



**ROLE OF JAMIAT-ul-ULEMA IN THE  
FREEDOM MOVEMENT  
(1937-1947)**


**DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
Political Science**

**BY  
Qazi Mohammad Jamshed**

*Under the Supervision of*  
**Dr. Shan Mohammad**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY,  
ALIGARH (INDIA)**


**1987**



27 SEP 1988

161 21 Con. 11/12

*Bu*  
CHECKED-2002



DS1252

## C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
P r e f a c e	.... i - vii
Chapter I : INTRODUCTION	.... i - 68
1.1 role of Deobandi Ulema in the First war of Independence.	.... 1 - 6
1.2 Formation of the Jamiat- ul-Ulema-e-Hind, aims and Objectives.	.... 7 - 12
1.3 Jamiat-ul-Ansar and Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi The Deobandi group.	.... 12 - 19
1.4 Founder of the Jamiat- ul-Ulema.	.... 19 - 22
1.5 Reaction to the Nehru Report.	.... 23 - 30
1.6. Khalifat Movement	.... 3 - 38
1.7 Muttafiqa Fatwa	.... 38 - 46
1.8 Shuddhi and Sangathan Movement.	.... 47 - 49
1.9 Council entry	.... 50 - 61
1.10 Civil Disobedience Movement.	.... 61 - 68
Chapter II : GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935 AND MUSLIM MASS CONTACT MOVEMENT.	.... 69 - 109
2.1 Formation of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board.	.... 79 - 85
2.2 Muslim Mass Contact campaign	.... 85 - 109
Chapter III : JAMIAT FROM THE WORLD WAR II TO THE QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT	.... 110 - 134
3.1 Reaction to the World War II.	.... 110 - 116

	<u>Page</u>
3.2 The August Offer	.... 116 - 123
3.3 Cripps Mission	.... 123 - 128
3.4 Quit India Movement	.... 128 - 134
<b>Chapter IV : JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN.</b>	.... 135 - 193
4.1 Lahore Resolution and the Formation of All-India Azad Muslim Conference.	.... 135 - 147
4.2 Muttahida Qaumiyyat.	.... 147 - 155
4.3 Jamiat-Analysed the Lahore Resolution.	.... 158 - 162
4.4 Not an Islamic State.	.... 162 - 171
4.5 A hindrance to the Missionary activity.	.... 171 - 173
4.6 Various Aspects of Pakistan analysed.	.... 173 - 178
4.7 Jamiat Formula.	.... 178 - 182
4.8 Pakistan not an alternative.	.... 182 - 186
4.9 Formation of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam as a Counter Organisation.	.... 187 - 188
4.10 General Election of 1945 and the defeat of Ulema.	.... 188 - 190
4.11 The last Phase.	.... 190 - 193
<b>C o n c l u s i o n</b>	.... 194 - 206
<b>APPENDICES</b>	.... 207 - 212
<b>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	.... 213 - 227

## P R E F A C E

In the twilight of a vague religio-political discontentment of the first two decades of the twentieth century, there appeared on the dark political horizon of India an organisation of Ulema known as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, comprising of the Ulema of all shades of opinion. It was the exigencies of time which produced the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. The Muslim leadership at that time was like a house divided amongst themselves. It goes to the genius of Mawlana Abdul Bari who tirelessly tried to forge an united front with the help of the Ulema and brought them on a common platform. He showed a rare example of organisation and persuasion and brought Ulema on a common platform and made them realise the acute need to organise themselves into a religio-political body for safeguarding the Islamic Shariah. The achievement of independence was always one of its prime goal. Though the Ulema were making their presence in different organisations in their individual capacity, but they always felt the need of an All-India Association of Ulema, through which they could ventilate their grievances and act as a pressure group on the government and to speak more unitedly and authoritatively on behalf of Muslim India.

An analysis of the aims and objective of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema reveal its dual loyalty to Islam and Islamic

countries on one hand and to India on the other. However it goes to the genius of the leaders of the Jamiat that their determination to safeguard the Islamic shariah did not come in their way to contribute to the cause of freedom. They made a happy blending of religion and politics and thus justified through their role that there was no need of divorcing religion from politics. Both could operate side by side provided the hold of string remained in the hands of men of qualities as the ulema proved to be.

The Jamiat rightly diagnosed that it was only because of their supremacy over Muslim countries of Middle East that the Imperial England was keeping its hold on India. On account of this the Jamiat thought it to be its religious as well as national duty to fight against British imperialism.

At that time the two principal centres of Muslim learning- Aligarh and Deoband had emerged as rival camps, each projecting the view of the rival Muslim political parties - the Muslim League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema respectively. On one hand the Muslim League incited the Muslims for the vivisection of the country, then on the other hand there were Ulema-e-Haq, who from the Jamiat platform, devoted their indefatigable energy to oppose the partition, keeping before their eyes the better future of Islam and Muslims in India. Their sincerity and devotion to the cause was beyond doubt. But their contribution to the cause of Indian

independence has been totally forgotten and it is the crying need of the time to highlight their role in the struggle for freedom. Therefore an attempt in the present dissertation has been made to study what the Ulema and nationalist Muslims had done in the freedom movement in India. They opposed the partition as they were convinced that it would be of no use for the people. They dreamt of an united India which could have best solved the Hindu-Muslim problems.

The first chapter deals with the political background and highlights the political development of the period under study. I have presented a gist of the role of Jamiat-ul-Ulema from the days of its formation to the Partition of India. In this chapter, besides other issues, I have dealt extensively with Jamiat-ul-Ansar and Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi which have wrongly been regarded as the predecessors of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. I have also touched the controversial points regarding the founder of Jamiat-ul-Ulema.

The second chapter describes the formation of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and the Muslim Mass Contact Movement. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema had joined the Muslim League in the general election of 1937 as Jinnah had made it clear that he was tired of the reactionary elements in the Muslim League who looked to their interest more than the community

and national interest and were always ready to sacrifice them to suit British policy: The Jamiat leaders seized this opportunity to keep the reactionaries out of the Legislature. But the attitude of Mohammad Ali Jinnah at the very first conference of the working committee of Muslim League Parliamentary Board at Lucknow was shocking to the Jamiat leadership. At this meeting of the working committee Jinnah tried to enlist the agriculturists in the League as he realised that there was no way out but to gain their support, due to the paucity of funds. Thus the wrong policy of the Muslim League alienated the Ulema and they, at the Allahabad meeting of the Muslim leaders, joined the Congress as the Congress creed was in consonance with the Jamiat creed in fighting the reactionary elements. Complete cleavage between the Jamiat and the Muslim League was thus accrued and the Jamiat cooperated the Congress in its programme of Muslim Mass Contact which was very much disturbing to Jinnah.

The third chapter deals with the war situation and other constitutional proposals which followed the Quit-India Movement.

In the fourth chapter the Lahore resolution and the opposition of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema has been discussed. This period presents an interesting picture of Muslim politics

in India. By that time the two principal centres of Muslim learning - Aligarh and Deoband collided against each other in deciding the final destiny of Muslim India, each accusing the other of doing fatal damage to the cause of Islam. It would have been better if they had cooperated with each other in deciding the final destiny of Muslims in India. Both quite sincerely desired the welfare to the Muslims, but differed in their approach to the problem. It puzzles the readers that if the Jamiat was very much concerned for the preservation and safeguard of the Islamic Shariah then why it did not demand Pakistan. I have to my best ability tried to answer these questions.

The whole theme has been summarised in the conclusion.

With great esteem and reverence I wish to acknowledge my immense debt of gratitude to my Supervisor Dr. Shan Mohammad, Department of Political Science, for his valuable guidance, timely suggestions and assistance in the present work. His constant encouragement, affection, dedication and constructive criticism have enabled me to finish this work.

My interest in this subject was aroused by my erudite teacher professor A.F.Usmani, Chairman, Department of

Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. He suggested me to undertake this project. His constant guidance and valuable suggestion guided and shaped my study. I am beholden to him.

A number of institutions have aided me in the preparation of this dissertation. The librarian/Zakir Husain Library, Jamia Milya Islamia, provided me full sets of the Madina which has now practically been extinct in India. I am thankful to Nigar Noman of Zakir Husain Library also for helping me. The National Archives of India, New Delhi enabled me to have access to the proceedings of the Home Department. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library placed at my disposal the All India Congress Committee papers and Abdul Bari papers. I am thankful to the staff of the microfilm section who allowed me to see the microfilm of the Hindustan Times, The Times of India, The Statesman, The Muslim outlook, The Leader, The Al-Jamiat, The Bombay Chronicles etc. The Presidential Address of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the minutes of the Working Committee, available on microfilm in the Nehru Memorial Museum, greatly helped me in clearing various cobwebs surrounding the crucial period of Jamiat-ul-Ulema. I am thankful to the Director, Indian Council for Social Science Research for granting me study grant which, to a some extent, solved the monetary problem.

I will be failing in my duty if I miss to thank Mawlana Asad Madani, the President, of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, who very kindly allowed me to have access to the various pamphlets of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, issued from time to time, which was a great source of help to me. The Librarian of Mahmoodia Library, Jamiatul Ulema, Mr. Habibullah took keen interest in making available to me the rare pamphlets and booklets. I am beholden to them all.

I take this opportunity to thank my brother Mr. Qazi Mohammad Junaid with whom I always exchanged views, which developed greater insight into the subject. I am also thankful to Mr. S.M. Anwar Husain, Mr. Waseem Ahmad Qadri, Mr. Irshad Ahmad, Lecturer in Mechanical Engg. Mr. Noshad Ahmad for helping me at various stages of my study.

I am indebted to my friends Mr. Tariq Saeed and Mr. Shabbir Ahmad for their kind help.

Department of Political Science  
Aligarh Muslim University  
Aligarh

8th July, 1987.

QAZI MOHD. JAMSHED

C H A P T E R    I

INTRODUCTION

## I N T R O D U C T I O N

The ulema had been very active in politics since the rise of British power in India. They led the Wahabi Movement against the British and participated in the first war of independence in 1857. In this struggle the Ulema of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband were in the forefront.

Prominent figures amongst the Deobandi Ulema involved in the revolt were Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi. Shamli, near Saharanpur,<sup>1</sup> was their secret meeting place. Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi succeeded in overcoming the difficulties created by the fatwa of Mawlana Sheikh Mohammad, an authority on Muslim Shariah at that time, who declared that Jihad against the Britishers was neither obligatory nor lawful in the then prevailing<sup>2</sup> condition.

However, by the counter efforts of Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi, Jihad was launched against the British Government in India. Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi were named as Imam of the Jihad, Commander of the forces

- 
1. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Nagsha-e-Hiyat, Volume II, (Deoband, 1954), p. 43.
  2. Mawlana Sheikh Mohammad was not against Jihad against the Britishers but his contention was that time was not ripe and they were ill equipped. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

and Qazi respectively.<sup>3</sup> Mujahideen running into thousands gathered<sup>a</sup> round them and made great sacrifices under their leadership. Mawlana Husain Ahmad gives an account of how these people defied the British attempt to capture them and falling into the hands of the Britishers following the<sup>4</sup> suppression of the upsurge.

The biographers of these three Ulema of Deoband have tried to raise a controversy regarding their participation in the Mutiny. For example Mawlana Mohammad Yaqub Nanautavi has given an entirely different version of Mawlana Qasim's activities during the stormy period of 1857, which he published after the death of Mawlana Qasim in 1880. To Mawlana Mohammad Yakub Nanautavi who himself had witnessed the revolt, men like Imdadullah, Mawlana Qasim and Mawlana Gangohi were<sup>5</sup> miles away from creating any disturbance. This impression has also been confirmed by Ashiq Ilahi, the biographer of<sup>6</sup> Rashid Ahmad Gangohi.

---

3. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., p. 43.

4. Ibid., pp. 53-62.

5. Mohammad Yaqub Nanautavi, Savanih Umri (Bhawalpur, 1897), p.47.

6. Ashiq Ilahi, Tazkirat-ul-Rashid (In 2 volumes), Volume I, (Meerut, 1908), p.73.

Another biographer Maw<sup>7</sup>lana Manazir Gilani holds that Mawla<sup>7</sup>na Qasim had nothing to do with the activities of those who participated in the Mutiny for wholly worldly benefits. While pointing that Qasim was miles away from creating any disturbance, Maw<sup>7</sup>lana Gilani thinks that since the time was not favourable when the first biography was written, the biographer used words which could give the impression that the Maw<sup>7</sup>lana was not involved in the revolt but at the same time could be understood to mean that he had participated<sup>8</sup> in the Mutiny with a different and a nobler motive.

About Ulema Professor Mushirul Haq says that they were wanted by the British Government. But as a matter of fact, the Ulema were not on the official list of the rebels for about 2 years after the mutiny was suppressed in Thane<sup>9</sup> Bhawan.

Ashiq Illahi says that they were branded as rebels to their Government, on the basis of false information<sup>10</sup> supplied by Qazi Mahbub Ali in August 1859. This version

---

7. Manazir Ahsan Gilani, Savanih Qasimi, Volume I, (Deoband, 1953).

8. Ibid., Volume II, pp.95-96.

9. Mushirul Haq, Muslim Politics in Modern India (Meerut, 1970), p.14.

10. Ashiq Illahi, op.cit., p. 73.

is supported by Mushirul Haq on the point that since Qazi Mahbub Ali was the main rebel, so the former one tried to divert the attention of the Government by directing their attention to the wrong direction (to the Ulema and other religious personalities), which was not strange and the Ulema were no exception.<sup>11</sup>

The official report about the Mutiny contained in the book entitled Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh,<sup>12</sup> does not mention the name of any of these three prominent Ulema i.e. Mawlana Imdadullah, Mawlana Qasim and Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi or the part played by them in the revolt. The said source refers Inayat Ali as the leader. It is said that Qazi Inayat Ali rose in rebellion against the Britishers<sup>13</sup> to avenge the execution of his brother Abdul Rahim.

In fact, there were a class of well known Ulema who actually did not cooperate or otherwise remained aloof from the mainstream of the revolt. Rahmat Ali has enlisted the name of 5 Ulema out of 76 originally declared by the British

---

11. Mushirul Haqq, op.cit., p. 15.

12. Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh : Source Material, six volume, Lucknow, 1961 (consolidated Index and chronology).

13. Ibid., Volume, V, p.133.

14  
Officers who had taken part in the revolt. Refuting this allegation Mushirul Haq argues that Mawlana Mohammad Ismail, now known as Shah Ismail Shahid, whose name was found in the Mutiny papers had died long before the revolt, his name appears in the Mutiny paper as the putative writer of a book Risalah-e-Jihad. Three of the five alims like Fazl-i-Rasul Badauni, Mufti Sadruddin and Fazl-i-Haq Khairabadi were in the service of the East India Company and had hardly any sympathy with the activities of the Mutineers.<sup>15</sup> The fifth alim far from being in the good books of the rebels had actually offended the rebel leader Bakht Khan, because he had given protection to a number of Christians.<sup>16</sup> In the light of these authentic sources, Mushirul Haq concludes that even those **five Ulema** whose name was **referred** to in the Mutiny records were not actually on the side of the Mutineers.<sup>17</sup>

Here it must be admitted that the British officers did not have any clear conception about "What and who was the Ulema" as according to Mushirul Haq, the subtle distinction between an alim and his counterpart misled many of the British

- 
14. Rahman Ali, Tazkirah Ulama-i Hind ed. and translated into Urdu by Mohammad Ayyub Qadiri (Karachi, 1961), p.412.
  15. Mushirul Haq, op.cit., p. 3.
  16. Freedom Struggle, op.cit., Volume V, p.329.
  17. Mushirul Haq, op.cit., p.4.

18  
officers of India, especially during the revolt of 1857.  
Hence it can be derived that there might had been other  
Ulema who actually participated in the revolt, than those  
actually recorded by the British officers in the Revolt.

The development in the West-Asian countries had greatly pained the Indian Muslims. The annulment of the partition of Bengal had further administered a severe blow to them. The Tripoli-Balkan wars was another straw into the camel's back. The Khilafat episode proved to be the last nail. The Muslim divines and theologians came out of their slumbering life of Khanqas and Madrasas and started taking part in the political activity, to guide the Muslims both in political and religious matters. They regarded themselves as the sole interpreter of Islamic Shariah. Any political activity in which they engaged was to them an

---

18. Ibid., p.2.

19. Though a number of prominent Ulema like Mawlana Abdul Bari, and Ali brothers etc. were already active in Indian politics, the Balkan Wars, the Kanpur mosque crisis, the development in West Asia were such issues which attracted theologians to undertake heavy responsibility. But the Khilafat issue brought all shades of Muslim opinion on the national platform and they clustered around the Ulema like Abdul Bari and Ali brothers. Hitherto, they were confined to the Muslim religious institutions and spending an inactive life but now they were active.

extension and their primary role as the custodians and  
intepreters of Islamic Law and religious practice. This<sup>20</sup>  
attitude was exemplified in the efforts to organise an  
All - India Association of Ulema under the supervision  
of Mawlana Abdul Bari, and Mufti-e-Azam, Mufti Kifayatullah<sup>21</sup>  
in October 1918. This quest for an organisation of Ulema  
reached perfection when the Ulema after the Khilafat Con-  
ference in Delhi assembled in a meeting and consequently the<sup>22</sup>  
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind came into existence. According to  
Qazi Adeel Abbasi, the editor of the Urdu newspaper the  
'Zamindar' and a man who was involved in the Khilafat Move-  
ment, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema came into existence in the wake  
of the Khilafat Movement. Ulema of different school of  
thought had assembled at Delhi to attend the Khilafat Con-  
ference followed by a meeting of Ulema, with the object of  
creating a political organisation which was to be guided by<sup>23</sup>  
the law of Shariah.

---

20. Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement : Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization In India, (Oxford Press, Delhi, 1982), p.79.

21. Gail Minault, op.cit., p.79.

22. Syed Tufail Ahmad, Ruh Roshan Mustaqbil (Badaun 1946), pp. 84-85.

23. Qazi Adeel Abbasi, Tahrik-e-Khilafat (Taragqi Urdu Board, New Delhi, 1978), p.60.

Though the Ulema had been actively participating in different organisations in their individual capacity but they needed an association through which they could speak to the Government with a<sup>24</sup> united authoritative voice. -

At the Amritsar meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema held on 28th December 1919, the aims and objectives of the Jamiat<sup>25</sup> were laid down. The chief feature of its aims and objectives

---

24. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 8.

25. The aims and objectives of the Jamiat were the followings

- (1) To guide the followers of Islam in their political and non-political matters from a religious point of view.
- (2) To defend Islam, centres of Islam (Jazirat-ul-Arab and seat of Khilafat), Islamic Rituals and Customs and Islamic Nationalism Against all odds injurious to them.
- (3) To achieve and protect the general religious and rational rights of the Muslims.
- (4) To organise the Ulema on a common platform.
- (5) To organise the Muslim community and launch a programme for its moral and social reform.
- (6) To establish good and friendly relations with the non-Muslims of the countries to the extent permitted by the Shariah-i-Islamiyah.
- (7) To fight for the freedom of the country and religion according to the Shariah objectives.
- (8) To establish Mahakim-e-Shariyah (religious courts) to meet the religious needs of the community.
- (9) To propagate Islam by way of missionary activities in India and foreign lands.

Contd.....

was the safeguarding of Islamic Shariah and to give political guidance of the Muslim community in accordance with the tenets of Islamic Law. But its determination to safeguard the Islamic Shariah did not come in its way of contributing to the cause of freedom struggle. By giving emphasis on Islamic Shariah it never intended to establish an Islamic state. The motivating factor behind this emphasis was simply the prosecution of Islamic law which concerns the personal life of Muslims e.g. marriage, divorce and inheritance etc.

The Jamiat considered the very presence of British rule in India to be the root cause of British supremacy

---

(Continued from the previous page)

- (10) To maintain and strengthen bonds of unity and fraternity (as ordained by Islam) with the Muslims of other countries.

See Asasi Usul-o-Aghaz-o-Magasiid-o-Zawabit-e-Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind: Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, Mukhtasar Halat Inaqad, b.16. In order to meet the exigencies of time clause 2,7,8,9 was amended and replaced by the following provisions:

- (2) To protect Islam, centre of Islam (Hijaz and Jazirat-ul Arab) and Islamic rites and usages and defend Islamic nationalism against all odd injurious to it.
- (7) Complete independence of the nation and the country according to Sharia objectives.
- (8) To organise the Millat-Islamiyah into a Sharia body and establish Mahakim-i-Shariah.
- (9) To work for the religious, educational, moral, social and economic reforms of the Muslims and to propagate Islam by way of missionary activities in India.

Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, Deoband School and Demand for Pakistan (Bombay, 1966), p.68; See also Mohammad Mian Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Kiya Hai, Volume I, (Jamiat Ulema, U.P. n.d.), p. 9.

over the Muslim countries of Middle East. On account of this perception the Jamiat thought it to be its religious as well as national duty to fight against the British imperialism. So the achievement of independence was its prime motive. Moreover, the Jamiat also considered the British Government to be chiefly responsible for the bitter communal relations and for creating a sort of fear in the mind of the Muslims.

The above ideas are also reflected in the Presidential Address of Allama Shah Muinuddin Ajmeri in the 9th session held of the Jamiat Ulema/in 1930. He is reported to have said, "Our greatest enemy is Great Britain who having India and her vast resources under her tyrannical occupation is the main cause for our degeneration and destruction and for the untold miseries and ruin in Islamic countries outside India. It is crystal clear that we will remain subjugated and downtrodden as long as India is under the British occupation. This is why the India Muslims have only one objective regarding the independence of India and that is that India must win complete freedom at all costs."

In Independent India, the Jamiat visualised the future confederation of two religious and political commu-

---

26. Khutba-e-Sadarat, delivered at the 9th session of the Jamiat-ul Ulema, held at Amroha, May 1930 (Al Jamiat Press, Delhi), p.25.

unities - Hindus and Muslims which would have fought shoulder to shoulder in ousting their common enemy from their mother land.<sup>27</sup> Speaking at the Jamiat meeting in November 1920 as its president Mohmood-ul-Hasan pleaded for Hindu-Muslim entente in order to furnish their joint venture.<sup>28</sup> Notwithstanding the overwhelming power of the majority community, the Jamiat held that so long as Hindu and Muslim remained united against the British, it had little effect if they were divided by religious or by different customs.

The Jamiat held the view that it had been enjoined on Muslims by Islam to fight for the freedom and independence of the country in which they live against the oppressor as only in an independent country the mandates of Islam as interpreted by the Ulema be applied to the Muslim community. But if Muslims fight single handed to achieve this objective,<sup>29</sup> only grief and humiliation would be in store. This would be

- 
27. Peter Hardy, Partners in Freedom and True Muslims : The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India 1912-1947 (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies 1971), p. 32; See also Mohammad Mian, op.cit., pp.40-42.
  28. Ibid., p. 32; Mohammad Mian, pp. 40-42.
  29. Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, Volume 2, compiled and edited by Najmuddin Islahi, Maktub No.33,pp.115-128.

disadvantageous from political and economic point of view top. Hence it was conceived that this could only be achieved successfully in cooperation with the other communities in India. Though the form of Government which would be established would not have an Islamic flavour, it would depend entirely on the missionary capacity of the Muslims to turn the tide in their favour. Viewed in this respect, the Jamiat considered the systems of Government which would be followed after independence as a lesser evil (AHUNUL BLATIN)<sup>30</sup>. Infact, the basic premises of the Jamiat was that once the British regime withdrew from this country, the Hindus would come to terms with the Muslims as the Muslims would be forming a strong minority and their legitimate interest could not be swamped by the majority.<sup>31</sup>

JAMIAT-UL-ANSAR AND JALSA-E-DASTARBANDI  
THE DEOBANDI GROUP

There has been a great deal of misconception about the Jamiat-ul-Ansar, an association of the old boys of Deoband, as being the predecessor of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi, held in 1910 at Deoband, had been

---

30. Muktubat-e-Shaikh-ul-Islam, Volume, 2, op.cit., pp.115-128

31. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 70.

regarded as an attempt to popularise the programme of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar.

Mawlana Mohammad Mian in his book, Ulema-e-Haq Volume I, holds that because of the vigilance of the Government everything was kept in secret. He further says that in order to popularise the programme of Jamiat-ul-Ansar Sheikhul Hind Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan instead of convening a conference on political level persuaded his colleagues in the administration of the Darul Uloom to hold the famous  
32  
Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi.

Refuting the above allegation as false Mawlana  
33  
Hafeezur Rehman in his booklet says that the presidential address of Shamsul Ulema Mawlana Hafeez Mohammad Ahmad would unfold motives behind 'Dastarbandi' crystal clear. He says that, "The benefit of holding Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi on the one hand is to make known to the Muslims about the ability and skill of the Dastars and on the other hand, to induce and stimulate the students. And its major benefit would be that the Muslim would be ready to contribute more actively

---

32. Saiyid Mohammad Mian, op.cit., pp. 130-131.

33. Hafeezur Rehman Wasif, Jamiat-ul-Ulema per Ek Tarikhi Tabsirah, (Kamal Press, Delhi, 1969), p.7.

to the Darul Uloom seeing their aid being utilised in proper  
34 manner." He further added that "being a Pan-Islamist we can  
become a trustee to the peace and public welfare, and also  
may be loyal and trustworthy to the Government. Shariah -  
35 never teaches us ingratitude, rebellion or breach of peace.'

Thus as a matter of fact Darul Uloom Deoband was  
primarily meant for Islamic teachings. It was miles way  
from political overtures. Well concerted and watchful  
attempts were made to keep it away from political issues in  
the country.

36

Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi, the Chief Director of  
of Jamiat-ul-Ansar himself elaborated the aims and objectives

---

34. Madarsa Islami Arabi, Deoband Ka Zarrin Mazee our Mustaqbil, p.27.

35. Ibid., p. 19.

36. Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi originally belonged to Sikh family. He embraced Islam while he was a school boy. The books like Tahfutul Hind and Tagwiyatul Islam by a Muslim preacher and Shah Ismail Shaheed respectively, had a revolutionary effect on his mind which prompted him to renounce Sikhism and accept Islam. After having served Hafiz Mohammad Siddiqui of Bharchondi (Sindh), a sufi, Obaidullah Sindhi finally came to Deoband where he was closely associated with Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan who acquainted him with the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi. Their teachings remained a torch bearer and guide throughout his life.

For a detailed study of Obaidullah Sindhi's early life and socio-political ideas see, Naimullah Khan, Political Ideas and role of Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi (an unpublished thesis) Aligarh Muslim University, 1981.

Contd.....

of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar. He says:

"Jamiat-ul-Ansar is the association of the old boys of Deoband which may take part subject to certain restraints,

---

(Continued from the previous page)

Obaidullah Sindhi wanted to enlist the graduates of Deoband in spreading the doctrine of Jihad throughout the sub-continent. But the problem with the management of Deoband was to save the institution from the British Government's onslaught. In the meantime differences arose between him and the Ulema of Deoband for his unorthodox ideas on the curriculum which led to his expulsion from professorship. Defeated from within he tried to achieve his objective from without and organised Naza'ratul Ma'arif in Delhi with the help of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Nawab Vigarul Mulk. The motive behind Ma'arif was to make the Muslim youths uninfluenced from the British Indian secular education by popularising the Islamic way of teaching. The school could not last long due to his involvement in the silk letter conspiracy which forced him to go abroad, See Mawlana Madani, op.cit., Volume II pp. 144-145.

37. Jamiat-ul-Ansar was the outcome of the bitter doctrinal battle between the nationalist group headed by Mahmood-ul-Hasan and puritanical and anti-Government group headed by Obaidullah Sindhi. The issue at point was certain reforms in the curriculum of the Deoband school and a straight forward struggle for power between the rival groups. Outmanoeuvred in his attempt Sindhi tried to achieve it from without by forming Jamiat-ul-Ansar. Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, (New Delhi 1975), pp. 269-70.

Though Professor Ziaul Hasan Farooqui is of the opinion that Jamiat-ul-Ansar was formed by Mahmudul Hasan yet in the light of the statements of 1917 by Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan and Nasrat Husain, his finding appear to be incorrect. Their statements testify that Mawlana Obaidullah was the founder of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar.

See, Home Poll, July 1918, 92-101.

Peter Hardy is wrong in saying that the Jamiat-ul-Ansar was founded to bridge the gulf and strengthen the fraternity between the Alumni of Deoband and Aligarh.

See, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge University Press 1972), p. 181.

in the affair of the Madarsa, as a brain and hand of the guardians of Deoband School. It has no relation with the national matters. The members of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar are the old boys of Deoband, on whom lies the duty to devote their energy in the development of funds and educational standard of the school."<sup>38</sup>

The first session of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar was held at Muradabad in 1911 where its President Mawlana Ahmad Hasan Amrohavi remarked that Jamiat-ul-Ansar was not an imitation of any other association, nor was it an embodiment of any one's personal and wordly ambitions. It included all the necessary and important objectives whose achievement was urgently needed.<sup>39</sup>

The clause "necessary and important objectives" has been interpreted by Professor Ziaul Hasan Farooqui as nothing than the motives underlying the programme of Shaikhul Hind,<sup>40</sup> an indication to the political objectives,

This assertion of Professor Farooqui comes in clash in the light of the aforesaid Muradabad session held in 1911. In the 5th sitting the members came out with seven proposals

---

38. Al-Qasim, a monthly Journal, Deoband, Volume I, Shumarah-9.

39. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, Volume I, op.cit., p.134.

40. Farooqui, op.cit., p. 58.

of purely academic and religious nature. One of them was to publish such magazines on a large scale, containing the teachings of Islam, and answer to the sectarians and faithfulness with the Government.<sup>41</sup>

#### THE DEOBANDI GROUP

It has to be kept in mind that the session in which the Jamiat-ul-Ulema was founded the Deoband group was not present.<sup>42</sup> This shows their aloofness with the movement. Again in its first session at Amritsar under the presidentship of Mawlana Abdul Bari in December, 1919 the Deobandi element was absent.<sup>43</sup> At the special session of the Jamiat at Calcutta on 6th December 1920 under the presidentship of Mawlana Taj Mohammad Sindhi, one does not come across the name of any Deobandi Ulema although Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani had returned from Malta at that time also did not attend the special conference.<sup>44</sup>

---

41. Al Qasim, op.cit., p. 9, Volume I.

42. See, Mukhtasar Halat Inagad; op.cit., p. 16.

43. See, The Proceedings of the First-Session held at Amritsar on 28th December 1919, available in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (microfilm).

44. Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., p. 215.

When Shaikhul Hind arrived India from the Malta prison he was warmly welcomed by the prominent leaders of both Hindu and Muslim at Bombay in 1920 and was acquainted with the latest political atmosphere of the country and when he was explained that the Ulema had formed their Jamiat-ul-Ulema Association he became very glad, and when he came to know that his disciples, who could have actively participated in the formation of the Jamiat, remained aloof, he expressed<sup>45</sup> his profound sorrow and displeasure.

Complete aloofness of the Deobandi group had been to such an extent that Shaikh-ul-Hind had to order Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad and Mawlana Murtaza Hasan to come from their home and cooperate with Mawlana Kifayatullah and Mawlana Ahmad Saeed in the management of the Jamiat session scheduled to be held<sup>46</sup> in Delhi.

Moreover, Professor Farooqui has himself written that the Jamiat had started as a body of Muslim religious leaders belonging to different schools but after the collapse of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements when the communal question had taken a different turn it generally came to be

---

45. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 362.

46. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., Volume I, p.262.

47

dominated by the Deobandi Ulema.

THE FOUNDER OF THE JAMIAT-UL-ULEMA

Shaikhul Hind Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan has widely been accepted as the founder of this organisation by several writers on Muslim politics in India. This seems paradoxical since at the time of the formation of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema he<sup>48</sup> was interned by the British Government at Malta. He was in strict vigilance and there was censorship on his letters<sup>49</sup> and correspondence. Thus he was completely cut off from what was going on in India and elsewhere. In this situation it was not even possible to be aware of relatives and friends not to talk of political matters.

There are a lot of conflicting and contradictory views expressed by writers about the men who happened to organise the

---

47. Ziaul Hasan Farooqi, op.cit., p.67. See also Robinson op.cit., p.354.

Shaikhul Hind Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan got the Deobandis into the Khilafat Movement. Untill this time, they had not been particularly active in what they perceived to be essentially a political movement, inspite of its religious background, Gail Minault, op.cit., p.17.

48. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Safarnama Asir-i-Malta, Deoband Saharanpur 1953-54), p.72.

49. Husain Ahmad Madani, Nagsha-e-Hiyat, Volume II, op.cit., p. 216.

movement within Indian politics. The version given by Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, Inayatullah of Firangi Mahli and Mawlana Sanauallah regarding the men who brought different Ulema are contradictory.<sup>50</sup> If Mawlana Inayatullah Firangi Mahli says that Mawlana Bari was the founder of this organisation, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and Sanauallah give some other names. That<sup>51</sup> these accounts are based cannot be ruled out.

According to Qazi Adeel Abbasi, who was very active in these days the idea to unite the Ulema representing wisdom and vision belonging to different school of thought on a common platform was conceived by Mawlana Bari who took the lead. He organised the Ulema on the tomb of Syed Rasulna of Delhi and acquainted them of the gravity of the situation and the necessity of finding an organisation exclusively of Ulema. He said:

"We solemnly take a plea to forge an united front on all the problems which concerned the nation and the Millat and all the ideological differences should not be allowed to undermine the unity....."<sup>52</sup>

---

50. For detail see, Hafeezur Rehman Wasif, op.cit., p.53.

51. Ibid., p. 54.

52. Qazi Adeel Abbasi, op.cit., p. 39.

If one keeps a close eye towards the activity of Mawlana Bari one would find that he was very much concerned with the unity of Ulema and his various speeches speak the truth themselves.

In his letter to an unnamed person in early 1919 Mawlana Bari wrote that the problem of defending the Khilafat and the holy places was essentially one of elucidating the Shariah and thus the Ulema should be the leaders of the Muslims in this issue. But he regretted that the Ulema were not organised into a body to express unified opinion on the law  
53  
and thereby to direct the Muslim opinion.

The spirit of this thinking is very much reflected in his address to various provincial Anjuman-e-Ulema and Sufi gathering during the year. In Bengal he quoted verses from the Holy Quran exhorting the followers to support one another for unity among the Ulema, and only then could they truly act  
54  
as an spiritual guide for the community.

---

53. Letter of Mawlana Bari to an unnamed person sometimes in early 1919, Mawlana Abdul Bari Papers.

54. Abdul Bari, "Presidential Address to the Anjuman-e-Ulema, Bengal, Chittagong"; (Al Nizamiah, Lucknow, December 1918-1919), pp. 1-13.

Another effort to bring Ulema on a common platform was done in the presidential address in which he appealed to the Ulema representing different conflicting schools of thought to cooperate among themselves and give a lead to the Ulema of Deoband, Bareilly, Badaun, Lucknow and Aligarh schools of thought.

At the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Muinuddin Chisti of Ajmer he took <sup>the</sup> advantage of the presence of Sufis and their disciples and urged them to unite on the Khilafat question. He further asked them to offer their prayers for the Caliph and called them to an All-India Conference.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema throughout its existence stood for unconditional cooperation with the Indian National Congress for the freedom of the country. The Ulema associated with it played a leading role in the Non-Cooperation and the Khilafat Movements and served as a bridge between Muslim masses and the Congress leadership. Due to this role the Jamiat leaders had to face persecution of the British Government in India on one hand and the wrath of Muslim League leaders on

---

55. Abdul Bari, Khutba-e-Sadarat (Presidential Address to the Anjuman-e-Ulema U.P. Kanpur April 1, 1920), pp.1-2.

56. Home (Poll) Deposit 1919, Proceedings 4.

the other who called them as traitors to Islam and mercenary  
57  
agents of Hindus.

However, inspite of its close association with  
nationalist movement Jamiat in pre-independence always  
tried to champion the cause of Muslims in its own way. This  
role of Jamiat can be seen in its opposition to the Nehru  
58  
Report which was also opposed by the Muslim League.

The Nehru Report was published on 16th of August 1928  
and on 28th December 1928 an All-Parties convention was to  
be held to review the recommendations of the report. In  
view of urgency the Jamiat hurriedly called a meeting of the  
working committee which reflected its thought on divergent  
issues. The Jamiat criticised the psychology of the supporters  
of the Dominion Status and visualised that although the report

---

57. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, Rise and Growth of the All-India Muslim League, (Allahabad, 1942), pp. 213-214.

58. The Nehru Committee formed under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, aimed at framing an agreed constitution for India in consultation with the elected members of the provincial and central legislative councils and leaders of the other communal organisations. But the deliberations of the All-Parties Conference convened in February 1928, failed to satisfy the Muslims League and other Muslim organisations. The issue that was heavily debated was the reservation of Muslims in the provincial legislatures of Bengal and Punjab which was unamiable to the Hindu Mahasabha and Sikh delegates.

See, Ran Gopal, Indian Muslims : A Political Biography (Bombay 1959), pp. 199-200.

did not shut the door for further struggle of independence yet it was quite repugnant to the motto of the Jamiat which stood for complete independence.<sup>59</sup> The Jamiat said that it could accept a constitution with only one Article, namely that India shall be independent. Dominion Status meant to the Jamiat as India's connection with the British empire in one way or the other, which it could not tolerate. Pointing<sup>60</sup> to the other drawbacks of the report the review committee of the Jamiat pointed out that the report had gone a long way in minimising the autonomy of the provinces. The Governor-General had been given over-riding powers, and the concept of Provincial Autonomy had become a farce. It emphasised that the autonomy was a prime necessity to ensure the development and progress of the provinces and maintain the balance amongst<sup>61</sup> them.

The Jamiat further rejected the Nehru Report on the ground that it did not safeguard adequately the Muslim majority in Bengal and the Punjab and did not give Muslims sufficient representation at the centre. The Jamiat also advocated for

---

59. Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind Kiya Hai, Volume I (Al-Jamiat Press, New Delhi), p. 147.

60. Ibid., pp. 147-148.

61. Proceedings of the Working Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, 1928-Minutes of the Working Committee, available in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library on Microfilm.

the separation of Sind from Bombay which was the popular demand of the inhabitants of the province.

It had been agreed by the Jamiat alongwith the Congress and the Khilafat Committee that no bill in the legislature be introduced without the prior consent of the concerned community and could not be passed thereof unless and untill it had been voted by 3/4 majority of the concerned communities. The report fell far short of what the Jamiat had been striving for. Consequently the Jamiat came heavily on the Nehru Report and claimed that while doing away with this demand, the committee did not offer any alternative safeguard to protect the interest of the minorities. They warned that the independence of the country depended on the recognition of due safeguard to the interest of the minorities.

Though the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference joined the convention of December 1928 after sometime but the Jamiat-ul-Ulema adhered to its prior stand. In response to the invitation of the Secretary of the All-Parties Convention addressed to the Jamiat -ul-Ulema, for participating in the Convention to review the report, the Working Committee of

---

62. Ibid.

63. Mawlana Mohammad Kian, op.cit., p. 149.

64. Ibid., p. 149.

the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at its Muradabad Session on 23rd December 1926,<sup>65</sup> ruled out the recommendations of the Nehru Report and complained that the Nehru Committee was irregularly constituted and had no adequate Muslim representation in it and was not placed before the Muslim All-Parties Conference for its ratification. Therefore it did not consider it suitable in the interest of the Muslims to depute its representative to the Calcutta Convention. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema further said that it could attend the Convention only when it first accepted the demands of various Muslim associations and another convention was appointed to prepare a constitution on the basis of mutual relation. This was a hope against hope and so it never materialised.<sup>66</sup>

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind realising a greater<sup>67</sup> sense of responsibility came out with their own proposals to solve the constitutional deadlock in India. No laws were to be taught in school inimical to Islam. Qazi courts were to be instituted, a department was to be created to erect and maintain Muslim religious buildings and there were to be constitutional safeguards for Muslims. Voting rights were to be

---

65. A.M.Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India, Volume III (S.Chand and Company, New Delhi), pp. 378-90.

66. The Indian Daily Mail, December 24, 1928.

67. Mawlana Mohammad Mian, op.cit., pp. 161-165.

proportional to population and restricted to adults men only; the rights of the Muslim majority in Punjab and Bengal were to be guaranteed; Sind was to become a separate province; Muslim representative in Central Legislative Assembly was to be 1/3 of the elected membership; legislation affecting community interests were to be banned. There was to be reservation of seats for minorities and there was to be no relinquishing of separate electorate untill all these provinces agreed and safeguards had been enacted into a fundamental constitutional law.

Jamiat's stand on the question of separate electorate was yet another reflection of its adherence to the cause of Muslims. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema declared that the separate electorate was an absolute necessity for the Muslims and they would hold fast to their right and never accept any proposals which would snatch their rights from them.

---

68. 8th Conference of Jamiat-ul-Ulema; December 2-5, 1927.

The Jamiat came out with 7 proposals of its own for solving the constitutional problems;

- (1) There should be a separate province of Sind;
- (2) Complete reform should be introduced in the Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan;
- (3) There should be separate representation in Punjab and Bengal too, proportionate to the population.
- (4) The right to vote should be fixed according to the strength of population.

Contd.....

These demands were the result of the decision taken on 20th March, 1927 in Delhi where Jinnah presided over a conference of Muslims.

69

It was the triumph of the Jamiat Ulema that the Congress Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee

---

(Continued from the previous page)

- (5) No such bill should be allowed to be presented for consideration in any elected Assembly, which was considered harmful to the members of a minority;
- (6) The representation of the Muslims in the Central Legislative Assembly should be not less than 1/3rd.
- (7) If a minority was given some concession in one province other minorities of other provinces too should become eligible to it.

The Indian Annual Register, 1928.

69. The Leader, 23 March 1927.

simply agreed to their demands as it was anxious to win the favour of the Muslim politicians and thereby taking the Jamiat into confidence. However, for this decision of the Congress Motilal Nehru, had to face the wrath of the Hindu masses and the Congress leaders equally

Even the press severely criticised Motilal for showing sympathetic attitude and supporting their cause. The quote Surya, "the Congress had become a handmaid of Motilal Nehru and the sole function of the All India Congress Committee is to register their decrees. It was, therefore, a foregone conclusion that this views in the matter of Muslim offer would prevail and it is an open secret that he favours Muslims."

In fact, separate electorate was the outcome of communal differences. The problem was essentially one of mutual trust. Separate electorate should have been unnecessary in an atmosphere of confidence and cordiality.

The system of mixed representation was quite detrimental to the Muslim interest. It was only through separate electorate

---

70. The Leader, 25 March 1927.

71. The Surya, 5 June 1927.

72. A Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India : A Brief Survey 1958-1947, (Oxford, 1967), p.192.

that the Muslim interest and due representation could best be secured. The system of Joint electorate would have enabled Hindus to elect only those Muslims who were under their influence. The election to the Central Legislative Assembly from the mixed constituency of the city of Delhi in 1927 where Asaf Ali, a Muslim Congressman of long standing and proven loyalty, was defeated by a Hindu candidate sponsored by the Hindu Mahasabha, can be quoted as an instance of the stranglehold of Joint electorate. On the contrary separate electorate had never prevented Congressite Muslims from making their way in purely Muslim constituencies. It is not insignificant that the twenty faithful Muslim followers of C.R.Das in the Bengal Legislature had been all elected on the basis of Separate representation<sup>73</sup>.

#### KHILAFAT MOVEMENT AND THE JAMIAT-UL-ULEMA-E-HIND

The Khilafat Movement was a turning point in the history of Muslim politics in India and a rare exposure of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Ulema who were already alarmed with the growing threat to Islam and tampering with the religious institutions thought it the exigencies of time to lead the Muslims in political, social and religious spheres. The

---

73. *ibid.*, p. 192.

Khilafat issue gave a further cause to their apprehension and forgetting their doctrinal dispute assembled on a common platform of Jamiat-ul-Ulema to give lead to the Muslims in a religious cum political issue. The Muslim League though in control of progressive Muslims like Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. M.A. Ansari and Ali Brothers, was set aside by the Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema whose leaders were bent upon undergoing all sorts of sufferings and sacrifices in order to achieve their goal. Without going into the details of the origin and progress of the movement one should only have to assess the role of the Jamiat in it.

Mawlana Bari endorsed the Non-Cooperation programme under the guidance of Gandhi. At the Jamiat meeting Abdul Bari said, " I have accepted his support in getting our aims fulfilled and for that matter I think it necessary to follow his advice. I know that the strength of Islam lies in association with him." The Congress resolution passed at the Nagpur session was strongly supported by a fatwa issued by Jamiat-ul-Ulema, calling upon the Muslims to boycott elections,

---

74. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 63.

75. Speech delivered by Mawlana Bari on 5th October 1920 at the Jamiat meeting held in Lucknow, Abdul Bari Papers; Home Coll Deposit 1921, 4.

Government schools and colleges, and law courts and to renounce titles and ranks conferred by the Government. The decree<sup>76</sup> was signed by nearly 900 Ulema. In June 1920 Mawlana Bari of Lucknow issued a fatwa signed by eminent divines declaring India to be Darul Harb, which presented to the Muslims with the alternative of Jehad or Hijrat.<sup>77</sup> This was reiterated in November 1920 as the Muttafiqa Fatawa. A large number of Muslim divines were sent to Jail. The appeal of the decree was so strong that a large number of Muslims migrated to<sup>78</sup> Afghanistan where only miseries and sufferings were in store.

Earlier, the first session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, presided over by Mawlana Bari, appealed to the British Government to send Mr. Asfahani and Mushir Hasan Kidwai to represent Indians in peace negotiation alongwith Mr. Lloyd George. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema was suspicious that the peace terms would not be in consonance with the religious feelings of the Muslims. If Indians were not represented in the conference it would<sup>79</sup> have to face the wrath of the crores of Indians.

---

76. 1921 Movement Reminiscence: Published by the Government of India, pp. 21-22.

77. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

78. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided 3rd edition, (Hind Kitabs Ltd. Bombay, 1942), p. 121.

79. 1st Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema held on 28th December 1919 at Amritsar (Al-Jamiat Book Depot, Delhi), p.7.

Again, speaking at the Bengal provincial Conference, held at Calcutta under the Presidentship of Mawlana Azad, Mawlana Bari in his most violent and forceful speech said that the Muslim of India would abandon their loyalty to the Government if the decision of the peace conference with regard to Turkey went against their wishes.<sup>80</sup>

Mawlana Bari also used his good offices to resolve the apprehension of the Indian Muslims with regard to the possible peace terms offered to Turkey. In a telegram to the Begum of Shopal Mawlana Bari requested to use her influence in Government for the preservation of the sanctity and integrity of holy places and supreme spiritual authority of Caliphate as well as the independence of Muslim countries.<sup>81</sup> Mawlana Bari in his another telegram to the Secretary of State for India also briefed him with the feelings of the Indian Muslims with regard to the Khilafat issue. Referring to the proposal to convert St. Sophia into church in Constantinople he criticised the Government for unnecessary interference with religious institutions of the Muslims which was contrary to the declaration of statesmen of England and Allies that the

---

80. Confidential Report on the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements in India by Deputy Director, Central intelligence Bureau, Home Department Government of India, pp.240-242.

81. Home Deptt. Political A, Proceeding June 1919 Nos. 362-76.

holy and sacred places of Islam shall remain free from all  
interference.<sup>82</sup>

The British Government assured the Indian Muslims,  
regarding the fate of the Khilafat in Turkey that the question  
of the Khilafat was one for Muhammaḍans to decide and that  
the Government had no desire to interfere.<sup>83</sup> The Secretary  
of State further assured that whatever decision the British  
would take it would be in keeping with the sentiments of  
Muslim India. Similar assurance were given by the British  
Prime Minister as well.<sup>84</sup>

True to the apprehension of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema the  
peace term issued to Turkey were not palliative to the  
Muslim India. This caused the deepest concern and the whole  
country was ablaze. On 22nd June 1920 a Muslim delegation  
presented a memorandum to the Viceroy Lord Reading, requesting  
him to ask the Government of Britain to revise its peace terms  
and threatened that in case the Government did not meet their  
demand they would stop cooperating with it.<sup>85</sup>

---

82. Ibid.

83. Home Deptt. Political A, Proceedings June 1919 Nos. 362-76; Home Deptt. Political F.No.16/192.

84. Home Deptt. Political A, Proceedings June 1919 Nos. 362-76

85. Home Deptt. Political A, November 1920, 19-31.

But finding Government otherwise the Jamiat directed<sup>86</sup> the students to boycott the English Schools and Colleges. The Jamiat further in view of the uneven distribution of the Muslim community directed its members to mobilise the Muslim masses for the non-cooperation with the Government.

Before the session of the Khilafat Conference, held at Congress Pandal on 15th September 1920 at Calcutta, Mawlana Syed Husain Ahmad Madani moved a resolution on the non-cooperation. The resolution declared that non-cooperation was a religious obligation binding on all Muslims of India and they should therefore carry out their religious duty most successfully and devotedly with united effort in connection<sup>87</sup> with the Khilafat Movement.

Thereafter in October 1920 Shaikhul Hind Mahmood-ul-Hasan gave a call for the boycott of educational institutions manned by the British Government which was the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims of India. He gave a religious sanction<sup>88</sup> to it by a Fatwa. He also made a tour of the united provinces exhorting the Muslims to follow the lead of the Congress and work for the success of the non-cooperation.

---

86. A.M.Zaidi, op.cit., Volume 2, p. 518, Second Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, December 17-19, 1920.

87. The Indian Review 1920, p. 584.

88. Bashier Ahmad, Tahrik-e-Mavelat (Deoband 1920), p.53.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema at its Third Session of Lahore under the Presidentship of Mawlana Azad declared that henceforth it would be an act of sin on the part of the Muslims to be in the police and military services. The resolution further asserted that in pursuance of the Islamic shariah the Muslims should try to dissociate themselves from the British as it (the British force manned by Indian Muslims) was being used against the Muslim states for killing Muslim population. The Jamiat further forbade the Muslims to dissociate themselves from joining the non-Muslims (Britishers) in the battle against the Muslims as it would add to the grandeur of the infidels (Britishers) with the loss of the prestige and strength of Islam. The Jamiat got quick response. In November 1921 a large number of Muslim policemen tendered their resignations. They were 31,40, and 17 in U.P., Bengal, and Bombay respectively.

Notwithstanding it was a pity that there were a number of Ulema of great stature who did not cooperate with their co-religionists in the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements and went on criticising and accusing those involved in these movements for cooperating with the Hindus. Mawlana

---

89. A.M.Zaidi, op.cit., Volume 2, pp. 520-521.

90. J.M.Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power :- Indian Politics 1915-1922 (Cambridge, 1972), p. 309.

Ahmad Raza Khan, the founder of Brelvi School was a staunch critic of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements. He formed the, Jamaat-i-Ansar-ul-Islam to counter the Khilafatists. Mawlana Mohammad Mian in his Presidential Address at the Jamaat-i-Ansar-ul-Islam Conference denounced the Khilafat Movement and opposed the advocate of Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements for joining hands with Congress. Earlier in 1920 Raza Khan had issued fatwa forbidding the Muslims to join the Hindus and harshly attacked the Ulema for cooperating the Congress in the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movement. He considered Gandhi as the enemy of Muslims who exploited them to further the political objectives of the Hindus.

Ironically enough Jinnah, more concerned with championing the cause of the Muslim community than the Jamiat (as the leaguers claim) criticised the pseudo-religious flavour of the Non-cooperation Movement. Vigorous and tiresome labour of Mawlana Bari and Mohammad Ali, to convince him in favour of the movement, ended in a fiasco.

---

91. An article by Syed Jalaluddin, The Brelvis and the Khilafat Movement; edited and compiled by Mushirul Hasan in Communalism and Pan Islamic trends in colonial India, (New Delhi, 1981), p. 349.

92. Ibid., p. 349.

93. Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, op.cit., p. 175.

Later Jinnah opposed a purely religious issue like Khilafat Movement and then demanded a separate state in the form of Pakistan on purely religious grounds. This was nothing but a political gimmikery. In fact, the Jamiat politics was much more desirable than the Brelvis or the Muslim Leaguers. While Jamiat stood for unflinching cooperation with other communities, Jinnah or Brelvis dissociated themselves from the Hindus. The Jamiat leaders knew and rightly diagnosed that the Khilafat agitation would not be a success without the cooperation of the Hindus. Although, the wrongs done to institution of Khilafat could not be rectified against the ruthless vengeance of British imperialism yet Jamiat's intention and sincerity for the good of the Muslims could not be challenged. Nevertheless its close relations with the nationalist forces in the country, the Jamiat throughout its existence acted in accordance with the Shariah and gave its preference over the cause of freedom Movement. Its role with regard to the Khilafat question, Nehru Report, communal riots of 1922-27; its opposition to the Sangathan and Shuddhi Movements, speaks the truth of its adherence to the cause.

MUTTAFIQA, FATWA:

Meanwhile Mawlana Abdul Bari was trying to get an unanimous fatwa in favour of Non-violent Non-cooperation. In this endeavour he had to travel to the nook and corner

of the country in order to mobilise the people for the  
Jamiat-ul-Ulema at its historic meeting at Delhi in November  
1920. The Fatwa was in the form of religious verdict based  
on the Quranic Verses and Hadith (Prophetic traditions), which  
became famous as the Muttafiqaa Fatwa in the history of the  
Khilafat Movement. The fatwa bore the seals of the celebrated  
Muslim divines such as Mawlana Kifayetullah of Delhi, Mawlana  
Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, a former disciple of Mawlana Shibli,  
Mawlana Azad, Mawlana Daod Ghaznevi, Mawlana Sanauallah of  
Amritsar, Mawlana Azizur Rehman, Mufti of Darul Uloom Deoband,  
Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, a leading Sufi of Bihar and all the  
95  
followers of Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal.

Following are the main points of the Fatwa:

1. It was **unlawful** to be the member of Legislative Council.
2. It was unlawful to practise in Government courts.
3. It was unlawful to get education in Government schools  
and **colleges** and in those aided by the Government.
4. It was unlawful to keep honorary magistracy, honorary  
ranks and the titles given by the Government.

---

94. Home Deptt. of Political 1921 F.No. 137.

95. CID list of names of Mawlvis Signing Fatwa March 15,  
1919. Home Political A, 415-26, August 1919.

5. All the Government services from which the Government received help were forbidden (Haram) specially of the army and police. It was a serious sin as they were duty bound to shot their brothers and God says in Holy Quran, Surah Mairaj, "Whoever will intentionally slaughter any Muslim will be punished in hell for ever" and the holy Prophet had said "whoever lifted weapon against Muslim would cease to be a Muslim."<sup>96</sup>

However, the fatwa was not unanimous. A number of celebrated Muslim divines who refused to endorse the fatwa were Mawlana Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid, Abdul Bari's old rivals at Firangi Mahal, Ashraf Ali Thanvi, a distinguished product of Deoband and Habibur Rehman Khan Sherwani of Aligarh.<sup>97</sup> Mawlana Hafiz Mohammad, the Rector of Darul Uloom, though agreed with the object of the Fatwa was reluctant in view of the anti-Government tone of Abdul Bari.<sup>98</sup> He still believed in the constitutional policy to petition the Government. He also objected that the fatwa has taken liberty with the Shariah. Mawlana Raza Khan had taken liberty with the Shariah.

- 
96. Confidential Report on the non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement by Deputy Director Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, pp. 162-163.
97. Home Poll, 415-26, August, 1919.
98. Hafiz Mohammad Ahmad. to Abdul Bari, February 11, 23 and March 25, 1919, Abdul Bari Papers.

In his long rejoinder he questioned the validity of the Fatwa from Islamic point of view. His contention was that if it was wrong to have Mavalat / <sup>with</sup> the British (Kafir) the same <sup>99</sup> would have been true to the Hindus. The other point of objection was certainly the extent to which the authority of the fatwa had gone in cooperating with the Hindus. Swami Shradhananda, who later organised Sangathan Movement, was taken in a procession to the Jama Masjid, Delhi and was <sup>100</sup> allowed to address the people from the pulpit of Jama Masjid. This was the extent to which the Ulema should had not gone and this was highly objectionable to the non-followers of the <sup>101</sup> Fatwa.

In spite of the criticism levelled against the Muttafiqa Fatwa it had produced good results. Much hatredness was created against the British and the loyalists. The hatredness against the loyalists was so great that the dead <sup>102</sup> body of a Nawab remained unburied for many days.' Hartals were organised in

---

99. Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, op.cit., p.270.

100. Ibid., p. 270.

101. Ibid., p. 270.

102. K.M.Ashraf, A Political History of Indian Muslims (1957-1947) in Muslim India, edited by Zafar Imam (Delhi, 1975), p. 35.

various parts of the country and anti-British slogans shouted. The effect of the fatwa was causing great anxiety to the Government so, it ordered for its confiscation. <sup>103</sup>

Despite its proscription the Khilafat leaders continued to circulate it to every segments of society. The Government waited for an opportunity to remove the Khilafat leaders from circulation. <sup>104</sup> Amongst the Khilafatists only Mohammad Ali and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani were posing threat to Government. Their arrest became crucial for the British authority which had been suggesting some strong action against the individuals who attempted to tamper the loyalty of Indian troops. <sup>105</sup> Reason was obvious. Mohammad Ali was the leader of the Khilafatists and Mawlana Husain Ahmad was the author of the resolution which was passed in the Karachi Khilafat conference in July 1921. This conference had passed the resolution which asked the soldiers and police to resign from Government services as it was haram. <sup>106</sup> At the <sup>107</sup>

---

103. All Indian Congress Committee Papers F.No.6/1922, Part I

104. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 169.

105. The statements of C.W.Jacob Rawlinson, W.S.Delamin W.H. Vincent See, Home Deptt.Political F.No.155/1922.

106. K.L.Gauba, Famous and Historical Trials; (Lahore 1946) p.23.

107. Home Deptt.Political F.No.155,1922 and F.No.114/1922.

instigation of these Ulema leaflets were circulated in the Indian Army which directed the Muslims serving in the Army to renounce their services because their service may be used against their own brethren. The leaflet further reminded them of the Quranic verses that if a Muslim murdered a fellow Muslim, he would be punished in the hell for ever and whosoever raised the weapon against a Muslim was out of the pale of Islam. The resolution and the leaflet were a clear act of sedition against the Crown which would have shaken the whole fabric of British imperialism. Due to such seditious activities of Ali Brothers and Mawlana Husain Ahmad, their arrest became imminent. They were thus rounded up alongwith Dr. Kitchlew, Nisar Ahmad, Shanker Acharya and Pir Ghulam Mujadid on the charge of sedition against the Crown. Mawlana Husain Madani alongwith others, excluding Ali Brothers, was charged under Section 120-B, 131 and 505 of Indian Penal Code, and was sent to the Karachi Jail to await trial. The Government found him guilty of making statements conducive to mischief and sentenced him to two years of vigorous imprisonment.

---

108. The Pioneer, July 30, 1921.

109. The Madina, (Bijnor) August 12, 1921.

110. Ibid., p.7 in the editorial.

111. The Madina. September 20, 1921.

112. Ibid., October 15, 1921.

The arrest of Ali Brothers and others created country-wide consternation. Their arrest had added more to their power and influence. But Minault does not believe that the agitation was because of the arrest of the Karachi prisoners.<sup>113</sup> On the other hand she feels that there was no agitation because the Ali Brothers had apologized for their deeds and thus they had got no influence. But the Government confidential reports speak otherwise.<sup>114</sup> Truly neither did Ali Brother apologize to the Government nor was there any dearth of meeting for the cause they stood.<sup>115</sup>

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Bombay in its resolutions condemned the arrest and called it a direct interference in Islam, as the Karachi Fatwa was in accordance with the Quranic injunctions.<sup>116</sup>

---

113. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 170.

114. Home Deptt. (POL), 459, 1921, See also K.L.Gauba, op.cit., p. 32.

115. Home Poll, 459, 1921, See, also K.L. Gauba, op.cit., p. 32.

116. The Independent, November 25, 1921; See also proceedings of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind available on microfilm at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; The Bombay Chronicles, September 1921.

The Khilafat leadership felt the need to renew their campaign to embarrass the Government and issued a manifesto in which they upheld the Karachi resolution declaring army service as unlawful.<sup>117</sup> The Ulema and the Khilafat Committee resolved that the Karachi resolution was in accordance with the Quranic injunction as it was a further endorsement of the "Muttafiqa Fatwa".<sup>1)</sup> The Government's utterances and its action to arrest the Khilafat leaders and the proscription of the Fatwa was widely condemned as they thought it to be an attack on Islam itself. Consequently they expressed their determination to reprint the fatwa which must be channelised through every platform including the religious institutions and pulpits.<sup>118</sup>

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi showed great courage in responding to the call. The provincial Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi telegraphed Gandhi for permission to start civil disobedience<sup>119</sup> to protest against the arrest of the Khilafat leaders and the confiscation of fatwa but Gandhi did not respond. The Jamiat on getting no reply from Gandhi decided

---

117. Bombay Chronicles, October 5, 1921.

118. Gail Minault, op.cit., p.171.

The fatwa generated great enthusiasm amongst the people especially in the areas in which the Karachi seven defendants had large followings;  
Gail Minault, op.cit., p.172.

119. C.A. Barron Chief Commissioner of Delhi to H.D. Craik, Secretary to the Government of India, Delhi, 2 September 1921. Home Deptt. (POL) 1921 F.No. 137.

to fight the battle at its own. Several private and public meetings were held in Delhi to formulate the way of action. The first public meeting on the subject was held on 23rd of August at Pataudi House in Delhi. It was reported that there was more religious enthusiasm among the Muslims than had been witnessed since the Ulema conference in November 1920.<sup>120</sup> This meeting was addressed by Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed of Delhi and Kifayatullah in which the conscription of Fatwa was condemned. Mawlana Ahmad Saeed viewed the proscription as sacrilege for it was an abstract of the orders of God.<sup>121</sup> He further asked the Jamiat to start civil disobedience at its own to be backed by the Muslims. But this move of the Jamiat was objected by Hakim Ajmal Khan and Azad.<sup>122</sup> As a matter of fact they were more positive in their approach than the Jamiat, for a purely Muslim civil Disobedience Campaign could have alienated the Muslims from the Hindus, which would have been followed by communal cleavage.

---

120. Home Department (POL) 1921, F.No.137.

121. Ibid., the resolution passed at the meeting condemned the action of the Government of prescribing the fatwa of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind by Police and viewed it as a great insult to Islam and Ulema and expressed its deep indignation. see; Ibid.

122. Home Poll, 1921, F.No.137.

SHUDDHI AND SANGTHAN MOVEMENT AND THE ROLE OF JAMIAT

Alarmed by the shuddhi movement, started by the Hindus to reconvert Muslims and the Malkana Rajputs who had retained Hindu customs and practice, and Sangthan movement for popularising warlike exercise among Hindus,<sup>123</sup> the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind formed the Tablighul Islam to combine various schools of thought for joint action against Shuddhi and Sanghthan.<sup>124</sup> It exhorted the Muslim youths to be up in fighting the enemies of Islam. A special department of Tabligh was constituted by the Jamiat to look after the problem and funds of the Muslims raised by the Jamiat Ulema.<sup>125</sup> The Jamiat regarded the Shuddhi and Sangathan Movement as an attack on Islam and Islamic nationalism. In its view it was the religious duty of the Indian Muslims to exhibit sacrifice both in terms of men and money, for even a slight unawareness would be catastrophic both to Islam and Islamic nationalism.<sup>126</sup> Efforts of the Jamiat did not go waste. A number of the prominent Ulema and Sufi

---

123. Peter Hardy, True partners in freedom and true Muslims: Political Thought of some Muslim Scholars in British India 1912-1947 (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, 1971), p. 161.

124. Mushirul Hasan, op.cit., p. 251.

125. Mohammad Mian, op.cit., p. 61.

126. Ibid., p. 62.

including Khwaja Hasan Nizami of the shrine of Nizamuddin  
Auliya in Delhi began a Muslim missionary movement. This  
effort was applauded by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. The Ahmadiya  
group of Muslim sect also cooperated with the Tabligh efforts.  
Jamiat-ul-Ulema, thus, as a counter reaction "Organised their  
troops and started their rationale."

Even in such an atmosphere of mutual hatred the Jamiat-  
ul-Ulema, an apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity, had been trying  
to passify the Hindus and Muslims. Syed Husain Ahmad from the  
Jamiat platform told that as Islam required every Muslim to  
do his utmost to overcome his enemy, the Hindu-Muslim entente  
could above enable them to work for it. The Jamiat resolved  
that as swaraj depends on unity both Hindus and Muslims should  
work together to bring about it. The conference condemned  
those activities which are likely to weaken the basis of unity  
and considered their promoters as enemy of the nation. The  
Jamiat held that it was the duty of every man to preserve and  
preach his faith and religion. But the manner in which that  
campaign had been carried on showed that its sponsors were the

---

127. Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiya Movement, A History and Perspective, Chapter 6 (Manohar Book Service, Delhi 1974).

128. Gail Minaul<sup>l</sup>, op.cit., p. 193.

129. Indian Annual Register Volume II, 5th Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Conference, Cocanada, 29 December 1923.

worst enemies of Islam. The Jamiat affirmed that conversion campaign must keep in view that those were to be taken back who really believe in that faith.<sup>130</sup>

Meanwhile the Muslims accused the Arya Samajists of coercive method to achieve reconversion. Khwaja Hasan Nizami received a number of letters threatening his life.<sup>131</sup> These unhealthy trends pained the Jamiat. Mawlana Abdul Bari, the erstwhile apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity, urged the Muslims to restart the sacrificing of cows, which the Muslims on the appeal of Bari had abandoned.<sup>132</sup> It was mainly due to the anti-Muslim propaganda carried on by the Sangathan which eventually led to communal riots in Ajmer in July 1925.<sup>133</sup> An Inquiry Committee formed to visit the riot stricken area blamed the Shuddhi and Sangathan Movement which in their own turn gave rise to counter agitation amongst the Musalmans.<sup>134</sup>

Despite the repeated onslaught on the Muslims and their religion, there were other schools of thought who did not

---

130. Ibid.

131. Home (Poll) 6/IX, 1924, Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Volume 2, pp. 57-59.

132. Robinson, op.cit., p. 339.

133. Home Deptt. (Poll) 1924, F.No. 249.

134. AICC Papers F.No.3, 1923.

cooperate with the Jamiat. Although various other organisations like the Anjuman-e-Tahaffuz Islam, Anjumana Hifazat-i-Islam and Anjuman-e-Hurriyat-i-Islam had started but they could not come closer to each other due to bitter doctrinal disputes. The Majlis-e-Ahrar, a group of a nationalist Ulema of Habibur Rehman, remained aloof. But credit goes to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema who succeeded in meeting the challenge of the Hindu zealot. Its efforts not only brought back more than 11,000 apostles into the fold of Islam but also resulted in the conversion of more than 2,000 non-Muslims who accepted Islam and became part of the Indian Muslim community. In this endeavour it organised missionary activities among the malkanas and Mawlana Mohammad Irfan, who was attached to the Jamiat as an active missionary, did good field work. To overcome the paucity of fund, the Jamiat forced the Khilafat Committee, much against the will of some politically minded Khilafatists, to donate Rs. 50,000.

---

135. Home Deptt. (POL) 1925, 140.

136. I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p. 289.

137. Mohammad Mian, op.cit., p. 62. Also quoted by Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 77.

138. I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p. 289.

139. Robinson, op.cit., p. 337.

The Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind's adherence and determination to protect the Islamic Shariah was reflected in its opposition to the tampering of Shariah by the British Government. The Muslim League under M.A. Jinnah gave its full support to these amendments to the Muslim Personal Law. This was too much for the Jamiat to tolerate. They protested, agitated and organised campaign against this unjust encroachment of the Government and the misguided Muslim Legislatures on the provision of Islamic Law. Moreover, the Civil Marriage Act of 1912 introduced by Bhopendranath and endorsed by Jinnah, the Shariah Bill of 1937, provides a significant testing ground of the role of Jamiat to the cause of the preservation of Islamic Shariah.

The Muslim League called the Jamiat-ul-Ulema as the traitor and the campfollowers of the Congress. But there are instances when the Jamiat even went on to oppose the decisions of the Congress as and when the Muslim interest came in the way. At such occasions violent remarks were passed against Gandhi and Congress by the Jamiat leaders. Mawlana Abdul Bari was vehemently opposed to Gandhi's policy of non-violence to achieve their ends. Bari sounded warning that if Gandhi

---

140. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 77 See footnotes.

141. For detail analysis see Chapter IV, p. 163-164

142. Saiyid Tufail Ahmad, Musalmano Ka Roshan Mustaqbil, (Delhi 1945), p. 73.

did not change his strategy of moderation and caution, the  
Muslims may desert him and recourse to the violent method.<sup>143</sup>  
To Mawlana Bari the non-violent methods was a weapon to get  
their grievances redressed but they never committed themselves<sup>144</sup>  
to always adhere to this principle.

The Jamiat leadership could not reconcile themselves  
with Gandhi that complete independence could not be incorporated  
in view of the disharmony between Hindus and Muslims. The con-  
tention of the Jamiat was that the question of Swaraj should  
be defined in terms of complete independence.<sup>145</sup> Mawlana  
Kifayetullah, the President of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, said that  
rejection of the proposal of complete independence had dis-  
heartened and disappointed the Musalmans. If it is  
accepted it would remove that feeling but if the Congress<sup>146</sup>  
rejected it the Musalmans would in a body demand it. Abdul  
Majid Badauni reacted in a rather harsh word. He was reported  
to have remarked, "if Gandhi does not favour complete indepen-  
dence we would advise him to join the illustrious group of .

- 
143. Statement by Bari to the press entitled "We are forced to revise our programme" June 1921: Home Deptt. (POL) 1921, 45.
144. Ibid.
145. P.C. Bomford, Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements; (Deep Publications, Delhi, 1974), p.201.
146. Home Deptt. (POL), 868, 1922.

Jee-hazoors who would welcome him with open arms." Abdul Bari also expressed his apprehension that Swaraj would prove beneficial to the Hindus but not to the Muslims.

An unbridgeable gap was thus created between the Ulema and the Congress. At a time when the non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement was at full swing and gaining wide currency the decision of Gandhi to suspend the entire movement on the pretext of Chauri Chaura incident amazed the Jamiat leaders greatly. Mawlana Bari condemned the Bardoli resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee in February 1922. In a fiery speech he complained that non-violence had failed in getting their demand fulfilled and asked the Muslims to advance their demands themselves. This resolution was latter supported by a number of Ulema. Criticising Gandhi for his wrong policies, Mawlana Bari said that Gandhi had exhausted all the items of his programme and no arrow was now left in his quiver. The Musalmans would not remain silent but need some forward programme for the achievement of their aims.

---

147. The Zulqarnain, 120 June, 1922

148. A.C.Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1921 (The Hague 1972), pp. 148-149.

149. Robinson, op.cit., p. 334.

150. The Madina., (Bijnor) March 7, 1922.

151. Home Deptt. (POL) 1922, F.No.501.

In a reply to a question about Bardoli decision Bari was reported to have said, "to me Gandhi is like paralytic whose limbs are not in control but whose mind is still active. I am doubtful of his future (success) because he has not yet acquired much success from (non-violent) method." There was general repression all over. Although Gandhi succeeded in extracting a temporary recantation from Bari but he remained firm on his prior stand. In a welcome address to the Annual Session of Jamiat held in late December 1923 Mawlvi Abdul Rauf touching the political issues in the country said that the non-cooperation had revolutionised the Indian mind but its great success was prevented by the Bardoli mistake of its author in suspending the offensive.

"CONTROVERSY OVER COUNCIL ENTRY AND THE JAMIAT"

Soon after the collapse of the non-cooperation fresh political turmoil was in the offing. Both Pandit Motilal Nehru

---

152. Press Statement of Mawlana Abdul Bari, 22nd February, 1922  
Abdul Bari Papers.

153. Francis Robinson, op.cit., p. 339.

In a statement to the Tribune on 21st March 1922 Mawlana Bari said, "Proceeding of the Bardoli and Delhi meetings had depressed me and I said so in my speeches. I have now met Gandhi and he has fully satisfied me that further efforts on our part can make the movement a success. I am determined to continue peaceful non-violence so long as I am convinced of success of the pacific movement as I have already made it quite clear in my speeches."

P.C. Bomford, op.cit., p.201.

154. Khutba-e-Sadarat Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hind, Fourth Session of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, available at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (See microfilm). See also A Moin Zaidi op.cit., p. 615.

and Chitranjan Das could not reconcile themselves with the Gandhian strategy to boycott the elections to the Council. C.R.Das true to his realistic conviction doubted the efficacy of direct action in the prevailing circumstances and advocated the political fight inside the legislature. Now the issue at discussion was not to revive the Civil Disobedience Movement but whether or not to fight the council elections of 1923. Both Khilafat Committee and Congress were divided amongst themselves on this issue. While the Khilafat enquiry committee advocated against the council entry, Sheikh Zahoor Ahmad differed and the issue could not be solved. The Khilafat Committee decided to postpone the decision till December 1922. The Congress was sharply divided on the issue. Though Hakim Ajmal Khan, Motilal Nehru and Patel agreed with the proposals put forward by C.R.Das but he was vehemently criticised by a Section of Congress led by Shri Rajgopalacharya and Kasturiranga Iyengar. The contention of the non-changers was that the acceptance of the proposal would mean the repudiation of Gandhian leadership. Mawlana Azad thinks that Rajgopalacharya's contention was not based on sound foundation. Das was only resorting to reconcile with the Government. The pro-changers proposed the resolution in the Central Legislature for the release of Gandhi

---

155. Robinson, op.cit., p. 336.

156. Mawlana Azad, India Wins Freedom : An Autobiography Narrative, (Orient Longman's Calcutta, 1959), p.11.

157. Mawlana Azad, op.cit., p. 11.

158  
from Jail. 'So there was no question of defaming or aversion  
of Gandhi's leadership. Like the Khilafat Conference the All  
India Congress Committée also postponed its decision till the  
159  
Gaya Session.

Like the Congress and the Khilafat Conference the  
Jamiat-ul-Ulema was too divided into the two schools of  
thought. The issue at point was that if the Jamiat won the  
election would it join the Legislature or boycott the council  
altogether.

In his welcome address to the Fourth Annual session of  
the Jamiat Mawlana Abdul Rauf of Danapur denounced the idea of  
entering the council without any constructive programme. His  
contention was that the Congress would not achieve any subs-  
stantial gain through the council than the present councillors  
and the idea of bringing the government machinery in the  
Legislature to standstill was just like to promise the attain-  
160  
ment of Swaraj within 3 months.

This division in their rank was very much reflected in  
the Presidential address of Habibur Rahman of the same session

---

158. Ibid., p. 12.

159. Robinson, op.cit., p. 336.

160. 4th session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema held at Gaya in  
December 1923; See Indian Annual Register, 1924, p.260.

of the Jamiat. In his long speech he appealed to save the division in their rank by adopting a middle path between the two extremes.<sup>161</sup>

It was amongst heavy odds that the Jamiat succeeded in overcoming the crisis and declared its stand on the Council entry even before the Congress and the Khilafat Committee could make up their mind.<sup>162</sup> In its resolution that followed after a long deliberations in the same session the Jamiat considered the participation in the next General election as against the Shariah even if their intention may not be to take the oath.<sup>163</sup> This was the refutation of the resolution taken by the Jamiat executive Committee at Delhi in November 1923, permitting election with an object not to enter the Legislature.<sup>164</sup>

The Khilafat Conference also followed the Jamiat but this was due no doubt to the unbending attitude of the Muslims

---

161. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema executive Committee had passed a resolution on 11th November 1923, permitting the capture of seats but refusing to take the oath of allegiance. According to a fatwa of the Ulema "the Muhammadans could neither cooperate nor take the oath of allegiance. They should not therefore sit in its councils, even if they are successful at the polls." The Indian Review, January 1923, pp. 23-25.

162. Moin Zaidi, op.cit., Volume 4, p. 648.

163. The Indian Annual Register, p. 24.

164. The Indian Review, January 1923, p.25.

divines who constituted the Jamiat. At the Gaya session of the Congress the pro-council entry group was also defeated by a majority vote. This was only due to the Muslim extremist group guided by the divines who constituted the Jamiat. The Government too recognised the Jamiat as a force to be reckoned with. The Government observed that if Hindu-Muslim conflict was to be avoided the Congress must look to the divines for the guidance for they were the group who held the strings of the Muslims. It was this group of Muslim divines who guided the Congress to boycott the council at the Calcutta session in September 1920.

The period under review present an interesting position of the Muslim leadership in India. The middle class leadership was divided on the stand to be taken in the changed circumstances. Some were in favour of total alienation from Congress, while others to stick to the Congress. But the Jamiat leadership continued to keep uncompromising attitude

---

165. A.C. Neimeijer, op.cit., p. 52.

166. Ibid., p. 54.

167. Home Deptt. (POL) 1922 F. No.18.

168. Robinson, op.cit., p. 337.

with the more radical group of the Congress. As a matter of fact it seems that the Jamiat was moving on the pattern parallel to the position of an exclusive Muslim leadership putting aside the western middle class element. Hence Mawlana Habibur Rahman deserved to proclaim the superiority of the Jamiat over all other Muslim organisations or conferences in India.

After their defeat in the Congress Gaya session the council entry group formed Congress-Khilafat Swarajya Party, as a party within the womb of the Congress. Only Ansari was amongst the prominent figure who did not join the group as others did. Meanwhile the council entry group intensified their canvassing in favour of council entry and attempted to compromise with those opposed to their movement. The Swarajists succeeded in winning over the disgruntled group within the Congress with the result that now the All-India Congress Committee decided to cease its stand against the council entry. M.A. Ansari, an erstwhile no changer, also changed his

---

169. A.C. Neimeijer, op.cit., p. 153.

170. Khutba-e-Sadarat, Fourth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Al-Jamiat Press; available on microfilm at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

171. P.C. Somford, op.cit., p. 91.

mind and joined the swarajists group.<sup>172</sup> Next to follow were  
Moazzam Ali and Khwaja Abdul Majid.<sup>173</sup>

Mohammad Ali was the only hope for the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, when he was released from jail on 29th August 1923 was asked to persuade the Ulema to withdraw the fatwa against the council entry which they had promulgated at Delhi in November 1920 at the conference of the Jamiat. He replied that "if non cooperation was haram two years previously, it could not become halal today....."<sup>174</sup> But the Jamiat leaders were taken by surprise when only after 3 weeks it was the same Mohammad Ali who moved the resolution in the Congress working meeting at Delhi in September 1923, which allowed those Congressmen who had no religious or other conscientious objections against entry into Legislatures.<sup>175</sup> Again at the annual session of Congress held in December 1923 at COCONADA Mohammad Ali as its President lobbied and used his influence to bring a compromise resolution which was proposed by Rajagopalacharya and seconded by C.R.Das.<sup>176</sup> The Jamiat severely criticised Shri Rajgopalacharya

---

172. Ibid., p.88.

173. Francis Robinson, op.cit., p.340; See also The Leader (Allahabad), 26th May, 1923.

174. The Leader, September 1923; See also P.C.Bomford, op.cit., p. 90.

175. P.C.Bomford, op.cit., p. 91.

176. P.C.Bomford, op.cit., p. 93.

177

for his act of betrayal.

This was the defeat of the Jamiat Fatwa at the hands of its own friends and allies. The influence of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema had been considerably declining due to Lausanne Peace Treaty, its defeats at the hands of its own friends proved to be the last nail. They were left high and dry. They had become a despondent inactive and isolated. A press statement of Mawlana Bari speaks the condition of the Ulema at that time. He is reported to have said, "I would like to call attention of the Muslim in general and the Ulema in particular to the critical condition which had arisen in India. The position of the Muslims has been rendered very awkward. Those who pretended to be our friends at one time and made a catspaw of the Ulema now seen anxious to get rid of them. An invidious method has been adopted to get rid of their religion which is the only source of their pride and strength. I have nothing to say against the party which exploited the Muslims for their own purpose, for, I know what they wanted."

178

"JAMIAT-UL-ULEMA VIS-A-VIS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT"

In marked contrast to the days of Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements the Muslims in general and nationalists

---

177. The Madina. (Bijnor) 31 December 1923.

178. Statement to the Press, 20th August, 1923, Abdul Bari Papers.

Muslim leaders within the Congress in particular boycotted the civil disobedience movement launched by the Congress. In a letter addressed to Ansari, Khaliquzzaman wrote, "as for Mahatmaji's Civil Disobedience programme to tell you the truth I have not been able to understand much less appreciate it. Mahatmaji is sadly optimistic and we shall have to reap its consequences. Other nationalist Muslims were also reluctant participant.

But there were few Muslims whose vision was fixed primarily on the greater interest of the country and on seeing Independent India/<sup>free</sup> from foreign yokes. They responded positively to the Gandhian call of Civil Disobedience, which ensued, after the Viceroy rejected the demand. The first to jump in

---

179. Khaliquzzaman to Ansari, 1 March 1930.

180. Ansari joined the Civil Disobedience Movement mainly due to the efforts of Azad and partly because he thought that as a disciplined soldier he should not refuse the marching orders of his officer. It is pertinent to note here that initially he was against launching a country-wide mass movement because of its being turn into violent campaign. He tried to convince the Congress Working Committee to his line of thought but having failed in his efforts, he resigned from the Delhi Congress Provincial Committee and refused the General Secretaryship and membership of the Congress Working Committee.

See, Mushirul Hasan, Muslims and Congress, edited, (New Delhi, 1984), p.121.

181. The Viceroy though promised Dominion Status for India and announced that the Round Table Conference would be organised to work out the future constitution for India

the fray were the Muslim divines who from their platform, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, which adopted the resolution in favour of  
182  
the Civil Disobedience.

The Congress Working Committee welcomed the resolution of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema passed at its Ninth Session held at Amroha making common cause with the Congress in its campaign of Civil Disobedience and appealed to Musalmans to strive for the liberty of their country and religion by joining the

---

(Continued from the previous page)

but made it clear that issue would not be fashioned in accordance with the right of the majority vote, unchallenged by Parliament. Gandhi was not satisfied with this statement and consequently a programme of Civil Disobedience was thrust upon the Indians much against the majority will of the Muslims and without taking them in confidence.

Khaliqzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Longman Pakistan Branch 1961) pp. 105-106.

In fact, Gandhi was a little bit hasty in launching a mass movement. He should have fully utilised the offer made by the Viceroy and should have not closed the door of further negotiation.

182. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, A Political History (Asia, Publishing House, Bombay 1959), pp. 223-224..

Congress whole heartedly in the fight for independence.

The Ali Brothers tried to exert pressure on the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to reverse its decision of joining hands with the Congress in its programme of Civil Disobedience Movement, but could not succeed in persuading them.

It seems that there had taken place a cleavage in the rank of the Jamiat leadership. The Nawab of Bhopal in one of his letters to the Viceroy is reported to have said, "In a letter to your Excellency I have forecasted a split in the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and it did take place. The Ali Brothers with a strong and influential body of Ulemas (Sic) have started a new Jamiat-ul-Ulema....they have advised the Muslims to keep aloof from the present struggle and to dissociate themselves from the Congress. The new Jamiat is also in favour of participating in the Round Table Conference."

Differences did become acute between the office bearers of the Jamiat. Mawlana Nisar Ahmad of Kanpur and Mawlana Abdul Majid Badauni went on to organise the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kanpur

---

183. Moin Zaidi, op.cit., Volume 4, p. 279.

184. Mawlana Al-Hafiz and A.H.Siddiqui, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Ke Chand Aham Khidmat-e-Milli, (Delhi 1940), p.9.

185. The Nawab of Bhopal to Irwin, 10 May 1930, Irwin Papers (152/24).

as they were not in favour of joining hands with the Congress in the Civil Disobedience Movement. The new organisation attracted a number of leading Ulema who unanimously elected Mawlana Mohammad Ali as their President.<sup>186</sup>

To counterpoise the move of Mawlana Mohammad Ali in persuading the Muslims to boycott the Civil Disobedience Movement, the Congress made an special appeal to the Muslims to cooperate. Jamiat along with other nationalist Muslim Political Parties was pressed into service to enlist the support of the Muslims for the Civil Disobedience.<sup>187</sup> The Congress also tried to exploit the religious sentiments of the Muslims by often pointing out their obligation to their brethren in Palestine, Turkey and Egypt who were subject to the tyrannical rule of the Britishers.<sup>188</sup> But the Muslims in a marked contrast to the Non-cooperation days showed no inclination towards the movement.<sup>189</sup> So in order to win over the support

---

186. Rais Ahmad Jafri, Awraq-i-Gum Ghashita, (London 1968), pp., 577.

187. Home Poll, 1930, 483.

188. Mushirul Hasan, Muslims and the Congress (edited) (Manohar Publication, New Delhi 1984), p.106. quoting Bulletin of the Bombay Satyagrah Committee, 11 June 1930, R.E.Hawkins Papers (Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge)

189. The Indian Muslims visualised the programme of Civil Disobedience Movement as an attempt to establish a "Hindu Swaraj" in India. The Indian politics was very much communalised after the failure of the Khilafat

of the Muslim the Congress, considering to the exigencies of time, passed a resolution reiterating the resolution passed at the Lahore session of the Congress that no solution of communal question will be accepted to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the Muslims and other minorities and assured the Jamiat and Muslims in particular that the Congress will at all times respect the liberty of all religions and culture in India and appealed to Musalmans to cast off all doubts and misgivings created in the minds of the Muslims by interested persons.<sup>190</sup>

It must be mentioned here that the Jamiat did not join the non-cooperation and the Congress unconditionally as some writers on Muslim politics allege. In this connection the assertion of I.H.Qureshi deserve full treatment . He says,

"When the Jamiat had not Jettisoned Mawlana Ali's leadership it had supported the resolution of the All parties Muslim Conference condemning the Nehru Report. That resolution instead of unconditional surrender demanded definite safe-<sup>191</sup>guards for the Muslims." First of all, it had been the creed

---

(Continued from the previous page)

Movement, followed by the communal riots throughout the country. The attitude of the Indian Muslims was further stiffened by the Congress virtual surrender to the Hindu Mahasabha over the Muslim demands at the All Party's conference. Most of the Khilafatists had parted company with the Congress with a determination never to join the Congress in any Undertakings whatsoever,

See, Ram Gopal, op.cit., p. 223.

190. Indian Annual Register, 1931.

191. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 303.

of the Jamiat to attain complete Freedom at any cost which it had repeatedly been making clear at various meetings and conferences both from own platform and outside. The main issue which had created gulf between the Jamiat and Congress was the Congress attitude towards the Nehru Report and Jamiat's stand for complete independence. By 30 December, 1930 the Congress at its Lahore Session had rejected the Nehru Report and adopted the complete independence as its creed. It may further be mentioned that the Jamiat had been pressurising the Congress to start the Civil Disobedience Movement since the arrest of the Khilafat leaders and the confiscation of fatwa. When the Congress gave up the call for the Civil Disobedience it was actually the endorsement of the Jamiat decision taken in 1926. The Jamiat seized the opportunity and declared at its Amroha Session, held on 9th of May 1930, that since the Congress had rejected the Nehru Report and endorsed the complete independence creed of the Jamiat, the Muslims should cooperate the Congress and extend their support to the cause. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in one of his

letter said that it had been the main plank of the Jamiat to achieve freedom and whosoever would extend their support to the cause would be his friend. Moreover, the Jamiat did not

---

192. Indian Annual Register, 1930.

193. Saiyid Tufail Ahmad, Ruh-i-Roshan Mustaqbil, (Nizami Press Badaun, 1946), p.16.

194. See Husain Ahmad Madani, Jawaz-i-Shirkat Congress aur Azal-i-Shukook, (Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Delhi 1944), p.29.

cooperate with the Congress unconditionally. In fact, it was only after the Congress gave assurance and made its attitude clear with regard to the Nehru Report and the religious freedom of the Muslim at the Lahore session that the Jamiat decided to join hands with Congress.

C H A P T E R    I I

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935  
AND THE MUSLIM MASS CONTACT MOVEMENT

GENERAL ELECTION AND THE FORMATION OF MUSLIM  
LEAGUE PARLIAMENTARY BOARD:

Indian politics in 1935 entered altogether a new phase. This period saw the Indian politics on the threshold of major constitutional change. A joint committee<sup>1</sup> of the two houses of the British Parliament deliberating for 18 months on the future Government of India, in the light of the White Paper,<sup>2</sup> gave their recommendations on the constitutional proposal in India. The publication of the committee's report, the most powerful parliamentary committee that had ever been setup,<sup>3</sup> got the attention of nationalist India. There ensued a long debate in the Indian Central Legislative Assembly on these recommendations. In the summer, the Government of India Act 1935 was passed with some modifications. The Act, passed after a prolonged gestation of seven years since the appointment of Simon Commission, gained considerable controversy in Britain and conflict in India.<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. Pakistan historical society publication, A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume IV, 1936-1947, p.1.
  2. After the last session of the third Round Table Conference a white paper embodying the proposals of the British Government for constitutional reforms were issued. This was infact a reproduction of the results achieved in the conference.  
See Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism-1928-1940 (Manohar Publication 1977), p.94.
  3. R.Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, (Oxford 1944), Volume, I, p.132.
  4. R.Palme Dutt, India Today, (Bombay 1947), p.409.

In the Act the Indians saw a departure from the previous British constitutional measures. The Provincial Autonomy had been recommended with so many limitations, envisaged in the garb of the 'minority and special interest.' For the first time the people were entrusted with the task of Governing themselves. It seemed that the road to the attainment of self-Government was clear but there were shortcomings in it. Special powers were reserved to the Governors to declare a state of emergency and once a Government did so he could suspend the constitution and assume all powers to himself. Democracy in the provinces could therefore function so long as the Governor permitted it. The position was even worse so far as the Central Government was concerned. Here there was an attempt to reintroduce the principle of Diarchy which had already been discredited in the provinces. Not only was the federation to be a weak federation but it was also over-weighted in favour of the provinces and other vested interests. These could generally be expected to side with the British

5

rule in the country.

Obviously the Act was denounced in most strong words by almost all political parties in India except the liberals like M.R.Jayakar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Although they

6

---

5. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Calcutta 1959), p.13.

6. R.Coupland, Volume II, op.cit., p.7.

were critical of the recommendation imposed by the Act on the self Government but they were in favour of utilization of the Act in toto as they thought that the Diarchy and safeguards would give way to full responsible Government and would lead to a vast expansion of powers equal to those enjoyed by the dominion.<sup>7</sup>

But the temper of the nationalist India in 1935 was some what different. If the Act had been introduced soon after the World War I it could have been hailed as a great step to self-Government. But in the changed<sup>8</sup> circumstances the Act received a rigid reception. It was condemned by all the political parties although their approach to the problem differed. If the Congress was most emphatic in denouncing<sup>9</sup> it as a charter of slavery, the Muslim League though condemned the Act vigorously like the Congress, but while denouncing the safeguards as making the responsible Government nugatory, it recommended that having regard to the conditions prevailing at present in the country the provincial scheme of the constitution<sup>10</sup> be utilized for what it was worth.

As expected the Jamiat-ul-Ulema with its pronounced nationalistic and democratic leanage was most vocal in

---

8. S.R. Mehrotra, Towards India's Freedom and Partition, (New Delhi 1984), p. 132.

9. The Congress condemned the Act in most strong words at its Lucknow session in April 1936. For detail analysis about the Congress reaction see, Mohammad Noman, Muslim India (Allahabad 1942), pp. 327-28.

condemning it. It is important to observe that the Jamiat-ul-Ulema had taken a lead over other major political parties for while they were still deliberating, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at its Delhi conference came out with its own view on the Act.<sup>11</sup> Mufti Kifayetullah, the President of the party, strongly denounced the unwanted constitution and declared that no amount of repression could suppress a whole nation of 350 millions from demanding its rights to manage their home.<sup>12</sup> The conference regarded the present Act as worse than the Montague - Chelmsford Reforms. The special powers given to the Governor in the garb of special interests with regard to the minorities and danger to the peace and tranquility of India was an example of the British imperialism to perpetuate their rule in India,<sup>13</sup> said Mufti Kifayetullah. He further declared that Islam stands for freedom and honour and no true Muslim can rest contented under a foreign Government. It is the duty of every Muslim to fight for freedom. A life without honour was disgrace to a true Muslim and he exhorted all to contribute their full share towards the country's freedom.<sup>14</sup>

---

11. The Madina, 26th March, 1936.

12. The Hindustan Times, 28th March, 1936.

13. Al-Jamiat, 28th March, 1936.

14. The Hindustan Times, 28th March 1936.

The Chairman of the reception committee, Haji Abdul Ghaffar, touching the controversy on the Communal Award, described it as a cup of poison 'which the Muslims had foolishly agreed to swallow because they were hinted that it had been advantageous to them. He further added that the Award had only benefitted the Europeans and the untouchables. The idea underlying it was to strengthen European and Anglo-Indians so that they could rule over Hindus and Muslims. The chairman also condemned the separate electorate and said that the interests of Bengal and Punjab Muslim had been vigorously sacrificed to strengthen the foreign hold.

Husain Ahmad Madani who could not reach in time to attend the conference as the president also spoke at length on the evils of the new constitution and communal Award.

This period was also marked by the re-entering of M.A. Jinnah into active politics. At that time the Muslim political parties were divided among themselves. Though their aim was the same to certain extent but their approaches to the issues had been different from each other. It was this pitiable condition which induced Mr. Jinnah to open a negotiation with

---

15. The Statesman, 28th March, 1936.

16. The Independent, 28th March, 1936.

17. The Madina, 30th March, 1936.

Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and an influential personality in the Unity Board, through the intermediary of Mr. Abdul Mateen Chaudhary, the Secretary of the Independent Party led by M.A.Jinnah in the Central Legislature. <sup>18</sup> Mateen met the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and acquainted him with the message of Jinnah that he had become tired of the reactionary elements in the Muslim League which consisted of landlords, title holders and selfish people and wanted to purify the Muslim League from such elements. <sup>19</sup> He requested Mr. Ahmad Saeed to help him by forging an united front of the Muslim political parties. At first, the Jamiat leaders were not ready to join hands with the League because it was not in consonance with their temperament. But when Abdul Mateen assured them that Mr. Jinnah was serious in his sayings, they showed some interests to meet him. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema whose goal was set for complete independence found this offer as a golden opportunity to purge the reactionaries from Indian politics who were the great enemy of independence.

A board consisting of Nawab Ismail Khan, Mawlana Shaukat Ali, Khaliquzzaman, Murtaza Kazim and Abdul Mateen was appointed

---

18. I.H.Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, (Karachi 1972), p.347. The address of M.A.Jinnah from the platform of Jamiat-ul-Ulema conference in March 1936 shows that some sort of prior understanding had already been reached between Jinnah and Ahmad Saeed. See, the Hindustan Times, 28th March, 1936.

19. Sir Muhammad Yamin, Namah-i-Amal, (Lahore 1970), pp.631-32.

to meet Mr. Jinnah and apprise him with the talk and seek the answers of the questions raised by the Jamiat representatives in the Unity Board. <sup>20</sup> Jinnah showed willigness to meet them.

A meeting was thus arranged at the residence of Mawlana Shaukat Ali which was attended by some members of the Unity Board and

<sup>21</sup> the representatives of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. Mr.Jinnah expressed that he was tired of the reactionary elements in

the Muslim League who looked to their interest more than the community and national interests and were always ready to sacrifice them to suit British policy and wanted to relieve

<sup>22</sup> the Muslim League of them. During the speech he further said,

“I would like to see the Muslim League organisation purified and revived and with that end in view I am going to hold a Muslim League session on 10th May at Bombay where I would ask the Muslim League to give me a mandate to form a parliamentary Board for the forthcoming elections. And I promise you that in that board I shall give people to your party a majority. If we have to fight election on the Muslim ticket it would not be in the interests of either of us to split our vote. Let us, therefore, fight from the common platform of the Muslim League

---

20. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Moamma our uska Hal, (Delhi 1937), p.11.

21. I.H.Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 347.

22. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, (Lahore 1961), p. 141.

23

Parliamentary Board. " Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani who was amongst the chief negotiations asked Jinnah that if they failed to bring the progressive elements in the Parliamentary Board what would be his position. To this Jinnah, with great excitement, replied that in that case he would merge with them and leave the Muslim League. Husain Ahmad further asked that they were committed to complete independence for the country while the League organisation did not approve of it. How was this differences to be reconciled. Mr. Jinnah replied that when "I give you a majority in the Parliamentary Board you can do everything."

24

25

As announced by Jinnah the session of the All India Muslim League was held at Bombay from 11 to 12 April 1936 under the Presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, a liberal known for his nationalistic views. In this meeting even those not related to the Muslim League were also invited. Chief among them was Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat. The session recorded emphatic protest against enforcing a constitution upon the people of India against their will but decided to use the provincial part of the Act for what it was worth.

.27

---

23. Ibid., p.41.

24. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., p.141.

25. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.141.

26. Z.H.Zaidi, Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-1947, an article published in the Partition of India-Policies and Perspective, 1935-1947, edited by C.H.Philips and M.O.Wainwright, (London 1970), p.251.

27. The Times of India, 28th March, 1936.

The session also authorised Mr. Jinnah to constitute, a Muslim League Parliamentary Board of atleast 35 members from all over India which would prepare its election manifesto and rules and regulation for the forthcoming general election at the Lahore meeting of the Parliamentary Board.


Mawlana Ahmad Saeed had been a constant source of strength to Jinnah through all these days. He had been instrumental in bringing the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to compromise with the Muslim League to fight the election from one platform. He was an important personality in the Unity Board and succeeded in bringing the members to compromise with the Muslim League. He had been constantly advising Jinnah how to conduct the election campaign and bringing the Muslim political parties to cooperate. In one of his letters addressed to M.A.Jinnah he said, 'Unless you visit a good number of important towns

---

28. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.144;

Soon after this Jinnah addressing a large number of Muslims in the Badshah Mosque explained his mission and the decision taken by the Bombay Session of the Muslim League. He emphasised that the object of the League was not to create division but to unite Muslims. The constitution as based on the communal electorate they had to organise communal bodies not hostile to sister communities to work in cooperation after entering council with such of them as had similar ideas as their own. The Hindustan Times, 1st May 1937.

29. Z.H.Zaidi, op.cit., pp. 246-247.



in different provinces, it is very difficult to form representative local boards on proper lines.....I would request you with all the force at my command to start on a tour and visit certain important centres of political activity.....we have not yet started with . earnest. The continuous publicity of the aims and objectives of the Muslim League and its present policy is essential for educating the public and and the press alike. An Urdu Daily, atleast a bi-weekly, wholly devoted to the cause of the League, is badly needed. I have already written to the members of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to make effective speeches in support of the Muslim League in public meetings and appeal to the Muslim voters to reserve their votes for the candidates of the Muslim League only."

Hence, Jinnah before announcing the Parliamentary Board toured the whole country in order to repose faith in the Muslim masses and getting support from the Muslim political parties of various provinces of British India comprising of all shades of Muslim opinion. And in the words of the Statement "from the saffron growing plains of far Kashmir," Jinnah announced his team. The list of the Boards show that Jinnah had tried his level best to remove the undesirable elements from the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. Apart from the representative of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and Unity Board the old Khilafatists,

---

30. Mohammad Noman, op.cit., p.331.

Ahrars were included in the list of Parliamentary Board. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani Shaukat Ali and Khaliquzzman from U.P., Mawlana Ahmad Saeed from Delhi and Multi Kifayetullah from Bihar were brought in.

First session of the Parliamentary Board was held on 8th 1936 at Lahore where the election manifesto of the Board was framed in consultation with the members of the Parliamentary Board. The representatives of the Jamiat took active part in the deliberations and were in constant touch with the framing of the Board manifesto. Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani told the United press of India, in an exclusive interview, that the meeting of the Board at Lahore was a complete success in as much as it had combined all the nationalist and progressive forces among the Muslims of India.

The election manifesto of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was as follows:-

1. To protect the religious rights of the Musalmans. In all matters of purely religious character due weightage will be given to the opinions of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind and the Majahids.

---

31. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.144; for details see Appendix-I, cited in Khaliquzzaman, pp. 416-417.

32. The Hindustan Times, June 11, 1937.

2. To make every effort to secure the repeal of all aggressive laws.
3. To resist all measures which are detrimental to the interest of India, which encroaches upon the fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic exploitation of the country.
4. To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery, central and provincial and allocate substantial funds for nation building departments.
5. To nationalise Indian Army and reduce the military expenditure.
6. To encourage development of industries including cottage industries.
7. To regulate currency, expenditure, exchange and prices in the interest of economic development of the country.
8. To sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness.
9. To stand for the social, educational and economic upliftment of the rural population.
10. To make elementary education free and compulsory.
11. To devise measures for the amelioration of the general condition of Muslims.
12. To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation.
13. To create a healthy public opinion and general political consciousness throughout the country.

---

33.  
33. See Appendix I, cited in Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., pp.416-41.

Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi has tried to blame the Jamiat-ul-Ulema for its breach of contract and intrigue. To quote him when the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was established a secret understanding was arrived at through the intermediaty of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema with the Congress high command that the Congress and the Muslim League would work together in the Provincial Legislatures and form coalition ministries in which the Muslim League would get representation in proportion to their population. In the United Provinces the League was to get two ministerships. This is only to opportion blame against the jamiat for its "disgraceful role" and not to testify this alleged charge through any tangible evidence. Mr. Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, impressed by the congress - League reapproachment during the election failed to see the under current conflict that was taking place between Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru. The situation at the time during which this alleged understanding had arrived had not been confugal for such enchantment. Even the way both the parties conducted the election campaign suggest that there was no any prior understanding and hence the charge against the Jamiat has been ill-founded.

---

34. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 349.

35. Ibid., p. 348.

36. R.Coupland, op.cit., Part II, p.14; Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy, Parliamentary Government in India (Calcutta, 1943), pp. 366-367; Both Jai Jipal, op.cit., and Khalid B.Sayeed Wrongly cited R.Coupland. The reference to this has been made on page 14 and not on pp. 11-16.

In the election the Congress pitted the Muslim candidates against the League candidates in most of the provinces and in U.P. where this alleged coalition agreement had been reached the Congress fielded 14 Muslims on its tickets, four of whom contested against the League candidates and lost.<sup>37</sup> This shows the type of understanding within the Congress.

During the whole election period Jinnah had been focussing on the idea that the Congress should not challenge the credentials of the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims.<sup>38</sup> Jinnah opened the election campaign in Bengal by highlighting the differences between the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah is reported to have said; "I warn my Hindu friends and the Congress to leave the Muslim alone. We have made it clear and we mean it that we are already and willing to cooperate with any group or groups of progressive and independent character, provided that their programme and our programme are approximately the same. We are not going to be the camp followers of any party or organization."<sup>39</sup> Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is also reported to have said in Calcutta that "there are only two parties in the country, namely the Government and the Congress and other

---

37. The Leader, February 9-20, 1937; The Pioneer, February, 9-2, 1937.

38. Dr. Jai Ji Pal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (a published thesis submitted to Meerut University 1980), p.102.

39. The Statesman (Weekly overseas edition), Calcutta, 7th January 1937.

40  
must line up. Jinnah refused to line up with the Congress  
and replied that there was a third party in this country also  
and that was the Muslims, and it was not going to be dictated  
41  
by any body.

Nehru was also perturbed about the remarks of M.A.Jinnah  
that the Muslims and the Hindus were different from each other  
in respect of economic and social matters and that the Muslims  
42  
must deal with other groups as one nation deal with the other.  
Nehru could not allow to go this statement unchallenge<sup>d</sup> and  
remarked with great excitement that "I come into greater  
touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the  
Muslim League. I know more about their hunger and poverty  
and misery than those who talk in terms of percentages and  
43  
seats in the councils and places in the state services.

In such an atmosphere of antagonism it would have been  
miracle if any understanding had reached for coalition Government  
So the charge of Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, that a secret  
negotiation had been carried on and understanding had been

---

40. Khalid B.Sayeed, Pakistan - The Formative Phase 1857-1948  
(London 1968), p.83.

41. The Statesman, 14th January, 1937.

42. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 348.

43. S.R.Mehrotra, the Congress and the Partition of India-  
an article in the Partition of India - Policies and  
Respective, op.cit., p.19.

arrived, through the "stooges of the Jamiat", between the Congress and the Muslim League, stands refuted.

I.H.Qureshi further says that in order to ensure full cooperation the manifesto of both Congress and the League was made corresponding and on several issues their stand was the same. The representatives of the Jamiat had participated fully in drawing up the manifesto while at the same time keeping in close contact with the Congress. At the first place it may be asserted that a slight similarity in the manifesto could not be the basis to think that there was any pre-election understanding between the Congress and the Muslim League through the Jamiat Office bearers. Infact, the election manifestoes of almost all political parties in 1937 was conspicuously the same, having a progressive and socialistic outlook. The League manifesto was aimed at conciliating the Radical Muslims who considered the League to be the conservative and a dumping ground for the reactionaries. It was aimed at drawing the attention of the peasants and middle class Muslim voters because in most of the constituencies the Muslim Leaguers were pitted against the agriculturists party headed by Nawab of Chhattari. Moreover, in respect to the policy and

---

44. Ibid., p. 193.

45. Khalid B.Sayeed, op.cit., p. 82.

46. S.R.Mehrotra, Towards Indias Freedom and Partition, op.cit., p. 162.

attitude towards the Communal Award, separate electorate, the Act of 1935, the expropriation of private property, the language issue, both the Congress and the Muslim League were sharply divided between each other.<sup>47</sup>

"MUSLIM MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN AND THE BY-ELECTIONS;  
LEAGUE-JAMIAT CLEFTAGE."

Although the achievement of the Congress was commendable in the general election held under the provision of the Government of India Act 1935, but so far as the Muslim Majority provinces were concerned, it did not fair well except in North-West Frontier Provinces where the Congress could boost her support from the Muslim masses. The Muslim Leaguers interpreted this pathetic show of strength of the Congress as the repudiation of the Congress policy towards the Communal Award.<sup>48</sup> Commenting on the outcome of the election Jawaharlal

---

47. Ibid., p. 163.

48. The Communal Award announced by Ramsay MacDonald on 4th August 1932, as a temporary settlement formula of the communal question allowed the communal electorate to other communities like Sikhs, Indian Christian and Europeans with reservation of seats to the Muslim in all provinces and weightage in the province where they were in minority.

See Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., p.23.

Nehru conceded that the latter had failed in enlisting and winning over the support of the Muslim masses. Only in regard to the Muslim Seats, he said, "did we lack success ..... we failed because we had long neglected working among Muslim masses and we could not reach them in time."<sup>49</sup>

So in order to provide flesh to his hope Nehru started campaign for reaching to the closed doors of the Muslims. Hence, there started an intensive effort to establish contact with the Muslim masses. In a circular addressed to the provincial Congress committees,<sup>50</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Congress President, asked them to appoint a special Committee to facilitate the work of contact with the Muslim masses and to make the Muslims, of rural and urban areas both, acquainted with the programme and ideology of the Congress. A special department of Muslim Contact was set up in the office of the All India Congress Committee with Young Muslim leftists like K.M.Ashraf and Z.A.Ahmad as its members.<sup>51</sup> The idea behind constituting a Department of Mass Contact was to streamline the work of contact by assisting the Provincial Congress

---

49. The Times of India, 3 March 1937; The Medina, 3 March 1937.

50. Circular dated 31st March 1937, Rajendra Prasad Papers.

51. A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume IV (Pakistan Historical Society Publication 1961), p.25.

Committees in their work of contact with the Muslims. Orders were also sent to the Provincial Committees to issue notices in Urdu in the areas where a sizable number of Urdu-speaking people resided.

52

By that time a clear cleavage between the Muslim League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema was in the offing. The Jamiat leadership interpreted the meeting of Mr. Jinnah with the Nawabs Yusuf and Chattari, at the time of the Working Committee Meetings at Lucknow in March 1937, as an attempt to bring the reactionary elements in the League.

53

It had been the creed of the Jamiat to fight the reactionary forces in the country. These elements were rightly considered as the great hurdle in the way to freedom. With this conviction in mind the Jamiat entered the Muslim League Parliamentary Board as Mr. Jinnah had made no secret of his conviction that he wanted to get rid of them. Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman has tried to rebut this charge of the Jamiat leaders that the intended meeting of Jinnah with these Nawabs was an attempt to enlist their support. This is a mere denial of facts.

54

---

52. Rajendra Prasad Papers, op.cit.

53. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, (Longman's, Pakistan branch 1961), p.154.

54. Ibid., p. 154.

The Jamiat did not join the Muslim League Parliamentary Board on the pretext that Muslim League had changed its creed and switched over to the policy of Complete independence, as contemplated by Jinnah in his press release.  
55

These allegations received a better treatment at the hands of Husain Ahmad Madani in his booklet entitled "Mr. Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Moamma Aur Uska Hal". He contended that he had never given the statement in any meetings that had been referred to by Jinnah, as the creed of the Muslim League till the Lucknow session of August 1937 was not of Complete independence, although many responsible Muslims were trying for that. This fact has been supported by Khaliquzzaman himself. He writes in his autobiography that he tried his level best to change the creed of League to the full independence from its prior creed of full responsible Government but "to my great surprise Mr. Jinnah started opposing this change, in the constitution and a discussion ensued ..... ultimately I made last appeal to Mr. Jinnah not to become a party to the finishing of the Muslim League and to agree to my proposal to save the Muslim League from possible disruption. Therefore he stood up rather excited

---

55. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Mr. Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Moamma aur Uska hal (Jamiat-ul-Ulema, New Delhi, n.d.), p.16; The Madina 22, March, 1937.

56. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Ibid., p.17.

and said "well I say full independence and not Complete  
57  
independence."

The only grievance Husain Ahmad Madani had with the League was the latter's betrayal of assurance that the League was fighting against the reactionary elements in the League and would try to recruit the progressive and enlightened nationalist Muslims in the League. The stand of the Jamiat was not without good reason, for Mr. Jinnah had, in an exclusive interview to the Bombay Chronicle in  
58  
June 1937, which was latter published in Madina, expressed the same desire.

So the attitude of Mohammad Ali Jinnah at the very first Conference of the Working Committee of Muslim League Parliamentary Board at Lucknow on 13th March 1937 was most shocking to the Jamiat leadership. In one of his letter Husain Ahmad Madani writes that the very tendency of the League made them to easily ponder over as if whether the Muslim League was the real protector of the interest of the Muslims and the nation as a whole or the dumping ground for  
59  
the landlords, reactionaries and vested interest persons.

---

57. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 172.

58. The Bombay Chronicles, 3 June, 1937.

59. A letter addressed to Babu Fa'ul Ranman Khansahib Saidharwi, Azamgarh, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, compiled and edited by Najmuddin Islahi, Volume I, Maktub No.134.

In this meeting a resolution was passed which was sought to make the gate open for the agriculturists to join the League. To finalise the list of the agriculturists, a second meeting was called on 27th March and in the agenda of the Working Committee a clause was inserted "to consider the resolution of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board which was purported to induct in the party those elected members of the Assembly who did not fight the election on the ticket of the Muslim League.<sup>60</sup>

There is no denying the fact that the Muslim League had been a platform of the aristocrates and the landlords who were rightly considered to be the greatest enemy of the freedom. These were the classes who remained always in good books of the Government and got maximum benefits for their pro-Government activity in terms of titles and power both. It is also a fact that the League mostly consisted of the aristocrates and landlords on whose finance the League was maintaining its existence in politics. The landlords had been using the League as a pressure group to ventilate their grievances and to get certain concessions from the Government. This was because of this fact that Mr. Jinnah tried to get rid of them labelling them "as opportunists and job seekers." But during the election

---

60. See, Agenda, office of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board of U.P., 8 March 1937.

when he realised that there was no way out but to gain their support, due to paucity of fund, he inclined towards them.

Jinnah was very much anxious to revive the then dying Muslim League and introducing it to the general masses. The Muslim League eclipsed under the impact of inter party rivalry for leadership, was passing through the most crucial period of its history. It was totally cut off from the general Muslim masses due to its wrong policies and passive attitude during the Khilafat Movement, the time when the Muslims of all shades of opinion assembled at a common platform to make a holy war against the British. This can be said as one of the reasons which alienated Muslim League from the Muslims. But the Muslim League was having a charismatic leader in the personality of Jinnah who, after a period of dormant political activity, was bent upon suffering all hardships in his effort to infuse a new lease of life in the League. But Muslim League was having no platform of its own to reach the general masses. Jamiat-ul-Ulema was only a Muslim Organisation which was exercising great influence on the Muslim masses right from the days of Khilafat Movement. This was quite diplomatically used by Jinnah. It has been accepted by his own biographer that

---

61. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India - the Rise and Growth of Muslim League (Allahabad 1942), p.325.

62. Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, op.cit., p. 346.

"Jinnah sought the cooperation of the Jamiat in view of the fact that chances of the Muslim League in the election was quite dim because by that time it was only a gentry of self seekers and political opportunists bearing no any access to the Muslim mass."<sup>63</sup>

The establishment of the Department of Islamics was hailed by the mouthpiece of Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Al-Jamiat and other nationalist newspapers. Madina of Bijnor in its editorial note tried to persuade the nationalist Muslim Organisations like the Ahrar and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to unconditionally join the Congress.<sup>64</sup> They emphasised that both the Muslims and Hindus had one thing in common and that was the existence of both exploiters and the exploited in them and therefore the exploited Muslim should join hands with the exploited Hindus pushing aside their differences.<sup>65</sup>

Hoodwinked by the Muslim League gimmick the Jamiat Ulema looked towards the Congress which they thought was more sincere and sympathetic towards the Muslim problems. The other reason was that the Congress creed was in

---

63. Hiyat Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p.231.

64. The Madina, 17 April, 1937.

65. Ibid.

consonance with the Jamiat creed in fighting the reactionary elements. The Secretary of **Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Ahmad Saeed**, met Dr. Ashraf at Allahabad to find ways and means to bring the Jamiat under the banner of Congress. He put forward certain demand, as preconditions of joining the Congress. But Dr. K.M. Ashraf, in charge of the Muslim Mass Contact section of the All-India Congress Committee, authoritatively denied that any correspondence regarding the term on which Muslims should join the Congress had passed between him and Mawlana Ahmad Saeed of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and he also said that it would not be fair to assign this motive on Mawlana's intended visit to Allahabad. But the stand of Ahmad Saeed at the Allahabad meeting of the Muslim nationalists leaders go contrary to the assertion of K.M. Ashraf. Here Ahmad Saeed was against the unconditional surrender to the Congress and he made no secret of his stand.

---

66. The Madina 21 April, 1937.

67. The demands put forward by Ahmad Saeed was as follows:

1. The Government should not interfere in any case in the culture, language, script, religious education, missionary activity, religious institutions of any religious minorities.
2. The Government should have no any right to interfere in the personal law of the Muslims.
3. Muslim Qazi should be appointed to various courts to look after the cases of the Muslims pertaining to the religious matters, see, the Madina, 21 April 1937.

68. An interview to the Associated press of India, 22 April 1937, All India Congress Committee Papers, file No.31. p.11.

69. The Madina, 21 March, 1937.

Mawlana Azad, a shrewed politician, ceased this psychological opportunity to wean the Ulema from the Muslim League Parliamentary Board to the Congress. Their active support to the Congress was considered as prime importance if the programme of the Congress sponsored Muslim Mass Contact Campaign was to be successful. The Jamiat leadership was having a great access to the Muslim masses which they showed during the general election by providing a new lease of life to the then dying Muslim League. Khaliquzzaman himself admitted this fact in one of his letters to Husain Ahmad Madani. Thus a consulting meeting of the various **Muslim Organisations** were held on 15th to 17th March 1937 at Allahabad mainly due to the efforts of Mawlana Azad. The issue at point was to consider <sup>ways</sup> and means to bring Muslims into the Congress fold.  
70

Jinnah was perturbed at the proposed meeting of Congress leaders and UP Muslims. In his statement to the Associated Press Jinnah remarked that "...it would be useless for any individual or individuals effectively to carry Muslims behind them if any statements arrived with a particular group or even for the matter of that, said a whole province. It is a pity that these round about efforts are made. The only object of it can be to creat some differences between Musalman..."  
71

---

70. A.I.C.C. Papers, file No. 12, p.45.

71. Ibid.

In this exclusive interview Jinnah also criticised the Jamiat leaders who were sometimes with the Congress and sometimes with the League to suit their need. In reply to Mr. Jinnah's attack on the Congress Babu Rajendra Prasad said, "No Congressman ever thinks of imposing his will on any one else be he a Muslim or of any other persuasion... there is no conspiracy in this against any Muslim leader or Muslim group. It is obviously the only proper course for an organisation like the Congress."<sup>72</sup><sup>73</sup>

It was the personal triumph of Mawlana Azad to bring the whole group of Ulema to his line of thinking. He succeeded in getting a fatwa contrary to what had been decided at Muradabad to remain with the League. Infact, at the Allahabad meeting there emerged two groups with<sup>in</sup> the Jamiat one, led by Hifzur Rahman and Husain Ahmad Madani, was in favour of unconditional surrender to the Congress while the other, led by Mawlana Ahmad Sayeed and Kefiyatullah, was against this.<sup>74</sup><sup>75</sup> Ahmad Saeed was a man who was more concerned

---

72. Ibid.

73. A.I.C.C. papers, file No.31, p.7.

74. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., pp. 156-157.

75. I.H.Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, op.cit., p.72.

with the fate of Muslim India and thought that it would not be in the interest of the Muslims to go to the Congress bench without any prior assurance for safeguarding the culture, traditions, language, and religion of the Muslims. It would have been an act of betrayal of the Muslim Community to go to the Congress without safeguards. Perhaps Ahmad Saeed was guided by the fact that it was the Congress which opposed the separate electorate for which Jamiat had been fighting since its inception. Keeping this fact in mind he thought it to be an unwise act to unconditionally surrender to the Congress.

In his autobiography Khaliquzzaman has tried to put blame on Mawlana Husain Ahmad that he left the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and decided to join the Congress at the Allahabad meeting in quest for a ministership in the Cabinet. This blame is not supported by any evidence and is only an attempt on the part of Mr. Khaliquzzaman to exonerate himself from the lust of ministership. Madani cannot be that small. He was an undisputed leader of an influential group which was exercising tremendous influence on the Congress and if he had given an indication of his will Congress would have accepted him as it was sure to enhance the prestige of the Congress amongst a sizable number of Muslim population. Madani's personality still governed

---

76. Uma Kaura, Nationalism and Indian Muslims (Delhi 1984), p.115.

the psychology of the Muslim masses which he showed during his campaign for the Muslim League candidates.

Khaliquzzaman exposed himself in enclosing a letter from Ahmad Saeed, the Jamiat Secretary;

"... do let me know how far it is true that if seats for yourself and Nawab Ismail Khan could be found in the Cabinet, a settlement might have been possible with the Congress and the Congress was ready to give one seat but you were not prepared to leave Nawab Ismail Khan behind and there was no room for him. Therefore, an agreement could not be reached. Is it also true that Rafi Ahmad Kidwai to whom you had offered full help and did not put up a candidate against him proved disloyal to you."<sup>77</sup>

In order to counteract the Congress move to contact the Muslim masses over their heads Jinnah appealed to the Muslims to establish Muslim League branches both at provincial and district level to recruit the members to the Muslim League.<sup>78</sup> Funds were also raised for the same purpose. At the meeting of the Muslim League Provincial Parliamentary Board held at Lucknow on 6th of May under the Presidentship of Nawab Ismail Khan, a plan for Mass Contact was chalked up

---

77. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.158, (a letter addressed by Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to Khaliquzzaman).

78. The Madina, 25 April, 1937.

and the Muslim League members of the UP-Legislative Assembly were asked to collect Rs.100 each from their respective constituency while the members of the Working Committee were required to pay Rs.500 for the purpose of carrying on propaganda among the Muslim masses and keep in close touch with them.<sup>79</sup>

Press played an important part in the political socialisation of the people and so it was felt essential to have an independent press for reaching the masses and projecting their policies and programmes to them. So donations were made by the influential and well off Muslims of UP for the same.<sup>80</sup>

A cleavage between the Muslim League and the Jamiat was thus very much in sight. While the League said one thing, the Jamiat said the other. A direct collision thus was inevitable.

The League-Jamiat relation touched the lower ebb in June-July 1937, when both the Muslim organisations collided with each other in the Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpura by-election,<sup>81</sup> while they were expected to join hands with each other in

---

79. A.I.C.C.Papers, file No.16, p.15; The Times of India, 27 July, 1937.

80. Uma Kaura, op.cit., p. 111.

deciding the destiny of Muslims in a predominantly Hindu India. Both the Congress and the Muslim League fielded their candidates from this seat.<sup>82</sup> The election was the real trial of strength of the Muslim League and the Congress, supported by Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. Hence a complete break in the relation between League and Jamiat followed and the latter rushed to Jhansi with full force to impress upon the Leaguers their strength and influence on the masses.<sup>83</sup> Mawlana Shaukat Ali, the old Khilafatist along with a group of League Ulema and workers<sup>84</sup> camped at Jhansi for carrying on electionering propaganda in favour of Rafiuddin, the Muslim League candidate. Nehru took keen interest in this election and attached a great importance for "a Congress victory in this (election) would indeed be a triumph for the Congress and our cause and also a point of honour."<sup>85</sup> The nationalist newspapers opened their columns in highlighting the achievements of the Congress candidate and persuading the electorate to support Mr. Sherwani, the Congress candidate.

---

82. Congress candidate was Sherwani, ably supported by Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, while Muslim League fielded Rafiuddin as the official candidate.

83. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.159.

84. It included Ulema like Mawlana Jamal Mian, Mufti Enayetullah of firangi Mahal, Mawlana Abdul Hamid Badauni and host of others. See, Khaliquzzaman, Ibid. p.159.

85. Nehru to Kher, 30 June, 1937, A.I.C.C.Papers.

The Congress entered the fray with many advantages accruing from a sound finance, better organisation and support of the press while the Muslim League was passing through the most critical phase of financial crisis. It was due to the generous help of Raja of Mahmoodabad, Amir Ahmad Khan, that the Muslim League was able to meet the<sup>86</sup> election expenses.

Notwithstanding the vast organisational strength, finances, backing of the press and the advantages emanating from ministerial authority, the Congress was defeated at the polls.<sup>87</sup> Credit for this goes to Mawlana Shaukat Ali, the hero of many political battles, who fought single handed<sup>88</sup> both against the Jamiat divines and Nehru's strength.

Analysing the election outcome the Madina visualised that the main reason of Leagues victory in that region was that Rafiuddin was a local man and his caste, Muslim Rajputs, constituted 25% of the whole Muslim population, whole-<sup>89</sup>heartedly supported him. . But the most important factor was

---

86. Khaliqzaman, op.cit., p. 159.

87. Out of 4700 votes polled the Congress could get only 2000 votes, see the Madina, 11 July, 1937.

88. A history of Freedom Movement, Volume IV, op.cit.p.47.

89. The Madina, 12 July, 1937.

the attitude of the Congress towards the minority problems and interest which gave ample opportunity to Jinnah to exploit the situation to his advantage. Blame was entirely<sup>90</sup> to be put on Babu Rajendra Prasad who speaking at Patna on the 3rd March 1937 ruled out the possibility of forming coalition with any party which was not in consonance with the policy of his party. He further said that two Muslim members may be included in the legislature in which one should be from Congress and other from that party which sign the pledge. This statement was made at the time when<sup>91</sup> most of the results were about to come. Nothing perturbed the Muslims than this hasty statement of Rajendra Prasad.

The Muslim League leaders specially Mawlana Shaukat Ali was criticised by a host of writers for communalising the election campaign by raising the slogan of Islam in danger. In one of his letters Nehru complained to<sup>92</sup> Khaliquzzaman about the election strategy of the League. In a press release, Nehru criticising Jinnah's attempt to import religious emotion into politics, said, "the cry (in the election) raised is that Islam is in danger and

---

90. Al-Jamiat, 23 February, 1937.

91. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 153.

92. Ibid., p.174.

non-Muslim organisation have dared to put up candidate against the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah appealed in the name of Allah and the holy Quran for support of the Muslim League candidate. He knew well that many eminent Muslims, including leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema like Mawlana Husain Ahmad were supporting the Congress candidate. Have they ceased to be Muslims because of this?"<sup>93</sup>

But this is only one side of the picture on the other hand the Congressmen also did not behave in a sensible manner. In one of his speeches Ataulloh Shah Bukhari labelled the Muslim League as foul smelling dead body and the description of the Hindustan Times, a Congress organ about the league "as Madaris and Bhands", also did not give credit to them.<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile, Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim resigned from his seat, in order to meet the criticism of Muslim Leaguers for breach of pledge and sought re-election. This was a rare respect to democratic principle and values. But while seeking re-election he retained the ministerial post which was most agitating to the Muslim Leaguers. Khaliquzzaman

---

93. An article by B.R.Nanda in The Partition of India - Policies and Perspective, 1935-1947, edited by C.H. Phillips and Mary Dorcen Weinwright (George Allen and Unwin limited, 1970), p.158, quoting from a press statement Allahabad, 30 June, 1937.

94. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 176.

complained and criticised the improper action of the Congress  
in the letters <sup>95</sup> to Jawaharlal Nehru. He said, "the Govern-  
ment of India authorised the Governor to appoint a person  
as Minister from outside, provided he secures a seat for  
himself within 6 months of his appointment but it nowhere  
allows a Minister to retain his office as a Minister and  
resign his seat when his appointment was made as a member  
of the Legislature." The objection of the League members  
was quite justified in view of the fact that any one  
seeking a re-election as a Minister would get undue advantage  
over his rivals.

This was the most hotly contested political battle  
in which all the prominent personalities from both sides  
actively canvassed for their respective candidates. <sup>96</sup> But  
inspite of the big guns like Mawlana Shaukat Ali and  
Hasrat Mohani, <sup>97</sup> League lost the election, mainly due to  
the influence of Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani who was  
exercising tremendous control over the minds of the voters

- 
95. A letter by Khaliquzzman to Pandit Nehru, published  
in Bunch of letters, see Khaliquzzman, op.cit., p.176.
96. Congress fielded Mohammad Abdul Samee while Hafiz  
Mohammad Ibrahim, once in the U.P. Congress parliamen-  
tary board, was the League nominee.
97. In the election the Congress candidate got 2,102 votes  
while the Muslim League candidate got 7,271 votes, see,  
the Madina 1 November 1937.

98

in the region. This success of the Congress was of far-reaching importance also for it was fought just after the Lucknow session of the Muslim League which had boosted its morale by enlisting the support of Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Fazlul Haq, the powerful premiers of Punjab and Bengal respectively.

At this time a demand was made from Jamiat-ul-Ulema asking the representatives of the Muslim League in the U.P. Legislature to resign and seek a fresh mandate because they succeeded at the polls only due to the support and <sup>99</sup> influence of the Jamiat and now they were not with them.

Thereafter three by-elections took place at Amroha, Bulandshahr and Saharanpur and in all these elections the Congress got defeat, mostly due to the inexhaustible energy of the great Muslim leader Mawlana Shaukat Ali and a hand of committed workers who were opposed to be idle and arm-chair politicians. Among these the Amroha by-election was most important from Jamiat point of view because for the

---

98. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.177.

99. The signatories were Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani and other prominent leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema see. Al-Jamiat, 1 November, 1937.

100. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 177.

first time a Jamiat representative was contesting against the Muslim League on the congress ticket. Great importance was attached to it by the Jamiat leaders. Both the leaders of the Jamiat and the Ahrar down to the Congress prominent leaders like Nehru and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan actively canvassed in support of Bashir Ahmad. Mawlana Mohammad Ismail and Habibur Rehman, the Ahrar president toured the Bachrao (Amroha) and asked the people to cast their vote in favour of the Congress candidate.

Addressing a huge gathering at Amroha on the eve of by-election Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to the people in the name of hunger and poverty and political and economic development of the country as if only the Congress was capable of placating the people and remedying the misgivings. He tried to remove the apprehension of the Muslims that Congress was against the Muslim culture tradition and language and substantiated his speech by the Congress resolution of Calcutta.

---

101. Al-Jamiat, 20 October, 1937.

102. The Madina, 28 November 1937.

103. Ibid.

104. In this resolution the Congress took the responsibility of defending the culture, language and religion of the Muslims.

In spite of the canvassing of the Congress leader, the League candidate did well and defeated the Congress candidate .

Commenting on the results of the election at Muradabad, Saharanpur and Bulandshahr the Madina remarked, "even though Congress could not be successful on these seats but one cannot deny the fact that the results of the election has proved beyond doubt that the majority of Muslims are not with the Muslim League because Congress candidate was defeated with a marginal difference. Secondly till that time Congress had been avoiding in fielding its candidate for the Muslim constituencies. But now Congress tried to contact the masses directly under its Mass Contact Campaign. If in that attempt it succeeded in getting 40% endorsement from the electorate then it meant that Muslim league had no influence and say in the masses. Congress failed to get success only due to the long neglected work among the Muslim masses and as a result the message and programme of the Congress could not impress upon their mind.

---

105. For example, as Madina newspaper claims, in Muradabad by-election Congress got 3441 votes from 7,570 votes polled, and the League candidate got 4129 votes against the Congress Candidate.

106. The Madina, December 1937, p.5.

Thus by the end of December 1937 the Congress  
campaign of Muslim Mass Contact had met with utter failure. 107  
Firstly, it was not taken up seriously and secondly it was  
crushed wherever launched by the wheel of the Muslim League  
which was rapidly gaining speed, strength and mobility. 108  
The All India Congress Committee file No.47 is full of such  
letters complaining and expressing anguish over the immobility  
and lack of commitment to the duty and obligations of the  
Congress workers and suggesting ways and means for the  
contact work. 109 Mohammad Ashfaq, the Secretary of the Young  
Muslim Party, Meerut, in a letter addressed to Jawaharlal  
Nehru, the Congress President, complained about the idleness  
of the Congress men. He said, "there is a group of prominent  
Ulema under the head of Mawlana Husain Ahmad and Mufti  
Kifayatullah which trying its best for Muslim political up-  
lift but reactionaries are more in number and have much  
wealth at their disposal while those venerable Ulema have  
only their lives to sacrifice over the country and Islam."  
He further taking the example of Meerut said, "it is one of  
the cities where the Congress is most powerful and influen-  
cial body of the town and the district. But what is being

---

107. A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume IV, op.cit.,  
p.50.

108. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., p.59; See also  
The All India Congress Committee Papers.

109. Ibid.

done by the local Congress for Muslim Mass Contact. How many leaders have been called at Meerut for this object. How many Muslims have been enrolled here as a Congress members. As far as I think the Congress diary is really blank ... what they have done of your circular about Muslim Mass Contact problem? Have they filled it or thrown it in waste paper basket? What have they done of it?

111 He suggested various ways and means for the contact work. These above mentioned documents show that the whole campaign was worked by disorganization and idleness and lack of devotion to the work.

Unmindful of the temper of the time and warnings even from its friends Congress persisted in its Mass Contact Campaign and tried to get by Governmental authority which it could not achieve through political activity.

---

A.I.C.C. file

110. /No.47, Contains several such letters addressed to Dr. K.M.Ashraf, the incharge of the Muslim Mass Contact Campaign department- see, pp. 83,87,89,91,93.
111. He suggested several ways and means to be followed for the Muslim Mass Contact campaign viz., Muslim leaders and Muslim congressmen like Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani of Deoband, Mufti Kifayatullah of Delhi, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, Mawlana Hifzir Rehman of Seohara and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan be pressed to tour the whole country with a definite programme and objectives. Moreover, other Muslim Congressmen may be also asked for, to tour their respective provinces and districts. Ulema and Muslim leaders would be more suitable for the object than our vulnerable Hindu leaders. File No.47 p.65 A.I.C.C. papers.

Contd.....

Congress thought that through the benefits accruing from long experience in political activity, strong financial position and backing of the press it could give rude shock to the Muslim League leadership and wean away the Muslims from the Jaws of the Muslim League. The latter interpreted it as an attempt at political Shuddhi of the Muslims and took up the challenge in the right earnest. Infact the Congress in an attempt to reach over the heads of the Muslim politicians and to the rank and file of the Muslim voters gave the Muslim league just the occasion it needed for a mass campaign. History then saw a remarkable change in the Muslim League and eclipsed the Congress influence over the Muslim masses.

---

(Continued from the previous page)

112. K.M.Ashraft sounded the warning that new move of the Congress with regards to the formation of the contacts with the Muslim masses is not being sufficiently appreciated by a number of progressive and independant Muslim outside, see A.I.C.C. File No.31, p.15.
113. A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume 5, op.cit., p. 50.
114. Ibid, p.16.
115. Ibid., p. 17.

C H A P T E R     I I I

THE JAMIAT FROM THE WORLD WAR II  
TO THE QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

## REACTION TO THE WORLD WAR II

The year 1939 saw the world on the verge of a global armed conflict. The conflict occurred in Europe which soon engulfed the whole world and brought untold miseries, sufferings and privation to the millions. The genesis of the war lay in the humiliating terms imposed by the allies in 1919 on Germany after the First World War.<sup>1</sup> The Germans never have forgiven Poland and under the spirited leadership of Adolf Hitler, they saw the hope of revival and revenge. Hitler after strengthening his power and position by bringing Austria and Czechoslovakia under his sways entered into a treaty of non-aggression with Russia on 24th August, 1939. In order to counterpoise the German designs Britain guaranteed protection to Poland on 25th August 1939.<sup>2</sup> Thus the stage was set for a world wide conflict, the immediate cause of hostility was the conflict over the Polish corridor a small territory given to Poland to have an access to the sea and as negotiations failed Germany attacked Poland on 1st September 1939.<sup>3</sup> On 3rd September Britain and France also declared war on Germany to make the world safe for democracy and to fight

---

1. R.C.Majumdar, History of Freedom Movement in India (Calcutta 1963), p. 594.

2. Khaliqzaman, op.cit., p. 217.

3. R.C.Majumdar, op.cit., p. 594.

for the preservation of democratic values and ideals and for protection of the right of self determination of all nations, against the onslaught of Nazis and Fascists.<sup>4</sup>

Britain followed the same policy with regard to India as it followed in 1914. India was used as a passive pawn of British policy and was ceremoniously declared a belligerent nation,<sup>5</sup> without even the formality of consulting the Central Legislatures and the will of the people. While in regard to the other Commonwealth countries their Parliaments met in a special meeting and declared war on their own. This very fact convinced the Indians that Britain treated India as a creature of its own will, without giving a formal recognition to its will in a matter like war.<sup>6</sup>

The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow made a formal broadcast to the nation on 3rd September 1939 informing that the war had been broken out between Germany and Poland and urged the people of India to help British in her lofty cause. In a broadcast the Viceroy is reported to have said, "I am confident that India will make her contribution on

- 
4. Vishnoo Bhagwan, Constitutional History and National Movement of India (Atma Ram, New Delhi, 1972), p.251.
  5. R.P.Dutta, India Today (People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1947), p.439.
  6. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad op.cit., p.26.

the side of human freedom as against the rule of force and will play a part worthy of her place among the great nations of the historical civilization of the world.<sup>7</sup>

The Working Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind in its meeting at Meerut on 16th, 17th, 18th September 1939 declared its attitude towards the European war. The Committee giving a most anxious consideration and passionate view on the current national and international situation in the light of holy teachings of Islam demanded patriotism and highest sense of ethics and resolved that considering all these factors together, the working Committee found no valid reason to support British imperialism in the war. It was the considered view of the Committee that in the present critical situation the Muslims of India, infact all Indians, should immediately unite to formulate a decision which should be in keeping with their national self respect and dignity.<sup>8</sup>

The British claim that it was fighting for the defence of the freedom of the nations sounded paradoxical to the Jamiat in view of the perpetuation of British domination

---

7. Indian Annual Register, 1940, Volume II, p.21.

8. Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya hai, (Jamiat-ul-Ulema (U.P.), publication Division 1946), Volume II, p. 213.

over many nation and adopting a deliberate policy of violence and oppression to keep them in subjugation and to suppress their struggle for freedom. It perplexed the Jamiat that if Britain had declared war in the guise of defence of freedom of the nations, then why Britain kept silent and became a dumb spectator over the happenings in Chzechosl<sup>o</sup>vakia, Austria, Abyassinia and Albana where freedom was wantonly sacrificed and the dictatorship carried on a campaign of fire and destruction and perpetrated all sorts of terror and barbarity against those free people.<sup>9</sup>

The Jamiat also regarded the declaration of war by the Viceroy on behalf of Indian without consulting the Indian public opinion as contrary to her cherished ideal of the defence of democracy. Moreover, Britain did not care to defend the Spanish Republic and was not willing to create a democratic form of Government either in India or in its colonies and dependencies.<sup>10</sup>

The Jamiat failed to understand that if Britain was fighting for the cause of the oppressed then why she did not come to the rescue of Tripoli, Syria, Abyssinia, Chzechoslovakia and Palestine which were no less oppressed

---

9. A.M.Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thoughts in India, Volume 5 (S.Chand and Company, New Delhi, 1975), pp. 592-593.

10. Indian Quarterly Register, 1940, Volume I, pp.378-380.

than Poland and allowed to be victimised by the oppressors. 11

The British plea that they were bound by the agreement with Poland to help her in case of emergency and foreign aggression could not convince the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, for the Britishers never held the promises and agreements in such high esteem. They had always been acted as unprincipled and indecisive men whose words and professions could not be trusted. It were the Britishers who in spite of the repeated declaration by responsible statesmen and politicians, regarding the territorial integrity of the various states which fought against them in World War I and the sanctity of the holy places of Islam, the victorious allies dismembered the Turkish empire and violated the sanctity of <sup>12</sup> the holy places of Islam with impurity.

Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad in his letter to the Viceroy dated 13th January 1940, elaborated the resolution passed by Meerut meeting of the Jamiat Working Committee. He said that the decision of the Jamiat had been based on the teachings of religious principles and injunctions of the Quran and that the people had nothing to do in any form with the war efforts. The Jamiat had the right to propagate

---

11. Indian Annual Register, 1940.

12. Khutba-e-Sadaarat, Eleventh Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Al Jamiat Press, available on microfilm at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

and spread its religion through missionary activity. To impose ban even on such activities would be tantamount to the interference in religious freedom.<sup>13</sup>

The Jamiat held Britain chiefly responsible for untold miseries and sufferings of the crores of Muslims all over the world. It has deprived the various nations of their wealth, trade, educational setup. It was Britain that had run down the Muslims, deprived them of their educational institutions trade, commerce and wealth. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in his lovely speech concluded that the responsibility to oust the Britishers from India fell upon the shoulders of all Indians and on the Muslims even more, for the Muslims have been living here for centuries and it were the Britishers who have deprived them of the position of once a ruler of the sub-continent.<sup>14</sup> Moreover their loyalty to Islam and Islamic countries also demand the immediate end of the British rule. He thought and quite rightly that it was only due to the enslavement of India that the Britishers had been maintaining their hold in Muslim countries of the Middle East like Egypt,<sup>15</sup> Syria, Palestine, Sudan and Arabia. Hence in order to

---

13. The Madina, 10 February 1940.

14. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq (Al-Jamiat Press, Delhi 1948), p.113.

15. Ibid.

liberate these countries the Muslims had to liberate India from the clutches of British imperialism. When the Jamiat realized possible threat to the territorial integrity and self-determination of the Islamic countries it warned Britain to dissociate herself from any move to establish her authority over these Islamic countries. The committee resolution declared that nothing could satisfy the Muslims than independence of the Islamic countries. The Muslims would not like any move of the outside power to deny complete independence of these countries.

Husain Ahmad Madani further condemned those who wanted to help Britain both financially and militarily in this hour of peril and termed them as the co-sharers in the barbarians. He thought that the best way to help Britain in this situation, when it was encircled with so many difficulties in face of the reverses in the European war, would be to persuade her to stop such acts.

THE AUGUST OFFER

In view of the deepening crisis in the European war and to enlist the support of the Indians in the war

---

16. Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hai, op.cit., p. 237.

17. Al-Jamiat, 12 June, 1940.

18. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, op.cit., p.111.

efforts the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on behalf of the British Government announced a new proposal on 8th August 1940 which had offered the immediate expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council by appointing a number of representatives of Indians and the establishment of a War Advisory Council consisting of representatives of British India and the Indian states to meet at regular interval.<sup>19</sup> But the offer fell short of what the Jamiat had been striving for. Because it fell short of any transfer of power, Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, in his statement ruled out any possibility of cooperating with Britain in its war efforts even though the government had promised to extend the number of Executive Council in order to accommodate Indians. For there was no common ground between Jamiat demand for immediate Complete Independence and Viceroy's offer of an enlarged Executive Council.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, even if the government declared India's complete independence, declared Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad, it would not be possible for the Jamiat to cooperate until and unless they are convinced that the declaration has been based on reality and they are self-determinent to decide their participation in war efforts. Moreover they

---

19. The Madina, 13 August, 1940.

20. The Madina, 17 August 1940.

were convinced that Britain was not fighting for the protection of the oppressed and weaker nations but only to fulfil their imperialistic design. He condemned the reactionary and opportunist elements for their attempt to enter into the Viceroy's Executive Council. He specially exhorted the Muslim to be guided by the laws of Islam in matter of peace and justice and not by the lure of posts and worldly honour.

The Jamiat's opposition to Britain in the war efforts would not be taken to mean that it wanted the defeat of the British in the war for this would have worse effect in India. A defeat of England would mean a triumph of the Nazis and the fascists which could not be in the best interest of India for it would further extend the bondage of slavery. Hence the Jamiat adopted a neutral policy with regard to the European war. This stand of the Jamiat taken at the Working Committee Meeting of the Jamiat at Delhi in October 1940 was supported by the nationalist press like Madina , Bijnor.

The Jamiat Leaders for their revolutionary and anti war activities had to suffer a great deal of hardships and

---

21. The Tej, 18 August, 1940.

22. The Madina, 9th October, 1940.

privation. A large number of Ulema were arrested for their inflammatory speeches and statements against the Government. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, one of the leaders of the Jamiat - ul-Ulema, was arrested under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1939. He was charged of making 'irresponsible' speeches against the war which would have aroused the people in revolt and was sentenced to a six years of vigorous imprisonment.<sup>23</sup> Many raids were made on the office of the Jamiat-<sup>24</sup> ul-Ulema and important documents and pamphlets were seized. In November, two days before Idd Mawlana Ahmad Saeed was also arrested and put behind the bars. These acts of the Government antagonised the Jamiat leaders and its Secretary Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad criticised the Government for its irresponsible acts at a time when it was facing great difficulties. The Secretary warned the Government that if they continued it, the Jamiat would be compelled to start civil Disobedience Movement. He further said that the Government would be making great mistake if it thought that if could crush the revolutionary zeal of the Indians<sup>25</sup> through oppression.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema responded to the clarian call given by Mr. Gandhi for a representative Satyagraha to

---

23. The Madina, 29th September 1940.

24. The Madina, 25th September 1940.

25. The Madina, 21 November 1940.

protest against the war. It was to be no struggle for freedom but a symbolic Satyagraha for asserting the right of free speech. The Jamiat Working Committee congratulated Indians and specially the representatives of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind who were serving a vigorous imprisonment for their anti-war speeches. An appeal was also made to maintain law and order situation in the country and not to give even a slight opportunity to the enemies of freedom to take advantage from this for in that situation only a policy of non violence could be beneficial for Indians and violent method would bring dangerous consequences because this would embrass the Government in a war situation.

In order to meet the exigencies of the situation the Jamiat in a circular to the people proposed for appointment of a Khuddam-e-Khalque Volunteers to maintain law and order situation in view of the rumours floating in the air which could be exploited to their full advantage by anti-social elements by engaging in loot and plunder.

---

26. Minutes of Working Committee, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind 1940, Microfilm at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

27. Ibid.

28. Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hai, op.cit., p. 226.

Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani was highly critical of the Muslim League for its policy during the war. In one of his letter, addressed to one Mawlana Ismail of Gojarkhan,<sup>29</sup> he criticised the attitude of the League during the war which served the cause of British imperialism.

Husain Ahmad Madani says that although the League was non-committal in the war it allowed individual help as a result of which the top rank Leaguers as well as the back benchers among them took so much part to aid the Government that the parellel of which would not be found any where else.<sup>30</sup>

Husain Ahmad Madani quoted with permission the statement of Mr. Jinnah which was published by the Zamindar, Lahore. Mr. Jinnah was reported to have said that at a time when Britain was involved in life and death struggle, the Muslim League did not want to embrass it and put obstacles in its way of recruitment to the army nor would it take to any movement. But on the other hand it was neutral and even this neutrality was not of aggressive nature. Moreover it had permitted some of its office bearers that if they liked

---

29. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, Volume 1, compiled by Najmuddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif, Azamgarh 1952), pp. 156-157. Maktub No. 150.

30. Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kiya Hai (Delhi 1945), p.16; See also The Zamindar, 25 March 1941.

they could help Britain in their hour of peril. Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, the premier of the Punjab who <sup>was</sup> a prominent leader of the Muslim League, had rendered so meritorious a military aid as could not be expected from any other man. <sup>31</sup>

Emphasising the Universality of Islam and the principle of extra-territorial loyalty Mr. Jinnah said that the "Indian Muslims are a part of that Islam<sup>ic</sup> community which is spread from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Turkey is also a part of this community and Afghanistan and Iraq too. I am glad that in the present war these powers have joined together with Britain and we, the Indian Muslims, are at one with them though in the past we may have multifarious differences and we have every desire to help the British in this war....." <sup>32</sup>

Husain Ahmad Madani thinks that the role of Jinnah during the war was the betrayal of Islam. He criticised Jinnah for his help in the passing of the Army Bill. Jinnah in course of his speech in the Assembly assured that those armies would not be sent to the Islamic countries as had been assured by the Viceroy. But latter those very armies were

---

31. Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kiya Hai, op.cit., p.14; See also the Zamindar, 25 March, 1941.

32. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, op.cit., pp. 156-157.

sent to Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt and the Muslim League could not do any thing or made any practical move against Britain.<sup>33</sup>

As a matter of fact Jinnah wanted to use war situation as a bargaining counter with Britain. Its cooperation with the Government was made conditional on its refusal to agree to the Congress demand for the right to form a Constituent Assembly, as it would be dominated by the Congress and the Muslims would be bound to be in a helpless minority and secondly, on its acceptance of the League's claim that no constitutional system in the country would be evolved without the prior approval of the minority.<sup>34</sup>

#### CRIPPS MISSION AND THE JAMIAT-UL-ULEMA-E-HIND

By the year 1942 the European war took a new turn. German, attacked France and Japan with her dramatic entry in the war on the December 1941 shouting the slogan of Asia for the Asian started conquering the countries, of Far East and South & West Asia.<sup>35</sup> This created a great consternation amidst the allied powers like USA, China, UK, France against

- 
33. Husain Ahmad Madani, An open letter to the Muslim League, (Lahore 1946), p. 53.
  34. R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, (Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 226.
  35. Jai Jipal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, (Delhi, 1983), p. 101.

the threat of Japan. Both China and America realised that a war in the eastern sector was bound to involve India.<sup>36</sup> The leaders of these countries began to advocate that a reapproachment between the servant and the master was vital for the better interest of the Allied powers. Realising the gravity of the situation, on 11th March 1942, Mr. Churchill announced the sending of the Cripps Mission to India to suggest the constitutional proposals suitable to Indians.<sup>37</sup>

When these developments were taking place the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind was deliberating at its 13th session at Lahore under the presidentship of Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani who was made permanent president of the Jamiat at the Johnpur session in June, 1940. Although the resolution adopted at the open session regarding the Cripps proposals were in the form of mere expectation from such a mission but in view of the subsequent development this prophesy became an album of future.<sup>38</sup> The Conference while calling the proposals as an outdated check called upon all Muslims and Muslim Organisations in India to get together and draw up a common formula agreeable to all shades of thought for the purpose of presenting to Sir Stafford Cripps.<sup>39</sup>

---

36. Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Volume 4 (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1972), p.335.

37. Jai Jipal, op.cit., p. 101.

38. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, (Al-Jamiat Publication, New Delhi), p.

39. The Statesman, 24th March, 1942.

The Cripps proposals were disapproved by both the major political parties like Congress and the Muslim League. While the Muslim League saw in the proposal the achievement of Pakistan as a remote possibility with a definite preference for a new Indian Union,<sup>40</sup> the Congress saw in the non-acceding clause the possibility of the creation of Pakistan by implication for it offered the opportunity of the creation<sup>41</sup> of two or more independent unions in India. Moreover the demand for national Government and complete independence had not been conceded either in the immediate present or in the future.

Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, the Secretary of the Jamiat Ulema,<sup>42</sup> in his press release said that the proposals are nothing but a promise in terms of future prospects and the proposals contain no guarantee that in the present time Indians would be given a chance to form a responsible Government. He condemned the proposals as an unprincipled and outdated piece of legislation meant to settle their own house in order. Had the Government introduced such proposals in the atmosphere of pre-war situation the Indians inspite of dislike would have accepted it as they had accepted the

---

40. Ibid.

41. Jai Jipal, op.cit., p. 102.

42. The Madina, 13th April, 1942.

Provincial Autonomy in the face of bitter criticism. But at a time when the clouds of calamity was over India, Britain wanted to drag her alone in the struggle for life and death. No principled and farsighted political party could agree with the proposals so easily. He further criticised the British Government for widening the gulf amongst the Indians by giving them concessions which were <sup>43</sup> contrary and anti thesis of each others claim.

Infact, the Cripps landed on the Indian soil under most unfavourable circumstances. The signing of Atlantic Charter raised the hope of the Indians that they were also going to be benefited by the principle underlying the charter. But the untimely outburst of Churchil contaminated the situation. Mr. Churchil, speaking in the House of Commons on 9th September 1941 said that the principle of Atlantic Charter applied only to the countries under Nazi subjugation and <sup>44</sup> the question of India was a separate matter. This made the Indians apprehensive of the British intentions. In such an atmosphere "a gradualist constitutional approach was apt to <sup>45</sup> be a miserable failure."

---

43. Ibid.

44. A History of the Freedom Movement, (Pakistan historical Society), Volume 4, p.121.

45. Vishnoo Bhagwan, Constitutional History of India, (New Delhi, 1972), p.

Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani was violently critical of the Britain for her irresponsible and untimely outburst in declaring that the principle underlying the charter did not apply to the British dependencies. Addressing the 13th Annual Session of the Jamiat Madani was reported to have said, "the Atlantic Charter was exposed to the world as a fantastic message to all which would be applied to the weaker and downtrodden". This infused a new lease of life in the minds of the Indians. But the September declaration of Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons made it clear that India was not going to be benefitted by the fruits of freedom and democracy. This was quite apprehensive to the Indians and thus their attitude stiffened.<sup>46</sup> Infact, England was negotiating from the position of weakness. This made her bonafides and generosity, suspect in Indian eyes.<sup>47</sup>

Hence the failure of the Cripps Mission and the changing of attitude of Sir Stafford Cripps between the first and second meeting with Mawlana Azad showed the evasive attitude of Britain towards the Indian problems and their non seriousness in granting Independence to India.<sup>48</sup> Only the circumstances had compelled them to show some

---

46. The Madina, 5th April, 1942.

47. Vishnoo Bhagwan, op.cit., p. 268.

48. Abul Kalam Azad, op.cit., pp. 43-47.

sincerity and interest. This also confirms the prophesy of Jamiat-ul-Ulema which had no faith in the different proposals put forward by Britain as they were only to meet the exigencies of time.

### QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT AND THE JAMIAT

There were great expectations with the Cripps Mission but these expectation soon reached its doom with the sudden departure of Cripps leaving the Indians in quigmore. This plunged the country in despondency and anger. Mahatma Gandhi who had not actively participated in the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps was, however, pained to see the handling of the situation by the British Government. In utter disguise he abandoned his cooperative attitude towards Britain and declared an open rebellion. This programme was drafted at Wardha meeting and latter passed and endorsed in the Bombay meeting of the <sup>49</sup> A.I.C.C. <sup>50</sup> on August 8th 1942. The resolution which is popularly known as Quit India resolution authorised Gandhi to start a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale. The resolution runs as follows, "This committee approves of and endorses the wardha resolution and is of the opinion that events subsequent to it have given

---

49. R.C.Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, (Calcutta, 1963), p. 633.

50. Bipin Chandra, Freedom Struggle, (National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1972), p. 219.

it future justification and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations.....

"The peril of today necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future compromise or guarantee can affect the present situation or meet the peril. They can not produce needed psychological effect on the minds of the masses only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of war. The AICC therefore repeats with all enthusiasm the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India."<sup>51</sup>

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema had already given the message of spontaneous revolution on mass level to the Indians in a circular issued by the Secretary of the Jamiat Mufti<sup>52</sup> Mohammad Kifayatullah. The circular said, the complete independence of India was the united and unanimous demand of all the Indians. It was in common knowledge of all the Indians about the arrogance and stubborn attitude of the British Government to accept this unanimous and united demanded

---

51. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, op.cit., in the appendix, p.279.

52. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, op.cit., pp.155-163

to transfer power of governance to the Indians. In this hour of peril when the British Government was engulfed with the power, it was before 1939. Hence the Indian National Congress had prepared a Programme of an all out war to get freedom. The war will be between Indian slaves and the imperialist white Masters.' The circular appealed to all the Indians and political parties to drop their differences through mutual agreement and understanding and to unite together to form an united front which was the prerequisite to achieve the cherished goal of Freedom. The circular expressed its hope that Mr. Jinnah would not let loose this historic opportunity and would realise the gravity of situation. The circular also expressed its hope that Mr. Jinnah would try to keep the Muslim nation away from joining the camps of the enemy of the Freedom and coming in the way of the devotee to the causes. The Jamiat hoped that this would avoid the defamation of the Muslim community and would exhort them to sacrifice for their Mother country. The Circular further hoped that the Congress with open mindedness and farsightedness would try to clarify the various suspicions which has been expressed from various cardinal points.

---

53. Ibid., p. 160

The Government so hopelessly placed against the enemies outside India could not tolerate the growth of rebellion inside, for this would have shaken the defence arrangements against the Japanese aggression. The government right from the very beginning had been watching the undercurrent from close eye. It was ready to meet any eventual<sup>it</sup>y. And when the Congress declared open rebellion it decided to suppress it with ruthless hands. Before the next day dawned, the important leaders like Mawlana Azad, Nehru and Gandhi were arrested alongwith large number of Congress workers. The Congress was declared illegal and its offices were  
55  
raided.

The arrest of important leaders left the people without responsible leaders while some of the remaining leaders like Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, Jaya Prakash Narayan etc. had gone underground. Passions of the people were ranging high. The repressive attitude of the government and the continuing Ordinance of the Raj further inflamed the situa-  
56  
tion. Mass violence erupted. The people forget the gospel of non-violence which had been poured into their ears for more than 20 years. The antisocial elements took the

---

54. R.C.Majumdar, op.cit., p. 646.

55. The Hindustan Times, 10th August, 1942.

56. The Pioneer, 11th August, 1942.

situation to their advantage and indulged in loot and  
57  
plunder.

In view of the changed circumstances when most of its leaders including the President Mufti Kifayatullah were put behind the bars and were serving a vigorous imprisonment, the meeting of the Jamiat Working Committee was called under the Chairmanship of Mawlana Ahmad Saeed. The Committee passed a resolution regarding the freedom of the country from foreign domination and criticised the British  
58  
government for its blind and callous attitude. The Jamiat also expressed its firm conviction that their sacrifice to the national cause would give them due share in free India and hence an appeal was made to join the march of other community in the Freedom. The resolution runs as follows, "India's lovers of Freedom have been compelled to embark upon their present course of action which is based on non-violent and non-cooperation. There was no other way open to India's omniscient and deserving leaders. Britain, however, still remained blind and obstinate. Not only did she refuse to accept a demand based on truth and justice but blind and callous to the consequences, she was now precipitated the present origin by arresting the national leaders.

---

57. The Madina, 28th September 1942.

58. Home Political (1), F.No.3/92/42-Pol.I.

This action had its inevitable result and India is now  
blazed from one end to other.<sup>59</sup> The resolution further  
condemned the violence which marred the principled Quit  
India Movement. The most regrettable feature, the committee  
viewed, was that these all were taking place in the name  
of Congress which stood for non-violence. The committee  
blamed the Government for such lawlessness because with  
the arrest and removal of the National leaders, the masses  
had been left without control and guidance.<sup>60</sup>

Pointing out the apprehension of the Muslim League  
that the Quit India Movement had been launched in order to  
oust the Britishers and established a purely Hindu Raj, the  
Committee felt convinced that if the Jamiat thought for one  
moment that there was the slightest suggestion of the present  
movement being designed for or leading to the establishment  
of Hindu Raj, it would have offered stern opposition. The  
Jamiat held the conviction that its conception of a free  
India was that of a free India where Muslims could enjoy  
cultural, religious and social Freedom.<sup>61</sup>

Mawlana Madani quoting the Hadith of Prophet  
Mohammad said that it was incumbent on the Muslims to  
participate in the struggle for freedom for independence of

---

59. Home Political (1), F.No.3/92/42-Pol.I.

60. Ibid.

61. Y.B.Mathura, Quit India Movement (Delhi 1979), pp.149-150.

the country would lead to the Freedom of the millat and that only after the Freedom of the country some sort of a Islamic laws could be enforced. He said that it would be Harams from Islamic point of view to live the life of a slave under a foreign domination.<sup>62</sup> Madani exhorted the Muslim to be up and doing *in* paralysing the administration of the British imperialism through the observance of the principle of non-violence. He advised the people to boycott their respective schools, colleges, Government offices, factory courts and organise hartals in the Government concerns and not to fulfil the Government orders. He further asked the peasants to stop the paying depts and organise independent self Govern-<sup>63</sup>ment in the villages and Tahsils.

His impression was that huge amount of gold had been carried out by the Britishers and deposited in the banks of America for which India got no material in return. The Government used to carry the business with the help of this gold and for which India get no dividends. He therefore advised the Indians to withdraw their money from the British owned banks and not to take money in return of goods which they deliver.<sup>64</sup>

However, the British succeeded in crushing the disarmed Indians and by the month of February 1943 the Quit India Movement led by Gandhi resulted in utter failure.

---

62. Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, compiled and edited by Najmuddin Islahi, Volume 4, Maktub No.39, pp. 138-139.

63. Ibid., p. 142.

64. Ibid., p. 144.

CHAPTER IV

JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

## JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

Relieved from the Congress rule, the Muslim League met at its Annual Session at Lahore in March 1940 and passed the famous resolution which latter dubbed as "Pakistan<sup>1</sup> Resolution." The resolution demanded the division of the country on communal lines and the establishment of independent sovereign Muslim State. The Lahore Session, on 23rd March<sup>2</sup> 1940, resolved the followings.

1. ....This session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterated that the scheme of federation is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of the country and is altogether unaccepted to Muslim India.
2. ....Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is considered denovo and that no revised plan should be accepted to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.
3. ....Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no

---

1. The Lahore resolution had not used the word Pakistan. This word latter got currency in the Hindu Press.

See, A History of Freedom Movement; The Speech of Jinnah at the Delhi session of the Muslim League, Vol.4 (Pakistan Historical Society, Delhi, 1984), p.101.

2. According to the reportings of the Hindustan Times this resolution was passed on 24th March, 1940 and not on 23rd March as most of the books refer. Dr.A.R.Ambedkar has wrongly dated this to 26th March, 1940.

See, Dr.A.R.Ambedkar, Thoughts On Pakistan; (Bombay, 1971), p.15.

constitutional plan would be accepted to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basis, namely the geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustment as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a minority as in the North-West and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which constituting units shall be autonomous sovereign.

4. .... That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the region for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguard shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.<sup>3</sup>

---

3. Saiyid Matlubul Hasan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study, (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore 1953), pp. 689-691.

The demand for a separate homeland was made on the basis that there are two major nations in Indian subcontinent and thus the Muslims being a nation by all cannons of law, must have their separate homeland, their territory and their state. <sup>4</sup> Jinnah in the course of his extempore Presidential speech remarked that this misconception of one Indian nation had been the cu <sup>a</sup> se of most of their troubles and would ultimately lead India to destruction. The Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different religions, philosophies and social customs, they could n ether intermarry nor interdine, for they belonged to two different civilizations which were based mainly on conflicting views of life. Hence to yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a majority and the other as a numerical minority, must lead to growing discontentment and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the Government of such a State. <sup>5</sup>

The Lahore resolution evoked a severe criticism from both the Hindus and the nationalist Muslims. The newspapers and the writers gave it as much space and importance in their columns as the war. <sup>6</sup> Savarkar, a prominent leader

---

4. M.A.Jinnah, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 Volumes; collected and edited by Jamiluddin Ahmad (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore 1952), p.162.

5. Ibid., pp. 160-161.

6. Jai Ji Pal; op.cit., p. 93.

of the Hindu Mahasabha criticised Jinnah and other Muslim Leaguers and said that his party will fight a teeth to teeth war against any move for the possible creation of Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> In a series of articles appeared in the Harijan in April 1940, Gandhi gave a patient view about the resolution. He said that, "If the Muslims insisted on the idea of partition of India, the rest of India would have to surrender to the Muslim dictation. I do not know of any non-violent method of making 8 crores of Muslims to have the will of rest of India. The Muslims must have the same right of self determination that the rest of India had."<sup>8</sup>

But the first united Muslims reaction came from the holding of four day All-India Azad Muslim Conference convened on the behalf of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and other organisations at Delhi in April, 1940. This conference was a combined effort of seven prominent Muslim Organisations and some leading Muslim leaders.<sup>9</sup> The Conference showed its hostility both to the Muslim League and the nationalist Muslims who were out and out congressite and had less concern with the protection

---

7. The Hindu, (Madras), 26 March, 1940.

8. The Harijan, 27 March, 1940; The Hindustan Times, 3 April 1940.

9. The seven important Muslim Political Organisations were; Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Hind; Ahrar Islam Hind; Independent, Bihar; All India Momin Conference; Krishak Proja Party, Bengal; Anjuman-e-Watan, Bluchistan; All-India Shia Political Conference.

10

of the religious rights of the Muslims. They were opposed to the Muslim League because of their opposition to the demand for Pakistan and secondly they did not like to be dictated and protected by the British Government in safeguarding their rights. This was amply revealed from the speech which Mufti Kifayetullah, the President of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, gave in the Azad Conference. He was reported to have said that "they (the Muslims) had to demonstrate to the world that they were not behind any other community in the fight for freedom. He declared that they did not rely on the British Government for the protection of their rights. They would themselves chalk out the safeguards necessary for the protection of their religious rights and would fight out any party, however, powerful, that it would be. Referring to the Pakistan Scheme Mufti Kifayetullah said that "by religion a Muslim was enjoined to send the message of Islam to the largest corner of the

---

(Continued from the previous page)

Among the prominent Muslim personalities were Dr. Syed Mahmood, Hafiz Ibrahim, Allah Bux, the president of the conference, Mr. Yasin Norie, Mr. Shah Siddiqui Ahmad, Mufti Nausher Ali Khan and Mufti Kifayetullah, Ahmad Saeed, Husain Ahmad Madani, all Jamiat's Prominent leaders.

The Hindustan Times; 28 April, 1948.

10. Dr. A.R. Ambedkar, op.cit., p. 197.
11. The Hindustan Times, 29th April, 1940.

world. They could not, therefore, shut themselves in zone. Similarly the Prophet of Islam came to free the whole world and therefore true Muslims could not be a party to enslave or did in keeping themselves in bondage. It was therefore all the more incumbent on the Indian Muslims to fight for the freedom of India. He added that it was an open fact that a section of Muslims were trying to dissuade the Indian Muslims to join the struggle for Freedom. These people were spreading the idea that the Indian Freedom was detrimental to the best interest of the Muslims. The duty of the Muslims was quite clear. They must line up with the forces of Progress." <sup>12</sup>

The Conference fully accepted the resolution moved by Mufti Kifayatullah which demanded immediate convening of a constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise and exclusive right for the elected Muslim members of the proposed constituent Assembly to lay down the safeguards for the protection of the rights and interests of the Community. <sup>13</sup>

While moving resolution on the Constituent Assembly Hifz-ur-Rehman said that it was an insult to their national self-respect that any foreigner should dictate to them in the matter of framing their constitution. <sup>14</sup>

---

12. The Hindustan Times, 29th April, 1940.

13. Jai Ji Pal, op.cit., pp. 87-88.

14. The Hindustan Times, 30 April, 1940.

Explaining the latter part of the resolution, mentioned above, Hifz-ur-Rehman said that they wanted the right of self determination for the Muslims in respect of their special safeguards, necessary for the protection of their religious rights. Just as they wanted the application of that principle<sup>15</sup> to the whole India.

Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulema, supported the resolution sought for the safeguards of the Muslims. He further condemned the Pakistan Scheme<sup>16</sup> as un-Islamic in its conception.

Earlier the observance of Pakistan day on 17th April, 1940 by Muslim League was countered by an anti-partition meetings called upon by Mawlana Hifz-ur-Rahman and Hilal Ahmad Zuberi, Municipal Commissioner and editor of the Ansari.<sup>17</sup> Meetings were organised and partition scheme, as propounded by the Muslim League was vigorously condemned. Mawlana Hifz-ur-Rehman addressing the anti-partition day meeting, attended by 10,000 people as the Hindustan Times claims, said that what had happened to the goal of Complete

---

15. The Statesman, 30 April, 1940.

16. The Tribune, 30 April, 1940.

17. The Hindustan Times, 20 April, 1940.

independence for India which the Muslim League session at Lucknow had adopted. In his opinion the idea of partition was diametrically opposed to the basic idea of independence<sup>18</sup> and therefore the two could not go together.

The Conference at last came out with the following resolutions;

This Conference, representative of Indian Muslims who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country constituting of delegates and representatives of every province having given its fullest and most careful consideration to all the vital questions affecting the interest of the Muslim Community and the country as a whole declares the following;

A "India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and such is the common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race and religion who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the historical eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common right of all residents of the country and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity, are the same. The Indian Muslims, by virtue of these rights and

---

18. The Hindustan Times, 20 April, 1940.

responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian national in every sphere of Governmental, economic and other national activities and in public services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self evident proposition, the truth of which no right thinking Muslim will question. This conference declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is Complete independence alongwith protection of their religion and communal rights and that they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever ready to make greater sacrifices."

B. "This is the considered view of this conference that only that constitution for the future Government of India would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed by the Indian themselves elected by means of adult franchise. The Constitution should fully safeguard all the legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the constituent Assembly. The representative of other communities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards."

C. The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of the Muslims also came in the conference. "Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different communities will be determined in the resolution which the conference has adopted, this conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly will be elected by Muslim themselves."

D. "This conference appoints a Board consisting of 27 persons. This Board, after the fullest investigation, consultation and consideration make its recommendations for submission to the next session of this Conference so that the conference may utilise the recommendations as a means of securing a permanent national settlement to the communal question. This recommendation will be submitted within two months. The matters referred to the board are the following:

1. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights.
2. Political rights of the Muslims and their protection.
3. The formation of the future constitution of India to be non-unitary and federal with absolutely essential and unavoidable powers for the Federal Government."

---

19. Dr. Ambedkar, op.cit., pp. 198-100.

The conference, due to its opposition to the Pakistan Scheme and the British Subjugation, was hailed by the nationalist newspapers and the Hindus as the conference of friends which could be used as a counter balance against the demand for a separate homeland where they could enjoy fuller religious and cultural freedom but the outcome of the conference left very little to choose between it and the Muslim League.<sup>20</sup>

The third resolution of the conference could not be materialised due to some unknown reason. If Humayun Kabir ascribed it to the inherent weakness in the organisation of the various parties exhibiting conflicting ideologies and programme of action,<sup>21</sup> then Ziaul Hasan Farooqi's speculation is that it could have been due to the Satyagraha launched by the Congress and the Quit India Movement and Cripps Mission in 1942 when all the nationalist leaders were behind the bars.<sup>22</sup> Whatever had been the reason the outcome of the Conference was that it threatened the position of Jinnah and his satellité as to be the representatives of the Muslims in India.

---

20. Ibid., p. 197.

21. Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics-1906-1947 and other Essays (Calcutta, 1969), p. 46.

22. Ziaul Hasan Farooqi, op.cit., p. 99.

The establishment of Azad Muslim Conference perturbed Jinnah and he became highly apprehensive of this emerging force in the way to the realisation of his dream. So long as the various Muslim political parties and organisations, chief among them was Jamiat-ul-Ulema, were not united Jinnah though attacked them time and again but did not regard them as the main rival. However, when combined together on a common platform and formed the All India Azad Muslim Conference in 1940, just after the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah<sup>23</sup> became highly critical of it since its very inception.

It must be emphasised here that the Lahore resolution was a negation of and departure from what Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal thought of absolving the Hindu Muslim problem in his Presidential speech at Allahabad in 1930. Iqbal did not argue<sup>24</sup> for a Muslim State and only sought a Muslim bloc within the Indian federation.<sup>25</sup> It is one of the myths of Pakistani nationalism to saddle him with the parentage of Pakistan.<sup>26</sup>

- 
23. Humayun Kabir, op.cit., p. 42.
  24. Mohammad Iqbal, Presidential Address delivered at the Allahabad Session of the All India Muslim League, 1930, in Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, compiled by Shamloo (Al-Manar Academy, Lahore, 1948), p.9.
  25. Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition (New Delhi, 1970), p. 100.
  26. K.K.Aziz, The Making of Pakistan - A Study in Nationalism, (London, 1967), p.54.

His idea was to amalgamate the Muslim States of North-West in a single Muslim province as to get advantage through bargaining from the dominant Hindu Centre.<sup>27</sup> It is pertinent to note that Assam and Bengal (the erstwhile Pakistan, now Bangladesh) did not come in his calculations. It is sheer misleading to call him the originator of Pakistan or the poet who dreamt of Pakistan.<sup>28</sup>

However, the Lahore declaration did not cast such an "unexpected shock as it is generally made out to be." For the Muslim opinion in India and Britain both was constantly aware of this day by day widening gulf and Schism between the League and the Congress mainly due to the wrong policies and lack of sense of Parliamentarianism on the part of Congress. When the Scheme was adumbrated it contained in it what in the minds of the common people.<sup>29</sup>

#### MUTTAHIDA QAUMIAT

Though Jinnah did not use religion specifically as the core of his definition yet it was quite implicit in the demand for a separate homeland to a Muslim nation.<sup>30</sup> This was

---

27. Ibid., p.54.

28. Ibid., p. 54.

29. Ibid., p. 60.

30. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 94.

quite apprehensive to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, which since its inception stood for a united Nationalism (Mattahida Quamiat), so here lies the basic difference between the philosophy and programme of two principal Muslim organisations on the issue of future destiny of 80 million Musalmans. Husain Ahmad Madani, the chief spokesman of united nationalism, forcefully opposed the two nation theory as the basis for Pakistan and argued for a territorial, as opposed to religious, nationalism. When Sir Mohammad Iqbal challenged the issue,<sup>31</sup> Mawlana Husain Ahmad said, that "there are world of differences between "Qaum and Millat." He held Sir Iqbal for wrongly equating the word "Quam and Millat" and as Millat could not be made the basis of nationalism so he concluded that Quam<sup>32</sup> also could not be the basis of nationalism. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in the light of Arabic dictionary proved that both the words were at par with each other. While the word Qaum stands for any collectivity whether its common characteristics was region, common habits, race, colour and creed, it should be distinguished from millat which refers to a

---

31. In the course of correspondence between Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, which appeared in the daily Ehsan, Madani denied that the motive of the speech in a meeting of Delhi Jama Masjid was to make any suggestion to Muslims of India to follow the modern definition of nationalism. He only said that now-a-days nations are made by nationality. He even denied that he had asked that the basis of religion and millat is nationalism. Husain Ahmad Madani; Nazariyah-i-Qaumiyat, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Sahib Wa Allama Iqbal, edited by Hazrat talut, (Dera Ghazi Khan n.d.), Maktub No.4.

Contd.....

collectivity with a Shariah or Din. He said that nations  
were made by homeland and not by religion or race and cited  
the example of England where members of different faiths  
made up one nation. There ensued a heated debate between  
the office bearers of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the adherents  
of Islamic nationalism. Later in 1939 Husain Ahmad Madani  
published a small treatise under the caption "Muttahida  
Qaumiat Aur Islam" in which he proved in the light of Quranic  
verses and prophetic traditions that nationality is determined  
by territory and not by religion alone. Here it must be

---

(Continued from the previous page)

In the last letter Allama Iqbal closed the discussion saying that Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani had conceded that his intention was not to give any suggestion to the Indian Muslims to follow.

32. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, compiled and edited by Najmuddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif, Azamgarh, 1952), Volume I.
33. Millat Aur Qaum, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani our Allama Iqbal Ki baths, (Multan 1938), p.7.
34. Ibid., pp. 9-35.
35. There ensued a heated controversy between the adherents of Islamic nationalism (Millatism) and nationalists through the magazine Burhan. See, Burhan 111/4, October 1939; iii/5, November 1939.
36. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Muttahida Qaumiat aur Islam op.cit., p.65.

cleared that he does consider religion as the basis of nationalism but emphasised that 'Wattaniat' could be the most effective and determining factor. He said that even during the time of Prophet Mohammad such type of nationalism existed. To quote him, "By Muttahida Qaumiya I mean that Muttahida Qaumiya whose foundation was laid down at Madina during the time of Prophet Mohammad. He quoted with authenticity the treaty which was concluded at Madina after the 14th years of Prophethood of Mehammad. Through this treaty he formed a Muttahida Qaumiya and Muttahida Ummat with the Muslims and the Jews. The essence and spirit of the treaty was that:-

1. The executioners of the treaty (Quraish, Muhajirs, Ansar and Jews) would be considered as a nation in comparison to all those non-Muslims and non executioners of the treaty.
2. The executioners of the treaty while remaining independent in respect of their religion would form a nation they will help each other in time of war and will be considered as Ummat.

---

37. Ibid., p. 63.

38. Ibid., p. 51.

39. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Abul Ala Maudodi in his booklet "Masla-e-Qaumiat" has tried to give interpretation that the treaty of Hudaibiya could only be regarded as a military pact. This was what Husain Ahmad Madani wanted to achieve. The very idea behind this theory of united Nationalism was to form some sort of military pact between the Hindus and the Muslims in order to form an united front to oust their common enemy.

Speaking at the Johnpur session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Madani is reported to have said, "we, the inhabitants of India in so far as we are Indians, have one thing in common and that is our Indianes which remains unchanged inspite of our religious and cultural differences.... As the diversities in our approaches, individual qualities and personal traits and colour and stature do not affect our

- 
40. Abu Ala Mawdoodi, Masla-e-Qaumiat, (Markazi Maktaba Islam, Delhi, 1962), p.93. Mawlana Mawdoodi's opposition to the united nationalism appears to many the acceptance of Pakistan as the sole goal of the Muslims of the sub-continent. But this is not so. He thought that Pakistan was a partial solution because it could neither secure security nor possibility of development on Islamic lines for the Muslims who will be necessarily be left in India was a matter of vital importance to him. His view with regard to the Muslim League was not favourable for he felt that it had accommodated within its fold hetrogenous elements, consisting of Communists, Secularists, Muslim nationalists, believers in Islam and non-believers, practising Muslims and those who did believe but their belief seldom expressed itself in practice or in action. How could such a body, he argued, bring about the kind of Islamic renaissance that he thought should be the goal of all Muslim efforts.

Abu Ala Mawdoodi; Tahrik-i-Azad-i-Hind aur Musalman (Lahore, 1964), pp. 22-23.

common humanness, similarly our religious and cultural differences do not interfere with our common associations with our homeland. Therefore, like the other millats and non-Muslims religio-cultural groups it is incumbent upon the Muslims to have concern with and struggle for the attainment of national interests and fight against the evils that hamper the country's progress and prosperity.....This duty which arises out of our common sharing in the happiness and misery of our motherland, is obligatory to all. Religious differences in no case serve as an impediment in the way of fulfilling this obligation. This is what I mean by the Muttahida Qaumiyyat. The other meanings which the people are attributing to it are wrong and baseless. The Congress, having the same stand (as ours), has made provisions in its fundamentals for the protection of all religions, cultures and languages. The European conception of nationalism or the outlook of (certain) individual Congressman regarding the different interpretations of the Congress fundamentals, is unacceptable to the Jamiat. I denounce it and is totally against it.<sup>41</sup>

In one of his letters addressed to one Hafiz Siddiqui of Muzaffargarh (Punjab) Madani cited the Hadith of Hazrat

---

41. Husain Ahmad Madani, Khutba-e-Sadrat, delivered at the Thirteenth session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Johnpur, 1940, (Al Jamiat-Press, Delhi 1940), available on microfilm. at Nehru memorial Museum and library, New Delhi.

Salma which said that if the infidels asked their Musalman captives to wage a war against the common enemy then it might be permissible provided that the infidels promised that after the termination of war they would be freed.<sup>42</sup>

Mawlana Husain Ahmad says that, in the light of these conditions of cooperation the Indian Muslims could cooperate with the infidels on the assurance that after the independence of the country they would be having a decisive share in Government of the country, their culture and personal law would be safeguarded and complete autonomy would be guaranteed to them in this respect, then the cooperation with the Hindus would not only be permissible but necessary also.<sup>43</sup>

Islam is a flexible religion which adopts itself with the need and requirement of the time. To make the Islam rigid is to close its doors to others. If this had been the policy and principle of the Prophet of Islam then Islam could have confined itself to the Desert of Arabia. Islam, infact, is a living force which adopts itself with the changing conditions of time. Mawdoodi or for that matter Jamaat Islami believes in complete isolationism. It is against sharing a common life with others. This very principle made it

---

42. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, op.cit., Volume IV, Maktub No.33.

43. Ibid., p. 128.

impractical and devoid of reality. Do the Indians not share a common life with other non-Muslims in the country in every walk of life social, political, economic, should one say that Indian Muslims have ceased to be Muslims and absorbed by the majority. The Indian Muslims, infact, are best representing Islam than any other Muslim countries. They are more conscious for their culture and personal law in the Hindu India and at the same time forming a nation with other community of the divided India. It is a fantastic idea to say that in a hundred years, perhaps in a shorter period, the Muslim people may cease to exist in India. This is the psychological justification for the division of the country.

Infact, the theory of nationalism propounded by Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mawdoodi which was latter adopted by M.A.Jinnah was the product of western Europe. The rise of this type of nationalism in Western Europe had given rise to the concept that the political boundaries of a nation should conform to the national characteristics of the people living within it. In the words of Macartney, "the rise of the problem of majority was a logical consequences of a doctrinal ascendancy of nationalism. Nationalism which consolidated dominant position in the Western Europe and

---

44. I.H.Qureshi, the Foundation of Pakistan Culture, the Muslim World, XLIV/1, January, 1954.

begging its global sweep, injected into politics a profound significant idea. The principle that nationalism and state boundaries should coincide; the state should nationally<sup>45</sup> homogenous and nation should be politically limited.

Though Iqbal and Masdoodi showed great hostility to the European concept of Nationalism they unconsciously edged nearer to it. The Jamiat on the other hand viewed this problem from purely Islamic point of view and kept the Quranic verses and prophetic traditions before them as a torch bearer.

Husain Ahmad Madani suspected a British hand in the proposed division of the country. According to him the division proposal did not come at a Lahore resolution or<sup>46</sup> in the minds of Rahmat Ali. The seed was sown long before by the British which found a fertile soil in the minds of some Muslims who were opposed to federation as the principle<sup>47</sup> of Government. In support of his contention Husain Ahmad Madani cited the letter of Mr. Plowden, a British officer

---

45. Macartney, The National States and the National Minorities. (Oxford, 1934) p.160.

46. Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge Student, in 1933 published a pamphlet entitled, now or never in which he looked for the formation of an independent Muslim State comprising the Punjab, the North West frontier province, Kashmir Sind and Bluchistan, in complete independence of the rest of India and in close alliance with the Muslim states of the Middle East.

K.K.Aziz; the Making of Pakistan, op.cit., p.54.

47. Husain Ahmad Madani, Pakistan Kiya Hai, Part I, (Delhi 1946), p.17.

in the United Provinces, written to someone in England which was leaked out to the press and was published by the Sunday Telegraph. In that letter M. Plowden had advised the division of the country into a Hindu India and Muslim India as the only solution to the Indian problem. "we had to resort to the same method in Ireland to end the Catholic and Protestant tangle after a long parliamentary battle of 36 years," said Mr. Plowden. "If the Hindu would be unwilling to have trade relation with the British then Karachi, will serve the same purpose as Bombay, at that time... This will sure happen, then why we should not establish business contact with them at the earliest possible time."<sup>48</sup>

Madani was also suspicious of the interview which Mr. Jinnah had given to the news Chronicles, London on 29th February, 1944 on the Pakistan issue. He is reported to have said that "if the British Government divide India into two, after a short period not exceeding there months, the Hindus will be silent and so long as the two parts of India do not remain at peace with each other, the British control of the army, foreign affairs is necessary. In this case

---

48. Ibid , p.15.

we would be free at least internally like Egypt."<sup>49</sup>

Referring to the statement of Qaid-e-Azam Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, one of the propounders of two nation theory, warned the Muslims particularly the Leagues with great excitement, "Let the Muslims see which way they are being led on by the Qaid-e-Azam. I knew it from the very beginning that Qaid-e-Azam was not sincere about the demand for Pakistan. Now he has revealed that he is not at all in favour of free Pakistan. He wants a state without sovereign rule. This is sought to be achieved in a long tutelage and following Egypt's pattern till it is like Egypt which constitutionally free but in every matters of its own internal and external administration looks to friendly gestures from the British side."<sup>50</sup>

Madani thinks that the Muslim League was nurtured by the hands of British diplomacy right from its inception. He says, quoting the criticism of Mawlana Shibli, "the Simla deputation was the first foundation stone and whatever practical shape the League may take in future, the future spirit of the Simla deputation will be represented in it."<sup>51</sup>

---

49. Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kiya Hai, (Delhi 1946), p.17; See also "The Madina (Bijnor)", 5 March, 1944.

50. The Ajmal(Daily), 6 March, 1944.

51. -Husain Ahmad Madani; An Open letter to Muslim League, (Lahore, 1946), pp.49-50, quoting from Hiyat-e-Shibli by Saiyid Sulaiman Nadwi, (Darul-Musannifin, Azamgarh, 1943), p.618.

Moreover, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk was reported to have said while addressing the student of Muslim University, Aligarh, "if (May god prevent mishap) the British Rule ceases in India, we will have to live as the subject of the Hindu."

"If the Musalmans of India posses any remedy of avoiding this danger it is that the British Rule should remains for ever duly deep in India."

"Our existence and that of the Government are complimentary to each other. If the Muslims are with England with /the very core of their heart nobody can turn them out of India.....Therefore in your hearts this idea should always be uppermost that to help this empire is your national duty.....you should earlier consider yourself to be the soldiers of the British army."<sup>52</sup>

Madani thinks that the Muslim League policy during the World War II served the cause of the British imperialism. A reference of which has clearly been made in the previous chapter.

Jinnah showed no desire to ascertain the fate of the Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces . He got

---

52. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

his own idea about the Indian State. He attached less importance to the Eastern State than to the North Western Provinces which could if chosen amalgamate in the federation of the Muslim homeland after coming to a reasonable settlement with them. This scheme was also silent on the ways and means to be adopted to safeguard the interest of the minority as envisaged in the Fourth Resolution of Lahore declaration. Jamiat was more concerned with the protection of the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims than any other Muslim Organisation. It warned the Indian Muslims not to be the victim of Leagues' gimmick which was trying to build its castle on the ruins of the Indian Muslims who were going to be the citizen of the Indian Union.

Analysing the Lahore Resolution Mawlana Mohammad Sajjad of Bihar remarked that the resolution would not be judicious to the Muslim living in the Hindu majority provinces as a minority community and bewildered as to how the Muslim provinces could be a guarantee that the Muslim in a Hindu majority provinces would be treated in a better way.

- 
53. Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Volume II, collected and edited by Jamiluddin Ahmad, (Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1947), pp. 159-160.
54. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 111.
55. Mawlana Ahmad Saeed; Kutba-e-Sadrat-ul-Jamiat-ul-Ulema Conference, (Meerut Division), February 1946 (Hamdard Press, Delhi, 1946), pp. 26-27.

Madani also expressed the same view and characterised the Pakistan proposal as a death knell to the Muslim, living in Hindu majority areas.<sup>56</sup> The Jamiat regarded this hostage theory of the League as not only a political nonsense but also against the holy law of the Muslims.<sup>57</sup> As far as the political reality was concerned Madani argued that in Pakistan provinces the population of the Muslim majority was 55.7% and that of the Hindu majority was 44.3%.<sup>58</sup> In this situation how it would be possible, said Madani, for the Muslim majority to impress and keep the majority in check while the difference in population was just meagre and the non-Muslim minority were in a better position of influence on accounts of their education, monopoly on trade, economy and industry. On the other hand in the divided India, the Muslim who would constitute 11% of the population due to their proportional representation and other weakness

---

56. Sayed Mohammad Mian, Ulema-i-Haq, Volume II (Kutub Khanah-i-Fakhriyah, 1948), p.136.

57. As early as in 1942 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, once a front leader of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, written a book, entitled "Hamara Pakistan", in which the author prophesised that a substantial number of non-Muslims in Pakistan would ensure a better treatment of Muslim minority from the majority community in India. Shabbir A.Usmani, Hamara Pakistan, Khutbah-i-Sadarat, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Lahore, 1946), pp.45-46.

58. Husain Ahmad Madani, Kashfa-e-Haqiqat, (Delhi, 1946), pp. 160-61.

(aducation, economy etc.) would neither from an effective front in the Assemblies nor their boycott in Legislatures would cast effect on normal working. Moreover, the non-Muslims in Pakistan provinces would not be much in need of safeguards than the Muslim minority in the Indian provinces because the former would be exercising greater influence due to their education and sound economy. Moreover, Islam would not permit to take a revenge for a sin committed by a non-Muslim of U.P. from the non-Muslim of Punjab.

In nutshell this appeared astonishing and devoid of wisdom to sacrifice two crores of Muslims in order to librate 7 crores of Muslim in the provinces where they were already in a majority. Mr. Jinnah in an address to the minorities was reported to have said, that "as a self-respecting people we, in the Muslim minority provincess, say boldly that we are prepared to undergo every suffering and sacrifice for the emancipation and liberation of our brethren in regions of Muslim majority." Speaking at Ahmadabad Mr. Jinnah said, "Let the Muslims of the Hindu provinces suffer, but let us come forward in order to librate our breth ren living in

---

59. Ibid., pp. 60-62; See also Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Tahrik-i-Pakistan per ek Nazar, (Delhi, 1946), p.12.

60. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Tahrik-i-Pakistan per ek Nazar, (Delhi, 1946), p.13.

61. Jamiluddin Ahmed, op.cit., p. 267.

Majority provincess. So that they may form the Government  
in accordance with the Islamic shariah.<sup>62</sup> The idea behind  
the demand for Pakistan was that in an independent India  
the Muslim as a minority would be swamped by the majority  
community then the question arises that if the Hindu majority  
could be ruthless enough in perpetuating atrocities in their  
provinces, as reported in the Pirpur Report when the Muslims  
were in effective minority then there was strong possibility  
that it would be more ruthless towards the Muslims who would  
be in a smaller minority, controlled by a strong Hindu  
<sup>63</sup>  
centre.

The Jamiat leadership was violently critical and  
suspicious of Mr. Jinnah's Claim that the proposed Pakistan  
would be an Islamic State based on Shariah and Sunnah. They  
thought the League leaders like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali  
Khan as incapable of establishing an Islamic State for neither  
their mental make up nor their way of life and educational  
training was capable of attaining such ideal.<sup>64</sup> They had not  
been only<sup>in</sup> concerned with the cause of Islam but at places  
violently opposed them in an open session. It was still fresh

---

62. The Inan, Pakistan Number, Lahore, 28 February 1941.

63. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 114.

64. Ibid., p. 118.

in their memory, how Jinnah lobbied against the passing of the Sharia Act of 1937 giving preference in the Court of British India to the Shariah over local customs and not joining hands with them in opposing the interference with the Islamic Law, in the dissolution of the Marriages Bill of 1939. The aim of the Shariah Bill, writes The Madina,<sup>65</sup> was to make enforceable on the Indian Muslims the Islamic<sup>66</sup> Shariah regarding the Marriages, divorce, Khula, Mehar, inheritance etc. Till that time these issues were decided in accordance with the customary Law which was against some pure Islamic injunctions. But when the bill was about to become an Act after its third reading, meeting the demands for which it was introduced, Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League and the saviour of Islam and its culture, devoted his whole juristic ability to cut the Sharia Law into pieces and introduced some amendments with much shrewdness that the very purpose of the bill was defeated. The effort of Mr. Jinnah was that the Act should not be called a Law which could have been binding on the concerned and in case of conflict between the Sharia Act and prevalent English made Law the latter will prevail. When Jinnah was reminded that it was defeating the very purpose of Islamic Law Jinnah

---

65. Musain Ahmad Madani, Congress, Muslim League and Jamiat-ul-Ulema Ki Siyasi position (Lucknow 1945), p.15.

66. Ibid.

replied that he do not like to support the proposed bill which could not be applicable.<sup>67</sup>

Madani says that "if these are the Quranic injunctions which the Muslim League leaders are anxious to apply in Pakistan. If these are the Islamic culture and tradition for whose safety the establishment of Pakistan was essential .... now the Muslims have to think whether or not the actions of the League was a clear revolt against the Islamic Shariah, Quran and Hadith as well as against Islam."<sup>68</sup>

The stand taken by Mr. Jinnah with regard to the Muslim Marriage Bill was also very shocking to the Ulema. The aim of the bill was to secularise the marriage whereby a Muslim could also marry with a non Muslim from non-Ahl-e-Kitab.<sup>69</sup> Mr. Jinnah speaking at the Viceroy's Council supported the bill in most strong words and lobbied for the bill.<sup>70</sup>

---

67. The Madina, 25 September 1937.

68. Husain Ahmad Madani, Shariat Bill aur League, (New Delhi, 1945), p.9.

69. Husain Ahmad Madani, Civil marriage aur League (New Delhi, 1945), p.16. This small booklet was written by Madani during the days of the general election, 1945 in order to make the Muslims aware of the hallowness of the Muslim League's claim for safeguarding the Shariah and striving for establishing an Islamic State.

70. Government of India Gazette , Department of Law, pp.16-161, quoted in Madani, Civil marriage our league, op.cit. pp. 7-11.

Madani says that this shows the religious belief which Mr. Jinnah had towards the Quran and the Islamic injunction and which type of laws he wanted to pass in the Assemblies. Neither he considered Quran as the variegated Law nor thinks it applicable all the time. We have to think now that how then the League and its members of the Assembly could project the Muslims and their religion in the legislative Assemblies He asked to the Muslims that if even after knowing these facts they think it proper to choose a man as Qaid and vote for him who possess all these "Qualities". The Muslims had to think which way they are being led on by the Qaid-e-  
71  
Azam.

These events and other day to day interview of the League leaders convinced the Jamiat leaders that the proposed Pakistan was not going to be an Islamic State but of a national worldly Government and so they were not prepared to perform the martyrdom of the Muslims of the Hindu Majority provides for a secular State.

As early as in 1940 Madani addressing 12th session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at Johnpur remarked;

"These days the Pakistan movement is very popular among the Muslim masses. If it means the establishment in the

---

71. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Muslim majority provinces of an Islamic state based on the prophetic traditions and the Qisas and others, then it is really a very noble cause and no Muslim will have any objection to it. But the fact is that under the present circumstances nobody can imagine the possibility of such a venture."<sup>72</sup>

Although there were men like Nawab Ismail and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani who gave the impression that the tenets of Islam will be the governing principle in Pakistan,<sup>73</sup> Yet Mr. Jinnah at several places clearly said that the future constitution of Pakistan would not be governed according to the injunction of holy Quran and Sunnah. In an interview to the Associated Press of America Jinnah said, "Pakistan would be a democratic country and I hope that the big industries and corporation would be handed over to the nation on the socialist pattern."<sup>74</sup> In an another interview to the News

---

72. Husain Ahmad Madani, Khutba-e-Sadarat, Twelfth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, Jhnpur, 1940, (Hamdard Press, Delhi, 1940) Translation quoted from Farooqui, op.cit., p.119.

73. Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had said that the Pakistan would be an Islamic State ruled by the Shariah and teachings of Islam. He held the criticism of Nationalist Muslims, that the Pakistan would be an irreligious state, run by irreligious people, as totally absurd and misleading. Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Hamara Pakistan, (Lahore, 1946), pp. 65-66.

74. Manshurah, 11 November, 1945; Anjan, 12 November, 1945.

Chronicles Jinnah is reported to have said that the Government of Pakistan would be democratic one. Both Hindus and Muslims will be the sharer<sup>75</sup> in the Legislative Assemblies and Ministers elected on the basis of population." The 'DAWN', the official wing of the Muslim League writes, "Jinnah has always termed Pakistan as a worldly state and took strong objection to think that it would be Muslim State. Whosoever term Pakistan as complimentary to the Pan-Islamism<sup>76</sup> were the greatest enemy of unity." Speaking at the Aligarh Muslim University Union on 2nd November 1941 Mr. Jinnah said, "telling them (The Hindus and the Sikhs) that it (Pakistan) would be a religious state excluding them from all power is entirely untrue."<sup>77</sup> Mawlana Hifzur Rehman in his scholarly analysis of the Pakistan issue quoted/<sup>The</sup> Dawn's article that there can be no religious state in a future Pakistan because<sup>78</sup> there will not unanimity of religious belief."

- 
- <sup>The</sup>  
75. /Shahbaz, 27 October, 1945, quoting from the Dawn. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman quoting this interview said that how the Pakistan Government can be called an Islamic state based on Hukm-e-Ilahi when it had been accepted that the non-Muslims would be given share in the legislature and cabinets in accordance with their numerical strength while in a Islamic state a non-Muslim can live as a Dhimmi but he cannot interfere in any Department of Government and administration what to talk of Legislative Assembly.  
See, Hifzur Rehman, Pakistan Per Ek Nazar, op.cit., p.7.
76. The Dawn, 9 September 1945.
77. The Dawn, 25 September, 1945, p.6.
78. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Pakistan per ek Nazar op.cit., p.7; See also Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit., Volume II, p.250.

Jinnah seemed to have been inspired by the revolutionary hero of Turkey Mustafa Kamal Pasha, and wanted to built his Pakistan on the line of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. Speaking at Patna at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League Mr. Jinnah asked to the people to follow the footsteps of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. He is reported to have said, that "in Kamal Ataturk the Islamic world has lost a great hero. With the example of this great hero in front of them as an inspiration will the Muslims of India still remain in quagmire?<sup>79</sup> Again in an speech to the Constituent Assembly on the 11th August 1947, Jinnah said "You may belong to any religion or cast or creed that have nothing to do with the business of the State...You will find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindu and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because it is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizen of the State.<sup>80</sup>

This was what Jamiat-ul-Ulema had been emphasising right from the days of Pakistan movement. But Muslims unfortunately lacked that vigour and insight to give a thought

---

79. Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Volume I, p.761 quoted by Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 120.

80. Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Qaid-e-Azam Speaks, Pak publicity, Karachi, nid. pp. 98-99.

over what the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema pointed out to them. Driven to the League's false propaganda that the Pakistan would be an Islamic state, the Muslim Youth embarked upon giving it a concrete shape, for which they got nothing in return.

K.K.Aziz in his books, 'Making of Pakistan' raised a very interesting question that if the Jamiat-ul-Ulema supported the Pakistan demand, had the League leaders pledged that the State would be an Islamic State<sup>81</sup> of all, the very personality of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were, suspicious for they had been showing less regard to the Islamic values and Principles. Secondly, the Jamiat was against any proposal for partitioning the country because as they thought, the partition would not be the solution of Hindu-Muslim problems and it would bring less benefits to the Muslims and detrimental to the missionary activity of Islam in a divided India. However, Husain Ahmad Madani ruled out that the new order would be entirely on the Islamic standards,<sup>82</sup> for in his view the situation was not favourable for a Muslim Raj in the light of Shariah and Sunnah. He had before him the example of Islamic stalwarts like Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, Mawlana Ismail Shaheed, Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana

---

81. K.K.Aziz, op.cit., p. 180.

82. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit., Volume II, p.117.

Nanautavi, Mawlana Gangohi and Mahmoodul Hasan. To him it was impossible to establish an Islamic State when such Islamic heroes in spite of their indefatigable efforts had failed in their venture. However, in an independent undivided India, Madani argued that the Muslims will get greater freedom to shape their future on an Islamic model. Their success depended upon their skill in propagating Islam. Moreover in a system of provincial autonomy they would enjoy greater freedom to act according to the Islamic Shariah if they so desired. Independence would not close the way for the Muslims to act according to the Mandate of Islamic Shariah to a certain extent.

However, in an undivided independent India the Shariah will have a restricted scope of activity depending upon the free will of ordinary Muslims, and be continued to observe /religious rituals and social relations such as marriage divorce inheritance etc. The state coercive power will not be available for inflicting penalties in case of disobedience to Shariah because the state would not be wholly in the hands of the Muslims.

---

83. Ibid., Volume, I, pp. 395-97.

84. Ibid., Volume II, pp. 117-119.

85. Peter Hardy, Partners in Freedom and the true Muslims, The Political Thought of some Muslim Scholars in British India 1912-1947 (Sweden, 1971), p.39.

It is obvious from the above writings that the Ulema were nationalist only in the sense that they wanted India to be free from the British. But they desired to keep education in their own hands which as Husain Ahmad Madani thought would remind them what they did not share with other communities. The more the Muslims of an undivided India were to be educated in Islam more they would become conscious of what they did not share with their fellow countrymen. Culturally as separate to acknowledge themselves as . separate entity, in political alliance only with Hindu against foreigners.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema also opposed the partition from the point of view that it will hinder the missionary activities of the Ulema in a divided India. In their view Islam has been a proselytising religion which demand an atmosphere of peace, friendship and goodwill for its nourishment. The division of the country, marked by hatred and antagonism, would give a jolt to this peaceful missionary activity. The atmosphere had already been contaminated by the demand of Pakistan. Writing to Abdul Bari Nadwi in 1931 Husain Ahmad Madani said, "...mutual relationship result in the removal of mutual hatred and bring people to the fold of Islam, while

---

86. Ibid., p. 41.

87. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p.114. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Tahrik-i-Pakistan Per ek Nazar, op.cit., pp. 37-38.

mutual hatred results in stubbornness in an overlooking of other's good points and constitutes an impediment in the progress of Islam. Islam being a missionary religion, it is its duty as far as possible to absorb others in itself, not to reject them.<sup>88</sup>"

Again addressing the Ulema at Delhi in September 1945 he echoed the same sentiments, when he said, "At the termination of the Muslims in India, within a period of less than a century their number increased upto 100 millions. The missionary work of the Ulema has a share in this increase. Compassion, and kindness, justice and equity, mutual good relationships and service to mankind these are the fundamental principles for the preaching of Islam. These principles when acted upon, have led to the progress of Islam."

"The great object of an overall spread of Islam in the whole of India cannot be realised by appealing to passions of hatred and antagonism. It is the non-Muslims who are the field of action for the tabligh of Islam and form the raw material for this splendid activity. Today, by propagating hatred towards the Hirdus, this field is being lost and this material is wasted. It is contrary to the universal message

---

88. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit., Volume I, pp. 157-158.

of our great Prophet (Peace be on him).'

"Our object is to bridge the gulf of hatred which is being created by the protagonists of the scheme of Pakistan. We are opposed to the idea of limiting the right of missionary activities of Islam within any particular area. The Muslim has got a right in all the nooks and corners of India by virtue of the great struggle and grand sacrifices of their ancestors in this country. Now it is our duty to maintain that claim and try to widen its scope, instead of giving it up."<sup>89</sup>

The Jamiat leaders were also critical of Pakistan scheme from economic viewpoint. They warned the Muslims that they would be worse off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition. They thought that Pakistan would be a financially weak state which will invite the outside powers to step in and thus the whole foreign policy would be dictated by Russia or Britain. It would not be able to meet the defence expenses due to its weak and crippled economy which would make it a safe ground for foreign intrigues.<sup>90</sup> Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in a letter to Hafiz Muhammad Sadiq of Muzaffargarh (Punjab) reflected the same view. He said, "in view of the economic backwardness

---

89. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, Volume II, pp. 340-41, English translation quoted from Farooqui, op.cit., p. 117.

90. Musain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, Volume II, op.cit., Maktub No. 33.

of the Muslim majority provinces and the active resistance of an effective, well-organised and numerically strong minority, Pakistan will have to face difficult problems and will be required in order to maintain itself, to seek the support of some Foreign Power. As a result, its economic life will have to be controlled by Foreign Governments and non-Pakistan capital. Moreover, due to the lack of its resources and further increase in its expenditure it will not be strong enough to give an effective assistance to Muslim countries. On the contrary, it will turn out to be a playground of political intrigues of England and Russia. The situation, finally, will give England a golden opportunity to take full advantage of Indo-Pak prejudices and rivalries and thus, inspite of the virtual termination of British rule in India it will eventually come to dominate Pakistan and Hindustan again." <sup>91</sup> Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, in his thought provoking book, "Tahrik-e-Pakistan per ek Nazar", analysing the economic perspective of Pakistan remarked that in the world of today economic and financial considerations are vital. On its depended the commerce, development and progress. The chief resources of economy had been the mines and mineral wealth. The provinces which were going to be amalgamated in Pakistan possess a small number of

---

91. Husain Ahmad Madani, Makatib-i-Shaikhul Islam, compiled by Sayyid Faridal-Wahidi, (Qauni Kitabghar, Deoband, n.d.), pp. 52-53.

working mines. There was one salt and coal mines in Punjab and Bengal has some deposit of coal with some iron mines. The remaining provinces are blank. The rest and bulk of iron, coal, mica, copper, Silver, Gold, Aluminium, Petrol mines and deposits are in Hindu Hindustan mostly located in Bihar, Central provinces and Madras. The industrial power in the world is based on the trinity of coal, iron and oil, Together coal and iron are the foundation of industrializa-  
92  
tion.

It was true that there were several mineral deposits in Sind, Bengal but in order to operate them crores of rupees would be required which would be beyond the reach of Pakistan. And if they invite some Hindu industrialists, as some Leaguers claim, to invest their money in Pakistan in order to operate these deposited minerals: then it would be a Suicidal to Pakistan itself. For if any Government wanted to be economically crippled and slave in the hands of other countries then the best way is to invite the multinationals with a view to develop the economic condition  
93  
of the country.

Hence, Hifzur Rehman concluded that the Pakistan scheme on the one hand deprived the Muslims of the benefits

---

92. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Tahrir -i- Pakistan per ek Nazar, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

93. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

occurring from Geographical resources and minerals deposit of the vast land of Hindu Hindustan while on the other invited the Hindu industrialists to invest the money and ultimately become the master of war and peace in line with the European Jews industrialists.<sup>94</sup>

The main issue involved was that of a constitutional problem. The Congress unnecessary repeated the possibility of a strong federation with one single Government in India agreeable to all, but Jinnah pressed for a separate homeland for the Muslims. They argued that in case of one central Government the minority would be at the mercy of the majority who then would exclude them from the political power. Congress did not concede to this demand as it would hamper the national unity. This eventually lead us to the issue of autonomy of the constitutional units.<sup>95</sup>

This was what Jamiat-ul-Ulema had been talking and arguing about as a means to solve the Muslim problem in India. As early as 1931 when the Hindu Muslim question was being discussed at the Round Table conference and different political parties and communities were in search of an agreeable solution of the problem, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind

---

94. Ibid., p. 23.

95. Moin Shakir, op.cit., p. 205.

having a greater sense of responsibility came out with its own formula. The Jamiat working Committee in its meeting at Saharanpur on 3rd August 1931 presented the following formula for the people as an alternative to Pakistan.

The committee resolved that the Indian political system would be a federal in which the constituent units would enjoy complete autonomy. The federal Assembly would be given only those powers or subjects which demanded uniformity of treatment throughout India. The residuary powers would be vested in the provinces which might be subjected to transfer to the centre, provided a majority of units agree to it.<sup>96</sup>

The Committee not only talked about the political freedom but the religious safeguards were also included in the resolution. The Working Committee recommended that the government would not interfere in the religion, culture language of the various communities inhabiting India. Moreover, an special clause was also inserted in the constitution that the Government would not in any case interfere in the personal law of the Muslims. The Muslims judges would be appointed to hear the cases which required a Muslim Qazi to interpret.<sup>97</sup> It recommended reservation of seats for

---

96. Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hai (Delhi, 1946), pp. 178-180.

97. Ibid., p. 179.

different communities in Punjab and Bengal according to their numerical proportion while in other provinces there should be reservation of seats for minority community with a right to contest additional seats. A Supreme Court would be constituted with representatives of various communities to hear the cases of grievances of the minority communities. <sup>98</sup>

When the Lahore declaration became acute and a flood of literature started coming out of the press and when people were in search of an alternative to the Pakistan resolution the Jamiat with more clear insight came out with the following formula which was popularly known as the Jamiat formula;

1. "Our goal is complete independence.
2. In a free India, Musalmans and their religion and culture will be free. They will not accept a constitution which does not approve of these freedom
3. We stand for the fullest and unrestricted autonomy of the provinces. The centre will enjoy only those powers which the provinces of their own accord hand over to it and which concerns equality with all provinces.
4. It is our considered opinion that a federation of autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a federation in which Ninety million Muslims with a

---

98. Ibid., p. 180.

distinct culture of their own are left on the mercy of a numerical majority will in no case be acceptable to them; the centre is to be on such principles that give a clear guarantee to the Muslims with regard to their religious, cultural and political freedom.<sup>99</sup>"

In 1945 at its Lahore Session Jamiat-ul-Ulema exhorted the Indian Muslims to be the finalist of their own destiny and appealed to them to agree to the formula presented at the Thirteenth session of the Jamiat at Johnpur in 1942, and present an unanimous demand to the British Government as it would be in the greater interest of India in general and Muslims in particular. Explaining the scheme it contemplated that "the Jamiat is not ready to discard or sacrifice the religious, political and cultural freedom of the Muslims. It is true that it likes a federal government and one centre because in its view it is more beneficial for India in general and Muslims in particular. But the establishment of this federal government is stipulated with this condition that the complete autonomy of the provinces be accepted. And that the federation should be so constituted that the non-Muslims majority at the centre could not apprehend the religious political and cultural rights on the basis of its numerical strength. Centre to be so constituted as to leave

---

99. Ibid., pp. 241-42; English translation quoted from Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., pp. 99-100.

100

little chance for the majority to oppress."

101

The alternative proposed by Dr. S.A.Latif, one of the propounders of two nation theory and at the same time an advocate of an All India Federation was, though theoretically perfect but impracticable mainly because the transfer of populations would affect about 2/3 of the whole population of India, would involve removal in some cases over long distance and into uncongenial climate and would be prohibitively costly.

102

tedly costly.

---

100. Ibid., p.274. The session also came out with a tentative proposal to be reviewed by the Muslims and non-Muslims organizations. The proposals runs as follows:

- (1) The federal parliament should be composed on the basis of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims; for example, the proportion should be; Hindu 45%, Muslim seats 45% and other minorities 10%.
- (2) In the federal parliament, if the 2/3 majority of the Muslim members are of the opinion that a particular bill or proposal is prejudicial to their religious, cultural and political interests then that bill or proposal will not be presented before or passed by the House.
- (3) There should be established a Supreme Court composed of equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim judges would be appointed by a committee having equal number of representatives from the Muslim and non-Muslim provinces. This Supreme Court should be empowered to give final verdicts on Muslim arising out of disputes between the centre and the provinces, between one province and other or between two communities in the country. And also if under the provision No.2 the majority of the Federal Parliament differs from the opinion of the 2/3 majority of the Muslim members with regard to a bill being or not being opposed to the interests of the Muslims, the matter will be referred to the Supreme Court.

Contd.....

103 Dr. Shawkatullah Ansari in his thought provoking book, also viewed the transfer of population as wholly unapplicable in the Indian context. He argued that the transfer of Turkey and Greek population which S.A.Latif had cited as an analogy would not be a safe analogy of

---

(Continued from the previous page)

(4) Any proposal agreed by the parties concerned.

Sir, Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind Kiwa Maj, op.cit., pp. 274-275, English translation quoted from Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p.100.

101. Dr. S.A.Latif held that partition was neither a necessary nor a desirable alternative. The India may be united. He proposed for division of India into central block (stretching from the eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow with Delhi as its centre) and eleven Hindu <sup>Pr. States</sup>. The Indian states interspread all over the country may be distributed between the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. Each zone will form a homogenous state with a highly centralised form of Government within ... but filling alongwith similar states into an All-India federation.

See, S.A.Latif, the Muslim Problem in India, (Bombay, 1939), p.30.

102. R.Coupland, The Constitutional problem in India, Part-III (Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1945), p.203.

103. Shaukatullah Ansari; Pakistan the Problem of India, (Lahore, 1944); the author had been the Chairman of the reception committee of All-India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind Session in 1939. He was elected the general Secretary of the All-India Azad Muslim Conference held in April, 1940.

exchange of population. For it concerned Greeks (orthodox church) who went and settled in Anatolia and Turks (Muslims) who had gone and settled in Greece while Muslims and Hindus are rationally in no way different to each other and both have lived together in this country for about a thousand years. The conversion from one religion to another taking place from time to time during common history....Pakistan can in no way be said to be underpopulated nor it has the financial resources for meeting the cost of an exchange of population." <sup>104</sup>

Hence in the light of above discussion the Jamiat formula alone appeared applicable to solve the problem.

As a matter of fact, partition was neither necessary nor a desirable alternative, nor it could had solve the communal problem which it sought to solve. It left about 1/3 of the Muslim minority on the mercy of the Hindus. Secondly the basis on which the partition was demanded was illogical because the areas which it sought to be separated were already a majority provinces. Hence the alternative rested with the Jamiat formula. The solution of the Muslim problem in India was not partition but a true federation. Coupland remarked, "regionalism meets half the Muslim claim.

---

104. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

It concedes the first demand of the Pakistan resolution....  
it provides the Muslims with a National home, which they can  
call their own. They would be autonomous state, not  
secondary or subordinate units of administration. It is  
one of the myths of Indian politics that the Congress did  
not agree for a loose federation as their mind was not  
prepared to consider any alternative to the official plan  
of a Constituent Assembly, and as a reaction, in the atmos-  
phere of tension and strife that was prevailing, the Muslim  
attitude stiffened."<sup>105</sup>  
<sup>106</sup>

Had the Jamiat formula been accepted by the Muslims,  
the Ulema could have been in a position to bargain with the  
Congress for more safeguards and better treatment. The  
Muslims might have been in a position to demand 40% represen-  
tation in the Assemblies and other Governmental services.  
Moreover in a loose federation with complete autonomy in  
home affairs the Muslims could have enjoyed more or less  
the same religious cultural and political privilege as in

---

105. R.Coupland, op.cit., p. 126.

106. Ibid., p. 206; Though the Congress, to meet the temper  
of time, passed a resolution in favour of a loose  
federation with complete residuary powers in the  
provinces.

But the resolution remained confined to the  
files of Congress Working Committee and was never  
taken up seriously.

See, R.Coupland, op.cit., p. 296.-

proposed Pakistan. In U.P. and Bihar they could have been 16% to 14% respectively while at the centre they constituted 27%, just 1/4 of the whole strength of seats which could have been an effective majority to creat deadlock in time of crisis. Moreover, the partition resulted in the migration of leading upper class Muslim intelligientia which proved to be a great community loss, a community which had just started catching up with the temper of the time; had to complete with a better placed, economically and educationally, Hindu Chauvinism.

In fact the leadership of the Muslim League mostly consisted of middle class. The Muslim bourgeoisie class were not courageous enough to face this competition from their Hindu counterpart. Pakistan appeared to them a safe heaven where they would be in possession of all important Governmental posts, industry and commerce. This temptation was having a great appeal to their insance mind. But no movement could be successful unless it becomes a mass movement. To achieve this the common man was made to believe that the fight for a Muslim state was a fight for brightening their future where they would flourish in an identical manner and would not be spending a hand to mouth life. The Muslim

---

107. Husain Ahmad Madani, Kashfa-e-Haqiquat, op.cit., p.62.

108. P.Moon, The future of India, (London, 1945), p.27.

masses easily believed it for "with their tradition of political servitude and consciousness of economic inferiority of the prospect /Hindu . monopoly of political power appeared 109 alarming and intolerable.

The demand for Pakistan throws light on the irrational traits of the Muslim mind. It was a self defeating project and an escape from hard realities. 110 One can not deny, that there are differences between the Hindus and Muslims at least in religious sphere if not in cultural sense. But only a difference between two communities in religion could not be a sound logic to argue for a separation. This was against the very logic of Islam.

The defeat of the nationalist Ulema in the General Election of 1946, which was infact an issue of deciding the issue of Pakistan, sealed the fate of the Muslims of this Indian sub-continent. The Muslim voters were asked to cast 111 their vote for the glory of Islam in Pakistan and abroad. Though the middle class Muslims voted for Pakistan in order to get rid of Hindu exclusiveness but an everage Muslim voter

---

109. H. Bolitho, Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan, (London, 1954), p. 158.

110. Moin Shakir, op.cit., p. 205.

111. Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, op.cit., pp. 243-248.

saw in Pakistan not only the chance to restore the physical<sup>112</sup> but also the moral authority of Islam. A dream of Islamic state was more attractive to them than any other considerations.

It would be pertinent to note that a small section of the Deobandi Ulema were against joining the Congress from the very beginning. The chief spokesman of this group had been Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. Even during the time of Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement some Ulema had been<sup>113</sup> critical of joining the Congress. But they were not then organised as a group. Their pronouncements were merely of an individual capacity. Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi did not agree with the view of other leading Ulema that the Muslim League was capable of embarking upon the establishment of an Islamic State at first. He considered both the Congress and the Muslim League as useless. But his contention was that the Muslim League was better than the Congress for it would be easy to change the Muslim League from irreligion to religion. But this was not possible in case of the Congress which was essentially a Hindu dominated organisation. He considered the Congress as a blind man and Muslim League as a one-eyed man. Hence it could be easy to purify the League for if a man with perfect sight was not available the one-eyed person could always be preferred.<sup>114</sup>

---

112. Ibid., p. 240.

113. See, Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and others, *Muttalique Delhi*, 193, also *Musalman aur Siwil Nafarmani Ke Mutalliq Shari Fatwa* (Lucknow, n.d.).

114. Mohammad Ashraf Ali Thanvi, *Ifadat.-i-Ashrafiyah dar masail-i-Siyasiya*, edited, Mufti Muhammad Shabi, (Deoband, 2nd ed. 1945), p.96.

This group of the dissatisfied Ulema founded in 1946, under the leadership of Mawlana Shabir Ahmad Usmani, the Jamiat-ul-Islam with the blessings from Jinnah in order to counteract the activities of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. He was opposed to the United nationalism and countered forcefully the claims of the nationalist Ulema in this favour.<sup>115</sup> This organisation was ably used by Jinnah to win over the Urdu-educated Muslim voters for the advantage of the Muslim League.<sup>116</sup> Now every religious shot fired on the British also hit the nationalist forces. The logic used by the nationalist Ulema to organise Muslims against the foreign power began to be utilised against them by their adversaries. Previously, the nationalist Ulema had tried to prove their one nation theory on the basis of the Quran and the Hadith. Now the pro-League Ulema looked to the same Quran Hadith but only to prove that the two nation theory was inconsonance with the Islamic Shariah and any move against this motion would be tantamount to be un-Islamic.<sup>117</sup> They viewed the establishment of Pakistan as the beginning of the end, the end being to establish the God's Quranic Kingdom on earth. Any move to undue the League

---

115. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., pp. 359-361.

116. Peter Hardy, Muslims of British India, op.cit., p.242.

117. Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Paygham Banam Mutmar Kul Hind Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam 1945, pp. 43-44.

mission would mean that the Muslims themselves have defeated  
the unique opportunity to establish His rule on the earth.<sup>118</sup>

But inspite of the propoganda of Pro-League Ulema, the Jamiat continued their religious arguments to justify their political stand on the issue. Mawlana Husain Ahmad and his colleague Mawlana Mohammad Mian wrote a pamphlet, Hamara Hindustan aur Uske Fuzailin which they tried to prove that India was their 'Watan'. To justify this view they argued that the Prophet Adam according to the Islamic books, descended from heaven to India and settled here. Hence the entire India was the Islamic land and its parti-<sup>119</sup>tion was undesirable.

During the General election of 1945 both the groups of Ulema tried their strength against each other to win the Muslim votes to their viewpoint. The nationalist Ulema made frantic appeal to the Muslim voters not to cast their votes in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan would mean abandoning the mosques, shrines, religious seminaries and the centres of Muslim culture. Muslim must not allow these to be  
<sup>120</sup>ruined. As the counter attack Shabbir Ahmad Usmani declared that "every one knows that the Prophet did not carry with

---

118. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

119. Husain Ahmad Madani, Hamara Hindustan aur Uske Fuzail, (Delhi, 1941), p. 3.

120. Ibid., p. 11.

him the Shrines of Madina. The Prophet did it because he  
121  
wanted to transform Madina into Pakistan."

As a matter of fact Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was hoodwinked by the false propaganda of the League that the structure of the Government and Society of Pakistan would be modelled on the Islamic principles. He challenged the criticism of nationalist Ulema that the Pakistan would be a heretic state ruled by irreligious people as totally  
122  
absured and misleading. But while levelling such criticism he failed to diagnose the real motives of the Leaguers and was moved by the lofty and lovely dream of an Islamic State.

One thing which came out of the establishment of Jamiat-ul-Islam and its prudent utilization by Jinnah to further his ends was that the Leaguers realised the need and help of the Ulema and followed their lead, who were held by the Leaguers as incompetible to lead the Muslims.

The defeat of the Muslims Ulema was not due to the fact that they lacked a case to argue but they failed to put across the minds of the common people who were not ready  
123  
to hear any thing than the Pakistan. The Jamiat-ul-Islam

---

121. Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Hamara Pakistan included in his Khutbah-e-Sadarat Suba Punjab, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, (Lahore, 1946), pp. 47-49.

122. Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, op.cit., pp. 65-66.

123. Ibid., p. 245.

founded by Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani with a blessings from Jinnah to counter the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, proved to be a decisive factor in attracting the Muslim voters to the Muslim League.<sup>124</sup>

The other factor was that the common Muslim voters failed to differentiate between the programme of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Muslim League. So much so that the Muslims thought that if the Jamiat was so much apprehensive of a Hindu majority as to demand exclusive safeguards with regard to their religion and culture then they might as well demand Pakistan. The Muslim League was offering them the physical partition of India; the Ulema from the Jamiat platform were offering them the mental partition of India. The former was to cut through the map of British India, the latter to scarify it.<sup>125</sup>

By February 1947 almost all political parties gradually came close to the acceptance of the partition plan for one reason or another. But it were only these Muslim divines who did not loose heart and carried their struggle to the end. They from the Jamiat platform tried their best to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation. But what pained the Jamiat much was that the

---

124. Peter Hardy, op.cit., p.41.

125. Peter Hardy, Muslim of British India, op.cit., p.245.

Congress, its long and trusted friend, also accepted the plan and thus put the death seal. The Congress not only accepted the division of the country but also favoured the partition of Punjab on the basis of Hindu and Muslim majority. Hence, the Jamiat further severely criticised the Congress for her breach of plea and assurances that it was fighting for an united India. By putting the seal of approval the Congress had accepted the two nation theory.<sup>126</sup> The Jamiat made it clear that it did not like either the proposed Pakistan Scheme of the Muslim League or the Akhand Bharat of Mahasabha<sup>127</sup> neither the proposed division of the Punjab by the Congress. In fact, the Jamiat was against any type of partition, mental, moral, intellectual, ethical, or physical.

The Jamiat reiterated its stand that only the acceptance of the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission plan could solve the problem. This would best be in the interest of the country in general and Muslims in particular. It also exhorted the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab to be up in opposing the bifurcation of their provinces which would bring great<sup>128</sup> miseries and sufferings to the millions of Muslims.

The Jamiat came heavily on the independence of India Act, 1947. It viewed in the proposed division of the country

---

126. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, Volume II, p. 536.

127. Ibid., p. 536.

128. Ibid., p. 536.

by the British authority as an attempt to break the territorial integrity of India. The British Government not only proposed for the bifurcation of the country but also cut the Punjab and Bengal into pieces. The Jamiat's apprehension was that the creation of this type of situation would naturally be beneficial to the British to intervene in the home affairs of both the country. This type of situation would be beset with hatred and bitterings amongst the communities. The Jamiat also criticised the India Independence Act of 1947 from the view point that it had not only divided the Indian Muslims into three parts but also made the five crore Muslims subservient to the twenty five crore majority of the people. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema criticised both Muslim League and the Congress. Muslim League was made the target of attack due to their perception that it was responsible for what was happening. The Congress was condemned for the breach of principle in accepting the partition of their motherland.

The forebodings of the Jamiat turned out to be true. Even before August 14, 1947 there were rumblings of discord and strife in the Punjab. Immediately after independence, violence erupted in different parts of the country and especially in the North Western areas of the sub-continent. Millions were uprooted and forced to migrate across the newly

created frontiers. After Punjab the fire of communalism soon penetrated into Delhi, where the Muslim minority was uprooted from their own home and their properties were raised to the ground. Winter was fast approaching and there was no adequate arrangement to meet the situation, thousands suffered due to cold and starvation. Infact, the sufferings and hardships of the people were beyond description.

The last occasion when the Jamiat-ul-Ulema tried to maintain the territorial integrity of India was their campaign in Sylhet to turn the referendum, held on the issue of Sylhet which was to go to East Pakistan or continue to form part of Assam, in their favour. The contention of Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani was that if referendūm go in favour of East/Pakistan it would be nominal and would not bring them any substancial benefit but it would surely affect the balance of the Muslims in Assam who would be reduced to the teeming minority, subjected more to the dictates of the majority community. His efforts failed and the subsequent development shows that Husain Ahmad was right in his thesis.

---

130. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Bombay, 1959), pp. 191-192.

131. Mohammad Mian, op.cit., p. 540.

## C O N C L U S I O N

In the twilight of a vague religio-political discontent of the 1919's, a vigorous campaign the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, sprang up among the Indian Muslims, comprising of the Ulema of all shades of opinion. It was the exigency of time which produced the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. The Muslim leadership at that time was helplessly placed and divided amongst themselves over ideological and doctrinal differences. It goes to the credit of Mawlana Abdul Bari who tirelessly tried to forge an united front with the help of the Ulema and bring them on a common platform. It was his organising ability and persuasion that brought Ulema of all shades of opinion on a common platform and infused in them the need to organise themselves into a religio-political body for safeguarding the Islamic Shariah. The achievement of independence was also one of its goals. Though the Ulema were making their presence in different organisations in the individual capacity, they always felt the need of an All-India associations of Ulema, through which they could ventilate their grievances and act as a pressure group on the Government and to speak more unitedly and authoritatively on behalf of the Muslim India.

The chief concern of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema was the safeguarding of Islamic Shariah in the light of the Quran and Hadith and giving the Muslims a lead in the political cum-

religious matters. But it goes to the credit of the leaders of the Jamiat that their determination to safeguard the Islamic Shariah did not come in their way to contribute to the cause of freedom. They made a happy blending of religion and politics and thus justified through their role that there was no need of divorcing religion from politics. Both could operate side by side, provided the hold of string remained in the hands of men of qualities as the Ulema proved to be.

The Jamiat considered the very existence of the British rule to be the cause of all ills in the Indian body politics. Jamiat considered the dominance of British in India to be the root cause of the British supremacy over all lands including the Muslims countries of Middle East. On account of this perception the Jamiat thought it to be its religious as well as national duty to fight against British imperialism. Its determination and adherence to safeguard Islamic Shariah and struggle for the freedom of the country never meant for establishing an Islamic state. The motivating force behind all the programme of action of the Jamiat was the persecution of Islamic law by the Muslims themselves while living in friendship with other sister communities.

The period of 1940's presented an interesting picture of the Muslim politics in India. By that time the

two principal centres of Muslim learning - Aligarh and Deoband - emerged as the rival camps, each projecting the view of the rival Muslims political parties - the Muslim League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema respectively. It is interesting to see ~~that~~ both quite sincerely desired the welfare of the Muslim community but differed in their approaches to the problem. They were strange travellers to the path of the same destination - the welfare of Muslim community. They perceived the solution of Muslim problems from different angles and viewpoints. If the Jamiat-ul-Ulema thought that the Muslim interest could best be secured in an undivided India, the Muslim League viewed that once the British left the country they would become more and more subjected to the tyrannical rule of the Hindu majority, the fruits of which they had already tasted during the Congress ministries between 1937-39. Here lies the basic difference between the Jamiat and the Muslim League. The Muslim League stood for free Islam which could only be realised if they were given free home to nurture it. The Jamiat leaders were not ready to share the views and sentiments of the Muslim League. They had their own plan for the future destiny of Muslims in an undivided India. The people thus failed to distinguish between the programme and ideologies of the Jamiat and the Muslim League. This had been one of the reasons of the defeat of nationalist Ulema.

It had been discussed in the foregoing pages that the Jamiat was very much concerned with the preservation of the Islamic Law in an undivided India. In view of their emphasis on the Islamic culture and preservation of Muslim Personal Law it puzzled the readers that why they opposed the creation of Pakistan, where they could have got a conjugal and favourable atmosphere to embark upon and establish an independent society based on Islamic Shariah and Sunnah? The reasons are many fold. First of all comes the question of leadership. The Ulema, well versed in Islamic Law and Hadith, considered themselves to be the chief interpreter of Islamic Law. They thought that the Muslim Leaguers, trained in the atmosphere of Western culture and tradition, were incapable of establishing an Islamic State. They thought that the leaguers were neither well versed in Islamic teachings nor interested in implementing them. On the other hand the leaguers suspected the capabilities of the Ulema to cope with requirements of the new world as they thought them to be conservative and traditional minded.

Closely related to the question of leadership was the clash of dualism in the Muslim educational system - the Ulema and the Western educated intelligentsia. The nationalist Ulema seeing the strings of the Muslim League in the hands

of the progressive like Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, were suspicious of their role to give a true lead to Islam. Moreover, their activities in opposing the implementation of Islamic laws and favouring the enforcement of man made laws alarmed the Ulema of the future fate of Islam in Pakistan. It was still fresh in the memory of the Ulema that how Jinnah lobbied against the passage of Shariat Act and cooperated in this move with Bhupendranath. He also favoured the Muslim Civil Marriage Bill, the Army Bill, Annulment of Marriages and Endowment Bill etc. and these can be cited as an examples. Madani was aware of such anti-Islamic activities of Jinnah and could not trust his leadership. The letter of Husain Ahmad Madani to his disciple complaining about the un-Islamic behaviour of the League leadership reflect the distrust of Ulema to the Westernised Muslim leaders. These negative approach of Jinnah strengthened their belief that Pakistan was not going to be a safe place for Islam and the whole system would be based on secular principles. The speech of Jinnah at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan fully confirmed the farsightedness of the Ulema, in viewing the plea of establishing an Islamic State as nothing but fake promises. Even men like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani could not assess the situation and was hoodwinked

---

1. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-i-Shaikhul Islam; Volume I compiled by Najimuddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif, Azamgarh 1952), p. 254.

by the lovely dream of an Islamic state based on the principle of Hadith and Sunnah. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani even tried to persuade him but all failed to open his eyes. Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was the man whose name was ably exploited by the Muslim Leaguers in showing to Muslim India that even a Deobandi Alim was amongst them. It was chiefly the personality of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani which brought the Muslim League victorious at the election of 1946. All the promises of an Islamic state had gone into oblivion. Even after forty years we do not see any sign of Islamisation in Pakistan. It were the Indian Muslims who suffered a lot. The Muslim India could have felt some psychological satisfaction that their sacrifices have not gone waste had Pakistan ever tried to become an Islamic State. One could say that Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan could not get sufficient time to guide and control their mission.

In fact, the leaders of the Muslim League were not clear about the system of Government to be adopted in Pakistan. Various speeches of their leaders as mentioned in the fourth chapter speak the intellectual backwardness of the Muslim League leaders. Its leaders were heard using contradictory statements with regard to the future system of society. The concept of Islamic democracy, Islamic socialism and the like were used interchangeably which spoke of the ideological confusion and intellectual bankruptcy of the Leaguers.

The Ulema were aware of all this and they never trusted their leadership. In one of his letters Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani said that "who will not desire and dream of establishing an Islamic State. Such type of possibility excite the Muslims to the full. If at any time their activities convince me that they are sincere in their claim then I will be the first to join them. But I know that they are neither sincere in their claim nor capable of going into such a venture."<sup>2</sup>

The Ulema were rightly convinced that the creation of Pakistan was not going to solve the Muslim problem for even after the bifurcation a considerable number of Muslims would be left in an even weaker minority in a divided India. It appeared to them illogical that in order to liberate seven crore of Muslims, where they were already in majority and having their own Government, they were ready to leave behind two crore of Muslims. What would happen to them, who would look after the deserted places of worship were some questions for which the Ulema did not get any satisfactory reply.

As a matter of fact that the Jamiat thought that in India there was much possibility of Dawah work especially

---

2. Ibid., Volume II, pp. 159-60.

among the oppressed communities which constitute majority of the total population. The Jamiat viewed such an opportunity with great interest. Missionary activities need an open society in which much spade work for proselytisation can be done. The cherished aims of the Jamiat was to see that the land of Allah be governed by His divine commands and put an end to all man made tyranny and oppression.

The two nation theory and a demand for separate homeland for the Muslims have been defended on the apprehension of possible assimilation of the minority in the majority community. The adherents of this perception holds that to achieve the artificial homogeneity the majority made the minority to abandon their ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic characteristics which differentiate them from the dominant group. They are also asked to relinquish their insistence on being different from the majority and thus merge themselves within the national mainstream.

Here it must be emphasised that Islam has been a proselytizing religion. For the progress and development of Islam a peaceful atmosphere and goodwill is essential. To achieve this objective one has to live within the non-religious peoples. Had Islam cared for such remote possibility it could have confined to itself the desertland of the Arabia. Moreover, the apprehension of the pro-two nation theory has been found ill based. At the time of independence

the population of the Indian Muslims was 9% while at present they constitute 14% of the whole population, according to the Government records. The actual number may even shoot up. Hence the apprehension of being swamped by the majority community has been defeated. What is more the Indian Muslims are presenting the true picture of Islam than their counterparts. They are conscious and capable enough to defend, preserve their culture and personal law in a divided India.

It has always been alleged by many historians that the Jamiat-ul-Ulema throughout its existence unconditionally cooperated with the Congress and acted as its satellite. This is only to defame the organisation and it is not testified by historical truth. We have seen in the preceding chapters that the Jamiat always joined the Congress after being assured that Muslim interests would be best secured. It was only after the Congress rejected the Nehru report and accepted complete independence as its creed and came out with a promise to safeguard the Muslim interest that the Jamiat agreed to join the Congress in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930. Again, after the 1937 election the Jamiat joined the Congress, only after being deceived by the Muslim League in the pre-election assurances and that too not unconditionally. Although we did see that at the Allahabad

Conference of Muslim leaders, convened by Mawlana Azad a section of the Jamiat leaders were in favour of unconditionally cooperating with the Congress. But a large number of group led by Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and Mufti Kifayatullah was against unconditional cooperation and emphasised that it would not be in the best interest of the Muslim to go to the Congress benches without any prior assurance that the culture, language and religion would be safeguarded.

In fact the Jamiat cooperated with the Congress in so far as it did not come in the way of Muslim interests. History of the Indian National Movement is replete with such instances when the Jamiat leaders went on to criticise the policies of the Congress. During the Khilafat Movement both Abdul Bari and Abdul Majid Badauni were highly critical of the Gandhian creed of non-violence and his reluctance to announce the complete independence as the creed of the Congress. Moreover, the suspension of the Khilafat and non-cooperation Movements was met with severe condemnation by Mawlana Abdul Bari and Abdul Rauf Danapuri. The Jamiat adopted the official resolution against it at the Ajmer and Patna conference of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind.

The Jamiat severely criticised the way the Congress behaved with Muslim sentiments in regard to fill the vacancies created by the absence of Muslim League members under

the interim Government. The contention of the Jamiat was that the Congress would have consulted the nationalist Muslim political parties before filling the vacancies at its own choice.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, those nominated to fill the vacancies temporarily were not given any important department whatsoever. The Jamiat viewed this attitude of the Congress as an insult to the nationalist Muslims. The Working Committee condemned the Congress way of tackling the issue as objectionable from national viewpoint and hoped that immediate steps would be taken to make the interim Government a representative and useful body.<sup>4</sup> The Jamiat-ul-Ulema also condemned the Congress at its meetings where Mawlana Hifzur Rehman severely criticised the Congress which was also upheld by the nationalist newspapers.<sup>5</sup>

The Jamiat also did not like the Congress accepting the partition proposal of India. And Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani could not conceal his sentiments at the painful development on the part of his trusted and long friends on the road to independent. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani viewed this attitude of the Congress as making the theory of united

---

3. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq (Al-Jamiat-book depot, Delhi, 1947), pp. 399-400.

4. Ibid., pp. 401-402.

5. The Madinah, 25 September, 1942.

nationalism nugatory. Mawlana Hifzur Rehman also went to the historical session of the Congress held at the constitution house, Delhi, where the Congress accepted the 3 June, 1947 Plan, and spoke against the Partition. It was only the personality of Hifzur Rehman who in most strong words condemned the proposal of partition and tried to desist the Congress to sign the death knell of united India.<sup>6</sup>

In spite of its glorious role in the Freedom Movement the role of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema has been a subject of conflicting assessment and criticism. A number of historians have tried to highlight the communal character of the nationalist Ulema. Regarding the role of the Jamiat R.C. Majumdar observes....."still the fact remained that all their proclamations were issued in the name and interest of Islam and their appeal was only to the Muslims... The support of Hindus were never asked for, and it hardly could be done without violating the basic doctrine of the movement which sought to eradicate from India all power and influence other than Islam."<sup>7</sup>

This is the tribute given to an organisation which since its inception tried <sup>to</sup> foster Hindu-Muslim unity. It were these leading Ulema who from the Jamiat platform acted as a bridge of contact between the Muslims and Hindus during

---

6. Ibid., 16 June, 1947.

7. R.C. Majumdar, British Paramountcy in India, Volume II, p. 297.

the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement and continued to be so throughout the freedom struggle down to the independence. The Jamiat leaders during the Khilafat even asked the Muslims to desist from the sacrificial ceremony of killing the cows, as a mark of respect to their Hindu brethren. It was this organisation which made Swami Shradhananda, an Arya Samajist, to address the Muslims from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid, a rare sign of tolerance and friendship. But unfortunately large heartedness is not the part of our country men. In fact in the long and chequered history of Indian National Movement the Ulema in general and Jamiat in particular occupy an important place. They have set high standards of patriotism, devotion to the cause and sacrifice in the annals of India's struggle for Freedom. It were the Ulema/<sup>who</sup> resisted the illegitimate authority and dominance of the East India Company and the British Government. After independence it was hoped that due recognition would be given to their services for the cause of the liberation of India from foreign domination. But it is sad that our historians lack objectivity : They have been biased in accounting their heroic deeds and gigantic contribution to the cause of freeing India from the foreign Yoke. There is very little mention of the contribution of Muslim Ulema in mobilising the people to take up arms against the British colonialists, organising them and leading them to the struggle against the British.

APPENDIX I

LEAFLET ISSUED BY THE NAZIM-UMUMI  
(GENERAL MANAGER), 'DARUL-ISHAAT-I-HIND', DELHI

The religious Fatwa of the Ulemas of all India-

- (1) It is not permissible to become a member of the Government Councils.
- (2) It is not permissible to plead as vakil before the British Courts.
- (3) It is not permissible to read in Government or semi-Government schools.
- (4) It is not permissible to keep Honorary Magistracies, other honorary posts and the titles conferred by the Government.
- (5) All Government services by which Government is helped are (harām) forbidden; specially serving in the Police and the Army is a great sin, because they have to fire upon their <sup>in</sup>breth rñ. God says/the holy Quran, Surah Mairaj, 'One who kills a Mussulman deliberately will be subjected to the eternal hell fire.' The prophet has said 'Whoever took up arms against Muslims he ceases to be a Muslim.'

Source: Home Dept. Pol 1921, F.No. 137.

APPENDIX II

(A) C.I.D. LIST OF MAULVIS SIGNING THE FATWA

1. Mawlana Kifayetullah of Delhi
2. Mawlana Sayid Sulaiman Nadwi
3. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad
4. Mawlana Daud Ghaznavi
5. Mawlana Sanaullah of Amritsar
6. Mawlana Aziz-ur-Rehman, Mufti of Darul Uloom, Deoband
7. Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, a leading Sufi of Bihar
8. Mawlana Abdul Bari of Lucknow
9. Mawlana Husain Ahmad
10. Azad Subhani of Cawnpur.

Source: Home Political, A 1920, File Nos. 415-26.

(B) C.I.D. LIST OF MAULVIS RIFUSING TO SIGN THE FATWA

1. Mawlana Abdul Hamid
2. Mawlana Abdul Majid
3. Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi
4. Habibur Rehman Khan Sherwani of Aligarh
5. Mawlana Hafiz Mohammad, Rector of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband
6. Mawlana Raza Khan Brelvi.

Source: Home Political, A. 1920, File Nos. 415-26.

APPENDIX III

DEMI-OFFICIAL LETTER FROM C.A. BORRON  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF DELHI, TO H.D. CRAIK,  
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Delhi, 2 September 1921

In my fortnightly report for the second half of August I have referred to the serious <sup>state</sup> of ill-feeling which is being worked up among the lower class Mahommedans in Delhi over the confiscation of the fatwa leaflet, and said I was submitting a more detailed report.

The local Jamiat-ul-Ulema at once telegraphed to Gandhiji for permission to start civil disobedience, but he counselled doing nothing in a hurry. Several private meetings of the local Maulvis were held at which it was decided to refer the question of further action to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind for advice and orders. The first big public meeting on the subject was held on the evening of the 23rd August at Pataudi House. It is reported that there was more religious enthusiasm among the Mahommedans at this meeting than had been witnessed since the Ulemas' Conference last November. A very great crowd assembled, amongst whom a fairly strong fanatical element was observed. The leading speakers were Maulvi Syed Hussain Ahmed Madni, Mahajar of Deoband, who presided, Maulvi Ahmed Syed of Delhi, Maulvi Ibrahim of Sialkot, and Mufti Kifaitullah of Delhi. The president in a lengthy address lasting nearly two hours reviewed the various occasions in the last 200 years when Christian powers had been opposed to Islam. Ahmed Syed emphasised the view that the prescribed fatwa as prepared by

nearly 500 Maulvis was an abstract of the orders of God and the Prophet and its confiscation would not be tolerated; the question of disobedience of the order had been referred to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, and if they ordered disobedience non-violence would have to cease and the responsibility for bloodshed would rest on the Government and on those who had not informed Government of the gravity of the situation; Pharaoh was no more, and the Czar had been shot by his own men; if people asked why they should help that Turks now when they had not helped the Mahommedans of India in 1857 the answer was that the Turks were themselves in difficulties at that time. Kifaitullah said he had been asked by many zealous Mahommedans why they were sitting silent when God's orders had been prescribed, but he had pacified them by saying the matter had been referred to the Jamiat-i-Hind. A local firebrand named Anwar Beg objected to waiting for any such decision and began to talk of Jihad, on which shouts of Allah-ho-Akbar came from the crowd, and the speaker was made to stop by Ahmed Syed. The resolutions passed at the meeting were:

- (i) This meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi condemns the action of the Government of Delhi of prescribing the fatwa of Jamat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind by the police and views it as a great insult of Islam and the Ulemas

and expresses its deep indignation against it and requests the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind to call its meeting immediately and let them know what course they should follow.

(ii) This meeting congratulates Arif Hussain, M. Nisar Hussain of Cawnpore and other patriots, who are in jail, for the sake of their religion and country on their merits and prays God to enable them be firm in their intentions.

(iii) The copies of the resolutions passed to be sent to the newspapers for general information.

Source: Government of India, Home Department,  
Political, 1921, F.No. 137.



B I B L I O G R A P H Y

PRIMARY SOURCES:

1. Private Papers:

Mawlana Abdul Bari Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

Rajendra Prasad Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

2. Institutional Papers.

A. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind;

Minutes of the working committee Meetings, 1920-1947. (On microfilm).

Presidential Addresses, 1919-1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (on Microfilm).

B. All India Congress Committee Papers, 1920-1937, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

3. Official Records:

Nationalist Muslim Conference, Allahabad, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

Congress Muslim Conference, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

Muslim Mass Contact Movement, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

File No. D-7/1937-1938

File No. 12/1937.

File No. 13/1937.

File No. 16/1937  
File No. 30/1937.  
File No. 31/1937.  
File No. G-32/1938.  
File No. 41/1937-1938.  
File No. 42/1937-38.  
File No. 47/1938.  
File No. G-68/1937-38.  
File No. G-76/1937

Government of India, Home Department:

Home Pol, July 1918, F.Nos. 92-101.  
Home Pol, Deposit, 1919, F. No.4.  
Home Pol. A, 1919, F.Nos. 362-76.  
Home Pol, A, August 1919, F.No. 137.  
Home Pol, F. No.16/192.  
Home Pol, August 1919, F. Nos. 415-26.  
Home Pol, A, November 1920 F. Nos. 19-31.  
Home Pol, Deposit, 1921 F. No.4.  
Home Pol, 1921, F.No. 137.  
Home Pol, 1921 F. No. 137.  
Home Pol, 1921, F. No. 459.  
Home Pol, 1921, F.No. 45.  
Home Pol, 1922, F. No. 155.  
Home Pol, 1922, F. No. 114.  
Home Pol, 1922, F. No. 868.  
Home Pol, 1922, F. No.501.  
Home Pol, 1922, F. No.18.  
Home Pol, 1924, 6/ix.  
Home Pol, 1724, 6/ix.

Home Pol, 1924, F. No.249.

Home Pol, 1925, F. No.140.

Home Pol, (1), 1942; F.No. 3/92.

4. Government Reports:

- Confidential Reports on the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement in India, by Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India. ●

1921 Reminiscence, Published by the Government of India.

SECONDARY SOURCES:

1. Published Articles, Books and Journals:

A. English Sources:

- |                       |     |   |
|-----------------------|-----|---|
| Ahmad, Aziz           | ... | <u>Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan</u> , (Oxford, 1967).                    |
| _____                 | ... | <u>Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment</u> , (Oxford, 1964)        |
| Ali, Chaudhary Rahmat | ... | <u>Pakistan, the Fatherland of the Pak Nation</u> , 3rd edition, (Cambridge, 1946). |
| _____                 | ... | <u>No and Never</u> , (Cambridge, 1932).  |

A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume 4, (Pakistan Historical Society Publication, 1961).

- |                   |     |   |
|-------------------|-----|---|
| Ahmad, Jamiluddin | ... | <u>Some Recent speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah</u> , Volume I, (Lahore, 1960), Volume 2, (Lahore, 1964), edition 6. |
|-------------------|-----|---|

- Aziz, K.K. ... The Making of Pakistan, A Study in Nationalism. (London, 1967).
- Ambedkar, B.R. ... Pakistan or the Partition of India, (Bombay, 1946).
- Ansari, Dr. Shawkatullah... Pakistan - the Problem of India, (Lahore, 1944).
- Ashraf, K.M. ... A Political History of Indian Muslim (1857-1947) in Muslim India, edited by Zafar Alam, (Delhi, 1975).
- Azad, Mawlana Abul Kalam. ... India Wins Freedom (Calcutta, 1959).
- Bhagwan, Vishnoo ... Constitutional History of India, (New Delhi, 1972).
- Bomford, P.C. ... Histories of the Khilafat and non-cooperation Movements, reprint, (Delhi, 1975).
- Brown, J.M. ... Gandhi's Rise to Power, Indian Politics, 1915-1922, (Cambridge, 1972).
- Bolitho Hector ... Jinnah Creator of Pakistan, (London, 1954).
- Coupland, R. ... The Constitutional Problem in India, (Oxford University Press, 1945).
- Chandra, Bipin ... Freedom Struggle, (New Delhi, 1972).

- Dutta, R.P. ... India Today (Bombay, 1947).
- Farooqui, Ziaul Hasan ... Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay, 1963).
- Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh, Source Material, Six Volumes, Consolidated Index and Chronology, (Lucknow, 1961).
- Gauba, K.L. ... Famous Historical Trials, (Lahore, 1946).
- Gopal, Ram ... Indian Muslims, A Political History, 1858-1947, (Bombay 1959).
- Hamid, A. ... Muslim separatism in India, A Brief Survey, 1858-1947, (Oxford, 1978).
- Hardy, Peter ... The Muslims of British India, (Cambridge, 1972).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Partners in Freedom and True Muslims, The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India, 1912-1947 (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, 1971).
- Hasan, Mushirul ... Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, (New Delhi, 1979).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Communalism and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, edited, (Delhi, 1981).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Muslim and Congress, edited, (New Delhi, 1984).
- Haq, Mushirul ... Muslim Politics in Modern India, (Meerut, 1970).

- Ikram, S.M. ... Modern Muslim in India and the Birth of Pakistan, 1858-1951, 2nd edition, (Lahore, 1965).
- Iqbal, Muhammad ... Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, compiled by Shamloo, (Al-Manar Academy, Lahore, 1948).
- Jinnah, Muhammad Ali ... Some Recent Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 Volumes, collected and edited by Jamil-uddin Ahmad (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1952).
- Kabir, Humayun ... Muslim Politics, 1906-1942, 2nd edition (Calcutta, 1944).
- Kaura, Uma ... Muslims and Indian Nationalism, The Emergence of the Demand for Pakistan, 1928-1940, (Delhi, 1977).
- Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhary ... Pathway to Pakistan, (Pakistan, 1961).
- Khan, Naimullah ... Political Ideas and rise of Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi, (unpublished thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, 1981).
- Levan, Spencer ... The Ahmadiya Movement , A History and Perspective, (Delhi, 1974).
- Latif, S. Abdul ... The Muslim Problem in India, (Bombay, 1939).
- Madani, Husain Ahmad ... An Open letter to the Muslim League (Lahore, 1946).
- Macortney, C.A. ... National States and National Minorities, (Oxford 1934).

- Malik, Hafiz ... Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan, (Washington, D.C., 1963).
- Mehta, Ashoka and Achyut Patwardhan ... The Communal Triangle in India, (Allahabad, 1942).
- Majumdar, R.C. ... History of the Freedom Movement, (Calcutta, 1962).
- Mehrotra, S.R. ... Towards India's Freedom and Partition, New Delhi, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... The Congress and the Partition of India, in the Partition of India Policies and Perspective, 1935-1947, edited by C.H. Philips and Wainwright, (London, 1970).
- Minault, Gail ... The Khilafat Movement, Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, (Oxford Press, Delhi, 1982).
- Muhammad, Shan ... Freedom Movement in India - the role of Ali Brothers, (Delhi, 1979).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Indian Muslim, edited, (Meerut, 1983).
- Mathura, Y.B. ... Quit India Movement, (Delhi, 1979).
- Neimeijer, A.C. ... The Khilafat Movement in India (Hague, 1972).
- Noman, Muhammad ... Muslim India, Rise and Growth of the All-India Muslim League, (Allahabad, 1942).
- Nanda, B.R. ... Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-1947, the Partition

- of India - Policies and Perspective  
1935-1947, edited by C.H.Philips  
and M.O.Wainwright (London,1970).
- Prasad, Rajendra ... India Divided (Bombay, 1946).
- Partition of India, ---- Policies and Perspective, 1935-  
1947, edited by C.H. Philips and M.O. Wainwright,  
(London, 1970).
- Pal, Jai Ji, ... Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan  
(a Published thesis submitted to  
Meerut University, 1980).
- Qureshi, Ishtiaque ... Ulema in Politics, (Karachi,1972).  
Husain
- \_\_\_\_\_, ... The Foundation of Pakistan Culture,  
in the Muslim World, xiv/I  
(January, 1954).
- Robinson, Francis ... Separatism Among Indian Muslims:  
The Politics of the United Provinces  
1860-1923, (Delhi, 1975).
- Riaz, Syed Muhammad ... The Khilafat Movement (unpublished  
Ph.D.Thesis, Aligarh Muslim  
University, 1973).
- Roy, Sir Bijoy ... Parliamentary Government in India,  
Prasad Singh (Calcutta, 1943).
- Shakir, Moin ... Khilafat to Partition (New Delhi,  
1970).
- Syed**, Khalid B. ... Pakistan - The Formative Phase,  
1858-1948 (London, 1960).
- Smith, W.C. ... Modern Islam in India, (London,1946).
- Saiyid, Matlubul Hasan... Muhammad Ali Jinnah, A Political  
Study (London, 1953).

- Tara Chand ... History of the Freedom Movement in India, Volumes 2,4 (Delhi, 1970).
- Zaidi, Z.H. ... Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947, the Partition of India - Policies and Perspective, 1935-1947 ed. by C.H.Philips and M.O.Wainwright (London, 1970).
- Zaidi, A.M. ... Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India (New Delhi, 1979).

B. URDU SOURCE:

- Ahmad, Sayyid Tufail ... Musalmano Ka Roshan Mustaqbil, (Delhi, 1945).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Ruh-i-Roshan Mustaqbil, (Badaun, 1946).
- Ali, Rahman ... Tazkira Ulema-i-Hind, ed. and translated from Persian into Urdu by Muhammad Ayyub Qadiri, (Karachi, 1961).
- Azad, Abul Kalam ... Khatbah-i-Sadarat to Lahore Session, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, 1921, (Hindustan Printing Works, Delhi).
- Abbasi, Qazi Adeel ... Tahrik-i-Khilafat, (Taraqqi Urdu Board, (New Delhi, 1978).
- Asasi Osul-o-Aghaz-o-Maqasid-o-Zawabit-e-Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i Hind, Makhtasar Halat Inaqad, 1919).
- Al-Qasim, a monthly Journal, Volume I, (Deoband, n.d.).

- Ajmeri, Allama  
Shah Muinuddin ... Khutba-e-Sadarat, Ninth Session  
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Amroha,  
1930 (Delhi, n.d.).
- Badauni, Abdul Majid ... Dars-i-Khilafat, 5th Edition,  
(Meerut, 1920).
- Bashir, Ahmad ... Tahrik-e-Mavalat, (Deoband, 1920).
- Bari, Mawlana Abdul ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat, First Session  
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind,  
28th December 1919, Amritsar,  
(Al-Jamiat Book Depot, Delhi, 1919).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat to the Anjuman-  
e-Ulema, Bengal, Chittagong,  
(Al-Nizamiah, Lucknow, December  
1918-1919).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat to the Anjuman-  
e-Ulema, U.P., Kanpur, 11th April,  
1920, (Al-Nizamiah, Lucknow, 1920.
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Speech delivered on 5th October,  
1920, Jamiat meeting, Lucknow,  
(Al-Nizamiah, Lucknow, 1920).
- Gilani, Manazir Ahsan ... Sawanih-i-Qasim, 3 volumes  
(Deoband, 1953).
- Husain, Sayyid Asghar ... Hiyat-e-Shaikh-ul-Hind, (Matba  
Qasimi, Deoband, 1920).
- Illahi, Ashiq ... Tazkirat-ul-Rashid, 2 volumes  
(Volume I, Meerit, 1908).
- Ikram, Shaikh  
Mohammad ... Mawj-i-Kawthar, 2nd edition,  
(Firoz Sons, Karachi, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Rud-i-Kauthar (Taj Afis, Bandar  
Road, Karachi, n.d.).
- Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, (Majlis-i-Amilah), Tajawiz,  
July 1946 - September 1946 (Delhi, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_, ( \_\_\_\_\_ ), Tajawiz, March 1947 (Delhi, n.d.)

\_\_\_\_\_, ( \_\_\_\_\_ ), Tanqid Wa Tabsirah, (on the Nehru report), Muradabad (Delhi, 1928).

\_\_\_\_\_, (Second session : Delhi) Tajawiz, November, 1920 (Delhi, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_, (Fourteenth Session : Saharanpur), Mukhtasar Report, May 1945, (Delhi, n.d.)

Madani, Husain Ahmad ... Naqsh-i-Hiyat, 2 Volumes, (Deoband, I, 1953, II, 1954).

\_\_\_\_\_, Jawaz-i-Shirkat-i-Congress aur Azlal-e-Shukook, Yani Majmua Fatwa va Irshadat, (Delhi, Jamiat, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Shariat Bill aur League, (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, Delhi, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Hamara Hindustan aur Uske Fuzail, (Delhi, 1941).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Muttahida Qaumiyyat aur Islam, (Delhi, 1938).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Sivil Marriage aur League, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, (Delhi, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Muslim League Kiya Hai, (Delhi, 1945).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Pakistan Kiya Hai, Part - I, II (Delhi, n.d.).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Muslim League Ki Ath Muslim Kush Siyasi Ghaltiyan, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, (Delhi, 1945).

\_\_\_\_\_ ... Mistar Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Moamma aur Uska Hal, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, (Delhi, n.d.).

- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Nazriah-i-Qaumiya, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Sahib wa Allama Iqbal, ed. by Talut (Dera Ghazi Khan, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Millat aur Qaum, Mawlana Husain Madani aur Allama Iqbal Ki Baths (Multan, 1938).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Safarnama-i-Shaikh-ul-Hind, Asir-i-Mulla, (Delhi, reprint, 1947).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Makatib-i-Shaikh-ul-Islam, compiled by Sayyid Farid al-Wahidi, (Qaumi Kitabghar, Deoband, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Maktubat-i-Shaikhul-Islam compiled by Najmuddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif Azamgarh, 1952).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Khutbah-i-Sadarat, Fifth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, coconada, 1923, (Delhi, 1923).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat, Thirteenth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Lahore, 1942, (Delhi, 1942).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat, Fourteenth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Saharanpur, 1945, (Delhi, 1945).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat, Fifteenth Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Bombay, 1945 (Delhi, 1948).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Congress, Muslim League aur Jamiat-ul-Ulema Ki Siyasi Position, (Lucknow, 1945).
- Mawdoodi, Abu Ala ... Masl-e-Qaumiya, (Markazi Maktaba, Islami, Delhi, n.d.).

- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Tahrik-i-Azad-i-Hind aur Musalman,  
(Lahore, 1964).
- Mian, Muhammad ... Ulema-i-Haq, 2 Volumes, (Kutubkhan-i-  
Fakhriya, Muradabad, 1946; II, Delhi,  
1948).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hai, 3 parts,  
I, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, U.P. Publication  
Division, n.d. II and III, Jamiat-ul-  
Ulema-i-Hind, (Delhi, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , ... Kashf-al-Ghawayah 'an al-Waqiah, Yani  
Mawlana Muhammad Shafi Ki Visalah  
Congress aur Muslim League Ka Shari  
Haisiyat par Tabsirah, (Delhi, 1946).  
Musalman aur Siwil Nafarmani Ke Mutallia  
Shari Fatwa (Lucknow, n.d.).
- Muttafiqa Fatwa Ulema-i-Hind, Supporting the Non-Cooperation  
Movement (Meerut, 1926).
- Nanautavi, Muhammad... Savanih Umri, (Bhawalpur, 1897).  
Yaqub
- Rehman, Azizur ... Mashayakh-i-Deoband Ki Do Sad Sala  
Tarikhi Tasavvuf, Yani Tazkirah  
Mashyakh-i-Deoband, (Bijnor, 1958).
- Rehman, Mawlana ... Muttahida Qaumiya aur Islam, Burhan,  
Abdur iii/4, (October, 1939).
- Rahman, Mawlana ... Pakistan per Ek Nazar (Delhi, 1946).  
Hifzur
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Muttahida Qaumiya aur Islam, Burhan,  
iii/5, (November, 1939).

- Rauf, Mawlvi, Abdul ... Khutbah-e-Sadarat, Jamiat, 4th Session, 1923, (Delhi, n.d.).
- Shafi, Muhammad ... Congress aur Muslim League Ke Mutalliq Shari Faisala (Deoband, 2nd edition, 1945).
- Sarwar, Muhammad ... Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi, (Sindh Sagar Akademi, Lahore, n.d.).
- Tayyib, Mawlana Muhammad ... Azad-i-Hindustan Ka Khamosh Rahnuma, Darul Uloom Deoband (Deoband, 1957).
- Thanvi, Muhammad Ashraf ... Ifadat-i-Ashrafiya dar Masail-i-Siyasiya, edited by Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Deoband, 2nd edition, 1945).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Muttafiqa Fatwa, (Delhi, 1930).
- Usmani, Shabbir Ahmad ... Hamara Pakistan, (Hashmi Book Depo, Lahore, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Hamara Islam, (Kutub Khanah-i-Azizia, Deoband, n.d.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Khutbah-i-Sadarat, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, (Lahore, 1946).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Makalamat -us-Sadrain, (Lahore, 1945).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Paigham Banam Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, (Lahore, 1945).
- \_\_\_\_\_ ... Khutbah-i-Sadarat, Muslim League Conference, (Meerut, 1945).
- Wasif, Hafeezur Rahman, ... Jamiat-ul-Ulema Per-Ek Tarikhi Tafsirah.

Yamin, Sir Muhammad ... Namah-i-Amal, (Lahore, 1970).

2. Weeklies/Bi-weeklies and Dailies:

The Al-Jamiat, 1937-1942.

The Bombay Chronicles, 1921-1945.

The Hindustan Times, 1936-1942.

The Indian Daily Mail, 1928.

The Independent, 1921.

The Leader, 1923-1927.

The Md ina, 1921-1947.

The Pioneer, 1921.

The Statesman, 1936-1937.

The Surya, 1927.

The Times of India, 1936-1938.