

**INDIAN MUSLIMS
AND
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE**



1876 - 1924

ABSTRACT

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

**West Asian Studies
(HISTORY)**

BY


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A B S T R A C T

India's isolation from European and West Asian regions was broken towards the end of the fifteenth century by the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route and the appearance of the Portuguese in the Eastern Seas as well as the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517 and the founding of Safavid Empire in Persia and the Mughal Empire in India.

In order to arrive at a more precise understanding of the Indian Muslims' relations with the Ottoman Empire, one has to look at the political map of Western and Central Asia during the Medieval as well as Modern period. The political and diplomatic relations between the Indian rulers and the Ottoman Empire were very friendly over the last five hundred years. The Bahmanids were the first Indian rulers to establish diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans. Later on they were followed by the Muslim rulers of Gujrat followed by Mughal rulers of India, Nizam of Hyderabad, Tipu Sultan of Mysore and Nawab of Arcot (Madras). Even during the British occupation of India there were bilateral exchanges of diplomatic missions between India and the Ottoman Empire.

In the present work efforts have been made to examine the various levels of relations between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire during 18th and 19th and

the first quarter of the present century. I have tried to investigate the basic objectives of such relations, and efforts have also been made to analyse the impact of these relationships.

This work has been divided into seven chapters. Firstly, I have discussed the diplomatic attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the Indian rulers especially the Muslim rulers. The relations between both the countries varied from ruler to ruler and from time to time. As for instance Bahmanid Kings Muhammad Shah (1463-82) and Mahmud Shah (1482-1518) and the Ottoman Sultan Muhammad II (1451-81) and Bayezid II (1481-1512) had exchanged between themselves letters and royal embassies. The Mughal ruler Akbar found that his throne was insecure like his father Humayun, so he started by going farther in positive friendliness towards the Ottomans. He had written a letter to Sulaiman the Magnificent, and addressed the Ottoman Sultans as the Khalifas on the earth. But as Akbar's power grew he developed an anti-Ottoman stance. Declining to recognise the Sultan as the Caliph he put forward his own claim to the title. He never regarded the Ottoman Sultans as the sole champions of the Islamic world. Jahangir followed the same policy and subsequent Mughal rulers Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and Muhammad Shah - exchanged their letters and embassies with the Ottoman Sultans. These relations were followed by Tipu Sultan of Mysore and Nizam of

Hyderabad. Both the rulers had sent their embassies to Constantionple and got positive responses from the Ottoman Sultans.

In the Second Chapter emphasis has been made to analyse the concept of the caliphate in the conciousness of Indian Muslim. As we know that caliph means the successor of the Prophet who rules over the entire Muslim territories. The Muslim advent in North-West India almost coincided with the crystalization of this concept of the Caliphate. Mahmud of Ghazna submitted himself in enlightened self interest to the spiritual sway of the Abbasid Caliphate in the eleventh century. The coins of Muhammad Bin Sam, the founder of Muslim Empire in India, bear the name of the Khalifa. More than that he bequeathed this to the Ghaznavids Sultan at Lahore and the Turkish Sultans at Delhi. Alauddin Khalji (1296-1316) and most of his successors until Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-1451) reconciled themselves to an abstract concept of Universal Muslim Caliphate with a hypothetical Caliph.

The Timurids even before Babur, believed in the theory that each emperor was also the Caliph of his own dominion. Akbar seemed to have ignored the Ottoman Caliphate. It may have been perhaps due to the fact that they (Mughals) regarded the Ottoman Sultan as their inferior, recalling the historical fact of Timur subduing

the Ottoman Empire in 1402. The Muslim subjects recognised the Ottoman Sultan as their rightful caliph and those Indian Muslims who visited Mecca must have said their prayer and performed their pilgrimage under the Turkish sovereigns. The Mughal rulers who dealt on equal terms with the Ottoman Sultan continued until the reign of Shah Alam II (1750) to qualify themselves with the title of Khalifa. The existence of the Ottoman Caliphate became an issue of religious concern for the Indian Muslims and assumed overgrowing proportions during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) was a great Muslim thinker of India in the eighteenth century. He believed strongly in the necessity of a Universal Caliph. Now the Muslims of India all along recognized the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph. The religious and temporal authority of the Ottoman caliph was interestingly enough, first invoked in India by the British when Lord Wellesly forwarded a letter from Ottoman Sultan Selim III to an Indian Sovereign Tipu Sultan of Mysore. The former had asked him to mend his relations with the British and make friendship with them. The second intervention by the caliph in India on behalf of the British was made during the upheaval of 1857. They made use of this power of the Ottoman Sultan for their own purposes. The change of British policy regarding this had begun to develop tension in Indian Muslim politics between those who were loyal to the British and those who were the

followers of Pan-Islamism. But in the second half of the nineteenth century Sultan Abdul Aziz's claim to be the Universal Caliph of Islam was generally accepted by the middle class Indian Muslim intellegentsia.

The third chapter examines the consequences of the imperial aggression against Turkey and responses of the Indian Muslims. The Russian Revolution of 1905 and its impact on the National Liberation Movement in Asia had far reaching consequences. Imperialist forces adopted all the possible means to suppress the revolutionary wave. The Indian Nationalists in particular and Nationalists of other countries in general were victims of this situation. Quick awareness could be felt among the Asian people and they realized the main objectives of Imperialist powers. The appeal of Pan-Islamic ideas was not accidental. The Muslims had suffered very severely from the onslaught of British imperialism. A large number of agents from various Muslim states frequently met at Constantinople in the 1870s and secretly discussed questions concerning their mutual interests. Now Pan-Islamic idea was taking a concrete shape. It seemed to Muslims that as their caliph would lead them in forging a strong united front against the relentless onslaughts of the West. Shaikhul Hind Mawlana Mahmudul Hasan of Deoband tried his best to give a practical shape to Pan-Islamic ideas on the political level at the beginning of the twentieth century. He prepared a secret scheme of

driving out the English. Apart from other achievements Pan-Islamic ideas became a powerful stimulus after World War I contributing decisively to the anti imperialist Khilafat Movement.

The Fourth Chapter deals with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's influence on Indian Muslims. The great Pan-Islamic thinker of the time Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani belonged to the group of Ulama who felt that Western onslaught should be met on the basis of Islamic unity. He continued to be a source of inspiration for the Muslim intellectuals of the entire Islamic world. We see that both the nationalist and modernist Muslim thinkers and political leaders were influenced by his thoughts and ideas. As a political figure, his reputation had already been established when he visited India in 1868. He was well armed by Indian officials but the Government did not allow him to meet the 'Ulama'.

The impact of al-Afghani's appeal was felt generally in the first decade of the twentieth century when he became a symbol of Islamic movement. Among the associates of Sayyid Ahmad Khan who came under the influence of al-Afghani were Mawlana Shibli Numani and Mawlana Altaf Husayn Hali. Al Afghani left a strong influence on the minds of Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad and Muhammad Iqbal. Apart from Calcutta and Hyderabad he also visited several cities

in north west India where he made several disciples. However, the teachings of al-Afghani had little influence on the direction which Muslim politics in India followed in later years.

The Fifth Chapter throws light on the development of Pan-Islamic Movement in India and its convergence with Indian Nationalism. The Indian Muslims came closer to the Pan-Islamic Movement due to the rising national and international political development. As a matter of fact the nineteenth century marked the zenith of British Imperialism in India. The Indo-Turkish press contributed a lot in promoting national spirit and Pan-Islamic feeling in the entire Muslim World. After 1880 there was a tendency to activate Pan-Islamic sentiments for political purposes. The spirit of Pan-Islamism was a political manifestation of the idea of Universal brotherhood. During the first phase it provided the meeting place between India and the Ottoman Empire. Although it was a religious sentiment of Islamic brotherhood which promoted the Muslims of India to participate in the Pan-Islamic Movement, it is significant that it was the anti-Imperialist and anti-Western in its orientation. The Pan-Islamic consciousness got its multi-religious colour with the passage of time. In India not only the Muslims but the Hindus too came forward and they supported the Ottomans in their struggle against the Europeans in all possible ways and means. It was a wise

step by Muslim Intellegentsia that the political colour was given to this issue. The Pan-Islamic movement was based on the sense of fraternity among the Muslims of the world. It had a tremendous affect on the political thinking of Indian Muslims and caused a definite change in their attitude towards the British rule. The British attitude to events which involved the Ottoman Empire also awakened them to the sinister motives of British imperialism. This awakening brought them into the mainstream of India's freedom movement and enabled them to identify themselves with the aspirations of their non-Muslim compatriots. The Pan-Islamic outlook and the emergence of Asian consciousness together shaped the sentiment of solidarity with the Ottoman Empire in the two major communities of India. Al-Afghani advocated inter-communal unity and defied any breach in the anti British front. He made not only an appeal to universal Islamic spirit but also emphasized the affinity between Hindus and Muslims for a common interest.

In the Sixth Chapter I have studied the subject in relation to World War I and the Indian Muslims. The impact of Pan-Islamic Movement on Indian Muslims was at its height before the outbreak of the World War I due to the involvement of Turkey. The Indian Muslims were very much excited over the trouble that had befallen the Muslim World. They were aggrieved and the Turko-Italian War greatly disturbed them. As soon as the news of Italian invasion of

Tripoli came to notice, a wave of unrest arose among the Muslim masses of India. The feelings of Muslims of India ran very high against the British at the beginning of the Balkan Wars. They were anxious about the outcome of the Balkan Wars. They conceived Machiavellian trails in British diplomacy and were led to think that the British were insincere as far as their friendship is concerned. They began to think that the Europeans were determined to destroy the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate also. The dismemberment of Turkey and the fate of Muslim states and the treatment meted out to them by Europe made the deepest and most painful impression on every mind. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru "the Balkan Wars, roused an astonishing wave of sympathy among the Muslims of India and all Indians felt that anxiety and sympathy". The Balkan State's Wars against Turkey was given religious colour. The Muslims considered it a religious war between Islam and Christianity. Mawlana Muhammad Ali propounded that the defeat of Turkey was not the defeat of Turkey alone but in real sense it was the defeat of Islam and what Islam expected from its co-religionists was the united action against the British at this critical juncture.

The consequences of World War I had disastrous effect, and Turkey was forced to sign a treaty on 10 August, 1920 known as the Treaty of Sevres. The harsh terms of the Treaty and consequent injustice, deepened alarm and

indignation in India. The Khilafat Movement in India gained momentum and strongly protested against the injustice of this Treaty which was forcibly imposed on Turkey. Which at that time was the leading Muslim power in the world.

The last Chapter examines the impact of Turkey's War of Independence on the Khilafat Movement of India. In this Chapter efforts have been made to show how Pan-Islamic and pro-claiph movements became anti-British in India. The outbreak and consequences of World War I sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire and it became very clear that this War had brought the Ottoman Empire on the verge of destruction. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I was sealed in the Mudros Armistice signed on 30 October, 1918. Mustafa Kemal and his associates were convinced that if Turkey wanted to exist and find a respectable place among the civilized nations of the world she must forget the dream of reviving the Empire. Mustafa Kemal started a War of Independence for Turkey. He launched a resistance movement against the Allied forces After sometimes it developed besides into a civil war. The decision taken by the Turks to defy the Western powers left a very deep impression on the Indian freedom fighters. At that time Indian intellegentsia took keen interest in the developments that were taking place in the Ottoman Empire. They derived inspiration from the content of Turkish liberation movement. In this way Mustafa Kemal had a direct bearing on the Indian

Freedom Movement. From the very beginning the Indian Freedom Movement followed anti-British Nationalist Movements in the rest of the Asian countries. The conservative Muslims of India had also developed anti-British sense. Turkey's War of Independence almost coincided with the phase of non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement in India, in other words we may call this phase a phase of Hindu Muslim unity. In fact the Khilafat Movement represented the reaction of Indian Muslims to consequences of the War which affected Turkey. The Khilafat Movement arose when it became quite clear that the British was not inclined to keep its promise as to the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the position of the caliph. However with the success of the War of Independence if Turkey and the abolition of the caliphate. The Khilafat Movement lost its main goal.

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Dated: 11.04.1991

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis on **Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1924** submitted by Mr. Shamshad Ali under my supervision is his own original contribution and suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Ph.D.

Further certified that Mr. Shamshad Ali has been engaged in full-time research and that he has put in required attendance as prescribed by the University.

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PREFACE

The Ottoman empire and India, especially Indian rulers had friendly relations with each other for last five hundred years. The present study discusses the relations between these two as well as the attitude of Indian Muslims towards the Ottomans, especially during eighteenth, nineteenth and first quarter of the present century. Efforts have been made in this regard to analyse the impact of such relations on both the countries.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter deals with the diplomatic attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the Indian rulers. The second chapter examines the concept of the caliphate in the consciousness of Indian Muslims. In the third chapter I have tried to analyse the consequences of the imperial aggression against Turkey and Indian Muslims. In the fourth chapter I have discussed Jamal-ud-Din al-Afghani's influence on Indian Muslims. The fifth chapter throws light on the developments of Pan-Islamic movement in India and its convergence with Indian nationalism. In the sixth chapter I have studied the subject in terms of the World War-I and Indian Muslims. The last chapter deals with Turkey's war of Independence and the Khilafat movement in India. In this, effort has been made to show how Pan-Islamic and pro-

Caliph movement became anti-British in India. The present work tries to measure the depth of Pan-Islamic sentiments among the Indian Muslims and the nature and degree of their attachment to the Caliphal cause.

Besides original and secondary source materials I have fully utilized the archival material which I have been able to find out including the political and confidential records of Government of India which consist of four sections i.e. letters of the rulers of both the countries, diaries of emissaries, summaries and extracts of newspapers as well as articles and the reports of various government officials.. The documents of Foreign, Home and Political Departments of India which I have been able to utilize in this work are in the custody of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, Andhra Pradesh State Archives Hyderabad and Calcutta National Library. Besides these, however, I have also consulted some important publications which deserve special mention: Mansha'at-i Salatin, Karnama-e Haydari, Dastur ul Insha' al Ahkam al-Sultaniya' Maslai Khilafat, Calenders of Document on Indo-Persian Relations, All About the Khilafat, Khilafat and England, Studies in the Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, The Indian Mussalmans, The Eastern Question, The Rise and Growth of Congress in India-1832-1920, The Caliphate, Jamal al Din Afghani, : A Political Biography, Development of Secularism

in Turkey. The Indian Muslims and World War I, and a number of other secondary source have also been used in this work critically. They have been mentioned in the bibliography, and references would indicate my indebtedness to various writers and editors. In the collection and the study of the materials grateful thanks are due to the staff of library of the Centre of West Asian Studies and Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., Aligarh, Khuda Buksh Library, Patna, National Library, Haji Abdullah Library Calcutta, National Archives of India, New Delhi, A.P. State Archives Hyderabad, Sapru House Library, New Delhi.

Shamshad Ali
(SHAMSHAD ALI)

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

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I do not know how to thank my parents, father Mr. Abdul Mojeeb, uncle Mr. Ahmadullah, brothers Dr. Ghazanfar Ali, Nasimul Haq, Dr. Khursheed Ahmad and Dr. Naseem Alam for their constant help and encouragement. I am also thankful to Mr. Shaheer Ahmad, Mr. Irfan Ahmad, Mr. Ozair Ansari, Mr. Junaid Zia, Mr. M. Abdullah and Mr. M. Tauseef (Cartographer) for their cooperation and help.

ABBREVIATIONS

AR	:	Asiatic Review
APSA	:	Andhra Pradesh State Archives
CUP	:	Committee for Union and Progress
FD	:	Foreign Department
GNA	:	Grand National Assembly
HD	:	Home Department
IIS	:	Institute of Islamic Studies
IC	:	Islamic Culture
IQ	:	Islamic Quarterly
IJMES	:	International Journal of Middle East Studies.
JIH	:	Journal of Indian History
JMH	:	Journal Modern History
JRAS	:	Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
MW	:	Muslim World
PQ	:	Pakistan Quarterly

NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTIONS
AND
PRONUNCIATION

Transcriptions of Ottoman Turkish names, place-names and titles of officials are as follows: 'Pasha' for 'Pasa', 'Ghazi' for 'Gazi', 'Wizir' for 'Vezir', 'Murad' for 'Murat', 'Muhammad' for 'Mehmet' etc.

Those who are unfamiliar with the Turkish alphabate may be assisted by the following guide to pronunciation of certain letters.

Letter	English Pronunciation
C	as English <u>j</u> in 'July'
Ç	as English <u>ch</u> in 'Chair'
Ġ	soft <u>ğ</u> , has no english equivalent. It is pronounced almost as <u>y</u> in 'Yet' and sometimes as <u>aga a-a</u> like the <u>a</u> in 'serial'.
I	as english <u>ir</u> in 'fir'
Ö	as French <u>eu</u> in 'deux'
Ş	as English <u>sh</u> in 'shut', 'ship'
Ü	as French <u>ü</u> in 'tu'

INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman Turks appeared for the first time in Asia Minor as a frontier tribe on the Western confines of the Seljuk Sultanate in the middle of the thirteenth century. Frequent invasions of Mongols had weakened the power and glory of the Seljuk Sultans. With the rise of the Ottomans the small principalities began to fall under their feet. By the fourteenth century the Ottomans had established themselves at strategic points in the region. This was followed by the conquest of Constantinople by them in 1453. By 1473 the whole of Asia Minor was firmly under the Ottoman rule. Under the able leadership of Muhammad the Conqueror (1451-1481) the Ottoman Turks pushed their conquest further into Europe and Asia. They established their supremacy in Anatolia as well as in the Balkans. After that the Turks marched towards the norther shores of the Black Sea which was brought under the control of Turks and Black Sea became a "Turkish Lake". Meanwhile India's isolation from Europe and the West Asian region had broken during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. With the discovery of the "Cape of Good Hope" route in 1498 and the appearance of the Portuguese in the Eastern Seas, the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1516-17, the founding of the Safavid Empire in Persia and the Mughal Empire in India, active political economic and cultural

contacts began to be established between Indian and the European peoples. Apart from the territorial expansion assumption of Caliphate was another achievement of the Ottoman Empire. Further task of expansion and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire was completed during the reign of Sultan Salim.¹ Sultan Salim was the first Turkish Sultan who turned his attention towards the East. The Turks conquered Northern Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria and Arabia. The most important and significant among the above mentioned conquests was the conquest of Egypt because it ended the Abbasid Caliphate. After Salim I the Turkish throne was occupied by Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1520. It was during the reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent that Ottoman Empire reached its climax both in foreign and in domestic affairs. The Ottoman Empire had been spread up to three continents in the reign of Sulaiman and political power of the Turks had grown far and wide. His reign also inaugurated a new era in the Ottoman relations with France. Turkey and France came closer due to the threat of Central European power of Austria. During the whole of this formative period the foreign policy of the Sultan was motivated mainly by three aims: (a) to extend the Ottoman power in the west and finally defeat and destroy the European coalition against

1. J.A.R, Mariott, The Eastern Question, Oxford, 1918, p. 36.

them, (b) to control all the trade routes of the East to West, and (c) to become undisputed leaders of their co-religionists by receiving his Caliphate from the Abbasids.²

The Ottoman Empire was one of the most important 'Key' states of Europe and Asia. The strategic, commercial and political importance of this country had been significant in international affairs. A glance at the map of the world discloses the fact that it separates and at the same time it connects Europe, Asia and Africa. The Ottoman Empire achieved a commanding position merely because of the restricted channel of water which unite and separate the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea.³

All the three monotheistic religions Christianity, Judaism and Islam were given official recognition by the Ottoman state and it was the only political organisation during the whole medieval and modern periods. In this way the Turks established the strongest Muslim Empire popularly known as the Ottoman Empire and they produced ten brilliant and great Sultans, who ruled in 14th 15th and 16th centuries over a vast stretch of land.⁴ From 16th to 18th centuries

2. M.H. Rehman, Turkish Foreign Policy, Allahabad, 1945, p. 37

3. Ibid.

4. Kamal H. Karpat, The Ottoman State and Its Place in the World.

the Ottoman Empire was not only the centre of power of Muslim countries but it was also the most powerful empire of the east. The Indian sub-continent during this period was although overwhelmingly non-Muslim but larger part of its territory was being ruled by the Muslim rulers. The Turks ruled the whole of the Muslim world, either directly or through allegiances and deputations. The Indian sub-continent somehow remained untouched from their direct control. Most of the Indian Muslim rulers especially enjoyed independence and they did not recognise the Ottoman Sultans as the Caliphs of Islam.⁵ Not only the Mughal rulers but Indian Muslims also ignored the Ottoman Caliphate during the Mughal period for more than three centuries.

The Bahmanid Kingdom in the Deccan as well as the regional Sultanate of Gujarat, successor states of the Delhi Sultanate in the 15th and 16th centuries bordered the Arabian sea and through merchants, travellers and pilgrims from Hijaz remained in touch with the news of the major happenings in the Muslim world.

The proper understanding of the Indo-Ottoman relations requires a study of wider Asiatic environment. In diplomatic background not only of the Indian Mughals and the

5. There was no Khilafat question for three hundred years from Akbar to Shah Alam II and Mughal Emperor was equated with the Khalifa, Yusuf Husain, Indian and Contemporary Islam, p. 450.

Ottomans but also of the contemporary neighbouring powers, the Persians, the Uzbeks, the Ilkhans of Khorasan and others be kept in mind. The beginning of the sixteenth century constituted a landmark in Islamic as well as world history. The Ottomans, the Uzbeks and the Mughals were having a common Turko-Mongol heritage and were almost co-extensive with the entire Dar al-Islam (Abode of peace) except some outlying areas down to the end of the eighteenth century. All of these powers, the Ottomans the Uzbeks and the Mughals were orthodox Sunnis while the Safavids were Shi'ites. While politics overborne religious differences at times, the latter came to the surface whenever political necessity passed away. The Uzbeks were hostile to Persia, friendly to the Ottomans and ever watchful of the Mughals. They also played an important role in shaping the balance of power.

One of the causes why the Muslim rulers of India were keen to establish relations with the Ottomans was Islam which they shared in common. It was only natural for them to express their religious ties with the latter particularly in view of the fact that Ottomans were regarded as the leaders of the Muslim world. Besides, the Muslim rulers sought to affirm legitimacy to rule over the Muslims through Ottoman sanction. With the establishment of the Bahmanid Kingdom in Southern India in the fourteenth century, for the first time the isolation in which India had stood so far was broken and active political, economic

and cultural contacts were established. The Bahmanids were the first in the Indian sub-continent to exchange embassies with the Ottomans.⁶ Gujarat's contact with the Muslim world abroad was a reaction to the Portuguese challenge in the Indian Ocean. It was a common menace to the commercial and navigation interests of the Mamluks of Egypt and the Sultans of Gujarat in the first decade of the sixteenth century. Malik Ayaz, originally a Russian renegade, culturally a Turk who was sold in captivity to Sultan Mahmud Begra, but due to his ability as a general and his generosity and foresightedness as a courtier, he rose to be one of the foremost administrators of Gujarat. He was the first Indian to realize the significance of the Ottoman Sultan Salim I's (1512-20) occupation of Mamulak Egypt and the Hijaz.

Like Gujarat, Mysore also sought friendly ties with Turkey. The ruler of Mysore Tipu Sultan sent an ambassador in the court of the Ottoman Sultan Abd al Hamid I in 1785 to obtain an investiture of confirmation for himself as the ruler of Mysore.⁷ Earlier Tipu Sultan tried to get recognition from Mughal courts which was thwarted by the

 6. Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London, 1964, p. 48.

7. Hikmaty Bayur, Maysore Sultani Tipu ile Osmanli, Padsahlarindani Abdul Hamid ve iii Selim arasindaki Mektuplasma, Belletn, XLVII (1948), pp. 619-54; Mahmud Hussain, A History of the Freedom Movement, Karachi, 1957, Vol. I, p. 451.

agents of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Then he turned towards the Ottoman Sultan and he received the same.⁸ Actually Tipu Sultan's mission was also meant to forge closer commercial ties with the Ottomans, to obtain the services of Turkish technicians, and to seek an alliance against the British East India Company. Although he received the Ottoman Caliphate's investiture, he was not successful in other matters. In fact, Tipu Sultan's correspondence with the Ottoman's was parallel to his efforts to make an anti-British alliance with Napoleon. The Ottoman Sultan Salim III was hard pressed by his enemies in Europe and Egypt in 1798 and he was bound to maintain good relations with British Government. Under the pressure of British Government he sent a letter to Tipu Sultan through the British governor general of India, Lord Wellesley, in which Tipu had been advised to maintain cordial relations with British Government and he was also advised to break his relations with the French, who were well wishers. Tipu Sultan refused to obey the orders of Turkish Sultan saying that since the British were the aggressors in his territory, his jihad could only be against them.⁹ Then the Turkish Sultan turned his attention towards the Nizam of Hyderabad

 8. I.H. Qureshi, Muslims in India, Delhi, 1985, p. 38

9. Mahmud Husain, op.cit., 48-9.

and he succeeded in his efforts. Several diplomatic exchanges took place between the Ottoman Empire and the Hyderabad state. Later on this tradition was followed by the Nawab of Arcot. They were also in the good book of Turkish rulers. Even during the British occupation of India, there were bilateral exchanges of diplomatic missions between India and the Ottoman Empire.

Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, remained one of the chief and attractive commercial and cultural centre for over one thousand years. The Turks were very farsighted people and they encouraged the settlements of foreign colonies to build their trade and commerce and thus it became a cosmopolitan city and an international port. Turkey had key position in the commercial world as the cross roads of Asia and Europe enabled it to profit enormously by the trade following from Russia, Iran, Iraq and India, and also in earlier times by the great overland trade route to inner Asia and the Far East. Thus, the geographical location of the Ottoman Empire had conferred on it the position of a bridge between Asia and Europe.

Although, there had been commercial relations between India, the Arab World, Turkey and Europe since time immemorial, the Arab lands stood at the cross roads of the trade route between India and Europe. The arrival of Portuguese in Arabian sea lead to far reaching consequences

with regard to the pattern of trade and commerce. Towards the beginning of the fifteenth century the Portuguese rulers began to search direct route to India for commercial benefits as they were well aware of Indian economy. The Portuguese ruler Don Hennriq popularly known as Henry made positive efforts to find out the direct route. It was the time Ottomans themselves were rising rapidly to become a world power. The expansion of the Turkish power on the coast of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf made inevitable a conflict between the Turks and the Portuguese for supremacy in Indian Ocean. In view of the growing Portuguese threat to Gujarat trade and the coastal areas, the ruler of Gujarat, Bahadur Shah, sent an embassy to the Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman the Magnificent, congratulating him on his victories and seeking his support. In return the Ottoman Sultan expressed a desire to combat the Portuguese who had "disturbed the shores of Arabia". In 1556 A.D., the Portuguese and the Ottoman came to an agreement to share the spice and the Indian trade and not to clash in the Arab Sea. The Ottomans shifted their interest once again to Europe and came to an agreement with the Portuguese for dividing the oriental trade between them.

The Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 was an attempt of the Indian Muslims to recover their lost power in India. But its future spelt the disintegration and collapse of the feudal structure of Muslim society. The main cause of the

failure of Mutiny was the lack of organisation and discipline. During this period the British had obtained a proclamation of the Ottoman Sultan advising the Indian Muslims to be loyal to the British and during the Crimean War the British themselves had magnified Turkey in the Indian eyes.¹⁰ In the great upheaval of 1857 the British Government again managed to obtain a firman from Sultan Abdul Majeed calling upon the Muslims of India to make their peace with the Britishers as they were the friends of their Caliph. The Royal firman of Turkish Sultan had tremendous effect upon the Muslim masses in India and since then the Indian Muslims began to consider the Britishers as their friends and protectors. Cordial relations were established between the Indian Muslims elite and the Britishers. The impact of these relations can be seen in the Indian National Movement. Due to the Turkish impact on Indian Muslims, the faith in the integrity and honesty of British Government was so much that Indian Muslim elite even opposed the National Movement of India.

From the Crimean War onwards the Britishers had tried to emphasise the Caliphal position of Sultan of Turkey before

10. Sayyid Mahmud, Khilafat awr Islam, 1922, p. 80, Cf. M.H. Tufail Ahmad, Musalmanon ka Roshan Mustaqbil, Delhi, 1954, p. 2.

the Indian Muslims. Dalhousie observed the wave of pleasure among the Indian Muslims during the Crimean War as British had extended full support to Turkey. The Caliph's connection with Indian Muslims was again sought to be brought into prominence in July 1867, when the Sultan paid a visit to England. The British Government justified this step on the ground that the attention shown to the Sultan as head of the Muslim religion would tend to propitiate the Indian Muslims. Perhaps, for the first time the Britishers showed their sympathy and concern for Muslims in 1875 at the time of the congress of Berlin.¹¹

Due to external aggressions and internal disorders the strong Ottoman empire began to disintegrate steadily in the 19th century. The signs of weaknesses were exposed. However, a few attempts had been made for the reform of Turkey. A series of internal reforms including military reforms in administrative organisations followed. The tasks of shaking the Empire out of its lethargy was taken up by the Young Turk movement in 1908. The Young Turks party drew its inspiration from the West and wanted to remodel the Empire into a liberal constitutional monarchy. It especially inspired the Muslims of India to participate more actively than ever before in the political life of the

11. S. Lane Poole, Turkey, London, 1922, pp. 361-66

country. This carried far reaching implications for the Indian freedom movement. The Young Turk Movement was hailed in India as a sign of awakening of East and the Muslims and recovery of the 'sick man'.¹² In the meanwhile the First World War broke out and it caused a great loss to the Turkish territory. The Ottoman political strategy in World War I could be summed up in two terms: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. Turkey entered this Great War and the Sultan of Turkey issued a fatwa on 11th November, 1914 as the Caliph and proclaimed the Holy War against the infidels and invited all the Muslims of the world to attend this Holy War physically and monetarily.¹³

Here we see that the First World War also proved to be turning point in the process of emergence of a national awareness in India. Young Turks Revolution gave a new direction to the Indian Freedom Movement. The Indians were influenced in all spheres i.e. the ideas of reforms and constitutionalism, unity and progress were the results of the impact of the Turkish revolution. A contemporary Indian newspaper, "The Mussalman" which was published from Calcutta

12. M. Sadiq, The Turkish Revolution and Indian Freedom Movement, 1983, delhi, pp. 11-12.

13. Ibid., p. 45.

rightly observed the awakening of East in the following words:

The transformation of the Turkish Empire into a constitutional monarchy is emblematic of the fact that the Orient has awakened, that the Moslem is no longer in sleep, and that the 'sickman' is convalescent. It is matter that will inspire a new spirit in the Mussalmans of India. 14

The status and future of the Ottoman Empire played a prominent role in British foreign and Imperial policy. In the earlier period what came to be known as "Eastern Question", British sympathy and support were generously given to the Ottoman Empire. To retain the Indian territory, and the presence of Russia in Asia and the possibility of Russian initiative in the East became a British phobia, which compelled British Government to support the causes of Turkey.¹⁵

The main aim of the British Government was to control the Indian territories and in order to fulfil this interest Palmerston had twice risked war and once waged a

14. The Mussalman, Calcutta, 31st. July, 1908.

15. R.L. Shukla, Britain India and Turkish Empire, 1853-87, pp. 70-71.

war in Crimea. For the interest of British Government the two Prime Ministers of Great Britain Palmerston and Disraeli agreed on the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. To their minds, the survival of Ottoman Empire was essential for the British interests.¹⁶ Here one can see that the establishment of British rule in India closed nearly all avenues of normal relations with the Turks. Both India and Turkey came virtually under the sway of imperialism. Pan-Islam and Young Turk Movement had influenced India's freedom, and the Khilafat Movement was also a direct product of India's affection for the Turkish people.

In 1911 war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and Italy and during 1912 and 1913 Turkey had to fight with the Balkan Powers. This time again like on earlier occasions the Turkish Sultan claimed to be the Caliph or religions leader of all Muslims and sought their cooperation in these wars that it was a kind of Jihad against the infidels. Moreover, most of the holy places of Muslims were situated within the boundaries of Ottoman Empire. So a wave of sympathy swept throughout India. Indian Muslims extended full moral and material support to Turkey. In this connection a medical mission, headed by Dr. M.A. Ansari, was sent to help Turkey. Since British policy during the Balkan

16. Aziz K.K., Britain and Muslim India, London, 1963, p. 25.

Wars and after was not sympathetic to Turkey. The Pro-Turkey and Pro-Caliph sentiments tended to become anti-imperialist. In fact, from 1912 to 1924 the loyalists among the Muslim leaguers were completely overshadowed by the nationalist young men. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few persons like Abu'l Kalam Azad and others who were nationalists in their thinking, most of the militant nationalist among Muslims young men also did not fully accept the modern secular approach to politics. The result was that the most important issues they took up was not political independence but protection of the holy places and of the Ottoman Empire. They fought Western Imperialism on the ground that it threatened the Caliph and the holy places. After having gone through the whole developments in Turkey and India, we come to the conclusion that the political appeal made by the Sultan and many Muslim leaders was mainly based on religious sentiments.

CHAPTER - I

DIPLOMATIC ATTITUDES OF THE OTTOMANS TOWARDS INDIAN RULERS 1750-1924

(i). Ottoman Relations with the Mughal Court:

The earliest record of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim rulers of the Indian subcontinent dates back to the year 1481-82, when royal embassies, letters and gifts were exchanged between the Bahmanid Kings Muhammad Shah (1463-82) and Mahmud Shah (1482-1518) and the Ottoman Sultans Muhammad II (1451-81) and Bayezid II (1481-1512)¹. However, the first Sultan who paid considerable attention towards the East was Sultan Selim I who ascended the throne in 1512². The Ottoman Sultans wanted to establish their domination in Eastern Europe as well as Iraq and Iran. The emergence of these empires synchronized with one another political event which had far reaching consequences for the political history of Northern India and the Asian balance of power as well. This was the establishment of the Mughal rule in India by Babur in 1526. Babur was expelled from his principality of Farghana in Transoxiana by the Uzbeks. He made no secret of

1. Bernard Lewis, "The Mughals and the Ottomans", Pakistan Quarterly, Karachi (1958), p. 5.

2. E.S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks, London, 1856, p. 295.

his desire for recapturing his homeland from the Uzbeks³. This factor of vengeance played an important role in the relations between the Mughals of India and the Uzbeks. This also explains the perpetual hostile attitude of the Mughals towards the Uzbek Khanate. Furthermore, this factor had influenced their relations with Persia and Turkey too.

Another factor of paramount importance with regard to the Turko-Mughal relations was sectarianism⁴. The Safawids professed Shi'ism as their state religion and promoted Shi'ite faith. They even resorted to persecution in order to convert people from other sects. The Ottomans, Mughals and Uzbeks were, on the other hand, Sunnis. The former had initially received the title of Sultan-e-Rum from the shadowy caliph living at Cairo. Later they assumed the title of Padshah-e-Islam and thus became the temporal and spiritual rulers of the Sunni world⁵. The rise of the Safawids and their policy of promoting Shi'ism in their territory made the Ottoman Sultans conscious of the danger

3. Babur, Tuzuki Babri, English Translation, Mrs. Beveridge, London, 1931, Vol. II., pp. 626-7.

4. Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London, 1964, p. 25.

5. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, "Asian Balance of Power in the Light of Mughal Persian Rivalry in the 16th and 17th Centuries", Studies in the Foreign Relations of India, Hyderabad, 1975, p. 205.

of the expansion of Shi'ism in the region adjoining the Safawid territory towards the East. In other words, they feared the Safawid domination in their own territory. This led to a number of clashes between the Ottomans and the Safawids. In 1512 Sultan Selim (the 'Grim') defeated the Safawid ruler Isma'il I. It may not be out of place to say that in the battle of Panipat in 1526 Babur adopted the same Rumi pattern of warfare as adopted by the Ottomans in the battle of Chaldiran against the Safawids in 1514. Babur also availed of the services of the Ottoman master gunners Ustad Ali and Mustafa. With the Ottomans, Babur had no direct contact, and references to them are indirect. He followed the Ottoman method of arranging his artillery in his battle against Rana Sanga⁶.

The Ottoman threat from the West compelled the Safawids to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Mughals, particularly when they had to face an aggressive Uzbek power in the East. Though Qandhar was always a bone of contention between the Mughals and the Safawids for commercial as well as strategic reasons, there was no other frontier dispute between them⁷.

6. Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 25

7. Ibid., p. 24

Thus the political and sectarian considerations put the Uzbeks and the Ottomans united together pitted against their common enemy, the Safawids of Persia. It was this element of common hostility which compelled the Ottomans and the Uzbeks to form an alliance with the Mughals in India against their adversary. But the Mughals were extremely indifferent to such an alliance for a number of reasons.

According to the Ottoman historian 'Ferdī'⁸, the first reference to the Mughals in the Ottoman sources refers back to the appearance one "Lodi Prince Burhan Bey, the son of Sikandar Shah, who arrived in Istanbul in 1536. Fleeing before the invasion of the Chaghtayan armies he sought refuge at the Ottoman Court. 'He was granted the privilege of kissing the Imperial hand and allowed a daily pension of 300 aspers. At about the same time, an embassy from King Bahadur Shah of Gujarat arrived in Istanbul, to ask for help against the encroachments both of Humayun and of the Portuguese'⁹. However, we have no evidence in Indian

8. The word 'Ferdī', appearing in a Persian poem in the work is not a proper name but bears its ordinary lexicographical meaning 'one person'; the author's makhlas in fact appears, in a poem at the end of the work, as 'Bustan' b. Mehemmed 'Bustan Efendi', Kadi'asker Suleyman I, b. 1498, d. 1570, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. II, London, 1985, p. 880.

9. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 6.

accounts of any of the Sikandar's sons by the name of Burhan who sought assylum in the Ottoman court after "being ruined by the invasion of the Chughatai (sic)! armies"¹⁰. . None of the Afghan Princes of Delhi bore this name. Moreover, this name was quite unfamiliar in Northern India at that time. According to Shaikh Abdur Rashid this might refer to Sikandar of Gujarat who ruled for little more than two months and was assassinated in 1526, the year when the Mughals defeated the Afghans at the battle of Panipat. Burhan may have been one of the numerous princes who were driven out of Gujarat by Humayun when he conquered the country in 1535¹¹. According to the same author, the appearance of Burhan at the - Sublime Porte is mentioned alongwith the arrival of an embassy from Bahadur Shah of Gujarat who fleeing before the Mughals had sent his family and treasures to Medina consisting of three hundred iron chests¹².

Babur did not recognise the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph and he had no direct contact with him. During the reign of Humayun who succeeded Babur in 1530 the Ottoman

10. Shaikh Abdul Rashid, "Ottoman Mughal Relations During Seventeenth Century", Journal of Indian History, 1963, Calcutta, p. 127.

11. Sidi Ali Reis, Mirat-al Mamalik, Eng. tr. A Vambery, p. 47.

12. For a detailed study, see E.S. Creasy, Op.cit., pp. 287-88.

Sultan Sulaiman the Magnificent ordered several naval expeditions to Gujarat to check the Portuguese advancements in the Arabian Sea and West Coast of India. In one such expedition under Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, his armies was disastrously routed. Sidi Ali Reis escapaced to Turkey through Mughal India, Central Asia and Persia¹³. Thus he became the first unofficial Turkish ambassador who came to Delhi indirectly. Sidi Ali Reis, the Turkish Admiral cum poet, received cordial welcome at the court of Humayun and he was escorted by Bairam Khan to the capital¹⁴. He had left deep impressions on the mind of Humayun particularly of his poetry. In Mughal India the tradition of Turkish poetry goes back to 'Ali Sher Nawai' which was introduced in India by Babur¹⁵. In the verses of both Humayun and Bairam Khan, one finds sensitive poetic allusion to the ghazals of Sidi Ali Reis. Even he paid a rich tribute to Indo-Persian poetry by composing verses in Mira't-ul-Mamalik. Sidi Ali Reis complimented the Indo-Persian school of poetry by composing Persian ghazals in the style of Khusrau¹⁶. It is quite probable that his voyage was the first channel through which the works of Indo-Persian poets reached the Ottoman

13. Shaikh Abdul Rashid, op.cit., p. 127.

14. A. Vambéry, op.cit., p. 47.

15. Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 27.

16. A. Vambéry, op.cit., pp. 54-55.

Empire and this may explain the familiarity of Naima and others with Indian literary scene¹⁷.

By the time of Sulaiman the Magnificent the Ottomans had already established their religious supremacy over the whole Islamic world. The Turkish Sultan wanted the Mughals to accept his status. This claim was implicit in the statement of Sidi Ali Reis that the Emperor of China had given his Muslim subjects the right to include the names of the Ottoman Sultan in the Khutba¹⁸. Humayun, without expressing any resentment, admitted that the Sultan was the only person to be called the Padshah¹⁹, but did not formally acknowledge his supremacy. At the death of Humayun in 1556, Sidi Ali Reis was still in India and it was on his advice that Humayun's death was kept secret till the enthronement of Akbar.

When Akbar found his throne insecure like his father Humayun, he also started by going further in positive friendliness towards the Ottomans. He had written a letter²⁰ to Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1556 and sent it through Sidi Ali Reis in which he addressed the Ottoman

18. A. Vambery, op.cit., pp. 53-54.

19. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, op.cit., p. 205.

20. De Hammer, Josef, "Memoir on the Diplomatic Relations between the Courts of Delhi and Constantinople in the Sixteenth Centuries" Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. II, 1830, p. 476.

Sultan as 'the Khalifa on the earth', no reply, however, came from the Sultan²¹.

Akbar in his early days was under the influence of the 'Ulama', and hence acknowledged with great willingness the religious superiority of the Ottoman Sultan²². This attitude of Akbar was totally in contrast with his later anti-Ottoman policies²³ which were shaped by a number of factors. One of the greatest achievements of Akbar in the realm of military administration is ascribed to the establishment of what is called 'Scientific Frontier' in the North-West. He rejected the previous boundaries of the river Indus and Sulaiman range etc. Instead of river Indus and Sulaiman range, he made Hindukush²⁴ the frontier of the Mughal Empire in the North-West. The occupation of Kabul and Qandhar was important for the defence of Hindukush, which he achieved in 1593. The person who made Akbar's task more and more difficult was Abdullah Khan Uzbek of Turan. Akbar was chary of Abdullah Khan's aggressive design of capturing Kabul and Qandhar. He directed all his efforts

22. T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, Oxford, 1924, pp. 146-47.

23. F.W. Buckler, "A New Interpretation of Akbar's Decree of 1579", TRAS, pp. 590-608.

24. Historians as well as geographers have revealed the strategic importance of Hindukush and Akbar's success could be understood from the fact that no external invasion took place through Hindukush, even the Britishers came through Western and Eastern Coasts.

to guard Kabul. When Akbar occupied Kabul the two giants came face to face with each other. Abdullah Khan Uzbek wanted to ally with Akbar as against the Safawids. The reason was obviously the same sectarian difference. Akbar on the other hand found that the existence of Persian Empire is essential to check the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks and the Ottomans were hand in glove against the Safawids. To him Akbar rejected the Ottoman proposal of tripartite alliance because, as he thought, Safawid's existence was necessary to check the Uzbek threat. He sent a counter proposal to Abdullah Khan Uzbek to help the Persians against the Ottomans. In one of his letters to the Uzbek chief he expresses his intention of driving away the Portuguese from India and of freeing the Holy places evidently from the Ottomans. The Ottoman Sultan seeks at first to have regarded the rise of the Mughals with suspicion. This was reinforced in 1588 when reports were received from Ottoman spies in India that Akbar was conspiring with the Portuguese and planning a naval expedition to strike at the ports of Yemen.

As Akbar's power grew he developed an anti-Ottoman bias²⁵. Declining now to recognize the Sultan as the Caliph

25. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 6; Abul Fazal, Maktubat, pp. 14-5, 23, 37-39.

he put forward his own claim to the title²⁶. He never regarded the Ottoman Sultan as the sole champions of the Islamic world. This was best manifested in his Mahzar of 1579, when he tried to assume the position of Imam-i-Adil, Padshah-i-Islam and Amir al-Mominin²⁷ and reserved the right of interpreting the Islamic law and issuing a religious 'decree'. The policy of Sulh-e-Kul or 'grand reconciliation' which he pursued from 1580 to 1605 denied any alliance with any religious authority outside the country. Hence we see that without an apparent reason Akbar developed a policy of antipathy towards the Ottomans.

Akbar's successor Jahangir continued to follow this policy. The early years of his reign were characterised by feelings of friendship with Persia and indifference to the Ottoman Empire. In his memoirs Tuzuk-e-Jahangiri, we find that his impression of the Ottoman was much influenced by his heritage mainly Timur's victory over Bayezid Yildirim²⁸. The Mughal relation with the Safawids also improved under Jahangir due to his friendship with Shah

26. Abdul Qadir Badauni, Muntakhab-al Tawarikh, Calcutta, 1868, Vol. II, p. 254.

27. Syed Mahmood, The Khilafat and England, London, 1920, p. 54

28. Jahangir Turzuk, English Translation, Rogers, London, 1909, pp. 144-5, 153-4.

Abbas I. Sir Thomas Roe suggests that in 1616 Shah Abbas I sent his embassy to obtain financial help from Jahangir for his war against the Ottomans and Jahangir responded liberally to it. The occupation of Qandhar by Shah Abbas I in 1617 which came as a great shock to Jahangir²⁹, totally altered his policy towards Persia and Turkey.

Meanwhile Shah Abbas recaptured Baghdad from the Ottomans. This led to the foundation of a new triangular solidarity of the Ottomans, Mughals and Uzbeks, all directed against Persia³⁰. This was the first clear reversal of the traditional Mughal policy. Jahangir received a letter from Sultan Murad IV of Turkey advising him to help the Uzbek king Imam Quli Khan against the Persians, announcing his own intention of marching against Persia. This letter which survives in Faridun Bey's Mansh'at-e Salatin, is the first known from an Ottoman Sultan to the Mughal Emperor. But the scheme of the Sunni Triple Alliance (1625-26) against Persia did not materialise on account of Jahangir's death in 1627 and the raid on the Mughal province of Kabul by the Uzbek ruler of Balkh, Nazar Muhammad Khan³¹.

29. Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 35.

30. Jahangir, Tuzuk, ed. Sayyid Ahmad, Aligarh, 1864, pp. 325-30.

31. Rogers, op.cit., pp. 65, 89.

Ottoman historian Naima tells us that in 1632, the Mughal prince Baysunkur Mirza³², the grandson of Akbar, came to Istanbul "to rub his brow on the Imperial Gate". He set up a house in the suburb of Uskudar. Naima relates at some length how the Mughal family had been massacred by Shah Jahan, and how Baysunkur escaped to Iran. Finding a cold reception there, he continued his journey to Istanbul, and sought hospitality and help from the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV (1623-40)³³.

After the death of Jahangir, Baysunkur joined Shahryar who had proclaimed himself Emperor against heir designate prince Khurram (Shahjahan). The princes were defeated near Lahore. Baysunkur fled to Badakhshan, and according to Qazwini, died there. He appeared at Constantinople before Sultan Murad IV in 1632. The Mughal prince seems to have created a bad impression at the Turkish court. Naima describes him as boastful arrogant and discourteous.³⁴ His lack of manners and general haughtiness displeased the Sultan. As a result of his acts of discourtesy which greatly annoyed the Sultan. In the words

32. Also known as Baisanghar.

33. Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p. 6.

34. Ibid.

of Naima, "by a servant who carried the hide of a hart and spread his master to sit upon. This stupid and uncouth behaviour was the cause that the Sultan had no liking for him".³⁵ However, he went on demanding an army from the Sultan, to enable him to win the throne of India. The Sultan was not interested in it because his relations with Shahjahan were good and the Mughal emperor had already sent him two embassies with gifts and protestations of friendship. Eventually Baysunkun gave up hope of winning Turkish support and left the country and became a darvish.

The military objective of Shahjahan which included the recapture of Qandhar and subjugation of Shi'ite state in Deccan made a clash with the Safawids inevitable. On the other hand the Persians were at war with the Ottomans. So Shahjahan started thinking in terms of entering into some kind of alliance to which his father had intended at the end of his reign. But the sinister movements of the ruler of Transoxiana, Nazar Muhammad towards Kabul, the victory of Shah Safi at Erivan in 1637 by Persian governor Ali Mardan Khan who was later on given the governorship of Kashmir by Shahjahan, amended Shahjahan's calculations. But before

35. de Hammer, op.cit., p. 463.

36. Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshahnama, Calcutta, 1867, Vol. II, pp. 21-24, 126.

the surrender of Qandhar, Shahjahan received the intelligence of a large scale military preparations by the Safawids and he got alarmed.

In 1638 he sent his first embassy to the Ottoman Empire under Mir Zarif³⁷ Isphani an expert dealer in horses. The horses that he brought for the royal stables were not liked by the Emperor and he fell out of favour. He was anxious to be restored to favour and requested permission to go to Arabia and Turkey to purchase horses. Afzal Khan was instructed to draft a letter to the Sultan and another to the Grand Vizir of Sultan Murad IV and despatch it through Mir Zarif. The purpose of this embasssy was proclaimed to be the purchase of horses presumably to relegate the suspicions of Shah Safi and the Persian nobles in the Mughal court.³⁸ The ambassador brought sumptuous gifts, including a girdle worth 15,000 piasters, and a shield of elephant ear and rhinoceros' hide. The letter he brought was less gratifying. Shahjahan urged on Murad the need for a close alliance between the two Sunni emperors against the Shia heretics in Iran but in such terms as to reproach the Ottoman Sultan for dilatoriness and lack of zeal.³⁹ But

37. Shah Nawaz Khan, Mathir-ul Umara' III, p. 92b.

38. Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 37.

39. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 7.

the letter which Mir Zarif carried to Murad IV contained the same old story of an alliance against Persia. The proposal suggested a coordinated invasion of Persia by the Ottomans, the Mughals and the Uzbeks.⁴⁰ In that letter Murad IV⁴¹ referred to by titles such as the "Khaqan of the Muslim kings" etc. was politically motivated because Murad's answers to Shahjahan offended him. Unfortunately, the text of this letter has so far not been traced. It is also said that Murad IV had objected to Shahjahan's title while he was in fact only the ruler of India, which brought displeasure to Shahjahan. This Ottoman reply was taken to India by an ambassador called Arsalan Aqa. In 1642 he returned to Constantinople bringing unmistakable indication of Shahjahan's displeasure. No letter was sent by Shahjahan to Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) who had meanwhile succeeded Murad IV to the Ottoman throne. However, one finds that the attitude of the Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim toward Shahjahan remained cold and indifferent, especially after Shahjahan's campaign of Balkh and Badakhashan.

39. Bernard Lewi, op.cit., p. 7.

40. Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshah Name, Calcutta, 1867, Vol. II, pp. 184-86.

41. Faridun Bey, Munsha'at-e-Salatin, Vol. II, pp. 67-69.

Another Turkish envoy named Sayyid Mohiuddin was sent in 1649 to the court of Shahjahan. He was sent with a letter to the Mughal emperor on 16th May, 1649 to notify the accession of Muhammad IV and to seek support for Nazar Mohammad and bring out a reconciliation between him and his son Abdul Aziz, Sayyid Mohiuddin's arrival in 1650 at Surat was reported to the Mughal emperor, and elaborate arrangements were made to receive him and conduct him to the capital. He was allowed to return in November 1651.

It was not until 1652 that a new Mughal ambassador, called Sayyid Ahmad⁴² (Mir-i 'Adl) arrived in Constantinople. He was sent there with the Ottoman ambassador Sayyid Mohiuddin. The letter which he had carried was in reply to the letter sent by the Sultan to Shahjahan and the letter informed him that the matter relating to Nazar Muhammad had been taken care of by him. "The Mughal ambasssador Sayyid Ahmad", Naima describes, "was a man of learning, charm and wit , and remarks that no ambassador had ever been received with such attention and honour."⁴³ The ambassador was feted and entertained and given rich presents to take home with him.⁴⁴

42. Padshahnama, Manuscript in Allahabad University, Library, p. 201b.

43. Abdur Rashid, op.cit., p. 132.

44. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 8.

The other Turkish ambassador Zulfiqar Agha came as head of the return embassy to the court of the Mughal emperor. He reached Surat in December 1653. He was received in audience in March 1654. Orders were issued to local officers to accompany the ambassador to the capital. He was received by Prince Sulaiman Shukoh and Jahanara Begum. The Turkish Sultan referred to the complaint he had received from Nazar Muhammad Khan but expressed satisfaction with Shahjahan's subsequent conduct. Shahjahan felt offended at the patronising tone of Sultan Muhammad's letter.⁴⁵ He gave an indication of this in a letter he sent through Qaim Beg⁴⁶ in August 1654.⁴⁷

After the death of Shahjahan diplomatic contacts between the Ottoman Sultan and the Mughal emperors became less frequent and casual and formal. Both the empires were faced with serious domestic problems.

The relation of Aurangzeb with other Muslim rulers outside India were cordial and friendly. In 1665 there came ambassadors from the Sharif of Mecca, Turkish governor

45. Banarsi Prasad, Shah Jahan, Allahabad, 1932, p. 301.

46. Muhammad Waris, Badshahnama, p. 276.

47. Ibid., pp. 485-6.

of Yemen and Basra.⁴⁸ In 1661 Husain Pasha the Turkish governor of Basra had sent a letter of congratulations on his accession and a gift of horses. Later on disgraced at the Ottoman court he took refuge in India and joined Aurangzeb's service, as did also his successor designate to the governorship of Basra, Yahya Pasha.⁴⁹ But diplomatic relations were non-existent between the Mughal Empire and the Ottoman Empire for 32 years during Aurangzeb's reign. In 1690 after the defeat of Qara Pasha at Vienna, when the Ottoman Empire was in distress the Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman II (1687-91) sent a letter through Ahmad Aqa to seek Aurangzeb's aid.⁵⁰

But the Ottoman ambasssador Ahmad Aqa was received coldly because of the Ottoman negligence in not sending an embassy to Aurangzeb until 32 years of his reign. Again, as Persia was weak there was no necessity of renewing Turko-Mughal alliance.⁵¹

The Ottoman historical records of the eighteenth century contain a few allusions to diplomatic exchanges

48. Saqi Mustaid Khan, Maathir-i-Alamgiri, Eng. Tra. J.N. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1947.

49. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

50. Ibid., p. 203.

51. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 8, Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 44.

between the courts of Delhi and Constantinople. Conditions in the sub-continent were chaotic, and the Ottoman Empire was in retreat in Europe when a Mughal embassy arrived in Constantinople in 1717. Apart from the usual details about the gifts, no information is given by the Imperial historiographer Rashid.⁵² The Imperial historiographer Izzi tells us that the Mughal Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan had long been friends. In 1744 Muhammad Shah (1719-48), the powerless Mughal Emperor of Delhi, had sent an ambassador called Sayyid Ataullah Bukhari to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud warning him against the tactics of Nadir Shah, and proposing a common alliance against him. Though he might for the moment seek Turkish friendship, his intentions against Turkey were no less hostile than against Mughal India. The letter addressed to, Sultan Mahmud says:

...he had earlier received through Sayyid' Ataullah b. Atai Husaini a letter from Sultan Ahmad Khan (III, d. 1730), congratulating him (Muhammad Shah) on his accession. Expresses pleasure on the accession of the Sultan (Mahmud Khan I). The envoy Sayyid' Ataullah is therefore being sent again. Requests maintenance of cordial relations and the keeping up of correspondence . 53

52. Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p. 8, Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 8.

53. Riazul Islam, Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations, Vol. II, Karachi, 1982, p. 346.

This letter of Muhammad Shah contained nothing new apart from the subject of renovation of the old ties of accord. But the letter of Wukala-i-Hindiya and the Muluk-i-Majusiya spoke of the need of revenge on Nadir Shah and of liberating the provinces grabbed by him. The tagrir of Sayyid Ataullah also contained a plea to Sultan not to make peace with Nadir Shah.⁵⁴

54. The summary of Sayyid Alaullah's tagrir is given below:

In the month of Safar of the Hijri year 1154/April 1741, Tahmas Quli Nadir Shah Afshar sent an envoy to India with the object of purchasing as many ships as possible...one hundred, two hundred or even more. The cost of these ships was to be paid from the treasury of the province of Sind which though part of the Indian empire, is at present under Persian occupation. Accordingly eight large ships were purchased and despatched to Bandar 'Abbas. Soon, however, it transpired that Tahmas Quli was planning an invasion of the Ottoman Empire and that these ships were being acquired for that purpose. When we came to know of this, we stopped all further supply of ships. To Tahmas Quli we wrote that no further ships were available and we thus put him off.

When, in the course of crossing the Persian Gulf, we reached the Port Bushahr and men from Bushahr boarded our ship, they told us that 500 skilled carpenters were working day and night to build large ships.

In the year 1155 when Tahmas Quli was fighting against the Lezquis and besieging them, a trustworthy spy brought to the Mughal government the following report of Tahmas Quli's plans: Tahmas Quli says he would invade the Ottoman Empire in 1154 [or 1159], doubtful reading]. If he succeeded, he would stay there and keep himself informed of the affairs of the seven realms. If he fails to conquer the Ottomans, he would make a feigned peace with them. Then, after

The Sultan's return embassy was led by Salim Muhammad Effendi, an official of the Department of Finance. The contents of the letter indicate the attachment of Sultan Mahmud's considerable importance to this correspondence. It further expressed general agreement and promised to take all possible precautions. On the basis of whatever material is available in India on this topic, we reach the conclusion that from sixteenth to the eighteenth century both the Ottoman and Mughal empires were the greatest powers of the Muslim world. The rulers of these empires were the Sunni Muslims. However, they were too remote to interact with one another very much, either as allies or as rivals. It was necessary for the Ottomans to have their eyes fixed on

making effective arrangements for the security and defence of the frontiers of Iran, he would swiftly march into India, and collect the ships from all the ports from Bengal to Lahari Bandar which marks the limit of the province of Sind. After collecting artillery, soldiers and all military equipments and supplies and putting them on board the ships, he would sail across the Persian Gulf to the Suez port. Then he would capture the cities of Mecca and Medina and the countries of Egypt, Syria etc. Some of the ships laden with military equipment he will send by way of the Persian Gulf for the seizure of the port of Basra.

Sayyid 'Ataullah concluded his speech thus: What I had been appointed to say, I have said. And it all comes to this: the Islamic Ottoman Empire will be well-advised to refrain from making peace with Tahmas Quli. For one cannot depend on the treaties made by him. He made peace with the people of Hindustan but went back on his pledge.

Europe due to some reasons. First, it was an area of expansion; secondly, it was also an area of danger for the Ottomans. So in the prevailing conditions the principal concern of the Ottoman Sultans was to protect themselves against Europe.

On the other hand, the Mughals were preoccupied with Indian affairs and with so many problems of their vast empire. There was only one thing which brought them together, that is, the common threat offered to the Ottoman Empire as well as to the Mughal Empire by the Safawid Empire of Persia. It was the time when the Ottomans were fighting near Baghdad and the Mughals were fighting near Qandhar. The ruler of both the empires had turned their attention towards the four sides of their enemies' territory and started to exchange their embassies by sea routes. In the last one see that there were some factors of amity between the Mughals and the Ottomans, first and foremost was the commercial and cultural identity. As we know that both Mughals and Ottomans were Turks. Babur was an accomplished poet of Turkish literature. Humayun was also equally well versed in Turkish language. He appreciated Turkish Ghazals composed by Ottoman Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, his minister Bairam Khan I has even left a Diwan of Turkish poetry. Most

55. N.R. Farooqi Mughal-Ottoman Relations, New Delhi, 1989, p. 229.

of the Mughal Emperors knew Turkish very well. As late as the 19th century Turkish was an important part of the curriculum of the Mughal Princes. They even corresponded with each other in Turkish.⁵⁶ though productive of a sense of solidarity between the two ruling houses, the racial and cultural affinity did not exercise much influence in shaping the Mughal Ottoman relations.

(ii). Ottoman Relations with the State of Mysore:

Towards the close of the seventeenth century disintegration of the Mughal Empire set in. Consequently, a number of independent states emerged during this time; Kabul was occupied by Nadir Shah in 1739, Punjab came under the possession of Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1754. The provinces of Bengal and Orissa too became independent under Aliwerdi Khan in 1758, while Gujarat and Sindh cut themselves off from the Mughal Empire in 1750, Sa'adat Khan, an immigrant from Khorasan, established himself in Awadh. His successors ruled over Awadh (modern Uttar Pradesh) until 1848. In the South, Mysore also emerged as an autonomous independent state in the wake of declining Mughal Empire. It was situated in south India at the junction of Eastern and Western Ghats. Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan made Mysore a powerful centre in the second half of the

56. Waqiat-i-Azfari, Urdu Tr. M.H. Molvi Siddiqi, ORI Madras, 1937, C.f. N.R. Farooqi, p. 229.

eighteenth century, whereas Asaf Jah had established independent Nizamat. However, it was Mysore which looked for legitimizing its rule. This was due to the political conditions in South India in the eighteenth century.

It was the open ambition of Hyder Ali as well as Tipu to be the overlord of all the area south of the river Kistna. This brought them into conflict with Nawab Walajah; the ruler of Arcot. There was nothing in the conditions of eighteenth century India to damp these ambitions. The anarchy brought about by the rise of the Marathas and the weakening of the Mughal Empire had made it possible for the new dynasties to establish and extend their power. Hyder Ali and Tipu were both men of deep acumen and possessed a sound political instinct. Apart from this they soon came to foresee that if the Indian powers did not unite against the British, the whole of South India would pass into British hands. Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad was enjoined with the British and wanted to invade Hyder Ali's dominion with the intention to partition his territories. Tipu ended his dependence on the Hindu Raja of Mysore which made his legal title even weaker. According to the legal ideas of the day every Indian ruler had acknowledged the supremacy of the House of Timur. This itself would be quite acceptable to Tipu, but as matters stood, he could get recognition only as a subordinate either of Walajah or the Nizam. Both the

Nizam and Walajah were dependent on the English who were by no means friendly to Tipu.

In the given political conditions when Tipu failed to get recognition from the Nawab of Arcot and the Mughals he turned his attention towards Sultan Caliph of Turkey. Tipu sent Osman Khan to Constantinople to find out whether an embassy to the Ottoman Government would be fruitful.⁵⁷ After receiving a positive response, he decided to depute Ghulam Ali Khan, Nurullah Khan, Lutf Ali Khan and Jafar Khan with Sayyid Jafar and Khwaja Abdul Qadir as secretaries to proceed to Constantinople⁵⁸ with the objective of securing a diploma in 1786. However, this was not the sole objective, as he wanted to fulfil several other objectives. On the basis of following points we can find out the real objective of Tipu's keenness to establish relations with Turkey:

- (1). If Turkey and Iran are provided ports in India, in lieu of this they will also provide ports for Mysore on the shores of their countries. Then the navigational routes of the Muslim ships and ports will not have the chance to be occupied by the Western Nations.

57. Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta, 1971, p. 128.

58. Mark Wilk, South Indian History, Vol. IV, Delhi, 1980, p. 361; Cf. M. Sharma Rao, Modern Mysore, Bangalore, 1936, p. 139.

- (2). Since ancient times India's trade was carried out through land route and by this trade the Islamic countries and the Muslims prospered themselves. After the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route, the Europeans had taken over this trade. Therefore, Tipu Sultan in order to recapture this trade proposed a short sea route direct from India to Turkey via Basra which was shorter and easier than the Cape of Good Hope route.⁵⁹ Apart from this, there was also another motive which was the security of the trade of the Muslim countries and the will to strengthen their naval power which did not exist at all till that age.
- (3). The Muslims were not much interested in trade and commerce which had made them superior all over the world. Therefore Tipu wanted to provide factories not only in his dominion but all over the Muslim countries to divert the attention of Muslims towards trade and commerce.
- (4). In order to expel the Britishers from India Tipu sought military help from Turkey.

59. See Map. p. 255

The embassy sent by Tipu was composed of 900 personnel and was led by Ghulam Ali Khan an important trusted officer of Tipu Sultan. Also included in it were some eminent courtiers and secretaries of the Sultan like Nurullah Khan, Lutf Ali Khan, Sayyid Jafar, Jafar Khan and Khwaja Abdul Qadir. Besides these, there were a number of traders and a large entourage of staff. This delegation carried considerable quantities of cloth, sandal wood products, spices, gold and silver coins, local garments and jewellery to offer them as gifts to high officials and nobles etc. as well as to meet the expenses of the embassy. It also carried four elephants of which one each was to be presented to the Ottoman Sultan, King of France and King of England respectively, and the remaining one was to be sold to realise the expenses of the journey. Some of these articles were taken for the publicity of the products of Mysore Kingdom were to be sold at the various ports of call. Thus, the objective of this embassy was apart from seeking the recognition from the Caliph, utilization of the opportunity to establish commercial and trade relations with other Muslim countries.

The embassy left Seringapatam for Constantinople on 17th November, 1785. It sailed from Tadri, a small port on Malabar Coast, on Wednesday, 9th March, 1786. The embassy consisted of four ships namely Ghurab-e-Surati,

Fakhrul Marakib, Futh-e-Shahi Muazi and Nabi Bakhsh.⁶⁰

The editor of Waqai-i-Manazeli Rum describes the objectives of Tipu's embassy in the first place to establish commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire. "Manesty", the English agent at Basrah reported:

The Wakil want to obtain firmans to establish factories in Turkish dominions for selling the produce of his Kingdom. We think this is a circumstance very material for the Honourable Court of Directors to be acquainted with as we apprehend it precludes all hopes of your servants at Tellicherry being able to provide pepper for your homeward ships . .61

In the second place his objective was to secure confirmation of his title to the throne of Mysore from the Caliph. The third main objective of the embassy was to obtain military assistance from the Ottoman Sultan against the English who were Tipu's most formidable enemies. In addition to achieving these objectives the ambassadors had been instructed to land at Muscat in order to strengthen the trade and friendly relations which already existed with Oman and in their way up the Persian Gulf, to touch Bushire and obtain commercial concessions from the Shah of Persia.⁶²

60. Khwaja Abdul Qadir, Waqai' Manazel-i Rum; ed. Mohibbul Hasan, Delhi, 1968, p. 25.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 1.

According to Professor Mohibbul Hasan, Ghulam Ali Khan, the leader of the embassy was instructed to enter into a treaty with the Ottoman Government on the following conditions: First, the Mysore and Ottoman Governments should always remain on friendly terms with each other. Secondly, the Ottoman Government should send troops to Mysore and its expenses would be borne by Tipu and would be sent back to Constantinople at his expense, whenever, they would be required by the Caliph. Thirdly, the Caliph should send Tipu technicians who should be able to make muskets, guns, glass, chinaware and other things. In return Tipu would send such workmen as were available in his dominions and required by the Caliph. And lastly, Tipu should be given trade facilities in the Ottoman empire. In return he would give similar facilities and privileges to the Ottoman Government in the Mysore Kingdom. Tipu, in addition, proposed that he should be given facilities at the port of Basra and in return he would present the same facilities at the port of Mangalore.⁶³

The reception of embassy at Constantinople was somehow lukewarm. The Grand Vizir received them "without any extraordinary ceremony".⁶⁴ They were however given the

63. Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, p. 130.

64. Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., p. 61.

robes of honour. They presented to the Vizir rich dresses, jewellery and 70,000 Venetian blinds.⁶⁵

Sultan Abdul Hamid I (1774-89) met the embassy in a fete organized especially for them at the village of Kelhana. The Sultan "invested them with sable furs and the two secretaries with ermine furs."⁶⁶ The Sultan conferred upon Tipu the title of an independent ruler. Tipu Sultan was granted the right to strike coins and have his name included in the Friday prayer Khutbah, owing allegiance to the Caliph and not to the Mughal emperor. The ambassadors also received a sword and a shield besides a number of friendly letters and Khetab for Tipu.⁶⁷

Tipu Sultan spent a lot of money on this embassy. However, in return he did not gain much in proportion to what had been invested. The embassy resulted in heavy losses of life and property. On account of the British influence at Constantinople and the rapid progress of French

65. Window Screens made of many horizontal strips (Slates of Wood).

66. Ibid., p. 61.

67. The embassy left Constantinople to return to India on 4th March, 1788. They returned this time through Alexandria, Suez and Jiddah. They reached Calicut in January, 1790.

arms in Egypt the Turkish Sultans were not very eager to encourage Tipu in his attempt to fight the British. Indeed, the British succeeded in persuading the Turkish Court to write to Tipu to foresake the friendship of the French and to ally himself with the English,⁶⁸ a request which Tipu could not accept. But Tipu did succeed in gaining recognition for his independence in spite of British machinations at Constantinople. The British news reporter writes:

Golam Alley Beg died in that country and another man returned having accomplished his means (sic) and he also procured from the Sultan the title of King and permission to hold (sic) a mint and to have the Khutba read in his name`. 69

This caused a great stir in the political circle of India and efforts were made to prove that Tipu's claim was baseless. The British emphasized that the recognition of Tipu's independence was a source of great danger. It was felt that people will begin to consider his usurped title of

68. Mahmud Banglari, Tarikh-i Saltanat-i Khudadad, Mysore, Lahore, 1945, p. 552.

69. Mir Muhammad Husain letter received 21 June, 1787, No. 42, ee I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p. 84.

king as derived from an authority held respectable among Muslims.⁷⁰

When it came to be known that Tipu had sent an embassy to France,⁷¹ the English prevailed upon Sultan Selim of Turkey to make an appeal as the head of Islam and forbid him for anti-British activities and establish friendship with them as against the French. This fact could be more clear from the letter of Sultan Salim to Tipu.⁷² It was addressed to the Indian sovereign Tipu Sultan dated 20th September 1798 from Constanople which was forwarded in January 1799 by Lord Wellesly, the Governor General of India with a covering letter⁷³ of his own in which he referred to French intrigues and expected that the domination of the head of his faith would dispose Tipu's mind favourably towards the British. The Sultan advised Tipu to refrain from hostile action against the British about a reconciliation between him and the English. He made pointed reference to French designs on Muslim lands and the Muslim religion and to the "reciprocity of interest" existing

70. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 84; Cf. Secret Consultations, 12th. Nov. 1787, No. 9.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. For a detailed study, see M.H. Abbas, All About the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 47-59.

between England and Turkey, and asked Tipu to assist the Porte in this "general cause of religion".

Tipu was shrewd enough to grasp the real purpose behind this Caliphal mission. In his reply he professed devotion to the Caliph and agreed that since the French were his enemy all Muslims should renounce friendship with them. At the same time he drew the Sultan's attention to the treachery and deceitfulness practised in India by the Christians, especially the English, and referred to the latter's "determined resolution to subdue the whole of Hindustan and subvert the Musalman religion". Tipu was willing to "exterminate the infidel" with the help of the Sultan, but remained non-committal with regard to the friendship with the British which the Sultan had asked him to cultivate.⁷⁴ The embassy naturally kept its real purpose secret and did not disclose it until it was necessary.

Tipu Sultan later on sent two embassies to Turkey in 1798. At that time the British ambassador had great influence in Turkey. Unfortunately, the letter written by him is not available, but the reply of that letter is reproduced by Mahmud Banglari in his Tarikh Saltanat-i-

74. Ibid., See also, Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., pp. 302-3; Cf. R.L. Shukla, Britain, India and Turkish Empire (1853-1882), p. 21.

Khudadad (Mysore). In this letter Sultan Salim addressed Tipu and suggested him that he should establish friendship with the British and further, he emphasised that the French were treacherous people, their friendship is not beneficial for the Muslims. Moreover, Sultan Selim advised Tipu Sultan that if he has any complaint against the English, he should inform me. After this letter Tipu had understood the feelings of Sultan Selim about India and the English. Therefore, he wrote a formal letter,⁷⁵ informing him that "English people want to make war on me and have collected arms and amunitions for that purpose I am therefore compelled to declare jihad against them".⁷⁶

(iii). Ottoman Relations with the State of Hyderabad:

The state of Hyderabad was founded by Chin Qulej Khan or Nizam-ul-Mulk Asfjah in 1724. He was one of the leading nobles of the post-Aurangzeb era and in fact was a deputy of the Mughal Emperor at Hyderabad where he ruled with a strong hand. He never openly declared his independence from the Central Government (Mughal Government) but in practice he acted like an independent ruler. He concluded peace treaties, waged wars and also started exchanging emissaries with foreign countries. He started

75. For a detailed study, see Mahmud Banglari, op.cit., pp. 549-552.

76. Karnama-i Haidari, Calcutta, 1848, p. 985. For the text of the letter see Appendix-A.

correspondence with the Ottoman government as if he was an independent ruler. He sent a letter to Sultan Mahmud of Turkey in 1747. The bearer of that letter was Al-Haj Yusuf Agha, or Sayyid Ataullah.⁷⁷ Apart from this letter several diplomatic exchanges took place between the Ottoman Empire and the Hyderabad state. This tradition was followed by his son Nizam-ud-Daula Nasir Jung. A famous Turkish envoy named Haji Muhammad Yusuf Effendi came to Hyderabad during his reign. In return Nasir Jang had sent many emissaries to Constantinople.⁷⁸

When the Turko-Serbian War broke out in 1876 the Indian Muslims actively supported Turkey. The British resident at Hyderabad felt that in the beginning, the local Muslims had little real sympathy for the Turks. But the appeals by influential co-religionists to their religious feelings led to the growth of a pro-Turkish movement among

77. For a detailed study, see Riazul Islam, op.cit., pp. 356-363.

78. Many of these letters of the Ottoman Empire and the Hyderabad state are preserved in Turkish Archives, (also see in Riazul Islam, section 10, Miscellaneous chapter). Even in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives Hyderabad, a number of letters and firmans are available in both the countries. The reports of Government officials and summaries of newspaper articles are found in the National Archives of India also which throw light on the Indo-Ottoman relations.

them. Their interest on the fate of Turkey increased so much that they formed a society to get regular telegrams from the seat of war.⁷⁹ The resident in a report has referred to the view, held by Salar Jang, the Prime Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad and many nobles at Hyderabad, that a number of Muslims should proceed from India to join the Turks in the war.⁸⁰ One Muhammad Badi-uz Zaman, a former employee of the Nizam's Government, visited Bangalore for raising funds and recruiting volunteers for the Russo-Turkish War. He circulated an address in the principal towns of South India asking the Muslims to join the war.⁸¹

At the instance of Salar Jang the resident at Hyderabad made enquiries about Badi-uz Zaman's movement who was likely to visit Hyderabad for preaching Jihad and gathering public support for Turkey. Badi-uz Zaman however himself put off the proposed Hyderabad visit and proceeded to Madras. The resident at Hyderabad sent a message to

79. Ibid., No.22, "Resident of Hyderabad to Government of India", 4th. June, 1817.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., No. 244, "Chief Commissioner of Mysore Government to Government of India, 11th August 1877, "The resident observed that altogether this movement was closely watched by the public but no sign of disloyalty to the Government was detected.

Madras requesting the authorities there not to allow Badi-uz Zaman to enter Hyderabad, as he was afraid of disturbance in Hyderabad. The message at once communicated to the Madras Government which did not allow Badi uz-Zaman to go to Hyderabad.⁸² A newspaper named Varita Dhara, in its issue of 18th June, 1877, stated that all the Indian Muslims keenly watched the progress of the war. It has also been reported that many of his officials in the Nizam's state used to receive telegraphic news of the war. They used to circulate these news among the public.⁸³

An anti-British newspaper al-Akhtar from Constantinople in Persian which was considered as the mouthpiece of an Islamic league was financed by the Nizam of Hyderabad when it was suspended due to lack of funds. These relationships continued in the first half of the 20th century. When Sultan Abdul Majid was exiled in Europe and his financial condition was miserable. In 1924, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a firman regarding financial help for the Sultan of Turkey. He fixed a sum of £ 300 annually to the Sultan of Turkey till his death.⁸⁴ On receiving the

82. Ibid., No. 105.

83. R.L. Shukla, op.cit., pp. 166-67.

84. Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Political Department Instalment No. 81, List No. 3, S.No. 411, July 1924. For the text of this firman see Appendix-B.

news of the Nizam's firman regarding the stipend Sultan Abdul Majid the exiled Sultan of Turkey wrote a letter back to the Nizam acknowledging his gratitude of the Nizam's generosity.⁸⁵ The state of Hyderabad was keenly interested in the victory of Turkey. After the conclusion of the treaty of Lausanne, the Nizam of Hyderabad, issued a firman on 19th Zilhijja 1341 A.H. and declared holiday for one day in the entire state of Hyderabad.⁸⁶ He also ordered distribution of sweets among the people in order to celebrate the victory of Turkey.

Apart from these the Nizam of Hyderabad had granted many individual grants for the Turkish people. A person named Dr. Hasan Khairi was granted a stipend of \$15 per month for two years for completing his medical education.⁸⁸ He had also sanctioned a sum of Rs.1,000/- to Sayyid Muhammad of Constantinople as travelling expenditure when they were going back to their homeland.⁸⁹ This sort of

85. Ibid., Firman of 25 Jamad II 1352 A.H.

86. Ibid., For the full text of letter, see Appendix-C

87. NPSA, Inst. No. 81, List No. 2, S.No. 464, 19 and 25 Zilhijja, 1341 A.H.

88. Ibid., Inst. No. 81, List No. 2, S.No. 699, 19th. Ramzan, 1342 A.H.

89. Ibid., Inst No. 81, List No. 2, S.No. 702, 27th. Zilqada, 1342 A.H.

financial help shows that the Nizam had deep sympathy for the Turkish people and his attitude was friendly towards Turkey.

The Nizam had issued a firman on 5th Rabi I 1341 A.H. regarding the contributions for the oppressed people of Turkey. He had given permission to Muhammad Akbar Ali, editor of a newspaper Saheefah to perform this task. But he also instructed that the amount should be used only for the real purpose and not for political motives.⁹⁰.

90. Ibid., Inst. No. 17, List. No. 2, S.No. 107, N5/C17, 5th. Rabi I, 1342 A.H.

CHAPTER - II

CONCEPT OF THE CALIPHATE

IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INDIAN MUSLIMS

Historically, the term Khalifa (Caliph) means successor of the Prophet Muhammad who rules over the entire Muslim territories. In other words we can say that the institution of caliphate was born after the death of the Prophet. The term Khalifa' Rasul Allah was for the first time addressed to Abu Bakr who succeeded the Prophet after his death in 632 A.D. and ruled for a brief span of time up to 634 A.D. The successors of Abu Bakr also assumed the same title. However they were also called Amir al-Muminin along with Khalifa al-Muslimin. The subsequent dynasties that came into power after the end of the brief tenure of the four caliphs better known as Khilafa al-Rashida were fascinated to assume the same title. However Umayyads tried to eradicate this notion of moral responsibility. They maintained the idea of unconditional obedience to the reigning Caliph. But they were not simply content with imposing the notion of unconditional obedience to the Caliph; they established at the same time in effect, the dynastic Caliphate. The concept of caliphate had been brought with new modifications by the Abbasids (750 A.D. - 1517 A.D.). The Abbasids presented themselves as belonging to the family of the Prophet, and it was with this above

mentioned title that the first Abbasid caliph acceded to the throne justified their action. They maintained the thesis according to which the Caliphate must revert to the kinsmen of the Prophet, and more particularly to the descendants of al-Abbas. Here we see that the same dynastic principle was applied on the same pattern as under the Umayyads the aparent being most often nominated by the ruling Caliph after consultation with the most influential supporters of the regime.¹

In the history of Islam the question of Khilafa has been a constant subject of debates and discussions. In fact the question of caliphate caused the first great division in Muslim society.² Theory it was the fundamental issue on which Shi'is and Sunnis formed two separate streams of thought.

The term Khilafa in Islamic history essentially means absolute authority vested with the ruling power. According to Muslim Law, the Khalifa being a successor of the Prophet or Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful)

1. Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 939.

2. The Prophet did not say anything about his successor. The question of Caliphate was left to the Ummah because it was more temporal than religious. Abdul Ghani Sani says that the majority of competent Sunnis deny certain claims made by Shi'te Ulama as well as some Sunnis that the Prophet had nominated either 'Ali or 'Abu Bakr' to be his successor. T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, London, 1967, p. 211.

or al-Sawt al-Haiy (the Living Voice of Islam) is the only legal authority in matters of innovation. He has power and authority to bring about any political, legal or social reform subject to the injunction and the authority of the Quran.³ In the words of Rosenthal:

The caliph is the defender of the faith. The dispenser of justice, the leader in prayer and in war, all in one. He is bound by Sharia to the loyal, effective discharge their duties, either in person or by delegating his authority to his appointed officials, chief among them, the Vizir and Qadi or Judge, or more often to the Sultan or emir who has usurped effective power by force. Everything connected with these offices of state is a part of constitutional law and is treated in the Fiqh book under Khilafa. 4

The Islamic injunction calls for the necessity of an imam or Khalifa. The caliphate as an institution is based upon the Qur'an: Sura II, 28. The most oft quoted verse of Qur'an in this regard is: "obey ye! God and obey the Apostle and those in authority among you"⁵. Many

3. Chiragh Ali, The Proposed Political Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1883.

4. Erwin E.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Cambridge, 1962, p. 26.

5. Ati Allah wa Ati ar-Rasul Wali` lamr Minkum.

traditions moreover tell us of the obedience to the Imam and the necessity for an Imam. The general qualifications for an Imam or caliph in Sunni theology are that he should be virtuous, learned, capable, administrator and possessing strength to enforce the law and to protect the religion. Moreover, it was assumed that no one can be a caliph unless he had sufficient authority on earth. So that he might be able to administer the law and protect the religion.

Ibn Khaldun dealing with the nature of the institution of the Caliphate, uses both the terms Khilafa and imama. But when he defines imama he distinguishes it from khilafa. He writes:

We discussed that caliph is one who is Deputy to the Law-giver, and his duty is to protect both religion and polity, sometimes the term khilafat is used for Imamat. One who shoulders these great responsibilities is known as Caliph and Imam. He is Imam because he leads (the community) just as is the case in prayer. This is Imamat-e Kubra, because in all matters the Ummat has to follow him. He is Caliph in the sense that he is the successor of the Prophet. Sometimes he is called only Caliph and at times Caliph of the Prophet. There is controversy as to the use of Khalifat ullah. 6

6. Ibn Khaldun: Prolegomena; under The Reality of Khilafat and Virasat (Urdu translation) ch. 26. cited in Rahimuddin Kemal, The Concept of Constitutional Law in Islam, Hyderabad, 1955, pp. 48-49.

al-Mawardi (d. 1058 A.D.) uses these words (khilafa and imama) as synonymous terms. He describes in his book al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya that the one who succeeds a Prophet is an imam, whose duty, it is to protect religion and allow the worldly affairs to continue; for this purpose, someone from the ummah, has to be appointed. This duty is wajib.⁷ Further, while discussing about the qualities required of the imam he especially mentions the following: adala (moral probity), 'ilm (religious learning), so that he could exercise independent judgement (ijtihad) necessary for the administration and management of the affairs of the state'.⁸

The Caliphate existed in different centres succesfully for 1300 years.⁹ The Muslims first entered India during the period in which rapid expansion of the caliphate was taking place. The Governor of Iraq Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, sent a well organised Arab expedition under the Governorship of Muhammad Ibn Qasim in 711 A.D. which brought

7. al-Mawardi, al-ahkam-al Sultanya, Ch. 1.

8. Ibid., p. 6, cited in, Ann K.S. Lambton, State And Government in Medieval Islam, London, 1981, p. 89.

9. The Caliphate has been held by different dynasties, in Madina 632-660 A.D., in Damascus 660-750 A.D., in Baghdad 750-1258 A.D., in Egypt 1258-1517 A.D., and in Constantinople 1517-1924 A.D. There was also a Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt and North Africa in 908-1171 A.D. Muslim World of Today, ed. John R. Mott, Delhi, 1985, p. 47.

about the conquest of Sindh and its incorporation in the Umayyad Caliphate. Sindh remained integrally an Umayyad province and till its overthrow in 750 A.D. by the Abbasids. Under this Caliphate, Sindh was culturally included in Daral-Islam¹⁰. Several independent caliphates, sultanates and principalities began to emerge within Islamic dominion with the disintegration of the Abbasid Caliphate. It was al-Mawardi who felt the necessity in his famous book Al-Ahkam al Sultaniya to buttress the tottering edifice of the caliphate. A.K.S. Lambton writes about this book in the following words:

Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya is a key document for the theory of rule which came to be accepted by the jurists of the fifth century and after. It is supported by the views of salaf (the early Muslims) and realistic appraisal of the contemporary political scene.... It is al-Mawardi's best known, though not his only work, which treats of Government. His purpose was to give a legal exposition of the theory of Government speculatively derived from the basis of theology and to set out formal basis of Government so that the ruler knowing his rights and duties, might fulfill the charge laid upon him. 11

10. Dar al-Islam literally means the "abode of peace". Territories in which Islam and the Islamic religious law (the Sharia) prevail. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, London, 1989, p. 93.

11. Ann K.S. Lambton, op.cit., OUP, 1981, pp. 83-84.

This book was meant to serve a political end in the Caliph's struggle with the independent Sultans. But it was much too late to turn the tide of events. With an entire disregard for the facts of history during the four preceding centuries of the Muslim era al-Mawardi maintained that the office of Caliph or Imam is elective, and he lays down certain qualifications for the electors. Firstly, he required for an elector 'adala, the quality of 'adl, i.e. a state of moral and religious probity. Secondly he demands 'ilm, religious learning, which would permit the elector to know whether an individual possessed the qualities demanded for imama, and thirdly judgement and wisdom, so that he would choose whoever was most worthy of the imama and the best qualified and knowledgeable in the administration of affairs.¹² Al-Mawardi argued that the quality of an elective office was maintained if the Caliph was elected by a single voice, and in this way al-Mawardi arrives at the conclusion that each Caliph may appoint his own successor and yet the elective character of the institution may be preserved.¹³

12. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, p. 6. cited by Lambton op.cit. See also Arnold, op.cit., p. 70

13. al-Mawardi, op.cit. (ed. Engner) pp. 5-7, cited in Arnold op.cit., p. 71.

The Ghaznavite's invasion must have brought with it the stories of the Baghdad Caliphate. So the people of this country (India) were familiar, from that remote time with the power, prestige and religious sanctity of the caliphate. The coins of Muhammad bin Sam,¹⁴ the founder of Muslim Empire in India, bear the name of the Khalifa.

The Muslim advent in North-West India almost coincided with the crystallization of this concept of caliphate. Mahmud of Ghazna submitted himself in enlightened self interest¹⁵ to the spiritual sway of the Abbasid caliphate in the early eleventh century. Mahmud's coins bore the name of the Abbasid caliph and the practice was continued by his successors at Ghazna and Lahore.¹⁶ More than that he bequeathed this to the Ghaznavid sultans at Lahore and the Turkish Sultans at Delhi. Like Iltutmish, Ghiyasuddin the ruler of Bengal had also procured a patent from the caliph of Baghdad. Iltutmish disregarding the caliphal recognition, carried war into Gaur and compelled Ghiyasuddin to pay homage to him as Sultan-i Azam. If so-called sovereignty of the caliph had any substance both

14. Mirza Kalich Beg, Fredun Beg, Chachnama, Delhi, 1974, p. 4. For detailed study see Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. II, p. 4.

15. Muhammad Nazim, Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, Cambridge, 1931, pp. 164-65.

16. Syed Mahmud, Khilafat and England, Patna, 1922, p. 55.

Iltutmish and Ghiyasuddin enjoyed equal status. The action of Iltutmish was a violation of the allegiance. But he knew well that the Caliph's sovereignty was a mere fiction. Even Balban in one of his inscriptions in the year 1283 A.D. called himself Naib-i Amir al-Mominin, a helper to the caliph, though caliphate had ceased to exist twenty years earlier.¹⁷ His independence in this regard shows his pragmatic attitude towards the Caliphal fiction. In the words of Ziauddin Barani:

Government conquest and kingship are incompatible with a life of religious poverty unless the prestige and power of the Monarch are maintained, men will begin to suppress each other lawlessly, the obedient will become disobedient, dignity of the Supreme Command will vanish and the execution of the Government will become impossible, such Islam and such Muslim are not left that one can govern them after manner of Abu Bakar and Umar. 18

Alauddin Khalji (1296-1316) and most of his successors until Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-1451), reconciled themselves to an abstract concept of Universal Muslim caliphate with a hypothetical caliph. The title used

17. E. Thomas, 'Coins of the Kings of Ghazni', Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. IX, p. 267.

18. Ziauddin Barani, Fatawa-i Jahandari, p. 34.

by these Sultans, no doubt on the advice of the 'Ulama' and the elite of their court was traditional one. Was the Nasir-i Amir-ul Mumineen or in the case of Alauddin Khalji¹⁹ even that of Yamin-ul Khilafat (right hand of the caliphate). After the sack of Baghdad the word khilafah underwent a change in its usage and became synonymous with monarch all over the Islamic world. Qutubuddin Mubarak Shah, son of Alauddin Khalji (1316-1320), assumed the caliphal title of Amir al-Muminin and Imam al-a'zam. It is significant that, this act of the Sultan did not receive any condemnation of the 'ulama' or any of the contemporary writers. This shows that caliphate was not considered to be a matter of deep religious feeling during the later Sultans. Its name was used to advance political interest of the sovereign concerned to satisfy the general Muslim public opinion. Moreover, it seems that from the end of the 13th century onwards, certain princes introduced the word khalifa into their titles, without however appropriating the title Amir al-Muminin. For the first time this was done by the Saljuk Sultans of Rum, protected by the Mongols and also by the Sultans of Delhi.

 19. At this time the word Khilafah, underwent a loosening of meaning in its Persian usage and became synonymous with other terms used for a state or kingdom like dawlat and saltanat. This vulgarization of the term khilafat was not confined to India, it was a logical consequence of the sack of Baghdad and the end of the Abbasid Caliphate. Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London, 1967, p. 7.

The Timurids even before Babur, believed in the theory that each Emperor was also the caliph of his own dominion:

Akbar did attempt to seige the religious sceptre of the Muslim world, and did wish the people of his dominion to look up to him as the khalifa. He was even styled, "Hazrat Sultan al- Islam, Khilafat Anam and Amir al- Muminin". .20

Akbar seemed to have ignored the Ottoman caliphate. It may have been, perhaps due to the fact that they regarded the Ottoman Sultan as their inferior, recalling the historical fact of Timur subduing the Ottoman Empire in 1402 A.D.²¹ By this time the Ottomans had already established their religious supremacy over Dar al-Islam. The Muslim subjects recognized the Ottoman Sultan as the rightful caliph and those Indian Muslims who visited Mecca must have said their prayer and performed their pilgrimage under the Turkish sovereigns.

In fact, the Ottoman Sultan wished to be considered, without however claiming the title Amir al-Muminin as bearers of the saltanat and the caliphate combined, a caliphate concieved by the Muslim thinkers of

20. Arnold, op.cit., p. 159.

21. Syedd Mahmud, Khilafat and England, p. 69

the time in terms completely different from those of early Islam.²²

After the conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1517, Sultan Selim I made the Abbasid caliph Al-Mutawakkil, a prisoner of deference and exiled him to Constantinople. He was in exile until the reign of Sultan Sulayman. When he returned to Egypt, where he died in 1543 A.D., he made no further exercise of his functions as Caliph, except in conferring the investiture to the governor Ahmad Pasha, a governor who had rebelled against the Ottoman Sultan. The fact emerges clearly from the account of these events that the last Abbasid Caliph was considered of negligible importance by the victorious Ottoman Sultan. There is no justification for the view that there was an official transfer of the caliphate to Constantinople. It is true that certain relics of Prophet and of the Companions were transferred to the capital of the Ottoman Empire. So far Sultan Selim and his successors never bore the titles other than Sultan and Khakan in the documents of the states, inscription and coinage also. Even they did not use those of Amir al-Muminin or of Imam. The new title adopted by Sultan Selim after the conquest of Egypt was that of Khadim

22. For a detailed study see, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 945.

al-haramayn, which was in fact a title belonging to the Mamluk Sultans and not to the Caliph. Here we see that these illdefined claims of the Ottoman Sultan towards sovereignty over the whole Muslim world came into conflict in certain respects in the East with the ambitions of Mughal rulers of India during the 16th and 17th centuries. After the reign of Akbar (1556-1605) the capital of these far away but powerful princes, Delhi was called Dar al-Khilafah²³ (seat of the Caliphate) and the coinage of Akbar bore the inscription: "the great Sultan, the exalted Khalifa". The Mughal ruler who dealt on equal terms with the Ottoman Sultans, continued until the reign of Shah Alam II (1760) to qualify themselves with the title of Khalifa.

The existence of the Ottoman caliphate became an issue of religious concern for the Indian Muslims and assumed evergrowing proportions during the last quarter of the 19th century. The early history of Islam does not provide any clue to the existence of Ottoman influence. Not to speak of Akbar, who stated his own claim to religious innovation, none of the other Mughal rulers seem to have recognised any religious or temporal authority outside the

23. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 946.

country. They regarded themselves as Khalifas in their own right.²⁴ The Indian Muslims completely ignored the Ottoman Caliphate during the Mughal period for more than three centuries.

Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) was a great Muslim Mujtahid of India in the 18th century. He believed strongly in the necessity of a Universal caliphate,²⁵ and considered it in accordance with the classical theory as the exclusive privilege of the Quraysh. He also mentioned it in his well-known book Tafhimat Ilaahiya. Indo-Muslim orthodoxy began to take an interest in the Ottoman claim to the caliphate during the 1840s. Revival of emphasis on the concept of a Universal caliphate began in Indian Islam with Shah Wali Allah.²⁶ His grandson Shah Muhammad Ishaq migrated to Hijaz in 1844 and undertook to support Ottoman political policies. Since then the trend of Wali Allahi 'Ulama and later the Orthodox Schools of Deoband and Nadwat-ul Ulama almost implicitly gave the Ottoman claim to the Universal Islamic

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24. Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta, 1971, p. 128.
25. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, London, 1967, p. 123.
26. Shah Wali Allah, Izala-al-Khafa and Hujjat al-Lahil Baligha, II, pp. 422-9.

caliphate a religious recognition in India.²⁷ The Muslims of India all along recognized the Sultan of Turkey as caliph.

The religious and temporal authority of the Ottoman caliph was interestingly enough, first invoked in India by the British when Lord Wellesly forwarded a letter from Ottoman Sultan Selim III to an Indian sovereign Tipu Sultan, asking him to mend his relations with the British and make friendship with them.²⁸ The second intervention by the Caliph in India on behalf of the British was made during the revolt of 1857. European nations themselves and especially the British Government always recognised the Khalifa.²⁹ They made use of this power of the Sultan of Turkey for their own purposes. The firman obtained from Sultan 'Abdul Hamid during the sepoy Mutiny of 1857 A.D. advising the Muslims to act loyally towards the British Government was based on the assumption that the Sultan of

27. Syed Mahmud, Khilafat awr Islam, 1922; see also 'Ubaydullah Sindhi, Shah Wali Allah awr Unki Siyasi Tahrik, Lahore, 1952, p. 110.

28. M.H. Abbas, All About the Khilafat, Calcutta, pp. 47-59, Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., pp. 295-6.

29. British understanding that the Ottoman Caliph was spiritual and political leader of the Muslims whether they lived within or outside the Ottoman Empire often prompted them to use the Caliph's good offices for

Turkey had a right to command and guide the Muslims as the Khalifa of Islam.³⁰ The caliph condemned the mutineers of 1857. We see that the British had obtained a proclamation from the Ottoman caliph and advised the Indian Muslims to remain loyal to his British allies and make peace with the English as they were the friends of their caliph. Such type of proclamations had tremendous effect upon the Muslim population of India. From that time Muslims of India began to look upon the English as their friends and protectors. This faith in the integrity and the honesty of the British Government was so much established that they even opposed the National Movement in India. British policy in India was to encourage a pro-Turkish attitude in Muslim India from the

securing Muslim allegiance in their empire. This policy continued to exist until the disintegration and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during the World War-I. There were many intellectuals and writers who praised the Ottoman, especially for their cooperation with the British. Such complimenting discourages were picked up by the Indian supporters of the Ottoman Caliphate and given wide publicity in support of their cause. For instance the Muslim Chronicle published the gist of English man's article 'Pan-Islamism and Khilafat' which was published in the Times, London. In the said article the writer had appreciated the Ottoman's friendly relations with the British. For detailed study, see The Muslim Chronicle, 12th. Sept. 1908, Calcutta, pp. 105-106.

30. M.H. Abbas, op.cit., pp. 61-62.

Crimean War to 1878. Already in 1876 the Indian Muslims were trying to influence the British Government in the direction of pro-Turkish policy.³¹ The Ottoman claim ceased to be merely titular and became an active factor in international politics with the coming of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876 A.D. Many supporters of 'Abd al-Hamid entered India as, other Muslim lands, to enlist Pan-Islamic sympathy for his caliphal aims. The change of British policy regarding Turkey had begun to develop tension in Indian Muslim politics between those loyal to the British and those who were the followers of Pan-Islamism. But in the second half of the 19th century, Sultan Abdul Aziz's claim³³ to be the Universal Khalifa of Islam was generally accepted by the Indian Muslim middle class intelligentsia.³⁴

The Shi'i intellectual leaders of India like Ameer Ali, Badaruddin Tayyabji and Chiragh Ali also considered the Universal Ottoman caliphate as the political solution for

31. Abul Kalam Azad, Masla-i-Khilafat, p. 182.

32. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, p. 125.

33. W.S. Blunt, The Future of Islam, London, 1882, pp. 81-84.

34. W.S. Blunt, India Under Rippon, pp. 64, 112. It has been safely assumed that he was the first Ottoman Sultan in whose name the Khutba was read in the Indian Mosques. Syed Ahmad Khan, Tahzib al-Akhlaq, Vol. II, p. 402.

the whole Dar al-Islam. Regarding Shi'i intellectual support for the Ottoman Caliphate Aziz Ahmad writes:

One of the most curious features of the Pan-Islamic Movement in the pragmatic support of Shi'i intellectuals for the Ottoman Caliphate, in India as elsewhere. Its philosophical basis, as we have seen, is the distinction worked out by Amir Ali between the immaculate spiritual imamat of Shi'i Imams, and the 'pontifical' or temporal caliphate of a monarchical head of the entire Muslim Community, both of whom he regards as mutually compatible. 35

In 1879 Bad-ruddin Tayyabji wrote a letter in Bombay Gazette, refuting British Press comments on Turkey's 'Bulgarian atrocities and petitioned Queen Victoria to support Turkey against Russia'.³⁶ Chiragh Ali chose Turkey as a model rather than Shi'i Persia in suggestions for political and religious reforms because of Turkey's primacy among Muslim states. Further he opposed Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view in 1882, defended Ottoman administration and emphasised its liberation and quoted Western views supporting Turkey on

35. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, p. 130

36. H. Tayyabji, Badruddin Tayyabji, Bombay, 1954, cited in Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 130.

the Armenian question. He was also opposed to the views of W.S. Blunt regarding the transfer of the caliphate to a Qurayshite Arab.³⁷

Sayyid Ahmad Khan had been pro-Turkish as long as this was the British policy. He had popularized the Fez (Turkish cap) in India. In 1870 A.D. he complemented Sultan Abdul Aziz as one who graced and defended the throne of the caliph.³⁸ In articles in Tahzib al-Akhlaq, he had congratulated the Ottoman Sultans on the reforms introduced during the Tanzimat period and later. His stand regarding Turkey during the 1880s and 1890s is represented by such statements as:

We are devoted and loyal subjects of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, he neither had, nor can have any spiritual jurisdiction over us as Caliph. His title of Caliph is effective only in his own land and only over the Muslims under his sway . 39

In the last year of his life Sayyid Ahmad Khan was so worried by the wave of antipathy towards the British and of

37. Chiragh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1883, pp. XIX-XXXI, 41-49, 82-95.

38. Aziz Ahmad, Op.cit., p. 60.

39. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Akhri Mazamin, The Truth about Khilafat, Lahore, 1916, pp. 32-33.

support for the Turkish Sultan that he wrote a number of essays denying the latter's claim to be a Khalifa. In his articles on the caliphate he refuted the claim of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II of Turkey to be the Khalifa of the Indian Muslims. He wrote that he could be a Khalifa only in that country which he governed and of those Muslims who owe allegiance to him, he could be a Khalifa in that country only where he could award punishment and maintain the laws of religion. But he could not be Khalifa for those countries which were outside his jurisdiction and sovereignty, in which he could neither impose his orders nor maintain the faith nor protect the Muhammadan inhabitants. Sultan Abd al-Hamid was undoubtedly a Muhammadan sovereign and consequently the Indian Muslims could sympathise with him as Muhammadans. But to say that he was the khalifa of the Indian Musalmans was true neither according to Muhammadan law nor Muhammadan religion.⁴⁰ He argued that the real caliphate was limited only to the first Four Pious Caliphs but under the Umayyads and Abbasids the caliphate became a monarchy. Sayyid Ahmad further argued that historically Muslims had known three Caliphates at one time, the Abbasid, in Baghdad, the Fatimids in Egypt and the Umayyads in Spain. He declared that there was no Quranic

 40. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, The Aligarh Institute Gazette, 11th. Sept., 1897.

text or hadith which enjoined Universal caliphate.⁴¹ In that sense the Ottomans could call themselves caliphs, but only in their own territory. He assured the British that Turkish politics would have no repercussions on Muslims of India despite its natural sympathy.⁴² On the other hand he considered any direct contact of the Ottoman agents with the Indian Muslims as unconstitutional and a breach of protocol.⁴³ The Indian Muslims were legally bound to obey the writ not of an external caliph but of the British Indian Government even if it were oppressive.⁴⁴ But Chiragh Ali while dedicating his book The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman and other Mohammadan State to Sultan Abdul Hamid, addressed him as Amir al-Muminin and a Khalifa. In the words of Chiragh Ali:

He is competent enough to bring about any political, legal or social reforms on the authority of the Koran just as the former Sultans introduced certain beneficial measures both in law and politics in direct contravention of the Hanafite School of the Common law. He is the only legal authority in matters of

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41. Maqalat-i-Sir Sayyid, Vol. I, Lahore, 1962, pp. 157-8, 161-63.
42. Tahzeeb-al-Akhlaq, Vol. II, p. 144.
43. Sir Sayyid, Akhiri Mazamin, pp. 51-53, 59-69.
44. Ibid., pp. 111-113.

innovation, being a successor to the successors of the Prophet (Khalifa Khalifai Rasul-Allah), the Amir al-Muminin, the Saut-ul-Hai or the living voice of Islam. . 45

Sayyid Ahmad raised serious objections to the Ottoman Sultan sending a direct communication to the Shaykhs and 'Ulama' of India in reply to the congratulating messages from Indian Muslims. The Sultan while thanking them, had stressed the necessity of all Muslims uniting together and reminded them of their religious obligations towards him. Sayyid Ahmad pointed out that according to the law of nations, the Sultan had no right to send such political communications to the subjects of another Government without directing it through the Government of that country! And since 'the Muslims of India are not the subjects of Turkey'. He emphasised, "they cannot have any objections towards the Caliph...."⁴⁶

He also persuaded Shibli Nu'mani to write an article which upheld the orthodox view that the Khilafa ended with the first four Khalifas, and that even in the sense of Universal monarchy, the Khilafa was the privilege


45. Chiragh ali, op.cit., pp. XXIX-XXX.

46. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "Sultan-i Rum aur Hindustan ke Musalman", Maqalat, Vol. 13, p. 427.

of the Quraysh.⁴⁷ Those views were presented by his contemporaries.

While discussing the term Khalifa and Khilafa and their rights and duties Mohsinul Mulk has rightly observed that it is impossible for any man to think that the Sultan of Turkey is the Khalifa of the Indian Muslims or that the Indian Muslims can call him their Khalifa in the real sense of the term. The Sultan cannot exercise any of the powers of Khalifa over the Indian Muslims, nor the Indian Muslims are bound to obey the Sultan by their religion. But at the same time by denying Khilafa it does not follow that the Indian Muslims have no love for the Sultan of Turkey and that they do not care for the safety of the Turkish Government. On the contrary it is a fact that all the Muslims had a great love for Turkey and they prayed for its stability.⁴⁸

It should be kept in mind that sympathy for religion and for a community is quite distinct from political relations. It is not necessary that those who love the Sultan should also be loyal to the British



47. Shibli Nu'mani, Maqalat-i Shibli, Vol. I, pp. 182-87.

48. Mohsin-ul-Mulk on 'Khalifa and Khilafat', The Aligarh Institute Gazettee, June, 1906.

Government. In the end of the article Mohsin-ul Mulk concludes that if there be a war between our Government and any Muhammadan power, we should as loyal subjects, be on the side of our Government, but being a Muslim we should also be sad about it. And Mohsin-ul-Mulk thinks that no true Muslim in India holds a different opinion.⁴⁹ By that time the era of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's leadership had come to an end. Here we see that the strength of feeling in India in favour of the Ottoman Sultan's claims to be the Khalifa of all Muslims and in favour of jihad against the British may be gauged by the reactions of loyalist Muslims.⁵⁰

Keeping the above factors and assertions of views we may come to a pragmatic conclusion. After the sack of Baghdad the word Khilafat became synonymous with monarchy. Akbar regarded the Ottoman Sultan as the inferior one. After the reign of Akbar Delhi was called Dar-al Khilafa (seat of the caliphate). The intervention by the caliph in India on behalf of the British during the revolt of 1857. We see that the British had obtained a proclamation from the Ottoman Caliph advising the Indian Muslims to remain loyal to his British allies. Indian Muslims were trying their

49. Ibid.

50. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's pamphlet Islam awr Jihad published in 1900 which called for loyalty towards the British. Cf. P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, London, 1972, p. 178.

influence in the direction of pro Turkish policy. This British policy brought tension between loyalists to British and the followers of Pan-Islamism. In the Middle of 19th century Sultan Abdul Aziz claimed to be the Universal caliph, and it was generally accepted by the Indian Muslim middle class intelligentsia.

CHAPTER - III

IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION AGAINST TURKEY AND INDIAN MUSLIMS

The highest stage of development of capitalist society better known as Imperialism took place towards the end of 19th century in the industrially developed countries. Britain emerged as a great colonial power and occupied India and some parts of Burma by the middle of the 19th century. She was also going to force China into a semi-colonial status by the Opium Wars. In face of the colonial oppression of about 800 millions of people at the beginning of the present century and against the constantly increasing imperialist exploitation, the national liberation movements in the colonies and dependent countries emerged as an active factor. There were many factors which positively influenced the process of the development of political consciousness in the National Freedom Movement. Lala Lajpat Rai rightly remarked:

There can be no doubt that Indian Nationalism is receiving a great deal of support from the world forces operating outside India . 1

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1. Young India, London, 1917, p. 181, Cf. Horst Karuger, "India's Freedom Struggle and Beginning of Solidarity Between National Liberation Movements Before World War I in various countries", Studies in the India's Foreign Relations, Hyderabad, 1975, f.n.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 and its impact on the National Liberation Movement in Asia had far reaching consequences. The Russians had succeeded in shaking the autocratic rule of the Czar and they had obtained certain concessions from him. This achievement of Russian people also inspired the patriotic forces in other oppressed countries especially the Asian countries with new confidence. The Indian nationalists compared the British colonial rule in India with the autocracy of the Czar. The revolutionary upsurge in Russia helped the Indian nationalists to arrive at the conclusion that the methods which has applied successfully against Czarism could also be used in India.² The Indian National Congress held its annual meeting in Calcutta in 1906. Dada Bhai Naoroji was the President of the Congress. In his presidential address he gave a remarkable example of the profound influence of the international factors on the Indian liberation movements. He said:

2. M.K. Gandhi who was in South Africa at that time was very much impressed by the methods of the Russian Revolution especially by the general strike and urged the Indian people to "resort to Russian Remedy against tyranny", 'Russia and India' (11.11.05) in The Collected Works, Vol. V, 1905-1906, Delhi, 131-32.

"While China in the East and Persia in the West of Asia are awakening and Japan has already awakened and Russia is struggling for emancipation - and all of them against despotism - can the free citizens of the British Indian Empire continue to remain subject to despotism? 3

Imperialist forces adopted all the possible means to suppress the revolutionary wave. Drastic measures of oppression were applied against the most active and most progressive section of the liberation movement. By promises of reform, however, the liberal wing was drawn over to the side of the colonial rulers which resulted in the split of the anti-colonial movement. Now it became nearly impossible for the nationalists to carry on this agitation against the colonial rule. The Indian nationalists in particular and the nationalists of other countries in general were victims of this situation. The radical political societies were largely forced underground, from where they endeavoured to carry on the unequal struggle against the apparatus of imperialist oppression' above all against the police and against the bureaucracy, increasingly by direct action including self sacrificing deeds of individual terrorism. But many active participants and leaders of the National

3. Quoted from I. M. Reisner and N.M. Goldberg (eds) Tilak and the Struggle for Indian Freedom, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 303-304.

Movement had to emigrate in order to continue the fight from abroad. These patriots did not go to foreign countries only to escape the impending penalties, but were sent by their organisations with the task of organising centres in foreign countries in order to work from there for the goal of national liberation.⁴ It is no mere accident that the Indian revolutionaries abroad came in close contact with the international working class movement and cooperated with it. The objective basis for this alliance was the fact that both revolutionary currents, the international working class movement and the national liberation movement were struggling against the same enemy, i.e. imperialism.

Quick awareness can be felt among the Asian people. They realised the main objectives of Imperialist powers. An interesting example of this is an article "Political Revolutions" published in Calcutta early in 1911 which runs as follows:

"From the events of the last few years it would appear that in the matter of obtaining their objects the European Powers are collectively as well as individually interested".

4. Documents of History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. I, 1917-22 ed. with introductory and explanatory notes by G. Adhikari, New Delhi, 1971, p. 4.

Politicians are generally agreed that development of Asia and the awakening of Asiatic mean so much loss to Europe and the Europeans, for it cannot be denied that all the present greatness of Europe has been at the cost of Asia.

Europe can not maintain its own population and the luxuries enjoyed by the Europeans are those taken away from Asia. Hence, it is that the several European powers are equally interested in preventing any progress and awakening in Asia and therefore help one another....

As for individual interest in Asia it lies in trade, industry, acquisition of wealth and personal government. Indeed, European powers are opposed to each other in respect of these. But since there is unanimity among them as regards the first two objects (the subjugation of Asia and the conversion of the non-Christians H.K) any dispute regarding them is altogether based on political considerations and defrauding a third party.... Hence they are trying to make up their quarrel as regards trade etc. in Asia and forming alliances with a view to attain the first two objects...." The article concludes with the call to the Muslims in general and to Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in particular for united action against the approaching danger from the Europeans. 5

The appeal to Pan-Islamic ideas was not accidental. The Indian Muslims had suffered very severely

5. Reports on Native Papers, Bengal, 1911, 161: Nama-i Mugaddas Hablul Matin, of 6th. February, 1911, National Archives of India.

from the onslaught of British imperialism. Suppressed and demoralised Muslim masses took the attacks of the English Colonialists in a spirit of resignation, even one of fatalism. Their only hope lay in the Pan-Islamic propaganda of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) of Turkey.⁶ The so-called Aligarh Movement initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Khan did not touch the masses in the beginning, but had its social basis mainly among the feudal landlords and a very weak hold over urban middle classes of Muslim Society. The proclaimed loyalty to the British rule did not attract the Muslim masses.

The Ottoman Empire was one of the most powerful empire among the Asian countries. Like the Holy Roman Empire and the Mughal Empire, the Ottoman Empire too, began to decline. We are well aware of the fact that the later part of the reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent marked the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The signs of decay of this great empire had appeared in the 17th

6. The Pan-Islam of Abdul Hamid was politically reactionary and had an absolutistic theocratic basis. It was first of all Pan-Turkism, and was utilized by the Sultan against the national liberation movement of the Arabian peoples. It is not to be mixed with the progressive ideas of al-Afghani who wanted the unity of the Islamic peoples on the basis of genuine constitutional liberties. Horst Karuger, *India's Freedom Struggle and Beginnings of Solidarity between National Liberation Movements before World War I in various countries, Studies in the Foreign Relations of India*, Hyderabad, 1975, pp. 300-301.

century but the whole process of decline took about three hundred years.⁷

There are so many causes and factors responsible for the decline of any empire. Similar factors were responsible for the decline of this empire too. We think that two important factors must be mentioned when we are going to analyse the cause of its decline. The foremost is the economic cause. The new world had already been discovered and the discovery had shifted trade centres to European merchantilism. Now, the Mediterranean trade had begun to loose its importance. Land routes were replaced by sea-routes. This brought havoc to the Ottoman economy and there was not much incentive for future investment. The reason was that the destruction of Europe was followed by the coming down of the Ottoman Empire. The European merchants now tried to engage themselves in some new markets which also effected the Ottoman Empire. The rise of European supremacy in the Middle East and the fall of Ottoman supremacy took place simultaneously with the Carlowitz treaty which was signed in 1699. At the cost of the Ottoman Empire many countries like Russia, Austria, Germany, France and England expanded their trade.

7. Yahya Armajani, Middle East: Past and Present, New Jersey, 1970, p. 160.

The battle of Vienna and the Treaty of Carlowitz closed a chapter in the history of the Ottoman Empire, and now the Turks ceased to be enemies of Western Christendom.⁸ On the contrary, their obvious weakness resulted in an exchange of roles for the Ottoman Empire and for Europe. Henceforth, it was Europe that threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In this regard Russia was keen enough among the European powers. Austria had never been pro-Turkish and it began to play a less prominent role. She wanted to enlarge her possessions in the Balkans and was not ready to see a strong Russia at the cost of the Turks. This was a new diplomatic chapter which lasted for over two centuries in the history of Turkey and came to be known as "the Eastern Question". On the one hand it was diplomatically designed to prevent improper and at random dissolution and on the other hand to prevent unequal distribution of balance of power. Apart from the above mentioned reasons we may assume in the light of the history that the main object of the 'Eastern Question' was to prevent Russia from disturbing the peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁹

8. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University, 1980, p. 9.

9. For a detailed study, see, The Eastern Question: A Study of European Diplomacy, J.A.R. Marriot, op.cit., 1930, pp. 1-20.

The British records are ambiguous and insincere so far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned. While the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was an axiom of nineteenth century British policy, this axiom had hedged qualifications and practical reservations.¹⁰ Britain's interest in Ottoman integrity originated, of course, in her desire to protect her imperial line to the East. Protection of this life-line sometimes demanded more than a mere negative hands off. Turkish policy required occasionally positive British penetration into Asiatic and African Ottoman possessions. Between 1883 and 1887 Britain was intensely interested in establishing an English controlled land and sea route through Mesopotamia to India.

During the last quarter of the 17th century the rise of European power and decline of Ottoman Empire took place simultaneously. The weakness of Ottoman Empire was further exposed when the Turks failed to capture Vienna for the second time in 1683. This was the signal for a concerted action against the Turks by the Europeans. The war was collectively started by Austria, Venice and Poland in 1684 and lasted till 1698. It was believed earlier that the Ottoman Empire was unconquerable, but after the defeat

10.G. Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 22.

of the Turks in 1683 it was revealed to the world that the Ottoman Empire was no longer unconquerable and no longer had the strength to dominate the affairs of Europe.

After the defeat of the Turks, a treaty was signed in 1699 at Carlowitz in Hungary which marked the advent of a new era in the history of Near East and it further deteriorated the power and glory of Turkey. Their subsequent defeats and cession of territory ended the glorious chapter of Ottoman threat to the Austrian Empire and indeed to Europe. The following centuries witnessed the further expansion of Austria into the Balkans at the expense of Turkey. E.S. Creasy has rightly remarked that after signing this treaty all serious dread of the Ottoman military power ceased in Europe.¹¹

Her importance has become diplomatic. Other nations have from time to time sought to use her as political machine against Austria or the growing power of Russia; and this diplomatic importance of Turkey has grown proportionally greater as the sovereigns of Russia became desirous of possessing of the Black Sea for the carrying out of their plans *

11. E.S.Creasy, History of the Ottoman Empire, London, 1856, Vol. II., pp. 104-5.

*. Schlosser, Introduction to the History of the 18th Century, Cf. E.S. Creasy, op.cit., p. 105

With the beginning of the 19th century Russia had made herself a great European power. She had established naval bases and fortifications in Odessa and Sevastopol; much of the Ukraine in South was under her control and thus, Russia had a firm grip on the Black Sea. Moreover, Russia was poised to dominate the Caucasus and later on much of Central Asia. In the North she controlled the Eastern Baltic. The French Revolution had not only freed the Jews from the oppression, it had overturned the world of the eighteenth century. An upstart Corsican general, Napoleon Bonaparte, having conquered Italy, was far ahead of Russia in seeking to take over the key regions of Middle East.¹² For his imperial ambitions Napoleon sought possession of Egypt which was, perhaps, the most strategic region in the world due to its geographical location as it was at the junction of Asia, Africa and Europe. As great Britain was the traditional enemy of France, Napoleon was persuing to cripple Britain, if not at home, at least in her imperial possessions. Meanwhile, Napoleon's conflict with Turkey ended with the brief peace of Amiens in 1802.* Thereafter, Napoleon used Turkey for his own purposes as he did with

12. Richard Allen, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent, London, 1984, p. 113.

*. A Treaty which was signed between the French and the Ottomans at Amiens in March, 1802. See JAR Marriot, op.cit., p. 172.

other nations. When the war resumed and Napoleon faced a European coalition initiated by Russia and Britain, the Turks were persuaded to join him in fighting Russia.

The Turks were considered to be very ambitious and they are known in history as 'empire builders'. But now they were bound to adopt a defensive policy after the treaty of Carlowitz. At the beginning of the 18th century the world of Islam lay sprawled from Central Europe and Morocco to Central Asia and the Bay of Bengal, but throughout the 18th century Austria and Russia were the leaders of European aggression against the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen the Treaty of Carlowitz was the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the Ottoman's in Europe and also paved the way for the beginning of European imperialism in the Middle East. This treaty not only marked a watershed in Ottoman relations with Europe, but it also marked the culmination of the era of internal disintegration and the beginning of rapid decline.¹³ Mainly Austria and Russia were involved in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The interests of Russia and Austria often clashed but both countries were mainly interested in the European holdings of the Ottomans. The main interest of Great Britain and France in Southern Europe

13. S.J. & E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, C.U.P. London, 1977, p. 225.

was economic gain and upholding of the European balance of power. Their territorial interests were concentrated in the African and Asian dependencies of the Ottoman Empire. The imperial policy of Great Britain was built around the protection of India and the main routes leading to it. France was mainly interested in North Africa and the Levant. Otherwise the interests of France in the rest of the Ottoman Empire economic and religious. Germany and Italy were late comers to the scene. The German interests were economic and political, immediate interest being gaining of influence at the Porte in order to foil the plans of Russia and England. Italy's role was significant, she was interested in the contract of Libya while other Europeans were involved elsewhere. According to Shaw this was the first of many agreements between the Ottomans and coalitions of European powers allied against them, and it represented the Ottoman transition from her offensive nature to the defensive one.¹⁴ The treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774 marked the first milestone in the forward movement of Russia. Henceforth it was that the Ottoman Empire set away her supremacy in the Black sea and in its adjoining lands.

Thus, we see that towards the close of the 18th century the weakness of the Ottoman Empire had become

14. Shaw, op.cit., p. 224.

manibest. Turkey had become the "sickman of Europe". She was losing not only her territory but also her power and prestige day by day. But in order to counteract the Russian attempt to control the Black Sea and the Straits which would have threatened British imperial interests in the East, the British pursued a policy of keeping up the existence of the tottering Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The British claimed herself the defender of the Sultan of Turkey and frequently identified her interests as their own. They made special efforts to impress the Indian Muslims that the British Empire was the great power in the world which supported the Muslim cause.¹⁵

The Ottoman Empire was placed in a very difficult situation which led to its further weakening. These situations were followed by revolts, plots and anarchy at home. With the beginning of the 19th century the minds of European statesmen got excited owing to the danger of Russia absorbing the Ottoman Empire bit by bit. Napoleonic campaigns of Egypt drove Russia, Turkey and England into one camp to put a stop to his drive towards the East. But in 1799, Napoleon's ambassador at Constantinople Sebastani was able to win over the Turks to his side. This forced England

15. Mowlvi Chiragh Ali, The Proposed Political Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1883, Introduction, p. I

to oppose the Franco-Turkish coalition. The Alliance of Tilsit in 1807 opened the way for the coalition of Russia and France and carried Napoleon to the zenith of his power.

Russian and French usurpations in the area tended to revive the possibility of an invasion of India by a European power, a fear nursed by a host of Anglo Indians since the abortive Eastern expedition of Napoleon. The British therefore re-examined the position of Turkey as a buffer between the East and the West, lying across the approaches to India. All the geo-political ramifications of the Turkish question were, however, not fully grasped by the British until after the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. From the British point of view this treaty marked a significant advance of Russian policy in the Near East.¹⁶ This awakened Palmerston¹⁷ to a full comprehension of British states in the area, and led him to formulate the policy of the British. The broad outline of this policy was decided in a speech which he delivered in the House of Commons on 11 July 1833: July, 1833:

16. V.J. Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, 1834-53, California, 1935, p. 9.

17. Palmerston, The British Foreign Secretary of Britain.

It is of the utmost importance for the interest of England, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, that the territories and provinces forming the Ottoman Empire should be an independent state... if Russian conquest should lead to the christianising and civilising of the inhabitants of that country, these advantages.... would be counter balanced by the consequences that would result to Europe from the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. I say, then, that undoubtedly Government would feel it to be their duty to resist to the utmost any attempt on the part of Russia to partition the Turkish empire, and, if it had been necessary, we should equally have felt it, our duty to interfere and prevent the Pasha of Egypt from dismembering any portion of the dominions of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty and balance of the rest of Europe . 18

The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi stiffened British attitude towards Russia and turned Palmerston into an implacable opponent of her Eastern ambitions. The political implications of the Eastern Question vis-a-vis India and the nature of Russian danger to Indian territories from the side to the Near and Middle East were also examined at some length by numerous political and military authorities.

18. R.L. Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish Empire, 1853-82, New Delhi, 1973, p. 5. Cf. Donald Southgate, the Most English Minister. The Policies and Politics of Palmerston, New York, 1966, p. 65.

Almost all the issues of the British policy in the Eastern Question converge in the Near East crisis of 1875-78. During the crisis period the British carefully examined the geo-political implications of the Eastern Question, particularly in the context of India.¹⁹

British involvement in the Crimean War was thought to have been influenced by their imperial interests in India.²⁰ Although British policy in the Crimean War was influenced, to a great extent by the considerations of the security of India but the Government of India was not directly involved in the war. This was due to the fear of internal trouble breaking out in case the Government was engaged in a big military enterprise outside the country. The Indians seemed ready to welcome Russian hold in order to throw off the British yoke.²¹ Even before the British actually entered the war its probable repercussions on India were examined by Lord Dalhousie. He was of the view that the war would have a direct bearing on the interests of India and might possibly affect the security of the British

19. bid., p. 15.

20. The Nineteenth Century, Vol.I, 1577, p.43., Cf. Shukla, p.14.

21. R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p. 40.

possessions in India.²² During the 19th century the British bolstered up the Turkish Empire against Russia under the conviction that it was in their imperial interest. They posed themselves as defenders of the Sultan and frequently impressed upon the Indian Muslims that a close community of interests existed between them and the Sultan of Turkey. There was a great deal of talk about the British Empire as being the greatest power in the world.²³ When the Crimean War was over the British Government now started to emphasize the position of the Turkish Sultan as the Caliph of Islam before the Indian Muslims. Even during the Crimean War Lord Dalhousie felt that the Indian Muslims had started feeling great pleasure due to the British support for Turkish cause. The real cause was not that the British had extended full support to defend the Muslim religion, but the reality behind this was to check the Russian aggression in the East.²⁴ The Muslims were kept in dilemma and Dalhousie bluffed that the British Government was fighting for the Muslim interest in the East and apparently lamented that even the Indian Muslims were hostile to the British. The Ottoman Sultan had advised the Indian Muslims to keep

 22. F.D. Secret. Proceedings, Vol. 30, June 1854 (Minutes of Govt. of Geneva, March, 1854.

23. A.J. Toynbee, ed. Survey of International Affairs, Vol.I, 1925, f.n.

24. R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p. 122.

themselves aloof and be loyal to the British crown during the Mutiny of 1857. The British Government had managed to get this proclamation from the Ottoman Sultan. Thus, during the Crimean War the British themselves had obtained a proclamation of the Ottoman Sultan who had advised the Indian Muslims to be loyal to the British. In this way in the whole period of the Crimean War the British themselves had magnified Turkey in the eyes of Indian Muslims.²⁵

The Pan-Islamic ideas were promoted further by the expansion of Russia in Central Asia in the sixties of the 19th century. The rulers of the endangered territories appealed for support to the Turkish Sultan encouraging him to proclaim a kind of religious supremacy over all Muslims.²⁶ Indian experiences were of great relevance in the process of the rise of Pan-Islamic conceptions. The development of Pan-Islamic ideas with its very definite anti-imperialist orientation which were propagated most of all by Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani can be understood to a

25. Ibid.

26. N.R. Keddlie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "Al-Afghani": A Political Biography, Berkeley, 1972, pp. 59-60.

large extent in the background of the Indian historical development.²⁷ The further advance of European powers against Turkey and other Muslim states was instrumental in strengthening the idea of Pan-Islamic unity. First of all Muslim revivalist currents as represented by the Deoband School in India discovered in the concepts of the renaissance of past greatness and of material bravery a common basis with Pan-Islam. In the same way the demand for liberation from alien domination corresponded with the national aspirations of the colonially oppressed and dependent peoples.²⁸

27. R. Hartmann, Islam Und Nationalismus, Berlin, 1948, 24; Cf. Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. II, Delhi, 1967, p. 364:

The main trouble was that the Muslim World was divided in its political aims. The 'Ulama, who commanded the Muslim majority, wanted to have no truck with the British Government then they were greatly perturbed by the recent events in the Islamic World. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire had been humiliated by the Russians, and the Caliphate was shorn of much of its territory and prestige. For the Indian Muslims, who looked upon the Sultan of Turkey as their Khalifa, this was adding insult to Muslims. About the same time another Muslim State, Egypt was fast losing its independent status and passing under British sway. The deposition of the Khedive and the defeat of 'Urabi Pasha in 1881 were blows which had repercussions all over the Islamic World.

As a result of these developments, sentiments of shame and reproach against themselves and of anger against the Imperialist Powers of Europe, especially Great Britain, were sweeping the Muslim countries.

28. N.R. Keddie op.cit., pp. 130-31.

Indian Muslims' relations with the Sultan Caliph of Turkey was again sought to be brought into prominence in July, 1867 when Sultan paid a visit to England. The Sultan was honoured by India Office with a lavish fete, all the expenses of which were charged to the Indian revenue. The British Government justified this step on the ground that the attention shown to the Sultan as the head of the Muslim religion would tend to propitiate the Indian Muslims, and soften their feelings of hostility towards their infidel masters.²⁹ However, many Anglo Indian people and newspapers raised a loud outcry against this expedition. The nature of the reaction by the India Office may be summed up by a quotation from the Friend of India:

.....We have the satisfaction of knowing from the precedented unanimity of the Indian journals and other authorities native and English, that our Mussalman subjects are not propitiated, while the Hindus are outraged.....' 30

The influence of the Sultan-Caliph over the Muslims coupled with the material power of England was thought to be capable of stopping the steady advance of Russia in Central Asia and preventing Persia's subservience

29. The Friend of India, 1 August 1867, p. 913 Cf. R.L. Shukla, p. 123.

30. The Friend of India, 29 Aug. 1867, p. 1026.

to her. According to this a scheme was contemplated in 1869, by that time the British had become extremely concerned about the Russian advance in the East. A part of the scheme was to propagate among the Indian Muslims and the Afghans that the Caliph looked upon England as his best friend and that cordial relations existed between the British and the Turkish Empire.³¹ Ali Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizir, was reported to have referred to the cordiality of feeling entertained by the Porte towards the British Government. He was also said to have dwelt upon the fortunate position of Indian Muslims, who enjoyed complete religious liberty with all advantages of a strong and enlightened Government", and to have asserted that the Sultan's Government would never countenance any attempt by the Indian Muslims to harm British interests.³²

A large number of supporters from various Muslim states frequently met at Constantinople in the 1870s and secretly discussed questions concerning their mutual interests. Several missionaries from Bokhara, Kashghar and other Muslim states to the Sultan pointed out a sign of revivalism. Pan-Islamic idea was taking a concrete shape.

31. F.D. see Home Prog, Vol. , 1869, No. III.

32. F.D. Sec. H. Prog. Vol. 1869, No.112.

33. F.D. July 1875, Nos. 193-96.

It seemed to the Muslims that the Sultan as their Caliph would lead them in forging a strong united front against the relentless onslaughts of the West. The British were aware of it, and also lent the Pan-Islamic movement a helping hand. This encouragement was however, hesitant, for it was double-edged weapon. It could be used against them. Any fusion or alliance of Muslim countries under the Caliph was bound, sooner or later, to have its impact on the Indian Muslim subject to Christian rule.³⁴

Shaykh al-Hind of Deoband tried his best to give a practical shape to Pan-Islamic ideas on the political level at the beginning of the 20th century. He prepared a secret scheme of driving out the English. He made contact secretly with the governments of Afghanistan and Iran. His motive was to bring the two Governments together and he further wanted to seek military support of Turkey in driving the British out from Iran and Afghanistan. To carry out this programme of action, an important and secret place was taken in the North West Frontier as a remnant from the Wahabi Movement* in the 19th century and the militant tribes in

34. F.D. Sec. July 1875, Nos. 193-96.

*. For a detailed study of this movement see, Qamaruddin Ahmad, The Wahhabi Movement in India, Calcutta, 1966.

this region which were in close contact with Deoband.³⁵ It is very remarkable and it should be kept in our memories in this connection that this current of anti-British Movement was based on the common action of Muslims and Hindus alike in spite of its Pan-Islamic orientation.³⁶ The plan of ousting the British colonialists from India culminated in the so-called "Silk Letter Conspiracy" during World War I.³⁷ Apart from other achievements Pan-Islamic ideas became a powerful stimulus after World War I contributing decisively to the anti-imperialist Khilafat Movement.

35. Ziaul Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Bombay, 1963, pp. 55-56.

36. Ibid., p. 56.

37. Ibid., pp. 59-60, Cf. Imperialism: Seditious Committee Report, Calcutta, 1918, p. 173.

CHAPTER - IV

JAMAL AL DIN AFGHANI'S INFLUENCE ON INDIAN MUSLIMS

The advent of colonial age brought many disastrous changes for the Muslim society. The question was how to deal with this new challenge. The Muslim intelligentsia of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries responded to this new situation with great vigour. It was interpreted by some Muslim intellectuals that Islam should be understood not merely as a theology but more as a patriotic movement. This response however did not represent the Muslim consensus but it was the belief of a narrow group of Muslim elite. The great pan-Islamic thinker of the time Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani belonged to the group of 'Ulama who felt that Western onslaught should be met on the basis of Islamic unity. As a pan-Islamic thinker he was unique among the Muslim thinkers of the age. He continued to be a source of inspiration for the Muslim intellectuals of the entire Islamic world. Both nationalist and modernist Muslim thinkers and political leaders were influenced by his thoughts and ideas.

During the later half of the nineteenth century the nations of the East underwent a great change under the influence of Western culture and society. Already the

Muslim society of the Eastern nations had lost its political and cultural identities under the thrust of Western imperialism. Jamal al-Din Afghani¹ was perhaps the first Asian thinker to identify these two elements of the West. Therefore the task before thinkers like al-Afghani was two-fold. On the one hand, to survive against Western imperialism and on the other to revive the past glory of Islam. On the political plane, al-Afghani insisted on the unity of Muslim states and on intellectual level he emphasized upon the need of bridging the gap between the medieval Muslim thought and modern Western knowledge.

Many Indian Muslims also realised that social and religious reformation was an essential condition for the development of the country on modern lines and for the growth of national unity and solidarity. But Western conquest had exposed the weakness of Indian society, which was at that time on the verge of decline. In fact that modern Western culture immediately gave birth to a new dimension in India. Indian thinkers and reformers had started to look into the defects of their society and they were trying to find out the means of removal of those evils. There were very few Muslim intellectuals who could face

1. For a study of the life and works of al-Afghani see Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Athar-i Jamal al-Din Afghani, Delhi, 1940.

these complex challenges. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali, Chiragh Ali, Badruddin Tayabji, Mawlana Altaf Husain Hali, Mawlana Shibli Naumani, Muhammad Iqbal, Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad and Ali Brothers and many others accepted these challenges. Except Sayyid Ahmad Khan, they were all influenced to some extent by the ideas of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani's main criticism was reserved for the Aligarh School led by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who saw that the Indian Muslims could regain their economic stability, first, by inspiring confidence in the Government as to their loyalty and secondly by acquiring Western culture and modern education. He wrote a book Tabyin al-Kalam (a Commentary on Bible) in 1862. Another book entitled Ahkam-i Ta'ami Ahl-i Kitab (Rules for Dining with the people of the Book) in 1868. His point throughout his life was that the Muslim Community might look for greater advantages from Britain, and before the close of his career he even combated the anti-British sentiments among his community created by the pan-Islamic Movement started in West Asian countries by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. The latter bitterly criticised Sayyid Ahmad's pro-British policy.² During his stay in Hyderabad he wrote a treatise entitled Haqiqat-i Madhab-i

2. For a detailed study on the life and achievements of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan see Altaf Husain Hali, Hayat-i Javid J.M.S. Baljon, Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan Leyden, 1949.

Nichari wa Bayan-i Hal-i Nichariyan, published in 1298 A.H. It was also translated in Urdu, Turkish and Arabic. In this treatise he ostensibly condemned Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers as heretics and athiests³, which was based upon a mistaken view of his religious ideas. In a number of articles published in al-Urwat al-Wuthqa he attacked the political, educational and religious outlook of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers. In fact, the higher favour in which Sayyid Ahmad Khan was held by the British Government and the official patronage extended to the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College made al-Afghani suspicious of the former's motives of religious reform and his educational policy. It is also believed some times that al-Afghani's opposition of Sayyid Ahmad was not on the religious ground. In fact the real cause of the attack was political. He had serious doubts about the reformist scheme of Sayyid Ahmad Khan on account of the policy of rapproachment with the British which, al-Afghani believed, would lead to the weakening of the Islamic front against the West."⁴

Al-Afghani spent a major part of his life as a wandering person who moved from one place to another. He

3. al-Urwat al-Wuthqa, Part II August 28, 1884, p. 138 Cf. Anwar C.f. Anwar Moazzam, op.cit., p. 93.

4. Mahmudul Haq, Islam in Modern Egypt: Nineteenth Century, Aligarh, 1988, p. 100.

also visited India many times in 1853 at the age of fourteen for educational purposes, then in 1856 on his way to Mecca and then once again between 1857 and 1869. His last visit was in 1879. During this last visit he spent three years in Bombay, Hyderabad, Bhopal and Calcutta. The purpose given by N.R. Keddie to visit India was:

Meet with all navvabs and princes and ulama and grandees of that land and to explain to them one by one the results that are manifested from Unity and solidarity in the whole world and the injuries that have appeared from division and disunity; and to caress their years with the mystery of the Hadith, "the faithful are brothers"; and to express inspiring and prudent words and to attract the friendship and cooperation of the learned and the eloquent; and to breathe into them the new spirit of love of rationality and to rend the curtain of their neglect; to explain to them the place of luminous sultanate in the world of Islam; and to reveal and make manifest to this group the fact that the perpetuation of religion depends on the perpetuation of this Government. And in all the Mosques of the famous cities I shall light a flame in their inner hearth by means of appealing sermons and hadiths of the Best of the Prophets, and I shall altogether burn out their patience and long-suffering. 5

5. N.R. Kedie - Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani : A Political Biography, London, 1972, pp. 134-5.

As a political figure, his reputation had already been established when he visited India in 1868. He was wellcomed by Indian officials but the Government did not allow him to meet the Ulama, and after a month he had to leave the country.⁶ He touched and deeply affected the Indian Muslims in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. His Pan-Islamic movement inspired various activities in different parts of the Muslim world. Coming from an Iranian background where elements of philosophy had not completely died down, he entered now in Indian environment in which both Western ideas and new movements among Muslim might have had a further impact on his mind. Even prior to Afghani, Shah Wali Allah of Delhi had propounded a more traditional theory for modification of Islamic jurisprudence according to the demand and need of the hour in the frame-work of Quran and Sunnah. He has also suggested a scheme of historical development, culminating in a caliphate that should now be revived. In this regard he appears to be the precursor of Afghani.⁷ According to Aziz Ahmad 'the caliphate stressed by Shah Wali Allah was to be an Arab Quraysh Caliphate but the stress on the Caliphate as well as on the need for Jihad in view of the Hindu conquest

6. Anwar Moazzam, "Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani", Bulletin Institute of Islamic Studies, Aligarh, 1960, p. 84.

7. N.R. Keddie, op.cit., p. 28.

of Muslim territory might have contributed something to later Pan-Islamic trends'.⁸ In Afghani's articles in al-Urwat al-Wuthqa, one finds those basic ideas which were later developed by the leaders of the Indian Khilafat Movement. He regarded it as the religious duty of the Muslims to reconquer any territory taken away from them by others, and if this was not possible, then to migrate from what had become, as a result of alien conquest, the Dar al-Harb to some other land in the Dar al-Islam.⁹ The word Pan-Islamism was used for the first time in the journalistic literature of the 1880s to describe the efforts made by the Muslim states to bring about some unity of action against the Christian powers of Europe.¹⁰ It was based essentially on a sense of paternity among the Indian Muslims as well as the Muslims of the world. This theory of Pan-Islamism had great impact on the political thinking of the Muslim of India and caused a definite change in their attitude towards British rule. Indian soil proved to be very fertile for the development and growth of Pan-Islamism and within no time a large number of ardent followers joined this movement, who actively made efforts for the success of this movement.

8. Aziz Ahmad, Studia Islamica, XXVIII, 1968, pp. 135-144. "An Eighteenth Century Theory of Caliphate".

9. Aziz Ahmad, Studia Islamica, XXVIII, 1968, p. 61.

10. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XVII, Fourteenth edition, New York, 1929, p. 185.

The exact nature and extent of Afghani's ideas on Indian Muslims needs a careful study. In some of the Persian articles written by him during his stay in India in 1878¹¹, he directly attacked Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views. Sir Sayyid Ahmad was deeply influenced by the Western concept of nature. He made efforts to interpret the Quran in the light of the laws of nature and went to the extent of making the law of nature a criterion of religious truth, hence he was dubbed as a naycharia. Consequently, the orthodox Ulama rose in revolt against him as the founder of a new sect in Islam.¹² It was around this time that Afghani's Refutation of the Materialists was written. This was an attack on naturalism especially that of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. During 1880s his writings gained momentum and became quite familiar in India. Many of his articles from al-Urwat al-Wuthqa were translated and published in Dar al-Sultanat, Calcutta and Mushir-i- Qaysar, Lucknow.¹³ In the words of W.S. Blunt 'the Muslims of Calcutta had great respect for Afghani to the extent of something like worship.'¹⁴ One of the most favourite disciple of Maulvi, M.A. of Calcutta has pointed out that Afghani was trying to find out a third path which

11. Published in Muallim-i- Shafiq from Hyderabad

12. Mahmudul Haq, op.cit, pp. 96-97.

13. W.S. Blunt, India Under Ripon, London, 1909, p. 112.

would appeal to the orthodox and traditional Muslims and younger Muslim intellectuals as well. They were all anti-British.¹⁴ In Hyderabad Sayyid Ali Bilgrami, an influential dignitary of the time, regarded him as too much of a 'socialist' and a firebrand to carry through a reformation of Islam.¹⁵

The impact of Afghani's appeal was felt generally in the first decade of the twentieth century when he became a symbol of Islamic movement. Among the associates of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who came under Afghani's influence was Shibli Nu'mani (1857-1914) who visited Constantinople in 1893 and received a medal from Sultan Abdul Hamid and established contacts with Afghani's co-worker and disciple Shaykh Muhammad Abduh in Cairo. Shibli Nu'mani himself admitted that he did not meet Afghani during his visit to Istanbul.¹⁶ Modern means of communication had brought the Muslim countries much closer during the later nineteenth century. His Pan-Islamic ideas were echoed in Altaf Husayn Hali's (1837-1914) most celebrated poem Musaddas, written in 1879. It evoked the sentiments that Indian Muslims were the

14. N. R. Keddie, p. 152.

15. W.S. Blunt, The Secret History of English Occupation of Egypt, London, 1907, Vol. II, p. 150.

16. Shibli Nu'mani, Safar Nama-i Misr-o-Rum-o-Sham, Agra, 1894, pp. 217-18.

greatest force of Islamic voice in the entire world. It had generated a popular interest in historical Islam which was fed at all levels by popular literature. Even Sayyid Ahmad Khan had desired that Hali's Musaddas should be sung everywhere. This ushered in an era of political poem, which carried to the masses revolutionary ideas of Afghani's Pan-Islamism¹⁷ A new trend developed in the first quarter of the twentieth century with the strong advocacy of Hali and Muhammad Ali. This was the trend of co-existence of diverse religious faiths or "Federation of Faith". In this theory it was propagated that the Britishers were not only the enemies of Muslims but they were enemies of entire "Eastern Nations" as they were destroying their culture and civilization. They convinced the people of different faiths to fight against the tyranny of Britishers jointly. Hali's view of natural solidarity beyond the nations: that which binds together all the people of the East threatened by the West,¹⁸ was further developed by Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari.¹⁹

17. Aziz Ahmad, Studia Islamica, pp. 64-65.

18. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, Oxford 1967, pp. 118-119.

19. At the All India Khilafat Conference held on 27th December, 1922, Dr. Ansari referred to the need for an Asiatic Federation to promote solidarity among the peoples and countries of Asia with a view to rescuing them from the political and economic bondage of Europe. H.N. Mitra (ed.) The Indian Annual Register, 1923, Vol. I, p. 921.

Afghani left a strong influence on the mind of Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad.²⁰ His theory of Pan-Islamism was developed in 1912-13 by Azad. He even modelled his paper al-Hilal on al-Urwat al-Wuthqa.²¹ Afghani's influence on Azad can be seen from the time of his stay in Constantinople and Cairo when he established close relations with al-Manar group of Syrian and Egyptian scholars. He developed the nationalist and anti-imperialist thrust of Afghani's ideas in al-Hilal, inspired by al-Urwat al-Wuthqa. In a series of articles Azad strongly attacked the Aligarh Movement and Sayyid Ahmad Khan's attitude towards the Turkish caliphate. It was also a heritage of Afghani's influence on Azad.²²

..... and like al-Afghani, he argued on the authority of the Quran that jihād was obligatory against those who had occupied even a part of Dar al-Islam. Political loyalty was due to the Khalifa, who unlike the Pope, was not a spiritual leader, "as in Islam spiritual leadership is due of God and his Prophet alone." The obedience to the Khalifat-i Muluki (Monarchical Caliphate) was

20. Humayun Kabir (ed.) Abul Kalam Azad, Contribution of Syed Mahmud, p. 39.

21. It was an anti-Imperialist journal published by Afghani in collaboration with Abduh.

22. For a detailed study see Abul Kalam Azad, Masla-i Khilafat, 1963,

therefore binding on all Muslims, though not in the same degree as submission to God and his Prophet. The monarchical Khalifa could be disobeyed only if his orders were contrary to the Quran and the Sunnah. 23

Abdul Kalam Azad provided greater ideological coherence to the activities of those Muslims who were beginning to come to terms with the objective reality of Indian nationalism and its ideal of a unified and powerful anti-colonial struggle. He stood strongly for inter-communal harmony citing Prophet Muhammad's covenant with some of the Jews as a valid historical precedent for an integrated alliance with the Hindus. He was of the opinion that the existence of the culture and civilization of East lies in the unity of its inhabitants irrespective of their caste, creed, sex and religion. So it was necessary for the Hindus and Muslims to join hands and make a united front for their existence against the Britishers. This emphasis on a peaceful way of living with Hindus were largely influenced by Afghani. Further we see that as remarked by Albert Hourani:

23. Abul Kalam Azad, Khutbat, Lahore, pp. 219-20, 249-50, 287-8. See also Abdul Ghaffar, Jamal al-Din Afghani, Delhi, 1941, pp. 12-13, 16-17, 35-37.

A religious link did not exclude national link with men of different faiths; in countries such as Egypt and India Muslims also should cooperate with others and there should be good relations and harmony in what pertains to national interests between you and your compatriot neighbours who adhere to diverse religions. 24

Muhammad Iqbal was deeply under Afghani's influence. He was attracted most of all by Afghani's endeavour to find in Islam a means of unification for resisting the domination of the West, and shared his desire to express unity on religious basis of Muslims as a supra-class and a supra national entity. On the eve of and during World War I, directly tied his hopes for liberation from colonial dependency to Pan-Islamic solidarity. This was reflected, in particular, in his poem Shama awr Shair (The Candle and the Poet) written in 1912.²⁵ Iqbal seems to have made some study of Afghani's writings and his influence on his middle of the road neo-modernism could hardly be exaggerated:

24. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, p. 118.

25. L.R. Gorden-Polonsky, "Ideology of Muslim Nationalism" in Hafeez Malik (ed.) Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Pakistan, New York, 1971, pp. 115-116, cited in Mushirul Hasan, Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, Delhi, 1985, p. 5.

The man ... who fully realized the importance and immensity of this task (i.e. of rethinking the world system of Islam without completely breaking with the past), and whose deep insight into the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought and life, combined with a broad vision endangered by his wide experience of men and manners, would have made him a living link between the past and the future, was Jamal al-Din Afhani. If his indefatigable but divided energy could have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief and conduct, the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would have been on a much more solid ground today. 26

In his another poem Jawid Nama he portrayed Afghani as the mouth piece for his own ideas on the ideal Muslim State i.e. the Kingdom of God on earth.²⁷ Here we see that on his political plane Iqbal accepted Afghani's view regarding Mecca as the accepted religious centre. He also searched for a political centre for Dar al-Islam by examining al-Mawardi's theories in the light of recent developments. And in agreement with Turkish thinkers he decided to leave the vexed question of the Khilafat aside for the time being, and arrived at a multi-national concept of Pan-Islamism.

26. Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, London, 1934, p. 92.

27. Iqbal was deeply under al-Afghani's influence and made him his mouth-piece for his own ideas on the ideal Muslim State. For a detailed study see Muhammad Iqbal, Jawaid Nama, Lahore, 1954, pp. 63-93.

On his departure from India at the end of 1883 he left behind him a number of disciples and friends.²⁸ It was perhaps as a result of his influence that the two journals Muallim and Muallim-i Shafiq edited by Muhibb-i Hasan and Sajjad Mirza respectively,²⁹ were started in Hyderabad. All his articles written in India except the two published in Dar-al-Sultanat of Calcutta, appeared in the aforesaid journals. In Calcutta there was an influential group of young Muslims who followed the teachings of al-Afghani.³⁰ It is also reported that besides Hyderabad and Calcutta he also visited several cities in the North-West of India where he

28. Qadi Abd al-Ghaffar, Athar-i Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Delhi, 1944, pp. 121-124.

29. These Journals were published in 1880 and 1881 respectively.

30. W.S. Blunt, India Under Ripon, London, 1909, pp. 98, 104, 113. Following are the names of some of his followers in India:

- a). Salar Jang. He was the Sadr-i Azam of Hyderabad.
- b). Rasul Yar Khan, he was known as Muhiy al-Dawla Nawab Rasul-Yar Jung, a judge and chief of Ulama of Hyderabad.
- c). Sayyid Ali Bilgrami.
- d). Sayyid Husayn Bilgrami.
- e). Sayyid Ali Shustri, he was the head of Shia Ulama of Hyderabad, Qadi Abd al-Haq and Asghar Ali from Bhopal. Abd al-Ghafur Shahbaz al-Bihari and Nawab Abd-al Latif Khan of Calcutta, distinguished from the views advocated by other two existing groups among whom one, led by Sayyid Amir Ali supported Western culture and other headed by Nawab Abd -al Latif Khan, emphasized religious education for the Muslims of Bengal.

made several disciples.³¹ The teachings of al-Afghani had little influence on the direction which Muslim politics in India followed in later years. As we have seen earlier he failed to bring up in India a group of intellectuals who would faithfully propagate his views. However, as mentioned above the influence of his religious ideas found expression in later years in the writings of certain eminent individuals such as Abul Kalam Azad and Muhammad Iqbal.³² With the growth of Indian Freedom Movement, however, this influence became subordinated to national objectives and was reduced to a mere sentimental sympathy for an ideal Muslim Brotherhood. As we have already seen Iqbal was another distinguished thinker who was deeply influenced by Afghani's diagnosis of the degeneration of Muslims as well as by his views on reform and regarded him amongst the foremost religious leaders of the modern times.³³ al-Afghani's influence is further evidenced by the translations of his writings, and in books on his life and works which have appeared in India from time to time.

31. Mhamud Ali Khan, Tarikh-i-Afghanistan, Lahore, n.d., p. 12. Cf. Anwar Muazzam op.cit., p. 94

32. The early issues of al-Hilal, published several articles on al-afghani's life in career and his views on religious reforms were highly praised.

33. Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1954, p. 97.

CHAPTER - V

CONVERGENCE OF PAN-ISLAMISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISM:

THE ISSUE OF TURKEY

Indian Muslims came much closer to Pan-Islamic Movement due to the rising international and national political development. Indian nationalism came into being as a counterpart of the West. The national awakening in India has been the greatest single development in the first half of the twentieth century, although it had its germination in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact the nineteenth century marked the zenith of British Imperialism in India. The alien rule itself was basically responsible for the growth of Indian nationalism. Political awakening and consciousness among the Indian people was infact due to natural reaction against the aggressive British Imperialism. The media played a very important role in it. The Indo-Turkish press contributed a lot in promoting national spirit and Pan-Islamic feeling in the entire Muslim world. Political awakening in India was not an isolated development. It bore the impact of similar movements of the world. In the words of Rabindra Nath Tagore India's awakening is part of the world awakening.¹

1. Sisir Kumar Mitra, Resurgent India, Bombay 1963, p. 40.

In Europe it was in the nineteenth century that Germany and Italy attained national unification. In England this century witnessed the movement for parliamentary reforms. The demand for representative government in India assumed more and more vigorous form under the influence of the young Turk Movement. The religious and social awakening in the nineteenth century prepared the base for the national movement in India. The era of social and religious reforms started with Raja Ram Mohan Roy who fought vigorously the superstitious and inhuman customs of Indian society. The motive behind his reforms was to regenerate political consciousness in the country.² For the propagation of his ideas, he founded the Brahmo Samaj, and through the activities of Brahmo-Samaj in Socio-religious fields, he prepared the ground for national awakening.

The earliest public associations viz the Land Holders Society (1837) and Bengal British India Society (1843) were founded to protect and promote general public interest. These two organisations merged in 1851 to form the British India Association. It was the first political body to adopt an All India outlook.³ Branches of the

2. J.C. Ghosh (ed) The English Works of Ram Mohan Roy, 1906, pp. 929-30. Cf., Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia (1900-1947), Delhi 1979, p. 7.

3. C.F. Andrews and Mukherjee G, The Rise and Growth of Congress in India (1832-1920), 1966, pp. 30-32.

Association were opened in Oudh, Madras and Bombay. After the Mutiny the association ceased to represent the political ambitions of the Indian people.⁴ However, by 1870 it was "the only political body in India respected by the Government."⁵ Sisir Kumar Ghosh, the leading Bengali of the 19th century, established India League to stimulate nationalism among the people and to encourage political education.⁶ In 1875 the Indian Association was established by Surendra Nath Banerjee who defined the objects of the association as the creation of a strong body of public opinion in the country, the unification of Indian races and people upon the basis of common political interests and aspirations and the inclusion of the masses in the great public movements of the day.⁷ The Indian Association summoned the First National Congress in Calcutta in December, 1883. Both Hindus and Muslims attempted the conference as a result of the efforts of Pheroz Shah Mehta, Badruddin Tayabji and K.T. Telang. Bombay Presidency was organised in 1885. This association concerned itself with

4. Andrews and Mukherjee, op.cit., p. 62.

5. Amrita Bazar Patrika, Nov. 20th 1870, Cf. Birendra Prasad, op.cit., p. 9.

6. J.C. Bagal, History of Indian Association 1876-1951, 1952, pp. 7-8.

7. Surendra Nath Banerjee, A Nation in Making Being the Reminiscences of Fifty Years of Public Life, 1965, pp. 42-44.

all matters of common interest.⁸ Many other associations were also formed. The main theme of all these organisations was to unite India. The educated Indians seriously felt the need of an **All India Association**. Their concerted attempts were crowned with success in 1885 when the Indian National Congress was formed. The Indian National Congress was the culmination of the evolution of the political ideas and associations that existed before its birth. The Indian National Congress was a symbol of India's urge for freedom. According to Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a well known historian, **The history of Congress is really the history of India's struggle for freedom.**⁹ It would be historically inaccurate to say that the Congress was the only body that symbolised the freedom struggle, for there were other forces at work. It would again be historically inaccurate to say that Indian nationalism was a single or unified Movement with local manifestations which were related to an over all conception making for the unity or homogeneity. India, infact, experienced many nationalisms as many as there were generally accepted ideas of the nation. As developments in the twentieth century proved

8. P.Mody, Sir Phiroz Shah Mehta, Bombay, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 166-168.

9. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of Indian National Congress, Vol., I, 1935, p. 10.

some of those nationalisms worked in opposition to others.¹⁰ In other words, side by side the nationalism of the Congress flourished another nationalism known as Muslim nationalism which at times co-operated with the former and at times was opposed to it.

A host of factors played their part in giving a separate identity to the national aspirations of the Muslims in India. In the 19th century the Muslims had developed little political consciousness in comparison to their Hindu fellows, because they lacked both the necessary education and contacts. During the first half of the 19th century the attitude of the Muslims towards the British was hostile and the Wahabi Movement and the Mutiny of 1857-58 convinced the Government that the Muslims were inimical to the British Raj.¹¹ But soon afterwards the Muslim leaders adopted the policy of reconciliation with the British. W.W. Hunter and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan came forward and played significant roles for the reconciliation. The Indian Muslims for the first time established a political association in 1856, which is known as Mohammadan Association.¹² In 1863 the Mohammadan Literary and Scientific Society of Calcutta was

10. Charles, H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 132-33, Cf. B. Prasad, p. 12.

11. T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, 1857-70, New Jersey, 1965, pp. 298-304.

established by Abdul Latif. Another Association was formed in Calcutta named National Mohammadan Association in 1878, Sayyid Amir Ali was its Secretary. The association was formed with the object of promoting the well being of the Muslims of India¹³ by all legitimate and constitutional means. The greatest movement to awaken political consciousness among the Muslims was the Aligarh Movement of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. He was not a separatist in the early years of his life. On several occasions he had stressed Hindu Muslim unity and had described India as a beautiful bride whose two eyes were Hindus and Muslims provided the two eyes shone with equal lustre.¹⁴ On January 2, 1884, he addressed an audience at Gurdaspur:

Remember that the words of Hindu and Mohammadan are only meant for religious distinction otherwise all persons, whether Hindu or Mohammadan or even Christian who reside in this country, are all in this particular respect belonging to one and the same nation . 15

12. B.B.Majumdar, History of Indian Political Associations and Reform of Legislature (1818-1917), Calcutta, 1965, p. 221.

13. The Rules and Objects of the National Mohammadan Association with a List of Members, 1882, p. 5. Cf. B.Prasad, p. 13.

14. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, The Present State of Indian Politics, Allahabad, 1888, pp. 27-28.

15. Quoted in B.Prasad, op.cit., p. 14.

But the then prevailing conditions compelled Sayyid Ahmad to change his ideas. He began to propagate that India was not a single nation and that Hindus and Muslims constituted two nations.¹⁶ There were so many factors responsible for this trend of thinking in the Muslim Community of India. Growth of Muslim separatism was facilitated by the British Government's policy to divide and rule and to placate the Muslims. The schism between the Hindus and Muslims had been traced to the aggressiveness and revivalist activities of the Hindus. The Hindu revivalist movement which was more anti-Muslim than anti-British, produced a wave of suspicion and unrest in the minds of Muslims in India. Moreover, the Muslims of India under Pan-Islamic influence began to demonstrate keen interest in the Muslim countries of the world which in turn gave birth to the feeling that Muslims outside India were more allied to them than their Hindu neighbours.¹⁸ By the end of the 19th century we see that two nationalisms were working in India. One was Congress Nationalism and the other was Muslim Nationalism, although the former enjoyed the support of the Muslims. The discussion of Indian Nationalism would remain

16. The Pioneer, January 11th, 1888, Cf. B. Prasad, p. 14.

17. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase 1857-1948, London, 1968, p. 21.

18. B.C.Pal, Memories of My Life and Times, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1932, p. 417.

incomplete without the discussion about the Muslim League. The All India Muslim League was established in 1906, which became the centre of Muslim activities and which, more or less monopolised the Muslim allegiance. Nevertheless, Congress Nationalism usually characterised as Indian nationalism still enjoyed the support of the Muslims. The Muslims belonging to the tradition of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and to the umbrella of Muslim League had different modes of working out their salvation. Both aimed at the independence of the country, though they differed from one another on so many important issues. However, at times the two nationalisms co-operated together and before 1940 they had the similar objectives with some minor differences, and, more or less, the political ideas of Indian Muslims were identical with the rest of the Indians.*

The Indian National Movement evinced keen interest in the neighbouring Asian countries and developed an Asian consciousness or the spirit of fellow-feeling with Asian nations. This strong Asian-bias became a dominant feature of the outlook of the Nationalist India and from the very inception closer collaboration with fellow-Asians became one of the objectives of the Indian National Movement. A sense of fellow-feeling with Asian nations became so deeply

*. Birendra Prasad, op.cit., p. 17.

coveted an idea with the nationalist leaders that one of the remarkable developments in India in the 20th century has been the growth of 'Asian consciousness'.¹⁹ The basic problems for India and remaining Asian countries were the same as were felt by the Indian nationalists. Now the sense of Asian consciousness developed and it resulted in closer collaboration among the national movements of all Asian countries who made a joint front for eliminating their common enemy i.e. the Western Imperialism.

The second half of the 19th century can be termed as the period of 'revolutionary changes' for the Ottoman Empire. Many unprecedented events took place during the said period in the Empire. At about the same period, in India, similar changes took place and political awareness arose among the people which finally shaped the Indian freedom movement. We see that during the 2nd half of the 19th century the two national movements flourished and developed side by side. It witnessed a full flowering of national political consciousness and growth of an organised national movement in India²⁰ and in the Ottoman Empire too.

19. Bimal Prasad, 'Indian Nationalism and Asian Consciousness 1920-1947', Studies in Asian History, 1969, p. 277.

20. The growth of Nationalism in India was the result of the interaction and intermingling of various factors - social, religious, cultural, political, economic and

The very common objective of these two national movements was to fight against the colonial and imperialistic designs of British Government.

The rise of nationalism in Asia in the 19th century was a political idea which heralded the downfall of the colonial empires and changed the destiny of Asian peoples. Although, nationalism emerged in Asia as a political idea in the 19th century, it made a perceptible impact on the national scene only in the 20th century. In the beginning of the 20th century while India was virtually a British colony the Ottoman Empire was consistently threatened by the British imperialist designs. The turmoils and crises on the international scene which resulted in great changes every where in the world also made an impact and gave a definite form to interaction between India and the Ottoman Empire. Indian freedom movement developed consciousness among Asian nations gradually. The important impact of this consciousness can be seen in the close collaboration within the Asian peoples. The question of national freedom remained its most important concern.

spiritual racial and the Western and Eastern, foreign and indigenous origin. Indian Nationalism had both an element of response and challenge. It was challenge to British domination of India and it was response in so far as India derived her inspiration from Western learning and liberalism. Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia, (1900-1947), Delhi, 1979, p. 1.

Geography had always been a compelling factor in the political life of a nation and geographically India had been the meeting point of whole Asia. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru:

It is fitting that India should play her role in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia. Because of this, the history of India is the long history of her relations with other countries of Asia. 21

We see that India was culturally connected with the Asian countries. The Muslims of India had cultural affinity with the countries in West Asia. This cultural uniqueness of India was rightly pointed out by Dr. M.A. Ansari in his presidential address for the Indian National Congress in 1927. This factor made Indian nationalists not only the champions of Indian cause but also that of Asian interests and persuaded them to have close contacts with Asian nations.²² The interaction passed through several

21. Jawaharlal Nehru, Nehru's Speeches, 1947-1949, p. 302.
Cf. Birendra Prasad, op.cit., p. 25.

stages, the first phase is characterised by the religious bonds between India and the Ottoman Empire. Religious elements gave way to other considerations during the second phase. It was the political consciousness among the people. The political trend was reinforced in the third phase, which began with the success of the Turkish Liberation Movement. The Turkish revolution inspired different sections of the Indian intelligentsia in different ways and stirred the masses, notwithstanding the diversity of their social, political cultural and religious outlook and their inherent orthodoxy.²³ In all political discussions Pan-Islamism came into force precisely in the last quarter of the 19th century. Defining it in a very general way, as a sense of unity of all Muslims, we may note at the same time that it existed mainly as a cultural, social and religious phenomenon. But as a political reality it led to a rather dubious existence. A sense of unity is natural to Islam; from this point of view Pan-Islamism may be called as old as Islam itself, being based on Quranic injunctions.²⁴

22. Encyclopaedia of Indian National Congress, Delhi, 1980, Vol. IX, "Report of 42nd Session, INC December 26-28, 1927, p. 22.

23. Mohammad Sadig, The Turkish Revolution and India Freedom Movement, 1983, Delhi, p. 11.

24. The Comrade, 14th. June 1914; see also Selections from Comrade, pp. 297-99; Cf. A.C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 34.

Muhammad Ali rightly pointed out in his paper The Comrade that 'If Pan-Islamism is anything different from every day Islam, the Mussalman do not believe in it'.²⁵ On the other hand, even in religio-cultural and social fields there existed animosities or more or less latent differences, as is stressed by Sir Harcourt Butler:

I have always maintained that Pan-Islamism is a feeling and not a force. The Arab, the Turk, the Punjabi Muhammadan, the class that go to Aligarh and the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal have very little in common with each other and mostly despise each other. 26

However, it is an assumption that political tie was much weaker than socio-religious and cultural ties. Another aspect of the problem was brought out by the question: was Pan-Islamism compatible with nationalism or not? We do not want to take into account here the larger question of whether Islam and nationalism could go together

25. A.C. Niemeijer, op.cit., p. 34

26. In a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 7th July, 1916 (Butler Coll, Vo, 49). Butler judgement may well be influenced by his wish to take a strong stand against what he regarded as Muslim pretensions in those years, but we do not think that we may wholly dismiss it as accidental; it is an opinion he repeats over and over again in his letters, and he was certainly a man with wide experience of the Indian Muslim World. At the time he was Lt. Governor of the U.P. Cf. A.C. Niemeijer, op.cit., p. 197.

and so we are confronted with a problem of much the same kind as would be passed by the relationship between Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism and nationalism

Then it is obvious that in a defensive phase, when Muslim peoples were trying to protect themselves from foreign domination, and when the position of Muslim power in general was so weak that the frequent incursions of foreign powers into Muslim territories could be interpreted as evidence of a great conspiracy against Islam as a whole, national resistance against these aggressions would welcome help from other Muslims. But when freedom from foreign domination and aggression was regained and sovereign Muslim states had been restored or had sprung into existence, as was more or less the case after 1920- then national egoism of these states would make Pan-Islamism a difficult goal to attain. 27

Then, too, the special relationship between Islam and nationalism would come to the fore as a new problem. As Rosenthal puts it

The real problem (i.e. of the relationship between Islam and nationalism) only emerged on home ground after the external enemy.... had been cleared from the old new fatherland . 28

27. A.C. Niemeijer, op.cit., p. 35.

28. Rosenthal, E. I. J., Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, 1965, p. 4.

This would explain why Pan-Islamism after a period of relative strength between 1880-1920 lost ground to national aspirations after World War I. This situation must have made it rather difficult, for Muslim reformers and revivalists as well as European observers, to get a clear view of the prospect of Pan-Islamism in the last decades of the 19th century. After 1880 there was a tendency to activate Pan-Islamic sentiments for political purposes. These efforts came from two sides. The Sultan of Turkey who was steadily losing territories and influence in North Africa and the Balkans, saw opportunity of making good these losses on the Asian side by stressing his religious authority over all Muslims in his capacity as Caliph.²⁹ At the same time certain reformers, troubled by attacks on the Muslim world, looked for redress not only by means of internal reforms of Islam, but also by restoring the last political unity of all Muslims.

The spirit of Pan-Islamism was a political manifestation of the idea of universal brotherhood. During the first phase it provided the meeting place between India

29. This policy may already be dated from the Turko-Russian Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774 (Cf. T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, Oxford 1924, p. 165), but in connection with India it seems to be of no importance before about 1880. Another question is whether any, and if so how much, religious authority over non-Turkish Muslim was the Sultan Caliph's due.

and the Ottoman Empire. Although, it was a religious sentiment of Islamic brotherhood which prompted the Muslims of India to participate in the Pan-Islamic movement, it was anti-imperialist and anti-Western in its orientation. The idea of Pan-Islamism got its first impetus from British aggression in India and Russian aggression in Central Asia. It was given a strong further thrust by the stepped up pace of European financial penetration and conquest of the Ottoman Empire and adjacent lands. The ideal of independence from foreign control also had a strong nationalist appeal. The most important factor which attracted the Muslim intellectuals in India was the powerful Ottoman Empire. They felt that Ottoman Empire was the only strong power among the Asian countries which could face the powerful European countries. Thus under the impact of Pan-Islamism and by way of reaction to the international situation that involved Ottoman Turkey, the Indian Muslims attained an awareness of the real nature of British colonial rule in India. They became conscious of the common destiny of all the Indian people in spite of their apparent diversity. The Pan-Islamic consciousness got its multi-religious colour with the passage of time. Now, not only the Muslims, but the Hindus too came forward and they supported the Ottoman Empire in their struggle against the Europeans in all possible ways and means. Thus the Pan-Islamic consciousness provided the ideological basis for the

interaction between India and Ottoman Empire. The conservative Muslims seemed to be more anti-colonial than other sections of the Indian Muslim community which accepted colonial rule as inevitable and chose to enjoy its blessings without quite comprehending its political implications.³⁰

India is said to be the birth place of Pan-Islamism. Long before the decline of the Ottoman Empire Shah Waliullah of Dehli, (1703-1763)³¹, a great Muslim intellectual and a theologian witnessed the downfall of Mughal Empire. He faced the loss of territories formerly ruled by Muslims and arrived at conclusions which anticipated elements of Pan-Islamism.³² At that moment Shah Waliullah had appealed to Central Asian and Afghan rulers for support against the advancing Europeans (infidels). Similar approach was adopted by Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly (1786-1831) too, after the death of Shah Waliullah. Certain conceptions of an alliance between the Muslims of India and

30. Mohammad Sadiq, op.cit., p. 16.

31. Shah Waliullah was born in Delhi in 1703 (1114 A.H.) and died in 1763 (1176 A.H.). He had seen the reign of 10 kings name, Alamgir, Bahadur Shah, Mu'izzuddin, Jahandar Shah, Farrukh Siar, Rafiuddaja Rafiuddaula, Muhammad Shah (Rangeela), Abu Nasar Ahmad Shah Alamgir II and Shah Alam. Tara Chand, History of Freedom Movement in India, Vol. I, Delhi, p. 206. Maulana Sayyid Manazir Ahasan Gilani, Shah Waliullah, edited by Muhammad Manzoor Ahmad Nomani, Bareilly, 1360, A.H., p. 115.

32. N.R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani", A Political Biography, London, 1972, p. 26.

their co-religionists living beyond the Indian border, who could bring relief by attacking the North-West Frontier, had a fairly old tradition.³³ Indian experiences were of great relevance in the process of the rise of Pan-Islamic trends. The development of Pan-Islamic ideas with its very definite anti-imperialist orientation as propagated by Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani can be understood better in Indian Historical background.³⁴

It was the need of the time that every Muslim was influenced by the Pan-Islamic movement.³⁵ The Indian Muslims were more aggressive and they showed their keen interest in it. The revival of Pan-Islamism under the leadership of Abdul Hamid II, the then Turkish Sultan in the last quarter of the 19th century was of much significance. He desired to forge a united front of the Muslim brotherhood to work as a bulwark against the Christian powers of Europe influenced the Indian Muslims and the Muslims of India were drawn closer to Turkey.

33. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

34. Ibid., p. 22

35. Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, 1929, pp. 48-49.

The treaty of the Pan-Islamic Movement is connected with the career the Sultan Abdul Hamid (A.D. 1876-1908) who became to a great extent its patron, seems to have regarded it as a bulwark against nationalism and Western influences generally. 36

The Muslims of India were drawn closer to Turkey with which they had sentimental, religious and cultural affinity. Indian Muslims came in touch with the Pan-Islamic activities of Abd al-Hamid II who established a press at Yeldiz from where notices and pamphlets on Pan-Islamism were published for circulation among the Indian Muslims. The European advance against the Muslim powers and also against the Ottoman Empire did not stop. It was troublesome for all Muslims and they had no option but to unite against the Europeans. Hence, it contributed in strengthening the idea of Pan-Islamic unity. The propagation of Pan-Islamic ideas was facilitated by the fact that they comprised traditional concepts like "Holy War" and "Defence of Islam" as well as rising national liberation movement. The Deoband School of thought reminded their co-religionists of the past glory of Islam, the greatness and bravery of the ancestors which was a common basis with Pan-Islam. In the same way the demand for liberation from alien domination corresponded with the

36. De Lacy O'Leary, Islam at the Cross Roads, London 1923, p.,121.

national aspirations of the colonially oppressed and dependent peoples.³⁷

The Pan-Islamic Movement was based on the sense of fraternity among the Muslims of the world. It had a tremendous impact on the political thinking of Indian Muslims and caused a definite change in their attitude towards the British rule.³⁸ The British attitude to events which involved the Ottoman Empire also awakened them to the sinister motives of British imperialism. This awakening gradually brought them into the mainstream of India's freedom movement and enabled them to identify themselves with the aspirations of their non-Muslim compatriots. For example the Turco-Serbian War of 1876 aroused the feelings of Muslims of India who organized demonstrations in the various parts of the country to express their solidarity with Turkey and raise funds.³⁹ Even during the Turko-Russian War of 1877-78, the Muslims and Hindus came together to express their feelings for Turkey. The main reason for Hindus' support to Turkey was not religion but because

37. Birendra Prasad, op.cit., pp. 130-131.

38. Abul Kalam Azad, 'Ittihad-i-Islam' Khutbat-i-Azad, New Delhi, 1974, pp. 13-36.

39. J.C. Dasgupta, A National Biography for India, Dacca, 1911, pp. 13-36.

Muslim power, Turkey was primarily an Asian Power, which could help other Asian countries against European aggression.⁴⁰

The British hostility to Turkey embittered the Muslims and reinforced the Pan-Islamic sentiments in the country. Britain's attitude in the Greeco-Turkish War (1897-98) shattered the hopes of Indian Muslims and it also sharpened their understanding of the character of colonial rule. The Sultan of Turkey received numerous letters of congratulations from India on his victory over the Greeks.⁴¹ This demonstration of fraternal sympathy for Turkey, and the rise of the feelings of opposition among the Muslims considerably worried the British. Thus the Pan-Islamic outlook and the emergence of Asian consciousness together shaped the sentiments of solidarity with the Ottoman Empire among the two major communities of India.⁴² We see that at the beginning of the 20th century Pan-Islamic ideas were put into practice on the political level when the Shaykh al-Hind of Deoband worked out his secret scheme of driving out the English. His intention was to bring the governments of

40. Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia, Delhi, 1979, pp. 30, Shibli Numani, Safar Nama-i Rum, p. 75.

41. Foreign Deptt., NAI, Proceeding No. 165, April 1898, New Delhi.

42. B. Prasad, op.cit., p. 31.

Afghanistan and Iran closer to each other and to seek the military support of Turkey to attack British India through Iran and Afghanistan. An important place to hold this programme of action was taken by the rebel colony of the Mujahidin in North-West Frontier area as remnant of the Wahabi Movement in the 19th century. The militant tribes in this region were in close contact with Deoband.⁴³

The year 1905 witnessed remarkable developments in Asia as a whole, and is also considered to be the turning point in Indian history. The partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon took place and brought about a drastic change in the thought pattern of Indian National Movement which caused widespread protest in the country. It strengthened extremist and revolutionary tendencies especially in Bengal. The whole nation was ablaze and from all concerns of country voices were raised to undo it.

The constitution of the league mentioned the promotion of feeling of loyalty in the Muslims towards the British as one of its objectives. However, a number of factors, especially, the changes in Turkey, inspired a change in the outlook of the Muslims on colonial rule and Indian freedom movement as a whole. Indeed the Indian

43. Z.H. Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Bombay, 1963, pp. 55-56.

Muslims embraced the idea of Pan-Islam more for the psychological satisfaction which it gave them, than for its use as a political instrument. The idea of unity inherent in the movement, even if national, signified little in the context of a colony that had no political will of its own. Halida Edib* wrote:

... Pan-Islamism for the Indian Muslims was a sort of sublimation or compensation for the loss of a thing without which his self-respect is not complete. If he himself had lost his political rights, he at least consoled himself with the fact that there was an independent Muslim Nation which also had the costly privilege of maintaining the Khilafat which, in mind was a necessity for the self respect of the Islamic world. 44

The reign of Abdul Hamid proved fruitful for the gradual advancement of Pan-Islamic trends. The Sultan spent

*. Halide Edib (1884-1964) was prominent Turkish novelist, writer and nationalist. Apart from her English novel, she published three books in English while abroad. The first two are based on her lectures in America and in India: Turkey Faces West, New Haven, 1930 and Conflict of East and West in Turkey, Lahore, 1935. The third book Inside India, London, 1937, contains her impressions and thoughts on a country which she "felt to be nearer to my soul climate than any other country not my own" and where she met Mahatma Gandhi and all outstanding nationalist leaders to the sub-continent. The Turkish version Hindistan'a dair was serialized in Yeni Sabah in 1940-1, but no published in book form, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV, pp. 933-6.

44. Halide Edib, Inside India, London, 1937, pp. 321-22.

enormous money for the organisation and propagation of Pan-Islamic ideas. Missionaries were also sent to different parts of the Muslim world for the propagation of Pan-Islamism. A significant name in this connection is that of Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1830-96). He sowed the seeds of political and intellectual awakening in most of the Muslim lands especially Persia, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, India and Russia.⁴⁵ The centre of Pan-Islamic activities in India was Bombay, and Husayn Effendi, the Turkish consul there, was the medium of communication and contact with Turkey. A society called Anjuman-i-Islam was established in Bombay in September, 1880 with its branches at Calcutta, Delhi, Varanasi and Hyderabad. Another society called "Committee in-aid-to Turkey" also took a prominent part in promoting Pan-Islamic activities.

Al-Afghani advocated inter-communal unity and defied any breach in the anti-British part. In his articles in Muallim-i-Shafiq,⁴⁶ he not only made an appeal to universal Islamic spirit but also emphasised on the affinity between Hindu and Muslims for a common interest. As N.R. Keddie, the biographer of Jamal-al-Din Afghani points out, the most important features of his writings and speeches in

45. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1856-1964, Bombay, 1967, p. 126.

46. N.R. Keddie, op.cit., p. 157.

India had been advocacy of nationalism of a linguistic or territorial variety, meaning unity of Indian Hindus and Muslims.⁴⁷ There are two important essays in this regard. One is entitled 'the Philosophy of National Unity and the Truth about Unity of Language', while the other is on "Lecture on Teaching and Learning". In these articles al-Afghani tries to overcome the contradictions of nationalism and Pan-Islamism. He thinks that Pan-Islam was no hinderance in one's following and struggling for the nationalist and patriotic causes. Accepting the linguistic affinity as an important factor in forming a nationality, he writes:

There is no happiness except in nationality, and there is no nationality except in language, and a language cannot be called a language except if it embraces all affairs that those in manufacture and trade need for explanation and use in their work . 48

He further adds:

In the human world the bonds that have been extensive... have been two. One is this same unity of language of which nationality and national unity consist, and the other is religion. There is no

47. The Journal Muallim-i-Shafiq first published from Hyderabad in 1880 edited by Maulvi Muhib Husain. Qazi Muhammad Abdul Ghaffar, Delhi, 1940, p. 121.

48. Ibid., p. 157.

doubt that the unity of language is more durable for survival and permanence in this world than unity of religion since in contrast with the latter it does not change in a short time. We see that a single people with one language in the course of a thousand years changes its religion two or three times without its nationality, which consists of unity of language, being destroyed. One may say that the ties and the unity that arise from the unity of language have more influence than religious ties in most affairs of the world. 49

After giving examples to show that linguistic ties are more important than religious ones, al-Afghani says that teaching should be in the national language which encourages ties to the national past. The encouragement of a national language is a requisite to national unity and patriotism, and Indians should translate modern language into their own languages, especially Urdu.

The purpose of these utterances by al-Afghani was to emphasise those factors that Indians of different religions are one and al-Afghani wished to see every Indian united so that they may be able to make a joint front against the British.⁵⁰ It is evident from his lecture which

49. Ibid., p. 158.

50. In an article written in his Paris newspaper, al-Urwat al-Wuthqa in 1884, entitled "Nationality and the Muslim Religion", Afghani makes points almost directly opposed to those on nationality and religion in his Indian

he delivered in Calcutta in 1882 entitled "The Lecture on Teaching and Learning". Although the lecture was addressed to a primarily Muslim audience, its opening passages resemble the assertions of the Indian nationalists. His appeal to take pride in the Hindu past was no different from his earlier exhortation to Egyptian Muslims to seek inspiration from pre-Islamic Egyptian greatness. Al-Afghani's attempt to reconcile Pan-Islamism with nationalism also carried conviction. The ideologies of the Khilafat movement insisted that the sum and substance of Pan-Islamism was to remove foreign domination. So their activities had an obvious nationalist dimension and were inextricably bound up with the concept of an emerging Indian nation. They always had their own Indian community most clearly in mind and were not oblivious to its trials and tribulations. The emblem used on the Khilafat delegation stationary, which was made up of twin circles of equal size overlapping with the word 'Khilafat' on the one and the word 'India' on the other, was symbolic of their loyalty to the nationalist cause.

articles. Using the same word for nationality, Jinsiyya, as in India, he now finds it something to blame, not praise. He sees nationalism as a phase of tribalism that the Muslims have overcome. Muslim, having passed this tribal stage, are bound by more universal ties, and have no more concern about racial and ethnic questions. N.R. Keddie, op.cit., p. 159.

There was a logical tie between India and Turkey. As stated above both these countries were facing the onslaught of one colonial power. Hence, Britain was their common enemy. For this reason Mawlana Azad observed that the agitation in India was at first directed against the British for the salvation of the Khalifa and the Ottoman Empire, but now it became plain that the problem of the Khalifa was part of the larger issue of struggle against British Imperialism. Khilafat workers must win India's liberty by means of non-cooperation and only then would they be able to save the Khalifa.⁵¹ Muhammad Ali offered the same advice: Muslim must fight for swaraj with non-Muslim brethren, for only in this way would it be possible to achieve the Khilafat aim.⁵²

Mohammad Ali made the most passionate and detailed attempt to demonstrate that Pan-Islamism and nationalism were compatible. He argued that Western aggression against Muslim states hastened disillusionment with their traditional reliance on the British Government and thereby contributed greatly to Indian unity.⁵³ His intention was to

51. Mushirul Hasan, op.cit., p. 150.

52. Muhammad Ali, His Life, Service and Trial, Madras: n.d. p. 151.

53. Islamic Quarterly Review, Vol. II, 1923, p. 30.

prove that, objectively speaking, his community's reactions to events in Turkey deepened their involvement in their anti-colonial struggle in India and brought them closer to the congress under Gandhi's leadership. Mohammad Ali said at the Round Table Conference in 1930. "I have a culture, a polity, an outlook on life - a complete synthesis which is Islam". He did not however believe that being a Muslim he was any less an Indian. His religious beliefs as well as his commitment to nationalism, never appeared to him to be incompatible.⁵⁴ To further prove the compatibility of his loyalty to Islam and to his country, he took pains to explain that "when India is concerned, where India is concerned, where India's freedom is concerned, where welfare of India is concerned, I am an Indian first, and Indian second, and nothing but an Indian".⁵⁵ He could, and must be true to both Islam and India. There is a little doubt that this view was shared by many Muslims who were able to easily swing back and forth between Pan-Islamic and local nationalist appeals, depending upon which was a more, appropriate anti-imperialist weapon in a specific Indian situation.

54. Mushirul Hasan, Mohammad Ali Ideology and Politics, Delhi, 1981, p. 115.

55. Ibid.

CHAPTER - VI

TURKEY AT WAR: INDIAN MUSLIMS' DEMAND FOR DECLARATION OF ALLIED WAR AIMS (1914-1917)

The impact of Pan-Islamic Movement on Indian Muslims was at its height before the outbreak of World War I due to the involvement of Turkey. It is interesting to note that the Indian Muslims had completely ignored the Ottoman caliphate for more than three centuries. It was perhaps for the first time that the caliphate was at stake due to the attack on Turkey. Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his supporters did not support Pan-Islamic theory saying that it was not beneficial for Indian Muslims. They were completely against the Pan-Islamic ideology as preached by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II.¹ But Sayyid Ahmad Khan's appeal did not attract Indian Muslim intelligentsia due to the deep rooted influence of Pan-Islamism.²

Gradual increase of Pan-Islamic sentiments among the members of Turkish Government and the masses as well can be seen at the outbreak of the War.³ Indian Muslims were

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1. Foreign Department, External Branch, October 1906, No. 339, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
 2. Y.D. Prasad, The Indian Muslims and World War I, New Delhi, 1985, p. 22.
 3. The Indian Muslims were keenly interested in Armenian, Greeco-Turkish war of 1897, the Hejaz Railway Project, the Macedonian Crisis, the Turko-Egyptian dispute of

very much excited over the troubles that had befallen the Muslim World. In 1911, Italy had forcefully captured Tripoli which was a Turkish territory. Seeing this troubled situation, the Balkan States in Europe waged a war of independence against Turkey. At that juncture Turkey was badly preoccupied in defending Tripoli. The Indian Muslims were aggrieved and hence, the Turko-Italian war greatly disturbed them. As soon as the news of Italian invasion of Tripoli came to notice, a wave of unrest was felt among the Muslim masses. Immediately, a mass meeting was held at Calcutta to protest against the iniquitous outrage on international morality perpetrated by Italy in Tripoli and to express active sympathy with the Ottoman Empire.⁴ In that emergency meeting a resolution was passed which was telegraphed to the Grand Wazir of the Ottoman Government which runs as follows:

Heart of Islam throbs in sympathy
with the Ottomans and expects Turkey
to defend Islamic honour and
prestige. 5

1907, Italian invasion and the Balkan Wars. The Indian Muslims' concern for these crises in the Ottoman Empire went beyond the sending of subscriptions, the occasional enlistment of recruits and the holding of protest meetings. The Indian Red Crescent Society and Anjuman-i Khuddam Kaba were founded with the sole purpose of extending moral and material support to Turkey. In this way all those were the direct manifestation of their Pan-Islamic sentiments.

4. The Comrade, 7th. October, 1911.

5. Ibid.

Another telegram was sent to the British Foreign Secretary requesting him to intervene in the war on the side of Turkey. The Indian Muslims requested the British Government to protect Turkey as the issue was related to their religious sentiments. The Council of Indian Muslim League held an extra-ordinary meeting on October 7th, 1911 and in this meeting a number of resolutions were passed in favour of Turkey.⁶

The crisis in the Balkans occurred due to the policy of Turkification adopted by the Ottoman government regarding its Christian subjects of the Balkan States, particularly Macedonia. The Christian nations of Europe extended whole-hearted support to the Balkan States. Taking advantage of a harassed and weakened Turkey and also due to the support of Christian countries, the four Balkan States: Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro; forgetting their differences, formed a league and organised an armed rebellion against Turkey. Turkey had to appeal to the big powers for their support. The feelings of Indian Muslims ran very high against the British at the beginning of the Balkan Wars.

6. For a detailed study see, The Comrade, 14th. October, 1911

The Pan-Islamic Movement developed in the years 1912 and 1913. The wounds of Italian invasion were yet to be cured that Turkey was attacked by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The war popularly known as the first Balkan War started in October 1912 and continued upto May, 1913 and resulted in the defeat and loss of Turkish territory. It was due to the quarrels among the victors themselves that Turks remained in Europe. The demand of Bulgaria (one of the victors) for all Macedonia, did not please her allies who attacked Bulgaria and found willing helpers in the Turks. In this Second Balkan War (June - July 1913) fought by Bulgaria against Greece, Serbia, Romania and Turkey, the Turks recovered Adrianople.⁷ The neutral policy of Great Britain throughout the war caused resentment amongst the Muslims against the British rule and widened the scope of Pan-Islamism in India. The Indian Muslims were anxious about the Balkan Wars which convinced the Muslims of the Machiavellian trait in British diplomacy and they were led to think that the British were insincere as far as the friendship was concerned. The Indian Muslims believed that these existed a sinister conspiracy amongst the Western

7. Jan Romein, The Asian Country: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia, London, 1962, p. 48.

8. Ziaul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, 1963, p. 54.

countries to undermine the Turkish territorial integrity as the conquest of Morocco by France, the seizure of Bosnia - Herzegovina by Austria, the Italian invasion of Tripoli and the Balkan Wars were evidences of the same. The Indian Muslims began to think that the Europeans were determined to destroy the Ottoman Empire and the caliphate. The anti-European feelings among the Indian Muslims developed due to their love for Turkey.⁹ They watched anxiously the unfortunate events in the Balkan States.¹⁰ The Muslims of North India eagerly watched every development in the Balkans and every reference of British politicians to the subject.¹¹ The Balkan Wars created intense reaction, especially in articulate sections of the Muslim community.¹² The dismemberment of Turkey and the fate of Muslim States and the treatment meted out to them by Europe made the deepest and most painful impression on every mind.¹³ The war came to be known as "the ultimatum of Europe's temporal

9. Jan Romein, op.cit., p. 65.

10. R.L. Shukla 'Some Aspects of Indian Muslims Response to the Balkan War' 34th Session of the Indian History Congress, held at Chandigarh in December, 1973.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, Rise and Growth of the All India Muslim League, Allahabad, 1942, p. 125.

aggression".¹⁴ The Indian Muslims were much excited by the "life and death struggle between the leading Asiatic power and four minor kingdoms of Eastern Europe".¹⁵ Meetings were held to pass resolutions denouncing the Balkan States. People prayed for the speedy recovery of the Porte.¹⁶ According to Jawaharlal Nehru "the Balkan Wars roused an astonishing wave of sympathy in the Muslims of India and all Indians felt that anxiety and sympathy".¹⁷

The apparent indifference of Great Britain throughout the war bitterly annoyed them and certain utterances of the British statesmen were interpreted as indicating that Great Britain favoured a combined opposition against Turkey. This created great suspicions in the minds of the Indian Muslims against the British Government as the latter at the initial stage of the hostilities had declared that "in no case would the Powers permit any alteration in the status quo (in the Balkans)".¹⁸ Prime Minister Asquith was soon to declare in the course of a speech at the Guild Hall on 9 November 1912:

14. Mohammad Ali, My Life: A Fragment, 1942, p. 57.

15. The Indian Review, Vol. XIII, 1912, p. 833.

16. Ibid.

17. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 10.

18. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. LVI, 1913, p. 2311 quoted in Y.D. Prasad, p. 11.

....Things can never be again as they were and it is the business of statesmen everywhere to recognize and accept the accomplished fact.... The map of Eastern Europe was to be recast... that the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear. 19

Commenting upon Asquith's aforesaid declaration a prominent Indian newspaper The Musalman wrote:

This most emphatically shows that England has thrown overboard the policy of Lord Beaconsfield and regards herself on the side of the foes of the Ottoman Empire. She has entirely disregarded the feelings of millions of her Mohamedan subjects in India and other parts of the Empire. 20

The Indian National Congress also shared the sorrows of the Muslim brethren in India and expressed its concern over the fate of Turkey and emphasised the need for the peaceful settlement of the disputes. Mazhar-ul Haq, the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the twenty-seventh session of the Indian National Congress, declared that the Balkan War was not a war against the Turks but a war to turn Muslims out of Europe, a war between the Cross and Crescent and a war between the Asiatics and the Europeans.²¹ He

19. The Times, 11th November, 1912.

20. The Mussalman, 15th November, 1912.

21. Report of the Proceedings of 27th Indian National Congress, 1912, p. 5.

further criticised the British policy of indifference to the Muslim cause and pointed out that this attitude of the British Ministers had deeply offended the sentiments of the seventy million Muslims of India.²² Rao Bahadur R.N. Mudholker, the President of the twenty-seventh session of Indian National Congress, expressed profound sorrow and sympathy which the Hindus and all non-Muslim Indians felt for their Muslim brethren in the great misfortune that had overtaken the caliphate. He further said that as a subject of Great Britain which was neutral in the war, it was not proper for him to take sides between the belligerents but "as staunch believers in the supremacy of the moral law and upholders of the principle of peaceful evolution, this much I believe is permissible to us to say that it is possible to satisfy the just and the legitimate aspiration of the Christian provinces of the Turkish Empire without destroying the existence of the importance of Turkey or subjecting her to the humiliating condition of powerlessness."²³ Nawab Syed Muhammad, the President of the Twenty-Eight Session of the Indian National Congress also pointed out that the disastrous results caused by the Balkan War had unnerved the Indian Muslims. The dismemberment of Turkey by depriving

22. Ibid.

23. Congress Presidential Address: From Silver to Golden Jubilee, 1911, Second Series 1934, pp. 65-66.

her to her European provinces had evoked a wide-spread protest in which non-Muslims also took part. He further declared that the defeat of Turkey, while it had caused intense grief and depression to the Islamic world, had at the same time brought Muslims closer together in a way that nothing else was capable of doing.²⁴ The intense heat of Pan-Islamic tendency led the Agha Khan to write in 1914:

For more than two years past the Moslems of India, in Common with their Co-religionists in other countries, have been going through the most painful experience. The Turkish loss of sovereignty in Northern Africa and in the Balkans, the continued disintegration of Persia, the treatment of Indians in South Africa, and certain matters of Indian administration, have all deeply affected Indian Muslims. The Mohammedans of India, newly awakened to national consciousness by the education in England has given them, not limited in their gaze by the vast ramparts of the Himalayas or by the waters of the Indian Ocean. There is between them and their fellow-believers in other lands essential unity, which breaks through differences of the sect and country, for it is not based on religious ground only They share the glorious heritage not only of the Koran . . . but of the History and Philosophy of Arabia, the incomparable poetry of Persia, the

24. Report of the 28th Indian National Congress held at Karachi on December, 26, 27 and 28, 1913, p. 56.

romances and legends of Egypt and Morocco and Spain drinking from these imperishable springs, Moslems, whether Turks, Persian, Arabi or Indians, and whether or not they have also come to the Western walls of knowledge, are bound together by a certain unity of thought of Sentiment, and of Expression . 25

The Muslim Organisations came forward for every kind of help as they did earlier during the Turko-Italian War. Every where in the country innumerable meetings were held, resolutions expressing sympathy with Turkey were passed and general appeals were made for collection of funds for war victims. The policy and attitude of British Government was strongly condemned by the All India Muslim League in its meeting held in Lucknow towards the end of 1912. In that meeting the following resolution was adopted unanimously:

All India Muslim League desires to draw the attention of the British Government in England to the cumulative evidence from disinterested sources appearing in the Press of neutral countries bearing on the Macedonian butcheries, and demands in the name of all that is true and honest in the life of the English nation, which owes duty to its fellow subjects of other creeds, that the British Foreign Office should take such action with regard to the wholesale massacres and outrages

25. Cited by Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, London, 1929, p. 47.

that have been perpetrated by the Balkan invaders amongst the Mussalman population of Macedonia as would do credit to its sense of justice and humanity. That the League deplores the unjust war declared by the Allies against the Turkish people, and deeply regrets the attitude of Christian Europe, which means the destruction of Mussalman power in Europe and of the integrity and honour of the Ottoman Empire. That the League views with great dissatisfaction the open expression of sympathy by responsible Ministers of the Crown with the Balkan States in their unrighteous war on Turkey . 26

The Balkan States' wars against Turkey were given religious colour. The Muslims considered it a religious war between Islam and Christianity.²⁷ The Muslim intellectuals played a very vital role in awakening the Muslims. Newspapers proved very strong media to support Muslim voices in favour of Turkey. Muhammad Ali, Abu'l Kalam Azad and Zafar Ali Khan reminded the Muslims of Islamic brotherhood through their papers.²⁸ Muhammad 'Ali announced that the

26. Modern Review, Calcutta, April 1913, Vol. XIII, No.4, p. 484.

27. An Islamic Power in Europe is an eye sore to the Christian nations of that continent and accordingly they are determined to dismember the Empire and humiliate it in every possible way, The Mussalman, 11th October, 1912.

28. The Comrade, edited by Muhammad Ali; Al-Hilal, edited by Abul Kalam Azad; The Zamindar, edited by Zafar Ali Khan.

defeat of Turkey was not the defeat of Turkey alone but in real sense it was the defeat of Islam and what Islam expects from its co-religionists was the united action against the British at this critical juncture.²⁹ The sufferings of their coreligionists in Turkey caused considerable uneasiness to the Indian Muslims. In order to ameliorate their condition, funds were raised throughout the country and branches of Red Crescent Society were opened. Agha Khan also advised his co-religionists to donate liberally for the Turkish Red Crescent Fund. In 1912, Zafar Ali Khan, after collecting subscriptions for the Turkish Red Crescent Society visited Constantinople personally to present the amount to the Grand Vizir³⁰ and to see the conditions of Turkish Muslims with his own eyes.

Pan-Islamic propaganda in India got a new momentum after the formation of the Indian Red Crescent Societies. The first Indian Red Crescent Mission which visited Turkey at the time of the fall of Kamil Pasha's cabinet and the return of the Unionist to power in Turkey was accorded a warm reception by the Unionists who had the sympathies of

29. Shan Muhammad, The Indian Muslims, 1990-1947, Vol. III, Meerut, 1980, p. vi.

30. Sedition Committee Report, p. 145. Cf. Y.D. Prasad, p. 14, op.cit.

every member of the Mission.³¹ The second and most significant Red Crescent Mission visited Constantinople under the most popular and well known Pan-Islamic leader Dr. M.A. Ansari in December 1912. It was of the same nature which carried the message of deep sympathy and good will to the Muslims of Turkey from their Indian co-religionists of India.³²

Another organisation through which the Indian Muslims gave vent to their Pan-Islamic and anti-British feelings was Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba or the Society of the Servants of Ka'ba. It owed its origin to the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars.³³ Basically it was a religio-political organisation. It appealed to religious sentiments of the Muslims because by doing this it could both escape the hostility of the British Government and achieve its purpose smoothly. Shawkat Ali publicly announced for the first time the aims and objectives of the society in his speech at Amritsar on 31st March 1913. He declared that it was the bounded duty of every Muslim to join hands together for

31. Political Branch, Deposit Proceedings, No. 33, January 1916, p. 4, National Archives of India (NAI)

32. The Comrade, 14th December, 1912.

33. H.D. Political A. January 1919, No. 206 and K.W.S. NAI.

protecting the holy places of Islam against the non-Muslim aggression. The manifesto of Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba became very popular and helped a great deal in uniting Muslims on the religious basis.³⁴

The defeat of Turkey in the Balkan Wars shocked the Muslim community which viewed it as a natural calamity. It made the Muslims conscious of their religious brotherhood which provided a base for the later day Pan-Islamic fervour. Even Turkey was influenced by the growth of Pan-Islamic Movement in India. After the Balkan Wars and before the outbreak of World War I, Turkey sent many emissaries to fan Pan-Islamic and anti-British sentiments amongst the Muslims. Hafiz Wahabi was an important Turkish emissary who visited India before the War. Turkey was greatly obliged by the immense sympathy and support expressed by the Indian Muslims. Early in 1914 Khalid Beg, the Turkish Consul-General, visited Lahore and presented to the Badshahi Mosque a carpet, sent by the Sultan of Turkey, as a token of his gratitude to the Indian Muslims. Soon after two Turkish doctors of the Red Crescent Society visited Punjab and succeeded in drawing the Indians to the Turkish side.³⁵

34. H.D. Political A January 1919, No. 206 and K.W.S., N.A.I.

35. V.P.S. Raghuvansh, Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought, 1951, p. 140.

The All India Medical Mission which visited Constantinople in 1912 under the headship of Dr. Ansari, had a practical significance for Turkey. Turkish subjects and Government considered Indian Muslims as their real sympathisers. In response to the services rendered by the Medical Mission to Turkey, a number of Turks visited India to make the Indian Muslims aware of the prevailing conditions in Turkey. The first two persons from Turkey who visited India in February 1914, were Kemal Umar Beg and Adnan Bey. The Turkish Government had sent them as representatives of Turkish Red Crescent Society for paying thanks of the Turkish Government to the Indian Muslims for their assistance they had received during the Balkan War.³⁶ There were indications that Turkey was endeavouring to spread Pro-Turk and Pan-Islamic ideas in India through its press. The avowed object of the Turkish weekly Jehan-i Islam, published in Arabic, Turkish and Urdu, and edited by an Indian Muslim was to promote intercourse between Muslims and to encourage trade with Muslim countries.³⁷ The Turkish official team was very much impressed by the Indian Muslims. They gained the impression that the elite and leading Muslims in India had great sympathy with the Turkish cause.

36. Proceedings of Home Political Deposit, February 1918, No. 31, Part II, pp. 115-116, NAI.

37. Ibid., p. 116.

However it was soon realised that this sympathy had no practical effect. Now efforts were made to stimulate it to action. This was the time when Germany herself was preparing for war and she naturally found that Turkey was an aggrieved and a dependable ally which was a staunch supporter of Germany.

In the beginning of 1914 when it appeared that a war would break out in Europe, Indian Muslims began to review their attitude in case of a war between Turkey and Britain. Muhammad 'Ali thought that in the event of a war between Britain and Turkey, he and his followers would have to take sides and that they would certainly support Turkey. When the World War I started and Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914 the Muslims of India found themselves in a dilemma. On 31 August 1914 Muhammad Ali sent a telegram to the Sultan of Turkey in which he urged the Sultan either to support Britain or to remain neutral in this war.³⁸ Turkey joined Germany against Britain on 4 November 1914. The Muslims became puzzled and what to do was the problem before them. Muhammad Ali and his followers ranged themselves with Turkey against the British Government. In May, 1915, Muhammad Ali and his brother Shawkat Ali were arrested for openly justifying Turkey's

38. Khalik-uz-Zaman, Pathway to Pakistan, 1961, p. 28.

entry into the war against Britain and Mawlana Abu'l Kalam Azad was also placed under surveillance at Ranchi for his pro-Turkish activities.³⁹

In June 1914 World War I broke out. Great Britain France, Italy, Russia, Japan and the the United States of America made a joint front against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The entry of Turkey into the War on the German side placed a strain on orthodox Muslim loyalty because the Turkish Sultan was recognised as the caliph in India.⁴⁰ Soon after, the Russia, Britain and France declared war on Turkey and attacked her in 1914. Unlike the Tripoli and Balkan Wars, this was not forced on Turkey.⁴¹ The consequences of the War had disastrous affect, and Turkey was forced to sign a treaty on 10 August 1920 known as the Treaty of Sevres.⁴² The harsh terms of the treaty and

39. M.Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, Lahore 1967, p. 434.

40. Percival Spear, pp 126-127, Cf. Role of Muslims in Indian Politics (1857-1947), p. 128.

41. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947), Bombay, 1959, p. 122.

42. The terms of a treaty to be imposed upon Turkey were handed over to Tevfik Pasha in May 1920, and the Treaty of Sevres, which embodied them, was signed on 10th August. Constantinople was to remain under Turkish sovereignty, but, except for a strip of territory assigned to the Turks for the defence of the capital city, Turkey in Europe ceased to exist. The zone of the straits and their navigation were to be controlled by an international commission, and contiguous areas were to be demilitarized. Western Thrace and Eastern

consequent injustices, deepened the indignation of the Indian Muslims. Now the Khilafat Movement in India gained momentum and strongly protested against the unjust treaty which was imposed on Turkey. Turkey at that time was the leading Muslim power in the world.⁴³

The pro-Turkish feelings of the Indian Muslims during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars had obvious religious and Pan-Islamic overtones. But on the eve of the war some

Thrace up to the Chatalja lines were, as already indicated, assigned to Greece, which was also to have Imbros and Tenedos, and other islands. The Dodecanese were assigned to Italy, but Italy had already agreed to cede them to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, which was to be retained by Italy, as long as Great Britain retained Cyprus. The city of Smyrna, with the Ionian hinterland, was to be under Greek administration for five years, at the end of which their future was to be decided by a plebiscite. Armenia and Kurdistan were to be independent; and the Turks were to renounce all their rights over Arabia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, Tripoli, Tunis and Morocco. In Arabia the King of the Hejaz was recognized as independent and to have the custody of the Holy Places. It had already been arranged (May 1920) that France should receive the mandate for the Syria and Great Britain for Palestine and Mesopotamia. The Treaty recognized the rights of the two principal allies over Egypt, Sudan, the Suez Canal, Cyprus, Tunisia, and Morocco respectively. The Turkish Navy and Air Forces were virtually abolished and the army reduced to 50,000 men, while Turkish taxes were to be controlled by a Commission of Great Britain, France, and Italy. J.A.R. Marriot, The Eastern Question, Oxford, 1930, pp. 526-527, see also S. J. and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, London, 1967, Vol. II, p. 356.

43. R. Palme Dutt, India Today and Tomorrow, London, 1955, p. 281.

other considerations were also influencing their sympathy for Turkey, since Russia, considered by the Muslims the traditional enemy of Islam, was now an ally of the British. The Muslims suspected Britain's policy as her intention was doubtful. On the other hand they had great reverence for Germany as she was considered a faithful and true friend of Turkey. Germany had supported Turkey through thick and thin and for future the Muslims had built some hope on Germany.⁴⁴ The Indian Muslims genuinely felt for Turkey's safety and well-being during the War. It was the concern for Turkey that moulded and shaped their mood, attitude and responses even before Turkey joined the War in November 1914. Many Pan-Islamists believed that Turkey would seize the opportunity, offered by the involvement of Great Powers in the War, for regaining the tracts that were wrested from her in the preceding years. They still tried to allay the fear that Turkey would abandon her neutrality and fight Britain in the conflict. A contemporary intellectual Mawlana Mazhar-ul-Haq said at a public meeting of local Muslims of Bankipur (Patna) on 5 September 1914 that Turkey was in search of peace.⁴⁵ He argued:

44. Memorandum on the Policy of British Government towards Turkey and the position of the Muslims of India by Theodore Morrison, 16th March, 1915, Cabinet Paper No. 137/12618, p. 2.

.... Turkish nation is fully alive to her Islamic obligations. They feel the responsibility of being the guardians of Islam and our holy places. And this is just what binds us most to them. Rest assured that they thoroughly understand that the sympathy of the whole Muslim World is with them as long as they perform Muslim obligations in Islamic spirit. Personally I have no fears. At present the reins of the Government are in remarkably capable hands. They know full well that it was Austria who tore the Treaty of Berlin by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina and paved the way for the disintegration of the Turkish Empire in Europe. Surely, surely they cannot but see that all their ports in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea are at the mercy of the guns of ships of the Triple Entente, and that the Turks are not in a position to defend these ports. I myself tremble to think of the day when the ports leading to Mecca and Medina will fall into non-Muslim hands and the conflagration that it will lead to. If such a day ever comes, no one but the Turks, who are at present in possession, will be blamed for bungling and incompetency. By whatever side I look, I am firmly convinced that the Turkish Government will never burn her fingers in this world-wide conflagration. 46

Although Mazhar al-Haq publicly exhorted his co-religionists to "rally as a man and stand by the side our gracious sovereign", it appears from Government records that

45. Y.D. Prasad, op.cit., p. 46.

he had been endeavouring to impress and inspire with the belief that the interests of Turkey were bound up with the fortunes of Germany and that the sympathies of Islam should be with the latter.⁴⁷

The Entete had provided Turkey with assurance for the safeguarding of her neutrality and for the presentation of her territorial boundaries during and after the struggle.⁴⁸ But the interest of each of the Entente powers was opposed to the interests of Turkey. At that time Algeria and Morocco were under the direct control of France. France was well aware of the fact that a strong Turkey would be a menace to her African possessions. On the other hand Russia was the eternal enemy of Turkey. Her sole desire was to have an open port on the Mediterranean. So she did not want to see Turkey as a strong power. Similarly a strong Turkey would also have endangered the British possessions in Egypt and the Suez Canal, and would serve as a rallying point for the Muslims all over the world. Obviously, the only choice left to Turkey was Germany. That was the reason why Turkey developed friendship with Germany. Then Turkish Empire would direct attack on Russia and Britain as both

46. Quoted in Y.D. Prasad op.cit., pp. 46-47

47. H.D. Pol. A. Sept., No.3, p. 29.

48. Y.D. Prasad, op.cit., p. 47.

were the enemies of Germany. In this way Turkey would create a diversion in favour of Germany.⁴⁹

Britain declared war on Turkey by simply extending order-in-Council to cover the Ottoman Empire. It was signed by George V. on 5 November 1914,⁵⁰ but local Governments in India had been informed that war had broken out on 1 November 1914. Britain made a public announcement on 2 November 1914 and declared that the shrines of Mesopotamia, port of Jeddah and all holy places will be out of attack by naval and military forces of Great Britain, France and Russia provided Indian pilgrims do not interfere into the matter.⁵¹ The entire British administrative machinery in India was geared up to forestall any hostile public opinion by securing a prompt declaration from the leading Muslim associations, and individuals in support of the Government. Assurance of loyalty to the British from Muslim public bodies issued by the British poured in abundance when war was declared between Britain and Turkey. The prominent Muslim leader Agha Khan gave whole-hearted support to Britain during the Anglo-Turkish War. The Nizam of

49. G.F. Abbott, 'A Revolt of Islam' Quarterly Review, January 1915, Vol. 222, p. 66.

50. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs (1914-1921), London, 1971, p. 4.

Hyderabad also impressed upon all Muslims that they should give their unreserved support to Great Britain. He issued the following proclamation.

In view of the present aspect of war in Europe let it be generally known, that at the critical juncture it is bounden duty of the Mohammadans of India to adhere firmly to their old and tried loyalty to the British Government especially when there is no Moslem or non-Moslem 'Power in the world under which they enjoy such personal and religious liberty as they do in India and when moreover they are assured by the British Government that as it has in the past always stood as best friend of Islam so will it continue to be Islam's best friend and will always protect and cherish its Moslem subjects. I repeat and reiterate that the crisis before us the Mohomedan inhabitants of India, especially the subjects of this state, should, if they care for their own welfare and prosperity, remain firm and wholehearted in their loyalty and obedience and swerve not hair's breadth from their devotion to British Government whose cause I am convinced is just and right, keep sacred the tie which binds the subject people to their rulers, and lastly that they should in no case allow themselves to be beguiled by the wiles of anyone into a course of open or secret sedition against the British Government. Finally I give expression to hope that as I, following traditions of

my ancestors, hold myself ever ready to devote my own person and all the resources of my State and all that I possess to services of Great Britain so will all Mohamedans of India, especially my beloved subjects, hold themselves wholeheartedly ready in the same way. 52

Many more prominent Muslim elites made similar declarations and requested their co-religionists to keep themselves away from hostile influences and also requested them to be loyal to the British Crown. We find various references of this nature. For example, the Begum of Bhopal addressed her people on 9 November 1914 in a public Durbar that Britain was unwillingly drawn into the War just to protect a small state against the rapacity of Germany. She expressed her earnest desire that all the Muslims should be staunch supporters of the Crown as they were earlier.⁵³ A similar statement was made by the Nawab of Tonk. He expressed regret that Turkey should have embarked upon that war ignoring both the innumerable favours received from Great Britain, and the fact that vast numbers of her co-religionists enjoyed full religious freedom and passed their lives in peace under the protection of Great Britain. He

52. Cited from Amrita Bazar Patrika in Library Digest, 13 Feb. 1915, Vol. 50, p. 322.

also declared that it was the bounden duty of all the Muslims in India to be loyal and faithful to the British Empire and to leave nothing undone to prove their loyalty. The Nawab of Rampur, in a proclamation issued to his subjects, pointed out that war was not sought by the British Government and that the British cause was a just one. He, therefore, enjoined his subjects and invited all Muslims in India to remain steadfast in their loyalty at that crisis, and to do everything in their power to further the British cause, which was also the Indian cause.⁵⁴

A number of meetings were organised by the loyalists and keeping in view the British interest, many resolutions were passed in which they assured the British Crown of their loyalty.⁵⁵ The Indians assured their loyalty in favour of British Government but it was unspontaneous and insincere. Pro-British Muslim leaders did not command much influence among the general Muslims of India. Even the Nizam of Hyderabad issued his manifesto under the pressure from the British authorities. In fact the Nizam had a soft corner for Turkey. The Indian Muslims also realised their

53. H.D. Political A. December, 1914, Nos. 256-370, p. 3.

54. Ibid.

55. The following resolutions were passed by the Council of the All India Muslim League:

helplessness and they were bound to suppress their actual feelings. Many prominent loyalists had begged for relief for Turkey just a few months ago before the outbreak of the War. A staunch Pan-Islamist, Mawlana Mazhar al-Haq advised his coreligionists to look into their own interests. He was of the view that the care of the interests of Islam in their own country was most important.⁵⁶ He observed the real strength of Islam was in India as this country had about 70 million Muslim population.⁵⁷ Mawlana Abu'l Kalam Azad the

"Firstly: That the Council of the All India Moslem League gives expression once more to the deep rooted loyalty and sincere devotion of Muslims of India to the British Crown and assures His Excellency the Viceroy that participation of Turkey in the present war does not and cannot affect that loyalty in the least degree and the Council is confident that no Muslim in India will swerve even a hair's breadth from his paramount duty to his sovereign.

Secondly: That the Council of All India Moslem League expresses its deep gratitude to the British Government for the assurances given to its Moslem subjects as to the immunity of holy places of Islam in Arabia and other places from attack or molestation and for obtaining similar assurances from its allies"., Cf. Y.D. Prasad, op.cit., pp 51-2

56. H.D. Political. A, December 1914, No. 80, p. 31, NAI.

57. Mussalmans of India will act with coolness, keep up their dignity and self control, will not be unruffled by any untoward events, will not be affected by any of the hostile or unjust criticism which are so plentiful in these days and will most assuredly rally to man by the side of their king Emperor for the defence of the Empire. Their lives and all their resources will be at the service of their sovereign. H.D. Political, A. December, 1914, No. 8a, p. 31.

most prominent Muslim figure gave similar statements. It was however, very difficult even for the British Government to believe the wordings of Abu'l Kalam Azad.⁵⁸

That our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility in India will meet the same success that it has always done. The Government may rest assured that the Mussalmans will under no circumstances disturb the peace of India. They will prove to the hilt that they are the most peace-loving and law-abiding people in India.

Muhammad Ali, Hasan Nizami, Dr. Ansari and many other leaders pointed out that the Turko-British war was exclusively politically motivated and it had nothing to do with religion.

On the other hand, the Shaikhy al-Islam of Turkey made an appeal to their co-religionists living in all parts of the world for ijihad and expressed that it was obligatory on the part of every Muslim to support Turkey in all respects. However, this call flopped as many Muslims doubted the co-religious motives of war.⁵⁹

58. H.D. Political, A, December, 1914, No. 81, p. 35 and Nos. 256-310, p. 167.

59. Alma Wittlin, Abdul Hamid: The Shadow of God, London, 1949, p. 65.

The results of the War I proved favourable for England and her allies and it excited the jealousies of other nations against England. Even the allies of England were not pleased with her due to her growing strength. The conflict between America and Japan became inevitable, in which the involvement of England was sure. The shameful defeat of Germany had compelled her for preparing future war against her enemies. The Bolsheviks declared England to be their arch enemy. The future world war will be fought on Asian soil as it seemed. England will perhaps be involved in it in a deadlier form than she was during the last struggle. With what materials will England go to fight her next war? Will she fight her numerous enemies with discontented India and anatagonised Islam? She will need the resources of India and Islam, especially their manpower. A friendly Turkey and grateful India would be a match to any combination of powers against England. The Turks had been humiliated. The Persians were in a state of disorganization, and Egypt, Morocco and Tripoli were dominated by European influence, but Islam was still a living force. The ruler of Afghanistan expressed himself in these terms:

I have written to the British Government that no Mussalman under any circumstances, can tolerate any kind of interference in the matter of Khilafat or see his Khalifa under any control. If they pay no heed to the friendship of Afghanistan in the

matter of Khilafat, they endanger the solidarity of their own Empire. Amanullah is ready to sacrifice his life in the path of Islam. 60

The Nizam of Hyderabad had also written to the Secretary of State for India about the question of Khilafat. On the other hand Muslim organisations like Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala had issued a fatwa (decree) that every Muslim should resist the dismemberment of Islam and the passing of the Jazirat al-Arab or its portion into the hands of non-Muslims whether through mandate or otherwise.⁶¹ The Khilafat of Turkish Sultan was recognised by the occupied Mesopotamian people in no ambiguous words. They were of the opinion that Islam did not allow anybody to the dismemberment of the Islamic Khilafat. If the Indian Muslims believed that the war with Turkey was being prosecuted in a crusading spirit, the Prime Minister of England was to blame himself. It will be remembered that he had hailed Lord Allenby as the hero who had achieved what the combined might of Christendom had failed to achieve during the struggle of centuries. A similar kind of statement was made by Mr. Churchill who had said that the War

60. Hurriyat, Delhi, April 20, 1920; Cf. Syed Mahmud, Khilafat and England, 1922, pp. 132-33.

61. Muslim Outlook, June 3, 1920. Cf. Syed Mahmud, op.cit., p. 133.

was a crusade against the Turks. And the Lord Mayor of London had declared that the Holy Land had been conquered from the infidals. W.S. Blunt wrote:

We fail because we are no longer honest, no longer just, no longer gentlemen... Our government is a mob, not a body endowed with sense and supported by the sense of nation. It was only by immense industry, immense sense and immense honour that we gained our position in the world, and now that these are gone we find our natural level. For a hundred years we did good in the world, for a hundred we shall have done evil and the world will hear of us no more. 62

England could not afford to disregard for long the feelings and the sentiments of the eighty million of her Muslim subjects.⁶³ It had generally been recognised that the institution of Khilafat was the oldest and most important institution of Islam which could not be trifled with. It had raised the emotions of the Muslims. As Sayyid Mahmud remarked:

The emotions of men are stirred more quickly than their intelligence. The aims of statesmanship should be to reckon with the people as they exist and their national peculiarities. 64

62. W.S. Blunt, Secret History of English Occupation of Egypt, London, 1907, p. 92

63. Sayyid Mahmud, op.cit., pp. 134-35.

64. Ibid., p. 136.

The foundation of the backbone of Islam, he said, was based on sentimental ideals as it was the belief of Western people. It carried the idea of God's direct rulership. This great and true 'idea' made of Islam a faith and a social and political system potent to achieve great things. For it entailed the observance by all Muslims of the moral law in all activities of life-religious, political and social. It was advisable for England that if it took up the idea of making common cause with Islam and India, her future glory was assured. She would live in history through the succeeding ages when her empire had gone and all her might had disappeared. Sayyid Mahmud wrote:

Thrace and Smyrna be restored to their rightful owners, particularly Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. These countries including Hejaz may be granted self-Government if they so wish under the effective sovereignty of the Khalifa... Turkey should be allowed to have an honest existence. 65

But there was no indication that the British Government was to join any such thing. In fact, the British Prime Minister strongly opposed any modifications and revisions in the Treaty of Sevres.⁶⁶ It was understood

65. Ibid., pp. 138-39.

66. Such an attitude was termed by Sayyid Mahmud as unfortunate for both Turkey and England. He wrote:

that consequently, no pledge whatsoever was given " to Turkey, India or any other country."

In the House of Commons on 26 February 1920 the British Prime Minister summarised his policies as follows:

1. Nothing will be done by us or by our allies in this war, which is likely to injure their (Mussalmans') religious feelings and sentiments.
2. The Holy places of Islam shall remain immune from molestation.⁶⁷
3. No operation will be conducted against the sacred seat of Muslim Khilafat.⁶⁸
4. But I think we might go so far as to give them (Mussalmans) some sort of assurance that we recognise that caliph should be not only a Muslim but a Muslim of such position as to be independent of any European pressure of any kind or sort (Lord Cromer in the House of Lords).

It was understood that the Premier will not succeed in his present anti-Islamic policy. He is ultimately bound to fail. He may occupy and exploit all the Muslim countries, but hardly knows what impetus he had given by his anti-Islamic attitude, to the Progress of Islam. He has undoubtedly succeeded in uniting the entire Muslim World, in fact the entire East with the possible exception of Japan against England.

67. The Times, 7 August 1920.

68. Col. Lawrence in Sunday Times, 22 Aug. 1920.

5. Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia-Minor and Thrace, which are dominantly Turkish in race (Mr. Lloyd George).

But inspite of these words what England did cannot be better summarized than what Lord Chelmsford said:

And one, not even a Muslim, could have have shown more dislike than I to the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty. 69

During the course of Pan-Islamic development in India, issues like the caliphate, the Sultan, the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Places were often mixed up, the focus of concerning primarily security of Holy Places. This was all the more so after Sultan Abdul Hamid's deposition in 1909. Thus when the British guaranteed the protection and security of the Holy Places including Shrines, there was much less anxiety among the Indian Muslims about the course of events. The Indo-Muslim Pan-Islamism had always been of a non-aggressive character and a defensive measure aimed at the defense of Muslim countries through mutual understanding and collaboration.

69. Speech delivered at the Calcutta Club on the 23 Feb. 1921, Cf. Sayyid Mahmud, p. 148.

CHAPTER - VII

TURKEY'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND KHILAFAT MOVEMENT (1918 - 1924)

The liquidation of the Ottoman Empire was complete when Turkey was defeated by the West European Powers in World War I. This defeat had sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire and it became very clear that the war had brought the Empire on the verge of destruction. Turkey had to sign the armistice of Mudros on 30 October, 1918. According to the term of the armistice the imperial capital, Constantinople, was occupied by the allies and the Sultan became virtually a prisoner in their hands.¹ The Turks as we have seen protested against the excess of the Allies and the high handedness of the Greeks. In the mean time the nationalist movement had been spreading all over the country. In the beginning the leaders of the movement intended to persuade the Sultan to cooperate with them and to allow Turkey to fight a last desperate battle for its existence. But all was in vain. The Sultan's government was completely under the control of the Allies.² Great Britain naturally played

1. Mustafa Kemal did not agree with the draconic terms of the armistice and came into conflict with Sultan Mehmet VI. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. I, p. 734.

2. Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, Yale, 1930, pp. 119-20.

a key role in the disposal of the colonial possessions of the various powers in the post War period.³ The Allied fleet landed at Istanbul on November 13, 1918 and the Allied forces occupied Istanbul the seat of the Empire, as well as parts of Anatolia. Overall administrative control was in the hands of the British. The British colonial scheme was so designed as to help the Greeks realize their irredentist ambition to create a Greater Greece⁴ and thereby secure fulfilment of Megali idea.⁵ British plan for the control of the Ottoman state were blocked by the resistance of Mustafa Kemal. Meanwhile the Greek forces entered Izmir,⁶ on 15th May, 1919. The occupation of Izmir proved to be a watershed in the fortunes of the Turks. It was at this moment in the life of the Turks that Mustafa Kemal appeared on the scene. In May 1919 he had been appointed Inspector General of the Third Army in Anatolia. On May 19, 1919⁷ he landed on the

3. It was during the struggle for Independence 1919-1923 that the Turks decided to destroy the "Sickman of Europe", Yahya Armajani, op.cit., p. 267.

4. While Greece had been under the Ottoman rule for nearly three centuries. To see them brought back as masters was too bitter a pill for the Turks to swallow, Armajani, op.cit., p. 268.

5. M. Sadiq, op.cit., p. 75.

6. A city which is situated on the western coast of Turkey.

7. This date become a national holiday in all Turkey.

Black Sea on the coast of Samsun. On his arrival Kemal's primary concern was to secure general acceptance of his leadership. His official duty as an army inspector was to arrange for the surrender of the Ottoman forces and restore internal peace as demanded by the armistice. But in fact his actual goal was to organise national resistance to occupation as decided in Istanbul after months of fruitless efforts and to stir the Sultan's government into action and to raise the banner of revolt.⁸

As soon as he arrived at Samsun, Kemal established contact with the resistance groups' military commanders and members of an organisation known as Association for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia⁹ operating in the area with a view to accomplishing the liberation of the country from foreign occupation. Mustafa Kemal¹⁰ and his associates were convinced that if Turkey wanted to exist and find a respectable place among the civilized nations of the world, she must forget the dream of reviving the Empire. He organised military resistance both against the Allies and

8. The Cambridge History of Islam, p. 528.

9. Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkiyed siyasi Partiler, Istanbul, 1952, p. 478, ff. Cf. M. Sadiq, p. 76.

10. S.J. and E.K. Shaw, op.cit., p. 343.

the government of the Sultan¹¹

The Allied plan that the United States should take the mandate for the Straits and Constantinople was upset by the refusal of President W. Wilson to do so.¹² After long and anxious discussions the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) was drafted. But it remained a dead letter. On the other hand Mustafa Kemal had been mustering nationalist forces to fight the Greeks and the Allies. He made up his mind to fight for the total independence of Turkey threatened by the designs of the Allies. He also issued a circular on June 22, 1919 from Amasya condemning the Government of Sultan and the Grand Vizir Damad Ferid Pasha.

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11. Mustafa Kemal was the most dynamic person in the history of modern Turkey who changed the destiny of the Turkish people. There is no exaggeration if he was considered the Ghazi of Turkey's war of independence and the architect of Turkish revolution. He was a revolutionary and harbinger of a new awakening in Asia. For the detailed study on the life and achievements of Mustafa Kemal, see İslam Ansiklopedisi, "Atatürk", cilt.I, İstanbul, 1940, pp. 719-804. Ziya Sakir, Atatürkün hayatı, (eds), İstanbul, 1938; Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbüdün (eds.) Ataturk Founder of a Modern State, London, 1981. H.E. Worthan, Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, New York, 1930, Enver Ziya karal, Türk İnkilabi Mahiyete ve ne Önemi, İstanbul, 1937, Lord Kinross, Ataturk A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey, London, 1965.
 12. Turkey's only hope had seemed to rest on President Wilson and his Fourteen Points. A Wilson league, composed of intellectuals had drafted a proposal for a period of American aid and a granted peace to assist Turkish recovery, Lord Kinross, op.cit, p. 169.

The circular was known as Second Amasya Protocol.¹³ Mustafa Kemal warned the British officers in Istanbul that the Turks would never tolerate foreign occupation.¹⁴ When the British finally learned of Kemal's move, they pressurised the Istanbul Government to dismiss him and order all officials in Anatolia to refrain from accepting his directions.¹⁵ The Government of the Sultan-Caliph issued an order to call him back. But he did not obey the order. On the other hand he resigned from the army on July 8, 1919, in order to take up the great task of organizing nationalist forces for waging a united struggle. He declared: "Hence forth Istanbul does not control Anatolia but Anatolia [controls] Istanbul".

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13. The second Amasya Protocol asked the Government to recognize the legality of the society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli, promising also that the forthcoming session of the chamber of deputies would not be held in Istanbul so that it would be free of foreign domination. Provinces inhabited by Turks would not be ceded to enemies. No mandate would be accepted, and the integrity and the independence of the Turkish Fatherland would be safeguarded. Non-Muslims would be given no privileges that might undermine the national sovereignty and social balance. Only delegates approved of the Nationalists Representative Committee would be sent to any peace Conference with the Entente Powers. S.J. and E.K. Shaw, op.cit., p. 346.
14. Dankwart A. Rustow "Ataturk as an Institution Builder" in Ali Kazancigil (ed.) Ataturk: Founder of Modern State, London, 1981.
15. S.J. & E.K. Shaw, op.cit., p. 343.

The political leadership for the nationalist movement was forged by the two congresses. Through the medium of the congresses which he assembled at Erzurum on 30 July 1919 and Sivas* 4 September 1919, he placed the national forces under the sovereign will of the nation and launched the demand for the independence and unity of Turkey. At the same time a Constituent Assembly elected him President on 23 April 1920 known as the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi) at Ankara. Now the struggle had started against both the Government of Istanbul and the Allied forces and particularly against the Greeks.

Meanwhile two important conferences were held in Erzurum and Sivas. The first was held from 23 July to 7 August, and the second from 4-11 September 1919. These Conferences helped in acquiring momentum in the resistance movement. It was in these conferences Misak-i-Milli (National Pact) was formulated. Mustafa Kemal was elected the President in February, 1920.

The Nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal had to fight on many fronts in their struggle for existence. In spite of their requests, entreaties and advices no serious attention was paid either by the prisoner

*. For a detailed study of both the Congresses see R.H. Davison Turkey, New Jersey, 1968, p. 122.

Government of the Sultan or by the Allies. This obstinate attitude of the victors in the long run proved disastrous to the Sultan's government which was a tool in their hands. As soon as the terms of Treaty of Sevres¹⁶ became known to the people they rose as one man to resist them. Meanwhile the supreme council of the Peace Conference compelled the Turkish delegation sent by the Sultan to sign the Treaty on 10 August 1920.¹⁷ According to this Treaty the Nationalists were to obtain the coastal strip of Syria and south eastern portion of Anatolia and Britain was assigned southern Mesopotamia along with the Mediterranean ports of Akka and Haifa. The Assembly passed a resolution rejecting this treaty in toto and declared its resolve to resist its execution at all costs. Being a realist Mustafa Kemal declared that it was true that he had not enough soldiers to wage a war, but he was in a position to prevent any foreign power from establishing its domination in Anatolia. When the struggle began the Greeks were already in possession of Smyrna, and the French and the Italians had occupied their

16. The Sultan's government had signed the Treaty of Sevres with the Allies on August 10, 1920. This treaty in fact, had reduced Turkey to the area around Istanbul and Northern Anatolia.

17. By the terms of this treaty Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia were separated from the Ottoman Empire. Hejaz was declared an independent country under Husain, Sharif of Mecca; Palestine was proclaimed a homeland for

respective zones in Southern Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal defeated the French and launched an offensive against the Armenians. In order to succeed in this campaign, the Nationalists made a pact with the Soviet Union on 16 March 1921 which opened the way to Russian-Turkish collaboration which was fruitful to both the parties. They temporarily united against their common enemy, i.e. the West.¹⁸ The integrity of Turkey was recognized as in accordance with the terms of her National Pact.¹⁹ The Armenians were defeated by Turkish and Russian forces. Mustafa Kemal's next step was to defeat and oust the Greeks from Turkey. The Italians and the French were now opposed to Greek intentions in this region and tried in various ways to help the Nationalists. Mustafa Kemal's right-man and principal military

the jews under the mandate of Britain, and Syria was passed on to the French mandate. The Armenians were given the right to establish an independant state in the North-Eastern portion of Turkey. Constantnople was to be retained by the Turks, but its status was to be subjected to modification by the Allies. Navigation in the Strait was to be open to all nations both in peace and war for the passage for their merchants vessels, warships and aircrafts. It was to be controlled by an international commission.

18. K.H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, New Jersey, 1959, p. 37.

19. The National Pact was accepted as the Assembly's basic aim. It declared null and void all treaties, contracts or other obligations signed by the Istanbul Government after March 16, 1920, reserving for itself the sole right to make agreements and laws in the name of the Turkish people.

collaborator was Ismet Pasha. He defeated the Greeks at the famous battle of Inonu. A very big offensive was launched against them at the Sakaria front on 18 August 1922, and the Nationalists forces emerged victorious. A fortnight later they captured Smyrna. Thus the Greek adventure came to an end and Kemal threatened to oust the Greeks from Eastern Thrace as well. France being conspicuous of British intentions in the Eastern Mediterranean withdrew herself from the Anatolian muddle and concluded a separate agreement with the Ankara Nationalist Government on 21 October 1921. A little earlier Italy had concluded with the Nationalists a treaty allowing them the economic exploitation of Southern Anatolia.²⁰ Britain was left alone.

After the battle of Sakarya the National Assembly in gratitude gave Mustafa Kemal on behalf of the Turkish people the name of Ghazi 'Conqueror'. On 11 October 1922 an armistice between Turkey and Greece was signed in Mudanya which encompassed in the main Turkey's present day boundaries.²¹ The agreement made no mention at all of the Sultan. Constantinople, the straits and Eastern Thrace as far as Martisa were to be handed over to the Government of

20. League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 54, p. 177.

21. K.H. Karpat, op.cit., p. 39.

Grand National Assembly.²² This amicable settlement brought the termination of war in the Near East. Turkey was thus saved from extermination. These brilliant military and diplomatic exploits of the Turks determined the whole course of the future Turkish history. Of all the defeated powers, Turkey alone got at Lausanne, the opportunity to secure a negotiated peace treaty. Having achieved such a notable success Kemal and his supporters decided to abolish the office of the Sultan lay the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

However, the Allied powers who still insisted on recognition of the Sultan's Government in Istanbul invited its offices as well as the nationalists to the peace conference at Lausanne. This two fold invitation and the attitude adopted by the British proved fatal to the Sultanate. Mustafa Kemal had made up his mind that the Sultanate and Caliphate had to be separated and the former abolished. On 1 November 1922, the Grand National Assembly passed a decree abolishing the Sultanate. Abdul Majid was elected the first Republican Caliph with religious but not political powers. At the same time the personal autocracy of the Sultan came to an end.²³

22. G.L. Lewis, Turkey, London, 1955, p. 69.

23. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 1969, p. 252

Thus the adoption of a resolution on 1 November 1922 by the Grand National Assembly put an end to the reign of the Ottomans and gave birth to "The Republic of Turkey". The name "Ottoman" was discarded in favour of the name Turkish. The resolution declared that:

... by the law of fundamental organization, the Turkish Nation having transferred its sovereign power to the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly, the Sultanate ended for all time on March 16, 1920. 24

When the Republic was declared, a few days after the adoption of this resolution, on 18 November 1922, Abd al-Majid Effendi, the Crown Prince, was chosen Caliph by the Grand National Assembly without any definition of his powers. Thus the Turkish Republic put an end to the Ottoman Sultanate, but continued the caliphate as a purely spiritual office devoid of temporal power.

The question now arose whether it is the caliphate, considered as an office pertaining to the whole world of caliphate, which will be succeeded by that of some other dynasty, as has been the case often in the history of Islam. In order to form any opinion on this question we

24. J.R. Mott, The Muslim World of Today, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 47-8, For detail, see Niyazi Berkes, op.cit, p. 450.

must understand the causes which led the Turks to repudiate the caliphate, and the affects which this repudiation had produced among Muslims.

In the minds of the Turks religion and nationalism have been held as synonymous terms. The GNA was animated by a strong desire that Turkey should become a modern, progressive, homogenous Muslim state. The abolition of the caliphate was regarded as the result of this desire pushing them to a series of steps rather than as a policy deliberately conceived before hand and consistently carried out. When the assembly adopted a republican form of government they did not at once realize that this would lead them to abolish the Sultanate and the caliphate, but they were carried along on the strong tide of the new nationalism. The Sultanate had died when the Republic was born.

As Mustafa Kemal had decided to abolish the nominal caliphate too, the word was spread that Mustafa Kemal was intending to destroy Islam, and at the same time a secret propaganda in favour of the caliph was made that he was irreligious and a non believer. There was anxiety all over the Muslim world as to the fate of the caliphate. Some newspapers criticized the action of the Assembly and the intention to abolish the caliphate. Meanwhile, two eminent Indian Muslims Agha Khan and Ameer Ali wrote a letter to Ismet Pasha in 1923 emphasizing that the caliphate be placed

on a basis that would command the esteem of Muslims every where. Their letter was published in the Istanbul press (they had ignored Ankara) and caused an uproar in the Assembly.²⁵ Mustafa Kemal seized upon the opportunity and prepared the ground by reaching an agreement with his chief supporters. Influential newspapers were persuaded to campaign against the caliphate.²⁶ The caliph, on the other hand, gave statements to the press emphasizing the need for the preservation of the caliphate, and explaining the anxiety of millions of Muslims all over Asia who sent him thousands of letters and telegrams, besides several delegations. He asserted that in view of the great importance of his office, he would not resign from the caliphate.²⁷ The caliph Abdul Majid thus became the focal point for the opponents of the new regime who wanted to re-establish the caliphate and Sultanate. However, the new Turkey, founded on the basis of nationalism and national sovereignty, could never fit in with the institution of the caliphate which had been established on the policy of asserting the primacy of the religious law. The caliph

25. R.H. Davison, op.cit., p. 129; see also M.P. Price, A History of Turkey, London, p. 128.

26. R.H. Davision, op.cit., p. 128.

27. M. Rashid Feroze, Islam and Secularism in Post Kemalist of Turkey, Istanbul, 1976, p. 84.

wrote to Kemal asking for increased privileges but Kemal retorted:

Let the Caliph and the whole world know that the caliph and the caliphate which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence. We cannot expose the Turkish Republic to any sort of danger to its independence by its continued existence. The position of Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a historic memory. 28

The caliph Abdul Majid attended his last Friday Selamik on 29 February 1924, the last such ceremony ever attended officially by a member of the Osman dynasty. Finally four days later, on 3 March 1924 the Grand National Assembly passed the bill abolishing the caliphate. The caliph was thus deposed and he was banished from the country alongwith all the other members of the house of Osman. Turkish agitation continued for a long period of ten years, but very few persons could imagine the existence of a Turkish nation before the Allied victory in 1918. The prevalent opinion was that since Britain controlled more Muslims than anyone else, Muslim unity under the British wing was the best alternative to an independent existence.

28. Quoted in Nutuk, Vol. II, pp. 846-48. Cf. S.J. & E.K. Shaw, op.cit., pp. 368-70.

The ideal condition would be a British protectorate over the Ottoman caliphate, a British guarantee for the Ottoman Sultanate and a bit of land in Anatolia for the Turks. The Treaty of Sevres gave best expression of this conception, endorsed by the supporters of Khilafat Movement in India.²⁹ The anti-Turkish agitation of 1919 and 1920 in Europe and America had an immediate repercussion in India, China, Egypt and Africa. Monsieur Mukhtar al-Ferzuk wrote:

If the Moslem fought heroically for France and turned a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and they would be greatly distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. 30

The Muslims of whole world showed great concern as to what would be the ultimate fate of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafa.³¹ Turkey's participation in the War as an ally of Germany had placed a strain on the loyalty of Indian

29. This idea was expressed indirectly both before and after the war by Maulana Mohammad Ali, for a detailed study see Maulana Mohammad Ali, My Life: A Fragment, ed. by Afzal Iqbal, Lahore, 1944, pp. 63, 125, 133 ff.

30. Monsieur Mukhtar al Ferzuk "Turkey and Islam" Ikdam, (an Algerian Newspaper), May 7th, 1920. Quoted in M.H. Rehman, op.cit., pp, 113-14.

31. Ibid., p. 131.

Muslims on account of the Turkish Sultan's character of being caliph.³² It is a well known fact that Turkey had to face consequences of this War and she suffered tremendously. As mentioned above she was forced to sign a shameful and humiliating treaty known as the Treaty of Sevres. The harsh terms of the Treaty and the consequent injustices, had deepened the Muslim alarm and indignation against the British. Indian Muslims regarded the treatment of Turkey on the part of the British a great betrayal. A storm of indignation broke out among them at the end of World War I. When prayers and deputations to the Government failed to achieve any modification of the terms of the Treaty of Sevres imposed upon Turkey, the Indian Muslims started a vigorous agitation to bring pressure upon Britain to change her policy towards Turkey.³³ Thus, although the Khilafat agitation was a protest against the injustice of this treatment to Turkey but in practice it served as the rallying point of Muslim mass unrest.³⁴

Although immediately after the outbreak of World War I with Turkey the Viceroy, authorized by His Majesty's

32. Percival Spear, op.cit., pp. 126-27.

33. R. Palme Dutt, op.cit., p. 281.

34. R. Majumdar, op.cit., pp 45-46.

Government, had declared that holy places of Arabia, the holy shrines of Mesopotamia and port of Jeddah would be:

immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances . 35

And a speech of British Premier, Lloyd George on 5 January 1918, declared:

Nor are we fighting ... to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race ... While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople ... Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia and Palestine are in our judgement entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it

35. Declaration of Nov. 2 1914 Indian Muslims regarded this as a pledge which would affect post-war conditions too, it was repeatedly referred to after the armistice, for instance Dr. Ansari's presidential address to the Muslim League Session of December 1919 at Delhi (P J P, 1424p, 1919). quoted in A.C. Niemeijer, op.cit., p. 80.

would be possible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred. 36

But when in May 1919, Greek troops landed at Izmir and advanced into the interior of Anatolia it began to appear as if the Byzantine Empire was to be re-created on Turkish soil. Given Lloyd George's (1863-1945) sudden homage to his Welsh non-Conformist upbringing in a number of "crusading" statements. The Christian West was determined to reserve the verdict of the medieval crusading wars.³⁷

The mounting evidence of Allied and particularly of British intentions to smash Turkey enraged nearly all sections of Muslim opinions in India. Already in December 1918 leading 'ulama', including Abd al-Bari (1878-1926) of Farangi Mahal attended the annual session of All India Muslim League. A Khilafat conference was held in November, 1919, which then gave birth to all India Khilafat Committee. The Khilafat conference embraced conservative Muslims, the "Young Muslim Party" and members of the religious classes.³⁸

36. As rendered by the Times, 6 January 1918, Cf. A.C. Neimeijer, op.cit., p. 80

37. P. Hardy, op.cit., Cambridge, 1972, pp. 188-89.

38. Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana (1874-1944) of the Punjab, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan (1875-1933), Faz al-Haq of Bengal, Abdul Aziz Ansari, Maulana Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951), and Abdul Bari, p. Hardy, op.cit., p. 189.

Abul Kalam Azad and Ali Brothers joined the party soon after they were released from the prison.

The Khilafat movement had three fold aims: (a) The caliphate would not be dismembered and the caliph should have sufficient temporal power. (b) In the island of Arabia there would be exclusive Muslim control without mandate or protection. (c). The caliph would be the warden of the holy places like Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and the sacred shrine of Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, Kazimain and Baghdad.³⁹

We have seen in the previous chapter that as in 1912, so again in 1918, resentment against the British for ill-treatment of Turkey once more drew the attention of Indian Muslims towards the Hindus. Muhammad Ali had stated:

Where God commands I am a Muslim first, and Muslim second and a Muslim last, and nothing but a Muslim ... but when India is concerned ... I am Indian first, and an Indian second and an Indian last, nothing but an Indian. 40

He further said:

I belong to two circles of equal sizes but which are not concentric, one is India and other is Muslim world. 41

39. Selected writings and speeches of Muhammad Ali, p. 159.

40. Ibid., p. 465.

41. Ibid.

In the light of the above we may say that Muhammad Ali was not only a staunch devotee of Pan-Islamism but also the most important spokesman of Indian nationalism. If Pan-Islamism was reality to him, 'Indianism' was no less so. What Muhammad 'Ali attempted was a compromise between Pan-Islamism and Indian nationalism. He sought the help and support of Mahatma Gandhi in this crisis and the latter came forward in support of Khilafat Movement.

At that juncture there was a complex situation in India because the War had loosened many old ties, and so many factors had come to the forefront in India. Undoubtedly, the most common factor was the economic stress on the people. Natural calamities in the form of bad harvests due to famine and flood had befallen. The masses were perturbed due to price hike of various necessary commodities. We may suppose that after 1917 there was some connection between the situation of scarcity and high prices. The War had made a few Indians very rich, but in general even the business community and other middle classes were quite dissatisfied with economic and financial measures of the Government.⁴² Another factor was the mental climate created by World War I and its aftermath. India had not

42. Rothermund, op.cit, p. 93, Cf. A.C. Niemejer, p. 69.

been devastated like northern France, but it too had carried its burden of human losses and economic hardships. This was what Europe had made them to suffer. The intellectuals in particular were quick to realize this. Analysing this situation, Madan Mohan Malviya remarked in the annual congress session of 1918 at Delhi.

The world, in particular the European world needed, a correction and change. It had been too much given upto materialism, and had been too much estranged from spiritual consideration . 43

The Indian situation at the end of World War I was conditioned by all the factors: economic stress, hopes raised by war, announcement of reforms, distrust of British intention awakened by the Rowlatt Act, the Amritsar massacre, a shift in psychological relations between the British and the Indians, the threat of an Afghan invasion, Gandhi's entrance on the political screen, and finally, the development of nationalism into mass nationalism. The masses as well as the educated and elite sections were quite restless. The Congress and the Muslim League were dissatisfied with their achievements and they met in their

43. Satya Pal and P. Chandra, Sixty Years of Congress, Lahore, 1964, p. 215.

sessions. The National Leaders including the Ali Brothers rushed to join the national mainstream.

The British Government, at this moment was busy in its own diplomacy in the West Asian region which had taken a definite anti-Turkish stance in Arabia. They were hatching plans to oust the Turkish governor from the soil of Mecca. Sir Reginald Wingate, (the then governor of Sudan), had succeeded to come into direct communication with Sharif Husain of Mecca and induced him to revolt against the Turkish regime. The Arab revolt made positive impact on the progress of the Khilafat Movement. Meanwhile, the Government of India was also in receipt of the information about the Deoband School which was organising an anti-British movement secretly under the leadership of Mawlana Mahmud al-Hasan who guided the whole movement. The 'Ulama' of Deoband were the first group in Muslim India to evolve a policy of contacts with the Turks during World War I and to enlist the support of the frontier tribesmen with the object of the eventual overthrow of the British rule in India. Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband left India for the Hijaz during the War, where he established contacts with Ghalib Pasha, the governor and the Turkish minister, Jamal Pasha and Enver Pasha,⁴⁴ who gave a pledge that Turkey and her allies would

44. For details, see Mawlana Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Madani, Naqsh-i-Hayat, Vol. II, Delhi, 1954, pp. 216-217, 221. Cf. Ibrahim Fikri Dar al-Uloom Deoband Aajkal, Delhi, June 1959, p. 45.

support India's demand for self-government at the peace conference after the victory of the Central Powers. The document based on this pledge was smuggled in India, photographed and distributed, and was traced and failed by the British Intelligence.⁴⁵ The Mawlana had also sent his emissaries to Afghanistan to try to enlist the government and the tribesmen in a struggle against the British in India. Unrest was promoted in the North West Frontier areas to the extent that the British had to send five large-scale military expeditions to Waziristan. German and Turkish agents were in contact in Afghanistan with an Indian "Government in Exile". A Hindu agitator, Raja Mahindra Pratap was its Prime Minister, and included among others Mawlana 'Ubayd Allah Sindhi a disciple and emissary of Mawlana Mahmud al-Hasan.⁴⁶

Dr. M.A. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan gave this movement all financial assistance to carry on the plan. In Mecca Mawlana Mahmud al-Hasan saw the Turkish authorities discussed his plan and sent his message on a silken cloth,⁴⁷

45. Muhammad Miyan, 'Ulama-i- Haqq, (i), pp. 131-142. Cf. Ibrahim Fikri, op.cit.

46. RIIA SURVEY 1925, Vol. I, p. 551, Ubayd Allah Sindhi, Kabul Men Sat Sal, Lahore, 1955, pp. 24-26, 52-64. For a detailed study see Rowlatt Act Committee Report 54/253.

47. For detailed information about Silk Letters, see Mawlana Abd al-Rahman, Tahreek-i-Reshmi Roomal, 2nd. ed. 1966, Lahore, p. 197.

which was detected and the Mawlana was taken under custody and sent to Malta as an exile till the end of the War. Such seditious activities led to many intrigues and plots. In August, 1916, one of them known as 'The Silk Letter Case' was discovered. This was a project hatched in India with the object of destroying British rule by means of an attack on the North West Frontier supplemented by a Muslim rising in this country.⁴⁸

Thus the interests and objectives of both, the Muslim and fellow compatriots converged. The leaders of the Khilafat Movement had no hesitation in joining the non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhiji. Although Mahatma Gandhi exercised some influence on the top most leaders of Khilafat Movement Muhammad Ali, he was very conscious of 'communal individuality'.⁴⁹ Muhammad 'Ali with all his association with Islamic politics did not lag behind in lending support to Gandhi in the freedom struggle.

48. Proceedings of Home Political Deposit, February, 1918, No. 31, Part II, N.A.I., New Delhi.

49. Muhammad 'Ali said " I do not believe either in the spiritualism or the institution of Gandhiji. I also do not consider him the saint of God. His religion is different from my religion. But I regard him as my political leader. He is the greatest and most sincere leaders of the country. We can become free from the British subjugation only through his leadership", quoted in Khilafat to Partition 1919-1947, by Moin Shakir, New Delhi, 1983, p. 65.

Political expediency brought him closer to Gandhiji. Gandhiji believed that most of the Muslim leaders were inspired by the lofty sentiments of nationalism. Muhammad 'Ali, when he called him dear brother' was one of the greatest Nationalist Muslims in his opinion. He gave an admirable exposition of the real Muslim view in his famous article entitled "the Communal Patriots", written in 1912. According to him:

The Hindu communal patriot sprang into existence with Swaraj as his war cry. He refuses to give quarter to the Muslim unless the latter quietly shuffles of his individuality and becomes completely Hinduized. He knows, of course, the use of the words like 'India' and 'Territorial nationality', and they form an important part of his vocabulary. But the Muslims weigh as his consciousness all the same as a troublesome irrelevance, and he would thank his stars if some great exodus or even a geological cataclysm could give him riddance . 50

However, it was Gandhiji's greatness that selflessly he fought for the cause of Khilafat, although Muhammad Ali Jinnah warned him not to encourage the fanaticism of the Muslim religious leaders and their followers.⁵¹ If we go into the details of Khilafat we find

50. Quoted in R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 46-47.

51. K.M. Munshi, Pilgrimage to Freedom, p. 22.

that by the year 1919 the fate of Khilafat was more in the hands of non-Muslims than the Muslims. Gandhiji wrote a letter to the Governor General at Delhi on 27 April 1918, which stated:

Closely associated with the safety and independence of the Holy Places in the question of Khilafat. It is a purely religious question, the decision of which rests entirely with Mussalmans. It is a part and parcel of the Muslim faith and no kind of outside interference with its settlement will be tolerated by the Mussalmans. If all the powers of the world combine to force a Khalifa on Mussalmans, the humblest of them will not follow him. If any one can have a right to choose a new religion for Mussalmans, he can also appoint a Khalifa for them. 52

He further wrote that the safety of the British Empire depends upon the just treatment of the Khilafatist demand and of the country's claim to home rule. In the words of R.C. Majumdar, he attached equal importance to the independence of India and satisfaction of the claims of the Indian Muslims regarding the integrity of the Khilafat in Turkey. He even gave priority to Muslim claim.

Some Muslim leaders called for observation of 27 October 1919 as Khilafat Day and they formed themselves

into a Khilafat Conference and also called a joint conference of Hindus and Muslims on 23 November 1919 at Delhi to have a fruitful debate on Khilafat question. Mahatma Gandhi was the special invitee on the occasion and he was asked to preside over the conference. As regard to the Khilafat Movement Hindus of India were divided into three broad classes:

- (a) those who were prepared to join hands with Muslims in their anti-British campaign on the condition that Muslims gave up cow slaughter;
- (b) those who feared that in the zeal of their extra-territorial loyalty, Muslims might go so far as to invite Afghanistan to invade India and usurp power with its help. A prospect which would establish Muslim rule once again, and
- (c) those who attached no condition and believed in the good faith of Muslims.⁵³

Gandhiji's decision to support the Khilafat Movement was the result of his realization that the Khilafat question had created an unprecedented awakening among the

53. Mawlana Abd al- Bari frankly admitted that the cooperation of Hindu brothers on the question of Khilafat with the Muslims was perhaps the best ever example of Hindu Muslim unity in India. For a detailed study see Resolution No. XIII, All India Congress Committee, May 30 and 31, 1920, Banares.

Muslim, an awakening which they were prepared to pour into nationalism and into a struggle which would eventually develop into a freedom movement.⁵⁴) India had not known Hindu-Muslim unity since the revolt of 1857. The alternative of rejecting the Khilafat sentiment as a non-political religious affair and unworthy of association with the anti-British struggle whose ultimate aim was self Government would mean creating schisms wider than ever known before." The Muslim consciousness grew in a decade had suggested that so far as Muslims were concerned, religion could not only be divorced from politics, but would in fact be one of the foundation stones on which political struggle could be founded. The feasible course before prudent politicians was, therefore, to admit Muslims into politics as Muslims, with all their love for the Turkish Empire and for the Khilafat and with the Persian with which they fought for the preservation of these.⁵⁵

Mawlvi Abd al-Bari of Lucknow endeavoured to secure fatwas on the subject of the Khilafat and the Holy Places from a number of ulama on the following points:

1. It was the duty of Mohammedans to appoint a Khalifa.

54. Ram Gopal, op.cit., p. 138.

55. Ibid., p. 141.

2. The fact that the Sultan of Turkey did not belong to the Quresh was no bar to his being the Khalifa and he had been recognized as such since the Qureshi rival was neither influential nor powerful. The Sharif of Mecca a Qureshi, claimed to be Khalifa but it was lawful for the non-Qureshi, to oppose him, especially, since the former was supported by infidels.

3. The late Sultan of Turkey was Khalifa and the Mohammedans were bound to obey the successor of the Khalifa (Sultan) whose duty it was to turn out the rebel Sharif from Mecca and Madina. The temporary expulsion of the Sultan under circumstances which were beyond his control viz., that he was ousted by the infidels (English) and the Sharif was no bar to his title of Khalifa. 56

4. Arabia comes under the definition of "Islamic Country" and includes Syria and Mesopotamia (where Arabic is spoken). This being so, Mohammedans all over the world were bound to aid the Sultan of Turkey to recover them. 57

We can draw a clear picture of the view of Indian Muslims of extremist orientation on the Khilafat problem from the following demands which are a part of a letter which the Ali Brothers wrote to the Governor General at the end of 1919.⁵⁸ At the end of the letter they declared that:

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. (a). There should never be any attempt to interfere by pressure or persuasion in the free choice, by the Mussalmans, of the Khalifa of their Prophet.

(CONTD...)

If Muslim claims continue to receive the same disdainful treatment, it will be our duty to ask for our Passports and to recommend the same grave and extremely painful step to our co-religionists so that they and we could migrate to some other land where to be a believing Mussalman and an ardent patriot is not considered a crime. *

'The Central Islamic Society' published a pamphlet from London, which was written by Mushir Husain Kidwai entitled "The Future of the Muslim Europe". In this pamphlet certain proposals were made for the future constitution of the Ottoman Empire. The following is an extract:

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- (b). No Mussalman, whether a soldier or a civilian, should be asked to assist in any manner whatsoever in the prosecution of a war of any other hostile design against the Khalifa, when he had declared a Jihad in the exercise of the functions of the Khalifat, and such assistance had become haram thereafter according to the law of Islam and any Mussalman undergoing at present any form of punishment for their refusal to render such assistance should be given amnesty.
 - (c). No part of the territories included in the expression Jazirat al-Arab as defined by the Muslim religious authorities should be directly or indirectly occupied or subjected to any form of non-Muslim control, but must remain as here to force under Independent Muslim Occupation and Control as required by the testamentary injunctions of the Holy Prophet.

(CONTD...)

*. Ibid.

The disintegration of Turkey - the Last Muslim Empire - will be a direct challenge to Islam. It will mean that the Muslims are to be made homeless like the Jews. But the Muslim nation is so constituted that it cannot exist like the Jews. It is bound to enter into a deadly struggle with all those forces which would tend to bring it to that position ... If England takes any part in the disintegration of the last Empire, she will be taking the position of the enemy of Islam....

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- (d). There should be no attempt to remove, whether directly or indirectly from the independent, indivisible and inalienable sovereignty of the Khalifa, who is the recognised Servant of the Holy Places and warden of the Holy Shrines, any portion of the territories in which such Holy Places and Shrines are situated, including the territories in which are situated, the three sacred Harems of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem and the Holy Shrines in Najaf, Kerbela, Baghdad, Kazmain, Sammara, Constantinople and Koniech, and such territories should forthwith be evacuated by the forces of His Majesty and of the Allied and Association Governments and restored to the Khalifa, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.
- (e). Nor should there be any such attempt to dismember and parcel out even among Muslim Governments or in any other manner weaken the Khalifa's Empire with the objects of weakening the temporal power of Islam.
- (f). His Majesty's Government should restore to the Khalifa the village of Egypt and should make determined efforts to induce other powers also to restore similarly such other territories like Bosnia, Herzgovina and Tripoli, as they have forcibly been taken from him, and similar justice should be done in the case of other Muslim territories like those of Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, the Caucasus and the Khanates and Kingdoms of Asia.

(CONTD....)

All this ostentatious sympathy for Arabs and Syrians is neither for the good of these people nor for the good of Islam. The actuating motive is to smash up the solidarity of Islam, and to secure more lands for exploitation by the so-called Christians. The Mussalmans of India know all that. 59

Such was the religious fervour in the air when on 19 January 1920, a Khilafat deputation met the Viceroy. But after getting no satisfactory response from him, the Khilafat conference sent another deputation to England to call upon the Secretary of State for India and the Prime Minister. But, this attempt also did not meet with success. Hence their hopes shattered. Lloyd George stated that Turkey could not be treated on principles different from those to be applied to Christian countries; he asserted that while Turkey would be allowed to exercise temporal sway over Turkish lands, she would not be permitted to retain the lands which were not Turkish.

(g). No Mussalman should in any manner be deprived of his liberty or otherwise punished, molested or disquieted by means of his expressing and promoting sympathy with his brother Mussalmans in any part of the world, or maintaining and strengthening the allegiance of all Mussalmans to the Khalifa of the Holy Prophet, and all persons thus dealt with, should be forthwith set at liberty and all newspapers suppressed for like reasons should be permitted a free publication cited in P.C. Banford, op.cit., pp. 139-140.

59. P. C. Banford, op.cit., p. 143.

A public meeting of Khilafat workers' conference dated 19 April 1920 was held at Banares Krishna Theatre in Delhi and was attended by 500 delegates and over two thousand spectators. One fanatical delegate from Bhopal is said to have come with his Kafan (coffin) wrapped round him. Several men supposed to be belonging to the Bhopal forces were noticed in Delhi about this time. Boycott and hijrat were openly advocated.⁶⁰ Just after these deputations provincial Khilafat Committee had commenced to spring up at Bombay, Sind, Kanpur etc. and the Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay issued a manifesto in May, 1920 in which the claims of the Muslims regarding the following three points were repeated:

- (a) European Turkey to be left, specially when Muslim population was preponderant, as it was at the time of the War.
- (b) The Khalifa's control of the Holy places of Islam and;
- (c) The retention of Turkish suzerainty over Jazirat al-Arab (Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Hejaz and Nejd).

60. Proceedings of Home Political Deposit, May 1920, No. 12., p. 3 (Confidential) N.A.I., New delhi

'The disappointment of Muslims after the Treaty of Serves led to the Khilafat Committee at Bombay in May 1920, to adopt Gandhiji's non-cooperation programme suggested by him on 10 March of the same year. The Muslims joined the campaign for non-cooperation in all parties conference held at Allahabad on 2 June 1920. It appointed a committee to chalk out a programme. Messages and notices were being sent to the Governor General, but there was no favourable response. He dismissed the non-cooperation movement as "the most foolish of all foolish schemes". The movement began with a one month tour of the country by Gandhiji and Ali Brothers.

The non-cooperation scheme was the direct result of the Khilafat movement jointly sponsored by Gandhiji and the Ali Brothers.⁶¹ Yet another feature of the struggle was that the Hijrat movement came into being as an offshoot of Khilafat movement in 1919. About fifteen thousand Muslims mostly youths came forward and responded to the call of the Khilafat leaders to leave India - a land condemned as Dar al-Harb. Their avowed object was to organise themselves politically and militarily to fight British Imperialism.⁶²

61. Moin Shakir, op.cit., pp. 176-77.

62. Campbell Car, Political Trouble in India, Cf. Santimoy Ray, Freedom Movement and Indian Muslims, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 76-77.

The non-cooperation movement and Hijrat movement ran side by side. The Khilafat received a psychological impetus from the Hijrat of 18,000 Muslims to Afghanistan. In August 1920, they travelled to Afghanistan but the Afghan authorities decided not to admit the emigrants and Dar al-Islam remained ever distant. However a number of them lost their lives on the way.⁶³

All India Khilafat Conference on 8 July 1921, resolved that, it was in every way religiously unlawful for a Muslim at the present moment to continue in the British army, to enter the army or to induce others to join the army'. Also that, 'if the British Government attacked Turkey, the Muslims of India would declare the independence of India and hoist the flag of Indian Republic at the next session of Congress.⁶⁴

Such extreme moves as the traditional Hijrat, that too in such a mismanaged form compelled various congressmen to rethink regarding their participation in the Khilafat

63. The Road from Peshawar to Kabul was strewn with the graves of old men, women and children. Those who returned found themselves homeless and penniless with their property in the hands of those to whom they had sold it for a little of its value. Ram Gopal, op.cit., pp. 144-45, for a detailed study see Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1947, p. 136.

64. Ram Gopal, op.cit., pp. 148-49.

Movement. There were powerful voices against active participation. Even the President of the Annual Congress Session, which met at Nagpur in December, 1920, was sceptical of the movement, but ultimately the more powerful voice of Gandhiji prevailed⁶⁵ and Mr. C. Vijay Raghavachariar had to give his 'consent'. After this the Jamiat ul-Ulema issued a fatwa advising the Muslims to boycott elections, Government Schools, Colleges and law courts and to renounce all titles and ranks conferred on them by the foreign government.

The Khilafat movement got a violent expression. The acts of violence enacted at Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur district of the United Provinces on 5 February 1922 shook Gandhiji and at once he withdrew this movement.⁶⁶ Mahatma Gandhi was arrested on 13 March 1922. His three articles, which were published in Young India were made basis for his prosecution. As soon as Gandhiji was arrested the Khilafat movement ended for all practical purposes. C.F. Andrew remarked that "it now had no chivalry in it."⁶⁷

65. Ibid, p. 146, For detailed study see Resolution No. 11, Congress Session, Deember 1920, Nagpur. See also Qazi 'Adil 'Abbasi, Tahrik-i Khilafat, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 163-5.

66. For detailed information about Chauri Chaura incident see Abdul Abbasi, op.cit., pp. 243-44.

67. Ram Gopal, op.cit., p. 150.

During September and October of 1922, Kemal Pasha was clinching his victory over the Greeks and his success brought into prominence the question of the continued occupation of Constantinople by the Allies. In this matter Great Britain took up a stronger line than did either France or Italy and for little time her relations with the Angora's Government were in critical condition. The news of Kemal Pasha's success coupled with Turco-British friction to some extent revived Muslim enthusiasm for the Khilafat cause and numerous meetings were held throughout the country. But the agitation never approached the heights it had reached in the preceding year.

Two aeroplanes and a sword of honour was presented to Mustafa Kemal after the meeting of Central Khilafat Committee at Delhi in October, 1922. They vowed to extend their support to Turkey until they would succeed in driving non-Muslims out from their holy places.⁶⁸

68. At this meeting the subjects of more important resolution were as follows:

- a) Presentation of a Sword of honour and two aeroplanes to Kemal Pasha.
- b) The internationalisation of straits is detrimental to the freedom of the Khilafat.
- c) Despatch of a deputation to the Hejaz to study the present situation in Arabia.

(CONTD....)

Inspite of this resolution the rekindled flame diminished with the successful conclusion of Kemal Pasha's hostilities with the Greeks and it was quenched very shortly afterwards by the deposition of the Sultan of Turkey and abolition of the Sultanate in November, 1922, by the Turkish Nationalist party headed by Kemal Pasha which we have mentioned earlier. Since the maintenance of the temporal power of the Khalifa was one of the main objects of the Khilafat agitation, this action by a purely Muslim agency completely took the wind out of the sails of the agitators. Of course, the cognate question remained unsolved i.e. the freedom of the Holy Place from foreign influence and control and in this regard an effort was made by the leaders to carry on the movement. But, now this agitation was confined to a limited section of Muslim extremists.

After having gone through all the ups and downs of Khilafat movement we may conclude, that the Khilafat, of course, was the starting point but the movement grew into a fullfledged political struggle reducing the Khilafat question to a mere symbol. From Indian view point this

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- d) Proposal to send an Indian Khilafat deputation headed by Hakim Ajmal Khan to the Near East forthcoming Conference.
 - e) Proposal to invite representations of all Muslim countries in the world to forthcoming All India Khilafat Conference at Gaya in December, P.C. Banford, op.cit., p. 208.

movement occupies a significant place because it brought temporary unity between the Hindus and the Muslims for about a decade which was unprecedented since 1857. The whole credit of bringing this unity between the two communities goes to the towering personality of Mahatma Gandhi who mobilized two sections to cooperate with each other and to non-cooperate with the British.

The national resurgence of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk at first encouraged the Indian Muslims delighting them with the defeat of Greece in late 1922, and the revision of the Treaty of Sevres at bayonet point. But these feelings were turned to perplexity and gloom as Ataturk in turn dethroned the Sultan and then abolished the caliphate altogether. The effect was to make them feel more alone in the world than before. Without friends outside, their apprehensions of Hindu dimension revived. By 1924, communal riots had replaced the Congress League alliance.⁶⁹

Majority of Indian Muslims had placed their religion before politics. They could not recover for a long time from the shock which they received due to the removal of the Khilafat. With the success of war of independence of Turkey and the abolition of the caliphate the Khilafat movement lost its main goal and went into recluse.

69. Percival Spear, op.cit, p. 194.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages I have tried to analyse Indo-Turkish relations especially between Indian Muslims and the Ottomans during the second half of the nineteenth and first quarter of the present century. The diplomatic attitude of the Ottoman Sultans towards the Indian rulers varied from ruler to ruler and time to time. Tracing it back I have tried to show that the Indian Muslim rulers of the Sultanat Period took keen interest in developing cordial relations with Sultan-caliphs of the Ottoman Empire. But Mughal rulers were not much interested to establish relations with the Ottomans. On the other hand the ruler of Mysore Tipu Sultan and Nawab of Arcot (Madras) Anwaruddin Khan and the Nizam of Hyderabad followed the policy of their predecessors. Even during the British occupation of Muslim India there were bilateral exchanges of diplomatic missions between India and the Ottoman Empire.

Religious involvement in politics was the most significant aspect of Ottoman Empire's affairs. The Ottoman Sultan by assuming the title of the caliph projected himself as the religious head of the entire Muslim world. In India it was a tradition among the Muslim rulers that in order to legitimise their rule they tried to secure investiture from the reigning caliph in Turkey. During second half of the nineteenth century the existence of the Ottoman Caliph

became an issue of religious concern for the Indian Muslims and assumed evergrowing proportions. Shah Wali Allah was a great Muslim divine who believed strongly in the necessity of a universal caliph. Muslims of India all along recognized the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire as their caliph.

The caliphal status of the Ottoman Sultan was exploited by the British to promote their imperial interests in Turkey, Central Asia, Afghanistan as well as India. Playing with the caliphal claims over the Indian Muslims was a double-edged weapon. If it could be used against Russia it was equally capable of being used against them. Soon after the Russo-Turkish war Abd al-Hamid sought to strengthen his position and promote his imperial interest against the growing menace of the Christian powers of Europe by using the weapon of Pan-Islamism. He took advantage of the growing intimacy between the Turks and the Indian Muslims and embarked upon anti-British activities in India. The Indo-Turkish opposition came as a rude shock to the British. Here we see that the British deliberately magnified the position of the Sultan caliph in the eyes of Muslim world. Imperialist forces adopted all the possible means to suppress the revolutionary wave prevalent in Asia and quick awareness can be felt among the Asian people and they realized the main objectives of Imperialist Powers. The Muslim world had suffered a great deal from the onslaught of British Imperialism.

The Muslim intelligentsia of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries responded to this new situation with great vigour. The great Pan-Islamic thinker Jamal al-Din al-Afghani felt that Western onslaught should be met on the basis of Islamic unity. Al-Afghani had to face two fold problems. On the one hand he tried to survive against western imperialism and on the other revive the past glory of Islam. On the political plane he insisted on the unity of Muslim states, and on the intellectual level his emphasis was upon the need to bridge the gap between the medieval Muslim thought and modern Western knowledge. Many Indian intellectuals were influenced to some extent by the ideas of al-Afghani. However, the teachings of al-Afghani had little influence on the direction which Muslim politics in India followed in later years.

The Indian Muslims came closer to the Pan-Islamic Movement due to the rising national and international political development. The Indo-Turkish press played a key role in promoting national spirit and Pan-Islamic feelings in the entire Muslim world. In India not only the Muslims but the Hindus also came forward and they supported the Ottomans in their struggle against the West in all possible ways and means. The Pan-Islamic Movement was based upon the sense of fraternity among the Muslims of the world. It had a great effect on the political thinking of Indian Muslims and caused a definite change in their attitude towards the

British Government. This awakening brought them into the main stream of India's freedom movement.

The impact of Pan-Islamic movement on Indian Muslims was at its height before the outbreak of World War I due to the involvement of Turkey in the War. The feelings of Indian Muslims ran very high against the British at the beginning of the Balkan Wars (1912, 1913). They began to think that the Europeans were determined to destroy the Ottoman Empire and alongwith it the caliphate also. The Balkan Wars against Turkey took a religious colour. The Muslims tended to consider it a religious war between Islam and Christianity. The War had disastrous effect, and Turkey was forced to sign a treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920. The harsh terms of the treaty and consequent injustice, deepened alarm and indignation in India. The Khilafat Movement in India gained momentum and strongly protested against the injustice of this treaty which was forcibly imposed on Turkey.

The outbreak and consequences of World War I sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire and it became clear that this war had brought the Ottoman Empire on the verge of destruction. Turkey had to sign the Armistice on 30 October 1918. In the meantime nationalist movement had been spreading all over the country and Mustafa Kemal started a War of Independence for Turkey. At that moment the Indian

intellegentsia took keen interest in the developments that were taking place in the Ottoman Empire. In this way activities of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters had a direct bearing on the Indian freedom movement. The Indian Muslims developed a strong anti-British sense. In fact the Khilafat Movement represented Indian Muslims' response to consequences of the War which affected Turkey. It arose when it became quite clear that Britain was not interested in keeping its promise as to the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the position of the caliph.

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
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جواب مکتوب خونک کارروم از شیریار دکین طیپو سلطان

الحمد لله الذي زين الاسلام بضبط الرؤساء العظام وشيد اساس
الدين بتنسيق السلاطين الكرام والصلوة والسلام على رسوله محمد
 وآله وصحبه موبدي طريفة حير الانام اما بعد فلا يخفى على جناب
 وارث المرتبة السليمانية جامع رموز الحكمة المتمانية مظهر القدرة
 آلافيه مورد الكرامة الغير المتناهي مجمع العليم والحكم معدن معالي
 الهمم مقدمة جنود النجح والظفر منتخبة كتاب القضاء والتدر سلطان
 البر والبحر خليفة الله في الارضين سلطان الروم خاد الماء ملكه
 وخلافته ان كتابكم العالبي المتعالي متضمننا على ذمايم القوم الفرنجويان
 ومعاداتهم لاهل الاسلام وارانة استيصالهم جميع المال والنحل من
 العالم وحمائد القوم الانكترلويان وعزيمة جنابكم العالبي على التكنل
 بالتصفيه فيما بيننا وبينهم واهر جنابكم المتعالي لنا ببيان سبب
 المعاندة الواقعة بيننا وبينهم وصل الينا في احسن الاوقات وعندنا كل
 مطوياته ليس مخفيا على جنابكم ان دمتنا الجهاد في سبيل الله
 وتنظيم امور دين الله والحق ما نلتهم ان القوم الفرنجويان قوم ليس
 لهم وفاء ونحن نعلم ذمايهم واهل في هذه الاوقات قدم القوم
 انكترلويان على حربنا رهيا والاسباب الحرب والضرر فلهذا وجب

علينا الجهاد بل على جميع اهل الاسلام فالمرجو من جنابكم ان
 يدعونا في خاتمة الارقات ويعاونوا بدعائكم ههنتكم وههالمستور
 معكم والله يكتفي لنا ولكم وكنا ارسلنا المكتوب قبل هذا الزمان
 بصحابة سيد علي محمد ومدار الدين وفصلنا فيه امورنا باحسن التنصیل
 وايضا ارسلنا المكتوب الثاني بوساطة يوسف وزير من طريق المدينة
 المذكورة سيظهر على جنابكم تمام المراكزات مشروحا ومبسوطا
 وصلى الله على النبي محمد وآله واصحابه الأبرار؟



۱۰

فرمان

چونکہ آج کل سرزول خلیفہ عبدالمجید خان کی مالی حالت بہت ناگفتہ بہ ہے اور وہ اندر
 (سینکل) یورپ میں قیام کے ہوئے ہیں۔ جہاں کے مصارف بے انتہا
 بڑے ہوئے ہیں لہذا اس آیتہ کے بموجب "المومن اخوة المومن" اور انکی
 سقیم حالت کے مد نظر میں اپنے استطاعت کے موافق ادنیٰ تا سب سے اپنا
 مذہبی فرسہ خیال کرتا ہوں۔ چنانچہ انہیں وجوہات کی بنا پر ماہ جولائی ۱۹۲۲ء سے
 آجیات تیر سو پانچ لاکھ روپے تقرر کرتا ہوں اور قریب میں انکا ادھر
 معلوم ہونے پر رقم کے ایصال کا انتظام عمل میں آئیگا۔

بلا کی اطلاع کی غلطی سے میرا یہ حکم جریدہ غیر معمولی میں طبع کر دیا جائے
 ۱۵ - ذیقعدہ ۱۳۴۲ھ ہجری ۱۹۲۲ء (شرعیہ سب سے) علیٰ حضرت نذکرہ اللہ تعالیٰ بنصرہ

نقل ملتان ۱۹۲۲ء

مدعا معقد

نقل از جریده غیر سرکاری



قطرہ

حمدگوئی و دست برداری ایران نیت
یا خداج وزیرارت کن ترک عثمان نیت


تاج بسم اللہ زریب فرق عنوان نیت
دست کشد کین تشار در دل و جان نیت

فرمان

چونکہ مال میر جو مسلح ہو رہا ہے اور اس سے اسلامی دنیا میں از سر نو امن و امان قائم ہو گیا ہے
لہذا اسکی مسرت و یادگار میں ایک روز کی عام تعطیل ٹانک محروسہ میں دیکھائے (۲۹ ۱۰۱۱ حال
یوم در شبند کر) اور اس روز شب میں شہر کے بڑے مساجد پر شٹلا گئے مسجد - چوک کی مسجد -
انفٹل گنج کی مسجد - جامع مسجد اور اسکے سوا چار مینار پر روشنی کی جائے تو کافی ہے کیونکہ
اہل اسلام کے لئے یہ اتہاج و انسا ط کا موقع ہے - (شرعہ مطہر مبارک و مختصر بندگانی ذمہ دارانہ)
جریدہ غیر معمول میں یہ حکم مرام کی اطلاع کی غنیر سے طبع کر دیا جائے -

۱۹ - ذی الحجہ ۱۳۲۱ھ

نقل مطابقت اصل



Based on Manazil-i Rum, ed. Muhibbul Hasan, Bombay, 1968.