

< *Special Issue* > * * * * *

Riots of Patriot or Victim?: Japan's Perception of Anti-Japanese Protests in China (2004-05)

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It is widely believed in China that Japan's interpretation of Chinese anti-Japanese protests was negative. This tendency is often argued to have been caused by the lacking of self-reflection on war history or the manipulation of public opinion by the Japanese government and mass media. By scrutinizing relevant writings and polls published in Japan soon after the two large-scale Chinese anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2004 and 2005, this paper suggests a more complicated picture on Japan's perception of Chinese anti-Japanese protests. It argues that both the negative image of "consequence of patriotic education" and the positive image of "genuine anger against Japan's ambiguous attitudes on history" coexist in Japan's interpretations of Chinese anti-Japanese protests. It suggests that, the aversion of violence, the distrust on Chinese treatment of history, the unwillingness to admit Japan's war responsibility and the sympathy of Chinese suffering caused by the past Japanese militarism all act as the major sources behind the sophisticated interpretations on Chinese protests against Japan.

1. Introduction

China occupies the second pivotal position that just after the United States in Japan's foreign relations in the post-Cold War world. Economically, China continued to be the largest exporter to Japan while Japan is also China's largest trading part-

ner in 2003¹. Yet the deepening economic interdependence fails to help the construction of favorable political relations. The outbreak of various political disputes, such as the Chinese submarine incursion incident in 2004 and the history textbook controversy in 2005, which were widely reported by the mass media, lead to an increasing mutual distrust in both societies.

In the summer of 2004 and the spring of 2005, the outbreak of two massive anti-Japanese protests throughout China refreshed Japan's image of the rising dragon. An *Asahi* survey conducted in September 2004 revealed that 61 percent of the respondents confirmed that the anti-Japanese demonstrations had created a negative impact of their image of China, with only

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34 percent responded “no impact”.² This perceptual trend is further evidenced by two polls conducted by Prime Minister Office in October 2004 and Japan Research Center in June 2005, which all showed a vast drop of image on China³.

Influenced by the dropping image, some observers concluded that Japan’s interpretation of Chinese anti-Japanese protests was negative in general. This tendency is often argued to have been caused by the lacking of self-reflection on history or the manipulation of public opinion by the government and mass media⁴. In fact, Japan’s view of Chinese anti-Japanese protests is far more complicated than the simple arguments proposed by political observers as well as the statistics of the surveys. By scrutinizing relevant writings and polls published soon after the Chinese anti-Japanese protests, we can improve our understanding of how Japanese society, from the decision makers at the top to the masses at the bottom, interprets China’s anti-Japanese sentiments.

With the two large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China as a backdrop, this paper examines the Japanese perception of Chinese anti-Japanese protests in 2004 and 2005. Two major questions will be raised in this research: First, what kinds of interpretations on Chinese anti-Japanese protests are most commonly found in the Japanese society? Second, why do they interpret the Chinese protests in this way?

To explore the answer more adequately, a perceptual-psychological approach will be employed in this research. The study of perception as cognitive variable is one of the indispensable areas in the study of

politics in general and international relations in particular⁵. It acts as a supplement approach to expose the limits of traditional realist approach in which the rational-decision is emphasized. Two basic categories can be divided in this area: 1) studies of perception directly related to the foreign policy decision-making which is usually used to explain the outcome of foreign policy and, 2) studies of the formulation of perception and image in which the content, structure, change and source of perceptions and images are examined. In this research, the latter one will be the focus of inquiry.

In the following pages, we will first generally look at the course of two Chinese anti-Japanese protests in 2004-05. Then, by reviewing relevant Japanese articles and books published between August 2004 and November 2005⁶, the article will move to examine how the Japanese society interpreted the anti-Japanese protests in China. The images of three groups: top officials, intermediate elites, and the general public will be investigated. In particular, the implicit logic behind those images on Chinese anti-Japanese protests will be examined in detail.

2. Overview of Anti-Japanese Protests in China 2004-05

2.1. Chaos in Asia Cup Soccer Tournament (August 2004)

Our story started from Chongqing, an inland city in China where used to be the capital during the Sino-Japanese War in the 1940s. On 31st July 2004, the first wave of large-scale anti-Japanese protest started from the soccer playground of this city at

the Asia Cup Soccer Tournament. During the game, the Chinese football fans booed the Japanese national team during the playing of the Japanese national anthem and attacked Japanese soccer supporters by words and cans. Banners with the slogans asking for Japan's sincere apology were also displayed during the game. A 23 year-old university student told a Japanese reporter that he has been very unsatisfied with Koizumi's visits of Yasukuni Shrine and it is a golden opportunity for him to show his dissatisfaction with hundreds of Chinese people during the game⁷.

Regarding the impolite Chinese anti-Japanese protests, Tokyo urged Beijing to improve the situation and protect Japanese citizens. During his meeting with Japanese media, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosogawa Hiroki confirmed that Tokyo had sent its concern for three times to Beijing and urged for improvements on security. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi Jungo also expressed her concern when met with Chinese officials in Tokyo and hoped Chinese soccer fans should treat the game calmly during the final that would be held in Beijing on 7 August⁸.

Tackling the demands from Tokyo, Beijing mobilized approximately 5,000 policemen around the auditorium in order to prevent any possible riots during the final. However, situation had not been improved. After the end of soccer game with the result of Japan defeated China by 3-1, riot broke out again and thousands of Chinese fans gathered in the square outside the auditorium and burned Japanese flag. Japanese ambassador's cars were also severely damaged⁹. Regarding this incident, surprisingly, Tokyo responded it

with a clam posture. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosogawa gave a positive comment on Beijing's effort in maintaining the security and order during the final.¹⁰

2.2. Anti-Japanese Demonstrations (April 2005)

The second large-scale anti-Japanese protest took place in the spring of 2005. It is widely believed that this wave of protest was motivated by Japan's campaign to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council as well as Tokyo's approval of one of the history textbooks that justified Japan's past aggressive war in Asia. The dispute of Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands currently controlled and claimed by Japan, but also claimed by China, also become a symbolic focus during the anti-Japanese demonstration¹¹.

The initial demonstration of this wave of protests started in Chengdu (2 April) and Shenzhen (3 April) in the early April. On 9 April, thousands of Chinese citizens and young students gathered in front of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and broke windows of the buildings inside the embassy. Protestors were also calling for a boycott of Japanese goods. Following the protests in Beijing, anti-Japanese demonstrations spread throughout the rest of the country. Major cities from north to south, such as Guangzhou (10 April), Shanghai (16 April), Hangzhou (16 April), Tianjing (16 April), Shenyang (17 April), Shenzhen (17 April), Hong Kong (17 April), all consecutively joined the movement¹².

Facing the outbreak of the second Chinese anti-Japanese protests, Tokyo expressed great anger to Beijing and condemned the violent behaviors outside the

Japanese embassy. Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura Nobutaka demanded an apology and compensation for damage against Japanese property and people during his visit in Beijing on 18 April but was rejected by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. After Japanese Premier Koizumi Junichiro expressed his deep remorse for the suffering that Japan caused to other Asian nations during World War II at the Asia-Africa Conference in Jakarta on 22 April, Chinese President Hu Jintao met Koizumi on 23 April and demanded that Japan needs to back up its reflection on history and its apology with action¹³.

3. Japan's Views of Chinese Anti-Japanese Protests

3.1. View of Officials

Conventional interpretation tends to conclude that the Koizumi administration's perception of Chinese anti-Japanese protests has been vastly influenced by the mentality of "the consequence of patriotic education". Yet such interpretation might not entirely accurate.

Without doubt, several major officials in the Koizumi cabinet have explicitly expressed their discontents on Chinese treatment of history. By stressing the authoritarian nature of Chinese Communist regime, those officials tend to contend that the "patriotic education" advocated by Beijing since the mid-1990s is the primary source of growing anti-Japanese sentiments in China. For example, soon after the anti-Japanese protest during Asia Cup Soccer Tournament, Japan's ambassador in Beijing, Anami Koreshige, concluded

that it is China's patriotic education that caused the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese youths¹⁴. On 4 March 2005, Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura Nobutaka criticized Chinese patriotic education and said that he would raise the issue to Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, as he thinks the Chinese history education as well as the mode of exhibition on Sino-Japanese War between 1931 and 1945 is inappropriate¹⁵. Abe Shinzo, who is one of senior advisors of Prime Minister Koizumi and was appointed as the Chief Cabinet Secretary since October 2005, also argued that history is being utilized by Beijing as a weapon to promote patriotism for its own political legitimacy. He further questioned Beijing's claims on the number of the Chinese casualties during the Sino-Japanese War, as the number of reported casualties increased significantly from 3.2 million in 1945 to 35 million nowadays¹⁶.

Despite the tough voices stated by those high level officials, which could be interpreted as a tactic or manipulation for their personal political interests, soft voices do exist within the Japanese government, particularly in the bureaucratic level where directly manages Japan's diplomatic relations with China. Sasae Kenichiro, the Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), stated that both Japan and China should endeavor to improve bilateral relations by cooperation and dialogue. He stressed that Beijing should let Chinese masses know that most Japanese people do not want to involve into war again while the Japanese society should also try to understand Chinese's

sentiments and sensitivity on the history issue with a humble attitude.¹⁷

3.2. View of Intermediate Elites

The term “intermediate elites” is defined as those people who are not directly involved in the foreign policy decision making process but whose opinions are influential to both top decision makers as well as the general public¹⁸. In this case, intermediate elites’ view certainly plays an important role in shaping Japan’s perception of Chinese anti-Japanese protests.

Around one month after the outbreak of first anti-Japanese protests in August 2004, large numbers of analyses written by intermediate elites were published in the current affairs journals and relatively professional publications related to international relations. Unlike the relatively congruent view among the major top officials in the Koizumi Cabinet, the interpretations of intermediate elites on Chinese anti-Japanese protests are divided. I would like to categorize those elites into two groups: the patriot school, who tends to primarily emphasize the impact of Chinese patriotic education on the formation of anti-Japanese sentiments, and the victim school, who inclines to view that the anti-Japanese protests as a behavior primarily derived from victim’s response to the Japan’s ambiguous attitude towards history. Through publication one can detect the clashing viewpoint between the two camps.

Patriot School

In brief, the primary logic of patriot school is that the Chinese anti-Japanese protest is primarily due to the continuous

patriotic education purposely advocated by the Chinese regime under the leadership of Jiang Zemin. The description of an undemocratic China can be frequently found in the discourse of this school, which implicitly constructed a picture that all protests against Japan on history are purposely mobilized by the communist regime or the consequence of anti-Japanese education (*hannichi kyoiku*).

For instance, immediately after the anti-Japanese protests in Beijing, one of the major Japanese newspapers, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, repeatedly stressed in its editorial that for the purpose of alleviating domestic social instability and to strengthen regime’s legitimacy, Beijing had intentionally advocated the anti-Japanese education from primary school to high school¹⁹. The problems of environmental pollution, the disputes over the farmland and the riots that broke out in different part of China were being cited to prove that Beijing has been facing a critical moment of its political legitimacy and thus made use of patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments as an outlet for domestic conflicts²⁰. Some other analysts raised the problem of Chinese history education for their argument. Sakaeda Kyoko, for example, addressed that Chinese media were full of films and documentaries on Sino-Japanese War on the commemoration day of Japanese invasion on 7 July 1937. She stressed that these anti-Japanese TV programs were part of the patriotic propaganda for the political legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which caused the growing anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public²¹.

Violence is another major concern that

patriot school addressed the most. Following this mentality, many analysts stressed that Beijing encouraged or at least tacitly approved the violent behaviors during the Chinese protests against Japan²². A professor from Teikyo University questioned the legitimacy of using violence against Japan's ambiguous attitude on history. It could be a disaster for the Chinese youths to use violence against Japan in protesting for history issue, according to her, as Japan's response will be totally contradicted to the objective they intend to achieve.²³


Regarding the role of past history on Chinese anti-Japanese protests, there is a subtle division within this school. On the one hand, many of them tended to argue that the Chinese protests could not be based on the genuine anti-Japanese sentiments and Chinese description of history on Sino-Japanese war is totally unfounded. They often question the detail of China-Japan war history claimed by Chinese historians and intend to deny Japan's war responsibility by stressing the inconsistency and possible errors revealed in the Chinese history books. Usually, these viewpoints could be frequently found in the right wing journals²⁴. The rest, on the other hand, although still insisting the vital impact of patriotic education on Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments, tend to confirm Japan's war responsibility in general. Most of their arguments focus on how anti-Japanese sentiments and inaccurate images of contemporary Japan have been spread in China, rather than totally denied the Japan's war responsibility. Some Japanese China specialists and journalists could be classified into this group²⁵.

Victim School

In contrast with patriotic school, victim school tends to portray the anti-Japanese protests primarily as a reaction against Japan's ambiguous attitude on history. They argue that the contradicted attitudes demonstrated by the Japanese government on the Yasukuni Shrine and textbook issue stimulated and hurt sentiments of Chinese people, leading to the break out of anti-Japanese sentiments in recent years.

For example, the *Asahi Shimbun*, another major Japanese newspaper, in its April 7 editorial concluded that it is Koizumi's visits of Yasukuni Shrine that caused the tension between China and Japan and the distrust among Chinese people that showed in the protests;²⁶ By providing evidences from extensive interviews among more than 10,000 university students throughout China from north to south, Omori Kazuo, the president of the Institute of International Exchange, also pointed out that the distrust on history interpretation is the major obstacle for China-Japan bilateral understanding and cultural exchange activities among the youths²⁷; Kobayashi Yotaro, the head of "21st Century Friendships of China-Japan committee", condemned prime-ministerial pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine and the viewpoint that the trial on Class A war criminals in 1946 is unfair. He stressed that the various disputes over history would stimulated further conflicts between China and Japan²⁸; Based on a quantitative study on the number of positive and negative reports about China from 2001 to 2003, Tabata Mitsunaga from Kanakawa University, also criticized the articulation of China's negative image in major conserva-

FIGURE 1. Japanese general public's perception of the influence of Yasukuni Shrine issue on the Chinese protests against Japan



Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 September 2004, Morning Edition, Page 3.


tive Japanese current affair and political magazines²⁹.

To challenge the interpretation of patriotic school, elites in victim school raised a counter-argument as well. For instance, some scholars questioned whether the growth of Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments is solely determined by the factor of the patriotic campaign launched by the government since the mid-1990s. The victim school's view in fact does not rule out the possible influence of patriotic education advocated by Beijing since the mid-1990s for the purpose of strengthening the political legitimacy of Chinese communist regime, however they stressed that the anti-Japanese sentiments always exist since the establishment of People's Republic of China or even before³⁰. The image of Japan as enemy is strongly rooted during the building process of Chinese modern state as well as the Chinese national identity, as China eventually gained national independence through defeating Japan in the Second World War. Kawashima Shin, a professor from Hokkaido University, for example, pointed out the Chinese hatred to

Japan could be traced back to the 1910s as Japan was seeking a full monopoly over China by requesting "the 21 items" to the Chinese government³¹.

Despite the sensitive understanding of the Chinese genuine anti-Japanese sentiments, the violence revealed in the protests is unacceptable for this group of elites. The *Asahi Shimbun*, which has been portrayed as left and pro-China, in its April 18 editorial criticized the Chinese anti-Japanese demonstrations in terms of using violence. It pointed out that the slogan of "Aiguo Wuzui" (you are not sin if you are patriotic), which were widely promoted during the demonstrations as an excuse for using violence against Japanese businesses in China, was absolutely unacceptable³². In addition, some intellectuals also criticized the promotion of violence against Japan on the internet. One of the writers claimed, such websites have been spreading the hatred against Japan among the Chinese youths, although he personally shares the view that Japan must not deny its war responsibility.³³

FIGURE 2. Japanese general public's perception of the influence of history education on the Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments



Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 April 2005, Morning Edition, Page 3.

3.3. View of General Public

The Japanese general public's perception on Chinese anti-Japanese protests also exhibits the character of ambivalence. On the one hand, it shows deep understanding on that the past war memories and the current controversies on history constitute a deep and dark shadow on the Chinese images of Japan, which is extremely sensitive and easily being stimulated. This perception can be evidenced by the poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* soon after the Asia Soccer Cup Tournament protests in 2004. According to this poll, when asked if you think Koizumi's visits of Yasukuni Shrine has any influences on the outbreak of Chinese anti-Japanese protests, nearly 82 percent of those polled responded "yes", with only 14 percent chose "no"³⁴ (See Figure 1).

On the other hand, however, the majority of Japanese public also demonstrates that they are also likely to believe that the anti-Japanese or patriotic education launched by Chinese communist regime is the origin of the Chinese anti-Japanese protests. This orientation was clearly

revealed in the opinion poll done by the *Asahi Shimbun* immediately after the Chinese protests in April 2005. According to this survey, around 83 percent of those polled agree that the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in China are influenced by the mode of Chinese history education, with only 12 % responded "no" or "little influence" (See Figure 2). In addition, 71 percent of the respondents rebuffed Chinese President Hu Jingtao's demand to Koizumi that Japan needs to back up its reflection on history and its apology with action³⁵.

4. Conclusion

By briefly examining Japan's view of Chinese anti-Japanese protests, this paper has presented two major arguments. These arguments concern, respectively, the content of Japan's perception of Chinese anti-Japanese protests, and the major reasons behind those perceptions.

Through the brief analysis, this article has demonstrated the perceptual sophisti-

cation of Japan's image of Chinese anti-Japanese protests. It showed that both positive and negative interpretations, namely the negative image of the "consequence of patriotic education" and the positive image of "genuine anger against Japan's ambiguous attitudes on history", coexist in the Japanese image of the Chinese anti-Japanese protests in various level. In other words, these two types of interpretations can be most commonly found in the Japanese interpretation of Chinese protests against Japan. However, the rational behind those interpretations is far more complicated, which also shows Japan's ambivalence attitude towards China's anti-Japanese sentiments.

From the discourse of patriotic school, we will find that the distrust on China's treatment of history plays an important role in supporting their arguments. They tend to contend that the Chinese protests against Japan are not a spontaneously act and are influenced by Beijing's anti-Japanese education or patriotic education. However, the implicit logic behind this interpretation is divided. This paper has demonstrated that a subtle distinction within this school. While the ring wing seized the opportunity provided by China's inconsistent description on history for their own purpose of denying Japan's war responsibility, other intellectuals focused on China's patriotic education may spread the anti-Japanese sentiments and an inaccurate image of contemporary Japan.

On the other hand, the interpretation of victim school revealed their reflection on Japan's past war history and their empathies towards general anger among the Chinese masses. They particularly stressed

that it is Japan's ambiguous attitude on history that provoked Chinese anger against Japan. However, like Whiting states, anti-Japanese protests in China would be impossible to occur "without someone in authority learning of the preparations in advance; therefore, if it had not been prevented, it must have been acquiesced in, if not quietly encouraged".³⁶ The victim school is not able to totally rule out the possible influence of patriotic education and the role of authoritative government on Chinese education and media. The primary distinction of their view compared with the patriotic school is not the difference of viewpoints, but the sequence of explanation.

Despite the above mentioned differences, consensus has been reached on the issue of violence in which both schools rejected to recognize the slogan of "*Aiguo Wuzui*", which was widely spread during the Chinese anti-Japanese protests. It showed that both schools objected the mentality of using violence for solving disputes on historical interpretation. The significant shift of negative image of China among Japanese general public could be portrayed as the consequence provoked by the violent behaviors revealed during the protests.

Understanding Japan's perception of Chinese protests is not only a process of knowing the "other", but also the "self". Sino-Japanese mutual understanding and cross national communication will be extremely important in avoiding misperception, reducing enmity as well as in reaching consensus in various disputes. It would be too late if xenophobia sentiment and extreme nationalism replace rational

debate in both societies when the next crisis breakout.

Notes

- 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Regional Diplomacy", in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2004*. 2004, p.46.
- 2 Asahi Shimbun, "Chugoku no insho Sakka 61 %, ajia sakka cup sodo. Asahi Shimbun Yoron Chosa", 1 September 2004, Morning Edition, Page 3.
- 3 According to the polls done by Prime Minister Office in 2004, 58.2 % of those polled chose unfavorable option on their image to China, which is 10.2 % increase compared to the poll took in 2003. It also showed that the young generation's (20-29 years old) image of China dropped the most. For detail, see 'Gaiko ni kansuru yoron chosa', accessed on 13 November 2005, 13:15 JST. Available at: <http://www.8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-gaikou/index.html>. For the survey conducted by Japan Research Center, it shows that around 57 % of those polled in Japan dislike China, with only 16 % chose the "favorable" option. If we compared this data with the similar survey conducted by Kyoto News Agency in 2002, it shows that the unfavorable rate increased by 14 % and the favorable rate dropped by 39 %. For detail, see 'Nicchu kankei ni tsuite no kokusai hikaku yoron chosa kekka', accessed on 26 October 2005, 19:43 JST. Available at: <http://www.nrc.co.jp/rep/rep20050715.html>
- 4 For example, see "Ribei chuanmei yu fanri biaoqian", accessed on 15 November 2005, 14:45 JST. Available at <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2005/2005-11-05/8/647513.shtml>; "Pandian zhongri guanxi 2005: cong jinguo shenshe dao zhongguo weixierun", accessed on 24 January 2005, 16:31, JST. Available at <http://big5.chinabroadcast.cn/gate/big5/gb.chinabroadcast.cn/8606/2005/12/26/107@835187-2.htm>
- 5 For the relevant literature in this field: see Herold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" in James N. Rosenau (ed). *International Politics and Foreign Policy, A Reader in Research and Theory*, (Free Press) 1969; Robert Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: (Princeton University Press) 1975; James F. Voss and Ellen Dorsey, "Perception and International Relations: An Overview" in Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson (ed). *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. (Boulder: Westview Press) 1992, pp.3-30.
- 6 The study of this paper is drawn from four major sources: 1) the articles that include the content of official statements reported by the newspapers; 2) the articles published on the current affair journals and newspapers that comment the anti-Japanese protests, such as *Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *Ronza*, *Sekai-shuho*, *Shokun*, *Voice*, *Chuokoron*, *Seiron*; 3) the articles published on the relatively academic publications that contain Japan's view of Chinese anti-Japanese protests, such as *Gaiko Forum* and *East Asia*; 4) the books that contain Japan's image of Chinese anti-Japanese protests.
- 7 Asahi.com, 'Ajia kappu sakkahai rokotsu na hannichi PK gaisu to daikansei', accessed on 24 October 2005, 13:40 JST. Available at <http://www.asahi.com/sports/soccer-japan/asia-cup2004/TKY200407310310.html>
- 8 Asahi.com, 'Sakka ajiahai hannichi kanjou mondai de Chugoku gawa ni zensho moshiire', accessed on 24 October 2005, 14:02 JST. Available at <http://www.asahi.com/sports/soccer-japan/asia-cup2004/TKY200408040205.html>
- 9 Asahi Shimbun. 'Sharyo hason pekin koankyoku shazai', 9 August 2004, Night edition, Page 1.
- 10 Asahi.com, 'Amari sawagazu ni, Koizumi shusho, Hannichi sapota mondai de', accessed on 24 October 2005, 13:54 JST. Available at <http://www.asahi.com/sports/soccer-japan/asia-cup2004/TKY200408090241.html>
- 11 This is evidenced directly by the author as I was in Shanghai on 16th April 2005 when the anti-Japanese demonstrations took place. Most slogans showed during the protests were

- about those themes.
- 12 Asahi Shimbun, “Chugoku pekin demo hannichi shukai pekin”, 9 April, Morning edition, Page 1; “Nihon daishikan doseki hannichi demo, ichi mannin”, 10 April 2004, Morning edition, Page 1; “Hannichi kodo, Chugoku kakuchi ni tobihi”, 11 April 2004, Morning edition, Page 1.
- 13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Kokintou Chugoku shusseki chunichi kankei ni tsuite juyo na danwa”, accessed on 3 November 2005, 14:24 JST. Available at <http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/zrgx/t192958.htm>
- 14 Asahi Shimbun, “Chugoku no hannichi gasu ga jumanshiteiru”, 7 April 2005, Editorial, Morning edition, Page 1.
- 15 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Chugoku no hannichi tenji minaoshi motomeru”, 5 March 2005, Morning Edition, Page 4.
- 16 Abe Shinzo and Okazaki Hisahiko, “Chugoku no yokokuruma wo yurushitenarumonoka”, *Shokun*, August 2005, pp.37-44.
- 17 Sasae Kenichiro, “Bandon kaigi 50 shunen no fushime ni - Nihon no taiajia afurika gaiko”, *Gaigo Forum*, July 2005, pp.68-71.
- 18 For relevant literature on the definition of the intermediate elites, see James Rosenau. *National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1963, p.13; Robert Putman, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall) 1975, p.11; Jianwei Wang, *Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press) 2000, p. 31.
- 19 For detail, see editorial of Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 April, 14 April and 17 April 2005.
- 20 For such point of view, see Fujino Akira, “Chugoku wo yurugasu nomin bodo no rensa”, *Chuokoron*, July 2005, pp.33-41; Nishimura Koyu, “Owarinaki Chugoku no hannichi, Sakka Ajia Cup, Hageshi buyingu no haikai”, *Seiron*, October 2004, pp.66-75.
- 21 Sakaeda Kyoko. “Shichi shichi rokokyo mo kokuchi kinenbi”, *Shokun*, September 2004, pp.118-126.
- 22 For example, see Ito Tadashi. “Chugoku seifu ga hannichi bodo wo nohoshi ni shiteita hontonoriyu”, *Seiron*, June 2005, pp.58-66; Mizutani Naoko. “Inpei sareta ‘aikoku boto’ no hanzai”, *Shokun*, September 2005, pp.76-81.
- 23 Endo Homare. “Kokinto mo te wo yaku ‘fengqing’ no jittai”, *Chuokoron*, August 2005, pp.94-101.
- 24 For example, see Komori Yoshihisa, “Chugoku ni rekishi o tsukitsukeyo”, *Shokun*, February 2005, pp.24-32; Nakanishi Terumasa, “Chugoku niwa ‘rekishiryoku’ de shobu seyo”, *Shokun*, June 2005, pp.22-32; Nakanishi Terumasa, “‘Boryaku senden kosaku’ toiu mei no Chugoku gaiko ni uchikatsu tame no deigen”, *Seiron*, July 2005, pp. 50-62.
- 25 For example, Kojima Tomoyuki, a Japanese China specialist from Keio University also stressed the vital role of patriotic education on Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments when he was interviewed by the Asahi Shimbun. For details, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 31st August 2004; For other articles, for example: Shida Kenzo. “Chugoku hannichi saito ni miru, nashunarizumu no kikensei”, *Sekai Shuho*. 12 October 2004, pp.60-61; Hamamoto Ryoichi, “Aikokushugi wa minshu ni hukaku nezuida”, *Chuokoron*, September 2004, pp.58-65.; Mizutani Naoko. *Hannichi kaibo - Hizunda Chugoku no aikoku*. (Bungeishuju) 2005.
- 26 Asahi Shimbun. “Gazu ga juman shite yiru”, 7. April 2005, Page 3, Morning edition.
- 27 Omori Kazuo. “‘Rekishi ninshiki’ga habamu nicchu koryu”, *Ronza*, July 2005, pp. 93-101.
- 28 Kobayashi Yotaro. “Aratana jidai no nichukankei o kizuku tameni”, *Gaigo Forum*. November 2005, pp.65-69.
- 29 Tabata Mitsunaga, “Zasshi ga aoru hanchugoku mudo”, *Ronza*, October 2004, pp.72-81.
- 30 Amako Satoshi, “Ikitsumaruru nicchu kankei wo do dakai suru ka”, March 2005, *East Asia*, pp. 8-19.
- 31 Kawashima Shin, “Rekishi no naka no

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- nicchu kankei”, *Gaiko Forum*, July 2005, pp.22–27.
- 32 Asahi Shimbun, “Aikoku muzayī no ayausa”, 18 April 2005, Editorial, Morning Edition, Page 3.
- 33 Shita Kenzo, “Chugoku hannichi saito ni miru, nashunarizumu no kikensei”, *Sekai Shuho*. October 2004, pp.60–61.
- 34 Asahi Shimbun, “Chugoku no insho Sakka 61 %, sakka ajia cup sodo”, Asahi Shimbun Yoron Chosa. 1 September 2004, Morning Edition, Page 3.
- 35 Asahi Shimbun, “Asahi shimbun kinkyū yoron chosa”, 25 April 2005, Morning Edition, Page 3.
- 36 Allen Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1989, p.6.