

**THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ OF KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA :  
A CRITICAL STUDY**

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## P\_R\_E\_F\_A\_C\_E

The Nimbārka school of Vedānta has not so far been fully explored by modern scholars. There are only a couple of significant studies on Nimbārka, published about 50 years ago. The main reason for not ransacking this system seems to be the non-availability of the basic texts. The followers of this school did not give much importance to the publications and mostly remained absorbed in the Śāstric analysis of the Ultimate Reality and its realization. One question still remains unanswered as to why there is no reference to Śāṅkarabhāṣya in Nimbārka's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras entitled "The Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha", and why Nimbārka has not refuted the views of his opponents, as the other Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas such as Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Śrīkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa have done. A comprehensive study of the Nimbārka school of Vedānta is still a longfelt desideratum. Even today the basic texts of this school are not available to scholars and whatsoever are available, they are in corrupt form and the editions are full of mistakes.



On account of the lack of academic interest on the part of the followers of this school, no critical edition of any Sanskrit text has so far been prepared. Therefore, the critical editions of some of the important Sanskrit texts viz. the Vedānta-Kaustubha-prabhā of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, the Parapakṣagirivajra of Mādhavamukundācārya are badly needed by modern scholars.

The Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa (14th Century, A.D.) is an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. It is a commentary of Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta-Kaustubha which itself is a commentary of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha of Nimbārka. Its main contribution is in the field of epistemology, logic, metaphysics and ethics. Its chief merit consists, in its elaborate and scholarly criticism of the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara. The work bears ample testimony to the fact that Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa was an erudite logician. No critical study of this difficult work has been done so far. To undertake a critical study of the Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā is, therefore, an utmost need of today. I have endeavoured for the same in the present thesis.

About five or six years ago I was directed by my Guru Professor Rasik Vihari Joshi of the University of

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Delhi to work on the Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa. I started the work facing many obscure problems without any solution. I asked my friends and scholars. Finally, it was Professor Joshi who very kindly and properly solved the problems, explained to me the whole text with philosophical notes, and made easy to understand the exposition of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa. I do not hesitate to confess that the work is a result of his kind help and encouragement. I take this opportunity to express my heartiest sense of gratitude to Professor Joshi for his unstinting scholarly advice, assistance and encouragement. I am equally deeply beholden to my Guru Dr. S.P. Singh, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh who also explained to me the difficult portions of this text, properly initiated me into the modern methods of scientific research, gave unstinted advice, assistance and encouragement, very kindly went through the manuscript and gave valuable suggestions for the improvement of the thesis. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Chhote Lal Sharma, Dean, Faculty of Humanities, Banasthali Vidyapith, Banasthali (Rajasthan) for his ever ready help and suggestions.

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-- MADAN MOHAN AGRAWAL



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CHAPTER - 1

KEŚAVAKĀSMĪRIBHATTĀ.

## CHAPTER -

### KEŚAVAKĀSMĪRIBHAṬṬA

#### 1. 1-2 Life and Date:

Keśavakāsmīribhaṭṭa is the well-known scholar and commentator of the Nimbārka-school of Vedānta. He was the twenty ninth teacher after Nimbārka.<sup>1</sup> He was the immediate disciple of Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa.<sup>2</sup>

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1. (a) 'Śrī-guru-nāṭi-vaijayantī', as given in Stotra-ratnāvalī, pp.127-136, compiled by Kalyāṇadāsa, Mathura, 1925.
  - (b) 'Ācārya-paramparā-stotra', as given in Laghu-stavāvalī, pp.9-11, compiled by Dulara Prasāda Shāstrī, Mathura, 1925.
  - (c) 'Ācārya-praṇāmāvalī' op.cit., pp.12-12.
  - (d) Caitanyacaritāmṛta of Kṛṣṇadāsa, Chapter XVI; pp.271-272, Calcutta, 1927.
  2. (a) "guruśrīgāṅgalābhicāham" -- Tattva-prakāśikā, a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā by Keśavakāsmīribhaṭṭa, maṅgala-pāṭha, verse 5, pp.1-2, Vṛndāvana, 1908.
  - (b) Keśavakāsmīrin could not have been, as Aufrecht notes, a pupil of Śrinivāsa (on

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Another name of his guru seems to be Mukunda who is mentioned several times in the Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, a commentary on the Brahmasūtras by Keśavakāśmīrin.<sup>1</sup> But we have no means of ascertaining whether he means Mādhava Mukunda, the author of Parapakṣagīrivajra, or not. As Keśavakāśmīrin did not mention the name of Mukunda in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, namely 'Tattvaparakāśikā', as his guru and mentioned the name of Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa instead, it is assumed that either he had two gurus

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whose Vedānta-Kaustubha he commented) (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, by S.K. De, p.73, Calcutta, 1961), for Śrīnivāsa's date would be about the 12th century, while Keśavakāśmīrin lived in 14th century which will be discussed later on.

1. (i) Śrī-Mukundaṁ Gurum natvā pūrvācāryoktavartmanā/  
Brahmasūtrāṇi saṅkṣepād-vivriyante svatuṣṭaye//  
Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, maṅgala-pāṭha,  
verse 5, p.4, Ed. by Paṇḍit Amolakarāma  
Shāstrī, Delhi, 1938.
- (ii) Śrīśrī-Nimbārkamatānuyāyīśrīmanmukundačaraṇārūpa  
padmakarandabhṛṅgeṇa jagadvijayi-śrīkeśava-  
kāśmīri-bhaṭṭa, etc. etc. at the end of each  
pāda of Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā.

or that they were identical.<sup>1</sup> The assumption of Kisoradāsa, the editor of the Tattva-prakāśikā, that Mukunda was the name of the father of Keśavakāśmīrin,<sup>2</sup> cannot be justified because we find that Keśavakāśmīrin very often added the word 'guru'<sup>3</sup> after the word 'Mukunda'.

He was a Telugu Brāhmaṇa, born in the province of Andhra, in the village named Vaidūryapattanam.<sup>4</sup> So far

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1. (a) Vedānta-pārijāta-saurāpha of Nimbārka and Vedānta-Kaustubha of Śrinivāsa (commentaries on the Brahmasūtras) (Doctrine of Nimbārka and His Followers), Expounded by Rama Bose, M.A., D.Phil (OXON), Vol.III, p.122, Calcutta, 1943.
  - (b) Nimbārka-school of Vedānta, by Mahāmahopādhyāya Umesh Mishra, p.12, Allahabad, 1966.
  2. (a) Preface to Tattva-prakāśikā, p.1.
  - (b) There seems to be no justification for the assumption of Dr. S.K. De that Keśavakāśmīrin was the son of Śrīmaṅgala (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, p.73), because we do not find any name of his father in any of his works which are available to us and Dr. De also did not refer to any work of Keśavakāśmīrin.
  3. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.4.
  - (b) Nimbārka-school of Vedānta, p.12.
  4. (a) Preface to Tattva-prakāśikā, p.1.
  - (b) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.3.

as the date of Keśavakāśmīrin is concerned, we do not know much, but he is traditionally placed in the 14th century.<sup>1</sup> Tradition is that he conquered thrice all learned men of his time. Hence the epithet 'Jagadvijayī'<sup>2</sup> is often prefixed with his name. His

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1. (a) Preface to Tattva-prakāśikā, p.1.
  - (b) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.3.
  - (c) Nimbārka-school of Vedānta, p.12.
  - (d) Keśavakāśmīrin's date cannot be fixed, as Roma Bose (Doctrines of Nimbārka and His Followers, p.122) and Dr. S.K. De (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, p.73) say, in the 15th century, because Harivyāsadeva, the immediate disciple of Śrībhṭṭa, pra-śiṣya of Keśavakāśmīrin, thirty first teacher after Nimbārka (Ācārya-praṇāmāvalī, pp.11-12) is generally placed in the beginning of the 15th century (Kāśī kī sārāsvatī sādhanā, by M.M. Gopinātha Kavirāja, Pariṣad patrikā, varṣa 2, aṅka 2, p.19, Bihār Rāṣṭra-bhāṣa Pariṣad, Patna, July, 1962), and Nimbārka lived shortly after Rāmānuja, i.e. he lived either in the beginning of the 12th century or at the end of the 11th century A.D. (see Vaiṣṇavism Śaivism and Minor Religious systems, by Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, pp.62-63, Varanasi, 1965; A History of Indian Philosophy by S.N. Dasgupta, Vol. III, p.399, Reprint, Delhi, 1975; and Nimbārka School of Vedānta, p.5). Hence Keśavakāśmīrin must have flourished in the later part of the 14th century.
2. Vide at the end of each pāda of Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā.



first conquest consisted in vanquishing Vidyācharācārya, a scholar of the Śākta school of thought in Kaśmīra. After vanquishing Vidyācharācārya, Keśavakāśmīrin converted him to his own Vaiṣṇava cult, deputed him to preach the Vaiṣṇava religion in Kaśmīra, and gave him the name Vrajesācārya. Vrajesācārya wrote in 1450 a commentary on Keśavakāśmīrin's Kramadīpikā.<sup>1</sup> Formerly Keśavakāśmīrin was called 'Keśavabhāratī',<sup>2</sup> but after his conquest he lived in Kaśmīra for some time and thence forward came to be known as 'Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa'. It seems that the title of 'Kāśmīrin' would have been added to Keśava's name simply to distinguish him from another Keśava<sup>3</sup> of the same school. His second conquest

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1. (a) Preface to Tattvaprakāśikā, p.1.  
(b) Nimbārka school of Vedānta, p.12.
  2. This Keśavabhāratī is a very different person from the Keśavabhāratī, the Saṁnyāsa Guru of Caitanya, because Keśavakāśmīrin of the Nimbārka sect was called Keśavabhāratī after he had vanquished the Bhārata in the philosophical discussions, when Keśavabhāratī, the Saṁnyāsa Guru of Caitanya, was a saṁnyāsīn of the Bhāratī order of Śaṅkara. In the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Itihāsa (in Bengali) by Madhusūdan Tattvavācāspatī (2nd Ed. Hooghly, 1333 B.S. = 1926 A.D.), a confusion is made (p.152) between Keśavabhāratī, the Saṁnyāsa Guru of Caitanya and Keśavakāśmīrin of the Nimbārka sect (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, p.20).
  3. (a) Preface to Tattva-prakāśikā, p.1.  
(b) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.3.  
(c) Bhaktamāla of Śrī Nābhājī, Chappaya 75, pp.504-516, Vrāndavan, 1960.

conquest consisted in driving away the Yavanas from Mathurā. After his second conquest, Keśavakāśmīrin set out on his third conquest, vanquished the Śākta sect in Bengal, defeated all learned men in Navadvīpa and settled himself in Kaśmīra.

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1. (a) Doctrine of Nimbārka and His Followers, Expounded by Roma Bose, Vol.III, p.123.
- (b) The assumption of Kīśoradāsa that Keśavakāśmīrin met Caitanya whom he initiated into the Vaiṣṇava cult (Preface to Tattvaprakāśikā, pp.3-4), which has been accepted by M.M. Umesh Mishra also in his book entitled 'Nimbārka-school of Vedānta' (pp. 12), is not justified because Keśavabhāratī, an ascetic apparently of Śaṅkara's Bhāratī order, initiated Caitanya into the monastic order at Katwa, near Burdwan, in Śaka 1431 = 1510 A.D. (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, p.20; and Vaiṣṇavism Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, p.84) and this Keśavabhāratī, the Saṁnyāsa Guru of Caitanya, is a different person from the Keśavabhāratī, the Keśavakāśmīrin of the Nimbārka sect, as we have seen above. As a matter of fact, Keśavabhāratī, the Saṁnyāsa Guru of Caitanya, and Śvara Purī, the Dikṣā Guru of Caitanya, formally introduced Caitanya into the tradition of emotional saṁnyāsa which was started by Śrīdhara Svāmin, who in his great commentary on the Śrīmadbhāgavata attempted to combine the Advaita teaching of Śaṅkara with the emotionalism of the Bhāgavatas. When the tradition of emotional saṁnyāsa hardly stood in the way of his practice of extreme forms of emotional Bhakti, Caitanya carried forward and definitely shaped, which was called Bengal Vaiṣṇavism (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, pp.17, 19, 20 and 21).

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From the works of Keśavakāśmīrin it is evident that he was a great logician, an adept in the art of subtle reasoning.

### 1.3 Works :

Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa wrote several works. In elucidation of Śrīnivāsa's "Vedānta-kaustubha", he prepared an elaborate commentary on the Brahmasūtras, called the "Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā". He composed also a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, called the "Tattvaparakāśikā", and a commentary on Veda-stuti, a part of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, tenth skandha, called the "Tattva-prakāśikā-veda-stuti-ṭīkā". He further composed a commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad called

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- (c) About one Keśavakāśmīrin we learn from Kṛṣṇadāsa's Caitanya-Caritāmṛta (chapter XVI, pp.28, 108) that Keśavakāśmīrin was defeated by Nīmāī Paṇḍita, later on universally known as Caitanya. It is, however, not definitely known whether these two Keśavakāśmīrins are identical (Doctrine of Nimbārka and His Followers, Expounded by Roma Bose, Vol.III, p.123). The Keśavakāśmīrin of the Nimbārka sect seems to be a very different person from the Keśavakāśmīrin who is said to have had a discussion with Caitanya (A History of Indian Philosophy, by S.N. Dasgupta, Vol.III, p.404). The meeting with Caitanya, as a fact, is not unlikely, but the account has been grotesquely exaggerated. For an analysis of the academic aspect of this episode, see Calcutta Oriental Journal, December, 1933, pp.91-99 in which the writer of the article comes to the conclusion

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the "Taittirīya-prakāśikā"<sup>1</sup> which is not found as yet. It is alleged that he wrote commentaries on twelve Upaniṣads as well.<sup>2</sup> Other commentaries written by him are "Brahmopaniṣat-ṭīkā",<sup>3</sup> and "Viṣṇu-Sahasra-nāmaṭīkā".<sup>4</sup> These are preserved in manuscript form. He composed many Bhāgavata Stotras.<sup>5</sup> We know of certain Stotras composed by him, viz. "Śrī-govinda-śaraṇāgati"<sup>6</sup> a collection of twelve hymns in praise of the Lord Kṛṣṇa, whom he describes as Govinda, Gopāla, Gopīnātha, etc., and "Yamunā-stotram"<sup>7</sup> --

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that "the entire episode looks very suspicious" -- The Vallabhācāris also claim Keśava Bhaṭṭa as a disciple of Vallabhācārya'. (The Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, pp.73-74).

1. Catalogus Catalogorum, p.127, Part-I.
2. (a) Preface to Tattva-Prakāśikā, pp.3-4.  
(b) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.4.
3. Catalogus Catalogorum, p.28, part-III.
4. (a) Catalogus Catalogorum, p.28, Part-III.  
(b) Preface to Tattvaparakāśikā, pp.3-4.  
(c) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.4.
5. (a) Preface to Tattva-prakāśikā, pp.3-4.  
(b) Preface to Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.4.
6. Given in Stotra-ratnāvalī, pp.70-71.
7. Given in Stotra-ratnāvalī, pp.73-76.

a collection of twenty one hymns in praise of the river Yamunā, the banks of which were the scene of Kṛṣṇa's sports with the Gopīs. He also wrote a work called "Kramadīpikā"<sup>1</sup> which was commented upon by

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1. Ācārya Lalitakṛṣṇa Gosvāmī doubts that "Kramadīpikā" is the work of Keśavakāśmīrin and gives the following arguments in this regard in his book entitled "Śrī Nimbārka-Vedānta", pp.109-110, published by Śrī Nimbārkapīṭha, Allahabad, Samvat 2020 : (i) There is no maṅgalācaraṇa with the names of Nimbārka, Śrinivāsa and the rest in 'Kramadīpikā' as Keśavakāśmīrin contained maṅgalācaraṇa with the names of Nimbārka and the rest in his other works like Tattva-prakāśikā, Vedānta-Kaustubha-prabhā and the like; (ii) There is no mention of the "Mantra-rahasya-śoḍaśī" of Nimbārka; (iii) Nimbārka did not give the right of study of the Brahma-vidyā to all castes while Kramadīpikā does the same; (iv) According to Nimbārka, Brahma-vidyā is only for salvation while Kramadīpikā gives us some magical formulas which are only for bondage; (v) Why was it not commented upon by any one of the followers of Nimbārka-school ?; (vi) What is it that the manuscripts of Kramadīpikā are found only in Bengal and not in Uttara Pradesh, Rajasthan and the like ? In this way, Ācārya Lalitakṛṣṇa Gosvāmī believes that Kramadīpikā is not the work of Keśavakāśmīrin.

Now our contention is that Kramadīpikā is the work of Keśavakāśmīrin. Our arguments are as follows : (i) Keśavakāśmīrin does not follow only one style of maṅgalācaraṇa in his works. In his commentary on the Bhagavat-gītā, he mentions Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa as his guru, but he does not mention him in his commentary on Brahmasūtras. Similarly, he mentions the name of Mukunda, Sundarabhaṭṭa and the like in his Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, but he does not refer to these names in his Tattvapra-kāśikā.

(contd....)

1 2

Vraješācārya and Govinda Bhattacharya. The Kramadīpikā is a work of eight chapters or Patalas dealing mainly with the ritualistic parts of Nimbārka-school of Vedānta. This work deals largely with various kinds of Mantras and meditations on them.

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In this way, Keśavakāśmīrin does not give any name of his guruparamparā, but only salutes the particles of dust arising from the lotus-feet of the guru; (ii) It was not necessary for him to have mentioned all the works of Nimbārka. He explains aṣṭadaśākṣaramantra according to Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī several times; (iii) It is also not necessary that if Nimbārka did not give the right of study of the Brahmavidyā to all castes, then the followers of Nimbārka ought to have followed him strictly, for it is quite possible that this conservatism might have been relaxed in course of time. Accordingly Keśavakāśmīrin gave the same right to all castes like the Puruṣottamācārya, a famous writer of the Nimbārka-sect, who wrote a well-known commentary on 'Daśa-ślokī' of Nimbārka called "Vedānta-ratna-mañjūṣā". According to Vedānta-ratna-mañjūṣā, pp.74 and 127, Śūdras are entitled to meditation enjoined in the Purānas, but not to those enjoined in the Upaniṣads; (iv) Basically the mantra-vidyā is used with the tantra-vidyā, if it is used in the good sense. Keśavakāśmīrin mentions some magical formulas in the Kramadīpikā; (v) It is mentioned in the preface to Tattva-prakāśikā (p.1) that Kramadīpikā was commented upon by Vraješācārya, the follower of Nimbārka school as we have seen above; (vi) It may be possible that Keśavakāśmīrin composed "Kramadīpikā" during his stay in Bengal. This is why it is found in Bengali manuscripts only. Thus we may conclude that "Kramadīpikā" is the work of 'Keśavakāśmīrin'.

1. Preface to Tattvaparakāśikā, p.1.
2. Kramadīpikā by Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa with a commentary by Śrī Govind Bhattacharya, published by Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1917.

CHAPTER - 2

THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ OF KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA

## CHAPTER - 2

### THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ OF KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA

#### 2.1 Introduction:

The Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā<sup>1</sup> of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa is an elaborate commentary on the Braḥmasūtras. It is a commentary of Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta-kaustubha<sup>2</sup> which itself is a commentary of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha<sup>3</sup> of Nimbārka. The work consists of four chapters, each one of which is again divided into four quarters. In chapter I, Samanvayādhyāya, it is sought to be established that Brahman is the sole subject of all the Scriptures. The nature of Brahman, His attributes and the sources of our knowledge of Him are discussed in this chapter. In chapter II, Avirodhādhyāya, the commentator first refutes the rival views of Sāṃkhya-yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivism, and Śāktism, and considers the problems of Jīva and Jagat, their natures and

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1. Ed. by Amolakarāma Śāstrī, Delhi, 1938.
  2. Ed. by Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī, Benaras, 1932.
  3. Ed. by Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī, Benaras, 1932.



attributes and the manner in which they are related to Brahman. These two chapters are purely metaphysical and supply the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of Nimbārka. The remaining ones are chiefly of devotional and ethical interest. In chapter III, Sādhanaḍhyāya, for example are discussed the means of attaining Mokṣa, the nature and importance of meditations as mentioned in the Upaniṣads. In chapter IV, Phalaḍhyāya, the commentator gives his views on Mokṣa, the fruit and the conditions of the Mukta Jīvātman etc..

## 2.2 Parts of Adhikaraṇa or section:

This work consists of several 'Adhikaraṇas' or sections. Every section consists of six parts : -

(1) Viṣaya or subject, (2) Saṁśaya or doubt (3) Pūrva-pakṣa or prima facie view, (4) Uttarapakṣa or Opposite view, (5) Siddhānta or conclusion, and (6) lastly Saṅgati<sup>1</sup> or consistency with the other parts of the work. Saṅgati or consistency shows that there is no conflict in what proceeds and what follows. It is of three kinds :

(1) consistency with the scripture called Śāstra Saṅgati,

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1. Nyāyakoṣa, by Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkara, Poona, 1928, p.13.

(2) consistency in the chapter or Adhyāya called Adhyāya Saṅgati, and (3) consistency in the Pāda or quarter called Pāda Saṅgati. Thus in the whole work Brahman is the main theme; it is the subject matter of discussion. In order to fulfil the condition of Śāstra Saṅgati, therefore an interpretation of any passage must not go away from the subject matter of Brahman. Secondly, with the Adhyāya, each Adhyāya has a particular topic of its own and a passage must be interpreted consistently with the topic of that Adhyāya. Similar is the case with Pāda Saṅgati. Besides these three kinds of Saṅgatis, there is a certain relation among Adhikaraṇas or sections themselves. One Adhikaraṇa leads to another through some particular association of ideas. In a pāda there are many Adhikaraṇas which are not put together in a haphazard manner. The Saṅgati which binds one Adhikaraṇa with another is of six kinds :- (1) Ākṣepa Saṅgati or objection, (2) Dṛṣṭānta Saṅgati or illustration, (3) Prati-dṛṣṭānta Saṅgati or counter-illustration, (4) Prasāṅga-Saṅgati or incidental illustration, (5) Utpatti-Saṅgati or introduction, and (6) Apavāda

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Saṅgati or exception. Thus, for example, in the seventh Adhikaraṇa of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya, the question is, who is meant in the passage 'Now, this golden person, who is seen within the sun, has a golden beard and golden hair, and is golden through and through, right to the tip of the fingernail. His eyes are like the full-blown lotus. His name is High, because he has risen above all sins. Verily, he who knows thus rises above all sins. His singers are the Ṛc and the Sāman ..... So much with reference to the gods, 'now, with reference to the self, 'now, this person, who is seen within the eye and so on', — Here is the Viṣaya; does it mean the individual soul, or the supreme Lord? — Here is the Saṅśaya. He is the individual soul, says the objector (Pūrvapakṣa). No, He is only the Supreme Lord says the Siddhāntin. This is the Uttarapakṣa. This proves that the passage refers to nothing but the Supreme Lord or Brahman. This is the Siddhānta. The being inside the sun and the eye is the Supreme Lord and not an individual soul, because the attributes of the Supreme

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1. Nyāyakoṣa, p.907.

Lord are taught therein. This is Dr̥ṣṭānta-Saṅgati.<sup>1</sup>  
 This method of treating a certain topic or subject  
 in each Adhikaraṇa is very systematic.

2.3 Anubandha-catuṣṭaya (The indispensable  
 quaternity of factors):

It is customary with Sanskrit writers to indicate  
 the scope and purpose of their works before beginning  
 the subject proper. This usually consists of four  
 parts collectively called Anubandha-cetuṣṭaya :

- (1) Adhikārin = The person entitled to the study,  
 (2) Viṣaya = the topic, (3) Sambandha = the relation,  
 and (4) Prayojana = the purpose.<sup>2</sup> As regards the  
 Adhikārin of studying this work, he should be a person,

1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.21, pp.75-78.

2. (A) Śāstrasyāḍau vaktavyeṣvadhikārivīṣaya-  
 prayojanasambandheṣu/jñātārtham jñāta-  
 sambandham śrotum śrotā pravarttate/  
 granthāḍau tena vaktavyaḥ sambandhaḥ  
 saprayojanaḥ// ityukterviṣayaprayojanā-  
 dīnāmarambha-prayojakatvāttaddhetutvam/  
 asmin pakṣe cānubādhyateneneti karaṇe ghaṇṇ/

— Vācaspatyam.

(B) Siddhārtham siddhasambandham śrotum śrotā  
 pravarttate/ śāstrāḍau tena Vaktavyaḥ  
 sambandhaḥ saprayojanaḥ//

— Mīmāṃsāśloka-vārtikam,  
 1.17, Trivandrum, 1943.

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who has studied the Veda with its six parts, who has been assailed with doubt arising from texts which teach that the fruits of Karman are both transitory and eternal i.e. whose mind is assailed with doubt owing to the contradictory teachings regarding the fruits of Karman, some texts declaring that the fruits of Karman are transitory, while others declaring that they are eternal; who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties i.e. Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein regarding Karmans, their kinds and their fruits; in whom, as a consequence, there arisen a disregard for worldly objects, which is the result of discrimination

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1. The six parts are :- (1) Sikṣā or the science of proper articulation and pronunciation, comprising the knowledge of letters, accents, quantity, the use of the organs of pronunciation, and phonetics generally, but especially the laws of euphony peculiar to the Veda; (ii) Chandaḥs or treatises on metre (iii) Vyākaraṇa or grammar; (iv) Nirukta or treatise on the explanation of difficult words; (v) Jyotiṣa or treatise on astronomy; and (vi) Kalpa or treatises on ceremonials. The first and second of these Vedāṅgas are said to be intended to secure the correct recitation of the Veda, the third and fourth the understanding of it, the fifth and sixth its proper employment at sacrifice.

-- Monier William's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.1016, Oxford.

between the finitude and eternity of fruits of the knowledge of Karman and Brahman respectively, the former being surpassable while the latter non-surpassable i.e. in whose mind has arisen a disgust for all worldly pursuits and objects, since he has apprehended the great distinction between the fruits of Karman, viz. ordinary worldly objects and heaven, and the fruit of the knowledge, Brahman, viz. salvation (Even heaven has an end, but not so salvation, and even heaven is not the highest end, but salvation is); who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a vision of Him; to whom the spiritual preceptor alone is the God; who has wholehearted devotion to the holy spiritual teacher; and who is desirous<sup>1</sup> of final release.

Secondly, the Viṣaya of the work is Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest person, denoted by the term 'Brahman', omniscient, the substratum of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes and powers persisting as long as He Himself does, the controller of Brahmā, Rudra,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.5-8.

Indra, matter, atoms, time, karman and nature, who is absolutely untouched by defects and who is the substratum of natural difference and non-difference<sup>1</sup> from the sentient and the non-sentient. But, according to the Advaita view, the identity between the Jīva and the Brahman is the topic. This Advaita view is not tenable, because the Advaitins admit that all things are falsely superimposed (adhyasta) except Brahman and hence identity should be superimposed. If the identity be falsely superimposed, then the difference becomes real, and this goes against the Advaita view itself. Just as in ordinary life, owing to the similarity of the object a silver is falsely superimposed on a nacre and is set aside by knowledge viz. 'This is a nacre and not a silver', so the identity should be set aside by the knowledge of Brahman and the difference between the Jīva and Brahman should be real and not the identity. If the identity is not falsely superimposed, then the difference becomes real because the identity is the non-difference from

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.10.

Brahman and the non-difference exists between two different objects. Therefore, if, the identity be real, then the difference becomes real, that too will go against the Advaita view. So the identity<sup>1</sup> between the Jīva and the Brahman is not the topic.

Thirdly, the Sambandha in the work lies in the relation between the subject and the means of the proposition.<sup>2</sup> Fourthly, the Prayojana of the work is salvation as characterized by attainment of the state of the Lord.<sup>3</sup>

Any Sanskrit work can be interpreted in either of the two ways deductive (traditional) or inductive (critical). The traditional method takes the doctrine for granted and proceeds from this assumption to find the doctrine in the work under examination. The critical method, on the other hand, pre-supposes an attitude of absolute impartiality, consisting the work by itself,

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1. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.10-12.  
(b) Bhāvadīpikā on Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, by Pt. Amolakarāma Śāstrī, Delhi, 1938, pp.10-12.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.13.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.13.



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without a leaning to any one particular doctrine.

The critical method was not unknown to the old Sanskrit writers, especially in the area of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsakas, whose special province it was to lay down the canons of interpretation have given the essentials of this method in the form of Upakrama or the beginning, Upasañhāra or the end, Abhyāsa or the repetition, Apūrvatā or the novelty, Phala or the object, Arthavāda or the glorification, and Upapatti or the argument.<sup>2</sup>

These are the canons for determining the purport. By Upakrama and Upasañhāra is means the mention of the topic under consideration in the section in the beginning as well as in the end. Thus for example in the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the subject to be taught, viz. the secondless Brahman is mentioned in the beginning in the words, 'Ekamevādvitīyam' (Chānd. VI, 2.1) 'one only without a second' and also in the end in the words, 'Aitādātmyamidam sarvam' (Chānd.VI, 8.7), 'All this has it for the soul'. Abhyāsa

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1. The Vedānta, by V.S. Ghate, Poona, 1960, p.48.
  2. upakramopasañhārāvabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam/  
arthavādopapatti ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye//  
- Vācaspatyam.  
- Nyāyakoṣa, p.158.  
- Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha of  
Mādhavācārya, Varanasi, 1964, p.293.

is the statement now and again, in the course of a section, of the matter to be taught in it. Thus we find the secondless Brahman mentioned as many as nine times in the same chapter in the words, 'Tattva-masi' (VI.8.7) 'That thou art'. Apūrvatā means the unknowability of the subject taught in the section through the other Pramāṇas. Thus we have in the same case the incomprehensibility of the secondless Brahman through the other Pramāṇas. Phalam means the usefulness of the knowledge of the matter taught or of its practice referred to here and there. Thus in the same case there is, as the result of knowing the secondless Brahman, mention of its attainment, in 'Ācāryavān puruṣo veda/tasya tāvadeva ciram, yāvanna vimokṣye/atha sampatsye/ (Chānd. VI.14.2) 'a man who has got a teacher knows; he has to wait just until he is freed from the body and then he becomes one with Brahman. By Arthavāda is meant the frequent commendations of the subject matter taught. In the same case as above, there is the extolling of the secondless Brahman in 'Uta tamādesamaprākṣyo yenāśrutam śrutam bhavatyamatam matamavijñātam vijñātam' (Chānd., VI, 1.3). 'Have you enquired of your teacher about the

instruction by hearing which is heard the unheard,  
 is taught the untaught, is known the unknown'. Upapatti  
 is analogical reasoning stated now and then in order  
 to establish the truth of the matter taught. To take  
 the same case once again, that all transformations  
 are verbal in character, is adduced as the reason in  
 support of the sole reality of Brahman in 'yathā  
 saumyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvam mṛṇmayam vijñātam syād-  
 vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam'  
 (Chānd. VI.1.4) 'Just as by knowing one lump of clay,  
 all that is made of clay would become known, the product  
 depends only on name, it is a name, while clay alone  
 is the reality'<sup>1</sup>.

This critical method has been employed in deter-  
 mining the meaning of any particular word in an  
 Upaniṣadic passage quoted in the commentary on the  
 Brahmasūtras. As one instance among many, one may  
 refer to the first Adhikaraṇa of the fourth Pāda, of  
 the first Adhyāya, where in determining what the word  
 'avyakta' means in Kaṭhopeniṣad 1.3.1, all those canons

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1. Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, Ed. by M. Hiriyana,  
 Poona, 1962, p.12.

instruction by hearing which is heard the unheard, is taught the untaught, is known the unknown'. Upapatti is analogical reasoning stated now and then in order to establish the truth of the matter taught. To take the same case once again, that all transformations are verbal in character, is adduced as the reason in support of the sole reality of Brahman in 'yathā saumyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvam mṛṇmayam vijñātam syād-vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam' (Chānd. VI.1.4) 'Just as by knowing one lump of clay, all that is made of clay would become known, the product depends only on name, it is a name, while clay alone<sup>1</sup> is the reality'.

This critical method has been employed in determining the meaning of any particular word in an Upaniṣadic passage quoted in the commentary on the Brahmasūtras. As one instance among many, one may refer to the first Adhikaraṇa of the fourth Pāda, of the first Adhyāya, where in determining what the word 'avyakta' means in Kaṭhōpaniṣad 1.3.1, all those canons

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1. Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, Ed. by M. Hiriyana, Poona, 1962, p.12.

for determining the purport have been applied. That the Adhikaraṇa establishes that the word 'avyakta', occurring in Kaṭhōpaniṣad 1.3-11 denotes the body from the beginning e.g. 'avyakta-śabdenātra śarīrasyaiva'<sup>1</sup> ---- 'By the word 'avyakta' in this text, the body is to be understood'; from the close also, --- e.g. 'tathāvyaktaśabdo'pi vaidikaprayoge na tāntrika-pradhānamabhidhātum योग्याḥ'<sup>2</sup> --- 'so it is established that the word 'avyakta' as well, being mentioned in the Veda, does not apply to Pradhāna, (but denotes the body)'. There is a repetition of the same idea throughout the adhikaraṇa, e.g. 'sūkṣmam tu tadarhatvāt'<sup>3</sup> etc. 'But the subtle body is denoted by the word 'avyakta', because of its fitness to be denoted so', etc.. There is a novelty here in the fact that the word 'avyakta' means 'the body', and this can be known from it and from no other proof. The object of knowledge of 'avyakta' meaning 'body' is also mentioned there, e.g. "tadadhīnatvāt<sup>4</sup>arthavat'; 'jñeyatvāvacanācca'<sup>5</sup> -- 'Avyakta has a

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.1, p.146.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.7, p.152.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.2, p.147.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.3, pp.148.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.4, p.148.

meaning on account of its dependence on Him', "Also because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known". Thus it is established that a consideration of the meaning of the prior and later texts of Kaṭhōpaniṣad is the fruit of the meaning of 'avyakta' which denotes the body.<sup>1</sup> There is also the eulogising of the body which is denoted by the word 'avyakta' thus, indriyebhyaḥ parā hyarthā arthebhyasca param manaḥ/ manasastu parā buddhir buddherātmā mahān paraḥ// mahataḥ puram avyaktamavyaktātpuruṣaḥ paraḥ/ puruṣānna param kiñcitsā-kāṣṭha sā parā gatiḥ//"<sup>2</sup> -- (Kaṭhōpaniṣad 3.10-11) 'Higher than the sense-organs are the objects of senses, higher than the objects in the mind, higher than the mind is the intellect, higher than the intellect is the great soul. Higher than the mahat is 'avyakta', higher than the avyakta is the Puruṣa; nothing is higher than the Puruṣa, He is the goal, the highest course". The argument is that the

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.6, pp.159-152.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.1, pp.146-147.

the cause and the effect being non-different, a term denoting the one, can very well denote the other. Hence the word 'avyakta' denoting pradhāna, the cause, can denote the body, its effect as well.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.2, p.148.

CHAPTER - 3

EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINES OF NIMBĀRKA-VEDĀNTA  
IN THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ



## CHAPTER - 3

### EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINES OF NIMBĀRKA-VEDĀNTA IN THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ

#### 3.1 Epistemology:

According to Keśavakāśmīrin there are three realities, viz. Brahman, the Jīva and the Jagat. For the knowledge of these he believes in five means of right knowledge, namely, Pratyakṣa (Perception), Anumāna (Inference), Upamāna (Comparison), Śabda (Valid-testimony), and Anupalabdhi (Non-cognition).<sup>1</sup>

##### 3.1.1 Pratyakṣa (Perception) :

Pratyakṣa (Perception) is that valid source of knowledge through which an object is known directly. It is the knowledge arising from the connection of sense-

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.3, pp.44-49.

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organs with objects. For example : "I see a pot". It is of two kinds : Nitya (Eternal) and Anitya (Non-eternal). Nitya perceptive knowledge is of the Lord; and Anitya obtains in human perceptions. Human perception is of two kinds : Bāhya (External) and Āntara (Internal).

Bāhya (External) is the common human perception brought into being by common causal collocations consisting of the normal organs of sensation assisted by requisite light for the observation of objects. It is fivefold as the causes peculiar to it are fivefold consisting of the five sense-organs, having five corresponding objects of sensation :-

1. The Cākṣuṣa pratyakṣa or the visual perception.
2. The Rāsana pratyakṣa or the palatal perception.
3. The Ghrāṇaja pratyakṣa or the nasal perception.
4. The Spārsana pratyakṣa or the tactual perception.
5. The Śrotraja pratyakṣa or the oracular perception.

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1. (a) 'pratyakṣasyendriyārthasannikarṣajanyatvāt'  
— Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.45.

(b) 'indriyārthasannikarṣajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvamiti'/ — Bhāvadīpikā, a commentary on Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.45.

Here Keśavakāśmīrin follows the Naiyāyikas exactly.

The Āntara (Internal) perception is produced by the instrumentality of the manas (mind) wherein the objects of perception are internal, such as pleasure, pain etc.. Here Keśavakāśmīrin differs from the Naiyāyikas on the following points :-

(a) First, as we have already seen, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, pleasure, pain etc. - mind-contact is one of direct conjunction, which the Naiyāyikas do not hold. The Naiyayikas hold that it is only in the perception of the self that there is a direct sense-object-contact. The self, as a substance, comes into actual contact with the mind as another substance, and thereby becomes an object of Internal perception, which is never acceptable to Keśavakāśmīrin, as according to him, the Jīva is not the subject to the mind.

(b) Secondly, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, pleasure, pain etc. are not attributes of the Jīva but those of the body,<sup>1</sup> while the Naiyāyikas accept them as attributes of the self.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.4.7, pp.349-350.

### 3.1.2 Anumāna (Inference):

Anumāna (Inference) is that source of knowledge through which things not present before the five external organs of sense are cognised. It depends on the relation between Hetu (middle term) and Sādhyā (major term) technically called 'Vyāpti' (invariable<sup>1</sup> concomitance). It involves two distinctive factors: (1) Vyāpti (the invariable concomitance), and (2) Pakṣadharmatā (the adjunctness of the middle term (Hetu) to the minor term (Pakṣa).<sup>2</sup> Keśavakāśmīrin, like Naiyāyikas, utilises all the five factors of syllogism in arriving at a conclusion. The five factors are : (1) Pratijñā (Preposition), (2) Hetu (Reason), (3) Udāharaṇa (Explanatory example), (4) Upanaya (Application),<sup>3</sup> and (5) Nigamaṇa (conclusion). Of these, Hetu is of three kinds : (1) Kevalānvayī (only affirmative concomitance), (2) Kevalavyatirekī (only negative concomitance),

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1. 'anumānasya hetuḍṛṣṭāntasatva eva sadbhāvāt'/  
Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.45.
  2. 'tatra vyāpteh pakṣadharmatāyāśca śāstramantareṇa grhitumaśakyatvāt'/  
Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.46.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.9, 19, 44-45 etc.

and (3) Anvayavyatirekī (affirmative-negative con-  
comitance)<sup>1</sup>. Hetu which possesses both the affirmative  
and the negative examples, has to fulfil the following  
five conditions : (1) Pakṣasattva, (2) Sapakṣasattva,  
(3) Vipakṣavyāvṛtti, (4) Abādhitaviṣayatva, and (5) Asat-  
pratipakṣatva. Whenever any one of these above mentioned  
five requisite conditions of a true reason or the middle  
term is violated, the logical reason becomes a fallacious  
one and is technically known as 'Hetvābhāsa'. Keśavakāś-  
mīrin, like Naiyāyikas, believes in the fallacies of  
probans. They are five in number : (1) Asiddha or  
unfounded reason, there are three kinds of it : (a) Āśrayā-  
siddha, (b) Svarūpāsiddha, and (c) Vyāpyatvāsiddha;  
(2) Viruddha or contradictory reason; (3) Anaikāntika  
or a reason which is co-existent with the major term  
only partially, it is of three kinds : (a) Sādhāraṇa,  
(b) Asādhāraṇa, and (c) Anupasañhārin; (4) Prakaraṇasama  
or counter balanced reason; and (5) Bādhitaviṣaya or  
Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa or stultified reason.<sup>2</sup> Keśavakāśmīrin

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.45.

2. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.45-46.

(b) Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics,  
by R.V. Joshi, Delhi, 1979, pp.45-73.

divides Anumāna into two kinds, viz. Laukika (secular) and Śāstramūlaka (Scriptural). Laukika is based on empirical perception, e.g. 'a body is not a soul, because it is material like a pot'. Śāstramūlaka is based on Scriptural testimony alone, e.g. 'A soul is immortal, because it is conscious like Brahman, and because the Śruti says : "The soul is indestructable", "The soul is never born nor does it ever die, nor does it ever exist on coming into being. For it is unborn, eternal, everlasting and primeval; even though the body is slain, the soul is not."

### 3.1.3 Upamāna (Comparison):

Upamāna means comparison or knowledge of similarity. Comparison is the immediate cause of assimilative cognition (Upamiti). Assimilative cognition is the knowledge of the connection of a name with the object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its proximate cause.<sup>1</sup> This may be illustrated thus :- A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word 'gavaya'. From a forester he learns that a 'gavaya' is similar

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1. 'Sādṛśyajñānanyopamitiḥ' / --Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.47.

to a 'cow' : he goes to a forest, sees the animal called 'gavaya' which is similar to a cow and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition (atideśavākya). Then the assimilative cognition 'This is the animal denoted by the word 'gavaya' arises. Just as assimilative cognition (upamiti) arises out of the knowledge of similarity, it can arise through a knowledge of dissimilarity<sup>1</sup> as well as through a knowledge of some uncommon or peculiar characteristics.<sup>2</sup> An example of the former kind is : 'Uṣṭro aśvavat ṅa samānapṛṣṭhah-rasvagalakāyaḥ' : A camel does not have a level back and a short neck like a horse; and of the latter 'khaḍgamṛgo nāsikodgama-dekaśṛṅgaḥ' -- a rhinoceros has a single horn protruding from its nose. Viewed in this way Upamāna can be of three kinds.

#### 3.1.4 Śabda (Valid-testimony):

Śabda (Valid-testimony) is a sentence spoken by a trustworthy person (āptavākya). A trustworthy person

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1. 'Vaisādrśyājñānajanyopamitiḥ/'

—Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.47.

2. 'asādhāraṇadharmajñānajanyopamitiḥ/'

— Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.47.

(āpta) is one who is free from the four causes of error, viz. weakness of intellect, etc., and speaks truth. There are three kinds of āpta in accordance with the difference in the degree of the authoritative-ness of the speaker. Āptatama is the Veda, and the Vedic texts are the most authoritative. Āptatara are the Smṛtis, like the Manu-smṛti and the rest and the Smṛti texts are a little less authoritative. Āpta are the commentators and expounders of Śruti and Smṛti and they are one degree less authoritative, since they have to depend on both Śruti and Smṛti and their words are one degree less authoritative.

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, Śabda (Valid-testimony) is of two kinds, viz. Śrauta (Scriptural) and Śābda (Verbal). Śrauta is a statement of an Āpta. Śābda conveys its sense through its vṛtti.<sup>1</sup> In fact, there is no difference between Śrauta and Śābda. Both are the same. Both are dependent on one another. Śābda is the process through which Śrauta exposes its sense through its Vṛtti. Keśavakāśmīrin has expressed his desire to emphasise on purely Śrauta. Hence he divides Śabda into two kinds : Śrauta and Śābda.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.2, pp.38-39.



### 3.1.5 Anupalabdhi (Non-cognition) :


Anupalabdhi (non-cognition) is the unique cause of such presentative knowledge of non-existence as it is not due to inference or any other kind of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Non-existence (abhāva) depends on the knowledge of the pratiyogi (counterpositive).<sup>2</sup>

Keśavakāśmīrin does not accept 'Arthāpatti' (Presumption) as a separate and independent source of knowledge but includes it under Anumāna (Inference).<sup>3</sup>

Thus, as regards the epistemology, Keśavakāśmīrin follows the Naiyāyikas, except that, the Naiyāyikas do not admit 'Anupalabdhi' as a separate source of knowledge, but they define and divide it as a separate entity, while Keśavakāśmīrin accepts it as a separate source of knowledge like the Advaitins. He is influenced by both Naiyāyikas and Advaitins.

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1. 'tasyā abhāvakarṇaktvāt'/  
— Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.48.
  2. 'pratiyogijñānasāpekṣatvādabhāvasya'/  
— Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.48.
  3. 'tasyāstarkarūpatayā tadviṣayatvasyānumāna-nirākarṇainaiiva nirāso jñeyaḥ'/  
— Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.48.

This is a chart of the sources of knowledge acknowledged by Keśavakāśmīrin :



### 3.2 Concept of Brahman :

Reality according to Keśavakāśmīrin is of two kinds : Independent and Dependent. Brahman alone is the independent reality. The dependent reality, on the other hand, is of two kinds : Conscious (Cit) and Non-conscious (Acit). Jīva is the only conscious reality. Jagat is the non-conscious reality which is of three kinds : Aprākṛta, Prākṛta and Kāla.

(3.2.1) The Higher Reality, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, is Brahman, Śrīkr̥ṣṇa<sup>1</sup> alone. He is

1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.8.

unsurpassed and greatest in nature, attributes, power etc.. He is variously known as : Brahman, Bhagavān, Vāsudeva, Śrīkr̥ṣṇa etc.. In accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti passages, viz. "He grows and causes to grow, hence he is called the supreme Brahman", "There are great attributes, so He is called the Brahman", "This is the nature, the unmanifest, a doer, an eternal and Higher than all beings, hence, he is called the greatest and imperishable." The Highest Reality is the Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, denoted by the term Brahman, Omniscient, the substratum of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes and powers persisting as long as He Himself does, the controller of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, matter, atoms, time, Karman and nature, who is absolutely untouched by defects and who is the substratum of a natural difference and non-difference from the sentient and the non-sentient.<sup>1</sup>

Brahman cannot be absolutely devoid of all attributes and distinctions. Such a Brahman cannot be an object of enquiry by scripture. According to Advaita view, three alternatives are possible here, -- viz. the object of

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.9-10.

enquiry is either the pure Brahman, or Brahman as limited by Māyā, or Ívara superimposed with ajñāna. Now the first alternative is not possible, because according to the Advaitins, the pure Brahman is not an object (aviṣaya), otherwise we might argue very well; the pure Brahman is false (mithyā), because it is an object of enquiry, like pots and the rest. The second alternative, too, is not possible, because in that case we shall attain knowledge of Brahman as limited by māyā and not of pure and real Brahman. Hence salvation will not follow. The third alternative, too, is not possible, because it is this very adhyāsa which, according to the Advaitins, is set aside by the Scripture.<sup>1</sup> Hence the attributeless and distinctionless Brahman cannot be an object established by the Scripture.

Further, according to the Advaita view, Brahman is truth, knowledge and bliss. Here the question is : Whether truth and the rest constitute the nature of Brahman or the attributes of Brahman. Now if these

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.9.

are the nature of Brahman, then Brahman will have a three-fold nature, which will go against the Advaita view itself, and if these are the attributes of Brahman, that, too, will go against the Advaita view. Moreover, if it be said that they denote the nature of Brahman, then Brahman becomes an object (viṣaya) of words, which is against the Advaita view. If it be said that Brahman cannot be denoted by words, then Brahman becomes anirvacanīya and as such mithyā in accordance with the inference. Brahman is mithyā because it is anirvacanīya, for whatever is anirvacanīya, is mithyā, like Māyā. Brahman is mithyā, because it is asat. Whatever is asat, is mithyā, like the snake<sup>1</sup>rope. Hence Nirguṇavāda and nirviśeṣavāda are full of self-contradiction and as such absolutely untenable.

(3.2.2) Brahman is the cause of the universe.<sup>2</sup>

He alone is the cause of creation and destruction of the universe. All names and forms arise from Him and return to Him.<sup>3</sup> He is both the material cause and

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.2, p.43.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.10-12, pp.59-60; 1.1.19, p.66; 2.1.35, p.240.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.3.42, p.142.

the efficient cause of the universe.<sup>1</sup> As declared by the Śruti: "Brahman was the forest, Brahman the tree from which they cut off the heaven and the earth. O learned man, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds".<sup>2</sup> He is the material cause in the sense that He enables His natural śaktis viz. the cit and the acit in their subtle forms, to be manifested in gross forms, and He is the efficient cause in the sense that He unites the individual souls with their respective fruits of actions and means of enjoyments. Thus, the creation of the universe is nothing but a manifestation in a gross form of what was subtle earlier and is thus a sort of modification or Pariṇāma.

Pariṇāma means modification or transformation or actual change resulting in an effect having the reality as the material cause, or, production of an effect that has same kind of (either real or unreal) existence as that of its material cause. The example of transformation of milk into curd, is often quoted. In this

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.23-27, pp.170-179.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.25, p.177.

school of thought, there is the scope for entire modification of the substance, name and form of this cause. The change of the cause is real. The relation between the cause and the effect is that of difference and non-difference. The cause itself assumes the shape of the effect. In reality both are real. The milk itself changes into curd; the effect in the cause in the form of cause or śakti is accepted. It established the relation of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect.<sup>1</sup>

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Pariṇāma has been divided into two kinds : (1) Svarūpa-pariṇāma as of the Sāṃkhya system (ii) śaktivikṣepa-lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma. Like Nimbārka, Keśavakāśmīrin admits the Brahmakāraṇavāda or the Brahmaśaktikāraṇavāda.<sup>3</sup> According to him the universe exists in the Brahman in unmanifest form or identical form or in the form of potency (śakti) because it becomes manifested as before.

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1. Joshi, Rasik Vihar, Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, p.81.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.26, pp.236-237.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.26, pp.178-179.

In this view, the relation between the universe and Brahman is that of difference and non-difference such as is the case of gold and ornaments.

One or two objections will be considered against the doctrine of Brahman as the cause of the universe. One of the objections is that Brahman is not the material cause of the universe, because there is difference between Brahman and the world. Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, while the world possesses just the opposite attributes of non-sentience and the rule is that whatever is different from something cannot have that object as its material cause, for example, the pot which is different from ether has not the ether as its material cause.<sup>1</sup> But according to Keśavakāśmīrin, there is no rule that there will be a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect. It cannot therefore be said that the world, being different from Brahman, cannot arise from Him. As Śruti says : "There is the origin of hairs on the head and so on from a person

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.4, p.185.



from whom they are different, and of scorpions from the cowdung from which they are different."<sup>1</sup>

An objection is raised : Brahman is not the material cause of the world in dissolution, because then He would be non-sentient.<sup>2</sup> The answer to this question is as follows : Just as the evolutes like the pot, when dissolved, do not defile the lump of clay by their attributes, so this world, consisting of non-sentience, when dissolved into Brahman, does not defile Brahman, possessing the non-sentient as His power.<sup>3</sup>

It may be objected : Being the material cause of the universe, Brahman will experience the pleasures and pains Himself in the form of Jīva, so that there will be no difference between the enjoyer (viz. the Jīva) and the controller.<sup>4</sup> The answer to this is as follows. Just as in ordinary life, though foams, waves

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.6, pp.186-187.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.8, p.188.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.9, p.188.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.13, pp.192-193.

and the rest, having the sea as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective causes and yet there is a difference amongst the particular effects themselves, in the same manner there may be a difference between the enjoyer and the controller, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause. The fact, however, is, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, that there is difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman.

Thus, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe and its soul. Of course, Keśavakāśmīrin, like the Sāṅkhya, is the upholder of Satkāryavāda.

The attributeless and distinctionless Brahman, as admitted by the Advaitins, cannot be the cause of the universe. According to the Advaita view, three alternatives are possible here, viz. the cause of the universe is pure Brahman, i.e. pure consciousness; or Brahman as limited by māyā, or as superimposed by avidyā. Now the first alternative is not possible, because one who is devoid of all attributes and distinctions cannot possibly think and resolve to be many, as the cause of the universe does in the beginning

according to the scripture.<sup>1</sup> In fact, an object, devoid of all attributes and distinctions, being beyond every proof,<sup>2</sup> is but a non-entity. The second alternative, too, is not possible. Here the question is : Whether the cause as limited by avidyā is of the form of the object reflected (bimbarūpa), or of the form of the reflection (pratibimbarūpa). The first alternative is not true for in that case just as the face reflected on mirror is outside the mirror and does not pervade it, so Brahman will be outside the individual soul and non-pervasive of it, and hence will cease to be the inner-controller of all. So is the case with the second one, for in that case, since the attributes of the upādhi belong to the reflection, Brahman must be subject to all the defects etc. due to avidyā which is the upādhi here. The third alternative, too, is not possible, because the superimposition of avidyā on Brahman, which is knowledge by nature, is absurd, just as it is absurd to hold that there is darkness in the sun.<sup>3</sup> Hence, Nirguṇa and

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1. Upaniṣad-prakāśikā, a commentary on the Chāndogyopaniṣad by Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, 6.2.2, pp.184-185, Ed. by Paṇḍit Amolakarāma Shāstrī, Vṛndāvan, 1930.
  2. Ibid., p.185.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.2, p.41.

Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe.

The most important and natural question is : What is the proof of the existence of Brahman ? The answer to this is as follows : Scripture alone is the source of the knowledge of Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.3 Concept of Jīva :

#### (3.3.1) Nature of Jīva :

Of the two dependent realities the conscious one is the Jīva. Jīva is knowledge<sup>2</sup> by nature. It is a special quality of the Jīva to delight the entire body in the same way as the odour pervades the flower. As proved by the Śruti : "He has entered here upto the hairs of the body and the nails of the fingers"<sup>3</sup>. On account of this special quality, the Jīva is different from the non-sentient. Being its essence, knowledge is present in every state of the Jīva, viz. the states of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep, swoon and death. It is present even in the state of deep sleep and the

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.3, pp.44-49.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.26, p.314.

3. Ibid.

rest. An objection may be raised here : where is it present during the state of deep sleep, as it is present during the state of waking ? The answer to this question is as follows : while in the waking state it is manifest, in the state of deep sleep it remains self-possessed. Just as, youth, though not manifest, is present even in childhood, so is the case here.<sup>1</sup>

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Jīva, being knowledge, is the knower as well. An objection may be raised here : Jīva cannot be both the knowledge and the knower. Just as a drop of water is identical with water, so knowledge is identical with the knower. Here Jīva is not the knower, but the pure knowledge. To this the answer is as follows : There is neither a contradiction between the knowledge and the knower nor is there an identity between them. In many cases, we find that the substratum (dharmin) and the attribute (dharma) are similar, but that does not mean that they are identical. Just as a gem and its rays are equally luminous and yet are different from

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.30, p.316.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.18, p.293.

each other and stand in the relation of substratum (dharmin) and attribute (dharma), even so, though Jīva and its quality of knowledge are knowledge equally, yet they stand in the relation of substratum and attribute. Thus there is a distinction between them, and also a lack of identity. This is clear from the scripture : "Seated on the body by knowledge". Thus, there is a difference between one drop of water and the water as a whole, for that drop of water, having a distinct form, must be different from other drops of water.<sup>1</sup>

Jīva, being a knower, is an Ego or 'I' (aham).<sup>2</sup> A knower always feels 'I know', 'I want', 'I do', etc. 'Ahamartha' does not consist of two factors, intelligence and non-intelligence.<sup>3</sup> It is not unreal but in the essence of the Jīva. It is objected here that if an Ego or 'I' is real or the essence of the Jīva, it must always exist along with it. But the 'I' no longer exists in the state of deep sleep, salvation

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.294-295.

etc., so the 'I' is an effect of Prakṛti. The answer to this question is as follows : The 'I' is present even in deep sleep, as is proved from such a memory as "For such a long time I slept happily and did not know anything"? It shows that the 'I' is present even in deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge and the feeling of happiness. Even the memory "For such a long time I did not know even myself", does not show the absence of 'I' during the state of deep sleep. But it means that it is present even in deep sleep, what is absent is the 'I' as it is during the waking state. Hence, the 'I' must persist even during the states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest.

Jīva, being an Ego, is a doer. It is proved by all spiritual injunctions : For example : "One who desires to go to Svarga should perform sacrifices",  
 or "one who desires salvation should worship the Brahman"<sup>1</sup>.  
 On account of its movement it is a doer as declared by the Śruti : "Jīva moves within the body at will"<sup>2</sup>, or  
 "Thus moves taking the vital-breath"<sup>3</sup>. This also proves

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.32, p.317.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.33, p.326.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.34, p.326.

that Jīva is a doer. It means that being the knower and enjoyer, the Jīva is the material cause of the vital breath, the sense organs and the buddhi etc.. The sentence that, "Vijñāna performs sacrifice"<sup>1</sup>, also proves that Jīva is a doer. Here one might ask : Does 'Vijñāna' not mean 'buddhi' ? To this one reply would be : No, because buddhi is not the doer but an impelling force. The fact is that Jīva is only a doer. Jīva is a doer not only during the state of mundane existence, but also in the state of salvation. It is clear from its capability of entering into samādhi.

It is not tenable to hold that Jīva is not really a doer, but only appears to be so through the false superimposition of the doerness of the mind on it in the same way as a white crystal appears to be red through the superimposition of the redness of a red flower. In the case of the crystal and the red flower, redness is perceived separately in the crystal and in the flower : "The crystal is red", "The flower is red". But in the case of the Jīva and the mind, doerness is never perceived separately in them : "The Jīva is doer",

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.35, p.326.



"The mind is a doer", but we always feel 'I am doer',  
<sup>1</sup>  
 and not my mind.

<sup>2</sup>  
 Jīva is an enjoyer, for, according to the law  
 of Karman, the fundamental principle of Indian  
 Philosophy, a doer is necessarily an enjoyer. A doer  
 here means one who performs sakāma-karmans. As a  
 doer does such an act out of his own free will, and  
 after due rational deliberation, he is fully responsible  
 for his acts, so it is but just and proper that he  
 should be held fully responsible for his acts and ex-  
 perience the results thereof, today or tomorrow; here  
 or hereafter. Hence, a doer is also an enjoyer. It is  
 also proved by the memory of deep sleep: "For such a long  
 time I slept happily", and it enjoys supreme bliss  
 produced from its direct vision of Brahman during the  
 state of salvation. Thus it continues to be so during  
 deep sleep and salvation.

Being the knower, the doer, the enjoyer Jīva can be  
 like the Brahman. To this doubt the siddhāntin replies

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.32, p.317.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.3.7, p.116; 3.2.13, p.381.

that it is not independent but is dependent on Hari, its activity, existence, knowledge, enjoyment etc. being dependent on Brahman. For example, the earthen jar is of the nature of clay, hence the existence and the activity of the jar are dependent on clay. It is proved by the Śruti : "Entered within the controller of man."<sup>1</sup> Whatever the Lord, who has regard for the works done by the Jīva, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited.<sup>2</sup> Even when it attains similarity to Brahman during the state of salvation, it remains under His control.

Jīva is a part of Brahman.<sup>3</sup> Here the 'part' means 'power', It means Jīva is a power of Brahman. "All the beings are a foot of the Lord", this Śruti also proves that Jīva is a part of Brahman. It is also proved by the Smṛti : "Just my part, the eternal Jīva came to the world of mortals".<sup>4</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.40, p.327.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.41, pp.327-328.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.42, p.328.
  4. Ibid., pp.328-338.

Jīva cannot be a reflection of Brahman, because Brahman being formless and colourless, can have no reflection. If it be argued that just as the ether, though without form and colour, is seen to cast its reflection on rivers etc., so should be the case here, our reply is that the ether does possess a form and colour, since it is an intermixture of all the elements<sup>1</sup> (cf. the process of pañcīkaraṇa).

Further, the connection of the Jīva with the Upādhi (viz. avidyā on which Brahman is reflected) can neither be svābhāvika, since that will make salvation impossible, nor aupādika, since that will lead to regress ad infinitum, for an upādhi will require another upādhi to be connected with the Jīva, that still another one and so on. Further, we find in ordinary experience that the object which is reflected (bimba) and the object on which it is reflected (upādhi) belong to the same category. For example, the real sun is reflected on real water only, but never on the mirage. Hence Brahman and avidyā must belong to the same category,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.8.

i.e. avidyā must be as real as Brahman. Also, an object can be reflected on something else only when it is outside that something. For example, an aquatic animal which is plunged in a river, can never be reflected on the river. But avidyā is not admitted to be outside Brahman, who is all-pervading. Hence there cannot be any reflection of Brahman on avidyā.<sup>1</sup>

According to the Advaitins, Brahman, as limited by avidyā or antaḥkaraṇa is called Jīva. Just as the ether lying inside a pot (ghatākāśa) is distinct from the universal ether (mahākāśa), but when the pot is broken, it is no longer distinct from the universal ether, so the Jīva as limited by avidyā is distinct from Brahman, but when free from avidyā it is no longer distinct from Him. But this view is absolutely untenable, because Brahman, who is by nature eternal and infinite knowledge, an abode of bliss and power, can never come to be connected with avidyā and upādhi. Here the question arises whether, according to the Advaita view, the

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1. Ibid., p.19.

upādhi is all-pervading or atomic or of middle size. First, it cannot be all-pervading, because in that case, the entire Brahman will be veiled up. Secondly, it cannot be atomic, for in that circumstance in the absence of motion of the all-pervading Brahman on the motion of Upādhi, there will result sudden bondage and release. Finally, it cannot be of the middle size, for that will go against the Advaita view that Jīva is atomic owing to its connection with an atomic upādhi. Moreover, if the upādhi is real, then the doctrine of Non-dualism will fall to ground as there would have been admitted at least two realities -- Brahman and upādhi; moreover in that circumstance salvation also would not be possible, since knowledge cannot set at naught what is real. If, on the other hand, the upādhi is unreal, then to say that the upādhi binds the Jīva would be as absurd as to say that a dream-fetter binds a man who is awake.<sup>1</sup> So the view that the Jīva is but Brahman, limited by avidyā or upādhi, does not stand to reason anyway.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.2.6, pp.92-94.

Thus, in nature Jīva is knowledge, knower, doer and enjoyer under the control of Brahman and also as a part of Brahman. All these things are true of the Jīva in bondage as well as in salvation.

(3.3.2) Size of Jīva :

This seems to be a strange question, for, if Jīva is wholly non-material, then what question can there ever be regarding its size ? But in Indian Philosophy, the question has been discussed in all seriousness; and, all possible views held, viz. that Jīva is Aṇu (Monotheistic Vedānta view); Madhyama-parimāṇa (Jain view); Vibhu (Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Monistic Vedānta view), why ? The reason is that 'size' in whatever way that may be taken is, undoubtedly, an important characteristic of an object; and, it does not mean, necessarily, a material size, or extension. For example, it is very common in Theological system to describe God as 'Greatest of the great', 'All-pervasive' and the like, all implying some kinds of 'size' - yet who would call God a material object ? The atomicity of the Jīva, or its all-pervasiveness, have a similar meaning. The Jain view of the Jīva, as having extension, in a special sense, is, of course, different.

The size of Jīva, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, is very minute (atomic or anuparimāṇa).<sup>1</sup> If we accept the middle size, Jīva will also be perishable like the jar. The followers of this siddhānta accept the size of Jīva according to the size of the body. Thus the size of the soul of an elephant will go as huge as the body of the elephant. The size of the intelligence of an ant will be as small as the body of an ant. This will create the following difficulty : when the intelligence of an elephant will obtain the body of an ant, or when the intelligence of an ant will obtain the body of an elephant, it will be rather impossible for both of them to enter into the body of each another. Hence the outlook of the Madhyama-parimāṇa-vādin cannot be accepted.<sup>2</sup>

The all-pervading size of Jīva is also defective. If we accept the all-pervading size, then the utkrāntī (going of the soul out of the body), gati (going of the soul to the higher worlds, like moon etc.) and āgati (return of the soul from other worlds to this world)

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.19, p.305.
  2. Ibid.

of the Jīva should not occur, because the all-pervading entity cannot move. Only Supreme Brahman is of the nature of all-pervasiveness. Hence the outlook of Vibhuparimāṇavādins cannot be accepted.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently we have to accept that the size of Jīva is most minute (aṇu). This is understood from the texts : "This soul goes out through the eye, or the head, or through other parts of the body"; "Whoever goes from this world he goes to the moon alone"; "Returning from that world to this world for action", and so on. This is clearly declared by the scripture as well which says : "The Jīva is as subtle as a hair-point divided and subdivided hundred times".<sup>2</sup> Here it may be asked : Jīva being atomic how can it experience the feelings of pleasure and pain of the entire body ? To this, we reply : Just as a drop of the paste of sandal wood applied to one part of the body can soothe and enlighten the entire body, so Jīva through it occupies only a point in the body, enlightens the entire body.<sup>3</sup> Further, it may be objected : The example of the

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1. Ibid., pp.305-11.

2. (a) Vedānta-Kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.19, p.305;  
2.3.21, p.312.  
(b) Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, p.115.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, pp.312-313.



paste of sandal wood is not suitable, on account of the speciality of residence. To this objection, we reply : Jīva, too, dwells in the heart, viz. in one part of the body; does not dwell everywhere as a<sup>1</sup> consciousness, just as the paste of sandal wood.

Thus, Jīva remains atomic in size, both in the state of bondage as well as in salvation.<sup>2</sup>

(3.3.3) Number of Jīva :

Jīvas are innumerable. For, each Jīva is a definite and a separate individual itself and this individuality always continues in bondage as in salvation. The view that there is only one soul, does not stand to reason. If there be only one individual soul, then evidently, there will be an unwarrantable intermixture of the respective experiences of different individuals. It cannot be said that though there is no real difference between different individuals, yet there is difference which is due to upādhis and as such there is no intermixture of experiences, — for we

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.34, p.314.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.15, p.536.

point out that the difference, which is due to upādhis only, does not guarantee non-intermixture, for in spite of the difference of hands, feet etc., which are due to upādhis, the sensations in hands, feet etc., are felt as alike by the soul.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the outlook of Ekajīvavādin cannot be accepted.

Nevertheless the scriptural injunctions prove that the Jīva is not one (endless). It is many while Brahman is one. There is a great difference between Jīva and Brahman. In the passage : "He who staying in the self, internally controls the self, He is the immortal self, eternal of all eternal, animate of all animates, and being one without a second makes many desires"<sup>2</sup>. In evidence all the three epithets, — nityānām, cetanānām, bahūnām prove that Jīva is endless. The Brahmasūtra states that Brahman in Jīva, who is śarīrābhimānin,<sup>3</sup> is different by nature. It also establishes that Brahman is different from Jīva.<sup>4</sup> The omniscient and

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.13-14.
  2. Kaṭhopanīṣad, II.2.13.
  3. Brahma-sūtra, 2.1.18.
  4. Brahma-sūtra, 2.1.21.

omnipotent ultimate reality is definitely superior to the Jīva. The Bhagavad-gītā also remarks : "O Arjuna ! it is not true that I was present before, I, you and all these kings are never present in present, past and future."<sup>1</sup> In this way the natural difference between Brahman and Jīva is strongly established.

(3.3.4) Kinds of Jīva :

There are broadly speaking two kinds of Jīva, viz. Baddha and Mukta.

(i) Baddha is one who is pointed out by the term 'the unborn' (aja), eternal by nature, carried away by the current of beginningless deeds, and devoid of the true knowledge of the real nature of itself or of the Supreme-Being. One who through nescience has identified itself with the body of a god, or a man, or of any other being, who is a modification of Prakṛti, and is experiencing sounds and the rest, the parts of Prakṛti, and is devoid of the supreme bliss.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) Mukta is one who has attained the grace of

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1. Gītā, 2.12.

2. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha, 1.4.10, p.126.

(b) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.10, pp.154-155.

the Lord through his poor and pitiable condition, and has attained the supreme bliss through the practice of hearing, thinking and meditating on the Vedānta by attending upon the feet of his Guru and refuses Prakṛti.<sup>1</sup>

The characteristics of the Baddha and the Mukta Jīva are apparently very much the same. Like the Baddha, the Mukta-jīva also is by its nature knowledge, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and infinite. But really this is not the case. It is undoubtedly true that a Mukta Jīva too, is knowledge, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and infinite, yet, it is entirely different from a Baddha Jīva, because it is all the above in an entirely different sense. The bodies and minds of Baddha Jīvas are product of Prakṛti. So, in such a body and a mind, there cannot be full knowledge, power, virtue, happiness and the rest. But in the case of the Mukta Jīvas, their bodies and minds are the products of Aprakṛti, consisting of the Sattva-guṇa only. Hence, in such an extra-mundane body and mind, there is, naturally, the fullest manifestation of knowledge, power, purity, perfection, virtue, bliss and the like. It is in this way that the knowingness and

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1. Ibid.

knowerness of the Mukta Jīvas are quite different from those of the Baddha Jīvas. Thus, a Mukta Jīva is knower and omniscient, while a Baddha Jīva is knower, but a knower and little knowing and ignorant. In the same manner, the doerness and enjoyerness of Mukta Jīvas are qualitatively distinct from those of the Baddha Jīvas. A Mukta Jīva is doer and all-powerful, while a Baddha Jīva is doer, but less powerful. The enjoyerness of a Mukta Jīva simply means that it enjoys with Brahman Himself, His full bliss, while a Baddha Jīva is enjoyer and subject to infinite pains and sorrows. A Mukta Jīva and a Baddha Jīva are equally atomic in size. But a Baddha Jīva is atomic and small, while a Mukta Jīva is atomic but non-small; just as grain of dust is atomic and small, while a drop of water is atomic, yet non-small, in the sense that the first is not subject to expansion, the second is. For a drop of water may very well join with other drops to become soon a large sheet of water; which, a grain evidently, cannot. Thus, a drop is small in form, but vast in nature. The same is the case here. Finally, infiniteness of the Baddha and Mukta Jīvas has to be explained in a similar manner.

(3.3.5) States of Jīva :

There are five states of Jīva -- wakefulness (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti), swoon (mūrchā) and death (maraṇa). These are, of course, the states of the Baddha Jīva only and not of the Mukta.

The state of wakefulness has been considered above. The waking Jīva is self-conscious, knower, doer and enjoyer, experiencing the inevitable fruits of its own karmans and thereby undergoing a variety of conditions.

In the state of dream, too, Jīva is conscious subject, knower and enjoyer.<sup>1</sup> It enjoys various dream-objects which are real and are created by the Lord in accordance with its own Karmans.<sup>2</sup>

During the state of deep sleep, too, Jīva is conscious subject, knower and enjoyer, though its knowledge etc. are not fully manifest as they are during its state of wakefulness, but remain unmanifest

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.1-6, pp.374-377.
2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.5-6, pp.376-377.

and latent.<sup>1</sup>

The state of deep sleep takes place in the Lord.<sup>2</sup> Jīva, after entering into the vein finally rests in the Lord and rises from Him again.<sup>3</sup> It is the very same Jīva who went to sleep that rises again and not a different one.<sup>4</sup> This is proved from three facts --<sup>5</sup> viz. recollection of work, scripture and injunction.

The state of swoon is half death. In this state Jīva reaches half way the state of death. The state of swoon cannot be included in deep sleep, for in the latter case, there is happiness, while mūrchā is the unconscious state. In fact, mūrchā is midway between deep sleep and death and not exactly identical with any one of them.<sup>6</sup>

The state of death is of two kinds : that which leads to rebirth and that which does not do so. In

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.30, p.316.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.7, p.377.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.8, p.377.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.9, pp.377-378.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.9, p.378.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.10, pp.378-379.

the first case, Jīva leaves the body, goes to heaven, or to hell, and returns to a new body, while in the second case, Jīva goes to the world of Brahman, not to return any more.

(3.3.6) Destinies of Jīva :

There are broadly two classes of Jīvas in bondage, viz. doer and knowers. The doers are, again, divided into istakarins and anistakarins. These three classes, that is the iṣṭakārins, aniṣṭakārins and jñānins undergo different destinies, attaining different ends along different paths.

Those iṣṭakārins who have not attained the true knowledge of the Lord but have performed good and righteous rites and sacrifices (iṣṭa) -- such as the Agnohotra, have observed penance, truthfulness in speech, have protected the Vedas, shown hospitality, offered oblations to Viśvadevas, and have done deeds of charity (pūrta) -- such as digging of wells, building  
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of temples, etc., go after their death to the Candraloka

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1. "Vāpīkūpataḍāgādīdevatāyatanāni ca/  
annapradānamārāmaḥ pūrtamarthyāḥ pracakṣate//  
ekāgnikarmahavanam tretāya yacca hūyate/  
antarvedyām ca yaddānamīṣṭam tadabhidhīyate//  
Agnihotram tapaḥ satyam Vedānām caiva pālanam/  
ātithyam vaiśvadevasya iṣṭamityabhidhīyate//"



along the dark-path (dhūma-mārga).<sup>1</sup> Accompanied by the sense-organs and surrounded by the subtle elements such as water, fire etc. which are the germs of a new body, they leave the body with a view to enjoying the fruits of their own karmans and go out of the body through eyes or any other part of the body.<sup>2</sup> Then they first go to smoke, and then successively to night, the dark half of the moon, six months of the sun's southern progress, world of fathers, and finally to the moon.<sup>3</sup> There they enjoy the fruits of their karmans, and after that, with a remainder of their karmans still clinging to them, they return once more to the earth and assume a new body in accordance with their karmans.<sup>4</sup>

The anīṣṭakārins, who have done only bad deeds and never any good deed in their life, go straight to the abode of the God of Death (yamaloka), as it is said: 'The passage from this world to the other is not manifest to him who is childish, careless, affected by the delusion

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.6, p.365.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.3, p.364.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.8, p.366.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.8, p.367.

of wealth. Thinking: 'This is the only world, there<sup>1</sup> is none else', he comes under my sway again and again'. There they experience various types of pain in the well known seven hells -- raurava, mahāraurava, vahni, vaitariṇī, kumbhī, tāmīra and andhatāmīra.<sup>2</sup> These Jīvas do not go to Candraloka even for assuming another body to come to this world again after the experience of hell. They get their bodies even without going there; for, Candraloka is meant for iṣṭakārins and jñānins alone. So says the Śruti -- "Be born and die"<sup>3</sup> -- thus is this third place. Their body is produced out of the watery elements present<sup>4</sup> in other elements.

Finally, the jñānis, who have attained the true knowledge of the Lord through His grace, go after death to the world of Brahman along the path of Gods. They, accompanied by the senses, the mind, the vital breath<sup>5</sup> and the subtle elements, leave the gross body through<sup>6</sup> the vein which passes out of the crown of the head.

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1. Kaṭhapaniṣad, 2.6.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.15, p.369.
  3. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 5.10.8.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.1.18, p.370.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.2.9, p.489; 3.3.30, p.426.
  6. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 8.6.5.

In recognising the vein they have no difficulties, since the Lord Himself, being pleased with the knower, lights up the tip of that particular vein.<sup>1</sup> Then they go out of the body through that vein which is directly connected with the rays of the sun and ascend up, following the rays of the sun and go along the path of Gods'.<sup>2</sup> The successive stages of the path are as follows : light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, air, the moon, the lightning, the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati.<sup>3</sup> Then they reach the world of Brahman to return no more.<sup>4</sup>

#### 3.4. Concept of Jagat :

(3.4.1-3) The non-conscious reality is the Jagat which is of three kinds, viz. (1) Aprākṛta - not derived from Prakṛti, (2) Prākṛta - derived from Prakṛti, (3) Kāla - the time. The Prākṛta objects are the

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.2.16, pp.493-494.

2. Ibid., 4.2.17, pp.494-495.

3. Ibid., 4.3.15, pp.511-512.

4. Ibid., 4.3.4-5, pp.501-504.

ordinary material ones, as the Prakṛti consists of three Guṇas, - sattva, rajas and tamas. The process<sup>1</sup> of creation and destruction is as follows.

In creation first the ether originates from the Lord, from the ether air, from the air fire, from the fire water, and from the water earth. In every case, Lord is the real creator. In destruction, the process is just the reverse of the process of creation, viz. first the earth is merged into water, the water into fire, the fire into air, the air into ether, and the ether into the Lord in the same way as salt is merged into water.

In that process the Jagat or acit is the affect of Brahman and abides in Brahman.

The view that the Jagat is simply a vivarta (illusion, and not real transformation) of Brahman is absolutely untenable. According to the Advaita view, Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the Jagat. But if the Jagat is false, Brahman cannot

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.1-14, pp.282-288.

be its efficient cause, for nobody-neither the mistaken person himself nor others -- can ever create a nacre-silver. It cannot be said that Brahman is the creator here in the sense as a magician is, - for a magician shows tricks to delude an audience, but there is none<sup>1</sup> whom Brahman can delude by creating the false Jagat.

Again Brahman, the real cannot be the material cause of the unreal Jagat, because the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. If it be said that Brahman is the material cause in the sense of being the substratum of error (bhramādhiṣṭhāna), then we point out that this definition is both too narrow, since clay, etc. which are not the substratum of error are still the material cause of pots etc., and too wide, since the nacre which is the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion is not the material cause of the illusory silver. If it be said that the Jagat, is the vivarta<sup>2</sup> -- or illusory transformation of Brahman and the pariṇāma<sup>3</sup> or real transformation of ajñāna, and

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.23, p.173.
  2. asatvarūpāntarāpattirvivarttaḥ/ -- Ibid., p.174.
  3. satvarūpāntarāpattistu pariṇāmaḥ/ --Ibid., p.174.

hence not Brahman alone, but Brahman and ajñāna both are the material cause of the Jagat, -- then we reply: If a real object assumes the form of an unreal something, that it must have certain specific features which enables it to appear in that unreal form, for example: any and every object does not appear to be a piece of silver, but only nacre, which possesses certain features like lustre etc. which appears in the form of silver to the unwary. But the attributeless and distinctionless Brahman, as admitted by Advaitins, can have no such qualities of appearing as the false Jagat. If it be said that the material cause of an object is that which is not seen to be separate from the object itself, then we point out that in that case, Brahman, which according to the Advaitins is not separate from the individual soul, becomes the material cause of the individual soul and the individual soul as a result becomes real; the milk becomes the material cause of water, because it is never separated from water; and the calf becomes the material cause of 'cowness' because it is never separated from 'cowness'. If it be said that māyā is the material cause, Ívara the instrumental cause, and the pure Brahman the substratum, then we point out that this goes against

the view that the material cause and the efficient cause of the Jagat are identical. The fact is that to say that Brahman is the substratum of the cosmic illusion is to give up practically the view that Brahman is the material cause of the Jagat, as held by the Advaitins themselves, for the nacre, the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion, is never the material cause of the illusory silver. Thus, the Advaita view is full of self-contradictions, and fails to prove how Brahman can be the material and efficient cause of an illusory Jagat, although it holds Brahman to be such.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, as already mentioned above, the substratum of an illusion must have certain qualities. For example, a nacre possesses certain qualities in common with the silver, such as luster etc., which bring about the illusion. And it possesses certain qualities of its own, as distinct from those of the silver, which when

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.23, pp.173-175.

known bring about the end of the illusion. But Brahman, devoid of all attributes, as admitted by the Advaitins, can have no such qualities, and hence cannot be the substratum of the cosmic illusion. Hence any substratum of the superimposition itself is not possible and hence the Jagat cannot be a vivarta or illusory superimposition of Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

Further to say that the Jagat is neither real -<sup>2</sup>  
 for then it could not have been set aside by knowledge, -  
 nor unreal -<sup>3</sup> for then it could have been perceived, -  
 but is anirvacanīya and mithyā, does not stand to reason. Because no definition and no proof of mithyātva and anirvacanīyatva are possible.<sup>4</sup> Further, it is not a fact that it is an unreal thing only which can be set aside, for the real anterior ignorance (prāgabhāva) regarding an object is set aside by the knowledge of a pot by that of a piece of cloth; real past impressions by recognition; real affection, etc. for a person by

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.23-24.
  2. Saccenna bādhyeta/ -- Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, p.193.
  3. asaccenna pratiyeta/ -- Ibid.
  4. Ibid.



his faults; the real sin of murdering a Brāhmaṇa by  
<sup>1</sup>  
 a visit to the Setubandha, etc..

Moreover, we find in ordinary experience that the denial of an object and the object denied belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like denial of ajñāna; knowledge and the object known, the doṣa and the adhiṣṭhāna belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like  
<sup>2</sup>  
 Brahman.

According to the Advaita view, the Jagat is false, but the question arises - whether this falsity itself is false or not. If it is false, then evidently the Jagat becomes real; if it is not false, then the view of Non-dualism falls to the ground there being at least  
<sup>3</sup>  
 two realities - Brahman and falsity.

Thus, the Advaita view of the Jagat is wholly untenable.

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1. Ibid., pp.193-194.
  2. Ibid., pp.195-196.
  3. Ibid., p.201.

3.5 Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat  
(Svābhāvīkabhedābheda-vāda):

What is the exact relation between these three realities, viz., Brahman, Jīva and Jagat ? This is a very important philosophical problem and hundreds of views have been advanced on this point. This cannot be easily brought under any well known logical category such as identity, difference, and difference and non-difference.

On one hand, we have strict non-dualistic doctrines, such as 'Advaitavāda' of Śaṅkara and the "Śuddhādvaita" of Vallabha, in which Jīva and Jagat are completely identical with Brahman; and on the other hand, we have strict dualistic doctrines, such as 'Dvaitavāda' of Madhva, in which Jīva and Jagat are completely different from Brahman.

And again, we see the doctrine of Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya, Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati. All of them accept the relation of both difference and non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, to be equally real; but all of them try to reconcile them in different ways. Nimbārka accepts the relation of both difference and non-difference

between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, which is equally natural (svabhāvika) and completely compatible. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha explain the relation of Brahman, Jīva and Jagat on the analogy of soul and body (śarīrī-śarīra) in which non-difference is principal; it is qualified by difference, which is subordinate to it. Bhāskara regards the difference and non-difference to be equally real but he takes difference to be aupādhika and non-difference to be natural and real. Śrīkrṣṇacaitanya regards the difference and non-difference as inconceivable (acintya). Śrīpati regards the difference and non-difference to be equally natural but he takes that identity is not only natural but also of form.


But considering the above doctrines, Nimbārka's main contribution seems to be very reasonable, both from the philosophical and theological points of view. Let us now see the exposition of the doctrine of difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda) of Nimbārka according to Keśavakāśmīrin.

(3.5.1) Difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat:

(A) In the first place, there is a difference

of nature between Brahman on the one hand, Jīva and Jagat on the other. The difference in the nature and concept of Jīva and Brahman is obvious. Brahman is the cause and Jīva his effect or transformation. There is a difference between the cause and its effect, as between the clay and the pots, dishes, etc., between the gold and the bracelets, ear-rings, etc., between the tree and the leaves, fruits, etc., between the sea and the foams, waves, etc., and between the sun and its rays. Similarly there is a difference between Jīva (the enjoyer) and Brahman (controller).<sup>1</sup>

And again, Keśavakāśmīrin points out that there is a difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the cause and the effect. He says that the creator of the world, viz., Brahman is something more than the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, "On account of the indication of difference"<sup>2</sup>. As in the passage: "O' the soul, indeed, should be seen", the knower of Brahman attains <sup>3</sup> "who controls the soul within".



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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.3, pp.192-93.
  2. Adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt-Brahmasūtra 2.1.21, p.234.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.21, p.234.

Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest, which are modification of the earth, are different from the earth, and the leaf and so on, which are modification of the tree, are different from the tree; the ray of diamond is different from the diamond, so the Jīva which is a modification of Brahman, is different from Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the part and the whole. Jīva is the part of Brahman, Brahman is the whole. As declared by the Śruti : "For it is a part of the Highest. A 'part' means a 'power', it is clear from Śruti : "The Jīva, a power<sup>2</sup> of the highest, is small in power and not independent".

The Vedic mantra also confirms it. The idea of parts comes from the Purusasūkta as quoted in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (3.12.6) "ṛādô'sya viśvabhūtāni tripādasyāmṛtam divi" (all the beings are His foot, immortal in the heaven are His three feet). 'Foot' means a part.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid., 2.1.22, p.235.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.42, pp.228-238.

3. Ibid., 2.3.43, p.238.

The Smṛti also corroborates the concept of part thus : "In this world of life the Jīva is My own part, in the form of eternal part".(Gita 15.7)<sup>1</sup>

The relation of part and whole declares : that there is a difference between Jīva and Brahman, "On account of the designation of variety" i.e., on account of the designation of difference. Jīva is, by nature, a part, and subject to bondage and salvation, while Brahman is, by nature, the whole and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest. The following are the designation of difference : "Who rules the soul within; having entered within, the ruler of men; the soul indeed is supreme, self-dependent, possessing superior qualities, Jīva is less powerful, dependent, lowest, the two unborn selves, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord."<sup>2</sup>

The statement of difference (bheda) is expressed in the Brahma-sūtra 1.1.18. Jīva is different from

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1. Ibid., 2.3.44, p.239.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.42, pp.228-238.

Brahman, on account of the designation of difference<sup>1</sup>. Just as the Vedic mantra: "He is indeed, the essence; for indeed on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful". It points out a difference between Brahman as the object to be obtained, and Jīva, as the obtainer; the obtainer cannot be the object to be obtained. Thus, there is a difference of nature between Jīva and Brahman, otherwise, an intermixture of attributes will result.<sup>2</sup> To prove this statement of difference, Keśavakāśmīrin says that the blissful is not the Jīva but only Brahman, because Brahman is the cause of the bliss of Jīva,<sup>3</sup> and the bliss of Jīva is momentary while that bliss of Brahman is endless.

Here a doubt arises that when Jīva and Brahman, both are conscious, both must be blissful. As Śruti says "may my (sheaths) consisting of food, consisting of the vital breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of understanding and consisting of bliss, be purified"<sup>4</sup>.

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1. Bhedavyapadeśācca-Brahmasūtra 1.1.18, p.65.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.18, pp.65-66.
  3. Ibid., 1.1.15, p.64.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.13, pp.60-62.

It is said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified; and as it is impossible for the ever-pure supreme soul to be something to be purified so that which consists of bliss is Jīva.

To this, the answer is as follows: that blissful is Brahman alone, on account of repetition, viz., the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times in the scripture in reference to Brahman alone.<sup>1</sup> So it is established that Jīva is different from Brahman, because on attaining him Jīva comes to be united with bliss.<sup>2</sup>

Who is in the sun, in the eye, and is to be worshipped by those who are desirous of salvation? He is Brahman alone, not Jīva. To prove this Keśavakāśmīrin explains the sūtra "antastaddharmopadeśāt", that is, there is difference between Brahman and Jīva, because Brahman has special qualities such as : He is free<sup>3</sup> from all sins, He is the soul of all and so on.

The statement of difference (bheda) is further

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.13, pp.61-62.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.20, p.66.
  3. Ibid., 1.1.21, pp.75-77.



expressed in Brahmasūtra 1.1.22, 'bhedavyapadeśāccānyah'. It means, by nature, Brahman is different from the individual souls of the sun and the rest, which He indwells, on account of the mention of difference. Again it means that Brahman in Jīva, who is Śarīrābhīmānin, is different by nature. It is also mentioned in the Śruti: "who dwelling in the sun, is other than the sun, the sun does not know him, of whom the sun is the body, who controls the sun from within. He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal". Thus, it is established that Brahman is different from Jīva which He in-dwells<sup>1</sup>.

"Vivakṣīta guṇopapatteśca" and "anupapattestu na śārīrah": Both the sūtras of Brahma-sūtra declare that Brahman is different from Jīva "because of the appropriateness of the attributes intended to be stated"<sup>2</sup>, and "on account of inappropriateness, not the embodied (soul)"<sup>3</sup>. It means that Brahman has the spiritual (manomaya) and vital breath body, the form of light; He has true volition, has the ether as the soul, has

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1. Ibid., 1.1.22, p.78.
  2. Ibid., 1.2.2., p.91.
  3. Ibid., 1.2.3, p.91.

all desires, has all odours, has all tastes, etc., while Jīva has no spiritual body, and has not the above mentioned attributes such as : having all desires, having all odours, etc. Again, "Karma-karṭṛvyapadeśācca" and "śabdaviśeṣāt" both the sūtras of Brahma-sūtra declare that Brahman is different from Jīva "because of the mention of object and agent"<sup>1</sup> and "on account of the difference of words"<sup>2</sup>. It means that Brahman is the object while Jīva is the agent. For instance: "Having departed from here, I shall attain him"<sup>3</sup>, in this sentence Brahman is the object, while Jīva is the agent. And on account of difference in words, this also is proved that Jīva and Brahman are denoted by different words, viz., the genitive and the nominative respectively. As in the Śruti: "This my soul is in my heart"<sup>4</sup>. In this sentence the mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is obvious.

To conclude this statement of difference (bheda)

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1. Ibid., 1.2.4, pp.91-92.
  2. Ibid., 1.2.5, p.92.
  3. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 3.14.4.
  4. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 3.14.3.

Keśavakāsmīrin gives the evidence of the Smṛti:

"O Arjuna ! the Lord dwells in the heart of all  
 beings'<sup>1</sup>. 'He who seeks Me everywhere and sees  
 everything in Me, of him I will never loose hold,  
 and he shall never loose hold of me'<sup>2</sup>. 'He who, estab-  
 lished in unity worships Me abiding within all beings',<sup>3</sup>  
 that yogin rests in Me whatever be his mode of living'.  
 There is nothing higher than I, O Dhanañjaya' all this  
 is threaded in Me as rows of gems in a string'<sup>4</sup>. 'Since  
 I excel the perishable, and am better than the imperish-  
 able, I am renowned in the world, and in the Veda as  
 the supreme person (puruṣottama)<sup>5</sup>. All these evidences  
 establish the mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman.

There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman.  
 Brahman is ever-free from all sins, while Jīva is  
 an enjoyer of the fruits of the deeds done by itself.<sup>6</sup>  
 Scripture is the sole proof. Such as : "Of course, he

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1. Gītā, 18.61.

2. Ibid., 6.30.

3. Ibid., 6.31.

4. Ibid., 7.7.

5. Ibid., 15.18.

6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.2.8, p.95.

who is the supreme self is characterised as eternal and devoid of all the properties of matter. He is not smeared even by the fruit as a lotus leaf is not touched by water. The active self, on the other hand, is another, who is liable to release and bondage<sup>1</sup>. Thus, it is established that Jīva is an enjoyer of the fruits of the deeds while Brahman is eternally free from all sins.

Brahman is the eater and destroyer of world, while the movable and immovable are food having death for their condiment. It declares that Brahman is different from Jīva. As Śruti : "He to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who knows where He is ?"<sup>2</sup>

"ṛtam pibantau sukratasya loke guhā-praviṣṭau"<sup>3</sup>. Here it is understood that there are two sentients, the Jīva and the Supreme Self, the difference between them being obvious. Brahman who is difficult to see,

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1. Ibid., 1.2.8, p.95.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.2.9, p.95.

3. Kathopaniṣad, 3.1.13, 2.1.7, 1.2.12.

is hidden by yoga-māyā, is all-pervasive, has entered into the cave, and the Jīva who arises with the vital breath, is aditi, is made of the deities, manifested through the elements, have entered into the cave.<sup>1</sup> To prove this, Keśavakāsmīrin points out that Brahman is the object to be worshipped<sup>2</sup> and known;<sup>3</sup> while Jīva is the worshipper<sup>4</sup> and knower.<sup>5</sup> The mutual difference is obvious between them.

Brahman is the inner-controller, while Jīva is not the inner-controller because both the Kānvas as well as Mādhyandins characterise Jīva as different from the inner-controller, viz. Brahman. This is supported by the Śruti : "He who is dwelling in intelligence" and "He who is dwelling in the soul."<sup>6</sup>

Brahman is imperishable and the source of beings, while Jīva is not denoted by the words 'imperishable' and the source of beings. So there is a difference between the Jīva and Brahman on account of the attributes and

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.2.11, pp.97-98.

2. Ibid., 1.2.12, p.98.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 1.2.21, pp.103-104.

difference. As the Śruti, says, the reference to the attributes of identity is "all-pervading" and that to difference is 'Higher than high, imperishable'.<sup>1</sup> The statement of difference (bheda) is expressed by Keśava-kāsmīrin in Brahma-sūtra 1.3.5, 'bhedavyapadeśācca'. It means that the Jīva cannot be the heaven, the earth, and the rest, on account the characteristic of difference, viz. "There is a difference between the Jīva which has little knowledge, and is subject to bondage and salvation through Lord's māyā consisting of the three guṇas, and the Brahman who is the omniscient Lord. It established that there is a difference between the Jīva and Brahman as the knower and the object to be known."<sup>2</sup>

Regarding the relation of Jīva and Brahman, it is explained that Brahman is non-eater, while Jīva is an eater.<sup>3</sup> As declared by the Śruti : "Of these two, one tastes the sweet berry, the other looks on without eating."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid., 1.2.23, pp.106-107.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.5, p.115.

3. Ibid., 1.3.7, p.116.

4. Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 1.1.3.

Jīva and Brahman are different from each other. Brahman is omniscient while Jīva is non-knower in deep sleep.<sup>1</sup> This refers to the Śruti : "Embraced by the intelligent soul, he does not know anything eternal,<sup>2</sup> much less anything internal."

There is indeed a difference between the Jīva and Brahman on account of the words like 'Lord' and the rest,<sup>3</sup> i.e. on account of the Śruti like : "He is Lord of all', 'the controller of all, 'the ruler of all', 'He rules all this', 'The Lord of all' etc..

The Jīva is alone, it is subject to deeds and participates in imperfections. But Brahman is not subject to deeds. It is said in the Śruti : "The two birds of handsome plumage, close friends cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet berry, while the other, without eating, looks on". It means, "Jīva is an enjoyer on account of its imperfection, while Brahman is not touched even by an odour of imperfection, and He is not the enjoyer of the names and the forms to be created by Himself."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.3.43, pp.142-143.
  2. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4.3.21.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.3.44, pp.143-144.
  4. Ibid., 3.2.13-14, p.381.

Thus, being imperfect, sinful, impure and so on the Baddha Jīva is entirely different from Brahman.

(B) There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as salvation. Mukta Jīva is different from Brahman in two respects. In the first place, the freed-soul is atomic in size while Brahman is all-pervading. Atomic Jīva cannot become all-pervasive in salvation. But it can take place in several bodies through its attributes of knowledge, as a lamp, though placed in one place, pervades many places through its ray.<sup>1</sup> This is supported by the scripture : 'The individual soul is as subtle as a hair-point divided and sub-divided hundreds of times. He is potentially infinite. He has to be known'.<sup>2</sup> In the second place, though similar to Highest Brahman, the freed-soul cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and non-sentient, their controller and supporter, all-pervasive, and so on; and hence its lordship is exclusive of the activities in relation to the universe<sup>3</sup>.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.15, p.536.

2. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 5.9.

3. Ibid.



Thus it is established that Jīva is not absolutely different from Brahman as it is in the philosophy of Maṅhva. The difference between Jīva and Brahman remains eternal, natural and undeniable, equally in bondage as well as salvation. In the same manner, the difference in the nature and concept of 'Jagat' and Brahman is obvious. Brahman is the cause while the Jagat is its effect. The cause and the effect cannot be absolutely non-different.<sup>1</sup> Brahman is all-pervading, omniscient and subtle while the Jagat is inanimate and gross.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the mutual difference of the three is distinctly established.

(3.5.2) Non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat:

In reality, there is non-difference between Jīva, Jagat and Brahman as between the cause (or the whole) and the effect (or the part). For, Brahman is the cause (or the whole) of the Jagat and Jīva; and Jīva and Jagat are effects and parts of Brahman. Keśavakāśmīrin points

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.16, pp.219-222.
  2. Ibid., 2.1.4, p.185.

out that between the cause and the effect there is non-difference and not absolute difference. This is suggested by the texts<sup>1</sup> of the Śruti, the Smṛti and ~~Smṛti~~ and the Sūtras. For example : "The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay'; 'The existence alone my dear, was in the beginning, one, without a second'; 'He thought, may I be many, may I procreate'; 'He created the light'; 'All that has this for its soul', 'That is true'; 'That is soul'; 'Thou art that', 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him'; 'That was unmanifest then';<sup>2</sup> 'It became manifest by name and form' and so on."

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, there is non-difference between the cause and the effect on account of the fact that the effect is perceived only when the cause is existent.<sup>3</sup> Again, he says, as the effect, though manifesting itself at the later stage, is present in the cause, so the effect is non-different from the cause.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, pp.193-217.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid., 2.1.15, pp.217-219.

This is evident from the Śruti : "Brahman, indeed,<sup>1</sup> was this in the beginning." Further, he observes that it cannot be said that the effect does not exist prior to creation, on account of the characterization of it as non-existent, as in the text, "The non-existent, indeed, was this in the beginning". For, the pre-existent, indeed, was this in the beginning." For, the pre-existence of the effect is known from the complementary passage, viz. "That was existent"<sup>2</sup>. Again, he says that the pre-existence of the effect is known from reasoning also. He admits that the names, forms knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, all are real, on account of being, perceived. An agent, viz. a potter makes a pot out of a lump of clay, that is existent. Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence the action of the agent is not useless. Here, it cannot be said that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the action of the agent has no meaning. For, the pot which was

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1. Ibid., 2.1.16, pp.219, 222.

2. Ibid., 2.1.17, pp.222-228.

unmanifest earlier, is made manifest. Hence, the action of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before. Thus, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, the conventional usage of names and forms is not unprecedented.

On the other hand, Keśavakāśmīrin says that the origin of a non-existent effect does not seem plausible, since the origin of a barely sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks - for, in an effect produced from gold and the rest of a known weight is never found. Likewise the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all, there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing ~~unprecedented~~ objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent ~~un-effect~~ (asatkāryavāda) is unreasonable. Keśavakāśmīrin puts forth another argument for the existence of the effect thus : the other text declaring the pre-existence of the effect is "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"<sup>2</sup>.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

The above mentioned doctrine of existent effect (sat-kāryavāda) is explained by the following illustrations, just as a piece of rolled up cloth, although not known to be a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, become non-existent, but is indeed existent, existing in a different form, and when spread out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth; just as the limbs of a tortoise when withdrawn are not perceived, even though existent, but do not become non-existent on that account and are known when stretched out again; just as the banyan tree, existent in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form, is manifested in a gross form;<sup>1</sup> and just as the vital breath, having the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercise, etc. remains in its real form; and when the control is removed, is instantly known in those respective forms,<sup>2</sup> so indeed prior to creation the universe remains existent, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.18, p.218.

2. Ibid.

having its name and forms manifest.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the cause and the effect are non-different as the effect which belongs to a posterior time, is present in the cause. Thus, it is established that the effect (or the part) is non-different from the cause (or the whole). Similarly, the Jīva and the Jagat - the effects and the parts of Brahman, are non-different from Brahman, the cause and the whole.

(3.5.3) The doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvīkabhedābheda-vāda) :

Having thus observed the difference and the non-difference between Jīva, Jagat and Brahman, let us now explain "Svābhāvīkabhedābheda" between Jīva, Jagat and Brahman.

The relation between Brahman, on the one hand and Jīva and Jagat on the other, is the relation of natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvīkabhedābheda-vāda). The natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman is explained by Keśavakāśmīrin in his commentary on Brahmasūtra

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1. Ibid.

"amśo nānāvyapadeśādanyathācāpi dāsakītavāditvadhīyata  
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 eka". The Jīva is neither absolutely different from  
 Brahman, nor absolutely non-different from him, but  
 it is a part of Brahman, and the Brahman is the whole  
 of the Jīva. Here, 'a part' means a 'power'. It  
 should not be understood as a portion like a portion  
 of wealth. Then there will result an absolute difference  
 between Jīva and Brahman, and hence the texts like,  
 "Thou art that" will be set aside. So, the true doctrine  
 is that there is a natural relation of difference and  
 non-difference between Jīva and Brahman. Thus, the  
 Jīva is by nature different from Brahman predicated  
 to be a part, as it is subject to bondage and salvation.  
 But it is yet non-different from Brahman, as its exis-  
 tence and activity are under the control of the whole.  
 There is a natural difference and non-difference between  
 Jīva and Brahman "On account of the characteristic of  
 variety and otherwise" viz. on account of the character-  
 istic of difference and non-difference. Following are  
 the accounts of difference. "Who controls the indi-  
 vidual self within", 'Having entered within, the ruler

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1. Brahmasūtra, 2.3.42, p.328.

of the People', 'The soul' indeed is independent and possessed of more qualities, Jīva is less powerful, is dependent and is lowly', the two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' and so on. Following are the accounts of non-difference : 'Thou art that', 'this ātman is Brahman', 'I am Brahman' and so on.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in salvation too. The freed Jīva is entirely non-different from Brahman as existence-cognition-bliss in essence (saccidānandasvarūpa). But the freed Jīva, too, is different from Brahman in two respects. In the first place, the freed Jīva is atomic in size, while Brahman is all-pervasive. And in the second place, the freed Jīva, though similar to Brahman, cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their creator, their supporter, their destroyer, all-pervasive and so on, which features Brahman possesses fully and eternally. Thus it is established that there is natural relation of difference and non-difference

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.42, pp.328-338.



between Jīva and Brahman in salvation.

The conclusion arrived at, therefore, is that there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation. According to Keśavakāsmīrin, the fact is that even during the bondage (baddhāvasthā) the Jīva, which is atomic in size and possesses little knowledge and hence is different from Brahman who is all-pervading, non-straying in nature and omniscient, is non-different from Brahman like the leaf from the tree, the ray from the lamp, quality from the qualified, sense organs from the vital-air, its existence and activities being dependent upon the Brahman. Likewise though in salvation (muktāvasthā) the Jīva is non-different from Brahman, it having no separate independent existence and activity, yet it is undoubtedly different from Brahman in accordance with the Śruti "svena rūpeṇa sampadyate" -- "It realizes its own nature". Otherwise the nature of both -- the Jīva and the Brahman, is loose.<sup>1</sup>

In the very same manner, there is the relation

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.21, pp.166.

of difference and non-difference between Jagat and Brahman. Brahman is all-pervading, non-gross, omniscient while the Jagat is inanimate and gross. Thus the mutual difference of the Jagat and Brahman is distinctly established. The doctrine of non-difference between the Jagat and Brahman is explained by the illustration of the ornaments. The ear-ring is different from the bracelet in name and shape simply on account of kuṇḍalattva and kaṭakattva, but is non-different so far as both of them are made of gold.

To conclude the present discussion on the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda), I will give the final evidence of the Brahmasūtra which is as follows : Ubhayavyapadeśādahikuṇḍalav<sup>1</sup>at". Which means "But on account of the designation of both, as in the case of serpent and its coil". All the corporeal and incorporeal entities of the universe, being different from Brahman, are also non-different on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference. In the present illustration "ahikuṇḍalav<sup>1</sup>at", the serpent is the material cause of the coil. The serpent is independent while the coil is

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1. Brahmasūtra, 3.2.27, p.390.

dependent. On one side, this proves the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other, the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. It proves the non-difference between the serpent and its coil. Likewise the universe is the effect or transformation of Brahman. The relation of the universe, the effect, with Brahman, the cause, is natural difference and non-difference<sup>1</sup> (svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda).

### 3.6. Liberation (Mokṣa) :

Mokṣa means becoming like the Lord (bhagavad-bhāvāpatti)<sup>2</sup> -- i.e. attaining similarly (sāmya)<sup>3</sup> with Him in nature and attributes, and it is due to the grace of the Lord.<sup>4</sup> But the attainment of the nature of Brahman is only one element in mokṣa and not the whole of it. The other and equally important element is the attainment of one's own real and essential nature (ātma-sarūpalābha)<sup>5</sup> as well. Mokṣa, thus, also

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.27, pp.390-391.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.524.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.6, p.383.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.524.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.1-2, pp.513-514.

implies full development of one's own individuality. The difference of the Jīva from Brahman being natural and eternal persistent even in the state of liberation, the latter does not imply any identity between the two, or any annihilation of the individuality of the Jīva. In fact, the word 'sāmya' often used to describe the state of liberation, means similarity and not identity. The freed soul, therefore, is similar to the Lord without losing its own nature and individuality.

It is clear from the above that since liberation means attainment of the nature of Brahman, as well as that of one's own nature, the liberated Jīva realises itself as non-different from Brahman -- which non-difference is not incompatible with a difference<sup>1</sup> between itself and Brahman. That is to say, as everywhere else, the relation between Jīva and Brahman is one of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda) in liberation, too.

The similarity between the liberated Jīva and Brahman consists in the following facts :-

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.4, p.515.

First, the liberated Jīva attains the nature and attributes of the Lord, viz. pure and obstructed consciousness, omniscience, freedom from sins, faults and impurities, decay and death. It, further, comes to have the power of realising all its wishes at once. It can meet its departed fore-fathers through a mere wish and can go freely to the lokas where his mother, brother, sister, friends etc. dwell. It comes to possess, in fact, supreme majesty and becomes a self ruler, not under the control of any one else excepting the Lord. It shares all the pleasures and enjoyments with Brahman in this world. It remains directly under the control of the Lord Himself. Thus, the liberated Jīva becomes svarāṭ, that is, it shines forth with the help of its ownself which is no other than the Lord himself.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, pp.517-533.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.8, p.533.
  3. Chāndogyopaniṣad, VIII, II, 1-9.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.9, pp.533-534.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.14, p.536.
  7. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.21, p.539.
  8. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.9, pp.533-534.
  9. Ibid.

On the other hand, the difference between the liberated Jīva and Brahman consists in the following facts :-

In the first place, the liberated Jīva is atomic in size <sup>1</sup> while Brahman is all-pervading. <sup>2</sup> Atomicity is the very essence of the Jīva. Since liberation does not imply disappearance of the essence of the Jīva, the essentially atomic Jīva cannot become all-pervasive in liberation. But this atomicity of the liberated Jīva does not prevent it from enjoying the pleasures etc. of several bodies simultaneously, <sup>3</sup> for just as a small lamp pervades several rooms with its rays extending far and wide, so the liberated Jīva can experience the pleasures of several bodies <sup>4</sup> through its all-pervading quality of knowledge.

In the second place, the liberated Jīva, in spite of possessing Supreme powers and majesty, does not

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.15, p.536.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.5-10.
  3. Chāndogyopanīṣad, 7.26.2.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.15, p.536.

possess the power of creating, protecting, controlling,  
<sup>1</sup>  
 and destroying the universe, which power belongs exclu-  
<sup>2</sup>  
 sively to the Lord.

The question is : whether the liberated Jīva  
 has a body or not ?

To this question, Bādarī replies that the liberated  
 Jīva does not have body. This is supported by the Sruti:  
 "But the being without a body is not touched by pleasure  
 and pain".  
<sup>3</sup>

Jaiminī, on the other hand, thinks that as the  
 Sruti quoted above refers to the body which is produced  
 by karman and not to that which is possessed by a  
 liberated Jīva, the Jīva does possess a body, sense-  
 organs, manas, etc., and so the Sruti says -- "He  
 being one becomes three, five, seven and nine and  
 then he is said to be eleven, a hundred and ten, a  
 thousand and twenty".  
<sup>4</sup>  
 This text certainly refers to  
 the body of the liberated Jīva. According to

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.21, pp.537-539.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.20, pp.538-539.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.10, p.534.
  4. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 7.26.2.

Keśavakāśmīrin, the Jīva being atomic and imperishable cannot have this diversity without having various <sup>1</sup> bodies.

Bādarāyaṇa, however, holds that the liberated Jīva may or may not have a body according to its will. The Śruti : "Having perceived these objects of desire <sup>2</sup> by mind alone who enjoys in this world of Brahman", shows that the Jīva has no body while the Śruti : "He being one becomes three, five, seven etc." <sup>3</sup> refers to its having a body for rejoicing, etc..

According to Keśavakāśmīrin the fact is that even when the liberated Jīva has true desire and true volition, it depends for all activities upon the Lord, and so it cannot produce a body for itself. <sup>4</sup> Even if it does not have a body of its own, it can have all possible experiences through the objects created by the Lord. So it is not certain whether it creates its own body itself for heavenly experiences or not. But that

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.11, p.534.
  2. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 8.12.5.
  3. Ibid., 7.26.2.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.12, p.535.



it experiences all sorts of rejoicing through the  
 grace of the Lord cannot be denied.<sup>1</sup> Although atomic  
 and remaining in one particular place, through its  
 attribute of knowledge which is all-pervasive the  
 liberated Jīva pervades all bodies and had experiences  
 thereof, as is clear from the Śruti : "It is capable  
 of infinity<sup>2</sup> and is infinite.

Thus, we find that the state of liberation is  
 a definite acquisition - a positive state of supreme  
 self-development, knowledge and enjoyment, and not a  
 negative state of unconsciousness and blankness.<sup>3</sup> The  
 liberated Jīva abides with a constant intuition of the  
 Lord and is, thereby, free from all fear and is full  
 of bliss.<sup>4</sup>

That Advaita view is not tenable according to  
 which the one Ívara is reflected in many upādhis  
 or antahkaraṇas, just as the one face is reflected  
 in many mirrors around it, and when the upādhi is no  
 more, the Jīva becomes Ívara, just as when a mirror

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.13-14, pp.535-536.

2. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, 5.9.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.16, p.536.

4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.19, p.538.

is broken or removed, the face reflected on it is no more there.<sup>1</sup> Here two alternatives are possible ; Either the Jīva becomes Īśvara in nature or comes to possess Īśvara's attributes like omniscience. On the first alternative, the question is : whether becoming Īśvara in nature means becoming non-separate from it without losing one's individuality, or by losing one's own nature. If the first is true, then there is nothing to object, this being our own view, - but it will go against the Advaita view itself. If the second one is true, then mukti will imply the very destruction of the nature of the Jīva, while the fact is that Śruti clearly states that the freed soul is manifested in its own nature.<sup>2</sup> Further, the question is : Whether Īśvara, the object reflected, and the Jīva, the reflection, are real entities or mithyā or anirvacaniya or tuccha like the hare's horn. They cannot evidently be real entities, because that will be giving up the Advaita view. They cannot be mithyā either, because the question of bondage and liberation will be meaningless in view of the fact that the reality,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.520.

2. Tattva-prakāśikā, a commentary on Chāndogyopaniṣad by Keśavakāśmīrin, 8.3.4, pp.259-260, - "svena rupeṇa abhiniṣpadyate".

which is without second and devoid of all attributes and distinctions, is never subject to bondage. Jīva is but an unreality. For that reason, they cannot be <sup>1</sup>tuccha. On the second alternative also the question is : whether the Jīva comes to possess the attributes similar to omniscience, etc., i.e. becomes similar to Ísvara, or it comes to possess those very attributes, i.e. becomes equal to Ísvara. The first goes against the Advaita view itself, and the second is impossible and has no proof, and will lead to the view that there are many Ísvara. <sup>2</sup>

Finally, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, there is no such thing as Jīvanmukti or liberation in this life, here and now, when a man is favoured by the Lord he comes, of course, to be liberated from any further <sup>3</sup>Karmans. But those Karmans which have already begun to bear fruits remain intact, and hence he must continue his mundane existence untill such Karmans are completely <sup>4</sup>destroyed through retributive experience. At the same

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.521.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.521.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.13, pp.480-481.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.15, pp.481-482.

time any further Karmans which he may have to do during that period do not cling to him and he attains liberation.

The rule is that on the destruction of the cause, the effect is invariably destroyed, for example, when the threads are destroyed, the cloth also is destroyed simultaneously. But the Advaita view is that in spite of the destruction of avidyā through pure and intuitive knowledge, the mundane existence, which is the effect of it, continues. The question is : whether knowledge destroys the avidyā or not. If it does not, then it loses its essential nature, the very nature of knowledge being to remove avidyā, and no liberation will ever be possible, and if it does, there can be no Jīvan-<sup>1</sup> mukti or liberation in this life. It cannot be said that just as the strong smell of garlic persists even when the garlic pot has been thoroughly washed, so even when avidyā is destroyed by knowledge, the impressions of avidyā will still persist. For, this too is open to the same objection as before. None but a

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, pp.525-527.

fool will say that when the sun arises there can still be trace of darkness. In the very same manner, there cannot be even the faintest trace of avidyā when knowledge arises.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be said that the Jīvan-mukta is like a piece of burnt cloth, because the burnt cloth does not serve the practical purposes of covering etc. as a real piece of cloth does, for a jīvan-mukta acts just as he himself did before. Further, what exactly is this avidyā-nivṛtti which, according to the Advaitins, is liberation? Is it the very nature of the self or something else? If the first, then the self being eternal, avidyā-nivṛtti must be so; and in that case knowledge becomes futile. If the second, then the question is: Is it real, or unreal, or both, or anirvacanīya? Not the first, because then the doctrine of Non-dualism will fall to the ground; not the second, because it cannot be set aside by knowledge, and in that case knowledge would become futile like a lamp during the day; nor the third, reality and unreality being mutually opposed; a thing cannot be both real and unreal; nor finally, the fourth, because

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1. Ibid., p.527.

what is anirvacanīya is set aside by knowledge. Thus we conclude that the Advaita view of Jīvan-mukti does not stand to reason in any way, and to say that an embodied being, still under the control of prārabdha karmans and subject, as a consequence to all the human frailties and passions, is freed, is as absurd as to call a man born blind "lotus-eyes", or a street beggar the "Lord of the goddess of fortune"<sup>1</sup>.

### 3.7 Ethics (The Sādhanas):

There are four sādhanas or means to mokṣa, viz. Karman, Vidyā, upāsanā, prapatti, and Gurūpasatti.

#### 3.7.1 Karman:

Karmans by themselves do not lead to mokṣa directly, yet they are not useless, because, if performed conscientiously in a proper spirit, in accordance with one's caste and stage of life, they give rise to vidyā which is a means to mokṣa<sup>2</sup>. Hence, Karmans being an indirect means to mokṣa, are to be undertaken as essential duties and not to be avoided as something worthless.

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1. Ibid., pp.527-528.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.9, p.452.

3.7.2 Vidyā :

'Vidyā' means not mere 'knowledge', but 'meditative knowledge', i.e. knowledge ending in meditation. According to Keśavakāśmīrin, knowledge and meditation are interconnected : knowledge ends in meditation while meditation is based on knowledge.

Brahman, the highest goal of men, can be attained through vidyā. So the importance of vidyā is emphasized by Bādarāyaṇa<sup>1</sup> on the basis of several scriptural statements like : 'The knower of the self crosses over<sup>2</sup> grief', 'verily, he who knows the Supreme Brahman<sup>3</sup> become Brahman indeed', 'The knower of Brahman attains<sup>4</sup> the highest'. 'He attains all the worlds', I 'know<sup>5</sup> this great person of the colour of the sun, beyond<sup>6</sup> darkness', 'knowing him thus one becomes immortal<sup>7</sup> on earth; there is no other way to salvation', 'Just

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.1, p.449.
  2. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 7.1.3.
  3. Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 3.2.9.
  4. Taittirīya-upaniṣad, 2.1.
  5. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 8.7.1, 2.3; 8.12.6.
  6. Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad, 3.8.
  7. Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka, 3.12.

as the flowing rivers merge in the sea, discarding names and forms, so a knower, freed from name and form, attains the celestial person, higher than high<sup>1</sup>, 'when the seer sees the creator of Golden coloured, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahman, then the knower, having discarded merit and demerit, stainless<sup>2</sup> attains the highest equality', and so on.

Vidyā is not a subsidiary factor of karman (karmāṅga), but is an independent means. Jaimini, on the other hand, holds that Vidyā is a subsidiary part of karman, because the self, in consequence of being the agent, stands in a complementary relation to action, i.e. because any effort towards acts having heaven and the rest as their ends is possible if there be the knowledge of the self as different from the body and the rest on the part of the agent. Hence, through the saṃskāra of the agent (kartr), the knowledge of the self, that is, vidyā is a subsidiary element of karman. The scriptural statements like : 'The knower

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1. Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 3.2.8.

2. Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 3.1.3.



of the self crosses over grief', The knower of Brahman attains the highest' and so on are all merely valedictory passages (arthavāda).<sup>1</sup> This view is supported by the example of king Janaka, who being a Jñānin performed several sacrifices<sup>2</sup> and also by the scriptural statements, viz. : 'what alone one does with vidyā (knowledge) with faith and the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent'<sup>3</sup>, 'Vidyā and Karman lay hold of him',<sup>4</sup> 'One who has studied the Vedas in the house of a teacher according to rules, during the time of leisure which he gets after performing the duties towards his teacher, and having obtained his permission, should enter into the life of a householder studies the Vedas in some sacred place',<sup>5</sup> and so on. All this shows clearly that even after having attained the knowledge of all the Vedas, one should continue to perform Karmans.<sup>6</sup> Again, the scripture states: 'Only doing work here, let

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.2, pp.449-450.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.3, p.450.
  3. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 1.1.10.
  4. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4.4.2.
  5. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 8.15.1.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.6, p.451.

one desire to live a hundred years. Thus work does not stick to a man; There is no other way than that<sup>1</sup> -- shows that the utility of vidyā is for karman.<sup>2</sup> On these grounds, Jaimini holds that vidyā is a subsidiary part of karman.

Keśavakāsmīrin does not agree with Jaimini. He says that Vidyā is not a subsidiary part of karman, but is an independent means. The reason is that the scriptural statements speak of the Lord, as an object of vidyā, and far superior to the individual soul. All the scriptural texts agree on this point that the Highest self alone is to be known, which would never have been possible had vidyā or the Highest Self been subordinate to Karman.<sup>3</sup> There are several scriptural texts which declare that the sages, after they had realised the true knowledge, declined to perform any karman. Thus, having known the Highest self, the descendants of Kavaṣa, said -- "For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices?", "knowing this indeed, those ancient ones did not perform

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1. Isāvasyopaniṣad, Verse 2.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.7, p.451.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.8, p.451.

the Agni-hotra sacrifice", "Verily, having known that self the Brāhmaṇas, rising above the desires for sons, the desires for wealth, live the life of mendicants"<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, holds Keśavakāsmīrin, the performance of karmāṣ without any desire for results, but only with a desire for knowledge, is justified. It has been stated by the Lord too thus : "By karman<sup>2</sup> also, Janaka and others attained perfection", and "The knowers should similarly act without attachment, desiring the welfare of the world"<sup>3</sup>. The sense is that if it be held that Vidyā is a subsidiary part of karman, then, the scriptural texts about the non-performance of karman will come to be contradicted. The scriptural statement, viz. : "What alone one does with vidyā ----" and so on does not refer to all vidyās but only to the particular vidyā called udgītha.<sup>4</sup> Again, the Śruti ---- 'vidyā and karman ley hold of him' should be taken as referring to two different purposes for different persons -- vidyā for one, and

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1. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 3.5.1.

2. Gītā, 3.20.

3. Gītā, 3.25.

4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.10, p.452.

karman for another.<sup>1</sup> The text, viz. : "One who has studied the Vedas in the house of a teacher ----" and so on refers to a man who has studied the Vedas and not a man who has attained true knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Then the text, viz. : "only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years", etc., does not refer to a man who has attained true knowledge; for there is nothing in the text to suggest such a meaning.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, it is clear from the above that vidyā is not a subsidiary element of karman, but is an independent means. Far from being a subordinate factor of karman, it, on the contrary, destroys karman which lead to endless rebirths, thereby hindering the attainment of final release.<sup>4</sup> The text declare the destruction of karman by vidyā,<sup>5</sup> thus : "The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off and this works perish, when he who is high and low is seen"<sup>6</sup> and so on. There

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.11, p.453.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.12, p.453.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.13, p.453.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.16, p.454.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.16, p.454.
  6. Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 2.2.8.

are statements by the Lord too, viz. "Him whose works  
are burnt off by knowledge the wise call a knower"<sup>1</sup>,  
"The fire of knowledge reduces all works to ashes, O  
Arjuna !"<sup>2</sup>

But in spite of this, it is not to be supposed  
that karmans are absolutely useless. The fact is  
that karmans help the rise of vidyā and are, as such,  
elements of vidyā (vidyāṅga)<sup>3</sup>. In accordance with  
the scriptural text: "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to  
know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice"<sup>4</sup>,  
Vidyā depends for its own origination on all the karmans  
which are the means, as one depends on a horse for  
travelling.<sup>5</sup> The performance of the karmans, in accor-  
dance with one's caste and stage of life, has the  
effect of purifying the mind and thereby helping the  
rise of vidyā.<sup>6</sup> Of course, the function of karmans ends  
here, i.e. in giving rise to vidyā, for once vidyā is

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1. Gītā, 4.19.

2. Gītā, 4.37.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.26, p.460.

4. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4.4.2.

5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.26, p.461.

6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.26, p.460.

generated, it does not wait for anything else, but  
 itself leads to salvation.<sup>1</sup> Thus, karmans produce  
 vidyā, but are, in their turn, destroyed by that very  
 vidyā which they have produced. It is to be noted,  
 however, that karmans do not always give rise to vidyā  
 and thereby lead to salvation -- sometimes they give  
 rise only to merit, and thereby lead to heaven only.  
 The fact is that it is the spirit with which one under-  
 takes a karman that determines the end attained. A  
 man, desirous of salvation, performs sacrifices, etc.  
 in a disinterested spirit with no desire for heaven,  
 attains knowledge as a result and through it the  
 salvation. But a man, who is not desirous of salva-  
 tion, performs his duties in a selfish spirit with a  
 view to attaining heaven, and the rest, accumulates  
 merit as a result, goes to heaven, and is born on earth  
 once more.<sup>2</sup>

Not only the performance of karmans, but the  
 internal control of the senses etc. also is incumbent  
 on one who is desirous of knowledge (vidyā) as a  
 means to salvation. In order that there may be a rise

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.26, pp.460-461.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.32-35, pp.463-464.

of vidyā in him, he must be calm, self-controlled,  
indifferent to worldly objects, forbearing and collected.<sup>1</sup>

Besides, for the attainment of vidyā pure food is equally necessary. Pure food leads to purification of the inner-sense (sattva), which, in its turn, leads to the dhruvāsmṛti, i.e. love for the Lord similar to that of a worldly man for perishable objects.<sup>2</sup> Of course, when life is in danger without food, then for its preservation alone one may take even such food which one would not have taken in normal condition. Muttering of some mantras also helps one to attain vidyā, through the purification of one's inner self (antaḥkaraṇa).<sup>3</sup>

Further, one, who is desirous of knowledge of Brahman, must have deep learning, child-like simplicity and unostentatiousness and profound thoughtfulness and the gift of silence. All these help in the rise of vidyā.<sup>4</sup>

These are some of the accessories for the attainment of vidyā.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.27, p.461.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.29, p.462.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.37, p.465.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.46;3.4.48-49, pp.469, 472.

The conclusion, thus, is that vidyā is not a subsidiary part of Karman, but is an independent means. But, in spite of this, it is not to be supposed that Karmans are absolutely useless. The fact is that karmans help the rise of vidyā. Hence, some, viz., the ascetics, who are not required to perform sacrifices etc. can attain vidyā (knowledge) without the help of karman,<sup>1</sup> while others again, viz. religious students and householders -- who are required to perform sacrifices, etc. in accordance with their respective castes and stages of life -- can attain vidyā only through the proper performance of sacrifices etc.

The question is : who are entitled to 'Brahman-vidyā' (the knowledge of Brahman) ?

Generally speaking, who has studied the Veda alongwith its six parts;<sup>2</sup> who has been assailed with doubt,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.25, p.460.
  2. The six parts are : (i) Sikṣā or the science of proper articulation and pronunciation, comprising the knowledge of letters, accents, quantity, the use of the organs of pronunciation, and phonetics generally, but especially the laws of euphony peculiar to the Veda; (ii) Chandaḥs or treatises on metre; (iii) Vyākaraṇa or treatises on grammar; (iv) Nirukta or treatises on the explanation of difficult words; (v) Jyotiṣa or treatises on astronomy and (vi) Kalpa or treatises on ceremonials.

(contd....)



arising from texts which teach that the fruits of karmans are both transitory and eternal, i.e. whose mind is assailed with doubt owing to the contradictory teachings regarding the fruits of karmans, some texts declaring that the fruits of karmans are transitory, while others declaring that they are eternal; who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties, i.e. Pūrvā-mīmāṃsā, and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein regarding karmans, their kinds and their fruits; in whom, as a consequence, there arisen a disregard for worldly objects, that is the result of discrimination between the finitude and eternity of the fruits of the knowledge of karmans and Brahman respectively, the former being surpassable, the latter non-surpassable; who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a vision of Him; to whom the spiritual preceptor is the only God; who has wholehearted devotion for the holy spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final release, -- is entitled to Brahman-

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The first and second of these Vedāṅgas are said to be intended to secure the correct recitation of the Veda, the third and fourth the understanding of it, the fifth and sixth its proper employment at sacrifice. (Monier-William's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.1016, Oxford).

vidyā.<sup>1</sup>

Further, all those who belong to one or the other of the stages of life or the āśramas -- both householders and ascetics -- are entitled to Brahman-vidyā through proper performance of their duties prescribed for the particular stages of life.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, even those who stand between the stages of life, that is to say, who do not belong to any particular stage of life, are entitled to Brahman-vidyā provided that the fact of their not belonging to any particular stage of life is due to mishap and not to actual lapse or wilful negligence on their own parts; for example, a widower, by misfortune, happen to be outside all stages of life -- being neither a religious student nor a householder, nor an ascetic. Such persons can attain vidyā through the muttering of prayers (japa), fasting (upavāsa), worship of the deity (devatārādhana) and so on, there being no particular āśrama-dharmas<sup>3</sup> to be performed by them. It is to be remembered, however, that one should belong to one or the other of the

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.5-7.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.36, p.465.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.37, p.465.

stages of life if one can help, for it is far better to do so than to remain outside.<sup>1</sup> But persons who voluntarily make lapse from their stages of life through misbehaviour, are not entitled to vidyā like widowers and so on. Such a lapse is a very serious offence. A Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārin, a Vaikhānasa and a parivrājaka, observing the vow of chastity, who make lapses from their vow are as good as the slayers<sup>2</sup> of themselves and no penance can atone for their sin.

The conclusion arrived at therefore, is that the adhikārins of vidyā are, generally speaking, those who have studied the Vedas and the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, have approached a preceptor and have been ceremonially purified; all those who belong to one or the other of the stages of life through proper performance of their duties prescribed for the particular stages of life; and those who stand midway, like widowers and the rest, through the muttering of prayers, fasting, charity, worship of the deity, non-violence, centement, straight forwardness, company of the great and so on.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.39, pp.465-466.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.41, p.287.

There is no fixed rule when vidyā<sup>1</sup> is going to  
 arise,<sup>2</sup> It may arise here or hereafter. If one has  
 no obstacle in one's way, then one does attain vidyā<sup>3</sup>  
 in this very birth; but if there be obstacles, then  
 one will have to wait for another birth. There are  
 Śrutis to support both -- "He whom many, though hear-<sup>4</sup>  
 ing, know not". "Even when in womb, Vāma-deva perceived".

### 3.7.3 Upāsanā :

Upāsanā means 'meditation' being of the form<sup>5</sup>  
 of contemplation (dhyāna), as evident from text : "Should  
 be meditated on".<sup>6</sup> One desirous of mokṣa should meditate  
 on one's own self - on one's real and essential self,  
 freed from all sins and imperfections.<sup>7</sup> He should meditate  
 on the Lord as his own self.<sup>8</sup> He should not meditate<sup>9</sup>  
 either on the self as it is during the stage of bondage,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.50-51, pp.293-294.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.48, pp.292, 293.
  3. Kaṭhōpaniṣad, 2.7.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.50, p.293.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.8, p.478.
  6. Bṛhadāraṇyakōpaniṣad, 2.4.5, 4.5.6.
  7. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.3.52, p.441.
  8. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.3, p.476.
  9. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.3.51-52, pp.440-441.

nor on any symbol.<sup>1</sup> The best kind of meditation, thus,  
 is the meditation on the self as one with the Lord  
 (abhedopāsanā).<sup>2</sup>

Meditation is to be carried on in a sitting posture,<sup>3</sup>  
 meditation being best possible in that posture alone,<sup>4</sup>  
 i.e. on the part of one who is motionless. There  
 is no particular rule regarding the place of meditation  
 the only requisite being that meditation should be  
 practised in a place which helps concentration of the  
 mind.<sup>5</sup> Meditation is to be carried on, not off and  
 on, but continuously as long as life lasts.<sup>6</sup> Meditation,  
 like knowledge, brings about destruction of all karmans  
 and leads to mokṣa.<sup>7</sup>

There are various kinds of meditation leading to  
 different results. There is, first, meditation on the  
 Lord in His own nature (svarūpena), which leads to Him  
 directly and immediately. The process of meditation

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.4-6, p.477.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.7-8, p.478.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.9, p.478.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.11, p.479.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.12, pp.479-480.
  7. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.5, p.376; 4.1.13-14,  
 pp.480-481.

depicted above is a somewhat higher intellectual process, presupposing the consciousness of identity between the individual soul and the Lord. Ordinarily, however, this process is not always resorted to. Whenever the Lord is meditated on, He must be meditated on as possessed of the essential qualities of truth, knowledge, bliss, being the soul of all, having true desires, non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest --<sup>1</sup> which pertain to His very nature. There are also various Brahman-vidyās or meditations on Brahman, viz. Śāṅḍilya-vidyā, Bhūmā-vidyā, Dahar-vidyā, Upakośala-vidyā, Vaiśvānara-vidyā, Ānādamaya-vidyā, Akṣara-<sup>2</sup>vidyā, etc., depicted in the upaniṣads, which also lead to the Lord directly. But in spite of the fact that the various Brahman-vidyās are really one as referring to the same object, viz. Brahman, yet since the method of procedure is different in each case and since different forms are resorted to by different<sup>3</sup> adhikārins, they are taken to be different in this sense.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.3.11, p.413; 3.3.13, p.414; 3.3.34, p.429.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.3.56, p.444.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

But since they all lead to the same result, viz. the attainment of Brahman, it is not necessary to resort to each of them, any one being enough to yield the desired result, viz. the liberation.<sup>1</sup>

There is, further, meditation on the Lord as the Inner controller of the non-sentient.<sup>2</sup> Finally, there are certain symbolic meditations which do not lead to the Lord at all.<sup>3</sup>

It is clear that these means are not mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary involve one another.

#### 3.7.4. Prapatti :

Prapatti means complete resignation or self-surrender to the Lord.<sup>4</sup> Self-surrender consists in dedication of oneself with one's dependents and property to the Lord. Prapatti-yoga is complete entrusting of one's own self to the infinitely merciful Lord. Being one of the forms of Vidyā Prapatti or nyāsavidyā is one

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.3.57-58, pp.444-445.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.32, p.87.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.3.15, pp.511-512.
  4. Bhāvadīpikā, 1.1.1, p.6.

of the most effective means to salvation.<sup>1</sup> It consists in depending on the Lord in every respect and at every step, relinquishing one's narrow individuality as a separate self-dependent and self-sufficient being, giving up every other sādhanā<sup>2</sup> like knowledge and the rest, and throwing one's self completely on the mercy of Lord. Prapatti consists of the following six limbs:-

(1) Anukūlyasya samkalpaḥ, i.e. the resolve that every one with good will and friendliness, being convinced of the great truth that everyone and everything, down to a tuft of grass, is the body of the Lord and as such deserves respect.

(2) Pratikūlyasya varjjanam, i.e. discarding what is contrary to the above solemn determination, i.e. refraining from all violence, malice, backbitting, falsehood etc..

(3) Rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāsaḥ, i.e. strong faith in the protection of the Lord.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.6.

2. Gītā, 18.66, with the ṭīkā called 'Tattva-prakāśikā'.



(4) Goptr̥tvavaraṇam, i.e. praying to the Lord for protection, being aware of the fact the Lord, though all-merciful, does not release any one who does not pray to Him, but is, on the contrary, averse to Him, otherwise there would have resulted universal release.

(5) Kārpaṇyam, i.e. discarding all false pride and sense of egoity, i.e. assuming an attitude of utter humility.

(6) Ātmanikṣepaḥ, i.e. complete entrusting of one's own self and whatever belongs to one's self to the Lord, being convinced, that such a complete resignation of the 'I' and the 'mine' to the Lord<sup>1</sup> alone induces the mercy and grace of the Lord.

The object of Prapatti is the Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, and not any other deity like Brahmā, Śiva and the rest, who all are subordinate to the Lord.<sup>2</sup> The Lord is ever-gracious to one who has thus taken refuge in Him. He protects him at all times from all harms and

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1. BhāvaĀīpikā, 1.1.1, p.6.

2. Ibid.

difficulties, regards him as His special ward, as His dear friend and never abandons him, in spite of his faults and failings. And, finally, He with His own hands, leads him to mokṣa, to attainment of Himself.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that only three higher casts were allowed to study the Vedas and practise Vaidika-rites. With a view to keeping harmony with the traditional religion of the age, Keśavakāśmīrin opened the path of prapatti-yoga to all - to the high as well as to the low, to the learned as well as to the ignorant, to the Brāhmaṇas as well as to the Śudras. Hence, prapatti is open to all.<sup>2</sup>

### 3.7.5. Gurūpasatti :

Gurupasatti, as the name implies, means complete self-surrender to a guru or spiritual preceptor<sup>3</sup> and not directly to the Lord Himself.<sup>4</sup> The Guru is the intermediary between the Jīva and the Lord, and leads the former to the latter. "Jīva-Guru-Hari" -- This is the eternal secret of all truth.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Gītā, 9.27-28, with the ṭīkā called "Tattva-prakāśikā"
  2. Krama-dīpikā, 1.4, p.3.
  3. Bhāvadīpkā, p.6.
  4. Kramadīpikā, 1.5, p.4.
  5. Bhāvadīpikā, p.6.

That is, Gurūpasatti means offering one's self together with whatever belongs to one's self to the Lord through the Guru.

Gurūpasatti is the best of all the sādhanas, involving, as it does, every other means, - Karman, Vidya and Upāsana. Thus, obeying the commands of the Guru is following the path of karman (karman-yoga); knowing one's self as having the guru for his-essence (taḍātmaka) is following the path of knowledge (jñāna-yoga), and being devoted to the guru is following the path of devotion (bhakti-yoga).

Gurūpasatti, further, involves the eight-fold yogas (aṣṭāṅgayoga) which are regarded as a means to a direct vision of the Lord, viz. Yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhyāna, dhāraṇā, and samādhi. Thus :-

(i) The Jīva's distaste for its narrow individuality (ātman) and what belongs to itself (ātmīya) is yama.

(ii) Intense love for the Lord and the guru is niyama.

(iii) The steadfast idea that all things sentient and non-sentient, belong to the Lord. Accompanied by a complete indifference to them is āsana.

(iv) Assigning different modes of the prāṇa and the rest to the Lord, is prāṇāyāma.

(v) Directing the mind to the Lord alone is Pratyāhāra.

(vi) The uninterrupted intuition, viz. "Brahman is myself or essence" is dhyāna.

(vii) Steadfastness of the above belief is dhāraṇā.

(viii) Continuous and uninterrupted meditation on the Lord is samādhi.

The sense is that one who has surrendered his self completely to his Guru, needs do nothing else, perform no other duties, follow no other sādhana-- except to obey and serve him.

It is clear that like Bhagavat-prapatti, Gurū-pasatti is open to all. This means is specially fit for those who cannot perform even the six-limbs of Bhagavat-prapatti independently of their own unaided efforts, but are required to be led by someone else in all respects, their only duty is to obey their guru with blind faith as a child obeys his mother. And, all that is necessary for their attainment of salvation is done by the guru himself, just as the mother of a suckling baby herself takes medicine for curing her child's disease.

CHAPTER - 4

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL DIFFERENCE  
AND NON-DIFFERENCE (SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDAVĀDA) WITH SOME  
OTHER BHEDĀBHEDA DOCTRINES

CHAPTER - 4

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINES OF NATURAL DIFFERENCE  
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The doctrine of difference and non-different (bhedābheda) is not quite new. Its tradition goes back to the Vedic time. The pre-Bādarāyaṇa thinkers like Āśmarathya and Auḍulomin offered the dualistic-cum-monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic passages and are referred to as such in the Brahma-sūtra. Kāśakṛtsna<sup>1</sup> is interpreted by Śaṅkara as an exponent of non-dualism.

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1. (i) Pandey, Dr. K.C., "Dualism-cum-Monism (Bhedābhedavāda)", Journal of the Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XXXI, pts. 1-4, Nov., 1963 - August, 1965, p.245.
- (ii) Bhedābhedavādo vaidikaparamparāyāmapyupalābhyate/Vaidika-bhedābhedavādinoh 'Āśmarathya', 'Auḍulomin' matayorbādarāyaṇena svīyabrāhmasūtra krata evopanyāsaḥ/"

-- "Śaivadarśanabindu" of Pandey, Dr.K.C., p.54, Benaras, Samvat 2021.

But Śrīnivāsācārya, an immediate disciple of Nimbārka and Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya think that Kāśakṛtsna was an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. It shows that Kāśkṛtsna was also an old exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. We briefly consider below the doctrines of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomin and Kāśkṛtsna, which are known from references only.

(i) The Doctrine of Āśmarathya<sup>1</sup> :

As the sparks, being the effects of the fire, are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire, and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other, so Jīvas are neither different from Brahman for that would mean they are not of the nature of intelligence, nor absolutely non-different from it, since then, they would not be different from each other. Hence, the Jīvas are different and

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1. Brahma-sūtra, 1.4.20.

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 non-different from Brahman. And again, just as in the case of the pot and the clay, being the affect and cause, there is undoubtedly primary difference between them and, on the other hand, there is non-difference between them, because the word 'pot' refers to the clay as well,<sup>2</sup> so, according to Āśmarathya, the Jīva is also the effect of Brahman, who is the cause of all, as the Śruti says, "Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"<sup>3</sup>, "from whom, all these elements arise". Thus, these two are related as cause and effect. Being the effect and the cause, this is undoubtedly a primary difference between them. Being born from it and so on, this is a point of non-difference between them. There is the natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, according to Āśmarathya.

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 (ii) The Doctrine of Auḍulomin :

Auḍulomin looks upon difference and non-difference of the Jīva from Brahman as due to difference in the

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1. Bhāmatī on Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, pp.415-16, Ed. Nīranayasagar, Bombay, 1938.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha, p.141, 1.4.20, Benaras, 1932.
  3. Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, III.1.
  4. Brahma-sūtra, 1.4.21.



conditions in which both are considered vis-a-vis each other. Bound by the limiting adjuncts of body, senses, and mind, the Jīva is different from Brahman. Through knowledge and meditation, it passes out of the body and becomes one with the Highest Self. Auḍulomin admits absolute difference between Jīva and Brahman but asserts their unity in the state of mukti of the Jīva.<sup>1</sup> This he maintains on the basis of two texts from the Upaniṣads. The first of these is : "eṣa samprasā-dosmāchharīrātasamuthāya param jyotirūpasam-pādyā svenarūpeṇābhiniṣampadyate"<sup>2</sup>. This Jīva after going out of this body, realises its own nature, attains higher light that is Brahman. The second is : "As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and form thus, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine person, higher than high"<sup>3</sup>. This shows that as rivers losing their names and forms disappear in the sea, so the Jīva losing the name and the form becomes united with the Highest Person. On

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1. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 1.4.20.

2. Chāṅḍogyaopaniṣad, VIII.12\*3

3. "yathā nadyaḥ syādamānāḥ samudre astam gacchanti nāmarūpavihāya tathā vidvān puṇyapāpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam/"

this view, there is the relation of difference between Jīva and Brahman during the state of bondage (baddhāvasthā) of the Jīva, and non-difference during its state of salvation (muktāvasthā). Thus there is the relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman.<sup>1</sup> Vācaspati Miśra in his 'Bhāmatī' on Śāṅkara-bhāṣya and Bhāskara in his Sūtrabhāṣya quote the following saying of Pāñcarātrikas :-

"ā mukterbheda eva syāj jīvasya ca parasya ca/  
muktasya ca na bhedo 'sti bhedahetor abhāvatah//"

(Up to the moment of liberation the Jīva and Brahman are different. But liberated Jīva is no longer different from Brahman, since there is no further cause of difference)

The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Auḍulomin is Satyabhedavāda.<sup>2</sup>

(iii) The Doctrine of Kāśakṛtsna :<sup>3</sup>

It is controversial whether Kāśakṛtsna was an

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha, p.140, 1.4.21.
  2. Vedānta-sūtra (George Thibaut), Vol.I, English Translation of Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, p.278, 1.4.20, Delhi.
  3. Brāhma-sūtra, 1.4.22.

exponent of difference and non-difference or non-dualism. He is interpreted by Śaṅkara as an exponent of non-dualism, and by Bhāskara as an upholder of the view of "identity in difference" (Bhedābheda). In fact he has been interpreted by almost all the commentators as supporting their disparate views such as the Monistic, Dualistic, dualistic-cum-monistic and qualified monistic as is clear from the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Madhva, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha, Rāmānuja<sup>1</sup> etc. But it appears that Kāśakṛtsna was an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as is clear from the commentary of Śrīnivāsācārya namely "Vedānta-kaustubha"<sup>2</sup>. Kāśakṛtsna is of the opinion that the Paramātman dwells in the Jīvātman who is His niyama (that is, controlled by Him)<sup>3</sup>. Thus there is a relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as the controlled and the controller.

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1. Pandey, Dr. K.C., "Dualism-cum-Monism (Bhedābheda-vāda)", Journal of Gaṅgānāth Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XXXI, pts. 1-4, Nov., 1963, August, 1965.

2. "tadevam munitrayamatadvārā prasāṅgāt bheda-bheda-prakāro bhagavatā darśitāḥ/"

-- Vedānta-kaustubha, 1.4.22, p.141.

3. Mīśra, Umesha, "Nimbārka School of Vedānta", p.63, Allahabad, 1963.

As declared by the Śruti : "He who dwelling in the soul is other than the soul whom the soul does not know, whose body is the Ātman. He who rules the soul, He is your soul, the inner controller of men, the soul of all" etc. etc.. The controller, viz. Lord is denoted by a knower of the object controlled by Him, viz. Jīva.<sup>1</sup> Śrīpati<sup>2</sup> is of the view that Kāśakṛtsna propounds the doctrine of bhedābheda which is declared by the Śruti texts which, without being contradictory to each other, enunciate in 'dvā suparṇā' etc. and other texts the bhedā doctrine and in 'tattvamasi' etc. the bheda doctrine. In order to point out clearly the existence of bheda and abheda between Jīva and Brahman, Kāśakṛtsna declares that all the Śruti texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine of Bhedābheda. Therefore the third doctrine of bhedābheda is the highest essential truth declared by all the Śruti texts; and so it must be understood. Hundreds of Śruti texts declare that in the state of worldly life Jīva and Brahman are quite

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha, 1.4.22, p.141.

2. (a) Śrīkarabhāṣya, Vol.I, Introduction, p.427, Ed. C. Haya-vaḍana Rao, Bangalore, 1936.

(b) Śrīkara-bhāṣya, Vol.II, p.174, Bangalore, 1936.

distinct from each other and separate and that in the state of salvation there is abheda between the two. Some of such texts are the following :

"Eṣa samprasādortha ātmā śarīrāt samuthāya param jyotirūpam sampādya svena rūpeṇābhiniśpadyate" etc.etc."

Even in the later ages Lakulīśa, Bhartṛprapañca and Yādavaprakāśa were the supporters of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. Their doctrines have been almost lost. Here we shall simply refer to the doctrines of Lakulīśa, Bhartṛprapañca and Yādavaprakāśa.

(i) The Doctrine of Laukulīśa :

According to the inscriptional evidence of Mathura pillar and of stone slab of Somanātha, in the first half of the second century A.D., Lakulīśa propounded the Lakulīśapāśupata a well known dualistic-cum-monistic system. It is based on five Vedic Mantras known as 'Sadyojātam', etc.<sup>1</sup> Lakulīśa wrote a 'Pāśupatasūtra'. Pāśupatasūtra with the commentary of Kauṇḍinya namely 'Pañcārthibhāṣya' is available at present. Pāśupatasūtra

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1. Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Dualistic-cum-Monistic (Bhedā-bhedavāda)", Journal of Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XXXXI, pts. 1-4, Nov., 1963, August, 1965.

is divided into five chapters. It is based on the five Vedic Mantras of Taittirīyāranya. The five Vedic Mantras are following :

- (a) 'Sadyojātam prapadyāmi'/'
- (b) 'Vāmadevāya namaḥ'/'
- (c) 'Agnorebhyoḥ ghorebhya'/'
- (d) 'Tatpuruṣāya vidmahe'/'
- (e) 'Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām'/'

It means that these five Anuvākas of the Taittirīyāranya are the basis of the Lakulīśapāśupata system. Sāyaṇa in his interpretation of this text maintains that they refer to Śaivism in general, both as a religion and as a philosophy.

#### Bhedābheda of Lakulīśa :

According to the Lakulīśapāśupata, there are five primary categories, viz., (i) Kāraṇa or pati, (ii) Kārya or paśu, (iii) Yoga, (iv) Vidhi, and (v) Duḥkhānta.

Here, it would, therefore, be useful to discuss briefly the concepts of Kāraṇa (pati) and kārya (paśu) to understand the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as propounded by Lakulīśa.

(a) The words pati and Brahman are synonymous. Pati is the cause of all effects (Kārya), viz., Vidyā,

kāla and Paśu.<sup>1</sup> He is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. The universe springs up (bhavodbhavaḥ) from Brahman in the same way as does a sprout from a seed. He is the cause of both the creation and the dissolution of the world. He bestows grace. He transcends all.<sup>2</sup> He is playful.<sup>3</sup> He is higher than the liberated.<sup>3</sup> He has perfect powers of knowledge and action. They constitute his essential nature exactly as heat does that of fire. He evokes fear of immortal deeds in bound Jīvas and unites them with the merit and demerit of the deeds.<sup>4</sup>

(b) The kārya or paśu is controlled by the Lord or pati (pāśanāt paśūn).<sup>5</sup> The kārya is that which is dependent on something ulterior. It is threefold,<sup>6</sup> sentience, the insentient and the sentient.

(c) Relation between the cause (pati or kāraṇa) and the effect (kārya) :

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1. Pāśupatasūtra, 55.
  2. Ibid., 56.
  3. Ibid., 57.
  4. Ibid., 57.
  5. Ibid., 5.
  6. Sarvadarśana-Saṅgraha, Eng. Translation by E.B.Cowell and A.E. Gough, p.106, Benaras, 1961.

There has been a great controversy over the question of the doctrine of causality in Indian Philosophy. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system, the effect is non-eternal (asat) but the effect according to Lakulīśa pāsupata is eternal (sat). Nor is the effect a mere illusion, as the Vedāntin asserts. The Lakulīśa pāsupata is not Monism, but Dualism-cum-non-dualism. It admits that the reality is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity and, therefore the multiplicity, according to it, exists in unity just as do the stars in heaven. The creation is nothing but the arrangement of what exists in a creation form (vṛtti lābha)<sup>1</sup>. The triad abides in His power,<sup>2</sup> which constitutes His very being, the most essential nature, the principal attribute, the chief characteristic, Dharma. There is no confusion (Vṛttisaṅkara)<sup>3</sup> between the cause and the effect like water and milk. On the other hand, the cause and the effect are different from each other like the light of the eyes and that of the sun or of lamp which illumines the object at the time of perception. He is all-pervading. But the pervasiveness of the 'effect'

1. Pāsupata-Sūtra, 60.
2. Ibid., 58.
3. Ibid., 59.



is of limited nature. Each higher category pervades the lower. So, in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, different effects do not have their existence in isolation from each other, like cells in a honey-comb. The pervaded and the pervading are to be seen differently as water is taken differently from the colour that colours it.

Thus, the cause and the effect exist together, but maintain their separate entity on account of the difference of nature. The effect is as eternal as the causes. For, the cause cannot be logically represented as the cause without the effect, the pati cannot be spoken of as pati without something to rule over. The effect has its existence in the cause as does a seed in the earth. The cause is free (svatantra) and the effect is 'not-free' (asvatantra). The former is the pati and the latter the paśu. The one stands for the cit and the other for both cit and acit.

Thus, Lakulīśa Pāśupata system is dependent on 'Satkāryavāda'. In creation the Lord is free. It has already been observed according to Lakulīśa that there is essential difference between the individual self and the highest self, the cause and the effect and the

sentient and non-sentient. Though, the cause (pati) and the effect (paśu) are mutually different, the effect (paśu), viz. Vidya, kala and rupa, is neither free from, nor equal to the pati. The effect is dependent and 'not-free' (asvatantra), as it is to be carried on, to be created and to be effected. Thus Lakulīśa Pāśupata believes in the doctrine of difference and non-difference.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) The Doctrine of Bhartṛprapañca:

Bhartṛprapañca is known from references only. None of his works is, at present, available. He wrote a commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Bhartṛprapañca's commentary was more voluminous than Śaṅkara's. He was an old Vedāntin anterior even to Śaṅkara.<sup>2</sup>

To understand his doctrine of Bhedābheda, it may, therefore, be useful to discuss the concept of Brahman, Jīva and the world.

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1. Pandey, Dr. K.C., 'Śaivadarśanabindu', pp.35-36, 39-41, 58, Benaras, Samvat 2021, and 'Bhāskarī', Vol.III, "An outline of Śaiva Philosophy", pp.cxx-xxxvi, cxiii-cxvi, Lucknow, 1954.
  2. Hiriyana, Prof. M., "Bhartṛprapañca-- An Old Vedāntin" -- Proceedings and Transactions of All India Oriental Conference, Session III, Madras, 1924, and Indian Antiquary, Vol. LIII, 1924.

Like Śaṅkara, Bhartṛprapañca considered Brahman to be para (higher) and apara (lower) both. He is both one and many. Just as a cow is one as a substance, but its features, the dewlap etc., are many, so is different and non-different.

He does not explain like Śaṅkara that Jīva or lower Brahman is vivarta of the higher Brahman. He does not explain like Bhāskara that diversity of Brahman is adventitious. But he says that para (higher) and apara (lower) or unity and diversity of Brahman are real. Just as an ocean has unity at the cause of waves, foam and bubbles etc., and diversity as effects viz. waves, foam and bubbles etc., even so Brahman has both unity and diversity inhering in Him.

Bhartṛprapañca admits the Brahmapariṇāmavāda, but not the Vivartavāda of Śaṅkara. According to him Brahman transforms itself by its own creative urge into the world and the Jīva. The Jīvas are :- 1. Antaryāmin, 2. Sākṣin, 3. Avyākṛta, 4. Sūtra, 5. Virāja, 6. Devatā, 7. Jāti, and 8. Piṇḍa. Prof. Hiriyana

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1. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, 4.3.30.
  2. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, 2.1.14, p.456, Bombay, 1938.
  3. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtikam, 2.3.
  4. Hiriyana, Prof. M., "Bhartṛprapañca -- An Old Vedāntin", Proceeding and Transactions of A.I.C.C., III, Madras, 1924.

says that according to Bhartṛprapañca these eight forms together with Brahman may be divided into three rāśis, in which we have the three-fold subject matter of all religion and philosophy, viz., God, soul and matter.

1. Paramātmārāśi.
2. Mūrtāmūrta-rāśi.
3. Jīva-rāśi.

1. Brahman is antaryāmī or inner-ruler of all. So this rāśi is absolute Brahman.
2. This is known as six material forms of the world. Which are thus : Avyākṛta -- An elementary substance from which all things were created, Sūtra -- the adjunct of the logos, Virāja - the visible universe, Devatā -- an organ of sense, Jāti -- a class, and Piṇḍa -- the body.
3. In this rāśi, Jīvas or the Sākṣins are real transformations of Brahman. Bhartṛ-prapañca takes it as a third rāśi.

Bhartṛprapañca explains the relation between Brahman, Jīva and the world as not of absolute non-difference. But the relation of difference and non-difference

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(Bhedābheda) between these three is obvious. To make it clear, in his Bhāṣya, on Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 5.1.1., Śaṅkara tells us that the one Brahman has got a dualistic as well as a non-dualistic aspect (dvaitādvaitātamakam). For example, the ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles etc. As the water is real and waves appear and disappear, but are a part of the ocean itself, and are absolutely real, in the same way dualistic world is absolutely real; it corresponds to the waves etc. on the water while the supreme Brahman stands for the water of the ocean and is absolutely real.

3

Prof. Hiriyana says that it is difficult to determine which of these view was in the mind of Bhartṛprapañca.

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Otto Strause says that the types bhāga-bhāgin and avasthāvatastavasthā appear to be the most usual ones. Kārya-Kāraṇa

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1. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadvārtikam, p.876, St.46, ASS, 1815, 1893.
  2. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad with the commentary of Śaṅkara and the glossary of Ānandgiri, Ed. by Dr. E. Roer, pp.951-952.
  3. Hiriyana, Prof. M., "Bhartṛprapañca -- An Old Vedāntin", Proceedings and Transactions, A.I.C.C. III, Madras, 1924.
  4. Otto Strauss, "Jīva and Paramātman", D.R. Bhandarkar Volume, pp.148, 150, Calcutta, 1940.

has to be taken in the sense of pariñāma, and sāmānya-viśeṣa cannot be employed directly on account of Brahman not being a Sāmānya in the logical sense of the word. On the other hand, Prof. P.N. Srinivasachari<sup>1</sup> says that according to Bhartṛprapañca the Sūtras bring out this truth by means of the classical analogy of the snake and its coil and the sun and its radiance. The cause is, logically speaking, immanent in the effect. The whole pervades the part and the universal is realised in and through the particulars. But the most adequate Category of Reality is the relation of substance and modes (avasthāvat and avasthā) in which there is a pervading identity that transfigures the parts.

(iii) The Doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa :

Yādavaprakāśa also is known from references only. Not much is known about Yādavaprakāśa and his philosophy. According to tradition, Yādavaprakāśa was the supporter of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. To

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1. Śrīnivasachari, Prof. P.N., "The Philosophy of Bhedābheda", p.152, The Adyar Library, 1950.

establish his doctrine of Bhedābheda, there is no clear evidence, because, though, he wrote his commentary on Brahma-Sūtra, his commentary is not, at present, available. His doctrine has generally been established on the basis of some critical references of works of Rāmānuja and Vedānta-Deśika. Rāmānuja criticizes the doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa in his Vedārthasaṅgraha.<sup>1</sup> Vedānta-Deśika devoted a brief chapter in his paramata-bhaṅga to the critical examination of the tenet of Bhāskara and Yādava.<sup>2</sup>

According to "Śrutiprakāśikā" the glossary on the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, which is written by Sudarśana-bhaṭṭa, there is the relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as the cause and the effect, as explained by Āśmarathya. Similar is the view of Yādavaprakāśa. It is called "Svābhāvika-Bhedābheda"<sup>3</sup> (Natural difference and no-difference).

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1. Vedārthasaṅgraha, p.15, Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānuja Granthamālā, Granthamālā Office, Kanchipuram, 1956.
  2. Śrīnivasachari, Prof. P.N., "The Philosophy of Bhedābheda", p.144.
  3. "Ayam Yādavaprakāśapakṣosmin sūtra upanyastah/  
tatra hi kāryātmanā ca Jīvaibrahmaṇo bhedābhedaḥ  
svābhāvikaḥ matau/  
Śrutiprakāśikā on the Śrī-Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja,  
1.4.20, p.148, Vol.II, 1967, Ed. By Govt. India,  
New Delhi.

Yādava tries to overcome the discrepancy by the concept of Brahma-pariṇāma or theory of transformation by which the absolute which is sat without a second by its own immanent śakti or potential energy becomes God and the universe of the cit and acit like the waves and ripples of the ocean.<sup>1</sup> It proves that Brahman is the cause of the cit and the acit. The cit and the acit are the effects of Brahman. Thus, in the view of Yādavaprakāśa, there is the relation of difference and non-difference between these three ultimate-realities as the cause and the effect, which relation is natural (Svābhāvika).

After the doctrines of Lakulīśa, Bhartṛprapañca and Yādavaprakāśa, there are doctrines of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati and Śrīkṛṣṇa-caitanya. All of them accept the doctrine of difference and non-difference, to be equally real; but all of them try to reconcile them in different ways. Bhāskara regards the difference and non-difference to be equally real but he takes difference to be aupādhika and non-

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1. Śrīnivasachari, Prof. P.N., "The Philosophy of Bhedābheda", p.144.



difference to be natural and real. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha explain their doctrines on the analogy of soul and body (Śarīrī-śarīra) in which no-difference is principal; it is qualified by difference, which is subordinate to it. Nimbārka accepts the doctrine of difference and non-difference, which is equally natural (svābhāvika) and completely compatible. Śrīpati regards the difference and the non-difference to be equally natural, but he takes that identity is not only natural but also of form. Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya regards the difference and non-difference as inconceivable (acintya). The doctrines of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati and Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya are extant to this day. Thus the development of the doctrine of difference and non-difference has been discussed in three stages. First, that which is known from references only, as the doctrine of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomin and Kāśakṛtsna; second, that which has been almost lost, as the doctrine of Lakulīśa, Bhartṛprapañca, and Yādavaparakāśa; third, that which is living to this day, as the doctrine of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati and Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya.

Now we propose to make a comparative study of the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference

(svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda) with aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda, Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda and acintyabhedābhedavāda.

#### 4.1 Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda and Aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda

(i) Bhāskara wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, on the line of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. His commentary on the Brahma-sūtra is available. He belonged to the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A.D.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) Bhāskara in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra throughout refers to the Highest Reality as Brahman,<sup>2</sup> and sometimes as Ívara,<sup>3</sup> but Nimbārka, Keśavakāśmīrin<sup>4</sup> and other followers call Him Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa. Bhāskara does not speak the consort of Brahman, as Nimbārka does in the form of Rādhā, as ever accompanying

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1. (a) Bhāskara-bhāṣya, C.S.S., First edition, p.7.  
(b) Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Dualism-cum-non-dualism" (Bhedābhedavāda), Journal of Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XXXI, p.246.
  2. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.2, pp.6-7, 1.1.2, p.8; 1.1.3, p.9 etc.
  3. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.2, p.3, 1.1.12, p.24 etc.
  4. (a) Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 1.1.1, C.S.S., Benaras, 1932, p.1.  
(b) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.9.

Brahman, i.e. Kṛṣṇa.<sup>1</sup> Here Bhāskara differs from Nimbārka.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds Brahman to be the cause of the world, its creator, supporter and destroyer.<sup>2</sup> Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world.<sup>3</sup> He is known only by the Scriptural authority.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, for Bhāskara, the world is a transformation (pariṇāma) of Brahman. But he does not accept the tradition of Sāṃkhya-yoga according to which the world is a transformation or pariṇāma of the Prakṛti, just as curd is the transformation of milk. Brahman possesses infinite power or energy (śakti) and makes the power undergo transformation,<sup>5</sup> so that he can remain what he is. Pariṇāma is for Bhāskara

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1. Vedānta-kāmadhenu, verse 5, Benaras, 1907.
  2. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.2, p.8, 1.1.11, p.24.
  3. Ibid., 1.1.2, p.8, 1.4.22, p.84.
  4. Ibid., 1.1.1, p.8, 1.1.3, p. 9 etc.
  5. Ibid., 2.1.14, p.97.

the throwing out of energy (śaktivikṣepa)<sup>1</sup>. Here Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara. Nimbārka also admits the Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda or the Brahmaśaktikāraṇavāda.<sup>2</sup>

Brahman, according to Bhāskara, has two aspects (dvirūpa), viz. the kāraṇa-rūpa and the kārya-rūpa.<sup>3</sup> The kāraṇarūpa is the real, original and natural form of Brahman, while the kārya-rūpa is due to upādhi and is, as such, something adventitious, though real.<sup>4</sup> But Nimbārka does not believe in any such sharp distinction between the two forms of Brahman, His kāraṇa-rūpa and kārya-rūpa. According to Nimbārka, Brahman has a kāraṇa-rūpa during the time of universal dissolution; but even in His kāraṇarūpa, Brahman is not absolutely non-difference, or nirviśeṣa, a pure unity or identity as Bhāskara holds. According to Bhāskara, Brahman is an abstract unity in His Kāraṇa-rūpa, with no internal differences,<sup>5</sup> but becomes a concrete unity in His Kārya-rūpa, with the internal differences of

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1. (a) Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.4.25, p.85.  
(b) Waltair, P.T. Raju, "Identity in difference in some Vedāntic systems", New Indian-Antiquary, Vol.II, 1939-40, Bombay, p.105.
  2. Vedānta-pārijāta, saurabha, 1.4.26, pp.144-145.
  3. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.4, p.19, 1.1.11, p.24.
  4. Ibid., 2.3.43, p.141.
  5. Cp. the three kinds of bhedas, sajātīya, vijātīya and svagata.

the sentient and the non-sentient. But for Nimbārka, Brahman is always differenced or saviśeṣa, in the sense that He has always internal differences. The sentient and the non-sentient are never absolutely identical with Brahman, but always retain their own individuality and separateness even during salvation and dissolution. Nimbārka, in fact, does not think it necessary to note the kāraṇarūpa of Brahman separately from His Kārya-rūpa for the evident reason that he thinks that there is no fundamental distinction between them to require special mention.

Like Nimbārka, according to Bhāskara, although Brahman is a qualified Being, yet the qualities of Brahman do not involve any difference in His own nature.<sup>1</sup> Never does Bhāskara directly refer to Brahman as the reservoir of all auspicious qualities, as Nimbārka repeatedly does.<sup>2</sup> He throughout emphasizes only one quality of Brahman viz. omniscience. Everywhere he refers to Brahman as omniscient and omnipotent.<sup>3</sup> Bhāskara, in fact, does not regard Brahman as a personal and

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1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 3.2.23, p.169.

2. Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 1.1.1, p.1; 3.2.11, pp.278-279 etc.

3. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.2, p.8; 1.1.11, p.24 etc.

embodied being as Nimbārka does.

Thus, although Bhāskara generally agrees with Nimbārka in holding the nature and qualities of Brahman, as the Universal cause etc., yet there is a vital point of divergence between the two in that Nimbārka does not regard Brahman as the purely formless and distinctionless as Bhāskara does.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the Jīva is knowledge by nature a knower,<sup>1</sup> doer,<sup>2</sup> enjoyer,<sup>3</sup> atomic<sup>4</sup> and infinite.<sup>5</sup> It is different and non-different from<sup>6</sup> Brahman.

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara is that latter holds that although the Jīva is an enjoyer etc. yet its state of being an enjoyer, doer, atomic, infinite and different and

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1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 2.3.13, p.135.
  2. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 2.3.33-39, pp.138-139.
  3. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.17, p.26; 1.2.8, p.40; 1.3.7, pp.52-53; 2.1.22, p.103.
  4. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 2.3.19-28, pp.135-137.
  5. Ibid., 1.4.21, p.52, 2.2.37, p.128.
  6. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.17, p.26; 1.2.6, p.39; 1.2.20, p.45 etc.

non-different from Brahman is not svābhāvika and nitya, but aupādhika and anitya.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the Jīva is the power of Brahman. Brahman has two powers -- bhogya-śakti and bhokṛ-śakti. The bhokṛ-śakti is transformed into the sentient soul. As regards the different destinies and path of the Jīva, Bhāskara completely agrees with Nimbārka.

As regards the different states of the Jīva viz. svapna, jāgrat, etc. Bhāskara generally agrees with Nimbārka, only unlike Nimbārka, he holds that the svapna-sṛṣṭi is not real and it is created by the Jīva<sup>1</sup> and not by the Lord.

(iv) Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the world is the effect of Brahman. The bhogya-śakti of Brahman is transformed into the non-sentient world. Brahman is both, the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. Like Śaṅkara, Bhāskara does not accept the world as illusion, but in agreement with Nimbārka he says

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1. Ibid., 2.1.27, p.105.

that the world is real<sup>1</sup> and eternal<sup>2</sup>. According to Bhāskara, as the cause and the effect, the world is different and non-different from Brahman during the effected state and is non-different from Brahman during the causal state. But according to Nimbārka, the non-sentient world can never discard its own nature and becomes sentient Brahman, and therefore the world is always different and non-different from Brahman, during creation as well as dissolution.

Bhāskara also does not speak of the three kinds of the non-sentient, aprākṛta, Kāla etc. like Nimbārka, but the world alone. Here he differs from Nimbārka.

(v) Bhāskara explains the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat on the basis of upādhivāda. His theory may rightly be called "Aupādhikabhedābhedavāda" as distinguished from the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda) of Nimbārka.

As it has already been observed, according to

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1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.4, pp.18, 20; 2.1.4, p.93 etc.
  2. Ibid., 2.4.4, p.146.



Bhāskara, Brahman is the cause and the Jīva and Jagat are its effects. Being the effect of Brahman, the Jīva and Jagat must be Brahman in nature and essence. During salvation and dissolution the Jīva and Jagat are completely identical with Brahman.

Hence non-difference between them is natural, eternal and real. But the difference between them is neither natural nor eternal; yet it is real. It is not natural because prior to creation, as shown above, Brahman, Jīva and Jagat are absolutely identical, again as well as during salvation and dissolution, Brahman, Jīva and Jagat are absolutely identical. The Jīva and Jagat are different from Brahman only during mundane existence and creation. So this difference is neither natural nor eternal but aupādhika. At the beginning of creation the Jīva and Jagat come to be associated with their upādhis. So they are different from Brahman. Thus, the non-difference is natural, eternal and real but difference is only real; it is neither natural nor eternal but only aupādhika.

But for Nimbārka, the Jīva and Jagat are different and non-different from Brahman in bondage and creation, as well as in salvation and dissolution. Again the doctrine

of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Bhāskara, because both regard the difference and non-difference as real. But, for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are of the same level; they have the same importance; both are equally natural, while for Bhāskara difference is due to the upādhis and non-difference is natural. In this manner, Bhāskara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

(vi) Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that liberation (Mokṣa) is a state of supreme bliss and not a state of pure consciousness only. Liberation is a positive state and not a mere negative removal of the veil of nescience. The Jīva is ever free.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara severely criticises the Śaṅkarite conception of Jīvan-mukti.

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara is that the latter unlike Nimbārka, holds that in liberation the Jīva becomes absolutely identical with Brahman. This Nimbārka never maintains.

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1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.5, p.21.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 3.4.25, p.210.

5. Ibid.

Another fundamental difference between the two is that while Bhāskara admits of two kinds of liberation, viz. sadyo-mukti and krama-mukti, Nimbārka does not do so. Bhāskara points out that those who meditate on the supreme Brahman, attain the supreme Brahman and become free at once, i.e. they at once become identical with Brahman and as such, omniscient, omnipotent and all-pervading like Brahman. This is sadyomukti. But those who meditate on the effected Brahman, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha, attain at first the effected Brahman only, and not the supreme Brahman at once. Then, after having acquired supreme knowledge there in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, they on the dissolution of that world, attain the supreme Brahman by and by, together with Hiraṇyagarbha.<sup>1</sup> This is krama-mukti. The krama-mukti-jīva remains distinct from Brahman, so long as it has not attained the Supreme Brahman, and is as such not so long omnipotent like Brahman, but lacks the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the world.<sup>2</sup> But when it at last attain the Supreme Brahman, it becomes omnipotent like the sadyo-mukta-jīva.

But according to Nimbārka there is only one kind of liberation, viz. sadyomukti, and the mukta-jīva ever lacks the power of creation etc. and is ever atomic

1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 3.1.17, p.157 etc.

2. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 4.4.17-22, pp.247-249.

in size.

(vii) Bhāskara lays great stress on karman as a direct means (sādhana) to liberation. He points out that the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken only after an enquiry into karman, for knowledge must essentially be combined with karman for the sake of liberation. Bhāskara insists on this jñāna-karma-samuccaya again and again throughout. <sup>1</sup> This jñāna-karma-samuccaya, according to him, is nothing but upāsanā-karma-samuccaya, <sup>2</sup> for knowledge cannot stop at itself, but must lead to meditation. Thus, according to Bhāskara, knowledge leading to meditation, plus karman is the cause of liberation.

According to Bhāskara, there are various kinds of meditation, viz. Parabrahman-upāsanā, Kārya-brahman-upāsanā, and Pratīka-upāsanā, para-brahman-upāsanā, again, is of two kinds, viz. nirguṇa-brahman-upāsanā and saguṇa-brahman-upāsanā.

Thus, according to Bhāskara, karman accompanies

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1. Ibid., 1.1.1, p.2.

2. Ibid., p.3.

knowledge of Brahman -- Meditation on Brahman and liberation.<sup>1</sup> But Nimbārka does not give to Karman so great an importance as Bhāskara does. According to him, the function of Karman is simply to purify the mind and thereby help the rise of knowledge. Karman is only an indirect means. Nimbārka also recommends meditation on the true self of the individual soul as identical with Brahman, but he does not speak of the nirguṇa-upāsanā of Brahman, but of the saguṇa-upāsanā only. According to him, the conjoint upāsanā of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa is the best form of Upāsanā, but not a mention of this is found in Bhāskara. Nimbārka emphasises on the grace of the Lord as the first essential pre-requisite of liberation, but in Bhāskara there is not a single mention of grace. According to Nimbārka, bhagavat-prapatti and guru-prapatti are independent means to liberation, but Bhāskara makes no mention of them at all. Nimbārka believes in mādhurya-pradhānā-bhakti, but in Bhāskara there is no place for mādhurya-pradhānā-bhakti. Here Nimbārka differs from Bhāskara.

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1. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 3.4.25, pp.208-209.

Thus, Nimbārka and Bhāskara differ in many essential points with regard to their theories of Brahman, the sentient, the non-sentient, liberation and the means thereto.

#### 4.2 Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda and Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda:

(i) Rāmānuja was born in śaka 938 corresponding to 1017 A.D.<sup>1</sup> In his youth he lived at Conjeevaram and was a pupil of Yādavaprakāśa. He composed the following works : Vedāntasāra, Vedānta-saṅgraha, Vedānta-dīpa and commentaries on the Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavad-gītā.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) According to Rāmānuja, the Highest Reality is Viṣṇu, a Personal God, endowed with all auspicious qualities and free from all defects.<sup>3</sup> His concept of Brahman is exactly similar to that of Nimbārka, except that Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Rāmānuja holds that Jīva is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and

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1. Vaiṣṇavism Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems by R.G. Bhandarkar, Varānasi, 1965, p.51.
  2. Śrī-bhāṣyam, Śrutiprakāśikāyutam, Catuḥsūtrībhāgaḥ, Bhārtiya Vidyaprakasana, Delhi, 1983, Śrībhāṣya-bhumika, p.10.
  3. Śrī-bhāṣya, 1.1.1, pp.2.63, Chapter 1, Madras Edition.

so on.<sup>1</sup> Here also, Rāmānuja perfectly agrees with Nimbārka. But while according to Nimbārka, Jīva<sup>2</sup> is a part of Brahman in the sense of being His śakti, according to Rāmānuja it is so in the sense of being His viśeṣaṇa.<sup>3</sup> The same remark applies to the non-sentient substance too. Like Nimbārka, again, Rāmānuja speaks of three kinds of the non-sentient viz. prakṛti, kāla and suddhatattva.<sup>4</sup> The last one of these corresponds to Nimbārka's aprākṛta.

(iv) Rāmānuja explains the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat on the analogy of the substance-attribute (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa), or soul-body relation (śarīrī-śarīra-sambandha). But Nimbārka, explains his doctrine, as it has already been observed, on the analogy of the cause-effect relation. And again, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Rāmānuja. Both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are on the same level. They co-exist and have the same importance. But for Rāmānuja, non-difference is the

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1. Śrī-bhāṣya, 2.3.19, pp.139-141 etc.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.42, pp.235-236, Benaras, 1932.

3. Śrībhāṣya, 1.1.1, p.61, 96, 101 etc.

4. Yatīndramata-dīpikā, pp.13-66.

principal one. It is qualified by difference which<sup>1</sup>  
is thus subordinate to it.

(v) Rāmānuja is in complete agreement with Nimbārka<sup>2</sup>  
in holding the view of liberation. According to Rāmānuja  
bhakti is the means to liberation. By bhakti he does  
not understand devotion or love, as Nimbarka does, but  
upāsana<sup>3</sup>. This bhakti is based on jñāna and arises  
from six essential pre-requisites, viz. viveka, vimoka,  
abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa and anavasāda. Bhakti, thus,  
comprises all ethical virtues. Nimbārka too holds  
that upāsana, based on jñāna, is a means to liberation,  
and that mental purity, generated by the external  
performance of sacrifices and internal practice of  
self-control and the rest, is its essential pre-requisite.

Thus, the main difference between Nimbārka and  
Rāmānuja consists in their views with regard to the  
relation of difference and non-difference between Brahman  
on the one hand and the Jīva and Jagat on the other.

#### 4.3 Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda and Śaiva-viśiṣṭā- dvaitavāda :

(i) Śrīkaṇṭha belonged to the Śaiva sect<sup>4</sup> and composed

1. Ghate, V.S., The Vedānta, Poona, 1960, p.30.
2. Śrībhāṣya, 1.1.1, pp.36, 39-72 etc.
3. Ibid., 1.1.1, p.9.
4. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, Maṅgala-pāṭha, verse 4, p.5, Part-I, published with commentary Śivārkaṇṭha-dīpikā by Appaya Dixit, Ed. by Hālāśyanātha Śāstrī, Bombay, 1903-1918.



an elaborate commentary on the brahma-sūtras, establishing the supremacy of Śiva, and developing the Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda, similar to that of Rāmānuja. The date of Śrīkaṇṭha is not yet definitely settled. He is supposed to have flourished prior to Śaṅkara.<sup>1</sup>

But we are of the view that he must have flourished after Śaṅkara, because he, in his commentary, made many references to the doctrines of Śaṅkara.<sup>2</sup> On the basis of verbal and doctrinal resemblances, it has also been suggested that he probably flourished close to the period of Rāmānuja. Suggestion has been made that Śrīkaṇṭha's treatment of sūtras III.3.27-30, where he criticizes those views which are said to be those of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, who, chronologically speaking, came some time after Rāmānuja, is fairly conclusive in this matter.<sup>3</sup> Mr. S.S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī suggests that Śrīkaṇṭha came probably some time in the 13th century when the Śaiva siddhānta was taking shape in the hands of the Saṅātana Ācāryas.<sup>4</sup>

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1. The editor, Hālāsyānātha Śāstrī takes him to be prior to Śaṅkara.
  2. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 2.3.19, p.142; 2.3.42, p.158 etc.
  3. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, Ed. by C. Hayavadana Rao, Bangalore, 1936, Vol.II, p.37.
  4. Ibid., pp.37-38.

(ii) According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the Highest Reality is Śiva Himself. He is denoted by the term 'Brahman'. He is variously known as : Bhava, Śarva, Paśupati, Mahādeva, Śambhu, Rudra, Nīlakaṇṭha, Trilocana, Umāpati etc.<sup>1</sup> But, according to Nimbārka, the Highest Reality is Śrīkṛṣṇa Himself. Here Śrīkaṇṭha fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the Universe.<sup>2</sup> Brahman is conceived as a personal God endowed with all auspicious attributes and powers,<sup>3</sup> and free from all faults,<sup>4</sup> and is supposed to be one forming the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that Jīva is by nature knowledge, knower,<sup>5</sup> doer,<sup>6</sup> enjoyer,<sup>7</sup>

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1. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 1.1.1, p.71.
  2. Ibid., 1.1.21, p.257; 1.4.29, p.579 etc.
  3. Ibid., 1.1.21, p.255, 3.2.31, p.265.
  4. Ibid., 1.1.22, p.260, 1.1.25, p.272 etc.
  5. Ibid., 1.1.2, p.129, 1.1.5, p.195 etc.
  6. Ibid., 1.1.1, p.89; 1.1.2, pp.121, 128; 1.1.24, p.272; 1.2.9, p.338; 3.2.11, p.245; 3.2.17, p.248 etc.
  7. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 2.3.19, p.142; 3.2.27-29, pp.146-147.
  8. Ibid., 2.3.22-29, pp.152-154.
  9. Ibid., 1.3.6, pp.407-8; 3.2.12, p.246; 4.4.19, pp.49-98.

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 atomic and infinite in bondage as well as in salvation.  
 Here the two are in perfect agreement. But, while,  
 according to Nimbārka, Jīva is a part of the Lord  
 in the sense of being His Śakti, according to Śrīkaṇṭha  
 it is so in the sense of being His attribute or Viśeṣaṇa.<sup>2</sup>  
 The same remarks apply to the non-sentient substance  
 also. Again, according to Nimbārka, Jīva, even when  
 free, is under the control of the Lord. But according  
 to Śrīkaṇṭha, the freed Jīva is not under the control  
 of the Lord, it is under the control of the Lord only<sup>3</sup>  
 during the state of mundane existence.

Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Nimbārka in regard to the  
 different states of the Jīva, such as dream, deep sleep  
 and waking. He also thinks that the dream-objects are  
 created by the Lord,<sup>4</sup> that the Lord is the place of deep  
 sleep and not the vein,<sup>5</sup> and that the state of swoon<sup>6</sup>  
 is a distinct and peculiar state.

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1. Ibid., 2.3.33-39, pp.152-154.
  2. Ibid., 2.1.22, p.31; 2.3.52, p.162.
  3. Ibid., 2.3.40, p.156; 2.4.14, p.178.
  4. Ibid., 3.2.1-6, pp.224-233.
  5. Ibid., 3.2.7-8, pp.235-239.
  6. Ibid., 3.2.10, p.242.

As regards the different destinities and paths of the Jīva,<sup>1</sup> Śrīkaṇṭha is in agreement with Nimbārka.

(iv) Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the world is real and eternal,<sup>2</sup> a power of the Lord.<sup>3</sup> According to him, the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is an effect or real transformation of the Lord,<sup>4</sup> just as the curd is of the milk. But he differs from Nimbārka on two points, viz. :-

- (a) First, he takes the world as an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not.
- (b) Secondly, he does not speak of the aprākṛta and Kāla as species of the non-sentient, as Nimbārka does.

(v) Śrīkaṇṭha explains the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat on the analogy of the soul-body (śarīrī-śarīra), substance-attribute (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa) and the cause-effect relation (kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha).

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1. Ibid., 4.3.1-25, pp.468-479.

2. Ibid., 1.4.9-10, pp.522-24.

3. Ibid., 1.2.9, p.340; 1.4.27, p.566.

4. Ibid., 1.4.27, p.565.

Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha thinks that there is both difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat. But Śrīkaṇṭha says that the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedābhedavāda) is not tenable. He observes that no such doctrine of difference and non-difference is to be understood here, as we only establish the doctrine of non-difference as qualified by difference (Viśiṣṭā-<sup>1</sup>dvaita). According to him, the non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat simply means that the Jīva and the Jagat, -- the effects and the cause; the attributes and the substance; the bodies and the soul, none of these can exist in absence of the other, as is the case with the pot and the clay. The Jīva and the Jagat can never exist without Brahman, while Brahman is never known to exist with His powers viz. the Jīva and the Jagat, in the same way as fire is never seen without heat. If a thing cannot be known without the other, then the first is qualified by the second. Hence, it is said that Brahman is non-separable from and necessarily connected with the Jīva and the Jagat. On the other hand the difference between the three also

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1. "bhedābhedakalpanam viśiṣṭādvaitam sādhyamaḥ"--  
Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 2.1.22, p.31.

is natural. Since the cause is non-different from the effect in nature and superior to it.<sup>1</sup> Hence Śrīkaṇṭha calls his doctrine "Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita"<sup>2</sup> viz. the doctrine that Śiva possessing the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, as his body, is one without a second, and he is both the cause and the effect.

Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīkaṇṭha. Both of them regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference (bhedā-bheda) are on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance. But for Śrīkaṇṭha (as for Rāmānuja) non-difference is the main principle. It is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it.

(vi) Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha also takes liberation<sup>3</sup> in the sense of attaining the nature of Śiva or Śivatva.

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1. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 2.1.22, pp.31-32.
  2. Ibid., 2.1.14, p. 19; 2.1.22, p.31.
  3. Ibid., 4.1.3, p.428; 4.4.9, p.487.

It is a state of supreme bliss<sup>1</sup> and knowledge,<sup>2</sup> and not a state of mere unconsciousness, and can be attained only after the destruction of the earthly body (videhamukti).<sup>3</sup> Śrīkaṇṭha severely criticises the Śaṅkarite conception of Jīvanmukti. According to him, the freed soul is different from Brahman in this that it is atomic, while Brahman is all-pervasive and that it lacks the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the universe -- which power belongs exclusively to Brahman.<sup>4</sup>

But, the difference between Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha is that while according to Nimbārka, liberation means attaining Kṛṣṇatva, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it means attaining Śivatva, although the nature of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, as held by the two, is the same. Another difference between the two is that while Śrīkaṇṭha, like Bhāskara, admits of two kinds of liberation viz. sadyomukti and Kramamukti, Nimbārka believes in one only.

(vii) Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that Karman,

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1. Ibid., 2.1.35, p.49; 4.4.9, p.488 etc.

2. Ibid., 1.1.1, p.92.

3. Ibid., 4.2.8, p.456 etc.

4. Ibid., 4.4.17-18, pp.495-497.

through generating mental purity, helps the rise of  
<sup>1</sup> jñāna, and is as such only an indirect means to  
 liberation; that jñāna and upāsanā are both direct  
 means to liberation; <sup>2</sup> and that the grace of the Lord  
<sup>3</sup> plays an important part in the attainment of liberation.

But the difference between the two is that Nimbārka  
 does not speak of meditation on Nārāyaṇa as the material  
 cause (upādāna-upāsanā), as Śrīkaṇṭha does, <sup>4</sup> although  
 he recommends the Ahamgraha-upāsanā <sup>5</sup> or the meditation  
 on the self of the devotee as identical with that of  
 the Lord. And Śrīkaṇṭha does not speak of prapatti and  
 gurūpasatti as an independent means to liberation, as  
 Nimbārka does. Further, unlike Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha does  
 not emphasise upon a sweet and intimate relation of  
 love between the Lord and His devotee. He lays emphasis  
 on a more distinct relationship of awe and reverence,  
<sup>6</sup> as does Rāmānuja.

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1. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya, 3.4.1, p.384; 3.4.9, p.387;  
 3.4.26, pp.397-398.

2. Ibid., 1.1.4, p.187.

3. Ibid., 1.1.1, pp.71, 92; 1.1.17, p.235; 4.2.16,  
 p.464 etc.

4. Ibid., 4.3.15, p.479.

5. Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 3.3.35, pp.329-30.

6. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, maṅgala-pāṭha, p.1, Vol.II.



Thus, from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between the Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda of Nimbārka and the Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda or Śaiva-viśiṣṭādvaitavāda of Śrīkaṇṭha lies in their conceptions of the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, non-difference and difference. On other points, however, they agree on the whole.

From the point of view of religion, too, there is a difference of spirit between their systems. Śrīkaṇṭha, as a Śaiva teacher, rejects the vyūhas, takes the Dahara-vidyā as the best of all the Vidyās.

#### 4.4 Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda and Vīra-Śaiva-viśiṣṭādvaitavāda :

(i) Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya belonged to the 'Śaiva sect' and wrote an elaborate commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra, namely - "Śrīkara-bhāṣya", establishing the supremacy of Śiva. His doctrine is referred to by various names, such as, 'Bhedābheda, Dvaitādvaita and Viśeṣādvaita,<sup>1</sup> and again, (i) Dvaitadvaita, (ii) Viśeṣadvaita, (iii) Seśvarādvaita, (iv) Śivādvaita, (v) Śaiva-śrutisāramata,<sup>2</sup> and (vi) Bhedābheda. He should have

1. Śrīkarabhāṣya, Vol. II, p.2.

2. Ibid., p.195.

belonged to 14th Century A.D.. From the internal evidence afforded by his commentary itself, it is clear that he is posterior to Rāmānuja, to whose doctrines he specifically refers by name and which he refutes in detail.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) According to Śrīpati, the Highest Reality<sup>2</sup> is Śiva Himself. He is denoted by the terms Brahman,<sup>3</sup> Paraśiva,<sup>4</sup> Paśupati etc. But, according to Nimbārka, the Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa. Here Śrīpati fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati holds that Brahman is 'Saviśeṣa'<sup>5</sup> and not 'Nirviśeṣa'. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause. The universe is a transformation of Brahman. When he himself remains only its efficient cause, He transforms His energy or māyāśakti into the world.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, Vol.I, pp.29-30.
  2. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, Vol.II, 1.1.1, p.5.
  3. Ibid., p.5.
  4. Ibid., p.8.
  5. Ibid., p.15.
  6. Ibid., 1.4.24-27, pp.179-180.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati holds that by nature Jīva is knowledge, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and infinite. Jīva is not born but eternal. Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman. It is different from the physical world. It is a part of Brahman. It is of two kinds, viz. Baddha and Mukta. But the difference between the two is that Śrīpati holds that in liberation Jīva becomes identical with Brahman, though it cannot possess the power of creation and remains secondary to Brahman, while Nimbārka holds that the freed Jīva is difference and non-different from Brahman.

As regards the different states of the Jīva, viz. dream, deep sleep etc., the dream objects are real and they are created by the Lord. Śrīpati largely agrees with Nimbārka except on the point that it is

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1. Ibid., 2.3.17, pp.262-263.
  2. Ibid., 2.3.31-37, pp.267-269.
  3. Ibid., 4.4.21, p.495.
  4. Ibid., 2.3.19-30, pp.264-266.
  5. Ibid., 1.1.2, p.29.
  6. Ibid., 2.3.19, p.261.
  7. Ibid., 2.3.40, pp.272-274.
  8. Ibid., 4.4.17, pp.491-93.
  9. Ibid., 3.2.1-6, pp.313-318.

the vien and not the Lord which is the place of deep-  
<sup>1</sup>sleep.

As regards the different destinies and paths  
of the Jīva, <sup>2</sup>Śrīpati is in complete agreement with  
Nimbārka.

(iv) Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati holds that the world  
<sup>3</sup>is real and eternal, a power of the Lord. According  
to him, the entire universe, consisting of the sentient  
and the non-sentient, is an effect or real transforma-  
tion of the Lord, just as the curd is of the milk. <sup>4</sup>

But he differs from Nimbārka on one point, viz. he  
does not speak of the aprākṛta and kāla as species  
of the non-sentient, as Nimbārka does.

(v) Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati calls his doctrine  
Bhedābheda and Dvaitādvaita. There is difference between  
Brahman, Jīva and Jagat in bondage and creation. Brahman  
is the object of worship, all-pervasive and omniscient  
while the Jīva is worshipper, has special limitation  
and possesses limited knowledge. Again, Brahman is the

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1. Ibid., 3.2.7-8, pp.319-321.

2. Ibid., 4.3.1-16, pp.468-477.

3. Ibid., 1.4.4, pp.48-50.

4. Ibid., 1.4.26, pp.179-180.

cause, while the Jagat is the effect. But in the states of salvation and dissolution the Jīva and Jagat are identical with Brahman. This identity is natural as well as formal. Here Śrīpati slightly differs from Nimbārka, because according to Nimbārka there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat in bondage and creation as well as in salvation and dissolution.

Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīpati. Both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as natural. But for Nimbārka, identity is not of form unlike difference whereas for Śrīpati identity is not only natural but also of form like difference. And again according to Śrīpati, difference holds only in bondage and creation and identity in mukti and pralaya; so that identity and difference are not found simultaneously but are found at different times. But for Nimbārka, there is the natural relation of difference and non-difference between the three in bondage and creation as well as in salvation and dissolution, so that difference and non-difference are found simultaneously.

(vi) Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati holds that liberation

means attaining the nature of Śiva or Śivatva.<sup>1</sup> It is a state of supreme bliss<sup>2</sup> and knowledge.<sup>3</sup> But the difference between the two is that while according to Nimbārka, liberation means attaining Kṛṣṇatva, according to Śrīpati, it means attaining Śivatva, although the nature of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, as held by the two, is the same. Another difference is that while Śrīpati, like Bhāskara, admits of two kinds of liberation, viz. sadyomukti and kramamukti<sup>4</sup> Nimbārka does not do so. A third point of difference is that Śrīpati, like Śaṅkara, admits of two kinds of liberation, viz. Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti.<sup>5</sup> But Nimbārka admits of one kind of liberation only, viz. Videha-mukti.

On other points, however, they are in perfect agreement.

(vii) Like Nimbārka, Śrīpati holds that karman,

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1. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, Vol.II, 225, pp.332-333; 3.4.49, p.43.
  2. Ibid., 4.4.9, p.485.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid., 3.4.52, p.435.
  5. Ibid., 3.4.25, pp.332-33; 3.4.32, p.435.

through generating mental purity, helps the rise of  
 jñāna,<sup>1</sup> and is only an indirect means to liberation;  
 that jñāna and upāsana are both direct means to  
 liberation,<sup>2</sup> and that the grace of the Lord plays an  
 important part in the attainment of liberation.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, from the point of view of philosophy, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīpati. Both of them regard difference as well as non-difference as natural. But for Nimbārka, identity is not of form unlike difference where as for Śrīpati-- identity is not only natural but also of form like difference.

From the point of view of religion, there are naturally sectarian differences between them. Śrīpati, as a Śaiva teacher rejects the vyūhas, takes the Dahara-vidyā as the best of all the vidyās and so on, which Nimbārka, as a Vaiṣṇava teacher, does not.

#### 4.5 Svābhāvika-bhedābhedavāda and Acintya-bhedābhedavāda:

Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya<sup>4</sup> was born in 1485 A.D., in Navadvīpa

1. Ibid., 3.4.1, pp.404-405, 3.4.26, p.419.

2. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, 1.1.4, p.52.

3. Ibid., 3.2.26, p.419.

4. "The religious condition of Bengal was far from satisfactory at the time (A.D. 1485) when Śrīcāitanya (Śrīgaurāṅga) was born".

--Rādhāgovindnāth, "A Survey of the Caitanya Movement", The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol.IV, Calcutta, 1956.

in Bengal. He adopts the doctrine of "Acintyabhedā-  
 bheda", but did not write any commentary on Brahma-sūtras.  
 He accepted the Śrīmadbhāgavat as the commentary on  
 Brahasūtras.<sup>1</sup> None of his works is available. His  
 philosophical views were elaborated only by his dis-  
 ciples in their works. Jīvaśwāmī, the one of his  
 followers, has done a famous work namely 'Ṣaṭsandarbha'.<sup>2</sup>  
 In spite of these sources, one commentary on Brahasūtras  
 was necessary to prove the doctrine of Acintya-bhedābheda  
 of Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya. In the nineteenth century, Baladeva-  
 vidyābhūṣaṇa wrote a commentary on Brahasūtras namely  
 "Govindabhāṣya" in support of the doctrine of 'Acintya-  
 bhedābheda'.<sup>3</sup>

Like Harivyāsadeva,<sup>4</sup> a Nimbārkist, Baladeva admits  
 of five tattvas, namely Iśvara, Jīva, Prakṛti, Kāla and  
 Karman.<sup>5</sup>

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1. "Brahmasūtrāṇāmarthasateṣāmakṛtrimbhāṣyabhūtaityartha/"  
 -- Tattva-sandarbha, 11 anuchheda.
  2. Ṣaṭsandarbha-Tattvasandarbha, p.4, Śloka 3-5.
  3. Vidyārūpam bhūṣaṇam me pradāya khyātim ninye ten  
 yo Śrīgovindaḥ svapnanirddiṣṭabhāṣyo rādhābandhu-  
 rbandhurāgaḥ sa jīyat/ -- Govindabhāṣya, avataraṇikā,  
 p.5, Mathura, Samvat 2011.
  4. Siddhānta-kusumāñjali on Nimbārka-Dāśa-Ślokī,  
 Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay.
  5. tathā hi Iśvara-jīva-prakṛti-Kāla-karmāṇi  
 pañcatattvāni śrūyante/  
 -- Govinda-bhāṣya, p.2.



(ii) According to Baladeva, Śrīkr̥ṣṇa, accompanied<sup>1</sup> by Rādhā, is himself the ultimate reality. He is Nirguṇa, free from the three guṇas of prakṛti, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and is saguṇa Brahman, being<sup>2</sup> the source of all auspicious attributes. His attributes are of two kinds -- majestic and sweet. He has an infinity of auspicious attributes and inconceivable<sup>3</sup> powers.

Brahman has three powers, viz. parāśakti, aparāśakti<sup>4</sup> and avidyāśakti. The parāśakti is called Viṣṇuśakti or svarūpaśakti; the aparā kṣetra-jñā and avidyā karman or māyāśakti.<sup>5</sup> Through the aparā and māyā-śakti, He creates the universe of cit and acit and through His parā-śakti which is of three-fold, viz. samvit or jñāna-śakti, sandhinī or bala-śakti and hilādinī or kriyā-śakti, He has knowledge, existence and bliss. Owing to the identity of substance and attributes, the power and attributes of Brahman are identical with Brahman just as the serpent and its coil<sup>6</sup> and the sun and its lusture.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Prameya-ratnāvalī of Baladeva, 1st prameya, p.18, Delhi, 1979.
  2. Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.1.11, pp.15-16.
  3. Ibid., 1.1.2, pp.7-8.
  4. Ibid., 1.4.26, pp.81.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Ibid., 3.2.28.
  7. Ibid., 3.2.29.

Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. He is the efficient cause through His parā-śakti and the material cause through His aparā-śakti.<sup>1</sup> As the efficient cause, Brahman is unchangeable or Kūṭastha and as the material cause He is subject to modification or pariṇāmin. It means that Brahman is cause as well as the effects with His powers. Brahman is the subtle powerful in causal state, and the gross powerful in the effected state.<sup>2</sup> Thus, there is the relation of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect as the power and the powerful.

3

Brahman is possessed of a celestical body. He dwells in a celestical city. He has a multitude of forms through which He manifests Himself as avatāras or incarnations.

If we compare this view of Baladeva with that of Nimbārka, we find that there is not much difference between the two doctrines, so far as general philosophical principles go apart from sectarian details.

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1. Ibid., 1.4.26, pp.81-82.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 2.1.31, pp.108-109.

According to both, Śrīkṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā, is the Highest Reality. Baladeva makes Śrī the constant consort of the Lord, but Śrī is nothing but Rādhā herself. For, he points out that when Śrī or the parā-śakti of the Lord manifests herself as the giver of gladness, joy and expansion of consciousness, she is called Rādhā.<sup>1</sup> Hence Rādhā is the parā-śakti or the hilādinī-śakti of the Lord and non-different from Him.<sup>2</sup> Again, according to both, Brahman has attributes and His attributes are majestic on the one hand, and sweet on the other. Brahman is both, the material and the efficient cause of the universe. He is possessed of a celestial body, dwells in a celestial city and manifests Himself in different incarnations and vyūhas.

Thus, on the whole, Baladeva is in complete agreement with Nimbārka, although the peculiar view of Baladeva, viz. that there is identity between Brahman and His attributes, powers, body and city, is not found in Nimbārka. According to Baladeva, there

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1. Govinda-bhāṣya, 3.3.42, p.216.

2. Ibid.

is no internal difference in Brahman, but according to Nimbārka, there is such a difference.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that Jīva is by nature eternal. Material objects are only destroyed and created; these are only transitory, while Jīva is never created nor can it be destroyed.<sup>1</sup> This is supported by the Kaṭhōpaniṣad, 1.2.18, "The soul has neither any birth, nor any death; it does not spring from any other thing, nor spring from it". Again, Śvetāśvatara "Two unborn ones, the knower and non-knower, the Lord and non-Lord. Further, eternal among eternal, conscious among conscious etc.

The Jīva is by nature knowledge as well as knower.<sup>2</sup> "Who is dwelling in knowledge", and "I slept happily, but I could know nothing", these two Śrutis prove that Jīva is knowledge as well as knower.

Jīva is an active agent.<sup>3</sup> It is an agent in a twofold sense, viz., it acts on the external world indirectly through the instrumentality of its sense-

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1. Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.16, p.151.

2. Ibid., 2.3.17, p.152.

3. Ibid., 2.3.31, p.159.

organs, e.g. it sees colour by means of its eyes, lifts objects by means of its hands and so on, and it is also an agent in the act of directly controlling those sense-organs, just as a carpenter is an agent in the act of carpentry through the medium of his instruments, viz. axe, etc., i.e. constructs various objects by means of those tools, and he is also an agent in the act of directly holding and using these tools.<sup>1</sup> But, though the Jīva is an agent, it is not an independent agent like the Lord.

Being an active agent the Jīva is an enjoyer.<sup>2</sup> Like Nimbārka, Baladeva points out that the Jīva's states of being knower, agent and enjoyer are natural, obtaining both in bondage as well as salvation.

Like Nimbārka, again, Baladeva regards that Jīva<sup>3</sup> is ever under the control of the Lord in bondage as well as in salvation. Jīva is the part and the potency of the Lord.<sup>4</sup> In this connection Jīva is both different

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1. Ibid., 2.3.38, pp.161-162.
  2. Prameya-ratnāvalī, 5th prameya, p.37.
  3. Govind-bhāṣya, 2.3.41, pp.164-165.
  4. Ibid.

and non-different from Brahman.<sup>1</sup> Jīva is atomic in size.<sup>2</sup> Jīva is plural in number.<sup>3</sup> "pādosyasarvabhūtāni" - in this phrase of the Śruti, "sarvabhūtāni" shows the plurality of Jīva. Again, though all the Jīvas are same in nature, yet there is difference amongst them owing to their deeds.<sup>4</sup> There are broadly three kinds of the Jīva -- baddha, mukta and nitya-mukta. Baddhas are of two kinds, viz. mumukṣus and bubhukṣus. Mumukṣus, again, are of two kinds, viz. svaniṣṭhas and ekāntins; bubhukṣus are of two kinds, viz. paraniṣṭhas and nirpekṣas.

Baladeva is in perfect agreement with Nimbārka regarding the different states of the Jīva, viz. dream,<sup>5</sup> etc. and also regarding the destiny of the Jīva and its journey through the paths of gods etc.<sup>6</sup>

(iv) Baladeva's view of the Jagat too is very similar to that of Nimbārka. He holds that the Jagat is an

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1. Ibid.
  2. Ibid., 2.3.18-30, pp.152-159.
  3. Ibid., 2.3.42, p.165.
  4. Ibid., 2.3.49, p.169.
  5. Ibid., 3.2.1-3, pp.194-195.
  6. Ibid.

effect and power of Brahman.<sup>1</sup> Brahman constitutes the Jagat through his avidyā or māyā-śakti. His māyā-śakti<sup>2</sup> is also called tamas. It means the Jagat is combination of three guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas.<sup>3</sup>

Baladeva emphasises the reality of the Jagat, and criticises the Śaṅkarite doctrine of Vivarta-vāda.<sup>4</sup>

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva admits kāla to be an eternal, non-intelligent substance.<sup>5</sup> But he does not speak of the aprākṛta as Nimbārka does. Instead of Karman, he speaks of a non-intelligent substance without beginning but having an end as the fifth category.<sup>6</sup>

(v) Baladeva explains the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat like Nimbārka. According to him, the mutual difference in nature and concept of Brahman, Jīva and Jagat is obvious. It has already been observed that Brahman is all-knowing, all powerful and omniscient, while Jīva knows little and has limited power. Brahman

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1. Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.4.26, pp.81-82, 2.1.14, pp.97-99 etc.

2. Ibid., Introduction, p.2.

3. Ibid., 1.4.26, pp.81-82.

4. Ibid., pp.91-92.

5. Ibid., Introduction, p.2.

6. Ibid.

is absolute, while Jīva is atomic. Brahman is creator, supporter, destroyer, while Jīva is created, supported and controlled by Brahman. The Jagat is inanimate and gross. Thus, the mutual difference of the three is distinctly established.

In reality, there is mutual non-difference. In the three aspects of knowledge, existence and bliss, viz. sat, cit and ānand of Brahman, these three, Brahman, Jīva and Jagat are identical.

Thus, like Nimbārka, there is a relation of both difference and non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat.

On the other hand, like Nimbārka, Baladeva also takes the relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman to hold good both in bondage as well as salvation. The mukta Jīva appears to be entirely identical with Brahman, being knowledge, existence and bliss viz. sat, cit and ānanda of Brahman; but, the mukta Jīva, too, is different from Brahman<sup>1</sup> in two respects. First, even a mukta Jīva is atomic, while Brahman is all-pervading; and even the mukta Jīva

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1. Govinda-bhāṣya, 4.4.20, p.324.



creates the Pitṛloka and māṛṭloka etc., as we learn from the Chāndogyopaniṣad, but his creation is limited in so far as it is a local creation only and hence differente from the creation of the Supreme Brahman, who created the whole universe, consisting of spirit and matter, substains it and dissolves it back into Himself. This power belongs to Brahman alone and to no mukta-Jīva.<sup>1</sup> In this sense mukta Jīva is different from Brahman. The Mukta Jīva is equal to God in matters of enjoyment only; not essentially and absolutely equal to the Lord.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, like Nimbārka, in the philosophy of Baladeva, both difference and non-difference are true. He accepts both difference and non-difference as incompatible and inconceiveable though true. Nimbārka accepts both difference and non-difference to be equally true and compatible. The doctrine of Baladeva may, therefore, be called "acintya-bhedābhedāvāda, which may be translated as "inconceiveable relation of simultaneous difference and non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat", as it is distinguished from the doctrine of

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1. Ibid., 4.4.17, p.322.

2. Ibid., 4.4.21, pp.324-325.

natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda) of Nimbārka.

(vi) Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that the state of liberation involves two factors. On the one hand, it means the manifestation of the real nature of the Jīva -- the full development of its eight-fold superior qualities,<sup>1</sup> and on the other it means attaining the nature of the Lord.<sup>2</sup> According to him, the freed Jīva does not ever become identical with the Lord. The freed Jīva is different from the Lord in two respects, viz. it is atomic,<sup>3</sup> while the Lord is all-pervading, and it lacks the power of creation etc. -- which power belongs exclusively to the Lord.<sup>4</sup>

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva also takes the freed Jīva as the knower, doer and enjoyer like the Jīva in bondage. According to him, therefore, liberation is a positive state and not a mere negative state of absence of pain.<sup>5</sup> Baladeva, further, agrees with Nimbārka in holding that

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1. Ibid., 4.4.1-2, pp.314-315.

2. Ibid., 1.3.23, p.49.

3. Ibid., 4.4.20, p.324.

4. Ibid., 4.4.17-18, pp.322-323.

5. Ibid., 4.4.1, p.314.

the freed Jīva is ever under the control of the Lord.<sup>1</sup>

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva admits only the Videha-  
mukti and not Jīvan-mukti.<sup>2</sup> He points out that Śruti  
speaks of four kinds of liberation, viz. sālōkya,  
sārṣṭi, sāmīpya and sāyujya. But of these, Sāyujya  
mukti is the main and includes all the rest.<sup>3</sup>

(vii) Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that by generating  
mental purity karman helps the rise of knowledge and  
hence it is only an indirect means of liberation.<sup>4</sup> He  
agrees with Nimbārka in holding that knowledge and  
devotion involve each other mutually.<sup>5</sup> Further, Baladeva  
agrees with Nimbārka in taking self-surrender too to  
be an independent means, although he does not consider  
it in details and regards it as a mode of devotion.<sup>6</sup>  
But unlike Nimbārka, he rejects gurūpasatti as an  
independent means, and points out that although guru-  
bhakti and guru-kṛpā are absolutely necessary elements

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1. Ibid., 4.4.9, pp.318-319.
  2. Govind-bhāṣya, 3.3.33, p.240.
  3. Ibid., 4.4.4, pp.315-316.
  4. Ibid., 3.3.48, p.252.
  5. Ibid., 3.3.48, p.252.
  6. Ibid., 3.3.54, pp.254-56.

in liberation, yet they are never the sole elements.<sup>1</sup>

Nimbārka holds that Śāṅḍilya-vidyā, Madhu-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā and the rest lead to liberation. Baladeva, however, does not mention any of these vidyās. Instead of these he emphasises upon meditations on different forms of the Lord.<sup>2</sup> Regarding these Nimbārka is silent.

Both Nimbārka and Baladeva emphasise mādhyakṣaṇa-pradhānā-bhakti.

Nimbārka does not speak of the three kinds of devotees -- Svaniṣṭha, etc., as Baladeva does.

Thus, we find that from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between Nimbārka and Baladeva lies in their conceptions of the reconcilability of difference and non-difference. On other points, however, they agree on the whole.

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1. Ibid., 3.3.44, p.248.

2. Ibid., 3.3.50, p.260.

CHAPTER - 5

THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ : ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE WAY OF LIFE

## CHAPTER - 5

### THE VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA-PRABHĀ : ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE WAY OF LIFE

#### 5.1 Epistemological Contributions :

Keśavakāśmīrin is the first teacher of the Nimbārka-school of Vedānta who has attempted syncretism of the Nyāya with the Vedānta. In the following pages our objective would be to study and evaluate the Nyāya-Vedānta-syncretism of Keśavakāśmīrin in respect of epistemology.

##### 5.1.1 Nature of knowledge :

All the systems of Indian Philosophy conceive of knowledge as an event brought into being by subject-object-contact. It is a different matter whether the subject, the object and their contact are true only empirically or really also. Knowledge is the knowledge of an object. Knowledge happens to a subject. Knowledge without an object is an impossibility. It is likewise non-entity without a subject. Knowledge, according to

the Nyāya as well as Keśavakāśmīrin, is an illumination or manifestation (prakāśa) of objects. The object of knowledge, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, is Brahman. But according to the Nyāya, these are the sensuous entities such as the earth, the water, the light, the air, the soul and the qualities excluding weights, dharma, adharma, saṃskāra, movement, sāmānya, samavāya and abhāva. For Keśavakāśmīrin, the subject is the Jīva, the Ātman, the self-conscious being, suffering from imperfections born of the impact of the saṃsāra. For the Nyāya, the subject is Ātman, the cetanā, the soul, in which is inherent the quality of caitanya, jñāna i.e. consciousness. The subject is all-pervasive (vibhu), but it does not know all objects at once as its instrument of knowledge, i.e. mind (manas) is atomic. But, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, knowledge exists as a property of the Jīva. When it so exists, it is called

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1. (a) 'arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ' -- Tarka-bhāṣā, p.212.  
(b) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, p.313,  
2.3.25, p.314.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.8-9.
  3. Tarka-saṃgraha, Ed. by Bodas and Athalye, p.140.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.18, p.293; 2.3.25-26, p.31
  5. Tarka-saṃgraha, Ed. by Bodas and Athalye, pp.134-136.
  6. Tarka-bhāṣā, p.190.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.18, p.293; 2.3.25-26,  
p.314.

'Dharmabhūtajñāna' (attributive knowledge).<sup>1</sup> In the case of mukta-jīva, Dharmabhūtajñāna remains in its pure form; but in the case of baddha-jīva, it remains enveloped by avidyā and as such it seems to us as if it were non-existent. When we refer to the birth and death of knowledge, we refer simply to the expansion and contraction of Dharmabhūtajñāna due to ignorance and karman.<sup>2</sup> This Dharmabhūtajñāna is compared with the maṇiprabhā,<sup>3</sup> since, like rays, this knowledge also flows towards an object and reveals it. Thus, according to him, the subject, the self-conscious entity, the Dharmīn-consciousness, even when atomic<sup>4</sup> in nature, can know all objects through its Dharma-consciousness which can reach out to any object whatsoever.<sup>5</sup> Manas, for him, is a sense-capacity like the other five sense-capacities.<sup>6</sup> According to Nyāya, it is the mind which brings about the relationship of the subject and the object through the agency of the senses.<sup>7</sup> But according

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.29, p.264, 2.3.23, p.313.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, p.313.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.25, p.314.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.19, pp.305-311.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, p.313; 2.3.25-29, pp.314-315.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.4.6, p.349.
  7. Tarka-bhāṣā, p.48.



to Keśavakāśmīrin it is the subject, the self conscious<sup>1</sup> eternal spiritual being that comes into contact with<sup>2</sup> the object of knowledge, through its Dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Although, the Dharmabhūtajñāna is essentially pure and all-pervasive, its powers are restricted by the Karmic-<sup>3</sup> limitations. Thus it is what expands and contracts and is not the constant universal effulgence like the transcendental Dharmīn-consciousness.

Knowledge is the experience of the knower.<sup>4</sup> It is eternal like the knower.<sup>5</sup> Yet its experience is possible only when it has illuminated the object. The states of dream, deep-sleep etc. all are explicable, inasmuch as, knowledge, even being eternal, is restricted in its illumination of an object by the material inertia entering into the physical and psychical make-up of the knower. Knowledge, which in deep-sleep is unmanifest, becomes manifest in the state of awakening, just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so<sup>6</sup> on which are existent in a latent form during childhood.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.16-17, pp.289-290.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, p.313.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.18, p.293.
  5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.16-17, pp.289-290.
  6. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.30, p.316.

The most striking characteristic of knowledge, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, is this. Just as the light constitutes the essence of the lamp and is also a quality inhering in the lamp, so knowledge is also both a substance and a quality.<sup>1</sup> It is a substance as it constitutes the essence of the Jīva and is an attribute as knowledge exists as a property of the Jīva. The relation between the Jīva and its knowledge is not that of inherence as the Nyāya would have it, but of difference and non-difference. Just as a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet they are different and stand in the relation of substratum (dharmin) and attribute (dharma), even so, though the Jīva and its quality of knowledge are equally knowledge, yet they stand in relation of substratum and attribute. Thus there is distinction between them, and there is no identity, as is clear from the scripture, "Seated on the body by Knowledge"<sup>2</sup>.

#### 5.1.2 Relation between knowledge and the object of knowledge :

Regarding the relation between knowledge and its

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.29, p.264.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.27, pp.314-315.

object, Keśavakāśmīrin is in favour of admitting it as a form of saṁyoga (contact) since both knowledge and its object are substances.<sup>1</sup> This relation is not of the nature of 'bimbapratibimbabhāva' as is held by the Sāṁkhya and the Advaitavedānta. Here the object and not its image becomes directly manifested in knowledge. This theory is, therefore, a form of direct realism. According to Nyāya, which is also a form of realism, the relation between knowledge and its object is not saṁyoga, (contact) as knowledge is not a substance according to this school.

We have seen so far that Keśavakāśmīrin does not explain knowledge purely from the epistemological and logical points of view. For, according to him, knowledge is neither a chemical secretion of the organism, nor a string of sensations, nor an empiric experience of a transcendental reality suffering under some illusion, nor even an issue of subject-object-contact, but, an illumination with the self-luminous soul that is meant for the manifestation of the objects of experience.

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1. 'Sambandhaśca saṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ/ jñānamāpi hi dravyameva/'

-- Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.29, p.264.

The fact is that knowledge, according to Keśava-kāśmīrin, is the illumination of an object for the sake of the Jīva, the subject, and that it is the subject, the Jīva that imparts its own illumination to knowledge before the latter can illumine an object. Never is knowledge either seen in its static aspect i.e. the Dharmin-consciousness or viewed in its dynamic aspect i.e. the Dharma-consciousness. Nature of knowledge follows from the nature of Being.

### 5.1.3 The Epistemic Value of dreams :

Dream-cognitions are presentative in character. They are felt as perceptions, and are aroused by external and internal stimuli. They are sometimes produced by extra-organic stimuli, and sometimes by intra-organic stimuli in the shape of peripheral disturbances and other organic disorders. These dreams may be called 'dream-illusions'! And there are some dream-cognitions which are produced by the strength of sub-conscious impressions of a recent experience coloured by an intense emotion. These dreams are centrally excited and hence may be called 'dream-hallucinations'.<sup>1</sup> And besides these two kinds of dreams,

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1. (a) Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāda, IX, 2, 6-7, Varanasi, 1969.

the Indian thinkers recognize 'prophetic dreams' and 'telepathic dreams'. The former are due to the merit and demerit of the dreamer, forecasting the future and so on; and the latter are due to the suggestive force of spiritualistic agents.<sup>1</sup> In addition to these there are 'dreams-within-dreams' or 'dream-end' cognitions which are representative in character.<sup>2</sup>

The Naiyāyikas, like Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayanācārya etc., point out that dream cognitions are invalid. But, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, all the dream-cognitions are valid, because the Lord Himself<sup>3</sup> is the cause of all the objects of dream-cognitions. So says the Śruti : "There are no chariots, no teams, no roads; then He creates chariots, teams and roads".<sup>4</sup>

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(b) Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, pp.151-152, Varanasi, 1966.

(c) Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, pp.181-182, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No.154, Baroda, 1971.

(d) Nyāya-kandalī of Śrīdhara, pp.439-440, Gaṅgānāth Jhā Granthamālā No.1, Sampūrṇānanda Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya, Varanasi, 1977.

(e) Vaiśeṣikasūtrōpaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra, pp.514-515, Varanasi, 1969.

1. Compendium of Philosophy, by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, p.48.
2. Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p.152.
3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.3, p.375.
4. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 6.10.3.

As regards the view that as both the cognitions and the objects of dream-cognitions are short-lived, they cannot be regarded as the creations of the Lord Himself, it is said that even the duration of the creations of the Lord depends upon His Will; and so, some creations, like ether etc. exist till the time of dissolution, while others, like some individual beings, are comparatively short-lived and those, like objects of dream-cognitions, are created and destroyed simultaneously.

Regarding the objection that the creation of the Lord should be visible to all and as dream-cognitions are not so, they cannot be regarded as His creations, it may be said that it is not true of each and every object. For example, objects like happiness, sorrow etc. although His creations, are not visible to all. So says the Lord Himself -- "Discrimination, true wisdom, sanity, forgiveness, truth, self-restraint, calmness, joy, sorrow, evolution, and dissolution, fear, fearlessness, non-violence, equanimity, contentment, austerity, charity, fame and disrepute, -- these<sup>1</sup> feelings of creatures emanate from me alone".

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1. Gītā, X, 4-5.

In fact, the various dream-cognitions are created by the Lord Himself in accordance with the merits and demerits of the dreamers in order that they may experience pleasure and pain as fruits of their past deeds through dreams. The duration of dream-cognition also is determined by the Lord in that very light. The Jīva is not responsible for dream cognitions. If the Jīva were responsible, then it would have never allowed such dreams to appear as are believed to forecast evil effects; for example, the cognition of a black person with black teeth, etc.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, creations like those of the dreaming state are caused by such Beings as are possessed of the attributes of true resolves etc., which are unmanifest in case of the Jīva, so long as it is not free from bondage.<sup>2</sup> Hence the Lord himself is regarded as the creator of dream-cognitions,<sup>3</sup> and therefore, these cognitions cannot be illusory perceptions. They have their epistemic value.

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1. Aitareya-āranyaka, 3.2.4.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.3, p.375.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.2.3-7, pp.375-377.

#### 5.1.4 The Anirvacanīya-khyāti, reason and common-sense:

Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusion, viz. Akhyāti, Asatkhyāti, Prasiddhārthakhyāti, Ātmakhyāti, Anirvacanīya-khyāti, Anyathākhyāti, Smṛtipramoṣa or Vivekakhyāti, Alaukikakhyāti, Sadasatkhyāti and Satkhyāti. These theories are not only based on the purely psychological analysis of illusion, but also on their epistemological significance and ontological basis.

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The Advaitins hold that an illusion is the apprehension (khyāti) of an indefinable (anirvacanīya) object. It is neither real (sat), nor unreal (asat) nor both but indefinable. If it were real, it would not be sublated. If it were unreal, it would not produce an immediate apprehension. It cannot be both, real and unreal, since the two contradictory attributes of reality and unreality cannot exist in the same thing. In the nacre-silver-illusion, the present action of silver, is, really speaking, something indefinable as

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1. "āhureke, 'asaccenna pratīyeta, saccenna bādhyeta, pratīyate bādhyate ca, ataḥ sadasadvilakṣaṇa-manirvacanīyamevābhyupagantavyam, anirvacanīya-tvādeva mithyātvamiti/"



it is the product of the indefinable principle of Avidyā. The perception of silver in the 'nacre-silver-illusion' is neither of silver as real, as then it will not be illusory and will not meet subsequent contradiction, nor, of silver as unreal, as then it will mean no presentation at all will not require to be contradicted by later presentation. Ultimately it has got to be a product of avidyā and hence neither real nor unreal, but indefinable. The Advaitins, therefore, hold that indefinable silver is produced at that time and place and continues as long as the illusion of silver persists. This kind of reality is called by them 'illusory-reality' (prātibhāsika-sattā), which is different from empirical reality (vyāvahārika-sattā) of things in the world, and ontological reality (pāramārthika-sattā) of Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

Keśavakāśmīrin does not approve of such causal 'avidyā' and such 'avidyā-products' which ultimately make 'Brahman' appear as 'Brahman'. Moreover, to say

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1. Joshi, Rasik Vihari, "The Problem of Error", Professor K.A.S. Iyer Felicitation Volume, Lucknow, 1975 and Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, pp.33-35.

that something that is neither real nor unreal is indefinable, does not stand to reason. For in the first place no definition and no proof of 'anirvacanīya' are possible.<sup>1</sup> Further, it is not a fact that it is an unreal thing only which can be set aside; e.g. the real anterior ignorance regarding an object by the knowledge of that object; the real knowledge of a pot by that of a piece of cloth; real past impressions by recognition; real affection, etc. for a person by his faults, the real sin of murdering of Brāhmaṇa by a visit to the Setubandha,<sup>2</sup> etc.. Finally, in fact, reality and unreality cannot apply to the same thing, at the same place and time. If something is real as Brahman, it is not unreal. If something is not real as the hare's horn, then reality cannot be attributed to it. Where do we apprehend the indefinable? Neither

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1. 'mithyātvānirvacanīyatvādelakṣaṇapramāṇānupapattyā....'

-- Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, p.193.

2. (a) "Kiñca nahi jñānamajñānasyaiva mithyābhūtasya nivarttakamiti niyamah, jñānamātreṇa jñānasamānaviṣayakājñānānupādānakasya satyasya tajjñānaprāgabhavasya ghaṭādi-jñānena paṭādi-jñānasya pratyabhijñādinā saṃskārasya yathā doṣadarśanena rāgādeḥ satvādidarśanena bhrahmahatyādeśca satya-syaiva nivṛttidarśanāt/

--Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.193-194.

(b) Bhrāntivādatimirabhāskaraḥ, by Paṇḍit Rāmpratāp Shāstrī, Nagpur, 1914, pp.7-15.

presentation nor its subsequent contradiction ever testifies to the indefinability of the object of erroneous perception. What do the Advaitins mean when the 'nacre' is presented as 'silver' in the nacre-silver-illusion? If they hold, however, that the indefinable silver is illusory, manifested against the background of Reality obscured by Avidyā, then, it may be shown that such a presentation cannot be erroneous and what becomes erroneous, instead, is the subsequent contradiction.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.1.5 The Ātmakhyāti of Buddhist Idealist and the external objects :

The Buddhist Idealist known as Yogācāra or Vijñānavādīn holds that those objects which are other than consciousness (vijñāna) are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an illusion. In the illusory perception of silver, the object of consciousness (e.g. silver) is a subjective form of consciousness itself, it appears as an extra-mental object owing to the potency of erroneous cognitions arising out of beginningless nescience. The beginningless

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.23-27;  
2.1.44, pp.194-195, 200.

series of various subconscious impressions are gradually awakened in persons. On account of this, various cognitions (e.g. pot, cloths, etc.) arise, which cognize their own forms.<sup>1</sup> There are no external objects corresponding to these cognitions.<sup>2</sup> All waking cognitions are devoid of external objects, since they are in the nature of cognitions, like dream-cognitions.<sup>3</sup> This is the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti.<sup>4</sup>

Keśavakāsmīrin refutes this doctrine on the following grounds : External objects are perceived as distinct from their cognitions. Although the Jīva is in the nature of eternal knowledge, and although its attributive knowledge is eternal, yet it cannot know the real nature of external objects owing to the beginningless nescience. The external objects do exist. In the 'nacre-silver-illusion', the creation and imposition of the form of silver on consciousness is simply unimaginable. It cannot be due to silver

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.30, p.265.
  2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.28, pp.262-264.
  3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.29, p.264.
  4. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.262-265.  
(b) Joshi, Rasik Vihari, Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, p.27.

existing as an object outside, because, there is nothing extra-mental, according to Vijñānavāda. It cannot be caused by enlightened intuition, because, the latter causes Nirvāṇa and not forms of consciousness. If, however, consciousness were supposed to be bifurcated into cause and effect in regard to the form 'silver' then the immediate presentation of silver becomes a mystery inasmuch as the moments of cause-consciousness and effect-consciousness presume a sequence that is denied by Vijñānavāda. The variety of residual impressions is not the cause of the variety of waking cognitions, because the former are not possible according to the Vijñānavādin. The perceptions of the external objects are the cause of their residual impressions, and the former are produced by external objects. But the Vijñānavādin denies the reality of the external objects. There is difference between waking cognitions and dream-cognitions in their nature. The former are produced by the external sense-organs in intercourse with the external-objects while the latter are produced by the residual impressions, through manas, of previous perceptions of external objects. So they are not ultimately independent of

the external objects. Finally, Ātmakhyāti is against all common human experience. It is not mind but the extra-mental object that is cognized in our daily experience of pot and cloth, for example. The 'Grāhya' and the 'Grāhaka' i.e., the blue and the sensation of blue cannot be identical, because, identity postulates prior difference. Thus, to maintain identity and non-identity between 'Grāhya' and 'Grāhaka' as the differentiation between knowledge and illusion is futile and self-contradictory.<sup>1</sup>

5.1.6 The Asat-khyāti of Buddhist Nihilist and the worldly facts :

The Buddhist Nihilist known as the Mādhyamika holds that an illusion is the apprehension of a non-existent object. In the nacre-silver-illusion, there is a cognition of silver as real, though really there is no silver at all. Hence, he concludes that in an illusion something non-existent is cognized as existent. He negates not only the extra-mental objects but the Vijñānas of the Buddhist Idealist even. According to him, reality cannot be characterised. It amounts to

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.262-265.

Śūnya which is a transcendental truth. Thus, the presentations and the presented both are relational, the non-relational being the only reality. Thus no point is made by Pramā and none lost by Apramā, as both are 'Asat'<sup>1</sup>.

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Keśavakāśmīrin refutes the above speculation. He argues : If Śūnya were the ultimate reality, is it known or not known by human means of knowledge ? If known, then it means that Śūnya being known as 'Śūnya' posits something else as really real; if not known, then does it not mean that the idea of 'Śūnya' is nothing but a misapprehension and as such never a transcendental truth ? Without any locus, how can error take its rise ? Even the Nihilists have such an experience -- 'this is there'. If, however, the experience of 'there' were taken as a real experience, then it means that some locus is known as 'sat', but, it goes against the main principle of Nihilistic Buddhism. If it is said that the experience of 'there' does not

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1. (a) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.193; 2.2.32, p.265.  
 (b) Joshi, Rasik Vihari, Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, pp.24-26.
2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, p.212.

take place, it may be shown, then, that there is no error at all in the case. Without spatial or temporal relationship reality or unreality of anything cannot be posited.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.1.7 The Foundation of Satkhyāti :

According to Kośavakāśmīrin, everything being of the nature of Brahman, the knowledge of animate and inanimate objects is always valid beyond doubt, and there is no erroneous knowledge at all. This is the doctrine of Sakhyāti.<sup>2</sup> In the nacre-silver-illusion, the silver that is manifested to consciousness is a real object, for an unreal object can never be apprehended. Otherwise, why is it that only silver is apprehended in a nacre, and not jar, or cloth, or some other thing ? It cannot be argued that silver is apprehended owing to its similarity with the nacre, inasmuch as the similarity of the nacre with silver will revive the subconscious impression of silver, and thus produce the recollection of silver, but will

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.2.32, pp.265-266.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, pp.195-196.



never produce the perception of silver. It is real silver that is the object of the illusory perception of silver. But how is it real ? All objects of the world are produced by Quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa) of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether, so that everything exists everywhere in the form of its elements. Hence, silver in which the element of fire predominates exists in part in the nacre in which the element of earth predominates. Moreover, there is a law that an object is similar to that object which contains the parts of the latter. According to this law, a nacre which is similar to silver must contain the parts of silver. Thus, in the nacre-silver-illusion, silver must exist in part in the nacre. But, then, why is the perception of silver in a nacre called illusory ? It is called illusory, not because silver does not exist even in part in the nacre, but because in the nacre the parts of silver are much less than those of the nacre, and they do not serve our practical purpose. Hence, every illusory perception has a real object for its objective substrate. This is the doctrine of Satkhyāti.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.26.

In the same way, the knowledge of the serpent in a rope is not erroneous, for the knowledge of the serpent which the knower has come to possess at that moment is produced from his correct knowledge of the true existence of the serpent which he already had in his subconscious mind. If it were not so, that is, if the knowledge of the serpent in a rope were produced out of the non-existence of the knowledge of an existing serpent, then a child who has no such knowledge also should perceive the serpent in that rope, which never happens. Hence the knowledge of the serpent in a rope is real and not illusory.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the knowledge of water in the mirage is also real according to the process of Quintuplication of the five elements. It is not visible, because earthly elements predominate in the mirage. Hence, it is not of any practical value either.<sup>2</sup> Likewise, when a person is suffering from jaundice, he happens to see the white nacre as yellow. This is due to the influence of the bile over the rays emanating from

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.24.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, p.215.

the eyes that the white colour is suppressed and the yellow is manifested in its place. This biliary influence is not perceived by others. Hence, those who do not see the yellow colour think him to be wrong, while, in fact, he is not so.<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes, people are found suffering from the so-called mistaken notion regarding a particular direction. They take the east to be the west, the south to be the north, and the like. Sometimes, the notion is so strong that people do not get rid of it throughout their whole life. This is also a case of valid cognition. The validity of this notion is due to the simple reason that the particular direction is present in another direction, and it is due to some unseen cause that only one direction is cognised there, while the presence of another is overlooked.

In all these cases of the so-called erroneous cognitions, both the sources of knowledge and the knowledge itself are always present; and through the cause one comes to have the knowledge of the effect. In every case, the knowledge should be present; for,

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1. Ibid., p.211.

if it is were not so, and even if the object were present, there would be no effect.

Thus, according to Keśavakāsmīrin, all the cognitions are valid in the waking state as well as in the dreaming state.

No doubt, the doctrine of Satkhyāti explains all our illusions and hallucinations and dreams as the imperfect grasp of the real object and accounts, thereby, for our 'pravṛti' and 'pravṛti-bādhā', but it is so highly imaginative that it cannot be accepted by ordinary human beings.

#### 5.1.8 Self-validity of Knowledge :

All kinds of knowledge are self-valid<sup>1</sup> inasmuch as they all grasp and reveal their corresponding objects. Self-validity is inherent in the very nature of knowledge. If it were not so, it could never be brought about by any external agency. It is a matter of self-experience. Even the so-called erroneous cognition of the nacre-silver-illusion' is not essentially invalid inasmuch as

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.35.

it does grasp something existing in the spatio-temporal world. It is only the presence of certain defects in the vision or casual collection of vision that leads to the invalidity of 'the nacre-silver-experience' . Validity of knowledge is intrinsic, invalidity extrinsic. Even Naiyāyikas, who hold that the validity of knowledge is conditioned by factors external to the factors of knowledge as such, admit the self-validity of the knowledge of the Supreme Being where no defects of vision can be found. Therefore, it stands to reason, so argues Keśavakāsmīrin, to accept self-validity of all knowledge, human and divine, and explain invalidity, wherever it may be, as caused by factors outside knowledge.

In the illumination of an object of the spatio-temporal world, all knowledge is self-valid and self-consistent. Otherwise no knowledge can be called 'arthaprakāśa' and 'arthakriyā-kārin'. Invalidity is caused by other factors and applies to two characters of the object; viz. the characters that determine an object, for example, in 'the nacre-silver-illusion' the determining characters of the 'this' (idam = śukti) is not grasped and what is grasped instead, is the determining character of a 'silver' (rajatam) -- a different object; and the defining details as for example,

in the 'yellow-nacre' cognition, although the object, i.e. the 'nacre' in its determining characters in grasped, yet, the defining details, i.e. the white colour of the 'nacre', remains completely ungrasped and instead, some other colour figures in knowledge. Thus, knowledge is essentially self-valid and when it is not so it is due to extraneous factors.

To conclude, according to Keśavakāśmīrin, know-<sup>1</sup>ledge, as the illumination of an object, is valid in itself. Invalidity applies only to the misapprehension of the determining features or the defining details, as the case may be, of an object of experience and is caused, consequently, by factors external to the causal factors of knowledge.

## 5.2 Contribution to logic :

The contribution of Keśavakāśmīrin to the cause of logic is by no means negligible. He has attempted the syncretism of the Nyāya with the Vedānta regarding the division of the source of knowledge. Like Naiyāyikas, Keśavakāśmīrin admits four kinds of the source of knowledge,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.23, p.313, 2.3.25, p.314.

viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. But, like the Advaita Vedāntins, he recognises 'Anupalabdhi' as a separate source of knowledge.

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, the epistemological and the logical subject in the phenomena of knowledge is a real spiritual substance, the knowing self. Knowledge is inter-action of the knower with the knowable. The knowable also is a substance but of a different nature. Underlying the knower and the known, there is the 'Substance Supreme', manifesting itself through the knower and the known. The essence of this underlying reality, this absolute ground of things is constituted by pure self-luminous consciousness. In this respect the cognitive experience resulting from the relation of the subject with the object is a direct awareness. It is this which is perception to all intents and purposes. It is immediate intuitive experience.

As the logical subject has the two aspects of the super-sensible and the sensible, so immediate awareness in perceptive experience also admits of a twofold character,

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.34-35.

viz. eternal and non-eternal. Eternal immediate intuitive experience is the characteristic feature of the Divine consciousness.<sup>1</sup> It is also a feature of the knowledge of the eternally free souls.<sup>2</sup> The Non-eternal obtains in human perceptions.<sup>3</sup> The eternity and non-eternity of immediate awareness depend upon the absence and the presence of the instrumentality of the sense-organs and the causal collocations responsible for perception.

5.2.1 Kinds of Perception : External (bāhya) and Internal (āntara) :

As regards the divisions and sub-divisions of perceptive knowledge, Keśavakāśmīrin differs from the Naiyāyikas. Perception has been divided by the Naiyāyikas into two broad classes, namely, Nitya or Eternal and Anitya or Non-eternal. Eternal perceptive knowledge is of the Lord; and the Non-eternal obtains in human perceptions. Human perception, again, has been divided into two broad classes, namely, savikalpaka or the determinate and nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate.

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1. Ibid.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.4, pp.524-525.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.4, p.45.



Savikalpaka, again, has been divided into two broad classes, namely, laukika or the ordinary and alaukika or the extra-ordinary. Ordinary perception again, has been divided into six kinds of visual, palatal, nasal, tactual, oracular, and mental perceptions. Extra-ordinary perception is of three kinds, namely sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja. Keśavakāśmīrin admits two broad classes of perceptive knowledge, viz. Nitya or Eternal and Anitya or Non-eternal. The Non-eternal again has been divided by him into two broad classes, namely, External (bāhya) and Internal (āntara). External again has been divided into the five kinds of the visual, palatal, nasal, tactual and oracular. That's all. He is silent about savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka; and, laukika and alaukika. He discusses external and internal which are similar ordinary (laukika) perception of the Naiyāyikas. However, Keśavakāśmīrin is influenced by the Naiyāyikas.

### 5.2.2 The Significance of perception :

Perception is the first means of our approach to the objects existing outside, all that is and that can be perceived in reality. But all reality is not within the range of perception. Perception presents and

represents that aspect of reality which stamps itself and its character on the senses. It means that the aspect of reality that is not captured by the senses cannot be perceptible. That is why Keśavakāśmīrin lays emphasis on the grace of the Lord for the highest spiritual realisation. Our perception must stop somewhere giving place to Śabda, the record of intuitive realisation, left by the sages which alone can generate the experience of the Transcendental, the Brahman in its real essence. Thus, perception is the most effective of the pramāṇas, as it is the asādhāraṇa-karaṇa of the final emancipation as well.

### 5.2.3 Kinds of Inference : Secular (laukika) and Scriptural (śāstramūlaka) :

Although there is no difference between the Nyāya and Keśavakāśmīrin's logic regarding the meaning of Anumāna, yet there is a difference in the two schools as regards the classification of Anumāna. The Naiyāyikas give us three different classifications of Anumāna. According to the first, Anumāna is of three kinds; namely pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. According to another classification, Anumāna is said to be of two kinds, viz. Svārtha and Parārtha. According to a third classification, Anumāna is distinguished into Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyatirekī and Anvaya-vyatirekī. Keśavakāśmīrin

divides Anumāna into two kinds, viz. secular (laukika) and scriptural (śāstramūlaka). Here he differs from the Naiyāyikas.

#### 5.2.4 Kinds of Valid-testimony : Scriptural (Śrauta) and Verbal (śābda) :

As regards the classification of valid-testimony, Keśavakāśmīrin follows the Naiyāyikas exactly. No new point is brought out.

#### 5.2.5 The Supreme Significance of Scriptural-testimony:

Although the daily Śāstra-jñāna is not necessary for those in whose heart the divine unrest is at its intensest, yet, for the rest of the spiritual seekers, Scriptural-testimony is extremely essential. Out of all the knowables, the Divine Being is the supreme-most knowable. Scriptural testimony is the only means to know the Supreme knowable.<sup>1</sup> Brahman is the ultimate reach of Scriptural-testimony.<sup>2</sup> Scriptural testimony is as much important in philosophical thinking as in practical spiritual living.

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1. Ibid.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.3, pp.44-49.

Scriptural testimony is the strongest source of knowledge. The other sources of knowledge are weaker than the scriptural testimony. Perception is said to be a stronger source of knowledge than Inference, because it yields the knowledge of the concomitant relation (vyāpti) which is the ground of Inference, and because it preceds Inference. Perception is said to be stronger than Scriptural testimony, because the latter produces the immediate knowledge of the Lord, which is perception. This view is not tenable, because Perception does not always represent the real nature of its object, e.g. the perception of a mirage and because the immediate experience of the Lord due to meditation depending upon Scriptural testimony is admitted by Keśavakāśmīrin.<sup>1</sup> It is not sense-perception, and its authority derives from that of Scriptural testimony on which it is based. Keśavakāśmīrin does not deny the validity of perception and Inference in regard to sensible objects, but denies their validity independent of scriptural testimony in regard to supersensible

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.3, pp.44-49.

<sup>1</sup>  
 realities. The nature, attributes, and powers of  
 the Lord being transcendental and inconceivable are  
 neither perceptible nor inferable. The Vedas alone  
 can prove their nature and existence, and are a valid  
 source of knowledge in respect of them.<sup>2</sup> The Smṛtis  
 based on them derive their authority from them. Reason-  
 ing can be disproved by stronger reasoning, and so on  
 to infinity. Reasoning repugnant to the Vedas should  
 be disregarded. The Śruti says "'The world which all  
 the Vedas record'<sup>3</sup>; 'That in regard to which all the  
 Vedas are unanimous',<sup>4</sup> 'We ask about the Supreme person  
 proved by the Upaniṣadas". The Lord Himself says :  
<sup>5</sup>  
 "By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known". Hence,  
 Scriptural testimony is supremely significant.

Here Keśavakāśmīrin follows Puruṣottamācārya, the  
 third teacher after Nimbārka, exactly. No new point  
 is brought out. His main contribution consists in the  
 fact that he is the first of the sect of Nimbārka to

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1. Ibid.
  2. Śāstra-yonitvāt -- Brahmasūtra, 1.1.3.
  3. Kaṭhupanīṣad, 2.15.
  4. Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, 3.11.1.
  5. Gītā, 15.5.

accept five kinds of the source of knowledge, viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Anupalabdhi.

### 5.3 Contribution to Metaphysics :

Keśavakāśmīrin's interpretation of the philosophy of Nimbārka is not an intellectual discernment, but, a deep personal realisation amounting to philosophy in itself. Consequently he contributes to the philosophy of Nimbārka on many essential points with regard to the trinity of Reals.

#### 5.3.1 The trinity of Reals :

Śaṅkara thinks that Brahman alone is the reality while the universe, both intelligent and non-intelligent, is only illusory (vivarta). Brahman is the cause of the universe and the universe is the effect of Brahman. The cause alone is real, while the effect is more delusion, something superimposed upon the cause. Thus he deduces the doctrine of mithyātva, the unreality of all effects, Brahman alone being real.<sup>1</sup> Śaṅkara's doctrine, which is usually known by the name of Kevalādvaita or absolute monism, may be summed up in the words, viz.

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1. Brahma-sūtra-śaṅkara-bhāṣya, 2.1.14.

'Brahma satyam jagannithyā', Brahman alone is the reality, while the universe is only illusory (mithyā).

The doctrine of Śāṅkara, though of great merit from the metaphysical point of view, was rather too elevated and too impersonal for the ordinary people who wanted something more definite and personal. Hence there arose the Vaiṣṇavite leaders who introduced the cult of a personal God and devotion to him or adoration of him, which gained great favour with the people.

All the Vaiṣṇavite scholars preached bhakti which presupposed a personal God, admitted the trinity of Reals, viz. Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, and condemned the principle of Māyā with equal vehemence. The chief difference in their doctrine relates to the metaphysical part of the doctrine, that is to say, they are with reference to the nature of the relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat.

Of the Vaiṣṇavite teachers, Keśavakāśmīrin also<sup>1</sup> refute the unreality of the universe and admits the trinity of Reals, viz. Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, also

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-orabhā, 2.1.14, p.193.

called by the significant names of Niyantṛ (the controller, ruler) bhokṛṛ (the enjoyer, the jīva), and bhogya (the enjoyable, matter). Though all are equally real, the last two are absolutely dependent on Brahman. According to him, Bādarāyaṇa also established a trinity of Reals, viz. the object to be enquired into (i.e. Brahman), the enquirer (i.e. the sentient) and Jagat (i.e. the non-sentient) in his very first sūtra of the Brahmasūtras, viz. 'athāto bhramajīñāsā' -- 'Then, therefore, an enquiry into Brahman'.<sup>1</sup> The Śruti and Smṛti establish the reality of the three entities, viz. Brahman, Jīva and Jagat, viz. "By knowing the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, everything has been said. This is the three-fold Brahman".<sup>2</sup> 'God is the Lord of Prakṛti and the individuals souls'; 'Prakṛti and the souls are originless and eternal'; 'The supreme person and the individual souls are real'; 'Prakṛti is beginningless, endless, composed, of sattva, rajas and tamas and the cause of physical things'; 'This Brahman is the self

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.5-10.

2. Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad, 1.21.



of all created beings'; 'This is thy Inner Controller';  
 'God is the Inner controller of all Jīvas, the Inner  
 Self of all creatures, the Lord of the universe,  
 pervasive of all entities'; 'This self is Brahman';  
 'All these are Brahman, from which they are produced  
 by which they are maintained, and in which they are  
 dissolved'; 'Perishable are all beings, the change-  
 less is called the Imperishable'<sup>1</sup>, 'But the Highest  
 Person is another, declared to be the supreme self'<sup>2</sup>;  
 'The souls, the sense-organs, manas, buddhi,<sup>3</sup> sattva,  
 rajas and tamas are in the nature of Kṛṣṇa', and so  
 on. There is a natural relation of difference and  
 non-difference between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat as between  
 the cause and the effect, as we have already seen.

### 5.3.2 Nirviśeṣa-Brahman and Saviśeṣa-Brahman :

Śaṅkara says that Brahman, as pure intelligence  
 entirely divested of all kinds of form, is the ultimate  
 reality, and that all differences of the knower, the  
 known, and the diverse forms of cognition are imposed  
 on it and are false. Falsehood with him is an appearance

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1. Gītā, 15-16.

2. Gītā, 15-17.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, pp.216-217.

which ceases to exist as soon as the reality is known and this is caused by the defect which hides the true nature of reality and manifests various forms. The defect which produces the false appearance of the Jagat is avidyā or māyā, which is anirvacanīya and this ceases when Brahman is known. It is, indeed, true that in our ordinary experience we perceive difference and plurality, but this must be considered as faulty, because the faultless 'Śruti speaks of the one truth as Brahman, and, though there are the other parts of the Vedas which impose on us the performance of the Vedic duties and therefore imply the existence of plurality, yet those scriptural texts which refer to the nature of Brahman as one must be considered to have greater validity, because they refer to the ultimate, whereas the Vedic injunctions are valid only with reference to the Jagat of appearance or only so long as the ultimate reality is not known. Again the scriptural texts describe Brahman as the reality, the pure consciousness, the infinite; these are not qualities which belong to Brahman, but they are all identical in meaning, referring to the same differenceless identical entity, absolutely qualityless (nirviśeṣa) -- the Brahman.

Keśavakāśmīrin, in refuting the above position,

takes up first the view of Śaṅkara that Brahman is absolutely devoid of all qualities (nirviśeṣa). He says that Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot be an object of enquiry by Scripture. According to Śaṅkara, three alternatives are possible here, -- the object of enquiry is either pure Brahman, or Brahman as limited by Māyā, or Iśvara, superimposed with avidyā. Now, the first alternative is not possible, because according to the Monistic view, pure Brahman is not an object (aviśaya). If it were admitted to be the object, it would be unreal and false, and such admission would lead to dualism. The falsity of Brahman would be proved by the following inference: Brahman is false because of Its being the object of enquiry, like the false appearance of the Jagat, according to the Monists. The second alternative, too, is not possible, because in that case we shall attain a knowledge of Brahman as limited by māyā and not of pure and real Brahman, and hence salvation would not follow. The third alternative, too, is not possible, because it is this very false superimposition which, according to the Monists, is set aside by the

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Scripture.

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1. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.2.2.

Further, the denial of any entity other than attributeless (nirviśeṣa) Brahman would contradict many Śrutis which assert the reality of the Jīva and the Jagat besides that of Brahman such as the following: "He resolved, I shall become many"; 'I shall differentiate names and forms or concrete objects'; 'From whom these creatures are born, etc.'; 'He is the knower of all and the experiencer of all'; 'He is the Lord of Prakṛti and guṇas, and of souls'; 'Two beautiful birds friendly to each other live on the same tree; once tastes its fruit, and the other merely looks on'; 'One is omniscient and the other is ignorant, both are unborn and eternal', 'one is the ruler, and the other is ruled'.

Further, Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot be the creator of the Jagat. According to the Advaita view three alternatives are possible here, -- viz. the creator of the Jagat is Śuddha Brahman, or Upahita Brahman, or Adhyasta Brahman. Now the first alternative is not possible, because Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot possibly resolve to be many, as the creator of the Jagat does in the beginning according to the Śruti. The second alternative, too, is not possible. Here the question is whether the Upahita Brahman is bimbarūpa or pratibimbarūpa. Both forms are not possible, because in the first

case just as the face reflected on a mirror is outside the mirror and does not pervade it, so Brahman will be outside the Jīva and non-pervasive of it, thereby ceasing to be the inner controller of all; and in the second case, since the qualities of the upādhi belong to the pratibimba, -- Brahman must be subject to all the defects etc. due to the upādhi. The third alternative, too, is not possible because Adhyasta Brahman, which by nature is knowledge, is absurd, just as it is absurd to hold that there is darkness in the sun.<sup>1</sup>

Further, according to the Monistic View, Brahman is by nature a unity of being, intelligence and bliss. Now, they must either hold that these constitute the nature of Brahman or the qualities of Brahman. Now if these are the nature of Brahman, then Brahman will have a threefold nature, which will go against Monism, and if these are qualities of Brahman, that too will go against it.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, what is qualitylessness ? A kind of

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.2, p.41.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.2, p.43-44.

quality, to be sure. Brahman, characterised with 'qualitylessness' becomes the qualified (saviśeṣa) Brahman. Hence nirviśeṣa-vāda is full of self-contradiction.

### 5.3.3 Pratibimbīta-Jīva, Aupādhika-Jīva and Nīrupādhika-Jīva :

Some Monists hold that the Jīva is a reflection (pratibimba) of Brahman in the internal organ produced by Avidyā.

Keśavakāśmīrin refutes this doctrine in the following manner. The Jīva cannot be a reflection of Brahman, because Brahman being form-less and colourless, can have no reflection. The sun is reflected in water; similarly Brahman is said to be reflected in the internal organ. Water is perceived to be distant from the sun. But the internal organ is not perceived to be distant from Brahman. So, Brahman is not similar to the sun, and is not experienced as reflected in the internal organ. Brahman is all-pervading and present in all conscious and unconscious entities including the internal organ, because the Śruti says that It controls the souls from within the hearts of persons, and that all souls are founded in It. Again, residing in the heart of a person Brahman is not subject to

increase or decrease of Its seat, but that the sun does not reside in water -- the medium of its reflection and that therefore Brahman is not similar to the sun. Further, we find in ordinary experience that the object reflected and on which it is reflected (upādhi) belong to the same category. For example, the real sun is reflected on real water only, but never on the mirage. Hence Brahman and Avidyā must belong to the same category, i.e. Avidyā must be as real as Brahman. Finally, just as a pot plunged in water cannot be reflected in it, so the self plunged in the Avidyā cannot be reflected in it. If the invisible Brahman were reflected in the Avidyā, then invisible merits and demerits also would be reflected in the avidyā and made visible. Thus, the doctrine of the Jīva as a reflection in the Avidyā or the internal organ is false.<sup>1</sup>

Some Advaitins hold that the Jīva is Brahman as limited by the avidyā, and that the difference between them is due to the upādhi or the limiting adjunct, although there is real non-difference between them, even as ether enclosed in a pot is different from ether enclosed in a temple, although there is real

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, pp.18-20.

non-difference between them. The Jīva is really non-different from the pure and eternally free Brahman, but its difference is due to the upādhi, the avidyā.

Keśavakāsmīrin refutes this view of the Advaitins. He says that it is absurd to say that Brahman, who is by nature eternal and infinite knowledge, abode of bliss and power, can ever come to be connected with avidyā and upādhi. The upādhi is either the avidyā or the internal organ. Either it splits up Brahman into parts, even as an axe cuts a log of wood into pieces or it exists in a particular place and limits Brahman. The first alternative is not possible, because being all-pervasive (vibhu) and partless Brahman is not capable of being split up into parts. If Brahman were split up into parts, the Jīva would not be uncreated and unborn as the Śruti declares.<sup>1</sup> Hence Brahman cannot be split up into parts. The second alternative, too, is not possible. The upādhi is either all-pervasive or limited. It is not all-pervasive, because if it were so, the Jīva would not be able to depart from the body and move. But the Śruti speaks

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1. (a) Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4.5.14.

(b) Kathopaniṣad, 2.8.



of the Jīva's motion and departure from the body.<sup>1</sup>  
 Further, Brahman is all-pervasive, and since the internal organ, the upādhi also, is all-pervasive, the entire Brahman will be veiled by the upādhi, and no pure unveiled Brahman will remain to be attained by the freed Jīva. This contingency will lead to total collapse of all our practical life. Nor is the upādhi limited, because though it leaves room for the Jīva's motion and departure from the body, it leads to other difficulties. When the upādhi departs from its body, the all-pervasive Brahman limited by it cannot move along with it, because It is motionless, like the unenclosed ether. Even the ether enclosed in a pot cannot move along with the pot which encloses it. Further, when the upādhi will move from one place to another, the conscious Jīva in the former will suddenly be liberated having no adjunct to limit it, and another Jīva in the latter will be suddenly bound being limited by another adjunct. This contingency will lead to destruction of earned deserts and the acquisition of unearned deserts. Deserts are merits and demerits. Further, the connection of the Jīva with the upādhi

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1. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4.3.8.

is neither natural or svābhāvika, because that will make liberation impossible, nor is due upādhi or aupādika, because that will lead to an infinite regress, for an upādhi will require another upādhi to be connected with the Jīva, that still another and so on. Moreover, if the upādhi be real, then the doctrine of Monism will fall to the ground, there being at least two realities -- Brahman and upādhi, and liberation will also not be possible, since knowledge cannot set at naught what is real. If, on the other hand, upādhi be unreal, then to say that the upādhi binds the Jīva would be as absurd as to say that a dream-felter binds a man who is awake. Hence the Śaṅkarite doctrine of the Jīva being Brahman limited by avidyā or upādhi is not acceptable.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.3.4 Akartṛtva-vāda and Kartṛtva-vāda :

The monists hold that the Jīva is not really a Kartā or doer or an active agent, but only appears to be so through the false superimposition or adhyāsa of the antaḥkaraṇa on the Jīva, just as white crystal

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.2.6, p.92.

appears to be red through the superimposition of the redness of a red flower.

Keśavakāśmīrin refutes this view of the monists. He says that the above mentioned view of the monists is not tenable, because in the case of the crystal and red flower, redness is perceived separately in the crystal and in the flower : 'The crystal is red', 'The flower is red'. But in the case of the Jīva and its doerness (kartṛtva), we never do we have perceptions to the effect 'The mind is a kartā', 'The Jīva is a kartā' separately, but we always feel 'I am kartā' and not my mind. Thus, the Jīva is really a doer. Hence, the monist doctrine is false.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.3.5 Vivartavāda and Pariṇāmavāda :

The basic question involved in any theory of causation is : Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause ? Those who answer this question in the negative are called Asatkāryavādins, while those who answer it in the affirmative are called Satkāryavādins. The Satkāryavāda is further divided into two : Pariṇāmavāda

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.3.32, p.137.

and Vivartavāda. Pariṇāma means real modification or transformation or actual change, resulting in an effect having equal reality with the material cause or production of an effect that has the same kind of existence as that of its material cause.<sup>1</sup> The example of transformation of milk into curd is often quoted. The doctrine of Pariṇāmavāda belongs to Sāṃkhya-yoga and Old Vedāntins. The Pariṇāmavāda is twofold : Pradhānapariṇāmavāda of Sāṃkhya-yoga and Brahmapariṇāmavāda of old Vedāntins. The Vaiṣṇavite teachers like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka etc. admit the Brahmakāraṇavāda or the Brahmaśaktikāraṇavāda. Vivarta means apparent change or illusory manifestation or transfiguration, resulting in an effect whose reality is not equal to that of the material cause or production of an effect that has a different kind of existence from that of its material cause.<sup>2</sup> It is neither real nor unreal like the change of gold into ornament. In Vivartavāda, there is apparent modification of the cause in name and form only but the material does not change. In fact, it is a

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1. Indian Logic and Metaphysics, by R.V. Joshi, p.81.

2. Ibid., 83.

misapprehension or illusion such as is the case of rope mistaken for a snake, or a nacre mistaken for silver. The change of the cause is not real. The illusory silver is simply transformation in relation to avidyā and transfiguration in relation to consciousness. The doctrine of Vivartavāda is upheld by the Monists.

The monists hold that the Jagat is but an illusory transformation (vivarta) of Brahman and not a real one. It is neither an aggregation of the elements nor a new creation nor a modification (pariṇāma) of Brahman. The first two alternatives are repugnant to the Śruti. The third alternative is not possible because Brahman is all-pervasive and partless, like ether. Hence, the Jagat is a vivarta of Brahman, even as illusory silver is a vivarta of a nacre.

Keśavakāśmīrin refutes this view of the Monists. He says that the monists too admit Brahman to be the material and efficient cause of the Jagat. But if the Jagat is false, then Brahman cannot be its efficient cause, for nobody can be creator of what is false, e.g. nobody -- neither the mistaken person himself nor others-- can ever create a nacre-silver. It cannot be said that

Brahman is the creator here in the sense as a magician is, -- for a magician shows tricks to delude an audience, but there is none whom Brahman can delude by creating a false Jagat. Again, Brahman, the real, cannot be the material cause of the unreal Jagat, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature.<sup>1</sup>

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, the Jagat is a modification (pariṇāma) of Brahman, because it is capable of being modified into the Jagat, although It is all-pervasive and partless. It possesses the power of being modified into the Jagat. It may be argued that milk and the like which consist of parts perceived to be modified into parts, and that therefore the partless Brahman cannot be modified into the Jagat. This argument is invalid, since the atoms of milk are partless and yet are modified into curd. In fact, the power of being modified is the cause of modification, and being composed of parts is not its cause. Otherwise, water would be modified into milk because of its consisting of its parts, and the atoms of milk would not be modifiable into milk because of their not being composed

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.23, pp.170-177.

of parts. In the modification of a substance power abiding in the whole or power abiding in its parts is the cause of its modification. The first alternative is not possible. Power abiding in the whole substance is not the cause of its modification, because the Advaitins do not admit that a liquid substance is a whole distinct from its parts. In the second alternative, the parts of a whole substance consist of parts or they are partless. They cannot consist of parts, because it will lead to infinite regress (anavasthā), and because in that case a pitcher will be as large as an ocean inasmuch as its parts are infinite. Hence the Advaitins must admit that the power abiding in the parts of a substance is not the cause of its modification. There is a general rule that a partless substance is not modifiable. Thus, the probans, e.g. partlessness, is unproven. Nor is there any general rule that an all-pervasive substance is not modifiable, because ether is found to be modified into air. Hence the second probans also is vitiated by a counter-probans, and the instance cited is wrong. Hence Brahman is modifiable because of its all-pervasiveness like ether. Thus, it is established that the Jagat is

an effect and of the nature of a modification of the partless and all-pervasive Brahman because of Its being endowed with the power of being modified into it.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, a substratum of an illusion must have certain qualities. For example, a nacre has certain qualities in common with the silver, such as lustre, etc., which bring about the illusion. And it also has certain qualities of its own, as distinct from those of the silver, which when known bring about the end of the illusion. But nirviśeṣa Brahman of the monists can have no such qualities, and hence cannot be the substratum of the cosmic illusion. Hence no substratum of the super-imposition being possible, the super-imposition itself is not possible and hence the Jagat cannot be a vivarta of Brahman.<sup>3</sup>

Further, Keśavakāśmīrin says that according to the monists, the Jagat is false, but the question arises here, whether this falsity itself is false or not.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.4.26, pp.178-179.

2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.23.

3. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 1.1.1, p.23.



If it is false, then evidently the Jagat becomes real, if it is not false, then the doctrine of monism falls to the ground, there being at least two realities, Brahman and falsity.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the famous passage 'Vācārambhaṇa-vikāra'<sup>2</sup> by no means proves the vivarta theory. The use of the term 'vikāra' (transformation) leaves no room for doubt that the effects are real transformation of the cause, otherwise the term "bhrānti" (error) would have been used. Moreover, the illustrations of vivarta, viz. nacre-silver, etc. do not fit in with the above text which professedly teaches the doctrine that through the knowledge of one (viz. the cause) there is the knowledge of all (viz. its effects). Now, this fits in very well with the pariṇāma doctrine, e.g. through the knowledge of clay, there is the knowledge of all the effects of clay; but how can it be said that through the knowledge of nacre, there is knowledge of silver?<sup>3</sup>

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, p.201.

2. 'Yathā somyaikenamṛtapinḍena sarvam mṛnmayam vijñātam syādvācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyamiti' /  
-- Chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.1.5.

3. 'Kiñca vikāro nāmadheyamityatra sākṣatkaṅṭharaveṇa vikāraśabdapāṭhādapi vivartāsiddheḥ/ yadi 'śrutēvivartor' bhīpretāḥ syāttarhi vikāra iti mṛtpinḍādidṛṣṭāntāñśca na śrāvayet apitu bhrāntirnāmadheyamiti brūyat, śuktirajatādidṛṣṭāntāñścopanyaset /  
-- Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, p.216

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Hence the Vivarta-vāda is supported by neither reason nor Scripture.

#### 5.2.6 Reality of the Jagat :

Keśavakāśmīrin holds that the Jagat, as an effect or modification (pariṇāma) of Brahman, is real. This view is confirmed by the following texts : 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second'<sup>1</sup>; 'Prakṛti, that is uncaused and undestroyed, and that is composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas, is the cause of the universe'; 'This tree of the universe has its roots upward in the Lord, and its branches downward', 'That was existent; vital forces are real; this is real among them. The ignorant call the universe unreal; they do not know the supreme power of the Lord. He created the real Jagat which is stable, and hence is called the creator of the real and stable Jagat'; 'The atheists call the Jagat unreal and founded in untruth and without Lord as its creator'; 'All that has this for its soul. That is true That is the soul. Thou art that;<sup>2</sup> All this, verily is Brahman emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing

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1. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.2.1.

2. Ibid., 6.8.7.

in Him'<sup>1</sup>; 'That was unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form"<sup>2</sup>, and so on. It may be objected that the Śruti says : "The non-existent alone was this in the beginning, one, without a second"<sup>3</sup>. This objection is groundless, because the word 'asat' here means the 'subtle' or 'unmanifest' that is modified into the gross or manifest Jagat. The creation of the Jagat consists in its unfoldment from the unmanifest to the manifest state, and its destruction lies in its return from the manifest to the unmanifest state. An effect is certainly real and emerges from its material cause, otherwise oil would be pressed out of sands. Hence the Jagat which is of the nature of a modification, is called 'asat' in its unmanifest, unexpressed, causal, subtle state. It is called 'sat' in its manifest, gross state. This view of the Jagat as a real modification of the Lord's power of Prakṛti is concordant with all the Śrutis.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 3.14.1.

2. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 1.4.7.

3. Chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.2.1.

4. 'prāgapi kāryasyāsattvam vyapadiśyate iti nāsāsanīyam/ tatra hetumāha, dharmāntareṇeti/ abhivyaktanāmarūpāt sattvadharmāddharmāntaramanabhi-  
vyaktanāmarūpamasattvam tena yogādiyam śrutirasa-  
ttvam vyapadiśati/ na tu svarūpāsattvam, sattvā-  
sattve hi dravyadharmāu anabhivyaktanāma-rūpa-  
kamatisūkṣmasīdityarthaḥ/

The monists argue that just as there is perception of the silver in place of a nacre, so the perception of the Jagat, too, is a false perception due to doṣas and not a real perception. Keśavakāśmīrin refutes this argument of the monists. He says that the unreal Jagat can never be the cause of the perception of the Jagat, its effect. The fact is that an unreal objection can never be the cause of anything, for the cause must be possessed of certain powers of producing the particular effect. It is not the unreal silver which is the cause of lustre but the real knowledge of the silver. And it is not the unreal silver which is the cause of this knowledge of the silver, but the real doṣas -- such as distance, etc. are the cause of that knowledge. If the Jagat is false because it is perceivable or knowable like the nacre-silver, then Brahman also is false, because He is perceivable or knowable by knowers. But the Advaitins regard Brahman as real. The Advaitin's argument is refuted by the counter-argument: Brahman is unreal, because It is knowable, like the false Jagat. The Śruti says, "The Brahman ought to be seen"; 'The Ātman is seen through focussed buddhi' "when the Ātman is seen the knots of the heart are cut asunder". Thus, Brahman is knowable

and real. Similarly the Jagat also is knowable and real; it is not unreal because it is knowable.<sup>1</sup>

### 5.3.7 Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti :

The monists hold that some souls, whose prārabdha karmans have not borne their fruits, but whose root avidyā has been destroyed, achieve Jīvan-mukti. Their bodies continue so that they may experience the fruits of their prārabdha karmans, which cannot be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, but can be destroyed only by the experience of their fruits in the shape of joys and miseries. When their prārabdha karmans are destroyed, their bodies perish and they achieve absolute liberation. The sañcite karmans and the kriyamāṇa karmans are destroyed by the immediate experience of Brahman owing to the destruction of the avidyā. The sañcita karmans are the potencies acquired in the past births, while the kriyamāṇa karmans are acquired in this birth by righteous and unrighteous actions. When these two kinds of karmans are destroyed, the soul becomes indifferent to happiness and misery. The monists call this state Jīvan-mukti.

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 2.1.14, pp.200-206.

Keśavakāśmīrin does not believe in Jīvan-mukti. He says that it is a term which has no meaning. The rule is that on the destruction of the cause the effect must be invariably destroyed; for example, when the threads are destroyed, the cloth also is destroyed simultaneously. Similarly, the avidyā is the cause of the potencies of actions born to desires. These potencies are the cause of the body and the sense organs. When Brahman is known, the avidyā is destroyed. When the avidyā is destroyed, desires, actions and potencies are destroyed. When potencies are destroyed, the body and the sense-organs are destroyed. Therefore, Jīvanmukti is not possible. The question is whether the knowledge of Brahman destroys the avidyā or not. If it does not, then it will lose its essential nature, the very nature of knowledge of Brahman being to remove ignorance, and no liberation will ever be possible; and if it does, there can be no Jīvan-mukti. It cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman partly destroyed the avidyā, and partly does not destroy it. If the strong smell of garlic persists even when the garlic-pot has been thoroughly washed, and on the same analogy if the avidyā partly persists even after its destruction by the

knowledge of Brahman, then Jīvan mukti is not possible. If a trace of the avidyā is not destroyed by the first knowledge of Brahman, then it cannot be destroyed by a subsequent knowledge also making this absolute liberation an impossibility. If a trace of the avidyā is different from the avidyā, it cannot persist on the destruction of the avidyā, which is its cause. Further, the continuance of a trace of the avidyā, which is not the material cause of the body and the sense-organs, and which is different from the avidyā, is ineffective and useless. Hence also Jīvan-mukti is not possible. Further, what exactly is this avidyā-nivṛtti which, according to the monists, is liberation ? Is it the very nature of the self or something else ? If the first, then the self being eternal, the avidyā-nivṛtti too must be so, and in that case the knowledge of Brahman becomes futile. If the second, then the question is: Is it real or unreal or both or anirvacanīya ? Not the first, for then the doctrine of Monism falls to the ground; nor the second, for then it cannot be set aside by the knowledge of Brahman, and in that case the knowledge of Brahman would become futile like a lamp during the day; nor the third; reality and unreality



being mutually opposed, a thing cannot be both real and unreal; nor the fourth, for what is anirvacanīya is set aside by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the doctrine of Jīvan-mukti does not stand to reason in any way.<sup>1</sup>

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, Mukti always means Videha-mukti.<sup>2</sup> The Chāndogya-upaniṣad says that in order to attain liberation one has to wait till his body is destroyed.<sup>3</sup> This statement of the Chāndogyopaniṣad has already disfavoured the idea of Jīvanmukti.<sup>4</sup> In fact, it is never possible for a living person to attain that knowledge which is completely free from all feelings of difference. Mind is purified by dhyāna-niyoga and it is by such a mind that the Jīva is able to have direct realisation of the Lord which leads to his liberation.

Here Keśavakāśmīrin follows Nimbārka exactly, yet he gives a very lucid exposition of the general doctrine

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1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, pp.525-527.
  2. 'Pāte tu, tu śabdo' vadhāraṇe śarīrapāte viduṣo mukti-revetyarthah/  
--Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.14, p.481.
  3. 'tasya tāvadeva ciraṃ yāvanna vimokṣyetha sampatsya iti'  
-- Chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.14.2.
  4. (a) 'tasyeti/tādrśānusandhānavato mumukṣostāvāneva vilambah yāvatprārabdhakarmārabdhaśarīrānna vimokṣyāte tadanantarantu sadrūpam brahma sampatsyate/  
--Chāngogyopaniṣad, with the commentary Śrutiprakāśikā of Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, 6.14.1, p.211.

(contd...)

of Nimbārka adding many new details. His main contribution consists in the fact that he is the first teacher of the Nimbārka-school of Vedānta to undertake a thorough criticism of the Advaita tenets. One cannot but be amazed at his wonderful power of subtle argumentation.

#### 5.4 Contribution to Ethics :

The contribution of Keśavakāśmīrin to ethics is by no means negligible. He has treated the Varṇāśrama<sup>1</sup> Dharmas and the Sādhāraṇa<sup>2</sup> Dharmas as means to an end - the end being the realisation of Prapatti. He regards the realisation of the inner spiritual imperative, the divine obligation of Nikṣepa as the Vaiṣṇava Dharma which transforms and transfigures the external obligation of the Varṇāśrama Dharmas and the Sādhāraṇa Dharmas with

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(b) 'tasya tāvadeva ciram yāvanna vimokṣye' tha sampatsya' ityutpannavidyasyāpi śarīrapātā-vadhiśravaṇādanyathā sarvavināśe śarīrasthi-tyanupapatteḥ/

-- Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.1.15, p.482.

(c) Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 4.4.7, p.528.

1. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.9, p.452; 3.4.26, pp.460-462  
3.4.32-35, pp.463-464.
2. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, 3.4.27, p.461; 3.4.29, p.462;  
3.4.37, p.465; 3.4.46, p.469;  
3.4.38-39, pp.469-472.

a new sense -- the sense of self-less service not only to the Transcendental Divine, but to the Divine in man, in nature and in the entire creation.

Keśavakāśmīrin's ethics, accordingly, is the ethics of Prapatti. It is not negation, but sublimation and spiritualisation of the Dharmas and Ācāras. In all essentials, Keśavakāśmīrin's ethics seems to be individualistic. But the social and the communal ethical values are also involved in it. Although, in reality, the practical Prapatti - sādhanā aims at individualistic love and devotion to God, yet the ideal of Keśavakāśmīrin's ethics is social and communal self-surrender or the founding of a fraternity of self-less servants to God working for and carrying out the will of God in the world. With a view to keeping harmony with the traditional religion of the age, Keśavakāśmīrin opened the path of Prapatti-Yoga to all - to the high as well as to the low, to the learned as well as to the ignorant, to the Brāhmaṇas as well as to the Śūdras.<sup>1</sup>

Keśavakāśmīrin has also admitted Gurūpasatti as

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1. (a) Bhāvadīpikā, p.6.  
 (b) Kramadīpikā, 1.4, p.3.

means to mokṣa. Prapatti has been considered by all Vaiṣṇava-Vedāntins, but Gurūpasatti has been considered only by Keśavakāśmīrin. It is really an original contribution to the Nimbārka-school of Vedānta as well as to the Vaiṣṇava-Vedānta.

According to Keśavakāśmīrin, Gurūpasatti is the best of all the sādhanas, involving, as it does, every other means - Karma, Viśyā and Upāsana. Thus, obeying the commands of the Guru is following the path of Karman (Karma-yoga); knowing one's self as having the Guru for his essence (tādātmaka) is following the path of knowledge (jñānayoga); and being devoted to the Guru is following the path of devotion (bhakti-yoga). Guru-prapatti, further, involves the eight-fold yogas (aṣṭāṅga-yoga). Like Bhagavat-prapatti, Gurūpasatti is open to all. This means is specially fit for those who cannot perform even the six-limbs of Bhagavat-prapatti independently of their own unaided efforts, but are required to be led by someone else in all respects, their only duty is to obey their Guru with blind faith as a child obeys his mother. And, all that is necessary for their attainment of salvation is done by the Guru himself, just as the mother of a suckling baby herself takes the medicine for curing her child's disease.

Like Puruṣottamācārya, Keśavakāśmīrin speaks of five sādhanas, - Karman, Viḍyā, Upāsanā, Prapatti and Gurūpasatti - and defines them exactly after him. Like other ācāryas of Nimbārka-school he emphasises the grace of the Lord as the direct cause of salvation. As regards Gurūpasatti as means to salvation, he follows Sundarabhaṭṭa exactly. Here no new point is brought out.

C O N C L U S I O N

## C O N C L U S I O N

In the philosophy of Nimbārka, Keśavakāśmīrin occupies a unique place. Being a teacher of the system, he commands the same respect as the founder of the system. He is acknowledged by his contemporaries, let alone his successors, as the only representative writer on the philosophy of Nimbārka.

His pre-eminence seems to be due to the following facts :

- (A) He is the only Nimbārkaist who combines logic with poetry, intellectualism with emotionalism and ritualism with spiritualism.
- (B) He is the only religious head of his times who led a life of poverty and cared a fig for worldly riches.
- (C) He is the only religious teacher of his times who commanded respect from his rival-religionists.

Unlike any other post-Nimbārka teacher, it was he alone who possessed the real synthetic sense, the key

note of the philosophy of Nimbārka. It was he, who carved, first of all, a prominent niche for Prapatti in the midst of the Vedic Sādhanas or the Brahma-Vidyās. It was he alone who gave, first of all, sound metaphysical background to the Nimbārka-school of Vedānta. In fact, the strength of the Dvaitādvaita Vedānta depends as much on Nimbārka's masterly formulation as on Keśavakāśmīrin's critical exposition. Keśavakāśmīrin is the real representative of the philosophy of Nimbārka.

The role of Keśavakāśmīrin as a religious reformer of India can be best appreciated by those who make a comparative study of the teachers of Hinduism of the medieval centuries. One thing stands out supreme and is this : Keśavakāśmīrin had realised in his life the ideal of self-renunciation. He had enough of Vairāgya in him to work for the good of men. The best of his works of reform was, indeed, his personal practice of the highest ideals of Hinduism in his day-to-day life.

It is a fact that Keśavakāśmīrin has emphasized the Varṇāśrama-basis of Vaiṣṇavism. But what he meant by the stress he laid on the performance of the duties of one's social status and standard in day-to-day life,



was the preservation of the ancient Vedic Culture and by no means imposition of restrictions on persons of lower castes in the matter of practising religion. Hinduism gained much through the efforts of Keśavakāśmīrin. Being the head of an institutional religion, he stood always for the culture of pure religion. What he prescribed by way of remedy to the Hindu religion, was the preservation of its age-old individuality. Accordingly, he did not like to weaken the Varṇāśrama-basis of India's religious culture.

The conclusion arrived at, therefore, is that the posterity takes Keśavakāśmīri-bhaṭṭa to be the only Dvaitādvaitic Vedāntin, who, by his contributions, has given the philosophy of Nimbārka the highly logical character.

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