

Social Identities of Immigrants

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Bridges or Barriers for their Attitudinal Integration into Politics in Germany?

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Abstract

The thesis is about immigrants' cognitive and psychological commitment to the political system in Germany. In the light of terrorist actions, migrant political integration has become one of the most pressing concerns of European immigration countries over the last years. More precisely, my dissertation focusses on the relationship between migrants' ethnic, religious, and national identity (i.e. psychological group memberships) and their attitudinal incorporation into the democratic political system of Germany. While national identity is perceived within public discourses as a bridge to migrants' psychological adaption to the mainstream political system, ethnic or religious identity are conceived as barriers. Thus, my main interest for the analyses is to evaluate how senses of belonging to the ethnic and religious minority group or the national majority affects recent and long-term immigrants' attitudes towards the self in German politics (i.e. being a Person who is interested in German politics), as well as attitudes towards the democratic regime (i.e. being satisfied with the democratic regime in Germany). Therefore, the thesis first assesses the conditions of identification with the national political community in Germany of recently arrived immigrants. Second, it examines the impact of national identity as well as ethnic identity on the inclination of recent as well as long-term immigrants to become interested in national politics in Germany. Thereby, I also discuss the meaning of a so-called dual ethno-national identity. Third, I analyse how religious (i.e. Muslim) identity relates to migrants' positive evaluations of the German democratic regime and how the impact is moderated by their ethnic, national group membership, as well as generational status.

Keywords: Political integration, social identification, immigrants, Germany

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<i>Theories</i>	
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SCT	Social Categorisation Theory
CVM	Civic Voluntarism Model
PCI	Politicised Collective Identity

<i>Hypotheses in Chapter 1</i>	
SC	Social Contact
L	Language
DS	Democracy Satisfaction
NI	National Identity
EI	Ethnic Identity
RI	Religious Identity
DI	Dual Identity
PI	Political Interest
TM	Turkish Migrants
PD	Perceived Discrimination

<i>Other</i>	
RC	Receiving Country
CO	Country of Origin
EU	European Union

<i>Data sources</i>	
GSOEP	German Socio-economic Panel
SCIP	Social-Cultural Integration Processes

Chapter 1: Migrants' Group Identities and Attitudinal Integration into Politics – Introduction, Overview, and General Framework

1.1 Introduction, motivation, and research questions of the doctoral thesis

Recurring events of terrorism since the early 2000s by Muslim extremists, e.g. witnessed in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and recently in France (2015) and Belgium (2016), as well as recurring occasions of political unrest by immigrant adolescents (e.g. in Paris), have raised public debates in Western Europe as well as in Germany on ethnic minorities' alleged failure to psychologically commit to the democratic political systems of European societies. Paradoxically, the terrorist attacks as well as most of the political activism currently committed in the support of political Islam, i.e. 'the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life' (Berman 2003, 257), and political unrest are commonly conducted by second- or even third-generation immigrants. These immigrants were born and raised within European societies' educational and social system, and they commonly possess national citizenship and know the receiving society's language. Thus, the search for the condition(s) under which ethnic minority group members become psychologically committed to or alienated from the political systems of European receiving societies or account for those outcomes has been gaining increasing momentum.

Against this paradoxically empirical background and puzzle, there have been raised contentious debates over the last years within the public and the media on the role of migrants' *national and ethno-cultural identity* that may account for their psychological engagement with politics of the receiving country (or the lack thereof)¹. It is generally assumed that migrants' ethnic or religious identities are psychological barriers for these individuals to become political actors within the realms and rules of the European receiving-country's political system. It is also believed that these identities prevent the development of favourable attitudes towards its democratic institutions, personnel, and government, as well as these regimes. Instead, they are suggested to foster the emergence of ethnic-group or homeland-based political orientations as well as political attitudes that run counter to the political objectives and secular values of current

¹ The terms "identity" and "identification" are used interchangeably within this dissertation to refer to an individual's self-ascribed psychological memberships in social categories: whereas national identification denotes identification with the receiving country, ethno-cultural identification refers to ethnic and religious identification. While the former refers to the identification with the ethnic community or the country of origin, the latter denotes the identification with the religious denomination or community.

European democracies that clearly separate religious from state powers. In consequence, and especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, there is, according to Modood (2003, 100), an ‘anti-Muslim wind blowing across the European continent’. This is also expressed in increasing levels of anti-Islamic attitudes among the native population that can be detected across European states, which is also referred to as Islamophobia (Helbling 2013; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Thus, for instance, 61% of German citizens have the opinion that Islam does not fit into the Western world, and 57% of non-Muslim German citizens perceive Islam as a threat due to different cultural values (Hafez and Schmidt 2015). These anxieties and phobias concerning cultural diversity through immigration also found their way into political institutions such as political parties in Germany. Thus, the recent draft of the party platform of the AFD (Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany]), clearly proposes that political Islam poses a threat to the free and democratic order. Furthermore, the draft states that ‘Islam does not belong to Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland 2016, 37). Additionally, more moderate voices and established parties within Germany, maintaining a Christian tradition, such as the Christian-Social Union (CSU), are becoming increasingly critical towards political Islam and migrant integration: ‘Wir müssen uns stärker und kritischer mit dem politischen Islam auseinandersetzen, denn er hintertreibt, dass sich Menschen bei uns integrieren [We need more and more critical to deal with political Islam, because it thwarts that people integrate with us]’². In contrast to immigrants’ ethno-cultural identities, it is assumed that the national identity of the receiving country – mainly defined culturally by its alleged Christian-occidental values and traditions (‘Leitkultur’) – provides the remedy and psychological bridge for immigrants to become psychologically integrated in the democratic political systems in Europe. This ‘retreat of multiculturalism’ (Joppke 2004) is also reflected at the cross-national European level within recent discussions on the failure of multicultural policies. Thus, Prime Minister David Cameron was claiming at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 that:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. [...] We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. [...] This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead [...] [to] a process of radicalisation. [...] instead of encouraging people to live apart,

² Secretary General of the CSU (Christian-Social Union) Anread Scheuer in an interview with the newspaper ‘Die Welt’ from April 22, 2016 (Vitzthum 2016).

*we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone
(Cameron 2011)*

The meaning of national identity for understanding multiculturalism is also emphasised by scholars. Hence, Modood (2007, 2) suggests that multiculturalism should be understood as combining ‘the recognition of group differences within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses [...] [with] a shared citizenship and national identity’.

Yet, despite the alleged culturally-based negative relationships between ethnic or religious identity and immigrants’ psychological accommodation in democratic political systems, and respective positive relationship between national identity and migrants’ democratic adaption as currently discussed in the wider public of European receiving societies, the precise meanings of those identities as well as the mechanisms that link them with migrants’ alienation or attachment to politics are often less unequivocal, and this is also true with respect to empirical evidence.

Current scholarly work on this topic is still far from conclusive and is lacking systematic research analysing migrants’ ethnic, religious, and national identity and migrants’ psychological integration into receiving-society politics. Indeed, existing research is characterised by considerations of varying strands of disciplines as well as various results that often contradict the simple equations drawn by the public concerning the impact of migrants’ religious or ethnic identity: Thus, there is an accumulation of grievance-based social movement research as well as group consciousness literature within Europe and the US, which supports that socially deprived and stigmatised ethnic and religious identities, as well as so-called dual identities, involving a combination of migrants’ ethnic or religious minority identity together with national identity, may have unique effects on immigrants’ cognitive intentions towards normative political action within host societies but also conventional policy-related participation such as voting (e.g. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001; ; Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008; e.g. US research on group consciousness: Shingles 1981; Verba et al. 1993). Moreover, cross-country research in Europe on religion and democracy satisfaction or trust in political institutions shows that Muslims evince nearly the same levels of trust in the government or even report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than non-Muslims in the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (cf. Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 93). Also, research among Muslim and Christian adolescents in the Netherlands by Grundel and Maliepaard (2012) does not indicate differences in democratic skills between both faith communities. Furthermore, European micro-level research on political attitudes such as political interest and political trust, which also accounts for identification with

the receiving society in their statistical analysis, has found independent positive effects of attachment to the native majority in addition to other integration factors such as majority language proficiency or social involvement with natives (e.g. Caballero 2009; Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 2010b). At the same time, the identification with the ethno-religious group is shown to have either no independent effects or additional negative effects on political trust-related measures (Caballero 2009; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013). However, there is also German-based research pointing to the opposite effects on political interest among Turks, indicating a negative effect of national identity and a positive effect of ethnic identity (Simon, Reichert, and Grabow 2013).

The current problems associated with previous research that prevent confident conclusions about the relationship between migrants' group identities and their psychological adaption to politics are threefold: First, most of the previous research (e.g. Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010) does not theoretically address the precise mechanisms of how religious, ethnic, and national identity relate to migrants' political attitudes towards the host society. Second, previous studies are inconclusive as they address different forms of political attitudes (e.g. political interest, or political trust). Third, most of the former European research that endeavours to explore the impact of migrants' group identities on their attitudinal incorporation into mainstream politics does not address group differences between immigrants of various origins (e.g. European Union versus non-European Union (i.e. third) countries). By studying different immigrant groups together, the studies implicitly assume that the effects are the same across immigrant groups (e.g. Turks and Italians). Finally but importantly, previous research mainly employs cross-sectional data and methods, which prohibit drawing causal inferences about the impact of migrants' social identities. In sum, the existing research literature is characterised by a current inability to provide consistent contributions to the empirical and societal puzzle concerning the relationships between migrants' social identities and attitudinal integration into host-society politics.

Against the background of existing lacunae in research as well as public debates, the present doctoral thesis seeks to provide a systematic research contribution to the European study of whether ethnic minorities' religious, ethnic, and national identities provide psychological barriers or bridges to immigrants'³ attitudinal integration into politics in Western Europe.

³ Here, I will use the term "immigrants" to refer to people who themselves (first generation) or at least one of their parents have migrated to Western countries (second generation).

Therefore, I will focus on immigrants in Germany, which provides an especially relevant and interesting European country to study the relationship between migrants' social identities and political attitudes for at least two reasons: On the one hand, Germany provides one of the main immigration countries in Europe since the period of labour recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s, which has attracted and still attracts considerable numbers of immigrants of various origins from EU (European Union) and non-EU countries, as well as immigrants of Muslim faith, e.g. from Turkey (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). On the other hand, Germany still formally excludes considerable parts of its immigrant population from formal and objective group membership (national citizenship), and thus from the formal pathway into its politics by its restrictive citizenship law: Statistics show that 44% of residents in Germany with a migration background do not hold German citizenship (cf. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016, 142).

The thesis focusses on the attitudinal bases of political behaviour to open up the black box behind migrants' political activity. It thereby addresses the political attitudes of political interest and democracy satisfaction and asks for their conditions as well as specifically for the impact of migrants' social identities. There are good reasons for choosing those attitudes for analysing migrants' attitudinal integration into the political system: First, they capture two main premises of democratic systems that involve participatory and representative elements: to have citizens who participate as well as to have citizens who perceive the political system to be sensitive and responsive to their demands. Moreover, both attitudes are conceptually comprehensive for capturing migrants' attitudinal integration in politics because political interest is a sample of "internal" and democracy satisfaction of "external" political attitudes, referring either to individuals' attitudes towards the self in politics (e.g. political interest, political self-efficacy) or individuals' attitudes towards external objects of the political system (e.g. authorities, the regime) (for the difference between internal and external political efficacy, see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Craig and Maggiotto 1982). According to Maxwell (2013, 285) both kinds are particularly informative about migrant political integration as they reveal immigrants' thoughts and beliefs about the political system as well as how immigrants feel about their political role within the destination country. Further, political interest and democracy satisfaction are valuable indicators as they are samples of cognitive and affective political attitudes that are both suggested to predict by psychological and political science literature conative (political) orientations and (political) behaviour (e.g. Rosenberg and Hovland 1960; Niedermeyer 2005). Thus, van Deth and Elff describe interest in politics as the line 'between democratic and non-democratic citizenship' (2004, 478). Also democracy

satisfaction can be expected to increase the likelihood of political participation because it implies that the regime is perceived to be responsive to the wishes and needs of its citizens and thus to be influenceable. At the same time, people who perceive the political system as legitimate are suggested to be more likely to comply with the rules (cf. Kelleher and Wolak 2007, 707). Thus, a lack of external positive political attitudes and thus lack of responsiveness and legitimacy of the political system may call the democratic system into question and encourages immigrants to seek political change, protest, or engage in antisystem behaviour (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Accordingly, Tillie, Slotman, and Fennema (2007) show in their study among Muslims in Amsterdam that a lack of political trust relates to alienation and radicalisation. Similarly, Maxwell (2010b) summarises Muslims' trust in the government: 'Trust in government (or the lack thereof) is not the only measure of alienation but it is an important indicator of Muslim attachment to mainstream politics because it measures the degree to which individuals feel government authority is legitimate and responsive to their needs' (90). Last but not least, those two specific examples of external vs. internal, respectively cognitive vs. affective political attitudes are chosen as dependent variables of investigation due a lack of other measures available in the empirical data used within the present thesis.

Concerning these two important indicators of migrants' attitudinal integration into politics (i.e. political interest and regime satisfaction), the core of the thesis (i.e. four empirical chapters that are based on single research articles) will elucidate specific questions concerning the explanatory role of ethnic, religious, and national identity among various immigrant groups in Germany. Concerning the public debates within Western Europe as well as in Germany that are currently predominant around the topic of European receiving-societies' national identities that immigrants need to adopt in order to become attitudinally integrated into European democracies, the empirical chapter will allow the illumination of the conditions that facilitate the national identity of immigrants as well as the effect that national identity may have on migrants' self-image as political actors (i.e. being a person who is interested in national politics) or positive attitude towards the political democratic regime (i.e. being satisfied with the regime). Phrased differently, this dissertation highlights and treats national identity as the outcome of interest as well as an explanatory factor. Accordingly, empirical Chapter 2 will first empirically and theoretically elaborate on the conditions of immigrants' national identity in Germany, before empirical Chapter 3 assesses its impact on migrants' interest in national (i.e. German) politics. Within a third step, in empirical Chapter 4, the impact of national identity on migrants' interest in politics in Germany will be gauged in combination with a deprived ethnic identity,

which has been found in literature to have in terms of a dual identity an independent effect on migrants' cognitive mobilisation and motivation to partake politically (e.g. Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Last but not least, empirical Chapter 5 will examine the moderating role of migrants' national identity on their religious identity (in terms of religious belonging and behaviour) and satisfaction with democratic governance in Germany.

Table 1.1 provides a first overview of my thesis that can be divided into three parts with respect to the outcome that is studied within each of the empirical chapters. The respective subsidiary questions of the chapters are: (1) What are the conditions for migrants' national (i.e. German) identity (Chapter 2)? (2) What is the impact of German identity on immigrant members' interest in receiving-country (i.e. German) politics (Chapter 3)? (3) What is the effect of dual ethno-national identity on migrants' general interest in politics within Germany (Chapter 4)? (4) What is the influence of religious identity (in terms of religious belonging and behaviour) and, in particular, of Muslim identity on migrants' positive affect towards (i.e. satisfaction with) democratic governance in Germany in dependency on migrants' national identity, generational status, and ethnic group membership (Chapter 5)?

In order to explore the research questions within Chapters 2 to 5 theoretically, these empirical chapters involve general theoretical insights from the social psychological and sociology literature (e.g. Gordon 1964; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995) as well as cross-country empirical evidence to delineate the conditions that foster immigrants' national identity in Germany as well as to define the theoretical mechanisms that link migrants' group identities⁴ to their internal and external political attitudes towards the German political system.

⁴ In the following, I treat the terms "social identity," "group identity", and "collective identity" interchangeably, which refer to the phenomena of psychological membership in a social group or category.

Table 1.1. Outline of the thesis

Chapter	Topic	Data	Co-authors	Article History (to 05/2016)
1	General			
<i>Part 1</i>				
2	National identity	SCIP	Claudia Diehl & Peter Mühlau	First submission to <i>Ethnicities</i> in 01/2015: Published in 02/2016: “Between ethnic options and ethnic boundaries – Recent Polish and Turkish migrants' identification with Germany.” <i>Ethnicities</i> 16 (2): 236–60.
<i>Part 2</i>				
3	Political interest	SCIP	Diana D. Schacht	First submission to <i>International Migration Review</i> in 01/2015: Revise and Resubmit in 05/2015 but rejection in 12/2015 Second submission planned to <i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i> in 05/2016
4	Political interest	GSEOP	Non	First submission to <i>Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</i> in 05/2013: Published (online first) in 11/2013: “Immigrants' Ethnic Identification and Political Involvement in the Face of Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of the German Case.” <i>Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</i> 40 (3): 339–62.
<i>Part 3</i>				
5	Regime satisfaction	GSEOP	Non	First submission to <i>Social Science Research</i> in 03/2016: Under review since 04/2016
6	Summary, Discussion and Outlook			

Empirically, Chapters 2 – 5 employ, in contrast to previous research, longitudinal data collected from recently immigrated or long-term immigrants from either traditional (i.e. guest worker) or new sending countries in Germany. While traditional immigrant groups involve migrants from nations of the former labour recruitment period in the 1950s and 1960s (i.e. Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Southern Europe (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain)), new immigrant groups refer to immigrants from the former Soviet Union as well as Poland in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain. More specifically, the empirical Chapters 2 and 3 use data from recently immigrated respondents of Turkish and Polish origin, who are within their first three years in Germany, from the international project ‘Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe’ (SCIP) (Diehl et al. 2015a). The present thesis thereby advances previous studies in literature that have commonly not studied political or identificational assimilation at the of the assimilation process of immigrants. In contrast,

Chapters 4 and 5 employ data that have been collected within different waves of the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) from immigrants of various ethnic origins who are usually already for some years/decades in Germany or are immigrant descendants (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007) (for a detailed description of the data, refer to the methods section, Section 1.4).

The present first chapter serves to provide a broader theoretical and empirical introduction, overview, and synthesis of the empirical chapters that build the main part of this doctoral thesis. It therefore delineates and presents a general conceptual as well as theoretical underpinning of the research questions that frame the empirical chapters. In Section 1.2, I therefore first discuss the key concepts of political attitudes and integration under study in my doctoral work and develop a conceptual model of immigrants' political attitudes. Before the delineation of the explanatory and theoretical approach of my thesis to account for the impact of migrants' social identities, Section 1.3 will outline the current empirical situation in Germany regarding political interest and satisfaction with democracy, as well as national identity. Section 1.4. in the following discusses the theoretical approach and derives hypotheses concerning the conditions and the effects of migrants' national identity as well as of other identities (i.e. ethnic and religious identity) on their internal as well as external political attitudes in Germany – here, political interest and regime satisfaction. Section 1.5 next gives a specific and conceptual outline of the empirical chapters of the thesis, summarising the theoretical arguments developed within Section 1.4. Section 1.6 elucidates the methodological and analytical approach as well as the data used, before the main results of the empirical chapters are presented in line with the hypothesis previously presented (Section 1.7). Finally but importantly, I close with an epilogue (Section 1.8.).

1.2 Conceptualising migrants' attitudinal integration into politics

Without a clear conceptual framework, it would not be possible to describe and explain immigrant minorities' attitudinal integration into European host societies such as Germany. Moreover, it would be difficult to understand the main attitudinal concepts behind migrants' attitudinal integration. Even though this seems self-evident, the current research literature on this topic is often characterised by a lack of conceptual definitions as well as terminological consensus because it is perceived through the lenses of different scholarly disciplines. Thus, research uses different terms for describing migrant inclusion in the host society (assimilation, acculturation, incorporation, and so forth), which leads to serious confusion and decreases the theoretical utility of the terms. Even though my thesis is not able to solve the missing conceptual

consensus across disciplines as well as to tackle all conceptual difficulties involved, I will at least increase conceptual consciousness and clarity for the purposes of the present scholarly work. For doing so, I will first clarify within this section the three main outcome concepts of interest within this doctoral work, namely national identity, political interest, and regime satisfaction (Section 1.2.2). For this purpose, I will refer to the political culture and supporting literature (e.g. Almond and Verba 1972; Easton 1965; Norris 1999a) (Section 1.2.1). Both approaches are valuable for this thesis's purposes to assess national identity as the outcome of interest as well as an explanatory factor because they suggest national identification as a political (support) attitude that warrants besides individuals' positive attitudes towards the regime and/or the political system the stability and legitimacy of political systems. Moreover, I will draw on the classic attitude-behaviour link model, namely the psychological theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 1988; 1991) to provide further insights on the general relevance of the political attitude concepts of national identity, political interest, and regime satisfaction for immigrants' behavioural integration into host-society politics (Section 1.2.3). Besides the conceptualisation of the attitudinal component of integration, I will further clarify within this section the concepts around migrants' inclusion in host societies and why the usage of the term of "integration" instead of "assimilation" in politics may be preferred (Section 1.2.4). Because the empirical research of the present dissertation project lies within the realms of sociological and social psychological scholarship, I will focus within this section on conceptual traditions of sociology as well as psychology.

1.2.1 Conceptual bases of political culture and support

To conceptualise the attitudinal component of migrant political integration into host-society politics, the present thesis integrates political science literature on political orientations (e.g. Almond and Verba 1972; Easton 1965) and psychological literature on attitudes (e.g. Ajzen 1991; Rosenberg and Hovland 1960). The insight that a stable democracy with a participatory citizenship has cultural and attitudinal prerequisites was suggested by the political culture approach, which has crucially changed the perspective of political research towards explicit subjective and psychological aspects of politics (cf. Verba 1965, 516). According to this approach, political culture refers to 'attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system' (Almond and Verba 1972, 13). Further, it is stated: 'When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population' (ibid.). Similar, but with a stronger focus on political culture's function, is the definition by Lucina Pye (1972, 218):

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics.

Following the previous definitions, four main notions generally refer to migrants' political attitudes that are under study within the present thesis: First, they may provide as political culture a characteristic of a collective (e.g., nation, immigrant political community) through a particular distribution of attitudes among its members, yet at the same time they also provide characteristics of the individual migrant at the micro-level. Second, immigrant political attitudes may serve important functions for the preservation and maintaining of political systems as they involve the norms, rules, and ideals guiding them. Third, migrants' individual attitudes are directed towards different political objects involving, besides the political system, its institutions and actors as well as its performance outcomes, in addition to migrants' attitudes towards the self as political actor within the system (cf. Almond and Verba 1972, 17). For the purposes of clearer distinctions, "external" and "internal" political attitudes can be distinguished. Whereas the former is referring to attitudes towards the political system and its objects, the latter is referring to attitudes towards migrants' self-image as political actors within the political system, for instance, of Germany (cf. also literature on political efficacy for the difference between internal and external, e.g. Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Craig and Maggiotto 1982). Close to the political culture approach, the political support paradigms of David Easton (1975; 1965) and Pippa Norris (1999a) suggest the concept of covered support, which is referred to as "political support" in this doctoral thesis, which addresses supportive attitudes and sentiments towards primarily four main objects of the political system, namely the political community, political regime, political institutions, and political actors.

Last but not least, migrants' internal or external political attitudes towards the self as political actor or the political system can be distinguished by the political culture approach along different types involving cognitive, affective, or evaluative aspects. Cognitive orientations address structures of beliefs and perceptions or knowledge of the political system. These orientations involve "internal" attitudes such as political interest or knowledge. In contrast, affective orientations as well as evaluative orientations can be conceptually subsumed as both are addressing feelings about the political system, its personnel and institutions, as well as the subjective judgements based on feelings or on other evaluation criteria such as performance (cf. Almond and Verba 1972, 15). These orientations involve "external" attitudes such as political trust or satisfaction, as well as national identification.

The psychological literature allows, in addition to cognitive, evaluative, and affect aspects, a conative (behavioural) component of political attitudes that has been neglected by the classical political culture and support literature. According to a classic tripartite view by the psychologists Rosenberg and Hovland (1960, 1), an attitude involves cognitive (opinion and beliefs) and affective (evaluative feelings and preferences), as well as behavioural/conative components (overt actions or statements of intent): ‘Attitudes are typically defined as predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a specified class of objects. [...] The types of response [...] fall in three major categories: cognitive, affective, and behavioural’. Thus, there are supposed to be behavioural intentions (e.g. to participate in national or local elections) involved in migrants’ political attitudes. Intention is conceived by psychologists as person’s psychological readiness or motivation to perform a given behaviour (Ajzen 1991), which coincides with Easton, who proposes that political attitudes involve ‘predispositions or a readiness to act on behalf of someone or something else’ (Easton 1965, 160).

Combining the insights of the previously outlined political culture literature as well as psychological literature on the three components of attitudes, Figure 1.1 depicts a possible classification and examples of individual migrants’ political orientations according to their type as well as object-relation (adapted from the conceptual overview by Niedermayer 2005, 17). It also involves the main indicators of migrant attitudinal integration of this doctoral thesis, “internal” political interest, “external” regime satisfaction, and “external” national identification (*).

Figure 1-1. Dimensions of political orientations

Types of orientations				
Objects of orientations		<u>Cognitive orientations:</u> (perceptions and beliefs)	<u>Affective/evaluative orientations:</u> (feelings and judgments)	<u>Conative orientations:</u> (intentions)
<i>Internal:</i>	<i>Increasing behavioural tendency</i> →			
Own political role	<i>Increasing degree of generalisation</i>	political interest*, political knowledge	internal political efficacy	intention to conventional (e.g., voting; party membership) and unconventional (e.g. lawful demonstration; signing a petition) political participation
<i>External:</i>				
Political actors			external efficacy, political trust, political satisfaction*	
Political institutions				
Political regime				
Political community		national identification*		

Source: Own illustration adapted from Niedermeyer (2005: 17); *main attitudes of this doctoral thesis

1.2.2 Meaning of national identification, interest in national politics, and regime satisfaction

What is the meaning as well as the relevance of migrants' political interest, regime satisfaction, as well as national identification with respect to migrant political integration? Following the political support approach, *national identification* refers to the object "political community" of a political system and refers to the mental and affective attitude of citizens towards it. According to Easton (1965, 177), it involves the we-feeling or sense of community 'with a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor'. Accordingly, national identification may also imply the emotional commitment to the production of shared national and public goods such as such as education, public infrastructure, and governmental policies that are produced within politics (van Deth 2000). Empirical studies within the political culture paradigm measure the support of the political community usually by national pride or perceived and subjective sense of belonging to the political community (cf. Norris 1999b, 10–11). Individuals may have multiple affective attachments to different political communities, which may affect each other in terms of weakening and strengthening (cf. Westle 1999, 166). With respect to migrants, those are multiple attachments towards the political community of their country of origin as well as the polity of their receiving country.

Within (social) psychological literature, these multiple attachments are acknowledged in the form of ethnic and national identity as a special form of social identity that is defined by Tajfel (1981) as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (255). Following both the social identity theory (SIT hereafter; Tajfel and Turner 1986; see also Hogg and Abrams 1988) and its extension, self-categorisation theory (SCT hereafter; Turner et al. 1987), social identification refers to individuals’ self-ascribed psychological membership in social categories and groups (e.g., gender, ethnicity, class, or religion) that build individuals’ self-concept besides his/her personal identity as unique persons. Social identity is a multidimensional concept that includes a number of dimensions, such as self-categorisation, belonging, regard, importance, or practice (e.g. Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Phinney and Ong 2007). By the reference to subjective feelings of belonging to a group, social identity can be distinguished from mere objective group membership such as that determined by passport or birth (Ashmore et al. 2004). Accordingly, migrants’ ethnic group membership is also defined in the literature as ‘a subjective belief in [...] common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration’ (Weber 1968, 389). Within this subjective perspective of ethnic group membership, some of the putative shared properties (e.g. shared kinship) may represent actual but also imagined internal and external ascriptions. Indeed, Nagel (1995, 21) refers to ethnic identity as ‘a dialectic between internal identification and external ascription’. While previous literature has conceived migrants’ national and ethnic or religious identity as mutually exclusive, i.e. a stronger attachment to the host country (i.e. national identification) must mean a weaker connection to the country of origin (i.e. ethnic identification) and vice versa, more recent literature in line with the bi-dimensional model of acculturation (Berry 1997) acknowledges four more complex identity combinations (see also Hutnik 1991): integrated identity (high national, high ethnic identification) - which is also referred to as dual or hybrid identity (cf. Verkuyten 2005, 149 ff.), assimilated identity (high, low), separated identity (low- high), and marginalised identity (low-low).

As migrants’ identification with the political community of European receiving countries constitutes one main indicator of migrants’ attitudinal integration into politics in this doctoral thesis, the theoretical Section 1.4 will address which factors may account for migrants’ psychological orientation towards the German host society. The reader should bear in mind that this dissertation also studies the question on the effect of migrants’ identification with the receiving community on migrants’ self-image as political actors (i.e. interest in national politics)

as well as affect towards the political system (i.e. regime satisfaction) (see the explanatory considerations in Section 1.4.2).

Interest in politics addresses within Figure 1.1 the internal cognitive component of migrants' self-image as political actors within the new home country. Even though widely applied, the concept and the meanings involved with political interest are barely addressed in research. Thus, by relying on interdisciplinary literature, the doctoral work differentiates three conceptions/dimensions that imply political interest and thus guide subsequent theoretical reasoning: *political attentiveness*, *political importance*, and *political motivation*. Before going into those conceptions, there is the question what "political" and "interest" may refer to in "political interest". Given that the main interest lies in the psychological inclusion in the host society political system, the term "political" may refer to the fundamental trichotomy of polity, policy and politics (e.g., Treib et al. 2007). Hence, migrants' political interest can be suggested to refer either to the interest in the institutional structures (e.g. the constitution, institutions, authorities, parties) of the host society political system (*polity*), its political procedures (e.g. elections, votes, lobbying) or processes (e.g. political clashes, debates, acts of war) by which decisions are made (*politics*), or its political programmes and outputs (e.g. laws etc.) its (*policy*).

Interest in the sense of psychological literature is a motivational variable (Hidi and Renninger 2006). Yet, in comparison to other motivational variables, it is content specific and exists in a particular relation/interaction with a person. Moreover, it is characterised by a cognitive and affective component, respectively value and feeling valances (i.e. the object or activity of interest is perceived as important and positive). According to the psychological literature, interest can imply both the underlying process of re-engagement with a particular content/object as well as the resulting motivational state the term. Consistent with this perspective, interest is suggested to be closely linked to self-determined forms of motivation, thus intrinsic motivation or identified/integrated regulation within extrinsic motivation, where goals and needs are fully integrated with the self (Ryan and Deci 2000). Thus, individual's interest in a specific object/content (e.g. politics) may be used to predict individual' intrinsic motivation for activities concerning the specific object/content.

According to the previous delineations, three specific conceptions of political interest may be applied: political attentiveness, importance, and motivation. Political attentiveness describes that political issues (politics, polity, policy) within the receiving society "arouses a citizen's curiosity" (van Deth 1990, 278) or cognitive attention (Zaller 1992, 18). Secondly, political interest may imply that political issues of the receiving country are perceived as personally important as well as positive (i.e. political importance) (cf. van Deth 2000). Last but

not least, as political processes specifically relate in terms of content to the production of collective and public goods, political interest may imply the intrinsic motivation to contribute to the shared collective goods of the German host society and thus to solve free-riding dilemmas (i.e. political motivation). Thus, in sum, migrants that are interested in politics in the conceptual terms of the thesis pay attention to politics, perceive politics as personally important as well as are intrinsically motivated to politically participate in receiving country political system. That the concepts of political interest are closely interrelated has been shown by van Deth (2000), who shows that subjective political interest (i.e. political attentiveness) and political importance in absolute terms (the absolute importance assigned to politics for one's own life) are highly correlated as well as are predicted by the same set of factors such as income or social capital.

Different from the previous *internal cognitive* type of migrant political attitudes, considering the self as political actor, are the *external evaluative or affective orientations* towards the political system. This kind of orientations encompasses concepts within the literature such as (external) political efficacy, political (dis)trust, or political (dis)satisfaction (Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Newton 2008). They all have two things in common: First, they address individuals' positive feelings and evaluations of political responsiveness, which promote feelings of legitimacy and commitment towards the political system. Responsiveness is central to democracy. Thus, representation theory identifies responsiveness as the main mechanism for citizens' control over governments between elections (Pitkin 1967). This implies a bottom-up understanding of responsiveness, respectively 'what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want' (Powell 2004, 91). Phrased differently, regime stability is also dependent on 'inducing [migrant-origin] citizens to believe that the government is responsive to their own needs and wishes' (Ginsberg 1982, 182). Thus, a lack of attitudes strongly relating to feelings of system responsiveness such as external political efficacy, political trust, or satisfaction has been discussed within the literature as an indicator of a 'legitimacy crisis' (cf. Arzheimer 2002, 42ff.) or related phenomena within the German context such as 'Politikverdrossenheit' (cf. Caballero 2009, 68ff.; and see also Arzheimer 2002). Second, they have in common that they rather address what Easton (1965, 1975) calls specific (dis)support of the political regime, system, and institutions, rather than a general withdrawal of diffuse support. Specific support refers to 'the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities [those governing]' (Easton 1975: 437). Subsequently, specific support is object-specific as well as dynamic and can thus be related to what Fritz Scharpf (1999) has called 'output legitimacy', which is

associated with the perceptions about and evaluations of effective governance and responsiveness, as well as the specific results of governance. In contrast, diffuse support refers to the more basic and stable support of the system taken as a whole. In the words of Easton (1975: 444), ‘... it refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents, not of what it does. [...] Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while diffuse support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues’. Thus, Arthur H. Miller also proposes that declining levels of individuals’ (specific) trust in governments do not imply a *general* legitimacy crisis of governments within societies:

Less than 1 per cent of the respondents proposed a change toward a socialistic government. What was expressed by the open-ended statements was a discontent and dissatisfaction with the performance of the system and the need for reform to make it more responsive. [...] To summarize, political cynicism is related to feelings of political inefficacy, to the belief that government is unresponsive, and to an apparent desire for structural and institutional reform (Miller 1974b, 992).

In summary, migrants’ satisfaction with the host-society’s democratic government and regime can be understood as an important evaluative expression of migrants’ perceived responsiveness of the democratic government to their needs, and respective wishes and demands.

Following the intergenerational theory of integration by Esser (2004) and the concept of social production functions (e.g. Lindenberg 1989), there are two main demands of migrants that address two commonly shared needs of individuals in general: to maximise their physical well-being, as well as their social approval (see also Kalter and Granato 2002). These basic needs and thus goals are typically provided through the production of some culturally-acknowledged and -specific goals and means, respectively, that are known within the society to produce them (e.g. economic access and educational credentials) (cf. Kalter and Granato 2002, 201 f.). Thus, Esser (2004, 1135) concludes that immigrants can be expected to ‘have an objective have (or should have) an objective interest in assimilative actions and investments in receiving country capital, like formal education or the acquisition of the host society’s language’. Accordingly, research has repeatedly attested that immigrants are a positive selective group with respect to achievement motivation within host societies (Kao and Tienda 1995; Kristen and Dollmann 2010; for an overview on mechanisms, see Salikutluk 2016). Yet, within a chain of production of social approval, immigrants are in general disadvantaged in the production of economic success as they lack specific capital needed within the reception context to produce this goal (e.g., educational credentials, language skills, native contacts) (Kalter and Granato 2002). This lack of necessary resources to produce better socio-economic positions is

found to be still relevant for the second generation of immigrants in Europe (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008).

Another main demand of immigrant minorities can be suggested to be cultural recognition, which is predicted to increasingly become an issue of ‘identity politics’ or ‘politics of difference’ (Verkuyten 2005, 58). These political demands aim at the recognition of migrants’ cultural and religious background. Especially because Europe and Germany officially follows the recognition of cultural pluralism, religious freedom, minority rights, and equality (EUR-LEX 2008), migrants may evaluate host-society governments according to these demands. In sum, the democratic political system may be affectively charged by first- as well as second-generation immigrants according to their social and cultural demands, which results in certain feelings of responsiveness by the individual migrant and thus, satisfaction with it.

Even though regime satisfaction suggests specific and time-dependent evaluations, I follow Muller and Williams (1980, 34) in their assumption along a support-alienation continuum that ‘the more negative reinforcement received by an individual, i.e., the more the experience of dissatisfaction with political outputs, the more will generalized affect for the political system incline toward [...] alienation [...]’. Thus, specific negative attitudes may change to diffuse and more stable negative attitudes towards the political system. Therefore, external evaluative or affective orientations such as regime satisfaction may measure their political alienation (Miller 1974), which involves ‘unfavorable affect for the political system or structure of political authority’ (Muller and Williams 1980, 343). From the previous outline, it follows that Section 1.4 requires the elaboration on the factors that may influence migrants’ perceived regime responsiveness as well as feelings and senses of legitimacy towards the political system (i.e. regime satisfaction).

In sum, the *previous overview* has highlighted the single relevance of each attitude for migrant attitudinal integration within European democracies such as in Germany in terms of forming, first, a politically informed and conscious migrant-origin citizenry (by political interest); second, a morally committed and lawful migrant-origin citizenry (by democracy satisfaction); and third, an emotionally committed migrant citizenry (by national identification).

1.2.3 The joint relevance of political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification for migrant political integration

Previous research directly studying individuals’ or migrants’ political attitudes as dependent variable or treating them as the cause of individuals’ or migrants’ political participation, commonly neglects to elaborate on the link between political attitudes and political participation

and behaviour, or to consider interrelations between the different internal and external political attitudes (e.g. de Rooij 2012; Eggert and Giugni 2010). Rather, for most of the previous literature, a very straightforward and self-evident link follows from being politically interested or having positive attitudes towards the political institutions, personnel, or democratic regime over a positive attitude to participate politically and in the end to do so according to the attitude. Yet, historical psychological views as well as longstanding psychological works on the attitude–behaviour relation crucially challenge the assumption that attitudes automatically indicate how people will behave (see e.g. Festinger 1964; LaPiere 1934; Wicker 1969). Based on the observed attitude–behaviour inconsistencies, the main psychological models on the attitude–behaviour link were developed that help to understand how attitudes predict deliberate behaviour, namely the psychological theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 1988; Ajzen 1991) and its forerunner, the theory of reasoned action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Reviews and meta-analyses have provided support for the efficacy of these models across a variety of behavioural domains such as health behaviours or exercising behaviour (for a meta-analysis, see Armitage and Conner 2001), but also voting behaviour (Netemeyer and Burton 1990; Ajzen, Timko, and White 1982). I argue that the link between the three main internal and external attitudes, involving political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification, and migrants’ political behaviour in the host society, can be understood through addressing the main components of TBP that predict intention and behaviour in consequence.


According to the TPB (Ajzen 1988, 1991), the most proximal determinant of people’s behaviour is their intentions to engage in the behaviour (e.g. the intention to participate in elections). This intention is determined by three main psychological components and related beliefs: (1) Attitude towards performing the specific behaviour; (2) subjective norms about social normative pressures to perform the behaviour; and (3) perceived behavioural control to be able to perform the behaviour. Attitudes refer to the overall positive or negative evaluation of performing the behaviour (e.g. whether to vote in the election is... good-bad, foolish-wise, favourable-unfavourable, desirable-undesirable)⁵, which is formed by behavioural beliefs about the consequences of the behaviour in question (e.g. value and expectancy of success, costs or benefits). Subjective norms, in turn, are based on individuals’ perception and belief regarding whether important other people in their life would want them to perform the behaviour in question (e.g. to vote in the national elections). In contrast, perceived behavioural control reflects the extent to which individuals perceive that they are able to perform the behaviour in

⁵ See also measurement examples by Ajzen et al. (1982).

question. Thus, following basic TPB, individuals and migrants who have positive attitudes towards the political behaviour (e.g. participating in a party or voting is wise, beneficial, or useful), think that there is normative social support or pressure for performing the political behaviour by others important to them (e.g. native contacts), perceive that they can perform the behaviour, and have strong intentions to perform the political behaviour.

I suggest that the political orientations of political interest, democracy satisfaction, and national identification can be included in the TPB model as antecedents of attitude, social norms, and perceived control, and thus of intention and individual political behaviour, because they modify the structure of the three main beliefs relating to the three components (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1-2. Conceptual scheme of political orientations within the model of planned political behaviour



Source: own illustration after Ajzen (1991, 182)

Thus, external affective political orientations such as regime satisfaction involving positive evaluations of the responsiveness of the democratic government can be expected to shape the overall positive evaluations of the political behaviour in question (e.g. whether is it wise, beneficial, or useful to participate in elections or parties). Furthermore, internal cognitive orientations such as political interest that indicate individuals’ political attentiveness as well as relevance of national politics can be assumed to affect the personal belief about the cost and benefits of the political behaviour and thus the overall positive evaluation of the behaviour. In addition, political interest can be supposed to shape the belief and feeling to be politically efficacious, and thus the perceived behavioural control over performing a political behaviour. Finally, ‘we’-feelings and senses of community with the national political community (i.e. national identification) should affect the perception of whether fellow citizens want them to perform the political behaviour, and thus the subjective norm to do so. Also, literature on the

social identity perspective suggests that social identities affect behaviour through the mediating role of group norms (Hogg and Smith 2007; Terry, Hogg, and White 2000).

In summary, the model of planned political behaviour in Figure 1.2 allows the derivation of a more complete conceptual model of migrants' political attitudes because it deepens understanding on how attitudinal dynamics may shape paths to migrants' behavioural activity over intention and preceding attitudinal, normative, and control beliefs. Thus, in sum, I suggest that the political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identity that are studied within my doctoral thesis provide indicators of migrant attitudinal political integration that are relevant to explain.

1.2.4 Attitudinal assimilation versus integration into politics

According to Classical Assimilation Theory (CAT) (e.g. Park and Burgess 1921), the term assimilation implies a one-sided process in which a minority group adapt behaviourally and culturally to the mainstream of the receiving society. Even though the doctoral thesis focusses on the changes of political attitudes that are involved with the individual immigrant, it is not referring to the classical conception of assimilation. Rather it refers to an understanding that can be derived from the New Assimilation Theory (NAT; Alba and Nee 2003) and the model of integration by Esser (2006) and thereby justifies the use of the terms of attitudinal integration or incorporation instead of assimilation. NAT and the approach by Esser challenge the classical understanding of assimilation as both suggest that assimilation addresses a decline in the salience of group differences not only depends on (e.g. attitudinal) changes by the migrant group as well as by the majority group. Moreover, assimilation is supposed to be depending on conditions within the receiving country of little or no ethnic discrimination or social distance. Further, Esser (2006, 9) specifically proposes that assimilation is only one out of four specific types of social integration of immigrants that emerge from individual migrants' inclusion along two contexts – ethnic group versus host society: assimilation, whereby inclusion is in the host society with exclusion from the ethnic group; marginality, whereby there is no inclusion in either the ethnic group or the host society; ethnic segmentation which involves inclusion in the ethnic group and exclusion from the host society; and multiple inclusion which involves inclusion in both social systems. In sum, both approaches suggest that assimilation is a more demanding process and integration outcome than suggested by CAT. Thus, the thesis applies the terms of integration or incorporation instead of assimilation because assimilation would additionally require to theoretically as well as statistically address exclusion processes with respect to political attitudes relating to the ethnic group/origin as well as changes in political

attitudes and conditions involved with the national majority group. Through a lack of operationalisation possibilities of the social integration types (in SOEP) or due to missing information of the majority (in SCIP), assimilation can't be appropriately addressed by the thesis ssimilation.

1.3 The current empirical situation in Germany on immigrant attitudinal integration into politics

Because this doctoral thesis empirically studies immigrant attitudinal integration into European politics in the case of Germany, the present section will describe the current empirical evidence and situation of immigrant political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification in Germany.

Germany has become one of the main European immigration countries since the period of labour recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, there is still an empirical and theoretical deficit concerning the political integration of its current approximately 16.4 million residents with direct or indirect migration backgrounds (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 7). One of the reasons for this existing lack is the long-time general resistance of policy makers to acknowledge Germany as an immigration country. Thus, Joppke proposes 1999: 'While Germany is not alone in Europe in not defining itself as a nation of immigrants, it is the only country that has not become tired of repeating it, elevating the no-immigration maxim to a first principle of public policy and national self-definition' (62). As a consequence, until the very early 2000s and liberalisations of the citizenship law in terms of dual citizenship or granting *jus soli* citizenship (based on territorial birth) for second-generation (i.e. German-born) immigrants at least under certain conditions, policy makers in Germany have been hesitant to acknowledge them as political actors as well as to consider their political incorporation into the German society. At present, as a considerable number of first- and second-generation immigrants in Germany do not hold German citizenship, a significant fraction of the immigrant population in Germany is still formally excluded from the main political right of participating in national elections. Yet, there are other political rights and non-electoral participation possibilities also open for foreign immigrant residents, such as taking part in demonstrations or joining political parties. Moreover, immigrants from European countries (such as Italy or Spain), i.e. EU citizens, hold voting rights at the city district level. Yet, immigrants from non-EU countries such as Turkey, which still currently constitute the largest immigrant group in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015) are excluded from local voting rights. As the political attitudes

under study within this doctoral thesis (i.e. political interest, regime satisfaction, national identification) are only partly but not fully determined by immigrants' (missing) formal political participation rights, they can be perceived as appropriate means to political integration of formally less or more excluded immigrants and non-Turkish as well as Turkish immigrants, respectively.

Within European and German scholarship, the long-time sidelining of migrants' political incorporation relates to two previous neglects (see Morales and Giugni 2011): First, there has been a general lack of adequate individual-level data with indicators of migrants' socio-political participation as well as attitudes. Second, even seminal scholarly works on migrant integration have neglected the political dimension almost completely (Gordon 1964; Portes and Zhou 1993; for Germany, cf. specifically Esser 2008).

As a joint consequence of the policy and research situation in Germany until very recently, empirical evidence related to immigrants' political interest, national identification, and regime satisfaction is quite limited. The existing scarce German research on political attitudes generally finds that immigrants show considerably lower levels of interest in politics than their native counterparts (cf. Diehl and Blohm 2001, 411; Diehl and Urbahn 1998, 34; Doerschler 2004, 469). On the basis of data from the Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), Diehl and Blohm (2001) reveal that only about one-sixth of all immigrant groups have a high or a very high interest in German politics, as opposed to approximately one-third of all Germans (cf. *ibid.*, 411). Moreover, immigrants are less likely to identify with a German politics (cf. Diehl and Blohm 2001, 411; Diehl and Urbahn 1998, 38), though their party identification increases with the length of residence in Germany (cf. Kroh 2009, 822). Besides the variation of political involvement between immigrants and natives, German studies also show variations in the political attitudes of political trust, interest, or party identification between different immigrant groups similarly to studies in the Netherlands (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Caballero 2009; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Kroh and Tucci 2009; Togeby 2004; Wüst 2002). For Germany, studies often reveal a difference between foreign Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants (e.g. Italians). While Diehl and Blohm (2001) find that Turkish nationals have higher political interest than other nationalities, Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans (2004) reveal lower interest in German politics for foreign Turkish than non-Turkish immigrants (e.g. Italians). With respect to satisfaction with democracy, Caballero (2009) shows that Turkish nationals among immigrants are the least satisfied (cf. *ibid.*, 127). Also with respect to national identification, research indicates that immigrants from Turkey identify less with Germany than

immigrants from other former guest worker nations such as Italy, Greece, or Ex-Yugoslavia (Diehl and Schnell 2006).

The next theory section serves to delineate the factors that can account for variation in immigrants' political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification as well as their different ethnic origins.

1.4 Predicting migrants' political attitudes

After having established the conceptual underpinning (Section 1.2) and empirical background in Germany (Section 1.3), the present section serves to identify and delineate the explanatory factors and the explanatory model that accounts for the attitudinal components of migrant political incorporation of interest (i.e. political interest, regime satisfaction, and identification with the political community). Phrased differently, the section serves a theoretical synthesis of the empirical chapters of the doctoral thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) and broader literature review (for a specific overview of the chapters, see Section 1.5.). Therefore, the section will draw on existing theoretical approaches of sociology and social psychology as well as empirical studies within the existing literature.

When it comes to explaining migrants' attitudinal integration into host-society politics in terms of the political interest, regime satisfaction, or identification with the political community, explanatory factors must be distinguished on two grounds: First, they can address different explanatory levels such as the individual- (micro-), group- (meso-), and societal- (macro-) level. Phrased differently, factors may involve either individual characteristics of migrants, characteristics of social organisational networks (e.g. social capital), or characteristics of the political structure and context of the country of residence (cf. Morales and Giugni 2011, 5ff.). Reviewing different literature suggests that political participation and attitudes depend on a variety of macro- and meso-level factors. First and foremost, migrants' political participation and attitudes depend on institutional settings, citizenship regimes, and political rights that open or close the access to the political community and system (Koopmans et al. 2005). Thus, open citizenship regimes give migrants much higher probabilities of being politically active than more closed regimes (González-Ferrer 2011; Morales and Morariu 2011; Morales and Pilati 2011). Moreover, at the meso-level, social capital at the group level plays a role. This kind of capital is perceived as a 'function of (1) the number of organisations, (2) the variety in the activities of the organisations and (3) the density of the organisational network' (Tillie 2004, 531).

Meso- and macro-factors are not at the centre of the explanatory approach of the present thesis, however. Rather, I seek a microfoundation of migrants' attitudinal integration into politics. In doing so, it opens up the black box of mechanisms that are directly implied with the individual migrant. Moreover, the data sets of thesis do not contain appropriate measures to grasp additionally macro or meso information.

For defining the conditions of migrants' attitudinal integration into politics, the thesis refers to the individual inclusion processes as well as implied individual characteristics and resources of migrants that have been suggested by Esser (2006, 8). Accordingly, migrants individual' inclusion in the host society is a matter of interrelation of four different dimensions of integration (in terms of content): the structural, cultural, emotional and social integration. While the cultural dimension addresses the acquisition of knowledge and skills, the structural dimension addresses the placement in positions, for example in the educational system or on the labour market. The social dimension refers to the development of social contacts and relations and the emotional dimension implies social identification.

I will argue that these integration processes serve as host country-specific culturally, socially, and emotional capital that explain how migrants become successfully involved psychologically in the political life. This argument draws on the general 'productivity' as well as 'context-specificity' aspect of capital of individuals, as it is noted in a large body of literature. Concerning the former aspect, classical proponents of the concept of (social) capital such as Coleman (1988), Bourdieu (1983), Lin (1999), and Putnam (1993; 2000) suggest that capital is productive, 'making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible' (Coleman 1988, 98). While capital or resources such as language skills and knowledge generally imply an investment of personal resources, social or emotional integration implies specific resources or aspects embedded in a social structure that may facilitate particular forms of action and cooperation (cf. Lin 1999, 35).

1.4.1 Predicting migrants' political interest

The knowledge of the language spoken in the receiving country can be suggested to be a highly relevant (cultural) capital for migrants' political interest: It not only induces the cognitive links and bases that allow to pay attention to political information (i.e. political attentiveness) but also facilitates that information on receiving-country politics become emotionally linked within the individual migrant and thus may gain some personal importance (i.e. political importance). Moreover, having a command of the host society language allows to access social capital in the form of native social contacts who enhance migrants' political interest, as well (see below).

Even though proficiency in the origin language allows for similar processes, they are less effective in fostering political interest as this proficiency limits the ways in which migrants are able to draw attention to political information within the host society, to perceive and memorise information on receiving country political issues, as well as to access social networks of natives.

There are trust, norms of reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social networks (Putnam 2000, Coleman 1988) that may link migrants' social membership in native networks to political interest: First, native networks circulate information about specific processes, expectations and rules of the political system and thus ease migrants' attention processes as well as may increase their curiosity about political affairs of the network members (i.e. political attentiveness). Moreover, the inclusion in native networks involves opportunities for cooperation that foster learning about national group specific interests and thus facilitates intrinsic motivation to contribute to those group interests (i.e. political motivation). Last but not least, norms of reciprocity and social trust are produced by the participation in native networks that enforce migrants' intrinsic motivation for the participation in the collective good production of this group. According to literature, voluntary but not necessarily political associations in particular provide this kind of social environment (Putnam 2000). Thus, the thesis expects that social contact with natives (and especially in voluntary associations) fosters immigrant members' interest in the political issues of the receiving country political system.

According to Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel and Turner 1986), social identity, i.e. perceived psychological membership in social groups or categories, is part of individual (migrant)'s self-concept. It has a main emotional and motivational meaning as it provides the individual with self-esteem and a positive self-concept. To maintain a positive self-concept through group membership, social identification invokes mechanisms that bias and affects interests, cognitions, emotions as well as behaviour in favour of the ingroup to increase ingroups' distinctiveness to other groups (see e.g. Brewer 1979; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). As politics involve the means and processes to protect and preserve a positive social identity by influencing the political representation and thus the distribution of the collective goods and privileges of groups, social identification may predict individuals' attentiveness, importance and (intrinsic) motivation towards political matters. Thus, through the meaning of political matters for the value of migrants' social identities and self-esteem, identification with the national majority (i.e. national identification) can be expected to increase the importance of host society political matters (e.g. polity, politics, policy) for the individual migrant. In the same line, national

identification facilitates/biases according to the social psychological perspective the cognitive attention to political structures (polity), processes (politics) and content (policy) of the national ingroup. Further, national identification affects migrants' (intrinsic) motivation to influence the collective good distribution of the national ingroup because it specifically structures migrants' interests in favour of the ingroup (i.e. collective interests).

The individual migrant holds multiple psychological memberships that relate besides the national majority to their ethnic origin or religious group (see e.g. Roccas and Brewer 2002; Tajfel 1978; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012b). According to Tajfel and Turner (1986), self-identified members of a devalued (i.e. low-status) group are motivated to opt for a political behaviour-related strategy that tries to re-establish a positive ethnic identity and thus self-concept (i.e. social competition). This strategy is likely when boundaries between groups are not perceived to be permeable and the existing status differentials are conceived as illegitimate and unstable. Thus, ethnic or religious identification of ethnic minorities in Germany may evoke specific collective interests and thus intrinsic political motivation (i.e. political interest). Those are however rather specific to the religious or ethnic group. Nonetheless, ethnic identification may increase political attentiveness and importance specifically of the structure and processes (i.e. polity and politics) of the receiving society, as the host society context builds the opportunity structure in which migrants can achieve a change the social status hierarchy in favour of the ethnic group and thereby experience self-enhancing. Hence, it can be expected that ethnic or religious identity may be also linked to interest in the political matters of the receiving country, specifically if the identities are perceived to be devalued. Yet, national identity may interact with ethnic identity in predicting migrants' political interest because national identity in contrast to ethnic identity enhances more efficiently political attentiveness as well as importance processes, partly through enhancing cultural and social capital (i.e. majority language proficiency and embeddedness in native networks) (cf. previous arguments above). Thus, the thesis expects that under perceived discrimination that reflect impermeable group boundaries, simultaneous identification with the ethnic minority group and the host society, a dual identity, may predict political interest to a higher extent than ethnic or national identification alone.

With respect to the impact of structural integration, the thesis expects that the placement in the host society labour market and related resources such as status and money may rather indirectly than directly impose an impact on migrants' political attentiveness, importance and motivation through migrants' majority language proficiency, national identification or the access to native contacts. Thus, in sum, migrants' structural integration is supposed to play a

minor role in predicting migrant’s political interest than their social, cultural and national emotional integration.

In sum, Figure 1.3 highlights the theoretical considerations within a micro model on the role of migrants’ ethnic/religious and national identity on interest in receiving country politics. While the upper part represents theoretical paths that are addressed within the empirical Chapter 4 of the thesis, the lower part represents explanatory considerations within the empirical Chapter 3.




Figure 1.3. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants’ integration processes/capital and their political interest in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4

1.4.2 Predincting migrants’ democracy satisfaction

Besides political interest, the thesis further proposes that the four integration dimensions (cultural, emotional, structural and social integration) are main conditions for migrants’ perceived regime responsiveness and legitimacy and thus *democracy satisfaction* in the receiving country. People with a higher social status (i.e. structural integration), for instance, are more likely to perceive their needs and wishes for social approval satisfied by the political system, and thus to perceive the political regime as responsive and legitimate. Relatedly, researches have documented that judgments of the personal state of the economy or health as well as job satisfaction or life satisfaction are closely related to democracy satisfaction (e.g. Schäfer 2013; Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007).

The command of the majority language and social contacts with natives in turn may affect democracy satisfaction through producing social trust, which spill over to political trust (Jacobs and Tillie 2004, 421). Yet, I argue that there is also another mechanism that links host country-specific cultural and social capital (i.e. majority language proficiency and interethnic contacts) to regime satisfaction due to reducing cultural distances on behalf of the native policy makers and authorities, which may otherwise foster disadvantages in terms of political representation of migrant interests. Thus, Ulbig (2005, 2) assumes that policy makers who share characteristics with citizens ‘by appearance, statements, or symbolic gestures send cues to their constituents that they will be more responsive to their needs’.

Further, emotional inclusion in the form of national identification can be expected to increase democracy satisfaction as it biases positive attitudes towards the national group (and related objects that help to preserve a positive identity). In similar veins, national identification bias migrants’ perceptions of regime responsiveness i.e. making the ‘the polity democratically more legitimate in one’s eyes’ (Mansbridge 1999, 651). Last but not least, national identification can be expected to enhance satisfaction with the democratic regime of the receiving society, because it drives migrants to assimilate the self to the content of the national group prototype. According to Kunovich (2009), besides ‘ethnic’ characteristics such as language, this also involves ‘civic’ and ‘political’ aspects such as legal rights and duties of a democratic national political community.

Apart from the structural, social, cultural and emotional inclusion processes, an increasing body of literature as well as theories from social psychology point towards religion as factor within the immigrant’s context of settlement that bear a main influence on migrants’ political support attitudes. There has been a traditional strand of political science literature that connects religion with attitudes towards democracy by cultural arguments (see, among others: Huntington 1996a; Huntington 1996b; Modood 2003; Pauly 2013). Yet, empirical studies do not consistently document the alleged negative association between a Muslim affiliation and democratic attitudes or democratic skills as well as differences to a Christian affiliation in western host societies (e.g. Jackson and Doerschler 2012; Maxwell 2010).

Relying on social psychological literature, the doctoral thesis argues for two distinct micro-mechanisms through which religion becomes relevant to migrants’ regime evaluation. According to SIT, social identities are a main source of shaping and determining individual’s well-being and expectations. Thereby, religious identity can be suggested to particularly enhance individuals’ subjective life-satisfaction because it offers a comforting and compelling worldview, a social support system, and a unique form of psychological enrichment (i.e.

personal well-being and self-esteem) (Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Yet, there are good reasons to assume that main dimensions of migrants' religious identity, their religious self-categorisation and attendance may have different (positive and negative) effects on democracy satisfaction.

Through the church-based social system, members can not only actively re-affirm a positive identity but may also experience support in terms of advice or assistance when attending religious services. Thereby individuals' general well-being is enhanced. Moreover, political participation in organised communities such religious organisations may satisfy migrants' needs and expectations towards democracies of free expression and practice of religion. In addition, religious participation provides social interaction opportunities to develop civic skills, norms, trust and the political knowledge necessary to practise democratic citizenship (Putnam 2000). Thereby, it may also enhance migrants' satisfaction with decision-making structures of a democratic regime.

In contrast, the self-categorisation dimension of religious identity as a member of a particular religious community may under circumstances of a socially disadvantaged and stigmatised religious identity lead to perceptions of a lack of responsiveness legitimacy of the political regime of the receiving country. Thus, as a Muslim affiliation is associated with disadvantages in the main positioning system of the host society, the labour market (e.g. Constant et al. 2006: 25), and the majority population shares negative attitudes as well as discriminate against Muslim believers (e.g. Helbling 2013), it can be expected to decrease migrants' well-being as well as perceived regime responsiveness.

Because religious attendance and affiliation are closely related, interaction effects can be suggested: Because Muslim believers experience contrary to their expectations and wishes for free expression and practice of religion a contested and disadvantaged identity within the German receiving society, the positive effect of church attendance can be expected to be less pronounced for them compared to Protestant or Catholic immigrant believers. Similarly, it can be suggested that because Muslim believers are less likely to meet native Germans by their church attendance than Protestant and Catholic believers do, respectively remain among their religious community of shared grievances, the negative effect of Muslim affiliation may be more pronounced among Muslims that frequently attend religious services and events.

Yet, an alternative assumption is that religious attendance may enhance the psychological resources that help to cope with a negative and contested Muslim identity through the mechanisms of a social support system. Thus, church attendance may buffer the negative well-being effect of Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction.

Figure 1.4 depicts the influence associations between migrants' emotional, cultural, social, and structural integration and democracy satisfaction that are topic of empirical Chapter 5 of the present doctoral work.




Figure 1.4. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants' integration processes/capital and their political interest in Chapter 5

1.4.3 Predicting migrants' national identification

Besides migrants' political interest and democracy satisfaction, the thesis also studies migrants' national identification as political attitude. Again, the question is how the other main integration dimensions of migrants by Esser (2001) relate to it. Following the classical assimilation theory by Gordon (1964), acquiring the language of the receiving country as well as entering social relations with the host society in clubs and institutions (i.e. 'structural assimilation' in Gordon's terms) can also be conceived as measures of migrants' social and cultural assimilation that precede their identificational assimilation in terms of developing a sense of peoplehood exclusively towards the (political community of host) society (for a similar argument, see also Esser 2001, 12–14): First, by learning and speaking the language of the host society, migrants become familiar with the host-society culture and become similar to the native group members, which increases levels of identification with this group (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Turner et al. 1987. Second, interethnic social ties can provide an explanation for immigrants' identification with the receiving country because individuals tend to adapt to the values, beliefs, and norms of a social group they interact with (cf. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014, 8). Moreover, having interactions with natives

is a signal for migrants that they are socially accepted and that social boundaries are permeable, which eases identification with this group (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Leszczensky 2013). Last but not least, migrants' structural in terms of economic integration can be suggested to increase national identification die to two reasons: First, to be economically successful in the host society provides opportunities for a positive social reference, which makes identification with the national group more attractive. Second, economic integration is an importance source for national identification through providing contact opportunities to natives as well as financial resources for participating in other social networks of natives, such as clubs and culuntary associations (cf de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014, 6.f).

Figure 1.5 shows the paths between migrants' cultural, social, and structural integration and their emotional integration (national identification) as suggested in the empirical Chapter 2 of the thesis.




Figure 1.5. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants' integration processes/capital and national identification in Chapter 2

1.4.4 Differences between immigrant groups in Germany

Next to considering the migrant-specific characteristics at the individual level that can account for migrants' attitudes towards the self in national politics (i.e. political interest) as well as attitudes towards the host-society political regime and political community (i.e. regime satisfaction and national identification), I also hypothesise on the role of group differences. Previous literature often implicitly assumes that the command and knowledge of the host-society language, as well as social contacts with natives, matter in the same way for the interest in national politics, regime satisfaction, and national identification in different immigrant groups (e.g. Hochman and Davidov 2014; Esser 2009; Maxwell 2010a; Morales and Pilati

2011). In contrast, I argue that the extent to which host-country language skills, as well as having social contacts with natives in networks (of voluntary associations), affects migrants' interest in national politics, regime satisfaction, or national identification depends on immigrant-group specific characteristics as well as on characteristics of the host-society context (see for national identity effects Schulz and Leszczensky 2016). More specifically, following classical assumptions on the nature of ethnic boundaries (Alba 2005; Wimmer 2008) or the permeability of inter-group boundaries (Tajfel and Turner 1986), I propose in line with Schulz and Leszczensky (2016, 186) that while being proficient in the native language as well as having social ties with natives may increase interest in national politics, regime satisfaction or 'national identification if boundaries between immigrants and natives are blurred, it may fall short thereof or do so only marginally in a context of bright boundaries between immigrants and natives'. The nature of ethnic boundaries (i.e. bright vs blurred) relates to social and cultural distinctions or in terms of Alba (2005:22) whether external (social) as well as internal interpretations of immigrants belonging are unambiguous or ambiguous. Two main factors that indicate the nature of ethnic boundaries are perceived discrimination by the majority population as well as incompatibility of cultures, respectively the distance between migrants' origin culture and the dominant culture of the country of settlement (see also Schulz and Leszczensky 2016, 170). Both factors vary between various immigrant groups in Germany and thus may moderate the impact of national language proficiency and having contacts with natives on national political interest, regime satisfaction, or identification with the political community. In comparison to traditional labour immigrant groups from Southern Europe (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and former Yugoslavia, but also new immigrant groups in Germany from Eastern Europe, specifically Poland, immigrants from Turkey are exceptional with respect to social and cultural distances in many respects: First, Turkish immigrants from the first as well as second generation perceive higher discrimination than the other immigrant groups (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a; Steinbach 2004, 146ff.; Ganter 2003, 133ff.). Second, Germans report higher social distance towards them than towards Italians or Greeks (Steinbach 2004, 120ff.; Ganter 2003, 133ff.). Third, Turks are also faced with strong norms of ingroup loyalty by their co-ethnics (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a). Fourth, Turkish immigrants are culturally more distant from Germans than, for instance, Poles due to a more dissimilar origin language (Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016, 184). Moreover, due to Turks' mainly Muslim background, their religious differences with respect to a traditionally Christian majority in Germany are more pronounced than for immigrants from Southern Europe or Poland (Diehl and Koenig 2013). In sum, Turkish immigrants can be perceived to be faced to higher extents

with bright and salient ethnic boundaries than other immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Southern Europe, or more recently from Poland. In sum, it can therefore be expected that cultural, social, structural and emotional inclusion processes in the German host society increase interest in politics and democracy satisfaction less strongly for Turkish than for non-Turkish-immigrants. Similarly, migrants' cultural, social, and structural integration should foster their national identification less strong if they are of Turkish in comparison to a non-Turkish background.

1.4.5 Previous empirical evidence and open questions

Even though there is a growing body of European empirical studies on migrants' political attitudes towards the mainstream society in the course of the attacks in New York, Madrid, and London in the early to mid-2000s, there is still a considerable gap of empirical research, especially concerning immigrants' external political attitudes such as political trust or regime satisfaction. While American research has examined the attitudes of political trust of African Americans and of Latinos for decades (see, for instance Abramson 1972; Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Michelson 2001; Long 1978; Rodgers 1974; Howell and Fagan 1988; Wenzel 2006), there is only a recent research field in Europe such as that indicated by studies conducted by Fennema and Tillie (1999), Janmaat (2008), Maxwell (2010a), Anduiza and San Martín (2011), Sanders et al. (2014), and Fleischmann et al. (2013). Thus, there is still comparatively less published in international peer-reviewed journals on ethnic minorities' external evaluative and affective political orientations within European host societies than on other dimensions of migrants' structural (i.e. economic), cultural, or social integration (cf. van Craen 2012, 114). Concerning national identification and its conditions, empirical research is also increasingly growing in Europe as well as in Germany (e.g. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016). Reviewing the existing European research literature, a diverse and complex picture emerges on the impact of majority language proficiency (i.e. host country-specific cultural capital) and interethnic contacts (i.e. host country-specific social capital) on migrants' interest in national politics, regime satisfaction, and national identification.

Previous quantitative research indicates that abilities to use the host-country language matter for immigrants' general *political interest* (Diehl and Urbahn 1998). Also, with respect to political interest measures that specifically relate to politics of the receiving country, Berger et al. (2004, 501) and Jacobs et al. (2004, 552) find for different immigrant groups in Berlin or Brussels that national language proficiency facilitates interest in national politics or local

politics. In contrast, the study by Zurich, Eggert, and Giugni (2010, 194) among different immigrant groups only provides evidence that language proficiency matters for political interest among Italian immigrants, but not for Kosovars or Turks. Building on the large Putnamien literature and social capital arguments on political trust provided by Fennema and Tillie (1999), Eggert and Giugni (2010, 192) find positive effects for Italian immigrants of both cross-ethnic membership as well as ethnic membership on interest in local politics, as well as positive effects for Kosovars of ethnic group membership. Moreover, Jacobs et al. (2004, 552) show that ethnic membership matters for Moroccans but not Turks indirectly through union membership. In contrast, Berger et al. (2004) as well as the European cross-national study by Moral and Palati (2011) in ten European cities reveal a more complex picture, in which not all types of organisational memberships show the same impact. More specifically, Morales and Pilati (2011) show that ethnic social capital in terms of formal involvement in ethnic associations and informal embeddedness in ethnically homogenous networks impinge on migrants' interest in hostland politics as well as active engagement in politics. Additionally, Berger and her colleagues (2004, 501) find that ethnic associational membership is negatively associated with Turkish migrants' interest in German politics when interest in homeland politics is accounted for. Morales and Pilati (2011) refer to the specific political context and existing political opportunity structures that may account for varying effects of ethnic social capital across countries. They conclude that 'Ethnic social capital has different meanings and mobilization value in different political and institutional contexts. In contexts where individual rights are easy accessible to immigrants and their children and group rights are underdeveloped, ethnic social capital is primarily a segregating force' (ibid., 110f.).

Besides interest in national politics, language proficiency has also been found to relate to regime responsiveness measures such as regime satisfaction. Thus, an effective command of the host-society language has been found to relate to ethnic minorities' *positive affect towards government in terms of institutional trust or satisfaction* (Janmaat 2008; Maxwell 2010a). Also, within a combined acculturation measure, familiarity with the English language fosters a measure of democratic engagement, which also involves besides behavioural indicators psychological indicators such as political interest, knowledge, or satisfaction with democracy (Sanders et al. 2014). In contrast to previous positive findings in literature, van Craen (2012) finds that both native language use as well as native group friends negatively relate to governmental trust among Turkish descendants in Belgium. Moreover, perceived discrimination has been found within various European studies to be a significant factor that

depresses the levels of governmental trust and satisfaction of minority members (Maxwell 2010a; Maxwell 2010b; van Craen 2012; Sanders et al. 2014).

With respect to the identification with the political community of the host society (i.e. *national identification*) and its conditions, previous research based on cross-sectional data finds evidence that social and cultural assimilation (i.e. native contacts and majority language knowledge) are positively related to higher levels of national identification among immigrants (Esser 2009; de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016). Yet, a recent longitudinal study on the relationship between social and national identification could not find a significant relationship, as soon as unobserved heterogeneity through time-invariant factors is accounted for (Leszczensky 2013). Moreover, Schulz and Leszczensky (2016) show that in contrast to immigrant adolescents of former Yugoslavian and Southern European origin, there is no association between having native friends and national identification for immigrants from Poland and Turkey. Research on the effect of perceived rejection by the native group finds cross-sectional as well as longitudinal evidence that perceived discrimination negatively relates to national identification (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim 2009; Morales and Pilati 2011; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).

In sum, arguments and previous empirical findings presented so far indicate that migrant-specific characteristics and capital at the individual level related to majority language proficiency and social contacts with natives matter for migrants' attitudinal integration into politics in Germany in terms of interest in national politics, national regime satisfaction, or national identification. Moreover, even though some studies have implicitly assumed the same effects for different immigrant groups (e.g. Hochman and Davidov 2014; Esser 2009; Maxwell 2010a; Morales and Pilati 2011), there is also research that shows that the effects of social involvement in interethnic networks as well as the knowledge of the majority language on political interest or national identification differ mainly between Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004). Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that most of the empirical research presented previously is cross-sectional. As a consequence, the studies are limited to draw any causal inference. Moreover, there are in general minimal studies on migrants' satisfaction with democracy.

Although minimal reliable empirical evidence is available on the impact of migrants' identification with the receiving society on their internal and external political attitudes, the scarce evidence in Europe that is available mostly supports that migrants' national identity

contributes to the explaining of migrants' trust- or political support-related attitudes towards the government, institutions, and so forth (cf. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013, 217; see also Caballero 2009; Maxwell 2010b) as well as political interest (cf. Eggert and Giugni 2010, 193; see also Diehl and Urbahn 1998). Yet, on the contrary, Reichert (2013, 168) finds a direct as well as negative indirect impact of national identification on Turkish immigrants' interest in politics in Germany through decreasing perceptions of ethnic disadvantages.

In support of the idea by SIT on the effect of devalued social identities to achieve positive social identity by social competition in the case of impermeable boundaries, research on ethnic minorities reveals a positive impact of ethnic or religious identification on political mobilisation intentions (e.g. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). Concerning more directly the political attitudes under study within this doctoral thesis, Reichert (2013, 168) does find a positive effect of ethnic identification for Turks' interest in politics in Germany, while Fleischmann and her colleagues (2013, 219) do not find a significant impact of an ethnic-religious identification measure on second-generation Turks' and Moroccans' political trust in Belgium.

Evidence for the unique mobilising power of such dual identities under perceptions of discrimination has been found in cross-sectional and small longitudinal studies among Turkish and other migrants in Germany (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008) and in the Netherlands (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). Those studies reported that dual identities among immigrants do not to foster radicalisation or political violence, but rather involvement in normative political actions (Simon and Ruhs 2008). Concerning migrants' political attitudes, Reichert (2013, 163) only found a relevant effect of dual identity on Turks' subjective political competence, though not political interest. Furthermore, Fleischmann et al. (2013, 219) could not identify a significant impact of interaction between civic (i.e. national) and ethno-religious identification on political trust among Turks and Moroccans in Belgium.

In sum, the existing evidence on the relationship between migrants' group identities and their attitudinal integration into politics in European societies is still scarce and limited with respect to important methodological aspects, such as being concentrated on single migrant groups (e.g. Turks), or applying cross-sectional data analysis.

1.5 The methodological approach of the doctoral thesis

Unlike many other researchers working on the political trust and political interest of ethnic minorities (e.g. Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Janmaat, 2008; Maxwell 2010; Wenzel 2006), the

main advantage and unique contribution of my doctoral research lies in the usage of longitudinal instead of cross-sectional data and statistical regression methods. The advantage of longitudinal data is that it helps to tackle the question of causality more convincingly than cross-sectional designs, because they enable the application of econometric estimation strategies that allows an estimation of 'within individual' changes and the elimination of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, selection bias, and estimate changes in migrants' cognitive and evaluative outcomes. The present section thus serves to outline and highlight the specificities of the data (Section 1.6.1), the causal and analytical approach (Sections 1.6.2 and 1.6.3), as well as measurement strategies of migrants' identities (Section 1.6.4) used within the core chapters (2-5) of the doctoral thesis.

1.5.1 Data

Chapters 4 and 5 use longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) to examine migrants' general political interest and satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany. More specifically, Chapter 4 employs data from 1993-2006 and Chapter 5 draws on the years 2005 and 2010. The German Socio-Economic Panel Study is a nationally representative and household-based individual-level panel survey collected annually by the German Institute of Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaft= DIW) since 1984. There are nearly every year 11,000 households and approximately 30,000 individuals sampled. Each individual in a respective household over the age of 16 is interviewed. GSOEP includes a broad spectrum of topics like demography, economic situation, education, health, value orientation, and satisfaction, as well as integration (Wagner et al. 2007). The richness of the data for studying migrant integration emanates from two features of the GSOEP: First, GSOEP involves various subsamples of immigrant minorities from different world regions that provide a sufficient number of immigrant respondents for statistical analysis. A first sample (sample B) that was drawn in 1984 oversampled the labour migrant population in Germany, who had migrated to Germany during the period of labour recruitment from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. More specifically, 1,393 households were drawn that were composed of individuals living in households in which the household head belonged to the main immigrant groups residing in West Germany, namely the Turkish, Italian, Greece, ex-Yugoslavian, and Spanish minorities. Another second immigrant sample drawn between 1994 and 1995 (sample D) includes individuals from households with at least one household member who immigrated to Germany after 1984. Two additional samples were drawn in 1998 and 2000 (samples E and F). Both samples also include immigrants in their population schemes, however only in the latter

(sample F) were households that included foreign individuals sampled separately. Second, besides the high number of respondents of immigrant background, GSOEP involves a sufficient composition of relevant migrant-specific indicators measuring immigrant integration, ranging from language skills, identification with the residence country as well as origin country, the ethnic composition of friendship networks, and experiences of discrimination. In summary, the data is quite unique because it provides repeated information on first- and second-generation immigrants in Germany over a long period of time, thus allowing statements about integration dynamics over time. Yet, because the majority of its immigrant respondents were sampled in 1984, GSOEP represents primarily long-term immigrants of Germany and not newly arrived immigrants.

Due to that disadvantage of GSOEP to provide information of recently immigrated immigrants in Germany, the thesis also employs data from an international Norface-funded project on ‘Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe’ (SCIP; Diehl et al., 2015), which constitutes a two-wave panel study of new immigrants in Europe. It was initiated in 2009 and entails approximately 7,000 migrants aged between 18 and 60 years. These were recent immigrants from four European destinations, namely England, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Germany. Immigrants have been interviewed at the latest 18 months after immigration and a second time approximately fifteen months later. Unlike most panel surveys in Germany, the dataset is one of the first to address a very crucial and dynamic phase and initial period after immigration that may lay the groundwork for subsequent acculturation and integration processes such as political or emotional integration. As previously outlined in Section 1.4.2, the literature on the dynamic nature of social and ethnic belonging emphasises that changes in social self-conception are crucially initiated by changes of social and reference contexts through immigration (Howard 2000). In sum, Diehl et al. (2015b, 5) thus conclude: ‘Studying new migrants, therefore, has the potential both to provide important descriptive information on recent immigrant flows to Europe and to help settle [...] unresolved questions of current integration research’. Another advantage of the SCIP project provides that it has collected data on various socio-cultural dimensions such as migrants’ social networks, religion, cultural consumption, as well as identification. Moreover, it also involves pre-migration characteristics of migrants, e.g. pre-migration worship attendance. The empirical studies of the thesis in Chapters 3 and 4 employ the SCIP data from Germany, which involve new immigrants from Poland and Turkey. A random sample was drawn from population registers in five cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich, and Bremen). The target population was comprised of recent immigrants between the ages of 18 and 60 years who, at most, stayed for 18 months in

Germany at the time of the first interview that took place in 2010 or 2011. In total, 2,644 face-to-face interviews (1,482 among Poles; 1,162 among Turks) were conducted in the first wave. Around 1.5 years later, approximately 45% could be re-interviewed (for a detailed description of the methodological setup of the project, see Gresser and Schacht 2015).

In sum, GSOEP as well as SCIP provide through their unique panel structure as well as different focus on either long-term or new immigrants a valuable empirical ground for this thesis's analysis of migrants' attitudinal integration into German politics.

1.5.2 Analytical strategy

In line with the thinking on causal inference by Smith (2014) or Holland (1986), the present doctoral thesis seeks to identify the 'the effects of causes' (EoC) instead of the 'causes of effects' (CoE). CoE has been traditionally applied within social sciences, leading to an infinite list of causes, and researchers needed to realise, according to Sobel (2000), 'that they are merely adding more and more variables to a predictive conditioning set, [that] one wonders what will take the place of the thousands of purported (causal) effects that currently fill the journals' (Sobel 2000, 650). Instead, the causal approach of EoC implies that it is not the main statistical aim to decompose the variance of an outcome variable as far as possible, respectively to identify as many causes of the outcome as possible, but rather the attempt to identify the causal effect of a specific variable such as national identification on an outcome variable such as political attitudes. According to the counterfactual approach on causality (Rubin's model) (Rubin 1974), the causal effect of a treatment (T) is defined as the difference between the outcome for an individual in case of no treatment as well as in the case of treatment. Yet, an individual can never be observed simultaneously in both states, which is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland 1986). Within cross-sectional designs, the difference between different individuals is thus measured. Yet, the causal effect would only hold if the assumption of unit homogeneity (no unobserved heterogeneity) holds. Within non-experimental survey data (without randomisation), this is not the case, and this method consequently suffers from the problems of self-selection based on unobserved heterogeneity (also called: omitted variables bias). Longitudinal data (i.e. repeated observations on individuals over time) and respective regression models allow researchers to deal with the problem of selection on observable and unobservable variables (for panel regression models, see Wooldridge 2010; Allison 2009; Mundlak 1978; see also Schunck 2013; Brüderl 2010). Panel data and respective regression methods address variations in characteristics between persons as well as within persons over time. The general formulation of the error-component model looks like the following:

$$y_{it} = \beta_1 x_{it} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

In this model, the error term is divided into two components. While α_i donates to a person-specific time-constant error term, thus involving the unobserved characteristics that do not change over time, ε_{it} represents the idiosyncratic error term that involves all unobserved characteristics of a person that vary over time. This error component model is the base of random effects (RE) as well as fixed effects (FE) regression models. Depending on the precise RE and FE model, assumptions on strict exogeneity hold, implying that the x-variables are uncorrelated with the error terms ε_{it} or α_i . Within the FE model, the unobserved α_i is removed prior to estimation through a transformation of time-deaming the data. Hence, fixed-effects are even unbiased (consistent) if $Cov(x_{it}, \alpha_i) \neq 0$. Phrased differently, FE controls for all time-invariant variables of individuals, even though they have not been observed or measured such as sex, country of birth, or personality traits that are rather stable (e.g. intelligence). Moreover, at the same time it applies that FE controls for one part of attrition bias in longitudinal data due to time-constant variables. The estimator based on the time-demeaned variables is called the fixed effects estimator or the within estimator and is entirely based on within-person changes over time. It only rests on the further assumption of strict exogeneity between the independent variables and the idiosyncratic error (unobserved time-variant variables) $Cov(x_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}) = 0$. In contrast, the random effects model assumes that the person-specific error term α_i is not correlated with the predictors, which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables in the regression models $Cov(x_{it}, \alpha_i) = 0$. Yet, the assumption can easily be violated in non-experimental research due to unobserved heterogeneity, which leads to biased and inconsistent estimates in the case of RE, while FE still provides consistent estimates. Yet, if the assumption $Cov(x_{it}, \alpha_i) = 0$ holds, RE is more efficient (due to smaller standard errors) than FE, because it draws on within- as well as between-person information to estimate the effect. Thus, there is a trade-off between efficiency and bias within panel regression modelling. Yet, in terms of identifying EoC, the latter “bias” is more important.

The empirical studies within Chapters 2-5 draw on these advantages of panel regression analysis. While Chapter 2 on the conditions of national identification applies random effects models, all other chapters (3, 4, and 5) use panel regression models that estimate within-effects in random-effects models, thus allowing us to address both advantages of FE and RE regression simultaneously (Allison 2009; Wooldridge 2010; Mundlak 1978; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; for an overview, see also Schunck 2013). These are called hybrid (Allison 2009) or correlated-random effects models (Mundlak 1978). They rest on the idea of decomposing between and within variation and to estimate the effects within only one model. Even though

the models are not new, they have received increasing attention within studies on panel data. Hence, the hybrid model according to Allison (2009) used within Chapters 2 and 3 on migrants' political interest decomposes the time-varying variables into a within and between cluster component by

$$y_{it} = (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)' \beta_1 + \bar{x}_i \gamma + z_i' \delta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Thus, β_1 gives the within or fixed-effect estimate that is unbiased by the level 2 error α_i . As in fixed-effects models, β_1 is not biased through time-constant unobserved variables. δ provides the coefficient for the time-invariant variables, for which $Cov(\alpha_i | x_{it}, z_i) = 0$ still needs to hold. Yet, by inclusion of the cluster means \bar{x}_i of the level 1 variables, the model ensures that effect estimates of the level 2 variables are corrected for between-cluster differences in x_{it} . In sum, this hybrid model provides the most efficient and unbiased estimates for time-variant as well as time-invariant indicators of national identification, political interest, as well as ethnicity (i.e. country of origin).

Similar to the hybrid model is the correlated random effects model (CRE) (Mundlak 1978) applied within Chapter 5 on migrants' satisfaction with democracy. In contrast to the hybrid model, it includes the cluster means of level 1 variables as an alternative to cluster mean centring (Halaby 2003, 519).

$$y_{it} = (x_{it})' \beta_1 + \bar{x}_i \gamma + z_i' \delta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The cluster mean picks up any correlation between the person-specific error and the level 2 variable. While β_1 still provides the same fixed-effects estimate as in the hybrid model, \bar{x}_i will differ, as it provides within the hybrid model the between effect, while it is within CRE the difference of the within and between effects.

In addition to the main strategy to account for selection of time-constant unobservables via panel regression models, the empirical regression models in Chapters 2-5 of my thesis also account for the selection of time-varying observables to assess the causal effect of social identification; as for fixed effects, the assumption of $Cov(x_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}) = 0$ stills needs to hold. I build on Morgan and Winship (2007) as well as Pearl's (2010) framework of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). Pearl elaborates three different approaches to identifying causal effects, of which one is the conditioning on variables that block all back-door paths from the causal variable to the outcome variable. This means, in more traditional terms, to identify observed variables that simultaneously affect X and Y. This variable is supposed to confound the relationship between X and Y and needs to be conditioned to assess the causal effect of X. Figure 1.4 C provides a

confounder of the relationship between D and Y, as in terms of Pearl's language, a back-door path. The Path $X \leftarrow C \rightarrow Y$ is a back-door path because it includes a directed edge pointing to X. In terms of my relationships of interests within Chapters 3, 4, and 5 between migrants' time-varying social identification and political attitudes, the approach suggests that other time-dependent integration processes such as social and cultural adaption must be conditioned on to identify the causal effect of changes in psychological group memberships. Hence, in summary, my empirical analyses in the form of panel regression models of political attitudes on ethnic neglect, rather than seek, to primarily account for all causes of political interest, but focus on common causes that affect ethnic identities and political attitudes simultaneously. To find the respective variables is, with a first step, a theoretical task.




Figure 1-6. A causal diagram in which the effect of X on Y is confounded by C

1.5.3 Moderation and mediation: Highlighting mechanisms

Besides the analytical strategies chosen above to approach the causal effects of social identification on political attitudes with longitudinal data, I also apply moderation and mediation analysis, which allow the definition of the conditions and mechanisms of how social identification exerts its effect on migrants' cognitive and evaluative political attitudes towards the German host society. Phrased differently, these types of analyses allow us to analyse in addition to the question of “whether” a variable has an effect, also “when” (moderation) and “how” (mediation) the variable has an effect on the outcome. Basic graphical models of mediation and moderation are depicted in Figure 1.5.




Figure 1-7. Simple diagrams on moderation and mediation of the effect of X on Y by M

Moderation implies a conditional effect of X, respectively that the effect of X is dependent on the values of another variable M. In contrast, mediation implies an indirect effect of X on Y, respectively that the effect of X on Y runs fully or partly over two paths (a and b) through another variable M. The empirical chapters of the present thesis have different hypotheses on moderation and mediation. For instance, in Chapter 4, the effect of a dual identity on political interest is suggested to depend on perceived discrimination (moderation). Further, Chapter 2 supposes, for instance, that the effects of cultural and social assimilation on developing a national identity differ for recently immigrated Turks and Poles. Chapter 2 also proposes that the effect of time in the receiving country on national identification is mediated by increasing social and cultural assimilation processes.

Moderation hypotheses are tested analytically by separate group analysis or including an interaction term within the regression equation, which is constructed as the product of X and M (Hayes 2013, 214). Analytically applying mediation analysis, Chapter 4 uses the product-of-coefficients approach (Preacher and Hayes 2004) to examine how the effect of time in Germany is mediated by social and cultural assimilation on national identification. This implies the product of the coefficients of both paths (a) and (b) between X and Y in Figure 1.5, which resolves in its own coefficient, which is referred to as the indirect effect of X in the literature. Another traditional strategy to test mediation hypotheses is applied within Chapter 3 that analyses how the effect of national identification may be exerted through host country-specific social and cultural capital (i.e. majority language skills and interethnic associational involvement) on interest in national politics. It is the Baron-Kenny method (Baron and Kenny 1986), also called the causal steps strategy, which identifies mediation through three premises: 1) one must first establish that there is an effect to be mediated, meaning evidence that X and Y are associated, 2) X must affect M significantly, and 3) the effect of X on Y is reduced by a condition on M.

1.5.4 Measurement of migrants' social identities

As noted by the literature and Section 1.2.1, social identity is a multidimensional construct. Social identity involves conceptually different aspects such as self-categorisation, importance, emotional attachment, or meaning, which are measured differently (see Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Hence, referring to oneself as a member of a social category (self-categorisation) can be measured by close-end or open-end questions such as 'Which of the following religious communities do you consider yourself to belong to? -Islam; -Christianity;

and so forth’, or ‘In terms of my religious denomination, I consider myself to be...’. To self-categorise as member of a certain ethnic or religious group can be differentiated from the strength or importance of the respective group identification. Both are commonly operationalised with Likert items, referring to the strength of attachment or perceived pride associated with the group membership (e.g., from SCIP: ‘How important is the following to your sense of who you are: your current country of residence?’ and ‘Do you feel proud of your current country of residence?’).

Ethnic belonging is applied within the empirical chapters of this dissertation with measures of own country of birth or of the parents (e.g. Chapter 5) as well as with ordinal measures of strength of ethnic belonging (e.g. Chapter 3). For operationalising national belonging in Chapters 2-5, there are only Likert items in GSOEP and SCIP available. Moreover, a behavioural measure for religious identity in Chapter 5 is used, which entails the information on respondents’ frequency of religious attendance.

Besides the different aspects of social identity, individuals also have multiple identities within their social self-concept, involving different group memberships. These overlapping national and ethnic identities are specifically referred to in the literature as dual (ethno-national) identity (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014), which is also of interest within this thesis’s empirical Chapters 4 and 5. Even though it is empirically demonstrated that individuals identify with several groups simultaneously, the measurement of this experience is far from self-evident in current empirical research as well as yielding different results (for an overview, see Fleischmann and Verkuyten 2015).

To measure the impact of a dual ethno-national identity in the thesis different strategies are applied: As the direct measure of dual identity (e.g., “I feel I belong to both the Turks and the Germans”) is not available in the data sets, bidimensional scale measures are applied, which consist of some kind of combination of the two separate national and ethnic identity scales (Nguyen et al. 2007). Either both single scales are split at some point of the scale (midpoint, mean, or median) to create categories of the inclusion strategies by Esser (2006) (dual, assimilated, separated, or marginalized) or the two emotional orientations are combined into an interaction term. In general, either measurement strategy has its statistical and conceptual disadvantages. Actually, the product term strategy is preferable for many statistical reasons, because dichotomisation of rather continuous variables results in loss of variability and statistical power (Demes and Geeraert 2014). Moreover, dichotomization at an arbitrary point of the sample (median or mean) limits cross-sample comparisons and may provide a distorted view of respondent identification. Nonetheless, if research interest specifically lies in testing of

the typological model by Esser (2006), such as in Chapter 4, the interaction strategy is less efficient/valid as the interaction term does not allow to differentiate between individuals who have medium scores on both scales and those who score very high on one scale and low on the other (Nguyen et al. 2007). Chapter 4 on general political interest finally uses the median instead of mean-split approach because the distributions of the single identification measures are skewed. Moreover, the median-split instead of the midpoint-split method is applied because even though the latter method might be more conceptually defensible as well as allows for cross-sample comparison, median-split allows for a more even distribution of participants across the four identity strategies (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006). Last but not least, the median-split method is chosen for reasons of inter-study comparability as it is the most applied method in previous literature (e.g. Berry and Sabatier 2010; Giang and Witting 2006). Because Chapter 5 on democracy satisfaction has no specific theoretical reason for differentiating bicultural migrants from other inclusion types (assimilated, separated, or marginalized), the product term strategy is used within the statistical analysis.

Other important intended variables (e.g. language proficiency or native contacts) are operationalised and used differently within the thesis, depending on their inclusion within the specific waves of SOEP or SCIP. Thus, for instance, as SEOP 2005 and 2010 lack the measures on migrants' language skills, it is not included in the analysis of Chapter 5.

1.6 Main findings of the empirical chapters with respect to the theoretical framework

The main objective of the doctoral thesis is to discuss the integration conditions of migrants' attitudinal integration into the German host society political system in internal/cognitive as well as external/evaluative terms (i.e. to gain a self-concept as political actor, to be satisfied with the regime and to identify with the national political community).

Referring to the hybrid panel regression results in Chapter 3 and 4, it seems reasonable to conclude line with theoretical expectations in Chapter 2 that migrants' cultural, social, structural, as well as emotional inclusion relate to the German host society (i.e. national identification) are main driving forces for their *political interest*. Due to different immigrant populations involved in Germany, also separate group analyses are calculated in Chapter 3 and 4. These subgroup analyses indeed show some ethnic group-related results with respect to the effects of social and cultural capital indicators of the thesis. Thus, contrary to expectations in Section 1.4.1 the effect of majority language on interest in receiving country politics is stronger

for recently-arrived Turks. Moreover, there is statistical indication that there is only a negative effect of ethnic bonding within associational involvement for new immigrants from Poland but not from Turkey. Relatedly, political interest is for Turks significantly increased by informal social capital in the form of contacts with natives. Due to the positive effects that native contacts and language proficiency also exert in Chapter 4 on general political interest, the thesis concludes that cultural and social capital in form of majority language proficiency and interethnic contacts significantly matter for migrant's political interest in the receiving country. This findings are consistent with previous (mainly cross-sectional) research (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010, Janmaat 2008).

The thesis primarily contributes to existing literature in outlining the impact of emotional capital and its interrelation with cultural and social capital. For migrants' receiving country-specific political interest, empirical analyses in Chapter 3 prove that national identification has an independent positive effect on political interest for recently immigrated Poles as well as for Turks. However, stepwise regression analyses also evince in line with expectations in Section 1.4.1 indirect effects of national identification. Thus, majority language proficiency interethnic contacts party mediate the national identity effect for Turks. That is because the national identity effect is reduced conditioning on these variables, as well as both indicators significantly predict the outcome. Moreover, separate regression analyses on interethnic contacts as well as language proficiency show a significant independent effect of national identification. Apart from indirect effects, the analyses also document as expected moderator effects, i.e. that impact of national identity (it's partial slope) is depending on levels of majority language and associational involvement. Thus, with increasing language skills, the effect if national identification increases for Turks. In contrast, when gaining associational membership, national identification positively predicts political interest among Poles but negatively among Turkish immigrants. The negative effect might be due to experiences of social distance and stigmatisation that Turks may encounter in voluntary associations of the host society. This evokes national identity conflicts and thus social participation may mitigate the effect of national identification.

Besides national identity, Chapter 4 on "general political interest" also empirically highlights in line with considerations in Section 1.4.1 that under the condition of perceived discrimination a combined dual ethno-national identity may function as emotional capital that enhances interest in politics in contrast to an assimilated or segregated identity. With respect to group specific effects between Turkish, Ex-Yugoslavian and Southern European immigrant

groups, subgroup as well as interaction analyses find that the dual identity effect conditional on discrimination only significantly applies to the Turkish migrant group.

In sum, the thesis concludes that emotional inclusion processes independently as well as in combination and relation with social and cultural inclusion processes predict migrants' inclination to develop an internal political self-conception in terms of becoming interested in its political issues (e.g. policy, politics, polity). Nonetheless, it also documents that not only host country-related psychological inclusion provides emotional capital for migrants' inclination to become interested in and possibly active in the political system of Germany, but also in combination with psychological inclusion in ethnic group. Dual identity is not only the most common form of self-identification of migrants (e.g. Verkuyten 2005, 158). Moreover, because its influence is conditional on perceived discrimination, which is often met by recent as well as long-term immigrants, it may be a main pathway for migrants' political integration in Europeans receiving society.

With respect to migrants' external attitudinal inclusion, their *satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany*, the empirical study in Chapter 5 confirms in line with considerations in Section 1.4.2 that social, structural and emotional inclusion processes of migrants with reference to host society are also main predictors (majority language proficiency as cultural capital could not be tested due to gaps in SOEP data in 2010 and 2005). Thus, it shows in line with theory that migrants' national identification, job status, as well as contacts with natives have independent effects on immigrants' democracy satisfaction. Moreover, perceived discrimination as important underlying mechanism decreases migrants' democracy satisfaction in line with assumptions. With respect to the religion as main condition, the analysis also documents the suggested independent positive effect of religious attendance on regime evaluations. In contrast to this dimension of religion, self-considered religious (i.e. Muslim) affiliation rather exerts conditional effects depending on the ethnic group membership of the individual migrant. Thus, the test of interactions terms as well as subgroup analyses reveal that it negatively predicts democracy satisfaction for immigrants from Turkey, while it positively predicts democracy satisfaction of for the other non-Turkish immigrants (from Eastern and Western EU states as well as other non-EU countries). Besides the negative effect of Muslim affiliation for second-generation Turks subgroup analyses also corroborate a negative interaction between frequent religious attendance and Muslim affiliation. Thus, the positive effect of frequent religious attendance on Turkish immigrants' democracy satisfaction is getting smaller in the case of self-identifying as Muslim in comparison to a Christian self-identification.

At the same time, it applies that a Muslim self-identification leads to lesser democracy satisfaction among Turks, when they frequently visit the mosque.

Concerning the development of a sense of national group membership, Chapter 2 evinces no large differences between newcomers from Poland or Turkey concerning the general conducive impact of their cultural and social assimilation as well as the hampering effect of perceiving discrimination for their emotional assimilation. Only the negative effect of perceived discrimination is stronger for Turks than for Poles. No effect of economic integration as suggested in Section 1.4.3 can be found. Yet, the analyses find considerable differences between Turkish and Polish immigrants in their social assimilation and their perceptions of discrimination and value compatibilities over time that determine a general decline if Turks' and Poles' increase in national identification over the length of stay in Germany. Thus, for instance, while the social assimilation increases for Poles, it stagnates for Turks. Moreover, the perception of discrimination increases considerably for recent immigrants from Poland. Those initial conditions partly account for the different identity trajectories of newly arrived Turks and Poles over time.

1.7 Epilogue

The previous Chapter 1 has served to provide a broad conceptual, theoretical, empirical background and synthesis of the core empirical chapters (2-5) of this doctoral work. The dependent variables of the empirical chapters were therefore set in a conceptual framework of political support literature/culture as well as within the framework of migrant integration by Esser (2006). Further, the methodological strategy of the thesis has been delineated and the main results of the chapters with respect to the discussed theory has been outlined.

The following main chapters of this doctoral thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) are research papers written for international peer-reviewed journals. Every article independently elaborates on theories and empirical methods. Thus, to some extent, each of the articles stands alone. Nonetheless, all of the research articles do fit the aim and framework that has been described in Chapter 1. Thus, within a more extensive conclusion in Chapter 6, each article will be discussed another time with respect to the broader whole of this doctoral thesis.

The present last section of Chapter 1 thus serves to provide a specific outline and introduction of the subsequent empirical chapters. The single empirical chapters revolve around single subsidiary questions on the impact of national, ethnic, and religious identity of migrants and their adaptation to the political systems of European democracies in terms of becoming

personally self-conscious as political actors in politics (i.e. political interest) as well as having a favourable affect towards the political system (i.e. regime satisfaction) (see Section 1.1). Moreover, there is a specific focus on the role of national identity in constituting a determinant of internal and external political attitudes and that at the same time provides an explanandum that seeks its own explanation.

The potential conditions of migrants' identification with the national political community in Germany are studied in *Chapter 2*. Thereby, the study builds on assumptions of the classical assimilation theory by Gordon (1964) that migrants' identificational assimilation (i.e. national identification) happens over time in Germany through migrants' cultural and social accommodation within the receiving society over time (i.e. familiarity with and knowledge of the host-society language as well as social contact with natives). In contrast, salient ethnic boundaries in the form of perceived discrimination and cultural incompatibilities prevent new immigrants from their identification integration (Alba 2005) Moreover, this research endeavour places special emphasis on group differences in developing national identification for recent immigrants in Germany from Turkey and Poland. It is assumed that that Poles and Turks differ in their starting conditions to culturally and socially assimilate as well as to perceive discrimination and cultural incompatibilities within Germany, which in consequence leads to lower national identification among Turks, while it fosters higher national attachment among Poles. Yet, aside from the initial differences, the paper supposes that the effects of cultural and social assimilation as well as perceived discrimination on national identification should be quite similar for newly-arrived Poles and Turks.

In contrast to Chapter 2, *Chapter 3* deals with the explanation and testing of the effect of national identity on recent Polish and Turkish immigrants' tendency to become interested in the political affairs of Germany, i.e. to become interested in national politics. Therefore, the empirical study draws on arguments of SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986) as well as CVM (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thereby it suggests, on the one hand, a direct effect of migrants' national identification on interest in national politics through affecting political attentiveness, importance, and motivation. On the other hand, indirect effects of national identity (i.e. moderation and mediation) by migrants' German language skills as well as formal (i.e. associational) and informal embeddedness in social networks with Germans are proposed. The research article also discusses ethnic group differences with respect to the effect of national identity due to differences in ethnic boundaries with the German population in the form of social and cultural distances.

Building on Chapter 3 but with a different explanatory focus, *Chapter 4* examines the role of national as well as ethnic minority identity for labour migrants' political interest in Germany. More specifically, the empirical study starts from classical theoretical arguments of the conditional mobilising effect of a discriminated against and socially deprived ethnic identity (Miller et al. 1981; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), which is also suggested by SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986). It then further adds arguments of the PCI model (Simon and Klandermans 2001) to propose that a dual identity that combines the deprived ethnic minority identity with a sense of belonging to the national political community has a stronger effect on migrants' cognitive mobilisation to act politically than a single ethnic or national identity. Moreover, due to different perceptions of discrimination among labour immigrant groups in Germany, the study also suggests that the dual identity is stronger for labour immigrants with backgrounds in Turkey versus South Europe or former Yugoslavia.

Chapter 5 finally devotes attention to migrants' regime satisfaction. Other than in the previous empirical Chapters 2 to 4, changes in satisfaction with democracy are primarily studied in relation to migrants' religious identity, which is perceived in public and previous scholarly debate to negatively relate to migrants' affect towards the government and institutions of democracies due to incompatible values between religion and democracy, with a particularly negative focus on Islam (Hofmann 2004; Huntington 1996a) (see also Section 1.1). Given that perceived responsiveness of political institutions, the government, regime, and so forth, is a matter of an individual's life-satisfaction, the study assumes that psychological memberships in social groups (e.g. religious, ethnic, and national groups) affect the satisfaction with democracy of immigrants due to shaping individuals' personal experiences and well-being. Because religious identity is a multidimensional concept according to social identity literature (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Phinney and Ong 2007), the empirical study discusses the social identity experiences provided by religious identity behaviour such as attendance of religious events or services alongside the effect of migrants' self-categorisation as members of Christian faith or Muslim faith. While a positive effect of religious attendance is suggested due to the positive and supportive experiences that are provided by religious attendance among cultural ingroup members, a negative effect of self-defining as Muslim is expected due to the negative experiences of stigmatisation that are encountered in the conflictive intergroup context of a historically Christian German host society. As individuals hold multiple group memberships, the article discusses how social identity experiences provided by national identity, ethnic identity by the country of origin (i.e. Turkish versus non-

Turkish ancestry), and immigrant generation (i.e. first versus second generation) shape the effect of religious self-identification.

1.8 References

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Chapter 2: Between ethnic options and ethnic boundaries –Recent Polish and Turkish migrants’ identification with Germany*

Abstract

We describe migrants’ early patterns of identification with the receiving society and explain why these differ by migrants’ origins. Using longitudinal data from a novel survey among recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany enables us to analyse the nexus between social assimilation, ethnic boundaries and identification more directly than previous studies. Theoretically, we start out from assimilation theory and its assumption that migrants’ identification with the receiving country is a consequence of their preceding social and cognitive assimilation and from the literature on ethnic boundaries. Results suggest that Turkish new migrants start out with higher levels of identification with Germany than Poles. Over time, however, their national identification decreases while it increases for Poles. This is partly explained by the fact that Turkish migrants’ social assimilation stagnates; more importantly, only Turks perceive more rather than less discrimination and value incompatibility over time. While both groups’ identificational integration with the receiving country thus starts out from different conditions, they do not show a fundamentally dissimilar pattern with respect to the consequences of assimilation and discrimination for their national identification. Yet, the negative impact of the latter is stronger for Turks than for Poles, reflecting the greater salience of ethnic boundaries for this group.

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2.1 Introduction

There is a renewed interest in migrants' 'emotional' or 'identificational' integration in the receiving societies (Joppke, 2007). This is not only reflected in the public debate on some, mostly Muslim migrant groups' alleged unwillingness to become full and loyal members of their receiving societies. There is also a substantial body of research in sociology, psychology and social psychology on migrants' identity patterns, on the factors influencing them and on their consequences, e.g. on psychological well-being, outgroup attitudes or political engagement (Fischer-Neumann, 2014; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). Some studies are based on experimental research (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000: 103ff.), others rely on survey data, for example from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). These studies mostly analyse the correlates of identity types or profiles using cross-sectional data (Schwartz, 2005: 299). They evince considerable inter-individual variation in ethnic and national identities. Correlates on the individual level include education (Zimmermann et al., 2007), proficiency in both the receiving and sending countries' languages (Esser, 2009), contact to majority and minority members (De Vroome et al., 2014; Leszczensky, 2013), citizenship status (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010) and experiences of discrimination (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007). Intergroup variation seems to be substantial as well, with some groups identifying more strongly with the receiving or sending country than others (Diehl and Schnell, 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2007). On the group level, ethnic group size, the degree of ethnic replenishment, residential segregation (Esser, 2004; Jiménez, 2008), as well as the salience and the nature of ethnic group boundaries play an important role (Verkuyten, 2005: 159).

In this paper, we will describe and explain early changes in recently arrived migrants' identification with the receiving country. Doing so will provide insight into a very dynamic phase in migrants' identities that has so far remained a black box in integration research. Migrating to a new country is a typical change in social context that social identity theorists have described as a trigger for changes in identity and their meanings (Howard, 2000: 379; Owens et al., 2010: 488): New– alternative or overarching – 'ethnic options' (Waters, 1990) are opening up as assimilated (e.g. 'German' or 'American'), hyphenated (e.g. 'Turkish-German') or pan ethnic (e.g. 'European') identities. Depending on their experiences in the host society, e.g. discrimination due to their ethnic background, migrants may decide to distance themselves from or to embrace these new – or their old – identities.

We will focus on migrants' identification with the receiving country – i.e. their 'national' identification (see Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012) or their 'identificational assimilation'

(Gordon, 1964: 71) – rather than with their country of origin for theoretical, empirical and policy reasons. Theoretically, it can be assumed that being exposed to a new context affects migrants' identification with the receiving country more than their identification with the country of origin. After all, it seems unlikely that migrants abandon their homeland identity right away, even though this may happen in the long run. In turn, empirical evidence for reactive ethnic identities, although a prominent concept, is yet very scarce (Diehl and Schnell, 2006), and if it happens at all, it will probably not happen right after migrating to a new context but over time or in the next generation (Hansen, 1962; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Moreover, from a policy perspective, it seems important that new members of a society develop some sense of belonging to their new homeland and to understand which factors can hamper this process. Compared with this, the question of whether they maintain their ethnic identifications and thus develop some sort of 'dual' identity or abandon their old ties and identifications and become 'assimilated' seems less important. However, we will take into account findings from previous studies showing that there is an empirical correlation between these two – analytically separate – dimensions of identification (Skrobanek, 2009; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007) by briefly presenting some preliminary findings on this issue in our conclusion.

Our analyses are based on novel data from a two-wave survey among recently arrived immigrants in Germany. We will assess how and why these patterns differ inter-individually and between migrants from various origins. In particular, we will analyse to which extent differences in migrants' identity trajectories reflect their ongoing cognitive (referring mostly to language acquisition) and social (referring mostly to making friends with majority members) assimilation processes as well as their group-specific reception contexts. Notably, differences in the nature of ethnic boundaries will be more salient for some immigrant groups than for others. By analysing longitudinal data collected among newly arrived migrants, our study moves beyond existing research in several respects. To our knowledge, no study on ethnic identity has so far focused on migrants who have moved to Europe only recently.

In the following, we will describe in further detail the theoretical arguments that guide our research and present existing empirical findings. These relate to changes in migrants' identification with the receiving country in general and to the role of their assimilation in other spheres and their experiences and perceptions of discrimination in particular. This section will be followed by a description of the ethnic groups under consideration here and the corresponding reception contexts and climates they face in Germany. Along with this, we will

present our theory-driven expectations about both groups' early identity trajectories. Based on this we will present our data, empirical findings, and finally sum up and discuss our results.

2.2 Theoretical background and existing findings

Theoretically, migrants' ethnic identities are examples of 'collective' or 'social identities', two terms that are often used interchangeably (Owens et al., 2010: 490). According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), social identity is 'that part of a person's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel, 1981: 255). There are many ways to measure immigrants' identities, most importantly, ethnic labelling and self-categorisation, the sense of belonging to a group, ethnic behaviour and in-group attitudes (Phinney and Ong, 2007). Many empirical studies on immigrant identities focus on their 'ethnic' and 'national' identifications, the former referring to migrants' identity as a member of the country of origin and the latter referring to their identification with the country of destination (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012).

2.2.1 Migrants' identification with the reception context: theoretical arguments...

When it comes to explaining if and why migrants identify with their new receiving country a canonical and simple answer is that this 'just happens' over time. Inter-individual and intergroup variations in the pace of this process are due to migrants' differential exposure to contexts and contacts that promote or hamper their identification with both contexts. This was the idea behind Milton M. Gordon's famous dictum that migrants' identification with the receiving country is the last and final stage of their integration process that follows more or less 'naturally' '[. . .] once structural integration has occurred [. . .]' (1964: 81). Migrants who have acquired the necessary language skills and left the ethnic niches of the receiving country's labour market meet majority members and enter the majority society's primary groups ('structural assimilation' in Gordon's terms). Once this step has been completed, their identification with the receiving country will automatically increase.

Gordon argues that this process might take several immigrant generations to be completed, implying that he had a rather long-time span in mind. But the idea that acculturation and social ties with majority members promote migrants' identification with the majority country can also be applied to first-generation migrants' national identification.¹ In order to come to testable conclusions about different groups' identity trajectories it is necessary, although, to identify the

general mechanisms that are at work behind Gordon's assumption (see also De Vroome et al., 2014).

Migrants' acculturation can be considered to be the first step in their assimilation process. It has been argued that skills in the majority language influence migrants' identification with the receiving context (Walters et al., 2007) because they are a precondition for contacts with natives. Another important mechanism is that speaking the receiving country's language comes along with a greater exposure to its values, norms and practices. Furthermore, language is an important means to indicate belonging and solidarity and to demarcate identities (Miller, 2000). It has also been argued that speaking the language of the receiving country increases minority members' similarity with majority members and that this enhances their identification with the latter (Hochman and Davidov, 2014: 346).

The relationship between *social assimilation* and national identification has also received some attention. One mechanism described in the sociological literature is based on the assumption that contacts with natives signal to minority members that ethnic boundaries are permeable and that belonging to the majority is a feasible strategy (Leszczensky, 2013, for a similar argument on the role of majority contacts in the naturalisation decision see Diehl and Blohm, 2003). According to SIT, permeability of intergroup boundaries is the main precondition for low status group members to abandon devalued group memberships/identities and to become members of higher status groups, which, in turn may foster positive social identities and psychological well-being (Tajfel, 1978). Verkuyten and Martinovic thus argue that in an '[. . .] intergroup group structure with permeable group boundaries, ethnic minority group members tend not to use strategies of ethnic identification and social competition, but rather national identification and individual mobility' (2012: 93).

Signalling permeability of ethnic boundaries is, however, not the only mechanism that links social and identificational assimilation. Interaction with majority members may again come along with increasing exposure to receiving society's norms, values and social practices and – for some groups more than for others – with the pressure to adopt these, including a national identification (Lubbers et al., 2007; Schulz and Leszczensky, 2015). Furthermore, contacts with natives offer opportunities to obtain social approval for declaring or showing loyalty to the receiving country (Esser, 2009: 360).

More recent theoretical approaches to migrants' adaptation emphasise the role of salient ethnic boundaries – i.e. socially relevant ethnic distinctions that matter in a given reception context (Wimmer, 2008: 975) – in migrants' assimilation process. Salient boundaries come along with some degree of social closure so that minority members' access to resources is

limited, in other words: they are discriminated against by majority members (Wimmer, 2008: 980). In line with this argument, proponents of classical and neo assimilation theory have conceded that *discrimination* can slow down the integration process (Alba, 2005; Gordon, 1964: 78). It can affect both migrants' motivation to identify with the receiving country and their opportunities for doing so (Esser, 2009: 360). Feeling as an integral part of the receiving country may not only become less attractive if it is perceived as being exclusionary and discriminatory but will also reduce perceived opportunities to receive social approval for visible signs of loyalty. As a consequence, 'assimilation [...] as a strateg[y] for individuals to 'shift sides' and escape a minority stigma [...]' (Wimmer, 2008: 19) may be perceived as not being an option by individuals who feel discriminated against. This could negatively affect their readiness to identify with the majority.

2.2.2 ...empirical evidence and open questions

Several studies have analysed the relationship between migrants' cognitive and social assimilation, discrimination and perceived incompatibilities between majority and minority culture on the one hand and their identification with the latter on the other hand. Previous studies based on cross-sectional data show that migrants' cognitive and social assimilation is associated with higher national identification especially for first generation migrants (De Vroome et al., 2014: 21). Hochman and Davidov (2014) show that migrants' cognitive assimilation, i.e. their proficiency in German, has a positive effect on their identification with Germany.

A recent longitudinal examination of the relationship between migrants' social assimilation and their identification with the receiving society among German born adolescents with Turkish background revealed that social assimilation and identification are unrelated once unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality are taken into account (Leszczensky, 2013). The author concedes, however, that causal effects might occur at earlier stages in life. Esser (2009) did not find an unambiguous relationship between contacts with natives and migrants' identification with Germany in his longitudinal study based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) either.

Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009: 121) show in their longitudinal study that there is in fact a negative relationship between experiences of discrimination and national identification among FSU migrants in Finland but not between discrimination and ethnic identification. De Vroome et al. (2014: 21) come to a similar conclusion and argue that perceived acceptance or rejection by the majority strongly influences immigrants' sense of national belonging. Schulz and

Leszczensky (2015) show that salient ethnic boundaries counteract the positive effect of native friends on migrants' identification with the majority.

The studies reviewed so far have in common that they study the relationship between migrants' cognitive and social assimilation, discrimination and national identification not at the beginning of the assimilation process but give a snapshot of this relationship at a later – and necessarily rather arbitrary – stage of their stay in the receiving country. Others look at this relationship among second-generation migrants which makes a lot of sense because they were born in the receiving country and an 'identification gap' between this group and majority members is more puzzling than between immigrants in a narrower sense of the word (i.e. those who immigrated themselves) and the latter. However, these studies cannot answer the question of whether some migrants' lower (or higher) levels of identification with the receiving country existed already right after or even before immigration or evolved during their course of their stay.

Furthermore, with a few exceptions (Esser, 2009; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Leszczensky, 2013), the studies mentioned so far have looked into the relationship between assimilation, discrimination and identification based on cross-sectional data. Even though they shed much light on the phenomenon under consideration here, they cannot test any assumptions about causal relationships between different dimensions of the assimilation process.

And finally, the arguments and findings presented so far refer to the general mechanisms triggering or hampering migrants' identification with the receiving country and focus on migrants in general or on specific groups but they do not study group differences systematically (for a recent study on these differences see Schulz and Leszczensky, 2015). We argue, however, that it needs to be taken into account that new immigrants' adaptation process starts out from group-specific circumstances. In this respect, an ethnic group's degree of residential and labour market segregation, linguistic and cultural distance, overall educational level as well as the nature and strength of ethnic group boundaries appear to matter most. In order to come to testable conclusions about the identity trajectories for the groups under consideration here, we will now turn to describing the migration history, immigrant population and the reception context for recent migrants from Turkey and Poland to Germany.² Based on this, we can formulate specific expectations that guide our empirical analysis of both groups' early integration trajectories.

2.3 Poles and Turks in Germany: expected results

Contemporary newcomers from Turkey or Poland enter into rather distinctive trajectories of Germany's post-war history of immigration. There are now about 2.8 million German inhabitants with Turkish migration background, thus constituting the second largest single immigrant group in Germany (Ethnic Germans being the largest). The pioneer migrants were predominantly male low skill labour migrants who came to fill the German economy's labour demand in the 1950s and 1960s. After a recruitment stop in 1973, family members joined them and settled permanently in the Federal Republic. Family reunion is still the most important migration motive among Turks (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010: 206). There are also a considerable number of Turkish migrants coming to Germany to pursue post-secondary education, and a few Turkish skilled migrants have arrived under the new governmental policy of attracting high-skilled immigrants. In contrast, while it is true that large numbers of Polish speakers had migrated from the former Eastern Prussian provinces to the industrial centres in the West Germany before the first World War, today's 640,000 or so persons with Polish migration background have mainly arrived in the post-communist period – either as 'Ethnic Germans' (*Aussiedler*) or as workers or students (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010: 37ff.). Since Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004, Poles have received new rights to freedom of movement within the wider European Union, though Germany restricted labour migration from Poland until May 2011.

Poles and Turks differ with regard to their ethnic group's size and ethnic institutional completeness. Given their numbers, especially in some larger German cities such as Berlin or Cologne, new coming Muslim Turks enter institutionally more complete ethnic communities than Poles. Germany's Turks also have been found to have comparatively few interethnic friendships, even in the second generation and even compared with Turks in other European cities (Crul and Schneider, 2012: 389). In a similar vein, both groups differ with respect to the nature and strength of ethnic boundaries they face upon arrival. Social distances on behalf of natives are particularly strong for Turks (Blohm and Wasmer, 2008) who also more often experience discrimination than non-Muslim immigrants (Hans, 2010) such as Poles. After all, ethnic boundaries tend to be defined religiously in Europe (Foner and Alba, 2008; Zolberg and Woon, 1999) and stereotypes about groups' alleged unwillingness to adapt and contribute to German society and culture are quite widespread (for an example see Sarrazin, 2010). New arrivals with a Muslim background such as Turks will thus soon be confronted with the vivid debate about the incompatibility between Islam and Western culture that has clearly gained

momentum during the last decade. This is not the case for Poles in Germany. The critical public discourse on immigration from Eastern Europe to Germany focuses mostly on Romanians and much less so on Poles.

In sum, Poles join a rather well-integrated group of co-ethnics in Germany whereas Turkish migrants' assimilation proceeds slower than for other groups. Furthermore, salient ethnic boundaries exist mostly between Turkish migrants and the majority population in Germany but not between Polish migrants and Germans. Starting out from the theoretical arguments outlined above and our description of group specific reception contexts we can now formulate specific expectations about both groups' patterns of early changes in ethnic and national identities (for a summary of our expected results see Figure 2.1).




Figure 2-1. Relationship between time in and identification with Germany for Polish and Turkish new immigrants: expected results

Given the different natures of ethnic boundaries that Turkish and Polish migrants face in Germany, we assume that Poles show a rather 'classical' pattern of social and cognitive assimilation and low perceptions of discrimination and group differences. We expect Turks, in turn, to assimilate socially and cognitively slower than Poles and to perceive more discrimination and group differences as a consequence of more salient ethnic boundaries than Poles.

Notwithstanding these initial differences, we further expect to find support for the assumption from assimilation theory that identification with the receiving context is generally stronger among those individuals who speak the language and interact with natives. Based on the boundary approach, we also expect that experiences of discrimination and perceptions of strong cultural differences between majority and minority are associated with lower levels of identification with the residence country – for both Poles and for Turks.

2.4 Data and analytical strategy

In our empirical analyses, we draw on data from a unique dataset produced in the international survey project on Socio-cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) that was funded by the NORFACE Research Programme on Migration (Diehl et al., 2015). The SCIP project is a two-wave-panel study of selected migrant groups in which about 7000 recent migrants aged between 18 and 60 were surveyed in four European destination countries – Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Ireland. Migrants with a maximum stay of 1.5 years were interviewed soon after their arrival and as many as possible were re-interviewed again another 1.5 years later.³ To analyse group differences, Poles as a rather recent immigrant group to these destinations, and Turks/ Pakistanis/Moroccans as groups representing the classical labour/colonial migration to Western Europe, were included in the SCIP survey. These groups contribute greatly to the share of migrant population in the four countries (for a detailed description of the methodological setup of the project see Gresser and Schacht, 2015). In Germany, immigrants from Turkey and Poland having stayed in Germany up to 1.5 years were interviewed in Turkish and Polish CAPI-interviews. Initially, a random sample was drawn from population registers in five large cities

Migrants' identificational integration is measured using the ISSP identity questions (full questionnaire available at: <http://www.scip-info.org>): *How important is the following to your sense of who you are/ how proud are you of [...]?* Answer options included, among others [...] *the country where you were born?, [...] your current country of residence?* These items are measured using a 4-point scale that were combined into an additive index ranging from 2 to 8 (very proud/important- not proud/important at all).⁴ As mentioned in the introduction, we will concentrate on migrants' identification with their receiving country.

The independent variables are measured as follows: *How well would you say you understand/speak/read /write German when someone is speaking to you? (1= not at all, 4= very well)* (cognitive assimilation); *Let us talk a little more about the people who are important to you personally and who you feel close to that live in Germany. Please do NOT include your parents, your husband/wife or your children, but you CAN include other relatives.* For up to four persons mentioned it was asked (among others): *Is the background of this person Polish/Turkish, German, or some other group?* As a second indicator migrants were asked: *How often do you spend time with Germans? (1= never, 6= daily)* (social assimilation).

Levels of discrimination are operationalised by perceived group discrimination rather than by individual experiences of discrimination since it can be assumed that discrimination

can hamper migrants' identification if they think that members of their group are discriminated against – even if they personally haven't experienced any discrimination: *Some say that people from Poland/Turkey are being discriminated against in Germany. How often do you think Polish/Turkish people are discriminated against in Germany? (1= never, 5= very often)*. In the SCIP survey, migrants' subjective perceptions of salient group differences were asked directly. Their approval of the item: *The values of Poles/Turks and Germans are irreconcilable/ totally different (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree)* thus serves as a second indicator for salient ethnic boundaries.

Time spent in Germany is measured in months. Every migrant was interviewed twice but for reasons related to the practicalities of sampling and fieldwork the time migrants' had already spent in the country at the time of their first interview ranged from 1 to 15 months.⁵ This enables us to analyse the relationship between migrants' assimilation, experiences of discrimination and identification in more detail than by just comparing wave 1 and wave 2 interviews. Independent of that, the time span between the first and the second interview was a minimum of 15 months and varies little between respondents.

We start out by examining if changes in migrants' identification with Germany differ between Poles and Turks over time. Based on this, we estimate a set of random effect regressions to utilise the between and within variation of time spent in Germany.⁶ Doing so, we analyse if group-specific trajectories reflect early experiences in those factors theoretically expected to trigger migrants' identification with the receiving context, namely their social and cognitive assimilation and their early perceptions of exclusion. These regressions are conducted separately for the two groups to allow that both groups react differently to assimilation and exclusion. By running both, regressions of assimilation and exclusion on time, in a first step, and of identification on time, assimilation and exclusion in a second step we can 'decompose' the total time effect into a direct (time→identification) and an indirect (time→assimilation/exclusion and assimilation/exclusion! identification) effect. Finally, we illustrate our findings by simulating how identity trajectories of Turks would look like if they experienced Poles' levels of assimilation and exclusion or reacted to these experiences as Poles do.

2.5 Findings

In order to get a grasp of the general patterns of identificational integration for Poles and Turks, we display Polish and Turkish migrants' identification with the receiving country in Figure 2.1

as a function of the time spent in Germany.⁷ As expected, both groups show different patterns of adaptation during their first 3 years in Germany (Figure 2.2).

In the beginning of their stay, Turkish migrants identify more with Germany than Poles' but this changes over time: Turkish migrants' identification with the reception country stagnates later on and eventually decreases and after about 24 months, they show slightly lower levels of identification with Germany than Poles. The latter group's identification with the reception context continuously increases over time⁸.




Figure 2-2. Identification with Germany for Poles and Turks by time in Germany in months (means)

While this basic pattern does indeed provide at least some support for the expectation that Turks' identity trajectories deviate from the pattern predicted by assimilation theory, it is yet unclear which processes underlie the declining identification of Turks with Germany. A closer look at the group averages of the model variables (see Table 2.1) yields several salient differences: only Poles show rising levels of identification with Germany between the two waves. To provide a full picture of both groups' identity patterns, we also display mean values for identification with Poland/Turkey. These reveal that while Turks identify somewhat stronger with Turkey than Poles with Poland, both groups show a slight though non-significant increase in their identification with the country of origin over time. This may point to a heightened salience of the homeland identity after migration. Fewer Turks than Poles are working, a finding that is likely to reflect the different migration histories of Poles and Turks to Germany: Poles come mostly to Germany to work and study whereas Turks come mainly to join their families already living in Germany. Accordingly, many immigrated as spouse.

Table 2.1. Descriptives and means of variables in wave 1 and wave 2 (balanced panel)

	Poles (n= 590)		Turks (n= 432)		Total (n= 1022)	
	mean		mean		min	max
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Identification						
Identification with Germany (add. Index)	5.85	6.04 ^b	6.02	5.94	2	8
Identification with country of origin (add. Index)	6.34	6.48	6.73 ^a	6.80 ^a	2	8
Time						
in Germany in months	8.52 ^a	28.38 ^{ab}	6.73	26.7 ^b	0	41
Socio-demographics						
Age at immigration	32.4 ^a	32.4 ^a	28.5	28.5	16	60
Ethnic Turk	0	0	0.76	0.76	0	1
Female	0.56 ^a	0.56 ^a	0.45	0.45	0	1
Education						
Primary or less	0.032	0.033	0.17 ^a	0.16 ^a	0	1
Secondary	0.47 ^a	0.46 ^a	0.38	0.38	0	1
Tertiary	0.50	0.51	0.45	0.46	0	1
Employment Status						
Working	0.57 ^a	0.66 ^{ab}	0.21	0.39 ^b	0	1
In education	0.19 ^b	0.15	0.30 ^{ab}	0.22 ^a	0	1
Other (e.g. unemployed, retired)	0.81 ^a	0.85 ^{ab}	0.70	0.78 ^b	0	1
Cognitive and Social Assimilation						
German language skills (mean Index)	2.40 ^a	2.68 ^b	2.35	2.74 ^b	1	4
Time spend with Germans	4.96 ^a	5.10 ^a	4.26	4.31	1	6
Number of German friends	0.41	0.50	0.58 ^a	0.67 ^a	0	4
Discrimination/ value incompatibility						
Perceived value incompatibility	2.66	2.62	3.30 ^a	3.37 ^a	1	5
Experiences of group discrimination	2.74	2.72	2.75	2.92 ^{ab}	1	5

^a significantly larger for Poles (Turks) than Turks(Poles) (p < .05)^b significantly increase/decrease between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (p < .05)

Table 2.2. Identification with Germany of Polish and Turkish new immigrants: Direct, indirect and total effects of time in Germany (unstandardized effects, for full models see appendix A2.1 M1-5 and appendix A2.2)

	Time in Germany → Assimilation and Perceptions of Discrimination				Assimilation and Perceptions of Discrimination → Identification (see A2)				Time in Germany → Identification				
	Poles		Turks		Poles		Turks		Poles		Turks		
	B	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	
Indirect effects...	(a)				(b)				(a*b)				
... German language skills (see A1. M1)	0.114***	(0.010)	0.178***	(0.015)	0.029	(0.074)	0.107	(0.119)	0.003	3.43%	0.019	(0.119)	-21.15%
...Time spend with Germans (see A1. M2)	0.074*	(0.034)	-0.065	(0.050)	0.087**	(0.032)	0.112**	(0.037)	0.006	6.68%	-0.007	(0.037)	8.08%
...Number of German friends (see A1. M3)	0.044*	(0.021)	0.030	(0.029)	0.039	(0.038)	0.158**	(0.057)	0.002	1.78%	0.005	(0.057)	-5.26%
...Perceived value incompatibility (see A1. M4)	-0.014	(0.024)	0.039	(0.036)	-0.001	(0.046)	-0.132**	(0.048)	0.001	0.89%	-0.018	(0.048)	20.46%
...Experiences of group discrimination (see A1. M5)	-0.011	(0.022)	0.098**	(0.033)	-0.078	(0.050)	-0.188***	(0.051)	0.000	0.01%	-0.005	(0.051)	5.72%
Time in Germany in months /10	(c')												
Direct effects					0.084**		87.20%		-0.083+		92.15%		
Total effects ¹					0.096***		100%		-0.090**		100%		

Note: + p<0.10. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001; Coefficients in **bold** indicate that absolute value of coefficient is statistically significantly (p<.05) larger for Poles (Turks) than for Turks (Poles)

With respect to the indicators for migrants' early social and cognitive assimilation, results show that Poles and Turks have similar German skills in wave 1 but that Turks improve their proficiency in German more between waves 1 and 2, possibly related to the fact that they know more German speaking co-ethnics when they arrive. The picture is mixed with respect to both groups' social assimilation: Poles spend more time with Germans than Turks and this gap widens over time. However, more Turks than Poles have Germans among their best friends.

The indicators for the ethnic boundaries suggest a group specific pattern: Turks and Poles perceive similar degrees of group discrimination at the beginning of their stay but these perceptions increase significantly over time only for Turks, whereas they remain stable for Poles.⁹ Perceived value incompatibility is substantially higher for Turks than for Poles in wave 1 and tends to increase over time for Turks but remains stable – at comparatively low levels – for Poles.

We will now turn to our multivariate analyses in order to study the relationship between migrants' early cognitive and social assimilation, their experiences of discrimination and their identity trajectories. We ran separate random effects regressions on both, the indicators of assimilation and discrimination and on migrants' identification using multiply imputed datasets.¹⁰ Results including calculated indirect and total effects¹¹ are summarised in Table 2.2 (for full models see Appendix A2.1, M1–5 and Appendix A2.2).

Overall, the total effect of Time in Germany confirms that over time, Turkish migrants' identification with Germany decreases significantly, while it increases substantially for Poles (see last row in columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). These effects are significantly different between both groups. Furthermore, Table 2.2 reveals that over time, Turks and Poles cognitive assimilation increases, for Turks even stronger than for Poles. However, social assimilation increases only for Poles but not for Turks. Multivariate results confirm that both groups also show a different pattern in terms of their experiences of discrimination: over time, Turks perceive more group discrimination whereas this is not the case for Poles (see columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.2).

With respect to the impact of migrants' early assimilation and their experiences of discrimination on their identification, the patterns look again similar for both groups (see columns 6–9 in Table 2.2): Migrants' early cognitive assimilation is unrelated (Poles) or weakly related (Turks) to their identification with Germany, whereas social assimilation enhances both groups' identification with the receiving context. Discrimination diminishes their identification with Germany but this effect is substantially larger for Turks than for Poles. This finding could be related to the greater salience of ethno-religious boundaries for Turks than for other migrants

that turn perceptions of discrimination into something more threatening for Turks than for Poles – possibly because they point to a larger societal problem and more severe social exclusion. The finding that the perception of value incompatibilities diminishes only Turks' identification with Germany but not Poles' sense of national belonging points in the same direction. Obviously, these incompatibilities are more fundamental in nature for Turks than for Poles.

The direct effects of time in Germany on identification are somewhat attenuated when taking the indicators of cognitive and social assimilation as well as ethnic boundaries into account (see second last row in columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). However, the relative size of the direct effect of time in Germany on identification with Germany remains quite large, especially for Turks (see columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). This is partly related to the fact that the indirect effects of cognitive assimilation and discrimination point in opposite directions and counterbalance each other. Obviously, the variables under consideration here (and the measurements used!) can only account for a small proportion of the overall trend in Turkish and Polish migrants' identification with Germany over time. We will come back to this in our conclusion.

In Figure 2.3, a simulation is presented that shows how the decline in Turkish migrants' national identification (not identification itself!) with Germany would decrease (or increase) if they experienced similar degrees of assimilation and discrimination and showed similar reactions to these processes than Poles.¹² Turkish migrants' decline would be by about 30% smaller if their perceptions of group discrimination and value incompatibilities were as low as Poles' perceptions. Their decline in identification with Germany would be about 18% smaller if they were as resilient to discrimination and perceived value incompatibilities as Poles.




Figure 2-3. How would it affect Turkish migrants' decline in identification with Germany if they showed Polish migrants' patterns of assimilation and discrimination? (Simulation based on Table 2.2)

Turkish migrants' identification with Germany would also be higher if their social assimilation progressed as fast as Polish migrants' assimilation. Since Turkish migrants' assimilate faster cognitively, i.e. learn German quicker, and since cognitive assimilation tends to enhance Turkish migrants' identificational assimilation, the decline in their identification with Germany would be even more pronounced if they learned German as slowly as Poles do. To put it differently: the fact that Turkish new migrants learn the language faster than Poles attenuates the decrease in Turkish migrants' identification.

2.6 Conclusions

Our analyses of Polish and Turkish migrants' early patterns of identification with the receiving country have revealed some interesting and significant differences between these groups. Most importantly, only new migrants from Poland show an increasing identification with Germany over time, whereas this is not the case for Turks. In fact, their national identification decreases.

Theoretically, we have argued that both groups' identificational integration has started out from rather different conditions: As non-EU immigrants, Turks arriving in Germany join an ethnic group that lags behind other minority groups with respect to their cognitive, structural and social assimilation. Since immigration from Turkey is still heavily network based, it can be expected that newcomers show a similar pattern of comparatively slow integration into the status systems and social networks of the majority. Moreover, Turks arriving in Germany join

an ethnic group that is in the center of a heated societal debate on integration, that is met by natives with comparatively high levels of social distance and that faces discrimination more often than other groups.

Based on assimilation theory and the literature on ethnic boundaries, we expected that both groups' identity trajectories start out from very different conditions but there is no reason to assume that the basic mechanisms leading to migrants' identification with the majority differ a great deal for newcomers from Poland and Turkey: On the one hand, their assimilation in other spheres should enhance both groups' identificational integration with the receiving country, on the other hand, discrimination and perceived value incompatibilities – reflecting bright ethnic boundaries – should hamper it.

Overall, our analyses confirm these expectations: over time, both groups show a clear pattern of cognitive, i.e. language, assimilation. While Poles assimilate socially during their first months in Germany this process stagnates for Turks. However, the most pronounced difference between the groups is that the share of individuals who feel that their group is discriminated against increases among Turkish immigrants. In addition, Turks' comparatively strong perceptions of value incompatibilities between Germans and Turks stagnate over time.

While both groups' identity trajectories thus start out from rather different conditions, they do not show fundamentally dissimilar patterns with respect to the consequences of assimilation and discrimination. The former increases migrants' identificational assimilation and the latter hampers it even though the negative impact of discrimination is stronger for Turks than for Poles.

By looking at new migrants, we have been able to study the nexus among social assimilation, discrimination and identification more directly than previous studies. Most importantly, we could demonstrate that Turkish migrants' comparatively low level of identification with Germany does not exist from the very beginning but evolves over time and reflects rising levels of discrimination and a stagnating process of social assimilation. However, our results show that the indirect effect of discrimination and social assimilation is quite small. That is, even if Turks experienced less discrimination and established more contacts with natives they would not show a pattern of rising national identification as Poles do – but their decline in identification with Germany would be less pronounced.

There are several possible answers to the question of which factors could account for this. First of all, it is possible that our model is misspecified, i.e. other factors than the ones under investigation here explain this finding. While we think that no alternative theoretical approaches are at hand – the arguments of the proponents of the Theory of Segmented

Assimilation (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) mainly refer to migrants' stable or even reactive identification with the sending context – we conducted some additional analyses not presented here in order to look into several alternative ideas. First of all, we included a very rough indicator for migrants' structural integration in our models (in the more current sense of migrants integration the educational system and the labour market). We have not done this in our original analysis since structural integration is a tricky concept for first-generation migrants. What does it mean – finding a job, finding a 'good' job or finding a job with many German colleagues? We decided to go for finding a job which is an indicator for migrants' labour market participation that may imply greater exposure to receiving society's values, norms and practices. However, results show that Turks lower rates of inclusion in the labour market do not explain their declining levels of identification with Germany. This is in line with previous findings that labour market integration influences migrants' identification only indirectly via an increase in migrants' social assimilation (De Vroome et al., 2014).

We also included migrants' religiosity (religious attendance) in our analyses. Even though we do not see any reason to argue that being religious, especially an attachment to Islam, needs to hamper migrants' identification with the receiving society directly (and not indirectly by evoking discrimination), this is a popular argument. However, we found migrants' religiosity to be unrelated to their identification with the receiving country. And finally, we included migrants' identification with the country of origin in our analyses. If both identities were incompatible as some authors suggest (see Berry et al., 2006 for the European context), a slight increase in newcomers' identification with Poland and Turkey (compare Table 2.1) would be reflected in a slight decrease in their identification with Germany. Unlike several other studies (e.g. Yagmur and Van De Vijver, 2012) we found, however, that both identity types are positively correlated for both groups of recent migrants. In this respect, our findings confirm the argument by Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009: 108) who state that 'it seems that among minority groups negative attitudes towards the national out-group may be related to other factors than in-group identification'. Last but not least, we replicated our analyses by conducting fixed (with time measured by wave) rather than random effect models (results available upon request) and this leads to the same conclusions.

Despite all these checks, the picture we have outlined here is preliminary and it is quite possible that Turkish migrants' identification with Germany gains momentum later on. However, our analyses show that Turkish migrants' early patterns of identification with the receiving country are influenced by their early experiences in Germany. Since these are quite different from the experiences of Poles, both groups' identificational integration trajectories

become more dissimilar over the time period considered here. Even though the differences are not large, our analyses have been able to link these initial differences in migrants' identification trajectories to those factors that are described in the literature as hampering the process of adopting new identities, namely perceiving discrimination and value incompatibilities between the home- and the receiving culture and staying apart from the social cliques and networks of majority members. One could argue that migrants' identifications can be considered to belong to the realm of private choices that may have little relevance for their eventual integration in the status systems of the receiving country. Things look different, of course, when these choices reflect feelings of exclusion and salient ethnic boundaries rather than what Mary Waters once called 'ethnic options'

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Notes

1. We argue that for new migrants, their labour market integration is less important and difficult to capture empirically, for more details see the discussion in the conclusion.
2. This following paragraph describing recent migration patterns of Poles and Turks in Germany is partly taken from Diehl and Koenig (2013) and their analyses of new migrants' religious adaptation that is also based on SCIP data.
3. Panel mortality was high due to the high mobility of this group not only within Germany but also between Germany and the sending countries. Even though large efforts were undertaken to re-interview migrants after 1.5 years only about 45% could be re-interviewed. Lasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009) report similar rates; in the US New Immigrant Survey

panel mortality was equally high (according to an email exchange with the NIS project director in March 2014).

4. Cronbach's α for identification with the country of origin is 0.72 for both samples and for identification with Germany is 0.74 (Poles) and 0.71 (Turks).
5. During fieldwork, addresses were stepwise assigned to interviewers and new addresses were only issued when the target persons that were issued first were either interviewed identified as "not-at-homes" or refusals or their addresses were found to be non-existent. There is thus little reason to assume that migrants interviewed earlier differed systematically from those interviewed later on (see Gresser and Schacht, 2015).
6. Since there is little variation in the time span between the two interviews, fixed effect regressions only allow us to estimate the difference in national identification between the two waves and not as a function of time in the residence country. The estimated effects for social and cognitive assimilation and discrimination and value compatibility are consistent in the random effect model as are the group differences between the effects.
7. The graph depicts the cross-sectional relationship between time in Germany and national identification based on the pooled data of respondents partaking at both waves. The plots have been somewhat smoothed using locally weighted regressions.
8. This holds regardless of whether the respondent has spent time in Germany before migration.
9. Results not displayed here show that personal experiences of discrimination are even lower for Turks than for Poles in wave 1 (with 29 versus 36% having felt discriminated against) but they increase significantly for Turks but decrease for Poles over time (to 32 versus 41% resp. in wave 2).
10. Missing values due to item non-response were multiply imputed using chained equations. Results refer to the analysis of five imputed datasets using Rubin's (1987) combination rules. In comparison to other missing data techniques, multiple imputation is more efficient, reduces potential bias in the estimation of coefficients (if missing values are not completely random but to some degree correlated with the vector of observed variables), and estimates standard errors that reflect the uncertainty of the missing information correctly (Allison, 2002).
11. Total effects are calculated as sum of the direct and indirect effects.
12. By recalculating the effects for Turks using the 'Polish' coefficients of the regressions of the relevant mediation variables on time ('experience') or the 'Polish' coefficients of the regressions of identification on the mediator variables of interest ('sensitivity'). The

predicted change of the identification of the Turks between t_0 und t_1 ($It_1(T) - It_0(T)$) is the product of the coefficients for the mediation variables and the change in the mediation variables over time: $It_1(T) - It_0(T) = B(T)(M_{t_1}(T) - M_{t_0}(T))$. The same holds ceteris paribus for the Poles: $It_1(P) - It_0(P) = B(P)(M_{t_1}(P) - M_{t_0}(P))$. The simulated change for Turks ‘with the experiences of Poles’ is then: $B(T)(M_{t_1}(P) - M_{t_0}(P))$, the simulated change for Turks ‘with the sensitivities of Poles’ is then: $B(P)(M_{t_1}(T) - M_{t_0}(T))$, expressed as a percentage of the observed change in identification of the Turks.

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2.8 Appendix

Table A.2.1. Turkish and Polish assimilation and perceptions of discrimination and value incompatibilities (random effect panel regression)

	German language skills		Time spend with Germans		Number of German Friends		Perceived value incompatibility		Experiences of group discrimination	
	Poles	Turks	Poles	Turks	Poles	Turks	Poles	Turks	Poles	Turks
Time in Germany in months/10	0.114*** (0.010)	0.178*** (0.015)	0.074* (0.034)	-0.065 (0.050)	0.044* (0.021)	0.030 (0.029)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.039 (0.036)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.098** (0.033)
Ethnic Turk	--	0.092+ (0.053)	--	0.303 (0.192)	--	0.057 (0.095)	--	0.051 (0.109)	--	0.036 (0.114)
Female	0.374*** (0.053)	-0.040 (0.054)	-0.030 (0.095)	-0.615*** (0.158)	0.245*** (0.073)	0.146+ (0.088)	0.054 (0.070)	-0.002 (0.092)	0.097 (0.065)	0.232* (0.103)
Age at immigration/10	-0.135*** (0.024)	-0.149*** (0.042)	-0.041 (0.047)	-0.136 (0.116)	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.057)	0.014 (0.034)	-0.060 (0.067)	-0.052+ (0.031)	0.121+ (0.073)
<i>Education (Ref.: Secondary)</i>										
Primary or less	0.077 (0.121)	-0.192** (0.072)	0.426** (0.130)	-0.246 (0.234)	0.064 (0.173)	0.008 (0.112)	0.120 (0.204)	-0.117 (0.125)	0.129 (0.148)	-0.201 (0.141)
Tertiary	0.155*** (0.044)	0.003 (0.051)	-0.082 (0.092)	0.330* (0.154)	0.195** (0.062)	0.198* (0.083)	-0.141* (0.063)	-0.220* (0.093)	0.049 (0.061)	0.203* (0.096)
<i>Employment Status (Ref.: Working)</i>										
In education	0.326*** (0.052)	0.066 (0.057)	0.000 (0.114)	-0.009 (0.185)	0.082 (0.090)	0.022 (0.107)	-0.216* (0.094)	-0.110 (0.113)	-0.211** (0.075)	0.232+ (0.120)
Other (e.g. unemployed, retired)	-0.038 (0.048)	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.958*** (0.138)	-0.632*** (0.172)	-0.128 (0.089)	-0.017 (0.091)	-0.059 (0.082)	0.021 (0.106)	-0.086 (0.073)	0.028 (0.109)
_cons	2.473*** (0.094)	2.640*** (0.140)	5.300*** (0.195)	4.961*** (0.407)	0.272* (0.132)	0.484* (0.213)	2.734*** (0.137)	3.541*** (0.245)	2.872*** (0.131)	2.047*** (0.252)
Sigma (e)	0.304	0.380	1.142	1.407	0.687	0.792	0.817	1.012	0.725	0.880
Sigma (u)	0.560	0.410	0.722	1.047	0.616	0.571	0.442	0.460	0.474	0.713
N	1041	748	1041	748	1041	748	1041	748	1041	748
N	590	432	590	432	590	432	590	432	590	432

Source: SCIP 2010-2013. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; unstandardized effects; + p<0.10. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001

Table A 2.2. Panel regression models: Turkish and Polish migrants' Identification with Germany

	Random Effects			
	Poles		Turks	
Time in Germany in months/10	0.084**	(0.030)	-0.083+	(0.049)
Ethnic Turk	--	--	-0.210	(0.140)
Female	0.241*	(0.100)	0.101	(0.134)
Age at immigration/10	0.176***	(0.044)	0.031	(0.094)
<i>Education (Ref.: Secondary)</i>				
Primary or less	0.250	(0.170)	0.415*	(0.173)
Tertiary	-0.269**	(0.090)	-0.381*	(0.151)
<i>Employment Status (Ref.: Working)</i>				
In education	0.004	(0.120)	0.098	(0.169)
Other	0.121	(0.110)	0.207	(0.143)
German language skills	0.029	(0.074)	0.107	(0.119)
Time spent with Germans	0.087**	(0.032)	0.112**	(0.037)
Number of German Friends	0.039	(0.038)	0.158**	(0.057)
Perceived value incompatibility	-0.001	(0.046)	-0.132**	(0.048)
Experiences of group discrimination	-0.078	(0.050)	-	
_			0.188***	(0.051)
_cons	4.833***	(0.358)	6.268***	(0.518)
R ² overall	0.063		0.122	
R ² within	0.029		0.069	
R ² between	0.082		0.131	
Sigma (e)	0.874		1.146	
Sigma (u)	0.892		0.888	
N	977		709	
N	576		427	

Source: SCIP 2010-2013. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; unstandardized effects

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001

Chapter 3: Does Identification with the Receiving Country Facilitate Political Integration? - A Longitudinal Study on the Impact of German Identification for new Immigrants' Interest in German Politics*

Abstract:

This article discusses and empirically tests the relationship between national identification with Germany and interest in German politics among new Polish and Turkish migrants in Germany using longitudinal data from the international project on Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP). It presents three theoretical pathways of influence through which national identification carries its effect on interest in national politics: (i) directly by social identity mechanisms of self and social identity enhancement; as well as indirectly and conditionally on (ii) German language proficiency; as along with (iii) involvement in interethnic social networks (of voluntary association). The effects of national identification are supposedly stronger for newly-arrived immigrants from Poland than Turkey. The panel data analyses reveal group-specific as well as non-group-specific patterns: the feeling of being connected to Germany is associated with a higher interest in German politics for both immigrant groups, but only among Turks is the relationship positively mediated by German language proficiency as well as with involvement in interethnic social networks. Moreover, national identification also predicts Polish migrants' interest in national politics positively in combination with their involvement in any sort of voluntary associations within Germany, whereas the same combination hinders interest in German political affairs among recently arrived Turks.

* A slightly shorter version of this article has been currently submitted to a peer-reviewed Journal. Co-author is Diana D. Schacht.

3.1 Introduction

There are longstanding insights from political sociology suggesting there is an empirical association between individuals' political alienation from public authorities, governments, and political systems as wholes and political protest behaviour (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979) as well as anti-system political behaviour (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those across Europe since the early 2000s, immigrants' psychological alienation from mainstream politics and their lack of attitudinal incorporation into the democratic political systems of European host societies has become a major topic within the public as well as academia. Though a range of potential explanations have been put forth, it is one that has received considerable attention within the political arena as well as in the media. It is based on the notion that a lack of immigrants' psychological commitment to the national polity leads to adverse political outcomes among ethnic minorities. The attention paid to migrants' sense of belonging is relatively novel in European research and does represent a departure from the longstanding perspective that has downplayed subjective and psychological orientation towards the host society as relevant conditions for immigrant integration. Accordingly, there is a growing body of research that is exploring the emotional attachment with the host society (i.e. national identity)¹ as antecedent of migrants' social, economic, or cultural integration (see e.g., Leszczensky 2013; Casey and Dustmann 2010; Hochman and Davidov 2014).

Even though previous European research has also indicated that identification with the receiving country may significantly affect migrants' political attitudes, such as political interest or political trust (e.g. Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Caballero 2009), the mechanisms through which migrants' perceptions or feelings of attachment with the national group relates to their attitudinal integration into politics continue to exist as theoretical and empirical blind spots. As a consequence, a number of questions remain unanswered: What precisely is the effect of national identification on immigrants' attitudinal integration into politics? What relevant factors account for "when" and "how" national identification exerts its influence on immigrants' attitudinal integration into politics? And, last but not least, is the effect of national identification the same for immigrants of different ethnic origins?

¹ The terms "identity" and "identification" are used interchangeably within this article to refer to individual's self-ascribed psychological membership in the national category/group of the receiving country.

To address these questions and to close the existing gaps in the literature are the main objectives of the present paper. We focus on “interest in national politics” as an indicator of immigrants’ attitudinal integration. We do so for two reasons: First, because, in contrast to external attitudes relating to the political system, e.g., trust in national government, institutions, and so forth, the interest in politics is an internal political attitude, which addresses person’s role and self-image as political actor, besides feelings of political self-efficacy or political knowledge (cf. Niedermayer 2005, 20). Put differently, political interest closely relates to an individual’s personal self-concept, which is generally comprised of an ‘individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is’ (Baumeister 1999, 13). In terms of national political interest this implies the self-conception as being a person who is interested in national politics. Thereby, political interest, secondly, provides a significant predictor of a variety of political activities, involving unconventional political activities such as signing petitions, demonstrating, and so forth, as well as conventional political activities such as voting, working for a political party, or contacting politicians, and so forth (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 353; de Rooij 2012; Ayala 2000; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Reichert 2013). Following Verba and colleagues (1995) citizens ‘who are interested in politics – who follow politics, who care about what happens, who are concerned with who wins and loses – are more politically active’ (345). Thus, literature also supposes political interest as an important prerequisite of stable democracies at the macro level: ‘[A] properly functioning democracy needs competent and involved [interested] citizens’ (van der Meer and van Ingen 2009, 283). In sum, we suggest that interest in receiving country politics is a very valuable measure of an individual’s cognitive and motivational involvement in politics and thus of attitudinal integration into politics of immigrants (cf. also Reichert 2013, 11).

To address the question on the impact of national identity on political interest as well as on other factors that account for the association explanatory, we will first conceptualise political interest by three concepts, namely political attentiveness, political importance– both well described in the existing literature (cf. Neller 2002, 489) – as well as what we refer to as political motivation, before we hypothesise how the identification with the national group affect it. We thereby focus on Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which conceptualises national identity as a part of individual’s social self-concept that drives ingroup favouring processes and thereby also renders migrants’ self-image in national politics. We combine the basic social identity mechanisms with insights from the traditional Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) to elaborate upon two distinctive indirect causal mechanisms of migrants’ host-language skills and

involvement in interethnic social networks (of voluntary associations) that closely relate to immigrants' political interest as well as nation identification.

Empirically, we make use of newly available data from the longitudinal SCIP- project (Social-Cultural Integration Processes) (Diehl et al. 2015), which involve recent arrivals at four European destinations, namely England, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. We focus on the German data and new immigrants from Poland and Turkey. Both groups are quite interesting to study, as they currently constitute the two largest non-western immigrant groups in Germany (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 7). Moreover, new Polish and Turkish migrants differ with respect to the group-specific conditions and circumstances they face regarding their emotional and political integration processes in Germany. Thus, we will discuss how the patterns mechanisms for immigrant' interest in national politics differ between Turkish and Polish immigrants. The SCIP data are also beneficial in analytical terms. It allows us to employ sophisticated empirical methods of longitudinal analysis in terms of hybrid random-effects models (Allison 2009) that grasp causal relationships between time varying variables, like national identification and political interest, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by omission of time constant variables.

Our article is organized as follows: First, the concept of national political interest is outlined before the impact of national identification is theoretically delineated. After the presentation of the general theoretical model, the situation of recent immigrants with Polish and Turkish background in Germany is highlighted and group-specific hypotheses are derived. Then, the data and the analytical strategy is outlined. The discussion of the results is followed by a conclusion with subsequent implications for future research.

3.2 Conceptualising political interest

Before we embark on theorising how national identification affect migrants' psychological socialisation within the receiving country political system in terms of becoming a resident who is interested in national politics, we will spend some words on its meaning. Even though political interest is acknowledged as an important condition for an individual's political activity within various strands of research (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 353; de Rooij 2012; Ayala 2000; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Reichert 2013), the concept itself is often less clearly defined and utilised with varied meanings.

Building on the psychological literature, interest is a general concept describing a motivational state or processes that initiate and maintain goal-oriented (political) behaviour

(Mook 1996). Moreover, interest is defined within psychology by its object specificity and is thus also referred to as a ‘psychological state of engaging or the predisposition to reengage with particular classes of objects, events, or ideas over time’ (Hidi and Renninger 2006, 112; cf. also cf. Reichert 2013, 11).

Following this literature, we focus in the present work on interest in politics that is specific to the German host society context. Furthermore, we concentrate on three concepts of political interest that best met the previous basic psychological definitions, namely political attentiveness, political importance– both well described in the existing literature (cf. Neller 2002, 489) – as well as what we refer to as political motivation. Considering the first concept, researchers define political interest as the ‘degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity’ (van Deth 1990, 278) – or the ‘attentiveness to politics’ (Zaller 1992, 18). The defining criteria of “curiosity” and “attention” relate to the fundamental cognitive components of learning processes. Accordingly, interest in politics provides a prerequisite for learning about national (i.e. German) politics, which constitutes ‘a complex matter, involving a large number of authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and groups’ (van Deth 1990, 278), and ‘building an informed [migrant-origin] citizenry’ (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 175). In contemplating the second concept, political salience and relevance is another aspect of national political interest that addresses the absolute importance of (German) political matters to a migrant’s life (cf. van Deth 2000, 119). Third, the concept of political motivation refers to the collectivity aspect of politics, i.e. that politics refer to public goods and outcomes (e.g. education, public infrastructure and governmental policies in general) individuals benefit from regardless of their individual contribution. Thus, for ethnically self-interested migrant-origin individuals, it is irrational to participate in the production of national public goods. In sum, a migrant’s attention to national politics (political attentiveness), their concern for national politics in terms of their individual life (political importance), as well as their desire to contribute to public goods and outcomes of the host society (political motivation) is overall classified as migrants’ interest in German politics.

3.3 Theoretical arguments

National group membership and national identity, respectively, are instances of social identities that involve psychological memberships in social groups and categories such as gender, occupation, ethnicity, or nationality. Social identity is according to Social Identity Theory (SIT), ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership

of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1981, 255). More precisely, following acculturation research, national identification is that aspect of migrants' social identity which addresses changes to the subjective sense of belonging to the national culture and group during the course of migration and integration (Phinney 1990). In contrast, changes in migrants' sense of membership to their ethnic origin group and belonging to their homeland refers to their ethnic identification. Similarly, in sociological research, the emergence of feelings of "we" and connection to the members of the native group of the receiving country is conceived as the emotional dimension of migrant integration, referred to as emotional integration (Esser 2001).

3.3.1 Migrants' identification with the host society and interest in host-land Politics

There are main cognitive and motivational mechanisms involved in social identification that may explain how specific national identity relates to interest in national politics. In general, the main theoretical tenet of SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986; see also Hogg and Abrams 1988) assumes that individuals try to maintain and establish a positive social identity, because the self-reference to social groups drives main parts of individual's positive self-feelings, self-esteem, as well as well-being. Thus, group and self-enhancing motives are inherent to social (i.e. national) identification. Because a positive social identity, and in consequence positive self-image, mainly bases according to SIT on positive social comparisons at the intergroup level, social identities drive processes of intergroup differentiation that favour the groups constituting the self, the ingroups (i.e. 'we's) and other groups, the outgroups (i.e. 'they's). This search for positive ingroup distinctiveness relates to perceptual, attitudinal, or behavioural biases. Accordingly, research finds that, ingroup identification is found to relate to ingroup biases to systematically favour the psychological membership group in terms of emotions (e.g. trust), stereotypical attitudes (e.g. friendly, smart, reliably) and behaviour (e.g. helping) (e.g. Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Pfeifer et al. 2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009). In addition, attention and memory processes are also found to be selectively biased in favour of ingroup-related information (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009, 5)

Moreover, the search for positive distinctiveness drives cognitive self-stereotyping and the depersonalisation of self-conception in terms of the ingroup prototype in order to reduce uncertainty and accentuate intergroup dissimilarities (Taylor et al. 1978; Turner and Reynolds 2010). Hence, individuals perceive themselves as prototypically representative of the ingroup in terms of norms and stereotypes in the course of social identification, which also lays the basis

for shared collective interests and collective actions. In short, ingroup members share a collective view and thus collective interests and concerns.

We argue that because receiving-country politics involve the main collective processes and outcomes with respect to satisfying a positive national identification that activating identification with the reception context spurs the cognitive and motivational processes of SIT with respect to ‘politics’ of the perceived (national) ingroup. Therefore, it can be assumed that national identification implies that information, aspects, topics policies, actors, and other features of host-country politics become part of the psychological self of immigrants, thus relevant to individual migrants’ lives (i.e. political importance). Moreover, at the same time, national identification implies that national collective interests instead of personal self-interests of the individual migrant become relevant due to personalsiation. Therefore, it also acknowledges the motivation to contribute to the provision of public or collective goods of the host society (i.e. political motivation). Lastly, national identification includes according to an ingroup bias, selective cognitive attention processes towards the objects, actors and issues of national politics (political attentiveness).

In sum, we derive that perceived national group membership (i.e. national identification) impacts immigrants’ political interest through affecting – (1) importance and (2) attentiveness of national politics, as well as (3) motivation towards national politics within the individual’s self-concept (*national identity hypothesis*).

3.3.2 Tackling the indirect and conditional Effects of national identification

Evidently, the impact of migrants’ national identification on their interest in national politics can not only be examined in direct terms but also with respect to closely related integration processes of immigrants within receiving countries that also affect migrants’ political interest. More specifically, we explore two factors of CVM-related work that characterise migrants’ cultural and social integration - on the one hand, civic skills or migrants’ host-language proficiency and on the other, social recruitment networks in terms of migrants’ involvement in host society voluntary associations and social networks (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). According to CVM, language competencies positively affect individuals’ political involvement because ‘citizens who can speak or write well [...] are likely to be more effective when they get involved in politics’ (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 273). We assume two main reasons why skills in the majority language affects migrants’ interest in national politics. First, it increases the likelihood that the individual migrant can draw attention to information on national politics conveyed by media or native contacts, as well as policy makers (i.e. political

attentiveness). Second, proficiency in the host-society language also facilitates information on national politics becoming integrated within immigrants' psychological and cognitive self-concept, thereby increasing the relevance for individuals' lives (i.e. political importance). There are a number of empirical papers that have previously tested the relationship between majority language proficiency and political interest. Berger et al. (2004) and Jacobs et al. (2004) found that for immigrant groups in Berlin and Brussels that national language proficiency generates interest in local and national politics.

In the literature, migrants' command of the host national language being correlated with migrants' national identification has been discussed (Esser 2006; Esser 2009; Remennick 2004; Vervoort 2011; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016). The acquisition of the language of the host society is closely linked to national identification as language is the main tool for positive social identity expression and reaffirmation. Moreover, it is a main boundary marker for effective inter-group differentiation between ethno-cultural groups for the purpose of maintaining positive national identity (Hochman and Davidov 2014). Therefore, host-national identification provides motivation to increase destination language acquisition. Though Hochman and Davidov (2014) only discovered causal influences that relate from language proficiency to migrants' national identification, Esser (2009) demonstrated that an assimilated identity primarily involving identification with the host-society context positively differs from ethnic-related identity forms when predicting German language acquisition. Against this backdrop, regarding majority language proficiency, we propose two indirect hypotheses on the impact of national identification on migrants' interest in German politics: 1) Identification with the German receiving society fosters immigrants' interest in German politics through encouraging migrants to also become proficient in the host society's language as means of social identity enhancement (*Language mediation hypothesis*); and 2) the motivational effect of migrants' national identification to attract attention to national politics as well as to increase its salience for individuals' lives positively varies with higher levels of German language proficiency (*Language moderation hypothesis*).

In the spirit of Tocqueville (1969), a considerable body of literature stresses the importance of social involvement in horizontal social networks of social and cultural associations for migrant-origin individuals' political attitudes towards host societies (Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010). The research drawing on CVM (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995) and Putnam (1993; 2000) suggests that memberships in voluntary associations constitute a type of social capital for individuals' political experience and socialisation as they 'instill in their members

habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life' (Putnam 1993, 89). Within the framework of immigration, it addresses migrants' memberships in voluntary associations of the host society and whether those memberships mainly involve native or co-ethnic members, also referred to as bridging or bonding social capital (Putnam 2000). Arguably, membership in cross-ethnic associations are more likely to foster aspects of interest in national politics. For one, interethnic associational networks provide social networks of inter-personal exchanges and communication, increasing the possibilities for migrants to encounter information on host-society politics and therefore involve means that facilitate attention to and learning processes for national politics (i.e. political attentiveness). Second, social interactions and communications permit the psychological anchoring of information and cues on national politics within individual migrants' self-concept, and therefore increase their relevance and salience (i.e. political importance). Finally, cooperative behaviour in national voluntary associations promotes migrants' interest in the provision of national collective goods (i.e. political motivation). Accordingly, Putnam (1993, 89) states that 'participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours'. Even though similar mechanisms can be suggested from immigrants' intra-ethnic associational involvement (i.e. primarily interactions with co-ethnics), it may rather generate interest in politics concerned with the enforcement of minority rights and interests of their ethnic identity group and homeland. While previous research on the Netherlands (Tillie 2004; Jacobs, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2004) indicated that ethnic as along with cross-ethnic associational involvement matter in terms of allowing migrant attitudinal integration into receiving society politics, other studies have only evinced the positive role of cross-ethnic membership on political attitudes towards the host society, whereas the effect of ethnic membership seems to be detrimental (Morales and Pilati 2011; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004).

Migrants' social integration into networks with the native population closely relates to the social identification processes. Thus, it should also affect the relationship between German identification and migrants' political interest in Germany. Social networks of voluntary interactions, like sport clubs, provide a very effective support structure to effectively display, reaffirm and experience a positive national identity. As a consequence, we propose two further indirect hypotheses on the moderating and mediating role of immigrants' association involvement on the interaction between national identity and national political interest. The first is that migrants who strongly identify with German society are more interested in German politics because they are motivated to participate within interethnic social networks (of

voluntary association) (*Social network mediation hypothesis*). Second, the strength of the effect of national identification on immigrants' interest in German politics depends on involvement in interethnic social networks (of voluntary association) (*social network moderation hypothesis*).

3.3.3 Differences between immigrant groups in Germany

Previous studies on the impact of national identification on migrants' integration have been prone to the implicit assumption that the effect of national identification is the same across ethnic groups (e.g. Esser 2009; Hochman and Davidov 2014). In this article, we focus on differences between groups of newly-arrived migrants of Turkish and Polish origin in Germany. We argue that national identification should only increase political interest in line with our previous theoretical mechanisms when the conditions and circumstances for national identification, host society language acquisition, and interethnic voluntary associational involvement are met. With respect to national identification, this addresses the idea that boundaries between immigrants and natives are rather blurred (versus bright) within the German host society (Alba 2005). The nature of intergroup boundaries is determined by cultural and social distances between the majority and the ethnic minority group as well as processes of discrimination. European research has overall found that perceived discrimination and rejection by natives may lead to stronger ethnic identification and to weaker national identification (e.g. Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim 2009; Skrobaneck 2009; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). While Poles' Catholic background is culturally close to the historically Christian German host society, Turks have a primarily Muslim background, which is more culturally distant. Several studies in Germany reveal that Turks perceive higher levels of cultural distances, discrimination and rejection by the native group than other ethnic origins (e.g. Blohm and Wasmer 2008; Hans 2010; Steinbach 2004, 146ff.) such as Poles. As a consequence, Turks may receive less social approval from the German host society than from identifying with their ethnic minority group. Therefore, research on the same data used within the present paper shows that perceptions on ethnic discrimination significantly increase over the first 18 months in Germany strictly for Turks and not for Poles despite both groups starting out with same perceptions connected to ethnic disadvantages (Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). In line with Diehl and colleagues (2016), the varying situation of social and psychological accommodation within Germany partly accounts for why national identification of newcomers from Turkey – even though beginning at higher levels – decreases over the first months in Germany, while it increases for recently arrived Poles.

Moreover, the literature reveals that different conditions for Turks and Poles apply for efficiently learning the host national language because of differences in linguistic similarities, or language distance, and exposure from social interaction possibilities (Chiswick and Miller 2001; cf. also Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016, 183ff.). With respect to the German language, the Turkish language is more dissimilar than the original language of Poles (cf. Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016, 184). Moreover, it has been suggested that Turkish nationals may indeed be involved in dense and cohesive social networks, but that these (associational) networks mostly consist of co-ethnic members (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004). Overall, the various integration patterns previously outlined contribute to the assumption that the conditions for positive effects of national identification conducive to developing interest in national politics, as defined in our paper, are less available for newcomers from Turkey than those from Poland. Put differently, national identification may not be sufficient to affect the attention, salience and collective good aspect of interest in German politics for new immigrants from Turkey as effectively as for new immigrants from Poland. Overall, we hypothesize that the effects of immigrants' identification with the German receiving context on their interest in German politics should be less strong for newly arrived Turkish than Polish immigrants (*Ethnic group-specific hypothesis*).

3.4 Data and analytical strategy

The empirical analyses of our paper employed the German longitudinal data from the international SCIP project (Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe) (Diehl et al. 2015). The two-wave study in Germany involved random samples of Turkish and Polish immigrants based on registry data from five cities (Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, Hamburg and Munich). The target population was comprised of recent immigrants between the ages of 18 and 60 years who, at most, stayed for 18 months in Germany at the time of the first interview that took place in 2010 or 2011. In total, 2,644 face-to-face interviews (1,482 among Poles; 1,162 among Turks) were conducted in the first wave. Around 1.5 years later, as many as possible were re-interviewed (for a detailed description of the methodological setup of the project see Gresser and Schacht 2015).²

² Only about 45% could be re-interviewed. The response rate reflects that recent immigrants constitute a very mobile population within Germany but also between Germans and the source countries. The response rate however in general also resembles the one that was achieved within the US based New Immigrant Survey (email exchange between the project directors) (cf. Gresser and Schacht 2015, 31).

We used the question on respondents' interest in host country politics, "How interested would you say you are in German politics?" to operationalise our dependent variable. The time-variant measure is based on a self-assessment ranging from 1 'not at all interested' to 4 'very interested'. Moreover, we include the corresponding measure of migrants' interest in politics of the country of origin (CO) as a control variable to be able to account for ethnic political segregation as well as a general higher individual psychological engagement with politics (also ranging from 1 to 4).

For our main independent variable of immigrants' national identification, we generated an additive index of items measuring the *identification with the receiving country* (RC). Specifically, we used the answers to the following questions "How important is the following to your sense of who you are: your current country of residence?" and "Do you feel proud of your current country of residence?". Both questions would be answered with a range of 1, being 'not important at all', to 4, indicating 'very important'. In addition, we controlled for the same index for the identification with the country of origin (CO) as a measure of ethnic identification.

To capture *migrants' cultural integration*, a mean index measuring the *proficiency in the host country language* is applied. The time-varying measure is based on self-assessments for understanding, speaking, writing and reading German, each ranging from 1 - 'not at all' to 4 - 'very well'. For social participation, respondents were asked twice about sports clubs, religious groups, or other groups, specifically if they were a member of this group and in the case of membership, how many people from the sending country participate in this group. The possible answers were: 'none or almost none', 'some', 'half', 'a little like me', 'most', 'all', re-coded with a scale 1 to 5. With this information, we computed two variables. The first was whether a given respondent was a *member of any voluntary association*. Moreover, concerning the aim to measure the degree of ethnic bonding and bridging social capital that migrants can access by associational involvement, we used that information and generated a new variable, *ethnic bonding within associations*, that for each immigrant reflects the respondent's percentage of associations in which they are involved that are composed of a majority of co-ethnics (i.e. whether half or more are co-ethnics) (cf. for same operationalisation, see Morales and Pilati 2011, 97 f.)³. Besides this more formal type of social integration by associational involvement, we also considered the *frequency of contacts* with members of the German native population to obtain an informal measure of social integration (ranging from 1 - 'never' to 6 - 'every day').

³ Respondents who were not involved in any association were assigned a zero value for the variable that we included in the multivariate regression analyses.

Besides our main theoretical measures, we captured a number of time-independent and time-dependent control variables to account for the spurious relationship between national identification and interest in national politics. On the one hand, we had time-invariant measures on *gender* (females =1) as well on *ethnic group membership* (Poles= 1; Turks= ref. cat.). The latter included Poles and Turks with the respective country of birth and nationality. Kurds are included in the Turkish sample⁴. In addition, we involved a measure of *age at migration* as a metric variable assessed on a yearly basis. We also took into account the *city the interview took place in* during the first wave (Berlin = ref.cat; Hamburg/Bremen; Cologne or Munich). Whether the respondent migrated based on educational (1) or other reasons (0) was measured within the dummy variable, *migration motive*. To also control and test for the impact of the time-constant *educational level*, we involved another indicator of the years of education an individual has acquired prior to immigration, usually in the country of origin. We did not include a measure of employment status because most recent immigrants do not usually have a job.

Further, time-variant controls and confounders encompass, for instance, respondents' assessment of how often people from the country of origin are *discriminated against in the country of reception* (1 - 'never' to 5 - 'very often'). As the general usage and *consumption of national media sources* may be a major source of developing a national sense of belonging as well as interest in national politics, we also included a mean index of the frequency of consuming German newspapers, music and television programs (1 - 'never' to 5 - 'every day'). Moreover, migrants' *duration of stay in Germany* was controlled, generated by subtracting the date of immigration from the date of the first interview (t1) and from the date of the second interview (t2). Based on the fact that all decisions for assimilative investments depended on the migrants' *intention to stay in Germany*, we constructed a variable that is set equal to 0 if the respondents planned to stay forever in the host country; otherwise, it obtained the value 1 if the respondents planned to move between Germany and the country of origin or 2 if the respondents preferred to return to the sending country or move to another country altogether.

Table A3.1 presents a brief overview of the descriptive statistics of the sample and the marginal distributions of all our model variables. All told, recent immigrants from Poland represented about 56% of the sample. Moreover, there are slightly less females (47%) than males. The immigrants in the total sample resided, on average, 13 months in Germany. To account for item non-responses regarding some variable values for statistical analyses, we employed multiple imputations on the missing responses (i.e., estimating the most likely responses, Rubin 1987).

⁴ We did check our subsequent regression analyses for differences between Kurds and Turks. As we found no significant differences, we decided to include them in the Turkish sample.

In comparison to other missing data techniques, multiple imputation is more efficient, reduces potential bias in the estimation of coefficients (if missing values are not completely random but to some degree correlated with the vector of the observed variables), and estimates standard errors that reflect the uncertainty of the missing information correctly (Allison 2002). Using the Stata “mi” package⁵, we generated 35 additional datasets with full information and then used these to estimate our models. The robustness of the imputation models was confirmed by imputing up to 30 datasets (Bodner 2008). It should be noted that we used the strategy of multiple imputation, then deletion (MID) to handle missing values of the dependent variable (Von Hippel 2007). Hence, subsequent regressions are based on smaller samples due to the omission of cases with missing values on the dependent variable.

As a consequence of our panel data providing time-variant as well as time-invariant variables that varied or did not vary between clusters (respondents, level 2) and occasions (time points, level 1), we used a regression method that estimated within effects in random-effects models. This was provided by the hybrid model of Allison (2009) that decomposes the time-varying variables into a within and between cluster component by

$$y_{it} = (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)' \beta + \bar{x}_i \gamma + z_i' \delta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Thus, β yields the within or fixed-effect estimate that is unbiased by the level 2 error α_i . Like in the fixed-effects models, β is not biased through time-constant unobserved variables, though. δ provides the coefficient for the time-invariant variables, for which $Cov(\alpha_i | x_{it}, z_i) = 0$ still needs to hold. Yet, by inclusion of the cluster means, \bar{x} , the model ensures that effect estimates of the level 2 variables are corrected for with between-cluster differences in x_{it} . In sum, this hybrid model provided the most efficient and unbiased estimates for our time-variant and time-invariant indicators of national identification, political interest and ethnicity.

3.5 Findings

Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, we will present results on the balanced sample (i.e. respondents who participated in both waves) for our central time-variant independent variables in a descriptive way.

⁵ <https://www.stata.com/manuals13/mi.pdf>.

Table 3.1. Distribution of important independent variables by ethnicity and time

	Panel balanced							
	Wave 1				Wave 2			
	Poles (601)		Turks (476)		Poles (601)		Turks (476)	
	M / P	SD	M / P	SD	M / P	SD	M / P	SD
Identification with RC	M	<i>5,85</i> (1.26)	5,97 (1.58)		<i>6,02</i> (1.28)	5,90 (1.58)		
RC language proficiency	M	2,44 (0.77)	2,35 (0.61)		<i>2,69</i> (0.72)	<i>2,74</i> (0.62)		
Frequency of contacts with natives	M	4,96 (1.51)	4,23 (1.93)		5,12 (1.37)	4,30 (1.82)		
Involved in any organization	P	0,66 (0.47)	0,45 (0.50)		0,82 (0.39)	0,61 (0.49)		
Ethnic bonding within associations	M	0,50 (0.50)	0,35 (0.47)		0,61 (0.48)	0,48 (0.49)		
Identification with CO	M	6,38 (1.49)	6,72 (1.55)		6,50 (1.51)	6,78 (1.51)		
Ethnic group discrimination	M	2,73 (0.90)	2,77 (1.16)		2,71 (0.86)	2,90 (1.10)		
National media consumption	M	2,94 (0.94)	2,78 (0.92)		3,11 (0.98)	2,82 (0.97)		
Intention to stay in RC								
Forever	P	0,33 (0.47)	0,41 (0.49)		0,38 (0.49)	0,31 (0.46)		
Move between RC and CO	P	0,22 (0.41)	0,25 (0.43)		0,20 (0.40)	0,28 (0.45)		
Return/Third country	P	0,45 (0.50)	0,34 (0.48)		0,42 (0.49)	<i>0,41</i> (0.49)		

Source: Own calculations (SCIP). *Note:* descriptives on the first of 35 imputed datasets. RC= receiving country; CO= country of origin. t-test or Chi-quadrat test. significant difference between ethnic groups bold ($p < 0.05$), significant differences over time in italics ($p < 0.05$)

As can be seen in Table 3.1, the identity levels with the receiving country (RC= Germany) are within the first 18 months of stay in Germany (Wave 1) higher for recently immigrated Turks than Poles, albeit not significantly. Yet, as expected through theory and also in line with the results of Diehl et al. (2016), around 1.5 years later, the picture is reversed and Turks indicated significantly lower senses of belonging to the German host society while Poles showed significantly higher senses of national attachment. Concerning both groups' cultural integration, Table 3.1 shows that proficiency in German increased over time so that there is no significant group difference after approximately 18 months between newly immigrated Poles and Turks. Similarly, national media usage also rose over time despite the remaining group differences between the groups. As expected, indicators of both groups' social integration showed that the share of individuals who were involved in voluntary organisations is much higher among recently arrived Poles than Turks despite the common increase in associational involvement over time also for Turks. In the same vein, the indicator of informal social ties to Germans shows that Poles are more integrated socially than Turks, which changed only moderately over time. Surprisingly, the degree of associational ethnic bonding varied between groups and is higher for Poles than for Turks. This may be due to the fact that Poles draw on a higher network of co-ethnic when they arrive. Moreover, associational ethnic bonding is elevated over time

among both groups. Therefore, 50 per cent of the associations in which Polish migrants were involved were formed by a majority of co-ethnics within their first months of stay (Wave 1), which increased further up to 61 per cent over time (Wave 2).

Identification with the country of origin (CO) is similarly high for both groups and only moderately altered. Experiences of discrimination increased moderately over time and is, after the first months in Germany, significantly higher for Turks than Poles (Wave 2). At the same time, the share of immigrants who wanted to stay forever in Germany is initially significantly larger among newcomers from Poland but then diminished significantly, while the share increased among immigrants from Poland. Overall, the results demonstrate ethnic group differences in migrants' national identity, language proficiency, and social ties over time. Starting out from these distributions, multivariate regression analysis permitted evaluation of how changes in national identification, language proficiency, as along with associational involvement related to changes in the development of interest in German politics among new Polish and Turkish immigrants:

Table 3.2 outlines the estimation results of hybrid random-effects regression analyses where interest in German politics of recently immigrated Turks and Poles is regressed on the strength of national identity, German language proficiency, associational involvement, in addition to other characteristics. A stepwise procedure is chosen to test for the interaction as well as mediation effects. To also assess for ethnic group-specific effects for newly-arrived Turks and Poles, we also employed subsample analyses as well as interactions between our theoretical variables and ethnic groups for an inferential significance test of group differences⁶.

⁶ For reasons of parsimony, the additional interaction analysis by interaction terms between ethnic group and theoretical variables is not included in the Tables, but are available upon request from the authors.

Table 3.2. Hybrid regression analysis of interest in receiving-country politics among recent immigrants from Turkey and Poland in Germany

	All						Poles					
	M1		M2		M3		M1		M2		M3	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Theoretical variables - time-varying</i>												
Identification with RC	0.06**	(0.02)	0.06**	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.06)	0.06*	(0.03)	0.06*	(0.03)	-0.09	(0.10)
RC language proficiency			0.10+	(0.05)	-0.12	(0.13)			0.04	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.19)
Frequency of contacts with natives			0.03	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.04)			0.00	(0.02)	-0.06	(0.06)
Involved in any organization			-0.05	(0.07)	0.06	(0.24)			-0.10	(0.09)	-0.68*	(0.31)
Ethnic bonding within associations			-0.09	(0.07)	0.06	(0.25)			-0.13+	(0.08)	0.23	(0.32)
<i>Interaction effects:</i>												
Identification with RC x												
RC language proficiency					0.04+	(0.02)					0.02	(0.03)
Frequency of contacts with natives					0.01	(0.01)					0.01	(0.01)
Involved in any organization					-0.02	(0.04)					0.10+	(0.05)
Ethnic bonding within associations					-0.03	(0.04)					-0.06	(0.05)
<i>Control variables - time-constant</i>												
Poles	0.11***	(0.03)	0.08*	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)						
Female	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.06	(0.04)	-0.06	(0.04)
Age at migration	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
City (ref. Berlin)												
Cologne	-0.14***	(0.04)	-0.13**	(0.04)	-0.13**	(0.04)	-0.20***	(0.05)	-0.19***	(0.05)	-0.19***	(0.05)
Hamburg / Bremen	-0.08*	(0.04)	-0.07+	(0.04)	-0.08+	(0.04)	-0.21***	(0.06)	-0.20**	(0.06)	-0.20**	(0.06)
Munich	-0.06*	(0.03)	-0.06+	(0.03)	-0.06+	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.03	(0.04)	-0.03	(0.04)
Migration motive (education vs. else)	0.15***	(0.04)	0.08+	(0.04)	0.08+	(0.04)	0.16**	(0.05)	0.08	(0.06)	0.08	(0.06)
Years of education	0.01**	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	0.01+	(0.01)
<i>Control variables - time-varying</i>												
Duration of stay (in months)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)
Identification with CO	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.07**	(0.02)	-0.07**	(0.02)	-0.07**	(0.02)
Interest in CO politics	0.40***	(0.03)	0.40***	(0.03)	0.39***	(0.03)	0.40***	(0.04)	0.40***	(0.04)	0.39***	(0.04)
Ethnic group discrimination	0.01	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	0.00	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)
Intention to stay in RC (ref. forever)												
Move between RC and CO	-0.09	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.06)	-0.09	(0.06)	-0.13	(0.09)	-0.13	(0.09)	-0.13	(0.09)
Return/Third country	-0.13*	(0.06)	-0.13*	(0.06)	-0.12+	(0.06)	-0.11	(0.08)	-0.12	(0.08)	-0.12	(0.08)
National media consumption	0.10***	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.12**	(0.04)	0.12**	(0.04)	0.11**	(0.04)
INTERCEPT	-0.55***	(0.13)	0.06**	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.24)	-0.45*	(0.18)	-0.59**	(0.18)	-0.31	(0.32)
N Person years	3681		3681		3681		2070		2070		2070	
N Persons	2604		2604		2604		1469		1469		1469	
Within R ²	0.20		0.21		0.22		0.21		0.23		0.24	
Between R ²	0.46		0.47		0.47		0.49		0.50		0.50	
Overall R ²	0.44		0.45		0.45		0.47		0.48		0.48	

Source: Own calculations (SCIP). Notes: Estimators of time-varying variables are deviations (fixed-effect/ within estimator). RC= receiving country= Germany; CO= country of origin. imputed dataset. the relation is statistically significant at +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 2 – continued

	Turks					
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
	β	β	β	s.e.	s.e.	s.e.
<i>Theoretical variables - time-varying</i>						
Identification with RC	0.06*	0.05+	-0.04	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)
RC language proficiency		0.16*	-0.19	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)
Frequency of contacts with natives		0.04+	0.06	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Involved in any organization		-0.02	0.81*	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.37)
Ethnic bonding within associations		-0.04	-0.32	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.40)
<i>Interaction effects:</i>						
Identification with RC			0.06*			(0.03)
RC language proficiency			-0.00			(0.01)
Frequency of contacts with natives			-0.14*			(0.07)
Involved in any organization			0.05			(0.07)
<i>Control variables - time-constant</i>						
Poles						
Female	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age at migration	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
City (ref. Berlin)						
Cologne	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Hamburg / Bremen	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Munich	-0.11+	-0.12*	-0.12*	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Migration motive (education vs. else)	0.18**	0.12+	0.13+	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Years of education	0.01+	0.01	0.01	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>Control variables - time-varying</i>						
Duration of stay (in months)	0.00	0.00	0.00	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Identification with CO	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.10**	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest in CO politics	0.40***	0.39***	0.39***	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ethnic group discrimination	0.01	0.02	0.02	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Intention to stay in RC (ref. forever)						
Move between RC and CO	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Return/Third country	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
National media consumption	0.08+	0.05	0.05	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
INTERCEPT	-0.66**	-0.87***	-1.00**	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.36)
N Person years	1611	1611	1611			
N Persons	1135	1135	1135			
Within R ²	0.19	0.21	0.23			
Between R ²	0.45	0.46	0.46			
Overall R ²	0.42	0.43	0.44			

Model 1 refers to the control variables as well as to our theoretical effect of national identification. By inserting German language proficiency as along with the indicators of immigrants' social capital in Model 2, we can determine whether cultural and social integration characteristics mediate the effect of emotional integration, net of other factors. Last but not least, national identification interacts with German language proficiency and indicators of migrants' social inclusion in Model 3. As the between estimates of the time-variant variables are by specification subject to time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and confounded with the level 2 error, we only report the relevant within-estimates for these predictors here (see Table A3.2 for the entire model with between and within effects)⁷.

Concerning our first hypothesis, the results of Model 1 reveal that a rise in feelings of attachment with the German RC is indeed associated with an increase in interest in German politics among Polish and Turkish migrants even if other important socio-demographic characteristics, such as education and other integration variables, are controlled for. Further in line with theoretical reasoning, identification with the CO, in contrast, exerts a significant negative influence on the development of interest in German politics. Comparing the direct effect of national identity in Model 1 separately across ethnic minority groups reveals that the positive effect of identification with Germany is only negligibly stronger among newly-arrived Poles versus Turks. Hence, we conclude that the positive effect of German identification on interest in German politics does not considerably differ between recently immigrated Poles and Turks in Germany as has been suggested by our *ethnic group-specific hypothesis*. With respect to control variables, estimators between the pooled and separate group models are very similar and point in directions that may be expected. Therefore, age at immigration, educational level, and intention to stay in Germany have, for instance, a significant impact on the tendency for respondents to become interested in German politics. While previous research often finds that migrant women and men differ in terms of political involvement (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010), we do not find that the levels of interest in national politics differ for female and male Polish or Turkish respondents. We also do not find that ethnic discrimination exerts a relevant negative impact on interest in national politics when keeping all other factors constant. As to the difference between the immigrant groups, regression results from the full model uncover – in agreement with expectations – that newly-arrived Poles show significantly greater interest in German politics in comparison to Turks.

⁷ Table A3.2 in the Appendix shows that the within and between estimates differ (i.e. the between effects are much larger), which is another test that the estimates are subject to unobserved heterogeneity and thus justifies the estimation of within/fixed-effects for our time-variant variables.

The results in Model 2 for the pooled sample disprove mediation by migrants' national language proficiency as well as social integration, as the coefficient of national identification does not change. Also, the analyses for Poles does not suggest mediation. Yet, for new arrivals from Turkey, we find that the effect of German identification ($b= 0.06$, $p< 0.01$) decreases when German language proficiency ($b= 0.05$, $p< 0.05$; not shown) as well as their formal and informal social inclusion is accounted for ($b= 0.05$, $p< 0.10$ shown). Thus, we find ethnic group-specific evidence for our *language mediation hypothesis* as well as for our *social network mediation hypothesis*, i.e. that characteristics of majority language proficiency and interethnic social and associational involvement mediate the effect of national identification.

Model 2 in Table 1 also shows the direct effects of migrants' cultural and social integration, independent of their emotional integration, on their interest in the politics of the German host country. As expected by CVM, *ceteris paribus*, we observe slight indications that a change in host language proficiency is positively associated with interest in German politics for the pooled sample of Turkish and Polish immigrants. Surprisingly, separate group analyses evince that the language effect only holds true for newcomers from Turkey with and without controlling for their interethnic social integration. Thus, only for Turks does destination language proficiency provide a crucial resource to acquiring interest in German politics.

For all social inclusion variables, we are not able to find within the pooled model of Turkish and Polish respondents that changes in the frequency of contact to natives as well as associational involvement are significantly associated with interest development in national politics. Yet, it appears – as expected – that more frequent contact with Germans does have a slight positive effect on interest in German politics among Turks. Further in line with our theory, among Polish respondents, bonding social capital (i.e. involvement in organisations with a majority of co-ethnic members) hinders their interest in the political affairs of Germany.

The interaction terms are included in Model 3 of Table 2 to further test our *language moderation* and *social network moderation hypotheses*. The results uncover significant interaction effects that show the importance of the national identity effect as a function of language proficiency as along with being involved in any voluntary organisation. Turning to language proficiency, the interaction term with national identification is in agreement with our moderation hypothesis that a strong proficiency in German is associated with a further increase in interest in German politics, which, according to the separate group analyses, is only statistically significant for Turks. Interestingly, when reviewing the social integration indicators, we discover significant interaction effects from being involved in any voluntary organisation that are opposite for recent immigrants from Poland or Turkey. Hence, in the case

of new Poles in Germany, and in line with our expectations of the moderator effect, we find a positive effect of national identification if the Polish respondent is involved in any voluntary association. On the contrary, there is a significant negative association between national identification and interest in German politics in the case where Turks become associationally involved in any organisation. The additional model of interactions (not shown here) between ethnic group and our language and social inclusion predictors proves that the interactive relationship between national identification and organisational involvement significantly differs between Poles and Turks, whereas the model does not show significant group differences for German language proficiency.

Overall, the model statistics (within R-squared) reveal that the explanatory power of the last models (M3) are quite high. Thus the fixed effects of the time-variant variables, for instance, account for 22% of the total variance of changes in interest in Germans politics within recently arrived immigrants from Poland and Turkey.

3.6 Conclusion and discussion

In this article, we have attempted to answer three main questions that thus far have been insufficiently answered within the existing research on migrant attitudinal integration into politics within European societies. The first was does emotional integration in the form of identification with the host society have an effect on migrants' interest levels in mainstream politics? Second, which factors account for the association between national identification and interest in national politics? Third, does the effect of host-national identification vary for different ethnic groups?

In line with theoretical arguments by social identity theory, we found within panel regression analyses that the identification with the receiving society is a significant psychological force for recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey acquiring interest in receiving country politics in Germany. Moreover, we observed that the effect is in agreement with CVM and Putnam mediated and moderated by national language proficiency and involvement in social networks (of voluntary association) that are ethnic-group specific, though. Hence, we found that language proficiency and characteristics of social inclusion (e.g. contact with Germans, involvement in voluntary associations) seem to mediate the national identity effect among Turks. Moreover, we discerned interesting contradictory interaction effects of national identification and Poles' and Turks' involvement in any sort of association. Thus, whereas national identification increases interest in German politics for Poles if becoming

a member of any voluntary organisation, it decreases interest in national politics for Turks. We argue that this negative effect of organisational membership among Turkish immigrants may relate to the experiences of higher cultural (i.e. identity) incompatibilities they face when entering any associations within the German host country in contrast to Poles; also reflected in higher social distances on behalf of native members, as well as strong norms of ingroup loyalty by co-ethnics. Thus, interethnic social contexts in associations may undermine conducive effects of national identification.

We would like to mention a few limitations of this study. The results are preliminary in the sense that they apply to recent migrants who have not stayed longer than three years in Germany. Even though this may be a constraint in some respects, it is also advantageous, as the paper outlines, among the first studies, early political integration patterns of recently arrived migrants who may be indicative of long-term integration processes. Moreover, even though our hybrid regression models had advantages per se in testing causal effects of time-variant predictors, like national identification, by controlling for time-constant heterogeneity, the predictors may still be biased because of the omission of relevant time-variant variables that may account for the relationship. Nonetheless, we argue that we accounted for a variety of relevant time-variant confounders, indicated by the relatively high within R-squared measure. Moreover, our panel data does not solve the possibility of reversed causality, implying that the causal arrow may point away from the interest in German politics to national identification. In the existence of at least three time points, the employment of fixed-effects models with lagged independent variables, as suggested by Allison (2009), would be a promising approach. Finally, our measure of interest in national politics, is elusive in two manners: Firstly, it cannot be ruled out that interest in national politics may imply for immigrants ethnic group/homeland-based and contentious politics, i.e. politics within the receiving society that target the homeland or ethnic community (e.g. immigrant parties) and contentious politics, including strategies of mass demonstrations and protest as well as political violence. Overall, the positive effects of various indicators of assimilation (e.g., national identification, German language proficiency, national media consumption) as well as the negative effect of identification with the origin country within our study suggest however that our measure of political interest may capture institutions, political personnel, policies, and topics of the the host-land political context that rely on the operations and rules of the dominant political system. Secondly, our measure cannot directly assess the different concepts of political interest implied within the present study in terms of political importance, attentiveness, or political motivation. Therefore, more detailed measures

capturing the different nuances of being interested in national politics would be a valuable approach of future research.

Taken together and despite several shortcomings, we conclude that our article can make a number of worthwhile contributions to the current literature on national identity and political integration patterns of migrants within Western European nations. It longitudinally highlights the conditional and unconditional meaning of psychological processes that are driven by identifying with the receiving country for the development of interest in national politics of recently arrived immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany.

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3.8 Appendix

Table A 3.1. Descriptive statistics of total sample

		Range	M / P	SD	Observations ¹
Interest in RC politics	M	1/4	2,06	(0.96)	3681
National identification	M	2/8	5,88	(1.44)	3353
Language index	M	1/4	2,44	(0.73)	3664
Frequency of contacts with Germans	M	1/6	4,64	(1.74)	3672
Involved in any organization			0,61	(0.49)	3568
Ethnic bonding within associations			0,44	(0.49)	3329
Poles			0,56	(0.50)	3681
Female	P	0/1	0,48	(0.50)	3681
Age at migration	M	18/60	30,9	(9.61)	3490
City					
Berlin	P	0/1	0,38	(0.48)	3681
Cologne	P	0/1	0,16	(0.36)	3681
Hamburg / Bremen	P	0/1	0,14	(0.35)	3681
Munich	P	0/1	0,33	(0.47)	3681
Migration motive (education vs. else)	P	0/1	0,18	(0.39)	3660
Years of education	M	2/30	13,1	(3.88)	3594
Duration of stay (in months)	M	0/46	13,5	(10.61)	3506
Ethnic identification	M	2/8	6,64	(1.47)	3543
Interest in CO politics	M	1/4	2,57	(1.03)	3680
Ethnic group discrimination	M	1/5	2,77	(1.01)	3272
Media consumption index	M	1/5	2,81	(0.97)	3614
Intention to stay in RC					
Forever	P	0/1	0,34	(0.47)	3449
Move between RC and CO	P	0/1	0,23	(0.42)	3449
Return/Third country	P	0/1	0,43	(0.50)	3449

¹observations are person years ; i.e. a person is counted for each year s/he responded in SCIP.

Table A 3.2. Hybrid regression analysis of interest in receiving-country politics among recent immigrants from Turkey and Poland in Germany

	Mean (M) / Deviation (D)	All			Poles			Turks			
		M1		M2		M3		M3		M3	
		β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Theoretical variables- time-varying</i>											
Identification with RC	M	0.09***	(0.01)	0.09***	(0.01)	0.08*	(0.04)	0.05	(0.05)	0.10+	(0.05)
RC language proficiency	D	0.06**	(0.02)	0.06**	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.09	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.08)
	M	0.09***	(0.02)	0.09***	(0.02)	0.13	(0.09)	0.14	(0.11)	0.10	(0.13)
	D	0.10+	(0.05)	0.10+	(0.05)	-0.12	(0.13)	-0.09	(0.19)	-0.19	(0.19)
Frequency of contacts with natives	M	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.05)	0.04	(0.05)
	D	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.04)	-0.06	(0.06)	0.06	(0.06)
Involved in any organization	M	0.20***	(0.05)	0.20***	(0.05)	0.32+	(0.19)	0.06	(0.25)	0.68*	(0.29)
	D	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.05	(0.07)	0.06	(0.24)	-0.68*	(0.31)	0.81*	(0.37)
Ethnic bonding within associations	M	-0.18***	(0.05)	-0.18***	(0.05)	-0.53**	(0.20)	-0.35	(0.25)	-0.80*	(0.32)
	D	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.07)	0.06	(0.25)	0.23	(0.32)	-0.32	(0.40)
Interaction effects: Identification with RC											
RC language proficiency	M					-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.00	(0.02)
	D					0.04+	(0.02)	0.02	(0.03)	0.06*	(0.03)
Frequency of contacts with natives	M					0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)
	D					0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)
Involved in any organization	M					-0.02	(0.03)	0.02	(0.04)	-0.08+	(0.05)
	D					-0.02	(0.04)	0.10+	(0.05)	-0.14*	(0.07)
Ethnic bonding within associations	M					0.06+	(0.03)	0.03	(0.04)	0.10+	(0.05)
	D					-0.03	(0.04)	-0.06	(0.05)	0.05	(0.07)
<i>Control variables - time-constant</i>											
Poles		0.11***	(0.03)	0.08*	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)				
Female		-0.03	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.06	(0.04)	-0.04	(0.05)
Age at migration		0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)

Table A2 – continued

	Mean (M) / Deviation (D)	All						Poles		Turks	
		M1		M2		M3		β	s.e.	β	s.e.
		β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.				
City (ref. Berlin)											
Cologne		-0.14***	(0.04)	-0.13**	(0.04)	-0.13**	(0.04)	-0.19***	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.07)
Hamburg / Bremen		-0.08*	(0.04)	-0.07+	(0.04)	-0.08+	(0.04)	-0.20**	(0.06)	-0.00	(0.05)
Munich		-0.06*	(0.03)	-0.06+	(0.03)	-0.06+	(0.03)	-0.03	(0.04)	-0.12*	(0.06)
Migration motive (education vs. else)		0.15***	(0.04)	0.08+	(0.04)	0.08+	(0.04)	0.08	(0.06)	0.13+	(0.07)
Years of education		0.01**	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01+	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
<i>Control variables - time-varying</i>											
Duration of stay (in months)	M	0.01**	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
Identification with CO	D	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
Interest in CO politics	M	-0.09***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.02)
Ethnic group discrimination	D	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)	-0.07**	(0.02)	-0.10**	(0.03)
Intention to stay in RC (ref. forever)	M	0.52***	(0.02)	0.51***	(0.02)	0.51***	(0.02)	0.51***	(0.02)	0.49***	(0.02)
Move between RC and CO	D	0.40***	(0.03)	0.40***	(0.03)	0.39***	(0.03)	0.39***	(0.04)	0.39***	(0.05)
Return/Third country	M	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.05*	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)
National media consumption	D	0.01	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.04)
INTERCEPT		-0.09*	(0.04)	-0.09*	(0.04)	-0.09*	(0.04)	-0.19***	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)
N years		-0.09	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.06)	-0.09	(0.06)	-0.13	(0.09)	-0.07	(0.09)
N		-0.12**	(0.04)	-0.11**	(0.04)	-0.11**	(0.04)	-0.16**	(0.05)	-0.06	(0.06)
		-0.13*	(0.06)	-0.13*	(0.06)	-0.12+	(0.06)	-0.12	(0.08)	-0.15	(0.10)
		0.25***	(0.02)	0.22***	(0.02)	0.22***	(0.02)	0.18***	(0.02)	0.26***	(0.03)
		0.10***	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.09**	(0.03)	0.11**	(0.04)	0.05	(0.04)
		-0.55***	(0.13)	-0.72***	(0.13)	-0.69**	(0.24)	-0.31	(0.32)	-1.00**	(0.36)
		3681	3681	3681	3681	3681	2070	1611			
		2604	2604	2604	2604	2604	1469	1135			

Source: Own calculations (SCIP). Note RC= receiving country= Germany ; CO= country of origin. imputed dataset. the relation is statistically significant at +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Chapter 4: Immigrants' Ethnic Identification and Political Involvement in the Face of Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of the German Case^{*†}

Abstract:

Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1993-2006 as well as longitudinal modelling techniques, the present paper contributes to the growing body of literature on ethnic identity and its effects on immigrants' social integration by examining the role of various forms of labour immigrants' ethnic sense of belonging and cognitive involvement in politics. Theoretically, the paper draws on interdisciplinary integration models, social psychological theories of social identity as well as theoretical frameworks that delineate the politicisation of collective identity and especially the role of dual identification. Applying "hybrid" models that combine the virtues of both fixed and random effects models, the statistical analysis confirms that dual identification – immigrant's identification with both the ethnic ingroup and the national community simultaneously – is positively related to labour immigrants' political interest, conditional on the perception of discrimination on behalf of the ethnic origin. Secondly, the longitudinal analyses show some indication that the effect is more pronounced among Turkish immigrants as well as that the mechanisms behind the cognitive politicising process of ethnic identity types differ by ethnic group. In summary, the paper recognizes the value of a multiple-, instead of a one-sided inclusion in emotional terms for immigrants' cognitive political involvement.

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4.1 Introduction

Germany, like many Western European countries, experienced high inflows of immigrants in the post-war era, especially through targeted labour recruitment, leading to high plurality in ethnic and cultural terms. As a consequence, questions of immigrants' incorporation into the receiving country arose. While first and second generation labour immigrants' structural, social or cultural integration and participation in Germany has been under considerable debate and inquiry in public and science throughout the last decades, less attention has been devoted to the immigrants' political integration in terms of development of political attitudes and behaviour. First of all, because of their status as guest workers, immigrants were not expected – or supposed – to act politically: “Migrants just had an economic role in the host society: to work and to produce” (Martiniello 2005, 1). Second, participation in national elections is completely restricted to German citizens by law. Thus, the majority of labour immigrants without German citizenship are still excluded from the core element of political participation within a democracy. One exception includes immigrants from EU-member states, who are entitled to participate in municipal and European elections. Notwithstanding this legal constraint, there are “participation rights” that are formally granted for natives and immigrants equally. For instance, immigrants are also allowed to state their opinion in political affairs; to take part in demonstrations, or to participate in a political party or in trade unions. However, only recently there has been a shift in the perception of migrants from objects of politics to political subjects (Wüst 2006). Beyond this, it is also a normative matter to study the empirical question whether there is also “demobilisation of migrants beyond their mere inability to cast a ballot” (Diehl and Blohm 2001, 403) as the stability and legitimacy of a political system can be argued to be dependent on the overt as well as covert political support of its citizens and residents (Easton 1965, 1975). On the other hand, receiving societies are sometimes confronted with political activism of immigrants out of legal realms, making it even more necessary to understand immigrants' political engagement in threat of intergroup conflicts.

In the present paper I move beyond standard theoretical explanations of immigrants' political participation, such as resource availability (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) or social capital (Putnam 1993), by drawing upon theoretical insights from social psychological research and literature proposing that political engagement of individuals and immigrants is not guided mainly by their individual motives or individual identities, but rather by their collective identities, i.e. their identity as a member of a certain social group or category (Simon 2011). Specifically, studies point to an especially conducive role of a dual identification for

immigrants' politicisation, which involves immigrants' emotional commitment to both their ethnic origin as well as to the society of settlement (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008).

Relying on this current empirical basis, the present study seeks a thorough analysis of the question whether, and how, different forms of ethnic identification held by first and second generation labour migrants possessing a foreign nationality in Germany affect their cognitive political involvement within the context of formal political exclusion. Furthermore, the study aims to clarify whether dual identification is thereby especially facilitating. For answering these questions, I build on theories explicating the concept of social identification (Tajfel and Turner 1986) with a particular focus on approaches that delineate immigrants' social or group identification as a bi-dimensional process, in which identification with the ethnic ingroup and identification as a member of the new society vary independently (Berry 1997; Esser 2003). Furthermore, I apply theories that focus on the link between social identification and political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Miller et al. 1981; Simon and Klandermans 2001). As the vast majority of research results have mainly been detected cross-sectionally or with small panel studies (Simon and Ruhs 2008), a crucial extension and, therefore, further valuable contribution to existing knowledge is sought to be provided and gained by analysing the association between immigrants' identification and political involvement with longitudinal survey data from over thirteen waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), as well as hybrid models as advanced longitudinal statistical method that exploits the advantages of random as well as fixed effects models and remedy the problem of unobserved (time-constant) heterogeneity. By doing so, it is aimed to achieve a more reliable and unbiased estimation of how changes in ethnic identification patterns (causally) effect immigrants' political involvement by controlling for all time-independent covariates (e.g. gender, ethnicity or enduring psychological personality traits like the Big Five). And finally, with regard to scientific and public widespread discussions about immigrant parallel societies and reactive ethnicity (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Rumbaut 2008; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004), the article expects to be able to formulate some valuable implications for further research and debates. In the following, I will discuss the theoretical and research background of my analysis, before deriving hypotheses that will be tested in longitudinal regression models. In the remainder of this article, conclusions for further research and public debate are drawn.

4.2 Ethnic Identity and Politicised Ethnic Identity in Theory and Research

4.2.1 Social and Ethnic Identity

Much of the research on ethnic identity relies on the conceptualization of social identity by the Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1978) and the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner 1978). According to these approaches, social identity can be defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978, 63). Social identity, thus, evolves from a process of social categorisation which involves individuals’ categorisation of themselves and others in terms of memberships in social categories or groups like sex, ethnicity, religion or occupation, provided that the individual strives for a positive social self-concept. Concerning intergroup relations, this process leads to systematic intergroup biases like ingroup favoritism or discrimination against the outgroup. At the same time, the re-categorisation of the self from an “I” to a “we” leads group members to think, feel and act in accordance with the values and norms associated with the ingroup. In summary, Tajfel and Turners framework endorses a constructivist perspective of ethnicity as opposed to a primordialist position, which equals ethnicity with culture and perceive ethnic groups as self-evident entities (Cornell and Hartmann 2007).

In consequence of the fluid and contingent nature of ethnic identity, the concept has soon been brought to the fore in the psychological acculturation and sociological integration literature. According to cross-cultural psychology, ethnic identity can be thought of as an aspect of acculturation that focuses on the adaptation of immigrants’ subjective sense of belonging to a group or culture (Phinney 1990). Whereas in former theories acculturation of immigrants has been conceptualised as a uni-dimensional, one-directional, and irreversible process of abandoning their heritage culture in favour of the mainstream culture, new approaches conceive acculturation as a bi-dimensional, two-directional complex process, in which preservation of one’s heritage culture and adaptation to the host society are conceptually distinct and can vary independently (Berry 1997; Esser 2003). By analogy, ethnic identity and identity as a member of the host society (“national” identity) can also be considered as two dimensions that vary independently. In either case, identity can be either strong or weak, thus resulting in four possible ethnic identification profiles: (1) integrated/dual identity (identification with both groups); (2) assimilated identity (only/mainly identification with the national group); (3) separated identity (only/mainly identification with the ethnic group) and (4) marginalised

identity (low identification with both groups) (Phinney et al. 2001). At the first glance, while the first three identity positions can be conceived of as being partly immigrants' individual choice and referring to group belonging per se, the marginalised identity position, i.e. the exclusion from both groups or, put differently, the presence of two negative group relations, seems an exception and contradiction to that. Research on immigrants' self-definitions can demonstrate that, in general, respondents are actually the least likely to opt for a marginalised or assimilated self-definition (Verkuyten 2005). However, if they choose marginalisation it might not be due to the perception of marginalisation in terms of group belonging or cultural distress per se, but rather due to an individualistic notion of self-concept that does not strongly rely on group belongings. In this light, the four ethnic identification types could be differentiated along a collectivist-individualist continuum. One extreme of continuum refers to the two-sided group reliance as most "collectivistic", followed by the one-sided inclusion forms that fall in-between and the marginalised identity form as most "individualist" on the other end of the continuum.

The four different identity or acculturation profiles have been found to be substantially related to all important types of adaptation (psychological, sociocultural, and economic), whereby studies tend to converge on the finding that integration is the most adaptive and marginalisation the least adaptive acculturation strategy, while assimilation or separation strategies are intermediate (for a meta study see Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2012). In contrast to the positive findings of the dual identification type in the psychological literature, a longitudinal study of (Esser 2009) evinced that this type is not beneficial to the other dimensions of integration, but rather exerts a negative influence compared to an assimilated type of identification, by impinging on immigrants' linguistic assimilation or their ability to establish interethnic contacts.

4.2.2 Ethnic Identity and Political Involvement

One of the most cited Theories of Individual Political Participation was laid forward by the research group around Sidney Verba and colleagues (Verba, Lehman, and Brady 1995; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978); an approach which also holds expectations for explaining immigrants' participation. Specifically, the theory focusses on political participation defined as "legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take" and, thus, clearly distinguishes political activity from psychological involvement in politics, like political interest (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Both, however, are expected to be highly related, implying that "the

generalization about the socioeconomic basis of political activity should also apply to the basis of psychological involvement in politics as well” (71).

The theoretical framework holds that the association between social stratification and political activity can be traced back to two independent processes of mobilisation: an ‘individual-based’ and a ‘group-based’ process. In the former case, the political participation is the result of individual motivations (e.g. beliefs of political efficacy or political interest, called “civic attitudes”) and resources (e.g. money, prestige or political skills) that do not rely on any group affiliations; whereas in the latter case, political mobilisation particularly relies on group-based motivations and resources. Here, the motivations emanate from a consciousness of membership in a particular social category. Thereby, group-based political mobilisation can rely on characteristics like economic position, ethnicity, religion or sex. The process implies that if members of disadvantaged social groups can be politicised to a higher degree than the actual possession of relevant social resources would actually predict, higher equality may arise across different socioeconomic levels but at the same time higher inequality along, for instance, ethnic lines.

Empirical results on higher political participation rates of African Americans compared to White Americans in the 1970s were highly inconclusive, however. Whereas, Verba and Nie (1972) or Olsen (1970) could find that African Americans, who display a kind of group consciousness when discussing political issues, were more likely to participate politically than non-conscious Blacks and Whites of similar social status, subsequent studies (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Verba, Lehman, and Brady 1995) rebutted the positive influence of group consciousness on African American participation rates.

Subsequently, there has been the attempt by Miller et al. (1981) to account for the inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between group identification and political involvement by proposing a general Model of Group Consciousness which differentiates between group identification per se and a politicised form of group identification: group consciousness. Whereas the former notion indicates a perceived self-location in terms of a social hierarchy together with a psychological feeling of belonging to that location, the latter additionally involves an attentiveness of the relative position of the group in society: “Participation is not simply a reflection of the social conditions that people experience. How people perceive and evaluate their position is an important link between the experience of certain social situations and political participation” (Miller et al. 1981, 503). Their ‘interactive’ model of group consciousness and political participation, thus, conceives group consciousness as a multidimensional construct consisting of four components: (1) identification with the

ingroup; (2) ingroup-favouritism; (3) dissatisfaction with the relative status of one's own group and (4) attribution of blame to the political system.

In the National Election Study (1972 to 1976), the models' assumptions proved useful, especially with regard to the conjunction of these components (Miller et al. 1981). Thus, group identification alone has been largely insufficient to promote political participation; but in interaction with feelings of group deprivation it yielded a significant impact on electoral turnout, even after accounting for the possible confounding effects of socioeconomic variables. This effect could be established for Blacks but also for several other social groups, which occupy subordinate positions in American society (e.g. women or the poor) but did not apply to superordinate groups like Whites. By delineating the necessity of group identification to be politicised for affecting immigrants' political participation, the model approaches Marxist terminology, that the social group needs to turn from 'a group of itself' ('Klasse an sich') into 'a group of and for itself' ('Klasse an und für sich') (cf. Miller et al. 1981, 495).

Social Identity Theory also suggests a trajectory of mobilisation on behalf of the group identity under certain conditions. Tajfel and Turner (1986) propose three strategies by which individuals can deal with a threatened identity as result of being a member of a devalued and subordinate low status group, depending on the legitimacy and permanence of the intergroup-boundaries: Besides leaving the group – psychologically or physically – if boundaries are seen as legitimate and permeable, or changing the basis of intergroup comparison if boundaries are seen as legitimate and impermeable, individuals invest in action that seeks to improve the intergroup status if boundaries are seen as illegitimate and impermeable. The last strategy is the one which most closely refers to politicisation and political action on behalf of the group.

Among the main groups of labour migrants in Germany (e.g. ex-Yugoslavian, Turks, Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese), the members of the Turkish minority group that currently composes the largest single immigrant group in Germany are known to be especially likely to define themselves in ethnic terms (Verkuyten 2005) as well as to be in comparison to the other labour migrant groups more socially disadvantaged (Kalter 2006; Kalter, Granato, and Kristen 2007) and to be more discriminated against by the majority group. For instance, Wasmer and Koch (2003) could show that Germans are more often inclined to deny equal rights form Turkish nationals than nationals from other origin countries. In addition, due to Turkish immigrants' cultural background, primarily Muslim, scholars propose that Islam forms a "bright boundary" separating the immigrant and the native group (Alba 2005). In this light, it can be argued that Turkish immigrants are faced with high identity threat and lack of positive distinctiveness with regard to their ethnic group membership (Verkuyten 2007), facilitating

Turks' perception of intergroup boundaries to be rather stable and highly illegitimate as well as impermeable (Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008) and, hence, to opt for social competition as an identity managing strategy.

Relying on the outlined research lines, mainly elaborated in the US context, European scholarship supplemented the American group consciousness approach in important respects. In the theoretical framework of Politicized Collective Identity (PCI) by Simon and Klandermans (2001), the politicisation of group identities is viewed as a process in which group members “intentionally engage, as mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in [...] a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly” (Simon and Klandermans 2001, 323). The authors contribute to the literature because in contrast to previous work (Miller et al. 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which mainly focuses on single identification and bipolar intergroup relations, they acknowledge the wider society as prerequisite. Hence, besides a first step, in which the members of a particular group have to perceive their group as relatively aggrieved and a second stage, that the aggrieved group members have to blame an external group for the experienced injustice, the group members also need to “acknowledge or even stress their identity as a member of [the] society because only by virtue of their membership in this more inclusive group or community are they entitled to societal support for their claims” (Simon and Klandermans 2001, 326). Thus, the Simon and Klandermans approach underlines that politicised collective identity or group consciousness, in the terms of Miller and colleagues (1981), includes the identification with a more inclusive group and, therefore, implies a nested or dual identity.

Yet, the precise underlying mechanism, explaining how and why dual identity effects political involvement, remains quite vague in the PCI framework and current theoretical discussions. Thus, I would like to propose three mechanisms that might be at work here. The first I call the “self-esteem” argument. Relying on notion by SIT that group identity is fundamental to the promotion of individual well-being and positive self-esteem, a newer line of research proposes that immigrants with a bicultural orientation or integration strategy evince the highest scores on psychological adjustment (e.g. life satisfaction or self-esteem) and behavioural competence as sociocultural adjustment, including academic achievement or career success, compared to those who are marginalised; immigrants preferring assimilation and separation fall in-between (Berry and Sabatier 2010; Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2012). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume, providing that political consciousness and behaviour requires some sort of self-esteem and feelings of competence, that dual identity orientation may

foster political involvement to a higher degree within the context of ethnic discrimination than the other identification types. The second argument I call “resource argument”. In sociological integration literature there is the notion that resources are in general country and society-specific (e.g. educational credentials), i.e. they are more productive in some societal contexts than in others (Kalter 2006). Through migration experience, immigrants often lack host country-specific capital, which, in consequence, may impede integration. In the same line, social integration theory like the intergenerational theory of integration developed by Esser (Esser 2003) argues that all individuals strive for physical and social well-being, that can be reached through society specific cultural recognized lower and higher order goals and means/resources. Thus, within an investment perspective it is possible to argue that both group identities fulfil two different functions. Dual identification includes both an ethnic specific orientation and resource that mainly provides a psychological function but also includes a host country specific orientation/resource providing an instrumental function involving the frames, means and resources necessary for political participation, conceived as a lower order goal to produce social well-being. Last I want to address that the effect of dual identity might reflect an “additive identity threat” argument: Arguably, it could be that having a bicultural identity causes by the maltreatment of one membership group by the other, a higher identity threat and, hence, politicisation than if only one group identity is threatened.

Subsequent studies, one among Turkish (Simon and Ruhs 2008) and the other among Russian minority members in Germany (Simon and Grabow 2010), could reveal empirical support for the hypothesised politicisation effect of dual identity. Moreover, Klandermans, Toorn, and Stekelenburg (2008), who simultaneously tested for an array of socioeconomic characteristics (gender, age, education) as well as different explanations for immigrants’ participation in collective actions like petitions or demonstrations among Turkish respondents in the Netherlands and New York found that “[w]hen respondents who felt treated unfairly displayed a dual identity, they were more likely to engage in collective action than were people who felt treated unfairly but did not display a dual identity. [There are] no such effects for national or ethnic identity” (1007).

As opposed to studies, which explored established forms of political participation, like turnout, as well as for less established forms like collective actions, there are only a few studies that examined immigrants’ (dual) identification in relation to psychological involvement measures in politics. For instance, Diehl and Urbahn (1999) studied the political interest among guest worker immigrants in Germany and demonstrated in a cross sectional analysis of the 1996 survey wave of the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) that labour immigrants who feel

German in only some respects demonstrate a higher political interest than those who do not feel German at all, taking different indicators of assimilation, like language proficiency in German or the amount of interethnic contacts into account.

Although revealing, the findings presented above are confined in their interpretation towards causal inference, as they are mainly cross-sectional in structure. More narrowly, they rely on between-person estimates that are subject to the main problem inherent of non-experimental research, unobserved heterogeneity, a bias that is caused by self-selection or variables that are not observed/measured but correlate with the observed independent variables. In the method part I outline how the usage of longitudinal data with repeated measures within persons as well as appropriate statistical methods can help to alleviate the problem of biases caused by variable omission.

4.2.3 Hypotheses on German Immigrants' political involvement

In the foregoing I have explored the theoretical background as well as the current state of research. These considerations lead to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: It can be expected that a dual identification leads to higher political involvement than separated or assimilated identification. However, the positive effect of ethnic dual identification should only be expected if it is politicised by perceptions of group deprivation and disadvantages.

Hypothesis 2: Arguably, due to arguments of Turkish immigrants most disadvantaged and aggrieved social position in intergroup contexts as well as high perceived levels of group discrimination and resentments, a higher politicising due to ethnic ingroup belonging can be supposed. Thus, and with reference to the reasoning of the PCI framework, I secondly suggest that the joint effect of dual identification and discrimination differs across the minority groups, but is more pronounced among Turks.

4.3 Method

4.3.1 Data and Measures

In order to investigate the theories and hypotheses outlined in the previous section, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is used. GSOEP is a household-based nationally

representative panel survey collected annually by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) since 1984 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). In the first wave, about 4500 households with a German born head of household were interviewed, as well as about 1500 households with a foreign born head of household. The GSOEP is quite unique and valuable for studies on the German immigrant population as it contains an especially high representation of the guest worker immigrant population, which has been oversampled in the foreigner sample (sample B), also drawn in the initial year 1984.

In several steps I constructed a longitudinal data set for my statistical analysis. Following GSOEP studies by Hochman (2010) as well as Esser (2009), I only included those labour immigrants who do not hold a German citizenship. On the one hand, this limitation to foreign nationals has methodological reasons, as some of the relevant indicators on immigrants' integration have only been asked in the GSOEP to those respondents whose nationality is not German (e.g. questions on ethnic and national identification, interethnic contact or language proficiency). On the other hand, it is the particular interest of the present paper to study the effect of symbolic instead of formal group membership on political involvement for the majority of the labour immigrants in Germany who are legally constrained in partaking in politics. Consequently, I restricted my sample to foreign nationals from the classic guest worker nations and classified them into three groups: Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and South European (foreign nationals from Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). To determine the ethnic background, I decided to choose respondent's country of birth as indicator as opposed to nationality that may change over life course. For the second generation immigrants born in Germany, I drew on the country of birth of the parents. Hereby, I only considered those respondents whose parents were both foreign born, in order to preclude dual identification due to two different ethnic backgrounds of the parents. Among those, I opted for the mother's country of birth to determine their ethnic background, because this information is more often included in the GSOEP (cf. Hochman 2010). On the basis of the indicators (described in detail below), which are not consistently included in every survey year, I further restricted the sample by choosing the years between 1993 and 2006 (including 13 waves) as period of analysis. Furthermore, only those respondents were kept who participated in at least two survey waves. For the purpose of following descriptive and multivariate analyses, cases with missing data on key variables were omitted, resulting in a total sample of analysis of 2209 respondents comprising 1021 respondents with a Turkish background, 917 migrants from South European states and 217 foreign nationals from the former Yugoslavia.

Political Involvement

The dependent variable of interest is ‘immigrants’ political involvement’. Because the GSOEP contains only limited information on the socio-political participation habits of immigrants in Germany, I selected the item on respondents’ general political interest (coded 1-4, with 4=highest interest). Furthermore, in theory and research, psychological involvement is expected to be closely associated with political activity, implying “the intervening step to the latter” (Verba et al. 1978, 71) and to be less susceptible to intervening effects of institutional constraints like participation rights.

Ethnic Identification Types

In accordance with the conceptualization of social identification, ethnic identity is conceived as a multidimensional construct that can be measured in several ways (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). In general, to avoid confounding ethnicity (objective membership by parents’ heritage) and ethnic identity, researchers commonly use respondents’ self-labels as an indicator for the latter. The GSOEP only assesses immigrants’ identification with their ethnic origin or with the receiving group by two items that capture some kind of affective dimension of group identity. For their ethnic minority identification, respondents are asked “to what extent do you feel connected with your country of origin”, and for their identification with Germany they are supposed to state “to what extent do you feel German” (coded 1-5, with 5=highest level of identification). In the presence of two independent identification scales in the data, scholars either use the median, the mean or the mid-point as cut point to construct the acculturation/integration typology by Berry (1997) or Esser (2003). According to Berry and Sabatier (2010, 196) “[t]here appears to be no ideal way of splitting the scales, since all three make an arbitrary cut near the middle of the scale where (in a normal distribution of scores) most respondents are likely to fall”. For the present study I decided to apply the median split method. Hence, I crossed the ethnic identification and national identification measure at the median point of each scale and coded a variable with four identity categories: dual identity (=1), marginalised identity (=2), assimilated (=3) and separated identity (=0).

Perceived/Experienced Discrimination

In the GSOEP, immigrant respondents can indicate on a three-point scale how often they have experienced disadvantages and discrimination due to their ethnic origin in the previous two years. The categories “often” and “seldom” were to 1 and “never” to 0.

Control Variables

In accordance with the concept of ‘participation resources’, I considered further predictors that were found to be relevant determinants for immigrants’ host country-oriented political involvement as well as to indicate immigrants’ assimilation in terms of different dimensions of social integration (Diehl and Urbahn 1999). To measure respondents’ cultural integration, I incorporated the information on respondents’ German self-reported reading and speaking skills into one single variable of ‘German language proficiency’ (coded 1-5, with 5=very well). To attain a measure for social assimilation, I computed a dummy ‘interethnic contact’ out of the information on whether the respondents had German visitors or have visited Germans over the last twelve months (=1). For structural integration, respondents’ ‘education attainment’ is measured on the CASMIN scale, which differentiates between ”general” and ”vocationally-oriented” education and is designed for international comparisons. I computed a four-category version that classifies general primary or lower education as low educational level (CASMIN 1a, 1b=1), secondary and intermediate general education as well as vocational qualifications indicate a medium educational level (CASMIN 1c, 2a and 2b=2) and maturity certificate with and without vocational qualification as well as tertiary education represent a high educational level (CASMIN 2c, 3a and 3b=1). Besides education, respondents’ labour market status is estimated by a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is ‘employed’ (=1), as well as through the logarithm ‘household income’.

Further controls are also considered: gender (female=1) as well as ‘number of years passed since immigration’, implying the respondents’ increasing exposure to the German society. For German-born respondents their age as proxy is used. The respondents’ generational status was coded into three categories: first, 1.5 (those who arrived at a young age between six and twelve), and the second generation.

In order to reduce the number of missing values in my model variables, due to waves in which they were not included, I imputed the values from the closest waves in which they were included. Hence, according to my selected period of analysis (1993-2006), the values were imputed as a maximum three years backwards (for the case of discrimination), and three years forward (for the case of ethnic identification) (cf. Hochman 2010, 102).

4.3.2 Analytical strategy

As emphasised in the introduction, one of the main contributions of the current study to the growing body of literature on ethnic identity and political involvement is the application of longitudinal methods of analysis on longitudinal data like the GSOEP with repeated measures

on the individual level. Specifically, I use hybrid models to predict the political interest as a function of several explanatory variables (Allison 2005). The advantage of this method is the combination of the fixed effects as well as random effects method, i.e. it allows an estimation of both time constant (e.g. ethnicity, gender) and time varied covariates (e.g. language proficiency, identification). The model is an extended version of a random effect model and decomposes each time-dependent predictor into its ‘within’ ($x_{it} - \bar{x}_i$) and ‘between’ ($\bar{x}_i\gamma$) differences, thus allowing to separate the within from the between effects

$$y_{it} = (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)' \beta + \bar{x}_i \gamma + z_i' \delta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where α_i presents the person-specific error or person-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and ε_{it} the idiosyncratic error or time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. The estimators of the within-component (β) are identical with the within-estimators of fixed effects regressions, i.e. the effects of the time-varying predictors are no longer biased due to time-independent unobserved heterogeneity because the between variation is controlled for (γ). At the same time, the hybrid method helps to get better estimates of time-constant covariates (δ) in contrast to the random effect model, because even though the estimates are still subject to person-specific unobserved heterogeneity, it now also accounts for time-varying heterogeneity. The utilization of the hybrid method for my study is also supported by the calculation of the Hausman specification test ($H_0: \hat{\beta}_{re} = \hat{\beta}_{fe}$) which displays that the implicit assumption of the re-model ($\beta = \gamma$) does not hold and, thus, that random effects estimates would be biased and overestimated by unobserved heterogeneity.

4.4 Findings

4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence

Before examining how ethnic identification types are associated with political interest, in this section I present a descriptive picture of the distribution of the model variables. According to Table 4.1, the mean level of political interest is in general rather low ($M=1.76$), Ex-Yugoslavs demonstrating the highest mean political interest ($M=1.82$). In terms of participation and assimilation resources, the Turkish immigrants are the most disadvantaged group. For instance, regarding cultural assimilation, Turkish immigrants significantly evince the lowest German skills ($M=3.18$). Likewise, the Turkish nationals also report the lowest average gross income ($M=10.09$).

Table 4.1. Means and percentages of model variables

	Ex-Yugoslavs (n= 272)	(1)	Turks (n= 1022)	(2)	South Europeans (n= 919)	Total (n= 2213)
Means (SD)						
General political interest	1.82 (0.81)	*	1.76 (0.79)		1.75 (0.76)	1.76 (0.78)
Household income (log)	10.17 (0.57)	*	10.09 (0.53)	*	10.24 (0.50)	10.16 (0.53)
Years passed since immigration	22.96 (8.28)	*	21.57 (8.33)	*	27.14 (8.29)	24.18 (8.72)
German language proficiency	3.44 (1.11)	*	3.19 (1.17)	*	3.49 (1.15)	3.34 (1.17)
Percentages						
<i>Ethnic identification types:</i>						
Assimilated identity	39.1	*	27.7	*	31.4	30.5
Separated identity	36.3	*	48.1	*	39.9	43.3
Integrated (dual) identity	18.2		17.8	*	25.7	21.3
Marginalised identity	6.4		6.4	*	2.9	4.9
Discrimination	51.4	*	57.0	*	39.1	48.6
Interethnic contact	80.2		79.4	*	86.9	82.8
Employed	64.1	*	49.1	*	63.5	57.0
<i>Educational degree (CASMIN):</i>						
General elementary school or less (CASMIN 1a, 1b)	50.1	*	58.2	*	53.7	55.4
Secondary/intermediate general and vocational qualifications (CASMIN 1c, 2a, 2b)	43.5	*	35.5		36.7	36.8
General/vocational maturity certificate or tertiary education (CASMIN 2c, 3a and 3b)	6.3		6.3	*	9.7	7.8
<i>Generational status:</i>						
First generation	72.6		61.2		59.0	61.4
1.5 generation	5.7		13.1		10.0	11.0
Second generation	21.7		25.7		31.0	27.6
Female	46.6		47.4		45.3	46.4

(1)*= two-sided significance test between Turks and ex-Yugoslavs at the 0.05 level

(2)*= two-sided significance test between Turks and South Europeans at the 0.05 level

What does the table tell about the distribution of the theoretical variables? The lowest proportion of respondents with an assimilated identity is found in the Turkish minority (27.7%), whereas they constitute the highest proportion of respondents demonstrating a separate identity (48.1%). In terms of an integrated or dual identity, respondents with Turkish or ex-Yugoslavian ethnic background are less likely to hold a dual identity (17.8 and 18.2%) than nationals from South Europe (25.7%). In this respect, it is, however, worth noting that the South Europeans

not at the same time show the highest political interest. As already found in literature (Verkuyten 2005) marginalised group identification was the less chosen by immigrant respondents. In regard to discrimination, about half of them have felt discriminated against due to their ethnic background in the last two years, however, Turkish immigrants reporting it significantly more often than South Europeans or Ex-Yugoslavs.

4.4.2 Multivariate Evidence

In order to assess and answer the research question of how ethnic identification causally relates to political interest, Table 4.2 displays the results from a series of the hybrid regression models conducted on the overall immigrant sample as well as separately for the three immigrant subgroups under investigation. The independent variables are added to the model in four steps.

Model 1 introduces base model factors, like the individual-based participatory or assimilation resources and other control variables. The model uncovers significant effects for immigrants' individual participatory resources consistent with previous research findings. For instance, *ceteris paribus*, German language skills in terms of cultural assimilation or interethnic contact with Germans in terms of social assimilation exert a positive influence on the level of political interest ($b=0.05$, $p<0.001$ and $b=0.03$, $p<0.05$). Of the two structural assimilation indicators, the coefficients of the logarithm income as well as of the educational degree signal a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable ($b=0.03$, $p<0.05$; $b=0.16$, $p<0.01$). Moreover, the number of years passed since immigration, implying growing exposure to the host society, leads to a slight increase in the interest in politics ($b=0.01$, $p<0.01$).

Turning to the respondents' ethnic background the first model indicates pronounced interethnic differences. Although respondents from former Yugoslavia and Turkey are completely barred from national and local voting, they demonstrate significantly higher political involvement compared with South European respondents ($b=0.10$, $p<0.05$; $b=0.15$, $p<0.001$). Contrary to expectations, respondents affiliated with the 1.5 and second generation, arguably, show a significant lower political interest than the first immigrant generation ($b=-0.17$, $p<0.001$ and $b=-0.27$, $p<0.001$). First generation labour immigrants might be more politicised than their descendants due to their direct migration experience and because of their more threatened residence and social status at the beginning of their stay in Germany.

Model 2 additionally includes the explanatory variables for the group-based politicisation process and the theories previously delineated. A chi-square statistic of a Wald test can provide evidence that the theoretical predictors significantly add to the explanation of political interest and improve the fit of the model ($Wald\ Chi^2(4)=10.87$, $p<0.05$).

Table 4.2. Hybrid regression coefficients (SE) predicting respondents' general political interest

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model Turks	Model Ex-Yugoslavs	Model South Europeans
<i>Ethnic background:</i>							
Turkey	0.15*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.07)	-	-	-
Ex-Yugoslavia	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.53*** (0.17)	-	-	-
South Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	-0.36*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.04)	-0.37*** (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.03)
<i>Generational status:</i>							
1.5 generation	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.11+ (0.06)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.22** (0.07)
Second generation	-0.27*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	-0.28* (0.13)	-0.28*** (0.05)
First generation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Years passed since immigration	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
<i>Participation/assimilation resources:</i>							
German language proficiency	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03+ (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)
Interethnic contact (yes)	0.03* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05+ (0.03)	0.09+ (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)
<i>Educational level:</i>							
Medium educational level	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)
Highest educational level	0.16** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.18)	0.21* (0.08)
Low educational level	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employed (yes)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)
Household income (log)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07+ (0.04)	0.06** (0.02)
<i>Ethnic identification types:</i>							
Integrated (dual) identity	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.07+ (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.03)
Marginalised identity	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.07)
Assimilated identity	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.03)
Separated identity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Discrimination (yes)	0.04** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.03)

Table 2 - continued


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model Turks	Model Ex-Yugoslavs	Model South Europeans
<i>Interactions:</i>							
Dual identity * discrimination			0.06*	0.01	0.11*	0.11	0.01
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Marginalized identity*discrimination			0.05	0.25*	0.02	-0.10	0.26**
			(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Assimilated identity*discrimination			-0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.04
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Dual identity * discrimination*Turkey			0.10+				
			(0.06)				
Dual identity * discrimination*ex-Yugos.			0.13				
			(0.10)				
Dual identity*Turkey			-0.12*				
			(0.05)				
Dual identity*ex-Yugos.			-0.09				
			(0.08)				
Marginalized identity*discrimination*Turkey			-0.23*				
			(0.12)				
Marginalized identity*discrimination*ex-Yugos.			-0.33*				
			(0.16)				
Marginalized identity*Turkey			0.00				
			(0.09)				
Marginalized identity*ex-Yugos.			0.06				
			(0.12)				
Assimilated identity*discrimination*Turkey			0.06				
			(0.06)				
Assimilated identity*discrimination*ex-Yugos.			0.02				
			(0.10)				
Assimilated Identity*Turkey			-0.10*				
			(0.05)				
Assimilated Identity*ex-Yugos.			-0.09				
			(0.08)				
Discrimination *Turkey			-0.02				
			(0.04)				
Discrimination *ex-Yugos.			-0.05				
			(0.08)				
Constant	0.34	0.28	0.28	0.08	1.04	-0.11	0.12
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.76)	(0.45)
Within-R2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02
Between-R2	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.31
Person year cases	17227	17227	17227	17227	7921	1784	7522
n	2209	2209	2209	2209	1021	271	917

Source: GSOEP 1993-2006; own analysis; Note: controlled for period effects by survey year dummies

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests)

Nonetheless, the model only conveys a significant parameter estimate for perceived discrimination. Although the direction of the coefficient of dual identification indicates that a dual identity has a positive effect, while a marginalised and assimilated identity has a negative effect compared to a separate identity, it is of no significance. By contrast, respondents who have experienced discrimination due to their ethnic background show higher levels of political interest than if they do not report such worries; independent from their education, generational status or employment status ($b=0.04, p<0.01$).

To test whether the influence of the ethnic identification types is contingent on a kind of politicisation through perceived discrimination, Model 3 adds the interaction terms between the respondents' ethnic identification profiles and discrimination experiences. In accordance with theory and hypothesis 1, the only significant interaction term in Model 3 ($b=0.06, p<0.05$) indicates that discrimination has a positive effect on respondents' political interest if respondents' hold a dual instead of a separated identity ($b=0.08$ and $b=0.02$ respectively). It also implies that dual identification significantly contributes to respondents' political interest only if they perceive discrimination. Hence, it is rejected by the data that there is an independent effect of immigrants' two-sided ethnic identification from the perception of devaluation on behalf of the ethnic group membership. No similar integration pattern is observed for marginalised or assimilated identification. To illustrate the complexities involved, Figure 4.1 depicts the varying impact of identification profiles depending on the perception of discrimination.



Source: GSOEP 1993-2006 (own analysis); Note: Adjusted predictions based on Model 3

Figure 4-1. The predicted values of ethnic identification profiles depending on the perception of discrimination

In addition, changing the reference category to assimilated identification yielded the same encouraging result for dual identification. Conversely, by setting dual identity as a reference category all other identity types evince negative estimates, with significant estimates for assimilated and separated identification (not shown).

In the theoretical section I also suggest that the effects of group identity and shared grievances might differ across labour immigrant groups. In line with my second hypothesis the subsample analyses indicate that the joint effect of the ethnic identification types and discrimination appears to differ by ethnic group. Specifically, as demonstrated in Model “Turks”, the interaction between dual identification and perceived discrimination is significant and positive ($b=0.11, p<0.05$). Thus, the negative effect of dual identification ($b=-0.07, p<0.10$) is moderated and reversed among Turkish respondents who feel discriminated against. At the same time, discriminated Turks demonstrate higher political interest if they feel that they belong not only to the Turkish group but also to the German native population. Concerning respondents who belong to the ex-Yugoslavian ethnic minority, the model does not display any significant interaction term. However, it is noteworthy that the relatively small sample size may have caused most of the parameter estimates in the model to fail any significance. Turning to the parameter estimates in the model for the South European immigrants, I find that it is not the interaction term between dual identification and discrimination, but between marginalised identification and discrimination that shows a pronounced significant impact on political interest ($b=0.26, p<0.01$).

Nevertheless, there is a caveat to these findings. In general, the evidence for possible group differences in parameter estimates, offered in the subsample models, must be interpreted cautiously, as it is simply based on the comparison of the significance of variables instead of precise estimators for significant parameter differences. To provide such statistical estimates to detect significant differences across groups requires estimating another overall model including all subsamples, the three-way interaction terms between each type of ethnic identification, experienced discrimination and each ethnic group. Thus, another combined model (Model 4) takes additional interaction terms into account. Due to the considerable number of interactions terms in the model and for reasons of parsimony, I do not discuss the model in detail here. In general, the results of the subsample models can be retrieved. Hence, the three-way interaction between dual identity, discrimination and Turkish ethnic background as well as for marginalised identity, discrimination and South Europeans is significant. Yet, there is only sufficient statistical support that the effect of marginalised identity and discrimination differs by ethnic group ($Wald\ Chi^2(2)=5.64, p<0.10$), whereas the other three-way interaction is not significant

(*Wald Chi2(2)=3.61, p=0.1643*). Thus, concerning my second research hypothesis, the analysis displays evidence that the effect is more pronounced among Turks, though not with sufficient statistical confidence. Moreover, the last findings suggest that it is not only a dual identity that can be a politicised identity. Indeed, for South European immigrants it appears to be a marginalised, thus, more individualistic form of ethnic identification in conjunction with discrimination that acts psychologically politicising. At the same time, however, some word of caution in interpreting the result is in order here, because marginalised identity is actually a really rare identity type among South Europeans (2.9%; cf. Table 4.1). Nevertheless, in sum, the findings suggest that the mobilising mechanism of ethnic identification types according the two-dimensional conceptualisation may differ by ethnic group membership. Taken together, these remarkable analysis results indicate that in the face of persistent discrimination, immigrants' dual identification, instead of an assimilated or separated identity, may counterbalance their lack of common participation resources and provide a unique politicisation factor. This result is quite encouraging, in the face of perceived ethnic discrimination on half of the respondents (cf. Table 4.1).

4.5 Summary and Discussion

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the role of immigrants' identification with their ethnic origin and with the German society on their political involvement. Even today, first and second generation immigrants are still largely conceived and legally treated by the receiving society as politically silent residents. Notwithstanding, as many of the labour migrants and their German-born children have already lived in Germany for several decades, it is necessary and valuable to consider and to understand their political involvement in the receiving society in wider terms than merely with regard to voting.

Following social psychological approaches on ethnic identity and the theoretical frameworks of politicised group identity the current longitudinal study of thirteen waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) revealed conclusively that dual identification leads to a higher political interest, though only in the attentiveness of discrimination. By the same token, the estimations indicate that perceived discrimination leads to higher political interest if respondents feel they belong to both the origin- and the host country than if they hold an assimilated or separated ethnic identification. However, what exact mechanism, alluded to in the theory section, is at stake in this process can only be suggested and could not be completely

disentangled on basis of the present data. Thus, further conceptual and methodological rigour is needed.

To give further insight to the political mobilisation process among immigrants I also conducted separate regression analyses for the traditional labour immigrant groups in Germany. For Turkish immigrants the subsample as well as overall analyses indicated as theoretically predicted that the joint politicising effect of dual identification and discrimination is more pronounced among Turkish nationals, although this effect could not be estimated with final sufficient certainty. In general, the intergroup differences found seem mainly driven by the exceptional political involvement pattern of south European nationals due to a marginalised form of ethnic identification. Referring to the previous discussion in the paper on the meaning of marginalised identity, it is, thus, called into question whether it is actually a politicisation on collective basis and accordingly because of feelings of marginalisation from group attachments or rather a politicisation due to an individualistic identity position, thus, rather constituting a “politicized individualistic identity”. However, it preliminarily remains in the dark and research is needed to shed light on this issue of collectivistic versus individualistic politicization.

It is also notable that with regard to interethnic differences in political interest my regression analysis uncovers remaining, pronounced ethnic disparities despite accounting for the theoretical indicators and an array of other control variables. Remarkably, although Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian nationals are more constrained in political participation rights than nationals from the EU member states, they evince higher political interest. However, as studies could show this higher interest of Turkish immigrants might be more addressed to issues related to country of origin and the defence of religious/Muslim rights than German politics (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Diehl and Blohm 2001), a special focus should also be placed on providing more encompassing data sets containing several measures that differentiate between immigrants’ political behaviour and attitudes that are directed to the homeland or the host country. It has clearly been beyond the scope of this paper to resolve this issue or to provide results for political behaviour instead of behavioural precursors. However, the positive findings in my models with regard to immigrants’ assimilation in different dimensions like cultural knowledge or social contact may also provide a sign that the dependent variable captures interest in German politics. A similar conclusion has also been drawn by the study of Diehl and Urbahn (1999). Some additional support is provided by the study of Simon and Grabow (2010) that conveyed that dual identification of Russian migrants in Germany was associated to peaceful and normative forms of politicisation within the given statutory framework, but was completely unrelated to radicalised forms like supporting political violence.

As a further limitation, I could also not adequately address the debate in research literature about the appropriate measurement of dual identification. Various researchers propose that the combination of high ethnic and high national identification does not adequately capture the direct psychological experience of dual identity (Simon and Ruhs 2008; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012). Thus, a direct single measure of dual identification in the inquiry of Simon and Ruhs (2008) could yield significant impact on immigrants' politicisation as opposed to an interaction term of ethnic and national identity. Finally, a note should be made regarding the method of analysis used. Notwithstanding the intriguing evidence on the effects of time-varying predictors that could be gained by my method of analysis, it is important to keep in mind that even though hybrid regression models account for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity, the fixed-effects estimations can still be biased due to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, which is caused by the omission of time-dependent variables and individual characteristics that may correlate with ethnic identification and political interest, e.g. further psychological adjustment processes or other cultural, social or structural indicators of integration not been addressed in the present paper.

Nonetheless, this caveats do not mitigate studies' two-fold advancement of not even attaining more reliable and unbiased estimates of ethnic identifications' impact on political interest, but also to obtain less biased estimates for time-constant indicators as well. Therefore, I argue that even though longitudinal analyses are still in their infancy, they seem to provide a productive path for future research on immigrants' integration processes. Besides the statistical contribution, the paper also crucially advances current research on ethnic identification and political involvement theoretically. With respect to a consistent and vivid scientific and public debate between a pluralist vs. assimilationist position of foreign nationals' integration (cf. Esser 2009), the study finds support that for an emotional inclusion there does not necessarily have to be a trade-off between immigrants' devotion to the group of origin and devotion to the dominant group (cf. Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012) but that an attachment including both groups may be valuable to be encouraged. But, first and foremost, it seems evident that future scientific controversies in this line should increasingly and thoroughly been tackled with questions of social context and situational dependency. For instance, learning how immigrants respond to perceived disadvantages or ethnic discrimination as one indicator for the social context in which the integration of immigrants in Germany occurs, merits further investigation.

4.6 References

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Chapter 5: An Alternative View of Religion and Immigrants’ Commitment to Democracy: The Impact of Religious Affiliation and Attendance on Immigrants’ Satisfaction with Democracy in Germany*

Abstract:

This article examines the role of religion in predicting Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants’ psychological commitment to the democratic regime in Germany. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the impact of religion on immigrants’ political attitudes towards European receiving societies has gained major attention within public and scholarly debates. From the angle of a social identity and subjective evaluation perspective as well as arguments of well-being and perceived discrimination, I discuss how two components of migrants’ religious identity, religious belonging and social religious behaviour, affect the satisfaction with current democratic governance differently. Moreover, I address the moderating influence of immigrant generation, ethnic origin, as well as national group membership. The employment of panel models on data measured in two waves (2005 and 2010) from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) reveals that religion is indeed linked to the democracy satisfaction of immigrants, yet in complex ways: while religious attendance generally contributes to migrant democracy satisfaction, belonging to a certain denomination has no independent effect regardless of migrants’ specific ethnic background. Compared to self-identified Muslims with a Turkish ancestry, non-Turkish Muslims from Western/Eastern European as well as other non-European countries are more satisfied with the democratic regime. Moreover, I find that German-born Muslim-Turks, compared to foreign-born, are less satisfied with democracy. Finally, the analyses show that the experiences of discrimination and general well-being are driving mechanisms for immigrants’ psychological commitment to democracy.

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5.1 Introduction

Migrants' political integration in Western democracies has become increasingly intertwined with controversial and heated debates concerning their religion, particularly regarding Islam (Connor and Koenig 2013; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Foner and Alba 2008; Voas and Fleischmann 2012;). As a consequence of the increasing international migration flows from non-Western countries, Muslims have become the largest religious group besides Christians among immigrants in Europe¹. Pluralism, minority rights, non-discrimination and equality are key aspects of European democracy (EUR-LEX 2008). Yet, within Western European nations, where Christian identities (albeit secularised) are still a main aspect of individuals' self-conception, immigrants' Muslim religious identity is perceived as disruptive to democracy due to irreconcilable values (Fish 2002; Fukuyama 2006; Huntington 1996a; Karatnycky 2002; Lewis 1996). According to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis, 'the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations. [...] It is now the line separating people of Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other' (1996a, 28). Since 9/11 and in the courses of political Islam and Islamism, public and political discourses have become particularly intense and conceptualise Islam as threat to both democratic values and the stability of Western democracies (Richardson 2004; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

As a consequence, the attentiveness and commitment to shared fundamental democratic values, such as human rights, freedom and equality as well as the psychological commitment to democracy involving political attitudes such as political trust, confidence and political satisfaction, have increasingly become the main subjects of study in immigrant political integration (e.g. Anduiza and San Martín 2011; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Maxwell 2010a; Maxwell 2010b; Maxwell 2013). Trust in the government or regime satisfaction measure the degree to which individuals regard democratic governance as legitimate and responsive to their needs (Ginsberg 1982). These political attitudes are central to the key normative principles of a democratic political system (cf. Anduiza and San Martín 2011, 199) and accordingly provide important indicators not only of migrant attachment to mainstream politics but also of the legitimacy of democratic political systems within European receiving societies. Moreover, according to Kelleher and Wolak (2007, 707) trust or confidence in the government is highly consequential because 'people are more likely to comply with laws when they have confidence'.

¹ According to the Pew Research Center, the Muslim population in Europe (excluding Turkey) will increase from 6% (44 million) in 2010 to more than 10% (71 million) in 2050 (Pew Research Center 2015, 147).

In contrast, a lack of political trust and regime dissatisfaction call the democratic political system into question and may generate resentment and individuals' interest in political change as well as protests or even antisystem behaviour (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Accordingly, research argues among Muslims in Amsterdam that a lack of political trust may provide a pathway to alienation and radicalisation (Tillie, Slooman, and Fennema 2007). Maxwell (2010b) has a similar perspective on Muslims' trust in the government: 'Trust in government (or the lack thereof) is not the only measure of alienation but it is an important indicator of Muslim attachment to mainstream politics because it measures the degree to which individuals feel government authority is legitimate and responsive to their needs' (90).

Although religion among immigrants as well as political engagement have become highly politicised as well as a main focus of growing scholarly literature in recent years (see e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2011; Just, Sandovici, and Listhaug 2014; Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010; van Tubergen 2007), both the theoretical accounts and the empirical evidence on how religion is associated with immigrants' commitment to democratic governance in Europe is still less systematic. Put differently, there are still very few studies analysing this relationship. In general, existing research on political confidence or political trust either tackles the impact of religious denomination (Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 82ff.; Maxwell 2010b) or immigrant status (André 2014; Maxwell 2010a; Maxwell 2013; Röder and Mühlau 2012; Voicu and Tufiş 2015) but rarely both systematically². As a consequence, certain questions remain that I seek to obtain answers to within the present study: What precisely is the effect of religion on immigrants' democratic commitment, and what other relevant factors should be considered? Is there a difference between migrants' religious affiliation (e.g. Islam vs. Christianity) in the psychological engagement with democracy for different ethnic groups? And, above all, how can these differences be explained?

To account for the impact of religious belonging and behaviour on migrants' psychological commitment to democracy, I go beyond standard theoretical approaches of political behaviour that discuss the impact of migrants' religion that stem from differences in the access to certain resources, social cleavages or networks (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). I also attempt to transcend the prevailing cultural

² Maxwell (2010b) is such an exception as he shows within his study on British Muslims that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because of their immigrant status, which relates to more optimistic evaluations of British society. However, the study does not consider immigrants systematically or with respect to different ethnic origins.

perspective on religion's role on democratic values and its main focus on incompatible values and cultural traits (e.g. Huntington 1996a; Lewis 1996), which gained only inconclusive empirical confirmation (e.g. Gundelach 2010; Tessler 2002; Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 82ff.). Instead, my theoretical account focuses on a micro-level perspective and builds on a subjective evaluation and social identity perspective (Inglehart 1999; Newton 2008; Tajfel and Turner 1986). I derive hypotheses on the different effects of immigrants' religious affiliation and religious social behaviour³ on the satisfaction with democracy due to the different social identity experiences they provide that are known to shape individuals' social and psychological well-being. These religious identity effects are further discussed with respect to social identity experiences due to migrants' multiple memberships in three other socially meaningful categories: their immigrant generation (e.g. first or second generation), their ethnic origin (e.g. Turkey) and the native majority (e.g. German).

In order to test my theoretical hypotheses empirically, in contrast to previous research, I apply a longitudinal empirical approach. More specifically, I use longitudinal and individual-level data that have been collected as part of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from 2005 and 2010 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). The data from GSOEP are of high quality and are commonly used to study various aspects of immigrant integration (see, among others: Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann 2009; Esser 2009; Diehl and Liebau 2015; Fischer-Neumann 2014). It is also unique as immigrants from former guest worker nations have been over-sampled to provide sufficient numbers for a detailed analysis. In my regression analysis, I distinguish self-identified Muslims, Christians and non-denominational immigrants from four European and non-European ethnic origins: from Western and Eastern Europe, Turkey and other non-European countries (e.g. those coming from the Middle East, North Africa or Indonesia). To exploit the clustered data structure analytically, I apply correlated random effect regression models that estimate the effects for time-constant (e.g. ethnicity) as well as time-varying variables (e.g. religious affiliation or religious social behaviour) (see e.g. Mundlak 1978; Schunck 2013).

The article is divided into five parts. I will begin by outlining the theoretical framework. Then, I will provide an overview of the data and method. Afterwards, the bivariate and

³ I use religious service attendance, church attendance and related terms such as religious participation and religious social behaviour interchangeably. All terms imply the social practice of religion, involving participation in religious communities as well as worship attendance. In a similar vein, religious affiliation is also used interchangeably with comparable terms like religious belonging and religious denomination to indicate identity categories an immigrant can consider himself or herself to be a member of – be it Christianity or Islam.

multivariate results are outlined and discussed. The final section offers a summary and addresses further implications of my research findings.

5.2 Theoretical considerations on the effects of religion on commitment to democracy

5.2.1 Previous literature

Political scientists have a long-standing interest in the connection between religion and political culture, involving democratic attitudes and values. A number of scientists have argued that Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive due to incompatible values (see, among others: Huntington 1996a; Huntington 1996b; Modood 2003; Pauly 2013). Put differently, proponents of this essentialist claim conceptualise Islam 'as problem' and 'threat' through its cultural traits. Huntington (1996a) identifies an inherent 'clash of civilizations' between Islam and the West. He writes, 'Muslims agree that a basic difference exists between their culture and Western culture.' For instance, in contrast to Western Christianity, Islam still supports the idea that the church and state are one; in essence, 'God is Caesar' (i.e. that the ultimate source of political authority is God) (Huntington 1996b, 31; cf. also Hofmann 2004, 654). Yet, the essentialist perspective has been applied to suggest differences in attitudes between Western and non-Western countries and between the Muslim immigrant and non-Muslim native population within European receiving societies (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009).

Despite the substantial coverage of the essentialist position in academic literature as well as in public debates, empirical results on the alleged negative relationship between Islam and democracy are far from conclusive. Empirical research thus reveals that Muslims do show positive attitudes towards democracy (Gundelach 2010; Tessler 2002). Moreover, Grundel and Maliepaard (2012) demonstrate that Muslim and Christian adolescents in the Netherlands do not differ in their levels of democratic skills, such as the expression of their own opinion, the respect of the opinions of others, as well as the reflection on democratic matters such as issues of power and equal rights. Both Muslim and Christian adolescents have proven to be more democratically competent than non-religious adolescents (ibid.: 2089). Also cross-country multivariate analyses on data such as the European Social Survey (ESS) indicate that Muslims evince nearly the same levels of trust in the government and show even higher levels of democracy satisfaction than non-Muslims in the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom or France (cf. Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 93). Similarly, Maxwell (2010b) highlights that British Muslims are more trusting of political institutions compared to Christians. He argues

that that British Muslims are more likely than Christians to be migrants, and migrants are more likely than natives to have more positive evaluations about host society institutions (Gille and Krüger 2000; see also Kao and Tienda 1995; Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2012). Altogether, previous empirical studies call into question the simplistic notion of Islam as peculiarly hostile to democracy per se.

Literature acknowledges that previous mixed findings on the impact of religion on democracy relate to the multidimensional structure of religion. Accordingly, religion is suggested to involve at least three dimensions – belief, behaviour and belonging (cf. Ben-Nun Bloom 2014, 5482). While the former exclusively refers to the individual, the latter two – behaviour and belonging – connect the individual to a social group and/or social context. In this line, literature shows that religion – be it Islam or Christianity – in terms of the personal belief component involving religious beliefs such as the belief in God, heaven and life after death is generally associated with conservative-traditional values that undermine democratic values such as freedom, tolerance, equality and universalism. In contrast, religion at the group level in terms of social religious activities, such as church attendance and participation in religious organisations, can be suggested to support democratic values, since religious activity fosters political-efficacy (a measure of whether individuals feel that they can influence the political system), civic norms and knowledge (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2013; Putnam 2000; see also, for an overview on the different effects, Ben-Nun Bloom 2014).

In this article on the impact of religion on migrants' psychological commitment to democracy (e.g. trust in or satisfaction with democracy), I rely on the multidimensional structure of religion and add to previous research by concentrating on the group level dimension of social religious behaviour and religious belonging. Within previous literature on migrant integration, the effect of religious affiliation and attendance has also been differentiated. Thus, Connor and Koenig (2013) show that through different mechanisms viewing religion as a religious marker as access to resources, religious belonging and religious attendance have different impacts on immigrants' occupational attainment. In the present study, I build on the general literature on social identification to propose why immigrants with a Muslim affiliation or Christian affiliation may differ in levels of democratic governance satisfaction.

5.2.2 Explanatory approaches to migrants' psychological commitment to democracy

The psychological commitment to democracy can be understood as a consequence of subjective perceptions and evaluations of the performance of the national democratic government. More specifically, I examine satisfaction with democracy as an outcome of whether individuals

perceive the democratic political system to be legitimate and responsive to their needs. Accordingly, previous research finds that citizens' judgment of the state of the economy, of health care, and of education has a considerable impact on individuals' view of democracy (Schäfer 2013). At the same time, subjective variables including job satisfaction, life satisfaction and happiness are discussed as predictors of regime satisfaction (Newton 2008, 250; see also Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). From this perspective, people commit to democratic governance because they personally benefit or do well. Satisfaction with one's own situation and life can be expected to lead individuals to attribute legitimacy and responsiveness to the political system, which increases feelings of satisfaction with it. Thus, individual resources such as higher household income and education are also found to lead to higher rates of democracy satisfaction, while personal hardships such as unemployment drive discontent (Schäfer 2013). Inglehart (1999), who also employs a cross-country comparison, evinces that life satisfaction is a strong predictor for a stable democracy. He argues that '[...] if one's *life as a whole* has been going well under democratic institutions, it gives rise to a relatively deep, diffuse, enduring basis of support for those institutions' (Inglehart 1999, 170).

There is a well-established body of literature on social identity that highlights that individual well-being and life satisfaction are mainly determined by individuals' perceived membership in socially meaningful categories such as gender, ethnicity, denomination or social class, which are referred to as social identities (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987). In general, social identity is defined by Tajfel (1981) as 'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (255). Individual social identities are determined by both internal and external ascriptions. Indeed, Nagel (1995, 21) refers to ethnic identity as 'a dialectic between internal identification and external ascription' such as by the members of the native majority group within receiving countries. It is suggested by social identity theory (SIT) that social identities are the main components of individual's self-image and are sources of psychological well-being. Thus, incorporated memberships shape self-perceptions as well as the social experiences with other groups in ways to achieve a positive social identity, and in consequence a positive self (cf. Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16).

Aside from emotional attachment and cognitive knowledge of the membership, social identities involve several other dimensions that capture, for instance, the importance of the membership, attitudes towards the social identity group as well as expressive components such as ethnic or religious practices regarding language usage, eating food, listening to music and

attending religious services (Phinney and Ong 2007; Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Consequently, immigrants' religious identities can be perceived as consisting of religious belonging (i.e. self-identification/categorisation as member of a particular denomination), as well as religious social behaviour. Religious identity, as suggested in literature, is particularly relevant for individuals' subjective well-being because it offers a complete worldview, a robust social support and value system and unique form of a psychological basis (cf. Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010, 670). In the following, I discuss how both religious identity dimensions shape migrant psychosocial functioning and experience and affect individuals' level of democracy satisfaction.

Social religious activities are a means to actively reinforce immigrants' social identity and thus well-being through social identity engagement. Literature acknowledges that religious identity performance includes group behaviour that primarily serves to bolster religious group identity (i.e. identity consolidation) (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010; Klein, Spears, and Reicher 2007). Additionally, the general high value of church attendance for individuals' health and well-being is discussed in literature (see e.g. Ellison 1991; Headey, Hoehne, and Wagner 2014). Accordingly, Lechner (2015) argues that church attendance buffers the impact of various life stressors on one's well-being, such as unemployment, due to the social support that religious communities provide. Moreover, they reinforce psychological resources such as self-efficacy. In addition to the well-being function, existing research shows that participation in organised religious communities provides opportunities to develop civic skills, norms, trust and the political knowledge necessary to practise democratic citizenship (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000). Due to its functions of social identity consolidation and democratic socialisation, social religious behaviour may lead migrants to attribute legitimacy and responsiveness to the democratic political system. Thus, I derive the hypothesis that immigrants' attendance of religious services contributes to their satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany (*Hypothesis 1*).

While the social activity component of religious identity can be expected to increase migrants' satisfaction with democracy, the effect of the social belonging component may be detrimental. Even though both religious identity components relate to immigrants' self-esteem and well-being, they differ in the social experiences they provide. While social experience through church attendance is mainly limited to the acceptance by and support from fellow religious ingroup members, the self-identification as a member of a certain social or religious group is seen by the proponents of the social identity framework to be tied to an ingroup-outgroup context as well as to respective social relations fostering the construction of ingroup-

outgroup boundaries (Turner et al. 1987). Thus, Muslim self-identification is not only affected by ingroup mechanisms but also by the way in which Muslims are externally defined, acknowledged and treated by the host society outgroup (Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010). While wearing the headscarf may be seen among Muslim affiliated persons as way to publicly and positively affirm their identity, the headscarf is often publicly disapproved by historically Christian receiving societies in Europe. Accordingly, Zolberg and Woon (1999) argue that 'European identity, despite national variations, remains deeply embedded in Christian tradition, in relation to which 'Muslim' immigrants constitute the visible 'other'' (Zolberg and Woon 1999, 7). Since the attacks in the early 2000s in New York, Washington, Madrid and London, as well as the recent attacks in France and Belgium, Muslim migrants seem to be more vulnerable to experiencing discrimination than non-Muslims. According to Modood (2003, 100), there has been an 'anti-Muslim wind blowing across the European continent'. Moreover, as Pauly (cf. 2013, 162) notes, unemployment levels among Muslims are up to five times the national average in France and Great Britain and are double in Germany (cf. also Khattab 2009; Model and Lin 2002). As other researchers have considered the 'otherness' status and lack of economic and social accommodation of Islam in Western democracies, I hypothesise that immigrants with a Muslim affiliation may feel more alienated from the politics of their host societies and therefore are less satisfied with democratic practice than immigrants with a Christian affiliation or no religious affiliation (secular) (*Hypothesis 2*). Further, and with respect to the considerations of the social religious behaviour component of religious identity, I suggest for religious service attendance to reduce the negative effect or increase the positive effect that belonging to Islam or Christianity may have on immigrants' democracy satisfaction (*Hypothesis 3*).

Most social identity researchers agree that people have multiple group identities that can intersect differently (see e.g. Roccas and Brewer 2002; Tajfel 1978; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012b). Hence, an individual's social self-concept and social experience involve multiple categorisations of internal and external ascriptions, as in the case of immigrants in terms of their ethnic origin (i.e. country of birth and kinship), their generational belonging (i.e. foreign-born or receiving-country-born) or the majority group of the receiving country (i.e. German).

In regard to migrants' generational status, being born either abroad or in the host country can be expected to involve different perceptions and social experiences in the Western European countries that shape different perceptions and evaluations of regime responsiveness and legitimacy. Actually, through their socialisation within the host country, second-generation immigrants, compared to those of first generation, can be expected to be more familiar with the

rules and regulations governing a receiving country's politics as well as its norms and values (Grundel and Maliepaard 2012; Maxwell 2010a). Accordingly, research shows that second-generation immigrants display more similar democratic values to autochthonous individuals than their foreign-born counterparts (Maxwell 2010a). However, with regard to generational differences in religious belonging, studies often refer to an inter-generational stability or special religious vitality and religious reaffirmation among second-generation immigrants as a means to uphold challenged religious values and practices in the context of socio-economic difficulties, discrimination and stigmatisation (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013).

Thus, social experiences with respect to preserving well-being as well as perceptions of responsiveness of the democratic governance due to religious belonging may differ between first- and second-generation immigrants. More specifically, while first-generation immigrants' Muslim identity has been socialised within the country of origin as a majority religion among fellow religious ingroup members, second-generation immigrants' Muslim identity develops in Western receiving societies within a conflictive intergroup context of boundary drawing, between a minority Muslim and majority Christian population. Further, receiving society-born immigrants have higher expectations and standards of equality with natives than first-generation immigrants, who have migrated voluntarily from lower-status countries to industrial societies such as Germany (cf. Maxwell 2013, 273). These expectations of second-generation immigrants are, however, often not met, because they still lag behind in relative positions to children with native-born parents within the educational system and the labour market ((for overviews, see Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008). As a consequence, second-generation immigrants, who actually feel entitled to the same treatment as the majority population through their native status, may have stronger personal feelings of frustration due to their Muslim identity compared to first-generation immigrants, which in turn may estrange them more from host countries' democratic politics, which are sought to uphold equality and pluralism (EUR-LEX 2008). I therefore hypothesise that the expected negative effect of being a Muslim on satisfaction with democracy should be stronger in the case of being a second-generation immigrant than in the case of being a first-generation immigrant (*Hypothesis 4*).

In Western countries, it is often thought that Muslim group identification implies low identification or even disidentification with the host society as a Muslim identity relates to incompatible values and beliefs. Yet, the literature on multiple identities indicates varying degrees of migrants' identification with both the religious minority group and the national community simultaneously (Berry et al. 2006; Phinney 1990; Verkuyten 2007). Thus,

Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012a, 92) posit that 'no clear evidence that an emphasis on a 'pure' Islam [...] implies psychological separation and opposition to the nation of settlement'. National identity can be expected to positively relate to democracy satisfaction due to two processes. First, it fosters positive social experiences and thus personal well-being. For immigrant minority members, it opens the access to the national majority group, its social and structural system and, in consequence, to valuable resources and improved social status. Second, research shows that besides ethnic aspects such as the majority language, the national identity consists of civic and political components involving shared sets of laws and institutions, political practices, norms and values (Kunovich 2009). Thus, if immigrants self-identify as members of a democratic national community such as Germany, they are psychologically motivated to adapt to the respective democratic norms and practices. In sum, national identity processes can also be expected to be a driving force behind immigrants' perception of higher democratic government responsiveness and legitimacy. As a consequence, I hypothesise that immigrants' identification with Germany moderates the negative relationship between a Muslim self-identification and satisfaction with democracy (*Hypothesis 5*).

Finally, within integration research, it is well known that the main influences of immigrants' generational status, religious denomination or national identification on labour market positions, educational attainment or political activities vary according to each immigrant's ethnic background (i.e. ethnic origin). For instance, British research on the question of ethnic or religious penalties directed towards the labour market shows that the Muslim 'effect' on unemployment varies considerably among different ethnic groups, being much higher for Muslim men from Pakistan than for Muslim men from other origin countries (Lindley 2002). Additionally, for Muslims in Germany, a representative study reveals that Muslims with a Turkish background are more structurally disadvantaged than Muslims from other non-European countries such as North Africa or the Middle East (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). Furthermore, European research highlights that second-generation immigrants of Turkish ancestry are far more likely to become early school leavers across different countries (Crul et al. 2012) and to be unemployed (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). Studies evince that most of the ethnic penalties in education can be explained by general factors associated with the socio-economic background (Kristen and Granato 2007; Phalet, Deboosere, and Bastiaenssen 2007). Kalter (2006), on the other hand, concludes that Turkish ethnic penalties in the labour market are largely explained by ethnic-specific characteristics such as the ethnic composition of friendship networks and German language proficiency.

Apart from integration disadvantages, immigrants of Turkish origin seem to perceive higher levels of cultural distances, discrimination and rejection by the native majority compared to other ethnic groups (Blohm and Wasmer 2008; Hans 2010; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Steinbach 2004, 146ff.). Thus, native Germans feel less social distance towards Italians and Greeks than they do towards Turks (Ganter 2003; Steinbach 2004). As such, researchers also suggest that Turks are less likely to hold a strong national identification as they are not able to combine their ethnic and host-national identities due to external discrimination and also because of the strong ingroup norms of exclusive loyalty (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a; see also on national identification Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). Moreover, Diehl and Schnell (2006) found that while Turks' German national identification is relatively low, their ethnic identity is particularly strong. Taken together, ethnic origin is associated with certain social identity experiences shared by members of the ethnic group. Based on the previous literature that suggests Muslims with a Turkish background seem to be more disadvantaged than Muslims of other ethnic origins, I hypothesise that the negative effect of Muslim self-identification on immigrants' democracy satisfaction should be stronger or even limited to immigrants of Turkish ancestry (*Hypothesis 6*).

5.3 Data and analytical strategy

The individual level data employed in my empirical analysis derive from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which provides a representative dataset collected annually since 1984 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). A main feature of the GSOEP is that it contains a sufficient number of respondents with a migration background because it oversampled households whose head was either from Italy, Greece, Spain, former Yugoslavia or Turkey when the original sample was taken in 1984. Hence, individuals from the so-called former 'guest worker countries' are overrepresented. Moreover, GSOEP also contains additional samples with foreign individuals drawn between 1994 and 1995 (as part of sample D) and in 1998 and 2000 (samples E and F). All samples are considered for the analytic sample of my study.

I proceeded in three steps to find my longitudinal analytic sample. Firstly, I restricted the sample to respondents observed in 2005 and 2010, as it was only in these waves that respondents had been asked about their satisfaction with democracy. Distinctions between first and second generations of immigrants are based on the country of birth. By definition, individuals who are not born in Germany belong to the first generation regardless of the age at which they immigrated to Germany. Thus, I define individuals who were born in Germany and

whose mother and/or father is not German born or has non-German nationality to belong to the second generation. Many of the questions from the GSOEP 2005 and 2010 that measured integration processes such as national identification or discrimination were asked because of the existence of immigrants who did not possess German nationality since birth. Consequently, my sample is restricted to second-generation immigrants who may or may not possess German citizenship, though not since birth. As the main interest of this study lies in assessing the impact of religious and Muslim membership, I consider first- and second-generation immigrants of three main religious groups: Muslims, Christians (involving Catholics, Protestants and other Christians), as well as non-denominational immigrants. Further, immigrants are distinguished by their ethnicity, which corresponds with their country of origin. More precisely, I look at immigrants coming from one of the four sending countries/regions (for an overview of which countries are included, see Table A5.1): immigrants from Western Europe, here defined as EU-15 plus Norway and Switzerland, or Eastern Europe, involving the ten states of the EU enlargement towards the East in 2004, plus Rumania and Bulgaria. Moreover, I also involve third-country immigrants from Turkey, as well as sending regions that are known to build the second, third and fourth largest populations of the four million foreign Muslims in Germany (besides Turkey), i.e. Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). To define the ethnic background, the emphasis is placed on the country of birth rather than on nationality as it may change over time. For second-generation immigrants, who are by definition German born in GSOEP, their ethnic background is identified by the country of birth of the father or mother. In the case of both parents not being born in the same country of origin or not having the same citizenship, the country of origin of the mother outweighs the country of origin of the father. When there is no information available about the country of birth or citizenship of the parents, non-German nationality is used as a criterion to determine immigrants' ethnicity. Immigrants' ethnicity is treated within the descriptive and statistical analyses as a time-constant variable.

Finally, I restricted my empirical analysis to immigrants over 17 years of age, because most of my data is missing for people aged 17, as they received specific youth questionnaires. In total, I have an unbalanced sample of 2,620 persons with a migrant background, either personally or induced by their parents, and 3,696 observations (person-years). Complete panels with information for both years comprise 1,076 immigrants.

Dependent variable

The evaluative dimension of subjective regime satisfaction is assessed with the following survey question: ‘How satisfied are you with democracy as it exists in Germany?’ Answers were given on an 11-point scale (0 = totally unhappy; 10 = totally happy). The measure closely coincides with the indicator often used within political support literature (e.g. Linde and Ekman 2003): ‘On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?’

Main explanatory variables

The main independent variables that allow for the testing of my theoretical hypotheses are religious affiliation and religious social behaviour. Religious affiliation is based on a thrice repeated self-categorisation question between 2003 and 2011 asking respondents to indicate if they consider themselves to be a member of a church or religious community and, if so, to include the name of the church or religious community of which they are a member. Based on this information, I created dichotomous variables for ‘Christian’ affiliation (involving Catholics, Protestants, or other Christians), ‘Muslim’ affiliation and ‘no religious affiliation’. I took the annually or bi-annually repeated measure of religious attendance in the GSOEP to measure religious social behaviour, which is based on a survey question that asked respondents to indicate how frequently they attended religious services and events. Depending on the year of survey, the variable had four to five response categories, ranging from ‘never’ to ‘daily’. To define a consistent measure across panel waves, I recoded the variable into three dummy variables and captured attendance at least once a week (‘weekly’), at least once a month (‘monthly’) or less than once a month (‘less than monthly’). The reference dummy involves respondents who ‘never’ attend religious services. Both denominational affiliation and religious social behaviour are treated as time-varying.

Ethnic group membership also involves multiple dummies measuring immigrants’ ethnic origin, which is time-invariant: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Turkey. As single case numbers of third-country immigrants other than those from Turkey are quite small, and studies show that Turks constantly differ in their integration from other non-European immigrants (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009), I created a collapsed category of ‘other non-EU countries’ for immigrants from countries in Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa and South/Central Asia.

The key indication of national identification is gained by relying on the only indicator available in the GSOEP that captures immigrants' sense of social belonging to Germany. On a five-point scale that ranges from 'not at all' to 'completely', respondents had to indicate to what extent they view themselves as a German.

To take into account the main theoretical mechanisms of social identities' effects on migrants' subjective evaluation of democracy, I further rely on one measure of perceived discrimination indicating if the respondents have perceived disadvantages due to their ethnic background within the last 12 months (often/seldom; reference: never) and general life satisfaction (0 = completely dissatisfied; 10 = completely satisfied).

Controls

I control for several possible confounders of the relationship between social identity aspects and democracy satisfaction. Time-varying dummies capture the effects of changes in migrants' age, citizenship (German; reference: else), marital status (married; reference: else: single, divorced, widowed), or occupational status (retired, jobless, all other non-working; reference: working). Additional time-varying factors of structural characteristics are considered if the migrant respondent has more than basic education (=CASMIN 2a, 2c, 3a and 3b) as well as the height of the household net income (logarithm). Furthermore, I included a time-varying measure to represent the years since the immigration of first-generation immigrants, which I calculated from their year of birth and their year of immigration. Moreover, migrants' cultural integration was measured if respondents read mostly/only German newspapers (reference: no, mostly/only from country of origin, or equally from Germany and country of origin). Moreover, a cognitive-political indicator of political interest is included (very much/much interest versus not so much/no interest) in addition to a measure of social integration, capturing if the respondent visits Germans or receives visits from Germans. As a time-constant, control migrants' gender (female; reference: male) is considered. Finally, to account for period effects, I include a dummy for the year of measurement (2010; reference: 2005).

Sample statistics

Table A5.2 presents the summary statistics of my sample as well as the information about the distribution and range of the included variables. The majority of the immigrants observed, namely 29.2%, have their ethnic background in Western Europe followed by Turkey (27.7%), immigrants from the other non-European countries (28.2) and East Europe (14.8%). Moreover,

about 37% hold a German citizenship. There are slightly more women (51.7%) among my sampled immigrants, and the age of the respondents varies between 18 and 96, with the average age being around 45 years. About one-third of the immigrants in my sample self-identify as Muslim, and about two-thirds identify as Christian. Immigrant respondents who do not consider themselves to be a member of a faith are the minority of the sample (~13% of the sample). The restrictions in information that the GSOEP contains with respect to immigrants older than 17 years of age as well as with non-German citizenship since birth leaves 17% of the immigrants in my sample who are by definition affiliated with the second generation. This percentage is lower than that presented in the official statistics of the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015), which indicates that one-third of immigrants in Germany belong to the group of persons without indirect migration experience (i.e. the second or later immigrant generation).

Treatment of missing data

There are two notable missing data driving mechanisms in my GSOEP-data, either due to ‘refusal’ by the participant or by ‘design’ due non-annually measurement of some variables. The proportion of missing values for the variables considered in the analysis is presented in Table A5.2. In the case that there was no information available for 2005 and 2010 due to non-collection, I replaced the missing values with information from the most recent year (up to 3+/- years) in line with other studies (see e.g. Diehl and Liebau 2015; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kalter 2006). To further reduce missingness due to non-collection of the main indicator of religious belonging, for 10% of the cases, I used information on the religious belonging of the mother (primarily) or the father, because religious belonging is found to be stably transferred between generations within families (Jacob and Kalter 2013). The remaining missing cases due to non-collection (not more than 3.73% for religious belonging) were dropped for the regression analysis. Even though the missing rate due to ‘refusal’ was less than 5% for most of my variables, the listwise deletion of all observations that have a missing value in at least one variable would have substantially reduced my sample size for the separate group analysis. Since the share of missing values due to refusal is not high for most of my measures, I apply the simple imputation approach of ‘dummy variable adjustment’ (Cohen and Cohen 1985). Even though the method is liable to produce biased estimates for the indicators that have missing values and to underestimate the respective standard errors (Allison 2002), I consider the bias negligible in my case as in fact only for one out of 27 variables, 5% of the data are missing. Readers should also be aware that I do not substitute missing data for the dependent variable ‘democracy satisfaction’; instead, cases that exhibit missing values (refusal) are dropped.

Regression method

In order to exploit the within-person as well as the between-person variation available in my two-wave panel data, fixed-effects models would actually outweigh random-effects models because they control for all time-constant (level 2) characteristics (e.g. ethnic group membership), i.e. 'partial them out', – whether observed or unobserved (see e.g. Wooldridge 2010; Schunck 2013). As a consequence, fixed-effects models account for one part of unobserved heterogeneity that generally biases causal inferences in survey-based and non-experimental research. Yet, there are two disadvantages involved in the fixed effects method. First, the method, by default, does not assess the effects of time-invariant characteristics such as ethnicity. Second, the coefficients are less efficient due to larger standard errors because of the loss of the between-person information within fixed-effects logic. To circumvent both disadvantages, I apply the correlated random-effects models first proposed by (Mundlak 1978), which measure within effects in random-effects models by including a cluster means of level 1 (time-variant) variables. Yet, I include cluster means only for variables, where the within and between effects are significantly different at 5% (cf. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 121).


5.4 Findings

Table 5.1 presents the mean distribution of key theoretical variables and measurements of integration by ethnicity, religion and generational status. The descriptive statistics of my dependent variable already addresses some theoretical expectations with respect to immigrants' ethnic and religious group membership. The mean value of democracy satisfaction is 5.617 for Muslims, thus only slightly lower than for Christians (5.688) and secular immigrants (5.709). Yet, the mean scores mask interesting differences among the ethnic groups. As Figure 5.1 reveals, democracy satisfaction is lower among Turkish Muslim immigrants compared to non-Turkish Muslims with origins in West/East Europe or other non-EU countries: the respective values are 5.446 vs. 6.615 and 6.195. In contrast, there are no considerable differences in democracy satisfaction between non-Muslim immigrants from Turkey and other countries, subsuming secular as well as Christian immigrants: the mean value for Turks is 5.866 in comparison to 5.607 for Western and Eastern Europeans and 5.819 for immigrants from other non-European countries.

Table 5.1. Distribution of main (intergration) indicators by religion, ethnicity, and immigrant generation

	Democracy satisfaction (0-10)	German identifi- cation	House- hold income	Religious attendance "weekly"	Work More than basic	Reading mostly German	High pol. interest	Discrimi- nated against	Visits from/ visiting	
				%	%	%	%	%	%	
Religious affiliation										
Christian										
mean	5.688	3.490	10.308	0.146	0.593	0.401	0.677	0.232	0.312	0.864
sd	2.221	1.255	0.627	0.353	0.491	0.490	0.468	0.422	0.464	0.343
Muslim										
mean	5.617	2.653	10.224	0.194	0.482	0.214	0.344	0.161	0.550	0.663
sd	2.133	1.068	0.574	0.395	0.500	0.410	0.475	0.367	0.498	0.473
No										
mean	5.709	3.354	10.326	0.022	0.632	0.531	0.687	0.292	0.405	0.854
sd	2.293	1.205	0.727	0.147	0.483	0.500	0.464	0.455	0.491	0.354
Ethnic background										
Turkey										
mean	5.544	2.683	10.225	0.208	0.480	0.188	0.318	0.151	0.566	0.648
sd	2.161	1.110	0.548	0.406	0.500	0.391	0.466	0.359	0.496	0.478
Western Europe										
mean	5.641	3.041	10.407	0.095	0.605	0.378	0.648	0.264	0.246	0.865
sd	2.220	1.238	0.676	0.293	0.489	0.485	0.478	0.441	0.431	0.341
Eastern Europe										
mean	5.600	4.109	10.323	0.177	0.630	0.591	0.837	0.246	0.359	0.909
sd	2.236	1.074	0.592	0.382	0.483	0.492	0.370	0.431	0.480	0.287
Other non-EU countries										
mean	5.884	3.456	10.188	0.106	0.565	0.386	0.615	0.213	0.421	0.826
sd	2.191	1.172	0.634	0.308	0.496	0.487	0.487	0.410	0.494	0.379
Generational status										
First generation										
mean	5.659	3.203	10.269	0.148	0.548	0.345	0.549	0.219	0.412	0.792
sd	2.206	1.267	0.637	0.355	0.498	0.476	0.498	0.413	0.492	0.406
Second generation										
mean	5.770	3.315	10.348	0.109	0.635	0.447	0.707	0.201	0.344	0.839
sd	2.176	1.174	0.559	0.312	0.482	0.498	0.456	0.401	0.475	0.368

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010 (own calculations)



Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010; own calculations

Figure 5-1. Mean satisfaction with democracy in Germany by religious affiliation and ethnic background

Table 5.1 also indicates that Muslims' integration patterns are as 'low' as that of the Turks, while Christians demonstrate higher levels of integration similar to the non-Turkish ethnic groups. Hence, for instance, Muslims in my sample demonstrate the lowest mean levels of German identification as Turks do (2.653 and 2.683 vs. 3.490 and 3.041 for Christians and Western Europeans). Moreover, Muslim persons and Turks are less likely to be employed as and are less likely to have more than basic education compared to other religious and ethnic groups (for education: 21.4% and 18.8% vs. 40.1% and 37.8% for Christians and Western Europeans). Also Muslim and Turkish immigrants show the strongest senses of discrimination (55% and 56%). Because many Turks are Muslims and many Western and Eastern Europeans are Christians, the question which is relevant here (and which will be answered in my further statistical analyses) is whether it is the ethnic origin of immigrants or their religion that determines democracy satisfaction⁴.

In sum, my bivariate analyses provide a partial and preliminary indication that there is a difference in democracy satisfaction on the basis of a Muslim/non-Muslim affiliation as well as a Turkish or non-Turkish affiliation among immigrants. Yet, to scrutinise the links among religion, immigrant generation and ethnic group as well their 'pure' effects more precisely, I proceed with a multivariate analysis.

I employ *multivariate correlated random-effects models* to assess the effects of social identity aspects and immigrants' democracy satisfaction in Germany. As a first step, I estimate models (see Table 5.2) on the total immigrant sample to assess the partial effects of the religious identity aspects of religious belonging and social behaviour as well as that of other indicators. Thereby, Model 1 includes the social identity variables as well as the controls that may account for spurious correlations. Model 2 adds interactions between ethnicity and religious affiliation to test for possible group-specific effects of religious belonging. In Model 3, life satisfaction is included to account for the SIT argument that the religious identity aspects are linked to migrants' democracy satisfaction through affecting personal well-being. In a second step, the relationship of interest is studied in separate analyses for Turkish as well as non-Turkish immigrants (see Table 5.3).

⁴ While Western and Eastern Europeans are predominantly Christian (84%), about 85% of the Turks in my sample are Muslims and about 4% are Christians; about 21% of the immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia and other non-EU countries are Muslims and about 64% are Christians.

Table 5.2. Democracy Satisfaction of immigrants in Germany: correlated random-effects regression models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Main theoretical variables</i>			
<i>Religious affiliation (ref. No affiliation)</i>			
Christian	-0.160 (0.135)	-0.030 (0.383)	0.038 (0.410)
Muslim	0.028 (0.163)	-0.364 (0.266)	-0.441+ (0.249)
<i>Religious service attendance (ref. Never)</i>			
less than monthly	0.291** (0.094)	0.318*** (0.094)	0.329*** (0.092)
monthly	0.502*** (0.121)	0.529*** (0.121)	0.510*** (0.117)
weekly	0.581*** (0.124)	0.576*** (0.123)	0.489*** (0.119)
Second Generation	0.156 (0.138)	0.195 (0.136)	0.164 (0.133)
German identification	0.103* (0.041)	0.090* (0.041)	0.047 (0.039)
<i>Ethnic background (ref. Turkey)</i>			
Western Europe	0.162 (0.180)		
Eastern Europe	-0.287 (0.199)		
Other Non-EU countries	0.335* (0.156)		
<i>Interactions</i>			
<i>Ethnic background (ref. Turkey)</i>			
West/East EU		-0.311 (0.323)	-0.470 (0.306)
x Christian belonging		-0.094 (0.428)	-0.120 (0.450)
x Muslim belonging		1.345** (0.452)	1.271** (0.426)
Other non-EU countries		0.017 (0.329)	-0.128 (0.313)
x Christian belonging		-0.084 (0.437)	-0.170 (0.459)
x Muslim belonging		0.741* (0.375)	0.849* (0.360)
<i>Mechanisms</i>			
Has been discriminated	-0.386*** (0.083)	-0.403*** (0.083)	-0.282*** (0.080)
Life satisfaction			0.306*** (0.025)
<i>Controls</i>			
Year of measurement 2010	0.076 (0.069)	0.062 (0.069)	0.003 (0.068)
Female	-0.055 (0.085)	-0.063 (0.085)	-0.104 (0.081)
Age	-0.053** (0.019)	-0.051** (0.019)	-0.023 (0.018)
Age squared	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Married	0.113 (0.105)	0.094 (0.104)	-0.023 (0.102)
German nationality	0.002 (0.108)	-0.106 (0.101)	-0.088 (0.097)
Years since arrival (First generation)	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)
More than basic education	0.281** (0.097)	0.268** (0.097)	0.240** (0.093)
Household income (log)	0.271*** (0.071)	0.299*** (0.072)	0.203** (0.068)
<i>Occupational status (ref. working)</i>			
non-working	-0.065 (0.100)	-0.071 (0.100)	0.035 (0.096)
retired	-0.090 (0.211)	-0.068 (0.212)	0.039 (0.203)
jobless	-0.456** (0.150)	-0.456** (0.150)	-0.116 (0.146)
Reading mostly/only German newspaper	-0.171+ (0.089)	-0.194* (0.089)	-0.247** (0.086)
Political interest (high)	0.102 (0.103)	0.118 (0.103)	0.059 (0.099)
Identifies with country of origin	-0.005 (0.044)	0.003 (0.044)	-0.043 (0.043)
Visits from/visiting Germans	0.179+ (0.105)	0.178+ (0.105)	0.087 (0.101)
Constant	3.974*** (0.885)	3.906*** (0.903)	2.607** (0.867)
Number of persons' years	3294	3294	3294
Number of persons	2344	2344	2344
Within R ²	0.010	0.009	0.050
Between R ²	0.079	0.087	0.143
Overall R ²	0.070	0.077	0.137

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. *Notes:* Results are random-effects regression estimates (using STATA's xtreg, re command) with cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. Controlled for missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Model 1 in Table 5.2 reveals some interesting preliminary patterns in the control characteristics. As can be expected from theory, grievances in integration such as being unemployed and perceiving discrimination have a negative effect on migrants' satisfaction with democracy in Germany. By contrast, integration indicators such as contacts with natives, higher educational levels and income are associated with positive regime evaluations. The length of residence in the receiving country negatively relates to first-generation immigrants' satisfaction with the democratic regime, which might reflect the frustrated expectations of immigrants who moved voluntarily to another country with high expectations to do better (economically) in the destination country.

In the following, the issues with respect to the main theoretical social and religious identity variables are highlighted. Model 1 shows an independent positive effect of migrants' identification with the German receiving country. Hence, everything else equal, an increase in the sense of belonging to Germany can be found to increase immigrants' satisfaction with democracy by 0.103 scale points ($p < 0.05$). There is some indication, though no final statistical proof, that second-generation immigrants are more satisfied than first-generation immigrants. Moving on to the influence of the ethnic group membership, interestingly, the coefficients reveal that being a migrant from other non-European countries (versus being a migrant with Turkish ancestry) is significantly related to democracy satisfaction. Thus, when keeping other variables in the model constant, immigrants from other non-European countries seem to be significantly more satisfied with democracy in Germany than their Turkish counterparts.

In regard to the religious identity aspects, Model 1 confirms the theoretical expectations of a somewhat mixed picture for religious behaviour and religious affiliation: It shows that the frequency of religious service attendance, independent of other characteristics as well as immigrants' religious affiliation, systematically increases immigrants' democracy satisfaction. Put differently, all else being equal, immigrants who attend religious services more frequently evaluate the democratic regime more positively. In contrast, the results for the religious affiliations show that there are no significant differences across religion in terms of immigrants' democracy satisfaction. Yet, in Model 1, the influence of religious belonging on support for democracy is constrained to be the same for Turks and immigrants from other origin countries. In theory, I hypothesised that religious affiliations' impact on shaping personal experiences and democracy satisfaction can be expected to be a function of immigrants' ethnic group membership. Moreover, previous descriptive patterns have already effectively indicated that there is an ethnic group dependent pattern of migrants' satisfaction with democracy.

Thus, Model 2 adds interaction terms between immigrants' country of origin as well as their Muslim and Christian religious affiliations. Because a cross-tabulation of ethnicity and religious affiliation (see Table A5.3) reveals that the number of cases in the cell for Muslim belonging and an Eastern or Western background is rather low, I combined these immigrant sources to provide more robust estimates in Model 2. The inclusion of the interactions does not change the findings for the effects of immigrant generation, national identification or religious social behaviour. Yet, there are two significant positive interaction terms for immigrants' ethnic background in Western/Eastern Europe and other non-EU countries with a Muslim self-identification ($b=1.345$, $p<0.01$; $b=0.741$, $p<0.01$). These results demonstrate that self-identification as a Muslim among non-Turkish immigrants is associated with significantly higher levels of democracy satisfaction, while being a Muslim is negatively yet insignificantly related to democratic commitment among Turks ($b=-0.364$, $p>0.10$). In contrast to being Muslim, there are no significant ethnic-group differences for immigrants' self-identification as Christian or as not being affiliated with any religious denomination. These results provide support that there are no commonly shared effects of Muslim belonging for immigrants across ethnic origins and show that they are unique to specific ethno-religious combinations.

To account for the previous identity effects, Model 3 further includes an indicator for the potential mechanism of immigrants' well-being. General life satisfaction, consistent with previous studies and theoretical considerations, has a considerable direct effect on migrants' satisfaction with democracy ($b=0.306$, $p<0.001$) and also shows substantial mediation effects as a mediator and a suppressor through diminishing or increasing other effects. For instance, the inclusion of life satisfaction diminishes the effect of discrimination and completely erases the effects of age, unemployment, contacts with natives and national identification. The results in Table 5.3 thus suggest that national identification is not directly related to democracy satisfaction but through general happiness. Moreover, life satisfaction also accounts for the negative effect of Muslim-being for Turks in terms of a suppressor effect as its inclusion strengthens the interaction coefficient between Muslim belonging and Turkish group membership slightly to significance ($b=-0.441$, $p<0.010$). Such a mediation (suppression) effect appears when the direct effect of a variable as well as the indirect effect through the mediator have opposite signs. Accordingly, the correlation matrix in Table A5.4 reveals that being a Muslim-Turk is the only ethnic-religious combination that significantly and negatively relates to democracy satisfaction, while at the same time it positively correlates with life satisfaction, which itself is systematically associated with higher democracy satisfaction. In sum, general

well-being is an important factor to account for the impact of social identity aspects as would be suggested by SIT.

To further the understanding of the interactions between religious and ethnic group membership among immigrants, Figure 5.2 illustrates the regression-based average predicted values of democracy satisfaction (Model 3). Figure 5.2 shows that while a Christian or non-religious affiliation predicts nearly the same average levels of democracy satisfaction among immigrants, a Muslim identification is associated either with lower or higher average values depending on migrants' ethnic origin. While a Muslim affiliation is associated with higher and similar average values of democracy satisfaction for immigrants of non-Turkish ancestry, it is associated in the case of a Turkish origin with lower average values compared to a Christian affiliation or to no religious affiliation. At the same time, it applies that while there are no considerable differences in the predicted values in the case of a Christian affiliation or no religious affiliation between different ethnic origins, group differences between Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants appear for a Muslim affiliation.




Figure 5-2. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by religious affiliation and ethnic background

These findings suggest two main preliminary conclusions. First, the effect of religious belonging seems not to matter in terms of a primarily cultural difference between a Muslim and Christian affiliation but as a difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation (involving secular as well as Christian immigrants). Second, it seems that while the religious identity aspect of social behaviour has an independent positive effect on migrants' positive evaluation of the democratic regime in Germany, religious belonging does not have any effect but varies according to immigrants' Turkish or non-Turkish ethnic group membership.

To give credit to the previous empirical findings, the difference in democracy satisfaction between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation as well as the other social identity

aspects is analysed separately for Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants in Table 5.3. By breaking the immigrant populations down, I am able to assess different influences of different social identity variables on democracy satisfaction depending on migrants' ethnic origin. Model 1 provides the basic and additive model for each ethnic category, while Model 2 involves the interaction terms between Muslim affiliation as well as the other social identity variables of religious attendance, generational status and national identity for testing Hypotheses 3-5.

Table 5.3. Democracy Satisfaction of Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants in Germany: Correlated random-effects regression models

	Turkish (T)		Non-Turkish (NT)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2				
<i>Main theoretical variables</i>								
Muslim affiliation (<i>ref. Non-Muslim</i>)	-0.588**	(0.203)	0.453	(0.619)	0.533**	(0.169)	-0.235	(0.479)
Religious service attendance (<i>ref. Never</i>)								
less than monthly	0.391*	(0.168)	0.330	(0.484)	0.324**	(0.104)	0.280**	(0.108)
monthly	0.570**	(0.213)	0.910	(0.835)	0.517***	(0.139)	0.472***	(0.143)
weekly	0.570**	(0.194)	1.509**	(0.471)	0.562***	(0.145)	0.539***	(0.149)
<i>Ethnic background (ref. Western Europe)</i>								
Eastern Europe					-0.268	(0.169)	-0.267	(0.170)
Other non-EU countries					0.151	(0.138)	0.151	(0.139)
Sec. generation	0.548*	(0.267)	1.480***	(0.445)	0.109	(0.164)	0.075	(0.173)
German identification	0.127	(0.079)	0.310+	(0.175)	0.051	(0.045)	0.038	(0.046)
<i>Mechanisms</i>								
Has been discriminated	-0.507***	(0.141)	-0.510***	(0.142)	-0.194*	(0.098)	-0.192+	(0.098)
Life satisfaction	0.391***	(0.046)	0.385***	(0.045)	0.281***	(0.029)	0.281***	(0.029)
<i>Interactions</i>								
Muslim x sec. generation			-1.135*	(0.446)			0.346	(0.403)
Muslim x attendance: less than monthly			0.055	(0.509)			0.637	(0.398)
Muslim x attendance: monthly			-0.360	(0.867)			0.693	(0.491)
Muslim x attendance: weekly			-1.008*	(0.492)			0.199	(0.497)
Muslim x German identification			-0.195	(0.181)			0.178	(0.148)
<i>Controls⁵</i>								
Number of persons' years	902		902		2392		2392	
Number of persons	646		646		1698		1698	
Within R ²	0.146		0.137		0.067		0.076	
Between R ²	0.252		0.268		0.145		0.145	
Overall R ²	0.229		0.239		0.142		0.144	

⁵ Controls are the same as in Table 5.2. For reasons of parsimony, they are excluded here but can be found in Table A5.5.


Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. Notes: Results are random effects regression estimates (using STATA's xtreg, re command) with cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. Controlled for missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

In line with previous findings, the base line models (M1-T and M1-NT) for both samples of immigrants yield nearly the same strong and consistent positive impact of religious service attendance on democracy satisfaction regardless of Muslim affiliation and other characteristics. Thus, Hypothesis 1 on the general positive effect of religious identity behaviour finds support. It may now seem unsurprising that, in line with the interaction effects in Table 5.2, M1-T and M1-NT confirm that a Muslim self-identification (versus a Christian affiliation or no affiliation) is positively associated with democracy satisfaction among non-Turkish immigrants while it negatively relates to democratic engagement among Turkish immigrants. In sum, the previous findings lend support to Hypothesis 6 on the ethnic group-specific effect of being a Muslim in Germany, while they disconfirm a general effect of religious affiliation as has been formulated in Hypothesis 2.

In a subsequent step, I assess how the group-specific Muslim identity effects are moderated by further social identity experiences relating to immigrants' religious identity behaviour, their ascribed generational belonging and their identification with German (cf. Hypotheses 3-5). First of all, Table 5.3 only reveals significant interaction terms among Turkish immigrants. Hence, *ceteris paribus*, the positive effects of Muslim belonging and religious social behaviour are the same for non-Turkish immigrants who are foreign- or native-born as well as for all levels of psychological attachment to the receiving society. I also cannot find any positive interaction effect when including the interaction terms stepwise (not presented here). An additional test for variation of the impact of Muslim affiliation between non-European and European origins also shows that the positive effect of Muslim affiliation does not differ within the non-Turkish sample (interaction coef. $b = -0.505$; $p = 0.150$ (not shown in Table 5.3)). Model 2 (NT) also cannot find evidence that immigrant generation as well as national identification play a significant role for non-Turkish immigrants' psychological commitment to the democratic system in Germany.


In contrast to the non-Turkish sample, Model 2 (T) suggests that the negative difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim self-identification on Turkish immigrants' regime evaluation is dependent on different intensities of their religious social behaviour as well as generational belonging (expect for national belonging). By including the interaction effects in Model 2 (T), the main effect of Muslim affiliation becomes insignificant. Thus, the effect of Muslim self-identification for Turks seems due to the specific combinations with levels of

generational affiliation and social religious practice. More specifically, I hypothesised that the effect of religious belonging is positively moderated by social religious behaviour in the way that the negative Muslim difference should be lower for higher levels of positive religious identity expression within the social environment of worship or religious events (cf. Hypothesis 3). An illustration of the significant interaction in Model 2 (T) is given in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.



Source: GSOEP 2005 & 2010; own calculations; 95% confidence intervals

Figure 5-4. Average marginal effects of Muslim affiliation at different values of religious service attendance



Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010; own calculations

Figure 5-3. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by Muslim affiliation and frequency of religious service attendance

Contrary to theoretical expectations, it turns out that all levels of religious attendance in reference to no attendance increase instead of decrease the negative difference between a Muslim and a non-Muslim affiliation. Yet, Figure 5.3 illustrates that the negative difference is only significant larger for a ‘weekly’ attendance of mosques and religious services. The large confidence intervals among Turkish immigrants who attend worship ‘at least monthly’ may be a result of a small number of observations in this category. Along the same lines, Figure 5.4 shows that the positive returns on democracy satisfaction due to differences between

frequencies of church attendance from 'less than monthly' to 'weekly' are lower or even absent in the case of a Muslim identity⁶. A separate analysis of the interactions between Muslim belonging and generational status as well as church attendance reveals that the interaction with the latter is actually dependent on the inclusion of the former interaction (not presented here). Hence, the significant difference between Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation in the case of a weekly attendance is a matter of taking the difference between generations into account.

For generational belonging, the negative interaction coefficient in Model 2 (T) between immigrant second generation and Muslim affiliation ($b=-1.135$, $p<0.05$) proves to be in line with Hypothesis 4, which assesses that the negative difference between Muslim and non-Muslim belonging on democracy satisfaction is larger for German-born (with at least one foreign-born parent) than for foreign-born (first-generation) immigrants of Turkish ancestry. As the main effect of Muslim affiliation (for first-generation Turks) is not significant, even if the other interactions are not included (not presented here), the negative influence of being Muslim compared to being a Christian or not religious seems to be limited to second-generation Turks. This finding is also depicted in Figure 5.5 (based on M2-T) as both regression lines indicate a negative difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation, yet the line of first-generation Turks is much flatter.




Figure 5-5. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by Muslim affiliation and generational status

⁶ I recalculated the interaction model by recoding the factor variable of church attendance as a quasi continuous variable, as the frequency of attendance could be recalculated in days. These results yield a significant negative interaction term (-0.317 , $P<0.10$) (not shown in Model 2 (T)) and also suggest a steady increase of the negative gap between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction due to increasing levels of religious practice.

At the same time, the significant main effect of generational status ($b= 1.480, p<0.05$) in Model 2 (T) suggests that second-generation Turks do have significantly higher levels of democracy satisfaction than first-generation Turks if they identify as Christian or are not religious compared to if they identify as Muslim (the difference is $b=-1.135, p<0.05$).

Finally, I do not find confirmation within the analysis for Turkish immigrants that the impact of a Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction is moderated by national identification (cf. Hypothesis 5). Yet, the inclusion of variation between Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation due to generational belonging and different intensities of religious social behaviour uncovers a slight significant independent effect of German identification on democratic commitment in Model 2 (T), holding other factors constant. Put differently, an increase in Turks' perception of membership in the national group by one scale point is associated with an increase of 0.3 scale points ($p<0.10$) in satisfaction with democracy in Germany⁷.

For the last step, in reference to SIT's theoretical mechanisms indicated by perceived discrimination and life satisfaction, Table 5.3 on ethnic group-specific analyses depicts, similar to Table 5.2, significant negative and positive effects, respectively, on Turkish as well as non-Turkish immigrants' satisfaction with the democratic regime. Yet, the negative effect of discrimination is considerably stronger for Turkish immigrants than it is for non-Turkish immigrants as might be expected from the literature review within the theoretical part.

In sum, the random effects regression models in Table 5.3 reveal interesting and complex influences of religious identity aspects on immigrants' psychological support for the democratic regime in Germany. The longitudinal analyses support the empirical distinction between religious belonging and religious social behaviour as different parts of immigrants' religious identity, which may affect the subjective evaluation of democratic governance differently. While religious social behaviour independently fosters immigrants' satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany, the variation between a Muslim and a non-Muslim affiliation is dependent on migrants' ethnic group affiliation. In addition, the effect is positive for immigrants with a non-Turkish European background as well as those from non-European countries, but the effect is negative for immigrants with a background in Turkey. Within the group of immigrants of Turkish ancestry, my analyses highlight that the negative Muslim effect is dependent on and specific to certain levels of other social identities. Hence, the negative

⁷ For a robustness check, Model 2 (T) has been recalculated by including German identification as categorical variable with 'not at all' as reference category. The results concerning the interaction do not change. With respect to the independent effect of national identification, only the midpoint category 'mostly' of the identity scale does not significantly increase democracy satisfaction. However, this might be due to larger confidence intervals and small case numbers.

effect is found to be specific to an affiliation with the second generation (i.e. being German born) as well as to be associated with higher intensities of religious social behaviour (i.e. 'weekly' church attendance).

5.5 Conclusion and Discussion

The aim of the current study was to shed light on the relationship between immigrants' religious identity and support for democracy in Western receiving countries, which is currently contested in public and scientific debates. There are serious doubts that the religious beliefs of the increasing Muslim immigrant population are compatible with the key principles of democratic governance in Western Europe. To respond to these debates, I attempted to achieve a more nuanced understanding about the impact of immigrants' religion on satisfaction with democracy, which is an important yet understudied indicator for immigrants' psychological affiliation to the political system of European receiving societies.

Building on theoretical arguments of the social identity literature, I sought to go beyond primarily cultural and essentialist perspectives and defined the impact of religious affiliation. Firstly, I differentiated between belonging and social behaviour aspects of migrants' religious identity. Secondly, I defined the impact of religious identity in interaction with other social group belongings with respect to immigrant generation, ethnic origin and the receiving society. Within this framework, I stressed that immigrants' social identities provide different social experiences that are crucially linked with their personal experiences, benefits, well-being and their evaluation of the democratic national government as responsiveness and legitimate to their needs. Hypotheses were formulated and subsequently tested with panel models that allowed for the testing of time-variant effects such as religious or national identity as well as time-invariant variables such as ethnic origin and generational status. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of more than 2,500 immigrants from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2005 and 2010. Three major conclusions can be drawn from this study.

First, while religious social behaviour (e.g. going to a mosque) has a general positive effect on immigrants' psychological regime commitment, the effect of (self-described) belonging to a religion (e.g. Islam) varies among different ethnic origins. Consistent with the theoretical expectations, a key finding of my paper is that it is neither religious belonging per se, nor the sole difference between a Muslim and Christian affiliation but an ethnic group-specific effect of being Muslim that drives immigrants' levels of democracy satisfaction. Being Muslim in Germany has a positive effect among non-Turkish immigrants from Western and

Eastern Europe as well as from other non-European countries. These countries, involving nations in Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia North, are known to provide the main sources of the foreign Muslim population in Germany besides Turkey (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). In contrast, a Muslim affiliation (versus a Christian affiliation or no religious affiliation) has a negative impact among respondents with a Turkish migration background. Hence, immigrant religion is not per se a burden as suggested by literature (Foner and Alba 2008) that needs to be left behind by all immigrants in the process of intergenerational integration regardless of immigrants' specific ethnic origin. In other words, being Muslim – as an identity category – is not disruptive to the support of democratic governance. Rather, the effect of Muslim belonging may be driven by mechanisms that relate to specific social experiences of this category membership by immigrants' immutable, ascribed categorisation in terms of their ethnic origin.

Second, in Germany there are pronounced ethnic group differences in terms of economic success, social distances and experiences of discrimination, often in particular to the detriment of Turkish immigrants. Thus, my analyses demonstrate that the negative Muslim identity effect for Turks seems to be specific to social identity experiences that relate to a high religious identity performance (i.e. the attendance of religious meetings more often on a weekly basis) as well as to the belonging to the second immigrant generation (i.e. to be born in the receiving country). Turkish immigrants' self-perception and social self-concept are shaped by their experience of belonging to a minority religion that is distinct and less accepted by the Christian majority as well as associated with larger integration disadvantages. Existing research indeed shows that second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe report higher levels of perceived discrimination than foreign-born Muslims do (cf. Voas and Fleischmann 2012, 536). An intensified ('weekly') form of social experiences within mosques or other religious events that involve the sharing of common grievances due to their religion as well as (alternative) foci due to religion such as the prioritisation of godly matters above world affairs may strengthen the negative impact of Turks' Muslim identity on estrangement processes from the democratic political system of European receiving societies. My research otherwise reveals that the second generation (versus first generation) as well as the weekly attendance of religious services (versus never) are associated with higher democracy satisfaction among Turks in the case of being a member of the majority religion and in the case of having no religious affiliation.

Third, my longitudinal analysis reveals that subjective perceptions of well-being (life satisfactions) as well as discrimination, which relate to social identity experiences, are driving

or hampering forces, respectively, for Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants' satisfaction with democracy.

Even though the current study has effectively provided new information on the relationship between immigrants' religious belonging and political regime support, it is not without limitations that, in turn, could pose as ideas for further research. First of all, by focusing on democracy satisfaction, my study captures only one aspect of immigrants' psychological commitment towards the democratic regime in Germany. There are reasons to expect that theory as well as results may differ for migrants' support of specific regime values and principles. Consequently, it would require more encompassing datasets with different indicators of psychological democracy support to assess this assumption. Second, as already mentioned, testing theoretical hypotheses about the ethnic group specificity of the religious identity effect may require datasets with much larger subsamples of ethnic groups than those applied in the present study (e.g. concerning the immigrant groups in the broad category of 'other non-European ethnicities'). Third, even though personal well-being as well as perceived discrimination are found to be decisive mechanisms that may link religious identity and immigrants' democracy satisfaction, there might be other mediating mechanisms at work that could not be observed within my study. Thus, it would be interesting to assess the impact of content-related aspects of religious group memberships such as orthodox religious viewpoints (e.g. to implement Islamic law or to defend Islam) on democracy satisfaction in contrast to non-essentialist mechanisms. In a similar vein, social identity research highlights that a social identity involves multiple dimensions of importance, regard, emotional attachment and, eventually, meaning (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Accordingly, a recent study on Sunni and Alevi Muslims from Turkey living in German could show that even though both groups present low levels of political tolerance, individual higher levels of emotional attachment to Islam foster higher political tolerance (Verkuyten et al. 2014). Concerning the effect of second-generational belonging on Turks' democracy satisfaction, it must be noted that my analysis only involves that part of the actual population that is older than 17 and does not hold German citizenship since birth. Finally, the panel models applied for the empirical analysis may be advantageous for causal inferences in comparison to cross-sectional studies, but they do not rule out reverse causality. Yet, in the case of my study, I propose that it is more difficult to imagine that immigrants with high democracy satisfaction become more religiously active in Germany or should identify less with their religious group. Moreover, in the case of ethnicity and generational status, the question of reverse causality is also less of a problem.

Thus, in sum and despite certain limitations, my study places emphasis on two main issues when studying the relation of religion to immigrants' psychological commitment with democracy in European receiving societies. First, immigrants' commitment to democracy can theoretically be understood from another non-essentialist social identity perspective. Second, our knowledge needs to extend beyond religious belonging to understand the effect of religion on migrants' subjective evaluation of democracy satisfaction. More specifically, we may need to consider immigrants' religious social behaviour as well as their ethnic background and generational belonging.

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5.7 Appendix

Table A 5.1. Sample characteristics: Country-of-origin groupings from GSOEP Data 2005, 2010

Country Grouping	Label	Countries Included in Group	Number of Cases
West Europe		Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and United Kingdom	1,086
East Europe		Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania	553
Turkey		Turkey	1,033
Other non-EU countries		Iran, Israel, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Algeria, Ghana, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Nigeria, Iraq, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Egypt, Tajikistan, Somalia, Pakistan, South Africa, Eritrea, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Albania, Georgia, Yemen, Palestine, Turkmenistan, Serbia, Former Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine, Lebanon	1,052

Table A 5.2. Descriptive sample statistics

Variables	mean	sd	observa- tions	min	max	%Missing due to "refusal"	%Missing due to "non- collection"
Satisfaction with democracy	5.678	2.201	3570	0	10	3.41	
Years since immigration	26.170	11.417	3583	0	80	3.06	
Second-generation immigrant	0.170	0.375	3696	0	1		
Turkey	0.277	0.448	3696	0	1		
Western Europe	0.292	0.455	3696	0	1		
Eastern Europe	0.148	0.355	3696	0	1		
Other non-EU countries	0.283	0.451	3696	0	1		
Christian affiliation	0.575	0.494	3558	0	1		3.73
Muslim affiliation	0.297	0.457	3558	0	1		3.73
No religious affiliation	0.128	0.334	3558	0	1		3.73
Female	0.515	0.500	3696	0	1		
German nationality	0.367	0.482	3696	0	1		
Age	44.766	15.608	3696	18	96		
Married	0.695	0.460	3696	0	1		
Church attendance: never	0.440	0.497	3671	0	1	0.68	
Church attendance: less than monthly	0.291	0.454	3671	0	1	0.68	
Church attendance: monthly	0.127	0.333	3671	0	1	0.68	
Church attendance: weekly	0.141	0.348	3671	0	1	0.68	
German Identification	3.221	1.253	3555	1	5	0.70	3.11
Country of origin Identification	3.354	1.104	3561	1	5	0.54	3.11
Household income (log)	10.282	0.625	3693	4	15	0.08	
Other non-working	0.241	0.428	3696	0	1		
Retired	0.105	0.307	3696	0	1		
Jobless	0.091	0.288	3696	0	1		
Working	0.563	0.496	3696	0	1		
More than basic education	0.362	0.481	3469	0	1	6.14	
Reading mostly German newspaper	0.576	0.494	3652	0	1	1.16	0.03
High political interest	0.216	0.411	3659	0	1	1.00	
Has been discriminated	0.400	0.490	3665	0	1	0.84	
Visits from/visiting Germans	0.800	0.400	3581	0	1	0.60	2.52
Happiness	6.858	1.859	3680	0	10	0.43	

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010 (own calculations)

Table A 5.3. Crosstabulation of religious affiliation by ethnic background

Religious belonging	Ethnic background				Total
	Turkey	West Europe	East Europe	Other non-EU	
Christian	38	873	426	613	1,95
Muslim	810	19	8	203	1,04
No religion	94	135	70	137	436
Total	942	1,027	504	953	3,426

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010 (own calculations)

Table A 5.4. Bivariate correlations between main theoretical variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Democracy							
1 satisfaction	1						
2 Life satisfaction	0.303***	1					
3 Muslim-Turk	-0.0653***	0.0472**	1				
4 Muslim-West EU	0.0322	0.0134	-0.00522	1			
5 Muslim-East EU	0.0298	0.0758***	0.107***	0.133***	1		
6 Muslim-non-EU German	0.00656	0.0510**	-0.268***	-0.144***	0.128***	1	
7 identification	0.0670***	0.119***	0.0657***	0.329***	0.0694***	0.113***	1

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010 (own calculations). Note: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A 5.5. Table 5.3 continued

	Turkish (T)				Non-Turkish (NT)			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
Controls								
Year of measurement								
2010	-0.444**	(0.136)	-0.457***	(0.136)	0.127	(0.079)	0.136+	(0.079)
Female	0.103	(0.154)	0.124	(0.154)	-0.131	(0.097)	-0.132	(0.097)
Age	-0.036	(0.046)	-0.038	(0.046)	-0.012	(0.020)	-0.011	(0.020)
Age squared	0.001	(0.000)	0.001	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Married	-2.027***	(0.492)	-2.083***	(0.519)	0.040	(0.117)	0.046	(0.117)
German nationality	0.306+	(0.169)	0.252	(0.168)	0.956**	(0.361)	0.945**	(0.364)
Years since arrival (First generation)	-0.020+	(0.011)	-0.018	(0.011)	-0.025***	(0.006)	-0.025***	(0.006)
More than basic education	0.065	(0.193)	0.100	(0.195)	0.307**	(0.106)	0.308**	(0.106)
Household income (log)	0.179	(0.137)	0.173	(0.138)	0.195*	(0.078)	0.192*	(0.078)
Occupational status (<i>ref. working</i>)								
Non-working	-0.087	(0.166)	-0.120	(0.167)	0.040	(0.116)	0.045	(0.116)
retired	-0.606	(0.433)	-0.613	(0.430)	0.149	(0.220)	0.146	(0.220)
jobless	0.208	(0.251)	0.195	(0.250)	-0.326+	(0.182)	-0.331+	(0.182)
Reading mostly/only								
German newspaper	0.155	(0.171)	0.167	(0.173)	-0.298**	(0.099)	-0.306**	(0.099)
Political interest (high)	-0.589**	(0.223)	-0.613**	(0.224)	0.201+	(0.108)	0.196+	(0.108)
Identifies with country of origin	-0.092	(0.083)	-0.075	(0.082)	-0.054	(0.051)	-0.058	(0.051)
Visits from/visiting Germans	0.244	(0.156)	0.266+	(0.157)	0.057	(0.134)	0.030	(0.133)
Constant	2.038	(1.761)	1.204	(1.847)	2.379*	(0.969)	2.508**	(0.971)
Number of persons' years	902		902		2392		2392	
Number of persons	646		646		1698		1698	
Within R2	0.146		0.137		0.067		0.076	
Between R2	0.252		0.268		0.145		0.145	
Overall R2	0.229		0.239		0.142		0.144	

Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. Notes: Results are random-effects regression estimates (using STATA's xtreg, re command) with cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. Controlled for missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

Chapter 6: Summary, Discussion, and Outlook

6.1 Introduction

Social identity, which reflects membership in various social groups and categories such as gender, nationality, and ethnicity, builds besides the personal identity as a unique person a central part of an individual's self-concept and his/her positive self-feelings (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Put differently, social identities such as in the form of ethnicity or religion provide meaningful self-references through which (migrant) individuals perceive themselves as well as the environment and others around them. Social identities are thus perceived as guiding principles of an individual's cognitions, emotions, and behaviour, specifically in intergroup situations such as in the context of multiculturalism and immigration within current Western European societies. Against this background, the purpose of the present doctoral thesis has been to scrutinise the role of immigrants' senses of belonging to the ethnic or religious minority group and/or the (ethnic) national majority group of the receiving country for their attitudinal integration into politics in Germany, which is a current focus of heated public and scientific discussions. Psychological group loyalties to the origin country or the religious minority group (i.e. Islam) are commonly perceived as barriers to migrants' psychological integration into the democratic political systems of historically Christian European countries. In contrast, loyalty to the national majority group is conceived as a psychological bridge that includes immigrants as psychologically involved (e.g. interested, competent, and knowledgeable) political actors in the host-society political systems as well as instilling in them positive attitudes towards (i.e. trust in and satisfaction with) the democratic institutions, governance, regime, and so forth. Within four empirical chapters, the present thesis tries to shed light on the relationship between the subdimensions of migrants' social identity (i.e. national, religious, and ethnic identity) and political integration at the attitudinal level in terms of internal political interest and external satisfaction with the democratic regime. A special focus has been on the role of national identity, on the one hand as its own explanandum and political attitude towards the national political community, and on the other hand as a source in addition and combination with ethnic and religious identity for migrants' interest in national (i.e. German) politics as well as satisfaction with democracy in Germany. In this final chapter, I summarise the important conclusions of my doctoral research and discuss their implications. Moreover, I also indicate current limitations of my work and formulate suggestions for future research.

6.2 Conclusions

6.2.1 National identification

Chapter 2 of this doctoral thesis focussed on the trajectories of migrants' identificational assimilation, identification with the national political community, and its determinants. To make a fundamental contribution to the literature, it examined the classic assimilation theory (Gordon 1964) and approaches on the nature of ethnic boundaries (e.g. Alba 2005) in the context of recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany. More specifically, it has discussed the effect of command of the majority language (i.e. cultural assimilation), bridging social contacts and networks (i.e. social assimilation), as well as salient ethnic boundaries—reflected in perceived discrimination and value incompatibilities between the home and the receiving culture—on the development of migrants' sense of belonging to the German host society over the first three years.

The longitudinal regression results on the two-wave-panel study SCIP seem to support both the classic assimilation theory (Gordon 1964) and approaches on the nature of ethnic boundaries (e.g. Alba 2005). The random-effects regression models showed that while effects of social assimilation and discrimination on national identity are not considerably dissimilar for newcomers from Poland or Turkey (even though the negative impact of discrimination is stronger for Turks), the identity trajectories indeed start out from very different conditions: while both groups show similar patterns of language assimilation, only Poles seem to assimilate socially, while the process stagnates for recently arrived Turks. Moreover, the groups differ in their perceptions of discrimination. Thus, only new Turks experience a pronounced increase in discrimination against their ethnic group. These differences in the conditions with respect to social assimilation and discrimination were shown partly to explain the emergent dissimilar identity trajectories of recently immigrated Turks and Poles: While for Turks it is indicated by an initial increase, and subsequent decline, for Poles national identity is characterised only by a steady increase of German identification, even though they first start out with lower levels of national attachment right after immigration than Turks do.

Even though the study can only draw a preliminary picture of identificational assimilation trajectories of recently arrived immigrants in Germany, it underlines the importance of social assimilation and discriminatory processes for migrants to become emotionally committed to the German majority group similar to that shown in studies by de Vroome et al. (2014) or Schulz and Leszczensky (2016). However, in addition to this and previous research, the present study of this doctoral thesis puts emphasis on the relevance to

decompose (identificational) assimilation processes of immigrants not only in the study of effects of the conditions under which migrants become emotionally committed to the mainstream society but also in the study of the conditions themselves and respective differences between various immigrant groups to adopt the conditions.

6.2.2 Interest in politics in Germany

In Chapters 3 and 4 of this doctoral thesis, I focused on the relationship between migrants' national and ethnic identity and their inclination to become interested in German politics. To provide clear and well-founded explanations, the relationship was scrutinised from different theoretical perspectives, involving the classic social identity theory (SIT) (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1986), as well as grievance-based social movement approaches (e.g. Simon and Klandermans 2001), or the classic civic voluntarism model (CVM) of political participation (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). I came to the view that the frameworks have intersections, so they should not be treated as entirely separate (see theory in Chapter 1). The basic idea is that national and ethnic identity may affect interest in national politics because politics provides means and processes to satisfy the basic need driven by social identification to establish and reinforce a positive social identity within an intergroup context, and in consequence to achieve a positive self-image. Both frameworks suggest that national and ethnic identity may therefore affect interest in national politics among immigrants through two independent but related social identity processes, conditional on if intergroup comparisons are favourable or unfavourable. Thus, in the case of national identity, which involves favourable comparisons with other groups within the receiving societies on various dimensions such as status and power, the motive to preserve a positive social identity relates to depersonalisation, assimilation, as well as in-group biasing mechanisms that affect three concepts of migrants' political interest: migrants' attention to national politics, involving national authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and groups, and so forth, (i.e. political attentiveness), their concern about national politics (i.e. political importance), as well as their motivation to contribute to national public outcomes (i.e. political motivation). I widened the focus by proposing that processes of language and social assimilation that positively relate to the motive of reinforcing a positive national identity, as well as at the same time according to CVM to political attentiveness, saliency, and motivation, mediate the national identity effect on migrant's interest in mainstream politics.

In contrast, in the case of ethnic identity, social comparisons are inclined to be unfavourable in the reception context with respect to status and power, which leads to the existence of salient intergroup boundaries to seek the reestablishment of a positive ethnic

identity through collective actions that may change the relative position of the ethnic in-group in the status hierarchy. The basic idea is then that minority group members' ethnic identity may relate to interest in politics within the reception country to the extent to which they are subject to discrimination and salient ethnic boundaries. However, the link to politics may rather imply ethnic group/homeland-based and contentious politics, involving ethnic group/homeland-based authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and groups, and so forth. Further considering the empirical reality and bi-dimensional models of acculturation (e.g. Berry 1997), in which self-definitions are characterised by varying levels of both ethnic and national identification, I further posited in line with the politicised collective identity model (PCI) (e.g. Simon and Klandermans 2001) that in the case of a devalued ethnic identity, an additional identification with the national majority group makes cognitive engagement even more likely because it increases the likelihood of success for ethnic group claims.

Accordingly, the hybrid random-effects analyses of two empirical longitudinal data sources in Germany (SCIP and GSOEP) in Chapters 2 and 3 showed that while by analysing interest that is specific to German politics, ethnic identification negatively relates to political interest among recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey (SCIP), it positively relates under the condition of perceived discrimination and the form of dual identity to general political interest in Germany of long-term labour immigrants (GSOEP; 1993–2006). National identification, instead, provides in both cases (interest that relates specifically to German politics, as well as general political interest) a single measure or in the form of dual identity, respectively, a significant determinant. Those findings lend support to previous results in the literature that national identity positively predicts political interest among immigrants in European countries (Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010). Further, my study validates the usefulness of dual identity not only for the prediction of collective action (intentions) (e.g. Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008) but also for more conventional political attitudes such as general political interest. Moreover, the analyses in Chapter 3 depicted that the effect of national identity on interest in national politics may be indeed mediated for newcomers from Turkey in Germany by host-country language proficiency, as well as gaining informal and formal (i.e. organisational) contacts to Germans. However, according to the regression results, there seems also to be a drawback related to organisational membership among Turkish immigrants: thus, interethnic social contacts in associations may lead to experiences of discrimination, which undermine the positive effect of national identification.

All of this leads me to conclude that national identification may act as a psychological bridge to involve migrants in the political system of European receiving countries in terms of internal political attitudes that address the self-image s/he develops about her/his place and role in the political system. This not only applies in terms of a single national identity but also in terms of a combined dual identity, which additionally involves the minority ethnic identity. However, at the same time it applies that also an ethnic identity may not per se indicate a barrier to migrants' interest in politics within receiving countries, but may also act as a bridge in the case of dual identity. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the effects are simple and the same for different immigrant groups. Thus, my research reveals that the positive effect of German identity on German politics is moderated and mediated group-specifically. Moreover, the impact of dual identity on general political interest is dependent on perceived discrimination and seems to be stronger for Turkish immigrants.

6.2.3 Satisfaction with democracy in Germany

In Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis, I focused on the relationship between migrants' religious (i.e. Muslim versus Christian) identity and their political attitude towards the political system of Germany in terms of satisfaction with the democratic regime. I contributed to the literature by moving beyond primarily essentialist positions on alleged conflictive cultural values of Islam (e.g. Huntington 1996) by explaining the impact of religious identity by a social psychological identity perspective (e.g. Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987; Verkuyten 2007). Accordingly, I have argued that the religious identity effect relates to the social and thereby personal (well-being) experience that the membership in a religious community provides for the individual immigrant within the receiving society context, which has an impact on how responsively s/he perceived a democratic regime. I therefore further perceived religious identity as a multidimensional concept, involving religious self-categorisation as well as religious social behaviour. This differentiation yielded different predictions concerning the effect of religious identity. On the one hand, through positive in-group references as well as democratic socialisation mechanisms following from social capital literature (e.g. Putnam 2000), I suggested positive effects of religious service attendance on migrants' democracy satisfaction regardless of denominational belonging. On the other hand, I argued that immigrants' self-categorisation as a member of a religious category relates to intergroup experiences (e.g. of discrimination) that alienate immigrant Muslim self-identifiers more strongly from the political regime than Christian self-identifiers. Within the social identity perspective of multiple group memberships that individuals possess, I further proposed that the

negative Muslim membership effect may be dependent on immigrants' belonging to the second generation, as well as ethnically belonging to the Turkish group.

The longitudinal analyses (i.e. correlated random-effects models) on data of two waves of GSOEP (2005, 2010) confirmed as anticipated that the expressive component of religious identity (i.e. religious service attendance) indeed relates positively to EU- as well as non-EU-migrants' satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany regardless of denomination, ethnic origin, immigrant generation or other factors. In contrast, the effect of religious self-categorisation as Muslim is more complex and is conditional on migrants' ethnic origin. Thus, only for immigrants of Turkish origin does Muslim self-identification significantly predict democracy satisfaction negatively, while there is a positive effect for all non-Turkish immigrants, independently of whether they have their ethnic origin within an EU or non-EU country. The analyses further revealed that the Turkish-Muslim effect seems to be specific to the second generation as well as weekly mosque goers. Moreover, my results further fit the arguments derived by the social identity literature proposing that personal life satisfaction (i.e. well-being), as well as perceived discrimination may be significant determinants of immigrants' satisfaction with democracy. Last but not least, my regression analyses also indicated a positive impact of migrants' national identity on democracy satisfaction, which may flow through higher personal well-being (i.e. life satisfaction).

Taken as a whole, the findings of my longitudinal study on German data contradict prevalent assumptions of a per se destructive (i.e. barrier) effect of religious (i.e. Muslim) identity on the affect that immigrants manifest towards the political regime of European democracies. In terms of being satisfied with the democratic regime in Germany, the effect seems to be specific to the experiences of second-generation (i.e. German-born) Turkish immigrants who attend religious services at least once a week. Those experiences may involve higher discrimination experiences as well as experiences of lower social positions within the status hierarchy of German society. My findings with respect to denominational belonging thus rather confirm results that have also shown previously that Muslim belonging does not self-evidently relate to lower external political attitudes such as trust in government or democracy satisfaction (e.g. Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 82ff.; Maxwell 2010b). I further conclude from my findings that national identity may be a bridge to migrants' attitudinal inclusion into mainstream politics in Germany in terms of positive external evaluations of the political regime through increasing well-being.

6.3 Implications

Even though there should be some words of caution with respect to my doctoral research (see section 6.4), I argue that the empirical studies within Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis can put some emphasis on the notion that migrants' social identities in terms of ethnic, religious, and/or national identity make a difference for their attitudinal integration into politics of Western European countries, involving attitudes towards the self in mainstream politics as well as attitudes towards the dominant political regime.

Which elements then should be taken into account when assessing the impact of national identity on immigrants' attitudinal integration for policy implications? First, my analyses suggest that national identity is affected by and itself predicts bridging social contacts and (associational) networks, German-language proficiency, as well as levels of perceived discrimination, which have been found also by previous research to matter for immigrants' political attitudes such as political interest or political trust (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Morales and Pilati 2011; van Craen 2012). Thus, the support of migrants' social as well as language inclusion by means of language classes, civic integration courses, or civil integration projects in Germany (already at the beginning of their stay) may provide pathways to promote their identification with the national political community, as well as at the same time their interest in national politics as well as satisfaction with the democratic regime. Moreover, stimulating migrants' social and language assimilation may decrease perceptions of ethnic discrimination and cultural incompatibilities – reflecting bright ethnic boundaries – which seem to hamper, according to my analysis, national identity as well as democracy satisfaction.

Is it important that minority group members also identify (in addition) with their ethnic and religious in-group for their attitudinal integration into politics of the receiving country? There are indeed reasons to believe that ethnic and religious identities are important. Thus, nonetheless of the meaning of national identification, this dissertation also dwells on the importance of dual identity on political interest defined as immigrants' identification with their ethnic in-group as well as the national community in their country of reception, specifically for immigrant groups that are known on the one hand to strongly identify with their ethnic in-group as well as on the other hand experience that their ethnic identity is devalued within the reception context and intergroup boundaries are impermeable. This is, for instance, the case for Turkish immigrants in Germany due to lower status positions and social distances by the majority group. Thus, an ethnic identity may provide an important part of immigrants' self-concept that gets

them cognitively involved in receiving-country politics. Most importantly, there is also no indication from previous research so far that dual identity relates to any form of violent or non-normative political actions (Simon and Grabow 2010). Hence, the acceptance of migrants' ethnic minority besides the support of a shared national identity might also be a promising pathway to migrants' attitudinal integration into politics in host societies. This also gains weight especially under the consideration that it is unlikely that immigrants abandon their psychological membership with their ethnic origin and group when entering new intergroup contexts such as in the case of multicultural receiving countries. Rather, they provide according to social identity approach important parts of migrants' self-references that are involved with subjective self-esteem and well-being, that may buffer negative experiences of discrimination (e.g. Branscombe et al. 1999). Thus, it can be expected that ethnic identity may also positively affect evaluations of responsiveness and legitimacy of the democratic political system if they perceive that their identity is not threatened and devalued due to low social status or cultural non-recognition. Moreover, empirical reality and research show that immigrants prefer and are more likely to identify in dual terms (e.g. Verkuyten 2007), and dual identity is related to higher self-esteem and well-being (e.g. Berry 1997).

In a similar vein, my argument also concerns the meaning of migrants' religious minority identity for their attitudinal integration into politics in European receiving countries. Thus, my research shows that belonging to Islam has a substantial positive impact on regime satisfaction in Germany for all non-Turkish EU- as well as non-EU-immigrant groups. Only for Turkish immigrants with an emphasis on the second generation as well as weekly mosque attendance Muslim belonging relates to significantly lower levels of satisfaction with the German democratic regime than for religiously non-affiliated or Christian-affiliated persons. Even though time-constant omitted variables as well as perceptions of discrimination or differences in well-being and other integration factors such as structural integration cannot completely account for the differences found between Turkish and non-Turkish immigrant groups within my longitudinal analysis, they yield to being important determinants of immigrants' current satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany. Hence, discrimination and joblessness are obstacles for migrants' regime satisfaction. However, further research is needed to disentangle the different meanings Muslim-being has for Turkish or non-Turkish immigrant's satisfaction with democracy.

In sum, my doctoral research, together with earlier studies, underlines that national identity has a bridging potential to generate interest in German politics as well as democracy satisfaction among immigrants and thus to foster migrant attitudinal integration into receiving-

country politics. Moreover, it highlights a more complex view on the bridging versus hampering functions of migrants' ethnic and religious minority identity, refuting a simplistic assumption of barriers to migrants' psychological inclusion in receiving-country politics.

6.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research

For the empirical analysis, this doctoral thesis used unique longitudinal data from two important panel projects that allow assessment of the integration of immigrants in Germany (SCIP and GSOEP). While the former project tackles within two waves the integration of recently immigrated Polish and Turkish immigrants who have not stayed longer than three years in Germany, the latter provide information over more waves on the integration of first- and second-generation immigrants, who have lived for a longer time in Germany. By employing longitudinal data and hybrid regression methods, the research in this doctoral thesis is superior to previous cross-sectional research on the same topic. Most of all, it more convincingly allows tackling the question of causality with respect to time-variant variables as identification because the hybrid regression models employed control for unobserved heterogeneity due to the omission of any time-constant variables. Moreover, those models allow assessment of the effects of time-variant (e.g. social identification) as well as time-invariant variables (e.g. ethnicity) at the same time.

Despite the general advantages and contributions of my doctoral research to shed light on the relationship between migrants' social identities and political attitudes, as with many other researchers, also I am confronted with some limitations that I use as starting point to propose suggestions for future research.

The models presented in this dissertation can be expanded in several ways. One of them involves tackling at another time more thoroughly about the question of causality. Despite the advantage of controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and my effort to control for time-variant confounding factors, the hybrid models used within this dissertation do not completely rule out unobserved heterogeneity due to the omission of time-variant variables as well as reverse causality (cf. Brüderl 2010, 992). Even though it is harder to argue in the case of religious identity and democracy satisfaction that democracy satisfaction impacts on religious belonging and church attendance, in the case of the relationship between nation (dual) identity and political interest, the influence may also flow the other way around from interest in German politics to identification with Germany. Accordingly, I propose to interpret my conclusions on these data in very cautious causal terms. A supplementing approach in the case

of at least three waves of empirical data might be the employment of fixed-effects models with lagged independent variables, as suggested by Allison (2009) to tackle reverse causality more profoundly.

Second, an extension can include the use of scales to measure immigrants' political interest or satisfaction with the democratic regime. In the present thesis, political interest was generally conceptualised as involving three concepts (i.e. political attentiveness, saliency, and motivation), yet in the end it was only operationalized by using a single item. Although this single-item procedure was determined by the information available in my data and is also commonly used in other research (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fennema and Tillie 1999), it would be worthwhile to expand the operationalisation of the concept using more items, which may also increase reliability as well as validity. Similarly, with respect to migrants' external political attitudes, the focus can be broadened with respect to political satisfaction to other objects of the political system, involving the democratic government, institutions, authorities, and so forth. Specifically, with respect to trust, previous research on ethnic minorities already includes more items (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 2010a).

Relatedly, a third extension can address further indicators of migrants' social identities. In this doctoral thesis, I was constrained to single-item or two-item measures of migrants' national or ethnic and religious identity. However, research proposes that identification is multidimensional, involving further aspects than attachment, pride, or importance, such as sense of interdependence, content and meaning, or social embeddedness (see for items and measures Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Moreover, within US research several ethnic identity scales, such as the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) by Phinney (1992) or the Ethnic Identity Scale (EIS) by Umaña-Taylor et al. (2004) have been developed, which measure different dimensions of ethnic identity, involving exploration, affirmation, or commitment. However, those scales are less employed thus far within immigrant surveys in Germany, even though multi-item measures are more regularly used within Dutch social psychological research (e.g. Verkuyten 2007). Thus, I am aware that this dissertation does not cover all subdimensions of migrants' social identities and specifically religious identity, for which I could only rely on a type of self-categorisation measure as well as the measures of religious social behaviour in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, the single-item approach is also in line with other current studies on the impact of social identity and migrants' political attitudes (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 2010b).

Concerning political interest, there is a general lack of appropriate measures that capture its different aspects (i.e. attentiveness, importance, motivation) or address what “politics” or “political” may imply for the respondent. Rather, political interest is measured only by one single question such as in SOEP: “Generally speaking, how much are you interested in politics?”. This measurement strategy is flawed in terms of reliability and validity. Even more problematic with respect to content validity in integration research is that this question in SOEP does not address the immigrant situation of different contexts of inclusion and thus whether it addresses political issues of the origin country or the host society. The problem is not completely solved with the item involved in the SCIP-data as “interest in receiving country politics” still leaves open what politics might refer to and what content is implied for the migrant. Thus, political interest in receiving country politics may also relate to ethnic group-specific interests (e.g. assertion of religious rights) or may involve anti-democratic or radical democratic views. These measurement problems can conceptually and statistically partly be solved by the thesis ex-ante and well as ex-post empirical analysis. First, the thesis conceptually differentiates and measures with political interest and democracy satisfaction both an example of migrants’ internal political attitudes as well as migrants’ external political attitudes. Even though political interest may still involve ethnic or religious group-specific content in terms of collective interests, the thesis argues that it may provide an indicator of migrants’ attitudinal inclusion as long as it evokes political activity within realms and means of the political system of the receiving country. Thus, possible activities may involve wide range of conventional as well as unconventional forms, e.g. voting as well as protesting. Moreover, ex post empirical analysis, the thesis argues that political interest may rather refer to interest in political issue of the receiving country as opposed to the origin country political system because the inclusion indicators with respect to the host society (e.g. majority language proficiency and native contacts) proves to predict political interest positively, while the reverse is true for ethnic group-related indicators (e.g. ethnic identification) (cf. results in Chapter 3 and 4).

Last but not least, a fourth research expansion can include sampling larger sizes of immigrant groups coming from predominantly Muslim countries to assess more profoundly the meaning of Muslim identity for migrants’ political integration in Germany. Within my studies on the SCIP and GSOEP data, I was mainly constrained to Muslim immigrants from Turkey and needed to subsume other countries in GSOEP within a broad ethnically diverse category. Further SOEP does not allow to detect issues of their legal status with respect to the question of asylum seekers. This research expansion especially gains momentum in the context of

current increasing influxes of refugees from Muslim countries other than Turkey, such as from countries in the Middle East or North Africa.

In sum, I conclude that this doctoral thesis yields a number of important (longitudinal) insights that contribute in several ways to the current scientific and research literature on migrants' social identities and attitudinal integration into politics within Western European countries. Nonetheless, more work still needs to be done to untangle the relationship between migrants' emotional integration on the one hand and their (attitudinal) integration into politics on the other hand.

6.5 References

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