



CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AMONG ELITES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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THE ROLE OF ELITES IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES

In Western democracies the theory of pluralist democracy is widely used as a model of the process of opinion and policy formation. In its classic version, this theory was conceived as a participatory model whose central variables were multiple group memberships and the concept of cross-pressures. V. Pareto, G. Mosca, M. Ostrogorski, and R. Michels, however, earlier contended that the "masses" are unable to rule themselves and that the existence of elites or ruling classes is universal. Later, the results of empirical political research also called into question the validity of the assumptions of the classic theory of pluralistic

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democracy with regard to the number and meaning of multiple group memberships, the extent of active political participation, and the existence of a broad consensus on basic values and the "rules of the game" within the general population.

In the "realistic" theory of democracy, therefore, instead of individuals and groups, it is the elites who are considered to be the main political actors in the processes of interest articulation and policy formation. Thus, modern pluralist theory and elite theory both agree "that leadership groups and their interrelationships are the theoretical key to the explanation of political behavior" (Balbus, 1975:237). There is, however, no agreement between these two schools of thought concerning the nature and composition of elites or the limitations set on elite actions by the social structure. While power elite theorists assume a somewhat oversimplified relation between economic status and political power, the pluralists have neglected the impact of socioeconomic and institutional structures on the policy formation process.

In the following, starting with a brief description of the structural features of the social and political system,¹ we will investigate the nature of elites in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the opportunities for cooperation and conflict among different elites. The first part will be devoted to the analysis of the social distances between elite groups, i.e., background and career differences which can create barriers to intersectoral communication and thus lead to difficulties in reaching agreement on collective decisions within the elites.

In the second part, investigating the political beliefs of elites, we want to show the main cleavage lines within the elites. In a pluralist society, such conflicts of interests or values must be considered as normal. Their rational settlement requires, however, the acceptance of certain rules of the game by the conflicting parties. These rules normally include the acceptance of political institutions such as general elections, party competition, and the majority principle, i.e., the general willingness to cooperate and compromise with competing groups in a pluralist process of policy formation. Therefore, we shall also investigate whether such a consensus on the rules of the game exists within the West German elite.

Given the decline of traditional patterns of ruling class homogeneity based on social ties and homogeneous political outlooks, we assume that more formalized interactions such as multiple position holding and role-related contacts to a wide range of organizations prevail among modern elites. These will be analyzed in the last part of the paper.

DEFINING LEADERSHIP GROUPS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

We shall try to answer the questions raised above by analyzing the data of an elite survey carried out in 1972.² Like previous empirical studies on national elites in the Federal Republic this study proceeded from a positional approach defining

the elites as holders of top positions in the most important organizations of society, (Edinger, 1960; Deutsch and Edinger, 1959; Zapf, 1965; Wildenmann, 1968; Enke, 1974; Roth, 1976). This implies the assumption that power is organized in terms of division of labor. As a first step it requires the identification of relevant organizations, an undertaking which is, however, not without problems. In doing this "one has to rely on what overall knowledge one has of the system under investigation. There is no question that an ample portion of arbitrary judgment is involved as long as sound theories of the system's structure and behavior are lacking." (Schleth, 1971:103). Zapf, reviewing the different approaches to solving this problem in a theoretically and analytically coherent fashion, comes to the conclusion that they all have proved to be inadequate and that lists of groups and positions "which have been drawn up by informed social scientists using their considered 'judgment'" have worked best (1965:68).

For the purpose of the survey of 1972 three main sectors were identified: the private sector, the mass media, and the political-administrative sector. In the private sector, those subsectors and organizations were selected which have the greatest potential for the organization and assertion of special interests, i.e., business, business associations, and trade unions. The mass media were included because of the crucial role they play in the opinion-formation process. In West Germany, the press and the broadcasting media as two distinctive subsectors are organized in two different ways: the press on a private enterprise basis and the broadcasting media on the basis of support from public bodies financed by government-regulated revenues, (i.e., fees paid by the consumers), and controlled by boards composed of representatives of major organizations of the private sector such as political parties, churches, and other voluntary associations. The political sector was represented by position holders in the federal and state administrations,³ legislatures, and political parties as well as the civil service and the military. After having identified all relevant position holders they were asked for an interview. The overall response rate was 60.2 percent.

In the following, we give a brief description of the composition of the different elite groups ("sectors") which were included in the analysis:

- *Federal government and federal parliament (Bundestag)* (n = 100)—cabinet members and junior ministers within the federal government; chairmen and deputy chairmen of permanent committees, parliamentary party groups, and permanent working groups of the parliamentary parties within the Bundestag; spokesmen of the parliamentary party groups for the different policy areas
- *State governments* (n = 82)—all cabinet members
- *Political parties* (n = 68)—members of the national committees of the political parties represented in the Bundestag (CDU, SPD, FDP), as well as the chairmen and deputy chairmen of these parties on the state level (including the CSU)
- *Federal political civil servants* (n = 78)—administrative heads (*Staatssekretäre*) and department heads of federal ministries

- *Permanent federal civil servants* (n = 138)—subdepartment heads in federal ministries; heads of the most important federal agencies
- *State political civil servants* (n = 53)—administrative heads of state ministries
- *Permanent state civil servants* (n = 209)—department heads in state ministries
- *Mass media* (n = 224)—managing directors, program directors, editors-in-chief, and heads of politically relevant departments of the broadcasting stations (n = 94); the editors-in-chief and heads of political and economic desks of daily and weekly newspapers with a circulation of at least 100,000 copies and those of leading magazines (n = 130)
- *Publishers* (n = 38)—publishers and managing directors of the newspapers and magazines in the above categories
- *Big business* (n = 173)—leading members of the executive boards, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the boards of directors of the largest business corporations (industry, trade, service)
- *Banks and insurance companies* (n = 74)—leading members of the executive boards, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the boards of directors of the largest financial corporations
- *Business associations* (n = 101)—chairmen or presidents and their deputies as well as managing directors of the federal top associations of business
- *Small business associations* (n = 20)—presidents and vice-presidents as well as managing directors of the federal associations of small business enterprises such as crafts and retail trade
- *Agricultural associations* (n = 53)—presidents or chairman and their deputies as well as managing directors of the agricultural associations at the federal and state level
- *Trade unions* (n = 62)—chairmen and their deputies as well as managing directors of federal labor associations, i.e., the leading position holders in the top association and the member unions of the DGB (German Trade Union Federation) and the DAG (German white-collar employees union)
- *Science and higher education* (n = 46)—presidents of universities (*Rektoren*), as well as the chairmen and managing directors of the biggest research organizations and science foundations
- *Military* (n = 41)—position holders in the highest echelons of the military hierarchy (generals and admirals)

ELITE RECRUITMENT

The differentiation of modern industrial societies and the resulting autonomy of different sectors make communication and cooperation between various group representatives more difficult. Formerly, social homogeneity made communica-

tion and cooperation easier between segmented groups by means of a "common language" (Dahrendorf, 1965; Edinger and Searing, 1967).

Social Profiles

Since the beginning of this century the characteristics of the German leadership class have changed noticeably (Zapf, 1965). This change was caused in part by the two world wars—especially by World War II—and their consequences, such as the breakdown of the economy and a massive population displacement which blurred the traditional lines of social cleavage (Lepsius, 1974), quite apart from the elimination of leadership personnel (i.e., the nobility and large landowners). A second important contributing factor was the development of the Federal Republic of Germany into a modern industrial society with its changing requirements as to the number of leaders needed as well as their specialized qualifications; today, criteria of achievement are stressed more than intimate ties.

Despite the disintegration of the traditional class structure, membership in a particular social stratum is still significant from the standpoint of either a common or dividing socialization. An analysis of the social status (or class membership) of incumbents of top leadership positions documents a shift in the basis of recruitment from a pattern of predominantly upper-class recruitment to a stronger representation of the middle class (Lepsius, 1974:180): almost two-thirds of the respondents came from a middle or lower-middle-class background (Table 1).

Within the elite sectors certain concentrations can be seen. Thus, the scientific-educational and military sectors as well as the business associations are disproportionately recruited from the upper class (between 40 and 49 percent). The portion coming from the lower class is disproportionately high among trade union leaders (16.7 percent), as is to be expected, but also among Bundestag leaders, where a substantial proportion are of lower-class origins. This is mainly due to the SPD members of Parliament: whereas the CDU/CSU and the FDP parliamentary parties are, in terms of class origins, concentrated in the lower middle class (50.0 and 55.6 percent, respectively) and draw hardly at all from the lower class, one-quarter of the SPD parliamentary leadership group are of lower-class origins and only about one-third (34.3 percent) come from the lower middle class. Similar social background patterns were found among the state government and the party elites.

By and large, the social distances among the majority of the members of the elite have shrunk; this tendency is strengthened by the fact that most of the sectors are relatively heterogeneous in their recruitment pattern. Nevertheless, entry into leadership positions for persons of lower-class origins is largely restricted to trade unions and the SPD.

To be sure, the family's social status determines to a large degree the kind and

Table 1. Social Class Origin^a (percentages)

	<i>Upper Class</i>	<i>Upper Middle Class</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Lower Class</i>
Federal government/parliament	19.3 ^b	25.0	44.3	11.4
State governments	26.1	21.7	42.0	10.1
Political parties	23.7	22.0	45.8	8.5
Political civil servants, federal level	29.9	38.8	28.4	3.0
Permanent civil servants, federal level	36.0	32.4	29.7	1.8
Political civil servants, state level	34.1	34.1	27.3	4.5
Permanent civil servants, state level	33.0	35.1	28.2	3.7
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Mass media	30.9	23.4	38.9	6.9
Publishers	32.3	35.5	29.0	3.2
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Big business	32.7	28.7	34.7	4.0
Banks/insurance companies	34.4	26.6	35.9	3.1
Business associations	48.9	25.6	23.3	2.2
Small business associations	—	62.5	31.3	6.3
Agricultural associations	14.0	20.9	60.5	4.7
Trade unions	3.7	11.1	68.5	16.7
Science/higher education	46.2	33.3	20.5	—
Military	48.6	28.6	20.0	2.9

^aThe classification is based on the Kleinig-Moore Scale [*Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 12(1960):86ff.; 20(1968):502ff.], modified by the level of father's education.

^bPercentaging on the basis of classifiable responses. The percentage of classifiable responses was, on the average, 85%.

extent of the education of their children; modern industrial societies require abilities and knowledge which can be acquired only by means of extensive education and on-the-job-training. Consequently, today, a formal education is a prerequisite for entry into leadership positions. Since this applies to all sectors, we did not expect to find large educational differences among the individual sectors; the data in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis.

Usually the education level of elites is very high: about two-thirds of the leaders graduated from a university, in contrast to only three percent of the general population. This means that a large part of the leadership personnel have attended similar educational institutions and have internalized the same or similar norms. This process influences individual communication patterns: as long as a high formal level of education is generally recognized as a recruitment mechanism, this standard will also be applied to partners and opponents in the political interactional process. An equally high educational level in all elite groups can thus reduce communication barriers that result from differences in class origin.

A high level of formal education has always been characteristic of the top

Table 2. Educational Level (percentages)

	<i>University Degree</i>	<i>High School Diploma (Abitur)</i>	<i>Lower Educational Level</i>
Federal government/parliament	55.6	17.2	27.3
State governments	70.6	11.0	18.3
Political parties	52.2	22.4	25.3
Political civil servants, federal level	96.2	2.6	1.3
Permanent civil servants, federal level	97.1	2.2	0.7
Political civil servants, state level	94.3	1.9	3.8
Permanent civil servants, state level	98.1	1.0	1.0

Mass media	32.6	55.7	11.8
Publishers	65.8	23.7	10.6
Big business	73.4	17.3	9.2
Banks/insurance companies	75.7	12.2	12.2
Business associations	82.2	9.9	8.0
Small business associations	80.0	5.0	15.0
Agricultural associations	64.2	9.4	26.4
Trade unions	23.7	8.5	77.8
Science/higher education	95.6	2.2	2.2
Military	22.5	75.0	2.5

administrative positions because of the statutory formal entry requirements; quite obviously this also applies to the representatives of the scientific-academic group—almost exclusively professors—who are correspondingly homogeneous. In addition, the economic elites have supplemented the managerial criteria of initiative, willingness to take risks, and managerial abilities with academic studies (Kruk, 1972:73).

Three groups in particular deviate noticeably from the norm of a high level of formal education: union leaders, journalists, and military leaders. But even in these three groups the level of education rose during recent decades (Zapf, 1965). This also applies to politicians, whose level of education is somewhat below the overall elite average. A breakdown by party reflects the earlier social background findings: compared to 73.5 percent of university graduates among CDU/CSU leaders and 57.5 percent among FDP leaders, of the SPD politicians only 46.2 percent are university graduates.

In summary, the West German elite is not homogeneous, at least with regard to class origins and education. Some concentrations were detected in the indicators selected; however, in general, the sectors are too heterogeneous to assume patterns of specific and autonomous social recruitment. The social background of top position incumbents is thus relatively neutral as far as the interaction among

groups is concerned—that is, it neither strengthens the communication barriers due to the division of labor nor contributes to the reduction of existing barriers due to the lack of social homogeneity.

Religious ties have traditionally been a part of elite social background analysis, since they may contain a potential for conflict on questions which concern the value system of a society. The religious cleavage was for a long time an important characteristic of German social structure which led to social and political tensions (Lepsius, 1974). This situation was reflected by the underrepresentation of Catholics among the political, administrative, economic, and cultural leadership of Germany since the founding of the German Empire in 1871 (Lepsius, 1974; Zapf, 1965; Peisert, 1967). In the overall elite sample 56 percent belonged to the Protestant church and 28.5 percent to the Catholic church, compared to 49 percent and 44.6 percent in the West German population.

A relatively balanced relationship (Table 3) between Protestants and Catholics is found in the Bundestag sample (47.3 percent Protestant, 44.0 percent Catholic), which is a result of the overrepresentation of Catholics in the CDU/CSU (56.1 percent). In the federal administration—among both political and permanent civil servants—the number of Catholics has increased; this is due in part to the previous CDU/CSU governments and the “religious proportionality arithmetic” (i.e., Protestant–Catholic balance) which they practiced in top civil

Table 3. Church Membership^a (percentages)

	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>No Religious Affiliation</i>
Federal government/parliament	49.0	41.0	9.0
State governments	52.4	26.8	18.3
Political parties	57.4	22.1	20.6
Political civil servants, federal level	56.4	39.7	3.8
Permanent civil servants, federal level	57.2	34.1	8.7
Political civil servants, state level	73.6	17.0	9.4
Permanent civil servants, state level	65.9	29.3	4.3
Mass media	47.8	30.4	21.4
Publishers	47.4	34.2	18.4
Big business	57.2	26.0	16.2
Banks/insurance companies	50.0	29.7	18.9
Business associations	76.2	16.8	5.9
Small business associations	65.0	25.0	10.0
Agricultural associations	66.0	32.1	1.9
Trade unions	40.3	32.3	27.4
Science/higher education	67.4	19.6	13.0
Military	68.3	24.4	4.9

^aMembership in other churches was mentioned by only nine respondents (0.6%)

service and other appointments; the number of Catholics in the trade union elite results from the existence of specifically Catholic labor organizations.

However, it should be noted that there are scarcely any religious cleavages in the West German population today which could be transmitted into the elite stratum. Moreover, the church has lost significance as a value-setting institution. This is shown by the fact that a federal government was elected which is not viewed as one which represents religious interests (Kaltefleiter, 1973:95). The growing number of incumbents of top positions without church membership—which, at almost 13 percent, is twice as high as in the West German population (about 6 percent)—likewise supports this assertion.

Professional Recruitment

The following considerations are based on the assumption that the behavioral potential of a person is determined largely by the internalization of professional norms or role expectations—a hypothesis which is supported by recent empirical studies of elite groups (Barton, 1973; Schleth, 1971; Searing, 1968/69). The dominant factor in these professional experiences is membership in a particular functional group. The intensity of this socialization process depends on the duration of the process and on the exclusiveness of such experiences.

For the different sectors this means that their behavioral potential depends on the degree of professionalization—that is, on the extent to which the careers of their members are exclusively within that professional area. The more specialized the career and the more autonomous the recruitment of the sectors, the greater will be the probability of interelite conflict (Keller, 1968; Enke, 1974; Eisenstadt, 1967). Whether this problem is found in the West German leadership and, if so, to what extent, will be investigated below on the basis of indicators of the sector of one's first position, careers completely in one sector, frequency of change of sector, and the extent of intersector elite circulation.

Indeed, the actual process of professional socialization begins with entry into the first professional position. To some extent, however, the "switches" are already set for starting out in a particular professional area by the choice of a specific field of training or course of academic studies. The relationship between the course of studies and the first position proves to be stronger than that between the course of studies and present elite sector membership. This indicates that the decision about a particular starting position is not equivalent to lasting ties to one sector.

Strictly speaking, one cannot take professionalization to mean that all the positions of a respondent from the first to the present one have been held within one sector. Concentrating, however, on the first, the most homogeneous group seems to be the mass media elite (Table 4). The extent of self-recruitment in the administration is surprisingly low, considering the traditional German concept of a career system and of the career civil servant (*Laufbahnbeamten*). This is so,

Table 4. Professional Socialization Factors (in percentages)

	<i>First Position in Present Sector</i>	<i>All Positions in Same Sector</i>	<i>Positions in More than Two Sectors</i>	<i>Top Position in Other Sectors</i>
Federal government/parliament	14.0	5.1	44.9	8.0
State governments	6.4	4.9	62.2	24.4
Political parties	21.0	9.0	43.3	8.8
Political civil servants, federal level	49.4	32.1	25.6	10.3
Permanent civil servants, federal level	42.3	29.7	23.2	2.2
Political civil servants, state level	43.4	18.9	41.5	18.9
Permanent civil servants, state level	51.5	34.9	16.3	3.3
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Mass media	79.1	61.9	7.1	1.8
Publishers	45.7	32.4	21.6	15.8
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Big business	67.5	60.1	10.4	1.2
Banks/insurance companies	61.5	54.1	19.0	6.8
Business associations	24.5	42.6	22.8	27.7
Small business associations	50.0	50.0	15.0	15.0
Agricultural associations	28.6	32.1	13.2	9.4
Trade unions	15.8	4.8	40.3	1.6
Science/higher education	67.4	39.1	17.4	2.2
Military	85.4	2.4	21.9	—

even though activities on all administrative levels, including local government, were counted as a same-sector start [see Steinkemper (1974) for a discussion of the implication of this]. Indeed, an additional 11 percent of the political and 23 percent of the permanent civil servants began their careers in the judiciary, i.e., in an area that is close to that of the administration in terms of the substantive socialization process.

The low within-sector recruitment of leaders of business associations can be traced to the fact that they usually start their careers in a business enterprise, and it is only after a few years that they change to a corresponding association. If these people are added, the proportion of within-sector recruitment in this group approaches that of the industrialists (about 67 percent); however, these numbers are still lower than previous studies led us to expect (Kruk, 1972; Pross and Boetticher, 1971). In the trade unions there are comparatively fewer full-time salaried positions on the lower organizational levels, where most of the union jobs are done on a honorary basis. For this reason, trade union leaders normally begin their careers as workers or employees either in the private sector (43.9 percent) or in the public service sector (31.6 percent).

The lowest degree of professionalization is found in the political area. This is due both to the lack of full-time beginning or "learning" positions in the political subsystem and to the view that qualifications gained from a nonpolitical profession are an important prerequisite for assuming political functions or office.

The impression of relative heterogeneity of careers gained from the analysis of starting positions is confirmed by an analysis of sector change over the entire course of professional careers (see Table 4). Only a third of the elite members held positions exclusively in one sector over the course of their entire careers; in fact, about one-quarter have been active in at least three sectors. Especially high is the number of sector changers in the political area: only 5 percent of the overall political elite sample have had exclusively political careers, whereas one-half had professional experiences in at least three areas. There were only insignificant differences among the political parties.

Journalists demonstrated the greatest homogeneity, followed by economic leadership groups. In these areas, exchange mainly takes place with only one other sector; apart from this, there is little intersector exchange, even less than in the group of top civil servants. The members of the military elite stand out by their high rate of extrasector recruitment, in contrast to the high rate of within-starting positions: only 2 percent can look back on exclusively military careers, compared to about three-quarters who were active in at least one other professional area; an explanation of this is that these other professional activities were often transitional positions that bridged the period between the end of the World War II and the formation of the West German armed forces (Bundeswehr).

Often taken as a further indicator of career homogeneity/heterogeneity is the extent of elite circulation, i.e., the exchange of top position holders among the

various sectors (Mills, 1956; Enke, 1974; Porter, 1966). Indeed, about one-third of the members of the elite had previously held a top position, but only 8 percent had held one in another sector. One can thus hardly speak of a high rate of elite circulation. An exception to this general pattern is the state government elite, which is recruited, to a large extent, from among top civil servants, a related area. In contrast to this, election to the Bundestag takes place almost exclusively from among those having a preelite status. Because of the risks involved in elective political office, potential leaders on the higher rungs of the career ladder are normally lost to politics (von Beyme, 1971). Moreover, a parliamentary career has become increasingly unattractive, especially for industrialists and businessmen, since today other more effective ways of interest articulation are available [see Neumann (1979) for a discussion of this point]. Economic association leaders exhibit an above-average rate of elite circulation, most of which, however, involves exchange with the business sector; there, too, elite exchange takes place only between related sectors.

In summary, we can say that during a professional career, experiences are often gathered from different sectors, with considerable variations among the elite groups in the extent of intersector exchange. However, upon achieving a top position there is practically no more change, or at best, only between related sectors. When this primarily formal consideration of career structures is supplemented by a classification of the specific area activities over the course of entire careers (Table 5), affinities between certain sectors are seen which can modify the results of previous studies of social and professional recruitment.

In the first place, it was found that a large majority of each group—between 70 and almost 100 percent—had already held at least one position in their present sector before their current one; as a rule, the last steps of the career ladder are within one sector. However, this does not explain anything about the time preceding this stage—whether, and to what extent, varied activities were performed and thereby different socialization experiences were undergone.

The political elites are recruited on the broadest base; they combine personnel from all the other groups, which supports the impression of heterogeneous career patterns that has been found in this study. The present position of almost 30 percent of the politicians is the first political office that they have held; they were previously active exclusively in other sectors. A breakdown of political leaders by party reveals several contrasting differences: whereas there is an above-average proportion of former civil servants among CDU/CSU leaders, the SPD has the most trade unionists, and middle-class professions dominate in the FDP.

In the ministerial bureaucracy it is also seen that a large number of “outsiders” rose to leading positions, many of whom had previously never been active in the administration. This proportion is naturally higher among political than among permanent civil servants; it is noticeably high among state ministry heads, for about one-third of whom their present position is their first administrative function. The largest group of civil servants with occupational experi-

	<i>Politics</i>	<i>Admini- stration</i>	<i>Mass Media</i>	<i>Big Busi- ness Enter- prises</i>	<i>Banks/ Insur- ance</i>	<i>Business Associa- tions</i>	<i>Small Business/ Pro- fessionals</i>	<i>Agri- culture</i>	<i>Labor Or- ganiza- tions</i>	<i>Science/ Higher Education</i>	<i>Educa- tion</i>	<i>Judiciary (Without Lawyers)</i>
Federal government/parliament	71.0 ^b	16.0	21.0	14.0	2.0	4.0	16.0	10.0	8.0	11.0	8.0	14.0
State governments	70.7	32.9	9.8	9.8	4.9	8.5	20.7	6.1	13.4	18.3	13.4	18.3
Political parties	76.5	16.2	14.7	16.2	4.4	—	22.1	4.4	10.3	8.8	11.8	14.8
Political civil servants, federal level	17.9	87.2	2.6	16.7	2.6	2.6	10.3	1.3	7.7	20.5	2.6	15.4
Permanent civil servants, federal level	7.2	92.0	5.8	15.2	2.2	3.6	3.6	0.7	1.4	15.9	5.1	24.6
Political civil servants, state level	18.9	66.0	9.4	17.0	1.9	5.7	13.2	3.8	7.5	20.8	9.4	18.9
Permanent civil servants, state level	9.6	90.0	2.4	9.1	2.4	3.3	8.1	3.8	3.3	10.5	6.7	25.8

Mass media	4.0	3.6	98.2	5.8	—	0.9	1.3	0.4	4.0	7.6	5.4	1.8
Publishers	10.5	5.3	84.2	18.4	—	2.6	15.8	2.6	—	5.3	7.9	5.3
Big business	1.7	11.6	1.7	88.4	1.7	6.4	16.8	1.1	1.1	15.0	2.3	9.2
Banks/insurance companies	5.4	10.8	2.7	24.3	82.4	5.4	10.8	1.4	1.4	5.4	6.8	13.9
Business associations	11.9	13.9	4.0	46.5	5.9	52.5	17.8	1.0	3.0	16.8	3.0	13.5
Small business associations	20.0	15.0	—	20.0	—	15.0	80.0	5.0	—	5.0	—	10.0
Agricultural associations	13.2	17.0	—	13.2	9.4	3.8	1.9	83.0	—	26.4	5.7	3.8
Trade unions	16.1	17.7	6.5	32.3	3.2	1.6	9.7	—	80.6	1.6	24.2	8.1
Science/higher education	6.5	13.0	4.3	26.1	—	4.3	6.5	—	8.7	100.0	6.5	4.3
Military	7.3	36.6	19.5	39.0	—	2.4	9.8	2.4	2.4	12.2	7.3	2.4

^aOther areas were hardly mentioned, so they are not considered here. A coding of the exchange with the military area could not be done since it could not be determined from the responses what the exact status of the military service was, i.e., whether draftee or professional soldier. The number who had military service was about the same for all sectors—between 20 and 30 percent.

^bBecause of multiple responses, the totals may exceed 100%.

ence outside the administration is recruited from other areas of public service, such as science and education or justice, but a considerable group also comes from the industrial sector. Moreover, almost one-fifth of the political civil servants had acquired political experience. The administration itself represents, next to business and industry, the most significant pool for all other sectors. Journalists exhibit the highest degree of autonomy; they show almost exclusively intrasector recruitment patterns and they supply few, if any, personnel to other sectors.

Business groups are recruited on a relatively broad basis. However, the aforementioned selection mechanism begins early and leads to comparatively homogeneous careers—there is subsequent exchange of personnel only from big business companies to the business associations. It is striking that the business associations, as the special organized interest representation for this sector, send fewer personnel to the political and administrative areas than do big business, small business, and professionals. These latter groups additionally serve as recruitment bases for all other groups.

The recruitment of union leaders is also heterogeneous, but with concentrations in the industrial sector and in public service (administration and education). Few personnel are supplied to other sectors, though some go to the political elite, almost exclusively the SPD.

What significance can be attributed to these recruitment patterns with regard to communication and cooperation among the elites? The political-administrative area is placed at the center of the multiple crisscrossing professional connections. In the political-administrative elite an understanding of the specific interests and concerns of almost all other social groups included in this study is acquired and integrated. Barriers due to social background and education—especially in the political area—are to a great extent dismantled, so that an openness to communication and cooperation on the part of both groups can be expected. However, there is a greater affinity between politicians and union leaders, on the one hand, and civil servants and business leaders, on the other (a relation that we shall discuss later). Near the edge of the elite exchange process—and therefore probably also of the interactional process—are to be found the leaders of the mass media; for them, however, an independent and autonomous position seems appropriate.

In summary, with regard to either social or professional recruitment we cannot speak of a homogeneous leadership stratum. However, neither can we find the other extreme pattern of autonomous, homogeneous elites, made possible by differentiation of tasks and division of labor, which has often been postulated to exist in Germany.

POLITICAL BELIEFS

The term *political beliefs* is used here as a global concept under which a number of different assessments and evaluations of specific aspects of West German

society and politics are subsumed. Assessment of the distribution of power, evaluations of this power distribution, support for or opposition to a number of political goals, and basic questions of the political opinion-formation process will be analyzed. Thus, our approach here will differ from that of previous sections, since more than only elite sector membership will be considered. Elite sector membership is of course an important independent variable in the formation of political beliefs (e.g., Edinger and Searing, 1967), but in addition to it a second variable, the party preference of the respondents, will be investigated. This is important in two ways. First, a relationship between elite sector membership and party preference can be presumed. Second, party preference assumes an important role with regard to specific political beliefs because, in Western democracies which do not have segmented political subcultures, the dominant camps of social conflict are defined in conflicts between or among the political parties (see, e.g., Hoffmann-Lange, 1977; Lepsius, 1973; Massing, 1974).

The comparison between the party politicians and the other sectors helps to identify more party-specific conflicts in contrast to more sector-specific conflicts, and to answer the question as to what extent the existing party system is able to transform the sector-specific conflicts into political conflicts.

Party Preference and Party Membership

Before presenting the results of the analyses, a few notes concerning the nature of the party system at the time of the survey are necessary. The reformation of the political parties after World War II led to a large number of parties and to a fragmentation of the party system during the first years of the Federal Republic. Since then the party system has shrunk to three parties which together hold more than 90 percent of the seats in the Bundestag. These are the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU), the CSU (Christian Social Union) being limited to Bavaria; the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP); and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

On the federal level the "bourgeois" parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) were dominant during the postwar period. During the decade of the 1950s the CDU/CSU increased its share at the cost of the small splinter parties, while the electoral results for its coalition partner, the FDP, fluctuated at around 10 percent of the votes. The SPD was at first relatively weak (about 30 percent), but by expanding into a "catchall" party, it not only increased its proportion of the votes but also became an acceptable coalition partner for the other parties. However, only between 1972 and 1976 did it hold a plurality of the seats in the Bundestag.

After internal crises in the CDU/CSU and increasing tensions in the governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP there evolved a grand coalition between the two large parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, in 1966. At this time a shift within the FDP in favor of the social-liberal wing of the party took place. In 1969 this party formed a coalition with the SPD, in spite of a narrow parliamentary majority. This social-liberal coalition maintained a majority in the Bundestag

until 1982 while the CDU/CSU continued to dominate the Bundesrat (Federal Council, the second chamber of the legislature). In the spring of 1972, at the time when our elite survey was carried out, the political climate was especially strained: the federal government in May 1972 barely survived a vote of no confidence.

The 250 politicians interviewed in this study are distributed among the four parties as follows:

100 SPD politicians	(40.0%)
83 CDU politicians	(33.2%)
24 CSU politicians	(9.6%) and
42 FDP politicians	(16.8%) ⁴

In other sectors the business leaders⁵ and the military, in particular, show a clear affinity for the CDU/CSU, and the union leaders express an equally clear affinity for the SPD, while the administration, mass media, publishers, and science leaders distribute their partisan preferences more evenly among all political parties.

A comparison of the party preferences of all the nonpolitical sectors with the results of the 1969 and the 1972 federal elections shows clear differences between the party preferences of West German elites and the general electorate:

		<i>SPD</i>	<i>FDP</i>	<i>CDU/CSU</i>
Nonpolitical elite	1972	29.5%	13.4%	51.7%
Federal elections	1969	42.7%	5.8%	46.1%
Federal elections	1972	45.8%	8.4%	44.9%

Support for the CDU/CSU and for the FDP is higher, and support for the SPD lower, among the nonpolitical elite than in the electorate. The rate of party membership of the nonpolitical elite (Table 6) is strikingly high—about 10 times the rate of the general electorate (39.3 percent, compared to only about 4 percent).

In this general pattern we see, however, clear sector-specific differences: the lowest proportion of party members is found among military leaders, business leaders, and the press, whereas the highest proportion of party members is found in the trade unions. The relatively large number of party members in the administration and in radio and television can be explained as primarily due to the fact that appointments to leadership positions in these sectors are increasingly dominated by the political parties.⁶

Attitudes towards Democratic "Rules of the Game"

The theory of democratic elitism proceeds from the assumption that a minimum consensus on basic democratic values (the so-called rules of the game) is a

Table 6. Party Preferences (percentages)

	<i>Party Preference</i>			<i>No Party Preference</i>	<i>Party Members</i>
	<i>SPD</i>	<i>FDP</i>	<i>CDU/CSU</i>		
Political civil servants, federal level	46.2	21.8	24.4	7.7	53.8
Permanent civil servants, federal level	34.1	15.9	37.0	13.0	34.8
Political civil servants, state level	37.7	15.1	39.6	7.5	84.9
Permanent civil servants, state level	27.8	10.5	57.9	3.8	55.5
<hr/>					
Mass media: press	41.5	16.9	38.5	3.1	20.8
Mass media: radio/television	56.4	7.4	34.1	2.1	51.1
Publishers	23.7	23.7	50.0	2.6	28.9
Big business	8.7	11.0	75.8	4.6	19.1
Banks/insurance companies	17.6	9.5	73.0	—	32.4
Business associations	5.9	16.8	69.3	7.9	24.8
Small business associations	10.0	15.0	65.0	10.0	30.0
Agricultural associations	7.5	17.0	73.6	1.9	41.5
Trade unions	74.2	3.2	21.0	1.6	88.7
Science/higher education	43.5	23.9	30.5	2.2	28.3
Military	9.8	2.4	73.1	14.6	—

necessary prerequisite, above all among the elites, for the successful functioning of a democratic political system. Many studies have found that this consensus is higher among political activists than among the general electorate. The former are therefore characterized as the "carriers of the creed" (Prothro and Grigg, 1969:239).

In the following, we investigate whether such a consensus on basic democratic values exists among the West German leadership stratum and, if so, which values such a consensus includes. In this connection another question can be answered. It is often contended that the rejection of the rules of the game of democratic politics by a large part of the German elite contributed decisively to the downfall of the Weimar Republic while, at the same time, the high degree of continuity of leadership groups in the German administration and in the economy was retained. The question therefore arises of whether this assertion still applies a quarter of a century after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. Answers to these questions are based on elite respondents' judgments of seven statements which contain acceptance of governmental control, the interplay of government and opposition, pluralistic power play, general elections, and the principle of (political) compromise (see Table 7). One can find a real consensus, operationally defined as more than 80 percent agreement among all elite groups, concerning only two of the seven statements of the democratic rules of the game. These relate to the readiness to compromise in political disputes and the decision of the citizenry on the formation of governments and governmental programs via general elections. A consensus of over 60 percent in all groups, except the economic (57.8 percent), was also found concerning a statement about the prece-

Table 7. Attitudes Toward Democratic Rules of the Game

	<i>SPD Politicians</i>	<i>FDP Politicians</i>	<i>CDU Politicians</i>	<i>CSU Politicians</i>	<i>Ministerial Bureaucracy^a</i>	<i>Mass Media^a</i>	<i>Publishers</i>	<i>Business^a</i>	<i>Trade Unions</i>	<i>Science/Higher Education</i>	<i>Military</i>
<i>Percentage of disapproval for:</i>											
In the Federal Republic an effective public control of the government is of less importance than the fact that there exists a strong, purposeful, and efficient government.	84.8	88.1	71.1	60.0	67.6	78.2	70.3	57.8	76.7	72.7	69.2
Stability and continuity of political leadership are more important for the Federal Republic than the highest possible chance of replacing the governing party by the opposition.	67.0	76.2	39.2	40.0	46.7	58.9	58.3	36.4	67.7	51.1	34.2
Democracy in West Germany is possible in the long run only if a strong political leadership disregards all group interests.	60.8	57.1	36.4	38.1	56.8	69.8	67.6	49.5	80.6	68.2	55.3

The general well-being in the Federal Republic and the interests of the entire population are basically endangered by the continuous demands and disputes of the pressure groups.	70.1	61.9	41.0	42.9	53.0	62.6	52.8	50.3	85.5	68.9	51.3
It is not necessary to decide conflicts openly in order to find socially just solutions.	60.8	71.4	53.9	45.0	57.8	69.5	50.0	38.9	70.5	64.4	61.5
<i>Percentage of approval for:</i>											
Even the one who is right in a dispute should be ready to search for a compromise.	92.8	81.0	93.5	85.7	89.6	86.5	91.9	91.1	79.0	84.1	87.2
In a democracy the population must have the highest influence possible on the composition and program of the government by voting in general elections.	93.5	85.7	85.3	75.0	86.2	84.7	86.5	88.0	86.9	93.2	87.2

^aThe groups in these areas were combined, since there were practically no attitudinal differences among them.

dence of public control vis-à-vis the freedom of action of the government. On all other statements agreement is lower, sometimes below 50 percent.⁷ This corresponds to empirical findings in the United States (Prothro and Grigg, 1969; McClosky, 1964). Even within the leadership stratum the consensus on democratic values is more partial and fragmentary than complete.

In order to provide a comparison among groups, the mean rate of agreement was calculated for each group; this yielded the following rank-ordering:

Trade unions	78.1%
SPD politicians	75.7%
FDP politicians	74.5%
Mass media	72.9%
Science and higher education	71.8%
Publishers	68.2%
Ministerial bureaucracy	65.4%
Armed forces	63.4%
CDU politicians	60.1%
Business	58.9%
CSU politicians	55.2%

Thus, throughout, there are rather marked differences within and among the elite groups in the area of democratic values. The two groups traditionally regarded as more authoritarian—administration and business—are so in the lower level of adherence to basic democratic values, but they do not depart substantially from the overall elite average (63.6 percent). There is, therefore, no continuation in the Federal Republic of Germany of the dichotomy between the prosystem political parties and other elite groups (antisystem groups) which was characteristic of the Weimar Republic. To be sure, the consensus on these items is in general not especially high, but the values which are basic to the legitimacy and functioning of a democratic order—namely, acceptance of the principle of general elections and willingness to compromise—nevertheless find broad endorsement by all groups.

Over and above the acceptance of the democratic rules of the game, a minimal consensus on substantive issues is required for the successful functioning of a pluralistic social order; most important is consensus on the basic principles of the economic order (Bachrach, 1962; Lehbruch, 1969)—specifically, in the Federal Republic of Germany, in support of the “social market economy” (*Soziale Marktwirtschaft*). This position is supported by more than 80 percent of the interviewed elites in all groups. Their attitudes toward European integration, which in the long run will decisively influence the national decision-making structures, also reveals consensus: the issue “renunciation of national sovereignty in favor of European unity” finds broad agreement (a minimum of 85 percent in all groups).

Evaluation of Political Issues

In the analysis of differences of opinion over political goals it should be borne in mind that a certain amount of disagreement between groups is not only unavoidable but is even desirable. Too extensive an agreement would be an indication that the conflicts which inevitably come about in a society are not reflected in the attitudes of the leaders or that their manifestation is suppressed.

In order to determine political cleavages among elite groups, the respondents were asked to evaluate a list of current political issues. These can be summarized as follows:⁸

A. *Foreign policy*

1. Strengthening of the defense potential of NATO (Western alliance)
2. Formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
3. The greatest danger for the Western Democracies continues to be aggressive world communism, which must be opposed strongly

B. *Economic policy*

1. Extension of workers' codetermination
2. Restriction of the right to dispose of landed property
3. Preservation of the independent middle class
4. Redistribution of wealth

C. *Social policy and social-moral values*

1. Liberalization of criminal law
2. Introduction of the comprehensive school
3. A lot can be said in favor of introducing the death penalty for certain crimes in the Federal Republic
4. Education of youth for adaptation to the existing social order
5. Freedom of opinion and discussion must reach its limits at the point where basic moral beliefs and values are concerned

Among politicians the following pattern is found (Table 8): SPD and FDP leaders take almost identical positions on foreign policy and social policy, the two areas which, at the time of the interviews, formed the basis of the work of the coalition. The goals in both areas originated with and were propagated by the coalition parties among the public under the slogans "Eastern policy" (détente and negotiations with the USSR, East Germany, and the other East-bloc countries) and "internal reforms" (liberalization of criminal law and prison reform, educational reforms, and general democratization). In contrast, in the area of economic policy the FDP leaders are clearly more conservative than those of the SPD and stand closer to CDU/CSU leaders. CDU politicians have the same views as CSU leaders on foreign and economic policy, but on social policy questions the CSU leaders are more conservative. The differences between SPD

Table 8. Attitudes Toward Foreign, Economic, and Social Policies^a

	<i>Foreign Policy</i>	<i>Economic Policy</i>	<i>Social Policy</i>
SPD politicians	3.6	4.6	4.7
FDP politicians	3.6	3.5	4.8
CDU politicians	1.6	3.0	3.1
CSU politicians	1.6	2.6	2.4
CDU/CSU politicians together	1.6	2.9	2.9
Ministerial bureaucracy ^b	2.8	3.5	3.7

Mass media	3.3	3.9	4.4
Publishers	3.0	3.3	3.8
Business ^b	2.5	2.5	3.2
Trade unions	3.7	4.9	4.7
Science/higher education	3.7	3.8	4.3
Military	2.0	3.0	2.9

^aThe scale ranges from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a progressive, prochange position and a lower value indicating a conservative position.

^bThe various groups of the ministerial bureaucracy and in the economy were combined, since there were no attitudinal differences among them.

and CDU/CSU leaders in all issue areas are great, and the distance between the SPD and CSU is especially marked.

Comparing the issue positions of the other elite groups with those of the politicians (Table 9), we find that the administrative elite falls in the middle between the parties in all three issue areas. This fact corresponds both to their normative role definition in terms of (political) "neutrality," as well as to the relatively balanced distribution of party preferences in this sector. Representatives of the mass media and of science and higher education take the SPD position on foreign and social policies, but fall in the middle (between SPD and CDU/CSU positions) on matters of economic policy. Union leaders show a clear affinity with the SPD in all three issue areas; in contrast, economic leaders take stands close to the CDU/CSU on economic and social policy, although they clearly take a middle position on foreign policy issues.

The military elite underlines its clear affinity with the CDU/CSU in all three issue areas; this corresponds to their predominantly CDU/CSU party preference. The issue positions of the publishers are the least "partisan": they are more progressive on foreign policy issues, between the SPD and CDU/CSU on social policy, and stand close to the CDU/CSU position on economic policy—which corresponds to their interests as businessmen.

In foreign and social policy the differences between the two major parties (SPD and CDU/CSU) define the limits of the political spectrum: in these issue areas the cleavages are defined by the political parties. Economic policy is a

Table 9. Issue Positions of the Leadership Groups with Regard to Those of SPD and CDU/CSU Politicians

	<i>SPD Position</i>	<i>Intermediate Position^a</i>	<i>CDU/CSU Position</i>
1. Foreign policy	FDP Mass media Publishers Trade unions Science/higher education	Ministerial bureaucracy Business	Military
2. Economic policy	Trade unions	FDP Ministerial bureaucracy Mass media Science/higher education	Publishers Business Military
3. Social policy	FDP Mass media Trade unions Science/higher education	Ministerial bureaucracy Publishers	Business Military

^aIssue positions were defined as "intermediate" which deviated more than 0.5 scale-points from both the SPD and the CDU/CSU positions.

different case. Here the distance between business and the unions is greater than that between the political parties. Nevertheless, this divergence, too, is reflected by the distance between Social and Christian Democrats. This confirms the role of the parties as institutions which not only express conflicts anchored in the social structure but also actively structure political options.

Assessment of Influence Structure

This analysis of political cleavages leads to important conclusions about the potential for conflict among the groups, but, taken by itself, does not permit any statement to be made about the extent to which these conflicts are actualized in the policy formation process. Concrete elite behavior is influenced not only by the goals of the elites but also to a considerable extent by their perceptions of the influence structure, which indicate their subjective estimates of the chance they have to implement their goals. Estimates of their own influence, as well as of the influence of their political opponents and other "political" actors, is therefore of great significance. However, these are not objective data about actual influence, since they are shaped by their personal experiences. Congruent assessments of the influence of a "political" actor by different groups permit conclusions to be drawn about the application of a common frame of reference for their estimates. This makes consensus formation easier, in that sanctions threatened by this actor will be assessed similarly by all parties to the conflict.

If the estimates of influence of the groups are homogeneous, and if, moreover, the influence of two actors is estimated as very different, the conflict potential between these two actors is presumably small, since the weaker partner will not enter into apparently hopeless power struggles. On the other hand, independent of the homogeneity of influence estimates, the conflict potential is always especially high when two competitors consider themselves equally influential. The strength of the conflict depends upon how important the upcoming decisions are for the actors concerned and how much their goals diverge from each other. In the case of important decisions, sharply divergent goals, and strongly perceived chances of success, conflicts between two actors will therefore be especially intense. Estimates of the strength of influence of 27 political actors—political institutions, administration, interest groups, the mass media, and the electorate—by the leadership groups yielded the following rank-ordering on a six-point scale, with higher values indicating greater influence on politics:

Federal government	5.6
Federal parliament (Bundestag)	5.3
SPD	5.2
“Political parties”	5.1
CDU	4.6
Television	4.6
Trade unions	4.6
CSU	4.4
Press	4.4
Administration/ministerial bureaucracy	4.3
State governments	4.1
Federal Council (Bundesrat)	4.1
FDP	4.0
Employers/industrial associations	3.9
Federal Bank	3.8
Federal Constitutional Court	3.8
Radio	3.7
Big business	3.7
Voters	3.6
Banks	3.6
Agricultural Association	3.6
Catholic Church	3.5
Protestant Church	3.0
Science	2.8
President of the Federal Republic (Bundespräsident)	2.6
Armed forces (Bundeswehr)	2.3

In comparison to the large differences in the evaluation of political goals, here the differences in the group estimates of influence are not large. Thus, they are good preconditions for effective communication between elite groups. When one looks at the strength of influence ascribed to individual sectors, the central political institutions rank first, and clearly ahead of the estimated influence of the

Table 10. Comparative Assessment of the Influence of Big Business and the Trade Unions (percentages)

	<i>Big Business More Influential</i>	<i>Both Equally Influential</i>	<i>Trade Unions More Influential</i>
SPD politicians	23.2	42.1	34.7
FDP politicians	23.8	31.0	45.2
CDU politicians	5.1	24.4	70.5
CSU politicians	—	22.7	77.3
Ministerial bureaucracy	5.8	31.2	63.0

Mass media	23.5	33.0	43.4
Publishers	2.6	31.6	65.8
Business	5.6	16.9	77.5
Trade unions	40.0	26.7	33.3
Science/higher education	8.7	39.1	52.2
Military	4.9	24.4	70.7

mass media, administration, and trade unions; business interest groups were perceived to be even less influential. This shows that none of the leadership groups interpret the distribution of power in the Federal Republic in terms of the Marxist "Stamokap" theory (theory of state monopoly capitalism).

Table 10 shows respondents' assessments of the relative influence of business and labor. It is striking that the unions are held by many respondents to be more influential than business organizations. This result can be traced to the close connection of the trade unions with the SPD as the leading party on the federal level. A second factor contributing to this result may be that the influence of business interests is not perceived as strong, because it is less visible. Since the difference in the estimations of the strength of influence of unions and business associations is only 0.7 scale points, on the basis of the foregoing considerations it may be assumed that the goal conflict which we identified in the area of economic policy will be strongly expressed because of the near-equality of the assessed chances of success of both business and unions.

The Relative Importance of Party Preference and Sector as Independent Variables

In the following analysis we will examine to what extent the attitudes of the nonpolitical sectors are not expressions of functional-specific interests but merely the result of different distributions of party preferences. Here we see whether party preference *or* sector is more decisive for the structuring of political beliefs.⁹ First we observe how much the supporters of the different parties differ in their views on foreign policy, economic policy, and domestic policy. CDU/CSU supporters are taken together, which is justified in view of the small differences

between these two parties. Table 11 shows clearly that in foreign policy and social policy the differences between SPD and CDU/CSU supporters within the individual sectors are greater throughout than those between the business and union representatives within the groups of party supporters. This confirms the already stated supposition that these policy areas involve political issues for which the alternatives are defined within the political sector. Here distances between the politicians are the greatest. In the economic area, in contrast, great differences are found both among the supporters of the various parties and also among the members of the different sectors. The largest difference, by far, exists between SPD supporters in the trade unions (mean scale value 5.1) and CDU/CSU supporters in the business sector (2.3). Interesting in this regard is the intermediate position of persons with "contradictory" party preferences—namely, SPD supporters in business (mean scale value 3.6) and CDU/CSU supporters in the trade unions (4.0). This result is consistent with the thesis of the moderating effect of cross-pressures on political attitudes.¹⁰ The intermediate position of the FDP on questions of economic policy, as noted above, is confirmed also in the double distribution by sector and party preference. Nevertheless, there are clear differences between FDP supporters in the mass media,

Table 11. Attitudinal Differences^a among Sectors and Between Groups of Party Supporters (mean differences)

	<i>Foreign Policy</i>	<i>Economic Policy</i>	<i>Social Policy</i>
<i>Distance SPD and CDU/CSU, by sector:^b</i>			
Politics	2.0	1.7	1.8
Ministerial bureaucracy	1.4	1.2	1.3
Mass media	1.7	1.1	1.0
Publishers	1.8	1.8	1.5
Business	1.3	1.3	1.5
Trade unions	1.5	1.1	1.1
Science/higher education	1.8	1.1	1.4
<i>Distance between business and labor^c by party supporters:</i>			
SPD supporters	0.5	1.5	0.6
CDU/CSU supporters	0.3	1.7	1.0

^aScale range of 1 to 6, low values are conservative.

^bBecause there were too few cases (less than 10) of SPD/FDP supporters among the military, the latter group is not included here.

^cThere were only two union leaders with FDP preferences; difference values were therefore not calculated for the FDP.

Table 12. Relationships^a of Party Preference, Sector, Age, Religion, and Social Background with Political Beliefs

	Political Issues			Democratic Rules of the Game ^b	
	Foreign Policy	Economic Policy	Social Policy	"Strong Government" Position	"Pluralist" Position
Party preference	.65	.64	.63	.29	.37
Sector	.35	.55	.45	.28	.33
Religion ^c	.33	.26	.33	.14	.17
Social background	.12	.23	.15	.03	.12
Age	-.27	-.24	-.36	-.23	-.29

^aEta values, except for the age variable (correlation coefficient).

^bScores for "strong government" are for a combination of items 1 and 2; scores for "pluralism" are for items 3 to 5 from Table 7.

^cThe highest values are for a religious variable based on a combination of church membership and frequency of church attendance.

who are closer to the position of SPD politicians, and FDP supporters in the business sector, who are closer to the views of CDU/CSU politicians.

Whereas in questions of economic policy party preference *and* sector influence the views of leadership groups, party preference clearly has greater power in the other two issue areas. This result is confirmed when one attempts to estimate the global effect of these two variables on the attitudes of the elite respondents in the three issue areas. The values in Table 12 clearly show the outstanding role of party preference, whereby, in questions of economic policy the sector influences political views almost as much as does party preference. Age and religion have a certain influence on views about current political issues, but this is not the case for the social background variable.

Consensus and Conflict in Political Beliefs

The above analyses of political beliefs have shown two closely interrelated main lines of cleavage. The first concerns the political power distribution among the parties, as well as current controversies in the areas of foreign and social policy. Here there is some difference of opinion between the parties of the social-liberal coalition as regards foreign and social policy introduced by the SPD/FDP federal government. The sectors of the mass media, trade unions, and science and education follow more closely the line of the federal government, whereas the military and business leaders support more strongly the CDU/CSU position in these issue areas. The second conflict concerns economic issues and lies

between the sectors of business and the unions. In this context the CDU/CSU politicians support business interests, whereas the SPD politicians support union interests. The FDP, as well as the mass media and science and education sectors, take an intermediate position in this issue area, whereas publishers and the military identify with the business position. This second cleavage is especially explosive for three reasons:

1. As a traditional conflict between employers and employees it displays a high degree of continuity.
2. The great differences found between the groups indicate the relatively high degree of intensity of this conflict.
3. The perceived chances of success of the groups which are participants in this conflict are rather close, so that the probability of confrontations is relatively high.

Two additional conflict potentials are related to the exercise of political influence: the influence of the political administration/bureaucracy and that of television—estimated as relatively great by all groups—is viewed with distrust by a considerable portion of the respondents in all other sectors. This points to a lack of legitimation of this influence, since the two current models of the legitimation of political influence—control through democratic elections or by the pluralistic balance of interests—are not applicable to these two sectors. Nevertheless, the probability that the conflict potentials we have found can be expressed within the framework of the existing political order, and thereby without recourse to violence, must be considered relatively great on the basis of several of our other findings. Among these are the general acceptance of the influence of the central political institutions, the thoroughly positive evaluation of the social market economy, and finally, the willingness to compromise in disputes which characterizes the great majority in all elite groups.

COMMUNICATION PATTERNS

The process of conflict articulation and consensus formation in pluralist systems is, as already mentioned, a complex process of communication and interaction. As has been shown in the previous analyses, the conditions for peaceful conflict resolution in the Federal Republic of Germany are favorable. In the following section the communication patterns among the leadership groups will be described by analyzing the formalized interaction and communication potentials which the system makes available to elites.

Multiple Officeholding

The analysis of the social and professional recruitment of leadership groups has shown that there are distances among the individual leadership groups, but

these are not marked enough to make communication among groups difficult. In addition, differentiated systems make available formalized interaction potentials, such as offices and memberships in several sectors and inclusion in commissions and advisory boards in the political-administrative system (i.e., interlocking positions), for the reduction of such social distances. The exchange of experiences with members of other sectors made possible by these potentials transmits knowledge of the norms, values, and problems among the various sectors. The personal relationships and informal contacts made here facilitate communication and compromise.

Before the connections of the sectors to one another—based on multiple office holding—are analyzed, it is necessary to present an overview of the use made of this potential for communication. Thereby the number of sectors, but not the number of offices per sector will be considered, since it is here mainly a matter of the intersector connections and not of the multiple office holding of individuals. The political-administrative sectors will be treated in the following analysis as a single unit and will be contrasted to the societal sectors.

On this basis the 1560 elite respondents held a total of 1270 positions outside of their own area. This rate of interlock must be considered relatively low, since there were frequent multiple responses. The interlocking positions are found in these sectors and proportions:

Business	18.5%
Science	15.0%
Banks/insurance companies	11.8%
Education	9.5%
Business associations	9.4%
Politics	8.6%
Mass Media	7.7%
Churches	5.3%
Administration, federal/state level	5.0%
Social sector	4.7%
Labor and employees' associations	2.4%
Agriculture	2.0%

The picture conveyed by the figures in Table 13 is similar to that of professional recruitment: the political-administrative sectors stand in the middle of the system of sector interlock. The members of the political-administrative leadership stratum hold one-half of the positions in the private sectors (top politicians, 19.3 percent; top civil servants, 30.7 percent). However, the spectrum of interlock with other sectors is broader for the political elite than it is for the administrative elite. Among the top politicians, ties to the mass media and to business firms dominate. The high proportion of positions in the mass media area is partly explained by the fact that the composition of radio and television control bodies is determined in large measure by parliamentary bodies as prescribed by radio and television statutes. Positions in business organizations held by politi-

Table 13. Multiple Office Holding^a

	Politics	Administration, Federal/ State Level	Mass Media	Business	Banks/ Insurance Com- panies	Business Associa- tions	Agric- ulture	Labor and Employees' Associa- tions	Science	Edu- cation	Churches
Federal government/parliament	81.0	2.0	12.0	7.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	7.0	8.0
State governments	64.6	9.8	18.3	26.8	12.2	6.1	1.2	1.2	12.2	11.0	15.9
Political parties	76.5	1.5	14.7	13.2	7.4	1.5	4.4	—	7.4	8.8	10.3
Political civil servants, federal level	9.0	5.1	5.1	19.2	3.8	1.3	1.3	1.3	12.8	5.1	2.6
Permanent civil servants, federal level	5.1	3.6	4.3	11.6	2.9	—	2.9	1.4	13.0	1.4	0.7
Political civil servants, state level	28.3	7.5	11.3	32.1	32.1	1.9	—	—	18.9	22.6	7.5
Permanent civil servants, state level	9.1	12.4	6.2	13.4	10.0	4.3	2.4	2.4	17.2	17.2	2.9
Mass media	2.7	0.4	21.4	1.3	0.4	0.4	—	2.7	3.6	4.9	2.7
Publishers	—	—	50.0	2.6	—	10.5	—	2.6	5.3	5.3	—
Big business	2.9	6.9	2.3	64.7	24.9	41.6	1.2	1.7	26.0	3.5	1.7
Banks/insurance companies	5.4	2.7	4.1	59.5	54.1	16.2	1.4	1.4	8.1	4.1	4.1
Business associations	8.9	11.9	4.0	27.7	10.9	52.5	1.0	3.0	11.9	2.0	5.9
Small business associations	15.0	15.0	20.0	15.0	20.0	20.0	—	5.0	30.0	10.0	—
Agricultural associations	22.6	9.4	11.3	22.6	32.1	9.4	66.0	1.9	9.4	11.3	5.7
Trade unions	27.4	24.2	9.7	37.1	21.0	1.6	—	53.2	17.7	16.1	4.8
Science/higher education	10.9	2.2	8.7	6.5	—	2.2	—	4.3	78.3	6.5	2.2
Military	—	2.4	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.4
<i>Politicians by Party:</i>											
SPD	72.0	3.0	13.0	20.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	7.0	12.0	8.0
FDP	83.3	4.8	11.9	23.8	14.3	2.4	2.4	—	11.9	4.8	4.8
CDU	73.5	6.0	16.9	6.0	4.8	3.6	4.8	2.4	8.4	7.2	16.9
CSU	75.0	4.2	20.8	12.5	—	8.3	8.3	—	12.5	8.3	16.7

^aMultiple responses were counted only for inter-sector positions, not for intra-sector positions.

cians and civil servants are usually those in supervisory bodies such as boards of directors of public corporations and of those enterprises enjoying the financial participation by the federal or state governments.

The proportion of those politicians who hold positions in the educational system and the churches is relatively high. A breakdown by party affiliation reveals that the SPD and FDP leadership groups are concentrated, in terms of offices and functions, in business enterprises, and those of the CDU/CSU in the mass media and religious organizations. The comparatively high proportion of SPD politicians in business enterprises may be attributed to three factors: the already mentioned assumption of control functions in public enterprises; the acquisition of positions in union enterprises acquired by close ties with trade unions; and the acquisition of positions in plants to which the parity codetermination (equal representation of capital and labor on the board of directors) applies.

Dominant among the positions that top civil servants occupy outside of government are those in business enterprises and in the science sector, but also relatively high is the proportion having positions in banks and insurance companies and in the educational system.

In comparison to the politicians and civil servants who are active in the private sector, the number of leaders in the private sector with interlocking positions in the political-administrative system is low. This is surprising, since the political area and, even more, the ministerial administration on both federal and state levels offer numerous positions on advisory councils, committees, work groups, commissions, and similar bodies. Only the trade union elite makes use of this communications potential to a great extent. The sector interlock among the noneconomic private sectors must also be described as relatively low: one-half of the listed additional functions in these sectors are held by the political-administrative leadership groups, and a further 19 percent go to the neighboring sectors of big corporations, business associations, and banks and insurance companies. Consequently, one can speak of a genuine sector interlock in only about 31 percent of these positions.

The military and mass media are the sectors with the fewest interlocking positions. The academic groups, too, have relatively few positions in other sectors; however, this sector offers the largest number of positions to the other leadership groups. For the representatives of big corporations and business associations this is the only noneconomic sector with which they have a significant connection. The broadest spectrum of sector interlock of its leadership groups is displayed by the sectors in which other groups have few or no additional functions: agriculture and the trade unions. The relatively high proportion of union elite members in business enterprises can be explained, on the one hand, by codetermination and, on the other, by the extensive enterprises of the trade unions, especially the German Trade Union Federation (DGB).¹¹ The interlocking positions of the agricultural elite reflect the close connection between agricultural associations and production and banking cooperatives.

In summary, the political-administrative sectors stand at the center of the interactional system analyzed here, but the political leadership groups have broader intersector connections than the administrative leaders.

Direct Communication

The previous analysis leads to the expectation of a high rate of contacts between sectors. Data on direct communication confirm this: almost 98 percent of the elite respondents claimed to maintain contacts with institutions and organizations outside their own sector. A sector classification of organizations (Table 14) underlines the dominant position of the political-administrative sectors in the communication and decision-making processes. Except for the banks and insurance companies, the proportion of all private groups reporting contacts with the political-administrative area is at least as high as the rate of reported contacts within their own sector. The communication of nonpolitical groups with each other shows a high rate of exchange with the mass media, confirming the latter's central information transmission function. Also in the center of the interaction process are big corporations and banks, business associations, trade unions, and the churches.

The interactions within the political-administrative area, as well as between this area and other sectors, must be seen against the background of political structures which facilitate communications. First to be considered among the latter is the internal differentiation of the political-administrative sectors.

When the organization of the federal executive and West German political infrastructure is considered, we can identify some ministries with the interests of particular social groups. This identity of interest is shown, for example, in the fact that compromises are often negotiated not between competing groups and the government but between the specialized ministries (see Kaiser, 1956). Among the interest representations of this kind are the connections between the German Farmers' Association and the Ministry of Agriculture, between the trade unions and the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry, and also between big business and business associations and the Ministry of Economics. This institutionalization of societal interests in the political-administrative sectors can be achieved by exerting influence on the selection of the political-administrative leadership personnel. There, where a ministry can be viewed as a "clientele" ministry (*Verbandsinsel*), the personnel-political anchorage of group interests is greatest (von Beyme, 1969). This applies both to appointments to civil service positions and to the respective ministerial positions. Since the founding of the Federal Republic only trade union members have been appointed as Labor Ministers and, with a single exception (H. Höcherl), all Ministers of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry have been members of agricultural associations, mainly of the German Farmers' Association.

The regulations of the right of consultation in ministries has also developed

Table 14. Direct Communication^a

	<i>Political- Administrative System</i>	<i>Mass Media</i>	<i>Industrial Corporations/ Banks</i>	<i>Business Associations</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Trade Unions</i>	<i>Education/ Science</i>	<i>Churches</i>	<i>Social Sector</i>
Federal government/parliament	100.0	89.0	35.0	53.0	11.0	68.0	4.0	70.0	21.0
State governments	100.0	92.7	56.1	67.1	12.2	82.9	9.8	67.1	14.6
Political parties	100.0	91.2	48.5	57.4	13.2	75.0	11.8	64.7	14.7
Political civil servants, federal level	98.7	65.4	41.0	66.7	5.1	66.7	10.3	43.6	11.5
Permanent civil servants, federal level	100.0	50.0	40.6	57.2	5.1	63.0	15.2	24.6	8.7
Political civil servants, state level	100.0	79.2	54.7	71.7	11.3	83.0	13.2	52.8	9.4
Permanent civil servants, state level	100.0	67.5	46.9	52.2	10.5	60.8	15.8	38.3	15.8

Mass media	95.5	91.1	42.4	61.6	4.9	72.8	6.7	50.4	7.1
Publishers	94.7	86.8	60.5	84.2	—	63.2	—	36.8	2.6
Big business	91.9	60.1	89.6	90.8	1.7	56.1	17.3	23.1	3.5
Banks/insurance companies	85.1	60.8	89.2	82.4	1.4	43.2	4.1	29.7	1.4
Business associations	100.0	62.4	78.2	99.0	4.0	68.3	10.9	23.8	2.0
Small business associations	100.0	85.0	65.0	100.0	5.0	70.0	10.0	30.0	—
Agricultural associations	98.1	86.8	83.0	73.6	81.1	69.8	15.1	52.8	1.9
Trade unions	98.4	87.1	59.7	75.8	6.5	98.4	8.1	45.2	8.1
Science/higher education	97.8	87.0	41.3	41.3	—	37.0	69.6	26.1	4.3
Military	97.6	85.4	19.5	53.7	4.9	51.2	14.6	70.7	4.9

<i>Politicians by party:</i>									
SPD	100.0	92.0	45.0	49.0	7.0	90.0	10.0	62.0	17.0
FDP	100.0	90.5	50.0	66.7	14.3	69.0	9.5	54.8	11.9
CDU	100.0	88.0	39.8	57.8	13.3	60.2	6.0	78.3	19.3
CSU	100.0	95.8	58.3	87.5	25.0	75.0	4.2	79.2	20.8

into an effective means by which private groups exert political influence. In the drafting and execution stages (statutory and administrative regulations) of a law "the representation of affected associations can be informed and they may be requested to submit materials as well as be given an opportunity to state their position" (*Rules of Procedures of Federal Ministries*). This regulation is restricted to "top" associations—i.e., to associations which are active throughout the Federal Republic. In practice, this "can" rule has developed into a process of continual consultation between government ministries and private organizations. This applies especially to the "clientele" ministries for which joint consultation with corresponding social organizations, and thereby the participation of the latter in the legislative process, is a matter of course. Communication and compromise is substantially facilitated by the fact that, as a rule, these negotiations between ministries and interest groups are confidential (Hennis, 1961).

The differentiation within the administrative system is reflected in the specialized committees of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, as well as corresponding bodies of the parties and parliamentary parties. The exertion of the influence of private organizations on the selection of parliamentary leadership personnel can take place through influencing the nomination of candidates for Bundestag elections. This can be done in two ways: either a group demands the nomination and election of their own members or they support nonmember candidates and thus bind them to their interests (see Hensel, 1973). The influence of private groups is, first, financial and, second, through the expectation of the parties of a "drawing effect" on the interest group clientele of such candidates. The most favored groups are agriculture, business, and the trade unions. This penetration of all parliamentary parties with representatives of powerful groups in connection with the internal specialized differentiation of the parliamentary parties and the Bundestag favors communication, but also the assertion of group interests: for, in the first place, the experts are concentrated in the respective bodies and, in the second place, the parliamentary party caucuses usually follow the recommendations of their working groups and the plenary session of the Bundestag follows those of its committees. The interparty cooperation of the representatives of private groups is also favored, in that they are interested above all in the details of legislation and here an agreement across party lines is more easily achieved. Once again, this is facilitated by the general confidentiality of the working groups and committee meetings (see Neumann, 1979). The strong degree of interest group "infiltration" of certain Bundestag committees and parliamentary party working groups has as a consequence the fact that, in drafting legislation, the ministerial bureaucracy consults the respective committees and working groups as well as the private groups to ensure that these bills can later pass the parliamentary legislative process.

The following remarks must be seen against the background of this rough sketch of the political structures as expressed by constitutional practice. In the center of the communicative relations of the political-administrative leadership

groups are the mass media, industrial enterprises and banks, business associations, trade unions, and the churches (see Table 14). In comparison with the previous findings on sector interlock, the low rate of communication with science and education is conspicuous. This is surprising in the case of state politicians and civil servants in view of the "cultural sovereignty" of the states in the West German federal system.

As a consequence of the increasing extension of governmental activities in modern industrial societies, a high degree of communication with the political-administrative system is to be expected. This is confirmed by our data: the average number of institutions of the political-administrative system with which the private sectors maintain contacts is 3.3.¹² The breakdown by sector is as follows:

Mass media	3.9
Agricultural associations	3.8
Trade unions	3.8
Small business associations	3.7
Science/higher education	3.4
Business associations	3.3
Publishers	3.3
Military	3.2
Big business	2.5
Banks/insurance companies	2.4

The average number of contacts of the political-administrative elites with institutions in their own sectors is somewhat higher (4.0), although it should be noted that politicians exhibit a higher rate of communication than do top civil servants:

State governments	4.8
Federal government/parliament	4.6
Political parties	4.6
Political civil servants, state level	4.5
Permanent civil servants, state level	3.8
Political civil servants, federal level	3.4
Permanent civil servants, federal level	3.0

The following communications patterns were found for the individual private sectors (Table 15): industrial enterprises assert their interests not only via their organized interest-representation but also directly in the political-administrative system. Their main "addressee" is the ministerial bureaucracy on both federal and state levels. The business associations, on the other hand, display a broader communications structure; their dominant communications partner is the ministerial bureaucracy, but they also maintain contacts with the Bundestag, as well as with the political parties, to a considerable extent. Likewise the banking and insurance leadership groups have a broader spectrum of communications than do

Table 15. Contacts with the Political-Administrative System^a

	<i>Federal Administration</i>	<i>Federal Legislature (Bundestag)</i>	<i>State Administration</i>	<i>State Legislatures</i>	<i>Political Parties</i>
Federal government/parliament	98.0	99.0	89.0	73.0	98.0
State governments	95.1	95.1	100.0	97.6	96.3
Political parties	85.3	98.5	89.7	88.2	100.0
Political civil servants, federal level	98.7	94.9	80.8	7.7	57.7
Permanent civil servants, federal level	100.0	95.7	73.9	1.4	31.9
Political civil servants, state level	92.5	71.7	100.0	100.0	90.6
Permanent civil servants, state level	92.3	36.4	99.5	95.2	55.0
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Mass media	83.9	77.2	83.5	56.7	87.1
Publishers	65.8	65.8	78.9	42.1	78.9
Big business	77.5	37.6	79.2	19.7	39.3
Banks/insurance companies	58.1	47.3	60.8	18.9	51.4
Business associations	97.0	76.2	78.2	20.8	62.4
Small business associations	95.0	100.0	80.0	25.0	65.0
Agricultural associations	73.6	64.2	94.3	77.4	69.8
Trade unions	96.8	87.1	58.1	32.3	90.3
Science/higher education	69.6	45.7	95.7	73.9	52.2
Military	95.1	61.0	68.3	36.6	63.4

^aMultiple responses within each of the five units were not counted in this table.

the industrial enterprises, and a similar pattern was found for the small business associations. The trade unions communicate to about the same extent with the federal ministerial bureaucracy, the political parties, and the Bundestag. The contacts of the scientific and higher educational groups are predominantly with state political institutions, which is due to the cultural federalism in West Germany. Among the agricultural elite the same pattern is explained by the fact that the federal structure of German agricultural organizations was taken into account in the sampling procedure.

The very high rate of communications of politicians with institutions of the political-administrative system results largely from the fact that most of the top political leaders in the Federal Republic hold positions on several levels—in parliament, in the government (executive), and in the political parties. Since the party and the parliamentary party have different functions—i.e., the party determines the framework of political action, whereas the parliamentary party is responsible for the political implementation of this framework—a practical integration of these two functions is more easily accomplished by the interlocking of the political personnel (see Kaack, 1971). The relatively low rate of communications of top civil servants with the political parties (in some respects lower than that of the private groups) is also explained by the different roles of party and parliamentary party.

The differences found in the previous analysis of political attitudes carry over only to a small extent to the communication structure: the members of industrial, banking and insurance firms, business associations, and agricultural associations communicate to a slightly higher degree with the CDU/CSU, and the trade unions with the SPD (not shown). However, all nongovernmental groups, with the exception of the business associations, interact less with the FDP than they do with the SPD and CDU/CSU. These results confirm the assumptions of pluralist theory—namely, that the private sectors work with all politically relevant parties and that a one-sided influence is avoided by these “cross-pressures.” However, these findings also underline the determination of the pattern of interactions by the political structure: the federal structure of a country such as West Germany requires cooperation with several parties, since some state governments may be governed by other parties than those which form the federal government.

This analysis of communication patterns has shown that the political-administrative system stands at the center of the conflict-regulation and consensus-formation process in the Federal Republic. The integrational capability of this sector has already been indicated by the above analysis of social and professional recruitment patterns. The general acceptance of the central political institutions means that this integrative function can also be put into practice. The potentials for conflict that existed in the Federal Republic at the time of this elite survey were expressed by the political parties, though to differing degrees, and were transmitted to the political-administrative system by the political parties. In connection with the broad recognition of the pluralist rules of the game and the

density of interactions, this guarantees the functional capability and efficacy of the system. However, the question may be raised, in view of the communication patterns and interaction potentials which the system makes available to the elites for societal conflict regulation, as to whether the pluralist theory applies here or whether the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany does not more closely correspond to the neocorporatist model.

NOTES

1. For basic descriptions of the West German system of government see Ellwein (1978), Pilz (1977), Heidenheimer (1961), and Sontheimer (1972).

2. This study was conducted under the direction of Professors Werner Kaltefleiter and Rudolf Wildenmann by staff members of the Social Science Research Institute of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. For a detailed description of the data base, see Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Helga Neumann, Helmut Palme, and Bärbel Steinkemper, *Westdeutsche Führungsschicht: Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchung der Inhaber von Führungspositionen*, volume of tables, edited by Werner Kaltefleiter and Rudolf Wildenmann (Kiel and Mannheim, 1973). For reports on this study, see Palme (1974), Steinkemper (1974), Kaltefleiter (1976), Hoffmann-Lange (1977), and Neumann (1979).

3. According to the West German constitution, most governmental activities are carried out by state and local agencies. Due to the development of the welfare state, the proportion of governmental services has steadily increased. Today, the proportion of federal laws (over one-half) which require approval by the Bundesrat, the second chamber, representing the state administrations, is correspondingly high. Until 1969 this was not problematical, since the same parties had majorities in both houses of parliament. Since then, the Bundesrat has been used frequently by its CDU/CSU majority as an instrument of opposition to the governing SPD/FDP coalition.

4. The totals add up to only 249, since one member of the state executive elite was an independent.

5. Considered as representatives of business interests, and hence the business sector, are the elite respondents from big corporations, business associations, banks and insurance companies, professional associations, and agricultural associations. On most questions they have very similar political beliefs and are therefore as a rule combined into one group.

6. Bärbel Steinkemper's (1974) analysis of party membership and career patterns of the administrative elite shows that party members have greater career opportunities than do nonmembers. She found differences among the four different groups of top civil servants which are explained by the different positional definitions (political and nonpolitical) and the varying party majority situations on the federal and state levels.

7. This may be due in part to the way the items were formulated. Often the statements were formulated as alternatives for which a priority between two values (namely, between democratic control or the pluralist power game and freedom of action by the government) was to be indicated. This latter aspect of freedom of governmental action was particularly salient, however, at the time of the elite survey because of the stalemate between the government and the opposition in the Bundestag at that time.

8. For a detailed presentation of the results for all issues, see Hoffmann-Lange, op. cit., pp. 100ff. For the interpretation, mean differences in scale values up to 0.5 points were considered as indicating the same positions; differences between 0.5 and 1.0 as small (negligible) differences; between 1.0 and 1.5 as moderate (clear) differences; between 1.5 and 2.0 as large differences; and more than 2.0 points differences in mean scale values as very large attitudinal differences.

9. In the following analysis, when party preference is taken as an "independent" variable, this

should not be understood as meaning that this variable moulds the elite respondents' political beliefs; the reversed causal relationship is also plausible—namely, that specific political beliefs lead one to a preference for a particular political party.

10. This effect was also found for the foreign and social issue areas; however, it was clearly much less characteristic of the SPD supporters.

11. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) owns the following enterprises: Unternehmensgruppe "Neue Heimat" Städtebau- und Wohnungsgesellschaften, which has about 60 subsidiary companies and is the largest European housing construction company; the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft AG, which has about 100 subsidiary companies and is the fourth largest supraregional commercial bank in the Federal Republic; the Volksfürsorge Lebensversicherung AG, which has 15 subsidiary companies and is the largest West German life insurance company in terms of policies in effect; and the Coop-Zentrale AG, the second largest German retail merchants group. For more on this, see Jühe et al. (1977).

12. Five units were included in this analysis: federal executive, federal legislative, state executive, state legislative, and political parties. Multiple responses within each unit were not considered in the coding.

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