



**A CRITICAL STUDY OF NEHRU'S ATTITUDE  
TOWARDS THE PALESTINE PROBLEM**

**ABSTRACT  
THESIS**

**SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF**

**Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Political Science**

**By**

**Shabana Sultan**

**Under the Supervision of**

**Prof. Taufiq A. Nizami**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY**

**ALIGARH (INDIA)**

**2006**

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# *Abstract*

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## **A Critical Study of Nehru's Attitude Towards the Palestine Problem**

### **ABSTRACT**

Palestine has a great strategic position because it connects three big continents of the world - Asia, Africa and Europe. India's links with Palestine are old and historic and have been generally cordial. History is strewn with the evidences of mutually advantageous relations between India and the Arabs. Britain since the days of her empire in India had an eye on Palestine because it was the only route to India. So for maintaining a hold Britain decided to settle a foreign group in the area which would constitute a majority and a defensive offensive garrison. When Britain was developing plans for Palestine and looking for the ways and means to fulfill them the Jews were already on the scene, they were being persecuted all over the world, they had no home and no nationality for them, but a big majority. The British government realised very easily the necessity of controlling Palestine and began to pay attention to the mutual interests of the Jews and British imperialism. In 1830s the British Jews began to build Jewish charitable settlements in Palestine and presented a memorandum to British Lord Palmerstone, entitled, 'a scheme for the colonisation of Palestine'.

Competition within the world colonialist movement was on the increase because of the rise of the new imperialist forces. Also new areas suitable for the colonisation began to appear especially in the Arab East because of the signs of the collapse of the

Ottoman empire. British imperialism after a thorough survey of the political situation of the world arrived at a conclusion which emphasised utmost importance to Palestine, because Palestine constituted for the British an exact point where the three continents meet. Its control was essential for the Sinai and the Suez Canal that was the only road to India. It also formed the area from where any expansionist plan could be launched. Before World War I, Palestine was under Turkish occupation as a part of Ottoman empire. In the war the Palestinians helped the British in the overthrow of the Turkish hegemony, and in return got British promise of complete national independence for the Arabs. As the war ended the British government went back on its solemn assurances and resumed the role of divide and rule as it was doing in India. In 1915, another memorandum was presented to the British government, and in 1916, Arthur Balfour, the then Foreign Secretary, approved it. After some months of redrafting, it finally received official approval as the famous Balfour Declaration, which was formally made on November 2, 1917. The clauses in the Declaration were a deliberate exercise to mislead the Arabs. These clauses did not mention Palestine as the Arab people's territory, whether Christian or Muslim, who comprised 90 percent of its population and 97 percent of land ownership. Following the Balfour Declaration the Jews from all parts of the world began to pour in Palestine. The sudden increase in Jewish immigration caused wide spread unemployment and a serious economic depression, the Palestinians saw their country slipping from their grasp. They saw their land being bought up by foreigners. They saw European immigrants flooding into their ports. The tragedy of Palestine had shivered the world. Indian reaction to the Palestine problem was

represented and articulated by the Indian National Congress and its leader like Nehru, Indian nationalism was never reconciled to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Palestinian struggle and the Indian struggle for freedom was underlined by Western imperialism as the common enemy of both. India expressed its full sympathy with the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle for liberation from the imperialist clutches. In 1922, with the British efforts Palestine was declared a British mandatory by the League of Nations. Now Britain was free to do any thing with that particular piece of land. The mandate for Palestine substantially incorporated the major clauses of the Balfour Declaration. The mandate placed Palestine on the level of a British colony it enabled the British authorities to avoid the expected and natural opposition of any local administration to the Jewish plans. With the mandate more and more European Jews started to come in Palestine. They sprang up overnight like mushrooms. The Jewish agency was given open license in every kind of depredation against the Arabs, so as to make them flee for life. The reaction of the Palestinians to the appointment of Britain as mandatory was first angry and then violent, they demanded immediate self determination and independence but who was there to hear them.

The mandate system was condemned by the Indian National Congress. To Nehru, the problems faced by the Palestinians were not to be viewed in isolation but were part of an international phenomenon which had been generated by conflicting interests of democracy and Fascism, nationalism and imperialism, socialism and the decaying capitalism. Nehru viewed the Arab struggle against British imperialism in the context of India's struggle for freedom. Nehru held the British government responsible for the breach of promises they made to the Arabs. He visualised the problem of

Palestine as purely a national struggle for independence. Nehru appreciated the common bond of friendship between India and Palestine because of the sharing of common experience and circumstances.

India's involvement in the Arab liberation movement in Palestine was not confined to the level of leadership, it extended to the masses as well, for instance, September 27, 1936, was observed as Palestine Day. Meetings and demonstrations were organised all over India to express support for the struggle of the Palestinians against British imperialism and Zionist movement.

It was not that Nehru was insensitive towards the plight and sufferings of the Jews, but he made it clear that no one could sympathise with the Zionist movement aiming at the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine under the protection of the British imperialism. Nehru regarded the Balfour Declaration as a gross betrayal of Arabs by British imperialism. Nehru from the very beginning condemned the idea of the partition of Palestine, when the matter was reached to the U.N. General Assembly and the UNSCOP was established of which India was a member, India sided with the minority plan for a federal state of Palestine consisting of Arab and Jewish states with its capital at Jerusalem. But the UNSCOP's majority plan of the partition of Palestine was passed by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, with an international status for Jerusalem. The termination of the British mandate on May 14, 1948, saw not only the creation of Israel but also the attack on Israel by the forces of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Transjordan to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. The turn of events at the U.N. and on the ground of

Palestine had greatly disappointed Nehru, according to him, the Palestinian question had become more complicated than ever due to the new Arab - Israeli conflict. He strongly felt that neither side would be able to achieve any settlement through military means. India formally recognised Israel in 1950 and did not maintain diplomatic relations with it. India always remained to the forefront in the U.N. in defending the Arab cause either it was the Suez crisis of 1956 or the Arab - Israel war of 1967, India always played an important role in the West Asian politics.

The crux of the West Asian turbulence, since the time of the Second World War has been the Palestinian problem. The human tragedy imposed upon the people of Palestine by the creation of Israel has been unprecedented in the world history. The Palestinian people became refugees and driven out of their homes and hearths. They were illegitimately punished for the crimes that Hitler perpetrated on the Jews. The neighbouring states of Palestine were equally subjected to the Israeli aggrandisement, when she expanded her frontiers through aggression. The Palestine problem is getting worst every moment, millions of innocent people have been slaughtered. The whole population became refugee in its own land. After this much of blood bath it was felt that if Nehru's plan would have been accepted there might have been peace in the region.

The present study consists of five chapters revealing Indo - Palestinian relations and the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru towards the problem of Palestine and how after his death his policies gained momentum.



In the *first chapter* an attempt has been made to evaluate the pre-independence foreign policy of India and Nehru's contribution to it. India's entire background was consistently anti-imperialist and she necessarily sympathised with the struggle against Western colonialism. From the 1920s onwards Jawaharlal Nehru utilised the Foreign Department of the Indian National Congress as an agency to oppose British imperialism in India and abroad. In 1927, Nehru participated in the Conference of the Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels, which left a deep impression on him and brought him into personal contact with the leaders of the freedom struggles in various countries. During the course of the independence struggle Nehru through the Indian National Congress had spearheaded a global anti-colonial movement and had acquainted himself with various nationalist organisations. This was the beginning of the India's policy towards West Asia in general and the Arab - Israeli conflict in particular. India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom and got independence in August 1947. At that time the Cold War had started and the world was divided into two power camps, India was too immature and too big a country to become a camp follower, so Nehru very wisely beckoned towards an independent foreign policy stance and adopted non-alignment as the principle of India's foreign policy.

The *Second chapter* discusses the historical perspective of West Asia, its geo-strategic location, political history, Suez Canal crisis and its oil wealth which rendered West Asia as the biggest trouble spot in the world. The 1973 oil embargo and India's support to it. West Asia because of its location and strategic significance, has played an important role in the international affairs, it was here that great power interests clashed, and it was here that decisive

battles were fought. British policy since the development of her empire in India regarded West Asia as the life line of the empire and attempted to control all possible approaches to the area and prevented the penetration by other great powers. Though India had relations with the West Asian countries much before the advent of the British rule in India, but it strengthened more and more after the similarities between the freedom struggle of India and Palestine against the British imperialism and Nehru's stand in the U.N. and outside in tackling the Suez problem.

The *Third chapter* discusses the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its consequences on the region, how it violated the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and how far India condemned this Declaration. After this Declaration the Palestinian people were reduced to the status of refugees and derived out of their homes. All the evidences suggest that the Declaration was a violation of the principles of International Law. The British or any country had no right to establish a national home for Jews on the Palestinian soil. If they had sympathy with them why didn't they establish them in England or any other European country.

The *Fourth chapter* deals with the study of the Palestine question being brought to the U.N. and India's selection to the UNSCOP. Formation of the Israel state which led to the Arab - Israel wars and India's response to it. The June 1967 war after which the situation in West Asia wretched out of perspective, the torrential violence abruptly unleashed by Israel against the Arab countries. India considered the 1967 attack on Palestine as totally unjustified and against the principles if International Law and practice of morality.

The *Final chapter* covers the recent major incidents in the West Asian region and their effect on the entire international community. The 9/11 terrorist attack on U.S. and America's call to the world to join the international coalition against terrorism. Its war with Iraq where thousands of innocent people have been killed. India condemned the attack on trade towers and pledged support for the U.S. led campaign against terrorism but it opposed the unilateral military action by U.S.A. and U.K. and also a regime change in Iraq imposed from outside forces not having proven popular legitimacy. The Iranian opposition to the Israeli dictate. The Jewish withdrawal from the occupied territories and the U.S. politics to safeguard its interests in the whole of West Asia. The inhumane crime done with the lives of the Palestinian Arabs and how the dirty British politics disturbed innocent lives and the West Asian stability. *The partition of Palestine brought permanent trouble in the region, now it is thought that if Nehru's plan of a federal state would have been accepted then the lives of thousands of innocent people might have been saved, but its too late to realise.*

The purpose of this study is to throw some light on the attitude of Nehru towards the Arabs in particular and in general to see India's foreign relations and its assistance to the countries in difficult circumstances.

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
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


**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY  
ALIGARH (INDIA)  
2006**

*DEDICATED TO*  
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*&*

*MY FATHER (ANNA)*



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*Centre for Nehru Studies*

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that **Ms. Shabana Sultan** has pursued research for Ph. D. Degree on the topic entitled "**A Critical Study of Nehru's Attitude Towards the Palestine Problem**" under my supervision and guidance.

Her research work is original and in my opinion suitable for the submission for the Award of the Ph. D. Degree of the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

*T. A. Nizami*  
(TAUFIQ A. NIZAMI)

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*Shabana Sultan*  
*( Shabana Sultan )*

# *Preface*

## Preface

India always maintained good relations with the countries of the world. Its relations with the countries of West Asia are age old. The advent of India's pro-West Asia policy and Indian response to the Palestinian issue can be traced back to the post World War I period, during which the Indian attitude was represented and articulated by the Indian National Congress and its leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian nationalism had always close kinship with Arab nationalism and was never reconciled to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its consequences. When the Ottoman empire was dismembered it gave rise to the problem of the formation of new political units based on some acceptable concept of nationality, this problem was substantially resolved with the creation of the mandate system. And in that context Britain got mandate over Palestine, the mandate for Palestine substantially incorporated the major clauses of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Arabs were not mentioned by name in any of the articles defining the mandate as in the Balfour Declaration. The mandate system was condemned by the Indian National Congress as a cloak to cover the imperialist greed. To Nehru, the problems faced by the Palestinians were not to be viewed in isolation but were part of an international phenomenon which had been generated by conflicting interests of democracy and Fascism, nationalism and imperialism, socialism and decaying capitalism. Nehru viewed the Arab struggle against British imperialism in the context of India's struggle for freedom.

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The Palestine problem is getting worse every moment. Millions of innocent people have been slaughtered, the whole population is facing refuge in its own land. Today it is felt that if Nehru's plan would have been accepted the region might have been in peace.

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immature and too big a country to become a camp follower, so Nehru very wisely beckoned towards an independent foreign policy stance and adopted non-alignment as the principle of India's foreign policy.

The *Second chapter* discusses the historical perspective of West Asia, its geo-strategic location, political history, Suez Canal crisis and its oil wealth which rendered West Asia as the biggest trouble spot in the world. The oil embargo and its impact on the world. India's relations with the region and Nehru's stand in the U.N. and outside in tackling the Suez problem.

The *Third chapter* explains the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its consequences on the region, how it violated the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and how far India condemned this declaration.


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The *Final chapter* covers the recent major incidents in the West Asian region and their effect on the entire international community. The Jewish withdrawal from the occupied territories and the U.S. politics to safeguard its interests in the whole of West Asia.

The purpose of this study is to throw some light on the attitude of Nehru towards Arabs in particular and in general to see India's foreign relations and its assistance to the countries in difficult circumstances.



# POLITICAL MAP OF THE WORLD



**REFERENCES**

| Country                             | Capital         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. ALBANIA                          | Tirana          |
| 2. ALGERIA                          | Algiers         |
| 3. ARGENTINA                        | Buenos Aires    |
| 4. AUSTRALIA                        | Canberra        |
| 5. AUSTRIA                          | Vienna          |
| 6. BELGIUM                          | Brussels        |
| 7. BRAZIL                           | Brasilia        |
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| 9. CUBA                             | Havana          |
| 10. CZECH REPUBLIC                  | Prague          |
| 11. DENMARK                         | Copenhagen      |
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| 13. FINLAND                         | Helsinki        |
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| 15. GERMANY                         | Berlin          |
| 16. GREECE                          | Athens          |
| 17. HUNGARY                         | Budapest        |
| 18. INDIA                           | New Delhi       |
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| 21. KOREA                           | Seoul           |
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## ANTARCTICA

Antarctica is a continent located at the South Pole. It is the only continent that is almost entirely covered in ice. The continent is surrounded by the Southern Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. It is the only continent that has no permanent population.

## *Chapter – I*

### *Introductory*

*a. Pre-Independence Foreign Policy Postures*

*b. India's Foreign Policy with Special Reference to*

*NAM*

*c. Cold War Rivalry and its Impact on India*

## Chapter-I

# Introductory

India has never been an expansionist power. It never went out of its frontiers to wage war. It never sought to build empires. If anything it only spread the message of peace and harmonious coexistence. Nehru often talked of the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom. What was this conditioning? The struggle for India's independence was led by the apostle of non-violence and peace- Mahatma Gandhi. That was a conditioning in itself. We appealed to what was good and noble in the British character and sometimes it worked. We probably helped the British to see reason.

The struggle for freedom also conditioned our mind to look upon colonialism, capitalism and imperialism as inimical not only to humanitarian values but the basic interests of Asia and Africa and even the world as a whole. We were conditioned to hate racialism. It is from these ancient ethos and recent experiences that the outlook of modern India is born. Being tolerant, India would not become bigoted, being peaceful, it would not brandish the sword, and being independent in mind and thought, it would not align with either of the contending blocs.

India has faith in the innate good sense of the world, for even when powerful sections of the European ruling classes bowed to Fascism and Nazism, the world as a whole rejected these pernicious ideologies. Nehru wrote: "*my whole nature rebelled against them*".<sup>1</sup>

There was no one in the Indian nationalist movement who knew global trends so well as Nehru. Of course he had certain advantages because of his family background and opportunities it provided. He had a European teacher and

got the best possible education. But while other Indian students in England were preparing themselves to become pillars of Raj, Nehru was deeply moved by the new winds stirring in Europe. Nehru refused to join the bandwagon of officers because in Nehru the revolt against the subjugation of this country was spreading like a prairie fire.

Nehru was a committed socialist, though not a Marxist as such. In fact, he was opposed to being identified exclusively with any body of thought. He was eclectic, borrowing from the best of all traditions. He was opposed to violence, considering war and conquests as barbarous and unworthy of civilised human beings. He was staunch independent and would not accept the dictates of other people. He came into conflict with the question of imperialism and then with Indian Communists. As a democrat, he considered accommodation an essential virtue.

Nehru saw politics in terms of social change and was also aware of the play of economic interests in political developments. He knew that the foreign policy of the major Western powers was influenced by interests of the capitalist class. Nehru wrote: *"this aggressive policy (of the great powers) is due to the capitalist influence, is dictated by the interests of the British plutocracy and we in India have to pay for their lust for profit."*<sup>2</sup> Nehru believed that future belongs to socialism. He admired the new society that the Soviet Union was creating and hoped that the Soviet experiment would blaze a new trail for the world. He also thought that the Soviet Union was the main bulwark against imperialism. Nehru adopted the policy of non-alignment because for him alignment with either of the power blocs was dangerous for the freedom of India. The large number of the third world countries that later become non-aligned had shared India's experiences in varying degrees and they also influenced by pragmatic considerations.

India's relations with the Arab world are age old and historic and generally cordial. The ancient Babylonian and Egyptian culture has resemblance to the brilliant culture of Harrappa and Mohanjodaro. History is strewn with the evidences of mutually advantageous relations between the two regions, for example, it was the Indian muslin which the Egyptians used to wrap the mummies, similarly it was the Arab craftsman which is believed to have produced figurines for the Indian Temples and homes. After the advent of Islam, the Arab-Indian contacts were further strengthened. It was the Arabs who attempted the first written history of India and drew its maps. They learnt a great deal from Indian science and medicine and spread it across the world.

With the onset of Industrial Revolution in Europe these two regions came under a slow but steady process of commercial penetration and political subjugation. India became a British colony and West Asia the only route to it. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Western powers scrambled for a foothold in the Arab world to reach out to India. Thus, West Asia became a region not only important in itself but as the way to somewhere else, and that somewhere else was India.

The experience of colonialism was same for both the regions, the development of Indian attitude towards the Palestine question and subsequent policies towards the Arab-Jew conflict were the outcome of these colonial experiences. In supporting the Arabs, treating the Jewish problem in West Asia as a minority question and hence opposing partition, the Indian National Congress fought for its concept of a secular Indian state based upon the territorial integrity of the Indian Sub-Continent. As is given in detail in the subsequent chapters that the development of India's attitude towards the Palestine problem was consistent and represented a varying blend of self interest, adjustment to changes in the political conditions governing the situation as well as convictions relating to what was right and what was wrong. The Palestine issue in its evolution to its present

state passed through four distinct phases, the first phase related to the problems from the Ottoman empire and the subsequent issue of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the second phase, consisted of enormously complicated situation which emerged from the Nazi holocaust in Europe and flow of Jewish refugees into Palestine. The third phase was related to the partition of Palestine and the problem of the treatment and resettlement of the Arab refugees. The fourth and last phase was characterised by the juxtaposition of Arab hostility to the new Jewish state of Israel and the emergence of Arab nationalism collided with the super power interest in the region. The Indian National Congress and subsequently the Government of India responded to the evolution of the Palestine issue in each of its phases.

**a. Pre – Independence Foreign Policy Postures:**

The end of the First World War found India in a state of excitement and unrest. The tempo of political activity became accelerated. The events of war and the new ideas to which it gave birth could not fail to affect India profoundly. India's loyal and generous response and her immense contribution in war earned for her a grateful British promise of ultimate 'responsible government' and dominion status within the empire. India was represented at the Imperial war Cabinet and the Imperial war Conferences of 1917-18. At the conclusion of the war India, like the dominions signed the peace treaties and was represented at the League of Nations. But even after it foreign affairs were never allowed to be debated in the Indian Legislature. The Viceroy of India, as an agent of the British government, retained exclusive and the nascent Indian outlook on world affairs. When the Indian National Congress began to take notice of the British foreign policy and its implications for the empire's colonies, it developed a strong urge to maintain her independent foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies which were being pursued by the Imperial powers for their own purposes. The Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 greatly disappointed the Indians, they

considered them to be an inadequate recompense of India's sacrifices during the war and a breach of earlier British promises about granting India self-government. In seeking independence from Britain both in the national and international spheres and in employing the method of non-cooperating with British government for its achievement, the Congress adopted not isolation, but international cooperation. In its fight for freedom, the Indian National Congress increasingly voiced sympathy with the freedom struggles of other countries. The first such country to receive sympathy from Indian National Congress was Turkey. The Muslims were full of misgivings about the fate of Turkey. The Khilafat Conference occupied itself with mobilising Indian opinion for exerting pressure on the British government to do justice to Turkey and the Caliph. In the meanwhile on 13<sup>th</sup> April, 1919, the Amritsar massacre had occurred, killing about four hundred and injuring twelve hundred completely unarmed persons for the fault of holding a public meeting in defiance of the government order of holding public meetings this gruesome act was made.

On May 14<sup>th</sup>, 1920, the Gazette of India Extraordinary announced the terms of the treaty of Sevres dismembering Turkey, it caused great indignation among Muslims. By that time it had also become clear that the British were far from feeling repentant about the Amritsar massacre. All this made a revolutionary change in the nature of the people of India. The Indian National Congress at its regular annual session held in December, 1920, adopted the attainment of Swaraj (self-government or independence) by the people of India and by all legitimate and peaceful means as its goal and laid down the framework of an active and well knit organisation based on mass support.<sup>3</sup> Nehru defined it as:

*"The whole look of Congress changed, European clothes vanished and soon only khadi [cloth produced by hand spinning and hand weaving which Gandhi popularised] was to be seen, a new class of delegates, chiefly drawn from the lower middle class became the type of Congressmen, the language used became*

*increasingly Hindustani or sometimes the language of the province where the session was held, as many of the delegates did not understand English, and there was also a growing prejudice against using a foreign language in our national work, and a new life and enthusiasm and earnestness became evident in Congress gatherings.*<sup>4</sup>

In May, 1921, on the implications of breaking up of a war between Britain and Afghanistan, Gandhi declared, that it would be a crime to help the British government as it had lost the confidence of the Indian nation.<sup>5</sup>

In November, 1921, the Delhi resolution of Congress disassociated itself from the imperial foreign policy of Britain, was a watershed in the history of entire colonial world. It asserted that the Viceroy's government did not represent Indian opinion since it pursued the imperial objectives.

The resolution informed the neighbouring and other non-Indian States that ;

- a) The present Government of India in no way represents Indian opinion and that their policy has been traditionally guided by considerations more of *holding India in subjugation than of protecting her border* ;
- b) India as a self governing country can have nothing to fear from neighbouring states or any state, as her people have no designs upon any of them and hence no intentions of establishing any trade relations hostile to or not designed by the people of such states ;
- c) The people of India regard most treaties entered into with the Imperial government, and would therefore urge the states having no ill will against the people of India and having no designs to injure her interests, to refrain from entering any treaty with the Imperial power.

The Indian National Congress as it was active to deal nationalism also worked to make itself appropriate to deal with the international relations. At the



same time it didn't want to go far from the Western countries, it wanted to work in cooperation with them.

This shows that the Indian National Congress was neither thinking of neutralism or isolation nor in terms of conflict with the West, It considered the struggle for freedom as a part of the 'global struggle.'

Jawaharlal Nehru, who at that time was working as the Vice-President of the Allahabad district Congress Committee of the Indian National Congress, was watching each and every message of world situation, he was having it in mind that isolation was both undesirable and impossible, he had to put India fit into the world. He was convinced that the only way of looking at Indian problems was to see them in world setting.

Reacting over the mandate system of Britain and France, the Congress Called it as a cloak to cover the imperialist greed. The Congress did not limit its sympathy for the Arabs to those in the mandated territories. In 1924, the All India Congress Committee sent its sympathy to the Egyptian people and hoped that they would rise superior to the terrorism set up in their land.<sup>6</sup>

The Congress heavily denounced the Balfour Declaration of 1917 as the betrayal of Arabs by the British. For Nehru the Arab struggle against British imperialism in Palestine was as much a part of this great world conflict as was India's struggle for freedom.<sup>7</sup>

During the year 1926-27, Nehru visited Italy, Switzerland, England, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and then U.S.S.R. This trip of Nehru greatly contributed to the ever growing awareness of international affairs, while in Berlin, Nehru came to know about the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which was going to be held in Brussels, hearing to this, an idea came to his mind that the Indian National Congress might take an official part in this Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. His idea was approved by the Indian

National Congress and he was appointed as the Indian Congress representative for this purpose. This Conference gave an excellent opportunity to Nehru to express his views at an international forum and to assess the mood and course of international affairs and events.

At Brussels invited members of various developed national liberation movements and various Communist parties joined together to discuss common problems; sympathetic anti-imperialists from the metropolitan countries and prominent intellectuals lent their weight to the proceedings. Sun Yat Sen's widow Song Qingling, brought to the Congress the legitimacy of a national movement struggling against the informal empire of the Western powers in China, ironically a merely two months before the Kuomintang Communist party alliance collapsed in violence in Shanghai, initiated by his sister's husband, Chiang Kai Shek. Nehru invited Song Qingling to the next session of the Indian National Congress, but the British government refused her visa.

Nehru spoke against western domination over Asian and African countries and successfully tied up India with changing world situations and other world problems. He said, "*India is a world problem and as in the past, so in the future other countries and people will be vitally affected by the conditions of India.*"<sup>8</sup>

In the Conference, Nehru revealed acute consciousness of Asian affairs. He said, "*standing on the watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs.*"<sup>9</sup> He also addressed the African Nationalist sentiments and asked the international conscience not to forget the countries of Africa as they had suffered so much and had been exploited too much in the past. For him it was a narrow out look to think of China, India and other countries and to ignore or forget Africa.<sup>10</sup>

The resolution on India, drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru, accorded the warm support of the Conference to the liberation of India from foreign domination and all kinds of exploitation as an essential step in the full emancipation of the people of the world. The people and workers of other countries should fully cooperate in the task and in particular take effective steps to prevent dispatch of foreign troops to India and the retention of an army of occupation in India. In the last paragraph of the resolution Nehru expressed the hope of the Conference that the Indian National Movement would base its programme on the full emancipation of the peasants and workers of India, "without which there can be no real freedom", and would cooperate with the movements for emancipation in other parts of the world.<sup>11</sup>

The Brussels Conference decided to establish the League against Imperialism for national independence, to organise cooperation between the nationalist movements in the colonial countries, labour and anti-imperialist movements in the exploiting countries. Nehru along with Albert Einstein, Romain Roland, Madam Sun Yat Sen, and George Lansbury elected one of the honorary Presidents of this League.

In Brussels Nehru noted in one of his speeches that in the years to come, it would be American imperialism that would be the major threat to the world, and that it would either replace British imperialism as the major threat or lead to the formation of a powerful Anglo-Saxon bloc to dominate the world.<sup>12</sup>

The participation of Nehru as the representative of the Indian National Congress in the Brussels Congress of 1927, marked a landmark in the evolution of India's foreign policy. The Brussels Congress greatly influenced him and helped him to create new interests and new ways of looking at the world affairs.

From Brussels Conference the Indian National Congress adopted an ideological character. It accepted the Marxist interpretation of the nature of the

Imperialism and Colonialism though not the ways of Communists. While in Russia, Nehru was so fascinated by the Russian socialism that he adopted it as one of the fundamentals of the Indian National Congress, and by now there had emerged a socialist youth wing in the Indian National Congress under Nehru's leadership and the atmosphere in the country was one of pervading socialist thought. Contacts among various countries and their nationalist movements became more frequent.

In 1928, the Congress warmly assured the people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq for its full support and sympathy with them in their struggle for freedom from Western imperialism, which was also a great menace to the Indian struggle.<sup>13</sup> The Congress declared that the Indian struggle was a part of the general world struggle against world imperialism and hence desired that India should develop contact with other countries and peoples who were also combating imperialism, It also decided to open foreign department in its office to develop such contacts.<sup>14</sup>

The Congress in 1931-32, showed great awareness of the value of the world opinion, particularly, the American opinion in advancing India towards the goal of independence. When the Congress Working Committee decided on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1932, to resume Civil Disobedience Movement it invited the free peoples of the world and their governments to watch the struggle and extend their support. In a message to the United States Gandhi hoped that his numerous American friends would watch the movement and use the influence of their great country for the sake of oppressed humanity.<sup>15</sup>

In 1933, Nehru took the opportunity to share his thoughts with the countrymen through a series of articles on the national and international situation, which were subsequently published in a pamphlet entitled 'Whither India', he emphasised that it was only in a world perspective that Indian problem of independence could be properly understood, the Congress followed the lead given by Nehru.

The world scenario was changing dramatically. Nazism and Fascism were gaining strength day by day, Nehru was painfully watching the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. He disapproved their theory and practice and hated their way of ruling. Nehru asked for no truce or pacts with these dictatorial parties. India was critically watching the activities and the behaviour of the world countries. As after the World War I the League of Nations was founded in 1920, with a view to safeguard the nations from the scourge of war, and to solve the problems between nations through mutual settlement, the Indian National Congress was watching the activities of the League and the big power pressure upon it.

India's opposition to Nazism and Fascism was clearly seen in its reaction to the Italian invasion and conquest of Abyssinia. In October 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia and the world was shocked. Nehru condemned the brutal fascist imperialism, he strongly criticized the great powers and the League of Nations for this aggression, he said that this aggression has shown the hypocrisy and duplicity of the great powers and utter futility of the League of Nations. In his Presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936, he described the bloody and cruel war in Abyssinia as an example of how hungry and predatory imperialism behaved in its mad search for colonial domains. In this connection Nehru specially criticised the role of Great Britain for indirectly encouraging the Italian aggression and when Britain decided to recognise the Italian conquest, Nehru disassociated India from this move, 'the British government, he declared, 'may forget their solemn pledges and betray the League and the cause of peace, but India must make it abundantly clear that she will not be a party to this shameful policy.' The Congress expressed India's sympathy with the Abyssinian people and declared their fight to be a part of the old exploited nation's fight for freedom.<sup>16</sup> It observed May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1936, as the Abyssinia Day by holding meetings and processions in sympathy with Abyssinia over her defeat.<sup>17</sup>

Nehru was equally conscious of imperialist designs for maintaining colonialism in Arab countries. His sympathies were entirely with the Arabs in the struggle against British rule as well as against the aims of the Zionists. Nehru admitted that the Jews had the right to look Jerusalem as their Holy land but not to settle there as the natives. He criticised the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as the gross betrayal of Arabs by British imperialism. Against this background the Congress Working Committee in 1936, sent its greetings to the Arabs of Palestine and sympathised with them in their struggle for independence,<sup>18</sup> and September 27, 1936 was celebrated as the Palestine Day all over India. A mass meeting was held in Allahabad in support of the Arabs, speaking on the occasion Nehru observed that in Palestine the problem concerned the Arabs and the Jews but it was never a religious problem as some of the Indian Muslims thought to be. It was a problem of growing nationalism desiring freedom from the clutches of imperialism, he appreciated the brave Arab people for putting up a valiant fight in the cause of national independence. Nehru believed that the solution to the Palestine problem was for the Arabs and the Jews endeavour to create an independent democratic state in Palestine with adequate protection of Jewish rights. If Nehru's plan would have been accepted the problem might have resolved much earlier.

The outbreak of Civil war in Spain in 1936 shook Indians specially Nehru. Since the early thirties Spain had been the scene of grim tussle between the reactionary elements - the Land, the Church and the Army aided by Fascist Italy and Nazist Germany on one side and the Republicans including Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists on the other side.

In the Spanish struggle all the values of European civilisation - democracy, socialism, human dignity, self determination and individual freedom which Nehru held dear to his heart seem to be at stake. In the annual session of the Congress in 1936, Nehru put the national spotlight on Spain,

*"In Spain today, he declared, our battles are being fought and we watch this struggle not merely with the sympathy of friendly outsiders but with the painful anxiety of those who are themselves involve in it."*<sup>19</sup>

The struggle between the democratic forces and the Fascist forces in Spain was not only significant for Spain but for India also. When the Spanish Republic was destroyed Nehru's faith in the West was severely shaken. "In February, 1937, Nehru appealed to the Indian people to give whatever material aid they could to the Republicans in Spain, particularly medical supplies and food or money with which to purchase them."<sup>20</sup> He was so attached to the Republican side that in June, 1938, he visited Spain as a guest of the Republican government.

India denounced the Japanese attack on China in 1937. When the Congress held its annual session in February, 1938, it declared that the Japanese aggression was fought with the gravest consequences for the future of world peace and freedom in Asia and reiterated the call for boycotting Japanese goods.<sup>21</sup> It declared June 12<sup>th</sup>, 1938, as the China Day throughout India and decided to send an ambulance unit to China, on 1<sup>st</sup> September, 1938 this unit sailed from Bombay to China. This action of Congress was much appreciated by the Chinese people, they seemed anxious and eager for friendship with India. Nehru visited China in August, 1939, he spent a fortnight there as the guest of Chinese government, he was treated with great hospitality.

Nehru's opposition to Fascism, Nazism and the British imperialism was further increasing. The German aggression on Czechoslovakia and the Munich Agreement aroused in Nehru anger and distrust, this incident aroused and pained all Indians. The international situation was deteriorating and it was likely to be heading towards the Second World War. On the one hand the Congress strongly criticised the aggressive action of Fascism and Nazism and extended its support to the victims, and showed its willingness to join hands with other peoples of the world in the preservation of peace and freedom. On the other hand it insisted on

the immediate recognition of Indian independence and repeatedly declared that imperialism itself was one of the greatest causes of war, but Britain was not willing to accept the demand of India's independence, Nehru thought that so long as freedom was not given to India there would continue a contradiction in India's policy towards war, Congress support for British imperialism in war was obviously a wrong policy for the country. This conflict would only resolve when subjection was removed and a free India could determine her own policy in regard to war and peace as well as other matters.<sup>22</sup>

Congress was ready to help Britain in prosecuting war if it could thereby secure India's independence. On the other hand under Nehru's guidance Congress was pursuing its own foreign policy. Thus in March, 1939, at its annual session it dissociated India entirely from British foreign policy and described it as one of the deliberate betrayal of democracy, an end to the system of collective security, enemies of democracy and freedom.<sup>23</sup> It stated that in the world crisis its sympathies are entirely with the people who stood for democracy and freedom, but it also recalled Congress opposition to all attempts to impose a war on India. In the first week of September, 1939, the Second World War broke out, on 3<sup>rd</sup> September, 1939, the British Viceroy Lord Linlithgo declared India a belligerent state,<sup>24</sup> without consulting the Indian Legislative Assembly he sent Indian troops abroad. The Congress considered this neglect as an insult and humiliation, it dissociated itself from British foreign policy and issued a resolution which might be considered as a serious attempt on the part of India towards the formulation of her independent foreign policy. It was for the people of India to determine whether India would join a war or not. Nehru, who was visualising a danger to the international code of conduct and democratic values was quick to issue a statement of war aims which included the liberation of countries taken by Hitler and Mussolini, the ending of Nazism and Fascism, no truce or pacts with these powers and the extension of democracy and freedom by winding up of imperialist structure and the application of the principles of self determination.



Though Nehru failed to convince Gandhi about the prevalent international situation, he, however, happened to be the sole draftsman of this resolution.<sup>25</sup>

The Viceroy's response was vague, dismissing Congress demand for the immediate transfer of power as impractical, and to consult different communities, political parties and princes at the end of the war to consider the modification in the act of 1935 so that India may attain her due place in the great dominions. The Congress considered the response to be inadequate and disappointing, it called upon its ministries in the provinces to resign. The Congress therefore, decided to launch civil disobedience movement. Mean while the war had taken a turn for the worse. In June, 1940, France had collapsed. Hitler was marching from one victory to another and England stood open to invasion. The Congress, notably Nehru grew more sensitive to the world situation. Congress Working Committee met in an emergency session and again put its demand for independence, but the British response was increasingly bolder and more reassuring. The British government emphasised the difference among the Indian parties and invited a certain number of representative Indians to join the war advisory council, the Congress rejected the proposal. Though, Nehru was not the Congress President at that time but he came to the front and said that Congress could not participate actively until its freedom was acknowledged. On the day following Pearl Harbour, Nehru expressed his skepticism over the practicability of the doctrine of non-violence in the face of a full fledged war.

Nehru was aghast at the prospect of war, seeing danger to India from almost every corner. In the meanwhile amidst turmoil, Chiang Kai Shek of China had paid a visit to India and made earnest appeal to the British government to give Indians real political power as early as possible. In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India with new proposals of British war cabinet. These proposals in short offered full dominion status to India. Cripps also pledged British acceptance of a Constitution so framed, subject to the right of any province to

remain outside the dominion. The right of no accession for the provinces was of great importance, it implied the British acceptance of partition of India and formation of Pakistan next five years. The Congress rejected the offer and in August 1942, the All India Congress Committee met in Bombay, there Nehru moved the Quit India resolution. The resolution was passed on August 8<sup>th</sup>, 1942, and in the morning of 9<sup>th</sup> August 1942, all prominent leaders of Congress including Nehru were sent to Jail. As being the architect of India's foreign policy, Nehru while in jail clearly foresaw the emergence of the two power blocs in the post war world, he noted that international supremacy would be of two powers, U.S.A and Soviet Union and much in the world was going to depend upon the policy pursued by these two countries. Beside the question of freedom, the upper most concern in Nehru's mind was India's attitude towards these emerging superpowers. With the end of the Second World War in 1945, the world was divided into two power blocs. Nehru was released and made a declaration on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1946 as the Vice-President of the Interim Government that:

*"we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of the groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past two world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of the colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races."*<sup>26</sup>

In March, 1947, before the transfer of power had taken place and India had emerged as the full fledged independent nation, Jawaharlal Nehru made his formal debut on the stage of international politics in the Asian Relations Conference, which was sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs, a non-political organisation devoted to study the International Affairs. In this Conference more than 22 nations

including Arabs and Jews from West Asia, Uzbeks and Kazakhs from Soviet Central Asia, Burmese, Indonesians and Indo-Chinese from South East Asia, Chinese and Koreans from East Asia, representing diverse nations, culture and languages were brought together to assert Asia's position in the world political community and to exchange ideas about the problems common to all these countries in the post war world. There had arrived a certain stage in human affairs when idea of one world and some kind of a world federation seemed to be essential, though there were many dangers and obstacles in the way. United Nations, he said, should be supported which was painfully emerging from its infancy. But in order to have one world they must also in Asian think of the countries of Asia cooperating together for that larger ideal. He served notice of Asia's "special responsibility" for Africa and concluded with a plea for faith in the human spirit.<sup>27</sup>

On August 15, 1947, India got independence, and also partitioned. The entire responsibility of forming India's foreign policy fell on the shoulders of Nehru, the factors that immediately influenced India's foreign policy formation were, her precarious economic situation at home and a devastating global conflict. India had neither friends nor enemies, so India had to be extra careful in formulating her own foreign policy. The spectrum of world powers thus represent a hazy picture. It was under these confused and unstable conditions India had to adjust herself with the power blocs. Since the freedom from want was the fundamental need, naturally a significant foreign policy could be developed on the basis of the vital internal policy. Nehru declared a policy of socialism at home for securing economic stability and industrial progress, and of non-alignment, of friendship with all, malice towards none; of unstinted support to a colonial country's freedom, fight against racial discrimination to secure world cooperation abroad. This policy was partly due to the tendencies generated by India's immediate problems and partly to his world view of things.<sup>28</sup>

Long before independence was achieved, Nehru decided that fundamental task of the Government of India was to raise the standard of living of the mass of the people, the country's revenue had to be earmarked for bringing about economic and social change, and with this end in view, he thought that foreign policy should be so evolved that it might play an essential and constructive role towards the realisation of this objective. In December 1947, in a speech to Constituent Assembly Nehru had made his position clear when he said-

*"whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting foreign affairs of the country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say, may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say, but in ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country it governs."*<sup>29</sup>

The study of India's foreign policy has, therefore, become the study of the way in which Nehru thought and acted inspite of obstructions. The peculiarities of decade in which he formulated his policy of non-alignment was greatly relevant. Since the attitudes of the satellite countries were entirely determined by Washington and Moscow in the early forties, his main concern was to define his relationship vis-à-vis these two powers. India requested the U.S.A. to extend her cooperation and sympathised with this attitude of many Asian nations, for she herself had a long record of neutrality and non-involvement, but Indian foreign policy was viewed with anger and sometimes with contempt in both the camps.

#### **b. India's Foreign Policy with Special Reference to NAM:**

The foreign policy of a country can not be linked with any static concepts, it is influenced at times by circumstances over which the national government has no control. India started to pursue its foreign policy much before the independence, because of international developments and British attitude at home but the shaping of India's foreign policy was largely influenced by the

World War II developments: the weakening of the forces of imperialism and reaction, the growth of the democracy and progress, the breaking away of a number of countries in Europe and Asia from capitalist system and formation of a world socialist system, and the upsurge of the national liberation movements. With the new alignment of forces in the world arena, India as newly independent country needed to formulate her own foreign policy. The heavy responsibility of formulating the foreign policy fell on the shoulders of Nehru, who before independence had been main spokesman of the Congress foreign policy. Nehru developed the strong urge to maintain India's independence in foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies being pursued by the big powers for their own purposes.

Though the factors which govern the foreign policy of India are numerous but most important of these are historical, geographical, strategic and economic. National self interest is, however, the guiding principle. India could not remain uninfluenced by all these factors which have been continuously affecting the formulation and conduct of her foreign policy.

India's historical development, no less than her recent experience, inevitably beckoned towards an independent foreign policy stance. India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom, India's entire background was consistently anti-imperialist and she necessarily sympathised with the struggle against Western colonialism, no matter where it was being carried on. It could not be surprising that an integral part of an independent India's foreign policy was 'the policy of standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents'. It was in this context that Nehru in a foreign policy statement on 11<sup>th</sup>, March 1950, told the Lok Sabha that, *"it is a policy which flows from our past, from recent history and from our national movement and its development from various ideals we have proclaimed."*<sup>30</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru himself pointed out the Geographical parameters of India's foreign policy, he said that "India was the gateway to both South - east Asia as well as the Middle East, anything happening in South Asia, South - east Asia, the Gulf region, West Asia and the Indian Ocean region affected India, he further said,

*"look at the map, if you have to consider any question concerning South - east Asia, you can not do without India. So also with the Far - east, while the Middle East may not be connected with South east Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organisations in India, you have to keep in touch with the other regions."*<sup>31</sup>

When the British government left India there was widespread poverty and misery. The social and economic system lost its vitality and life had become stagnant. Poverty, hunger, illiteracy and diseases became the common elements of India. Indeed, the conditions were so miserable that nearly two third of the total population were either under nourished or disease ridden.

Apart from the terrible economic crisis at home, India was fully aware of the international realities which were the legacy of a devastating global conflict. The spectrum of world politics was presenting a hazy picture. The need of the time was a cooperative effort on the part of the bigger nations, but in this explosive international situation in which clashing ideologies, conflicting ambitions, antagonistic economic interests, territorial disputes, racial and religious animosities were posing a danger to the world peace. India had to adjust herself with the power blocs without in anyway compromising its own basic position on fundamental issues. In 1947, Nehru declared that *"ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has properly evolve her economic policy her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and will be groping."*<sup>32</sup> In order to improve economic conditions, India felt it imperative that there should be international peace so that its government could muster all its

strength and resources to tackle its domestic problems effectively. Long before the independence was achieved, Nehru had decided that the fundamental task of the Government of India was to raise the standard of living, this clearly meant that as far as possible, the country's revenue had to be earmarked for bringing about the economic and social change.

India got independence on August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1947, and a new government was formed under the Prime Ministership of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. As the world was divided into two camps and the world scenario was posing a worst picture than ever, Nehru as the sole spokesman of India's foreign policy thought that India's foreign policy should be so evolved that it might play an essential and constructive role. In a speech of Constituent Assembly in December 1947, he made it clear when he said that –

*“we have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we can not be made to vote this way or that way.”<sup>33</sup>*

As the year 1947, was of great uncertainty, newly independent India was in a state of dilemma. Stalin's Russia was not much adored by the nationalist leaders of the colonies, though it stood committed to the freedom of the colonies. As for America, Nehru had already presaged its emergence as an imperialist power on the ruins of nineteenth century empires. In this confused state his faith in a brave new world of socialism stood firm. In a resolution which he moved in the Constituent Assembly, formed in December 1946, on the eventual goal of an 'independent sovereign republic' Nehru reiterated his faith in socialism and a socialist form of society, he adopted the policy of socialism at home for securing economic stability and industrial progress, and of non-alignment, friendship with all, malice towards none, unstinted support to colonial country's freedom fight against racial discrimination for securing world cooperation abroad. The policy

was partly due to the tendencies generated by India's immediate problems and partly due to his world view of things. The foreign policy of India that Nehru adopted is based on the following principles,

- a) Non-alignment with any of two groups between which the world is divided today;
- b) Knitting together the South east Asian countries for mutual economic and other interests;
- c) Contributing to world peace wherever and whenever possible;
- d) Championing the cause of the weak, even at the risk of estranging vested interests;
- e) Making the best use of United Nations for the purpose for which it was created;
- f) Establishing diplomatic contacts with all leading countries in the world so that India may know and be known in all the four corners of the world.<sup>34</sup>

Nehru's declaration that India would not align with any power blocs was the starting point of the policy of non-alignment, because by the time the Cold War had begun and the world was divided into two power blocs. New Delhi, however, got deeply absorbed in the post partition problems, soon came the Kashmir conflict and the revelations that the U.K and the U.S.A were opposed to India and were on the side of Pakistan, this further confirmed Nehru's faith in his policy to remain nonaligned.

Though Nehru was committed to socialism and planning, certain vested interests wanted India to seek the goodwill of the west for loans, investments, and technological aids. They wanted him to follow a policy of extra friendship towards the West, but Western attitudes on almost all issues continued to be hostile to India.



Nehru visited U.S.A in October 1949 to make it conscious of Indian needs and situations. In his address to Columbia university on 17<sup>th</sup> October, 1949, Nehru said:

*“The pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major power or group of powers; but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of the subject peoples; the maintenance of freedom - both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which afflict the greater part of the world’s population.”<sup>35</sup>*

In the meantime, Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir forced India to shop for defense equipments from abroad. The U.K. was not in a position to help much and the U.S.A. refused to supply equipments on the ground that these were needed for the NATO forces, on the other hand Cold War was vying in Europe. By the middle of the year 1950 Korean war broke out, this war put the non-alignment to test. Nehru did not want to offend China and put India as a negotiator. India played a very constructive role in the Korean question as a peace maker. In the U.N. it denounced North Korea as aggressor. In this event India’s role was appreciated by the U.S.S.R, but Nehru’s faith in U.N. was shaken because of the domination of the big powers over it, and the way Kashmir question was handled in this great body. India’s cooperation with Asian and African nations and movements, the image of Nehru as a great leader of the liberation movements, and New Delhi’s efforts at the U.N. to coordinate the activities of the newly independent nations helped in the growth of the non aligned movement.

In 1950’s India’s policy of nonalignment came under severe attack in U.S.A. Nehru was under pressure both at home and abroad to change his policy one way or the other. Even the Chinese were using provocative language, it blamed that Nehru was on the way to selling India to American imperialism.

While Nehru was steadfastly opposing the American imperialism and that he did till his death. When India was caught up in famines which led to the import of food. India naturally looked to U.S.A. for capital goods and loans. India asked for an urgent wheat loan in 1950, the United States government thought it was an opportunity to twist India's arm for its Cold War aims and required India to make certain adjustments in its foreign policy as a *quid pro quo* for the aid of wheat.<sup>36</sup> The reason was India's attitude in Korean war. The aid was not made urgent the U.S.A. processed it in the middle of 1951. The same year India launched its first five year plan, which was a landmark in economic planning, it showed its firm commitment to planned development as opposed to the West's doctrine of *laissez faire*.

In the period 1952 onwards there was a race for joining military blocs. India and several other newly independent countries were engaged in opposing military alliances that were being imposed on them. But through non-alignment and its principles of not being aligned with any of the military blocs saved India and other newly independent countries from this menace.

The first effort to incorporate the principles of non-alignment in a major document was the India China Agreement on India's trade with Tibet. This document is well known as 'Panchsheel', in the preamble to the agreement signed on 29<sup>th</sup> April, 1954, the five principles of peaceful co-existence, these were:

- a) respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- b) non-aggression,
- c) non-interference,
- d) equality and mutual benefit,
- e) peaceful co-existence.

These principles had their foundation on three different sources:

- a) they were declaratory of some essential principles laid down by the U.N. Charter,
- b) the general acceptance of the principles of co-existence in the numerous treaties and international agreements,
- c) and unanimous acceptance of these principles by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

These were the decisive years of India's foreign policy. Both India and China were well aware of the possible conflict between their respective national interest and the irritants left over by imperialism. The agreement was an attempt to reconcile India's national interests and aspirations and to find a peaceful method of resolving the differences through peaceful means and direct diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. It was an attempt to rule out war between the two nations and ensure peaceful settlement of their disputes. The two Prime Ministers hoped that the adoption of these principles by nations would help in creating a climate of peace in the world, lessening the incidence of war and strengthening the foundations of peace. Thus, Nehru was the first statesman to formulate these principles into a code of conduct governing bilateral relations between two sovereign countries with different social, economic and political systems. India emerged as a great factor in world politics. Within a few months of signing the Sino-Indian Agreement, many countries expressed their adherence to the Panchsheel. Burma, China, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Cambodia- had commended the Panchsheel worth of universal respect and a support in the extension of international relations. They realised that under the prevailing world situation peace could rest only on the principles of co-existence.

The same year in 1954, the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, India and Indonesia met at Bogor and decided to convene a Conference to promote goodwill and cooperation among Afro-Asian nations; to consider social, economic and cultural problems and the problems of special interest to their

peoples and to review the position of Afro-Asia in contribution to the world peace and cooperation.<sup>37</sup> They decided that the Conference should be composed of all the independent and near independent nations of the two continents (Africa and Asia). The invitations were sent to thirty countries, and the Conference was to be held at the level of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers, as for the invitation of the Asian countries, the most controversial question was whether or not the Chinese people's Republic should be invited. After much discussion it was decided that China would be invited, Burma insisted for inviting Israel but India and Pakistan steadfastly opposed it, because Israel was in a state of war with the Arabs.

The Conference took place in Bandung (Indonesia), from April 18-24, 1955, it was attended by the delegations of 29 countries. The Conference declared that friendly cooperation in accordance with the principles of Panchsheel would effectively contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about a common prosperity and happiness to all. The declaration at Bandung contained the following ten principles :

- a) Respect for fundamental Human Rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N.
- b) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- c) Recognition of the equality of all races and the equality of nations, large and small.
- d) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- e) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.

- f) 1. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.  
2. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
- g) Refraining from acts of threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- h) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.
- i) Promotion of mutual interests of cooperation.
- j) Respect for justice and international obligation.<sup>38</sup>

The Bandung Conference was the scene of an acute struggle between the non-aligned countries and countries entangle with the imperialist powers in all sorts of economic, military and political commitments. At Bandung Nehru said "*I do not want any country in Asia to be lulled into a sense of, shall I say, dependence upon others, because that saps- that undermines the growth of that élan of a nation- that spirit of self dependence of having faith in themselves.*"<sup>39</sup>

The Bandung Conference helped many representatives of Asian and African countries to rectify some wrong ideas about the socialist states and helped China to gain a foothold on the international scene, it condemned the imperial system of colonialism which was considered an evil to be eliminated as soon as possible. On April 24<sup>th</sup>, 1955, the Bandung Conference finished its work. After the exhibition of the influence of bloc politics at Bandung it began to be realised that the nations which were truly independent and uncommitted to either bloc come together to raise their voice in support of freedom and peace. It was the Bandung that the history changed in a sensational way, breaking away from the past patterns of international behaviour, which was based more on a master slave relationship. Despite the wide diversity of every kind among the participants in

Bandung, a unity had been patently constructed. The big powers which were hostile and disdainful towards the Conference, were started to examine their attitude towards Asia and Africa. In this Conference India sided with China and helped her to maintain international relations, specially with the African countries. The Conference also decried the production and use of the weapons of mass destruction, it called for their total prohibition for the establishment and maintenance of such prohibition by an efficient international control. It also denounced nuclear tests.

Now India moved towards Soviet Union to make her efforts for the betterment of relations. The history of India's relations with Soviet Union was sometimes better and sometimes bitter. In 1946-47, session of the U.N. there was close cooperation between India and Soviet Union because of their similar attitude in the issues like colonialism, racialism, disarmament, banning of atomic weapons etc. but when India became independent and formed its foreign policy, the policy of non-alignment made both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. unhappy. In 1947, session of General Assembly India could not get a Security Council seat due to their opposition.<sup>40</sup>

India's support to ruthless suppression of the communist element in Indonesia and Nehru's visit to U.S. in 1949, in the context of the victory of Communism in China brought a bitter taste in the Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup> But India's mediation in the Korean war and its non-participation in San Francisco Conference in 1951, as a silent protest against the exclusion of the Soviet Union and Communist China from deliberations on proposed draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, won the Russian admiration for India. In 1952, the Russian delegate broke his country's silence on the Kashmir question and took a definitely pro Indian view by lending support to the Kashmir issue.<sup>42</sup> Soviet Union was greatly impressed with the Indian role at the Bandung Conference, as it helped to establish the position of Red China as a guardian of peace.

In 1955, the Soviet government invited Nehru to visit U.S.S.R. and in June 1955, Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi along with the government delegation visited Moscow. The Indian Prime Minister spent many hours talking with Soviet leaders, about the results of the talks, Nehru said at a press conference that the Soviet government had expressed its readiness to assist India in carrying out her development plans and that Soviet aid was without any political strings whatsoever.<sup>43</sup>

As a logical sequel of the Indo-Soviet relations, Nehru invited the Soviet leaders to pay a return visit to India. It was so immediate that the Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev paid this return visit in November, 1955. And the visit by Soviet leaders was highly successful.

In the mean time, in 1956, two major crises broke out, the commitment of India's foreign policy to national interest and world peace was shown in two crises (1) Suez crisis (2) Hungarian crisis. In the Suez crisis of July, 1956, India sided with Arab countries, it condemned the aggression as Israel's naked invasion of Egypt and the consequent Anglo-French intervention. In the U.N. India demanded immediate withdrawal of forces by all the three powers Israel, Britain and France from Arab territories. In January, 1957, the Eisenhower doctrine was propounded, which claimed that the withdrawal from the Middle East of Britain and France had left a power vacuum there which the United States had to fill so as to prevent the U.S.S.R. from doing it. Nehru strongly reacted over it by declaring that if at all there is a power vacuum in the Middle East, that had to fill through their strength, unity and progress. Speaking at the National Congress session on January 6<sup>th</sup>, 1957, Nehru said that *this power vacuum theory was wholly wrong as it created a race among big powers to cut out spheres of influence in other countries and subvert their independence.*<sup>44</sup> It is worth noting that when the Western powers staged economic boycott of Egypt, blocking among other things all Egyptian assets in foreign banks, India granted Egypt a loan of

Rs. 50 million, though it was not a big loan it represented a moral and political assistance to Egypt. But in the Hungarian crisis of Oct. 1956, India's reaction was opposite as its reaction in Egypt, India showed a lack of response on the issue because it never wanted to antagonise the U.S.S.R. by supporting the Western powers on Hungarian crisis. India voted against the U.N. resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungary. Thus, India was the only non-Communist country to oppose the resolution.

As in the light of growing Indo-Soviet relations it was obvious for India to defend Soviet Union, as it was the biggest ally of India who was lending all types of support to it. In 1958 the Indian government took a somewhat less active role in the settlement of international problems.

In 1959, in connection with an armed insurrection in Tibet, many Tibetan Buddhists together with Dalai Lama fled to India and took refuge there. The friendly trend of India and China received a rude shock when China claimed over Indian borders. This claim forced the Nehru government to build up its armed forces along the border with China. A serious border incident occurred on 25<sup>th</sup> August, 1959, when an exchange of fire took place between the border guards, each side accusing the other of having been first to fire. It was a test of Soviet Union's friendly attitude towards India. But Soviet Union put pressure on China and India to further discuss the boundary matter, the Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed for meeting and discussing the issue but nothing came out of this discussion.

In 1960, the world scenario was a bit changed over the war in Congo. After attaining independence Congo became the theatre of power politics. There were three main concentrations of authority, Leopoldville- where President Kasavubu with the help of Western powers was trying to carry on the work of the central government of Congo, Elizabethville- where Tshombe with the help of Belgium was trying to establish an independent state of Katanga, and



Stanleyville- where followers of Lumumba were claiming legal authority over the whole of Congo with the support of the socialist countries. For India the choice was difficult and embarrassing as she wanted to use all her influence to keep the state of Congo intact; territorially and politically. India persistently pleaded for settling the internal conflict in accordance with the Constitution of Congo and asked the interested foreign powers to keep aloof and let the United Nations play an effective role in restoring normalcy. After the murder of Lumumba, India sent combat troops to Congo at the request of the U.N. Secretary General. In Congo India had always held that the United Nation's forces should enter. In the wake of the Congo crisis the non-aligned countries felt the need of having a non-aligned Conference just to assert themselves in world affairs. Tito took the initiative of holding the first Conference of the non-aligned countries in 1961, it was in recognition of this initiative that this Conference was held at Belgrade. Though the suggestions for holding the first non-aligned Conference had come first from Tito, it had, of course had some stronger support of other stalwarts of the non-Communist world, notably Nehru, Nasser, Soekarno and Nkrumah. The bitter experience at Congo led Nkrumah to sound this idea. In the 1960, session of the General Assembly the conviction of holding such a meeting became more firm, the agenda gave due attention to India's views for strengthening of international peace and security. Imperialism was regarded a positive factor contributing to the outbreak of wars. There were also references to 'non-interference' and 'non-intervention' reflecting concern over the U.S. role in Cuba and the French and Belgian atrocities in Congo. The outcome of the need of having a non-aligned countries Conference was the Belgrade Conference of 1961, which was held at Belgrade from September 1-6. At Belgrade all agreed that non-alignment meant abiding peace and freedom to be free, Sukarno said:

“and now we have this present Conference.....to draw the non-aligned countries into a coordinated accumulated moral force in order to help preserve

world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium, based on a world order of social justice and prosperity".<sup>45</sup>

In the 27 point declaration the Belgrade Summit made the following demands:

- a) immediate cessation of all forms of counter revolutions, intervention and invasion of Asia, Africa and Latin America;
- b) granting of independence to Algeria, Angola, withdrawal of French troops from Tunisia, termination of the imperialist intervention in Congo;
- c) an end to the policy of Apartheid in South Africa;
- d) restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples of Palestine.

The non-aligned nations brought several proposals before the world assembly and called for general and complete disarmament. They asked for a stage by stage approach to arms reduction. The ultimate goal of the non-aligned nations was an operative test ban accord prohibiting all nuclear explosions.

At the end of the Belgrade Conference, the Chinese showed their ire on India, they denounced the principles of Belgrade Conference. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute was getting warmer day by day from 20<sup>th</sup> October, 1962, heavy fighting broke out all along the Sino-Indian border. The non-aligned Colombo Conference countries in December, 1962, appealed to Chinese government, calling upon its troops to withdraw 20 kilometers to that line which was previously drawn between India and China. But the Chinese continued their attack and their government issued a statement which served a clear notice to India and the world that this incursion is not merely a border fight but a full scale invasion on India. On India's part the Indian defense system was not so organised from the point of view of the war. The Chinese attack on India was compared as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour of December, 1941, in both cases the attack was unexpected. India turned towards the big powers for help. It first moved towards U.S.A. Y.B. Chavan the then Defense Minister himself led the mission to America,

but America was unresponsive. He then went to Britain, there too he met a cold reception. Britain could not supply even an old sub - marine of which we were in need. In fact Britain and America were afraid of hurting their ally Pakistan which was on the side of China. Chavan then moved to U.S.S.R. and got all that he wanted. Nehru regarded the Chinese incursion not only as a serious threat to India's security but also a great personal trouble, an attempt to undermine that in which he had profound faith; whom India helped to get a foothold in Afro-Asian countries. The Soviet Union whom India had not supported as much as she did with China, helped India at the time when Sino-Indian war was at its peak and India was looking for the arms to defend herself, when U.S. and U.K. both refused to give arms to India, Soviet Union gave whatever India needed.

The Sino-Indian rift brought a setback in India's foreign policy, Nehru's critics did not lay down their arms, they waited and watched for an opportunity to change the course of India's foreign policy. Such an opportunity came their way with the Chinese aggression of 1962. The opposition bloc was seeking to obtain the resignation of the Nehru government, insisting on complete rejection of non-alignment. All this made it incumbent on Nehru government to follow the course of non-alignment more consistently and simultaneously to build up country's defense capacity. After sometime the United States thought of it and in November 1962, India began to receive arms from the United States and Commonwealth countries. The U.S. and India signed an agreement on military aid. Under the agreement India consented to allow American advisers and observers to exercise control over the use of arms and also agreed to make available to the United States a certain amount of military information. Now that India had accepted military aid from the West. It sent to India numerous military diplomatic missions which used negotiations about the arms supply to influence India's foreign policy, these missions tried to persuade India to abandon non-alignment, it was simple that the Western imperialists chose other ways of involving India in their military strategic plans, they were not going to miss such a good chance of

pushing India out of the path of non-alignment. But Nehru with his vision of world history had kept the doors open to the Soviet Union. The new rapprochement between India and Soviet Union started in 1963, when the Soviet government offered to help India to construct an integral iron and steel plant at Bokaro. India previously turned to the United States for assistance, but U.S. ruling circles haggled over the terms of aid as long as Soviet Union constructed the Bhilai iron and steel plant, and finally it refused to build the plant at Bokaro. The Indian government then took further steps to build up inter-state and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. In July 1963, Indira Gandhi paid a visit to the Soviet Union. She went to Moscow for the opening of Indian Exhibition and had talks with the Soviet government representatives. Closer friendship between India and Soviet Union manifested itself convincingly in April 1964, at Jakarta during a meeting of 22 representatives of Asian and African countries assembled to discuss the programme of 2<sup>nd</sup> non-aligned Conference.

After the death of Nehru in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi very well carried the foreign policy of India with non-alignment as its principle. Indira Gandhi in her statement on foreign policy on January 26, 1966, said:

“the fundamental principles laid down by my father, to which he and Shastri ji dedicated their lives, will continue to guide us; it will be my sincere endeavour to work for the strengthening of peace and international cooperation, so that people in all lands live in equality, free from domination and fear.”<sup>46</sup>

Many ups and downs came but India never changed her foreign policy as adopted by Nehru. The Indian attitude in Czech crisis of 1968, was commendable. When this issue was being voted upon in the General Assembly India was among the absentees, thus, India in a polite manner made it clear that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was improper, India did not involve herself unnecessarily in the issues which arose during this period and those where her vital national interests were involved. India made persistent and integrated efforts

to normalise her relations with neighbours, in April, 1968, treaties relating with training and education were signed with Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia and Philippines, in June, 1974, an agreement took place between India and Sri Lanka through which India gave recognition to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka over Kachcha Tibu island and a treaty was also signed on sea boundary at Palk Straits. In the first half of 1976, an agreement was signed between India and China to exchange ambassadors and hopes of full diplomatic relations with Pakistan were also enlivened. India's relations with socialist countries remained cordial and full of warmth.

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, both the super powers initiated their naval buildup in the Indian Ocean region, the U.S. to bring the whole Ocean area under her sphere of influence. It was a serious matter of concern and had a significant impact on India's national interests, India felt that if the Indian Ocean region falls under the domination of a hostile power or powers, her maritime vulnerability would immediately become obvious. India had energetically supported collective attempts to exclude great power competition in the region. In the conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the non-aligned countries as well as in the United Nations, India had given total support to the attempts to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The question of a 'peace zone' had represented a problem for both U.S. and Soviet diplomacy because neither Washington nor Moscow desired a total naval withdrawal. But under diplomatic pressure from regional states Kremlin showed some cooperativeness, Moscow announced its readiness to act for the conversion of the Indian Ocean into a peace zone on the basis of equality with the other great powers. The denial of U.S. to withdraw its navy from Indian Ocean made India unhappy about the United States. New Delhi emphasised that any build up by the U.S. only encourage Soviet rivalry. The United States presence in the region was often a source of irritation in Indo-U.S. relations during 1970's, but contributed towards cordial Indo-Soviet relations.

The relevance of non-alignment can be seen in the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Bandung Conference which was held on 24<sup>th</sup> April, 2005, at Bandung. In this Afro - Asian Summit the Asian continent was represented by our Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh, addressing the Conference Mr. Singh declared that non-alignment remains a 'valid and effective instrument' to ensure the creation of 'a more just and fair' global order and stressed for its revitalisation. He remarked that India and other countries had literally followed 50 year old footsteps to the building where the historic Conference was held and in which Prime Minister Nehru played a leading role. Pointing out that NAM has played a central role in the struggle for political emancipation in the past, we need to revitalise this movement to make it a vehicle for social and economic emancipation in our times.<sup>47</sup>

Apart from this, India also supports strongly the peaceful settlement of international disputes as it has become imperative need for the survival in this nuclear age. Further more, it is essential that each problem should be approached in a peaceful and friendly way. The only alternative to the principle of co-existence of co-destruction or co-extinction. India feels that nations should at all times avoid a war like approach to the world problems. India always supports the Palestinian cause, it was the first non-Arab state to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. India has always extended its consistent and unwavering support to the Palestinian issue in the United Nations and other U. N. forae. India has supported the Middle East Peace Process since its launching in 1991 and committed to the peaceful settlement of the dispute.

To wit, the challenges are many, the prospects grim, the time short, yet the need for non-alignment is enormous. Its continued relevance is best epitomised in the words of its founder-member, Jawaharlal Nehru, "*if you give it up, there is no other policy for (the non-alignment) to adopt with the slightest advantage.*"<sup>48</sup>

**c. Cold War Rivalry and its Impact on India:**

The differences between the Western bloc and the Soviet Union began to assume serious proportions after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Although Stalin's Soviet Union joined the Allied powers to fight against the axis powers in the Second World War, as the Russian army, and had contributed to the victory of the Allied powers, as a matter of fact the Americans and the Russians became partners against Hitler, they began having serious differences over post war reconstruction policies and ideologies. They opposed ideologies of Soviet style Marxism-Leninism and American style bourgeois democracy were viewed as one of the major factors of the Cold War. To the Americans the Communist ideology was expansionist, atheistic, militaristic form of Soviet organisation that presents a threat of immense proportion to the civilised West. Any cooperation with such an ideology was both dangerous and abhorrent. To the Soviet Union, Western democracy particularly evidenced in the United States, was a genuine threat to the survival of the Soviet state and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. Then the Soviet and American leaders found it possible to selectively choose among the historical record, real and imagined objectives, ideological preconceptions, and their own personal biases to arrive at an image of the other that was malevolent and evil. Events were interpreted in the light of expectation, and both sides have ample evidence to 'prove' the worst intentions of the other.

The Cold War broke out on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1945, when the U.S., Britain and Canada issued a three power declaration refusing to export the secret of atomic bomb to the Soviet Union and affirming their decision that "the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial (and military) application of atomic energy would not contribute to the devising of effective reciprocal and enforceable safeguards. This declaration was the opening of bi-polarity."<sup>49</sup>

Thus, when the Cold War between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was intensifying, Winston Churchill made a speech at Fulton, on March 5<sup>th</sup>,

1946, which came to be known as the 'Iron Curtain' speech, in which he denounced Stalinism as a challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. In an interview on March 10<sup>th</sup>, 1946, Stalin considered Churchill's speech as a call for war on the Soviet Union. He feared the Anglo-American combination against the Soviet Union. As the end of the World War II brought bipolarity, for all practical purposes two worlds existed. The first world was centered on the United States, with its global military might and massive economic strength, the second was centered on the U.S.S.R., with its powerful army and growing economic base. A classical balance of power existed in the international arena, with the economically powerful U.S. armed primarily with its arsenal of nuclear weapons, confronted with the economically destroyed Soviet Union, employing the world's largest army. American nuclear weapons held the Soviet Union hostage, whereas the Soviet army held the Western Europe hostage. Both feared the other, and neither side dared to act.

The first world, that was the United States, had moved to a position of clear and unchallenged leadership of Great Britain's February 1947 realisation that it no longer had the economic wherewithal to combat insurrectionist forces in Greece. In rapid succession the Truman administration formulated the Truman Doctrine, in which the American President declared that America's policy would be one of tendering support to "the peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures; and the Marshall plan, in which the United States sent billions of dollars of economic aid to Western Europe to restore Europe's war shattered economy and to prevent the expansion of Communism."<sup>50</sup> Within two years of this in 1949, the United states, Canada and several other countries had concluded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), at first 16 nations joined NATO. By 1955, the United States expanded its alliance system and had constructed a global system of treaties such as NATO, the Organisation of American states treaty (the Rio Pact), the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and the



Australia - New Zealand - U.S. Pact (ANZUS). Nearly 50 nation states belonged to these treaty organisations.

The second world, that was of those countries in which the Communist countries held sway, and Soviet Union enjoyed pre-eminence over them. During this period the U.S.S.R. also initiated the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Militarily the U.S.S.R. constructed its own system of bilateral treaties with its Eastern European neighbours, concluded a mutual defence pact with China after Mao-Tse-Tung's 1949, victory, and capped its treaty system with the Warsaw pact in 1955.<sup>51</sup>

Relations between the two powers improved somewhat following the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, the wars in Korea and French Indo-China were brought to an end, and the first post-war summit meeting of Soviet and Western leaders was held in Geneva in July, 1955, but the result of this meeting was nothing more than a surface 'thaw'. By the end of 1955, the world was divided into two hostile camps dominated by the American and Soviet Union States, both sides in this bi-polar system viewed other international actors as being either Soviet and American surrogates. Throughout the 1955 to 1969 era thaw and accommodation followed by periods of renewed Cold War tensions. The opening event of this period was the first meeting in ten years between an American President and a Soviet Premier in the Geneva Summit of 1955, the spirit of this Summit indicated a new willingness of both sides to discuss global issues. But this rapport ended very quickly, as the Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary and British, French and Israeli forces invaded Egypt in 1956. For the next two years U.S., Soviet relations remained tense.

Unfortunately for both the United States and Soviet Union it became increasingly difficult to cooperate with certain of their allies. In NATO, France in particular questioned and challenged the American dominance. Not trusting American guarantees of coming to Europe's assistance in the event of a war in

Europe, France developed her own nuclear capabilities, exploding its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and in 1966, France withdrew its forces from NATO military command.

On the other hand Soviet Union was having even greater difficulties in keeping its allies in line. Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiments grew up in East Germany, Poland and Hungary between 1954-68, Albania formally withdrew itself from the Warsaw pact in 1968, Soviet Chinese relations began to deteriorate from 1960, and by the end of the decade Soviet and Chinese forces were engaged in open conflict along the Sino-Soviet border. Additionally, as more and more colonies escaped from their colonial yokes and joined the ranks of sovereign nation states, and a third world was created, separate and distinct from the first world of western industrial democratic states and the second world of the Communist states. Many of these third world states were willing to accept economic and military aid and technological assistance from whoever offered it but they chose to remain non-aligned.

The differences between the 'free world' and the 'Communist world' became irreconcilable and the world was being divided into the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, immediately following the independence of India. The domestic and global interests of these two blocs remained mutually exclusive. India like many other nations was presented with the alternative of being on the side of one bloc or the other or to remain neutral between two rival camps. In this game of power politics a sustained attempt was made to draw the newly independent states of Asia and Africa into the nexus of the Cold War. To India and the other newly independent states the choice was obvious, it was open to them to participate in the Cold War, which implied signing of military pacts and compromising the newly won political independence, on the other hand, the choice was to keep out of the bi-polar conflicts, preserving the political independence and playing a positive role in the world affairs retaining the right to decide the

issues on the basis of merit and at the same time concentrating on domestic economic development and nation building.

Nehru was interested in promoting an area of peace 'to distinguish it from the area of bloc politics which was an area of war'. He hoped that by promoting the area of peace, he could serve as a 'go between' for the two camps and help reduce tensions between them through non association or non-alignment with either of the two blocs, thus, Nehru founded the policy of non-alignment to establish the area of peace. Non-alignment was the result of emerging historical process in the world intensively dividing onto two hostile camps, there must be something, an area of peace to serve as a moral force and as an instrument of the world peace.

As the gap between Soviet Union and U.S.A. increased, great efforts were made by both countries to persuade Nehru to abandon the path of independent foreign policy, but Nehru always defended it. His foreign policy stance irritated both the sides.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Korea had been occupied by U.S. and U.S.S.R. with the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel forming an artificial dividing line between North Korea and South Korea their zones of occupation. The Korean war that started on 25<sup>th</sup> June, 1950, was one of the issues which caused a tense political struggle in India as well as abroad, it specially provided a sore spot in the Indo-American relations. It had a great impact on the evolution of the entire foreign policy line of the Indian government. Throughout the crisis, India played the role of a mediator by making full efforts to end the war in Korea. It completely denounced the American aggression on Korea and threat of using an atomic bomb, Indians saw the American action as the corroding element in the shining armor of collective security. There was also a change in Soviet relations towards India, in the last phase of his life in 1952-53, Stalin was slowly beginning to realize that India could play a useful role in the international affairs, seemed to coincide with an increase in tensions in U.S., India relations. At the time of the

Korean Peace Conference held in Geneva in 1954, the Soviet Union recognised the need to invite India in any conference which involved the future of the Asian peoples. While the United States voted against India's participation in the Korean peace talks. Washington's decision to sponsor arms aid to Pakistan and to create the South East Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954, under the U.S. leadership, the Soviet Union realised that it was in its interest to support India so as to enable it to withstand the pressures of the Western powers and continued to follow its independent foreign policy. This was symbolised by the signing of Indo-Soviet agreement in February 1955, for the setting up of a steel plant at Bhilai, and later the same year exchange of visits between Nehru on the one hand and the Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin on the other. The year after Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to India, two very important events- the Suez Canal crisis and the Hungarian crisis - took place which tested the U.S.S.R. India relationship. The Suez crisis revealed the common approach of India and the U.S.S.R. Nehru sharply reacted to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. At the London Conference which was convened to settle the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union supported the proposals made by the Indian delegation, and Indian proposals were described as a plan for just and peaceful settlement of the Suez problem. On the issue of the Hungarian crisis the Soviets were pleased with New Delhi's initial reaction to the crisis, they became rather irritated later when India called for the entry of the United Nation's observers into Hungary and self determination for the people of Hungary. But when the Hungarian question was discussed in the U.N. the Indian delegate Krishna Menon did not take an anti-Indian stand.

In January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was propounded, which claimed that the withdrawal of Britain and France from Middle East would left a 'power vacuum' there which the U.S. had to fill so as to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the area. Jawaharlal Nehru reacted over this doctrine by declaring that if at all there is a power vacuum in the Middle East that had to be filled through their strength, unity and progress. He further said: "*if any outside power came*

*into the West Asia it might give help for some time, but it would sow the seeds of the conflict. Instead of peace reigning, there would be a tussle for supremacy in the region among the foreign powers".*<sup>52</sup> The doctrine resulted in the overthrow of the neutralists and pro-Egyptian government of Jordan and an impending Syrian attack on Jordan.

In 1957 Soviet launching of Sputnik-I, the world's first artificial satellite and Soviet development of inter continental ballistic missiles, ensued a new round of Soviet American confrontations. It became all riskier because now both sides possessed nuclear weapons. The Berlin crisis of 1958-62 was an open exhibition of this nuclear rivalry.

In 1962 the invasion of Cuba by refugee elements, backed by the U.S. and its decision to impose trade blockade, drove Cuba to seek a number of trade and military agreements with the U.S.S.R.. The presence of Soviet military personnel and the information that Soviet had placed guided missiles aimed at the United States in Cuba, made U.S.A. worried. It gave birth to serious military confrontations between the two great powers. All U.N. efforts for conciliation between the two contending powers miserably failed. The crisis was only averted when great wisdom was shown on the part of the Soviet Union when Nikita Khrushchev ordered the removal of the missiles from Cuba which were aiming towards U.S. India showed reluctant attitude even when the U.S. had made gross violation of the International Law and Human Rights. In October, 1962, China invaded India. These two crises made Soviet Union panic with the danger of a military confrontation with United States. By the late 1960s, the U.S.S.R. had developed a nuclear capability sufficient to devastate the United States and Western Europe. The United States had already had such a capacity to devastate the U.S.S.R. and this 'balance of terror' made the détente more powerful, which had started with the war in Vietnam in 1950s. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Of 1963, was a turning point in the Cold War. The treaty was accorded considerable

symbolic significance on both sides and seemed to signify that U.S. and Soviet leaders wanted to end a costly risk that was increasing the danger of a real war. In 1968, ninety eight states signed the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.). That was the most promising and most frustrating treaty in the history of efforts to control nuclear weapons. It was monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But India refused to sign N.P.T. because of its discriminatory provisions. India said that this treaty makes discrimination between a nuclear weapon state and a non-nuclear weapon state, by allowing a nuclear weapon state to continue to proliferate nuclear armaments while non-nuclear weapon states are denied the use of nuclear energy even for peaceful purposes. In 1950s Nehru had stated that India would never use nuclear energy for military purposes. The attempt of super powers to persuade India to sign the N.P.T. through the threat of punishment could not exceed certain restrictions, rooted in the competitive relationship between the Washington and Moscow that took precedence over their consensus on the N.P.T.; neither side could be certain that the other would not try to conclude a covert agreement with New Delhi. Moreover Washington and Moscow attempted to use the nuclear non-proliferation issue to entrench the super power détente, but New Delhi saw no incentive to assist their endeavour. The super powers were continuously pressurising India to sign N.P.T., but India maintained her independence by not signing N.P.T. and made her nuclear option open.

In 1972, Soviet and American leaders reached an agreement on the First Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). This agreement placed a cap on the quantity of the Soviet and U.S. delivery vehicles, and an accompanying protocol limited the number of anti-ballistic missile systems each side could deploy. No limits were placed on qualitative improvements and the nuclear arms race continued. India's plan for conducting Peaceful Nuclear Explosion was actually announced in May 1970, this decision was a demonstration of India's freedom in decision making vis-à-vis super powers, and a reinforcement of her non-alignment

policy. The test was meant to have an impact on the super powers, indicating not only a disapproval of their attitudes towards India in the past, but also a desire to be consulted over matters of regional importance in the future. The Tashkent Agreement, the N.P.T., and the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, particularly made India to decide for conducting the tests. Thus the manner of the super powers' decision making in the strategic crises confronted by India appeared to have an impact on Mrs. Gandhi's perceptions. As the crises created greater sensitivity towards security and prestige, she seemed to look favourably upon the contentions promoting the national interest. There were advantages in having a nuclear status because no nuclear state's territory had ever attacked. So on May 18, 1974, India conducted a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. The test could also be seen as a reaffirmation of India's opposition to the N.P.T. and determination to challenge the discriminatory international system represented by this treaty.

On India's P.N.E., the U.S., Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said the explosion did not alter the balance of power on the sub-continent, and so it did not warrant any change in the United States' foreign policy in that region.<sup>53</sup> Dr. Kissinger felt that India's emergence as a peaceful nuclear power need not have any negative impact.

In Moscow there was no sign to use its diplomatic influence on New Delhi. Neither it wanted to face the possibility of losing a major ally by imposing pressure against India's nuclear policy, and this was probably the circumstance that Moscow confronted with New Delhi. Moscow appeared to have regarded the issue from the perspective of promoting Indo-Soviet ties, in a similar way as Washington appeared to perceive it in the context of Indo-U.S. relations.

The super powers recognised that India's nuclear stance did not threaten their predominance within the contemporary structure of international power. But in fact the super powers were irritated by the complications that the Indian nuclear tests

added to their contemporary attempts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. The nuclear test was seen by informal sources at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva as a major setback for the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>54</sup>

The Vietnam war which continued around 25 years, from 1950s-1975, was a part of soviet-Americans détente. U.S. concluded that the struggle in Vietnam was not between colonial power and the freedom fighter but rather between anti-Communist and Communist. The way U.S. policy makers looked at the world scenario no other alternative than the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was possible. This U.S. involvement was undertaken with the specific purpose of preventing the expansion of Soviet controlled monolithic communism into the vital Geopolitical and resourceful area of South East Asia. During these 25 years of war from 1950s to 1975, over 50,000 American lives were lost and over \$200 billion were spent, but all these expenditures and U.S. sacrifices proved futile as North Vietnamese forces over ran South Vietnam during March-April 1975. Soviet arms help to North Vietnam over ran South Vietnam. Henry Kissinger accused the Soviet Union of 'breaking the rule of détente'. In so far as the Vietnamese crisis was concerned, India's consistent efforts had been that the U.S. bombardment should be stopped and be followed by the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. Although the conflict was viewed through bipolar binoculars, it was also seen as a part of a larger strategic picture that pitted East against the West in geopolitical terms. The Soviets, pointed Vietnam as a classical case of capitalist imperialism and American expansionistic aggressiveness.

Rigid bi-polarity and tense Cold War conditions offered the most conducive atmosphere for non-alignment, obsessed and pre-occupied with the task of securing the obedience of the emerging free nations by force if necessary, both the super powers initially questioned the moral basis and *modus operandi* of non-alignment. Indian non-alignment was viewed as a camouflage and a matter of time by both Moscow and Washington. In their opinion, it was impossible for the emerging



nations to successfully follow a socialist economy as India did- but the emerging nations with the help of non-alignment resisted the fore of two super powers. The Soviet Union helped India while the relations with the U.S. remained complex.

The relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. deteriorated since the war in Vietnam and U.S. intervention in it. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in late 1979, nearly 100,000 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Soviet's claimed that the Amin government had invited them into Afghanistan. But in the first wave of Soviet intervention, Amin was murdered, allegedly by Soviet troops. The United States condemned the Soviet actions in Afghanistan in the same terms as the U.S.S.R. had used to describe the U.S. actions in Vietnam. Most of the world nations had criticised the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as vehemently as they had criticised the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The U.S. sought and Pakistan was too willing to offer herself as a 'front line' state in the U.S. strategy of keeping military pressure upon the Soviet Union. But the Carter administration first consulted to India and India refused to be a party in such a game plan. India criticised the Soviet invasion and demanded that Soviet soldiers should withdraw from Afghanistan territory as their presence would have extensive negative consequences for the whole region. India abstained when a resolution demanding the 'immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan' was put to the vote in General Assembly. India's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, was fairly positive and in accordance with her policy of 'genuine non-alignment'. India tried to project a balanced policy that in reality had meant carefully apportioning rebuffs as equally as possible to the competing super powers.

The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union did not demonstrate a trend towards an improved strategic environment for India. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union desired an India which is too powerful, that is self reliant in her economic development and military capability.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Cold War was raised to its high pitch, Americans made Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Vietnam. The U.S. began a defense build up to confront the Soviet Union every where in Asia, Africa and Europe. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was based on multiple perceptions, but the Soviet and U.S. perceptions of each other's actions were fundamentally opposed. The U.S. government's view of the Soviet actions emphasised only two: that the Soviet Union sought to add to the territory under its influence, and that the U.S.S.R. sought to place itself in a position where it could cut off the West's oil imports from the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union argued that it was defending the cause of peace and progress, which not coincidentally furthered Soviet national interest. Whereas the U.S. maintained that the Soviet Union was engaged in aggressive expansionism.

By early 80s, it was apparent to the rulers of Soviet Union that their country needed reforms if it was going to survive. The 1980s clearly saw operation of what Prof. Cohen described as system of balance of power between the U.S.-Pakistan-China on one side and India and the Soviet Union on the other. Since the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the United States had cut off its military relations with India. The U.S. reluctance to accommodate India's military needs because of Pakistan's pressure on U.S. and then developing closer relations with the Soviet Union had led India to rely upon the Soviet military hardware to the extent of 70% by early 1980s. But in the changing scenario when Soviet leaders were thinking of reforms India thought of repairing her relations with the U.S. In July 1982, President Ronald Reagan invited Mrs. Gandhi to visit the U.S. Mrs. Gandhi described her visit as "an adventure in search of understanding and friendship."<sup>55</sup>

With the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the situation began to change dramatically. Gorbachev inaugurated a reversal of Cold War policies, with the cooperation of President Reagan, arms reduction agreements were signed.

Gorbachev recognised the serious economic situation and desired to reform it, while intending to perpetuate control by the Communist party. Once he allowed freedom of speech a policy called Glasnost, he suddenly watched the whole society rejected Communism and demanded democracy. The myth of international Communism was shattered. While maintaining a sure hold over Eastern Europe the Soviet Union attempted to gain better relationship with the West, particularly the U.S., both super powers realised the futility of edging towards a nuclear war. Gorbachev also made it clear to the leaders of Eastern European Communist states that Soviet troops would no longer be available to keep them in power. This policy triggered the rapid collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It began in Poland, spread to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and then to Eastern Germany. The new Soviet democratisation spilled over the rest of the Eastern Europe dramatically. By the end of 1989, the Communist domination had ended, the Soviets also ended their ten year long war in Afghanistan. With the breaching of Berlin wall there was no turning back, on November 9, 1989, East German authorities allowed the opening of the Berlin wall, the destruction of large sections of the wall signaled the end of the Cold War, by October 1990, the East and West Germany were reunited. On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw pact voted itself out of existence and by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist, breaking apart into its constituents and new independent republics - the end of Soviet system itself, finally brought the Cold War to an end and there remained in the world only one super power-the United States.

The end of Cold War had given the United Nations a new lease on life because from the time of its birth the U.N. was merely a tool in the hands of super powers. The U.N. now started to play that role which it had to play decades before.

The impact of Cold War on the newly independent countries like India was very bad, at the time when India should devote all her resources to economic

reconstruction, the Cold War highlighted inter state conflicts, encouraged various segments within the third world countries which made them for the seizure of power at the behest of extreme ideologies of one kind or another, and prevented them from a peaceful settlement of disputes. It accelerated defense expenditure virtually all over the world. The Cold War was often fought by making several third world countries spent an inordinately large share of their GNPs on unproductive defense expenditure. The existence of over large military machines on the other hand encouraged inter state conflicts at the least provocation. It has been estimated that during the Cold War almost 300 conflicts, wars and smaller military engagements took place in the third world.<sup>56</sup>

The effect of the swings of pendulum were particularly and deeply experienced by India which had at least thirty years of close bilateral politico strategic and economic relationship with the Soviet Union, which was a historic necessity created by the geo-political compulsions as a result of America's Cold War policies. With this end of Cold War, the Soviet, American and Indian policy makers called upon to re-evaluate their bilateral relations. If we peep into history we will find that India and U.S. more often saw themselves into two opposite ends in the Geo-political game, since Pakistan was drawn into America led military alliances, to sub serve her own ends rather than to be a game player in achieving the U.S. objectives. In 1984, President Reagan himself accepted that "India is not pro or anti to any other country but instead is pro India, we accept that position."<sup>57</sup>

In the absence of the Cold War and a rival power, the U.S. would increasingly see India as a regional power to maintain peace and stability in South Asia. India alone among the Indian Ocean littoral nations have a blue water navy which can play a major role in maintaining freedom of seas in cooperation with the U.S. and other interested nations. This was this cooperation

in 1991 Gulf War India provided refueling facilities to the U.S. Air force planes and there was a qualitative change in the Indo-U.S. defense cooperation.

As a matter of fact, U.S. had also set in motion its policy of developing independent military relations with India. The U.S. for its own global role wanted India to move towards greater autonomy in military arena.<sup>58</sup> The first beginning in this area was made during the Rajiv regime when the U.S. and India signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1984 for transfer of technology for dual use. Ever since then, momentum in Indian-American cooperation in strengthening of military relations has been maintained. Earlier main obstacle was the U.S. perception of a close relationship between India and U.S.S.R; Hence the fear of transferred technology falling in the Soviet hands.<sup>59</sup> Now no such fear on ideological grounds exists though the U.S. may still like to safeguard its scientific inventions on commercial grounds. With the end of Cold War, there was greater scope for military cooperation between the two democracies. This cooperation was because the U.S. has seen India as a growing middle power.

The end of cold war did not signaled the end of international strife, old problems remained but they were no longer flourish under the East-West competition. In the Middle East, for example, the weakness of Soviet Union after 1989, meant that such war like states as Iraq and Syria could no longer rely on it for weapons and support. Thus, when Iraq invaded tiny Kuwait in August 1990, it found itself opposed by a whole U.N. coalition of armed forces, including those of Syria. The success of offensive against Iraq rearranged conditions in the Middle East. The United States, the sole super power after the demise of Soviet Union found itself with new allies, it now started seeing its objectives in the region, but for this it was important to bring peace in the West Asian region. It enabled President George Bush and Secretary of State, James Baker, to persuade Israel and its Arab enemies to sit down at the negotiating table to work out a means of living together, the peace talks began in September

1991. India has a deep interest and stake in the security of the region. It participated in various multilateral talks and the working groups to signal her continuing commitment to find a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the West Asian region. India has extended unqualified support to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), on the basis of the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as 425, which among other things allowing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to be achieved and all the states of the region including Israel and Palestine to coexist peacefully within secure and internationally recognised boundaries. India shares a common desire for peace, stability and security in the region. India pledged US \$ 3 million assistance to the Palestinians at the International Donors' Conference, it regularly contributes to the UNRWA, for the benefit of the Palestinian refugees.<sup>60</sup> On the Palestinian refugee problem in a press conference on 11<sup>th</sup> June 1951, had remarked that "the refugee problem is a problem which should be dealt with from the human aspect, friendly and helpful in every way".<sup>61</sup>

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## *Chapter – II*

### *Historical Perspective of West Asia*

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## Chapter-II

### Historical Perspective of West Asia

Western Asia is a link between Europe, the Soviet Union, Asia and Africa and between the Mediterranean and Black sea, the Red sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. As such it had become a field of vested interests for three continents. The obnoxious policy of allocating 'spheres of influence' in order to circumvent 'oil rivalries' and to carry on imperialist exploitation provides one of the blackest chapters in the history of mankind. Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, all provide the same sorry spectacle of internal weakness and mutual antagonisms perpetuated and whipped up by self-seeking powers. The major participants in the scramble for spoils, privilege and power are Britain, America, Russia and to a lesser extent France. The history of West Asia up to the First World War was largely a history of Ottoman empire. The Ottoman empire involved almost every great European power in its foreign and domestic affairs. And this provided the opportunity to the great powers to penetrate in the region.

History bears witness to a large process of cultural assimilation between India and West Asia. Britain's interest in safeguarding her life line to the East led her, inevitably, to concentrate on major routes to India. Since the day of her empire in India Britain has regarded herself as a custodian of West Asia including Suez. America and France supported Britain in view of the strategic importance of these areas and oil reserves. Throughout recent history, the region has witnessed the presence of a global great power struggle that has influenced the political dynamics of the region.

The Soviet Union on her part continued to make abortive attempts to secure a warm water post in the Black Sea. The Russian interests in the region

dates back from the times of Catherine the great. Also, the control of oil was her great desire. Thus, ambitions of Russia, America and Great Britain have converted West Asia into one of the most explosive trouble spots of the world. But with India this region played a vital role in the historical development of this country and has been of key importance through the centuries. Historical trade routes lay through this region much before Islam came on the scene. Islam fortified the ties. Few regions in the world have been as close historically to India as this one, call it Near East, Middle East, Gulf (Persian Gulf), West Asia and what have you. Today nearly a hundred million Muslims in India provide testimony to this interaction and intimate links. These links have been socio-economic and cultural with the Muslim world of the Gulf and West Asia, whether Shiia or Sunni, beginning of course even before either was there. But both the streams of Islam flowed to India and made a natural home here. This relationship acquired a new dimension with the struggle against the imperialism in the modern world and the post war colonial revolt. Western Asia is thus in every way a conglomeration of states with different interests and working for different, and often mutual objectives. With the tragedy of Palestine the whole Western Asia shivered, the tragedy was not the sudden outcome of the partition plan of 1947, but it was the outcome of an old colonial plan which found in Zionism the means for its realisation.

**a. Its Geo-Strategic Location and Political History:**

The geography of West Asia both as to the Global setting and as to physical characteristics, explains the strategic value of the area in the contemporary world. Individually the countries of West Asia presents many physical contrasts, high and rugged mountains in Eastern and Southern Anatolia, others fronting on the Mediterranean in Syria and Lebanon, and yet others fringing the great Iranian Plateau and bounding the Arabian shield in the South West are compensated by predominantly low and flat expanses in Egypt, Arabia

and Mesopotamia. Coast lines on the Black and Caspian seas, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean are regular and unbroken, for most part, and good natural harbours are rare. Yet the Aegean coast of Turkey is deeply serrated and is flanked by islands which have figured importantly in the relationships of peoples of East and West from ancient times to present. One very significant fact drawn from these dispositions of nature is that, except at a few points, these countries of West Asia are difficult to access from other quarters of the globe. No large river other than Nile debouch into Western seas, and small tortuous and shallow streams through which this noble river reaches the Mediterranean and the extensive mud and sand bars which guard the watered delta, flanked by the arid reaches on either side, give Egypt a large measure of natural protection on the North, as the Western desert and the forbidden Red Sea coast do on West and East. Arabia, whose Western and Southern perimeters are formed by mountainous highlands through which there are no easy pathway into the interior, faces eastward toward the Persian Gulf. On the East natural defenses are provided by extensive deserts, relieved only by a few Oases. On the North this huge, rocky, arid 'shield' merges gradually into more hospitable lands. Except for the Egyptian invasion of Arabia under the direction of Muhammad Ali Pasha in the earlier part of the last century. The main lines of force which have affected Arabia generally have had Northerly and Southerly axes.

Palestine is that part of West Asia which lies between the Mediterranean in the West, Lebanon in the North, Syria and Jordan river in the East, and the Red Sea and Sinai in the South and South West. The area of Palestine is 27,027 km<sup>2</sup> and in the past was often called as South Syria because it forms a natural part of it. This geographic position made Palestine through out history, a passage and stepping stone for a large number of countries and successive civilisations. The prominence of Palestine prevailed until the West Asia occupies the position of a partial barrier-a kind of baffle- across the natural lines of passage by water between the countries washed by the Atlantic and its long Mediterranean extension

and those dependent for trade and communications on the Indian ocean-that is in both geographical and cultural terms, between the West and the farther East.

The Taurus and Amanus mountain ranges have inhibited movement in land from the Mediterranean since earliest times. Even the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which enter the Persian gulf through the common estuary of the Shatt-al-Arab, belie the promise of the map to provide ready access from the South into the heart of Iraq and Syria, the lower Euphrates is lost in a maze of marshy streams almost impassable to vessels of any size, while the seven - mile - an - hour current of the Tigris can be overcome only by strongly powered vessels. The streams entering the Persian Gulf from Iran, of which only the Qarun is noteworthy, likewise provide no natural routes of travel into the interior for considerable distances because of various sorts of obstructions. Along the Northern boundaries of the region, nature has provided major obstructions. The high Caucasus mountains lie across an otherwise logical invasion route from the North into Eastern Anatolia or Northern Iran.

For other purposes the area is dry, over great portions there is insufficient precipitation to support any agricultural activities, wide expanses are desert or barren wastes, uninhabited or occupied only by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes. The region is very important for two reasons, first is its strategic locations, many of the most important sea and air routes pass through and over it. Any power that could seize control over the West Asia could disrupt communications between the European countries and their allies in India, South east Asia and Australia. Second, the West Asian region is rich in one of the world's most important resources, petroleum. The area has almost half of the world's oil reserves and supplies much of the petroleum used in Europe. This region marks the center where for centuries the East and the West met. Humanity always passed through here on its way between Europe and Asia, and between Africa

and Europe. Water routes led to Suez and the Dardanelles, caravans came from Central and Southern Asia to Baghdad and on to the Levant.

So West Asia which encompasses the world's oldest centers of civilisation, presents now to the modern world some of its most difficult and intriguing problems. A little of the intense concern with which the area has come to be regarded in later years, indubitably stems from scholarly interest in the ancient origins of modern culture some of its springs from objective interest in the efforts of a group of a young nation which had become occupants of the area. The geography of the region both to the global setting and as to the local physical characteristics, explains the strategic value of the area in the contemporary world. It requires but little imagination, when we look at the world map, we will realise that how the West Asian region become so important. Strategically it occupies a position which makes a kind of baffle-across the natural lines of passage by water between the countries washed by Atlantic and its long Mediterranean extension and those dependent for trade and communications on the Indian Ocean.

Although the peoples of Western Europe in the modern times have not been isolated from and unaware of the West Asia nearly to the same extent, and have had some realisation of the importance of the area in European affairs, they have shown little more sagacity than Americans in dealing with contemporary West Asian issues. This circumstance is not altogether surprising, Western European relationships, including those of Great Britain with the West Asia originated and were formalised when the area was occupied by the two great empires- those of the Ottomans and Qajar dynasties. In the course of the several centuries covered by the sway of these regimes, European official attitudes and methods of approach were formed and became habitual. They were not susceptible of easy change and adaptation as the old empires passed away and gave place to a number of states varying widely in size, resources, institutions and out look, but all of them intent on breaking with the past in many ways and on becoming free,



modern consequential nations. The attitudes manifested in the course of these efforts by the peoples of the area, each imbued with its own form of nationalistic feeling, presented difficulties nearly as puzzling to the foreign offices of European states as to government agencies of the United States.

Physio-geographical features still are factors of prime importance in the flow of commercial goods and in the movement of armed forces. The elements that combine to make up the geographical environment of the area consequently enter into and have an important bearing on every question which affects the international relationships of the West Asian states. Only the designs and rival interests of the great powers may have exerted a comparable influence on the trend of the events in the area in recent times. There have been two manifestations, one positive and voluntary, and other negative and involuntary.

The most outstanding aspect of the West Asian region in the last hundred and fifty years has been the impact of the West on the society of the region, and the intensity of the impact has increased in geometrical progression with the passage of time. The Western education afforded by Christian missionaries in West Asia opened up to them the gates of modern civilisation and created a deep discontent with their Eastern patterns of life which converted into a desire to 'enlighten' their people and lead them from their backward and static position to the light of European civilisation. They planned for a grafting on a basic Eastern civilisation, of the attractive and inspiring ideas of the West. But they failed to understand the underlying forces which had created the Western type civilisation and the forces which had brought about the Eastern type, that the values evolved by each were the results of processes and forces that could not be manipulated and changed by a mere decision of an elite group. This voluntary and positive impact of the West was soon to encounter a negative and involuntary one. Egypt came under the British rule at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and France and Britain were to follow as mandatories over the territories detached from the Ottoman

empires after the First World War. Any study of the problems of the modern West Asia prescribes a basic knowledge of the past, not only for the more comprehensive understanding of the present as it evolved from the past, but for discovering the clashes between past practices and the modern usages adopted by the new West Asian society.

One of the factors which has seriously affected the region has been the discovery and production of oil. In attempting to evaluate the contribution of this factor to the modern development of the area, oil production is purely a product of modern times and must be studied as such in its effects on the East as well as on the West. The oil of the area also presented problems to the great powers who in one form or another had been involved in the area for the last two hundred years. The West Asia because of its location and strategic significance, has played an important role in the international affairs, it was here that the great power interests clashed, and it was here that decisive battles were fought. British policy since the development of the empire in India regarded the West Asia as the life line of the empire and attempted to control all possible approaches to the area and prevented the penetration by other great powers. England clashed frequently with Russia over Persia, in 1907, a *modus vivendi* was worked out which divided Persia between Britain and Russia, this division gave Britain control over southern Persia. By maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire, England kept both France and Russia from breaking through into the West Asia. In the mean time oil had been discovered and developed by the British in Persia and the area assumed a new importance. Germany became a threat in her efforts to penetrate into the West Asia by way of Berlin and Baghdad railway, and during the first fourteen years of the last century British policy veered between completely opposing Germany and cooperating with her, with the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the defeat of Germany, and the elimination of Russia from the region, England occupied the area directly. As a trade route and a line of defense for India and British communications with the East, the area was long of great

importance to Britain. Though India had relations with the West Asian countries much before the advent of British rule in India. From the most ancient times, India's communications with West Asia have been both along the land and sea routes. Apart from these commercial, cultural and political factors, strategic considerations weigh considerably in India's relations with West Asia. The protection and defense of the Suez and the effort to keep it open as a means of communication to the Indian empire had ever been the cardinal principle of British policy in West Asia. Because of the strategic factors the West Asian region was always remained and still is an area of conflict between the great powers.

The imperial Turkey known as the Ottoman empire and in the language of diplomacy the 'Porte', is the key to the complicated story of West Asia. Turks entered into the Arab empire as slaves, body guards of the Caliphs and finally emerged as rulers. The Turks accepted Islam because it fostered their martial spirit. The Ottomans grew to be the leading power in Asia Minor, in the fourteenth century the Ottomans established themselves at strategic points in Greece (1399), Serbia (1389), and Bulgaria (1393) and managed to take Constantinople (1453). In 16<sup>th</sup> century Sultan Selim I (1512-20) conquered Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia. The reign of Suleiman I (1520-1566) the magnificent law giver and Selim's only son, was the climax of Ottoman greatness. The Ottoman rulers built up a special civil service consisting of slaves, prisoners of war and the children of conquered people, they had been taken to Istanbul for training. They were trained hard enough and called Janissars and this system was called Janissary, they were totally devoted to warfare and their Sultan. The Ottoman empire reached its heights of glory in the sixteenth century. Henceforth, Ottoman Sultans also became the Caliphs of Islam. Sultan Suleiman the magnificent law giver gave his empire a system of government. He allowed local governments to function undisturbed and placed Turkish officials at the top. His Christian subjects enjoyed better protection. At the zenith of his power he granted

the famous *capitulations* to foreign powers, to regulate the status of foreigners. France received them in 1535, Austria in 1567 and England in 1592. According to the articles of the capitulations, they enjoyed privileged positions; their citizens were no subject of Turkish laws, paid no taxes and their houses and business premises were inviolable. After Suleiman's death, the empire was ruled by a succession of utterly cruel and incapable, corrupt sultans, under them the administration and military organisation started deteriorating. In the late seventeenth century the Ottoman empire began to show signs of rotting away from inside. The Janissary's became a lazy privileged group. After the victorious war Russia imposed on Turkey, the treaty of Kutschuk Kainardji was made in 1774, where Russia gained control of the northern coast of the Black Sea. The interests of the various European powers in West Asia became manifest, until near the close of eighteenth century the interests of the Western Europeans, Venetians, French and English were confined to trade with the lands under Ottoman rule. The French began to think of establishing control over Egypt, the French explorer Napoleon Bonaparte in 1778, organised a military expedition to Egypt for the purpose of crippling British communications with India. But it is clear that after centuries of friendship and understanding France had to invade the Ottoman territory, on 1<sup>st</sup> August 1798, Napoleon occupied the whole of Egypt. The British brought to the awareness of the geographical bearings of the Ottoman territories, these developments brought British statesmen, adventurers and business groups to make trial of the practicability of opening up of a route of communications between England and India through Ottoman territories, and this brought the European powers to West Asia. Britain acquired Malta in 1800, then in 1801 the French Egypt surrendered to the British. Britain was determined to gain uncontested supremacy in Persian Gulf. Russia's influence was by no means negligible to its vast size, physical position and proclivities for expansion in all directions were ever present. Before the close of eighteenth century Russia had become the chief power in Black Sea and Caspian Sea became a Russian lake.

Before the end of Napoleonic wars Great Britain had entered into engagements with the independent and semi-independent Sheikdoms of Persian Gulf, which extended from time to time, when after 1814 the Anglo-Persian relations deteriorated, Russia found it inexpedient to resort open conquest of that country. Russia was looking to grasp any opportunity to control the Turkish straits. By this time the Ottoman empire was declining and Russia endeavoured by every means to project its authority into the power vacuum caused by the weakness of the Ottoman rule. Out of this situation emerged the most characteristic issue of the century 'the Eastern Question'- the question of the disposition of the Turkish territories when the palsied hands of the Sultan could no longer hold the weight of the Turkish empire. It was the problem of the succession of the declining Ottoman empire. Because of their own interests Britain and France wanted to see the declining Ottoman empire, besides this they could not prevent the Russo-Turkish war of 1827, and it became acute when Pasha of Egypt Muhammad Ali waged his own war of independence in 1830, but was prevented from seizing Constantinople. The Eastern Question was also responsible for the theme of Crimean war which resulted into the neutralisation of the Black Sea, which was under Russian control and the closing of the straits to non-Turkish vessels of war.

Now there were Russia, France, Britain and Germany who were directly involved in the bitter struggle for the control of West Asia. German commercial influence was now preponderant in Turkey beyond any doubt and she was supplying a large proportion of Turkey's armament needs. Consequently, the German company obtained the concessions. Till to this stage the British were favourable to Germans. The threat to Britain's position in West Asia comes mainly from Russia and France. In 1892, the British ambassador in Berlin had urged the Germans to develop a commercial interest in the region as a counter poise to Russia. In 1898, British relations to the German railway concession were

favourable and Turkish railway was given in the hands of Germany. In 1900, the German technical mission visited Kuwait and made a tempting offer to the Sheikh for a concession for a terminus and a port. When Sheikh resisted their offer, the Germans persuaded the Ottoman government.

In 1903, the Anatolian Railway Company which was partly British partly German had its plan for Baghdad railway, invited British capitalists to participate on equal terms with the existing German and French interests. The Balfour government favoured the acceptance, but the cabinet was unanimous. Consequently, the British government declined the German offer. The following year in 1904, the Anglo-French entente was born and in 1907, the Anglo-Russian entente. The same year in 1907, the young Turks who were dispersed by Abdul Hamid in 1876, began to infiltrate into their country. They established secret societies under the name of 'Committee of Union and Progress'. The Arabs under the tyranny of Abdul Hamid, began to oppose his statecraft, had welcomed the Young Turk Revolution. When the young Turks proclaimed the Constitution of 1876, Abdul Hamid changed himself into a Constitutional ruler. Secretly, the Sultan plotted for the overthrow of the Committee on April 13, 1909, he carried out a *coup* with the help of some loyal regiments, but his triumph was very short lived, on April 25, Young Turks re-entered Constantinople and deposed Abdul Hamid. On the other hand the Arabs were not represented in the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, they founded the Young Arab Association with the object of securing Arab independence from Turkish or any other foreign rule.

In the foreign affairs, the Turkish government was helpless and desperate, Europe was now divided into two armed camps. Russia was the arch enemy, Britain repelled the Young Turks, France was never popular at Constantinople. Italy waited like a jackal to pick up any thing which she could find. In a state of no sincerity Germany extended her left hand towards the dying Turkish state. The Turks had to grasp it because they felt that military re-organisation was the

only way to survive. Turkey requested Britain for an alliance, but Britain rejected it. Then Turkish government asked Germany to send a military mission, when Germany declared war against Russia on 1<sup>st</sup> August 1914, and against France on 3<sup>rd</sup> August, it became urgent for Germany to net Turkey on her side, if the Turkish Straits could be closed Russia would be paralysed because Russia depended on the supply of arms from her western allies through these narrow water ways. Germany closed the Baltic sea to Russian ships, time was on the side of Turkey, defensive treaty was immediately signed by German and Turkey.

On the declaration of war against Russia the Turks had not obliged their ally. On 4<sup>th</sup> August, Britain joined France. After Turks signed their defensive treaty with Germany, The Russian government frightened, the Russian foreign minister suggested that Russia was prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity of Turkish empire, if it remained out of the war but Turkey took no decision. In November the straits were closed and Russia defeated.

The Turkish empire was disintegrated, Enver Pasha, the hero of the Young Turk Revolution and Jamal Pasha were too much worried that which bloc should Turkey join 'the triple entente or Germany' the Turks had no friend among them, the Germany helped them in the time of distress when other powers left them to their destiny, so Turkey made the alliance with Germany. Before Turkey was drawn into the war, the British government tried to probe Sheriff Hussein's attitude in case Britain had to fight with the Turks. In the beginning Sheriff hesitated but after the war broke out he took a definite step. The Turks requested him for Jihad but the shrewd Sheriff pointed out that Jihad is not possible with the help of Christians. The Young Turks were very desperate being surrounded on all sides by actual and potential enemies.

In January 1915, Sir Henry Mac Mohan became the High Commissioner of Egypt. In February the Turkish army fought a bloody battle with British imperial army which was guarding the Suez Canal. On the other hand the Arabs revolted

against the Turks, they were tired of Turkish domination and plotted for freedom. The Arab wanted their language to be recognised and their culture preserved. The new Turks ruled out the possibility of a bi-lingual, bi-cultural state where they and Arabs could live on the terms of equality. It was the only solution and some Arabs were prepared for it but some were against it and started their propaganda against the Turks because in an Arab-Turkish state domination was of Turks and discrimination was rampant. This repression and discrimination gave birth to Arab nationalism. Saving themselves from the Turkish authorities the Arabs requested Sheriff Hussein to lead the Arab nationalist movement. In the meantime the war broke out between Turkey and Britain, this war gave the Sheriff his opportunity, he appointed himself as the spokesman of Arab nationalism, with all the tenacity of old age he started negotiations with Britain. Britain carried out negotiations under exceptionally trying conditions. She was fighting for her empire, the defeat of Turkey at any price appears to have been the immediate objective of Britain. These were some of the considerations which led Britain to make large promises with Arabs and at the same time with France. The Arab nationalists made a written document known as the Damascus protocol, it contained a clear statement of the aims of the Arab nationalism, it also clearly defined the boundary of the state which it wished to create. The negotiations started on July 14, 1915, between British High Commissioner Henry Mac Mohan and Sheriff Hussein and called 'Hussein-Mac Mohan correspondence'.

From these letters, Hussein appeared to believe that he had reached a precise understanding with Great Britain on the formation of Unified Arab state. Hussein also protested against the exclusion of the portions of Syria and Mersin, in reply the High Commissioner tried to define French interests in the excluded area, while he rejected the Anglo-French claims, Britain made him to discuss it after the war, on January 30, 1916, the correspondence had been closed. This correspondence only defined the boundaries of the state which the Arabs wanted to create, Britain was more interested in keeping the Suez Canal under her



control rather than the Turkish empire, France too had a similar interest of taking Syria and Palestine. The British interests in West Asia were well known, throughout the nineteenth century she tried to keep the Ottoman empire alive but her attitude radically changed in the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain maintained relations with France and Russia and developed hostility towards the Turks. Britain and France decided to share with Russia whatever they acquire from the dying Ottoman empire, but Russia did not negotiate with her allies. The famous or infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement which was signed between Britain and France on May 16, 1916, just 18 days before the Arabs rebelled against the Turkish rule was a proof of British and French intentions. This agreement was the distribution of the land of Turkish empire. The entente powers were keeping their eyes on dying Ottoman empire. France had her designs on Syria and Lebanon, Italy had some hopes of collecting tit bits, Russia looked towards the Constantinople. The agreement was substantiated by a carefully drawn up map. The French and British areas of interest were respectively coloured blue and red. There was a brown area too consisting of Palestine, and it was decided that in Palestine there would be an international administration. This agreement was kept secret.

As soon as the war with Turkey had started, it had become important for Britain to secure Sheriff Hussein's support in order to reinforce war operations in the Arab countries. On the other hand the news of executions in Syria and the brutality of Turks had finally convinced the skeptical Feisal that nothing was to be gained by hanging, Hussein declared war against Turkey, this war was also known as the Arab revolt, accordingly begun on June 5, 1916. In November 1916, Hussein proclaimed himself the king of the Arab lands, but Britain and France recognised him only as the King of Hejaz, because Britain and French were of the view that the Arab revolt was an insignificant movement and it should not be allowed to spread beyond the coastal area of Hejaz.

Finally the Turks were on the edge of bankruptcy and were physically exhausted, it was a substantial achievement for the Arabs. A few days later the Arabs completely cut off the Turkey's contacts with the red sea. In October 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia and the entente powers immediately published the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Disclosure of the Anglo-French plans of parceling out the Arab lands astounded the leaders of the Arab revolt, the pathetic faith of the Arabs in British character was shocked.

The exception which Britain claimed about Palestine was not clearly mentioned either in the correspondence or in any other official document. In Sykes Picot treaty Palestine was supposed to be placed under international control which was not welcomed either by Zionists or Britain. Supported by the Zionists Britain had to obtain an agreement with France. There was some delay in obtaining the agreement from France because France was unwilling to give her consent to the cancellation of the proposed internationalisation. In July 1917, Palestine was captured by the imperial forces and Arabs, Arab countries and territories, rich in oil had been seized. The secret wartime aims of Britain made it to conclude an agreement with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Jewish chemist, who was an expert of producing acetone for war efforts, he materially contributed to the British war efforts and attracted the attention of British officials to Zionist aspirations. The spring of 1917, brought two dramatic developments which proved decisive for the success of the Zionist cause, the first was Revolution in Russia, and second was America's entry into the war. On November 2, 1917, the famous Balfour Declaration was made. This Declaration was the fulfillment of the home sickness of the Jews who had left this land centuries ago. The Balfour Declaration set the seal on Weizmann's efforts, and gave the backing of a great power to Jewish immigration into Palestine. Britain's undertaking to the Zionists was the concern for imperial communications and for defending the Suez canal which was the life line of trade and communications with India. After the Turkish defeat in Syria the Ottoman empire was completely collapsed and the whole area was

occupied by British troops with a small French force on the coast and the army of King Hussein in the interior. In Palestine there was a British military administration, in the coastal region North of Palestine a French provisional government, and in four cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus and East of Jordan, an Arab administration under Ameer Feisal, to whom a number of British and French officers were attached. At the end of the First World War, the Arabs expected the fulfillment of promises made to them by Britain, these consisted of various statements and declarations made during the war.<sup>1</sup> The Arabs maintained that Palestine was included in the Hussein - Mac Mohan correspondence while the British said that it did not. Britain particularly wanted to safeguard its interests in India and Egypt by keeping hold on Palestine. French and Russian interests were dealt with specifically in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916,<sup>2</sup> which conflicted with the Mac Mohan correspondence in regard to the area and degree of Arab independence. Under its terms Russia was to have, besides Constantinople and a strip of territory on each side of the Bosphorus, the greater part of the four Turkish provinces adjacent to the Russian frontier. Russia laid no claim to any Arab territory, and recognised the claims of France and Britain in regard to them. As between themselves Britain and France agreed that there should be :

- a) an international zone in Palestine,
- b) a British zone of Basra and Baghdad,
- c) a French zone of Syria (and Cilicia),
- d) an independent Arab state or federation, between the British and French zones, divided into the British and French spheres of influence.

On January 30, 1919, the Peace Conference decided that the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire should be wholly separated from Turkey, and announced the adoption for some of them of the mandate system, a kind of trusteeship, as a bridge to complete independence. Britain and France disagreed over the boundaries

of the mandated territories, but in September 1919, an agreement was reached between Britain and France whereby British troops were withdrawn from Syria (excluding Palestine) and from Cilicia, and replaced by Arab troops in the interior of Syria and by French troops on the coast and in Cilicia. On March 20, 1920, a congress of Syrian notables at Damascus offered the crown of Syria and Palestine to Feisal, who accepted it. This action was repudiated by the British and French governments, who subsequently at the Conference of San Remo (24 April 1920), received mandates: the French for Syria and Lebanon, the British for Palestine, with Transjordan, with the obligation to carry out the policy of the Balfour Declaration. This award was repudiated by Feisal. Subsequently the French Commander-in-Chief advanced in Syria and occupied Damascus. Feisal departed into exile, but later became King of Iraq.

The mandates for 'Palestine' and 'Syria and Lebanon' were formally approved by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922 and became effective in September 1923.<sup>3</sup> In 1924 the United States gave its concurrence to the mandates. With the final disintegration of the Ottoman empire, Western penetration became Western domination, and Arab nationalism, which had allied itself with Britain against the Turks, became the formula for resistance to Western economic and political power.

The Arab territories placed under mandate were dissatisfied with a political status inferior to that of less advanced countries such as Yemen and Hejaz. Nevertheless, except in Palestine, where there was an exceptional regime under international supervision, all the mandated territories made political progress between the wars, and one of them, Iraq, in 1932 attained independence. Egypt too, which when the First World War ended was a British protectorate, became independent in 1936.

Britain emerged from the post war settlements in a predominant position in West Asia. The British declaration for Palestine caused unceasing anxiety and

conflict between Arabs and Jews. There were outbreaks of violence on the part of the Arabs, from 1920 onwards, there were several inquiries and white papers in regard to it. In 1937, a Royal Commission recommended the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews; in 1938 a Partition Commission found the proposal to be impracticable. Throughout the period, and specially after the Nazi brutality had begun to drive the Jews out of Germany, Palestine had difficulty every year about the number of Jewish immigrants to be admitted. Finally there was the British White Paper of 1939, providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, except with Arab consent, when 75,000 more Jews should have been admitted, for a ten year scheme of preparation for self government, and for restriction on the acquisition of land by the Jews. This White Paper was rejected by the Arabs, and failed to secure approval of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

One consequence of the British predominance was a tendency for the West Asian nationalists to look to rival powers for support. Fascist Italy was active in propaganda and political intrigue in West Asian countries, by 1939, extensive anti-British activities were being conducted from German and Italian missions and consulates in the West Asian region. Italian activities concentrated chiefly on Egypt and Red Sea coast of Arabia, particularly the Yemen, and they did not entirely cease after the signature of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 16 April, 1938, 'regarding questions of mutual concern' in the West Asia. German activities were directed upon Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

With the outbreak of World War II, the actual defense of the area was a British responsibility. In a speech delivered in May 1941, Anthony Eden said that the British government would give full support to any scheme that commanded general approval among Arabs for strengthening the cultural, economic and political ties between the Arab countries. The Vichy regime in Syria was defeated by British and Free French forces, and replaced in July by a regime dependent on General De Gaulle. The Syrian and Lebanese independence, promised by the

Free French and confirmed by the British or their entry into Syria in June 1941 was formally recognised by the British government on 27 October (Syria) and on 26 December (Lebanon) 1941. In December 1942, Nuri-al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, brought forward a scheme for the unification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, with 'semi-autonomy' for the Jews in Palestine, as the first step towards the Arab unity. This proposal was not pursued, but a general Arab Conference met in Alexandria in September-October 1944, which was attended by representatives of the Government of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and by an observer on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. The proceedings resulted in the foundation of the Arab League. By the end of World War II it had become plain that the *status quo* could not continue in Palestine. During and after the war the eyes of thousands of Jews who had suffered from Nazi persecution were turned towards Palestine, not only as containing the Jewish National Home but as their only place for refuge. Jewish demands enjoyed strong support in the United States, as President Truman made repeated requests to the British government to admit into Palestine forthwith 100,000 of the homeless Jews of Europe. The British government tried unsuccessfully to reach agreements with the United States government, with the Arabs, and with the Jews, and in February 1947, it referred the problem to the United Nations, to whom it gave warning on 26 September, that if no settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs could be found it would plan for the early withdrawal of British forces and British administration from Palestine. A United Nations plan for the partition of the territory was approved by the Assembly on November 29, but the Arab states refused to accept it. On May 14, 1948, the British mandate was abandoned and the last of the British troops withdrew from Palestine. On the same day the state of Israel was proclaimed: it was recognised immediately by the United States, followed closely by the Soviet Union. On May 15, the forces of Egypt, Jordan and Iraq began to invade Palestine. In spite of the efforts of the United Nations fighting did not finally stop until January 1949,

while the signature of armistice arrangements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon on the other, was not completed until July. No peace treaty has followed. In 1950, a tripartite declaration was issued by Britain, France and the United States, expressing readiness to supply the Arab states and Israel with arms for internal security and self-defense and to take action, both within and outside the United Nations', to prevent the violation by force of any West Asian frontier or armistice line. In November 1950, the Arab League decided to continue the war time blockage of Israel, on the ground that an armistice did not constitute a state of peace.

The establishment of the state of Israel created a new political reality in the region. India did not recognise the establishment of the state of Israel because from the very beginning India opposed the partition plan. Nehru proposed the establishment of a federal Palestine with internal autonomy for the Jewish population, but his plan was rejected and the U.N. General Assembly voted in favour of the partition of Palestine. When the repercussions of the partition were felt then it was realised that India's proposal was best for the peaceful co-existence of both the Jews and Arabs.

#### **b. The Suez Canal Crisis:**

For centuries Egypt attained an important position in the commercial history of the world because of its geographical location. In ancient times the Phoenicians traded in the whole Mediterranean and established their centers in North Africa and Southern Europe. Same way they conquered the whole of North Africa and Spain. Later the Turks conquered most of the area from the Arabs, this way before the advent of modern times the Mediterranean was covered by different trade centers and empires. It has been a fortune and misfortune of Egypt that she lies between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Strategically Egypt is situated at the cross roads of the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. In

this way it commands the approaches of three continents, it is generally believed that Egypt is the country where first Neolithic revolution took place which resulted in the development of trade and trade routes, since then Egypt has been one of the main centers of commercial activity in West Asia. Besides its strategic location, the most important physical feature of Egypt is the Isthmus of Suez lying between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, this feature made the traders and the merchants to think of Egypt as an easy passage. Caravans from the Levant in East and beyond would cross into Africa and from Africa into some of the Asian areas via the Isthmus. The Isthmus of Suez joined Africa to Asia, the tongue of the Red Sea licked up close to the Mediterranean waters, not so far in the West, the river Nile flowed and did indeed reach the Middle sea through its seven or eight delta channels, one of which- the Pelusiac- so entrancingly crossed the edge of Isthmus. Before the growth of central empires of Greece and Rome, and the commercial development of Europe, access by shipping from the Red Sea to Western waters could not perhaps be regarded as a vital necessity, though it had its obvious uses. The earliest Egyptian canal builders were immediately concerned with providing a passage for vessels from the Red Sea to the great interior cities along the Nile.

Details of first navigable Canal linking the Nile with the Red Sea are lost in the mists of antiquity. Tradition claims that it was Sesostris, a Pharaoh of the twelfth Dynasty, who first set his hand to this enterprise. So it is remembered as the Canal of the Pharaohs. Sesostris' Canal was silted up, and the next attempt was made by Pharaoh Necho (612 B C) who reopened it but soon he refilled it when he was warned by an oracle that he was preparing the way for the barbarian invader afterwards Egypt was conquered by Persians. It was a Persian ruler, Darius Hystaspes. Who less than a century later in 521 B C resolved and enlarged the Canal of the Pharaohs. Subsequently, Darius, for a reason unknown destroyed the last section of the Canal but it was re-excavated by his successor Xerxes.



The Roman occupation of Egypt saw the Canal of the pharaohs converted in due course into the river of Trajan. The emperor Trajan (98 A.D) cleared out the old Canal which pass through so many vicissitudes, and gave it a better water supply by uniting it with the main stream of the Nile at the Babylon. With the Arab conquest of Egypt in the seventh century A.D the Nile Red Sea Canal entered on the last phase of its history by the permission of the Caliph Omar, Amri Governor of Egypt, re-opened the waterway in the winter of 641-642 A.D. It was finally closed in 776 A.D., by the order of the second Abbasid Caliph, Abu-Jaffar as a blockading measure against the revolted holy cities of Mecca and Medina. From this period commerce between East and West via Egypt steadily declined. Through the journey of Marco Polo and other travellers the Northern over land route to India and China was developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries until the growth and aggressive power of the Turkey robbed the merchants of this avenue for the profitable traffic and brought to an end the commercial supremacy in Europe of the Venetians and Genoese which depended so largely on the Levant.

A new means of access to the East become a crying need in face of the Turkish barrier, the journey of Vasco-de-Gamma opened up an effective Ocean route to India and the Far East, with the opening up of this route the European powers showed their interests to gain the monopoly of trade. Among the European states France now held a leading position in the Eastern Mediterranean, and for geographical reasons her interest in the ancient commercial route through Egypt was bound to be greater than of any other country. France was concerned to re-open the old route through Egypt, and so to deal a heavy blow at the Cape commerce. France did not immediately contemplate the annexation of Egypt, her government contended itself with negotiating treaties with the Beys, which would have the effect of giving her merchants transport facilities through the country.

It was evident that the power of Turkey in Egypt was weakening, and it only required that the government of that country be replaced by one more amenable or controlled by one of the Western power, to make immediately practicable the construction of the Suez Canal, either by cutting through the Isthmus or restoring the ancient indirect Nile-Red Sea system. The advocacy of a Suez Canal, mainly and naturally by the French, had been going on continuously, so the matters stood when the war broke out between England and France in 1793. To give England a lesson France decided to capture Egypt. Napoleon landed his forces at Alexandria and occupied the country. After the French occupation it was obvious that Egypt could no longer be a matter of unconcern to European governments. The geo-strategic location diverted the attention of Britain toward the Egypt. Hence forth Britain adopted a defensive policy, so that no other power could get preponderant influence in Egypt. This policy of Britain can be understood in the context of Eastern Question, because Britain's main policy was to maintain the integrity of the Ottomans empire. So that the balance of power in Europe could remain intact as France, Russia and Austria were trying to take advantage of the declining Ottomans empire. Britain also wanted to maintain the security of her Eastern dominions specially India for this purpose she regarded effective maintenance of Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt as the best guarantee of continuous security of her empire in the East.

Whatever ingenious the power might have for the future of Egypt, the event which brought about the most radical and far reaching change in Egypt's internal administration was the rise to power of Muhammad Ali, an Albanian Colonel, nominally he was serving the Sultan of Turkey.

Under Muhammad Ali Egypt awakened from her long sleep and became a factor to be reckoned with in world affairs. In his political sympathies he on the whole favored the French and every opportunity was afforded to French experts to come in and assist him in his schemes of construction and organisation.

England now became really anxious about the Egyptian route to India, and concerned to maintain the existence of the Ottoman empire as a bulwark against the intentions of any other European power to deprive her of the use of this route. It was lieutenant Thomas Waghorn, who was the first to demonstrate practically the advantages of the route to India through Egypt, in 1830, Waghorn had tested this route by journeying from London to Bombay.

After the Napoleon's expedition to Egypt various schemes of piercing the Isthmus was put forward in Muhammad Ali's time by French sponsors but non of the schemes proceeded farther than the stage of discussion due to the strong British opposition. From the British point of view it became obvious that such a canal would create a physical barrier against the march of the Turkish armies into Egypt. It would encourage and sustain Egyptian independence of Constantinople and therefore it would defeat the basic aim of the British policy towards Egypt. Lord Palmerstone the then British Foreign Secretary believed that the peace of Europe and the safety of the British people unquestionably lay in opposing the project of the Suez Canal. He said that the cutting of the canal would sooner or later lead to the occupation of Egypt. In order to prevent the route falling wholly into the hands of the rivals the British government adopted after 1842 a definite line of action. As an alternative to the Suez Canal project Palmerstone advocated a railway project from Alexandria to Suez, which he concluded would not alter the geo-political status of Egypt, in the least and would produce no international complications.

In 1847, Mr. Barret, the French Consul General in Egypt told Muhammad Ali that if Egypt should one day become a greatest route between Europe and India, it would be better that it should be opened by means of a canal to the ships of all European nations who would naturally control it. Than by the construction of a railway which would make the passage through Egypt the monopoly of England. Palmerstone in a dispatch to Mr. Murray, the British

Consul General in Egypt wrote that the Austrian interests in the canal were commercial but the French interests were political in that it would place them as a military and naval power in the Mediterranean much nearer to India than the English would be.

Muhammad Ali was then on one hand under the pressure of Britain to build a rail road and on the other was under the pressure of France and Austria to build a canal. The result was that he kept on putting off taking a decision for fear of antagonising either side. He had not yet reached a decision when he died in 1849, and was succeeded by his grand son Abbas Pasha. Abbas Pasha being an Anglophile expelled all French advisors and appointed the British ones.

Muhammad Ali gave the country a new life and though he recognised the importance of a canal, he refused to jeopardise the country's future by granting permission for its construction. Ferdinand de Lesseps was a French consular official in Egypt, but he received no encouragement from Muhammad Ali. At Constantinople British influence was very strong and Lord Palmerstone opposed the canal idea because he feared that if it materialised it would increase the influence of France in the West Asia. Under British pressure Sultan Abdul Aziz withheld permission, he refused to oblige the Egyptian Viceroy about the Suez Canal. There are two facts which are noticeable in order to have a clear picture of the way Suez Canal concession was obtained by de Lesseps. Firstly, since October 23, 1853, the Turkish empire was at war with Russia; the Crimean war was now on preoccupation of the two Western powers and Turkey with Russian menace gave Egypt freedom of action. Secondly, Abbas Pasha died and Muhammad Said became the new Viceroy of Egypt in 1854, it was a turning point in the history of the Suez Canal, because the French man de Lesseps was a friend of Said and it revived the French influence. Lesseps succeeded in convincing Said about the utility and importance of the Suez Canal scheme. At the height of the Crimean war, de Lesseps obtained on November 30, 1854, a

preliminary concession by a firman of Said. It authorised de Lesseps to form a *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*. It followed by a second firman on August 5, 1856, the concession provided a solid ground to Lesseps for the excavation of the canal, and the great project began to emerge from the realm of pure speculation to reality. The news of the concession was ill received by Britain and hectic diplomatic activities started. The British government headed by Palmerstone opposed the scheme tooth and nail for fear of French pretensions in Egypt. Britain used all its influence in Constantinople to prevent the Sultan from giving his approval to the concession. The result was that the British opposition led to the delay of more than a decade in the ratification of the concession.

Said died and before his death it was decided in the concessions between him and de Lesseps that France should have 400,000 shares, Britain entitled 80,000 shares, and Egypt 177,642 shares. In 1862, Said had to borrow money from foreign money lenders at 8% interest rate, after his death in 1863, Ismail Pasha became the new Viceroy, and he greatly complicated de Lesseps' task. Finally having overcome most of the difficulties, de Lesseps secured a new convention with Ismail in January 1866. In this convention Article 16 was a new provision which stated that the *Compagnie Universelle* was an Egyptian corporation and as such was to be subject to the laws and customs of the country. The concession was to last for 99 years, but the date of expiry was to count from the day when the Canal was opened for navigation, after the lapse of the concession, it was to be an Egyptian property.

On November 17, 1869, the Canal was opened, the inauguration of the Canal celebrated in the presence of many crowned heads of Europe and European statesmen, and was a moment of great personal triumph for de Lesseps. By that time the British attitude towards the Canal was radically changed, instead of opposing it Britain became very much interested in the Canal as a commercial and strategic route. Ismail as inherited a sizeable debt from the time of Said,

spent lavishly, he borrowed from foreign money lenders at an usurious rate. At the verge of bankruptcy, Ismail in 1875, decided to sell his share, put up 176,602 shares of Suez canal company valued at four million pounds for sale. Disraeli, the Prime Minister of Britain promptly decided to purchase them. Lacking parliamentary authorisation (Parliament was then in recess) he borrowed 100,000,000 francs from the banking house of Rothschild. Thus one of the boldest financial and political transaction in the world history was made. This purchase of shares made Britain an important share holder, although the majority of shares still belonged to France and politically the Canal was under the Turkish-Egyptian sovereignty. The year 1877, was a very bad year for Egypt, due to low rain fall the Nile did not rise, the country went through a severe famine, taxes could not be collected. By the end of the year there was so much suffering that even the foreigners expected something unusual to happen. Ismail was forced to appoint a commission of inquiry, he appointed de Lesseps as the head, the commission reported extensive reforms not only in finances but also in the composition of the government. The British and French government wanted to grab the canal but Ismail was a great hindrance to their plan, after a few months Ismail was exiled and his successor Taufiq was very much aware of the dual control of France and Britain and he knew what was actually expected of him, but found his position undermined by a movement which began as an Army Mutiny, led by Colonel Ahmad Arabi. It soon became a powerful movement against the European dual control, Arabi, now virtually at the head of the affairs, was weak and indecisive. In 1882 conditions deteriorated and Egypt became a British protectorate.

*The Constantinople Convention of 1888:* The British government was quite ready and indeed anxious, to enter into guarantees with the other powers to preserve the freedom of the Canal for the passage of all ships in any circumstance. But she desire to preserve the right to defend the Canal from an act of aggression against Egypt so long as the necessity for her present occupation of the country continued. This was by no means acceptable to the

powers primarily interested. Negotiations dragged on until 1888, on October 29, 1888, the Suez Canal Convention was signed by France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Russia and Turkey in Constantinople also known as Constantinople Convention, defining the international status of the Canal. The signatories pledged not to violate this provision and never to subjected the Canal to a blockade. The Constantinople Convention proclaimed the principle of free navigation in the Canal for all nations. The signing of the Convention of 1888, might have been thought to have terminated the Suez Canal controversy. Both France and Russia, France in particular, was dissatisfied with the prolonged British occupation of Egypt. It was felt that England was steadily taking over the rights of the Ottoman empire as Egyptian suzerain. The outbreak of First World War, effectively put an end to any questions affecting the future status of the Canal. Its security became a more urgent matter.

Egypt was willy-nilly a belligerent on the side of Britain against the central powers, in view of the British military occupation. The pro-German Khedive Abbas Hilmi was at Constantinople at the time, his Prime Minister, Hussein Rushdie Pasha, was acting as regent, Rushdie realised that nothing could be gained by defying Great Britain.

During the war Britain freely used the Canal for her own purposes. Towards the end of October 1914, the Turkish government sent a note to the British embassy declaring that Egypt was and would always be considered an integral part of the Ottoman empire. In November 1914, turkey openly joined the central powers and Britain declared a state of war between herself and the Ottoman empire. At the end of the war, Egypt was severed from its Turkish suzerain and transformed into a British protectorate. The Egyptians were more or less opposed to the British occupation. A nationalist feeling was increasing and Egypt planned for independence, self determination was the slogan, these slogans were vocal before the war but now they organised themselves into the Wafd. The

Wafd forced Great Britain to abolish the protectorate, though with certain reservations. In 1922, the British protectorate over Egypt was (nominally) terminated and Egypt was declared an independent sovereign state, the same time Ahmad Fuad succeeded Hussein Kamil and became King Fuad with Wafdist Zaghlul Pasha as Prime Minister. But Britain did not lose command over Egypt, it declared, a) security of the communications of British empire in Egypt, b) the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect. The British forces remained in Egypt and the British High Commissioner continued to act. The successive British governments remained adamant on these reserved questions.

In 1924, when the labour party came into power in Britain and Ramsay MacDonald became the Prime Minister, the Wafdists hoped for some modifications and made some specific demands like the withdrawal of British troops, withdrawal of financial and judicial advisors, no interference in Egyptian affairs, renunciation of Great Britain of her claim to protect the Suez Canal.

As regards the Canal it was suggested that its protection should be given to the League of Nations and Mr. MacDonald made it clear that the 'proposals are unacceptable'. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations dragged on for years, never reaching an agreement on all the points, draft treaties were prepared and rejected. But with the passage of time Britain's position in West Asia was seriously threatened by Germany and Italy.

Meanwhile King Fuad died and succeeded by his sixteen year old son Farouk I, the passing of King Fuad gave the Wafd a new opportunity to reassert itself in Egyptian politics. In May 1936, Nahas Pasha the then Prime Minister formed an all Wafd cabinet, one of the first steps of the new government, and asked Great Britain for the renewal of negotiations to replace the status quo by a treaty. Britain was anxiously looking for an opportunity to make her relations better with Egypt to strengthen its position in West Asia in view of the Italian



and German menace, the differences were hurriedly adjusted and on August 26, 1936, the treaty was ratified by Egyptian Parliament. Britain was now more evidently an ally of Egypt rather than her protector. British troops were to continue on the Egyptian soil, but only to the time the Egyptian army was not strong enough to take over full responsibilities. Egypt was definitely marked down as a prey, Mussolini had great designs over Egypt. Italy was to oust Britain from Egypt because the Italians feel that their East African empire would never be safe as long as another power commands the Suez Canal.

The Second World War began on September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, on 2<sup>nd</sup> Italy proclaimed her neutrality, on 3<sup>rd</sup> Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, on the collapse of France, Italy declared war on Great Britain and France. The axis leaders were in a state of elation, Hitler was thinking in terms of continents now, and Africa had become a key to everything whether in strategy or in economy, he had decided to seize Gibraltar and Suez without further delay. At the same time Hitler discussed with the chief of his naval staff the further implications of this strategy, 'the Suez Canal must be taken, it is doubtful whether Italians can accomplish it alone or support by German troops will be needed. An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as turkey is necessary, if we reach that point Turkey will be in our power.'<sup>4</sup>

The position of the British forces in the Canal zone was both diplomatically awkward and strategically dangerous. A state of siege had been declared over the whole of the Canal area. Though the Mediterranean itself was closed to allied merchant shipping for a considerable time, the facilities at Suez were quite unable to cope with the huge convoys that began to reach the Gulf. This presented a major problem for the navy, but the vulnerability to air of the concentration of ships that might be waiting at Suez, made this process the safest one. It was generally expected that Italy would at once attack by air. The Canal

was immune to damage by high explosives, so the only danger was mining. The Italo-German threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal, built up over a long period, and it was of course the German hand in bombing the Canal that had so completely changed the defense situation. In the first raids the Germans employed magnetic mines, but it was difficult to plot the mines that did fall in the Canal. On March 3, 1940, six enemy aircrafts succeeded in dropping twelve mines into the Canal, and a week later a further eight, shipping came to a standstill. With the elimination of Italy the Mediterranean was once more open for convoys. Once again in chequered history of Egypt and the Suez Canal a dream of domination had brought disaster to the aggressor. But the experience of the Second World War had been very revealing as to the attitude of the great powers towards the Canal.

Britain's de facto control of the Suez Canal obtained judicial confirmation by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. the Article 8 of the treaty stated that the Canal was 'an integral part of Egypt' but that Britain was entrusted with the task of its defense. It would be recalled from chapter XI, that Britain was authorised to keep 10,000 soldiers and 400 pilots in the Canal zone apart from technical and administrative personnel. At the time of this treaty no one raised the problem of its compatibility with the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and it was assumed that the Convention remained in force. It should be noted that at no time did British assume direct responsibility for the administration of the Canal traffic, which was left entirely to the company and at no time did they deprive the Egypt of her traditional right as the sovereign power to exercise, police, customs and sanity control over the Canal and the adjacent area.

After the war Egypt had asked for the revision of the treaty of 1936, and for this purpose embarked upon negotiations with Britain, negotiations failed and led to the placing of Anglo-Egyptian dispute before the United Nations in 1947,

in the discussions the Security Council failed to reach any decision and the legal status of the Canal remained unchanged.

The Palestinian war of 1948, brought the Suez Canal once again to the fore in the international Affairs. Egypt, as a belligerent applied various restrictive measures against enemy ships and against neutral ships carrying contraband of war. These measures were based on Military Proclamation no. 5, issued by Egyptian government in the early summer of 1948, and instituted a regime of inspection of ships in Alexandria, soon followed by further regulations concerning customs inspection and prize courts, did not differ from similar decrees issued. Although these measures interfered with the normal navigation through the Suez Canal, no protests were raised by foreign powers, it was silently admitted that Egypt was at war with Israel, and her rights to adopt measures of self defense did not violate the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. The Egypt Israel Armistice concluded at Rhodes on February 24, 1949, it put an end to hostilities and a new era of peaceful co-existence for two states. Egypt relaxed her control over Canal shipping but did not abolish them altogether. Britain annoyed when in July 1951, an Egyptian corvette detained a British Freighter, Empire Roach, in the Gulf of Akaba, although not directly connected with Suez Canal traffic this incident contributed to the deterioration of the already strained relations between Egypt and the major maritime powers and proved to be a turning point in their attitude towards Egypt.

Profiting from this state of mind, Israel on July 12, 1951, brought a complaint against the Egypt before the U.N. Security Council. Israel's complaint included three points-

- a) Egypt had violated international law by exercising the rights of belligerency in time of peace.
- b) Egypt had violated the armistice of February 20, 1949.
- c) Egypt had violated the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.

In the Security Council the Egyptian delegate defended his country's behavior by repudiating each of the three contentions. He argued, that the armistice was not yet a peace treaty and that Egypt was therefore still technically at war with Israel. Consequently, she was entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent. Moreover, the Egyptian delegate asserted that Israel had violated the armistice by expelling peaceful Arab population across the Egyptian border, by raiding certain localities in the neutral frontier zone, and by illegally attacking Egyptian territory. Then he asserted that the Convention of 1888, specially allowed Egypt to take self protective measures, in the Canal zone, and that despite these measures freedom of navigation through the Canal remained unimpaired, the volume of traffic actually increasing by leaps and bounds.

In consequence of this and numerous protests arising from Egyptian interference with shipping the United States, Great Britain and France on August 16<sup>th</sup> introduced a joint resolution in the Security Council requesting Egypt to end the blockade at the Suez Canal of Israel bound vessels on the ground that such actions was unjustified and inconsistent with the 'permanent character' of the armistice regime. The Egyptian response declared that the armistice had not ended the state of hostilities and that Egypt, acting in self defense, had not violated the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. Although on September 1, the Security Council holding that Egyptian interference with Canal shipping was unjustified on various grounds, called upon the state to terminate the restriction on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound, its admonition went unheeded, with the sympathy of the Soviet Union and the encouragement of the other Arab states Egypt pushed steadily ahead with measures designed completely to eliminate British control of Suez waterway. In October, 1951, Nahas Pasha presented to the Parliament a series of decrees unilaterally abrogating the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, providing for the eviction of the British troops from the Canal zone, reuniting Sudan with Egypt and

proclaiming Farouk, King of Egypt and Sudan, on October 15, the decrees were unanimously approved by the Parliament. A wave of anti-British riots following these decisions failed to induce the British to leave the Canal zone.

The excitement produced by the denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty led to an ever increasing number of incidents between the British forces and Egyptians in the Canal zone. On January 19, 1952, Ismailia an important town and base on the Canal, became the scene of mass fighting which ended six days later in British occupation of the town. The Ismailia incident inspired major riots in Cairo on January 26. The Toll was 552 wounded and 26 killed after the day of rioting. This was indeed a black day in Cairo. King Farouk traditionally hostile to Wafd, sees this opportunity summarily to dismiss Nahas Pasha and his Cabinet, and appointed in his place a veteran Ali Maher Pasha, the subsequent six months so considerable turbulence and the anti-Wafdist cabinet had to face either a hostile Wafd dominated Parliament or after its dissolution on March 29, a dangerous political vacuum. This vacuum was abruptly filled by a new dynamic force, when at the dawn of July 23, 1952 a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), composed of eleven young officers, assumed supreme authority in the country. The ostensible leader Major General Naguib became Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, while Ali Maher Pasha was made Premier, on July 26, Major Naguib handed to King Farouk an ultimatum to renounce the throne and leave the country forthwith. Farouk signed an act of abdication in favour of his infant son Ahmad Fuad II and on the same day left Egypt for Italy. On August 2, a regency council was formed. It consisted of three men, Prince Mohammad Abdul Moneim, Bahieddin Barakat, and Let. Colonel Rashad Mehama representing the RCC. This new regime was more effective in destroying the old reforms. On December 10, 1952, the RCC abrogated the 1923 Constitution and on January 23, 1953, it appointed a fifty man committee to redraft the Constitution. Simultaneously, the RCC underwent a number of internal readjustments, some of a very dramatic character. As was later revealed, General Naguib had not

belonged to original group of officers. The real leader of the movement was Lt. General Abdul Nasser, who resented the gradual usurpation of power by Naguib. Nasser replaced Naguib as Prime Minister and President of the RCC. When new constitution began to operate Nasser became the President, in Foreign policy the new government could boast of a number of achievements. Although it inherited from the previous regime two major unsettled issues- those of the Suez and the Sudan, the first issue was resolved soon when on December 19, 1955, Sudan claimed independent, Egypt, England, Soviet Union and the United States promptly recognised this decision. On the other hand, by the end of 1954, Egypt's relations with the Western powers suffered principally on account of Baghdad Pact. Though enjoying dictatorial powers, Gamal Abdul Nasser and his associates could not safely disregard public opinion, which was so opposed to any foreign pact. Consequently, for the sake of his position at home, Nasser with Indian Prime Minister emerged As the principle champion of a 'no pact' policy on behalf of the Arabs.

One of the cherished objectives of the Cairo Revolutionary Regime had been the construction of a new high dam above Aswan near the Sudanese border. Such a dam would harness enough Nile water to provide the delta with all the electric power it needs and increase the cultivable area of Egypt by some two million acres. Egypt's interest in the dam gained momentum in the fall of 1955, following the arms deal with the Soviets. In October of that year Moscow expressed its willingness to come to the aid of Egypt in this connection. On December 15, 1955, the United States declared to lend Egypt \$ 56,000,000 for the first stage of the Aswan dam. Britain followed with an offer of \$ 14,000,000. these offers were made with an understanding that 'counterpart' funds would be laid aside for construction by Egypt herself. Further conditions of Western aid included Egypt's granting priority to this project over other schemes and non-acceptance of Soviet aid. Nasser delayed the Soviet offer because he expected that a more concrete Soviet offer might come forth. In the meantime the controlled

Egyptian press carried a vituperative campaign against the U.S. and the West for their sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact, their interference with the sovereign right of the Egypt to buy arms where she pleases, their partiality to Israel and their alleged over all hostility to Arab national aspirations.

At the same time the Egyptian news papers repeatedly hinted that a Soviet aid was in the making, but the expected Soviet offer did not materialise. Consequently, in mid July Nasser sent his ambassador to Washington to accept the American offer, when he arrived in Washington from Cairo, with dismay and shock he learned from Secretary Dulles that the American offer had been withdrawn.

Nasser's reaction to the news was both sudden and violent, angry at what he called an insult to Egypt's dignity on July 26, 1956, he issued a decree nationalising the Suez Canal Company, the revenues from the Canal were to be used for the Aswan dam project and navigation through the Canal by a new measure. The countries most effected by the nationalisation were France and Britain. Who owned the majority of the Company's stock. The reactions of the British and French governments were quick, sharp and vehement, they denounced the move. Consequently both London and Paris condemned Nasser's action in the strongest terms possible. Britain blocked Egyptian accounts in London. The United States attitude was different, neither American holdings nor her prestige was directly involved. With an eye to the broader issues of American-Arab relations, it was believed that some *modus vivendi* could be established with Egypt's leader. The three governments held an urgent consultation in London on August 2, 1956, and announced a plan to hold a 24 nation conference including India. The three powers held the view that the Egyptian act of nationalisation was not such an act, but an arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency. They alleged that the act threatened the freedom and security of the Canal guaranteed by the 1888 Convention.<sup>5</sup>

The reaction of the Government of India to the Egyptian act was just opposite that of the Western governments, on August 1<sup>st</sup> 1956, Nehru voiced promptly and authentically that "*the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was 'symptomatic' of the weakening of the domination of European powers over West Asia which had lasted for over a hundred years, Asia is on the march and is emerging to take its rightful place in the world affairs.*"<sup>6</sup> The anxiety felt in the European countries was due to European oil interests in West Asia and the fact that their economies are based on oil. The old relationship between the West Asian countries and the Europe was changing and ought to change but the question was whether it would change through war or through peaceful means.<sup>7</sup> The problem was not solved by peaceful means, the gulf between the Asian and European powers would widen. Therefore, Nehru pointed out that "*a grave crisis had developed as a consequence of the Egyptian nationalisation, repercussions thereto which, if not resolved peacefully could 'lead to conflict' the extent and effects of which, it is not easy to asses.....*" in this situation the foremost consideration must be to strive for a calmer atmosphere and a rational outlook."<sup>8</sup> The Anglo-French threats to settle the dispute or to enforce their views in the matter by display or use of force was the wrong way. Nehru deeply regretted these reactions and measures and expressed the hope that they would cease and the parties would seek a peaceful settlement. Regarding the invitation to the London Conference, the Government of India objected on the exclusion of many countries from the list of invitees. Indian government only agreed when it sought assurance from the Anglo-French governments that they would not injure the interests or the sovereign rights and dignity of Egypt. The London Conference was held during 16-23 August 1956, with 24 states participating.<sup>9</sup> India was invited by U.K. to attend the Conference and the Indian delegation was led by Krishna Menon. The Government of India had given careful consideration of all aspects of the Suez Canal question and remained in touch with Egypt and other interested countries, such as Burma and Yugoslavia which were signatories to the



Suez Convention of 1888. At the London Conference Menon put forth the Indian plan, which had the following proposals;

- a) Recognition of sovereign rights of Egypt,
- b) Recognition of Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt and a waterway of international importance,
- c) Free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations in accordance with the 1888 Convention,
- d) Tolls and charges should be equitable and the facilities of the interway should be available to all countries without discrimination,
- e) The interests of the users of the Canal should receive due recognition.<sup>10</sup>

The London Conference failed to find solution to Suez crisis. The Western plan suggested setting up of a Canal Users Association which would collect all transit dues and pay appropriate share to Egypt. The Western proposals called 'the Dulles plan' were not acceptable to Nasser because the Dulles plan proposed internationalisation of the Canal. Nasser described the recommendations as 'collective colonialism', the imposition of the authority of a group of nation over Egypt. Instead he accepted 'the Menon plan'. The Dulles plan proposed that Egypt would have the sovereign rights of ownership over the Suez Canal, but she would not be permitted to exercise those rights i.e., Egypt should delegate those rights to an international authority. Some seven Muslim countries including Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, which were known as the 'Western bloc' backed the Dulles plan.

In September Nehru paid a three day official visit to Saudi Arabia on the invitation of King Saud. There Nehru discussed the Suez question with the Saudi Monarch. At the end of the meeting it was announced that Krishna Menon would visit Cairo at the invitation of President Nasser, King Saud and Prime Minister Nehru issued a joint communiqué urging for a negotiated settlement of the Suez crisis. In the meantime Nehru sent messages to Eden and Eisenhower urging them

for a peaceful settlement of the Suez Crisis. Both of them sent replies endorsing his suggestion.<sup>11</sup> Nehru sent another message to Eden indicating India's stand on the crisis, while President Eisenhower remained in touch with Nehru on the Suez question.<sup>12</sup> but it soon became clear that Dulles viewed the Canal primarily a dues collecting agency on behalf of Egypt, so Britain and France disappointed over it brought the matter before the United Nations Security Council on September 23, 1956. Nehru welcomed the reference of the Suez question to the Security Council by Britain and France.

The Security Council passed unanimously on October 13, 1956, the first part of an Anglo-French draft resolution (the second part being vetoed by the Soviet Union) which stated that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following six requirements: free and open transit, respect for Egyptian sovereignty, insulation from the politics of any country, tolls to be fixed by agreement between Egypt and the users, a fair proportion of the dues to be allotted to developments, and unsolved disputes between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company to be settled by arbitration. India was therefore doubly pleased at the Security Council resolution; that as Nehru said, "*we are definitely now in the negotiating stage and it is difficult to go back on it.*"<sup>13</sup> But the Security Council resolutions were inconclusive and did not result in any censure of the Egyptian action. The two governments of France and Britain in mid October began consulting each other with a view of taking punitive action against Egypt. On October 25, 1956, Egypt concluded a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan setting up of a unified command for the three armies under Egyptian direction. Israel's exclusion from the use of the canal, although was not a new phenomenon, aggravated the tense situation, the situation became more acute when Egyptian *Fidayeens* stepped up raids into the Israeli territory. On October 29, 1956, the Israeli forces invaded Egypt, divided into four columns landed within forty miles of the Suez Canal, they occupied Gaza Strip, ejected Egyptians from the coast of the Gulf of Akaba, took a strong hold on Sharm-al-Sheikh and

penetrated deep into Sinai peninsula. Quantities of Egyptian arms and war equipments fell into Israeli hands. Israel's military action provoked multifarious reactions through out the world. On October 30, 1956, Britain and France addressed an ultimatum to the belligerents, demanding the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of their forces twenty miles from both sides of the Suez Canal within the next twelve hours. And if the belligerents did not comply then the U.K. and France declared they would intervene. As a self appointed guardian of peace, Britain and France claimed that their action was motivated by solicitude for the safety and availability of the Suez Canal. In reality their ultimatum had rewarded the aggressor. On receiving the ultimatum Nasser discussed the situation with Nehru through the Indian Ambassador in Egypt Mr. Rajwade. Nasser had rejected the ultimatum. At the expiry of the dead line of the ultimatum Israel accepted it on the condition that Egypt accept it as well. That Egypt refused earlier. On the same day the British and French bombers began to attack Port Said and other military targets in Egypt. Nasser spoke of his determination to fight all the three aggressors, if necessary.<sup>14</sup> On November 1, 1956, Nehru's message of support reached Nasser. India sent a note of protest to the High Commissioner of United Kingdom. The note mentioned that the aerial bombing of Egyptian territory was against "all considerations of humanity and was bound to stir the feelings of all countries very deeply, particularly in the countries of Asia and Africa."<sup>15</sup> On November 5<sup>th</sup>, the Franco British paratroopers captured Port Said.

In the meantime, the outside world was following two separate lines of action, collective and individual, Russia and United States acting individually, expressed their views on the crisis. In a series of notes and statements Russia proposed that a Soviet States force be sent to Egypt to stop the fighting, warned Britain, France and Israel against the continuation of aggression. On its part the United States warned Russia that it would oppose any Soviet use of force in the West Asian region. At the same time Washington pressed for a cease-fire and early evacuation of Egypt by the aggressor forces under the auspices of United

Nations. Seeing this the General Assembly passed a resolution on November 7<sup>th</sup>, calling for the evacuation by aggressor forces under the supervision of a special United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).

Nehru addressed the Lok Sabha on November 16, 1956, and spoke in length regarding the attack on Egypt. He said that the aggression had come as a shock. It was a flagrant case of "*aggression by two strong powers against a weaker country.*"<sup>16</sup> Nehru was both annoyed and disappointed with the United Kingdom. In spite of this, he refused to consider India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth as a mark of protest against the British action. To him the Commonwealth acted as an instrument of peace and it was good not for India, but also for the United Kingdom.<sup>17</sup>

India clarified that UNEF would not be the occupying force, but would only assist the observer corps on the Armistice line between Egypt and Israel. Its work would be supervision and not forcing evacuation. Twenty four nations offered to contribute troops to the UNEF. Out of these the Secretary General chose only ten countries. The total strength of UNEF was 5,777 out of which India's share was 957.<sup>18</sup> With the stationing of the UNEF troops in Egypt, the immediate task of peace-keeping was solved. By December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1956, the last British and French troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory. On April 9, 1957, the Canal was declared clear for navigation. After the clearance of the Suez Canal the issue that confronted the users of the Canal and the Suez Canal Company was the terms regarding its future administration. And the amount of compensation to be paid. This problem was solved when on 24 April, 1957, Egypt sent a letter to the Secretary General containing terms it had set before the Suez Canal Company and which had been accepted by the latter.<sup>19</sup> In the document Egypt promised free navigation in accordance with the provisions of the 1888 Constantinople Convention. The Suez Canal authority set up by Egypt on 26 July, 1956, would be in charge of collection of tolls. Out of the tolls collected, Egypt

would be given five percent of the all gross receipts as royalty. Besides this, the Suez Canal authority would establish a capital and development fund in which twenty five percent of all gross receipts would be paid for further development of the Canal. The document further recommended that any complaints or cases of discrimination would be solved by a tribunal consisting of three members. One member was to be nominated by Egypt, one by the complainant and one by both in agreement with each other. In case of disagreement the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would recommend the third member. On the question of compensation it recommended that unless agreed between the parties concerned the issue would be referred in arbitration to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).<sup>20</sup>

The Egypt's decision to nationalise the Canal Company come closely in the wake of Nehru's meeting with Nasser in Brioni and Cairo, was a visible embarrassment for India. Nehru took the earliest opportunity to inform the Indian Parliament that his discussion with Nasser was never in relation with Suez Canal. India's deep concern about the Suez dispute was the result of practical considerations, no less than its anxiety to promote stability and peace in the area. India believed that the blatant British and French threats to use force against Egypt gravely prejudiced the prospects of negotiated settlement. The Indian approach took full account of the fact that under Constantinople Convention of 1888, the Suez Canal formed an integral part of Egypt and a settlement of the Suez dispute must be sought within the framework of this acknowledged principle. But India's further efforts for a peaceful settlement were cut short by the Israeli invasion of Egypt which was followed by landing of British and French troops in the Canal zone. Nehru, bluntly described it as a 'naked aggression' and a reversion of the past colonial methods. When the matter was reached to the United Nations, India played an active role there, in the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil and in indicating Egypt's sovereign rights.

India, in accordance with her policy of peaceful co-existence made concerted efforts to counsel moderation on all sides and to help resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of Egypt and Canal users. The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt evoked a sharp reaction in India, it considered the invasion as an illustration of 'an old, familiar evil,' a revival of 'old style colonialism'. India played a conciliatory and constructive role through out the Suez crisis. It also played an important role in the United Nations in securing the withdrawal of the British-French and Israeli forces from the Egyptian soil, for India the major issue was whether it was right and proper for the great powers to try to impose their will over small and weak powers.

**c. The Politics of Oil :**

West Asia covers an area of some six and a half million square kilometers, located at the crossroads of the world between East and the West and at the juncture of three continents. The region is well known to the outside world because of the intrinsic complexities of both its internal oil and external politics. The discovery of oil in this area presented many problems and made the scene more chaotic, this discovery played an important role in the international affairs, it was here that great power interests clashed.

In the global context, oil and its products account for more than half the physical volume of the world trade. Oil is not only the most important item of the world commerce, it is also a strategic commodity. The economic and military machines of the developed countries run on oil which, in most cases, is imported from the Gulf. Until recently, the Western Europe was the principle consumer of the Gulf oil, but the growing gap between the world supply and demand in the early 1970s, brought in, the United States, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as new customers. The ever increasing and insatiable demand for petroleum products based upon the compelling needs of this highly industrialised and mechanised age made the West Asia economically a more strategic area than it

has ever been in the past, the great wealth of oil coupled with its importance to the rest of the world has had profound effect upon the people and the states of the West Asia early in the twentieth century, the prospects of finding oil in the Ottoman empire began to interest the great oil companies of Europe and the United States and the governments of the great powers. Foreign concession hunters sought to secure control of Turkish petroleum deposits which became an added source of international rivalry.

The rise of oil to the central position in the world's energy picture was relatively a new phenomenon. At the beginning of the twentieth century, coal occupied the dominant position; at the onset of First World War, as much as 75 percent of the world's energy consumption came from coal. Coal's preferred position deteriorated rapidly during the next 40 years, however, as more and more oil was found in exploitable locations. Oil gradually surpassed coal as the world's dominant energy source. The amazing impact of oil upon the West Asian region can not be fully understood without some knowledge of the international struggle of the oil companies to obtain control of oil deposits, and of the history of the exploration and development of petroleum in West Asia.

The knowledge of the existence of petroleum in West Asia goes back to ancient times. In 1900, General Kitabji Khan, Persia's Commissioner General asked Sir Henry Drummond, former British Minister in Teheran, at a Paris exposition to find someone in London who would be willing to invest in the exploitation of oil. Sometime later General Kitabji was summoned to London, where he proposed his plan for exploitation of minerals of Persia to William Knox D'Arcy. D'Arcy sent his representatives Alfred M. Marriot and Mr. Cotte with General Kitabji to obtain a concession in his name after passing some difficulties because of Russian influence the concession was signed in D'Arcy's name on May 28, 1901. Although the company was organised in 1903, to operate the D'Arcy concession in Southern Persia, soon the company found itself

in financial difficulties, then the Burma oil Company and British Admiralty came to help the D'Arcy Company, fearing that the concession might fall into American hands and in May 1905, Concessions Syndicate Limited was formed, D'Arcy as director. It took over as the first exploitation company. In 1908, when oil in commercial quantities was discovered at Masjid-e-Suleiman, and the Anglo Persian oil company was formed in 1909. During the early years of concession two important events took place which effected the development of oil, one, on August 5, 1906, Shah Mozaffar-ed-Din issued a proclamation granting Constitutional government for Persia, and second, in August 1907, an agreement between England and Russia was signed dividing Persia into three zones: the Northern—under Russian influence, and reserved for Russian nationals to seek concessions, the Southern—under British influence, and the Central zone—as a neutral zone for the two great rival powers. This agreement neither admitted Persia to partnership nor even to consultation. The result was the weakening of the control of the Teheran government over the territory under the influence of Russia and Britain.

After this concession all the super powers were in queue to pursue the oil rich countries for concession. The Americans on their part showed no great desire to search for oil until the end of First World War, but when they saw how much American oil had been consumed during the War, from then a continuous struggle had been waged between the U.S. and the Great Britain for the exploitation of the oil resources and in seeking oil concessions. Now the American oil interests became active in the region. The American group represented by Teagle continued to negotiate with the Turkish Petroleum Company. And till the year 1928, the shareholders of the Turkish Petroleum Company were; Anglo Persian Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell Company, Campaigne Francaise des Petroles, the American Group and S.C. Gulbenkian. On July 31, 1928, all the participants of the Turkish Petroleum Company signed a group agreement which limited the activity of each participant in a specified area, which was marked out on a map attached



to the agreement by red line, hence it was called the 'Red Line Agreement' and the name of the Turkish Petroleum Company was changed to 'Iraq Petroleum Company'.

As in accordance with the treaty of December 26, 1915, between Ibn Saud and Britain, the Saudi Arabia was a British protectorate and no oil concession would be given without the approval of the British government. In the Early twenties, a British company, Eastern and General Syndicate Limited through a British major Frank Holms, attempted to obtain oil concessions in the Persian Gulf area. In 1923, he was informed that Ibn Saud had granted the concession of Al Hasa for Eastern and General Syndicate,<sup>21</sup> with the provision that the government had right to cancel the concession. In the first two years the rentals were paid but from the third year the company defaulted on its payments. In 1925, Ibn Saud warned the company for the cancellation of the concession, but the company never acted on this warning.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand the relationship between Ibn Saud and Britain was no longer be that of a protector and protected, and Britain recognised Ibn Saud as an independent ruler.

Now the financial situation of Saudi Arabia was in doldrums. Ibn Saud was finding ways and means to make the country's financial situation a little better, the concession seekers were in queue to get concessions for the region but because of the Red Line Agreement it became a little difficult to adjust. Finally the Standard Oil Company of California obtained a concession for Saudi Arabia on May 29, 1933.<sup>23</sup> In 1936, a subsidiary of Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the Petroleum Development Company Limited, acquired a sixty year concession in the Western part of Saudi Arabia which abandoned in 1941, in the same year in 1936, it obtained a sixty five year concession from Anglo Iranian Oil Company for the region of Qatar, Oman, Lebanon, Palestine Cyprus and the petty Sheikhdoms.

In 1933, the Standard Oil Company of California secured a sixty six year concession over Eastern Saudi Arabia, to carry on its operations in Saudi Arabia, this company created the California Arabian Oil Company which became the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1934, with the Texas Oil Company having a fifty percent share.

In Saudi Arabia the first commercial oil field was discovered in Dammam in the year 1938, it brought a flock of concession hunters to Saudi Arabia, among them were the Germans, Italians, Japanese and the Iraq Petroleum Company. But Ibn Saud granted the concessions to American company because of the pressure exerted on him by the governments of other foreign countries and America was the only country which was making his choice of money. Between 1938–1940, the work of the company progressed but with the entry of Italy in the Second World War which had started in 1939, its work seriously curtailed. On the other hand the pilgrimage to Mecca was completely stopped, and these were the two sources of income for the Saudi government. Ibn Saud turned for assistance to the American company and the British government. The American companies in West Asia had never felt secure, they were fully aware of the hostilities of the British, because the Americans had obtained concessions which the British thought should have been theirs and they were intruding in an area which was regarded as an exclusive sphere of British influence. When Ibn Saud demanded for advances, the British might come for the assistance, that situation the Americans wanted to avoid. The only alternative for the American government was to come to company's assistance. Early in 1943, the company determined to try to persuade the United States government to grant Ibn Saud direct land lease aid. Finally, in February 1943, the United States government lend direct aid to Saudi Arabia, and with this removed the possibility of British penetration. President Roosevelt was fully aware of the oil resources of Saudi Arabia and their importance to the war efforts. As the war was going on, so at this stage he did not want to antagonise the British. He therefore, arranged to

assimilate the British in his assistance to Ibn Saud and decided that Ibn Saud should get his financial assistance but through the British.

The companies were not too happy but something was better than nothing, the promise to King to make available to him \$ 6 million over and above had not to come entirely from their own pockets, at least \$ 3 million was to come from the British and to that extent they were relieved. The ARAMCO also purchased local materials and services which added to the country's economic assistance. But when the American government saw that the British government was advancing to the local Sheikhs and Ibn Saud, and making all the means to get oil concessions, it felt a great danger, the only alternative was for the Americans to come to the company's assistance. Negotiations with the Saudi government started for direct American government's acquisition of the stocks of California Arabian Oil Company, one of the two parent companies. When it became clear that the government could not acquire a direct ownership of the Saudi concession; it proposed that it would build a refinery.

In the meantime the Petroleum Reserve Corporation of America had sent a mission to inspect the reserve potentialities of Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region, the mission was headed by Everette Lee De Golyer, the well known oil geologist. The mission's report was that estimates of reserves proved by developed fields and indicated by fields discovered but not fully explored were about nine billion barrels in Iran, five billion barrels in Saudi Arabia and a billion in Qatar.<sup>24</sup> These estimates encouraged the Petroleum Reserves Corporation to seek new means of securing petroleum reserves in the West Asia. Admiral Andrew Carter, Petroleum Administrator of the Navy, after visiting Saudi Arabia and conferring with representatives of the companies and local governments came up with a proposal that U.S. government build a pipe line from Saudi oil fields to the Mediterranean, for this he began to negotiate with ARAMCO and the Gulf Exploration Company. To the British the reaction to the pipe line project was

bitter. After a preliminary exchange of assurances with respect to British oil interests in Iran and Iraq and American interest in Saudi Arabia a compromise was worked out that the exploration by both the groups, the negotiations with both the governments were going on but no decision came further, seeing this proposal pending, the Companies decided to build it themselves. In building it they had to face a major problem of acquiring rights of ways from various countries and territories through which the line passed and where the terminus was to be located. In 1945, the companies organised the Trans Arabian pipeline Company (Tapline) with Burton E. Hull as President. On the same basis as their ownership in ARAMCO. In December 1946, the board of directors of the company approved the pipeline project,<sup>25</sup> and it was managed that from where the pipeline would pass.

The pipeline which had a daily capacity of about 310,000 barrels, ran from a distance of 1,040 miles from Saudi Arabian oil fields to the coast of Lebanon. The five birth tanker loading terminal at Sidon, and the pipeline from there to Qaisumah was owned and operated by Tapline. While the pipeline from Qaisumah to Saudi oil fields was owned by ARAMCO.

In order to preserve the dwindling resources of United States oil the availability of West Asian oil must become the cardinal aspect of American oil policy and American foreign policy, but it was sure that America wanted the oil just for her profits to secure a dominant position over Britain and France, while for her own consumption America was having enough oil, for the British and French the situation was quite different. They did not have any alternative resources other than West Asia. Their economies did not permit them to depend upon United States for oil. For solving this problem the British approached Northern Iran which was under Russian dominance, Russia prevented the establishment of other foreign companies in her area of influence, while the Iranians tried very hard to induce American companies to exploit their Northern

fields, however, neither Soviet Russia nor Great Britain was willing to permit the Americans enter into Northern Iran. On the other hand the relations between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian oil Company which were tolerably good began to deteriorate because the Iranians had started to realise that Great Britain was making enormous profits out of the great potentialities of their oil resources which they could use for the welfare of their own country. Since the outbreak of Second World War the relations became more intense on the issue of withdrawal of Allied troops from Iranian territory, on the other after the war the oil prices dropped. The country's basic needs were not fulfilled, together with difficulties and power politics of super powers set the stage for the nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian oil Company in 1951, in March 1951 the Company's name changed to National Iranian Oil Company. This gathering storm in Iran prompted ARAMCO to conclude an agreement with Saudi Arabia inaugurating the principle of equal profit sharing. The Americans were primarily concerned with the profit sharing and with keeping the Soviet Union far from entering the area.

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, greatly effected the pace of the political arena of the Arab region. In many ways the stakes had become more narrowly regional, and the situation was growing more intricate because of the tendency of the Arab - Israeli conflict. It set into motion a tide of Arab nationalist sentiments across the Arab world.

As the IPC was composed of four different groups, the prices charged from the partners were very low, but the profits which went to the partners from IPC were very high, this attitude of the company was not accepted by the Iraqi people, the relations between the government and IPC started to deteriorate, Iraqi people wanted to make their country prosperous, wanted to use their money for themselves. This sentiment led the Iraqis towards the revolution of 1958. The Iraq government demanded the share of Iraq in the profits of the company and higher royalties. To them, the foreign companies were exploiters of Iraqi resources,

thieving imperialists who had managed to obtain extraordinary concessions and privileges. Through this emotional sentiment the Iraqi people threatened the company for the nationalisation of IPC. Same was the case with Saudi Arabia, the government was fed up with the oppression of the company, but Saudi Arabia was not ready for nationalisation because of the task of technical know how, the task of the capital necessary to maintain the operation and development of the industry and to the most, the task of international market, to all this, Ahmad Zaki Yamani proposed a 20 percent government participation.

The British protectorates in the Persian Gulf presented another situation, the entire governmental budget of the sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar was dependent on oil revenue and that revenue was the subject of British control. Same was the case with Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, these countries benefited very little from the privileges granted the companies for constructing the pipeline terminal and refinery. The countries suffered greatly were Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The most appropriate answer of the problem of being cheated would naturally be unity, if all the members of the area had united against the foreign companies, they could have obtain their maximum rights and prevent the foreigners from exploiting for their own ends.

Since 1959, three collective instrumentalities were set up in the West Asia for overall purpose of uniting against the oil companies:

- a) the Arab Petroleum Congress,
- b) the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries,
- c) the Organisation of Arab Oil Exporting Countries.

Beginning with the Iraq Revolution in July 1958, a number of changes took place, Iraq felt that through United Arab efforts she might perhaps get better terms from IPC. In Saudi Arabia Ameer Feisal became the dominant figure, and Abdullah-al-Tariqi, Saudi Arabia's Director General of Petroleum and Mineral

Affairs, began to agitate for greater Arab participation in the petroleum industry and to call for greater concession from the foreign companies, finally their was a cut in the oil prices which brought a decrease in revenue. These factors brought the Arab League in the oil area. To remedy the situation Iraq suggested that the Arab countries should arrive at a uniform policy for the exploitation of their resources. For this, Arab League Secretariat invited the member states and Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar to attend the session of the technical committee, on April 16, 1958, the chief of the Arab League's Petroleum Bureau, Muhammad Salman opened the first Arab Petroleum Congress, the Congress proposed the two categories, the first category demanded greater representation for the growth in the actual management of the companies, more Arabs were trained for administrative and executive positions, relinquishment of areas not exploited and for which no rent was paid, no drop in the price of oil without the consultation with the governments concerned. The second category recommended the formation of national oil companies which would embrace all the phases of the industry, "side by side with the private oil companies operating the states," and a unified policy on the exploitation and preservation of oil resources.<sup>26</sup> In the mean time, the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries came into being. On February 13, 1959, the British Petroleum Company of Iran announced a cut of 18 cents per barrel on its West Asian oil, the other companies operating in the region soon followed it. This price reduction amounted a decrease in total income. The major purpose of OPEC was the restoration of the price cuts.

After the June 1967 Arab-Israel war and the subsequent closure of Suez Canal and a general increase in world demand for oil, the basic relationship pattern between the governments and the companies changed, as a result the role of OPEC changed, meanwhile the devaluation of dollar became an acute issue and subject of negotiations between the governments and the companies. An extraordinary Conference of OPEC members was convened in Beirut in September 1971, it adopted two resolutions, one on government participation and the other

on dollar parity in oil revenues. Hectic negotiations began between the governments and the companies, the matter of dollar devaluation was settled but the question of participation was not easily resolved. Ahmad Zaki Yamani, who negotiated participation for the Persian Gulf countries, warned the companies that the alternative to the participation was the nationalisation, for which the Arabs were ready.<sup>27</sup>

The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was the youngest of the limited efforts instrumentalities, it was organised in January 1968, in the face of the consequences for West Asian oil of the Arab-Israel war in 1967. Its conveners, Saudi Arabia and Libya were the greatest victims of the stoppage of oil production during the war and they attempted to remove oil from political interference in future. Its membership at first restricted to Arab countries having oil as the principle and basic source of national income, this condition was waived in 1971. OAPEC'S main concern was to take maximum benefits from its member countries' national resources. In 1970s, the host countries' policies tended to bifurcate: the radical revolutionary states favoured nationalisation, trying to achieve maximum control of the oil industry through negotiated agreements with the companies.

In February 1971, Algeria seized 51 percent interests of the French concessionaire companies, on 7<sup>th</sup>, December of that year, Libya nationalised the British Petroleum Company in relation of the occupation of three Persian Gulf islands by Iran, the occupation was bitterly criticised by some Arab countries and greatly intensified the conflict between Iran and Iraq. On June 1, 1972, Iraq nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company, but offered its French shareholders, a separate agreement in appreciation of French support of the Arabs against Israel. In line with this policy, Saudi Arabia preferred to avoid nationalisation, it launched the idea of participation, and it concluded in 1972, the first participation



agreement, which gave it a 25 percent share in ARAMCO, that was scheduled to rise to 51 percent by 1983.

The out break of Arab-Israeli war in 1973, catalysed the situation, the action taken by the Arab oil producing states in response to the Arab Israeli war of October 1973, was very strong. The Arab states decided the general production cutback and selective embargoes on exports to certain states. The Arab boycott implemented the concept of using oil as a weapon, Saudi Arabia warned the United States that an unfriendly American policy might adversely affect the availability of Arab oil, on the other hand OPEC decided to increase the prices of crude oil several fold. In the following weeks and months after the war, the Arab oil ministers held a series of meetings at which the boycott policy was refined, the first meeting held in Kuwait from 17-19 October 1973, in this meeting a binding decision was made to cut monthly production by a minimum of 5 percent from September level of production, Saudi Arabia provided leadership and guidance to the embargo, the united countries established classes of consumer countries:

- a) hostile, to which a ban on exports was to be applied,
- b) friendly, which were to benefit the September level of exports,
- c) neutral, to which the remaining production was to apportioned
- d) most favoured, which were exempted from any cutbacks or embargoes, they were to receive oil according to its needs.

Hostile- U.S., Holland, Portugal, South Africa And Rhodesia to which a full embargo was imposed.

Friendly- those countries which had adjusted their policies in favour of the Arabs such as Japan, Belgium, West Germany and Italy to them supply to September level of exports.

Neutral- (EEC countries).

Most Favoured- Britain, France Spain, Arab countries and those of African countries who had severed their relations with Israel after the October war.

Iraq was the only dissenter among the Arab states: it opposed the cut back decision because it did not differentiate sufficiently between friends and foes, but it soon joined the rest of the Arab states and proclaimed a full ban on exports to the United States and Holland.

The EEC countries were taken in the neutral group because they strongly urged the forces on both sides to return to the original ceasefire line and urged for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians. This declaration of EEC evoked a sympathetic response in the Arab states. On November 21, 1973, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued a warning that the United States might have to take counter measure if the Arabs continued their embargo. In response to this warning Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani declared that American counter measure against the oil embargo would prompt Arab producers to reduce production by as much as 80 percent and any military intervention would result to the destruction of oil factories.<sup>28</sup>

The October war which ended not in a victory for either party but in an uneasy ceasefire, made necessary a further classification of collective Arab policies with this view an Arab Summit Conference convened in Algiers from 26-28 November 1973, the Arab heads of States declared themselves prepared to pursue a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of two principles:

- a) Israeli withdrawal from the all the occupied Arab territories, headed by Jerusalem, and
- b) restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

The Conference decided to ask the West European countries to stop their military and economic assistance to Israel, as for the Asian countries they were to

be persuaded to sever all political, economic and cultural relations with Israel. India's response was very prompt, the spurt in oil prices in 1972-73 and the scare about the impending oil scarcity necessitated India to strengthen its relations with the West Asian countries other than Egypt. India lost influence entirely with Israel and became a passive factor, it abandoned her principles and interests without any incremental leverage. India's support to the Palestinian cause also became stronger and firmer. The secret provisions made to strengthen Arab relations with Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to ensure a supply of arms to the Arabs. These endeavours seem to have born fruits, America started to think for the betterment of relations with the Arabs.

By that time the United States intensified its search for peaceful disengagement in the West Asian conflicts and in response Egypt encouraged these endeavours, and began to press for the relaxation of oil embargo, but Saudi Arabia adamantly rejected the lifting up of the embargo against U.S. until some tangible progress had been made in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The subsequent agreement of the January 17, 1974, on the disengagement of the Arab and Israeli forces reached under American auspices, Egypt again came forward for lifting up of the embargo. The Tripoli Conference of March 1974, brought an agreement to ease or remove the boycott, the Arab states agreed to end the embargo against the United States on the ground that a shift had taken place in Washington's Arab policies, as evidenced by its active role in bringing about an Egyptian Israeli disengagement.

To counter balance the Arab attitude and Arab strategies the United States, Canada, Japan, Turkey and other twelve European states finally created the International Energy Agency (IEA) on November 15, 1974, in Paris, the main features of the IEA were:

- a) establishment of an energy sharing agreement among the major consumer countries in case of a new embargo,
- b) setting up of a cooperative conservation and energy development programme,
- c) establishment of a \$ 25 million fund to recycle petro money into deficit countries,
- d) the convening of a conference among the producer and consumer countries.<sup>29</sup>

The 1973 oil embargo created a dynamic change in the international political system, a tremendous increase in world oil consumption during 1967 and 1973 was dried up the access productive capacity outside West Asia. OPEC countries emerged as the key suppliers and it enabled OPEC to rise oil price from \$ 3 per barrel to \$ 36 per barrel. This increase prompted the consumer countries for investment in non OPEC countries for exploration and development, for all this the consumer countries established the IEA. The price hike imposed severe pressures on India's foreign exchange resources coupled with the pressing need for ensuring oil supplies in a situation of panicky world wide scramble for oil. There was also a massive hike in India's oil bill. Two thirds of India's oil imports came from Iran, the next largest supplier was Saudi Arabia. India was earlier spending only 130 crores on petroleum and lubricants but with the two subsequent oil crises, the expenditure shot up to astronomical figures for India.

India's major concerns were finding credits on favourable terms, investment in India by oil producers and obtaining oil at concessional prices, if possible, in order to reduce the sky-rocketing balance of payments deficit. The urgent task of broadening the source of supply of oil and strengthening the ties with existing supplier countries was patent. In addition India was interested in finding fresh outlets in the oil rich countries to market her non traditional (manufacturing and semi-manufacturing) exports as well as primary commodities. With a surplus skilled and semi-skilled manpower, India was also interested in exporting this asset to oil rich countries in order to secure foreign exchange through remittances.

The development of relations with Iran had already been noted, so too with Iraq which had undertaken in October 1972, to supply two million tons of crude over the next many years. Agreements were also signed with the oil surplus countries like UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, etc. for taking their market so that India could ensure reliable source for her oil needs as well as diversify the source of supply in order not to become dependent on one source alone.

Next to Iran, India imported oil from Saudi Arabia (until replaced by Iraq), but relations with Saudi Arabia developed slowly. There was a variety of reasons for this halting and trading developments of relations. The Saudis had their sights fixed on Washington and their pro-Western orientation produced its own reactive inhibitions in India. Moreover, India's close relations with Moscow could hardly please Riyadh. Its conservative appeal to religion and self acquired mission to help Islamic movements in many other countries, which made it tilt towards Pakistan, was another impediment. Yet another factor was that Saudi Arabia was generally very cautious and careful both in reactions to international developments and relations with other countries. All the same relations with Saudi Arabia as with many other countries of the region continued to develop.

A cultural agreement was signed in November 1971, and in September 1972, it was disclosed that Kuwait had agreed to reduce by \$ 1.75 per ton the price of furnace oil to supply one million tons of petroleum products as against the originally committed figure of 600,000.<sup>30</sup> In February 1973, the two countries agreed to the establishment of an inter governmental joint committee for economic and technical corporation which would meet at least once a year in the two countries respectively.<sup>31</sup>

So in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, India successfully improved bilateral relations by developing mutually beneficial economic and cultural exchanges with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries. New Delhi's Middle Eastern relations were further strengthened by its anti-Israeli stance in the Arab-Israeli

wars of 1967 and 1973, and by Indian support for the fourfold price rise in 1973 by OPEC.

But in any way super powers were not ready to leave West Asia. They always wanted to protect their strategic and economic interest in the region. America wanted to protect its interests from Soviets whose military presence in the region was always a matter of worry for Americans. After 1973 war Soviets started to cultivate a good relationship with Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Libya by supplying them with modern military hardware so as to enable them to fight their war with Israel. Soviet Union always envisaged the control of Iranian oil, if opportunity arises. To counter balance the Soviet strategies the United States started to think for the establishment of its military bases in the region. United States Department of State and Defense explored the possibility of reaching agreements with one or more of the states in the Gulf and Mediterranean. The areas considered were, Mombasa, Kenya, Barbera, Somalia and Arabian sea islands of Masira belonging to Oman. These locations had the necessary infrastructure and could provide adequate support to naval and air forces of Rapid Deployment Force which was later in 1983 was discharged to CENTCOM as the United States Central Command.

When in the year 1979-80, the OPEC increased the oil prices five times greater than the increase in 1972-73. The consumer countries started to boost up domestic oil production because the oil crisis had severely affected the economic development of the non-oil-developing world.

On the other there were border disagreements between Iran and Iraq, though they have rivalry since ancient times, the rivalry often translated into an armed conflict. Since 1960s each had used the others arms building up, to justify its own acquisitions, Iran aligning with the United States received arms superior to those provided to Iraq by Soviet Union. In 1975, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Shah of Iran signed the Algiers Agreement, establishing the navigable

channel on the Shatt-al-Arab river as the official border between the two countries.<sup>32</sup> Iraq had long considered the entire river under its jurisdiction. President Hussein agreed to settle the Shatt border dispute in return for the Shah's pledge to stop aiding Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi government but Shah's regime was overthrown and Khomeini regime captured power in Iran. This regime immediately began a campaign against Iraq to destabilise Iraq through the support of Iraqi dissent groups. Iran continued to threat Shatt as sovereign Iranian territory. The building up of political tension and border skirmishes and Khomeini's call for Hussein's overthrow, all indicated increase in tension. In 1979, the Iraq government asked Iran to abrogate the Algiers Agreement and return to the previous border areas including Shatt river. Faced with growing pressure from Iraq, Iran stated to restore ties with the U.S. The meeting between Iranian officials and U.S. diplomats was settled. This meeting aroused suspicion among the radicals in Iran, they thought that the Americans were conspiring for another coup as they made in 1953, in which Premier Mossadegh's regime was ended and General Zahedi took over the government after a heavy clash between the supporters of Mossadegh and Shah.. the radicals occupied the U.S. embassy in Teheran taking American officials hostages. The hostage crisis isolated Iran from America. This provocative move not only created chaos but also isolated the nation and weakened its military capabilities.

As Iraq was watching it closely it chose to strike Iran in 1980, but miscalculated Iran's resourcefulness and President Saddam Hussein failed to achieve a quick victory, the war lasted for seven long years and ended in 1987. The war was like a puzzle for the super powers, they were neutral at the start, the Americans wanted to take advantage of the war drama to release its hostages and desire to maintain security of the Western and Japanese oil supply and protected the supply route from Soviets. The U.S. succeeded in acquiring facilities for its bases in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and possibility of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

for the deployment of CENTCOM. The war had offered the United States and its allies in IEA to cooperate in building more strategic reserves. Severely weakened due to the terrible losses in war with Iran, Saddam Hussein expected the U.S. and GCC states to bail him out of his predicament. Instead the reverse happened. Not only the U.S. abandoned Saddam Hussein but GCC countries over produced oil which hurt Iraq. The result was Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a bargaining chip to achieve Saddam's demands: the waving of loans and a curb on the GCC oil production. Although the U.S. support to Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and U.S. naval bombardment of Lebanon in 1982-83, U.S. attack on Libya in 1986 and also its efforts to isolate PLO had undermined U.S. position in the Muslim world but with Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Pakistan, GCC states, Syria and others on its side the U.S. mobilised a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990-91. For some times U.S. interests were of controlling Iraq's oil deposits because along with the Libyan, Iranian oil the Iraqi oil was out side the influence of U.S. but U.S. presented its action as multilateral effort to liberate Kuwait, an occupied country.

The war between Iran and Iraq caused deep disappointment and dismay among most non-aligned countries and considerable anxiety in India. Both the countries suffered considerable destruction and severe economic strain. Subsequently, it enabled and encouraged Israel to march into Lebanon with impunity and deal a crippling blow to the PLO. India was inevitably greatly concerned at this sudden crisis. As a leading country among the non-aligned countries her anxiety was natural. This war forced India to shift its oil purchases from Iran and Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. India took a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, it maintained warm ties with Baghdad and built workable political relations with Tehran.

The rise of oil to the central position in the world's energy picture was a relatively recent phenomenon. At the beginning of the twentieth century, coal



occupied the dominant position; at the onset of World War I, as much as 75 percent of the world's energy consumption came from coal. Coal's preferred position deteriorated rapidly during the next forty years, however, as more and more oil was found in exploitable locations. Given oil's relative cleanliness, its ease of production, and relatively low cost during this period, and given the invention of the internal combustion engine, oil gradually surpassed coal as the world's dominant energy resource. By 1950, oil had supplanted coal as the world's most important energy source, and fifteen years after that, by 1980, oil met nearly one half of the world's energy needs. Impending oil scarcity was not the only reason that oil became a source of concern. Much of the Western world's prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s was built on the availability of inexpensive oil. Indeed, from the late 1940s through the early 1970s, oil declined in price relative to most other commodities. Depressed oil prices for this 25 years period may be attributed both to favourable concessions gained by the major oil companies from their sources of production and to their success in keeping independent producers out of the market. When OPEC, whose member states had recently gained control of production and pricing decisions over the oil they produced, quadrupled the price of oil during the winter of 1973-74, the entire non-Communist world economy felt the shock. Cheap oil was the thing of the past.

Unfortunately, however, the habits, technologies, and investment patterns that had been established during the post war era of cheap oil could not be changed overnight. In the United States, for example, the automobile played a dominant role in social, cultural, and economic life; to some the entire American style of life was based on the habit of the car. In industry cheap oil had led to lack of concern about efficient energy use. Impending scarcity, increased prices and politically induced disruption of oil supply also played havoc with the economies of the third world countries.

Oil problems exist in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well. A 1977, CIA report concluded that Soviet oil production would begin to slide during the early 1980s, but Kremlin vehemently denied the reports accuracy, eventually forcing the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe to begin to import oil by the mid 1980s. During the turmoil in Iran following the collapse of Shah's government and Khomeini's coming to power, the cut off of Iranian oil exports to the U.S.S.R. found the Soviet Union in such tight oil supply that Soviet factories in Central Asia grounded to a halt because of the U.S.S.R.'s inability to make up the short fall. Price increase had also frustrated consumers of Soviet oil and oil products.

In the emerging world order with the end of Cold War and demise of U.S.S.R. the United States became the only super power to rule the world on its own terms, it became clear from the Kuwait crisis of 1990-91. During this war Indian policy makers were torn between adopting a traditional non-aligned policy sympathetic to Iraq or favouring the coalition of moderate Arab and Western countries that could benefit Indian security and economic interests. India initially adopted an ambivalent approach, condemning both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the intrusion of external forces into the region.

Conflict over oil is far from certain, however for as we have seen, the world's energy future is murky at best. How well will government policies, technical innovations, and changed living habits succeed in making alternate energy sources more attractive? Can efficiency and conservation extend the time that currently utilised energy sources, particularly oil, can be exploited? How much more oil, gas, and coal remain to be discovered? These questions are unanswerable, but their answers hold the key to the world's energy future.

West Asia is one of the most strategically important regions in the world. Both geographical proximity to oil resources and important communication lines have attracted the powers to West Asia. The British connection to India and West

Asia the only route to it made British to have a stronghold on West Asia. The advent of World War I brought a reorientation of British policy committed to fight and destroy the Ottoman empire. The years from 1915-1922 were of dramatic consequence over the West Asian region, the Hussein-Mac Mohan correspondence, the Sykes-Picot treaty, the Balfour Declaration and the British and French mandates over the Ottoman territories finally constituted a great deal of trouble to that area. Then the discovery of oil and a grand rush of the powers for acquiring oil concessions of that region made the situation more complex. Britain as mandatory over Palestine was free to do anything with that piece of land it issued the Balfour Declaration to gain support of world Jewry and placed the Jews in Palestine, this act of theirs aroused the world's most tragic problem.

The policy of India towards the West Asian crises were a continuation of its age old relations with the region. On the question of Palestine, India supported the cause of Arabs since the issue of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. When the Suez crisis erupted in the wake of Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, and the subsequent invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, India's response was very critical, it opposed the move of three big powers against a small country like Egypt. The Indian government cautiously extended its support to Egypt on the grounds that the Canal was an Egyptian property and the act was an exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. In the U.N. India repeatedly advocated the need for a peaceful solution of the problem. It gave its full support to the UNEF. Nehru stressing the need for a peaceful solution stated in the Parliament that because of Egypt's decision and the world wide repercussions to it, the issue if not resolved peacefully could lead to a great conflict, whose effects would not be easy to asses. When the issue was resolved India also assisted Egypt on the question of ownership and the management of the Canal.

Oil was a great factor in the West Asian politics, even the big powers who produce oil have been interested in the control of oil resources of the West

Asian region to maintain their supremacy and preserve their own limited resources for future. The region was influenced more by Europe than the East despite the fact that Asian countries identify with Arabs more than the Europeans. The Palestinian question is the fundamental cause of the oil being used as a political instrument.

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## *Chapter – III*

### *India and the Balfour Declaration of 1917-Its Implications and Consequences*

## Chapter-III

# India and the Balfour Declaration of 1917- Its Implications and Consequences

There is hardly any country in the world with which we have better, warmer and more cordial relations than the Arab world. India's cultural relations with Arabia date back to prehistoric times. From the times immemorial, India's communications with West Asia have been both along the land and sea routes. Direct voyages in those days were rare. Indian and Arabian traders used to meet half way to exchange their products. The Indians sailed from the Western Indian sea ports along the coast, entered the Persian Gulf and rested at Bahrain, where recent diggings by a Danish Mission have uncovered seals and other objects which show that the island's cultural group ran the trade between the Indus civilisation and the Sumerian. Large quantities of Indian merchandise were conveyed over the oxus to the Caspian Sea and transferred from there by the Curus and through the adjoining countries to Euxina.

Trade relations got impetus in the subsequent centuries. The Arabian steeds in King Harsha's camp were as popular as the sword made of Indian steel. Our kapas was in great demand and the Arabs took it over giving it the name of qutun which became cotton throughout the Europe. With the advent of Islam, relations between India and the Arab world were further strengthened.

Indian physicians and medical systems enjoyed a wide reputation even in pre-Islamic Arabia. The famous pre-Islamic Persian academy of Gondeshapur invited Indian physicians to meet their counter parts and a curious blending of sciences took place there. Equally important in the context of Indo-Arab relations is the influence of Indian astronomy. Through Al-Baruni Indian astronomy exercised a far reaching influence on Muslim astronomical sciences of subsequent



generations. In the field of mathematics, it was the concept of Sine which contributed to and revolutionised the science of triangles. The Arabic numerals 1,2,3, as they are called in the West, were borrowed by the Arabs from India and were consequently known as *Al-Arkan-al-Hindia* or Indian numerals. The Indian science of music also made a deep impact on Arabic musicians. This impact helped to produce the greatest Muslim musician of medieval India Amir Khusro. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Arab travellers and geographers whose works are important sources, though yet unexplored in the reconstruction of the history of India, particularly after the 9<sup>th</sup> century A.D. the names of Al-Baruni and Ibn-Batuta are too well known to need any introduction.

India and a major portion of Arabia having come under foreign influence, during the succeeding centuries there was a set back to this process of exchange of ideas.

The name of Palestine is derived from the Philistines, who lived in the Southern coastal part of the country in the 12<sup>th</sup> century B.C. It is necessary at the outset to correct a misconception. The Israelis were not the earliest inhabitants of Palestine, they were invaders, when the Israelite tribes after their exodus from Egypt invaded the land of Canaan in the 12<sup>th</sup> century B.C. they found a settled population and an established culture. The population then included the Canaanites, the Gibeonites and the Philistines. The Philistines were never completely subdued by the invaders and retained control of their coastal plain along the Mediterranean. The rest of the country was occupied and settled by the Israelites, who established the kingdom of Israel. The kingdom lasted for two centuries, after that the country was occupied by the Persians and the Greeks and the Romans from 4<sup>th</sup> until the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D. the Palestine came under the Christian influence. Emperor Constantine built the Church of Holy Sepulcher, and his mother Helena. Built two other Churches in Bethlehem and at Jerusalem. In A.D. 637 occurred the Moslem Arab conquest of Palestine, many of the indigenous

Ottoman empire, the rise of national liberation movements began to appear on the horizon. So it was necessary to prepare new plans to meet the new situations. British imperialism after a thorough survey of the situation arrived at a conclusion which emphasised the utmost importance that Palestine represented in the new conditions, and it could play a big role because of its position. In 1869, the reopening of Suez Canal added a star in its importance because Palestine constituted for the British a point where the three continents meet, its control was essential for the protection of Sinai and the Suez Canal that was the road to India and Africa and adjacent to Egypt. It also formed the area from where any future expansionist plan could be launched following the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Thus Britain started to design its plans for Palestine. Britain decided to settle a foreign group in the area which would constitute a majority and a defensive offensive garrison. At that time when Britain was developing its plans for Palestine and looking for the ways and means to fulfill them, Zionism was already on the scene. Zionism was, at the beginning an expression of bourgeois nationalism of the middle classes of European Jews, at a time when Feudalism was collapsing and European Bourgeois nationalisms were rising together with the colonial expansionism. Zionism taking advantage of these developments, offered itself as a systematic political attempt at a new and total solution to all the Jews in the world.

Growing sense of helplessness, homelessness and persecution of Jews all over the world made Theodore Herzl, a Viennese journalist to think of it and in 1898, he produced a pamphlet, 'the Jewish state' in which he proposed the creation of a Jewish national home, the three motifs: religious Zionism, the need of asylum from persecution and discrimination, made Herzl's political idea fused and in 1897, he succeeded in holding the first international Zionist Congress. It was the first step in the process of colonial usurpation in the modern history. Almost overnight he found himself as the head of the political Zionism. The Zionist organisation for years tried hard to interest any great power in its plans,

'to establish for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law'. A reading of Herzl's diaries as well as subsequent Zionist action reveal that the term 'public law' refers to nothing but the patronage of the imperialist powers. Herzl managed to approach directly the Sultan of Turkey and put forward in May 1901 his proposals of Zionist immigration to Palestine and in return he promised that the Zionists would take care of the financial problems of Turkey.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan however did not agree to the idea of mass immigration to Palestine. The Zionist executive body then turned towards Great Britain in October 1902 to seek a chunk of Sinai Peninsula for immigration and settlement. It received in 1903 an offer from the British government to settle in British East Africa, Herzl somehow tried to reconcile the offer but no concrete action was taken upon it because Zionist movement in Europe was planning to create a national home for the Jews in Palestine. But at that time there was a very little Jewish population, the country had been populated for more than thirteen centuries by Palestinian Arabs. According to official statistics of British mandate, the Arabs of Palestine constituted in 1895-1897, 90 percent of the total population of the country and owned 99.5 percent of the land.<sup>2</sup>

When the Earl of Shaftsbury presented a memorandum to Palmerstone, entitled 'a scheme for the colonisation of Palestine' he explained the politics and economic importance of setting Jews there. The British Ex-Governor in Ceylon, E.L. Milford, explained openly in 1845 the importance of Judaisation of Palestine to British interests. Thus, Theodore Herzl the founder of the modern political Zionism, looked towards Britain which had enormous interests in Egypt and India. Herzl approached the British government and the Zionist organisation entered into negotiations with the British government, but before anything could be finally settled, Herzl died in 1904, meanwhile the British government offered territory in Kenya for the Zionist colonisation, but a young chemist Chaim Weizmann led fierce opposition which rocked the Zionist Congress of 1905.

Weizmann was enthusiastic and devoted to Zionism, he perfected a method of extracting acetone from the grains at a time when this material was running short and essential for the manufacture of explosives. His name came to be known by British cabinet and was already known to Arthur Balfour.

The outbreak of First World War put on the agenda the question of the Ottoman possessions, including Palestine, and this was the opportunity the Zionists were waiting for. The British government which realised very easily the necessity of controlling Palestine, began to pay increasing attention to the mutual interests of the Zionism and British imperialism. In 1915, Herbert Samuel, the Jewish Zionist British minister presented a memorandum to the British government entitled "Palestine: Five Alternatives"<sup>3</sup> the memorandum explained the necessity of including Palestine within the sphere of British domination. The memorandum mainly emphasised on the suggestion of establishing a British protectorate in Palestine.

In 1916, Arthur Balfour became the Foreign Secretary and the memorandum met with the approval of a number of British ministers including Balfour. When Britain was planning for Judaisation of Palestine, it was simultaneously practicing a policy of hypocrisy and deception towards the Arabs. Thus in Hussein-Mac Mohan correspondence which took place in 1915-16, Britain promised to safeguard the independence of Arab East, including that of Palestine, and same with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which was a secret agreement between France and Britain, in this agreement too Britain excluded the area of Palestine and put it under international administration. These treaties had become a temporary convert to Zionism with the gradual exhaustion of both Russia and France in 1917 it had become imperative to ensure an early armed intervention of U.S.A. and President Wilson had shown himself 'warmly responsive to the Zionist deal'. A formula was submitted by the Zionist organisation for the consideration of the British government on July 18, 1917, it was worded as:

“His Majesty’s Government after considering the aims of the Zionist organisation, accepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people, and the right of the Jewish people to build up its national life in Palestine. His Majesty’s Government regards as essential for realising of this principle the grant of internal autonomy of Palestine, freedom of immigration for the Jews and the establishment of a Jewish national colonising corporation for the settlement of the economic development of the country. Meanwhile, however, the Jewish Conjoint Committee, which officially represented the Anglo Jewry, sent the times a letter strongly protesting against the Zionist project. The ‘Holy Land’ they wrote, ‘has necessarily a profound and undying interest for all Jews, as the cradle of their religion, the main theatre of Bible history, and the site of its sacred memorials..... since the dawn of their political emancipation in Europe have made the rehabilitation of the Jewish community one of their chief cares, and they have always cherished the hope that the result of their labour would be the great memories of their environment and a source of spiritual inspiration to the whole of Jewry.’”<sup>4</sup>

Balfour had long sympathies with the Jews, he visited the United States, there the Zionist influence was very strong. With Herbert Samuel there were some other prominent jews, who formed a committee in accordance with the ideas of the memorandum which Samuel presented, it had recommended that His Majesty’s Government should issue a public declaration, formally recognising the high historic interest which Palestine possessed for the Jewish community and affirming that at the close of the war the Jewish population in Palestine would be secure, in the enjoyment of civil and religious rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation and such municipal privileges in the town and colonies inhabited by Jews as may be shown to be necessary.

The bold and uncompromising phraseology was not however acceptable either to the foreign office or to some influential British Jews. But after some months of redrafting, it finally received official approval as the famous Balfour Declaration. The Declaration was formally made on November 2, 1917, in the form of a letter addressed by Balfour to Lord Rothschild, a leading English Jew in sympathy with the Zionist aspirations.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

Foreign Office, London.

November 2, 1917.

*I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with the Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.*

*"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."*

*I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist federation.<sup>5</sup>*

*Yours sincerely,*

Arthur James Balfour.

This Declaration was the British promise of a Jewish National Home, it signified the fulfillment and salvation to the Jews. This project got a favourable attitude from Woodrow Wilson in the form of the approval.

The Balfour Declaration put the seal on Weizmann's efforts, and gave the backing of a great power to Jewish immigration in Palestine. The Jews from different parts of the world started pouring in Palestine. This terrified the Arabs, the Arabs would not have time to build up any effective opposition. This sixty seven word letter was a dream for the Jews and a nightmare for the Arabs. Since the declaration was against the people of Palestine, it was decided that the Declaration should not be published there. The Declaration took the form of a promise about the territory to a foreign group so that this group can make this territory a National Home of the Jewish people.

The clauses in the Declaration were a deliberate exercise to mislead the Arabs. These clauses did not mention the Palestine as the Arab people's territory, whether Christian or Muslim, who comprised 90 percent of its population and 97 percent of the land ownership. The Declaration simply refers them as 'existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.' All the evidences suggest that the Declaration was a violation of the principles of International Law. The British or any country had no right to establish a national home for Jews on the Palestinian soil. The Declaration brought the British much ill will and complications.

The Zionists were determined to use the Balfour Declaration as a means by which to make Palestine a Jewish land and create there an independent Jewish state. The Arabs on the other hand were determined that Palestine should remain an Arab land because Palestine was and ever has been an Arab area. The Arabs of Palestine are the descendents of the indigenus inhabitants who have lived in the country since the earliest recorded time and who were there when the Jews entered it in Biblical times and went on living in it after the Jews dispersed. The Arab and Jewish aims were incompatible and an Arab Jewish conflict was inevitable. There was no Arab organisation which could compare with the Zionist organisation. The Arabs did not receive any aid from outside and could not boast of any comparable international linkages or backing. Moreover, since the Arab

leadership was in the hands of Mufti Haj-Amir al-Husayni, who was extremely anti-British and anti-Zionist, the Arabs could not get any sympathy from the British.

India heavily criticised this act of Britain and Indian concern for Palestine was greatly voiced by its most eminent mentors Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. In Nehru's view:

*"Palestine attracts a great deal of attention because of its old history and associations, and also because of its being a Holy land for the Jews, Christians and Muslims. The British policy (which) has created a special minority problem here- that of the Jews, and the Jews side with the British and oppose the freedom of Palestine, as they fear that this would mean Arab rule. The two pull different ways and conflicts necessarily occur. On the Arab side are numbers, on the other side great financial resources and the world wide organisation of Jewry. So England pits Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism and makes it appear that their presence is necessary to act as an arbitrator and to keep the peace between the two. It is the same old game which we have seen in other countries under imperialist domination."*<sup>6</sup>

The Indian response to the Palestine issue was not of the nature of an official government policy until August 15, 1947, but being a broad based political organisation, the Indian National Congress was bound to respond in a manner that reflected the internal situation that India was facing of the struggle against colonialism. In a letter to his daughter Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru strongly criticised the Balfour Declaration which contained the promise of establishing a 'Jewish National Home in Palestine.'

Mahatma Gandhi declared that the Palestine belonged to the Arabs in the same sense as England belongs to English and France to French. He said "it



would be a crime against Humanity to give Palestine wholly or partially as a national home to the Jews.”<sup>7</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru argued and rejected the Balfour Declaration, *that the Declaration was made to win the goodwill of international Jewry and this was important from many point of views, it was welcomed by the Jews..... one not important fact seems to have been overlooked, Palestine was not a wilderness, or an empty uninhibited place, it was already somebody else's home. So this general gesture of the British government was really at the expense of the people who already lived in Palestine.*<sup>8</sup>

The Balfour Declaration of November 1917, caused much anxiety among the Arabs, who intensified their struggle against both British imperialism and Zionism. The Zionist leaders, while opposing self government in Palestine, welcomed the Balfour Declaration and supported the British during and after the First World War. Britain's undertaking to the Zionists was not merely opportunism, there was the concern for imperial communications and for defending the Suez Canal. Nehru realising the British tact said: *“so England pits Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and makes it appear that her presence is necessary to act as an arbitrator and to keep the pace between the two. It is the same old game which we have seen in other countries under imperialist domination, it is curious how often it is repeated.”*<sup>9</sup>

After the First World War the Allies were faced with a major problem of delineating the political status of territories and peoples formerly under the Ottoman rule, in this context a clever strategy was chalked out by Allied powers at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the territories, which were formerly governed by the Allied powers and were inhabited by the peoples not yet able to stand by themselves, were put under the mandatory system. Since the treaties of Versailles and Lausanne empowered the Allied powers to apportion the 'Freed territories' as their mandates. And according to Sykes-Picot agreement between

France and Great Britain the administration of Syria and Lebanon was awarded to France and that of Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq) to Great Britain. Various mandate instruments were created by the mandatory powers, which were subject to approval of the League of Nations. Palestine and Transjordan were included in the same mandates, but were treated as distinct territories. Consequently, the ground was carefully prepared for the regular influx of the Jews into Palestine. No Arab leader except Amir Feisal was invited to the Peace Conference to represent the Arab case as well as the Palestine question, since Feisal relied heavily on the British, he could not play any significant role in the Conference. But he insisted that all the Arab people desired independence, considering his insistence the Americans pressed Britain and France to test the reactions of the population to the proposed mandatory arrangements. For this purpose an inter allied enquiry commission was set up, the King-Crane Commission which was sent to visit the proposed mandatory territories to take the views of the population in regard to the mandates, more than 72 percent of the King-Crane Commission report showed that the people of the area are against the mandate system and against the entire Zionist programme. But the findings of the report were never considered and the report was conveniently shelved and forgotten.

The mandate system was condemned by the Indian National Congress as a cloak to cover imperialist greed. Nehru maintained that:

*“the Arabs, supported by the Christians and other non-Jewish peoples, have demanded self determination and complete freedom. They have taken strong objection to the mandate and to fresh immigrants on the grounds that there is no room for more.... They (the Arabs) have declared that Zionism had been an accomplice of British imperialism; responsible Zionist leaders had constantly urged what an advantage a strong Jewish National Home would be to the English in*

*guarding road to India, just because it was a counteracting force to Arab national aspirations.”<sup>10</sup>*

The main thrust of the British policy of mandates was for the establishment of a Jewish national home. At the Peace Conference Dr. Weizmann stated his movement's aspirations in the following words: “to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English.”<sup>11</sup> The object of Weizmann was to prepare Palestine for the thousands and millions of the Jews of the world. These fundamental Zionist principles that statesmen like Balfour and Wilson were ready to accept as a valid goal. The Zionist strategy was to bring immediately into Palestine so many Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe that they would become the majority, and that this should happen in such a speed that the Arabs would not have time to build up any effective opposition. The Zionists in order to work up enthusiasm for their cause, have to go all over the world preaching the return of thousands and thousands of oppressed Jews.

The years following the First World War and Balfour Declaration saw a great influx of Jewish immigration in Palestine. The dislike of Jews by the Arabs was increasing day by day. The frustration of Palestinian Arabs manifested themselves in violence, however in March 1921, there was a serious outbreak of violence in Jaffa when 170 Palestinians were killed and 507 injured. After seeing this unrest the British government issued a statement known as the Churchill White Paper of 1922, which disclaimed any intention of British government to create a “wholly Jewish Palestine” or to effect “subordination of the Arab population and culture in Palestine.”<sup>12</sup>

The Churchill White Paper of 1922, which explained the basis for the division of the Palestine mandate into areas open and areas closed to Zionism also laid down other principles which controlled the interpretation of the mandate, thereafter.<sup>13</sup> to the Jews the White Paper was an assurance to the policy of the Balfour Declaration.

In any case the British were not prepared to enforce the mandate without an attempt to gain Arab consent, but despite all efforts the Arabs continued to reject the mandate though the concept of the mandate was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919. It was interpreted as an idea of tutelage under which the development of the population of the former Ottoman territories would be promoted until these peoples should reach a stage where their independence could be recognised.

As the mandate was approved by the League of Nations in 1922, it was formally recognised by the United States. The establishment of the British mandatory regime in Palestine from then until 1939, Britain was left to her own devices.

The Indian National Congress criticised the mandate system as being a new form of colonialism that enabled the European powers to continue their domination of the weaker nations in West Asia and Africa. It expressed its respect for the sentiments of Jews that Palestine was Holy to them because it contains many of their shrines, and they can have claim to freedom of access for the purpose of offering worship but the place was not less holy to the Muslims who in addition had exercised sovereignty over the area for centuries and they can only go there for worship, can not receive the sovereign rights in place. The Indian National Congress also maintained that in Palestine the British were following their pet policy of divide and rule as they followed in the Indian Sub-Continent.

The tasks undertaken by Britain as mandatory power over Palestine of facilitating the establishment of a Jewish National Home and preparing the people of Palestine for independence were mutually exclusive. The British government refused to admit this and set about both tasks in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The Zionists had the dedication, the brain power, the connections, the material resources and a favourable emotional climate in the West, with Britain to ensure

their success in Zionist determination. The reaction of the Palestinians to the appointment of Britain as mandatory was first angry and then violent, they demanded immediate self determination and independence.

The sudden increase in Jewish immigration from 1925, caused widespread unemployment and a serious economic depression, the Palestinians saw their country slipping from their grasp. They watched their land being bought up by foreigners. They saw European immigrants flooding into their ports, they brought with them arms and ammunitions, all Jewish settlements which sprang up overnight like mushrooms were heavily fortified. The Jewish agency was given open license in every kind of depredation against the Arabs, so as to make them flee for life. While the Jews could carry all kind of weapons a ban was enforced on the Arabs against carrying any kind of arms, even knives and sticks.

Stressing the need to sympathise with the Arabs, Nehru argued, "*India and Palestine have both their national problems, and both struggle for independence, they have something in common in this struggle and the opponent is the same.....we must, therefore understand each other and sympathise with each other.*"<sup>14</sup> He thus found something common to the Arabs and the people of India, viz. their fight against the British government, His meeting with the representatives of the Palestine National Movement at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Brussels in 1927, gave him greater insight into the Palestinian affairs. He was very much influenced by the struggle of the Palestinian people against British imperialism. From the 1920s onwards Nehru utilised the Foreign Department of the Indian National Congress as an agency to oppose British imperialism in India and abroad including that in West Asia. Though Nehru was sympathetic towards the Jews, he believed that the Arabs were fighting British imperialism in Palestine. He was of the opinion that the Jews should not rely on the British support but should reach an agreement with the Arabs to safeguard their position in an independent Arab country. To Nehru, the British appeared to be exploiting

the differences between the Jews and the Arabs in the same manner as they were promoting communal tension in India.<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, some extremist Zionists disputed over the wailing wall, that shrine of Orthodox Jewry which was yet a Muslim property and the outer face of the chief Muslim sanctuary of Jerusalem Harm-al-Sharif, the third most Holy spot in the Sunni world, these young extremists expressed their hope of winning back the Harm, when some Jews began to encroach slightly on the status quo at the Wailing Wall, the Muslims interpreted them, and the Mufti was riposted with vigorous and provocative counter measures. An attempt by the government to bring about agreement in the matter was baffled as much by the Jewish reluctance to give way as by the Arabs.<sup>16</sup> In August, 1929, these provocative demonstrations by both Jews and Arabs changed into massacres, at the end of the month there were 133 Jews killed and six agricultural settlements were totally destroyed, under the pressure to do something about the matter the British sent the Shaw Commission of enquiry in 1930, to investigate the situation. The Shaw Commission of inquiry in its report on the causes of the Arab rebellion of 1929, pointed to Jewish immigration as the primary cause, in the words of the Commission, 'the Arabs have to come to see in Jewish immigration not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord for the future,' the Shaw Commission recommended that the Jewish immigration be controlled and non-Jewish settlements given voice in discussion. It was not the solution of existing Palestine problem, and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations severely criticised the manner in which the British government had administered Palestine.

In 1930s, Hitler's rise to power and the spread of Nazism in Europe directly resulted in the exodus of Jews. As a result the German and Polish Jews flocked to Palestine. This enormous influx frightened the Arabs, it appeared that the attainment of a Jewish majority was in sight and with it a Jewish state. The

fear of this among the Arabs created increasing unrest. Arabs declared a general strike in 1936, which continued for six months, trains were blown up, Jewish settlements invaded, Jews and British police murdered. The situation in Palestine deteriorated considerably. The issue of Palestinians was now taken to the neighbouring states who explicitly committed themselves to the cause of Palestinian Arabs. Despite the formation of the Arab Higher Committee on April 25, 1936, consisting of members from various Arab countries of which the Mufti of Jerusalem was President, no immediate political solution was to be found to the Arab Jewish problem. As a result, violence and counter violence continued unabated in Palestine. The reaction of the Indian National Congress to this state of affairs was unequivocally in favour of the Arab cause. Jawaharlal Nehru greatly criticised the Jewish inflow, addressing the 50<sup>th</sup> session of the Indian National congress in 1936, he observed that the Arab struggle against British imperialism in Palestine is as much a part of the great world conflict as India's struggle for freedom.<sup>17</sup>

Nehru held the British government responsible for the breach of promises they made to the Arabs. Although, the Arabs had supported the British government in the disintegration of the Ottoman empire on clear understanding of independence, instead of helping them in securing their independence, they converted Palestine into mandatory with a burden of creating National Home for the Jews. Nehru greatly denounced the Zionist action of pushing out the Arabs from all the places of importance in order to dominate the Palestine economy. He visualised the problem of Palestine as purely a national struggle for independence and in his opinion the controversy boiled down to the issue of nationalism versus imperialism. Nehru appreciated and identified the common bond of friendship between India and Palestine because of the sharing of common experience and circumstances.<sup>18</sup>

The reaction of the Indian National Congress to this state of affairs was unequivocal. In 1936, the All India Congress Committee conveyed its greetings and sympathy to the Arabs in their struggle for freedom.<sup>19</sup> As a mark of respect the Indian National Congress observed September 27, 1936, as Palestine Day by holding meetings and demonstrations through out the country as an indication of support for the Arab cause.<sup>20</sup> The Indian leadership led by Jawaharlal Nehru contended that a Jewish settlement could be effected only in an atmosphere of goodwill and peace and not if the Jews went to Palestine with a view of dominating the country. In Nehru's views, events in Palestine after the issue of Balfour Declaration represented a gross betrayal of the Arabs by the British. He did not dispute the rights of the Jews to regard Jerusalem as their holy land and said that this entitled them to free and unhindered access and right to worship, but he pointed out that the Balfour Declaration had gone beyond this fact and had envisaged the creation of a Jewish state within the Arab community. This was a gross injustice which took no account of the fact that the area was also Holy to the Muslims and Christians.<sup>21</sup> Nehru believed that Palestine is essentially an Arab country and must remain so, and the Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homeland.<sup>22</sup> Nehru always decried the attempts made by various organisations to give the Palestine issue a communal touch. To Nehru the problem of Palestine was a nationalist one, for the Arabs were fighting against the imperialist control. It was therefore a pity that instead of aligning themselves with the struggle against imperialism, Nehru pointed out, the Jews of Palestine had taken the side of British imperialism and desired its protection against the natives of the country.

The findings of the Royal Peel Commission of 1937 were published in a volume (the Peel Report), where after admirably setting forth the background and history of troubles, it advocated the division of the country into a small Jewish state, a large Arab state and a considerable area which was to constitute under the mandate. Though the Zionists showed the willingness to discuss the proposal



the Arabs would not hear of it and in December 1937, the revolt blazed forth again more fiercely than ever with the murder of a British official and his police escort. The cabinet however adopted the recommendations and another Commission the Woodhead Commission came out to demarcate the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish states, in accordance with the decision for partition which the previous Commission put forward and which the cabinet had adopted. At its Calcutta session in 1937, the All India Congress Committee recorded its emphatic protest against the reign of terror that has been established in Palestine by British imperialism, with a view to coerce the Arabs into accepting the proposed partition of Palestine and assure them of solidarity of the Indian people with them in their struggle for National freedom.<sup>23</sup>

The Arabs who were supported by the neighbouring Arab states and India rejected the partition plan entirely and claimed their right to independence in the whole of Palestine with and immediate stopping of Jewish immigration and land purchase. The state of security deteriorated with the murder of a Commissioner by the Arabs because he was widely considered one of the authors of the partition plane. In 1938, 5,700 major acts of terrorism were recorded and some hundred Arabs were convicted by the military court and hanged.

The leaders of India expressed their full support to the Palestinians. The All India Congress Committee at Hripura session, in February 1938, passed the following resolution:

The congress condemned the decision of Great Britain as a mandatory power to bring about the partition of Palestine in the teeth of the opposition of the Arabs and the appointment of the commission to carry out this project. The Congress records its emphatic protest against the continuation of the reign of terror which is still being maintain in Palestine, to force this policy upon the unwilling Arabs. The Congress expressed its full sympathy with the Arabs in their struggle for national freedom and their fight against imperialism. The Congress

holds that the proper method of solving the problem by which the Jews and the Arabs are faced in Palestine is by amicable settlement between themselves and appeals to the Jews not to seek the shelter of the British mandate and not to allow themselves to be exploited in the interest of British imperialism.<sup>24</sup>

The period between 1936-1939 saw great disturbance, Britain faced great difficulties when clashes between Jewish and Palestinian committees mounted. The partition proposals drove the Arabs into open rebellion, confronted with this crisis the British government called an Anglo-Arab-Jewish Congress at London and also invited some neighbouring states, who had shown themselves increasingly concerned in the Palestine question. Both Arabs and Jews rejected this new British proposal, and the Government of Britain was eventually left to announce a new policy in May 1939, when Hitler had occupied Czechoslovakia and the Second World War clouds were visible to everyone.

So seeing the war clouds looming large over its head and the Arab unrest, the British issued a policy statement known as the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 which pointed out that:

“the Royal Commission and previous commissions of enquiry have drawn to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the mandate, such as the expression, ‘a national home for the Jewish people,’ and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between the Arabs and Jews.”<sup>25</sup>

The White Paper recommended a proposal for the establishment of an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the strategic and commercial requirements of both countries in the future. The proposal for the establishment of the independent state would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the mandate. It urged that all Jewish immigration in

Palestine would be stopped forthwith, it limited the Jewish immigration, during next five years there would be only 75,000 Jewish immigrants it stated and further immigration was to be dependent on Arab consent. The High Commissioner to Palestine would have the powers to regulate or prohibit the transfer of land.

To the 1939 White Paper the Arab political leader's reaction was of different kind some declared it unacceptable and some protested against it. While the Jews were embittered by the White Paper, they furiously condemned it as an outrageous breach of faith, claiming that it denied them the right to construct their National Home in Palestine. The White Paper caused great suspicion among Zionist leaders about the future British intentions towards Zionism. The Zionists quickly saw the need to transfer their base of operations from Britain to the United States. Ben Gurion acknowledged that achieving the aim would not be an easy task, the Jewish community in Britain exerted tremendous pressure on the British government to retract their 1939, White Paper policy.

*The British Parliament received the White Paper with little enthusiasm.* The Labour Party naturally opposed it, it was strongly criticised by the strong imperialists like Churchill and Amery. In June 1939, seven members of the Permanent Mandates Commission reported unanimously to the League Council that the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation, which in agreement with the mandatory power and the Council, the Commission had placed upon the Palestine mandate. But the outbreak of Second World War prevented the Council from discussing the White Paper which thus remained de facto in force.

In 1940, the issue of the Land Transfer Regulations, denying Jews the right to acquire land in Palestine, came as severe blow, they organised country wide demonstrations with arms and bomb incidents, and their cooperation in war nevertheless continued. The Jews saw that thousands of their kin denied refuge in Palestine, a ship carrying 750 Jewish refugees blew up and sank near Black sea port and it was also suggested to them that they also had been made the objects

of a political gesture. These events caused a hardening Zionist feeling and increased terrorism. There were meetings, organised protests and demonstrations against the British policy.

Increased pressure for the pro-Zionist solution began to be exerted by American Zionists, in May 1942, the American Zionist Organisation met in New York and adopted the Biltmore Programme, and presented it to David Ben Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency's Executive committee, the Biltmore Programme demanded:

- the establishment of a Jewish state, which would embrace the whole of Palestine,
- the creation of a Jewish army,
- the repudiation of the White Paper of 1939, and unlimited Jewish immigration in Palestine.

This Programme went much further than the Balfour Declaration, the avowed Zionist objectives had now surfaced. By stepping up their demands, the Zionists expressed their growing conviction that a policy of moderation did not pay, that Britain could no longer be relied upon, and that it was expedient to seek the support of the United States. Officially the Jewish Agency agreed to observe a truce with the Arabs for the duration of war. But this attitude was not followed by the extremist Jews. The war gave the Jews a unique opportunity to equip themselves with arms, partly stolen from the allied forces.

Meanwhile, the systematic annihilation of millions of Jews by Nazi Germany led many people, both Jews and non-Jews, to conclude that they ought to have a state of their own. Beginning in 1943, an intensive propaganda campaign was mounted by the American Zionists with a view to bring the American public opinion to support Zionist aims. Finally in January 1944, a resolution endorsing the Biltmore Programme was introduced in both the Houses

of Congress, calling for concrete action on the part of the United States government to:

“use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonisation so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth.”<sup>26</sup>

This resolution was a landmark. American support for Jewish statehood was now a fact. However, Zionist efforts to obtain Presidential endorsement of this resolution met with some resistance, the Zionists were largely unsuccessful in getting the United States’ full backing for their policies.

Consequently in 1945, the Labour Party came to power and it declared its support for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the British government had come to the conclusion that in determining a post war policy for Palestine the collaboration of the U.S. government must be sought, since both political parties in that country had courted the Jewish votes in the Presidential elections of 1944, by pledges of support for the full Biltmore Programme, in October 1945, President Truman called upon the British government to open the gates of Palestine to 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe, in reply the British government proposed the creation of an Anglo-American Committee of enquiry to study the matter, shifting the burden of responsibility to the United States both the governments appointed a Committee, composed of non-official citizens of the two countries. The joint Committee held hearing in Washington and London, visited the displaced person’s camps in Germany and Austria and made a tour of Palestine. After completing its task on April 20, 1946, the Committee presented a report with three major recommendations:

- a) that the government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate, pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations,
- b) that 100,000 immigration certificates were to be immediately granted for the Jews, for the admission in Palestine who have been the victims of the Nazi persecution,
- c) that the land transfer limitations be rescinded.<sup>27</sup>

The U.S. and Great Britain neither accepted nor rejected these recommendations. Instead, the two governments appointed a new Anglo-American Commission, to devise ways to implement the Committee's recommendations. The new Committee rejected the idea of early partition of Palestine into two states. The Committee advised that the hostilities would disappear and until such time Palestine would be placed under U.N. Trusteeship and the mandate should continue. The United States accepted these recommendations but the British government reserved its rights for policy statement. Ultimately the two governments failed to reach an agreed decision.

The Arabs reacted demanding the abrogation of the mandate, the withdrawal of the British troops and the establishment of an Arab democratic state and threatened the Russian support.

The Zionists were profoundly disappointed by these developments. In December 1946, at the World Zionist Congress in Basle, the American Zionist leaders asserted that the British rule in Palestine was "illegal" and declared that "we have the right to resist this rule and pledged the support of American Jewry to this resistance."<sup>28</sup>

From 1946-1947, ruthless civil war and terrorism by British and Jews continued. Conditions had so deteriorated that the Anglo-Jewish conflict had become a brutalising series of reprisals. Having failed to solve the Palestinian question, inspite of having held the mandate over Palestine from the League of

Nations since 1922, the British had no choice but to handover the volatile issue to the U.N. The Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, informed the House of Commons on February, 1947, that as the mandate had proved unworkable, the question of Palestine was being referred to the United Nations. On April 2<sup>nd</sup> 1947, Britain requested the General Assembly to consider the Palestine problem for that it requested for a special session on the issue. Then on May 15, 1947, the U.N. set up the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Committee composed of eleven states (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Uruguay, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru and Yugoslavia) under the presidency of a Swedish delegate, it visited Palestine and submitted a report to the General Assembly. The report recommended the establishment of an independent and economically unified Palestine at an early date and if the recommendations were pending then the area should fall under the United Nations supervision. Here the unanimity ended and the report was divided into a majority and minority plan. The majority plan endorsed by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay provided for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and Jerusalem under international control.

The minority plan was favoured by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia. It advocated a federal state of Palestine, composed of two states, Jewish and Arab, each of them enjoying local autonomy with its capital at Jerusalem. It also provided for a three-year transitional period during which responsibility for administering Palestine would lie with an authority designated by the United Nations, as also for the election of a Constituent Assembly and the formulation of an appropriate Constitution. Jewish immigration would be permitted on the Jewish side within a reasonable limit, to be determined by a nine-member International Commission composed of three representatives each of the Jews, the Arabs and an appropriate organ of the United Nations. The Arab states favoured the minority plan, because it satisfied their basic considerations, like a single independent state

with Arab majority and limitation of Jewish immigration. While India opposed the majority plan. In an emotional letter written to Albert Einstein on July 11, 1947, Nehru recognised the wonderful achievements of the Jews in the past and the miseries they had to face through the ages of persecution. But he maintained with Einstein that the Jewish approach towards the Arabs in Palestine was wrong and that an amicable solution should be found to the problem without the use of force.

At the UNSCOP, the Indian side argued that the plan for a federal state gave full expression to the principle of self determination and did not represent the play of great power politics. The Indian delegate at the UNSCOP, Sir Abdur Rahman, stated before the General Assembly that Great Britain wanted the creation of Jewish state for political and strategic reasons in total disregard of the principle of self-determination.<sup>29</sup> The note presented by Sir Abdur Rahman, also decried the way political rights were being confused with religious rights. It said: "it would be entirely wrong..... to regard that country (Palestine) as being in some way peculiar politically, whatever importance it does possess from a religious or sentimental point of view but there is no reason why political considerations and why political rights in a state should be confused with religious rights."<sup>30</sup> India's position was made clear even at home. Emphasising the Indian stand in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru stated the proposal for a federal state was "*not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution.*"<sup>31</sup>

Both plans were thoroughly debated by the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly at its fall session in 1947, both Arab and Jewish representatives were heard again. The political scene grew tense and it became clear that the Zionists with full support of U.S. were determined to obtain a decision favouring the majority plan. Finally, on November 29, 1947, the General Assembly voted the recommendation of partition of Palestine as proposed by the majority plan.



## *India and the Balfour Declaration of 1917- Its Implications and Consequences*

By January 1948, the Palestine situation had taken a turn for the worse. In a note written to the chief ministers on January 5, 1948, Nehru observed that "*in Palestine there is organised religious conflict on an intensive scale, probably the prelude to large scale disorder and battle.*"<sup>32</sup> This prognosis of Nehru was to prove true after six months when the region witnessed a bloodbath after the creation of Israel. Despite the pressures exerted on him by the carrot and stick policy of Zionists, Nehru stood firm and refused to dilute the Indian stand in any way.

On the other hand the Americans who had voted for the partition of Palestine seemed anxious to win back the Arab support which was essential for them in view of the oil situation, and the possibility of war in West Asia.<sup>33</sup> In February 1948, the Arab League had threatened withdrawal of oil concessions if the United States continued to support the partition of Palestine. Owning about 42 percent of the oil resources in West Asia, the United States had much to lose if the Arab threat became a reality. Therefore as a safety measure the U.S. did a strategic withdrawal of its position on Palestine. Its delegation in the United Nations withdrew support from the General Assembly and supported the proposal for a temporary trusteeship for the whole of Palestine. However, the U.S. resolution failed to gain acceptance in the face of the consistent Soviet support for the partition plan. The Soviet Union declared that the partition plan was the best possible solution in the circumstances, and declared that effective measures should be taken to implement the plan.<sup>34</sup>

The Arab state was to include the central and Eastern part of Palestine. And Jaffa, Haifa and a major part of Negev around 56 percent was given to Jewish state. Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to stay outside of both states, subject to an administration responsible to the Trusteeship Council. The General Assembly also took note of Britain's decision to terminate the mandate by August 1, 1948, provided for the establishment of the two states within two months after the

British withdrawal, it established a five nation U.N. Palestine Committee to implement the resolution and called upon the Security Council to assist in its implementation of the plan. Britain accepted the partition resolution but refused to cooperate with the U.N. in Palestine. She announced that she would not admit the U.N. Palestine Committee before May 1, 1948.

Arabs were greatly shocked over the attitude, they never expected that it would be the solution. When the resolution was passed in November 1947, they refused to accept it. They announced in December 1947, that they would intervene with the military force to prevent its implementation. They argued that according to U.N. Charter the Assembly did not possess the right of binding decision but only of recommendation, so they adopted an attitude of non-cooperation. In the neighbouring Arab states volunteers were recruited for the defense of Palestine, and in 1948, armed detachments started to enter Palestine and attacking Jewish settlements. By February these clashes had resulted in over 2,500 casualties and as days passed the toll mounted. Hostilities began to precipitate within Palestine and a large scale Arab exodus from Zionist held areas.

On May 14, 1948, Britain officially terminated its mandate over Palestine, it withdrew the forces from the country and the same day on May 14, 1948, the Zionists invoked the U.N. Partition Resolution and proclaimed Palestine 'a Jewish state' to be called Israel. A few hours later President Truman extended de facto recognition to this new state. Later Russia followed it, Israel immediately received a flood of supplies and of immigrants.

India criticised the denial of independence to Arabs, it argued that when other Arab states of West Asia which had been placed under mandate system had already acquired self government then why this had not to be done with Palestine and its peoples. India taking in view both the communities, Jews and Arabs, proposed for a single Palestine state based on federal principles, where all the inhabitants of the area continued to be the citizens of a single Palestinian state.

But unfortunately the big powers did not like peace, and its repercussions the Palestinian Arabs are facing, there is no state of peace, conditions are getting worse day by day. For the Arabs the establishment of the state of Israel was an infringement upon the rights of the indigenous Arab population, it dispossessed them of their homes and made them refugees in their own homeland. In a letter to chief ministers on May 20, 1948, Nehru wrote:

*“the international situation has, as you know, flared up in Palestine and a bitter small scale war is going on there. I must say that the U.S. government have handled the Palestine question with quite extraordinary ineptitude and opportunism. It is difficult to say whether this war will continue for very long as, in any event, the area is very limited. It appears also that the King of Transjordan is playing a hand mainly in his own interests.”<sup>35</sup>*

The emergence of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century coincided with the rise of nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. As the British were looking for the strengthening of their presence in India, Egypt and Africa, it became necessary for them to protect all the vital routes leading to these countries. Palestine is the only country which connects the three continents and could play a big role because of its position, for the British imperialism. So Britain decided to settle a foreign group in that area which would constitute a majority. For this reason it decided to place Jews there, through the Balfour Declaration to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Palestinian people were reduced to the status of refugees and driven out of their homes. This imperialist-cum-Zionist game had been treacherous and had dastardly effects.

The Indian National Congress was bound to respond in a manner that reflected in part the internal situation in India and in part its views on Palestine in context of the struggle against colonialism that was convulsing Asia. India's policy towards this grave problem of Palestine grew and crystallised on the

fundamental issues arising out of the complex situation at home. History had tied India with the West Asian region through diverse contacts and the Palestinian issue has dominated India's West Asia policy partly on the humanitarian grounds and partly due to the political and ideological similarities. Nehru identified the similarity between the freedom struggle of India and Palestine on the ground that both are National Liberation movements against the British imperialism. He argued that *"only on the stable foundation of Arab-Jew cooperation and elimination of imperialism" the future of Palestine could be secured.*<sup>36</sup> These views of Nehru were no doubt the reaction and reflection of the general political background of Asia and particularly India. So it became quite natural that Nehru's approach was meant to fight the imperialist intervention in the region.

The views expressed by both Nehru and Gandhi were identical in character. They had preferred a federal state comprising of the interests of both Arabs and Jews, as they were never prepared to accept the victimisation of one by the other. Both leaders had sympathy for the Jews, but not at the cost of the Palestinians. The partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in West Asia. If Nehru's plan of a federal state would have been accepted, the problem perhaps might have been resolved much earlier.

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## *Chapter – IV*

*The Palestine Issue : India at the U.N.*

## Chapter-IV

### The Palestine Issue : India at the U.N

Prior to 1914, Palestine was under Turkish occupation as a part of the Ottoman empire. In World War I, the Palestinians helped the British in the overthrow of the Turkish hegemony, and in return got British promise of complete national independence for the Arabs. As the war came to a close the British government went back on its solemn assurances to the Arabs and resumed its role of divide and rule. The result was the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Following the Balfour Declaration a bulk of Jewish immigrants began to pour in Palestine. In 1922, with British efforts and American designs Palestine was declared a British mandatory, now the British were free to do any thing in that piece of land. There started a great Jewish inflow, demand for Jewish National Home in Palestine and many clashes between Jews and Arabs over this. By the end of World War I 1939-45, the Palestinians found themselves facing a powerful front composed of vested interests of Britain, America and the Zionists international, all aiming at transforming Palestine into the Jewish state. The British authorities also permitted the formation of Zionist military squads which took the name of sporting clubs and scout groups, on the other hand the Arabs were totally disarmed, they were forbidden from owning or carrying firearms. By 1947, the British troops had killed a total of 10,000 Palestinian Arabs and hanged 167 Arab militants. The Zionist military organisation went on destroying Arab villages, capturing Arab towns and looting Arab properties. Conditions so deteriorated that the British felt their complete failure in Palestine. On 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1947, Great Britain requested the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of General Assembly. Taking into consideration the urgency of the situation Britain requested the U.N. for an early settlement. This way the U.N. stepped into the sphere of Palestine question. After being considered the issue, the United Nations established



a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Meanwhile the Zionists declared the formation of Israel further precipitating the situation. The subsequent reports of UNSCOP contained two partition proposals, one majority and the other minority. The majority proposal was represented by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay proposed that Palestine should be divided into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem. The minority proposal represented by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, proposed that an independent federal state should be created, this state would comprise of an Arab state, a Jewish state and Jerusalem under international control. There would be thus a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship. As India in its opposition to partition plan favoured the minority plan. But on November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the Partition Resolution 181(II) on majority plan.

The resolution established a United Nations Palestine Committee of Five member states- Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines, to supervise the implementation of the plan. As violence and disorder was increasing in the country a Truce Commission, composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which had consular offices in Jerusalem, was established on February 24, 1948. Thus, Belgium, France and U.S. formed the Truce Commission.

On May 14, 1948, British withdrew all its forces from Palestine and the same day Israel was declared independent. This action complicated the situation and the armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon crossed the frontiers and violent fighting broke out. This was the first Arab Israeli war, which resulted in the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and nearly 80,000 Palestinians became refugees in the neighbouring countries. In an effort to achieve a political solution acceptable to Arabs and Jews the General Assembly on May 27, 1948, appointed a U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden in Palestine to use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine for a

political settlement of this difficulty. Whereas the Arab Higher Committee rejected any solution on partition and insisted that the only acceptable solution was the formation of one independent state for the whole of Palestine.<sup>1</sup> As the situation went violent, the need for military intervention grew more, this was the birth of United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).<sup>2</sup>

According to Nehru, the Palestinian question had become more complicated than ever due to the new Arab - Israeli conflict. He strongly felt that neither side would be able to achieve any settlement through military means. He said that:

*"In military sense, at present, probably the Arabs are stronger. But the fact is that American and Russian prestige are involved in maintaining a new state of Israel, and it will not be easy for the Arabs to win through. What the final end of all this will be, therefore it is very difficult to say. Both sides feel passionately about their position and are hard fighters. In the past, India has generally sympathised with the Arab cause in Palestine, though with some reservations. The position we took up in the United Nations represented this attitude which I still think was the correct one. However, neither party approved of it. In the present struggle there, India does not want to be involved. We have enough trouble of our own."*<sup>3</sup>

On May 23, 1948, the Indian government had received a request from the president of Israel to recognise the Jewish state, majority of nations in the world accepted the fact of existence of Israel, but the Indian government had withheld its recognition.

The Israelis, however, exploited the situation and strengthened their own position, they were helped by the United States and Britain. The U.N. mediator Count Bernadotte in his report submitted to General Assembly on September 16, 1948, stated that, it is however, undeniable that no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the rights of the Arabs to return to the

homes from which they have been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine grew. It would be an offence against the principle of element justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return their homes, while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and indeed offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries. He had warned that unrestricted immigration would bring economic and political disturbances, he also made some proposals to Security Council for the solution of the problem. But the Israelis found these proposals unfavourable and the very next day Bernadotte was assassinated by a Zionist terrorist in the broad day light. So horrible was this act that the security council had to pass a resolution which among other things condemned the Israeli authorities for not being able to protect the life of Bernadotte, and for not apprehending the culprits.<sup>4</sup>

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly discussed Bernadotte's report and resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be admitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. But Israel continued to defy the U.N. and prevented the return of the Arabs to their homes. Not only did the Israelis refused to allow the return of the Arabs to their homes, but they consummated the tragedy by seizing all their property in one of the greatest acts of plunder in modern history.

On May 4, 1949, the United Nations Security Council accepted Israel's application for admission to the U.N. A week later, the General Assembly also passed a resolution granting Israel the membership of the United Nations. On the question of Israel's admission to the United Nations India's first reaction was to abstain. Later as a part of the policy of cooperation with the Arab states, Nehru ordered the Indian delegation to vote against, since "*India could recognise an Israel which had been achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations.*"<sup>5</sup> India stood against it and criticised every move of it, Nehru

maintained that India's suggestion of a federal state was not only fair and equitable solution of the problem but the only real solution. Referring to the question of recognition. Nehru in Constituent Assembly on December 6, 1949, said that:

*"Israel is now a member of the United Nations and its recognition by other states can not obviously be differed. The government of India would like to act in this matter, which has been the subject of controversy among the nations with whom we have friendly relations that would avoid this understanding and ill feeling...."*<sup>6</sup>

India's opposition to the state of Israel was also based on ethical, moral and political grounds, India thought it not fair and wise to have a sudden shift in its position on Israel unless it was demanded by international situation and domestic compulsions.

On the other hand America and Britain did not stop encouraging the ceasefire violations by Israel, ultimately truce agreements were signed in Rhodes in the winter and spring of 1949 between the Arab governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan on one hand and Israel on the other. The armistice agreements went beyond the truces and ceasefires and represented the first formal agreements between the parties themselves. They provided for an end of military actions and, except in the Egyptian-Israeli case, for the termination of 'acts of hostility' as well. Demarcation lines were established, but these were not to be "construed in any sense as apolitical or territorial boundary and (were) delineated without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of (the Parties) as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question." The agreements were meant to "facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace."<sup>7</sup> However, the Israeli incursions in the Arab territories did not stop. Israel also occupied those areas reserved for the Arabs, turning millions of Palestinians into refugees. On December 7, 1949, the Israelis moved their capital and Parliament (Knesset) to

Jerusalem, which was declared by U.N. under international control. Reacting sharply to it the U.N. Trusteeship Council adopted the following resolution on December 20, 1949, it said, (the Council) :

- concerned at the removal to Jerusalem of certain ministries and central departments of the Government of Israel;
- considers that such action ignores and is incompatible with the provisions of paragraph II of General Assembly Resolution 303(IV) of December 9, 1949.

In response to the Trusteeship Council resolution Israel had stubbornly refused to implement that part of the resolution.

The injustices to which the Arabs in Israel were subjected went far beyond the expropriation of their farms and property, and included flagrant infringement upon their basic human rights and civil liberties. For meeting this situation of refugees the United Nations formed the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees which began operation in 1950.

From 1948-50, India withheld recognition for Israel, India's reservation in according recognition was conspicuous, it was based on moral and ethical grounds. But such grounds may not find applicability in the behaviour of modern states whose foreign policies are mainly shaped and influenced by long term and short term objectives of national interests. Whatever the reasons for delaying the process of recognition, India took more than two years to comply with the Israeli question. Finally on September 17, 1950, the Government of India issued a communiqué which read: the Government of India have decided to accord recognition to the Government of Israel, through the Israeli embassy in Washington.<sup>8</sup>

The Government of India recognised Israel in September 1950 but it so *de facto* and not *de jure* because : (a) Israel had followed a wrong policy against the

Arabs, particularly against the Palestinians; (b) the criterion that religion could become the basis for nationality was unacceptable; (c) Zionism was considered a product of Western imperialism not a part of general Asian liberation movement and under present political circumstances Israel has had to maintain close relations with certain European states.<sup>9</sup>

The point that Israel had already become a member of the United Nations made Nehru to press this point more convincingly, he said "*our policy (is) to recognise any country that was an independent functionary country represented in the United Nations.*"<sup>10</sup> In fact it was Krishna Menon who persuaded Nehru to recognise Israel. Menon held the view that "whatever country is recognised by the U.N. should be recognised by us."<sup>11</sup>

The recognition of Israel was important if India were to play an intermediary role between Israel and other states. The road to a settlement in West Asia could only be found through reconciliation between Israel and Palestine. It would be India's role to find out the ways and means by which this reconciliation could be achieved. Subsequently after having recognised the state of Israel Nehru formally recognised the Arab factor in delaying the process of recognition. In October 1950, Nehru wrote, "*we would have done this (recognition of Israel) long ago because Israel is a fact, we refrained because of our desire not to offend the sentiments of our friends in Arab countries.*"<sup>12</sup>

Soon after granting recognition, Nehru ruled out diplomatic exchange due to the financial and other reasons and added that that the government was anxious to avoid additional commitments abroad at present.<sup>13</sup> Right from the beginning of 1950s, there were hectic efforts on the part of Israel to make diplomatic relations with India, in March 1952, Mr. Walter Eytan, the director general of Israeli foreign ministry, visited India and tried to have an Israeli Consul General in Bombay, but he could not be able to evoke a firm response from Nehru on the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with India, as Nehru was very critical of

his attitude on this issue. During the same period there was a constant pressure from the Arab world against making any diplomatic ties with Israel. India was reluctant to revive its Israeli policy, for she doubted that any inclination to have relationship with Israel would be exploited to her disadvantage. On the other the Indian government was suspicious of the evil designs of Pakistan who was trying to project herself as a staunch supporter of Arabs on the question of Israel. Pakistan's designs and initiatives to forge a Pan-Islamic alliance of the Arab countries in order to guard her own interests were of concern to India.

Israelis seemed to have achieved a breakthrough when, in 1953, Nehru allowed an Israeli consul to function in Bombay. But further Israeli hopes were shattered when despite repeated requests and unofficial delegations to India, Nehru refused to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. According to Nehru :

*"this attitude was adopted after a careful consideration of the balance of factors. It is not a matter of high principle, but it is based on how we could best serve and be helpful in the area. We would like the problem between Israel and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully. After careful thought, we felt that while recognising Israel as an entity, we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel. As I said, it is not a matter of principle, and it is not a matter on which two opinions can not be held. That, in the balance, is the decision we arrived at, and we think it is a correct decision."*<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand a fundamental change had taken place in the Arab political world with the success of the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and emergence of President Nasser to power. From 1952 onwards Nasser was gathering the forces of Arab nationalism around himself and Egypt and this process attempted to throw traditional regimes in other Arab countries too. The most important of them was that he employed himself up as the leader of Arab struggle against Israel. Subsequently, the situation further complicated by Soviet diplomatic

activities in the region in opposition to Western interests. Pakistan was trying to project itself into the West Asian region with the help of Western powers.

In these circumstances India had to take no action but had to resolve the problem of identifying the Indian government with one or the other of the two forces in conflict in West Asia. But with the passage of time, the policy of non-alignment made considerable headway in the Arab region's politics, and the problem of identifying the Indian government's move to align with one of the power blocs in the region. The Nehru-Nasser friendship further cemented the Arab and dedication for an independent and non-aligned approach in their foreign policies. Therefore, India cultivated friendship with Egypt and other like minded countries of West Asia to offset the Pan-Islamic maneuverings of Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

Nasser was able to tie the two most emotionally charged issues together—the urge to eliminate Western economic domination and the question of Israel. Nasser represented the forces of the Arab social revolution struggling against economic colonialism saving the Suez waterway from the Western domination which was of enormous strategic and economic value to the Western powers, and most of them were supporters of Israel. At Cairo, on his way back from London in 1953, Nehru advised Nasser not to use harsh language against Britain. Nehru's involvement with Nasser did not end his involvement with the Palestinian question but it became more effective after his friendship with Nasser and emergence of other issues linked with Palestinian refugees and Arab nationalism.

On April 2, 1954, the Pakistan-Turkish agreement was signed, and the Baghdad pact of 1955 projected Pakistan in West Asia in an entirely different role. The pact was the outcome of (1) an Anglo-American drive to forge a military alliance among the Muslim countries of West Asia to counter the Soviet influence in the region and (2) Pakistan's drive to bring about an Islamic grouping in the region as a counterpoise to India. India heavily criticised the move, and Nehru called it



as the most unfortunate and deplorable action on the parts of the countries who joined these pacts.

In time, the relations between India and Egypt were gradually getting stronger and the leaders of the two countries were discovering greater and greater areas of common concern. In 1955, Nasser stopped at New Delhi on his way back to Bandung to meet Pt. Nehru, Nasser admitted that this short stay with Nehru proved a turning point in his political understanding. At Bandung, Nehru urged the Arabs not to rule out negotiations as a means of settling the Palestine issue and joined other Asian African states in calling for implementation of the United Nations Resolution on Palestine.

On July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company. This nationalisation was mainly due to the decision of America to withdraw the Aswan Dam aid. The rumours were high that Nasser consulted Nehru on the nationalisation question because Nehru had been the guest of Colonel Nasser only a few days before the nationalisation of Suez Canal Company. India refuted these rumours and Nehru gave a lengthy statement on August 8, 1956, in Lok Sabha:

*"the Government of India had to take a decision in the situation as it confronted them. India is not a disinterested party, she is a principle user of this waterway and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the disputes, not to speak of worse developments, in regard to it."*<sup>16</sup> Nehru then pointed out, *"the suddenness of nationalisation decision and the manner in which it has been implemented have contributed to the violent reaction. But the terms of nationalisation itself under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that government."*<sup>17</sup> Nehru again clarified, *"as I informed the house some days ago, that the Suez Canal issue was not discussed between President Nasser and myself when we met recently. The considerations of it and the concerned decision must have been made later."*<sup>18</sup>

India felt that any adverse development in West Asia would affect Indian interests badly. Moreover, India's association with Egypt, Palestine and other West Asian countries brought her closer to every crisis. With President Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the French and the United Kingdom governments reacted sharply to the Egyptian announcement, France, Britain and Israel secretly agreed to a joint but phased military attack on Egypt. France and Britain hoped to overthrow Nasser and seize the Suez Canal, while Israel welcomed the opportunity to destroy the Arab Commando bases and Egyptian military power, to force open the Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to its ships, and to compel Egypt to stop depending on the U.N. as an intermediary and to enter into direct peace negotiations. They proposed a Suez Canal Users Association. The first London Conference on Suez issue was held during August 16-23, 1956, and India was one of the participants in it. India's diplomacy was practiced by Krishna Menon with the support of Nehru. Menon pointed out, "therefore, since our interest in this canal is not a political one, it is a user interest and that user interest can best be served by negotiations, by trying to make the interest a mutual one, by persuasion, by making Egypt a party to a solemn agreement which comes under the obligations of International Law and of the Charter of the U.N."<sup>19</sup>

Nehru, however, told the Lok Sabha on September 13, 1956, that the Western proposal to set up a Suez Canal Users Association was full of dangerous potentialities for it was unacceptable to the United Arab Republic, he further said that "*the action proposed is not the result of an agreement but is in the nature of an imposed action.*"<sup>20</sup>

On October 16, 1956, Prime Minister Eden decided finally to use force against Egypt, in the company of France and Israel, who had already prepared

their plans for attack on Egypt. Finally from October 29, 1956, the three forces attacked United Arab Republic.

India's reaction to this development was sharp and forthright. India denounced the Israeli aggression as a flagrant violation of U.N. Charter and in opposition to all principles laid down in the Bandung Conference.<sup>21</sup> Nehru believed that the Israeli aggression was a clear 'naked aggression' and he was critical of the British and French backing it received. Not only India but also the United States, Soviet Union, Commonwealth countries and a large part of Afro-Asia demanded an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces from Egypt. United States took the lead in demanding a ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces through a draft resolution introduced on October 29, 1956, which was vetoed by England and France. Then Yugoslavia prompted by India from outside, took the initiative by introducing a motion under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, calling for a special emergency session of the General Assembly which was accepted by the Security Council on October 31, 1956, thus the Anglo-French attempt to paralyse the United Nations was defeated.

The Israeli attack on Egypt created much anger and concern in India. This development dissipated whatever sympathy and understanding the Indian political leadership and intelligentsia had for Israel. However, soon, India and Israel found themselves in the opposite camps, while India had found more friends in the Arab countries. India supported Canada's proposal for the creation of an United Nations Emergency Force:

Resolution 999 (ES-1), "authorised the Secretary General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the military forces and arms into the area....."<sup>22</sup>

Resolution 1000 (ES-1) However;

“established a United Nations Command for an Emergency International Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1) of November 2, 1956.”<sup>23</sup>

Twenty four member states offered the forces for the formation of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), but only ten of them were accepted by the United Nations, they were Sudan, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Indonesia, Columbia, Brazil, Canada, Yugoslavia and India. On November 7, 1956, the General Assembly approved the guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the UNEF. The Assembly also established an Advisory Committee composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, Norway, Pakistan and India and requested this Committee to undertake the developments of those aspects for the planning for the force and its operations not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which did not fall within the area of direct responsibility of the chief of the command.<sup>24</sup>

The UNEF stationed on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. The Secretary General in his report of January 24, 1957, to the General Assembly suggested that the force should have units stationed also on the Israeli side of the armistice demarcation line. In April 1957, the Canal was declared clear for navigation. After the Suez confrontation of 1956, the Arab countries looked upon Israel as an out post from which their freedom might be threatened at any time. The emphasis given by India to the common Arab cause out of this crisis was reflected in the unconditional support given by India to the Palestinian refugees. India had deep sympathy for the Palestinian refugees. It believed that the problem had arisen because a majority of United Nations members (India not included) had decided to partition the country against the wishes of large population. In November 1958, Indian delegation at the U.S. Special Political Committee represented by Akbar Ali Khan argued that the responsibility of the United Nations because they have not become homeless people, had it not been for a

political decision taken by United Nations.<sup>25</sup> By this action, the United Nations automatically took the responsibility for the future of those who were affected by the partition and the Palestinian refugees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency and Arab League held Palestinian refugees in limbo. It operated 27 refugee camps in West Bank and Gaza and another 32 camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It counts nearly four million Palestinians as refugees. India was and still so consistent in its help to Palestinian refugees.

On May 22, 1967, President Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and other ships carrying strategic goods to Israel. India supported this move of Egypt, in March 1957, India had already clarified that the Gulf of Aqaba and the strait of Tiran were the territorial waters of Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively and since the navigable channel in the strait of Tiran is inside the Egyptian territorial waters, Egypt has complete control over the same.

On June 6, 1967, Israel made a pre-emptive strike on Egypt, Jordan and Syria and in the course of a short six day war occupied the entire area from the Suez Canal to the Jordan river and the Syrian Golan Heights. After this attack the situation in West Asia wretched out of perspective by the torrential violence abruptly unleashed by Israel against the Arab countries. Before this war, many Arabs talked about the Israeli menace without really comprehending the full dimensions of the threat. The dramatic experience of June 1967 shocked the Arabs into a realisation of the full implications of the Israeli challenge. India squarely put the blame on Israel for escalating the situation which acquired the proportion of a full scale war and emphasised that our own national interests are bound up with peace and stability in West Asia.

The war ended with Israel occupying all Palestine including the West Bank of Jordan and Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula in Egypt and Golan Heights in Syria. After the end of the war the Indian diplomacy exerted its influence to get fruitful resolutions passed by the United Nations, insisted for the Israeli

withdrawal of forces from the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territories, and gave full support to the Gunnar Jarring U.N. mission to bring about a settlement of the problem.

During the 1967 war Israel also occupied East Jerusalem and came to control the Al-Aqsa Mosque located in it. India showed a sincere concern and sympathy of the Al-Aqsa Mosque issue. On July 3, 1967, India forwarded a resolution cosponsored by other non-aligned countries, calling upon Israel to withdraw its forces immediately behind the armistice line established by the armistice agreement. This resolution was called the most consistent with the principles of U.N. Charter and interests of all parties involved in the dispute. But Israel rejected the resolution and her Foreign Minister Abba Eban said... "this is the prescription for renewed hostilities."<sup>26</sup> Israel did not favour the resolution until the Arabs recognise their existence and come around a negotiation table to decide the area of demarcation lines anew. But the Arab states did not surrender and proposed that first things must come first. Until the Israelis withdrew from the occupied areas, the Arabs could not sit with a belligerent state.

The Indian government in conformity with its pro Arab policy condemned the Israeli aggression. Looking at the crisis from global perspective, Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi observed in Lok Sabha on June 6, 1967:

"The world today faces a disastrous war in West Asia...and the situation becomes graver by the hour. If not stopped, this war is likely to expand into a much wider one, drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war...it is our solemn duty as a government to help in restoration of peace in the present perilous situation."<sup>27</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi, while addressing the General Assembly on October 14, 1967, stressed the need for solving the problem by political means based on the principles of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the

area. But finally in consonance with Indian proposal, on November 22, 1967 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 (1967), which laid down the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in 1967 war and termination of acts of belligerency.

In December 1967, Mr. D.P. Dhar, a member of the Indian delegation to U.N. Special Committee reiterated the Indian position, which recognised the Palestinians as a people and not merely as refugees. India sided with the Arabs during the protracted Arab - Israeli war through 1968 and 1969 and denounced the Israeli attack on Beirut International Airport in December, 1969.

Speaking in the Lok Sabha, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, reflected the Indian mood, he said: "the continued occupation of Jerusalem by Israel in defiance of the resolution of the United Nations is a matter of great concern. The shocking incident of Al-Aqsa Mosque makes it imperative that the Security Council's resolutions on Jerusalem should be implemented without delay. In this context Israel can not be absolved of responsibility for this outrage."<sup>28</sup>

These aggressive expansionist designs and policies pursued by Israel created its counter reflections in Palestine that there originated various moves by different factions for the purpose of making a united front to counter the Israeli threat. In this frustrating situation, the Palestinian people responded by evolving various political parties and military organisations, whose sole objective was to fight the illegal existence (what they thought) of Israel. And at the same time to safeguard the Palestinian's rights especially the right to have their own independent state.

Yasser Arafat (Abu Amar) organised General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS) in Egypt just after the creation of Israel. This organisation had objective of arranging 'return to Palestine' as reflected by its name i.e., the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah). In the sixties two important events proved a turning point in Palestinian history- breaking off the Egyptian Syrian union and

triumph of the Algerian Revolution which inspired the Palestinians. They restored the course of do or die, in the liberation struggle.

At the 40<sup>th</sup> session of the Arab League in Cairo on September 1, 1963, it was decided to establish a 'unified Palestine entity' for the projection of Palestine problem, by the Palestinians themselves in the international field. The First Arab Summit Conference (January 1964-Cairo) endorsed this proposal, Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed with full Arab support and Ahmad Shuqairi was appointed as chairman of this organisation. The PLO held its first session on May 28, 1964, under the auspices of Arab League. The PLO has been the embodiment of the Palestinian national movement, It has been a broad national front, an umbrella organisation. Comprised of numerous organisations of the resistance movement, political parties, popular organisations and independent personalities and figures from all sectors of life.

Israel generally represented the Palestinian problem as a problem of displaced community, a group of refugees in need of resettlement. After the 1967 victory Mrs. Golda Meir (the then Prime Minister of Israel) even went to the extent of asking "where they are? looked around and remarked, they have been settled among their own brothers."<sup>29</sup> India strongly contested this position. Later on the Indian President V.V. Giri in the Parliament address, stated : "the Palestinian problem that created tension in West Asia is not dead past, neither they have lost in history but are a living sore on the international humanity."<sup>30</sup> India considered the Israeli attack in anticipation as totally unjustified and essentially aimed at gaining a new *status quo* and balance of power in the region. India considered the Israeli aggression as against International Law, practice and morality.

India defended that the natives of Palestine were made refugees, scattered in various Arab countries and now they are waiting for their return and settlement



in their homeland. In 1969, a PLO delegation visited India at the invitation of the Indian Association for Afro - Asian solidarity. During the visit the delegation called on the Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh and requested permission to open an office in India.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria for the first time took the initiative of attacking Israel, this was the fourth war between the Arabs and Israel since the inception of Israel in 1948. It was a powerful attack launched by the Egypt across the Suez Canal and equally strong attack came from the North of Israel on Golan Heights. There had been conflicting claims of breaking off the ceasefire lines by both the Arab states and Israel. However, the U.N. truce observers on the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights reported that ceasefire lines in both areas were initially crossed by the Egyptian and Syrian troops who moved into the Israeli occupied areas. On October 22, 1973, guns fell silent on a Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) for ceasefire, both the warring parties accepted the ceasefire resolution, yet respected little of its provisions. On October 24, 1973, the Security Council created UNEF II, the deployment of 7000 men from twelve countries brought the war to an end. The fighting was described as the 'most bloody fighting since the commencement of the Second World War', marked by great tank battles and heavy losses of men and material on both sides.

On October 8, 1973, Mrs. Gandhi, while reiterating India's total sympathy with the Arab world, gave two reasons for Indian attitude. Firstly, India's relations with the Arab countries required India to stand by their side in the time of their travail and secondly, Israel's refusal to vacate the Arab lands occupied in 1967 war and its refusal to honour U.N. resolutions. India supported the Arabs and felt that their action could not be termed as aggression, as Israel had provoked the war by not adopting a more flexible attitude in negotiating peaceful settlement. Indian government's policy was contained in a statement on the eruption of fighting which declared that the cause of tension in the area is Israeli

aggression and refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed forces. Justifying the Arab initiative in starting the war India's permanent representative in the U.N. Samar Sen remarked : "what Egypt and Syria are doing is nothing more than upholding the provisions of the Charter in asserting their right to self-defense and to territorial integrity."<sup>31</sup> While conceding Israeli right to exist as a sovereign state, he, on October 21, 1973, demanded immediate vacation of Arab territories and a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people. Declaring India's sympathy with the Arabs, the Government of India further stated that Arabs' cause is based on justice, and suggested immediate implementation by Israel of United Nations Resolution 242 (1967) for the peaceful solution of the problem.<sup>32</sup>

Immediately after the war, President Anwar Sadat, renewed diplomatic relations with the United States and close contacts were established with the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, an Egyptian - Israeli disengagement agreement was signed in January 1974. the same year in 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution recognising the rights of the Palestinian Arabs including those in Israel, to nationhood.

However the October war was a turning point in the history of the Arab nations crossing the Canal and capturing Bar-lev line was regarded a miracle. Although the occupied territories had not been captured and the war objective remained unaccomplished, but Arab national pride was restored to some extent. The Arab states, no doubt at the time fanatically, were seeking to achieve by military means what they have failed to achieve by diplomacy and through peaceful means: the recovery of their occupied lands, warranted by the 242 (1967) Resolution.

Meanwhile, there has been a change in European and American attitude, the 1973 war brought a fundamental shift in the Middle East balance of power. Because the 1973, oil embargo was like a blow to the economy of these

countries, OPEC used oil to pressurise the United States not to aid Israel. President Nixon received a warning that a major petroleum supply crisis would occur if the U.S. government should increase military aid to Israel. Subsequent price hike and American, European dependence on Arab oil persuaded these countries for a policy change. It was not until 1974 that a proposal for an Israeli withdrawal from captured Syrian territory gave the oil producers a justification for suspending the oil embargo.

India believed that self defense was the most crucial element for every sovereign state. Therefore, the Arab states acted within their right to self defense to terminate the aggression of the aggressor. Israel's persistent refusal to vacate the occupied Arab lands and her violation of the rights of inhabitants was the logical cause for tension and conflict in the area. The U.N. Secretary General in his report expressed identical views, he stated that the Palestine problem could escalate the tension and crisis to a larger scale. Therefore, the international community owned its responsibility, as proposed by India, to take resolute measures which could arrest the tragic march of events that threatened the peace of the region and the world at large.<sup>33</sup> With these views in mind India sought to help the PLO to gain regional and international acceptance. Following the Algiers Declaration of March 1974, India co-sponsored a draft resolution in the U.N. General Assembly calling for the PLO's participation in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the Palestine question. India argued that the resolution sought to invite PLO to participate in our deliberations because that organisation represents the people of Palestine. Thus, the sort of moral boosting given by India in her personal capacity and through the NAM provided considerable political and diplomatic momentum to PLO in the region, which was reflected in the Rabat Arab Summit of October 1974.

On October 28, 1974, the seventh Arab Summit was held in Rabat. This Summit was very significant because it passed a resolution which formally

recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. PLO had emerged as a significant factor in the region under the leadership of Mr. Yasser Arafat. Arafat expressed "deep gratitude" and appreciation for the solid support of the Indian delegation in the General Assembly discussions on the Palestine issue. The PLO leader Mr. Arafat was invited to address the U.N. General Assembly on November 13, 1974, in his address he stressed the PLO's willingness and priority for a peaceful solution of the Palestine issue. He reminded the world body, "today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."<sup>34</sup>

India introduced another draft resolution, on November 21, 1974, as a follow up to the success and response to her efforts at the U.N. in favour of the Palestinian cause. This resolution also reaffirmed the inalienable rights of Palestinian people to self-determination without external interference and also stood for Palestinian national independence and sovereignty.

On January 10, 1975, India accorded diplomatic recognition to PLO, and allowed it to open its office in New Delhi. This was really a grand strategic move meant to ensure and consolidate PLO's diplomatic recognition among the comity of nations. India was the first non-Arab country to make such a move. Though diplomatic recognition was accorded to PLO India still continue arguing for the cause of the Palestinian people and the legitimate demands of the PLO at the U.N. and its related bodies.

After acquiring an observer status in the U.N. in 1974, the PLO's diplomatic triumph proceeded uninterrupted, in 1975, it became a member of the NAM, and in 1976, in the Group of 77.

However, in the latter part of 1970's following the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in 1977, there was wide apprehension that the Government of India would revise India's traditional policy on Palestine and PLO, mainly because of the presence of

Mr. A.B. Vajpayee, a former Jan Sangh leader in the ministry of Morarji Desai, but soon after assuming charge in the office of the External Affairs, he reaffirmed India's support to the Arabs in general and with Palestinians in particular. He declared that the new government shall not only continue to seek to maintain old links with entire Arab world, but would further strengthen India's economic co-operation with them. He assured the Arabs that India would continue to lend her full support for a just settlement of the West Asian problem based on the U.N. Resolutions which require the vacation of occupied territory. Addressing the plenary session of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of non-aligned countries at New Delhi on April 7, 1977, he demanded that, "Israel must vacate the occupied Arab territories, and recognise the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people."<sup>35</sup> During this period there emerged the question of the regularisation of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in August 1977. The Janata government responded very sharply to the issue. The ministry of External Affairs issued an official release in which it said : "India was always against the acquisition of territory by any country by use of force.... India therefore, strongly deplores the action taken to regularise existing Israeli settlements in the occupied areas and to authorise new ones."<sup>36</sup>

Reacting on Camp David accord, which was signed on September, 17, 1978, between Egypt and Israel with the mediation of President Carter of United States, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. A. B. Vajpayee said at a press conference that India did not welcome the Camp David accord due to some reasons, firstly, Palestine was the key issue and there could be no lasting peace until the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people were restored. Secondly, the PLO has not been recognised by Egypt and Israel as the representative body of Palestinians. Thirdly, the Camp David accord was silent on the status of Jerusalem.<sup>37</sup>

Detailing India's position on the Camp David accord at the U.N. on November 28, 1979, Indian representative B. C. Mishra said that India did not dispute the sovereign rights of any state to enter into treaties and agreements on bilateral matters. However, such agreements could not presume to settle matters affecting others who are not contracting parties. India could not agree that any argument to which PLO was not a party should seek to impose on the Palestinian people a predetermined settlement.<sup>38</sup>

Mrs. Indira Gandhi with her return to power accelerated the diplomatic status to the PLO by upgrading its office to that of an embassy endorsed with all diplomatic immunities and privileges. She invited the PLO leader Mr. Yasser Arafat to pay an official visit, as a follow up to this Mr. Arafat paid a three day visit to India from March 28-30, 1980.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, and destructed PLO's political base in Lebanon, disturbing the political situation in West Asia. India's reaction to this was sharp and harsh. On July 25, 1982, Mrs. Gandhi made a statement in Lok Sabha condemning the Israeli attack on Lebanon and maintained that "Israeli attempts to wipe out the Palestinian movement can not succeed in the long run."<sup>39</sup> Being the President of NAM India played a greater role in the 7<sup>th</sup> NAM Summit held in New Delhi in March 1983, it put the Palestinian issue at the fore front of the Summit, it condemned the Israeli attempt to quell legitimate opposition by the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Summit also resolved to set up a NAM Committee on Palestine in order to monitor closely the developments in relation to the Palestine issue and initiated 'some action' in face of rapidly deteriorating situation in the West Asia.

The Committee was formed and the first meeting of the Committee was held at New Delhi in October 1983, it urged that a process of negotiations should be launched as early as possible. The Committee also discussed the question of

securing a separate seat for the Palestinian Arab state in the U.N. to be occupied temporarily by the PLO with the status of an observer.

By this time there emerged a factional crisis within the PLO. The Lebanese Arab Shia Resistance Movement strengthened the cause of those PLO factions who were committed to armed struggle against Israel, called the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) an option which had lost relevance or priority after the Israeli onslaught on the Palestinian stronghold in Lebanon in June 1982, the substantial set of gains for the Israelis after the Lebanon war was the dispersal of Palestinian guerrillas in the Arab world, the weakening of the Palestinian resistance on the West Bank and the split in the PLO, with Arafat emerging as much more confident and moderate than before committed to negotiated settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One outcome of these developments was the Mubarak-Husseini-Arafat peace initiative of March 1985 envisaging talks between the Israelis and a composite Jordanian-Palestinian team, with Americans mediating actively. In April 1985, a meeting of NAM Committee was held in New Delhi, the Committee in turn recommended the convening of an international conference under the aegis of the United Nations in order to obtain a comprehensive and durable peace in West Asia.

As Rajiv Gandhi's coming to power after the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1984, India's activity on the international scene had been increased by leaps and bounds. There was a change in the foreign policy of India and this change had been applied in West Asia too. India gave permission to the Israeli Davis Cup team to play in Delhi, but the Arabs reacted very strongly over it. Then the Indian government pulled out its decision and the match had been cancelled.

On December 8, 1987, eight Palestinians were wounded and four killed, when their truck was rammed by a vehicle driven by an Israeli. On December

17, the rebellion broke out, and it changed itself into a movement called 'Intifada.' Very soon it spread into other areas too. Israel used various methods to crush the movement, killed hundreds of Palestinian youths who were armed only with sticks and stones. But it proved counter productive because Israel came under severe criticism for committing violence and violation of Human rights provided under the provisions of Geneva Convention, 1949. the U.N. political Ad-Hoc Committee for the Palestinian refugees and then the Committee for the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people, appointed by the General Assembly provided reports about the violence and suppression of the natives of the occupied areas.

Intifada, was a civil resistance movement which represented disobedience to the occupying authority, its rules and regulations. It was represented by the younger generation of the Palestinian people in the territories and areas under the occupation of Israel. It posed a direct challenge to Israel.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi condemned the Israeli atrocities inflicted on innocent and unarmed population of the occupied territories by Israelis. He reiterated unequivocal support of the government and the people of India. In order to free the Palestinians from the Israeli bondage, the Government of India thought it important to make concerted action and efforts through the forums of Non-alignment, the United Nations, and other organisations like SAARC, ASEAN, and EEC to bring pressure upon the Israeli government to settle the Palestinian issue. As being the President of the party he informed the PLO Ambassador that the Palestinian cause and collective relief assistance for innocent victims, as a token of popular support and solidarity with the popular movement of the Palestinian people. After this various peace initiatives were worked out but the first major step towards peace was the Strasbourg meeting of September 13, 1988, President Yasser Arafat met a socialist group of European Parliament, discussed with them



the Palestinian problem and then moved step-by-step into his policy towards Israel.

In November 1988, the Palestinian Parliament in exile, the Palestinian National Council, adopted a series of unpredictable historic resolutions in Algeria. For the first time Palestine indicated its acceptance of the principle of partition of their homeland- Palestine. They signaled their willingness to settle for less than what was promised to them in the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947- for the mandated Palestine.

The PLO's acceptance of a two state solution based on the United Nations Resolutions and their willingness to settle for less than what was promised to them. On this background Yasser Arafat in 1988, had a crucial meeting with some Americans. And same year in a special session of the U.N. General Assembly held at Geneva, the chairman accepted Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as a basis for a peaceful solution, recognised the existence of Israel as by right in return for Israeli acceptance and recognition of a Palestine state, comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem as its capital. He formally disassociated PLO from all acts of terrorism.

India appreciated this move of Palestine and the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. It accorded recognition to the state of Palestine and Arafat had been conferred with the 1988 Jawaharlal Nehru award for international understanding. Announcing this in September 1989, the Ministry for External Affairs said :

“India has always been sympathetic to the cause of Palestinian people and had been steadfast in its support to Yasser Arafat and the people of Palestine. In honouring Yasser Arafat in the name of Jawaharlal Nehru, we underline our commitment to support the rights of every people to freedom, justice and peace.”<sup>40</sup>

In October 1990, 22 Palestinians were gunned down by the Israeli military authorities in Harm-al-Sharif, it created an international outrage, the Palestinian cause got wide support through out the world. The non-aligned members introduced a resolution deploring the killings and requested the Security Council to sent its own mission in Jerusalem to investigate the shootings, and come up with recommendations on how to protect the Palestinians living under the Israeli military occupation. After long deliberations Resolution 672 (s-1990) was passed, calling for the deputation of a representative from the United Nations Secretary General, to make investigations and report to the Assembly. However, Israel rejected the resolution and made another inhumane act, i.e., deportation of the Palestinians from their homes to Lebanon and to 'no man's land.' This act of Israel compelled the U.N. Security Council to adopt another Resolution 681 (s-90) on December 21, 1990. This resolution criticised Israel's inhumane crimes against the Palestinians. This resolution was also supported by U.S.A. because U.S.A. was now keen to avoid the rupture in the Arab coalition, it had assembled against Iraq for its invasion over Kuwait. The America's peace making strategy in West Asia gave birth to a convergence of interests of PLO and Israel. The disintegration of Soviet Union and the emergence of New World Order, generated potential for the three main players- U.S.A., PLO and Israel- to pursue and compensate the peace efforts, to start moving in the same direction.

In the Gulf war the United States achieved a decisive victory, securing in the process its vital interests in the region. Saddam Hussein ensured that the tension throughout West Asia would not even begin to be defused until the issue of Palestinian homeland was at last addressed. But Bush administration and the United Nations refused to link the two, however, the reality was that the Gulf crisis could not end until the Arab-Israeli crisis has resolved. A new phase of negotiations came up after the March 6, 1991, declaration of U.S. President George Bush concerning the revival of peace efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in West Asia. The PLO cautiously welcomed the call that opened the

road to the Madrid talks of October 30, 1991, once the round of bilateral talks was resumed between Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and the Israeli delegations, it was agreed that the Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) would form the basis for the ongoing negotiations. After the first round of talks, the venue was shifted to Washington D.C. to hold the rest of Madrid negotiations. A long spell of negotiations continued in Washington but nothing tangible was achieved. But after these talks there was a wider talk between Israel and PLO coming closer and feeling spread that an amenable peace agreement was imminent. In this context India was also enthusiastic to play her own role in the West Asian Peace Process, on the other hand Israel was using all its official sources to woo India for maintaining relations with her. Simultaneously, there were higher level contacts between Indian and Israeli officials in the U.N. and elsewhere.

In this situation the Indian problem was simplified further when Yasser Arafat gave the signals for India's up gradation of diplomatic ties with Israel. Arafat made the observation that..... "exchange of ambassadors and recognition are acts of sovereignty in which I can not interfere."<sup>41</sup> He further commented that, 'India's help in the peace process in West Asia is needed as it is the country with second largest Islamic population after Indonesia and had with the Arabs relations of neighbourhood and shared traditions.' By the time, in tune with the already initiated policy shift, India decided to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. And a long lasting controversy came to an end. The declaration of the Government of India, forging diplomatic relations with the state of Israel on January 29, 1992, was a step sought by Israel for the last four decades.

Thus, the changes in the Arab attitude to the Jewish state could be seen as a major factor deciding India's policy reorientation towards Israel. A window of opportunity to pursue the possibilities of peace in the West Asian region was opened, and a new era of peace appeared on the West Asian political horizon.

However, after the Madrid talks there was a wider talk of Israel and PLO coming closer, the atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation created between Israel and the Arab world. This process assumed a shape and direction by the Oslo Accord signed on September 13, 1993, between Israel and PLO in the full presence of U.S. Israel and PLO signed agreements that led to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and most cities and towns of West Bank by early 1996. As the Israeli's withdrew, the Palestinians became the governing authorities in these areas. While a third area of West Bank and Gaza Strip remained under total Israeli control. Israel also recognised the PLO as the representative of Palestinian people. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a declaration that marked the end of hostilities that had technically existed between them since 1948.

But all these declarations and agreements were a strategy for Israel that from Yitzhak Rabin's point of view the purpose of the accord was to unburden Israel from the role of direct occupation, under its conditions the Palestinian liberation is subject to Israel's mercy. It is still upto Israel to set the limits as to how far the Palestinian liberation may go. Israel could not stop itself for doing injustices and inhumane activities with Palestinians. The atrocities are still going on and as retaliation. There is no peace in West Asia. Every day the Palestinians are killed by Israeli military attacks making the situation worst.

In April 2002, the Israeli troops exchanged fire with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's guards outside his office in Ramallah, troops have surrounded Arafat's office building, where Arafat was a virtual prisoner. Arafat's envoy arrived in India carrying a personal letter from Arafat for Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Arafat had sought India's intervention in diffusing the ongoing West Asian crisis.<sup>42</sup> India reiterated its support to Palestinian leader and warned of 'serious negative consequences' if his movement or he was forcibly removed. In a statement by External Affairs ministry strongly urged Israel that no move for Arafat's forcible removal be even contemplated.<sup>43</sup> Later India has made it clear

that its ties with Palestine were on a stand alone basis, its relations with Israel do not have a bearing on its age old ties with Palestine or the Arab world. India has expressed grave concern at the on going violence in the West Asia and has said that Israel - Palestine conflict is essentially political in nature and can not be resolved by force.

On the Death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat India sent a high level delegation to attend Arafat's state funeral in Cairo, External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh headed the delegation, with a letter from Congress President Mrs. Sonia Gandhi to Arafat's wife Suha. Both the houses of Indian Parliament paid glowing tribute to the PLO leader.

India's relationship with West Asian countries have been subject to certain ideological anti-colonial opposition to military blocs and solidarity with Afro-Asian nations as well as to deep historical, economic and political bonds. Because of India's cultural, political and economic stakes in the region. West Asia occupies a position of major importance for India's total foreign policy. Muslim population have shown deep concern in West Asian developments because of the religious affinity. Domestic compulsions as well as difficult relations with Pakistan, were the factors which prompted Nehru to pay special attention to develop friendly relations with West Asia.

In the U.N., India has consistently voted to condemn Israeli military actions to suppress Arabs. Following the six day war, India has been a consistent and vocal supporter of Arab demands for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the conquered territories. The same implacable opposition was evidenced in the Security Council debates, during the Yom Kippur war, when as a member of the Council, India led the attack of the so called the non-aligned countries against Israel. Mrs. Gandhi set the Indian line in these debates when shortly after the Egyptian Syrian attack she laid the cause of the war the 'Israeli intransigence' and declared that India's sympathies were with the Arabs. At the various

conferences of the non-aligned countries that were held in different countries and in different times India supported resolutions calling for the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. India has also played host to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which has been allowed to open an office in New Delhi and that was changed to an embassy of the state of Palestine in 1988.

On the question of the Palestinian refugees, India has consistently maintained that the only permanent and just solution was the return of the refugees to their homes in what is now Israel. When the United Nations created U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to take care of the immediate and urgent needs of the displaced Palestinians on a temporary basis, India gave its firm support to it. Indian delegates expressed their firm support and appreciation of the work done by the UNRWA. India perceived the Suez war of 1956 as a desperate, last ditch attempt by Western colonialism to resurrect itself, although India was appreciative of American and Russian responses during the war.

Nehru seriously dealt with the Palestine problem and warned that it would give rise to a great deal of tension and trouble in West Asia. Nehru saw the partition of Palestine full of conflict and dissention. He suggested that a federal state with autonomy for the other regions would have been the better and lasting solution. For him it was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution, any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. Though India's proposal was included in the Palestine Committee, it did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. When partition of Palestine became inevitable, it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best, but it was too late to realise.

Partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in the West Asia, which at present is extremely explosive with the possibility of a great deal of trouble in the future, as the U.S. attitude is changing there is a possibility of some solution to the problem. If Nehru's plan would have been accepted, the

problem perhaps might have been resolved much before. He expressed sympathy for the Jews when they were being persecuted and hounded out of various countries of Europe and acknowledged their considerable contribution to the country since they came to Palestine. However, he believed Palestine essentially to be an Arab country and regarded it basically a national struggle for the independence of the Arabs. It was not an Arab-Jew problem or a religious problem but a struggle for independence. It was quite understandable that the Arab people would resist any attempt to deprive them of their country, any people would do so.

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## *Chapter – V*

### *Conclusion*

*(Present Explosive Situation in the Region Linking  
with the Nehru's Concern on the Issue)*

## **Chapter-V**

### **Conclusion**

#### **[Present Explosive Situation in the Region linking with the Nehru's Concern on the Issue]**

Foreign policy is a dynamic process by which states try to adjust themselves to the changing pace of international realities and domestic demands. All the countries in the world try to adopt successful foreign policies. But it is noted that all foreign policies can never be successful at all times, nor could they be a failure throughout. This makes international politics a complex phenomenon and foreign policy decision making a complex task.

Jawaharlal Nehru the first Prime Minister of India also known as the architect of India's foreign policy, first thought India as a world power and tried to establish foreign contacts. After World War I he had joined the Indian National Congress. The situation in India and the British policies convinced him that the only way of looking at Indian problems was to see them in world setting. In 1927, he became the interpreter and formulator of Indian world outlook, he was considered the Indian representative for the Brussels Conference of Oppressed Nationalities which had held in Brussels in 1927, there he was determined to fight the foreign domination of India and other countries too. He placed the case of India before the world and tried to mobilise international public opinion to this end. Nehru through the Indian National Congress fought for the independence of India and other countries too. He compared the Palestinian colonialism with the Indian British colonialism. Nehru was undoubtedly the builder of modern India. While eager to bring about changes in the life of the Indians and concentrating mostly on domestic problems that the other countries were facing. When India got independence on August 15, 1947, Nehru became the first Prime Minister of

India. At the time of Indian independence the world situation was becoming very fragile, with the end of the Second World War in 1945, the world was torn into two parts, and there were two super powers standing on each part of the world, making countries aligned with either of them. India was entirely devastated by the British colonialism, its economy was totally damaged and nothing was left. With this situation the burden of forming a foreign policy for the newly independent India fell on the shoulders of Nehru. The very first thing Nehru did, he chose not to align with either of the power blocs, because in such a state of international affairs India had neither friends nor foes. India had to be extra careful in formulating her foreign policy, which would have to meet both domestic and international requirements. Nehru declared a policy of socialism at home for securing economic stability and industrial progress and of non-alignment, of friendship with all, malice towards none, of unintended support to a colonial country's freedom fight against racial discrimination to secure world cooperation abroad. The core of India's foreign policy since independence has been the non-alignment with major power blocs. The policy of non-alignment therefore, arose out of India's traditions and experience as well as practical considerations.

Nehru opposed the blocs because infact the blocs invited confrontations between the countries of the world. Nehru wanted India to retain her freedom of action so that she could deal with each new issue on its own merits. He believed that this was the best way to help maintain world peace and to protect India's own interests. It was this robust faith in the validity of non-alignment that Nehru dominated the Belgrade Conference and succeeded in injecting truly non-align elements into the Conference, which would otherwise have been merely an anti-colonialist Afro-Asian meet.

In the Cold War times when both the blocs were forming the military pacts like NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and Warsaw pact and attracting the countries

to become members of these military pacts, India decided to get out of this military pact drama and joined neither of the military pacts. Nehru advocated the cause of disarmament and believed that it would create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and cooperation. There have been negotiations, deliberations and discussions on disarmament but little progress has been achieved. India put forward that disarmament was only a step towards a peaceful world. It has argued that the purpose of armament was fourfold: security of the country; expansion for the acquisition of colonies; the question of markets through economic penetration; and to assert themselves into ideological conflict.

India as being a peace loving country has age old relations with the Arab world. Nehru once said that:

*“India’s relations with the West Asian region went back to the dawn of history and were in fact more ancient than her ties with other parts of Asia. These relations were largely of cultural, commercial and religious character. Common European domination had snapped these relations and ties of friendship, and therefore he urged that India should renew these ancient relations and old bonds of friendship.”<sup>1</sup>*

Much before its independence and being involved with her own problems of freedom movement India bitterly opposed the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as the betrayal of Arabs by the British. Though India had sympathy with the Jews but not at the cost of Arabs. When Britain got mandate over Palestine India criticised it heavily. Nehru believed Palestine essentially an Arab country and regarded the Arab struggle as a national struggle. Despite his European education and experience Nehru was not willing to endorse Zionist aspirations in Palestine.

In 1947, when India got independence, it therefore, felt emotionally and morally committed to the national aspirations of Arab people to gain their rightful place in the comity of nations. India’s political economic and above all security

interests, all these began to shape the broad outline of India's policy towards the West Asian region. History and contemporary international life served to bring into sharp focus the relevance of Arab world to India. Closely connected with India's security, was the question of international communication lines which lie across the Arab world. In ancient and medieval times Indian goods were carried to Europe by sea and land routes passing through the Suez Canal. In 1869, when Suez Canal was reopened for international traffic, the West Asian route was resumed. The expansion of the Indo-Arab trade was of course a two way affair and was immensely beneficial to the developing economies on both sides. After the Second World War West Asia became more important for the super powers too, due to its immense strategic, economic and political values. The entire region soon became the attraction of super power rivalry. Britain had played the most important role, for the sake of her interests it placed Jews in Palestine and got mandate over it from the League of Nations. The Arabs who were living in Palestine for centuries could not tolerate the Jewish inflow in their native land they saw their land being slipped from their grasp. Fighting broke out between Jews and Arabs. The British as being opportunist decided to divide Palestine in two states and composed a partition plan. They tried very hard to implement the partition plan but the Arabs never cooperated them and the matter went out of their hands.

Then the matter of Palestine was referred to the United Nations, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) contained two partition proposals, one majority and the other minority. The majority proposal proposed that Palestine should be divided into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem, while the minority proposal contained an independent federal state of Palestine. India favoured the minority proposal of forming a federal state of Palestine, with Jewish and Palestinian units. India pleaded that the partition of Palestine would not lead to any lasting solution, it considered partition as impracticable, unworkable and anti-Arab. India along with the Afro-Asian states

voted against the adoption of the partition resolution in the General Assembly. India's support with the Arab cause was based on the moral and practical considerations. With the bitter experience of partition India could not support the idea of imposition of outsiders on Arab land leading to the division of Palestine. But India's vote could not find favour and Palestine was divided according to the majority proposal. The creation of Israel on May 14, 1948 led to the first Arab Israeli war, as a result of which Israel with U.S. backing captured larger area than was proposed by the U.N. resolution. The eviction of Palestinians from their home land created huge refugee problem. India again denounced the U.N. partition move and believed that U.N. is responsible for the Palestinian refugee problem. India having deep sympathy with the Palestinian refugees, consistently supported Arab demand for their rehabilitation. Despite the strong adherence to Palestinian cause, India could not abrogate the fact of Israel's existence as a state, accordingly India had to give her recognition on September 17, 1950, though it prolonged the process of recognition. But no diplomatic relations were established with her.

In the 1950s India's foreign policy became oriented to practical considerations due to her awareness of security requirements. In a world torn by Cold War between the two power blocs and formation of military pacts, India encountered a two fold challenge to its interests in the West Asian region. The U.S. drive to bring about a military grouping of the West Asian countries to safeguard its oil interests and Pakistan's designs to forge a Pan-Islamic alliance of Arab and other West Asian countries to isolate India from a region so vital for its security and economic well being. India endeavoured to counteract this ominous development by projecting the concept of non-alignment in the region. In the early years the non-alignment did not make much of an impact on the Arab states, even so, Nehru clearly saw the relevance of non-alignment not only for India but for other newly independent states as well. Speaking before the Constituent Assembly in December 1947, he observed:



*"I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justified and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power, but a large number of smaller nations which today are rather helpless will probably look to India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters."*<sup>2</sup>

And after some time the principle of non-alignment made considerable headway in the Arab world. India promoted cooperation with the Arab states through the treaties of friendship as well as trade and cultural agreements.

The collaboration of India and Egypt on various international forums drew them closer. The withdrawal of joint American British aid for the Aswan Dam provoked Nasser for the nationalisation of Suez Canal. The nationalisation of Suez Canal by Nasser and then the tripartite aggression of Egypt in 1956, badly shocked Nehru, he rather greeted Nasser's move as a signal of the weakening of the European powers' domination over West Asia. In accordance with her policy of peaceful co-existence, India made concerted efforts to counsel moderation on all sides and to help resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of Egypt and Canal users. At the London Conference the Indian representative sought to evolve a peaceful solution which would safeguard the legitimate interests of the Canal users without detracting from the sovereign rights of Egypt. But the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion evoked a sharp reaction in India. India played a conciliatory and constructive role at the U.N. and participated in the formation of UNEF. The Suez crisis ended with the vacationing of invading forces and stationing of UNEF on the Egyptian territory in Gaza. The Suez crisis had brought in a major impact on India's policy perspectives in West Asia. Though it did not make any direct implication on India's Palestine policy, it had really hardened India's attitude towards Israel. After this crisis Indian attitude towards Israel became bold, negative and hard.

Though the 1956 war had ended but there were still some border skirmishes on both Arab and Israeli sides. In late 1966 and early 1967 incidents involving the Syrian-Israeli demilitarised zone, stepped up Palestine Arab commando activities, and Israeli military retaliations increased Arab-Israeli tensions. Israel's occupation of large parts of Egypt, Syria and Jordan containing more than a million Arabs created problem for Arabs. Israeli feelings of superiority and the Arabs' sense of humiliation were stimulated, and Israel developed an interest in retaining portions of the occupied territories, while Egypt, Syria and Jordan now held irredentist claims to those same lands. On June 6, 1967, the third time Israel invaded Arab lands and captured a large part of it in the course of a short six day war. This war aggravated the refugee problem by causing more than 200,000 Palestinians to flee the West Bank of Jordan, more than 100,000 Syrians and Palestinians to leave the Golan Heights, and over 300,000 Egyptians to evacuate Sinai and the Suez Canal West Bank areas. The U.N. seemed too dazed to respond immediately to this new war situation, the Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 233 (1967) in the evening of June 6, 1967, and called upon the governments concerned to take step for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of all military activities in the area. The Indian delegation welcomed the decision of the Council and preferred a resolution that linked the ceasefire with a withdrawal of armed forces to the positions held prior to the out break of hostilities. The Indian suggestion was welcomed by the U.N. and the Security Council passed Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, this resolution called for the Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the conflict. India's response to these developments was in tune with the positions she had taken earlier. In the post 1967 war, two crucial issues dominated the political scene of West Asia: 1) the resolution of legitimate rights of the Palestinians that have provoked four rounds of Arab Israeli wars hitherto; 2) withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories. India tirelessly supported Arabs at the diplomatic, political and public

levels on both these issues. India stressed the need for lasting peace and withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to the position held before the commencement of hostilities in June 1967. India made it clear that it was not against the people of Israel, but India always opposed the concept of waging war. Mrs. Gandhi when spoke in the General Assembly stressed the need for solving the problem by 'political means' based on the principle of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the West Asian region.

While most Arab states accepted the Security Council Resolution 242, Israel was unhappy with the resolution, it refused to withdraw from the occupied areas. In the wake of this on October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria very first time attacked Israel to get back the territories they have lost in June 1967. In this war the U.N. was very active in effecting a ceasefire. The Security Council passed Resolution 338 (1973), which called for the immediate implementation of Resolution 242 (1967). For a just and permanent peace in West Asia. In this war India supported the Arab cause as she felt that their action could not be termed as aggression as Israel had provoked the war by not adopting more flexible attitude in negotiating peace settlement. It declared that the cause of tension in the area is Israeli aggression and its refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed forces. Justifying the Arab cause in the U.N. The Indian representative asserted that Egypt and Syria were securing their right of self defense and territorial integrity. Commenting on the Security Council draft resolution on West Asia on October 21, 1973, he demanded that first the Arab territories must be vacated, second Israel had no right to exist as a sovereign state, and third a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people.

In the 1973 war the action taken by the Arab oil producing states was very strong, the Arab states decided to generate production cutbacks and selective embargoes on exports to those states which were hostile to the Arabs and supporting Israel on Arab cause, it decided to increase oil prices several fold. The

Arab states agreed to end the embargo on the ground that the countries hostile to the Arabs would shift their policies towards Arabs. The oil embargo created a dynamic change in the international political system. OPEC countries emerged as a key supplier. The price hike imposed several pressures on India's foreign exchange too. Because the OPEC countries were the biggest supplier of oil to India, but India managed this crisis and fully supported the OPEC demands.

India became the first non-Arab country to give full recognition to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1974. India took bold steps in getting PLO observer status in the United Nations and permitted them to open their office in New Delhi to the status of an embassy. India declared that Israel was an aggressor and that it would have to vacate every inch of the occupied land and PLO should not be kept out of any negotiation. In relation to the Camp David Accord of 1978 between Egypt and Israel under the U.S. auspices India observed that U.S. had felt short off a comprehensive solution of the West Asian crisis. It called upon the super powers to defuse the existing situation by pressurising Israel in accordance with the U.N. resolutions, because without the creation of Palestine state no lasting peace can be secured in the region.

The emergence of PLO further alienated India from Israel, India recognised the PLO as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. Even the Janata government in 1977-79 found it prudent to continue Nehru's West Asia policy. Mrs. Gandhi granted full diplomatic relations to the PLO mission in New Delhi, while Israeli consulate in Bombay languished. In 1980, when Iraq struck Iran and brought another disturbance to the region. India stressed the need for a NAM initiative to find a solution to the West Asian problem, because there was a danger that the problem might sweep across the other parts of the world. With the death of Mrs. Gandhi in October 1984, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. He signaled a fresh Indian approach towards Israel. But the Arab countries strongly reacted over the Indian move. Despite his best intentions

and efforts, Rajiv Gandhi was unable to effect a complete reversal in his policy. The 1987, Intifada further curtailed his freedom of action. The Government of India expressed sorrow for suppression and inhumane crimes against unarmed Arab civilians by Israelis. Rajiv Gandhi condemned the Israeli atrocities inflicted on innocent and unarmed population of the occupied territories. He reiterated unequivocal support of the government and the people of India, in order to free the Palestinians from the Israeli bondage, the Government of India thought it important to make concerted action and efforts through the forums of non-alignment, the United Nations and the organisations like SAARC, ASEAN and EEC to bring pressure upon Israel to settle the Palestinian issue. The Harm-al-Sharif killings of 22 Palestinians by Israeli military in October 1990 created an international outrage. The Palestinian cause got world wide support. India alongwith other non-aligned countries compelled the U.N. to pass resolutions to protect the Palestinians living under the Israeli military occupation.

The conflict between Israel and the Arab states over the Palestinian question went uninterrupted through out the Cold War period. The strategic position of the West Asian region compelled the super powers to enter the scene with peculiar political positions and objective interests. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to decades old Cold War and bloc politics. This guaranteed the emergence of U.S. as the only surviving and unchallenged super power in world politics. India's decision making structure came under intense U.S. influence, it became evident from India's policy shift in the PLO-Israel sector.

In the emerging world order the United States did not perceive its freedom to pursue its own policy goals restricted in any way. This became sure during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and then American action to free Kuwait from the grip of Iraq in 1990-91. In this war the United States succeeded in getting the endorsement of the United Nations' Security Council and the support of more than thirty countries that included several Arab countries too. With the end of Cold

War there were many changes in the West Asian region, as a result the perceptions and the postures of the states of the region also changed. It was said that the Gulf War has created circumstances which created an unprecedented window of opportunity to pursue the possibilities of peace between Israel and her neighbours. It was this new environment which led to the convening of the Madrid Conference of October 1991, with the consent and participation of Israel, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. This Conference got concrete shape and direction which led towards the Oslo Accord signed on September 13, 1993. The United States concedes that it is not possible to intervene in all crises in the world, but it also proudly declared that no problem could be solved without its assistance and the countries wanting to assist in international intervention on humanitarian concerns could not do things on their own. This attitude of U.S. was reflected during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and the subsequent military operations in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq etc.

Iraq and Iran gave moral support to the Palestinian demand for vacation of Israeli occupied Palestinian areas and creation of an independent state of Palestine. The U.S. applied the policy of divide and rule in the case of Iran and Iraq, but when the policy did not worked the fire had been directed towards Iraq. This brings us to the conclusion that the United States has two phases, one to weaken both Iraq and Iran for oil interests and to save Israel from being a target of Iran, Iraq and Palestine, second phase of ruining Iraq to get the oil wealth of the region to become in charge of the largest oil reserves in the world. With the end of Cold War and 1991 Gulf War, the American military leadership became conscious of its strategic role as the sole super power with self acquired leadership of the world.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century opened with the 9/11 incident which badly shook the Americans. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the New York trade towers, the United States declared war against terrorism with calls to the world

that they must join the international coalition against terrorism and President Bush's famous "you are with us or against us".<sup>3</sup> The Taliban leaders in Afghanistan were given ultimatums by Washington to hand over Osama bin Laden who had been declared responsible for the terrorist attacks against the United States. Within the two months time the United States launched massive air attacks on Afghanistan. However, during these massive air attacks thousands of innocent Afghans were killed and injured who had no hand in the activities of Taliban and they might as well have been the victims of the Taliban's repressive regime. It was obvious from the day one that Taliban regime has no match with the super power. The guilt of Osama bin Laden in the terrorist attacks has not been proved and so the killings of so many innocent people was nothing but a brutal massacre. The United States forces have not been able to apprehend either Osama bin Laden nor the Taliban supreme Mulla Omer.

India condemned the attack on trade towers, and pledged support for the U.S. led campaign against terrorism but in that global situation India's policy was to favour multilateral action through the United Nations for a peaceful solution of disputes. Though India had no sympathy with the Taliban but it could not approve the killings of innocent people. India opposed the unilateral military action by U.S.A. and U.K. and also a regime change imposed from outside by forces not having proven popular legitimacy.

It was in this background that Washington began to turn its attention to Saddam Hussein. A massive propaganda campaign was unleashed against Saddam Hussein, which was also joined by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The War against terrorism has not been finally won and now President Bush was trying to make the people believe that Saddam regime was also responsible for the terrorism and it was claimed that it had some linkages with the Al-Qaida. The U.S. gave three reasons for removing Saddam Hussein. 1) He had developed weapons of mass destruction and had failed to comply with the conditions of the

cease fire to which it had agreed in 1991. 2) His regime provided shelter to Ansar-al-Islam, a terrorist in Northern Iraq. Saddam was a threat to the peace and security of the region, the United States and the world peace. 3) He was a brutal tyrant who had killed thousands of his opponents and used chemical weapons against his own people. What was not mentioned that the United States want to control the second largest deposit of oil in the world and even more importantly put it in a position to command the entire West Asian region from Iraq. From the start of the 1991 Gulf War the United States had made several attempts to eliminate Saddam Hussein through military coups and uprisings. But he survived. Now the ground was being prepared for a direct invasion. U.S. was in search of an opportunity and the 9/11 incident again made Saddam Hussein an anathema for the U.S.

The America led war against Iraq started on March 20, 2003. It was the invasion of the oil rich but a weak country, Iraq, by a Super power the United States with all the weaponry at its command. It was the bloodiest and most brutal of all armed conflicts since the Second World War. On the one side the British and Americans were happy about the fact that the war has been won at a low cost sacrificing only 128 American and 31 British soldiers. The unjustness of the war was that the innocent civilian Iraqi population was bombed in the name of liberation, democracy, human rights and peace. The cities were razed to dust, food, water supply and the electricity were cut off and medical aid denied. Never in the history of wars in the world has any city suffered such horrendously heavy bombardment as Baghdad during America's terroristic "operation shock and awe".<sup>4</sup> Never have so many civilians been slain, so many buildings blown to rubble and the significant Mesopotamian civilisation's cultural centers destroyed and many hospitals strewn with casualties because of the barbaric cluster bombs and murderous missiles sprayed with killer appetite. It has been also a highly intense conflict in terms of sophisticated arms consumption and use, particularly, of technologically advanced weapon system. The American forces behaved in the



same manner as medieval invaders and colonial conquerors who looted and subdued defeated countries. The world has witnessed hapless Iraqi women and children face an immediate tragedy. The American war against Iraq has been one of the most protracted and most devastating conflicts in terms of social and human casualties and economic damage. While the U.S. forces in Iraq have yet to find a single weapon of mass destruction or mechanism to produce it. There is still no evidence of Iraq having links with Al-Qaida or any other international terrorist organisation. The only thing that U.S. found is oil.

India opposed military action of U.S.A. and U.K. against Iraq, it also opposed a regime change. Two days before the attack on Iraq the Indian Union Cabinet issued a statement on the situation in Iraq, on March 8, 2003, it clearly said that in the UN Security Council on the issue of Iraq, India had consistently counseled against war and in favour of peace, "we have stated that any move or change in regime in Iraq should come from within and not be imposed from outside. We have also been drawing attention to the precarious humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people which war would only aggravate."<sup>5</sup>

On December 14, 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured from a hide out in Tikrit in mysterious circumstances. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle of the Iraqi people against U.S.-U.K. occupation forces. All this strategy showed that military action in Iraq had economic objectives and the main aim was the control of oil resources, than the discovering of weapons of mass destruction. The situation in Iraq demands that international community, the developing countries and non-aligned movement should assert themselves through the United Nations and allow the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, and their fate should not be determined by the most powerful nations of the world, the United States and the Great Britain.

India consistently stood for a peaceful solution of the Iraq issue. The peace and prosperity of the Gulf region was of vital interest to India, because of its political, cultural and economic ties with the countries of the region. There were 3.5 million Indians working in the Gulf, whose welfare was of great importance. Over 60 % of India's crude oil imports were sourced from this region. India had voiced its concern on various occasions about the difficult humanitarian situation in Iraq. The Indian government had been cautious in its reaction because Saddam Hussein was the only leader in the Arab world who publicly and consistently supported India on Kashmir issue. It is noteworthy that when in the 1990 Gulf war U.N. sanctions were put on Iraq, India asked Iraq to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations and vacate its occupation of and aggression against Kuwait, Iraq in no way obstructed the repatriation of 172000 Indian nationals from Kuwait and another 9000 from Iraq itself. At the same time on receiving reports of shortage of food in Kuwait and Iraq, India sent tons of essential food supplies and medicines with the approval of the U.N. Sanctions Committee. This reflects a positive approach on the part of India as far as humanitarian problems in West Asia are concerned. And India continued with this policy.

After Iraq the next U.S. objective is the solution of the Palestinian problem. The intensity of the conflict started after the June 1967 war with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; hence peace meant an Israeli withdrawal from these areas. The Camp David Accord and then the Oslo Process, tried to persuade the Palestinian leadership that the best they could expect would be limited sovereignty in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with neither territorial integrity nor a capital. The Palestinian leader refused to sanction such a deal as a final settlement. Meanwhile, unarmed Palestinians went out to protest against the visit of Ariel Sharon, to Harm-al-Sharif in Jerusalem in September 2000, thirteen Palestinians were shot dead by the Israeli police. After the deaths over Sharon visit the Palestinian resentment took another form, they took up suicide bombing as the sole way of ending the occupation. The Israeli retaliation

was even more severe than in the past, culminated in the destruction of the Jenin refugee camp, with the deaths of scores of Palestinians in 2002. After this the American administration resumed its peace efforts, in the winter of 2002-2003 they initiated a plan called the 'road map' for peace in Palestine. In cooperation with Russia, EU, and the United Nations, the U.S. had prepared the road map for the creation of a Palestinian state that would exist side by side in security and peace with the state of Israel. It rules out handing over any of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, the road map calls for an independent Palestine state alongside Israel. While the Palestinians claim all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war. It is hard to believe that where the vital interests of Israel are involved, it set out a series of steps for leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories by 2005 (without defining where its borders would be) in return for a Palestinian promise to end the terrorist attacks against Israel. It should be recalled that the United States had demanded a regime change in the Palestine because it believed that Arafat was either unable or unwilling to control the terrorist attacks against Israel and end corruption in Palestinian authority. The United States succeeded in forcing Arafat to appoint a more cooperative Mahmoud Abbas as the Prime Minister and share power with him. But Mahmoud Abbas couldn't be Prime Minister for long time and resigned. He admitted that he could not wield authority without Arafat's support, nor could he control the Palestinian struggle to end the occupation. On U.S. demand of forced regime change to find an amicable solution of the problem, India opposed it, the Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahemad said that 'it is wrong on the part of anyone to impose regime change in any country, it was the sovereign right of the people of any country to elect or change their respective governments, he maintained that any effort contemplated to remove Arafat from the scene would be 'indefensible' in International Law and would serve no constructive purposes. He said that Arafat represented the authority of the Palestinian people and to subject him to this

treatment was an affront to the Palestinian people and this must immediately stop.<sup>6</sup> India had made it clear that its relations with Israel would not come at the expense of the Arabs. India can not sacrifice its strong relations with the whole Arab world for the sake of Israel. It maintained that it will continue financial assistance to the Palestinians till the two sides are brought back to the negotiation table to find a solution.

With the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004, the situation dramatically changed, as U.S. and Israel both prayed for the departure of Arafat from the scene because Arafat was always stick to the demands of his followers and they now love to see Mahmoud Abbas as President. With Abbas as President there was hope for a negotiating process, he has called for a resumption of Peace talks with Israel under a U.S. backed road map, but the Palestinian militants rejected the call for U.S. backed road map, and refused to stop Intifada which started in September 2000, over Sharon's Harm-al-Sharif visit. Now Israel was also willing to pursue the internationally backed withdrawal from occupied Gaza, after Arafat the Western countries hailed the Israelis and planned withdrawal from the land occupied since the 1967 war, it was a possible step towards peace. It was decided that there would be peace on both sides and any report of skirmishes from any side would further halt the peace process. Abbas tried very hard to convince the Hamas leaders and other militant groups and pursued a truce deal with them.

Seeking india's active engagement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the Palestinian Authority (PA) has said, "New Delhi has an important role to play in pushing ahead with implementation of the road map plan for peace in the region approved by the UN Security Council."<sup>7</sup>

In the first week of August 2005, the Jewish pull out started from Gaza strip in accordance with the road map plan. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned the Jewish settlers that "he will use all the Government's power against

those who will try to resist his planned withdrawal from Gaza.”<sup>8</sup> Sharon is ready to turn over more territory to the Palestinians and accept an independent Palestinian state on the basis of the U.S. backed ‘road map’ but rules out handing over any of Jerusalem to the Palestinians if elected to a third term.<sup>9</sup> It is important to recognise that there is no peace after the Jewish withdrawal, there is no end to Palestinian sufferings and dispossession. As the disengagement plan clearly stated that Israel will maintain military operations in the Gaza Strip, and continue to control its access to the outside world. nothing will come in or out of Gaza without Israeli permission. This basically means that Israel will continue to dominate and strangulate Palestinian life, only now it will do so from a safer and cheap distance, that’s all. Gaza’s future is therefore as bleak as ever. For the majority of Palestinians the disengagement will have little positive impact on their daily lives; their freedom of movement will still be denied, their right to economic development will still be subject to Israeli dictate; and their political institutions will still be fundamentally constrained by robust and life-denying Israeli security considerations. While Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and his people dream up high rises and big projects for the evacuated land, ordinary Palestinians continue to feel stifled, denied, and hopeless, their horizons shrunk and their humanity reduced. How can anyone talk of liberation when today Palestinians are living their worst period since their dispossession in 1948, and when there will be little hope for improvement in the future?

The crux of the West Asian turbulence, since the time of Second World War has been the Palestinian problem. The human tragedy imposed upon the people of Palestine by the creation of Israel has been unprecedented in the world history. The Palestinian people were reduced to the status of refugees and driven out of their homes and hearths. They were illegitimately punished for the crimes that Hitler perpetrated on the Jews. The Imperialist-cum-Zionist game had been a treacherous and dastardly act because the entire people of Palestine were hounded out in order to rehabilitate the ‘persecuted’ minority of Europe whose sole claim

was their mythical injunction to return to the 'promised land'. Since that time those helpless people of Palestine have been running from pillar to post in search of their homeland. The neighbouring states of Palestine were equally subjected to the Israeli aggrandisement, when she expanded her frontiers through aggression. The poignant situation and the violation of human rights for decades gave serious turns and developments in the regional politics of West Asia. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's remarks of December 8, 2005, "that Israel should be moved to Europe"<sup>10</sup> are very true and justified, he further said "that some European countries insist on saying that during World War II, Hitler burned millions of Jews and put them in concentration camps, let's assume that the Europeans say is true..... let's give some land to the Zionists in Europe or in Germany or Austria"<sup>11</sup>, he said "they faced injustice in Europe, so why do the repercussions fall on the Palestinians"?<sup>12</sup>The much derived goal of self determination expressed by the Palestinians through various movements could not be other than the Palestinian nationalism- a nascent nationalism of occupied generation, which had remained unchanged since the decades of confiscation of their home land. India welcomed every step that would lead to the realisation of the legitimate ambitions of the Palestinian people for forging a comprehensive solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The intensity and courageous response the innocent masses provided against the brutalities of Israel could not be underestimated. Israeli handling of the situation has been widely condemned and has resulted in an unprecedented wave of appreciation and sympathy for the Palestinians throughout the world, the developments helped to expose Israeli violation of human rights and total disregard for international conventions.

January 25, 2006, was decided as the date for the Palestinian legislative elections, but the future of Palestine entered a new era of uncertainty as the militant Palestinian opposition group Hamas snatched power from the ruling old guard Fatah and made skeptics of many key players in the peace process. Mahmoud Abbas urged Hamas to keep negotiations moving forward, he said to

Hamas that "together, we will work to achieve the dream for which our martyrs have fallen."<sup>13</sup> But the U.S. seemed doubtful and Israel demanded that the Palestinian Authority should disarm the new ruling party which has a long history of militancy and a call for the destruction of Israel. The acting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that "Hamas would have to drastically change its philosophy for the success of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process."<sup>14</sup> President Bush - whose Middle East policy includes support for the emerging democracies - said that "he would not deal with Hamas unless it renounced terrorism."<sup>15</sup> The United Nations and the European Union seemed more hopeful that the Hamas government could operate productively and peacefully.

Even after fifty six years of the partition of Palestine the problem is the same and it threatens world peace and security. Nehru was conscious of imperialist designs for maintaining colonialism in Arab countries. He considered the Balfour declaration as the betrayal of Arabs by the British. For Nehru the Arab struggle against British imperialism in Palestine was as much a part of this great world conflict as India's struggle for freedom. Nehru was convinced that the Palestine problem was created by the British and would never be solved by the British. Nehru rightly felt that this problem be solved by ignoring the British and coming to an agreement with each other. Being very vocal on this issue of Palestine he elaborated his points to make it clear-

1. that you can not solve this problem by trying to crush the Arab people.
2. that it will not be settled by the British but by the two main parties coming to an agreement.

Nehru saw the partition of Palestine full of conflict and dissension. He suggested that a federal state with autonomy for the other regions would have been the better and lasting solution. For him this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem but the only real solution, any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. But India's proposal was not included in

the Palestine Committee and did not find favour in the U.N. When partition of Palestine became inevitable it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best, but it was too late to realise. The problem is becoming worst every moment, millions of innocent people have been slaughtered, the whole population of Palestine became refugee in its own land living in miserable conditions. Today it is thought that if Nehru's plan would have been accepted the problem perhaps might have been solved much earlier and the Arabs could also live in peace.



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# *Appendices*

## APPENDIX - I

### NEHRU'S SPEECH ON JUNE 13, 1936, ON ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE

My expression of sympathy with the Arab national movement and their struggle for freedom has brought me some protests from Jews in India. I venture therefore to state a little more fully what my attitude is to this problem of Palestine.

Few people, I imagine, can withhold their deep sympathy from the Jews for the long centuries of the most terrible oppression to which they have been subjected all over Europe. Fewer still can repress their indignation at the barbarities and racial suppression of the Jews which the Nazis have indulged in during the last few years, and which continue today. Even outside Germany, Jew baiting has become a favourite pastime of various Fascist groups. This revival in an intense form of racial intolerance and race war is utterly repugnant to me and I have been deeply distressed at the sufferings of vast numbers of people of the Jewish race. Many of these unfortunate exiles, with no country or whom to call their own, are known to me, and some I consider it an honour to call my friends.

I approach this question therefore with every sympathy for the Jews. So far as I am concerned the racial or the religious issue does not affect my opinion.

But my reading of war-time and post-war history shows that there was a gross betrayal of the Arabs by British imperialism. The many promises that were made to them by Colonel Lawrence and others, on behalf of the British Government, and which resulted in the Arabs helping the British and allied

powers during the war, were consistently ignored after the war was over. All the Arabs, in Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, smarted under this betrayal, but the position of the Arabs in Palestine was undoubtedly the worst of all. Having been promised freedom and independence repeatedly from 1915 onwards, suddenly they found themselves converted into a mandatory territory with a new burden added on — the promise of the creation of a national home for the Jews — a burden which almost made it impossible them to realise independence.

The Jews have a right to look to Jerusalem and their Holy Land and to have access to them. But the position after the Balfour Declaration was very different. A new state within a state was sought to be created in Palestine, an ever – growing state with a backing of British imperialism behind it, and the hope was held out that this new Jewish state would, in the near future, become so powerful in the whole of Palestine. Zionist policy aimed at this domination and worked for it, though, I believe, some sections of Jewish opinion were opposed to this aggressive attitude. Inevitably, the Zionists oppose the Arabs and looked for protection and support to the British Government.

Such case as the Zionists had might be called a moral one, their ancient associations with their Holy Land and their present reverence for it. One may sympathise with it. But what of the Arabs? For them also it was a holy land — both for the Muslims and the Christian Arabs. For thirteen hundred years or more they had lived there and all their national and racial interests had taken strong roots there. Palestine was not an empty land fit for colonisation by outsiders. It was a well populated and full land with little room for large numbers of colonists from abroad. Is it any wonder that the Arabs objected to this intrusion? And their objection grew as they realised that the aim of British imperialism was to make the Arab – Jew problem a permanent obstacle to their independence. We in India have sufficient experience of similar obstacles being placed in the way of our freedom by British imperialism.

It is quite possible that a number of Jews might have found welcome in Palestine and settled down there. But when the Zionists came with the avowed object of pushing out the Arabs from all places of importance and of dominating the country, they could hardly be welcomed. And the fact that they have brought much money from outside and started industries and schools and universities, can not diminish the opposition of the Arabs, who see with dismay the prospect of their becoming permanently a subject race, dominated, politically and economically, by the Zionists and the British Government.

The problem of Palestine is thus essentially a nationalist one — a people struggling for independence against imperialists control and exploitation. It is not a racial or religious one. Perhaps some of our Muslim fellow — countrymen extend their sympathy to the Arabs because of the religious bond. But the Arabs are wiser and they lay stress only on nationalism and independence, and it is well to remember that all Arabs, Christian as well as Muslims, stand together in this struggle against British imperialism. Indeed some of the most prominent leaders of the Arabs in this national struggle have been Christians.

If the Jews had been wise they would have thrown in their lot with the Arab struggle for independence. Instead they have chosen to side with British imperialism and to see its protection against the people of the country. Ultimately therefore the struggle revolves itself into one of nationalism versus imperialism, and all other minor aspects of it, such as the Arab — Jew problem, though important today, have little historical significance. In the same way the communal problem, spoilt child of British imperialism, looms large in India today, but in the wide range of history it loses all importance.

India and Palestine have both their national problems and both struggle for independence; they have something in common in this struggle and the opponent is the same. In both cases, as elsewhere, nationalism comes into contact with new

social forces and it affected thereby, and gradually takes shape as an aspect of the world problem, which affects us all alike whether we realise it or not. We must therefore understand each other and sympathise with each other.

As we take this long view the Arab - Jew question fades into insignificance. The Arabs of Palestine will no doubt gain their independence, but this is likely to be a part of the large unity of Arab peoples for which the countries of Western Asia have so long hankered after, and this again will be part of the new order which will emerge out of present day chaos. The Jews, if they are wise, will except the teaching of history, and make friends with the Arabs and throw their weight on the side of the independence of Palestine, and not seek a position of advantage and dominance with the help of imperialist power.

I trust, therefore, that the people of India will send their warmest greetings and good wishes to the Arabs of Palestine in their brave struggle for freedom against a powerful adversary.

## **APPENDIX - II**

### **NEHRU'S SPEECH ON PALESTINE DAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1936**

Political India is full today of talk of the coming provincial elections and candidates for these elections are cropping up everywhere. As the days go by we shall probably hear more and more of these elections and the air will be full of sound and fury which always accompany them. Other questions also occupy our minds such as the communal question or even the petty controversy about Hindi and Urdu. And yet how petty all these are before the mighty problems of poverty and unemployment—the poverty that crushes our millions, the unemployment that has us by the throat. Inevitably we must think of these problems for our sphere of thought and action is India.

But to confine ourselves to Indian problems is not good enough, it is not even sufficient for our own national purposes or our struggle for freedom. Every tyro in public life knows that the politics and economics of different countries are related to each other, that the world hangs together today as it has never done before, and the great problems we have to face are essentially world problems. To ignore this world aspect of any major issue is to lose perspective and invite error.

Therefore let us look round the world today with all its conflict and tension and cruelty and unhappiness, and behind all, its vast questioning. We meet today especially to think of the little country of Palestine and of its troubles. In a world view this problem of Palestine has relatively little importance for bigger things are happening elsewhere. And yet it has an intrinsic importance of its own and it throws a light on the working of imperialism from which we ourselves

suffer. Therefore it is right that we should consider it and send our greetings to those who are struggling for freedom there.

But before we turn our thoughts to Palestine I should like to take you to Spain for a while for that will give us a broader view of the world stage. It is in Spain today that the most vital happenings are taking place, frightful and terrible events, of enormous consequence to the future of Europe and the world. Our fate in India is bound up with them more than we realise.

What has happened in Spain? Some months ago there were normal democratic elections there and as a result a popular radical party—a joint popular front—came into power. They formed a Government of a liberal democratic variety. It was not a Communist or even a Socialist Government. There was not a single Communist or socialist in it. They started with a programme of liberal reform to take Spain out of the feudal and reactionary ruts in which it had lived for so long. They made good progress, and then suddenly there was a military rebellion, headed by the army chiefs and other reactionaries. And this rebellion first started not in Spain, but in Morocco with the aid of non Spanish troops. It was a rebellion against law and order—words so dear to the British Government—against the constituted government of the country, against a moderate liberal regime.

How did these military bosses dare to raise the flag of rebellion? It is clear enough now. They did it with the material aid of the Fascist countries, of Germany and Italy and, it is interesting to note, financial aid from the big financiers of the city of London.

The Spanish Government and the people were taken aback. It was terribly difficult for unorganised and improperly armed masses to face an organised and well equipped army in rebellion. And this was why the rebels expected an easy victory. But the Spanish people rose at the bidding of their popular government



and without discipline or proper arms they faces bravely the rebel armies, most of which consisted of Moroccan troops. There was a mass levy of the people, even boys and girls rushed to the rescue of their hard - won liberty. We saw a strange sight — these masses fighting against regular armies and holding them often in check.

The reactions in other countries were noteworthy. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were entirely on the side of the rebels and gave them every help. France sympathised with the Spanish Government but dared not help. In England great newspapers, like the *Times*, frankly sympathised with the rebels, thus indicating clearly the attitude of the British Government and the British ruling classes. British financiers rejoiced at the victories of the rebels. European Governments evolved a policy of non-intervention which meant in effect that the Spanish Government could not be helped, but the rebels could draw aid from outside.

And so this terrible tussle goes on in Spain with every thing weighted in favour of the rebels. And yet the ordinary people, men and women, boys and girls, are keeping their end up and giving their lives in thousands to prevent their country from falling under a bloody and most reactionary tyranny.

In Spain today we see clearly the terrible conflict of the forces of progress and the forces of reaction, the conflict which is latent all over the world. On the issue of this conflict depends whether Europe and the world will be dominated by Fascism or not. On that issue depends vast and bloody war all over the world. The triumph of the rebel means the strangling of France by three Fascist countries surrounding her. It means that Fascism will make a triumphant attempt at world dominion in co-operation with the Fascism of Japan.

In this vital issue we find the ruling classes and government of Britain definitely favouring Fascism. We find imperialist Britain with her much vaunted

democracy sympathising with those who are trying to crush democracy in Spain. For it must be remembered that the struggle in Spain is not between Communism or Socialism and Fascism, but between democracy and a cruel military Fascism.

This is not really surprising for essentially Imperialism and Fascism are of one family and if a crisis comes they stand together. All over the world today they oppose the forces of progress — in Europe of social progress, in India and other subject countries of even political progress. Between imperialist and Fascist powers there is also inherent conflict for many of them want a greater share in the spoils of exploitation. But despite this mutual conflict they sympathise with and aid each other as against the social urge to freedom and the nationalist struggle for political freedom. And thus we find the Indian struggle for independence a part of this world struggle against Imperialism and Fascism. So also the struggle that is going on against British Imperialism in Palestine.

We must have this larger and clearer view or else we shall lose ourselves in a maze and fail to understand events. But if we have this to guide us and to provide us with a yard measure we shall be able to judge of happenings correctly and we shall know which group or individual is on this side of the struggle or that. In India we find sometimes persons posing as experts on foreign affairs expressing sympathy for the rebel cause in Spain or Fascism generally, and some of our newspapers unthinkingly accept this outlook. Essentially this is propaganda for the Fascist and reactionary cause. It is not surprising that reactionaries in India should sympathise with reactionaries elsewhere.

In Palestine the problem seems to be one of Arabs and Jews, and some of our Muslim friends here look upon it as a religious problem demanding sympathy for their co-religionists. That is a wrong and misleading outlook. It is a problem of a growing nationalism desiring freedom and being suppressed by imperialism. In this process, British imperialism, as in India, has tried to play off one

community against another and set the Jews against the Arabs. Like our own communal problem, they have sought to produce a communal problem in Palestine. So also the French Government have done in Syria. We must learn from this what the true genesis of this communal problem is in subject countries and try to remove the root cause.

It is true that at present there is ill-will and conflict between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It is also true that a true solution will come by an understanding between them based on the freedom of the country. The Jews have been and are the victims of a cruel Fascism and we must feel for their sufferings. It is a misfortune that they should allow themselves to be exploited in Palestine by British imperialism. Their future in Palestine lies in co-operation with the Arabs and in recognition of the fact that Palestine is and must continue to be essentially an Arab country. If that is admitted co-operation is easy and Jews will be welcomed in Palestine, as well as in Trans-Jordan, to help, as they are in a position to do, in the development of the country. Arabs and Jews have cooperated in the past and lived together as friends. There is no reason why they should not do so again.

For the moment the immediate issue is the fresh determination of British imperialism to crush the Arab movement. Large additional British armies are being sent to Palestine almost to conquer the country afresh. Martial law will flourish there. Our sympathies and good wishes must go out to the people of Palestine in this hour of their distress. The crushing of their movement is a blow to our nationalist strength as well as to theirs. We hang together in this world struggle for freedom.

I am aware that outrages and regrettable happenings have taken place in Palestine. We must disapprove of them for they tarnish and weaken a good cause. It also know that various feudal elements are trying to exploit the nationalist

sentiment to their own advantage. But, in spite of all this, let us remember that essentially the struggle is one of Arab nationalism seeking freedom against British imperialism, and all the power of that imperialism is trying to crush it. It can not ultimately be crushed for nationalism and the will to freedom survive.

But though we send our sympathy and good wishes to the people of Palestine, the real way to help is to play our own part worthily in our own freedom struggle in India. That is but another, and perhaps the most important, aspect of the great struggle against world imperialism. It is absurd for people to talk of sympathy for the Arabs, and then cooperate with British imperialism in India.

For us therefore the problem becomes one of carrying on our own struggle for independence. All those who stress other and smaller aspects, like the communal aspect, divert attention from the real issue. In this struggle we shall waste our energy and injure the cause if we think in terms of minor improvements with the help of that very imperialism which we seek to combat. In the congress election manifesto this vital background of our struggle has been emphasised. This manifesto has been welcomed by the country as a whole, though there are some people who have grown angry over it. We see here the essential difference between our great organisation standing for anti-imperialism and certain principles, and others who have no clear vision and who always think in terms of individuals and petty reforms or communal favours. If the country wants freedom it has only one course open to it—to line up with the Congress. Our doors are open to all on this basis; we are not exclusive. But those who think in terms of cooperation with British imperialism have no common ground with us. They may be estimable people, as many of them are, but the question is not of individuals but of principles. And in the great world crisis that overshadow the horizon, it is essential that we should offer a strong and united front to the forces of imperialism and reaction. Only the Congress offers that front.

The Congress attitude is clear. Only in one matter — the question of accepting office under the new constitution — is it still undecided. My own view about this has been repeatedly stated and I hold by it with the same conviction as ever. It is that we must not accept offices or ministries or else we help in working the new act. This flows naturally from the Congress Manifesto and I trust that when the time comes, this decision will be taken.

## **APPENDIX - III**

### **NEHRU'S SPEECH AT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (LEGISLATIVE) DECEMBER 4, 1947**

Sir, I welcome this occasion. Although we are discussing this subject of foreign affairs not directly but by way of a cut motion, nevertheless, it is a novel occasion for this House and I think it is good that we realise what it conveys.

It means ultimately that we are entering into the international field, not only by going into conferences and the like, but by really putting international questions before the country, before this House for its decision. There is no immediate question before this House today. But undoubtedly as time goes on, the major international questions will have to be decided by this House.

Listening to the debate, to the speeches made by Honourable Members, I find, as was perhaps natural, that there was no immediate issue, no particular question for discussion, but rather pious hopes, vague ideals and sometimes a measure of, let us say, denunciation of things that had happened in the world. It has been a vague debate, with nothing pointed about it to which one could attach oneself. Many of the Honourable Members have been good enough to speak gently and generously of what has been done in the realm of foreign affairs on behalf of the Government of India during the past year. I am grateful to them, but may I say in reply that I am in complete disagreement with them?

I think the Government of India during the past year has not done what it should have done. That, perhaps, has not been so much the fault of the Government of India as such, but rather of circumstances. Anyway, what we have envisaged that we ought to do, we have not been able to do, largely because other circumstances arose in this country which have prevented its being done.

We are not out of those difficulties, internal and other. We have not had a free hand in our external relations, and therefore, I would beg the House to judge of this period in the context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the middle of the internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters.

That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time and energy to it. Nevertheless, I think we have advanced in that field. Again, it is difficult to say how you measure advance in such a field. My Honourable friend, Dr. Khare, was critical of various things, as he has very right to be, and his criticism took the shape of a written speech to which your attention, Sir, was not drawn! I was glad of the Honourable Dr. Khare's intrusion in this debate, because the debate was getting rather heavy and he brought a touch of comedy and humour into it as well as unreality. When the Honourable Member represented the Government in this House, it was a little difficult to attach much importance to what he said. I suppose now it is less difficult to do so, or a little more difficult to do so! So I will not venture to say anything or to reply to what he said because it seems to me totally inconsequential and without any meaning.

But coming to other subjects, the main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of "Do you belong to this group or that group?" that is an utter simplification of issues and it is all very well for the Honourable Maulana to hold forth that India will go to war under this banner or that banner. But that surely is not the way that a responsible House or a responsible country views the situation.

We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. Any person with any knowledge of international affairs knows that. The point is not what will happen when there is war. Are we going to proclaim to the world, taking the advice of Maulana Hasrat Mohani, that when wars come, we stand by Russia? Is that his idea of foreign policy or any policy? That shows to me an amazing ignorance of how foreign affairs can be conducted. We are not going to join a war if we can help it: and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends.

But talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chess board. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping. It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom and yet that does not convey much to anybody, except a pious hope. We do stand for peace and freedom. I think there is something to be said for it. There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them. There is some meaning in that.

Undoubtedly it has some substance, but a vague statement that we stand for peace and freedom by itself has no particular meaning, because every country is prepared to say the same thing, whether it means it or not. What then do we stand for? Well, you have to develop this argument in the economic field. As it happens today, in spite of the fact that we have been for sometime in authority as a Government, I regret that we have not produce any constructive economic scheme or economic policy so far. Again my excuse is that we have been going



through such amazing times which have taken up all our energy and attention that it was difficult to do so. Nevertheless, we shall have to do so, that will govern our foreign policy, more than all the speeches in this House.

We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we can not be made to vote this way or that way.

Last year when our delegation went to the United Nations, it was the first time that a more or less independent delegation went from India. It was looked at a little askance. They did not know what it was going to do. When they found that we acted according to our own will, they did not like it. We were unpopular last year at the United Nations. I do not mean individually, but in regard to our policy. They could not quite make out what we were or what we were aiming at. There was a suspicion in the minds of the first group that we were really allied to the other group in secret, though we were trying to hide the fact, and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret though we were trying to hide the fact.

This year there was a slight change in this attitude. We did many things which both the groups disliked, but the comprehension came to them that we were not really allied to either group, that we were trying to act according to our own lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us. They did not like that, of course, because the position today is that there is so much passion and so much fear and suspicion of each other between these great rival powers and groups that anybody who is not with them is considered against them. So they did not like what we did in many instances: nevertheless, they respected us much more, because they realised what we had an independent policy, that we were not going to be dragooned this way or that, that we might make a mistake just like anyone else, nevertheless, we were going to stick to our

own policy and programme, so that while possibly we irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year, we got on much better with everybody, because they understood that we did stand for something.

To give the House an instance of how we acted, take the Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a federal state with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the other attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted: the other was a unitary state. We suggested a federal state with, naturally, an Arab majority in charge of the federal state but with autonomy for the other regions—Jewish regions.

After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. Nevertheless, our solution—which as the House will remember was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee—did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. Some of the major powers were out for partition; they, therefore, pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of preventing partition at any rate or preventing a two thirds majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion. When during the last few days somehow partition suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to it, owing to the pressure of some of the great powers, it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best and an attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who had wanted a unitary state.

It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves to partition. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority,

with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result again of trouble now and a great deal of trouble in the future in the Middle East.

I point this out to the House as an instance, that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so that I have no doubt that ours would have brought about the best solution.

This applies to many other things. But inevitably it means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations and at international conferences of this type. Nonetheless, that is the only honourable and right position for us to take and I am quite sure that by adopting that position, we shall ultimately gain in international prestige, that is to say, when we take a long view of the situation, not a short view of getting immediately a vote here and there.

I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justified and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power, but a large number of the smaller nations which today are rather helpless will probably look to India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters.

May I in this connection say that during this last session of the United Nations General Assembly, many very difficult and very controversial issues were raised, and our delegation had to face extraordinarily intricate situations? I should like to pay a tribute to our delegation, especially to the leader of the delegation. The Honourable members often put questions about the appointment of Ambassadors, members of delegations and the like and rightly so, because the House should be interested in such important appointments. May I say to this House that nothing is more difficult than to make these appointments, because they are not just appointments of able persons, but appointments of particular

persons to particular places where they must fit in, which is an extraordinarily difficult thing?

In the key places of the world the ideal Ambassador must be some kind of a superman. It is so difficult now not only to understand the intricacies—that is not difficult,—but to remain friends with everybody and yet to advance your cause. After all we have in the past discussed foreign affairs from the outside, in other assemblies, or here perhaps, rather in an academic way, rather as in a college debating society. That is, we talked of high policies, but we did not come to grips with them when we had to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question and face the consequences.

If the House will forgive my saying so, even in today’s debate many of the speeches were of an academic kind which did not take into account the vital questions which concern the world today, which may mean peace or war. But when the House does have to face the question and take a decision which may lead to war or peace, when one comes face to face with realities, then one can not rely merely on idealistic principles.

Foreign affairs are utterly idealistic today. A false step, a false phrase, makes all the difference. The first thing that an Ambassador of ours has to learn is to shut his mouth and give up public or even private speaking. It is not a habit which we have developed in our past careers—that of being completely silent. Yet this habit has to be developed, and in private one has to be silent lest what one says injures the cause of the nation, creates international ill-will.

It is in this background that I should like the House to consider international affairs—this realistic background, this notion that it is not merely some naughty men playing about and quarrelling with one another, some statesmen in America and the U.S.S.R. or British imperialism that we can not get rid of the habit.

To come to grips with the subject, in its economic, political and various other aspects, to try to understand it, is what ultimately matters. Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short run or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences, or take a short distance view. Others may think that in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important, because if war comes everyone suffers, so that in the long distance view, self interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as indeed it does demand.

Every intelligent person can see that if you have a narrow national policy it may enthuse the multitude for the moment, just as the communal cry has done, but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally, because you lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger your own good. Therefore, you propose to look after India's interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved.

We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union. We have had, as the House

knows, a distinguished Representative of the United States here for some time past within a week or two we shall have a distinguished Representative of the Soviet Union here, in the Soviet embassy which is being opened in New Delhi.

I do not want to say much more at this stage about foreign affairs partly for lack of time, partly because it is a little difficult to discuss these matters. Some of the Honourable members might, perhaps want to talk about what should be done in China, Japan, Siam and Peru, but I fear it would be a little irresponsible of me to talk about these various matters. Naturally India is interested in Asian countries even more than the rest of the world. We have had an Asian Conference, and at this moment we have a distinguished visitor here, the Prime Minister of Burma.

May I say in this connection that some people are under a misapprehension? They think that we are conducting special negotiations with the Burmese delegation here. That is not quite true. It is primarily a visit of courtesy. At the same time, of course, we have broadly explored various questions, discussed various matters of common concern, not with the idea of suddenly coming to decisions in regard to these intricate matters now, but rather with a view to laying the foundations for future talks. May I also say that Prime Minister of Burma is interested, as many of us have been, in closer association, not only between Burma and India, but between various other countries of Asia also? We have discussed that also, again not with a view to coming suddenly to decisions, because these things take a little time to grow. It all indicates the new spirit of Asia which wants Asian countries to draw closer together in their own defence and to promote world peace.

Coming to another part of this cut motion in regard to Indians in the British Commonwealth, this is an old subject and a painful subject. I entirely agree with any criticism that may be made that we have not been able to do anything substantial in this direction. Something has been done in Canada and

elsewhere, but nothing substantial has yet been done. Now, the odd thing is that this subject becomes more and more difficult to deal with and not easier. Indians have gone to the British Colonies and Dominions in the past in various capacities, as merchants, traders, workers, indentured labourers and the rest.

The history of Indian emigration abroad, including that of the humblest of those who went from India, reads almost like a romance. How these Indians went abroad! Not even citizens of a free country, working under all possible disadvantages, yet they made good wherever they went. They worked hard for themselves, and for the country of their adoption. They made good themselves and profited the country they had gone to.

It is a romance and it is something which India can be proud of, and may I say most of all of those poor indentured labourers who went out under unhappy conditions, through their labour, gradually worked their way up? It is also true that India is a country, which in spite of everything, has abounding vitality and spreads abroad. It rather frightens our neighbour countries, just as china which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there.

That naturally frightens others who may not have that vitality in them, and they want to protect themselves against it. Questions then arise of vested interests which India has developed or Indians have developed there. Such questions have arisen, and while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand we can not protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. there is that difficulty. Nevertheless, undoubtedly we shall try to do our best to protect all legitimate interests.

Now, one word more. I will not take more of the time of the House. An Honourable Member, Mr. Kamath I think, referred one of the minor headaches I have had to suffer from is a relatively new tendency in old and new newspapers alike to publish without check or hindrance the most amazing lies. It is impossible to keep pace with it. It is undesirable to go about contradicting every little thing they say. It just cannot be done, and new types of papers and journals which have been inflicted by some I have come across, which do not raise either the stature of Indian journalism or anything else. So many of these stories are untrue. I think I read somewhere in a Delhi paper about the U.P. Government presenting Rs. 20,000 and 200 *saris* to Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit on her departure to Moscow. I read all manner of the most malicious and unfounded and false statements in these papers about Mr. Asaf Ali.

Now, coming to the question of cost, the figure Mr. Kamath mentioned, 5 lakhs, have of course no relation to the fact. I do not know what the figure is.

I suggest that if Mr. Kamath makes any statements, he might investigate the facts before he makes them.

What I should like this House to remember is that these ambassadorial appointments have to keep up a certain dignity and a certain status. It is not good our sending an Ambassador and not giving him a house to live in, not giving him furniture in the house, not providing him with the minimum wherewith he can meet and entertain other diplomats properly and decently. I doubt if any country, big or small, is conducting its ambassadorial establishments so cheaply as we are doing.

A great deal of criticism has been made about our ambassador in Moscow getting furniture from Stockholm. Well, how a house has to be furnished in Moscow, of course, Honourable members do not realise. It just is not possible to furnish easily in Moscow. You get an empty house. We thought of sending things



from India, but it was almost a physical impossibility unless to spent vast sums on aeroplanes to carry chairs and tables from here. Of course, it could have been furnished alternatively with Russian furniture. The Russian people, and all credit to them for this, ever since the war, are so intent on doing what they consider to be the fundamental things, that they refuse to waste their time on the accessories of life. They have to rebuild their country after the most horrible suffering and damage suffered in the war and they are concentrating on major undertakings. They go about in patched-up clothes and broken down shoes. It does not matter, but they are building dams, reservoirs and factories and the rest which they consider more important. So it is not easy to get any of these small accessories of life for the moment.

The only things you can get in Russia are antique pieces of Czarist days which are frightfully expensive. The result is that our Embassy in Moscow had to go to Stockholm for its chairs and tables, and as these were urgently required—office equipment, etc.—our Ambassador had to go there. But, of course, the visit to Stockholm was not merely, members of the House should realise, to buy furniture. When an Ambassador goes somewhere, that Ambassador does other work too, and any kind of shopping that might be done in incidental.

I am grateful to the House for their kind sentiments and their expressions of goodwill for our attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs. I wish it were a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite, and in this connection may I say that at present moment no country, including the Big Powers with their long traditions in foreign affairs, has anything which could be called a precise and definite foreign policy, because the world itself is in a fluid condition. Of course, if you call this a definite policy, that of one great country looking with bitter dislike upon another and suspecting it,—that may be the foundation of a policy, but that is not a policy, it is mere passion and prejudice. Otherwise there is hardly any very definite policy in any country

and each country is trying to fit in its policy from day to day to changing circumstances.

## **APPENDIX - IV**

### **NEHRU'S SPEECH AT LOK SABHA, AUGUST 14, 1958**

Our general view in regard to West Asia has been frequently stated. Our approach is not inimical to any country there. It is friendly to all countries, but inevitably our sympathies are with the Arab countries and Arab nationalism which represents today the urge of the people. Also according to our general policy as well as our views on the present situation in West Asia, we do not accept that foreign troops should be used in any territory in the area in the circumstances prevailing there. We are convinced that there can be no settlement and no return to normality till foreign troops are removed from the area. Sometimes it is stated that these countries should be treated like tender infants and be under the guardianship of bigger countries. But it is quite clear that they do not like this offer of guardianship and patronage, and in fact resent such suggestions.

One has to take, to some extent, a historical view of the developments in West Asia. For hundreds of years these countries in West Asia were under Turkish domination. They came out of it at the end of the First World War. The Western powers decided what they liked about these countries without really caring much for the wishes of the people. Probably there was no organised way for the people to express their views. New nations were created, and the contacts of the Western powers were with the rulers of their own creation or, chiefly, with the landed gentry. There were few contacts with people. The whole period between the two world wars was one when Arab nationalism was trying to push out this foreign domination and was gradually making some progress in that direction. Then came the war and the post-war period, when much has happened in the various countries of the Middle East.

The major fact in West Asia is the growth of Arab nationalism in a very powerful, resurgent way. Egypt took the lead in this matter and, under the wise leadership of President Nasser, has played a very important part. Nasser, in fact became the most prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. This fact, which was patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers, and an attempt was made to split the Arab countries, in fact Arab nationalism.

The House may remember the talk about building up the "northern tier defence" and about the Baghdad Pact. The motives were supposed to be to protect these countries from attack or invasion from the Soviet Union and to give them security and peace. As a matter of fact, the result was quite the contrary. The troubles of these countries only increased because of such an approach. The Arab countries, at any rate the Governments, were divided—some in the Baghdad Pact and some outside it. While the Governments carried on a cold war against each other, the people almost in every Arab country were powerfully affected by this tide of Arab nationalism. Thus in the countries associated with the Baghdad Pact there was a hiatus between the Governments and the people, the people looking more and more towards Arab nationalism and the Governments looking in another direction and rather ranged against the spirit of Arab nationalism. How big this hiatus was can be seen from the *coup d'etat* in Baghdad which surprised everyone. I believe it surprised even the people in Iraq and Egypt. The surprise was not essentially that it took place but the speed with which it took place and the complete success which attended it. It showed how utterly divorced from public opinion the Government of Iraq was. When the change came, it brought tremendous relief all over Iraq, and the people flocked to the side of the new Government. So this attempt at not recognizing the spirit of Arab nationalism, even trying to come in its way and obstructing it, really achieved the opposite effect—it encouraged nationalism as such an approach will inevitably do. This has resulted in the Arab nations coming nearer to one another and will no doubt bring about a great deal of co-operation between them. It was said that some

kind of an Arab empire was being built up, which was dangerous. I do not know about the future, but I see no empire, much less than Arab empire.

The theory of the vacuum is sometimes advanced, as if the removal of the influence of some great powers must necessarily be filled in by some other powers. It is an extraordinary appraisal of the situation which does not recognise the effect of Arab nationalism which has become such a dominant force.

We are convinced that any effective solution of the problems of West Asia must be based on the recognition of the dominant urge and force of Arab nationalism. Any settlement must have the goodwill and co-operation of the Arab nations. The need of the European countries for oil is patent, but there should be no difficulty in arriving at a friendly arrangement which ensures the supply of oil. However, the presence of foreign forces of any kind in this area will be a constant irritant, leading to trouble. Peace in this area, as indeed anywhere else, will come if the area is removed from the orbit of the cold war. Every one of the Arab countries has tremendous problems of development to face. If the threat of war is removed from them, they will apply themselves to these problems and become a source of strength to the forces of peace.

There is another aspect of the West Asian problem which can not be ignored. This is the continuing element of danger in the relations between the Arab countries and Israel. Ever since Israel came into existence, it has been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries. The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years ago is fresh in our memory. Apart from this, there is the big problem of the old Palestine refugees. The Arab countries have looked upon Israel as an outpost from which their freedom might at any time be threatened. Israel, on the other hand, fears the Arab countries which surrounded it. There can be no real peace in the area till this difficult problem is settled in a satisfactory way. Naturally, a settlement can be reached only with the goodwill of the countries of this area. There can be no settlement by war which, if it occurs, may well

become a major war. I do not suggest that any attempt should, or can, be made to deal with this problem now. The question should not be raised at this stage, but will have to wait for some time. Only then the other problems of West Asia have advanced towards a solution and the passions have cooled to some extent can this difficult problem be tackled.

## APPENDIX - V

### United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947, For the Future Government of Palestine

'A'

*The General Assembly,*

*Having met* in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

*Having constituted* a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

*Having received and examined* the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) 1 including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

*Considers* that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

*Takes note* of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

*Recommends* to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

*Requests that*

- (a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
- (b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorisation of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
- (c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
- (d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

*Calls upon* the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

*Appeals* to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

*Authorises* the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.



**B 2**

*The General Assembly*

*Authorises* the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed \$2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

*[At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution [181 A], elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: **Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.**]*

**PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION**

**PART I**

**Future constitution and government of Palestine**

**A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE**

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to

provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

## **B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE**

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.
2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organisations of The Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.
6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.
7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines. The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively. Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies. During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall

embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

- (a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
- (b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
- (c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- (d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
- (e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

## **C. DECLARATION**

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

### **General Provision**

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognised as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

### **Chapter 1**

#### *Holy Places, religious buildings and sites*

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. *Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved.* No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out

itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

## **Chapter 2**

### *Religious and Minority Rights*

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.



3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

### Chapter 3

#### *Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations*

1. **Citizenship.** Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. **International conventions.**
  - (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations.

(a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognised by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

## Chapter 4

### *Miscellaneous provisions*

The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

1. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

### **D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT**

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to economic union and transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilising to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organisations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

### *The Economic Union of Palestine*

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:
  - (a) A customs union;

- (b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
  - (c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and port and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
  - (d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
  - (e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.
  4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realise the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organisation and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
  5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
  6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.
8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.
10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
  - (a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
  - (b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
  - (c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:
    - (i) The service of the outstanding public debt;
    - (ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.
14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to

the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.
16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's export fair and equal access to world markets.
17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

*Freedom of transit and visit*

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each state and the City shall control residence within its borders.

*Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking*

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.



21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

#### **E. ASSETS**

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.
2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

#### **F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### **PART II**

##### **Boundaries 5**

## **A. THE ARAB STATE**

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of `Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I'nan roads. From south-west corner of Kafr I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan'. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to I'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'Billin situated to the west of the I'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here

it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuiya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lyddá and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezín to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Es

Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands

of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Israel lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

## **B. THE JEWISH STATE**

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern) Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the

Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish Section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

### **C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM**

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below).

## **PART III**

### **City of Jerusalem**

#### **A. SPECIAL REGIME**

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

## **B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY**

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

## **C. STATUTE OF THE CITY**

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions:

1. *Government machinery; special objectives.*

The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

- (a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
- (b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.



2. *Governor and administrative staff*

A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. *Local autonomy*

(a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of a special town units consisting respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. *Security measures*

(a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarised; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

- (b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.
- (c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organise a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. *Legislative organisation*

A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. *Administration of justice*

The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. *Economic union and economic regime.*

The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decision of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. *Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents.*

Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. *Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.*

Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City.

10. *Official languages.*

Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

11. *Citizenship.*

All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan. The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. *Freedoms of Citizens*

- (a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
- (b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
- (c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
- (d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
- (e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

- (f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

- (g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. *Holy Places.*

- (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
- (b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
- (c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

- (d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. *Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.*

- (a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.
- (b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
- (c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

**D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME**

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it

necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.

#### **PART IV**

#### **CAPITULATIONS**

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

*[Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting 29 November 1947]*

## **APPENDIX - VI**

### **United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of November 22, 1967**

*The Security Council,*

*Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

*Emphasising* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

*Emphasising further* that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
  - (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
  - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms further* the necessity
  - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;



(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem,

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

*[ Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting ]*

## **APPENDIX - VII**

### **United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) of October 22, 1973**

*The Security Council,*

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

*[Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none].*

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

## **APPENDIX - VIII**

### **United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515 of November 19, 2003**

This resolution, introduced by Russia, adopts the quartet roadmap for peace between Palestinians and Israel as UN policy, explicitly endorses a permanent two-state solution to the conflict and calls on the sides to implement their obligations under the roadmap. These include a cessation of violence, reform of the Palestinian authority, dismantling the terrorist infrastructure on the part of the Palestinians, and dismantling of illegal outposts by Israel. The resolution gave new life to the faltering roadmap following the fall of the reformist Palestinian government of Mahmoud Abbas and continued violence initiated by both sides.

The UN press release noted:

The Security Council this afternoon endorsed the Middle East Quartet's Road Map towards a permanent, two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

By its unanimous adoption of resolution 1515 (2003), the Council called on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the plan in cooperation with the Quartet.

In its preambular section, the text also reiterated the Council's demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction. It emphasized that a just and lasting peace should take into account the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian question.

[On 20 December 2002, the "Quartet" (Russian Federation, United States, European Union, United Nations) reached agreement on the text of the Road Map with the goal of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ending the occupation that

began in 1967. That goal was to be achieved on the basis of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the principle of land for peace, Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002), agreements reached previously by the parties, and the "Arab Initiative" of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed by the Council of the League of Arab States on 28 March 2002. The performance-based and goal-driven Road Map presented clear phases, time lines, target dates and benchmarks aimed at the progression by the two parties through reciprocal steps in the political, security, economic, humanitarian and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The Road Map was officially submitted to the parties on 30 April 2003.]

### **Resolution 1515 (2003)**

The Security Council,

"Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and the Madrid principles,

"Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events in the Middle East,

"Reiterating the demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction,

"Reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,

"Emphasising the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks,

"Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet and others,

- "1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529);
- "2. Calls on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security;
- "3. Decides to remain seized of the matter."

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