

THESIS



ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (1938-82)

**ABSTRACT
THESIS**

**SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**IN
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**UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
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ABSTRACT

In tenth century, the Turks of central Asia had converted to *Islam* and by the eleventh century they began to push their way into South-Eastern Russia and Persia. The Ottoman State emerged consequent to an Islamic movement under Ghazi Osman (1299-1326), founder of the dynasty, at Eskişehir, in North-Eastern Anatolia. *Sufis*, *Ulema* and *Ghazis* of Anatolia played an important role in this movement.

For six centuries the Ottomans were almost constantly at war with Christian Europe and had succeeded in imposing the Islamic rule over a large part of Europe. The later Sultans could not maintain it strictly. With the expansion of the Ottoman dominions the rulers became more autocratic with the sole aim of conquering alien land. To achieve this the rulers granted freedom and cultural autonomy to his non-Muslim subjects and allowed the major religious groups to establish self governing communities under the leadership of their own religious chiefs.

The recent work is spread over two parts containing eight chapters with a brief introduction and my own conclusions. Each part has four chapters. Part I, chapters I to IV, deals with the political mobilization of the Turkish peasants from the beginning of the modernization period and to the war of

Independence as well as the initial stages of the transition to comparative politics. In these instances the use of religion for securing mass support was made possible through traditional authority channels.

Part II is a study of the development of religious education, religious literature and the role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the *Faculty of Ilahiyat* in providing Islamic Literature under the rule of different political parties. A brief account of the Religious reform movements and Religious life of the Turkish Muslims has been given.

Chapter I deals with the condition of *Islam* from Empire to the Republic with the causes of decline and the process of modernization. It is difficult to point out the exact date of the decline of the Ottoman Empire but it began after Suleyman, the magnificent.

After the industrial revolution, Europe had improved its war techniques which proved fatal for the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire began to lose its European territories. In its long decline the Ottoman Empire had been humiliated and defeated by the West and lost vast territories. These defeats and humiliations impregnated an inferiority complex in the Turks given rise to the belief that they could only survive by adopting Western ideas and techniques. So began the modern

ntroducing western reforms by force and suppressing *Yeniçeri* and those *Ulema* who were not in favour of western reforms and education. This misunderstanding proved dangerous for the Ottoman Empire and provided a chance to the European Powers to interfere in the legal as well as internal affairs of the state.

In the nineteenth century there was a change in the attitude of the Turks towards their non-Muslim fellow subjects. It was also due to European diplomatic pressures, weakened the Islamic forces. In the reign of Sultan Abdül Mecit I (1839-1861) a second phase of reforms were started known as the *Tanzimat*. The Sultan issued two noble rescripts *Hatt-i Şerif* in 1839 prepared by Mustafa Reşit Paşa, and *Hatt-i Hümayün* of 1856. These re-scripts confirmed the equality before law of all the subjects respective of their religion and race. The Sultan's government, through these reforms, tried to convince the European powers of its sincerity in implementing reforms and ensuring full equal rights to non- Muslims. These diplomatic contacts started a cultural infiltration whence peoples were encouraged to go abroad for study and to learn foreign languages. The *Ulema* vehemently opposed the reforms considering it as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of *Şeriat*.

A group of intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans also opposed the *Tanzimat*. Instead they wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy and revitalize Islam choosing *Islam* as a spiritual ideological base for their Nationalism. Among them Ziya Paşa (1825-1880), Ibrahim Şinasi (1824-1871), Namik Kemal (1840-1888) and Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) were prominent. They opposed the policy of Sultan Abdül Aziz (1861-1876) in which Midhat Paşa played an important role. For his survival the Sultan played the Pan Islamic card. Sultan Abdül Hamit II encashed the opportunity promising to ratify a new constitution (*Kanun-i Asasi*) drafted by Midhat Paşa. Sultan Abdül Hamit did as he promised but soon after he dissolved the parliament in 1878 and shelved the constitution. It was a great set back to the Young Ottomans and to their cause. The Sultan banished and exiled Midhat Paşa alleging his involvement in the murder of Sultan Abdül Aziz. Although they failed to fit the Islamic theories in the concept of democratic popular government but they were successful to introducing new values to the Turks.

All the reforms in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries were results of the policy of Frakophil Sultans who introduced their reforms by force and due to diplomatic pressures that weakened the forces of Islamic traditionalism.

These reforms played major role in widening the gulf between the rulers, the subjects and the *Ulema*. But these internal conflicts invoked an enthusiasm of nationalism among the non-Muslims subjects.

The Young Turks, then, formed a Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which opposed the policies of Sultan Abdül Hamit II. The CUP was lead by mainly Talat Bey, Ahmet Riza, Mehmet Murat and Anwar Paşa. They wanted the restoration of the constitution of 1878. After a long struggle the Young Turks succeeded, through a revolution in 1908, in replacing Sultan Abdül Hamit by Mehmet V (1909-1918). But World War I broke out and dismembered the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of the Ottomans was also a result of the successfully exploitation of Arabs and non-Muslims subjects of Turkey on the basis of nationalism. The Allies succeeded in their aims and the Sultan became a puppet in their hands. The idea of Pan-Islamism used by the Sultan was bitterly shattered by the Arab revolt in World War I.

It was the charismatic personality of Mustafa Kemal, a nation builder and educationist, who gathered the scattered army of the Empire and was able to unite the army against the Allied powers. Mustafa Kemal's movement was different from that of the Young Turks. He did not want to overthrow the

government. His fight was against foreign intervention. To achieve this he used *Islam* and was able to get support not only from the local people but also from those *Ulema* and religious reformers like Sait Nursi who wanted to revitalize *Şeriat*. In this war of Independence many military figures like Rauf Orbey, Kazim Karabekir as well as some influential peoples supported him. He was able to win the battle against the Allies but with his victory he laid down the foundation of a modern State and began a series of secular reforms. These reforms brought criticism from all over the Muslim world as well as from his own friends and colleagues.

Chapter II deals at length with the secular reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal alongwith their reactionary demonstrations. In a series of reforms he abolished the Sultanate in 1922, the Caliphate in 1924, and deposed and exiled Sultan Abdül Mecit II, thus putting an end to thirteen centuries of Muslim political system and marking a victory of the West over Islamic ideals and system.

Mustafa Kemal did not pay any attention to the criticism of secularism. He took many steps to secularize the country, which apart from the religious life also effected the social and cultural life of the people. In 1925 wearing of Fez was declared a criminal offence. Against this new law a revolt broke out and

a few *hocas* were hanged for preaching against it. Officially all *Tarikat Orders* were dissolved *Tekkes* and *Turbes* of holy men were closed, veil was discouraged and, Polygamy was abolished. *Şeriat* courts and ministry of *Avkaf* were abolished and in 1926 a new civil code was adopted. On November 1, 1928 the GNA passed a law introducing the Latin Script and forbade the use of Arabic letters in publication after the end of the year. He was not against Islam and its teachings but wanted to curb the power of those *Ulamas* who misguided the people of Turkey through their superficial knowledge of Islam. These reforms widened the gulf between the secularists and Islamists, which is continues till the present day.

Chapter III deals the political activities after Mustafa Kemal upto first military takeover. After Atatürk, especially during the events of the World War II, different types of *Islamism* and *Turkism* began to appear in public life. After World War II political liberalization and a period of reassertion of *Islam* was begun in which *Islam* returned to political discourse alongwith competitive politics which affected the states understanding of nationalism. Ismat Inonu, Mustafa Kemal's successor, allowed forming opposition parties, which brought much liberalism in Turkey.

During this period a number of parties emerged with sought to use religion in order to gain a foothold in electoral competition. Of the 24 parties, founded during this time, at least eight had explicit references in their programme to Islamic themes. But these parties did not participate in the elections or gain much familiarity. *Islam* became the centre pillar of politics. *Islam* was used for political mobilization. All the major ruling parties, which contributed in the development of the Islamic learning and which sanctioned religious freedom openly and hiddenly as well as favoured religious reformers and education have been discussed with a brief introduction of the two political parties which served as opposition under Mustafa Kemal. A major portion of the chapter covers the achievements of those political parties, which ruled or participated in forming government.

In chapter IV the role of different political parties like JP, MNP, and MSP, and their liberal attitude toward Islamic revivalism have been discussed. In the 1960's religion once again assumed an important role in Turkish Party Politics. The Justice Party (JP), which had been founded in 1961, had managed to establish an image for itself as the successor to the defunct DP. JP had succeeded to capture power in 1965. JP's success in capturing the organizational network of the DP and

its appeal to the rural voters proved to be rewarding for the party in establishing mass support.

Turkey entered a new era and every ideology began to sound its voice through its own organizations and publications. This environment in the late 1960's created a gap between the Turkists and Islamists. This new generation of Islamists were influenced by the ideas of Islamic movements in the Arab and Muslim World. Almost all the books and pamphlets written by the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were translated into Turkish and widely read in 1960's *Islam* was seen as a unique system/ ideology in itself, similar to socialism and capitalism, and very much distinct from nationalism.

By the late 1960's in the circle of nationalist/Turkist, *Islam* became the most hotly debated issue with quarries whether "*Islam* includes nationalist, "whether *Islam* rejects *mailliyet* or *Kavmiyet*," or whether "One should give priority to *Islam* or nationalism". All these discussions were put to an end through redefining Turkish nationalism by the nationalist academicians.

In the late 1960's and 1970's many Islamic Parties emerged like MNP (Party for National Order), MSP (National Salvation Party) RP (Prosperity Party), FP (Virtue Party) and NAP (National Action Party). In the election campaign of 1969

Islamic sentiments were openly raised. *Islam* came to the fore in party programmes and publications. Islamic nationalism” (*Islam milliyetçiligi*) gave rise to “National outlook” meaning acquiring welfare through developments in both material and spiritual ground in the economic, social and cultural developments of Turkey.

In 1970 *Aydinler Ocagi* (Intellectual’s Hearth) was established. It represented an attempt to integrate the Islamists and nationalists. They were against radical religious movements. They also stated that Turkey will remain religious but will never be a theocracy”. Its primary goal was to achieve political unity within the right, there by, creating a ‘national front’ against the lefts.

After the third military take over in September 1980, Islam was described as one of the two main elements of Turkish national culture –Nationalism and language. This new emphasis on Islam has remained a key component of the nationalist ideology in the 1980’s. Thus in 1982 the constitution was again amended with some religious liberties. New Islamic intellectuals, *tarikats* and *cemaats* groups were emerged and gained influence over the people creating public opinion in favour of an Islamic nationalist outlook.

Chapter V contains a survey of the middle and higher religious educational development and their importance under the major ruling parties. Religious education was need of the time when the multi party system emerged. A brief historical development of the religious education system under the Ottomans and Mustafa Kemal is given. Emphasis is given dual system of education which had confused the people. Mustafa Kemal abolished these dual systems of education and replaced them with one system by the 'Unification of Education Law'. But after the death of Atatürk the misinterpretation of secular education and rejection of the Islamic values caused a serious moral crisis which impoverished the cultural and religious life of the people.

After the introduction of the multiparty system in 1946, the Democrats were the first to pay attention towards the need of religious education of the people. Religious education became compulsory and for its overall development necessary measures were taken. Many new *Imam Hatip Okullari* were opened to full fill the demand of the Islamic functionaries.

From 1950's to 1980's *Islam* was a widely discussed topic among the religious reformers and political leaders. Islamic and religious activities were controlled by the government agencies.

In chapter VI the role of government agencies like Ministry of Education, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Directorate of Pious Foundation, and Faculties of higher Islamic learning has been described. All these agencies played an important role in the development of religious literature. Without the permission of Ministry of Education not a single Islamic Institute or school could be opened neither a single book could be approved for publishing. Presidency of Religious Affairs, Directorate of Pious Foundation and *Ilhiyat* faculties played an important role in providing religious literature for encouraging the moral values among the women and children.

Many translation of the *Kuran* into Turkish with Arabic version, New encyclopaedia of *Islam* and many religious magazine and news papers for children and women were permitted to be published form different private publishing house and government agencies.

In the development of the religious literature, Islamic reformer Sait Nrusi's *Risale-i Nur* played an important role. Many political parties from 1950 to 1980's played important roles in the development of Islamic literature.

Chapter VII contains a general account on the resurgence of *Islam* in Turkey in the recent past, which attracted the attention of several Western observers. Some of them have

expressed the fear that it would lead to the revival of Islamic fanaticism. The growing interest of Islamic education and the religious literature shows that people are very serious in the study of *Islam*. It is clear proof that secularism did not confine Islamic sentiment and it failed to fulfil their social and cultural requirements.

The secular reforms of the 1920's and 1930's had made little impact on the countryside. It was mainly in the large cities and town that an upsurge of common man's devotion to *Islam* became manifest after the changes of regime in 1950. The resurgence of *Islam* in Turkey has been largely the work of the Islamic reformists. Facts cannot be denied that Sait Nursi and his followers created the interest in *Islam* through their literature and demonstration against secular reforms. *Islam* is the religion of about 99 percent of the people of Turkey. The Turkish people continue to main their identification with *Islam*.

The Turkish family system is still based largely on the old type of ties and paternal authority, particularly in the countryside where almost 75 % of the population of Turkey lives.

Mosque attendance is regular in Turkish cities and in the countryside. The *Ezan* is recited in Arabic and *Prayer* are said in Arabic as usual. Among the Muslim nations the Turks have

distinct taste for the celebration of their festival with pomp and solemnity. The two important feasts of the Islamic calendar *Şeker Bayrami (Id al-Fitr)* and *Kürban Bayrami (Id-al-Adha)* are officially celebrated each for three days. *Mevlud*, *Şerif* and *Aşura* are also recited and celebrated by them respectively

In chapter VIII an attempt is made to cover the activity of *tarikât orders* and their role in revitalizing the religious teachings and beliefs. It is very difficult to point out organized Islamic movements in contemporary Turkey, although some information has become available in recent year. All these Orders like *Ticani*, *Suleymanci* and *Nurcu*, emerged against the secularist reforms of Mustafa Kemal. Taking a fresh look at the religious question the public also discovered that the Mystic orders that Kemal had outlawed had in fact continued their dervish ceremonies in secret meeting places. In this chapter we shall try to trace the general influence of *Islam* on Turkish society after the impact of secular reforms that have so far been introduced and the role played by the reactionaries like *Ticaniye*, *Sulemanciler* and *Nurcular*.

These sects came out of their hiding and engaged themselves in their preaching. These official changes in the understanding of secularism led to the revival of the *tarikât* and religious fundamentalist movements. An in-depth study has been

made in this chapter of the activities of these another religious orders and their role in farming the public opinion of *Islam* and against secularism.

The growing interest in the Islamic teachings shows that *Islam* responded to the spiritual and moral needs of the Turkish people. This indicates the extent of the importance of *Islam* in the life of the Turkish people. This heavy incline infavour of religious freedom and changes in the state policies is a clear indication that the future of *Islam* in Turkey seems bright.

Thus, we can deduce that any show of secularism by Turkish governments in power does not reflect the true spirit of the masses in general and further, it may be safely remarked that within their hearts the people are religious and respond to the call of *Islam* so much so that at times the government in power or the military has to highhandedly, crush their sentiments.



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
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*This is to certify that the thesis entitled *Islam in Modern Turkey (1938- 82)* by Mr. Aijaz Ahmed is his own original contribution carried out under my supervision. The thesis is complete in all respects and is fit for submission for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies of this university.*

(SAYYID AHSAN)

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(AIJAZ AHMED)

PREFACE

The Ottoman Empire that emerged as an Islamic movement under Ghazi Osman Khan in 1299 AD., they succeeded to impose Islamic rule over a large part of Europe. The European Powers did not tolerate this. They did not want to see Istanbul as the centre of *Khilafat*. They tried to Christianize them through Westernisation and never gave up this hope. At last they got success. The history of the reforms in the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century to the first half of the Twentieth century is the history of westernization in the Empire, started to please the European powers, and, introduced at the expense of the *Şeriat* institution.

After the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, *Islam* became a hotly debatable topic with the foreign scholars. The idea of this title *Islam in Modern Turkey (1938-82)* is a result of so many questions that arose in my mind when I was busy in the completion of my M. Phil dissertation *Principles of Kemalism and the Modernization of the Turkish Republic* at A. M. U. Aligarh. These questions are: what is the position of *Islam* in post Kemalist Turkey after the introduction of secular reforms? What is the impact of these western reforms on the religious and cultural life of the people? And how religion has been practiced by the broad masses of the Turkish people?

These questions were instigations for an indepth study of the following period. Much has been written on social, economic, and political condition of Modern Turkey by the western writers but all these works are full of one-sided praise for westernization in Turkey. Their works on the resurgence of *Islam* did not take proper recognition in recent years and goes on unnoticed since most of the works on Modern Turkey avoid the practical aspect of *Islam* among the Turkish Muslim.

To discuss these challenges and western reforms a separate study requires to be done. The present work remains confined to the study of *Islam* in the Post-Kemalist Turkey from 1938 to 1982. Because this period is important with regard to the re-emergence of *Islam* and also due to some especial events such as the introduction of the multiparty system, three military coups and the revision of the constitutions of 1961 and 1982. It was that period in which Turkish people wants some changes in the state policies because Turkish Muslims fed up with the pseudo policy of secularism of RPP.

Attempt has been made to combine the scattered materials produced by the foreign writers who visited Turkey or spent many years there for different purposes. This work is based on the study of the development in the political, social, religious and cultural fields from direct sources as well as first hand informations.

It is expected that this study about *Islam* in Post Kemalist Turkey will help to explain the social, the cultural and religious life of the Turkish Muslims to the world as well as to remove the portrayed misconceptions, illustrated by the western authors. Attempt has been made to explain the revival of *Islam* and its role in the political activities in fields that became focus of central of attraction with foreign media.

This present work is spread over two parts comprising eight chapters as well as an introduction and my own conclusion. Chapter I gives the details about the adoption of the Western reforms like *Nizam-i cedit* , *Tanzimat* and the *Young Turks* and their reaction against the adoption of the western reforms and the war of Independence of Mustafa Kemal.

Chapter II contains all of the secular reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal and the peoples reaction and the attitude of the religious leaders towards them.

In chapter III and IV the role of *Islam* under the major different ruling political parties which gained power after the World War II and participated in the coalition governments, has been discussed. It also provides more information about the revival of *Islam*, religious freedom, and cultural life of the Turkish people.

The Part II deals with the contribution of the major political parties to religious education, religious literature and

the facilities provided to the Muslims in the performance of their religious practices.

A brief introduction of the system of education under Ottoman Empire as well as under Mustafa Kemal has also been given in chapter V.

In the following chapter the role of the Ministry of Education, Presidency of Religious Affairs and *Ilahiyat Fakultesi* in the development of the religious literature has been mentioned.

In chapter VII deals with various Muslim traditions and customs. In the last chapter, *Tarikat* orders like *Nurcular Suleymanci*, and *Ticaniye* and their role in preaching Islamic beliefs and teachings has been discussed which goes on to show how those religious/fundamentalist movements emerged and their reaction to the secular reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Middle East from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries was a reaction of the Muslims of the Middle East against the challenges of Western civilization. These challenges were social, economical, educational, artistic, political and religious. This type of reaction, encountered with Western civilization, has created two types of revolutions for the Muslims of that region— the revolution for independence and revolution for change

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Muslims were divided among champions of Arab supremacy among Muslims, champions of Islamic supremacy in Arab states, champions of secularism and nationalism and champions of revival of dynastic claims over various parts of the Arab World. On the other hand, the process of modernization had begun in Europe in the form of European renaissance and reformation. Both these incidents of the eighteenth century had greatly affected the social, political and cultural life of the Muslims of the Middle East region especially Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran and Turkey

From the early part of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century, the process of modernization was mostly confined to the religious changes. These religious changes polluted the religious life of Muslims of the Middle

East and particularly of Turkey. It had proved fatal in weakening the powers of Muslim rulers in general and by damaging their religious life particularly of the Turkish people.

Industrialization may aptly be described as a great revolution against the Muslims of that region. It compelled the Muslims of the Middle East to change their social, cultural, political, and religious life as well as the system of education. These changes created gaps among the Muslims themselves in the interpretation of Islamic beliefs. These misconceptions provided an idea of nationalism among the non-Muslim millets in the name of peace and unity in the region. Its secular consequences continue to be influential till the present time.

In nineteenth century the Islamic world was almost entirely encircled by the superior strength and enterprises of the west. According to Arnold Toynbee :

“The noose was around the victim’s neck and the victim was inexorably condemned to die by strangulation whenever an alien executioner might choose to draw the fatal bowstring tight.”

From the eighteenth to the second half of the nineteenth century *Islam* played an important role in the political framework of the Middle East. On the one hand in the other part of Middle East like Egypt, Afghanistan, Syria, and

Nigeria *Islam* was used against the colonial powers that had greatly polluted the social, cultural and religious life of that region. Here *Islam* proved a resistance against the encroachment of the European Powers and their interference in the central policy and local affairs. But in Turkey this situation was quite different, *Islam* was used here by the rulers, political leaders and reformers for their own survival as well as for their position and power. Here *Islam* was not used against colonial encroachments. Indeed, different groups have used *Islam* for variably in different countries to solve their own purpose. According to Levy: "Religious doctrine has always been subjected to the most aired interpretation. Men hasten to adjust their theories to their desires and circumstances. Religions often justify rather than determine politics"

The varied use of *Islam* for a particular purpose had led to different interpretations and perceptions. *Islam* had different functions, which depended upon the nature of the political legitimization system. The overall role of *Islam* varies not only from one country to another but from one region to the other within the same country. This aspect is aptly described by Abdan Unat and Yucekok thus: "in more developed part of Turkey *Islam* is the status quo ante ideology of a part of the petit bourgeois, directed against the capitalist development and expansion. In the under developed parts, it is

a conservative ideology in the hands of the classes that benefit from under development”.

Bear expresses his views on the role of *Islam* in the Middle East political framework as:“ Political manifestations of *Islam* have evinced considerable diversity and its instrumental utilization by the rulers on the one hand, and the fuel it gave to protest movements on the other.”

Throughout history Islamic political activity has involved different religious factions, different supporters and leaders, different motives and different modes of operation. The fact is that religion and politics are a closely integrated unity in *Islam* and not two separate spheres of lives.

Islamic insurgence is a response to different types of challenges posed from within the Islamic world as well as from outside it. Islamic resurgence can also be a response to social problems posed by rapid westernization, social, economic and political corruption, colonialism, and imperialism etc. *Sufi*, *Şeyh* and *Mahdis* had served *Islam* a political framework for the tribal community. These Islamic resurgences emerged and played important roles to revitalize *Islam* in its original form.

All the movements wanted to unite the tribes through the provision of a common Islamic ideology as well as military power and administrative organization into an Islamic state. These movements were the *Wahhabi* movement of Saudi

Arabia, Abdul Quadir's movement in Algeria *Mahdi* movement of Sudan, *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* of Egypt, *Sanusi* movement of Libya, *Pan-Islamic* movement of Jamaluddin Afghani and *Nurcu* movement of Turkey. The Pan-Islamic feeling was used to gather support of the Muslims for a concerted stand against the steady encroachment being made on Asia and Africa by European colonialism and imperialism.

The movement emerged against the background of a progressively weakening Ottoman Empire, which had something to do with European expansion. The aim of all the above movements was to raise the moral regeneration of their people through a return to the simpler ways of the early Muslims and the spirit of the *Kuran*. Because the Muslims of the Islamic World were defending their faith against the Christian powers, most of these movements achieved political successes through the establishment of a religious organization. All these movements were unique in their own respects. It will be a very lengthy process to discuss their aims and objectives.

In the post war period, the Pan-Islamic movement drew its strength largely from the fact that a number of Muslim states attained political independence. The Ottoman caliph used *Pan-Islamism* to mobilize support for his own ends, the Arabs used it to build a pressure group on the Palestine issue, Muammar al Qaddafi of Libya and King Hussein II of

Morocco used it to strengthen their position in their countries. Thus different groups used the Pan-Islamic appeal for different reasons.

It is interesting to note that all these movements developed in countries outside the Arab core of Middle Eastern Countries. Although Islamic politics i.e. active Pan-Islam arose out of the need of Muslims rulers to consolidate their positions. But it lost out to Turkish nationalism, which was successfully exploited by Britain to dismember the Ottoman Empire. After a long struggle the Muslim World succeeded to breakout the toils of western encirclement and managed to survive but it remained, as it is today, disunited.

These were the conditions prevailing in the Muslim countries, the Islamic political activities and the process of Westernization that played an active role in the Middle Eastern political turmoil as well as the whole Muslim World. The need for modernization in the Middle East was felt after the industrial revolution in Europe but gained momentum only after the French revolution. Among the Muslim countries Turkey was the first to adopt the process of modernization at a time when other Muslim countries were busy in thinking of what ought to be the form of modernization. Thus, Turkey has become an interesting subject of study among the Turkish commentators as well as foreign authors.

The idea to modernize Turkey was not newly conceived by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Actually the Ottoman rulers began the process of modernization in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. During this period modernization became as increasingly popular a subject of study as *Islam* became a hotly debatable topic throughout the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey with the Turkish intellectuals and others. It continues so till now. The foremost questions that strike the attention of students of Turkish history are: how and why did the Turks establish a secular national state over the remains of the Ottoman Empire? Further questions arise as to what is the position of *Islam* in Turkey since the introduction of western reforms by Mustafa Kemal? These are some of the most widely discussed topics in the Muslim World till now. Chapter I and II will provide more information and facts about both the above questions.

Chapter I shows that the Ottomans ruled a polyglot, multi-faith Empire and were able to form a *Şeriat* based official orthodoxy. But when the Ottoman dominion expanded, the rulers became more autocratic whose sole aim was to conquer alien lands at all costs. For this purpose Ottoman rulers needed flexibility which was achieved by developing a body of traditional laws (*Orf hukuku*) which was not derived from religious law but care was taken that the religious law was not openly violated.

With the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 AD a new chapter began in the history of the Ottoman Turks. Sultan Mehmet II opened a powerful channel for European influences in the Ottoman Empire by granting freedom of cultural autonomy and extra-territorial concessions for trade and commerce to his non-Muslim subjects. By granting a Law, he also set a precedence for his successor that the heir to the Ottoman throne should strangle his brothers in the interest of the State. The majority of the *Ulema* approved this law. It opened the way for internecine warfare among the successors. After the reign of Sultan Mehmet II, European influences came to stay in the Palace of the Ottoman Sultan and the Palace became a hotbed of intrigues under overwhelming influence of the European wives of the Sultans, who moulded the state policies to their own advantages.

Actual modernization began in the Ottoman Empire after the industrial revolution of Europe. Continuous defeats at wars with Russia and European neighboring countries gave the superior complex of modern arms. The fear of continuous territorial loss compelled the Sultans and reformers of the Ottoman Empire to adopt the process of modernization in the fields of administration and army. They believed that the Ottoman Empire could survive only by adopting western ideas and techniques otherwise their doom is certain. But Turkish rulers and reformers always misconstrued the cause of

European progress and modernization. These were the results of the European's spirit and determination. For Turkish rulers and reformers science and industry was the main cause of modernization. They never tried to control over the economic affairs in their hands.

Selim III was the first Sultan to introduce westernizing reforms known *Nizam-i Cedid* (the New Orders). New military schools and colleges were opened on European lines. Muslims were encouraged to study abroad. When these students came back to Turkey they brought European culture with them. All these reforms coming from the West were opposed by the *Ulema* who believed that the gate of *Ijtihad* was closed. This tendency brought the *Ulema* into direct clash with the rulers. In this clash the *Ulema* were divided into two camps. One was the elite in favour of the Sultan, who wanted to modernize the country on Western pattern and other were those who were against the Sultan and the elite class as well as against those reforms which polluted *Islam* with the implementation of equality of Christian subjects and the growing interference by European consuls and missionaries in the central policy and even in local affairs. But the Turkish rulers introduced their reforms in sporadic manner by force.

From the very beginning of the nineteenth century to its end European diplomatic pressure played a major role in the westernization measures adopted by the Ottomans. The

imperial rescripts of 1839 and 1856 and the first Constitution of 1876 were also promulgated under such pressures.

This diplomatic contact between the Sublime Porte and the European States weakened the forces of Islamic conservatism. Turkish diplomats and statesmen not only began to learn European languages, they also became deeply interested in the study of European culture and in the assimilation of Western values. These reforms reduced the place of *Islam* and widened the gulf between the rulers and their subjects as well as they provided an enthusiastic idea of secularism and nationalism among non-Muslims subjects. Actually the *Tanzimat* and the Young Turks movements were the direct results of a reaction against the centralization of administration.

A brief introduction of the Young Ottomans, who wanted to revitalize *Islam*, is also given alongwith the policy of Sultan Abdül Hamit who promised to ratify the Constitution prepared by Midhat Paşa. As Abdül Hamit became the Caliph he dissolved the Constitution and banished Midhat Paşa. The Young Ottomans failed to fit the Islamic theories in the concept of democratic popular government but they were successful in introducing new values to the Turks.

Later Sultans used Pan-Islamic ideas for their survival. The Sultans became a puppet in the hands of European powers

after World War I and had lost vast territories in favour his European neighbors.

It was the charismatic personality of Mustafa Kemal, a brave warrior, who played an important role in salvaging some respect for Turkey. His movement was different from the *Tanzimat* and the Young Turks. He did not want to overthrow the government. His fight was against the foreign intervention. He did not want a triangular fight—European forces, the Sultan's Troops and religious reformers and *Ulema* of Turkey—therefore, in the war of liberation he used Islam as a political weapon. He gave a slogan "Our Caliph is captive in the hands of the infidel". But as he won the war of Independence a series of secular reforms were launched by him to end the centuries old hostility between the European powers and Turkey. The historical connection of *Islam* and state was broken off when the Turkish Republic was established in 1923.

In chapter II the secular reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal after the establishment of the Turkish Republic are discussed at good length. These significant reforms began with the abolition of Sultanate in 1922 followed by the abolition of Caliphate in 1924. These reforms seem to have little influence on the people of the villages rather than big cities. Although *Islam* had remained in practice in the daily life of the people but proved fatal for the institutional and

functional strength of *Islam* in Turkish society. *Şeriat* courts, family law and education were also secularized. *Islam* has its own distinct set of legal procedures, a system of education and codes of social conduct, all of which conflicted with its western version. It was definitely a frontal attack that was launched against *Islam*. The result of these drastic changes gave rise to reactionary movements giving vent to bloodshed and increasing the gap between the elite and mass culture. Similarly other changes were effected so as to transform an Islamic state into a western one. These changes included hat laws, abolition of alphabets, abolition of veil and office of the *Şeyhul Islam* which are discussed at length in chapter II.

In chapter III and IV multi party politics and the role of *Islam* has been discussed against the background of their vote gaining propaganda. *Islam* was used to gain electoral strength. *Islam* played a prominent role in the political mobilization of the rural strata. After the introduction of secularizing reforms of Atatürk it was to be investigated whether or not *Islam* wielded any influence on Turkish politics? And in so far as the internal affairs of Turkey were concerned, what appeal remains of the secular politics of today to the mass of Muslim Turks? Another question props up when we want to know about the religious and cultural life of Turks is: what have been the effects of the western reforms in Turkey during the post Kemalist period, particularly concerning the religious

and cultural life of the Turks and how far have these reforms influenced the attitude of the secular politicians towards *Islam*? In these chapters the role of major parties like Peoples' Party, Democratic Party, Justice Party, Milli Salamet Party, Milli Nizam Party and Nation Party has been discussed regarding their contribution and facilities provided in the field of Islamic education and religious freedom.

Chapter III put a special emphasis on the political activities and developments of religious liberalism after Mustafa Kemal and under Democrats till first military coup of 1960. The 1950 election brought the Democratic Party into power. Democrats were the first to dare to challenge the Kemalist reforms. They said true secularism was not implemented in Turkey. They tried to reinterpret the principles of secularism that had been exploited for more than ten years especially under Ismet Inonu's reign.

During the Democrats rule *Kuran* was broadcast over the state radios and Azan was read in Arabic. Many *Kuranic Schools*, *Imam Hatip Schools* and some *Ilahiyat Faculties* were opened. Many new mosques were built and old ones repaired. The state control over *Islam* was relaxed. All these reforms were an indications of the result of the opinion of the people of Turkey who were searching for some spiritual guidance as well as were ready to find it in an Islamic reform to meet the new conditions of the secular Republic.

This ten years period of Democrats showed a change of policy marking a general resurgence of *Islam* in Turkey. The Democrats were first dare to establish foreign relations with the Muslims countries. On these changes of policies and good relations with Sait Nursi, leader of the *Nurcu movement* with Adnan Menderes and other party leaders, a good criticism is to be seen in this chapter. Republican People's Party bitterly alleged that the Democrats used *Islam* and Said Nursi in their political campaign to gain the support of the Muslims.

In chapter IV development Islamic activism and the role of *Islam* against the communist propaganda has been discussed. From 1960 to 1970 the problems of *Islam* was commonly seen as a matter of party politics and a revival of *tarikats* activity. The achievement of the Justice Party (1965-69) has also been discussed in this chapter with the causes of the first military revolutionary intervention and the preparation of the Constitution of 1961 as well as military rule from 1960-65 alongwith their differences to hand over the government to the civilian rule. Justice Party also used *Islam* in their vote-gaining tactics. They claimed to be successors of DP and continued the policy of their predecessor. During this period religious education continued to develop and many *Imam Hatip Schools, Ilahiyat Fakültesi, Kuranic Schools* were opened and religious literatures and Arabic text of the *Kuran*

were also seen in the shops near mosques. Many new mosques were also built and old ones repaired.

During the 1970's and the 1980's *Islam* occupied an important place in the political and social life of the people. Between the second and third military takeover in 1971 and 1980 no party was able to get a majority of votes therefore there were several coalition governments were formed. A detailed description and contribution of the two Islamic fundamental parties like National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) and National Salvation Party (*Milli Salamat Partisi*) established in 1969 and 1972 respectively, have been discussed in the field of Islamic teaching, religious freedom and moral development. Necmettin Erbakan was a very great leader like Adnan Menderes. He was not against the adaptation of Western technologies but was against western culture, music, dance club etc. He served as deputy Prime Minister under a coalition government. During his short period he fulfilled his promises, regarding religious reforms like *Islamic dress, scarf, derslane*, that he had made to the people. He was the first to dare to replace many statues of Ataturk as well as nude idols from the beaches. He was also very much in favour of the western technologies and *Islamic Common Market*.

The chapter V, is concerned with the Islamic education in Turkey. A detailed account is given of the importance and

development of religious education with a brief account of the system of education under the Ottomans and Mustafa Kemal which makes it helpful to understand the changes that occurred in the *medrese* education system. This chapter also discusses the development of elementary religious education like *Kuranic Schools, Imam Hatip Schools* etc, and religious higher learning like *Faculty of Ilahiyat*, Islamic Research Institute developed under various political parties from 1940's to 1980's.

In this development Democrats was the first to pay their attention towards the importance of religious education because the misinterpretation of secularism and complete rejection of the Islamic education and values under Republican Peoples' Party had caused moral crises and also improvised culture. There was a great shortage of religious preachers and *Imams*. As the Democrats got hold of power in 1950 they made religious education compulsory and adopted necessary measures for its over all developments. In providing the religious and moral education the role of Sait Nursi cannot be ignored. All these educational institutions were governed under the strict control of the auspicious Ministry of Education. During the reign of Necmettin Erbakan religious Institutions were supported financially by the government and also privately.

In chapter VI, development of religious literature has been given adequate space. In this chapter the importance of religious or Islamic literature has been probed and the roles of the different political parties like DP, JP, RPP, MNP and MSP have been discussed particularly with respect to their developments and the encouragement they provided for Islamic ideologies. The other government departments such as Ministry of Education, Directorate of religious affairs and *Faculty of Ilahiyat* have also been given good space because of their liberal contribution in the development of religious literature. These departments provided a good quantity of religious literature for children and women for their moral encouragement.

In the chapter VII the religious life and activities of the Turkish Muslims has been described at length. Along with religious beliefs like *Namaz*, *Zakat*, *Hajj*, fasting, religious festivals (*Kurban Bayrami* and *Şeker Bayrami*), the role of the *Sufi Orders*, as well as other Muslims minor and major practices, i.e. marriage, divorce, and family law alongwith the ritual customs and internal decorations of the houses and shops of the Muslims has been elaborated. The above practices of the Muslims of Turkey have been observed keenly by foreign writers like Feroz Ahmed, M. Rashid Feroze, Paul Doumant, Jean-Paul Roux and Şerif Mardin etc. who spent a good portion of their life in Turkey for different purposes. In

this chapter the differences in the religious practices of the Muslims in the developed cities and those of the villages are marked out.

In the last chapter, reactionary religious movements like *Ticaniye*, *Sulemanciler*, and *Nurcular* etc who played important roles in preaching Islamic beliefs and teachings has been discussed. All these movements have emerged in reaction to the secular reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. All these movements or *tarikats* had been banned by the law passed by the GNA under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. But as the multi-party system was introduced in Turkey they emerged out of their holes and began to preach Islamic beliefs among the Muslims of Turkey. Of them *Nurcular* were very important. In this chapter *Nurcular* have been discussed in detail because of their active role in spreading Islamic education and teachings. Sait Nursi has played an important role in revitalizing *Islam* in which he was encouraged by the Democratic leader Adnan Mendres and later on by the MSP's leader, Necmettin Erbakan.. His *Risale-i Nur* served an important role in raising the moral of the Muslims and providing good information about religious teachings and Islamic beliefs. Necmettin Erbakan's attitude was very liberal towards the *Nurcular*. Under his rule *Tarbiyathane* for the moral teaching of the Muslims were opened at many places in Turkey.

These political leaders realized that *Islam* could not be neglected in Turkey's public affairs. Whatever western influences remain visible in the large cities are superficial and limited in their scope. The preponderant majority of the Turks have been forever practicing *Islam* in their daily lives even after the introduction of secular reforms in the Turkish Republic. The growing interest in the Islamic teachings and literature goes to show that *Islam* answers the spiritual and moral needs of the Turkish people which also is an indication of the importance of *Islam* in the national life of the Turkish people.

The religious atmosphere is noticeable everywhere and, thus it seems reasonable to believe that in the following years the condition of *Islam* is bound to improve further. It is important to note here that the village people have greater religious fanaticism than the urban. Thus, from birth to death, the life of the majority of Turks of today continues to be punctuated and illumined by *Islam*.

CHAPTER – 1

THE OTTOMAN TURKS AND ISLAM.

The Turks are a people who speak Turkish and live in Turkey.¹ Both Ottoman² and Turk³ are terms of comparatively recent usage. The Ottoman Turks had identified themselves with Islam – submerged their identity in *Islam* to a greater extent than perhaps any other Islamic people.

The name of the Ottoman Turks is not entirely unfamiliar to the reader by now. In either ninth or tenth century, the Turks of Central Asia were converted to *Islam* and in the eleventh century they began to push their way into South-Eastern Russia and Persia.⁴ In the almost continuous

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- 1 The name Turkey has been given to Turkish –speaking Anatolia almost since first conquest by the Turks in the eleventh century in a chronicle of the Crusade of Barbarossa of 1190. By the thirteenth century the terms is already in common use among the Western authors. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961) p.1. But the Turks themselves did not adopt it as the official name of their country until 1923.
 - 2 The word ‘Ottoman’ is the Europeanized form of Osman, the founder of the Turkish dynasty, so the Turkish tribesmen of Osman were called ‘*Osmanli*’. They belonged to the Kayi clan of the *Oghuz* Turks who had fled before the Mongol armies.
 - 3 It is curious that while in Turkey the word Turkey almost went out of use, in the West it became a synonym for Muslim, and a Western convert to Islam was said to have ‘turned Turk’ even when the conversion took place in Fez or Isfahan.
 - 4 Turks came to Islam in different ways. In their original Central Asian homeland they had followed shamanistic practices and in the course of time had come into contact with Buddhism, Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity. But when they started moving westward and encountered Arabs carrying their new faith into and beyond Iran it was

struggle, Turkish soldiers proved to be effective advanced guards for *Islam*. The Turks who came into contact with *Islam* accepted the Sunni faith and were fanatically loyal to its tenets and institutions. The nature of their attachment to *Islam* was more emotional than rational; it sprang more from a sense of loyalty than from understandings.⁵

Establishment of an Islamic State:

The Ottoman State had emerged as the result of an Islamic movement under the leadership of Ghazi Osman (1299-1326), founder of the Ottoman dynasty, towards the end of the thirteenth century at Eskisehir, located in North Western Anatolia. The *Sufis* and *Ghazis* of Anatolia played a major role in this movement. In this movement *Ulema* also came forward for moral support. Early Ottoman rulers were chiefs of the *Şeljuqi* monarchs whose capital was Konya.⁶ They derived their title of Sultan from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo.⁷

Islam that made the greatest impact upon them and thereby changed the course of history. For more information about the story of involvement from the adoption of vicarious forms of Islam by Turks throughout their rise and decline. See J. D. Norton, "The Turks and Islam", in Stewart Sutherland, Leslie Houlden and others (eds.), *The World's Religions* (London, 1988), pp. 190-400. A good account of conversion of Islam by Turks has given by S. Fayyaz Mehmud, *A Short History of Islam* (Karachi, 1960), pp. 351-53.

5 Yahya Armajani and T. M. Ricks, *Middle East: Past and Present* (New York, 1986), P. 109.

6 The city where the famous Turkish mystic philosopher and poet, Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi lived and died.

7 Tamara Talbot Rice, *The Seljuks in Asia Minor* (London, 1961), pp. 13- 14. Sultan Selim I (1517-1520) was the first Sultan who assumed the title *Caliph* in 1517 when he conquered Egypt and brought the Abbasid Caliph Mustasim to Constantinople.

For six centuries the Ottomans were almost constantly at war with the Christian West. The Ottoman Sultan was the first who attempted to impose the Islamic rule on a large part of Europe⁸ but the later Sultans did not maintain it strictly⁹. In the Ottomans chronicles the territories of the Empire are referred to as *the land of Islam*, its sovereign as the *Padishah of Islam*, its armies as *the soldiers of Islam*, its religious head as the *Şeyhul Islam*, its people thought of themselves first and foremost as Muslims.¹⁰

In its formative stages, the Ottoman State was of a far more democratic character in comparison with its contemporaries, since its rulers depend for their power on the support of their people and the *Ulema*. But when the Ottoman dominions expanded the rulers became autocrats whose sole aim was to conquer alien land at every cost.¹¹ This trend is signified by the Ottoman policy to look to the West, not only

8 Murat I (1359 – 1389) was the first Turkish Sultan who made the *Osmanlis* (Ottomans) a European power and took over the Byzantine territories, first in Western Anatolia and then in Southern Europe.

9 The later Sultan was Mehmet II (1451-1481) known as *Fateh* (conqueror). He laid down a law for his successors prescribing that the heir to the Ottoman throne should strangle his brothers in the interests of the state. The other Sultan was Suleyman the Magnificent who had also introduced secular laws under the title *Kanun*. This tendency of the rulers to make laws the jurisdiction of the *Seriat* not only went almost unnoticed by the *Ulema* but also approved by the *Ulema*. For the liberal attitude of Sultan Mehmet, see Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York, nd.), pp. 747-748

10 Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

11 M. Rashid Feroze, *Islam and Secularism in Post Kemalist Turkey* (Pakistan, 1976), pp. 11 – 12. For the detail of the establishment of the

for expansion but also for commercial as well as cultural relations. This trend of conquest gave rise to the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century when Mehmet II (1451- 1481) conquered Constantinople in 1453, which marked the beginning of a new chapter in Turkish history.¹²

The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 marked the point of a pro- western attitude of the Turkish ruling hierarchy. Mehmet II (1451-1481) known as *Fateh*¹³ had undoubtedly set a precedent of the generous treatment of non-Muslims by granting freedom and cultural autonomy to his non-Muslim subjects in an Islamic State in the contemporary world.¹⁴

In the fifteenth century European influences came to stay in the palace of the Ottoman Sultan, not only in the upbringing of the rulers but also in their flesh and blood. Thus the Turkish ruling institution became westernized while it remained camouflaged under the paraphernalia of an Islamic state. The Ottoman State under Sultan Mehmet II (1451-81)

ottoman dynasty see. Yahya Armajani and T. M. Ricks, *op.cit*, pp. 110-114.

12 *Ibid.* p.10

13 Mehmet II known as *Fateh* after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 which marks the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the victory of Islam over Christianity.

14 After the conquest he allowed the major religious group to establish their own self governing communities, under the leadership of their religious chiefs, each retaining its own civil laws, tradition and language under the general protection of Sultan. For liberal attitude of Sultan Mehmet; see, Edward Gibbon, *op.cit.*, vol., 3 , pp. 747ff.

was already getting organized on the lines of a modern state.¹⁵ Three treaties were signed¹⁶ but these treaties weakened the Turkish economy and provided European powers with pretexts for interfering with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. This direct interference in the Ottoman affairs and these treaties had served as an important media of western cultural infiltration and played an important role in the decline of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

During the Sixteenth Century under Suleyman I¹⁸(1520 – 1566), Ottoman Empire reached its greatest strength and zenith. The golden period provided an aspect of permanence

15 Gifted with a keen intellectual curiosity Mehmet II desired to make a comparative study of the two great religions as well as of metaphysics and reason. He tried to create a true interaction of Islamic and Western culture and made a sincere effort to replace dogmatic by critical thought. But his efforts did not produce any lasting results and Turkey once more returned to the obscurantism of the Middle Ages which was to continue until the nineteenth, even the twentieth century. See Maurice Parmelle, *The History of Modern Thought* (London, 1961), p.493.

16 The first treaty of capitulation was signed with France in 1536. This was followed by similar treaties with Austria and England in 1567 and 1592 respectively.

17 Tarik Zafer Tunaya, *Turkiyenin Siyasi Hayatinda Batililasma Hareketleri* (Istanbul, 1959) p. 19.cf. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

18 Suleyman I (1520 –66) was known to his people by the honorific title of *al- Qanuni* (the lawgiver) while the Europeans called him *the magnificent*. Most of the North African conquests were achieved during his reign. Hungary, Vienna and Rhodes were also besieged under his regime. He ruled from Buda to Basra from Algeria to Armenia and from Azov to Aden. For details see, S. Lane Poole, *The Story of the Barbary Corsairs*, New York, 1891.

and luster to the Empire, but also marked the beginning of a long decline in imperial power and influence.¹⁹

Period of Decline:

It is very difficult to find the real date of the decline but internal as well as external causes, which were interrelated with each other at many points, made the decline obvious.²⁰ In this decline historians differ in their views since the causes are not easy to distinguish. In its long decline the Ottoman Empire had lost vast territories.²¹ Being continuous at war with Russia and European neighbours Ottoman economy had collapsed totally. They borrowed money from foreign banks and governments who later took the control of the state.²²

19 The period from 1451 to 1466 was called the golden period in which Mehmet Fateh (1451-81), Bayezit (1481-1512), Selim (1512- 1520), and Suleyman I (1520-1566), ruled. After Suleyman this Empire began to decline. Since Suleyman withdrew himself from the administrative and public affairs to enjoy the pleasure of his harem. The role of Roxelana Khurram, the Russian favorite of Sultan Suleyman in moulding the state policies to her own advantages is too well known.

20 R H. Davison, *op.cit.*, p. 54

21 Through the series of the treaties like *Treaty of Carlowitz* in 1699, *Treaty of Passrowitz* in 1718, *Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca* in 1744 with Russia and *Treaty of Adrianople* in 1829 with England and France, many parts of the Ottoman Empire had been lost. In so far as significant territorial loss may be taken as a measure, the treaty of *Carlowitz* of 1699 provides a more rational starting point for decline. If internal decay rather than territorial loss be taken as the index, the starting date may be pushed back into Suleyman's own reign. See for more information about the causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, R. H. Davison, *Turkey* (New Jersey, 1968), pp.53-66. M Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, pp. 12-15.

22 Sultan Mehmud had sent Damad Halil Pasa, Commander in Chief of the Ottoman Navy, to Russia in order to negotiate with Czar Nicolas I for the reduction in the amount of reparations—10 million Turkish Liras—promised to be paid by Turkey to Russia, under Article 9 of the *Treaty of Adrianople* of 1829. This amount was reduced to 8 million Turkish

Continuous defeats and humiliation by Russia and European neighbours had given rise to an inferiority complex among the Ottoman rulers. This inferiority complex led them to a formal recognition of Western superiority in arms and techniques of warfare.²³ They believed that the Ottoman Empire could survive only by adopting Western ideas and techniques. So they began the modernization in the armed forces and administrative system on the European lines.²⁴

Period of Westernization:

The later Ottoman Sultans checked weaknesses within the Empire but none paid attention towards the economic reforms, which could prove helpful to stop the decline. With the advent of the French Revolution, the attention of Sultan Selim III (1789 – 1808), who was an ardent supporter of the

Liras when Halil Paşa submitted his report to Sultan Mehmet II, he recommended: "If we cannot Europeanize ourselves, our doom is certain. Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanli Imparatorluğunda Inkilâp Hareketleri Ve Milli Mücadele* (Istanbul, 1956), p., 27. Cf M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p 9 and see also Y. Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

23 M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

24 A number of books have been written since 17th century by Turkish writers putting forward their suggestions for reforms with a view to strengthening the Ottoman Empire. Among the earliest may be mentioned in Hacı Halifa's , *Dustur al- 'amal li - Islah al - Halal* , written in about 1653, *Rasila of Kocu Bey* , a memorandum by Ibrahim Muteferrika presented to Sultan Mahmut I (1730-54) and the *Risala of Koca Sekbambaşi*. Among later work may be mentioned , *Nasaih ul Vuzera Vel Umera* by Sari Mehmet Paşa the *Defterdar* . Walter Livingston Wright has published the Turkish text of this work along with an English translation from Princeton in 1935, under the little 'Ottoman State Craft'. Cf. M. Rashid Feroze,*op.cit.*, p. 13.

French,²⁵ was turned to the West. He was a well-educated young man who was very much convinced that without military modernization the Empire could not regain its lost territories.²⁶ So Sultan Selim continued his predecessor's²⁷ policies to modernize Turkish army and was able to separate the administrative and military function from the army. He succeeded to form a new corps on French pattern, called *Nizam- i Cedid Ordusu*²⁸ (Army of the New Order) which was separated from the rest of the Ottoman army both in command and financing.

The Sultan, however, lacked the sanction of the *Ulema* who along with the Janissaries, opposed these western reforms.²⁹ But *Şariat* continued to be the supreme law of the

25 Diplomatic relation between France and Turkey had been strained ever since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 during the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789 - 1808). B. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 80

26 Yaha Armajani & T.M. Ricks, *op.ci.*, p. 161.

27 Sultan Abdül Hamit I (1774-1808) was the first Sultan to conceive the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. In order to stem the rot he, in 1774, invited European experts and artisans to train the Turkish army. L. S. Stavrians, (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1959), p 8

28 Whole series of new instructions and regulations came to be known collectively as the *Nizam-i-Cedid*. It is both interesting and significant that the terms *Nizam- i -Cedid* originally applied to the regulations of the new system, came to be used almost exclusively of the new regular troops established under it. *Nizam -i - Cedid Ordusu* had actually been made by Selim III's grand vezir, Koja Yusuf Pasa in 1791 and were trained by a French advisor, the Hungarian- born de- Tott, who was employed towards the end of the war to train artillery engineering units. *Nizam-i -Cedid Ordusu* was given the latest weapons used by the European army. R. H. Davison, *Turkey*, pp. 70-71 and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.* pp., 56-58.

29 Selim III established military schools under foreign advisors and revived the printing press, which was bought by Jewish refugees

Ottoman Empire. Without the approval of *Şeyhul Islam*, the chief representative of the *Ulema*, no innovation could be introduced by the Sultan.³⁰ Selim III failed because of the opposition of military and religious vested interest, the Janissaries (*Yeniçeri*)³¹ and the *Ulema*. The *Şeyhul Islam* issued a *fetva* deposing Sultan Selim in 1807 and elevating his submissive cousin Mustafa IV to the throne. Many, however, were not satisfied with this arrangement and after a short period of confusion, Mustafa was deposed in favor of his younger brother Mehmed II (1807-1839).³²

from Spain in 1493. More translations of French military or technical books were undertaken. He invited French men to Istanbul for official or unofficial reasons. He also tried to reduce the number of *Jannissaries*. This was not liked by *Jannissaries* and the *Ulema*. So the *Şeyhul Islam* issued a *fetva* against the Sultan and deposed him and his cousin Mustafa succeed him. M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 13 and K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 7 On these reforms see, Frank S. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reforms Movement* (Cambridge, 1942), pp. 25-38; Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey", *Journal of the World History*, July, 1953, pp. 105ff

30 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 13

31 Murat I began to organize a new military force composed of "Slaves of the Porte". These men came to the ruler as his *pencik*, or one-fifth share, of booty captured from the enemy. When these youths came to the Sultan, they were educated in Turkish language, Islam, Arabic and other characteristics of the Ottoman way. Then they were given military training and organized as infantry called *Yeniçeri* (New Force) or Janissary Corps or as Cavalry, called *Sipahis*. S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976), Vol. I, p. 26.

32 Yaha Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

Western Reform:

It was Sultan Mehmut II³³ (1807 – 1839) who introduced Western reforms outside the jurisdiction of *Şeriat*. He ordered the Janissaries (*Yeniceri*) to adopt the European form of military drill and weapons but Janissaries refused to use it and revolted against him. In this open clash between the Janissaries and the Sultan, the *Ulema* opposing the Westernisation³⁴ also came forward for the moral support of the Janissaries. Sultan Mehmut II (1807 – 1839) succeeded in breaking the power of the *Ulema* as well as in wiping out the Janissaries in 1826.³⁵ He replaced it with a European trained

33 Mehmut II some times described as Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire. He was born in 1784. His mother was French His father was Abdul Hamit I. There is a vast literature on the Ottoman reforms inaugurated under Mehmut II and his successor though as yet no comprehensive monographic treatment. The general survey, by a Turkish historian using both Turkish and Western sources given by Karal in his three volumes contributed to the large-scale Ottoman history published in Ankara by the Turkish Historical Society: *Osmanli Tarihi* V (1789-1856), 1947; VI (1856-61), 1954; VII (1861-76), 1956. Cf. Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 75

34 The *Ulema* opposed to any innovation coming from the West. It was generally believed by the *Ulema* that the gate of *Ijtihad* was closed. Islamic law had thus become inflexible and it was the policy of the *Ulema* the learned class in the Ottoman Empire.

35 Sultan Mehmut was fully aware of an acute awareness that his survival depended on the replacement of the Janissaries; the submission of the clergy who had been the faithful ally of the janissaries in opposing western reforms and on reasserting his rule over rebellious administrators in various provinces of the Empire. On Mehmut II and his attempt to strengthen the authority of the central government. See, A Slade, *Records of Travel in Turkey and Greece, 1829-1831*, (London, 1833), Vol. I, pp. 113ff; H. Luke, *Old Turkey and the New*, pp. 34-35; Bailey, *British Policy*, pp.13-33, 34-36, 271, 276; D. A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East* (Princeton, 1956), p.17. and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 77-83

army named *Asakir-i Mansure Muhammediye*.³⁶ After that he took all power into his own hands and dissolved the dervish brotherhood of the *Bektaşîş*.³⁷ He abolished the feudal system and thus was able to crush the power of the landlords who were previously employed to raise the army. He established the Directorate of *Avkaf*³⁸ through which the collection and expenditure of *waqf* revenue had come directly under the supervision of the Sultan.³⁹

Instead of improving the Islamic institution his policies put an end to the supremacy of the *Şeriat* in formulating the state policies. He tried to replace it with European institutions. Finally Western reforms were declared to be

36 For the training of his army officers experts were also invited from Britain, Russia and Australia. His officers were introduced to the latest weapons that were used by the European army.

37 A month later, on the pretext that they had stirred up revolts of protest against the destruction of Janissaries. They for centuries intimately associated with the corps of Janissaries. With the support of the chief *Müfti* and chief *Ulema*, Sultan Mehmud outlawed the brotherhood destroyed its convents publicly executed three of its leaders and exiled the rest. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of the Modern Turkey*, p, 78. And for the best study about *Bektashi* order, see, Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, London, 1937. See also M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 20.

38 From 1813 onward Mehmud gradually acquired all the revenues from the *Wakf* in his own hands. By a *ferman* in 1826 the administration of *Wakf* was put under the control of a separate Ministry, called, *Ewkaf-i Humayün Neareti* in 1831 and all the official and unofficial *Wakf* were put under the care of *Nezaret* The *Ulema* who were influential in government affairs lost their control over the *awqaf* that was abolished by Sultan Mehmud II and their salaries were now paid by the Ottoman exchequer. In other words *Ulema* become subservient to Sultan. For details see. J. Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundation in the Ottoman Empire* , London, 1987, and see also M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, 37)

39 B. Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 92. and J. Barnes, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-76

entirely outside the jurisdiction of the *Şeriat*. His reforms paved the way for the implementation of programme of Westernization and clear the ground for his successors by removing two great obstacles ie. the Janissaries and the provincial lords.⁴⁰

Tanzimat and Social Justice:

Sultan Mehmud's reign ended with the beginning of the Tanzimat Era⁴¹ which was the second phase of Ottoman reforms. Tanzimatists wanted to recreate the state and to amalgamate East and West.⁴² Their aim was, first of all, to create a modern national army, then to use it to restore the power of central government over the provinces and to create a new frame of work of centralized administrative and secular laws.⁴³ A Tanzimatist summarized this mentality by this simple frank sentence "there is no means to save the Ottoman State save by imitating the West."⁴⁴

40 L. S. Stavrians (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1959), p. 40.

41 *Tanzimat* (Regulation) is the name given to the programmes of reform that were inaugurated in November 1839. The term *Tanzimat* is derived from the root meaning 'order'. A collective studies and surveys on various aspects of the reforms by different authors, will be found in the volume *Tanzimat*, published in 1940 by the Turkish Ministry of Education on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the first great reforming edict. Cf. Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.* p. 75.

42 Halida Edib, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* (New Delhi, 1935), p. 67.

43 K. H. Karpat, *The Ottoman State and Its Place in the World History* (Leiden, 1974), p. 37

44 Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism" in Richard N. Frye, (ed.) *Islam and the West* (Netherlands, 1957), p. 61.

The guiding genius of the early Tanzimat was Mehmud's foreign minister, Mustafa Reşit Paşa⁴⁵ (1846 – 1858), a Westernized Turkish diplomat and grand *Vezir*, who happened to be in London seeking British aid against Mehmet Ali⁴⁶ (1805 – 48) at the time Abdül Mecit I (1839 – 1861) took over.⁴⁷ Advised by the British and the Grand *Vezir*, Raşit Paşa, the new Sultan had issued a proclamation called The Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber (*Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane*)⁴⁸ often

45 Mustafa Reşit Paşa (1846-1858) was born in 1800 A.D. in Istanbul. He was well read and farsighted statesman. He had served as Ottoman Ambassador to Paris as well as *Grand Vezir* no less than six times between 1846 and 1858. He was anxious to save his country from what had overtaken the French monarchy. He knew French very well and was quite familiar with European politics.

46 Mehmet Ali (1805-48) was the most famous modernizer of the nineteenth century in Middle Eastern history. He remained an Ottoman Governor of Egypt from 1805-1848 and was the founder of the dynasty that was to rule the country for over a century until 1952-53. In 1952 Gamal Abdul Nasser and the Free Officers deposed King Faruq and his infant son Ahmed Al-Faruq II and the following year established a republic. For their genealogy and dates of their reign. See Donald Malcom Reid, "Muhammad Ali Dynasty", in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, by John Esposito, New York, 1995, pp. 166-67; L. Hoskins Halford, "Some recent work on Muhammad Ali and Modern Egypt", *American Historical Journal*, March, 1932, pp. 52-103; Ehud R Toledano, "Muhammad Ali Pasha", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, Leiden, 1960 vol. 7. Pp. 423-431; Vatikiotis, P. J., *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, 4th edition, Baltimore, 1999 and also see, J. H. Kramers, "Muhammad Ali Pasha", *EI Vol. VI*, pp. 681-684 He had invited French advisor to modernize his army. He was known as the leader of Albanian and Bosnian soldiers.

47 This New Sultan at the age of 16 was determined to continue his father's work and was supported in this by his mother, the *Valide Sultan Bazm-i Alem*, a remarkable woman who exercised considerable influence over her son and consequently over the government of the Empire. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 104

48 This edict was Resit Pasa's creation and was publicly read by him in open space of *Gülhane* along the *Topkapi* palace wall, the Sultan being present. This *Khatt (Hatt)* built on the innovation of Mehmud II in the later years of whose reign the term *Tanzimati Hayriyye* (Beneficent

called by Turks the *Tanzimat Fermansi*, in which for the first time equality among the Ottoman subjects was declared to be the official policy in these words: " These imperial concessions are extended to all our subjects of whatever religion or sect they may be"⁴⁹

The *Hatt* made promises in three broad areas: there should be security of life, honour, and property; all classes of people to be treated alike; trials to be public no-one to be put to death except after a regular sentence and all confiscation abolished; a system of collecting fixed taxes should replace tax-farming; military conscription should be regularized and the term of service reduced from lifetime to four or five years. The most striking promise was that the reforms would apply without exception to " the people of Islam and other peoples among the subjects of our imperial sultan".⁵⁰

orderings) had already designated administrative changes. For more detail see: Goldschmit Jr. Arthur, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (London,1988), p.165; .K.H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 10; Barnard Lewis, *op.cit.* pp.104-105; R. H. Davison, "Tanzimat" in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New edition, Vol. X, (Leiden, 2000), pp.201-203; Cengiz Orhanlu, " Khatt-i Humayun and Khatt-I Sherif," Vol. IV, p. 1131

49 R. H . Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (New Jersey, 1963), p. 37. and *Turkey*. P. 78

50 R. .H. Davison, " Tanzimat", *op.cit.*, p. 201; H. Scheel, " The Ottoman History from 1774-1918". In *Neuzeit the Fgeschichtedet Islamischen Lander*, part III tr.,. And ed., F.R.C. Bagley (Leiden, 1959) pp. 12-13; Mezheruddin Siddiqui, *Development of Islamic State and society*,(Islamabad, 1956), pp. 24 and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-107

The *Hatt-i Şerif* was more important since through it the first time non – Muslim millet⁵¹ were enlisted in military services and provincial *Meclis* or council of the governor were also represented by them. These promises of *Hatt-i Şerif* proved more realistic to them.⁵²

A French based provincial administration was introduced to replace the old pattern. In 1840 *Kanun-i Ceraim*, a new penal code was put into effect. It was influenced by French Law, although it remained within the framework of the *Şeriat*. A commercial code based on the French was also introduced to the Council of Justice⁵³ in 1841. The *Ulema* vehemently opposed the legal reform considering it as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of *Şeriat* under the pressure of the *Ulema*⁵⁴, Sultan Abdul Mecit had to dismiss Mustafa Reşit

51 Jews, Christians, Armenians , Albanians and Greeks were considered included in non- Muslim millets .they were given more rights to encompass all segments of the society Millet was replace by *Osmanlilik* (Ottomanism)

52 R.. H. Davison,*op.cit*, p. 44

53 In 1854 the council of Justice was split into two bodies. Henceforward the Council of Justice was to deal strictly with legal matters. While another body known as *Meclis –i Tanzimat* (The High Council of Reforms) was entrusted with the responsibility for implementing the reforms program. It was this council which played the leading role during the *Tanzimat* period. But again in 1868 this High Council was split into two bodies *Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye* for quasi-legislative and judicial function and *Sura-yi Davlet* for administrative matter formed on the line of French Conseil, d'tat. See B. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 107-108, 114, 119 and Şerif Mardin " Some Explanatory Notes on the Origins of the " Mecelle", *The Muslim World* Vol. 51, 1961, No. 4, pp. 274-279.

54. By the eighteenth century, the *Ulema* had reached the apes of their wealth, privilege and political power. They constituted the hereditary aristocracy in the great 'mollaship' known as 'the *Mavalizadeler*' in

Paşa. The reforms were interrupted from 1841 to 1846, when Reşit paşa return as minister of Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Prime Minister in 1846. But once again the religious opposition in 1852 dismissed him.⁵⁵

In 1845 stressing the importance of the education Sultan issued another rescript and a council of Public Instruction was formed.⁵⁶ For this purpose *Ruşdiye* (secondary) schools were established in various parts of the Empire.⁵⁷ Although the Sultan was much aware of the importance of the religious education but he wanted to keep them out side the influence and approach of the *Ulema*. So he was interested mainly in the establishment of new secular schools.⁵⁸

the Ottoman history. They participated in political maneuvers in the Empire. Their "Oath of allegiance" (*Bayah*) confirmed the sovereignty of each new Sultan. Any opposition group, who wanted to remove some political figure including Sultans from their posts, had to co-operate with these *Ulema* and justify their action. See. Seyfettin Ersahin, " The Ottoman Ulema and the Reforms of Mehmud II, Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 20

- 55 Although Abdul Mecit I (1839 -1561) was rather in favour of the *Tanzimat* but religious opposition compelled him to dismiss Mustafa Reşit Paşa in order to introduce mixed Civil Code and Criminal Courts in 1847 and Commercial Code in 1850. See also, Lewis, *op.cit.*, pp. 105 - 116.
- 56 After the promulgation of the Rescript of 1845, this council of public instruction was raised to the status of a Ministry in 1847.
- 57 The word "*ruşdiye*" derived from *rusd* which means adolescence. The first *Ruşdiye* School had been opened in Istanbul in 1847. From 1875 separate military *ruşdiye* schools were established to prepare for admission to military high school and colleges. Under Abdul Hamit rusdiye school were set up in the centers of all the 29 *vilayets* and 6 independent *mutasarrikliks* of the Empire as well as many *Kaza* centers in Turkey proper. For detail see, Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 83, 112 and 178.
- 58 They included the Schools of Finance (1878); Law (1878), Fine Arts (1879), Commerce (1882), Civil Engineering (1884), Veterinary

There were also periods when foreign intervention called for new efforts in which Allied Powers wanted to bind the Sultan with an international agreement to carry out the reforms.⁵⁹ For this purpose Turkey's allies met in Paris Peace Conference.⁶⁰ To save the Ottoman independence, in this situation, the Sultan issued another new Decree, which is known as *Hatt-i Hümayün*⁶¹ (Noble Script) of February 18, 1856. In the preparation of this noble script Ali Paşa⁶² and

Science (1889), Police (1891), Customs (1892) and improved new Medical School (1898), Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 177

59 Mazheruddin Siddiqi, *op.cit*. p. 243.

60 All the signatories of the Treaty of Paris assumed an obligation to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects and to what extent the Porte was placed under the tutelage of the European powers. Their main purpose was to Christianize the Turks. For details see, H. W. V. Temporally (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. VI, (London, 1924), pp. 1-80.

61 This Noble Rescript of 1856 was a result of European interference in the internal affairs. The Sultan's government tried to convince the European Powers of its sincerity in implementing reforms and ensuring full equal rights to non-Muslims. It marks the real beginning of Westernization in the History of Turkey, not only in technical and administrative matters, but in the cultural field as well. For detail of *Hatt-i Hümayün*, see, R.H. Davison, "Tanzimat", *op.cit*, p. 103-105 and Cengiz Orhonlu, "Khatt-i Humayun and Khatt-i Sherif" *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IV, p. 1131. Serif Mardin, "Tanzimat", *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1995, pp. 183-86

62 Ali Paşa's full name was Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa (1815 – 1871), son of an Istanbul shopkeeper. He started his education as a *medrese* student. He transferred into the newly developed scribal service of the Porte on September 1, 1830. He learned French in the translation office and rose in its service, going as a junior office clerk on missions to Vienna (1835 –1836). He was Reşit's personal scribe and translator during the later embassy to London. He served as ambassador to London from 1841 to 1844, and foreign minister two times (1846 –48) and (1848- 52). He remained as a member of the principal legislative body of that time and supreme council of judicial ordinances, *Meclisi Vala-yi Ahkam-ı Adliye*. For the best study on the life and achievements of Ali Paşa. See, H. Bowen, "Ali Pasha

Fuat Paşa⁶³ played a leading role. This Noble Script reaffirmed the promises that Sultan had already made in *Hatt-i Şerif* of 1839.⁶⁴ It went even farther by assuring non-Muslims religious liberty and full equality in the administration of justice, taxation, public employment and military services as well as admission to the civil and military schools⁶⁵. This gave a great shock to the Muslim population of Turkey. Cevdet Paşa⁶⁶ portrayed the popular Muslim feeling against the

Muhammad Amin", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I (London, 1960), pp. 396-398 and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

- 63 Fuat Paşa, Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Paşa (1815 – 1869) was from an *Ulema* family and received *medresa* education. With his family support he studied in Medical School (*Tibhane-i-Amire*). He knew French and became the Scriber to Tahir Paşa the then governor of Tunis from 1832 to 1836. Fuat Paşa entered his service only in 1837. He rose to become first translator of the Porte. He also served as a foreign minister five times and twice Grand Vizier, for more detail about his life and achievement, See, R. H. Davison, "Fuad Pasha" *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* New edition, Vol. II, pp. 934-936. And R. H. Davison, *Reforms in the Ottoman empire 1856-1876*, chap. 3 and index; R. H. Davison, "The 'Question of Fuad Pasha's Political Testament'", *Bulleten*, XXIII/89, 1959, pp.119-136; T. W. Reiker, *The Making of Rumania*, (London, 1931), pp. 55-59, 75, 155-180 and index; Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East* (London, 1936), pp. 262, 267-68, 306-310 and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 115-21.
- 64 H. Scheel, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 65 Through this rescript *Jizya*, levied on non-Muslims for their protection and *bedel*, exemption tax charged from non-Muslim for their exemption from military service was abolished in 1855. See Alford Bon, *State and Economy in Middle East* (London, 1955), p. 13.
- 66 Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895), a famous historian as well as educationist and Jurist was appointed head of *Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliya*, a post equivalent to the Ministry of Justice. He had served as Minister of Justice and he presided over the *Mecelle* Committee which drafted the new civil code *Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliye* based on Hanafi law. It became the landmark in the history of Islamic Jurisprudence in 1876. It remained effective until its abolition in 1926 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Cevdet Paşa called the Westernizers *mutefernicin* (Europeanizer). See for detail, Serif Mardin, "The Origin of the Meccelle" *The Muslim World*, Vol. 51, No.3-4, October 1961, pp.

reforms. He said, it was a great day of mourning for the Muslims of Turkey as they had lost their rights, which their forefathers had won with their blood.⁶⁷

On the whole the *Tanzimat* were carried out in an uncertain and troubled atmosphere in which Grand Vezir, and Reşit Paşa , by drawing up the characters had served dual purpose for satisfying the European powers whose intervention had become more and more serious in the domestic affairs and to restore confidence in the home government.⁶⁸ To carry out these reforms which were revolutionary for the Ottoman Empire, Reşit Paşa believed that only liberal reforms would save the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹

These reforms and pronouncement contained in it self weaknesses and contradictions which were to carry disintegration to its logical end. Tanzimat reforms ignored the rising tide of Nationalism among the non-Muslims and failed to appreciate the effects of reforms based on the millet system.⁷⁰ These reforms and pronouncements could not stop the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

189-196, 274-279 For the detail about his life and works as well as achievements. See. H. Bowen, "Ahmad Djevdet Pasha", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* , New edition , Vol. I, pp. 284-286

67 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), P. 18.

68 R. H. Davison, "Tanzimat", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New edition, Vol. X, (Leiden, 2000), p. 201.

69 Goldschmidt Jr. Arthur, *op. cit.*, p.165.

70 During the *Tanzimat Era* two ideas, democracy and nationalism emerged. The reformists took up democracy but Nationalism was

Young Ottomans and Constitutional Reform:

The most important opponents of *Tanzimat* were a group of young intellectuals who called themselves the “New Ottomans” (*Yeni Osmanlilar*) later they were known as ‘Young Ottomans’ (*Genç Osmanlilar*)⁷¹ to distinguish them from the Tanzimatists. They accused the bureaucrats of being more interested in imitating the West than in creating a new Ottoman society. Their aim was to establish a constitutional monarchy and revitalize *Islam*. So they chose *Islam* as the spiritual ideological base for their Nationalism. Later they put forward the theory of Ottomanism in place of the millet society.⁷² The Young Ottomans based their ideas almost entirely on the Koran.⁷³ The Islamic leaning of the Young Ottomans attracted some of the *Ulema* to their groups, but their number was in significant.

highlighted through out the country among the non-Muslim millet through Western Powers. Halide Edib, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, pp. 68-70 and Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (London, 1971), p. 319.

71 They were familiar with the West and were anxious to shape the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. They were the forerunners of a new breed of young men who were not satisfied with modernizing the machinery of the state, but wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy and revitalized Islam. Yaya Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.* p.170 and for the best study of the Young Ottomans, see. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

72 By emphasizing *Islam* they probably knew that they could not attack the non-Muslim population of the Empire, but most of them revolted anyway. Y. Armajani and T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

73 R. H. Davison, *Turkey*, p. 85.

Amongst the Young Ottoman intellectuals a group⁷⁴ was opposed to the policies of Sultan Abdül Aziz (1861 – 76) Because the main purpose of this movement was to put a check on the powers of the Sultan by establishing a constitutional government. Of these, three were more important than the others namely, Ziya Paşa⁷⁵ (1825 –1880), Ibrahim Şinasi⁷⁶ (1824 – 1871), Namik Kemal⁷⁷ (1840 –1888),the most important theoretician and journalist as well as effective critic of the *Tanzimat*. They published newspapers in

74 Mehmet Bey , Nurri Bey, Reşat Bey, Namik Kemal, Ayatullah Bey, Refik Bey, were the six people who started a literary movement. Fazil Paşa, Ali Suavi, Ibrahim Şinasi were joined later in this group.

75 Ziya Paşa (1825-1880) was a famous Turkish poet and writer and a fast friend of Namik Kemal.

76 Ibrahim Şinasi (1826-1871) first modern journalist, poet as well as literary and linguistic innovator who initiated the movement of democratization of the Turkish language. After a few years in the Turkish Ministry of Education, he worked on the staff of the *Terjümani ahval*, the first non-government newspaper, which was founded in 1860. Later in 1862, he edited his own paper, *Tasviri Efkar*, which was issued until 1925 when it was suppressed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Yahya Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit*, p. 169.

77 Namik Kemal (1840-1888) was a Turkish poet and thinker. He was an Ottoman and is credited with having used the words " *Fatherland*", and *millet* " nation", in their modern sense. Soon the former was used throughout the Middle East and the latter mostly among the non-Arabic-speaking peoples. He fought for a Constitutional regime and infested the idea of liberty, progress and patriotism among the Turkish intelligentsia .see Yahya Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit*, p. 171.

London and Paris.⁷⁸ Namik Kemal criticized the Tanzimatists and wrote:⁷⁹

“ The Tanzimatists cared neither to modernize the state nor to revitalize Islam. They merely helped to produce a degenerate form of the modern state to strip religion of its political support. They created neither a genuine Islamic state nor a genuine Western type of state.”

In his newspaper “*Hurriyet*” which was the organ of the Young Ottomans in which he wrote about the importance of the basic principles of Islam and approached the problems from the Islamic point of view. Unlike the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats who preceded him, he talked about the importance of the *Şeriat* and the observance of the basic principles of Islam.⁸⁰

Young Ottomans saw the reward of their efforts, but they proved to be short lived. On May 30 1876 Midhat Paşa⁸¹ along with a small group of high officials, civil and

78 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.* p. 45 and E. E. Ramsaur Jr., *The Young Turks*, p. 4-7 see also Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 80.

79 Richard N. Frye, *op.cit.*, p .66.

80 Yahya Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

81 For details of the role of Midhat Paşa , see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of the Modern Turkey*, pp. 156ff. And consult Ali Hyder Midhat, *The Life of Midhat Paşa* (London, 1903) R. H. Davison, "Midhat Pasha", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. 6, 1991, pp. 1031-1035 and Fr. Babinger, "Midhat Pasha" *The E. J. Brill's First Encyclopaedia of Islam 1913-36.*, pp. 481-483.

Military, played an important role in the deposition of the Sultan Abdül Aziz⁸² (1861 – 1876) who opposed the measures of reforms and modernization. After his deposition his liberal minded nephew Murat V succeeded the throne for three months. After him Sultan Abdül Hamit II (1876 –1909) ascended to the throne of Turkey who promised Midhat that he would call the representatives of the nations to constitute, the imperial Ottoman parliament.⁸³ The new Sultan promised to ratify the constitution named *Qanun-i Asasi*, which was drafted by Midhat Paşa when he was President of State Council in June 1876 and to constitute the imperial Ottoman parliament. Sultan did as he promised. Ahmet Vefik Paşa⁸⁴ was chosen its first president and Midhat Paşa was appointed as Prime Minister. The parliament tried to limit the Sultan's powers, but the Sultan shelved the constitution and dissolved

82 After the death of Sultan Abdül Mecit , his brother Abdül Aziz ascended the Ottoman throne in 1861. He was anti Western. It also was he who asserted that the Ottoman ruler was not only the head of the Ottoman Empire but the Caliph of the Muslim World . Five days after Abdül Aziz committed suicide. R. H. Davison, " Midhat Pasha", EI p. 1033

83 Mohammad Baraktullah, *The Khilafat* (London, 1924), p. 3 and R. H. Davison " Tanzimat", p. 208 and G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 39.

84 Ahmet Vefik Paşa was a famous diplomat and statesman. He initiated a language reform by producing a number of works, of which his dictionary of Ottoman Turkish became a standard work of reference. Gokalp was also very much influenced by his *Ottoman Dialect Lehceyi_Osmani* . He attached great importance to the development of Turkish grammar and syntax on proper lines. Cf. Rashid Feroze. *op.cit.*, p.54.

the parliament in 1878⁸⁵ and declared state emergency on the ground that they were unable to run a constitutional government.⁸⁶ It was a great setback to the Young Ottomans and their cause. Some of the Young Ottoman thinkers were banished and exiled from the Empire, while others were imprisoned or beheaded. Midhat Paşa⁸⁷ was dismissed and exiled and Sait Paşa⁸⁸ was appointed Grand *Vezir* in his place in 1879.⁸⁹

The Westernization had now entered a crucial stage. Sultan Abdül Hamit II strongly favoured Pan-Islamic ideas and had a dislike for Western reforms. He also seems to have agreed with the Young Ottomans regarding Islam as an element of value in Ottoman society. For this purpose he used

85 The new Ottoman parliament held only two sessions. It was opened on March 19, 1877 and adjourned sine die on February 13, 1878. The first session covered three months and a half and the second session from December 1877 to February 1878. R. H. Davison, "Tanzimat", p. 208.

86 The first Turkish Parliament mustered enough strength to bring about the fall of the cabinet of the Grand *Vezir* Ibrahim Ethem for its failure to carry out administrative responsibilities during the Turko – Russian War started in 1876 by Russia.

87 In 1878 Midhat Paşa was dismissed and banished. Later he was tried on a false charge of having murdered Sultan Abdül Aziz and then exiled to Taif near Mecca and then clandestinely estranged in 1884. The same changes in office took place under Sultan Abdül Aziz. Midhat Paşa (1822-1884) was grand *Vezir* for three weeks in 1873 and for the second time for seven weeks from December 19, 1876 to February 5, 1877. R. H. Davison, "Midhat Pasha", EI. p.1034

88 Sait Paşa (1834 –1914) also known as Küçük Sait. He was grand *Vezir* nine times 1879-80, 1880-82, 1882-85, 1895, 1909-1903, 1908, 1911-1912. For detail see S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976), Vol. I, p. 39

89 G. L. Lewis, *Turkey* , p. 39.

Islam as a flag to rally for his Ottoman–Muslim citizen to a common cause. He seems to have realized that it was the lower – class population that had to be sensitized. His use of Islam was consequently targeted to his humbler subject. He used the *Tarikat* as a means of reaching the people. This was a brilliant move and it is because the Sultan was able to communicate with his lower class citizens with religious propaganda conducted through the *Tarikat* and other channels that they (not the intellectuals) looked back on his reign with much warmth⁹⁰. But the movement for reforms took roots in the soil and could not be reversed.⁹¹ Although the Sultan opposed the idea of Western democracy but he enlightened the system of modern education.⁹²

The Young Ottomans were perhaps the first ideologists of Islam in Modern times that tried to take the best of the West and grafted it into Islam. Although they failed to fit the Islamic theories in the concept of democratic popular government and also failed to graft Western ideologies to the

90 Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey” pp. 141-42.

91 The Young Turks entered a new phase in their struggle for constitutionalism in London, Paris and Geneva. After the coup de‘tat of 1896 they forced the Sultan to reinstate the constitution of 1876. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

92 The *Mulkiye* school was established for the training of civil servants. The *Harbiye* (War College) was extended and several military, civil and medical schools were set up. The first modern Turkish University called *Darul Fünün* was established in 1900, which later came to be known as University of Istanbul, *Ibid.*, p. 47.

body politic of Islam but they were successful in introducing new values to the Turks.⁹³

Young Turks and Islam:

In the mean time the ideological heirs of the Young Turks⁹⁴ had banded together and were plotting to overthrow the Sultan. In 1889 the first organized opposition group named Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)(*Ittihat Ve Teraki Cemiyeti*) played an important role. It was founded under the leadership of Ibrahim Temo⁹⁵ at the Istanbul Imperial Military Medical College. The other group was Ottoman Freedom Association (*Osmanli Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) which was founded by Talat Bey⁹⁶(1874- 1921) at Salonica in 1906. Several

93 Yahya Armajani and T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.*, pp. 171 -72.

94 Young Turks movement was started by those people who were neither young nor ethnically Turkish started this revolution. The name seems to have originated with *La JuneTurquie* founded and published in France by a Morenite Christian Khalil Ghanim. Lois A. Arion and R. P. Mitchell, *The Modern Middle East and North Africa* (New York, 1984) p. 113 For the best study about the Young Turks, see, Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*; E. E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*

95 Ibrahim Temo (Edhem) was an Albanian Christian who was joined with two Kurds Abdullah Cevdet (1869 -1932) and Ishak Sukuli a Circassian student of Mehmet Rasit and Huseyin Zade Ali from Baku, Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 193.

96 He was an Islamised Bulgarian gypsy and a son of a poor family of Edirne. He was a chief clerk in the correspondence division of Salonica directorate of posts and telegraphs. In Salonica he rendered great service to the Young Turk's cause. After the Revolution he became deputy for Edirne in all three Parliaments, Minister of the Interior in a number of Cabinets, and leader of the main faction in the Committee. Became Grand *Vezir* in 1917, resigning in 1918 at the dissolution of committee. Escaped to Europe and was assassinated in Berlin on 16 March 1921. Said to be a shrewed politician, he was also a man possessing great charm and personal integrity. For details about Talat Bey. See Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, p. 180 and

groups emerged but CUP survived because other groups joined it.⁹⁷ This CUP was a direct extension of the reform movement of the nineteenth century, especially the Young Ottomans and like them, it was concerned only with the problem of how to save the Empire.⁹⁸

Its basic programme was constitutionalism, Ottomanism and Freedom, which could be achieved by replacing the Sultan. Ahmet Riza⁹⁹ (1859 -1950) and Mehmet Murat Efendi¹⁰⁰ (1853 -1912) became the main leaders, who played

Feroz Ahmed, "Talat Bey", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. X, pp. 159-160.

97 Other group was *Vatan*, founded by Mustafa Kemal at Damascus in 1905. Its membership spread among the third and fifth army corps officers. This society developed to be the Fatherland and Freedom Society. See Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 201.

98 Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks* (Oxford, 1969), p. 16.

99 Ahmet Riza (1859 -1930) was a son of Ali Riza. His nick name *Ingliz Ali*, because of his knowledge of English and his friendship with Englishmen during the Crimean War. His mother was an Austrian or Hungarian lady converted to Islam. Ahmet Riza was key figure of the Young Turks. Educated in France he first served in the ministry of Agriculture. He also served the ministry of education as its director before going to Europe where he remained till 1889. Auguste Comte influenced him. In 1894 he published a series of memorandum to the Sultan demanding a constitutional regime. Along with the other exiles, he started publishing a fortnightly journal *Mesveret* in 1895 which was smuggled into the Empire and played a key role in increasing the members of the society. He was a disciple of Auguste Comte, and did not think in terms of Pan- Islamism.

100 He was second to Ahmet Riza in developing the Young Turks movements is a Caucasian Turk from Daghestan. He was a journalist, historian and liberal politician. He sometime also known as *Mizanci Murat* and *Dagfghanistanli Murat*. He was educated in Russia from where he fled to the Ottoman Empire in 1873. He was employed for some time in the Council of the Public Debt. Later he became a teacher of history at *Mulkiye School*. He established contact with many liberal writers and published his own works including a six volume general history and a single volume Ottoman history. He presented several reform proposals to the Sultan. In 1895 he fled to the British occupied Egypt where he published a new paper *Mezan*

important roles in this movement. Murat Bey was closer to the idea of the Young Ottomans. He was a Pan-Islamist and felt that Islam was a liberal enough entity to unite all the Muslims under one roof. His solution was to remove the Sultan, restore the constitution, make Islam the cornerstone of the empire and bring all nationalities under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire. Ahmet Riaz was different in his thought. He never rejected Islam and did not think in terms of Pan-Islamism. The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte led him towards secularism and the espousal of Turkish rather than Ottoman nationalism. A number of his followers were freemasons and they established lodges in Turkey¹⁰¹. Therefore, CUP received support from Muslims as well as the Christian minority in the hope of National independence and internal peace. Later army officials supported it.¹⁰² Its main objective was to introduce constitutional government and to curb the autocratic rule of Sultan Abdül Hamit II and to limit the powers of the Sultan, especially the power to dissolve the chamber and satisfying

which was openly critical of the Sultan and his regime. This newspaper was also smuggled into the Ottoman Empire and generated considerable reaction. In 1897 'bought off' by Abdül Hamit, returned to Istanbul and became a member of *Suraye Devlet*. After 1908 supported liberal and even allied with reactionary elements. Continued to publish *Mizan*, which was suspended after 31 *Mart Vakasi*. Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, p. 174 and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 189-190.

101 Yahya Armajani, *op.cit.*, pp.173-74.

102 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 256. Vol. I

the aspiration of the minorities by giving them equal rights within the Law¹⁰³.

After a long struggle the Young Turks finally succeeded in 1908 to force the Sultan to restore the constitution of 1876 through which the power of the Sultan was no longer as absolute as it had been. This new regime took over the power with out blood shed.¹⁰⁴ The *Ulema*, though still influential were not dominant. The resolution of the constitution was also marked by a struggle for power between liberals and unionist.¹⁰⁵

While the committee was consolidating its position, the reactionary forces were getting organized too. The first challenge to the constitutional regime of Young Turks had come from the reactionaries in October 1908, during *Ramazan*. Kör Ali¹⁰⁶ demonstrated against the constitution and led the crowd to the Sultan's residence in Yildiz Palace. There, he

103 The Young Turks thought that all the complaints of the different elements came from mall administration, oppression, and a lack of freedom. If all these causes of discontent were removed through the constitution and parliamentary government, the Turkish nation would be saved. Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, p. 16.

104 Abdül Hamit was not happy for his new role and would have liked to restore the status quo ante as he had done before in 1876.

105 Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", *The Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 27, No. 2, 1991, p.3. For detail about Liberals, later they found Liberal Union, see. Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*.

106 Kör Ali was a muezzin of the mosque in the *Fatih* district of Istanbul, which is still famous for its Islamic conservatism. It was the reaction against the Bulgarian declaration of independence, the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Greek announcement of Union with Crete.

demanded the end of the constitutional rule on the ground that the *Şeriat* orders that flock be led its shepherd. He also demanded that Muslim women should not be permitted to appear in public unveiled, their pictures should not be printed in news papers and drinking places and theatres be shut down. There were also demonstrations against the constitution in other places of Istanbul all led by the Imams of local mosques. The reactionaries also demanded the restoration of the Sultan's absolute authority in the name of Islamic solidarity against an aggressive Christian world. So they called for a *Jihad* in order to resolve the external crises. These religious demonstrations¹⁰⁷ led by the reactionaries, were crushed by the Young Turks and their leader Kōr Ali was put to death. The Young Turks had united against the reactions.¹⁰⁸

Again Islam provided the rhetorical ammunition with which to attack the Committee. The opposition were led by Dervesh Vehedeti,¹⁰⁹ a leader of a hurriedly organized

107 These demonstrations led by the Imams and muezzins of the local mosques were poorly organized. According to a palace official in these demonstrations a few mosque officials had succeeded to mobilize only the poor and the unemployed persons.

108 Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit*, p. 4.

109 Little is known about dervesh Vahedeti. He was born in Cyprus, where he became a *hafiz*. Later he joined the Naqshbandi Order .In 1902 he moved to Istanbul and founded the newspaper *Volkan* in December1908. Initially its political position was liberal and humanistic, supportive of liberty and the constitutional order. At the same time Vahedeti was anti – unionists and supporter of Kamil

political group known as the Muhammedia Union (*Ittihad-i Muhammediye*)¹¹⁰, a Pan-Islamic organization. He published a newspaper, *Volkan* in which he wrote articles for the restoration of the *Seriat*. He abandoned liberalism and adopted Islamic polemics and denounced the Unionists as freemasons and anti – religious and secular. His newspaper *Volkan* claimed not to be opposed to the constitution, on the contrary, it was made a supporter provided ‘the constitution’ was made the guardian of *Şeriat*.¹¹¹ The Societies' political programme was published on March 3 in the column of its organ, *Volkan*. Its doctrine and programme of action were clerical and strongly opposed to the idea of Union based on the Ottoman ideal. It stood for the rule of the *Şeriat*, and if there were to be any union, it must be based on the ideal of Islam. The society was therefore against the westernizing reformism of both the CUP and the Liberal Union. Through its organ, *Volkan*, the Society was able to exercise considerable influence on the traditional deputies in the chamber and the rank and file in the army. They also demanded the restoration of *Şeriat*, and restriction of Muslim women to their homes. The government floundered helplessly in the crisis and

Paşa's English policy. Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit.*, pp. 4 –5 and Fr. McCullagh, *The Fall of Abdul Hamit* (London, 1910), pp. 52-56.

110 It was an important organization. On April 5, 1909, the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, it was officially established. It was also known as Mohammedan Assiciation (*Cemiyeti Moħammediye*). Fr. McCullagh, *op.cit.*, pp. 52-56

111 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p .5.

promised to protect the Holy Law. At last, on April 5, a circulation went out to all provincial governors, instructing them to safeguard the *Şeriat*.¹¹² After some time, the modern officers of the CUP army crushed this insurrection. A new regime led by Enver Paşa¹¹³ was formed after the Coup d'état of 1913 with the help of his close associates Talat Paşa¹¹⁴ and Cemal Paşa.¹¹⁵

During the Young Turk regime the intellectual ground was prepared for the advancement of the Turkish nation. There was a strong group of conservative Muslims who advocated

112 For details on this event a good account has been given by Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 210-14; Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, pp.40-43 and G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 42-44.

113 Enver Paşa was born in Istanbul in 1881, the son of a father variously described by his friends or enemies, as a railway official or a porter. He was a graduate of the War College in Istanbul in 1902 from *Harbiye* and posted in the IIIrd army. He joined CUP in 1906 in Monastir. He joined Young Turks and first achieved fame as a 'hero of freedom' by his role in the revolution of 1908. After serving as military attaché in Berlin and then as a highly popular field officer, he returned to Istanbul and led the raid on Sublime Porte. In 1913 he became Minister of war, general and Paşa. In 1914 by marrying an Ottoman Princess, he even acquired the title of *Damad*. See Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 221 and Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, pp. 168-69.

114 See for detail ~~page~~ p 26

115 His full name was Ahmed Cemal Paşa. Soldier-statesman and notorious as the senior member of the so-called triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Cemal. Some times known as Buyuk Cemal. Graduated from war college in 1895 and attached to the III army in Salonika. Joined CUP in 1906. After the Revolution became a member of Central Committee (*Merkezi Umumi*) in 1908; military governor of Uskudar in 1909 and promoted to rank of colonel. *Vali* of Adana (1909); Baghdad (1911); Commander of Konya Reserve (1912); Balkan War (1912-13); Military Governor of Istanbul (1913). Served in Cabinets as Minister of public Work and later Marine. In 1914 sent to Syria to command IVth army. Resigned on November 2, 1918 and escaped abroad; assassinated in Tiflis by Armenians. Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p. 221.

that a revival of the Turkish Empire was possible only through a reinstatement of the *Seriat* and the use of *Ijtihad*. Among their eminent figures were Sait Halim Paşa¹¹⁶ (1863-1921) and Mehmet Akif.¹¹⁷ Despite the existence of a strong Turkish faction in the CUP, the policies of the regime, until the very end, continued to be essentially Islamist.¹¹⁸

Turkish Nationalism and Islam:

One of the eminent members of the Young Turk movement was Ziya Gökalp¹¹⁹ (1875/6-1924) who formulated

116 He was a Grand *Vezir* and diplomat and grandson of Mehmet Ali of Egypt, and belonged to a ruling family of Egypt. In 1888 appointed to Ottoman Council of State (*Suraye Devlet*). After the revolution he come back to Istanbul and was appointed to the senate. He was sent to Europe by the CUP during Libyan War to rally support for the Turks. He became the President of the Council of State in 1912 and General Secretary of CUP in 1913. In Sevkett Pasa's cabinet he joined as a foreign Minister and became Grand *Vezir* after the latter's assassination. He resigned in February 1917 after the failure of Islamist policy of which he was one of the chief representatives. In 1919 he was arrested and exiled to Malta. Assassinated by Armenians in Rome in 1921. Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

117 Mehmet Akif was a famous poet who composed the National Anthem of the Turkish Republic.

118 Feroze Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

119 His real name was Mehmet Ziya and Gökalp was his penname. Gok means 'sky' and alp means hero and brave. He was of Nationalist ideology, poet as well as philosopher and sociologist. Born in Diyarbakir, came to Istanbul in 1896 for further education and joined the CUP. He was imprisoned and banished to Diyarbakir for revolutionary activities in 1897. After the revolution he went to 1909 Congress in Salonica as representative of the local branch. Elected as member of Central Committee, a position he held until 1918. He was very close to Talat Pasa. He was arrested and deported to Malta by the Allies in 1919 and had a cool reception from Kemalists, he was deputy for Diyarbakir in the second Parliament. Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 181; for detailed study about Ziya Gökalp's life and works. See Uriel Heyd, *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism*, London, 1950 and Niyazi Berkes, (trs.ed.), *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, London, 1959.

the principle of Turkish Nationalism and supported Enver Pasa's regime. He used poetry as well as prose for the propagation of his nationalistic ideas.¹²⁰ Explaining his programme of Turkish Nationalism, Gokalp stressed the importance of the educational system, which should be three fold purposes. It had to be Turkish, *Islam* and modern. Gokalp criticized the negligence shown towards Islamic education after the introduction of secular education in Turkey. He laid special emphasis on the need for the training of religious teachers, which had been neglected since the beginning of *Tanzimat* Era.¹²¹ He believed that *Islam* was compatible with modern civilization and concluded that *Islam* is the most modern and reasonable of all religions.¹²²

In this regime nationalism proved stronger than religion and strengthens the position of the nationalist. The idea of Ottomanism was bitterly shattered in 1913 by the Balkan war.¹²³ The Young Turks committed a mistake. It was that they

120 His collection of poem entitled *Kizil Elma* (Red Apple), published in Istanbul in 1914, *Turk Yurdu*, a series of articles on Turkish Nationalism, bearing the title *Turkileşmek* , *Islamlaşmak*, *Muasirlaşmak* (Turkification and Modernization) and *Genç Kalemler* was published in Salomica.

121 Niyazi Berkes, *op.cit.*, pp. 1.

122 *Ibid.*, p. 243.

123 CUP's idea of Ottomanism was failed in 1913. Through Ottomanism they wanted to create a powerful common wealth of the Ottoman people. But after that incident pure Turkish nationalism was choose for the creation of a Turkish national state. Kemal H. Karpat, *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History*, p.103.

got involved in the First World War in 1914, which ended their regime in the chaos of defeats.¹²⁴

In the World War I the idea of Pan- Islamism was shattered when the Arabs revolted against the Turks.¹²⁵ On the behest of the British and the desire to take back the Caliphate, Şerif Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca revolted against the Turks.¹²⁶ In a letter, British war minister Lord Kitchner promised Hussein to be declared the Caliph and King of Hijaz. This negotiation is known as Hussein- McMahon correspondence¹²⁷.

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- 124 The Young Turks did not want to involve themselves in the World War I but Enver Paşa , who was an ardent supporter of Germans and a dominant figure in the Ottoman Government, had decided to land their troops in favour of central powers on the German side and declared war on the Allies. Mustafa Kemal opposed this decision because he was convinced of the German's defeat in the World War which breakout in 1914 between the Allies (Britain, France, Russia and the central power Germany and Astro-Hungry)
- 125 The idea of Pan-Islamism first propogated by Sultan Abdül Aziz and his brother Abdul Hamit (1876-1909) whose object was to rally the support of the Muslim World.
- 126 It has been established elsewhere that gaining the Caliphate for the Hashimite family was a consuming interest for the Şerif of Mecca, Husayn b. Ali and his son, Abdullah. For detail, Joshua Teitelbaum, " Shrif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite vison of the Post-Ottoman: from Chieftaincy to Suzerainty," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34 (January 1998), pp. 103-122. And Joshua Teitelbaum, " Taking Back " the Caliphate: Sherif Husayn ibn Ali, Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman empire", *Die Welt des Islam*, 40 (3), 2000. pp. 413-424.
- 127 This was a negotiations between Sharif Huseyn of Meecca and the British War Minister, Lord Kitchener in the form of letters in which Britain promised Huseyn that if he would come out against Turkey Britain would guarantee his restoration of the title of Grand Sharif and defend him against external aggression and hinted that if the Sharif was declared Caliph he would have British Support, and included a general promise to help the Arab's obtain their freedom. Mansfield, *op.cit.*, pp38-39. For Husayn Mac Mohan correspondence See Yahya Armajani, *op.cit.* pp. 225-27 .Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations* (Cambridge, 1976) and Joshua Teitelbaum, *op.cit* and Eliezer Tauber, " Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and state in

When, in 1918, the world war ended, various parts of the Ottoman Empire which were previously ruled by Ottomans, were captured by the Allied forces. Sultan Reşat, known as Mehmet V, became the puppet of the Allies and was ready to impose always anything that they chose to impose on them.¹²⁸ In the same year (1918) the Armistice of Mudros¹²⁹ was signed between the government of Sultan Vahituttin and the Allied forces. Eastern Syria and Silicia remained under the control of the French troops as the Sykes-Picot agreement promised.¹³⁰ A Company of Allied troops was posted at Constantinople with the purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia but actually

the Thought of Abdul Rehman Al Kawakibi, Najib Azuri and Rashid Riza", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 21, (1994), pp. 190-198.

128 Halide Edib, *Turkey Faces West*, pp. 166-67.

129 The Armistice was a full capitulation, including the occupation of the straits, the demobilization and disarmament of the Ottoman army and permission for the victorious armies to occupy any place in the Empire which threatened their security. See, Joshua Teitelbaum, "Taking Back the Caliphate: Sherif Husayn Ibn Ali, Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman Caliphate, p. 413 and Erik Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, 1993), pp. 138-139, 142

130 It was a secret agreement of British with France and Russia on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. According to this agreement whole Syria and Iraq and a large part of Southern Turkey were to be partitioned into spheres of direct or indirect French or British influence. The terms of the Agreement were published by the Bolsheviks when the Petrograd archives came into their possession. For more information about this agreement, see, Yaha Armajani & T. M. Ticks, *op.cit.*, p. 228; G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 49; H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of Peace Conference of Paris*, and Sir Reader Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East* (Hutchinson, 1951); Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Eastern Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922), p. 48ff.

their main purpose was to dismember the Ottoman Empire.¹³¹ The Sultan and his minister wanted to crush the Young Turks and their supporters. Consequently Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa were dismissed from the army in January 1919 and later they were assassinated.

War of Independence and Religious Symbols:

During the period 1918-20 there was a proliferation of political parties (some thirty parties arose) as the *Hurriyet ve Itilaf* (Freedom and Alliance) party formed an ineffective government under Damad Farid Paşa¹³² (1853-1923) who collaborated with the Allied Powers in the partition of Turkey.¹³³

131 Allies main purpose was to create a Greek Empire in the Near East in which Thrace and Smyrna were included. The Strait of Bosphorus was to be opened for all the nations and an Armenian state was to be established in the East from Samsun to the Caspian Sea, and from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's politics*, p. 32, G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 48; A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and War* (London, 1915), pp. 379-433.

132 He was a Grand *Vezir* and Liberal politician and had always been an outspoken enemy of CUP. He was a friend of the Allies also. He joined the Foreign Office and served in Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Bombay. In 1886 married Abdül Hamit's widowed sister Mediha, thereby becoming a *damad*. In 1888 appointed to the Council of State and made Minister. After the Revolution became one of the leaders of the Liberals and appointed to the Senate *Chairman of Huriyet Ve Itlilaf Firkasi* (Freedom and accord Party) in 1911. After the War joined three cabinets in 1919 and took strong anti-nationalist line. Signed *Treaty of Sevres*. Close to sultan Mehmet VI. Left for Nice (1922) following the success of the Kemalists. Feroz Ahmed. *op.cit.*, p. 169.

133 Kamel H. Karpat, 'The Evolution of the Turkish Political System and the Changing Meaning of Modernity, Secularism and Islam (1876-1945)', *Islamic Culture*, Vol. LIX, No. 4, 1985, p.386.

Mustfa Kemal studied the situation quietly and anxiously in order to chalk out a programme for national liberation. He was convinced that the National Liberation Movement could only succeed if it was based on the spirit of nationalism.¹³⁴ For this he met the leading citizens of the towns and cities, and explained his view on the national struggle for independence.¹³⁵

The organizational base of the war of Liberation was to be found in a variety of groups known under various names.¹³⁶ But Mustafa Kemal was the only person who was able to organize all these scattered resistance associations in a single body known as Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.¹³⁷ Mustafa Kemal became the spokesman for the group and sought to establish contact with various army officials who opposed the occupation. On June 21, 1919, they signed the Amasya Protocol.

Even before the *Sieves* congress was called, the Association for the Defense of Rights of Eastern Anatolia had arranged a regional meeting to be held in Erzurum in Eastern

134 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p 76.

135 Kemal H. Karpat, "The Evolution of Turkish Political ...", p.388.

136 These various groups are the *Mudafa-i-Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (Association for Defense of Right) which were the first resistance groups that had been formed in Thrace, Izmir, Manitsa and Anatolia, *Redd-i Ilhak Cemiyeti* (Rejection of Annexation society) in the country side and the *Kawakol Cemiyeti* (Sentinel Association) in Istanbul. Kamal H. Karpat, *op.cit.*, p. 338.

137 The revolutionaries of Anatolia to defend the national right of all the Eastern Provinces founded this society.

Anatolia in July 1919. Here a representative committee elected Mustafa Kemal as president of the Association for the Defense of the Rights and a resolution was passed which was known as National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*).¹³⁸

The Istanbul government of the Sultan on the other hand ordered Mustafa Kemal to immediately return but he refused and resigned from his army post.¹³⁹ The military authorities Kazims Karabekir¹⁴⁰ and Fevzi Paşa¹⁴¹ received an order for Mustafa Kemal's and Rauf Bey's¹⁴² arrest and transport to Istanbul. Both military officers refused the order of the

138 It was based on the declaration of *Erzurum* and *Sivas Congress*. The aim of this pact was to protect the Eastern Provinces and formulating the basic demand for territorial integrity and national independence. Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p.243; M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p.78

139 Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*. p. 243

140 He was commander of the 15th Army Corps at Erzurum. Later he became an opponent of Mustafa Kemal. Indirectly claimed to have been the first to organize the liberation movement in the eastern part of the country. For details see, Kazim Karabekir, *Istiklal Harbimizin Esaslari* (Istanbul, 1951), pp. 44. cf. K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 47

141 He was known as Marsal Cakmak, who was very pious and pro-Islamist as proven during his chairmanship of the *Millet Partisi* (National Party) in 1948-50, remained as chief of staff throughout Ataturk's life time. It is reliably reported that no alcoholic drinks were allowed in Cakmak's presence out of his religious feelings. Throughout the Republic mosques remained open, and two religious holidays were officially recognized.

142 He was a staunch supporter of Mustafa Kemal from the early days of the Nationalist movement and remained a military officer. He was honest opponent of one- man rule so he resigned his military post and joined the Progressive Republican Party *Tarakkiperver Cümhuriyet Firkasi*, which was abolished on June 5, 1925.

Istanbul government and declared their own revolt as well as their acceptance of Kemal's leadership.¹⁴³

During the war of liberation the Nationalists were already fighting the West on several fronts and were also engaged in the civil war against the army of the Caliphate¹⁴⁴ during 1919-20. Mustafa Kemal channeled his efforts to mobilize the masses. The struggle came to be described as a national struggle. But at the time most people saw it as a religious struggle, the struggle of the Muslim millet for its very survival. The nationalists as a rallying point for the liberation efforts used two powerful symbols, the Sultanate and the Caliphate.¹⁴⁵ Nationalists or Kemalists presented their struggle as a Jihad, these calls for Jihad proved to be effective means of mobilizing the masses for liberation efforts. They argued that the Sultan – Caliph was a prisoner of the infidels and that it was the duty of the nationalists, indeed of all Muslims, to liberate the Caliph from captivity.¹⁴⁶ Even Islamic

143 Mustafa Akdağ, "Kemal Atatürk" *The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica Macropaedia*, Vol. 2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1975, p. 256, and S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 344; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 243.

144 This was an organized group, which was loyal to the Sultan. It was known as the Army of the Caliphate (*Halifet Ordusu*) or Mohammedan Militia (*Kuva-yi Muhammediye*)

145 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-55", in Richard N. Frye, *op.cit.*, p.73.

146 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p .6.

reactionaries like Sait Nursi¹⁴⁷ joined the national struggle. But very soon he changed his policy to extreme secularism.

In December 1919 under the pressure of the nationalists a new election was held for the new Ottoman Parliament in which the nationalists and their sympathizers won a majority.¹⁴⁸ They ratified the National Pact and founded its head quarters at Ankara. The British realized that it would be hard to coup with the decisions of such a parliament so a series of arrests in which many deputies, nationalists as well as sympathizers of Mustafa Kemal were arrested and deported to Malta.¹⁴⁹ As a result of the protest against the British occupational forces, Mustafa Kemal dissolved the Parliament and issued his call for a new election of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (G.N.A.)¹⁵⁰ The Nationalists won the elections and Mustafa Kemal was unanimously elected as its president.¹⁵¹ The composition of the first G.N.A. reveals the

147 For details about Sait Nursi's life and his movement. See below chapter VIII, 'Reactionaries Movements, p. ..

148 Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

149 Many nationalists and suspects were arrested who were deported to Malta and released in 1921 in exchange for British officers arrested in Malta Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 78, see also, D. A. Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 76 and Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

150 Grand National Assembly was established in place of the disbanded Ottoman Parliament, which was founded by Sultan Abdul Hamit II in 1876. The last Ottoman Parliament held its final session in Istanbul on March 18, 1920 and prorogued itself indefinitely. With the establishment of G.N.A., there were two governments in Turkey- one of the Sultan's in Istanbul and second was of the nationalist government at Ankara which was more powerful and popular than the Sultan. Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 246 ;Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

151 Dankart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam", p. 76.

importance of religious leaders within the ranks of the nationalists .In all, close to one -fourth of the Assembly's membership at the time of its opening were of religious background.¹⁵² So the Nationalists proclaimed their loyalty to Mehmet Vahitettin, Sultan of the Empire and Caliph of Islam and reaffirmed their desire to rescue him form enemy hands. It soon ceased to be possible. On April 5 1920 the Sultan had recalled Damad Farit Paşa to the Grand *Vezir* and opened a new and bitter attack on the nationalists.

In this reaction on April 11, the Ottoman Şeyhul Islam Durrizade Abdüllaḥ Efendi had issued a *fetva* stipulating that all true believers should try to kill the nationalists. Kemal countered with a *fetva* from the *müfti* of Ankara, which declared the government 'traitor'. He was also careful to stress that the nationalist movement was fighting against the government for the protection and honour of the Sultanate and the Caliphate.¹⁵³

In 1920 Istanbul government signed the *Treaty of Sevres*¹⁵⁴ which was humiliating and the position of the Sultan

152 At the time of its opening 57 out of 437 member of the Assembly held official religious duties. In addition, 59 members belonged to the *Ulema*. Of those who finally took their seats, 73 out of 361 or approximately 20% were clerics. In comparison, no new deputy with a clerical background was elected to the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Assemblies. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

153 Zurcher, *op.cit*, pp. 158-159; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, pp. 246-47.

154 This treaty was signed between the Sultan's government of Istanbul and the British on August 1920. By this Treaty the Greek army extended its area of occupation, advancing within 50 kilometers of

was further weakened. But the nationalist government did not recognize the Treaty as legitimate.¹⁵⁵

Nationalist government in Ankara gained recognition through Franco- Turkish Treaty¹⁵⁶ signed between the Ankara government and the French. Later Italy too came to a friendly agreement with the Kemalist government of Ankara. Italy had withdrawn its forces from Adalya and its neighborhood.¹⁵⁷ The Bolsheviks¹⁵⁸ had also very friendly relations with Mustafa Kemal who aimed at maintaining peace with his neighbours. Russia too signed a treaty with Mustafa Kemal against the Western powers. The ring of the enemy¹⁵⁹, which surrounded

Ankara. It recognized an independent Armenia and gave Izmir and Eastern Thrace to Greeks, as well as internationalized the Straits. The Entente Powers did not have the will to enforce these terms, and accepted a Greek offer to do so. The humiliating *Treaty of Sevres* also greatly boasted the position of Mustafa Kemal.. Erik Zurcher, *op.cit.*, p. 153.

155 K. H. Karpat, "Modern Turkey", p. 530; Donald Webster, *op.cit.* p. 45.

156 By this agreement variously known as the *Franklin-Bouillon Pact*, the *Angora Agreement* or the *Franco - Turkish Treaty*, a new boundary more favourable to Turkey as compared to the Sevres lines was drawn between Syria and Turkey by mutual agreement between Turkey and France. See A. J. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London, 1926), p. 102.

157 *Ibid*,p.103.

158 Gold, arms and ammunition were supplied by the Bolsheviks to strengthen the military position of the Nationalist government of Ankara (Angora)in Turkey as aid to a friendly regime fighting against the Allied Powers. See Ahmed Bedavi Kuran, *Osmanli .Imparatorlugunda Inkitap Harekeleri* (Istanbul, 1960), pp.663-71 cf. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*,p. 81.

159 In 1921the Greeks were defeated at İnönü, a little west of Eskisehir by Ismet Paşa in the same year at Sakariya by Mustafa Kemal Paşa (1881-1938) and in 1922 that was the final defeat of the Greeks by Mustafa Kemal at Anatolia.. The Greco-Turkish War, which ensued till 1922, ended with a Turkish victory in which Mustafa Kemal and

the territories of Turkey, was bitterly broken by the Nationalist government of Ankara. Against the nationalists, Lord George sent a plea to his former Allies¹⁶⁰ to defend the Strait but the convention of Mudaina was signed by which eastern Thrace and Adrianople were ceded to Turkey and Mustafa Kemal accepted international control of the Strait.¹⁶¹

The final clash between the two was precipitated by the Allies, who still insisted on recognizing the Sultan's government in Istanbul. The Allies issued a formal invitation to the peace conference to be held at Lausanne in Switzerland in October 1922. In this conference the Allies sent invitation to both the governments at Istanbul and at Ankara.¹⁶² But the British refused to recognize the Nationalist government. The Sultan's government had been allowed to represent the

Ismat İnönü played a key role. E. Zurcher, *op.cit.*, p. 153; S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 365.

- 160 France and Italy had withdrawn their forces from the Strait because they had come to friendly agreement with Mustafa Kemal. They were afraid that the Turkish nationalists might cancel all debts the same way the Bolsheviks had done earlier. They wanted to gain as much as they could without going to war.
- 161 By it the Greek army would move west of the Mariitsa, turning over its position in Thrace to the Allies, who would in turn surrender them to the Turks. The Allies would occupy the Right Bank of the Maritsa and would stay in Thrace for a month to assure law and order. In return Kemal's army would recognize continued British occupation of the Straits' Zones until the final treaty was signed. This arrangement included also Istanbul, which thus would have to wait a little longer for its liberation cf. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 364.
- 162 R. H. Davison, *op.cit.*, p. 125. Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement* (London, 1975), p. 186; E. Zurcher, *op.cit.*, p. 168 and Halil Inalcik, "The Caliphate and Atatürk Inkilap" *Turkish Quarterly digest*. 2 (Spring, 1987), pp. 25-36; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 251-252

Lausanne Conference. But Mustafa Kemal did not want the participation of the Sultan's government.¹⁶³

Sultan Vahitettin (1918-1922) continued making intrigues to interpose and create difficulties in maintaining peace.¹⁶⁴ Mustafa Kemal made his decision that the Sultanate and Caliphate had to be separated. On November 1 1922 the Grand National Assembly passed a law by which the Sultanate and the Caliphate were separated and the former was abolished.¹⁶⁵ The Ottoman Sultan Vahitettin had gone into exile on November 17, 1922. The Turkish Grand National Assembly appointed his cousin Abdül Mecit II (1922-24) as successor to Sultan Vahitettin on November 18, 1922 in the capacity of the Caliph of Islam.¹⁶⁶ Now there was no Sultan but an Ottoman Prince who would hold the office as Caliph with only the religious powers and the G.N.A. held all political powers. By this act the Istanbul government lost its legal foundation.¹⁶⁷

163 Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New* (London, 1955), p.165.

164 Muhammad Barkatullah, *op.cit.* p. 10.

165 This action of the National Assembly met with bitter criticism of Kemal's active supporters as well as in the pages of *al-Qibla*, a leading newspaper of Mecca quoting other papers, It decried the removal of temporal powers from the Caliph as entirely against Islam. *Al-Qibla*, no. 651, 8 January, No. 656, 25 January: No. 657, 29 January 1923, Quoted from Joshua Teitel Baum, "Taking Back", *The Caliphate...*, p. 418.

166 K. H. Karpat, *The Ottoman Empire and Its place in the World History*, p.18.

167 Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 252.

The G.N.A. was dissolved on April 6, 1923, for new elections. The membership of the Assembly was limited to persons who agree with Kemal's nationalist views. New elections were held in June 1923 and in which 286 deputies were elected. The new G.N.A opened on August 11, 1923. The Treaty of Laussane¹⁶⁸ was ratified by the G.N.A on August 23, 1923. On 2nd October the Allied forces vacated Istanbul and four days later Turkish troops entered the city.¹⁶⁹

On October 13, 1923 the G.N.A passed a law making Ankara the official capital of the Turkish State which provided a central defensible location for the government.¹⁷⁰

On October 29 1923, it accepted a new constitution that declared the state to be a Republic¹⁷¹ with sovereignty coming from the people. Its president was to be elected by G.N.A from amongst its own members who would appoint the Prime Minister. Kemal was elected the first President and Ismet İnönü the first Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.¹⁷²

168 According to this Treaty Turkey was recognized as the master of all Asia Minor, the Strait, and Eastern Thrace. Extra territoriality was abolished and the Straits were internationalized under the League of Nations but the chairman of the commission was to be a Turk.

169 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 84 ; Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

170 K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 42.

171 This constitutional Amendment faced a bitter opposition. The resolution was carried by 158 votes in a house of 286 deputies. B. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

172 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 368, Vol. I; G. L. Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 256 and M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 84.

Mustafa Kemal and his associates had achieved their goal after four years of perseverance, sacrifice, diplomacy and war. Kemalist Turkey was much smaller than the Ottoman Empire, it was however more homogeneous and manageable and a strong viable state.

CHAPTER II

ISLAM AND THE NATION BUILDING

The first fifteen years of the republic, dominated by Mustafa Kemal, brought rapid innovation in religious field under the regime of Republican Party.¹ The entire political social and cultural life of the Turkish people underwent rapid transformation that has affected the place of religion in Turkish society. So the influence of *Islam* over public affairs declined in 1920's and 1930's.² The number of books and periodicals on *Islam* increased rapidly. The religious implications of the Kemalist reforms have been a subject of controversy ever since their implementation.³

Mustafa Kemal was a revolutionary from the very beginning of his career. His ideas did not differ much from those of the radical members of the Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdat and Ziya Gökalp. But he influenced them

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- 1 The only political Party that ruled under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal till his death in 1938. After his death it came under the leadership of İsmet Paşa till 1949. He was a close friend and second in command. He is known as İsmet İnönü in honour of his two commemorating victories over the Greeks at İnönü in 1921, see M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 91.
 - 2 The pressure of secularization in the 1930's not only discouraged religious education, it also led to discouraging of prayer in public and the building of mosques in the new capital, Ankara. But the secular reform had reached its height during 1933 and 1935. For the details of these reforms. See Uriel Heyd, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-30; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, pp. 406-12, 426-30 ; M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, pp. 112-13 see also Dankwart A. Rustow, " Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-55" in Richard N. Frye, *op.cit.*, p. 69
 - 3 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

with his own revolutionary doctrines.⁴ At the same time he was able to develop a pattern of thought peculiar to him. Since he enjoyed a unique position of being the hero of the Turkish Revolution⁵ and the head of the State, therefore, he directed all his policies in accordance with the need of the time.⁶ Mustafa Kemal himself said:⁷

" The aim of reforms we have already carried out or continuing to carry out is to transform the Turkish society into modern society in every aspect. This is the basis of our reforms".

Mustafa Kemal's movement was different from the Young Turks movement. It was not a revolt against the established authority or Sultan, but against a foreign invasion for self-defence.⁸ They claimed as their goal "Islamic Land" and the "Islamic Population" and the preservation of the

4 In spite of some ideological differences, the Kemalist regime was mainly inspired by Gokalp's Theory of Turkish nationalism. Gokalp's approach to the problem of Turkish nationalism was secularist. The programme of the Peoples Party, which was supported by him and first constitution of the Republic was based on Gokalp's views. M. Rashid Feroze has it on the authority of Prof Niyazi Berkes that the first Turkish Constitution of the Kemalist State was written by Gokalp. For Gokalp's ideas see. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 50-71.

5 Through this revolution Mustafa Kemal "Atatürk" wanted to change Turkey into a modern Western nation from a traditional Muslim society. B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.39

6 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p 93 and Enver Ziya Karal, "The principle of Kemalism" in Ali Kazancigil and Orgun Ozbudun (ed), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London,1981, p. 15

7 *Loc.cit*.

8 Dankwart A. Rustow, *loc. cit*.

“Islamic Caliphate and Ottoman Sultanate”.⁹ Mustafa Kemal spent considerable time in the study of the early history of Islam. In this context Halida Edib writes:¹⁰

“One of his tactics was to impress the clerical mind with his knowledge of religious history”.

Mustafa Kemal made frequent references to Islam whenever he tried to justify his reforms and the programmes of the nationalist government. Mustafa Kemal never attacked Islam directly but he was against those *Ulema*, who through their superficial knowledge of Islam were exploiting the innocent people of Turkey for their self-aggrandisement.¹¹

In 1923 Mustafa Kemal laid down the foundations of a modern secular Turkish Republic on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. As President of the Turkish Republic he imposed a new Constitution which placed all the powers in the hands of the President of the Republic. Kemal's efforts during the first four years of the Republic were devoted essentially to shaping the government, to consolidate his control over it and to secularize with the intention of bringing Turkey closer to

9 Through this propaganda their only aim was to gain the moral support of the Muslim world and nothing else. For this purpose in 1921 nationalists called a Pan-Islamic Congress at Sivas, that was presided over by the *Şeyh* of the Sanusi order, Sidi Ahmad al-Shrif. Enver Ziya Karal, *op.cit.* p. 15

10 Halida Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York, 1928), p. 168.

11 The secularist leaders of modern Turkey also tried to explain to the people of Turkey that their reforms were not against Islam, but just wanted to put an end to the powers and influence of the *Ulema* who had been responsible for the reactionary movements. M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p.25

Western civilization.¹² To fulfil the goal of Westernization, the first attempts were made by Republican People's Party (later RPP) to separate religion from politics. Its aim was to put an end to the power of the exponents of religion in political social and cultural affairs of the public.¹³ Mustafa Kemal believed that Westernization is the only means by which he can easily succeed to secularize the country in every respect.¹⁴

Turkey remains today the only Islamic country whose constitution stipulates that Secularism is one of the basic organisational principles of the state.¹⁵ In the early days of the revolution Kemal Atatürk did not use the term 'secularism' though he strictly adhered to this idea, perhaps because of various reasons of not risking the amalgonism of the masses.¹⁶

Mustafa Kemal strictly implemented the principle of secularism in all aspects of life. It was implemented not only in government institutions but also in every effort that was reflected in the field of social life, culture, language,

12 The programme of total Westernization made Mustafa Kemal one of the strongest personalities in Turkish history. His immediate concern was to raise Turkey's level of civilization to that of the advanced nations of the West in every way. He also would try to surpass the level of Western Civilization. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 25.

13 *Ibid*, p. 107.

14 Secularism as a principle of state policy meant that religion and state should function independently, and that neither should interfere with the other. But Nationalists have always maintained that the adoption of secularism does not mean that the Turks have abandoned Islam. *Ibid*, p. 25

15 Ali Kazancigil & Orgun Ozbudun, *op.cit*, p. 3.

16 *Ibid*, 22

literature and the day to day life. To secularize the state Mustafa Kemal brought unity among the people of Turkey through the same kind of education, language, culture and law. To achieve this goal Islamic education was discouraged¹⁷ and anti-clerical tendencies were encouraged although worship or attendance at mosques was never prohibited.¹⁸

The Kemalist attack on Islam basically stemmed from an understanding that religion had played a conservative role in the socio-political structure of the Ottoman Empire, conservatism being defined by the Kemalist elite as anti – Westernization.¹⁹ The religious reforms can be viewed as a step to modernize and nationalize Islam.²⁰

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- 17 In 1925, only 284 students had remained in the theological school in 1926-33 the number fell from 167 to 2, and in 1941 it was closed for lack of students and later it had become the Institute for Islamic Research. *Imam- Hatip* (clergy) schools were also closed. Some religious instructions were offered in *Hafiz Ve Kuran Kurslari*. Which operated under the supervision of the presidency of Religious Affairs. On religious education, see Howard A. Reed. "Turkey's new Imam Hatip Schools" *Die welt des Islam*. Vol. IV, 1955, No. 2-3, pp.150-63; "The faculty of Divinity at Ankara", *The Muslims World*, October 4, 1956, pp. 295- 312 for part I and Vol., XIVIII, January 1, 1957 pp. 22-35 for part II and see chapter "Islamic Education" below
- 18 Turkish intellectuals in the twenty years of secularist policy in Turkey wrote: Within the last twenty years the vast majority of the Turkish youth have been brought up without any official religious teaching, western positivism being imposed in it just as Islamic dogma had been imposed in the past. A. A. Adiver, "Interaction of Islamic and Western thought in Turkey" in T. Cuyler Young (ed), *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, (Princeton, 1951), p. 128.
- 19 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.38
- 20 The plan to reform Islam was mainly a scheme to Turkify Islam in its spiritual content. The idea was promoted probably by the general feeling of hostility towards the Arabs countries, which had revolted against the Ottoman Empire and contributed in no small measure to its fragmentation and liquidation. M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 112; Uriel Heyd, *op.cit*, p. 30 and Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 410.

Islam represented a set of tradition, values, legal rules and norms that were intrinsically non-western in character, it clashed with the Kemalist version of a modern nation-state. If Westernization as a quasi-ideology was to gain mass acceptance, the non-western value structure of the society had to be changed. Hence, the series of secular reforms undertaken during the first decade after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 were designed to minimize the role of Islam in Institutional and cultural life. The secularization programme accordingly followed a four-phase course.

1. **Symbolic secularization:** i.e. enforced changes in aspects of national culture or social life, which had a symbolic identification with Islam.
2. **Institutional secularization:** i.e. change in organizational arrangements designed to weaken the institutional strength of Islam.
3. **Functional secularization:** i.e. Changes in the functional specificity of religious and governmental institutions.
4. **Legal secularization:** i.e. Changes in the legal structure of society.²¹

I. SYMBOLIC SECULARIZATION:

Symbolic transformation means the transformation in the connotations of a set of symbols from the sacred to the

21 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 40

profane. This transformation can be either internal or induced. Internal symbolic transformation usually comes about as a result of man's scientific knowledge. It was an important aspect of the Kemalist reform because it dealt with an area of secularization, which had a crucial significance for the Kemalist concept of a modern state, that is, the transformation of culture.²²


Symbolic secularization involved an effort to westernise Turkish society through changing traditional symbols. This effort was backed by a series of laws, which were designed to dilapidate the institutional strength of *Islam* and its role in political affairs. The reforms in the symbolic secularization will be discussed one at a time.²³

Abolition of the Sultanate:

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal's leadership were faced precisely with the dilemma that there were least available groups to fight the nationalist war. To rid the country of the occupation forces, Mustafa Kemal had to work independent of the collaborationist government in Istanbul and organize the War of Independence in Anatolia to

22 *Ibid*, p. 41.

23 *Loc.cit*,



fight a nationalist war ~~with the~~ support of a peasant population.²⁴

In that respect, the use of religion as a politically unifying force was one of the most interesting aspects of the Kemalist movement.²⁵ During the war of independence Mustafa Kemal, through the most influential group like *agas*, the *eşraf* and the *ulema*, used religious symbols, issued regulations that had played an important role in the induction of the masses into the political process, and channeled his efforts to mobilize the masses.²⁶

In 1920 a body of delegates, known as Grand National Assembly, met in Ankara in which nationalists proclaimed their loyalty to Mehmet Vahitettin, Sultan of the Empire and *Caliph of Islam*, and reaffirmed their desire to rescue him from enemy hands. The independence movement itself, in its earlier phases, was strongly religious in character. Its main

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- 24 It was Mustafa Kemal's charismatic leadership which was able to succeed in mobilizing a peasant population which for centuries had remained in isolation. The traditional peasant community had largely remained intact and unaffected by the social and cultural changes, which the Empire underwent as a result of the western impact. B. Toprak, *op.cit*, pp. 61-62.
- 25 Because nationalists knew that a direct appeal to the Anatolian traditional society or masses might have proved ineffective. So they would have to first secure the loyalty of those group which formed a link between the central government and villages. Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Boston, 1963), p. 61; B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 63 and D. A. Rastow, *Politics and Westernization in Near East* (Princeton, 1956), p. 29.
- 26 They did not want a triangular fight, first the opposition of masses second fighting with army of the caliphate and on the third but important against the Allied Powers. So they used religion as a political weapon which was a prominent tactics of the Kemalist leadership prior to the consolidation of power by the nationalist government. Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston, 1970), p. 124. Cf B. Toprak, *op cit*, p. 63

aim was to rescue 'Islamic Land' and Islamic population from foreign i.e. Christian rule and its declarations were addressed to 'Muslim compatriots'.²⁷ But this proved to be a short-term tactical alliance. Once he was in power, he started a series of reform designed to eradicate the importance of Islam on Turkish society.²⁸

. His struggle actually was against the occupation powers whose main aim was to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Such type of activities of the nationalists were not tolerated by the European powers. They thought that it might prove dangerous for them. In 1920 Istanbul was captured and nationalists and their sympathizers were beaten and arrested and deported to Malta.²⁹ Sultan Mehmet Vahitettin became a puppet in the hands of the Allied forces. The Sultan's government had neither any revenue nor any army and he was for all practical purposes a prisoner.³⁰

On April 5, 1920 the Sultan had recalled Damad Farid Paşa as Grand *Vezir* and opened a new and bitter attack on the nationalists. On April 11, 1920 the *Şeyhul Islam* Durezade Abdullah Effendi issued a *fetva* declaring that the killing of rebels, on the orders of the Caliph, was a religious duty and

27 B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 396, D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam", *op. cit.*, p. 71.

28 B. Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

29 M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 78; Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 246; D. A. Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

30 *Loc. cit.*,

also declared them false representatives of the nation.³¹ The nationalists replied in kind. On May 15, the *Müfti* of Ankara, Borekcizade Mehmet Rifat Efendi, issued a *fetva*, endorsed by 152 other *Müftis* of Anatolia, declaring that a *fetva* issued under Allies pressure was invalid and calling on Muslims to liberate their Sultan – Caliph from captivity.³² On May 19 the Grand National Assembly declared Damad Ferit Paşa as a traitor. Anti – nationalist riots broke out in many places that harried the nationalists even in the neighborhood of Ankara.³³

On 20th January 1921 G.N.A. passed a law of fundamental organization, which began with the uncompromising declaration that 'sovereignty belongs without reservation or condition to the nation; the system of administration rests on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct their destinies. The subsequent articles went on to establish the position of G.N.A. in Ankara as 'the only real representative of the people and as the holder of both legislative and executive powers.'³⁴

31 For this purpose on April 18, 1920 Disciplinary Forces (*Kuvvat-i Inzibatiya*) were formed to fight the nationalists. The Sultan and his government were preparing to use all weapons- religious, political, military in their last desperate assault on the new power in Anatolia. B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 246 and see also Zurcher, *op.cit.*, pp. 158-59 ; Dankwart A Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution builder, in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, *op. cit.*, p.66.

32 Dankawart A Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 66-67,

33 On these religious changes see D. A .Rustow, " Politics and Islam" *op.cit.*, pp 69-107, B. Lewis. *op. cit.*, p. 246 and B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

34 With the establishment of the Grand National Assembly, the new parliament, at Ankara, there were two governments in Turkey – one was Sultan's government in Istanbul whose chief aim was to preserve and save the monarchy and second was the Nationalist government at Ankara (Anatolia) whose main aim was territorial integrity

The British refused to recognize the GNA as the sole representative of the nation. Sultan Vahitettin became a puppet in the hands of the Allied forces. Kemal decided to terminate once and for all, the political powers of the throne. The task was not easy. Kemal himself tells how he sounded some of his closest associates, and found them still loyal to the Sultanate. Rauf Bey, for example, when asked of his view on this question, replied.

“I am bound by conscience and sentiment to the Sultanate and Caliphate.... It is my duty to remain loyal to the sovereign. My attachment to the Caliphate is imposed on me by my education. Besides this, I would make a general observation.... such is the office of Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and to try and set an entity of a different character in its place would lead to failure and disaster. It is quite inadmissible.”

Refat Paşa, who was sitting near-by, agreed, and added that in fact, there can be no question of any form of Government other than Sultanate and Caliphate.

Mustafa kemal had however, reached his decision, that Sultanate and Caliphate were to be separated and the former

and national independence. Ankara government became more popular among the majority than the Sultan's government of Istanbul. Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (New York, 1973), p. 45; B. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 251

abolished.³⁵ In a meeting of the Association for the Defence of Rights, Mustafa Kemal said³⁶:

Gentlemen, I said Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion or debate. Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and the forces. It was by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and the Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and Sultanate into its own hands.

The Grand National Assembly passed a law *Heyeti Umumiye Karari* on first November 1922 deposing Sultan Vahitettin and voiding all laws of his government. The resolution passed by G.N.A. contained two articles. The first article declared that the Turkish people considered that the form of government in Istanbul resting on the sovereignty of an individual had ceased to exist in March 1920 and from now on was history, the second recognized that the Caliphate

35 There would henceforth be no Sultan but an Ottoman Prince would hold office of as *Caliph* only, with religious but not political power. By this compromise Mustafa Kemal hoped to disarm the opposition of the religious elements to political change. Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 252.

36 *Ibid*, p. 253; Ahsanullah, *History of the Islamic World* (New Delhi, 1986), p. 152 and see also G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 70-71, for the full text see A. J. A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, p. 571.

belonged to the Ottoman House but laid down that the Caliphate rested on the Turkish state and that the Assembly (G.N.A.) would choose as Caliph that member of the Ottoman House who was in learning and character most befitting.³⁷

The last Ottoman Sultan Vahitettin³⁸ (1918-1922) had gone into exile on Nov. 17, 1922. The Turkish G.N.A. has appointed his cousin Abdul Mecit II (1922-24)³⁹ a successor to Sultan Vahitettin on November 18, 1922 in the capacity of the Caliph of *Islam*. Abdul Mecit II (1922-24) would hold the office of the Caliphate with religious power only but not political power.⁴⁰

Abolition of the Caliphate

The abolition of the caliphate was another important act of symbolic secularisation. The origin of the caliphate went back to the succession crises after the death of Prophet Mohammed (S.A). The office of the caliphate was then established with Hazrat Abu Bakr (R.A) (632-34), taking over the leadership of the Muslim community as the 'Caliph' or substitute of Prophet Mohammed (S.A). After Hazrat Abu Bakr's death (634), Hazrat Umar (634-644), Hazrat Uthman

37 Ahsanullah, *op. cit*, p. 52 and see also Bernard Lewis, *op. cit*, pp. 253- 54

38 Sultan Vahitettin was also known as Sultan Mehmet VI. He was Sultan Mehmet Resat's brother, who is known as Sultan Mehmet V.

39 Abdul Mecit II's (1922-1924) election to the office of the Caliphate marked the first time that an Ottoman Prince gained recognition from non-Ottoman Muslims as Caliph. He received support especially from the Muslims of India who had come to view that Caliphate as a symbol of the Indian Muslim's unity.

40 Kemal. H. Karpat, *The Ottoman Empire and its Place in the World History*, p.18.

(644-656) and Hazrat Ali (656-661) successively assumed the title Caliph. The basis of their selection to the office had depended on their influential position within the Arab society. Hence during the time of these first four Caliphs, the elective nature of the office was widely accepted as a principle by Muslim jurists. However, with the establishment of the Umayyad Dynasty in 661AD. Muawiyah its founder assumed the title Caliph and appointed his son Yazid as his successor to the office of the Caliphate. The precedent once set became increasingly more common for later Caliphs, both of the of the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid Dynasties (750-1258) to designate their sons as their successor although the elective principle was still kept in theory.⁴¹ The Ottoman Sultan formally assumed the title of the Caliphate after Selim I conquered Egypt 1517. After Selim I the title Caliph fell into disuse by the Ottoman rulers.⁴²

Abdul Mecit II had held the office of Caliph with religious powers only and not political powers. He used

41 For the early history of the Caliphate, see, Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, (New York, 1969), pp. 271-354; Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London, 1965) PP. 19- 23 Bernard Lewis, "Politik and War" in Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (eds.), *The legacy of Islam* (London, 1974), pp. 156- 209

42 The title was transferred to Selim I by the last Egyptian Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, for a century and a half before Selim's entry into Egypt, Ottoman rulers had been in fact using the title and having their claim recognized both by their subject and in diplomatic correspondence. An appendix attached to a diplomatic correspondence of 1575, for example, listed sixteen different forms of address used by the Ottoman ruler with an apparent absence of the title of Caliph among the sixteen. In the 18th century, however, it was picked up again for diplomatic reasons for example in the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca* in 1774 between Sultan Abdul Hamit I and Catherine II of Russia B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 43 and also see "Khilifa" in *The Encyclopaedia Islam*, first edition

religion for his own survival and gave statement to the press emphasizing the need to preserve the office of Caliph and explain the anxiety of millions of Muslims. He asserted that he would not resign from the Caliphate.⁴³ The Caliph Abdul Mecit II soon became the focal point for the opponents of the nationalist regime, who wanted to re-establish the Sultanate and Caliphate⁴⁴. It was logical that Mustafa Kemal did not want a second center of power in his country.⁴⁵ The Caliph wrote to Mustafa Kemal demanding increase in privileges but Kemal retorted.⁴⁶

“ Let the Caliph and the whole world know that the Caliph and the Caliphate which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence. We can not expose the Turkish Republic to any sort of danger to its independence by its [the Caliphate's] continued existence. The position of Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a historic memory.”

On November 24, 1923, Ismet Paşa received two letters from two eminent Indian Muslim leaders Agha Khan and Syed

43 Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit*, p.18, M.Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 84.

44 One-fifth of the members of G.N.A. was cleric. Many of Attaturk's close friend wanted a liberal but Islamic State.

45 R. H. Davison, *Turkey*, p. 129.

46 Y. Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op. cit*, p. 245, Nutuk vol. II, p. 848- 48 cited by S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op. cit*, p. 368-69, vol. 2

Amir Ali, which were published in major Istanbul dailies,⁴⁷ emphasizing that the Caliphate be placed on a basis that would command the esteem of Muslim universally.⁴⁸

Mustafa Kemal seized upon the opportunity and prepared the ground for the abolition of the Caliphate and on March 3, 1924 G.N.A. gave its approval to the abolition of the Caliphate.⁴⁹ Article I of the law which abolished the Caliphate stated that the new regime was not against the Caliphate but rather incorporated its spirit within the Republican framework.⁵⁰

This abolition of the Caliphate brought much opposition from the Four Corners of the Muslim world as well as from Kemal's close associates⁵¹. They demanded and

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- 47 A number of Newspapers were closed and its publishers brought before the Court as early as 1924 for defending the Caliphate. For the trial of Newspapermen see Ahmad Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, (Norman, 1956), p. 151-159; A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London, 1926), pp. 189-90.
- 48 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 44 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 258 and for the text of the letters sent to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu by Indian Muslim leaders signed by Agha Khan and Syed Amir Ali see, Sadik Albayrak, *Turkiyede Din Kargase* (Istanbul, 1975), pp. 158-60.
- 49 The next morning, at day break the unhappy Abdul Mecit II with all male and female members of the House of Osman was packed into a car and driven to a railway station to board the Orient Express not the main Sirkeci station, where his departure might have provoked demonstrations but a small one out side the city, the last Caliph was sent into exile. Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 259 and see also G. Jascheske, "Turkey Since the Armistice of Mudros", in *Neuzeit*, part III (E.J. Brill, 1959), p. 36.
- 50 During the discussion of the Abolition of the Caliphate Tunali Hilmi Bey of Zonguldak argued that the proposed law would not abolished the Caliphate itself but rather the office of the Caliphate. Seyh Saffat of Urfa who was a man of religion and representative of G.N.A. brought that proposal to the agenda of the G. N. A. Cf. B. Toprak, *op. cit*, p. 44.
- 51 Halida Edib, Adnan Adiver, Kazim Kara Bekir, Rauf Orbey opposed its secularist policies. Rauf Orbey and Kazim Kara Bekir resigned from their military services as well as Mustafa Kemal's *Republican Peoples' Party* (R.P.P.) and joined a second

emphasized the need of the preservation of the Caliphate. For this Serif Hussein of Mecca claimed the Caliphate and said, "I belong to the tribes of *Quraish* so I am more suitable for Caliphate and quoted *Hadith*, 'Caliph will be appointed among the *Quraish*.' But the Indians and Egyptians opposed the Serif. A new Caliph will be appointed in Cairo in the near future.⁵² They then put forth the idea of an Islamic Congress for the Caliphate to meet in Cairo in 1925 to which representatives from all the Islamic peoples should be invited. In fact the meeting had to be postponed till May 1926 for some rising problems in the Muslim world. But the final decision was not taken regarding the establishment of the Caliphate in Cairo.⁵³

Language: (Turkification)

The easiest cultural symbol to identify is of course language, through which men can express their shared experiences over time. The Kemalist language reform had a similar aim breaking the continuity of the Ottoman-Islamic

group to form a new party known as *Progressive Republican Party* (P.R.P.) . Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 260.

52 On March 25, 1924, the Chief *Ulema* of Egypt made a statement to the effect that the Caliphate of Abdul Mecit was not a legal Caliphate since the Islamic religion does not recognize a Caliphate in terms laid down for him by the Turkish Government and which he accept, hence the allegiance *Bayah* paid to him by Muslims was not valid in Islamic law (*Şeriat*). Cf. T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London, 1965), p. 241.

53 When the Islamic Congress was held it was not represented by all the delegates and representatives of the Islamic countries. Some of the delegates did not attend it only in their private capacity nor did it give a final answer to this question.. T. W. Arnold, *op.cit*, p. 241

tradition in Turkey. But the most important aim was to destroy a cultural symbol.⁵⁴

The most critical stage in the Turkish transformation was exemplified best in the adoption of the Latin Script.⁵⁵ The more radical idea of abandoning the Arabic script entirely and replacing it by the Latin alphabets was put forward and discussed in Turkey in 1923 and 1924 but was decisively rejected.⁵⁶ According to Minister of Education:⁵⁷

“If we have been slow in this matter, it is because we waiting for the findings of the special commission we are appointing. The question of the alphabets will naturally be resolved in accordance with the principles accepted by the civilized world.”

In November 1928 a law was passed by the G.N.A. that the use of the Latin script for Turkish was compulsory and forbid the use of the Arabic script in all affairs after Dec. 1, 1928.⁵⁸

54 Binnaz Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 41.

55 There had been proposals for improvement of the Arabic script since the time of *Tanzimat* though nothing had come to them The sanctity attached to the Arabic language as the language of God had made the use of the Arabic script laden with religious symbolism. A concerted effort was made to change the vocabulary see Niyazi Berkes, *op. cit*, p. 476.

56 The idea of adopting the Latin script for Turkish was first raised by the Azerbaijani exiles in Turkey who already had adopted the Latin Script for their Turkish in 1925. Soon after the Soviet decision of the Baku congress, the Turkish minister of Education suggested the adaptation of the Latin Script. See Niyazi Berkes, *op.cit*, pp. 474-6 & B. Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 271; G. L. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 95.

57 G. L. Lewis, *op.ci.*, p. 96

58 M.Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 88 and Niyazi Barkes, *op. cit*, pp. 474-6; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 270-72; K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 55.

Mustafa Kamal's purpose in changing the alphabets was not prevent Turks from reading *Kuran* but wanted to reduce illiteracy and develop a uniform and logical Turkish language. He rightly concluded that it was easier for the Turks to learn to read and write using the Latin alphabet.⁵⁹ During the debate on education the use of Arabic letters was discouraged by Sukru Saracoglu, a prominent member of the G. N. A. He said:⁶⁰

“The Arabic letters are not suited for the writing of Turkish. In spite of so many years, indeed centuries, of self-sacrificing labour on the part of our learned men and officials, only two or three percent of our people are literate.”

Many observers have pointed out that the literacy rate has significantly increased since the adaptation of the Latin alphabet.⁶¹ In a Friday sermon delivered from the pulpit of the

59 It should be pointed out here that as early as 1862, Tahir Munif, the founder of Ottoman Scientific Society (*Cemiyet-i-Ilmiye-i Osmaniye*) had agreed that the Arabic script was too difficult to learn and hence an obstacle to the dissemination of literacy. See N. Berkes, *op. cit.*, p. 195. Cf. B. Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Yahya Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op. cit.*, p. 246

60 The speaker was overstating his case. The true figure was something under 9 per cent: 1,111,496 literate out of a population of 13, 648,270 according to the census of 1927. But there has been a steady increase in literacy in the Republican period. The 1945 census showed that 35 per cent of the male population and 14 per cent of the female population were literate; figures giving no case for complacency but indicative of a substantial improvement. Cf. G. L. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

61 Atatürk himself pointed out that large number of people who did not know how to read and write the Arabic Script had no difficulty in teaching Latin. Similarly Ismet Inonu in a speech at Malatya in 1928, argued that through the adoption of the Latin alphabets and the subsequent increase in literacy, the Turkish nation would no longer be deprived of attaining its place among the civilized nations. Cf. H. E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation* (New York, 1968), pp.128-29.

Balikesir Mosque on Feb.7 1923, Mustafa Kemal stressed the need for the use of Turkish in all religious sermons so that the people could understand their meaning, as well as the need for discussing current national problems. A few excerpts of the sermon are given below. He said:

“O nation! Allah is One. His position is Great. May *Allah's* peace kindness and blessings be upon you. Our respected prophet was appointed by Allah as his Messenger to propagate religious principles to human beings.... Allah is the Maker of all the laws of the universe.

Friends, the venerable Prophet possessed two houses for his activities. One of them was his own house, and the other was *Allah's* house. He performed the nation's affairs in Allah's house. Following the auspicious footstep of the revered Prophet, we are in *Allah's* the presence in this sacred house at this moment to discuss the present and future matters of our nation. The religious and heroic people of Baliksir have given me this opportunity. I am therefore, very happy and hope it will be a means of my achievement of great virtues....

The purpose of the sermon is to enlighten and guide people, and nothing else. To read sermons which are a hundred, two hundred or even a thousand years old means leaving human beings in ignorance and negligence. It is essential that

speakers should always give sermons in the language of the people....”⁶²

For the purpose of religious reforms the Faculty of Theology including many theologians and psychologists appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Prof. Mehmet Fuat Koprulu. The religious reform, sponsored by the Faculty of Theology, University of Istanbul in June 1928, failed to win any support of Muslim scholars. The report of the committee was published in June 1928.⁶³ The report on the proposed religious reforms remained a dead letter. But an unsuccessful attempt to introduce a Turkish translation of the *Kuran* to be used in prayers was made.⁶⁴

The *Kuran* was publicly read in its Turkish translation for the first time at services in Istanbul early in 1932. The Turkification of prayers was also found unacceptable. It was given up in the face of strong opposition from the public. Despite some popular demonstrations in Anatolian cities against the innovation, it was made obligatory the next year.

Finally, the Turkish government decided to introduce the *Azan* in Turkish in 1932. The Turkish version of call to prayers was prepared by the linguistic society⁶⁵ (*Türk Dili*

62 Quoted from M. Rashid Feroze *op.cit*, p. 98- 99

63 See report in M. Rashid Feroze Appendix 1 pp. 169-172

64 Mustafa Kemal's purpose in changing the alphabet was not to prevent Turks from reading the *Kuran*, he wanted to educate the people or nation and to develop a uniform and logical Turkish Language.

65 Its name was de-Arabicized *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Linguistic Society) in 1936. According to Article 2 of its statutes the aim of the society was to bring about the

Tetkik Cemiyeti) and it was published by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. A melody for the *Āzan* was approved by the National conservatoire of music, Ankara. A government order issued in 1933 made the Arabic recitation of *Āzan* an offence. This innovation caused more resentment among the people than any other secular reform, and it was considered as government interference in religious affairs.⁶⁶

After the death of Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, the then President of the Turkish Republic launched a fresh campaign in 1941 by increasing penalties for infringements of the laws.⁶⁷

Abolition of Fez:

The most astonishing of Mustafa Kemal's reforms was the new law of 1925 better known as the hat law. Mustafa Kemal aroused widespread opposition but he took little notice of the popular opposition to his reform programme.⁶⁸

During the month of August 1925, Mustafa Kemal paid an official visit to the Black Sea coastal region where he pointed out that:

genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language to elevate it to the high rank it deserves among world languages. Uriel Heyd, *op.cit*, pp. 25-27.

66 In 1933 one brutal upheaval occurred in Bursa in which a number of *Nakşebendis* protesting the recital of *Ezan* in Turkish and they also claimed to have acted in order to "save Islam" But the government response to such upheaval was very severe, involving suppression, trials and death sentences. B. Topark, *op.cit*, p. 69 B. Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 407-408 and D. A. Rustow, *op.cit*, p. 84 and M. Rashid Feroze *op.cit*, p. 111.

67 Uriel Heyd, *op.cit*, p. 37.

68 M. Rashid Feroze *op.cit*, p. 91

“ the traditional Anatolian male attire of full gown and baggy trousers look far more material than a suit of European cut, while ‘*Fez*’ with its skullcap beneath and its cloths wrapped round, was for more expensive than a European hat.”

After a few days, at Inebolu in a speech, he said:⁶⁹

“We are going to adopt the civilized international made of dress ... including head dress with a brim, this I wish to say openly. The name of this headdress is *ha t*”.

Shortly after his Black Sea tour in August 1925, all government officials were ordered to replace their *Fez* by 'hat'.⁷⁰ On October 25, 1925 a law was passed compelling all male citizens to wear the hat with effect from November 28, 1925.⁷¹ The wearing of *Fez*⁷² became a criminal offence by the law of 1925. This touched off a number of riots and demonstrations in the East. In order to deal with the revolt,

69 G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 91-92

70 The word ‘hat’ (*Şapka*) was at first avoided, since it connoted infidel custom. But in August 1925 Kemal appeared in a Panama hat in some of the more conservative towns of Anatolia that may be judged from the fact that in the Turkish idiom of that time *Şapka giymek* ‘to put on a hat’ meant to apostacize from Islam’ or to enter the service of a foreign power. Later he used the word ‘*Şapka*’.

71 After this law all kinds of new and second hand European headgear found a sudden market in Turkey. One of the popular items was a vizard cap, which could be turned backward during the prayer to touch the forehead to the ground.

72 *Fez* is a red cylindrical head covering cap which had been introduced as a reform measure by Mehmet II only a century before but it had by now become a symbol of the Islamic Ottoman Empire even through Ottoman Christian and Jews also wore *Fez*. *Fez* was a Greek head-dress. Cf .R. H. Davison, *op.cit*, p.131.

Takiri Sukun Law for the maintenance of order was passed on November 25, 1925 by the G. N. A. The law given extraordinary powers to the government to deal with rebellion and reactionaries as well as subversive elements and a platform to suppress all opposition.⁷³ All the rebellions were suppressed by the independence tribunals⁷⁴ (*Istiklal Mehkemeleri*) with some hangings.⁷⁵

The *Fez* was compatible with the Muslim practice in such a way that the hat was not, since, during prayers in prostrating the forehead touched the ground whereas the hat presented a problem. But the Turks changed it and prayers were performed either with a bare head or with the cap turned backwards.⁷⁶

Abolition of the Veil

It is also a fact that Mustafa Kemal had always tried to explain that his reforms were not against Islam. His attention was diverted against those *Ulema* who had been responsible for reactionary movements.⁷⁷

73 Using its power, the government took the occasion to close down a number of Istanbul's news papers, to arrest journalists and to suppress the progressive party which was the only opposition party and the association for the protection of Religion and Association for advancing Islam were also band. R. H. Davison , op cit., p.131

74 Independence Tribunal was a special court. It was set up with Mustafa Kemal's support when Ismet Paşa was Prime Minister. In order to curb the opposition, G.N.A. passed the drastic law for the maintenance of order giving exceptional powers to the Government.

75 R. H. Davison, *loc.cit.* p. 131; G. L Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

76 Yahya Armajani& T. M. Ricks, *op.cit.*, p. 247.

77 In the beginning Atatürk definitely had no intention of any break with Islam because in the 1924 constitution article 2 clearly specified that Islam to be the state religion

Mustafa Kemal believed that the essence of civilization and the basis of strength and progress lie in family life. The male and female elements, which comprise the family, must have possession of their natural rights in order to perform their family duties.⁷⁸

In an address to the citizens of Izmir on January 31, 1923, he emphasized the importance of the role of women in Turkish society.⁷⁹

“Our enemies blame us for remaining under the influence of our religion and attribute our stagnation and decline to it. This is a mistake. Our religion has never demanded that women should remain behind men. Allah has ordered every Muslim man and woman to acquire science and knowledge, to go wherever they are found to equip themselves with them.”

Mustafa Kemal modified this hectoring tone when goes on to speak of the position of women:⁸⁰

“ A society or nation consists of two kinds of people, called men and women, can we shut our eyes to one portion of a group while advancing the

and included reference to Allah in the official oath-taking. M. R. Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 110

78 Ercumand Kuran, *The Reforms of Atatürk* (RCD Cultural Institution Publication, no. 46, see also M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 7.

79 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, p. 98.

80 G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 91-92.

other, and still bring progress to the whole group. Can half a community ascend to the skies, while the other half remains chained in the dust? The road of progress must be trodden by both sexes together, marching arm in arm as comrades....

In some places I see women who throw a cloth or a towel or something of the sort over their heads, covering their faces and their eyes. When a man passes by, they turn away, or sit huddled on the ground. What is the sense of this behavior? Gentlemen, do the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation assume this curious attitude this barbarian posture? It makes the nation look ridiculous; it must be rectified immediately.”

He went on: ⁸¹

“ In the course of my trip, I have seen that our women comrades – not in the village but particularly in towns and cities are careful to muffle up their faces and their eyes. I should think this habit must cause them great discomfort, especially in hot weather. Men this is to some extent the result of our selfishness.... Let them show their faces to the world and let them have the chance to see the world for themselves. There's nothing to be afraid of in that.”

81 *Ibid*, p. 90.

Mustafa Kemal's efforts were a factor in the disappearance of the veil from the big country towns. He did attack but never outlawed the Muslim custom of veiling of women. The use of veil was discouraged particularly in the cities, but it never was actually made illegal⁸². Impetus was given to this trend by the World War I, by which many women had entered the civil service⁸³ and now began to expose themselves in beauty contests.⁸⁴

Further, women were accorded full and equal rights of franchise. They were permitted first not only to vote but also later on to be elected deputies.⁸⁵

Abolition of the Islamic Calendar:

In the year 1926 the Muslim Calendar for legal official and every day use was abandoned and replaced by the Western Gregorian Calendar. Everywhere the Muslim year of 1342 became 1926, although the Muslim Calendar was still used in calculating the *Ramzan*, the month of fasting and religious festivals and holidays. The country also began to use the international designation for the time instead of the hours of

82 The Majority of educated women had discarded the veil in the cities and the towns; the generality of women remained shut off from this equality, Niyazi Berkes, "Development of Secularism in Turkey", p. 472.

83 G. L. Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 92.

84 In 1929 the first Turkish beauty queen was chosen.

85 First in the municipal election in 1930, and then in the Council of Elders in 1933 and finally in the National Assembly for G.N.A. IN 1934. They were admitted in the public school and the professions on increasingly equal basis along with men. Niyazi Berkes. *op.cit*, p. 472; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 55; M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit*, pp. 90-91.

the day and sunset. Yet another change in this regard was that concerning the weekly holiday.⁸⁶ This was affected in 1935, the weekly holiday on Friday,⁸⁷ was dropped and instead it was fixed from 1.00 p.m. Saturday until Monday morning.

II. INSTITUTIONAL SECULARISATION:

Through institutional secularization Kemalists wanted to check the institutional strength of orthodox Islam and to destroy the institutional strength of the folk Islam which was the real threat to the Kemalist secular reforms.⁸⁸ Institutional secularization was the most controversial aspect of the Kemalist secularization policies among the Turkish people. In general, it has been argued that the inclusion of the religious organization within the state bureaucracy and the conquest subordination of religious authority to the political are contrary to the spirit of secularism as understood in the West.⁸⁹

Abolition of the office of the Şeyhul Islam:

The same day when Caliphate was abolished, the G.N.A. also decided to abolish the office of the *Şeyhul Islam*, which

86 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 90

87 Friday had not traditionally been a Muslim day of rest but rather a market day and the day of the congregational worship with preaching in the mosque. R. H. Davison, *op.cit.*, p. 133

88 *Ibid*, p. 46.

89 *Ibid*, p. 47.


was of greater religious significance than the Caliphate.⁹⁰ As and when the Republic was formed the office of the *Grand Vezir*, which was higher in rank than *Şeyhul Islam*, was abolished. The power of the *Şeyhul Islam* was confined only to issuing *fetvas*. After the victory of Turkish Nationalists all that remained in Constantinople (Istanbul) of the old government institution of the Ottoman was abolished. In Ankara, the officers of the new government had assumed their functions and *Şeriat Wakaleti* had been instituted and thus the anti-clerical spirit of G.N.A. did not allow even this institution of the *Şeyhul Islam* to survive.⁹¹

Abolition of the Ministry of Evkaf:

With the abolition of the office of the *Şeyhul Islam* another step was taken that was the abolition of the ministry of Religious Affairs and *Evkaf*, by the law of 1924. In their places, two separate offices were established named Presidency for Religious Affairs (*Diyinet İşleri Reisliği*) which is now known as the Directorate of Religious Affairs and second was the Directorate General of *Evkaf* (*Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü*). The Prime Minister nominated the President of the Religious Affairs and his department was attached to the latter's office. His duties included administration of mosques,

90 Kemal .H. Karpat. *Turkey's Politics*, p. 44

91 See *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Shorter) (Leiden, 1974), pp. 520 ff; Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 407.



appointment and dismissal of religious functionaries such as the general supervision of the *müftis*.⁹²

The Directorate of *Evkaf* was allowed to function independently, and was made responsible for the administration of all the religious functions that were taken over by the state alongwith all the religious buildings. From 1931 the directorate was also entrusted with the responsibility for disbursing the payments of all religious functionaries. The Presidency of Religious Affairs was concerned mainly with the appointment of the preachers, the censoring of their sermons, and giving of an occasional ruling on some question of the *Şeriat*.⁹³

Abolition of the Tekkas and Turbes (Dervish Orders):

Folk *Islam* had founded its expression in the *Sufi* movement. It had organized itself around a number of *Tarikats* (brotherhoods) the most important of which in Turkey were the *Mevlevis*, the *Bektasis*, the *Kadiris*, *Naqşbandis* and *Rufais* Orders had wider contacts with the common people.⁹⁴ The reforms of 1924 were directed against those *Ulema*, who by their superficial knowledge of religion exploited the Turks, but not against the *dervishes*. The *dervish* tradition had

92 For details regarding his work and administration see below

93 B. Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 407.

94 For details regarding the various *Tarikat Orders* and their activities see B. Lewis *op.cit*, pp. 398 ff B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.46-47. J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes* (1868, re-edited by H. R. Rose in 1927; K. J. Kissling, "The Sociological and Educational Role of Dervish Orders in the Ottoman Empire" in Von Grunebaum, ed., *Studies in Islamic Cultural History* (London, 1954), pp. 23-35.

generally been one of opposition against the Ottoman government⁹⁵

Ataturk's secularist reforms of 1924 left the brotherhood free from any official harassment but it soon became apparent that *derviş* were not to spread. So the nationalist government soon came to the conclusion that the greatest threats to the secular reforms⁹⁶ were most likely to come from the *dervis*, brotherhood rather than the *Ulema* of the time. The latter had generally co-operated with the state and hence were unaccustomed to techniques of opposition to state authority. The brotherhoods on the other hand had stood as a centre of opposition and knew how to conduct it.⁹⁷

On September 30, 1925 in a speech, Mustafa Kemal lashed out at most of the old Muslim modes of conduct which the vast majority of Turks would have considered immutable and unusable. He touched on the exaggerated veneration paid to the Tombs (*Türbes*) of holy men. "It is disgraceful for a

95 For example several of the orders had sympathized with the Young Turks Movement against Abdul Hamit's absolutism. During the war of independence many of them had similarly supported the Kamalist nationalists in Anatolia. Seyh Sait Nursi supported him but very soon he differed with Mustafa Kemal's secularist policy. For details. See B. Lewis, *op.cit*, pp. 400-403

96 In November of 1925, the *Naksibendi Order* in a country of Rize in protest against the wearing of hats and alleged decision of the government outlaw the veil attempted an armed rebellion. This was followed by several demonstrations in many cities against the "Hat law" Two months later a group of *Hocas* in Erzurum with the participation of a large crowd led a "march against secularism" During the trial which followed, it was learned that the Association for the Protection of Religion (*Muhafaza-i-Mukaddesat Cemiyeti*) and the Association for Advancing Islam (*Islam Teali Cemiyeti*) had played major roles in organizing the demonstration. Binaz Toprak, *op.cit*, p 69.

97 K.H.Karpat, *op.cit*, p. 47.

civilized society to seek help from the dead” Then he passed on to give the first warning of what was in store for the *tarikats*.

“ I take it that the aim of the orders can only be the well being of their followers in worldly and spiritual life. I can not accept the existence in the civilized Turkish community of people so primitive as to seek their material and spiritual well being through the guidance of any *Şeyh*... Gentlemen I want you and the whole nation to understand well that the Republic of Turkey can never be the land of Sheikh dervish disciples and lay – brothers. The straightest truest way (*Tarikat*) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization dictates and demands. The heads of the orders will grasp this truth I have stated and will at once close their *tekkes*, of their own accord. They will acknowledge that their disciples have at least attained right guidance.” ⁹⁸

In a six-day speech Mustafa Kemal exclaimed two days later:

98 G. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 91 and see also in article “Ataturk” in *Islam Ensiklopedisi*, Istanbul, 1950, p.784, translated and quoted by J. R. Barnes, “A. Short note on the Dissolution of the Dervish Order in Turkey” *The Muslim world* No. 1 Vol. LXIV, January 1974, pp. 34-35.

“Could one regard as a civilized nation a mass of men who allowed themselves to be taken in tow by a rabble of *Şeyh, dedes, çelebis, babas* and *emirs*; who entrusted their faith and their life to chiromancers, magicians, casters of lots and amulet setters? Ought they to be allowed in the new Turkish State? In the Turkish Republic to have eliminate and institution such as these....”⁹⁹

The answer to these questions had been law no. 677 passed on September 24, 1925 by the G.N.A. It consisted of three decrees and accomplished the following.

The first decree closed all religious houses (*tekkes* and *zawiyehs*) and all established orders in Turkey, prohibited individuals as living members of the Orders and from wearing the traditional costumes and bearing the titles associated theirwith; closed all mosques which were attached to the religious houses.¹⁰⁰ Apart form the ‘*tekkes*’ there were also *Turbes* (tombs) to which votive offerings were made and which were considered miracle working. These were also ordered to be closed.

A visible reason for their closure may have been that their popular support, their radical traditions, their Masonic organizations all made them little amenable to state control.¹⁰¹

99 *Dicourse du Mustafa Kemal* (Leipzig, 1921) translated by J. R. Barnes, *op.cit*, pp. 33-39.

100 A. J. Toynbee, *op.cit*, pp. 72-73.

101 B.Lewis, *op.cit*, p.261

Yet another reason for the abolition of the *dervis* orders was the revolt against Mustafa Kemal's secular policies by a head of the *Nakşibendi* order of *Derviş*, Şeyh Sait Nursi¹⁰² in Eastern Anatolia which was severely dealt with. The independence tribunal (*Istiklal Mahkemeleri*) also captured Şeyh Sait and his assistant.¹⁰³

Abolition of Islam as State Religion

The official religion of the Ottomans was Islam and the majority of the Turks were Sunni Muslims and the followers of the Hanafi School of *fiqh*. In the beginning Atatürk had no intention of any break with *Islam*.¹⁰⁴ His intention was also seen in a circular notice which was sent to the provincial and district officials regarding the inauguration of the G.N.A. reflected the traditional pomp and ceremony that accompanied the historic establishment of the Turkish nationalist government. The circular was as follows:¹⁰⁵

102 According to Behçe Cemal Sait Nursi's rebellion started in the name of religion. He also agreed that a secret committee of the caliphate (*Hilafet Komitesi*) was founded on Bucharest under the leadership of the one-time Interior Minister of the Ottoman government Mehmet Ali had been in touch with both Şeyh Sait Nursi and Seyit Abdul Kader who was the chairman of a secret and under ground organization called the Kurdish Liberation Committee (*Kurt Istiklal Komitesi*), established in 1923, whose main purpose was to create Independent Kurdistan. The Khilafat Committee's aim was to restore the Sultanate and Caliphate and want to bring vehituttim back to the throne. For detail see Behçe Camel, *Şeyh Sait İsyani* (Istanbul, 1955) cf. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 152 – 53.

103 R.H.Davison, *op.cit.*, p.151 & Binaz Toprak, *op.cit.*, p.68.

104 M.Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p.98.

105 Mustafa Kemal, *Nühat* (Ankara, 1927),p.273.Cf. M .Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*,p. 81.

1. “ By the grace of Allah the Grand National Assembly will be inaugurated in Ankara on Friday, April 23,1920 after Friday prayers.”
2. “ By fixing the inauguration of the G.N.A which is going to perform the most important duties as securing the independence of the fatherland and the release of the high office of the Caliphate and the Sultanate. On Friday, advantage will be taken of the sanctity of this day as well as of the prayers of the honorable deputies in the mosque of Haji Bayram Wali, recitation of the *Kuran* and *Salat*. After *Salat*, they will go to the special building preserving the *Lihye-i Saadet* (hair of the Prophet's beard) and *Sancak-i Şerif* (the Prophet's Banner). Before entering the special building, a prayer will be recited and sacrificial cattle will be slaughtered.”
3. “In order to benefit from the sanctity of the said day, recitation of the *Kuran* and *Bukahari* will be started with effect from today (April 21,1920). The final part of the recitation will be completed after Friday prayers under the supervision of the provincial governors, in front of the special office building,”
4. “ In all corners of our holy and mutilated fatherland, recitation of *Bukhari* and the *Kuran* will be started from today in the same manner and on Friday *Salwat* will be recited over minarets of the mosques before the *Ezan*. During the Friday

sermon, the auspicious name of our Caliph and *Padsha* will be mentioned,... On the completion of this religious and national ceremony in the mosques, felicitations will be exchanged at the government houses in all parts of the Ottoman territories over inauguration of the G.N.A. Everywhere *mevlud şerif* will be recited in a befitting manner before Friday prayers.”

The national state was virtually secular from its very inception, as the idea of national sovereignty was foreign to Islamic principles. Officially, however Islam was the religion of the state as a legacy of the first Ottoman constitution of 1876. The Republican Constitution that came into effect on April 20, 1924 was officially secularized by deleting the clause: “ The religion of Turkish state is Islam” on April 10, 1928.¹⁰⁶ The de-establishment of Islam completed and Turkey was now legally and constitutionally lay state, secular, and modern in her constitution, laws and aspirations.¹⁰⁷

The religious policy of the Kemalist regime, since its very inception, was to separate religion from politics and to put an end to the power of exponents of religion in political,

106 M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 88

107 The major consequence of this change was that religious institutions lost their former judicial functions. As a result, the religious formula for taking an oath in court was changed to a statement of truth based on the individual's honor and conscience. The amendment in 1928 of the articles 16 and 18 of the 1924 constitution similarly changed the wordings of the oath taken by newly elected members of the assembly and the President of the Republic. For the details of 1928 constitutional amendment see, Suna Killi, *Kemalism*, pp. 104-109.

social and cultural affairs. The law against High Treason passed by the G.N.A. aimed at stopping the misuse of religion for political ends.¹⁰⁸

It was always explained to the people that these reforms were not against Islam but against just those *Ulema* who misused religion in politics.¹⁰⁹

III FUNCTIONAL SECULARIZATION:

Institutional secularization aimed at weakening the organizational strength of *Islam* as well as excluding the religious organization from involvement in political affairs. Religion in traditional Ottoman society, however had two important functions. The religious hierarchy controlled both the educational and judicial process. Functional differentiation in these two areas, therefore, was the third major act of secularization that the nationalist government undertook.¹¹⁰

108 Bernard Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 406 – 407

109 In this way not only the political and social influence of the *Ulema* were suppressed but also it reduced the role of religion from the social and cultural life of the people. Mustafa Kemal wanted to break the hold of those *Ulema* who still had great power and influence and mobilize the people by their superficial knowledge. Facilities of the country were under their control, the law relating to family and personal matters were still dominated by the code they administered. This was the only authority to challenge the new leadership. In fact this was the aspect of the conflict. Cf. B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 258 – 60

110 Religious hierarchy assumed many of the functions that state institution performed in administrative set up of a more differentiated character. The education, Judiciary and interpretation of Islamic law as well as administration of the court system were left under the jurisdiction of the religious hierarchy, which was considered to be the only legitimate overseer of political decisions. Through the institution of the *fetva*, the *Ulema* either sanctioned or condemned the policy decision of the Sultan and his government as well as reform changes and innovation with in the Empire. Cf. B. Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Abolition of the Şeriat:

Till the mid nineteenth century the *Şeriat* was supreme throughout the Ottoman Empire. But the *Tanzimat* reforms of Sultan Abdul Mecit I (1839-1861) were the first significant move towards modification of the religious law.¹¹¹ These codes were superimposed on the *Şeriat Law*, and the modifications were made in favour of the existing Muslim customs.¹¹² But the most significant codification was done in 1876, known as *Majalla (Mecella)*¹¹³ These laws were under the ministry of Justice and were applied in secular courts which existed simultaneously with the *Seriat* courts which were under the *Şeyhul Islam*.¹¹⁴

111 The first changes were affected in the field of commercial laws, which fell outside the *Şeriat* when in 1850 secular laws were framed dealing with trade and commerce. In the system of Judiciary certain modifications were made when a new panel code was framed in phase in 1840, 1851 and finally in 1858. See. Niyazi Berkes *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 162.

112 For example panel code imposed payment of blood money in addition to prison sentence in case of bodily injury or homicide, and a man was allowed to go unpunished for killing a female relative discovered in the act of adultery. Cf. Thomas D. Robert's and others, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington 1970), p. 367.

113 This was a compilation of *Hanafi law* of personal obligations, but unlike the other codes, it was not regarded as exclusive of the religious law it compiled. It was applied in the Secular Courts which had been instituted to carryout the new codes. The *Mecelle* (*Majallah*) concerned a small portion of the law of contract. It contained 1851 Articles. Of which 300 articles of this code meet the requirements of the present time. Its compilation was started on 8th Muharram 1286 AH. Completed on 26th Shaban 1293AH. And made effective the same day. For details see, S. Mahamasani, *Falsafat al.Tshrih fi-al-Islam*, Eng trs. Farhat J. Zaidah, *The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam* (Leiden, 1961) p. 39.ff. see also Majid Khudduri & Herbert J. Liebensy (ed.), *Law in the Middle East* (Washington, 1955), Vol. 1. p. 292ff. and M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit*, pp. 173-180.

114 Niyazi Berkes , *op. cit*, p.165

The abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate did not effect the daily life of the average Turks. But the abolition of the *Şeriat* and office of the *Şeyhul Islam* effected every individual and rocked the country.¹¹⁵ To fulfil the ultimate goal of a modern secular Turkish state, the replacement of the *Şeriat* by the Western legal codes was the most revolutionary of all the reforms.¹¹⁶

In 1917 the *Şeriat* courts were tied to the Ministry of Justice but within three years these courts were linked again to the office of the *Şeyhul Islam* in the year of 1920. But the final secularization of the courts system was accomplished in 1924 with the abolition of the *Şeriat* courts, the subsequent unification of the Ministry of Justice, and enactment of distinctly secular codes.¹¹⁷ Even before the final abolition of the *Şeriat*, a law school was opened in Ankara in Nov. 1925.¹¹⁸

The Christian and Jewish millets were governed by their own religious laws up to that time. After the abolition of *Şeriat*, that was a major step in ensuring the legal equality not only of the sexes but also of the sects. For the first time the Jewish, Armenian and Greek communities in Turkey were

115 *Ibid*, p. 467

116 C. L. Ostrorog, *The Angora Reforms* (London, 1927), p. 87ff.

117 Suna Kili, *op.cit*, p. 104.

118 The law school intended to be not merely the training ground of high officials and legal specialists but more important the basis of a new Jurisdiction consistent with the revolutionary ideals and in harmony with the social needs of Turkey. Cf. A. J. Toynbee & Kirkwood, *op.cit*, p. 202 and see also in Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-55", p. 81.

governed under the same law.¹¹⁹ This new law sounded the death knell for the millet system. .¹²⁰

Abandonment of Religious education:

Of all the reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal, the most important was the development of the modern education system through the Republic. Secularization of education was the second phase of the functional secularisation, which started with the unification of the education system and with the abolition of the religious education.¹²¹ Under the Republic, education was taken away from the *Ulema*. The government built Western type Schools and education was proclaimed to be universal.¹²²

119 R. H. Davison, *op.cit*, p.133

120 The word Millet is an Arabic word for which there is no equivalent in the Western political terminology. The millet were actually the members of the non-Muslim religious communities living in the Ottoman Empire who had already been granted a wide scope of cultural and civil autonomy by Mehmet Fateh, the conqueror of Istanbul. First in importance among these millet was the *Millet-i Rum* which comprised all the Greek orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan. The next in importance were the *Armenian Millet*, the *Jewish Millet*, the *Roman Catholic Millet* and the *Moronite Millet*... Lord Dufferin said....All over the Turkish period religious communities (*Millets*) were considered as individual nationalities. Thus the line of demarcation was not along racial but along religious lines. The political identity of the Sultan's subjects was the Ottoman (*Osmanli*) and his Nationality was the religion to which he belonged. For details, see H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. I, part II (London, 1977), pp. 207-61, see also Z. N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relation and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958), p .28.

121 It was understood as a means of attachment of religious knowledge in speical religious school called *Medrese* B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 49.

122 In the Ottoman Empire education had been under the control of the ulema. Besides, each mosque there was usually a school. In small towns, the mosque was used as a school the main purpose of which was teaching children to read the *Kuran* to pray and to perform the basic rituals of *Islam*. Those who wanted higher education attended special schools that trained *Ulema*. Yayha Armajani & T. M. Ricks, *op.cit*, p 247.

During the 18th and in the first half of the nineteenth century many attempts were made to secularize education for the purpose of spreading literacy and to train students in military, medical and technical and educational fields. During that period secular education existed side by side with the religious one.¹²³

As a result for centuries whatever schooling a Turk could receive was in or near the mosque, where one of the chief functionaries was the *Hoca* (Teacher). The emphasis was on teaching Islamic sciences and Arabic language, which was not understood by most Turks. Elementary education was limited to this sort of teaching unless the student sought to become a member of the *Ulema* and make himself an authority on Islamic law.¹²⁴ The government of Ataturk took up this field as a measure for social welfare. The provincial government setup by G.N.A. considered drastic changes in the organized education of the country as of primary importance. Immediately after the formation of the Republic education was

123 Contact with the West and the recognition of Ottoman military weakness led to the foundation of secular Institutions of learning in the second half of the 18th century and in the *Tanzimat* period the number of secular schools expanded in addition to several learned societies. Due to the unstable political condition of the constitutional period any remarkable progress in this field was checked. But in Young Turks era modern western education was given its due importance. During this period the number of government schools were increased as well as Muslims were encouraged to study abroad. A number of Turkish Muslims students began to attend the European and American schools within the Empire already maintained by the missionary agencies. Toprak, *op cit.*, p. 49.

124 H. Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation* (Chicago, 1935), p. 92.

taken away from the *Ulema* and *Tevhid-i-Tedrisat Kanunu*,¹²⁵ a bill, concerning abolition of the *medrese*, the theological seminaries and development of modern education, was presented to G.N.A. for the discussion and approval. After a lengthy discussion the bill on secularization of education was approved on March 3, 1924 with this approval the religious seminaries were abolished and received their final death blow and were closed forever¹²⁶.

Government built schools on the model of the West took their place and education was proclaimed to be free and universal.¹²⁷ Halide Edib has aptly described this thus.¹²⁸

“ The *medreses* for the first time were to have modern teachers instead of the old scholastic curriculum and the teachers. The mosque schools, which so far taught only the *Quran* and which were housed in little holes were to modernize, and a dozen schools were amalgamated in one big and up-to- date building in an important center. Each was to have a modern staff with a modern curriculum. The boys' schools were organized by Ali Bey, a very capable and progressive section chief in *evkaf*. The girls schools as well as the

125 Literally *Tevhid - i Tedrisat* means the unification of the education system.

126 H. Malik Envenol, *Revolutionary Turkey* (Ankara, 1936), pp. 47-48.

127 H. E. Allen, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

128 *Memories of Halide Edib* (New York, 1926), p. 351.

small mixed ones were to be organized by Nakie Hanum as the general director.”

The different millets continued to provide separate schools, hospitals, and other social institutions for those wishing to use them with the government insisting only that all millet children receive their elementary education in the state schools according to curriculums established by the Ministry of Education, in order to prove the common bounds needed for them to participate in Turkish life.¹²⁹ However, provision was made by the state for further training of religious personnel. At the lower level 29 new schools known as *Imam Hatip*, were opened to train the Imams and preachers, and at the higher level a Faculty of Theology (*Ilahiyat Fakultesi*) was established at the *Suleymaniya Medersa* which was affiliated to the University of Istanbul. Thus religious education was brought under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. This new Faculty was established with an intention to serve as the center of a new modernised and scientific form of religious instruction which could serve the purpose of a secular, westernized republic.¹³⁰

But the Faculty of Theology could not function adequately in these circumstances. The abolition of Arabic and Persian from the curriculum of Secondary Schools in 1929 had an adverse effect on the competence of the students for

129 H. E. Allen, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

130 M. Rashid Feroze, *op. cit.*, p. 108 and see also chapter V below.

higher religious education¹³¹. Very soon due to lack of number of students' the faculty was closed down in 1933¹³² and in its place an Institute of Islamic Studies, (*Islam Incelemeleri Enstitüsü*) which was affiliated to the Faculty of Arts, University of Istanbul, was founded for the study of Islam. After 1933 all institutions and schools of formal religious education ceased functioning except only for those schools which taught *Kuran* only. By these phenomena, the first generation of young men and women remained largely without sufficient religious education.¹³³

As Basgoz and Wilson point out, within a decade after the establishment of the Republic, there remained no religious educational institution, which received state support. But after 1940 it were reintroduced as a result of the multiparty competition.¹³⁴

131 The plan to reform Islam was mainly a scheme to Turkify *Islam* in its spiritual contents the idea was promoted probably by the general feeling of hostility towards the Arab countries who had revolted against the Ottoman Empire, and contributed in no small measure to its fragmentation and liquidation.

132 At the time of its founding in 1924, at *Darulfünun* the faculty of Divinity (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) had 224 enrolled students but the figure had dropped to 20 by 1933.

133 M. Rashid Feroz, *op. cit.*, p. 111-112

134 For a short history of the *medreses* see Basgoz İlhan and H. E. Wilson, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Eğitim Ve Atatürk* (Ankara, 1968), pp. 21-27 and pp. 82-83 on the *İmam Hatip School*, see, Nahit Dincer, *1913'den Bugüne İmam Hatip Okulları Meselesi* (İstanbul, 1974) and Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New İmam Hatip Schools," *Die Welt Des İslam*, Vol. IV 1956, p.1 50-63 and Howard A. Reed, "Faculty of Divinity at Ankara" *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, (1956), pp. 395-412. For part I and Vol. XLVII, No.1, (1957), p. 22-35. For part II. On the problem of religious education in Turkey, see Fehmi Yavuz, *Din Eğitimi Ve Toplumumuz* (Ankara, 1969), pp. 54-99. For information of both İmam Hatip School and higher institute of İslam, see *Cumhuriyetin 50.Yilinda Milli Eğitimiz*, pp.153-54 and Dincer, *op.cit.*, pp. 51-96.

Education no longer worked to produce good and faithful Muslims acquainted with religious knowledge but good and faithful Turks. Islam in so far as it could contribute to the new end was retained, but religious instructions were not given by turbaned *Hoca* (teacher) but by regular secular teachers and were so presented as to produce devoted Turks.¹³⁵

IV. LEGAL SECULARIZATION:

The final act of secularization of the Kemalist government was in the legal field. Symbolic Institutional and functional secularization was reinforced by a legal framework, which eliminated the religiously sanctioned provisions of civil commercial and criminal laws. Although secularization of law had gained quite a momentum since the *Tanzimat* legal provisions based on the *Şeriat* were still in effect.¹³⁶ The Kemalist government made its first attempt to change the legal system with the appointment of special committees by the Ministry of Justice to prepare the framework for a new set of secular codes the result of the committees report, however, showed the heavy influence of religious law on the proposed

135 H. E. Allen, *op.cit.*, p. 101

136 It was in the *Tanzimat* era that efforts were made, for the first time, to codify the law. Although such codification of law was based on the *seriat*, it was nevertheless an important step towards the secularization of law in that it was the first recognition of the necessity to establish legal codes that were written and distinguishable from religious provisions. During the *Tanzimat* and the following periods, a number of secular codes were enacted in the fields of commercial, penal and civil law that supplemented the religious ones. At the same time, a parallel effort was made to establish secular courts where the new codes would be applied. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

changes.¹³⁷ But the project, therefore, was stopped and with minor revision the government decided to adopt the new codes i.e. Swiss Civil Code Italian Criminal Code, and the German Commercial code.¹³⁸ The then Minister of Justice Mehmet Issat is said to have declare on the question:

“ We are badly in want of a good scientific code. Why waste our time trying to produce something new when quite good codes are to be found readymade? Moreover, what is the use of a code without good commentaries for a new code? We dispose neither of the necessary time nor of the necessary precedents in practice. The only thing to do is to take a good ready-made code to which good commentaries exist, and translate them whole sole. The Swiss Code is a good Code, I am going to have it adopted, and I shall ask the assembly to proceed to a vote anabolic, as Napoleon had his code voted. If it had to be discussed article by article, we should never get through.”¹³⁹

A committee of lawyers was set up to adopt the Swiss Civil Code to the legal needs of Turkey. On February 17, 1926

137 Where as the *Şeriat* courts were left under the jurisdiction of the *Şeyhul Islam*, the secular ones were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. It was during the second Constitutional period, in 1917. Three years later, however, in 1920, they were linked to the office of the *Şeyhul Islam* once again. *Iibd.* p. 48.

138 The adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code, a new Penal Code from Italy and a new Commercial Code based on Germany and Italy were the means of fulfilling the ultimate goals of a modern Secular Turkish State. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

139 C. L. Ostorrog, *op.cit.*, p. 87ff.

a complete version of Turkish Civil Code which was based on Swiss Civil Code was passed by the G.N.A. which came into force on October 4, 1926. Through this new code all the civil laws in the *Şeriat* were replaced and equality of men and women was recognized in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property rights. Marriage of Muslim women to a non-Muslim was permitted. The husband's advantage under Islamic law in securing divorce was swept away. All adults were given rights to change their religion if they so desired.¹⁴⁰

The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 was one of the most important acts of the Kemalist government towards the creation of a secular state.

The adoption of the new Civil Code by the Kemalist government was a major step towards the emancipation of Turkish women.¹⁴¹ Family law had been one of the last strongholds of the *Şeriat* courts and the most resistant area of the legal system of secularisation.¹⁴² The success of the

140 Actually non-citizen is allowed to renounce Islam in Turkey according to Turkish law. Any person wishing to do so must surrender his Turkish citizenship and only then he may renounce Islam and embrace another religion in some other country. This law is also applicable to non-Turkish Muslims residing in Turkey. It is also interesting to note that non-Muslims are not allowed to build any new places of worship in Turkey. The Government of Secular Turkey has non-Muslim employees in its civil and military departments.

141 Turkish women were given the right to vote and were elected to parliament in 1934. On the status of women in Islam see Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (New York, 1969), pp.91-134. For the status of women in present day Turkey see the article in Nermin Abden- Unat, (ed) *Türk Toplumundan kadın*, Ankara, 1979.

142 For legal reforms, see Sunakili, *op.cit*, p. 46-47 and Daver Blunt, *Türkiye Cumhuriyatında Layiklik* (Ankara, 1955) p. 91-110. For explanation on old civil code,

Kemalist reforms in this field however has been limited. In contrast to women in Arban centers the majority of women in more closed communication still continue to perform their traditional roles and the provision of the Civil Code concerning marriage divorce, or monogamy are evaded in favor of more traditional arrangements that Islam has sanctioned for centuries.¹⁴³

Law of Marriage

Under the new Turkish Civil Law a civil ceremony is considered the only legal method of marriage. The code required that couples establish an identity by producing valid birth certificates, submit to a medical examination, and registered the marriage with the appropriate official after putting up the *banns*.¹⁴⁴ The code completely replaced the Islamic law making all religious marriage ceremonies legally irrelevant.¹⁴⁵

Marriage from then on was made an entirely secular matter. Although religious marriage performances were not prohibited they were left to the inclinations of persons concerned after the marriage act was completed in the legal

the *Mecelle* in effect after 1870 (its first section came out in 1870 and later sections were completed in 1876) and how it deferred from the new civil code adopted in 1926. See Count Leon Ostorog, *The Angora Reforms*, (London 1927), pp. 77-93.

143 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 54

144 Fifteen days public notice of intended marriage.

145 Thomas D. Roberts & others, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

sense. Their performance or non-performance made no difference to the validity of the contract.¹⁴⁶

However the civil registration of marriages continued to be neglected especially amongst the villagers who constitute a majority of the Turkish population.¹⁴⁷

Law of Divorce

The civil code changed the nature of divorce radically under the *Şeriat* law the husband had a greater right with respect to divorce. Although under the *Şeriat* the wife too had a right for divorce but in actual practice it had been unknown. Under the changed laws the rights to divorce were equally given both to the husband and the wife, but divorce could only be obtained through a court of law. Whereas the *Şeriat* law did not require the husband to give reasons for the divorce the new law specified the grounds upon which the divorce could be obtained.

The legal grounds for obtaining divorce for either party include adultery desertion insanity incompatibility and felony. Mutual consent is not accepted by the state as sufficient ground for divorce. The state recognises the civil divorce as the only legal one.¹⁴⁸

146 N. Berkes, *op.cit.*, p. 472.

147 In this context Hifzi Vildet Velideoglu, a prominent scholar of Civil Law, has suggested that the higher percentage of unregistered marriages in the villages might have something to do with the difficulties of the divorce proceedings for which the villager has to make quite a number of trips to a city or town court house.

148 For the detail of divorce see N. Berkes, "Development of Secularism", pp. 417-418.

Abolition of the Polygamy

Another significant aspect of the civil code was the prohibition of polygamy according to the *Şeriat* a man is permitted a maximum of four wives at a time provide that the husband treats and provides for all his wives equally well. However among the people, polygamy had already declined to insignificance by the time the Republic made it illegal in 1926.¹⁴⁹

Law of Inheritance

Another aspect of *Şeriat* transgressed by the civil code was in connection with inheritance rights of the female members of the family. According to the *Şeriat law* of inheritance the male members of the family have a double share. The civil court accorded equal rights to men and women regarding inheritance and succession, thus giving high legal status to women it also gave the mother equal rights to the guardianship of children.¹⁵⁰

From the above we can clearly see the efforts made by Mustafa Kemal towards giving a special place amongst his plans for reform to the emancipation of women. He always insisted on the necessity for both sexes to take part in progress. He believed that 'Family life is the basis of progress and the source of strength. A defective family life begets

149 E. Bisbee, *The New Turks* (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 36.

150 N. Berkes, *op.cit.*, p. 473.

social economic and political weakness. It is necessary that the male and female elements which constitute the family enjoy their natural rights, and are in a condition to fulfil their duties in the family.¹⁵¹

The passing of the new Civil Code by the G.N.A. did not transform Turkey overnight into a Modern Western State. The new laws of marriage, divorce and inheritance were no doubt enforced in the majority of the remote villages but the old ways survived. A marriage was usually registered with the civil authorities to ensure legitimacy and legal inheritance only. Even then the adoption a European Civil Code by a Muslim nation accustomed for centuries to follow only the revealed law is one of the most important events in history.

151 J. B. Villalta, *op.cit.*, p. 369.

CHAPTER - III

ISLAM AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

Many aspects of the role of *Islam* in modern Turkey have debated among foreign observers and Turkish commentators. Contrasting and changing interpretation of the apparent revival in Islamic consciousness have been suggested.¹ According to Şerif Mardin:² “*Islam* in Turkey was to be multi-dimensional and took different form and function”.

From 1950s to early 1980s the function and role of *Islam* were different from the period of 1923 and 1940s.³ The period from 1950 to 1980, the problem of *Islam* was commonly seen as a matter of partly politics and the revival of *Tariket* activity which became most influential in the military, the bureaucracy, education and government⁴. Since the republican revolution in 1923, *Islam* in Turkey has been redefined. In

1 Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*(London, 1994), p. 3.

2 Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey”, p. 280.

3 Since the 1950's but particularly during the 1970's and 1980's, Islamic revival has taken variety of forms. There has been massive increase in Islamic publishing activity, including both intellectuals treatises and popular prayer-manuals, *tarikats* journals and other literature. Media attention — both in Turkey and the West — has been particularly drawn to visible symptoms of Islamic activity and identity, such as women's headscarves and men's facial hairs, mosque-building and the formation of Islamic communes, and the growth of religious education (including unofficial *Kuranic Courses*). Some of these phenomena notably the last, have received government support. Cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

4 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

Atatürk's new state, religious expression came under strict government supervision and control⁵. Atatürk wanted to create a homogeneous society on the basis of same religion, race and language as well as law.⁶ Regarding the importance of the education he said:⁷

“The Turkish nation which knew how to defend its country and noble independence must also liberate its language from the yoke of foreign language”.

Further he justified the aim of his reforms in these words:⁸

“The aim of the reforms we have already carried out and are continuing to carry out is to transform the society into a modern society in every aspect. This is the basis of our reforms”.

5 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.* p. 2, and Şerif Mardine, *Ideology and Religion* (Ankara, 1969), p. 268.

6 Mustafa Kemal was a charismatic leader who had not only a reasonably clear vision of what type of society he wished to create, but also the skills to mobilize the masses to support the changes he wanted to realize. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 50. His repeated emphasis on the importance of education for the youth of Turkey, therefore, was based on his recognition that education was not only equally effective tool for cultural transformation. B. Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1981), p. 51.

7 Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 9.

8 Enver Ziya Karal, “The Principle of Kemalism” in Ali Kazancigil and Ozbudun ed., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London, 1981), p. 15.

Having cut the traditional ties between religion on the one hand and law and education on the other hand, the government had taken little interest in the Islamic revivalism. The party dictatorship of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü continued. It was impossible to air any direct opposition to the governments secularizing and westernizing policies.⁹

Political Development and Islam under Mustafa Kemal:

Atatürk believed that political freedom and freedom of conscience are a mere dream unless social freedom is realised. There was no prohibition of the multiparty politics in the constitution, but Kemal realized that the people's interest could least be served by focussing its energies into the party i.e., into one party that was founded by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁰ According to him:¹¹

“The prerequisite of democracy is the inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy and exercise political liberty, that is his right to participate in the

9 However, throughout the Republican era, the conservative religious feelings were seen to spread in Turkey. During this period various opposition groups emerged. Through these groups secularist and modernist policies of Mustafa Kemal were openly attacked, but they were suppressed by Atatürk

10 The Republican Party (*Halk Firkasi*) originated in the *Müdafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Associations for the Defense of Rights) established in Anatolia and Thrace. Later a proposal to transform the Association for Defense of Rights into Political Party was passed. This *Halk Firkasi* was established officially in October 1923. After the establishment of the Republic this party was called *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Peoples Republican Party).

11 *Self Government in Turkey*, (Distributed by) Turkish information office 444, East, 52 (New York, nd.), p. 2.

administration of the state either directly or through his chosen representatives.”

Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cümhuriyet Firkasi*):

This was the first opposition group which was founded in November 1924 by prominent leaders of the war of Independence first after the abolition of the Caliphate, by a number of Kemal's most prominent military and political associates¹² who attacked Kemal's secularist and modernist policies. They were also opposed to the abolition of the Caliphate and Kemal's dictatorial leadership. Their chief aim would seem to have been to prevent the erection of a personal dictatorship by Kemal. The party dedicated itself to democratic and liberal principles and its programme was chiefly concerned with constitutional and economic issues.¹³

The progressive Republican Party's basic idea was that the concentration of all powers in the National Assembly without the control of an opposition would rest in

12 Kemal's personnel ascendancy was growing among his colleagues who were former supporters and closely associated with him in the early phase of the National Struggle. They were, Adnan Adiver, Halida Edib, Refet Paşa, Fauf Orbay and two military soldiers Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, see G. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 86-87.

13 Dankwart A. Rustow, *op cit*, p. 87.

authoritarianism. Its main purpose was to survive, to preserve individual freedom by "opposing the despotic tendencies of a few people and their oligarchic aim"¹⁴. For the moment Kemal bent slightly to their wishes by removing his devoted supporter Ismat Paşa against whom they had grievances, from premier ship. On Nov. 12, 1924 Mustafa Kemal appointed as Prime Minister, his old friend Ali Fethi Okyar who was regarded as liberal.¹⁵

Kemal apparently allowed the party to grow because he felt that by this time opposition to the Republic was so weak that it could not gain mass support. But the new party's existence unleashed such a torrent of willing supporters from all sides of the political spectrum that the President and his associates soon were forced to recognize their error.¹⁶

Party leaders, notably Huseyin Rauf (Orbay), had favored the preservation and even the strengthening of a Caliphate diverse from temporal law. Its programme merely stated that the party proposed to "respect religious beliefs and convictions". This cultural cleavage became more manifest with the emergence of what might be called counter-

14 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p 46.

15 R. H. Davison, *Turkey*, p. 130, and Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 105.

16 Bernard Lewis, *op.cit*, p. 260.

revolutionary movements¹⁷. In February 1925, after the formation of the party, a widespread Kurdish rebellion broke out in Eastern Provinces under Seyh Sait Nursi¹⁸, religious head of *Nakşibendi* order, who challenged the authority of the Young Republic¹⁹. Mustafa Kemal acted swiftly and vigorously. Fethi proved to be a poor administrator, and Ismet returned to power in March 1925²⁰. The revolt was soon quelled the rebels and supporters of the rebellion, including some newspapers²¹, were dealt severely. The government then turned against the Progressive Party, which, the Independence tribunals had found to be connected with the rebellion, although the proof was not clearly established. On the report of the tribunal in Ankara, the Progressive Republican Party was abolished on June 5, 1925²² and charged that its religious programme plank had served as a rallying point for religious

17 These were a series of localized rebellions launched in the same of Islam during the first decade and a half of the Republic. B. Toprak, *op.cit.* p. 67.

18 For more detail, *Turkey Kā Mard-e Müjahid*, (Pakistan, 1978), and see chap⁹ above.

19 On the revolt, see, A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 507-11, and B. Toprak, *op.cit.* p. 61.

20 Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (New York, 1960), p. 401

21 A number of newspapers were closed and their publisher brought before the court as early as 1924 for defending the Caliphate and criticizing the government polices. Ahmet Amin, Halide Edib and her husband, Adnan Ediver were exiled from Turkey. For the trial of newspapermen .see, Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, Norman, 1959 and Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, (London, 1926), p. 189-90.

22 Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit.* p. 47 and G. Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

reaction and thus materially contributed to fomenting the rebellion.²³ Although no evidence of such involvement was found, the government insisted that the party, by including a clause in its programme, which stressed respect for religious traditions, had encouraged the rebels²⁴.

Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cümhuriyet Firkasi*)

Kemal Atatürk withdrew the law for the maintenance of order in 1929 and the next year Kemal invited his old friend Fethi Bey (Okyar)²⁵, the then Ambassador to France, to return and form an opposition Party named, Free Republican Party²⁶. Fethi published the party's new programme in the newspaper 'Yarin'. He promised to work for freedom of thought and the press, reduction of taxes, lessening of Etatism, and various other liberalizing principles²⁷.

The secularist principle received special emphasis and in some of its official statements the party even called itself the

23 Dankwart A. Rustow, *op.cit.* pp.87-88., and Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, (New York,1963), p. 175

24 B. Toprak., *op.cit.* p. 74

25 Atatürk worte to Fethi, ' I consider it one of the basis of the Republic to have a new party in the assembly which based on similar principles (anti-clerical), will debate freely on the affairs of the nation", *Cümhuriyet* August, 12, 1930, quoted from Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 65.

26 Five year after the abolition of the Progressive Republican Party, this new opposition group, Free Republican Party, was founded on August 1930, by Fethi Bey (Okyar) at the direct suggestion of Mustafa Kemal, who also urged others to join it, including with his own sister Makbula. S. N. Fisher, *op. cit* , p. 401

27 William Spencer, *Political Evolution in Middle East* (New York, 1962) p. 71.

Free Secularist Republican Party (*Serbest Laik Cümhuriyet Firkasi*). Ali Fethi soon began to build a national organization touring the country to enlist mass support. The popular response was favourable and, in some places such as İzmir, where he immediately attracted a large number of enthusiastic followers and antigovernment demonstrations were shown²⁸. Six weeks later a minor rebellion occurred in Menemen, only a few miles north of İzmir, led by the local *Şeyh* of one of the outlawed religious orders, the *Nakşibendiye*. The battle cry of the rebels was “ We want the *Şeriat*”²⁹.

The final blow came in the Assembly debate of November 15, 1930, when Ali Fethi (Okyar) complained of large-scale irregularities and was charged that this religious opposition used Islam as its political instrument. Finally in November 17, 1930, the religious oppositions were disbanded by the order of Ministry of interior. Two other minor parties³⁰ that had appeared at about the same time were dissolved by

28 After the establishment of his party, Fethi Bey was met in Izmir by thirty or forty thousand people who broke the window of the office of the newspaper *Anadolu* that had criticized the new party, and demonstrated against the ruling Republican Party. *Cümhuriyet*, September 5, 1930. Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit.* pp. 65-66

29 Dankwart A. Rustow. *op.cit.* p.88.

30 These two minor parties were Populist Republican Party (*Ahal-i Cumhuriyet Firkasi*) which was established in Adana and the Workers and Peasant Party (*Türk Cümhuriyet Amele Ve Çiftçi Partisi*) which was established in Edirne. Both the Parties were closed the same year and not allowed to be active because they were considered as communist.

the order of the government ³¹ for next fifteen years Turkey remained subject to one – party, man rule. From 1923 to 1938 all the reforms and policies in Turkey were initiated by the Republican Peoples Party under the President ship of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who ruled as a President till his death³².

Turkey's New Democracy and Religious Liberalization:

Ismet Inonu was a man who had done more than any one else to help Mustafa Kemal save and modernize the nation and therefore there was no dispute at all about Atatürk's successor. In November 11, 1939 the Grand National Assembly unanimously elected Ismat İnönü as the life President of the Republican Peoples Party³³. He embarked upon conservative policy including a more benevolent attitude towards religion. He announced his intention of maintaining and carrying on the works of his predecessor. When he was elected president of the Republic many people had a hope of change in official attitude towards religion. He continued the secularist policy of his predecessor, Atatürk. The penalties for violators of the hat law³⁴ and of the ordinance prescribing the Turkish version of the prayer call were increased in 1948. A

31 B. Lewis, *op.cit.* p. 275

32 . On the 15th anniversary of the Republic when G.N.A. convened in November 1938, the Prime Minister, Celal Bayar, on behalf of the President of the Republic, read the opening address. It was the first occasion in the history of G.N.A., when Mustafa Kemal had missed it. William Spencer, *op.cit.* p 74. and K. H. Karpat, *op.cit.* p. 394.

33 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.* p. 396

34 For the detail of hat law, See. Chap.-II below.

renewed campaign for the excision from the language of Arabic and Persian elements, which had Inonu's personal blessings, culminated in 1945, in the translation of the constitution into a "pure Turkish" idiom at least as far removed from the vernacular as the earlier heavily Arabicised version³⁵. He has been known for his moderate and rather conservative views. There was indeed a very rapid turnover within the government following his accession.³⁶ Many of the surviving leaders of the Progressive Party of 1925 were readmitted into the good graces of the government.³⁷

This new President was soon called upon to guide his country through a very difficult time. Two major events dominated the years of Ismet Inonu as the President of the Turkish Republic. One was the Second World War, which broke out less than a year after he assumed power and the

35 Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, p. 36.

36 Only five of the 11 ministers at the time of Atatürk's death retained their post two months later; among those who were detached from the cabinet were Celal Bayar, the then Prime Minister, Tavfik Rüstü Aras Foreign Affairs, and Sukru Kaya, Interior and powerful Vice-Chairman of the RPP

37 The former Progressive Chairman, General Kazim Karabekir, was readmitted to the Peoples Party and the Assembly in 1939 along with eight or ten other ex-Progressive or conservative opponents of Kemal. Journalists were also allowed to resume their profession especially Huseyin Cahid Yalcin who was tried for high treason for his support to the Caliphate in 1923 and Ahmet Amin Yalman who supported the party in his paper *Vatan*. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, co-founder of the Progressive Party, was also allowed to join the cabinet and to sit in the Assembly as Independent in 1933-35.

other, the increasing demand for liberal reforms that followed the War.³⁸

President Ismet Anönü and his associates were well aware of the results of involvement in the World War so they wanted to keep Turkey away from the War. But because of some compelling circumstances³⁹ it was involved in a number of international alliances.⁴⁰

After the end of World War II there was a general move to exercise greater democratic rights, so Turkey came closer to the Western Allies and began to receive land lease help to increase production and exports.⁴¹ After World War II a multiparty political system emerged that brought some changes in the Turkish Republic. In that period a partial revision of Atatürk's secular policies and some religious issues were

38 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.* p. 396.

39 In 1943, at the Masco and Tharan Conference, the Allies decided to pressurize the Turks to enter the War as soon as possible but President İnönü continued to put them off until the spring of 1944, when the rapidly differing German collapse led him to break the economic and political ties that Von Papen of Germany had built and finally declare war on Germany on February, 23, 1945.

40 In May 1923 Anglo-Turkish declaration was issued, which stated that the British and the Turkish government, in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, would cooperate effectively and lend each other all the aid and assistance in their power. This prepared the way for the formal Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Alliance signed on October 19, 1939, in which France and Britain promised to give loans to help Turkey re-arm and settle its commercial debt. *The Middle East and North Africa 1997*, 43rd edi, part 3, Europa Publication, 1997, p. 987

41 An arrangement authorized by the U.S. Congress which was held in 1941, by which the President could supply war material to other countries whose defense is vital to the US

debated among the politicians of the Turkish Republic. In 1945, the then President İsmet İnönü, under pressure, announced to his People's Party that he would welcome the formation of one or more opposition parties. This announcement of President İnönü ended the one party rule in Turkey⁴². The emergence of multiparty system led to a full-scale debate of the religious issue and a partial revision of Atatürk's secular policies.⁴³ All the then existing political parties changed their minds and political platforms and then added appeals to the religiously inclined in their campaign promises.⁴⁴

The rise of opposition parties played an important role to bring religious interest in their political campaign promises. The politicians had begun to take interest in traditional Islam because they began to realize anew that Islam had much vital and traditional respect. So they promised to meet this desire for more attention to Islam and even began to exploit Islam for their own political means.⁴⁵ In this climate the Islamists were able to present secularism as anti-

42 *Middle East and North Africa, 1997*, p. 987

43 Richard N. Frye, *Islam and the West*, p. 90.

44 It was clear that the atmosphere had already begun to change because İsmet İnönü was more moderate or radical in matter of religion than Atatürk. It was expected that the political parties would raise the issue of religion for obtaining votes. In their search for votes all parties turned to Turkey's often forgotten peasant majority. H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1954, p. 271.

45 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 270

democratic because the freedom of conscience of the Muslim majority was being violated.⁴⁶ The Islamists criticized the government practice of secularism for crushing the national conscience for 20 years by giving no importance to the teachings of Islam.⁴⁷

After 1946 the rise of political parties necessitated a change of government policy on religion. Therefore, a number of significant concessions were made towards Islamic sentiments in order to regain popularity among the voters. After this the discussion on Islam had started.

During the initial years of the transition to competitive politics, between 1945 and 1950, a number of parties emerged which sought to use religion in order to gain peasant support and to form new linkages with rural notables in electoral competition. During this period 24 parties were founded in which at least eight had explicit references in their programme to Islamic themes. Like, the National Resurgence Party (*Milli Kalkma Partisi*), founded in 1945, had among its objectives the establishment of a World Islamic Federation as well as a greater emphasis on traditional values in educational policy.

46 Islamic polemicists did not call an end to secularism they simply claimed that true secularism was never practiced in Turkey. Cf. Feroz Ahmed, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", *The Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 8.

47 The secular policies of the RPP had created religious amnesia and ignorance among the people of Turkey and the country was in a state of confusion as far as its religious policies were concerned. It was suffering from an acute shortage of men of religion who could provide guidance in religion. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

In 1946, the Social Justice Party (*Sosyal Adalet Partisi*) was founded which also sought to support a world federation of Muslim people. In the same year, the Farmer's and Peasant's Party (*Çiftçi ve Köylü Partisi*), the Purification and Protection Party (*Aritma Koruma Partisi*) and Islamic Protection party (*İslam Koruma Partisi*) were also founded with the aim to the protection of Islamic traditions and "national" values. The Turkish Conservative Party (*Türk Muhafazakar Partisi*)⁴⁸, founded in 1947 and The land, Real Estate, and Free Enterprise Party (*Toprak, Emlak ve Serbet Tesebbüs Partisi*) founded in 1949, had similar concerns of advancing the causes of Islam in their programs. But the most important religious party during this time was the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*).⁴⁹ The NP's programme stressed the need for religious reform, greater emphasis on Islamic mores and values in social life, greater respect for Islamic institutions, an end to state control of religious organizations, and the inclusion of courses on religion in primary and secondary school curricula.⁵⁰

48 This party was founded six months after the establishment of the Democratic Party in 1947 and headed by Rifat Atılhan. This party proclaimed its support to religious education. see. Lenczowski. *The Middle East in World Affairs* (California, 1952), p. 150.

49 Founded in 1948 by a group of dissident DP members who were expelled from DP for breaking party discipline. Its main founder leader was Marsal Fezvi Cakmak who was a devout Muslim and a hero of the war of liberation.

50 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.75.

However, despite their efforts to build a mass following by politicizing the religious issues not a single party achieved mass success nor was able to play a significant role in national politics except Democratic Party⁵¹ which became the official opposition after the election of 1946. Religious issues had assumed a greater significance in their secret propaganda.⁵²

The concern of the RPP leaders that Democrats would capitalize on the religious issue and hence gain massive electoral supports led to a reappraisal of the party's secularization policies. During the 7th General Congress of the Republican Peoples' Party in 1947, the party's understanding of secularism was, for the first time, subjected to extensive criticism. Many of the delegates to the Congress argued that the RPP governments had neglected the need for the religious training of clerics as well as the religious education of the of the youth.⁵³

The Minister of Education prepared a programme for the founding of private religious courses to be attended by primary school graduates and approved the text book to be

51 Those who split from Republican Party were known as moderates. They founded this party. The main founder leaders were Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes , Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü

52 They did not take any risk of being declared as Islamists, They declared themselves as secularist.

53 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

used.⁵⁴ As early as in December 1946 two deputies⁵⁵ from People's Party to Grand National Assembly asked a question regarding the fate of religious institutions, especially those provided by private individuals⁵⁶ and had urged that government is going to reintroduce religious instructions in the schools so as to strengthen moral resistance against the growing impact of communism from the North. But the Republican Party's leader Recep Peker the then Prime Minister, refused to open the gates of religious propaganda.⁵⁷

Peker's successor had come to realize the importance of promises of religious liberalization, and warned the party's political strategists that they would not be able to get a single vote in the next election unless they did something about religion and did it fast.⁵⁸ The Republican People's Party that was an initiator of Secularism, after a long debate⁵⁹ and much

54 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

55 Hamdullah Suphi Tanriover who in 1925 served as one of the first Ministers of Education after the secularization of the school system and Muhittin Baha Pars's statements were supported by the Democratic leaders Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü on December 24, 1946.

56 As regards the teaching of religious catechism by the private individuals, Republican Peoples Party considered that these particular religious teachings were not favourable to the government and might prove dangerous to the well-established reforms of the Republic. But in 1947 after some debate on Secularism People's Party allowed to open private schools for religious instructions.

57 A. Adivar, *Loc.cit.*,

58 Dankwart A Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955", Richard N. Frye. *op.cit.*, p. 93

59. In the debate the most eloquent plea came from Hamdullah Suphi Tanriover who explained "Let us train at least one tenth the number of

hesitation, adopted the religious liberalization in view of fear of losing votes to other parties. This event has been considered of supreme significance in Turkey since for about twenty years no such discussion was possible in political or even cultural gatherings of any sort.⁶⁰

By 1947 the People's Party leadership could no longer afford to ignore the pressure for some kind of religious reform. In 1947 government passed a resolution that allowed the teachings of *Islam* in the New Latin alphabets and textbooks approved by a special committees nominated by the Ministry of Education⁶¹. These proposals were debated at greater length. In order to strengthen the moral foundations of the society, it was therefore, necessary to accept a more liberal attitude on religious education with fear that this would lead to religious reaction. The importance of religion had to be recognized by giving *Islam* a proper place in the new democratic political framework.⁶²

men that secular states (in Europe or America) are training to serve the Turkish nation in its religious institution". But this plea was refused to change the traditional programme plank on secularism so that is why Tanriover resigned from the People's Party.

60. Adnan Adivar, *op.cit.* p. 130.

61 In this resolution government had also approved the private public schools that should be ran under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In 1951 these schools expanded with the government's co-operation under the democrats but they were considered private schools

62. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 280.

In 1949 religious liberalization was accepted by the Grand National Assembly under the Premiership of Şamsettin Günaltay, a liberal theologian who, thirty years earlier, had been a literary associate of Mehmet Akif. This religious liberalization was expanded. At first the religious education was optional but later it became compulsory for the Muslim Children on the wishes of their parents.⁶³ Fifteen new professional courses were started for the Muslim clerics (*Imam-Hatip Kurslari*) in 1949.⁶⁴ In the same year the creation of the faculty of Divinity (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) in Ankara was also authorised to prepare qualified religious teachers for state schools.⁶⁵

During the election campaign of 1950 the government permitted, for the first time in 25 years, to visit the tombs of a number of Ottoman Sultans and other religious and political heroes of the past. The religious publications were more freely published⁶⁶ and the government made available foreign

63 Parents must be asked in writing if they want their children not to attend such classes. Religious courses were also introduced in junior high schools as promised by the premier in a speech in Konya .Cf. Birge, "Islam in Modern Turkey" *Islam in Modern World* (Washington, 1951), pp. 41-46.

64 For details, see, Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", *Die Welt des Islam* No. .IV, (1955), p. 150-163. And see also chap. V below

65 On this issue see, Howard A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara", *The Muslim World*, , Vol. XLVI, October, 1956, pp. 295-312 and Vol. XLVII, January, 1957, pp. 22-35

66 The dervish orders, which had continued to exist underground, awoke to renew their activities in the late 1940's, and stream of popular literature on Islamic themes was published. Jacob M.

exchange for the *Hajj* pilgrims. And more and more people began to attend the mosque.⁶⁷

At the time of Multi Party Politics, anti-Kemalist and anti-secularist themes have come to play an important role in Turkish politics. This remains one of the points of controversy between the strongly pro-Kemalist army and some politicians.

After the multiparty period all the political parties sought votes by promising additional religious freedom. Due to the arithmetic importance of the votes no political group in the multi-party period could afford to ignore religious feelings as a potent element in recruiting electoral support. Indeed the importance in politics of religious sentiments increased and became clear in the election of 1950-1957 to the National Assembly.⁶⁸ The authorities, moreover, refrained from preventing intensive religious instructions to groups of children in many rural localities. Substantial funds were earmarked for religious education, including schools for prayer- leaders and preachers (*Imam Hatip Okullari*). These

Landu, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1947), p 172, B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 412-13 and L. V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2. 1952, p. 22.

67 It was reported that after 1950 there was a sharp increase in the sale of religious publications. *Kuran* in Arabic script, imported from Egypt, sold 150,000 copies in one year. As soon as the demand for religious publications became well known, several printing firms requested the use of the old script printing press. Kingsley Birge, "Islam in Modern Turkey", p. 45.

68 Kemal H. Karpat , " The Turkish Election of 1957", *The Western Political Quarterly* , Vol. XIV (2), June, 1961, pp. 443-44.

institutions offered a regular Turkish high school education, but nearly half of the curriculum-hours were spent on courses in Arabic, the *Kuran* and the religious instructions.⁶⁹

Democratic Party and Religious Reforms:

Soon after the death of Mustafa Kemal, opposition had risen in RPP when the charter of UN was introduced for ratification in the Turkish parliament in 1945. This opposition within the assembly took a more definite form. Sharp criticism of the government was voiced during the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Commerce in 1945. In the month of June of same year a proposal known as *Dortlu Takrer*⁷⁰ (proposal of the four) was submitted to the RPP parliamentary group but this proposal including freedom of press, law and liberties was rejected by the RPP and its sponsors were forced to leave the party.⁷¹

The party was split between the conservatives who wanted to retain its privileged position as the instrument of modernization and more liberal groups which felt that further democratization and liberalization was necessary if Turkey was to take place among the other advanced nations. Despite

69 Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 174.

70 The signatories were Celal Bayar, ex-Prime Minister, Adnan Mendere, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan who dissatisfied with the economic policy of RPP. This four vote belonged to the future founder of the Democratic Party. For the details, see. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 143-147

71 Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit.*, pp. 144-45.

all liberal measure there were others who wanted to go even further.⁷² Those members who left the RPP formed an opposition party on January 7, 1946, which was called Democratic Party (*Demokrat Partisi*) that was supported by the newspaper '*Vatan*' edited by Ahmet Emin Yalman.⁷³

This major opposition group shortly became the chief spokesman of religious reform in Turkey. Most original Democratic Party's founder members had all been members of long and good standing in Republican Peoples Party.⁷⁴ Those who joined the Democratic Party included businessmen dissatisfied with wartime economic control, Urban consumers dismayed by the high cost of living, Istanbul's Christian and Jewish minority hard hit by a confiscatory tax (*Varlik Dergisi*) in 1942, and individual members of the ruling party leadership for reasons of policy or personal ambition.⁷⁵

The Democrats set out to build their own national organization. Some RPP members wanted to suppress this new group but Ismet Inonu strongly defended its right to organize. The programme was not much different from that of the RP.⁷⁶

72 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 402, Vol. II

73 Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today* (New York, 1971), p. 170.

74 In 1923 Celal Bayar and Refik Koraltan, both were the founder members of the Peoples' Party alongwith Mustafa Kemal., Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu who had been chairman of the 1928 committee of religious reforms.

75 Richard N. Frye, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

76 Its founder and other leading figures probably knew that their survival depended, at this time, on giving guarantees to the

Earlier experiences of opposition parties during the one party period had a restraining impact on the newly founded DP's approach to religious questions during its formative years.⁷⁷

During the DP congress in 1949, Celal Bayar, one of the leaders of the DP told the delegates that our party is secular in its policies and would not use religion for political purpose. Further he also said that his party would oppose any movement for a religious revival. Similarly on the party's programme, another leader Fuat Köprülü assured that DP would defend secularism and fight against religious reactionaries. The RPP's Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay encouraged this assurance of Köprülü.⁷⁸

The DP leaders were accused of having betrayed the cause of *Islam*. Religious press turned against the party leadership for their anti religious attitude.⁷⁹ The Democrats accepted five of the six basic tenets of the Peoples Party. The

government party that they would follow the same line on one of the most important issues which had concerned Atatürk and İsmet İnönü during twenty three years of one party rule, namely strict adherence to secularism

77 B.Toprak, *op.cit*, pp. 74-75.

78 For this see. *Vatan* , June 24, 1949, April 25, 1949; May 3, 1949 and April 4, 1949. Quoted from, B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.73.

79 Esrif Edib of *Sebilurreşad* advised his readers to refrain from giving their votes to the Democrats since a DP victory, he pointed out, would not change the previous governments' policies concerning Secularism. Eşraf Edib, "Partilerin Din Seyaseti", *Sebillurreşad*, Vol. IV, No. 76, 1950, p. 2-10 and "Democrat Partinin Din Siyaseti" *Sebillurreşad*, Vol. II, No. 27, 1949, pp. 27-28. Quoted from B. Toprak, *op.cit* p. 74.

essential point of oppositions was etatism.⁸⁰ One article of their programme declared that "Our party... rejects the erroneous interpretation of secularism of enmity towards religion, it recognizes religious freedom like the other freedoms as a sacred human right."⁸¹

Although DP leaders were more strict on the question of secularism but had gained mass support because of its religious liberal views which the public had felt. Local DP candidates used religion for political support. A DP representative boasted that if it came to power his party would permit worship in any language and at any place. Further the DP representative pointed out that when his campaign team had visited the villages prior to the election of 1950, the peasants had asked them to do nothing else but protect the Islamic faith. The Democrats promised the peasants not only religious freedom but better roads, better schools, electricity, water, agricultural credits, state loans etc.⁸²

80 The economic policies for the reconstruction of the new Republic known as Etatism was one of the six cardinal principles of Kemalism, which Mustafa Kemal laid down as being necessary for the birth of the new Turkish nation from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was adopted in 1933 by the newly formed RPP but officially recognized as a central plank of the Turkish economic policy in 1935. The Principle had its origin in the West. Cf. Huseyin Ramazanoğlu, "A Political analysis of the Emergence of Turkish Capitalism, 1839-1950", in H. Ramazanoğlu (ed.), *Turkey in the World Capitalist System* (London, 1985), p. 54 see also Ahmed Amin Yalman, "The struggle for Multi Party", p.

81 For the detail of this quotation see Article 14.

82 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 76.

The politician had taken much more interest in traditional *Islam* and generally much less changes. They began to realize anew that *Islam* had much more vital and traditional respect. The politicians naturally promised to meet this desire for more attention to *Islam* and began to think about the renewal of Islamic legacy for their own survival.⁸³ For this purpose, in their campaign, promises for greater religious freedom were made frequently.⁸⁴ The RPP ran a gamut of charges against the Democrats that DP politicized the religion for their own political ends.⁸⁵

But Eşref Edib argued that the Republican People's Party had no right to complain about politicizing religion by the DP, since it was the RPP itself, which had started the trend to use religion for political ends. The DP deputies also pointed out that RPP had been the first to politicize religion by reopening sacred tombs and permitting religious education.⁸⁶ Political parties proliferated during the Democratic period. The climate of tolerance for the expression of *Islam* grew steadily, and no

83 Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", p. 271

84 *Vatan*, (Istanbul), April 22, 1951. According to it Democratic speakers during the 1951 by-election campaign alleged that a leading People's Party candidate had gone to prayers in a *mosque* without the ritual ablution, that the People's Party had no fear of God; that if elected the opposition would forbid the Arabic prayer call. Other Democrats reportedly promised their audience the reintroduction of the *Fez*, of polygamy, of inheritance Law and of *Islam* as a State Religion. Richard N. Frye, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

85 Don Peretz, *op.cit.*, p.179.

86 B.Toprak. *op.cit.*, p. 78

party could afford to ignore religious sentiment. All political parties offered larger concessions but none achieved the same success as the Democrats had achieved in the general election of 1950.⁸⁷

On May 14, 1950 the Democratic Party won a landslide victory through politicizing the religious issues in the first free and honest election under the Republic.⁸⁸ In the same year on May 29 the new Assembly was founded on May 22. Ismet İnönü handed over the government to the new President Celal Bayar. Refik Koraltan became President of GNA. Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü were elected deputy from Istanbul⁸⁹, It is well known that with the rise of the Democratic Party to power through general election of 1950. Secularism in Turkey also started to lose its momentum and was redefined by the DP.⁹⁰

87 Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit.*, p. 289

88 The first real test of free elections occurred during the May 1946 municipal elections when a number of non RPP candidates were elected for the first time and again in 1946 national election Democratic Party won only 60 seats out of five hundred. In the election of 1950 Democratic Party swept into power with 408 seats, leaving only 69 to the RPP and 1 for the Nation Party and 9 independents. For 1950's election data see. S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 405-13. And other changes, Peter Mansfield, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors* (London,1973), p. 165

89 S. N. Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (London, 1971), p. 500-501 and H. A. Reed, "Turkey under the Democratic Party", *World Today*, September, 1953, p, 385

90 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p 70.

In the very first year of their installation in office Democrats first action was to amend Article 526⁹¹ which permitting the *Ezan* into Arabic. This proved quite effective in strengthening the Party's popularity other changes followed. On July 5 the ban on religious radio programme was lifted and broadcasting of the Koran over the state radio was started in accordance with its promises. The religious circles interpreted the government's decision as not only a victory of Democrats but also of *Islam*. After this incident Eşref Edib praised democrats as the "real representatives of the people." The "real republic", he argued, was established on May 14, 1950.⁹²

Many *Turbes* had been repaired and reopened to the public since 1950.⁹³ Everywhere new mosques were built and dilapidated mosques repaired. The attendance at town mosque greatly improved and officials and army officers were seen performing their ritual Prayers.⁹⁴ The authorities looked the

91 This article forbade the *Ezan* (the call to prayer) being made in any other language than Turkish.

92 Eşref Edib, *Hukümetin Programı Ve Ezan Meselesi*, *Sebilurrişat*, Vol. II, No. 80, 1950, For similar praises of the DP government, See Eşref Edib, "Hakiki Laiklik Ve Hakiki Cemati Islamiye", *Sebilurrişat*, Vol. IV, No. 84, 1950, pp. 130-33. M. Raif Organ "Farmasonluk Ve Kizi Taassub Binaları Yikinliyor", *Sebillurreşat*, Vol. IV, No. 89, 1950, pp. 213-15; Eşref Edib, "Kara İrtica, Sari İrtica, Kizilİrtica", *Sebillurreşat*, Vol. IV, No. 91, 1950, pp. 242-48 above references cited from B Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 155-56.

93 Bulent Daver, "Secularism in Turkey", *Siyasat Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. XXII, March 1967, p. 59

94 Paul Stirling, "Religious Changes in Republican Turkey", p. 405.

other way as such ancient social practices of *Islam* as the wearing of *Çarşaf* and village wedding performed by Imam was openly held.⁹⁵ They claimed that this prohibition prevented Muslims from worshiping in the way they wanted and therefore they violated their freedom of conscience. The end of this prohibition as obliged and encouraged by the majority. No one challenged these arguments and even the Republicans too agreed to vote to the proposal which was accepted by a large majority.⁹⁶

The religious ceremonies were included in radio programmes and, voluntary religious organizations spread throughout the country.⁹⁷ In 1950 Menderes changed the system of religious instructions in the schools.⁹⁸ Elective courses on religion in primary schools were included in the regular primary school curriculum during the academic year 1950s.⁹⁹ The faculty of theology (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) also received considerable assistance in its development.¹⁰⁰

95 William Spencer, *Political Evolution in the Middle East* (New York, 1962), p. 82.

96 Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", *op cit*, p. 10

97 See table no, 4, Religious organization in B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 82.

98 Dankwart A Rustow, " Politics and Islam", *op.cit*, p. 95

99 For the detail of religious instructions see chap. no. V above.

100 Just after its establishment in 1949 it had an annual budget of more than one billion of Turkish Lira but in 1950-51 this budget was raised up eight million Turkish Lira. B. Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 412-13 and B. Lewis, *Muslim world*, XLIII (4), October 1953, p. 206.

At the same time, substantial funds were raised for religious education and the budget of PRA was increased constantly and reached around forty million by 1960.¹⁰¹ These institutions offered a regular Turkish high-school education, but nearly half of the curriculum-hours were on courses in Arabic, the Kuran and religious instructions. But it was made necessary for parents who did not wish their children to attend such classes to furnish a letter to that effect.¹⁰²

The supporters of the DP were the opponents of the RPP. And now that their party was in power they believed that they were free to vent their feelings against the policies. At the DP's Konya Congress they demanded restoration of the *fez*; the veil for women, and the Arabic script. Religious sermons were used to attack the Republicans the Director of Religious Affairs issued a *fetva* against communism. He declared:¹⁰³

“Islam rejects communism absolutely, its ideology in any form and all its practices. Faith and the spirit are the most powerful weapons against communism. It is not possible for a genuine believer to reconcile himself to the ideas and practices of communism.”

101 See table no.3 for the budget of the Presidency of Religious affairs from 1945 to 1960 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 81

102 Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p.174. A good discussion has given in B. Lewis, and V. Thomas, “Recent Development in Turkish Islam”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1952, pp. 22-40.

Initially no objections were raised but very soon the RPP charged that DP's members encouraged the reactionaries who demanded the restoration of the *Fez* and Arabic script as well as the veil which was bitterly attacked in Atatürk's reforms.¹⁰⁴ The RPP interpreted these outbursts as full-fledged reactionary movement, which threatened the very existence of the republican, secular state. Menderes regretted the reactionary outbursts as much as they did. Many of the leading Democrats, including Menderes were described as freemasons because under the Democrats freemasonry flourished, becoming more popular and open. The Sufi Orders, which had gone under ground, began to reappear and attacked the Kemalist secular reforms.

In the fifties the religious orders became active once more though there was no way of measuring their influence. The first such order which made its presence felt was the Tijaniya (*Ticaniye*)¹⁰⁵ which resembled others like *Nakşibendi* and *Kadris* in organization. The *Ticaniyye* rejected the reforms as atheistic and morally corrupting. They claimed the right of rebellion since the state did not recognise *Islam*, which they wanted to restore to its former glory. In their

103 Ahmad Hamdi Akseki's Press Conference *Cümhuriyet*, 28 August 1950, cf. Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit.* p. 366.

104 A newspaper, *Ulus*, reported that a DP member had went as far as asking for the return of veil, the *Fez*, and the Arabic script during the DP Congress in Konya in 1951. Cf. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

105 For the details of Ticaniye chap. VIII above.

protests they were vandalizing Atatürk's statues and campaigning for theocratic monarchy.¹⁰⁶

The democrats cultivated the good will of Sait Nursi and his followers called Nurist (*Nurcular*). The *Nurist* were really a school and not a Sufi order simply because there could be no successor to Sait Nursi who saw himself as kind of a saint Sait Nursi was hesitant to secularism and wanted to see the restoration of a theocratic state.¹⁰⁷ To the opposition, these demonstrated that DP was in collaboration with "reactionary religious circles" in an effort to broaden its political supports.¹⁰⁸

Turkey, he said, had just emerged in to the light after a long period of darkness when atheism had ruled, his task was to save the morals and faith of the people. Nurists began to set up schools in mosques. It was called *derhane*¹⁰⁹ Sait Nursi even wrote to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes proposing that

106 Feroz Ahmed, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey" *op.cit.* p. 11

107 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

108 *Ibid.*, 84.

109 The word *Dershane* in modern Turkish can refer to a special apartment floor or one-floor building and a congregation of people who meet there to read and discuss to writings of Sait Nursi. *Dershanes* have been used as dormitories for University students. *Dershanes*, as urban networks of Sunni Islam, do not separate religion from everyday life; rather they seek to mold and shape everyday life through Islamic idiom and practice. It provides avenues for the realization of individual interest as well as for the preservation of a collective identity. *Dershane* are central to *Nurcu* identity and facilitate the formation of multifaceted close networks of relationship among followers. *Dershane* is considered as a centre of economic and social activities. Cf. M. Hakan Yavuz, *op.cit.*, pp. 196-97.

his treatises known as *Risal-iNur* be taught in all schools. He hoped to unite under the umbrella of Nurism all Muslims who shared this common goal.¹¹⁰

The government was serious about checking reactionary tendencies. In March 1951 the Ministry of the Interior sent a circular to the provincial governors ordering them to take measures to protect Atatürk's statues, busts and pictures. Many *Ticanis* were arrested and punished for their anti-Atatürk outrages. And on June 27, 1951 Kemal Pilavoğlu, the Şeyh of the order, was also arrested and given a jail sentence of 10 years with hard labor and his order sank slowly into oblivion.¹¹¹

The passage of the "Atatürk Bill" on July 25, 1951, gave the government greater powers to deal with those who challenged the reforms. Deputy Prime Minister Samet Agoğlu promised the "reaction will be crushed wherever it raises its head". Cases were opened against the reactionaries like Necip Fazıl Kısakurek as well as the Islamist publications, *Büyük Doğu*, *Sebilürreşat* and *İslamiyet*.¹¹²

110 Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit*, p. 11

111 *Cumhuriyet*, July 11, 1951; Abdülbaki Golpınarlı, *Türkiyede Mezhepler Ve Tarikatlar* (Istanbul, 1969), pp. 224-5 It provides a brief but good account of the *Ticaniye* and other religious groups of that period. Cf. Feroz Ahmed. "The Turkish Experiment in Democracy", p. 367

112 Ahmed Yucekok, *Türkiyede Din Ve Siyaset*, 1977, pp. 90-91. Cf Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*. p. 367.

In February 1952 the press announced that all-party organizations known as the Clubs of the Turkish Revolution (*Türk Devrim Ocakları*) would be set up to protect the Kemalist traditions and reforms.¹¹³ Some days later the Islam Democrat Party (*İslam Demokrat Partisi*) was closed down and the activities of its founder, Cevdet Rifat Atılhan, a notorious rightist, were placed under investigation. The representative of Samsun, Hasan Fehmi Ustaoglu was expelled from the DP and was charged with publishing articles attacking laicism and the Kemalist revolution.

Finally on July 23, 1953 'the law to protect the freedom of conscience' was passed to prevent religion from being used for political ends.¹¹⁴ On July 8, 1954, the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) was temporally banned on the ground that it was engaging in subversive activities under a religious cloak and on January 27, 1954 it was dissolved by a court order.¹¹⁵ Restriction was also imposed on the other opponent of DP and suppressed by the DP government.¹¹⁶

113 This organization included Hikmet Bayur from the *Nation Party*, Yavuz Abadan and Behcet Kemal Caglar from RPP and Fethi Celikbas and Avni Basman from the DP, *Ibid.* p. 368.

114 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 368.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 370. And the small Nation Party was banned on account of its intensive propaganda for the restoration of the *Seriat*. J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 174

116 The daily newspaper '*Ulus*' established by Atatürk in 1920 was confiscated and 200 RPP branch offices were also closed by the court order. The decree was followed by imprisonment of scores of leading Turkish writers who had dared voice their opposition. Even the Dean of the Turkish Journalism Department, Ahmet Amin

In the light of this activity it is difficult to justify the accusation that the Democrats encouraged religious reaction. During their first four-year they did not use *Islam* as a crutch. Without sacrificing the Kemalist reform they maintained their reputation as a liberalizer of religion.¹¹⁷ It was only when the DP leadership began to lose ground on account of the worsening economic situation, as well as dissensions in the party, that it began to use *Islam* more explicitly.¹¹⁸

In the elections of 1954 major parties tried to exploit Islam and once again religion became a major issue of controversy between the government and the opposition. Both the government and the opposition extensively politicized religion.¹¹⁹ It were the Republicans who had to use religion in order to increase their votes. Kasim Gülek promised that his party would always remain faithful to *Islam*. The Democrats counteracted this by distributing a photograph of Gülek in an academic gown and mortarboard, claiming that this was the outfit of a Christian priest.¹²⁰

Yalman of 'Vatan' who had originally backed the Democrats, was jailed.

117 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.* p. 368

118 *Ibid*, p. 371.

119 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

120 Necedet Evliyagil reporting on the by-election campaign in *Cümhüriyet*, September 2, 1954. Kasim Gülek had begun to pray in public but his political opponents for doing so without proper ablution attacked him. Nadir observed that this controversy would never have arisen if Gülek had not gone out of his way to pray in public. *Cümhüriyet*, March 6, 1954. Cf. Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 370.

During the campaign speeches in Ankara, and Adana Adnan Menderes, the then Prime Minister, recited passages from the *Kuran* and promised that Istanbul would become a second *Kaba*. The RPP's leading figures like Kasim Gülek and Şemsettin Günalty also did not hesitate to use religion as a political weapon in similar strategies. Kasim Gülek, General secretary of RPP, during an election campaign speech in Adana, declared that it was the RPP which had transformed the country into a second *Kaba* through its support of *Islam*. He also emphasized that it was the RPP that had initiated the liberalization of secularist policies in the late 1940s. On the other hand Ismet İnönü, in his campaign speeches, also criticized the government's economic policies and politicization of religious issues. He pointed out that the DP was using religious issues as propaganda weapon in the coming elections just as it had done in the previous one.¹²¹ Democrats won the election on the basis of their record during their first four-year term in office.¹²²

The opposition blamed the DP that its government was less able to assist the people financially and the cabinet had not planned the development of Turkey's economy seriously. In foreign affairs, the stalemate in Cyprus, under a condition

121 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 85.

122 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p. 371.

which many saw as Turkish political defeat, was also blamed on the leadership.¹²³

Although concessions¹²⁴ were made to the Islamists but the criticism much affected the elections of 1957 won by the Democrats but their percentage of votes dropped from 56.6 to 47.3 and were given less seats.¹²⁵ Although this concession did not help the DP electrically, they did encourage the Islamist traditional forces throughout the country. The year of 1958 was the peak year for the manifestation of Islam in Turkey. The radio broadcast the Koran, the *ezan* and religious programme, while the Nurist carried out their anti-secular propaganda. The government was no longer willing to deal with the reactionaries as it had done in the early fifties. The

123 B. Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey", *The Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 2, February, 1959, pp.55-72; and G. L. Lewis, "Turkey: The End of the First Republic", *The Word Today*, (London, September 1960), Vol. XVI, No. 9 pp. 377 ff. Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 4

124 The 'concessions' included inter alia: the legalization of religious instructions in secondary schools (*Resmi Gazete*, September, 13, 1956); Menderes' private gift of TL 100,000 for a mosque (*Cumhuriyet*, February 1957); the granting of official status to *Imam-Hatip School* on March 6, 1957 (Robinson *op.cit.*, p. 318); Kasim Kufrevi, the son of a *Şeyh* of a religious order in Eastern Turkey, rejoined the DP (*Cumhuriyet* September 21, 1957); in Kayseri, Menderes claimed that during the seven years of DP rule 15000 mosques were built and 86, including the magnificent Suleymaniye mosque of Istanbul, repaired (*Zéfer*, October 20, 1957). Cf Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 371.

125 Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish election of 1957", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol., XIV No., 2, June, 1961, pp. 436-59. and Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.* p. 4.

Atatürk Law was still on the statutes book but it was a tally ineffective.¹²⁶

Democrats were accused by the opposition especially İsmet İnönü claiming that the DP had asked Sait Nursi to make propaganda on the party's behalf. A series of accusation between İnönü and Menderes concerning the government's alleged support of the *Nurcular* became the major issue of Turkish politics during the late fifties.¹²⁷ They continued preaching and practicing their rites in the defence of law and increased their following.¹²⁸ Again in the year of 1959, religion once more became a serious issue of controversy between the two major parties.¹²⁹

To the large extent the government was exploiting this trend in its 'Patriotic Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) campaign making it seem like a religious and national duty to join the front. A few days later the party's assembly group issued a

126 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, pp.371-72. And Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit*, pp. 436-459

127 B.Toprak, *op.cit*. p. 87-88.

128 *Nurcular* continued their activities in 1960s and appear to have increased their followers. In Konya five members of *Nurcu* movement were jailed for reading their shaikh's book to the public. And in several cities *Nurcular* were brought before courts during January of 1960. But this repeated arrest did not appear to hurt their popularity. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 184 and B. Toprak. *op.cit*, p. 157.

129 When Adnan Menderes survived an air crash at Gatwick in February 1959, hundreds of sheep were sacrificed throughout the country, many allegedly financed by the DP, consequently a new image bestowed upon the Prime Minister. This incident was cashed by the Democrats in the next elections. B. Toprak. *op.cit*. p. 157.

communiqué denying that the RPP was against religion but warning that the exploitation of religion would be disastrous for the country. The DP government had taken a number of measures against fundamentalist groups.¹³⁰

The pattern of charges denials and counter-charges suggested that both parties were expecting an early election. But there was no early election. On May 27, 1960 the DP government was overthrown.¹³¹ The army successfully took over the key points and other offices as well as succeeded in arresting the state president and the entire cabinet. In public trials, Adnan Menderes and his Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Zorlu were executed. President Celal Bayar's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on account of his advanced age. Many other DP leaders were jailed for various terms.¹³²

130 For example 60 people were arrested in Ankara for their involvement in a sectarian ceremony and a periodical publishing fundamentalist views, *Büyük Doğu*, was banned from publication for a month by a court order and its editor Nacib Fazil Kisakurek, was arrested and sentenced to jail term of a year and six months in addition to a 300,000 TL fine. *Cumhuriyet*, March, 22, 26, 1959. Cf. B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 157.

131 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p. 372.

132 The DP leadership was surprised when a group of thirty-eight army officers struck in the early hours of May 27, 1960. The success of the military coup was due mainly to its brilliant planning, For the details of 1960 military intervention. See. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 413-416; William Spencer, *op.cit.*, pp. 87-97; Don Peretz, *op.cit.*, pp. 182-84; J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 8 and G. Lewis, "Turkey: the Thorny Road to Democracy", *The World Today*, XVIII (5), May, 1962, pp. 187-188.

Islam and Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*):

Division between the Conservatives, the Liberals in the Democrats continued and public opinion became more important, popular representative influence grew. Once the threat of government action was removed, the disparate element in Democratic Party also began to fight, leading to a series of resignations and dismissals. The majority, led by the party founders, applied party discipline to remove their opponents.¹³³ Those who were ousted from the Democratic Party in summer 1948 formed their own group and gave impetus to the demand for religious groups. This new party was known as *Millet Partisi*¹³⁴ (Nation Party) which represented more religious wing of the opposition to the Republican Peoples Party.¹³⁵

It was Turkey's third major party, which was led by Osman Bolukbasi and Marsal Fevzi Çakmak. In an effort to present their party as being born as a result of the peoples' demands. The founders modestly called themselves only *sunucu* (presenters)¹³⁶ Marsal Çakmak declared that the Nation Party was a direct answer to the needs of the Turkish people

133 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 404.

134 This party was also known as Republican Peasant National Party and in 1954 it was re-named Republican National Party,

135 William Spencer, *op.cit*, p. 80

136 Marsal Fevzi Çakmak, Kenan Omer, Hikmet Bayur, Sadik Aldaogan Mustafa Kentli, Enis Akaygen, Osman Bolukbasi.

who were dissatisfied with the Democrats.¹³⁷ The independent Democrats Group in the Assembly joined the Nation Party in July 1949 after the Democratic Party Convention ratified the decision of the Central Committee to expel them from the party. Members of the True Democratic Party which was established in Afyon Karahisar also joined the Nation Party at the same time as the Independent Democrats.¹³⁸

The Islamists knew all this and concluded that Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) is the only party which defends religious freedom and to the moral standard of the society. They attacked Atatürk's basic principles especially 'Secularism'. *Islam* in their views was a basic spiritual necessity for the Turkish society and they claimed that *Islam's* negative impact on science and modern society was purposely misjudged and misinterpreted. They interpreted that real *Islam* is not against humanitarian principle of civilization, science and institutions of our modern world on the contrary it supports them.¹³⁹

The Nation Party frankly stated that it recognized the importance of tradition (*gelenekler, orf ve adet*) for the social order and that it proposed to respect 'religious institutions and national traditions'. They insisted that religious education should be added to the primary and secondary school

137 Kemal. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 220.

138 *Ibid.* p. 431.

139 Kemal H. Karpat, *op.cit.* , p. 274.

curriculum¹⁴⁰ and demanded that every citizen should be free to worship in whatever fashion or language in which he wishes, that various religious organisations should be allowed to organise freely and that the government turn the pious foundations over to such religious organizations.

At least a dozen other splinter parties, which were formed in the post-war period, espoused religious cause in similar or even strongest terms.¹⁴¹ The Nation Party campaigned on the basis of populism¹⁴² alone and adopted liberalism as its basic principle. The official birth of the Nation Party was greeted by press criticism sharper than during its organizational stage. It was criticized for every conceivable fault. For taking the name ' Nation, for lacking experience, for the advanced age of its founder; for its conservative religious tendencies, for a preconceived intention of opposing everything, but above all for dividing the opposition.¹⁴³

140 B. Toprak, *op.cit.* p. 75 and see also Zefer Tunaya, *op.cit.*, p. 190-91

141 A brief discussion on small religious parties which never survived long, has been given by Richard N. Frye, *Islam and the West*, p. 93.

142 Populism is one of the six principles of *Kemalism*. In the Turkish Republic, Article 69 of the constitution states that all Turks are equal before the law and all the " privileges of whatever description claimed by the groups, classes, families, and individuals are abolished and forbidden". It was this idea that Mustafa Kemal incorporated in the word populism. According to this principle, the country was composed not of social classes but individuals who belonged to various occupational groups. S. N. Fisher, *op.cit.*, p. 395.

143 *Tasvir* (editorial), July 23, 1948. *Vatan*, July 25,26, 1948. Quoted in K. H. Karpat *op.cit.*, p. 220.

In the elections of 1950, a law was passed for the election, which provided for a secret ballot, public vote counting equal radio timing for all parties and judicial supervision of elections. Three major groups RPP, Democrats and Nation Party were active and ran for office in 1950. It was for the first time when the first true free elections were held in 1950.¹⁴⁴ The Nation Party did not gather much support in the election of 1950.¹⁴⁵ According to newspaper, *Vatan*, the main reason of its failure was that this party overlooked the important issues and chose to attack personalities especially Inonu, rather than policies in the Republican and Democratic Parties. But more important was that there was no unity in party policies even among its hierarchy.¹⁴⁶

Many members of the Nation party, including Marshal Fevzi Çekmek, who originally supported the Democrats, charged that both the RPP and the Democrats were too bound

144 In the election of 1950 under the majority system the seats in the G.N.A were divided as follows: Democrats 396, Republican 68, Independents 9, and Nation Party 1.

145 Although its founder members were well-known and capable personalities had some backing from press (e.g., the daily *Kudret*, the periodicals *Millet* and *Sebilürreşat*) it could muster only 240,209 votes out of the approximately eight million votes cast in the 1950 election and sent only one deputy to the National Assembly. B. Toprak, *op. cit*, p. 75.

146 One of its deputies in the National Assembly, named Sadik Aldogan, was eventually deprived of his immunity for having advocated violent opposition to the government.

by Kemalist principles and the leaders of both had belonged at one time to the same party.¹⁴⁷

The political liberalization professed by the Nation Party was jeopardized by its clericalism and conservatism in cultural matters. The death of two important leaders of the party Kenan Onar in 1949 and Marsal Cakmak in 1950¹⁴⁸ weakened the party. Finally, the unfriendliness of the press caused by the fact that religious elements seemed to align behind the party kept the main opposition groups rallied around the Democratic Party.¹⁴⁹

In 1953 the Nation Party was suspended on the charge that it advocated an Islamic State, restitution of Arabic script, the *fez* and the veil for the women. The government began to prosecute the Party for its definitely anti-constitutional clericalism and eventually dissolved it, amidst protests of undemocratic action, alongwith the periodical *Millet* that had

147 Don Peretz, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

148 The Marsal was admired as a person of character and virtue, famous Turkish army commander and one of the heroes of the war of liberation, therefore, the government decided to hold a state funeral. On the day of his funeral a crowd of a religious group opposed the modern funeral ceremonies as a violation of *Islam*. Some of the youth in the group demanded that the radio music should cease broadcasting and cinema in Istanbul should be closed. But the governor ruled that they could stay open. The call to prayer in Bayazit mosque was read in Arabic, which violated the law. The coffin was snatched from the gun carriage and carried on the shoulders of the crowd by the chanting *Imam*. All the shops on the way of the funeral procession were ordered to close their door as a token of respect. The demonstration ended with the burial of the Marsal, and later seventy-six people were arrested. K. H. Karpat, *op.cit.*, p. 284-85.

149 K. H. Karpat, *op.cit.*, p. 432.

become its religious reactionary Supporter.¹⁵⁰ In 1954 the Nation Party was banned altogether and its leaders given token prison terms and fine.¹⁵¹

In 1954 this party was formed under the name of *Cümhuriyet Millet Partisi* (Republican National Party) under the leadership of Osman Boluk Başı, a resourceful speaker. In the election of 1954 Nation Party received 480.000 votes and elected five deputies to the Assembly. They won only 4 seats and received 603,000 votes in the election of 1957. After election the strength of the National Party increased further when it merged with the Peasant Party and added "Peasant" to its name.¹⁵²

RPNP was weakened visibly when late in 1961, Osman Bolukbaşı formerly a leader of Nation Party (NP) left the RPNP with his followers and re-established the NP, a similarly conservative party, representing landed interests.¹⁵³ Alparslan Türkeş took RPNP's leadership in 1965. In 1969 a brand new regulation was prepared and the name of the party was changed. In 1961 elections the party took part with a new name National Action Party (NAP).¹⁵⁴

150 *Ibid*, 432.

151 Don Peretz, *op.cit*; The Nation Party was banned on account of its intensive propaganda for the restoration of the *Şeriat* or Islamic Law, J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 174

152 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 434-435.

153 Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 12

154 *Ibid*. p. 210

CHAPTER IV

ISLAMIC ACTIVISM AND POLITICS IN TURKEY

Radical Politics and Islam:

After the military intervention of 1960 radical politics became the rule of the day for both the right and the left and the electoral politics had been suppressed temporarily. A group of military officers formed the National Union Committee,¹ which held power and this military administration remained in power until late 1961.² This NUC liberalized press censorship, allowed banned newspaper to reappear and made an attempt to control food prices. But NUC's main task was hand over the government to civilian hands, under a new and better constitution. For the preparation of the new constitution a Constituent Assembly (*Kurucu Meclesi*) was formed by the NUC in the same year. So several university professors were invited to prepare the new constitution.³

Differences of opinions arose among the NUC members on the role of the military in politics. Because NUC's main

1 For the detail of NUC See, S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, pp. 414-16.

2 *Ibid.* p. 420.

3 For the preparation of the new constitution a new constituent Assembly (*Kurucu Mecelsi*) was formed by the NUC in 1960 and several universities professors were invited to prepare the new constitution. But the constituent Assembly was packed with the RPP's leading members and its sympathizers. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 9.

task was to restore democratic and civilian government. But some of the younger and more ambitious officers of the NUC wanted the constitution of military rule in order to ensure the execution and safeguard of reform and modernization. These differences of opinions among the members of NUC created a big problem amongst them that of how to restore democratic and civilian government.⁴ To normalize political life and to hand over the government to the constitutionally elected civilians, a majority of 23 military officers out of 38⁵ dismissed a 14 members group from the NUC and retired them from the armed forces.⁶

Constitution of 1961:

After lengthy discussions, consultations and some pressure from political parties, a draft constitution was approved by a national referendum on July 9, 1961.⁷ This

4 *Ibid*, p. 11

5 One of its members died in a car accident.

6 Foremost among "the fourteen" was Colonel Alparsalan Türkeş senior in rank and apparently the leader of this group of junior officers. See Nur Yalman, "Intervention and Extrication: the officers corps in the Turkish crisis", in Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development* (New York, 1968), p, 133 ff. Cf, *Ibid* p 12.

7 In actual practice, its drafting and approval took just one year. The voting figures were as follows: 12,735,009 had right to vote, of which 10,233,169 or 81% cast their votes of these 10,282,561 were valid votes. 6,348,191 or 61.5% of these votes "Yes"; 3,94,370, or 38.5% voted "No" On closer inspection it is clear that the constitution gained very low proportionate support— indeed, the number of those voting 'Yes' was just under half of those having the right of vote. This was certainly true of the heavy 'No' vote in Western Anatolia, a DP, stronghold. For further information see, İsmet Giritti, "Some aspects of the New Turkish Constitution"

constitution of 1961 not only reaffirmed a general separation of *Islam* and state, but also a complete freedom of worship, it also threatened with criminal prosecution and penalties any misuse of religion for political purpose.⁸

According to the article 19:

"No individual can exploit religion in order to change the social economic political or legal structure of the state according to religious principles, neither can he use religion to further his personal or political interest."⁹

Thus, previous legal prohibitions on the use of religion for political purposes acquired constitutional legitimacy through Article 19.¹⁰

These new constitutional arrangements provided greater freedom of thought and organization. Under these conditions voluntary religious publications propagating the establishment

Middle East Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Winter 1962, pp. 1-17; C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Manchester, 1969), chap. 8; J. S. Szyliowicz, "The 1961 Turkish Constitution", *Islamic Studies*, (Karachi, 1963), Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 363-81; R. Devereux, "Society and Culture in the Second Turkish Republic (the New Constitution)", *Middle East Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 8, October, 1961, pp. 230-239; S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, pp 416-20. For the constitution of 1961.

8 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw. *op.cit.*, p. 417-20.

9 See for the text of 1961 constitution in Erkin Topkaya (ed.) *Anayasa, Siyasi Partilar Kanunu, Program Ve Tuzukleriyle Turkiyede Baslica Siyasi Partiler*, (Ankara, 1969) p. 22; and for explanations of the provisions of the 1961 Constitution concerning religion, see, Cetin Ozek, *Turkiyede Gerici Akimlar Ve Nurculuğun Icyuzu*, (Istanbul, 1964), pp. 70-90. Above reference is quoted from B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

10 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

of an Islamic state and condemning secularism flourished. Among other concepts, the constitution of 1961 laid down that the political parties are necessary in a democracy but the later 'Party Law'¹¹ stipulated that the political parties which violated constitutional principles or threatened Turkish democracy might be dissolved.¹²

The topic of religion versus secularism remained a cardinal one in the 1960s and frequently arose in different forms of public debate. All observers familiar with the internal scene in Turkey were struck by the intense religious feeling throughout the country. Religion received a fair amount of support from the authorities.¹³ The future of Islam in Turkey was not clear because government had done nothing about *Islam*.¹⁴

11 The party law was adopted finally—after heated debate on July, 13, 1965, and conformed to the principles of the 1961 constitution. It was largely inspired by the bill for the law on political parties in federal Germany See Mehmet Ali Yalci, *Siyasi Partiler Kanunu ve Secim Kanunlari* (Istanbul, 1965); Sait Cesnigil, *Anayasa Ve Siyasi Partiler Kanunu* (Ankara, 1967). Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

12 This could be done only by the constitutional court a new institution brought into existence by the 1961 constitution to safeguard it and all freedoms. Further, a senate was added to the former National Assembly. Of the 23 officers, 22 (One had resigned from the NUC) became life members of Turkey's new-established Senate. In order to take their seat in the senate, they had to retire from the military forces and agree not join any political party. Jacob M. Landau. *op. cit.*, p. 11 and p. 13.

13 For details, see, Uriel Heyd, *Revival of Islam in Modern Turkey*, Jerusalem, 1968.

14 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 291.

Political Parties of 1960's:

Through the constitution of 1961 the ban imposed on the political parties was lifted on January 13, 1961. Parties were allowed to continue their activities and ordered to register within one month. Only two pre-1960 parties resumed activity, the RPP and Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP).¹⁵ The activities and role of Republican Peoples Party (*Cümhuriyet HalkPartisi*) in Turkey's politics has already been discussed. After 1960 a number of the other parties emerged and legalized their activities but some of them proved to be short lived.¹⁶

Justice party (*Adalet Partisi*) and Religious Propaganda:

Justice Party was founded by Gen. Ragib Gumuş Pala, who had been commander of the third Army at the time of Coup d'etat of 1961, in February 1961. The Party chose its name to express the desire of its leaders to redress the wrong done to the DP.¹⁷

15 Jacob M. Landau. *op.cit*, p. 14

16 Political parties that were founded after 1960 were *New Turkey Party*, *The Labor Party of Turkey*, *Union Party*, *Reliance Party* and *Nation Party*. For detail about this and other parties. See. Firouz Bahrapour, *Turkey: Political and Social Transformation* (New York, 1967), pp. 57-58; W. F. Weiker, "Turkey", in T.Y. Ismael (ed.), *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* (Homewood, 1970), pp.138-40.; Nuri Eren, "Turkey : Problems, Policies, Parties", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XL, No. 1 , October, 1961, p. 96; D. A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey" in Joseph LaPalombra and Myron Wiener (ed.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, chap.4. For the programme of these parties, see, Ferruh Bozbeyli, *Parti Programlari*_(Istanbul, 1970), Cf . J. M. Landau. *op.cit*, p. 16.

17 *Ibid*, p. 15.

By claiming unofficially and capturing more vote from the villages, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) was able to manage to its image as a real successor to the defunct DP. The proof of this claim was its closely similar ideology and similarity of its leadership. In fact JP was not only headed by very much the same circles of notables, officials, and politicians had led the DP, but also many ex-DP members even became increasingly active in the JP, some in prominent positions.¹⁸

The elections from 1960 to 1965, for the first time in Turkey's electoral history, did not give an absolute majority to any one party. During this period a series of coalition governments was formed.¹⁹ However, greater allocation of the state resources for religious institutions and education, which

18 This enabled the JP in the election of 1961 to come second to RPP in the National Assembly and first in the senate. In the election of National Assembly in 1961, its 450 seats were divided as follows: RPP 173, JP 158, NTP 65 and RPNP 54. In the senate the composition of 150 elected senators was JP 70, RPP 36, NTP 28 and RPNP 16. B. Lewis, "Turkey" In Ivison Mcadam (ed), *The Annual Register: World Events 1961* (London, 1962), p. 276ff; Kemal H. Karpat, "Recent Political Developments in Turkey and their Social Background", *International Affairs* (London, 1962), p XXXVIII, No. 3, pp. 317-19, Cf. J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, p 18. And for the percentage of vote. See. S. J. Shaw & E. K Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 424.

19 First coalition government was formed between RPP and JP. But in 1962 the first coalition broke up and Inonu formed his second coalition with the RPP and the small parties RPNP and NTP (New Turkey Party). A third coalition was formed in January 1964, Inonu was forced to rule through three successive coalitions. Ismet Inonu remained as Prime Minister and Akif Iyidogan became his deputy and retired General Cemal Gürsel served as State President. For details of the coalition and result of the other parties see S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 424-432.

had gained momentum under the Democrats, continued in the early 1960s. A number of mosques and *Imam Hatip Schools* were continuing to be built.²⁰

However, in the mid-1960s, religion once again assumed an important role in Turkish party politics. JP was identified as the champion of *Islam* and its emblem, containing an open book with a rising sun, was criticized by its opponents and interpreted as imbued with religious symbolism.²¹ After the sudden death of the party's first chairman Ragib Gümüşpala, Saatettin Bilgiç²² held the post as the party's acting chairman. In the 1960s *Islam* in Turkey acquired a new ideological

20 Period from 1961-64 maintained the record of DP government in terms of the number of mosques which were built. Between 1950-60, an average of 1500 new mosques a year had been built. This average remained exactly the same during the period from 1961 to 1964. In addition enrolments in *Imam Hatip Schools* more than doubled during the four years following the military intervention of 1960, with an increase in their number from 19 in 1961 to 26 in 1964. For the construction of the mosques. G. L. Lewis, "Islam in Politics: Turkey", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LVI, No. 4, October 1964, pp. 235-36 and B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

21 An open book symbolized the Koran and although "A. P." in fact stood for *Adalet Partisi*— they had come to signify also 'Allah' and 'Pagambar'. Feroz Ahmed, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy* p. 376.

22 Saatettin Bilgiç was the leader of more religiously conservative group from JP's leadership rank who blamed that the JP had adopted a more moderate line in this respect. He had briefly assumed the post of the acting party chairman following the death of the JP's first leader Ragib Gumushpala, in 1964. But in the General Party Congress, Bilgiç had lost the leadership of the party to Demirel in 1964. The supporters of Bilgiç, from 1964-70, often clashed with the more moderate group of the Party especially on educational and cultural policies. Finally in 1970 they were expelled from the party but later Bilgiç returned to the JP. B. Toprak, *op.citp.* 95.

dimension when Suleyman Demirel was elected chairman of the Justice Party.²³

The left and right cleavage gained much importance in the politics of Turkey. *Islam* was recognized as the antidote to communism and it was natural for the right to wield these weapons as soon as it felt the threat from the left. At the same time when the political parties prepared themselves for the general election of 1965 *Justice Party* adopted "*Ortanin Sagindayiz Allahin Yolundayiz*" (We are right of center and on the path of Allah) and their campaigners were simply telling the people that those who voted for the RPP were communists.²⁴ On the other hand the RPP accused the JP of being the Party of masons and Demirel was a Freen mason. But this propaganda was in vain. It is impossible to evaluate the influence of the religious factor on the election results. This propaganda of RPP only brought secular retort. We elected him as a political leader, not the *Imam* of a mosque.²⁵

JP was supported by a number of anti - communists organization that were in close contact with the local JP's

23 Although Demirel was regarded as a moderate and not too involved in DP's politics, though he was criticized by the propagandists who made much use of the fact that he came from a village in Isparta called *Islamkoy* (Village of Islam), that his father had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and that the *Kuran* was daily read in his household B. Toprak, *op. cit*, p. 92.

24 In this election RPP was accused of being communist - oriented and therefore anti - religious. Feroz Ahmed, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 376-78

25 Feroz Ahmad , *op.cit*, p. 378

organization which were very active to publicize JP's support for *Islam*.²⁶ In the villages of Tokat, *gezici vaiz* (travelling preachers) were reported to be taking an active part in the JP's election campaign and often relating the RPPs stand on the religious question to its alleged communist leanings.²⁷ In this election JP decided to change its emblem and adopted the disbanded DP's symbol and emblem.²⁸

Because the party leader calculated that its connotation of the former Democrats would pay richer dividends than the religious symbol, and, the electoral results seem to have justified their calculation.²⁹ In the election of 1965 many religious issues were politicized by the JP under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel and the minor parties, the Republican Peasant National Party (*Cümhüriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) also politicized religious issues in this election.³⁰ But it failed to achieve any notable success in

26 Anti-Communist organizations like the Society for the Struggle Against Communism (*Komunizmle Mucadele Derneği*); Turkish Nationalist Youth Society (*Türkiye Milliyetçi Gençlik Derneği*) and Sacred Nationalist Society (*Milliyetçi Mukaddesatçılar Derneği*), had played an important role in bringing JP in power in 1965

27 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 93.

28 The Party's Emblem was changed in 1965 to that of a white horse with an apparent attempt to establish a continuity between the DP and JP in voter's minds since the word " *Demokrat*" in Anatolian dialects was often pronounced as *Demirkirat* with literally mean a iron grey horse. See, Joseph S. Szyliowicz, " The Turkish Election: 1965" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1966, pp. 481-82 and B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 92

29 Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 377.

30 According to Abdan's analysis, the RPNP used religious issues as a major theme of campaign speeches on state radio more frequently, 6

terms of votes it received. JP was the only party, which won the 240 seats out of the 450 in the National Assembly. Suleyman Demirel was elected as Deputy Prime Minister. This smashing victory marked further decline of RPP, which barely won one-third of the seats. Suleyman Demirel's JP administration proved to be so successful that the party won an even longer majority in the 1969 elections, 259 seats out of 450.³¹

In the mid sixties *Islam* again began to play an open role in Turkish society. In the backward part of the East the religious orders acquired greater influence.³² The growth of the Islamic movement also served to control the expansion of the Leftist activities. In this regard *Nurcular* (Nurist) , the follower of *Nakşibendi* Şeyh, Sait Nursi, were very active . Its influence was not restricted to the illiterate and semi – literate masses but it enjoyed a following even in the Universities and the bureaucracy. The *Nurcular* and the students of *Imam Hatip Schools* attacked not only teachers but also the members and

times, than either the JP 5 times or any other party like RPP and TLP which made only once. See. Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku Ve Siyasi Bilimler Acsindan 1965 Secimlerinin Tahlili* (Ankara, 1966) table 4, p. 253, Cf. B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p.158.

31 Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, (Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1971) , p.178; and for the details of the elections of 1969, see, M. Hayland, "Crisis at the Polls : Turkey's 1969 Election", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 24, 1970, pp. 1-16; W. M. Hale, " Aspect of the Turkish general election of 1969", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, October, 1972, pp. 393-404. And Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, pp. 276-286.

32 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p 378.

meetings of the Worker Party,³³ a communist party. The *Nurcular* were not only a threat to the state but they diverted attention away from the badly needed reform.³⁴

The religious question became even more politicized during the Senate by-elections a year later, Suleyman Demirel picked up again the long-standing theme that animosity of the Turkish elite towards Islam and Islamic traditions had often been concealed under a secularist umbrella. He argued that "declaring oneself a Muslim or revoking references to God had been interpreted as exploitation of religion for political purposes," and that since such statements had nothing to do with religious exploitation or obscurantism, "every Muslim Turk could proudly announce that he is a Muslim."³⁵

In the senate elections of 1966 Ismet İnönü accused JP and Prime Minister Demirel of collaborating with *Nurcular*, claiming that, "those who seek to benefit from the use of Sait Nursi's sect as a vote-getting machine are obscurantists" Inonu made this particular issue the main theme of the 1966 campaign for the Senate elections and he repeatedly invited Demirel to denounce any collaboration between the Justice Party and the *Nurcular*. These accusations about the alleged cooperation between the JP members and the *Nurcular* had

33 For the detail of Worker Party. See, Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.* p. 123-47

34 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 379-80.

35 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 93

brought wider criticism from the religious press and demonstrations. Once again RPP's stereotype image held by its opponent as anti religious party.³⁶

Ismet İnönü warned the Demirel government that religious fanaticism was as dangerous for Turkey as communism. " Give up your urge for fanaticism. Don't encourage it, don't see it as less dangerous than communism; which is more dangerous only time will show."³⁷ Demirel agreed with Inonu's interpretation and promised that his party would not give ground to either communism or fascism.³⁸ The Islamist faction, led by the Professor Osman Turan, denounced Demirel of going to the left and serving the masons.

But Demirel government's liberal attitude were continued towards the *Imam Hatip Okullari* and the *Koran Kurslari* and also promised that graduates of *Imam Hatip Schools* would be able to go on to the University. The Minister of Education, İlhami Ertem, told the Assembly that his party's aim was to open *Imam Hatip Schools* in every province to produce enlightened men of religion and put a check to growing radicalism but their aim was not fulfilled. At

36 In the campaign of the elections of 1965 the secularist stand of the RPP had been identified by its opponents with anti-religiosity because the religious issue and the RPP's attitude towards it were merged with questions of ideology as the RPP was accused of being communist-oriented and therefore anti-religious. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

37 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit* , p. 380.

38 Loc.cit.

the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara, first students boycott took place when a female student insisted on wearing a traditional headscarf (*basortu*) in class in defiance of the authorities.³⁹

Anti communist campaign was launched throughout the country, in which National Action Party (NAP) had played an important role.⁴⁰ NAP was an anti-Communist party. The party drew on several Pan-Turkey Associations.⁴¹ Its semi official publication, *Milliharket* and *Devlet* supported NAP. The party's semi-official weekly *Devlet* declared that their goal was to revive and re-established Turkish Islamic civilization and also claimed that nationalism is the only guiding principle.

39 Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p. 381

40 The Party's first name was Republican Nationalist Peasants Party (RPNP) but in the election of 1969 it changed the name and appeared as *National Action Party*. The Party's main leader was Alparslan Turkes who had been deeply involved in the plot that brought about the May 27, 1960 Revolution. For the role of Alparslan and more information about RPNP and NAP, see. Jacob. M. Landau, *op.cit*, pp. 205-242.

41 It was generally believed that such organizations like *Turkcular Birliđi*, later called *Turkiye Milliyetiçiler Birliđi*, and a smaller group, *Vatansever Turk Teşkilati*, (Patriotic Turkish Association) , which was headed by RPNP, National Assembly member Ismail Hakki Yılanlioglu. The *Ulku Ocaklari Birliđi* (The Union of Homes of Ideals), and *Genç Ulkuculer Teskilati* were connected, headed and sponsored by the NAP. The latter, called, *Turkiye Ulkuculer Gençlik Teşkilat* (Idealist Youth of Turkey), possibly a parallel organization, was responsible in 1970-71 for publishing in Istanbul a monthly named *Turkiye Ulkucu Gençlik Dergisi* . The Magazine of the Idealist Youth of Turkey brought the party's message to the Turkish Youth of either sex. See, Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 214.

A Youth group of commandos, later called *Bozkurtlar*⁴² (Grey Wolves), was also organized by the NAP. They demonstrated on streets, at first peacefully enough, but later they become very violent against the leftists.⁴³ They were even reported to have disrupted a world Health Organization Seminar on birth control with shouts of “ great Turkish nation is going to be made impotent.” Turkeş, who was made the main leader of the NAP, assumed the responsibility for the organization and candidly acknowledged that the *Bozkurtlar* were essentially setup to assist the party in defending Turkey from communism.⁴⁴

There was an entirely complex relationship between *Islam* and Politics.⁴⁵ The foreign policy under JP was also marked by an improvement in relations with the conservative regimes of the Middle East and this also enhanced the role of *Islam*. By the spring of 1969, the foreign connection with the

42 *Bozkurtlar* started their training in summer in 1968 and began to make its presence felt in public life in 1969. Their main training camp were setup in Istanbul, İzmir Ankara, Samsun and Anatolia. In its daily schedule of three week camp prayer was also given importance for the religious participant. Up to 1970 their number increased from a few hundred to five thousand. *Ibid*, p 216

43 They broke up the leftists meeting smashed windows of bookshops selling leftist literatures and quarters of the leftist students at Ankara University's Faculty of Soaial Science were also attacked by the *bozkurtlar*. For the details of the bozkurtlar see,. Jacob M. Landau. *op.cit*, p 215-16.

44 J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 216.

45 Islam was no longer merely a force to be exploited before elections as it had been in the fifties. It was still that, but it was an instrument to be used against the radical left and on behalf of the NATO alliance. Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, p. 382.

Islamic reaction in Turkey had been extended to ARAMCO, the Arabian American Oil Company.⁴⁶

In this last era, Demirel was beginning to lose control of the Islamic movement. In 1969 the challenge came from outside the party, from Necmettin Erbakan who adopted the line of Islamic propaganda. He was opposed to Turkey joining the common Market.⁴⁷

The Islamists began to abandon the JP and join these two new, explicitly right wing organizations – NP and Dem. P. The struggle between the JP and its two rivals on the right became more equal and as a result JP had lost the majority in the elections of 1971.⁴⁸ The government of Demirel proved to be unable to control the violence between leftists and rightists. As a result, the military finally forced the Demirel

46 This company was said to be behind the Pan-Islam organization known as the Union of the World of Islam (*Rabitatul Alemul Islam*). Many foreign oil companies also allegedly involved in supporting the Islamists, especially the *Nurcular* were supported financially by German, Dutch and American Oil Companies. Kasim Gulek's *Yeni Tanin*, of April 12, 1966 reported that the *Risale-i Nur Institute* in Berlin had intensified its activities among Turkish Workers in Western Europe. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 381

47 *Ibid.*, p. 382

48 By 1971 JP has lost its absolute majority because of the establishment of *National Order Party* later *Milli Salemet Party*, *Nation Party*, *Reliance Party*, *Republican Peasant National Party*, All the parties claimed that they were the real supporters of Islam. In the name of *Islam* JP's votes were divided among them., Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit*, pp. 383-84.

government to resign on March 12, 1971, leaving the nation to be governed by a series of non-party coalitions.⁴⁹

From 1965 until the renewed military intervention on March 1971, the JP held an absolute majority in the National Assembly and in the senate also, and Demirel remained as Prime Minister at the head of a JP cabinet. JP ruled from 1965 to 1971.⁵⁰

Islam and Electoral Behaviour:

In the first half of 1970s both the major parties RPP and JP by adopting a more moderate stand on the issue of religion had provided a chance to minor parties to enter into Assembly in greater numbers.⁵¹ Thus the minor parties, especially *Milli Nizam Partisi*, Nation Party (NP) and National Action Party (NAP) who based their appeals on the defence of *Islam* and Islamic tradition, played an important role in Turkish politics.⁵²

49 Non-Party coalition was led by Nihat Erin from March 26 to March 21, 1971, Ferit Melen from May 22, 1972 to April 10, 1973 and Naim Talu from April 15 to October 1973, until the next election were held. F. K. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 428.

50 *The Middle East and North Africa 1997*, p. 990. and for the election results of 1965 to 1969. See. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, table no. 16, p. 270 and the Senate results of 1966-68., see table no. 14. p. 269. Assembly election result 1950-75. See S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw. *op.cit*, table 6.1, pp. 406-407 and senate results of 1961-68. p. 421.

51 In reaction to the emerging left the main conservative parties the *Reliance Party*, *Nation Party* and *New Turkey Party*, formed a coalition, only to see their more religious elements form the conservative *National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)* while some of the old Democrats left the existing parties to organize the *New Democratic Party*. S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit*, p. 428.

52 B. Toprak. *op.cit*, pp. 95-96.

National Order Party and Fundamental Reforms:

Before the 1970 no political party could establish itself with *Islam* as its platform but in the beginning of 1970 an Islamic group set itself up formally as a full-fledged political party.⁵³ This party was known as National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) which was founded by Necmettin Erbakan⁵⁴ (b.1926), a political leader, on January 26, 1970 just after one year when he was elected as an independent candidate to G.N.A. in 1969. This party grew quite remarkably within a short time, and became a serious threat to JP.⁵⁵ On the

53 J. M. Landau. *op.cit.*, p. 188.

54 Necmettin Erbakan came from a notable provincial family. His father was a civil servant, a judge, who was an ardent supporter of Republicanism and an admirer of Atatürk. He is one of the six children in the family. He had his primary-school education in Trabzon and his high school education in Istanbul. He was an outstanding student and graduated from Istanbul Lycee with honors. He then went to the prestigious Technical University in Istanbul. He received his B.S. in 1948 and subsequently entered into a university career. He had completed his postdoctoral degree from the Federal Republic of Germany. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 107. He had been a Professor at the Technical University worked in several industrial enterprises then and was also the secretary and after wards the chairman of the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In politics, he had been a prominent leader of the Justice Party, where he was credited with heading the more conservative, Islamic minded faction. An extreme advocate of private initiative, Erbakan was trying to outbid Demirel. Shortly before the 1969 elections to the National Assembly, he fell out with Demirel; the latter knew that Erbakan was challenging him as party leader, and also wished to give the JP a younger, less conservative look. Cf. *Ibid* p. 88

55 Other leader of the party elected in its first meeting on January 26, 1970 were Hasan Aksay, responsible for organization, propaganda and information; Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, head of Electoral Affairs and of groups affiliated to the party; Suleyman Arif Emre, Secretary General; Ismail Muftuoğlu, Assistant Secretary-General and Omer Faruk Ergin, Accountant-General (treasurer). Some were, ex-JP members, all were conservative in their politics. J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

occasion of the founding congress of NOP, speeches were made, slogans supporting religion displayed and poem against freemasonry and communism were read. The Party received some support from well-to-do townsmen and devout Muslim villagers as well as followers of Sait Nursi (*Nurcular*).⁵⁶

The press and the public considered the new party and its leaders committed to the bolstering of Islam in Turkey by political means. The newspaper assured its reader that the NOP would be a party of the rightists and that truly encroached Islam.⁵⁷ At the time of its founding, the party leadership published a pamphlet, which described the NOP's worldview.⁵⁸ The basic aims of its programme were listed as social justice, in terms of morals and virtues (*ahlak ve fazilet*), happiness and peace to all Turks, freedom of conscience and reform in education. The NOP was legally prevented from inscribing Islam in its programme and not legally oppose secularism, it affirmed that the party opposed any interpretation of secularism, hostile to religion.⁵⁹ Erbakan himself tried to emphasize that the NOP was different from the rest of the political parties, as well as truly progressive in

56 J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, pp. 189-90

57 Both the *Bügün* and *Babi Alide Sabah* dailies, strongly supporting Islam, hailed the NOP. The former indeed, was apparently the only newspaper to announce the party's establishment even before it was set up. J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 189.

58 B. Toprak. *op.cit*. p. 98.

59 Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 190-91.

every respect. But there were those who took it at its face value as an extreme Islamic party.⁶⁰

In a press conference on January 26, 1970, Erbakan announced that the NOP would accept anyone as a member except freemasons, communists and Zionists. The NOP strongly opposed the exploitation of religious feelings for political gain any form of population planing or birth control and Turkey's increasing ties with the common Market.⁶¹ NOP would aim to modernize the country through both spiritual and technical development programmes.⁶²

In the technical field, these programmes would emphasize creativity rather than imitation of Western technology. According to the Party's assessment, Turkey would catch-up with Western technology and reject the Western culture. The NOP's views were basically an extension of the 19th Century Islamic movement which had opposed the wholesome acceptance of both the culture and the technology of the West advocated by the Ottomans "Westerners" but rather, had argued that Western influences be limited to technical fields alone.⁶³

60 Ahmet Guner, " Milli Nizam Partisi", *Bügün*, February 9, 1970, Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 191.

61 Jacob. M. Landau. *op.cit.* p. 191-92.

62 John L. Esposito, *op.cit.* p. 438.

63 For the views of the " Westerners" and the "Islamists" during the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, See Tarik Zafaer. Tunaya, *Turkiyenin Siyasi hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri* (Istanbul, 1960), quoted from B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

It was charged with violating the legal provisions of the Constitutional Court. It was banned from political activities by the Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*) in 1972 because of some printed material that a youth organization⁶⁴ of the party had put out which violated a provision of the Political Parties Laws (*Siyasi Partiler Kanunu*) forbidding the use of religion for political purpose.⁶⁵

It is difficult to examine the impact of NOP on the Turkish voter because the NOP never got a chance to enter elections. It is generally believed that this party was shut down not only because of military sensitivity to its anti-Kemalist stand, but also because the Justice Party wanted to eliminate competition.⁶⁶

After a series of non-party coalitions new elections were held in 1973, The destabilizing impact of fragmentation in the party system came into full force when no party could return a governing majority to the National Assembly. In the elections that followed in 1973 NSP received much support from the Islamist and liberal circle and succeeded in gain familiarity.⁶⁷

64 In 1971 NOP had published a magazine for its youth wings, *Tek Mizan* which appeared in Ankara twice a month.

65 B. Toprak. *op.cit*, p. 99

66 For banning the party the main reason was that NOP received much support from the enthusiastic supporters of the country and this support became a serious threat to the Justice Party. Turker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party", p. 82.

67 Ustun Erguder and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Election in Turkey: Continuity and Change in Voting Patterns", in

National Salvation Party and Westernization:

The NSP neo-Islamic Party was established as an explicitly religious party. Although the NSP campaigned on a platform, which emphasized a number of issues, only one of which was religion.⁶⁸ It was the successor of *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order party), banned in the military coup of 1971, as well as a predecessor of the Turkish political organization known as *Rifa Partisi*, which was founded after the military takeover of 1981. All the three parties functioned under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan.⁶⁹

The Platform, policies and general stand of NSP were quite similar to those of the defunct NOP. A close examination of its programme as well as views of its leadership might provide us clues about the specific combination of religion with other issues and problems which influenced the voting behavior of the special sector of the electorate.⁷⁰

The World-View of the NSP and Necmettin Erbakan:

The NSP's worldview and programme were basically a continuation of the defunct NOP. The leadership of NSP was more careful to express its views within legal limits. The

Metin Haper and Ahmed Evin, (ed.), *State, Democracy and Military in Turkey in the 1980s* (New York, 1988), p. 89.

68 B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 96.

69 Binnaz Toprak, " Refiah Partisi" in John L . Esposito, *op.cit*, vol, 3, p. 413.

70 B. Toprak, *Islam and Political Developments in Turkey*, p. 97.

major issue that NSP leadership considered was the re-creation of a powerful Muslim nation, hence in order to regain world prominence, the Turkish nation would have to regain its consciousness as a Muslim society with a distinguished historical mission. A second component of the NSP's concept of culture is the importance of the family and social life. The NSP vehemently criticized the western orientation of the Turkish elite in terms of social customs. This included such details as criticisms of long hair, miniskirts, pornography⁷¹, TV movie and theatre programme which was influenced by western culture rather than the national one, wearing of shorts by women students during gym classes, tourist accommodations,⁷² lack of religious belief among the youths, the disappearance of night clubs "where the youth are initiated into drinking and sexual liberty etc. To the NSP these changes in social norms and system of value is one indication of the

71 The sculpture of a nude erected in an Istanbul square was considered pornographic and dubbed "the Sculpture of Shame", by the NSP and was later lifted from the square by an order of the Interior Minister an NSP member, in 1974. Similarly, a documentary film about the Amazon tribes, which was shown on TV, prompted the Ministry of Justice then an NSP member, to take legal action against the General Director of the State-Owned Television with the charge of having used pornographic material. B. Toprak, *op.cit*, p. 101.

72 The Minister of Commerce in 1974, who was an NSP member, refused to sign an application for government credit to construct tourist resorts on the ground that although tourists bring in foreign exchange, they corrupt the morality of the Turkish people. *Ibid*, p. 101

corruptness, which had inflicted the Turkish society as a result of Turkey's opening to the West.⁷³

They took from the West what they needed least, namely, Western culture, which is inferior to the Turkish. And they had failed to borrow what they needed most namely Western technology. According to Erbakan, Western countries have developed their technology at the expense of the Muslim World.⁷⁴ A second major issue, which the NSP emphasizes, was rapid industrialization. It is almost with religious zeal that Erbakan and other party leaders repeatedly pointed their commitment to industrialization.⁷⁵ Industrialization was the most important topic in the speeches of Erbakan in 1973.

In the party's worldview education was also given much importance. According to them, if Turkey wanted to regain its historical value and become an industrial country it will have to adopt the right educational policy which will be creative rather than initiative and will offer competence in technical field. A good educational system can be established only if, as Erbakan suggested, the government stops giving priority to building dance halls and stadiums over universities and factories.

73 *Loc.cit*

74 *Ibid*, p. 100

75 *Ibid*, p. 102

In addition the NSP called for better religious education for all high school students, more programme on state radios and TV and a broader definition of religious freedom within a general plea for a more open and liberal society.⁷⁶

In his speeches Erbakan supported freedom of thought even for communists and leftists. He said:⁷⁷

"We are leading the formation of the government... A government will be formed, as our brothers desired. This solution means something. The NSP does not support indecent dressing... youth will not be trained to be bandit and communist, immoral movies will be prohibited in the cinemas, every one will speak as he believes, those who read books at home will not be punished".

Erbakan believed that national and historical values should be taught to children, who should also be taught to be more respectful to their elders. When NSP comes to power, he said, ' they will trim the long hair of the hippy-like youth, they will train the young girls to be chaste and modest, and

76 *Ibid*, p. 103

77 Erbakan, *Milli Gazete*, December 5, 1973. Cf. Turker Alkan , " The National Salvation Party in Turkey", Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, (ed.), *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (Australia, 1984), p. 92.

religious education will be stressed as an antidote to terrorism.⁷⁸

The desire of the NSP for an Islamic state based on the principles of *Şeriat* clashed with secularism which was favoured by NSP in official documents at official levels but at unofficial level, it was NSP's die hard enemy.⁷⁹

During his meeting with Ziya-ul Haq, the then president of Pakistan, Erbakan asserted that the total Islamization of life is the basic condition of an Islamic State. 'First of all, the state should be Islam. If it is not, the religion of Muslims will be in danger',⁸⁰

For an Islamic state based on *Şeriat*, he said:⁸¹

"It becomes clear that man does not have the right to [pass] legislation. If he passes laws or claims to do so, he sins against God.... The creator of Islamic law is the creator of man as well. God created man in accordance with these laws. Human laws do not fit human nature... Islam is the rule for all times ... It is both religion and states ... the Koran has not been revealed to be recited in

78 *Ibid*, p. 95.

79 *Ibid*, p. 90-91

80 *Milli Gazete*, 5 January, 1980, cf. *Ibid*, p. 90

81 This quotation has been cited by Turker Alkan, *op.cit* p. 91 from M, Emin Demircan, "Kelime- i Tevhid Ve Islam Nizami", a Turkish newspaper, *Milli Gazete*, April 6, 1980, which was a mouth organ of NSP.

graveyards to be closed down in temples. It has revealed to reign".

West and Westernization was condemned in Turkey mostly on moral grounds against missionary schools, gambling houses, bars, brothels, freemasonry, the infiltration of Greeko-Latin idolatry into Christianity, immorality, immodesty, indecency and sexual perversion.⁸²

According to the NSP all the Turkish institutions should be recognized according to the *Koran*, including medicine, commerce, education, the military industry, agriculture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and as to the relation between the Islamic States and Organization of the United Nations of Islam, a common monetary unit, an Islamic Common Market, an Islamic culture and Islamic heavy industry should be founded.⁸³

The Place of the NSP in Turkish Politics:

In 1972 the leadership of disbanded *Milli Nizam Partisi* founded another pro-Islamist party which was known as *Milli Salamet partisi*. Although, Suleyman Arif Emre, ex-secretary general of the NOP, was the heir apparent to the leadership of the new party. Necmettin Erbakan was generally recognized as the leader behind the scene. Erbakan preferred to evade formal leadership for the time being hoping to thereby avoid the fate

82 *Ibid*, p. 95.

83 *Ibid*, p. 90.

of the NOP. He was willing to recognize the obvious connection between the two parties.⁸⁴

The NSP was established as an explicitly religious party. It entered the 1973 election with an established image as the party of the "Silent Muslim majority"⁸⁵ On 16th May, 1973, five months before the general elections, Erbakan and two other members of parliament officials became members of the NSP. At the same time Erbakan started to run the party's election campaign on a platform, which emphasized a number of issues, including religion. It received much of its support from marginal economic groups. Mardin has argued that in the Turkish case individuals who are unassimilated into the modernist center probably tend to support the NSP in greater numbers than other groups in the society.⁸⁶

In the election of 1973 NSP, which was participating for the first time, received a high proportion of its votes from former supporters of the other parties, which marks a notable achievement for NSP. It received 11.8 percent of votes and 48 seats in parliament and became the third largest party after RPP (186 seats) and JP (150 seats). This indicates that the JP was the major loser in this respect. A coalition without the

84 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 96

86 Şerif Mardin, "Religion and the Turkish Social Transformation", Paper presented at the conference on "The Republic of Turkey 1923-75: Studies in 20th century Nation Building", held at the University of Chicago, December, 1973. cf. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

NSP was practically impossible. Immediately following the elections, on October 21, 1973, Suleyman Arif Emre resigned from the party leadership and Erbakan promptly and officially replaced him.⁸⁷ After several months of bargaining and military pressure it was left to the RPP to join forces with the NSP. In February 1974 a coalition government was formed between RPP and NSP with Bulent Ecevit⁸⁸ as Prime Minister and Erbakan as his deputy.

In March 1974, Turkey was for the first time represented at an Islamic Summit Conference. The appointment of an NSP deputy as Minister of Interior brought about a number of petty manifestations of Islamic Puritanism. The differences arose between NSP and RPP on internal as well as foreign policies. Having resigned from the post of Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, demonstrated for new elections. New elections were not held immediately and President Koruturk sought to find out a coalition government.⁸⁹ After a long period Suleyman

87 Suleyman Arif Emre served as Secretary General of NOP and as President of NSP up to October 21, 1973.

88 After the death of İsmet İnönü Bulent Ecevit was elected General Secretary of RPP. He had served as Minister of Labour from 1961-65 under İnönü's coalition government. He was very much opposed to the military intervention of 1971. He controlled the Party in an extraordinary convention in 1972. He also succeeded to carry out his predecessor's programme.

89 *The Middle East and North Africa*, Part, III, 1997, p. 991.

Demirel was able to form a new coalition with right wing coalition, the Nationalist Front on March 31, 1975.⁹⁰

Another coalition was formed between AP, NSP and NAP when the elections of June 1977 did not give a governing majority to any party. Although the fortunes of NSP drastically changed and its representation was reduced from 48 to 24 in the Assembly. But key ministerial posts were given to the member of NSP too.⁹¹ Following the vote of 'no confidence' in the GNA, the Demirel government resigned on 31 December. With the help of some ex-Justice Party members Bulent Ecevit formed a coalition government in 1978. Under this administration terrorism and inflation worsened. Violence led to imposition of the martial law for two months in 13 provinces on 26 December 1978.⁹² In April 1979 a crisis developed on the political front when six ministry members of the group of defectors from the AP, issued a public

90 The Nationalist front was consisted of four parties Demirel's JP, Necmettin Erbakan's NSP, CGP and NAP of Colonel Alparslan Turkes who become the Deputy of Demirel. Of the Council of Minister of 30, the JP occupied 16, NSP 8, the CGP 4 and NAP 2 . For this distribution of seats see, *The Middle East and the North Africa*, part,III, 1997, p. 992 and S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, *op.cit.*, p. 429.

91 The absolute number of votes cast for NSP did not vary between the two elections, staying fixed at around 1.25 million. This numerically stable support may indicate that NSP was not a dynamic force that could coup with social changes, hence the proportional decline. Turker Alkan, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

92 In response to the growth of Kurdish separatism, and alarmed by Kurdish violence in Iran, Ecevit agreed to extend martial law into six more provinces, all in the Kurdish south-east, excepting Istanbul and Ankara. *The Middle East and North Africa*, p. 993

memorandum criticizing the Ecevit government policies. During the next few months Ecevit's parliamentary majority gradually dwindled after a series of resignations of RPP's deputies.⁹³

In a local election of October 1979 the AP achieved substantial gains.⁹⁴ Two days after the local elections Ecevit had to resign on October 16, 1979. On October 24, Suleyman Demirel was able to form a new coalition government, which ran the country until September 12, 1980, with the backing of NSP and NAP.⁹⁵ Erbakan declared his support in order to demonstrate that Demirel was no better than Ecevit. Things were getting worse; the country was on the verge of a civil war and economic collapse.⁹⁶

On September 11, 1980 military forces took over the government.⁹⁷ And the National Security Council (NSC)

93 The RPP deputies promptly resigned also, reducing the party's minority representation in the National Assembly to 211 out of 450. *Ibid*, p. 992-93.

94 In local elections, which were held on October 14, 1979, JP received 33 seats in the senate while the RPP got 12, the NSP 4 and the NAP 1. It was a disastrous defeat for the NSP.

95 The date of formation of the Demirel government was November 12, 1979, which was quoted by Traker Alkan in Metin Haper and Rephael Israeli, *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, p. 85.

96 Twenty Provinces were now under martial law. At this time a number of Left- Wing papers were shut down, including *Politika* and in May the *Turkiye Emekci Partisi* (Workers' Party of Turkey) was dissolved by the Constitution Court. Once again May Day processions were banned and violence broke out. The sectarian and political killings continued to increase at an average rate of 10 per day. *The Middle East and North Africa*, p. 993

97 There were three main reasons for the military intervention: the ineffectiveness of police forces, the failure of the government to

appointed General Evren the President of the State.⁹⁸ The GNA was dissolved following the military intervention of 1980 and the NSP alongwith all the other political parties, was outlawed by a 1981 law.

On September 21, 1980 a new civilian Council of Ministers was formed by the NSC with Bulent Ulusu, a retired naval commander, as Prime Minister and Turgut Özal as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs.⁹⁹ But Turgut Özal resigned from the Ulusu cabinet in June 1982 after disagreement with his colleagues over economic policy. On May 20, 1983 Turgut Ozal formed a political party known as 'Mother land Party' which won the majority in 1983 elections.¹⁰⁰

1982 Constitution:

In October 1981 the NSC drafted a seven point provisional Constitution which provided the generals with

deal with the country's political and economic chaos and more immediately, the sudden resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism which was evident at a rally in August of 1980, during which Necmettin Erbakan and NSP appealed for the restoration of the *Seriat*, *Ibid*, p. 993.

- 98 The leader of the coup of 1980 formed a five men National Security Council (NSC) which included the chief of the General Staff, Commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force and Secretary General of the Council, General Evren was chosen as the Chairman of NSC. *Loc.cit*
- 99 For the details of the 1980 military intervention. See, Kemal H, Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army- Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", Metin Heper and Ahmed Evin, *op.cit*, p. 148-55.
- 100 William Yale, "Transition to Civilian Government in Turkey: The Military Perspective" in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, *op.cit*, p. 72.

unlimited powers for an indefinite period. In October 1981 a Consultative Assembly¹⁰¹ was formed to draft a new constitution and to prepare the way for a return to parliamentary rule. On October 16 all political parties were disbanded and their assets confiscated. A new constitution was approved by a referendum on November 7, 1982, which replaced the constitution of 1961, with a 91% of majority and 8.37% 'no' votes.¹⁰²

According to the provincial article 4 that Chairmen, General Secretaries and other senior office-holders in the former political parties could not form, join or have 'any kind of relations' with the future political parties, or stand for election (even as independents) for ten years. Ex-deputies and senators could not form or occupy executive posts in any new party for five years though they could run for elections as backbenches.¹⁰³ The new constitution also put restrictions on the organization and activities of political parties and voluntary associations. Political parties could not establish women's, youth and other affiliated organizations, nor could

101 It comprised five members of the NSC and 160 others. Of whom 40 were appointed directly by the NSC while the remaining 120 were chosen by the NSC from candidates put forward by the governors of the 67 provinces. All former political activity in April 1981 was excluded. *The Middle East and North Africa*, p. 994.

102 *Ibid*, p. 994.

103 William Yale, "Transition to Civilian Government in Turkey", p. 169.

they have organic ties with interest groups.¹⁰⁴ But in 1983 new political party law was made. In addition, the founding of new parties under the same names and emblems was outlawed.¹⁰⁵

But in the 1980's, *Islam* also became a vehicle for the youth to protest against the military regime. Female students becoming Islamists and insisted on wearing the head scarf (*Turban*) in the classrooms. This act was the first and foremost protest against the new 'Higher Education law' of November 1982. After the military Coup of 1980, Islamic discourse has essentially followed the lines established and developed since 1950. The military regime despite its claim to restore 'true Kemalism' was also willing to use religion to arrest politicization among the youth. Therefore, it permitted religion to be taught more widely in schools and allowed the influence of the Sufi order to expand through their *Koranic Schools* and student's hostels.¹⁰⁶

In 1983, a new Islamic party was formed named *Refa Partisi* which challenge the Motherland Party, founded by Turgut Özal. It was the true successor of NSP. After the

104 Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey", Metin Heper and Ahmed Evin, *op.cit*, p. 128

105 *Ibid*, p. 129

106 Such is the expansion of the influence of Sufi Orders, there were some crises of alarm, that the Istanbul daily *Milliyet*, January 13, 1987, reported that the *Nurcular*, the *Naqşibendis*, the *Suleymanciler*, had partitioned Anatolia amongst themselves. Feroz Ahmed, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol., 27, No.2, 1991, p.18.

referendum of September 1987, which ended the ban on former politicians imposed by junta, there could be no doubt, Necmettin Erbakan took over the leadership of the Welfare Party (*Refa Partisi*). It was the real heir of the NSP. It has the same programme as the NSP has.¹⁰⁷

107 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

CHAPTER V

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND LITERACY IN TURKEY

Since the 1920s *Islam* has taken an important place in political issues in Turkey and many aspects like social, economic as well as political changes have different manifestations. These had been studied and commented on by numerous writers.¹ The most important consequence was the spread of education. The question of how the Islamic intelligentsia, *Ulema* and religious functionaries (*Imam Hatip, Vaiz* and so on) should be educated had been hotly debated in late Ottoman and Republican Turkey, and reached its highest intensity during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.² Its main

1 For example: N. Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism", D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955"; H. A. Reed, "Religious life of Modern Turkish Muslims", in R. N. Fry (ed.), *Islam and the West* (Mouton and co. the Hague, 1956); pp. 41-48; K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 271-292; B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp.395-436; H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, VIII, 3 (1954), pp.269-79 ;H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam- Hatip School", *DieWelt Des Islam* NS IV 2-3 (1955), R. D. Robinson, " Mosque and School in Turkey", *The Muslim World*, LIX, 2, (1961), pp.107-110; R. B. Scott, " Turkish Villages Attitudes Towards Religious Education", *The Muslim World*, LV, 3 (1965), pp. 222-229; A. P. Stirling " Religious Change in Republican Turkey," *The Muslim World*, XII, 4 (1958), pp. 395-408.

2 Paul Stirling, *op.cit.*, p.395.

purpose was to create a new type of elite³ who brought their cultural baggage into the political and socio-cultural environment. Later this elite became the producers and supporters of the new Islamic ideologies.⁴

It was only at the end of World War II that the course of events changed. There was a general move to exercise greater democratic rights. After the introduction of multi party in 1946⁵, *Islam* had taken an important place in the political debate in Turkey.⁶ Very soon, the religious question became one of the principle war horse of the their oppositions.⁷ During the 7th General Congress of the RPP in 1947, secularization policies of RPP were received extensive criticism and blamed for all the alleged lack of morality in

3 This new elite was educated in the new secular universal educational institution and also quite successful in creating new channels through which these ideas could be communicated. They were those people who were and are instrumental in the formation of new generation of Islamic intellectuals and lay sympathizers.

4 Şerif Mardin, "Culture and Religion Towards the Year 2000" in *Turkey in the year 2000* (Turkish Political Science Association, Ankara, 1989), p. 163 cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit*, p. 187.

5 For a country which, for nearly a quarter of a century, had been accustomed to a single-party, this was truly a prodigious change. Ataturk's successor, Ismet Inonu, allowed the formation of the opposition parties and institutionalization of free and competitive elections in 1945. For the reasons to the formation of opposition parties, see D. A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey", in Joseph La Palombara and M. Wiener (ed.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), p. 122. For religious change and political parties, see Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-75* (London, 1977), p. 364.

6 Most of the newly founded political groups began to demand the abrogation of the anti-religious measures decided by the Kemalists or authorities and eager to argue in favour of Islamic values. Paul Dumont, "The Power of Islam in Turkey", p. 83.

7 In December 1946, after free elections, it was debated in Assembly for the first time.

Turkish social life which, some of the delegates felt, had resulted from the absence of proper religious education and faith in god. The Congress also blamed RPP government had been serious only about negative measures to protect secularism but had neglected their obligation to support and protect religious institutions and personnel as well as provide religious training for the youth.⁸ The competition for votes forced the ruling party i.e. RPP and the opposition parties to reconsider their attitude towards religion.⁹ The government realized that complete suppression of religious institutions might cause a lack of ethical and moral qualities of Turkish Muslims.¹⁰

Among the proposals on the religious question submitted to the Congress of 1947 for the consideration were the following:

- (1) The tombs of saints and other holy men (*Turbe*) should be reopened.

8 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, pp. 76-77.

9 With the coming of the free elections, which were held in 1946, religious fervor could manifest itself in voting behavior. In the same year Democratic Party become the biggest official opposition group which demanded the religious instruction in the primary and secondary school. cf. T. B. Miller, *Turkey*, p.83 and see also H. A. Reed, *Faculty of Divinity at Ankara*, p. 302.

10 Because there was a great shortage of religious leadership and very few qualified leaders since the closing of the old *medreses* and the unification of education in 1924. Hardly any *Ulema* were under sixty years of age and they were in dying group. H. A Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", *Die Welt Des Islam* No. 4, p. 151.

- (2) An elective course on religion for one-hour a week, to be given to students with a written approval from their parents, should be included in the primary and secondary school curricula.
- (3) A clause indicating in the RPP's concern with religious training should be included in the party programme.
- (4) The party programme should also include a statement of the RPP's decision to permit elective course on religion in the primary schools.
- (5) The programme of the Ministry of Education should state the elective religious courses are part of the primary school curriculum.
- (6) Higher schools of religion should be opened.
- (7) Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (*Imam Hatip Okullari*) should be reopened.

The Congress decided that these proposals would be presented to the party council and the cabinet members for consideration. Indeed, the party leaders swiftly acted on the suggestions of the Congress and initiated a series of measure designed to compensate the gap in religious education.¹¹ The government decided to announce that the time had come for

11 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

Turkey to change direction and give expression to new political parties.¹²

The increasing number of religious schools up to 1980s have been hailed by some Islamic group orders and neo-orders as channels for the recruitment of new members and as a cradle for *Ulema*. Secular circles too have divided opinion on Islamic education. Some welcome it as a source of scientifically-minded and enlightened men of religion (*Aydin din Adami*) while others forcefully opposed it as a breeding ground for a radical- militant *Islam* which might put an end to the secular state and to democratic pluralism. A brief survey of historical background will help to understand the development of the contemporary religious education.¹³

Medrese Reforms in late Ottoman and Kemalist Society:

In the classical Ottoman period the education system was composed on three different educational institutions like *mektep*, *medrese* and palace school (*Enderun-Mektabi*). Mostly Koran was taught in *Mekteps*.¹⁴ Though this type of education was not compulsory but gradually spread and existed separately. This education was completed when the student had learned to read Koran from the beginning to the end

12 Paul Dumont, *Ibid.*, p. 82.

13 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.* p. 145-46.

14 These were the first schools of type and were supported by *Vakifs* and attached to mosques where the *Hoca* (Teacher) provided education.

(*Kurani Hatmekmek*). Although this level of religious education was not universal for all children but free. It was available in most places for any parents who wanted his children to profit by it.¹⁵

The most advanced religious institution was provided through the *medreses*¹⁶, which were first established in 1331.¹⁷ These *medrses* hold an important place among the classical Ottoman society. The *medrses* were as important as the palace school. They trained teachers and top staff of the state. It was always attached to a mosque and it was provided free. Students were given free food and small allowance too.

The third one was the palace school¹⁸ and based on the *devsirme*.¹⁹ Its recruitment was based on merit rather than on family status. The selection at all stages before entering the

15 A. M. Kazamias. *Education and Quest for Modernity* (London, 1966), p .31.

16 In *Medreses*, besides the religious education, grammar, syntax, logic, metaphysics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic and medicine were also taught. The term 'alim' was almost exclusively applied to *medrese* graduates, a new term 'muteddinin' was adopted for those who were trained in modern scientific knowledge. H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara-I, *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1956, p. 395.

17 Cemal Kafadar. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of Ottoman State* (University of California Press, 1995) p. 16.

18 Which was first established after the conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople). It was a non- religious school. Later it emerged as a formal education and selective agency for the choicest youth of the Empire.

19 Through *devsirme* (the Law of Draft) non-Muslim boys were recruited for service in the state. It provided the ablest children for leadership positions in the Ottoman Empire's body politics, either as military leadership or as high administrative posts in the "Sublime Porte" and the provinces of the Empire. cf. Kazamias, *op.cit.*, p. 27 for Mehmet's 'Palace School' see especially. Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror*, Cambridge, 1941.

school and while in school, was done by high-trained officials.²⁰ The knowledge of Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Muslim religion, riding, archery, wrestling, sword practice, music and mathematics were also provided to the students of these schools. The emphasis was on practical skills than intellectual qualification.²¹ The palace schools and *medrses* were not separate from one another. Even though the palace school mainly trained soldier and administrators while *medreses* trained judges and learned men. The two educational institutions interacted and were mutually supportive.²²

Up to the 18th. Century *medrese* system had reversed this trend by giving some kind of autonomy to reason and science. The Greeco-Islamic rational observational sciences that had migrated to the West returned to the Ottoman Empire in much-developed Westernized and secularized forms.²³ The *Ulema* had allowed these innovations only on the condition

20 For a detailed treatment of this aspect of the selection see, Sir Hamilton Gibbs and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Case study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Muslim Culture in the Near East* (London, 1950), part I, pp. 43-44; L. S. Stavrianos (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire: Was It the Sick Man of Europe* (New York, 1957), pp. 10-11.

21 A. M. Kazamias, *op.cit*, p. 27-30.

22 *Ibid*, p. 3

23 Ottoman Empire entered a process of peripheralisation in relation to the European core economics, technologies and armies, thus urgently necessitating the introduction of a new organization of the Ottoman army and the adoption of new technologies.

that their authority was not challenged in the areas of Islamic theology, law, the family and the education of children.²⁴

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, under the reign of Mehmud II education first became the subject of reforms to reinforce central power.²⁵ In 1824, according to a *Ferman* (imperial edict), education at the primary level became the responsibility of the state. In the history of Ottoman Empire for the first time a Minister of Education was appointed. The new school that was to be called *Ruṣḍiye*²⁶ *School* (Secondary from adolescence) was established in different parts of the Empire and *Tercume Odasi* (Translation chamber) was also established in 1833 at the Sublime Porte.²⁷ But an important objective of these reforms was to put education under the purview of the state, rather than the *Ulema*.²⁸

24 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 153.

25 As long as the Ottoman Sultans were at the peak of power, as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the *Ulema* had a relatively subordinate position. As the power of Sultans declined, however, the *Ulema* became relatively a powerful group. The standing army, the *Janissaries* as well as the local notables, the *ayan* also strengthened their position. To reduce the power of the *Janissaries* as well as *ayan* new system were taken to reinforce Central Power Military training also received attention,. Cf. Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit.* p. 417.

26 Many writers disagree as to the exact date of the establishment of the first *Rusdiye* School. For the different opinions on the establishment of the *Rusdiye School*. See A. M. Kazamias *op.cit.*, pp. 53-54

27 The purpose of these *Ruṣḍiye* Schools was to prepare Turkish men for various military, naval and medical professions for government offices Its main purpose was to train interpreters to fill the gap in government posts created by the dismissal of the Greek dragomans. cf. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

28 Elizabeth Ozdalga *op.cit.*, p. 417.

During the *Tanzimat* era, in 1856, a Ministry of Education was setup with the purpose of controlling and coordinating the *medreses* and other educational institutions.²⁹ In this period a number of higher institutions, based on European model, were developed and some private schools were also opened. Islamic and modern sciences were combined in their curricula.³⁰ Missionary groups were also active in establishing schools.³¹

From the middle of the 19th century a dual system of education had grown up which resulted in the form that the new educational institutes were annexed with the older one. A new curriculum was adopted³² and the *medreses* were transformed into modern Islamic educational institutions where modern sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, rationalist philosophy, sociology and psychology were introduced but it brought wide criticism.³³ The *medreses* themselves were considerably reformed and

29 A. M. Kazamias, *op.cit.* p. 61.

30 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

31 These schools were run according to their own regulations and opened not only for Europeans but for the Turkish population as well. Cf. Erik Zuncher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York, 1994), p. 66.

32 The new curriculum differed little from that of some of the private schools of 1880s. They continued to teach almost exclusively rote memorization of the *Holy Kuran* Arabic text learned by reciting aloud before the teacher. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 296.

33 On the *medrese* reform the journals and newspapers of that period contain regular discussions of opinion, criticism and counter-criticism. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

liberalized in the 1910s.³⁴ It was the period of free and pluralistic atmosphere of the Young Turks Revolution in which Ottoman educational pluralism seemed to be a state of chaos and crisis. Many educational theories and policies emerged with the public figure of the pedagogue. Ziya Gökalp and Sati Bey emerged in this atmosphere and offered a viable educational policy for the multi ethnic, multi- religious Ottoman society.³⁵

Ziya Gökalp proposed that a modernist educational system organized along etatist and nationalist lines must be complemented by Islamic education. Religious education should be run under the supervision of the office of the *Şeyhul Islam*³⁶ while the primary, secondary and higher education should be under the control, co-ordination and guidance of the Ministry of Education. He also proposed that *medreses*' curriculum must be modernized and transferred from the Ministry of *Evkaf* (religious endowment) to the office of the *Şeyhul Islam*, where there should be a special department of *medreses* alongwith the department of the mosque and *Sufi Tekkes* (lodge). This special department of *medrese* was not

34 The *medreses* themselves were reformed and liberalized in 1910, 1914, 1915, 1917, 1919 and 1922.

35 At the time of debate, both could be said to be Ottomans although eventually one became a theorist of Turkish nationalism and the other of Arab nationalism, cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit*, p.155.

36 The chief authority, at the Capital, of the religious hierarchy extending to the provinces.

only to carry out a reform programme for the *medreses* but also to establish higher-level educational institutions, as well as more occupationally specialized schools to train *imams*, *hatips* and other religious personnel.³⁷

Sati Bey reacted to this position. He adopted natural science methods of developmental and educational psychology and was trying to devise a universalistic Ottoman educational system. Hence, for Sati Bey, religious educational institutions were to be closed and replaced by universalist modernist institutions. Some westernists like Abdullah Cevdet, had openly blamed *medreses* for the decline of the Ottoman Empire and argued for their abolition.³⁸

In 1911 M. Şevketi³⁹ proposed a reformed *medrese* curriculum and supported the teaching of philosophy, psychology, logic and western languages in addition to Turkish, Arabic and Persian and all of the Islamic sciences. He was zealously arguing for the teaching of modern positive sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics,

37 Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1968), pp. 202-247. cf. Richard Tapper, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

38 Niyazi Berkes, "Development of Secularism", pp. 400-23.

39 M. Şevketi was a *muderris* in one of the Istanbul *medreses* and he published a book on *medrese* reform, including a very comprehensive curriculum which was as rich as the curriculum of contemporary *Imam-Hatip School*. He was educated in both Islamic and modern sciences. cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 158-59.

biology and agriculture. He too failed to address the question of reconciling modern and Islamic sciences.⁴⁰

In 1912 a partial answer came from Emrullah Efendi, the then Minister of Education and master mind of the theory of Tuba- Tree (*Tuba Agaci*)⁴¹, with the establishment of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Istanbul *Darulfunun*.⁴²

In 1914 his idea was seemed to be upheld in *medrese* reform when a higher educational *Medrese*, *Medresetul Mutehassisin*, was opened. But very soon *Şeyhul Islam* and the Minister of *Evkaf*, Mustafa Hayri Effendi, who was not a great believer of Tuba- Tree theory of education, launched a comprehensive reform in September of the same year with the *medrese* reform known as *Islahi Medaris Nizamnamesi*. With this law all the *medreses* in Istanbul were organized into junior and senior secondary level and undergraduates and graduates higher educational level under the name of *Darul Hilafetil Aliyye Medresesi*.⁴³ These reforms in the *medrese*

40 According to Islamists modernists, modernism and *Islam* could be reconciled and the new reformed *medreses* should be embodiments of their reconciliation. Yet nobody was sure how this process was to be accomplished, or what modification should be compatible with revealed knowledge and faith. Some Islamists may have just been mocking at these efforts with the conviction that modernist Islam was not possible. See, Richard Tapper, *op. cit.*, p.158.

41 The *Tuba Tree* in Islamic paradise is spread to be upside down, delivering its fruits to all inhabitants in their dwellings. Similarly the Young Turks educational reforms was supposed to proceed from the top down, from the university to the secondary schools, eventually reaching primary education. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

42 Where in there was a Medical School and Law Faculty incorporated with the new department of science, letters and theology.

43 Both *Medresetul Mutahassisin* and *Darul Hilafetul Aliyye Medresesi* became centre of higher learning but very early they were closed. The curriculum of the

system of education were also continued under the new *Şeyhul Islam*, Kazim Efendi. During the period 1916 and 1917 more occupational *medreses* such as those for *Imams* and *Hatip* (*Medresetul Eimme Vel Hutaba*) and preacher (*Medresetul Vaizin*) had been opened and were organized under *Medresetul Irşad*.

In 1921 there were a demand on the restoration of *medreses* so the GNA passed a regulation on Islamic *medreses*, *Medarisi Ilmiye Nizamnamesi*.⁴⁴ But in 1923 in G.N.A a serious matter on Islamic education was discussed as to whether or not the *medrese* should be converted from *Medreses* of the Caliphate into *Medreses* of the sovereignty. Lastly and finally on March 3, 1924 G.N.A had passed unification law of education (*Tevhidi Tedrisat*) which abolished the prevailing *medreses* system.⁴⁵

various levels of this *medrese* complex seem to have been launched a number of mathematical, natural and social sciences on the one hand and a number of Islamic sciences the other hand. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

44 But no serious decision had taken because of two types of *medrses* those pre-dating the Young Turks reforms, with no course on modern subject in curriculum, and other the reformed *medreses* with half modern and half traditional subjects which postponed the judgement of restoration of Islamic education. *Ibid.*, p.160-61.

45 The unification law of education was not only a rejection of the traditionalism of the *medreses*, but also put an end to the pluralism of the minority schools, missionary schools and foreign schools and thereby asserted a centralist, modernist, national educational system under the guidance of rationalism and scientism to establish a new nation with a new identity. cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61. The text of this key law in English translation appears in A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I ; *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement* (London, 1927), pp. 574-75; For the best discussion of the law and its effects, see Ihsan Sungu, " Tevhide Tedrisat" *Belleten* II, 78 (1938), pp. 397-431., cf. H. A. Reed, "Faculty of divinity at Ankara - 1" p. 296.

This decision of the then Minister of Education, Vasif Bey, to shut down the *medreses* gave rise to considerable opposition. There was bitter criticism also in the conservative media. According to them it was a grave attack against the old institutions. They believed that the *medreses* were regarded as primary sources for the students to religious education in Turkey.⁴⁶ Defenders of religious education argued that religious education is needed to uphold the moral requirements of Turkish society. The chief Editor of *Ikdam*, Ahmet Cevdet, wrote that religious education is necessary for the youth of the nation. On the other hand the defenders of secularism believed that the *medreses* were a barrier in modernization and a source of ignorance and dogmatism. They argued that in secular state there is no need to provide such type of education. According to Saderettin Celal Bey, in an article published in '*Son Telgraf*', that religion is a personal matter which is to be kept out of the matters of the state. He saw religion as a primary agent of ignorance and corruption in the society.⁴⁷ It was clear that the law that abolished the *medreses* allowed opening the new vocational school to train *Imam, Hatip* and other religious functionaries.⁴⁸

46 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit*, p. 392.

47 Saderttin Celal, "Terbiyenin Esaslari" *Son Telgraf*, No. 51, 6 August 1940, p. 2. cf., *Ibid*, p. 394.

48 The government had allowed the religious education, which was provided in elementary schools, secondary schools, and teacher training institutions and in the faculty of Divinity at Ankara University, under the strict control of the office of

Hafiz Ve Kuran Kurslari (Kuran Courses):

The period from 1933 to 1946 had a little stressed the need for formal religious education. In fact from 1933 to 1949 the only indigenous legal and officially supported education in Turkey was offered in the special very elementary courses to teach *Kuran* by heart.⁴⁹

These began in 1925 with ten courses having an average of 35 students until 1931 but this figure had almost more than doubled up to 1950.⁵⁰ All these courses were organised by the Presidency of Religious Affairs under the very tenuous supervision of the Ministry of Education. These *Kuran Kurslari* consist of rote memorization of *Kuran*, which usually requires about two to three years in achieving satisfactory skill in chant like recitation.⁵¹ The graduates of these courses

Religious Affairs and ministry of education. H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", p.150.

- 49 It is to be borne in mind that from 1933 to 1949 there was no other officially sanctioned religious training with the exception of the Islamic Research Institute (*Islam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü*) of Istanbul established since 1924. H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara", *op.cit*, p. 302.
- 50 In 1932-33 there were only nine teachers and 232 students. In 1945-46 there were 61 courses with 65 teachers and 2021 male and 744 female students of whom 347 boys and 248 girls earned certificates. In the year 1949-50 their number had increased to 127 courses, 130 teachers, 6403 male and 2303 female students of whom 1811 male and 811 female earned diplomas. When the *Imam Hatip Schools* were established their attendance had dropped roughly by fifty percent. H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara" pp. 301-302. For the details see appendix I.
- 51 These courses were taught without Arabic language and the meaning of the sacred text. In spite of the fact that almost without exception neither by recitation nor listening the Turk understood its meaning.

were considered qualified to become enlightened Muslim leaders without a great deal of other education.⁵²

A significant shift took place in 1950 when the National government took interest in the religious education.⁵³ Private instruction became popular and informal and illegal Muslim religious educational societies also become active.⁵⁴ According to the findings of a Turkish scholar, Ahmet Yucekok, voluntary associations were established for the support of religious culture, such as *Kuran Kurslari* approved by the Directorate General of Religious Affairs and Mosque Building Association that had constituted the foundation of religious revival in many parts of Turkey and had played an important part in religious learning.⁵⁵

After 1950 the number of *Kuran* courses increased tremendously, and became a regular part of the curriculum. Students were required to get passing marks in this course in order to advance to the next stage. Students were to pass the examination unless their parents requested, in writing, that they be excused.⁵⁶ These classes met with a quick and

52 H.A.Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 302.

53 The leader of Democratic Party, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu, once Dean of the Istanbul Faculty of Theology proposed private religious classes for the children who had finished primary school

54 These associations rose from 237 in 1951 to 751 in 1967 and they took root in small provincial town..

55 Şerif Mardin, " Religion and Politics", p. 154

56 H. A. Reed, *op. cit.*, p.303, and see also H. A. Reed, "*Turkey's New Imam Hatip School*". p. 152.

enthusiastic support from the public, especially in many villages.

There were two types of officially recognised courses: those taught by teachers on government payroll position (*Kadrolu*) and those taught by teachers paid with locally solicited funds (*fahri*).⁵⁷ The formers were the more serious students of religion in the group. This supported the fact that *Kadrolu* courses were more serious centre of religious study than the *Fahri* courses.⁵⁸ Both courses came under the strict control of the office of Religious Affairs of the Prime Ministry, which carried out checks and inspections as a joint function with the Ministry of Education. At the local level *müflülük* (district branch of the office of the religious Affairs) and Directorate of Education, in each district, (*Kaza İlce*) were responsible for these activities. One interesting aspect was that nearly half of the students in *Kuran Courses* were women.⁵⁹

57 The terminology was that used by the office of Religious Affairs Ankara. There were 32045 students reported attending the courses, 19267 students in government-supported courses and 12778 students in the privately supported courses.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 154.

59 In one case, at least, the *Müftü* in Elmali (Anataliya) indicated that there was no conflict of interest or friction between the two systems. The *Müftülük* was left in full control of its courses, being the authority in the religious sphere. The main interest of the Directorate of Education was that students were not poached from the primary school. Richard B. Scott, "Quran courses in Turkey" *Muslim World*, Vol. LXI, 1971, No. 4., p. 240-41.

It has been pointed that girls attended the unofficial *Kuran Courses* more frequently than boys, at least in the rural areas. In many rural regions the girls were noted to be attending the District schools where verses from the Holy *Kuran* were only read and recited. The girls would attend these courses, sporadically, until marriage, which tended to occur at a relatively young age. The girls were not to go to the *orta* (Middle) school. When the government primary school was established, with its more 'modern' or Western Oriented subjects of study, the male students only in a large number in attended it urban as well as rural areas.⁶⁰

Religious education gave status to the person who engaged in the pious activity of learning from the *Kuran* and made him a better, more complete man. With his knowledge, he was be asked to act as prayer leader or in some other religious capacity in case of the village *Imam*'s absence. Appointments to all religious posts including village *Imam*, received at least government approval. Villagers were very conservative in their practices and well aware of the Islamic practices. In every village a number of villagers were capable of leading Friday prayers or taking a funeral or a wedding if a practicing village *Imam* was not available. That is why the

60 For a brief discussion of the problems relating to minimum age of marriage as defined by the law (the adopted Swiss Civil Code) as opposed to practice. See, H. V. Velidedeoglu, "The Reception of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey", *International Social Science Bulletin*, IX, 1 (1957), p. 63.

villagers in the selection of their *Imam*, expected him to be able to read and interpret the *Kuran* for them.⁶¹

To become a *Kuran* course teacher one did not need other qualification than a certificate substantiating competence in reading the *Kuran*. The *Suleymancilar*⁶² increased their activity and enrolled themselves in the Directorate of Religious Affairs as teachers of the *Kuran* courses. To a large extent the *Kuran* courses came under the control of the *Suleymancilar*. They were regarded more competent instructors for the *Kuran Courses* than others. But in 1965 a law was passed that changed the qualification the instructor of *Kuran Courses*. It regarded that anyone who enrolled in the Directorate of Religious Affairs must have a university Diploma or degree from *Imam Hatip School* and Faculty Theology.⁶³

The larger and more permanent course centres had gradually been given government support. In 1968, there were 3216 government recognized *Kuran Courses* in the country.

61 For example, a young *Imam* in the village of Seylek (Ankara) was retained by the villagers for only one year, 1965-66 (the changes occurred normally after harvest in the fall when he received the yearly salary in grain). He was a *Hafiz* only but admittedly could not understand what he read or recited. The villagers demanded someone with more profound knowledge of the *Kuran*. See Richard, B. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 248. and see also Paul Stirling, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey", *The Middle East Journal* pp. 402-3.

62 For the details of *Suleymancilar*, see. Chap. V above.

63 Elizabeth Ozdalga, "Education in the name of 'Order and Progress' reflection on the recent eight year obligatory school reform in Turkey", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, No, 3-4, July - October 1999, p. 43.

All were initiated and most were financed by local action. Less than only one-third of the courses received some government support. The larger and more permanent course centres were gradually given government support like the public school, the *Imam Hatip Schools*, the Faculty of Divinity, Higher Islamic Institute and the other sources of religious training. After the military intervention of 1971, all the *Kuran school* came under state control.⁶⁴

Imam Hatip Kurslari (1948-49):

The reforms damaging the daily religious life of the people were the cutting off of all religious training. Moreover, with the secularisation of education and law the number of posts for the religious trained at high level must have dropped sharply. But this shortage did not infact become acute till the 1940s. The government had taken steps to meet these crises.⁶⁵

The first step of the plan of Ministry of Education was an announcement for the academic year 1947-48 to train religious leaders in private seminaries (*Ozel din Seminerleri*) which offer a five year course to graduates of middle schools (*Orta Okullari*) with a total of at least 8 years of previous education - 5 year in primary (*Ilk*) and 3 years in Middle

64 Richard B. Scott, "Quran Courses in Turkey" p. 241.

65 Paul Stirling, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

(*Orta*). Similarly two years intensive training courses were also to be available to these graduates.⁶⁶

The second step was taken to fulfil the desire and need of the Turkish nation and to produce high calibre as well as certified *Imam*. Because a great percentage, nearly 70 percent, of the then *Imams* in Turkey were not duly qualified or certified by the Presidency of Religious Affairs.⁶⁷ On the religious education, which became the need of that time some members of the CHP or (RPP) also spoke in favour of the official religious instruction. On May 20, 1948, the caucus of RPP instructed the Ministry of Education to organise the *Imam Hatip Kurslari*⁶⁸ (Prayer- Preacher Course). The government also suggested to the Ministry of Education that in order to open *Imam Hatip Kurslari* for secondary school graduates who could register only after completing military service.⁶⁹

On January 15, 1949, *Imam Hatip Kurslari* was started for the graduates of middle school (*Orta Okullari*) in Ankara and Istanbul. But very soon in the same year these courses were also opened in 8 other cities.⁷⁰ According to the

66 In 1954, when the Democrats were in full power, *lise* were reduced to three years from a four-year course, which had been in effect since 1951. This programme was apparently still born, although in Urfa and some other places the two courses was, in fact, instituted with very few students. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 153.

67 *Ibid.*, p.154.

68 A. M. Kazamias, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

69 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, " *op.cit.*, p. 398.

70 The other cities were Izmir, Isparta, Kastamonu, Adana, Trabzon, Urfa and Afyonkarahisar. At the end of 1949 only 50 certificates were awarded to the

principal of *Lise* in Urfa, Bekir Elam, these courses were under the strict control of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. They were semi-official and supported in part by the community who paid for buildings and supplied religious teachers for these courses, who were loaned by his *Lise*. In its curriculum Turkish language, History, Geography and Knowledge of Homeland or Civics (*Yurt Bilgisi*) were included. These courses were closed in 1951 when the expanded *Imam- Hatip Okullari* (Prayer- Preacher Schools) were opened with advanced curriculum.⁷¹

Imam Hatip Okullari:

After the unification of education law (*Tevhide Tedrisat*), some special legal religious training course were continued like *Imam Hatip Mekteplari*, *Hafiz ve Kuran Kurslari* and *Imam- Hatip Kurslari* under the strict supervision of the Presidency of Religious Affair. But these courses proved inadequate to fulfill the required need of the religious functionaries like *Imam* and *Hatip* etc. for the nation.⁷²

graduates of these courses the goal of these courses was to overcome the shortage of qualified men who could lead prayers and funeral ceremonies.

71 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

72 These courses were introduced from 1933 to 1948 in addition to religious education up to 4th and 5th grade in public elementary school. H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", pp. 151-52.

As and when the Democrats held power, the climate turned in favour of *Islam*. The discussions on religious question also reached its highest intensity and the teaching of *Islam* became practically compulsory. In this regime religious education, establishment and association for the construction of new mosques began to proliferate. They also busied themselves in modifying school curricula.⁷³

In the first academic year 1951-52 of the Democratic government seven middle level and lise (*Lycee*) level *Imam Hatip Okullari* were opened under the tenuous supervision of the Ministry of Education.⁷⁴ These schools were started on a three-year middle school (senior school) curriculum that was slightly reduced and to which was added a fairly heavy vocational training of four years junior school programme.⁷⁵

In these schools two types of subjects - regular and vocational- were offered. The regular subjects known as *Kultur dersleri* were virtually the same as given in all government middle schools and use of all prescribed textbooks in the various subjects. The vocational subjects were called

73 Paul Dumont, *op. cit.*, p.85; These associations rose from 237 in 1951 to 2510 in 1967 and took root in small provincial towns. These associations also played an important part in the religious learning. Serif Mardin, "Religion and Politics", p. 154.

74 These seven schools were opened with the collaboration of private organizing efforts of the interested groups in Isparta, Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, Kaysari, Konya, and Maras. cf. Richard Tapper, *op. cit.*, p.146. For details see appendix II.

75 Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op. cit.*, p.423.

Meslek dersleri. Out of the 27 subjects 17 were *Kultur dersleri* and 10 were *Meslek dersleri*.⁷⁶

During the next academic year 1952-53 no new *Imam Hatip Schools* were opened but in the year 1953-54 eight more *Imam Hatip Schools* was started⁷⁷ and their number had increased to 15 with 1721 students.⁷⁸

The *Imam Hatip Okullari* gradually got over their growing pains and became established institution. The need of their graduates had grown so a request was made to open another school in one of the *Kaza* (district) town of Busra but it was refused by the Ministry of Education on the ground that the *Imam Hatip Okullari* were, in principle, only to be established in provincial capitals. In accordance with the demands of such religious training the hard pressed Ministry of Education may had to authorise the establishment of more such schools. But the Ministry of Education failed to find suitable teachers for the then existing schools and was also

76 Out of 32 hours per week during the first year religious subjects, which included Arabic language occupied the students for 15 hours and *Kultur dersleri* observed the remaining 17 hours. During the second year, religious (*meslek*) and culture (*Kultur*) courses were allotted 13 and 19 hours respectively. The figures for the third and fourth year were 14/18 and 15/17 hours respectively. It means that out of the total 128 week hours (32 hours per year) of study 57 hours were for religious subject (*Meslek Dersleri*) and 71 hours were for culture course (*Kultur Dersleri*). cf. H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", p.154 -55.

77 Eight new schools were established in Anatalya, Corum, Elazig, Erzurum, Izmir, Tokat, Trabzon, Yozgat and Diyarbakir, *Ibid.*, p. 157.

78 In these 15 schools there were 50 regular salaried teachers a number of which comprised of ladies and there were 39 temporary instructors. No ladies taught religious subjects. Richard Tapper, *op cit.*, p.146.

unable to provide the required *Imam*. Though the number of graduates grew gradually to about 400-500 per year but this number did not suffice.⁷⁹ To fulfil the requirement of suitable teachers for the then existing schools most of the suitable teachers were to invited to nearby schools on part time basis because most of the young teachers had leave their posts in order to perform their military service. Most of the religious teachers were older men and the product of *medrese* or old *Imam Hatip Mektepleri*. They were working on a temporary basis.⁸⁰ The teachers, on cultural courses, were also invited nearby schools on a part time basis. All the principals and teachers were well aware of the related problems, but were confident that they could solve the problem and very soon they could produce a new scientifically minded, informed *Imam* who can provide intelligent and devout leadership in the villages and towns of Turkey.⁸¹

In the academic year 1955-56 a new upper division three year course were offered by only five of the first seven

79 In 1955 it was estimated that around fifty thousand imams were required in Turkey. In response to this demand only some 285 graduates of the first four-year section of these special schools were eligible to fill the gap of that year. Because it was clear by the year 1955 that the great majority of the survivors of the seven original schools wanted to continue their education even beyond the lise (*Lycee*) level. H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", p.157-158.

80 For details of the number of students, teachers who received regular salary and temporary in *Imam Hatip Schools* unto 1955. See Table III, H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p.159.

81 *Ibid.*, p.163.

schools⁸² which handled all the students who proceeded to the second upper division of the of the *Imam Hatip Okullari* programme. However, those students who did not continue for another three years upper division course could take the various posts and become certified *Imams* after completing their first four years Junior High School course. They were theoretically ready and qualified for the official appointment as *Imam*.⁸³

Having finished their four-years junior high school programme, they could continue their combined professional and standard education for another year of senior school programmes and also joined any other senior school programme (for example so called “ normal” *Lycee level*)⁸⁴ while a complete seven years programme in the *Imam Hatip Okullari* did not give the students the right to continue studying at a university. He or she could only study at the Institute of higher Islamic Learning if they wished to pursue theological studies. They could take a four-year course in the *Ilahiyat Fakültesi* (Faculty of Theology) at Ankara

82 These five schools were in Isparta, Istanbul, Kaysari, Konya and Maras. All these were established in 1951.

83 The demand for their services was great. Many villages and towns of Turkey don't have an Imam. So in summer some students at *Imam Hatip Okullari* worked part time as an assistant Imam or even as acting ones and most have done very satisfactory work inspite of their youth and experience. *Ibid.*, p-151.

84 What distinguishes *Imam Hatip Okullari* from the so-called normal high school was that in addition to the ordinary timetable, they offered a number of courses in Arabic, Persian history of religion, theology, Kuran exegesis etc.

University.⁸⁵ A common practice of that time was for the student to enter the final examination of a normal *Lycee* “from outside” and thus they secured a second diploma, with which they were able to enter any University. Since such an alternative to enter the university existed, a much larger number of students choose to study at the *Imam Hatip Okullari* then could possibly get position as *Imam*. The *Imam Hatip Okullari* thus grew into a popular alternative to normal *Lycee* education. Students more often resorted to the *Imam Hatip School* with the goal of preparing for future university education rather than training to become *Imam*.⁸⁶

After the first military coup in 1961, under the new leadership of the chief executive General Cemal Cursel, religion received a fair amount of support from the authorities. *Islam*, although still an elective subject, was given increasing attention in the curricula of the state schools. The *Imam Hatip Schools* grew swiftly, in the numbers of institutions, teachers and students. This is particularly noticeable in the late 1960's.⁸⁷ The Department of Religious Education was also established to check religious education and the activities of the religious institutions. Under the military rule these schools (*Imam Hatip Okullari*) worked

85 H. A. Reed, *op. cit*, p. 158.

86 Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit*, p. 426

87 Based on 1968 *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey* (Ankara, 1970), p. 115, table 84 Cf. J. M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 175

smoothly. Between 1965 and 1969 three more Higher Institutions and 40 more middle level *Imam Hatip Schools* were established under the government of Justice Party (JP) which was able to play the Islamic card in the elections of 1965 and succeeded to hold the power. This government continued its predecessor's programme to encourage religious education. The government took interest in religious learning. So in the academic year 1969-70 seventy-one more middle level and 30 *Lycee level Imam Hatip Schools* with a total of 42,443 students were opened.⁸⁸

The year of 1971 marked as second military take over and a new period in the history of *Imam Hatip Schools*. They become subject to new and restraining legislation. In a law promulgated on August 4, 1971, the first junior high school portion of the previous seven years programme was cancelled and restrictions were enforced concerning the choice available for future university education for students with *Imam Hatip* diplomas.⁸⁹

From 1974 to 1979 Erbakan and some of his advisers came to hold office in several coalition governments. Erbakan played an important role in the field of state education and

88 Richard Tapper, *op cit.*, p. 146; State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Statistical Year Book 1952-1987*, Prime Ministry, Ankara, State Institute of Statistics Publication and N. Dincer, *1913 ten Bugune Imam Hatip Okullare Meslesi* (Istanbul, 1974), pp. 66-7.

89 Paul Dumont, *op.cit*, p. 91 - 92.

especially in religious education and learning.⁹⁰ The coalition government revised the programme of the 1951-71 period. According to the legislation of 1974, graduates from the *Imam Hatip Schools* were for the first, time granted the same status as a student from any so called normal *Lycee* (non-vocational) in entering the university.⁹¹

In the same year office of the Ministry of Education started a vast programme for the revision of the school textbook. They emphasized the importance of religious life and generally undertook to portray *Islam* as one of the essential elements of Turkish civilization and culture. They also stressed the grandeur of Turkey's past and extolled the idea of Islamic fraternity.

After the coup d'etat by the Army on September 12, 1980, General Evren, the chief of the executive, proclaimed his attachment to the principle of secularism.⁹² But in those hard days no question of removing religious instruction from school curricula and of closing down the institutions specializing in training the men of religion were argued. In 1982, however, before the national Security Council had

90 The period from 1974 to 1979 when Erbakan held office in several coalition governments, stupendous advances had been made. *Imam Hatip School* at middle level increased in number up to 334 and *Lycee* level to 103 with a total of 134,517 students *Statistical Year Book 1952-1987*, Cf. Richard Tapper *op cit.*, p. 147

91 Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit.*, p. 427.

92 Paul Dumont, *op.cit.*, pp. 92-93

allowed normal democratic procedure again, religious instruction was made obligatory. Arguments in favour of obligatory religious instruction can be summarized as followed:

- Every young man and women should have enough religious instruction to be able to make an in-formed decision about this vital issue
- Religious belief must be based on independent, individual choice, without too much influence from the family.
- Compulsory religious education is better then voluntary education, because it prevents division among the students on the issue of religion.
- When it is taught as one of many subjects in school, no special advantage or privilege is given to religious instruction.⁹³

Between 1980s and 1990s the growth of new schools practically came to a stand still, but the number of students continued to increase. The state school also became an increasingly important place for the teaching of Islamic precepts.⁹⁴

93 Cf. Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit.*, p. 434.

94 Between 1980 and 1990 the number of schools (*Imam Hatip schools*) increased by 3% only while the number of students increased by 51% at the junior level and 61% at the senior level Between 1990-98 the increase in the number of schools

The fact that the number of schools increased again during the 1990s was an indication that the political atmosphere was more agreeable of the needs of Islamic group during that decade than in the decades immediately before.⁹⁵

Imam Hatip Schools were eagerly supported by the people with Islamic orientation because of their social, cultural as well as religious nature also. They believed that *Islam* served as a bridge between the present and the past, between the common people and the intellectuals and between the state and the civil societies. Because of pious atmosphere of these educational institutions, many families in the rural areas of the country dared to send their girls to school.⁹⁶

These schools were obviously different from the traditional Islamic training schools. There was no regular prayer programme but many students and teachers usually prayed in a nearby mosque or a special room in the school.

rose to 57% while the increase in the number of students varied from about 48% for junior high school and 92% for senior high school. The reason for this disproportion was that it was more difficult to get permission to set up new *Imam Hatip School* while it was possible to add another branch office to an already existing institution. In these developments the role-played by the leader of the Motherland Party, Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister from 1983-89 and President from 89-93, should be taken into consideration here, Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit.*, p. 424.

95 The reason behind the dramatic increase in *Imam Hatip schools* was that considerable sums of money were invested by private persons as well as privately supported pious foundations. Private initiatives support 93% of the *Imam Hatip Schools'* buildings. *Ibid.*, p. 425.

96 For the increase in the number of girls in the students' population see, Mehmet Aydin, "Kutur Davamizda Imam-Hatip Liseleri Yeri", *Kurulusunun 43 Yilinda Imam Hatip Liseleri*, p. 140. Source: State Institute of Statistic Yearbook, and Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit.* p. 428.

Some of the students knew the *Kuran* by heart and had already completed a course in one of the *Kuran Kurslari* classes run by the presidency of Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Education.⁹⁷

As far as the administration is concerned *Imam Hatip Okullari* were administered under the direct supervision of the *Ozel Okullar Müdürlüğü* (Directorate of Special or Private Schools).⁹⁸ Located at Ankara with their different regional branches in all over the country. The Ministry of education simply authorised the establishment of an *Imam Hatip School* unless a vigorous, responsible, formally organized group of local citizen showed its genuine interest in the establishment of a new school. For this purpose these legally constituted private groups raised funds among the community. In the construction of the school building one-fourth of the cost was also contributed by the central government. Ministry of Education only appointed the principal and his assistant, who both taught part time in addition to their administrative services.⁹⁹

Working with an enthusiastic local group yet under the supervision of, and ultimately responsible to, the Ministry of Education, the *Imam Hatip* schools faced certain special

97 H. A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam Hatip School", p. 161.

98 See, law No. 5980 of June 20, 1952.

99 H. A. Reed *op.cit.*, p. 158.

problems like lack of trained teachers, funds and hostel accommodation.¹⁰⁰

The Radical Kemalists or secularists of the Republic made many criticisms. According to them *Imam Hatip Schools* are a threat to the very foundation of the Secular Republic and to the law laid by Kemal Attaturk concerning the unity of education- *Tevhide Tedrisat Kanunu*,¹⁰¹ a corner stone of the secular Republic. This criticism was not made only for the *Imam Hatip Schools*, but also to the other Institute of religious instruction, like *Kuran Kurslari*.¹⁰²

HIGHER EDUCATION:

Faculty of Theology at Istanbul:

The idea of a higher level religious academy also went back to the Ottoman era. Between 1908 and 1919 the then Minister of Education (*Maarif Naziry*), Emrullah Efendi, attempted to open a modern institute of higher religious education. The implementation of the Tuba Tree Theory (*Tuba*

100 Because most of the students came from the villages so they particularly needed healthy congenial housing *Ibid.* p. 161

101 According to the spirit of the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* Public Educational Institutions in Turkey should not graduates different types of educated people, but basically one type.

102 Elizabeth Ozdalga, *op.cit*, p. 429.

Agci) resulted in the opening of a University (*Darul Fünün*) in 1908.¹⁰³

This university included a branch called *Ulum-i Aliye-i Diniye*, which was latter called *Ulum-i Periyye*. This was an early example of what would later become the branches of higher religious education..¹⁰⁴

After some time, some changes were done in the curriculum of the Faculty. Alongwith the *Usul-i Fikh* (Methodology of Fiqh) *Ilm-iHikmat* (Knowledge of wisdom/philosophy), *Tarih-i Edyan* (History of Religions), *Siyeri Nabevi* (Life of the Prophet) and *Kitabiyat-i Arabiyye ve Turkiyye* (Arabic and Turkish Literature) were added to the fourth year programme of the Faculty. But in 1913 the then Minister of education Emrullah Efendi imposed a new regulation. After that regulation the following department (Pube) of the Faculty were organized:

- *Department of *Tafseer* and *Hadith*
- * Department of Theology
- * Department of Philosophy
- * Department of *fik*, Department of Religious Ethics (*Ahlak-y perriyye*) and life of the Prophet (*Siyer*).

103 The *Darul Funun*, which had, since grown into the University of Istanbul was formally inaugurated on August 19, 1900 to mark the 25th anniversary of the accession of Sultan Abdul Hamit II.

104 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay *op.cit.*, p. 390

Apart from these changes the curriculum too was revised and new courses like *Ilm-i Ahlak Periyye Ve Tasavvuff* (Science of Religious ethics and Sufism), *Garb felsefesi* (Western Philosophy), *Felsefe ve Tarikh* (Philosophy and History of Philosophy), *Ilm-i Hilaf* (Discipline of contravention) were introduced.¹⁰⁵ In 1915 Islamic sciences moved out of the university with the opening of higher level *medreses*. Lastly in 1919 Faculty of Theology was abolished as a result of continuous opposition to the traditional offering.¹⁰⁶

To abolish this dual composition in educational system the G.N.A. had passed the law of unification of education on March 3, 1924.¹⁰⁷ By the activity of the fourth article of the law Faculty of Theology (*Ilahiyat Fakültesi*) at higher level at Istanbul was reopened and became a part of the University. The curriculum for three-year Faculty of Theology was designed to promote a modern and active understanding.¹⁰⁸

105 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.*, p. 390.

106 The reason of this opposition was that the traditional *medreses* were sufficiently structured to provide the Turkish people with religious education, and, therefore, there was no need for any other religious institution with the same purpose. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

107 Dual compositions mean *Medrese* gave traditional and religious rooted education while the *Mektep* provided a westernized or modern type of education. With this law all *Mekteps* and *Medreses* were attached to the Ministry of Education both administratively and financially. *Ibid.* p. 392.

108 For details of the curriculum, see appendix III

The then scholars and media persons also criticized the curriculum of *Ilahiyat Faculty*. They stated that the curriculum was neither a curriculum of natural science nor that of a *Faculty of Ilahiyat*. Rasih Kaplan, an MP from Anatolya, argued that the faculty taught history of religion rather than *Islam*.¹⁰⁹ According to the regulation, students who wanted to register for the faculty were required to be graduates from *Lycee* and also must have passed an entrance examination in Arabic and Persian. The graduates of *Imam Hatip Mektepleri*, which was not given the status of *Lycee* at the time, could not register at the *Faculty of Ilahiyat* at Istanbul. But later this faculty was allowed to accept students from *Imam Hatip mektepleri* also.¹¹⁰ In the first year, the faculty received more than four hundred ex-students from the higher level of *Darul Hilafa* and *Medresetul Mutehassisin*, both of which had been closed earlier.¹¹¹

It is only fair to say that inspite of its excellent staff and some courageous innovations this *faculty of Ilahiyat* ceased to

109 *Ibid.* P. 396.

110 Osman Ergin, *Turkiye Maarif Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1977) p. 17-42 and see also Parmaksyozglu, *Turkiyede Din Eđitim* (Ankara, 1966) p. 25. Cf. Mehmet Pacaci, and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.* p. 396.

111 Fry W. Frederick, "Education: Turkey", in Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, (ed.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (New Jersey, 1970), p. 217. and *Ibid.*, p. 395.

attract students and gradually disappeared in the course of the recognition of Istanbul University in 1933.¹¹²

This faculty was replaced by an Institute for Islamic Research (*Islam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü*) and attached to the faculty of letters of the University of Istanbul. This institute in turn failed in its function and survived in a single elective course entitled Islamic Religion and Philosophy (*Islam Dini Ve Felsefesi*) taught by the late Professor Mehmet Serefettin Yaltakaya (1879-1947) until his appointment as President of Religious Affairs on January 6, 1942. It also proposed to study the contribution of Muslims in all domains of life. Unfortunately this institute was also closed in 1942. But some time later it was also revived on February 24, 1955¹¹³ under the leadership of the dynamic Professor Zeki Velidi Togan, and now called *Islam Arastirmalari Enstitüsü*. It became a part of the Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University, but is primarily as a research rather than teaching centre and is distinct from the new faculty of Theology began at Ankara in 1949.¹¹⁴

112 H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of divinity at Ankara-I", p. 298.

113 Jean Paul Roux, "A Study of Islam in Turkey in 1955", in *The Islamic Review*, Vol., XLV, No., 9, 1957, p. 16.

114 Four courses offered in 1955-56 deal with the methodology of Islamic research, taught by Professor Zeki Velidi Togan; the history of Islamic Law, and the documentary sources of the life of the Prophet, both taught by Professor Hamidullah; and history of the tradition, taught by Docent Sezgin. Cf. H. A. Reed, "Faculty of Divinity at Ankara", p. 296-97

İlahiyat Faculty of Ankara (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*)

The first formal suggestion that a new Theological Faculty should be setup was made in January 1948 when two deputies¹¹⁵ in the G.N.A tabled a bill to this effect. This proposal was highlighted and supported through the media. The editor of the influential newspaper *Tasvir*, Cihat Baban, pointed out that such proposal was not out of keeping with secular principles and that religion was both an individual and social matter. He further claimed that if Turkey did take pains to train religious leaders or specialists, false beliefs would spread among the people of Turkey. On February 4, 1948, in the leading newspaper of Izmir *Yeni Asr* M. Tuncer favoured this proposal and expressed his views that they must train up a body of well informed and patriotic religious leaders who could teach religion to the people of the Republic in those difficult times. The leading newspaper of Turkey, *Cumhuriyet* in February 12, 1949 also echoed the sentiments of Nadir Nadi when he reiterated the need for religious guides (*din Rehberleri*).¹¹⁶

Meanwhile the Minister of Education Tehsin Banguoglu tried to explain the purpose of opening the *Faculty of İlahiyat*. He distinguished the concept of the Faculty from that of

115 Two deputies were I. Arvas and Fatim Gokman. the latter famous creator of the Istanbul Observatory at Kandilli.

116 H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara-I". p. 304, 305.

medrese. He explained *medrese* to be places where the basic tenants of *Islam* are learned where as the Faculties were the houses of science. Emin Soysal (Marap) also defended the opening of the *Ilahiyat Faculty* in the following words. He said:¹¹⁷

"...Was Great Atatürk irreligious? No! He was never. Great Ataturk was a great person who wanted this country to develop and improve in European sort.... This country is in need of this institution and verily there is great need of it."

The programme and text for this were to be prepared by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and eventually they were subject to the approval of the Ministry of Education.¹¹⁸ The then President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, Ahmad Hamadi Akseki, asserted that a thorough knowledge of Arabic was necessary to understand the basic source of *Islam*. So, at least, one foreign language must be taught. He believed that the studies should be based on *Kalam, Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh, Ethics*, four schools of law, Islamic philosophy, logic, metaphysics, mysticism, the life and the ethics of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) and Turkish and Arabic Literature.¹¹⁹ Tehsin Banguoglu, the Minister of National Education of that

117 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.*, p. 401.

118 *Ibid*, p. 398.

119 H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity of Ankara-I", pp. 305-6.

period, touched the matter of the curriculum of the faculty in a report. He stated that:

"The subject that will be studied on the faculty will be religious in majority, like exegesis (*Tafsir*), tradition (*Hadis*), jurisprudence (*Fykyh*). Besides, such courses from the faculty of language, history and geography as ethics, psychology sociology will be taught.... Again language courses of the faculty of literature will be the associate courses. Furthermore history of religions and some other religions comparatively will be learned.... Theology is by itself an autonomous discipline, while the faculty of literature is only a faculty of human sciences. In this respect by its foundation we will not repeat the mistake that once was made at the University of Istanbul. The essential core here will be the religious sciences".¹²⁰

The project of the creation of the new Faculty of Theology was examined and pursued by the Senate of the Ankara University on January 7, 1949. At last a new law No. 5424, that confirmed the establishment of the Theological Faculty at Ankara University, was passed on June 4, 1949 and took effect on June 10, 1949.¹²¹ This law provided the teaching

120 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.*, pp. 398-99

121 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.* p. 307.

staff which was initially appointed for a period of up to seven years with an allocation of 4300 Turkish Lira for the budget of the Faculty for the academic year 1949-50.¹²²

On June 6, 1950, examinations for the first Semester of the Faculty were held in Ankara. During the first semester over 85 students enrolled in the faculty for the four-year programme. Out of this number 80 consisting of 58 male and 22 female students, successfully completed the first semester. In the second semester 130 new *Lycee* graduates were registered.¹²³

Among the then present staff most of them had rationalistic tendencies except Professor Yusuf Ziya Yurkan¹²⁴ who was a real theologian. He taught *Islam Mezhepleri Tarihi* (The History of Islamic Schools of Law and Sects). In 1953 the first batch of 40 graduates had completed this course. This unique Turkish Faculty stood at the apex of the formal, public religious education system established under the Ministry of Education.¹²⁵ The Faculty sought more to create scholars in

122 This included one Dean, eight Professors, fifteen Docents and twenty-nine Assistants. Esat Arsebuk who taught Islamic law, became the first Dean. According to a report only 39865 TL were apparently spent in this first half-year. For the details on teachers, students, graduates and budgets of the year, 1949-51 and 1953-1956. See, Table no. II in H. A. Reed, p. 310 and Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.* p. 401, Table II.

123 *Ibid.* p. 402. and H. A. Reed., "Faculty of Theology at Ankara-", p. 295.

124 He had rendered his services as a professor at the *Faculty of Ilahiyat* (Theology) of Istanbul and also served as a member of the advisory council of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs. H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 309.

125 *Ibid.*, p. 295.

religious knowledge than devotes. Its aim was that belief must be enlightened. The study of religion was based on modern philosophy and comparative religion.¹²⁶

After the establishment of the Faculty a number of influential scholars and politician expressed their views. They hoped that it would soon be able to provide the urgently required and modern enlightened religious leadership. Professor Ismail Hakki Baltacioğlu, former Rector of Istanbul University and deputy, expressed his views in the following words: "The new Faculty was needed for the liberation and gratification of the social conscience".

Professor Sut Kemal Yetkin¹²⁷ who taught History of Islamic Art, was Different in his opinion he announced that the Faculty did not wish to study on current trends of Islam in Turkey because these were all linked with politics which they sought to avoid. But the faculty could not abstain from the controversial issues of that time as well as politics.¹²⁸

While Minister of education of that time Tehsin Banguoglu, announced,¹²⁹

126 Jean-Paul Roux, *op.cit.* p. 16.

127 He became the second dean, after the death of Arsebuk on June 13, 1951. H. A. Reed , "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara II". *op.cit.*, p. 23

128 Very soon the Faculty got involved in the issues of religious education and reaction when the Faculty of Theology prepared a Turkish translation of the *Kuran* which was the most controversial issue of religion.

129 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 306.

“ It will be worthy of Ataturk Revolution and will not work in the spirit of *medrese*, but will not work against reactionary trends.”

This promise took effect early in 1956-57 when four Professors were invited to join the staff of Ankara University. Dr. Muhammad Daud Rahbar¹³⁰ was also invited to teach *Tafsir*. Three Professors were of foreign origin.¹³¹ Within four years the Faculty had lost four prominent professors who were masters in their fields, including Omer Budda and Esat Arsebuk, the first Dean of the Faculty.¹³² On the other hand two professors Karsian the Dean, and his colleague in the *Faculty of Ilahiyat*, Hamidi Ragib Atademir, the professor of Philosophy and logic, were elected Democratic deputies so they had to resign their posts. To fulfil the requirement of religious teachers Bedi Ziya Egeman was appointed as Dean to complete the former Dean Karsian's terms.¹³³ But because of lack of teaching staff, Bedi Ziya was unable to produce enough graduates to fulfill the required need for specialized

130 He was an able young specialist of *Kuranic* exegesis. He was trained at Cambridge University and had taught at the Institute of the Islamic Studies, *Ibid.*, p. 309.

131 A German Protestant converted to *Islam*, who taught History of religion, a Maliki Moroccan from Tangier who lectured on the philosophy of Islam and a Yugoslav Muslim who taught *Hadith*. Jean-Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

132 R. D. Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey July 1953-October 1954*, American Universities Field Staff, (Distributed by subscription only), New York, 1954, p. 59. Quoted from, H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 309.

133 H. A. Reed., “Faculty of Divinity at Ankara-II”, p. 22.

teachers in *Imam Hatip Schools*.¹³⁴ Female Teachers also taught courses of religious culture and moral knowledge at ordinary *Lycee* and secondary schools.¹³⁵

Adnan Menderes, the Democratic Prime Minister, showed great interest in the development of religious higher education in order to train needed religious men (*din adamlari*) as demanded by the entire nation.¹³⁶ For this purpose the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs was also raised. A large proportion of the scholarships by the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence or the General Directorate of Pious Foundations was granted to the deserving and needy students. Later the Red Crescent Society (*Kizilay*) and the Faculty welfare fund also gave financial assistance to deserving students.¹³⁷

For ten years up to 1959, this Faculty, except for the *Islam Tetkikleri Enstitusu*, which had been working under the auspices of the University of Istanbul, was the only institute, which provided higher religious education. But in 1959 another Higher Islamic Institute (*Yuksekk Islam Enstitusu*) was

134 By the summer of 1955 not more than forty nine graduates of the Faculty had become teachers in the *Imam Hatip Schools*, *Ibid*, p. 32.

135 Female graduates of the Faculty were appointed as teachers in normal schools where they were responsible for instruction in religion offered to prospective 4th and 5th grade primary school teachers.

136 H. A. Reed, " The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara-I", p. 309.

137 H. A. Reed , " The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara-II", p. 30.

opened in Istanbul.¹³⁸ In 1971 a new institute appeared in Erzurum called the Faculty of Islamic Sciences with the initiative of the rector of Atatürk University. This Faculty started a five-year programme on July 22, 1971, for only the graduates of *Imam Hatip Schools*. The curriculum of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences was similar to the other higher religious education of that time. But it suffered from shortage of able teachers.¹³⁹

After the second military intervention in 1972 when coalition government was formed between the RPP and *National Salvation Party*, Erbakan paid more attention towards religious education. In the curriculum of the Faculty of *Ilahiyat* drastic change was brought about and the four-year programme increased to five-year programme. In the first 3-years Arabic and foreign language courses were emphasized and the last two years were allocated to specialize in two basic areas. Two departments,— *Tafsir* and *Hadith*, and Theology and Islamic Philosophy — were established in the Faculty of Theology.¹⁴⁰

After the third military intervention, the council of Higher Education (CHE) (*Yuksekk Oretim Kurulu*) launched an

138 *Ilahiyat Fakultesi Albumu*, 1949-60 (Ankara, 1961), p. 16, cf. Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, *op.cit.*, p. 402.

139 *Ibid*, p. 403.

140 *Ibid*, p. 402.

extensive reform in 1982 through which seven Institutes of Higher Islamic Knowledge were transferred to the Faculty of *Ilahiyat*. These reforms of the Council of Higher Education (CHE) were considered the second attempt at the unification of education. The old curriculum of *Ilahiyat* education was revived and the same revised curriculum was sent for application all over the country.¹⁴¹ After the unification of the higher religious institution several meetings were held to discuss the coordination of the Faculty and the further development of the curriculum.¹⁴²

To produce higher quality of officers, the Council of Higher Education (CHE) decided to open a five-year middle level institute between *Imam Hatip Lycee* and the Faculty of *Ilahiyat*. It was called the Higher *Ilahiyat* School of Profession (*Ilahiyat Meslek Yuksek Okulu*).¹⁴³ It was stipulated that only officers who had graduated from *Imam Hatip Lycee* and had worked in the Presidency of Religious Affairs for at least two years would be eligible.¹⁴⁴ They were also asked to

141 Fazlur Rehman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*, (Chicago, 1982), p. 98 and *Ibid.*, p. 403.

142 *Ibid.*, p. 404.

143 Accordingly the Executive Board of CHE decided to establish to four Higher *Ilahiyat* Schools of profession in Ankara, Izmir (Dokuz Eylul University), Istanbul (Marmara University) and Bursa (Uluda University) on December 29, 1988. Cf. Fazlur Rehman, *op.cit.*,pp. 406-407

144 According to statistics, officers who had graduated with a high religious education still made up only 3.76 % of 1095 students. This programme began in 1998-99 school year when about 400 officers of religious affairs and the graduates of the *Imam Hatip Lycee* were accepted, *Ibid.*, p.406-407.

obtain the required marks from the Central Students Selection Examination (CSSE). It was developed for the improvement of the academic level of the officers of the Presidency of Religious Affairs under the auspices of Professor Mustafa S. Yazicioglu.¹⁴⁵

The Faculty of *Ilahiyat* of Ankara played a significant role in the case of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences. The staff and the Deans of the new Faculties of *Ilahiyat* were mostly graduates from the Faculty of *Ilahiyat* of Ankara.¹⁴⁶

This was also because of their knowledge of Persian and Arabic. Graduates of the Faculty could teach special courses at *Imam Hatip* Schools also. The graduates of the faculties had the opportunities to find positions in the Ministry of Education as a teacher and in the various levels of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. They also taught courses of Religious culture and moral knowledge at ordinary *Lycee* and secondary schools.

Graduates of this Faculty could find positions at the Prime Ministry, the Turkish Radio, Television organizations and at the state Archives because of their knowledge of Ottoman Turkish. The Ministry of National Defense used to

145 Yazicioglu was originally a graduate from the *Ilahiyat* Faculty of Ankara. Later in 1997 he became the Dean of the *Ilahiyat Faculty* of Ankara. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 407.

146 Up to 1993, the deans of six of the nine faculties of *Ilahiyat* at other cities had graduation from the *Ilahiyat Faculty* of Ankara.

recruit a certain number of students to employ teachers at Military Secondary Schools and Higher Schools or at the Moral Department of the Land, Sea and Air Forces until the very early 1990s.

Until late 1980s there were only nine but later there were twenty-three faculties of *Ilhiyat* all over the country. The increase in numbers first took place with the conversion of higher Islamic Institutions to the Faculty of *Ilahiyat*.¹⁴⁷

147 *Ibid.*, p. 405.

CHAPTER VI

ISLAMIC PUBLICATION AND LITERATURE IN TURKEY

Mustafa Kemal Paşa was most cautious in his dealing with religious institutions. He decided on an uncompromising secular policy only after he was convinced that his regime would always be threatened by the old order so long as *Islam* provided the slightest toehold¹. In 1920s the young Republic cut itself formally off first from the Caliphate, and then from the Islamic laws embodied in *Şeriat*, and finally even from *Islam* as the state religion. The secularisation of these institutions affected on the religious life of the Turkish Muslims.²

After Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü's new regime also encouraged the secular policy of his predecessor. During the first generation, the Turkish Republic was governed by the RPP, which exploited secularism and ignored *Islam*³.

1 The best discussion of this period is to be found in B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.234-74 and Niyazi Berkes, *op.cit.*, p. 431-60.

2 H.A. Reed, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslim", *op.cit.*, p.108.

3 For these Changes See A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925 Vol. I; *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement*, (London, 1927), pp. 25-81; H.E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935, with details on religious changes and for social changes see, D. E. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939) and H. C. Luke, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, London, 1936.

Liberal attitude towards Islamic Literature:

In 1945 after the introduction of multi party politics the RPP had to change its attitude towards religion for competition of votes. After World War I in 1946, *Islam* began to occupy an important place in the political debates in Turkey. Few observers deny that the Islamic ideologies widely articulated in Turkey constitute themselves as an alternative to Western-oriented secular modernization.⁴ For this purpose a number of reforms were carried out before the general elections of 1950 in which religion was used for political ends. But the Democrats won a majority and adopted a liberal attitude towards *Islam*.⁵

The encouragement of Islamic literature in Turkey, few years before, was sufficient indication of the new literacy among the people of Turkey. This new literacy, in effect, produced its own realm of knowledge and information and expressed its own politico – religious claims at the intellectual level. We can say that *Islam* became a powerful ideology in Turkey.⁶

4 Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, p. 171.

5 Their first measure was to allow the *ezan* into Arabic then recitation of the *Kuran* over state Radio and introduction of religious education up to higher level. The budget for the religious publications was also raised for the first time. During 1950's the copies of the translation of the *Kuran* were also sold everywhere. Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 15; Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, pp. 364-65.

6 Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

After the military coup of 1980, Islamic discourses had essentially followed the line established and developed since the 1950s. The military regime, despite its claim to restore 'true Kemalism', was also willing to use religion to arrest politicisation among the young. Therefore, it permitted religion to be taught more widely in schools and allowed the influence of the *Sufi orders*, like Erbakan's government in 1974, to expand through their *Kuranic Schools* and student's hostels.⁷

Thus, the new government supported Islamic institutions. But it was not free. These institutions were put under a close, formal control of three central government agencies. The first two, established on March 23, 1924, are the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Directorate of Pious Foundation. The heads of these offices are appointed by the president of the Republic on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to whom they are directly responsible and on whose Prime Ministry budget they depend. The third, most important, is the Ministry of Education, which has been ultimately responsible for all formal instructions, including religious education, since 1924⁸.

A short study of the literature on Islamic revivalism shows three periods when this literature attracted the attention

7 Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit*, p.18

8 H. A. Reed, *op.cit*, p.109-110.

of the scholars. First was during the 1950 s, when the main emphasis was on whether the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Partisi*), because of its populist outlook, would retreat from the secularist reforms of Kemal Atatürk.⁹ It continued up to the 1960s when a number of books and booklets were published that explained the dogmas and rites of Islam in a simple and straight forward way to adults and school children.¹⁰ In 1960s, a number of books on religion, theology, *Zakat*, Islamic philosophy, history of *Islam* as well as text books for learning the Arabic of the *Kuran* and collection of *hutbes* (Friday Sermons) were published. Some Islamic classical works were also translated into Turkish.¹¹

The second period was began in the 1970's with the establishment of the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*) till its consolidation as a major political party.¹² At that time the role played by peripheral towns in the revitalization of *Islam* was very significant and was a theme that received due emphasis in the Islamic literature of the period. The role of the provincial towns is seen as a highly

9 B. Lewis, 'Islamic Revival in Turkey'. *International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1952, pp. 38-39 and see also H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey, *Middle East Journal*, Vol., 7, 1954, p. 269.

10 B. Lewis, "Islamic Revolution in Turkey", *International Affairs*. Vol. 28, No. 1, 1952, p. 42.

11 Books like Sahihs of Muslim, Bukhari, some works of Al-Ghazali and modernist thinkers like Muhammad Kutub. J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 177.

12 J. M. Landau, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol., 11, No., 1, 1976, p.

suitable social environment for the conversion of traditional religious views into fundamentalist beliefs. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood developed its militant base and political support in peripheral towns is shown as a case in point.¹³

The third wave, which began in the 1980s, is radically different from the first two, because the nature of the subject, Islamic revivalism, had changed drastically. The period of 1980s was different in several aspects from the first two periods 1950s and 1970s respectively. First, this new development of *Islam* was a result of a popular reaction but its proponents intellectualizes it much more fiercely than before, so much so that they published up to 45 monthly periodicals. Secondly, they were organized but not necessarily in political parties. Thirdly, it was a rare period in the sense that *Islamic groups* remained very close to power and their direct attacks on the Secular Turkish State, as well as demands for a totalistic Islamic State, had greatly increased. Fourthly, for the first time the introduction of radical Islamic elements took roots in the history of the Turkish Republic, especially under the influence of the Islamic revolution of Iran. State and religion complimented as well as conflicted with each other as they sought to attract, monopolize and expand resources.¹⁴

13 M. Kuperschmidt, " Reformist and Militant Islam in Urban and Rural Egypt", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1987, pp. 404.

14 H. M. Fedespiel, " Islam and Development in the Nations of Asian", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 8, 1985, p. 8.04-7.

Three salient features of the revitalization of *Islam* in Turkey in the 1980's were the increase in the number of publications, especially the monthly journals, the emergence of religious networks associated with local power centres and a shift of emphasis within the Islamic movement itself in favour of traditional Sufi brotherhoods, for example, *Nakşbandi*.¹⁵

As regards the religious publications, Sencer Ayata makes the following comments:¹⁶

"I identified some fifty different Islamic journals on the counters of bookstores and newsagents in Ankara. The vast majority of these, especially those affiliated to the traditional Sufi Orders, began to be published in the early 1980's. Also striking is the fact that some of these journals are not published in Turkey's three major cities. Although monthly journals have for long been an important element of Turkish political and intellectual culture, I doubt whether any leading journal has ever been published in peripheral towns."

15 B. Lewis, "The Return of Islam", *Middle East Review*, fall, 1979, p. 29.

16 Sencer Ayata, "Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery" In Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

STATE CONTROL OF ISLAM:

Presidency of Religious Affairs

This control of *Islam* is effected by means of *müftü*. The Presidency of Religious Affairs is responsible for their (*Müftüs*) appointments and payments. These *müftüs* reside in each of Turkey's administrative districts (*kazas*) and, supervised and examined and issued license to all *Imams* who are on the staff¹⁷ of the Presidency of Religious affairs, which pay the *Imams* of the cities and towns. But most of the villages must pay their *Imams* out of local funds raised from amongst the people through organized bodies.

The Presidency of Religious Affairs was successfully supplying the personnel required for all mosques receiving state support, organized and financed courses on the *Kuran* and also handled the broadcasting of the *Kuran* recitations and sermons over the state radio from the very beginning of its introduction i.e. 1950. It was also responsible for the publication of various materials on *Islamic* ethics and religion. Without its knowledge any religious matter or sermon was not published¹⁸.

17 In the year 1954 near about 7500 *Imams* in cities and town were on staff of the Presidency of Religious Affairs but in the villages *Imams* were paid by the local funds.

18 *Ibid.*, p.110.

Directorate of Pious Foundation (*Vakiflar Umum Muduru*)

Its responsibilities include the repair and maintenance of the more than 3000 endowed mosques, which it administers and controls, as well as it maintaining many other social welfare and business activities. It was able to maintain representation in most of Turkey's important provinces.¹⁹

The Ministry of Education:

This was another important department state control of *Islamic* activities. After the abolition of the *medrese* system by Mustafa Kemal, a national Islamic religious education programme was directed between 1935 and 1949 at primary, secondary teacher training and university levels. From 1924 to 1935 religious education was offered in grades 2-5 on primary level. These were revived from 1949-50 on a voluntary and extra curricular basis but during the Democrats government in 1952 it became a regular part of the curriculum unless a pupil's parents requested in writing that he be excused. At the middle and secondary levels *Imam Hatip Okullari* were opened in 1924 but they closed due to lack of students in 1933 and fortunately they were started again from 1951. They played an important role in providing *Imams* and teacher of religions in primary/ middle schools. The state other schools also instituted courses on religious education in order to prepare teachers who can staff the primary school classes on *Islam*.

19 *Loc.cit.*

A Faculty of Theology (*Ilahiyat Fakultesi*) was also created at Ankara in 1949. This new Faculty has been developed now there are twenty-two faculties all over the state. It has a huge budget of over millions of Turkish pounds annually²⁰

Religious Publication under Presidency of Religious Affairs:

In the Publication of *Islamic Literature*, the Presidency of Religious Affairs took very active part when the Democratic Party came to power. It was for the first time that the Turkish took great interest in religious matters. As and when the Democrats came to power the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs was raised.²¹

This official agency authorized the translation and publication of the Indian Muslim Mohammed Ali's well known book, '*The Religion of Islam*' and issued Turkish translation of elementary religious textbooks used at al-Azhar University in Cairo.²² The Presidency of Religious Affairs published some books bearing the title *Islam* also. In the beginning of the 1980's five books were published out of these books two books were published by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and three books were published by the

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

21 The funds, which were raised from 0.18 per cent to 0.36 percent in 1951, went up to 49 per cent.

22 H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", p. 278.

faculty members of the University. In all these books, *Islam* and modern science are brought together in the context of *Atatürkism*²³, the official ideology of the modern secular Turkish nation state. Out these book five were revived by Bahattim Akist.²⁴

The first book entitled *Atatürk and Religious Education*,²⁵ which was written by a faculty member of the Konya Islamic Institute, was published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1982. In this book the compulsory course on *Islam* is argued in the curriculum of all elementary and secondary schools in Turkey. It is also remarked that it is against neither *Atatürkism* nor the Secularism as practiced in Turkey. Hence, the new constitution, which was then in preparation, need not to make religious instruction elective as in the 1961 constitution, and because an elective course on religion breeds confusion and anarchy, such a course should preferably be compulsory, but if optional it should be made

23 *Ataturkism* also called *Kemalism*, were the six arrows of the Republican Peoples' Party. It was incorporated in the constitution of Turkish Republic in the year of 1937. These six arrows or principles were Secularism, Nationalism, Republicanism, Etatism, Populism, and Revolutionism.

24 C. Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968). and Bahattin Aksit, "Islamic Education in Turkey", Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

25 A Gurtas, *Atatürk Ve Din Eğitimi* (Ankara, 1982) published by Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı Yaninlari 1982. This book is in Turkish language and written by a Turkish Scholar. Cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*,p. 162.

elective by asking parents to say if they do not wish their children to offer it.²⁶

In this book Atatürk is quoted as saying, ‘ *Islam* should be taught in schools’. With numerous other quotations from Atatürk it is argued that he believed *Islam* to be the last and the most perfect religion and that whatever was rational, scientific and to the benefit of the people cannot be against *Islam*. Western thinker are also quoted extensively, to argue that modern sciences confirm the *Kuran*.²⁷

The second book, *Education and Instruction in Islam*, was written by a retired member of higher religious council of the Directorate of Religious Affairs for the Youth. In this book message was given that *Islam* and positive science are not antithetical to each other. The bulk of this pamphlet-sized book is devoted to lists of the names of *Ulema* and their works in different fields.²⁸

The third book was the publication of a symposium on religious education which was organized in 1981 on the occasion of the one hundredth birth anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This book contains 60 papers on the problem

26 At the time when this book was published, Religious education was made compulsory in the secondary school level on September 12. Administration and the relevant sentence in 1982 the Constitution was formulated in such a way that a course on religion and morality and culture was to be included in the curriculum of secondary schools.

27 Bahattin Akşit, ‘Islamic Education in Turkey’ p. 162

28 *Ibid*, pp.162-163

of Islamic education, Islamic institute, mosque *Koran*, the family and so on. In these papers Islamic education is discussed in relation with secularism and modern science.²⁹

The fourth book, entitled *Introduction to Education and values Islam Contributes to Education*, was written by the head of an Islamic Institute and argued that *Islam* has always embraced science and technology. The modern theories of education recognized a place for moral and religious education, hence the teaching of *Islam* and the modern sciences in schools does not involve a conflict.³⁰

The fifth book, *Education in Islam, with a comparison with the Western System of Education*, was also written by a member of the Faculty of Theology at Marmara University. He proclaimed the superiority of the Islamic concept and practice of education. He says that *Islam* is the knowledge and practice of education throughout its history.³¹

The Major publication of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Reisliği*) which may be qualified as a general work, was the original book, *Islam Dini* (The Religion of Islam) which was written by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki in 1933 but it was published in 1954. That was the only text book on *Islam* which was recommended by the government for

29 *Ibid*, p.163

30 H. Ayhan, *Egitime Giris Ve Islamiyetin Egitime Getirdigi Degerler* (Istanbul, 1982) quoted from Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 164.

instruction at the new *Imam Hatip Okullari*.³² In the year 1957 the Ministry of Education instructed teachers of religions to use this book as a basis for their instruction in the Middle Schools.³³

Development of Islamic Literature under Faculty of Theology and the Ministry of Education:

The Faculty of Theology (*Ilahiyat Fakultesi*)³⁴ and the Institute of Islamic Studies (*Islam Tetkikleri Enstitute*)³⁵ of Istanbul had also played an important role in the publication of Islamic literature. At these centers religion was studied scientifically and some of the studies were published in a review especially on Islamic Studies and some of the results of the studies were published quarterly and in occasional monographs.³⁶ The Ministry of education had also played a

32 After some debate the Republican Peoples' Party started a discussion on the education of *Imam* and *Hatip*. In 1949-50 *Imam Hatip* Courses were opened in various provinces and in 1951-52 under the Democrats seven-middle level and lycee level *Imam Hatip Schools* had been opened under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. For the details of the *Imam Hatip Schools* See chap. IV below.: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Statistical Year books 1952-87*, Prime Ministry, Ankara, State Institute of Statistics Publications. Bahattin Akşit, " Islamic Education in Turkey", Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, pp. 146-153.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

34 This was housed in November 1949 in an annexe of the Faculty of Law at Ankara and started to function with five professors, jurists, philologist or archaeologist. All these were men who had rationalistic tendencies and that real theologian was Yuusuf Ziya Urkan.. Cf, Jean Paul Roux, "A study of Islam in Turkey", *Islamic Review*, " Vol. XLV, No. 9, September 1957, p. 15.

35 This organization was founded in October 1954 in the Faculty of Letters of the University of Istanbul, with the active help of many other faculties (Medicine, Law, Economics, and Fine Arts). It proposes to study the contribution of Muslims in all domains of life. *Ibid.*, p. 16

36 A. L. Tibawi, "Turkey and Islam Today ", *op cit*, p 30.

vital role in the publication of religious matters and in the translation. During the reign of Prime Minister Ismet İnönü, in 1939, the Minister of Education approved the translation and revived the Encyclopaedia of Islam into Turkish language.³⁷

Many articles, which were out of date, were to be revised and re-written and many new articles added. Many articles in this work were translated and edited under the title *Islam Türk Ansiklopedisi* by a committee of clergymen and scholars under the supervision of eminent scholars, medical doctors and historians of science, Abdulhak Adnan Adivar.³⁸ This Islamic Turkish Encyclopaedia (*Islam Turk Anisklopedisi*) which was the first issued with contributions by Ismail Hakki İzmirli, former Dean of the Faculty of Theology, was a revised edition of the European publication Encyclopaedia of Islam on the same pattern.³⁹ They claimed that all the contributions were written from, what they believed to be, and a strictly Muslim point of view. In the preface of *Islam Turk Ansiklopedisi*, *Islam* is described as a turning point of world history and also pointed out that most of the fundamentals of Islamic values were borrowed by the European civilization. The editor strongly criticized the Encyclopaedia of Islam which was published in Europe and

37 This great co-operative work was published in Leiden E J. Brill, by an international team of European Orientalists in Turkish Language.

38 H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey" p. 270.

39 A. I. Tibawi *op. cit.*, p. 30

alleged that "It was written by well know Christian missionaries and by Orientalists who did not spare any effort to prepare the ground for Christian propaganda." ⁴⁰

At the same time an ambitious program of translation work to Turkish, sponsored by the Ministry of Education, was significant and till 1952 the commission, that was appointed by the Ministry of Education, began to translate to modern Turkish and publish Islamic classics originally written in Arabic, Ottoman Turkish and other languages. The Ministry of Education had issued several translations of Islamic classics and made an effort to make Islamic literature available in modern Turkish. ⁴¹

This Faculty had also served actively in the development of Islamic Literature. The new Faculty of Divinity (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*), now an independent faculty and modern institution, taught history of comparative religion in addition more exclusively Islamic disciplines. Since 1952 it began to publishing its quarterly review titled "Review of the Faculty of Divinity" (*İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*) which has been well received in Turkey as well as European scholarly circles. ⁴²

40 Uriel Heyd, "Islam in Modern Turkey", *Journal of the Royal Central Asiansociety*, The Royal Central Aisan society, Vol. XXXIV, 1947, Part III- IV, p. 307

41 It published among others *Mukaddime*, *El-Munkizu Min el-Zalal*, *Fusus al-Hikam and Şehnama*. These books were written by the prominent Muslim scholars like Ibn Khaldun. Imam al-Ghazzali, Muhye al-Din Ibn al-Arabi and al-Firdausi respectively. *Ibid*, p .270.

42 H. A. Reed. "Revival of Islam in secular Turkey", p. 274

In 1952 the first issue of Review of the Faculty of Divinity was published at Ankara, in which the leading article entitled "*Islamin Ilm-i Hali*" (The Catechism of Islam) was written by Prof. Yousuf Ziya Yorukan, who had the unique position of being the only professor in the Faculty of Theology . In 1953 an expanded version of above mentioned article was published in a booklet entitled "*Kuran-i kerimden Ayetler: Islam Esaslari*" of which substantial number of 25,000 copies were ordered to be printed at first time.⁴³ Public demand for the copies of the Review of the Faculty of Divinity, which is original, scientific and critical in its character, had been great, and its sale was very high. The contents of its articles was to cover different fields of *Islam* like origins of *Futuvvet* organization, art in *Islam*, remarkable archeological discoveries of interest to Islamic iconography, early Ottoman religious movements and similar topics. There was a column for frank criticism of each other's research made by the members of the faculty. The members of the faculty differed in their party politics.⁴⁴

43 *Ibid*, p. 278

44 The members of this Faculty of Divinity, former Dean Sut Kemal Yetkin, and the new incumbent Dean. Prof. Mehmet Karsian ran for the parliament on the Republican Peoples' Party and Democratic Party's tickets respectively. Dean Karsan won the seat and represented his home constituency of Denizli, He had to resign his academic post and was succeeded as Dean by Prof. Bedi Ziya Egemen. Cf. H. A. Reed, "Islam in Secular Tuekey", p. 279.

Liberal *Kuranic* exegesis and prayer books were written by "Omer Fevzi Mardin"⁴⁵ who was waited upon by a few disciples and wanted to maintain unity and friendship among the *ehli-Kitab* (People of the Book) especially Muslims, *Jews* and *Christians*. He exhorted his numerous followers to a more inspired, prayerful and dedicated life and thoroughly believed that he has a mission to perform. His publication was financed anonymously. His earnest desire was to revivify *Islam* and all monotheistic religions.⁴⁶

Besides its journal the *Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, the Faculty of Divinity published several books. Among them *Dinler Tarihine Giris* (Introduction to the History of Religion), which was written by a German scholar named Prof. Annemarie Schimmel Tari who was then teaching the History of Religion in the *Ilahiyat Faculty*, was most important book. Another book titled *Türk Sanati Tarihi*, written by Calel Esat Arseven, a Prof. of Architectural Extensive History of Turkish Art. In this book the author includes a sketch of the general

45 Omer Fevzi Mardin died in March 1953. He was one of the first members of the Revolutionary Committee of Union and Progress in Macedonia before 1908. He had been a distinguished staff officer and colonel in World War I, almost miraculously supplying the raidercruiser, *Hamidiye*, Commanded by his friend, the famous captain Rauf Orbey. Cf. H. A. Reed "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", p. 276.

46 Omer Fevzi Mardin, "Toward the Union of Heart and Spirit", *International Review of Missions*, Vol. 26, April 1937, pp. 177-88 for an exposition of his views at that time.

development of Islamic Art because Turkish Art is Islamic Art.⁴⁷

The other important publications of the Faculty of Divinity included Prof. Bedi Ziya Egemen's *Din Psikolojisi: Saha, Kayanak Ve Metod Uzerine bir Deneme* (The Psychology of Religion: An introduction to the Field, its Sources and its Methodology), Prof. Sabri Sekir Ansay's *Hukuk Tarihinde Islam Hukuku* (Islamic Law in the History of Law), Nafis Danishman's *Kelam Ilmine Giris* (Introduction of the Science of Theology) and Nevzat Ayasbiyoglu's *Ibn Rüstün Felsefesi* (Ibn-Rushid's Philosophy) were very remarkable for the readers.⁴⁸

Islamism highlighted in the press:

Interest in *Islam* enriched by a literary and journalistic output of books, pamphlets and journals with the word "*Islam*" and the name "*Muhammad*" prominently displayed in their titles, tables of contents and texts, were quite numerous, as could easily be seen from visits to the bookshops and perusal of the catalogues of printing houses.⁴⁹ In Turkey printing press as well as publishers were free to print Islamic literature. The press was taking active part in this movement. The copies of the translation of the *Kuran* were being sold on small bookshops as well as the bookstalls near to the mosques. In these shops one could easily find a larger stock of

47 H. A. Reed, *op.cit* , p. 277.

48 H. A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara- II", Table V, p. 34.

49 A. L. Tibawi, " Turkey and Islam", pp. 29-30.

the *Kuran* in Arabic too. In those day the shopkeepers sold more copies of the *Kuran* in Arabic than in Turkish language.⁵⁰

Islamic Journals:

The religious sphere had found conspicuously little representation in the ranks and products of the civilian - military elite of the 'centre' in Republican Turkey. The Islamic Revolution in Iran and general upsurge of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East had been popularly indicated as the external factors contributing to the ascent of *Islam* in Turkey. The rise of Islamic groups may be seen as a gradual process. The Islamic groups' incorporation into the rank of the elite by the late 1970's. and 1980's are related to their ability to reintroduce *Islam* as alternative ideology.⁵¹

In addition a great amount of apologetic literature was also written in the 1960s of which a characteristic example was the attempt, that Islamic Civilization is the real source of Western Civilization.⁵² With these changes many intellectuals and the people at large began to take more interest and greater pride in the Ottoman past.⁵³

After the 1960 revolution, when the constitution of modern Turkey was changed, printing presses as well as

50 Jean Paul Roux, pp. 14-15.

51 Feride Acar, " Women in the Ideology of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey", in Richard Tapper, *op.cit*, p. 281.

52 J. M. Landau, *op.cit*, p. 177

53 D. A. Rustow, *op.cit*, p. 96.

private publishers were given freedom to print religious materials. Press was also free to criticize any party on a genuine point. Publishers and the distributors of journals were also free to sell Islamic journals.⁵⁴ Some copies of the translation of the *Kuran* in Turkish language were also sold every where especially in small shops near the mosque. The Turkish translation of the *Kuran* produced by Omer Riza Dogru could also been seen in the shops there.⁵⁵ In the bookshops of the main cities of Turkey Islamic journal could be sold freely. In these Islamic Journals or periodicals the authors were also free to explain their views on *Islam*, concept of education, *Sufi* movements and *jihad* against non Islamic elements. The following Islamic journals played an important role in the Islamic revolution of Turkey and produced a vast Islamic literature for the young generation who are very anxious to know to the Islamic history sprit. There were some very widely circulated monthly periodicals published by Islamic group in the light their variation.⁵⁶

Risale- i Nur :

It was the first treatise written by Bediuzzaman Sait Nursi in Barla in 1926. In this treatise he wrote about the

54 Ayşe Gunes " Pluralism Versus Authoritarianism", Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

55 Omer Riza Dogru was son in law of the famous Turkish Poet Mehmet Akif. This Turkish translation of the *Kuran* was first display in all the shop windows in the summer of 1955. Cf., A. L. Tibawi, " Turkey and Islam Today", *The Islamic Review*, Vol., XL, No., 3, 1959, p. 30.

56 Ayşe Guneş, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

resurrection of the dead and the hereafter and all the main truths of belief as well as Divine Unity of God. By the time of his death, *Resale-i Nur* consisted of 130 sections, based directly or indirectly on certain *Kuranic* verses that are taken as points of departure for long and complex discussions of logical and metaphysical questions. The sections are not arranged in any logical sequence and do not constitute a systematic exegesis of the *Kuran*.⁵⁷

His brief work, entitled *Nurun İlk Kapilari* (The First Gate of Light), composed in Burdur, was put in the preface of *Resale-i Nur*. This work consists of thirteen lessons on the fundamentals of *Kuran*.⁵⁸ The whole work have the title "Light" and its various sections are entitled *Lema* (Flash) or *Sua* (Ray) and each has the effect of refracting the *Kuranic* luminosity through the prism of Sait's expression.⁵⁹

It has also been recorded that some of the things he taught his students at that time were subsequently included in the *Risale-i Nur*.⁶⁰ In his Sermons delivered in Nursin Mosque in Van, he concentrated on the fundamental truths of belief such as divine unity and resurrection of the dead. It has also given an important place in the *Risale-i Nur*.⁶¹

57 Hamid Algar, *op.cit* p. 325

58 *Ibid.*, p. 320.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 326

60 Sukran Vahide, *op.cit*, p. 223.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 223.

His previous writings, which were in Arabic, was rewritten in Turkish language and arranged in a book form in many sections entitled *Ders*.⁶² These *ders* were found in full expression in the *Resale-i Nur*. About the importance of these *Ders*, Sait Nursi himself said: “ It was an index, list, and seed of the *Risale-i Nur*” and was the first instruction, the New Sait received “ directly from the *Kuran*”.⁶³

Sait Nursi’s struggle to write such treatise, after 1928, when there was no printing press and writing of religious material was forbidden, was a constructive, positive struggle and was considered as “ *Jihad-i manevi*” (Jihad of the World.).⁶⁴ The *Risale-i Nur*, which is described as a moon to the sun of the *Kuran*, had as its aim the demonstration of the *Ijaz* of the *Kuran* in a manner suited to the needs of the time. Most of his interpretations can be founding the great classics of esoteric *Tafsir*, such as Ismail Hakki’s *Ruh al-Bayan* and also found the commentaries of the *Kuran* of the Egyptian Tantawi Jawhari and Muhammad Ali of Ahmadiya.⁶⁵

62 In 1922 he produced a number of pieces in Arabic which he added to the treatises *Semme* and *Sule* in Istanbul. He Subsequently rewrote these addenda in Turkish and arranged them in book form in sections entitled First Lesson (*Ders*), Second Lesson and so on.. It was probable that these formed the basis of the daily “*Ders*” or instruction he gave in the mosque after the afternoon payer. Cf. Sukran Vahide, *opcit*, p. 225.

63 *Ibid*, p. 225.

64 In this struggle the students of *Risale-i Nur* were subject to having their houses raided as well as imprisonment and ill-treated. *Ibid.*, p. 227 and 230.

65 Hamid Algar, *op.cit*, p. 326.

In the eight and half years in Barla, he completed the first two collections of the *Risale-i Nur- Sozler* (The Words) and *Mektubat* (Letters) as well as a great part of *Lemalar* (Flashes)— a total of 119 pieces. Among them described above all the main truths of beliefs. Especially noteworthy are the Tenth Words. About it he himself said that the writing of the Tenth Words coincided with official moves to spread atheistic ideas denying resurrection.⁶⁶ In the *Risale-i Nur* Twenty-Second and Thirty-Second Words, and Twentieth and Thirty-Third Letters, on the Divine existence and unity; The Twenty Fifth Word, which proves that every matter of the *Kuran* that had been attacked by its enemies are sources of its “eloquence” and “miracles of Muhammed (PBUH) and The Twenty-Ninth Word, on the angles, the immorality of man’s spirit and the resurrection of the dead.⁶⁷

Among the *Risale-i Nur* ‘The Thirty three Words’ (*Otuzuc Soz*) hold a special place and are considered the core

66 It should be mentioned that the resurrection of the dead and the life of the hereafter were openly denied by the thinkers of that time, whose ideas were very influential at that time. Cf Sukran Vahide “ The Life and Time of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi”, *The Muslim World*, Vol., LXXXIX, No. 3-4, July-October, 1999, p. 227.

67 In 1934 in Isparta where he wrote three parts of his *Risale-i Nur*: the nineteenth, twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth Flashes, called, *On Frugality, Message for the Sick and Treatise for the Elderly*. He was made unable to complete the latter due to his arrest and imprisonment. In Eski Sehir in 1935, during his eleventh month in prison, he wrote the twenty-seventh to Thirtieth Flashes and the First and Second Rays. The Twenty-eighth Ray consists of the letters and notes he wrote to his students in prison giving solace and guidance. In the four year from 1936-40 at Kastamonu, he wrote the Third to the Ninth Ray. The Seventh Ray called the Supreme Sign (*Ayetul Kubra*) is the most important part of the *Risale-i Nur*. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-233

of the whole works. The contents of these "Thirty Three Words" do not differ markedly from the rest of the *Risale-i Nur*.⁶⁸

The Primary goal of the writings of Sait Nursi was to refresh the people's mind which were sought to be wiped out through the *Kemalist* policies. He believed that a new generation does not emerge without any tradition or any knowledge of history and ethics. He believed that people sought not only to preserve but also to update Turkish memory in new public space so that they can survive against all odds. Nursi's writings have to a great extent defeated the "mankurtization" of the Muslims.⁶⁹

He says that the reason for his writing in this form are "to facilitate comprehension", and to show how rational, appropriate, well founded, and coherent are the truth of *Islam* ... each story is like an allusion pointing to its concluding truth".⁷⁰ His writing had reached the most dynamic and refined level of Anatolian and Ottoman Sufi Islam. His work has been

68 Hamid Algar, *op.cit*, p. 326.

69 Sait Nursi was assured that in the efforts of de-establishment of Ottoman legacy and Islam by changing the alphabets from Arabic to Latin, *Kemalism* sought to create a people without memory, a people of mankurts. Mankurt is a character in the writing of Chingiz Aimatov, a man who is forced through torture to forget his memory and even his name. And as a result, loses all dignity. This concept originated in Chingiz Aitamatov, *The day lasts more than a hundred years*, tr. By John French (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), Cf. M Hakan Yavuz, "The Assassination of Collective Memory: The Case of Turkey", *The Muslim World*, Vol., LXXXIX, No. 3-4, 1999, pp. 195-96.

70 Sukran Vahide, *op.cit*, p. 228.

referred as 'Light' (*Nur*) which helps to overcome the darkness of the un-Islamic practices. His books have become familiar to many Muslims who discover their self-identity as a Muslim and spent their loneliness. They examine themselves and their history within and between the lines of *Risale-i Nur*.⁷¹

It is difficult to decide whether the *Risale-i Nur* has in fact been able to restore or preserve the faith of those who would otherwise have lost it. But the role of the *Risale-i Nur* has primarily been to provide them with a focus for their loyalty to *Islam* and to strengthen their faith in the face of the constant hostility that was being displayed by the secular Republic.⁷² In order to revive *Islam*, Nursi wanted to bring religion and science together only to establish a connection between science and religion as he writes in *Risale-I Nur*:

"All the sciences you study continuously speak of God and make known the creator, each with its own particular tongue. Don't listen your teachers, listen to them".[sic]

He tried to show how various sciences make the creator known together with some of His Names.⁷³ He also stressed, in

71 M. Hakan Yavuz, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

72 Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 327

73 This was an answer given to schoolboys who were among the visitors of the Kastamonu. They came to him regularly to hear him speak about the beauties of belief in god and the hereafter even though they suffered various punishments in school as a consequence. One day they came to him and said "Tell us about our

particular, that scientific knowledge is Gods bounty to man and that modern technology should therefore be used rather than passively suffered.⁷⁴ Sait Nursi has tried to develop a new science of *Kalam* that addressed the problems posed by the development of material science and its attacks on the *Kuran* and *Islam*.⁷⁵ He stressed on multi-meaning of the *Kuran* and treated nature containing the signs that reveal the *Kuranic* truth about God.⁷⁶ He also stressed the importance of the *Risale-i Nur* as a guide. It is modern in the sense that its text encourages reflection on ideas of society and nation.⁷⁷ For Sait Nursi and his followers, the *Risale-i Nur* was bestowed on him by God and, therefore, his writings have a semi-sacred status and are actually more significant than Nursi himself.⁷⁸

These two aspects of his thought— the fact that he made Islamic theology accessible to the masses without robbing it of its mystic qualities, and his approval of technology and science as ‘steeds that one should mount’ and of progress as ‘a train’ that one should follow— have made his teachings

Creator, our teachers don't speak of God” Bediuzzaman later incorporated the answer he gave them in the sixth Topic of the Eleventh Ray of *Risale-i Nur*. See *The Ray Collection*, p. 75. Quoted from Sukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 236.

74 Serif Mardin, “ Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, p. 156.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 236.

76 M. Hakan Yavuz, *op.cit.*, p. 198

77 *Ibid.*, p. 196

78 Sukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 237. He it should be mentioned that although in later years, wanted to direct attention away from his own personality to the *Risale-i Nur*. Because he began to be known among his disciples as a “Vali” or saint. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

attractive to many Turks. Those who are attracted come especially from the middle classes of craftsmen and artisans and businessmen.⁷⁹ *Risale-i Nur* is also studied among the officials' circles, among the common people as well as among the university students because of its allegorical comparison, which is not too difficult to understand.⁸⁰ But the *Risale-i Nur* was not accepted among the statis elite due to their socialization in superficially “borrowed Western Culture”.⁸¹

Nevertheless, in a way contrary to all expectations, the imprisonment and trials of Sait Nursi and his followers received a lot of publicity and aroused widespread sympathy for him and *Risale-i Nur*. In the village of Isparta province, Nebolu and Kastamonu , the *Risalei Nur* was written out by hundreds even thousands of pens who were encouraged by Sait Nursi. The purpose of this was to save the belief of the people. It was a scholarly work, addressed to the Philosophers of Europe and not intended to challenge the government itself, but those philosopher and the atheists who worked on its account in Turkey.⁸²

Because of the danger of using the state postal service, the letters and treatises of the *Risale-i Nur* were delivered

79 Şerif Mardin, *op.cit.*, pp. 156-57.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

81 M.Hakan Yavuz, *op.cit.*, p. 98

82 Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.* p. 233

from place to place by ‘*Nur Postman*’.⁸³ The greatly increased availability of the *Risale-i Nur* together with the greater freedom led to a considerable growth in the numbers of *Risale-i Nur* students and the consolidation of the movement. *Dershane*s or the study centre for the *Risale-i Nur* were opened all over the country.⁸⁴

Risale-i Nur also began to spread in the Islamic World when in 1947 people were again permitted to make the *Hajj*. Students took copies of it to Mecca and Medina where they distributed them among Muslims from different countries. His purpose was to re-establish and strengthen relation with the Islamic World through the *Risale-i Nur*.⁸⁵

Ittihad:

Among the weeklies one may mention *Ittihad* (Union) which started to appear in Istanbul from 24 October 1967 under the editorship of N. Mustafa Polat. It’s publisher was Salih Ozcan. *Ittihad* mentioned that the Muslim world had begun to awaken, faced as it was with the challenges of Western materialism and of the Northern sickness of atheism. It claimed, further, that social life in all respects was facing bankruptcy. The main goal of *Ittihad* was to save Muslims from materialism and all types of atheism and to encourage

83 *Ibid*, p. 234.

84 *Ibid*, p. 243.

85 *Ibid*, p. 240

the union of all Muslims so as to foster material and spiritual progress. It supported those domestic policies, which showed favourable attitudes towards *Islam* and attacked those hostile to *Islam*.⁸⁶ It criticized the RPP's "left-of-centre" policy since 1965. After the second military coup in 1971, it did not hesitate to make a criticism against the cabinets of Erim, which was an anti, religion.⁸⁷ Much of the information in *Ittihad* was on Ottoman history or Muslim feats and practices, which served as an incentive for study of the *Kuran* and *Islam*.⁸⁸

Islam:

It was one of the monthly journals of *Nakşibendi Order*. This monthly periodical was published in Ankara in 1956 and continued well into the 1960's⁸⁹ by Iskender Pasa Dergahi, which was one of the biggest lodge (*dergah*) of the *Nakşibendi Order*. The circulation of this periodical was 100,000 copies in a month. The followers of *Nakşibendi Order* were usually asked to buy several copies and distribute it among their friends.⁹⁰ This journal has developed a holistic conception of

86 J. M. Landau, "Turkey from Election," *The World Today*, XXVI (4), April 1970, p. 163 J. M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 181.

87 *Ittihad*, p. 182, April 27, 1971. Cf. J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

88 *Ittihad* attacked particularly communist, socialist, and the Labor Party of Turkey. In 1965 it criticized the RPP's left of centre policy and in 1971 it did not hesitate to attack the Erim's cabinet for supposedly anti religions.

89 The last issue to hand is September 1965. There may, however, be later ones. It was again published in 1983

90 Ayşe Guneş, *op.cit.*, p. 267

Islam. Meeting the challenges of modern science and technology from the point of *Islam* required education in both fields.⁹¹

The editor of '*Islam*' wanted to cover all aspects of life and to offer solution to every problem. Through this journal, its readers obtained a sound knowledge about the teachings of *Islam*. The journal was famous among the followers of the *Nakşibendi Order*, graduates of *Imam Hatip School* and the Faculty of Theology.⁹²

It was interested in distributing knowledge of *Islam* and the teaching of *Kuran* into Arabic with a Turkish translation. It contained articles, included expositions of *Islam's* views on such matters as the position of women, medicine and bribery. Some articles dealt with events from Muslim history as well as current affairs such as Turco-Greek disputes over Cyprus, which was presented, in a pro-Muslim spirit. In this magazine supplements for the Muslim youths were also published from time to time.⁹³

This magazine contained news of the Islamic countries, interviews with Muslims well known for various reasons, and major section of the magazine was reserved for Islamic history as well as Ideal Muslims. The magazine '*Islam*',

91 Bahattin Akşit, "Islamic Education in Turkey", p. 164.

92 Ayşe Guneş, *op.cit.*, p. 267.

93 J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

provided its readers with an opinion about *Islam* as a religion.⁹⁴ The backwardness of Turkey was related to the negligence of *Islamic* practices. So a major section was reserved for *Islamic* History and moral stories. A special section called "Catechism" (*Ilmihal*) was reserved for the detailed descriptions of *Islamic* practices and women. A special issue also had at least 8 pages of advertisement, clearly indicating the financial back up for the journal.⁹⁵

'*Islam*' was a sophisticated periodical. It provided a profound knowledge of *Islamic* practices doctrines and belief like *gunah*, *şirk*, and *tagut* etc. It gave an understanding to the readers to social, economic and political instructions. By reading this periodical a non-Muslim could become a true believer and an ordinary Muslim could convert on the *tarikah* line. In every issue of '*Islam*' there is a story of conversion to *Islam*.⁹⁶ *Islam* paid more attention towards the unification of *Ummat*⁹⁷, Islamic United Nation for the political purpose, an Islamic Common Market, single monetary system and a common *Islamic* political development.⁹⁸ *Islam* insisted that

94 Ayşe Guneş, *op.cit.*, p. 267

95 *Ibid.*, p. 268.

96 *Ibid.*, p 270.

97 Unification in all the fields like Political barriers such as Nationality and National border problems, and economical barriers such as trade and investment tariffs should be eliminated and a common cultural and economic medium should be organized and implemented Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

98 *Ibid.*, p. 271-72.

Muslim news agencies should be established, Radio and television are not intrinsically bad, but they are used by westerners for the wrong purpose. Private Muslim foundations including private radio and television stations, clubs and learning schools must be established in all over the country.⁹⁹

Islam Düşüncesi:

This quarterly review began to be published from March 1967 in Istanbul at the same time as *Ittihad*. It was edited by Ishak Eradebil and published by M Ihsan Babali. This journal was not actively involved in politics but its major aim was to instruct Islam and closely related matters to its readers. Its writing was in a style replete with Arabic terms, with the Turkish equivalents rendered in parentheses.

Yeniden Milli Mücadele:

This sixteen page weekly magazine was the most aggressive of all the magazines, which began to be published in Istanbul from February 1970. Its editor was Salim Arkos and publisher was Omer Ziay Belviranlı. This weekly, *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* (the struggle for Independence— Anew¹⁰⁰), printed regular features on Muslims point of belief sometime going into more detailed exposition of faith. It was included

99 *Ibid.*, p. 274.

100 Probably referring to a renewal of Ataturk's War of Independence.

reports on Islamic event in Turkey and Muslims abroad such as in Soviet Union, Kashmir and North Africa.¹⁰¹

Many of the well-informed people in Turkey believed that this magazine was the mouthpiece of the National Order Party. The weekly, however, has continued publication regularly during 1971, after the party was banned. In 1971, before the party was banned, NOP had published another magazine for its youth organization, *Tek Nizam* (Unique Regime) which appeared in Ankara twice a month.¹⁰²

Ribat:

During the 1980s mostly monthly Journals were published by the traditional *traiket circle* and their various subdivisions gradually came to outnumber the *Nurcu* journals as well as those initiated by independent Islamic groups. This journal, *Rabat*, started publication in 1981 and had nation wide circulation of 20,000 copies. At the time of writing, six volumes had appeared, each containing twelve issues having 32 page and 15 articles of different authors.¹⁰³ These journals

101 J. M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey*. p. 182.

102 *Ibid.*, p.192.

103 Sencer Ayata says that 'I shall not refer to the authors by name when discussing *Rabat's* religious views for tow reasons: first there is little specialization among author, so that they end to step on each other's territory. The two major exceptions are Tahor Buyuk Korkucu, a former MP from the National Salvation Party who write short articles on Rumi, and Abdullah Hoca, who dwells on the relationship between the Prophet and his companions. Neither however are discussed here. Secondly *Ribat* does not seem to tolerate individual variation, so that, although different authors are mentioned, each issue or infect each volume seems like a single book by a single author.

of *Nakşibendi Order* rejected the Western thought including science and technology as well political and cultural infiltration but were silent as regards economic relation with the west.¹⁰⁴

To analyse the nature of the political, ideological and economic power in non-Islamic Societies *Ribat* adapted the symbolic form developed by Ali Shariati.¹⁰⁵ The various contribution of the *Ribat* admit that common people pray and fast regularly: the vast majority would at least go to Friday prayers while many go on *Hajj* at later stage in life. Those who prefer comfort and lust to *Islam* ask for God's forgiveness and repent later in life. On the other hand, many of the religious practices of the common people are superstitions or false beliefs from which a common people can never save themselves.¹⁰⁶

It also recommended its readers to stay away from the misleading interpretations of Islam.¹⁰⁷ This journal draws heavily upon the vast stock of *Nakşibendi* ideas and practices.

104 Semcer Ayata, "Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery", p. 226.

105 M. Yadigari, "Liberation Theology and Islamic Revivalism", *The Journal of Religious Thought*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1986, p. 47 Cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p252.

106 False beliefs means, using the *Kuran* to decorate walls, opening of the shops with prayers by the Imams, reciting *Mevlud Şerif*, cooking special foods on various days of religious importance, visiting saints' tombs and making sacrifices veiling women improperly and practicing usury in trade.

107 Some of these are: first, the attempt to justify the truth of revelation by showing the scientific nature of the *Kuran*, secondly, the Muslim intellectuals who deny the truth and relevance of the *Sunnat* and the tradition of the Saints. Thirdly, the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis which is simply absurd. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 234.

Ribat was addressed mainly to the young students.¹⁰⁸ *Sufism* is very different from modern humanitarianism, it given an extraordinary light status to humanity presenting man as perfect and as a divine product reflecting the qualities of God. This notion is again and again elaborated on *Ribat's* pages in order to inculcate in its readers a sense of dignity, self worth and light-esteem *Ribat* further upgraded the moral of their believers.¹⁰⁹ Hence, *Ribat's* fundamental message to the reader can be summarized as follows: if you cannot afford a meaningful and decent living why not risk an honourable death?¹¹⁰

Icmal (Ijmal):

This Islamic journal, *Icmal* was published by the traditional Kadri Sufi Order, at provincial city Trabzon in the Black Sea region, small towns of which are commonly identified as strongholds of Islamic fundamentalism. This journal emphasized the Sufi doctrines and teachings. *Icmal's* sufism recognizes freewill and predetermination. Its emphasis is less on physical asceticism and on maintaining a high stranded of religion morality.¹¹¹ On the one hand, *Icmal* stated that education involves teaching advance programme to give pure Islamic conciseness to Muslim and on the other hand,

108 Sencer Ayata, *op.cit.*, p. 237.

109 *Ibid.*, p. 238.

110 *Ibid.*, p. 239.

111 *Ibid.*, p.241.

that Islamic education will bring peace of mind and emancipation from anxiety.¹¹² *Ogut* is also a well known journal of the *Kadri Order*. Its contents bear different topics.

Din Yolu:

This magazine was launched by the liberal Turkish Ismail Hakki Baltacioğlu and was most widely circled. It could be found on almost every newsstand and among the comic books and magazine that were sold by the street corner newspaper seller. The *Din Yolu* began as an attempt to present a reformed *Islam*, which could co-exist with modern scholarship and scientific thinking.

Sebilurreşat:

This magazine was considered the mouthpiece of the more orthodox expression of *Islam* and devoted itself to carrying full texts of discussions in G.N.A. concerning religious matters. The editor of this magazine was Eshref Edib who criticized the Ministry of Education's proposal to translate the Encyclopaedia of Islam into the Turkish language. According to him it was not an Encyclopaedia of Islam but against it and alleged that it was an anti-Islamic project. This magazine also covered a partisan of religious instructions and news about the *Imam ve Hatip Okullari*. It was widely read by students in these schools.¹¹³

112 *Ibid.*, p. 246.

113 J. A. Kingsbury, "Observations on Turkish Islam Today", *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVII, No.2, April, 1957, p. 129.

The appearance of magazines entirely devoted to religious matters can be considered as the most interesting development in the history of Islamic literature in Turkey. It can be seen that the scope of Islamic literature in Turkey is wide and extensive.¹¹⁴

Important Islamic Newspapers:

As religion became a subject of political policy, news about religions increased and Islamism was also highlighted in the newspapers. Cihat Baban who pointed out in *Tasvir*, that religion was an individual and social matter and that if Turkey did not take pain to train religious leaders false beliefs would multiple.¹¹⁵

A statement made by Ahmet Hamti Akseki, who was the then president of Religious Affairs, was also reported in *Tasvir* on the July 19, 1949. He emphasized that for the research on the basis sources of *Islam* the thorough knowledge of Arabic is very necessary. He also emphasized on the need of religious studies that should be based on creed (*Itikad*), dogmatic philosophy (*Kelam*), worship (*Ibadet*), Kuranic exegesis (*Tafsir*), the history and methodology of tradition (*Hadith*), the schools of Islamic law (*Mezhebler*), Islamic jurisprudence and its methodology (*fikeh*), the method of liberal interpretation of Islamic law (*Ictihad*), the

114 J. A. Kingsbury, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

general history of religion and of *Islam*, and the life and ethics of the prophet Mohammad and Turkish and Arabic literature.¹¹⁶

Another newspaper from Izmir named *Yeni Asir* in which M. Tuncer expressed his emotional feeling in these words:

“They must train up a body of well-informed, patriotic religious leaders who could teach religion to the people of Turkey.”

These sentiments were also highlighted in the Turkey’s leading newspaper *Cumhuriyet* under the editorship of Nadir Nadi on February 12, 1948 when he reiterated the need for religious guides (*dinrehberleri*). Another Istanbul daily *Vatan* edited by Ahmet Emin yalman who was assassinated in 1952 by the fiery writing of a fanatical newspaper *Yeni Bükük Doğu* edited by Necip Fazil Kısakurek, in the October 8th issue there appeared a front page story from western Thrace about efforts to get the Turkish minority to think of themselves first as ‘Muslims’ and not as “Turks”.¹¹⁷

A notorious incident that had been occurred in Turkish parliament in February 4, 1949 and the speech of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes at Konya January 1950 had been given broad news coverage. The newspapers were also free to publish reports concerning the Turks outside Turkey. The newspaper also provided religious knowledge to their readers

116 H. A. Reed. “The Faculty of divinity at Ankara-I”, p. 403.

117 Kingsbury. *op.cit.*, p. 126.

for which they carried a separate column on religion. During the month of *Ramzan* most of the newspaper carried a religious column that gave devotional paragraphs wherein they discussed the significance of religion for the solution of personal problems.¹¹⁸

The leading Istanbul newspaper *Vali* had given the photograph of the president of Pakistan while he was performing the prayer (Namaz) in Eyup Mosque. Another Istanbul daily *Havadis* on 19 December 1956 on its front page editorial *Kim Musluman deđil* answered the Egyptian and Syrian propaganda against the Baghdad pact that claimed that Turkey is not a Muslim nation and the Turk is not Muslim.¹¹⁹

The number of religious and theological newspapers ranged 13 (out of total of 1653) in 1962 to 1964 (out of a total of 1739) in 1964.¹²⁰ The dailies mostly identified with the pro-Islamic policy were *Bügün*, *Babe Alide Sabah*, *Yeni Asia* and *Hakikat* that all published from Istanbul. But another newspaper, *Tercüman*, which had a mass circulation, was published daily from Istanbul. It was generally sympathetic to *Islam*. In general all the above mentioned newspapers defended the, *Seriat and* accused its opponents of atheism,

118 Uriel Heyd, *op.cit.*, p. 305.

119 Kingsbury, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

120 1968 Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, *op.cit.*, p.121, table 94. Quoted from J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 180.

secular intellectuals were branded as communists.¹²¹ Both the *Bügün* and *Babe Alide sabah* strongly supporting *Islam*, hailed National Order Party (NOP) (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) that was founded by Necmettin Erbakan and was closed down May 20, 1971.¹²²

Islamic Literature for Women:

During 1970s and 1980s vast Islamic materials for women was published. Because the ideology and strategies of Islamic revivalism in Turkey had acquired some reason. There were two groups in Turkey one were the secularists and the other the Islamists. The issue of women's emancipation became a major-battle-ground in their struggle. On the issues of the women's role and dress, rights, position Islamists expected to receive wider support in society.¹²³

The Kemalist elite emphasized on women's emancipation as the height of the country's level of secularism and modernity, and equated the concept of social justice and individual happiness. During the period of Islamic revivalism in Turkey, the banner of women's rights and emancipation was raised by the Islamic groups especially *Nakşibendi* and *Kadiri Orders*. They attack secularism and modernity, which were perceived as reasons for women's exploitation and

121 *Loc.cit.*

122 *Ibid.*, p.189.

123 Feride Acar, "Women in the Ideology of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey" in Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 281.

degradation in manner and was reminiscent of their position in early *Islam vis-à-vis*, the *jahiliye* system. Hence the Islamic groups' called on women to the front of Islamic Jihad.¹²⁴

In Turkey, there were two Islamic groups, which took part in politics too, and had a strong hold among the society. These two groups provided Islamic literature for the women. Mostly Islamic journals for women were published in the late 1980's which were published by *Nekşibendi*, *Kadri* and *Nurcu Orders*. In those days some magazines could be seen, which were not women's magazines but had pages and sections for and about women. These magazines contained some articles on her role as mother and housewife as well as the image of ideal women, with some discussions on children's health care.¹²⁵

Islamic Literature for Children:

Islamic literature for children was provided through magazine and religious books with pictures. Children's books are the basic socializing agents, which transmit social values, norms and behaviour as well as Islamic values among them. By reading the religious literature through Islamic books, children learn how to behave and, speak on different occasion to the elders and parents. Children's books were considered to be part of the popular literature available to Turkish readers. In the past, popular literature, especially in the form of

124 *Ibid.*, p. 282.

125 *Ibid.*, p. 283.

illustrated stories played an important role in defining opposite political identities. Islamic journals and magazines also justified these forms of popular literature.¹²⁶

Children's picture books in Turkey are based on different ideologies. This diversity can be interpreted as an outcome of the prevailing cultural diversity in Turkey.¹²⁷ These books can be classified into three major categories: traditional tales, modern children's books and religious stories and were written with the object to instill the basic principles and moralities of *Islam* among the children of age up to 10. These stories related to the important Islamic historical events, stories from the *Kuran*, courage, self – sacrifice, and wisdom of pioneering Muslims and their roles in preserving *Islam*.¹²⁸

Here the important point is that the children's stories, that tried to convey a stamp of authenticity, related to those events only, which actually took place. Similarly quasi-mythical stories, which recount the lives of Adam and Abraham and their campaigns and miraculous adventures on the path of true faith, were also covered by religious magazine.

126 Ayşe Saktanber, "Muslim Identity in Children's Picture-Book", in Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

127 *Ibid.*, p. 173

128 *Ibid.*, p. 174

Children's religious picture books were recommended in 1983-84 by both, the Ministry of Education as well as the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The aim of these books was to teach Islamic rules and regulations and also practices of worship. Some of those books were produced in series ending with the book on death and collected under the heading *My religion*, with specific topics such as *Towards Religion*, *The Child Who Searched for God*, *Our Prophet With Children*, *I Am Performing Ritual_Ablution*, *I Am Performing Ritual Prayer*, *I Am Praying* and soon.¹²⁹

The remarkable point in these books is that some of them are illustrated by photographs that carry the narratives. Religion and the basic practices and observation of religious worship that are taught to the children by their parents, especially their fathers, were also discussed in these books. These books also dealt with the duties of the Turkish Muslim children, home of the children all emphasizing the place of *Islam* in every day life.¹³⁰

129 All the books in the series are by the same authors, M. Yasar Kandemir, and were published between 1983 and 1984: *Din Serisi* Istanbul, Damla Yayınevi, Cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 175.

130 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

CHAPTER VII

MUSLIM TRADITIONS AND CULTURE IN TURKEY

Public and private interest in *Islam* has grown in Turkey during the past few years. Few observers now doubt that an overwhelming majority of the population in Turkey is Muslim without question and is a fact. Islamic revivalism began in Turkey when multi-party system was introduced after 1945. Religious revival is currently an important political phenomenon in *Islam*. In Turkey the general usage of the concept of Islamic revivalism tends to treat the movement as a whole.¹ The reforms of Atatürk damaged most of the practices but not the minor ones. The people of Turkey are very different in nature. Villagers are more conservative and strict in performance of their religious duties and practices than the modern city dwellers.

Religion in Personal life:

It is clear that the Turkish population has benefited by the freedom it has received and the encouragement given to *Islam* by practicing the Muslim religion with more fervour. All observers and all Turks whatever their opinions, recognize

1 J. Voll, "Revivalism and Social Transformation in Islamic History", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 76, No. 3-4, 1986, pp. 168-80; M. Yazdegari, "Liberation Theology and Islamic Revivalism", *Journal of Religious Thought*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1987, pp. 38-50.

this fact, although some deplore it while others feel happy about it.²

Çarşaf (Veil):

A very benevolent attitude is towards women who still go about veiled. If, on the one hand, the authorities do not encourage the peasant girls and women to hide their faces they, on the other, hardly criticize the veil the women put over their heads and faces. In this context, Jean - Paul Roux, a non - Muslim foreign scholar, wrote:³

"We were about to see in Istanbul women who when they were performing repair works in the mosque, hid their faces completely under *Çarşaf*."

During 1920s the gradual disappearance of the veil among the urban women and the adoption of European dress were rightly stressed by many scholar. Since 1950, as Adnan Menderes' Democratic Party held the power of the state, this adaptation trend of the European clothing was reversed, the traditional garb became familiar among some of the poorer and more conservative Turkish women in the towns and cities too. In December 1954, many veiled ladies on the streets of Maras, dared to stand out in sharp contrast to the Western dresses of the lady teachers and others.⁴

2 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 16

3 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

4 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 117.

In an interview, *Cumhuriyet*; a leading paper of Turkey, the governor of Niğda, Hasip Koylan praised this act of women and said that he was proud that there were only one or two veiled ladies in his city⁵. The women in modern western dresses were discouraged from entering the mosque. They were, sometimes, asked to wear sober traditional *Çarşaf* before entering the mosque.⁶

Necmetten Erbakan also encouraged the veil. The interview he gave to a German journalist while he was Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit in 1974 is worth quoting in full for the insights it provides.

"What will be the situation of women? They say that there are people in your party who wanted women that veil (peace) again?"

"Everyone must be able to dress as he/she wishes. We have great respect for women who want to wear veil."

5 Personal observations, and interviews with Governor Hasip Koylan Niğda, August 3, 1952. A scholarly discussion of the serious national, social and legal issues involved in seclusion, veiling, or unfair means to women by plural marriages. Appears in Professor Hifzi Velidedeoglu's speech on October 20, 1954, before the *Türk Devrim Ocakları*, Istanbul, which was printed as publication No.5 of the *Milli Tesisat Birliği* and entitled *Cok Karilck Ve Ortunme* (Istanbul, 1954), pp. 14ff. Another comment on this problem appears in B. Lewis, *op.cit.*, pp. 185-6.

6 In mosque ladies pray in the back or at one side, separately, if they enter at all. Other Imams deny any but aged women access to the mosque. According to one of the popular Turkish manuals on worship and religious duties, "old ladies may perform their prayers in the mosque behind the male. It is *mekruh* "not prohibited, but frowned upon by religious law", "Abominable", "disgusting" for young women, particularly those having children to go mosque. Suleyman Fahir, *Biyuk Namaz Hocasi* (Istanbul, 1954), p. 32. cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

"That's to say every-one will dress as/she wishes"

"Yes, on condition that it does not go against morality."

"During the first few day in government you said that mini-skirts would be lengthened. It seems that you were not successful. I saw lots and lots of mini-skirts (in Turkey)."

"As we were in a coalition unfortunately one could not get everything passed. If we had the final word, skirts would definitely have become longer. However, we insisted on having the skirts of hostesses in Turkish Airways lengthened by 15 centimeters. So we had some success and we believe that we are on right path"⁷.

The Military regime, which came to power on September 12, 1980, put an end to political activity for the next three years. All the parties were dissolved and the country underwent another period of repression. But after the Islamic revolution of Iran, *Islam* also became a vehicle for the youth to protest against the military regime in Turkey, especially in a period when politics were forbidden to the students. This incident partially explains the growth of religious influence in the schools and the Universities. During the military regime in 1980s much has been made of female students becoming

7 Interview in *Onur* (n.25), p. 92-4, cf. Feroz Ahmad "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1991, pp. 15-16.

Islamists and insisting on wearing the headscarf in the classrooms. But this brought first and foremost strong protest against the Higher Education Law of November 1982.⁸

In spite of the loud criticisms and protests many more women were wearing the voluminous robe draped over the head known as the *Çarşaf* and few ladies in town and cities also dared to appear wearing the veil in the market.⁹

It seemed that the emancipation of women, which is always encouraged and for which example is set by the town on one hand and by the college girls on the other, represented a current stronger than the one provoke by tolerance, a current which continues to bring in its train the general movement towards a greater liberty of the feminine charms.¹⁰

Minor Islamic Practices:

A traveller in Turkey hears and sees many other evidences of Islamic piety. Before starting on any journey, he often hears the bus drivers and many passengers say the "*Bismillah*" (In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful) in an audible voice which is usually echoed by all with earshot¹¹. Some minor habits of Islamic origin continue to generally exist. Some are purely religious, while others are

8 Feroz Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

9 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 117.

10 Jean-Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

11 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

of a superstitious nature. In large towns one hardly hears the Muslim salutation of *al-Salam 'ala'ikum*, but it is still the most common form of salutation among the villagers and the people of small towns.

The *Nazarlik* is universal. It is a superstitious habit in Islam. On all cars one could see a small blue eye or a small blue rosary hanging as protection against the evil eye. One finds it in boats, on horses and on the dresses of children¹². The majority of Turkey's vastly expanded fleet of taxis, buses and trucks are decorated with talismans bearing *Bismillah* in Arabic script. Most trucks also display religious formula painted on their cabs.¹³ During early 1950s the formula " In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the Merciful", could be seen in ornate Arabic print on the walls of grocery shops, mosque and law offices or embossed on metal plates that dangle from taxi's rear view mirror, mosque attendance has increased.¹⁴

In many Turkish homes, if one had the opportunity of going, in the hotels of small towns, and sometimes in offices, one could notice and find a small text from the *Kuran* in Arabic characters displayed in a prominent place. This is more so in the case of *Shahadah* in its entirety or its first half - *La*

12 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18.

13 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

14 Dankwart A Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 96

Ilaha illallah, the inscription of this kind are sold practically every where in frames and very cheap. The tombs in the cemeteries of the provinces the head stone bears a short Arabic text, which is usually *Bismillah or Bismillah al-Rehman al-Rahim*¹⁵

Life is interwoven with religious duties; and Turkish conversation, even about the most elementary topics, is always a fabric of religious expressions, and from the regularly used *inshaallah* and *mashallah* to thanking or to informing you of news, the name of Allah is always on the lips of the pious. In the middle class families every act is begun with *bismillah*. Virtually every Turkish Child, according to consensus of opinion, was conceived in an act, which began with the worship supplication, " In the name of *Allah*, the Beneficent, the Merciful". During labour most Turkish peasant mothers and many an Urban, superficially "modern" emancipated women is attended by a " learned", devout lady who recites or reads suitable *Kuranic* verses to inspire the mother and ease the birth pangs¹⁶.

Its father or older male relatives in its ear greet the child, immediately after its birth, with the religious formula, the recitation of *takbir*, the *Ezan* and the *fatiha*. Then it is given a name by which it was called. If a child is born a

15 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit*, p. 15

16 H. A.Reed, *op.cit*, p. 121.

thanks to a vow made at some sacred place it is either called after the saint or it is metaphorically "sold" to the lodge or the tomb of the respective saint. Then a boy is called *Satilmis*, (sold) and the girl *sati*. Sometimes a pious or saintly friend of the family is asked to find an auspicious name. Between the age of seventh and eleventh the circumcision (*Sunnet*) ceremony is celebrated and is still considered a big family feast. Sometimes a number of boys are put together into a big room and are diverted by shadow plays or films or amused by light music and the visit of many friends.¹⁷

Between the age of circumcision and puberty most lads and girls, learn to pray in proper fashion at home. Many were not taught their formal prayers¹⁸. After 1949 religion was taught up to the fifth grades of primary school. *Hafiz ve Koran Kurslari* were also designed to train memorizers of the *Kuran* in the metropolitan mosques or special schools operated by the Presidency of Religious Affairs.¹⁹

Some families in town and city are reviving the practice of hiring qualified learned men to give their family and children private religious instructions at home. All this simply

17 Annemarie Schimmel, "Islam in Turkey", in A.J. Arberay, *Religion in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1969), p. 82.

18 From 1929 until 1949 there was no formal requirement of public religious teaching in the regular state elementary, middle and secondary schools, so children learnt their rituals at home.

19 For detail of religious education and *Hafiz Kuran Kurslari* courses see. Chap. V, below

indicates that Turkish children are now receiving more regular Islamic instructions than before.²⁰

Freedom of Private Religious Organizations:

Both Turkish and foreign observers writing at the time have pointed to a general increase of religious freedom and of a growing popular interest in religion during the first few years of DP's tenure in office.²¹ More significantly, the number of private religious organizations (e.g.; organizations for the construction of mosques or the founding the *Kuran courses*) registered a continuously upward trend after the DP came to power.²²

Although part of this increase was due to liberalization, in 1946, of the law pertaining to the founding to private organizations which resulted in an increase of all interest groups, the percentage of religious organizations to the rest nevertheless remained high.²³

There is no doubt that the government supported such types of organizations with some restrictions on them. Their activities made a positive contribution in the cities and towns. It should be clearly understood that many of the secularizing

20 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

21 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 81.

22 For example, whereas in 1949, the total number of religious organizations was 95, this figure had more than doubled by 1951 to 251. By 1960, their number had reached 5104. Cf. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 82. See, Appendix,

23 For example, whereas in 1949, this figure was 5.5 per cent, in 1951 it increased to 10.0 per cent and by 1960 to 29.7 per cent. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

reforms of the Republican Party, up to 1950, had weakened the Islamic practices particularly in urban areas. People never stopped to enter mosque. Only a remarkable number of them had to be closed according to the restriction of law no.2845, 15 November 1935²⁴.

Jean-Paul Roux, a non - Muslim foreign scholar who traveled Turkish, having clear these doubt he wrote:

“In Istanbul, to our knowledge, in all four or five were closed: *St. Aya Sofya*, because of the well known reason (it was regarded as a symbol of the fight between Islam and Christianity) ; the old Byzantine church of sora, known as the *Kaviye Cami* ; the imperial mosque of *Dolme Bağhçe* which has been turned into a museum and a small building near Ayaz Paşa, below the well known park Oteli, not used in deference to the wishes of Kemal Atatürk, who for various reasons did not want this mosque to be used for prayer.”²⁵

The activity of religious architecture, on the contrary, has not ceased, after World War II, a growing interest in the repair and reconstruction of places of worship made itself felt. Between 1950 and 1954 the state assumed responsibility for

24 On December 25, 1932 detailed restrictions was announced that a mosque was to be at least 500 meters from the next mosque, otherwise it would be used for non-religious purpose. Republican Government closed down very few mosques. In the provinces, the closure was necessitated by the bad condition of buildings.

25 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit*, p. 17.

maintaining 2997 additional mosques. There were over 750 legally chartered mosque building societies in Turkish towns and cities in 1953. In addition, the Directorate of Pious Foundation repaired 60 mosques in 1952 and planned to restore 160 in 1953 at a cost of over 2500,000 TL. It also contributed 1,500,000 TL to assist local privately built mosques in 1953²⁶. Jean - Paul Roux write, "I saw funds being raised for a mosque in Zonguldak . The collectors sold tickets of value LT 1"²⁷.

So many mosque were being built, it was not only because one wanted to provide the recently built town with mosques, but also because often the older ones were too small to accommodate the devotees.²⁸

Old and new mosques alike are being used regularly in the residential quarters of Ankara that had been completely devoid of religious buildings. New mosques came into existence in the 1950s, all of them constructed after classical Ottoman models without an attempt at creating a new style. This trend also continued after the military coup of 1960.²⁹

26 Between 1951 and 1954, a total of 616 mosques and historical shrines were repaired and 5,553,000 TL were allotted to the Directorate –General of Pious Foundations for this purpose. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 82 and see also H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

27 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

29 Between 1950 and 1960 an average of 1500 new mosques per year were built under the government of Adnan Menderes. In which Mosque Building Societies (*Cami Yaptırma Dernekleri*) played an important role. See G. L. Lewis, "Islam in Politics: Turkey" *The Muslim World*, Vol. LVI, No. 4, October 1966, pp. 231-66. Annemarie Schimmel. "Islam in Turkey", p. 84.

THE FIVE PILLARS OF ISLAM:

The *shahada* stands unshaken, worship (*namaz*), the Ramzan fast, and the pilgrimage are more popular than they have been since 1928, although they are far from universally practiced. Till the 1960's there was no organization which could collect *Zakat* which earlier was collected and distributed by the Ottoman government. Now it is given to private social welfare funds. There is, however, more secular as well as parallel and sometimes almost indistinguishable concern for charitable works and social welfare, which is the actual counterpart of this traditional pious Muslim duty.³⁰

Salat (*Namaz*)

Ritual prayers continue to be performed in the established manner with the prayer recited in Arabic. Old and new mosques are being used regularly. From the Black Sea Coast near Samsun to Anatolya on the Mediterranean, from Thrace and Istanbul to Erzurum and Diyarbakir, in fair weather or in foul, overflowing crowds of intent worshipers jamming mosques, courtyards and even adjacent squares or streets for the Friday noon congregational prayers.

In 1950s inspite of the growing number of the mosques, courtyards its adjacent side streets and the public squares before it have been seen full of worshippers even a second

30 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p.128.

Imam had to read the prayers for those outside the mosque precincts.³¹

According to the findings of Jean-Paul Roux he wrote:³²

" The officers in the garrison in a suburban town of Istanbul said their prayers tucked away in a corner, and the fishermen say their prayers in a deserted corner of the Bosphorous ."

In Ankara, every Friday noon large crowds perform their Friday congregational prayers on the pavement of *Haci Bayram Cami* , using even newspapers as prayer-mats.³³ Over sixty percent of the worshippers were young men who were well-dressed in Western style clothing. Even in some places ladies too were among the worshippers, though the attendance of women at the public prayers is quite rare.

Ramzan Fast

Between the age of seven and eight, healthy Muslim children should begin to keep the annual daylight fast during the month of *Ramzan*. Turkish girls and women are usually more faithful in this respect than men, who often postpone the start of their observance until well past the age of 18³⁴. This activity of fasting had never been discouraged. *Ramzan* was

31 *Ibid.*, p.115-116.

32 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

33 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

34 It were personal observations and interviews. Cf. *Memleket Sahipler*, pp. 85.89. Quoted from H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 124.

respected in the eastern and northern regions, and less in others, and more in small villages than in larger towns and more by the common people than by the middle class. In this regard Jean Paul Roux, write his personal observations. He wrote:³⁵

“We had the opportunity of being in Turkey during *Ramzan*... : While travelling in the eastern part of Turkey our impression was that every body fasted. In the Lyceum of Erzurum we were given lunch in a very generous manner; four teachers out of the 52 ate with us, and the other apologized and asked to be excused. In all the neighbouring *Vilayets* the proportion seemed to be the same. In the offices, every one from the *Vali* (the Governor) to the people fasted. But we were surprised when we went towards the west for the first time to see that the *Vali* of a province offered us cigarettes and smoked with us. It was from there onwards (in western and central region) that it was more frequent to find people who did not fast.”

A growing minority of civil servants, who make up the biggest group of modern, secular Turks, is observing the fast of *Ramzan*. During 1950s and 1960s the Press was full of special features on *Islam* during this month and the newspapers were also free to publish articles regarding faith

35 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

and practices of *Islam*.³⁶ Apart from including a corner giving the *Hijri* month and year and the times of the call for the five daily prayers, a number of the dailies, especially *Milliyet* and *Yeni Sabah* have published features on religious subjects in the 1950s. *Tan*, an independent newspaper has serialized a translation and commentary of the *Kuran* accompanied by the Arabic text given on two pages as a gift to its reader, and this fact was advertised on the top right hand corner of the first page of the paper.³⁷ During the month of *Ramzan* the religious broadcastings were closely followed by the state radios.

During the month of *Ramzan* no government offices closed, yet certain number of officials keep the fast and many Turks who do not observe the fast tactfully give up eating in public during daylight hours. In small places in central Anatolia it is different to find a warm meal in daytime.³⁸

Some people, even unable for health reasons, fasted during the three months preceding *Ramzan* because they thought it *Çok Sevab*. Some people who did not intend to fast during the whole month try at least during the first or last three days of *Ramzan* or before *Kadir gecesi*, (the night of power), the night, which is celebrated everywhere with great

36 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

37 A. L. Tibawi, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

38 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p.129 and Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

enthusiasm.³⁹ Every year since 1952 the Istanbul press has reported unprecedented crowds at the night of power (*Kadir gecesi*) ceremonies especially in such great mosques as Sultan Ahmet and Suleymaniye⁴⁰. During the month of *Ramzan* mosques were always full especially in the evening prayers. Most of the devotees had to say their prayers in the courtyard or on the street.⁴¹

The breaking of the fast with a sip of water and some olives and similar small things is in tune with the customs every where, to put the *Iftar-food* early on the table, is thought meritorious: then "the food is praising Allah". In this holy month one may perform a full recitation (*hatm*) of the *Kuran* in the *Tarawih* prayers which are partly performed in the mosque, partly at home.⁴²

The Religious atmosphere is noticeable everywhere, and it seems reasonable to believe that in the years to come the condition of Islam will further improve. From now on it is impossible to say that Turkey is not a religious country. The life of Turkish people is ardent.

It is important to note that the village people have greater religious fanaticism than the urban⁴³. Thus, from birth

39 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

40 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

41 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

42 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 95.

43 Jean Paul Roux, *op.cit.*, p.18.

to death, the life of the majority of Turks today continues to be punctuated and illumined by *Islam*.⁴⁴

Hajj:

It is the duty of every Muslim to make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once. But he must be of age, of sound mind, and be able to afford the expense. Pilgrims dress should be worn.⁴⁵ The pilgrimage to Mecca, forbidden for a long time, has again been authorised. Today personal Islamic tradition is resurgent in Turkey. Before 1925, for days before the parting, well-wishers, friends and even enemies willing to patch up old quarrels, would come to offer their gifts or their earnest salutations, to ask for some special favour of the pilgrim, or just to see the devout one before he left on what was usually an arduous, sometimes even fatal but always a glorious journey. On the appointed day of departure special early-morning prayers were recited in each pilgrim's home and at the mosques. Since 1952 *Hajis* have again enjoyed their old style send-offs, sometimes repeated in villages, town and cities as the local pilgrim contingents assembled in growing numbers at each centre.⁴⁶

44 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

45 For a man this consists of two lengths of unsewn cloth, which leave the arms and right shoulder bare, while women wear a voluminous, long dress. This clothing may be worn on the entire pilgrimage, or be put on just before arrival in Mecca. Cf. Thomas D. Robert, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 159.

46 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p.114.

After a long prohibition, in 1947 the government authorized Turkish citizens to accomplish the pilgrimage and made some funds and facilities available to assist the traveler. These pilgrims were very few but in 1954 these numbers had increased to more than 10,000, including a group of newspaper reporters from the widely read paper *Hurriyet* which boasts Turkey's largest circulation of some 200,000 copies⁴⁷. Their reports and pictures about the pilgrimage were given prominent displays and were eagerly bought⁴⁸. As and when the *Haji* returned from *Hajj*, the airport of Istanbul and Ankara crowded with their small bundles and the big water jars (*Zamzam*) and they were enthusiastically received by their relatives as well as well-wishers. Many Turkish leaders had performed *Hajj*.⁴⁹ According to Jean Paul Roux's analysis: " In the last fifties more than 35,00 Turks went to the holy cities. They formed one of the strongest delegation, without doubt next to the one from Egypt".

Kuranic Teachings in the Mosques:

After the unification of education law in 1924, there was no formal education required for public religious teaching in the regular state elementary, middle and secondary schools. So the more traditional Islamic religious instructions by

47 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit*, p. 85.

48 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

49 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit*, p. 85.

unauthorised hoca's or elderly women had been maintained illegally since 1924, to some extent in the villages, where it is now quite popular and widespread. These traditional but, at that time, illegal courses consisted of little more than memorization of the *Kuranic* passages and attempt to learn the Arabic alphabets in order to pursue religious texts in the revered original script, which still has an almost charmed significance to many simple villagers.⁵⁰

For the first time in 1925 under the ministry of Education, more traditional *Hafiz Ve Kuran Kurslari* were designed to train memorizers of the *Kuran*. These courses were taught in metropolitan mosques only or in special schools operated under strict control of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. But in 1951 the attendance in these courses dropped upto 50 percent because the *Imam Hatip Schools* were established in 1951.⁵¹

The only restriction imposed on *Kuranic* teachers in mosques as distinct from private houses is that they should be licenced.⁵² But this is not in reality a restriction, it is rather a guarantee that only those with suitable qualifications are allowed to undertake the task. Almost all those who are now learning to read the *Kuran* in Arabic, whether privately or

50 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*,p. 123.

51 For more details see chap. IV below.

52 *Imam Hatip Okullari* and *Hafiz Kurslari* provided the licence to the *Imam* and *madrese* teachers.

under official auspices, are young, an evidence of the religious appeal which is said to be strongest among the youth the activities of the promoters of the religious revival are concentrated. In a material world, teachers of the *Kuranic* reading must earn their means of livelihood. The salary of the teacher (*Hoca*) is paid by privately raised funds among the notables or religious organizations and those teachers who do not charge fee from their disciples are either well off themselves, or have modest income from private business or casual work, or in a number of cases are in the pay of pious patrons.⁵³

MAJOR RELIGIOUS PRACTICES:

Marriage:

Aside from the service in the armed forces, which is compulsory for adult males, who receive a little Islamic religious education as a part of their military training, the next great event in the life of the average Muslim Turk is marriage⁵⁴. Two separate, antagonistic systems of law operate in Turkey— the traditional, customary law and civil law derived from the Swiss Civil Code in 1926. Civil law dominates in towns and cities and customary law, dominates in villages and is adapted to local conditions and circumstances. A civil ceremony is considered the only legal

53 A. L. Tibawi, *op.cit.*, p. 29

54 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 124 -25.

method of marriage under the Turkish Civil Code. The code completely replaced Islamic law, so that all religious marriage ceremonies are legally irrelevant.⁵⁵

When the time of marriage arrives, in smaller towns it is still arranged by the parents and celebrated according to the tradition. Kinship is noted even to the eighth, tenth or father related renounced cousins, and many marriages are arranged inside of a large family circle.⁵⁶ A close kinswoman is often preferred, not only because she is easier to find, but also because she will most likely fit into the household easier since she already has established relationships with household members, especially with her new mother-in-law. Hence, many marriages are between fairly close kinsmen.⁵⁷

Arranged marriage has, so far, continued to be the usual marriage in the Republic as a whole, rural and urban. The Turks are different in their opinion about the love marriage and arranged marriage. Some believe that arranged marriage has had certain advantages for domestic peace. While some discussing this at length believe, that it would be wise to see enough of a girl before an engagement to discover congenial

55 Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

56 E. Bisbee. *The New Turks*.(Philadelphia,1951), p. 41

57 Only the incest rules of *Islam* formally restrict the choice of marriage partners. These prohibit to a man his lineal descendants and ascendants, his parent's sisters, his own sister, his nieces and grandnieces, his father's wife and widows, their stepdaughters, his wife's mother and son's wife, and his current wife's sisters. Beyond this, it is quite common for a man to marry his paternal parallel first cousin— his father's brother's daughter. Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, pp. 103-104

taste and habit. The Turks are hard put to decide how to compromise between old and new ideas of engagements and marriage; how to gain new freedom without sacrificing old advantages.⁵⁸

After the adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 marriage was governed according to it and civil marriage, in the presence of a mayor or a person of similar status, was made obligatory.⁵⁹ The minimum age of marriage among those who do not delay marriage for schooling, parents engage and marry their children in their early teens, formally sometimes as early as fourteen but by present law, not before sixteen, and this disposes off most adolescent problems of courtship. Children of the poor, who secure an education, as many do, have the same problem as well to-do young people who marry later.⁶⁰

It has been truly hard for parents of the pioneer decades in new Turkey to advise their children. But in marriage, parental experience still carries authority. Parents of the boy, especially his father, theoretically control the selection of the bride yet the boy exercises considerable influence over choice. Supposedly, the mother can only suggest and advise,

58 For a good discussion on arranged marriage and love marriage and on divorce see also E. Bisbe, *op.cit.*, pp.43 – 45.

59 The code requires that a couple establish an identity by the production of valid birth certificate, submit to a medical examination, and register the marriage with the appropriate official.. Richard D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

60 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

and the young people have no say at all. In practice, the young people make known their wishes, and mother, whose main interest is marriage no doubt play a major role in the decision. Although there are always exceptions, a boy usually marries between the ages of 16 and 22, while girls normally marry earlier. The minimum age of the marriage has been altered according to the requirements of a southern country.⁶¹

In the best old tradition they consulted relatives and friends and learned of an eligible daughter in desirable family. They inquired into her family's standing. Sister and mother of the bridegroom call upon the bride's mother. Visiting ladies with the object of matrimony used to be called "Viewers" (*gurculer*) and literally they did call in order to "View" the prospective bride. Upon arrival at the bride's home the older women visited for a while and, at the suitable moment, the bride entered politely to serve coffee. Then she sat quietly waiting to be included in the conversation.⁶² The primary qualities sought in a bride are honor and efficiency, with the former being the more explicitly important of the two.⁶³ After

61 First to the age of 18 for boys, 17 for girls; in 1938 it was reduced to 17 to boys and 15 to girls but in some cases under 14 are still married. Marriage is a time of severe grief for the bride's mother, and no attempt to conceal the emotional pain is made. After marriage, a girl still seeks advice, help and comfort from her mother, and she visits as often as is feasible. If the distance is great, then a daughter will try to visit for a month or so once a year; if not, visits are frequent and casual. In any case, mothers and daughters usually retain their emotional attachment towards one another throughout their lives. Cf. Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 100, 104.

62 Besbee, *op.cit.*, p. 42-43.

63 Her efficiency is evaluated in terms of skills, ability, and desire to work hard, physical health, and personality traits such as good nature and submissiveness.

that the parents of the daughter met the boy. A prospective groom is evaluated primarily in terms of status— his family tradition and current family position— all measured against the marital expectations of the prospective bride. On being satisfied of the manner and complexion of the bride their parents engaged them.⁶⁴

Once a father selects his prospective daughter-in-law, he goes with, or sends, two close kin and respected older man to serve as negotiators, to pay a formal visit to the girl's home. A similarly constituted group greets them and negotiations through the intermediaries are begun. If the union is agreeable to both sides, an initial statement of the bride price is agreed upon, with a first installment sometimes expected. The betrothal and its period precede the actual marriage. The ceremony marking formal betrothal is entirely women's affairs. A group of the groom's female relatives, including his mother, visits the girl's home and is received by her close female relatives. Two or three days of reciprocally provided meals and dancing follow all the time strictly without men. Presents, usually including gold ornaments, are also given to the bride.⁶⁵

64 Thomas D. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

65 Betrothal ceremony takes place a month or so after the initial meting. Betrothals may last anywhere from a week or two to a year or two but several months is considered a respectable time. During this period, the betrothed are not supposed to see each other. They normally, however, do meet with the connivance of the girl's household. These meetings are not viewed as illicit, but simply as an implicitly acceptable deviation from the ideal norm. If an engagement is broken during this

For the 70% of the population who live in the country, as for many of their urban compatriots, the required legal, justice-of-the peace, or natural kind of wedding ceremony in vogue since 1926 is virtually meaningless alone.⁶⁶

The actual wedding ceremony begins at the groom's house from 3 to 4 days before consummation. On the day of consummation or the night before, a group of seven or eight women, relatives and neighbours of the groom are selected to be escorted by a party of men to the bride's home.⁶⁷ A wedding in the Republic is by civil contract called the *Nikah*, which is performed after health examinations, on a fifteen-day public notice. After the formalities, the couple and witness sign the register and receive the certificate. After *Nikah* boxes of candy, usually Jordan almonds are served to the officials and the guests who attended the *Nikah* ceremony. The *nikah* is binding and nothing but divorce can break it. Many couples, by their own or their parent's wish will have the *Nikah* but not live together until after a second ceremony, *dugun* or *imam nikahi* or *nikah-duasi*; which may be a reception to relatives

period, a girl's honor is said to be diminished because of her close contact with her betrothed. Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p.104.

66 The best general study of marriages in Turkey is Hamit Zubeyir Kcsay's, *Turkiye Turk Dugunleri Uzerine Mukay Eseli Malzeme*, (Ankara, 1944), pp. 81-2. Cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

67 Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

and friends, in effect announcing that the couple will there after make their home together.⁶⁸

Imam – nikahi is usually a three-day celebration, which is most important. However they believed that in the marriage of a common man without a short sermon and the *nikah duasi* the prayer of *Imam* is considered invalid because “only the *Imam's dausi* (prayer) can prevent the enemies from succeeding in rendering the groom impotent by magical knots. And they also believed that the issue from such a union are considered illegitimate and the mother almost a harlot.”⁶⁹

After *Nikah duasi* the men and women are entertained and dined separately. Then amid much fan-fair and weeping the bride leaves in a procession with her new neighbours and relations to her new home. Ideally, she should make the trip mounted on a white horse, but in reality she may leave on horsedrawn cart, in a taxi, or truck or foot. Before this final day an exchange of wealth between the two households takes place. The bride's household is responsible for providing the trousseau, usually containing such things as mattresses and bedding, home-woven, and presents of

68 Bisbee, pp. 40-46, has comments on town and city wedding, but her discussion of the *nikah* ceremony on p. 43 is misleading. Infact, this ceremony is almost exclusively performed by imams in simpler city quarters and in rural areas. The *dugun* is a festive occasion, not a specific brief ceremony performed by an *imam*, although the *imam* is naturally invited to share in the general celebration. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

69 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

clothing for all the members of the bridegroom's household and close kin, especially the bridegroom himself.

The bride price paid by the groom's household varies in worth depending upon the wealth of the respective households and the value of the bride's trousseau. It is usually paid in cash although in some cases gold ornaments may substitute for part or all of it. The payment of bride price does not constitute a sale as some educated, urban Turks believe. When such is suggested to villagers, they fiercely deny it with the question, "Are our daughters cattle that we should sell them?" The bride price is really regarded as a sort of *quid pro quo* for the trousseau, with which it is most often systematically evaluated and compared.⁷⁰

In the recent years some reactionary Muslims in the interior of the country have had only a religious ceremony *Imam-dausi*.⁷¹ Although according to the penal code article 765 any *imam* who performs the *nikah dausi* with a preceding civil wedding is liable to imprisonment. Though the villagers continue to marry before imam according to *Şeriat*, because the people in the villages did not care for these restrictions there fore the government had to promulgate several laws by which the offspring of these marriages

70 Between 1950 and 1955 inflation and other factors drove average bride prices up from around LT 500 to LT 2000 (LT 2.80 equalled US \$ 1 during the period mentioned. Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

71 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

was recognized as having the status of legitimate children.⁷² This is simply another example of the continuing tension between presently outlawed traditional Islamic custom and modern, westernized laws which are still psychologically alien to most Turks. It is one of the problems in contemporary Turkish society, which remain in part unresolved.⁷³

Divorce :

Either the husband or wife can now obtain divorces, where as of old only the husband could make a direct break and he needed merely to make his personal declaration of divorce before witnesses. If however, a woman's marital plight was serious, men of her own family could usually obtain some sort of official order to free her. The Republic requires modern court procedure, and either husband or wife may sue for divorce. The legal grounds for divorce are adultery, desertion, insanity, cruelty, extreme incompatibility, and felony. Since 1948 the divorce rate in Turkey is increasing noticeably.⁷⁴

Mutual consent is not sufficient ground for divorce, but public opinion in both urban and village areas strongly favour its inclusion. Opposition to civil divorce procedures centres

72 Government promulgated several laws: October 26, 1933, April 30, 1945, February 1, 1950, and January 30, 1956, which were directed mainly against the polygamy. Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

73 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p., 125.

74 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

on the courts' generosity in granting maintenance payments to women. It is objected that the payments are commonly more a man can afford and that they are allowed to a woman who is herself the guilty part.

According to traditional Islamic law a man divorce his wife by pronouncing any words of dismissal three times. Once a woman is divorced, she should wait 100 days before marrying again. No concern is made over the fact that according to Islamic law the couple is divorced and cannot remarry. If a woman desires a divorce, she will simply leave her husband's household and return to that of her nearest living relatives. In such a case neither civil nor Islamic Law recognizes the divorce. But if reasons are satisfactory, the community sanctions it. In fact a prolonged separation of a man and his wife. Initiated by either for whatever reasons, tends to be synonymous in meaning and consequence with divorce. The primary cause of divorce initiated by men is sterility of the wife. For those initiated by women, maltreatment on the part of the husband or bad feeling between the wife's and husband's kin group are two chief reasons.⁷⁵

The conflict of the two system of laws— Civil and traditional— is again evident in divorce proceedings. The

75 Thomas D. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p.106.

state recognizes only the civil one as legal, though most villagers ignore the law.⁷⁶

With the advancing age, Turks tend to give more attention to their creator, death and immortal life taught by *Islam*. The aged also tends to pray more regularly, dress more conservatively, perhaps grow bread and adopt other devout practices. Some of them try to make a pilgrimage to Mecca and never taste alcoholic drinks and also engages in pious works such as the building and endowment of water fountains, a minaret, mosque, or other charitable foundations.⁷⁷

DEATH:

From 1960's to 1980's birth to death, the life of the majority of Turks continued to be punctuated and illumined by Islam. Islam again plays a dominant role at the death of Turkish villagers. A dying Turks will like to have around him his friends and relations who continue for hours and hours the recitatives of *Kuranic* verses which first struck his eardrums at birth and of the confession of faith.⁷⁸

Islamic practice still governs the procedure of preparing a corpse for burial and committing it promptly and simply to the grave in *Allah's* gracious mercy. The burial prayer is

76 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

77 Personal observation of Makal in, *Memleketin Sahipleri*, pp. 56 -61.and 76 -84 quoted from H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

78 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

recited.⁷⁹ It is important to note that when Atatürk died, his sister urged his closest friend to have the burial prayer recited which was according to *Şeriat* done on November 19, 1938 at a small gathering in Istanbul. It is touching to witness the deep trust in God with which the death of the nearest relation is accepted. They believed one *Allah (Tanrı)* and Muhammad as his Prophet and also believed that Allah is good, wise, patient, kind, forgiving and so on. They believed in eternal hell fire for failing to do *Allah's* will; yet he has faith in *Allah's* forgiveness, if they have done their best.⁸⁰

This religious attitude, to accept everything as sent by *Allah* who knows best what is good for His servants, makes the Turks such excellent soldiers, neither affected by brain-washing nor by any danger; and here lies, the deepest source of strength of the Turkish Muslim, in the often quoted verse of Ibrahim Haqqi Erzerumlu:

Goralim Haqq ne eyler – n`eylerse guzel eyeler (Let us see, what Allah does – whatever He does, He does well.)⁸¹

They distinguished conscientiously between three kinds of conduct. *Sevap* is necessary pious acts such as saying prayers, giving to the poor, and earning for weak humans and

79 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

80 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 136.

81 In K. Morgan, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York, 1958), p. 280.

animals. *Günah* is a sin such as failure to pray, stepping on a piece of bread, lying, cruelty, stealing and suicide. *Mekruh* is undesirable but not sinful behaviour. For example, drinking wine is *günah* and smoking a cigarette is *mekruh*.⁸²

RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL OR CELEBRATION:

Mevlud Şerif:

Besides the two big festivals, people are very fond of celebrating the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) on the 12th of Rabi al-Awwal.⁸³ Pious people spend the day fasting and at night the lights on the minarets are lit (Candle), as they are during *Ramzan*, on *Ragib gecesi*, the night of *Muhammad's* conception, in *Rajab*, and *beratgecesi*, the night of the revelation of his mission to the Prophet, mid *shaban*.⁸⁴

One of the most touching religious ceremonies in Turkey is the recitation of *Mevlud*,⁸⁵ Though during the centuries many similar epics have been written in simple and sweet poem, it is still enjoyed by everybody.⁸⁶ The *Mevlud* poem is a narrative account of the birth and life of the Prophet Mohammad and *mevlud* recitals are arguably the most

82 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

83 Prophet's birthday had been declared an official holiday in 1910 but it was abolished by Mustafa Kemal and is now only privately celebrated.

84 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, pp. 85 – 86.

85 *Mevlud* was a Turkish poem, which was composed by Suleyman Celebi (d.1423) of Bursa over five hundred years ago in honor of the prophet's birth. It is still beloved by Turks. It was translated by E. Lyman Mac Callum, London, 1943.

86 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

prominent religious services held in Turkey today⁸⁷. The *mevlud* can be read at home, relatives, friends and stranger gather and also recite in public. It is recited by special readers. Women are particularly associated with the mourning *mevlud*. Musical members of the group eagerly share copies of the poems to follow as a libretto for the chant.⁸⁸

When *Mevlud* are performed in private homes as a part of marriage and circumcision ceremonies, they have a confirmatory character and are particularly associated with men, as are those recitals sponsors on Islamic festivals by the local religious establishment and performed in local mosque to coincide with a nationally broadcast *Mevlud* on Turkish television. Most *Mevlud* recitals, however, are part of funeral and morning rituals and have a peculiar character⁸⁹. It is usually recited forty days after the death of a relative, and on the anniversaries of the death but the gathering can also be held to fulfill a vow. For the ceremony in private home relatives, friends and even strangers gather in memory of their dead. The sexes sit separately, the women covering heads, a special beautiful scarf (*Mevlud Ortusu*) is often used. Men also cover their heads by caps and handkerchief etc.⁹⁰

87 Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "Religious Education and Continuity in Provincial town" in Richard Topper (ed.), *Islam in Modern Turkey*, p. 64.

88 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 138

89 For the distinction between 'Confirmatory' and 'Piacular' rituals, see E. E. Evans – Pritchard, *Nuer Religion* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 196ff., cf. Richard Tapper, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

90 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

One peculiarity of the Sunni sect is that it forbids the picturing of any human or angelic forms. In the modern Turkish home, during the *Mevlud* any such pictures or photographs are removed or draped. At the same time, however, camera fans may be snapping pictures of the ceremony and the people engaged in it. To complete a ceremony the final formality is to display a hair from the beard of the Prophet. Brought from a mosque, many layers of priceless brocades are removed from the jewelled box in which rests the gold etched glass tube which contains the sacred hair. Worshippers kiss the tube or persist to their foreheads. The *Mevlud* is frequently also chanted in a mosque on *Kadir Gecesi*, the night of power, the night before *Şekar Bayrami*, which celebrates the lunar date when the *Kuran* was revealed to Prophet Mohammad. (S.A.W.).⁹¹ At the end of this ceremony one offers sherbet (*Serbet*) and distributes sweets. The heavenly reward of the recitation is ascribed to the deceased whose memory is being celebrated. The reciters are given some money together with the sweets.⁹²

There is no clause which restricts the recitation to Muslim, yet it was amazing that a Turkish Mystical leader,

91 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

92 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, pp. 86 – 87.

Omer Fevzi Mardin, read a *Mevlud* for Evita Peron on December 19, 1951 in the new mosque Sisli, Istanbul⁹³.

It was Makbule Atadan⁹⁴, the sister of Gazi Mustafa Kemal later Atatürk who for the first time in the memory of sixteenth death anniversary of his brother Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on 19 Nov. 1954, arranged for celebrating a notable *Mevlud* recitation by a group of Turkey's most celebrated reciters and cantors in the splendid, Suleymaniye mosque in Istanbul thus, even Atatürk, who was often careless about traditional Islamic practices, is remembered in a cherished Muslim Turkish fashion by his closest surviving relatives friends and admirers.⁹⁵

Another important *Mevlud* in December 18, 1955 was recited in honour of Jalalul- din Rumi (Jalaleddin Rumi) in the Alaeddin mosque in Konya. It was attended by nearly eight thousand persons, the sexes sat separately especially the ladies sitting in the outer courtyard of the mosque.⁹⁶

ASHURA:

Turkey is formally a secular state and over 98% of its population are Muslims. These Muslims are divided into two

93 *Ibid.* p. 87.

94 Makbule Atadan died in Ankara on January 18, 1956, and was buried with great pomp next day. *Cümhuriyet*, January 1920 and 28, 1956. cf. H. A. Reed. *op.cit.*, p.127.

95 H. A. Reed. *op.cit.*, p. 127.

96 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 87

groups — orthodox and heterodox. Nevertheless, various conscientious Turkish estimates suggest that there are probably from four to five million Alevi's or heterodox Turks who are recognized as distinctly different Muslim, if accepted at all as true believers by their immediate Sunni Muslim neighbors⁹⁷. Among the Alevi population *ashura* is celebrated after days of fasting. The Alevi communities particularly cherish the first ten days of the *Islamic* month of *Muharram* when a good many of them fast again in memory of their sainted martyrs Hasan and Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W). On this day, the 10th *Muharram*, a certain sweet, made of different pulse grains, raisins, sugar etc, is offered the guest even in some Sunnite families who celebrate the *ashura* in the remembrance of the last meal of Hazrat Hussein (R.A) at Karbala. It is not recognized official holiday as *Şeker Byrami* and *Kurban Bayrami*.⁹⁸

Şeker Byrami and Kurban Bayrami:

In secular, republican Turkey the great Muslim religious feasts of *Şeker Bayrami* (Eid) at the end of *Ramzan* and of *Kurban Bayrami* (Bakara Eid) at the end of the *Hajj* are recognized as official national holidays.⁹⁹ They also thoroughly enjoy these two holidays. *Şeker Bayrami* is

97 Cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

98 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 124.

99 Annemarie Schimmil, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

celebrated for three days at the end of *Ramzan* fast. Every body visits every body else and gives and receives candy in these three days. *Kurban Bayrami* is celebrated for four days, *Allah's* mercy in letting a ram appear for Ibrahim (Abraham) to sacrifice instead of his son Ismail. Flocks of sheep with patches of dyed wool on their backs appear on the streets of Turkey's towns before this Bayram.¹⁰⁰

As soon as the Democrats held the office, *Şeker* and *Kurban Bayrami* retained as official and national holidays, They are observed with gusto every where. It is fair to add that many younger city people knew little of the fundamental religious implications of the *Şeker* and *Kruban Bayrami*.¹⁰¹ In Turkey the demand for sacrificial ram for the *Kurban Bayrami* increased in 1950's; the meat was mostly given to the poor, the hide to some national welfare organization¹⁰². Each family that can afford it buys one or more. The family shares the meat with relatives, and with the poor who come to the door knowing that they will not leave empty handed. Schools and offices are closed in these holidays. Both traditional feasts remain popular regaining more of their Islamic character in the public mind.¹⁰³

100 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

101 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 124 and brief description of the feasts in urban areas are found in H. G. Dwight, *Constantinople Old and New* (New York, 1915), chap. VIII-X.

102 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

103 E. Bisbee, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

CHAPTER VIII

TARIKAT ORDERS AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

Despite the secularization of modern Turkey most of her citizens are quick and proud to claim that they are Muslims. The life of a Muslim Turk today is still cast in an essentially Islamic framework.¹ Turkey is formally a secular state and over 98 percent of its citizens are Muslim. It should be clearly understood that many of the secularizing acts of the early Republican years, which seemed to weaken particularly in urban areas, were not nearly so effective in the countryside, where most traditional Islamic practices and beliefs continued in quieter and less popular form throughout the nineteen twenties and thirties.²

Classical *Islam* never held sway in Turkey completely except among the small, dominant, educated and bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the great mass of the people were then and remain today largely ignorant of the classical exposition of the medieval doctors, which is based

1 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 131

on the *Kuran* and the *Hadith*.³ Today three main elements first, reactionary tendencies, secondly the folk *Islam* thirdly the mystical tendencies have contributed to continue vitality of *Islam* in modern Turkey.

FOLK ISLAM:

The religious belief of Anatolian peasants and many facets of their life, still await general systematic research. Folk *Islam*, which is so vital in contemporary Anatolia, in Turkey has always been heterodox, with ample borrowing or remains from Christian and other orthodoxies and heresies mingled with it. Sir Willium Ramsay has pointed out the lasting power and depth of these folk- beliefs in his brilliant works.⁴

Some Turkish villagers believe that they are directed by the will of Allah, implemented by four invisible but very real spirits. The first of these, as described by Makal, is their *Malaike*, or guardian angle, who sits on each person's right

3 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

4 Sir William Matchell Ramsay, *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor* (London, 1890); *Impression of Turkey* (London, 1897); and particularly his works *Asiatic Elements in Greek Civilization*, being the Gifford Lectures in the university of Edinburg, 1915–1916, second enlarged edition with illustration (London, 1928); M. F. Kuprulu, *Anadoluda ilk mutasavviflar* (Istanbul, 1919), and his article in *Islam Ansiklopedise*, S. V. Bektasi; F. W and M. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultan*, 2V. (Oxford, 1929); Mehmet Makal, the gifted young native Turkish villager and village teacher, have described peasant life and belief in his three haunting books. Makkal has produced series articles in the Istanbul literary periodical *Varlik* from 1948 onward, and in the excellent new Ankara fortnightly Forum, 1955 onward. Above reference quoted from H. A. Reed, *op. cit.*, p.135.

shoulder pencil in hand noting down all good deeds and endeavoring to direct its charges into good paths. On the left shoulder rides a *Şeytan*, or devil, like wise armed with a pencil striving to impel his ward to fiendish acts. Before each person moves an invisible *Jinni* who is a sort of guide. This *Jinn* takes his direction from either the guardian angel or the evil, when ever sprits fail to reach agreement, they and the mortals they direct get confused. Hence, whenever someone is at sixes and sevens the villagers promptly infer that his spirits are not in harmony (*arkadaşlare uyusamiyor*). In addition to these three principal spirits another resides in everyone's stomach. He symbolizes appetite, for without him the ill fed Anatolian believes that his hunger would be satisfied with a single mouthful instead of demanding a meal. These beliefs are very real and cherished forces in the lives of millions of devout Turkish Muslims. There is a curious similarity between these good and evil spirits of Anatolian peasants, the demons of Greek mythology, or the opposing forces of light and dark apprehended by Zoroaster ⁵.

Although superstition and folk-*Islam* are still powerful in Turkey, the new desire for both secular and religious education, economic change, vastly improved communications and related factors are all elements contributing towards greater enlightenment and critical faculties which will

5 Makal, *Memleketin Sahipleri*, pp. 62 – 67. cf. H. A. Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 136 – 137.

gradually tend to weaken the bonds of this type of superstition and folk-*Islam*. They are still, however, very potent, widespread forces⁶.

Mysticism:

In the development of Turkish *Islam* mystical currents have played a more important role than the official orthodox creed. Through mystical approach to *Islam* many Turks seek and admittedly find an inspiring religious faith. The influence of *Sufisim* on Turkish cultural life cannot be estimated highly enough and it is quite natural that even today Turkish religious feeling is imbued with mystical feelings. Because most Turks, Anatolian and Central Asians, were converted to Islam by mystic dervishes⁷. Mystical tendencies and the dervish fraternities have persistently been more popular than the classical Islamic theory and practice of the religious elite in Anatolia⁸.

Dervish lodges and many famous *Turbes* (shrines) have been reopened since 1950 and have again become active in the past few years. Mysticism and *folk -Islam* in Turkey never suffered the eclipse which *classical Islam* did, so their present

6 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p.137

7 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 87.

8 John P. Brown, *The Darvishes or Oriental Spiritualism* (London, 1927); J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London, 1937) is model study of a Dervish order and a standard work on the most popular of the *tarikats* cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

vigorous state is more natural. *Mystical Islam* is at once the most vital and hopeful aspect of modern *Islam* in Turkey. Mystics come from all walks of life, but many are intelligent, well-educated, responsible men and women⁹.

The *Mevlevi's*, *Bektashi's*, *Naqshbandi's*, *Kadiri's* and *Rafai's Order* had played an important role in the cultural development in Turkey. Followers of the Maulana Celaleddin Rumi¹⁰ (1207 -1273) are called 'Mevlevi' whirling dervish. The beauty of his thought, life and poetry and his great humanism as well as his inclusiveness attracts them. These mystics meet for corporate worship in private homes and occasionally at shrines because lodges do not exist openly.¹¹

Newly married couples from some devout orthodox Muslim family are in practice of visiting the Mevlana's tomb at the time of their marriage. After a long negligence of Rumi's tomb on the 680th death anniversary of Rumi on December 17, 1953 a modest commemorative ceremony was

9 *Ibid*, p. 138-139.

10 Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi was a great saint of the thirteen-century. He was born in 1207 and died in Konya in 1273 AD. After whom the *Mevlevi* order is named. In Konya his tomb has always been a centre of popular veneration. In recent years Mevlana's tomb has been turning to its old status as a center of pilgrimage, particularly for Turks, Pakistanis and Indians. The growing interest in the work of Rumi who wrote in Persian but proudly claimed by the Turks as Turk, can be judged by the number of books written about him and of translation from his works. In Rumi, see the great works of R. A. Nicholson, and his posthumous book *Rumi, Poet and Mystic, 1207-1273* (London, 1950); and various studies by Abdulbaki Golpinarli esp. , his *Mevlana Celaleddin* (Istanbul, 1951), Nicholson has edited and translated Rumi's monumental poem, *the Mesnevi*, and Golpinarli has produced a new Turkish translation. Cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 137.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

held in Konya in the presence of a limited number of his admirers. This took the form of some recitation from his books and few talks on his life and the history of his influence. This meeting was held outside the sanctuary. In May 1953, the *Islamic Cultural Center* at Paris also organized a meeting in honour of Rumi and invited Turkish representatives to attend it. But unfortunately both the ceremonies of 1953 have received little notice in the Turkish press.¹²

On December 17, 1954 the government authorities, for the first time, permitted a commemoration that was arranged in Konya. In this great celebration speeches were made and a special authority was granted to the *Mevlevi*s to dance their formal worshipful whirling dance shown on the stage in which the dancer hopes to attain ecstatic communion with the almighty. The dervishes, coming from all parts of the country displayed an amazing ability in performing the long forbidden 'Sema'.¹³ This graceful vivid ceremony was to be accompanied by the usual music consisting of drums, the flute like ney and trained voices singing traditional *Mevlevi* music.¹⁴ Mystic

12 In 1953, the then Minister of Education Tevfik İleri, the mayor of Konya, Rustu Ozel and Veled Celebi İzbudak the oldest Rumi descendant were invited at Paris in *Islamic Cultural Center*. All sent cordial telegrams to the committee in Paris in which they extolled Rumi in most flattering terms. This was too passed almost unnoticed in Turkish press. cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.* p. 141.

13 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

14 H. A. Reed., *op.cit.*, p. 142.

music is alive today along with the *tarikats*, but they remain underground because of the ban imposed on their public activities. Their adherents belong to all classes of people.¹⁵ Roughly 300 guests were invited in this ceremony.¹⁶

During these ceremonies in Ankara, Istanbul, Konya and several other cities, *Mevlevis* appeared in their usually outlawed traditional robes and tall conical felt caps for the occasion only. At the public meeting brief demonstrations by whirling dervishes and attendant musicians figured on the programme.

The entire ceremony was to be held in the ancient shrine at Konya and was to be recorded, filmed and broadcast throughout the nation. Many columns of pictures and texts appeared during the next few days in the press. Several editorial and reviews criticized the government and sponsors of these commemorative ceremonies either for supporting dangerous reactionary tendencies, or else for failure to achieve the desired technical excellence in the arrangements,

15 Although the *Mevlevi* dance, or *Zikir* is still forbidden in Turkey, as are all other Dervish Organizations and ceremonies, they still take place quietly and privately. The *Mevlevis* at their Lodge (*tekke*) in Tripoli, Lebanon, are free to whirl and worship as they wish. Mr. Huxley gives an interesting description of their *zikir* in, *From an Antique Land, Ancient and Modern in the Middle East* (London, 1954), pp. 89-91. Cf. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.* p. 142. and see also M. Rashid Feroze, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

16 Among these guests, many members of parliament including the Education Minister and his wife, the wives of the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and Ambassador and their wives from Ankara. H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 142.

the unsatisfactory quality of most of the speeches, and the fact that anything short of perfection was in fact a dishonour to Mevelana's memory.¹⁷

There is a strong feeling that mysticism, strengthening of the 'inner life', rather than stress on details of law, is needed in the country. Late Kenan Rifai (d. 1950) was a mystical leader whose followers are known as *Rufais* or Howling dervishes, the influence of this saintly teacher whose aim was the resuscitation of spiritual values of *Islam* in his disciples is seemingly very deep. One of his four disciples Samiha Ayverdi after his death spiritual leader of the group, has tried in her beautiful books to show the marvelous achievement of the Turkish Islamic life.¹⁸

Another leader of mystical tinge was Omer Fevzi Mardin¹⁹ (d.1953) whose warm liberal personality is praised by all those who have met him. Through his writings he tried

17 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, pp. 142 – 43.

18 Rifai's ideas was set forth in, *Kenan Rifai ve Yirmi inci Asrin Isiğinda Muslumanlik* (Kenan Rifai and Muhammadanism in the light of the Twentieth Century ed. By Samiha Ayverdi, Nezihe Araz Safiye Erol and Sofi Huri (Istanbul, 1951) and Sofi Huri, "Kenan Rifai, the greatest Islamic mystic of our time", *Progressive Islam*, Vol. II, No. 3 – 4, 1955, pp. 2 – 13, edited by Hussain Alatas in *Aniterdan*. Cf. H. A. Reed, "Religious life", p. 140; "Revival of Islam", pp. 274 – 6.

19 *Islam* p. 2., More than twenty-five books and pamphlets among them a collection of Prophetic tradition. According to H. A. Reed "Mardin produced over 16 books and pamphlets presenting an enlightened interpretation of Islam". His work on Tradition, *Hadis-i Şerifler* (Istanbul, 1951-52) and annotated Turkish translation of the *Kuran* entitle *Kuran-i Kerim* (Istambul, 1950) and an English version of some of his ideas, *A Voice from the East, Fragments from the Turkish Thinker (Mardin)* tr. By F. Layman Mac Callum (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 63 are very important. Cf. H. A Reed, *op.cit.* p. 140.

to bridge the gap between the Muslim and *Ahl al- Kitab* and tried to lead Turkish people to an ethically based faith full of love of God and mankind.²⁰

It was very moving ceremony and few participants heeded the criticism leveled against it. It was an expression of an ancient Turkish Muslim feeling, long suppressed, but withal alive and eager to reassert itself.²¹ From 1950's Mavlana's tomb has gained its old status as a centre of pilgrimage, particularly for Turks, Pakistanis and Indians.²² There is no the formal organization of earlier times is active. Dervish lodges do not exist openly, although some clandestine lodges are reported. Now Mevluna days are celebrated in different towns and cities, the main musical part and speeches are broadcast on 17th December.²³

Reactionary Movements:

The official changes in the understanding of secularism also led to the revival of the *tarikats* and religious fundamentalist movements.²⁴ It is very difficult to point out organized Islamic movements in contemporary Turkey, although some information has become available in recent years. While reports of the existence in Turkey of a

20 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

21 H. A. Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

22 *Ibid.*, 140

23 Annemarie Schimmel, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

24 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 81.

widespread network of Islamic cells, manipulated by the international Muslim Brotherhood, seem exaggerated and unreliable, less systematic organized activities does continue.²⁵

The Muslim revival on the fringe of the social fabric has taken forms that come as a shock to the original advocates of moderate religious reform. The legislation of that time has affected only very small part of Atatürk's secularism but a few of the Journals and Pamphlets carried on a systematic and increasingly vituperative campaign against secularism in all its reforms. Taking a fresh look at the religious question the public also discovered that the Mystic Orders that Kemal had outlawed had in fact continued their dervish ceremonies in secret meeting places. Emboldened by the change in government policy the dervishes abandoned some of their secrecy and the pamphleteers, most of their restraint.²⁶

The Ticiani Sect:

Along with the conservative tendencies there have naturally appeared reactionary manifestations. One of the secret and most notorious group has been the Turkish version of the originally North African dervish order of the *Ticianis*²⁷

25 Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 182.

26 D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-55", p. 97.

27 The exact history of this group in Turkey is not clear. It had its beginning at the end of the World War and this group had disappeared after 1925. But again it was very active in 1930's.

who stepped into the limelight with an active campaign of civil disobedience. The *Ticanis* appear to have numbered several thousand disciples²⁸. Its members went from town to town, from village to village, inciting the local population to oppose the reforms. This brotherhood originated in Algeria in 1781. Its founder, Ahmed al-Ticani was a member of several brotherhoods in succession until he finally had a vision in which the Prophet ordered him to abandon previous teachings and become his direct caliph on Earth. The *Ticania* are very tolerant in religious matters having an abbreviated prayer form for those who have little time — or are illiterate and have to trust their memory. Members call each other "friend", instead of "brother" but in apparent contradiction are bound together by oath and have the most exaggerated sense of solidarity.²⁹ They concentrated in the Ankara and Central Anatolian region and took forceful action in destroying public monuments of living creatures notably a number of statues of Ataturk that were smashed by them. Because they considered that such images are prohibited to orthodox Muslim.³⁰

Ticanis become very famous and were able to gather a large number of enthusiastic disciples. This order began to come into prominence at the end of World War II when a

28 Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey" p. 275.

29 F. S. Vidal, "Religious Brotherhoods in Moroccan Politics" *The Middle East Journal*, 1950, No. 4, pp. 432-33.

30 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 401.

young Ankara businessman, trained in law, began to attract a following. Later this man becomes a leader or *Şeyh* of the *Ticani's* in Turkey. This man is known as Kemal Pilavoglu, the leader of the *Ticani* (Tijani). He was well to do and ambitious. Kemal Pilavoglu tried to use the ignorant zeal of his adherents for his own questionable material and political ends.³¹

In February 1949, in the midst of a legislative session, a member of the *Ticani* sect or order began to recite the call for prayers (*Ezan*) in Arabic language instead of Turkish in a very clear and loud voice from the gallery of the Grand National Assembly. At the same time, when the guards tried to stop him from doing such thing and rushed him out, another *Ticani* member began to recite the same from the opposite gallery. The police arrested both of them who recited the *Ezan* in Arabic language. The names of the persons were Osman Yaz and Muhiettin. The official restoration of the prayer call *Ezan* to its Arabic version a year later only made the *Ticanis* more intransigent.³²

Ticani stepped up their activities after DP came to power and concentrated their activities in the Ankara and Central

31 Howard A Reed, *op.cit*, p. 274.

32 The first *Ticani* incident in parliament 1949 promoted the Fiunaltay government to provide a house arrest of leaders of secret religious orders and to raise the maximum penalty on all types of subversive religious propaganda to seven years at hard labour see Dankwart A Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 97.

Anatolian region. These stepped-up activities of religious circles soon led to an outcry by the secularist intellectuals that the DP had encouraged obscurantist movements by politicizing religion.³³

The *Ticanis* came across a number of clashes with the police. In 1951 *Ticanis* launched a successful campaigns to demolish some statues especially Kemal Atatürk in Ankara region.³⁴ Following the *Ticanis*' bust-smashing campaign of the 1951 the Democratic government hastily passed a law called "Atatürk Law (*Atatürk Kanunu*) for the protection of Atatürk's memory under which future attacks on his statues became liable to prison terms of up to five years.³⁵

After this clash the government ordered to arrest Kemal Pilavoglu and his enthusiastic followers. On the basis of this law, Police arrested 400 members of the Order. *Ticanis*' leader, Kemal Pilavođlu and his followers forty in number received five to ten years sentences some at hard labour and for various offences.³⁶ Their leader, Kemal Pilavođlu, was also

33 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

34 The erection of the first statue of Atatürk on Seraglio Point, Istanbul, in 1926 had aroused considerable comment because of the Islamic prohibitions against the depiction of human forms. The precedent had, however, already been made in Egypt where statues of Muhammad Ali had been erected prior to that. cf. Howard A. Reed, *op.cit.*, P. 274.

35 Lenczowski, *The Middle East in the World Affairs* (California, 1952), p. 154.

36 Howard A Reed, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

condemned to fifteen years in jail as well as forced residence on an Aegean island (Bozcaada) for the rest of his life.³⁷

Since then, little has been heard of the *Ticanis*, although some are said to hope for a miraculous reappearance and justification of their leader in true Mahdist style.³⁸

Nurcu Sect (*Nurcular*):

After the decline of the *Ticani* sect and its virtual disappearance from political activity, a more widespread religious order came to the fore that of the *Nurcular* or “disciples of *Nur* and they may be called as followers of the light.”³⁹ The founder and the leader of this sect was Badiuzzaman Sait Nursi⁴⁰ (1876-1960). He was a Kurd so some times called Said Kurdi. Who challenged the authority of the Young Republic just after the abolition of the Caliphate in

37 See, Rustow, “Politics and Islam.....”, pp. 97-98. Also see Tunaya, *op.cit.*, p. 231, *Ulus*, March 27, 1951. Cf. B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

38 Howard A. Reed, “Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey”, p. 274-75.

39 They called themselves *Hizb-ul Kuran* or party of the *Kuran*. J. M. Landan *op.cit.*, p. 183.

40 He was also called Sait Nursi after his village Nurs or Nuris a small hamlet of some twenty houses in the province of Bitlis in Eastern Anatolia where he was born in 1876 or 1877. There are some discrepancies between the dates given for his birth in the available sources but the majority give it as 1876 (1293 Rumi). His father's name was Mirza who had a smallholding of land and his mother Nuriye, was from the neighbouring village of Bilkan. On both sides they were a family of Sayyid. Bediuzzaman told Salih Ozcan that his mother was Hussein and his father Hasan. It was probably the political implications, which deterred Bediuzzaman from mentioning the matter in his written works. However, there is no record of his family being known as Sayyid family, quoted from Sukran Vahide, “The Life and Times of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi”, *The Muslim World*, Vol., LXXXIX, No., 3-4, 1999, p. 208. See for more details, “Nurculuk” *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 255-56.

1924. He was trained in the *Halidi – Nakşibendi*⁴¹ seminaries of Eastern Turkey and took up the *Mujedidi* torch in the Bitlis – Hizam region of Anatolia.⁴² The peripheral sources of this movement are interesting in that it replicates similar developments in the margins of the Islamic world at that time. They wanted to revitalize Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁴³

Sait Nursi was very enthusiastic in pursuing his studies. He moved from *medrese* to *medrese*. He was, at first unable to find what he was seeking but in 1891, he set off for Dogu Bayezid and *medrese* of Seyh Mehmet Celali, where he learnt Arabic Grammar and syntax. Şeyh Mehmet Celali must have looked favourably on his exceptional student, he awarded him his diploma (*Ijazet*) confirming that he had completed the

41 The Halidi- Naksebandi branch was founded by Mevlana Halid Baghdadi (1776-1827). He was born in the District of Shahrizur in Iraq. He left India in 1810-11 and went to Baghdad where he established the first Halidi Lodge in 1813. From there his order spread to Suleymaniye and then, by his own account to Jerusalem, Aleppo, Basra, Kirkuk, Erbil, Diyarbakir, Cizre, Mardin, Urfa, Gaziantep and Konya. The *Halidis* also established a set of seminaries in the Hizanvan region of Eastern Anatolia, which were to be the fountainheads of a later movement the *Nur* (Light). For details of this Order, see Şerif Mardin, "The Nakshibendi Order in Turkish History", Richard Tapper, ed. *Islam in Modern Turkey*, pp. 121-142. Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Naqshbandiya- Mujaddidiya in the Ottoman land in the early 19th century", *Die Welt Des Islam* (NS), 22, 1984, p. 6-10.

42 Most of Sait Nursi's teachers belonged to the *Halidi Naksebandi* Order (Vahide), but he also read the writings of Abdul Kadir Geylani, the founder of the *Kadiri Order*. He was heavily influenced by the writings of Naksebandi leaders such as Ahmed Sirhindi of India and Ahmed Ziyaedin Gumushaneli (d. 1893), a prominent Seyh of *Halidi Order*. Cf M. Hakan Yavuz, " The Assassination of collective Memory: The Case of Turkey," *The Muslim World*, Vol., LXXXIX, No., 3-4, July-October, 1999, p. 198.

43 John D. Voll, " The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundamentalist", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10, 1979, p. 147.

course. His fame spread and came to be known as Molla Sait Meshur.⁴⁴ After receiving the diploma he left Bayezid for Sirvan where he was engaged in other religious scholarly debate whenever the opportunity arose. He was given the name Bediuzzaman (Wonder of the Age).⁴⁵ Further he embarked on a comprehensive study of all *Islamic Sciences*. Within two years he completed some forty basic works on logic and Arabic sciences on the one hand and the *Kuranic* exegesis (*Tafsir*), *Hadith*, *fiqh* and theology (*Kalam*) on the other hand in Bitlis.⁴⁶

It was the time when the long reign of Sultan Abdul Hamit II was nearing its end, and the various forces that were to bring about his overthrow were gathering strength, foremost among them was the Society of Union and Progress (*Ittihat Ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) Sait Nursi did not remain indifferent to the political struggle, therefore, he favoured the Society of Union and Progress and joined the rebellion of July

44 Through his extraordinary power of memory and faculty for absorbing knowledge Sait Nursi completed his diploma in six months which normally continued over fifteen or even twenty years. Cf Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 209.

45 Eminent Molla Fethullah Efendi of the *Şiirt Medrese* gave this name. For the details of his education and activities see. Sukran Vahide. *The Author of the Risale-i Nur, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Istanbul, 1998) and " Life and Times of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 3-4, pp. 208ff.

46 The major reason of this study was to prepare himself to reply to the criticism of Islam made in work of western origin and to dispel the doubt to which they had given the rise. Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 211.

in 1908 against the Sultan in favour of the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution.⁴⁷

During the World War I he also established relations with the Pan- Islamic propaganda of the *Young Turks*.⁴⁸ But said Nursi's confidence in the Society of Union and Progress declined as he saw the liberty proclaimed by the Movement of July 1908 to be assuming an anti – religious aspect. He became their fierce opponent. Articles hostile to Islam and surveying the current superstitions of Europe began to reappear in Istanbul press, and in order to counteract these, Sait Nursi contributing articles to the paper, *Volkan*, organ of the group known as the *Ijtihad-i Muhammediye*.⁴⁹ His entire articles in the newspaper reiterates his views on education and Islamic freedom and constitutionalism, or explains the unifying role of the society. His aim was to strengthen the bonds of Unity between all Muslims trough the revival of

47 It at the first sight surprising to see Sait Nursi in the ranks of the Sultan's opponents. Among the many Turkish Islamic circles, the period of Sultan Abdul Hamit II is regarded as a period of Islamic ascendancy. It should, however, be remembered that numerous members of the Ottoman *Ulema* supported the establishment of constitutional government and opposed what they considered to be the tyranny of Abdul Hamit. But some considered that this event led to the destruction of the caliphate with all the attendant damages to *Islam*. Hamid Algar, "Said Nursi and the Risale-i Nur: An Aspect of Islam in contemporary Turkey", *Islamic Perspectives*, p. 315.

48 Şerif Mardin, " Turkey: Islam and Westernization", Carlo Caldarola, *Religions and Societies: Asia and the Middle East* (New York, 1982), pp. 191-92.

49 It was led by Bektashi dervish from Cyprus, called Vahdeti and had as its aim the regeneration of the Ottoman state on the basis of *Islam* and the promotion of Islamic unity. In *Volkan* 15 articles were published in the defense of *Şeriat* It was because of his involvement that he was arrested and sent before the court martial. Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

Sunnat.⁵⁰ In April 1909, shortly after the foundation of *Ittihad-i Muhammediye*, a mutiny brokeout among Albanian soldiers garrisoned in Istanbul and was joined by members of other units as well as by some civilians. His slogan of the rebellions was simple” We want the *Şeriat*” (*biz seriat isteriz*) that was against the westernizing tendencies of the Society of Union and Progress. But this uprising was swiftly crushed by the arrival of an army from Salonica under the command of Muhammad Şevket Paşa and the Society of Union and Progress which was in power.⁵¹

When the war of Independence was fought in the name of *Islam* then both the *Ulema* and *Sufi Şeyh* had presented a widespread participation. On the cause of *Islam* and the restoration of *Şeriat* Sait Nursi also took part in this movement. But in 1923 when the war of Independence had come to a successful conclusion and National Assembly was convened in Ankara in which Sait Nuris was invited by the deputies of Bitlis, Muş and Van where he addressed the members of the Assembly. He said:⁵²

50 Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

51 In the uprising of 1909 *Ittihad-i Muhammadiye* played an important role. Sait Nursi was also brought to trial with the other members of the organization. Hamid Algar, “Said Nursi and Risali Nur : An Aspect of Islam in Contemporary Turkey” in *Islamic Perspective*, p. 316.

52 The text of his remarks is recorded in *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. XXIV, p. 457 and *Bediuzzaman Sait Nursi*, pp. 133-136. Quoted from Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 319.

"Islam was the only strength of the Muslims and abandonment of it would be an act of treason. European culture was on the point of collapse and it would be folly to replace *Kuranic* civilization with the bankrupt norms of Europe. The deputies should affirm their loyalty to *Islam* by regular performance of communal prayers."

In this address he laid stress upon the necessity of continued adherence to *Islam* as the condition of national Unity. Some deputies responded favourably, but Mustafa Kemal reproached Said Nursi for bringing to light differences of outlook and aspiration among the deputies. He left Ankara for his homeland in the East.⁵³ In an uprising in Eastern Anatolia against the Ankara government, Sait Nursi had been approached by various leaders and tribal chiefs who sought his support and profit from his considerable influence. Declaring itself as dictatorial, Ankara government decided to disperse any potential alternative centers of power and all kinds of opposition.⁵⁴

In 1925 the government banned all *Tarikats* and their activities and closed their meeting places. In their place

53 Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 319.

54 In this uprising some of the tribal leaders heeded his advices and did not take part, thus saving many, lives in Van area. Bediuzzaman was arrested along with many notables and others, and sent into exile. Bediuzzaman was not guilty of this crime for which he had been exiled. It was, in the words of the police inspector who had interviewed him in Istanbul, merely " a precautionary measure". Sukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, pp. 224-225.

enlightened societies based on scientific learning were formed.⁵⁵

In 1934 he was accused of establishing a secret religious society. In the light of this charge he received six-months jail together with fifteen other persons. After being released from jail he went Kastamonu where he continued the *Risale-i Nur*. Despite police surveillance, in a short time, his writings had penetrated to wide areas of the country and had been able to contact an increasing number of followers.⁵⁶

In Afyon fifteen of his closest associates were arrested with him and those who engaged in the distribution of the *Risale-i Nur* in Emirdag, Isparta, Kastamonu, Konya, Inebolu Safranbolu and Aydin. In September 1947, he was condemned to two years confinement where he himself referred to the jail as *Medrese-i Yusufiye* (The School of Joseph).⁵⁷

After the World War I he found himself in a new situation. Up the beginning of the multiparty in 1945, he kept out of the limelight but in the same year he came into open as *Ustad* or master of an order and declared himself as 'New Sait'.⁵⁸ With the multiparty system in Turkey, the voices and

55 J. D. Norton, "The Turks and Islam", in Stewart Sutherland, Leslie Houlden and other, (eds.), *The World's Religions* (London, 1988), p. 402.

56 Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 321.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 322.

58 Sait Nursi himself divided his life into three periods. In the first phase, he was "the Old Sait". He was an active soldier in the Ottoman army as well as an activist student involved in a number of conservatives Islamic causes. At the end of the World War I, he returned to Istanbul from Russia from his exile and declared

desires of the periphery began to be heard and were quickly transformed into a political force. The elections of 1950 cracked *Kemalism* and brought the Democrats into powers. It gave the importance to the periphery.⁵⁹

Nurcular were against the idea of a secular Republic and wished to restore a theocratic Islamic state. They openly admitted their support of the DP government. He also argued in a pamphlet he wrote that the *Nurcular* had to work for a DP victory "in the interest of Koran".⁶⁰ In 1950 when Adnan Menderes came to power Sait Nursi wrote to him addressing as "Champion of Islam" and urging him to observe Islamic principles while in government.⁶¹ Said Nursi wrote a letter to Adnan Menderes, the then Prime Minister, in this letter he demanded that Religious schools are to be established in which his collection of speeches *Risale-i Nur* (The message of light) became a part of the curriculum in all of Turkey's schools.⁶² Their philosophy had been formulated in *Risale-i Nur* and widely used in *Nur* classes dispersed throughout the country.⁶³

himself "the New Sait". He withdrew from active involvement in social and political life. During 1950s Sait Nursi entered the third and the last phase of his life. Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, pp. 312-320

59 Resat Kabasa, "Populism and Democracy in Turkey: 1946-1961", in Ellis Goldberg, et al (eds.), *Rules and Right in Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society* (University of Washington Press, 1991), pp. 43-44.

60 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

61 Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 323.

62 Şerif Mardin, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

63 B. Toprak, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

In 1950 Said Nursi took the favourable climate towards religion under Menderes by travelling around the country, preaching and writing through which the publication of *Risale-i Nur*⁶⁴ became finally possible and readers and students of *Risale-i Nur* became a cohesive movement.⁶⁵ Several volumes of his speeches and writings were collected both in this lifetime and after his death in Urfa in 1960.⁶⁶

Sait Nursi became convinced that revival of Islamic strength was not dependent upon the establishment of individual nation- state, but rather on a renewal of faith, which would lead to a general Muslim revival. He rejected the secularist policies of the Turkish Republic and believed that the time had come to reinstall faith in the hearts of the Turks. He also made a connection with the politics and dedicated all his life to preaching for renewed faith in the *Kuran*.⁶⁷ He believed that one should make all the sciences and knowledge that one had acquired, a means to understand the *Kuran* and prove its truths and that *Kuran* alone should be his aim, the purpose of his learning and the object of his life.⁶⁸ He also

64 It is a multi volume life work of Sait Nursi. It comprises of *Kuranic* commentary with instructions to his students and followers, whose number grew over the years despite his imprisonment and exiles. For the details of the *Resile-i Nur* See, chap. V above.

65 Resat Kasaba, pp. 43-44 and Şukran Vahide, *The Author of the Rixalei Nur. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*, London, 1982.

66 Jacob. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

67 Şerif Mardin, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

68 Şukran Vahide, "The Life and Time of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi", p. 226

insisted that since Islam contains every thing, it should be the basis of the state. The head of the state and the members of the National Assembly ought to be a religious Turks. All the answer to the contemporary problems are in the Koran therefore, the *Şeriat* should be the law of Turkey.⁶⁹

In 1952 he was arrested and brought for the trail for the fourth and the last time, in Istanbul when his follower students of Istanbul university distributed publication of a section of *Risale-i Nur* entitle *Genc Rehberi* (A Guide for Youth). In this work Sait Nursi asserted that The Islamic criteria of dress are more suited to the beauty and dignity of women than imported western fashion and also demanded that religious instructions be promoted at all levels of education.⁷⁰ During the early days of the Republic through his activities he received several imprisonments and exiles⁷¹ during these days he prepared a number of commentaries on the Koran which

69 Şerif Mardin, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

70 These writings were found objectionable among the prosecutors of the courts and the court ordered him to leave the city. On this action Adnan Menderes was criticized personally by some Muslims. It was alleged that his appeals to Islamic sentiment were largely opportunistic and no real changes took place in the attitude of the state to Islam, beyond a few symbolic gestures. Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 323.

71 For the details of his exilement See, Şerif Mardin *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (New York, 1989), pp. 42-54 and Şukran Vahide, *The Author of the Risale-i Nur, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* and "The Life and Times of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, No., 3-4, 1999, pp. 209-251. And Hamid Algar, "Sait Nursi and the Risle-i Nur: An Aspect of Islam in Contemporary Turkey", pp. 312-325.

were produced by his disciples and widely distributed throughout Turkey.⁷²

After the death of Sait Nursi in 1960 their followers continued their activities in the 1960s and appear to have increased their numbers. After the military coup of 1960 that overthrew the Menderes regime. The righteous guardians of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal exhumed the body of Sait Nursi and transported it to be reburied in an unknown and unmarked location. This fact was concealed even from Sait Nursi's brother.⁷³ After a series of demonstrations many followers of the *Nurcu* were arrested by the order of the government but this did not hurt their popularity. They continued preaching and practicing their rites, in defiance of the law.⁷⁴ Sait Nursi had left his real successor in the form of *Risale-i Nur* among his followers and others works which he himself regarded as the sole fruit of his life. After his death, his followers continued to distribute his works and expand his ideas.⁷⁵

72 These commentaries provided a 'catechism' (in Turkish, not in arabic, as are manu of the 'orthodox' text) for the many villagers and townspeople who lived in the vicinity, and it was to this population, which had been thoroughly confused by the Young Turks and later by the secularism of the republic, that he appealed. Cf. Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", p. 156.

73 Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 324.

74 J. M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

75 Among Sait Nursi's important work, *Hutbe-i Semiye, Recetetul Avam* in Arabic (Prescription for the Common People) and *Recetetul Ulema* (Prescription For the Ulema). He also wrote Turkish version of these, called *Munazarat* and *Muhakemat* respectively. The former consists of his answer to the question put to him during his journey around south Anatolia. The work was published in Istanbul in 1911 and 1913 respectively, Mollah Habib, his much loved student who acted as his scribe on the front at Erzurum, writing down the celebrated Koranic commentary *Ishrat al - Ijaz* as Bediuzzaman dictated. Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 216-17

In the late 1960s during the reign of Justice Party the printing and distribution of *Risale-i Nur* became possible and reached its peak. Islamic press played an important role in spreading the message of the work to the public in the second half of the last decade. The followers of Sait Nursi (*Nurcular*) themselves have made several ventures in journalism. Extracts from the *Risale-i Nur* news of Islamic World and many articles commemorating his life appeared in numerous journals.⁷⁶ In 1964 a weekly *Hareket*, *Zulfikar* and *Bediuzzaman* were published in Erzurum, Izmir, and Konya respectively and began to appear with the same form and contents as *Bügün* and *Hilal*. All of these were short lived and were superseded in 1968 by a weekly *Ittihad*,⁷⁷ printed in Istanbul and distributed through out the country.

Beyond such individuals who, of course, publicly associated with the message of *Risale-i Nur*, there exists only a network of distribution for *Risale-i Nur*. After the death of Sait Nursi there is no spiritual or directive successor to him except *Risale-i Nur*. In addition to the nationally organized work, distribution small circles were formed, spontaneously and informally, for the study of the *Risale-i Nur*. But in 1970

76 Mention may be made particularly of the monthly *Hilal* edited by Salih Oscan who was under arrest by the Istanbul Martial Law authorities and the daily *Bugun* edited by Mehmet Sevket Eygi who was exiled in Germany. Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 325.

77 It's editor was Mustafa Polat, formerly editor of *Hareket*. In February, 1970, *Ittihad* became a daily news paper later to be succeeded by the widely read *Yeni-Ayssa* Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 325.

the police disrupted such a meeting.⁷⁸ A clandestine boarding school, which was run by the *Nurcular*, was discovered and raided by the police in 1971 where the students used to wear religious robe and turban. Students of the school were arrested while learning *Islam* and Arabic. Nine sacks of *Nurcu* publications were seized.

This greatly increases availability of the *Risale-i Nur* together with the greater freedom led to a considerable growth in the numbers of *Nurcular* and the consolidation of the movements. *Dershane* or *Risale-i Nur* study centres were opened all over the country as well as out side the country too.⁷⁹ The *Nurcular* (Followers of Sait Nursi) considered Said Nursi a *Veli*, or saintly person.⁸⁰ The *Nurcular* frankly recommended polygamy, traditional dress and other measures consonant with the *Şeriat*.⁸¹

The *Nurcular* has taken a position in Turkish politics, but it is interesting that an alliance, which it had formed with the National Salvation Party, had dissolved in favour of its present support of the Justice Party. This seems to be a sign

78 This meetings were attended by the present writer in Fatih area of Istanbul in March 1970 had sixty participants, and the discussion of the *Risale-i Nur* was led by the Mufti of Bakiyor. There is nothing conspiratorial or political about them. They consist exclusively of reading and discussion of the *Risale-i Nur* and the recitation of dua. Hamid Algar, *op.cit.*, p. 325

79 Şukran Vahide, *op.cit.*, p. 243.

80 The *Nurcular* claimed that he could perform such miracles as being in two places at the same time, more through locked doors or live without food. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

81 Şerif Mardin, *opcit*, p. 182

seriously, are more interested in Demirel's kind of national development than Erbakan's more sectarian economics. The success of the *Nurcular*, then, had to do with the fact that it had taken the need for a 'view of the world' seriously but had not made this view as directly related to the immediate establishment of a Muslim society as have Erbakan and the National Salvation Party.⁸²

Kotku:

A parallel influence was that of the Halidi Şeyh Mehmet Zahid Kotku. Kotku witnessed the closing of the religious orders in 1925, the time of his youth. He studied in Istanbul and returned to his home town, Bursa, where he remained as a village *Imam* for fifteen years and after that in the same town, he was appointed *Imam* of the *Uftade mosque* by Directorate of Religious Affairs under the Republicans. Abdulaziz Bekkine had taken over the secret leadership of the *Nakşibendi* in Istanbul. Kotku's new official position was an *Imam* of the Ummu Gulsum Mosque. He was also transferred to the Iskenderpasa Mosque in 1958, where he worked as an *Imam* till his death in 1980.

The followers of Kotku had played a key role in the politics in the 1970's and 1980's. Among them Neemettin Erbakan, the founder of the first Turkish clerical party,

82 Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", p. 157.

Korkut Özal and Mehmet Şevket Eygi⁸³ were very prominent. After Kotku, Esat Çorsan became his successor and head of the organization, which publishes three periodicals with an Islamic ideology.⁸⁴

The Great Esat Society:

Consequently several Islamic organizations planned to work clandestinely or semi- clandestinely. Some sincere and other unscrupulous leaders and publicists have sought to turn this combination of a revival in religious interest and ignorance about *Islam* to their own advantage. Out of these was Necip Fazil Kısakürek who an able poet and editor of a highly reactionary and fanatical newspaper.⁸⁵ He was forced to interrupt his career as self appointed supreme guide of a revivalist movement known as the Great East, when the police apprehended him in a swank Istanbul apartment on a gambling charge. The Great Society dissolved itself on May 26, 1951. His paper was closed for alleged implication in the attempt of a group of youth, supposedly inspired by his fiery pen, to assassinate one of Turkey's leading liberals and most

83 He was a published of the most influential Islamic daily *Zaman* that makes profitable reading as an informative magazine and take up Islamic cause.

84 See Şerif Mardin, "The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History", p.133-34.

85 His paper name was *Yeni Büyük Doğu* (New Great East) which had a wide circulation in rural areas till 1952 and claimed Democratic Party support. Howard A Reed, *op.cit.*, p.275.

experienced newspaper men, Ahmed Emin Yalman, at Malatya in November 1952.⁸⁶

Süleymancilar (Suleymanists):

Another underground movement which is known as Suleymanci in Turkey's remote Eastern provinces. Its founder's name was Süleyman Seyfüllah (1863-1946). His aim was a theocratic state. He was an extremist in character. This group was very different from the other group and preached a type of popular Islam. They condemned anything foreign as the work of the devil, and those who supported foreign works as the army of the devil. They considered themselves an army against anything from abroad and were great partisans of and participant in the *Kuran Courses*. Some of their leaders were educated at al- Azhar in Cario and at the *Umayyad Medrese* in Damascus.⁸⁷

Apart from the above mentioned groups, there existed numerous other religious associations (*dernekler*) to assist the *Imam- Hatip Schools* and courses for learning Koran. These were not necessarily politically- slanted, they represented an important potential for recruitment to action in political

86 Ahmet Emin Yalman was editor of a paper Vatan and one of the Turkey's leading journalists, who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He had been the first to support the Democratic Party in 1945. He was a descendant of the Donmes, a Jewish sect converted to Islam two centuries ago. Dunkwart A Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

87 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

organizations some indeed, combined social welfare activities with the imparting of political religious notions.⁸⁸

Hizbul Tahrir:

From 1967 Ahmet Selahel-Ali, a Palestinian living in Lebanon, was reported to be increasingly active in Turkey first for the *Islamic Hizbul Tahrir*⁸⁹ then for an Islamic Organization in Saudia, *Rabitat- ul Alem-i Islam* . Ahmet Selah el-Ali reportedly held public meetings in Ankara Konya and Nigde and formed branches of the above politico-religious organizations in these towns. The boldness of *Hizbul Tahrir* reached its peak in May 1967, with the publication and distribution of political handbills dealing with current events in Turkey. In the same year several leading members of the party were arrested. Police broke up the party cell, which comprised Jordanian students of agriculture at Ankara University, and in 1968 other members of the party were also arrested.⁹⁰

88 These Islamic groups were made among the University student's organization; the *Turkiya Kuran Kurslari Kurma, Koruma Ve idame ettire dernekleri* (Associations for establishing in Turkey Kuran courses, supporting them and maintaining their existence); the *Turkiye din adamlare yardimlasma federasyonu* (federation of associations for assisting men of religion in Turkey); the *Ilm Yayma Cemiyeti* (Society for crescent – an anti alcoholism). *Ibid*, p.183.

89 For its ideology and objectives cf. J. M. Landau, ed. *Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York, 1972), pp. 183-186.

90 J. M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 187.

Milli Mücadele Birliđi (Union for National Struggle):

This union was formed on November 18, 1967, it claimed to represent a wide front of the scientific right of all trends – based on *Islam* and patriotism. More over it frankly fought leftists and secularist by oral and written propaganda and through its branches with the *Imam Hatip Schools*. These activities not withstanding any political party could be established with *Islam* as its platform.⁹¹

91 The Party law of 1965 explicitly forbade the establishment of political parties conflicting with the principle of secularism. Jacob M. Landau, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

CONCLUSIONS

The Ottoman Empire had emerged consequent to the Islamic movement under Ghazi Osman Khan in 1299 A. D. and they ruled a polyglot, multi-faith Empire. But they identified themselves with *Islam* and submerged their identity in *Islam* and were able to form a *Şeriat* based official orthodoxy. They were almost constantly at war with Christian Europe in which *Sufis* and *Ghazis* of Anatolia played an important role. They successfully imposed Islamic law over a large part of Europe. Being the center of Caliphate Turkey had acquired a unique place among all the Muslim countries. The European Powers could not tolerate this. They did not want to see Turkey as the centre of Caliphate or the leaders of the Muslims of the World. They tried to expel them from European territories and to Christianize them but they failed. After a long struggle of 600 years, they succeeded in the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I.

Although the loss of Constantinople was a great grief for the Westerners but the conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmet II (1451-81) provided them a chance to interfere in the internal, political and economic matters by signing three capitulation treaties. After Mehmet II European influence came to stay in

the palace of the Ottoman Sultan. They also married European women who carried western culture and traditions with them. The Europeans never gave up the idea of modernizing the Turks. At last after the industrial revolution they got the opportunity to modernize the Turks.

After the industrial revolution of Europe, the territorial loss compelled the Ottoman rulers to adopt the modernization process. They invited Europeans to train their armies on European war methods. Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mehmud II was getting organized on the lines of the modern state. It was an indication of willingness of the Turkish ruling elite to acknowledge the over all superiority of western civilization. Although the *Ulema* of the time opposed every modern weapon, education and technique coming from the West but the Sultans imposed their reforms by force. This misconception created a gap between the rulers and peoples. *Ulema* of the time were divided into two camps one was in favour of the Sultan and other was opposed to the reforms which polluted *Islam* and were also against the implementation of equality of Christian subjects. This internal fighting provided the chance to the European Powers and missionaries to interfere in the central policy and even in the local affairs of the Ottomans. From 1839 to the nineteenth century all the

reforms were the results of European diplomatic pressure which played an important role in Westernizing Turkey.

The Sultan's government tried to convince the European Powers of its sincerity in implementing the reforms ensuring full and equal rights to non-Muslims. The Imperial Prescript of 1839 and 1856 and the first Turkish Constitution of 1876 were also promulgated under such pressure. These chain of events provides enough indication for the assumption that what ever the Turkish westerners did in the way of modernization was calculated to please the European Powers and to introduce western political and cultural institutions at the expense of the *Şeriat* institutions.

Diplomatic contact between the Sublime Porte and European states weakened the forces of Islamic conservatism. Turkish diplomats and statesmen not only began to learn European languages they also became deeply interested in the study of European culture and in the assimilation of Western values. These reforms reduced the place of *Islam* and widened the gulf between rulers and subjects and also provided an idea of secularism and nationalism among the non-Muslim millet as well as a formal recognition of western superiority in culture, arms, techniques of war fare and education among the Turkish peoples. The Sultans of Turkey became puppets in the hands of

European Powers. They did, as the European Powers wanted. Whenever any question of survival of Turkey arose, the European Powers did not hesitate to revive their crusading spirit against the Turks. Henceforward, Turkey was seen like a pawn on the chessboard of European politics.

For gaining moral and religious support from the Muslim World the later Ottoman Sultans Abdül Aziz and Abdül Hamit II exploited the enthusiasm of Muslims through Pan Islamic feelings for their own survival. But World War I bitterly shattered this propaganda of Pan- Islamism and the Ottoman Empire was dismembered which was consequent to the successful exploitation by England of Serif Hussein of Mecca and the Young Turks.

It was Mustafa Kemals's charismatic personality who played an important role in saving Turkey. His movement was different from the *Tanzimat* and the Young Turks. His fight was against foreign intervention. He also used *Islam* to unite the scattered army and to gain support from the local people and *Ulema* and religious reformers who wanted the revivalism of *Şeriat*. But as soon as he won the war of Independence he launched a series of secularizing reforms. This gave a major setback to the Muslims of the world. But as for as the motherland is concerned he did his best to save the Turkey

otherwise Turkey would not have been on the map of the World. Since Asia Minor had always been a multi-faith and multi-lingual society, therefore, secularism and nationalism was the only way to maintain peace in that region.

Mustafa Kemal was not the initiator of the westernization reforms which had begun from the late seventeenth century. As far as the *Islam* is concerned he committed a great mistake in abolishing the *Şeriat* courts. This destroyed the religious and cultural life and beliefs of the people. He was not against *Islam* but against those *Ulema* and rulers who exploited *Islam* through their superficial knowledge for their own survival. The abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate was the result of the above reaction. So far as the office of the Sultanate, the Caliphate and the *Şehul Islam* was concerned there was no importance of these offices because they worked under the European influence which was very shameful. Regarding the changes in the field of education, *Purda* (Veil), *Tarikat Orders*, Language and Law Mustafa Kemal was not responsible of these changes as many steps were taken on these reforms under Sultan Mehmud I to Abdül Mecit II. Mustafa Kemal did believe that secularization is the only way to protect Turkey against the resurgence of fanaticism. Now Turkey is only a Muslim country and not Islamic.

After the death of Atatürk, during the reign of İsmet İnönü, secularism was misinterpreted and was used as a weapon for the suppression of religious feeling. But Secularization of the Turkish State failed to confine *Islam* to the conscience of the Turkish people. Sait Nursi launched a strong movement for the reinstatement of *Şeriat* in all fields of life. It was Adnan Menderes, the leader of the Democratic Party, first dare to lift the band on *Ezan* in Arabic and broadcasting *Kuran* on state radios under his premiership. But later the followers of Sait Nursi were imprisoned and this movement was banned after the coup d'état of May, 1960. Although Islamic education became compulsory but written permission of the parents was necessary. Many Islamic institutions were opened, and many religious study centres financially supported by the government. But no one dared to change the principle of secularism.

These changes created conditions that were conducive to the resurgence of *Islam* and led to the active participation of Turkey in the affairs of the Muslim World. The signs of this resurgence were visible after the introduction of the multi-party system when Turkey became a member of the United Nations. Democrats were accused by the Republicans that they were appeasing reactionaries and fanatics. After the Democrats, the

Justice Party in the 1960's and Necmettin Erbakan's *Milli Nizam* and *Milli Salmet Partisi* also used religion for their political ends. But whatever exploitation had been done by Adnan Menderes and Necmettin Erbakan they were an opportunity to move ahead in line with the trend of public opinion which was heavily inclined in favour of religious freedom and changes in state policies. They have realized that *Islam* could not be neglected in Turkey's public affairs for an indefinite period.

As far as the resurgence of *Islam* in Turkey is concerned, reactionaries like the followers of *Ticaniya*, *Sulemanji* and most important Sait Nursi (*Nurcular*) played an important role. Three military takeovers between 1960 and 1980 were the results of those disputes, which goes to show that fighting between the secularists and the Islamists has not come to an end simply because of the fact that the military in Turkey has great power to interfere in political matters.

The role of *Islam* in the political development in each phase of the developmental process was different. It has assumed different functions during: 1) the Ottoman period, 2) the transition from Empire to a nation state, 3) one party era 4) Multi party era.

The western authors projected the image of modern Turkey abroad as completely Europeanized where *Islam* is either dormant or dead in the public life of the people and remains confined to the four walls of the mosque. *Islam* was never dead in Turkey either before or after the Kemalist reforms. Turkish culture is still based on Islamic traditions and whatever Western influences are visible in the large cities are superficial and limited in their scope. The preponderant majority of the Turks have ever been practicing *Islam* in their daily lives even after the introduction of western reforms in the Turkish Republic. Westernization seems to have very little influence on the people in the Turkish countryside who form about three-fourth of Turkey's entire population. The importance of Islamic education and upbringing has attracted increasing attention from all classes of people in recent years. This is an indication of the importance of *Islam* in the national life of the Turkish people. The increased interest in religion shows that *Islam* responds to the spiritual and moral needs of the Turkish people.

The sense of belonging to the *Ummah* is quite strong among the Turks. This is an important factor in the development of Turkey's cultural relations with the Muslim World. The future of *Islam* in Turkey seems to be bright. The

reconstruction of Muslim countries seems to have reached a stage wherein Turkey can play an active role in the development of the Muslim World.

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APPENDIX - I

Number of Kuranic Courses and Students 1932-1997

Year	Number of Courses	Year	Number of Courses
1932/33	9	1986	4033 (142763)
1934/35	19	1987	4058 (144031)
1935/36	15	1988	4420 (142763)
1936/37	16	1989	4715 (165416)
1940/41	56	1990	4998 n d
1945/46	61	1991	4557 (169040)
1949/50	127	1992	4783 (172473)
1951/52	256	1993	4925 (176892)
1972	977	1994	4985 (184943)
1980	2610(65816)	1995	5011 (181561)
1981	2773 (93025)	1996	5241 (180831)
1982	2946 (101268)	1997	4890 (177120)
1983	3047 (114668)		
1984	3047 (102493)		
1985	3355 (113080)		

APPENDIX - II

Number of Imam-Hatip Schools, Students and Teachers 1951-98

Year	Number of Imam-Hatip Schools	Number of Students	Number of Teachers
1951-52	14	1765	27
1953-54	15	1790	91
1954-58	18	2476	121
1960-61	36	4545	246
1961-62	-	5375	388
1962-63	-	7040	436
1963-64	-	9824	484
1964-65	-	10961	508
1965-66	49	13478	558
1966-67	-	20208	736
1967-68	-	29132	1090
1968-69	-	37862	1173
1969-70	101	44275	1263
1970-71	112	48454	1548
1971-72	114	45189	1555
1972-73	143	46378	1564
1973-74	149	34482	1612
1975-75	174	48899	2152
1975-76	243	77638	2933
1976-77	320	111741	3852
1977-78	431	314486	4922
1978-79	670	262963	4448
1979-80	678	308085	5500
1080-81	707	201004	7768
1981-82	710	216864	9212

1982-83	715	219931	10537
1983-84	715	220991	11113
1984-85	716	228973	11334
1985-86	717	238025	11439
1986-87	717	249863	11824
1987-88	718	258038	12261
1988-89	733	267478	12010
1989-90	749	282761	12995
1990-91	765	2310215	12803
1991-92	796	337275	13581
1992-93	807	395895	15022
1993-94	835	444690	16344
1994-95	843	473301	16903
1995-96	931	495580	18330
1996-97	1203	503231	18809
1997-98	1208	396677	18702

APPENDIX – III
List of the Courses of Faculty of Ilahiyat

Ist Year	Ist Semester		2 nd Semester	
	Courses	Credit	Courses	Credit
	Arabic	9	Arabic	9
	Major Themes of the Kuran	2	Reciting the Kuran and Tajwid	2
	Islamic History I	2	History of Hadith	2
	Foreign Language	4	Foreign Language	4
	Turkish I	2	Turkish II	2
	Introduction to Psychology	2	Introduction to Psychology	2
	Computer	3	Principles of Kemalism and History of Revolution	2
	Principles of Kemalism and History of Revolution	2		
	Fine Arts/ Physical Training	0		

2nd Year	3rd Semester		4 th Semester	
	Courses	Credit	Courses	Credit
	Arabic	4	Arabic	4
	Reciting the Kuran and Tajwid	2	Methodology of Tafsir	2
	History of Tafsir	2	Hadith	2
	Foreign Language	4	Foreign Language	4
	Methodology of Hadith	2	History of Theology	2
	Islamic History III	2	Reciting the Kuran and Tajwid	2
	History of Ancient Philosophy	2	History of Islamic Philosophy	2
	Truco-Islamic Literature	2	History of Islamic Psychology	2
	Psychology of Religion	2	Sociology of Religion	2
	Logic		History of Turco-Islamic Art	2

3 rd Year	5th Semester		6th Semester	
	Courses	Credit	Courses	Credit
	Arabic	2	Arabic	2
	Tafsir	2	Methodology of Islamic Law II	2
	Study of Kuran Translation	2	Systematic Theology I	2
	Methodology of Islamic Law	4	History of Islamic Sects I	4
	Theological Schools	2	History of Religions II	2
	Modern Age Philosophy	2	History and Philosophy of	2
	History of Religions	2	Mysticism	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
			Elective Course	2
	Names of the Elective Courses	Credit	Names of the Elective Courses	Credit
	Hadith Criticism	2	Contemporary Comments on Hadith and Sunnah	2
	Reciting Kuran	2	Philosophy of History	2
	Semantic of the Kuran	2	History of Science in Islam	2
	Method and Critique of History	2	Islamic Arts and Aesthetics	2
	History of Islamic Institutions	2	History of Education in Islam	2
	Methodology in social Sciences	2	History of Turkish Thought	2
	Turkish Religious Music	2	Turkish Theologians	2
	Persian	2	Ottoman Turkish	2
			Turkish Religious Music	2
			Astronomy and Sciences of Space	2
			Persian	2
			Modern Biology	2

4th Year	7th Semester		8th Semester	
	Courses	Credit	Courses	Credit
	Islamic Law I	2	Islamic Law	2
	Systematic Theology	2	Religious Oratory	2
	History of Islamic Sects II	2	Philosophy of Religion II	2
	Religious Education	2	Islamic Philosophy of Ethics	2
	Philosophy of Religion I	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2	Elective Course	2
	Elective Course	2		
	Name of the Elective Course	Credit	Name of The Elective Course	Credit
	Contemporary Approaches to the Kuran	2	Kuranic Judgements and Modern Law	2
	Comparative Islamic Law	2	Contemporary Trends of Philosophy	2
	Religious Trends in Turkey	2	Contemporary Theological Problems	2
	Reciting the Kuran	2	Inter-religious Dialogue	2
	Contemporary Muslim Thinkers	2	Contemporary Islamic Trends	2
	Comparative Folk Believes	2	Contemporary Trends in Education	2
	Contemporary Mystical Trends	2	History of Turkish Republic	2
	Ottoman Turkish	2	Problems of Philosophy of Religion	2
	Paleography and Epigraphy	2	Philosophy of Ethics	2
	Public Relations			
	Text on Religion and Literature			
	Text on Classical Theology			
	Selected Hadith Texts			
	Religious Texts in Foreign Language			
	Arabic Eloquence			

APPENDIX - IV

The Ottoman Grand Vezirs and Prime Ministers (1839-1922)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Dates of Service</i>
1. Koca Husrev Mehmet Paşa	July 2, 1839-June 8, 1840
2. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa	June 8, 1840-December 4, 1841
3. Topal İzzet Mehmet Paşa	December 4, 1841-August 30, 1842
4. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa	August 30, 1842-September 28, 1846
5. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	September 28, 1846-April 28, 1848
6. İbrahim Sarım Paşa	April 29, 1848-August 12, 1848
7. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	August 12, 1848-January 26, 1852
8. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa	January 26, 1852-March 5, 1852
9. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	March 5, 1852-August 5, 1852
10. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa	August 6, 1852-October 3, 1852
11. Damat Mehmet Ali Paşa	October 3, 1852-May 13, 1853
12. Mustafa Naili Paşa	May 14, 1853-July 8, 1853
13. Mustafa Naili Paşa	July 10, 1853-May 29, 1854
14. Kibrisli Mehmet Emin Paşa	July 29, 1854-November 23, 1854
15. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	November 23, 1854-May 2, 1855
16. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa	May 2, 1855-November 1, 1856
17. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	November 1, 1856-August 6, 1857
18. Mustafa Naili Paşa	August 6, 1857-October 22, 1857
19. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa	October 22, 1857-January 7, 1858
20. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa	January 11, 1858-October 18, 1859
21. Kibrisli Mehmet Emin Paşa	October 18, 1859-December 23, 1859
22. Mehmet Rıstı Paşa	December 24, 1859-May 27, 1860
23. Kibrisli Mehmet Emin Paşa	May 28, 1860-August 6, 1861
24. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa	August 6, 1861-November 22, 1861
25. Mehmet Fuat Paşa	November 22, 1861-January 2, 1863
26. Yusuf Karnil Paşa	January 5, 1863-June 1, 1863
27. Mehmet Fuat Paşa	June 1, 1863-June 5, 1866
28. Mehmet Rıstı Paşa	June 5, 1866-February 11, 1867
29. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa	February 11, 1867-September 7, 1871
30. Mahmut Nedim Paşa	September, 1871-July 31, 1872
31. Midhat Paşa	July 31, 1872-October 19, 1872
32. Mehmet Rıstı Paşa	October 19, 1872-February 15, 1873
33. Ahmet Esat Paşa	February 15, 1873-April 15, 1873

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|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 34. Mehmet Rustu Paşa, Sivanizade | April 15, 1873-February 13, 1874 |
| 35. Huseyin Avni Paşa | February 15, 1874-April 25, 1875 |
| 36. Ahmet Esat Paşa | April 26, 1875-August 26, 1875 |
| 37. Mahmut Nedim Paşa | August 26, 1875-May 11, 1876 |
| 38. Mehmet Ruhu Paşa | May 12, 1876-December 19, 1876 |
| 39. Midhat Paşa | December 19, 1876-February 5, 1877 |
| 40. Ibrahim Ethem Paşa | February 5, 1877-January 11, 1878 |
| 41. Ahmet Hamdi Paşa | January 11, 1878-February 4, 1878 |
| 42. Ahmet Vefik Paşa | February 4, 1878-April 18, 1878 |
| 43. Mehmet Sadik Paşa | April 18, 1878-May 28, 1878 |
| 44. Mehmet Rustu Paşa | May 28, 1878-June 4, 1878 |
| 45. Mehmet Esat Saffet Paşa | June 4, 1878-December 4, 1878 |
| 46. Hayreddin Paşa | December 4, 1878-July 29, 1879 |
| 47. Ahmet Arifi Paşa | July 29, 1879-October 18, 1879 |
| 48. Mehmet Sait Paşa | October 18, 1879-June 9, 1880 |
| 49. Mehmet Kadri Paşa | June 9, 1880-September 12, 1880 |
| 50. Mehmet Sait Paşa | September 12, 1880-May 2, 1882 |
| 51. Abdurrahim Nureddin Paşa | May 2, 1882-July 11, 1882 |
| 52. Mehmet Sait Paşa | July 12, 1882-November 30, 1882 |
| 53. Ahmet Vefik Paşa | November 30, 1882-December 3, 1882 |
| 54. Ahmet Sait Paşa | December 3, 1882-September 25, 1885 |
| 55. Mehmet Kamil Paşa | September 25, 1885-September 4, 1891 |
| 56. Ahmet Cevdat Paşa | September 4, 1891-June 8, 1895 |
| 57. Mehmet Sait Paşa | June 8, 1895-October 1, 1895 |
| 58. Mehmet Kamil Paşa | October 2, 1895-November 7, 1895 |
| 59. Halil Rifat Paşa | November 7, 1895-November 9, 1901 |
| 60. Mehmet Sait Paşa | November 18, 1901-January 14, 1903 |
| 61. Mehmet Ferit Paşa | January 14, 1903-July 22, 1908 |
| 62. Mehmet Sait Paşa | July 22, 1908-August 4, 1908 |
| 63. Mehmet Kamil Paşa | August 5, 1908-February 14, 1909 |
| 64. Huseyin Hilmi Paşa | February 14, 1909-April 13, 1909 |
| 65. Ahmet Tefik Paşa | April 14, 1909-May 5, 1909 |
| 66. Huseyin Hilmi Paşa | May 5, 1909-December 28, 1909 |
| 67. Ibrahim Hakki Paşa | January 12, 1910-September 29, 1911 |
| 68. Mehmet Sait Paşa | September 30, 1911-December 30, 1911 |
| 69. Mehmet Sait Paşa | December 31, 1911-July 16, 1912 |
| 70. Ahmet Muhtar Paşa | July 22, 1912-October 29, 1912 |

71. Mehmet Kamil Paşa	October 29,1912-January23, 1913
72. Mahmut Şevket Paşa	January 23, 1913-June11, 1913
73. Sait Halim Paşa	June 12, 1913-February 3, 1917
74. MehmetTalat Paşa	February 4,1917-October 8, 1918
75. Ahmet İzzet Paşa	October 14, 1918-November 8, 1918
76. Ahmet Tevfik Paşa	November 11, 1918-January 12, 1919
77. Ahmet Tevfik Paşa	January 13, 1919-March 3, 1919
78. Damat Ferit Paşa	March 4, 1919-May 16, 1919
79. DamatFeritPaşa	May 19, 1919-July 20, 1919
80. DamatFeritPaşa	July 21, 1919-October 1, 1919
81. Ali Rıza Paşa	October 2, 1919-March 3, 1920
82. Salih Hulusi Paşa	March 8, 1920-April 2, 1920
83. Damat Ferit Paşa	April 5, 1920-July 30, 1920
84. Damat Ferit Paşa	July 31, 1920-October 17, 1920
85. AhmetTevfik Paşa	October 21,1920-November 4, 1922

APPENDIX - V

**Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Grand National Assembly and
the Turkish Republic (1923-1999)**

PRESIDENTS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Dates of Service</i>
1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk	October 29, 1923-November 10, 1938
2. İsmet İnönü, October,	November 11, 1938-May 22, 1950
3. Celal Bayar	May 22, 1950-May 27, 1960
4. Cemal Gürsel	May 27, 1960- March 28, 1966
5. Cevdet Sunay	March 29, 1966-March 28, 1973
6. Fahri Korutürk	April 6, 1973-April 6, 1980
7. Kenan Evren (Head of the State)	September 1980-November 8, 1989
8. Turgut Özal	November 9, 1989-May 15, 1993
9. Süleyman Demirel.	May 16, 1993- April 18, 1999.

PRIME MINISTERS

1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk	May 3, 1920-January 24, 1921
2. Fevzi Çakmak	January 24, 1921-July 9, 1922
3. Rauf Orbay	July 12, 1922-August 13, 1923
4. Fethi Okyar	August 14, 1923-October 27, 1923
5. İsmet İnönü	November 30, 1923-November 21, 1924
6. Fethi Okyar	November 4, 1924-March 2, 1924
7. İsmet İnönü	March 4, 1925-October 25, 1937
8. Celal Bayar	October 25, 1937-January 25, 1939
9. Refik Saydam	January 25 1939-July 8, 1942
10. Sükrü Saracoğlu	July 8, 1942-August 5, 1946
11. Recep Peker	August 5, 1946-September 9, 1947
12. Hasan Saka	September 9, 1947-January 14, 1949
13. Şemsettin Günaltay	January 15, 1949-May 22, 1950
14. Adnan Menderes	May 22, 1950-May 27, 1960
15. Cemal Gürsel	-May 28, 1960-November 20, 1961
16. İsmet İnönü	November 20, 1961-February 21, 1965
17. Suat Hayri Orguplu	February 21, 1965-October 22, 1965
18. Süleyman Demirel	October 27, 1965-March 19, 1971
19. Nihat Erim	March 19, 1971-April 17, 1972
Ferit Melen (acting P.M.)	April 17, 1972-April -29, 1972
20. Suat Hayri Orguplu	April 29, 1972-May 13, 1972

21. Ferit Melen	May 15, 1972-April 7, 1973
22. Naim Talu	April 12, 1973-January 25, 1974
23. Bulent Ecevit	January 25, 1974-November 17, 1974
24. Sadi Irmak	November 17, 1974-March 3, 1975
25. Süleyman Demirel	March 31, 1975-June 21, 1977
26. Bulent Ecevit	June 21, 1977- July 21, 1977
27. Süleyman Demirel	July 21, 1977-January 5, 1978
28. Bulent Ecevit	January 5, 1978-November 12, 1979
29. Süleyman Demirel	November 12, 1979-September 11, 1980
30. Bulent Ulusu	September 21, 1980-December 13, 1983
31. Turgut Özal	December 13, 1983- October 31, 1989.
32. Yıldırım Akbulut	November 9, 1989-June 23, 1991
33. Meşut Yılmaz	June 23, 1991 – November, 1991.
34. Süleyman Demirel	November 20, 1991-March 2, 1993
35. Tansu Çiller	June 16, 1993-June 28 1996
36. Necmettin Erbakan	July 8, 1996-June 30, 1997
37. Meşut Yılmaz	June 30, 1997-May 15, 1999
38. Bulent Ecevit	May 18, 1999

APPENDIX - VI

CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS OF HISTORY OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY

- 1288: Osman chief or amir of the *Osmanli*.
- 1326: Capture of Bursa (Brusa).
- 1326-39: Orhan forms a standing army.
- 1343: Turkish mercenaries assist John Cantacuzene.
- 1349: Turkish mercenaries assist in relief of Salonika.
- 1353: Turks occupy Gallipoli: later, Demotika and Chorlu.
- 1359: Murat I forms the Janissary Corps.
- 1361: Capture of Adrianople
- 1363: Hungarians, Bulgars, and Serbs defeated at Harmanli on the Maritza.
- 1365: Ragusan Republic makes Treaty of commerce with Murat.
- 1371: Bulgars and Serbs defeated at Samakov. Conquest of Macedonia.
- 1387: Genoese commercial Treaty with Murat.
- 1388: Venetian commercial Treaty with Murat.
- 1389: Battle of Kossovo. Serbia reduced to vassalage.
- 1393: Fall of Tirnovo. End of the Bulgarian kingdom.
- 1396: Sigismund's Franco-German Crusaders routed at Nikopol.
- 1400-2: Timur the Tatar invades Armenia. Battle of Angora.
- 1402-13: Civil war in Turkish dominions. Mehmet I becomes Sultan. Venice and Genoa renew their treaties.
- 1430: Capture of Salonika by Murat II.
- 1436: War with Hungary. Bosnia and Wallachia vassals of the Sultan.
- 1443: Murat defeated at Belgrad. Hunaydi's victories at Hermanstadt and Varsag.

- 1444 Treaty of Szegeddin. Vladislas of Hungary defeated at Varna.
- 1448: Hunyadi defeated at Kossovo. Wars with the Albvanians.
- 1451: Accession of Mehmet II the conqueror.
- 1453: Capture Constantinople.
- 1453-81: Conquest of Trebizond. Venetians drove from Euboea. Conquest of the Crimea. Subjugation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Wallachia. Friuli devastated. Capture of Otranto. But Mehmet II defeated at Belgrad, Semendria, and Rhodes.
- 1481-1512: Peaceful reign of Bayazit II. Construction of the Turkish fleet.
- 1512-20: Reign of Selim I. Religious massacres. War against Persia. Conquest of Syria, Egypt, and Arabia Felix. Turkish Sultans assume title of Khalifa (1517).
- 1520: Suleyman I the magnificent. Capture of Belgrad.
- 1521: Kinghts of St. John lose Rhodes.
- 1526: Battle of Mohacs and capture of Bvuda-Pesth.
- 1529: Siege of Vienna.
- 1535: Alliance with France. First capitulations.
- 1535-65: Successes of Kheir-ed-din Barbarossa, Dragut, and Piale, Conquest of North Africa. Battle of Prevesa. Siege of Malta.
- 1566: Siege of Sziget and death of Suleyman the magnificent. Accession of Selim the Sot. Rule of Grand Vizier Mehmet Sokilovich. Proposition to construct Suez and Voaga-Don canals.
- 1567: Treaty signed with Austria.
- 1568: Russians defeat Tatar-Turkish army at Astrakhan.
- 1571: Battle of Lepanto.
- 1573: Venice cedes Cyprus to the Porte.
- 1578: Death of Mehmet Sokolovich. Decay sets in.
- 1582: William Harebone in Constantinople.
- 1593: War with Austria. Michael attempts to form a United Rumania.

- 1596: Austrians defeated at Cerestes.
- 1592: Treaty signed between Ottomans and England.
- 1604: Capitulations to Henry IV
- 1606: Treaty of Sitvatorok.
- 1622: Sir Thomas Roe in Turkey. Accession of Murat IV. Drastic reforms.
- 1655: Blake visits Tunis and Algiers.
- 1656: Reforms of Mehmet Köprili.
- 1663: Agreement between Britain and Turkey respecting Barbary corsairs. War breaks out with Austria. Campaign in Hungary,. Battle of St Gotthard.
- 1669: Capitulation of Candia.
- 1672-76: War with Poland. Treaty of Zurawnow, Podolia deded to the Turks. French fleet in the Dardanelles. Capitulations of 1673. Death of Ahmed Köprili.
- 1683-96: War with Austria. Siege of Vienna. Relief by Sobieski. Coalition of Austria, Poland, Russia, and Venice against Turkey. Loss of Buda-Pesth, Belgrad, the Morea, and Azov. Defeats at Zlankamen and Zenta. Peace of Carlovitz.
- 1699: Treaty of Carlowitz was signed.
- 1711: Affair of the Pruth. Treaty of Falksen.
- 1715: Reconquest of the Morea.
- 1716: War with Austria. Battle of Pietervaradin. Fall of Belrad.
- 1718: Treaty of Passarovitz
- 1735-38: Russo- Austrian coalition against Turkey. Munnich captures Ochakov. Austrians defeated at Krotzka. Peace of Belgrad.
- 1738-68: Continued internal decay.
- 1768-74: Russo-Turkish war. Crimea ravaged. Battle of Chesme. Treaty of Kutchuk Kainaji.(Küçük Kenarca). European expert and artisans were invited to train Turkish Army.
- 1784: Meeting of Catherine and Jposeph at Kherson.
- 1787-91: Russo-Austrian coalition against Turkey. Austria withdraws. Treaty of Sistova. Russian victories. Treaty

- of Jassy. 1789. Accession of Selim III. Outbreak of the French Revolution. Anarchy in the provinces. Age of the independent pashas.
- 1798: Napoleon lands in Egypt. Nelson sinks the French fleet in Aboukir Bay.
- 1799: Failure of the Siege of Acre. Turkish army defeated at Aboukir. Napoleon returns to France.
- 1801: Abercrombie occupies Egypt.
- 1802: Peace of Amiens. Turkey and Russia joint-protectors of Septinsular Republic.
- 1804: Serbian peasant rising against the Janissaries.
- 1805: Treaty of Pressburg. Marmont in Dalmatia. Sebastiani and Italinski at Constantinople. Meeting of the first Serbian Skupshtina.
- 1807: Russia invade Rumania. Duckworth in the Dardanelles. Palace revolutions at Constantinople. Accession of Mehmud II. Mehmet Ali defeats the British in Egypt. Napoleon and Alexander meet at Tilsit "to form an Imperial Duumvirate of the world."
- 1809: Peace of the Dardanelles. Russians capture Rustchuk and sistovo.
- 1812: Last Campaigns of Napoleon. The Turks refrain from attacking Russia. Philike Hetairia formed at Odessa.
- 1815: Congress of Vienna. Rising of Milosh Obrenovich.
- 1817: Autonomy for Serbia. Obrenovich Prince.
- 1821: Unsuccessful rising of Greeks in Rumania. Out-break of the Revolution in the Morea. The "Peloponnesian Senate." Fall of Tripolitza. Massacres of Moslems and Jews.
- 1822: "Constitution of Epidauros." Massacres of Greeks at Constantinople and elsewhere. Failure of Turkish attempt to pacify the Morea.
- 1823: National Assembly at Argos. Arrival of Byron. Hostilities between Kolokotronis and the primates. Congress of Verona.
- 1824-26: Ibrahim lands at Modon and lays siege to Nafarino. Complete defeat of the Greeks. Ibrahim and Reshid

- Kioutages reduce the Morea. Greek Government removes to Porous. Accession of the Emperor Nicholas I.
- 1826: Wellington at St Petersburg. Massacres of the Janissaries. Mehmud training a New Army. Nicolas imposes the Convention of Akkerman.
- 1827: Treaty of London provides for intervention in Greece by Britain, Russia, and France. Battle of Navarino. Ibrahim evacuates the Morea.
- 1828-29: Arrival of John Capo d'Istria, first "President," in Greece. Mahmut denounces the Convention of Akkerman. The Russians invade Bulgaria and Armenia. Fall of Varna. Battle of Kulevcha. Diebich crosses the Balkans. The last Turks expelled from the Morea by a Franco-Greek force. Mahmut accepts Peace of Adrianople.
- 1829: Treaty of Adrianople with England and France. 10 million TL was promised to be paid by Turkey to Russia under article 9 of this treaty.
- 1830: Revolution in France and Poland.
- 1831: Pan-Mohammedan risings in Bosnia and Albania. Assassination of Capo d'Istria. Ibrahim over-runs Syria.
- 1832: Grand Vizier Resit Pasa defeated at Konieh.
- 1833: Russian fleet in the Bosphorus. Convention of Kutayeh and and treaty of Khunkiar-Iskelessi. Nesselrode and Metternich conclude Convention of Munchengratz. Uneasiness in England. Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece.
- 1835: Movement in Serbia against Obrenovich. "Constitution of Sretenje."
- 1839: Turks defeated at Nisibin. Death of Mehmud II. Accession of Abdul Mecit I. Hatti-Serif of Gul-Hane. Turkish fleet surrenders at Alexandria. European crisis. In Serbia, Milosh abdicates, and is succeeded by his son Muchael Obrenovich.
- 1840: Treaty of London stipulates for coercion of the Mehmet Ali. A new Penal Code, *Kanun-i Ceriam*, was put into effect. It was influenced by French Law.

- 1841: Straits Convention. Straford Canning Ambassador at Constantinople. A Commercial Code based on the french was introduced to Council of Justice.
- 1842: Alexander Karageorgevich Prince of Serbia.
- 1843: Constitution in Greece. Expulsion of Otho's Bavarian ministers.
- 1846: Mustafa Resit Pasa was appointed Prime Minister.
- 1847: Council of Public Instruction was reaised to the status of a Ministry.
- 1848: "The Year of Revolutions." The Russians in Rumania. Convention of Balta Liman. Russo-Turkish crisis with regard to the extradition of the Hungarian refugees.
- 1851: Rising in Bosnia headed by Ali Pasa Risvanbegovich.
- 1852: "The sick man is dying." Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French.
- 1853: The Question of the Holy Places. Menshikov at Constantinople. The Russians in Rumania. Nationalist movement in Greece. Trukish defensive victories at *Kalafat* and *Oltenitza*. Sea-fight at *Sinople*.
- 1854: Britain and France declare war. Paskievich evacuates the Principalities, and they are occupied by the Austrians.
- 1854-55: The Crimean and Kars campaigns. Sardinian troops co-operate. The Allies reduce Sevastopol but the Russians capture Kars. Operations in the Basltic and Pacific. Allies at the Piraeus.
- 1856: The Congress of Paris. The *Hatt-i Hümayün*
- 1857: Unsuccessful Nationlist Movement in India.
- 1858: Stratford de Redcliffe leaves Constantinople. Death of Resit Pasa. Riza Grand Vizier. Turks defeated at *Grahovo*.
- 1859: Col. Alexander Cusa, elected Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia.
- 1861-62: Accession of Abdul Aziz. Military revolt in Greece. Deposition of Otho. Nationalist movement tıreatens among the South Slavs: repressed by Omar.
- 1863: Polish insurrection. European cirsis.

- 1864: Danish War. Another crisis. Cession of Ionian Islands to Greece. Midhat vali of Bulgaria. George I, King of Greece.
- 1866: Porte consents to evacuation of the Serbian fortresses. Palace-revolution in Bukharest. Nomination of Prince Charles. Cretan insurrection. Prusso-Austrian War. Gen. Manteuffel visits St Petersburg.
- 1868-69: He is murdered. Accession of Milan. Turko-Greek crisis. Intervention of the Powers. Establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian Church. Inauguration of the Suez Canal.
- 1870: " L'annee terrible." Russia repudiates the Treaty of Paris, and is supported by Germany.
- 1875: Insurrection in Herzegovina; spreads to Bosnia; unrest among all the Southern Slavs. The Andrassy Note.
- 1876: " The Bulgarian Atrocities." Indignation in England. Fall of Abdul Aziz. Midhat in power. Campaigns against the Serbians and Montenegrins. The Powers impose an armistice at request of Prince Milan; terminated by the Serbians. Continued Turkish successes. Russian ultimatum. Bellicose speeches of Beaconsfield at Aylesbury and the Guildhall, and of Emperor Alexander at Moscow. Conference of the Powers at Constantinople. " Midhat's Constitution."
- 1877: Failure of the Conference. Fall of Midhat. Treaty of Peace with Serbia. Russia declares war. Turkish campaign in Montenegro. Russian invasion of Bulgaria and Armenia. Collapse of Turkish resistance. Renewal of war with Serbia. Insurrections in Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus.
- 1878: Armistice of Adrianople. British fleet in the Sea of Marmora. Treaty of San Stefano. European crisis. Emperor Alexander consents to Congress of Berlin. Treaty of Berlin. Cyprus Convention.
- 1879: Austro-German Treaty of Alliance signed at Gastein.
- 1879-80: The Albanians resist concessions to Montenegro. Mehmet Ali Pasa murdered at Ipek. Allied fleet compels cession of Dulcigno to Montenegro. German Military Mission sent to Turkey.

- 1881: French Acquisition of Tunis. Austro-Serbian Treaty. Persecution and exile of Midhat Pasa and others.
- 1882: Thessaly ceded to Greece. Rising of Ahmet Pasa Arabi in Egypt. Crisis with regard to Egyptian affairs. Italy joins the Austro-German Alliance.
- 1883: Bratianu interviews Bismarck. Germans secure lease of Ismid-Haidar Pasa Railway. Serious revolts in the Yemen.
- 1885: Rumelian Crisis. Serbo-Bulgarian War.
- 1886: Enforced abdication of Prince Alexander. Russian intrigues.
- 1888: Completion of Belgrad-Constantinople Railway.
- 1889: German Emperor visits Abdul Hamit at Constantinople. Anatolian Railway Company obtains concession to construct extension to Konieh.
- 1890: Fall of Bismarck.
- 1891: Troubles in Old Serbia between Muslim Albanians and Serbs. Committee of Union and Progress formed at Geneva.
- 1892: Renewed insurrection in the Red Sea vilayets: there is serious unrest among the Arab tribes during the next twenty years.
- 1893: Massacres of Armenians in different parts of Asiatic Turkey begin: result of Abdul Hamit's policy of Turkification and of agitation of Armenian nationalists: these massacres continue intermittently during the next twenty years.
- 1894: Fall and persecution of Stambulov.
- 1895: He is murdered.
- 1896: Cretan insurrection. Turko-Greek crisis.
- 1897: Edhem Pasa overruns Thessaly. Treaty signed at Constantinople.
- 1898: Second visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople. Anatolian Railway Company receives concession to undertake extension from Konieh to the Persian Gulf: Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons applauds this enterprise. Disorders in Greece as a result of the unsuccessful war. Prince George of Greece " High

- Commissioner of Crete.” Much Muslim emigration from the Island.
- 1899: Flight of Damad Mehmud Celelettin Paşa to Paris.
- 1900: Death of Ghazi Musir Osman Nuri Paşa, defender of Plevna.
- 1902: Disgrace and disappearance of Musir Fuat Paşa
- 1903: Austro-Russian scheme of reform for Macedonia. Continued Disorders in Macedonia. King Edward visits Vienna, and the Emperors Francis Joseph and Nicholas meet at Mursteg. King Alexander Obrenovich murdered in Belgrad. Prince Peter Karageorgevich becomes King: under influence of the regicides.
- 1904: Mursteg Programme submitted to the Porte: its failure. Anglo-French Agreement recognises Britain’s special position in Egypt. Agreements between Britain, France, and Spain with regard to Morocco. Franco-German estrangement on the Moroccan question. Manchurian War and revolutionary movement in Russia.
- 1905: Continued disorders in Macedonia.
- 1906: Central Committee of C.U.P. at Salonika.
- 1907: Anglo-Russian Partition of Persia into “spheres of influence.”
- 1908: Signs of approaching European intervention precipitate action by the Young Turks. Abdul Hamid restores the Constitution. Young Turks in power. Austria annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ferdinand proclaimed Tsar of Bulgaria at Tirnovo. Crete demands union with Greece.
- 1909-10: Reactionary movement at Constantinople repressed. Abdul Hamid deposed. Young Turk extremists in power. Methods of repression throughout the Empire during the three following years. Greece overawed: the Military League and the advent of Venizelos. The Agram Treason Trial and the Friedjung Case.
- 1911: Truko-Italan campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
- 1912: Treaty of Lausanne cedes African vilayets to Italy. Count Berchtold proposes “progressive decentralisation” for Macedonia. Consummation of Balkan League. The First Balkan War. Armistice and

- Conference of London. Ismail Kiamil Bey proclaims independence of Albania.
- 1913: Coup d'état at Constantinople. Enver in power. Rupture of the Armistice and further defeats of the Turks. Second Conference of London. Differences between the Balkan victors. The Second Balkan War. The Treaties of Bucharest, Constantinople, and Athens.
- 1914: World War I breakout.
- 1918: The Armistice of Mudros was signed and Turkish troops lay down their arms.
- 1920: March 19: The invading Christian armies abolish the last Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul. The centre of war of independence moves from Istanbul to Ankara. British forces captured Istanbul. Treaty of Sevres was signed between Sultan and England.
- April 23: Turkey elects a new parliament on the basis of direct adult franchise.
- September: The new Parliament declares that it has assumed power provisionally in order to pave the way for the restoration of the Caliphate and the establishment of an independent Islamic State.
- 1921: November 17: The last Ottoman caliph ordered to leave the country.
- November 22: The abolition of the Ottoman dynasty by the Turkish Parliament declared in the words: "The Caliphate belongs to the Ottoman Dynasty," It also declared: "The Caliph will be elected by the parliament from the most suitable members of that dynasty." It further declared that "The Turkish State is the protector of the Caliphate." Thus the Act made a distinction between the Caliphate and the monarchy.
- October 20: Franklin-Bouillon Pact or Angora Agreement or Franco-Turkish Treaty, between France and Turkey was signed.
- 1921-22: Greeks were defeated at Inona and Anatolia by Ismet Paşa and Mustafa Kemal respectively.

- 1923: July 24: Lausanne Treaty signed between Bulgaria, England, France Greece, Italy, Japan, Rumania, The Soviet Union, Turkey, and United Nation of America and endorsed by the Parliament on the 23rd August.
- September: Republican People's Party formed with Secularism as one of its objectives. Since it was the ruling party all the elected members of the Turkish parliament became members of that party.
- October 13: Ankara declared as the capital. Istanbul that had served as the centre of Islamic culture for the last so many centuries is abandoned.
- October: Turkey declared officially as a Republican State.
- 1924: March 3: The passing of the following Acts by the Parliament:
 Act 429—the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
 Act 430— Abolition of all traditional religious schools and nationalization of all educational institutions.
 Act—Abolition of the Caliphate system,. The last Caliph—Sultan Abdul Mecit—and all the members of the Ottoman dynasty expelled from Turkey. They were deprived of Turkish citizenship and their properties confiscated by the State. The Parliament approves new constitution which declares the end of the empire, the monarchy, the dynasty and the Caliphate. It stated, however, that “ the official religion of the Turkish State is Islam.”
- 1925: February: The parliament abolishes old Islamic Tax system known as tithes.
- November 25: By an Act (No. 671), the western type of hat was introduced as a part of the military uniform. The fez cap and other items of eastern dress prohibited.
- November 30: The tombs, convents of dervishes and *Zawiyya* (Sufi circle) closed and people prohibited from joining any *Tarikat* order. The *Şeyh* and the *dervish* disallowed to collect any tithe from the members of the public.
- December 31: The Turkish parliament passed the Act (No. 618) to enforce the Christian calendar in place of the old *Hijra* calendar. It also enforced the new working hours in place of the old which had provision for the prayer times.

- 1926: February 17: A new civil code adopted after the abolition of the old Islamic Law. The new code incorporated following pieces of legislation which were borrowed in toto from the legal system of the country names in the parenthesis:
- a. Civil Code 1926 (Switzerland)
 - b. Liabilities Act 1928 (Switzerland).
 - c. Trade Law 1928 (Germany).
 - d. Law of Punishment 1928 (Italy).
- 1928: April 20: Turkey declared “ a secular state” by a constitutional amendment of the Articles 2, 16, 26, and 38 which pertained to the Islamic character of the State.
- November 3: Arabic script abolished and the use of Latin script implemented (Act 1353).
- 1929: September: Teaching of Arabic and Persian languages stopped in the high schools.
- 1932: Turkish government decided to introduce the Ezan into Turkish language.
- 1934: January 3: Use of garments worn in religious circles banned outside religious centres.
- 1935: May 27: Friday ceased to be the day of religious significance and Sunday declared as a closed holiday of the week.
- 1941: June 2: An old decision of the Department of Islamic Affairs (March 6, 1933) banning the use of Arabic for the call to prayer from the Minaret implemented and the use of Turkish language enforced (Act No. 4055).
- 1949: Lectures about Islamic religion introduced in the primary schools. Later on, Islamic Studies was introduced at the University level and the first Faculty of Theology was opened at the University of Ankara.
- 1950: The Parliament amended an Act (No. 677) passed earlier and allowed the tombs of famous Turkish saints to be reopened—including the tomb of Ayub al-Ansari (a renowned companion of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.). Joining of *Tarikat* (Sufi orders) was also permitted. This was conceded under the Treaty of Human Rights which Turkey signed on November 4, 1950.

- The members of the Ottoman dynasty permitted to come back and settle down in Turkey.
- June 16: The parliament recognized the return of the use of Arabic language for the call to prayer, In fact, the Act made it optional either to use Arabic or Turkish for this purpose.
- 1951: October: The Ministry of Education decided to reopen the schools of Islamic Studies. This was followed by a series of measures towards the introduction of Islamic Education at different levels.
- 1960: Act 7344, decided to open High Islamic academies.
- 1965: June 26, The whole clerical officials of Islamic Religion, paid and supported by the State, and introduced into the State-budget.
- 1967: July 13: Act 903 re-established the legal ways for new private Islamic foundations.
- 1970: Presidency of Religious Affairs officially supported the organization of Kuranic courses all over country. Prof. Necmettin Erbakan founded *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP).
- 1971 April: Martial Law was proclaimed, initially for one month in 11 provinces, including Ankara and Istanbul., MNP was dissolved. Dr. Erbakan introduced a number of amendments to the Constitution, limiting individual civil rights and the autonomy of universities and radio and television stations as well as placing restrictions on the press and trade unions and giving the Government powers to legislate by decree. But he was opposed.
- 1972: Prof. Necmettin Erbakan founded another party called *Milli Salamat Partisi* (MSP); for the first time, the CHP voted against the prolongation of martial law.
- 1973: A Land Reform Law was passed under Naim Talu's government; martial law was finally lifted.
- 1974: Turkey was for the first time represented at an Islamic Summit Conference; Turkish troops landed Cyprus and rapidly won control of the area around Kyrenia on the northern coast.
- 1975: The Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared a ' Turkish Federated State' in northern Cyprus.

- 1978: Special military courts were established to hear cases of those arrested for martial law violations.
- 1980: The armed forces led by Gen. Evren seized power in a bloodless coup.
- 1981: A law was passed depriving the Universities of their traditional administrative autonomy and banning academics and students from political parties; a Consultative Assembly was formed to draft a new Constitution.
- 1982: A new Constitution was approved.
- 1983: The President lifted a 30 months ban on political activity and allowed political parties to be formed under strict rule.
- 1987: An amendment adopted in June increased the number of deputies in the Grand National Assembly from 400 to 450.
- 1988: An anti-terror bill was approved by the GNA.
- 1995: The Supreme Court cancelled the charges against four Kurdish former deputies again.

APPENDIX - VII

THE CONSTITUTION

In October 1981 the National Security Council (NSC), which took power in September 1980, announced the formation of a Consultative Assembly to draft a new constitution, replacing to that of 1961. The Assembly consisted of 40 members appointed directly by the NSC and 120 members chosen by the NSC from candidates put forwarded by the governors of the 67 provinces; all former politicians were excluded. The draft Constitution was approved by the Assembly in September `1982 and by a national referendum in November. Its main provisions are summarized below:

Legislative powers are vested in the unicameral Grand National Assembly, with 400 deputies, who are elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. Executive power is vested in the President, who is elected by the Grand National Assembly for seven-year term and is empowered to appoint a Prime Minister and senior members of the Judiciary, the Central Bank and broad casting organization, to dissolve the GNA and to declared a state emergency entailing rule by decree. Strict controls on the powers of trades unions, the press and political parties were also included. An appended 'temporary article'

automatically installed the incumbent President of the NSC as Head of State for a seven-year term, assisted by a Presidential Council comprising members of the NSC.

An amendment adopted in June 1987 increased the number of deputies in the Grand National Assembly from 400 to 450. The number was increased to 550 in a further amendment adopted in July 1995.