a possibility of the Thembu being attacked and defeated, the consequence of which would be the proportionate strengthening of the Gcaleka - a development which had to be prevented at all costs. He

therefore advised that the Cape Government take immediate action, without prior consultation with Ngangelizwe. Only after the appointment of a commission should Ngangelizwe be informed that Sarhili had referred the matter to the Government, and his consent to have the matter settled by arbitration be obtained, together with a promise that he would abide by whatever decision was taken. Brownlee did not foresee any problems. Ngangelizwe, threatened by the Gcaleka, and conscious of the possible withdrawal of Colonial support in the event of his non-compliance, presumably would abide by any decision. Finally, Brownlee warned that there was one possible complication, not likely to arise, but which nevertheless had to be considered: Ngangelizwe could refuse to submit to any investigation, and could endeavour to obtain a settlement simply by asserting his innocence. Here Brownlee held the trump card. Should such a complication arise, a detachment of the F.A.M.P. would be sent to the Umgwali river. This, besides overawing Ngangelizwe, would have the further effect of keeping all parties quiet until the matter was finally settled.⁴⁸

A show of force was not immediately necessary. Ngangelizwe agreed to Colonial arbitration and W. Wright and W. Ayliff were appointed to investigate the matter. Their final verdict was that Ngangelizwe, smarting under disgrace of his defeat in 1872, had vented his rage on Sarhili's niece. He had thrashed her on the head until she was all but dead, then forced her in a crippled state to attend him at a beer-drinking. After their return he sent two young men to force her from her hut and beat her to death. The Commission also pointed out that there had, for a long time, been ill-feeling between Ngangelizwe and Sarhili as a result of Ngangelizwe's acts, which, if unchecked, would

involve the whole country in war.⁴⁹ The report was submitted to Brownlee who fined Ngangelizwe two hundred head of cattle, to be paid, not by his people, but in his personal capacity, to Sarhili.⁵⁰

Even before the Commission gave its verdict, both Brownlee and Sir Henry Barkly, had stressed the desirability of bringing the Thembu under the direct rule of the Cape Colony,⁵¹ but they had to bide their time. Under these circumstances Brownlee now embarked upon a policy of direct interference in Thembuland. Four years earlier, during the Mqanqeni dispute, the Cape Government had been adamant that it would not interfere in the disputes between Ngangelizwe and a subordinate chief.⁵² Now, when in 1875, a dispute arose between Ngangelizwe and the Mfengu chief, Menziwe, Brownlee did not hesitate to interfere.

Menziwe had, many years earlier, sought refuge in Thembuland where he lived as a loyal subject. In the war of 1872 he fought on Ngangelizwe's side, but, disgusted with the Nongxokozelo affair, he informed Ngangelizwe that he would stay neutral should another war arise out of the murder. When Ngangelizwe threatened to take revenge. Menziwe fled to the Idutywa Reserve where he dispelled all rumours that Nongxokozelo had died of ill-health. The lands from which Menziwe fled formed a buffer between Sarhili and Ngangelizwe, and Brownlee, for defence reasons, supported the chief when he wished to return. Ngangelizwe who forbade Menziwe to re-occupy these lands, was warned by Brownlee that he had no right to expel a chief from a country that was held by the Government's favour without reference to that Government. "Hitherto," Brownlee told Ngangelizwe, "we have not interfered in the internal affairs of your tribe,"⁵³ thereby

indicating that a new phase in Thembu-Cape Colonial relationships had started. In fulfilment of his promise to protect Menziwe once he was resettled, against reprisals from Ngangelizwe, a detachment of the F.A.M.P. under Captain J.H. Bowker was sent to Thembuland.⁵⁴ The presence of a police force had a decisive influence on the further developments in Thembuland.

Sarhili who was intensely disappointed that the Nongxokozelo case had not resulted in any territorial gains for him, but instead had only brought cattle - which he considered to be inadequate compensation - expressed his disappointment in no uncertain terms.⁵⁵ It was only in December, certainly influenced by the presence of the police force, that he finally notified his agent that he would accept the cattle.⁵⁶ He was further distressed when a number of cattle died of lungsickness on their way to Gcalekaland.⁵⁷ Meanwhile there were constant rumours that he was preparing for an invasion into Thembuland.

Aware of Ngangelizwe's vulnerability, ^{Cape Town authorities hoped} it was hoped in Cape Town that the time had come when the Thembu paramount would be compelled to seek protection. J. Rose-Innes, the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate at King William's Town, assured Wright that any request by the Thembu to be taken over would be favourably received by the Cape Government.⁵⁸

The local news media pressed for even more decisive steps. Criticizing what they regarded as inadequate punishment for Ngangelizwe's brutalities, the Daily News advocated the annexation of

the whole country between the Kei and Natal, in which case proper magistrates and a proper police force could be set up and the new subjects could then be subjected to a system of taxation.⁵⁹

Ngangelizwe found himself in a situation that he could no longer handle. The Gcaleka threat had not yet receded, and he could no longer rely on Colonial support in the event of another war. He was furthermore overawed by the presence of a police force which was placed in a strategic position to act swiftly in case of Thembu resistance. To add to his problems, he found the support of many of his chiefs wavering. They showed their disapproval of his actions by refusing to pay fines imposed on them, and by staying away from meetings. There were rumours that some of them were contemplating placing themselves under Colonial rule. In his distress, Ngangelizwe turned towards Hargreaves who advised him to accept British rule. Ngangelizwe agreed and on his request Hargreaves drew up some conditions which were shortly afterwards shown to S.A. Probart, the M.L.A. for Graaff-Reinet, who was then on his way to Kokstad. Probart proposed some amendments. These conditions were taken by Hargreaves to Clarkebury where they were accepted by the Thembu at a large meeting.⁶⁰ Dalasile and Sitokwe Tyali were the only chiefs who refused to attend the meeting.

The Clarkebury meeting was held in the presence of Capt. J.H. Bowker who had for a long time been propagating the annexation of Transkeian territories, and who saw in the existing situation a perfect opportunity for the fulfilment of his expansionist ideals. What followed is a very good example of policy being made by the man

on the spot. It transpired later that the Clarkebury agreement was far too liberal for Bowker's liking. It is not clear whether he later intentionally gave the Colonial Secretary the wrong impression, but his summary of the Clarkebury agreement was interpreted in Cape Town as meaning that the Thembu should be administered by a system of government similar to that in Mfenguland. By implication, the chiefs would have lost their power. As a step towards preparing the way for Colonial control over Thembuland, he suggested that Ngangelizwe should be deposed and replaced by his son together with his mother, Sarhili's daughter, who would in turn be placed under the care of the Thembu Agent. This, he said, would satisfy Sarhili, and put an end to "political intrigue".⁶¹ The Government's reply to Bowker was in accordance with the assumption that Ngangelizwe would cease to have any power.⁶² This was a deviation from the Clarkebury agreement, but Bowker lost no opportunity in assembling the chiefs and informing them accordingly. Walter Stanford disapprovingly wrote to Judge that "Mr Bowker deposed Ngangelizwe that day."⁶³

Mistaking silence as a sign of agreement, as was so often the case in European-African dealings, Bowker hurried on with his plans. He sent messages to Dalasile and Sitokwe Tyali, the two chiefs who remained aloof, to inform them of the Government's decisions, and rather brusquely asked them what they had to say on the matter. In time these two chiefs had little option but to agree to their being taken over by the Government. Meanwhile S.A. Probart, M.L.A. for Graaff-Reinet, was appointed as special commissioner to proceed to the Transkei to arrange the take-over.⁶⁴ On his arrival he found that Bowker had already informed the Thembu that their country was to be

taken over as British territory, and that Ngangelizwe's authority would cease in every way. Bowker was justified in boasting that he had annexed Thembuland on his own, thereby having secured for his government a coastline of twenty miles containing almost inexhaustible forests and valuable timber with rich pasturage and good wagon roads.

Like Bowker, Probart was aware of the economic advantages that annexation would have for the Cape Colony. In addition to the rich agricultural and pastoral possibilities of the country with its *adequate* rainfall, considerable revenue could be obtained from the population and an abundant supply of labour could be siphoned towards the Colony. It would seem that in their haste to get hold of this valuable territory, there was little time for other considerations. Probart acted in a great hurry. He met the assembled chiefs on 4 December 1875, and he announced that the conditions, as agreed upon at Clarkebury, were accepted, but that Ngangelizwe, owing to his bad behaviour, would be deprived of all authority. He added that it would depend on his behaviour whether he was to be reinstated. — Probart further submitted a proposal to the Cape Government for the division of Thembuland into four judicial districts: Emyanyani whose magistrate, W. Wright, had the additional authority of Chief Magistrate for Thembuland Proper, Engcobo with W.C. Stanford as Magistrate, Umtata under J.F. Boyes, and Mqanduli, under the Rev. John Scott. Probart's conditions were accepted in Cape Town. Government officials, however, did not only lack an understanding of the exact conditions under which the Thembu submitted to Colonial rule, but in believing that the Thembu had voluntarily accepted the deposition of Ngangelizwe, they deluded themselves about realities. The following

extract from Sihele's account of the events of 1875 reveals something of the feeling of indignation and shame of having been betrayed, experienced by the Thembu at the time:

"The whites constantly enquired from abaThembu as to what the position of amaGcaleka was. Then (the whites) would remind them (abaThembu) that they had long advised them to hand over their country to the government because Sarhili was coming. While amaThembu was still confused, not knowing which way to go, the government quickly posted its regiments all over Thembuland, under the pretext that the regiments were for their protection, and at the same time telling abaThembu that they should submit on their own terms. It was at that time, and under those circumstances of white regiments that abaThembu gave in and started drawing up stipulations of agreement of submission to the government. The prime mover in the whole Agreement was Hagile (Hargreaves) who repeatedly said, 'just remember this, we are at your service. You must say that it is you who are asking to be put under the wing of the government. Sarhili will confiscate your land. All this army you see has come to your aid.' Oh what a pity about the abaThembu who read no newspapers and who were also ignorant of the trickery of the whites...the Thembu saw the advice given by the servant of God as being a sound one...the outcome of the meeting was the acceptance by the government representative of a request by abaThembu that they be put under the wing of Queen Victoria...the Regiments of the government were then withdrawn having obtained what had been so strongly desired - the incorporation of abaThembu under the wing of the government without shedding blood, since they were allies of the government.⁶⁵

Emigrant Thembuland

When the four chiefs, Matanzima, Gecelo, Ndarala and Sitokwe Ndlele, settled in Emigrant Thembuland in 1865, the understanding was that they would be independent.

E.J. Warner, the first Thembu Agent, gave the following account of the attitude of the people in 1872: "One great idea of chief and people is to be on friendly terms with us and be called government people. They find it much more to their advantage, especially the common people, to be in this position than to be in an entirely independent state. But they have no desire to be annexed to the Colony, and any such attempts will create distrust. When they removed to this country the inducement was held out that in doing so they would avoid being subject to colonial law, hut taxes, etc. They have no objection to being under immediate and direct control of the Governor as High Commissioner, but they have a dread of colonial law and tax-paying. And it is my opinion that rather than (to) submit to these they would give up their present advantage under government, and prefer being left to themselves as independent tribes." Warner's own feelings were that it would be more advantageous to the Cape Government if Emigrant Thembuland could be annexed to the Colony, but as it was not yet possible, he thought the position they held was satisfactory. "We are gradually gaining more control over these people. The Government officer is looked up to by them as Paramount Chief, and by judicious management, laws and regulations suitable to their condition can be gradually introduced from time to time without creating bad feeling with either chiefs or people."⁶⁶

Although Sir Philip Wodehouse had in 1865 officially declared that it was the intended policy of the Cape Government to relinquish all rights and sovereignty over the territory between the Kei and the Mbashe rivers, it had, in fact, assumed certain powers over Emigrant Thembuland. The problem was that the position of the chiefs had not been clarified at the time of the Emigration. It is true that they were promised the right to settle all cases in their respective territories, and the position of the Thembu Agent was to be that of a diplomatic agent.⁶⁷ Yet, when E.J. Warner tried in 1870 to establish whether he was acting in accordance with the Government's wishes in exercising authority over the Emigrants, or whether he had nothing to do with the internal affairs of the country, he was informed that the Government would have no objection to his continuing a wholesome influence and control as far as the people were willing to submit to his doing so.⁶⁸ During his whole term of office he tried in vain to find a satisfactory answer concerning his exact powers and duties, and when he retired in 1874 to return to missionary work, he could not hand any written instructions to his successor, W. Fynn, as to the administration of the territory. In the absence of any clear guidelines, the distinction between advice and interference soon became blurred.

The extent to which Fynn actively interfered in the internal affairs of the Emigrant chiefs can be seen in two events that took place in 1874. The first concerned the Vundhli chief, Kosana. Kosana's people actually lived in Ngangelizwe's country under the authority of Sitokwe Tyali, but the chief himself had settled in Emigrant Thembuland. Successive agents had found themselves unable to gauge his attitude

towards the Colonial Government. At one stage he was rewarded for his good conduct by being acknowledged as chief, but in 1874 Fynn found his behaviour troublesome enough to deprive him of his chieftainship. He and his people were henceforth to come directly under the control of the Cape Government. Gecelo then claimed that Kosana's followers were his subjects.⁶⁹ It would seem that Gecelo had justifiable grounds for his claim,⁷⁰ but Fynn, without any investigation, denied this and told Gecelo that "it was not for him to prevent any chief or people from coming under the government."⁷¹ This certainly was a negation of a chief's control over his own people, and it caused bitter resentment.

The second incident also concerned Gecelo. For a long time there had been disputes between Gecelo and the Qwati chief, Sitokwe Ndlele, and in 1874 they fought each other. As they were independent chiefs, they certainly had reason to be disgruntled by the actions of Fynn, who interfered and fined each one fifty head of cattle for going to war "on Government land". This, Fynn hoped, would convince all the chiefs that "Government is not to be trifled with".⁷² Fynn had further exceeded his powers by taking Siquanqati, Matanzima's younger brother with him when he visited the chiefs. Siquanqati had no authority whatsoever, but he received a portion of the fine.⁷³ This strange behaviour on Fynn's part, can only be explained in terms of his apprehension of Matanzima's increasing influence in Emigrant Thembuland, and he probably spotted in Siquanqati a likely counterweight.⁷⁴ Matanzima's protests led to an investigation by Brownlee and to Fynn's subsequent dismissal from office. Brownlee accused him of having actively encouraged Siquanqati in his

subordination to Matanzima; of having illegally deprived Matanzima of part of his income from traders' licenses, and of having undermined Matanzima's authority by encouraging his people not to pay the fines rightfully imposed upon them. Fynn was succeeded by Charles Levey whose term of office coincided with the take-over of Ngangelizwe's country.

Encouraged by what was regarded as the successful dealings with Thembuland Proper in 1875, the Cape Government pressed forward, and extended its influence over Emigrant Thembuland as well. Without any prior consultation with the chiefs, it was decided that this territory was to be divided into two judicial districts, Southeyville and Xalanga, under magistrates Levey and Cumming respectively, and that these two magistracies were to be included in the Chief Magistracy.⁷⁵ Although Emigrant Thembuland was not legally annexed to the Cape Colony, the chiefs had now, for all practical purposes, lost their authority. Both Levey and Cumming assumed powers that were hardly compatible with the rights and powers that were promised to these chiefs at the time of the Emigration.

Charles Levey, frankly admitted that he had at times ~~ex~~ceeded his powers. He described his magisterial duties as judicial, political and diplomatic. Although he did not consider his judicial authority to be legal, he felt himself obliged, in his capacity as magistrate, to assume such duties in the interests of the more "advanced" people who, he feared, would otherwise leave the country. "The actual position I am justified in assuming", he replied to a questionnaire, "is Diplomatic Agent. The chiefs under my charge are really

independent."⁷⁶ A devoted disciple of Sir George Grey, Levey was an implacable opponent of traditional chieftainship which he regarded as the greatest stumbling block to progress and "civilization". His administration was characterized by attempts to curb the influence of the chiefs. One effective way in which this could have been done was by the appointment of paid headmen, a policy that had been followed since 1865 in Emigrant Thembuland. Sir Richard Southey believed that this was the key to efficient management. "I fancy," he once advised Warner, "if I were in your position and Cobbe's I should frequently, at stated periods, assemble all the paid men, say once a quarter, and have long talks with them. I should endeavour to let them see and feel that they get the money from me, and that if they did not do what I thought right they might lose it, and I would tell them what I think right and...I fancy I could obtain such an influence among them as would enable me to do almost anything with them. At any rate I think this is the right thing."⁷⁷ Southey's judgement proved to be correct. Headmen paid by the Cape Government were useful in detecting and recovering stolen property, especially as there were no policemen in the Transkeian Territory. E. Warner, during his term of office would have liked the number of headmen to be increased, but initially the Cape Government could not increase the expenditure beyond the payment of three headmen, two petty chiefs and four principal chiefs. From time to time new appointments were made, often for political reasons. In May 1876 Levey decided that Kosana, who was by then back in favour, should receive a second class chief's allowance as he could put a check on Sitokwe Tyali's ambitions, and "to show others that the Government will support loyal men."⁷⁸ In December, when Sitokwe Ndlela was accused of misbehaviour, Levey recommended that his chief

councillor, Mankeyi, a man of good Christian influence, should be made independent of Sitokwe and placed in the northern part of this chief's location. As this part was occupied by more westernized people, Levey hoped, by this arrangement, effectively to separate Gecelo and Sitokwe's people, and thereby put an end to their constant quarrelling.⁷⁹

Like Levey, W.G. Cumming, who became magistrate with Gecelo in 1878, had little regard for the rights of the chiefs. In his evidence before the Thembuland Land Commission, he referred to the Emigrant Thembu as semi-independent. They could try cases against their own people who had the right to appeal to the magistrate. But decisions by magistrates could override those of the chiefs. The chiefs, in his opinion, did not have the right to grant land to anybody without the consent of the magistrate. What is remarkable about Cumming's evidence, is that he could not remember ever having received formal instructions on these very important issues, but rather that he was told what to do.⁸⁰ Even the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland had to confess in 1879 to ignorance of conditions in Emigrant Thembuland. "The Emigrant Thembu", he wrote, "are in a different position to the other natives of the District, in fact, I don't know to what position they are really entitled. They claim to be independent."⁸¹ Yet Cumming's interference in land matters in Gecelo's country showed a complete disregard of the chiefs' authority.⁸²

The Cape Government was quite prepared to negate the 1865 agreement with the Emigrant chiefs who had no defence against such onslaughts on their power. This emerges very clearly from Elliot's attitude when,

after the war of 1881, renewed attempts were made to curb the influence of the chiefs. He then wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs that, at the time of the Emigration, the conditions of settlement were traditional since there were no written records. The Government, he argued, had now found it necessary to change these in order to meet the changing conditions of the Thembu themselves.

Such "changed conditions" meant that Colonial law was extended to Emigrant Thembuland, and that taxes were imposed upon its inhabitants.⁸³ What the chiefs dreaded had happened. Levey once wrote: It is a common saying with the people in my district: "u Rulumentu balekiti lamhlaba." (The Government has lent us the land.) Levey assumed, then, that the Emigrant Thembu looked upon the land as a gift, i.e. not something to which they had a legitimate claim.⁸⁴

In 1875 the "gift" was taken back. Another agreement with the Thembu had been unilaterally abrogated.

ii. Thembu Resistance to Colonial Control

As the impact of Colonial control made itself felt throughout the Thembu territories, widespread discontent manifested itself. Unrest was not confined to the Thembu. The Gcaleka chief, Sarhili, resenting land settlements that had deprived him of territory to which he felt he had a rightful claim, appeared to be restless. Further afield there were similar signs of black discontent. In the Transvaal the Government was at loggerheads with Sekhuhuni's Pedi, while in Natal the awakening of Zulu power under Cetshwayo caused alarm. In the 1870s fear of a black alliance against the white man was uppermost in the minds of frontier people, and this resulted in periodic "war scares". In 1876 such a scare sowed panic on the frontier. Rumours implicated both Sarhili and Ngangelizwe in a plot to overthrow the Government. The fact that the heir to the Thembu throne was Sarhili's grandson certainly gave credibility to speculations that the two chiefs had casted aside former differences and were in constant communication.⁸⁵ When the war scare started traders and white residents in Thembuland were uncertain of Ngangelizwe's attitude. While some took precautions by moving their families to Clarkebury in anticipation of the outbreak for which - so the alarmists said - the date had already been fixed,⁸⁶ others rejected the idea outright as absurd talk indulged in by Europeans.⁸⁷ Brownlee's visit to the Transkei, in an attempt to establish the true facts, confirmed the view of the non-alarmists. He summarized the situation correctly when he ascribed Ngangelizwe's disaffection to his loss of power, which he was attempting to recover by resistance to white authority, rather than by invading the Colony. Brownlee found that Ngangelizwe was

supported by his chiefs who, by then, had had time to reassess the step they had taken in accepting British control. They had now realized that such acceptance had jeopardized the whole institution of chieftainship. Ngangelizwe was, after all, an independent chief who could not be deposed by an alien power.⁸⁸ Although Brownlee was confident that the Thembu clans distrusted each other, and that lack of unity would prevent any concerted action, his tour of the Transkei did bring home the message that Thembu disaffection over Ngangelizwe's deposition could not be ignored. He was, however, hesitant to take immediate action. Although Wright, the Chief Magistrate, had reported favourably on the subject of Ngangelizwe's conduct, it could not be overlooked that it was with the latter's connivance that war rumours had originated. His reinstatement, at this stage, would therefore have had a pernicious effect on the Thembu as war threats could in future be seen as a way of finding redress for grievances.⁸⁹

But discontent among the Thembu went deeper than the deposition of Ngangelizwe. The magistrate's disregard of traditional systems of authority by consultation led to estrangement, and they found it increasingly difficult to carry out their judgements. They could rely neither on physical support from the Colony nor on the support of the black people.⁹⁰ Resentment was particularly strong in Ngangelizwe's country. This was borne out by general complaints which came from that area: "Every few miles we have magistrates placed among us. The old men are never consulted with: we do not know whether those law talkers are for good or for evil...We see now that it is too late - we are sold - we are slaves. We can't tell our minds to the white man,

he won't listen to us. He gets paid to come up here; he does it as a duty. He cares nothing for the good of this country; his mind is not here."⁹¹ The appointment of Xelo, Ngangelizwe's chief councillor, as public prosecutor and general adviser to W. Wright, was further seen as proof of Government indifference to the feelings of the ordinary people.⁹² Rumours that a tax on huts was to be introduced added to the general unrest. Therefore, when by the end of 1877 the Colonial Thembu, as well as the Emigrant Thembu, joined the movement for the re-instatement of Ngangelizwe, which had by then almost developed into a resistance movement, Brownlee realized that the time had come for a more conciliatory attitude; and, in November 1877, Ngangelizwe was re-instated as chief over his section.⁹³ Although the main source of Thembu dissatisfaction had been removed, the war scare continued.

In 1877 a new governor, Sir Bartle Frere, took responsibility for this situation. He was entrusted with the power to deal instantly and on his own discretion with the Africans. Frere's appointment underlined the expansionist trend in British policy, following the return to power of Disraeli, and the appointment of Lord Carnarvon as Colonial Secretary. The unresolved racial conflicts in South Africa had convinced Carnarvon that the problems of the sub-continent could not be solved on a piecemeal basis, but only by the establishment of British sovereignty over Southern Africa. In his attempts to obtain this goal, Carnarvon was guided by two principles: the need for a strong central government for the whole of Southern Africa, and the restoration of peace and order as a pre-requisite for the successful amalgamation of the states. Carnarvon found in Sir Bartle a man whose

Victorian concepts of "the clear responsibility of sovereignty" and "the mission of the British people as an imperial and civilizing power", matched his own; hence his appointment, nominally as Governor, but really as "Statesman...most capable of carrying out my (Carnarvon's) scheme in effect, and with the prospect of becoming the first governor-general of the South African dominions."⁹⁴ Frere accepted his appointment in a spirit of great optimism. He saw his task as a dual one: the defence of the Colony against black invasions, and the promotion of the African people by the extension of British rule, whereby they could be placed under a settled form of government.⁹⁵ He found on his arrival that, although the war scare had to a certain extent subsided, white feelings were not reassured by a report of the Defence Commission, appointed in 1876 under the chairmanship of Gordon Sprigg. The Commission's report emphasised the ineffectiveness of the defence system as well as pointing out the stark possibility of a black coalition against the Colony. It further expressed indignation over the sale of arms to Africans and it adopted an implacable attitude towards the recognition of African law and constitutions in Black communities under Colonial control.⁹⁶ Before the Governor could make a proper assessment of these recommendations, he was summoned to the Eastern frontier where trouble was brewing.

The explosive frontier situation was the result of a minor incident in Gcalekaland, when fighting broke out between Mfengu and Gcaleka guests at the wedding of the son of a Mfengu, Ngcayecibi.⁹⁷ The continued hostility, after the brawl, extended into the Idutywa Reserve, with its large Mfengu population under Cumming's much-criticized administration.⁹⁸ Although Sarhili pleaded that the attacks by his

people upon the Mfengu had happened without his knowledge or sanction, the Cape authorities' distrust of the Gcaleka paramount, nurtured over many years, was too deep-rooted for them to believe in his innocence. William Ayliff, convinced that Sarhili was contemplating war on the Colony, advised the military occupation of Gcalekaland.⁹⁹ The Government furthermore saw in the Gcaleka-Mfengu conflict an ideal opportunity to cement their relationship with the Mfengu. Also, they had to convince the Idutywa people that Britain was prepared to protect her subjects. On Ayliff's advice, then, Brownlee sent troops to Butterworth, a step which further exacerbated Gcaleka-Mfengu feelings.

Meanwhile Frere, accompanied by John X. Merriman, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, had arrived at the frontier. In the weeks to follow, their unfortunate delay in keeping Cape Town informed on frontier developments was interpreted by the Molteno Ministry as an attempt to conceal Sarhili's progress; hence a decision was taken by the cabinet that the Governor should allow the despatch of the 88th regiment to the frontier.¹⁰⁰ Frere, who regarded the whole problem as an inter-tribal affair, at first refused to comply with this request.¹⁰¹ He was severely criticized for his decision. But the worsening situation, in the following weeks, in consequence of the decision by E. Chalmers¹⁰² to move with troops to Idutywa; the lack of sufficient Colonial police to carry out the governmental policy of support for the Mfengu; the raids by the Gcaleka war faction on Mfengu - all these factors convinced him at last, that war had become inevitable.¹⁰³ From the Colonial side, war preparations were stepped up, and Sarhili was placed in an untenable position: he was pressured

by the Cape Government to restrain his people, but this had by now become impossible.

The first skirmishes between Gcaleka and Colonial troops - the latter, stationed at a place called Ibeka - took place in September 1877. Determined that the Gcaleka power must finally be destroyed, Frere issued a proclamation by which Sarhili was deposed and his lands forfeited.¹⁰⁴ As justification for this step, Frere maintained that the Gcaleka had held the lands on condition of good behaviour. Charles Griffith who, as commander of the F.A.M.P., was put in charge east of the Kei, acted swiftly. He invaded Gcalekaland, burned down Sarhili's Great Place, and forced the paramount and most of his people to seek refuge in Bomvanaland. By the end of November 1877, the Colonial government was mistakenly made to believe, that the war had come to an end. However, the Gcaleka returned in full strength, and a more serious and protracted phase started in December. One of Sarhili's sub-chiefs, Khiva, made his way to the Ngqika location where he persuaded Sandile to join the war. From there, unrest spread to Glen Grey.¹⁰⁵

Differences between Frere and Molteno on matters of frontier defence led to the Prime minister's dismissal and the appointment of Gordon Sprigg as his successor.¹⁰⁶ Sprigg was determined to bring the war to a speedy end. In a decisive battle at Kentani, the chiefs Sarhili and Sandile, who had joined forces, were defeated, and by May 1878, the costly war was over.¹⁰⁷

The war demonstrated the extent to which various Thembu factions had

been moving along divergent political roads. In Glen Grey, where there had been a long history of close Ngqika-Thembu cooperation, and where the people, since 1870, had angrily watched the erosion of their traditional systems by the application of Colonial law, there was overt sympathy with the warring tribes which in turn found vent in isolated cases of armed resistance against Colonial rule. The Mfanta and Gungubele rebellion was an example.¹⁰⁸ In Emigrant Thembuland some chiefs like Sitokwe Ndlele gave moral support to the insurgents while they themselves played a waiting game. Others, notably Ndarala and Matanzima, not prepared to take the risk of losing their land, pledged their loyalty to the Colony, although there were officials who suspected Matanzima of having secretly supported the war faction.¹⁰⁹

Ngangelizwe's attitude was crucial. In his district there was considerable sympathy with the Gcaleka, but, as chief over only his section, his powers were limited. He nevertheless immediately complied with Elliot's request, and, with the support of all his minor chiefs, he induced a considerable number of men to join Elliot's Colonial levies.

In the final analysis, the non-participation of the larger section of the Thembu made little difference to Cape Colonial attitudes towards them in the aftermath of the war. It was the involvement of some, rather than the neutrality of the not negligible majority, that was taken into account when laws, aimed at the preservation of peace, were passed in Cape Town.

During his seven month spell in the troubled area, Frere's earlier

convictions that an alliance between all the major black nations, from Sekhukuni to Sandile was possible and that it was inadvisable to allow Africans possession of arms, were confirmed. His opening speech to the Cape Parliament in 1878 reflected his determination to prevent a recurrence of "events fatal alike to the prosperity of the Colony and the happiness of the Inhabitants". He therefore announced that "with the view of guarding for the future against the rising of any large number of armed natives within the Colony, a measure providing for the Better Preservation of Peace by the disarming of all persons whom it is not safe or desirable to entrust with arms" would be laid before parliament.¹¹⁰ A disarmament bill was easily passed in 1878 under the name of the Peace Preservation Act, and was immediately put into effect in the spirit expressed by Prime Minister Sprigg: "The natives", he said, "should learn that there was no other course than to submit. The Government was not going to pursue the system of palaver anymore..."¹¹¹ The Mfengu were disarmed first. As they showed no resistance the Government was brought under the erroneous impression that there was to be no opposition to the bill.

Although the bill was not extended to Emigrant Thembuland, Levey lost no time before starting to disarm the people under his jurisdiction. He unwisely went round with a force of twenty men to collect guns. The episode, interpreted by the Thembu as the "use of a large army to disarm them",¹¹² caused incalculable harm to Thembu-Colonial relationships. H.G. Elliot, who succeeded Wright as Chief Magistrate,¹¹³ in later years, maintained that Levey was responsible for the rebellious acts of Sitokwe, Ndlele and Gecelo and the hostile attitude assumed by Matanzima in 1880,¹¹⁴ and he correctly predicted

that "disarmament had created a feeling of bitterness that half a century will not remove."¹¹⁵

Apart from having been influenced on questions of defence, Frere's spell on the eastern frontier had convinced him that the war was to be blamed on the British Government which had shrunk from the responsibility of ruling the black people "justly, strictly and mercifully, thereby having neglected its civilizing power."¹¹⁶ In essence his political thinking focussed on policies which stressed the need for "civilization" and annexation. He found in Gordon Sprigg a Prime Minister amenable to his own views on the most important aspects of frontier policy. Sprigg was an Eastern Cape farmer,¹¹⁷ and held very strong views on frontier affairs. His ministry was responsible, in the years after 1878, for the introduction of those administrative, fiscal and territorial policies which paved the way for the extension of Colonial control over the black peoples beyond the Kei.

The year 1878 also saw the appointment of William Ayliff as Secretary for Native Affairs.¹¹⁸ He followed Brownlee's policies, albeit with more rashness. His attitude during his first visit to the subject tribes, in August 1878, showed that Cape efforts to achieve control over the black people were bound to escalate. Addressing a large meeting of Emigrant Thembu at Cofimvaba, he explained the disarmament bill as one which had been passed in the best interests of "the Government's children". He added: "Like a good father who would take the sticks away from his fighting children, the government now takes your arms away. Thus only government will in future call out

men to fight." After this little lecture, he announced far-reaching administrative reforms.

Emigrant Thembuland was to become part of the district of Thembuland, and would be ruled by a chief magistrate and two assistant magistrates. Furthermore, the Thembu were informed that they would in future be expected to contribute towards the Cape treasury by paying hut tax. As the Government was about to embark upon a program of educational and agricultural reform, this was from a European point of view a sensible measure. But the Thembu chiefs, whose decision in 1865 to emigrate, was in no small measure motivated by their dread of hut tax, objected to this new infringement on their independence. They received little sympathy. Sitokwe Ndlele was bluntly told that the Government did not acknowledge chiefs, but that Government was "chief of all chiefs."¹¹⁹

While Thembu dissatisfaction with Colonial measures was mounting, news filtered through that the Government was considering the annexation of Emigrant Thembuland. The four Emigrant chiefs put up a united front and jointly sent a petition to protest ^{against} ~~to~~ this. They pointed out that their independence had been acknowledged at the time of their emigration, and that during the last few years they had had to surrender one privilege after the other. They expressed their willingness to make concessions by agreeing to pay hut tax and to surrender their arms, but they objected to the proposed annexation of their land, and requested that a law should be passed to prevent such a step.¹²⁰ Before they could receive any reinsurance on this all-important issue, the Thembu were offered their last opportunity of combining with other

black people against Colonial intrusion on their lands.

In Basutoland, where relations with the Cape Colony were already strained, the Government met with formidable opposition when the Peace Preservation Act was extended to that area.¹²¹ What started as a rebellion in that country developed into a war which spread to the neighbouring territories. Early in October 1880 Brownlee, then Chief Magistrate for Griqualand East, was attacked; and, shortly afterwards H. Hope, Resident with the Pondomise, was killed on the instructions of the chief, Mhlontlo. Thus started the so-called Gun War, sometimes also referred to as Hope's War. The wave of unrest spread to Thembuland. Magistrates, convinced that there was a plot between the principal Thembu and Sotho chiefs, feared a combination of forces by the two nations, an event which would extend both the duration and the area of war with disastrous consequences for the Cape Colony. But there was to be no general rising. Insurrections were isolated and disconcerted, and Thembu resistance was easily crushed within three weeks. Before an attempt can be made to analyse the reasons for this lack of cohesion it is necessary to consider events before and during the rebellion in the various Thembu chiefdoms.

In Emigrant Thembuland we can, roughly speaking, discover three areas within which diverse attitudes operated:¹²² a turbulent northern belt, inhabited by the Gcina under Gecelo, and the Vundhli under Sitokwe Ndlele; a southern zone under the pro-Colonial Ndarala; and a central zone where Matanzima held sway. In this latter part influences from both the north and the south were at work.

Various factors contributed towards the unsettled state of affairs in the northern zone. First, Ngangelizwe had very little influence in this area. Traditionally the Gcina and the Vundhli, had only nominally acknowledged the authority of the Thembu Paramount.¹²³ Moreover, when the Gecelo and Sitokwe settled in Emigrant Thembuland, and their independence was recognized by the Colonial Government, their bonds with the central authority were all but snapped. Their attitude, once war broke out, was therefore in no way influenced by Ngangelizwe's policy. Secondly, both chiefs had strong ties with the Sotho, and malcontents in their districts were understandably influenced by developments in Basutoland after the extension of the Peace Preservatic Act to that country had caused an uproar. The fact that Basutoland was readily accessible, facilitated communications between disgruntled people in both areas. Thirdly, the Vundhli and the Gcina were surrounded by troublesome neighbours. The western part of Gecelo's lands adjoined the Wodehouse part of the Glen Grey district. This area, situated just below the Stormberg, had for many years been a rendezvous of unsettled people, both white and black.¹²⁴ Of more importance was the presence of Sitokwe Tyali, a Vundhli chief who lived in neighbouring Thembuland Proper. He was known as the "madman". Having refused to accept Ngangelizwe's authority, he acknowledged Dalasile, the influential Qwati chief whose lands adjoined his own. Fourthly, from a strategic point of view this part of Emigrant Thembuland was favourably situated. The vastness of the Stormberg range and the Gatberg to the north lent itself to the waging of a type of guerilla warfare which would put the enemy at a disadvantage.

Under circumstances such as these, it would have taken a strong leader to ensure a measure of stability in his domain. While Sitokwe Ndlele does seem to have yielded considerable influence - until his authority was completely undermined by Colonial policies - Gecelo emerges as a weak personality who by 1880 had lost control over his people. To a large extent he himself was responsible for this situation. At the time of the Emigration he might have felt insecure, having not been the legitimate heir to the Gcina chieftaincy. The heir, Mpangela, had remained in the Location, but there were from time to time rumours - completely unfounded - that he was contemplating a move to Emigrant Thembuland. Such an event would have constituted a threat to Gecelo's position. It was probably for this reason that Gecelo found it necessary to strengthen his position by inviting Mfengu to settle in his country. Successive magistrates encouraged him to do so, and he was too weak to resist these magistrates when he realized that his own people resented the presence of foreigners on their lands. On his own admission it was during this time that he himself noticed that his authority was dwindling.¹²⁵ Therefore even if he would have preferred to stay neutral, he was not in a position to restrain his people. The introduction by the Colonial Government of unpopular measures such as hut tax, cuts as a penalty measure and compulsory labour on a bridge,¹²⁶ had already, by 1878, led to the rise of a militant spirit in this troubled area. Although the Chief Magistrate held regular meetings with the Emigrant chiefs, very little was achieved.

While Gecelo's resistance to Colonial intrusion was limited to verbal protests, Sitokwe Ndlele's more militant stance increased tension in

northern Emigrant Thembuland. It was certainly Cape Governmental interference in his domestic affairs and the partitioning of his Location that brought about the radical change in this chief's attitude. When he emigrated in 1865 he was considered to be one of the most loyal chiefs, and his good conduct was rewarded by an increase in the stipend paid by the Cape Government to the Emigrant chiefs. His disputes with Gecelo, and Fynn's interference in such disputes, brought him into discredit with the Cape Government. Being reminded by the authorities that the lands he occupied were those from which Sarhili had been expelled for misconduct,¹²⁷ he was left under no illusions as to his own vulnerability. It is understandable that he found kindred spirits in the disgruntled Glen Grey chiefs with whom he was suspected to have been in alliance in the war of 1878-1879. Although there was no proof of such an alliance having materialized, Levey remained suspicious and treated him with disdain. "There is only one way of taking down their (the chiefs') pride", the magistrate wrote in 1879 when he reported on Sitokwe's unsatisfactory behaviour, "and that is to reduce their authority".¹²⁸ Shortly afterwards Sitokwe suffered the humiliation of seeing his stipend being reduced from £50 to £20 per annum.¹²⁹ This was a further blow to the chief who, two years earlier, had had to see a part of his lands taken from him and being handed over to his pro-Colonial brother, MatumbeKati.¹³⁰

Even though Elliot was not a supporter of Sitokwe - he on occasion warned the chief that failure to carry out his responsibility could lead to his dismissal¹³¹ - he considered depriving a man of his stipend so serious that it could not be carried out without a clear case being proved against the offender.¹³² He therefore disapproved

of Levey's high-handed actions at a time when unrest was mounting, and he warned the latter that Sitokwe's followers might regard the reduction of his stipend as an arbitrary decision, induced by personal considerations. Levey, however, was supported by the Secretary for Native Affairs¹³³ and, in February 1880, correspondence on the matter closed, Sitokwe being finally deprived of his stipend.¹³⁴ By then the dispute between Levey and Sitokwe had developed into a personal affair, and the situation became increasingly explosive. When a shot was fired at Levey during a visit to Sitokwe's location, he suspected an attempt on his life. Elliot, after having had the case investigated, came to the conclusion that Sitokwe had not fired in the direction in which Levey was standing, and that, though the shot might have been fired in defiance, it was not meant to kill the magistrate.¹³⁵ The incident, nevertheless, showed that Sitokwe's relationship with his magistrate had by 1880 broken down completely.

In contrast to the turbulent north, the southern part of Emigrant Thembuland remained calm, Ndarala having exerted himself to maintain good relationships with the authorities.¹³⁶ The geographical position of Ndarala's lands might have played a part in the general attitude of the people. These lands adjoined those of the "faithful" Mfengu in the Idutywa Reserve. Furthermore there were no mountain fastnesses in this area to afford protection to warring factions in the event of war.

Matanzima's lands were wedged between those of Gecelo and Ndarala. Some of his people were thus in close contact with the turbulent north, and they eventually decided to join forces with the insurgents

there. Others fought on the side of the Cape Colony. The attitude of the chief himself was highly equivocal.¹³⁷ But even if Matanzima himself did not want to fight, it had become almost impossible for him to preserve peace in his country as a militant faction under his brother Siquanqati became caught up in the revolutionary spirit of the late 1870's.¹³⁸

In Thembuland Proper the Thembu were as divided as the people in Emigrant Thembuland. The southern boundary of this territory was adjacent to Bomvanaland and the border dispute there still lingered on. The Thembu may have hoped that a Colonial victory would bring a settlement to their advantage. In the central part, Ngangelizwe, like Matanzima, managed to maintain an uneasy peace. In the northern part, where the Qwati and Jumba were in close proximity to the core of unrest, problems became insurmountable. The Jumba chief, Mgudhlwa, had two distinct tracts of land, one just below the Zuurberg and the other, known as Jumba's Veldt in Maxonga's Hoek, just south of the Drakensberg. While the people in the former territory had close ties with the Hala in central Thembuland, it was in the northern part that unrest was brewing, as people there were strongly influenced by Dalasile. This resilient chief had in 1876 accepted Colonial rule under protest. When the newly appointed magistrate, Walter Stanford, paid his first official visit the chief's attitude was very cool; and, in a deep guttural tone, which Stanford later discovered was assumed for effect, he warned: "I have agreed to come under government, but I do not give myself over as Gangelizwe has had to through fear of his enemies, nor do I appear before you with blood on my hands. These people are mine, they are sitting on my back. I

alone come under government. They remain on my back."¹³⁹ Stanford could see that Dalasile had no love for the yoke Ngangelizwe's actions had placed on his neck.¹⁴⁰ In 1879 he showed his indifference to the Cape Colony by refusing to send men of his tribe to fight in the War of Ngcayecibi. Although he appeared to be less hostile towards the end of that war, he was probably waiting for the opportune moment to throw off the Colonial yoke.

The political unrest described above coincided with a period of economic hardship. From all over Thembuland, magistrates reported pessimistically on the drought and consequent bad harvests. The decision by the Cape Parliament at this stage to increase the hut tax was greeted with dismay by magistrates who rightly suspected that this would add fuel to smouldering fires of discontent.¹⁴¹ Indeed, towards the end of 1880 there was no doubt that dissidents in Thembuland, Glen Grey, Mpondoland, and Basutoland were in constant communication.¹⁴² Although the magistrates were aware of such contact, they were at first inclined to underestimate the danger, as, on the surface, everything seemed quiet. Evidently the murder of Hope was the signal the war factions had been waiting for. In the turmoil that followed magistrates, missionaries and traders were forced to remove themselves as quickly as possible. Shops were looted and magistrates' offices and churches burned down amid scenes of wild rejoicing.¹⁴³ The joy did not last for long. So deeply were the people divided on issues of war that it was impossible to distinguish between pro- and anti-Colonial factions. Some magistrates were kept well-informed as to the movements of the enemy. In Engcobo, for instance, Stanford knew that Dalasile would not attack the magistracy

before his war-priest had duly carried out the rites to enlist ancestral aid. This war-priest, Matiwane, was connected by marriage to a policeman, Thomas Poswayo, who was kept well-informed on Dalasile's actions. Poswayo was in turn a confidant of Stanford, so that Stanford was well aware of what was going on in his district. This helped him to escape in time from Engcobo.¹⁴⁴

In Emigrant Thembuland Sinquanqati and Sitokwe Ndlele, aided by Glen Grey insurgents who were incited by all kinds of rumours, fell upon Lady Frere.¹⁴⁵ Their attempts were frustrated by a commando led by C. Driver, the resident magistrate of Queenstown, consisting of sixty European volunteers and loyal Thembu. Another commando under Frost set out for Maclear in the extreme north of the Engcobo district where there was a European settlement. The Thembu were forced to retreat to the mountains of Maxonga's Hoek. Little resistance was left.

For most of the Thembu leaders the war ended in disaster. Sitokwe Ndlele was killed in a skirmish with Col. Wavell in the valley of the Indwe river. Gecelo, finding himself in a situation which he could not handle, gave himself up under the pretext that he did not want to fight, but was unable to restrain his people. However, evidence of his complicity was overwhelming.¹⁴⁶ He was sentenced to imprisonment. Dalasile fled to Bomvanaland where he remained in exile until 1884.

In Thembuland Proper Ngangelizwe, realizing that he could not restrain his people, went to Umtata where he placed himself under Elliot's protection while offering the assistance of an army.¹⁴⁷ He was, however, no longer in full control of his people, and this had led to

great confusion in his country. On the very same day that Elliot telegraphically informed the Cape Government of the chief's request for Colonial protection, he (Elliot) was notified from Butterworth that all Ngangelizwe's Thembu had taken up arms. This turned out to be a false rumour as unrest was confined to those chiefs who lived close to the borders of Mpondoland. Ngangelizwe was still able to quell these uprisings, and the assistance his people gave to Elliot contributed to a great extent, to the suppression of resistance elsewhere in Thembuland.

The so-called Thembu Rebellion was the culmination of a long period of resistance to the increasing power of British imperialism, but it failed tragically, because the various Thembu sections were unable to form a united front against a formidable and militarily superior enemy. To a certain extent this lack of cohesion, at such a critical time, can be understood in view of the heterogeneous nature of Thembu society.¹⁴⁸ Not only were diverse groups kept artificially together by a nominal head whose control, over the years, had become weaker and weaker, but the Colonial policy of divide-and-rule had encouraged rivalries between different clans. These differences became so divisive that the emergence of a national movement, which could transcend personal and group divisions, had become an impossibility. After the war of Ngcayecibi, Levey could boast that it was only by persistent efforts to promote disunion amongst the chiefs, and to foster jealousies amongst the common people, that he had been able to prevent the prevailing sentiment escalating into active participation in the conflict.¹⁴⁹ These words might well have been spoken in 1881.

The most important Hala chiefs had not joined the war, and we may be justified in asking whether there were political motives behind their decision. To answer this question it is necessary to have a look at Dalasile's relationship with the Hala. Mention had been made of this chief's independent attitude, as well as of the fact that he was accepted as chief by Sitokwe Ndlele, Kosana and Sitokwe Tyali. It would seem, that after 1875, when Ngangelizwe fell into disfavour, Dalasile's influence was on the increase. This might well have constituted a threat to the leadership of the Hala paramount. Therefore, when Dalasile and his protégés showed disaffection, Ngangelizwe and Matanzima might have thought that by standing by, and watching these chiefs destroying themselves, they could strengthen their own position. Levey was of opinion that Matanzima followed this strategy in Emigrant Thembuland, where his two brothers, Sinquanqati and Bambendino, who had rejected his authority, joined the war. Levey's argument seems plausible, as after the war, Matanzima immediately, on the grounds of his having remained neutral, claimed - and indeed received - the lands of these two chiefs. He thus emerged after the war as a wealthy, influential leader.¹⁵⁰ Self-interest has obviously then, at least to a certain extent, determined the attitude of the chiefs during the war.

It would, however, be wrong to over-emphasise the lack of cohesion as reason for the failure of Thembu resistance. Behind the rivalries we can discern one common bond between the chiefs, however widely their responses might have diverged, and that was a real concern for their lands and their independence. Widespread resentment, as the chiefs witnessed the extension of Colonial control over them, had been

building up before 1880. When Sitokwe Ndlele met Ayliff in 1878 he had mentioned the loss of part of his lands, as one of his main grievances.¹⁵¹ The four Emigrant chiefs also put up a united front when it became clear, from rumours circulating in 1880, that Emigrant Thembuland was to be annexed.¹⁵²

Transkeian magistrates had no doubt that all the chiefs were united in their desire to get rid of the magistrates in their districts, and that this was the main cause of the war.¹⁵³ Walter Stanford believed that there was a plot to kill the magistrates, and he came to the conclusion that resentment against the judicial authority imposed upon the chiefdoms existed among chiefs and commoners. In his view, then, it was a chiefs' war as much as a peoples' war, fought to regain independence.¹⁵⁴ Levey saw the 1880-1 events as a war between "kaffir chieftainship and civilized government."¹⁵⁵ Judging from the course of events in the Xalanga district, Cumming believed that the war was a desperate effort to regain "what they regarded as freedom." He too thought that it was as much a war of the chiefs as of the people.¹⁵⁶ There can be no doubt that commoners were affected as adversely by the imposition of Colonial rule, as were the chiefs. Mention has already been made of the introduction of burdensome taxes, humiliating punishments and compulsory labour. Rumours, founded or unfounded, accused the magistrates of executing their duties in a way completely foreign to Africans.¹⁵⁷ The involvement of the common people is reflected in the fact that while Ngangelizwe sided with the Colony, of the 23,969 men in his country capable of bearing arms, 13,000 sided against the Government.¹⁵⁸

To accept that the Transkeian Rebellion was a chiefs' war and a peoples' war to get rid of the magistrates, would however be an oversimplification of a far more complex situation. It would seem that there were two parallel forces at work in Thembuland. On the one hand there was the rejection of white rule. Resistance, here, took the form of rebellion against the white government, but was not, as some people saw it, a conspiracy against the white man.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand there was within the chiefdoms increasing tension after 1870 as various economic factors led to a polarization between westernized and traditional Thembu.¹⁶⁰ The privileged people, of whom many were Mfengu, benefited enormously by their loyalty to the Cape Colony in the war of 1878. Not only did they capture large quantities of stock from the Gcaleka, but they were also compensated by the Government for duties performed. They emerged from this war as a stronger and even more influential group. Gecelo admitted that, after the war, he had settled Mfengu and other educated blacks on the lands of the ordinary "red kaffir". He had done this on the insistence of the magistrates, and without prior consultation with his people. This, he maintained, was one of the main reasons why his people had rebelled. He told the Thembuland Commission:

"Yes, Councillors, and all were against me, and they reported me to the Government, but what I did I did in deference to the wish of the magistrates who told me that the land was not mine, that it belonged to the Government, and that I had to give people land when they asked for it. I was but a child in the hands of the magistrate. This was the first time (i.e. the time when the evidence was taken) I heard that the ordinary red Kafir had any rights. The civilized kafir came in and rode roughshod over us. This stuck in our throats, but we had to swallow it. It was the wish of the magistrate and we were like doves in a Krantz, we were frightened."¹⁶¹

What Gecelo was thus insinuating was that hostilities by commoners were directed against him and the westernized people, as much as against the Government. Magistrates' reports frequently mentioned the animosity between the Thembu and the Mfengu. Cumming wrote about the "land-grabbing propensities" of the Mfengu.¹⁶²

The civil strife also manifested itself in the animosity between the mission people and those living on tribal lands. In some way the stations were regarded as separate from the rest of the tribe, and thus viewed with suspicion by chiefs and commoners alike. A.H. Stanford often referred to such cleavages between the two classes. In 1879, for instance, he recommended that the boundaries of mission stations should be clearly defined so as to avoid conflict between the "civilized people" and the "heathen natives". He remarked that the animosity between them was increasing year by year.¹⁶³ Other magistrates in Thembuland noticed the same divisions in their districts.¹⁶⁴ In 1880 the school people in Sitokwe Ndlele's Location were reported to expect a sudden attack upon them following Sitokwe's threat to drive them away. He was especially irritated by the refusal of the school people to have cases settled by him, and insisted on referring disputes to their own headmen.¹⁶⁵ Christianized Thembu were also likely to associate with Mfengu, rather than with their own kinsmen. In this way the gap between western and traditional people, and between rich and poor became wider.

It therefore seems likely that the war of 1881 was not only a war of black versus white, but also of black against black. In its aftermath the Thembu were more divided than ever before.

1. Although this episode, the Transkeian War of 1881, is usually referred to as the Rebellion, it should be noted that Emigrant Thembuland was then not under Cape Colonial rule, hence those Emigrants who partook in the uprising, could not be termed rebels.
2. See p.247.
3. For British colonial policy under Gladstone see C.F. Goodfellow: Great Britain and South African Confederation, chapter 3.
4. Wodehouse-Granville, 17 January '80, A.P. (colonies) 1870 XLVIII, quoted by Mona MacMillan: Sir Henry Barkly Mediator and Moderator, p.117.
5. E.H. Brookes: White Rule in South Africa, 1830-1910, p.78. See also Stanford Papers, F (VV): A.E. Judge-Stanford, 16 October '74; C.C. Saunders: The Annexation of Transkeian Territories, pp.1-30.
6. PRO CO.48/457: Barkly-Kimberley, 14 September '71, p.106, quoted by C.C. Saunders: Annexation, p.26; CPP.C12-'73: Barkly's speech at the opening of Parliament, p.1.
7. For evidence on this issue see Judge Papers: ACC.533 Diary of Proceedings 8 November - 25 December '72; Evidence P. Hargreaves, 5 December '72; Bacelo's evidence, 29 November '72; Langa's evidence 30 November '72; Xahaxaba's evidence, 6 December '72. See also Section B, Correspondence with various officials. The Judge-Edmonstone Commission was appointed in 1872 to investigate the causes of the Thembu-Gcaleka war which will be discussed below.
8. Xego was apparently an influential man although of uncertain origin. Evidence before the Judge-Edmonstone commission (see below, p.130) was contradictory and confusing. Some witnesses identified him as Ngangelizwe's councillor who had some years earlier fled from his paramount and put himself under Sarhili. Others described him as a Mpondo refugee who had settled on vacant lands adjoining those of Moni, while Sarhili said that he was one of those Gcaleka who settled in Thembuland during the Cattle-Killing, but under his (Sarhili's) paramountcy. For Xego-Xelo affair see Judge Papers: Diary of proceedings, 8 November - 21 December '71; CO.3193: W. Fynn-Colonial Secretary, 23 January '71; Ibid. Copy of letter from Kreli to Gangelizwe and Gangelizwe's reply in cover letter; Ibid., Chalmers-Col. Sec., 4 November '71; 6 November '71; 9 December '71; CO.3179: Blyth-Colonial Secretary. (Letters written between April - June '70); Kaffrarian Watchman, 24 February '70. Kreli and Gangelizwe.
9. CO.3193: Chalmers-Col. Sec., 4 November '71.
10. For Ngangelizwe-Mnqanqeni dispute see CO.3163: J. Warner-Col. Sec., 17 October '69; CO.3179: E. Warner-Col. Sec., 11 February '70 (and Government marginal note); Ibid: 14 April '70; Ibid: 21

April '70; M. Blyth-Col. Sec., 21 April '70; Ibid: 19 May '70; Ibid: 9 June '70; Kaffrarian Watchman, 24 February '70. Kreli and Ngangelizwe. See also pp.251-2.

11. ACC.533 Judge Papers: Judge-Col. Sec. 23 November '72; and Cumming's evidence before the Commission, 22 November '72. The Commission criticized his handling of the Mnqanqeni affair. He was accused of negligence in maintaining the laws of neutrality and they found him guilty of gross injustice to Ngangelizwe.
12. The right to use this footpath had been granted to him by J.C. Warner some years earlier. See Judge Papers: J.C. Warner-C.C. for Queenstown, 23 November '72.
13. See also p.252.
14. CO.3193: W. Cumming-Col. Sec., 25 January '71; 31 January '71.
15. Members of the Fynn family held various posts in the Transkei during the time under discussion in this thesis. See appendix. 2 for Fynn-Sarhili relationship. See also NA.840: Brownlee-SNA., 2 May '73.
16. CO.3193: W. Fynn-Col. Sec., 16 January '71.
17. CO.3193: Blyth-Col. Sec., and various other letters between 1870-1872.
18. CPP.A12-'73: Special Commission-Col. Sec., 14 May '72.
19. Ibid: Correspondence Governor Barkly-Lord Kimberley, Kimberley-Barkly, August '72 - March '73, pp. 140 - 41.
20. SP.611/59: Brownlee-Southey, 1 February '71; Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn-Col. Sec.; 28 April '70.
21. Ibid: C.A. Smith-Col. Sec., 28 February '71. Abercrombie Smith was M.L.A. for King William's Town. He lived at Balfour.
22. CO.3193: Copy of letter from Resident with Sarhili-Resident with Gangelizwe and Gangelizwe's reply in cover letter, 23 January '71.
23. CO.3205: Cumming-Col. Sec., 24 August '72.
24. See footnote 23.
25. ACC.533 Judge Papers: E. Chalmers-Commission, 11 December '72; Report of Commission, December 1872. The Judge Commission accused Chalmers of having acted injudiciously and with "want of discretion".
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.

28. GTJ., 14 October '72. Native Hostilities. The very latest.
29. GTJ., 16 October '72. The Transkei. The War between Kreli and Gangelizwe.
30. CO.3205: Chalmers-SNA., 20 October '72; NA.150: Chalmers-SNA., 7 March '73.
31. CO.3205: Chalmers-Col. Sec., 14 October '72.
32. CPP.G10-'77 Votes and Proceedings: Report of Commission to inquire on question of col. defences, Judges testimony, p.135.
33. Judge Papers: Report of Commission, 20 December '72. Also included in Stanford Papers B263.5.
34. NA.840: Brownlee-Res. with Gangelizwe, 18 September '73; GH.23/32 Barkly-Kimberley, no 125, 4 November '72; Stanford Papers B263.5, Report of Judge Commission, December '72.
35. ^{Judge} Commission's Report, 20 December '72.
36. This was a reference to the Dreikaiserbund, the alliance signed in 1872 between Germany, Austria and Russia.
37. NA.150: C. Griffith-Sir Henry Barkly, 11 November '72.
38. CPP.A10-'73: Report of Secretary of Native Affairs of his mission to Sarhili, in January '73. (My emphasis)
39. NA.840: Brownlee's confidential annexure to CPP.A10-'73.
40. NA.840: Brownlee-Res. with Gangelizwe, 18 September '73. (My emphasis)
41. NA.840: Brownlee's confidential letter to Wright, 23 August '73. (My emphasis)
42. See map 3.
43. NA.840: Brownlee's confidential annexure to A10-'73.
44. NA.840: Brownlee-Wright, 4 June '73.
45. NA.841: Brownlee's message to Gangelizwe, 21 May '75.
46. See C.F. Goodfellow: Great Britain and South African Confederation. Goodfellow points out that the idea of federation was already present in the minds of successive Colonial Secretaries in Gladstone's ministry, but that Lord Carnarvon was the most positive of them all. He envisaged the expansion of British control from a confederate Southern Africa until eventually her supremacy should spread over the greater part of the continent. He further argued that the idea of Confederation was little more than a personal ambition which Carnarvon shared with other

imperialists like Sir Robert Herbert, his top official. See also A. Atmore and S. Marks: *The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the 19th Century: Towards a Reassessment*, JICH (1969) pp. 105 - 39 and N.A. Etherington: *Labour, Supply, and Generation of South African Confederation in the 1870's*. JAH 20, (1979) pp. 235 - 53. These writers stress Carnavon's awareness of possible mineral discoveries in south and central Africa and his consequent fear of foreign intervention in South Africa.

47. See pp.253-6 for an analysis of evidence against Ngangelizwe in this case. See NA.153: Res. with Kreli-S.N.A., 9 July '75; CPP.G16-'76, Ayliff-SNA., 2 January '76; NA.153: Cumming-SNA., 3 August '75; G16-'76: Res. with Kreli-SNA., 2 January '76; F. Brownlee: Transkeian Historical Records, p.28.
48. NA.294: Brownlee-Colonial Secretary, 11 August '75.
49. CPP.G39-'76: Ayliff and Wright-Colonial Secretary, 28 August '75.
50. CPP.G16-'76: W. Ayliff-SNA., 2 January '76.
51. See C.C. Saunders: Annexation, p.47. He quotes Brownlee who in early August advised that "the time was ripe for bringing them under direct rule" (Rhodes House Library, MSS.AL 5/22/3, ff 38-39, Brownlee's Memo. 11 August '75). Barkly informed Molteno that "it would be a pity to lose the opportunity of extending our controlling power should the Thembu wish to come under our rule". See Molteno Papers: Barkly-Molteno, 21 August '75.
52. CO.3179: E. Warner-Col. Sec., 14 April '70, and Wodehouse's marginal note.
53. NA.841: Brownlee's message to Gangelizwe, 11 August '75. See also T. Master: Colonial Control in Thembuland and Resistance to it. (MA-thesis, UCT, 1966) pp. 7-9, for a detailed discussion of this dispute.
54. GTJ., 29 October '75, Transkeian Territory (from Daily News). For Bowker, see appendix 6.
55. CMT.1/1:H. Bright (Brownlee's clerk) - Res. with Gangelizwe, 9 September '75; CMT.1/1: Brownlee-CMT., 18 November '75. See also CPP.G4-'83: p.427.
56. NA.153: (Res. with Kreli Folder) Ayliff-Brownlee, 18 December '75.
57. Transkeian Agent's Letterbook: p.3 (Fynn's entry).
58. CMT.1/60: J. Rose-Innes-A. Wright, 11 August '75.
59. GTJ., 29 October '75, Transkeian Territory (from Daily News).
60. See Appendix 5.

61. CPP.G39'76: Telegram, Bowker-Under Col. Sec., 29 October '75.
62. Ibid: Telegram Under Col. Sec.-C.C. King William's Town, 30 October '75, with instructions to forward message to Com. Bowker.
63. Stanford Papers, D1: W. Stanford-A. Judge, 11 September '76.
64. CPP.G39-'76: Probart's Report, p.20; CMT.1/145: Minutes of Meeting between Probart and Thembu chiefs. Undated.
65. E.G. Sihele: pp.110-12.
66. CPP.G41-'72: E.J. Warner's report (wrongly printed as G.J. Warner), 8 May '72.
67. NA.66: E. Warner-CMT., 24 February '81.
68. CPP.G66-'83: Report of Thembuland Land Settlement Commission, Q 87.
69. NA.152: W. Fynn-Sec. for NA., 23 May '74.
70. NA.152: A.M. Wright-Sec. for NA., no 17, 5 November '74.
71. NA.152: W. Fynn-Sec. for NA., 23 May '74.
72. Ibid.
73. NA.841: Brownlee-Fynn 8 November '75; 13 January '76. See also pp.
74. See pp.249-50 for Sinqanqati's settlement in Emigrant Thembuland.
75. See appendix 4.
76. NA.49 (Thembu Agent Cofimvaba Folder): Levey-Sec. for NA., 12 February '79.
77. SP.611/57: R. Southey-J.C. Warner, 24 September '68.
78. NA.153: Levey-Sec. for NA., (Thembu Agent Folder), 24 May '76.
79. Ibid: 20 December '76.
80. CPP.G66-'83: Q 239-41. Cumming did not mention by whom he was told what to do. Presumably he received oral instructions from his predecessor, E. Warner.
81. NA.46: H. Elliot-Sec. for NA., 5 March '79.
82. See p.177 for Gecelo's evidence on this issue before the Thembuland Commission.
83. See p.336-8.

84. NA.47: Levey's Report, pp.165-171.
85. For War Scare see W. Campbell: The South African Frontier 1865-1885 (AYB, 1959, I, pp.137-39.
86. GTJ., 2 August '76. Frontier Affairs.
87. GTJ., 11 August '76 War Probabilities.
88. GTJ., 25 August '76. The War Prospect. CPP.G12-'77: Brownlee's Memo., pp.150-80; BPP.C1748: pp.108-9 and 164-5.
89. Ibid: See also GTJ., 1 September '76. Editorial. At a meeting with the Thembu he put it bluntly: If I were to fulfill my promise now (i.e. to reinstate Ngangelizwe) you would all say I am afraid. You would abuse us to-morrow again, thinking, that by doing so you will get your rights.
90. CPP.G1-'77: Evidence by the Rev. J.P. Bertram, 30 October '76, Q3660, p.204.
91. GTJ., 5 September '76 (Cape Mercury Correspondent).
92. Xelo, alias Elias, was looked upon by white officials as an extremely able person, and, according to Brownlee, "well up in kaffir laws and customs". When Elliot was appointed Chief Magistrate of Thembuland, Brownlee instructed him to make contact with Xelo. (CMT.1/2: Brownlee-Elliot, 3 April '77.) In the months before the outbreak of the war Stanford relied on Xelo for information on Sarhili's actions as well as on other war rumours. His attachment to colonial officials would account for the prejudice of many Thembu against him.
93. It would seem that the Thembu never really understood the terms under which they had come under the British rule. When in August 1877 C.D. Griffith, who had then just succeeded W. Wright as Chief Magistrate of Thembuland, paid a customary visit to the people under his jurisdiction it emerged that they did not know that, according to article 4 of the Clarkebury agreement, Ngangelizwe was only chief of his section and not of all the Thembu. Nor is there any clarity as to what was meant by "his section". Apparently it implied only those Thembu in the Umtata district. See Stanford Papers, B263/1: Extracts from Judge Report, 19 October '76. (Also included in CMT.1/2).
94. J. Martineau: The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, p.162.
95. The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol 8, p.481.
96. CPP.G1-'77: Report of the Colonial Defence Commission.
97. For a detailed discussion of the War of Ngcayecibi and the events leading to the War see M. Spicer: The War of Ngcayecibi. (MA Thesis, R.U. 1978).

98. He was severely criticized, in 1872, by the Judge-Edmonstone Commission. In 1876 Sarhili accused him of deliberate vindictiveness against him. (NA.155: Fynn-Cumming, 10 July '76) and Brownlee had reason to reprimand him for laxity in submitting reports. (NA.154: Cumming-SNA., 20 October '76). See also Spicer: Ngcayecibi, p.50. Spicer points out that Cumming was in an impossible position, sandwiched between the feuding Thembu and Gcaleka, and in charge of the Reserve with its polyglot population, susceptible to all kinds of speculations.
99. CPP.G17-78: W. Ayliff-Sec. for NA., 18 May '77; Spicer Ngcayecibi, p.73.
100. CPP.C1961: Telegram Molteno-Frere, 27 August '77.
101. Ibid: Telegraphic communications between Frere and Molteno, 28 August '77.
102. After having been replaced by Wright as Resident with Ngangelizwe, Chalmers was appointed as Inspector of the F.A.M.P., a position he held from 1873 to 1879.
103. BPP.C1961: Frere-Carnarvon, no 39, 23 September '77.
104. Cape Government Gazette, 12 October '77: Proclamation of 5 October '77.
105. For a full account of this war see Spicer: Ngcayecibi; Saunders: Annexation., pp.60-66.
106. See Saunders: Annexation, p.66.
107. See Saunders: Annexation., pp.66-7. He gives the following figures: On colonial side 60 whites and 133 Africans were killed; 3,650 Gcaleka had been killed, and over 45,000 cattle were seized. The Cape had spent over £1 200 000 on this war.
108. See pp.285-9.
109. See p.268.
110. CPP.C5-'78: First instalment of papers called for by the Legislative Council, 9 July '78.
111. Daily Dispatch, 14 March '78. Sprigg's Speech in Grahamstown.
112. NA.49: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 2 December '79.
113. See appendix 5.
114. Stanford Papers, BC.293: H.G. Elliot-W. Stanford, 3 May '98. Elliot referred to Levey's illegal and injudicious attempt at disarming the people before the Peace Preservation Act had even been proclaimed by law.

115. NA.53: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 2 December '79.
116. CPP.C5-'78: First instalment of papers called for by the Legislative Council, 9 July '78.
117. See appendix 5.
118. Saunders describes him as a man of weak character with few ideas of his own. (See Annexation, p.26.)
119. CPP.G43-'79: Appendix to Blue Books on NA, 1879, W. Ayliff's Report, pp.3-4.
120. CPP.A54-'80: Petition against the Bill,
121. BPP.C2755: Proc. 6 April '80. Sprigg argued that it would be a great injustice to disarm the Mfengu and some Thembu, but not the Sotho. (See GTJ., 28 May '80.)
122. See map 3.
123. See p.1.
124. GTJ., 17 August '37. Kafir Depredations.
125. See p.177.
126. NA.45: Minutes of Meeting at Xalanga between Major Elliot and Gecelo and other chiefs, 5 December '78.
127. NA.59: Minutes of Meeting at Southeyville, 13 December '79.
128. NA.50: Levey-Ayliff, 4 August '79.
129. NA.56: Cofimvaba Agent's Diary entry, 15 January '79.
130. Stanford Papers, B263.1: Stanford-Brownlee, 1 March '77.
131. NA.57: Minutes of Meeting at Southeyville, 13 December '79.
132. NA.57: Elliot-USNA., 26 January '80; Ibid: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 26 January '80.
133. NA.57: Ayliff's marginal note in letter Elliot-Sec. for NA., 26 January '80.
134. NA.56: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 18 February '80.
135. NA.56: Elliot-CMT., 22 June '80.
136. NA.56: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 22 June '80.
137. See pp.268-9.
138. Ibid.

139. Stanford Reminiscences, I, pp.20, 56. Stanford wrote: "Dalasile had always resented to appeal to me from a decision of his.
140. Stanford, p.91.
141. NA.60: Elliot-Sec. for NA., 11 May '80; R.M. Umtata-Sec. for NA. 22 April '80; R.M. Southeyville 30 April '80; R.M. Xalang-Sec. for NA., 28 April '80; NA.65: Occurences completed from Journal of R.M. of Southeyville, 5 December '80.
142. Stanford Reminiscences, p.117; Stanford Papers B.1.15.1: Stanford to his mother 1 November '80; CPP.C20-'81: Reports from various magistrates in Thembuland. Stanford Papers B.118.2: C. Levey-Stanford, 5 October '80.
143. Stanford Reminiscences I, pp.117-137.
144. Ibid.
145. CPP.C13-'80: Report of CMT., pp.114-115. There were rumours that barracks had been constructed in Cape Town to which young girls were to be taken with the object of raising a future army for the subjugation of the native races.
146. NA.76: Thembu chiefs charged with sedition, case 51 of 1881.
147. NA.65: R.M. Mqanduli-CMT., 25 November '80; Stanford Reminiscences, Vol.1, p.20; NA.65: CMT.-USNA., 12 November '80.
148. See pp.1-3.
149. CPP.G12-'78: Levey's Report, p.42.
150. See pp.270 ff.
151. See p.154.
152. CPP.A54-'80: Petition of Emigrant Chiefs.
153. Only Chief Magistrate Elliot did not share this opinion. He described the cause of the war, short and simple to idleness, and he foresaw that there would be no peace until such a time that the Africans became more industrious. See CPP.G20-'81: Elliot's report, December '80.
154. Stanford based his theory regarding the killing of the magistrates in a letter written by A. Davis who was the only eye-witness of the Hope murder. Umhlonto allegedly said: "I am not fighting traders and missionaries; I am at war with the magistrates." See NA.65: Stanford-SNA., 11 November '80; Stanford Papers, F(e)3: Letter from R. Davies, R.M. Qumbu, 23 November '80.
155. NA.65: R.M. St. Marks-SNA., 5 December '80.

156. NA.65: Cumming-SNA., 2 December '80.
157. Cape Argus, 17 September '80. The Transkei. Excitement was caused by rumours concerning Elliot's alleged hanging in public of men found guilty in a similar case. It was alleged that Elliot ordered a number of people to attend the execution. Even the sympathetic Stanford was so opposed to so-called witchcraft than on hearing of a murder case connected with this practice, he punished all the people involved in the affair with flogging, confiscation of property and burning of homesteads. See Stanford Papers, B1.5: W.E.S.-Mother, 17 December '77.
158. NA.74: CMT.-SNA., 3 January '82.
159. CMT.1/4: Ayliff-Elliot, 8 November '80; Stanford: Reminiscences, pp.104-105. Various other references in Magistrate's Reports, 1878-1881.
160. See pp.329-335; 347-352.
161. CPP.G66-'83: Gecelo Evidence, p.10. (my emphasis) When questioned on this Cumming contradicted himself. He first denied that he ever asked Gecelo to give land to a man (p.13, Q.128) but later he admitted that he encouraged the granting of land to the Mfengu because he thought it would have a civilizing effect. (Q.245)
162. See NA.65: W. Cumming-SNA., 2 December '80; Stanford Reminiscences, p.113; CPP.G8-'83: Bayes's Report, December '82.

Chapter 5

In the Aftermath of the War of 1881: Annexation and its Consequences

(i) The Policy of Removals

The Basutoland and Transkeian rebellion has been seen by Theal as the most formidable attempt ever made by black chiefdoms to throw off European supremacy.¹ For the Cape Colony it was a traumatic experience and left an indelible mark on the minds of white officials and statesmen alike. Many years later Sir Walter Stanford had the war in mind when he wrote:

"In 1880-1881 we had the strongest combination known in South Africa of native chiefs and their tribes to drive the white man out. I am not convinced that led by the agitators of to-day there is any greater hostile feeling or as great against the government as there was then."²

The termination of the war did not put an end to white apprehensions; on the contrary, officials, for the rest of the century, were obsessed by fear of another black military alliance against the Cape Colony. The Secretary for Native Affairs, J. de Wet, expressed the general mood when he warned in 1882:

"If in the late disturbance there has been an attempt to combine against the government, it became an important consideration to determine in what way such a combination can in future be either averted or weakened or made more ineffective."³

It was commonly thought that the answer lay in a more aggressive application of the Cape Colony's territorial and administrative policies. The Grahamstown Journal was quick to advise that "in settling the reconquered districts they (the Government) should strike

decisively at the implacable enemy, chiefdom, (as) in the abolition of this great evil the native tribes will at last find peace."⁴

Not all Cape officials shared such sentiments. A. Stanford, magistrate at Umtata, warned correctly that whether the Government acknowledged the authority of the chiefs or not, the fact remained that the people were guided by them.⁵ The Government was therefore fully aware of the impracticability, if not impossibility, of the total abolition of chieftainship, but ways and means had to be found in which the power of the chiefs could be curtailed and their influence rendered ineffective.

One way in which this could be done was by breaking up the tribes as much as possible. Accordingly, immediately after the war, the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland was instructed to resettle people regardless of tribal affiliation. He was further cautioned not to allow any other authority than that of the magistrate to be exercised.⁶ From the Government's point of view this policy was effective. The two Hala chiefs, Ngangelizwe and Matanzima, found their lands penetrated by Vundhli, Qwati, Gcina and Mfengu who felt no loyalty towards them, and who would readily appeal to the magistrates against the decisions of the tribal courts. The chiefs resented the presence of these newcomers, more so as their settlement led to endless garden disputes. Ngangelizwe expressed his discontent in no uncertain terms. "The land is mine", he said "I do not consider it forfeited through the acts of rebels."⁷ In Emigrant Thembuland Matanzima voiced the same objections.⁸ The discontent thus generated was intensified by territorial settlements after 1881.

The Cape Government considered as rebels all those Thembu who had participated in the war. This was hardly a valid argument. British control over Thembuland was an informal affair; Britain had no legal jurisdiction over the territory.⁹ As Britain had no authority in the territory, the Thembu were not British subjects, and could therefore not be branded as rebels. However, the Government acted on the principle that those who collaborated with the warring nations were indeed rebels, and had thereby forfeited all claims to the lands they held before the war. These lands were now to be confiscated and redistributed between white farmers and pro-Colonial black farmers, while so-called rebels, after their surrender, were to be resettled in a way advantageous to the Cape Colony. To deal with all these land matters the Thembuland Land Settlement Commission was appointed under chairmanship of J. Hemming.¹⁰

The findings of this commission were in no small way influenced by a new political party, the Afrikaner Bond, which emerged in the 1880's, and played a dominant role in Cape politics until its dissolution in 1911. To understand the importance of the Bond for our period under discussion, it is necessary to have a closer look at its origin and composition:

The birth of this predominantly Afrikaner political party was the outflow of an awakening Afrikaner nationalism. As Herman Giliomee has explained, the political apathy of the Afrikaner was dissolved by an expanding Cape economy and growing government revenue, particularly as a result of the discovery of the diamond fields. The polarization of latent ethnic ties was the result of the need to put a political

movement together which could especially promote farming interests as these were underrepresented in parliament.¹¹

It was under these circumstances that pro-Afrikaner Boeren Beschermings Vereenigingen and branches of the more political minded Afrikaner Bond mushroomed in the 1880's. In the western Cape Onze Jan Hofmeyr was the leading spirit in the establishment of the Zuid Afrikaasche Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, the earliest political organization set up by Afrikaners. In the eastern Cape the Albert Boerebeschermings Vereeniging, established in 1879, distinguished itself as the most wide awake and fiery of all Afrikaner political associations. This Vereeniging established close relations with Die Afrikaanse Patriot, a Paarl paper which championed the recognition of the Afrikaner people as a culturally distinct element within the population of South Africa. Although, then, the Boeren Vereenigingen were established in the first place to protect the interests of the white farmers, they inevitably became caught up in the cultural issues of the day, notably the recognition of the Dutch language. Cultural issues in turn developed into political issues. By June 1879 the need was recognized for an Afrikaner Bond in which all Afrikaners would feel at home, and in 1880 the first three branches of the Afrikaner Bond were established. In 1882 the Boeren Vereenigingen and the Bond amalgamated.¹²

As the champion of farming interests, the Bond concerned itself with the acute land shortage experienced by European farmers after 1870, when the land frontier in South Africa was becoming closed. By then extensive farming, by means of extending the size of grazing lands or

by trekking further into the interior, had become impossible. Free land, to which, especially the poorer farmers turned their eyes, was limited.¹³

The policy of the Bond, as propagated in its newspaper De Zuid Afrikaan, was directed towards the colonization by Whites of Transkeian territories and the expropriation of black peasants within the Cape Colony so that their lands could be thrown open for white farmers. Hence, the support given by Hofmeyr to white squatters who moved into the northern parts of Thembuland during and after the war of 1881.

Illegal squatting on Thembu lands had already been going on for some time before the war. The evacuation of large parts of northern Emigrant Thembuland and Engcobo in consequence of the participation of most of the inhabitants in the war, afforded new opportunities to white farmers from the north eastern districts who had for years been coveting fertile Thembu lands. In the Engcobo district the locations of Langa, son of the Jumba chief, Mgudhlwa, and those of Ngenqanu, a Qwati chief, were almost completely cleared of its inhabitants except for the presence of some pro-Colonial black farmers, and the white farmers of the Slang River Settlement. Walter Stanford watched with near-desperation as white squatters, in defiance of his warning that their actions were illegal, poured into the district, arranging boundaries of farms and building homesteads. This pattern of white squatting was repeated in northern Emigrant Thembuland.¹⁴

Hofmeyer's support for these squatters stemmed amongst other reasons, from his conviction that a broad belt of white settlement from Queenstown to Kokstad would be of great advantage to the Colony. In this way the Sotho in the north could be separated from the Thembu and the Mpondo in the south, order could be brought to the tribal areas and opportunities for white farmers could be extended. Hofmeyr's support for the squatters placed the government of T.C. Scanlen in a dilemma. Scanlen became Prime Minister in 1881 with the support of the Bond on the votes of whose members he was now dependent for his political survival. It is therefore understandable that the ideas of the Bond were to a large extent reflected in the settlements made by the Thembuland Land Commission.

In dealing with Engcobo and Emigrant Thembuland, the Commission was instructed to use lands confiscated from "rebels" for white settlement. A dividing line was therefore laid down, south of which lands were reserved for black settlement, while European farmers would receive lands to the north.¹⁵ This measure solved none of the problems. First, many Europeans who lived south of the line refused to move. Their numbers were constantly strengthened by new arrivals from the Cape Colony, and there was the distinct possibility of a clash between these squatters and the Thembu on whose territory they were now living. Secondly, by drawing this boundary line, the Commission had pressurized the Thembu into accepting smaller farms than was originally intended, while the Europeans came into possession of a much larger tract of land.¹⁶ Black landholders, some of whom possessed farms of more than 1000 morgen, were informed that their new farms would not exceed 500 morgen.¹⁷ The Thembu farmers were

persuaded to accept these conditions; the Commission argued that they received their lands from chiefs, who did not, according to African custom, have the right to alienate land. Hemming abruptly told a meeting: "The short of it is this, that the Government says that a chief has no right to give away land of the people, but as the chiefs have done this, we do not wish to oppose you if you have a good claim, and if you are a good man and make a proper use of the land, but it is an act of grace on the part of the government to give you land at all. There are other people to be provided for as well, but we recognize your claims to an extent of 500 morgen."¹⁸

The Commission's argument, that the chiefs had no right to give away land, was strongly refuted, not only by black farmers, but also by missionaries.¹⁹ In the final analysis, however, the conditions under which the black farmers would have been allowed to remain north of the line seemed to be so unfavourable that they consented to move south. A number of pro-Colonial people on whose loyalty the Government reckoned during the war, now found that their efforts brought them little material benefit. At a meeting with Hemming it was clear that their farms north of the line were also to be reduced in size.²⁰

The Hemming Commission also had to face the problem of re-locating thousands of so-called rebels who after their surrender reclaimed their former lands. This was a formidable task as a glance at the following table will show:

Table

No of people surrendered		No of families for which lands were available
Southeyville	12 927 (1 900 men)	1 000 families
Engcobo	9 488 (No of men not available)	1 000 families
Umtata	2 022 (333 men)	50 families
Enyanyana	2 263	Not available
Xalanga	2 257 (512 men)	250 families
St. Marks	153	Not available
Total	29 110 (3 319 men)	2 300 families

Not only was there a serious land shortage, but those lands claimed by returning men had meanwhile been occupied by "loyalists" who felt they were entitled to compensation. Matters were further complicated by the fact that it was, in many cases, almost impossible to decide which lands were previously occupied by "loyalists" and "rebels" respectively as their homesteads had become intermingled.

A solution that would satisfy all claimants to land, was impossible; and considerable discontent followed on the implementation of the Commission's recommendations. Chiefs like Kosana, who claimed that they did not join the war and who hoped to be compensated for their neutrality, were disappointed. Kosana objected not only to the size of the farm granted to him and his 400 loyal followers in the Nququ Valley, but he pointed out that the land was of inferior quality. This complaint was echoed by his 400 ex-followers, who were resettled in the Nququ and Umtingwenu valley in the Southeyville district. They claimed more land as they had to resort to agriculture on

unsuitable lands, having lost all their cattle during the war.²¹

In Engcobo a number of hardworking, pro-Colonial men were also badly affected by the post-war settlements. They received farms in 1879 when Walter Stanford had used his influence to have the defeated Sitokwe Tyali's farms parcelled out among people whom he regarded as trustworthy. He then advised that, for security reasons, the fastness of Mahonga's Hoek should be kept clear of undesirable elements. The tract of country north of the road between Kokstad and Dordrecht, from the boundary of the Engcobo district to the boundary of the Slang River settlement with the line of the Drakensberg as its northern limit, should therefore, he argued, be settled with picked men likely to farm efficiently and to become a barrier between black and white. This plan had been brought into effect in 1879. The select group was given farms with a recommendation that in future individual titles would be granted in deserving cases.²² The Hemming Commission now decided that the whole northern part of Engcobo should be set aside for European occupation. Although the black farmers who remained on their farms during the war were relocated on the lands of some "ex-rebels", a fair compromise was not achieved. The settlement of about 500 European families in northern Engcobo, coupled with the fact that a large number of refugee Gcalekas had to be accommodated, severely restricted the access to arable land.²³ The growing land shortage manifested itself in the ploughing of pathways, garden disputes and, finally, in the banding together of groups who looked for land in Griqualand East and Basutoland. From 1887 onwards magisterial reports stressed the shortage of land.

The post-war settlements had repercussions in Glen Grey where the strains in Thembu-European relationships, always present below the surface, became manifest in renewed and more determined efforts to transfer Glen Grey lands to European farmers. Foremost amongst these white agitators were the farmers from the Dordrecht and Wodehouse districts who were in close contact with the Engcobo squatters. The possible displacement of the Thembu and their settlement in remote and less fertile areas was hotly debated in the Cape parliament as Bond members and their allies, pledged to relieve the plight of the poorer farmers, advocated the removal of the Thembu from Glen Grey. They maintained that, as a result of over-crowding, living conditions in Glen Grey had become impossible.²⁴

In a further attempt to justify the removal of the Thembu, both the Government and the Bondsmen called the legitimacy of Thembu claims to lands in Glen Grey into question. It was argued that, since the Thembu had refused the offer of emigration in 1865, the Glen Grey district had become crown land; the Thembu were consequently squatters with no legal right and could therefore be removed at any time. According to evidence given by Resident Magistrate Jenner in 1892 before the Glen Grey Commission, the Thembu had held the land in tribal tenure before 1870, but thereafter they resided upon crown land.²⁵ It should, however, be kept in mind that at the time of emigration the Thembu were told that the move was entirely voluntary, and the question of the Location becoming crown land was never raised.²⁶ The abrogation of promises made at the time of the emigration meant that the Glen Grey Thembu were living precariously under the disadvantage of not knowing when, and if, they were going to

be removed, or whether other people - especially white or Mfengu were to be moved in.

The effect of such uncertainty, aggravated by the intimidating attitude of adjacent farmers, was emphasised by W.J. Hughes, the Field Cornet for Tambookieland in his annual report to the R.M. of Glen Grey in 1884:

A large number of people have trekked, not only on account of the drought, but because they dislike the attitude of the Europeans towards them, petitioning the government for their removal, which in their opinion is very threatening. The farmers have taken this course not so much on account of the thefts, which are often exaggerated, but because they are anxious to obtain the ground by having it cut up in farms.²⁷

Understandably, then, there was great consternation when in 1884 rumours were spread by traders and farmers suggesting that all the Thembu were to be removed beyond the Kei.²⁸

The Thembu were further upset by Governmental procedures in 1884 when land was needed for a railway line to the newly discovered coal mines in Indwe. A meeting to discuss ways in which the land could be obtained, was held with the government-appointed headmen. They agreed to the expropriation of 25,000 morgen of land. Although the people were resettled on the same amount of land, they were disgruntled because they were separated in three different blocks. One block was near the coal mines, one near Lady Frere, and one at Idwana. Resentment was further felt because those who were removed were inadequately compensated for their cultivated lands and good houses.²⁹ They were also now living under ever more insecure circumstances. On the one hand, their resettlement in already over-

crowded areas was received with misgiving by the established community³⁰ while, on the other, rumours that all the Thembu were to be removed across the Kei were still rife. Their fear that they could once again be removed at any time was confirmed when, shortly afterwards, the Ndonga and Guba basins fell victim to the Government's resettlement zeal.

A particularly unhappy example of the way in which resettlement was carried out, is to be found in the history of the Umhlanga location. This location, situated just outside the border of Emigrant Thembuland, comprised eight farms inhabited altogether by 30,000 Mfengu and Thembu. It was a prosperous community. "Even in adverse seasons, Umhlanga was a garden of Eden", stated one newspaper. In 1885, when many blacks could not plough on account of the poor conditions of the oxen, the people turned up with hoes and, after appealing in vain to the Cape government for a hundred bags of seed grain, they pledged their property to private individuals and purchased seed at extreme prices.³¹

As the Umhlanga Location adjoined Emigrant Thembuland, it is understandable that the resettlements there, as well as in Engcobo, were seen as precedents for similar procedures in Glen Grey. Under the influence of the Bond, the Government gave in to the farmers' petitions and a commission was appointed to investigate the possibility of resettling the Umhlanga people elsewhere. Either this commission was incompetent or it deliberately misled the Government. Following their recommendations, five farms in the Umhlanga location were sold and the inhabitants were resettled on three other farms.³²

Within a year these farms were so over-crowded that the Government was considering other measures.³³ By then the possible removal of the Thembu across the Kei had already been advocated in the Cape Parliament. In an attempt to sway official opinion, the white farmers argued that the Thembu had in 1870 received lands in Glen Grey for ten years on condition of good behaviour, a right which they had forfeited by their participation in the war of 1881.³⁴ By implication therefore, all the Thembu were branded as rebels and therefore not entitled to land. What made the position of the Umhlanga Thembu particularly vulnerable was the fact that there were indeed a considerable number of ex-rebels in the Cape Location. They received land in 1884 from the Resident-Magistrate, C. Driver, who realized the futility of trying to separate them from the loyals.³⁵

The only safeguard that the Thembu had in the face of such onslaughts was a law promulgated in 1883 to the effect that no black man could be resettled without his concurrence being obtained.³⁶ This security fell away in 1885 when a Bondsman from Queenstown, J. du Plessis, carried a motion which virtually gave the Government carte-blanche to deal with the Glen Grey people. Besides expressing the desirability that all lands across the Kei should be settled by Colonial Africans, preference being given to the Glen Grey and Peddie people, it stated that the Government could carry out the terms of the motion as it thought expedient. Furthermore, a part of the 197,000 morgen of vacant land across the Kei had to be set aside for European farmers.³⁷ Having tasted this victory, the Bond members renewed their efforts to have black farmers in Glen Grey replaced by Europeans.

In the following parliamentary session it was argued that Du Plessis's motion had removed the "fetters" of 1883, and that the Government now had the power to remove such blacks as they thought necessary. Members objected to certain recommendations such as those that stipulated that only people willing to abandon their locations should be removed. They argued that those people who left the locations should do so as a body so that their lands might be settled by Europeans.³⁸ Although the policy of the Government was in line with the sentiments expressed in Parliament, it is clear that at this stage strong arm tactics were not yet considered. Removal was, if possible, to be accomplished by agreement rather than by force. The result was a series of meetings between high level officials and Thembu headmen in Umhlanga.

The first meeting addressed by A.M. Frost, exposed the coercion by which the "consent" of the people had been obtained. After having explained to the assembled meeting that the Government, in view of overcrowding, wished four hundred families to leave their farms to go to Qumbu and Tsolo in Griqualand East, where they could depend upon good crops although the land was not suitable for stock, he added:

"You need not go if you wish to remain, but let me tell you that if you decline the offer made to-day, it will be useless for you to come to this government in a few years time and ask assistance in the way of lands, for they will have none to give you, it will be disposed of in other ways, for there are many other natives looking for land,...but this I can say that the people of the Glen Grey will have first choice..."³⁹

The meeting was adjourned for half an hour during which the people came to make their decision. On their return they were unanimous in

declining the offer, and, on the recommendation of Jenner, the headmen were given time to consult with their people and report back within a week. Their feelings remained unchanged. "We would rather die of starvation than go to a strange land", said Sam Sigeneau, supported by Mayekisi who said they wanted to stay where they had been brought up. Others voiced the sentiment that they wished to watch their fathers' graves.⁴⁰

By now Jenner's patience was running out. Some of those who did not want to go were told that they would be removed to a different part of Glen Grey. The unfavourable prospects, amongst others, lack of water, made Qumbu seem the lesser of two evils. People in the Cacadu valley were, at the same time, informed that those who had gone off to look for pasturage would not be allowed to return. Under these circumstances a number of black farmers left Glen Grey. Their decision was incorrectly interpreted as a completely voluntary act. The following year saw more determined governmental actions. At a meeting with headmen, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Jacobus de Wet, warned headmen, on threat of dismissal, against any resistance.⁴¹ This was followed in 1886 by Frost's warning that force would be used unless the people moved on their own initiative.⁴² Farms in the Umhlanga location were advertised for sale, cattle were impounded, and police moved in to destroy houses on farms that were up for sale. E. Warner wrote in desperation that in the bad weather women and children were left in the cold. Understandably the Thembu resistance crumbled. "I have advised the people", Warner wrote, "to stick to their lands as long as they can, but I am afraid they are getting rather timid."⁴³ But neither the resistance of the Thembu

leaders nor Warner's zeal, which at times outstripped that of the Thembu themselves, could in the end prevent the removal of 6,500 families, consisting of 31,241 people, to the more remote Qumbu district. Further resettlements followed in 1886.⁴⁴

Meanwhile a Select Committee had been appointed⁴⁵ to investigate problems in the northern parts of Emigrant Thembuland and Thembuland Proper. The failure of the Government to resettle these areas which, on recommendation of the Hemming Commission had been cleared of rebels, created a no-man's-land, which attracted both white squatters and ex-rebels. Rivalry between the two groups took on alarming proportions.⁴⁶ The further recommendations by a Select Committee appointed in 1882 contributed little towards a solution of the problem.

These recommendations, which suggested that "rebel" lands should be thrown open for white occupation, while taking into account the rights of the "loyal" blacks,⁴⁷ in fact implied that the Cape Colony would have to administer an area over which it had no legal jurisdiction. The only practical solution would have been immediate annexation, a question which had by then become a matter of urgency as well as of controversy.

The anomalous position in which the Cape Government found itself in its administration of Thembu territories, came to light in 1881. Authorities, both in the Cape and in Britain, accepted 24 December 1875 as the date on which de facto British Government had begun in Thembuland, but the exact legal status of Thembuland had not been

agreed upon. For the next six years the administration of the territory had remained in the hands of the Cape Native Affairs Department. In 1881 Sir H. Robinson replaced Sir Bartle Frere as Governor of Thembuland, Emigrant Thembuland, Gcalekaland and Bomvanaland, with the power to issue proclamations for their government.⁴⁸ Up to that time the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland had regularly referred his actions to Cape Town for confirmation. James Rose-Innes, who was appointed head of the Cape Native Affairs Department in 1881, considered this to be wrong, since in his opinion the Cape had now no controlling power east of the Kei.⁴⁹ When, next, Chief Magistrate Elliot sent his decision in a murder case for review, Rose-Innes passed it on to the Attorney-General, J.W. Leonard. Leonard, after thorough investigation, concluded that the extension of British protection over the Thembu in 1875 had been an entirely informal act, and had conferred no right to the Cape Government to exercise jurisdiction there. Elliot, he pointed out, had been Judge de facto although not de jure. Lastly, he maintained, that, until the country was formally annexed to the Cape Colony, the magistrates had no legal right to exercise jurisdiction over Thembuland.⁵⁰

Elliot's interpretation as to his jurisdiction differed from Leonard's views on the matter. As Elliot saw it, clause V of the conditions under which the Thembu had been taken over granted every person in Thembuland a right to appeal to the magistrate. If, then, the magistrate did not have the power to compel all parties to appear before him, the clause was meaningless. He furthermore maintained that the same clause prohibited chiefs from dealing with certain serious crimes. Elliot argued that if Leonard was correct the

magistrates would not, by implication, have the right to enforce the payment of hut tax and licences. He warned that should this become known, the revenue in the territory would be nil; there would be no security for life and property, and the chiefs would be able to assert their old powers and "pull down authority and power that it has taken years to build up."⁵¹ Rose-Innes thereupon instructed Elliot to continue to exercise the jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases as he had been doing up to then, whether expressly delegated, or "implied by the tacit recognition of the authority you have already exercised."⁵²

From a strictly legal point of view there was therefore no question as to the desirability of the extension of Colonial control over Thembuland. When in 1882 a proclamation was issued which made provision for the introduction of Cape laws in Thembuland, a serious debate was started as to whether these territories should form a part of the Cape Colony or not.

During the next four years the question of annexation was thrown to and fro. The persistence with which white farmers clung to the lands on which they had squatted, the fear that the Free State could intervene should their kinsmen be removed by force, and, not the least, the declared policy of creating a continuous belt of land in white hands from the Indwe River to the Griqualand East border, all these gave new urgency to the question of annexation.

(ii) The Scanlen Government and Annexation

The Scanlen ministry was opposed to the annexation of Transkeian territories to the Colony, despite strong demands from the European squatters that Thembuland should be united to the Cape Colony, and the white inhabitants be given the privileges of Colonial citizens. The Government's policy was influenced in part by trouble in Basutoland that made them wary to accept extra responsibilities in black territories, and, in part to the trouble within Thembuland itself, where discontent, as the chiefs felt their powers slipping from their hands, crystallized broadly along the lines of former divisions viz. armed resistance or diplomatic manoeuvre. In 1883 another war scare swept through Thembuland. In Matanzima's country Europeans were alarmed by reports that a diviner had held a dance at that chief's Great Place and that his people, as well as those living in Mfanta's former village, were purchasing saddles. Further reports warned that Matanzima and Ndarala, the latter hitherto a staunch Colonial supporter, were contemplating a combination for hostile purposes.⁵³

In Thembuland Proper, fights broke out between school people and the ordinary people, and between Mfengu and Thembu. Moreover, there seems to have been growing dissatisfaction with Ngangelizwe's rule, which gave rise to the emergence of a strong war party. Other rumours implied that Ngangelizwe had received messages from the Sotho chiefs, Letsie and Lehana, who invited him to join in a general war. Matanzima was said to have made a similar proposal the previous week. According to these rumours, Ngangelizwe had indicated his willingness to fight and he had said that, in order to blind the government, he

would profess loyalty.⁵⁴ There was, however, not the slightest chance of Ngangelizwe going to war against the Colony. His assault on a young boy, and subsequent rumours that the boy had died, gave the war party the opportunity to agitate for his deposition. At the same time many of his followers had lost sympathy with their king's alleged outrageous deeds. Others felt that they were just recovering from the War of 1881 and they had no desire to be drawn into another war.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, magistrates were inclined to believe that the war rumours had some substance; that they were eagerly embraced by Ngangelizwe, and that war could easily be precipitated by any unfortunate event. Their minds were only put at ease after an investigation by Fleischer, the civil commissioner for East London. He was appointed to investigate the origins of the war scare in Emigrant Thembuland. In his report he stated that the scare had been started by traders who had misinterpreted a casual remark by Arthur Stanford.⁵⁶ Fleischer might have been correct in assuming that there were no serious war-like intentions, but there were, undeniably, signs of increasing discontent which could escalate into another revolt. Scanlen thus insisted that the Imperial Government should, for the time being, bear the responsibility for the Thembu territories. The general election of 1883 strengthened the Government's hands, but in the following year Scanlen resigned as Prime Minister. He was succeeded by Sir Thomas Uppington, who strongly rejected the idea of British rule east of the Kei.

Uppington believed that imperial participation in South Africa should decrease and not increase, and, in one of his first statements to the Assembly, he announced the Government's intention to push ahead with

the annexation to the Colony of those territories already under Cape administration.⁵⁷ Despite objections from humanitarians both in Britain and in the Cape Colony, who accused Uppington of following a policy of severe repression of the African population,⁵⁸ the Imperial Government was keen to be relieved of a burdensome responsibility. There were no further stumbling blocks in the way of annexation, and a bill to that effect was easily passed by the Cape Parliament. In August 1885 Thembuland and Gcalekaland were formally annexed to the Cape Colony.

Annexation brought the whole of the Transkei, except Mpondoland, effectively under Colonial control. The territories were to be governed by proclamation of the Governor . . . in Council, but the Cape Parliament had the right to amend proclamations laid on the table the following session. The legal system was clearly defined by the Penal Code of 1886. In drawing up the code, the Government was mindful of recommendations put forward by the Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission that had been at work since 1881 under chairmanship of Sir Jacob Barry, Judge President of the Eastern Districts Court.⁵⁹ The Commission warned against too rapid changes that could provoke resistance. African customs, it found, had been so firmly entrenched in tribal life that any "premature or violent" attempt that could disturb the status quo would be extremely dangerous.⁶⁰ But even if no dramatic changes were brought about by the introduction of the Penal Code, the judicial power of the chiefs was further restricted as criminal cases now fell outside their jurisdiction.

The question that now emerges concerns the extent to which the chiefs

still had a role to play under the new dispensation. The truth is that their power had already been broken down effectively before 1885. We could quote at length from magisterial reports to substantiate this, but two examples will suffice.

In 1884 a headman, Ntini, committed a serious crime in direct opposition to the wishes of some of his men, who tried to restrain him. Ngangelizwe asked for the removal of this Ntini because he was unpopular with a section of his people and no longer able to exercise beneficial influence. Shaw, the Resident Magistrate, objected against such a procedure, since this could create a precedent, which could have enabled Ngangelizwe in future to exercise a similar privilege over other headmen who might incur his displeasure or that of some of his councillors. Ntini was only fined £10, and Ngangelizwe had to face the fact that he could not get rid of a headman whom he himself had appointed in the first place.⁶¹

A second example of the erosion of Ngangelizwe's power arose in 1885, and it concerns a tract of land that he had granted in 1881 to the Bishop of St. Johns. When the Bishop claimed title to these lands, Elliot disputed Ngangelizwe's right to have granted the land to the Bishop. In a letter to the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs in 1882, he explained the position as follows:

"Whatever may have been the legal position of Thembuland up to 1881, it is clear that since the appointment of a Governor to it by the letters patent of the 14th November last, it has formed part of the British Colony...and

Gangelizwe, therefore, has no power whatever to dispose of any portion of public domain over which he once held sovereign rights - and no grant made by him has any legal validity, the sovereignty and ultimate ownership in the whole of Thembuland having since the before mentioned 14 November, been vested solely in Her Majesty the Queen.....and I am to add that the Government is not prepared to recommend a grant to the Bishop of the nature proposed, as it could be establishing a bad precedent..."⁶²

It is no wonder that when a garden dispute arose in 1884 in Ngangelizwe's district, the defendant in the case refused to adhere to his decision, saying: "Ngangelizwe is bleeding". By this he meant that Ngangelizwe was no longer a chief.⁶³ The point had obviously been reached where the essence of chieftainship - a chief is a chief by the people - had fallen away,⁶⁴ and chiefs could no longer be effective spokesmen for their people. There was, in fact, no way in which they could protect their people's rights. The era of military resistance had passed by, and oral protests or petitions to the Government were regarded with suspicion by those in power, as Matanzima was to find out.⁶⁵ All that remained was some semblance of authority which could be practised under the white umbrella.

(iii) Thembu reactions in politics

As the chiefs receded into the background their ineffective, and irrelevant, leadership was increasingly challenged by the emergence of the new elitest class which became prominent in the 1880's. Educated at the mission schools, where they were steeped in Christian and western traditions, these relatively affluent and politically aware members of the population were in a better position to take up the intermediate role between the Colonial government and the black people. The 1880's, then, saw the emergence of a number of political parties such as the Imbumba Yama Nyama (1882); the South African Aborigines Association (1883) and the South African Native Political Association (1883). These organizations broadly aimed at the unification of the Eastern Cape Africans on political matters; closer union between church denominations; and the advancement of black people in general.⁶⁶

A detailed study of Thembu involvement in the political activities of the 1880's is not possible within the scope of this chapter. We will only concentrate upon two developments: the resistance of Thembu leaders to the resettlement schemes discussed earlier in the chapter, and the Nehemiah Tile movement which, with its blend of secular and religious ideals, aimed at the reunification of the Thembu tribe and the establishment of an independent Thembu church.

Our first focal point then is Glen Grey in the mid 1880's where a series of resettlements caused intense bitterness.⁶⁷

Prominent among the black men who resisted the Cape Government's resettlement schemes during that period were Petrus Mahonga, Sam Sigeneau, Thomas Poshwayo, Klaas Mayekiso and Thomas Zwedala. They came from the ranks of people commonly referred to as "school kaffirs", and they had a vested interest in land matters since most of them possessed their own farms. Mahonga and Sigeneau, for instance, had received their farms way back in the 1850's from Nonesi and Tyopo who, under the influence of J.C. Warner, had followed the Rev. Calderwood's example in Victoria East and enticed influential men by means of gifts of land for cultivation, to settle among them in the area annexed by Sir Harry Smith in 1848.⁶⁸ Within the ranks of this privileged class were also men like Richard Kawa who was secretary of the South African Native Political Association. This association propagated, amongst other things, the election of black men to parliament, and it had contact with politically aware Africans in the NgamaKwe and Tsomo districts.⁶⁹

These, then, were the leaders who opposed the resettlement schemes. They based their arguments against the alienation of land on the principle that Glen Grey (procured for them by Sir George Grey in 1853), belonged to the Thembu as a whole. They insisted that they did not consider the Thembu Location to be crown land, and that the people were entitled to tribal title under a chief. These arguments were brought forward vociferously at meetings of the assembled Thembu, which resulted in petitions to the Government as well as by action groups which proposed ways and means of securing a better deal for the Glen Grey people. They openly showed their disdain for the paid headmen whom they regarded as indifferent and incapable of

understanding the political realities of the day. At one of the very first meetings, after the railway line removals of 1884 took place, they explained that dissatisfaction was not limited to the removal question, but that it was linked to the disarmament issue.⁷⁰ They further rejected governmental statements that the removals had taken place with the consent of the people. The 'people', according to them, were a few headmen who could not speak on behalf of the Thembu.⁷¹

That the headmen had indeed been reduced to nonentities was undoubtedly true. Those who dared to speak out against removals were summarily dismissed, and the Secretary for Native Affairs, J. de Wet, made it clear that any opposition from those quarters would be unacceptable to the Government. Addressing a meeting at Lady Frere, he referred to the meeting at Qogodala which had led to the dismissal of some headmen, and then warned: "I do not say that natives have no right to hold meetings, but you are not yet sufficiently advanced for that, and had better be led by a white man for your own good...It is utterly illegal for paid government officials to take part in such meetings. A man who receives government pay is to do the work of the government, and is not to attend meetings and help to frustrate the actions of government." The rebuke did not deter headmen Pellem, Tabata and Kalipa from expressing their deep disappointment at the way in which deputations were ignored and promises were broken during negotiations on the removal issue.⁷² It was, however, clear that the Government had no intention of deviating from its declared policy, the object of which was to make more land available for white settlement.⁷³

The failure of the 1884 protest movement to prevent any resettlement, can be ascribed to two factors. First, it did not succeed in putting up a united front against the Government; and secondly, it failed to reach the mass of the people.

The lack of unity among the leading figures, may be ascribed to a strong tendency among the Thembu towards ethno-centricity. This made cooperation between Thembu and Mfengu leaders almost impossible. Furthermore, it would seem that the Wesleyan ministers who were more closely associated with the Thembu than with the other population groups played a divisive role. E.J. Warner, especially, was suspected of having encouraged the Thembu in their desire to be recognized as an independent nation.⁷⁴ His zeal in promoting Thembu interests at times outstripped that of the Thembu leaders themselves. For this there could be several reasons. He certainly had a real concern for the suffering of the people with whom he and his father had been associated for such a long time. It is also true that the cause of the Wesleyan Church which had been so closely associated with the Thembu, was at stake. There could perhaps have been a more personal reason, and that was the desire to maintain an independent Thembu nation in which the Warners' "father image" could survive. His active involvement in the affairs of both the Glen Grey people and the Emigrant Thembu undoubtedly emphasised the existence of the Thembu as a separate national group albeit one which was politically divided.⁷⁵

It is not possible to determine to what extent Warner's influence contributed towards the rifts between the Thembu and other population groups. Any attempt to do so would be guesswork and might be unfair

to Warner himself. That such rifts did exist cannot be denied. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Jacobus de Wet, on occasion tried to dissuade the Thembu from listening to Pellem by branding him as a Ngqika who was trying to further his own interests through the Thembu.⁷⁶ The rift between the various factions in Glen Grey became more obvious in the 1890's during a leadership dispute following a governmental decision to ignore the feelings of farmers in the vicinity of five Wesleyan Mission Stations, and to grant individual tenure only to inhabitants of the station.⁷⁷ Earlier, a survey had shown that various other farmers also desired this privilege, but doubts were expressed as to the expediency of giving the rights as well as the burdens of private ownership to black farmers. Farmers, not being attached to mission stations, were regarded as "ignorant heathen", incapable of looking after their own interests, and the easy prey of reckless speculators.⁷⁸ At a subsequent meeting farmers expressed their dismay and elected a deputation under leadership of J. Tengo Jabavu and J. Mahonga to meet the Government in Cape Town on this issue.⁷⁹ Jabavu and Mahonga were not of Thembu origin, and their right to act as representatives of the people was immediately questioned. In a letter to Imvo, Thomas Malasili not only rejected their right to speak on behalf of the Thembu, but also pointed out that David Makoti, who was elected by the Glen Grey Thembu to be convenor of a public meeting, was ignored at the time of the e-Xora meeting. The result was that less than one-third of the Thembu people involved in the issue attended the meeting.⁸⁰

Clearly, then, ethnicity was a divisive factor in the Glen Grey

resistance movements, and it was further accentuated by the polarization between affluent and poor people which outruled the possibility of putting up a united front against the Colonial Government. The questions put to and the answers given by Johannes Mahonga, when questioned by the Glen Commission on the issue of land distribution in this district, will show to what extent polarization had taken place:

- Q: "How much do you think a school kafir wants?"
- Mahonga: "I think he would be satisfied with 50 morgen."
- Q: "What do you think would be a fair extent of land for a Red Kafir?"
- Mahonga: "From eight to fifteen morgen."
- Q: "Why should school kafirs have a preference over Red kafirs?"
- Mahonga: "On account of one being more industrious than the other. The Red Kafir will only grow mealies and Kafir Corn whereas the school kafir would grow all sorts of things."
- Q: "Do you think it is right that one man should have twice as much as another?"
- Mahonga: "Yes - because all gifts could not be alike, and their work could not be alike."
- Q: "How do you know that the Red Kafir would not cultivate 30 morgen of land if they got it?"
- Mahonga: "I see them and how they plough."⁸¹

The cleavage between the two groups was also emphasised at the time when the Government contemplated the granting of individual title to farmers in the vicinity of mission stations in Glen Grey. These farmers objected very strongly to sharing commonages with the mission people. The inability of the educated people to identify with the

traditional communities, rendered their leadership ineffective.

When studying documents covering events during the late 1880s one is led to the conclusion that the problems of the ordinary people were taken up by the white missionaries rather than by their own kinsmen.⁸² Such observations support J.M. Lonsdale's diagnosis of the failures of early black nationalist movements in Africa when he wrote: "While old communicators were becoming less suited to their tasks, the new men them-selves did not make real contact with the potential mass following...this contact was essential for the development of mass nationalism...(The new men) were political leaders but not social leaders."⁸³

The political organizations to which reference has been made earlier in this chapter functioned within the framework of white dominated structures. They accepted western values as the foundation of their political ideals; were moderate in their approach to white domination, and hoped that through a process of constitutional evolution the blacks would eventually be accommodated in the Cape system. But there were also those who responded differently to the politics of the 1880's. Disillusioned with white control, they wished to assert their independence, albeit without denouncing those things which they found valuable in western civilization.⁸⁴ Thoughts along these lines crystallized in the establishment of independent black churches of which Nehemiah Tile's Independent Thembu Church was the most prominent.

(iv) Thembu reactions in religion

Nehemiah Tile had his early training as a Wesleyan Minister at Healdtown.⁸⁵ It was perhaps under the influence of leading African Wesleyans, such as Richard Kawa and James Dwane, that his interest in politics was awakened.⁸⁶ In 1879 he moved to the Mqanduli district where he was first probation minister at Morley, then moved to Qokolweni close by, and eventually settled at Xora where he worked as a teacher.

Tile's residence in the Mqanduli district was of particular significance in his career. Not only was he here close to the centre of authority, but this district had, since 1875, been a seething pot of discontent. After the take-over of the Thembu in 1875 frustration had built up as a result of Colonial delay in settling the Bomvana-Thembu boundary disputes. When eventually the boundary was drawn, mutual trespassing had made reconciliation between the two tribes impossible. The Thembu resented the Colonial Government's clumsy handling of this affair. It was, moreover, the district where the paramount's influence was strongly felt, and his followers were more offended in 1875 by his demotion than those living further from his immediate sphere of influence.⁸⁷ In 1876 the Mqanduli people were the most outspoken in their complaints against the Government's destruction of Thembu chieftainship and the handing over of the chiefs' judicial powers to magistrates.⁸⁸ That the people in this district did not join the war of 1881 must therefore be ascribed to Ngangelizwe's opposition to waging a war that could end in defeat, rather than to their feeling of affection for the Colony.

It was in this atmosphere, then, that the young probationer minister started his career. Here too, he made the acquaintance of an evangelist, Paul Shaw, who became his right hand man.⁸⁹ A capable, hardworking and ambitious man, it was inevitable that Tile would have been caught up in the political activities of the time. His involvement in secular affairs led to a break with the Wesleyan-Church. Like other African members, Tile resented certain discriminatory practices such as the right of white English-speaking ministers alone to decide on the distribution of church funds.⁹⁰ It was, however, most likely his political activities within the Thembu chiefdom that led to his final breakaway.⁹¹ Tile's departure from the Wesleyan Church was followed by the establishment of an independent Thembu church, and by Tile's personal active involvement in attempts to undermine the powers of the white magistrates.

The church he envisaged was to be designated the "Thembu Church of South Africa", and was to be moulded along the lines of the Church of England. Allen Lea mentioned that the first separatist Church was erected at Mqekweweni, near Ngangelizwe's Great Place. In this church a prayer, composed by Tile, was sung on the command of Ngangelizwe. It stressed the supremacy of the king over the church and implied the rejection of Queen Victoria as head of the church.⁹² The establishment of this church was closely linked with Tile's political ideals namely the reunification of the Thembu nation. As Saunders explained: "Tile's church stressed Christian allegiance to the paramount, and endowed him with a certain religious sanctity, which enhanced his traditional ritual role and helped to buttress his authority, weakened by missionary activity and the economic and

political change accompanying white penetration in the area". A church, speaking through the chiefdom, could play a part in welding together, under the paramount, the whole of that area which Tile's programme envisaged would once again fall under his direct control."⁹³ From 1883 onwards Tile held a series of meetings at Ngangelizwe's Great Place, at which he called for the removal of all the magistrates, except the Chief Magistrate, from Thembuland; for the abolition of passes; for the unification of the Thembu "from the Indian Ocean to Glen Grey"; and for imperial rather than colonial rule.⁹⁴

Tile's activities were likely to appeal to Ngangelizwe as the appointment of magistrates was a deeply divisive factor in Thembuland, and had further weakened his tottering authority. The meetings addressed by Tile and Paul Shaw at the Great Place, were followed by petitions for the removal of magistrates, signed by the paramount in his capacity as "Lord of the Thembu tribe". This would reinforce the suspicion that Tile had become a tremendous power behind the throne.⁹⁵ On the other hand there is no evidence that Ngangelizwe personally attended any of Tile's meetings, and, when visited by chiefs who had attended such a meeting, he cautioned them to live peacefully under the magistrate, sounding his oft-repeated warning that the Government had never yet fought a man without conquering him and driving him out of the country.⁹⁶ It would seem, then, that Ngangelizwe, despite being attracted by the movement, gave it only half-hearted support. His hesitation to take a stand is understandable, given the situation in which he found himself at the time. On the one hand he could not challenge the Government while the outcome of a stabbing case in which

he was involved was still pending; on the other hand there was the war party which wanted his removal.⁹⁷ An egg dance between the extremes would have been the only way in which he could save his skin. There were also rumours, supported by medical reports, that Ngangelizwe was a very sick man, usually under the influence of liquor, and by no means capable of carrying out his titular responsibilities.⁹⁸ It may be that decisions were taken on his behalf by councillors who supported Tile.⁹⁹

It is equally difficult to determine Tile's influence over the other chiefs in Thembuland. Evidence indicates that many refused to attend the meetings, while others seemed sceptical about his suggestions. Asked by one of the chiefs: "What is wrong with the magistrates?", Tile shrewdly answered: "The magistrates do no harm, but the chiefs do not get as much money as formerly for fees." Another sceptic was informed that "the petty chiefs ignore the chiefs, but if the magistrates were gone, they would listen to the chiefs."¹⁰⁰ There was only one brief period when it seemed as if success was within his grasp. In 1884 there were rumours that the posts of magistrates were to be abolished as part of an economy drive. Walter Stanford warned that this could be seen by Tile as a Colonial concession to his demands.¹⁰¹ Later that year, the Uppington ministry came into power and all ideas of the Cape Colony's withdrawal from the Transkei were rejected. The posts of magistrates were therefore secured. By that time Tile was in serious trouble, following accusations that he had instigated the Mqanduli people to refuse to pay hut tax. He was arrested, but the Attorney-general ruled that the arrest was illegal, and after a reprimand in front of the chiefs and headmen he was released.¹⁰²

After the death of Ngangelizwe, Tile tried with new vigour to gain influence over Dalindyebo, the mission-educated successor to the throne, who, he had reason to believe, would give him more substantial support. Early in 1885 a letter, dated 12 December 1884, signed by Ngangelizwe, was forwarded to the Chief Magistrate. In this letter it was asked that Dalindyebo should be recognized as chief, with his lesser brothers as chiefs under him. It further stated that the Thembu nation had selected Tile to speak on their behalf; that Tile, Holosima, Ngonyana, and Jobinambayi represented the real mind of the Thembu people; and that those headmen, such as Cutalele and Nanyaki, who spoke against Tile, were not representative of the Thembu people. The latter, they said, were in fact the subjects of the Bomvana chief, Sipendu. The letter emphasised, in conclusion, that the Thembu had the right to decide for themselves who their spokesman would be. The authenticity of this letter was seriously doubted. By the end of December, Ngangelizwe was already in a dying state. Elliot was therefore of the opinion that it was either written at the time, but that the tribe refused to forward it, or that it was of their recent concoction.¹⁰³

The Chief Magistrate suspected Dalindyebo of having had a hand in the writing and circulation of the letter. He had serious reservations as to Dalindyebo's relationship with some ex-rebels, and he was particularly concerned about the young paramount's attempts to have his two "rebel" uncles, Siquanqati and Bambendino, resettled in the Umtata district. The matter of their being pardoned had already been raised by Ngangelizwe the previous year.¹⁰⁴ Elliot distrusted the two ex-chiefs, believing that they were still in contact with the

Sotho.¹⁰⁵ In view of the declared Colonial policy of rendering any possible military alliances against the Cape Colony as ineffective as possible, it would have been most inexpedient to allow these chiefs to settle in Thembuland Proper. At the same time Gungubele's people were settled in the Emyanyani district. Almost immediately trouble broke out between the newcomers and the old residents. It seemed that the ex-rebels had the support of Tile and Dalindyebo.¹⁰⁶ Dalindyebo's concern for the settlement of ex-rebels in his district was seen as an attempt to win the favour of the anti-Colonial faction in Thembuland.

Further alarm in official circles arose when, in 1885, Blakeway was presented with a letter from Dalindyebo written by Tile. In this letter they informed Blakeway of their intention to visit those chiefs and headmen in the district whose boys had been circumcised after the death of Ngangelizwe, to establish why they had ignored the traditional period of mourning, during which boys could not be circumcised.¹⁰⁷ Blakeway indicated that while he would allow the visit to take place, he would strongly object to any fine being inflicted on people for having circumcised their boys. The infliction of a fine would have been most unfair, since only a few favoured chiefs had been notified that there should be no such ceremony. In an attempt to settle matters, Blakeway assembled the chiefs and headmen at his office. The meeting was attended by all concerned, except by Dalindyebo's councillors. The chiefs unanimously confirmed that no notice had been given with regard to the circumcision. Should Dalindyebo be allowed to proceed, Blakeway pointed out, it would mean that the impoverished district would suffer the loss of about three

hundred cattle paid as fine to the paramount. Blakeway understood Tile's involvement in this matter very well. If Dalindyebo's messengers could be allowed to proceed through the territory, bringing frivolous charges against the people for the sake of fines, while ignoring the magistrates in the matter, the latter's authority would soon be undermined. This was evidently Tile and Shaw's ultimate object.¹⁰⁸ In the months following Dalindyebo's installation, Tile resumed his efforts to get rid of the magistrates. Early in April 1885 a large meeting was held at Dalindyebo's great place.¹⁰⁹ This meeting is of some significance since, for the first time, Matanzima was present. This Emigrant chief had, by now, emerged as an influential leader.¹¹⁰ He was an outspoken critic of Governmental interference in the affairs of the chiefdoms, and would certainly have been attracted by any movement that propagated the removal of the magistrates from Thembuland. What is strange, though, is the fact that Tile, in calling on Matanzima's support, put in a plea that Charles Levey should not be removed from office. Between Matanzima and Levey, there existed a very strong animosity,¹¹¹ and it is highly unlikely that Matanzima would have been amenable to any suggestion aimed at strengthening this magistrate's position. On the other hand it is possible that Matanzima was trying to fish in troubled water, hoping that in giving some moral support to the resistance movement, he might gain some influence in Thembuland Proper. Allegedly he called on the chiefs to stand together, saying that hitherto their requests were ignored by the Government, because they were not unanimous in their decisions. He then asked that his presence at the meeting should be kept a secret. Dalindyebo, who presided over the meeting, assured the chiefs that it was in their power to bring about

the removal of the magistrates, especially as they could count on the support of a number of Europeans.¹¹²

When Elliot summoned Dalindyebo to Umtata asking him to explain his involvement in the incriminating meetings held at his Great Place, the chief appeared to be very well-disposed towards the Government. Matters such as the paying of subsidies to chiefs were discussed, and Elliot was convinced that a good relationship could be established with Dalindyebo so that he could be kept from Tile's influence.¹¹³ Shortly afterwards Tile clashed with Dalindyebo, after which the former disappeared from the scene for about four years. He returned in 1889 to resume his agitation for a united Thembu nation.

While it would seem that Tile had not succeeded in making headway in Emigrant Thembuland, he maintained some influence in Thembuland Proper, after his return. At one of his meetings at Dalindyebo's Great Place in 1890, where demands for a united Thembu nation and the recognition of his church as the church of the people were repeated - certainly with the whole-hearted support of Dalindyebo. Tile also advised that only black ministers should be allowed to hold services with chiefs.¹¹⁴ There is no evidence of any support for this suggestion.

Tile lived at a site near Dalindyebo's Great Place, until his death in 1890. Although his successor, Goduka, succeeded in maintaining the movement's influence in Thembuland, Dalindyebo, some years later broke with the Church to return to the Wesleyan fold.¹¹⁵ Saunders points out that the Tile church had risen above a narrow ethnic basis,

as it was open to people other than Thembu. He then concludes that Tile's political activities "may have played a part in creating a milieu conducive to later participation in African nationalist politics," and that "the element of African assertion in early religious independency, which first expressed itself in Tile's church, was to form a major ideological component of African nationalism."¹¹⁶ It is suggested here that it was the emphasis on a united Thembu nation, that attracted Thembu people to Tile's church. Once this emphasis fell away, the movement lost its support in Thembuland. In that sense it remained an ethnic church. Saunders's theory that it particularly stimulated Thembu participation in political activities seems plausible, given the prominence, in the 20th century, of Thembu leaders in Transkeian and South African politics.

1. F. Brownlee (ed): The Transkeian Native Territories: Historical Records, p.23.
2. Stanford Papers, B3.1: W. Stanford-Lord Buxton, 10 June 1921.
3. CPP.A52-'82: J. Rose-Innes-R.M. of Griqualand East, 15 September '81.
4. GTJ., 4 January '81 Editorial.
5. CPP.G33-'82: Annexure C in no 3. Stanford's Report, 31 December '81.
6. CPP.A26-'82: Telegram, J. Rose-Innes-CMT., 8 February '81. See also CMT.1/5: Rose-Innes-Elliot, 29 April '81.
7. CMT.1/36: Proceedings at Court of Resident Magistrate, Umtata, 9 May '81. For more garden and boundary disputes see for instance CMT.1/26: R.M. Emyanyeni-CMT., 18 September '83; 11 December, '83; 3 August '84; 5 August '84; CMT.1/36: R.M. Umtata-CMT., 12 June '82.
8. See pp.270-72 for alienation of Matanzima's lands in correspondence of his two brothers' activities in the war.
9. See p.205.
10. This commission consisted of J. Hemming, Civil Commissioner for Queenstown, as chairman; John James Irwin M.L.A.; John Bradfield M.L.A.; C. Bekker, Justice of Peace for the District of Wodehouse.
11. Herman Giliomee: 'Afrikaner Nationalism' in Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, Vol.13, (Collected Seminar papers, no.33, Univ. of London, Institute of Commonwealth).
12. T.R.H. Davenport: The Afrikaner Bond, pp.19-23, 54-85.
13. C.W. de Kiewiet: A History of South Africa, Social and Economic, p.13.
14. Stanford Reminiscences, p.178-80.
15. CPP.G66-'83: Report of Thembuland Land Settlement Commission, p.11. See map 3.
16. Davenport: Afrikaner Bond., pp.84-5; G.66-'83: Thembuland Land Settlement Commission's Report, pp.1-2.
17. Morris Mxaku, for instance claimed that, according to the surveyor, his farm was 1,170 morgen in extent. Hemming dismissed it as a guess, and was adamant that he should not receive more than 500 morgen. Others, like Saule, Lot Mama, Paulus Madliwa and Kalipa all possessed farms of more than 500 morgen in extent.

See G.66-'83: pp.64-67.

18. Ibid: p.65
19. Ibid: Kalipa's evidence, p.65-67; E.J. Warner-Thembuland Commission, p.84; G. Dugmore-Thembuland Commission, p.92; See also C.-'83: Correspondence, E. Warner and W. Ayliff, pp.1-5.
20. Ibid: Minutes of evidence: Hemming's meeting with native farmers at Xala, Xalanga, 16 February '83, pp.62-8.
21. Ibid: p.viii.
22. 1 EC0.5/1/1/1 Papers Despatched: Stanford-CMT., 18 August '82; 30 August '82. See also CMT.1/27 Stanford-CMT., 12 October '78. See map 3.
23. Stanford Reminiscences: pp.178-179; 1 EC0.5/1/1/1, Stanford-CMT., 30 August '82.
24. See p.110-11.
25. This argument was highly suspect. See p.317 for findings of the Glen Grey Commission which was appointed in 1892.
26. See p.74 for Southey's assurance that no man would be deprived of land in consequence of his refusal to emigrate.
27. CPP.G2-'85: Annual Report of W.J. Hughes, Field Cornet, Tambookieland, Enclos. A in no 50, 10 January '85.
28. MS.15045, (Cory Library) Unsigned Ms.
29. MS.15045, E.J. Warner-The Rev. Smith Spencer, 25 February '86.
30. Resettled people often complained that the old people "did not like them". See below, p.224.
31. Frontier Guardian, 4 October '84, The Thembus; 7 August '85, The Natives of Glen Grey.
32. NA.225: Glen Grey Papers, Correspondence re Umhlanga Location.
33. Ibid.
34. The Frontier Guardian, 18 March '83. No reference could be found to substantiate the former claim as to the lands being given to the Thembu for 10 years. Nor is it clear whether they referred specifically to the Umhlanga people as having forfeited their rights, or to all the Thembu in Glen Grey.
35. MS.15045, Meeting of the Glen Grey Natives, Lady Frere, 7 September '85.
36. Frontier Guardian, 7 August '85. The Natives of Glen Grey;

MS.14045.

37. Ibid.
38. Frontier Guardian, 30 October '85, Naboth's Vineyard.
39. MS.14045, Meeting of the Glen Grey Natives.
40. Frontier Guardian, 11 December '85. The Secretary for Native Affairs at Lady Frere.
41. See below, p.214.
42. MS.14045, Frost-Warner, 11 September '86.
43. MS.15059, Correspondence on Glen Grey Question, E. Warner-M. Hodges, 26 August '86.
44. Ibid: Warner-Hodges, 4 September. '86; Warner-Hughes, 1 September '86.
45. This Committee consisted of W. Ayliff, G. Sprigg, J. Hofmeyer, Sickel, Lewis and C. Rhodes.
46. Stanford Papers, D-7, 25 May '82; PMO 260, Prime Minister-Gordon, 9 June '82. ("Chinese" Gordon was the Government's adviser on affairs in Basutoland. While in King William's Town en route to Basutoland he was asked to mediate in the squatter question.) See also Saunders: Annexation, p.104; Merriman Papers: Gordon-Merriman, 31 August '82; Gordon-Scanlen, 31 August '82.
47. CPP.A15-'82, p.iii.
48. BPP.C3122: Kimberley-Robinson, 15 November '81, pp.87-8.
49. NA.73: J. Rose-Innes-Attorney-General, 22 February '81; USNA-CMT., 21 March '81.
50. CO.1156, Memo of Attorney-General, 25 April '81; CPP.G4-'83: USNA-CMT., 25 June '81, p.429.
51. CPP.G4-'83 CMT.-USNA., 4 April '81.
52. Ibid: USNA-CMT., 25 June '81, p.429.
53. CPP.G109-'83: Telegram R.M. Umtata-SNA., 14 June '83. See also p.275.
54. Ibid. See also CMT.1/36: Acting R.M. Emyanyani-CMT., 23 May '83.
55. CPP.G109-'83: W. Stanford-W. Fleischer, 26 June '83. See also p.259.
56. Ibid: Fleischer-USNA: 29 June '83.

57. Saunders: Annexation, p.119; GTJ., 17 May '84.
58. Saunders: Annexation, p.121.
59. The appointment of this commission was the outcome of a debate following the introduction in the Cape Parliament of an Annexation Bill in 1881. The work of the commission was interrupted by the War of 1881, and the final report was only brought out in 1883.
60. CPP.G4-'83: Commission's Report, p.20. See also Saunders: Transkeian Territories, p.124, footnote 46. Saunders points out that the Commission was nevertheless concerned to wean the Africans from their customs, and had all its recommendations on African Law been implemented, there would have been less tolerance of African customs in the territories in the late 1880's than there was.
61. CMT.1/26: R.M. Emyanyeni-CMT., 4 August, '84.
62. CMT.1/6: CMT.-USNA., 17 October '82.
63. CMT.1/26: Statement by Tokwe and Dambuza in cover letter R.M. Emyanyeni-CMT., 22 July '84.
64. S.J. Jingoos: A Chief Is A Chief By The People, p.171.
65. See pp.275-6.
66. A. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, pp.8-10; 229-36; 258-61.
67. See pp.198-206.
68. Stanford Papers B.32: Petition to E.M. Judge signed by Matanzima, Mtirara, Gecelo, Tyopo and Sitokwe Ndlele, 4 September '75. For Smith's Annexation see p.19.
69. Odendaal, Vukani Bantu, p.44.
70. For disarmament issue see p.163. For account of this meeting see Frontier Guardian, 15 March '84; 29 March '84; Umhlanga Natives.
71. Frontier Guardian, 11 December '85. The Secretary for Native Affairs at Lady Frere.
72. See above, p.200-3.
73. See pp.193-4.
74. Frontier Guardian, 15 March '84 Umhlanga Natives.
75. See p.267 and various other references in chapter 6 (Matanzima section) for his relationship with this chief.
76. Frontier Guardian, 11 December '85. The Secretary for Native

Affairs at Lady Frere.

77. These stations were Agnes, Bowden, Arthur, Zwart Vlei and Misintsila. See also NA.245: Glen Grey Commission, Meeting of Natives at Glen Grey, 5 March '92, p.1.
78. NA.225: Glen Grey Papers, Hammond Tooke's Comparative Review.
79. NA.225: Report of meeting of Thembus at e-Xora, 3 March '92.
80. CPP.A1-'93: Glen Grey Commission letter signed by Pelem, Malasi and Sibeko, 24 June '92.
81. CPP.A1-'93: Glen Grey Commission, Mahonga's evidence, p.21. For the granting of individual tenure see pp.315-320.
82. See correspondence in the Methodist Archives, MS.15,046 (Cory Library)
83. J.M. Lonsdale: 'Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa', in JAH., IX, 1, 1968, p.120.
84. A. Odendaal. Vukani, pp.32-33; P. Walshe. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, p.9.
85. In the 1870's, before he was sent to Healdtown he assisted the Rev. Peter Hargreaves at Clarkebury and obtained permission from Ngangelizwe to build a chapel at the outstation Cwescwini, about 20 miles from Clarkebury. See Hargreaves Papers, Ms Diary, 4 July, 26 August/9 September 1874.
86. C.C. Saunders: 'Tile and the Thembu Church', in JAH., II, 1970, p.558.
87. See pp.144-8.
88. CMT.1/32: R.M. Mqanduli-CMT., 22 November '76.
89. Little is known about Shaw. In 1876 a Paul Shaw was employed as police constable in the Mqanduli district (CMT.1/32). When Ngangelizwe in 1881 gave evidence before the Thembuland Commission he was accompanied by a councillor, Paul Shaw. Whether this was the same person is not certain.
90. Allen Lea, in The Native Separatist Church Movement in South Africa, described him as a fine specimen of a Thembu, of good descent, eloquent as a preacher and a most vigorous and earnest worker. According to the Rev. Peter Hargreaves he was an impressive preacher with charismatic gifts (Hargreaves Papers Ms diary, 26 Aug. '74.)
91. See C.C. Saunders: Tile, p. 555.
92. Allen Lea: Separatist Church, p.24.

93. C.C. Saunders: Tile, p. 562.
94. CMT.1/83: G. Palmer, acting R.M. Mqanduli-CMT., 13 June '83; CMT.1/33: Blakeway-CMT., 22 August '83. Included in these letters: evidence of chief Dwanzaza, 28 August '83; Headmen Mange, 28 August '83; Holosima, 22 August '83; Chief Mtolobo, 12 March '83. Tile styled himself as "one of the Queen's subjects". See CMT.1/33: Blakeway, R.M. Mqanduli-Blakeway, 6 May '84.
95. Saunders: Tile, p. 577; Stanford Papers D.8., 18 August '83; CMT.1/7: CMT.-USNA.; 28 November '83; CMT.1/8: Petition in cover letter, USNA.-CMT., 25 January '84.
96. CMT.1/33: R.M. Mqanduli-CMT., 22 August '83 Ibid. Evidence of Chief Dwanzaza, 24 August '83.
97. See pp.258-9.
98. Ibid. See p.246.
99. Sihele has suggested that Ngangelizwe was strongly influenced by his councillors, those who had become converted to Christianity. See E.G. Sihele, p.119.
100. Blakeway, the R.M. of Mqanduli was of opinion that the native chiefs were not in favour of Tile's proposals. See CMT.1/33: Blakeway-DMT., 22 August '83; 6 May '84.
101. Stanford Papers D.8, 26 March '84.
102. Saunders: Tile, p. 560.
103. NA.104: CMT.-SNA., 9 April '85.
104. E.G. Sihele, p.130.
105. NA.104: CMT.-USNA., 25 March '85.
106. NA.104: CMT.-USNA., 30 January '85; 9 April '85; Tile's statement 9 April '85 included in cover letter.
107. CMT.1/33: Statement by native of Mqanduli District, 21 April '85.
108. Ibid.
109. CMT.1/33: Statement by native of Mqanduli District, 21 April '85.
110. See p.270.
111. See pp.265-275.
112. NA.105: CMT.-SNA., 24 June '85.
113. See Saunders: Tile, for a detailed discussion of his activities.

114. NA.115: CMT.-USNA., 17 October 1890.

115. Saunders: Title, p.570.

116. Ibid.

Chapter 6

Ngubengcuka's Grandsons

(i) King Ngangelizwe: Villain or Vilified?

Contemporary official and newspaper reports present an unfavourable picture of the last king of independent Thembuland. From them he emerges as an ambitious and cruel tyrant, lascivious, addicted to liquor and politically inept. F. Brownlee wrote that he was "a man of savage disposition and ungovernable temper,"¹ while Sir Walter Stanford spoke of his cruel disposition.² His one-time mentor and confidant, the Rev. Peter Hargreaves, referred to his rule as one of debauchery and bloodshed.³ The most acrimonious attacks came from J.C. Warner during the time that he was Thembu Agent. His letters to Southey between the years 1865 and 1871 frequently referred to a "half-cracked fellow", a "living freak", and "a Chaka-like despot".⁴ "It is dangerous to have anything to do with him", he once wrote. "He is such a liar that he cannot be trusted. I sometimes think I see signs of real insanity in him. He gets into horrid passions and does outrageous things. He drinks kaffer beer and sleeps alternately almost day and night".⁵ Warner was supported by the local press which made regular reports on the behaviour of this "monster of brutality". An anonymous traveller who visited Thembuland in 1867 painted a horrifying picture of conditions in that country. Ngangelizwe was said to have chopped off the arm of one of his wives, killed another, thrust an assegai through the body of a girl who was too tired to dance on his wedding night and killed a horse that stumbled.⁶ Other reports accused him of having beaten a pregnant woman to death, of having cut off the ears of a horse which had become tired and of

having killed an infant who gazed at him.⁷

Less politically-minded Europeans treated the king more kindly in their memoirs. It is as difficult to reconcile Capt. Cunynghame's "coarse-looking savage"⁸ with the trader W.J. Clarke's picture of "one of nature's true gentlemen",⁹ as it is to imagine this murderer, returning the day after he had been treated to a lunch, to thank his hostess.¹⁰ H.G. Elliot, who was chief magistrate of Thembuland during the crucial years 1879-1881, when the Cape Colony was particularly keen to strengthen its ties with the Thembu paramount, was of the opinion that Ngangelizwe was not vicious by nature, but that he committed his atrocious acts when under the influence of liquor.¹¹ Sihele described him as an outgoing, talkative person, witty, and as mischievous as a boy.¹²

To view this character in any sort of realistic light, it is necessary to consider the profound changes that took place, both in his personal life and in the lives of his people at the time of his accession to power.

Born in the 1840s,¹³ Ngangelizwe grew up at a time when European influences were beginning to infiltrate Thembu institutions to a marked degree. The closer cooperation between the Colonial and Thembu Governments, which followed on Mtirara's settlement nearer to the Colonial boundary in 1839, was complemented by the increasing influence of the Wesleyan missionaries. At the Great Place at Rhoda, near the Indwe river, the lay-preacher J.C. Warner gained a position of such confidence that it earned him the title "the uncrowned king of

the Thembu".¹⁴ When Mtirara died in 1848, Warner assumed the position of head of the House of Ngubengcuka, in which capacity he hoped to exercise benevolent, but firm parental control over the young prince.¹⁵ The Rev. Peter Hargreaves, who became missionary at Clarkebury in 1858, abandoned his predecessor's policy of non-interference in Thembu affairs to such an extent that he later prided himself on having been called the Prime Minister of Thembuland.¹⁶ It was undoubtedly through the influence of Warner that the young Ngangelizwe became a scholar at Clarkebury and a candidate for Christian baptism, living in Hargreaves's house with the full consent of Joyi.¹⁷ We do not know whether he acquired his preference for western clothes and his love for music at this time.¹⁸ What does emerge is that he was a kind and promising lad who showed no sign of the violent temper for which he was to become so notorious.¹⁹

This period of intense exposure to Christianity - which taught a set of values vastly different from those held by the Thembu, who were known for their resistance to innovation,²⁰ was abruptly interrupted when Ngangelizwe became king in 1863. Hargreaves related that on his assumption of power he raised the matter of Christianity with his subjects. They warned him against it, saying "You cannot become a Christian and remain a chief. Who is going to keep our tribal practices? Who is going to doctor us for war?" To this challenge Ngangelizwe allegedly answered: "Very well, you decide I must be a heathen. I will let you know how far heathenism can take me."²¹ According to another report, he was once again confronted by his conservative councillors when a marriage was to be arranged between himself and Emma, the Christianised daughter of the Ngqika chief,

Sandile. They objected to their king being married in Christian fashion and thus being restricted to one wife.²² Such accounts must be treated with circumspection,²³ but it seems reasonable to assume that a complete break from existing Thembu mores, on the part of Ngangelizwe, would have subjected him to considerable antagonism from his people. He may have found himself under pressure from two quarters - the traditional one from which he originated and the Christianized one which attracted him. A satisfactory solution to such a dilemma may well have been beyond the reach of one as young and inexperienced as he was at the time. The effects of these personal pressures upon him are speculation. What is certain, however, is that he was unfortunate having assumed power at a time when the friendly relations between Thembu and the Colonial Government were beginning to decline. This trend was already discernable prior to Ngangelizwe's accession to power as has been mentioned earlier.²⁴

The basis for most of the serious problems in the Transkeian territories at the time must be sought in the question of land. Until Ngangelizwe became paramount in 1863, this struggle had been between three contenders; the Thembu, the Gcaleka and the Mfengu. Towards the end of the decade this pattern was complicated by an additional factor - the interference of the Cape Colony in the affairs of black chiefdoms. This interference resulted from the policy of divide-and-rule applied by Governor, Wodehouse in the hope of preserving peace in the least costly way. In fact, it often threatened to disturb the very equilibrium the Government was hoping to establish.

It was therefore under conditions of uncertainty, apprehension and political intrigue that the story of Thembuland's "villain king" unfolded itself. It began in September 1863 when, allegedly in accordance with the wishes of the late Mtirara, the ailing Joyi took the young Qeya²⁵ to Glen Grey to be inducted as paramount by his "foster father", J.C. Warner, who was then still Thembu agent in the Location.²⁶ Warner welcomed the occasion as a means of strengthening the equivocal Thembu-European relationship, cultivating a useful and obliging ally who could act as a bulwark against the Cape Colony's arch-enemy, Sarhili and, above all, reaffirm his own position as Head of the House of Ngubengcuka and, by implication, big chief of the Thembu. All these he considered, from a political and personal point of view, to be of the utmost importance. He was apprehensive of the possibility of Ngangelizwe becoming the most popular and powerful ruler in independent Transkei, which may have led to the latter giving way to pressure of other chiefs and transferring his allegiance to his black neighbours instead of to the Cape Government. Warner realized that all his manipulative powers would be needed to forestall such a development.

In his dealings with Ngangelizwe, Warner used a blend of bribery, indoctrination and patronage, of which the King's induction ceremony was a perfect example. Warner made sure that the gift of £50 which he was to hand over to Ngangelizwe on behalf of the Cape Government, received precedence over the gifts of all the chiefs who attended the ceremony. In a fatherly speech, consisting of advice and admonitions, the young king was promised a stipend of £50 a year, provided that he remained faithful to the Cape Government. He was reminded of

Mtirara's excellent record of friendship with the Colony, and of his protection of missionaries in times of war, an example Ngangelizwe was advised to follow as "it was through the Bible that Britain reached her state of greatness among the nations of the world."²⁷

Warner's next step was to strengthen his hold on the new ruler. Not only did he persuade the Government to leave Ngangelizwe to his exclusive guidance,²⁸ but in a clever move he also ensured that the annual stipend should be paid by Warner's office to Ngangelizwe in person.²⁹ Thereby he effectively blurred the distinction between his personal and official capacities. Furthermore, to prevent interference from other Transkeian officials, in whom he had little confidence,³⁰ he suggested that once Ngangelizwe was back at the Mbashe, all communications between him and the Government should be conducted through Hargreaves whom he regarded as "a sensible man, deeply interested in the religious welfare of the chief, but who, will not fail to influence his mind or teach him the lesson of loyalty to the British government."³¹ One other factor had to be carefully managed: Ngangelizwe's position as paramount of the Location. Here it had to be made clear to him that, although the Location residents were his subjects, they lived nominally within the Cape Colony; he could, therefore, have no dealings with them except through the Thembu agent, Warner himself.

One can only speculate as to Ngangelizwe's intentions at the time. Outwardly he behaved with commendable modesty,³² and on various occasions politely professed his loyalty to the Cape Colony. But he was certainly not being duped. Soon after he became king, he had his

first brush with the authorities on the hitherto unresolved questions of free intercourse between the Mbashe and the Location Thembu, and the distribution of Fadana's lands.³³ He could do little, other than to voice his protest, but the Government was obliged to take note of the strong influence he had over the Location residents. When a census was taken in Glen Grey in February 1865, he objected to his people's being "counted by the white man" without his consent having first been obtained. His message to the chiefs caused such excitement that the census had to be stopped for some time.³⁴

Initially such protests were sympathetically received by Warner and faithfully conveyed to the Government, together with warnings not to estrange the Thembu king. The breakdown of these cordial relations, soon after the Emigration had started in 1865,³⁵ was the result of the head-on clash between Ngangelizwe and Warner on the question of Thembu unity. Ngangelizwe's behaviour at the time of the Emigration, his attempts to put Mfanta up as his representative in the Location,³⁶ his meetings with Nonesi, and his insistence on maintaining control of the Emigrant chiefs, all pointed to an understandable desire to restore the Thembu Empire.³⁷ Such designs militated against the successful execution of the Cape Government's policy of divide-and-rule.

In essence, the end result of this divide-and-rule policy was the destruction of traditional tribal structures, thereby leaving the people defenceless in the event of Colonial onslaughts on their lands and culture. The first step in its implementation was the weakening of the position of the paramount by recognising the independence of

the lesser chiefs. In this way the unity of the nation crumbled.³⁸ The establishment of Emigrant Thembuland and the recognition of the four independent chiefs is an example of the way in which this policy was advanced. J.C. Warner believed implicitly that the key to future stability on the frontier was to be found in actively encouraging estrangement between a paramount and his chiefs. "It is also my policy," he wrote to Southey, "to divide and conquer. This I will carry out with as much vigour as possible on any paramount by supporting his subordinate chieftains to maintain their representatives, thus keeping up a healthy balance of power amongst them which might at any time be used to our benefit."³⁹ The implementation of this policy, however, involved considerable risks. Warner's fostering of antagonistic interests among the Thembu, could alienate Ngangelizwe and drive him into an alliance with Sarhili. On the one hand therefore, Warner had to appease the King by allowing the Thembu partial hegemony, while on the other, he had to encourage jealousy between the chiefs. In this way he hoped that the two Thembu sections could be divided into two separate antagonistic blocs, comprising more or less equal numbers. Materially weakened in this way, their threat would be contained. The creation of such a Bismarckian system of alliances and counter-alliances required skilful manoeuvring, and Warner's actions during this period often resemble those of a conspirator rather than a government official.

Ngangelizwe must have been bewildered by such actions by an erstwhile friend. He had reason to believe that, according to agreements between himself and Warner at the time of the Emigration, his paramountcy over all the Thembu had been recognised by the Cape

Government. In this capacity he would have had certain prerogatives in Emigrant Thembuland such as the distribution of land and the settlement of foreigners among his own people, provided that no alienation of land took place. He would also have had the right to call on his subordinate chiefs for military aid in time of war. These prerogatives were now disputed by Warner, who tried to contradict him on every point and to undermine his authority.

A serious dispute between Warner and Ngangelizwe began in 1867 when the latter, acting in his capacity as Thembu Paramount, allowed three Afrikaner families and a few Sotho families to settle at the mouth of the Tsomo river, in Emigrant Thembuland.⁴⁰ The emigrant chiefs saw Ngangelizwe's interference in their domain as a bid to usurp their sovereignty. Matanzima, acting as their spokesman, lodged their complaints with both J.C. and E.J. Warner. J.C. Warner took up the case with his usual élan. The episode provided him with another opportunity of using the two brothers' quarrels to the advantage of the Cape Colony. By presenting Ngangelizwe as the bogeyman against whose tyranny the chiefs had to be protected, he emphasised their dependence upon the Cape Colony, hoping that in time they would be willing to place themselves entirely under the Government.⁴¹ In this way he was already subtly paving the way for British intervention beyond the Kei. But above all, Warner wanted to use this incident to humiliate Ngangelizwe whose active opposition to the Emigration had infuriated him. The dispute between the two men had by 1867 developed into a personal affair. Warner now thought that by removing farmers who were living on lands given to them by Ngangelizwe, he would demonstrate once and for all that Ngangelizwe had no say in Emigrant

Thembuland. The question of the Thembu paramount's relation with his emigrant subjects, which had not been finalized in 1865, was thus reopened.

During the meetings that followed, Warner left Ngangelizwe under no illusion as to the fact that he was recognised only as the nominal head of Emigrant Thembuland, and that by interfering in any way with the chiefs he jeopardised his relationship with the Cape Government from whom he received a subsidy. Southey, on receiving a letter from Warner on this issue, warned that they had dealt freely with Ngangelizwe when they had exchanged the land across the Kei. Ngangelizwe, Southey said, could thus quite rightly say: "the land is mine. I have a right to do so" (i.e. settle foreigners in Emigrant Thembuland). The Governor would probably have taken the same view.⁴² Warner was quick to retort that Southey should not stress the matter of the deal having been made with Ngangelizwe. "You must not forget" he frankly admitted, "that Qeya was only made use of as a convenience in the negotiations, and that the Location was only nominally his, and that he had no legal title to the lands, whereas the chiefs who have migrated had a legal title...and that in reality they were the real contracting parties....So it will be well not to lay too much stress on that point. In fact it would be bad policy... it will never do to make Qeya greater than we can avoid."⁴³ Some months earlier he had justified his policy of interference in Emigrant Thembuland by indicating that he was acting on official instructions. "I can make peace with Qeya tomorrow," he told Southey, "by dropping the first syllable from Disunion - the term you yourself used to express your policy." As further justification for his

actions he added: "Qeya wants to unite the whole of the Thembu, Basuto and Pondomise, and even some Boers under his uncontrollable government."⁴⁴ It is unlikely that Southey would have taken such exaggerations seriously,⁴⁵ but, except for the occasional mild reprimand, there were for the time being no efforts from Cape Town to put an end to Warner's interference in Emigrant Thembuland. This left Ngangelizwe in a quandary, but he nevertheless made a tough stand on the subject of the disputed territory. Accusing the Warner family of sowing distrust between himself and his people, as well as between himself and the Cape Government, he appealed, through the office of the Queenstown magistrate, for the removal of all the Warners from the Transkei.⁴⁶

The eventual eviction of the farmers by the F.A.M.P. put an end to the dispute, but the breach between Warner and Ngangelizwe could never be healed. Warner's continued interference in the affairs of Emigrant Thembuland drove matters to a head. When Wodehouse visited the Mbashe area in 1869 he came to the conclusion that Warner's position was no longer likely to be beneficial.⁴⁷ Already, in May 1869, the Governor had proposed the abolition of the post of British Resident as a result of a lack of finance and, in 1870, Warner was allowed to retire on pension.⁴⁸ Even in his retirement he kept a vigilant eye on Transkeian affairs, maintaining a regular correspondence with Southey until his death in July 1871.

The years following Warner's retirement were packed with drama. There was the intensification of the Thembu-Gcaleka dispute which culminated in the war of 1872, following Ngangelizwe's alleged assault

on his wife, Novili. Then came the Nonxokozelo affair which gave the Cape Government the opportunity of interfering in Thembuland's internal affairs and which led directly to the deposing of Ngangelizwe as chief in 1875. His re-instatement in 1876 meant that the traditional Thembu-Cape friendship was restored, and, despite rumours to the contrary, he remained loyal and fought on the Colonial side during the wars of resistance of 1879 and 1881.⁴⁹ He died in 1885, after a long period of suffering, shortly after the annexation of Thembuland. Dr. Johnstone, the district surgeon of Umtata, diagnosed his disease as the failure of the heart and liver to function properly, due to the excessive use of alcohol.⁵⁰ In his last days the king resorted to the beliefs of his people, and summoned a witchdoctor - in vain.⁵¹

In the light of all these complex factors outlined above, the accusations of cruelty that haunted Ngangelizwe all through his life, can now be examined. The first references to his cruel and tyrannical disposition came from J.C. Warner, at a time when it was clear that he was no longer keen on the Emigration. It was also a time when the farmers and frontier officials were trying to expose the failure of Cape policies of non-interference across the Kei. They used all the means of propaganda at their disposal to discredit the inhuman black rulers, while at the same time propagating the annexation of the Transkei as an obligation, should Britain wish to fulfil her civilising mission in Africa.

One example of this is provided by the report of an anonymous traveller in Thembuland, referred to earlier. The author expressed

the hope that "Mr Warner has reported the crimes of this inhuman wretch. He lives on and holds land from the British crown.... He receives a subsidy of £100 per annum from the Colonial Government. Should the Governor fail to chastise him in some way His Excellency will not only tacitly tolerate and sanction the murderous deeds of a weak and impetuous chief, but an Imperium in Imperio".⁵² Another example was even more straightforward. This was a report presumably written by the editor of the Kaffrarian Watchman. Referring to alleged atrocities, he condemned the British policy of non-interference. Britain, he wrote, should have taken possession of the whole coastline and made subjects of the inhabitants of that area.⁵³ In another report the editor expressed the hope that "...the authorities will learn a little practical wisdom, retake the country and people it with Europeans. It is high time that this bearding of the Colony by a set of nude, half-tutored savages should at once and for ever be put a stop to."⁵⁴ When, by 1869, there were no signs that the Cape Government had reconsidered its policy, the newspaper came up with more atrocious deeds committed by the King, and it warned that if interference failed it would bring down upon the British name the scorn and contempt of all the tribes from the Kei to Natal.⁵⁵

Conditions in Thembuland during the first unstable years of Ngangelizwe's rule played into the hands of his detractors. This instability was rooted in events that had taken place long before he became paramount. Mtirara's abandonment of the Mbashe area in 1839, the absence of the Royal House for about twenty-five years from the core settlement, and the long period of rule by a regent - all these had left a vacuum in which contenders were eventually unwilling to

accept Ngangelizwe's authority. From the start the young paramount had had to face opposition, the most formidable being that of his uncle, Mnqanqeni.⁵⁶ This chief, who claimed that he had a greater right to the Mbashe area, since he had been living there when Ngangelizwe was still with his father at the White Kei, tried to solicit Cape recognition for his attempts at secession, and for setting up an independent chiefdom.⁵⁷ The simmering dispute between uncle and nephew came to a head in 1870. Mnqanqeni had the support of several influential chiefs, and the dispute caused considerable commotion throughout the Mbashe area.⁵⁸ Moreover, internal rejection of Ngangelizwe's rule was not confined to the Hala hierarchy. During Mtirara's absence, the Qwati took up a more independent attitude, and when Joyi returned to the Mbashe, Chief Fabu refused to recognise his authority. His successor, Dalasile, continued his father's policy and only nominally recognised Ngangelizwe's paramountcy.⁵⁹ Ngangelizwe responded to such challenges by allowing the settlement of other groups, especially Mfengu, in his country. In this way he hoped to strengthen his power. It proved to be a miscalculation. Rejected by the original inhabitants, he found the presence of these newcomers to be a constant source of friction, a factor that contributed to the Thembu-Gcaleka War of 1872.⁶⁰

Minor affrays added to the general confusion in the early years of Ngangelizwe's rule. After the establishment of Emigrant Thembuland, tension within the Mbashe area could be relieved by a disgruntled chief switching his allegiance from the paramount to one of the Emigrant chiefs. Over a period of time there seems to have been a situation in which those who were dissatisfied were able to move to

and fro, possibly playing one chief off against another. If we also consider the disruptions that followed the traditional raids by a new paramount on his subordinates "to fill his milk-bag,"⁶¹ we can understand that the situation during those early years of Ngangelizwe's paramountcy provided valuable propaganda for those who wished to represent him as a 'Chaka-like tyrant', despised by councillors and subordinate chiefs. A closer look at some of the facts may open up new perspectives.

Ngangelizwe's younger brother, Siquanqati, was one of the chiefs said to have fled from Thembuland in consequence of the paramount's tyrannical behaviour.⁶² Siquanqati eventually settled in Emigrant Thembuland under Matanzima, where, as it turned out, he became known as a difficult character and an embarrassment to Matanzima.⁶³ It is important to note the Warner family's involvement in this dispute. J. Warner maintained that Siquanqati had initially placed himself under his son, H.B. Warner. The latter, unwilling to become involved in family affairs, asked advice of the Thembu chiefs, who recommended that he should be taken to J.C. Warner. We do not know who these chiefs were. Warner was only too willing to interfere in a dispute which he thought "could split the nation." He assured Southey that in this matter he would act as the guardian of Mtirara's family, rather than as a government official, while keeping a sharp eye on Colonial interests, and taking advantage of every circumstance that could favour these interests. If there was to be another Boer-Sotho war, he said, it would be advantageous to keep up as many clashes of interest as possible across the Kei.⁶⁴ It is therefore not unlikely that Siquanqati was encouraged by the Warners to defy Ngangelizwe's

authority. In view of this we may well be justified in asking whether Sinquanqati had actually fled because, as Warner alleged, he could not tolerate his brother's tyrannical behaviour. It might have been that as an ambitious junior member of the Royal House, he saw the opportunity of establishing himself as an independent chief in Emigrant Thembuland.⁶⁵ In these designs he was actively encouraged by the Warners, for reasons already discussed.

Even more pertinent to the question of Ngangelizwe's reputation are official reports concerning the Mnqanqeni dispute. It has been mentioned that Mnqanqeni had gained influence in the Mbashe area during the regency of Joyi, and that this had led to clashes with Ngangelizwe once the latter had returned to the Mbashe. It is also possible that Ngangelizwe's half-Christian views on matters such as divination were unpalatable to his tribal chiefs and councillors.⁶⁶ Attention has also been drawn to the discontent arising from Ngangelizwe's settlement of Mfengu on Thembu lands. Probably, then, these were disputes likely to arise in any chiefdom when a new young ruler was establishing his authority over older chiefs. A settlement of such disputes was rendered impossible by the interference of Colonial officials who wished to bring about disunity with the nation by sowing distrust between the chiefs. Matthew Blyth's attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Ngangelizwe and Mnqanqeni was criticised by Warner as contradicting Colonial policy, which aimed at maintaining divisions within the chiefdoms.⁶⁷ With the assistance of E.J. Warner, Mnqanqeni was settled on Matanzima's lands and awarded a second class chief's allowance.⁶⁸ In this way both Mnqanqeni and Matanzima were being supported at Ngangelizwe's expense.⁶⁹ Incidents

such as Mnqanqeni and Sinquanqati's flight from the Mbashe area do therefore not provide any concrete evidence of the despotic acts of which Ngangelizwe was accused. On the contrary, Sihele emphasised that he respected the opinions of his councillors, and that he ruled according to their advice.⁷⁰ The Judge Commission of 1872⁷¹ concluded that he was a weakling, rather than a despot. "Gangeliswe is a promising young man, forced by his councillors for political reasons," their report stated.⁷²

Ngangelizwe's alleged cruelty, as was his despotism, is also open to conjecture. Warner's report that the King had chopped off the arm of one of his wives, were understandably greeted with disgust by officials in Cape Town, and the Governor seriously considered punishing him by stopping his stipend. However, when Southey asked Warner for more information, the latter was evasive. He answered that the incident had occurred a long time before he had informed Southey of it and that it would be difficult to prove that it had been done with intent. He further evaded the issue by accusing other chiefs of being guilty of the same kind of atrocities. Sarhili, he said, had stamped out the 'derms' (sic) of his pregnant daughter.⁷³ When Southey was questioned in Parliament on Ngangelizwe's alleged atrocities, he answered that, in his opinion, the newspapers had made a little too much of it, and that he himself did not think it was as bad as it had been presented.⁷⁴

It should be noted here that the African use of the expression "chopping off an arm" was never meant to be taken literally; it was

merely an idiomatic expression for severe cruelty.⁷⁵ Clearly, then, Warner's report was based on hearsay, and forwarded to Cape Town just at the time when Ngangelizwe started working against the Emigration. Such rumours, true or false, had thoroughly discredited Ngangelizwe. Therefore when rumours were rife in 1869 that he had assaulted and badly maimed his Great Wife, Novili, the daughter of Sarhili, most Cape government officials readily accepted them as true. As little effort was made to establish the facts, although judgment in the case was passed by the Cape Government,⁷⁶ the whole episode remains clouded in uncertainty. Was the Mfengu agent, Matthew Blyth, speaking the truth when he claimed that, the day after the alleged assault, Novili had been seen in the Idutywa Reserve with Veldman Bikitsha,⁷⁷ and that, not only was she perfectly well, but also denied having been ill-treated?⁷⁸ If so, what was her connection with Bikitsha? If she had been maimed as badly as the newspapers stated, how could she have reached Gcalekaland without her escape being discovered by her husband? Why did Sarhili delay for months before sending messengers to Thembuland to find out the truth? Nor do we know whether Novili was as cruelly assaulted as has been alleged. Ngangelizwe at first denied all the rumours, but later admitted that he had chastised but not maimed her. According to traditional law, a scratch on a woman of Novili's rank was considered more serious than a welt on a common woman. Reports about Ngangelizwe's treatment of his wife may thus have been exaggerated. All that we know for certain, is that both the Cape Government and Sarhili used the incident to further their own interests.⁷⁹

Not has the mystery that surrounds the death of Novili's niece, Nonqxokozelo, been successfully solved.⁸⁰ At the time of her alleged murder there was a British Resident in Thembuland who could have ordered an immediate investigation. From the start the behaviour of this officer, William Wright, was equivocal. He took no steps to establish the veracity of rumours that the woman had been killed, when these began circulating in May 1875, but allowed such rumours to continue until it ended in the woman's actual death. For this neglect he was later reprimanded by the Secretary for Native Affairs.⁸¹ The rumours were undoubtedly false; the woman was in fact seen by people weeks after the alleged murder had taken place. Moreover, when Wright and Ayliff, who were appointed as a two-man commission to investigate the affair, visited the grave (if it was the real grave!) they found it to be not more than one month old. This was at the end of August 1875. The occupant of the grave had probably died in late July, two months after Nonqxokozelu's death had first been reported.

These strange events raise another question: who was responsible for these rumours and why had they been started? Brownlee was of the opinion that Ngangelizwe had committed a brutal attack upon the woman, so serious that she was reported to be dead, when in fact she was still alive, and that it was arranged by Ngangelizwe that this false report should be spread in the hope that Sarhili would make an unjustifiable attack upon the Thembu, bringing himself into conflict with the Colony. That this could have been the motive seems reasonable and would indeed have been an astute move by Ngangelizwe. His plans, according to Brownlee, were frustrated by Sarhili who decided to take the matter to the Government instead of resorting to

war.

It is difficult to follow Brownlee's reasoning when he carries the argument further by saying that "meanwhile, Ngangelizwe, believing that he would effectually stop the mouths of all witnesses through fear of his anger, in a most diabolical manner actually put the woman to death and then reported that she died of natural causes."⁸² This is unconvincing, as there was already a strong suspicion that she was being ill-treated. Ngangelizwe could hardly have hoped that both Sarhili and the Government would believe his version of what happened.

W. Wright also believed that the murder (if it happened) was a deliberate act to provoke war with Sarhili.⁸³ but there is no evidence that Ngangelizwe made preparations for war. Furthermore, there could have been no doubt in his mind that Colonial goodwill towards the Thembu depended upon his behaviour. After all, shortly before the above events he had been severely reprimanded by Brownlee for not having exerted himself in settling a case of cattle raiding in which his people had been implicated. He had then been warned, through his agent, that "if he permits these things to take place, how can he in case of trouble appeal to the Government for aid?"⁸⁴ Ngangelizwe would certainly have been aware that the Government would react far more strongly in the case of murder. C.C. Saunders, in The Annexation of Transkeian Territories agrees with Governor Henry Barkly who blamed the murder on "a fit of ungovernable passion,"⁸⁵ but if the story of the murder, as told by witnesses and accepted by the Wright-Ayliff Commission is correct, then it was certainly a premeditated act. There is no satisfactory

answer as to the origin and motives of the rumours.

Of significance in any attempt to gain a clearer understanding of this story, is the source of information about the murder. The main witness was the Mfengu chief, Mensiwe, who had settled in the Idutywa Reserve in August 1875, after having allegedly been driven away by Ngangelizwe.⁸⁶ According to Mensiwe's son, Mbande, it was the murder of Nonqxokozelo that caused the rupture between Ngangelizwe and Mensiwe. The latter, unwilling to risk another war against Sarhili, made known his intention of not fighting should Sarhili go to war. Ngangelizwe threatened him with retaliation. Mensiwe fled to the Reserve, where he told the story of her death. Yet the question remains whether Mensiwe fled to avoid getting involved in a war, or whether he fled as a result of some other dispute, and then, in an attempt to solicit Colonial or Gcaleka aid, spread the news that the woman had been murdered. It is significant that the Commission was of the opinion that, but for the dispute between Ngangelizwe and Mensiwe, the details of the murder would never have become known⁸⁷ - a statement which contradicts Wright's belief that Ngangelizwe deliberately spread the news himself.

All these rumours make it difficult to establish the true facts concerning the alleged murder. On the pretext that it would be difficult to obtain unbiased information, Sarhili persuaded Wright not to hold the investigation in Thembuland. Ngangelizwe was given the choice of attending the inquiry (to be held in the Idutywa Reserve) in person or of sending representatives. As he chose the second alternative, sending four representatives, he himself was never

questioned nor did he state his case. The inquiry seems to have been conducted in a peculiar manner. The representatives were allowed to ask questions on Ngangelizwe's behalf, but were not themselves cross-examined.⁸⁸

The final verdict of the Commission was based on unsatisfactory evidence. The only witnesses to be called were two Mfengu, both of whose impartiality is dubious. One witness was Mbande and the second, Klaas, was a Mfengu, who for unknown reasons, had chanced to be "hanging around" Ngangelizwe's Great Place for four months. Mbande told a sordid tale. Ngangelizwe, he said, had on the Friday evening made an unprovoked assault on the woman. The next day, a Saturday, he sent her to a beer drinking with the clotted blood still upon her face and head. On Monday her death was reported. Mbande also alleged that she had been ill-treated before and had on occasion tried to escape to her people. The second witness, Klaas, gave evidence which in some respects differed from Mbande's. While he agreed with Mbande as to what happened on the Friday, he stated that a doctor was sent for, who attended to her injuries. Klaas mentioned nothing about the beer drinking on Saturday, in fact he said that he did not see her the next day, but was told by the doctor that she was past cure. On the Sunday Klaas was incidentally near the kraal when he heard blows. The woman was beaten, on instruction of Ngangelizwe, by a young man, Ndevu. Early the next morning he (Klaas) heard from the doctor that she was dead, and he fled. It is no exaggeration to say that the findings of the Commission were based upon a stunningly inadequate inquiry. The Commission did not "consider themselves justified in checking any

questions that were put to statements that were made, for fear of natives getting hold of the impression that they were not permitted all they had to say." Furthermore, they omitted to contact the doctor, who, according to the statements made by Klaas, had attended the woman after the assault.⁸⁹ Their ineptitude was further illustrated by their response to Brownlee's query as to why they had not made arrangements for the body to be exhumed. Wright maintained that such a course by non-professional people would have had little meaning, and that they had not been authorised, in their instructions, to proceed to a post-mortem examination. They did not explain why no professional help was obtained.

However critical we may be of the manner in which the Commission conducted the inquiry, it is impossible to dispute their findings after so long a lapse of time. But whatever the truth may have been, they did not seem anxious to establish it. In the light of subsequent events⁹⁰ we are justified in saying that the Commission used specious reasoning to take advantage of a situation that could lead to an extension of the British sphere of influence.

In 1875 there were once again rumours that Ngangelizwe had assaulted one of his wives, Nosepessi. Despite Wright's advice to the contrary, Captain Bowker attempted to arrest him, but when the police arrived at the Great Place they found that he had fled. Nosepessi denied that she had been assaulted, and even Thembu who admitted that Ngangelizwe had previously been guilty of cruelty, now confirmed his innocence. It should however be kept in mind that the Thembu, disgruntled at Ngangelizwe's deposition, might have rallied round him

for the purpose of preventing the Cape from any further meddling in their affairs.

In the years after Ngangelizwe's deposition when war scares sowed panic on the frontier every attempt was made by the Colonial government to secure the Thembu king's loyalty in the event of trouble. The vilification thus came to an end. In 1878 Chief Magistrate Elliot told the Emigrant Thembu: "Many bad things have been said about Ngangelizwe. I speak of a man as I find him, and I believe him to be a good and loyal man, having the interests of his people at heart while wishing to obey the commands of the Government."⁹¹ And when, in July 1878, it was said that Ngangelizwe had once again assaulted Novili (who had meanwhile returned to Thembuland) the Government expressed their disgust with his behaviour, but was unwilling to interfere in the matter.⁹² The Government's confidence in Ngangelizwe was further proved by its willingness to arrange for him to visit Cape Town. William Wright was to accompany him, but the Thembu, apparently not trusting the Government, blocked the road and insisted on their chief's returning to the Great Place.⁹³

In the last years of Ngangelizwe's life, when tension between him and the war party in the country escalated⁹⁴ he once again became involved in an assault case.⁹⁵ According to his own version, he reprimanded a lazy boy for having failed to milk the cows. The boy picked up an assegai, whereupon Ngangelizwe got hold of the weapon and stabbed the boy in the arm. The boy alleged that Ngangelizwe had made an unprovoked attack upon him. Gangrene set in and the boy lost his arm. A doctor who was consulted shortly after the incident, testified

that he wanted to take the boy with him for treatment, in which case the arm would probably have been saved. The boy refused to accompany him. This incident caused a commotion in Thembuland, and the war party, hoping to get rid of Ngangelizwe, insisted on Cape Governmental action. According to traders, most of the Thembu were not particularly concerned about the incident.⁹⁶

The attitude of the Colonial Government in this case forms an interesting contrast to the general attitude in the 1870s when each of Ngangelizwe's atrocities was given all possible negative publicity. Now, it would have been inexpedient to estrange an ally, and there was genuine concern lest the boy should die and Ngangelizwe, as a British subject, should be tried for murder. The Chief Magistrate, H. Elliot, recommended that, in the event of the boy's death, judgement should be postponed until the report of the Commission on Native Laws and Customs was completed, since it might emerge from the report that the death sentence, according to Native Law, would not be applicable in this case.⁹⁷ To everyone's relief the boy recovered.

Ngangelizwe will remain a controversial figure. It is as difficult to prove as to disprove many of the allegations against him. Peter Hargreaves believed that other chiefs were equally cruel; they were only more cunning about it.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the vilification of black chiefs for political reasons was a common feature of 19th century colonial policies. W. Beinart showed that the Mpondo chief Sigcau became the object of a campaign of vilification by the Kokstad Advertiser during the few years before the annexation of Pondoland. Like Ngangelizwe, he was labelled a despot, a tyrant and an

incompetent ruler.

What finally then emerges is that Ngangelizwe's unpopular image cannot be explained only in terms of his personality: it must be related to the political preoccupations and pressures of his time.

(ii) Matanzima Mtirara: Pawn or Plotter?

Matanzima rose to prominence in Thembu history during the Emigration of 1865 - 1869.⁹⁹ We know very little about his life prior to that event. We catch a glimpse of the young Raxoti - as he was called at this stage - where he was a member of the royal household at Rhoda; being the eldest son from Mtirara's Right Hand House. In 1849, when the Royal House, which included the heir to the throne, moved back to the Mbashe, and Nonesi was made regent over the western Thembu, Matanzima remained at Rhoda.¹⁰⁰ Did he remain because he had political aspirations? We do not know. Even his age at the time remains uncertain. If Walter Stanford was correct in saying that he came of age shortly before the Emigration started, he would have been more or less in the same age group as Ngangelizwe, who came of age in 1863.¹⁰¹ But according to Sihele, Matanzima was considerably older than Ngangelizwe.¹⁰² Sihele pointed out that the British action of elevating Nonesi to the regentship, was alien to African thought and custom. He implied that Matanzima should have been given precedence. The fact that Queen Victoria was reigning in Britain at the time may well have been, according to Sihele, a determining factor favouring Nonesi.¹⁰³ Sihele would probably have felt less strongly about the issue if Matanzima had been a child at the time.¹⁰⁴ When the Tambookie Location was proclaimed in 1853, and the paramountcy of Nonesi was reaffirmed,¹⁰⁵ Matanzima retired once again into the shadows. We hear no more about him until the Emigration started, and Warner had become thoroughly disenchanted with his earlier favourites, Ngangelizwe and Nonesi. Matanzima then stepped into the breach, showing that he was willing to cooperate with Warner, and play a

leading role in persuading as many Thembu as possible to settle across the Indwe river.¹⁰⁶ His enthusiasm for the project was certainly fostered by his desire to break loose from his grandmother who, he believed, had usurped his hereditary rights.¹⁰⁷ Warner now cleverly instigated trouble between Matanzima and Ngangelizwe in order to prevent the unification of the Thembu nation. He made it his business to keep himself informed about family tensions and disputes, magnifying each problem and always insinuating that it was either Nonesi or Ngangelizwe who had instigated the trouble.¹⁰⁸ But even while denigrating the activities of Nonesi and Ngangelizwe, thus ensuring Matanzima's anger against them, Warner was obliged to work secretly against Matanzima in accordance with the divide-and-rule strategy. When Richard Southey expressed the fear that Matanzima might become too powerful, Warner emphatically assured him that he was constantly playing the one chief off against the other.¹⁰⁹

At the same time Matanzima emerges as having his own share of guile. Later events seem to suggest that the enmity between Ngangelizwe and Matanzima, actively encouraged by Warner, was apparent rather than real, and that under the cover of division, they were working towards the same end, which was the strengthening of the Hala clan. In times of distress Ngangelizwe tried to solicit aid from Matanzima and it would seem that it was only fear of Colonial disapproval that withheld the latter from complying with such requests. At the time of the Novili incident Matanzima was willing to help Ngangelizwe in forcing Sarhili to return her to Thembuland.¹¹⁰ During the Thembu-Gcaleka War of 1872 there were likewise signs of Matanzima joining Ngangelizwe.¹¹¹ When Ngangelizwe was deposed in 1875, Matanzima made

no secret of his opposition to the Cape Government's actions.¹¹² The irony of the situation, then, lies in the fact that the cohesion Warner had striven so hard to prevent, might already have been brought about and that, unknown to him, the brothers had despite family disputes been allies all along.¹¹³

Warner found himself in a situation more complex than he realized at the time. Contrary to the divide-and-rule policy which aimed at weakening the chiefs' power he was obliged to implement, he found himself favouring Matanzima's aims to establish himself in his new country thereby strengthening this chief's position. Matanzima, playing a clever game of his own, managed to obtain from Warner the very concessions that went against the official policy. When the chiefs settled in their new country, there was no suggestion that the one should at any time gain ascendancy over the other. In 1871, when Sitokwe and Gecelo applied to have their separate locations marked off, Matanzima did not request a similar dispensation as, according to Warner, he wished Emigrant Thembuland to be as undivided as possible in order to gain supremacy over the whole area.¹¹⁴ Warner supported Sitokwe and Gecelo. He hoped that by separating the chiefs, their power would be weakened, and they would become more dependent upon the Cape Government. Matanzima's persistent protestations of loyalty to the Government, his active cooperation in bringing the Emigration about, and his attempts - real or pretended - to discredit Nonesi and Ngangelizwe, all brought Warner on to his side. "Our policy," Warner explained to Southey, "therefore requires that we should...gain over as many (i.e. African chiefs) as we possibly can to our interest, and it seems to me that our greatest dependence is on the Fingoes, and the

Emigrant chiefs, especially Raxoti."¹¹⁵ A year later separate locations were indeed marked off, and, through Warner's influence, Matanzima received the largest share of Emigrant Thembuland, as well as lands east of the Tsomo that originally belonged to Ngangelizwe.¹¹⁶ He scored another victory when he won recognition as "head of the Transkeian chiefs." While he was still in the Location he was considered to be under Nonesi's authority, and he received a stipend of £26 per year. This was only half the amount paid to the chiefs Ndarala and Gecelo. Once in Emigrant Thembuland, he claimed that, as representative of the paramount who was too far away to exercise authority, he should also receive £52. On Warner's recommendation, the request was granted.¹¹⁷ Matanzima's eventual recognition as chief of Emigrant Thembuland was therefore due as much to Warner's influence as to hereditary factors. It was also through Warner's influence that Matanzima was able to extend his authority beyond the boundaries of the territory originally allocated to him. The Cape Government's removal of Afrikaner families who received lands from Ngangelizwe at the mouth of the Tsomo, and the addition of their lands to Matanzima's, occurred on the insistence of Warner.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, disgruntled relatives, such as Ngangelizwe's brothers, Sinquanquati and Bambendino, and his uncle, Mnqanqeni, were encouraged by Warner to settle in Emigrant Thembuland under Matanzima.¹¹⁹ By 1875 Matanzima had thus emerged as an influential Thembu leader. It seems as if he could be ruthless, and the Colonial Government from time to time frowned upon his over-hasty actions and the excessive fines that he levied.¹²⁰

The years after 1875 show that the threat to Matanzima's power did not

emanate from his brother - as inferred by Warner - but from the Imperial Government, and its Colonial administrators. The appointment of Levey in 1875 as Thembu agent, and his promotion to resident magistrate in 1876, led to a clash of wills between two obstinate personalities. Levey's policy, from the beginning, aimed at the weakening of the power of the chiefs, and the undermining of their independence. The chiefs, he maintained, were utterly unfit to exercise the power with which they were entrusted.¹²¹ Understandably a headstrong chief, whose ego had initially been boosted by the Colonial official with whom he had dealings, would have resented any restrictions on his traditional rights. Matanzima's outspoken criticism of Cape Governmental policies embarrassed and annoyed the authorities. He made no secret of the sympathy he evinced for Sitokwe Ndlele when this chief was deprived by Levey of his stipend.¹²² Moreover, at a series of meetings in 1879 with the Chief Magistrate he was blatantly insolent. "Government must let us know when we lose privilege of our independence," he remarked at one such meeting.¹²³ On another occasion he remarked bitterly: "Government is a wolf. Government does not come like a man and say frankly to me that he is going to take away my privileges, but removes them one by one like a thief in the night."¹²⁴

Matanzima had every reason to suspect the Cape Government of looking for excuses to deprive him of his chieftainship. In 1879, for example, when he fined an offender, Elliot interfered and issued him with an unequivocal warning. This case arose when a certain Booy Solomon first refused to obey when ordered to accompany Matanzima on a special visit to the magistrate, and thereafter ignored Matanzima's

summons to the Great Place. For these offences, he was fined 288 sheep and a horse, a portion of which Matanzima kept for himself.¹²⁵ Elliot, at a meeting some time afterwards, told the chief: "No advocate for upholding the power of a chief can uphold a man who commits acts of oppression. The charges to the Government against Matanzima's people are rapidly accumulating and one day there will be a last straw."¹²⁶

Through his allegations Levey attempted to convince Elliot that Matanzima was not deserving of being entrusted with the responsibilities that the position of chief entailed. This emerges clearly from two charges that he brought against the chief. In the first case Matanzima was accused of laxity as to the settlement of a case of theft. The second charge arose from a complaint coming from Mfengu, who said that some of Matanzima's young men had abducted girls from their village, and taken them to their chief, where they had been raped.¹²⁷ The letter in which the Chief Magistrate was informed about Matanzima's activities contained serious accusations against the chief, amongst others, that his opposition to law and order had rendered the effective administration of the district virtually impossible. At his next meeting with Matanzima, Elliot issued a very stern warning. Matanzima, he said, was either unfit or unwilling to carry out his duties, and should there be no improvement, the Government would find it necessary to replace him with a more suitable person.¹²⁸ The Secretary for Native Affairs was even more outspoken on this matter. "Should Matanzima continue", he wrote to Elliot, "you would have the right to discontinue his authority."¹²⁹

Matanzima was supported by E.J. Warner in his disputes with the magistrates, even after the latter had left the civil service, and became a missionary at Mount Arthur. The friendship between Matanzima and Warner was firmly cemented when, in 1873, the chief deviated from the traditional custom of giving land to missionary societies, and instead made a grant to Warner personally for his establishment of a station.¹³⁰ H.B. Warner, a brother of E.J., carried on the work at this station. Levey believed that the Warners were the real instigators of the trouble, and that, but for them, Matanzima would have been perfectly content. "It is high time", he wrote to Elliot, "that the little game of a few people acting through Mr. Warner should be exposed. The chief Matanzima and Sitokwe, without the knowledge of the majority of their people, are agitating through Mr. Warner to become independent chiefs - a position that they have not dared to assume since I have been in this district, nor would they now unless supported by the messrs. Warner."¹³¹ Warner retorted that the imposition of hut tax on the Emigrant chiefs, coupled with the magistrate's disregard of the traditional system in the application of justice, were a violation of the 1865 agreement by which the chiefs had settled in Emigrant Thembuland. The chief Matanzima, he said, had repeatedly sent to him, begging him to intercede on his behalf.¹³² Warner's intercession on Matanzima's behalf certainly encouraged the chief in defying the Cape Government's restrictions on his power. When Levey was transferred to Cofimvaba in 1878, and a cousin of the Warners, Robert Stanford, was appointed acting-Resident Magistrate, Matanzima gained another valuable ally.

In view of all that has been said about the relationship between

Matanzima and his magistrates it is understandable that there has been much divergence of opinion concerning the role he played in the troubled years 1878 - 1881. When the Mfanta rebellion broke out, he was suspected of having been in alliance with this brother of his. Given his frustrations, following the appointment of Levey as Resident Magistrate, there can be little doubt that he evinced strong sympathy for the rebels. It was perhaps only from a realization that the risks involved in fighting the Colony were too great that he refrained from joining the warring factions, and eventually tried to dissuade his brother from doing so.¹³³ During the war of 1881 his attitude was highly equivocal. Levey scorned the chief's dubious loyalty, in particular pointing out his failure to come to his aid when, in 1881, he was hemmed in at Southeyville.¹³⁴ But R. Stanford commended the chief for his loyalty and compensated him accordingly with one hundred head of cattle. Stanford justified this reward by referring, amongst others, to an incident when Lady Frere was attacked. On this occasion Matanzima summoned his people and ordered them to be loyal. As proof of his loyalty he sent his cattle into the Colony.¹³⁵ Stanford emphatically denied that Matanzima played a double game during the war. J. Hemming also believed implicitly in Matanzima's innocence. "How the magistrate of Cala (i.e. Levey) can denounce Matanzima as 'such an unreliable chief' when his whole conduct during all the disturbances from 1877 to the present time has been loyal and faithful to the Government, notwithstanding much interference with his independence, I do not know," he wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs in 1884.¹³⁶

To understand these conflicting reports, it must be remembered that by

the late 1870's Matanzima's power had been thoroughly undermined by magistrates who, over the years, encouraged various factions to question his authority. Reference has already been made to Sinquanqati. Another example is that of the Mfengu chief, Mtyakisane, who received land from Matanzima in 1879. Through the years Mfengu had been cordially received in Matanzima's country as the presence of these relatively wealthy men strengthened his position. The problem was that first W. Fynn, and then Levey, not only allowed Mfengu settlers in Matanzima's country, but afforded them a measure of independence not contemplated by the chief, when he first started giving land to these new-comers. When Mtyakisane entered Matanzima's territory in search for land, the chief did not formally allocate lands to him, but, following Levey's instructions, he allowed him to settle on unoccupied land. In time Mtyakisane, supported by Levey, started to settle cases in his own way, and like Sinquanqati, became virtually an independent chief.¹³⁷ Given the support that the Mfengu received from the magistrates it is understandable that they were - generally speaking - Cape Colony supporters, and they were encouraged by Levey to undermine Matanzima's authority. In this way the territory over which Matanzima was in 1880 nominally the head, was infiltrated on the one hand by anti-Government factions such as Sinquanqati and Bambendino, who had become more or less independent. They probably hoped that, by joining the warring factions, they would stand a chance of ousting Matanzima. On the other hand, pro-Government Mfengu constituted a threat to his power from another angle. It is not surprising, then, that he would have disappointed those people, like Levey, who expected him to exert influence on the Government's behalf. It was absolutely impossible for him to control

Sinquanqati, and other rebellious chiefs; especially as the boundaries between his lands and those of his younger brother had never been clearly demarcated. There could be no certainty whether insurgents spotted in the heat of battle, belonged to Matanzima or to Sinquanqati. Stanford claimed that he had all Matanzima's men registered, and that not one of them went into war, but allowances must be made for the fact that Stanford was very biased in favour of Matanzima.

However difficult it may be to assess Matanzima's motives and conduct during the Transkeian War,¹³⁸ there can be no disputing the fact that he emerged after the war both richer and more influential than before.

With the deposition of Gecelo in consequence of his part in the war, and the death of Sitokwe Ndlele, the non-Hala leaders had disappeared, and their dispersed followers were located under various magistrates. The only other chief left was the ageing Ndarala who had always been inclined to follow Matanzima's lead.¹³⁹ When Ndarala died in 1884 the Ndungwana influence in Emigrant Thembuland was further weakened. The heir, Siyabalala was still a minor. During the ensuing dispute over the appointment of a regent, it emerged that supporters of the popular choice, Getye, accepted Matanzima as their paramount.¹⁴⁰ Although there is no evidence that Matanzima interfered in the matter, the Government certainly had to take note of the chief's increasing influence and ambitions. Even Levey, who was never inclined to see Matanzima as a particularly influential leader,¹⁴¹ now had to revise his judgement, and admit that Matanzima was regarded by the Emigrant Thembu as a great chief.¹⁴² The increasing power of such an ambitious

chief, Levey warned, could become a threat to the interests of the Cape Colony, so that it was essential to prevent him from obtaining any more land. Levey therefore believed that the lands across the Tsomo, which formed the greater part of the Southeyville district, and had become vacant during the War of 1881, should be settled by people loyal to the Cape Colony.¹⁴³ Matanzima, who wished to locate his own followers there, was supported by E. Warner and the Stanford brothers, Robert and Arthur.¹⁴⁴ Warner defended Matanzima's claim on the grounds that the "rebel chiefs", Siquanqati, Bambendino and Falo, had been settled, with the support of the Cape Government, in Emigrant Thembuland under Matanzima's authority in the 1860s. In course of time Siquanqati had been recognized by the Government as a chief in his own right, despite Matanzima's objections. Matanzima could therefore not be held responsible for the behaviour of the rebel chiefs. In Warner's opinion it would have been an act of gross injustice to deprive Matanzima of lands legally given to him in 1865, as a result of the conduct of chiefs whose disobedience was, in the first place, condoned by the Government.¹⁴⁵ Matanzima gave substance to his claim to the lands by referring to the Sotho chief, Letsie, who, during the war of 1881, had remained neutral, and who was rewarded with a grant of lands. Levey, on the other hand, maintained that Matanzima did not have any rights to the rebel lands. Siquanqati and his brothers, he said, had already been living in separate locations, independently from Matanzima, when he (Levey) arrived as Magistrate. Furthermore, at the time of the dispute, a hut tax return would show that Matanzima did not have a single follower there.¹⁴⁶ In this he was certainly correct, as he himself had made sure that the rebel lands were settled by people not particularly

faithful to Matanzima.¹⁴⁷

The question was settled in a way unsatisfactory to both Matanzima and Levey. With the delineation of the magisterial boundaries in Emigrant Thembuland in 1881,¹⁴⁸ a part of Matanzima's lands now fell in Levey's district, Cala. Levey was under the impression that the lands were incorporated into the Cala district, and that Matanzima had no authority there. However, when Matanzima complained about his loss of lands, he was assured by the Chief Magistrate that the territory was simply divided for administrative purposes, and that Matanzima's rights there, were in no way affected.¹⁴⁹ This did not satisfy the chief. His continued request that his grievances should be reconsidered, was eventually met when part of the Cala district, to the dismay of Levey and some traders, was transferred to his location. It turned out to be merely a symbolic gesture. The headmen in the district were assured that although they would in future have to recognize Matanzima, their relationship with the Government was in no way affected.¹⁵⁰

As he saw his power being diminished, Matanzima made use of various ploys to maintain as much authority as possible under the white umbrella. In view of the large-scale alienation of tribal lands by the Cape Government after 1881,¹⁵¹ he repeatedly asked that tribal title should be given to his people, while at the same time he requested a large farm for himself.¹⁵² He did not succeed in obtaining tribal title for his people. In 1894, C.J. Rhodes assured him at a meeting that the people were secure in their lands as long as they behaved themselves; it was only in the event of their being

disloyal to the Government that their lands would be parcelled out among whites.¹⁵³ However he eventually managed, after several petitions, to secure for himself a large farm of 4000 morgen.¹⁵⁴

It was not only the problem of land alienation that occupied Matanzima's mind; he also had to devise strategies to cope with the problem of overcrowding that was causing numerous garden disputes. One of his ploys was to settle his sons uncomfortably near to the homesteads of people whom he wanted to get rid of, and then to start ploughing up new garden lands for his own benefit on lands claimed by such people.¹⁵⁵ Many Mfengu fell victim to these strategies; the great exodus of Mfengu from Matanzima's lands in the 1880s perhaps being attributed as much to the chief's attitude as to the periodic droughts.¹⁵⁶

An interesting case that further illustrates Matanzima's tactics to obtain land arose in 1888, when the chief claimed lands in the Engcobo district for one of his sons. Prior to the outbreak of the war, these lands formed part of Emigrant Thembuland, but in consequence of post-war settlements, it was included in the Engcobo district.¹⁵⁷ By that time Levey had already settled people there who rejected Matanzima's authority. In an attempt to regain influence over the territory, Matanzima now asked that one of his sons should be granted a farm. Stanford had no objections provided that none of the black farmers in occupation of the lands would be dispossessed. Unfortunately the particular spot that Matanzima desired had already been cultivated for twenty five years by a headman named Nconyana. Matanzima took up an aggressive attitude, demanding that the homesteads should be removed

and the gardens given up to his son.¹⁵⁸ In this case his request was not granted, but Matanzima had twenty-two sons and he certainly was in a favourable position to expand his territory by infiltrating the lands of his rivals.

Understandably, uncertainty as to the ownership of land, as well as to the extent to which Matanzima could exercise power in his location, caused increasing tension, especially after the formal annexation of Thembu territories in 1885. He annoyed the Resident Magistrate by carrying on with his titular responsibilities as if there were no Governmental restrictions. He settled criminal and civil cases, sent out armed patrols to apprehend thieves, imposed fines and allocated lands to his favourites.¹⁵⁹ Such actions often led to court cases as the more enlightened people could make use of law agents for a redress of their grievances, and, not infrequently, sentences were set aside.¹⁶⁰ While Stanford was magistrate, Matanzima could still lodge complaints against the interference of law agents in his district. He was therefore embittered when Stanford was replaced in 1886 by R. Merriman. When he met the Chief Magistrate in Umtata in 1885 he condemned Merriman's handling of affairs in no uncertain terms. The magistrate was, in his opinion, incompetent. He alleged that Merriman had time and again failed to keep appointments when boundary disputes had to be settled; that he had resorted to the burning of homesteads before a dispute concerning Matanzima's settlement of people on lands previously allocated to traders Birch and Aldun could be resolved; that he had allowed himself the authority of controlling woodcutters (hitherto Matanzima's prerogative); and lastly, that people who went out to follow the spoor of cattle thieves were

disarmed.¹⁶¹

Because the chief was so outspoken in his criticism of the Government's policies and of some of the officials, he was always regarded with suspicion. In the 1880s, he was twice involved in events that questioned his loyalty. The first was his attendance at meetings held by Nehemiah Tile at which the removal of magistrates was advocated. Taking into account the erosion of his authority by successive magistrates, his sympathy for Tile's sentiments would have been understandable, but we have no proof that his involvement ever stretched further than having attended one meeting.¹⁶² Then, in 1883, another war scare swept through Thembuland and various civil commissioners suspected Matanzima of having been in communication with some of the leading agitators.¹⁶³ Again, it is possible that he did show an interest in anti-Government activities. After all, some years earlier Robert Stanford had warned that there was no telling what a man would do when provoked too far.¹⁶⁴ Matanzima was, however, too much of a pragmatist to consider armed resistance against the Cape.

During the last years of his chieftainship, he managed to establish a cordial relationship with successive resident magistrates. True, he was never trusted implicitly. In 1891, for instance, there was great alarm when his son, Sabata, accompanied by three hundred armed followers, was seen in the northern part of the district. Their explanation that they were looking for cattle thieves was not readily accepted, and Matanzima had to assure the Government telegraphically, through his resident magistrate, that he had no warlike intentions.¹⁶⁵ On another occasion he was thought to be behind a large-scale killing

of pigs in the district - the rumour being that people were instructed by him to kill all their pigs. It turned out to be a harmless incident, the people having thought that the animals were spreading a deadly disease.¹⁶⁶ Magistrates were further influenced against the chief by law agents, who pointed out that he levied excessive fines and often lined his own pockets with money that should have reached the treasury.¹⁶⁷

On the other hand, there was evidence that he cooperated actively with the Government in improving conditions in his district. He personally contributed funds towards the building of a bridge over the Tsomo River, supported the Scab Act at a time when other chiefs regarded it with suspicion, and actually asked for the erection of dipping tanks as well as for somebody to instruct his people as to the benefits of the dipping.¹⁶⁸ In 1894 C. Bunn, the resident magistrate, supported Matanzima's claim to a farm, on the ground that the chief had rendered excellent service to the Government.¹⁶⁹ Matanzima also managed to establish a warm relationship with the missionaries in his district, and their reports might have swayed official opinion in his favour. He would from time to time visit the mission station at St. Marks to ensure that everything was going well.¹⁷⁰ On the occasion of R. Stanford's official attendance at a service, Matanzima carried the sword of state by the side of the magistrate.¹⁷¹ Archdeacon Waters commended him for his abstinence from brandy, as well as for his interest in education.¹⁷²

However, while accepting certain western standards, such as having his sons educated at Clarkebury, Matanzima took care not to estrange his

people, who were still tied to tradition. From time to time he was accused of having allowed divination to take place, or to have revived certain "heathenish" customs such as the Untonyani dance, or the killing of the Mgidi beast.¹⁷³ He defended his leniency toward such practices, by saying that they were very old customs, and especially important to young men who hoped to obtain important positions with the tribe, and that it would therefore be very difficult to eliminate them without causing great dissatisfaction.¹⁷⁴

How then are we, in retrospect, to view Matanzima? Are we to see him, as a Black Nationalist might well do, as a white stooge and a worthless traitor to the cause of the black people? Was he a narrow-minded tribalist who could not see beyond the needs of his own small clan? Or should we agree with Levey and some historians who see him as a leader intent on promoting his own interests? Or would it be nearer to the truth to see him as a shrewd and desperate man carrying on a covert fight (under the guise of cooperation) to salvage what he could for the people of his clan in the face of the overwhelming onslaught of the Colonial tide? Whichever of the above may approximate to the truth most closely - whether Matanzima was pawn, plotter or talented diplomat - his achievements lie in history. He did manage to keep his people's lands intact, and further, he succeeded in laying the foundations of the House of Matanzima for the weal or woe of South Africa.

(iii) Mfanta: Rebel or Freedom Fighter?

The Mfanta-Gungubele Rebellion of 1879

Oh, the tragedy of the bones of Mfanta!
 It is Mfanta who leapt into action,
 He seized his fighting-sticks and entered Gwatyu,
 Helping the forces of Gungubele of Bawana,
 For the whites caused the trouble
 On the day the weapons clashed
 Gungubele quarrelled with the English;
 But the English ground us underfoot,
 Yet we will make a fresh start
 For the black stick is kept in safety.
 We will speak on the day the bones tremble,¹⁷⁵
 On the day we recover the bones of Mfanta.

Mfanta does not figure prominently in European and early African historiography. He is not even mentioned in Sihele's rather detailed account of Thembu leaders. What we do know about him comes to us through documents dealing with the War of Ngcayecibi. However, in such writings it is the Tshatshu chief, Gungubele, who is given a central place, and not Mfanta, the leading spirit in the resistance movement in Glen Grey. It is only in modern times that he has emerged in African minds as a national hero - one of a long list of black leaders whose resistance to a white government has ended in prison.

Mfanta was the eldest son from Mtirara's Left Hand House. Like Matanzima, he chose to remain with Nonesi when the Great House moved back to the Mbashe in the 1840's. If he was the ambitious young man later events seem to suggest he was, he would have grown up knowing many frustrations. The formidable Nonesi maintained firm control over her grandsons, and in the event of her death, her mantle would have fallen on the shoulders of the much older Matanzima, who, in any case, enjoyed a position of superiority due to his being born from the Right

Hand House. Thus, even the Emigration had not afforded him the opportunities it had offered the other chiefs, as, in the new country, he would have been subject to Matanzima. He remained in Glen Grey, and in 1867 Warner was disturbed by rumours that Ngangelizwe wanted to nominate him as his representative.¹⁷⁶ Although Ngangelizwe denied the allegations, the possibility that Ngangelizwe hoped to gain control over Glen Grey and that he was instigating Mfanta to resist Colonial rule, cannot be discarded.¹⁷⁷ It is also possible that Mfanta was one of those chiefs who remained behind in Glen Grey, believing that Colonial rule would never be applied there, in which case he would be able to step into the vacuum left by the departure of the emigrant chiefs.¹⁷⁸

For some unknown reason, he left Glen Grey in the late 1860's. We could speculate that, this being the time when the Cape Government took action against Nonesi and her councillors, banishing the former to Mpondoland, the latter to Robben Island, Mfanta was trying to escape the same fate. We have, however, no evidence to prove this. He returned in 1871 at a time when an accumulation of political, economic and social factors had caused mounting opposition to the Cape Government.

As a result of Glen Grey's proximity to the eastern frontier zone, the Thembu there were understandably sensitive to any disaffection among the Ngqika and other Xhosa peoples in the contiguous areas. Having been living for years far from the paramount's immediate sphere of influence, they were less affected by traditional pro-Colonial attitudes. When, after 1865, the paramount's authority was no longer

recognized by the Cape, another bond was snapped, and chiefs were free to act as individuals, rather than to be dictated to by tradition. Furthermore, unfavourable conditions, which De Kiewiet sees as the cause of war and tension, were especially conspicuous in this area.¹⁷⁹ Not only had the Thembu suffered loss of land in consequence of the creation of a white buffer zone between the Queenstown and Wodehouse districts, but the land policy, introduced by E. Judge, was highly discriminatory. This policy, which was devised with the dual purpose of combatting squatting and of solving the Cape Colony's labour problems, made provision for the granting of farms of limited size to deserving men.¹⁸⁰ The so-called ordinary people, who were unable to obtain farms, found it increasingly difficult to meet the needs created by their contact with western influences. The dearth of land also had implications for the distribution of wealth. The general assumption that the Thembu were more prosperous in 1876 than ever before was false, as it rested on misleading statistical evidence regarding the incidence of stock in the Location. This stock, in fact, was distributed among a small number of families, mainly concentrated around mission stations.¹⁸¹ During the early 1870's the economic impact of Cape Colonial expansionism was not so severely felt by the poorer families, but the drought of 1876 exposed the realities of their situation. The Government, relying upon reports from appointed headmen, failed to realize how serious the situation had become. The extent to which the traditional systems of communication between chief and subject had degenerated under Cape Colonial rule emerges from W.E. Stanford's annual report on the Tambookie Location in 1875:

"The system (of paid headmen) works well, and has had the effect of breaking to a very great degree the power and influence of the chiefs who did not emigrate to the Transkei...The headmen value the authority given to them and soon become jealous of any interference on the part of the chief, and as their power is derived solely from us, they are thoroughly under our control, and when necessary a headman may be removed from his office without danger of raising those feelings of discontent amongst the people which might have been the case in dealing with a chief."¹⁸²

Missionaries like J.P. Bertram and E.J. Warner warned against the unreliability of information obtained from headmen, who often said what the magistrate wanted to hear. They had a far better grasp of the situation than officials who believed that the influence of chiefs was declining.¹⁸³ It is understandable that at a time when every effort was being made to curb the influence of chiefs, Mfanta's return to Glen Grey was viewed with apprehension, especially as the Hala immediately rallied around him. J.C. Warner, still smarting under the humiliation of the Emigration catastrophe, which could largely be blamed on the uncooperative attitude of the Hala, advised that, since there was no reason to apprehend Mfanta, he should just be treated as an ordinary man, neither being given a farm nor made a headman. He was indeed later made a headman, but he could have derived little satisfaction from his appointment as his powers were effectively curtailed by the policy applied, in accordance with the Judge recommendations in the Bolotwa part of the Location where he settled. This district was divided into farms, each constituting a sort of township, under headmen each of which had jurisdiction only over his small community. Ten or twelve of these farms constituted a Field Cornetcy under supervision of a black Field Cornet. The headmen had to report periodically to the field-cornets and the latter reported

once a month to the magistrate.¹⁸⁴ On the surface, chieftaincy was effectively eliminated, but ambitious chiefs did not accept the new dispensation complacently, and Mfanta found a kindred spirit in Gungubele, the son of the erstwhile enemy of the Cape Colony, Maphasa.

Although Sir George Grey had decreed after the war of Mlanjeni that the name and the lands of the Tshatshu should be forfeited in consequence of their participation in the war, this clan lived on as a distinct group. They were relocated under Gungubele's mother, Yiliswa, in the area between the Black Kei and White Kei at Gwatyu. Gungubele came of age in 1871 at a time when the first attempts were made effectively to implement Colonial law in Glen Grey. Under these circumstances the young Gungubele's requests to have his chieftainship recognized were firmly rejected by the authorities.¹⁸⁵ He settled down quietly for some time, so much so that the civil commissioner spoke highly of his diligence in suppressing cattle raids, but the authorities expected his mother and his councillors to be less submissive.¹⁸⁶ It was perhaps on their insistence that he became increasingly opposed to the presence of government appointed headmen in the Tshatshu area. On occasion he told the civil commissioner that only he, as chief, had the right to appoint the headmen.¹⁸⁷ His aversion to government appointed headmen found expression in threats and even assaults upon them.

Because of the contiguity of Sitokwe Ndlele's location at Stock's Basin in Emigrant Thembuland, the Tshatshu would certainly have been influenced by this chief's resistance to the curtailment of his powers

of chieftainship that led to his losing part of his lands in 1878.¹⁸⁸ It was, then, under these conditions of increasing discontent in Glen Grey, that the war scare of 1876 sent Brownlee in great haste to this troubled area.¹⁸⁹ In his memorandum on this visit, Brownlee expressed his concern over the dogged and sullen attitude of the Glen Grey people which contrasted so sharply with the frank and open discussions he was used to in his dealings with the Thembu.¹⁹⁰ Even E.J. Warner, always ready to defend the Thembu, and the Rev. Dugmore warned that immediate steps should be taken to defend Queenstown,¹⁹¹ while the Queenstown Chamber of Commerce, as well as the municipal commissioners, emphasised that there should be a restriction on the sale of arms.¹⁹²

Brownlee's remarks as to a possible outbreak in Queenstown, were criticized by the Commissioner of Crown Lands, John X. Merriman, who blamed the unfriendly attitude on the injustices to which the Thembu were subjected, and on the unfounded suspicions evinced by the Government with regard to the general feeling of disaffection among the Colonial Thembu. He denied that there were any proofs of such dissatisfaction, and insinuated that many of the accusations were fabricated by newspapers. The Thembu, he thought, had behaved exceptionally well under insults and provocations which had been heaped upon them. Taking all these facts into consideration he concluded that they would be "less than human if, during a time when the Colonial press is ringing with talk of war, and when the whole frontier appears to be utterly prostrated by the most abject panic, they were to abstain from any talk on similar subjects, and I think it rather unjust that such talk should be adduced as a proof of

disaffection."¹⁹³

It seems unlikely, in view of later events, that an armed attack upon the Colony was actually contemplated. There was nevertheless no doubt that Glen Grey was in a disaffected state, and perhaps only internal divisions had kept the Thembu people from overt acts of hostility. Not only were there inter-tribal divisions,¹⁹⁴ but the emergence of a wealthy class which would not easily risk the loss of their possessions in case of war, militated against a concerted movement.¹⁹⁵ There was one way in which the chiefs could raise sympathy for themselves, as well as a spirit of revolt, and that was by the exploitation of grievances. Such an opportunity presented itself when Gungubele and Mfanta became embroiled in law suits.

The introduction of Colonial law subjected the Thembu to a judicial system which they found difficult to reconcile with their traditional outlook. Stress had already been laid upon the misunderstandings that arose from the settlement of cases regarding inheritance, dowry and marriages.¹⁹⁶ It had been such misunderstanding that led to the trouble in which Gungubele found himself in 1878.¹⁹⁷ What happened was that he bought a farm, part of his father's former territory, from a Mr. Bower. The transaction took place against the advice of Hemming,¹⁹⁸ at an inflated price of £2,200. As Gungubele was unable to pay the last installment of £1000, Bower offered to cancel the sale, on condition that he could keep £500 to cover expenses. Gungubele refused, arguing that it was unfair that Bower should remain in possession of the farm and keep the money. This incident exacerbated the ill-feelings between Gungubele and the Colonial

Government. More important, it gave him the opportunity to consolidate behind his followers. They were now told that the issue was in the Government's hands and that he would be arrested for not paying.

We have less evidence concerning Mfanta's law suit, and the story which he spread about his possible arrest, certainly rested upon very flimsy foundations. It arose from what appears to have been a libel suit, brought by him against a certain Schultz who had accused him of warlike intentions. Mfanta expected that Schultz should be fined, and the fine be handed over to him. When Hemming failed to act according to his wishes he resigned his headmanship in protest. He now alleged that he was going to be apprehended for having done this.¹⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the Ninth Frontier War, in which the Ngqika had become involved, had broken out. Not surprisingly, malcontents among the Colonial Thembu were excited by the prospect of at last settling accounts with the Colony, and once again the Location was in turmoil.²⁰⁰ In view of conflicting pre-war rumours and post-war evidence - which was also often contradicting - it is difficult to establish whether Mfanta and Gungubele actually planned to fight.²⁰¹ Of the two ex-chiefs, Mfanta undoubtedly appears to have been the more militant leader. He instigated the burning down of shops at the Bolotwa because, as he said, it was the habit of the English to open one shop and then another, until there was a whole town like Queenstown.²⁰² On a visit to Beaufort West he met the Ngqika chief, Tini Maqomo, who also claimed that he was going to be arrested.²⁰³ On this occasion Mfanta made statements that could officially be interpreted as inflammatory. He told the people that it was

unnecessary for their children to starve when there were so many cattle and so many young men. Translated into plain language this meant that he was encouraging cattle raiding.²⁰⁴ On several other occasions Mfanta openly showed his contempt for the Government. When the Thembu were invited to the installation of a new magistrate at the Bolotwa, he advised a stay-away.²⁰⁵ It would also seem that he instigated the burning down of the houses of so-called loyal people. These illegal acts called for governmental interference, but before Hemming could take any decisive steps, rumour once again added to the crisis.²⁰⁶

Msheshwe, a step-brother of Gungubele, reported to the Ngqika chief, Anta, that Gungubele was prepared to fight. At the same time, he confidentially informed Hemming about communications that were taking place between Sandile and Gungubele. Msheshwe's conversation with Hemming was overheard by the latter's interpreter, Dondasha, who informed Gungubele accordingly. Advised by his missionary, the Rev. Newton, who was stationed at Gwatyu, Gungubele went to see Hemming. The latter denied having had communication with Dondasha. Mfanta now warned Gungubele against the danger of seeing the magistrate again, and maintained that he had information from various sources about their possible arrest. After several attempts to meet Gungubele had failed, Hemming decided to go to Gwatyu in person. Mfanta's attitude became more aggressive. He urged Gungubele to kill the magistrate and he assured him of the support of a "whole string of chiefs including Sitokwe, Moorosi, Adam Kok and Sandile."

Hemming was in a difficult position. Since there was not enough

evidence of Gungubele's personal responsibility for the assaults on Colonial supporters, he could not be arrested. Merriman, too, cautioned Hemming, and suggested that both Mfanta and Gungubele should be deposed as headmen.²⁰⁷ Hemming tried in vain to arrange a meeting with Gungubele, and by December the situation was explosive. The Tshatshu, claiming that the war cry had been sounded against them, refused to pay taxes. Hemming recommended that Gungubele should be brought to account, and in January 1878 he proceeded to arrest the ringleaders. The Tshatshu, having received the news of Hemming's approach via Newton, still tried to preserve the peace, urging them to talk to Hemming. However, spurred on by Mfanta, who warned that the actual purpose of the expedition was their arrest, Gungubele took up a position under a hill, whence he could, if necessary, launch an attack upon the expedition. Initially it seemed as if matters could be settled by negotiation; but when a shot was fired (by which party it is not known), fighting broke out. The battle ended indecisively, and the matter could have ended there, had it not been that Gungubele, still bearing a grudge against Msheshwe, made known his intention to kill the latter. While the burghers were retiring, Msheshwe was actually killed, and thus hostilities were renewed.

Up to this point the Government was hesitant to take action. As there was no clear evidence of Gungubele's direct implication in the lawlessness, he could not be arrested. Furthermore, the Government was also unwilling, at that stage, to extend the war.²⁰⁸ But when in January the Ngqika joined the Thembu in a futile attempt to break through to Emigrant Thembuland, the Government was jolted into action. The initiative was now taken by John X. Merriman, a former

Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public works, who had, since the outbreak of the war, acted as a sort of Minister of War. On hearing of the news of Msheshwe's death he ordered Griffith to the Thembu location to crush all disaffection and to arrest the leaders. This campaign was launched without previous knowledge of, and contrary to the wishes of, the general commanding forces and the Governor. The latter had to obtain information on this from very imperfectly fragmented and very unsatisfactory pieced-together telegrams.

Mfanta, as could be expected, came to Gungubele's aid, but their rebellion ended in tragic failure. It was clear that there were not only divisions between the three main Thembu sections (those in Thembuland Proper, those in Emigrant Thembuland and those in Glen Grey), but also among the Glen Grey Thembu themselves. Gungubele could not muster aid from any group other than the Tshatshu, and even they were divided. In the final skirmish, in which he was captured, he could muster only six hundred men.

Mfanta must have been sorely disappointed, as he fared even worse than Gungubele. Only three hundred men came to his aid, a clear indication that the majority of the Colonial Thembu were not prepared to settle their disputes by means of armed resistance. He was furthermore let down by his brothers. Matanzima refused to come to his aid, while Ngangelizwe eager after his reinstatement to maintain his friendship with the Colonial Government, was said to have threatened to kill Mfanta with his own hands.²⁰⁹ Not one of the Emigrant chiefs was prepared to give the Glen Grey Rebellion any assistance other than moral support.

After his defeat in the Glen Grey, Mfanta managed to slip through Emigrant Thembuland to join Sitokwe Tyali in Engcobo where they occupied the fastnesses of the Drakensberg at the Xuka river. An expedition under Walter Stanford, consisting of thirteen European officers, sixteen European volunteers and a thousand Africans, were sent against the two rebels. Ngangelizwe personally took the field with his men.²¹⁰ The expedition was further strengthened by volunteers from Barkly East. In a short and decisive campaign which lasted only eleven days, the Maxonga's Hoek was cleared of Tyali's men and a large number of cattle were captured.²¹¹ Mfanta, realizing that the enemy was closing in upon him, slipped back to the Glen Grey where he surrendered to the authorities. He was tried as a British subject in Queenstown and sentence of death was passed on him. It was afterwards commuted to imprisonment with hard labour for life. He died at the Breakwater Convict Station in Cape Town.²¹²

Whether Mfanta's decision to diverge from the traditional Thembu policy of avoiding war with the Colony, was motivated by personal ambition or by genuine grievances, will never be known for sure. From a European point of view it may be argued that his militance brought disaster over his people, while Matanzima and Ngangelizwe had, by their co-operation with the Colony, secured the lands, life and property of their people. From a modern black point of view, it may be argued that it was the early resistance movements which had produced the environment from which modern black national politicians get their inspiration.

1. F. Brownlee: The Transkeian Native Territories, Historical Records, p.28.
2. Stanford Reminiscences I, p.22.
3. Biography of the Rev. Peter Hargreaves. MS.15211.
4. See for instance SP.611/23: Warner-Southey, 19 October '66; SP.611/24: Warner-Southey, 12 October '67; SP.611/34: Warner-Southey, 27 February '69, and many other references.
5. SP.611/23: Warner-Southey, 19 November '66.
6. Kaffrarian Watchman, 27 June '67. Extracts from my Journal, Part II.
7. Ibid., 7 April '70. Affairs beyond the Kei; 27 April '70. Kreli and Gangelizwe.
8. A. Cunynghame: My Command in South Africa, p.119.
9. W. Clarke: "Native Reminiscences" in South African Pamphlets, Vol.23,
10. H. Prichard: Friends and Foes in the Transkei, pp.154-164.
11. NA.44: Elliot-SNA., 13 August '78.
12. E.G. Sihele, p.90. See also pp.118-19.
13. D.S.A.B. 11, gives the date as 1840. The Rev. S. Sihlali in The Beginning of the Gospel, (Deathless years Centenary Souvenir, of Clarkebury Mission) gives it as 1846. In 1878, H. Elliot estimated his age at about 40. NA.44: Elliot-SNA., 13 August '78. 1840 seems to be the more acceptable date.
14. See p.47.
15. Burton Papers: MS.14636; CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 26 February '63. In these letters he hinted that he was accepted by the Thembu as their chief.
16. GTJ., 24 January '77. Speech of the Rev. Peter Hargreaves.
17. A. Lammant: 'Brief History of Clarkebury' in The Deathless Years, p.13.
18. Contemporary writers often referred to Ngangelizwe as being neatly dressed in European clothes. J. Cunynghame: in My Command in Southern Africa, p.119, remarked that during a military inspection in Thembuland, Ngangelizwe was excited by the instrument belonging to the trumpeter. He was most anxious to obtain this, saying that he would direct one of his councillors to play for him. Mrs. H. Prichard relates an amusing incident. While Ngangelizwe had lunch with her he was greatly upset by the

unexpected appearance of a stranger behind him. Trying to reassure him, she produced her music box, to which he listened with more than usual interest. See H. Prichard: Op. cit., pp.159-60.

19. A. Lammant: Brief History of Clarkebury; MS.15211: Hargreaves's Biography.
20. In recent times missionaries have still been impressed by the strong sense of exclusiveness displayed by the Thembu. It has been seen, for instance, that they were more reluctant than other black people to adopt western clothing. See Ronald Ingle: Doctor's Notebook - Dr. Johnson.
21. Hargreaves' Biography. MS.15211.
22. Kaffrarian Watchman, 16 December '67. Sandile at Home.
23. Sihele suggests that it was Ngangelizwe who refused to marry Emma, and for a very good reason. J.C. Warner was said to have arranged the marriage in the first place, and when Ngangelizwe unexpectedly changed his mind, he tried to pacify the Ngqika, who certainly would have regarded Ngangelizwe's behaviour as a great insult, by suggesting that Emma should be offered to Sitokwe Ndlele. The latter accepted the offer. On the day of the wedding a conversation between Warner and Sitokwe took place in the course of which Warner led Sitokwe into acknowledging that Emma was given to him by the Cape Government, that the Cape Government was senior to the Xhosa paramount, and that the Government's daughter should therefore become the senior wife (i.e. the wife of the Great House.) Sihele then suggests that a similar conversation might have taken place between Ngangelizwe and Warner, and that the former was unwilling to get married on such conditions. See E.G. Sihele, pp.93-4.
24. See pp.36-7.
25. After he became king, he changed his name to Ngangelizwe, which means "as great as the world". Qeya simply meant 'Hottentot'.
26. Stanford Reminiscences, I, pp.20-25. Warner's family believed that Ngangelizwe looked upon him as a father. See CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 24 July '63; 7 July '63.
27. *Ibid.*, Ngangelizwe in fact received a stipend of £100 a year.
28. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 7 July '63.
29. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 1 September '63.
30. See pp.119, footnote 35; 120, footnote 52.
31. CO.3062: Warner-Southey, 14 October '63.
32. Stanford Reminiscences, p.25.

33. SP.611/15: Warner-Southey, 27 February '65; 611/53: Gilfillan-Currie, 19 February '65. Thembu from the Mbashe, making use of a footpath which they had used for many years, were apprehended by the police, and in the ensuing skirmish, were shot. See also GH.8/4: Warner-Southey, 11 November '65. For Fadana's lands see pp.72-3.
34. SP.611/15: Warner-Southey, 27 February, 28 February '65.
35. See pp.105-6.
36. See p.279.
37. CO.3179: E. Warner-Col. Sec., 11 February '70 (and Wodehouse's minute, 1 March '70); NA.151-2: Tambookie Agent Folder, various references. Even if one makes allowance for J.C. Warner's exaggerations, a study of these documents suggest such ambitions. See also Saunders: Annexation, p.56-7.
38. See J. van Otten: Sir Philip Wodehouse (Ph.D Thesis, Univ. of Oregon, 1971) for a detailed analysis of the Wodehouse policies.
39. On receipt of a report in which this policy was set out, Wodehouse warned that should such injudicious reports be published, they would do great harm. He had, however, no objection to such a policy being carried out privately. See Wodehouse's marginal note on letter in SP.611/37: Warner-Southey, 15 May '69.
40. For this dispute see CO.3122: P. Hargreaves-J.C. Warner, 11 December '67; J.C. Warner-P. Hargreaves, 18 December '67; Ibid., 24 November '67; SP.611/25: Warner-Southey, 24 May '67; Ibid., 9 May '67.
41. Matanzima might have been playing a double role, cooperating secretly with both Warner and Ngangelizwe. See p.263.
42. SP.611/58: Southey-Warner, 20 June '67.
43. SP.611/26: Warner-Southey, 20 July '67 (my emphasis). Warner's insistence that the four chiefs who emigrated were the "real contracting parties" were in the 1890s refuted by Thembu leaders. See NA.245: Glen Grey Papers, Petition of Native Chiefs presented to the Governor at Dordrecht, October 1891.
44. SP.611/65: Warner-Southey, 13 December '67.
45. On one occasion Southey had confided in Walter Currie: "Old Warner always takes extreme views." SP.611/56: Southey-Currie, 23 July '67.
46. SP.611/56: Statement by Xelo, chief councillor of Ngangelizwe, included in cover letter, Griffith-Southey, 21 July '67; 20 July '67; 5 August '67.

47. SP.611/41: Warner-Southey, 3 September '70. Warner remarked bitterly that he was only trying to carry out faithfully the Government's policy, i.e. to keep at separate and antagonistic interests between the Emigrant chiefs and Ngangelizwe.
48. Ibid.; Stanford Papers, D.10: E.J. Warner's Biography.
49. See pp.162; 173-4.
50. NA.93: Dr. Johnstone-R.M. Umtata, 14 February '84. An earlier report (8 February) mentioned that the King had been insane for nine days and tried to run away at all hours of the night.
51. NA.92: CMT.-USNA., 16 April '84.
52. Kaffrarian Watchman, 27 June '67 (my emphasis). (The allegation that Ngangelizwe held land from the Colonial Government was totally unfounded.)
53. Ibid., 13 July '68. Summary for England. Political.
54. Ibid., 19 November '68. The Governor's Policy. General.
55. Ibid., 7 April '70. Affairs beyond the Kei.
56. Mnqanqeni, a descendant from Ngubengcuka's Right Hand House was also known as MpenduKana.
57. See pp.127-29.
58. NA.153: (Res. with Kreli Folder): J. Ayliff-C. Brownlee, 18 December '75; CO.3179: E. Warner-Col. Sec., 11 February '70.
59. Stanford Reminiscences, I pp.52, 57.
60. See pp.132-5. See also E.G. Sihele, p.23.
61. This also happened when Dylandyebo became king in 1885. See NA.104: Elliot's reply to Tile, 9 April '85.
62. Sinqanqati was also known as Mengami, which means "to rule over."
63. See pp.269-70 and E.G. Sihele, pp.122-3.
64. SP.611/24: Warner-Southey, 27 February '67; Ibid., 30 March '67.
65. In this he did, in fact, succeed to a large extent. See E.G. Sihele, pp.122-3.
66. CPP.G4-'83: Evidence of Thembu chiefs before the Native Laws and Customs Commission, Q.7640-51, pp.435-438. Various chiefs confirmed that Ngangelizwe was opposed to the killing of people in consequences of their being "smelled out" by diviners. The chief Ngoyi told the Commission that Mnqanqeni after having consulted a diviner, found him guilty of having bewitched the

ailing Joyi. Ngoyi knew Ngangelizwe's feelings on this issue and sought refuge at the "Great Place". Ngangelizwe not only saved his life, but also prevented his persecutors from taking his property away from him. The Kaffrarian Watchman gave a different version of the incident. Ngangelizwe was reported to have ordered Mnqanqni to kill the man who had bewitched Joyi. Significantly, this report began: "You may like to hear what sort of individuals they are who draw upon the colonial chest". (See Kaffrarian Watchman, 9 December '67. News from the Transkei. Letter from our own correspondent.)

67. SP.611/44: Warner-Southey, 4 March '71.
68. NA.150: E. Warner-Sec. for NA., Mnqanqeni received a second class chief's allowance and he was settled under Matanzima.
69. NA.150: E. Warner-Sec. for NA., 31 December '72.
70. E.G. Sihele, p.90.
71. See p.130.
72. Stanford Papers, B263.1: Report of the Judge Commission, 30 December '72.
73. Ibid.
74. Kaffrarian Watchman, 9 July '67. Qeya again.
75. I am indebted to Dr. J. Peires, author of The House of Phalo, for drawing my attention to this.
76. See pp.142-3.
77. Bikitsha was the most important Mfengu leader. He was located in Idutywa on the Gcaleka boundary, a district particularly threatened by the Gcaleka.
78. CO.3179: Blyth-Col. Sec., 19 May 1870.
79. See pp.129-30.
80. See pp.141-2.
81. CMT.1/1: Brownlee-W. Wright, 10 August '75.
82. CPP.G16-'76: Memorandum of SNA., April 1876, p.103.
83. See Saunders: Annexation, p.47, footnote 131.
84. CMT.1/1: Brownlee-Wright, 13 July '75, no.82.
85. Saunders: Annexation, p.47.
86. See p.143.

87. CPP.G39-'76: Probart's Report; NA.153: J. Ayliff-C. Brownlee, 12 August '75, no.290.
88. CPP.G39-'76: Probart's Report. This was one of the objections raised by Thembu chiefs at a meeting conducted by Brownlee in 1887. See also GTJ., 1 September '76. A chief, Minzwa, was reported to have said "Government gave judgement without any reference to the Thembu". This has never been recorded by Brownlee in any of his reports on this meeting.
89. NA.153 (Resident with Ngangelizwe folder): W. Wright-SNA., 17 September '75.
90. See pp.145-6 for the deposition of Ngangelizwe and the extension of Colonial control over Thembuland.
91. NA.45: Minutes of Meeting of Major Elliot with Emigrant Thembus, 2 December '78.
92. CMT.1/2: SNA.-CMT., 26 July '78.
93. GTJ., 23 April '77. News from the Transkei.
94. G2-'85: Report of CMT. for 1884, 6 January '85, p.121. R.M. Mqanduli, 3 January '84, p.130.
95. For evidence on this case see NA.87: CMT.-USNA., 20 June '83, 26/9/83. Also included in NA.90, p.2. See also CPP.A59-'83 Correspondence on Stabbing Case; CMT.1/26: R.M. Emyanyeni-CMT., 25 January '83. In this letter the R.M. alleged that Ngangelizwe's people wanted to get rid of him and that all his wives had left him as a result of his insane conduct. The Chief Magistrate did not mention this in his correspondence with the Cape Government.
96. CPP.G109-'83: Reports on the threatened combination of the Native tribes in extra-Colonial territories, pp.24-5.
97. NA.87: CMT.-USNA., 20 June '83; CPP.A59-'83; CMT.-USNA., 22 May '83. It was decided to fine Ngangelizwe £100 - half going to the Government and half to the injured person.
98. Hargreaves Papers, Diary entry, 28 February '71.
99. See p.97.
100. E.G. Sihele, p.95.
101. Stanford Reminiscences I, p.24.
102. E.G. Sihele, p.95.
103. Ibid. Sihele was clearly writing from an Emigrant Thembu point of view. He emphasised that the Right Hand House is usually a branch that is independent and different from the Great Place.

He then continued, "All in all readers should take note of claims made by some people that the house of Ngangelizwe has authority at Roda, this is because these people lack the details to the whole matter.

104. E.G. Sihele, p.97.
105. See pp.44, 51-2.
106. See p.109.
107. SP.611/18: Warner-Southey, 1 August '65. In a statement to J. Hemming (in the absence of Griffith, C.C. for Queenstown), Matanzima said that they (Mtirara's sons) were now grown up, and he could not see why Nonesi was keeping their father's people away from them.
108. SP.611/30: Warner-Southey, 1 August '68; 611/31: Warner-Southey, 12 June '68; 611/35: Warner-Southey, 16 May '69; 611/31: 9 October '68, and many other references. Such incidents were regularly reported in The Queenstown Free Press. See for instance 26 June '68. Local and Colonial. Southey had reason to treat Warner's reports on such matters with circumspect. On one occasion when Warner related a great fight between the Emigrants and the Location people, Southey asked how many were killed. Warner answered that two were wounded. See GH.8/4: Southey-Wodehouse, 10 July '65.
109. SP.611/32: Southey-Warner, 9 October '68; Warner's reply 16 October '68.
110. Burton Papers, MS.14,693: Book 4. Copy of Ayliff's Report, p.363.
111. NA.44: CMT.'s answer to questionnaire, 13 August '78. Elliot, in referring to the war of 1872 said that the Emigrant chief sympathized with Ngangelizwe.
112. See p.158.
113. A further irony lies in the fact that such cooperation, far from having constituted the threat which Warner had envisaged, in the end led to a release of tension in 1878 and 1881. It was the understanding between the two brothers that ensured their non-participation in the two wars.
114. CO.3193: Warner-Southey, 21 December '71.
115. SP.611/25: Warner-Southey, 18 May '67. See also SP.611/31: Warner-Southey, 12 January '68 in which Warner suggested that Raxoti deserved all the support of the Cape Government, since "he is more attached to our interests."
116. CMT.1/5: Levey-CMT., 2 March '81. Levey referred to this settlement when he explained to Elliot the presence of a large number of Mfengu in Matanzima's country. See below.

117. SP.611/21: Warner-Southey, 24 March '66; 611/22: Warner-Southey, 24 May '66.
118. Warner did not wish to see any dispute between the brothers developing into actual war that would involve the Colony. He therefore brought Ngangelizwe under the impression that it was the Government who wished the removal of the farmers. To Southey he admitted that Matanzima insisted on having the farmers removed. See pp.244-6 for further discussion of this issue.
119. E.G. Sihele, pp.122-3. Siquanqati and Bambendino's settlement in Matanzima's country turned out to be a disaster as will be seen below.
120. CO.3163: E. Warner-Col. Sec., 3 December '69; 26 October '70, and Southey's marginal note.
121. NA.47: Levey-CMT., 3 May '79. Levey wrote: "I cannot support the power of the chiefs whose influence is inimical to the progress and peace of the country, and I can confidently assert that by far the larger number of people look forward with hope that a radical change will be affected."
122. NA.58: C. Levey-SNA., 28 May '78. Levey wrote: "It is hardly necessary for me to state that Matanzima's motives for displaying such an unusual interest in this affair, is evidently a fear that he may be dealt with in the same manner, in the event of any misconduct on his side. See pp.168-70.
123. NA.45: Meeting between Elliot and Emigrant chiefs, 2 December '78.
124. NA.99: W. Stanford-G. Theal. (Matanzima remarked thus to Stanford) pp. 174-5.
125. NA.50: CMT.-SNA., 26 June '79. Correspondence on case included in this letter. See also Booy's statement, 5 July '79.
126. NA.51: Minutes of Meeting at Cofimvaba between the CMT. and Matanzima, 22 September '79.
127. See correspondence in cover letters NA.51: Elliot-SNA., 22-29 September '79; CMT.1/3: Sec. for NA.-CMT., 24 October '79. Levey was then resident magistrate at Cofimvaba. These charges were made by Cofimvaba people against Matanzima.
128. NA.51: Minutes of Meeting at Cofimvaba, 29 September '79.
129. CMT.1/3: SNA.-CMT., 13 October '79.
130. NA.54: E.J. Warner-Levey. Warner alleged that he knew that Matanzima would not grant land to a mission station, and he therefore persuaded him to make a grant of land to him personally. It is not clear why Matanzima would not have granted land to a mission station.

131. NA.47: Levey-CMT., 3 May '79.
132. NA.52: E. Warner-CMT., 4 September '79.
133. It was rumoured that Matanzima had approached Ngangelizwe on this question, but the latter warned that no chief who had fought the Government, was still in possession of his lands. NA.52: Elliot-SNA., 30 September '79.
134. CMT.1/44: Levey-CMT., 4 July '89. See also NA.65: R.M. of St. Marks, Summary of events, 2 October '80 for rumours that Matanzima was considering fighting against the Government.
135. CMT.1/40: R. Stanford-CMT., 26 February '81. See also CPP.G20-'81: R. Stanford-Elliot, 15 June '81.
136. CMT.1/8: J. Hemming-SNA., included in cover letter, CMT.-SNA., 30 May '84.
137. NA.150: Levey-SNA., 5 March '76.
138. Levey was of opinion that Matanzima did not openly join the war because he was an ambitious and wealthy man, who hoped that his brothers Sinqanqati and Bambendino would destroy themselves by joining the war, and that he would then gain their followers. See G66-'83: Levey's evidence, Q.6272.
139. At meetings where the chiefs and the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland met to air their grievances, Matanzima was invariably the spokesman. See, for instance, CMT.1/40: Meeting between CMT. and chiefs Matanzima and Ndarala.
140. CMT.1/40: R. Stanford-CMT., 12 September '84.
141. NA.57: Levey-SNA. (Private letter), 29 January '80. Levey alleged that all Matanzima's people were against him.
142. CPP.G66-'83: Levey's Evidence. See also CPP.G47-'82: R. Stanford's report for 1881, p.42. "Matanzima", he wrote, "has great influence with all the Thembus in the neighbourhood. Both he and Ndarala are intelligent, well-behaved men...the people are entirely guided by them."
143. See p.194.
144. Arthur was at the time in charge of a patrol camp at Civaru, a Mfengu settlement. For clashes of opinions between the Stanford brothers and Levey, see for example NA.66: R. Stanford-W. Ayliff, 23 March '81.
145. NA.66: E. Warner-CMT., 21 February '81.
146. CMT.1/5: Levey-CMT., 2 March '81; CMT.1/81: Levey-CMT., 21 March '81, and Elliot's answer.

147. CPP.A-'81: Select Committee on Thembuland, Q.897.
148. See appendix 4.
149. CMT.1/8: J. Hemming's Report, included in cover letter, 30 May '84.
150. NA.102: Report of R.M. St. Marks, 20 December '84, p.116.
151. See pp.194-6.
152. These requests were regularly put forward. See for example CMT.1/42: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 22 May '89; CMT.3/65: R.M. St. Marks, 14 October '91; CMT.1/40: Meeting between Chief Magistrate of Thembuland and chiefs Matanzima and Ndarala, 29 March '83.
153. Queenstown Representative, 4 March '94. Meeting with Matanzima.
154. CMT.3/66: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 19 September '95.
155. CMT.1/42: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 6 February '89; CMT.1/12: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 30 April '89; CMT.1/41: R.M. St. Marks-USNA., 10 January '85; CMT.3/65: Letters concerning the case of a certain Koki, January-April '93.
156. CMT.1/40: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 12 September '84. A young man, Mtyakisana, moved with about 50 families to Kokstad. Stanford was of opinion that there was a distinct tendency among the Mfengu to move eastward. See also CMT.1/40: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 12 September '84.
157. Originally these lands belonged to Ngangelizwe, but when Mngqaneni fled in the 1860s, E. Warner settled him on this particular spot, and he was told that he was now under Matanzima. See E.G. Sihele, p.123.
158. CMT.1/31: R.M. Engcobo-CMT., 9 November '88; CMT.1/12: USNA-CMT., 30 April '89.
159. Amongst many references see for instance CMT.1/42: R.M. Cala-CMT., 10 May '89; 7 March '90; CMT.3/65: Complaint of J. Kelly on behalf of Koki in cover letter 12 April '94; CMT.1/13: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 13 February '90.
160. CMT.1/42: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 22 February '90. See also footnote 58.
161. NA.104: Minutes of meeting between Elliot and Matanzima, 14 April '85.
162. See p.225.
163. CPP.G109-'83: Various letters and telegrams, regarding the war scare, from C.C. King William's Town; C.C. East London; C.M.

- Umtata, included in Fleischer's report, 28 May '83.
164. CMT.1/39: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 25 November 1880.
 165. CMT.3/65: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 30 October '91; 13 December '91 and telegrams included in cover letters.
 166. CMT.1/42: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 24 October '89. Harris, did express concern about rumours that people called the slaughtering "Nongquwusi", thereby repeating, as he thought, a common saying "Nonqwavusi is not yet dead".
 167. CMT.1/41: Petition of traders of Southeyville in cover letter R.M. St. Marks-USNA., 10 January '85.
 168. CMT.3/65: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 7 January '92.
 169. CMT.3/65: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 8 June '94.
 170. USPG.E33: Report of the Rev. P. Masiza, 8 February-26 March '78.
 171. USPG.E36: Report of Archdeacon Waters, 21 April '81.
 172. USPG.E39: Report of Archdeacon Waters, 31 March '84; CPP.G20-'81: Annexure A in no.6: H. Waters-R. Stanford.
 173. CMT.3/66: R.M. Cofimvaba-CMT., 24 September '95.
 174. CMT.1/43: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 27 May '81.
 175. The Bones of Mfanta: The Xhosa Oral Poet on the Voice of Protest in South Africa. In August 1976 the Xhosa poet, D.L.P. Yall-Manisi produced the poem from which this excerpt came in the presence of his chief, Manzezulu MthiKraka. Manzezulu is a direct descendant of Mfanta.
 176. SP.611/26: Warner-Southey, 9 May '67; 18 June '70.
 177. See pp.105-6.
 178. See p.114.
 179. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in South Africa, chapter 7.
 180. For granting of farms to deserving men see CPP.G1-'77: Report of Commission to Inquire into Defence Matters, evidence by E. Judge, Q.1357-1362, 20 September '76.
 181. See pp.310-11.
 182. CPP.G16-'76: W. Stanford's Report on the Tambookie Location, district Queenstown, p.86.
 183. CPP.G1-'77: Evidence of Rev. J. Bertram, Q.3634-3635, 3 October '76; CPP.G16-'76: E. Warner-W. Stanford, 18 December '75.

184. Stanford Papers, B.26315: Sketches from the East by John Noble.
185. CO.1065: Re "Gungubele and Tambookieland Rebellion", enclos. in cover letter Acting-Clerk to Solicitor-General - Attorney-General, 15 August '78.
186. CO.3186: E. Judge-Col. Sec., 18 January '71.
187. CO.1065: Re Gungubele and Tambookieland Rebellion, Acting Clerk to Solicitor General-Attorney General, 15 August '78.
188. See p.153-4.
189. See p.156-7.
190. Merriman Papers, no.467: Brownlee memo., 7 October '76.
191. Merriman Papers 498-804: Brownlee's Comments on Merriman's Memo., 2 November '76.
192. CPP.G12-'77: Address by A. Bill, 1 September '76 to Municipal Commissioners included in Report of Secretary of Native Affairs, pp.160-161.
193. Merriman Papers 793-797: Commission of Crown Lands Remarks on Brownlee's Memo., 2 November '76.
194. Rumours prior to the outbreak of the war of Ngcayecibi implicated the Gcina in Glen Grey in the general unrest. Such rumours proved to be false. The ex-chief, Mpangela, had emigrated to the Transkei and his followers settled down quietly in the location, taking no part in the war which broke out two years later. See CPP.G12-'77: Memo from Sec. for N.A., pp.164-165.
195. See pp.308-10 for rise of an affluent, westernized class in Glen Grey.
196. See pp.64-9.
197. This issue has been discussed in detail by M. Spicer: War of Ngcayecibi, pp.188-190. See also Merriman Papers: Extract from letter from persons regarding attitude of Tambookies, especially the so-called chiefs, Gungubele and Umfanta in the cover letter, C.H. Driver-C.C. Queenstown, 19 July '77, no.127.
198. This was part of the Tshatshu lands that Maphasa had to forfeit in 1853, and thus had symbolic value for Gungubele's people.
199. Merriman Papers: C.H. Driver-C.C. Queenstown, 18 December '77.
200. See p.159-65.
201. Merriman Papers: Extract from letters from persons regarding the attitude of the Tambookies, 18 December '77.

202. G.2079: Statement by Hendrik Bamba, 27 January '78, included in letter Frere-Carnavon, 5 February '78, no.53, p.86.
203. Tini could produce no court case against himself on the grounds of which he could be arrested. He evinced sympathy by telling his people that since the Government was annoyed at not being able to get hold of Sarhili, they were going to catch him (Tini), cut his head off, and send it overseas as Sarhili's (Merriman Papers: Driver-Hemming, 18 December '77.
204. Ibid.
205. GTJ., 29 July '78. The Trial of Gungubele.
206. The following account is based upon reports in the GTJ., 29 July '78. The Trial of Gungubele; Merriman Papers: Digest of Evidence against Gungubele; C.2079, Frere-Carnarvon, 5 January '70, no.53, p.86; Spicer: War of Ngcayecibi, pp.186-193.
207. There is no reference as to Mfanta having been reappointed as headman after his resignation. Probably his resignation had not been accepted by the Government.
208. Spicer, p.195.
209. GTJ., 28 February '78. Our Diary, Dordrecht. Statements like these have to be treated with circumspect, but the fact remains that Ngangelizwe took no part in the war.
210. GTJ., 18 March '78. Our Diary.
211. See Stanford Reminiscences, p.92 for Mfanta-Sitokwe Tyali rebellion.
212. Ibid., p.97. It is not clear why in the praise song it is insinuated that he died at Robben Island.

Chapter 7

Aspects of the Economic Development of the Thembu (1870 - 1900)

Three Thembu territories have been singled out for discussion. The first two, the district of Glen Grey and Emigrant Thembuland had a long history of close Thembu-European contact. At the start of the period under discussion acculturation to western norms had already set in. The third district, Engcobo, which formed part of Thembuland Proper, was more isolated, had less access to European markets, and was described by Sir Walter Stanford as the most "tribalized" of all Thembu communities. The economic developments within these three territories will be discussed in the context of their own historical and geographical divergencies, and of South Africa as a whole during the period of late nineteenth century dynamic change.

The profound changes, brought about by South Africa's industrialization after the mineral discoveries of the 1870's and 1880's, have been well documented.¹ There was a drive for capital from overseas. Commerce expanded. The boom in railway building, together with the exploitation of mines, offered hitherto unknown labour opportunities to black and white.

The prosperity following the industrial revolution was increased by the unprecedented agricultural progress in the 1870's. The production and export of wool rose dramatically, while the production of mohair, hides, skins, ostrich feathers, fruit and vegetables advanced rapidly. Agricultural production was further stimulated by the growth of secondary industries and the building of new railway lines which

created new markets in the interior. The expansion of interior markets, in turn, initiated a boom for wagon makers and transport riders. Understandably there was now a new emphasis on forestry as a source of income.

In this chapter the degree and rapidity with which Thembu farmers availed themselves of new opportunities will be investigated. An attempt will be made to establish whether the process of adaptation to the western economic system was slower in isolated Engcobo than in the two other districts where missionaries and traders played a decisive role prior to the period under discussion. How did white farmers react to the competition offered by black farmers? This question will necessarily focus attention upon the Afrikaner Bond and its role in the alienation of tribal lands in the 1880's. Another focal point will be the conditions in the black agricultural communities towards the end of the century, and the relationship between such conditions and the policy of the Cape Colonial Government, which had become increasingly concerned with the protection of white farmers and the maintenance of a regular supply of black labour.

The exploitation of the black labour market once the mining era had begun, is seen by many modern historians as the central dynamic in the late 19th century Cape Colonial and Imperial policies.² Both mine-owners and farmers, so it has been argued, called for a constant and cheap supply of labour. They demanded such a supply under conditions whereby the majority of the potential black labour force retained its access to independent subsistence in rural reserves. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 has especially come in for criticism as the provisions of

individual land tenure combined with a labour tax, stipulated by the Act, on the surface seem to fit in exactly with such demands.³ While there can be no doubt about the close connection between the demand for labour and the passing of the Glen Grey Act, other factors that played a part in the late 19th century legislative process need examination. One such factor was the need for the Cape Government to devise strategies through which to establish its supremacy over thousands of people of dubious loyalty who were included in the Cape Colony by the large scale annexation of black areas. Another important factor was the desire of some black farmers to obtain title to their lands, thereby obtaining security in the face of land alienation.

Previous chapters concerned the onslaughts on the cultural and political traditions of the Thembu in the immediate post-annexation period; the economic ramifications of the Cape Government's policies of the late 1870's are now due for discussion. There were the introduction of more burdensome taxation, restrictions on cash croppers, and the alienation of tribal lands. How did the lands from which people were expelled compare with those where they were re-settled? How did communities react to prolonged fear of expulsion? Was taxation as burdensome as is usually accepted, or could people find effective ways of avoiding payment?

In conclusion, then, the aim of this study is to reconstruct as far as is possible the economic and social forces at play which changed the destiny of the common black person in the areas concerned during the last three decades of the nineteenth century.

(i) Glen Grey

The district of Glen Grey was the original Tambookie Location which was proclaimed by Sir George Cathcart in 1853. In 1870 the Location was divided into two sections with the larger part joined to the Dordrecht district and the rest to the Queenstown district. As a result of administrative problems the two sections were amalgamated in 1878 under the name Glen Grey, with the chief magistracy at Lady Frere. The administration was placed in the hands of a civil commissioner.⁴

The district, inhabited in 1870 by about 30,000 people,⁵ comprised 208,000 morgen. On the whole it was well-adapted for both agricultural and pastoral farming despite some unfavourable conditions: almost one-third of the territory was very rugged, and the rainfall was erratic. However, the river valleys were very fertile and irrigation from the two main rivers, the Cacadu and the White Kei, as well as from numerous mountain streams, supplemented the annual rainfall of 600 mm. A long-standing resident of Queenstown described Glen Grey as an extremely fertile district, unsurpassed for horse-breeding and sheepfarming, and capable of growing enough wheat for the whole Cape Colony.⁶ Sir Richard Southey considered it to be the most valuable part of the Cape Colony,⁷ while a Mr. Hopley, who was well-acquainted with the area, stated emphatically: "There is not a part in the Colony, east, west, north or south, taking acre for acre, worth anything like it."⁸

Mention has already been made of contact between the western Thembu

and Europeans - missionaries, farmers, traders and officials - since the 1820s.⁹ At the beginning of the period under discussion, the Glen Grey Thembu had already been exposed for nearly half-a-century to western influences, and they had adopted various western methods of production. As early as 1864 J.C. Warner had stated in an official report that hundreds of Thembu had substituted the plough for the wooden hoe and had cut watercourses for purposes of irrigation; owners of wagons could be counted by scores.¹⁰ They also valued money, and practised diversified agriculture. In years to follow various reports confirmed that the Thembu had responded keenly to the Cape Colony's expanding economy. A trader, M. Wilson, wrote in 1873 that while a few years earlier he counted it a good deal to sell ten ploughs a season, he then counted as many as fourteen at work in one small valley.¹¹ The civil commissioner for Wodehouse reported at the same time that in his district he noticed a desire among the people to obtain clothing and other luxuries, and that they had developed a "keener sense of the value of money and labour as means to obtain such luxuries."¹²

An important development in Glen Grey was the acceptance by a large number of people of the concept of individual landownership. This advancement to a stage where a man could possess his own piece of land was certainly stimulated by developments in nearby Victoria East. The Rev. Henry Calderwood, on instruction of Sir Harry Smith had in 1848 settled there a large number of Mfengu in locations where they received individual holdings at a quitrent of £1 per annum. The Thembu lands to the west of the Kei were annexed in the same year and in 1849 placed under the regency of Nonesi.¹³ Under influence of

J.C. Warner, Calderwood's policy was partly adopted in the newly annexed area. Both Nonesi and the Gcina chief, Tyopo, enticed influential men with gifts of land to settle among them.¹⁴

When Warner was Thembu Agent it became official policy in the Tambookie Location to grant small farms to black farmers who, by industry and hard work, had improved their condition. In 1868 the Land Tenure Act was passed, making provision for individual landownership in the Location. When Warner left in 1869 his recommendation that the policy of granting farms should be extended, was accepted by Sir Philip Wodehouse.¹⁵ Although only a small number of men received land in this way, the density of the population created a situation where many people at least became acquainted with tenurial experiments in surveyed plots and quitrent holdings.

Developments, such as outlined above, in turn, led to the rise of a westernized class whose way of life diverged from those of their tribal kinsmen. Their affluence was conspicuous, as can be seen from the report of a traveller who visited the area in 1885. One farmer, Thomas Zwedela, had erected a brick house, with eight rooms, the usual outbuildings, and a school building for forty pupils. He could boast of superior stock, including a well-bred stallion, and a shorthorn bull. Another enterprising farmer, Fortuin Peits, had planted seven hundred fruit trees, while many other black farmers possessed merino sheep.¹⁶

Superficially this presents a picture of unprecedented prosperity. In 1874 the civil commissioner for Wodehouse reported that, in his part

of the Location, four hundred bales of wool were produced, and that agriculture flourished.¹⁷ J. Hemming proudly testified that in the Queenstown part people were showing signs of "civilization" - they sowed wheat, barley and oats instead of sorghum and maize; education had made progress and there was little crime.¹⁸ In the Umhlanga Location, from which the Thembu were evicted in 1885,¹⁹ a hard working, enterprising community was highly appreciated by white inhabitants of Dordrecht. They objected to the removal of the Umhlanga people, and pointed out that not only did the black farmers possess more cattle, sheep, horses and pigs than the white farmers by whom they were replaced, but that they had also supplied the Dordrecht and other contiguous markets with more dairy and agricultural products and had purchased and consumed more household goods. As one resident put it: "they are a mine of wealth and an army of consumers and producers."²⁰

Perhaps the most telling evidence came from John X. Merriman when, in 1894, he opposed the introduction of a labour tax under the Glen Grey Act. Statistics, he said, showed that the Glen Grey district rated fifth in the production of corn in the Colony, had as many sheep and ten times the number of cattle as the Caledon district, produced half the quantity of wool produced in the whole of the Fraserburg district and a hundred times the quantity of mealies.²¹ The Frontier Guardian pointed out that the agricultural produce of the 6,800 families in Glen Grey amounted to £145,000. Even in adverse seasons, the paper maintained, the black farmers cultivated more intensively than Europeans could or would do.²²

Obviously this picture of dramatic economic progress must be qualified. Fluctuations in the Cape Colony's economy were reflected by variations in those of black communities, and magisterial reports were often grim, in stark contrast to the glowing reports quoted above. The years 1877-1878 saw a severe drought.²³ Conditions were aggravated by the War of Ngcayecibi.²⁴ "The drain on the division in the matter of defense has been very severe", wrote the civil commissioner for Queenstown, "It has been drained of food supplies. Everything had risen in price, especially as the rates of carriage from the seaports are very high and there are few carriers willing to transport under present circumstances."²⁵ In 1885 another severe drought forced a large number of Thembu to seek refuge in the Transkei.²⁶

It must further be kept in mind that wealth was very unevenly distributed as an analysis of statistics provided by the 1891 census suggests.²⁷ The population numbered about forty thousand, of whom just over eighteen thousand were males. The average number of cattle per family was seventeen, and that of sheep fifty-three. An average of twenty-six bags of corn and sorghum, forty-seven bundles of oats and hay, and nine bags of other grain were produced. About one hundred and sixty pounds of mohair were cultivated per family.

At first these figures look impressive, but given the fact that there were several farmers who owned well-stocked farms of up to 1500 morgen on which large herds of cattle and sheep grazed, and taking into account the greater productivity of the wealthier people, we can assume that a section of the population possessed very little stock

and cultivated very little. A Law Agent, Kelly, said in his evidence before the Glen Grey Commission that there were men who cultivated twice as much as others, while some did not cultivate at all.²⁸ This was confirmed by David Malasile who said that "some men had very small pieces of land. They cultivated as far as they could go and depended upon friends for the rest."²⁹

Despite such obvious signs of poverty, the impression we get is that most households could still sustain themselves without men being forced out to look for work. It is true that Warner estimated in 1865 that one thousand men were annually selling their labour to farmers in the Wodehouse and Dordrecht districts,³⁰ but available evidence suggests that farmers who gave evidence before the Cape Labour Commission in 1893, while unanimously agreeing that these two districts had never at any time experienced a labour shortage, nevertheless stressed that the Thembu were a nervous and timid people who refused to go far from their homes, though they were also gregarious. They preferred to work during the shearing season, but even then were unwilling to go as far as Cradock and Graaff-Reinet.³¹ There were some exceptions where men ventured further afield, for farmers from Victoria West told the Labour Commission that Thembu from the Queenstown district often worked for them, and that they preferred them to labourers from their own district.³²

Reluctance to take up employment far from home is also reflected in Thembu attitudes towards new labour opportunities. In the 1870's jobs became available on the railway lines, and the wages of 2/6 to 3/6 a day were considerably higher than those offered by the farmers.³³

The Glen Grey people, however, responded reluctantly to attempts by the civil commissioners to recruit labour. They might have been put off by the unsatisfactory conditions of employment for those who did go complained regularly of delays in payment. Even in 1885, when Field Cornet Hughes found that many people in his district were starving, strenuous efforts by civil commissioners to find men to work on the Aliwal North-Queenstown line, met with little success.³⁴ It was the more enterprising men, rather than the extremely poor, who did look for employment. Hemming, the civil commissioner for Queenstown, linked the rise of a westernized class to the increase of shops throughout the district, while Cole, his counterpart in Wodehouse, was convinced that the men went to work so that they could buy luxuries, western clothes, ploughs, sheep and (illegally) brandy from these shops.³⁵

From 1880 onwards the pattern of labour migrancy changed dramatically as an increasing number of men left the Location to look for employment.³⁶ One factor that led to this situation, was that of over-crowding in the Location. In the mid-1880's civil commissioners agreed that this problem had reached alarming proportions. Not only could the district not carry the natural increase, but the situation was exacerbated by various other factors. There was first the far-reaching revolution in both the social and economic organization of the Thembu. This revolution which showed itself in the changing structure of the homesteads was set in motion with the introduction of the plough in the 1860s, whereby the traditional male-female role in the cultivation of land was reversed.³⁷ This in turn struck a blow at the system of polygamy. The increasing tendency towards monogamy and

the consequent reduction of the lobola value of cattle emphasised the economic expediency of concentrating on the attainment of draught animals and small stock such as sheep, which grew their money on their backs.³⁸ The importance of these developments can only be appreciated if we take into consideration that under the traditional system a young man who went out to work might in practice never have seen any money, as his object was the attainment of cattle. Once the cattle were advanced he had to work until he had earned them.³⁹ It was therefore only after he had worked off his payment that he was in a position to claim his land and set up his first household. There was consequently a waiting period before manhood was achieved. With the acceptance of westernized farming methods the economic effectiveness of at least a section of the population was increased, and a man could buy cattle, get married and claim land at an earlier age. The waiting period for manhood was thus reduced, a development which strained the capacity of the chief (or headman) to find land for all the legitimate claimants. Land shortage set in earlier. According to a Mr. Cooke who gave evidence before the Native Grievance Commission of 1914, the rate at which this happened could not be ascertained, but there was a definite tendency.⁴⁰

As land shortage increased, it was especially the younger sons in the family, or - in the case of polygamous marriages - those from lesser houses, who often found themselves in trouble. In traditional societies the law of primogeniture was followed.⁴¹ Unless a man made a will by calling together his friends and

explaining to them how his possessions had to be distributed, his estate would devolve on his eldest son, or the son of his Great Widow. Their *heir* became guardian of the women and the minor sons in the family. Once Glen Grey had become crown land such minor sons, on having obtained manhood, had to apply to the magistrate for land, and not to the chief as had traditionally been the case. The outcome of such applications was often unsatisfactory as the magistrates themselves were not always fully acquainted with the circumstances surrounding applications.

The history of the Kulu family is an example of such an unfortunate situation.⁴² In 1869 Kulu received 12 morgen quitrent land situated in the division of Queenstown. On his death in 1885, leaving behind nine sons, letters of administration were issued to his eldest son, Mayekisi, who received the deed of transfer the next year. Mayekisi, having mortgaged the farm for £250, notified his brothers, on threat of ejection, that they had to quit. The brothers lodged their complaints via a law agent to the Secretary for Native Affairs, who found their case to be a very weak one as the farm was legally bequeathed to Mayekiso. The brothers were at a further disadvantage since the magistrate, Jenner, had a few months earlier rejected their application for farms on the grounds that the lands belonged to the Kulu family and that they were thus provided for. Further correspondence on this issue brought little satisfaction, except that their names were placed on a waiting list for land in the Macibini location. The outcome is not clear, but given the land shortage, they may well have suffered a considerable period of uncertainty followed

by landlessness.

In view of the existing land shortage civil commissioners began to pressurize men into taking individual tenure as a means of securing their land.⁴³ In Queenstown, Jenner pointed out that the available 248,476 morgen of crown land had to be divided among 9,464 adult males. He calculated that an average family of eight needed at least fifty-five morgen on which to keep seventeen large and fifty-three small stock, while producing twenty-six bags of sorghum, nine bags of wheat and forty-seven bundles of oats.⁴⁴ There was thus hardly any more land left for distribution, and he could not cope with the dramatic increase of population which occurred in the 1890's. This increase was due to natural factors as well as to the return of labourers from the Cape Colony. In the first months of 1894 Jenner had to relocate eight hundred people who had returned from labour; thereafter he received instructions not to locate any more. Jenner found it difficult to carry these instructions out. People, desperate for land, threatened to take the law into their own hands and start ploughing up communal lands. He warned the Government that should there be no settlement of the land question within the next three or four years, there would have to be a general re-distribution of land.⁴⁵

The population pressures, the fact of which was emphasised by white officials, coincided with two important developments; the intensified efforts by the Cape Government in the wake of the annexation of Transkeian territories to undermine whatever vestiges of tribalism had remained; and an increasing demand for labour, following the discovery

of gold in 1886. Under these circumstances official minds began to see in the introduction of a system of individual tenure a possible solution to the existing problems. This led, in 1892, to the appointment of the Glen Grey Commission to inquire into the tenure of land in Glen Grey. The Commission was instructed to report upon the following:

- (a) The nature and conditions of the tenure under which Glen Grey lands were held in native occupation.
- (b) The extent and natural features of the ground so occupied and its suitability for pastoral and agricultural purposes.
- (c) The number of male residents and the number of huts occupied by them.
- (d) The practicability of reducing the number and extent of the locations by combining two or more locations into one.
- (e) The best way of disposing of vacant land.
- (f) The desirability of giving individual tenure to those black farmers who wished for it; and the best course to adopt regarding those who did not want it.

The findings of the Glen Grey Commission were published more or less at the same time as those of the Cape Labour Commission. From the minutes and proceedings of these two Commissions, as well as from the debates in the House of Assembly, it emerges that there was an intimate link between overcrowding, land tenure and the question of labour supply to a growing market. In the words of Charles Levey, then civil commissioner of Cofimvaba, the land question and labour were inseparable.⁴⁶

The link between individual tenure and labour demand was eloquently expounded in parliament by John Frost, the M.L.A. for Queenstown. Amid cheers from the House, he argued that as long as the Location (i.e. Glen Grey) existed, and individual responsibility was removed from the shoulders of the Africans, there would be difficulties connected with the labour market.⁴⁷ Under individual tenure, C.J. Rhodes argued, the majority of farmers would be secured in their rights and there would be a surplus of men to supply the labour market. "In future," he elaborated, "nine-tenths of the native population will have to spend their lives in manual labour. The enormous increase in population will soon make it impossible for the locations to support them and they will then turn to canteens, and will thus not be taught the dignity of labour."⁴⁸ The African policy which Rhodes envisaged, and on which the Glen Grey Act was eventually based, rested then on four points: land settlements, the establishment of location boards and district councils, a labour tax and liquor provisions.⁴⁹

The final findings of the Commission on Glen Grey were certainly influenced by reports from various sources which emphasised the system of tribal tenure as the root cause of lack of progress in the locations.⁵⁰ The Commission also concluded that, contrary to official statements, the Thembu were legally in possession of the Glen Grey district. They further concluded, on rather dubious grounds, that the majority of black farmers wanted individual tenure. There was in fact widespread opposition to this system of landownership. Those farmers who were anxious to take up title either belonged to the more educated or to the more affluent section of the

population. In studying the evidence before the Glen Grey commission, it would also seem that the Mfengu were more inclined to support the system than the Thembu. This could be because the Mfengu were, generally speaking, the more prosperous section of the community. It could also be ascribed to the conservatism of the Thembu and their resistance to novel ideas. It could also be that the Thembu, with their strong sense of ethnicity, wanted to keep the tribal lands intact.⁵¹ The Glen Grey Commission based its claim that the majority of people desired individual landownership on the fact that they had visited eleven locations to test the feelings of the residents. They found that 2,356 people were in favour of it while 1,321 were against it. However, this was by no means a true reflection of the general attitude of the residents. The Commission, in "testing" the feelings of the people, made it clear that rejection of the individual tenure could result in loss of land. The people in the Bengu location were asked whether they realized that Glen Grey lands were crown lands with which the Government could deal as it saw fit. In the Mkapusi Location, where individual title was rejected by an overwhelming majority, the inhabitants were threatened with forced removals.⁵² Those people who accepted individual landownership might have done so for fear of losing their lands.

The reports of the Glen Grey Commission and the Labour Commission, as well as those of various Transkeian magistrates, swung public opinion among whites in favour of granting individual tenure to the Glen Grey people. Such a step was seen as the solution to the problems of overcrowding and labour shortage. An additional problem raised its head in the 1890s: the possibility that black farmers and squatters,

not tied to the locations, could flood into the border districts. Merriman argued in parliament: "The real danger of the native question is not so much in the filling up of the Transkei, not in the increase of natives in their own country, but in the increase of the natives in the white man's country, and we must be careful in our land settlement that we do not increase that danger."⁵³ J. Rose-Innes remarked: "European intrusion has ceased to be a menace; the anti-native forces have adopted a new alignment; the slogan now is not dispossession, but segregation. Natives are not to be driven out, but into their reserves. The problem is now how to provide the necessary land."⁵⁴ Other Europeans, notably some Bond members, favoured the granting of individual title despite the fact that more Africans would obtain the vote. They hoped that the lands of black farmers would soon become liable for debt and available for purchase by white farmers.⁵⁵ Acting then on the reports of the two commissions, Cecil John Rhodes and his secretary, Milton, drafted the Glen Grey Bill which was eventually promulgated in 1894.⁵⁶

The Bill stipulated that title deeds were to be issued to Africans, subject to perpetual quitrent of 15/- per annum, which meant 5/- more than the hut tax it replaced. Allotments could not be subdivided, but land had to remain intact under one owner. There were provisions for forfeiture of title should the holder be involved in rebellion, or for having previously been convicted of theft for which he had been sentenced to imprisonment of not less than twelve months. Lands could also be forfeited in cases where owners failed to cultivate their allotments for a period of twelve months. An important part of the bill was the provision that land should pass according to the law of

primogeniture. In view of this provision a table of succession was drawn up. The Government's adherence to the law of primogeniture rested upon the argument that it would not be sound economy to allow a man to divide his land among four or five children. Land had to be kept intact as a reserve to which children, who went out to work, could return. It was therefore essential to limit ownership of land to one man only.⁵⁷

The most controversial part of the bill was the provision for a labour tax of 10/- on each adult male, unless he could show to the satisfaction of the resident magistrate that he had been at work beyond the borders of the district for a total period of three months during the preceding year or had been employed outside the district for a total period of three years.

The introduction of this clause is not surprising, taking into account the findings of the Labour Commission which emphasised that the want of sufficient farm labour was acutely and increasingly felt in the western districts of Worcester, Malmesbury and Piquetberg and that several thousands of labourers could be absorbed in that area.⁵⁸ This situation was the direct result of the competition between the great employers of labour, the mines and public works, which under stress were beginning to compete strongly against each other, thus fixing a wage rate beyond that payable by the white farmers. Since these large employers had organizations, means and agencies to organize a labour supply, the country and towns became drained of an adequate supply. Besides, farmers had to compete against each other, especially in critical times, under pain of losing a sowing, harvest

or vintage. Some stock farmers had to compete with wine farmers and manufacturers. That the mines were beginning to draw labour away from the farms was borne out by the evidence of Solomon Kalipa, who told the Labour Commission that since farmers did not pay Johannesburg wages, and more-over paid in stock rather than in money, people preferred going to the mines.⁵⁹

The provisions of the bill, then, which aimed at bringing about a stable farming community by giving them security of property while forcing the less energetic, by means of a labour tax, to look for work, were seen by the Cape politicians as an ideal compromise between, on the one hand, the farmers' demand for labour which necessitated the presence of thousands of Africans on white-owned land; and on the other hand, the demand of farmers for protection against black intrusion. The introduction of the labour tax in Glen Grey was greeted with misgiving from various sources, although there were, surprisingly, Africans who supported it outside their district.⁶⁰ Elliot was of opinion that the desire for people to earn money was a sufficient inducement for them to go out to work, and that the tax, even if enforceable, would have little effect.⁶¹ There were Africans who saw it as a "black man's tax"; a means of discriminating against the African. One deputation expressed its feelings, when testifying before the Select Committee on the Glen Grey Act, as follows: "You have thousands of lazy white men in the Colony who do not work; they sit all day drinking coffee. They grow nothing because they have no servants to work for them, and they do not work themselves. Why is not the tax put upon them?"⁶²

In the final analysis the Glen Grey Act solved none of the problems it was intended to solve. The Labour Tax was soon considered a dead letter, and numerous problems regarding the survey of lands resulted in farmers feeling less secure than when they held the lands in the traditional way. The Glen Grey district was divided into eighteen locations, each surveyed and divided into allotments of approximately four morgen. Initially the cost of survey was estimated at £2.10, but it finally amounted to £5, of which half had to be paid immediately. The rest was spread over four annual instalments. Although 6,576 of the 7,093 plots were taken up within the first three years, resident-magistrates had little cause for satisfaction. Many people could simply not afford the survey costs, and shortly after the survey had been completed, various farmers had to forfeit their claim to land following their non-payment of the first instalments. J. Sweeney's experience as resident-magistrate at Lady Frere had convinced him that Glen Grey was, from every point of view, an unfortunate choice for the launching of the great experiment. Most of the surveyed plots had to rely on an erratic rainfall. He pointed out that in the eight years since the Act had been introduced, there were only three good crops. A succession of dry seasons made it impossible for farmers to meet their obligations, especially as they had to pay an annual quitrent in addition to survey costs. This fee of 15/- per year replaced the old tax of 10/- per hut. Furthermore, the survey cost of £5 for a four morgen holding was well above the market value of land. Farmers also found themselves at a disadvantage in that they were now confined to a single plot which was often not of the same value as the several fertile patches which they were allowed to cultivate under the old system.⁶³

As many farmers fell victim to droughts and other disasters, and consequently failed to pay their quitrent, the old pattern once again emerged: those who had land had to support the landless. Also, since the labour tax was ineffective in forcing people out to work, the problem of overcrowding was by no means resolved; in fact it would seem that the habits of encroaching on each others lands or of ploughing up commonages and path ways were as alive by 1900 as had been the case before the Act was applied.⁶⁴

As the century drew to a close we can detect definite signs of arrested progress in Glen Grey. This will be discussed in the concluding part of this chapter.

(ii) Emigrant Thembuland⁶⁵

In 1880 the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland wrote as follows, in a reply to a circular from the Cape Legislative Council as to the best way of extracting labour from the black territories:

"I believe that the Transkeian territory is one of the richest in South Africa, that if properly developed it would compare well in proportion to its extent with any other in the Colony. It is surely well worth opening up. The cry now is for labour in the old Colony. Why not try what the new can produce? ...Make roads, establish model farms, train the natives tenderly and carefully in their own land, and then they may be disposed to seek labour at a distance...I do not think it would be difficult to induce, by force of example, the natives of the Transkeian territory to produce more breadstuffs than the Colony could consume."⁶⁶

Elliot's letter reflects the growing awareness in the 1880's among Transkeian magistrates that the Transkei had enormous potential as a contributor towards the Cape Colony's revenue, as a consumer market and as a labour reservoir. The Chief Magistrate was therefore advocating the direct intervention of the Cape Government in the economic life of black Transkeians, and the restructuring of the traditional subsistence economy. What was needed, then, was the creation of an educated class of farmer who could actively contribute towards the development of a viable rural economy.

In Emigrant Thembuland various factors enabled the Cape officials to embark on experiments in building up peasant production.⁶⁷ The Emigrant Thembu, like their kinsmen in Glen Grey, had a long history of western contact. For almost forty years they had been renowned as excellent farm workers. As labourers on white farms they became acquainted with the western monetary system and they were introduced

to western agricultural methods and implements.⁶⁸ After the Emigration, in 1865, they continued to sell their labour on neighbouring white farms, and the new district benefited greatly from this. It would also seem that the people who emigrated came from the more affluent section of the Glen Grey district. They took into their new country considerable numbers of sheep, goats and cattle.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the geographical situation of Emigrant Thembuland, bordering on the districts of Queenstown and Wodehouse, from which it was separated only by the Indwe river, made it easily accessible to traders and missionaries.

Although the Wesleyan Church was traditionally most closely associated with the Thembu, it was the Anglican Church that played the major rôle in Emigrant Thembuland. In part this could be accounted for by the fact that already in 1855, when the lands belonged to Sarhili, the Anglicans established St. Mark's Mission Station on the banks of the Kei River with the Rev. Henry Waters as the first missionary. This station made rapid progress after 1865. In 1879 Waters could report that there were 2,843 church members and that as many as 4,305 people attended services.⁷⁰ He referred to his station as an English Village with well-supplied shops, a wagon-making establishment and a shoe-maker. These business concerns had, in the missionary's words, "a beneficial influence on the native mind", as they provided employment as well as the opportunity to exchange their produce for western articles such as blankets, clothes, ploughs and spades.⁷¹

Various other missionary societies found their way to Emigrant Thembuland, where they were cordially received by the chiefs. Under

missionary influence education made rapid progress. In 1872 it was reported from the Xalanga district that young men, who had considered themselves too old to be educated, had formed a large class and that good schools were erected at Cofimvaba, Isobeka and Southeyville. Elementary schools were established at Seplan, Inbekwateni and Xalanga. In 1879 the Rev. Henry Waters wrote with great satisfaction that there were ninety-five boys and seventy-five girls in his day school where pupils were instructed in the making of wagons, scotch carts, post carts, tables, chairs, wardrobes, couches, shoes and tinware. Girls were instructed in needlework.⁷²

It was a rule at mission stations that all people had to be neatly dressed, even if they wore a blanket instead of European rags.⁷³ Emphasis was also laid on other symbols of "civilization" such as the building of square houses and the acquisition of furniture. Traders were therefore rapidly attracted to the new country. In 1881 there were seventeen trading stations in the vicinity of St. Mark's alone, while in 1883 thirty-four traders claimed that they had been granted licences at £5 per annum by various chiefs.⁷⁴ There is definite evidence that a brisk trade was carried out. Shopkeepers often had stock up to the value of £5000 in their shops. Such stock consisted mainly of superior blankets, beads, clay and agricultural products.⁷⁵

Magistrate's reports for the first decade after settlement in Emigrant Thembuland had taken place, portray a peasantry that had advanced well beyond the subsistence level. By 1873 the plough was in common use; water and irrigation furrows were cut; hundreds of fruit trees were planted; and sheep-farming was rapidly gaining popularity over

cattle-farming.⁷⁶ A glance at some statistics which were made available during the 1870s will confirm W. Fynn's observation that the Thembu were a very wealthy people. In 1876 the total population which numbered 40,000 (almost 7,000 adult men) possessed among themselves 5,384 horses, 38,749 cattle, 82,201 sheep, 107 wagons and 898 ploughs.⁷⁷

If we take Cumming's estimate in 1878 of twelve persons per household as correct, there would have been about 3,400 homesteads. This would give an average of twelve cattle and twenty-four sheep per family; but in a report of 1879, he estimated that each household had from twenty to forty cattle and a small flock of sheep.⁷⁸ It should be taken into account that it was very difficult to make such estimations, as people were often unwilling to make known the exact number of stock in their possession. The general prosperity of the district was also clearly reflected in export figures for 1876. Wool was exported to the value of £50,000, hides and skins to the value of £4000, grain to the value of £3000 and timber to the value of £3000.⁷⁹

One other factor which contributed towards the relatively rapid economic transformation of Emigrant Thembuland must be discussed here in detail: the rise of an elitist class, deliberately cultivated by the Colonial Government. The presence of a number of men who could be collaborators in time of war and spies in times of uncertainty was considered to be of the utmost importance in this territory, strategically situated as it was between Thembuland Proper and Glen Grey. It was for this reason that magistrates exerted themselves in

furthering the interests of those black farmers who were potential allies. The most influential of these magistrates was Charles Levey.⁸⁰ However critical one may be of his authoritarianism, and his disregard for the feelings of those people who were still deeply attached to traditional institutions, he was undoubtedly an extremely capable administrator who was also genuinely interested in the economic development of his district. He asserted that the key to prosperity rested upon two pillars: the fixity of tenure which was to go hand in hand with the development of self-government, and a sound agricultural policy. To this end he untiringly pleaded for the improvement of education, and, more specifically, for the establishment of technical and agricultural schools. Half-educated people, he believed, were useless to themselves as well as to others, since they were only producers of an increased population! He gave substance to his arguments by referring to France where agriculture was considered to be the cardinal principle underlying all education.⁸¹ His unique system of land tenure in the Cala district, and his agricultural societies - about which more will be said later - contributed largely to the emergence of a class of westernized farmers, from whose ranks he selected the leaders of the community. In accordance with his belief in self-government, he prided himself that he would not even erect a pound without consulting the people,⁸² and he regularly conducted meetings with the chiefs and other leaders to stimulate the cultivation of wheat. He founded, with great success, a Farmers' Tree Planting Association, established a nursery for trees, and propounded the idea of introducing some form of municipal government, in which Africans would be represented.⁸³ We can see that from the late 1870's Levey was already applying those principles on which the Glen

Grey Act was based. In later years he was very keen to have the act extended to Emigrant Thembuland, although he disagreed with certain stipulations, amongst others the labour tax.⁸⁴

The emergence of a substantial peasantry, as advocated by Elliot, and encouraged by the activities of Levey and other magistrates, could only be brought about by a radical change in the system of landownership. The traditional system, whereby the allocation of arable land was vested in the chief, had to be broken down to be replaced by one in which special treatment could be given, not only to Colonial allies, but also to men who showed the inclination to improve their position. Such changes were already visible immediately after the Emigration. Chiefs, departing from the traditional system, which did not allow the alienation of tribal lands, followed the advice of magistrates, and made gifts of lands to so-called deserving men. Initially the chiefs followed this policy to enhance their prestige in their new country, and to increase their income. Gradually the magistrates became closely involved in land transactions so that eventually chiefs only allocated lands to men approved of by the magistrate.⁸⁵ E.J. Warner informed the Thembuland Land Commission that chiefs were encouraged to make gifts of land to a certain class of blacks who could be an example to others and who could "teach the real kafir civilization." On the question of whether these people would form a protective shield round the Government, he answered: "Yes, they were men that could be depended upon - they were thoroughly loyal."⁸⁶

The interests of these Colonial allies were further advanced by the

land settlements after the war of 1880-81 - settlements in which an overlap between black elitist and Cape Colonial interests were conspicuous. The Thembuland Land Settlement Commission recommended:

"That natives of known loyalty, good character, with small means, and irrespective of nationality, should receive small locations of from one to five morgen of arable land at a quitrent of five shillings per morgen per annum, that this should give them the right of from ten to fifteen morgen of grazing land to each morgen of arable land without further payment, and a building plot of about half an acre, the grazing rights to give the allottee the privilege of grazing five head of large stock or twelve sheep or goats for each morgen of arable land registered in his name...that a certificate securing to the grantee and his heirs ownership to such allotment be granted; that in case of rebellion the land to be declared forfeited to the Crown; that the grantee shall personally occupy the ground, failing which for three consecutive years, the land to revert to the Government; no change of ownership to be permitted without the consent of Government...that the land allotted be no security for debt; that the Government shall have the preferent claim on the crops of the grantee for the payment of quitrent and taxes, such crops to be liable to seizure and execution without further process of law after 14 days notice of such arrears having been duly served..."⁶⁷

While the Colonial allies were compensated in this way, the Commission dealt harshly with those who fought against the Cape. It was stipulated that they would be located on a piece of garden ground with commonage for their stock, and that they should not receive a certificate of ownership for such gardens until "they had proved themselves worthy of such privilege by their loyalty, industry and progressive disposition." It was further emphasised that "they (should) be overlooked by headmen to be appointed by the Government, who for such service should receive a large concession of land, such headmen to be of approved loyalty of character,"... Lastly "ex-rebels" were to pay a sum of twenty shillings annually in lieu of hut tax and house duty and they were liable, on proof of misconduct, to be

expelled from their location.⁸⁸

In their settlements the Commission further made provision for a number of black farmers who already possessed a considerable extent of lands before the war had broken out. With regard to these farmers it was stipulated:

"That: all loyal claimants who had fully established their claims should receive grants not exceeding 500 morgen, either where they now occupy, or in such other locality in Emigrant Thembuland as can be found for them, and they consent to accept, at a Quitrent of not less than 20s per 100 morgen. That in deciding the extent of grant and amount of Quitrent, the Commission take into consideration the length of time the claimants have occupied, the amount of improvement and cultivation on their farms in relation to the quantity of arable land, time of occupation and quality of land, and that in event of the grantee at any time taking up arms against the peace of the country, the land should revert to the Government."⁸⁹

There were after 1883 three classes of farmers: those who did not own any land; those who owned very small patches of land and those who owned relatively large farms. In no instance did farmers receive title deeds to their farms. Although there were some requests for title deeds by some farmers, Elliot did not consider the time ripe for such a step as title deeds were only to be given to black farmers who had sufficiently improved their holdings, and who gave proof of being able to maintain certain standards. In the event of failure to comply with Governmental requirements, they could be expropriated. In the uncertain political climate of the 1880s, Elliot thought it would be unwise to implement any system that could cause such discontent as would have arisen should farms be taken away from the owners. It was only after the passing of the Glen Grey Act that the Government became favourably disposed towards the granting of individual title to lands.

number of advanced people, a council should be formed consisting of a president and three or four councillors who should then, under guidance of magistrates or officers nominated by the Government, have control of these villages. All regulations for the management of the villages were to be made by the council and submitted to the Government. Levey hoped that young men with fair education and those who had been taught trades, could serve on these councils.

At this first meeting, Levey could also report with understandable pride on the great progress that had taken place since the formation of the society. Between 1875 and 1877 the number of square houses had increased from four to seventy, and the number of water courses from thirty to two hundred. Far more wheat was sown - ten bags for every one sown before - and the amount of land under cultivation had doubled. "The agricultural societies", Levey noted on another occasion, "form a bond of association among the wealthiest classes, and do much to counteract the influence of the chiefs whose authority is too often exerted in a manner prejudicial to Government and the spread of civilization."⁹¹

We could quote at length from various sources in support of the argument that a substantial class of farmer had emerged, who grew large quantities and varieties of grain solely as cash crops, planted fruit trees and vegetables and competed favourably with white farmers at cattle sales and auctions. A few examples, however, will suffice. In the Xalanga district 5000 bags of wheat and 80,000 lbs of wool were produced in 1880. The members of that district's Agricultural Society had erected their own hall in 1883 at a cost of £400, and the annual

Native Farmers' Report mentioned with great pride the achievements of the top farmers. There was Mankayi who sowed 81 bags of wheat, 8,400 bundles of forage, sixteen bags of barley, five and a half bags of peas and nine bags of beans. In addition he planted more than a thousand fruit trees. Another progressive farmer, whose example was soon followed by two others, imported a threshing machine from Europe. The same pattern of economic growth was apparent in other parts of Emigrant Thembuland. Responses to a government inquiry of 1882 revealed that there were farmers who owned up to five hundred sheep. Sol Kalipa possessed one hundred and twenty cattle, twenty horses, five hundred small stock, two wagons and three ploughs. Petrus Mahonga had two hundred and twenty cattle, forty-four horses, three hundred and fifty small stock and five ploughs. In the Cala district one man was said to have possessed a vineyard large enough to supply all Cala with grapes. In this flourishing district the black people built a hall at a cost of £350, the whole of which sum was subscribed among them before the building was opened. It was used by both Africans and Europeans for concerts and dances.⁹²

People who had made this much progress were in the position to avail themselves of opportunities offered by the Cape's expanding economy after the discovery of first diamonds and then gold. Cumming noted in 1880 that the advanced farmers in the Cofimvaba district were not only cultivators, but that in time of leisure they increased their income by transport riding or by purchasing timber, which they took to the upper parts of the Cape Colony and the Free State, where they sold it at a profit.⁹³ Some wagon owners hired their wagons out.⁹⁴ The increased demand for square houses and outbuildings offered

opportunities to builders, and the wagonmakers, carpenters, shoemakers and other artisans stood an excellent chance of being rewarded for their services in a community where there was a growing demand for their skills.⁹⁵

It is incontrovertible that the prosperity of peasant farmers and entrepreneurs rested upon the compatibility of their interests with those of the colonial state. The distribution of superior seed among advanced farmers, aid given in the combatting of animal diseases, and the undertaking of public works,⁹⁶ could either be attributed to a genuine desire to improve the condition of the black people, or to the more selfish motive of enabling them to meet the demands of the colonial state. Without the necessary means taxes, court fees and fines could not be paid; and during an adverse period Elliot warned correctly that when men have neither money nor produce they cannot become purchasers.⁹⁷

Furthermore it was the black entrepreneurial element's dependence upon improved communications which facilitated the building of roads and bridges in Emigrant Thembuland. The extent to which the Cape Colony benefited from free labour, obtained from work parties, which were often organized by chiefs and headmen, as well as from voluntary cash contributions from black communities, emerges from the evidence provided by J. Hemming when he was questioned on the advisability of Colonial expenditure on the road from Cala to Queenstown, and a bridge over the Tsomo river. Asked in whose interest these works were to be undertaken, he answered: "In the interest of the Colony". On being more closely examined he explained that the road would provide a

shorter route from the East London-Queenstown railway to the districts of Maclear, Kokstad and Barkly. He was finally asked: "And would you say that this would justify the expenditure of money which Government has put in the estimates for the sake of making the road to Cala?" To this he replied: "Yes, because the expenditure is not simply intended for native benefit."⁹⁸ This project, however, was only completed several years later, and then with the aid of free labour offered by men in the St. Marks district, while Matanzima and his people donated £3000 for the building of the bridge.⁹⁹ Peasants not only helped with the building of new roads, they also contributed towards the maintenance of those already in existence.

Far more beneficial than these indirect taxes were the direct contributions towards the Colonial revenue in the form of hut taxes and fines. To gain some perspective upon the symbiotic relationship that existed between the Colonial state and its dependencies we can look for a moment at the Transkei as a whole. Although the figures which will be quoted below are those for the year 1907, they nevertheless reflect a pattern which had started in the 1870s. While it was generally believed that the Transkeian territories were the beneficiaries after annexation, the editor of the Territorial News argued convincingly that the black Transkeians paid a fairer share of taxes than white citizens. The Cape Colony's deficit for 1907 was £421,340 while the Transkei had a surplus of £123,000. This surplus was used to reduce the Cape's deficit. Despite the Transkei's considerable contribution towards state expenditure, this territory suffered most under the Colonial policy of retrenchment. The Cape Riflemen were replaced by black policemen, roads were not kept in good

order, schools and hospitals did not get their fair share, and grants for agricultural societies were withdrawn.¹⁰⁰ When, on a later occasion, it was proposed in the House of Assembly that Transkeians should contribute something themselves to the maintenance of their roads, John X. Merriman retorted that they had already collected £46,000 among themselves in the form of taxes. Of this sum they spent £20,000 on education, £12,000 on the maintenance of roads and a considerable amount on hospitals.¹⁰¹

We are now in a position to assess the situation in Emigrant Thembuland. There, because the magisterial districts were relatively small, it was easier for magistrates to collect taxes, so that even in years when a district like Mqanduli had large sums of taxes outstanding, the magistrates of St. Marks and Xalanga reported no arrears. It was, in fact, only during the exceptionally bad years 1884-1885 that they found it difficult to collect the full sum. In 1885, a year of severe drought, Sweeney, then magistrate of St. Marks, resorted to the seizure of cattle in an attempt to wipe out arrears. He blamed the situation on the laxity of the headmen, and he suggested that the salaries of efficient headmen should be increased and that they be allowed 5% of all taxes collected.¹⁰² This suggestion was favourably received by the Cape authorities, who disagreed with those magistrates who asked that grain should replace money as a means of paying taxes.¹⁰³

The effectiveness with which taxes were collected is reflected in the fact that, while in 1888 the outstanding account in the whole of Thembuland amounted to £15000 - and the prospect was that it would

increase each year¹⁰⁴ - arrears were either non-existent or negligible in St Marks and Xalanga right up to the end of the century. The tax system was, however, not without loopholes. A man could get by with building a house for all his wives instead of a hut for each one, retaining their labour and their garden land, but avoiding the tax. A certain Belindi, managed to get hold of nineteen gardens while paying for only one hut.¹⁰⁵ Payment of tax on one hut might have meant little to affluent farmers such as Belindi, but for the poor man the same tax accounted for a large proportion of his scanty means. When, in 1885, Sweeney seized stock as payment for taxes, there existed such poverty in the St. Marks district that women were found on unfrequented paths, digging roots to eat.¹⁰⁶ This suggests that the impact of Colonial rule sat heavily on the poorer homesteads.

The plight of the poorer farmer was exacerbated by the acute land shortage and resultant overgrazing and overcrowding in Emigrant Thembuland. At the time of the Emigration, J. Warner had already warned that the land was too small to contain all the people.¹⁰⁷ Large tracts of the most fertile lands were soon afterwards appropriated by missionaries and traders. Emigrant chiefs and petty chiefs, keen to enhance their prestige and income, made considerable grants to such newcomers. Chief Usachili for instance, gave a tract of land, four by three miles, to the Anglican Church, while considerable grants to other societies were also made by Ndarala, Siquanqati, and Sitokwe Tyali.¹⁰⁸ These lands comprised the most fertile parts of Emigrant Thembuland. Traders, also, were not slow in taking advantage of the chiefs' willingness to alienate tribal lands to enrich themselves. Trader Kenneley was granted, in addition to a

shop, a house with a garden and commonage as well as a part of the fertile Papasa Valley. Trader Moore opened a shop and shortly afterwards acquired so much livestock that he requested, and received, some grazing land from the chief.¹⁰⁹

In 1880 the resident magistrate of Xalanga warned that there was not a vacant spot left in that district. This situation was the direct result of the land settlements of 1883. Not only did these provide for a redistribution of land which favoured the Colony's black allies at the expense of the ex-rebels and those commonly referred to as the "red-kaffir" (i.e. those who clung to tribal traditions), but in the final delineation of boundaries between black and white 229,000 morgen in Emigrant Thembuland were set aside for white settlement. The object of this was to maintain a safe access route between the Cape Colony and Maclear so as to prevent the hemming in of magistrates in the event of war.¹¹⁰ The Thembu were thus squeezed into an area too small to support them. In Xalanga 512 families surrendered but the district could only hold two hundred and fifty, while in Southeyville more than a thousand ex-rebels had to be located on land that could hold a thousand families.¹¹¹ From 1880 onwards there were constant complaints about land shortage that culminated in garden disputes. Headmen in St Marks objected in 1894 to the granting of any more lands to traders as the land was already over-crowded¹¹² and the resident-magistrate warned that owing to population increase, lands that had supported ten would soon have to support twenty people.¹¹³ Land shortage was also one of chief Matanzima's main complaints when he met the Prime Minister at Queenstown in 1894. On this occasion Rhodes told him bluntly that those chiefs who had lost their land had only

themselves to blame, that there was no more land and that they had to rest content.¹¹⁴

In desperation people trespassed upon each other's lands or they started ploughing up roads and footpaths. Others turned to those who were better off to hire lands from them, or to find grazing for their cattle, or to cultivate their lands for them. However, ploughing for another man presupposed the possession of a plough and oxen, so these, too, had to be hired. A plough could be hired at £3 for one year, and an ox for 10/- a season. A farm could be hired at £10 a year, and grazing for four cattle could cost £4 a year.¹¹⁵ Droughts and crop failures often left a man without the means to pay such hiring fees. This resulted in his being embroiled in a court case for debt, the outcome to which was usually an order to pay the creditor in cash. Not having the cash, it was not unusual for the debtor to borrow the money from affluent neighbours at an interest that varied from 6% - 8%.¹¹⁶ He could then still consider himself to be lucky. If he was forced to turn to a trader he might have paid an exorbitant interest of up to 200% on his small loan.¹¹⁷

Under these circumstances, the increasing impoverishment of many homesteads by 1890 is understandable. The affluent farmer still prospered. The possession of a wagon or of cash to pay transport costs enabled him to compete with white farmers on the Colonial markets or else his entrepreneurial activities could provide him with money to meet his obligations. The poor farmer, however, found himself in a dilemma. He needed money to pay his taxes, or in adverse seasons, to buy his food. But it was almost impossible to obtain

money within his district. He could only try to sell his labour on an expanding market. Here, too, he met with many problems. These problems, as well as others that contributed towards the adversities of the late 1890s will be dealt with when similar developments in the other two territories are discussed.¹¹⁸

(iii) Engcobo

When Thembuland Proper came under British authority in 1876 it was divided into four magistracies namely Emyanyeni, Engcobo, Umtata and Mqanduli.¹¹⁹ Engcobo, formerly known as Dalasile's country, was the largest district, stretching from the Drakensberg in the north-east and the Tsomo river in the south-west over an area of 2,100 square miles.¹²⁰ Engcobo was also the most populous district in Thembuland. In 1876 the population numbered about twenty thousand, the majority of whom - about 60% - were Qwati under the headstrong chief, Dalasile. Next in numerical importance were the Jumba under Mgudhlwa who constituted about 30% and the two thousand Vundhli under Sitokwe Tyali. Besides these three tribes there were by 1876 a number of Europeans, a small settlement of Hottentots and a sprinkling of Mfengu.¹²¹

We lack detailed information on the socio-economic conditions in this district prior to 1876, but a collage of scant pieces of evidence portrays a society organized on the same basic principles as all other Nguni societies. The chiefs acknowledged Ngangelizwe's authority in varying degrees, but his control over the district was weak.¹²² He did, however, demand certain royal privileges, such as having large numbers of cattle slaughtered on the occasion of his visits,¹²³ and the right to make certain land settlements. In an attempt, for instance, to form buffers on his outlying borders, he granted farms to Europeans on lands under control of Mgudhlwa and Sitokwe Tyali. At Mahonga's Hoek, just south of the Drakenberg, some eighty farmers were settled in 1863 along the Slang River under an arrangement whereby, in

return for the use of a farm and protection against cattle lifting, each man was to pay the paramount £6 a year. At a second settlement on the Pondo and Pandomise boundary, farms were marked off by natural boundaries and here, too, right of occupation was given to European farmers on payment of a rental of £6 a year. A councillor, Ngayi, greatly respected by the Europeans, was put in charge of the settlement.¹²⁴ Ngangelizwe held full control over these lands. There was no alienation of land; the right of occupation was given in the same way as to any other subjects except that boundaries were drawn and rental had to be paid. When a farmer left or failed to pay rent, the land reverted to Ngangelizwe. As far as could be established, the Paramount did not extract income in any other way from this district. Traders, of whom there were six in 1876, paid licences of £6 p.a. to the chiefs from whom they received land. The only other Europeans who lived in the district by 1876 were those on two mission stations. All Saints, an Anglican station, situated in the centre of the district, was established in 1860 by the Rev. John Gordon of the Church of England on Dalasile's lands. A Moravian station under a Mr. Jutzen was founded on lands granted to them by Sitokwe Tyali with the permission of Ngangelizwe.

The arrival of newcomers was welcomed by the two great rivals Dalasile and Mgudhlwa who, by an increase of followers, could enhance their prestige, increase their income and expand their frontiers. Mfengu from the neighbouring districts who possessed large herds and could make substantial gifts to the chiefs were particularly welcome. In this way the Mfengu chief Mendele received land, that actually formed part of Mgudhlwa's domain, from Dalasile.¹²⁵ After the War of

Ngcayecibi many impoverished Gcaleka also received warm welcomes even if unable to reward the chief accordingly.

Like other Nguni tribes the Engcobo people lived in scattered nuclear homesteads, the populations of which varied considerably. The largest concentrations of homesteads were to be found in the well-watered areas, fed by the three branches of the upper Mbashe area. The nearby forests provided wattle for houses, brushwood for cattle kraals and ample firewood, all of which could be obtained freely. Even in 1891, after severe restrictions had been placed upon the cutting of wood, 98% of the houses in the district were still built of wattle and daub.¹²⁶

Arable garden lands which were allocated by the chiefs to each homestead were cultivated with wooden implements. Traditional methods of cultivation survived throughout the period under discussion.¹²⁷ Maize and sorghum were the main products. Each woman usually had a hut in which grain, stored after the harvest in June, remained for a few months or, in good seasons when pits were full, all year. In such times the surplus sorghum was consumed in the form of beer. Under normal circumstances threshing started in August and the grain was pitted in September. After the lands were reaped stock could freely graze on the old lands, a custom which would explain the resistance to the introduction of wheat farming in the 1880's which did not allow for such practices. Poor people were assisted by the system of Umkumgana whereby a man could plough a land for somebody else on the promise that he would get certain land for use that year.¹²⁸ Food supplies were further supplemented by the hunting of bushbuck. The

chiefs did not demand any fees for this.

The important rôle of cattle in Nguni societies and the drive to accumulate large herds have been stressed by all writers on pre-colonial Nguni history. The people in the Engcobo district, living in an area well suited to pastoral farming were no exception. In typical fashion there was a constant circulation of cattle, not only from chief to commoners and from homestead to homestead, but also between the various districts. As Beinart has explained, the wide distribution of herds in a pastoral environment, where the only fodder available was the stubble left in the fields after the harvest, was the only safeguard against over-grazing.¹²⁹ Although the payment of bridewealth in the form of cattle was an important factor in the distribution of these animals, calculations based upon census statistics and the examination of the ratio between men and women in the number of returned rebels after 1881, would suggest that polygamy was not as widespread as was commonly accepted. The passage of cattle through the lobola system was therefore limited.¹³⁰

Another way in which the constant dispersion of cattle could be ensured was through loan relationships. In Engcobo the system of Ngoma was in common use. A man would borrow animals either from the chief or from one of the commoners, supervise their grazing, make full use of them and return them with some part of the off-spring at a determined date. In such cases ownership of cattle could not pass.¹³¹ Men also freely borrowed cattle from their kinsmen in the Cape Colony. Police officers disapproved of what they interpreted as begging, giving men the opportunity to enter the Colony and commit

theft. Stanford, however, defended this old custom, and explained that farmers had to certify all stock that were given to a man in this way, and the recipient had to go to the nearest magistrate to have the certificate endorsed. They were only allowed to travel on highways, and cases were known where men were sent back eighty-five miles to have their passes endorsed. The system therefore could hardly be open to abuses.¹³²

Unlike Glen Grey and Emigrant Thembuland, where the impact of "civilizing agencies" such as individual land tenure, diversified agriculture and the western monetary system were already noticeable in 1870, production in the Engcobo district was then still firmly based upon the two traditional concepts of subsistence economy and common ownership of land. There was little driving force in the community to produce above the subsistence level. Trading opportunities with both African and European neighbours were limited. The district was not only far from good markets in Queenstown, King William's Town and East London, but a mountain barrier prevented intercourse with the white farmers in the Maclear and Barkly East districts. Bad roads also hampered contact with other Thembu districts. Although Engcobo was only thirty-seven kilometres from Xalanga, a distance of almost eighty miles had to be travelled to get there. The road to Umtata was almost impassable. There were therefore very limited opportunities to get rid of surplus production.

From what has been said above it must not be concluded that there was no contact with Europeans. A few traders had by 1876 already opened shops in the district,¹³³ and a number of men regularly worked on

white owned farms in the adjacent districts. The most valuable contact with whites was made in 1863 when, in response to demands from Aliwal North, Barkly East and the Orange Free State, large-scale sawing of forests commenced. Hundreds of people became involved in one way or another with the forestry business, and timber became very valuable. Not only was the wood used for poles, houses and for cattle kraals, but also for bartering.¹³⁴ There were considerable opportunities for enterprising men to enrich themselves. Together with the influential farmers - mostly wealthy Mfengu - who were invited by Mgudhlwa and Dalasile to settle among them, they formed a privileged class who were willing to give their support to the Cape Colony when the district was taken over in 1876.

With the extension of Colonial control over the district, the scene was set for rapid socio-economic changes. The first magistrate was the dynamic Walter Stanford, who received his early training as civil servant under his uncle, J.C. Warner. Like Warner, Stanford believed in the ever-present danger of a black alliance against the Europeans in the Cape Colony, and he regarded a policy of westernization and detribalization as the only key to future peace and stability. His term of office was characterized by the introduction of various western concepts such as the monetary system, stock fairs and diversified agriculture. The Thembu responded rapidly to these new influences, and there followed a decade or so of relative prosperity in which most households were able to hold their own while adapting to the cash economy. In 1879, shortly after the introduction of ploughs, there were already six hundred in use.¹³⁵ The number of woolled sheep rose from 16,390 in 1879 to 141,975 in 1891.¹³⁶ Stanford

remarked in 1885 that slaughter oxen and sheep were readily available, and that stock fairs were well-attended by both "school-kaffirs and red kaffirs".¹³⁷ They were prepared to pay such prices that traders often went away without buying a single animal as they were outbid by the Africans. The prices realized at Engcobo were much higher than at Umtata.¹³⁸ In 1887 532,000 pounds of wool were produced, which sold at 4d per pound. Pigs, fowls, turkeys and geese were seen on many farms.¹³⁹ The rapidity with which the Engcobo people responded to new challenges seems to show that the length of exposure to new influences does not play a significant role in the process of adaptation. The production of maize and wool in this district compares favourably with that in the two other districts under discussion, which had a much longer history of contact with western influences.

The production of wheat, although encouraged by Stanford, who believed that cultivators felt more secure in their possessions than stock farmers, was not so commonly accepted.¹⁴⁰ Since land was held under communal tenure, the wheat producer, as has been pointed out above, found himself consistently at loggerheads with his neighbours, for according to traditional practice they allowed their stock to graze on maize and sorghum lands after the crops had been harvested.¹⁴⁰ Diversified agriculture was therefore practised mainly by those farmers who received farms after the wars of Ngcayecibi and of 1881 when the lands of defeated chiefs were parcelled out among Colonial allies.¹⁴¹

A number of enterprising men made full use of the opportunities that

became available when the Cape Colony experienced its boom period following the discovery, first of diamonds and then gold. Transport riders and sawyers were in great demand. The civil record books of the successive magistrates reflect the activities of enterprising African farmers in those years. If a man possessed a wagon, he would be in great demand as transport rider. Some men preferred not to make the trips themselves, but to hire their wagons and oxen out. That this was common practice emerges from the resident magistrates' criminal record books. In one court case a charge was laid against a man who failed to pay £2.40 for the four oxen he hired for a trip to Queenstown. Another accused owed money for having hired oxen at 1 & 6d each for a trip to the Cacadu river. Wagon owners were also required to take timber to Aliwal North, Barkly East and even as far as Bloemfontein. Tariffs were established either according to the number of pieces of timber that had been transported, or at a tariff fixed per day. Not many farmers possessed their own wagons, hence the flourishing business that could be conducted by those fortunate enough to have them.¹⁴²

The valuable forests also offered new job opportunities. A large number of men were employed as sawyers and woodcutters either by whites or by other blacks, to produce poles and timber required by farmers in the Slang River Settlement. Timber was often used in place of money. There was, for instance, a court case involving of a black man who employed a sawyer, paying him two pieces of timber for every ten that he sawed. Another court case revealed that a man could barter a horse for eighty pieces of timber. Timber was used for bartering pigs, chickens and ploughs, and a trader even exchanged a

bag of salt for seventy pieces of this now valuable commodity.¹⁴³ However, people became increasingly restricted in wood sawing activities. Shortly after the annexation of Thembuland a number of European and Coloured sawyers migrated into the district from the Cape Colony, mainly from King William's Town. They obtained monthly licences at 5s for cutting wood and started a flourishing trade with nearby towns. The newcomers devastated large parts of the forests, and although the forest soil produced excellent crops, it became completely exhausted after a few years.¹⁴⁴ Magistrates increasingly expressed their concern about the destruction of forests, and the first act to prevent this was passed in 1883. According to this act forests of more than five acres in extent were declared government property,¹⁴⁵ and thereafter licences had to be obtained before wood could be cut in such preserved areas. This act caused considerable confusion as was explained by Stanford. On some farms, especially in the European section, where more than five acres of forests existed, farmers fenced out those who had paid licences to the Government, while in other cases farmers refused right of way arguing that, although such forests were government property, no provision was made for right of way for licence holders. Further strains developed over the Preservation of Forests Act, passed in 1885, according to which licences of £1 for each load of a hundred pieces of timber or fencing poles were charged. A licence to cut spars costed 10s while a 5s licence gave rights to the cutting of dry wood for fuel. The Colony's total amount of revenue from licences in 1885 was £575.¹⁴⁶ Forest rangers were appointed and headmen were employed and rewarded for cases brought forward. Even more confusion arose in 1890. Until then people had the right to cut wattle for houses, gates, poles, sledges,

hoes and handles, provided these were not cut in government reserved forests. (The making of bush kraals, however, had been forbidden since 1881). These rights were confirmed in 1893, by proclamation 209 of 1890. However, under this permit, reserved trees could not be cut. Most of the trees that could be used for building purposes were reserved trees, except for Gonici (underbush) which were insufficient for building requirements.¹⁴⁷

As a result of all these restrictions many people, hitherto dependent upon forestry for a livelihood, fell foul of the law. In 1884, seventy-two cases of trespassing were brought before Stanford, and the number rose to eighty-five the next year. Fines varied from 2s to 10s. The most common trespasses were the cutting of poles to sell to farmers.¹⁴⁸ The forest laws caused considerable bitterness as people were often unaware of the restrictions. In 1888 a number of women were arrested for entering a forest with axes, a privilege which they had enjoyed up to then.¹⁴⁹

Economic changes after 1870 emphasised the fact that the acquisition of money had become a dominant factor in most households. Once power was transferred from the tribal to the magisterial courts, cattle fines were replaced by fines to be paid in cash. Magisterial record books are studded with references to fines which varied from 10/- for a stolen chicken to £10 for horse theft. Even a successful plaintiff in a civil case needed money for court fees. Furthermore, there was in the 1880's an insistence on the part of the Government that hut tax should be paid in money. And finally, the influx of traders created new needs for which money was required.

In 1883 there were 17 European traders stationed on the main routes from Engcobo to All Saints, Ngkozi, the Mbashe river, Immaume and Mahonga's Hoek.¹⁵⁰ There were also a number of black traders such as Paulino Tanbinoy, Simon Mbalali and Pambani Ntombini. Most shops were well-stocked with soap, calico, shirts, trousers, hats and blankets. By 1890 they also boasted luxury items like lace, ribbons, shawls, beads, saddle cloths, belts, handkerchiefs, cups, dishes and earrings.¹⁵¹ A typical example of goods bought on credit from a trader can be found in the case brought forward by Siman Mlabalu in 1889:

1 Jacket	15/-
1 Shirt	3/6
1 Woollen Blanket	15/-
Paraffin and matches	9d
1 Hat	4/-
1 Cotton blanket	3/6

Opportunities of earning money to meet all these obligations were limited. Although, men had for a long time been accustomed to work on adjoining white-owned farms, wages were extremely low and often not paid in cash. It was especially Afrikaans-speaking farmers who preferred paying in stock which varied from three sheep for six months to a heifer a year.¹⁵² With the emergence of a black peasantry black farmers employed men at the same wages that whites paid.¹⁵³ Employees were often at a disadvantage in that their employers failed to pay their wages. They could hardly find redress in taking the defaulter to court since they did not have the money to pay court fees.¹⁵⁴

However, in Engcobo, as in the other two districts, there was a

reluctance on the part of the men to sell their labour in far-off labour markets. After the war of 1881 when many households were poverty-stricken, Stanford tried by public speaking to persuade men to take up employment further afield, but the attachment to land seemed to be too strong. Some simply relied upon friends to carry them through the period of distress. Stanford was aware of the fact that men were often deterred from leaving the district by obligations towards the old and sick and he asked the Government for £1000 to spend on the repair of roads so as to create job opportunities within the district. He also asked for seed to be distributed among poorer homesteads.¹⁵⁵ Governmental aid, however, could only bring temporary relief. As the century proceeded the emphasis was increasingly on forcing men out of the district rather than on keeping them on their lands. The 1890s saw a rapid decline in economic growth, manifested in the many debt cases that were brought to the courts, and the trespassing on each other's lands as the problem of over-crowding became more acute.

(iv) Conclusion

Two phases are discernable in the economic history of the three districts during the period under discussion. The first, which lasted roughly until 1890 was a period of relative prosperity as peasants availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the Cape Colony's expanding markets. This was followed by a period of decline culminating in an exodus of men looking for employment on the gold and diamond mines and on farms as far as the Orange Free State and the Western Province. However, complex situations where societies are in the process of social, political and economic transformation do not allow for precise periodizations. Already in the early 1880's there were strains and tensions as many homesteads became impoverished, social stratification became more marked and traders' debts increased.

The extension of Colonial rule in the 1870s over Thembuland brought burdens such as taxation, quitrent and custom duties. It also brought about the conversion to the western monetary system, a development which adversely affected the poor homesteads as will become clear. Although the evasion of hut tax was possible either by making use of the loopholes within the system¹⁵⁶ or by escaping from the tax-collectors,¹⁵⁷ these homesteads suffered since magistrates from time to time resorted to the seizure of stock when people were in arrears with their obligations. In 1887 many Engcobo people, in consequence of drought and the depreciation in the value of grain and wool, could not pay their hut tax. A.H. Stanford first proposed the confiscation of cattle. This proved to be impracticable as the animals were in too poor a condition to be transported to the Cape

Colony. As a last resort he then confiscated sheep.¹⁵⁸ Where people had already suffered stock losses, this added burden might well have caused a devastating blow to farmers struggling to keep their heads above water. Furthermore, the Cape Government's reluctance to allow seizure of stock instead of cash, left homesteads with the problem of finding money in some way or other to meet their obligations.

Thus far it has been argued that it was the poorer homesteads that bore the brunt of Colonial intervention: the more affluent farmer was affected less directly. The Cape Government imposed a duty of up to 100% on beads, and it also received the larger part of profit on blankets sold to Africans. On shawls and similar articles there were duties of 18% - 25%. In addition there was a duty on the bales and boxes in which these items were packed. Those people who did not work, and who had no money bought little; it was consequently the industrious people who contributed in this way towards the revenue.¹⁵⁹

The customs duties on luxury items and the resultant escalation of prices of goods was a contributing factor towards the increase in traders' debts from 1870 onwards. Traders had no hesitation in giving credit. "Kafir debt is the best debt" was a common saying in Glen Grey.¹⁶⁰ The availability of credit led to overspending and extravagance. A court case revealed, for instance, that a man bought a wedding outfit of £75 for his daughter. It is no wonder that there were traders who had up to £4000 debts on their books. Magistrates disapproved of the indiscriminate credit system as it led to impoverishment of the people. They were furthermore sensitive to the

fact that money was spent at the shops instead of being used for the payment of hut tax.¹⁶¹

Traders also acted as law agents and money lenders, and they admitted frankly that they made more money by lending than by legitimate business.¹⁶² In St. Marks interests on small loans varied from 40% to 200% and Levey ascribed the bankruptcy of many farmers in the 1890s to usury that was doing incalculable harm.¹⁶³ In Engcobo where interest in 1890 rose to 8/- in the £1, traders clashed with the Resident Magistrate, R. King, who refused in court cases to allow such exorbitant interest. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the traders to have him removed from office. It should be noted, though, that King emphasised that the honest traders in his district supported him. It would therefore be wrong to see all traders as dishonest exploiters of the people who were at their mercy.¹⁶⁴ It can, however, not be denied that many took full advantage of the existing situation to enrich themselves.

As a result of the lack of markets, black farmers having no bargaining power were at the mercy of traders. In times of scarcity the farmer had to pay what the trader asked, and in times of surplus he had to sell at the trader's price. During a period of drought in the St Mark's district, traders resold grain at £1.10 a bag having bought it the previous season at £1.10.¹⁶⁵ Farmers in Engcobo were particularly at a disadvantage as they were further from the Cape markets than their kinsmen in Glen Grey and St. Marks. In times of surplus traders came into the district and bought grain very cheaply. In 1887, which was a very good year, a farmer could not get more than

2s a bag for his grain, and then the value had to be taken out in goods. In bad seasons, as in 1893, cheap grain was resold at 30s a bag.¹⁶⁶ Many farmers did not have the money to pay such high prices and this added to the number of those who went bankrupt.

The vulnerability of farmers to the effects of Colonial intervention and traders' exploitation was increased by a conjunction of setbacks such as droughts, locusts and animal diseases. The drought of 1885-1886 resulted in the loss of 10,000 cattle and 30,000 sheep in Engcobo.¹⁶⁷ The next year locusts descended upon the district. Then followed another severe drought in 1892, aggravated by the destruction of the maize crop by what was called Isihlavu (grub); and damage to the millet crops by maggot flies. In Glen Grey and Emigrant Thembuland conditions were no better. During the drought of 1889 heavy stock losses were reported in these districts and in St. Marks farmers lost all their lambs. Although magistrates were inclined to see such disasters as blessings in disguise, since it brought relief to over-stocked lands, we can well imagine that in the poorer homesteads it could spell famine. In fact, Stanford reported in 1892 from Engcobo that in some homesteads not a chicken could be found.¹⁶⁸

Apart from droughts, cattle diseases such as scab and redwater which constantly plagued farmers, added to their expenses as various laws were introduced to combat diseases.¹⁶⁹ The greatest disaster was the devastating rinderpest that ravaged the districts for the greater part of 1897. In Xalanga 75% of the cattle died and in St Marks 85%. Although the chief Matanzima set an example by inoculating his cattle

not many people were willing to follow his example.¹⁷⁰ The disease struck with the same ferocity in Glen Grey and Engcobo.¹⁷¹ The loss of trek cattle forced farmers to fall back on agriculture for a livelihood.

The adverse conditions in the 1880s were aggravated by the problem of over-crowding. Ever since 1881 when people were squeezed into unfavourable areas or in areas that were too small to carry an increasing population, magistrates' reports had reflected an accelerating process of proletarianization and polarisation. In overcrowded districts the condition of stock deteriorated rapidly. Not only did farmers find it difficult to sell inferior stock, but the quality of wool was also adversely affected. Furthermore, where draught animals are too few or too weak, they become incapable of doing the desired ploughing. Agriculturalists are in agreement that poor tillage of land can result in the loss of potential crops. Finally, then, overcrowding resulted in malnutrition and the outbreak of diseases.¹⁷²

As the cumulative effects of Colonial intervention, natural disasters and traders' activities, made itself felt after 1890 in the three Thembu territories, a change in the pattern of labour migrancy as evidenced in the 1870s and 1880s emerged. In 1871 E. Warner was unable to persuade men from Emigrant Thembuland to take up jobs in King William's Town.¹⁷³ Eleven years later this same reluctance to leaving their district was still evident in Thembu responses to the attempts of labour agents to canvass labourers for the Kimberley diamond fields. Levey warned beforehand that there was not the

slightest possibility of their inducing people to go there,¹⁷⁴ and he proved to be correct. The magistrates in Cala, St. Marks and Engcobo expressed concern over this attitude of the people when, in a joint statement in 1888, they condemned the system of spasmodic labour as being detrimental to the interests of both the district and the industries.¹⁷⁵

We do not know to what extent chiefs were able to force or motivate people in going out to work. In Basutoland and Mpondoland, the ruling lineages played a central role in organizing and controlling the pattern of labour migration, by organizing work parties to their advantage.¹⁷⁶ A hint that this might have happened in Emigrant Thembuland, comes from a report written by Levey in 1874. In that year, according to Levey, a work party, badly dressed, left the district in search of employment on public works. Amongst them was Ndarala's son, Dindala. Dindala returned some time later on horseback, and well-dressed. He immediately started organizing his own work parties.¹⁷⁷ But even if chiefs had had a hand in the organization of work parties we have no evidence that they were successful. The problem experienced by the Kimberley diamond fields in canvassing labourers would suggest that such parties were the exception rather than the rule. Levey ascribed the hesitancy of his district's people to go to Kimberley, to fear of the Sotho.¹⁷⁸ Other reasons ^{put} forwarded by magistrates, for people not accepting jobs, were the low wages paid by the mining companies and the inconvenience of travelling long *distances*.

While, then, in the 1870s and 1880s people were decidedly disinclined

to leave their districts, we see a dramatic change in the 1890s. There was now a mass exodus of men who left the Transkeian districts in search of employment. In 1899, from Engcobo alone, 7,675 men had left. Of these 4,111 went to various parts of the Cape Colony, 145 to Kimberley, 14 to the Orange Free State, 4,283 to Johannesburg.

Men were still inclined to sell their labour on their own conditions. In 1895 when the Penschaw Collieries in Indwe tried to recruit labour from St. Marks, they found an unwillingness to be bound to contracts for longer than six months. A request of the Transvaal Government for six hundred men to work in Vereeniging also met with little success.¹⁷⁹ But labour migrancy was influenced by the economic conditions at particular periods. The years 1888 and 1889 were relatively good years; in that period the number of men who left Engcobo dropped considerably. In 1892, which was a particularly bad year, almost 4,000 men left the district for the gold fields. Another 350 went to the diamond fields, 150 went to work on the railways in various parts of the Cape Colony and 2,000 were employed on neighbouring European farms.¹⁸⁰ Stanford had noticed in 1891 with concern that it was not the able-bodied men in his district who were in arrears with their taxes, but the old and decrepit. Another disturbing observation was that an amount of hut tax was owed by men who had left for the Cape Colony, apparently in an attempt to avoid the payment of tax. When such defaulters were traced, there was no way in which pressure could be brought upon them to take up employment on public or any other works. He therefore urged that section 49 of Proclamation 140 of 1885 should be used to exercise such pressure.¹⁸¹ Similarly, we find that in 1895, a particularly bad year, numbers once

again soared.

Magisterial reports from Emigrant Thembuland suggest that the people there were more amenable than their kinsmen in other districts to sell their labour. This could be ascribed to the presence of a larger number of affluent people who wished to improve their positions. It would therefore seem to imply that it was the wealthier rather than the extremely poor who went out to work. Significantly, in 1893 when there was no hope of inducing men from poverty stricken Mqanduli to take up employment, the more affluent St. Marks district sent a thousand labourers to all parts of the Transvaal. H. Bunn, the magistrate, was confident that under a practical labour scheme, the farmers in the Cape Colony could be well supplied with labourers from his district.¹⁸² This was confirmed by Levey who wrote that the people in the Xalanga district were well suited for taking up employment on the railways, and that a large number of men went to Johannesburg every year where better wages were earned. Farmers, who were then paying their shepherds wages of 7s to 10s a month could no longer attract labourers.¹⁸³

Labour migration tendencies for the year during 1897 would confirm that far more people left Emigrant Thembuland for employment than from any other districts with larger populations. This can be seen from the following table of statistics:

Statistics for 1897 to compare labour migrancy in Emigrant Thembuland with that in other districts:¹⁸⁴

Home District	Johannesburg	Kimberley	Cape Colony	OFS	Total
Umtata	1068	31	522	-	1360
Mquanduli	221	4	61	-	286
Engcobo	3905	11	1859	24	5799
St. Marks	1770	-	3243 (Inc. Kimberley)	16	5210
Xalanga	685	1	1087	-	1087

It should be kept in mind that Xalanga at this time had a population of less than half of that of Engcobo and that Mquanduli and Umtata were also far more densely populated than Emigrant Thembuland. While the larger number of labourers from Emigrant Thembuland can be partly ascribed to the fact that the more affluent people needed more money than their poorer kinsmen, it should be kept in mind that St. Marks and Kei Bridge were also the principal outlets for the labour supply for the Cape Colony. Emigrant Thembuland was also close to the Indwe coal mines, where after 1890 attempts were made to improve working conditions. Besides paying wages of 2s to 4s a day, fuel, water and accommodation were available. Underground workers earned £2.10 for 24 days, and were given as much mealie meal as they could eat and meat twice a week. There were also jobs available for women. Labour agent C.F. Innes and the magistrate of Cofimvaba agreed that it would be a good plan to engage petty chiefs at £5 per month to collect one hundred men for work in their mines. Between 1895 and 1898, when many people responded to the call of the gold mines, it was not uncommon for people from St. Marks to work on the Indwe collieries until they

earned enough to go to Johannesburg.¹⁸⁵ It was clear that the Thembu preferred to make their own arrangements rather than to work under government contracts.

In Glen Grey we find a similar exodus of labourers after 1890. A certain Ngqika, Pelem, who was appointed as labour agent in Glen Grey, told the Cape Labour Commission in 1894 that in less than two months, more than two hundred men were contracted to work on the mines for four months at a payment of £3 a month plus food.¹⁸⁶ Another witness, Qunqu, ascribed the greater willingness to go to the mines to the working conditions that compared very favourably with those offered by other employees. Since farmers usually paid in stock, a man returning from the Cape Colony first had to have his sheep dipped, thereby running the risk that they might get stolen. Not only was it difficult to apprehend thieves, but if the owner succeeded in a court case he had to sell some of his stock to obtain money for the case. On the other hand those who went to the mines returned with enough cash to invest in houses, wagons and stock.¹⁸⁷ Whether the Labour Tax that was introduced under the Glen Grey Act did in the final analysis make much difference in the number of people that left this district is questionable. It is true that there was in the years immediately after its introduction an increase in the number of men who left the district - in 1898 the number exceeded 7,000, but the increase could be accounted for by the general population increase. Magisterial reports from that region indicate that it was drought and rinderpest, rather than the Labour Tax that forced men out of the district. In fact, the weight of evidence before the Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905 pointed to the tax having become a dead

letter, and more of an irritation than a stimulant. Sweeney, the resident magistrate wrote in 1896 that of a total of 5,400 people liable for tax, 3,400 had already been given full exemption while another 600 were due for exemption the next year. There were therefore, according to him, only 1,100 liable for tax, but at the time of his writing only £100 had been collected. Men got out of paying the labour tax either by prevarication or they ignored the claims altogether.¹⁸⁸ It would therefore seem, that while taxation certainly did force some men out to look for employment, it was but one of the factors that led to the great exodus of the 1890s.

The detrimental effects of the exodus of thousands of able-bodied men were severely felt in the three districts under discussion - as was also the case in the rest of Thembuland. Women and children were left to cultivate the lands. Many children were not equal to these jobs, and in the process of ploughing they merely scratched the ground. This in turn led to weaker crops and hence greater poverty.¹⁸⁹

As the century drew to a close it was only too evident that Elliot's dream of opening up the new colony was not to materialize; on the contrary the signs of economic collapse in Thembuland were only too visible.

1. See C.W. de Kiewiet: A History of South Africa: Social and Economic; D. Hobart-Houghton: The South African Economy; C. Bundy: The Rise and Fall of a South African Peasantry; M.H. de Kock: Selected Subjects in Economic History; A. Purkis: The Politics, Capital and Labour of Railway Building in the Cape Colony 1870-85 (D.Phil Thesis, Oxford, 1978); P. Richardson and J.J. van Helten: The Goldmining Industry in Transvaal in P. Warwick (ed.): The South African War, pp. 18-36. Stanley Trapido: 'South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialization' in Collected Seminar Papers on Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Vol.2 (London Institute of Commonwealth Studies), pp.50-62.
2. R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds): The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa; S. Trapido: "Friends of the Natives", in S. Marks and A. Atmore: Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, pp.247-79.
3. See below, p.320.
4. See p.113.
5. CPP.G27-'74: Reports from Civil Commissioners of Dordecht and Queenstown, pp. 50-60. It must, however, be pointed out that statistics in the first years following the Emigration were particularly unreliable. There was little check on those people who had temporarily moved to the Colony or to Emigrant Thembuland.
6. CPP.: Select Committee on Native Questions, App.2, 16 September '69. Mr. Hall's evidence, p.3.
7. Ibid., p.6.
8. Ibid., p.10.
9. See pp.27-33.
10. C0.3075: Tambookie Agent's Report, 16 January '64.
11. Stanford Papers, B.263.15: Sketches from the East, by John Noble.
12. CPP.G27-'74 Report on the Division of Wodehouse, 30 March '74, p.59.
13. See pp.19-20.
14. Stanford Papers, D.10: E.J. Warner's Ms.
15. Ibid., See also Stanford Papers, B.32: Petition to E.M. Judge, signed by Matanzima, Mtirara, Gecelo, Tyopo and Sitokwe Ndlele, 4 September '75.
16. The Frontier Guardian, 20 October 1885, The Natives in the Tambookie Location.

17. CPP.G22-'74: Report of Civil Commissioner Wodehouse, 30 March '74. p.59.
18. CPP.G12-'77: J. Hemming's report, 10 January '77, p.37.
19. See pp.200-4.
20. Frontier Guardian, 14 October '84. The Thembu. See also 7 August '85. The Natives of Glen Grey.
21. Cape Hansard, 1894, p.387.
22. See Frontier Guardian, 30 October '85. The Tambookie Location.
23. CPP.G17-'78: J. Hemming's Report, Civil Commissioner, p.45.
24. See pp.159-62.
25. CPP.G33-'79: J. Hemming's Report for 1878, p.16.
26. See p.357.
27. CPP.A1-'93: Glen Grey Commission, Minutes of Evidence, p.21. The low masculinity rate would suggest labour migrancy.
28. Ibid., p.22.
29. Ibid.
30. Cape Commission of NA.: Warner's Evidence, p. 68. (This volume is unnumbered).
31. CPP.G39-'93: Cape Labour Commission's Report, Vol.viii, evidence of various farmers in Albert, Dordecht, Wodehouse districts. See also CPP.G3-'94: Levey's evidence, p.71, Q.24264-24272, on the question of Thembu unwillingness to work far away from home.
32. One such labourer from Queenstown had accumulated 1,100 sheep during the eleven years that he worked in that district. When the farmer could no longer accommodate so many stock on his farm, the labourer left for Carnarvon where he soon found himself in trouble. See CPP.G3-'94: J.J. Claassen's evidence, Q.14472-'84; 12 November '93.
33. Wages on farms varied from 1/- to 1/6 a day or 10/- and a ewe per month. Shearers could earn 5/- for every 100 sheep. See CPP.G37-'93; Q.26314; 23765-6; 23932-4 and numerous other references.
34. CPP.G2-'85: W.G. Hughes's report, enclos. A in 50 50, 10 January '85. Only 330 people could be recruited to fill the 600 vacancies.
35. CPP.G17-'78: Reports from Civil Commissioner for Queenstown and Wodehouse, 10 January '77.

36. See pp.363-4.
37. W.D. Hammond-Tooke (ed.): The Bantu-speaking Peoples of South Africa, pp.169-70.
38. See W. Beinart: The Political Economy of Pondoland, pp.37, 50 for advantages of sheep farming.
39. UG.37-'14: Report of the Native Grievance Commission, pp.78-9. Various witnesses maintained that, owing to competition of recruiters sums of £20-£30, or even up to £60, were advanced to a single "boy" (par.585). Other witnesses said that formerly (i.e. before 1914) a man often received the whole payment for his contract in the shape of cattle. Even when this was not done his first object, in coming to the mines, was to earn money to buy cattle on his return.
40. This theory has been expounded by a Mr. Cooke, who gave evidence before the Native Grievance Commission. The information has not been published, but is referred to by E. Wiggins in: The Glen Grey Act and its Effects upon the Native System of Land Tenure in the Cape Colony and Transkeian Territories (M.A. Thesis, U.C.T., 1929), p.18. Wiggins got the information from J. Goodfellow in whose possession Cooke's writings were in 1929. (Cooke is not identified in the above report.)
41. A.J. Kerr: The Customary Law of Immovable Property and of Succession, pp.124-36.
42. PMO.132: Van Zyl Commission-USNA., 15 November '95. See correspondence included in cover letter.
43. Individual tenure was undoubtedly seen by many people as a means of securing their lands, and missionaries such as E. Warner encouraged people to take title for that very reason. On the other hand Marian Lacey sees the fact that eventually tenure was granted under the Glen Grey Act in terms that did not fulfil proprietary conditions for the vote, as an attempt by Rhodes to curb the growth of an assimilated African élite - in keeping with mining capital's need for an unskilled and exploitable workforce. The restriction of the vote, she also argues, would have found favour with the Transvaal and O.F.S. at a time when the issue of a federation - or union - of S.A. states and colonies were in the air. By an alignment of the Cape tradition with the conservatism of the north, the migrant labour system would then be perpetuated with the support of those in the north who were potentially opposed to the policies of Rhodes. See M. Lacey: Working for Boroko, p.56.
44. CPP.A1-'93: Jenner's report, 14 May '92; CPP.G3-'94: Jenner's evidence, p.94.
45. Ibid.
46. CPP.G3-'94: Levey's evidence, p.94.

47. Cape Hansard, 1893, p.372.
48. Cape Hansard, 1894, pp.362-3.
49. For a full text of the Act see Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, No.637, 31 August 1894, pp.1681-93.
50. CPP.G3-'94: Evidence of CMT. Transkei, p.14; CPP.G9-'94: Evidence of R.M. of Nqane. See also R.T. Ally: The Development of the System of Individual Tenure for Africans with Special Reference to the Glen Grey Act, 1894 (M.A. Thesis, R.U., 1985).
51. CPP.A1-'93: David Malasi told the Glen Grey Commission: "Most of the Thembu want a tribal tenure, that is the great question...". Mahonga, who claimed to speak on behalf of the majority of the Glen Grey people, and Kalipa who also supported individual title very strongly, came from amongst the "school people". Tim Keegan in African Responses to the Implementation of the Glen Grey Policy (B.A.(Hons), U.C.T., 1979), p.9 is of the opinion that "the introduction of individual tenure...was universally welcomed by the educated class." See also J. Rose-Innes: Biography, p.26 and R. Ally: System of Individual Tenure, pp.118-121 on the question of the more prosperous and educated people wanting individual tenure.
52. CPP.A3-'92, p.5; CPP.A1-'93, pp.25-36.
53. Cape Hansard, 1894, p.385.
54. J. Rose-Innes: Autobiography, p.105.
55. J.H Hofmeyr and F.W. Reitz: The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan), p.469.
56. The Act also drew upon ideas contained in the report of the Cape Commission on Native Laws and Customs, and it was greatly influenced by the views of Bondsmen. See R. Edgcombe: 'The Glen Grey Act: Local Origins of an Abortive Bill for Africa', in J.A. Benyon (ed): Studies in Local History, p.89; Davenport: The Afrikaner Bond, p.152-5.
57. Cape Hansard, 1894, p.469.
58. CPP.G39-'93: See for instance: J. van Aarde, Malmesbury, p.219,; F. Botha, Worcester, p.480; and numerous references, pp.136-330.
59. CPP.G3-'94: Abraham Qunqu's evidence, p.63. He explained that the man who was paid in stock had to pay for their dipping and then ran the risk of having his sheep stolen. He added: "the native can return with the money in his pocket and purchase wagons or build huts and fence his kraal. His money so invested cannot be stolen for what thief can 'jump' a kraal?"
60. CPP.G33-'98: Elliot's evidence before the Select Committee on Glen Grey, par.245-248.

61. Ibid.: Select Committee's Report, par.85. For further responses to Glen Grey Act see T. Keegan: African Responses to implementation of Glen Grey Act, p.47.
62. CPP.33-'98: Select Committee on Glen Grey Act, par.185.
63. CPP.G47-'96: Report on Working of Glen Grey Act, Sweeney-Sect. of P.M., 31 March '96.
64. NA.613: R.M. Glen Grey-PMO., 10 May 1903. See also R. Ally: Development of System of Individual Tenure, chapter 4.
65. After 1878 Emigrant Thembuland was divided into two districts. In the following years boundaries of these districts were frequently redrawn, districts were renamed and a new district was created. These developments are explained in appendix 4 so as to avoid confusion that might arise from the footnotes.
66. CPP.8-'81: H. Elliot-USNA., 5 February '80.
67. Various definitions for the term "peasant" have been put forward by modern historians, economists and social scientists. In this discussion it is used in the sense as defined by Colin Bundy, i.e. "a rural cultivator, enjoying access to a portion of land, the fruits of which he could dispose of as he owned the land; he used his own labour and that of his family in agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and sought through this to satisfy directly the consumption needs of his family; in addition he looked to the sale of a portion of what he raised to meet the demands (taxes, rents, and other fees) that rose from his involvement in an economic political system beyond the bounds of his immediate economy." See C. Bundy: The Rise and Fall of a South African Peasantry, p.9.
68. This was especially due to the influence of the Moravian missionaries on the western Thembu. See p.30.
69. CPP.G35-'73. Acting Tambookie Agent's Report, 25 February '73, p.6.
70. USPG.E.34: Henry Waters's report for 1879.
71. SPG: St. Marks Mission Report for Quarter ending 31 September 1880, referred to by C. Bundy in Fall of Peasantry, p.58.
72. USPG.E.34: Report of the Rev. Henry Waters, September '79.
73. Ibid. and various other references.
74. CPP.G66-'83: Schedule of Traders' claims in Southeyville and Xalanga district, appendix B.
75. CPP.C20-'81: Report of Rev. Henry Waters,
76. CPP.G35-'73: Acting Tambookie Agent's Report, 25 February '73;

- NA.152: W. Fynn-SNA., 6 May '74; CPP.G.21-'75: Tambookie Agent's Report, 23 February '75.
77. CPP.G17-'77: Tambookie Agent's Report, 3 January '77.
 78. CMT.1/45: R.M. Xalanga-CMT., 12 June '79.
 79. CPP.G17-'77: Report of R.M. Cofimvaba, 3 January '77.
 80. See appendix 4.
 81. For his views on education see his report in CPP.G7-'94: December '93; CPP.G31-'93: 16 January '89.
 82. CAA.A1/1/2: Levey's monthly report, 1 April '80.
 83. CPP.G7-'92: Levey's report, 31 December '91.
 84. CPP.G-'42: '98: Levey's report, 31 December '97.
 85. See pp.177-8.
 86. CPP.G66-'83: Warner's evidence, Q.50-60.
 87. CPP.G66-'83: Report of Thembuland Land Settlement Committee, p.5, par.xvi. (my emphasis). A great deal of these recommendations made their way into the Glen Grey Act too.
 88. Ibid., par.xviii. (my emphasis).
 89. Ibid., p.8, par.xxxi. (my emphasis). It should be noted how standard the threat of forfeiture for rebellion was.
 90. USPG.D.65: Bishop Key's Report for year ending 31 December '84; T. Beattie: A Ride through the Transkei, pp.6-10; South African Native Affairs Commission (Lagden Commission) Vol.2: E. Gibbert's evidence, p.929.
 91. Christian Express, 1 June '79. Missionary News-Native Agricultural Society.
 92. NA.49: Elliot-USNA., 18 June '79; CPP.G8-'83: Accounts of irrigation in Cofimvaba; CPP.G66-'83, p.127-129; CPP.G4-'83: pp.373-81; Bundy: South African Peasantry, pp.86-8; T. Beattie: A Ride through the Transkei, p.6.
 93. CPP.G12-'80: Cumming's report, 1 January '80.
 94. See for instance COF.2/2/1/1/1/3: Court case 28 (1879). In this case a wagon was hired out for 6 months at £15 a month. Looking only at court cases for 1882 we find that there were regularly, at each session of the court, four or five cases which involved transport riding. The amounts involved correspond with those mentioned in the above case. Oxen were frequently hired out at 10/- a week.

95. USPG.E34: The Rev. Henry Waters's report, September 1879.
96. CAA.2/2/1/1: Levey's monthly report, 1 April '80, the Government supplied 100 bags of wheat seed to St. Marks district to stimulate the cultivation of wheat. Magistrates time and again urged the Government to make seed available so that superior grain could be cultivated. See NA. also 65: R.M. Xalanga-SNA., 19 January '80.
97. CPP.A26-'82: CMT.-USNA., 28 February '81, annex 1 in no 2. In the same letter Elliot expressed concern over the burning down of huts during the war of '81, which resulted in loss of taxes for the Government. Tax and trading licenses, he said, were the two main sources of income for the Colony.
98. CPP.A31-'83: Cape of Good Hope Select Committee on Thembuland, John Hemming's evidence, p.191.
99. On its completion 12 years later this road also provided the shortest wagon road from East London to Johannesburg. See also Beattie, Ride through the Transkei, p.6; COF.2/2/1/1/1/3 Matanzima's letter, included in cover letter, Stanford-CMT., 20 August '86.
100. Territorial News, 31 August 1907. Editorial.
101. Ibid., 14 September 1907; Cape Hansard, 1907, p.503.
102. CMT.1/41: Sweeney-CMT., 14 October '85.
103. CMT.1/1: USNA.-CMT., 6 January '87.
104. NA.66: Examination of Audit Books at Engcobo, Cala and St. Marks. 23 June '88.
105. Ibid.
106. CMT.1/41: Sweeney-CMT., 14 October '82.
107. See p.101.
108. NA.59: Copy of report, A. Henry, 19 January '80. See also CPP.G66-'83, Mission claims to lands in Xalanga and Southeyville districts, Appendix A, pp.A4-A6.
109. CPP.G66-'83: Claim of Traders and other Europeans to land in Xalanga and Southeyville districts, Appendix B, pp.B2-B11. (Moore's claim, no.5). There were a total of 33 claimants.
110. CPP.A-'31: Report of Select Committee on Thembuland: Evidence by J. van Gass, pp.4-6.
111. NA.73: Returns submitted by Resident Magistrates, 11 October, '81.

112. CMT.3/66: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 24 February '94.
113. CPP.G7-'92: R. Harris's report, 31 October '91.
114. Queenstown Respresentative, 4 May '94. Matanzima's Grievances.
115. See COF.2/2/1/1/1/1-3 for numerous court cases in this respect. See also CAA.1/1/1, case 190, 27 August '83. Mosheshwe from Dalasile hired a wagon from Myambani from Matanzima. Myabani now claimed £85 for the hire of the wagon and £10 damages.
116. Ibid.
117. CPP.G42-'98: Levey's report. For a discussion of the role of traders, see below, pp.101-2.
118. See pp.354-364.
119. See pp.147, 152.
120. See map 3. The final boundaries were only laid down in 1883. When Stanford was appointed as Agent with Dalasile in 1876, there were no southern boundaries - his authority stretched as far as the different clans under him occupied territory.
121. The first proper census was only held in 1891; the numbers up to then being mere estimates which may well have been too low.
122. Macquarrie: Stanford Reminiscences, p.52.
123. W.J. Clarke: Native Reminiscences, S.A. Pamphlets, Vol.23.
124. Stanford Reminiscences, pp.59-60.
125. ECO.5/1/3/1: Walter Stanford-CMT., 29 August '81, Mendele's statement. The lands across the Umgwali had traditionally been disputed by the two chiefs. After the war of 1881 Stanford attempted to solve the problem by settling the land with Mgodhlwa's followers.
126. It is generally accepted that the wattle tree was introduced into South Africa from Australia in 1864 (although there were already some in the Cape Botanical Gardens in 1858). It was extended from the Cederberg to the Transkei. The word wattle, in this context can therefore not refer to the wattle tree. The Oxford English Dictionary explains the word wattle as meaning to interlace (boughs, twigs, etc.) so as to form wattle work (p.1486). The Chambers History describes wattle as a twig or flexible rod. It is certainly in this sense that the references to wattle trees in magisterial reports must be understood. Large indigenous forests would not contain wattle trees. (See S.P. Sherry: One Black Wattle; C.H. Stirton (ed) Plant Invaders.)
127. ECO.5/1/1/3: W. Stanford-CMT., 19 July '83; ECO.5/1/1/1: A.H. Stanford-CMT., 23 October '93.

128. ECO.5/1/1/3: W. Stanford-CMT., 19 September '83. Oxen were presumably supplied by the employer.
129. W. Beinart: Political Economy of Pondoland, p.14.
130. See IECO.5/1/1/1: Papers despatched by R.M. of Engcobo for 1881 (June-December '81). Between 18 and 20 July, the families that returned consisted of 55 men and 66 women; between 1-27 August there were 69 men and 85 women relocated; in September the numbers were 92 men and 116 women; on 11 December, 22 men and 29 women returned.
131. W. Beinart: Political Economy of Pondoland, pp.14-15.
132. IECO.5/1/1/1: Stanford-CMT., 15 January '82.
133. The first trader was W. Clarke. See "Native Reminiscences" in South African Pamphlets, Vol.23.
134. See pp.349-50.
135. CPP.G13-'80: Census Returns for Territory of Thembuland, September '79, p.116.
136. Ibid. See also CMT.1/30. Statistical Return for District of Engcobo, 18 December '84. There were then 60,000 sheep.
137. This despite the great drought of that year. See p.357.
138. ECO.5/1/1/3: Stanford-CMT., 21 June '83.
139. CPP.G6-'88: R.M. of Engcobo, annual report, p.49.
140. CPP.G5-'96: R.M. of Engcobo, annual report, p.108.
141. See p.194.
142. ECO.2/1/1/1/4: Various court cases, for example case 90 of 6 May 1890, case 42 of 6 February 1890; ECO.2/1/1/5, case 112 of 6 October 1890.
143. ECO.2/1/1/1: Various court cases, for example case of Lupendo as Bishop, 7 March '82; Juku vs. Class, 6 April '82; Pika vs. Peter, 6 July '82.
144. Territorial News: 30 July '93. Soil Preservation and Overstocking, 30 July '93.
145. ECO.5/1/1/3: WES.-Bona Fin., Conservation of Forests, 8 December '93.
146. ECO.5/1/1/5: WES.-CMT., 31 January '85.
147. ECO.6/1/1/10: R.M. Annual report, January '95.

148. See ECO.1/1/1/2-1/1/1/3: R.M.-Civil Cases Record Book. In 1885 during one session of the court, 44 cases of trespassing forest laws had been tried.
149. ECO.5/1/1/9: A.H. Stanford-CMT., 26 November '88.
150. See map 3. The most prominent names were Gubb, Baker, Lawlor, Ewers, Clarke, Duffy and Murray.
151. ECO.1/1/1/5: Debt case 135, 16 July 1889.
152. This emerges from the many court cases recorded in ECO.1/1/1/2-1/1/1/4. Farmers were frequently found guilty of failing to pay wages.
153. See for instance IECO.1/1/5: Case 201. Tulu was hired by Umququcuba at 4 sheep for 6 months during the hoeing season; ECO.2/1/1/1: Case 76: Lupindo employed Bishop to saw timber. As wages he got 2 pieces of timber for every ten he sawed, 7 March '82; Kami employed Ishu as a daily servant in the forest at 1/- per day, Sundays included, case 58, 26 February '83.
154. See numerous court cases in R.M. Civil Cases Record Book, IECO.1/1/1/2-1/1/1/4.
155. IECO.5/1/1/1: W. Stanford-CMT., 18 June '82, p.191.
156. See above, p.338.
157. As late as 1899 C.J. Warner pointed out that there was no provision under the law for dealing with men who evaded payment of hut tax. See CPP.G31-'99, Warner's Report, 20 January '99.
158. ECO.1/1/1/5: Stanford's annual report, 28 December 1887.
159. Territorial News, 25 November 1905. William Parson's letter to the editor.
160. South African Native Affairs Commission (Langden Commission) Vol.2: Parkes's evidence, 2 December 1903. Parkes had then been a trader in Glen Grey for 11 years.
161. NA.55: R.M. Engcobo-CMT., 6 January '80. See also correspondence from various magistrates 28 October '79; 10 January '80; 31 December '79.
162. S.A. Native Affairs Commission 1903-1905, Parkes Evidence. Parkes, a trader himself in Glen Grey, had £3000 on his books, but he knew of traders who had up to £8000. A case was known of a man who owed £1,500. In the same period, i.e. 1890-1895, debts in Xalanga district soared to £15,00.
163. CPP.G42-'98: Levey's report, 31 December '97.
164. NA.5144 (No.344) Correspondence included in cover letter R.M.

- Engcobo-CMT., November 1905 (Date missing).
165. Ibid., CPP.G42-'98. Levey's report, 31 December '97.
 166. Up to at least 1920 it remained difficult for the farmer to exchange his products for money badly-needed. He either had to exchange it for traders ware or he was paid with the traders own "money". An example was the so-called "Good For" medals which were specially struck in Britain for traders in Cala. These medals had currency only between the trader and the farmer thus ensuring that the farmer would obtain his goods from that particular trader. This was pointed out to me by Mr Jimmy Baxter, of Garry Owen in the Cala district. The Baxter family opened a trading station in Cala in the 1880s. He has one of these GoodFors in his possession. (Private interview, 14 April 1987).
 167. IECO.5/1/1/3: Stanford-CMT., 23 January '86.
 168. See NA.106: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 26 October '85. 4 August '85; CPP.G-'94, Stanford's report, January 1893; CPP.G50-1900: reports of R.M. St. Marks, Xalanga; Engcobo, January 1900; CPP.G4'93: R.M. Engcobo refering to locusts, bad roads, leprosy and cattle diseases, January '93.
 169. When the Scab Act was introduced, people had to erect their own dipping tanks. CMT.3/65: R.M. St. Marks-CMT., 6 January '93.
 170. CPP.G42-'98: Levey's Report, 31 December '97; W. Bertram's Report, 1 January '98.
 171. For effect of rinderpest see C. van Onselen: "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-1897, Journal of African History, xiii, 3, 1972. See also CPP.G42-'98: Reports from R.M. of Xalanga, St. Marks, Engcobo, January '97, pp.98-102.
 172. Although it never became epidemic, it would seem that small pox plagued the districts from time to time.
 173. 1CAA Add 1/1/1, Tambookie Agent's Letter Book, E. Warner-CC for King William's Town, 7 January '71.
 174. CMT.1/43: C. Levey-CMT., 3 August '81.
 175. NA.66: R.M. of Engcobo, St. Marks, Cala-CMT., 23 June '88.
 176. This happened in Basutoland where the ruling Koena lineage played a central role in organizing and controlling the pattern of labour migration. See J. Kimble: Labour Migration in Basutoland in R. Rathbone (ed.): Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa, pp.119-125.
 177. CPP.G12-'77: Levey's report, 3 January '77, pp.100-103.
 178. CMT.1/43: Levey-CMT., 3 August '81. He did not explain the

reasons for such fears.

179. COF.5/1/6/1: A. Soga, Assistant Labour Agent-CMT. St. Marks, 10 August '95.
180. CPP.G4-'93: Report of R.M. Engcobo, January '93, p.69.
181. Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, 1 September '85. This article read: "In the event of failure or refusal on the part of any person liable to house or hut tax to pay the same, the amount due may be removed under and judgement of the Court of the Magistrate of the district by sale of so much of the property of such persons as may be sufficed to cover the amount due, with any expenses that may have been incurred of the recovery of the same, and it should be lawful the magistrate of the district, if he should think it fit to do so, and if he cannot obtain payment of the tax, to eject the person in default from the occupation of land." (my emphasis) Such men would therefore be forced to look for employment.
182. CMT.165/93: H. Bunn-CMT., 2 May '93.
183. CMT.646/93: Levey-CMT., 1 May '93.
184. See CPP.G42-'98: Annual reports of magistrates from districts mentioned in the table, pp.94-105.
185. COF.5/1/6/1: C.F. Innes, Agent Native Labour Depot, Bowkers Park-R.M. Cofimvaba, 10 August '95; Ibid., Tainton, Labour Agent-R.M. St. Marks.
186. CPP.G3-'94: Labour Commission Report; James Pellem's evidence, p.17.
187. See footnote 57.
188. CPP.G47-'96: Sweeney's report on working of the Glen Grey Act, 21 January '96.
189. CPP.G5-'96: C.J. Warner's report, 2 February '96.

CONCLUSION

The complex relationship which existed between the Cape Colony and the Thembu developed in the 1820s when both parties were driven by common insecurity into forming unofficial alliances. Throughout the period under discussion they remained uneasy bedfellows.

The Thembu paramounts, from Ngubengcuka to Ngangelizwe, embroiled as they were in perennial warfare with their Xhosa, Pondo and Pondomise neighbours, sought security in a pragmatic policy of cooperation with the militarily superior Cape Colony. In the Frontier War of 1836 the regent, Fadana, proved his goodwill towards the Colonial Government by giving refuge to missionaries, thereby incurring the wrath of the Xhosa. Mtirara's attack on the dissident Tshatshu chief, Maphasa, during the war of the Axe, eliminated a potential threat to the Colonial forces in the north-eastern frontier zone. The War of Mlanjeni which lasted from 1850-1853 was the longest and most costly war up to that time. It was prolonged and the area of conflict greatly extended by the participation of Maphasa's Tshatshu on the side of the warring African tribes.¹ Nonesi's collaboration with the Cape Colony, and her removal of a large section of her people across the Mbashe to prevent their joining the anti-Colonial forces, had greatly eased the pressure on the Colonial armies, and also facilitated Governor Cathcart's task in 1852 of bringing hostilities to an end. Further it made possible the systematic opening up of the north-eastern frontier zone for white Settlement.² It was with the help of so-called loyal Thembu that the Sitokwe and Mfanta campaign was undertaken during the war of Ngcayecibi.³ Above all, it was

Thembu attitudes during the Transkeian Rebellion of 1881 that determined the course of this war. Ndarala and Matanzima, by their support, contributed towards a quick Colonial victory over the insurgents in Emigrant Thembuland, thereby leaving the Cape forces free to focus their attention elsewhere,⁴ and in Emigrant Thembuland Ngangelizwe turned out in person commanding a strong army to assist Major Elliot. This he did despite the fact that almost half of his people had joined the anti-Colonial forces. The outcome of the war would have been uncertain had it not been for Thembu involvement on the side of the Cape Colony. However, considering the ability of the Cape forces to put down all resistance without having to call on British help, it cannot be said beyond all doubt that Thembu alignments with the Cape had prevented the warring African factions from gaining a victory at a most crucial time in their history. However, if we take into account the numerical strength of the Thembu at the time⁵ it seems reasonable to assume that their full-scale participation on the side of the Africans could have resulted in a prolonged and more costly war which would further have delayed, or even wiped out, Colonial and Imperial annexation of the Transkeian territories.

The Cape Colony had to rely heavily on African collaborators, but as the Mfengu experience had proved, the white government never completely trusted its black allies.⁶ The Cape officials saw in the increasing Thembu population a threat to the security of the Colony; they often suspected the Thembu of playing an ambiguous role in harbouring cattle raided by the warring nations, while they themselves professed to be on the Colonial side; they lived in constant fear of

the Thembu switching their allegiance should that seem to be in the latter's own interest; and they were apprehensive of a black alliance against the Cape in which the Thembu might play a dominant part. White farmers saw the Thembu as competitors for land, and as a political threat once considerable numbers began to qualify for the vote. European suspicions of their Thembu allies were not always unjustified. Frequent rumours regarding the meetings between Thembu chiefs and those of nations hostile to the Cape,⁷ would have suggested that the Thembu had never completely cast aside the cultural ties that linked them to other black nations. Officials had reason to ask whether a people torn between two loyalties could ever be trustworthy allies.

In the final analysis, then, the Thembu did not derive much benefit from their allegiance to the Colonial Government, whose policy was aimed at undermining their military potential. In 1848 Mtirara saw his lands annexed and he himself subjected by Sir Harry Smith to the same humiliating treatment that the Governor had meted out to other chiefs. If Nonesi's cooperation in the War of Mlanjeni was rewarded with the acknowledgement of her paramountcy over the Tambookie Location, it was a position she held only as long as it suited the Government, and her long history as "Nonesi the faithful" finally ended in banishment in Mpondoland. The Emigrant chiefs who cooperated with the Government in 1865 in the hope that their independence in their new country would be secured to them, soon witnessed the extension of Colonial control over their lands. When in 1879 legislation was passed to disarm all Cape Africans, they were included in the order. With the annexation of Thembuland in 1885 the Thembu

finally lost their independence, and under the new dispensation collaborators with the Colony found themselves in the same position as those Africans who had for almost a century resisted Cape intrusion on their tribal lands and culture. The ambiguity of the Cape Government towards its Thembu allies is reflected in its dealings with the paramount, Oliver Dalindyabo, at the end of the century. In 1900 this chief, in his capacity as Chief of Native Intelligence, commanded a force of five hundred men against the invading armies of the two Afrikaner republics. He was rewarded for his services with a visit to Cape Town after which the magistrate for Umtata expressed the hope that the strength of the forces along the railway line had given the chief some conception of the strength of the British in the Colony.⁸

The fact that the Thembu were able to keep their lands intact throughout the turbulent nineteenth century was the only rewarding aspect of their long history of cooperation with the Colony. Unlike the Xhosa, who had lost most of their land, the Thembu could pride themselves in never having been driven from their territory. Referring to Ngangelizwe's cooperation with the Colony in the war of 1881, Sihele remarked with great pride that Ngangelizwe was in a position to invite rebellious chiefs like Mnqanqeni and Bambendino to return to Thembuland where they were resettled on their former lands. "All in all," Sihele wrote, "Ngangelizwe became the beacon of hope to the sub-nations just as his fore-fathers had done before. He also managed to save the territory of the abaThembu from being captured by enemies, especially whites."⁹

Each of the African nations in Southern Africa responded in its own

way to nineteenth century Imperial and Cape Colonial policies. The Xhosa chose the path of military resistance. Jeff Peires has argued that it is an exaggeration to ascribe their eventual defeat in the century of long drawn-out frontier wars to their internal divisions. As he sees it, a decentralised political leadership resulted in a decentralised army which might well have served the Xhosa better than the large, but conservative army of the Zulu monarchy. The Xhosa, he maintains, had, through their long exposure to European methods of making war, learned how to face fire-arms and how to use them to their best advantage. They adopted tactics which neutralised the massive technological superiority of their opponents. If, therefore, the Xhosa had achieved no great victories, during their "heroic age", comparable to the Zulu's Ishlandwana, they at least learned something about frontier warfare that the Zulu never understood.¹⁰ For the Thembu there were no great battles; there was no heroic age in the sense that Peires describes Xhosa resistance to white intrusion. It is true that large numbers of Thembu were caught up in the African resistance movement of the time, and joined forces with other nations. Even so leaders like Maphasa, Mfanta and Gungubele have never been afforded the place in history given to Sarhili, Sandile, Hintza and Shaka, and they could never succeed in mustering enough support for any significant resistance. For most of the Thembu independence was subordinate to security, especially the security they found in the possession of their lands. This will certainly provide one answer to the question as to why the Thembu, next to the Mfengu, became the greatest military collaborators with the whites. A search for further explanations will lead us to the second political theme that emerges from a study of Thembu history: the divisive nature of the Thembu

monarchy, and the failure of successive leaders to achieve unity.

It would seem that the conglomeration of clans loosely connected by common loyalty to the Thembu monarch¹¹ had been offered three opportunities of welding themselves into one strong nation. In each case failure to do so had left the nation more divided and more vulnerable than before.

The first opportunity arose when Ngubengcuka became king after a succession of weak rulers. According to tradition he had all the personal qualities needed in a great nationbuilder.¹² His misfortune was that his assumption of power coincided with the period of devastating Mfecane wars¹³ which sent waves of emigrants into the Cape's north-eastern frontier zone. Thus, the Thembu kingdom was materially and politically weakened before Ngubengcuka had time to consolidate his earlier victories over the Qwati and other neighbouring clans,¹⁴ and sectionalism was already firmly established at the time of his death. Not only were the eastern and western Thembu separated by the diversification of their cultural and economic interests, but the emigration had also precipitated a major break between the royal Hala clan with their tribal centre at the Mbashe and the non-Hala clans which made up the bulk of the emigrants. A strong king might have been able to pick up the threads, but after Ngubengcuka's death the government devolved for the next fifteen years upon a regent. Under these circumstances Mtirara had little chance of bringing the scattered clans together when he moved to the White Kei river in 1839.¹⁵ By that time the ambitious Tshatshu leader, Maphasa, had already assumed a position of semi-independence and he overtly

challenged the Hala paramountcy. A complicating factor at this stage was the expansionist policy of the Cape Government, the effect of which was to polarise the Thembu into collaborators (mainly Hala) and non-collaborators (mainly non-Hala) with the Cape Colony.

In the 1860s the Thembu had their last opportunity to unite. On becoming king in 1863 Ngangelizwe had ambitions of bringing about a kingdom that would stretch from the Mbashe to present day Queenstown. Had he succeeded this would have been the largest African kingdom in southern Africa. The Emigration of 1865 offered him the opportunity of fulfilling this dream, but the movement failed. The split that now occurred cut right through the Hala clan and had repercussions that made themselves felt in 20th century Thembu and South African history. The Hala chief, Matanzima, like the three other emigrant chiefs, insisted on their independence from the Hala paramount being recognized, and, in time, Matanzima gained recognition as Chief of Emigrant Thembuland.¹⁶ Sihele went to great lengths to emphasise the emergence of Emigrant Thembuland as a separate political entity. With reference to disputes between Ngangelizwe and Matanzima in consequence of which E.J. Warner laid down boundaries separating the chiefs, he wrote: "The idea that the great house of Mtirara could wield authority over the territory that belonged to the Right Hand House was defeated during Ngangelizwe's time, a time when tradition was still respected."¹⁷ In a further reference to the chiefs who in 1849 refused to follow Joyi back to the Mbashe,¹⁸ he added: "The reader should also note that in all those lineages, Matanzima is the most senior, besides the fact that the Right Hand House normally is a branch that is independent and different from the Great Place...All in

all readers should take note of the claims made by some people, that the house of Ngangelizwe has authority at Rhoda, this is because these people lack the details to the whole matter. When Ngangelizwe died he knew the real situation..."¹⁹ The emergence of Emigrant Thembuland set a precedent for the subsequent appointment, almost a century later, of Matanzima's great grandson, Kaiser Matanzima as paramount chief of Emigrant Thembuland.

Historians are inclined to dismiss Ngangelizwe as a weakling, incapable of the leadership qualities that could have prevented the fragmentation of the Thembu kingdom following the Emigration of 1865. It has been argued in this thesis that the young and inexperienced king assumed power when official minds were obsessed with the fear of a black alliance against the Cape Colony, and they saw the extension of British control over the Kei as the only safeguard against such dangers. A strong, united Thembuland did not fit in with Cape expansionist ideals, and the king was impotent in the face of increasing interference in his domestic and external affairs by the militarily superior Cape Colony. It is doubtful whether a man even of Ngubengcuka's stamp or any other 19th century African leader, would have fared better at that particular point in time.

The failure to bring about unity had weakened the position of the Hala clan to a point where its paramountcy was questioned by other clans, notably the Qwati. It has been pointed out that it was mainly the Hala chiefs who had refrained from joining the frontier wars. They possibly saw in an alliance with the Cape Colony the possibility of strengthening the Hala clan at the cost of rival clans. In Emigrant

Thembuland Matanzima's cooperation with the Colony at a time when the non-Hala clans joined the Transkeian war certainly resulted in his emergence as the strongest leader in that area.

One other factor that could have contributed to the ambiguous attitude of the Thembu during the frontier wars can be mentioned here. This was the strong sense of exclusiveness and ethnicity that existed among them.²⁰ A call for black unity in which Thembu interests might have been subservient to the cause of a greater African nationalism would have had little appeal for Thembu chiefs who cherished their own lands and ethnic patterns.

The effects of Cape-Thembu relationships could also be felt in the economic field. As allies of the Cape the Thembu were receptive to western influences, and when the mining era began, there had already emerged, in Emigrant Thembuland and Glen Grey, prosperous peasant communities,²¹ competing favourably with their white neighbours. Enterprising farmers made full use of the opportunities offered by the Cape's expanding economy after 1870, while some benefitted considerably from their cooperation with their white administrators.²² The collaborators with the Colony in the wars of 1879 and 1881 came mainly from the ranks of these affluent farmers, and the rewards for services thus rendered enabled them to further improve their positions.²³ However, the prosperity experienced by Thembu farmers in the 1870s and early 1880s were short-lived. Towards the end of the century magisterial reports increasingly reflected a gloomy picture of increasing impoverishment, and indebtedness to traders.

It has been argued that there is a tendency among modern historians to lay too much stress on the role of Cape intervention, in an attempt to secure a regular labour supply for white farmers and mine-owners, as a factor in the decline of the nineteenth century black peasantry.²⁴ The reasons for such a decline were far more varied and complex. Burdensome taxations certainly rested heavily upon many homesteads, but in view of the many loopholes in the system,²⁵ the importance of hut and labour taxes in the process of proletarianization should not be over-emphasised. There were other causes of impoverishment such as lack of capital and agricultural training, both of which were essential to enable farmers to overcome the effects of droughts, plagues and animal diseases of which the devastating Rinderpest epidemic of 1898 was the most serious. Many farmers did not have the money to buy superior stock, nor to erect dipping tanks nor to acquire the necessary implements. As for the question of education, magistrates time and again pointed out that farmers did not know how to repair a plough or how to prune a tree. Also, there were farmers who could for some time rely upon other sources of income, but enterprises which in the beginning seemed to be successful, were in fact beset with problems. The difficulty that experienced by transport riders in recovering fees due to them; the high cost of wagon repairs; the scarcity of draught animals; the competition from white entrepreneurs; all of these made transport riding a far less lucrative business than it might have seemed superficially.²⁶ Forestry, which in the 1870s was an important source of income to many homesteads, became less and less viable as foresters were prevented by numerous forest regulations from chopping wood, and they moreover became vulnerable to the fines imposed on them in cases of

trespassing such regulations.²⁷ Furthermore, the dearth of land, intensely experienced in Glen Grey, Emigrant Thembuland, parts of Thembuland Proper, following the Government's policies after 1880 of alienating tribal lands and of resettling large numbers of people, resulted in over-crowding and soil erosion. Already at a disadvantage in competing with their white neighbours, the Thembu further became the victims of discriminating laws towards the end of the century, as the influential Afrikaner Bond threw its weight behind the poorer white farmers who felt threatened by the emergence of an affluent black peasantry.²⁸ The Government, more over, became sensitive to the cause of white farmers as the 1800s saw an increasing awareness of the poor white problem.²⁹ By the end of the century white farmers were in a position to secure subsidies, grants, better communication and special credit facilities - all of which were almost unattainable by their black neighbours.

Having pin-pointed reasons other than Cape Governmental efforts to extract labour from the Transkeian territories, for the economic decline of the thembu peasantry, does not mean that the effects of such efforts - notably heavy taxation - has been underestimated. It is argued here that it was the combined effect of Government policies, natural disasters and indebtedness to traders that drove men in increasing numbers to white farms and to the cities in search of employment.


Notwithstanding these negative effects of their contact with the Colony, they did derive one other benefit, apart from retention of their lands, from their cooperation with the Government. This was

that, never having been driven off their lands and dispersed, as was the case with the Xhosa, it was possible for education to make more rapid headway in the Thembu territories. Although education never reached the masses, there emerged a literate, educated class that was not without political influence. Furthermore, the Christian church had a particularly close and strong relationship with the Thembu, and it was from the pulpit that the cause of education was further fostered. It was also, as Donovan Williams has pointed out, from the Christian pulpit that, very often and very effectively, a vehicle was provided for the African to express his growing consciousness of belonging to the supra-tribal community, and that the cause of African nationalism was fostered.³⁰ It would seem, then, more than just coincidence that Thembu involvement with the activities of the African National Congress has since the inception of this organization up to the present day, been particularly strong³⁰ Oliver Dalindyebo, who became paramount in 1885 was a product of the mission schools. At its foundation in 1912 he was made honorary president of the African National Congress, and he appeared at the Universal Races Congress in London in 1912. On the other hand the Thembu is equally strongly represented in conservative Transkeian politics. While at present the ruling Transkeian National Independence Party consists mainly of Thembu, it is still also the Thembu that is most strongly represented in the leadership of the African National Congress.³¹ It could be that the acquisition of wealth and education, which was made possible for the Thembu through their cooperation with the Cape Colony, has enabled them to become leaders in the political field.

1. Br. Parl. Papers 635-'51: Select Committee on Kafir tribes. See especially p.170 for John Fairbairn's evidence Q.528-531; and that of Andries Stockenström Q.12722. See also GTJ. 6 November '52 Tambookie Frontier; Ibid. Report from Whittlesea.
2. Wagenaar: Settlements, pp.176-77.
3. See p.173.
4. See p.268 for a discussion of opposing views regarding Matanzima's part in the war.
5. According to the first reliable census taken in 1891 the population of Thembuland in that year numbered 99,292 of which 48,349 were males. See CPP.G6-'92. p.7.
6. See A. Moyer: the Mfengu, Self-Defence and the Cape Frontier Wars in C. Saunders and K. Derricourt (eds): Beyond the Cape Frontier, pp.101-27.
7. Such rumours usually reached the ears of officials via appointed headman. While, in retrospect such reports can be treated with circumspect, contemporary officials on the spot had to take note of them.
8. CPP.G50-1900: A.H. Stanford's report, 12 February '99; G25-1882: Stanford's report, 21 February 1882.
9. E. Sihele, p.130.
10. Peires: House of Phalo, p.160.
11. See pp.1-3.
12. See pp.4-6.
13. For remarks re Mfecane, see p.40, footnote 35.
14. E. Sihele, p.27. See also pp.5-6.
15. See p.15.
16. See pp.263-4.
17. E. Sihele, p.97.
18. See p.22
19. E. Sihele, p.97. In 1849 the Royal House moved to Rhoda on the Great Kei. This remained the Great Place when Emigrant Thembuland was established.
20. See introduction for Brownlee's remarks re Thembu claims of precedence over other nations. On p.157 mention has been made of Joyi's unwillingness to join the Cattle-Killing unless a prophet

from among the Thembu would tell him to do so. See also Ronald Ingle: Doctor's Notebook - Dr. Johnson. Dr. Johnson who had for many years worked in Thembuland held very strong views on Thembu conservatism and their resistance to innovations.

21. See p.369, footnote 67 for explanation of the sense in which the term "peasant" is used here.
22. See pp.306-10; 324-8.
23. See pp.330-3.
24. See pp.304-5.
35. See p.338.
36. See p.349.
37. See p.348-51.
28. See p.193.
29. For the "discovery of the poor white problem see C. Bundy: Vagabond Hollanders and Runaway Englishmen, in W. Beinart, P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds): Putting a Plough to the Ground, pp.120-1.
30. As Saunders remarked, of the active African National Congress leadership at the time when the organization was banned in 1960, most were of Thembu origin. See Saunders, Title, p.570.
31. Walter Sisulu was a founder member of the African National Congress Youth League and Secretary-General of the ANC from 1949 to 1954. Alfred Xuma, who like Sisulu, was born in the Engcobo district was President-General of the organisation from 1940 to 1949. The national organiser of the ANC in the mid-1950s was Enoch Ka Tshunungwa, a member of the Thembu royal house. He was arrested in 1956 and during his trial he found himself at odds with the ANC and more in sympathy with the emerging Pan African Congress. Following his acquittal in the Treason Trail in 1961 he became an aide to Matanzima and eventually member of the Transkeian Parliament. (See T. Karis and G. Carter: From Protest to Challenge, pp.143, 160, 164). The best-known of these leaders is Nelson Mandela, who was born into the royal Thembu household. In 1930, after the death of his father, he became ward of his cousin, David Dalindyebo, then paramount chief of Thembuland. He was trained to become a chief, but when he reached the acquired age, he was no longer prepared to have a position of authority over an oppressed people. Mandela's long association with the African National Congress, his arrest and trial and his influence, from prison, on South African politics is now history.



(¹) This is basically the genealogy given in Soga (p. 466), supplemented or verified by data obtained from files, or from the tribal units identified here. Superfluous names have been omitted. The genealogy given by (p. 19) agrees largely with that of Soga, but differs in older names.

(²) Sobantu represents a junior house of Gcuwa and is regarded as acting head of this unit.

APPENDIX 2

The Fynn Family

William McDowell Fynn

Came to Cape Town in 1808 with his parents. Employed by John Murray Ship Chandler in Cape Town from 1822 to 1827. Spent five years in Natal. Appointed in 1838, by Sir Andries Stöckenstrom as British Agent beyond the Great Fish River. Appointed Assistant-Commissioner to Ndhlani tribe in 1847 and Commissioner of the Gcaleka in 1849.

(D.S.A.B., pp.170-171)

William Raffely Donald Fynn

Son of William McDowell. Appointed Resident Magistrate with Sarhili in 1865. In 1871 Sarhili laid various charges against him, and he was replaced by James Ayliff. In 1873 he was appointed Tambookie Agent with the Emigrant Thembu. Appointed magistrate of Bomvanaland 1874.

(Davies, M: Twin Trails, pp.39-49)

West White Fynn

Son of William McDowell. Appointed in 1874 as Chief Clerk to Resident with Sarhili. Served, in this capacity, first under James Ayliff and then under John Eustace. Left the Transkei during the War of Ngayecibi. Later took up farming in the Transkei. We have evidence of close relationship between West Fynn and Sarhili. Fynn was presented with Sarhili's favourite armllet at Sarhili's express desire. In 1911, when Fynn moved to the then Rhodesia, Sarhili's sons sent him a letter of appreciation.

(Twin Trails, pp.57-59. MS 2018 (Cory Library): Mcotoma Kreli and others to Fynn, 16 Aug. 1911; Spicer, p.83)

APPENDIX 3

The Stockenström-Maphasa Treaty, 1837

Source: Cape of Good Hope - Treaties with Native Chiefs 1806-54

TREATY entered into between Andries Stockenström, Esq., Lieut.-Governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and the Tambookie chief Mapassa, when, after the fullest explanations by means of the Resident Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, the following articles of convention were fully agreed upon, in the presence of Hougham Hudson, Esq., Agent-General, and the said Resident Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, as also the Tambookie Counsellors Quasha and Nyela, subject, nevertheless, to the ratification by or on behalf of his said Majesty.

Article 1. There shall be peace and amity for ever, between his said Britannic Majesty, his subjects - particularly those of the said colony - and the said contracting chief and his tribe, - and both parties shall honestly and faithfully use their utmost endeavours to prevent a rupture of the same, to remove every cause for disagreement which may occur, and scrupulously to abide by the engagements contained in this treaty.

Article 2. The said contracting chief doth acknowledge that the country which he and his tribe do occupy between the Stormberg and Kaffraria, and adjoining the eastern frontier of the colony, is part of what was the Bushman country, still thinly inhabited by the remnants of the said tribe.

Article 3. The said Lieut.-Governor doth engage, on the part of his said Majesty, not to molest the said chief or tribe, or cause him or them to be molested in the possession of the said territory, or to lay claim to any part thereof, provided the said chief or tribe do not in any way disturb the peace of the colony, or molest the inhabitants therein; and provided also the said chief and tribe shall strictly adhere to the terms of this treaty.

Article 4. The boundary between the said colony and the territory possessed by the said chief and tribe is agreed to be the Zwarte Kei or Winterberg Spruit, from its source in the Winterberg down to the colonial hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smit's River, and thence the latter river to its source in that kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called Buffels Hoek; provided, however, that the free communication between the Kat and Gonappe Rivers, and the said territory, of the Shiloh missionary institution, as also between the Tarka and Kaffraria through the now uninhabited country east of the Winterberg, continue uninterrupted as hitherto.

Article 5. The said contracting chief engages to protect by all means in his power the Bushmen who reside, or may come to reside, within the said territory, as the original proprietors of the soil, to let them enjoy all the rights and privileges to which the Tambookies are entitled, and to be responsible for their acts, in the same manner as he binds himself by this treaty for the acts of the Tambookies.

Article 6. No Tambookies, armed or unarmed, single or in number, male or female, shall be allowed to cross the said boundary into the colony, and no British subject, armed or unarmed, single or in number, shall be allowed to cross into the said territory occupied by the Tambookies, except with permission and under the restriction hereinafter to be specified in article 10.

Article 7. The said contracting chiefs shall, with the concurrence of the said Lieut.-Governor, or person appointed by him, fix upon certain points in the said territory, as near to the said boundary and to each other as convenient, at each of which he shall station a chief or responsible man of his tribe, to be called, for the sake of distinction, "pakati", to reside there, and to act as a guard.

It shall be the duty of such amapakati to keep a good and constant understanding with the field-cornets residing nearest to their said residences, and to do every thing in their power to prevent inroads or aggressions, either on the part of the colonists against the Tambookies or of the Tambookies against the colonists.

The amapakati, who shall be so stationed, must, by the said contracting chief, be made known, by name, to the said field-cornets, and any change, either of person or station, which may take place with reference to the said amapakati, must be previously communicated to the said field-cornets.

The amapakati shall be responsible to their own chief, who will see the necessity of selecting for such stations trustworthy men, and to

punish every neglect, fraud, or deception, which they may commit, as the said contracting chief hereby pledges himself to do.

Article 8. The said Lieut.-Governor engages, on the part of his said majesty, to place an agent, to reside in a convenient situation in the said territory, which agent shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity; and the said contracting chief binds himself to respect such agent as the representative of the British Government, and to protect his person, family, and property, to the utmost of his power, and to leave him full liberty of ingress and egress through the said territory, or across the boundary into the colony, at all times, without the least molestation of hindrance.

APPENDIX 4
Emigrant Thembuland
Administration

When Emigrant Thembuland came into existence in 1865, E.J. Warner was stationed at Southeyville as "Tambookie Agent". He was succeeded by William Fynn.¹ In December 1875 Charles Levey succeeded Fynn. After the War of Ngcayecibi, Emigrant Thembuland was divided into two judicial districts, Southeyville and Xalanga. The Tambookie Agent was now termed Resident Magistrate. William Cumming assumed duty as Assistant Magistrate at Xalanga. After the war of 1881 the district of Cala was formed of parts of the districts of Southeyville and Xalanga.

C. Levey was stationed at Cala as Resident Magistrate. The remainder of Southeyville was formed into a separate district, St. Marks, where R.W. Stanford assumed duty in 1881. St. Marks and Cala were mainly occupied by Africans, while Xalanga was predominately acquired by Europeans. In 1884 these districts were again formed into two, by the partition of Cala between Xalanga and St. Marks.

The name of Charles Levey is most closely associated with Emigrant Thembuland. He first entered the civil service as clerk and interpreter to Capt. Cobbe in Mfenguland. In 1874 he was appointed Government Labour Agent, a post which he held until his appointment as Thembu Agent in Emigrant Thembuland in 1875. In the War of Ngcayecibi

1. Brownlee in The Transkeian Native Territories, p.27, wrote that it was William Fynn.

he commanded the Thembu volunteers. In the war of 1881 he successfully defended Southeyville and assisted in the defence of Lady Frere. He held the post of Resident Magistrate of Xalanga until 1900, when he was appointed Resident Magistrate for Wodehouse.

(Cape of Good Hope Civil Service List, 1899.

Brownlee: Transkeian Native Territories.)

APPENDIX 5

" CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE TEMBUS AGREED TO
BE TAKEN OVER BY THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT AND
BECOME BRITISH SUBJECTS (1875)

- 1st. That the following Chiefs be recognised as chiefs -
 Ngangeliswe, Umgudhlw(a), Umdukiso, Bacela, Umhloba, Umdulasi, Sandili, Umdiki, (Sidiki), T'sompa, Dubelikwele, Umtyedwa, Udwanyaza, Stockwe son of Chamlie, (Tyali), Umganyana and Maramouna (Maramnowa)
- 2nd. That the following salaries be paid to the Chiefs.
 Ngangeliswe £200, Umgudhlwa £50, Umdukiso £50, Bacela £30, Umhloba £30, Umdulasi £20, Sandili £30, Umdiki £20, T'sompa £20, Dubelikwele £20, Umtyedwa £20, Udwanyaza £20, Stockwe £20, Umganyana £20.
- 3rd. That in order to induce the return of those Tembus who have been compelled to leave through mismanagement and wars, the hut tax shall not become due until January 1878.
- 4th. That the boundary on the North-west be that fixed by the Commission, the members of which were Messrs. Griffiths, Ayliff and Grant, the boundary on the South-east, be that fixed by the Hon'ble Mr. C. Brownlee in 1873.
- 5th. The Chiefs to exercise authority and settle lawsuits (excepting cases of murder, crimes existing out of charges of witchcraft, serious assaults, and thefts from other tribes and from the Colony) within their own sections, subject to right of appeal to the magistrates. The Chief Ngangeliswe having hitherto been considered the paramount chief of the whole tribe, it is now proposed that his authority should not extend beyond his own section.
- 6th. That the Government of the Mission stations shall not be interfered with for the present.
- 7th. That in order to remove all cause of irritations and heart burning, arising from the compulsory return of Menziwe, he and his tribe be located in the land vacated by the chief Umtata, and the land at present occupied by Manziwe be filled up by loyal Tembus, who choose to return to this part.

8th. It is understood that Government will prohibit the sale of liquor to all natives.

Office of the Resident with
Gangeliswe, 28 October 1875.

The Revd. Mr. Hargreaves appears at the office and states that he is deputed by the Tambookie tribe, to submit the above proposals, to the Resident, for the consideration of Government.

Mr. Bowker, Commandant of Police, being present, the above proposals are submitted to him for his information, who fully concurs in its being forwarded to Government.

Sgd. W. Wright
Resident. "

Copies in NA49, p.71 and G4-83.

against Sarhili and Fadana; served under Walter Currie in war of Ngcayecibi; British resident with Ngangelizwe, 1873; Chief Magistrate of Thembuland 1876 - 1877.

Elliot, H.G.: Came to South Africa in 1870 for health reasons, after having resigned from military career in England with rank of major. He was persuaded by J.C. Molteno to take up post of chief magistrate of Thembuland. Became chief magistrate of all Transkeian territories in 1891.

Resident Magistrates in Thembuland (1878 - 1900)

(a) Umtata

Boyes, J.F.: 1876 - 1881.
 Merriman, T.R.: 1885 - 1892.
 Sweeney, C.J.: 1892 - 1894.
 Stanford, A.H.B.: 1897 - 1900 -

(b) Mqanduli

Blakeway, C.F.: 1878 - 1896.
 Farrant, F.E.: 1897 - 1900 -

(c) Engcobo

Stanford, W.E.M.: Appointed magistrate with Dalasile, 1876. Title was changed to resident magistrate for Engcobo 1882. Became chief magistrate for Griqualand East, 1885. Served as member of the Native Laws and Customs Commission, 1881. Appointed under-secretary for Native affairs, 1896. In 1902 he became chief magistrate for the newly united Transkeian territories. Served from 1903-1905 as member of the Native Affairs Commission. He was knighted in 1919.

Stanford, A.H.B.: 1885 - 1894.
 Warner, C.J.: 1894 - 1900 -

(d) St. Marks (Previously Southeyville)

Sweeney, C.J.: 1885 - 1888.
 Harris, R.L.: 1888 - 1892.
 Bunn, H.H.: 1892 - 1895.
 Bellairs, W.G.: 1895 - 1900.
 King, C.A.: 1900 -

(e) Xalanga

Cumming, W.G.: 1876 - 1878. Commanded Engcobo levies in the war of 1880.

Levey, C.J.: 1884 - 1900 - First appointed Thembu agent in Emigrant Thembuland in 1875. Resident Magistrate of Southeyville 1878. Defended Southeyville in war of 1878 - 1879. Assisted in that war in defence of Lady Frere. Served in expedition against Mfanta and Sitokwe Tyali.


(f) Glen Grey and Queenstown (resident magistrates and civil commissioners)

- Driver, C.H.: Special magistrate Glen Grey 1877 - 1878; resident magistrate Glen Grey, 1879 - 1884.
- Garcia, E.: Civil commissioner for Queenstown 1883 - 1895.
- Griffith, Charles D.: Served under Walter Currie in the F.A.M.P. Took part in the Fadana expedition. Civil commissioner for Queenstown 1859 - 1868. Appointed High Commissioner's agent in Basutoland in 1871.
- Hemming, John: Civil Commissioner for Queenstown 1875 - 1881 and from 1882 - 1883. Served as chairman of the following commissions: Kamastone Land Commission (1875); War Losses (1880); Thembuland Land Settlement, 1882 - 1883.
- Jenner, H.A.: Joined F.A.M.P. 1870; sub-inspector of F.A.M.P. 1871; civil commissioner's clerk at Dordrecht 1877; commandant commanding Dordrecht troops in Xalanga and Maclear districts; resident magistrate of Glen Grey, 1894 - 1895.
- Jennings, H.J.: civil-commissioner, Queenstown (March - December 1883).
- Rawstone, L.G.: resident magistrate Wodehouse 1880.

Other persons involved in Thembu affairs (1850 - 1900)

- Blyth, Matthew: British Resident in Mfenguland (1869 - 1876); Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East (1876); Chief Magistrate of Transkei (1878).
- Bowker, James H.: Appointed inspector of F.A.M.P. in 1855; and in 1870 succeeded Currie as commander.
- Chalmers, E.B.: British Resident with Ngangelizwe 1871 - 1873; inspector of F.A.M.P., 1873 - 1879; civil commissioner Wodehouse January - March 1880; civil commissioner Queenstown, 1878. He was special commissioner under the Glen Grey Act, 1896.
- Cunynghame, Arthur A.: Came to South Africa in 1875 as lieutenant-general. Commander of army in Thembuland in War of Ngcayecibi, but had serious difficulties with Merriman over control of Cape forces. He was nick-named the "War-Horse".
- Currie, Walter: Appointed by Sir George Cathcart as first commandant of the F.A.M.P. Sir George Grey established this as a permanent force with Currie as first general commandant. After his expulsion of Sarhili beyond the Mbashe in 1858 he was knighted.
- Cumming, J.: Acted as acting resident magistrate for Idutywa from time to time between 1877 - 1879.
- Hargreaves, Peter: Missionary for 48 years at Clarkebury and Mfundisweni, Eastern Pondoland. Often referred to as the Prime Minister of Thembuland.
- Hook, David B.: Joined the F.A.M.P. in 1885. Served in 1858 in expeditions against Sarhili and Fadana, as well as in the war of Ncgayecibi. Led small army to capture Nonesi. Acting magistrate of Transkei and Gcalekaland (1883).


- Judge, E.A.: Civil commissioner for various districts in the Western Province; civil commissioner for King William's Town. Served on the following commissions: re boundaries of Dordrecht settlement of Tambookie Location (June - July 1870); disturbances in Transkei between chiefs Kreli and Gangelizwe (November - December 1872); war expenditure Basotholand-Transkei (July - November 1884).
- Maclean, John: Served in the Sixth Frontier War. Succeeded Theophilus Shepstone in 1845 as diplomatic envoy to the Ndhlabi and Ngqika. Became chief commissioner of British Kaffraria in 1852, and served as Lieutenant Governor 1860 - 1863. Became Governor of Natal in 1864.
- Merriman, John Xavier: Elected member of House of Assembly for Aliwal North 1869; for Wodehouse 1874; Namaqualand 1879, 1884. Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works 1876 - 1878 and 1881 - 1884. During the war of Ncgayecibi he became a sort of minister of war, and in 1878 he almost single-handedly took over the conduct of the war.
- Southey, Richard: Served in 1828 with volunteers in charge of Colonial military outposts. Distinguished himself in Hintza campaign; resident agent with certain tribes in Province of Queen Adelaide; secretary to Sir Harry Smith and later to Secretary-General of the eastern districts; colonial secretary 1864 - 1872.
- Smith-Abercrombie, M.: Studied at Cambridge and Glasgow; Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cambridge. Member of Executive Council (1872); Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works (1872 - 1875); Became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town.
- Tainton, C.: Clerk at De Beers Native Offices, Kimberley, 1885.
- Theal, George McCall: Government agent with Ngqika chief, Oba (1877); in charge of natives of western districts (1878); keeper of colonial archives, 1879.
- Tooke, William Hammond: Clerk in audit office (1878); promoted to Department of Crown Lands (1882). Received a medal for services in war of Ncgayecibi.
- Warner, Ebenhaezer: Son of J.C. Thembu Agent in Tambookie Location 1865 - 1867; stationed at Southeyville 1867 - 1873. Resigned from the civil service to take up missionary work at Mount Arthur.
- Warner, Joseph Cox: Thembu Agent in Tambookie Location (1852 - 1864); British resident in the Transkei (1865 - 1869).




LEGEND

- Trading Stores
- † Mission Stations
- ⌘ Chiefs Kraals
- ▲ Mountain Peaks
Gatberg (After 1881 Maclear)
- Magistrate's Offices
CALA (Removed From Southeyville 1883)
- A** Kosana's Original Lands
- B** Farm granted to Kosana in 1883
- C** Gecelo's original Lands
- D** Gecelo relocated
- E** Sitokwe's Lands
- F** Ndarala's Lands
- G** Matanzima's Lands
- H** Myatikisane's Lands
- I** Civaru Mfengu
- J** Slang River Settlement
- K** Lands originally granted to Matanzima - later occupied by Siquanquti and Bambenduna. Reclaimed by Matanzima after rebellion

THEMBULAND AFTER 1883,
boundaries, relocation of chiefs
of Trading & Mission Stations.



MCIP 4



MAP
SHOWING SUBDIVISION
of
EMIGRANT TEMBULAND
AND
TEMBULAND PROPER.

According to the Boundary fixed by the Tembuland Commission and the line granted by the Chief Gangelizwe in 1882.

CONTENTS APPROXIMATELY.

Emigrant Tembuland, European Section	108,208 morgen
Slango River Settlement	27,175 "
Tembuland Proper, European Section, including Maxongo's Hoek	91,548 "
Remainder of Emigrant Tembuland, Native Section,	263,483 "
REMARKS.—The dotted line from Leuwe Kop to Umtintloni Mountain is the boundary asked by the Squatters, and embraces an additional area of 35,600 Morgen = 118 square miles.	
Length of Commission's line from A to V	25.1 miles
Gangelizwe's line from V to X	10.2 "
" " " X to XXXVI	37.3 "
	72.6 "

NOTES.—The European portions of Emigrant Tembuland and Tembuland Proper, including Maxongo's Hoek, coloured Red, are from detailed Surveys. The remainder of Emigrant Tembuland, coloured Green, is from Mr. Surveyor Schunke's Approximate Triangulation. The Southern Boundary of Emigrant Tembuland is from document annexed to Colonial Office Letter No. 1,420, dated 22nd August, 1871, describing Fingo-land.

Cada. Tembuland,
8th March, 1883.

SCALE:—4,000 Cape Rods to an Inch.

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- 1835 xxxix (279) Kafir War 1835

- 1836 vii (538) Select Committee on Aborigines
- 1837 xLiii (503) Despatches re Caffre War
- 1847-1848 xliiii (912, 969) Correspondence re Kafir Tribes
- 1851 xxxviii (1334) Correspondence re Kafir Tribes
- 1851 xxxviii (1380) Papers re Kafir Tribes
- 1855 xxxviii (1969) Papers re state of Kafir Tribes
- 1857 Sess.1x (2202) Further papers re state of Kafir Tribes
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- 1865 xxxvii (3436) Correspondence re annexation of British Kaffraria
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- 1881 Lxvi (C.2740, C.2783) Correspondence re South Africa
- 1881 Lxvi (C.2755) Correspondence re Basutoland
- 1882 xlvii (C.2964, C.3112) Correspondence re Basutoland and Territories to Eastward of Cape Colony
- 1883 xlvii (C.3493) Correspondence re Basutoland and the Native Territories

- (b) Annexures and Appendices to the Vote and Proceedings of the Cape Parliament (cited in the footnotes as CPP., the series number "C" Papers printed by order of the Leg. Co., "A" ones by order of the Assembly, "G" ones by order of the government is followed by the number of the Paper and then the year in abbreviated form, followed by the title, also in abbreviated form).

- G16-'58: Reports on Native Industrial Schools at Heald Town, Salem and Lesseyton
- A40-'58: Communications from the agent with the Tambookies
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- A49-'65: Proceedings and Evidence of Native Affairs Commission (1865)
- C10-'68: Report of British Resident in Transkeian Territory
- G41-'72: Reports on the Social and Political condition of the Natives in the Transkeian Territories (June, 1872)
- A10-'73: Report of Secretary of Native Affairs
- A12-'73: Report of Select Committee on Native Affairs
- C12-'73: Barkly's Speech at the opening of Parliament
- G35-'73: Report on the Social and Political condition of the emigrant Tambookie
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- A1-'77: Speech at Opening of Parliament
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- C5-'78: Papers re Griqualand East Land Commission
- G17-'78: Further Despatches - Governor and Secretary of State for Colonies re affairs of the Frontier
- A54-'80: Petition of Emigrant Thembus
- C3-'80: Return of Cost and Working of Colonial Railways
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(c) Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette

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(d) Cape of Good Hope Civil Service List

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(e) Cape Hansard 1893, 1894, 1907

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