Post-War Reconstruction and Development

A Collective Case Study

Savo Heleta

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Post-War Reconstruction and Development

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Supervisors

Professor Richard Haines and Dr Janet Cherry

This DPhil research is dedicated to Professor Sarah Pruett from College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University, Minnesota, United States

Without her help and support, I would never make it in the academic world

Table of contents

Declaration

I, Savo Heleta (student number 207049149), hereby declare that the dissertation, titled 'Post-War Reconstruction and Development: A Collective Case Study,' for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, is my own work and it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another University or for another qualification.

Savo Heleta

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a surge in post-war stabilisation, reconstruction and development operations around the world. Externally driven efforts have been shaped by the liberal peace framework, which assumes that a rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal norms and values, combined with Western-style governance institutions, would create conditions for lasting peace and prosperity. Only in a few instances countries have attempted internally driven post-war reconstruction and development; in most cases, these efforts were either ignored or suppressed by international analysts, experts, academics and organisations.

Despite all the expertise and funding spent since the early 1990s, externally driven operations have not led to lasting peace and stability, establishment of functioning institutions, eradication of poverty, livelihood improvements and economic reconstruction and development in war-torn countries. All too often, programmes, policies and 'solutions' were designed and imposed by external actors either because they worked elsewhere or because they were influenced by geopolitical, economic and/or security interests of powerful countries. Furthermore, external actors have tended to assume that generic approaches based on the liberal peace framework can work in all places, while ignoring local actors, contexts and knowledge.

Focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan and Somaliland, this exploratory qualitative study critically explores and assesses both externally and internally driven post-war reconstruction and development practices and operations in order to understand the strengths and shortcomings of both approaches and offer recommendations for future improvements. This is important since socio-economic recovery and economic development are crucial for lasting stability and peace in post-war countries.

Key Words

Violent conflict, civil war, peace, post-war reconstruction, development, liberal peace, peace-building, state-building

Ethics

Ethical integrity of this study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee (human) of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. Ethics number: **H 2010 BUS DST 15**

List of abbreviations

AU – African Union

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement

EU – European Union

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GOSS - Government of South Sudan

IFIs – International Financial Institutions

IMF – International Monetary Fund

MDTF – Multi-Donor Trust Fund

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OHR – Office of the High Representative in Bosnia

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe

PIC – Peace Implementation Council

PWRD – Post-War Reconstruction and Development

SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPLM – Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SSR – Security Sector Reform

TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

US – United States

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

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Finally, many thanks to my family and particularly my wife, Jade, for all the help and support over the years while I was busy with my research.

Chapter One - Introduction

This chapter will provide general introduction to the study, define key concepts and explain the focus on post-war reconstruction and development. It will outline statement of the problem, research questions, aims, objectives and scope of the study and introduce research design and methodology. The chapter will conclude with a discussion about significance of the study and an outline of subsequent chapters.

1.1 General introduction

Countries emerging from violent conflict face enormous challenges. Fighting and violence lead to death, injury, misery, destruction, displacement and human rights violations, leaving behind physical and psychological marks that take a long time to go away. Social relations, infrastructure, economies and government institutions get damaged or completely destroyed.

This study focuses on post-civil war reconstruction and development. The reason for the focus on civil wars and not international wars is the fact that over the last few decades, the majority of wars fought around the world have been between organised groups within countries, not between sovereign countries (Hanlon 2006: 18; Collier 2010: 121). However, civil wars are not entirely internal affairs as they negatively affect neighbours, regions and in some cases the world as a whole. This happens through the spread of fighting and instability beyond borders, refugee flows, arms trafficking and disruption of trade and movement of goods, services and people. Because of this, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 3) stress that civil wars, apart from being a challenge facing war-torn countries, are also a 'pressing global challenge.'

As Dayton and Kriesberg (2009: 5) point out, ending civil wars is only part of a process of stabilisation and recovery. This can only be achieved through extensive and comprehensive socio-economic reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building. Mark Duffield (2007: 27) adds that 'ending wars is relatively easy; winning the peace is much more difficult' and is an uncertain, complex and lengthy process. To show the challenges and difficulties of post-civil war recovery operations, processes and approaches, this study will

focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina[1], South Sudan and Somaliland. Each of three cases is a developing country that has experienced civil wars in the recent past and is currently attempting to recover, reconstruct, develop and build lasting peace.

In the aftermath of war, there is a need to rebuild countries and establish long-term peace and stability. The aim of post-war recovery efforts is to establish security, stability, good governance and the rule of law, promote justice and reconciliation and enhance the socio-economic well-being of citizens in war-torn countries (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 89). Ultimately, the goal of post-war processes and operations is to create a stable environment, consolidate lasting peace and prevent return of violent conflict in the future (Paris 2005: 767).

There are currently two approaches to post-war recovery. The most widely used approach is the externally driven approach, where powerful Western governments and international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), hundreds of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid agencies, as well as numerous international experts and practitioners, drive the post-war recovery processes[2]. The second approach is the internally driven approach. Under this approach, local political elites and citizens design and implement recovery programmes and projects, with or without the help of external actors.

Post-war reconstruction and development is a relatively new phenomenon. The origins of externally driven post-war recovery processes and operations are found in the American interventions in post-Second World War Western Europe and Japan (Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005: 15-16; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 69). Even though post-war reconstruction and development in Western Europe and Japan were successful in the late 1940s and 1950s, during the Cold War, the international community and organisations such as the UN were unable to conduct similar operations due to superpower politics (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008: 462) and lack of support from major world powers for multilateral post-war reconstruction and development operations. During this time, the UN focused primarily on peacekeeping and monitoring of ceasefires after wars.

The end of the Cold War significantly lifted geopolitical limitations and opened doors for

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[1] The study will refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina as Bosnia.

[2] The study will refer to all these as 'external actors.'

multilateral operations and interventions in countries experiencing or emerging from violent conflict. Hoping that the new world order with the United States as the only remaining superpower could provide an opportunity for better global cooperation, then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formally introduced 'post-conflict peace-building' to the already used concepts of preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping in 'An Agenda for Peace' in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 2). Since then, the term 'post-conflict' has become a 'standard policy term' used by international organisations, donors and policy-makers (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 739; Barnett 2006: 88). In the aftermath of the Cold War, peace-building and post-war recovery came to be seen as key tasks for the international community. Consequently, since 1990, there were over fifty UN-led post-war operations around the globe. Apart from traditional peacekeeping, the majority of these operations also involved externally driven reconstruction of state institutions, socio-economic development and peace-building, while some countries were even formally administered by the UN (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 11-12; Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 25).

In terms of ideology, most post-Cold War externally driven post-war recovery operations were shaped by the concept of liberal peace, which assumes that a rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal norms and values, combined with Western-style governance institutions, would create conditions for lasting peace and prosperity. Thus, all external post-war efforts over the last two decades have attempted to establish stability and peace 'on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics' (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 6). As Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2009: 590) point out, since the end of the Cold War, externally driven post-war recovery operations have become 'major enterprises in global politics.' In monetary terms, since the early 1990s, over US $100 billion was spent by bilateral and multilateral donors on externally driven post-war recovery around the world, from the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia (Kang and Meernik 2004: 152).

While the majority of contemporary post-war recovery operations and processes have been externally driven, some countries, such as Somaliland, have attempted internally driven post-war reconstruction and development. However, despite its relative success, little is known about Somaliland in the academic and policy-making circles around the world because the existing literature on post-war reconstruction and development is mainly written from Western perspectives, supporting externally driven interventions and operations and imposition of ready-made Western 'solutions' (Ottaway 2003: 256). Furthermore, as Sandole

(2010: 78) points out, the 'Western bias' in the literature on post-war peace-building, state-building and reconstruction has shaped the thinking about post-war operations and approaches since the early 1990s, often excluding local voices and initiatives from academic and policy debates.

Susan Woodward (2011: 108) thinks that 'it is time that research focuses on local processes' of post-war recovery and the 'ways that international assistance can promote or obstruct peace and political stabilisation.' This study will critically explore and assess both externally and internally driven post-war practices and operations in order to understand the strengths and shortcomings of both approaches and offer recommendations for future improvements. This is important since socio-economic recovery, economic development and lasting peace are crucial for medium-to-long-term stability in war-ravaged countries.

1.2 Definition of key concepts

Violent conflict is an 'intentional struggle between collective actors that involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting or destroying human beings, human psyches, material property and/or socio-cultural structures' (Himes 1980: 104).

Civil war is a violent conflict between organised groups within a country in which at least one thousand people are killed annually (Collier 2010: 133). Woodward (2011: 106) defines civil war as a 'contest among rival parties' over the control of the state. According to Paris (2005: 1), civil wars are violent conflicts within a country, fought by people who reside in that country.

Fragile state is a state whose institutions are vulnerable to crisis and breakdown (Putzel 2001: 1).

Failed state is a state where governmental authority ceases to function across the territory; a state that cannot provide basic security, law, order and services to its citizens (Milliken and Krause 2003: 2; Yannis 2003: 66).

Development is aimed at generating economic opportunities and growth and improving people's livelihoods (Moss 2007: 2).

Post-war reconstruction includes short-term humanitarian assistance and relief and medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development. Key aspects of post-war reconstruction are rebuilding of physical infrastructure, creation of an inclusive and accountable governance system, economic recovery and repair of social relationships (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 130).

Post-war development aims to 'reactivate' economic and social development that was disrupted during violent conflict (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1071-2).

Post-war peace-building involves policies and programmes aimed at creation of a stable environment after armed conflict; the primary goal of peace-building is to prevent the return of war and fighting and create long-term stability and peace (Paris 2005: 767).

State-building involves constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical, social and economic security (Chandler 2006: 1).

1.3 Post-war vs. post-conflict

Ever since Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced 'post-conflict peace-building' in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, the majority of academics, policy-makers, experts and media have used the term 'post-conflict' to describe the period after the end of war. However, the use of this term is problematic. Berdal (2009: 95) writes that 'distinctions between war and peace, conflict and post-conflict tend to be blurred and unclear' following the formal end of fighting. This period, he notes, is often 'characterised by a sense of insecurity, continuing violence and the weakness of legitimate and properly functioning institutions.' Similarly, Binns, Dixon and Nel (2012: 260) point that in most cases, 'there is little difference between conflict and the immediate post-conflict periods, since very little changes in terms of state functioning, access to resources and livelihood opportunities.' As some authors argue, transition from violent conflict to stability and peace is never linear and smooth but could be full of unexpected incidents and difficulties (Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: 4). A formal end of war does not always bring an end to violent conflict and fighting. In most instances, some form of conflict continues between various groups, especially groups that are unhappy with a peace deal or military defeat (Goodhand and Hulme 1999: 18; Moore 2000: 11; Campbell 2008: 557; Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 260).

According to Laurie Nathan, 'the notion of a post-conflict society is a myth.' He thinks that the only way we can have a post-conflict society anywhere in the world is if we experience an apocalypse or if the entire humankind is eliminated from the Earth. Nathan adds that 'there is no society in the world that is free of conflict and the mistake that the UN and other organisations make is to equate conflict with violence. This is inaccurate and misleading.' He argues that instead of talking about post-conflict recovery, it is more appropriate and correct to use the term 'post-war' since 'in most cases we can say with certainty when wars officially end. On the other hand, we cannot ever say that social conflict has ended in any society anywhere in the world.'[3]

Conflict and animosity between adversaries do not stop overnight with the formal announcement of the end of civil war and hostilities. In some cases, conflict continues through small-scale violence and proxy fighting, while in other cases it can move from the battleground to political institutions. Due to all these reasons, this study will use the term 'post-war' instead of the mainstream term 'post-conflict.' The term post-war refers to the period after the formal end of armed conflict, whether through a negotiated settlement or military victory by one side.

1.4 Post-war reconstruction and development

Authors who write about contemporary reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of war use terms such as 'post-conflict peace-building' (Menkhaus 2004; Pouligny 2005; Krause and Jutersonke 2005; Paris 2005), 'post-conflict reconstruction' (World Bank 1998; NEPAD 2005; Englebert and Tull 2005), 'post-conflict recovery' (Boyce 2008; Barakat and Zyck 2009; Blattman 2010) and 'post-conflict state-building' (Samuels and von Einsiedel 2009).

Some authors argue that establishment of security, stability and peace-building need to be separated from socio-economic reconstruction and development after war. They point out that establishment of security and peace-building are aimed at stopping fighting and preventing further violence in the short-to-medium run. At the same time, they see reconstruction and development as long-term processes aimed at restructuring war-torn societies and promoting economic growth (Busumtwi-Sam 2004: 317). On the other hand, Sandole (2010: 78) stresses

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[3] Interview with the author, Port Elizabeth, 25 May 2011.

that the lack of integration of development, conflict management, governance, peace-building and other fields has undermined peace-building and post-war recovery efforts since the early 1990s. Boyce and Pastor (1998: 42-3) argue that post-war, stabilisation, peace-building and socio-economic reconstruction and development should not be separated into distinctive boxes because they are in many ways linked. They see successful stabilisation and peace-building as key prerequisites for economic reconstruction and development while at the same time economic reconstruction, development and growth can help consolidate peace and stability and prevent resurgence of violent conflict.

Kofi Annan (1998: 19) points out that 'unless there is reconstruction and development in the aftermath of conflict, there can be little expectation of progress or durable peace.' Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 2) write that socio-economic reconstruction and development are 'integral parts of peace-building.' A report by the African Union (2007: 1) states that peace and development are 'two sides of the same coin' and that they are mutually reinforcing in post-war situations. Similar opinion is voiced by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): 'Without peace there can be no sustainable development and without development it is impossible to establish enduring peace' (2005: 2). Schomerus and Allen (2010: 81) add that 'peace holds a meaning far beyond "peacefulness" or simply "absence of conflict."' Establishment of lasting peace requires improvements in living conditions, including better infrastructure, employment opportunities, basic services and reliable and effective government structures.

Post-war recovery is comprised of security, social, political, institutional and economic elements, all of which are equally important (Cilliers 2006: 94; Jhazbhay 2009: 198). Because of that, establishment of security, state-building and development of a stable political environment are as important as socio-economic reconstruction and development. While 'social and economic development [can] reinforce peace in the long-run, unstable politics and reversion to violence [will] undermine development,' peace and other post-war gains (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones 2004: 379).

This study will focus on post-war reconstruction and development (PWRD). Instead of focusing solely on physical and economic reconstruction and development efforts, this study will also focus on post-war stabilisation, security, peace-building and state-building. As it will be discussed in more detail in the next section, all these aspects, efforts and activities are part of the discipline of Development Studies and development thinking and planning.

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1.5 Positioning of post-war reconstruction and development within the discipline of Development Studies

The discipline of Development Studies is relatively new, emerging as a field of study only in the 1960s (Haynes 2008: 188; Sumner and Tribe 2008: 755). Initially, the field was shaped largely by economic thinking; however, over the last two decades, it has moved beyond economics, becoming a multi-disciplinary field (Sumner 2006: 644-5), working with and encompassing economics, politics, sociology, conflict and other fields. Haines and Hurst (2011: 24) go further, calling Development Studies a discipline in its own right and arguing that the field evolved over the decades to emerge as a 'fully fledged discipline' that possesses 'interdisciplinary flexibility' which allows it to interact and engage with other academic fields and disciplines.

As Galtung (1996: 265) and Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 6) point out, development is not only about economics, but also about social, political and institutional issues and factors. The subject matter of Development Studies is largely the developing world. Its rationale over the decades has been the policy and practical research and recommendations aimed at poverty reduction, livelihood improvements, economic development and growth (Sumner 2006: 645).

Socio-economic reconstruction and development are integral parts of post-war recovery[4] efforts. Without reconstruction, inclusive development, livelihood improvements, poverty eradication and delivery of basic services to the population in the aftermath of war, it is unlikely that there can be long-term stability and peace (Annan 1998: 19; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 2). Furthermore, as the literature review will show, various development theories and approaches have had a profound influence on externally driven post-war recovery practices and approaches and the liberal peace framework, which has shaped all externally driven post-war operations and interventions since the end of the Cold War.

Post-war reconstruction and development are not only about economics, development and physical reconstruction but also about social recovery, peace-building, reconciliation, security improvements and institutional reform and development. This fits well with the above mentioned focus of Development Studies. For this reason, this study about post-war reconstruction and development is positioned within the discipline of Development Studies.

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[4] Throughout the study, 'post-war reconstruction and development' and 'post-war recovery' will be used interchangeably.

1.6 Statement of the problem

The main aims of reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war are to 'prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and build and consolidate sustainable peace' (NEPAD 2005: iv). This involves work and improvements in areas such as humanitarian assistance, safety and security, socio-economic reconstruction and development, basic services, livelihoods, governance, justice and reconciliation.

As the literature review will show, since the end of the Cold War, out of many externally driven attempts to stabilise, reconstruct and develop countries emerging from war, there seem to be only a few relative success stories. All too often, programmes, policies and solutions are imposed by outsiders, either because they worked elsewhere or because they are influenced by geopolitical, economic and/or security interests of powerful countries.

It is difficult to determine how internally driven and externally supported recovery after war would work as experts, analysts and academics have spent little time examining and assessing internally driven PWRD (Ottaway 2003: 256). According to Paris (2004: 4), given the importance of post-war recovery for countries emerging from violent conflict, 'any opportunity to improve the effectiveness of future operations should be vigorously pursued.' Focusing on Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland[5], this study will assess strengths and shortcomings of both externally and internally driven PWRD and explore the possibility of internally driven and externally supported PWRD.

1.7 Research questions

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of externally driven PWRD?

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of internally driven PWRD?

- How can post-war practices and approaches be improved in order to bring lasting peace and socio-economic stability in countries emerging from war?

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[5] The study refers to Somaliland as a country even though it is not yet internationally recognised.

1.8 Aims and objectives

1.8.1 Research aims

- Assess the practices, shortcomings and potential of externally driven PWRD;

- Assess the practices, shortcomings and potential of internally driven PWRD;

- Explore the nature and practicality of an alternative/improved approach to PWRD.

1.8.2 Research objectives

- Present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD based on an extensive review of literature and field research in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland;

- Offer recommendations to improve current PWRD practices.

1.9 Scope of the study

This study focuses on post-war reconstruction and development since the end of the Cold War. It does not focus only on one case where PWRD is taking place. Instead, it will look at the field and concepts in general and explore in-depth experiences and practices in three post-war developing countries in order to understand the strengths, shortcomings and potential of post-war recovery processes and operations.

This study will not focus on some of the key aspects of PWRD. For example, the humanitarian aspect is not the focus of the study as its purpose is not to promote medium-to-long term reconstruction and development but only to offer immediate short-term help to vulnerable people (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 738-9). Similarly, peacekeeping, an integral part of many post-war recovery efforts, is not the focus of the study because its aim is to stop fighting, monitor cease-fire and improve security situation in the aftermath of war through the deployment of foreign soldiers. While security is important after war, this research looks beyond peacekeeping and focuses on medium-to-long term socio-economic and institutional recovery and stability.

Initially, the focus of this study was to be only on post-war recovery in South Sudan. However, reading about externally driven operations and processes in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor have led to a conclusion that post-war recovery in South Sudan differed significantly in that in South Sudan, despite all problems, challenges and lack of local capacity after decades of war and destruction, local authorities still had a significant say in the PWRD process. On the other hand, in countries such as Bosnia, post-war recovery, peace-building and state-building were fully externally driven, with local authorities often having limited or no influence over important decision- and policy-making. Furthermore, a review of the literature provided an insight into a relatively successful internally driven recovery process that took place in Somaliland. All this information led to a realisation that, in order to understand the bigger picture about contemporary post-war recovery approaches and processes, the focus had to be on more than one case. As Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 50) point out, focusing on individual case studies often leads researchers to become 'so engrossed in their particular case that they are unable to make comparisons and connections between cases.'

Thus, three cases were selected – South Sudan, Somaliland and Bosnia – because they represent different approaches to reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building after war. Sarantakos (2005: 11) calls this research approach a 'collective case study,' where researchers explore and investigate a number of cases for the purpose of understanding a phenomenon. South Sudan, Somaliland and Bosnia were purposely selected as case studies since these three developing countries have experienced civil wars and are currently in the process of post-war recovery. What is important for this study is the fact that these countries are experiencing different forms of PWRD. For over a decade, Bosnia has been experiencing externally driven PWRD that some analysts consider to be a form of neo-imperialism; South Sudan is experiencing a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD; finally, PWRD in Somaliland has been internally driven, almost without any external support.

1.10 Research design and methodology

The methodology used in this exploratory qualitative study is interpretive research methodology. Since the primary aim of interpretive research is to learn about individuals and processes, this research methodology is the most appropriate for an exploratory study about

post-war recovery approaches, processes and operations. Data for the study was collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews with selected individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in Bosnia, Somaliland and South Sudan. In addition, an extensive review of the literature provided a better understanding of the arguments, debates, issues and developments linked to PWRD as well as insights into the broader context in each of the three cases that are studied.

To analyse the data, the grounded theory approach, one of the main analytical tools in qualitative research, was used. Denscombe (2007: 92) argues that grounded theory is particularly useful when researchers want to investigate and understand points of view of respondents. Even though the grounded theory approach is often used to generate theories about studied topics, the goal of this study is not to develop a grounded theory about PWRD. Instead, the study will present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD approaches and practices after a systematic analysis of data and offer recommendations for future improvements. The grounded theory approach can be used even if research aim is not a generation of theory but exploration and explanation of phenomena through a set of key findings (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 155; Birks and Mills 2011: 29-30). In this case, researchers present their findings without final integration of concepts and categories and development of a theory.

1.11 Critical stance

Paris (2004: 4) points out that in order to improve post-war recovery approaches and practices, there is a need to critically 'scrutinise the assumptions that underpin the design and conduct' of past and present post-war recovery operations. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 4) similarly argue that 'modalities and implications' of externally driven PWRD operations need to be critically questioned. To do this, this study has adopted a 'critical stance' (Denscombe 2010: 30), borrowed from critical social research. Critical social research questions how institutions, policies, frameworks and approaches are formulated and implemented in practice. This approach does not 'accept existing policy parameters as given or necessarily legitimate.' Furthermore, critical research challenges the 'prevailing structures of power and power relations, prevailing discourses or ways of thinking and the interests they serve' (Newman 2009: 38).

This study is not using critical social research approach but only adopting a critical stance. This is done in order to show inadequacies of existing externally driven approaches and practices, bring to the fore and critically examine internally driven efforts and offer recommendations for future operations. Adopting a critical stance is contrary to the majority of existing studies about PWRD, which use the problem-solving approach and deal mainly with improvements in planning and implementation while ignoring structures of power, discourses, assumptions and power relations. As Pugh (2009: 79) points out, the problem solving approach has not significantly benefited citizens in post-war countries or improved PWRD practices. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to adopt a critical stance and scrutinise design and implementation of past and present PWRD operations.

This illustration explains research methodology used in the study.

1.12 Significance of the study

This study significantly differs from the existing research about post-war reconstruction and development. Below are three key gaps in the existing research that this study will try to address:

- The majority of existing publications about PWRD focus primarily on externally driven approaches, processes and efforts, paying slight or no attention to internally driven PWRD. In contrast, this study will assess strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven PWRD;

- This study will challenge the way 'mainstream' actors, academics, experts and policy-makers have been approaching PWRD since the end of the Cold War. It will put in context and critically explore experiences of countries that went through externally and internally driven as well a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD in order to unpack results and practices, recommend possible improvements to current approaches and explore the possibility of internally driven and externally supported PWRD;

- The existing literature about PWRD is mainly written by Western authors, experts, academics and policy-makers. Most of them support externally driven interventions and operations and imposition of ready-made 'solutions' to complex problems in war-torn countries. This study will provide a comprehensive non-Western perspective to the existing body of literature.

1.13 Chapter outline

Chapter One - Introduction

This chapter has provided general introduction to the study, defined key concepts and explained the focus on post-war reconstruction and development. It has outlined statement of the problem, research questions, aims, objectives and scope of the study and introduced research design and methodology. The chapter has concluded with a discussion about significance of the study and an outline of subsequent chapters.

Chapter Two – Literature Review

This chapter will review relevant literature, provide a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues, arguments, concepts and concerns related to externally and internally driven PWRD and highlight gaps in the literature. The chapter will define key aspects of post-war reconstruction and development, place PWRD in the research context, explore its main trends and present various arguments, approaches and practices. The literature review chapter is divided into two sections: section one will focus on theoretical underpinnings about development, conflict and foreign aid; section two focuses on and unpack various approaches and practices related to externally and internally driven post-war reconstruction and development.

Chapter Three – Research Methodology

This chapter will discuss research design and methodology, sample, data collection and analysis, validity and reliability of the study, ethical considerations and limitations of the research methodology.

Chapter Four – Contextual Background

This chapter will provide contextual background about post-war recovery in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland. The chapter will not provide historical background to the violent conflicts in each country or the approaches used to end conflicts but focus only on post-war periods.

Chapter Five - Research Findings

This chapter will present research findings gathered through semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews with selected individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in Bosnia, Somaliland and South Sudan.

Chapter Six – Data Analysis, Discussion and Key Findings

In this chapter, findings derived from in-depth interviews in Bosnia, South Sudan and

Somaliland will be analysed, compared and contrasted with the data, concepts, ideas and arguments from the literature review and contextual background chapters. The first section will provide an analysis and discussion about each case; section two will present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD that emerged from the data collected in the study; section three will discuss the prospects for an improved/alternative approach to post-war reconstruction and development.

Chapter Seven – Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter will reflect on the study, key findings and limitations of the research. It will discuss the contribution of the study and offer practical recommendations for improvements in future PWRD processes and operations. The chapter will also provide recommendations for future research about post-war reconstruction and development.

1.14 Conclusion

This chapter has provided general introduction to the study, defined key concepts, explained the focus on post-war reconstruction and development and positioning of the study within the discipline of Development Studies. It outlined statement of the problem, research questions, aims, objectives and scope of the study and introduced research design and methodology. The chapter ended with a brief discussion about significance of the study and an outline of subsequent chapters. The next chapter will review relevant literature, provide a critical analysis of the main issues, arguments and concepts related to externally and internally driven PWRD and highlight gaps in the literature.

Chapter Two - Literature Review

This chapter will review relevant literature, provide a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues, arguments, concepts and concerns related to externally and internally driven PWRD and highlight gaps in the literature. The chapter will define key aspects of post-war reconstruction and development, place PWRD in the research context, explore its main trends and present various arguments, approaches and practices. The literature review chapter is divided into two sections: section one will focus on theoretical underpinnings about development, conflict and foreign aid; section two will focus on and unpack various approaches and practices related to externally and internally driven post-war reconstruction and development.

This literature review was conducted over the period of three years. It embraced literature about externally and internally driven post-war socio-economic recovery since the end of the Cold War, political economy of foreign aid and assistance, economic development theories that relate to post-war reconstruction and development and post-war peace-building, state-building and nation-building. This informed the focus and scope of the study as well as the issues and themes that were the focus of field research in South Sudan, Somaliland and Bosnia. The review of literature continued during and after field research in order to keep up with the arguments and trends in the PWRD field. The literature review saturation was reached when no new arguments, themes and viewpoints emerged that were significant for the study.

As noted in chapter one, this research uses the grounded theory approach for data analysis. Some qualitative researchers take the grounded theory to the extremes and start research process 'without any fixed ideas about the nature of the things that are about to be investigated' (Denscombe 2007: 93-94). Such researchers do not conduct a review of literature at all before field research and data collection. Others, on the other hand, review literature and explore historical and contextual background of their topics in order to prepare themselves for field research. As mentioned above, in this study, an extensive literature review was conducted in order to develop a better understanding of the approaches, practices and concepts related to PWRD. According to Johann Mouton (2001: 87), a comprehensive literature review helps researchers understand what has so far been done in the field, how

other researchers went about exploring and examining the field and the widely accepted arguments and definitions of the terms related to the topic.

While the grounded theory approach will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, it is important to point out that the primary aim of this approach is to 'develop theory [or key findings] through the research, not to subject research to theory' (Sarantakos 2005: 119). The grounded theory allows researchers to 'take a fresh look at things and… avoid having their vision of events "clouded" by the cumulative theories of previous researchers' (Denscombe 2010: 105). This approach was selected as it requires researchers to focus on concepts and meanings that emerge from the data gathered in the study and build findings 'from the ground up' instead of using conventional research practices that start out with theories and hypotheses and then try to prove them (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 498; Denscombe 2010: 16).

This literature review is not organised to fit into existing theories but around issues, practices and approaches that are studied. The main reason for this is that theories of post-war reconstruction and development *do not yet exist* (emphasis added) (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008: 464). Another reason is that an attempt to fit an exploratory research about a relatively new phenomenon into existing theories would lead to 'narrow' studies and simplistic assumptions (Beswick and Jackson 2011: 146). Even though section one of the literature review explores theoretical underpinnings about conflict, development and foreign aid that are of relevance for the PWRD phenomenon, this is not done in order to fit the study into existing theories but to explore how existing research about conflict, development and foreign aid relates to the study and the studied phenomenon.

As Creswell (2009: 70) points out, qualitative researchers do not have to incorporate an explicit theory into their research but 'present descriptive research of the central phenomenon.' Ultimately, the aim of this chapter is to highlight important arguments, issues and paradigms instead of 'simplifying complex situations to fit a theoretical lens' (Beswick and Jackson 2011: 146). Furthermore, the literature review is structured into themes that are relevant to the study. This way of organising a review of literature is specifically appropriate as it works well for studies whose aim is 'not to test a theory or to review theories' but to explore the topic and key definitions, issues and arguments related to it. Organising the literature review this way is specifically appropriate for exploratory qualitative studies (Mouton 2001: 93), which this study is.

In terms of the time period, this chapter covers publications about post-war recovery since 1990, as the study focuses on PWRD in the aftermath of the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, many countries have experienced internal wars and post-war recovery operations after wars ended. As mentioned in chapter one, in 1999 alone, over forty countries around the world were undergoing some form of PWRD.

The literature review, apart from focusing on main issues, arguments and concepts related to PWRD, will also provide practical examples from countries that have been recovering from wars over the last two decades. These examples will be provided as footnotes and will go beyond the focus on PWRD practices, experiences and approaches in South Sudan, Somaliland and Bosnia and include countries such as Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq[6]. The reference to these countries is provided in order to broaden the discussion and understanding of the 'bigger picture' about contemporary PWRD.

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[6] Discussing PWRD in Afghanistan and Iraq can be seen as 'oxymoron' (Williams 2009: 3) since these two countries do not yet resemble a situation anywhere near a post-war stage. However, it is still important to refer to various reconstruction, peace-building and state-building practices that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq since the invasion by the United States and its allies in 2001 and 2003 respectively, but see them as 'mid-conflict stabilisation' attempts (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1077) instead of post-war recovery operations.

Section One – Theoretical Underpinnings About Conflict, Development and Foreign Aid

2.1 Note on problematic and/or vague terminology from the literature

Before moving into discussion about theoretical underpinnings about conflict, development and foreign aid, it is important to discuss terminology found in the literature on PWRD that has problematic and/or vague connotations. This section will provide clarification and explanation of these terms before proceeding to the review of literature.

2.1.1 Underdeveloped, developing and 'third world' countries

William Easterly (2006: 20) writes about post-colonial 'political correctness' that led to a change of language used by Western governments and international aid and development organisations when dealing with former colonial possessions and other poor countries. He argues that since the 1960s, the term 'uncivilised' became 'underdeveloped,' while 'savage peoples' became 'third world.' The term 'third world,' also known as 'underdeveloped' and 'developing' world, came to represent the poor, 'backward' and traditional parts of the globe (Dowden 2008: 265-6; Schellhaas and Seegers 2009: 7) which are presented as unlike the rich, developed, forward-looking and modern Western and some Asian countries. Today, these terms are commonly used in academic literature, policy documents and media 'as terms of contempt, shorthand for failure.' At the same time, many of those who use these terms without critical scrutiny often assume that all developing countries are somehow similar, if not the same, ignoring great diversity among these countries and societies (McEwan 2009: 304).

This study will use the terms 'developing' and 'third world' countries but with critical scrutiny recommended by McEwan. As this study is situated within the discipline of Development Studies, it is important to engage with these concepts. Furthermore, each of the three cases studied - Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland – is a developing country. However, there are great discrepancies between these countries in terms of socio-economic development achieved so far (more about this in chapter four).

2.1.2 West and Western

Contemporary use of the terms 'West' and 'Western' is political, not geographic. The terms refer to Western liberal democracies organised in neo-liberal economic fashion. These countries control all major international organisations, promote 'free trade' and closely cooperate in economic, security and military terms (Easterly 2006: 7; McEwan 2009: 14). Some authors use the term 'West' when writing about countries which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU), as well as their 'core' allies such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Bellamy and Williams 2009: 40).

2.1.3 International community

When the term 'international community' is used in this study, it is not referring to the community of all nations of the world. Instead, the term refers to powerful Western countries and financial and other institutions under their control. Samuel Huntington (1993: 39) argues that the 'international community' is a phrase used to 'give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.' Similarly, Marina Ottaway (2003: 245) points out that the term represents the 'conglomerate of industrialised democracies and the multilateral agencies over which they have preponderant influence.' It is also important to note that 'international community,' even when referring to powerful Western states, is not a unified block but a complex community of countries and various actors, each of whom have their own interests and competing agendas (Elges 2005: 178).

2.1.4 Reconstruction vs. recovery

Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1072) argue that those who write about PWRD should refrain from using the term 'reconstruction' as this can imply the return to pre-war status quo as well as infrastructure-oriented work only. Instead, they recommend the term 'recovery' which, according to them, implies a transformation into something better. Similar argument is put forward by the African Union, which argues that rather than reconstructing societies and returning them to pre-war status quo, post-war activities need to be transformative and lead to establishment of stable and non-violent societies (African Union 2007: 1). Despite the above mentioned problematic connotation related to the term 'reconstruction,' this study will still

use the term in reference to physical, economic and socio-political recovery, reconstruction and development in war-torn countries. In addition, as noted before, throughout the study, 'post-war reconstruction and development' and 'post-war recovery' will be used interchangeably.

2.1.5 State-building vs. nation-building

State-building is a process of constructing or reconstructing legitimate institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security (Chandler 2006: 1). Nation-building, on the other hand, involves construction of a common identity and nationality (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 5) among people residing in the same country. Even though the terms 'nation-building' and 'state-building' differ considerably, many authors do not seem to see and understand the difference. Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005: 15), for example, confuse state- and nation-building and argue that the aim of externally driven nation-building is restoration of 'effective states and their governance systems.' Karin von Hippel (2000: 96) argues that in many instances, the term 'nation-building' actually means 'state-building,' adding that the misunderstanding is due to the fact that many American academics, analysts and policy-makers confuse the term 'nation' with 'state' (Ibid: 111).

2.2 Conflict and development

According to Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 2-3), theories of conflict and theories of development 'have largely evolved in isolation from one another.' Prior to the 1990s, many development actors, experts and practitioners worked '*in* conflict and *around* conflict' areas but did not to work '*on* conflict' related issues (original emphasis) (Tschirgi 2006: 47). Only in the last few decades development and conflict practitioners have begun exploring how development and conflict relate to each other. This change was primarily caused by the increase in the number of civil wars around the world in the aftermath of the Cold War and urge by many institutions and individuals to find ways to deal with these violent conflicts, minimise their effects on people, countries and the world as a whole and ensure that they do not return in the future (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 2).

Thus, since the early 1990s, conflict and development experts began looking closely into

links and complex relationship between the two fields. They focused on issues such underdevelopment, uneven development and effect of development aid and assistance on fragile countries, aiming to find ways to prevent conflict and violence from breaking out. Over time, conflict and development experts realised that equitable development can contribute to conflict prevention and that in the case of countries emerging from violent conflict, post-war reconstruction and development were necessary for lasting peace and stability. It is important to highlight that this study is primarily concerned with post-war reconstruction and development approaches and practices and the ways development in the aftermath of violent conflict can help build and consolidate lasting peace and stability and prevent resurgence of fighting in the future.

2.3 Causes of violent conflict

Without going into too much detail, this section will provide basic definitions and highlight the main causes of violent conflict before proceeding with the detailed review of PWRD literature. Conflict is part of human relations and cannot be entirely eliminated. Conflicts over territory, resources, identity, religion, ethnicity, values and interests have existed at all societal levels throughout the history of humankind (Burton 1990: 50). Social conflict is defined as a purposeful attempt to gain resources or status, overcome resistance and/or defeat opponents (Anstey 2006: 5). Violent conflict is defined as an 'intentional struggle between collective actors that involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting or destroying human beings, human psyches, material property and/or socio-cultural structures' (Himes 1980: 104). Rubenstein (2008: 58) stresses that 'potential for conflict exists whenever individuals or groups pursue goals that they perceive to be incompatible.'

Mark Anstey (2006: 6) separates social conflict into latent and manifest. Latent conflict emerges when parties perceive or have different needs, values or interests and realise that their goals and aspirations cannot be achieved concurrently. Manifest conflict, on the other hand, is purposeful use of power to 'eliminate, defeat and neutralise' opponents in order to protect or advance own interests. The level of severity in any conflict depends on grievance and injury experienced by the parties during the course of a conflict. Greater hostility and harm inflicted by one party on the other, the level of severity in the conflict will be greater

(Kriesberg 1998: 18).

The most common causes of violent conflict are scarcity, human needs, incompatible interests and values, ideology, identity, structural imbalances, ambiguity, differing goals and interpersonal relations (Anstey 2006: 12). Contemporary intrastate violent conflicts and civil wars are often caused by socio-economic and political inequalities that either create or exacerbate social divisions in countries (Panic 2011: 159; Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 246). In many instances, economic, political and/or security interests of various parties (local, regional and international) can promote, sustain and exploit violent conflict. Maathai (2010: 10) adds that apart from inequalities, competition over economic and political power between various groups, as well as struggle over access to or control of resources such as land, water and minerals, can lead to violent conflict.

Key drivers of contemporary violent conflicts and wars are demographic pressures, unequal distribution of resources, corruption, coups and rigged elections (Baker 2007: 92; Maathai 2010: 185), repressive and authoritarian governance, manipulation of social differences and divisive politics (Busumtwi-Sam 2004: 323). Hanlon and Yanacopulos (2006: 316) stress that in most cases, people 'go to war because they can see no other way to redress underlying inequalities in power, rights, income and access to resources.' Brown (2011: 66-7) adds that a failure by the state to respect a social contract and provide inclusive political and governance institutions, equitable development and distribution of resources to all groups in the society is a primary driver of contemporary violent conflict.

On the other side of the spectrum, economists, many of whom have joined the debate about causes of violent conflicts, rebellions and wars in the aftermath of the Cold War, argue that economic opportunities and greed, not the above mentioned grievances, are key drivers of violent conflict in the developing world (Hanlon 2006a: 74). Paul Collier (2000: 91-2), the most prominent of the economists researching causes and consequences of violent conflict, argues that 'conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance.' Critics of the 'greed thesis' point out that while economic opportunities and greed play roles in some outbreaks of fighting, primary causes of violent conflict remain identity, basic needs, structural imbalances and socio-economic and political inequalities (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 32).

2.3.1 End of violent conflict

To a great extent, PWRD approaches and effectiveness depend on the way conflicts end. Sørbø (2004: 2) presents three ways violent conflicts can end and kinds of post-war recovery and peace-building that can follow: self-enforcing peace-building, mediated peace-building and conflictual peace-building. *Self-enforcing peace-building* takes place after a decisive victory by one party in a war and neutralisation of opponents. In this case, the winning party is free to decide on its own how the country will move forward, without the need to compromise with anyone. *Self-enforcing peace-building* has its benefits as 'military victors are likely to form a more stable government, whereas a coalition of recent antagonists… is likely to be unstable' (Easterly 2006: 293). At the same time, it can also be a two-edged sword, as one-party decision-making can easily lead to corruption, nepotism and authoritarianism after war.

In theory, *mediated peace-building* - after two or more parties in a war compromise and sign a peace agreement - has the greatest potential for success. The parties reach a compromise and then work to implement the peace agreement (Sørbø 2004: 2). In reality, however, peace agreements are often signed after extensive external pressure or through 'deadline diplomacy,' where international mediators and donors pressure parties to follow strict deadlines and come up with 'quick fixes' to complex problems. In addition, parties often do not assume real ownership of the agreement and distrust among them continues to brew (Nathan 2010: 3). Another problem with mediated peace agreements is that they are often based on 'difficult and unstable compromises' that can be easily broken, leading to renewed fighting (Belloni 2007: 97). Dayton and Kriesberg (2009: 1) write that in practice, civil wars that end through negotiations have a higher probability of reigniting again than those that end through a military victory by one side.

Conflictual peace-building is the most problematic of the three. It takes place in situations where there is an incomplete military victory by one party and a peace agreement is missing. Opponents remain in the country or in the neighbourhood and continue to undermine the government and its peace-building, reconstruction and development efforts through insurgency[7] (Sørbø 2004: 2).

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[7] Examples of 'conflictual peace-building' are Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003.

2.3.2 Addressing root causes of violent conflict

Some authors argue that if root causes of a violent conflict are not addressed and resolved, this can undermine stability and peace after war and possibly lead to resumption of fighting in the near future (Krasner and Pascual 2005: 159). According to the NEPAD (2005: 6), one of the main aims of post-war reconstruction and development is to 'address the root causes of conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace.' Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010: 387) argue that in order for peace to be restored and to last, there is a need to 'effectively address *some* of the underlining causes of war' (emphasis added). If countries fail to address grievances that led to fighting, they risk remaining 'trapped in vicious cycles of conflict, deprivation, despair and persistent insecurity' (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2011: 199). Miall (1999, quoted in Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 107-8) thinks that addressing root causes of conflict is essential for 'peace-making.' He defines peace-making as an 'attempt to overcome structural, relational and cultural contradictions which lie at the root of conflict' in order to establish lasting peace and stability.

In many cases, however, addressing root causes of violent conflict could be problematic, if not impossible. Thomas (2006: 197) notes that often, causes and drivers of violent conflict are 'unclear and ambiguous.' In many cases, civil wars have 'multiple, complex and deep-rooted' causes (Nathan 2010: 1) that are hard to track and identify. Issues that lead to the outbreak of conflict may not be the prime issues after a few years of fighting[8] (Goodhand and Hulme 1999: 18; Doornbos 2003: 52). Simpson (1997: 476) reminds that 'conflict is not static. The sources of social conflict shift over time, taking on new forms and manifestations.' This makes even the diagnosis of root causes of conflict difficult (Call 2008: 183).

For all these reasons, addressing and resolving root causes of violent conflict may be utopian and unattainable, just like attempts to 'make poverty history,' end all conflicts and bring long-lasting peace around the world. Contemporary violent conflicts often do not have clearly 'identifiable causes that can be fully understood and for which "solutions" can be generated' (Goodhand and Hulme 1999: 24). Ultimately, relative peace and stability can be achieved and sustained even without resolving root causes of conflict, with post-apartheid South Africa

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[8] A case in point is Sudan, where the North-South conflict had taken many forms between the 1950s and 2005, from a conflict over self-determination, race, ethnicity and discrimination to fighting over religion and resources such as oil.

being the prime example (Call 2008: 190). Nonetheless, Galtung (1996: 271) thinks that even though it is hard and in many cases impossible to address root causes of violent conflict, it is still important to identify them in order to design programmes and policies that can lead to a positive post-war transformation.

2.4 Development theories and approaches

This section will focus on development theories and approaches that are relevant to contemporary PWRD. While modernisation theory, dependency theory, basic needs, sustainable development, local participation and empowerment and post-development approaches are discussed, the main focus is on neo-liberalism, people-centred development and China's 'find your own way' (Schmitz 2008: 94) approach to development. Focus on neo-liberalism is due to its profound influence on externally driven post-war recovery practices and approaches and the liberal peace framework, which is discussed later. People-centred development is explored due to its potential to offer theoretical backing for internally driven PWRD. Finally, focus on the Chinese approach to development is discussed as a possible alternative to neo-liberalism.

It must be pointed from the outset that there is still no agreement in the development circles 'on how we should define, understand, theorise and "do" development' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 172). Decades of research and theorising about development and continuous changes in development theories, strategies and approaches are a proof that not one theory of development works on its own and can be easily replicated, if at all. Instead, development is a trial-and-error approach (Hancock 2009: 74).

The purpose and aims of development have been redefined and modified over time, with development theory and policy experiencing 'constant changes of direction' (Pieterse 1998: 363). While the majority of development experts and practitioners were largely interested in GDP growth and economic development in the past, over the last few decades other factors were included in development thinking and planning (Pieterse 1998: 344; Chambers 2005: 186). Thus, human development, basic needs, participation and sustainability - first promoted by the critics of mainstream development – were over time adopted by the mainstream development approaches (Pieterse 1998: 348-9), albeit often on paper only. While one single definition of development does not exist, it can be argued that development implies improved

standards of living, availability of basic services such as health care, education, clean water, electricity and 'the achievement of whatever is regarded as the general good of society at large' (Thomas 2006: 187).

Critics argue that over the decades, the Western development community has assumed the 'burden' of 'third world's' development, which is seen as incompetent and incapable of improving its own situation without the help of Western economists, development experts and aid workers (Dossa 2007: 890). However, there is a significant difference between various international development actors and approaches to development that they promote. For example, human development is promoted by organisations such as the UN and its agencies, while powerful IFIs and major Western powers primarily promote neo-liberal economics and development (Pieterse 1998: 345). This can create problems in the developing world, with different development actors calling for different actions by local authorities and conditioning their support on the strict implementation of externally designed policy prescriptions. For example, developing countries are often asked to increase social spending by the UN and its agencies and cut social spending by the IFIs.

Despite all the efforts and hundreds of billions of US dollars in foreign aid and development assistance spent in the developing world since the 1950s, the mainstream development theories and approaches have 'rarely matched their upbeat rhetoric' (Dossa 2007: 888), failing to bring about significant economic development and growth in the recipient countries. One of the main reasons for this was that during the Cold War, development policies and practices in the developing world were based on geopolitical and ideological assumptions of the two superpowers, particularly the United States, and not the developmental considerations in the recipient countries (Haynes 2008: 29). Thus, many development theories and approaches ended up standing 'like ruins in an intellectual landscape' as they did not work in practice; in many instances, they only made developing countries poorer and worse off (Pieterse 1998: 360).

Critics of the mainstream development theories and approaches argue that the 'dominant discourse of Western modernity' is constantly imposed on the developing world through Western-designed and led development efforts (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 760). Over the last six decades, structural factors that shape development approaches and practices on the global level have in most cases limited the space for local actors and authorities in the developing world to do what they think should be done to develop their countries and economies (Wills

2011: 233). Even when educational and research institutions in the developing world attempt to study development and come up with locally designed approaches and frameworks, more often than not they take the 'cues [about development] from the dominant Northern texts' (Dossa 2007: 893) and replicate Western models. Instead of continuing with this, Nayyar and Chang (2005: 7) argue that developing countries need to be allowed to take responsibility for their own development and given 'more policy space that will allow them to adopt policies that suit their levels of development and other socio-economic conditions.'

2.4.1 Modernisation theory

Modernisation theory has been the most prominent theory of development in the aftermath of the Second World War. Based on this theory, the developing countries were prescribed plans and reforms and expected to follow examples and experiences of already developed countries. This included transformation from a traditional society, through an industrial revolution and investment in infrastructure and technology, to 'the age of high mass consumption' (Beswick and Jackson 2011: 72). Sørensen (2007: 362) writes that European industrialisation and development were seen as 'natural paths' to economic development and prosperity. The assumption among Western economists and policy-makers at the time was that underdeveloped countries needed to 'catch up' with the developed West and follow its development models in order to modernise, develop and improve the lives of their people (Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 320). In essence, modernisation theory saw development as an evolution from tradition to modernity (Schmitz 2008: 95) based on Western ideas. This approach saw tradition and culture as key challenges hampering economic development and growth in the 'third world.' Proponents of this theory assumed that poor and developing countries had to follow Western advice and prescriptions in order to escape poverty, develop and prosper (Payne and Phillips 2010: 68). Adopting Western values, ideas and technologies was seen as the key step in this process (Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 320).

Furthermore, proponents of modernisation theory argued that changes and reforms had to be imposed from the outside, by experts from 'modern' and developed countries (Payne and Phillips 2010: 71). They 'often read Western history in excessively simplistic and rose-tinted ways,' arguing that 'quick fixes' were possible if only the 'third-world' countries would follow Western capitalist advice (Ibid: 71). In most cases, application of modernisation

theory in the developing world 'made few appreciable differences' and failed to bring about economic growth and development (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 10).

While modernisation theory has not been the most influential development theory in decades, ideas and arguments behind this theory still 'continue to underpin some contemporary thinking about development,' especially the notion that 'backward' societies need to go through social, economic and political change and 'experience a shift in culture and values' to resemble the developed world in order to improve and develop (Beswick and Jackson 2011: 72). Such arguments are often prevalent in discussions about 'fragile' 'third world' and post-war countries. Heathershaw (2008: 610) and Newman (2009: 43) point that externally driven PWRD efforts are often seen by their proponents as a form of socio-economic and institutional modernisation in the aftermath of war.

2.4.2 Dependency theory

Dependency theory emerged as a counter-argument to modernisation theory. It aimed to show that the lack of economic development in some countries was due to the pressures from and exploitation by rich and powerful countries. This school of thought saw development in the 'third world' as a 'process which has been disrupted, undermined or stifled by the West' (Schmitz 2008: 97) due to the Western geopolitical and/or economic interests. Proponents of this theory argued that powerful states, in order to control and exploit weaker states, developed, imposed and maintained an unjust economic and political global system (Haynes 2008: 20; Beswick and Jackson 2011: 72). As Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 10) note, proponents of dependency theory have also claimed that modernisation theory was used to further submerge the developing world in a 'structural dependence' on the West, primarily its financial aid and technical assistance. The relevance of dependency theory for this study comes from the fact that a number of authors argue that contemporary externally driven PWRD operations often create dependencies and 'rentier states,' unable to function without external funding and assistance (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 75; Duffield, quoted in Tschirhart 2011: 1; Chandler 2011: 77).

2.4.3 Basic needs approach

The basic needs approach emerged in the 1970s aiming to address the failures of past development approaches. Its proponents argued that real development improvements in the 'third world' needed to start on the local level and livelihood improvements and delivery of basic needs to all – from shelter, food, clean water and sanitation to health care and education (Haynes 2008: 28). However, even though the above mentioned basic needs shortcomings needed to be the addressed, the focus on the basic needs approach failed to significantly improve living conditions in many developing countries. This was mainly due to the fact that this period saw development aid and assistance being used to suit geopolitical and ideological purposes of the two superpowers and not for livelihood improvements in poor countries. In addition, when aid and assistance reached the 'third world,' local ruling elites often undermined transfer of resources, assistance and services to the poor (Ibid: 189).

2.4.4 Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism, also known as neo-liberal economic theory, emerged in the late 1970s as a response to perceived failures of other development theories and approaches. Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism has dominated development thinking, planning and policy-making (Payne and Phillips 2010: 86; Willis 2000: 29). This was mainly due to the ascendance of globalisation, erosion of control over capital flight, state inefficiency and corruption in the developing world and collapse of the Soviet Union, communism and scientific socialism in the late 1980s (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 11). The extensive focus on neo-liberalism is due to its profound influence on the liberal peace framework, the main externally driven approach to post-war recovery since the end of the Cold War.

Neo-liberalism 'preaches restraint on state intervention and social spending and the prominence of the market' (McEwan 2009: 30). Key factors in the neo-liberal approach are limited government, private sector as the driver of growth, prices determined by markets and lack of protection for inefficient industries (Payne and Phillips 2010: 93). This approach sees unregulated markets as engines of growth and development, which would 'trickle down and benefit all' members of societies that follow neo-liberal agenda (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 11).

In the late 1980s, proponents of neo-liberalism came up with a universal blueprint for development and growth known as the 'Washington Consensus.' Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 16) writes that the Washington Consensus is a 'consensus between the IMF, World Bank and the United States Treasury about the "right" policies' for poor countries. Proponents of the Washington Consensus argued that universal neo-liberal prescriptions were the only hope for the developing world, claiming that neo-liberalism was incontestably positive and 'immune to reasonable questioning' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 94). Key features of this blueprint were promotion of free markets, economic and trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, fiscal austerity (Barbara 2008: 309) and abolition of barriers that prevent foreign corporations from entering domestic markets (Klein 2007: 204), while at the same time marginalising the state apparatus in both the economic and public spheres (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 103; Ogbaharya 2008: 399; Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1073; Willis 2011: 56).

For over two decades, neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus policies have been aggressively promoted, advocated and imposed in the developing world and countries recovering from violent conflict by Western governments, IMF, World Bank and other Western-controlled organisations. The impositions came through the attachment of conditions to loans and assistance which forced domestic economic and institutional reforms and restructuring, known as 'structural adjustment programmes' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 96). Structural adjustment programmes, developed in the West and imposed on the developing world (Willis 2011: 56), demanded from recipient countries not only economic reforms and restructuring along the neo-liberal lines, but also political reforms and insistence that recipients become liberal democracies (Paris 2004: 30). To achieve this, proponents of neo-liberalism insisted on imposing 'universal' formulas, 'rarely giving a thought to the social and political implications [in the recipient countries] of what they were doing' (Dowden 2008: 87). They argued that the same approach was suitable for all countries regardless of their histories, contexts and conditions (Payne and Phillips 2010: 96).

However, despite all efforts, reforms, policies and impositions, neo-liberalism did not lead to economic growth and development in the 'third world.' Instead, the neo-liberal economic theory 'failed dramatically' in all developing countries where it was imposed (Payne and Phillips 2010: 96), completely unable to address poverty, underdevelopment and social exclusion (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 13; Murshed 2011: 174). Poor people in the developing world hardly saw any meaningful benefits from neo-liberal prescriptions and

universal 'solutions;' poverty, inequality, instability and social injustice increased even further (Brown 1995: 14; Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 264; Milanovic 2003: 679; Chang and Grabel 2004: 1; Willett 2005: 570; Nayyar and Chang 2005: 2; Thomas 2008: 250; Haynes 2008: 31; Willis 2011: 58), leading to 'extreme hardships' in many countries (Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 331). Stiglitz (2002: 84) adds that the Washington Consensus policies destroyed jobs and created economic, social and political instability on a large-scale in many countries; in most cases, the rich got richer, the poor got poorer and the middle class all but disappeared. Paris (2004: 166) notes that after decades of neo-liberal prominence, its proponents are not able to 'demonstrate convincingly' that their approaches and policies can lead to economic growth and development. Instead, the overwhelming evidence points to a conclusion that neo-liberal policies and programmes only worsened socio-economic conditions in affected countries. In addition to the lack of economic growth in the developing world, through marginalisation of the state in economic and public spheres and promotion of small government, the Washington Consensus has limited the role and capacity of developing country governments and institutions and contributed to decline of their legitimacy, which in many cases led to further fragility (Boege et al. 2008: 6).

On paper, the neo-liberal approach promotes free markets, free trade and economic liberalisation. Yet, at the same time, Western powers do not operate by free market and free trade rules. Moyo (2010: 115) stresses that rich Western countries spend hundreds of billions of US dollars every year on agricultural subsidies. In Europe, each cow is subsidised with about $2.5 per day, which is far more than over a billion poor people around the world are able to spend daily on basic necessities. Africa alone loses about US $500 billion annually due to various Western trade embargoes that are aimed at helping Western farmers through subsidies. McEwan (2009: 99) thinks that free trade has always been a myth. For decades, in order to protect and grow their economies, Western economies have openly used subsidies and tariffs, which are contrary to the free trade concept as well as their public sermons about the importance of free trade. This, according to a number of authors, is a fundamental barrier to economic development, stability and prosperity in many developing countries (Brainard, Chollet and Lafleur 2007: 20; Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 154; Maathai 2010: 101). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 32) argue that the lack of real free trade during the neo-liberal dominance has contributed to 'prolonged economic retardation' in the developing world.

After the failure of the Washington Consensus and structural adjustments, a 'new paradigm

for development' emerged, known as the 'Post-Washington Consensus.' This approach was intended to address the failures of previous neo-liberal approaches and prescriptions. The aim of this approach was socio-economic and institutional transformation, democracy promotion and good governance, sustainable and equitable development, local capacity building, local participation in development initiatives, transparency and civil society promotion (Payne and Phillips 2010: 148). As the section on liberal peace will show, the liberal peace framework used for externally driven PWRD operations is almost an exact replica of the Post-Washington Consensus.

Critics of the Post-Washington Consensus argue that, while being 'a more humane approach to development than its neo-liberal forerunners' and adopting the notion of sustainable development and 'buzzwords' such as capacity building and local participation, the Post-Washington Consensus does not differ significantly from the Washington Consensus and other neo-liberal ideas and principles mentioned above. Most significantly, it has failed to deal with 'questions of the global structural and political context within which development strategies are articulated' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 151). Further, the focus on good governance and institutional reform in the developing world seem to assume that failures of imposed neo-liberal prescriptions have been mainly due to the lack of local capacity to implement external directives and impositions, and not externally driven and 'one-size-fits-all' approaches to development.

Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 31) stresses that the current global financial crisis has exposed 'fault lines within the ideology of capitalism' and neo-liberalism promoted by the West, adding that this may lead to a serious search for alternative economic approaches. However, despite all its shortcomings and failures, neo-liberalism is still powerful, with proponents in most Western governments and IFIs. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 14) write that 'structures of the contemporary international political economy have been captured by neo-liberal forces' capable of eliminating any alternative ideas from public discourse. Katie Willis (2011: 232-33) adds that due to the 'current global inequalities in economic and political power and relationships of dependence, the scope for autonomous development decisions by the peoples of the South remain a distant dream.' Nonetheless, significant shifts in global development thinking have been taking place for a few decades, especially in terms of the rise of China (Schmitz 2008: 91; Payne and Phillips 2010: 158), and this may have a profound influence on future approaches to economic development. This will be discussed in more detail in the

section below that focuses on the Chinese 'find your own way' development model.

2.4.5 Sustainable development

The sustainable development approach is seen as an alternative approach to development that challenges neo-liberalism and other approaches. There are various definitions of sustainable development. According to Brundtland (1987: 41), sustainable development is defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.' Payne and Phillips (2010: 119) write that this approach focuses on well-being of individuals, improving livelihoods, addressing basic human needs and freedoms, protecting the environment and promoting sustainable economic development. They argue that many proponents of sustainable development do not argue for the economic growth promoted by neo-liberals, but call for benefits to be shared by all (Ibid: 137). However, the problem with sustainable development approach is its broadness and vagueness. Critics argue that this approach lacks focus and could encompass anything (Ibid: 136). Still, the notion of sustainable development and focus on well-being of individuals has significantly influenced development thinking and debates in the last two decades (Ibid: 144). The influence of sustainable development approach on development theory will continue to grow due to the increasing concern about climate change and global warming (Haines and Hurst 2011: 16). In principle, sustainable development is one of the key features of post-war recovery thinking and planning.

2.4.6 People-centred development

Development is or should be about improving living conditions of people and ensuring delivery of basic services to all (Nayyar and Chang 2005: 1). However, while 'the premise that the well-being of humankind is the essence of development' is present in most policy documents, this is often forgotten and ignored by mainstream development actors who are primarily interested in growth figures and macro-economics (Ibid: 3). This, as well as the imposition of development ideas, visions and prescriptions from the West onto the developing world, has led to an emergence of a people-centred development approach. People-centred development is seen as development from below or from within, where local

people act as agents responsible for development, not mere subjects of outside efforts (Pieterse 1998: 346). It follows an understanding that different people and societies have different historical and cultural experiences, contexts, visions and needs and may want to develop in distinctive ways (Thomas 2006: 193).

This approach to development calls for 'greater local control, accountability, initiative, and self-reliance… the people are encouraged to mobilise and manage their own local resources, with government [and other development actors] in an enabling role' (Korten 1987: 145-6). According to Korten (1984: 342),

> To achieve the desired improvements in human well-being, development would need to become not simply people-oriented. It would need to become truly people-centred, a creation of peoples' initiative, and based on the resources which they controlled. Development performance would be judged by its direct contributions to the enhancement of human well-being in its social and psychic, as well as its physical and economic dimensions.

Chambers (2005: 193) argues that the aim of development efforts and initiatives should always be the well-being for all in a society, with livelihood improvements and livelihood security being key factors in the quest for well-being for all. Nayyar and Chang (2005: 3) think that the failures of past and present development approaches call for an exploration of 'alternatives in development, where the focus is on people' and their well-being rather than primarily on growth, macro-economics, markets and fiscal balance. However, with neo-liberalism remaining the dominant approach that shapes development thinking and planning globally, 'the scope of people-centred development will remain limited by broader structural factors, particularly at a global scale' (Willis 2011: 233). In addition, while there is a widespread consensus among many development actors about the need for people-centred development, there is still no agreement how this can be achieved (Haynes 2008: 188).

2.4.7 Local participation and empowerment

Participation in the development context refers to local contribution and empowerment during development efforts and initiatives. It includes giving local people a decision-making role and allowing them to initiate actions they see appropriate for their settings (Chambers 2005: 104). Even though participation was used in development planning and policy documents for decades, the term emerged as a key 'buzzword' in development circles only in

the 1990s. Since then, 'local participation' has been part of most development efforts and policy documents, 'in name if not in reality' (Ibid: 101). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 73) argue that, despite the rhetoric, global institutions and structures that work on development are still largely top-down and non-participatory.

Participatory development approaches aim to enable and empower poor and marginalised people and communities in the 'third world' and help them 'gain for themselves the better life that is their right' (Chambers 2005: 115). In addition, participatory approaches seek to give a chance to people and communities to voice their opinions and talk about their realities in order to 'make their reality count' in development thinking and planning (Ibid: 191). Furthermore, Chambers (Ibid: 113-14) stresses that participation is about power and power relations. He thinks that levelling of power relations and empowerment of poor and powerless sections of any society can positively contribute to livelihood improvements and development.

Finally, local participation can refer to both top-down and bottom-up participation. Top-down participation refers to participation of local elites in externally driven, designed and/or funded development efforts. Bottom-up participation refers to participation of ordinary people and communities in external development efforts (Ibid: 88).

2.4.8 Post-development approach

The post-development approach emerged as a radical critique of neo-liberalism and other development theories and approaches. It rejected all other development approaches as Western projects aimed at subjugation of the 'third world.' Its proponents claim that mainstream development theories and approaches have been and still are only about the promotion of 'neo-imperialist, neo-colonialist and patriarchal structures of domination and exploitation' of the developing world by powerful countries (Payne and Phillips 2010: 138). Critics argue that the post-development approach is too negative, refusing to admit many socio-economic improvements around the world since 1945. Further, proponents of the post-development approach are seen as critics of various development theories and approaches who do not offer any sound alternatives. They only promote 'superiority of the local, traditional and simple' and 'idealise pre-modern communities and lifestyles' while rejecting modernity and influences of the developed world (Ibid: 140-142). This approach is included

here as it could be related to calls from some circles for internally driven post-war recovery that relies primarily on local capacity, knowledge and ideas. This approach to post-war recovery will be discussed in more detail in the last section of the literature review.

2.4.9 'Find your own way' approach to development

It is useful to go back in time and discuss economic approaches taken by some of today's major economic powers. Between the sixteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, major European powers used imperialism and slavery to drive their economic growth (McEwan 2009: 81). Brett (2002: 5-6) writes that Western European powers, United States and Japan 'did not use free markets, cooperation and democracy to catch up with Britain' in the nineteenth century or to manage reconstruction after World Wars. Instead, they used the power of the state to build (and rebuild again after the wars) their economies. After the Second World War, free markets were put on hold in these countries until they were done rebuilding their infrastructure, industries and economies. The inescapable fact is that today's economic powers have for a long time relied on protectionism and state intervention for economic growth and development (Cramer and Goodhand 2002: 887; Stiglitz 2002: 16; Chang and Grabel 2004: 10), opening up only after building internal capacity that has enabled them to compete with other countries (Pugh 2011: 151).

As discussed above, since the early 1980s, developing countries have been forced to adopt radical neo-liberal and free-market policies, despite the fact that there is no historical evidence that these policies can lead to long-term and sustainable development (Putzel 2004: 6). Instead of stability, these policies have left behind 'increased inequalities and the sense of social injustice' (Willett 2005: 570), leading some economists to conclude that neo-liberalism is not a route to stability, economic growth and prosperity (Moyo 2010: 43). As Brett (2002: 5) points out,

> History offers us examples of many *successful* interventionist programmes managed by authoritarian states and *none* of *weak* countries that have voluntarily adopted liberal policies and overcome the problems of late development (original emphasis).

In South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, India and China, to mention only a few countries, successful economic growth and development over the last six decades were due to the developmental state model and 'illiberal characteristics of economies,' requiring extensive

involvement of the state in the economy through subsidies and protection for local industries (Putzel 2004: 6). Successes in above mentioned countries were due to the use of unorthodox methods and policies by states in order to consolidate their economies and support domestic industries and private sector (Sumner 2006: 647; Dossa 2007: 893; Barbara 2008: 313; Haynes 2008: 33). In addition, the private sector was supported by the state only if it conformed to national development goals and objectives. Stiglitz (2002: 20) adds that subsequent globalisation has brought great benefits to above mentioned Asian countries due to the fact that they benefited from being part of the globalised world but 'embraced [it] under their own terms, at their own pace.'

A case that needs to be examined in more detail is China. Over the last few decades, China has posted extraordinary rates of economic growth, helping hundreds of millions of its people escape from poverty and becoming one of the leading economies in the world (Stiglitz 2002: 6; Moyo 2010: 119). According to Schmitz (2008: 94), China used a 'find your own way' approach to economic development and growth. He explains that the 'key feature of China's development strategy was that it did not follow models from elsewhere.' Milanovic (2003: 676) highlights the fact that China refused to follow 'the orthodox economic advice' from Western-controlled financial institutions. Instead, it experimented and innovated on its own and borrowed certain aspects and characteristics of development from other countries and approaches (Schmitz 2008: 100). McEwan (2009: 226) writes that the result of this was the greatest wave of poverty reduction in the history of humankind. Schmitz (2008: 90) adds that this was due to three decades of economic growth at about 9% annually.

Contrary to the recommendations from the World Bank and IMF, China's economic success came from nationalisation, prevention of free movement of labour, provision of free education and land reforms (Milanovic 2003: 675). Still, it must be pointed out that the Chinese growth and expansion began only after significant economic liberalisation and opening to the rest of the world in the 1980s, after decades of stagnation under Mao Zedong and Mao-style politics and economic policies for years after his death (Payne and Phillips 2010: 153). In addition, China's growth and development would not be possible if the country did not integrate into the global economy (Schmitz 2008: 97). However, this happened on Chinese terms, preserving local socio-economic and political structures, institutions and systems and without wholesale adoption of Western blueprints and ideas.

Sørensen (2007: 373) explains that the Chinese example is a proof that association between

Western-style democracy and socio-economic development is problematic as China's progress shows that democracy is not a necessary condition for economic growth and development. Alex Perry (2010: 291) stresses that China is a proof that 'there is more than one way to develop' while McEwan (2009: 228) writes that Chinese economic growth shows that there are alternatives to neo-liberal and externally driven programmes and policies. Similarly, Payne and Phillips (2010: 155) add that Chinese expansion is a prime example that neo-liberal blueprints are not universal recipes for development and growth and that alternatives do exist.

Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 186) thinks that Chinese economic development and growth have been successful because they were 'home-grown,' designed by the Chinese and 'sensitive of the needs and concerns of the country.' Subsequently, China's economic success has led many countries in the developing world to start looking at it as a potential model for economic development (Large 2008: 52-3). Furthermore, rapid economic growth in China has over the years undermined 'pretensions of universal, globalist theories of development' (Payne and Phillips 2010: 158), leading to a 'significant reordering of the global economy and processes of global development' (Ibid: 173). As Schmitz (2008: 96) points out,

> The legitimacy of adopting the Western lens always rested on the superior performance of the Western economies and societies. This superiority is increasingly questionable. China's growth record over the last thirty years is superior to anything Western nations have ever achieved in their long history.

However, apart from a few Western analysts who think that the developing world can learn a great deal from China about development, growth and poverty eradication (Chollet and Goldgeier 2006: 15), China's economic and development approaches have been ignored and downplayed by the majority of Western development and economic experts and IFIs (McEwan 2009: 226).

While other countries can learn from the Chinese experience and adopt certain aspects of its approach, it is probably impossible to replicate Chinese expansion and growth anywhere in the world. Key factors that led to economic growth in China have been its economies of scale, massive workforce, resources and strong state that controls all aspects of life; other developing countries are much smaller and lack many of these factors. Further, it would be wrong to think that the Chinese model could be replicated elsewhere or become a universal development theory or approach. This would be the same as the promotion and imposition of

neo-liberal 'one-size-fits-all' approach to development (Schmitz 2008: 100; Payne and Phillips 2010: 154-155).

The rise of China's influence in Africa and the rest of the developing world[9] – from trade, investments, loans and aid, all governed by the policy of 'no political strings' attached – is one of the major worries for Western powers in their quest for geopolitical dominance, influence and resources (Boyce 2008: 35). The media and policy-makers from the West see Chinese involvement in Africa as a danger to their 'democratisation,' 'liberalisation' and 'good governance' projects on the continent (Large 2008: 49). As Dowden (2009: 166) points out, China does not seem interested in joining 'Western consensus on issues of governance and development.' Instead, China is only interested in the continent's natural resources and trade, leaving ideologies and African politics out of the relationships.

In the case of Africa, China has made a bigger economic, political and social impact in ten years than any Western country or IFIs in six decades (Moyo 2010: 103). Duffield (in Tschirhart 2011: 9) argues that major improvements in Africa and the rest of the developing world over the last few decades did not come from aid and development assistance from the West, but from China in the form of infrastructure development and cheap consumer goods. The Africa-China trade, for example, has increased from US $5.6 billion in 1996 to $65 billion in 2007 (Dowden 2008: 486). Finally, economic incentives offered to African countries by China provide these countries and their governments with an alternative to Western funds, influence, demands, conditions and impositions (Tull 2006: 466).

While some Chinese impact being negative, such as support for African dictators, destruction of local manufacturing industries through cheap imports and exploitation of African economies for its interest, many African countries have benefited greatly from the Chinese economic involvement on the continent in terms of infrastructure development, trade and access to funds (Moyo 2010: 103; Duffield, quoted in Tschirhart 2011: 9). Furthermore, with Chinese financial assistance and lack of policy and ideological impositions, resource-rich post-war countries may in the future be able to reconstruct and develop using their own ways, initiatives and ideas, instead of having to rely on Western governments and IFIs and their

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[9] In 2010, China's development banks became major global lenders, providing loans to the developing world worth at least US $110 billion, about $100 million more than the World Bank during the same period (Financial Times, 17 January 2011).

policy prescriptions and impositions.

2.5 Political economy of foreign aid and assistance

Dependence on external funding is one of the major issues facing countries emerging from war and trying to recover and rebuild. Because of this, it is important to critically explore and discuss the political economy of foreign aid and assistance and the impact they have on contemporary PWRD. As James Boyce (2011: 115) points out, in post-war settings, foreign aid is often used to encourage or pressure local parties to implement peace accords, reform and adopt various policy prescriptions. Beswick and Jackson (2011: 75) expand on this, noting that foreign aid to developing and post-war countries is 'underpinned by particular understandings and assumptions about what development is and the kinds of economic changes, structures and political systems needed to make it happen.'

Out of the three major types of foreign aid – humanitarian or emergency aid, charity aid and systematic aid – this review will focus only on systematic aid, which includes both bilateral and multilateral development aid transferred from the developed world and lately China to the developing world and post-war countries in the form of grants and concessional loans (Moyo 2010: 7-8). This type of foreign aid is delivered directly to the governments in the developing world or international and local NGOs and aid agencies that work there (Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 344). Humanitarian and charity aid are not the concern of this study as their purpose is not to promote medium-to-long term reconstruction, development, political reform and economic growth but only to offer immediate help to vulnerable people (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 738-9).

Even though some authors argue that provision of foreign aid by powerful countries is an act of 'global generosity' (Calderisi 2006: 28), the notion of foreign aid as an apolitical exercise has been discredited (Herbold Green and Ahmed 1999; Menkhaus 2004: 3; Fishstein and Wilder 2012: 8). Foreign aid and assistance have always been 'deeply political acts to get involved in a country's [political and] development trajectory' (Moss 2007: 11). In most cases, foreign aid is given with conditions attached to the funds, aiming to influence policies and reforms in the recipient countries, serve commercial purposes and/or advance security and geopolitical interests of the donors (Boyce 2011: 114-15). This is informed by realism, or *realpolitik*, the oldest and most used theory of international relations both in the academic

circles and as an approach used by governments in foreign relations (Hough 2004: 2; Sandole 2010: 55). Political realism is a 'doctrine of scepticism' (Crawford 2000: 73) that leads governments to act not according to moral and legal principles, but by considerations of power and advancement of national interests (Donnelly 2005: 48; Sandole 2010: 55).

2.5.1 Foreign aid and assistance during the Cold War

The first organised attempt by external actors to rebuild and reconstruct countries after war through extensive provision of foreign aid was the American Marshal Plan, which helped rebuild Western Europe and Japan after the Second World War. Under the Marshal Plan, Europe and Japan received US $13 billion in assistance (about $120 billion in today's money) between 1948 and 1952 (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1070; Moyo 2010: 35). The Marshal Plan, however, was not an exercise in goodwill and compassion. Its main purpose was to promote national and geopolitical interests of the United States, the key of which was to prevent the spread of communism to Western Europe (Bellin 2005: 602; Chollet and Goldgeier 2006: 10; Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2011: 193; Willis 2011: 43). Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005: 377) call the Marshal Plan 'an act of enlightened self-interest,' which undoubtedly helped these two countries rebuild, recover and develop into stable global powers.

During the Cold War, foreign aid was used by both superpowers as a tool to get various regimes on their side. For the Soviet Union and United States, strategic considerations and economic interests were a priority and both powers provided extensive foreign aid to the developing world in return for political allegiance[10] (Annan 1998: 4; Duffield 2005: 2; Tschirgi 2006: 47; Boyce 2008: 33; Dowden 2008: 59; Siegle 2009: 55; Maathai 2010: 30; Moyo 2010: 14). Todd Moss (2007: 74) argues that the Western and Soviet aid were 'little more than bribes' to keep leaders in the developing world on their side. Apart from financial aid, superpowers provided governments in the developing world with weapons and military equipment which were often used to subjugate local populations (Maathai 2010: 33). Both superpowers ignored dictatorships, repression, gross human rights violations, poverty and

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[10] For example, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, extensive Western aid for Afghan insurgents was aimed solely at undermining the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul. Apart from the support from Western governments for anti-Soviet groups, many international aid agencies and NGOs also provided unconditional support to Afghan 'freedom fighters' in their fight against the Soviets and their Afghan allies (Goodhand 2002: 842-3).

mismanagement in the recipient countries and kept supporting their allies even when knowing that they were oppressive and violent at home (Annan 1998: 28; Uvin 1999: 2; Dunning 2004: 412). Wangari Maathai (2010: 31) adds that during the Cold War, 'dictators and bad governance were at best ignored and at worst promoted' by the superpowers.

In a similar fashion, European countries such as Britain and France allocated the bulk of foreign aid to their former colonies in order to remain influential and protect their geopolitical, economic and other interests (Moss 2007: 118; Carey 2007: 448; Moyo 2010: 14). Christopher Clapham (2009: 258) argues that in the decades following the end of colonialism, the most important sources of financial aid for many African countries were their former colonial powers.

Bilateral donors were not the only ones that supported governments in the developing world based on geopolitical and ideological terms. International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), were also involved in the Cold War struggle, providing extensive funding to the allies of the United States and the Western block[11] (Boyce 2008: 33-34). As Paris (2000: 37) points out, international financial institutions have for decades 'closely mirrored the domestic political and economic predilections' of powerful Western governments.

2.5.2 Foreign aid and assistance in the aftermath of the Cold War

The political economy of foreign aid and assistance has not changed since the end of the Cold War. As Boyce (2008: 33) points out, 'geopolitical considerations continue to exert profound impacts on the policies of external assistance actors, particularly those of bilateral donors.' Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 56) write that post-Cold War aid and assistance by powerful countries and international organisations are not neutral. Rather, any support reflects the

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[11] Mobutu Sese Seko, the ruthless dictator from Zaire, today's Democratic Republic of Congo, is a telling example: During the Cold War, the US and IFIs financially supported Mobutu, who openly used funds given by the US government, World Bank and IMF to build palaces and airports in his home village or take the money out of the country. Instead of stopping the flow of funds, the above mentioned donors kept supporting Mobutu, knowing well that he was cruel and corrupt and that most of the money would never reach the people in need (Dowden 2008: 373; Hancock 2009: 178). In total, the Mobutu regime received over US $20 billion in foreign aid from the United States and IFIs over the period of twenty-five years (Easterly 2006: 131-2).

worldview, interests and ideological underpinnings of the funders[12]. Mark Duffield (in Tschirhart 2011: 3) argues that over the last two decades, Western foreign aid disbursements have been underpinned by a 'strong neo-liberal ethic.' Since the early 1990s, Western donors have been attaching political conditions to aid and insisting on state reform in the model of Western states (Goodhand 2006a: 291). In most cases, foreign aid has been linked to democratisation, liberalisation, privatisation and macro-economic reforms (Kaldor 2007: 183; Boyce 2011: 114), based on the neo-liberal economic model.

As Manning and Malbrough (2010: 145) point out, since the end of the Cold War, 'patterns of aid conditionality' have also 'carried over into internationally led post-war operations.' If countries emerging from war want to receive bilateral and multilateral aid from Western countries and IFIs, they have to accept economic policy prescriptions and conditions such as good governance, democratisation and political and economic liberalisation (Englebert and Tull 2008: 113).

Apart from geopolitical and strategic influences, 'tied aid' has for decades dominated international assistance. This type of aid disbursement requires the recipients to use expertise, equipment and materials from donor countries (Calderisi 2009: 29; Pugh 2011: 152), often paying more for goods and services than what is a market price (Hancock 2009: 162). In many cases, recipient countries that are given millions of US dollars hardly see any money; most of the funds remain in Western countries through payments for goods and services[13]. Calderisi (2006: 156) thinks that tied aid is nothing but 'wasteful and inefficient.' Some authors argue that the tied aid concept is still widely used by major bilateral donors. According to Boyce (2008: 34), foreign aid is often a 'vehicle by which donors subsidise overseas sales by their domestic private sector.'

Dichter (2005: 1) argues that billions of US dollars given to poor countries over the decades by bilateral and multilateral donors 'have not reduced poverty in any lasting way.' Despite

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[12] Panic (2011: 180) points out that there are exceptions to these rules. He offers an example of Scandinavian countries, which in most cases provide untied aid, generally free from self-interest. He argues that for the most part, their aid and assistance are not aimed at achieving geopolitical and other interests but are intended to genuinely help economic development, poverty alleviation and promotion of human rights.

[13] Roger Bate (2009: 68-9) writes that in 1996, the US foreign aid 'business' sustained about 200,000 domestic jobs; in 2009, about 80% of USAID funding was given to US companies and experts, who then provided technical assistance or shipped goods to the 'third world.'

the overly intrusive involvement by the World Bank, IMF and bilateral donors through aid conditionality and pressures on the recipient countries to adopt macro-economic policies that donors and IFIs believed were the best for economic growth and development (Manning and Malbrough 2010: 145), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in many developing countries was less in 2000 than what it was in the 1970s (Milanovic 2003: 679). Ultimately, instead of helping the developing world, foreign aid has been an 'unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster,' making poor people even poorer, slowing down economic growth and creating aid dependencies in the process[14] (Moyo 2010: xviii-xix). Duffield (in Tschirhart 2011: 1) highlights the fact that foreign aid has often created and continues to create dependencies that are unable to function without external funding and technical assistance[15]. Dambisa Moyo (2010: 49) calls this 'the vicious cycle of aid' which 'chokes off investment, instils a culture of dependency and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious consequences for growth.' Further, Johan Galtung (1996: 134) notes that foreign aid often profoundly influences and negatively impacts social and political relationships in the recipient countries. Large amounts of money given to governments and political elites can trigger competition over control of the government, causing animosity, fighting and corruption. Similarly, Ross Herbert (2009: 141) summarises past and present negative consequences of foreign aid, resembling the experiences of many developing countries around the world:

> [Foreign aid] increases individual and governmental dependency in recipient nations, distorts political processes, offers opportunities for corruption and reduces the accountability between government and taxpayer.

On the other hand, some authors argue that the lack of economic development and progress in poor countries has not been due to politicisation of foreign aid and assistance but to the failures of the recipient countries to make good use of the funds. Brett Schaefer (2009: 168) writes that since the 1960s, Western donors have given tens of billions of US dollars in aid to

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[14] The African continent is a case in point: after receiving over US $1 trillion in foreign aid since the 1950s, the continent has little to show for it today (Moyo 2010: xviii-xix).

[15] Dependency on foreign aid is not unique to countries. The African Union, for example, is fully dependent on donor funding for its work. According to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who became the AU chair in 2012, 97% of AU programmes and activities are funded by international donors, including staff salaries, AU peace-making and peace-keeping efforts and even the continental body's strategic planning. Only 3% of the funds come from contributions from AU member countries (Business Day, 29 October 2012).

'help poor countries attain economic growth and prosperity.' He thinks that the failure to develop had been due to 'poor policies of recipient countries.' Schaefer, however, does not mention that the vast majority of Western aid was never aimed at helping poor countries during the Cold War, but at securing support of their often corrupt and autocratic regimes. While he is right that a number of recipient countries have implemented poor economic policies and wasted foreign aid, in many cases the polices that led to failures were not designed by the recipient governments but were imposed by Western donors and IFIs under their control (Goodhand 2006a: 291; Manning and Malbrough 2010: 145).

Boyce (2003: 275) writes that today, as in the past, helping bring about economic growth, stability, peace and prosperity in the developing world and countries recovering from war are not the main interests of donors. In most cases, geopolitical, security and economic interests play major roles in deciding where to provide funding and support[16]. Thus, foreign aid often goes to 'friendly' regimes and places that are important on the geopolitical map, while other countries with similar and even greater needs are ignored[17]. According to Carey (2007: 451), in order to accomplish their foreign policy goals, Western powers often put aside promotion of human rights and democratisation when committing funds to their allies. Kang and Meernik (2004: 151) add that the more important the country is to major world powers, the more likely it is that it will receive significant amounts of aid. In this, Western countries are often supported by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF[18].

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[16] In 2010, the British government decided to double its foreign aid budget from 1.9 billion to 3.8 billion pounds but to channel funds mainly to countries that pose threats to Britain's geopolitical, strategic, economic and security interests such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. Other poor, underdeveloped and 'fragile' countries with great needs are largely excluded if they do not pose threats to the British national interests (Guardian, 19 October 2010).

[17] Brainard, Chollet and Lafleur (2007: 26) provide an example of how politics and national interests of powerful countries play a role in aid distribution: in 2005, 'autocratic Egypt,' seen as a key American ally in the Middle East and North Africa, received US $27 per capita in aid and economic assistance from the United States. At the same time, Ghana, with relatively good governance and similar needs, but not as important to the US as Egypt, received only US $4 per capita in aid. The primary reason for favouring Egypt over Ghana in this particular example was the US-led 'war on terror' since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Ever since, the majority of the US foreign aid has gone to countries linked to its 'war on terror' efforts (Dowden 2009: 165).

[18] Easterly (2006: 264) highlights the case of Pakistan, which, only because it was an American ally on the frontlines of the 'war on terror,' has received billions from the World Bank, IMF and US government since 2001. In 2002, Pakistan was the largest recipient of foreign aid in the world, receiving over US $2.1 billion. A significant portion of this amount came from the IFIs.

Despite the Western rhetoric about the importance of human rights, good governance and the rule of law, poor countries that respect human rights and have responsible governments do not receive more foreign aid than countries ruled by repressive regimes. Panic (2011: 181) points out that, apart from Scandinavian countries, other donor countries do not treat democratic and autocratic states differently when allocating aid and assistance. In a quantitative study about the provision of European foreign aid in recent years, Sabine Carey (2007: 455) came to a conclusion that despite all the rhetoric, promotion of human rights and good governance by aid recipients is 'almost completely irrelevant for the eligibility for European aid.' Focusing on Britain, she points out that the British government is 'twice as likely to give aid to a country with widespread repression' of the local population [but important on the strategic and geopolitical map] compared with a country that promotes the rule of law and human rights. Another issue related to foreign aid is accountability. Holman and Mills (2009: 136) claim that since the 1950s, foreign aid has removed the link of accountability between leaders and citizens in many 'third world' countries. Today, as in the past, aid-dependent governments are more accountable to their foreign funders than their own citizens (Goodhand 2002: 850; Chandler 2006: 30) since accountability in most cases 'follows the direction of resource flows' (Suhrke 2006: 6).

2.5.3 Non-Western aid and assistance

Noam Chomsky (2006: 258) notes that, when the United States and other Western powers give aid to poor countries, this is presented by Western policy-makers as apolitical and noble acts and 'pure-hearted altruism.' However, when countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, China or Russia offer similar aid and assistance to poor people and communities in the same countries, Western policy-makers claim that this is done 'for political gains' only. As a case in point, Gerhard Wahlers (2009: 15) argues that China and Russia use foreign aid today 'mainly as a means of leverage in foreign policy, challenging the Western approach of development aid.' It is true that Chinese and Russian aid are not politically neutral. Still, it cannot be argued that only aid from these countries is not politically neutral; all countries use foreign aid and assistance as leverages in foreign relations and as tools for promotion of geopolitical, economic and security interests around the world.

The economic rise of China has over the years lead to a significant geopolitical change in the

world. Apart from China's global expansion and reach, the country has become one of the major contributors of foreign aid and assistance, challenging Western dominance. According to the Financial Times (17 January 2011), in 2010, China's development banks became major global lenders, providing loans to the developing world worth at least US $110 billion, about $100 million more than the World Bank during the same period. This amount excludes direct assistance provided to the developing world and post-war countries by the Chinese government. What distinguishes the Chinese from the Western financial assistance is the fact that Chinese banks provide more preferential financial terms and impose 'less onerous transparency conditions' than the World Bank and other Western financial institutions. These conditions make Chinese loans and aid more attractive to many 'third world' governments. Just like the Western aid and assistance, Chinese loans and aid are not acts of generosity but foreign policy tools in the quest to safeguard economic and geopolitical interests and reach around the world. In addition, Chinese financial assistance and aid are often in the form of 'tied' aid, where funding goes to Chinese contractors to build infrastructure in the developing world (Wheeler 2012: 9).

The emergence of China as a key donor and lender to the developing world – including countries recovering from war – means that many countries in need of funding for post-war reconstruction and development now have an alternative source of funding instead of having only to rely on Western governments and IFIs. In most cases, funding from China comes without political conditions attached to the loans in the sense that the recipients do not have to conform to Chinese policy prescriptions and rules that Western donors and IFIs impose when providing loans and assistance (Tull 2006: 466; Dowden 2009: 166; Kuo 2012: 3).

2.6 Conclusion

This section of the literature review dealt with theoretical underpinnings about conflict, development and foreign aid. It focused on the relationship between conflict and development, causes of violent conflict and approaches used to end violent conflicts. In addition, this section dealt with development theories and approaches that are relevant to contemporary PWRD. Finally, the political economy of foreign aid and assistance and the impact they have on contemporary PWRD were discussed. The next section will focus on and unpack various approaches and practices related to externally and internally driven post-war

reconstruction and development.

Section Two - Post-War Reconstruction and Development

2.7 Key definitions, aspects and dimensions of PWRD

According to the 'African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework,' developed by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the main aims of post-war reconstruction are stabilisation, building and consolidation of lasting peace and prevention of future disputes and violence (2005: 5). Richard Gueli (2008: 84) states that post-war reconstruction is a 'foreign intervention that aims to rebuild a country devastated by war.' Other definitions do not limit post-war reconstruction only to foreign interventions and external actors. Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1071-2) write that the main aims of post-war recovery and reconstruction are to 'reactivate economic and social development' that had been disrupted or destroyed during violent conflict and 'create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence.' Similarly, Wolfram Lacher (2007: 238) defines post-war reconstruction as efforts aimed at 'rebuilding and transforming the institutions of state, society and economy in order to consolidate peace' and prevent new conflict from emerging. Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 89) note that post-war reconstruction is a process that aims to establish the rule of law, security and good governance, promote justice and reconciliation and enhance socio-economic well-being of the people. Soon after becoming United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan (1998: 19) highlighted that without reconstruction and development after war, lasting peace and stability are unlikely.

Paris (2009: 98) stresses that there is hardly a more challenging undertaking than post-war reconstruction, development and peace-building. Peter Uvin (1999: 10) adds that PWRD is a 'daunting task' for any country, including transition from war to peace, resettlement of refugees and displaced, rebuilding of infrastructure, institutions and economy and regeneration of basic service delivery to the population. All these tasks often need to be tackled in difficult and unstable environments. Woodward (2011: 106) writes that the immediate post-war period is often a 'continuation of the war to define the new state.' El-Bushra (2006: 230) adds that civil wars are almost always fought over power and control. The immediate period after war thus 'requires redefining how power is exercised and shared.' During this time, warring parties shift from military to political means and compete over political and economic power and distribution of resources.

Post-war development is defined as a process which aims to 'reactivate' economic and social development that was disrupted during violent conflict (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1071-2). When defining development, Todd Moss (2007: 2) separates development of individuals and economies. Development of individuals involves helping people to find 'opportunities… so they can live better and longer lives.' Development of economies is aimed at 'generating economic growth to raise average incomes and reduce the number of people living below a defined poverty line.' While this is a generalised definition of development, it fits well with the post-war reconstruction and development agenda, where there is a need to help both the individuals and economies recover and improve after a wartime destruction, which Collier (2010: 9) calls 'development in reverse.'

The aim of peace-building is to create a stable environment after war, prevent the return of conflict and establish long-term peace (Paris 2005: 767). Peace-building programmes and projects are intended to address 'underlining grievances and inequalities' that led to war and fighting (Hanlon 2006: 32). Focusing on externally driven peace-building efforts, David (2001: 12) writes that goals of peace-building are reconstruction and reconciliation based on establishment of security and democracy and transformation of the economy into a capitalist system. Gunnar Sørbø (2004: iv) notes that post-war peace-building refers to a number of transitional activities: transition from humanitarian relief to economic reconstruction and development; return of displaced people and refugees; physical reconstruction of infrastructure; reform of the security sector, (re)building of political and government institutions; and promotion of accountability, rule of law and human rights. According to Goodhand and Hulme (1999: 16), peace-building is a long-term process that requires patience and creativity. Binns, Dixon and Nel (2012: 260) argue that the length and complexity of peace-building and post-war recovery depends on the length and intensity of violent conflict – the more destruction, deaths and fighting, the more difficult it is going to be to establish peace, stability and security.

Peace-building is closely linked to the concept of conflict transformation, which aims to build long-term peace after a violent conflict through a transformation of attitudes and relationships among groups and individuals. The key in this process is the move from destructive to constructive relationships and some form of understanding among former adversaries and elimination of factors that had led to the conflict in the first place (El-Bushra 2006a: 236; Anstey 2006: 128; Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010: 372). Similarly, Karbo (2008: 114-

15) writes that peace-building efforts seek to transform and improve socio-economic, personal and communal relationships in war-torn countries while Ali and Matthews (2004: 6) note that the aim of peace-building is to 'revive a country's economy, to rebuild its society and to restore its polity.'

A number of authors emphasise that rather than reconstructing societies and returning them to pre-war status quo, post-war recovery and peace-building need to be fully transformative and lead to establishment of new, stable and non-violent institutions and societies (Herbold Green and Ahmed 1999: 204; African Union 2007: 1). Binns, Dixon and Nel (2012: 260) write that in most cases, 'return to the "normality" of pre-conflict is not necessarily desirable,' adding that if inequalities led to violent conflict, these should not be reintroduced after war.

Even though major external actors such as the United Nations often present post-war peace-building as an apolitical exercise that depends solely on availability of funds, good planning and coordination among external actors while ignoring local and international politics (Newman 2009: 42), peace-building is to a large extent a political exercise. Hanlon (2006: 45) reminds that peace-building is an 'explicitly political' work in which programmes and actions need to support the 'political purpose of consolidating peace and preventing renewed conflict.' Newman (2009: 42) adds that post-war peace-building is 'essentially political work,' especially in terms of the local balance of power and interests of powerful states.

As Albert (2008: 34) points out, when discussing peace-building, it is important to remember that different people and societies see and define peace differently. He notes that 'peace' in the West is seen as a 'social system aimed at assuring prosperity,' while people in many African and other developing countries see peace as a 'product of individual's conformity to societal customs and norms.' This requires sensitivity and familiarity with local customs, norms and understandings of peace and needs to be kept in mind when designing PWRD operations.

Herbold Green and Ahmed (1999: 190) write that even though each country recovering from violent conflict has its own specific background and needs, there are common issues that need to be considered when planning and preparing for PWRD: social, political and livelihood rehabilitation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR); economic reconstruction and impact of foreign aid on long-term development. To this, Krause and Jutersonke (2005: 447) add

establishment of institutions for conflict management and civil society (re)building and promotion. Similarly, the NEPAD framework addresses 'the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions after conflict' and proposes five key dimensions to PWRD: security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and coordination, management and resource mobilisation (2005: iv). Ali and Matthews (2004a: 396-7) argue that post-war recovery involves a 'triple transition:' security transition from war to peace; democratic transition; and socio-economic transition. They add that this 'triple transition' is intended to start with 'negative peace' (mere absence of armed conflict and violence) and then move towards 'positive peace'[19] (reconstruction, development, peace-building, state-building and lasting peace and stability).

One of the essential building blocks for lasting peace and sustainable development is creation of functioning state institutions (Brahimi 2007: 2; Rocha Menocal 2009: 1). Englebert and Tull (2008: 106) note that key aspects of PWRD are restoration of 'state's monopoly over the means of coercion, reestablishment of political institutions, promotion of political participation and human rights, provision of social services and economic recovery.' Schwarz (2005: 433) writes that core challenges for rebuilding a functioning state in a post-war situation are the provision of security, level of political representation and legitimacy and provision of welfare to the population. Putzel and Di John (2012: v) argue that in the short-run, establishment of basic security is a key precondition for all other aspects of post-war recovery such as state-building, governance reforms and socio-economic reconstruction. In the long-run, establishment of legitimate and functioning government institutions and political stability are prerequisites for lasting security, stability, peace-building and sustainable economic growth and development after war (Misra 2002: 23; Milliken and Krause 2003: 8; Kaldor 2007: 197; Dobbins 2008: 82).

In terms of security improvements, a successful DDR process in the aftermath of war is seen as a necessity in order to provide alternative ways of income generation to former combatants (Specker 2008: 5; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 142) In terms of security sector reform, Nathan (2007: 14) highlights that the main objective of SSR is to reform security sector in order to ensure that security forces, such as army, police and national security agencies are

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[19] Terms 'positive peace' and 'negative peace' were first introduced by Johan Galtung in 1975.

'governed by democratic arrangements' and under control and oversight of civilian government, parliament and independent courts.

In addition to all the above, post-war recovery includes repair of fractured relationships among different communities, many of which may have been on the opposite sides during the conflict (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 130). Justice and reconciliation processes are seen as key means that can help repair fractured relationships among former adversaries. Binns, Dixon and Nel (2012: 265) write that an important part of any peace-building and post-war recovery process is 'bringing to justice those who have perpetrated war crimes, while simultaneously engaging in a wider process of reconciliation among all those involved in conflict.' This, they note, is necessary in order to rebuild relationships and trust after war. Over the years, two approaches to transitional justice and reconciliation have been used around the world - restorative justice in the form of truth and reconciliation commissions and retributive justice through prosecution in domestic or international courts.

Various dimensions and activities listed in above paragraphs are often interlinked and cannot succeed without each other. For example, without post-war security there can hardly be any socio-economic recovery and development, reconciliation or respect for human rights. At the same time, without economic reconstruction and development and equitable provision of basic services, it is hard to build a stable and peaceful society after war (Annan 1998: 19; NEPAD 2005: 2; Collier 2008: 138). In addition, it is important to remind that all post-war societies experience 'uneasy peace' (Herbold Green and Ahmed 1999: 191) for many years after war. Roberto Belloni (2007: 97) notes that most of the contemporary violent conflicts end through peace agreements that are based on 'difficult and unstable compromises' that can easily break down. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008: 461) write that the first decade after the formal end of fighting contains high levels of risk. Their study notes that there is a 40% chance of return to fighting within a decade (Ibid: 474) if peace and stability are not established and if citizens do not see socio-economic and livelihood improvements in the aftermath of war.

2.7.1 Socio-economic dimension of PWRD

Socio-economic reconstruction and development are key aspects of post-war recovery. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008: 461) argue that while societies emerging from war

face a number of challenges, two of the most important ones are 'economic recovery and reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict.' Similarly, Talentino (2002: 39) writes that in post-war settings, apart from the end of fighting, the second most important imperative is economic reconstruction and development. Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2011: 198) add that post-war recovery needs to happen in stages. Countries first have to establish peace, security and stability. This needs to be followed by economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. They argue that the final stage should be establishment of a 'development path determined largely by own priorities and resources.'

Collier (2010: 88) writes that slow economic recovery after war increases the risk of continued instability and even return to fighting. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 69) note that post-war stability and peace 'depend as much on socio-economic inclusion as they do on more overt security or identity related issues.' Most importantly, economic reconstruction, development and growth that are not inclusive and do not improve standards of living of the entire population can lead to further instability, crime and even return to violent conflict (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 33; Panic 2011: 181). Highlighting the link between social and economic issues in post-war reconstruction and development, Simpson (1997: 476) writes that 'we can rebuild the social fabric and negotiate political settlements, but unless we meet people's economic needs, those agreements are worth very little.'

According to the NEPAD (2005: 11-12), socio-economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of violent conflict includes 'recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations displaced during the conflict.' To this, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 130) add repair of social relationships destroyed during the war. Key short, medium and long-term socio-economic programmes proposed by NEPAD (2005: 11-12) are emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation and reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social services such as education, health, and social welfare; economic growth and development through employment generation, trade and investment; and legal and regulatory reform. Short-term programmes focus mainly on humanitarian assistance and distribution of relief aid. In the medium and long-term, socio-economic reconstruction and development aim to reduce poverty and provide economic recovery and sustained growth. Ali and Matthews (2004: 3) note that medium and long-term socio-economic programmes and efforts are 'centrally important for lasting peace.'

Mansoob Murshed (2002: 387-92) emphasises the importance of social development and (re)establishment of social contract between citizens and governments in the aftermath of war and argues that medium-to-long-term economic development cannot take place without social stability. He notes that 'restoration of peace' in war-torn societies 'requires the reconstitution of the social contract' among local communities, including formal and informal agreed-upon rules about peaceful coexistence, resolution of conflict, reduction of poverty, fair sharing of resources and economic growth. Graeme Simpson (1997: 475) underlines the fact that wars profoundly affect societies, destroying economic infrastructure and social relations in the process. He adds that, for whatever reason, 'so much international aid for the recovery or reconstruction process seems almost blind to this social dislocation and to the vital and basic need to rebuild social relationships.'

2.8 Externally driven post-war reconstruction and development

This section will discuss externally driven PWRD. However, before moving into discussion about externally driven approaches and practices, key external actors involved in PWRD will be listed and discussed.

2.8.1 Key external actors involved in PWRD

2.8.1.1 United Nations

The United Nations was established in the aftermath of the Second World War in order to address the issues of global peace and security and prevent future world, regional, international and civil wars (Tschirgi 2006: 47). Even though the UN was successful in preventing another world war, the organisation's ability to deal with regional and internal violent conflicts around the world was often limited due to superpower politics during the Cold War. In terms of post-war recovery, during this time, the UN was mainly involved in peacekeeping and ceasefire monitoring. Since the early 1990s, the organisation has evolved considerably and has been involved in negotiations to end violent conflicts, peace agreement implementation and peacekeeping, post-war reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building (Korhonen 2001: 495; Duffield 2007: 26). In some recent cases, the UN has

gone as far as taking over full legislative and executive authority and running countries such as Kosovo and East Timor on a day-to-day basis (Zaum 2006: 455).

Apart from the office of the UN Secretary General that deals with peace-building issues and UN missions, various UN agencies work on humanitarian and development issues in war-torn and post-war countries. One of the main UN entities working on post-war reconstruction and development is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), helping countries that are emerging from violent conflict to 'build self-reliance' and provide 'basic needs and human development' to their populations (Busumtwi-Sam 2004: 335). Apart from this work, the UNDP often serves as 'in-country coordinator' of all UN activities (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones 2004: 375).

A number of authors point that geopolitical and diplomatic influences can limit UN's post-war recovery plans and efforts. Hough (2004: 3) argues that powerful countries see organisations such as the UN as mere 'alliances of convenience between states.' According to Mearsheimer (1995: 340), such countries create international institutions such as the UN to maintain or increase their share of world power and influence. These institutions are fundamentally 'arenas for acting out power relationships' among countries. This setup leads to a situation where the UN can do only what its member states decide to do (Polman 2004: 5). If UN members, and particularly five permanent members of the Security Council, are not interested in post-war operations, the UN-led operations will not take place.

Because of its complex organisational structure, it is difficult for the United Nations to be effective in post-war operations. The UN is divided into forty-seven entities which are run by different units and member countries. Due to the constant 'political bargaining and competition' between UN members, these entities and units hardly ever cooperate or integrate their plans and programmes (Campbell 2008: 557-9). Fearon and Laitin (2004: 32) argue that the UN is not suitable to lead large post-war operations because it is incapable of 'quick and resolute action.' Campbell (2008: 561) thinks that even more problematic is the fact that post-war plans of various UN units and sub-units are often not driven by the needs in countries emerging from war but by the priorities and mandates of the United Nations Security Council and its powerful members.

2.8.1.2 World Bank

The idea behind the founding of the World Bank in the 1940s was to establish an institution that would assist countries destroyed in the Second World War through provision of long-term loans and support. The original name of the World Bank describes its initial purpose: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Moyo 2010: 11). From its founding, the Bank has been firmly controlled by the United States, with each of its presidents being a US citizen. After post-Second World War reconstruction was over, the World Bank continued its existence, focusing on the provision of long-term loans and developmental advice in order to facilitate economic growth and structural reforms throughout the world (Brown 1995: 69; Boyce and Pastor 1998: 44; Moss 2007: 126; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 65-6; Willis 2011: 40).

The World Bank has evolved significantly over the last six decades. In the 1960s, the bank funded large state-owned infrastructure projects; when this approach did not bring desired results, in the 1970s, its focus shifted to smaller projects such as improvements in education, health or rural development; since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the World Bank shifted its focus again to structural changes in the developing world, trying to influence government policies such as public spending, trade barriers and privatisation of state-owned enterprises; when the above approaches failed to bring prosperity, the bank changed its agenda once again in the 1990s, this time promoting the Western neo-liberal agenda and good governance, democratisation and economic liberalisation (Huntington 1993: 39; Moss 2007: 126-7; Barbara 2008: 309).

McEwan (2009: 169) writes that since its inception, the World Bank has been the 'leading provider of doctrine and knowledge about how countries should develop.' Over the decades, the bank has become the largest provider of loans and foreign aid in the world (Calderisi 2006: 5). Despite being a financial institution, World Bank's work is 'deeply political since the economic reform agenda fundamentally affects the political balance and access to resources' (Moss 2007: 80) in both the developing and post-war countries. According to Busumtwi-Sam (2004: 335), the World Bank is the 'single most important international financial institution involved in peace-building.' Ruiters and Giordano (2009: 5) note that the bank was the first international institution which developed a post-Cold War strategy for dealing with countries emerging from violent conflict. The bank claims that its strength lies in design and implementation of reconstruction policies that support macro-economic

stabilisation and rebuilding of infrastructure after war (World Bank 1998: 3). In 1997, the World Bank established a *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit* as well as a *Post-Conflict Fund*. In the following years, the bank became one of the main drivers of post-war reconstruction and development globally; in 2008 alone, the World Bank spent over US $3 billion in development assistance to post-war and 'fragile' countries (Zoellick 2008: 67).

2.8.1.3 International Monetary Fund

The stated role of the International Monetary Fund is to facilitate the international financial system, promote macro-economic stability and provide short-term loans to countries facing financial crises (Moss 2007: 118; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 65; Willis 2011: 41). Decision making and voting rights at the IMF are based on the economic and financial power of member countries. Developed countries are almost in full control of decision-making at the IMF. Since its inception, all IMF's presidents have come from Western Europe, while the United States is the only member that has veto power (Stiglitz 2002: 12).

Since the 1970s, the IMF has been giving loans to the developing countries in exchange for a right to influence and/or impose policy changes the IMF experts think are the best for these countries (Moss 2007: 106). Helman and Ratner (1993: 8) point out that when the IMF deals with countries which are the recipients of its loans and credit, the organisation sets country's inflation targets, foreign exchange reserves and other fiscal mechanisms; if the recipients want to retain access to funding, they have no choice but to comply with the IMF's demands and policy prescriptions. However, IMF's macro-economic stabilisation policies, such as public expenditure cuts, often have negative side-effects in the developing world and countries emerging from violent conflict, 'eroding public institutions and weakening the capacity of states to provide social safety nets, health, education, law and order' (Willett 2005: 576-7).

Even though the IMF claims to be an apolitical organisation, its work is often highly political. According to Stiglitz (2002: xiii), all decisions made by the IMF are based on the free market ideology. Easterly (2006: 129-30) writes that supporting unstable governments with loans, which is one of the key roles of the IMF, is 'unavoidably a political act.' The IMF is also one of the major promoters of the neo-liberal economic agenda. Countries hoping to receive loans from the IMF are required to accept impositions from the organisation such as structural

adjustments and adoption of the neo-liberal macro-economic framework (McEwan 2009: 173).

While the IMF does not have a specific post-war unit like the World Bank, economic reconstruction after war is seen as 'an important concern' for the organisation (Stevenson 2000: 51-2). Apart from providing loans to countries that are recovering from war, the IMF also provides technical assistance and advice on macro-economic issues. As in the case of other developing countries, post-war countries are required to strictly comply with the IMF demands and economic policy impositions if they want to receive funding.

2.8.1.4 Bilateral donors and government agencies

A large part of financial and technical aid and assistance for PWRD is provided directly to war-torn countries by bilateral donors. The amounts of money provided by bilateral donors such as the United States are very often far more than what the UN can spend on post-war recovery (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones 2004: 376). In most cases, bilateral aid to post-war countries reflects strategic, economic and geopolitical interests of donor governments (Chesterman 2003: 7; Englebert and Tull 2008: 138).

Many countries around the world have government agencies which promote their foreign policy interests through humanitarian and development work. One of the best known government agencies working in these fields is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Mark Berger (2006: 17) writes that the United States government formed USAID in 1961 to coordinate initiatives aimed at countering the communist threat by providing military and development aid, advice and support around the world. Moss (2007: 118) adds that the USAID was established to provide aid as a 'tool of US foreign policy.' While the USAID exists to promote US foreign policy interests, it presents its work in terms of humanitarian and technical assistance, goodwill, care and compassion (McEwan 2009: 184). In addition, over the last decade, the US and other Western militaries have become major players in certain reconstruction and development operations, both during and after violent conflict. A prime example of this is the US Department of Defence's leading role in reconstruction efforts in Iraq (Dobbins 2008: 67; Fishstein and Wilder 2012: 13).

Over the last few years China has become a major bilateral donor globally, providing

extensive financial aid and loans to the developing world and countries recovering from war. The main reason developing countries are attracted to Chinese aid and assistance is the fact that recipients do not have to conform to Chinese policy prescriptions in order to receive loans and aid (Tull 2006: 466; Dowden 2009: 166). As Boyce (2008: 35) points out, China is only interested in developing world's natural resources and trade, leaving ideologies and policy prescriptions out of the relationships.

2.8.1.5 Regional organisations

Regional organisations are often closely involved in PWRD operations. For example, the European Union and Organisation for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been involved extensively in Bosnia and Kosovo, dealing with human rights, rule of law, democratisation, police, institutional and education reforms and many other issues (Krasner 2004: 102).

Similarly, the African Union has been involved in numerous conflict prevention and post-war peace-building efforts on the African continent. In 2005, NEPAD published the 'African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework' as an African agenda for post-war reconstruction and development. While NEPAD's policy framework looks promising on paper, there has not been much done since 2005 to put it into practice. Tim Murithi (2006: 21) argues that the main problem with implementation is the fact that the African Union and NEPAD do not have resources and capacity to implement the framework.

2.8.1.6 NGOs and aid agencies

Apart from the above mentioned actors, hundreds of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid agencies are also involved in PWRD operations around the world. These organisations provide direct assistance and support through their work in in-conflict and post-war countries, focusing on hunger, poverty, medical assistance, education, human rights, development and democratisation (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 133). Apart from raising money from the public and implementing their own humanitarian and development programmes and projects, NGOs and aid agencies are often contracted by bilateral and multilateral donors to implement projects in countries emerging from war

(Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 86; Willis 2011: 109). Even though NGOs and aid agencies do not hold as much power, financial clout and influence as bilateral donors or IFIs, they are still powerful actors in post-war settings. In some cases, they provide basic services that are normally provided by local authorities[20].

2.8.2 General introduction about externally driven PWRD

Externally driven PWRD includes a range of activities by external actors, from peacekeeping and provision of security, organisation of post-war elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers, economic and constitutional reform, civil society development, reconstruction of infrastructure and economies, reconciliation among former adversaries to sometimes even running of countries by foreign administrators and bureaucrats. Externally driven PWRD work by the UN, EU, bilateral donors, IFIs, international NGOs and aid agencies is aimed at transformation of social, economic and political structures after war. This, according to Duffield (2010: 5), is highly intrusive political work. Goodhand (2006: 261) points out that neutral post-war interventions by external actors do not exist. Outsiders working in post-war settings are always involved in 'highly political contexts and will be seen as political actors themselves.'

In terms of theories that guide international relations, it can be argued that externally driven PWRD operations are both realist and idealist. They are realist since their key aims are to 'contain conflict [in the developing world] and its international repercussions' (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 4) as well as to promote national security, geopolitical and/or economic interests of powerful countries (Brahimi 2007: 3); they can be seen as idealist too since their publicised aim is to 'save people [in war-ravaged countries] through education, economic incentives and the space to develop mature political institutions' (Chesterman 2003: 1) modelled after Western democracies. Even though there may be idealist tendencies among some external actors, the large majority of externally driven PWRD operations since the end of the Cold War have been based on realism, where key priorities are not establishment of 'positive peace,' welfare and livelihood improvements in post-war countries

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[20] For example, since 2005, due to the lack of local health workers, facilities and resources, international NGOs and aid agencies working in South Sudan have been delivering 'up to 85% of primary health-care services' in the country (Mailer and Poole 2010:24).

but containment of violent conflict 'in the interest of international peace and stability or particular hegemonic interests' (Newman 2009: 48).

The majority of post-Cold War externally driven operations have been shaped by the concept of liberal peace[21], which assumes that a rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal and democratic norms and values, combined with Western-style institutions, would create conditions for lasting peace and prosperity (Wolpe and McDonald 2008: 141). Outi Korhonen (2001: 496) thinks that externally driven PWRD is 'international social engineering' in the aftermath of war. Similarly, Roland Paris (1997: 56) sees externally driven PWRD as an 'enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict.'

Externally driven post-war recovery, peace-building and state-building operations in the aftermath of the Cold War have in most cases been 'coercive and interventionist… drawn on rigid blueprints and guidelines' (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 221). Furthermore, most of the operations have reflected the preferences and strategic interests of foreign governments and donors and not the needs of the people in war-torn countries (Chesterman 2003: 7; Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 744; Brahimi 2007: 3; Englebert and Tull 2008: 138; Boyce 2008: 3). Susan Woodward (2011: 107) argues that international actors see the post-war period as a moment when they can influence 'fundamental transformation' and 'institutionalise their own policies and preferences through domestic laws and procedural rules, technical assistance, support for particular local leaders and direction of financial aid.' However, even though externally driven PWRD operations have been 'major enterprises in global politics' over the last two decades (Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009: 590), this is still a relatively new field and phenomenon[22]. As Paul Collier (2010: 75) points out,

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[21] Liberal peace will be discussed in more detail in a separate section below.

[22] While externally driven PWRD operations have been taking place since 1989, the first comprehensive operation was in Bosnia since the end of 1995, where the goal of the international community was to create 'entirely new structures of interaction in all parts of government and society' (Talentino 2002: 28). Woodward (2011: 90) notes that economic recovery and development after war have not been part of the policy debate among external actors before the Bosnian PWRD operation. Since then, many countries emerging from war have experienced similar comprehensive attempts by external actors. Furthermore, in many cases, such as Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, externally driven PWRD experiments have gone hand-in-hand with Western military occupation (Chesterman 2005: 342; Duffield 2007: 27).

contemporary externally driven post-war recovery approaches and practices 'are still in their infancy' and require extensive studying and research to be improved.

2.8.3 Lack of local capacity

One of the main reasons used to justify extensive and intrusive externally driven PWRD operations is the assumption that countries emerging from war lack capacity to recover and develop on their own. Indeed, war-town countries face substantial capacity challenges. Some countries lack capacity for economic development and growth even before the outbreak of fighting[23]. In other countries, many educated and skilled individuals die in wars while others leave and start their lives elsewhere; a great number of them never return even after peace is established in their former countries.

External technical assistance is often seen as an adequate substitute for ineffective or lacking local capacity in post-war countries (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 795). Proponents of external assistance claim that war-torn countries, as well as developing countries in general, need foreign experts to help them with reforming institutions, economic development and building of local capacity. Over the years, this has become a profitable industry. Moss (2007: 120) points that a large part of the overall overseas development assistance to the developing world and countries recovering from war is spent on external experts offering technical assistance[24].

In many cases, people with experience and expertise are employed to provide assistance. However, there are also countless cases where key advisory positions are given to inexperienced individuals[25] or people without any knowledge of local conditions. Ghani and

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[23] In South Sudan, decades-long wars and marginalisation have created a situation where local people hardly ever had a chance to receive education and be able to contribute to rebuilding, development and running of institutions after war.

[24] In 2005, US $3.2 billion was spent on over 100,000 foreign experts to provide technical assistance to African countries alone (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 19).

[25] In post-US invasion Iraq, young and inexperienced American college graduates in their early twenties, with hardly any previous work experience apart from being interns for members of US Congress, ended up writing a new Iraqi Constitution and setting up privatisation of public enterprises. Some of these young Americans were tasked with setting up and running of Iraq's stock exchange (Easterly 2006: 273), while others managed budgets of tens of billions of US dollars without having any previous experience in financial management (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 50).

Lockhart (2008: 102) write that organisations such as the USAID regularly send consultants to the 'third world' and post-war countries without first consulting with local governments which are to receive assistance. These 'experts,' often lacking basic knowledge of what is happening or what the real needs are, then offer 'generalised advice delivered from rules of thumbs and so-called best practices.' According to Fearon and Laitin (2004: 32), police officials recruited around the world for the UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions are often individuals who were dismissed in their own countries as unfit and incompetent for police work. These same people then go to post-war countries and 'teach' locals about 'effective' policing and the rule of law. Lesley Abdela (2003: 212), who worked for the international administration in Kosovo, writes that very often 'senior posts in peace missions are subject not to finding the best and most appropriate person with the character and outlook for the job, but rather by turn and trading places.' In this case, 'turn and trading places' means that powerful countries, through their diplomats, decide who should run these missions, often trading diplomatic favours along the way.

Local capacity building is lauded by external actors, analysts and academics as key for post-war recovery success and long-term stability. Some authors see capacity building as a main priority that needs to be supported by donors (Uvin 1999: 10; Nathan 2007: 40). Wolpe and McDonald (2008: 141) think that in cases where there is a lack of capacity and skills, local officials and people need to be provided with extensive training in order to be able to meaningfully contribute to rebuilding of their societies. Kumar (2006: 11) writes that capacity building is a prerequisite for long-term stability. He adds that 'if societies do not develop their own [capacity and] infrastructures for peace, peace is unlikely to be sustained.' In most cases, however, capacity building is not the key priority[26] and receives small fraction[27] of donor funding for post-war operations. Susan Woodward (2011: 103) thinks that

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[26] In Bosnia, international donors and other foreign actors have for years lauded local capacity building as the key for long-term success of the PWRD mission; however, instead of building local capacity, the international community created a situation where the country has become dependent on external actors' expertise and assistance (Recchia 2007: 5).

[27] In South Sudan, the country with enormous developmental and capacity needs after four decades of war, destruction and complete lack of education, the international community earmarked only US $22.7 million specifically for capacity building (Mailer and Poole 2010: 23). What is more, a significant portion of this amount was not spent on capacity building at all but on clearing the payroll system of the government and other public institutions of 'ghost workers' (Gurtong, 25 January 2010). Further, between 2005 and 2010, hundreds of international organisations working in South Sudan could not agree on a broader capacity building strategy. Instead, each organisation had its own capacity building goals and programmes, often

international organisations in many cases deliberately do not want to improve local capacity because that would mean they do not need to provide services any more, losing lucrative projects and well-paid jobs in the process. Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 99) argue that external actors are often part of the problem when it comes to the lack of capacity for local governance. Able to pay much more than local governments, international organisations, aid agencies and NGOs 'drain the talent of the government and private sector[28] while lamenting the government's lack of capacity.'

2.8.4 Light footprint vs. heavy footprint approach

According to Paris and Sisk (2007: 5), footprints of PWRD operations refer to the degree of intrusiveness, size and length of missions, scope and assertiveness of external actors. The light footprint approach to externally driven PWRD refers to a minimal involvement in decision- and policy-making in post-war countries by external actors and allows local initiatives and ownership. In many ways, this approach resembles the 'internally driven and externally supported' PWRD that this study is exploring. However, while the light footprint approach exists in theory and policy documents of some external actors, it is yet to be used constructively in practice in PWRD operations.

On the other hand, the heavy footprint approach involves a major intrusive involvement by external actors in all spheres of life, governance, economy and policy-making (Newman 2009: 32). Prime examples of the heavy footprint approach are Bosnia[29], Kosovo and East Timor. Newman further argues that the heavy footprint approach can lead to a 'culture of dependency and a lack of local ownership, where institutions are not organic and thus not durable when internationals leave' (Ibid: 32).

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competing over donor funding and local participants in need of training and support (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 95).

[28] In Bosnia, the presence of hundreds of international organisations after the war has 'undermined the long-term ability [of the country] to develop sustainable local economy and social structure' (Belloni 2001: 165). For over a decade, many highly qualified local professionals and experts refused to work for local businesses or government institutions as international organisations paid much more. In turn, this significantly reduced economic competitiveness of the country (Talentino 2002: 37; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 80).

[29] The heavy footprint approach in Bosnia will be described in more detail in chapter four.

In post-2001 Afghanistan, the UN decided to use a light footprint approach to peace-building and state-building. UN officials argued that the light footprint approach was appropriate as it was important for Afghans to govern themselves (Chesterman 2002: 37-8). As Chesterman (2002a: 4) points out, one of the main goals of the UN in Afghanistan was to 'create space for Afghans to establish their own political trajectory.' The UN mission preferred to do what it saw as locally feasible instead of promoting Western ideas of democracy, human rights and gender equality. Further, the United Nations had no choice but to choose the light footprint approach as the organisation could not financially afford a more intrusive and long-term approach due to the decline of the financial, material and personnel support from the West since 2000 (Bellamy and Williams 2009: 54).

However, when discussing the Afghan light footprint approach, one has to bear in mind that only the UN used the 'light' approach. The United States and NATO, being the major international players in the country and working independently from the UN on stabilisation, reconstruction and state-building, while at the same time fighting the Taliban insurgency, have used a heavy footprint approach. Sørbø (2004: 9) reminds that since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan was ruled by 'foreign- installed and foreign-financed' governments, while tens of thousands of US and NATO military forces provided security and fought the insurgency; this in no way can be regarded as a light footprint approach by major international players in Afghanistan. Zuercher (2006: 8) writes that rather than being a light footprint approach, the US-imposed socio-political reconstruction in Afghanistan has been a 'highly intrusive attempt at social engineering' imposed on the country from the outside.

2.8.5 Unlimited power and immunity for external actors

Some authors assume that in most cases, political elites from countries emerging from violent conflict invite external actors to come in and drive PWRD processes in order to bring peace, stability and prosperity (Paris and Sisk 2007: 9), thus legitimising their work. In reality, however, external actors often assign themselves administrative tasks and responsibilities through peace agreements that are in most cases mediated, written and even imposed by the same external actors or through self-authorisation by the UN Security Council.[30] Tadjbakhsh

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[30] In Kosovo and East Timor, UN administrations that became de facto governments with unlimited powers received 'self-authorisation' through the UN Security Council mandates. Citizens of these

(2011: 2) writes that international peace-builders claim that the legitimacy of their often intrusive operations 'comes from the international consensus around liberal peace and the normative power of international institutions, such as the UN.'

Some overly intrusive externally driven operations give unlimited executive, legislative and judiciary powers[31] and total immunity to foreign military and civilian personnel. Apart from unrestricted power given to outsiders, immunity for external actors in any post-war situation is very problematic given that they are above the rules and laws they are trying to put in place. Saira Mohamed (2005: 829) notes that giving immunity to the UN and other international actors 'means that [staff and] peacekeepers are exempt from laws that the UN itself creates and enforces.' International administrations demand from local actors and populations to observe human rights norms and the rule of law; they, however, do not demand the same from their own personnel (Ratner 2005: 703). Wolfrum (2005: 696) thinks that if external actors such as the UN want to 'perform the functions of a state' in post-war settings, they need to stop finding excuses and asking for immunity for their staff and 'act within the same legal framework as democratic states committed to human rights and the rule of law.'

Still, there are those who argue that without immunity given to external actors it would be very hard to get support and recruit personnel for PWRD operations. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 34-35) write that, if crimes committed by international actors can be brought to justice and prosecuted in a domestic or international court of law, hardly any country will be interested in taking part in post-war operations. In a speech in 2002, Jean Arnault, UN's second in command in Afghanistan, proposed that 'only the highest crimes of UN personnel [or those contracted by the UN) be subject to criminal prosecution' (in Fearon and Laitin 2004: 35).

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countries were never consulted about the missions and the extent of power to be given to external actors (Korhonen 2001: 499).

[31] In 1999, the UN Special Representative for Kosovo was given unlimited executive, legislative and judiciary powers (Lemay-Hebert 2009: 67) and full control of all levels of government – from central, regional to municipal. The UN mission became a de facto government, running health care, education, banking and finance, law and order, postal services and communication (Richmond and Franks 2007: 1) and signing international treaties and trade agreements in the name of Kosovo (Ford and Oppenheim 2008: 89).

2.8.6 Lack of knowledge about local conditions

As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2007: 496) point out, all post-Cold War externally driven PWRD operations have been top-down and in tune with Western politics, interests and ideologies. At the same time, external actors have in most cases failed to 'make connection with cultural understandings of peace' in war-torn countries. In addition, external actors often do not know even the basics about societies in which they operate, lacking clear understanding of the nature and structures of power and socio-economic relations (Brahimi 2007: 2; Manning and Malbrough 2010: 146). Because of this, they tend to start PWRD operations 'from zero, without history or critical baggage' (Denskus 2007: 660). Many Western analysts and experts assume that post-war countries are empty places 'with no pre-existing institutions' (Traub 2000: 75), where everything has to be created from scratch. These assumptions encompass all policy thinking in post-war environments, from institutional and constitutional development, economic reconstruction, to governance and civil society promotion (Elges 2005: 185).

The 'starting from scratch' thinking is a prime example of external actors lacking knowledge about post-war countries and their histories, institutions and social relations. Instead of trying to understand these societies, external actors assume that they are empty spaces in need of Western-style institutions in order to escape poverty and hardship. Naomi Klein (2007: 589) writes that the 'starting from scratch' thinking is a wrong way to deal with countries emerging from war since no society is starting from a blank slate. According to her, rather than starting from scratch, many countries are starting 'from scrap, from the rubble that is all around.'

Berdal (2009: 19-20) argues that the 'knowledge of local conditions and realities… is critical to a deeper understanding of the politics, society and patterns of violence characteristic of post-conflict settings.' Paris and Sisk (2007: 7) write that external actors must have extensive knowledge about countries if they want to make a positive contribution to post-war recovery. Similarly, Robert Zoellick (2008: 78) thinks that it is necessary for external actors to understand the history and socio-economic and political relationships in countries where they operate. However, as one after another author emphasises, in almost every case of external intervention in post-war situations, outsiders hardly had, or cared about, knowledge of the situation, context and needs of post-war countries and their citizens (Poulgny 2005: 502; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007: 496; Manning and Malbrough 2010: 146; Duffield 2010: 11).

Krause and Jutersonke (2005: 459) explain this in detail:

> Most post-conflict interventions follow a donor-driven, bureaucratic institutional logic that conjures into existence a social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of society and social change. These can in some circumstances have unintended or perverse outcomes, beyond just representing a waste of energy and resources[32].

In many cases, donors, the UN, international NGOs and aid agencies establish their bases and headquarters in the capital cities of the countries emerging from war, hardly ever leaving them or knowing what is going on in the countryside (Uvin 2006: 7). They often exclude themselves from the local society in what Mark Duffield (2010: 2-3) calls 'fortified aid compounds,' creating a 'great gulf between the "developers" and those they have come to develop' (Hancock 2009: 128). From Iraq, Afghanistan to South Sudan, these highly protected compounds, 'exclusionary and disempowering in their workings and appearance,' are designed to be used for living, working and leisure. This leads to a complete segregation from local life, with external actors unable to know what is going on in the real world outside the high compound walls, often relying on secondary sources for their information (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 19; Duffield 2010: 11).

Pointing out the lack of interest for local knowledge and needs, Beatrice Poulgny (2005: 502) notes that the United Nations and other international organisations working in post-war situations 'more commonly cite reports from [Western] human rights NGOs than local ones, even though local organisations may possess a more profound knowledge of the situation.' Schwarz (2005: 442) writes that in contemporary externally driven PWRD operations, opinions of foreigners are valued more than those of local people and experts.

The lack of basic knowledge about countries in which external actors are working is nothing new. Just like contemporary donors and foreign experts who work on post-war recovery and

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[32] An example of the complete lack of consultation with local actors and subsequent 'unintended consequences' is UN's planning for Kosovo mission in 1999. The planning team seemingly did not consult anyone from the region to even get the basic information about the society, people, culture and customs (Lemay-Hebert 2009: 75). The mission was named the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). When pronounced, UNMIK sounds very similar to the term 'anmik,' which in Albanian language spoken in Kosovo means 'enemy' (Chesterman 2003: 11). If there was a person on the planning team who at least knew the language spoken by the majority of the people in Kosovo, a basic mistake like this would not be made.

development in the 'third world,' colonialists 'were outsiders who never knew the reality on the ground' (Easterly 2006: 243) but still attempted to make profound socio-economic and political changes in many societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, American and Western European development and aid officials working in Africa 'were often hired not for their knowledge' of the continent's history, politics and conflicts 'but for their familiarity with Western ideas about what should be done for Africa' (Scroggins 2004: 66). The notion of development experts and practitioners being outsiders who often lack basic knowledge about the developing countries where they operate is not new; in the 1990s, for example, the majority of the IMF and World Bank officials who imposed economic and development programmes and policies on African countries 'simply had no idea of the realities of Africa' (Dowden 2008: 277). The same appears to be happening today, both in the case of 'fragile' states and countries recovering from violent conflict.

2.8.7 Local participation and ownership in externally driven PWRD operations

The importance of participation and involvement of local actors and local ownership of PWRD operations are widely acknowledged in most policy documents drafted by Western donors and international organisations. In practice, however, they are not implemented (NEPAD 2005: 21). In most cases, the talk about local participation and ownership by international organisations and donors are 'superficial' (Newman 2009: 50), not more than a 'lip service' (Tschirgi 2006: 60; Boege et al. 2008: 15) and empty rhetoric[33] (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007: 496; Egnell 2010: 477). More often than not, external actors 'flout the principle of local ownership and impose their models and programmes on local actors' (Nathan 2007: 6). Mac Ginty (2010: 399) notes that from the 'conception, design, funding, timetable, execution and evaluation,' post-war programmes and projects are carried out by external actors to suit Western political, economic, security and strategic agendas. At the same time, programmes and operations are presented to the Western public as missions of

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[33] Krasner (2004: 108) argues that the international community should refer to externally driven PWRD operations as 'partnerships' between local and international actors. This, he argues, 'would more easily let [external] policy-makers engage in *organised hypocrisy*, that is, saying one thing and doing another' (emphasis added). In essence, Krasner recommends that externally driven PWRD operations should always publicly emphasise the importance of local ownership and joint work with local groups and elites. In reality, however, external actors would run countries in question and make all key socio-economic and political decisions on their own.

charity and goodwill and are supposed to represent the care, compassion, morals, values and enlightenment of the Western world (Handrahan 2004: 433).

Easterly (2006: 293) argues that many Western academics, analysts and policy-makers 'suffer from the patronising assumption that only the West can keep locals [in the "third world"] from killing each other.' Similarly, Laurie Nathan (2007: 7) thinks that Western donors and experts suffer from the superiority complex and this leads them to impose 'solutions' on 'third-world' peoples and their leaders and governments. Thus, the 'very nature of international reconstruction efforts suggests that the knowledge, capacity, strategies and resources of external actors are crucial ingredients for success' (Englebert and Tull 2008: 134). Cox (2001: 19), for example, argues that economic policies and reforms in the aftermath of war should be formulated, designed and implemented by external actors instead of 'waiting for local institutions to develop to the point where they can formulate and implement their own policies.'

Tadjbakhsh (2011: 3-4) writes that since the early 1990s, externally driven operations have failed to 'recognise the agency and capacity of local institutions' and people. Political and civil society leaders in countries experiencing externally driven PWRD 'often have limited chances to manifest themselves or to be heard' (Doornbos 2003: 59). In addition, local voices are almost completely excluded from the academic and policy-oriented conversation about PWRD; in most cases the outsiders, mainly Westerners, are involved[34] and consulted (Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009: 593). This creates a situation where experts and policy-makers working for powerful international institutions which work in developing and post-war countries consult mainly Western experts and documents prepared by Western researchers and academics. While they may have a theoretical and even some practical understanding of conflicts, poverty, instability and torment in the 'third world,' there is a real need to ask the people from the affected countries to become part of the discussions that are making decisions about their own future. As Nathan (2007: 7) points out, 'the bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained.'

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[34] Dambisa Moyo (2010: 27) points that even the Western celebrities such as Bono and Bob Geldof have more say about the foreign aid and development agenda in the Western policy-making circles than African and other 'third world' leaders, policy-makers and experts.

However, instead of recognising local agency and capacity and supporting it, a number of authors argue that if external actors do not intervene to 'save' countries ravaged by war and design and drive post-war recovery operations, these countries will never stabilise, build peace, reconstruct and develop. Richmond (2011: 37) notes that external actors often depict local people in post-war countries as 'homogenous and disorderly other, whose needs and aspirations do not conform to liberal standards' and who cannot escape conflict, poverty and lawlessness without Western peace-builders and state-builders. Paris (2004: 2006), for example, thinks that international peace-builders and administrators are the 'key to creating a competent, professional, law-abiding bureaucracy' in countries ravaged by war. Similarly, Christian Schaller (2009: 6) claims that building sustainable peace after war depends on external actors taking over significant, if not all, authority over governance and decision-making[35]. Lene Mosegaard Søbjerg (2007: 483) goes even further and claims that people in countries emerging from violent conflict may not know what is best for them. She argues that their decision-making may be based on 'passion and irrational impulses' and 'in the name of their own good' outsiders should act on their behalf through a trusteeship system or international administration until they are once again capable of running their own lives as well as their societies and institutions. This thinking, according to Hancock (2009: 19), resembles the Western aid industry's portrayal of the 'third world' peoples as 'fundamentally helpless,' unable to survive if the rich and powerful from the West do not 'intervene and save them from themselves.'

Korhonen (2001: 528) notes that all too often, local people in post-war countries 'become outsiders in the processes of international administrations that are there to offer the country a new starting point.' Similarly, after evaluating a number of post-Cold War PWRD operations, Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1075) came to a conclusion that the recipient states and institutions have often been 'relegated to observer status in much of their countries' recovery' by donors, IFIs, international NGOs and aid agencies. Hancock (2009: 124-5) notes that this has been

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[35] In Bosnia, external actors have attempted to (re)create the socio-political culture and relations according to their ready-made blueprints, often sidelining local actors. Paddy Ashdown, one of the international community's High Representatives in the country, argued that external actors had to assume absolute power and decision- and policy-making and not consult local political elites as 'sharing political power with the domestic political leaders would lead to delays in reform implementation' (quoted in Ford and Oppenheim 2008: 98-99). He did this in practice, imposing laws and regulations and dismissing democratically elected politicians. However, despite all this, Bosnia is nowhere near socio-economic and political stability more than a decade and a half after the end of the war.

the practice of the international aid and development industry since the 1960s and nothing has significantly changed since then. External actors still make decisions in the name of citizens and institutions in the developing world and countries emerging from war. Even when local people are consulted, they are in most cases left out of the decision-making process.

2.8.8 'Quick fixes' and 'one-size-fits-all' approaches

Apart from the lack of capacity in countries emerging from civil war, people affected by fighting are traumatised, disillusioned and often divided along ethnic or religious lines; social cohesion is damaged, economies and infrastructure are destroyed and government institutions are dysfunctional or non-existent and unable to provide even the most basic services to the population (Samuels and von Einsiedel 2003: 3; Murithi 2006: 16; Paris and Sisk 2007: 1). Where wars were fought over ethnic or religious differences, divisions and animosity remain for years, even decades after war. These problems and challenges facing post-war countries require a long-term commitment to reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building in order to 'normalise and repair economic, political and cultural conduit of local social interactions' (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones 2004: 363).

Elbadawi, Hegre and Milante (2008: 451) argue that post-war operations during which a range of PWRD programmes and policies need to take place should last for at least ten years after the formal end of fighting. According to Samuels (2005: 734), it takes at least fifteen years to 'anchor new institutional or political cultures - especially following a legacy of oppression or a damaging institutional culture.' Similarly, post-war economic development cannot happen quickly; it takes years, even decades, and involves a 'complex and usually messy evolution of societies and economies' (Moss 2007: 10). Thomas Dichter (2005: 3) adds that development is a slow process, an 'evolution of habits, mentalities and ways of being' which cannot take place overnight.

The length and extent of post-Cold War international involvement in war-torn countries have in some cases depended on the importance of such countries to the world powers and their interests (Uvin 1999: 20). Due to geopolitical and strategic interests of powerful countries, PWRD and in-conflict stabilisation operations have lasted for over a decade in countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Western powers decided to take a long-term approach in order to bring peace and stability to the Balkans region and

prevent any future war in Europe; in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States and its allies have been involved in the 'war on terror' and attempts to stabilise these two countries since 2001 and 2003 respectively (Chesterman 2003: i).

In other cases, such as Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Siera Leone and East Timor, external actors have aimed for quick political and socio-economic solutions to complex post-war situations (Sørbø 2004: 16), attempting to rebuild and reconstruct countries in a few years. Specker (2008: 1) adds that contemporary externally driven post-war operations are often limited to short-term and ad-hoc solutions, focusing on humanitarian and emergency assistance, establishment of security and democracy promotion through elections. Abiew and Keating (1999/2000: 91) argue that, while beneficial in some ways, short-term measures can do 'more harm than good' in the long-run. Boyce (2008: 45) and Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano (2010: 5) explain how short-term 'solutions' cause harm: looking for 'quick fixes,' external actors often sideline local authorities and provide post-war assistance and support directly through international organisations and experts, thus undermining long-term capacity and legitimacy of the state.

When it comes to externally driven PWRD operations, ideally, there should be enough time to plan, find resources and staff and learn about local actors, histories and developments in post-war countries. In reality, however, most externally driven operations are established urgently, with uncertain funding and 'in absence of political certainty' (Chesterman 2001: 13). Similarly, Sandole (2010: 35) points that PWRD operations have so far been mainly 'reactive, ad hoc and minimalist,' aiming to achieve only 'negative peace' in war-torn countries. In addition, short-term solutions inevitably involve short-term postings and frequent staff turnover. A number of authors think that external actors need to reduce staff turnover and have committed personnel working for a number of years on specific PWRD operations instead of spending a year or less in post-war countries[36] (Rocha Menocal 2009: 4; Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: x).

Goodhand (2006: 269) writes that most external actors do not think beyond one, maximum

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[36] In Bosnia, one of the main reasons external actors lacked knowledge of local conditions, history and structures of power and socio-economic relations has been posting of the majority of international staff for only six to twelve months in the country. This is not enough time to even begin to understand Bosnian history, problems, needs and complexities, let alone positively and constructively contribute to post-war recovery (International Crisis Group 2001: 6).

two year project cycles. Belloni (2007: 106) argues that reasoning behind short project cycles and 'quick fixes' is that external actors aim for short-term efficiency and 'instant gratification' at home. This often implies ignoring local actors, their knowledge, skills and aspirations because working with locals could prolong the PWRD process. Brainard, Chollet and Lafleur (2007: 5) think that the problem with securing long-term support for PWRD operations in Western capitals is due to the political setup in these countries: 'players, parties and administrations change [every few years] … and [new] "urgent" typically triumphs the "important" on the policy agenda.' There are problems even when there is external support: external actors can get countries addicted and dependent on foreign aid and assistance; in the process, countries recovering from war and underdevelopment give up trying to do things themselves, leading to capacity vacuum when external actors lose interest and leave (Dichter 2005: 4; Trejos 2009: 123-4).

Looking for 'quick fixes,' external actors frequently approach war-torn countries with 'one-size-fits-all' and 'template-style' interventions (Mac Ginty 2008: 157). Often, this is due to donor red tape, financial constraints and bureaucracy, leading to programmes and projects 'with a high level of pre-determined detail, inhibiting flexibility and responsiveness to local circumstances' (Nathan 2007: 7). Doornbos (2003: 57) writes that the 'recipe-thirsty international community appears inclined to search for readily available programmes and interventions, at times apparently irrespective of the factors that have led to actual crisis situations.' The 'solutions' offered by external actors are often outdated, ignoring local demands and contexts; time and again, this has been a self-defeating process and has not lead to stability in the recipient countries (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 5). Berdal (2009: 29) adds that international organisations, governments, donors and experts regularly approach post-war situations 'in terms of easily transferable templates or universally valid planning assumptions.'[37] It is important to remember that this tendency to design replicable solutions is nothing new; IFIs and development experts have been trying for decades to come up with development theories, approaches and blueprints that would fix problems in the developing world (Easterly 2006: 321).

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[37] Berdal (2009: 29) offers two examples: many problems encountered in East Timor have resulted from the 'mistaken planning assumptions' replicated from Kosovo; similarly, many 'solutions' for Afghanistan were borrowed from the NATO's experiences in the Balkans in the 1990s, despite the vast social, political, historic and geographic differences between these countries.

2.8.9 Donor pledges vs. deliveries

In many instances, what is pledged by international donors after warring parties sign a peace agreement and what is delivered by the same donors varies greatly.[38] Donors like to pledge significant sums of money in front of the global media and then deliver only small portions of the pledged amounts (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005: 744). James Busumtwi-Sam (2004) argues that success of externally driven PWRD operations depends on donor responses that are 'prompt, flexible, coherent and coordinated.' In 1998, the World Bank, one of the key international organisations involved in post-war reconstruction and development, called for 'flexibility in programming and design' of post-war operations, arguing that projects, programmes and policies in countries emerging from violent conflict need to be 'fluid rather than blueprint' if they are to 'remain adaptable to urgent needs and volatile circumstances' (World Bank 1998: 4). In practice, however, donor responses have in most cases been very slow, lacking flexibility, fluidity consistency and coordination[39]. Thus, as Chesterman (2002a: 1) points out, reconstruction and development after war are 'supply- rather than demand-driven,' meaning that both external and local actors involved in PWRD cannot do what needs to be done but have to wait until funds arrive and then plan accordingly[40].

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[38] A case in point is Afghanistan. Of the US $1.8 billion pledged for rebuilding Afghanistan in 2002, only US $890 million was given by donors. Most of this money was given to external actors and spent on humanitarian assistance and maintenance of the UN and international NGO offices, and not on medium- and long-term reconstruction and development projects (Saikal 2005: 206). Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 93) write that in 2002, about 70% of donor funds was spent on salaries, cars, satellite communication equipment and a special airline for international staff. Between US $180 million and $300 million of donor funding was spent on the airline alone (no one knows the exact amount as the UN had not published its Afghan financial reports by 2008). Lastly, of the $890 million given by donors, the Afghan government received only US $90 million (Saikal 2005: 206).

[39] A prime example of this is the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, which failed to spend most of its funds between 2005 and 2010 due to complicated bureaucracy and red tape at the World Bank headquarters (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 92).

[40] Another example of a huge discrepancy between donor promises and deliveries is South Sudan. At the end of the war in 2005, the international community pledged over US $6 billion for humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development. By 2010, only a small fraction of this amount, some $500 million, was given by donors (Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 9). Moreover, even that small fraction was hardly spent on much needed projects and programmes across South Sudan, mainly due to World Bank's bureaucracy and red tape (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 92).

2.8.10 Lack of coordination, 'turf wars' and competition over donor funding

Post-war reconstruction and development require 'coherent and coordinated multi-dimensional responses' (Cilliers 2006: 94). However, even though countless articles, academic papers and policy briefs have over the years called for better coordination among various external actors, the lack of coordination persists. There is still 'no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken' (NEPAD 2005: 19). International organisations, UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors work on their own programmes and agendas instead of using coherent and integrated approaches (Brahimi 2007: 18). In many instances, international actors 'pursue divergent policies and partisan political agendas' (Nathan 2007: 58) in developing, in-conflict and post-war countries. This, in turn, can further exacerbate already complex situations and prolong instability (Zoellick 2008: 79).

Sandole (2010: 77) argues that the lack of coordination, communication and cooperation among external actors and international peace-builders have been main reasons externally driven PWRD has not lead to long-term stability and development in post-war countries[41]. Brahimi (2007: 18) writes that even the United Nations does not coordinate the efforts of its various agencies. In 2005, the UN Peace-Building Commission was set up to improve coordination among the actors working on post-war recovery and peace-building as well as to help with planning of operations, raising funds and developing of best practices and strategies based on previous operations (Belloni 2007: 107; Lambourne and Herro 2008: 281). However, to this day, there are no substantial improvements brought about by the work of this commission (Sandole 2010: 165).

As noted before, externally driven PWRD operations frequently involve ad hoc planning which in turn results in a competition over donor funding by international organisations and random selection of often unnecessary programmes and projects based on little or no research[42]. This competition over donor funding between external actors is nothing new. All

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[41] Paris (1997: 78) gives an example of the lack of coordination in post-war operations: after the war ended in Mozambique in 1992, the UN encouraged the government to increase public spending and provide some form of 'peace dividends' to the population; at the same time, the IMF conditioned new loans and support for the same government on substantial cuts in public spending. Boyce (2008: 6) notes that the IMF's neo-liberal macro-economic prescriptions, such as cutting budget deficits, often 'clash with the aim of building peace' and delivering immediate and visible peace dividends in post-war settings.

[42] A case in point is Afghanistan: in December 2001, in an attempt to prepare for a large donor conference,

over the world, international organisations, NGOs and government agencies frequently compete against each other for donor funding for work in war-ravaged countries, often duplicating each other and trying to impress Western donors in order to get a 'piece of the aid pie' (Moore 2000: 15). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 166) call this competition 'turf wars.' Calderisi (2006: 216) stresses that 'rivalry and competing objectives' among international organisations often significantly undermine PWRD work.

Wolfram Lache (2007: 246) points out that PWRD has become a large industry that is closely controlled by powerful Western organisations that move from one operation to another in quest for funding. According to Call (2008: 174), this industry is worth billions of US dollars annually. Tobias Denskus (2007: 660) writes that work on PWRD has become a very profitable 'lifestyle for a small community of global "cosmopolitans" who travel from aid city to aid city' promoting Western values and ideas. At the same time, they are earning very good money and are exempted from paying taxes in countries where they work, further undermining local economies in weak post-war countries (Boyce 2008: 20). Graham Hancock (2009: 80) thinks that, while some people work in the international development and aid industry because they are idealists and want to help, a large number of them are in it only for money and lifestyle.

Finally, apart from the constant competition over donor funds, international NGOs and aid agencies are leading campaigners for more aid for the developing world and post-war countries. They claim to work in the interest of the poor and suffering people while at the same time they are the 'foremost profiteers from the aid business' (Holman and Mills 2009: 137), or, as an Afghan analyst puts it, they are the 'cows that drink the milk themselves' (quoted in Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur 2005: 378).

2.8.11 Impact on local socio-economic relations

Even if their underlining aim is to help countries emerging from war to recover, rebuild and

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UN officials spent ten days preparing proposals for over 400 projects to be implemented in Afghanistan, 'rushing to ensure that the UN, and not the World Bank, garnered the bulk of the aid resources.' This process led to a selection of random projects worth hundreds of millions of US dollars. In subsequent years, implementation of many of these projects ran contrary to the plans and strategies put together by the Afghan government (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 216-7).

develop, externally driven operations and assistance can completely distort post-war societies and their internal socio-economic relations, creating new problems in the process. Too much post-war aid can overwhelm local institutions which often lack capacity to plan and implement big projects and programmes. In addition, large amounts of money can distort local socio-economic and political systems, instigating fierce competition over the control of funds and leading to corruption (Goodhand 2006a: 289; Nathan 2007: 57-58). Furthermore, as Pham (2006: 25-6) points out, local markets in post-war countries could be 'irreparably distorted' by the presence of foreign troops, civilian personnel, NGO and aid workers and the restructuring of the economy to service and accommodate the influx of foreigners[43]. Misra (2002: 17) adds that the presence of a large number of external actors can also lead to a development of 'parasitic' economic environment, such as a thriving prostitution industry that existed to serve peacekeepers and peace-builders in the Balkans, Cambodia and many countries in Africa since the early 1990s.

2.8.12 Accountability

At the time when accountability of local leaders and political elites to the citizens is the key for transformation and normalisation in societies recovering from war, interventions by donors frequently promote external while sidelining internal accountability (Englebert and Tull 2008: 139). David Chandler (2006: 30) explains that aid conditionality, imposed by bilateral donors and institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, often creates a situation where 'non-Western states… are more accountable to international policy-makers than to their own people[44].' Jonathan Goodhand (2002: 850) adds that foreign aid and externally driven PWRD in most cases create dependencies and 'rentier states that are unaccountable to their citizens.'

In the current externally driven PWRD setup, apart from local political elites being accountable to donors and not their population, there do not exist mechanisms that would

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[43] In Bosnia, the most profitable industry that emerged after the war was catering to the needs of external actors, from accommodation, food, entertainment and luxury goods (Misra 2002: 22).

[44] In Mozambique, foreign aid financed over 50% of the government budget in 2007 (AfDB/OECD 2008: 465), making the government more accountable to donors who provided the funding rather than the citizens.

make donors and other international actors accountable to citizens and institutions in post-war countries[45] (James Boyce 2008: 15; Egnell 2010: 473). Outi Korhonen (2001: 526) writes that external actors and administrators working for the UN or other international organisations are 'virtually untouchable by any social or legal consequences of their administrative conduct.' Even if they make fundamental mistakes and negatively influence reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building after war, they know they will not be held accountable and will be able to leave these countries without any fear of having to answer difficult questions or be prosecuted.

2.8.13 Transitional justice

Transitional justice is a major component of externally driven post-war recovery operations. Sriram (2009: 116) explains that there are various opinions and arguments in the literature about transitional justice and accountability for wartime crimes and abuses. The first argument is that it is necessary to hold those who have committed crimes accountable in the court of law in order to build stability and peace. This approach is known as 'retributive justice' (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 108). Newman (2009: 43-4) writes that this is the primary approach promoted by external actors. Sriram (2009: 121) adds that 'repertoires for accountability are largely formulated by external actors' in the aftermath of war. Since the end of the Cold War, special international tribunals were established to deal with war crimes suspects from the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Following these ad hoc courts, a permanent International Criminal Court was established in 1998 to deal with war crimes, crimes against humanity and other violations in armed conflicts around the world (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 115-16). In addition, many countries also have domestic war crimes tribunals which are not the jurisdiction of international courts.

According to the second argument, to complement post-violent conflict/post-war peace-building, it is better to use truth commissions[46] rather than trials, as truth commissions are

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[45] In Kosovo and East Timor, there was no way for local people and elites to even 'question, challenge or overview' externally driven PWRD operations, practices and decisions (Korhonen 2001: 501), let alone make external actors accountable to citizens and local institutions.

[46] Truth commissions after violent conflict were used in countries such as South Africa, Chile, Argentina and El Salvador.

seen as a better approach for public dialogue, reconciliation and accountability for past crimes than what can be achieved through retributive justice and trials (Sriram 2009: 116). This approach is known as 'restorative justice' (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 108) and is in most cases driven by domestic actors and supported by the international community. The third argument about transitional justice is that, in order to preserve peace and stability, accountability for past crimes 'ought to be eschewed' (Sriram 2009: 116) and people who have suffered during the war should move on without holding anyone accountable in any way for the past wrongdoings.

The role of both truth commissions and war crimes tribunals is to deal with 'historical memory' and establishment of 'facts' about violent conflict. The aim of both approaches is to 'deflate' the spiral of violence, accusations and revenge through a process of 'truth-telling' and either restorative or retributive justice (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 117-18). Sriram (2009: 120) highlights that some form of transitional justice after war is 'absolutely necessary' but the question often is in what form. The insistence on holding perpetrators of war crimes and human rights abuses accountable is 'likely to generate tensions and exacerbate conflict,' thus undermining peace-building efforts (Ibid: 112). This is especially the case because those who are suspected of committing crimes and abuses are often the wartime elites who have transformed themselves into political elites after war, with significant following in the society and capacity to undermine stability. Sriram adds that in some instances, the 'pursuit of legal accountability may serve to hamper reconciliation and help to reify divides in society' (Ibid: 119). In addition, international war crimes trials are very expensive and often slow in bringing perpetrators to justice (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 115). Mac Ginty and Williams further explain that 'there is not yet evidence, for or against, to have a judgement on the effectiveness' of war crimes tribunals in helping bring peace, stability and reconciliation after war (Ibid: 115).

The truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in South Africa is a prime example of the use of restorative transitional justice approach to deal with the difficult past. Instead of holding apartheid-era perpetrators of violence, human rights abuses and other crimes accountable in courts, perpetrators were offered amnesty in return for full disclosure about the crimes they had committed during apartheid. At the same time, the TRC gave a chance to the victims, many of whom suffered in silence for decades, to speak out about their ordeal (Maathai 2010: 207). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 119) think that it is still difficulty to say what the long-

term effect the TRC will have on the South African society and future stability.

In many post-war countries, legal systems are weak or completely destroyed; in some societies the formal justice sector has never been a significant provider of justice mechanisms. In such countries, people often rely on traditional justice structures for accountability (Sriram 2009: 121-2). In Rwanda, for example, traditional courts were used after the 1994 genocide because the country's justice sector could not handle a large number of suspected genocide perpetrators (Ibid: 123). However, as Newman (2009: 43-4) points out, traditional forms of justice and reconciliation have been in most other cases ignored and sidelined by external actors, with preference given almost exclusively to international and domestic war crimes trials. Still, it is important not to romanticise traditional justice systems and mechanisms; local forms of justice are not necessarily better just because they are indigenous (Sriram 2009: 124).

2.8.14 Civil society promotion

Support for the civil society sector in war-torn and developing countries has become a fashionable activity among Western donors and hundreds of international NGOs since the early 1990s. Some authors write that local civil society groups and NGOs have a 'unique potential for linking [people] across previously violent political divides' (El-Bushra 2006a: 249). Maathai (2010: 11) explains that civil society groups can play a very important role in any society, working on and campaigning for the promotion of human rights, good governance, accountability, poverty alleviation and other issues.

However, since the end of the Cold War, many local civil society groups and organisations have been established in post-war countries for the sole purpose of attracting foreign funds and implementing donor agendas. Laurie Nathan (2007: 58) thinks that 'many of the NGOs that spring up in response to funding opportunities have little legitimacy and are really expressions of private enterprise' instead of genuine campaigners for good governance, human rights and accountability. According to Mary Kaldor (2007: 141), the civil society concept, modelled after civil society groups in the West, has been 'taken up by the global institutions and Western governments' as part of their democracy promotion and neo-liberal agenda. In most cases, external actors arrive to post-war countries with ready-made blueprints, supporting and funding establishment of local civil society organisations. The

newly created civil society groups are then expected to work on external actors' objectives (Paris and Sisk 2007: 6; Bradbury 2008: 172) and implement their socio-economic and political agendas (Richmond and Franks 2008: 31).

In many countries emerging from violent conflict and instability, Western donors frequently use local civil society groups and NGOs to interfere into local politics and support certain local parties over others (Misra 2002: 17). As Michael Lund (2006: 3) points out, donors often fund local organisations 'to mount "people power" campaigns… aimed at opening up political regimes to opposition parties and ousting leaders holding onto power through irregular methods.' Uvin (2006: 8) notes that despite all the rhetoric about externally supported development and aid programmes being neutral and lacking political bias, local NGOs and civil society organisations in the developing world and post-war countries are often selected and supported 'based on their opposition to a government.' While many countries around the world badly need 'people power' campaigns and freedom of expression, this interference by Western donors is nothing but support for regime change in order to suit Western geopolitical and strategic interests.

While a strong local NGO and civil society sector is important for an effective functioning of any society, Richmond and Franks (2007: 7) question sustainability of externally driven and funded groups, which are often not rooted in the needs and aspirations of post-war societies but in international community's quest to impose its preferred solutions. They add that in many cases, local civil society groups remain nothing but 'an imagined community – a figment of aspiring international imaginations.' Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 83) add that civil society groups initiated, created and/or funded by external actors tend to be artificial and unsustainable, without roots in the actual society.

Often, outsiders arrive in developing countries or countries emerging from violent conflict with an assumption that they have to assist in building a civil society from scratch in places that completely lack 'civility,' antagonising local populations[47] (Belloni 2001: 169). Another problem with externally driven and funded civil society promotion is the fact that local

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[47] Belloni (2001: 169) writes that since the mid-1990s, many Bosnians have found the international community's support for civil society building to be an offensive attempt to portray them as uncivilised and teach them 'proper' ways and norms required for 'civilised' behaviour. According to Talentino (2002: 37), many external actors arrived to Bosnia hoping to 'teach [locals] to think in a different manner than they are accustomed to' in order to transform their socio-political structures and adopt civic responsibility.

groups and NGOs that emerge out of these processes are all too often led by small urban and educated groups of people which know how to speak donor language. Furthermore, in many ways, civil society groups that emerge after wars become new non-governmental elites able to make good living from cooperation with donors. At the same time, the majority of citizens in these countries who are not connected to international donors and organisations remain trapped in their misery despite all efforts by external actors (Belloni 2001: 177; Richmond and Franks 2008: 32).

2.8.15 Positive contributions by external actors

While the majority of this section is critical of externally driven efforts, it would be unfair to be only critical of external actors' work. External efforts often provide significant help and assistance to countries and populations recovering from war. International and regional organisations, such as the UN and African Union, are helping end violent conflicts through diplomacy and negotiations (Woodward 2011: 96). International peacekeepers, whether from the UN, NATO or African Union, assist with post-war stabilisation and peacekeeping in many war zones and post-war countries around the world (David 2001: 23).

Many international donors and organisations have capacity and funding to positively contribute to PWRD. In many cases, people with experience, expertise and knowledge about local conditions are employed by international organisations to provide assistance. In the aftermath of fighting, international organisations such as the UN and its various agencies help refugees and displaced, assist with demining, emergency and humanitarian assistance, help rebuild destroyed infrastructure and institutions, deliver basic services such as health care and support vulnerable groups such as women and children (Paris 2004: 106).

2.9 Interventionism, securitisation and politicisation of reconstruction and development

As mentioned in chapter one, 'weak' and 'fragile' states are those states which are displaying poor governance and lack of accountability and whose institutions are vulnerable to crisis and breakdown (Putzel 2001: 1; Rocha Menocal 2009: 1). 'Failed states' are states that cannot provide security, order, representation and basic services to their citizens (Milliken and Krause 2003: 2). Karbo (2008: 126-7) goes further and argues that 'failed' states are those

states that experience severe economic decline, loss of legitimacy, social unrest and identity-based divisions. Such states are seen as significant sources of instability, both for their populations and the world (Rocha Menocal 2009: 1). Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 4) write that 'fragile' and 'failed' states are 'at the hearth of a worldwide systemic crisis,' creating a situation where people in the Western world cannot 'take their security for granted.' According to Stephen Ellis (2005: 2), two key dangers posed by 'failed' and 'fragile' states are the possibility that they can cooperate with anti-Western forces and offer them support and assistance. Robert Zoellick (2008: 68), former president of the World Bank, sees 'fragile' and 'failed' states as the 'toughest development challenge of our era,' while Pauline Baker (2007: 85) argues that 'failing' states are 'driving forces of a growing world disorder.'

On the other hand, there are many who criticise the use of such simplistic terms to describe very complex situations. For Pham (2006: 14), the assumptions that 'fragile' and 'failed' states are threats to the West are nothing but the *realpolitik* considerations. Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano (2010: vi) argue that the use of the above mentioned terms 'can lead to an oversimplification of multiple factors that drive fragility and its diverse expressions and hinder effective engagement.' Baker (2007: 87) reminds that root causes that lead to fragility are complex, ranging from historical inequalities, colonialism, Cold War politics, to authoritarianism, lack of capacity to govern and corruption. Other authors think that misuse of these terms goes beyond the basic oversimplification and touches on the current geopolitical state of the world. Noam Chomsky (2006: 1) writes that these 'currently fashionable' terms are 'conveniently applied to states regarded as potential threats' to American and Western European security and other interests and used to galvanise public support for military missions or diplomatic pressures against such states.

2.9.1 Post-Cold War interventionism

During the Cold War, state sovereignty was seen and (often) respected and protected as a 'fundamental right.' Key aspects of state sovereignty, entrenched in the UN Charter, were self-government and non-intervention in affairs of other independent nations. While not always respected, this began to change radically after the Cold War, when the focus began shifting from the 'rights of states' to 'rights of individuals.' State sovereignty was no longer seen as a deterrent to external interventions by powerful Western states as long as they saw

national security, geopolitical or economic interests in a particular region or country (Chandler 2006: 26-7). Thus, since the early 1990s, Western powers led by the United States have had a free hand to intervene in 'fragile' and 'failed' states (Chandler 2006a: 480). The subsequent two decades saw the first Gulf War, interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and finally invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. These interventions were aimed at 'controlling and disciplining non-Western governments and populations… and preventing the disorder and instability of underdeveloped regions from spilling over to industrialised countries' (Borges and Jose Santos 2009: 77). As Julien Barbara (2008: 308) points out, 'failed' and 'fragile' states have become 'green-field sites' where international experts and organisations are testing various political and development theories and hypotheses, hoping to find solutions to underdevelopment and instability.

Many post-Cold War externally driven operations and interventions in 'fragile' and 'failed' states have been labelled as humanitarian (Duffield 2007: 127), presumably influenced by the needs in war-torn countries rather than geopolitical and economic interests of powerful countries. Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 782), for example, argue that 'the greater the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must be' in countries under distress. This, however, does not happen in practice. Not all post-Cold War violent conflicts and large-scale sufferings of civilians receive equal attention from major world powers[48]. Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 8) explain that the international community reacts to violent conflict around the world in two distinct ways: it either intervenes and imposes international preferences or completely neglects countries. Michael Ignatieff (2005: 65-6) reminds that world powers are not interested to intervene in troubled states if they do not pose strategic or security challenges to their interests. Similarly, Chesterman (2003: 5) and Fearon and Laitin (2004: 28) point out that politics and interests of powerful countries play key roles in deciding where to intervene.

2.9.2 Securitisation and politicisation of PWRD

Even though the securitisation and politicisation of PWRD began in the aftermath of the Cold War, it became prevalent after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Since

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[48] For example, in 1994, the Rwandan genocide was completely ignored by the international community, preoccupied at that time with the Bosnian conflict.

then, the major issue in the West has become how 'fragile,' 'weak' and 'failed' states are affecting the West and its security; at the same time, security, stability, economic development and basic services for the citizens in 'fragile' states are of lesser importance (Willett 2005: 570; Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009: 587; Fishstein and Wilder 2012: 8). Tschirgi (2006: 62) writes that,

> The current policy declarations on the security-development nexus serve to reveal the great chasm between global vulnerabilities that cut across human, national and international levels and the structural shortcomings of an international system that is shaped by the national interests of its member states.

McEwan (2009: 147) argues that since 11 September 2001, stabilisation, economic reconstruction and development in war-torn countries have become major factors in Western security discussions, discourses and policy-making. Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1076-7) think that the events of 11 September 2001 led to the 'greatest transformation' of interventionism. This transformation has involved the realignment of Western aid and assistance 'alongside counterterrorism goals[49], democratisation agenda and the military.'

Christopher Clapham (2003: 25) writes that 'core states' (powerful Western states) fear that instability in 'fragile' states can affect their own security, development and economic prosperity. Mark Duffield (2007: 1) notes that the West regularly invokes the 'globalisation argument' when discussing threats from and responses to 'fragile' and 'failed' states. According to this argument, poverty, conflicts, economic crises and environmental disasters anywhere in the world are destabilising the West since they are not limited to the 'third world' countries or regions alone, but can easily and quickly spread around the globe. To minimise these threats, Western powers see themselves as 'saviours' of the world from instability through military interventions and impositions of Western-style democracy and the neo-liberal economic model.

A number of authors argue that establishment of security is a key precondition for economic, social and political reconstruction and development in countries emerging from violent conflict (Krause and Jutersonke 2005: 455; Schwarz 2005: 437; Specker 2008: 4; Boege et al. 2008: 4). Robert Zoellick (2008: 69) writes that there is a need to 'secure development' in

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[49] According to the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, American stabilisation and reconstruction efforts since 2001 have been 'an essential component of the US strategy… to defeat al-Qaeda and ensure that terrorists cannot operate from Afghan territory' (SIGAR 2012: 11).

'fragile' and post-war societies. He thinks that in the first stage of post-war recovery, security is essential but needs to be followed by livelihood improvements and medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development in order to 'smooth the transition from conflict to peace.' Indeed, if security is not established after violent conflict, it is unlikely that substantial reconstruction, development and peace-building can take place. However, the US 'war on terror' that began in 2001 has completely distorted the security-reconstruction/development nexus; security after war is becoming the primary concern of external actors, who are in most cases driven by their own security aims and interests. Local people in war-torn countries, their security and other basic needs are sidelined, if not completely ignored[50], in the quest to promote and improve Western security[51] (Willett 2005: 570; Fishstein and Wilder 2012: 8).

Politicisation and securitisation of reconstruction, development and humanitarian work has gone so far that some authors, such as Candace Karp (2007: 7), think that a close relationship between international development agencies and NGOs and Western military actors in strategically important countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq is a 'crucial element of state-building,' reconstruction and development efforts[52]. According to Karp, in these two countries international organisations, US military and NATO are fighting the same fight

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[50] Christopher Coyne (2008: 17) provides an example from Afghanistan: in 2004, the USAID implemented a project worth US $73 million aimed at refurbishing old and constructing new schools and clinics throughout the country. The USAID did not care about quality of the work; buildings had to be completed before the 2004 Afghan presidential elections in order to help a candidate supported by the United States as well as to show reconstruction progress back at home in the US. Subsequently, owing to the hasty progress and use of construction material of poor quality, many schools and clinics collapsed after the first snow later that year.

[51] A prime example of this is spending on security in post-Taliban Afghanistan, where the United States government invested heavily in the Afghan security sector. Between 2001 and June 2012, out of US $89 billion that the US government appropriated for reconstruction in Afghanistan, over US $52 billion was spent on security and training of the Afghan army (SIGAR 2012: 53). James Boyce (2008: 30) notes that the official spending on the security sector in 2003-4 and 2005-6 was equivalent to 494% of Afghanistan's entire revenue, about one-third of country's GDP. Quoting the World Bank reports, Boyce adds that security expenditures in Afghanistan 'will exceed forecast domestic revenues for some years to come' and that this overspending on the army is completely 'unaffordable and fiscally unsustainable.' Due to overspending on the security sector, which some may argue is necessary given the instability since the US-led invasion in 2001, there have been hardly any funds left for even the most basic services, let alone long-term reconstruction and development projects.

[52] More than any other places, Afghanistan and Iraq have seen securitisation of reconstruction and development aimed at safeguarding American and Western political, national security and economic interests instead of promoting and implementing meaningful reconstruction and recovery (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 19). Mark Duffield (2007: 128) argues that this has led to a situation where '"their" [Afghan and Iraqi] development is only important in so far as it contributes to "our" [Western] security.'

against the 'Islamist insurgency.' Similarly, Mark Ward (2007: 8), a high-ranking USAID official working in Afghanistan, argues that post-war reconstruction and development in countries important to the United States 'play a key role in [ensuring American] national security.' He emphasises that, given today's challenges, USAID often works in fragile and in-conflict countries in conjunction with the US army[53] to promote development (Ward 2007: 10).

On the other hand, a number of authors argue that in any conflict and post-war situation, there must be a clear separation between external military actors on one side and humanitarian, development and NGO actors on the other side (Kaldor 2007: 196; Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: vi). The above mentioned practices have led to a situation where international NGOs, development and aid agencies working in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan are not seen neutral by many locals but the same as the US and other Western occupying forces. Consequently, many development and aid workers have been targeted by 'insurgents' who see them as enemy collaborators and spies (Duffield 2007: 130-1).

2.9.3 Human security vs. international security

Since the end of the Cold War, the notion of human security has become a prominent concept seen by many external actors as a desired end goal for conflict zones and countries recovering from war. Roland Paris (2001: 87) defines human security as provision of welfare to ordinary people. Key indicators of human security are provision of health care, education and other basic needs, poverty eradication, political freedom and democratic governance (Ibid: 94). Kofi Annan (1998: 2), former UN Secretary General, argues that human security and human development are necessary for conflict prevention, peace-building and lasting peace. Mary Kaldor (2007: 193) argues that proponents of human security approach see it as more important than macro-economic improvements forced upon post-war countries by international donors and IFIs:

Human security approach implies that the economic and social well-being of the

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[53] In Iraq and Afghanistan, US soldiers are not only seen as fighters by the US administration, but also as developers and nation-builders, following the US counter-insurgency manual directives (Mac Ginty 2010: 401). In both countries, the US military, apart from fighting wars and insurgencies, is building kindergartens, paving roads and assisting in other reconstruction projects (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 6).

individual matters more than economic growth and macro-economic stability, even though the later may be necessary conditions for helping individuals.

In principle, human security in post-war countries is acknowledged by all international organisations, agencies and donors. In reality, however, many external actors seem to have sidelined this concept, especially when it comes to the trade-off between human security and the security and other national interests of powerful countries. Tschirgi (2006: 42) argues that the main reason for this is the fact that while the human security is a 'worthwhile policy goal… it does not necessarily lead to national development [in fragile or post-war countries] or international security.' This has been especially evident since 2001 and the US-led global 'war on terror.' Instead of focusing on human security and basic needs of suffering people in war-torn countries, what is important for Western powers and IFIs is the success in the 'war on terror' and protection of Western economic, strategic and geopolitical interests (Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009: 587). Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2009: 594) further argue that using externally driven PWRD to promote regional and international security and stability at the expense of citizens in post-war countries and their basic needs is 'something of a diversion' from a genuine aim to help countries in conflict and those struggling to rebuild after war.

The United States and Western European countries are not the only countries that put their interests and security first when dealing with countries experiencing violent conflict and instability or emerging from war. As mentioned before, all countries follow the same realist approach to international relations. For example, Australia intervened in Solomon Islands in 2003, fearing that certain non-state actors could use Solomon Islands as a base for attacks on Australia and that the local government was not capable of dealing with these groups on its own (Samuels and von Einsiedel 2003: 5). Another example is the role of South Africa on the African continent. According to Richard Gueli (2008: 83-5), wars in Africa 'pose a grave danger' to South African interests and national security. He argues that the government of South Africa needs to increase support for peace-making, peace-building and democracy promotion in Africa both to protect its own security and economic interests and because it is a moral responsibility of Africa's top economy.

2.9.4 Calls for more intrusive PWRD operations

A number of authors think that externally driven PWRD operations need to be more intrusive and longer than what took place since the end of the Cold War. Roland Paris (2004: 206), for example, thinks that post-war recovery and peace-building operations 'require a more interventionist and long-term approach,' adding that international peace-builders need to 'take on the role of nation-builders' and 'serve as surrogate governing authorities for as long as it takes' to build peace, stability and liberal market democracies. Paris (Ibid: 187) also argues that countries recovering from war are not suitable for a quick Western-style political and economic liberalisation since these processes are 'inherently tumultuous' and can further highlight social divisions and undermine prospects for peace and stability. As a solution for this, he proposes 'more intrusive forms of intervention in the domestic affairs' by external actors. He adds that international experts need to take time to build effective institutions first, before they introduce political and economic competition to locals and ultimately build liberal market democracies for them. Katja Nieminen (2006: 271) goes further, claiming that externally driven post-war governance 'necessarily involves autocratic acts' in order to bring peace, stability and prosperity to war-torn countries.

David Chandler (2006a: 491) points that there is a widespread consensus among Western politicians, policy-makers and experts that external actors 'can better govern a country than politicians accountable to the people who have to live with the consequences of their policy-making.' Kang and Meernik (2004: 149), for example, think that if countries emerging from war are 'fortunate' enough, external experts will arrive and take over to rebuild and put them on the right track. They offer two success stories in over five decades: Western Europe and Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War; they, however, do not point out to any successful post-Cold War externally driven operations.

Reinhold Elges (2005: 177) writes that proponents of externally driven PWRD claim that 'basic concepts' and structures employed in their operations 'are right and only implementation needs improvement.' Mark Berdal (2009: 171-72) thinks that the lack of success in post-Cold War 'commitments to transforming and reshaping war-affected societies' has been mainly due to the 'short supply' of funding, soldiers and civilian experts as well as to 'deep divisions and limited normative consensus that exist within the wider international community about the "new interventionism."' Berdal thinks that, if there were only more money, soldiers and external experts available, as well as better cooperation and

understanding among key Western powers and international organisations, success of intrusive externally driven PWRD would not be in question. On the other hand, as noted in chapter one, this study has adopted a critical stance in order to test the arguments that externally driven PWRD is facing only technical challenges related to implementation and not fundamental issues and challenges such as structures of power, discourses, assumptions and power relations linked to post-war reconstruction and development.

Fearon and Laitin (2004: 43) argue that the international community needs to establish a neo-trusteeship system, with institutions, sufficient funding and personnel in place to effectively deal with 'fragile' and 'failed' states and countries recovering from war, and even run countries in places where locals lack capacity. The same authors think that another way to improve the efficiency of peace operations and state-building in countries emerging from war and 'fragile' states, interventions by external actors need to be privatised and contracts given to private corporations and security companies (Ibid: 27) instead of being driven by the United Nations or regional organisations such as the African Union. The United States government under George W. Bush has done this in Iraq and Afghanistan, privatising and outsourcing everything from war efforts to post-war rebuilding to private contractors (Klein 2007: 526). The privatisation of post-war recovery, however, did not improve efficiency; instead, it led to astonishing levels of fraud and corruption by the US authorities and contractors.[54]

2.10 Post-war state-building and nation-building

Post war state-building is a process of (re)building and (re)constructing legitimate institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security and basic

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[54] In July 2010, the United States Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction published a report about the misuse and disappearance of more than US $9 billion earmarked for reconstruction of Iraq after the US invasion. These funds came from previous Iraqi oil sales, UN's oil-for-food programme and frozen Iraqi assets. The US administrators in Iraq gave these funds to the US Department of Defence, which has led Iraq reconstruction efforts despite the fact that the DOD had a very limited experience in reconstruction and development (Rathmell 2005: 1025; Dobbins 2008: 67). In most cases, the DOD gave reconstruction contracts to private US companies and contractors with political connections in Washington, D.C. The funds were to be used for humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction, infrastructure repair, disarmament and Iraq's civilian administration. However, by July 2010, the US Department of Defence *could not account for US $8.7 billion out of $9.1 billion* of reconstruction funds – the whole 96% of the money (emphasis added) (SIGIR 2010: 1-4).

services (Chandler 2006: 1; Belloni 2007: 100; Newman 2009: 30). In most cases, post-war state-building follows partial or complete state collapse - an outcome of a 'steady society-wide process of institutional disintegration' and loss of political legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens (Ogbaharya 2008: 398).

Establishment of functioning, inclusive, effective and legitimate state institutions is seen as a key prerequisite for long-term stability, peace, democratisation and economic development (Bellin 2005: 598; Paris and Sisk 2007: 1; Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: 18). A functioning state must be able to govern its territory, maintain law and order, have political legitimacy and authority, raise taxes and revenues, provide basic services and be transparent and accountable to the population (Hanlon 2006a: 79; Poku 2008: 106). Key aspect of state-building is (re)establishment of a social contract between the state and society. Such social contract needs to provide inclusive political and governance institutions, equitable development and fair and effective distribution of resources and services (Brown 2011: 67).

Elges (2005: 179) argues that post-war state-building is a behaviour changing project aimed at transformation of state institutions and those working for them to move from hostility and conflict to cooperation. Thus, over the last decade, post-war state-building has become 'intertwined with peace-building' (Call 2008: 184). Samuels and von Einsiedel (2003: 4) add that state-building is a 'highly political activity… [which] directly challenges the power structure in the country.' Rebuilding of state institutions after war is seen as a crucial task for medium-to-long-term peace and stability as state 'remains the primary vehicle for providing important functions for any given population' (von Einsiedel 2005: 30).

Nation-building, on the other hand, involves construction of a common identity and nationality (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 5) among people residing in the same country. Jok Madut Jok (2011: 4) defines nation-building as a 'national political project' aimed at creation of a 'sense of national unity and collective national identity.' A 'nation' is an 'idea of peoplehood' that unifies diverse groups living inside a country's borders (Fenton 2003: 162). While distinctive in many ways, state-building and nation-building can go hand-in-hand and support the process of post-war recovery and reconstruction. As Jok (2011: 4) points out,

> Providing services, improving living standards and strengthening security allows citizens to be proud of their country, just as pride in one's nation is the foundation for stability, producing and environment in which services can be provided.

2.10.1 State- and nation-building in the past

In the past, state-building and nation-building took centuries and faced numerous challenges. In Europe, both state- and nation-building were bloody, erratic and violent (Schwarz 2005: 434; Moss 2007: 75; Boege et al. 2008: 4). In the United States, formation of the state and nation involved the genocide of Native Americans and a long and bloody civil war (Hanlon 2006a: 79). Furthermore, many Western states were 'built on the foundations of populist imperialism and colonial expansion' (Luckham 2011: 90), exploiting countries and societies in Asia, Africa and the Americas for their own economic, strategic and geopolitical benefits.

Externally driven state- and nation-building were attempted in Africa and elsewhere during the colonial times (Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005: 15; Dowden 2008: 52). On the African continent, local people and elites 'played no part in the creation of their nation-states' that exist today. This was done by Europeans, who claimed to be working in the best interest of the 'natives.' Thus, European powers divided Africa, drew boundaries of new countries and 'imposed their systems of trade, belief and rule' (Dowden 2008: 55). Colonial powers 'decided what a nation was… [and] which peoples got their own nation and which did not' (Easterly 2006: 255). Soon after African countries became independent, many of these externally imposed states proved to be nothing but artificial creations or 'quasi states' (Milliken and Krause 2003: 11), without a common national identity and legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Stiglitz (2002: 39) adds that colonial rule left most African countries 'without institutions or human resources,' sowing the seeds of instability and failure. Moss (2007: 6) points out that, even decades after independence, the majority of African countries are still going through a process of post-colonial consolidation and nation-building.

It is argued that socio-economic and political transformations in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War are examples of successful externally driven state- and nation-building. As Allouche (2008: 3) points out, this way of thinking is wrong since both Germany and Japan had developed strong national identities and state institutions on their own long before the US-led involvement in the post-1945 period. Instead of state-building, these countries experienced state reform in the aftermath of war. Externally driven state- and nation-building briefly re-emerged in the 1960s but soon disappeared from the 'foreign policy lexicon' after the American failure to 'build' a friendly nation in Vietnam (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 89; Berger 2006: 5-6).

2.10.2 Contemporary externally driven state- and nation-building

Externally driven state- and nation-building emerged after the Cold War, becoming a 'major policy focus' of powerful Western states and international organisations (Chandler 2006: 1). Ignatieff (2005: 70) argues that contemporary post-war state- and nation-building have been 'driven by the utopia of liberal democratic model,' based on the Western model and vision of state (Newman 2009: 30). Over the last two decades, proponents of externally driven state-building have assumed that the Western state is the 'ideal state' and that all countries that have not yet adopted Western structures of state - such as democratic institutions and market-driven economics - must adopt them in order to be seen as legitimate globally (Barnett and Zurcher 2009: 28).

Dobbins (2008: 69) writes that in the aftermath of Cold War, Western governments, and particularly the United States, came to assume that externally driven post-war state- and nation-building are their 'inescapable responsibility.' Since the early 1990s, the United States has been involved in seven 'nation-building' projects: Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Dobbins argues that the US is the most experienced and qualified nation- and state-builder in the world, capable of (re)building nations even in the most difficult environments and circumstances (Ibid: 67). Similarly, Walton (2009: 725) thinks that the United States is the key for success of externally driven state- and nation-building. He argues that if the US government and its agencies are not willing to participate in comprehensive PWRD operations, these operations cannot be successful. These claims come despite the fact that the majority of the above listed countries emerged from the US-led state- and nation-building either as 'fragile' or 'failed' states, far from socio-economic and political stability.

Sebastian von Einsiedel (2005: 27-8) argues that the goal of Western powers is to 'save states from failing' using the concept of state- and nation-building. The main aim of international actors, according to this argument, is to 'build a common identity of a society within a state and thereby strengthen its fabric.' Dobbins (2008: 80) adds that the primary objective of externally driven state- and nation-building is to 'leave behind a society at peace with itself and its neighbours.' Chandler (2006: 490) points that proponents of Western interventions see externally driven state- and nation-building as 'scientific, technical or administrative processes which do not require a process of popular consensus-building to give the target population a [real] stake in policy-making.' Ford and Oppenheim (2008: 84), for example,

think that the best way to rebuild states after war is to give external actors full executive and legislative authority in order to 'avoid interference and obstruction by domestic political actors.' Sarah Cohen (2006: 11) argues that there is nothing wrong with overly intrusive externally driven state- and nation-building in countries such as Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq apart from the lack of coordination among external actors and 'tensions between short and long-term priorities' of international donors.

As mentioned above, state- and nation-building in Europe was internally driven and took centuries; however, over the last two decades, countries emerging from years of violent conflict and destruction often have no choice but to accept externally driven state- and nation-building that aim to completely transform their social, political, economic systems in a few years. A case in point is Rondinelli and Montgomery's (2005: 19) long list of requirements without which, they argue, externally driven state- and nation-building cannot succeed:

> Post-conflict nation-building requires programmes to *create a strong state quickly* and in such fashion as to strengthen the capability of the governing regime not only to provide security, eliminate violent conflict and find ways to reconcile conflicting ethnic or religious factions, but also to protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies and combat poverty and inequality (emphasis added).

A brief critical examination of the above paragraph leads to a conclusion that those who propose and promote 'quick fixes' to complex problems do not understand post-war realities or state- and nation-building in divided societies. Mark Bradbury (2008: 8) thinks that the 'assumption that state-building can be controlled through aid projects, logical frameworks and set timeframes is simplistic, if not delusional.' However, as discussed earlier, quick 'solutions,' logical frameworks and set timeframes are primary approaches used by Western governments and international institutions in post-war settings. Apart from the lack of sufficient funding and political will for long-term engagements, this urgency is due to the fact that, fearing for their own security and aiming to protect their own interests, Western powers cannot afford 'costs and risks of "natural" processes of state formation' in the globalised world (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 43).

2.10.3 Criticism of externally driven state- and nation-building efforts and practices

Contrary to the proponents of external interventions, Woodward (2011: 88) argues that

externally driven state-building 'violates all academic knowledge on state formation.' She asserts that state-building is a 'long historical process, specific to each country' and product of locally driven efforts. Judy El-Bushra (2006: 208) notes that the Western model of state, seen by many as the only acceptable model, is a 'product of a particular history, in which forms of power have evolved over centuries and have been challenged in particular ways.' She adds that this model 'may not necessarily fit other contexts.' Zuercher (2006: 22) thinks that outsiders cannot build states and institutions or impose reforms that will last and be accepted by local actors and people if they did not have an input in their design, structure and making.

In terms of nation-building, Newman (2009: 29) writes that externally driven efforts are 'contrary to most empirical and theoretical understanding of what a nation is and how it emerges.' He adds that nations are 'products of social, cultural, historical and political factors that coalesce around local identities' and cannot be imposed by outsiders. Similar arguments are put forward by other authors, who emphasise that nations cannot be built by foreigners; rather, nations emerge from long locally driven historical processes (Misra 2002: 22; Wolfrum 2005: 653-4; Brahimi 2007: 5; Allouche 2008: 3). Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 89) point out that local people are the only ones capable of establishing and building their nations; external actors cannot lead these processes, they can only assist them.

Elges (2005: 185) writes that domestic political processes and efforts are key for real, long-term socio-economic and political change and stability. Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano (2010: 18) think that state-building cannot be sustainable if it is imposed by external actors; sustainable states and institutions which are legitimate in the eyes of the local population can emerge only from domestic 'bargains and power struggles.' According to Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005: 362), international actors should not 'confiscate or monopolise political responsibility, foster state dependency on the international community or impede the creation and consolidation of local political competence' and institutional capacity. Imposed institutions will in most cases remain 'weak or even mere facade' if they are built according to external models without seriously considering local circumstances and engaging local people (Samuels 2005: 734).

Fundamentally, for state-building to be effective and sustainable in the long-run, 'fragile' states and countries emerging from war should not replicate models and institutions from elsewhere; rather, institutions need to be built based on local needs and conditions (Sørensen

2007: 372). Elges (2005: 186) thinks that even the term 'state-building' is flawed. He argues that states cannot be built. Rather, states are constituted over a long period of time that involves local power struggles and difficult compromises. Michael Barnett (2006: 88) argues that the goal of external actors should be to help create the foundations of a state, not impose a Western-style state on non-Western societies. He lists three key foundational components that could over time lead to establishment of stable states: ability to contain outbreaks of violent conflict, existence of checks and balances that prevent exercise of arbitrary power and political legitimacy.

While claiming that their goal is to promote democracy and self-determination in 'fragile' and post-war countries, international state-builders often do the opposite. Through their intrusive actions and lack of accountability, they deny both the self-rule and establishment of functioning democratic societies (Zaum 2006: 456). One reason for this is the fact that policies guiding externally driven state-building have not been developed strategically but in an ad hoc manner (Chandler 2011: 87; Woodward 2011: 88). Due to the deadlines imposed by donors and other external actors who look for 'quick fixes' in complex environments, externally driven operations lack patience to see countries gradually develop their local political and governance capacity and build consensus among various groups[55]. Writing about the current externally driven state-building approaches and practices in post-war countries, Boege et al. (2008: 16) argue that their main fault is that they,

> Ignore the fact that state-building is not merely a technical exercise, limited to enhancing the capacities and effectiveness of state institutions. Rather, it is a highly controversial political endeavour which is likely to involve serious political conflict as existing distributions of power are threatened.

Furthermore, Newman (2009: 41) stresses that one of the major externally driven state-building contradictions is the fact that Western governments and IFIs under their control insist on (re)building strong post-war states; at the same time, the neo-liberal economic model

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[55] In early 2002, the UN administration in Kosovo 'stepped in to form a coalition government' after 'months of political wrangling' following elections (Steiner 2003: 88). Michael Steiner, who was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo between 2002 and 2003, does not see anything wrong with external actors meddling in local politics because local politicians are taking time to establish coalitions. For Steiner, months of 'political wrangling' are far too much; instead of encouraging a peaceful democratic process and state-building that may take time but would most likely have a better chance of being sustainable when compared to imposed 'solutions,' he decided to intervene and form a government in Kosovo, thus undermining the importance of local politics and consensus-building.

that they promote insists on undermining and limiting the state and its power. Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005: 379) explain that the dominant view in most of the developed world is that the 'function of government is to do little more than facilitate a market economy and provide a very few public goods.' Countries recovering from war, on the other hand, require far more from the state. They require extensive involvement in post-war economic recovery and 'peace dividends' in the form of basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, employment, education, health care and welfare (Rolandsen 2006: 1).

Alina Rocha Menocal (2009: 4) reminds that the international community and powerful countries can help facilitate peace negotiations and agreements but their post-war state-building record is rather bleak. Out of sixteen state- and nation-building efforts led by the United States since 1900, only in four countries – West Germany, Japan, Grenada and Panama – governance systems imposed by the United States were self-sustainable and functioning ten years after externally driven operations took place (Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005: 16). On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, from Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, to Afghanistan and Iraq, externally driven state-building efforts have been 'disappointing' (Paris and Sisk 2007: 1; Walton 2009: 717).

Susan Woodward (2011: 87) points out that sound and widely applicable theories of state-building in the aftermath of war do not exist in the literature, only explanations, debates, concepts and disagreements. Hanlon (2006a: 80) stresses that 'there is no single road to state-building' as states, parties and issues differ from case to case. Michael Ignatieff (2005: 73) adds that Western analysts, academics and policy-makers do not know 'how to make states work in societies that are poor, divided on religious or ethnic lines or lack a substantial state tradition in the first place.' Because of this, countries undergoing externally driven state- and nation-building after war are often referred to as state-building and peace-building laboratories (Berdal 2009: 12) where the international community is testing theories, approaches and practices, hoping to come up with a satisfactory procedure that will ensure the success of externally imposed governance models that mirror Western concept of state and governance[56].

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[56] Berdal (2009: 12) writes that Bosnia has been a 'large [externally driven] peace-building laboratory' since the end of the war in 1995. Similarly, Kosovo and East Timor are seen as 'labs' where the UN-led international administrations have since 1999 tested externally driven development of 'viable polities' (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779) after years of violent conflict. Similarly, Marcus Cox (2001: 5) writes

2.11 Liberal peace

This section will discuss the concept of liberal peace. The first part will provide a general introduction; this will be followed with discussion about two main components of the liberal peace framework – post-war democratisation and economic liberalisation. The concept of 'liberal peace,' also called 'liberal peace framework' and 'liberal peace project,' is a Western philosophy and/or ideology that has shaped all externally driven PWRD operations and interventions since the end of the Cold War. The liberal peace framework is based on the assumption that countries built around the principles of market economics and democratic governance will be stable, peaceful and prosperous (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 11; Liden 2011: 59). Salih (2009: 135) writes that the 'ethos and values of neo-liberalism' have become 'preferred paradigms' for post-war recovery operations since the early 1990s. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 47) note that liberal peace has a 'peculiarly Western flavour… and promotes highly specialised Western ideas, namely versions of liberalism, democracy and economics.' Clapham (2003: 38) writes about the same liberal ideas but calls them a Western 'ideology of statehood.'

Starting in the early 1990s, the mainstream policy discourse became dominated by attempts to '(re)produce liberal states' in countries experiencing instability and underdevelopment as well as those recovering from violent conflict (Beswick and Jackson 2011: 18). Since the end of the Cold War, when the concept of liberal peace 'entered the field of practical politics' (Vorrath 2010: 1), Western policy-makers have assumed that many parts of the world are in a desperate need of 'liberation by liberalism' (Pugh 2008: 420). Proponents of the liberal peace framework assume that they can bring peace and stability to 'fragile' and war-torn countries through 'intrusive and aggressive democratisation and economic liberalisation induced from outside' (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 221). According to Paris (2004: 13), the main reason the liberal peace framework has become the only option promoted and/or imposed by 'international peace-builders' is the fact that this 'industry' emerged at the end of the Cold War, with no alternative to neo-liberalism.

Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones (2004: 359) think that liberal peace suffers from the Western concept of peace, which promotes transformation of war-torn societies into Western-

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that all these countries are testing grounds for overly intrusive peace-building and state-building by external actors.

style market democracies without offering any alternatives. Backed by the Western economic, military and diplomatic power since the early 1990s, externally driven liberal peace framework has been able to 'overshadow, outbid and outgun' all other alternatives (Mac Ginty 2010: 403), becoming the 'only deal in town' and the 'only acceptable version of peace' globally (Ibid: 398-9).

2.11.1 Three models of liberal peace

Most authors who write about liberal peace see it as an externally designed and driven framework for post-war recovery that promotes and in some cases imposes Western-style versions of liberalism, democratic governance and neo-liberal economics (Heathershaw 2008: 607). However, Richmond and Franks (2008: 186-8) divide liberal peace framework into three distinct models. The first model is a *conservative model* of liberal peace. This is an externally driven, top-down approach that depends on external military force to provide security and order and external civilian actors to run countries and impose laws and reforms. The goal of this model is to build Western-style institutions and economy and change mindsets of local people in order to transform them into 'civilised' members of the global community. The second model is an *orthodox model* of liberal peace. International actors who use this model are far more interested in local ownership of the recovery process and respect local customs and culture than proponents of the *conservative model*. They tend to work together with local actors but still promote Western ideas and 'solutions.' The third model is an *emancipatory model* of liberal peace. This is an internally driven model that resists or lacks intrusive external impositions and emphasises local ownership and bottom-up PWRD. The main aim of *emancipatory model* is the provision of basic necessities to the population, promotion of social justice and establishment of a governance system based on liberal and democratic principles or a hybrid system that mixes liberal and democratic principles with local traditional structures.

Of the three models presented above[57], the *conservative model* of liberal peace has been by far the most used model by the United Nations, IFIs and Western powers since the end of the Cold War. Only in a few places local actors were taken into consideration and given room to

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[57] These three models of liberal peace were used in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland. Chapter four will provide more information about each country's post-war recovery experience.

operate and meaningfully contribute to post-war recovery and state-building. Moreover, the *emancipatory model* of liberal peace has been rare, with Somaliland as a notable success story[58]. However, this distinction is not shared by most authors who write about PWRD and liberal peace, with Richmond and Franks being exceptions. Nonetheless, it shows that liberal peace does not have to be exclusively an externally driven affair but that citizens and elites in war-torn countries can desire and work on establishment of a society based on liberal and democratic principles without external pressures and impositions.

2.11.2 Liberal peace framework as a universal blueprint for peace, stability and development

Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 52) present a universal sequence of events that proponents of externally driven liberal peace framework argue can bring peace, stability and development after war: first, there are pressures from powerful Western countries and organisations such as the UN to end violent conflict through negotiations; second, when the adversaries finally decide to negotiate, Western mediators draft a peace agreement with them (in many cases for them); third, the international community organises a donor conference and pledges funds for PWRD; fourth, the international community deploys troops and 'experts' who help write a new Constitution, organise elections, build local capacity and in some cases run the country and impose new laws and regulations; finally, through neo-liberal economics and market liberalisation and privatisation, a war-torn country rebuilds and develops its economy and prospers in the long-run. If this sequence of events is followed and local 'spoilers' are discouraged, proponents of the conservative liberal peace think that the outcome will be peace, stability and Western-style market democracy anywhere in the world.

Roger Mac Ginty (2010: 394) points out that proponents of the conservative liberal peace framework are confident that 'their version of liberalism can save the world' from war, instability and poverty. They see liberal peace as a 'kind of magic dust that, if spread within ['fragile'] states and economies, would produce harmony and prosperity.' Mac Ginty and

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[58] Even though Somaliland is not specifically mentioned in the literature as an example of the emancipatory model of liberal peace, since the early 1990s the country has gone through an internally driven post-war recovery and its people and political elites have established a political and governance system based on liberal and democratic principles.

Williams (2009: 98) use the term 'dogmatic belief' to describe the conviction among many Western policy-makers that the Western governance and economic system can solve all deep-rooted problems and lead any country to stability and prosperity after war. Similarly, Wolpe and McDonald (2008: 141) and Paris (2010: 341) argue that over the last two decades, Western policy-makers have insisted on rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal and democratic norms and values, combined with Western-style institutions, as remedies for war and instability and recipes for lasting peace and prosperity.

The above mentioned convictions and beliefs have led to a situation where liberal peace is seen as a universal ideal in the eyes of its powerful proponents (Paris and Sisk 2007: 4), while a neo-liberal capitalist state has become the 'only conception of statehood to be accorded legitimacy' by Western countries and organisations they control (Clapham 2002: 789). As a result, the last two decades have been the 'era of global liberal hegemony' (de Waal 2007: 5), with market-led 'solutions' to post-war recovery and peace-building becoming the order of the day (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 12). Furthermore, as Moore (2000: 15) suggests, post-Cold War domination of the West and IFIs has led to 'neo-liberalisation of the development discourse,' with development becoming synonymous with the adoption of Western-style institutions and economic, social and political organisation (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 257).

In most cases, Western norms, ideas and systems are imposed on the developing world and post-war countries 'regardless of the motivations and interests expressed by the states themselves' (David 2001: 3). As Schaller (2009: 9) points out, all these impositions and policy prescriptions by donors, international organisations and IFIs are taking place despite the fact that, according to the UN Charter, all sovereign countries have the right to 'freely choose and develop their own political, economic, social and cultural systems.' Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 55) remind that only projects, programmes and operations that promote liberal peace attract funding from Western governments and IFIs, 'whereas other programmes based on alternative worldviews do not.' Paris (2004: 5) notes that all fourteen externally driven PWRD operations that took place between 1989 and 1999[59] have shared two common

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[59] According to Paris (2004: 3-4), these fourteen missions were: Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999) and Siera Leone (1999).

strategies – 'immediate democratisation and marketisation.'

2.11.3 Democracy promotion after war

While this study is critical of the neo-liberal economic approach to post-war reconstruction and development, it does not argue against the basic principles of liberalism and democracy. It, however, argues against the imposition of rigid and 'one-size-fits-all' principles and blueprints on post-war societies by outsiders. To work and be sustainable, post-war reconstruction and state-building should be locally driven and local ideas, visions, voices, needs and demands should be brought to the fore. External actors can and should support these processes but they should not impose and/or drive them. This opinion is shared by some authors who point that the majority of critics of externally driven PWRD and liberal peace do not have a problem with democracy, human rights, freedom of expression, equality, equitable economic development and prosperity but with the fact that outsiders are attempting to impose these norms, ideas and ideals on post-war countries (Tadjbakhsh 2011: 5; Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 233).

Samuels (2005: 733) writes that democracy is the most appropriate form of governance for establishment of stability and peace after war and prevention of future violent conflict. An argument often used to justify democracy promotion around the world is the 'democratic peace thesis,' also called 'liberal peace thesis,' which stipulates that democracies do not fight wars with other democracies (von Hippel 2000: 96; Mac Ginty 2010: 394). According to the liberal peace framework, the best way to end wars and live in peace and prosperity is to have a 'uniformly democratic' world. This, proponents of externally driven liberal peace argue, would have a 'revolutionary impact on world politics, making war obsolete' (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 116). Furthermore, collective global security, according to Alfred Zimmern (quoted in Osiander 1998: 426), can be established only between democratic states forming the nucleus of a 'large and important political constellation.' John Gray (quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 118) thinks that 'liberal morality is not a formula for coexistence among regimes that contain diversity of ways of life. So long as the world contains a diversity of regimes, it is a prescription for conflict.' Thus, many proponents of Western-style liberalism aim to end the diversity in the world of politics, governance and economics, forcing all countries to accept the liberal peace framework and Western-style

democratic governance in order to save the world from violent conflict, instability, poverty and suffering.

It is true that since the end of the Second World War democracies did not fight wars against other democracies. However, this does not mean that democratic states are non-violent promoters of peace and stability (Navari 2008: 36-7; Luckham 2011: 90). Johan Galtung (1996: 50) writes that since 1945, countries that have fought most wars have been Western democracies. Murshed (2011: 164) points that between 1945 and 2003, Britain was engaged in twenty-one wars, France in nineteen and United States in sixteen. Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 24) adds that the fact that democracies often go to war with non-democracies is a proof that they are 'de facto prone to war.'

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has become a key tool used by the international community to promote political and economic development modelled after the American and Western European societies (Ake 1993: 240; Ali and Matthews 2004a: 408; Lacher 2007: 241). Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 21) notes that over the last two decades, democracy was seen as a 'condition of membership into the international community's global zone of peace.' She adds that this has led Western policy-makers to assume that Western-style democracy needs to be promoted vigorously and even imposed on those who reject it. Thus, democracy promotion has been taking place on many fronts, from 'fragile' and 'failed' states to countries emerging from war.

Numerous interventions and operations in 'fragile' and post-war countries have promoted and still promote 'free and fair elections, construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties and market-oriented economic reforms – the basic elements of Western-style liberal market democracy' (Moore 2000: 15). Ian Taylor (2007: 556) argues that liberal peace fully 'depends on external interventions, elevating external actors to an omnipresent (if not omnipotent) position.' This is evident from the fact that in fourteen externally driven PWRD operations between 1989 and 1999, external actors wrote national Constitutions, drafted laws, organised elections, formulated economic policies and even completely took over the administration of countries in some cases (Paris 2004: 3-4).

'Free, fair and democratic' elections in the aftermath of violent conflict are seen as the key showpiece of the liberal peace framework. Despite the talk about wide-ranging reforms and promotion of democratic values, human rights and free-market economy, many Western

donors and organisations often primarily focus on holding multi-party elections while paying less attention to other aspects of liberal peace (Englebert and Tull 2008: 117; Borges and Jose Santos 2009: 76). Lacher (2007: 244) writes that elections after war 'serve the purpose of providing the international community with legitimate partners through whom to ratify its decisions.' Chesterman (2001: 8) argues that elections in post-war settings provide 'instant gratification' for Western governments, policy-makers and other proponents of externally driven PWRD. Paul Collier (2010: 6) writes that many policy-makers in the West see quick post-war elections as a 'healing balm for post-conflict tensions and hatreds.'

However, holding premature elections in deeply divided societies that only recently went through traumatic civil wars can worsen the situation and lead to further divisions and instability (Ali and Matthews 2004a: 413; Zoellick 2008: 73). Elections can make matters worse and aggravate divisions when political parties form around and campaign along ethnic, religious or other differences (Abiew and Keating 1999/2000: 102; Samuels 2005: 732). Some authors think that elections held soon after violent conflict has ended can make countries more dangerous, bolstering divisions and helping wartime leaders and elites remain in power[60] (Samuels and von Einsiedel 2003: 10; Collier 2010: 81). Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano (2010: vii) argue that elections on their own are not the problem; the problem arises from the fact that the election process promoted by the proponents of liberal peace is a 'winner-takes-all' process; this can be problematic and lead to resumption of violence when majority groups win elections and exclude minorities from running the country and sharing benefits. El-Bushra (2006a: 256) thinks that post-war elections should in some cases be delayed and take place 'only when genuine participation is possible.' Putzel and Di John (2012: iv) argue that in such instances, it may be better to promote power-sharing than 'winner-takes-all' elections and exclusion of opposition and minorities.

A functioning multi-party democracy and freedoms and opportunities that come with it are better than authoritarianism, totalitarianism and dictatorship. Matlosa (2006: 9) claims that democracy is a 'fundamental prerequisite for development and stability' and that 'people-centred development requires a democratic setting.' At least in theory, a democratic system

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[60] In Bosnia, the international community insisted on holding first post-war elections within a year after the war ended. The premature elections led to an overwhelming victory of nationalist parties that took the country into the war in 1992; subsequently, these parties continued with their divisive politics, making implementation of the peace agreement impossible (Paris 1997: 56; Recchia 2007: 18).

'provides a transparent structure for the succession and distribution of political power in a society' and encourages tolerant and peaceful debate, diversity of opinions, political competition and accountability (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010: 387-8). Moreover, a functioning democracy can provide checks and balances between citizens and government, guarantee human and political rights, protect the autonomy of private sector, property rights and freedom of the press, all of which can significantly foster economic growth and promote stability, peace and non-violent resolution of conflict (Annan 1998: 23; Samuels 2005: 733; Calderisi 2006: 130; Siegle 2009: 53).

Nevertheless, one of the key lessons of history is that democracy 'cannot easily be designed, and particularly not by outsiders' (Sørbø 2004: 16), let alone introduced by force (Schmitz 2008: 95). Democratic consolidation is not a simple and straightforward technical exercise but a complex social and political process (Richmond and Franks 2007: 11; Haynes 2008: 109). As Omaar (2004: 92) points out, 'there are no blueprints for democracy.' To be sustainable, democracy must be defined and established by local people, not external actors.

Generally, a democratic system encourages intense political competition over power. In stable and peaceful societies, this rarely creates problems or leads to violence. In countries emerging from war, however, 'adversarial politics of democracy' (Paris 1997: 76) can easily exacerbate unhealed divisions and animosities, prolonging instability, enmity and conflict. Democratic system and governance can easily be manipulated and abused by strong elites, especially in fragile post-war settings (El-Bushra 2006: 229). Furthermore, at the time when developing countries as well as countries recovering from violent conflict are trying to accelerate economic growth and development, democracy can be a stumbling block rather than a helping hand as 'democratic regimes find it difficult to push through economically beneficial legislation amid rival parties and jockeying interests' (Moyo 2010: 42). Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1080-1) think that a 'delayed onset of democratisation may allow it to develop naturally and in a locally owned manner… rather than being enforced according to predominantly Western models.' Hanlon (2006a: 82) reminds that in Europe, democratisation came last, after centuries of consolidation and state-building. Today, on the other hand, state-building and democratisation are expected to happen at the same time and be completed in a few years.

Whatever the reasons, the record of democracy in the 'third world' and post-war countries has not been particularly good over the last two decades. Cilliers (2008: 95) notes that,

'however desirable democracy is, political liberalisation does not ensure economic regeneration or popular welfare.' She notes that African democracies are not performing any better economically compared to non-democracies. In addition, in many countries around the world that have adopted a democratic system of governance since the early 1990s, political and other forms of violence and oppression have continued (Luckham 2011: 97). Collier (2010: 8) thinks that the reason for this is that for a long time, the West has mainly promoted the 'facade rather than the essential infrastructure' of democracy. He points that democracy should not be only about elections, but about governments serving their citizens. Luckham (2011: 92) adds that a functioning democracy must also allow citizens to influence decisions and policies[61]. Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, many 'third world' and post-war countries have seen the spread of externally driven elections rather than the spread of democratisation (Collier 2010: 15). Salih (2009: 137) and Vorrath (2010: 1) claim that even though democratisation has been a key part of contemporary externally driven PWRD efforts, external actors have yet to create stable and effective democracies in societies emerging from war.

The above mentioned negative record of democracy in the developing world creates significant problems for external actors who work on democracy promotion. In addition, people in many countries do not see Western-style democracy as their key priority (Misra 2002: 16). Richmond (2009: 580) similarly notes that Western-style liberal ideas and ideals are often imposed on societies emerging from violent conflict despite the fact that even though the majority of people and communities around the world want to live their lives in freedom and prosperity, 'many do not aspire to Western-developed forms of liberalism.' Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 163) argue that in many countries ravaged by years of fighting, instability and poverty, key problems facing the population are not the lack of democracy but 'economic and social hardship and inequality.' Furthermore, imposing Western-style democracy and liberal peace framework in many Middle Eastern and African countries often leads to a 'clash of cultures.' One of the key aspects of conservative liberal peace is the 'individual as the primary unit of society,' which may be contrary to communal and traditional ways of life in many non-Western societies (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 50).

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[61] Luckham (2011: 92) questions if many 'mature' Western democracies, which are used as models for 'fragile' states and countries recovering from war, are truly democratic. He argues that in many Western countries, citizens are not really able to influence policies and decisions, adding that corporations, lobbyists, various interest groups and political elites primarily shape policy- and decision-making.

As Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 223) explain, 'cosmopolitan insistence on the supremacy of the individual' is not always 'in accordance with local interests, indigenous cultures and values, local politics and informal institutions.' Instead of promised stability and prosperity, this clash of cultures, traditions, values and worldviews can create problems between local elites aiming to establish a Western-style society and the majority of the population wanting to preserve their traditional way of life.

2.11.4 Economic liberalisation after war and delivery of peace dividends

Many poor and war-ravaged countries significantly depend on foreign aid and assistance and cannot escape external meddling and influence in domestic affairs. Since the end of the Cold War, aid and support from Western countries and IFIs have been linked to reforms based on neo-liberal economic model (Kaldor 2007: 182; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 207). The recipient countries in most cases do not have a choice but to accept conditions in order to receive funding. This leads to a situation where donors and IFIs are able to 'decisively influence the type of state [and economic system] being constructed' after war (Barbara 2008: 309-10). Krasner and Pascual (2005: 153) add that externally driven reconstruction and development in the aftermath of violent conflict entail 'influencing the choices' that post-war countries make about their institutional and governance setup and economy. Citizens and political elites in these countries are hardly ever allowed to choose economic and governance systems that are established and developed. The choices, as Krasner and Pascual note, are influenced (often imposed) by powerful Western countries and IFIs. Locals 'are expected to welcome, tolerate or passively accept radical experiments with their economic environment' (Pugh 2009: 83). Focusing on African post-war countries, Salih (2009: 155) explains how they have no choice but to accept external meddling into internal affairs and policy-making:

> African post-conflict states cannot resist the economic conditionality of global financial institutions… with their weak competitive advantage in the global market, they can hardly own the political agenda, let alone control the economic and public policies essential for consolidating peace.

As a mix of the neo-liberal economic approach, the Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies and prescriptions, externally driven post-war economic reconstruction and development efforts aim to develop 'free market economies by

eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital[62] and goods within and across a country's borders… [and] stimulate the growth of private enterprises while reducing the state's role in the economy' (Paris 2004: 19). Programmes designed and promoted by donors and IFIs include macro-economic stability, trade liberalisation, balancing of the budget and fiscal constraint, deficit reduction, cuts in public expenditure, encouragement of export-led growth and privatisation of state-owned institutions and industries (Newman 2009: 41; Pugh 2011: 149-50).

However, just as the neo-liberal prescriptions and policies failed to eradicate poverty and bring development and prosperity to the developing world, the 'dominant political economy of the liberal peace has failed to address major developmental problems such as poverty, exclusion, social justice deficit' and access to basic services (Salih 2009: 134) in post-war countries. Instead, the neo-liberal economic approach - the key component of liberal peace framework - has 'exacerbated economic marginalisation among the poor, increased poverty and fomented grievance and social injustice' (Ibid: 137). Barbara (2008: 310) argues that by imposing neo-liberal economics on war-torn countries and 'by subjecting prematurely rebuilt states to the vicissitudes of the market,' the liberal peace framework and neo-liberal economic approach are not helping create viable states, able to compete economically in the globalised world. In most cases, results of neo-liberal impositions and reforms in the aftermath of war are 'social dislocation and increased inequality in ways that imply the (re)creation of social fragmentation rather than cohesion' (Pugh 2009: 82). Further, the insistence on quick privatisation of state-owned industries often leads to a situation where wartime elites take over the state structures and profitable industries (Salih 2009: 135) while the population continues to suffer and stagnate.

Another problem with the economic aspect of the liberal peace framework, according to Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 31), is that it does not allow local people and elites in post-war countries to 'decide on their economic priorities… and protect local economic activities from the

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[62] In September 2003, American administrators transformed Iraq into a 'neo-liberal economic haven,' privatising state-owned companies, ending government subsidies, imposing 'radical' trade liberalisation and 'allowing unrestricted foreign direct investments and profit remittance' by foreign companies (Lacher 2007: 245). According to Michael Pugh (2008: 420), imposition of neo-liberal economics in Iraq has 'severely disrupted' the lives of poor Iraqis and pushed more people into absolute poverty. William Easterly (2006: 273) calls the Iraqi experience with neo-liberal impositions 'one of the most radical free-market reforms ever attempted anywhere… a structural adjustment [with the help of] an army and a navy.'

negative effects of globalisation.' Instead, they are forced to follow foreign prescriptions even though there is no certainty or evidence that neo-liberal 'blueprints' and programmes would ultimately lead to economic development and growth in post-war countries, only an assumption that there is a 'possibility of economic improvement in the long-run' (Paris 2004: 200).

After wars end, expectations of people living in war-torn societies are high. People anticipate immediate and meaningful benefits, such as peace, security and stability as well as access to basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, employment, education and health care. These benefits are called 'peace dividends' and are supposed to demonstrate and provide the 'benefits of peace over war' (Rolandsen 2006: 1). A number of authors do not think that external policy prescriptions that come with the liberal peace framework are the best choice for war-torn countries in need of immediate peace dividends. They argue that peace which results from externally driven efforts has in most cases been of 'poor quality,' marked by the lack of peace dividends and welfare, continuing insecurity, political instability and slow economic recovery[63] (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007: 496; Pugh 2011: 158).

Specker (2008: 3) stresses the importance of addressing macro-economic issues after war in order to encourage growth and development in the medium- and long-run. Sørbø (2004: 6), however, points that 'prudent' macro-economic measures imposed by Western donors and international financial institutions as part of the liberal peace framework often clash with 'political logic of peace-building,' which aims to finance short-to-medium-term social programmes aimed at sustaining peace. Pugh (2011: 150) thinks that macro-economic stability and deficit reduction are not the best short-to-medium-term policy options for delivery of peace dividends such as poverty alleviation, livelihood improvements and creation of employment opportunities. He stresses that there is no question that macro-economic stability is important to prevent hyperinflation and assist with debt servicing, exchange rate and currency stability. However, in post-war countries, the main priorities should be livelihood improvements, reconstruction and social well-being, not [only] monetarism (Ibid: 158).

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[63] In Kosovo, the neo-liberal economic model has failed to improve living conditions for the majority of the population. People in Kosovo complain that they hardly saw any meaningful investments in education, health care and job creation since the end of the war in 1999 (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 80). In fact, since Kosovo became a protectorate of the international community in 1999, poverty and unemployment have increased and standards of living have declined (Richmond and Franks 2007: 16-17).

Stiglitz (2002: 77) thinks that economic recovery and development after war are important but they should not be done in any way that can undermine social stability and peace. Some authors argue that economic models, policies and reforms promoted and imposed by the IFIs can destabilise and negatively affect post-war recovery, peace-building and provision of peace dividends (Murithi 2006: 19-20; Schellhaas and Seegers 2009: 5). Salih (2009: 153) argues that the 'obsession of liberal peace advocates with economic liberalisation in the form of privatisation and fostering the principles and practices of the free market is a major factor in relegating pressing social problems to obscurity.' A number of authors point that the neo-liberal economic model does not provide for social security or support for the population living below the poverty line; instead, it insists on substantial social spending cuts which profoundly affect the poor and further increase poverty and inequality (Chang and Grabel 2004: 18; Richmond and Franks 2007: 19; Tadjbakhsh 2011a: 27). For example, the IMF's insistence on cutting budget deficits through public spending cuts often 'clashes with the aim of building peace' and delivering immediate and visible peace dividends in post-war countries[64] (Boyce 2008: 6).

Julien Barbara (2008: 311) writes that neo-liberalism is a 'premature and ill-considered response to the immediate and distinctive' peace-building and developmental needs and challenges facing war-torn countries. 'In their efforts to radically transform major aspects of state, society and economy' in a short period of time, externally driven post-war recovery operations are 'subjecting fragile societies to tremendous stress' (Barnett and Zurcher 2009: 23). Writing about necessary trade-offs in the aftermath of war, Collier et al. (2003: 166) write that promotion and maintenance of peace and stability should receive the highest priority, even when this involves sidelining economic growth and macro-economic stability. On the other hand, Boyce (2011: 118) reminds that there is a need to balance peace-building efforts and macro-economic stability as post-war countries cannot just keep borrowing funds or printing money, thus risking high levels of debt and inflation.

Even when post-war countries closely follow neo-liberal instructions and blueprints and see no benefits, Western donors and IFIs hardly ever accept any responsibility for socio-economic failures and instability. Rather, they blame post-war countries and their

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[64] A case in point is Mozambique: after the war, the IMF conditioned new loans and support for the government on substantial public spending cuts; at the same time, the UN encouraged the government to increase public spending and provide some form of 'peace dividends' to the population (Paris 1997: 78).

governments, their lack of capacity, high levels of corruption or the inability to compete in the 'free market' environment[65]. As Barbara (2008: 317) points out, neo-liberalism is a useful tool used by the international community to 'disavow responsibility for economic development, which is conveniently left for the unimpeded market to determine.' Further, as Stiglitz (2002: 8) writes, when projects designed and imposed by the IFIs fail, poor people in recipient countries are still required to repay the loans.

Moore (2000: 15) thinks that the main problem related to economic recovery in post-war countries is that many external experts and practitioners who design and drive PWRD operations and programmes 'equate development with neo-liberalism almost automatically,' not allowing domestic actors any space for alternative discourses. As Paris (1997: 74) points out, neo-liberalism and capitalism 'encourage conflict and competition' and may not be the best immediate choices for countries that are trying to move away from conflict and establish stability and peace. Insisting on 'instant' economic and political liberalisation, external actors, through their 'one-size-fits-all' blueprints, often sow 'the seeds of conflict, encouraging rivals to wage their struggle for supremacy through markets and ballots' (Barnett and Zurcher 2009: 24).

Given all this, some authors think that external impositions of governance and economic models and policies may be the main barriers to establishment of long-term stability, peace, functioning institutions and economic reconstruction and development after violent conflict (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010: 390). Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 12) argue that democracy and market economics are 'arguably adversarial or even conflictual forces' and are 'not necessarily suitable' for fragile post-war societies. Murshed (2011: 174) writes that the neo-liberal economic approach, together with dependency on foreign aid and assistance, has undermined long-term stability, peace, economic recovery, growth and development in every country where externally driven PWRD has taken place.

According to Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 29), another problem is the fact that Western donors and

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[65] Tzifakis and Tsardanidis (2006) argue that the failure to bring stability, economic growth and development in post-war Bosnia had nothing to do with the intrusive external meddling into local politics and imposition of the neo-liberal economic model in a small, war-ravaged and formerly communist country; instead, they claim that causes of post-war stagnation and lack of development have been solely due to the fact that Bosnian authorities have not fully embraced and wholeheartedly implemented neo-liberal prescriptions.

IFIs insist on promoting the 'conservative and limiting version of neo-liberal economic models' in post-war countries and not socialist-oriented models used by some European countries. She thinks that socialist economic models, with their emphasis on social security, universal health care and welfare, would be far more beneficial and could help deliver more substantial peace dividends after war. Newman (2009: 41) writes that instead of insisting on neo-liberal economic transformation after war, external actors need to help war-torn countries alleviate poverty and generate employment opportunities. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 88-89) point that economic reconstruction and development that provide equitable and inclusive opportunities and empower all groups and individuals in the society are the best way to influence change and help post-war countries. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009: 213) and Richmond (2011: 51) add that post-war countries need to focus on improving the welfare of the population instead of transforming economies according to neo-liberal prescriptions.

2.12 Neo-imperialism and international administration of post-war countries

Imperialism, colonialism, international trusteeship and other forms of rule over independent and sovereign nations, societies and peoples by powerful Western countries have not been generally acceptable and 'politically correct' since the 1960s. However, the idea of external administration of countries and peoples has re-emerged yet again since the early 1990s through numerous calls for establishment of a new trusteeship system and administration of post-war and 'fragile' countries by the international community (Helman and Ratner 1993; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Ellis 2005; Mosegaard Søbjerg 2007).

Imperial and colonial rule included both direct and indirect socio-economic and political control, dominance and exploitation of resource-rich parts of the world by European powers in the form of settler or extractive colonies (Dixon and Heffernan 1991: 3; Mamdani 1996: 17). They emerged out of the belief by European colonial powers and their political elites that they were superior human beings on a mission to save and 'civilise' 'uncivilised' people in Asia, Africa and the Americas. William Bain (2003: 64-5) writes that during the colonial times, a widespread belief among the colonisers was that there existed a 'paternal duty that obliged self-proclaimed trustees of civilisation to seek the good of the disadvantaged.' Colonial powers saw themselves as providers of supervision and guidance to the 'weak' and 'childlike' peoples in their colonies (McEwan 2009: 220). Apart from the missionary zeal,

Western powers used the colonial and imperial rule as tools for control and exploitation of resource-rich parts of the world (Maathai 2010: 26; Willis 2011: 23).

Colonial rule saw top-down politics and decision-making, where the colonial authorities ran countries while local people had limited, if any, influence on policy- and decision-making (Hanlon 2006a: 81). As Poku (2008: 101) points out, colonial power 'did not rest in the legitimacy of public confidence and acceptance' in the colonies; it rested solely in the use of the military, diplomatic and other might. At time same time, colonial powers often used selected local individuals who were willing to act as 'agents' of the colonisers and ruled through them. This approach is known as 'indirect rule.' Such individuals were empowered by colonialists to implement colonial policies and they often used harsh methods to subjugate local populations (Maathai 2010: 27).

2.12.1 Calls for a new international trusteeship system

Stiglitz (2002: 24) writes that the colonial-style mentality, which assumes that white Westerners know how to 'save' and 'fix' 'backward' 'third world,' has persisted long after the formal end of colonialism and imperialism. He adds that this mentality has been exercised for decades through Western-controlled organisations such as the IMF and World Bank. Willis (2011: 20) explains that this is what many refer to as neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism – the economic, political and diplomatic dominance of powerful countries and limitation of autonomy of the 'third world' to determine their own future. The idea of a formal international trusteeship system has re-emerged among Western policy-makers and experts after the end of the Cold War (Duffield 2007: 7). According to Saira Mohamed (2005: 811), the old trusteeship system that existed under the League of Nations was used to govern territories and countries 'inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.' She proposes a new UN trusteeship council, which would assume the responsibility for governing countries recovering from war and 'failed' states (Ibid: 812).

Already in 1993, there were calls to establish a United Nations 'conservatorship,' a system similar to guardianship or trusteeship aimed at helping 'hapless individuals' in the domestic system or bankrupt companies in the commercial system. In a similar fashion, the aim of the UN conservatorship would be to 'save failed and failing states' and help them get back on

their own feet again (Helman and Ratner 1993: 8). Proponents of a new trusteeship system argue that there is a need for a new formal mechanism that would legitimise and guide externally driven operations since the old UN trusteeship system 'does not apply to territories which have become members of the UN' (Ibid: 9).

Lena Mosegaard Søbjerg (2007: 480) argues that there are no hidden agendas behind the proposed new trusteeship system, but only a desire to 'accelerate the development of post-conflict societies and promote establishment of values and institutions that enable the individuals of war-torn territories to reach their highest self.' Stephen Ellis (2005: 2) writes that the international trusteeship system needs to be brought back and used to fix problems in many countries around the world. He argues that a new trusteeship system would not have to take away full sovereignty from states, but should 'entail a new enhanced form of international responsibility.' Krasner (2004: 89) goes further and argues that there is a need for a mechanism that would allow for the cancelation of sovereignty of 'failed' states for an indefinite period of time in order for external actors to be able to have full executive authority, run and 'fix' these countries. Ford and Oppenheim (2008: 59) think that transitional administrations that take away sovereignty of the states and assume full control of the government would be better for countries emerging from violent conflict than international operations that share sovereignty and work together with local actors. They point that sovereignty sharing and joint decision-making require consensus-building, which 'can frustrate the international authority's attempt to effectively implement governance and reconstruction operations.' Interestingly, consensus-building, instead of being seen as a positive exercise that can help post-war countries rebuild socio-political institutions and relations, is seen by Ford and Oppenheim (Ibid: 59) as problematic and wasteful.

Some authors argue that success of international trusteeships and international administrations depends on full compliance by the local population. Helman and Ratner (1993: 11) think that states and people subject to a trusteeship system should 'turn over power [to external actors] and follow their orders.' According to Mosegaard Søbjerg (2007: 482), only when citizens in a post-war country understand and accept that 'authority rests with a foreign administration will the trusteeship become a success.' However, Mosegaard Søbjerg does not offer one example of a trusteeship system or international administration working in practice and successfully helping people in war-torn countries achieve socio-economic development, prosperity, lasting peace and stability.

Krasner (2004: 107) argues that formalisation of a new trusteeship system 'would smell if not look too much like colonialism' in the eyes of governments and citizens in the 'third world.' William Bain (2003: 75) adds that any new form of trusteeship, 'no matter how enlightened and well intentioned, cannot escape its imperial past because it belongs to a mode of conduct that is imperial by its nature.' However, as if the problem with foreign rule over sovereign countries, societies and peoples is only in the semantics, Saira Mohamed (2005: 839) thinks that the links to the colonial and imperial past and wrongdoings can be erased with calling the new trusteeship system something more appropriate and politically correct, such as 'international administration.'

2.12.2 New forms of neo-imperialism and international trusteeship in practice

According to a number of authors, various forms of neo-imperialism, neo-colonialism and international trusteeship system – disguised in international administrations and efforts by external actors to rebuild, develop and transform societies after violent conflict – have been used since the end of the Cold War. While a new international trusteeship system has not (yet) been formalised, an informal trusteeship system has been used in places such Kosovo and East Timor since 1999 (Bain 2003: 60; Mosegaard Søbjerg 2007: 475). In these countries, the UN-led transitional administrations have been de facto governments, exercising full legislative and executive authority and running the countries on a daily basis (Richmond and Franks 2008: 188).

Liden (2011: 57) writes that critics see many externally driven PWRD operations as 'form of imperialism in denial.' Comparing old colonialism and contemporary international peace-building and post-war recovery operations, Paris (2009: 101) argues that both 'have sought to refashion the domestic structures of weaker societies in accordance with prevailing notions of "good" or "civilised" governance.' Sandole (2010: 82) notes that liberal peace has so far been 'primarily a neo-imperialistic enterprise.' According to Chandler (2006: 30), Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor have been 'unwieldy international protectorates.' Furthermore, some authors see international administrations and efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan as 'imperial' and 'neo-colonial,' where Western powers use military, political, economic and diplomatic force to impose 'solutions,' while not allowing local actors to have a meaningful say on matters related to their own future (Ottaway 2003: 265; Clapham 2003:

39; Zaum 2006: 456; Heathershaw 2008: 605). Mark Duffield (2007: 7) calls these interventions and operations 'liberal imperialism… through Western humanitarian and peace interventionism.' James Fearon and David Laitin (2004: 7) use terms 'neo-trusteeship' and 'post-modern imperialism' when talking about external actors' involvement and efforts in the above mentioned countries.

Paris (2009: 105) points that while contemporary externally driven PWRD operations are definitely not the same as old imperialism and colonialism, many international operations possess 'echoes of old-style colonialism.' Lacher (2007: 240) argues that the old trusteeship system is 'at the heart of contemporary transitional administrations.' In countries administered and/or run by external actors, the aim of the outsiders is to 'transform societies and social relations and change people's behaviours and attitudes' (Duffield 2003: 308) to fit better to the 'mythologised international standards' (Heathershaw 2008: 603). Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) note that international administrations of post-war countries are similar to the old colonial model in that they involve a 'remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries.' On the other hand, they highlight that today's externally driven operations differ from imperialism and colonialism from the past in that today's operations in countries emerging from war are multilateral, involving powerful countries, international financial institutions, aid agencies, NGOs, private consultants and even private armies, 'whereas in classical imperialism the great powers jealously monopolised control of their domains' (Ibid: 12).

While often presented as cases where local elites have given full consent for the intrusive external involvement, in reality, international missions in countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo have governed with the help of Western military forces (Chesterman 2005: 342). Citizens and elites in these countries could do little, if anything, to oppose international governance and imposition of external 'solutions' and blueprints. Even though both Bosnia and Kosovo are seen as independent and sovereign countries (although this has been and still is problematic in the case of Kosovo, which, at the time of writing, is not recognised by the majority of countries around the world nor accepted as a member of the UN and other international bodies), have elected presidents, prime ministers, national parliaments and regional and local governments, in reality, local political actors in these countries have little or no say in how their countries are run (Knaus and Martin 2003: 61; Ford and Oppenheim 2008: 88). Similarly in East Timor, the UN-led transitional administration has completely

ignored local people, elites and politicians and ran the country in an authoritarian manner for years (Boege et al. 2008: 12; Ford and Oppenheim 2008: 94).

The stated aims of liberal peace and numerous externally driven post-war operations are not in any way different from the imperial goals of the British Empire, whose aim was to impose 'Western norms of law, order and governance around the world' (Ferguson 2004: xxi). During the colonial times, Western liberalism was seen by its proponents as a 'path to enlightened freedom' and they justified imperial and colonial projects on the grounds that these were necessary to teach the 'natives' to govern themselves 'in a civilised manner' (Liden 2011: 59). As Easterly (2006: 9) points out, many current 'neo-imperialist fantasies' do not differ in any significant way from the 'old-time colonial fantasies.' Schellhaas and Seegers (2009: 11) explain that the new neo-imperial model goes even further than the old one:

> The old imperialism stuck to controlling behaviour; the new imperialism wants to reconstruct social relations and change behaviour and attitudes through levels of metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation unprecedented since the colonial period.

To this, Liden (2011: 60) adds that in the past, colonialism and imperialism were 'driven by economic interests and geopolitical competition.' He notes that in many ways, today's liberal peace and externally driven post-war recovery operations in many parts of the world promote the same 'Western interests in a larger political and economic perspective.'

While some authors think that a new trusteeship system should be part of the UN machinery, others, such as Ellis (2005: 5), argue that the new trusteeship system should not be implemented directly through the UN but should resemble 'multilateral joint ventures in which certain countries and institutions share control over key operations.' A case in point is Bosnia, where the international administration has not been accountable to the UN Security Council, but to the Peace Implementation Council, a coalition of donor countries and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Knaus and Martin 2003: 61). Ellis (2005: 5) adds that there would still be a role for the UN in the new trusteeship system, as the organisation 'can confer the kind of [formal] legitimacy critical to such projects.'

Historically, colonial and imperial policies and trusteeship system have not led to stability, security and economic prosperity anywhere in the world. Instead, they were, in the words of

Kwame Nkrumah (1962), 'nothing but deception, hypocrisy, oppression and exploitation' (quoted in Bain 2003: 65). Given all this, the question is how Western policy-makers and international development and peace-building experts can expect that similar policies and methods will promote freedom, democracy, security, economic growth and well-being of local people in countries recovering from war.

2.13 Measuring success of externally driven PWRD operations

Two cases often presented as post-war recovery success stories are reconstruction and development in Germany and Japan after the Second World War. It must be pointed that Germany and Japan had been militarily defeated societies and had no choice in accepting or rejecting externally driven programmes and solutions. Apart from this, despite the destruction caused by the war, these two countries still possessed a considerable human, organisational and social capital needed for reconstruction and development (Bellin 2005: 596). This, in turn, led to a situation where local people identified priorities and guided economic reconstruction with the financial assistance from the United States (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1069). Coyne (2008: 19) adds that Germany and Japan had been much easier candidates for post-war recovery and consolidation of liberal democracy than many contemporary post-war countries since they were highly industrial societies where the 'institutional context was already in place for liberal democracy.' Walton (2009: 727) reminds that instead of state-building, what took place in these two countries was the reform of already existing state institutions and structures.

Writing about contemporary PWRD, Schaller (2009: 15) and Sandole (2010: 9), stress that post-war recovery and peace-building operations need to be designed in a way to lead to 'positive peace' and lasting political, social, economic and security improvements, instead of the mere absence of fighting and violence, also called 'negative peace.' Similarly, Panic (2011: 160) thinks that the primary goal of external actors working on PWRD needs to be building of 'sustainable, permanent peace.' When Boutros-Ghali (1992: 3) coined the term 'post-conflict peace-building' in 1992, he argued that post-war reconstruction, development and peace-building should aim to rebuild infrastructure and institutions in post-war countries, advance the well-being of citizens and build lasting peace.

Christoph Zuercher (2006: 2) thinks that success of PWRD operations should be measured

using three key dimensions: absence of war; state having full monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; and economic development, democracy and improvement in institutional capacities. Krause and Jutersonke (2005: 449) point that PWRD operations can be considered successful if war-torn states are on the path of sustainable development, security and state-building. Susanna Campbell (2008: 564) thinks that success or failure of externally driven post-war recovery efforts should be judged by the 'willingness and capacity of the host state and society to maintain peace' after external actors leave.

On the other hand, a number of authors argue that the goal of external actors over the last two decades has been to achieve 'too much' in fragile environments and in a short period of time. According to Barnett and Zurcher (2009: 23), one of the main reasons international peace-builders have so far been unable to build stability, peace and prosperity in war-torn countries was their aim to 'achieve the impossible dream, attempting to engineer in years what took centuries for West European states.' Call (2008: 183) questions if it makes sense to have high standards for peace-building as this may ultimately lead to many failures. Walton (2009: 720) thinks that the best way to prevent future failures is for the United States and other Western powers to focus their attention only on 'easy' peace-building cases and ignore more difficult ones. Some external actors, such as the British government's agency for post-conflict and 'fragile' states, have already made changes when it comes to the standards for success, preferring a minimalist approach that aims only to stabilise countries that are recovering from war. In this context, stabilisation means the provision of basic security and humanitarian assistance rather than post-war economic reconstruction and development and establishment of lasting peace (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1072).

Similarly, Sørbø (2004: 3) offers a more moderate definition of a successful post-war operation: prevention of the resumption of violence and implementation of key peace agreement provisions. Charles Call (2008: 176) thinks that such definitions 'represent a conservative and minimalist standard.' According to Sørbø's definition, externally driven operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Mozambique can be considered success stories because 'wars had concluded; elected officials had taken office; and the international press had moved on' to other countries in crisis. On the other hand, there are rather questionable levels of socio-economic and political recovery in each country[66] (Ibid: 173). While ending of

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[66] Richmond (2009a: 66) writes that in March 2006, the World Bank proclaimed East Timor as a post-war reconstruction success story; a few days later, country's institutions collapsed and social unrest and

fighting is crucial, without economic reconstruction, development and institutional and political reforms after war it is unlikely that there can be lasting peace (Annan 1998: 19).

Dennis Sandole (2010: 9) writes that international experts and policy-makers who design and implement externally driven PWRD operations have so far prioritised 'negative peace.' He adds that external post-war efforts are mainly about ending violent conflict, with little or no efforts to achieve 'positive peace.' Roland Paris (1997: 64-9) examined eight externally driven peace-building operations to assess if they only ended violent conflict or created conditions for 'self-sustaining peace.' Of the eight countries, only Namibia was a success story. This was mainly due to the fact that the Namibian conflict was fuelled by apartheid South Africa. Thus, the departure of the South African forces 'facilitated the consolidation of peace' among the Namibian people and political actors. On the other hand, in countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Mozambique, externally driven reconstruction and development, together with the imposed economic liberalisation policies, had only increased unemployment, poverty and economic inequalities. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2007: 492) argue that this is typical for externally driven operations, adding that the quality of peace and post-war recovery facilitated by external actors has not been satisfactory since the end of the Cold War.

Post-war Mozambique is a case that deserves a closer look. A number of authors see Mozambique as a definite success story in terms of externally driven reconstruction and development after war (Krause and Jutersonke 2005: 449; Englebert and Tull 2008: 106; Dobbins 2008: 70; Berdal 2009: 172; Ruiters and Giordano 2009: 10). Ali and Matthews (2004: 11) write that, apart from the end of fighting in 1992, Mozambique saw successful demobilisation of former combatants, return of over one million refugees, transformation of a socialist state into a liberal democracy and 'adjustment of the country's economy to the imperatives of the global economy.'

Costy (2004: 142) writes that when Western donors and IFIs talk about the success in Mozambique, they refer to the successful structural adjustment and transformation of the formerly socialist economy into a market-driven capitalist economy as well as the

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violence engulfed East Timor once again. Richmond stresses that one of the main reasons for this was the 'failure of the neo-liberal model,' promoted by the World Bank and other international actors, to deliver peace dividends to the population.

introduction of democratic governance. The 2008 African Economic Outlook (AfDB/OECD 2008: 461-5), jointly published by the African Development Bank and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, notes that Mozambique is a success story in terms of transition from war to peace and stability, pointing out 'impressive economic growth and sustained macro-economic and political stability.'

In contrast, many authors do not see Mozambique as a PWRD success story, especially when it comes to post-war reconstruction and inclusive economic development, but only as a successful international peacekeeping and peace agreement implementation case (Manning and Malbrough 2010: 150-1). While politically the country may be relatively stable and despite the fact that the GDP per capita doubled between 1990 and 2005, the majority of the population remains trapped in poverty (Pugh 2011: 153). The AfDB/OECD (2008: 461-5) mentions that the 'impressive' post-war economic growth has been driven by only a few 'mega-projects' such as aluminium smelters and natural gas pipelines funded by foreign investors and that the majority of ordinary Mozambicans have not seen benefits from these investments in terms of better standards of living or job opportunities. According to Alexander Costy (2004: 173), 'living conditions for many have remained extremely difficult or even deteriorated.' He adds that, 'despite peace, much aid and impressive growth,' Mozambique was at the bottom of the 1999 UNDP Human Development Index, with only five other countries in the world performing worse[67]. Between 1996 and 2000, at the time when Mozambique was presented as a prime post-war success story by Western governments, donors and IFIs, an additional one million Mozambicans moved into absolute poverty. As Ali and Matthews (2004a: 406) point out, instead of improving the living conditions, post-war macro-economic policies introduced by the IMF have 'reduced the quality of life for most Mozambicans.'

Barakat, Chard and Jones (2005: 832) think that the current evaluation process used to judge PWRD operations is fundamentally flawed: externally driven operations are evaluated and judged based on the criteria set by external actors themselves, not citizens and policy-makers from countries in question. They point out that the main criteria used to judge if a country is a PWRD success or failure is the 'existence of structures for liberal democracy and market economy.' If countries recovering from violent conflict reject reforms conditioned and often

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[67] According to Pugh (2011: 153), by 2008 the situation had not improved, with the country occupying the fifth lowest Human Development Index rank.

imposed by Western donors or neo-liberal policies imposed by international financial institutions, then it is very likely that these countries will be ostracised and labelled as failures. Call (2008: 186) offers an example: according to the World Bank's indicators, the capacity and sustainability of post-war states are judged on the ability of governments to adopt economic policies prescribed by World Bank experts.

Furthermore, international donors and financial institutions that provide funding for externally driven PWRD operations are rarely judged based on the quality of the projects that they fund and the results and benefits for targeted populations. Instead, they are judged based on the amount of money that they disburse to international NGOs, aid agencies, recipient governments and local organisations. Generally, donor funding has to be spent in the fiscal year by any means. If the funds are not disbursed, this may mean that donors and international organisations will have less money available the following year (Dichter 2005: 5; Moyo 2010: 54; Boyce 2011: 141). This often means that donors give money even when knowing the funds would not be used properly and would very likely be wasted by either external or domestic actors (Moss 2007: 111). In the end, donors are never held accountable when their spending does not produce desired results or 'entails unwelcome side effects' in the recipient countries (Dichter 2005: 4).

2.14 Key criticism of externally driven PWRD

Before discussing internally driven PWRD, it is important to highlight key criticism of contemporary externally driven post-war reconstruction and development efforts, practices and operations. Over the past two decades, external operations and impositions have not led to lasting peace and stability, building of functioning institutions, consolidation of democracy, eradication of poverty and livelihood improvements in countries emerging from war (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 264-5; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 13; Richmond 2011: 37; Chandler 2011: 77). Instead, intrusive external efforts have in most cases 'created empty states, or a virtual peace, mainly populated by either compliant or predatory elites' (Tadjbakhsh 2011: 3). For this, Sandole (2010: 78) blames 'simplistic' 'one-size-fits-all' externally driven liberal peace efforts which assume that generic approaches designed by outsiders can work in all places, while ignoring local actors, contexts and knowledge.

Roland Paris (1997: 57) argues that international efforts work relatively well when it comes

to stopping fighting between warring parties but do not contribute to long-term and sustainable reconstruction, development and stability. However, instead of looking for alternatives, the international community is still imposing the same/similar policy prescriptions. When donors, policy-makers and academics do this, they are 'replacing empiricism with ideology' (Milanovic 2003: 679). Boyce (2011: 146-7) thinks that competing interests of multilateral and bilateral donors and IFIs and their 'ideological biases' are undermining recovery in many post-war countries. As Mark Anstey (2006: 112) points out, all too often in international relations, 'ideological conviction tends to supersede factual information.' Policy makers, blinded by their ideological beliefs, tend to reject all alternatives, whatever the price. In the case of externally driven PWRD and the liberal peace framework, this is justified with the notion that the only alternative to externally driven liberal peace is continuation of underdevelopment, instability, fighting and suffering of civilians in the 'third world' (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007: 492).

In reality, however, externally driven interventions and operations are 'very uncertain instruments with which to effect political and economic transformation and state-building' after violent conflict (Rathmell 2005: 1038). Despite all the expertise, diplomatic, political, economic and military might and tens of billions of dollars spent on externally driven PWRD operations, most of the efforts since the end of the Cold War have been nothing but 'hit, miss and run' affairs (Pugh 2011: 158). According to Paris and Sisk (2007: 8), external actors have a 'limited ability to effect profound and truly far-reaching transformation in the workings of any society.' Through various pressures, externally driven PWRD operations may be able to advance reforms and peace-building agenda designed by outsiders. In the process, however, external actors undermine local political ownership and accountability (Recchia 2007: 5) and can even worsen the tensions among former adversaries and contribute to continued instability (Paris 1997: 64).

Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (2008: 95) go as far as saying that externally driven operations in post-war countries are often a 'source of waste, corruption, and indebtedness [that] directly undermine [local] state institutions.' Isaac Albert (2008: 31) thinks that the key problem with externally driven post-war recovery is that it focuses almost exclusively on how the international community can bring peace, stability and prosperity to war-torn countries. In reality, however, external actors who design and impose 'solutions' and blueprints in countries recovering from violent conflict are in most cases 'unable to change the social

forces and state practices that shape development' as they often do not fully understand the societies they are trying to influence and change, seeing only what is on the surface (McEwan 2009: 195). According to the NEPAD (2005: 17), programmes and approaches 'undertaken by most external actors often lack flexibility, patience, creativity and responsiveness required to have a meaningful impact on the beneficiaries they are intended to assist.' In addition, externally driven operations and actors implementing them frequently express overly paternalistic behaviour, pretending to know 'what is best for others and acting on their behalf' (Sørensen 2007: 369).

Schomerus and Allen (2010: 75) argue that the impact of imported formulas and blueprints for post-war recovery and peace-building is often the creation of an environment where peace and societal structures are 'divorced from the realities and complexities on the ground.' Often 'unaware of, and insensitive to, religio-cultural needs' and realities in societies emerging from war, external actors can 'do more harm than good' (Misra 2002: 6). Easterly (2006: 22) points out that fundamental problem with externally driven operations is the fact that external actors and experts assume that just because they have 'studied and lived in a society that somehow wound up with prosperity and peace, [they] know enough to plan for other societies to have prosperity and peace.' He adds that this would be the same as arguing that 'racehorses can be put in charge of building the racetracks.'

The Western notion of superiority and the assumption that experts, practitioners and policy-makers from the West know best while local actors in war-torn countries are primarily 'troublemakers' and 'spoilers' can be seen from the fact that some authors refer to peace-building attempts, projects and programmes which are designed and implemented jointly by external and local actors as 'compromised peace-building' (Barnett and Zurcher 2009: 24). This leads to a conclusion that externally driven post-war recovery and peace-building are the only 'pure' and right ways of bringing peace and stability to war-torn countries; working together with local actors is seen as an inferior approach that will not lead to stability, peace, development and prosperity because locals will compromise, undermine and spoil 'noble' efforts of external actors. The same authors argue that the best hope for post-war countries is if local actors accept whatever international peace-builders do and 'fully cooperate' with them; they call this 'cooperative peace-building' (Ibid: 24).

El-Bushra (2006a: 254) thinks that the key reason for externally driven failures is insistence on overwhelming socio-economic and political change too quickly. Kozul-Wright and

Rayment (2011: 201) add that insistence by Western donors, organisations and IFIs on uniform solutions and 'sequencing of reforms runs the risk of substituting general technocratic solutions for political choices shaped by local values and conditions.' Similarly, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 98) argue that main causes of externally driven PWRD failures are imposition of uniform solutions and not paying attention to local people's views and needs. Furthermore, some authors think that the lack of success in externally driven PWRD operations is due to the 'cumbersome and bureaucratic' setup and strategies of post-war operations (Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: ix). Others think that the fundamental problem with externally driven recovery and state-building after war is the assumption that models, norms, ideologies and political and economic systems that work in the West can easily be exported to the developing world (Elges 2005: 177), where they would provide 'quick fixes' to all societal ills and problems.

Goodhand (2006: 268-9) emphasises that external actors who work in post-war countries need to 'unlearn' lessons from other places where they have worked. He insists that 'place matters' and there is a need for specific, contextual processes and programmes to be designed for each country. Brett (2002: 12) reminds that 'no two countries can follow the same post-war recovery and developmental path, since differing social, economic and political conditions will ensure that policies that work well in one context will fail dismally in another.' NEPAD's 'African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework' highlights the fact that 'each country's transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its own particular circumstances' (2005: 1). According to Uvin (2006: 9), there is a need to be sceptical about replicating 'best practices' from one country to another. Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2011: 202) write that 'fragile and uncertain contexts' typical of post-war settings require flexible and well-informed projects, programmes and frameworks, not 'one-size-fits-all' 'solutions' predetermined by external actors. However, replication of 'best practices' predetermined by outsiders has been the case in weak and underdeveloped states throughout the world for decades and this does not differ in the case of countries emerging from war. In most cases, international organisations and donors have had limited understanding of local contexts and have used 'one-size-fits-all' approach when designing and implementing post-war interventions.

Paris (2010: 357) argues that a viable alternative to externally driven liberal peace does not exist. Paris complains about the 'hyper-criticism' of the liberal peace framework, arguing that

if externally driven peace operations are to continue in the future, the critics of liberal peace would need to scale down their 'exaggerated' criticism (Ibid: 339). On the other hand, Richmond (2009: 567) cautions that if liberal peace is to be 'salvaged, it would have to offer a more pluralist debate on its own alternatives.' Instead of protecting externally driven PWRD and liberal peace by any means, Elges (2005: 186) thinks that alternative approaches to post-war recovery need to be sought. Similarly, Woodward (2011: 108) argues that it is time to focus on internally driven post-war recovery processes and options and the 'ways that international assistance can promote or obstruct peace and political stabilisation.'

Finally, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2011: 5) reminds that the majority of critics of externally driven post-war operations and liberal peace framework do not have a problem with liberalism, human rights, freedom, equitable economic development and prosperity but with the fact that outsiders are attempting to impose these norms, ideas and ideals often through colonial-like, illiberal and undemocratic methods. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 233) add that the goal of most critics is not to get rid of the concept of liberal peace or basic principles of liberalism and democracy, but to challenge their current configurations and structures and modify them in order to improve the chances of creating lasting peace and stability in war-torn countries.

2.15 Internally driven post-war reconstruction and development

When compared to the material and publications about externally driven PWRD, not much has been written specifically and exclusively about internally driven post-war reconstruction and development. Still, a number of authors discuss internally driven post-war recovery approaches, practices and possibilities in their writing. This section of the literature review will present the views and opinions about internally driven PWRD.

Oliver Richmond (2011: 41) writes that people in post-war countries need to be able to decide on their own 'what type of peace' they want as well as the economic, political and governance systems and structures that are appropriate for their context. He further emphasises that peace is 'something organic, resting on hybridity, the everyday, [local] agency and self-determination' and that it 'implies the importance of needs and contexts for ordinary people.' In order to build lasting peace, countries emerging from violent conflict need to be ready to 'fundamentally reshape values, principles, interests and power relations'

among former adversaries. This can be assisted from the outside but in order for it to work and be sustainable, it needs to be designed, implemented and accepted by citizens and elites from countries that are recovering from war (Rocha Menocal 2009: 4).

Busumtwi-Sam (2004: 347) stresses that the 'success or otherwise of peace-building lies in the hands of domestic actors.' Elges (2005: 182) writes that the international community and powerful countries can force local actors to cooperate and share power through diplomatic pressures and threats of sanctions. Still, for the cooperation to be sustainable and bring socio-political and economic stability and progress, local actors have to compromise and come to terms with their opponents on their own. David (2001: 13) notes that peace after violent conflict 'cannot be nurtured unless the [local] parties have an unconditional desire for it.' Without the political will of local people and politicians to build peace and develop their countries, 'not even the noblest sentiments' will succeed (Annan 1998: 31). In addition, this process may take many years, even decades, as building peace and stability after war require time (Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006: 319).

A number of authors point out that lasting peace, sustainable development and effective state institutions can emerge only if recovery and reform processes are designed and driven by local actors (Doornbos 2003: 60; Elges 2005: 185; Brahimi 2007: 3: Englebert and Tull 2008: 138; Egnell 2010: 475). Haynes (2008: 201) writes that building peace, consolidation of democracy, economic development and livelihood improvements 'are linked primarily – although by no means exclusively – to a range of domestic factors.' Pouligny (2005: 503) suggests that the goal of post-war recovery operations should be to get local and external actors to collaborate and 'initiate processes in which local resources, knowledge and information are taken seriously' and supported. Harris and Foresti (2011: 20) think that external support needs to 'complement and build on local institutions and social norms rather than seeking to replace them.'

External actors can offer advice, support, assistance and incentives to local people, 'but ultimately, those within a society must define their own future' (Krasner and Pascual 2005: 160). Similarly, Abiew and Keating (1999/2000: 105-6) note that peace-building, state-building and recovery after war need to be 'internal matters' where local people lead the process and are supported by external actors. Ali and Matthews (2004a: 408) highlight the fact that 'peace-building is essentially a domestic activity.' They add that the international community can play a vital role in facilitating this process and supporting local actors but

needs to refrain from 'imposing its preferred vision of a peaceful society.' Goodhand and Hulme (1999: 24) think that international donors and organisations who genuinely want to help post-war countries 'need to be "smart" and recognise that, at the very best, they can only help build [local] capacities that increase the likelihood of peace.'

Peter Uvin (1999: 21) argues that if post-war operations are to be successful, local ownership and reliance on local information and opinion should not be only a 'matter of ethics' but also an 'affair of sustainability.' Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 234) think that local people in post-war countries, instead of being only 'subject to and objects of interventions,' need to be given space and support to decide on their own about their future. Richmond (2009a: 73) stresses that peace-building, reconstruction and development after war require more than 'international consensus on how [this] should be done.' What is needed is an approach that allows locals and internationals to work together and jointly decide 'what type of peace is being fostered' in war-torn countries. Instead of imposing their own programmes, ideas and visions, external actors need to help build local capacity and develop locally driven and designed structures and institutions (Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006: 319).

Stefano Recchia (2007: 8) argues that the 'ultimate goal of post-war peace-building and state-building is to create the conditions for inclusive, self-sustaining governance at the domestic level.' In practice, however, self-sustaining government structures cannot be created when Western donors have a tendency to assume the role of teaching politicians and people in 'fragile' states and countries recovering from war how to do govern and develop their countries based on the Western model (Boege et al. 2008: 15) instead of helping local actors create institutions suitable for local needs and conditions. Lakhdar Brahimi (2007: 3) stresses that these practices need to change if external actors genuinely want to help post-war countries:

> However important and even indispensable their contribution – security forces, financial aid and technical expertise – might be… [external actors] do not have the right to impose their views over the national will and the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous people.

Due to the lack of capacity and institutional weakness right after the war, Busumtwi-Sam, Costy and Jones (2004: 379) think that PWRD operations in many countries may need to be initiated by external actors, focusing on stabilisation and establishment of security. However, they think that in the medium- to long-term, there needs to be a shift from externally driven to

internally driven and externally supported PWRD, ensuring local ownership and sustainability of recovery and peace. Writing about external impositions in post-war settings, Laurie Nathan (2007: 7) points that without true local ownership of PWRD, lasting peace, development or democracy will not emerge and be consolidated despite all the efforts by external actors:

> Whatever the reasons for the absence of local ownership, it is inimical to development and democracy: domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors; local actors have little commitment to externally imposed products; these products do not adequately reflect local needs, dynamics and resources; and democracy cannot take root other than by democratic means.

Some authors argue that functioning and sustainable governance institutions can emerge only from an internally designed and driven post-war state-building process that is supported by external actors. They think that anything else will not create stable institutions legitimate in the eyes of the local population and able to function independently after external actors leave (Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010: 19). According to Baker (2007: 93), 'unless and until state-building takes root in the indigenous society and with committed local leadership,' externally driven programmes and projects will not improve post-war situation. Similarly, Peter Uvin (2006; 10) argues that institutional reforms and state-building can be viable and sustainable only if they emerge through an internally driven process and political and social bargaining between local groups and actors.

Achim Wennmann (2005: 490) reminds that in most cases, 'donor support is temporary… priorities change and international experts come and go - and with them relative levels of material support and political commitment.' Most external actors stay in post-war countries 'for a year or two and most agencies need "results" in a year and are gone in three' (Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006: 320). On the other hand, in most cases, local actors are there to stay and will have to live with the consequences of their decisions. Furthermore, as Englebert and Tull (2008: 137) conclude in their article titled 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas About Failed States,' outsiders are not necessarily better than locals in building political institutions and reconstructing war-ravaged states and economies. The lack of contemporary externally driven success stories discussed earlier substantiates this claim.

2.15.1 Importance of local and traditional structures and norms

Roger Mac Ginty (2008: 139) argues that most externally driven attempts to rebuild countries after war have been 'entirely antithetical to indigenous and traditional practices, regarding them as unaccountable, opaque and contradictory to the "enlightened" intentions of liberal peace.' Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 225) write that instead of utilising local culture, tradition, knowledge, norms, structures and institutions, external actors working in post-war environments often see these as 'anomalies' and aim to modify them to reflect modern, Western-style norms, institutions and structures. Boege et al (2008: 11) write that contemporary externally driven PWRD approaches and efforts often completely ignore and neglect local and customary governance structures, practices, values and cultures which have been dealing with welfare, order and conflict management in the developing countries for centuries and which still play an important role in the lives of ordinary people.

Reinhold Elges (2005: 185) writes that there is a need to recognise the importance of traditional and local social structures and work with them instead of only imposing new, foreign structures. Lambourne and Herro (2008: 276) argue that external actors working on post-war operations need to 'avoid creating cultural dissonance by imposing inappropriate mechanisms and processes' that do not relate to local norms, needs and aspirations. Murithi (2008: 28) thinks that locally driven processes have a potential to bring about a more sustainable peace as they generally 'draw upon local cultural assumptions, norms and values as well as traditional and grassroots notions of justice and community-based political dialogue.' According to Yannis (2003: 77), the involvement by the international community should aim to complement local structures and PWRD efforts and initiatives.

2.15.2 Internally driven economic recovery and development

Alberto Trejos (2009: 130) defines development as a long-term process aimed at creation of a society able to 'attend to its own needs and justly, competitively and successfully interact with the rest of the world through trade, investment, human relationships, provision of services and exchange of information.' Thomas (2006: 193-4) argues that the developing and war-torn countries need human and people-centred development, where countries are free to develop as they see fit and do what they think is right for them. This way, countries and peoples would be able to develop in 'different, culturally distinctive ways,' instead of

following 'one-size-fits-all' vision of development promoted by the West and IFIs. He stresses that this form of development needs to be based on principles such as empowerment, participation, justice, inclusiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, the focus of people-centred development is on people and their well-being rather than primarily on growth, macro-economics, markets and fiscal balance (Nayyar and Chang 2005: 3). In many ways, this resembles the notion of peace dividends discussed before, where the primary aim of PWRD is to improve livelihoods and provide basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, employment, education and health care to the population in order to deliver 'benefits of peace over war' (Rolandsen 2006: 1).

Richard Dowden (2009: 164) writes that sustainable socio-economic development of any society – whether a country recovering from war or a developing country in general – cannot be driven by outsiders but only by the countries in question and their governments and citizens. Maathai (2010: 134) thinks that in order to ensure sustainability of development initiatives, people in the developing world and countries emerging from violent conflict need to determine development priorities and play key roles in design and implementation of reconstruction and development programmes and projects. Similarly, Galtung (1996: 135) and Calderisi (2006: 162) stress that to be sustainable and successful in the long-run, economic development has to be driven from the inside; outsiders should only assist this process, not impose and drive it. William Easterly (2006: 318) adds that development 'comes from self-reliant, exploratory efforts and the borrowing of ideas, institutions and technology' from developed countries when it suits the developing countries to do so. While some of the above mentioned authors write about economic development in general, their arguments are appropriate for post-war countries and economic recovery in the aftermath of violent conflict.

In terms of economic reconstruction and development, imposition of foreign ideas and frameworks by external actors is 'unlikely to be successful if they ignore local conditions and suppress the processes of trial and error' that have been the key for successful economic and institutional development in many developed countries in the past (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2011: 189). Julien Barbara (2008: 308) thinks that international donors, organisations and experts involved in post-war recovery operations do not know how to 'stimulate' economic development in countries emerging from violent conflict; the majority of experiments conducted by external actors since the end of the Cold War have left behind economically fragile and aid dependent states, unable to function on their own and provide

basic services to their people. The reason for this, argues James Busumtwi-Sam (2004: 345), was the imposition of the neo-liberal economic model which is not conducive to peace-building and economic recovery. He proposes an alternative developmental approach for recovery and peace-building in the aftermath of war:

> Development for the purpose of building and sustaining peace differs from mainstream development in that it is designed to institutionalise peace as a condition or outcome by facilitating the emergence of more stable, non-violent and responsive forms of political, economic and social relations.

Barbara (2008: 311) expands on the Busumtwi-Sam's argument and points that post-war countries need an 'alternative developmental conception of a state that is capable of promoting economic growth as a basis for state consolidation.' This would include economic and developmental policies and approaches aimed at consolidation of the economy, livelihood improvements, job creation and protection of domestic industries and service providers by the state while building local capacity to compete in the globalised world (Ibid: 313).

2.15.3 Freedom to choose political and economic systems

James Busumtwi-Sam (2004: 344) writes that, in order for peace-building, state-building and economic recovery to be successful, countries recovering from war should be helped by the international community without having to accept any ideological or political convictions and systems:

> Peace-building is not, or should not be, about moulding countries in a particular image (i.e. Western market democracies) based on ideological convictions. International assistance for peace-building is [or should be] about helping local actors establish the conditions that will enable them to make choices in an atmosphere that is relatively free of large-scale violence, fear, deprivation and predation.

Schwarz (2005: 433) thinks that the fundamental problem with externally driven PWRD is the ideological push to build 'liberal, reformed states and not strong, effective and welfare states.' Christian Schaller (2009: 19) adds that citizens and elites in post-war environments must be free to choose political and economic systems that best suit their countries, customs,

traditions and cultures[68]. Socio-economic policies and programmes need to be adopted with the country's national, economic, regional and geopolitical interests in mind rather than those of Western powers and IFIs. This is in line with the people-centred approach to development, which calls for local control of developmental choices and development of home-grown initiatives that aim to improve livelihoods and people's welfare (Korten 1987: 145-6; Thomas 2006: 193).

However, if the above is to become a reality, it may be necessary to first restructure and reform powerful international organisations working in developing and post-war countries. Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 111) think that the global development and aid system and institutions that run it need to be fundamentally reformed in order to provide meaningful assistance to developing world and countries emerging from violent conflict, allowing locals to drive these processes instead of only imposing 'one-size-fits-all' 'blueprints' and 'solutions.'

William Easterly (2006: 105) argues that a sustainable democracy 'depends on the slow and bottom-up evolution of rules of fair-play.' Democracy is not a 'transplant' that can be imposed by outsiders. It can only 'grow' out of the society over time (Korhonen 2001: 525). Georg Sørensen (2007: 371) writes that in essence, 'democratisation is a job for insiders. *They* must create the appropriate conditions for democracy in their own countries, because they are the people and democracy means rule by the people' (original emphasis). Ake (1993: 241) adds that if democracy in Africa [and the rest of the developing world] is to be 'relevant and sustainable,' it cannot only follow the Western liberal democracy model but has to adjust to local conditions, customs, traditions and needs.

For democracy to work in any country, and especially in countries recovering from violent conflict, much more is needed than pluralism, multiparty elections and political competition. Functioning and sustainable democracy needs a common national vision and clear and respected rules of political behaviour. In addition, democracy requires cooperation among politicians and policy-makers, not only competition over power, offices and resources (Wolpe and McDonald 2008: 139), as well as active citizens that can influence policy- and

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[68] Herbold Green and Ahmed (1999: 191) argue that in countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan, the goal of external actors should not be to impose Western-style system of governance that has failed numerous times in the past, but rather to help build locally designed systems that will be accepted by local elites and citizens.

decision-making (Luckham 2011: 94). For such a democracy to emerge after war, external actors can provide assistance and support but it is up to the local actors to establish the 'rules of fair-play' (Easterly 2006: 105) and ensure that all parties respect these rules in the long-run.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that globalisation, geopolitics, powerful countries and international organisations have significant influence on social, political and economic life in every country in the developing world (Putzel 2001: 4). Also, dependence on foreign aid and assistance is inevitable for many post-war countries due to destruction and lack of funds and capacity for reconstruction and development (Kang and Meernik 2005: 98). This, however, should not give external actors the right to impose their systems, practices and ideologies without consulting local people and political elites, considering their opinions, needs and aspirations and allowing them to decide in what kind of a country they want to live in.

2.15.4 Danger of romanticising all things local

Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2009: 594) remind that it is very important not to 'engage in a romanticisation of all things local, indigenous and traditional.' In most post-war countries, institutions are weak, civil society does not exist or lacks capacity and resources to operate, governments lack legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens and international donors while political divisions prevent recovery and progress from taking place (Nathan 2007: 6-7). Governments often prioritise security, defence and self-enrichment while giving little attention to education, employment, poverty alleviation, welfare and delivery of basic services (Maathai 2010: 16-17).

Further, in ethnically divided countries, where fighting was along the ethnic lines, political elites are often not interested in unity and stability. Instead, they base their political platforms and messages on ethnic divisions, creating further instability (Krasner 2004: 103). There are also many local and traditional practices that are harsh and inhumane. For example, many indigenous and traditional practices around the world often deny basic rights to women. However, this does not mean that all local practices are inhumane and have to be discarded. Despite all their real or perceived flaws, local actors should never be sidelined by external actors. Instead, locals need to be involved in the design, development and implementation of PWRD processes, encouraged to reform and empowered to run their own countries and

affairs if PWRD is to be successful and sustainable. Laurie Nathan (2007: 7-8) stresses that,

> The underlying assumption is not that local actors will necessarily develop good policies. Rather, the assumption is that a process-oriented approach that respects and empowers local actors is more likely to yield good results in the long-term than… [an] approach that undermines local actors.

2.16 Post-liberal peace

The concept of post-liberal peace is very new, emerging after years of critical research, writing and discussions about externally driven PWRD and its failings and shortcomings. Oliver Richmond (2011: 43) argues that instead of forcing externally driven liberal peace framework on countries recovering from war, there is a need for alternatives that can work in practice and leave behind positive results and stability. He proposes a 'post-liberal peace' approach to PWRD and envisages it as an approach that would allow 'pluralism of peaces to be thought about as a way of reconstructing societies… and rebuilding states.' He notes that this approach should not romanticise all things local and reject all things foreign but ensure that external actors genuinely engage with local people and elites 'in a non-hegemonic manner' (Ibid: 47) as well as fully understand local contexts, cultures, traditions and needs in war-torn countries. Richmond (2009: 578) argues that external actors can play an important role in terms of 'support and guidance on technical aspects of governance and institution building' but should not do it in an invasive and intrusive way, treating locals as mere subjects and creating dependencies on foreign assistance along the way. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 234) think that post-liberal peace should seek to put external actors 'in a position to help, assist and aid but not reproduce the ideological hegemony of a particular form of liberalism.' They add that the purpose of post-liberal peace should not be to design and develop blueprints, uniform frameworks and step-by-step outlines for post-war recovery but do what is best for each particular country and context (Ibid: 235).

Kristoffer Liden (2011: 69) writes that the ideas for post-liberal peace approach can be derived from post-colonial theory. According to him, post-colonialism is a 'critique of neo-colonial features of global politics where external actors violate international norms and traditions in the name of peace and development.' Liden adds that overly intrusive and imposed liberal peace efforts, especially in terms of international administration of countries such as Kosovo, East Timor and Bosnia, are examples of violation of international norms and

traditions by external actors, all in the name of global security, peace and development. However, instead of promoting disengagement of external actors as many post-colonial theorists would do, post-liberal peace needs to be built around 'non-hegemonic engagement' and external support for local initiatives in post-war countries.

Richmond (2011: 45) notes that post-liberal peace needs to lead to a 'liberal-local hybrid form of peace' and post-war recovery. This means that the current externally designed and driven approaches and practices would need to be modified in order to bring to the fore local voices, needs, demands, ideas and visions. External actors would need to work with locals instead of treating them as mere subjects. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 234-5) write that post-liberal peace would allow peace to 'emerge from the everyday context' as opposed to institutional blueprints for neo-liberal economic development and state-building. They add that local people should be seen as 'agents' who are capable of contributing to post-war recovery and creation of stability (Ibid: 237). Richmond (2011: 45) stresses that both local and international actors are important for the success of post-liberal peace – locals because they know the context and needs and should be the ones to decide in what kind of society they want to live in; and international actors because they have skills, capacity and funds to help countries ravaged by war. Liden (2011: 67) argues that instead of adjusting local norms to Western standards, peace-building in war-ravaged countries needs to be a 'balancing act between external normative intervention and local agency rooted in the norms and ideas of the agents themselves.'

Richmond (2011: 51) concludes that the idea about post-liberal peace is not aiming to undermine basic principles of liberalism and democracy. Instead, it is a critique of the rigid conservative liberal peace framework that has been imposed on many post-war countries since the end of the Cold War. He thinks that liberal and democratic principles should not be disposed of, but efforts should be made to improve the liberal peace framework to engage with local actors in a non-paternalistic way.

Even though the post-liberal peace approach may resemble the post-development approach discussed earlier, it differs in that its proponents do not call for reliance on local capacity, knowledge and ideas only and rejection of all things foreign. Rather, it calls for 'non-hegemonic engagement' of external actors and external support for local initiatives in post-war countries. Finally, the concept of post-liberal peace, while still at early stages of development, is congruent with the notion of internally driven and externally supported

PWRD which is explored in this research. This notion seeks to find a way where, instead of imposing ready-made solutions and blueprints, external actors would work with locals on post-war recovery in a collaborative and constructive way, with a goal of leaving behind peace and institutions rooted in local needs, norms and practices and sustainable after external actors leave.

2.17 Global shifts and changes

Despite all the shortcomings of the liberal peace framework and neo-liberal economics (Barbara 2008: 308), the majority of Western governments, IFIs, international organisations, agencies and NGOs do not even question their viability (Taylor 2007: 556). This, however, may soon change as significant global shifts have been taking place over the years. Schmitz (2008: 96) notes that for decades, the assumption among international development experts, economists and policy-makers was that the only viable approach to economic development was the Western, neo-liberal economic model. However, he adds that 'this superiority is increasingly questionable' as China's economic development and growth over the last three decades have been 'superior to anything Western nations have ever achieved in their long history.'

Luckham (2011: 90) thinks that it is doubtful if the liberal peace framework and Western hegemony in global institutions can remain as influential as they have been over the last two decades due to the rise of countries such as China, India and Brazil. As mentioned earlier, in 2010, China's development banks became major global lenders, providing loans to the developing world worth at least US $110 billion, about $100 million more than the World Bank during the same period (Financial Times, 17 January 2011). Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011: 238) add that China, through its investments and 'conditionality-free aid' and assistance to many developing and post-war countries, is already challenging Western neo-liberalism and liberal peace framework. According to Binns, Dixon and Nel (2012: 347), future economic development in Africa and the rest of the developing world 'will be shaped by new global players' such as China, India and Brazil and not the West.

Most importantly, even the West has begun to question its own economic models, theories and approaches. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis and recessions, caused in large part by the lack of regulations and oversight, many Western governments have directly

intervened in their economies, increasing government spending in order to stimulate economic growth. This is contrary to what these same governments and IFIs under their control have 'preached' to the developing world for decades (Willis 2011: 66; Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012: 348).

2.18 Gaps in the literature

This section will highlight the gaps in the literature that emerged after a comprehensive study and analysis of the scholarship about PWRD. The majority of the existing literature on PWRD supports externally driven interventions and operations and imposition of ready-made 'solutions' and 'blueprints' designed by development and conflict management experts and practitioners from the West. According to Tim Murithi (2008: 18), the 'mainstream and dominant literature [about development and post-war recovery] works on the premise that the values, resources and institutions that have been developed by Eurocentric Western tradition… have a universality and can easily be transposed on to other societies.' Because of this, so far, internally driven processes and local dynamics of post-war reconstruction and development have been given little attention in the academic, development, state-building and policy-making circles globally (Ottaway 2003: 256; Elges 2005: 183; Debiel et al. 2009: 41). This is evident from a limited availability of literature that deals in detail with internally driven PWRD efforts.

A review of the literature has not identified an analysis that critically and in length examined both the externally and internally driven PWRD approaches and practices. The majority of existing publications focus primarily on externally driven approaches, processes and experiences, paying little or no attention to internally driven efforts and possibilities. These circumstances provide an opportunity for this study to assess the strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven PWRD.

Most of the literature on PWRD since the end of the Cold War has ignored factors such as foreign aid and national and geopolitical interests of international donors. To understand the links between the interests of powerful countries, political economy of foreign aid and post-war recovery, it was necessary to consult the literature which deals exclusively with foreign aid and international politics. This study has attempted to make connections between the factors that influence the thinking and decisions behind PWRD operations, practices and

approaches.

Most of the literature that deals with post-war recovery, economic reconstruction and development since the early 1990s does not make an explicit link between the record of neo-liberalism and its suitability for economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war. This is a major flaw because neo-liberalism has had a profound influence on externally driven PWRD and liberal peace framework. The lack of criticism of neo-liberal policies in the PWRD literature leads to the question of the appropriateness of these programmes for post-war countries given their track record in the developing world since the 1980s. This is especially the case since countries ravaged by war are in most cases in even worse shape socially, economically and politically than poor developing countries.

A number of prominent authors who write about PWRD only explore how externally driven post-war approaches, practices and efforts can be improved. According to this school of thought, PWRD operations in countries recovering from war should be planned and implemented solely by international peace-builders, state-builders and development experts, who know how to bring stability, peace and development to war-torn countries. For example, Roland Paris (2004) does not even assume that local people, elites and experts should have a say in the planning, design and implementation of post-war recovery operations. He mentions local participation and consultation only in one sentence, when he argues that there is 'room for much greater consultation and experimentation with different forms of local participation' in externally driven operations (Paris 2004: 210).

As noted in chapter one, the majority of existing publications and studies about PWRD have used the problem-solving approach and dealt mainly with improvements in planning and implementation of externally driven operations while ignoring structures of power, discourses, assumptions and power relations (Newman 2009: 38). This study, on the other hand, has adopted a critical stance in order to show inadequacies of existing externally driven approaches and practices, bring to the fore and critically examine internally driven efforts and offer theoretical and practical recommendations for future operations.

Even though the majority of post-Cold War externally driven operations in the aftermath of war have been shaped by the concept of liberal peace, some prominent and recent publications on post-war recovery do not mention this concept. For example, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2011) do not mention the liberal peace framework at all. It is difficult to

understand how anyone working on PWRD today can assume that it is possible to examine the trends, approaches and practices related to post-war reconstruction and development and attempt to improve current practices if key issues, concepts and ideological underpinnings related to PWRD are completely ignored.

Many critics of the liberal peace framework do not call for fundamental changes to intrusive externally driven experiments and socio-economic and political engineering after war, but only criticise the ideologically-driven and overly intrusive operations that are not helping bring 'positive peace' to war-torn countries. However, as the section on the post-liberal peace has shown, there are also those who think that there is a need for significant change. Mac Ginty (2008: 159), for example, argues for a move beyond mere critique of externally driven PWRD and an exploration of internally driven alternatives. Murithi (2008: 30) writes that more research about locally driven peace-building and post-war recovery processes and approaches is needed in order to explore 'practical strategies' and improve current practices. Finally, Richmond (2011: 47) stresses that a post-liberal peace could offer an alternative to externally designed and driven blueprints and impositions, combining external expertise and funds with local agency, ideas and initiatives in a cooperative and non-hegemonic manner.

In the following chapters, this study will critically challenge the way 'mainstream' actors, academics, experts and policy-makers have been approaching PWRD since the end of the Cold War. It will contextualise and explore experiences of countries that went through externally and internally driven as well as a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD in order to unpack empirical results and practices, recommend possible improvements to current approaches and explore the possibility of internally driven and externally supported PWRD. Finally, the study will provide a non-Western perspective to the existing body of literature.

2.19 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed relevant literature and provided a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues, arguments, concepts and concerns related to externally and internally driven PWRD. Section one dealt with theoretical underpinnings about development, conflict and foreign aid; section two defined key aspects of post-war reconstruction and development and unpacked and put in the research context various approaches and practices related to externally and internally driven PWRD. The chapter also

highlighted the gaps in the literature and explained how the study will address these gaps.

Chapter Three - Research Methodology

This chapter will discuss research design and methodology, sample, data collection and analysis, validity and reliability of the study, ethical considerations and limitations of the research methodology.

3.1 Type of research

This is an exploratory qualitative study. The methodology used in this study is interpretive research methodology. Since the primary aim of interpretive research is to learn about processes and individuals, this methodology is the most appropriate for an exploratory study about reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building processes and operations in countries emerging from war. For an in-depth understanding of various PWRD approaches and practices, a collective case study approach was used. To analyse data, the study used the grounded theory approach, one of the main analytical tools in qualitative research.

3.2 Interpretive research

The aim of interpretive research is to learn about processes and individuals and their views, perspectives, interpretations and experiences (Neuman 2006: 88) as well as to understand and interpret actions and behaviour of human beings (Sarantakos 2005: 12). Interpretive researchers argue that social researchers need to collect, analyse and take into consideration people's points of view, values and feelings. Since they see people and their interactions, opinions and beliefs as key influencers of reality, interpretive researchers do not think that value-free science is possible (Neuman 2006: 93-94). Struwig and Stead (2001: 16) add that social research is part of everyday reality and cannot be considered value-free.

Interpretive research is criticised by positivist researchers for the lack of precision and objectivity in data collection. Positivist research uses quantitative research methods such as surveys, experiments and interpretation of statistical data in the quest for precise measures and causal laws that can be used to make predictions about human behaviour (Struwig and

Stead 2001: 5). Positivist researchers assume that the 'reality is composed of unambiguous facts which await discovery by the observer' (Mayoux 2006: 116) and seek generalisation and establishment of universal findings and theories (Rule and John 2011: 60).

Interpretive researchers, on the other hand, use qualitative methods in order to conduct 'systematic analyses of socially meaningful actions' and understand how humans relate to each other and how they 'create and maintain their social worlds' (Neuman 2006: 88). Qualitative data collection methods are used to generate data that 'provides accounts of [respondents'] world in their own words' (Henn, Weinstein and Foard 2006: 14). Proponents of qualitative research emphasise that facts are 'fluid and embedded within a meaning system' and depend on a complex web of people and events in a specific setting (Neuman 2006: 92-93). Neuman adds that qualitative researchers think that social reality is not always stable with predictable patterns. Instead, people and their interactions, views, actions and beliefs shape reality (Ibid: 88-89).

Contrary to the methods used by positivists, interpretive researchers use qualitative data collection methods such as observation, semi-structured, in-depth and open ended interviews and case studies to collect data about people and processes. They argue that there are many unquantifiable facts about humans and the world in which they live that can only be understood through interpretive and qualitative research methods (Berg 1995: 7; Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53; Sarantakos 2005: 50; Welman, Kruger and Mitchell 2005: 9). Interpretive researchers think that people's statements and behaviours usually have different meanings and cannot be seen as standardised (Berg 1995: 3).

3.3 Research methodologies for development and PWRD research

In the past, the primary methodology used in development research was quantitative research methodology. One of the main reasons for this was the pressure from economics and positivist paradigm to quantify development work and its impact. This has significantly changed over time and qualitative research methods have become important pillars of development research, especially when the aim of researchers is to holistically understand complex processes and phenomena (Mayoux 2006: 116-18).

In terms of PWRD, while quantitative research methods are often used to numerically and

statistically show the benefits of external actors' involvement, the use of quantitative research to study post-war recovery efforts often masks the reality (Richmond 2009: 557; Newman 2009: 28-9) and 'erases the particularity of places and experiences through inevitable generalisations.' This, in turn, leads to research reports in which real people are mere numbers and statistics (Denskus 2007: 657).

One of the main problems related to externally driven PWRD operations is the imposition of 'one-size-fits-all' blueprints. This, according to Berger (2006: 21), arises from the quantitative research paradigm which 'assumes that the "right" set' of post-war recovery 'solutions' can succeed 'without reference to the specificity of the local, regional and global context.' Berger states that quantitative analysis of in-conflict and post-war environments is not appropriate for an understanding of the historical, social, political and economic context of PWRD processes and operations and their short- and long-term effects on societies emerging from war. He recommends the use of qualitative and interpretative rather than quantitative methodologies for studies of this type. Berger argues that qualitative research methods offer 'more critical, historical and creative approaches' which can provide better background and methodology for understanding and critical analysis of local conditions and help search for solutions that suit local needs and circumstances (Ibid: 13).

According to Denskus (2007: 660), in order to better understand in-conflict and post-war societies and their needs, there is a need for 'more qualitative insight into the social dynamics of war and peace.' Similarly, Richmond (2011: 49) argues that qualitative and contextual research is necessary if we want to understand post-war operations and developments and improve current practices. Berger (2006: 7) adds that, when compared to quantitative research, qualitative research about PWRD offers a broader analysis and facilitates better and more critical engagement with actors, programmes and practices involved.

3.4 Statement of the problem

The main aims of post-war reconstruction and development are to 'prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and build and consolidate sustainable peace' (NEPAD 2005: iv). This involves work and improvements in areas such as humanitarian assistance, safety and security, socio-economic reconstruction and development, basic services, livelihoods, governance, justice and reconciliation.

As the extensive literature review has shown, since the end of the Cold War, out of many externally driven attempts to reconstruct and develop countries emerging from war, there seem to be only a few relative success stories. The reason for this is the fact that all too often, programmes, policies and solutions were imposed by outsiders, either because they worked elsewhere or because they were influenced by geopolitical, economic and/or security interests of powerful countries.

It is difficult to determine how internally driven and externally supported PWRD would work as experts, analysts and academics have spent little time examining and assessing internally driven attempts (Ottaway 2003: 256). Given the importance of post-war recovery for countries emerging from violent conflict, 'any opportunity to improve the effectiveness of future operations should be vigorously pursued' (Paris 2004: 4). Focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan and Somaliland, this study assesses strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven PWRD and explores the possibility of internally driven and externally supported PWRD.

3.5 Research questions, aims and objectives

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of externally driven PWRD?

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of internally driven PWRD?

- How can post-war practices and approaches be improved in order to bring lasting peace and socio-economic stability in countries emerging from war?

The aims of this study are to assess the strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven PWRD and explore the nature of an alternative/improved approach. Main objectives of this study are to present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD based on the extensive review of literature and field research in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland and offer recommendations to improve current practices.

3.6 Critical stance

As mentioned in more detail in the introduction chapter, in order to improve PWRD approaches and practices, there is a need to critically 'scrutinise the assumptions that underpin the design and conduct' of PWRD operations (Paris 2004: 4). This study has adopted a critical stance and will attempt to show inadequacies of existing externally driven approaches and practices, bring to the fore and critically examine internally driven efforts and offer recommendations for future operations.

3.7 Collective case study

In social research, case study method is used when research aim is to come to an in-depth understanding of a case, concept or phenomenon in question (Welman, Kruger and Mitchell 2005: 193). This study uses the collective case study approach in order to explore in-depth three cases for the purpose of understanding the PWRD phenomenon. Collective (also known as multiple) case study approach allows researchers to explore and analyse data and findings 'within each setting and across settings' (Baxter and Jack 2008: 550).

The selection of the cases was based on initial review of literature of a number of developing countries in post-war situation. The selection of Bosnia, Somaliland and South Sudan was made because of the different PWRD approaches experienced in each. Bosnia experienced an intrusive externally driven PWRD; in Somaliland, post-war recovery was internally driven; and South Sudan is experiencing a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD. Using the collective case study approach and focusing on these three cases, the study will use the sequenced structure for presentation of findings and data analysis. This type of multiple case study organisation calls for presentation of individual cases, followed by both individual and cross-case analysis (Rule and John 2011: 120) in order to draw specific and general findings and conclusions.

In the data analysis and discussion chapter, the three countries and their post-war recovery experiences will not be directly compared. This is not done because each case differs and a comparison of Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland would not tell much in terms of contemporary PWRD approaches and practices. Instead, different approaches will be compared and their strengths, weaknesses and potential will be analysed in terms of delivery

of inclusive and broad-based reconstruction and development, livelihood improvements and establishment and consolidation of lasting peace and stability.

3.8 Data collection

Data for this study was collected from multiple sources. Semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews were conducted with selected individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Bosnia in October 2010 and July 2011, South Sudan in November 2010 and October 2011 and Somaliland in November 2011. In addition, interviews with some respondents were conducted in South Africa or through the use of Skype audio conferencing via the internet.

Open-ended in-depth interviews allowed the collection of detailed and elaborative responses from respondents. Data collection through semi-structured interviews in the natural settings, where respondents are experiencing the issues that are studied, was chosen because it allowed the collection of first-hand qualitative data and broadening of the understanding of the studied phenomenon (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 120; Creswell 2009: 175). Walsh (2001: 66) writes that the advantage of semi-structured interviews is that respondents are often more open to talk about their views and experiences when given an opportunity to add to the conversation, thus helping researchers 'discover unexpected and unforeseen data.' According to May (2001: 123), semi-structured interviews give a chance to respondents 'to answer more on their own terms than standardised interviews.'

During the interview process, the focus was on the qualitative dimensions of PWRD and the processes, attitudes, patterns and opinions. Broad interview guides[69] were used, which provided a list of themes and issues to be covered in the interviews. Different interview guides were prepared – a general guide about PWRD and specific guides about Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland – based on the extensive review of literature. In most cases, additional questions emerged during the conversation with respondents. Furthermore, since semi-structured in-depth interviews allow for additional probing beyond the interview guides, respondents had a chance to bring up issues they thought were important but were not covered by prepared questions.

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[69] See appendix II for interview guides.

Data collection was based on the informed consent. Informed consent forms[70] were given to respondents before interviews, which they read and signed. The right to privacy and anonymity of respondents were respected. Interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis and respondents were able to leave the process at any time if they wished to do so. All interviews in Somaliland and South Sudan were conducted in English. In the case of Bosnia, most interviews were conducted in English while five were conducted in Serbo-Croatian[71]. Furthermore, all interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder. This was done with the permission of respondents. Recording of the interviews ensured that taking notes was not necessary and the focus was on the interview process.

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, a wide range of sources such as books, academic journals, news articles and interviews, publications, policy briefs, speeches and statements from various actors who work on or write about post-war reconstruction and development were consulted. This was done in order to get a better understanding of the arguments, debates, issues and developments linked to PWRD and the broader post-war context in each of the three cases that are studied. The review of the literature provided the theoretical background and insight into PWRD practices, approaches and experiences around the world and informed interview guides. References to the information presented in the literature review and contextual background chapters will be made in the data analysis chapter in order to enhance the validity of the research process and findings as well as to ensure data triangulation.

3.9 Type and size of sample

Sampling for this study was based on purposive and theoretical sampling strategies. This form of sampling leads researchers to choose respondents based on their possession of particular knowledge related to the research topic (Mayoux 2006: 118; Rule and John 2011: 64; Birks and Mills 2011: 11) or 'relevance to the research question and analytical framework' (Schwandt 2007: 269). When theoretical and purposive strategies are used for sampling, sample size depends on the type of research, research questions and aims of the

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[70] See appendix III for an informed consent form.

[71] As this is author's first language, he did not need a translator for the interviews. He was also able to translate the Serbo-Croatian transcripts into English after conducting the interviews.

study (Ibid: 270).

For this study, fifteen individuals were interviewed in each of the three cases. An additional interview was conducted about PWRD in general. In total, forty-six respondents were interviewed[72]. Most interviews lasted for over an hour, providing over sixty hours of audio taped interview material. Instead of aiming to interview a large number of respondents who would provide similar feedback, the focus was on key informants. All respondents were deliberately selected because they possessed extensive knowledge and/or experience related to the issues, concerns and concepts that are studied.

Some respondents were selected after an extensive research. Others were selected using the snowball sampling technique, where respondents would refer or recommend other potential respondents. Respondents were either from or working in Bosnia[73], South Sudan[74] and Somaliland[75], ranging from local government officials, NGO officials and academics who either worked on PWRD in some form or oversaw these processes; international donor, aid and NGO officials, local or foreign experts and practitioners involved in processes and projects; and local people on the receiving end of PWRD processes and operations. The key criteria for selection of respondents was that they have been/are personally involved in or have experienced PWRD processes and operations in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland.

3.10 Saturation of the data

Data saturation is the 'point at which the information begins to repeat itself' during the data collection process (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey 2011: 88). Finding a point of saturation requires initial data collection, transcription of the findings, assessment of the initial findings, identification of gaps and then additional cycles of data collection and analysis until saturation of the data is reached (Ibid: 89). For each of the three cases in this study, the initial data was collected, transcribed, assessed and interpreted; after identifying shortcomings and

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[72] See appendix IV for the list of interviews.

[73] In the case of Bosnia, ten respondents were the citizens of Bosnia while five were foreigners. Out of ten local respondents, five worked for international organisations in the country.

[74] In the case of South Sudan, seven respondents were South Sudanese while eight were foreigners.

[75] In the case of Somaliland, ten respondents were the citizens of Somaliland while five were foreigners.

gaps in the data, another cycle of data collection was conducted. After two cycles of data collection[76] for each of the cases, the saturation of the data was reached, leading to the final data analysis process.

3.11 Data analysis

3.11.1 Grounded theory approach

To analyse the data collected in this study, this study used the grounded theory approach. This approach is one of the most commonly used methods in qualitative data analysis and specifically in exploratory research (Henn, Weinstein and Foard 2006: 198-199). John Creswell (2009: 13) defines the grounded theory approach as a 'strategy of inquiry in which the researcher derives a general abstract theory of a process, action or interaction' grounded in opinions and views of respondents. The grounded theory approach requires the use of a bottom-up analysis in order to generate findings and possibly theories (Rule and John 2011: 91). Denscombe (2007: 92) argues that this approach is particularly useful when social researchers want to investigate and understand respondents' points of view. Being generated and developed from the data, grounded theories and findings in most cases accurately explain human actions and behaviour (Sarantakos 2005: 118). Birks and Mills (2011: 16) emphasise that the grounded theory approach goes beyond exploration and aims to 'explain the phenomenon being studied.'

Charmaz (2008: 210) points out that the grounded theory approach can be used to 'anchor agendas for future action, practice and policies by making explicit connections between the theorised antecedents, current conditions and consequences of major processes.' As the primary aim of this research is to critically explore externally and internally PWRD approaches, practices and shortcomings and recommend improvements, using the grounded theory approach for data analysis is appropriate and potentially beneficial.

The grounded theory approach employs a 'systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon' (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 24).

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[76] In the case of Somaliland, the first cycle of data collection took place in South Africa and via the Skype in 2010. This was followed by a visit to Somaliland in November 2011 for the second cycle of data collection.

Glaser and Strauss (1967: 1), founders of the grounded theory, argue that this approach helps social researchers generate theories from the 'data systematically obtained and analysed.' Instead of using conventional research practices that start out with theories and hypotheses and then try to accept or reject them, grounded theory focuses on concepts and meanings that emerge from the gathered data and builds findings and theories 'from the ground up' (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 498). Sarantakos (2005: 119) stresses that the grounded theory approach 'aims to develop theory through the research, not to subject research to theory.' Similarly, Denscombe (2010: 16) writes that grounded theory considers the purpose of social research to be a potential 'discovery of social theory rather than the testing of social theory.'

One of the key aspects of grounded theory is the 'acceptance of openness to ideas' that develop during the course of the data analysis process (Henn, Weinstein, and Foard 2006: 199). Research process is not guided by 'conventional practices' but by the 'knowledge gathered during the study' (Sarantakos 2005: 118). Grounded theory concepts and indicators are 'concrete data, such as behaviour patterns and social events, which are observed or described in documents or interview texts' (Ibid: 347).

Denscombe (2007: 93-94) notes that some researchers take the grounded theory approach to extremes and start research process 'without any fixed ideas about the nature of the things that are about to be investigated.' They do not conduct a review of the literature before field research and data collection. Others, on the other hand, do conduct literature review and explore historical and contextual background of their topics in order to prepare themselves for the research. For this study, an extensive review of literature was conducted in order to develop a better understanding of the approaches, practices and concepts that relate to post-war reconstruction and development in order to select appropriate case studies for the research as well as to understand post-war contexts in each of the three cases.

Even though the grounded theory approach is often used to generate theories about studied topics, the goal in this study is not to develop a grounded theory about PWRD. Instead, the study will present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD approaches and practices after systematic analysis of the data and offer recommendations for improvements. The grounded theory approach can be used even if the research goal is not a generation of theory but exploration and explanation of a phenomenon through a set of key findings (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 155; Birks and Mills 2011: 29-30). In this case, researchers present their key findings without the final integration of concepts and categories and development of

a theory. This way of using the grounded theory approach is often called the 'modified grounded theory approach' (Birks and Mills 2011: 30).

3.11.2 Using the grounded theory approach

The grounded theory approach entails a method of constant comparison, where 'empirical indicators from the data are compared looking for similarities and differences' (Schwandt 2007: 131). This process leads researchers to categorise the data into thematic concepts and sections (Gibbs 2007: 38). Finding relationships and connections among concepts and sections can lead to emergence of key research findings or formation of theories. As noted by Henn, Weinstein and Foard (2006: 199), 'the cycle of sampling, data collection and coding is driven by the constant comparative method' which leads to saturation of the data, emergence of key findings and possible development of a theory.

Using grounded theory, researchers can start a process of coding as soon as the initial data is collected. Birks and Mills (2011: 9) define coding as identification and labelling of important words, themes, ideas or arguments. During the data analysis process, researchers look for themes, concepts, arguments and descriptions of processes that are frequently mentioned by respondents or found in the data that highlight the issues of importance or interest to the study. Identifying these phrases and arguments is called coding. Gibbs (2007: 40) writes that codes 'form a focus for thinking about the data and its interpretation.' According to Babbie (2007: 296), when the grounded theory approach is used to analyse the data, 'systematic coding is important for achieving validity and reliability in the data analysis.'

After the data is coded, researchers look for conceptual patterns. Generally, this process may lead to 'emergence of concepts that eventually [could] become the basis of a theoretical model' (Sarantakos 2005: 349). Categories and concepts that are 'neutral, appear frequently in the data, allow easy reference to other categories and possess clear implications for a formal theory' form key findings and grounded theories at the end of the research process (Ibid: 348).

3.12 Validity and reliability of the study

Validity is a 'measure of precision, accuracy and relevance' of a study (Sarantakos 2005: 83). Validity is important in interpretive and qualitative social research. However, instead of using the term validity, which is used mostly by positivist researchers, qualitative researchers prefer terms such as credibility, trustworthiness, authenticity and accuracy. Credibility and authenticity of research are more important to qualitative researchers than the 'idea of a single version of truth' promoted by positivist research approach and quantitative researchers. Qualitative researchers' goal is to give a 'fair, honest and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives it every day' (Neuman 2006: 196). To achieve credibility, trustworthiness, authenticity and accuracy and strengthen the quality of their research, qualitative researchers provide detailed information about data collection and analysis, support the findings by other studies and use triangulation (Sarantakos 2005: 86; Rule and John 2011: 109). One way to achieve triangulation is to compare and contrast multiple sources of data in order to enhance the validity, accuracy and quality of the research process and findings (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 66; Gibbs 2007: 94).

Reliability is a 'measure of consistency and precision' of the research. While qualitative researchers give attention to reliability, they use terms such as consistency and dependability (Sarantakos 2005: 89). In order to come up with reliable, consistent and dependable data, qualitative researchers consult various sources of data and 'employ multiple measurement methods' (Neuman 2006: 196).

For this study, in-depth semi-structured interviews in three post-war countries and an extensive literature review were conducted in order to get multiple and diverse perspectives about different approaches to PWRD and confirm credibility and authenticity of the study and findings. This chapter has provided detailed information about data collection and analysis. The study was planned and conducted in a comprehensive, accurate, ethical and professional manner to ensure its validity, reliability, credibility and trustworthiness.

3.13 Ethical considerations

Social researchers have a 'moral and professional obligation to be ethical' and are expected to always follow ethical standards in their work (Neuman 2006: 129). Listed below are ethical

standards based on Sarantakos (2005: 18) and Denscombe (2007: 141) to which this study has adhered to:

- Respect for the rights and dignity of respondents;

- Honesty, integrity and professionalism of researchers;

- Provision of clear and truthful information about research aims and procedures to respondents;

- Avoidance of any physical or psychological harm to respondents;

- Explanation of possible risks and consequences the respondents may encounter due to their participation in a study;

- Right to privacy and anonymity of respondents;

- Confidentiality of the data collected in a study;

- Research needs to be based on informed consent.

In order to protect respondents from any harm, they were asked to remain anonymous in the study. Anonymity ensures that respondents are unidentifiable in order to protect their identity after the study is completed and made public. In addition, full confidentiality of the data collected during the interview process was guaranteed. Interviews were based on the informed consent; an informed consent form was read and signed by respondents prior to the interviews. Respondents voluntarily took part in the study, fully understanding possible risks and consequences involved. They were informed of their right to decline to answer any questions they found inappropriate. Furthermore, respondents were advised not to reveal any politically sensitive information that could jeopardise them.

3.14 Limitations of research methodology

- In two instances, the study had to rely on the internet (Skype audio conferencing) to interview respondents instead of conducting in-person interviews. When researchers conduct interviews this way, they lose the opportunity to observe 'visual clues' and 'non-verbal behaviour' of respondents (Sarantakos 2005: 285; Denscombe 2007: 187). However, using this method to interview some respondents was the only method

that could be used due to the distance.

- Potential limitations of qualitative research are subjectivity of analysis and possible bias about a topic (Mayoux 2006: 123). Similarly, the main limitation of the grounded theory approach is a possibility of researchers being too subjective and having 'high level of arbitrary decisions' in their studies (Sarantakos 2005: 350). To limit subjectivity, bias and arbitrary decisions, this author kept an open mind throughout the research process and based the findings solely on the data collected in the study.

3.15 Conclusion

This chapter discussed in detail research design and methodology, sample, data collection and analysis, validity and reliability of the study, ethical considerations and limitations of the research methodology.

Chapter Four - Contextual Background

This chapter will provide contextual background about post-war recovery in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland[77]. As explained in chapter one, these are developing countries which have undergone civil wars in the recent past. Furthermore, each country has undergone a distinct process of post-war reconstruction and development. Rule and John (2011: 49) emphasise the importance of placing each case in context in order to understand the background and issues related to the study. Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011: 289) add that it is necessary to explore and describe the broader context of the studied cases in order to provide a 'backdrop for readers to understand the study findings.' The chapter will not provide historical background to the violent conflicts in each country or the approaches used to end conflicts, but will focus only on post-war periods.

4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of an intrusive externally driven PWRD. The international administration in Bosnia was established in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) that ended the Bosnian civil war[78] in December of 1995. The agreement was drafted by international experts - mainly American and Western European experts and policy-makers - and signed under a pressure from the United States and Western European countries (Cox 2001: 6; Talentino 2002: 31; Recchia 2007: 7; Parish 2011). Furthermore, the agreement was not negotiated by all warring parties from Bosnia but only the presidents of Croatia and Serbia, representing Bosnian Croats and Serbs respectively, with only Bosnian Muslims being represented by their wartime political leader (Paris 2004: 99; Richmond and Franks 2008a: 17). As Wolfrum (2005: 676) points out, none of the three sides in Bosnia were satisfied with the final agreement, which became Bosnian post-war Constitution; subsequently, this negatively affected its implementation. As noted above, the agreement was drafted and written by external actors; the Bosnian population, experts and political elites

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[77] See appendix V for basic statistics for Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland; see appendix VI for a map of Bosnia; see appendix VII for a map of South Sudan; see appendix VIII for a map of Somaliland.

[78] The war began in 1992 and it was fought between Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. About 100,000 people died in the war while many more were wounded and displaced.

were not involved in the drafting of the agreement/country's Constitution (Venice Commission 2005: 3), but were expected to obey it and live by it.

Chesterman (2001: 10) writes that the Dayton agreement was aimed at stopping the war rather than consolidating and building long-term peace and stability. Luckham (2011: 102) argues that the DPA 'froze the underlying conflict under unworkable power-sharing Constitution,' thus requiring international presence if peace was to hold. Apart from dividing Bosnia into three ethnic parts[79] and legitimising the status quo after the war (Kaldor 2007: 130; Newman 2009: 34; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 296), the agreement established what some consider to be too many layers of government that are financially unsustainable for a small country like Bosnia: a central government, two entity governments and ten cantons in one of the entities, all having parliaments, presidents or governors and numerous ministries (Venice Commission 2005: 13; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 78; Sandole 2010: 95). In addition, the peace agreement created a 'weak and decentralised state' (Richmond and Franks 2008a: 2) and provided 'legal foundations for the international community to intervene in practically every sphere of Bosnian affairs' (Belloni 2001: 164). Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009: 206) adds that the agreement gave power over economic policy-making to entities and not the central government. This led to a situation where the central government lacked power and means to institute reforms and policies in the country.

The ultimate goal of the DPA and Western policy-makers who drafted it was to transform Bosnia into a Western-style liberal market democracy (Paris 2004: 99; Richmond and Franks 2008a: 3). This project envisaged multiple transitions – the transition from war to peace; from a communist to democratic system of governance; and from a socialist to market economy (International Crisis Group 2007: 2). This, however, was not easy as the country and its institutions were largely destroyed in the war. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009: 205-6) describes the challenging environment in the aftermath of war: half of Bosnia's population was displaced; employment was around 50% and the majority of the people depended on humanitarian assistance. In addition, the wartime destruction led to a total disintegration of pre-war political, institutional and economic systems and frameworks.

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[79] The country was formally divided into two entities – Republika Srpska (with Bosnian Serbs in majority) and Federacija Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (with Bosnian Muslims and Croats in majority); in reality, however, Federacija BiH was divided into two ethnic parts, one with Bosnian Muslim and another with Bosnian Croat majority.

To transform Bosnia into a liberal market democracy, external actors employed extensive externally driven socio-economic and political engineering under military occupation. Richmond and Franks (2008a: 10) point that since the DPA established a conservative version of liberal peace, external military intervention was needed to implement the peace agreement. Initially after the war, the NATO deployed 60,000 troops to Bosnia. This number dropped to 30,000 by 1998 and 13,000 in 2002 as the security situation improved (Bischoff 2003: 111). In 2004, NATO troops were replaced by 7,000 European Union troops (Recchia 2007: 14), further reduced to 2,500 troops in 2007 (International Crisis Group 2007: 5). Belloni (2001: 165) points out the staggering costs of the NATO peacekeeping mission: at the time when NATO had 30,000 troops in Bosnia, the cost of the mission was US $7 billion per year.

Like many other post-war countries, Bosnia was flooded with international 'peace-builders' in the aftermath of war. Since 1996, over 60,000 international civilian administrators and officials worked for various organisations, agencies and NGOs in the country (International Crisis Group 2007: 1); over 10,000 worked on peace-building alone, representing more than two hundred international organisations, NGOs and agencies (David 2001: 23). As in other post-war environments, there was a complete lack of coordination among international donors and organisations, who arrived in Bosnia with differing agendas, interests, plans and programmes. Many international actors spent years 'jockeying for power and responsibility,' often replicating and overlapping projects and programmes (International Crisis Group 2001: 2). This, according to David (2001: 23), greatly impeded much needed post-war recovery and progress.

4.1.1 External actors' sweeping powers

The DPA established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), whose task was to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement (International Crisis Group 2001: 2). Initially, the international community planned to stay in Bosnia for only one year after the war, replicating 'quick and dirty' peace-building efforts attempted elsewhere in the early 1990s (Paris and Sisk 2007: 3). Looking for a 'quick fix,' external actors insisted that the first post-war elections take place within a year after the war ended. The elections, held in September 1996, led to an overwhelming victory of nationalist parties that took the country

into the war; subsequently, these parties continued with their divisive ethno-nationalist politics, making the implementation of the peace agreement literally impossible (Paris 1997: 56; Recchia 2007: 18). Paris (2004: 111) notes that the immediate post-war political liberalisation and democratisation 'reinforced the power of the most extremist, nationalist parties,' preventing stabilisation and reconciliation among wartime adversaries.

After realising that local political elites were not interested in effective power-sharing and implementation of the peace agreement, the international community decided to remain in the country for longer than a year and oversee the PWRD process. During the first two years of peace, the High Representative had limited powers and only tried to moderate between local parties and oversee implementation of the peace agreement. Seeing that the country was not moving forward due to dysfunctional local politics and ethnic divisions, the international community decided to change the course and give sweeping powers to the OHR in December 1997 in order to enforce the implementation of the DPA (Bischoff 2003: 117; Knaus and Martin 2003: 62-5; Recchia 2007: 5). These powers, known as the 'Bonn powers,' were granted to the Office of the High Representative not by a UN Security Council resolution but by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an informal group of fifty-five donor countries, international organisations and IFIs, led by the United States and European Union (Zaum 2006: 459; Recchia 2007: 15).

After the 'Bonn powers' were introduced, Bosnia became a trusteeship of the international community (Bischoff 2003: 124; Recchia 2007: 5). The OHR was the 'ultimate authority' (International Crisis Group 2007: i) and a 'supreme institution vested with power' (Venice Commission 2005: 2), exercising 'de facto executive and legislative' power in the country (Richmond and Franks 2008a: 11). As Bischoff (2003: 112) points out, through the OHR, the PIC became the 'engine of policy-making' in Bosnia, imposing major political and constitutional arrangements on local parties through the Office of High Representative. At the same time, the OHR was not accountable to the Bosnian population; what is more, the OHR was not accountable even to the UN Security Council, but only to the Peace Implementation Council, an ad hoc coalition of donor countries and IFIs (Knaus and Martin 2003: 61; Wolfrum 2005: 686; Chandler 2006a: 483).

While the 'Bonn powers' were used in moderation between 1997 and 1999 (on average four major decisions and impositions per month), they peaked between 1999 and 2004 (on average thirteen major decisions and impositions per month) (Knaus and Martin 2003: 68). Since

1997, hundreds of democratically elected Bosnian politicians and public officials have been dismissed by the High Representatives because they '*may have been engaged* in inappropriate activities' (emphasis added) (International Crisis Group 2007: 8). None of these 'inappropriate activities' were ever proven; at the same time, the accused never had a 'legal remedy available [to them] to appeal against such decisions' (Zaum 2006: 471). Matthew Parish (2011), former Chief Legal Adviser to the International Supervisor of the Brčko district in Bosnia, calls this period 'an era of tyranny' and 'internationally sanctioned despotism' by powerful Western countries. He adds that the majority of dismissals were 'arbitrary… no evidence was presented against the officials and no studies were undertaken of their work.'

Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin (2003: 61) argue that in Bosnia, 'outsiders *set* the agenda, *impose* it and *punish with sanctions* those who refuse to implement it' (original emphasis). Using threats and dismissals, the OHR tried to 'force the country [and its politicians] to develop in the direction the international community desired.' At the same time, local actors 'were not allowed to challenge the [international] peace-building agenda' (Newman 2009: 34). The 'Bonn powers' and dismissals by the OHR created a situation where local politicians had to be fearful of and loyal to the OHR in order to remain in their positions, despite being democratically elected by the Bosnian people. If they did not accept OHR's decisions, rules and policies, they could be easily dismissed after being labelled as 'spoilers' or for alleged obstruction of reforms (Belloni 2001: 172; Chandler 2006a: 490). This approach, according to Chandler (2006a: 492), reduced local political and governance institutions to 'irrelevant talking shops.'

Parish (2011) argues that the dismissals by the OHR have been the 'principal instruments in a novel model of neo-colonial administration of a post-conflict state.' Due to all this, in the academic and policy-making circles Bosnia has become known as the 'world capital of interventionism' by external actors (Bischoff 2003: 116), where even the national flag and anthem were imposed by the international community's High Representatives (Belloni 2001: 172; David 2001: 21). Talentino (2002: 35) notes that the OHR's approach after the war was to 'teach democratisation' through authoritarian methods. Belloni (2001: 163) claims that, by using non-democratic means and not understanding the nature of societal relations and ethnic politics in Bosnia, the international community's involvement and efforts have 'retarded the transition towards more substantive levels of democracy.' The Council of Europe's

'Commission for Democracy Through Law' (The Venice Commission) has found that the powers vested in the international community's High Representative in Bosnia to impose laws and regulations and dismiss elected politicians have been 'fundamentally incompatible with the democratic character of the state and the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Venice Commission 2005: 22). Simon Chesterman (2003: i) thinks that the international community has been building and will one day leave behind 'uncertain foundations for legitimate and sustainable governance.' Knaus and Martin (2003: 70) argue that instead of building and promoting democracy in Bosnia, externally imposed social and political transformation 'implicitly teaches that technocratic rule at arm's length from the people is perfectly good governance after all.'

Apart from dismissing elected politicians and imposing laws and reforms, the international community was also directly involved in political and electoral engineering, hoping to 'bring to power moderates who would then undertake needed reforms by reshaping the social and economic structure of the country' (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 78). The International Crisis Group (2009a: 1) points out that since 1997, the OHR has been 'more a part of Bosnia's political disputes than [an independent and impartial] facilitator of solutions.' Another report by the International Crisis Group (2001: 5) notes that the US and UK ambassadors in Bosnia acted as 'local kingmakers' in 2000, creating and supporting local political coalitions in the aftermath of elections. In some cases, external political engineering took place before elections, when Western diplomats and officials from various international organisations offered promises to the Bosnian population – such as financial support for the country and European integration - if they voted for specific political parties and politicians. In other cases, Western donors and IFIs used financial aid as a means of influencing government formation after elections (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 78).

Kaldor (2006: 70-71) argues that intrusive involvement by the international community in post-war Bosnia was necessary, arguing that the 'alternative to a strong international protectorate… [would be] nationalist partition and perhaps renewed warfare.' David (2001: 10-11) writes that without the presence of external actors, 'Bosnia would not be an experiment in peace-building but a dangerous powder-keg for many years to come.' Knaus and Martin (2003: 70) also think that after the war, ethnically divided Bosnia needed extensive external support and even 'some coercive powers… in order to enforce' the implementation of the peace agreement. However, instead of creating some form of stability

and then shifting to internally driven and externally supported PWRD, the international community kept expanding and strengthening the powers of international actors, leading to a creation of 'European Raj'[80] fully dependent on external aid and assistance for Bosnia's socio-economic and political survival.

4.1.2 Positive contributions by external actors

It must be pointed out that not all international community's efforts and impositions were negative; some have benefited Bosnia and its population. Post-war stabilisation and establishment of security by the UN and NATO forces are the most notable success stories (David 2001: 23; Talentino 2002: 32). In fact, post-war Bosnia is considered as one of the safest countries in Europe (ESI 2007: 3). Another externally driven success story was establishment of a new and relatively stable currency (Stevenson 2000: 63). Security sector reform has been another major externally driven success. Right after the war, the country had three ethnic armies with over 400,000 soldiers in total. With the help of the international community, the DDR process and reform of the security sector have led to a creation of a small, professional and single army with 10,000 regular soldiers and 5,000 reservists (ESI 2007: 2). External support also played a key role in helping many refugees and displaced return to their homes after war. Finally, donor funding for physical reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed during the war - from people's homes to roads, bridges, electric power and water facilities - was another notable success (Paris 2004: 106), helping individuals and the country as a whole rebuild after wartime destruction.

4.1.3 Economic reconstruction and development

Between 1996 and 2001, the international community spent \$1,200 per person on reconstruction, peace-building and state-building in war-ravaged Bosnia (Belloni 2001: 165). This is a large amount of money, far more than in any other case before (Misra 2002: 14; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 201). During the Marshal Plan, for example, the recipient countries received not more than \$275 per person in today's money, more than four times less than

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[80] Knaus and Martin (2003: 70) compare the international community's involvement in Bosnia to the British colonial rule in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, often called the British Raj.

what Bosnia had received during the first five years of peace (Belloni 2001: 165). In Bosnia, donor funds were spent in two phases: between 1996 and 1999, phase one covered rehabilitation of infrastructure, public services and establishment of neo-liberal macro-economic framework. Since 2000, phase two included governance and financial reforms, including privatisation and deregulation of the economy (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 70).

Economic improvements and development in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s were evident soon after the Marshal Plan assistance took place. In Bosnia, however, there are few instances of economic growth and development (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 70), despite the fact that the country had followed the 'neo-liberal path required to adjust weak [and formerly communist] economies to global economic competition' (Belloni 2001: 176). While Bosnia's post-war macro-economic performance, fiscal balance and inflation have been relatively stable, the country has experienced a 'limited and distorted recovery,' failing to create employment opportunities for many and alleviate poverty despite the extensive assistance from donors and IFIs (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 208). In 2007, for example, unemployment in Bosnia was over 40%, while the country's GDP was lower than the pre-war GDP (Recchia 2007: 17).

Privatisation of state-owned industries and enterprises, the key aspect of economic liberalism promoted by external actors after the war, did not lead to development, economic growth and livelihood improvements. Most of the valuable industries and enterprises were purchased by dominant nationalist political elites and their followers (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 211), thus 'reinforcing the dominance of clientelistic and mafia political economies' (Pugh 2000: 2). This further increased poverty, inequality and the gap between the elites and poor (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 211). The economic hardship and deprivation experienced by a large section of the population have impacted negatively on the socio-political situation in the country, 'allowing hardline appeals… [and] ensuring that politics continue to reflect division rather than inclusion' (Talentino 2002: 39).

Tzifakis and Tsardanidis (2006: 79) argue that the international community was never interested in poverty reduction or provision of basic social services to the poor people in Bosnia; its primary goal was imposition of the neo-liberal economic model in this formerly communist country. As Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009: 214) points out, in the aftermath of war, Bosnia desperately needed 'structural transformation, but the transformative potential of neo-liberal development has been extremely problematic… and perhaps self-defeating.' She

explains that a 'rigid implementation of the economic policies informed by the neo-liberal paradigm has produced inadequate growth… and has not benefited the population at large' (Ibid: 213). What is more, the neo-liberal model has 'negatively affected pensions, social welfare and health care' (Richmond and Franks 2008a: 32) and undermined creation of employment opportunities (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 214).

As Tzifakis and Tsardanidis (2006: 78-9) point out, in the aftermath of war, donors, IMF and World Bank refused to 'consult Bosnian authorities over the design of their strategies and reconstruction programmes.' Even though they were not consulted and involved in design and development phases, local authorities were expected to implement policies and reforms imposed by external actors. In most cases, Bosnian authorities showed no interest or commitment to implement the ready-made solutions drafted and developed by outsiders. A report by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) (2007: 1) states that, when it comes to the lack of economic improvements and state-building failures in Bosnia, the international community has never blamed itself or questioned its policies and actions; external actors have only blamed local politicians who, according to the Venice Commission (2005: 2), do not have any real power to make important decisions, as well as Bosnian voters and governments of neighbouring countries (ESI 2007: 1).

As mentioned in the literature review, one of the major problems facing externally driven PWRD operations is the fact that outsiders often lack knowledge of local conditions, history and structures of power and socio-economic relations. This happened in Bosnia, where local people, experts and elites were ignored while peace-building, state-building and economic reconstruction and development 'solutions' and 'blueprints' were imposed by external actors, most of whom lacked basic knowledge about the country. This, according to the International Crisis Group (2001: 6), has led to numerous attempts to 'impose theories or models that are not readily applicable to Bosnia's post-war, post-communist and post-industrial circumstances.' One of the reasons for the lack of knowledge has been posting of the majority of international staff for only six to twelve months in the country. This is not enough time to understand Bosnian history, problems, needs and complexities, let alone positively and constructively contribute to country's post-war recovery (Ibid: 6).

4.1.4 Sustainability of externally imposed reforms

Since the end of 1997, various High Representatives have enacted many key laws and reforms, overruled decisions made by domestic authorities and even amended the Constitutions of the two entities in Bosnia. Very often, this was done after local politicians were unable or unwilling to come to an agreement (Venice Commission 2005: 21). However, these impositions have undermined the importance of local politics, consensus-building and accountability (Chandler 2004: 315; Recchia 2007: 5). This led to a situation where local politicians do not try to make difficult choices and decisions that can cost them votes in elections; they only have to slow down the negotiation process and reject any compromise, knowing that the High Representative will impose 'solutions' in the end (Cox 2001: 14; Recchia 2007: 10). Furthermore, many imposed decisions have 'strengthened the ethno-nationalist forces' in the country instead of promoting peace and national unity (Elges 2005: 184).

Despite the 'heavy-duty external engagement' in Bosnia (Krasner 2004: 102), it is questionable if many of the laws and reforms imposed by the international community will be durable and sustainable when external actors leave one day and the country gets its full sovereignty back (Elges 2005: 184; Newman 2009: 28). Many governance and economic reforms and laws were based on the liberal peace framework and neo-liberal economic model and imposed by external actors in order to accommodate requirements for a possible membership in the European Union (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006: 68; Recchia 2007: 6) and not necessarily to improve the lives of Bosnian citizens. In the quest to accommodate the EU demands and standards, the decisions made by various High Representatives have, arguably, moved the country closer to the European Union. However, this has often happened through the use of authoritarian means, overruling decisions made by democratically elected politicians and ignoring the Bosnian population and its needs and demands.

4.1.5 Transitional justice

In terms of post-war transitional justice, the emphasis in Bosnia was on retributive justice through trials of war crimes suspects (Kaldor 2007: 132) at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague as well as the special war crimes court in Bosnia. While high-ranking suspects were tried in The Hague, mid- and lower-ranking suspects were tried in Bosnia. In

total, domestic and international courts are expected to prosecute estimated 13,000 war crimes suspects (International Crisis Group 2007: 13). At the same time, little or no efforts have been made in terms of restorative justice. Despite the extensive retributive justice efforts, reconciliation in Bosnia is seen to be a 'distant goal' (David 2001: 11). This has been due to the dominance of ethno-nationalists in politics after the war and their insistence on ethnic divisions (International Crisis Group 2003a: 1).

4.1.6 Continued ethnic divisions

After more than a decade of intrusive 'neo-imperial' involvement by the international community, Bosnia is still 'mired in virulent ethnocentrism and ethno-political paralysis' (Sandole 2010: 95). Even though local political and governance institutions have been reduced to 'irrelevant talking shops' (Chandler 2006a: 492), international actors were unable to engineer a stable socio-economic and political system (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 213). Richmond and Franks (2008a: 38) think that the main reason for this was the fact that external actors were 'unable to co-opt local cooperation unless it suits a local agenda.' Stephen Krasner (2004: 103) argues that external actors will not succeed in the long-run as their prescribed 'solutions' do not seem to be in the interest of local political elites, most of whom base their political platforms and messages on ethnic divisions:

> The transitional administration in Bosnia is not likely to work because it is not in the interest of Bosnian political leaders to make it work. These leaders are committed to their ethnic constituents. A successful transition to a multi-ethnic democratic state would leave nationalist leaders with no base of support.

Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009: 211) adds that the political elites on all sides in Bosnia have over the years politicised ethnicity in order to remain in power, undermining post-war recovery and peace-building. She adds that country's political elites have 'vested interests in keeping the formal institutions of governance weak' and the country divided as 'this allows them to benefit from the inequitable model of development that has been pursued through the neo-liberal economic policies of the liberal peace' (Ibid: 213).

4.1.7 Change of approach

After the international community 'failed' to create a 'functioning liberal state' (Richmond and Franks 2008a: 4) using excessive and intrusive methods (International Crisis Group 2003: 41), its approach began changing in 2009. Since the end of 2009, the OHR did not use its 'Bonn powers' (International Crisis Group 2011: 7). In July 2011, Valentin Inzko, the High Representative at the time, lifted bans on Bosnian politicians dismissed from public office by previous High Representatives, 'correcting the predecessors' wrongs and restoring the civil liberties of those unjustly deprived of them through international executive fiat.' This, however, was not the end of the dismissals saga as the courts are now expected to spend years 'adjudicating compensation claims for indefensible breaches of the affected individuals' human rights' (Parish 2011). In addition, in August 2011, the OHR was replaced by a European Union representative. The biggest change, according to Parish (2011), is that the EU representative plans to use 'soft power,' such as mediation and diplomatic pressures, to influence change in Bosnia, instead of the hardline approach and imposition of laws, policies and reforms used by the OHR. However, it remains to be seen if this new approach will bring any positive changes.

Despite the change of approach, due to country's geographic location and the need to prevent any new outbreak of violent conflict in Europe, the international community is expected to stay in Bosnia for many years to come. Paris and Sisk (2007: 1) call the externally driven PWRD in Bosnia a 'never ending mission' aimed at building a 'viable state.' Fearon and Laitin (2004: 40), proponents of neo-trusteeship and foreign rule in 'weak' states, go as far as saying that 'transfer to full sovereignty' in Bosnia 'may never be possible.' This, argues Lacher (2007: 238), is due to the fact that many Western policy-makers do not think that the people in Bosnia are capable of governing themselves and that they need Western experts and bureaucrats to guide them. However, as the International Crisis Group (2011: 16) points out, if Bosnia is to become a member of the European Union in the near future, it will have to become a truly sovereign and independent country instead of being a protectorate of the international community.

4.2 South Sudan

Post-war recovery in South Sudan cannot be considered as either externally or internally driven; rather, it can be seen as a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD. Since 2005, hundreds of external actors – from the World Bank, United Nations, African Union, to bilateral donors and international NGOs and aid agencies – have been present in South Sudan. However, as it will be discussed in more detail below, their primary focus on was humanitarian assistance, not post-war reconstruction and development. At the same time, the government of South Sudan has initiated and implemented a number of post-war initiatives and programmes on its own.

4.2.1 'Starting from scratch'

Since the end of the Cold War, external actors have tended to see many post-war settings through the 'starting from scratch' lens, as if these places were starting 'from zero, without history or critical baggage' (Denskus 2007: 660). As mentioned in the literature review chapter, most countries emerge from civil wars badly destroyed and lacking functioning institutions. South Sudan is one of the unique places that in many aspects had to 'start from scratch' after decades of war and destruction[81]. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the prolonged violent conflict between the North and South Sudan in 2005, the South faced enormous challenges. Continuing with the British colonial policies, since the 1956 independence successive central governments and military dictatorships in Khartoum have marginalised South Sudan politically, socially, economically and culturally. Whatever little development the region saw since 1956, it was largely destroyed during the four decades of war (Deng 2007: 93; Heleta 2010: 34).

Thus, in 2005, South Sudan, a region comprised of ten states and almost the size of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda combined (Jok 2011: 12), started its post-war recovery 'from a situation of extreme poverty and underdevelopment, with weak skills and virtual non-

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[81] The first North-South civil war started on the eve of independence in 1955 and lasted until 1972. After a decade of relative peace, the second civil war began in 1983 and lasted until 2005. Both wars were fought over power, marginalisation, basic needs, race, religion, ethnicity, resources and self-determination. Only during the second civil war, about two million people were killed and another four million were forced to flee their homes.

existence of government institutions' (Joint Assessment Mission 2005: 56). The 'starting from scratch' notion has been the official position of the president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, who argued that in South Sudan, 'everything is at zero' (quoted in Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 6) after decades of war, destruction and neglect. Collier (2010: 76) notes that the South 'inherited an economic landscape that was virtually lunar.' Without infrastructure, complete lack of civil service and basic service delivery structures (Ibid: 9; Samasuwo and Ajulu 2006: 3), what South Sudan needed in 2005 was construction rather than reconstruction (Jooma 2005: 2).

4.2.2 Humanitarian relief vs. reconstruction and development

While the CPA did bring peace, the interim transitional period between 2005 and the January 2011 referendum on self-determination in South Sudan also led to a loss of six years in terms of reconstruction and development, which, according to the Institute for Security Studies (2010: 2), 'have largely been absent.' Instead, main post-war priorities were humanitarian assistance, security and preparations for the referendum. Reasons behind the absence of meaningful reconstruction and development during the interim period by either local or international actors will be discussed below.

Short-term programmes in post-war countries focus on humanitarian assistance and distribution of relief aid. In the medium and long-term, socio-economic reconstruction and development aim to reduce poverty and provide economic recovery and sustained growth (NEPAD 2005: 12). While many parts of South Sudan have been in need of humanitarian aid and assistance during the outbreaks of violence or droughts, most donors and international organisations working in the South never moved away from basic short-term humanitarian assistance to a post-war reconstruction and development stage. This was partly due to the fact that international organisations working in South Sudan have been 'restricted by short-term funding cycles which prohibit long-term and multi-faceted planning' (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 7). This type of funding is appropriate for humanitarian assistance projects but not for medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development. In addition, external actors found it problematic that the government of South Sudan (GOSS) would even consider the region to be in the post-war reconstruction and development stage; most external actors saw the region as a continuous humanitarian emergency case (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 10). Only after

the proclamation of independence in July 2011, some donors decided to start making a shift from humanitarian to development assistance (Barber 2011: 7).

In the same way international donors and organisations focused on short-term priorities, the GOSS has not done much in terms of medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development during the interim period. Instead, it focused mainly on security and protection of its interests and positions in a constant political struggle with its peace partner, the Northern government in Khartoum. Furthermore, during this time foreign investors also did not want to invest in South Sudan, not sure if peace would hold and whether the South would remain part of Sudan or become an independent country after the 2011 referendum (Yoh 2010: 52).

4.2.3 Local PWRD efforts

The CPA brought peace and relative stability to war-ravaged South Sudan and gave the region political and economic autonomy and substantial funds to function independently from the central government in Khartoum. Since 2005, oil accounted for the majority of Sudanese exports, earning billions of US dollars annually which were shared between the governments in the North and South. Between 2005 and 2010, South Sudan received over US $7 billion in oil revenues (Mailer and Poole 2010: 25; Yoh 2010: 54). Funds from oil sales became a 'minimum operating requirement for the smooth functioning of post-conflict institutions' (D'Agoôt 2009: 120) and an incentive for continued cooperation between former adversaries.

The oil revenues gave an opportunity to South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir, to initiate a peace-building and reconciliation process and bring the Southerners - many of whom fought viciously against each other during the war - into the same camp. Through negotiations that led to signing of the Juba Declaration in January 2006 by the GOSS and a number of Southern armed groups, president Kiir was able to 'bring home' the majority of groups previously aligned to and paid by the Khartoum regime and prevent a possible civil war within the South (International Crisis Group 2011a: 1). This process took external actors by surprise as the negotiations largely took place behind the scenes and often involved unconventional methods such as literal buying of support, cooperation and loyalty (Thomas 2009: 26; de Waal 2010: 19; Heleta 2011: 35). Nevertheless, the Juba Declaration 'has arguably done far more to improve human security in South Sudan' than the North-South peace agreement itself (Young 2007: 14).

Despite the fact that the GOSS had over US $7 billion at its disposal between 2005 and 2010 from oil sales, it was still unable to provide basic services to the population. One of the main reasons for this was the spending on the Southern army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which according to a number of authors took about 40% of government funds annually since 2005 (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani 2009: 16; Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 23). Another reason was rampant corruption. In May 2012, South Sudan's president said that a number of former and current GOSS officials 'stole' about US $4 billion of government funds between 2005 and 2011 (Reuters, 4 June 2012).

Lack of skills and capacity in government and other public institutions have been additional reasons for the lack of locally driven service delivery and meaningful post-war recovery (International Crisis Group 2011b: 5). The majority of current government officials in South Sudan come from a military background and many of them never had an opportunity to complete secondary or higher education, often lacking basic skills for civilian leadership and running of a country. Furthermore, the country lacks skilled people able to run entrepreneurial, trade and services sectors, fully depending on the labour force from the neighbouring countries to fill this gap (Grawert 2007: 390).

Another reason the GOSS was unable to do more in terms of reconstruction, development and service delivery was establishment of an 'extensive patronage system of governance' aimed at buying political support and loyalty (de Waal 2010: 19). In addition, John Young (2010: 9) notes that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the most powerful political party in South Sudan, has drawn candidates for state governors and county commissioners for the April 2010 elections 'almost exclusively from military backgrounds… their central concerns are security and control and not administration, development and the provision of services.' The reason for this is the fact that the military rank in the SPLA and years of membership in the SPLM are key factors that still 'contribute heavily towards prestige and positions' (Rolandsen 2007: 17-18). Since 2005, weak administrative capacity and a 'militarised' approach to governance and politics have often heightened 'tribal' differences among the population, with the more powerful ethnic groups and tribes controlling power and suppressing the minorities (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 15). According to the International Crisis Group (2011a: 13), in many ways, the SPLM is a 'marriage of convenience between divergent actors, groups and agendas.' In the medium-to-long-run, the internal SPLM politics and ability to manage many potential ethnic and regional 'fault lines'

will determine country's political stability.

Outside the major urban centres in South Sudan, people saw little or no tangible peace dividends apart from the formal end of North-South war (Hemmer 2009: 17; Downie and Kennedy 2010: 6; International Crisis Group 2011a: 1; Wheeler 2012: 9). This has exacerbated inequality between rural and urban areas, between Juba, the capital of South Sudan, and other state capitals and between different states (Barber 2011: 14). Furthermore, limited basic services have over the years been provided not by the government and local authorities and agencies but by various international organisations. For example, due to the lack of local health workers, facilities and resources, international NGOs and aid agencies have been delivering 'up to 85% of primary health-care services' (Mailer and Poole 2010:24). Similarly, in 2009, the government of South Sudan was unable to deal on its own with severe food insecurity affecting about 1.5 million people. During this time, the UN and World Food Programme provided vital help in reaching the affected population via food airdrops (Ibid: 17).

This in many ways resembles the wartime arrangements, when international NGOs and aid agencies were often the sole providers of basic services and emergency assistance in the absence of government structures and capacity (Samasuwo and Ajulu 2006: 4; Grawert 2007: 393). However, the current delivery of basic services by international organisations, while important and necessary in the short-term, is creating a 'credibility gap' for the South Sudanese authorities and potential long-term problems caused by the fact that the population sees the GOSS as an institution incapable of providing them with services (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 71). Thus, a gradual shift of responsibility for service delivery from external actors to the government is necessary for stability and credibility of local authorities in the long-run.

4.2.4 Focus on security

Security after war is seen by many authors as a key prerequisite for sustainable reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building (Milliken and Krause 2003: 8; Schwarz 2005: 433). As mentioned above, the Juba Declaration, which brought former enemies into the same camp, significantly improved security in South Sudan. However, despite these improvements, many communities across the country have experienced

outbreaks of violent conflict since 2005. Wheeler (2012: 9) stresses that South Sudan cannot be classified as a 'post-conflict' country due to the post-war insecurity and fighting. Even though the war with the North ended in 2005, fighting within South Sudan and on the border with the North did not end with the signing of the CPA.

In 2009 alone, more than 2,500 people were killed in fighting between armed groups and about 350,000 had to flee their homes due to insecurity. Much of this violence was caused by the competition over resources and land, cattle rustling and child abductions and has taken place mainly in rural areas (Mailer and Poole 2010: 2). In addition, since the April 2010 elections, South Sudan has faced a number of localised rebellions in seven out of ten states by groups dissatisfied with election results, lack of service delivery or encouraged by Sudan (International Crisis Group 2011b: 10). The above mentioned fighting and insecurity have negatively affected people's livelihoods, limiting their access to fields, grazing lands, water sources and markets (Barber 2011: 20).

The lack of internal security has impeded attempts by the government to disarm the population after the war. A report by the Small Arms Survey (2009: 1) stresses that civilian disarmament campaigns have been 'conducted selectively, took place alongside rearmament and failed to address internal conflicts and gaps in civil security provision, which continue to motivate weapons possession.' Mailer and Poole (2010: 13) argue that as long as communities 'do not have confidence in government security forces to provide for their safety or to address their grievances, civilian disarmament – whether peaceful or forcible – will remain ineffectual.'

As one of the guarantors of the peace agreement was the UN, its peacekeeping mission, called the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was seen by many as the force that would help keep the peace and provide security to vulnerable communities in South Sudan. While the peace was kept between the North and South, the mandate of the peacekeeping mission, comprising of about 10,000 peacekeepers and 650 police officers, was never protection of civilians in South Sudan. Instead, the UNMIS was mandated by the UN Security Council to monitor the cease-fire, assist joint Northern and Southern army units, observe movement of armed groups and help with security sector reform and DDR (Schumman 2010: 107-8). Thus, in many instances when fighting was taking place across the South and civilians were killed or displaced, the UNMIS did nothing, justifying its inaction with its limited mandate (Heleta 2011: 35). In addition, despite its 'expertise' and experience

from other post-war countries, the UN mission did very little to help the DDR process (Schumann 2010: 108).

Provision of internal security is supposed to be the job of police. In South Sudan, the police struggled to establish itself and uphold order and the rule of law since 2005. This was mainly due to the lack of capacity, training, equipment and infrastructure. Both the GOSS and international actors are to blame for the lack of effective police force capable of providing internal security. Due to the continued animosity and lack of trust between the governments in Sudan and South Sudan, the security planning of the GOSS has been 'largely based on the perception that… a future war with the North is likely' (Small Arms Survey 2009: 1). This, in effect, has meant that the majority of funding for the security sector has gone to the army while the needs of the police have been sidelined and neglected. When it comes to international actors, the text of the CPA, mediated and drafted by external actors led by the United States, contains thirty-one pages about the reform of the army and the DDR process. At the same time, there are only two pages that mention internal security issues and policing (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani 2009: 16). Since 2005, international donors have largely ignored the police and focused their efforts almost exclusively on transformation and modernisation of the army (Ibid: 26). Only in late 2009 some international donors finally decided to provide significant financial support for police training (DefenceWeb, 24 November 2009).

4.2.5 Transitional justice

While the international community played a crucial role in pressuring two sides in Sudan to sign the CPA and even imposed the peace deal on the two parties in order to end the war (Woodward 2004: 477), external actors compromised on a number of issues, most notably transitional justice. In terms of accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses during the long and deadly second North-South civil war, transitional justice and accountability were excluded from the peace agreement as the leaders of all parties in the conflict feared that they could be held responsible for their wartime actions. International actors, afraid that insistence on transitional justice could jeopardise the peace agreement, decided to ignore this issue. Thus the CPA completely lacked both the retributive and restorative justice mechanisms (International Crisis Group 2009b: i; Natsios 2008).

4.2.6 External PWRD efforts

Since 2005, South Sudan has been a 'testing ground for effective international engagement in fragile states' (Pantuliano 2009: 1). The PWRD role of external actors was entrenched in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The CPA identifies the international community as the principal funder and guarantor of the peace agreement implementation and post-war reconstruction and development (Shanmugaratnam 2008: 2).

Gueli (2008: 84) writes that in 2003, on the eve of the North-South peace agreement, the African Union appointed the government of South Africa to chair the AU's ministerial committee on post-war reconstruction and development and 'lead the African reconstruction efforts' in South Sudan. However, over the years, South Africa has done 'precious little' to help post-war socio-economic recovery in concrete terms. The same author notes that the main reason for this has been the fact that the South African government and institutions do not really know how to approach post-war recovery apart from sending humanitarian aid, peacekeepers and mediators. He adds that South Africa currently does not have institutional capacity to provide extensive support and assistance to other African countries that are recovering from violent conflict (Ibid: 86).

In the aftermath of war, international donors pledged over US $6 billion for humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development in both Sudan and South Sudan. However, by 2010, only a small fraction – some $500 million – of this amount was given (Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 9). Moreover, even these funds were not spent on much needed projects and programmes. In 2005, international donors set up a World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to help (re)build government systems and (re)construct roads, health and educational facilities, running water and agriculture in South Sudan. Out of the US $524 million given to the MDTF by donors and GOSS since 2005, only $181 million was spent by 2010 (Mailer and Poole 2010: 22). What this meant for ordinary people can be seen from the following example: the fund initially planned to support construction of about 100 schools across South Sudan. That goal was cut to 44, while only 10 schools were completed by 2010 (Financial Times, 16 February 2010).

The main reason for the lack of spending and delivery was the complicated bureaucracy and red tape at the World Bank headquarters and the fact that between 2005 and 2010, the MDTF did not have any senior staff based in South Sudan (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 92). The

procedure for applying for and accessing the funds was so complicated that it was 'extraordinarily difficult' even for well-established Western NGOs to get funding (Mailer and Poole 2010: 22). For example, to apply for a teacher training contract, aid agencies and NGOs had to be present in all 10 states of South Sudan. Given the size of the region and massive logistical challenges, only a few organisations have presence in each state. Officials working for various international organisations have argued that the Multi-Donor Trust Fund had been 'set up with a fundamental lack of understanding about the reality of South Sudan' (Financial Times, 16 February 2010).

Another factor that undermined the delivery of tangible peace dividends by international organisations working in South Sudan has been the lack of coordination among external actors as well as their turf wars and 'squabbling' over control of donor funds. Each of a few hundred international organisations operating in the country 'wanted to coordinate and none wanted to be coordinated' (Collier 2010: 78). In addition, during this time, local NGOs and civil society organisations found it 'extremely difficult' to access donor funds due to 'cumbersome application procedures' and grants too large for local organisations to manage. This has in many ways limited the ability of local organisations to deliver services and promote good governance (Barber 2011: 12). Furthermore, despite all the talk about capacity building by donors and international organisations, not enough was done to improve the skills and capacity in South Sudan. As Rebecca Barber (2011: 11) points out, 'throughout the years of humanitarian and development assistance, adequate attention has not always been paid to the development of local capacities.'

Due to the pressure on international organisations, NGOs and aid agencies to spend their annual budgets and be 'seen to do something' about peace-building and post-war recovery, the region has over the years seen numerous localised peace and reconciliation workshops, meetings and conferences between local communities organised by external actors. Apart from being replicated from one place to another, the efforts by external actors lacked creativity, follow-up engagement and monitoring of the implementation of decisions and resolutions made at meetings and conferences. This form of externally driven peace-building has also made many local communities dependent on foreign 'solutions' and funding; in many instances, local actors have ignored traditional approaches to conflict resolution; they would do nothing in times of crisis, waiting for donors and international NGOs to show up and provide funding and directions (Schomerus and Allen 2010: 75).

4.2.7 Long road to post-war recovery

Despite all the challenges and shortcomings, South Sudan has made substantial progress, creating institutions and government structures and promoting reconciliation and peace-building since 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2009: 12; Schomerus and Allen 2010: 25). This, however, has only brought 'negative peace' to the majority of the population. There is still a very long way to go and a lot of work to be done in order to address numerous social, economic and political challenges and achieve 'positive peace.'

For South Sudan, the hard work on post-war recovery, reconstruction and development has begun after the proclamation of independence in July 2011 (International Crisis Group 2011a: 30; Vertin 2011). Apart from reconstruction and development that has to take place, the government of South Sudan will have to carefully manage the expectations of its population. Southerners, who for generations fought for freedom and better life, expect that their lives will improve now that they have independence. A report by the International Crisis Group (2009: 25) states that inability of the GOSS to provide 'post-independence dividends could catalyse popular discontent and deepen tribal orientation,' potentially leading to internal conflict. However, the provision of 'independence dividends' will not be easy and quick as the needs are immense.

South Sudan has an significant economic potential. In January 2007, Sudan's proven oil reserves were estimated at five billion barrels, with majority of the reserves located in now independent South Sudan (D'Agoôt 2009: 119). While significant, oil reserves are expected to start declining by 2015 if exploration does not lead to new discoveries (International Crisis Group 2011a: 20). When it comes to the oil industry, the challenge facing South Sudan is the fact that the pipeline that enables the country to sell its oil runs through neighbouring Sudan and the oil industry infrastructure and all crude processing facilities are concentrated in the North. At the time of writing, governments of Sudan and South Sudan still have to implement an agreement which would allow South Sudan to export its oil through Northern facilities. If and when the two countries resolve the issues related to oil exports, the next challenge for South Sudan will be to ensure good management of oil production and revenues in order for the oil to become a blessing, not a curse (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2008: 394).

Given the uncertainties related to the oil industry, it is of outmost importance that South Sudan diversifies its economy and does not rely primarily on oil revenues in the future.

Currently, over 90% of country's revenues come from oil. However, if the South could maintain peace and stability, minimise corruption and remain open to trade, private sector development and foreign investments, it could create other economic opportunities. For example, apart from relying only on oil as a source of revenue, the country could become one of the major food producers on the African continent, given its climate highly favourable to agriculture (Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 11; Downie and Kennedy 2010: 6-7). Even though agriculture is not the backbone of the formal economy, the majority of the population depends on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. However, the current use of arable land is minimal, with only 4% of the land being cultivated at the moment (Barber 2011: 20).

To ensure the country's stability, the GOSS will need to establish an open political space, decentralise governance, share power and resources among regions, deliver basic services, protect people's rights and improve capacity of those working for the government and other public institutions (Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 13; Heleta 2011: 37). The International Crisis Group (2011b: 32) stresses that, even though the work of the national government in Juba is very important, the improvements and success across South Sudan 'will depend in large part on what can be achieved at the state and county level.'

Coming out of the decades of war and without experience in civilian governance, PWRD in South Sudan will be a difficult and long process. Apart from the need for economic development, diversification of the economy and state- and institution-building, South Sudanese will have to build a nation and manage ethnic diversity. Currently, the country is 'only slightly more than a geographical expression,' made up of more than sixty ethnic, tribal, cultural and/or linguistic groups which have a 'stronger sense of citizenship in their tribe than in the nation' (Jok 2011: 2). A number of authors point that South Sudan needs to build a common identity that is based on more than the opposition and animosity towards the North (Brenthurst Foundation 2010: 27; Downie and Kennedy 2010: 7; Jok 2011: 10; Heleta 2011: 37).

One of the main international players in South Sudan is China. This is mainly due to the Chinese interest in country's oil industry, with China being the primary buyer of South Sudanese oil (D'Agoot 2009: 126; Kuo 2012: 3). It is expected that China will continue developing good relations with South Sudan in the future through provision of loans, assistance and investments in order to safeguard access to oil and other resources (Attree 2012: 19). Given China's own success with economic development, growth and poverty

alleviation, there are great expectations among South Sudan's political elites that China will assist Africa's newest country in developing its economy, infrastructure and industries (Kuo 2012: 4). Furthermore, the close relationship between China and South Sudan is likely to reduce country's dependence on Western donors and IFIs, undermining their influence in the future developments in the country (Attree 2012: 15). As Luka Biong Deng, a senior member of the ruling SPLM, points out, good relations with China are crucial for South Sudan both as an economic necessity and strategic national interest at the time when Western economies are facing economic and financial crises (Sudan Tribune, 16 April 2012).

To succeed as an independent country, South Sudan will need help and assistance from Africa and the rest of the world but the Southerners themselves need to lead the recovery, state-building and nation-building processes. Francis Deng (2007: 89) writes that the country needs to merge modern and traditional institutions and structures and 'build on existing African cultural values and institutions,' instead of replicating foreign models. Jok Madut Jok (2011: 13) thinks that the key for long-term stability will be identification and development of a 'home-grown philosophy of development, democracy and open participatory system of governance.' When it comes to economic reconstruction and development, Samasuwo and Ajulu (2006: 5) argue that the political elites in South Sudan need to 'protect the long-term interests of the citizens and avoid the economic pitfalls of uncritically embracing neo-liberal development strategies that regard the state as an obstacle rather than a facilitator of development.'

A report by the Brenthurst Foundation (2010: 29) stresses that South Sudan's international partners need to urgently shift the focus from humanitarian assistance to medium-to-long-term development. In addition, the Southerners will need to ensure the 'ownership of their own future' and not continue being dependent on foreigners and their technical support and financial aid (Ibid: 13). However, as Grawert (2007: 400) points out, given its history, lack of capacity and long-term dependence on external aid and assistance during the war, it will take a long time for South Sudan 'to gain sovereignty from the influences of the aid system and to free itself from aid dependence.'

4.2.8 First year of independence in South Sudan

During the first year of independence, the government of South Sudan hoped to embark on

post-war recovery, development and state-building with the help of its international partners. However, most of these efforts came to a standstill due to the inability to come to an agreement on a number of unresolved issues between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as due to the fighting in the border areas between the two countries. In addition, after accusing Khartoum of stealing its oil and charging inflated fees for the use of its oil pipeline and other facilities, the government in Juba decided to completely stop oil production in January 2011. Dependence on oil revenues has meant that due to the shutdown of the oil production, the South has lost most of its revenues and funds that are needed for reconstruction, development, improving the standards of living and building of effective government institutions (Lyman 2012).

According to Oxfam (5 July 2012), apart from the complete stop of internally driven recovery and development projects and efforts due to the lack of funding, South Sudan is 'facing its worst humanitarian crisis since the end of the war in 2005, under the weight of severe economic meltdown and on-going conflict' in Sudan. The fighting in the areas of Sudan that border the South has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians who have found refuge in Africa's newest country. Lyman (2012) argues that South Sudanese leadership needs to resolve the differences with Sudan in order to defuse conflict and instability in the border areas and resume oil production. He adds that the 'long-term may suggest alternative export facilities [through Kenya, for example], but the new nation cannot afford to lose years of income when the development basis of the country is so low.'

In September 2012, Sudan and South Sudan signed an agreement on oil transit fees and border security after months of protracted talks. It is expected that oil production will resume in early 2013, after all necessary technical preparations are made (Sudan Tribune, 4 October 2012). While this agreement is sound on paper and essential for the revival of both economies, it remains to be seen if it is going to be implemented. Given numerous past failures to implement agreements in Sudan, this remains a serious challenge.

4.3 Somaliland

An example of relatively successful internally driven PWRD after prolonged civil war and instability is Somaliland. In the early 1990s, Somaliland was in ruins. A decade of war and fighting between Somaliland's liberation movements and the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu left tens of thousands of people killed and half of the population displaced (Bradbury 2008: 77). Socio-economic and political institutions and infrastructure were 'decimated' in the war (Harris and Foresti 2011: 5). Some 90% of the infrastructure in the capital, Hargeisa, was completely destroyed; other cities and towns suffered similar destruction (Omaar 2004: 87; Eubank 2010: 4). Dowden (2008: 94) writes that in the early 1990s, Hargeisa resembled Hiroshima after the explosion of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War.

After Somaliland's liberation movements defeated the Mogadishu forces in 1991, the central government of Somalia completely collapsed and the country plunged into chaos. At this time, Somaliland's political leadership and clan leaders decided to secede from the rest of the country. The main catalyst of this was the intense pressure from ordinary people who demanded separation and independence (Omaar 2004: 88; Walls 2009: 379; Hoehne 2011: 312). Mark Bradbury (2008: 1) argues that in May 1991, Somaliland re-established its sovereignty and independence that the region had in 1960; after becoming independent from the British colonial rule, Somaliland was an independent state for five days and recognised by over thirty countries, before voluntarily joining the union with the formerly Italian Somalia. However, to this day Somaliland's independence has not been recognised by any country or international body.

4.3.1 Peace-building and reconciliation

Even after the proclamation of independence, Somaliland was still far from stability and peace. Various local clan militias fought each other and killed at will while basic institutions of governance existed only on paper (International Crisis Group 2003: 9). This prompted local leaders and elders from country's clans to begin work on establishing peace, security, order and 'modest' structures of the state (Bradbury 2008: 77). Ignored by the outside world, they had no other choice but to use traditional conflict mediation methods, with clan elders playing major roles in stabilisation, peace-building and reconciliation processes (Huliaras

2002: 160; Omaar 2004: 88; Harris and Foresti 2011: 7). Between 1991 and 1997, thirty-nine locally organised peace and reconciliation conferences took place in the region (Jhazbhay 2009: 47; Fadal 2009: 3; Harris and Foresti 2011: 10), trying to balance and resolve political and social divisions and factionalism (Bradbury 2008: 87). All these conferences were held in Somaliland and were funded by the local business community which needed peace and stability to function and prosper (Eubank 2010: 9).

A milestone event that created a 'de facto state' was the Borama Conference in 1993. This conference, which lasted over five months, led to a peace and security accord, new national charter and new civilian government which shared power among the clans (International Crisis Group 2003: 10; Hansen and Bradbury 2007: 464; Jhazbhay 2009: 40-1). The reason behind long negotiations, mediation and conferences was the attempt by local organisers – traditional leaders, business people and political elites – to be as inclusive as possible (Bradbury 2008: 103). Huliaras (2002: 160) highlights that these Somaliland-wide conferences had representatives from all clans and sub-clans[82] and people from all sections of the society – elders, women, youth, professionals, business people and politicians – taking part. Bradbury (2008: 96) stresses that these all-encompassing peace conferences were 'key political events in the process of state foundation.' Michael Walls (2009: 384-7) adds that the parties were willing to negotiate even when they fundamentally disagreed.

The political consensus achieved between 1991 and 1993 was damaged between 1994 and 1996, when fighting broke out again between the clans. According to Jhazbhay (2008: 63), during that time, Somaliland experienced fighting and instability similar to that in southern Somalia. The fighting ended after another Somaliland-wide peace and reconciliation conference was held in the capital, Hargeisa, between October 1996 and February 1997 (Bradbury 2008: 124). Since then, Somaliland has been relatively stable. The country was able to disarm local militias, repatriate refugees, rebuild civil administration, provide basic security, stability, law and order to its citizens without significant external help and assistance (Ali and Matthews 2004: 404a; Fearon and Laitin 2004: 39; Englebert and Tull 2008: 136-7; Boege et al. 2008: 13; Dowden 2008: 123; Hesse 2010: 75; Walls and Kibble 2010: 40-1). As Rakiah Omaar (2004: 84) points out, post-war recovery in Somaliland was locally driven, taking place in a 'context of international neglect.' Most notably, traditional social structures,

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[82] While all people in Somaliland are Muslims and Somalis, they divide themselves into clans and sub-clans.

such as councils of elders, known as the Guurti, have played a key role in the creation of peaceful environment and reconciliation (Debiel et al. 2009: 41).

A number of authors argue that decades of instability, war and suffering at the hands of various Mogadishu dictatorships have helped strengthen a common identity and forge sense of nationalism in Somaliland that moved beyond clan and sub-clan divisions (Huliaras 2002: 157; Hesse 2010: 73). Bradbury (2008: 50) writes that the wartime suffering has helped create a 'political community of shared interests,' serving as a 'foundation for political and social recovery.' Another important factor was the fact that Somaliland is a 'fairly homogenous' society (Hesse 2010: 75) with more than 70% of the population belonging to the Isaaq clan (Huliaras 2002: 158). Mark Bradbury (2008: 91) adds that 'economic incentives for peaceful cooperation' among various clans significantly helped the peace-building process in the 1990s. He points out that people understood that there was no hope for peace, recovery and prosperity without socio-economic cooperation (Ibid: 103). In addition to all the above, establishment of peace and stability was due to the 'public desire to avoid a return to conflict' as well as the 'urge to win international recognition' (Walls and Kibble 2010: 32).

4.3.2 Transitional justice

The majority of the literature on Somaliland does not focus on transitional justice issues. While the country has been successful in internal reconciliation and peace-building through peace conferences and public dialogue, no one from former Mogadishu regimes was ever held accountable for the crimes and abuses committed in Somaliland during the 1980s. According to the International Crisis Group (2003: 20), after proclamation of independence, people in Somaliland did not want to 'reopen old wounds, even in the interests of justice, for fear that [this process] might unravel their hard won peace and security.' Thus, in order to preserve their own peace and stability, Somalilanders avoided seeking justice for wartime crimes and abuses.

4.3.3 Foreign assistance

The International Crisis Group (2003: 6) stresses that foreign aid and assistance have played a

'minor part' in Somaliland's post-war recovery. For example, in 2002, Somaliland received only about US $30 million in external assistance. Moreover, half of this money was not spent on reconstruction and projects that would benefit the country and its people but on overheads for international organisations. Bradbury (2008: 158) adds that external aid provided to Somaliland through international NGOs and aid agencies has been limited mainly to short-term emergency assistance, basic service delivery projects and support for elections. Still, various United Nations agencies and European Union have provided some aid and assistance over the last two decades despite the lack of recognition of country's independence. At the same time, the African Union has largely ignored the plight of Somaliland and its people since 1991, afraid that any form of support for Somaliland would be seen as a recognition of the country and encouragement to other secessionists on the continent (International Crisis Group 2006: 2-3).

However little, external aid and assistance have to some extent helped improve living conditions for many in Somaliland, especially in sectors such as education, health care, landmine clearance, reintegration of displaced people, civil society development, justice and rule of law. Funding for these activities and projects came from international aid agencies and NGOs since donor countries cannot give money directly to a government they do not recognise (International Crisis Group 2003: 6; Bradbury 2008: 6).

4.3.4 State-building and democratisation

In 2001, Somaliland held a referendum on a new Constitution. After the new Constitution was adopted, reproducing 'many key features of liberal democracy' (Luckham 2011: 106), the region was transformed into a multi-party democracy (International Crisis Group 2003: i). The country has held presidential elections in 2003 and 2010, local elections in 2002 and parliamentary elections in 2005 (Harris and Foresti 2011: 9). In 2005, foreign observers following the elections noted that these elections were the 'freest and most transparent democratic exercise ever staged in the Horn of Africa' (Kaplan 2008: 150). Kaplan (2010: 83) emphasises that a functioning government and multi-party democracy were established through the use of traditional methods of consultation and consent as well as modern governance and elections borrowed from the Western world and adapted to Somaliland's conditions, culture and customs.

Apart from elected government structures, Somaliland also has an Upper House of Elders (Guurti) comprised of unelected lineage elders, whose role is to provide a 'check on the executive and representatives,' review legislation and act as mediators and peacemakers when needed (Bradbury 2008: 100). The Guurti have even extended president's term in office on three occasions in the past in order to prevent power vacuum until delayed presidential elections were held (Hoehne 2011: 332-3). A report by the International Crisis Group (2003: 10) notes that the system of governance adopted in Somaliland – 'a hybrid of Western political institutions and the traditional Somali system of clan representation' – has been the key for peace and stability. Murithi (2008: 29) defines such hybrid approach to state-building and governance as the use of best local and international practices.

Walls and Kibble (2010: 40) compare the hybrid political system that has emerged in Somaliland to a 'pragmatic marriage' of differing elements such as tradition, clanism, kinship and modern political system. Most importantly, the entire process of political reconstruction, state-building and democratisation has been an internal affair, without any external meddling or pressure (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf 2003: 458; International Crisis Group 2003: 8; Omaar 2004: 89). This process required extensive debate, negotiation and mediation among local actors (Walls 2009: 372). Ultimately, this has ensured that the democratic system that has emerged is not an external blueprint or imposition but a system based on local needs, values and cultural norms.

4.3.5 Socio-economic reconstruction and development

Iqbal Jhazbhay (2009: 47) argues that establishment of security has been the major factor that led to stability as well as basic socio-economic and physical reconstruction and development. By 2003, over half a million of refugees and internally displaced people returned to Somaliland, tens of thousands of businesses were (re)established, basic infrastructure was rebuilt and clan militias were demilitarised or incorporated into the army (International Crisis Group 2003: 6). All this was accomplished with rather modest financial resources. For example, between 1999 and 2007, annual budget of the government of Somaliland was between US $20 million and $40 million (Eubank 2010: 6), mainly coming from the revenues collected at the sea port in Berbera and taxes (Fadal 2009: 18). This money covers all government ministries, civil administration as well as the military and security services

(Fadal 2009: 17). Bradbury (2008: 243) points that, even though Somaliland possesses modest state structure and funding, it is still able to provide security and order and formulate development plans and policies 'as competently as many better resourced and recognised states in Africa.'

After establishing multi-party democracy in the early 2000s, Somaliland embarked on a project aimed at creation of an open economy and stable business environment. This was done in order to improve trade, earn income and prove to the world that Somaliland is a functioning entity deserving to be an internationally recognised state. Helped by the 'entrepreneurial spirit' of its people, which is considered to be 'one of the greatest strengths of the country' (Huliaras 2002: 163), opening of the economy has led to a private sector boom (Mesfin 2009: 2). Bradbury (2008: 118) claims that subsequent economic recovery has been crucial for stability of Somaliland and its institutions.

The private sector has been the engine of post-war recovery, earning about US $175 million annually, mainly from livestock exports (International Crisis Group 2003: 7). However, dependency on livestock exports also created problems in the past, especially when Arab states and particularly Saudi Arabia, which are the main importers of livestock from Somaliland, banned livestock trade due to the fear of the Rift Valley Fever. During this time, Somaliland's economy suffered greatly, losing millions of US dollars in exports. Jhazbhay (2008: 84) writes that the country needs to diversify its economy and move away from the dependency on livestock exports. He lists energy and minerals such as coal, oil, natural gas and gemstones as possible options.

Due to the lack of funds, the government of Somaliland has not been able to fund major reconstruction and development projects. However, the positive business climate mentioned above has ensured that development of telecommunications, transport and banking sectors, as well as provision of services such as education, water supplies and social services were funded by private enterprises (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf 2003: 462; Eubank 2010: 11). Furthermore, both the business community and government depend on each other – businesses need the government to provide security and stability while the government depends on businesses for tax revenue and provision of basic services. In many instances, unable to receive funding and loans from international donors, the government had received loans from local businesses. Some authors argue that the leverage and influence of the business community would not be as significant if the government was able to receive

external financial assistance and loans (Eubank 2010: 9-11).

Local economic activity, however, is not the main source of revenues for Somaliland. About half of estimated 3.5 million of Somalilanders live all over the world and send about US $500 million annually back to their relatives. These remittances from the Diaspora are far more than the amount earned from livestock exports and international assistance combined (Huliaras 2002: 162; Jhazbhay 2009: 97; Mesfin 2009: 1). It is estimated that about one-third of the population, mainly those living in urban areas, are receiving remittances. Over the years, this money was used by individuals and families to rebuild their homes or start new businesses and has been the key to Somaliland's reconstruction and development (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf 2003: 458; Jhazbhay 2009: 66). However, as Jhazbhay (2008: 85) points out, the remittances are also contributing to income inequality and rural-urban economic divide as about two-thirds of the population do not have relatives outside of the country and do not receive any financial assistance.

Depending on its population and the Diaspora for most of its revenue, the government of Somaliland has had to show that it is working hard to deliver security and rule of law and is accountable to the citizens. This has led to a situation where the governing structures and institutions enjoy a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Boege et al. 2008: 13; Eubank 2010: 19). Kaplan (2008: 151-2) and Huliaras (2002: 164) think that the lack of foreign aid has been a 'blessing' for Somaliland, keeping foreign influences and impositions to a minimum and contributing to region's internal stability. Eubank (2010: 27-8) argues that if Somaliland had been internationally recognised in the 1990s, it would be eligible to receive tens, even hundreds of millions of US dollars annually from international donors. This would very likely make the government less accountable to its people and more accountable to external funders. In addition, Eubank warns that a potential future recognition of Somaliland and financial support by the international community will have to be managed carefully. A large inflow of foreign aid could have a negative effect on the relationship between the government and citizens. If the government does not have to depend on taxation for its revenues in the future, it may not have to be accountable as well (Ibid: 21).

4.3.6 Factors that led to relative post-war recovery success

Englebert and Tull (2008: 135) point out that internally driven peace-building, state-building,

reconstruction and development in Somaliland have 'fared better than its externally sponsored counterparts' around the continent and world. The International Crisis Group (2006: i) calls the internally driven state-building in Somaliland a positive 'rarity in the Horn of Africa and the Muslim world.' Mesfin (2009: 9) calls the country an 'oasis of sanity' in the unstable Horn of Africa, while Hansen and Bradbury (2007: 461) think that only a few other countries in Africa and the Middle East come close to stability and democratic system that has been developed and consolidated in Somaliland over the last two decades. This success is even more significant considering the fact that the Horn of Africa is 'the most militarised and conflict-ridden region' on the continent (Mesfin 2009: 1).

A number of authors think that success in Somaliland has been due to a number of factors: peace-building and reconstruction processes were 'home-grown' and 'bottom-up,' rooted in local culture, customs and traditions, while fully internally driven and owned (Jhazbhay 2009: 19; Walls and Kibble 2010: 32; Eubank 2010: 23). According to Bradbury (2008: 107), post-war stability has been due to the long-term time-frame, broad public participation and locally designed, driven and managed processes. Some authors think that success can be partially contributed to the British colonial 'indirect rule,' which left 'traditional systems of authority largely intact;' this helped in the early 1990s when the strength of traditional social structures was a key factor in establishment of peace and stability (International Crisis Group 2003: 2-3). This was contrary to the rest of Somalia, which was ruled by Italians in an authoritarian manner and where traditional structures were undermined and damaged during the colonial times (Huliaras 2002: 158).

While Somaliland was recovering on its own, in the rest of Somalia the international community 'lavishly' funded and organised fourteen major peace initiatives since 1991 (Walls and Kibble 2010: 32). All these initiatives were 'top-down,' where external actors worked only with elites, powerful groups and individuals. During this time, external actors spent more than US $8 billion on peace-making, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, development and state-building. Yet, because all attempts involved imposition of 'solutions' that external actors thought would be the best for Somalia, all these initiatives have failed and Somalia is still a prime example of complete state failure and collapse (Omaar 2004: 85; Easterly 2006: 293; Bradbury 2008: 103; Jhazbhay 2009: 149; Walls 2009: 372; Kaplan 2010: 81-2). On the other hand, Luckham (2011: 105-6) argues that the key factor that led to Somaliland's post-war stabilisation, peace-building, reconciliation and home-grown

democratisation has been the near absence of international actors and donors. This meant that the country 'never became the focus of counterproductive international efforts to impose peace and reconstruct the state as in the rest of Somalia.'

Even though Somaliland represents an 'alternative path to recovery and development' after war (Bradbury 2008: 1), it hardly ever 'figures in current state-building debates, probably because it was not subject to extensive international peacekeeping and state-building efforts' (Englebert and Tull 2008: 135). Those who have studied the case of Somaliland, such as Markus Hohne (2006: 404), argue that it presents an 'innovative way' for social, political and economic reconstruction and development after a long period of unrest, instability and war. Jhazbhay (2009: 195) writes that Somaliland is a proof that an 'internally driven, bottom up approach can achieve post-conflict nation-building and regional stability.' Harris and Foresti (2011: 7) call Somaliland a 'fascinating story of progress' that challenges the mainstream thinking about post-war recovery and governance.

Bradbury (2008: 257) points out that the citizens and political elites in Somaliland 'have demonstrated, in their own way and on their own terms, an alternative path to building a state and a system of government that is consistent with their own culture.' They had to 'pursue a political and developmental path that has made a virtue of necessity for self-reliance, based on the political realities of international isolation' (Jhazbhay 2008: 62). The case of Somaliland shows that 'new forms of state-building that do not simply copy the Western model of state but draw on customary institutions which are rooted in the local communities can have positive results' (Boege et al. 2008: 14). Similarly, Kaplan (2008: 154) writes that success in Somaliland shows that societies emerging from violent conflict need to 'look inward for their resources and institutional models and adopt political structures and processes that reflect the history, complexity and particularity of their peoples and environment.' Berouk Mesfin (2009: 11) thinks that Somaliland should be used as a 'role model for other African post-conflict entities and states in terms of building a peaceful and stable system making use of local resources.' Iqbal Jhazbhay (2009: 208) adds that Somaliland shows a way to 'reconcile "tradition" and "modernity"' and build a functioning state and democratic system rooted in local needs and experiences, instead of only importing foreign models and blueprints.

4.3.7 Challenges facing Somaliland

It is very important not to romanticise the internally driven PWRD in Somaliland as something ideal and without a fault. Besides all its successes, the country is facing many challenges. Somaliland is still a 'weak and poorly funded state' (Walls and Kibble 2010: 32) and its progress and stability are very fragile (Harris and Foresti 2011: 14). Worried about security in a highly unstable region, the government is spending more than half of its budget annually on security forces and less than 10% on basic services (Bradbury 2008: 158). Over the years, a number of politicians have seen democratisation 'purely as an instrument in the pursuit of international recognition rather than as a worthwhile objective in its own right' (Walls and Kibble 2010: 39). Economic development and provision of education and health care have happened almost exclusively in urban areas, broadening the urban-rural divide and disparities (Hansen and Bradbury 2007: 473; Jhazbhay 2009: 89-91). Civil society is elite driven, operates mainly in urban areas and is dependent on external funding (Hansen and Bradbury 2007: 473). The judicial system is not fully competent and independent, lacking training and resources (Bradbury 2008: 230-1). Hoehne (2011: 319-20) points out that, even though the Guurti have done a very good job as mediators numerous times in the past two decades, they are not fully independent. They often take sides with powerful politicians and are 'susceptible to manipulation and corruption.'

Kaplan (2008: 151-3) notes some additional challenges: corruption is common, politics is not immune to clan divisions, the government lacks funds and capacity and women are still largely excluded from politics and government structures. Freedom of the press and expression exist but in some instances newspapers were banned and journalists were jailed for writing about corruption or possible reunification with Somalia. Other authors write that in Sool and Sanaag regions in the east as well as Togdheer region in the south, a large part of the population does not want to be part of the independent Somaliland. Further, disputes with the neighbouring Puntland over Sool and Sanaag could in the future ignite violent conflict (Bradbury 2008: 219; Hoehne 2011: 322-3).

Clan politics is an issue that needs to be discussed in more detail. Even though Somaliland exists as a relatively stable multi-party democracy and has moved from clan-based representation to parliamentary governance (Jhazbhay 2008: 61), the region has not yet been able to move away from clan-based politics (Omaar 2004: 91; Hansen and Bradbury 2007: 470). Clan loyalty still influences politics and elections more than any other factor (Bradbury

2008: 217) and affects the work of the cabinet and parliament (Hoehne 2011: 327). Jhazbhay (2009: 74) argues that 'clan and kinship networks promote and sustain conflicts of interests underpinning corruption,' a challenge facing all levels of government.

Despite all challenges and problems and even though it is still not recognised by other countries, which makes it ineligible for international aid, financial assistance and loans, Somaliland is among the better functioning societies in Africa. The orderly and peaceful political transition that took place after the death of Somaliland's president Mohamed Egal in May 2002 and transfer of power to vice-president, who was from one of the country's small clans, is often highlighted as the key indicator of stability and 'robustness of Somaliland's Constitution and governmental institutions' (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf 2003: 463-4).

Finally, if Somaliland's success is to continue and if the country is to develop further, it is argued that Somaliland needs international recognition which would help it establish diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, attract foreign investments and get access to international financial institutions as well as multilateral and bilateral donor assistance (Kaplan 2008: 152; Jhazbhay 2009: 174). Luckham (2011: 106) thinks that the lack of international recognition is a major 'obstacle to the long-term consolidation of the country's democratic peace.' Huliaras (2002: 163) writes that Somaliland's 'capacity to survive' depends on its ability to further develop its economy and trade with the outside world in order to earn revenue to pay for administration and deliver basic services to the population. Some authors argue that since an independent and internationally recognised Somaliland voluntarily entered into a union with the rest of Somalia in 1960, it has the right, under the international law, to abrogate the union, reclaim its sovereignty and form an independent country (Mesfin 2009: 8). Others, such as Huliaras (2002: 173), think that while waiting for full independence, Somaliland should be given an observer status at the United Nations. This would allow it to deal directly with other countries and international organisations, receive financial assistance, sign trade agreements and do business with the outside world.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored and described in detail the broader contextual background about post-war reconstruction and development in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland. The next chapter will present research findings gathered through semi-structured and open-ended

interviews with selected individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in these three countries.

Chapter Five - Research Findings

This chapter will present research findings gathered through semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews with selected individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in Bosnia, Somaliland and South Sudan. After conducting and transcribing the interviews, the findings were coded. In qualitative research, codes are evident issues, ideas, concepts and arguments raised by respondents. Systematic coding assisted with sorting of the data under different themes, concepts and arguments. For each of the three cases in this study, initial data was collected, transcribed, assessed and the findings were coded. After identification of shortcomings and gaps in the collected data, another cycle of data collection was conducted to address the gaps. During all this time, codes were added, modified or taken out as more interviews were conducted, transcribed and interpreted. At the end of this process, the codes were grouped into related categories/sections of the data.

Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011: 205) write that qualitative data presentation and analysis include development of a 'story' from the collected, coded and categorised data. This story is a 'coherent presentation of people's experiences that reflects the grit and complexity' of the studied phenomenon. In terms of this study, the story of each case is presented in the form of 'thick descriptions.' Provision of thick and detailed description of the issues, ideas, concepts and arguments raised by respondents is the 'foundation of qualitative analysis,' helping readers understand issues from respondents' perspectives (Ibid: 238). Similarly, Denscombe (2010: 133) notes that qualitative researchers present their research findings as 'thick descriptions' in order to 'allow readers to gain a revealing insight into the particular situation.' He further argues that descriptions need to be detailed in order to depict all aspects of the studied phenomenon. Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011: 239) argue that presentation of 'thick descriptions is fundamental to fully understand the meaning of behaviours or actions in the data and will provide a foundation for later conceptualising and explaining.'

In this chapter, the findings are presented in *italic* and followed with the data and information that led to each specific finding. Data from interviews is summarised, paraphrased or quoted directly in order to present 'thick' and detailed descriptions for each category/section and finding. It must be pointed out that this chapter only presents the findings. In the next chapter, the findings will be analysed through conceptualisation, comparison with other data from the literature review and contextual background chapters, further interpretation and explanation.

Section One – PWRD in Bosnia and Herzegovina

5.1.1 End of the war

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian civil war at the end of 1995, was necessary to end fighting and suffering of civilians but was not a solution for issues and problems that caused the war or a path to stability and lasting peace.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was not a product of talks between Bosnian warring parties but was imposed on the Bosnian and regional political elites by the United States and other powerful Western countries (Visegrad, 12 October 2010; Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). The way the agreement was negotiated ensured post-war instability:

> During the negotiations that ended the war, no one ever consulted Bosnian people on all three sides and asked them for their opinion. The agreement was written by American and European policy-makers and then given to three wartime leaders, one from Serbia, one from Croatia and only the representative of one party in Bosnia, to sign it. This is the main reason the peace agreement has been difficult to implement in the post-war period (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

External actors who wrote the peace agreement were primarily interested in ending the war and not on long-term issues and potential effects the agreement would have on Bosnia (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). Furthermore, the agreement gave absolute power to external actors to do whatever they thought should be done in post-war Bosnia:

> The agreement gave the international community the right to assume absolute power and act intrusively in Bosnian domestic affairs… [external actors] decided what the role of the international community should be and how much power international administrators should have (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

5.1.2 Post-war security improvements

External actors contributed significantly to post-war stabilisation and security improvements in Bosnia through peacekeeping and security sector reform.

Respondents stressed that external actors played a key role when it comes to post-war stabilisation and security improvements. They listed a number of factors that contributed to

this: the presence of international peacekeepers, security sector reform and disarmament campaign, all managed by external actors such as the UN and NATO. Respondents highlighted that the most helpful external actor was the NATO, which kept the peace, merged warring armies and created a small professional army in Bosnia (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010; Belgrade, 30 October 2010). Another respondent added that without NATO troops present in the country after the war, peace would probably not hold (Visegrad, 13 October 2010).

Security improvements were essential for the overall post-war stability and freedom of movement in the country.

'Right after the war, people in Bosnia were not able to go across the entity lines freely and safely. Over the years, this changed significantly and today people move freely everywhere' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). However, as one respondent pointed out, while necessary, security alone could not bring long-term stability. He added that 'Bosnia will not experience progress as long as we see the current situation as good just because it is better than the wartime suffering and destruction. We need to strive for better' and improve economically, socially and politically (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

5.1.3 Post-war governance and state-building

In the first two years after the war, Bosnian politics and governance institutions were in chaos, with nationalist politicians promoting further divisions among three ethnic groups and preventing implementation of the peace agreement.

One respondent described the crisis that engulfed Bosnia after the war:

> Between the end of 1995 and mid-1997, Bosnia was in chaos. The international community had no power to ensure implementation of the Dayton agreement. During this period, the country saw no improvements. Wartime elites continued with divisive politics even after the formal end of war and the same political elites from all three sides who started the war continued to hold power in the country (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

Instability caused by dysfunctional and divisive local politics led the international community to assume an aggressive, intrusive and all-encompassing role in the country.

When the war ended and implementation of the peace agreement stalled, 'the international community feared that local ownership [of post-war recovery and state-building] would not take the country anywhere.' For about two years, Bosnia was unstable and there was hardly any implementation of key aspects of the peace agreement. 'The international community realised that it would be premature to expect that local political elites would create stability and effective state institutions. Given all that, a decision was made to assume an aggressive interventionist role in Bosnia.' That role was crystallised through the 'Bonn powers' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

A respondent who works for the Office of the High Representative explained that after the war, the majority of the European Union members 'called for a real local ownership of the state-building process in Bosnia. The United States and Britain, on the other hand, were the primary drivers of intrusive intervention' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). In the end, the intrusive intervention by the international community prevailed and external actors ran PWRD in Bosnia. This was confirmed by a Bosnian political analyst who argued that post-war recovery and state-building in Bosnia were 'designed and imposed by external actors. They were not based on local initiatives and local actors were hardly ever consulted' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

An official working for the OHR said that the 'Bonn powers' allowed the OHR to impose legislation, block decisions made by local actors and dismiss politicians whose work was seen as counterproductive for the country. She added that 'we think that Bosnia needed the "Bonn powers" after the war, which gave the OHR tools to impose necessary changes and move the country forward' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

The intrusive involvement and impositions by the international community contributed positively to some aspects of PWRD but created numerous challenges and problems in the process.

The international community had the urge to achieve post-war recovery success quickly in Bosnia. For this reason, the OHR often did not want to wait for local political elites to agree and compromise but would impose 'solutions' that external actors thought were necessary. At

the same time, local political elites used this to 'save face' in the eyes of their supporters, not making difficult political decisions and compromises but waiting for High Representatives to impose reforms, laws and other political decisions (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

A number of respondents think that the OHR definitely helped the implementation of the DPA at the time when local political elites completely stopped the implementation during 1996 and 1997. They said that many technical decisions and policies imposed by the OHR have improved the situation in the country - from joint identity documents and car plates to return of homes to displaced people. All this needed to be done but local authorities could not or would not do it on their own. However, in the long-run, due to the fact that there was the OHR which could impose 'solutions,' Bosnian political elites hardly ever attempted to make difficult and unpopular decisions on their own, leaving them to High Representatives (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010; Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

One respondent went as far as to say that externally driven post-war recovery and state-building in Bosnia have been nothing but a test case for the Western world to learn how to deal with aftermaths of violent conflict in the post-Cold War era. He added that 'this implies that they did not come to Bosnia to sincerely help but to test their post-war reconstruction approaches' (Visegrad, 12 October 2010). Other respondents argued that external actors assumed absolute power but never had a clear vision and strategy for the future of Bosnia and a plan which would take the country towards stability and prosperity (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010; Belgrade, 10 July 2011). A local civil society official added that all too often, the international community used a trial-and-error approach, especially when it comes to post-war state-building and peace-building, which often backfired and created even more political instability (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

5.1.4 'Forced democratisation' and lack of accountability

Insistence by external actors on elections immediately after the war helped wartime elites remain in power and undermined medium-to-long-term prospects for political stability.

For decades, Bosnia was part of a socialist/communist Yugoslavia and under one-party rule, without any experience with democracy and democratic governance. After the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, the country had a brief experience with democracy but soon

after the first multi-party elections, in which ethnic nationalist parties won, the war broke out. Democratisation process was put on hold and continued after the war (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010; Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

One of the crucial mistakes made by the international community was insistence on holding elections less than a year after the war ended. This ensured that the same people who started the war got political and 'democratic' legitimacy through elections, while more moderate politicians had no time, money and capacity to attract voters (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010; Belgrade, 30 October 2010). Another respondent said that holding elections right after the war was nothing but an attempt by Western powers and experts to show quick success:

> The international community did not allow any time for the country and society to recover and for moderate groups and parties to attract support. People in Bosnia were still unsure if the war really ended and if the peace would hold when they were asked to go to polls. In the end, wartime elites, with money, nationalist rhetoric and organisational capacity, benefited the most (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

The use of undemocratic means by external actors to promote democracy and good governance will have negative consequences on country's political and governance structures in the future.

After the war, Bosnia experienced 'forced democratisation,' the results and sustainability of which are questionable (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). In many ways, the OHR and its approach to state-building and democracy promotion have been 'highly undemocratic,' often violating basic democratic principles and local people's human rights (Belgrade, 10 July 2011). The international community created a 'protectorate without accountability,' where the OHR had power to impose whatever it wanted but without any accountability towards the people of Bosnia (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

One respondent said that many decisions made by the OHR, such as dismissals of democratically elected officials without a right to appeal, go against the very ideas of democracy, transparency, accountability and the rule of law that the international community claims to be trying to foster in Bosnia. 'Instead of using undemocratic means to bring stability and democracy, the international community was supposed to lead by example' (Belgrade, 30 October 2010). Another respondent said that dismissals of democratically elected politicians by the OHR have been 'one of the worst violations of basic human rights,

freedom of speech and expression by international officials and policy-makers who claimed to be working on democracy promotion, good governance and creation of stability and prosperity in Bosnia' (Belgrade, 10 July 2011). A Bosnian civil society official argued that this approach could have negative consequences in the future:

> It is completely absurd that the international community is promoting democracy in Bosnia and at the same time not allowing democratically elected authorities to do their work as they see fit. What is more, the international community has in numerous cases dismissed democratically elected officials without providing any evidence of wrongdoing. One has to wonder what kind of democracy they are building and how will this backfire in the future when international experts and forces leave (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

One respondent said that many international officials engaged in the 'forced democratisation' project in Bosnia arrived in the country full of arrogance and with a superiority complex:

> When Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative in Bosnia between 1997 and 1999, was asked by the media why did he dismiss a number of elected local officials, he responded with 'because I can.' This is just one out of many examples that show the arrogance of international officials who were sent to a country ravaged by war and given absolute power to do whatever they wanted while not having to be accountable to the local population. This is nothing but modern-day colonialism by powerful Western countries (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

Another respondent asked if it was necessary for Bosnia to have local institutions and a sense of local responsibility at all after the war when international policy-makers made all key decisions in the country:

> If the OHR is so important and necessary for Bosnia, as the international community claims, why do we have presidents, prime ministers and various levels of government? Why are people asked to vote in elections? In any case, whenever local authorities made decisions that the OHR and Western diplomats did not like, these decisions were dismissed. Why do we need local institutions which are costing so much money while only pretending to have power?

Despite all shortcomings, without international community's aggressive and intrusive involvement, the situation in Bosnia would be much worse than it is today, especially in terms of security improvements and freedom of movement.

Contrary to the criticism of the international community's involvement voiced by most respondents, a high-ranking OHR official argued that without external actors and their

intrusive involvement, not much would improve in post-war Bosnia. He said that 'it is easy to be critical of the OHR's work, especially the intrusive meddling into Bosnia's domestic affairs' during what he called the 'colonial-like period' between 1997 and 2005. However, he noted that during this time and due to the 'heavy interventionism' by external actors, 'things happened and the country moved forward' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). He specifically highlighted security improvements and freedom of movement across the country. The same respondent added that after being criticised for its 'heavy-handed' approach, the OHR changed its course in 2006 and tried to move away from heavy interventionism and instead act as a facilitator. 'Due to this change of course, the reform process slowed down, almost coming to a standstill.' Asked if externally driven post-war recovery and state-building in Bosnia have been successful, the same OHR official said the following:

> Were the international community's involvement and billions of US dollars spent in Bosnia worth it? Yes! Think about the countries in the region and around the world that had to deal with the refugees from Bosnia during the war. They spent much more on the refugees than what the international community has spent on peacekeeping, post-war recovery and state-building in Bosnia. Add to that the loss of life, income and economic growth in Bosnia itself. Despite all the problems, difficulties and mistakes, the international community's stabilisation and state-building efforts were worth the investment and are better than the alternative, which is continued fighting (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

5.1.5 The international community's interests and geopolitics in Bosnia

The international community's long-term involvement in Bosnia has been due to geopolitical and strategic interests of Western powers. At the same time, interests of various global and regional powers have often undermined post-war recovery and stabilisation in the country.

An official working for the OHR said that the main reason Bosnia has been receiving extensive financial and other support from the international community is the fact that the country is 'geographically in Europe… that influenced the attention of the international community,' especially among the European powers and United States (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). Another respondent noted that many people think that the reason the United States and European countries are so heavily involved in Bosnia and for such a long time is the 'fact that Bosnians are white and in Europe. There are countries in Africa with greater needs but they never receive such attention and support' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Geopolitics and interests of global powers and countries in the region have also had negative influence on local affairs in Bosnia:

> Geopolitical and other interests of many countries played a huge role in the way they approached their work and assistance in Bosnia. Very often, foreign and regional powers would support one side at the expense of other sides – for example, Russia and Serbia supporting Serbs, Arab and Western states supporting Muslims and Croats, Croatia supporting Bosnian Croats. In many instances, this has undermined the Bosnian state as a whole (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

5.1.6 Engineering local political changes by external actors

International community's involvement in Bosnia has not been neutral. Instead, external actors have often taken sides, favouring certain political leaders or groups over others in order to engineer local political changes and reforms.

The OHR and other external actors were supposed to be neutral bodies which would not favour any party or side. However, international actors have in many cases taken sides in Bosnia, doing what political elites in one entity, Federacija BiH, wanted and punishing Republika Srpska, the second entity. This was particularly evident in the case of international community's campaigning for centralisation of power in the capital, Sarajevo, at the expense of entities, despite the fact that this was against the Dayton Peace Agreement, which is also the current Constitution of Bosnia (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). An OHR official confirmed this, noting that the OHR and other international actors have not been neutral but 'part of the political game and political life in Bosnia' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). According to a Balkans analyst, the international community has 'tried to install in people's minds a shared conception of the state. The problem is that many people and political elites do not want this but prefer to have social, political and economic autonomy.' These differences have led to serious deadlocks which last to this day (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

Apart from taking sides when it comes to centralisation of power in the country, the OHR and powerful Western governments have often supported certain local political elites hoping they would in turn help accomplish international community's aims and goals. In many instances, external actors attempted to engineer local political changes through open support for some politicians, who were seen by external actors as more moderate and 'better' for Bosnia's future than others (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

5.1.7 Dysfunctional local politics and governance

Divisive and dysfunctional local Bosnian politics have been one of the primary factors that undermined progress in terms of post-war peace-building, reconciliation, governance and socio-economic recovery.

A number of respondents pointed out that it would be wrong to assume that all problems in post-war Bosnia have been caused by the international community's intrusive and heavy-handed involvement. They argued that dysfunctional local politics played a major role in creating and fuelling post-war instability. Politically, the country has been unstable since the end of the war. One respondent pointed out that the reason for this was the way the government was set up following the DPA, allowing the same political actors that led the country into the war to remain in power after the war. He added that,

> The mistake made by the international community after the war was that there was nothing resembling 'de-Nazification' which took place in Germany after the Second World War. Instead, the international community allowed nationalist parties to continue ruling in their ethnically divided areas. In many ways, Dayton agreement ensured that wartime elites were able to maintain the status quo and remain in power (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Another respondent said that one of the major problems in post-war Bosnia has been the fact that divisions which led to war remained engrained in people's minds:

> The war ended in a military stalemate, largely influenced by the NATO and US, who forced warring parties to stop fighting. Nationalist political elites who started the war remained in power and continued with promotion of ethnic divisions, this time using the political stage instead of fighting with weapons. Thus, the political situation was highly unstable and this negatively influenced peace-building, reconciliation and economic recovery (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

Massive bureaucracy and various levels of government institutions, which emerged from the Dayton Peace Agreement, have led to unsustainable spending on administration while socio-economic reconstruction and development were sidelined.

A respondent argued that the setup of various levels of government that emerged after the DPA is to blame for many current problems. The peace agreement envisaged that the country of about 4 million people should have over 160 government ministers on the national, entity and regional levels. Over the years, about 40% of Bosnian GDP was spent annually to

support this large government bureaucracy. The bureaucracy also creates a lot of red tape, discouraging foreign investments in the economy (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). A local civil society official said that 'the country is simply not capable of supporting such a big bureaucracy. Due to the large spending on administration, there is little money available for economic recovery and development' (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

Another respondent added that 'the government apparatus is the biggest prize worth fighting and competing for.' Those who control the government are in control of its budget and can give positions in the administration and state-owned enterprises to their followers, while those who are not in power have limited opportunities to get employment (Visegrad, 12 October 2010). Many in Bosnia see involvement in politics primarily as a way to get financial and other benefits. 'Instead of excelling academically or starting up businesses to become successful, many people go to politics and use their positions and influence to enrich themselves through corruption, nepotism and other illegal means' (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

Bosnian political elites are using the dysfunctional political and governance system that was created by external actors who drafted the Dayton Peace Agreement to ensure continued ethnic polarisation in the country and hold on power in their respective entities/regions.

A Bosnian advisor working for the OSCE mission said that even though local political elites frequently speak harshly about each other [other nationalist parties representing one of the three main ethnic groups] in public, they cooperate behind closed doors in order to continue with the status quo which would ensure political instability and ethnic animosity in the country, as well as their hold on power. He offered an example:

> I was once present at an informal meeting in the Bosnian national parliament where politicians from leading nationalist parties from two Bosnian entities were discussing issues over which they would fight on an upcoming TV show. They joked and laughed as they talked about this. This was not a unique incident; local political elites often fabricate crises in order to remain popular with their voters. In addition, they know that it is much easier to get the vote through ethnic polarisation instead of actually delivering goods and services to the population (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Another respondent had similar opinion about local politics, arguing that the institutional setup in post-war Bosnia has been dysfunctional, preventing efficient decision-making. She

said that political elites from two entities and three ethnic groups often do not cooperate and try to resolve problems and challenges simply because they do not want to be seen by their supporters that they are working together and compromising with representatives of other ethnic groups (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

A foreign advisor working for the OSCE mission in Bosnia argued that the Bosnian population is partly to blame for the bad economic, social and political situation in the country. 'People often complain about hardships but when elections come they either do not vote or vote for the same political parties that are not doing anything to improve the socio-economic situation in the country' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). On the other hand, one respondent reminded that despite all their flaws, corruption and manipulation of the electorate, Bosnia's political elites do not significantly differ from politicians in any other country, developed or developing:

> Even though Western policy-makers and foreign media like to claim that Bosnian political elites have many flaws, we need to remember that they use methods that are not in any way different than methods used in the West or anywhere else. We just need to take a look at the American politics and the language used there in the daily political life and things that politicians do to get into power and we will realise that Bosnia does not significantly differ from other countries (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

5.1.8 Post-war nation-building

Post-war nation-building in Bosnia has not been effective due to local resistance and lack of a shared vision for nationhood among the three main ethnic groups. Another factor that undermined nation-building was the fact that external actors designed and imposed many nation-building efforts and initiatives.

A number of respondents argued that post-war nation-building in Bosnia has not been very effective. According to one respondent, 'common Bosnian identity and a sense of belonging to the Bosnian nation have never taken hold after the war. Many Serbs and Croats still do not see themselves as members of the Bosnian state but only as members of their ethnic groups' (Belgrade, 10 July 2011). Another respondent added that the majority of people from the three main ethnic groups that live in the country have not had a shared vision for nationhood and joint future in post-war Bosnia (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

Some respondents argued that a major flaw when it comes to nation-building after the war has been the fact that many nation-building efforts were designed and driven by outsiders. A Bosnian civil society official said that externally driven nation-building will not lead to stability or be sustainable in the long-run:

> As a Bosnian citizen, it is very hard for me to identify with the Bosnian flag or national anthem, both of which were imposed by the OHR and international community, with little or no input from Bosnian citizens. That says a lot about sustainability of post-war nation-building (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

Same sentiments about national symbols were echoed by an international official who worked in Bosnia in early 2000s. He said that no one should be surprised 'if the majority of Bosnians do not have a sense of connection with the flag' and other symbols that were imposed by the international community (Juba, 23 November 2010).

5.1.9 Reconciliation and justice

The focus on retributive justice only has not contributed to reconciliation and peace-building; in many ways, this further widened ethnic divisions in Bosnia.

Despite all the talk and efforts on many levels, very little was achieved in Bosnia in terms of reconciliation after the war. One respondent said that when it comes to reconciliation,

> I do not think that the foundation for a more peaceful and stable future has been prepared well. During the war, the country experienced enormous suffering, crimes and destruction. We needed to deal with all that as well as with people's feelings and emotions. However, local and international institutions had no clear vision how to approach this and move the country forward. As a result, not much was done in terms of reconciliation (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

Another respondent argued that there will be no true reconciliation in Bosnia until all wartime victims are seen as equal, regardless of their ethnic background. This, according to the respondent, has not happened and some groups are still seen as the only victims. 'Blaming only one side for the wartime suffering, even though crimes have been committed by members of all three ethnic groups and people from all ethnic groups have suffered greatly, is very unhealthy for the future of the country.' She added that,

> On a political level, a number of symbolic acts have taken place since the end of the

war, such as apologies by political leaders for the wartime suffering or commemoration of victims from other sides by politicians. However, it is questionable if any of that had any real effect on the ordinary people and overall situation in the country. In my opinion, the importance of these political proclamations has been grossly exaggerated (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

While it is important that those who committed war crimes are held accountable, retributive justice has not lead to stability, reconciliation and peace-building. Instead, the three sides keep blaming and accusing each other for wartime wrongdoings. In addition, Bosnian Serbs claim that the international war crimes tribunal is only after them while ignoring the crimes committed by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. All this is only 'prolonging the crisis and widening ethnic divisions' (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

5.1.10 Physical reconstruction

Reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed in the war was one of the key priorities of the international community. With substantial financial support from donors, physical reconstruction has been one of the main success stories in post-war Bosnia.

Apart from security improvements, another post-war success in Bosnia was reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and financial support for rebuilding homes (Visegrad, 13 October 2010). Another respondent explained that,

> In terms of reconstruction and rebuilding of infrastructure, Bosnia needed a lot of funding since almost half of infrastructure was completely destroyed during the war. After the war, with the help of the international community, infrastructure around the country was rebuilt (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

A World Bank official working in Bosnia confirmed that external actors contributed significantly in terms of physical reconstruction. He said that since 1996, the World Bank alone implemented over fifty large projects in Bosnia, spending about US $1.5 billion. The majority of the projects took place between 1996 and 2003 and were aimed at reconstruction of key infrastructure such as bridges, roads, electricity grids and water facilities (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

5.1.11 Institutional and economic reforms

While post-war institutional and economic reforms were necessary, the reform process driven by external actors did not lead to good governance and economic prosperity.

According to one respondent, post-war Bosnia needed extensive reforms as the country required 'a triple transition:'

> First transition was from a socialist/communist economic system to capitalist system and market economy; second from being part of a bigger country, Yugoslavia, to becoming smaller, independent nation; and third from war to peace. All these transitions alone would be difficult for any country; when combined, they have been and still are huge hurdles for Bosnia (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

One of the main problems in Bosnia today is that many institutional and economic reforms, policies and laws were put in place and often imposed by external actors to satisfy the requirements for Bosnia's potential EU membership. On the other hand, ordinary people have seen little, if any benefits in their lives from these reforms, with economic opportunities and good governance lacking on all levels. 'Instead of only aiming to please foreigners, reforms should be undertaken with the purpose of improving the economic and institutional efficiency' (Belgrade, 30 October 2010). The head of a local NGO added that 'there is no question that Bosnia needs reforms and democratisation, but the reform process needs to be driven by local actors' (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

5.1.12 Economic reconstruction and development

Despite the financial assistance from donors and imposition of policies and reforms by external actors, post-war economic reconstruction and development failed to provide economic opportunities for Bosnian citizens, many of whom today live in poverty.

One respondent said that 'Bosnia received so much money after the war, far more per capita than what Western European countries received after World War II through the Marshal Plan. What happened to this money? What is there to show sixteen years after the war? Where is economic development?' She added that if one travels around the country, especially to smaller towns and cities, one can see a shocking economic situation, with the majority of citizens unemployed and living in poverty. Furthermore, the same respondent argued that the lack of economic opportunities has been one of the main causes of political instability:

The main reason there has been so much political tension in Bosnia since the end of the war is the complete lack of economic reconstruction and development and lack of employment and economic opportunities. Even the successes such as physical reconstruction and return of displaced and refugees to their pre-war homes have been undermined by the lack of employment and economic opportunities for these people, many of whom today live in poverty (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

Other respondents added that, when the amount of money spent by the international community as well as the advice and prescriptions given to the country by foreign experts are considered, it is hard to see positive results. They noted that the current economic situation in most parts of Bosnia is far worse than before the war and even the period right after the war (Visegrad, 12 October 2010; Sarajevo, 21 October 2010; Sarajevo 22 October 2010). Another respondent added that 'without economic development and employment opportunities, people on all sides will be susceptible to manipulation by politicians and that could lead to another violent conflict' in the future (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

Lack of coordination and integrated planning by external actors, coupled with the lack of consultation with local actors, were some of the main reasons that prevented economic reconstruction and development in post-war Bosnia.

A number of respondents said that a significant factor that prevented economic reconstruction and development after war was the lack of coordination among foreign donors and other external actors (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010; Belgrade, 10 July 2011). One respondent explained that,

Many international efforts lacked clear focus and idea how to help and promote reconstruction and development in the country. Various development and other international agencies came to Bosnia to implement projects and programmes without coordination among each other. For years since the end of the war, each donor and international organisation had its own agenda, hardly ever trying to fit that agenda to the bigger picture and country's needs. Furthermore, there was a complete lack of consultation with local authorities and experts (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

Significant portion of the blame for the lack of economic development and growth in post-war Bosnia must be levelled on local political elites, who focused primarily on self-enrichment while ignoring economic reconstruction and development.

Instead of only blaming the international community for the lack of economic development and growth in post-war Bosnia, country political elites deserve significant blame (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010; Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). One respondent said that,

> The bad economic situation is largely the fault of our local political elites, who never cared about economic reconstruction and development after the war. What is more, they destroyed industries, facilities and factories that were not destroyed during the war through misguided privatisation which enriched and benefited them and their followers (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

Privatisation of state-owned industries and enterprises, one of the main external impositions in post-war Bosnia, led to corruption, nepotism and massive job losses.

One respondent explained that the flawed economic privatisation after the war had a negative impact on the overall socio-economic situation. He added that the problems related to privatisation were not caused only by the local political elites but also by the fact that,

> The international community insisted on quick privatisation of state industries and property as part of the neo-liberal economic transformation. This process was managed, better to say mismanaged, by external actors and local political elites. Local elites either helped their followers get hold of the state industries and property or profited from their sales (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

The same respondent added that the international community did nothing to ensure that the privatisation process was well managed by local actors, even though it had power and tools to do so (Belgrade, 30 October 2010). Ultimately, the privatisation process led to massive job losses. For example, if 500 people worked in a state-owned company before the war, once the company was privatised, the new owners would keep only 100 workers. The rest were dismissed (Visegrad, 12 October 2010). A World Bank official added that privatisation of state-owned industries and enterprises did not only benefit local actors. He added that many industries and services that were worth something have been purchased by foreign companies and corporations over the last few years, often for very little money. He mentioned the banking sector as an example, noting that the 'entire banking sector in Bosnia is in the hands of foreigners. Austrian, Italian and German banks own all local banks' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

5.1.13 Dependency syndrome

Due to the dependency on foreign aid and assistance, local political elites are often more accountable to donors who provide funds than the citizens who elect them.

A World Bank official said that the lack of domestic funding for recovery and constant influx of donor money since the mid-1990s has led to an aid dependency in Bosnia. He added that the country has received billions of US dollars since 1996 from donors and international financial institutions (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). Another respondent pointed that local authorities, NGOs and civil society organisations have become used to 'easy' money from international donors. 'They never had to do much to impress donors, apart from talking about multi-ethnic cooperation, peace-building and reconciliation, often superficially. All the while, money kept coming' (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

The dependency on donor money has led to a situation where local authorities have to be accountable to those who fund them, not the citizens. In theory, local politicians should be accountable to the population and voters. In Bosnia, however, politicians are more accountable to foreigners who provide funds than the citizens who elect them (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010; Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

The intrusive involvement by the international community has led to a situation where many Bosnian politicians and citizens presume that only foreign experts can help the country move forward through the imposition of reforms and 'solutions.'

Apart from the financial dependency, the intrusive involvement by the international community has created a dependency syndrome when it comes to decision- and policy-making. A World Bank official said that many Bosnian politicians and ordinary people think that the key for country's stability are external actors, who in the eyes of many are more competent to solve country's problems. 'Locals have got to a point where they think that Bosnians themselves are not capable of doing things on their own' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

Another respondent added that citizens and authorities have largely given up on locally designed and driven initiatives. Many think that only external actors can come up with ideas and initiatives which can help the country move forward (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010). A

high-ranking OHR official claimed that there are only a handful of politicians in Bosnia who want to do things on their own and who are asking the international community to leave. The majority, on the other hand, still want the OHR to remain in the country and 'impose solutions' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). A World Bank official offered an example of the above mentioned dependency syndrome:

> In 2006, Bosnian authorities introduced a new national tax system which brought a huge influx of money into government coffers. Encouraged by this, the authorities in Federacija BiH introduced a number of unsustainable laws related to social spending such as monthly payments for unemployed and increases for wartime soldiers, people wounded during the war and families of those who died in the war. All this was aimed at attracting potential voters by the parties in power at the time, with the law put in place five days before elections.
>
> The government was able to pay for all these expenses in 2006. However, in 2007, the authorities realised they could not continue paying for these social categories as the money was needed for other projects. Then the vice-president of Federacija BiH, at an official meeting with the World Bank and OHR officials in Sarajevo, said that the parliament of Federacija BiH adopted the law to please the local population in hope that the OHR would realise the unsustainability of the law and thus cancel it. The OHR, however, refused to take part in this matter, leaving it to the local authorities. Subsequently, this law crippled government budget (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

A high-ranking OHR official explained that local authorities often wanted the OHR to impose reforms and policies:

> Numerous times in the past, many local politicians, some of them government ministers and even prime ministers of the two entities, have asked the High Representatives to impose certain difficult decisions and laws. They would explain that they wanted the laws and decisions to be imposed because they thought the political price they would have to pay if they did it themselves was too high - for example, in the case of formation of a unified army after the war. This way, local political elites tried to absolve themselves of all responsibility (Sarajevo 22 October 2010).

Over the centuries, Bosnia had been a dependency of various powers, with outsiders often making key decisions and providing funds for development and running of institutions. This could explain the fact that many people in the country think that the best option for the country is to become a formal, long-term protectorate of the international community.

One respondent highlighted that Bosnia did not become a dependency with the post-war involvement of the international community. She argued that,

> In many ways, Bosnia was also a dependency during the communist rule, when it was seen as an underdeveloped region of Yugoslavia, with funds and major political decisions often coming from Belgrade, the capital of the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps because of this, there are many people today who think that outsiders know better how to create a stable country (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Similarly, a high-ranking OHR official argued that post-war dependency syndrome has not been caused by the international community's intrusive involvement but has roots in country's history:

> The problem in Bosnia is that too many people do not think they are the masters of their own fate. This probably comes from history and numerous foreign rules. For all these reasons, many Bosnians would like the OHR to remain in the country; they think that the only hope for the future is if their country becomes a formal, long-term protectorate of the international community (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

5.1.14 Long-term involvement and international community's fatigue

Intrusive long-term involvement by the international community did not lead to economic development, progress, prosperity and effective governance in post-war Bosnia. This, in turn, led to local frustrations with international efforts and international community's fatigue.

An official working for the OHR said that for externally driven state-building and socio-economic recovery in the aftermath of violent conflict to work and produce positive results, external actors have to act fast and hope they are successful quickly. The longer external efforts are, there is less chance of success because long externally driven operations are likely to lose legitimacy and support in the eyes of the local people, who could lose patience and become frustrated with external actors due to slow improvements. She argued that this happened in Bosnia, where citizens have become frustrated with the lack of progress. She further added that,

> External efforts can be successful only if the international community has a unified position. This, however, is very difficult, not only on the global level (reconciling American, Russian, Chinese and European agendas) but also on the EU level, where each country has own opinions, ideas and agendas (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

216

In addition, the same respondent pointed out that since 2005, the OHR has significantly changed its involvement in Bosnia. This change happened because the OHR lost political support from the international community that existed between 1997 and 2005. 'There are many countries, especially members of the EU, which previously supported the OHR but today argue that after fifteen years, our job should be done and Bosnia should be able to function on its own. They also call for real local ownership of political processes and reforms' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

Similarly, another respondent said that over the last few years, the OHR has become 'highly impotent,' losing much of the support from powerful Western countries (Belgrade, 10 July 2011). According to a high-ranking OHR official, the main reason for this was the international community's fatigue:

> The long-term involvement by the international community in Bosnia had a negative effect in Western capitals. There is hardly anyone among Western politicians and policy-makers who is interested in Bosnia as much as they were in the 1990s and early 2000s. The fatigue has kicked in and is significantly impacting the work of the OHR and other international organisations (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

5.1.15 Local ownership, competence and capacity

The intrusive and heavy-handed involvement by the international community prevented local people, elites and experts from participating in the design and development of post-war programmes and policies. Because of this, local people and elites never assumed local ownership of recovery, peace-building and state-building in Bosnia.

An international official who worked in Bosnia in the early 2000s argued that the international community has been 'very arrogant in its involvement in Bosnia. It assumed that everything local was bad and useless and that what the country needed were foreign experts and ways of doing things' (Juba, 23 November 2010). Talking about local capacity and competence, a Bosnian civil society official said that

> There are enough people in Bosnia who are capable, if given a chance, to do things on their own, whether we talk about politics, economics or anything else. The intrusive involvement by the international community has prevented this so far. Ultimately, if Bosnians do not find a way to develop their country socially, politically and economically, there will be no bright future here despite all the help and assistance

from the outside (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

The head of a local Bosnian NGO thinks that one of the major mistakes made by the international community was to 'ignore the opinions, ideas and wishes of local people, authorities, experts and political elites. The situation would probably be better today if they worked with local actors from the start. Instead, foreigners came to Bosnia to do things they thought were needed, often imposing decisions on local actors and people' (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

Instead of patronising local people and elites, external actors needed to act as facilitators and mediators, supporting local initiatives and allowing Bosnians to decide what kinds of political and economic systems they wanted to establish.

A World Bank official argued that the international community, instead of its intrusive role, needed to act as a facilitator and mediator, allowing local parties to assume real ownership and full responsibility for post-war reconstruction (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). Another respondent said that rather than imposing solutions and reforms, external actors needed to safeguard peace and security and prevent any future war through the presence of peacekeepers and other mechanisms but allow Bosnians themselves to decide about their own future (Visegrad, 12 October 2010). One respondent said that the country would have been better off if there was no intrusive and heavy-handed involvement by the international community. 'This way, we would definitely go through a lot of crises, but it is possible that at some point we would realise that we have to talk, compromise and resolve our problems' (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010).

All too often, international actors assumed that local political elites and people were not competent and did not know 'how to do politics.' In reality, however, local politicians knew very well how to 'play the ball' (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). A Bosnian advisor working for OSCE argued that over time, Bosnian political elites learned how to play the international community:

> Whether it is the IMF, World Bank, UN or Western diplomats, Bosnian politicians always feed them what they wanted to hear. For example, they would tell them how democracy, media freedom, human rights, transparency and accountability are very important for the country. However, the moment the meeting is over, local political elites would turn the page and continue business as usual, which in most cases meant

ignoring all the above (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Asked if there are lessons about post-war recovery from the Bosnian experience that are related to local ownership, competence and capacity, one respondent said that the main lesson is that 'external actors should never patronise local people.' She added that,

> I am not against outside help and expertise… I think that countries emerging from war need support… but locals must be able to decide in what kind of society they want to live in. This is not about knowing better but about the fact that all situations and circumstances are different and locals usually know better what is going on. Instead of patronising local people, foreigners need to work with them (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

5.1.16 The civil society sector

Most local NGO and civil society organisations established after the war have been donor-driven to promote international community's agenda. Still, many organisations have evolved over time, playing important roles in areas such as peace-building, human rights and protection of the environment.

According to a head of a local NGO, establishment of the NGO and civil society sectors after the war was not easy, especially since the country did not have anything resembling these sectors during the Communist rule. She pointed out that people working for local NGOs on peace-building and reconciliation faced serious problems, adding that some were even physically attacked by those who wanted to continue with the wartime hardline nationalist politics. However, she said that the situation has changed considerably since then. 'Over the last few years, the NGO sector has become strong and respected in local communities. Even the local authorities now see the importance of this sector and we often receive financial support from them' (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

When it comes to NGO and civil society promotion, many organisations and groups established with donor help proved to be unsustainable in the long-run without constant external funding. Still, a number of organisations have survived and are today doing a good job in areas such as peace-building, promotion of human rights and protection of the environment (Visegrad, 13 October 2010). In contrast, another respondent argued that the 'bulk of local NGOs in Bosnia are still donor-oriented. The main reason why the majority of them exist is to access donor money.' In addition, she said that many well established local

NGOs who receive large sums of money from foreign donors are 'fulfilling international community's agenda' (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

Asked how much Bosnians working for local NGOs and civil society groups were able to influence design, development and implementation of projects funded by international donors after the war, a local civil society official said that 'the bag is mixed. While there were some flexible donors interested in allowing Bosnians to decide what needed to be done for the country and local communities, most donors came to Bosnia with ready-made ideas and projects, telling us what to do and how to do it' (Sarajevo, 21 October 2010). Talking about her experience working with foreign donors and international NGOs and agencies, the head of a local Bosnian NGO said that,

> After the war, foreign donors and organisations would regularly meet with the people from local NGO and civil society sectors and tell them what projects to plan and work on. Foreign donors and organisations did not seem interested in the needs on the ground but only looked to achieve their aims and objectives. Over the last few years, however, they have significantly changed their approach. Many international donors now consult local NGOs and civil society groups and support locally designed projects and ideas (Visegrad, 12 October 2010).

A Bosnian citizen working for a UN agency echoed the above experience. He said that before 2005, international donors would come up with projects without any serious consultation with local people, organisations or authorities. 'Things started to change slowly after 2005, when some donors realised that money was spent on projects which did not lead to change and that sustainability of the projects depended on local involvement, input and ownership' (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010). Another respondent pointed out that while some donors have changed their approach and are now consulting the locals, the majority still promote their own ideas and agendas and local organisations have to plan around these agendas and try to fit in (Belgrade, 10 July 2011).

5.1.17 Challenges facing Bosnia

The international community still does not know when its work in Bosnia will be completed and when the country and its people will be ready for self-rule. Bosnia will remain an unofficial protectorate of the international community for the foreseeable future.

An official working for the OHR argued that 'fifteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia is still a protectorate of the international community without a sign of becoming able to function on its own' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). Another respondent said that the view of many international policy-makers and analysts is that the OHR has not been able to create a stable political environment and institutions able to function effectively without the intrusive involvement of external actors. 'That is why they are reluctant to end the mission in Bosnia and give the ownership of state-building and full sovereignty back to the locals' (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

An OHR official pointed out that international actors still do not know if their job in Bosnia is done and if the country is ready for self-rule after more than a decade of international community's involvement (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). A Bosnian political analyst working for an international think tank claimed that for a few years now, the international community and OHR 'do not really know what to do with Bosnia,' adding that 'nothing that they have tried since the late 1995 has created a stable and sustainable state' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010). Another respondent, who worked as an international 'democracy promotion' official in Bosnia in early 2000s, went further with critique of the international community's footprint:

> The international community has done a very bad job in Bosnia since the end of the war. It literary took over in 1997 and has not been able to create a stable state for over a decade and a half. Bosnia today is in a stalemate, without anyone in the international community knowing what to do and how to move forward (Juba, 23 November 2010).

While late, the change of international community's approach is a welcome sign that local political elites and Bosnian citizens will be given a chance to decide about their own future.

In 2010, the EU appointed its special representative in Bosnia, whose role is to encourage local parties to continue with the reform process towards the membership in the EU. Unlike the OHR's intrusive approach, the EU special representative will not impose decisions but only help local parties through mediation (Belgrade, 10 July 2011). However, the problem is that the EU, which is now leading international community's efforts, does not know what to do and how to move things forward (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010; Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

One respondent said that political divisions among three ethnic groups are still strong and that it is going to be very hard for local political elites to come to an agreement about the reform

of the Constitution without mediation and even some pressure from the international community. He argued that, while involvement by the international community is still needed, it should not be done in the intrusive way as it was done by the OHR between 1997 and 2005 (Visegrad, 13 October 2010).

Bosnia urgently needs to improve economic situation and deal with rising unemployment and poverty in order to prevent social unrest and possibly another violent conflict.

A number of respondents said that something has to be done urgently to improve economic situation and deal with the increasing levels of poverty and unemployment (Visegrad, 12 October 2010; Sarajevo, 21 October 2010). As one respondent pointed out, it should not be very difficult to promote economic development and growth in Bosnia:

> This is a small country, with less than 4 million people, fairly well educated population and significant natural resources. It does not require enormous investments. What we need is political stability, good leadership, vision and good management of resources (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

The same respondent added that for whatever reason, Bosnian leaders and political elites 'still do not have a plan which way the country should go in terms of economic development and whether to focus on tourism, heavy industry, agriculture, small business promotion or something else' (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010). Another respondent said that the only hope for Bosnia is if one day the population elects leaders who are interested in economic recovery, growth and development instead of 'divisive ethno-nationalist politics' (Sarajevo, 20 October 2010).

According to one respondent, given the current serious economic hardships and high levels of poverty, it is surprising that the country has not yet experienced extensive social protests. 'Living conditions for many are dreadful and at some point the situation could get out of control. The problem is that the local political elites could easily use this frustration and channel it in a way that can benefit them' (Belgrade, 30 October 2010). Similarly, another respondent said that 'it is probably only a matter of time before we see widespread social unrest. Unfortunately, politicians are very likely going to try and use this to their advantage' (Visegrad, 13 October 2010).

The future of Bosnia depends on its people. While the international community should be

there to help and assist country's socio-economic and institutional recovery, Bosnians should
be allowed to drive these processes.

A Bosnian advisor to the OSCE mission in the country said that the 'future of Bosnia depends on local people and elites getting their act together. With a few exceptions, external actors do not really know or understand what has been going on in Bosnia since the end of the war.' He added that if Bosnians are left alone to resolve their issues and problems, they would very likely do it. He added that this would not be easy, but it would happen over time:

> Bosnia still needs some form of international advisory body which would provide advice and assistance, especially when it comes to negotiations about a possible EU membership. However, it is time for international actors to allow locals to do what they think is the best for the country (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010).

Section Two – PWRD in South Sudan

5.2.1 Challenging post-war environment

After decades of war and underdevelopment, South Sudan's post-war environment was one of the most extreme and challenging since the end of the Cold War.

Two protracted wars since the 1950s, coupled with neglect and discrimination since the colonial times, are the primary reasons for the extremely challenging situation in South Sudan today. When the war ended in 2005, the region had no infrastructure such as roads, hospitals or schools; there were no industries apart from the oil industry controlled by Sudan; no basic services such as drinking water and electricity and no civilian governance institutions. All this had to be built from scratch (Juba, 16 November 2010; Juba, 19 October 2011; Juba, 29 October 2011). A county commissioner in one of the ten states in South Sudan emphasised key post-war challenges:

> During the war, people in South Sudan were socially and economically destroyed and the structure of the communities and life were paralysed. Many people today are unable to provide basic necessities on their own and depend on outside assistance for their survival. This is a continuation of the wartime situation when the majority of people depended on international organisations for food, health care and education (Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

5.2.2 Post-war security

South Sudan has seen significant security improvements since 2005; local efforts and initiatives were major factors that led to improved security.

According to a German technical advisor at one of the GOSS ministries, when it comes to security, South Sudan has seen a 'dramatic change for the better' since 2005:

> In 2005 and 2006, it was unsafe to travel anywhere in South Sudan without heavy security because of the presence of armed militias. Since then, the government was able to either neutralise or reign in most of the militias; today, apart from a few isolated areas, it is safe to travel anywhere (Juba, 19 November 2010).

The same respondent said that the main driver of the process that led to improved security

was the government of South Sudan. 'While the UN peacekeeping mission and other external actors have been present in the region since 2005, they played a minor part in this process.' He added that time and again, 'the UN Mission in South Sudan failed to act when civilians were attacked and killed across the region, justifying its inaction with its limited mandate' (Juba, 19 November 2010).

While the security situation has improved when compared to wartime fighting, many communities in South Sudan continue to experience outbreaks of fighting and insecurity caused by ethnic animosity, cattle rustling, fighting over resources, power and rebel activity.

Not all respondents agreed that security has improved significantly across South Sudan. A conflict management lecturer at the University of Juba said that one of the key problems since 2005 has been the lack of security in many areas. Due to insecurity in these areas, local authorities and international organisations were often prevented from working on reconstruction and development (Juba, 19 November 2010). A number of respondents pointed out that many parts of the country often experience localised violence and insecurity due to ethnic fighting, cattle rustling, fighting over resources and rebel activity (Juba, 23 November 2010; Juba, 13 October 2011; Juba, 16 October 2011).

While South Sudan's security forces have reformed significantly from a rebel movement, security sector reform is still far from complete.

A Sudan analyst working for an international think tank argued that security sector reform and transformation of Sudan People's Liberation Army from a rebel movement into a modern army as well as the establishment of the police force have been key factors that led to improved security and stability. He added that there is still a long way to go until this process is completed (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011). Another respondent said that security forces have not reformed and improved anywhere near the satisfactory level. He noted that a very problematic issue over the years has been deployment of the army to prevent ethnic fighting or disarmament attempts. Not being trained for internal interventions, the army often creates problems instead of solving them (Juba, 13 October 2011).

Years after the formal end of war, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former

combatants are yet to take place. South Sudan's political and army leadership think that the country is not yet ready for DDR.

A key part of security sector reform was supposed to be disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. Technical advisor at a GOSS ministry argued that external actors such as UNMIS, who were supposed to lead this process as per the CPA, have failed to do so and the DDR and its limited achievements have been the work of local actors:

> DDR process began four years later than planned because the international community could not get its act together. The GOSS then decided to take initiative and try to demobilise various armed groups and communities. A number of armed groups have been reintegrated into the army and other security structures. DDR, however, is far from over (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Contrary to the above opinion, another respondent said that the DDR process never had serious support from the South Sudanese army and government. There are many within the government and army who do not think that the country is ready for DDR as the government cannot guarantee safety and security of the people and communities. In terms of demobilisation of soldiers, the key argument of the government is 'what would happen if the army dismisses tens of thousands of soldiers, whose only income is the army salary. They think this would only create even more instability' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

5.2.3 Post-war justice, reconciliation and peace-building

During the negotiations that led to the North-South Sudan peace agreement, justice and accountability for the crimes committed during the war were ignored by both sides and the international community. Since all sides were guilty of war crimes, this was seen as the only way forward.

One respondent explained that there is no mention of any transitional justice mechanisms in the peace agreement as all parties knew they would have to answer for war crimes and human rights abuses. Because of this, 'justice was ignored altogether.' She added that 'South Sudanese seem to have moved on without justice… reconciliation and peace-building have taken place without transitional justice' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

South Sudanese authorities relied on local efforts and unconventional approaches to

reconciliation and peace-building to reconcile differences between former adversaries. This, however, was not a country-wide process; it only happened between the leaders from the government, army and rebel groups formerly aligned with Khartoum, not between all communities and groups in South Sudan.

Local NGO official said that South Sudanese political, military and rebel leaders realised in 2005 that they had to reconcile their differences and work together to ensure that the self-determination referendum is held on time in 2011. 'They knew they had no chance against the Khartoum regime if they were not united and had a common goal' (Juba, 19 November 2010). Former GOSS official explained that, in order to achieve the above mentioned reconciliation, South Sudanese relied on their own efforts and approaches to reconciliation and peace-building:

> Reconciliation and peace-building in South Sudan (primarily the 2006 Juba Declaration) were a typical example of a traditional South Sudanese way to deal with conflict – practical peace-building efforts aimed at reconciling differences and getting people to move on for the sake of the future, without creating animosity and anger among the former adversaries (Juba, 16 November 2010).

The head of an international NGO emphasised that South Sudanese, many of whom during the war fought against each other, have been able to build peace among themselves without the help of outsiders. 'Without Juba Declaration and many other locally driven peace and reconciliation initiatives, South Sudan would probably not get to the referendum on self-determination in a peaceful environment' (Juba, 22 November 2010). Thus, as one respondent noted, 'the biggest achievement that South Sudan has made since 2005 is the unity of the Southerners,' adding that the 'person who deserves a lot of credit for this is President Salva Kiir, who was able to accommodate former enemies and get them to work together' (Juba, 19 November 2010).

An international Sudan expert added that 'peace-making and peace-building in South Sudan have been entirely locally driven and in many cases very unconventional. Time and again, the GOSS would literary buy off spoilers with government or army positions and even money' (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Reconciliation and peace-building between leaders was important for internal stability and peace in the aftermath of war. In the long-run, however, South Sudan needs a national

reconciliation and peace-building process that would involve ordinary people and communities.

A respondent who works for a local NGO pointed out that the process of reconciliation and peace-building has not yet been completed. The Juba Declaration and other peace-building and reconciliation efforts have happened mainly on 'top' between leaders. He added that South Sudan needs a national reconciliation and peace-building process that would involve ordinary people and communities and not only leaders. Only after such process takes place, 'we could emerge as a peaceful country and have a good chance to develop and prosper' (Juba, 19 November 2010).

5.2.4 State-building and governance

Despite the lack of capacity, South Sudan has established basic governance structures and institutions since 2005. However, the need to accommodate potential 'spoilers' led to creation of a large, expensive and ineffective administration.

In terms of state-building and governance, South Sudan had to 'start from scratch' in 2005. Due to the decades of war, 'civilian structures did not exist and there were not many people in the entire region who had civilian administrative experience' (Juba, 16 November 2010). South Sudanese diplomat explained that,

> Due to the nature of the peace agreement, which insisted on power-sharing with Khartoum on the national level, we spent a lot of time establishing national government. This involved a lot of bargaining and compromising over positions and we had to appoint our best qualified officials to the national government in Khartoum in order to protect our interests. In addition, due to a large number of potential spoilers in the South, we often had to give positions to people who were not qualified but had to be brought in. This created an administration that was too large but at that time we did not have a choice (Juba, 15 November 2010).

Two respondents said that during the interim period, South Sudan's authorities established basic institutions and in 2010 held multi-party elections for president, parliament, state governors and local administration. This period also saw claims about tribalism in politics and government institutions as well as armed rebellion by some candidates for state governors who lost elections (Juba, 19 November 2010; Juba, 13 October 2011).

During the interim period, there was a minimal political competition in South Sudan due to the need to present a unified front against Khartoum and hold self-determination referendum on time. The country could face serious political competition and instability after independence and specifically during the first post-independence elections.

Politics and governance during the interim period were more focused on presenting a unified front against Khartoum and holding the 2011 referendum on time rather than on political competition (Juba, 13 October 2011). The real internal political and governance test that South Sudan is going to face will be when the next elections are held (Juba, 16 November 2010; Juba, 16 October 2011).

While South Sudan has been relatively successful in setting up basic governance structures on the national and state levels, authorities and institutions still do not reach many people in rural areas across the country.

Even though there was significant success in terms of setting up governance structures on the national and state levels, South Sudanese authorities and institutions still do not reach many people in rural areas (Juba, 23 November 2010). While the basic structures of the state have been built, there is still a long way to go until there is a stable state, able to govern effectively and deliver services to the population (Juba, 15 November 2010).

5.2.5 Short vs. long-term plans and recovery

Due to a difficult relationship with Sudan and the need to preserve stability and hold the referendum in 2011, the government of South Sudan prioritised short-term post-war stabilisation and recovery over medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development.

According to a South Sudanese diplomat, difficult political relationship and lack of trust between Juba and Khartoum meant that the GOSS had to constantly keep its focus on short-term security issues and the moves made by Khartoum and not on other burning issues (Juba, 15 November 2010). A number of respondents argued that because of the six years of the interim period leading to the referendum in 2011, the GOSS could not afford to think about long-term post-war recovery. It had to focus on short-term plans which prioritised security, political stability and holding of the referendum over delivery of basic services and economic

reconstruction and development (Juba, 16 November 2010; Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011; Juba, 29 October 2011).

The focus on security and sidelining of other priorities was also due to the fact that 'almost everyone in the government has a security or army background and this is what they see as the key issue' (Juba, 13 October 2011). Thus, during the interim period, a large part of the government budget went to the army as there was a fear among the leadership that a war with the North could break out (Juba, 29 October 2011).

Between 2005 and 2011, international donors and organisations working in South Sudan focused only on short-term humanitarian and emergency issues, ignoring medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development. This was mainly due to the uncertainty during the interim period over whether the South would remain in Sudan or become an independent country.

In the same way the GOSS focused only on short-term priorities, international donors and organisations working in South Sudan have hesitated to begin working on reconstruction and development during the six-year interim period, focusing instead mainly on short-term humanitarian and emergency issues (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011; Juba, 13 October 2011). One respondent blamed the six-year-long wait-and-see interim period for this:

> To this day, donors and international organisations working in South Sudan have not come up with a long-term recovery and development strategy. The main reason for this was the six-year interim period leading to the referendum, which created a situation where no one was sure what would happen and if the South would remain in Sudan or become an independent country. The interim period kept important decisions and long-term planning in limbo (Juba, 19 November 2010).

5.2.6 Economic reconstruction and development

Apart from the oil industry, South Sudan currently does not have any other industries. Due to the lack of capacity and focus on security, very little was done to build small-to-medium-scale production facilities and industries since 2005.

Since the end of the war in 2005, the GOSS received billions of US dollars from oil revenues. However, most of these funds were used for security and running of government

administration. A respondent said that while oil revenues are South Sudan's key source of income, 'we must scale down the overdependence on oil and diversify the economy' in the near future (Juba, 29 October 2011). One of the main problems is that the region does not have any significant local production so basically everything has to be imported from neighbouring and other countries. The lack of capacity and focus on security meant that not much was done to start small-to-medium-scale production facilities and industries during the interim period (Juba, 16 November 2010; Juba, 16 October 2011).

Due to the interim period uncertainty, foreign investors were reluctant to invest in South Sudan. During this time, the country only saw small-scale investments, mainly from neighbouring countries.

In the same way the government, donors and international organisations were uncertain about the future and did not focus on long-term issues, reconstruction and development, foreign investors also waited to see if the peace would hold and if South Sudan would become an independent country. As one respondent pointed out, apart from a few exceptions such as the SAB Miller investment into a local brewery and mobile phone networks, South Sudan did not see any serious investments between 2005 and 2010 (Juba, 19 November 2010).

According to a manager of SAB Miller's South Sudan Brewery, the majority of businesses set up between 2005 and 2010 were 'short-term, temporary structures, with, at best, medium-plan scenario. Not many businesses looked beyond the referendum' (Juba, 18 November 2010). Still, as pointed out by a Sudan analyst working for an international think tank, countries and small and medium-size businesses from the region have profited in South Sudan since 2005:

> While the global business community hesitated to invest in South Sudan, neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have profited greatly from trade and investments in restaurants, hotels and other accommodation facilities. Tens of thousands of skilled and semi-skilled workers from these countries have been working across the South since 2005. Furthermore, due to the lack of local capacity, many companies from the region have been given large contracts to build infrastructure (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011).

Before opening itself to the outside world and markets and joining regional trade blocks,

South Sudan needs to build industries, infrastructure and service providers in order to be competitive in the region and globally.

In terms of the prospects for regional economic cooperation and trade with other East African countries now that South Sudan is an independent country, a local economist and government official said that the country first needs to 'get its house in order' and build industries, infrastructure and service providers so it can compete with the outside world. He thinks that 'only then the country can open itself to the free trade with the region and other countries. Otherwise, foreigners will take over the country and locals will not be able to compete.' He further said that the government should build physical infrastructure and protect local businesses and industries in the short-run so they can establish themselves and build capacity (Juba, 29 October 2011).

South Sudan needs to explore post-war recovery and economic reconstruction and development experiences of other countries but should not allow others to dictate country's economic choices and policies. Furthermore, the government needs to be involved in development and diversification of the economy instead of leaving this to the markets.

A South Sudanese economist said that 'we need to look at what other countries have done in terms of economic development and pick their best practices but we cannot allow others to tell us what is best for us. We must be able to choose our economic system and policies.' He noted that apart from oil, agriculture should be the most important industry supported and developed by the government, adding that 'we should start producing our own food. This will minimise food insecurity and cut down our import bill.' He further pointed that,

> The state needs to intervene and support large scale agricultural projects in South Sudan. This would create jobs, ensure local food production and food security and could even earn us foreign currency. We cannot leave this to the markets to sort out. The dogma of leaving everything to the markets has failed everywhere and we should not even think about this (Juba, 29 October 2011).

5.2.7 Infrastructure reconstruction and development

Major urban centres in South Sudan have seen significant infrastructure reconstruction and development since the end of the war.

When it comes to infrastructure reconstruction and development, an official working for an international development agency argued that 'South Sudan has come far since 2005. The region has made considerable progress, partly because there has never been much development in the South in the past.' He added that in the first three years after the war, not much was done mainly due to the lack of capacity and funding, bad management and corruption, but things have improved since 2008 and the government was able to build roads and other basic infrastructure across the country (Juba, 16 November 2010). Another respondent said that the GOSS should be given credit for improvements:

> The GOSS needs to be given credit for the reconstruction work it has done since 2005. While a lot more was expected from them, we must remember that the GOSS has existed for only six years. This is one parliamentary term and there are many countries where governments do much less in one parliamentary term when compared to the work done by the GOSS (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011).

One respondent reminded that when the two-decades-long war ended in 2005, South Sudan was completely ravaged. 'In the capital, there were only a few working cars, a few kilometres of paved roads, no functioning hospitals or hotels. Today, the situation is completely different' and the city experienced great improvements (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Unlike the major urban centres, rural areas, which constitute the majority of the country, have seen little or no reconstruction and development of infrastructure since the end of the war.

According to a former GOSS official, Juba, the current capital of South Sudan, has seen 'an extraordinary change and rapid reconstruction and development of infrastructure. However, the situation is different outside the capital, where there was little or no development' (Juba, 16 November 2010). Sudan analyst working for an international think tank echoed the above views. He said that a large amount of funding from oil revenues was spent in the capital and a few other urban centres, with rural areas hardly seeing any improvements (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011).

5.2.8 Peace dividends

Since the end of the war, key peace dividends experienced by the majority of people in South

Sudan have been basic security and freedom of movement. At the same time, many people have not yet seen dividends such as livelihood improvements and basic services.

A conflict management lecturer at the University of Juba reminded that in a post-war environment such as South Sudan, the end of violent conflict is not enough for long-term stability. He added that people need to see peace dividends such as physical reconstruction and development, basic services and job opportunities (Juba, 19 November 2010). A researcher working on peace- and security-related issues in South Sudan said that extensive research conducted by her organisation suggests that the 'primary concern of many people today is not security but other basic needs such as clean water and food for survival' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

A number of respondents argued that many people in South Sudan have not seen tangible peace dividends since the end of the war (Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011; Juba, 13 October 2011). Key peace dividends since 2005 have been security and freedom of movement in most parts of South Sudan (Juba, 16 November 2010). While Juba and a few other places have also seen infrastructure reconstruction and development, most rural areas were sidelined. The majority of people in South Sudan are still waiting for basic services, such as water, health care and education (Juba, 16 November 2010; Juba, 29 October 2011). This lack of services and development is leading to movement of people to urban centres that have experienced improvements over the last few years. Large influx of people could soon overwhelm urban areas and their ability to deliver services (Juba, 29 October 2011).

The biggest peace dividend for many South Sudanese has been the employment in the government administration, public institutions, army and other security services.

One of the major peace dividends for a large number of people has been the employment in the government and army:

> Both the army and government in South Sudan are bloated, having far more people than it is needed and that is sustainable. This was a political decision made in 2005, aimed at providing positions to former combatants and potential spoilers in order to maintain stability. In many ways, these salaried positions have been the most tangible peace dividends since 2005. However, after the proclamation of independence, the GOSS will have to find a way to gradually cut down the number of soldiers in the army and officials in the civil service as the current situation is not sustainable

(Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011).

Centralisation of service delivery, development and employment opportunities only in the capital and few other urban centres at the expense of rural areas could lead to instability in the near future.

One respondent stressed that the lack of development and services outside urban areas is a recipe for disaster:

> Development that was initiated by the GOSS after the war was focused only on Juba and a few other urban centres. When you visit Juba, you can clearly see the benefits of peace. But if you go to rural areas, there are still no improvements and development. This will have to be corrected soon as we cannot afford to make the same mistake the governments in Khartoum had made since the 1956 independence, with power and development centralised around Khartoum, while the peripheries were marginalised. This led to rebellions and wars in the past and could easily happen in the future to us (Juba, 19 November 2010).

5.2.9 Lack of skills and capacity

Lack of capacity for governance and economic reconstruction and development are key challenges facing South Sudan.

Due to the decades of war, most South Sudanese never had a chance to receive education. After the war, the GOSS hardly had anyone working for the government who had previous civilian administrative experience. The government had to bring in South Sudanese who during the war lived and worked in other countries to help establish government institutions. While beneficial, this also created problems as there was a lot of tension between those who remained in Sudan during the war and those who left as refugees and are now coming back to get high-ranking positions (Juba, 16 November 2010). Another respondent echoed similar views, pointing out that one of the great difficulties that South Sudan has faced since 2005 was integration and accommodation of various groups – from former combatants, internally displaced, to refugees and people coming back from all over the world. 'All these people have expectations and are often competing for the same positions and jobs' (Juba, 15 November 2010).

Since the end of the war, South Sudan has faced a massive capacity shortage as the majority of positions in the government were not given to qualified individuals but those who had taken part in the liberation struggle or to the members of various rebel groups who needed to be accommodated.

Lack of capacity for governance and economic reconstruction and development are seen as some of the main challenges facing independent South Sudan. After the peace agreement was signed in 2005 and the South began forming its autonomous government, the majority of positions in government institutions were not given to people based on their qualifications and competence, as there were not many qualified people available, but based on their previous involvement in the liberation struggle. Furthermore, positions also had to be given to the members of various rebel groups who were seen as threats to stability and peace. All this meant that there was a 'massive capacity shortage' since the end of the war (Juba, 16 November 2010).

The lack of capacity is not only a problem for the government but exists in all other sectors and aspects of life. This is due to the decades of war, marginalisation, underdevelopment and lack of educational opportunities.

Problems with skills and capacity are not only present within the government structures but exist in all other sectors and aspects of life. As one respondent pointed out, 'currently, the majority of skilled and semi-skilled workers and traders come from neighbouring countries. With the arrival of South Sudanese refugees from Sudan and other countries, we may see a lot of competition over jobs and trade. The authorities will have to somehow manage this' (Juba, 18 November 2010).

Education and capacity building need to be main priorities of the GOSS and its partners. Without skills, capacity and educated workforce, the country will never develop and improve standards of living of the people.

A local NGO official said that the government and its international partners must prioritise education and capacity building in order to deal with skills and capacity shortages:

> Without a well-educated and trained population, there will be no labour force big enough to support the economy. If we do not educate our population, we will have to

depend on expatriates. This is very expensive and takes money out of the country (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Similarly, a county commissioner in one of South Sudan's states pointed out that,

> The big problem in South Sudan is the lack of education and skills among local people. Locals have a hard time finding employment even in areas where there is a lot of economic activity, such as oil rich states, because they do not have skills. We will have to improve our education system and provide training and education to the people so they can help in the future development of the country (Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

A high-ranking UN official said that in South Sudan, despite all the problems related to the lack of capacity and skills, there is willingness among the people and authorities to work hard and rebuild the country. He added that, unlike in other countries emerging from war, South Sudanese authorities seem to realise the shortcomings and are asking the international community for help and support (Juba, 23 November 2010).

5.2.10 International community's involvement

Since 2005, international community's diplomatic efforts and pressures ensured that the southern referendum on self-determination was held on time. In terms of other efforts, most of the work by international donors and organisations has focused primarily on provision of emergency assistance to vulnerable communities.

A respondent who works as a researcher in Juba said that since 2005, South Sudan has been a 'prime post-war recovery test case where international donors and organisations are applying their approaches, practices and strategies derived from previous experiences' (Juba, 13 October 2011). According to one respondent, 'the most positive impact made by the international community was of political nature – from influencing Khartoum regime to sign the peace agreement to pressuring it to allow the referendum to take place on time and to respect the results' (Juba, 29 October 2011). Another respondent added that international NGOs and aid agencies have been delivering emergency assistance to a significant percentage of the population since 2005 (Juba, 13 October 2011).

Apart from humanitarian and emergency assistance, the work of international donors and

organisations in South Sudan has been a disappointment. This was mainly due to the red tape, lack of medium-to-long-term strategy for reconstruction and development and lack of coordination among external actors.

As mentioned above, between 2005 and 2011, donors and international organisations have not had a long-term recovery and development strategy, focusing solely on emergency and short-term priorities (Juba, 19 November 2010; Nairobi [via Skype], 10 February 2011; Juba, 16 October 2011). The head of an international NGO working in the education sector in South Sudan said that, apart from the humanitarian and emergency assistance, the work of most external actors has been a disappointment:

> The work of international donors and organisations in South Sudan since 2005 has been a huge disappointment. They worked on improving coordination among themselves and their administrative procedures, spending little time on implementation of much needed programmes and projects (Juba, 22 November 2010).

The same respondent pointed out that the biggest failure was the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan:

> The fund was managed by the World Bank, which took first two years to set up its offices in Sudan. Due to the red tape and difficult procedures, most of the money given to the fund was not spent to this day. For example, between 2005 and 2008, the fund planned to spend US $98 million on education. By 2007, only $7 million was spent and a few more million was spent in 2008. Still, this was a minor amount when compared to the planned $98 million. Because of this, education and other basic services are still in ruins (Juba, 22 November 2010).

In many instances, international donors and organisations made promises to South Sudanese population but failed to deliver promised services. Further, despite the enormous needs, many international organisations have been engaged mainly in research, needs assessments and workshops and not delivery of needed services.

Some respondents said that one of the problems facing local communities and authorities were the promises by donors and international organisations that were not delivered. A county commissioner from one of South Sudan's states explained:

> One of the big problems I faced in my county were the visits by donors and international organisations who would conduct needs assessments, promise projects, services and funds and then nothing would ever be implemented. They would raise

hopes in the community and also make the local government look bad since we are the ones that the community comes to and asks where the promised services are. At the end of the day, we get blamed for someone else's false promises (Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

Another respondent echoed the above sentiments, saying that needs assessments and workshops have been the main activities of 'the internationals' and that these activities often lacked follow-up and delivery of needed services (Juba, 13 October 2011).

Despite the needs for infrastructure reconstruction and development, the international community has done little in terms of providing funding and assistance for physical reconstruction in post-war South Sudan.

One respondent argued that since 2005, the international community has done little in terms of physical reconstruction in South Sudan. 'This is especially evident when we consider their extensive work on rebuilding infrastructure in the Balkans after the war.' He added that while in the Balkans the international community funded rebuilding of infrastructure and even people's homes destroyed in the war, none of that happened in South Sudan (Juba, 22 November 2010).

All international donors and organisations working in South Sudan have their own interests and agendas. Often, their agendas and interests are contrary to the local needs and priorities.

A South Sudanese diplomat noted that all external actors and donors involved in South Sudan have their own economic, security, regional and geopolitical agendas and interests. For external actors, 'needs and interests of South Sudanese come only after their own interests and agendas' (Juba, 15 November 2010). Some international organisations, according to an official from the United Nations Development Programme, go even further, 'behaving like saviours and assuming they are on the continent to save poor Africans who do not know how to take care of themselves. In many ways, they behave just like many colonialists did during the colonial times.' He added that many international organisations are behaving like this in South Sudan (Juba, 23 November 2010). Another respondent said that 'it is unclear if most of international organisations are here to help South Sudanese or for their own benefit, advancement and expansion. I think it is the second' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

Since 2005, the majority of staff and officials working for international organisations in South Sudan have lacked basic knowledge about the country, its history, people, problems and needs. Furthermore, they arrived in the country from other post-war or in-conflict countries, often trying to replicate the work they had done elsewhere.

A UNDP official, himself a foreigner, argued that one of the main problems in South Sudan is the fact that the large majority of officials working for international organisations do not understand the basics about the region, its history, problems and needs (Juba, 23 November 2010). Another respondent highlighted the same problem, pointing out that many people working for the UN and other international organisations arrive in South Sudan without any knowledge about the country; their only qualification is that they previously worked in countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan. 'More often than not, they just try to replicate things that they have done in these other countries. Also, they keep comparing South Sudan with these places, often ignoring historical and cultural differences' (Juba, 15 November 2010). Another respondent added that it is absurd that 'the internationals' come from Afghanistan, Iraq and other places and try doing the same things in South Sudan that they have done elsewhere. 'Apart from all these places being fundamentally different, the problem is that whatever was done in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries has not produced positive results there' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

For most of the interim period, high-ranking international officials who made decisions about projects and programmes that were to be implemented in South Sudan were not based in the South but in other countries. They would visit the region from time to time and make their decisions based on these short trips.

The head of an international NGO said that during the interim period, most of donor-driven projects were managed by 'parachute visitors.' He explained that these are high-ranking international officials based in Khartoum, Nairobi or some other place who would visit Juba for a day or two, do a quick needs assessment, make decisions and then leave (Juba, 22 November 2010). A technical advisor to a GOSS ministry pointed out the same issue, arguing that this has been one of the key reasons for the lack of results:

> For many years, senior decision-makers working for donors and international organisations would catch a flight to Juba from Khartoum or some other place in the morning and leave in the afternoon. It is questionable how much they could see and

understand during their short stays once or twice a month. Yet, they were the ones who would make final decisions about projects and funding (Juba, 19 November 2010).

The majority of international staff remain in South Sudan for a year or less. This is not enough time to learn about the country, its problems and needs and also positively contribute to its post-war recovery.

In addition to the lack of presence of decision-makers and knowledge about South Sudan among external actors, a high-ranking UN official noted that frequent staff rotations within international organisations, and specifically within the UN and its agencies, are diminishing chances of success:

> The majority of UN personnel in South Sudan remain in the country for one year; only some higher ranking officials stay for two or three years. This creates a lot of problems when it comes to continuity of projects and programmes and prevents long-term involvement and development of extensive knowledge, experience and relationships with local actors (Juba, 23 November 2010).

Staff rotations and short-term presence are not exclusive to UN agencies but are happening in most international organisations working in South Sudan. One respondent said that out of tens of thousands of 'internationals,' there is a very small percentage of people who stay in South Sudan for more than a year and engage with local people and try to learn about the country. 'Most internationals are here because it is very good to have South Sudan experience on the CV for future international development careers' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

5.2.11 External capacity support

While numerous external capacity building efforts have been taking place in South Sudan since 2005, most of them were either short-term or conducted by inexperienced foreign advisors and officials.

External capacity building efforts in South Sudan have been taking place on two fronts. On one side, foreigners are working as advisors to local ministries and high-ranking officials. On the other side, numerous international organisations are organising short workshops and seminars about peace-building, conflict management, reconciliation, project planning and

implementation and many other topics. However the problem with workshops and seminars is that in most cases, they are short, once-off events without follow-up (Juba, 13 October 2011).

According to a former GOSS official, many times since 2005, young people in their twenties from Europe or United States, without any previous experience working for government institutions in their own countries, were appointed as advisors to various GOSS ministries as part of external capacity support programmes funded by the European Union and United States. 'Their lack of experience could be seen from the fact that some of them would go to their offices in the ministries in shorts and slippers' (Juba, 16 November 2010). The head of an international NGO added:

> In terms of the foreigners who come to work for international organisations in South Sudan, most of them are in their twenties, right from university and in need of 'field experience.' They do not know much, if anything about Sudan and Africa when they arrive. Most of them are here for a year, some maybe for two years. They are not interested in long-term prospects. They are hoping that their work in South Sudan would be a good addition to their CVs (Juba, 22 November 2010).

Another respondent said that in South Sudan,

> We can see the most blatant arrogance of the international community, where they think they can send people in their twenties to tell the government how to do things better… these are people who hardly have any experience apart from college education and perhaps some internships and entry-level jobs and do not know yet how to properly run their own lives (Juba, 13 October 2011).

South Sudan needs a long-term mentorship programme where experienced foreign advisors and administrators would work in pairs with local officials, offer advice and share experiences but leave decision-making to the locals.

A high-ranking UN official argued that instead of inexperienced foreign advisors and officials, 'South Sudan needs a mentorship programme where experienced administrators from Africa and around the world would work in pairs with local officials on all levels of government over a longer period of time. External administrators would not make decisions but only advise locals and share with them their experiences' (Juba, 23 November 2010).

Some organisations are already working on such mentorship programmes. An international

expert who works as a technical advisor to a GOSS ministry said that he spends every working day with the minister in the same office. This is not a short-term advisory post, but a long-term involvement lasting for a number of years. 'When a problem comes up, we discuss it and try to come up with solutions together. This is a hands-on capacity building work.' However, the same respondent pointed out that this is not how the majority of external actors approach capacity building:

> The problem is that the majority of foreign technical advisors, especially the ones coming to South Sudan through the UN, do not work like this. They are not spending any significant time with the people they are supposed to advise. Instead, they meet only by appointment once or twice a month or during workshops and seminars (Juba, 19 November 2010).

5.2.12 Dependency syndrome

South Sudan suffers from a dependency syndrome created over the decades of war. Extensive post-war emergency and humanitarian efforts by the international community, while necessary, are only prolonging this dependency on foreign aid and assistance.

One respondent said that a serious problem in South Sudan is the dependency syndrome created during the war. Today, people do not hold the government accountable for the lack of delivery of basic services because they have become used to being provided these services by international NGOs and aid agencies. She added that 'there is a need to urgently change this dynamic and thinking, where local communities and authorities expect that "the internationals" will continue to feed them. This thinking is dangerous as "the internationals" will not be here forever' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

Extensive involvement by external actors, while necessary, could easily prolong the aid dependency syndrome. A county commissioner in one of South Sudan's states said that,

> Even though we are very grateful for the help and support we are getting from the international community, especially relief support and health care, the problem is that this support is continuing to make our people dependent on outside aid and assistance. Decades of dependency on international organisations, NGOs and aid agencies have completely changed the mentality of the people in South Sudan. When they need something today, they do not think about their own initiatives or local authorities and agencies but go straight to international organisations and ask for help. This is a great challenge facing the government and local authorities, whose credibility is at stake

(Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

Local authorities and international donors and organisations need to work together on a strategy for changing the dependency on foreign assistance to that of self-reliance. This, however, may take time as many vulnerable communities still fully depend on international NGOs and aid agencies for survival and basic services.

A county commissioner argued that a lot will have to be done to change the dependency mentality in South Sudan:

> We will have to work with our people to change their mentality from expecting free services and food from international NGOs and aid agencies to having to work, be self-reliant and productive and provide for themselves and their families. This will be a long process and we will have to work together with the international community on this (Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

However, as one respondent noted, the fact is that without external actors supporting local communities, many would struggle to survive. She emphasised that 'there are many rural communities where, if international NGOs and agencies do not deliver basic services, no one would. People would literally be left alone to suffer' (Juba, 13 October 2011).

5.2.13 Lack of communication and consultation between external and local actors

Many international donors and organisations working in South Sudan design and implement projects and programmes with little or no communication and consultation with local authorities and organisations. This often leads to projects that are not necessary or appropriate for local conditions.

One of the challenges facing local authorities is the lack of communication and consultation between external actors and local authorities, organisations and people:

> Many international organisations operating in South Sudan are designing and implementing projects with little or no consultation with local authorities and organisations. They often overlap each other's work or implement projects that are not needed or necessary. This will have to change as we need to know what all these organisations are doing in our communities. Instead of everyone working on their own projects and programmes, we all need to work towards goals that are defined by South Sudanese and not foreigners (Port Elizabeth, 22 June 2011).

A UNDP official argued that external actors need to communicate and consult more with local actors. 'We need to communicate more with South Sudanese as they are the recipients of our help and assistance and they know more about their country, problems and needs than any international expert.' He went on to explain what happens when external actors do not consult and communicate with local people:

> A very interesting analogy that links well to everything external actors are trying to do in South Sudan and other war-torn countries is construction of donor-funded buildings in rural areas. Instead of building mud huts that have been in use in the region for decades, Western donors insist on building Western-style buildings with bricks or concrete and metal roof. While mud huts are appropriate for South Sudanese environmental conditions and do not get very hot, Western-style buildings are simply unusable if one does not have air-conditioning, which people in rural areas do not have. Instead of insisting of building Western-style buildings, we should maybe try helping locals improve their mud huts. This analogy could be applied to other things external actors are trying to do here (Juba, 23 November 2010).

5.2.14 Local ownership

South Sudanese are proud people, toughened during decades of war and suffering. They often reject ready-made 'solutions' imposed or recommended by foreigners without prior consultation.

A number of respondents pointed out that, despite the overwhelming presence of international donors and organisations in South Sudan, local authorities and citizens have not given up on having a significant say in post-war recovery and state-building processes. A former GOSS official said that the military mentality and people toughened during the war are key reasons why Southern Sudanese authorities do not see Westerners as the 'knowing all' people and why they often refuse to implement what outsiders tell them to do (Juba, 16 November 2010). A South Sudanese diplomat noted that 'culturally, South Sudanese are proud and tough people. They rarely accept ready-made solutions recommended by foreigners. This often frustrates foreign experts and donors who are used to imposing solutions in Africa' (Juba, 15 November 2010). Similar opinion was given by a German technical advisor working for a GOSS ministry:

> Today, South Sudanese do not suffer from the old colonial trauma. Unlike many other African peoples, South Sudanese do not respect the 'white man' just because he is

white and Westerner. Perhaps because of this, many local politicians do not allow foreigners to impose decisions and solutions on them (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Many projects and programmes designed by international donors and organisations were not implemented by local authorities because locals were not part of the design and development process.

Over the years, many projects and programmes planned by international donors and organisations were not implemented because South Sudanese authorities do not accept impositions by foreigners. Often, visions and ideas of 'the internationals' were not the same as those of the local authorities but South Sudanese went along and accepted the funding as they needed donor support. However, the problem was the implementation, where local authorities would not even try to implement what was agreed previously as they were not involved in the design of the projects (Juba, 13 October 2011). To prevent these problems from occurring again, a UNDP official said that 'we need to support local structures instead of imposing our own [Western] structures and ideas or doing things on our own while sidelining locals.' He added that, while some international actors are trying to support local structures, 'many are still imposing their ideas or doing things on their own without consulting locals' (Juba, 23 November 2010).

While South Sudan needs extensive support and assistance from the international community, external actors need to ensure genuine local ownership so that South Sudanese authorities, organisations and citizens are part of the design, development and implementation of all projects and programmes.

An official working for an international development agency said that South Sudan needs a lot of support from the international community, but this 'always needs to be support and not imposition of foreign ways and ideas. South Sudanese have to drive state-building, peace-building and development' (Juba, 16 November 2010). Similarly, a high-ranking UN official stated that locals, whether in South Sudan or any other post-war country, 'must be decision-makers. Outsiders should only be there as supporters, coaches, mentors and advisors' (Juba, 23 November 2010).

One respondent added that the only way South Sudan can become a stable country is 'if local

people and elites take control of their own destiny. If we allow foreigners to set priorities and impose solutions they think are needed, we will never be truly independent, stable or prosperous' (Juba, 16 November 2010). Another respondent reiterated the above sentiments:

> We have a chance to build a country after so many decades of suffering and war. We need to build a country that will accommodate our needs and expectations. To achieve this, state-building, nation-building and development processes and programmes must be designed and implemented by South Sudanese, not outsiders who lack knowledge of our history, problems, challenges and needs (Juba, 15 November 2010).

5.2.15 Challenges facing South Sudan

Stability and peace in South Sudan will depend on the government's ability to provide basic services to the population.

A South Sudanese diplomat said that, despite significant reconstruction, peace-building and state-building work and improvements since 2005, 'we still have a very long way to go to create a stable state' (Juba, 15 November 2010). A UNDP official pointed that his experience in rural areas has taught him that in many areas 'people do not appear to have any links to the government, whether it is central, state or local government' nor do they receive any services from the authorities (Juba, 23 November 2010).

The majority of people in South Sudan live in rural areas and face difficult challenges. Key needs in rural areas are access to water and grazing lands for cattle keepers, lack of which are causing conflict and violence among different communities (Juba, 23 November 2010; Juba, 16 October 2011). A local NGO official said that the expectations of people after the referendum and independence will be great and the 'government will have to deliver on the promises in order to prevent anger and possibly large-scale violence and rebellion' (Juba, 19 November 2010). For South Sudanese to 'achieve lasting peace, people need development. People still do not have roads, hospitals, schools, job opportunities and basic services' (Juba, 19 November 2010). Delivery of basic services was highlighted by another respondent as key for peace and stability:

> Between 2005 and 2011, the GOSS used its difficult relationship with the Khartoum regime to justify the lack of service delivery in South Sudan. People were patient, willing to sacrifice for the sake of referendum. This will not work after the referendum as the South will be independent and Khartoum will be out of the picture.

People will not be patient for too long. They expect roads, schools, hospitals and other services and the government will have to deliver if it wants stability (Juba, 15 November 2010).

A high-ranking UN official argued that South Sudan has a great potential to become a stable and prosperous country. 'This will largely depend on the local political elites. It is of utmost importance to continue to build infrastructure and capacity, improve education and fight corruption' (Juba, 23 November 2010). Another respondent said that nation-building and institutions that are working to improve people's livelihoods will be more important in the short-term than infrastructure development:

> Some Western commentators argue that the South cannot become a functioning country because it lacks physical infrastructure. However, we must remember that to have a functioning state, there is a need for national unity, sense of belonging and institutions which are doing their best to improve the lives of citizens and develop the country and economy. There is more to a country than skyscrapers, glass buildings and highways (Juba, 19 November 2010).

Being a diverse country, South Sudan needs to embrace all its communities and peoples. The authorities need to deliver services and share resources equitably among regions and communities, without favouritism based on ethnicity, tribe, membership in a political party or geography.

Two respondents said that it is of outmost importance that resources are shared equitably among regions and communities in South Sudan, without favouritism based on ethnicity, tribe, membership in a political party or geography (Juba, 19 November 2010; Juba, 16 October 2011). Another respondent argued that decentralisation of governance and balanced development throughout South Sudan will be the key for stability:

> A big problem so far has been the fact that a large part of the money that came to South Sudan remained in the capital, Juba. If this continues, it could create problems in the future as people from other parts of the country could rise up against this centralisation. It is important to remember that centralisation of power and resources in Khartoum was one of the main causes of North-South wars (Juba, 16 November 2010).

One respondent reminded that in the 1990s, 'South Sudanese fought each other bitterly. The situation is relatively calm today but there are no guarantees that in the future, for example when Southerners hold next elections, old divisions will not come to the surface and around

the same old fault lines.' Still, he hopes that the younger generations, which he sees as much more 'nationalistic' and willing to work on a united South Sudan than the older generations, will be able to prevent this and create a stable and strong nation (Juba, 16 November 2010). However, South Sudanese are still far from overcoming tribalism in politics. 'This is one of the great challenges in the South and will have to be managed carefully if there is to be peace and stability in the long-run' (Juba, 22 November 2010).

South Sudan will need to go through a social transformation in order to catch up with the region and world after decades of war, suffering, marginalisation and isolation.

A local respondent said that South Sudanese will have to go through a significant social transformation to catch up with the region and rest of the world. He pointed that 'many people who remained in the South during the decades of war have lost touch with the modern world and will have to catch up quickly' (Juba, 19 November 2010). Another respondent argued that South Sudanese need to transform their thinking and behaviour and not take up guns every time they have a grievance such as lack of basic services or losing elections. He hoped that in the future, people will follow legal procedures and use peaceful means to protest instead of rebellion and violence (Juba, 29 October 2011).

In post-war South Sudan, everything is a priority. One of the main challenges facing authorities is to decide what to focus on first.

One respondent noted that education is one of the most important priorities that needs urgent attention as this is the key for the future of South Sudan. However, he added that there are also other pressing priorities such as clean water, food, health care and security that need urgent attention too and that all this has to be somehow balanced (Juba, 29 October 2011). One of the biggest challenges is deciding what comes first – security, basic services, jobs or infrastructure. 'Everything is important and necessary but not everything can be delivered at once so the government has to decide what key priorities are and deliver' (Juba, 13 October 2011). Talking about the government priorities in the independent South Sudan, a local diplomat said that in the medium-term, the top priority will be security, nation-building and maintenance of unity in the country. 'Only after this is completed, the focus will shift to basic services and economic development' (Juba, 15 November 2010).

Section Three – PWRD in Somaliland

5.3.1 Formation of independent Somaliland

Somaliland's leaders and elites proclaimed independence under the pressure from the population which wanted to re-establish Somaliland as an independent country and distance themselves from the war and chaos in Somalia.

The formation of Somaliland as an independent state was 'people's reaction after the war… they wanted to re-establish themselves as Somaliland within the 1960 borders, have an identity as a state and be able to manage their own affairs' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Because of the long war, suffering and destruction, people in Somaliland were 'sick of war and fighting. In some way, that explains why many of them were so eager to put pressure on their leaders to resolve their differences' and establish an independent country (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011). Another respondent added:

> Many people and political elites from Somaliland lived in Mogadishu before and during the early 1990s, experiencing fighting, violence and suffering. When they came back to Somaliland, they wanted peace, order and stability. They did not want to go the same route as the rest of Somalia. This was one of the main reasons our people choose separation, negotiations and peace (Juba, 22 November 2010).

5.3.2 Peace, stability and reconciliation

The negotiation process that led to peace, reconciliation and stability in Somaliland was locally designed, driven, owned and funded, using traditional methods and approaches to mediation, peace-making and conflict management.

A researcher and political analyst from Somaliland said that the long process of reconciliation and peace-building was locally funded and driven, following traditional Somali and Islamic norms. He further said that,

> We were lucky to have locally organised, funded and implemented peace and reconciliation processes as we could use our own initiatives, ideas and agendas and not have to follow instructions given to us by foreigners, as it happened in the rest of Somalia and many other places that experienced war (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Another respondent explained how negotiations led to stabilisation and peace in the early 1990s:

> Conferences that brought peace and stability in the 1990s were a traditional Somali way of mediation, conflict management, peace-making and reconciliation. This was a long process where clan elders and representatives would meet and discuss issues, go back and consult their clans before coming back and meeting again with other clans. Some conferences took months, without pressure to come up with quick solutions (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

The lack of foreign interference was lauded as key for today's stability by the head of a local NGO:

> Somaliland was lucky that the outsiders did not attempt to influence political and other post-war developments. This is especially evident when we look at Somalia, where many of the troubles are influenced by outside forces such as Ethiopians, Kenyans, Americans and others (Hargeisa, 12 November 2011).

According to an international Somaliland expert, over the last two decades, through extensive negotiations and numerous compromises, local people and elites were able to build 'fragile stability.' He added that while the situation is far from perfect, 'there is a significant cohesiveness of the society, with strong moral foundations that keep things together' (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011). The process that led to this was not easy, as one respondent pointed out:

> After years of fighting between various groups and clans, reconciliation had to take place in order to set the foundation for peace and stability. Through peace and reconciliation meetings and conferences, all clans came together, agreed to stop fighting and decided to build an independent state of Somaliland. This, however, was not an easy process. It took many years to resolve differences and conflicts (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Somaliland's influential traditional leaders played a key role in post-war stabilisation, peace-building and reconciliation efforts.

According to one respondent, 'the key for Somaliland's stability and peace were the work of traditional elders and religious leaders (Guurti) in the 1990s. They were able to use their influence to restore peace and encourage disarmament and reconciliation.' He added that this was not a new role that traditional leaders played but that they have done this throughout the history (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). What helped Somaliland during the transitional period

was the fact that the elders remained respected despite the war. This was not the case in the rest of Somalia, where young militia fighters have been in charge and where elders have had little or no say (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). In Somaliland, the traditional leaders were so influential in the 1990s that they were able to convince many militias to stop fighting and disarm (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). The Guurti became institutionalised after their work in the 1990s, influenced by clan and sub-clan politics, as clan leaders wanted traditional representatives to have a say in country's governance (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011).

Somaliland's business community played an important role in supporting and funding locally driven peace-building and reconciliation efforts as it was in its interest to have a stable and peaceful country in order to do business.

One respondent highlighted the role of the local business community in the peace-building process. He explained that in the early 1990s, the local business community realised that it was in its interest to support peace-building and reconciliation processes as businesses needed stability, security and peace in order to operate. Without their financial help, many conferences that brought peace and stability would probably not take place (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

A major factor that led to post-war stabilisation, power-sharing and ultimately creation of a democratic system was the handover of power from the Somali National Movement (SNM) to traditional leaders soon after the war ended.

An important factor that led to peace and stability was the handover of power from the Somali National Movement[83] to traditional leaders. As respondents pointed out, the SNM leadership was not interested in power after defeating the Mogadishu regime in the early 1990s, but only liberation of the country and people. That is why they did not remain in power for long after the war but transferred power to traditional elders in 1993 (Pretoria, 3 June 2010; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). This was 'a key moment for peace-building and state-building, leading to clan-based power-sharing and ultimately creation of a democratic system' (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

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[83] The Somali National Movement was the leading Somaliland liberation movement that fought against the Mogadishu regime in the 1980s.

A strong sense of collective responsibility, rooted in tradition and local customs, has significantly influenced post-war stability, security and peace-building in Somaliland.

One respondent said that when it comes to post-war stability, the Somaliland society 'may be unique in terms of the sense of collective responsibility rooted in tradition that still exists today.' Most individuals would not commit a crime because they are afraid to 'give a bad name to their clan.' He further pointed out that,

> You can go anywhere in Hargeisa and see people exchanging money on streets and pavements. They have stacks of money but do not need guards or security. There are many poor and hungry people around but no one is trying to steal the money. People know that not only their own pride and reputation are at stake, but that of their clan (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

5.3.3 Peace-building and reconciliation without justice

The people of Somaliland were able to move on, build peace and reconcile among each other without holding anyone responsible for the past crimes. Transitional justice mechanisms were either seen as impractical due to the fighting in Somalia or potentially counter-productive internally during the process of building peace and stability.

Reconciliation and peace-building in Somaliland have taken place in the absence of justice. 'Terrible crimes were committed against the people of Somaliland by the Mogadishu regime and even in fighting between various clans in Somaliland, but we never got justice or held anyone responsible.' Reasons for the lack of transitional justice mechanisms were the focus on building internal peace and stability in Somaliland and instability in Somalia. For many people, the defeat of the Siad Barre's regime, split from Somalia and internal reconciliation and stability in Somaliland have been enough reasons to move on even without transitional justice (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

5.3.4 Peace at all costs

The people of Somaliland are willing to struggle in their daily lives and ignore serious difficulties in order to protect peace and stability in the country.

One respondent noted that the people of Somaliland are very proud of their peace and

stability. He noted that 'there is a huge commitment to peace, almost at all costs' (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011). 'Even though many people are struggling and living in poverty, they are still patient and do not want to protest because they are afraid that their protests could cause conflict and instability' (Hargeisa, 12 November 2011).

One respondent pointed out that sometimes, people ignore important challenges and problems for the sake of peace and stability. She said that this may not be the best way to address the problems but most people are willing to do this to preserve the peace. 'Peace in Somaliland is like a gigantic bubble that covers the territory of the country. This bubble could easily burst so everyone is being very careful not to burst the bubble and undermine the peace' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

5.3.5 Focus on security

Due to the geographic location in a very unstable part of Africa and a number of unresolved regional and domestic issues, the government of Somaliland prioritises security over delivery of basic services and development.

A number of respondents pointed out the government's overwhelming focus on security. They highlighted the 'difficult neighbourhood' and outstanding issues with bordering Puntland and some regions within Somaliland that reject independence as main reasons for this. The respondents said that over the last decade, government's main focus was on security while very little attention was paid to development and service delivery (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011; Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012). A minister in the government of Somaliland said that in 2010, half of the annual government budget was spent on security while only 12% was spent on basic services (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011). As noted by a local researcher, apart from the provision of security, most people do not benefit from the government in any other way (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

According to an international analyst who worked in Somaliland for many years, while the focus on security may be justified given the difficult regional situation and fighting in neighbouring Somalia, the government of Somaliland needs to move beyond focusing only on security and work on improving livelihoods and economic development. 'This is important because it is going to be very hard to maintain security and peace without

development, employment and basic services' (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011).

5.3.6 Governance, democratisation and politics

Democracy was not introduced in Somaliland immediately after the war. Instead, clans shared power for a number of years until the country was ready to introduce a democratic system and multi-party politics.

The democratisation process in Somaliland did not begin immediately after the war as the country was not ready for it. Instead, in 1994, the leadership decided to balance power among the clans, giving each clan proportional representation in the government. During this time, there were no elections, but the clans nominated and selected their representatives. This changed in 2000, when multi-party elections and a democratic system of governance were introduced, replacing clan-based power-sharing (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). A respondent said that one of the main reasons for the shift from clan-based power-sharing to a multi-party democracy was to try and convince the international community to recognise Somaliland as an independent country. He added that many people also genuinely wanted to introduce a democratic system, noting that this is obvious from the fact that even though there is no recognition, people are very proud and protective of their democracy (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

Instead of replicating the Western model of governance, Somaliland mixed the Western governance model with traditional structures of oversight and conflict management, creating its own hybrid system of governance.

As one respondent explained, in Somaliland, 'we decided to mix the modern system of governance with our traditional system of oversight and conflict management' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). A Somaliland expert based in London called the Somaliland governance model a 'hybrid political and governance system' that uses elements of the 'modern' [Western] system of governance and local traditional structures (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011). Another Somaliland expert noted that in traditional societies such as Somaliland, 'there has to be a balance between traditional and modern systems. People should not give up on their heritage, history and tradition' (Pretoria, 2 June 2010).

While locally driven, state-building and democratisation in Somaliland have not taken place in isolation:

> We looked at other countries and their experiences and tried to learn from them. We sent people to South Africa, Rwanda and other countries to consult with their policy-makers and see if there is anything that worked there in terms of governance, elections and development that could be applied to Somaliland's context (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

An important factor that contributed to stability of Somaliland's democratic system was the fact that local media is more open and enjoys more freedom than media in most African and Middle Eastern countries. 'People in Somaliland do not like to keep quiet when it comes to the problems and issues that they face, but like to discuss and debate them in public, either in meetings or through the media' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Since introducing the multi-party democratic system in 2000, Somaliland has seen orderly and peaceful transfers of power from ruling elites to the opposition, a rare sight on the African continent. Most importantly, all this happened with little or no assistance from the international community.

The head of an international NGO highlighted the success related to state-building and democratisation:

> What Somaliland has achieved politically on its own is impressive. Take, for example, the 2010 presidential election. When the president was defeated at the polls, Somaliland did not experience any instability. He simply moved out of the government offices and the opposition took power. There were no demonstrations and the army or police did not have to be called in to intervene. The entire post-election process was peaceful and orderly. Many African countries which achieved independence in the 1960s have never experienced such orderly change of government (Juba, 22 November 2010).

Similar sentiments were echoed by a Somaliland expert from South Africa, who noted that 'peaceful transfers of political power from ruling parties to the opposition have been rare in Africa. Somaliland, however, has done that on its own, with little assistance from the outside world' (Pretoria, 2 June 2010).

Just like politics in other countries, politics in Somaliland 'is often messy due to competing interests and rivalries' but what is important is that there is no violence (Pretoria, 3 June

2010). There exists an unwritten rule and understanding among the political elites and traditional leaders in Somaliland – 'we can disagree and verbally fight over power but no one should ever seek foreign support or invite foreign forces or actors to intervene in our affairs and problems' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

The lack of foreign interference in design and development of governance and political systems in Somaliland ensured that local actors and people owned the entire process and built systems and structures that work for the country and its people. However, to sustain peace and stability, Somaliland urgently needs support from the African continent and rest of the world.

A Somaliland analyst said that the lack of foreign interference was a blessing, but a harsh one:

> In many ways, the lack of foreign assistance and involvement were a blessing, allowing local actors to negotiate peace and build political and governance systems on their own and not follow foreign agendas. Still, this was a harsh blessing as the country has not had enough funds to improve infrastructure and livelihoods (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011).

Similarly, an international aid worker said that Somaliland has benefited from being left alone during the last two decades but that it may not be able to sustain its stability on its own in the future:

> Somaliland was lucky to be left alone to work on peace-building, reconciliation and state-building. This ensured full local ownership during the process of setting up structures and institutions. At this point, however, when locally built structures are in place, the country needs outside assistance to sustain its progress (Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

Somaliland still has a long way to go in terms of governance, particularly on the local level. Under the Constitution, local government should be the most important part of the government, working directly with communities and providing basic services. However, due to the lack of capacity and funds, this arm of the government is failing the citizens.

One respondent reminded that there are a number of challenges and shortcomings when it comes to governance in Somaliland. Under the Constitution, the country is to be governed

through a decentralised system of governance, with local councils responsible for service delivery. He noted that local government should be the most important part of the government as it works directly with communities and should be providing basic services. However, local councils are not doing their job well and delivering services. This is mainly due to the lack of funds and capacity. Additional problem is that in the Somali language, the term used for local government literary means 'lower government.' This has bad connotations as many people 'think that local government is less important than other branches of government.' Often, people with skills do not want to work for local government because of these negative connotations (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

5.3.7 Clan-based politics

Clan-based politics still play a major role in Somaliland and are frequently far more influential than the official state, regional, local and party politics. This, in turn, often leads to clan-based divisions, corruption and nepotism.

Even though the democratisation process in Somaliland is seen by most respondents as a success story, some have pointed out that clan-based politics still play a major role in the country. Informal politics – on the clan, sub-clan and family level – are often far more influential than the official state, regional, local and party politics. In many ways, this is influenced by the fact that many people do not see the state as a provider of basic services, which they receive from clan-based institutions and bodies (Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

Another respondent said that in terms of political control and economic development, whichever political party is in power, clan and sub-clan politics play an important role. The thinking 'how will my clan and sub-clan benefit' from certain decisions or projects is very prevalent (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011). A local researcher pointed out that clan-based politics are 'leading to corruption and nepotism. Those in power tend to employ people mainly from their clans and sub-clans even if they lack experience and qualifications. This is seriously undermining governance and service delivery' (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

5.3.8 The current role of the Guurti

While the Guurti's primary role was to help the transition from war and instability to peace, many in Somaliland still see them as important mediators and overseers of government's work. Others, on the other hand, fear that the Guurti today are being politicised and manipulated by political elites.

As mentioned above, Somaliland's traditional leaders (Guurti) have played a key role during the transition from war to stability and peace. One respondent said that peace-building, state-building and democratisation 'would never have worked if the traditional leaders were not consulted and willing to support them. Our society would not be as stable and peaceful today if the traditional leaders did not play their constructive role' (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

However, some respondents questioned the role of the Guurti today. While their role is to be a body that oversees the work of the elected government and mediate disputes and conflicts in the society, over the years various presidents were able to get the Guurti on their side to support whatever decisions they were putting forward, even when the decisions were not based on the rules, regulations and law (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011). Another respondent echoed these views, noting that over the last few years, the Guurti have become overly politicised, aligning themselves with certain political parties or leaders and pushing for various political agendas (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

On the other hand, one respondent said that the 'role of the traditional leaders is still very important in a democratic Somaliland. If there is a political or any other dispute, they are expected to mediate it and use their influence to prevent it from spreading' (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). According to the head of a local NGO, Somaliland's traditional structures should be there as they 'are very good at making peace. If disputes or conflicts break out, elders always get involved and mediate' (Hargeisa, 12 November 2011). The Guurti have played a critical role in some of the most important moments in post-war Somaliland, such as transfers of power to the opposition after elections, ensuring that the process was peaceful and orderly (Pretoria, 2 June 2010). Another respondent said that while the Guurti system has a lot of shortcomings, it is still important for country's stability, security and peace. Respect for traditional leaders is still very strong and they are able to influence the majority of the population (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). The key constitutional challenge currently is how to select members of the Guurti in the future as well as the length of their mandates

(Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

5.3.9 Lack of funding for governance and service delivery

Despite minimal funding available, the government of Somaliland has been able to achieve relative success in maintaining security, stability and basic administration.

Over the last two decades, the government of Somaliland has had limited funding. One respondent noted that over the last few years, the annual budget of the government has increased from 20 million to about 40 million US dollars. While this is a significant increase, it is still minimal, with half of it spent on security (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011). Nonetheless, even with little funds available, the authorities are still able to maintain security and basic administration (Pretoria, 3 June 2010; Hargeisa, 12 November 2012).

Due to the lack of funding, Somaliland's government is unable to deliver basic services, develop the economy and improve livelihoods of the population.

One respondent explained that what Somaliland has achieved so far is only a 'night-watchman, security conscious state,' unable to contribute to service delivery, people's welfare and economic development (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011). Similarly, a Somaliland expert said that what the country has built is a 'minimalist' state. He argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing as many people do not want the state to be powerful and involved in all aspects of life. He added that the 'Somali people have had bad experiences with strong, centralised and often violent state structures. That is why today people in Somaliland do not want a strong, centralised state but small, accountable state that provides security and mere basics' (Pretoria, 2 June 2010).

Since the government does not have the funds to provide basic services such as health care and education, most of these services have been privatised. Today, Somaliland has a number of good private health care and education facilities funded by the Diaspora. The problem, however, is that the majority of the population lives in poverty and cannot afford access to these facilities. Another issue is that many of these private services are run by clan-based institutions and bodies, which can be exclusionary (Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

Lack of funds and foreign assistance has forced the government to rely on its population, taxation and local businesses for revenues and funds. This, in turn, has ensured government's greater degree of accountability towards the citizens.

The lack of funds and foreign assistance has forced the authorities to rely on its people, taxation and local businesses for government revenues and funding. In return, the government has had to show a great degree of accountability and that it is working in the best interest of the population (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011; Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

5.3.10 Remittances

Remittances from the Diaspora have been the lifeline for Somaliland and its people, contributing significantly to post-war recovery and livelihood improvements.

All respondents interviewed about Somaliland noted the importance of remittances for country's post-war recovery. The funds from the Diaspora bring in more money into the country annually than all economic activities and trade combined (Pretoria, 2 June 2010; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Remittances have been and still are the lifeline for Somaliland and many of its people. Many families fully depend on the monthly remittances sent to them by their relatives who live and work abroad (Pretoria, 3 June 2010; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

While important, remittances also have negative side-effects such as creation of a dependency syndrome. Furthermore, in the near future, it is expected that remittances will decrease as younger generations growing up abroad do not have the same strong links to their families in Somaliland as their parents do.

While important, remittances also make people dependent on outside financial assistance. Many people do not even try to work or create opportunities because they know their relatives will send them money every month. Apart from creating dependency, the problem with remittances is that any financial troubles abroad, such as the current global economic crisis, negatively affect Somaliland as well (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

The reliance on remittances is an important issue as it is expected that remittances will

significantly decrease in the future. One respondent said that the 'current generation that is sending remittances has strong links to Somaliland and their families there. This, however, may not be the case with their children, most of whom were born abroad and do not have the same links to Somaliland and their relatives who live there' (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

5.3.11 Post-war reconstruction and development

Somaliland's authorities and citizens were able to reconstruct and develop basic infrastructure destroyed during the war without the help of the international community. However, due to the shortage of funds, reconstruction and development of major infrastructure such as roads and industries is lacking.

After a decade of fighting between the Somaliland liberation groups and Mogadishu forces, the region was completely destroyed by the time the war ended in 1991 (Pretoria, 3 June 2010; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Infrastructure was in ruins and there was no running water, electricity or any other services. The majority of the population was displaced and those who remained in Somaliland had their property destroyed (Pretoria, 2 June 2010; Hargeisa, 12 November 2011). One respondent said that rebuilding and recovery 'had to start from scratch,' after decades of dictatorship, destruction, neglect and war (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Another respondent pointed that in terms of physical reconstruction, people of Somaliland 'have done a tremendous job on their own,' adding that after two decades of reconstruction and development, the capital Hargeisa has grown into a booming city of over one million people (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). The people of Somaliland were able to rebuild their country with their own funds and with the help of country's Diaspora, without any significant support from international donors and organisations. However, while the citizens were able to rebuild homes and build new homes and businesses with the funding from the Diaspora, infrastructure such as good roads and medium-to-large-scale industries are lacking (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

A Somaliland expert highlighted that the government does not have funds to develop capital infrastructure and economy and improve living conditions of citizens. This may undermine the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the citizens and country's stability in the

future (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011). Another respondent added that for infrastructure and economic development, the government cannot only depend on the Diaspora, but needs to be able to work with other countries and international institutions and have access to funding like other countries do (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

5.3.12 The need for economic diversification, development and employment

Primary sources of income in Somaliland are remittances, livestock exports and small trade. The country urgently needs to diversify and develop its economy as this is insufficient for long-term stability, development and prosperity.

According to some respondents, Somaliland urgently needs to diversify its economy and sources of income and not rely only on remittances, livestock exports and small trade (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). One respondent emphasised the need for better infrastructure in order to support economic development and growth. For example, if roads and the Berbera port are improved, Somaliland could become the main transit hub for landlocked Ethiopia and its exports and imports, earning funds for the government from taxes and other fees (Pretoria, 2 June 2010). Another respondent added that the country has significant oil and mining potential, noting that some international companies have already began exploration in both of these sectors (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Stability, security and peace in Somaliland cannot be sustained without equitable economic development, employment opportunities, basic services and livelihood improvements.

One respondent said that the people and leaders of Somaliland cannot expect peace, stability and democracy to last if there is no economic development and employment opportunities:

> Democracy cannot be sustained if there is no economic development. It cannot function if people are dying of hunger or live in absolute poverty. We must promote economic development in order to safeguard and sustain our democracy and the achievements that we have made so far (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Another respondent echoed these views, adding that 'we have built stability and peace but this has to be sustained… Peace and stability are linked to economic development. If there is no development, it will be hard to sustain peace' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Yet another

respondent said that 'for peace and stability to last, we have to improve governance, deliver basic services and provide employment opportunities' to the population (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Many in Somaliland fear that if young people do not get employment opportunities, their frustration could lead them to join radical groups such as those that operate in Somalia (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). As one respondent pointed out, 'many educated young people who do not have employment opportunities in the country are trying to get abroad illegally. They go through Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Egypt, hoping to reach Europe via the sea. A lot of them have died this way, either in the deserts or at the sea.' This is especially the case with young people from families who do not have relatives abroad. They want to get to Europe, get a job and support their family members back in Somaliland (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

One respondent highlighted uneven development and disparities between urban and rural areas in Somaliland. He said that there is a great disparity between the capital city and a few other urban centres and rural areas. Urban areas have experienced significant infrastructure development and many people there have opportunities and access to basic services. This, however, is not the case in rural areas where development and services are almost non-existent (Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

5.3.13 Involvement of the international community

Involvement of the international community in Somaliland has been limited. International donors and organisations have made minimal contributions towards country's post-war reconstruction and development.

When the war ended in the early 1990s, people in Somaliland hoped and expected that international assistance would arrive to help them rebuild their country. However, throughout the 1990s, this did not happen, apart from the arrival of a few international NGOs and agencies with small budgets and staff. As one respondent pointed out, 'in many ways, it was good for us that the international community did not pay attention to what was going on in Somaliland. If they did, they would probably mess things up' (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

Another respondent explained that a number of international organisations and UN agencies

have been present in Somaliland over the last two decades but 'their contribution towards building a better society has been limited.' Projects that they initiated were in most cases donor-driven and often 'did not reflect the needs of local communities.' He further added that the 'majority of funding from donors goes to admin and management expenses. Very little is spent on actual improvements in local communities. This way, they cannot change the society and fix problems on the ground… the impact of their projects is very low' (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

As Somaliland is not a recognised country, it cannot receive any official multilateral or bilateral aid and assistance. Because of this, international funding comes into the country only through NGOs and aid agencies. A large part of international funding remains with international organisations while a small amount is given to local organisations to implement their projects (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Key decisions about donor projects and programmes that are implemented in Somaliland are often made by high-ranking officials who are not based in Somaliland and who lack knowledge about the country, people and needs.

A number of respondents argued that the reason behind limited impact of projects and programmes implemented by external actors is the fact that major decisions by donors and international organisations are made by officials who do not reside in Somaliland and who lack knowledge about the country, people and needs (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). As an international Somaliland expert explained,

> Most of donor officials who are making key decisions in terms of what to do in Somaliland are not based in the country but in Nairobi. They visit Hargeisa from time to time and make their decisions based on these short visits and a few interviews and conversations with locals (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

Other issue raised by the same respondent is that donor officials hardly ever visit any other places apart from the capital, Hargeisa. All these factors lead to external decision-makers being 'completely disconnected from the local people' who are supposed to benefit from their projects and assistance (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011). Similarly, another Somaliland expert pointed out that,

> A number of international NGOs and agencies have been present in Somaliland for

years but they were mainly involved in small-scale projects and programmes. While beneficial, their activities have not fundamentally influenced the developments in Somaliland. Instead, it was the local people and the Diaspora who have made the difference (Pretoria, 2 June 2010).

International organisations operating in Somaliland do not coordinate with each other. This often leads to unnecessary duplication of efforts and waste of time and funds.

Another complaint raised by respondents was that international organisations operating in Somaliland hardly ever coordinate with each other, often replicating each other's work (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). One respondent explained:

> I was in a meeting with international donors and organisations where we discussed informal education in Somaliland. I learned at this meeting that forty-two international organisations worked on informal education in a particular region. They all offered similar projects and competed over participants. Each organisation had its own unique curriculum for informal education – forty-two in total. In my opinion, this competition is creating problems and confusion instead of helping the communities (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Interests of bilateral donors play a major role in disbursement of foreign aid and assistance, with each donor supporting mainly organisations from their own countries.

According to one respondent, there is a lot of politics when it comes to foreign aid and assistance in Somaliland. He noted that the British funds go mainly to British NGOs and agencies and that the same is the case when it comes to Norwegian, Danish and other funds and organisations. Donors do not focus on specific needs but on organisations that are designing and implementing projects and tend to support only organisations from their own countries. This is also negatively affecting local organisations, which are often unable to access donor funds (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

Many local NGOs and civil society organisations in Somaliland were established to attract donor funding. In turn, some of them have become tools of international donors through which to promote donor agendas.

A respondent who works for an international aid agency said that many local NGOs and civil

society organisations have been 'donor-driven,' emerging because there was availability of funding for specific projects planned by donors. She claimed that 'many local organisations are not doing what they think needs to be done but only implementing donor agendas' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

In some areas such as landmine clearance, support for health care, education, empowerment of women and civil society promotion, international donors and organisations have made significant contributions. Some external actors have also financially and technically supported Somaliland's election processes.

A number of respondents pointed that the involvement of the international community was not entirely negative and that many organisations have positively contributed to some aspects of Somaliland's post-war recovery. International donors and organisations have contributed to landmine clearance, fixing water supplies, supporting health care, education, empowerment of women, local capacity building and funding for elections (Pretoria, 3 June 2010; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Some respondents highlighted support from Britain, the EU and Scandinavian countries for the election processes in Somaliland. This support did not come directly from governments of the above mentioned countries but through various 'democracy promotion' organisations. These countries have also sent diplomats on a few occasions to mediate between local political parties when there were serious disagreements about voter registration in 2010 (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011; Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

5.3.14 Women's empowerment

Since the end of the war, Somaliland has made significant progress in terms of women's empowerment. However, many challenges facing women still remain and there is a long way to go for full women's emancipation and political participation.

Women's empowerment is seen as an area that has improved significantly since the early 1990s. According to one respondent who works for a local women's empowerment organisation,

> Before and during the early 1990s, women were denied their political rights and were not able to participate in politics or run for office. This has changed considerably over

the last decade. Today, we have several female government ministers. Also, public view of women's participation in political life is improving (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011).

The same respondent added that international NGOs and UN agencies have played a key role in women's empowerment since 1991, supporting education, capacity building, and organising of women's groups. All this support and improvements have led to a situation where today many small businesses are owned and operated by women. However, challenges facing women still remain. Somaliland is still a patriarchal society and there is a long way to go for full women's emancipation and political participation (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). Another respondent pointed that there were far more improvements in the business and civil society sectors and far less in politics and governance, where women are still underrepresented (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011).

5.3.15 International recognition

Even though Somaliland has a strong case for international recognition, the country will struggle in its quest to become an internationally recognised country due to the lack of political will in Africa and globally to support secession.

According to a Somaliland expert, legally, the country has a very strong case for separation from Somalia and independence, especially since it was previously an internationally recognised country even if only for a short period of time. However, there is no political and diplomatic will on the African continent to support its quest for independence (Pretoria, 2 June 2010). A number of respondents noted that Somaliland will struggle to secure international recognition. A researcher and political analyst from Somaliland summed up the perception of many people regarding the lack of international recognition:

> We cannot understand the hypocrisy of the international community and bodies such as the United Nations and African Union. They recognise a government [of Somalia] that controls only a few streets in Mogadishu and is paid by foreign powers but refuse to even consider recognizing Somaliland and its success (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Another respondent echoed similar views: 'We are not happy about the way the international community treats us. They talk about democracy and stability… we have achieved this on our own and they still do not want to recognise our success' (Hargeisa, 12 November 2011). The

head of an international NGO highlighted key challenges related to the issue of international recognition:

> The problem that Somaliland has faced for a long time is the African Union's rule that a part of a country cannot break away without consent of the central government. However, what happens when there is no functioning and legitimate central government to speak of, as in the case of Somalia? For two decades, there was no legitimate government in Mogadishu that the government of Somaliland could speak to and negotiate the split. For a long time, Somaliland has been a hostage of Somalia's chaos and African Union's rigid rules (Juba, 22 November 2010).

A government official pointed out that the people of Somaliland will never accept to be part of Somalia:

> Somaliland will never go back to any form of unity with the rest of Somalia. They had decades to build a functioning Somali nation but they choose to discriminate against us, kill us and destroy and loot our properties and possessions. We do not want to repeat the same mistake we made in 1960 when we joined with the former Italian-controlled Somalia (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

The same government official further noted that a number of diplomats from countries such as Britain, the United States and South Africa have privately expressed willingness to recognise Somaliland's independence but none of them want to be the first to do it. Britain and the United States say African countries should be the first to recognise Somaliland and they would then follow. South Africa says it does not want to be first on the continent to do this but would follow other countries. All the while Somaliland is losing time, unable to establish bilateral and multilateral relations with the outside world (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Somaliland should find ways to cooperate and trade with the rest of the world even as an unrecognised country while it is lobbying for international recognition.

One respondent pointed out that the government of Somaliland 'should not just wait for international recognition but needs to find ways to develop the economy and infrastructure, receive foreign aid, attract foreign investments and trade even as an unrecognised country (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011). Respondents argued that Somaliland should take a step-by-step approach when it comes to international recognition. First, it should build on good relations with some key African and global players (such as South Africa and Britain). This

should be followed by finding a way to provide legal guarantees to foreign investors so they can come and invest in the country. All this could enable Somaliland to do business with the outside world, improve livelihoods of its people and then slowly lobby for full recognition (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011; Port Elizabeth, 5 January 2012).

5.3.16 Challenges facing Somaliland

Poverty, unemployment and government's inability to provide basic services to the population are the main challenges facing Somaliland that could undermine the country's stability and peace.

Two key challenges facing Somaliland today are increasing poverty and unemployment, especially outside the major urban centres. This forces people to migrate from rural areas and look for opportunities in urban centres. However, urban centres are already overcrowded and unable to offer basic services to all (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). Unemployment, which currently stands at about 65%, was highlighted by a minister in the government of Somaliland as a key challenge which may threaten stability of the country. He noted that another challenge is provision of basic necessities to the population. Currently, many households do not have access to clean water and electricity (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011).

Another respondent said that in the near future, 'poverty, lack of development and employment opportunities could undermine state-building and democratisation progress' that Somaliland has achieved so far, adding that 'if people's standard of living does not improve, we could see serious instability' (Hargeisa, 8 November 2011). As one respondent pointed out, 'for twenty years, people have been very patient when it comes to the lack of basic service delivery and employment. If things do not improve, I am not sure how much longer they will be patient' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Another challenge is incorporation of young people into social, economic and political systems that favour tradition and elders (Hargeisa, 11 November 2011). When young people graduate from universities, most of them do not have any employment opportunities. 'This is a time-bomb waiting to explode. If this situation continues, one day these young people will march to government buildings and demand change as the people are currently doing all over North Africa and the Middle East' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

A minister in the government of Somaliland highlighted that the priority of the government remains security, adding that everything else depends on it (Hargeisa, 7 November 2011). While maintenance of peace, security and stability are major priorities and challenges, this will largely depend on the improvements in people's lives. As one respondent explained, 'we have peace but now we need development and better standards of living for all in order to maintain peace' (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

Without international recognition, Somaliland will have a hard time establishing bilateral and multilateral relations with the rest of the world and doing business with countries and international corporations.

One respondent said that the lack of international recognition is a key challenge facing Somaliland. Without recognition,

> It is very hard to do most of the things we would like to do. We must be able to sign agreements with other countries and international companies and establish bilateral and multilateral relations with the rest of the world (Hargeisa, 9 November 2011).

5.3.17 Lessons from Somaliland's experience

African countries experiencing violent conflict or trying to recover from wars can learn a great deal from Somaliland's locally driven post-war recovery, peace-building and reconciliation. The experience of Somaliland shows that locally designed and driven PWRD can work.

One respondent said that African countries that are experiencing violent conflict between tribes, clans, ethnic groups and communities could learn a lot from Somaliland's reconciliation, peace-building and locally driven democratisation. He added that countries in Africa also need to try and drive their post-war recovery and state-building processes as Somaliland has done and not just follow instructions of international donors, experts, organisations and foreign governments (Pretoria, 3 June 2010).

Key lesson highlighted by a Somaliland expert is that internally driven peace-building and state-building can work. He pointed that externally driven state-building attempts have never worked on the Somali territory. On the other hand, Somaliland has shown that internally

driven processes can bring peace and stability (Pretoria, 2 June 2010). The same respondent noted additional lessons from the Somaliland experience:

- External actors should not 'kill' local spirit and people's urge to fix things on their own;

- Local people should own socio-economic and political recovery processes from planning to implementation;

- It is important to build 'home-grown, indigenous systems' of governance rooted in local history, context and tradition;

- Societies must have a 'big vision' – Somaliland had and still has a vision about independence;

- Good leadership is necessary for stability, management of diversity and nation-building.

Section Four - General findings about PWRD

While the interviews were specific about the three cases, a number of respondents spoke about PWRD in general terms. This is presented below.

5.4.1 'Quick fixes'

One of the main mistakes made by external actors time and again is expecting that PWRD can happen quickly and that countries can recover from war and stabilise socially, politically and economically in a few years.

A high-ranking UN official working in South Sudan said that the problem with externally driven post-war recovery operations is that the international community and various external actors often expect that the situation in war-torn countries can improve quickly. He added that 'societies emerging from war are expected to stabilise, reconstruct and develop in a few years. What is needed, however, is a long-term involvement and a lot of patience as things cannot change and improve overnight' (Juba, 23 November 2010). Another respondent added that 'short-termism' has been a wrong approach that did not lead to stability and peace anywhere in the world over the last two decades (Port Elizabeth, 25 May 2011).

5.4.2 Need for locally designed and driven post-war recovery

Instead of imposing externally designed and driven solutions, external actors need to empower local actors and support locally designed and driven PWRD efforts.

One respondent said that 'post-war countries are not given a chance to figure out on their own how to rebuild and create security and stability. Instead, they are forced to do what outsiders tell them' (Juba, 13 October 2011). When it comes to peace-building and state-building after war, external actors need to stop imposing their solutions, models and ideas which have not led to stability over the last two decades. They need to help and empower local actors to design and establish their own structures and systems (Port Elizabeth, 25 May 2011).

5.4.3 Knowledge about local contexts, conditions and needs

If international donors and organisations want to positively contribute to PWRD, they need to select and deploy staff to post-war countries that possess in-depth knowledge about local contexts, conditions, histories, parties and needs.

If outsiders want to get involved in a country that is recovering from war, they need to have proper understanding of the history, context, issues and needs and be ready to spend a long time in that society. Otherwise, their involvement will not help at all and could even make things worse (London [via Skype], 27 April 2011). Similarly, another respondent argued that external actors must be sensitive to local dynamics and politics. This can be achieved only if they have long-term outlook and possess in-depth knowledge about contexts, histories, local parties and needs (Pretoria, 2 June 2010).

5.4.4 Post-war priorities

One of the main challenges in post-war countries is to decide what the priorities are. In many instances, everything is a priority (from security, basic services, infrastructure and economic development to reconciliation, state-building and poverty alleviation) and both external and local actors need to decide what to focus on first. There is no recipe for this as each context will differ and those working on PWRD will have to decide the sequence of priorities for each specific country.

One respondent argued that political stabilisation and building of strong government institutions should be given the most attention in the first few years after war. 'Without socio-political stability and political will to change and reform among the leadership and political elites, hardly anything else will follow. Also, without strong institutions able to initiate and implement reforms and plans, not much can be done' (Sarajevo, 19 October 2010).

On the other hand, a World Bank official working in Bosnia argued that economic reconstruction, job creation and ability of citizens to earn a living and support their families are key issues that need immediate attention after war. If people do not see economic benefits and are unable to provide for their families, they will be frustrated and angry and could become victims of negative influences (for example, radicalisation or being exploited by 'spoilers') (Sarajevo, 22 October 2010). Similarly, another respondent said that post-war

economic reconstruction, recovery and development are in many ways more important than post-war democratisation. 'If people do not have jobs and are unable to provide basic necessities to their families, democratisation may be meaningless' (Belgrade, 30 October 2010).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented research findings gathered through semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews with individuals, officials and policy-makers from or working in Bosnia, Somaliland and South Sudan. The findings were presented in *italic* and followed with the data and information that led to each specific finding. The data from interviews was summarised, paraphrased or quoted directly in order to present 'thick' and detailed descriptions for each category and finding. In the next chapter, research findings will be analysed through conceptualisation, comparison with the data from the literature review and contextual background chapters, further interpretation and explanation.

Chapter Six - Data Analysis, Discussion and Key Findings

In this chapter, findings derived from in-depth interviews in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland will be analysed, compared and contrasted with the data, concepts, ideas and arguments from the literature review and contextual background chapters. The first section will provide an analysis and discussion about each case; in section two, key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD that emerged from the data collected in the study will be presented; section three will discuss the prospects for an improved/alternative approach to post-war reconstruction and development.

As Birks and Mills (2011: 66) point out, when researchers use the grounded theory approach for data analysis, data comes in many forms – from interview transcripts to literature, reports and policy documents. All this data can be considered for and used during the data analysis process. They recommend that researchers should treat the literature as data and refer to it during data analysis (Ibid: 22).

Findings and other data will be rigorously interrogated and interpreted, exploring and explaining their meaning and implications (Creswell 2009: 189). Issues, ideas, arguments and perspectives will be identified and linked through immersion in the data (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey 2011: 205). Using the inductive data analysis method, 'patterns, categories and themes' will be built 'from the bottom-up' (Ibid: 175). Conceptualisation of the data is the final process of data analysis where it will be considered how the findings and arguments presented in the previous chapter and the material in chapters two and four relate to each other. This is done in order to develop a conceptual understanding of the issues, arguments and practices related to externally and internally driven PWRD. This process will ultimately lead to development of key findings (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey 2011: 245). Conceptualisation is a more abstract level of analysis than coding and categorisation of the data that was done in chapter five. It requires looking at the data as a whole, examining the links and explaining what is happening in the data and with the studied phenomenon (Ibid: 247-248).

This chapter will first analyse and conceptualise the data from each case and then look at the 'bigger picture.' Analysis about each case will be presented under different sub-headings, based on the findings from each country. The three countries and their post-war recovery

experiences will not be directly compared. This is not done because each case differs and a comparison of Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland would not tell much in terms of contemporary PWRD. Instead, individual case analyses will be conducted, followed by the presentation of key findings derived from the study. The next chapter will offer practical recommendations for possible improvements to PWRD.

Before moving into analysis and discussion, the research questions, aims and objectives of this study are summarised. This will help focus this chapter in order to achieve the aims and objectives. As already mentioned earlier, this study explores and assesses strengths, weaknesses and potential of externally and internally driven PWRD and the ways post-war practices and approaches can be improved in order to bring lasting peace and socio-economic stability in countries emerging from war. It also aims to explore the nature and practicality of an alternative/improved approach to PWRD.

Section One – Case Study Discussion and Analysis

This section will provide discussion and analysis of the findings and data from the literature for each case. While there may be some repetition in this section from previous chapters, it is imperative to consolidate, discuss and analyse a wide range of data and findings presented earlier in order to establish strengths, weaknesses and potential of various PWRD approaches and practices used in each of the three cases. Furthermore, comparing and contrasting multiple sources of data enhances the validity, accuracy and quality of the research process and findings and ensures triangulation.

6.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina

6.1.1 Imposed peace agreement

Even though the focus of this study is not on negotiations that led to the end of wars in the three cases, it is important to discuss negotiations that ended the Bosnian war as this had a profound impact on post-war developments in the country. Both the field research and literature indicate that the drafting and imposition of the Dayton Peace Agreement by experts and policy-makers from the United States and Western Europe helped end the war but did not lead to lasting stability, effective governance and development. The agreement did not resolve any important issues that led to war but only froze the conflict and prolonged wartime ethnic divisions. In addition, the nature of the negotiation process ensured that the peace agreement was not owned by local parties (two out of three sides in Bosnia were not even represented at the talks by their political leaders but presidents of neighbouring Croatia and Serbia), who, in turn, were not interested in its implementation.

6.1.2 Dysfunctional political and governance system and massive bureaucracy

International experts and policy-makers who drafted the Dayton Peace Agreement created a dysfunctional political and governance system in Bosnia that ensured political instability and entrenched ethnic divisions after the war. They also established a massive bureaucracy and

numerous levels of government institutions that a small country such as Bosnia could not afford. Funds that could be used for post-war reconstruction, development and provision of basic services have for years been spent on unnecessary government bureaucracy on the local, canton, entity and state levels.

While the literature on Bosnia's post-war recovery mentions dysfunctional local politics in the aftermath of war, local political dysfunctionality has been highlighted far more in the interviews with local respondents. Most respondents were discontented with political elites and their constant fighting over power while ignoring development and socio-economic improvements. This discrepancy between the literature and local respondents can be explained by the fact that local respondents have a first-hand experience of local politics and its effect on socio-economic situation in the country; at the same time, foreign experts and academics who write about Bosnia's post-war reconstruction and development are in most cases distanced from Bosnia's daily reality.

Furthermore, both the literature and field research indicate that one reason for dysfunctional local politics was the fact that wartime animosity did not end when the war ended but continued in Bosnia's post-war political and governance institutions. Another reason was that none of the local parties were satisfied with the imposed peace agreement that called for interethnic cooperation and return to pre-war status quo. In addition, Bosnian wartime political elites benefited from the international community's insistence on elections less than a year after the war ended. Once the wartime elites entrenched themselves in power after the first post-war elections, they controlled their ethnic territories and institutions and it was difficult for more moderate political groups to make a difference. This, in turn, prolonged instability and prevented economic, social, and political progress from taking place as nationalist elites were not particularly interested in reconstruction, development, peace-building, reconciliation, transitional justice and building of effective state institutions.

Despite all the above, it is important not to see Bosnia's dysfunctional politics as an anomaly unique to Bosnia alone. Politicians internationally often work in their own self-interest or in the interest of their own parties and interest groups that support them and not in the best interest of their countries and peoples. They make promises in order to get elected and then fail to deliver and refuse to cooperate with their political opponents.

6.1.3 Bosnia as an international protectorate

To ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement amid local divisions, political dysfunctionality and resistance, the international community assumed a highly intrusive approach to post-war recovery and state-building. It gave sweeping powers to the Office of the High Representative to enforce implementation of the agreement and transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy. Bosnia was a testing ground for post-Cold War interventions in war-torn countries by the international community, with external actors acting as the ultimate authority and exercising *de facto* legislative and executive power in the country.

However, it is questionable if the colonial-style intrusive involvement by the international community and imposition of decisions, policies, reforms and even national symbols on the country and its political elites and citizens had any positive impact in terms of creating functional political and governance institutions, long-term stability and peace. Despite the extensive financial support and deployment of thousands of international 'peace-builders,' 'state-builders,' economists and development experts, external actors were not able to instil good governance, economic development, reconciliation and prosperity in post-war Bosnia.

The highly intrusive and heavy-handed involvement by the international community prevented the Bosnian people, elites and experts from designing, developing and implementing local initiatives and efforts, undermining local ownership and sustainability of PWRD. The respondents interviewed for this study were not against external involvement in post-war Bosnia, which they thought was necessary on many levels (this is discussed below). However, they were critical of the international community's patronising approach towards local people and elites and their visions and ideas.

The intrusive approach was changed in 2005, when the international community decided to act as a mediator instead of imposing decisions and policies. This in itself would not be a problem if external actors' intrusive approach between 1997 and 2005 had not already seriously damaged local political life and relations and created dependencies on foreign aid and assistance in the process. Despite the change of approach, local politics and institutions are still dysfunctional, with many political elites unable and/or unwilling to act on their own and expecting that the OHR and international community would continue to impose 'solutions.' A change of approach will not erase the damage caused by the international community's intrusive involvement and empower local actors to make fundamental socio-

economic and political changes.

6.1.4 Use of undemocratic means to build democracy and stability

For almost a decade, the international community used undemocratic and autocratic means to build peace, stability and democracy in Bosnia, such as imposition of laws, policies and reforms and dismissals of democratically elected local politicians and public officials. In addition, since the end of the war, external actors have often taken sides, favouring certain political leaders or groups over others in order to engineer and influence local political changes. At the same time, external actors, such as the Office of the High Representative, were not in any way accountable to the Bosnian population but only to powerful Western governments and international organisations under their control.

It is uncertain what kind of long-term impact this intrusive and authoritarian approach will have on the country in the long-run. It is possible that just as many African elites inherited and embraced authoritarian and repressive colonial approaches to governance after independence (Dowden 2008: 69; Maathai 2010: 44), Bosnia's political elites will embrace authoritarianism and excessive centralisation of power after 'the internationals' leave one day. It should not come as a surprise if future Bosnian leaders rule the country like the international community's all-powerful High Representatives, dismissing political opponents and imposing laws, reforms and regulations without consultation.

6.1.5 Imposition of institutional and economic reforms

In the aftermath of war, Bosnia needed an extensive reform process, especially since for decades the country was part of communist Yugoslavia and needed political, institutional and economic reforms after the collapse of communism. However, instead of the post-war reform process being informed by local needs and priorities, driven by local political elites and experts and supported by international experts, institutional and economic reforms were imposed by external actors, many of whom lacked knowledge about the country, its people, challenges and needs. This process undermined the importance of local politics, consensus-building and accountability of politicians to the population.

Furthermore, many reforms were imposed not because they were needed but because they were requirements for Bosnia's potential EU membership. However, Bosnia's membership in the EU is a distant prospect, expected only to take place in at least a decade. It is questionable if Bosnian citizens and political elites will have patience for European integration, especially since they cannot see many immediate benefits from the reforms.

Ultimately, despite all the efforts, imposed reforms did not lead to good governance, economic development and prosperity. It is doubtful that any of the imposed reforms will last when the international community leaves Bosnia in the hands of local politicians.

6.1.6 Lack of economic development

Despite the substantial financial assistance from donors and imposition of neo-liberal policies and reforms by external actors, post-war economic reconstruction, development and growth have been minimal. Even though Bosnia's macro-economic performance, fiscal balance and inflation have been relatively stable over the last decade, unemployment remains around 40% and many citizens continue to live in poverty. Furthermore, the neo-liberal economic model led to cuts in government spending on basic services and social welfare, negatively affecting the struggling population.

One of the main tools used by external actors to transform Bosnia's economy from the communist to the neo-liberal model was privatisation of state-owned industries and enterprises. Privatisation, imposed by external actors as a solution to all Bosnia's economic ills, only led to corruption, nepotism and massive job losses. Moreover, external actors failed to institute checks and balances and ensure that the process was not mismanaged. As the OHR was the ultimate authority and exercised *de facto* legislative and executive power in Bosnia during the privatisation process, it had power and tools to do this but it failed to act.

Even though the neo-liberal economic model was imposed on Bosnia in the aftermath of war, it would be wrong to only blame external actors for the lack of economic development and high unemployment. It is evident from the field research that a significant portion of blame must be levelled at the local political elites, who over the years focused primarily on self-enrichment and hold of power while ignoring economic reconstruction, development and job creation. This was especially the case during the implementation stage of the privatisation

process. As noted in chapter four, most of the valuable state-owned industries and enterprises were taken over by nationalist politicians and their followers, reinforcing the dominance of wartime elites in post-war Bosnia.

The findings from Bosnia highlight that the country will not be stable as long as its people lack economic and employment opportunities, basic services and development. While security improvements (discussed below) were necessary for post-war stabilisation, this alone was not enough for long-term stability and recovery. The country needed security improvements and economic reconstruction and development to go hand-in-hand. Instead, economic reconstruction and development trailed far behind, leaving in their wake unemployment and poverty. This could easily undermine the security improvements and other progress made since the mid-1990s.

Furthermore, as it was suggested in chapter two, promotion and maintenance of peace and stability are more important than macro-economic stability during the first decade after the war. Instead of rigid neo-liberal reforms, which further increased poverty and inequality, Bosnia needed inclusive and broad-based livelihood improvements, delivery of basic services and job creation. In addition, instead of imposition of economic policies and reforms on the country and its political elites and citizens, the international community needed to consult local authorities and experts and jointly find a way forward for economic reconstruction and development.

6.1.7 Transitional justice

In terms of transitional justice, the main focus in Bosnia was on retributive justice. After the war, hundreds of war crimes suspects were captured by international peacekeepers or local security forces and tried either at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague or at a special war crimes court in Bosnia. At the same time, little or no efforts have been made in terms of restorative justice. The focus on retributive justice only did not contribute to reconciliation and peace-building; in many ways, this further widened ethnic divisions. While the country needed retributive justice to deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the war, it also needed restorative justice mechanisms in order for the divided communities to heal.

6.1.8 Positive contributions by external actors

External actors' involvement in post-war Bosnia also had positive impact – including security improvements through peacekeeping and security sector reform, helping refugees and displaced to return to their homes and rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed during the war. Among these, the most notable success was post-war security. This was achieved with the help of international peacekeepers, who first helped end fighting between the warring parties and later worked extensively on peacekeeping, DDR and security sector reform.

All these positive contributions, however, were mainly technical in nature (even though security sector reform and return of refugees and displaced were also highly political exercises that were accepted by local actors under intense diplomatic pressure and/or in return for international community's financial assistance). A war-torn country such as Bosnia could not do many of the above mentioned tasks on its own and needed external assistance.

6.1.9 International community's involvement – necessary, but in what form?

Some respondents, as well as some authors quoted in chapter four, stressed that without international community's involvement in post-war Bosnia the country would be engulfed in more chaos, fighting and human suffering. After four years of fighting between Bosnia's three ethnic groups, the country needed international peacekeepers to help keep the peace and aid and assistance for rebuilding.

The question is not whether or not the above mentioned international efforts and assistance were necessary; the question is if impositions and intrusive meddling into country's political, economic and social affairs by external actors created a stable socio-economic and political system. Both the field research and literature indicate that they did not. One of the findings from Bosnia is that 'the internationals' were supposed to support emergence of progressive local initiatives and allow Bosnians to decide what kinds of political and economic systems and frameworks they wanted to establish for themselves. In addition, external actors needed to work with local political elites, experts and people instead of patronising them and imposing their own solutions, blueprints, ideas and visions in the quest for a 'quick fix' and establishment of a 'liberal peace heaven.'

As mentioned in chapter two, the most acceptable way democracy can emerge is through

bottom-up, locally driven efforts that pay attention to local conditions, customs, traditions and needs. Democracy, whether in Bosnia or any other post-war country, can *never* be consolidated if it is imposed by outsiders. External actors can support the democratisation process but must allow locals to design and drive it. In the same way, instead of imposing economic and development approaches and policies on the country, external actors were supposed to allow locals to genuinely participate in the design and development of socio-economic programmes and policies. Ultimately, if Bosnians do not find a way to develop their country socially, politically and economically, their future will be bleak despite all the help and assistance from the international community.

6.2 South Sudan

6.2.1 Challenging post-war environment

An important issue raised by respondents and highlighted in the literature is the challenging environment in post-war South Sudan. For decades, the country was marginalised politically, socially, economically and culturally, lacking any development. Thus, when the war ended in 2005, South Sudan had to 'start from zero' in terms of economic, infrastructural and institutional development as well as the establishment of providers of basic services such as health care and education, which for decades were either non-existent or provided by international NGOs and aid agencies. All this meant that post-war recovery in South Sudan would be arguably the most challenging since the end of the Cold War.

6.2.2 Post-war interim period

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North-South Sudan civil war in 2005 was a product of long negotiations and difficult compromises by warring parties and diplomatic pressures from the West. One of the key aspects of the CPA was the clause that allowed South Sudan to secede from Sudan after six years of the interim period. This period was meant to give the government in Khartoum time to 'make unity attractive' to Southerners through good governance, development assistance and peace-building. However, during the interim period, none of this happened and the two sides remained suspicious of each other.

Not only that the interim period did not serve its original purpose, it also led to a loss of six years in South Sudan in terms of medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development. During this time, the international community waited to see what would happen at the end of the six-year period. International donors and organisations working in the South hesitated to begin working on reconstruction and development, unsure if South Sudan would remain part of Sudan or become an independent country. Instead, external actors focused mainly on short-term humanitarian and emergency issues. For the same reasons, foreign investors refused to invest in the region. At the same time, the government of South Sudan used most of its funds and capacity to ensure internal security and stability and that self-determination referendum is held on time in 2011, spending little time on reconstruction, development and

delivery of basic services.

6.2.3 Post-war security improvements

According to both the field research and literature, local efforts have been the key for post-war security improvements in South Sudan. The major factor that led to this was the Juba Declaration, an agreement signed in January 2006 by the GOSS and a number of Southern armed groups that fought on the side of Khartoum during the war. The Juba Declaration took the international community by surprise as external actors were not involved in the negotiation process. At the end of this process, most South Sudanese armed groups that allied with Sudan during the war joined the GOSS. This, in turn, led to significant security improvements.

However, despite the security improvements in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration, many areas in South Sudan continued to experience instability and outbreaks of localised fighting between various ethnic groups over resources. This often took place in remote areas where the presence of government institutions and police is minimal and where citizens do not have access to basic services, suggesting that fighting was in most cases caused by legitimate grievances and desperation.

While the UN Mission in Sudan was supposed to offer considerable support to local authorities in South Sudan for security improvements and DDR, little support materialised during the interim period. The UN often justified its inaction with its limited mandate, which did not include protection of civilians affected by fighting. In addition, while UNMIS mandate included support for the DDR and SSR, the UNMIS failed to meaningfully assist the GOSS and its security forces. The main reason for this was UN's inability to coordinate and plan the DDR and SSR with other international donors and partners. If there was a more effective support from the UN and other external actors, much more could have been done in terms of the DDR and SSR.

Local authorities also lagged behind in terms of the DDR. The main reason for this was the fact that South Sudan's political and army leadership did not think that the country was ready for disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and former rebels during the interim period. This was also due to the government's inability to guarantee safety and security of the

people and communities. In terms of demobilisation, the government feared that dismissal of tens of thousands of soldiers, whose only income are salaries from the army, would create instability, social unrest and potentially lead to rebellion.

6.2.4 Top-level peace-building and reconciliation

As mentioned above, negotiations between various armed groups and actors led to the signing of the Juba Declaration in 2006, which was a key milestone in post-war peace-building and reconciliation within South Sudan. This ensured the unity of Southerners and holding of the referendum on self-determination in a peaceful environment. However, this process included only the government and wartime rebel leaders, completely excluding communities and ordinary people, many of whom suffered at the hands of fellow South Sudanese during the war. While important, negotiations and reconciliation between the elites are not enough for long-term peace and stability. Now that South Sudan is an independent country, there is a need for a broad-based national reconciliation and peace-building process in order to deal with the past and build a new nation on solid foundations.

6.2.5 Local post-war recovery efforts

When the war ended in 2005, South Sudan began receiving half of the oil revenues from the oil produced in the region. During the interim period, this amounted to over US $7 billion. This significant amount of money was to be used for post-war recovery, infrastructure development and establishment of government institutions. However, there were little improvements from the oil revenues due to corruption and extensive spending on security. In addition, lack of skills and capacity in the government and other public institutions as well as the private sector meant that there were not enough qualified people who could design and implement locally driven post-war recovery projects and programmes and work on economic development.

Now that South Sudan is an independent country, the national government and authorities on the state and local levels have a chance to begin improving livelihoods of the citizens. As noted in chapter four, the expectations among the citizens are huge. They were promised better life in an independent South Sudan. If this does not materialise, there is potential for

social unrest, instability and conflict. If the government does not soon begin to provide basic services and implement inclusive reconstruction and development projects and programmes, there will be little chance of long-term stability and peace.

This, however, will be difficult to achieve given the capacity constraints and overwhelming focus on security. In addition, disputes with Sudan over fees for oil exports through the Northern facilities led South Sudan to stop its oil production during 2012. Since oil revenues are the main source of income for the country, the shutdown of oil production meant that all locally driven reconstruction and development efforts ceased. The country struggled throughout 2012 but the citizens remained largely patient, with expectations for livelihood improvements and better life once the oil production resumes.

6.2.6 State-building, governance and local politics

Considering the fact that South Sudan did not have functioning civilian government structures before 2005, the country made significant progress since the end of the war in terms of establishment of basic governance structures and institutions on the national, state and local levels. However, while the establishment of institutions on the national and state levels was relatively successful, authorities and institutions still do not reach many people in rural areas across the country. As mentioned above, this often leads to anger and fighting between desperate communities who do not have access to institutions and basic services.

One factor that undermined state-building and establishment of effective institutions was the need to accommodate potential local 'spoilers.' The GOSS had to accommodate various armed groups that used to fight on the side of Sudan, offering them positions in the administration in return for loyalty. While this may have been necessary in order to establish stability and prevent fighting within the region, it led to a creation of a large, expensive and ineffective administration. Another factor that undermined effective governance and delivery of services to the population was the lack of skills and capacity within the government. In addition, most of those who work for the government come from the army and other security forces. For them, the key priority is security, not reconstruction, development, good governance and delivery of basic services.

In terms of local politics, South Sudan was in limbo during the interim period. Between 2005

and 2011, there was very little political competition due to the need to present a unified front against Khartoum and hold self-determination referendum on time. This, however, does not mean that the country will be politically stable in the medium-to-long-run. As noted in chapter four, the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement is a 'marriage of convenience' between various ethnic and regional groups. Many current leaders of the SPLM fought against each other during the war and wartime divisions within South Sudan have never been forgotten and could return to undermine country's stability in the future. The real test for South Sudan will be the first post-independence elections, when the country could face serious political competition and instability.

Due to the decades of war, destruction and marginalisation, South Sudan never developed local capacity and institutions for effective governance. The country still has to establish stable and functioning state institutions that prioritise the wellbeing of the population, good and effective governance and accountability. Apart from this, it is of outmost importance that the politics remains open and inclusive and not based on ethnicity and/or exclusion of minorities.

6.2.7 Economic reconstruction and development

Apart from the oil industry, which was developed by Sudan and its international partners during the war and benefited only the North until 2005, South Sudan currently does not have any other significant industries (apart from a SAB Miller beer producing facility). Due to the lack of capacity and overwhelming focus on security, very little was done to develop small-to-medium-scale production facilities and industries since the end of the war. As mentioned above, the main reason for this was uncertainty during the interim period, which prevented both the local actors and foreign investors from investing in economic reconstruction and development.

South Sudan is currently fully dependent on oil revenues. In the medium-to-long-run, however, economic diversification will be an absolute necessity as oil is a finite resource. The country has ideal climate and enough land to become one of the main food producers on the African continent. To achieve this, the South will have to build infrastructure and develop capacity and skills of its workforce. This needs to be the main priority of the GOSS and its partners since without infrastructure, education, skills and capacity, the country will not be

able to develop and improve standards of living of its citizens in the future. In addition, being a new country with inexperienced leadership, country's political elites need to be careful not to be exploited by powerful countries which are not interested in the wellbeing of South Sudan and its people but only want its natural resources.

Findings suggest that South Sudan needs to resist the imposition of mainstream development approaches such as neo-liberalism and design its own development model that is suitable for country's context, conditions and needs. Furthermore, some respondents argued that South Sudan first needs to build its institutions and develop infrastructure, industries and service providers and then consider regional, continental and global economic integration. This is a valid assertion as the country currently does not have much to offer apart from its oil industry. Without local capacity, institutions and industries, South Sudan will remain dependent on goods and services from other countries.

Respondents also suggested that the government needs to be involved in economic reconstruction, development and diversification and support local industries instead of leaving this to the markets. Given the failures of neo-liberalism in the developing world in the past, this is the most sensible approach that can be taken. Since the country does not fully depend on aid and assistance from the West and IFIs for its future existence and development but has its own resources and also receives support from China, this could turn out to be a better choice for Africa's newest country.

6.2.8 Uneven reconstruction, development and provision of services

Since the end of the war, major urban centres in South Sudan have seen significant infrastructure reconstruction and development. However, while the country's capital and a few other urban centres have seen improvements, rural and remote areas, which are the large majority of the country, have seen little or no reconstruction and development of infrastructure such as roads, hospitals and schools since 2005.

Centralisation of reconstruction, development and provision of basic services only in a few centres at the expense of the rest of the country is dangerous and could lead to instability in the near future. The government needs to reverse this trend, especially since it was the current political elites from South Sudan who went to war with the North over centralisation of

power, resources, services and development in Khartoum, while the rest of the country was marginalised.

Another danger of uneven development in an ethnically diverse country is that communities that do not see development and basic services may perceive this to be due to them not belonging to a certain ethnic group. Being a diverse country, South Sudan needs to embrace all its communities and peoples. The authorities need to deliver services and share resources equitably among the regions and communities, without favouritism based on ethnicity, tribe, membership in a political party or geography. Anything else will lead to instability and conflict.

6.2.9 International community's involvement in South Sudan's post-war recovery

According to the literature, since 2005, South Sudan has been a testing ground for international community's post-war recovery efforts. Some of these efforts were positive while others were not effective. Respondents stressed that the most positive impact made by the international community were diplomatic efforts and pressures which ensured that the referendum on self-determination was held on time in 2011. Other positive efforts by international donors and organisations were the provision of emergency assistance and basic services to vulnerable communities.

In other aspects, however, international donors and organisations have not been very effective. Most international donors and organisations did not attempt to work on medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development between 2005 and 2011. They also failed to support physical reconstruction in South Sudan, despite the enormous needs. This can be blamed on the uncertainty during the interim period, red tape and lack of coordination among external actors. In addition, while international donors promised over US $6 billion for reconstruction and development when the war ended, they failed to deliver on their promises, contributing only a small fraction of this amount. Another reason for ineffective involvement by the international community was the fact that the majority of officials working for international organisations in South Sudan or as advisors to the GOSS lacked the most basic knowledge about the country, its history, people, problems and needs. Most of them arrived in the South from other post-war or in-conflict countries, often trying to replicate the work they had done elsewhere while staying in the country for only a year or less.

Since 2005, most international donors and organisations working in South Sudan have designed and implemented projects and programmes with little or no communication and consultation with local authorities and organisations. This often led to projects that were not necessary or appropriate for local conditions. Furthermore, respondents argued that since South Sudanese are proud people, toughened during decades of war and suffering, they often rejected ready-made 'solutions' imposed or recommended by foreigners without prior consultation, leading to waste of money, time and efforts.

Ineffective international assistance was not only the work of donors and organisations from the West. As noted in chapter four, the African Union appointed the government of South Africa in 2003 to lead AU's post-war reconstruction and development efforts in South Sudan. However, over the years, South Africa and the AU have done little to help the country. Reasons for this are the lack of funding and capacity within the AU and South Africa to contribute meaningfully to post-war recovery.

It remains to be seen if the international community's involvement and work will change now that South Sudan is an independent country. While the South needs extensive support and assistance from the international community in the years to come, the field research suggests that external actors need to change their approach and ensure genuine local ownership and participation so that South Sudanese authorities, organisations and citizens can play an integral part in the design, development and implementation of all projects and programmes. This is the only way to ensure that post-war recovery efforts positively benefit the country and its people and last in the long-run.

6.2.10 Dependency and dependency syndrome

South Sudan suffers from a dependency syndrome created over the decades of war, when the region lacked institutions and providers of basic services. During this time, the only services that the majority of the citizens could access were the ones provided by international NGOs and aid agencies. Extensive post-war emergency efforts and provision of basic services by the international community, while necessary, are only prolonging this dependency on foreign aid and assistance.

The field research suggests that instead of protracting this dependency, local authorities and

international donors and organisations need to come up with a strategy for building local capacity, transferring service delivery responsibilities to local authorities and changing the dependency mentality among South Sudanese population to that of self-reliance. In addition, the government needs to do this in order to protect its credibility in the eyes of the population. This, however, may take a long time as many vulnerable communities still fully depend on international NGOs and aid agencies for basic services since the GOSS and local authorities currently do not have capacity to provide these services. Finally, an important argument was put forward by respondents, who think that in the long-run, stability and peace in South Sudan will depend largely on the government's ability to provide basic services to the population.

6.3 Somaliland

6.3.1 Locally driven peace-building and reconciliation

The negotiation process that led to peace, reconciliation and stability in post-war Somaliland was entirely locally designed, driven and funded. One of the key factors that ensured peace-building and reconciliation success was the fact that, instead of following instructions of foreigners, Somaliland's political and traditional elites used their own methods and approaches to broad-based mediation, peace-building and reconciliation, ensuring local participation and ownership. Furthermore, lacking financial support from international donors, Somaliland depended on its own people to fund peace-building and reconciliation efforts. The key was the local business community, as it was in its best interest to have a stable and peaceful country in order to do business and prosper.

One of the most important factors that ensured the success of post-war stabilisation and peace-building efforts was the strong sense of collective responsibility, rooted in tradition and local customs. Respondents pointed that people in Somaliland generally do not only care about their own wellbeing but that of their extended family and clan. All this significantly influenced post-war transition, stability, security and peace-building.

Peace-building and reconciliation in Somaliland were not easy nor have they come about quickly. Negotiations that led to stability and peace took years; some conferences lasted for months. In some instances, consensus achieved through talks was broken and clan militias went back to fighting. The fighting finally ended in 1997 and since then Somaliland has been relatively stable and peaceful. This shows that peace-building and reconciliation after a long violent conflict is not easy and that 'quick fixes,' favoured by external actors, are not the solution. It can be argued that Somaliland is stable and peaceful today because its political and traditional leaders were patient and took time to resolve their issues and disputes instead of trying to come up with 'quick fixes' to complex problems.

Furthermore, the field research suggests that the people of Somaliland have a great commitment to peace and are willing to struggle in their daily lives and ignore serious difficulties in order to protect peace and stability in the country. One of the reasons for this, highlighted by both the respondents and literature, is their awareness of the on-going destruction and violence in Somalia as well as their past wartime experience. While this is

commendable, it is unlikely to last in the long-run. Without livelihood improvements, basic services and economic opportunities and development, Somalilanders may lose patience and subsequent social unrest could undermine their hard-won stability and peace. This is in line with numerous authors who write about PWRD and suggest that there is little hope of lasting stability and peace without reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war (Annan 1998: 19; NEPAD 2005: 2; Schomerus and Allen 2010: 81).

6.3.2 Lack of transitional justice mechanisms

According to the field research and literature, people of Somaliland were able to reconcile and build peace among each other without holding anyone responsible for wartime crimes. Transitional justice mechanisms were either seen as impractical due to the fighting in the rest of Somalia or potentially counter-productive during the process of building internal peace and stability. In the case of Somaliland, it seems that the lack of transitional justice will not undermine internal peace and stability in the long-run. The split from Somalia and internal reconciliation and stability in Somaliland are the main reasons that allowed people to move on without transitional justice.

6.3.3 Focus on security

Being located in a very unstable part of Africa and due to a number of unresolved regional and domestic issues, the government of Somaliland has over the years prioritised security over development and delivery of basic services. While this is understandable, especially given the threats coming from the neighbouring Somalia and outstanding issues with bordering Puntland and some regions within Somaliland that reject independence, too much focus on security and very little on development, livelihood improvements and service delivery may undermine internal security, peace and stability in the medium-to-long-run.

6.3.4 Governance, democratisation and politics

Rebuilding of governance institutions and democratisation in Somaliland were entirely locally driven, with limited support from the international community. Instead of rushing

with democratisation and elections immediately after the war, Somaliland's political elites waited for years until the country was stable and ready for a democratic system and multi-party politics. During that time, the country was run through clan-based power-sharing. This was contrary to a common urge by external actors to conduct elections and establish a democratic system as soon as wars end and while wartime divisions are still fresh.

In addition, instead of replicating a Western model of governance, Somaliland mixed the Western model with its own customary institutions and structures of oversight and conflict management, creating its own hybrid system of governance and democracy that can accommodate local norms, context and needs. Most notably, according to the literature, this locally driven hybrid system has fared better than many political and governance systems in Africa and the Middle East, most of which have been externally designed, imposed and/or funded. Numerous peaceful elections and transfers of power from Somaliland's ruling elites to the opposition prove this.

The most important factor that led to a creation of a stable governance system in Somaliland was the lack of foreign interference. This ensured that local actors 'owned' the entire process and built institutions and structures that work for the people of Somaliland. The lack of outside support ensured that the recovery process was slow; on the other hand, the lack of external funding meant that local elites and citizens were able to drive the recovery and state-building processes and decide what kind of society and socio-political and economic system they wanted to build. Furthermore, the lack of foreign funds and assistance forced the government to rely on its population and local businesses for revenues and funding. This, in turn, ensured government's greater degree of accountability towards the citizens.

6.3.5 Physical reconstruction

The decade-long war in the 1980s destroyed most of Somaliland's infrastructure. With the help of the country's Diaspora, Somaliland's authorities and citizens were able to reconstruct and develop basic infrastructure. However, due to the shortage of funds, reconstruction and development of major infrastructure such as roads and production facilities is lacking. In addition, while major urban areas have seen significant improvements, rural areas have lagged behind. In the medium-to-long-run, the country will have to find ways to fund development of major infrastructure and ensure a more equitable infrastructure development

in order to prevent regional divisions and urban-rural divide.

6.3.6 Economic reconstruction and development

Due to the fact that Somaliland is not a recognised country, the government cannot establish trade, diplomatic and other relations with other countries and have access to international loans and assistance. Consequently, due to the lack of funding, Somaliland's government has been unable to develop the economy, deliver basic services and improve livelihoods of the population.

Despite all the challenges that come with the lack of international recognition, Somaliland's businesspeople were able to establish informal links and trade with many countries in the Middle East and East Africa. The government and its policies, which created an open economy and stable business environment, helped in this process and led to a private sector boom. In turn, the private sector has contributed to economic reconstruction and development, from telecommunications, transport and banking sectors to provision of services such as education, clean water and social services.

However, as noted in the findings and literature, the main driver of economic reconstruction and development after the war was not the government or private sector but Somaliland's Diaspora. The remittances from the Diaspora, amounting to over half a billion US dollars annually, have been far more than the amount earned from country's exports. Due to the lack of donor funding for post-war reconstruction and development, the remittances have been the lifeline for Somaliland and key contributor to rebuilding of the country, economy and expansion of the private sector.

Since the end of the war, Somaliland's main economic activities have been livestock exports and small trade. The country urgently needs to diversify its economy as livestock exports, small trade and remittances are insufficient for long-term development and prosperity. As noted in chapter four, Somaliland has potential in the energy and minerals sectors that could be key components and drivers of economic development. Economic diversification and development are not only important in order to make profit; ultimately, stability, security and peace in Somaliland will not be sustained without equitable economic development, employment opportunities, basic services and livelihood improvements.

6.3.7 International community's involvement in Somaliland

The involvement of the international community in Somaliland has been limited over the last two decades. Both the literature and field research suggest that international donors and organisations have made minimal contributions towards country's post-war reconstruction, development and state-building. Over the years, Somaliland has been receiving about US $30 million annually from international donors. Compared to the funds given to other post-war countries, such as Bosnia and South Sudan, this is an insignificant amount. What is more, even this amount was not entirely spent on improving livelihoods and services in Somaliland; at least half of the above mentioned funds were annually spent on overheads for international NGOs and aid agencies.

Key issue related to the involvement of the international community in Somaliland that was raised by respondents was the fact that decisions about donor projects and programmes that are implemented in the country are often made by high-ranking officials who are not based in Somaliland and who lack knowledge about the country, people and needs. Another issue was that international organisations do not coordinate with each other. This often leads to unnecessary duplication of efforts and waste of time and funds.

Nevertheless, however minimal the involvement of the international community has been over the last two decades, international NGOs and aid agencies have helped the country and its people in areas such as landmine clearance, support for health care, education, empowerment of women and civil society promotion. Some external actors have also supported Somaliland's election processes.

It can be argued that increased donor funds, better coordination between international donors and organisations, consultation with local authorities and organisations and decision-making about project funding done by well-informed international officials based in Somaliland would help provide assistance in the future.

6.3.8 Somaliland as a role-model for other African countries

African countries experiencing violent conflict or trying to recover from wars stand to learn a great deal from Somaliland's locally driven post-war reconstruction, peace-building, state-building and reconciliation. This does not mean that other countries should replicate

Somaliland's experience or processes; instead, it means that, like Somaliland, other countries need to use their own initiatives and build governance and social systems that are rooted in local traditions, customs and visions.

Somaliland is also an example that liberal peace framework does not have to be imposed and/or externally driven. Local actors in war-torn countries are capable of establishing, building and safeguarding a governance system based on liberal norms and ideas when they deem it appropriate.

6.3.9 Challenges facing Somaliland

As noted in chapter four, locally driven post-war recovery and state-building in Somaliland should not be seen as a panacea. Just because the PWRD process was driven by local elites and people, this does not mean that it does not have shortcomings and flaws. As noted in chapter five, despite significant improvements for women, Somaliland is still a patriarchal society and women do not have the same opportunities as men. Furthermore, most of post-war reconstruction and development efforts have taken place in urban areas; in rural areas, citizens have not seen significant improvements since the end of the war.

Poverty, unemployment and government's inability to provide basic services to the population could undermine Somaliland's stability and peace. Despite all the efforts by the government and patience of the citizens, it will be hard to sustain stability, security and peace without equitable economic development, employment opportunities, basic services and livelihood improvements. Furthermore, local government structures and institutions are still weak and lack capacity and funds to deliver basic services to the population. Under the Constitution, local government should be the most important arm of the government, working directly with communities and providing basic services. However, due to the lack of capacity and funds, this arm of the government is failing the citizens and not delivering much needed services. In addition, even though the governance system is structured in a way to minimise clan-based divisions, clan-based politics are frequently far more influential than the official state, regional, local and party politics. This, in turn, often leads to corruption, nepotism and clan-based divisions.

The above mentioned challenges threaten Somaliland's stability and the government will

have to address them in the medium-to-long-run. However, Somaliland cannot significantly improve standards of living of its citizens in isolation, neglected by the African Union and the rest of the world. Instead of ignoring Somaliland, the international community needs to find a way to help the country protect its peace and stability.

Section Two – Key Findings About PWRD

This section will present key findings about PWRD that emerged from the data collected in the study. The section will reflect on the analysis and discussion about each individual case as well as previous chapters in order to conceptualise the data and present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD.

6.4 Externally driven PWRD

External actors and their involvement and efforts in post-war settings are very important. Most countries recovering from war lack capacity and funding to recover and reconstruct on their own. At the same time, various bilateral and multilateral external actors have funds and capacity to provide assistance in terms of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, state-building and physical and economic reconstruction.

Numerous technical and structural shortcomings have undermined externally driven PWRD in the last two decades. The lack of coordination, communication and cooperation among external actors is one of the major technical flaws facing externally driven operations. In most cases, each donor and organisation works on and implements their particular plans and agendas, often duplicating efforts and wasting time and funds. There is an urgent need for effective coordination of PWRD efforts in order to provide maximum support to post-war countries and their populations. Additionally, if external actors want to genuinely help post-war countries recover and build peace, they need to end the practice of sending staff who lack basic knowledge about countries and are qualified only because they previously worked in some other war-torn country. Instead, they need to recruit, train and deploy staff who understand local contexts, cultures, traditions and needs. Officials who work for international donors and organisations need to be ready to stay in post-war countries for longer periods of time – at least two years – in order to be able to make a meaningful contribution to PWRD. All the above, however, will not be easy to achieve given the complexities, contradictions and interests of the international development industry and actors who work on PWRD.

Due to the deadlines imposed by donors and other external actors interested in 'quick fixes' in complex post-war environments, externally driven operations lack patience to see countries

develop their local capacity, build consensus among various groups and recover. PWRD is a slow and difficult process, with many setbacks along the way. Instead of 'quick fixes,' there is a need for long-term support and assistance – for at least a decade – for reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building in order to bring about meaningful change and prevent future outbreaks of fighting. During this time, the primary aim of external actors should be to build local capacity and transfer responsibilities to local actors as soon as possible.

While the importance of local ownership and consultation with local actors is highlighted by most external actors, in most cases this has been nothing but empty rhetoric. Interested in 'quick fixes,' external actors often ignore the principle of local ownership and impose own ideas, visions and 'solutions' on local actors. This is not helping war-torn countries; what is more, these practices are undermining the process of lasting post-war recovery. External actors cannot impose profound and lasting socio-economic and political changes. They can encourage, facilitate and support these processes but it is the responsibility of local actors to drive this if it is to work and take root in post-war countries. Ultimately, post-war programmes, policies and reforms that are designed and implemented without input from local actors will not be sustained in the long-run.

In terms of structural shortcomings, the widely accepted argument among international donors, institutions, organisations and experts that work on PWRD is that only external actors coming from powerful Western countries have the capacity to help war-torn countries recover and become peaceful, stable and prosperous. However, the record of externally driven PWRD in the aftermath of the Cold War suggests that outsiders are not better than locals when it comes to building peace and reconstructing war-ravaged states and economies. As it was discussed in detail in chapter two and as it is evident from the Bosnian case, over the last two decades, externally driven PWRD efforts have not led to 'positive peace' and lasting political, social, economic and security improvements in post-war countries.

One of the reasons for this has been the fact that key priorities of external actors and international donors have not been broad-based development, livelihood improvements, welfare and delivery of basic services in post-war countries but containment of violent conflict in order to promote and safeguard national security, strategic, geopolitical and/or economic interests of powerful countries. Foreign aid and assistance are given to post-war countries with conditions attached, aiming to influence policies and reforms in the recipient

countries, serve commercial purposes and advance interests of donors. As international relations are based on realism, this will not change in the near future. However, if external actors want to help war-torn countries recover and rebuild, their main goal should be establishment of lasting peace and stability and livelihood improvements for suffering populations; advancement of geopolitical, economic, security and other interests of the donors should be secondary priorities.

External actors can continue to use their diplomatic, military and financial power to impose policies and reforms in vulnerable post-war countries. This, however, will not lead to recovery, effective governance and stability. External impositions inevitably undermine local institutions, ownership and accountability, damage local political relations and create dependencies on foreign aid and assistance. Furthermore, intrusive, colonial-like, illiberal and undemocratic methods used by external actors to presumably build democracy and stability in some post-war countries can only lead to authoritarianism and instability once external actors finish their missions and leave.

In terms of economic reconstruction and development, local actors need to be able to decide what kind of economic system they want to establish in their countries. Apart from this, local actors and experts need to participate in planning, design and implementation of economic reconstruction and development programmes and policies instead of having to [only] follow instructions of donors and IFIs. Instead of direct interference into domestic affairs of post-war countries and imposition of 'one-size-fits-all' development theories and approaches, external actors need to encourage and support economic reconstruction and development that are informed by local priorities, provide equitable and inclusive opportunities and empower all groups and individuals in post-war societies. This may be the best way to influence change and help countries recover after war (note: more about post-war economic reconstruction and development in section three of this chapter).

In addition, rather than imposing foreign economic and political ideologies, visions and ideas, external actors should try and make these attractive to local actors and population. There is a greater chance of success if there is a genuine local 'buy-in' instead of economic models, governance systems and institutions being foreign impositions. The goal of external actors should be to establish peace and institutions that are rooted in local norms and practices and sustainable in the long-run.

Finally, as noted above, the inability of external actors to build 'positive peace' has been due to the shortcomings at both the technical (design, development and implementation of processes) and structural levels (content and structure of policies and processes). Even if technical shortcomings are addressed and improvements are made in planning and implementation of externally driven operations, the crucial change needs to take place on the structural level. Instead of continuing with the same externally designed and driven approaches and practices and only improving the implementation and providing more international experts and funds, there is a need to fundamentally change the structure, discourses, assumptions and power relations in post-war operations. Local actors, voices and ideas need to come to the fore and meaningfully contribute to post-war reconstruction and development in their societies. Genuine local participation is likely to lead to policy solutions which are context-specific and appropriate.

6.5 Internally driven PWRD

It is important not to romanticise all things local given the fact that in many post-war settings political elites are not interested in livelihood improvements, broad-based development and good governance. However, it is wrong to assume that if external actors do not intervene to 'save' countries ravaged by war and design and drive post-war recovery operations, these countries will never stabilise, build peace, reconstruct and develop. The case of Somaliland indicates that when given a chance, local actors and their initiatives can lead to peace, stability, reconstruction, establishment of functioning institutions and consolidation of multi-party democracy. The case of South Sudan also shows that local initiatives can lead to security improvements and reconciliation among former adversaries.

In terms of the weaknesses of internally driven PWRD, the case of Somaliland shows that internally driven PWRD takes place when external actors are not interested in intervening and getting involved in country's post-war recovery. Lacking international financial and technical assistance, such countries face numerous difficulties, most notably lack of funding and capacity for broad-based and comprehensive reconstruction and development. Moreover, while local traditional structures can make a positive impact in the aftermath of violent conflict and contribute to reconciliation and peace-building, the problem in many war-torn societies is that traditional structures are often weak and undermined by wartime elites.

While external support and assistance are often necessary for post-war recovery, long-term reconstruction, development and stability depend on local capacity to govern and plan, design and implement projects and programmes. Stability, security, peace, poverty eradication, development and functionality and effectiveness of institutions in post-war countries require local skills and leadership on all levels of the government and other public institutions for delivery of basic services, strategic planning, good governance and economic development. This can be achieved through extensive and long-term capacity building, training and education of government and public officials and youth in countries that are recovering from war. Instead of imposing their own visions and 'solutions,' external actors need to contribute to local capacity building.

6.6 Post-war state-building and democratisation

A functioning state needs to be able to govern its territory, maintain law and order, have political legitimacy and authority, raise taxes and revenues, provide basic services and be transparent and accountable to the population. While the establishment of functioning state institutions can be supported by the international community, the state-building process needs to be locally driven and owned in order to work. Sustainable states and institutions can only emerge over a long period of time that involves local power struggles, difficult compromises and establishment of structures and mechanisms rooted in local norms. In the same way, nation-building is a process of construction of a common national identity and unity among people who live in the same country. This can only be achieved through the efforts of local people and political elites.

In terms of post-war democratisation, while good governance and democratisation are important for lasting peace and stability, they require a long-term timeframe, local 'buy-in' and local ownership of the democratisation process. Local actors need to see the benefits of this system, adjust it to local conditions if necessary and drive the process in order for it to work and be sustainable. Democratic and governance systems and institutions need to be 'home-grown' and reflect local traditions, social relations and history. Ultimately, domestic political processes and interactions are key for real, long-term socio-economic and political change and stability. Furthermore, democratisation in the aftermath of war should never be rushed as intense political competition over power can further exacerbate divisions and

animosities in war-torn countries. Instead of 'quick fixes,' democratisation should be the end goal of PWRD operations, introduced after the establishment of security, stable political environment, functioning governance institutions, livelihood improvements and economic reconstruction; during the transitional period, countries can be run through local power-sharing.

Section Three – PWRD Prospects

This section will discuss the viability of liberal peace principles and prospects for an internally driven and externally supported approach to post-war reconstruction and development.

6.7 Viability of liberal peace principles

Are liberal peace principles viable for post-war settings? In terms of the dominant paradigm of liberal philosophy, international actors emphasise the basic liberal principles of democratic government, respect for human rights, freedom of expression and equality. A strong argument can be made that democracy *is* the most appropriate form of government for the establishment and safeguarding of peace and stability and prevention of future violent conflict. However, as noted previously, for democracy to work, it has to be built by local actors and citizens of post-war countries, not imposed by outsiders. In addition, instead of replicating Western governance models, democratic and governance models need to be adjusted to local conditions, customs, traditions and needs if necessary.

The second component of the liberal peace framework – neo-liberal economics – is not the best solution for post-war countries. For decades, neo-liberalism has been the dominant paradigm in the development discourse and was often imposed on 'third world' countries by Western powers and IFIs. Instead of contributing to poverty eradication, livelihood improvements, economic development and growth, neo-liberal policies worsened already difficult socio-economic conditions in the developing world and led to further increase in poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. Furthermore, marginalisation of the state in the economic and public spheres and promotion of small government has in most cases limited the capacity of developing country governments and institutions to address socio-economic problems and contributed to decline of their legitimacy.

Since the end of the Cold War, post-war countries that experienced externally driven PWRD have faced the same above mentioned developmental challenges. As part of the externally driven liberal peace framework, economic reconstruction and development efforts by the international community have been based on the neo-liberal ideas and prescriptions -

development of free market economies, reduction of state's role in the economy and social spending cuts. In post-war countries experiencing externally driven PWRD, citizens and political elites have not been allowed to freely choose economic and governance systems that were established and developed in the aftermath of war. Instead, the choices were influenced and often imposed by powerful Western countries and IFIs.

Over the last two decades, there has been a significant difference between various international development actors and approaches to development that they promote. For example, human and people-centred development is promoted by organisations such as the UN and many of its agencies, while IFIs and major Western powers primarily promote neo-liberal economics and development. However, even though a number of global institutions and development actors promote alternative development approaches, the development discourse has been and continues to be dominated and dictated by the IFIs and powerful Western countries. They continue to primarily promote neo-liberalism as the cure for all ills in developing, fragile and post-war countries. Moreover, even though the neo-liberal approach has evolved over the years and adopted the notion of sustainable development and 'buzzwords' such as local capacity building, participation and ownership, it still does not differ considerably from the Washington Consensus and past neo-liberal approaches, frameworks, ideas and principles. Most significantly, neo-liberalism has failed to address power inequalities and structural factors that determine development strategies and approaches in the developing world.

Peace-building after war requires extensive spending on short-to-medium-term social programmes in order to provide meaningful peace dividends in the form of livelihood improvements and basic services and consolidate and sustain peace and stability. Based on the Bosnian case study and corroborated by experiences of many other countries, it is evident that the externally driven PWRD and liberal peace framework imposed on countries recovering from war have time and again failed to contribute positively to peace-building efforts, deal with poverty and inequality, improve livelihoods and economic conditions and lead to development and growth. In most cases, inequalities, poverty and dependence on foreign aid were increased while welfare and basic services were reduced. Furthermore, while post-war settings require strong states able to provide services and welfare and improve livelihoods of struggling populations, the neo-liberal economic model has undermined and limited the state and its power in post-war countries.

Instead of neo-liberal blueprints, prescriptions and impositions, short-to-medium-term priorities in post-war countries need to be livelihood improvements, provision of basic services and welfare and creation of employment opportunities. In the medium-to-long-run, instead of having to follow external instructions and impositions, countries need to be allowed to find their own way to develop, based on local capacities, potential and needs. Local actors need to be allowed to determine their own development priorities and play key roles in design and implementation of reconstruction and development programmes and projects. This, however, will be difficult to achieve since post-war countries significantly depend on foreign aid and assistance and cannot escape external influence in domestic socio-economic and political affairs.

6.8 Internally driven and externally supported PWRD

Most countries emerging from years of fighting, war and destruction cannot rebuild and develop without external support and assistance. However, instead of externally driven PWRD or local actors working on their own, there is a need for more integrated approaches and practices. Local actors know more about problems and needs in their countries and (often) care more about the future of their societies than outsiders. At the same time, external actors often have capacity and funding to assist.

Insistence by the majority of international experts and organisations that external actors are central to peace, stability and economic reconstruction and development in post-war countries is not supported by evidence. Instead of continuing with the same externally designed and driven approaches and practices and implementing operations that are even more intrusive and interventionist than the previous ones, there is a need to fundamentally change the structure of post-war operations. Local actors, voices and ideas need to be allowed to come to the fore and meaningfully contribute to the rebuilding and reconstruction of their societies. Locals need to take the lead when it comes to designing and driving of PWRD processes and interventions and deciding what kinds of socio-economic and political systems are built in their countries in the aftermath of war. Instead of imposing their visions, ideas and blueprints, external actors need to work with locals and complement their efforts.

This proposal for internally driven and externally supported PWRD is in line with a number of development and post-war recovery approaches and frameworks discussed in chapter two.

Like internally driven PWRD, people-centred development is development from below or from within, where local actors and people act as agents responsible for development and livelihood improvements. This approach follows an understanding that different people and societies have different historical and cultural experiences, contexts, visions and needs and may want to develop in distinctive ways informed by local knowledge and needs. People-centred development calls for a 'greater local control, accountability, initiative, and self-reliance… the people are encouraged to mobilise and manage their own local resources, with government [and other development actors] in an enabling role' (Korten 1987: 145-6). Moreover, the internally driven and externally supported PWRD calls for genuine local participation and empowerment. In the development context, these refer to the local contribution and empowerment during development efforts and initiatives, including giving local people a decision-making role and allowing them to initiate actions they see appropriate for their settings.

This proposal is also in line with the emancipatory model of liberal peace, which emphasises local ownership and bottom-up PWRD. The main aim of the emancipatory model is provision of basic necessities to the population, promotion of social justice and establishment of a governance system based on the liberal and democratic principles or a hybrid system that mixes liberal and democratic principles with local traditional structures. In the same way, the light footprint approach to PWRD refers to a minimal involvement in decision- and policy-making in post-war countries by external actors and allows local initiatives and ownership. Finally, post-liberal peace aims to offer an alternative to externally designed and driven blueprints and impositions, combining external expertise and funds with local agency, ideas and initiatives in a cooperative and non-hegemonic manner.

Even though the internally driven and externally supported PWRD has theoretical backing in both the development and post-war recovery literature, its implementation will remain a challenge. The people-centred development approach, while sound, demanded in many developing countries and backed by organisations such as the UN, has struggled to come to prominence due to the dominance of neo-liberalism. In the same way, while the emancipatory model of liberal peace and light footprint approach exist in theory and policy documents of some external actors, they are yet to be used constructively in practice in PWRD operations. It is important to remain realistic and remember that neo-liberalism remains the dominant approach that shapes development thinking and planning globally. This means that both

people-centred development and internally driven PWRD 'will remain limited by broader structural factors' in the near future (Willis 2011: 233). Nevertheless, academics, development experts and practitioners need to continue attempting to make development and post-war recovery approaches and practices more inclusive, integrated and locally driven.

An important practical question is whether it is realistic to expect that bilateral and multilateral international donors will provide funding and allow locals to design and drive post-war recovery processes. It may be idealistic to expect that donors – most of whom provide assistance to post-war countries because they have geopolitical, strategic, security, economic and other interests to do so – will provide financial aid and technical assistance to post-war countries but not insist on driving PWRD processes. Given the fact that international relations are based on realism, which leads governments to act not according to the moral and legal principles but by considerations of power and advancement of national interests, it may be overly idealistic, indeed, to expect external actors, particularly those from the West, to provide funds but allow locals to design and drive PWRD processes.

However, significant global shifts have been taking place over the last decade and this may influence post-war recovery efforts in many countries in the future. It is doubtful that the Western hegemony in global institutions can remain as influential as it has been over the decades due to the rise of countries such as China, India and Brazil. China is already one of the main contributors of foreign aid and assistance to the developing world and many post-war countries. War-torn countries rich in natural resources do not depend solely on Western aid and assistance but can receive the same from China. Most importantly, unlike the Western aid, Chinese aid and assistance come without political conditions attached in the sense that the recipients do not have to conform to the Chinese policy prescriptions and reforms. This means that in resource-rich countries, internally driven and externally supported PWRD could become a reality. Western governments and IFIs under their control will have to adapt to these global changes in order to remain relevant and influential in many parts of the world.

6.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, findings derived from in-depth interviews in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland were analysed, compared and contrasted with the data, concepts, ideas and arguments from the literature review and contextual background chapters. The first section

provided an analysis and discussion about each case. Section two reflected on the analysis and discussion about each individual case as well as previous chapters in order to conceptualise the data and present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD. Section three discussed the viability of liberal peace principles and prospects for an internally driven and externally supported approach to post-war reconstruction and development. The next chapter will conclude the study, discuss limitations and contributions of the research, offer practical recommendations for improvements in future PWRD processes and operations and provide recommendations for future research about post-war reconstruction and development.

Chapter Seven – Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter will reflect on the study, key findings and limitations of the research. It will discuss the contribution of the study and offer practical recommendations for improvements in future PWRD processes and operations. The chapter will also provide recommendations for future research about post-war reconstruction and development.

This study focused on post-civil war recovery operations and processes. Looking at Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland, the study explored and assessed strengths, weaknesses and potential of externally and internally driven PWRD and the ways post-war practices and approaches can be improved in order to bring lasting peace and socio-economic stability in countries emerging from war. The study also aimed to explore the nature and practicality of an improved/alternative approach to PWRD.

Post-war reconstruction and development is a relatively new phenomenon, emerging in its current form only in the aftermath of the Cold War. Over the last two decades, post-war recovery – including socio-economic reconstruction, development, peace-building, state-building and security sector reform – came to be seen as key tasks for the international community and various international organisations, aiming to promote political and socio-economic recovery and development in war-torn countries. Stated aim of PWRD processes and operations is to create stability, establish long-term peace, reconstruct infrastructure and economy, improve livelihoods and welfare of the population and prevent return of violent conflict in the future.

However, since the early 1990s, externally driven operations have not led to lasting peace and stability, establishment of functioning institutions, eradication of poverty, livelihood improvements and economic reconstruction and development. All too often, programmes, policies and 'solutions' were designed and imposed by external actors either because they worked elsewhere or because they were influenced by geopolitical, economic and/or security interests of powerful countries. Furthermore, external actors have tended to assume that generic approaches based on the liberal peace framework can work in all places, while ignoring local actors, contexts and knowledge. At the same time, internally driven attempts were either ignored or suppressed by international analysts, experts, academics and organisations working on PWRD.

7.1 Summary of key findings

Countries ravaged by civil wars face massive challenges on the road to recovery and stability. In most cases, they lack funds and capacity for reconstruction, development, livelihood improvements and delivery of basic services. Since the end of the Cold War, the remedy offered to war-torn countries by international donors and organisations have been approaches and processes that focus exclusively on external actors and experts creating stability and institutions, building peace and working on economic reconstruction and development. However, to this day, external actors have not been able to build 'positive peace' in any war-torn country, despite the extensive financial and technical help and support from donors and international organisations. There are numerous reasons for this, from the use of rigid blueprints and ready-made 'solutions' based on the work in other countries, ideological underpinnings that favour Western-style neo-liberal norms, values and institutions, paternalistic behaviour and assumptions that outsiders know best, to the lack of knowledge about local conditions, history, structures of power and socio-economic relations and realities.

This study has shown that whether it is economic reconstruction, state-building, democratisation or peace-building, externally designed and driven programmes do not lead to livelihood improvements, development, good governance and lasting peace and stability. External impositions inevitably undermine local institutions, ownership and accountability, damage local political relations and create dependencies on foreign aid and assistance. Moreover, post-war programmes, policies and reforms that are designed and implemented without input from local actors will not be sustained in the long-run.

While external support and assistance are often necessary to start post-war recovery, long-term reconstruction, development and stability depend on local capacity to govern and plan, design and implement socio-economic projects and programmes. The key principle driving post-war recovery and stabilisation efforts should be to empower citizens and elites in post-war countries to decide on their own what kinds of economic, political and governance systems and structures are appropriate for their context. Outsiders can and should offer assistance and incentives but local people need to be able to define their own future. Instead of imposing externally designed 'solutions' and policy prescriptions, international donors and organisations need to support progressive forces in post-war countries and use aid conditionality to encourage reforms, but allow local actors to design and drive PWRD

processes.

In terms of economic reconstruction and development, instead of imposing 'one-size-fits-all' economic theories and approaches developed by outsiders, external actors need to help local actors to establish their own development priorities and come up with locally designed ways to reconstruct and develop in line with the people-centred approach to development. Furthermore, instead of focusing on macro-economic stability and fiscal balance, post-war countries need immediate peace dividends in the form of livelihood improvements, basic services and employment opportunities. In the short-run, peace and stability can be protected by peacekeepers or through extensive spending on security forces, but for a long-term solution, better standards of living, delivery of basic services and job creation are key. In the medium-to-long-run, countries need to be allowed to find their own way to develop, based on local capacities, potential and needs instead of following external instructions and impositions. Ultimately, lasting peace and stability can only be achieved through the efforts of local people and political elites. Instead of imposing their ideas and visions, external actors need to support local initiatives.

In many post-war settings political elites are not interested in good governance, livelihood improvements and broad-based development. However, it is wrong to assume that, if external actors do not intervene to 'save' countries ravaged by war and design and drive post-war recovery operations, these countries will never stabilise, reconstruct and develop. Local actors and their initiatives *can* lead to peace, stability, reconstruction, reconciliation, establishment of functioning institutions and multi-party democracy.

Finally, rather than developing a universal sequence of events and blueprints for PWRD, each case needs to be assessed on its own and specific sequences, priorities, contextual processes and programmes need to be designed for each setting. Further, instead of 'quick fixes,' there is a need for long-term commitment to reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building in order to bring about meaningful change and prevent future outbreaks of fighting. Most importantly, the end goal of PWRD processes and operations should always be building of lasting peace and sustainable political, social, economic and security improvements, and not only the mere absence of fighting and violence. This is necessary since without economic reconstruction, development and institutional and political reforms after war, it is unlikely that there can be lasting peace.

7.2 Contribution of the study

This study differs from the existing research about post-war reconstruction and development. The majority of existing publications focus primarily on externally driven approaches, processes and experiences, paying slight or no attention to internally driven PWRD. In contrast, focusing on Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland, this study has critically and comprehensively assessed strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven operations and processes. Furthermore, in this study, internally driven PWRD in Somaliland was systematically and extensively contrasted with externally driven efforts and operations.

Most of the literature on PWRD since the end of the Cold War has ignored issues and factors such as political economy of foreign aid and national and geopolitical interests of international donors. To understand the links between the interests of powerful countries, political economy of foreign aid and post-war recovery, it was necessary to consult the literature which deals exclusively with foreign aid and international politics. Contrary to other studies and publications, this study has made connections between all important issues and factors that in one way or another influence the thinking and decisions behind PWRD operations, practices and approaches.

Most of the literature that deals with post-war recovery, economic reconstruction and development since the early 1990s does not make an explicit link between the record of neo-liberalism and its suitability for economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war. This is a major flaw because neo-liberalism has had a profound influence on externally driven PWRD and liberal peace framework. If other authors had critically interrogated the record of neo-liberal policies and approaches and examined their track record in the developing world since the 1980s, this may have led them to question if similar policies, programmes and impositions were appropriate for countries ravaged by war – countries that are in most cases in even worse shape socially, economically and politically than poor developing countries. This study, on the other hand, has critically examined the record of neo-liberalism and demonstrated its unsuitability for post-war reconstruction and development.

This study has challenged the way the 'mainstream' actors, academics, experts and policy-makers have been approaching PWRD since the end of the Cold War. It has put in context

and critically explored experiences of countries that went through externally and internally driven as well a mix of externally and internally driven PWRD in order to unpack results and practices, recommend improvements to current approaches and explore the possibility and practicality of internally driven and externally supported post-war recovery operations. Furthermore, the study has moved away from abstract and rhetorical proclamations about potential of internally driven PWRD and showed through the case of Somaliland that internally driven post-war efforts can lead to peace, reconciliation, reconstruction, stability and establishment of a society based on liberal principles.

This study has proposed an internally driven and externally supported approach to PWRD. Key findings derived from the study show that instead of continuing with the same externally designed and driven approaches and practices and only improving the implementation and providing more international experts and funds, there is a need to fundamentally change the structure of post-war operations and allow local actors, voices and ideas to come to the fore and meaningfully contribute to rebuilding and reconstruction of their societies. This approach would allow local elites and people in post-war countries to take the lead when it comes to designing and driving of PWRD processes and interventions and deciding what kinds of socio-economic and political systems should be built in their countries in the aftermath of war. Instead of imposing their visions, ideas and blueprints, external actors would work with locals and complement their efforts.

Finally, the existing literature about PWRD is mainly written by Western authors, experts, academics and policy-makers. Most of them support externally driven interventions and operations and imposition of ready-made 'solutions' to complex problems in countries recovering from war. This study provides a comprehensive non-Western perspective to the existing body of literature.

7.3 Limitations of the study

This study has a number of limitations. Listed below are limitations and shortcomings and explanations how their impact on the study was minimised:

- Lack of non-Western primary and secondary sources on PWRD – The majority of primary and secondary sources on post-war reconstruction and development are

written by Western experts and academics. Still, throughout the research process, a number of non-Western sources were located, consulted and incorporated in the literature review and contextual background chapters;

- Subjectivity – During the extensive review of the literature, the author came across overwhelming evidence that externally driven PWRD is not working and creating stability in countries emerging from war. This has substantially influenced his thinking and preparation for field research and interviews. Still, to limit subjectivity and bias, the author has kept an open mind throughout the research process and based the findings solely on the data collected through literature review and field research;

- This study has focused on PWRD in three countries – South Sudan, Somaliland and Bosnia. It would be beneficial if the study included extensive background about wars in each country, such as causes of wars, parties involved, pre-war and wartime socio-economic and political dynamics and approaches that led to end of each war. However, doing this would make the study too extensive and unfocused. The approach taken in this study, where the focus is on the period after the formal end of war, is in line with other studies and publications about PWRD;

- Focus on only three countries – Since the early 1990s, many countries have experienced violent conflict and subsequent post-war recovery operations. However, due to the space, time and financial limitations, as well as the need to keep the study focused, it was not possible to focus on more than three countries;

- Urban bias – Field research for this study was conducted mainly in the capitals of Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland. Only in Bosnia the author was able to visit other cities apart from the capital (and even neighbouring Serbia) and interview respondents about PWRD. Even though this is a significant limitation, the author was not able to travel extensively in Somaliland and South Sudan due to financial and security constraints.

7.4 Recommendations for future PWRD processes and operations

This section will offer practical recommendations for improvements in future PWRD processes and operations.

7.4.1 Ending violent conflict

Even though negotiations to end violent conflict are not the focus of this study, it is evident that they are crucial for the success of PWRD. Negotiations should always be about local parties coming to an agreement, with or without international mediators, that deals with their issues and disputes and accommodates all in a future setup in the country. Local parties have a lot at stake and they should be the ones to decide their future. External actors can help in this process through mediation and even diplomatic pressures and threats of sanctions, but they should not impose solutions or entirely draft agreements and impose them on local parties, as happened in Bosnia. The only way local parties will implement an agreement is if they draft and write it - in other words, if they fully own it. Anything else will not lead to stability and lasting peace.

7.4.2 Prioritisation of security

While security after war is one of the main priorities in order to prevent future outbreaks of fighting and violence and prepare the ground for reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building, disproportionate focus on security while other aspects of PWRD are sidelined will not lead to lasting peace and stability. Ultimately, peace dividends in the form of livelihood improvements, basic services and employment opportunities are of paramount importance on the road to recovery and stability in the aftermath of war. In the short-run, peace and stability can be protected by peacekeepers or through extensive spending on security forces, but for a long-term solution, better standards of living, delivery of basic services and job creation are the key.

7.4.3 Transitional justice and reconciliation

Transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms can help peace-building, reconciliation and repair of fractured relationships among former adversaries. This can be in the form of restorative justice (such as truth and reconciliation commissions) or retributive justice (prosecution in domestic or international courts) or a combination of both. In the three cases that were the focus of this study, transitional justice mechanisms either focused solely on retributive justice without paying attention how that affected reconciliation and peace-

building (Bosnia), or were ignored. This is likely to negatively affect long-term reconciliation and peace-building prospects in Bosnia and South Sudan; the situation is to some extent different in Somaliland, as the split from Somalia and internal peace-building and reconciliation allowed people to move on without transitional justice. Most importantly, transitional justice mechanisms should always be planned and structured to maximise the prospects of reconciliation and peace instead of contributing further to animosity and divisions.

7.4.4 Civil society promotion

Establishment of a strong and independent civil society is very important in the aftermath of war. Local civil society can contribute to peace-building, reconciliation, promotion of human rights, good governance, accountability and poverty alleviation. However, instead of being voices of the population and genuine campaigners for better life for all, local NGOs and civil society organisations are often established primarily to attract foreign funds and implement donor agendas. In most cases, local organisations have to implement what donors want, not what they think is needed and necessary in their communities and countries.

7.4.5 African Union's contribution to PWRD on the continent

As noted in the literature review, while the AU has sound policy documents for post-war recovery on the continent, such as NEPAD's 'African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework,' the AU and NEPAD lack resources and capacity to implement the framework and help African countries recover after war. If the AU wants to remain credible and offer concrete support to African countries, it would need to move from rhetoric and writing of policy frameworks and begin to implement them in practice. In addition, African countries need to start contributing funds to the AU so the continental body does not remain fully dependent on Western donors for all its activities.

7.4.6 Liberal peace framework in post-war countries

The field research in three countries recovering from war and interviews with forty-five key

informants who have been/are personally involved in or have experienced post-war recovery processes and operations in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland have led to an interesting observation about the liberal peace framework. Even though this framework has shaped all externally driven PWRD operations and interventions since the end of the Cold War and has significantly influenced academic and policy writing about PWRD in general, it remains a largely unknown concept in post-war countries. Only five out of forty-five respondents interviewed for this study were familiar with the concept of liberal peace (all international officials and mainly in Bosnia). If this concept is used to decide the future of post-war countries, it should be presented to the public in these countries and debated, instead of only being framed and reframed by a small group of foreign experts and policy-makers.

7.4.7 Post-war vs. post-conflict

Ever since Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced 'post-conflict peace-building' in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, the majority of academics, policy-makers, experts and media have used the term 'post-conflict' to describe the period after the end of war. However, the use of this term is problematic. Conflict is part of human relations and will never be entirely eliminated. Conflict and animosity between adversaries do not stop overnight, if ever, with the formal announcement of the end of civil war and hostilities. In some cases, conflict continues through small-scale violence and proxy fighting, while in other cases it can move from the battleground to political institutions. Due to all these reasons, it is recommended that researchers start using the term 'post-war' instead of the mainstream term 'post-conflict.' The term 'post-war' refers to the period after the formal end of armed conflict, whether through a negotiated settlement or military victory by one side.

7.4.8 Post-war reconstruction and development and the discipline of Development Studies

As noted before, economic reconstruction and development are integral parts of post-war recovery efforts. Without reconstruction, inclusive development and livelihood improvements after war, it is unlikely that there can be lasting stability and peace. While PWRD fits well within the discipline of Development Studies and even though a lot can be learned from past

and current development theories, approaches and efforts, development experts and practitioners should not try to fit post-war reconstruction and development into the existing development theories and approaches as it has been the case with externally driven PWRD since the 1990s. Reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war are arguably far more challenging than development efforts in poor and developing countries. Apart from poverty and lack of development, war-torn countries are faced with other challenges such as wartime destruction, displacement, animosity and hatred.

Effective PWRD requires approaches that do not undermine peace, security and social stability. Such approaches need to emerge from research about post-war countries with the need for peace dividends in mind. Furthermore, post-war reconstruction and development approaches have to develop in conjunction with post-war state-building, peace-building, conflict management and reconciliation approaches, practices and efforts.

7.4.9 Integrated approach to PWRD

In countries recovering from war, reconstruction and development go hand-in-hand with peace-building and state-building. They are all interconnected and crucial for post-war recovery, stability and prevention of future violent conflicts. Without post-war peace, security and stability, significant socio-economic development, reconciliation or respect for human rights are unlikely. At the same time, without physical, social and political reconstruction, economic development and equitable provision of basic services, it is difficult to build and consolidate a stable and peaceful society after war. In addition, post-war peace-building and state-building often go hand-in-hand and cannot be separated in both research and practice. State institutions will not be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the population if they are unable to provide peace, security, stability and basic welfare.

The reality in countries attempting to recover from war requires incorporation of all these aspects and fields if interventions and operations are to be successful. If experts, academics and practitioners want to help countries emerging from war, they cannot afford to limit thinking, research and exploration to their distinctive fields only. They have to reach across different fields if that can potentially improve their understanding of important topics and lead to concepts, findings and recommendations that can make a real difference.

7.5 Recommendations for future research

This section will offer recommendations for future research about PWRD:

- The focus of this study was on medium-to-long term aspects of PWRD. The study did not focus on the humanitarian aspect as its purpose is not to promote medium-to-long term reconstruction and development but only to offer immediate short-term help to vulnerable people. Future research needs to focus on the humanitarian aspect and its impact on PWRD, especially in terms of delivery of basic services, livelihood improvements and creation of dependencies on humanitarian assistance;

- It would be beneficial if future research focuses on the impact of international peacekeeping on PWRD efforts and medium-to-long term stability in the aftermath of war;

- As noted in the previous section, instead of applying existing development theories and approaches to post-war settings, post-war reconstruction and development approaches need to emerge from research about post-war countries. Future research should focus on development of approaches that do not undermine peace, security and social stability in the aftermath of war;

- Further research is needed to explore in detail the nature and practicality of internally driven and externally supported PWRD;

- Future research should explore the impact of global shifts that have taken place over the last decade (most notably the rise of China) and how this may influence post-war recovery efforts in the future;

- Future research needs to explore a possible integration of various academic fields – from development studies, economics, political science, sociology, peace studies to conflict transformation and management - and establishment of an integrated conceptual PWRD framework.

7.6 Conclusion

Focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan and Somaliland, this exploratory

qualitative study critically explored and assessed both externally and internally driven post-war reconstruction and development practices and operations. The aim of the study was to understand the strengths and shortcomings of both approaches and offer recommendations for future improvements.

The study has shown that whether it is economic reconstruction, state-building, democratisation or peace-building, externally designed and driven programmes do not lead to livelihood improvements, development, good governance and lasting peace and stability. While external support and assistance are often necessary for post-war recovery, long-term reconstruction, development and stability depend on local capacity to govern and plan, design and implement projects and programmes. Key findings derived from the study show that there is a need to fundamentally change the structure of post-war operations and allow local actors, voices and ideas to come to the fore and meaningfully contribute to rebuilding and reconstruction of their societies.

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Appendices

Appendix I - Author's qualifications and motivation

Savo Heleta holds BA degrees in History and Business Management from Saint John's University in Minnesota, United States (2006) and an MPhil degree in Conflict Transformation and Management from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2009). His primary research interests are violent conflict and civil wars, conflict transformation and management and post-war recovery.

Since August 2007, the author has focused his research activities primarily on violent conflict and post-war reconstruction and development in Sudan and South Sudan. He has given numerous talks, lectures and presentations on Sudan, South Sudan, Bosnia and conflict and post-war issues in Africa. He has written and published extensively in newspapers, magazines and online media in Sudan, South Africa, Europe, Middle East and the United States. Since February 2009, the author has worked as an advisor and facilitator on the South Sudan Executive Leadership Programme at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

Author's passion for conflict management and post-war recovery has been shaped by his wartime experience during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. He is the author of *Not My Turn to Die: Memoirs of a Broken Childhood in Bosnia* (March 2008, AMACOM Books, New York). In the book, the author gives a testimony about the suffering in his childhood and demonstrates the personal struggle and search for the strength to choose peace, reconciliation and hope over hatred and revenge. Furthermore, author's interest in post-war recovery emerged while completing MPhil in Conflict Transformation and Management. The author came to a realisation that, while ending violent conflicts and wars is very important, the formal end of fighting is only a small step towards long-term peace and stability. This can only be achieved through substantial reconstruction, development, peace-building and state-building after war.

Appendix II - Interview guides

Note: In this study, broad interview guides were used for field research. The guides provided a list of themes and issues to be covered in the interviews. Different guides were prepared – a general guide about PWRD and specific guides about Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland - based on the extensive literature review. In most cases, additional questions emerged during the conversation with respondents. Furthermore, respondents had a chance to bring up issues they thought were important but were not covered by the below questions.

General questions

- How do you define a successful post-war reconstruction and development operation? How to measure success of these operations?

- How do you explain the fact that since the end of the Cold War, out of many externally driven attempts to reconstruct and develop societies emerging from violent conflict around the world, there seem to be only a few relative success stories and many failures?

- Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) say that post-war reconstruction and development 'require programmes to create a strong state quickly… provide security… protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies and combat poverty and inequality.' Doing all this quickly? Is this realistic?

- Externally driven state-building and democracy promotion imply compressing processes that have taken centuries in Western Europe into a few years. Can this realistically work?

- In many cases, local actors often have limited or no say on matters related to the future of their country (Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor are some of the prime examples). Have we not seen something similar during the colonial days? Colonial and imperial policies did not lead to stability and prosperity anywhere in the

world. How can anyone expect that these failed intrusive approaches and methods will somehow work this time?

- Do you think externally imposed socio-economic and political 'solutions' can work in the long-run?

- While most analysts and experts who write about post-war reconstruction and development argue that 'one-size-fits-all' interventions do not work, they are being used again and again. Some call this 'try again, fail again, fail better' method. What needs to happen in order for external actors to realise that these methods are nothing but very expensive failures?

- It is argued that Western experts, often lacking basic knowledge of what is happening or what the real needs are in post-war societies, are making major decisions in/for these societies through generalised advices and so-called best practices. How can we expect any improvements in these societies when those who make decisions do not know much about post-war countries?

- The importance of the involvement of internal actors and local ownership of PWRD processes are often highlighted by Western government officials and international donors and organisations and can be found in all policy documents. In practice, however, post-war reconstruction and development interventions around the world are externally driven. Is this contributing to the high rate of failures and lack of sustainability of post-war operations and processes? Should this be changed?

- Western governments, international organisations and NGOs all talk about accountability. However, their policies and programmes seem to be undermining rather than improving accountability in post-war societies. In the current externally driven post-war reconstruction and development setup, apart from local actors becoming accountable to donors and not the local population, there do not exist mechanisms that would make donors and other international actors accountable to local people. What message is being sent to local officials and population with this?

- There is no question that a functioning democracy is better than authoritarianism, totalitarianism and dictatorship. However, is externally driven imposition of liberal market democracy in war-ravaged countries and expectation that this can take hold in

a few years reasonable and sustainable?

- Do you think that externally driven liberal peace framework is the only option for post-war countries in the quest for recovery, stability and peace?

- Some authors argue that for a state to be seen as legitimate by the citizens, state-building process must be designed, owned and implemented by local actors, not outsiders. Do you agree with the above statement? Please explain your answer.

- Many analysts argue that since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, most policies on in-conflict and post-war societies are about providing protection for the Western world rather than addressing problems in these societies. Is this helping or undermining recovery in post-war societies? Will this lead to a safer or more dangerous world?

Bosnia

- Where is Bosnia 15 years after the war and extensive involvement by the international community? How stable is the country socially, politically and economically?

- What is your opinion about local politics and governance in post-war Bosnia?

- Between 1996 and 2000, the international community spent US $1,200 per person on reconstruction of Bosnia (compare that to US $275 per person in today's dollars spent in Western Europe through the Marshal Plan after the Second World War). Yet, externally driven post-war recovery and specifically economic reconstruction and development in Bosnia are seen by a number of analysts as failures. What is the problem in Bosnia? Wrong programmes and policies imposed from the outside or something else?

- While Bosnia is formally an independent and sovereign country, in reality, it has been a trusteeship of the United States and European Union for many years. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia has had the power to directly impose legislation and dismiss elected government officials and civil servants, while the EU and US bureaucrats and administrators have had the final say over policy-making in Bosnia.

However, when things do not work out, local politicians and population are blamed as being too nationalist and backward. The international community does not accept any blame for its policies. Who should be held accountable for the failures?

- In Bosnia, the international community, looking for 'quick fixes' to complex problems, decided to marginalise local politicians and population and impose major laws, reforms and policies and even dismiss democratically elected politicians. Can such approach lead to sustainable democratic governance and lasting peace?

- In Bosnia, the aim of external actors was/is to 'transform society and social relations and change people's behaviours and attitudes,' as one analyst puts it. Is this too intrusive and paternalistic? What do you think the aims of these methods and policies are? Is it not naïve to expect that everyone in the world will change behaviours and attitudes and accept Western norms and values?

- How sustainable are economic and governance reforms and laws that were imposed by the international community?

- How far is Bosnia in terms of peace-building and reconciliation?

- Do you think externally driven 'nation-building' is sustainable? Can outsiders build a nation for Bosnians?

- What are key challenges facing Bosnia on the road to lasting peace, stability and development?

South Sudan

- How much did local authorities do in terms of livelihood improvements and post-war recovery since 2005?

- How far is South Sudan in terms of state-building?

- How far is South Sudan in terms of peace-building and reconciliation?

- In South Sudan, the international community focused primarily on humanitarian assistance and not on reconstruction and development between 2005 and 2011. Would

the situation be better today if there were more reconstruction and development efforts by external actors?

- Local capacity building is lauded by external actors as the key for long-term PWRD success. Yet, in South Sudan, the region that has started from scratch in almost every sense of the term after the peace agreement was signed in 2005, the international community earmarked just over US $20 million for capacity building. If local capacity building is important, why is it being ignored in practice?

- The World Bank, as one of the key international institutions dealing with PWRD, administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, seen by many as a complete failure. Of the US $524 million given by donors and the government of South Sudan to the fund since 2005, only $181 million has been spent by 2010. The main reason for this was complicated bureaucracy and red tape at the World Bank headquarters. Is the World Bank (the same goes for the UN and other international organisations) competent to run such important programmes? What should happen when they fail, as in the case of South Sudan? Who should be held accountable and what should that entail?

- What are key challenges facing South Sudan on the road to lasting peace, stability and development?

Somaliland

- Over the last two decades, many countries recovering from war have not been able to create stability and build peace despite the extensive financial help and technical assistance from the international community. Somaliland, on the other hand, has done this on its own, with hardly any support from the outside apart from its own Diaspora. What were the key reasons for this?

- Democratisation process in Somaliland took place without external pressures. This ensured that the democratic system which emerged reflects local cultural norms and not [only] Western norms and values. Do you agree with the above statement? Do you think that this locally driven democratic system is more sustainable than the ones that

are imposed by outsiders?

- A number of analysts think that the post-war recovery success in Somaliland is due to a number of factors: peace-building and reconstruction processes were home-grown and bottom-up, rooted in local culture, customs and traditions and emerged from the grassroots while being fully internally driven and owned. At the same time in Somalia, the international community has organised fourteen externally driven peace initiatives and spent billions of US dollars since 1991 but to this day Somalia is still an example of complete state failure. Is Somaliland a unique case or does the internally driven post-war recovery, supported by the international community, have a better chance of success than intrusive externally driven operations?

- Some analysts argue that post-1991 Somaliland presents an 'innovative way' for social, political and economic reconstruction and development after a long period of unrest, instability and war. Do you agree with the above statement? What can other African countries learn from Somaliland's post-war recovery?

- How much did the international community contribute to post-war reconstruction and development in Somaliland?

- Some analysts argue that the lack of foreign aid has in many ways been a blessing for Somaliland, keeping foreign influences and impositions to a minimum. This has ensured that socio-political and governmental structures and institutions which have emerged after 1991 are rooted in the local tradition, culture and needs. What is your opinion about this?

- Depending on its population for most of its revenue, the government of Somaliland, to a significant extent, has to be accountable to its citizens. This differs in countries that are dependent on donor aid, where governments are often more accountable to donors than the population. If Somaliland becomes an internationally recognised country in the future and starts receiving large amounts of foreign aid and assistance, could this have a negative effect on the relationship between the government and people? How can this be prevented?

- How stable is Somaliland today? What are the current socio-political and economic challenges facing the region?

Appendix III – Informed consent form

NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Participant's full name: _____

ID or passport number and email address: _____

_____

I was invited to participate in the below-mentioned research project undertaken by Savo Heleta, a DPhil candidate in Development Studies at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

Title of the research project:

Post-War Reconstruction and Development: A Collective Case Study

Principal investigator: **Savo Heleta**

The following aspects of the study have been explained to me, the participant:

Aims and objectives of the research:

- Assess the practices, shortcomings and potential of externally driven post-war reconstruction and development (PWRD);

- Assess the practices, shortcomings and potential of internally driven PWRD;

- Explore the nature and practicality of an alternative/improved approach to PWRD;

- Present key findings about externally and internally driven PWRD based on an extensive review of literature and field research in Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland;

- Offer recommendations to improve current PWRD practices.

Procedures:

I understand that the investigator will use semi-structured interviews and literary analysis to gather information about the field of post-war reconstruction and development and its practices, shortcomings and potential.

The data gathered through the interview will be used for a DPhil dissertation. I understand that the results of the research may be presented at conferences, published in specialist publications and communicated to the media, international organisations working in the PWRD field and academic community.

Possible risks:

- Participants revealing information that may harm them.

The principal investigator has advised me not to reveal any sensitive information that can put me in jeopardy after the research is made public.

Possible benefits:

- Better understanding of the field of post-war reconstruction and development;

- Contribution to the academic debate about the PWRD;

- Offering recommendations to improve current PWRD practices.

Confidentiality:

My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or scientific publications by the investigator. If I choose to give a permission to the principal investigator to use my name in the research report, I will sign a document that will serve as my written permission.

Access to findings:

As a participant, I will receive the final research report in an electronic form via email after the research project is completed.

My participation is voluntary and my decision whether or not to participate will in no way affect my present or future career/employment/lifestyle.

The information above was explained to me (the participant) by Savo Heleta in the English language and I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and all questions were answered satisfactorily.

No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I understand that I may withdraw at any stage without penalisation. Participation in this study will not result in any additional cost to myself.

I HEREBY VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROJECT.

Signed in _____ Date _____

Name of participant _____ Signature _____

Appendix IV - List of interviews

(sorted by countries and dates; all interviews conducted by Savo Heleta)

Bosnia

Head of a local NGO. Interview conducted in Visegrad, Bosnia, on 12 October 2010.

Local media executive. Interview conducted in Visegrad, Bosnia, on 12 October 2010.

Local government administrator. Interview conducted in Visegrad, Bosnia, on 13 October 2010.

Local official working for UNDP. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 19 October 2010.

Local official working for an international organisation. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 19 October 2010.

International official working for the OHR/EU office. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 October 2010.

Local political analyst working for an international think tank. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 October 2010.

Local expert working for the World Bank. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 October 2010.

Local NGO and civil society official. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 21 October 2010.

Local official working for an international organisation. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 22 October 2010.

High ranking OHR official. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 22 October 2010.

International political analyst working for an international organisation. Interview conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 22 October 2010.

Head of an international think tank. Interview conducted in Belgrade, Serbia, on 30 October 2010.

International official who worked in Bosnia. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 23 November 2010.

Local analyst and conflict management practitioner. Interview conducted in Belgrade, Serbia, on 10 July 2011.

South Sudan

Former South Sudanese diplomat. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 15 November 2010.

Former South Sudanese government official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 16 November 2010.

International official working for an international development agency. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 16 November 2010.

Director of an international company doing business in South Sudan. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 18 November 2010.

Conflict management lecturer at the University of Juba. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 19 November 2010.

German advisor to a GOSS ministry. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 19 November 2010.

Local NGO official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 19 November 2010.

Head of an international NGO that works in South Sudan. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 22 November 2010.

High-ranking UN official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 23 November 2010.

International official working for UNDP. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 23 November 2010.

International analyst working for an international think tank. Interview conducted via Skype from Nairobi, Kenya, on 10 February 2011.

County commissioner in one of South Sudan's states. Interview conducted in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on 22 June 2011.

International official working for an international NGO. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 13 October 2011.

Government official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 16 October 2011.

South Sudanese economist and government official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 29 October 2011.

Somaliland

Head of an international NGO that works in Somaliland. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 22 November 2010.

International Somaliland expert. Interview conducted via Skype from London, England, on 27 April 2011.

South African Somaliland expert. Interview conducted in Pretoria, South Africa, on 3 June 2011.

Researcher and analyst from Somaliland. Interview conducted in Pretoria, South Africa, on 4 June 2011.

Local researcher. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 7 November 2011.

Local government minister. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 7 November 2011.

The head of a local think tank. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 9 November 2011.

Local official working for an international aid agency. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 9 November 2011.

The head of a local women's NGO. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 10 November 2011.

Local researcher and political analyst. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 10 November 2011.

Official from a local women's network. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 9 November 2011.

Official from Somaliland's anti-corruption commission. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 10 November 2011.

International official working for an NGO in Somaliland. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 11 November 2011.

Local official working for an international NGO. Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 12 November 2011.

International aid worker. Interview conducted in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on 5 January 2012.

Other

Laurie Nathan. Interview conducted in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on 25 May 2011.

Appendix V - Basic statistics for Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland

Note: some statistics for South Sudan and Somaliland are not available. In addition, many of the statistics that are available are only estimates.

	Bosnia[84]	South Sudan[85]	Somaliland[86]
Population	3,879,296 (2012 est.)	10,625,176 (2012 est.)	3,500,000[87] (est.)
Poverty	18.6% (2007 est.)	50.6%	N/A
Unemployment	43.3%	N/A	47.4%
Literacy	97.9%	27%	45%
GDP	$31.57 billion (2011 est.)	$21.12 billion (2011 est.)	$2.10 billion (est.)
GDP per capita	$8,100 (2011 est.)	$2,100 (2011 est.)	$300 (est.)

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[84] CIA. The World Factbook. 2012

[85] CIA. The World Factbook. 2012.

[86] Somaliland's Ministry of National Planning and Development. 2011; Irin News. 20 May 2011.

[87] While the government reports claim that the population of Somaliland is 3,500,000, about half of them reside abroad (Jhazbhay 2009: 97).

**Appendix VI – Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Source: NationMaster

Appendix VII – Map of South Sudan

Source: International Crisis Group (2011b: 33)

Appendix VIII – Map of Somaliland

Source: Africa Confidential (1999)